Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

21 February 2024 ([\*](#Footnote*))

(Agriculture – Protected designation of origin – Opposition proceedings – Registration of the name ‘Χαλλούμι’ (Halloumi)/‘Hellim’ (PDO) – Article 52(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 – Obligation to state reasons – Length of the administrative procedure – Scope of the review carried out by the Commission of the application for registration – Principle of sound administration)

In Case T‑361/21,

**Papouis Dairies Ltd,** established in Nicosia (Cyprus), and the other applicants listed in the Annex, ([1](#Footnote1)) represented by N. Korogiannakis, lawyer,

applicants,

v

**European Commission,** represented by M. Konstantinidis, B. Hofstötter and B. Rechena, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

**Republic of Cyprus,** represented by E. Zachariadou, I. Neophytou, E. Symeonidou and M. Marinou, acting as Agents, and by T. Georgopoulos, lawyer,

intervener,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of O. Porchia, President, L. Madise (Rapporteur) and P. Nihoul, Judges,

Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 6 June 2023,

gives the following

**Judgment**

1        By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Papouis Dairies Ltd and the other legal persons listed in the Annex, seek annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/591 of 12 April 2021 entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (‘Χαλλούμι’ (Halloumi)/‘Hellim’ (PDO)) (OJ 2021 L 125, p. 42) (‘the contested regulation’).

I.      **Background to the dispute**

2        Halloumi is a Cypriot cheese with a characteristic smell and taste. It is made from sheep’s or goat’s milk, or a mixture thereof, with or without cow’s milk. It has the property of not melting at high temperatures.

3        On 5 April 2012, several Cypriot companies and organisations operating in the cheese production sector lodged an application with the Cypriot authorities to register (‘Χαλλούμι’ (Halloumi)/‘Hellim’ (‘the name at issue’) as a protected designation of origin (PDO). That application was based on the Cypriot production standard CYS 94 of 1985 (‘the 1985 standard’) which provides, inter alia, that halloumi may be produced from sheep’s or goat’s milk, or a mixture thereof, with or without cow’s milk. The application requested that that standard be interpreted as requiring halloumi producers to use more than 50% sheep’s or goat’s milk. In other words, when cow’s milk is used in addition to sheep’s or goat’s milk or a mixture thereof, the proportion of cow’s milk must not be greater than the proportion of sheep’s or goat’s milk or the mixture thereof.

4        The application for registration was published on 30 November 2012 in the *Episimi Efimerida tis Kypriakis Dimokratias* (Official Journal of the Republic of Cyprus).

5        On 14 November 2013, the Cypriot authorities met with the objecting entities, which did not result in an agreement.

6        On 9 July 2014, the Minister for Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment of the Republic of Cyprus dismissed the objections put forward and, on the same day, published the application for registration in the *Episimi Efimerida tis Kypriakis Dimokratias*.

7        On 17 July 2014, pursuant to Article 49(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 2012 L 343, p. 1), the Cypriot authorities lodged application CY/PDO/0005/01243 with the European Commission for registration of the name at issue as a PDO, specifying that the milk composition required in the specification referred to a predominance of sheep’s or goat’s milk or a mixture of the two.

8        The application for registration was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 28 July 2015 (OJ 2015 C 246, p. 9).

9        Following the publication of the application for registration, the Commission received 17 notices of opposition between 21 October 2015 and 3 November 2015, which it forwarded to the Republic of Cyprus, except for the notice lodged by the Republic of Finland, which was lodged after the deadline, and those lodged by natural persons or legal entities residing or established in Cyprus. Pursuant to Article 51(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, nine of those notices of opposition were followed by reasoned statements of opposition, which the Commission received between 15 December 2015 and 24 December 2015.

10      After having examined the admissibility of those reasoned statements of opposition, the Commission invited all the interested parties, in accordance with Article 51(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012, to engage in appropriate consultations with a view to reaching an agreement. The Republic of Cyprus held consultations with the nine parties who had lodged admissible reasoned statements of opposition. Those consultations did not, however, result in any agreement.

11      The information on those consultations was then forwarded to the Commission, which began scrutinising the oppositions as from September 2016.

12      On 12 April 2021, the Commission adopted the contested regulation.

II.    **Facts subsequent to the adoption of the contested regulation**

13      By judgment of 14 June 2021 (‘the judgment of 14 June 2021’), the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court, Cyprus) overturned certain acts adopted by the Cypriot authorities as part of the national procedure preceding the lodging of the application for registration with the Commission.

14      Subsequently to the registration of the name at issue, a standard amendment was made to the specification of that name in accordance with Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012 (‘the first standard amendment to the specification’), which was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 24 October 2022 (OJ 2022 C 407, p. 11).

15      A further standard amendment was made to the specification of the name at issue in accordance with Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012 (‘the second standard amendment to the specification’), which was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 13 February 2023 (OJ 2023 C 53, p. 5).

16      A further standard amendment was made to the specification of the name at issue in accordance with Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012 (‘the third standard amendment to the specification’), which was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 10 May 2023 (OJ 2023 C 165, p. 14).

III. **Forms of order sought**

17      The applicants claim that the Court should:

–        annul the contested regulation, ‘including and as modified’ by the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

18      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the requests to modify the application as inadmissible;

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicants to pay the costs.

19      The Republic of Cyprus contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicants to pay the costs.

IV.    **Law**

A.      **Consideration of the requests to modify the application**

20      On the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicants have lodged three successive requests to modify their application further to the publication of the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification.

21      The Commission submits that the requests for modification lodged by the applicants are inadmissible.

22      Article 86(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that, where a measure the annulment of which is sought is replaced or amended by another measure with the same subject matter, the applicant may, before the oral part of the procedure is closed, or before the decision of the General Court to rule without an oral part of the procedure, modify the application to take account of that new factor.

23      As an exception to the principle of unalterability of proceedings, Article 86 must be interpreted strictly (judgment of 20 September 2018, *Spain* v *Commission*, C‑114/17 P, EU:C:2018:753, paragraph 54).

24      Moreover, it should be noted that lodging a procedural document during proceedings before the General Court with a view to modifying the application is equivalent to bringing an action for annulment by means of an application. Consequently, the settled case-law setting out the requirements as to the form and content of such an action applies by analogy (see judgment of 16 June 2021, *Lucaccioni* v *Commission*, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 70 (not published) and the case-law cited).

25      For the purposes of examining the admissibility of the requests to modify the application, regard should be had to the provisions applicable to amendments to the specification of a registered name.

26      Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, in the version thereof applicable on the date of adoption of the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification, provides as follows:

‘Amendments to a product specification shall be classified into two categories as regards their importance: Union amendments, requiring an opposition procedure at the Union level, and standard amendments to be dealt with at Member State or third country level.

…

Union amendments shall be approved by the Commission. …

Standard amendments shall be approved and made public by the Member State in whose territory the geographical area of the product concerned is located and communicated to the Commission. …’

27      Article 6b of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 664/2014 of 18 December 2013 supplementing Regulation [No 1151/2012] with regard to the establishment of the Union symbols for protected designations of origin, protected geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed and with regard to certain rules on sourcing, certain procedural rules and certain additional transitional rules (OJ 2014 L 179, p. 17), in the version thereof applicable on the date of adoption of the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification, provides as follows:

‘…

2. Where the Member State considers that the requirements of Regulation […] No 1151/2012 and of the provisions adopted pursuant to that Regulation are met, it may approve the standard amendment. The approval decision shall include the amended consolidated product specification and, where relevant, the amended consolidated single document or shall include the electronic reference to the published version of the consolidated product specification and, where relevant, single document.

… The Member State shall communicate approved standard amendments to the Commission not later than [one] month following the date on which the national approval decision was made public. The Member State shall communicate, without undue delay, to the Commission any final and unappealable national judgments annulling a decision approving a standard amendment.

…

5. In the event that the standard amendment implies an amendment of the single document, the Commission shall publish the description of the standard amendment and the amended single document in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, C series, within [three] months from the date on which it has received the communication of that standard amendment.

…

The national authority referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 … that communicated a standard amendment to the Commission shall remain responsible for its content.’

28      As observed by the Commission, it follows from those provisions that the national authorities have the power to approve standard amendments to the specification of a registered name, after having verified that those amendments comply with the applicable provisions.

29      Moreover, under Article 263 TFEU the EU Courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority (see order of 28 February 2017, *NF* v *European Council*, T‑192/16, EU:T:2017:128, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

30      It follows that the EU Courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure by which the national authorities approved a standard amendment to the specification of a registered name.

31      That conclusion is not negated by the fact that where, as in the present case, the standard amendments entail an amendment of the single document, they entail publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

32      Under Article 6b of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 cited in paragraph 27 above, when a standard amendment is communicated to it, the Commission is under an obligation to ensure publication as provided for therein. In so doing, the Commission does not review the content of the standard amendments and does not exercise any decision-making power in proceeding with publication of those standard amendments. Article 6b(5) of Delegated Regulation No 664/2014 provides in that regard that the national authorities remain responsible for the content of the standard amendment. It is, moreover, for the national authorities to verify that the amendments to the specification lodged with them comply with the applicable provisions, including, inter alia, ensuring that those amendments constitute standard amendments within the meaning of Article 53(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012. Hence the applicants may not claim that, in publishing the standard amendments to the specification of the name at issue, the Commission adopted a decision that may be challenged before the EU Courts, by which it itself categorised those amendments as standard amendments in view of their content. Thus, the Commission may not be regarded as being the party that adopted, or even co-adopted, the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification.

33      It follows from the foregoing that the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification. It also follows from the statements in paragraph 24 above that the requests for modification of the application, which are procedural documents equivalent to the bringing of an action for annulment by means of an application, are also subject to the rules on jurisdiction and admissibility applicable to those actions. As a result, the applicants’ requests for modification of the application, by which they ask the Court to rule on the lawfulness of measures not coming within its jurisdiction, are, for that reason, inadmissible.

34      Consequently, the forms of order seeking annulment must be examined solely in the light of the contested regulation and the pleas directed at it, without taking account of the content of the first, second and third standard amendments to the specification and the pleas directed at those amendments, which it is accordingly not necessary to examine.

B.      **Substance**

35      The applicants put forward five pleas in law in support of their action alleging, in essence: (i) failure by the Commission to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration; (ii) the presence of irregularities vitiating the procedure by which the contested regulation was adopted; (iii) excessive length of the registration procedure; (iv) insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation; and (v) unlawfulness of the contested regulation in the light of the inferences to be drawn from the national judicial proceedings that led to the judgment of 14 June 2021. It is appropriate to begin by examining the fourth plea in law put forward by the applicants, followed by the second and third pleas and, lastly, the first and fifth pleas.

1.      ***The** **plea** **alleging an** **insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation***

36      The applicants submit that the statement of reasons for the contested regulation does not satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 296 TFEU, which infringes their right to an effective remedy and prevents the EU Courts from carrying out a proper judicial review.

37      The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, maintains that the plea is unfounded.

38      According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure in question and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted that measure, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to carry out its review. The requirement to state reasons must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 28 May 2020, *Agrochem-Maks* v *Commission*, T‑574/18, EU:T:2020:226, paragraph 59 (not published) and the case-law cited).

39      Furthermore, in the case of a measure of general application, the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating the overall situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve, on the other (judgment of 3 July 1985, *Abrias and Others* v *Commission*, 3/83, EU:C:1985:283, paragraph 30).

40      In the present case, the contested regulation refers to the difference stages of the procedure that occurred following the publication of the application for registration in the *Official Journal of the European Union* and the principal arguments put forward by the parties who lodged reasoned statements of opposition. The contested regulation sets out in detail the reasons why the Commission considered that those arguments were unfounded and that the name at issue satisfies the requirements of a PDO under Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012.

41      Next, the contested regulation refers to the particular situation of the island of Cyprus and the provisions laid down so that the entire territory of the island can be included in the geographical area covered by the PDO. That regulation further refers to the principle of territoriality governing intellectual property rights as regards the territorial scope of the protection conferred by the PDO, underscores the need to take the other relevant provisions of EU law into consideration for marketing the product concerned by the application for registration and the lack of grounds justifying the grant of a transitional period to certain third-country producers.

42      The contested regulation also includes data relating to halloumi production in Cyprus, refers to the question of commercial trade marks relating to that product, addresses the opposition lodged by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, sets out the reasons why the Commission considers that the name at issue has not become generic, refers to the transitional period granted by the Cypriot authorities to those operators fulfilling the conditions laid down in Article 15(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012 and states the conditions for its entry into force.

43      The contested regulation concludes that the name should be registered and reiterates that the measures for which it provides comply with the opinion of the Agricultural Product Quality Policy Committee.

44      Thus, the contested regulation discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Commission in finding that the registration of the name at issue as a PDO was justified. That statement of reasons enables the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons on which the Commission based itself and the Court to carry out its review of those reasons. Thus, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the contested regulation is accompanied by a sufficient statement of reasons, a fortiori because it comes within the category of measures of general application for which the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating the overall situation which led to its adoption and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve.

45      It follows from the foregoing that the contested regulation satisfies the requirements laid down in Article 296 TFEU.

46      The arguments submitted by the applicants concerning certain specific points of the statement of reasons for the contested regulation are not such as to call this finding into question.

47      Although the applicants submit more specifically that the contested regulation does not refer sufficiently specifically to the conditions in which the consultations took place with persons having signalled their opposition to the application for registration, including FFF Fine Foods Pty Ltd, the Court finds that the contested regulation contains a sufficient statement of reasons on this point.

48      Indeed, in recital 4, the contested regulation identifies the authorities and bodies who lodged reasoned statements of opposition found by the Commission to be admissible, including that of FFF Fine Foods. Next, it is stated that the parties concerned were invited to engage in appropriate consultations and that consultations were conducted between the Republic of Cyprus and the nine parties having lodged an admissible statement of opposition. It is stated that no agreement could be reached with the parties who had lodged reasoned statements of opposition. Lastly, in recital 23 of the contested regulation, it is stated that the Commission examined the arguments set out in the reasoned statements of opposition, taking account of the results of the consultations that took place with the persons having lodged reasoned statements of opposition.

49      Thus, the contested regulation recounts with sufficient precision the conduct and results of the opposition procedure undertaken on the basis of Article 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012. Contrary to what the applicants assert, it was not necessary that the contested regulation specify the conditions in which each of the consultations with the parties opposed to the application for registration was conducted. Indeed, such a detailed statement of reasons on that particular point was not required in order to afford an understanding of the objectives pursued by the contested regulation or the reasons that led to its adoption.

50      The applicants add that the statement of reasons for the contested regulation is insufficient in that it does not state that a substantial share of the products legally marketed prior to registration of the name at issue does not comply with the requirements of the specification. However, even if that were true, since such a fact would in any event be unrelated to the reasons why the Commission considered that the application for registration was well founded and that the name at issue should be registered, it was not necessary to include a statement to that effect in the contested regulation.

51      The applicants add that the contested regulation does not give any explanation for the exceptional length of the procedure following which it was adopted. However, the obligation to provide a statement of reasons under Article 296 TFEU does not require the Commission to set out in detail the different stages of the process leading to the adoption of its decisions and any difficulties it may have encountered. Nor does such information seem necessary for a proper understanding of the reasoning that led to the adoption of the measure in question.

52      Lastly, the applicants complain that, in the defence, the Commission relies on ‘further reasoning’ put forward by the Republic of Cyprus. They argue that any ‘further reasoning’ other than that included in the application dossier published in the *Episimi Efimerida tis Kypriakis Dimokratias*, then the *Official Journal of the European Union*, ought to have been included in the statement of reasons for the contested regulation. They add that such a document, if produced for the first time in the course of the present proceedings, at the stage of the rejoinder, constitutes inadmissible evidence under Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure.

53      Such a complaint is ineffective, however, in support of the plea alleging an insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation. Even if, as the applicants allege, the Commission did rely in its defence on additional information in order to justify the well-foundedness of the contested regulation, that fact in itself has no bearing on compliance with the obligation to provide a statement of reasons, which must be assessed in the light of the information existing on the date when the action is lodged against the contested measure (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2011, *Evropaïki Dynamiki* v *EIB*, T‑461/08, EU:T:2011:494, paragraph 109 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it follows from the finding in paragraph 45 above that the statement of reasons for the contested regulation, as evidenced by that regulation, satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 296 TFEU.

54      It is, moreover, common ground that the Commission did not adduce any additional evidence at the stage of the rejoinder. Therefore, the applicants may not claim that the Commission adduced evidence which is inadmissible under Article 85 of the Rules of Procedure.

55      Nor may the applicants claim that the Commission relied on new elements in the course of the proceedings. Indeed, it is apparent from the Commission’s written pleadings that the ‘further reasoning’ referred to by it is among the information provided to it as part of the communication of the results of the consultations organised in the context of the opposition procedure conducted at EU level, to which reference is made in recital 23 of the contested regulation.

56      It follows from the foregoing that the plea in law alleging an insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation must be rejected.

2.      ***The plea alleging irregularities vitiating the procedure by which the contested regulation was adopted***

57      By their second plea, the applicants claim, in essence, that the contested regulation was adopted on the basis of an irregular procedure. That plea is divided into two parts, by which the applicants criticise the conditions in which the national opposition procedure, on the one hand, and the opposition procedure conducted at EU level, on the other, were run.

(a)    ***The national opposition procedure***

58      The applicants submit that the national opposition procedure conducted pursuant to Article 49(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012 was irregular, as the persons concerned were not given a reasonable time period in which to present their opposition, the consultations that were to take place with the persons concerned were not conducted properly and the objections put forward by them were not examined correctly.

59      The applicants argue that, under Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012, the Commission was required to verify compliance with the essential procedural requirements imposed thereby on the Member State and the lawfulness of the national opposition procedure.

60      The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, submits that that part of the applicants’ line of argument cannot be upheld.

61      Article 10 of Regulation No 1151/2012, in the version thereof applicable to the present dispute, provides as follows:

‘1. A reasoned statement of opposition as referred to in Article 51(2) shall be admissible only if it is received by the Commission within the time limit set out in that paragraph and if it:

(a)      …

(b)      …

(c)      shows that the registration of the name proposed would jeopardise the existence of an entirely or partly identical name or of a trade mark or the existence of products which have been legally on the market for at least five years preceding the date of the publication provided for in point (a) of Article 50(2) …’.

62      Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 provides as follows:

‘1. Applications for registration of names under the quality schemes referred to in Article 48 may only be submitted by groups who work with the products with the name to be registered. …

2. Where the application under the scheme set out in Title II relates to a geographical area in a Member State …, the application shall be addressed to the authorities of that Member State.

The Member State shall scrutinise the application by appropriate means in order to check that it is justified and meets the conditions of the respective scheme.

3. As part of the scrutiny referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of this Article, the Member State shall initiate a national opposition procedure that ensures adequate publication of the application and that provides for a reasonable period within which any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established or resident on its territory may lodge an opposition to the application.

The Member State shall examine the admissibility of oppositions received under the scheme set out in Title II in the light of the criteria referred to in Article 10(1) …

4. If, after assessment of any opposition received, the Member State considers that the requirements of this Regulation are met, it may take a favourable decision and lodge an application dossier with the Commission. It shall in such case inform the Commission of admissible oppositions received from a natural or legal person that [has] legally marketed the products in question, using the names concerned continuously for at least five years preceding the date of the publication referred to in paragraph 3.

The Member State shall ensure that its favourable decision is made public and that any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest has an opportunity to appeal.

…

5. Where the application under the scheme set out in Title II relates to a geographical area in a third country …, the application shall be lodged with the Commission, either directly or via the authorities of the third country concerned.’

63      Article 50(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, in the version thereof applicable to the present dispute provides as follows:

‘The Commission shall scrutinise by appropriate means any application that it receives pursuant to Article 49, in order to check that it is justified and that it meets the conditions of the respective scheme. …’

64      It should be borne in mind that Regulation No 1151/2012 creates a system of division of powers between the Member State concerned and the Commission in the sense that the decision to register a name as a PDO may be taken by the Commission only if that Member State has lodged with it an application for that purpose and that such an application may be made only if that Member State has checked that it was justified. Moreover, given the decision-making powers falling to the national authorities in that system of division of powers, it is for the national courts alone to rule on the lawfulness of measures taken by those authorities, such as those relating to applications for registration of a name, which are a necessary stage in the procedure for adopting an EU measure. It follows that it is for the national courts to recognise irregularities potentially vitiating a national measure by making, if necessary, a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union, under the same terms of review as those applicable to any final measure which, when adopted by the same national authority, is liable to affect adversely a third party (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2020, *GAEC Jeanningros*, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, paragraphs 23 to 26 and the case-law cited).

65      It follows from the foregoing that the EU Courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of measures taken by national authorities, particularly those adopted in the course of the national opposition procedure. Consequently, the applicants may not challenge before the General Court the time period granted by the Cypriot authorities to the persons concerned to lodge their opposition to an application for registration or the detailed rules by which the oppositions were examined by the Cypriot authorities.

66      Moreover, under Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 62 above, the national opposition procedure is conducted at the initiative of and under the control of the Member State concerned, which must also ensure that persons having a legitimate interest have an opportunity to appeal. There is nothing in Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012, relied on by the applicants, or any other provision of that regulation providing that the Commission, which intervenes only at a later stage of the procedure once the application for registration has been forwarded to it, is responsible for reviewing the lawfulness of the national opposition procedure. It would, moreover, be contrary to the system of division of powers introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012, under which the authorities of the Member State concerned have autonomous decision-making power during the national phase of the registration procedure, for the Commission to exercise such a power of review. Consequently, the applicants’ argument to the effect that the Commission failed to carry out a proper review of the regularity of the national opposition procedure cannot be upheld.

67      Moreover, given that it follows from the foregoing that the Commission was not required to verify the lawfulness of the national opposition procedure, the fact that the contested regulation states, as a supplementary ground, that an ‘exhaustive’ national opposition procedure was carried out at national level has, in any event, no bearing on the lawfulness of the contested regulation.

(b)    ***The opposition procedure conducted at EU level***

68      The applicants dispute the regularity of the opposition procedure conducted at EU level, in which inter alia FFF Fine Foods, a company established in a third country, took part.

69      The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, submits that that part of the applicants’ line of argument cannot be upheld.

70      Article 51 of Regulation No 1151/2012, in the version thereof applicable to the present dispute, provides as follows:

‘1. Within three months from the date of publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, the authorities of a Member State or of a third country, or a natural or legal person having a legitimate interest and established in a third country may lodge a notice of opposition with the Commission.

Any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest, established or resident in a Member State other than that from which the application was submitted, may lodge a notice of opposition with the Member State in which it is established within a time limit permitting an opposition to be lodged pursuant to the first subparagraph.

…

The Commission shall forward the notice of opposition to the authority or body that lodged the application without delay.

2. If a notice of opposition is lodged with the Commission and is followed within two months by a reasoned statement of opposition, the Commission shall check the admissibility of this reasoned statement of opposition.

3. Within two months after the receipt of an admissible reasoned statement of opposition, the Commission shall invite the authority or person that lodged the opposition and the authority or body that lodged the application to engage in appropriate consultations for a reasonable period that shall not exceed three months.

The authority or person that lodged the opposition and the authority or body that lodged the application shall start such appropriate consultations without undue delay. They shall provide each other with the relevant information to assess whether the application for registration complies with the conditions of this Regulation. If no agreement is reached, this information shall also be provided to the Commission.

…’

71      Article 52(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012 provides as follows:

‘If the Commission receives an admissible reasoned statement of opposition, it shall, following the appropriate consultations referred to in Article 51(3), and taking into account the results thereof, either:

(a)      …

(b)      if an agreement has not been reached, adopt implementing acts deciding on the registration. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 57(2).’

72      In the first place, the applicants submit that the consultations with FFF Fine Foods were not properly conducted, as they took place with the Cypriot authorities and not with the producers who had lodged the application for registration.

73      That argument must be rejected.

74      Under Article 49(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 62 above, where the application for registration lodged by the group of producers concerned relates to a geographical area in a Member State, it is to be addressed to the authorities of that Member State. Under Article 49(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, it is the authorities of the Member State concerned who lodge the application for registration with the Commission. By contrast, under Article 49(5) of Regulation No 1151/2012, where the application relates to a geographical area in a third country, the application may be lodged directly with the Commission by the group of producers concerned.

75      It follows that, where reference is made in Article 51(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012 to ‘the authority or body’ that lodged the application, the term ‘body’ refers to a group established in a third country that lodged the application for registration directly with the Commission. Since, in the present case, it was the Cypriot authorities who lodged the application dossier with the Commission pursuant to Article 49(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012, under Article 51(3) of that regulation the consultations were to take place between those authorities and the party that lodged the opposition.

76      Consequently, the applicants may not claim that, in the present case, the consultations provided for in Article 51(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012 ought to have been held with the group of producers that lodged the application for registration and not with the Cypriot authorities.

77      In the second place, the applicants submit that the arguments put forward by FFF Fine Foods in its opposition were not examined correctly.

78      That argument is unfounded.

79      Under Article 52(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012, the Commission, before registering a name as a PDO, must take account of the results of the consultation referred to in Article 51(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012, which it did in the present case, as is apparent from recitals 7, 8 and 23 of the contested regulation. However, neither that provision nor any other provision of Regulation No 1151/2012 requires the Commission to check that all of the arguments put forward by the persons who lodged a reasoned statement of opposition were examined in the course of the consultations referred to in Article 51(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012. Similarly, no provision of that regulation requires the Commission to rule expressly on each of the arguments put forward by the persons who lodged a reasoned statement of opposition.

80      Lastly, the applicants claim that the Commission reversed the burden of proof in its examination of the arguments put forward by the parties opposing the application for registration. It is apparent from recital 37 of the contested regulation that the Commission required them to produce proof that the application for registration was not justified, whereas it is, on the contrary, for the parties who lodged the application to demonstrate that it satisfies the conditions laid down in Regulation No 1151/2012.

81      That argument is unfounded.

82      In recital 37 of the contested regulation, the Commission states that it examined the application for registration and did not identify any manifest error. It adds that the persons who signalled their opposition to the application for registration did not submit sufficiently reasoned evidence showing that that application was inherently flawed. It further states that it deemed the evidence submitted by the Republic of Cyprus to be sufficiently convincing to justify the registration of the name at issue. It is thus apparent that the Commission, after having found, at the end of the examination of the application for registration, that that application met the requirements of Regulation No 1151/2012 and was free of manifest errors, checked whether the evidence submitted by the persons having signalled their opposition to that application was such as to call that finding into question. In so doing, it did not reverse the burden of proof.

83      It follows from the foregoing that both parts of the second plea in law put forward by the applicants must be rejected.

3.      ***The plea alleging excessive length of the registration procedure***

84      The applicants submit that the Commission adopted the contested regulation at the end of a procedure that was excessively lengthy and, in so doing, infringed the principle of sound administration.

85      The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, maintains that the plea is unfounded.

86      The principle of acting within a reasonable time, which is incorporated, as an element of the principle of sound administration, in Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be observed in every EU administrative procedure (judgment of 1 July 2008, *Compagnie maritime belge* v *Commission*, T‑276/04, EU:T:2008:237, paragraph 39).

87      Infringement of the ‘reasonable time’ principle does not, as a general rule, warrant annulment of a decision adopted following an administrative procedure. It is only where the elapsing of an excessive period of time is likely to affect the very content of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure that failure to observe the reasonable time principle affects the validity of that procedure (see judgment of 10 October 2019, *ZM and Others* v *Council*, T‑632/18, not published, EU:T:2019:732, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

88      In the present case, the applicants state that the information provided at the time the application for registration was lodged was obsolete on the date the Commission took its decision. In their submission, the production of halloumi increased by 20 000 tonnes between the date when the application was lodged and the date on which the contested regulation was adopted. That claim does not suffice, however, to establish that the content of the contested regulation would have been different if the Commission had adopted it at the end of a shorter procedure. Overall, the applicants have failed to produce any evidence establishing that, if the Commission had taken its decision in a shorter time, it would not have registered the name at issue and, conversely, would have adopted a decision refusing the application for registration.

89      It follows from the foregoing that the length of the registration procedure had no effect on the very content of the contested regulation. Consequently, without it being necessary to determine, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, whether or not the time period at the end of which the Commission took its decision was unreasonable, any disregard there may have been of the reasonable time principle in any event has no bearing on the outcome of the administrative procedure at the end of which the contested regulation was adopted and therefore is not such as to justify annulment of that regulation.

90      The additional arguments put forward by the applicants are not such as to call that finding into question.

91      Although the applicants claim that the length of the procedure was such as to give rise to uncertainty for those persons who produce or market the products concerned by the application for registration and infringe their rights, they at any rate fail to adduce any specific evidence to prove that claim. In that regard, there is nothing establishing that the length of the registration procedure at EU level affected the conditions in which the applicants could produce and market their products. Moreover, as from the date the application for registration was forwarded to the Commission and throughout the time of the procedure, the producers concerned benefited from the transitional period of 10 years granted by the Cypriot authorities on the basis of Article 15(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012.

92      Nor has the infringement of the applicants’ rights due to the length of the procedure been demonstrated in the case of Neomax Sales. The applicants submit in that regard that that company did not satisfy the minimum period of use requirement laid down in Article 49(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012 and was therefore not entitled to lodge an opposition. However, irrespective of the length of the registration procedure, that company, established in a Member State other than the Republic of Cyprus, would not have been able in any event to take part directly in either the national opposition procedure or the opposition procedure conducted at EU level. Moreover, the conditions in which that company could have lodged a notice of opposition with the Member State where it was established pursuant to Article 51(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 would not have been different had the Commission taken its decision in a shorter period.

93      It follows from the foregoing that the plea in law alleging an excessive length of the procedure must be rejected.

4.      ***The plea alleging failure by the Commission to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration***

94      The applicants submit that the Commission failed to scrutinise properly the application for registration, and therefore failed to exercise properly the powers conferred on it by Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012.

95      The Commission and the Republic of Cyprus contend that this plea should be rejected.

96      Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, in the version thereof applicable to the dispute, defines a ‘designation of origin’ as a name which identifies a product ‘originating in a specific place, region or, in exceptional cases, a country’, ‘whose quality or characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors’ and ‘the production steps of which all take place in the defined geographical area’.

97      Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 provides that a PDO must comply with a specification including, inter alia, details establishing the link between the quality or characteristics of the product and the geographical environment referred to in Article 5(1) of that regulation.

98      Recital 58 of Regulation No 1151/2012 states the following:

‘To ensure that registered names of designations of origin and geographical indications and traditional specialities guaranteed meet the conditions laid down by this Regulation, applications should be examined by the national authorities of the Member State concerned, in compliance with minimum common provisions, including a national opposition procedure. The Commission should subsequently scrutinise applications to ensure that there are no manifest errors and that Union law and the interests of stakeholders outside the Member State of application have been taken into account.’

99      It should be borne in mind that the decision to register a name as a PDO may only be taken by the Commission if the Member State concerned has lodged with it an application for that purpose and that such an application may only be made if the Member State has checked that it is justified. That system of division of powers is attributable particularly to the fact that registration assumes that it has been verified that a certain number of conditions, including the one relating to the link between the product and the geographical area in question, have been met, which requires, to a great extent, detailed knowledge of matters particular to the Member State concerned, matters which the competent authorities of that State are best placed to check (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, *Carl Kühne and Others*, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 53; of 2 July 2009, *Bavaria and Bavaria Italia*, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 66; and of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 34). Consequently, the assessment of the abovementioned conditions must be carried out by those authorities before the application for registration is forwarded to the Commission (see, by analogy, judgments of 2 July 2009, *Bavaria and Bavaria Italia*, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 93, and of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 34).

100    It follows that the application for registration, comprising, inter alia, a specification, constitutes a necessary step in the procedure for adopting an EU measure registering a name as a PDO, the Commission having only limited, if any, discretion with regard to that national measure (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, *Carl Kühne and Others*, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 57, and of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 35).

101    It is nevertheless apparent from the overall scheme of Regulation No 1151/2012, in particular recital 58 and Article 50 thereof, as well as the case-law, that the Commission, before registering a name as a PDO, is required to verify, first, that the specification accompanying the application submitted to it contains the information required by Regulation No 1151/2012, in particular Article 7(1) thereof, and whether that information does not appear to contain manifest errors and, second, on the basis of the information contained in the specification, whether the name satisfies the requirements of Article 5(1) of that same regulation (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, *Carl Kühne and Others*, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraph 54; of 2 July 2009, *Bavaria and Bavaria Italia*, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraph 67; and of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 36).

102    It follows from Regulation No 1151/2012 that the national courts are required to ascertain whether the national authorities have observed the conditions for registration laid down in that regulation, whereas the EU Courts must verify whether the Commission has complied with the provisions thereof and, more specifically, whether it has correctly discharged its task of verification and compliance with the conditions laid down therein (see, by analogy, judgments of 6 December 2001, *Carl Kühne and Others*, C‑269/99, EU:C:2001:659, paragraphs 57 to 59; of 2 July 2009, *Bavaria and Bavaria Italia*, C‑343/07, EU:C:2009:415, paragraphs 70 and 71; and of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 37).

103    Those are the principles which must guide the examination of the plea, divided into three parts, alleging that the Commission failed to scrutinise the application for registration properly. In the first place, the Commission endorsed the interpretation of the 1985 standard used in the application for registration, even though it is contrary to the literal interpretation of that standard. In the second place, the Commission failed to note the manifest errors vitiating the application for registration as regards the description of the link between the quality or characteristics of the product and its geographical environment of origin. In the third place, in its scrutiny of the application for registration, the Commission failed to conduct a proper analysis of the halloumi production market and the situation of the undertakings that market that product.

(a)    ***The application for registration is allegedly contrary to the 1985 standard***

104    The applicants submit that the application for registration diverges from the 1985 standard on a number of points. In the applicants’ submission, in failing to note the non-compliance of the application for registration with that standard, despite the fact that it was required to conduct a thorough inspection of the application and verify the key elements thereof, the Commission failed to scrutinise that application in accordance with Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012 and made a manifest error of assessment.

105    That part of the applicants’ line of argument is ineffective, however.

106    Under Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, in order to be registered as a PDO, a name must concern a product identified as originating in a specific place, whose quality or characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to its geographical environment of origin and the production steps of which all take place in the defined geographical area. When it examines the application for registration, the Commission must, inter alia, verify, on the basis of the information in the application, that the link between the quality or characteristics of the product and its geographical environment of origin is established sufficiently.

107    However, as observed by the Commission at the hearing, the provisions of Regulation No 1151/2012 do not require, in order for a name to be registered as a PDO, that the method of obtaining the product described in the specification comply with a prior national production standard, such as the 1985 standard in the present case. In other words, as long as the specification allows for demonstrating that the product whose name is proposed for registration as a PDO fulfils the conditions required by Regulation No 1151/2012, the application for registration can, without infringing the requirements under that regulation, depart from a prior national standard relating to the product in question.

108    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants may not successfully claim that the Commission failed in the present case to note the alleged non-compliance of the application for registration with the 1985 standard.

109    In any event, the applicants’ line of argument alleging that the application for registration is contrary to the 1985 standard must be rejected as unfounded.

110    The applicants further submit that the application for registration is based on a new interpretation of the 1985 standard, to the effect that the proportion of goat’s or sheep’s milk or a mixture thereof must be greater than the proportion of cow’s milk. In the applicants’ submission, that interpretation of the 1985 standard is contrary to the literal interpretation of that standard, which does not preclude cow’s milk from being used in greater quantities than sheep’s or goat’s milk or a mixture of the two for the production of halloumi.

111    It should be noted, however, that the 1985 standard states that halloumi can be produced using sheep’s or goat’s milk, or a mixture of the two, with or without cow’s milk. The application for registration, in particular the single document referred to in Article 8(1)(c) of Regulation No 1151/2012, reproduces, in the description of the raw materials used to make the cheese, the wording of that standard, whilst specifying that ‘the proportion of sheep[’s] or goat’s milk or the mixture thereof must always be greater than the proportion of cow’s milk’.

112    Although the applicants observe that the 1985 standard does not contain any indication as to the proportion of cow’s milk that may be added to the sheep’s or goat’s milk or the mixture of the two for the production of halloumi, that standard does not ipso facto negate the requirement that cow’s milk, if used, may not account for over 50% of the mixture used to make the cheese. Hence, although the application for registration introduces a clarification in relation to the 1985 standard in terms of the composition of the mixture used to make the cheese, it is not ipso facto contrary to that standard.

113    Furthermore, the use of the formulation ‘with or without cow’s milk’ in the wording of the 1985 standard shows that cow’s milk is considered by the authority that adopted that standard to be a purely optional ingredient and as a potential complement to sheep’s milk or goat’s milk. In that light, the choice made in the application for registration to limit to 50% the proportion of cow’s milk used in the mixture used to make the cheese seems consistent with the 1985 standard.

114    The applicants further submit that the application for registration is in contradiction with the 1985 standard as regards the smell and taste of the cheese. The applicants observe in that regard that the application for registration states that fresh halloumi smells strongly of milk/whey and has an aroma and taste of mint, a barnyard smell and a pungent, salty taste and that mature halloumi smells strongly of milk/whey and has an aroma and taste of mint, a barnyard smell and a pungent, salty taste, and is also slightly bitter and very salty, whereas the 1985 standard states that fresh halloumi and mature halloumi have a ‘pleasant and characteristic’ smell and taste. As observed by the Commission, however, although the description of the characteristics of the smell and taste of the product contained in the application for registration is more specific and detailed that the one given in the 1985 standard, it does not deviate from it.

115    Lastly, the applicants claim that the application for registration also deviates from the 1985 standard in its description of the weight of the product. However, although the application for registration states that the weight of halloumi is between 150 and 350 grams, whereas the 1985 standard is silent on the weight of the cheese, the application for registration is, on this point as well, more specific than the 1985 standard without however contradicting it.

116    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants’ line of argument to the effect that the application for registration is at odds with the 1985 standard must be rejected.

(b)    ***Manifest errors vitiating, in the applicants’ submission, the application for registration***

117    The applicants submit that, whilst the Commission is required to carry out its own analysis and detailed scrutiny of the scientific evidence submitted to it, it failed, in the present case, to recognise the obvious errors vitiating the application for registration regarding the description of the link between the quality and characteristics of the product and its geographical origin. In so doing, the Commission failed to comply with its obligation to scrutinise the application under the conditions set out in Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012.

118    In the Commission’s submission, the errors alleged by the applicants would be liable to affect the lawfulness of the contested regulation only if they were such as to establish the lack of a link between the quality and characteristics of the product in question and its Cypriot origin. The Commission submits that, in the present case, the applicants do not allege, still less establish, that those alleged errors mean that the link between the quality or characteristics of the product and its Cypriot origin is not sufficiently established by the information contained in the application for registration. The Commission concludes that that part of the applicants’ line of argument must be rejected as ineffective.

119    This argument cannot be upheld.

120    According to the case-law cited in paragraph 101 above, when it examines an application for registration, the Commission must verify, inter alia, first, that the information in that application is not vitiated by manifest errors and, second, that the name meets the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, including the one relating to the link between the quality or characteristics of the product and its geographical environment of origin. It follows that, even if the Commission considers that the application for registration establishes to the requisite legal standard the presence of such a link, it is not thereby released from its obligation to verify that that application is not vitiated by manifest errors. Consequently, the applicants’ line of argument to the effect that the application for registration is vitiated by manifest errors cannot be rejected as ineffective.

121    The Court must therefore examine the merits of that line of argument.

122    It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 99 and 100 above, the pre-registration checks of a name to be carried out by the Member State concerned before it forwards the application to the Commission call for in-depth knowledge of aspects specific to that Member State. As a result, the Commission has limited discretion, which means that the check carried out by it, in particular of the factual information contained in the application for registration, is confined to manifest errors. It is for the EU Courts to ascertain whether the Commission correctly discharged its task of checking and, in view of the latter’s limited discretion, to make sure that it did not fail to note any manifest errors, if any, in the application for registration.

123    Moreover, as observed by the Commission in recital 36 of the contested regulation, Regulation No 1151/2012 does not require a detailed technical and scientific description of each of the characteristics of the product which is the subject of the application for registration.

124    It is in the light of those principles that it must be examined whether the Commission, in scrutinising the application for registration in the present case, failed to note errors that were manifest in nature.

125    First, the applicants submit that the application for registration contains an incorrect statement in stating that a bacillus, *Lactobacillus cypricasei*, which has been isolated only in Cypriot halloumi, testifies to the link between the island of Cyprus’ microflora and the product.

126    It is apparent from the case file that that statement in the application for registration, reproduced in the contested regulation, was supported by the reference to a scientific study (Lawson et al., 2001), referred to by the Commission in recital 26 of that regulation.

127    In order to demonstrate that that statement is incorrect, the applicants rely on a technical note and scientific studies, annexed to the application, which indicate that the lactobacillus identified in halloumi was also detected in other products not originating from the island of Cyprus, with the result that the presence of that bacillus in halloumi does not prove the existence of a link between that product and the microflora of that island.

128    However, given that the statement in dispute was supported by a scientific source and that the demonstration of the link between the characteristics of the product concerned and its geographical environment of origin was not based solely on that statement, the alleged error cannot in any event be regarded as being manifest. Consequently, the applicants may not claim that, in failing to note the alleged error, the Commission failed to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration.

129    Secondly, the applicants submit that the application for registration contains errors in the description of the diets of the animals whose milk is used for the production of halloumi and the effect of that diet on the characteristics of the cheese.

130    More specifically, the applicants submit that certain plant varieties referred to in the application for registration as being part of the diet of grazing animals, namely *Phlomis cypria var. occidentalis*, *Phlomis brevibracteata* and *Quercus alnifolia*, are protected under, inter alia, Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7), which precludes them from being able to be used legally to feed animals.

131    It should be noted, however, that the fact that the plants referred to by the applicants enjoy specific protection under, inter alia, Directive 92/43, does not suffice to establish that the application for registration is incorrect in stating that those plants are part of the diet of grazing animals in Cyprus. Moreover, as observed by the Commission in the defence, the inclusion of the plants referred to by the applicants among the species protected under Directive 92/43 entails the obligation for the States to take conservation measures necessary to protect those plants, but does not preclude absolutely the consumption of those plants by grazing animals. Nor do the applicants adduce any evidence substantiating their assertion that the presence of the abovementioned plants on the island of Cyprus is so limited as to make it scientifically impossible for the milk characteristics to be influenced by the ingestion of those plants by grazing animals.

132    The applicants further submit that the contested regulation states, incorrectly, that thyme and *Sarcopoterium spinosum* are species endemic to the island of Cyprus.

133    As acknowledged by the Commission in its written pleadings, the contested regulation contains an incorrect statement in recital 27 to the effect that thyme and *Sarcopoterium spinosum* are species endemic to the island of Cyprus. It is common ground, however, that those two plant species are present in Cyprus. Referring, inter alia, to the study by Papademas et al. (2002), the application for registration states that those plants are among those consumed by goats and sheep, whose milk is used for the production of halloumi. Consequently, that error, which concerns only whether the plants in question are endemic, does not suffice to call into question the finding, also set out in recital 27 of the contested regulation, to the effect that the aromatic characteristics of plants ingested during grazing, such as thyme and *Sarcopoterium spinosum*, are found in halloumi. Consequently, that error does not establish that the Commission failed to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration.

134    The applicants further submit that the application for registration does not adequately substantiate the claim that the aromatic features of plants ingested by sheep and goats are found in the final product. Similarly, they dispute the assertion, in the application for registration, to the effect that the ingestion by grazing animals of plants rich in essential oils affects the taste, smell and aroma of halloumi. Lastly, they submit that the application for registration does not contain any evidence showing that certain components found in the plants consumed by grazing animals are also present in the cheese produced using the milk of those animals.

135    In recital 26 of the contested regulation, however, the Commission states that the application for registration contains references to a number of scientific studies in order to show the link between the diet of grazing animals and the quality of the cheese produced with the milk of those animals. In the contested regulation, the Commission refers more specifically to one of those studies, according to which the volatile compounds detected in the milk used to make halloumi originate from the plants used to feed the animals (Papademas et al., 2002). Although the applicants refer to the technical note annexed to the application, the authors of which discuss, on certain points, the interpretation of the results of that study, those criticisms do not call into question the finding, set out in the application for registration, to the effect that there is a link between the diet of the grazing animals and certain characteristics of the milk used to make halloumi. Moreover, such a finding is also apparent from another study referred to in the application for registration and in the contested regulation (Papademas, 2000), according to which the local vegetation consumed by the animals has an effect on the quality of the milk and accordingly the characteristics of the halloumi. Moreover, in support of the finding that the diet of the grazing animals influences the characteristics of the milk, the contested regulation refers to another study (Bugaud et al., 2001), the validity of which the applicants do not dispute.

136    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants may not claim that the Commission failed to note manifest errors relating to the influence of the grazing animals’ diet on the characteristics of the grazing animals’ milk and those of the final product.

137    Thirdly, the applicants submit that the application for registration is not supported by sufficient scientific proof inasmuch as it assumes that the predominant use of sheep’s or goat’s milk in the production of halloumi contributes to the formation of the smell and taste of the finished product.

138    More specifically, the applicants dispute the statement in the application for registration, to the effect that sheep’s milk and goat’s milk have a fat content concentration that is around twice as high as cow’s milk.

139    As observed by the Commission, however, the study referred to by the application for registration on this point (Economides et al., 1987) indicates that the fat content of sheep’s milk, goat’s milk and cow’s milk is 6.20%, 4.33% and 3.34%, respectively. That study also indicates that the mixture of sheep’s milk and goat’s milk, used in equal proportions, results in a fat content of 5.26%. The Commission adds, without being contradicted on this point, that, in practice, the quantity of sheep’s milk used in that mixture is higher than the quantity of goat’s milk.

140    In view of that evidence, the applicants may not claim that the statement to the effect that the fat content of sheep’s milk and goat’s milk is around twice as high as that of cow’s milk is manifestly incorrect.

141    Furthermore, although the applicants dispute the relevance of the reference to the Scott (1986) study on the ground that it does not specifically concern halloumi, in so doing they do not successfully dispute the statement in the application for registration, based on that study, to the effect that goat’s milk contains significant concentrations of caproic acid, caprylic acid and capric acid, which give the cheese a picante and peppery taste.

142    The applicants add that the application fails to take sufficient account of the fact that, irrespective of the species or breed of animal used for milk production, the characteristics of the milk may also be influenced by other factors, such as animal diet, lactation period or the production process. That statement, however, is not such as to call into question the conclusion in the application for registration to the effect that, given their specific characteristics, the use of goat’s milk and sheep’s milk has an influence on the taste of the cheese.

143    Lastly, the applicants argue that the application fails to provide evidence that the fatty acid profile of milk from the Cypriot type of Damascus goat and Chios sheep differs from that of the original Damascus goat and Chios sheep, with the result that it can be linked to the island of Cyprus. It should be noted, however, that neither the application for registration nor the contested regulation contains any statement to that effect. Like the contested regulation, the application for registration merely states that the Cypriot type of Chios sheep and Damascus goat have morphological and productive features that distinguish them from the population of origin.

144    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants may not claim that the Commission failed to note manifest errors relating to the influence of the use of goat’s and sheep’s milk on the organoleptic characteristics of halloumi.

145    Fourthly, the applicants submit that the application contains misquotations and incorrect references to certain scientific works and studies.

146    However, although, in paragraphs 92 to 95 of the application, the applicants refer to statements in the application for registration which, in their view, are not expressly included in the Economides et al. (1987) study, the statements in question are based on an interpretation of the results of that study, concerning the fat content and transfer of the fat content of bovine, caprine and ovine milk, with the result that they cannot be regarded as resulting from an obviously incorrect reference to that study.

147    The applicants further submit that the application for registration contains incorrect references to the work of Harbutt, J., *World Cheese Book* (Dorling Kindersley Publishers Ltd, London, 2009). They submit that the application for registration refers, incorrectly, to the ‘pungent and picante’ taste of halloumi. Similarly, the application for registration contains an incorrect translation of the work in referring to the ‘malleable, elastic and crispy’ texture of halloumi. However, it is apparent from the extract from the work produced by the applicants that therein the author describes the taste of halloumi as ‘salty and tangy’ and the texture of halloumi as ‘supple, springy and squeaky’. As observed by the Commission, the differences in the terms used highlighted by the applicants may result from the fact that that work, written in English, is cited in the application for registration in its Greek translation. Given that the terms used are equivalent, the references to the work in question in the application for registration should not be regarded as being manifestly incorrect. Lastly, although the applicants submit that the work in question does not contain any citation about the reaction of the lactose’s carbonyl group with the amino acids, the further discussion in the application for registration is not supported on this point by a reference to that work.

148    Consequently, the applicants may not claim that the Commission failed to note manifestly incorrect quotations and references in the application for registration and, in so doing, failed to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration.

149    Fifthly, the applicants submit that the amendments to the specification of the name at issue envisaged by the Minister for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment of the Republic of Cyprus, in a statement conveyed in a press article published in April 2022, cannot be regarded as being of minor importance. They add that the changes which were ultimately made to the specification through the first, second and third standard amendments are based on grounds which are different from those set out in the contested regulation, concerning the link between the characteristics of the product and its geographical environment of origin. Thus, the approval of those amendments, not long after the adoption of the contested regulation, confirms the existence of manifest errors which the Commission failed to note.

150    It should be borne in mind, however, that, in accordance with settled case-law, the legality of an act of the European Union must be assessed on the basis of the factual and legal elements existing on the date on which the act was adopted (see judgments of 3 September 2015, *Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others* v *Commission*, C‑398/13 P, EU:C:2015:535, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited, and of 4 September 2015, *NIOC and Others* v *Council*, T‑577/12, not published, EU:T:2015:596, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).

151    In the present case, relying on the amendments to the specification envisaged, then adopted after registration of the name at issue, the applicants rely on facts subsequent to the contested regulation and hence unrelated to its lawfulness. Moreover, the fact that the amendments were made to the specification of the name at issue subsequently to the registration of that name does not by itself establish that the conditions necessary in order for that name to be registered were not fulfilled on the date when the Commission adopted the contested regulation.

152    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants may not claim that, in its examination of the application for registration, the Commission failed to note the presence of manifest errors and, in so doing, infringed Article 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012.

(c)    ***The allegedly inadequate analysis of the market and the situation of the undertakings marketing the product covered by the name at issue***

153    The applicants complain that the Commission registered the name at issue without having taken account of the fact that, in their submission, the vast majority of the products that had been hitherto produced and marketed on the market did not comply with the requirements of the specification for that name. According to the applicants, in so doing, the Commission failed to comply with Articles 10 and 50 of Regulation No 1151/2012.

154    This argument cannot be upheld.

155    As stated in paragraph 101 above, inter alia the Commission, when it carries out the examination of an application for registration, must make sure, on the basis of the information in the specification, that the name fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012, that is to say, that it identifies a product as originating from a specific place, the quality and characteristics of which are attributable essentially or solely to its geographical environment of origin and all of the steps of production of which take place within the defined geographical area. It is also for the Commission to ascertain whether registration must be refused on one of the grounds laid down in Article 6 of Regulation No 1151/2012. Under that provision, a name is not to be registered, inter alia, where it is generic or where, in the light of a trade mark’s reputation and renown and the length of time it has been used, registration thereof would be liable to mislead the consumer as to the true identity of the product.

156    Yet there is nothing in the provisions of Regulation No 1151/2012 to the effect that registration of a name should be refused on the ground that the products marketed under that name are produced, to a greater or lesser extent, according to a method that does not comply with the method provided for in the specification. In other words, the fact that, on the date when the Commission takes a decision on the application for registration, only a limited proportion of the products covered by the name proposed for registration are produced in accordance with the specification does not by itself justify a refusal to register that name.

157    It should also be emphasised that the choice to include one method of production of the product in the specification rather than another is the result of a choice made at the level of the Member State from whence the application originates. Thus, it is not for the Commission to intervene in the drawing up of the detailed rules for the production of the product covered by the application for registration, such as those contained in the specification (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 51).

158    It follows from the foregoing that, in the present case, it was not for the Commission to review the method of production of the product included in the specification of the name at issue. Nor was it for the Commission to ascertain what proportion of the products present on the market complied with that specification. Even if that were so, the fact that, on the date when the contested regulation was adopted, given the choices made in the application for registration, only a limited proportion of those products complied with the specification of the name at issue, could not lead the Commission to refuse registration of that name. Similarly, the fact that cheese producers might not enjoy the benefit of a PDO for a significant proportion of the products they marketed lawfully prior to the adoption of the contested regulation, inter alia those produced using a mixture comprised mostly of cow’s milk, even if proven, has no bearing per se on the lawfulness of that regulation.

159    Moreover, the applicants may not successfully rely on Article 10(1)(c) of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 61 above, in support of their argument that the Commission failed to take account of the situation of the products that were legally on the market prior to the registration of the name at issue. Under that provision, a reasoned statement of opposition is admissible if it shows that registration of the name proposed would jeopardise, inter alia, the existence of products which have been legally on the market for at least five years preceding the date of the publication provided for in Article 50(2) of Regulation No 1151/2012. Such a ground of opposition, which may provide a basis for the admissibility of a reasoned statement of opposition, does not, however, constitute a ground for refusal to register such a name. It follows from Article 52(3) of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 71 above, that the lodging of an admissible reasoned statement of opposition does not prevent registration of the name from being granted.

160    In the light of the foregoing, the applicants may not claim that the Commission failed to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration on the ground that it did not take proper account of market realities and the situation of the undertakings marketing the product at issue.

161    The other arguments relied on by the applicants are not such as to call that conclusion into question.

162    First, although the applicants rely on rights held by them as proprietors or users of commercial trade marks and rely, more specifically in that regard, on the EU collective trade mark HALLOUMI, the existence of those marks did not prevent registration of the name at issue. It should be noted in that regard that the applicants do not allege, still less prove, that those marks enjoyed a reputation and renown such that registration of the name at issue ought to have been refused on the basis of Article 6(4) of Regulation No 1151/2012.

163    Secondly, although the applicants submit, in the reply, that the Commission did not clarify, in the contested regulation, whether products legally marketed before registration of the PDO could continue to be so after that registration under the 1985 standard, in any event no provision of Regulation No 1151/2012 obliged the Commission to decide on that point as part of the examination of the application for registration. It should further be noted in that regard that, in the contested regulation, the Commission recalls that the Cypriot authorities allowed the producers a transitional period of 10 years, during which they were allowed to use, subject to certain conditions, a lower quantity of goat’s or sheep’s milk than that provided for in the specification.

164    Thirdly, the applicants submit that, in recital 48 of the contested regulation, the Commission based itself on outdated data on halloumi production in Cyprus. However, that results from the fact that the Commission made its decision in the light of information that had been provided to it by the Cypriot authorities in 2016. Moreover, as observed by the Commission, the obsoleteness of the data referred to in recital 48 of the contested regulation is not such as to call into question the finding in that recital, the validity of which is not disputed by the applicants, that Cyprus is by far the largest producer and exporter of halloumi worldwide.

165    Fourthly, the applicants criticise the fact that the contested regulation does not cite all of the case-law relating to the trade marks concerning halloumi. However, although the contested regulation refers to a number of Court judgments delivered in cases involving intellectual property in order to prove the Cypriot identity of the product, no provision required the Commission to engage in an exhaustive enumeration of that case-law.

166    Fifthly, the applicants submit that, in recital 49, the contested regulation contains incorrect information about the regulation on the EU collective trade mark HALLOUMI. They submit that the contested regulation incorrectly states that that mark was registered for the cheese produced in Cyprus ‘in accordance with the … specification’ of the name at issue. Although it is indeed apparent from the case file that the regulation on that trade mark is not worded in terms identical to those found in the specification, the alleged error nevertheless has no bearing on the reasoning followed by the Commission in recital 49 of the contested regulation, at the end of which it finds that there are no elements that would lead to a refusal to register the name at issue due to the reputation or renown of an earlier mark. As stated in paragraph 162 above, the applicants do not dispute that finding.

167    Sixthly, the applicants submit that it has not been demonstrated that, outside Cyprus, halloumi is considered to be a cheese of Cypriot origin and that the Commission failed to take account of consumer opinion on this point.

168    That argument cannot be upheld.

169    It should be noted that there is nothing in the provisions of Regulation No 1151/2012 requiring the application for registration to include an analysis of EU consumer opinion as to the origin associated with the product covered by the name proposed for registration. Hence, that is not a factor that the Commission is required to take into account when it carries out a check of the content of the application for registration.

170    Furthermore, in order to determine whether or not the name at issue had become generic, the Commission analysed inter alia, in recitals 57 and 58 of the contested regulation, the reputation of halloumi and, in view of the evidence provided by the Cypriot authorities, found that EU consumers did not perceive halloumi as a type of cheese disconnected from a specific geographical origin. In order to challenge the statement that halloumi is known as a cheese originating from Cyprus, the applicants rely on a single study concerning a specific Member State, without thereby challenging the relevance of the factors referred to in recitals 57 and 58 of the contested regulation, or questioning the finding, set out in recital 55 of the contested regulation, that the name at issue has not become generic.

171    It follows from the foregoing that the applicants may not claim that, in its scrutiny of the application for registration, the Commission failed to conduct a proper analysis of the halloumi production market and the situation of the undertakings that market that product.

172    It follows from the foregoing that the plea in law alleging failure by the Commission to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration must be rejected.

5.      ***The plea alleging that the contested regulation is unlawful in the light of the inferences that should be drawn from the proceedings that led to the judgment of 14 June 2021***

173    By their fifth plea in law, the applicants submit that, in the light of the inferences that should be drawn from the national judicial proceedings that led to the judgment of 14 June 2021, the contested regulation was adopted contrary to Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 and the principle of sound administration.

(a)    ***Admissibility of the plea in law***

174    It should be borne in mind that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is applicable to the procedure before the General Court in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 53 thereof, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, all applications must contain the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of the pleas relied on. It is settled case-law that that information must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the application, if necessary without any further information (see judgment of 25 January 2018, *BSCA* v *Commission*, T‑818/14, EU:T:2018:33, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

175    In the present case, the Court notes that, in their written pleadings, the applicants set out in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the basis of their fifth plea in law, including that it alleges infringement of Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, of which they cite paragraphs 2 to 4. Consequently, even if the Commission did intend to challenge the admissibility of this plea in its defence and rejoinder, the Court finds that the plea is in any event admissible.

(b)    ***The merits of the plea***

176    The fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants comprises two parts, alleging, first, that the Commission was required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation and, second, that the annulment of measures adopted by the Cypriot authorities prior to the lodging of the application for registration with the Commission entails unlawfulness of the contested regulation.

177    Those two parts should be examined in turn.

(1)    *The Commission’s alleged obligation to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation*

178    The applicants submit that the Commission, informed of the bringing of the action before the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court), could not complete the registration procedure as long as the national judicial proceedings were pending, as there was a risk that the measure adopted by the Commission might be based on an invalid national measure. The applicants submit that the Commission’s obligation to wait for the outcome of judicial proceedings brought before national courts before deciding on the application for registration follows from Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012 and the principle of sound administration.

179    The Commission contends that it was not legally required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before proceeding with registration of the name at issue.

180    In the first place, it should be borne in mind that Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, cited in paragraph 62 above, governs the procedure applicable before national authorities when an application for registration of a name is lodged. Although those provisions provide, inter alia, that persons having a legitimate interest must have an opportunity to appeal when the Member State adopts a favourable decision following examination of the application for registration, they do not, in their wording applicable to the dispute, provide for any obligation for the Commission to refrain from taking a decision pending final judgment by a national court when actions are brought against measures adopted by national authorities in the procedure governed by that article. Nor does such an obligation result from any other provision of Regulation No 1151/2012.

181    In the second place, it should be borne in mind that the principle of sound administration is included among the guarantees conferred by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings, that principle entailing the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see judgment of 29 March 2012, *Commission* v *Estonia*, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

182    In the present case, there is nothing in the case file suggesting that the Commission failed to take all of the relevant factors into account when it took a decision on the application for registration. On the date of adoption of the contested regulation, the proceedings before the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) were still pending. There is nothing in the case file suggesting that the Commission had information enabling it to know when the judgment bringing the proceedings to an end would be delivered. Nor is it apparent from the case file that there was anything that might lead the Commission to doubt the validity of the application for registration. Consequently, whilst the principle of sound administration also places an obligation on the Commission to deal with matters lodged with it within a reasonable time, it cannot be criticised for having adopted the contested regulation without waiting for the outcome of the national judicial proceedings.

183    Furthermore, although the applicants rely on the judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission* (T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208) in support of their line of argument, that judgment does not cast doubt on the conclusion set out in paragraph 182 above.

184    It should be noted that facts of the present case differ from those of the case that gave rise to the judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission* (T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208). In that case, the national court ruling at first instance had partly annulled the specification of the name proposed for registration as a protected geographical indication (PGI), whereas the Commission had not yet taken a decision on the application for registration. Once informed of the existence of that judgment, the Commission asked the authorities of the Member State concerned whether they intended to continue with the registration procedure. The national authorities confirmed to the Commission that they intended to continue with the registration procedure, adding that they had lodged an appeal against the judgment delivered at first instance. The Commission then proceeded with registration of the name at issue.

185    In view of those facts, the Court held that the Commission, in taking the view that it did not have to consider independently the inferences to be drawn from partial annulment of the specification for the application for registration pending before it and in registering the name notwithstanding that annulment, had infringed, inter alia, the principle of sound administration (judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 75). The Court further held, in response to the Commission’s argument that Regulation No 1151/2012 provided for the possibility of amending the specification or annulling the registration of a PGI, that that option could not justify registration of the PGI when, at the time of adoption of the corresponding regulation, the specification for that PGI had been partly annulled. The Court took the view that it would have been contrary to the principle of sound administration to register a PGI, only to then annul it or commence the procedure for amending the specification in the light of facts of which the Commission was already aware at the time of adoption of the regulation registering the PGI (judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraph 82). Thus, the Court found that the principle of sound administration had not been observed in view of the fact, specific to that case, that the Commission registered the name when it could not be unaware, on the date when it adopted the corresponding regulation, that the specification had been partly annulled by the national court having jurisdiction.

186    Be that as it may, the principle of sound administration does not entail, in a general and absolute manner, an obligation for the Commission to suspend the registration procedure for a name as from the time when it is informed that an action has been brought before a national court against a measure adopted in the national phase of that registration procedure.

187    It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants must be rejected.

(2)    *The inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court on the lawfulness of the contested regulation*

188    The applicants submit that the effect of the judgment of 14 June 2021 was that the decision by which the Minister for Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment of the Republic of Cyprus dismissed the objections raised against the application for registration and ruled in favour of forwarding the application for registration to the Commission was annulled.

189    The applicants submit that the contested regulation is accordingly based on domestic measures which, by effect of that annulment, have been removed from the national legal order. The contested regulation cannot continue to exist following the annulment pronounced by the national court and, consequently, should itself be annulled.

190    The Commission, supported by the Republic of Cyprus, submits that the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) cannot entail annulment of the contested regulation.

191    It should be borne in mind, as stated in paragraph 64 above, that, taking into account the decision-making power which belongs to national authorities under the system of division of powers introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012, it is for national courts alone to rule on the lawfulness of measures adopted by those authorities, such as measures relating to applications to register a name (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2020, *GAEC Jeanningros*, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

192    Where a measure adopted by the authorities of the Member State concerned in the national phase of the registration procedure is annulled after registration of the name at issue in a given case, it is for the Commission to review the case (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2020, *GAEC Jeanningros*, C‑785/18, EU:C:2020:46, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

193    The Commission, although not bound by the assessment by the national authorities, must determine independently the inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2018, *CRM* v *Commission*, T‑43/15, not published, EU:T:2018:208, paragraphs 75 and 84). In that context, the Commission may be led to take account of the nature and gravity of the unlawfulness committed and any measures adopted by the Member State in order to remedy that unlawfulness.

194    At the end of any review undertaken, the Commission may, on its own initiative, initiate the procedure for annulling the PDO provided for in Article 54 of Regulation No 1151/2012 (see, to that effect, order of 7 December 2015, *POA* v *Commission*, T‑584/15 R, not published, EU:T:2015:946, paragraph 36).

195    Nevertheless, given the system of division of powers introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012 and the Commission’s powers in reviewing the case, the subsequent annulment of a measure adopted by the authorities of the Member State concerned in the national phase of the registration procedure cannot automatically entail nullity of the registration act adopted by the Commission and automatically lead to its annulment.

196    It follows that the applicants may not claim in the present case that the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) must automatically entail annulment of the contested regulation.

197    Nor is there anything in Article 49 of Regulation No 1151/2012, which specifies the conditions in which applications for registration are lodged and examined at national level, providing that annulment by the national court of a measure adopted pursuant to that article automatically entails unlawfulness of the regulation by which the Commission registers the name at issue in a given case.

198    Similarly, as stated in paragraph 181 above, since the principle of sound administration entails a duty for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case on the date on which it is called upon to take a decision, the contested regulation cannot be regarded as having been adopted in disregard of that principle due to the annulment pronounced by the Dioikitiko Dikastirio (Administrative Court) subsequently to its adoption.

199    Consequently, the second part of the fifth plea in law put forward by the applicants must also be rejected.

200    It follows from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

V.      **Costs**

201    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, as applied for by the latter.

202    In accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, Member States which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. It follows that the Republic of Cyprus must bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Dismisses the action;**

2.      **Orders Papouis Dairies Ltd and the other applicants listed in the Annex to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;**

3.      **Orders the Republic of Cyprus to bear its own costs.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Porchia | Madise | Nihoul |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 February 2024.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| V. Di Bucci |  | S. Papasavvas |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Registrar |  | President |

Table of contents

I. Background to the dispute

II. Facts subsequent to the adoption of the contested regulation

III. Forms of order sought

IV. Law

A. Consideration of the requests to modify the application

B. Substance

1. Fourth plea in law: insufficient statement of reasons for the contested regulation

2. The plea alleging irregularities vitiating the procedure by which the contested regulation was adopted

(a) The national opposition procedure

(b) The opposition procedure conducted at the EU level

3. The plea alleging excessive length of the registration procedure

4. The plea alleging failure by the Commission to carry out a proper examination of the application for registration

(a) The application for registration is allegedly contrary to the 1985 standard

(b) Manifest errors vitiating, in the applicants’ submission, the application for registration

(c) The allegedly inadequate analysis of the market and the situation of the undertakings marketing the product covered by the name at issue

5. The plea alleging that the contested regulation is unlawful in the light of the inferences that should be drawn from the proceedings that led to the judgment of 14 June 2021

(a) Admissibility of the plea in law

(b) The merits of the plea

(1) The Commission’s alleged obligation to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before the national court before adopting the contested regulation

(2) The inferences to be drawn from the annulment pronounced by the national court on the lawfulness of the contested regulation and the resulting annulment

V. Costs

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[\*](#Footref*)      Language of the case: English.

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[1](#Footref1)      The list of other applicants is attached only to the version notified to the parties.

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