Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| European flag | Official Journal  of the European Union | EN  C series |

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|  | C/2024/4222 | 24.7.2024 |

P9\_TA(2023)0436

Implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2023 on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2022/2188(INI))

(C/2024/4222)

The European Parliament,

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| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |

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| — | having regard to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part [(1)](#ntr1-C_202404222EN.000101-E0001) (the TCA), |

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| — | having regard to the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community [(2)](#ntr2-C_202404222EN.000101-E0002) (the Withdrawal Agreement), including the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland thereto (the Protocol), |

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| — | having regard to Article 524 of the TCA, |

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| — | having regard to the Commission report of 24 March 2022 on the implementation and application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 1 January – 31 December 2021 (COM(2022)0126), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission report of 15 March 2023 on the implementation and application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 1 January – 31 December 2022 (COM(2023)0118), |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on the proposed mandate for negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [(3)](#ntr3-C_202404222EN.000101-E0003) with regard to Gibraltar and the Council’s decision of 20 July 2021 authorising negotiations on Gibraltar, |

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| — | having regard to its resolutions of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 [(4)](#ntr4-C_202404222EN.000101-E0004) and on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022 [(5)](#ntr5-C_202404222EN.000101-E0005), |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2023 on the implementation report on the Agreement on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU [(6)](#ntr6-C_202404222EN.000101-E0006), |

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| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/657 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part [(7)](#ntr7-C_202404222EN.000101-E0007), |

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| — | having regard to the meetings and positions of the EU-UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA), in particular the statement by the Co-Chairs and the recommendation to the Partnership Council on EU-UK common efforts to support Ukraine and effective cooperation on sanctions, both adopted during its third session in Brussels on 3 and 4 July 2023, as well as the recommendation adopted on 8 November 2022 on EU-UK energy cooperation, |

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| — | having regard to the statement by the European Council of 25 November 2018, the European Parliament resolution of 12 February 2020 on the proposed mandate for negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [(8)](#ntr8-C_202404222EN.000101-E0008), with regard to Gibraltar, and the Council decision of 5 October 2021 authorising negotiations on Gibraltar, |

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| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, |

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| — | having regard to the European Social Charter, |

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| — | having regard to International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and Protocols, in particular the ILO’s fundamental instruments, |

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| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, |

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| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Fisheries, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Regional Development, |

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| — | having regard to the letters from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Budgets, |

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| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on International Trade (A9-0331/2023), |

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| A. | whereas the TCA covers a wide range of areas, including energy, fisheries, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, law enforcement, trade, transport and social security coordination, providing a comprehensive basis for the relationship between the parties, ensuring a level playing field and maintaining high standards in areas such as labour rights, fair competition, State aid, environmental protection and sustainable development, as well as respect for fundamental rights; |

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| B. | whereas the cultural and creative sectors are not included in the TCA, which mentions the term ‘education’ only in relation to cybersecurity and the need to educate citizens on related challenges; |

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| C. | whereas, as a consequence of Brexit, EU citizens studying in the UK are no longer entitled to ‘home fees’, but must pay higher tuition fees as international students, making it prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of them and, in particular, penalising young students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds; |

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| D. | whereas youth and school exchanges have been severely affected by Brexit; whereas there was a 50 % decrease in EU citizens enrolling in UK universities between 2020 and 2022; |

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| E. | whereas the UK decided not to be part of the 2021-2027 European Solidarity Corps programme or the 2021-2027 Creative Europe programme; |

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| F. | whereas freedom of movement has benefited all segments of the cultural and creative sectors, including the audiovisual sector, festivals, tour companies, bands, orchestras and dance and theatre companies, from both the EU and the UK; whereas the TCA applies a cultural exception, excluding audiovisual services from its scope, despite the EU and the UK sharing many of the same values in the fields of culture and education; |

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| G. | whereas the UK remains a party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television, and audiovisual works originating in the UK are considered ‘European works’ for the purposes of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive [(9)](#ntr9-C_202404222EN.000101-E0009) (AVMSD) in accordance with Article 1(1), point (n) and paragraph 3; whereas the UK implemented the AVMSD during the transition period as this legislation fell within the scope of retained EU law; |

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| H. | whereas the TCA fails to develop the territorial dimension of the relationship between the UK and the EU; whereas the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU varies among EU regions and the impact of the TCA at regional and local level is still unknown; whereas the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has negatively impacted regions and partners involved in Interreg projects and endangers territorial and cross-border cooperation and the existing relationships between the different regions and cities of the EU and the UK as a whole; |

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| I. | whereas the TCA does not cover any decisions on the equivalence for financial services, the adequacy of the UK data protection regime, the free movement of people and services, or the UK’s sanitary and phytosanitary regime; |

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| J. | whereas UK service suppliers, including in the area of financial services, no longer benefit from the ‘country-of-origin’ framework or ‘passporting’, which enables automatic access to the entire EU single market; |

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| K. | whereas the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA constitute a common framework for the UK’s relationship with the EU; whereas both agreements have been agreed on and ratified by the EU and the UK and are legally binding treaties under international law; whereas the relationship between the EU and the UK must be based on full respect for and effective application of these international commitments; |

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| L. | whereas implementation of the TCA is directly linked to the full implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland; whereas its full implementation was delayed while the EU and the UK were finding common solutions to the practical challenges created in the implementation of the Protocol resulting from Brexit; |

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| M. | whereas the Windsor Framework addresses the challenges that have arisen in the operation of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland over the first two years of its implementation and creates legal certainty, therefore, paving the way for full implementation; whereas the Windsor Framework covers a wide range of areas, such as customs, agri-food, medicines, State aid, VAT and excise duties; welcomes the UK Government’s June 2023 guidance on the Windsor Framework and its commitment to ensuring full implementation [(10)](#ntr10-C_202404222EN.000101-E0010); |

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| N. | whereas the conclusion of the Windsor Framework opens a new chapter in relations between the EU and the UK and offers the UK the opportunity to move forward with the implementation of the TCA and to have a positive and stable relationship; |

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| O. | whereas the importance of transparency in international trade and investment is to the benefit of all stakeholders and parties; whereas a predictable commercial environment that fosters trade and investment between the EU and the UK is welcome; |

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| P. | whereas the EU and the UK share common values and security interests, both in the immediate European neighbourhood and globally; whereas it was unfortunately not possible to agree on a structure for regular and in-depth consultations and cooperation on foreign affairs, security and defence policies; whereas the EU and the UK, as strong and reliable partners in the context of transatlantic relations and cooperation, would both greatly benefit from more comprehensive and better structured cooperation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy, including in the framework of NATO; |

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| Q. | whereas the global consequences of the Russian Federation’s unjustifiable and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the return of full-scale war to the European continent, as well as economic instability and the Russian Federation’s deliberate instrumentalisation of energy volatility have resulted in immediate geopolitical uncertainty for EU citizens and for partners around the world; whereas, as a consequence, the UK and the EU should increase cooperation and coordination when assisting Ukraine and addressing the multifaceted consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggressive behaviour, including disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; |

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| R. | whereas the TCA requires respect for and the promotion and effective implementation of internationally recognised core labour standards, as defined in the fundamental ILO Conventions; whereas the fundamental right to organise, bargain and take action collectively is enshrined in international law and inherent to ensuring sustainable development and a level playing field as set out in the TCA; whereas the TCA commits to implementing far-reaching and comprehensive environmental and labour protection provisions, which are subject to dispute settlement mechanisms in the event of breaches; |

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| S. | whereas the TCA requires respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, including as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas these rights serve as guiding principles for the work of the domestic advisory groups (DAGs), including in the TCA chapter; whereas the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed concern about the overall human rights landscape in the UK; |

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| T. | whereas it is the general assessment of the Commission that the TCA is a modern and comprehensive agreement, reflecting the EU’s interests on trade and cooperation, while, at the same time, preserving the red lines that were established by the EU institutions and Member States during the UK’s withdrawal process; whereas for the years 2021 and 2022, the Commission, in its annual implementation reports, established that, overall, the trade arrangements for goods and services established in the TCA have functioned well, despite minor implementation issues; |

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| U. | whereas the common fisheries policy [(11)](#ntr11-C_202404222EN.000101-E0011) requires the EU to promote and ensure the policy’s objectives and principles in any fishing activity, regardless of geographical area, so as to provide a level playing field for EU and non-EU stakeholders; whereas the policy also requires the EU to cooperate internationally on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and to fight illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; |

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| V. | whereas Heading Five (Fisheries) of Part Two of the TCA recognises the importance of conserving and sustainably managing marine biological resources and ecosystems on the basis of the best available scientific advice, as well as the importance of promoting responsible and sustainable fishing and aquaculture activities, good fisheries governance and the role of trade in achieving these objectives; |

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| W. | whereas the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has had a severe impact on the EU fisheries fleet, resulting in the loss of quotas, the decommissioning of vessels and the disruption of long-established commercial enterprises and trade; |

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| X. | whereas the Specialised Committee on Fisheries will prepare multiannual conservation and management strategies to serve as a basis for setting total allowable catches and other management measures, including for non-quota stocks, and for defining scientific data collection for fisheries management purposes as well as for sharing this data with scientific bodies so that they can provide the best possible scientific advice; |

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| Y. | whereas the Protocol on access to waters, appended to the TCA as Annex 38, provides for an ‘adjustment period’ from 1 January 2021 to 30 June 2026, during which each party will grant the other party’s vessels full access to its waters to fish for the species listed therein; whereas after this date, reciprocal access to waters and fisheries resources will be the subject of annual negotiations between the EU and the UK; underscores the need for clarity on the post-transition period in order to maintain investment in the sector; |

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| Z. | whereas the TCA gradually reduces the share of fishing opportunities for the EU fleet in UK waters by 25 % by 2026, a reduction that will affect all segments of the EU fleet, in particular small-scale fishing; |

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| AA. | whereas the UK unilaterally decided not to be part of the 2021-2027 Erasmus+ programme, covering the education, youth and sports sectors; whereas UK institutions can still be associated with Erasmus Mundus and the Jean Monnet actions; |

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| AB. | whereas Erasmus+ is not just a mobility programme, but a powerful tool for exchanging knowledge, fostering academic cooperation, supporting individual development, creating strong and lasting links and promoting understanding between people from different cultural backgrounds, institutions and their members, as well as a wide range of stakeholders and their organisations and networks, contributing to the development of policies and practices; |

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| AC. | whereas the UK was one of the most popular destinations for Erasmus+ participants up until the Brexit referendum; |

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| AD. | whereas non-EU countries can join Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps as associated countries; |

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| AE. | whereas the Brexit Adjustment Reserve [(12)](#ntr12-C_202404222EN.000101-E0012) (BAR) was established to provide support in countering the adverse consequences that Member States, regions and sectors have experienced as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and thus to mitigate the related negative impacts on economic, social and territorial cohesion; whereas the shift in quota shares from the EU to the UK over the transition period agreed in the TCA will have major negative economic consequences for EU fishers; |

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| AF. | whereas the full implementation of the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement in all areas, such as trade in goods and services, digital trade, intellectual property, public procurement, aviation and road transport, energy, fisheries, social security coordination, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, thematic cooperation and participation in EU programmes, is a precondition for maximising the beneficial impact on both cooperation partners; |

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| AG. | whereas the TCA states that the UK and the EU share the objective of achieving a high level of consumer protection and must cooperate to that end; |

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| AH. | whereas most collaboration efforts under the TCA have been partially or fully suspended pending a solution for implementing the Withdrawal Agreement, especially with regard to real-time customs data access; whereas areas of cooperation set up in the TCA might receive renewed attention following the finalisation of the Windsor Framework in March 2023; |

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| AI. | whereas, as a result, there has been little to no cooperation between EU and UK market surveillance and customs authorities on product safety, despite mandatory commitments under the TCA’s chapter on technical barriers to trade; whereas UK authorities do not have access to the EU safety gate, nor does the EU have access to the new UK product safety database; |

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| AJ. | whereas the UK Competition and Markets Authority is no longer part of the EU Consumer Protection Cooperation Network; whereas close cooperation and exchange of information between authorities is vital to ensure proper enforcement of consumer rights and should therefore be encouraged; |

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| AK. | whereas, as of 2021, all exports from the UK to the EU are subject to customs procedures and checks; whereas the UK has delayed EU import checks four times since it left the EU; |

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| AL. | whereas EU national customs authorities have raised concerns about both the correctness of operators’ self-declarations of origin and the replies provided by the UK customs authorities concerning origin verifications; whereas the Trade Specialised Committee on Customs Cooperation and Rules of Origin has issued new guidance to support Member States; |

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| AM. | whereas the TCA contains a chapter on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), recognising the need to ensure an open and secure market for businesses, including SMEs, and seeks to ensure that their needs are taken into account in the implementation process, so that they can take advantage of it; |

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| AN. | whereas the automatic recognition of professional qualifications, such as for lawyers, accountants and actuaries, no longer applies; whereas, instead, the agreement sets out a framework for cooperation between the EU and the UK on the recognition of professional qualifications, including the establishment of a dialogue to exchange information on recognition procedures and to develop guidelines for assessing qualifications; notes the particular difficulties that this creates on the island of Ireland; |

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| AO. | whereas under the TCA, service suppliers or investors from the EU must not be treated any less favourably than UK operators in the UK and vice versa; whereas the non-discrimination principle applies to a wide range of economic activities, including the provision of services, the establishment of businesses and the protection of intellectual property rights; |

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| AP. | whereas, under the TCA, the possibility of temporary secondments of highly skilled employees and short-term business trips between the EU and the UK is maintained; whereas this allows for the temporary cross-border provision of services by professionals in certain circumstances, such as for short-term projects or consultancy work; whereas professionals will still need to comply with relevant regulations in the country where they are providing services; |

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| AQ. | whereas UK public procurement markets remain open to EU bidders and vice versa on an equal footing; whereas both parties must ensure that the procurement process is fair, transparent and open to competition; whereas the UK and the EU have also agreed to maintain their existing procurement commitments under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement, which further opens up their public procurement markets to businesses from other countries; |

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| AR. | whereas the EU and the UK are currently committed to maintaining regulatory and supervisory cooperation in the field of financial services; whereas this cooperative approach should underpin long-term EU-UK relations; whereas on 17 May 2023, the Commission adopted a draft UK-EU memorandum of understanding (MoU) on financial services cooperation, which has since been published and endorsed by the Council and signed by the Commission on behalf of the EU; |

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| AS. | whereas the MoU makes it clear that the EU and the UK have the shared objective of preserving financial stability, market integrity and investor and consumer protection; |

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| AT. | whereas the TCA is the only free trade agreement concluded by the EU establishing zero tariffs and zero quotas on all goods that comply with the appropriate rules of origin; whereas trade statistics for the period since the TCA’s entry into force demonstrate that trade flows between the EU and the UK have been negatively impacted by the UK’s withdrawal; whereas trade between the UK and the EU in goods and services has remained stagnant; whereas the EU’s trade with other trading partners has grown much more than its trade with the UK over a comparable period; |

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| AU. | whereas, for the further implementation of the TCA, particular monitoring efforts should be focused on possible regulatory divergences which will increase over time; whereas comprehensive regulatory cooperation between the parties is of the utmost importance; whereas it is a positive sign that no official complaints were received from stakeholders about the implementation of the TCA through the Commission’s online tool during 2022; whereas the European institutions continue to engage regularly with stakeholders to discuss the practical aspects of the implementation of the TCA; |

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| AV. | whereas, in terms of the EU’s internal implementation process of the TCA, the EU legislators completed the necessary regulatory framework by adopting Regulation (EU) 2023/657 of 15 March 2023 laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA; |

Main conclusions

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|  | 1. | Recalls that the conclusion of the TCA limits the negative consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and establishes a cooperation framework which should form the basis of a strong and constructive future partnership, avoiding the most disruptive elements of a ‘no-deal’ scenario and providing legal certainty for citizens and businesses; |

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|  | 2. | Underlines that the TCA is one of the most ambitious and comprehensive trade agreements which the EU has concluded with a third country; stresses, however, that it does not and cannot be a substitute for EU membership and the corresponding access to the single market and the Customs Union; |

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|  | 3. | Underlines the importance of assessing and addressing potential challenges in the application of the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA as early as possible, in order to avoid further delays in their application; |

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|  | 4. | Welcomes the Windsor Framework and underlines the specific situation of Northern Ireland, thanks to its unique position with access to both the EU and UK internal markets; calls for the swift implementation of the Windsor Framework in order to ensure lasting certainty and predictability for businesses and people in Northern Ireland, to protect the all-island economy, safeguard the Good Friday Agreement in all its dimensions, ensure smooth trade and cooperation, as well as safeguarding the integrity of the single market and the Customs Union and ensuring the smooth implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA; |

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|  | 5. | Welcomes the fact that the British Government has announced its intention to suspend work on the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill and to allow it to lapse; encourages the British Government to take the specific circumstances of Northern Ireland into account when proposing new laws or regulations; |

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|  | 6. | Welcomes the fact that the Windsor Framework establishes new rules on sharing customs data in order to enable real-time access; takes note of the recommendation of the EU-UK Joint Committee of 24 March 2023 on the subject of enforcement and market surveillance [(13)](#ntr13-C_202404222EN.000101-E0013); stresses the need for effective mechanisms to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements in order to provide legal certainty for both businesses, especially SMEs, and citizens, enhance consumer protection and guarantee a level playing field; suggests the establishment of a one-stop shop in Belfast where people and businesses could get the assistance they need to navigate the new arrangements set out in the Windsor Framework; |

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|  | 7. | Welcomes the positive initiatives included in the Windsor Framework, such as the proposal on medicines to ensure that people in Northern Ireland have access to all medicines at the same time and under the same conditions as people in Great Britain, and the proposal on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, while keeping in mind that the transport of animals should respect animal welfare; calls on the Commission to monitor the proper implementation of the agreements, to safeguard the integrity of the single market and to prevent the unlawful distribution of medicines, SPS- and agricultural products marketed for Northern Ireland in the EU’s single market, while ensuring that they remain in Northern Ireland; calls for the Commission to monitor the acknowledgement of the ‘One Health’ approach as an integrated and unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems; |

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|  | 8. | Stresses that the EU has reacted quickly to implement the Windsor Framework and now expects the UK to promptly implement its part thereof; considers it essential that both parties fully comply with the Withdrawal Agreement, the Protocol and the Windsor Framework in order to facilitate the UK’s access to the EU single market under the TCA, while preserving the integrity of the single market and the Customs Union, fostering fair competition and ensuring legal certainty for EU companies when trading with the UK; |

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|  | 9. | Is deeply concerned by the Retained EU Law Act, which creates uncertainty for businesses and stakeholders on both sides of the Channel and could remove existing rights derived from EU law from workers in the UK; stresses the need to carefully analyse its impact and implement measures to mitigate the adverse effects; is deeply concerned, furthermore, by the adoption of the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act, which could restrict the fundamental right of workers to withdraw their labour; |

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|  | 10. | Underlines that Article 524 of the TCA provides that cooperation is based on the parties’ and Member States’ long-standing respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, including as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, and on the importance of giving effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by that convention domestically; is therefore deeply concerned by the Illegal Migration Act, which passed through the UK Parliament on 26 April 2023, and, if adopted, could have the potential to diverge from the European Convention on Human Rights, causing clear divergence between the two parties and could, according to the TCA, lead to the termination of law enforcement cooperation between the UK and the EU; |

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|  | 11. | Welcomes the UK Government’s continued commitment to the PEACE programme, which plays a key role for cooperation between Northern Ireland and the border regions of Ireland; notes the fact that the 2021-2027 PEACE PLUS programme was formally adopted by the Commission in July 2022; |

Institutional framework

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|  | 12. | Welcomes the full operationalisation of the TCA’s institutional framework in 2022 and the good functioning of the joint bodies under the Agreement; underlines the importance of the institutional structures for the smooth implementation of the EU-UK TCA and calls for continued transparency in the implementation of the agreements concluded between both sides; stresses that, in order to ensure that the TCA is fully implemented, all relevant legal instruments should be employed and leveraged, including those related to market access, as well as all countervailing and response measures and dispute settlement mechanisms provided for by the TCA; urges the Commission and the Council to ensure that all decisions taken under the TCA respect the prerogatives of the different institutions and follow the appropriate legislative processes; |

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|  | 13. | Regrets that the sectoral working groups under the Trade Specialised Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade have not yet been convened; |

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|  | 14. | Welcomes the swift setting up of the EU-UK PPA and notes that three meetings have already taken place in 2022 and 2023, with another one scheduled for late 2023; considers that the PPA provides a good framework for parliamentary cooperation and open exchanges between parliamentarians on topics of common interest and for parliamentary scrutiny of decision-making with regard to the implementation of the TCA; calls on the PPA to provide increased scrutiny of the implementation of the TCA and the Windsor Framework; requests that special attention be paid to Northern Ireland, due to its specific situation; calls for the devolved territories of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to have greater involvement in the EU-UK PPA; |

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|  | 15. | Welcomes the establishment of the EU DAG in accordance with Article 13 of the TCA, composed of 24 representatives of civil society organisations and six representatives of the European Economic and Social Committee; notes that the first meeting of the EU DAG and the UK DAG was held on 3 October 2022; recalls that reinforcement of customs cooperation between the parties has emerged as a very important issue at these meetings; notes that the EU DAG has published an issue tracker on the implementation of the TCA; welcomes the joint declaration issued as an outcome of this meeting; underlines the need for well-balanced and representative DAGs, including proportionate representation of employers’ organisations and trade unions, and geographical representation of all parts of the UK; |

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|  | 16. | Underlines the importance of the close involvement of civil society in the implementation of the TCA; notes that the first meeting of the Civil Society Forum was held on 4 October 2022, bringing together civil society representatives from the EU and the UK, in accordance with Article 14 of the TCA; notes that the EU representatives included employers’ and workers’ organisations, as well as academics and non-governmental bodies; |

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|  | 17. | Stresses the importance of strong EU and UK civil society involvement, including regional and local authorities employers’ organisations and trade unions, as well as non-governmental organisations, in the implementation of the TCA, in accordance with Articles 13 and 14 thereof; calls for representatives of the fisheries sector, regional authorities, coastal communities and other stakeholders to be actively involved in the monitoring and implementation of the TCA; urges the Commission, to that effect, to promote the establishment of a domestic internal fisheries advisory group, without prejudice to the existing advisory councils; notes with regret the absence of organisations specifically representing young people among the UK civil society organisations selected to participate in the TCA Civil Society Forum; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 18. | Reaffirms Parliament’s commitment to closely monitor the implementation of the TCA; in close cooperation with the EU DAG; recalls that the Commission should fully and immediately provide Parliament with information relating to the implementation of the TCA to ensure adequate scrutiny, if necessary on a confidential basis and including its participation in the Joint Committee, the Partnership Council, the trade specialised committees and working groups; welcomes the continued good cooperation between Parliament and the Commission; calls for Parliament’s participation in any future review procedure for the agreements; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 19. | Recalls that Gibraltar was not included in the territorial scope of the TCA between the EU and the UK, and that separate EU-UK agreements on Gibraltar require the prior agreement of the Kingdom of Spain; |

Trade

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 20. | Recalls that the TCA provides a comprehensive and ambitious basis for the relationship between the parties, in particular for EU-UK trade, while ensuring a level playing field for fair competition and sustainable development; recalls that the TCA is a unique free trade agreement in the history of the EU, as it focuses on limiting divergence rather than promoting convergence between trading partners; recalls that the TCA is also unique as it provides for zero tariffs and zero quotas for EU-UK trade; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 21. | Takes note of the fact that even with these unprecedented trade arrangements with a third country, EU-UK trade flows have been far more stagnant for goods and less dynamic for services between2016 and 2022 than EU trade with other international partners and that, therefore, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has had, as expected, a negative impact on EU-UK trade flows, due to the creation of significant non-tariff barriers creating additional costs on both sides; recalls that this outcome is only one of the negative consequences of the UK’s withdrawal and is a direct result of the type of Brexit chosen by the UK Government; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 22. | Takes note of the Commission’s assessment that overall, the trade arrangements in goods and services established in the TCA are working well, although certain implementation difficulties have persisted, such as the sponsorship scheme for the entry and temporary stay of natural persons for business purposes and the verification of origin for applying preferential tariff treatment; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 23. | Takes note of the fact that it is a logical consequence of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, in particular, the ending of freedom of movement, that the opportunities in the EU for the UK’s largely service-based economy have been reduced; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 24. | Welcomes the fact that the Partnership Council has started to work on a case-by-case basis on the recognition of professional qualifications, as these provisions can facilitate the movement of professionals in the areas of mutual interest; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 25. | Calls on the Commission to assess the level of protection of EU geographical indications in the UK and maintains its call for both parties to activate the ‘rendez-vous’ clause on the future protection of geographical indications registered after 2021; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 26. | Reiterates that the TCA is the delicate outcome of long and difficult negotiations and that it should therefore be fully implemented in good faith, as should the Withdrawal Agreement, in particular the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, and the recent Windsor Framework, for the mutual benefit of both parties; calls on both parties to make full use of the TCA’s huge potential to facilitate EU-UK trade to the greatest extent possible, while bearing in mind that the advantages of membership in terms of access to the EU single market and to the Customs Union, as well as of participation in other common and flanking policies, cannot, under any circumstances, be replicated through a free trade agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 27. | Agrees with the Commission that the horizontal and product-specific rules in the TCA are satisfactory and that product-specific rules should not be revisited beyond technical adaptations, as these rules strike a fair balance while contributing to the Union’s overarching objective of achieving strategic autonomy in essential sectors; calls, however, for reasonable solutions to be found with regard to the upcoming changes to the rules of origin for electric vehicles, given the difficulties encountered by EU manufacturers in sourcing parts, in particular batteries, from within the EU; points out that any exception would risk shifting investment away from the EU and should be assessed in the light of the European economic security strategy; encourages the UK to consider re-joining the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM Convention); calls for the UK and the EU, as like-minded partners, to explore new avenues for cooperation on the supply of raw materials, the development of net-zero technologies and of emerging technologies, ‘Green Corridors’ and other global trade issues, both bilaterally and within the World Trade Organization (WTO); calls on the Commission to look into the added value of the development of an EU macro-region for the North Sea to encourage closer EU-UK cooperation in this respect; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 28. | Takes note of the further postponement of the implementation of certain UK import procedures and checks, in particular SPS checks, on products coming from the EU; calls on the UK Government to clarify the schedule and requirements in order to avoid further uncertainty for businesses, and to digitalise and simplify UK customs procedures to the extent possible in order to avoid further frictions in trade between the EU and the UK; notes that the UK Government could reduce barriers to trade with the EU by committing to voluntary and dynamic alignment across key sectors; highlights the need for greater UK recognition of EU product rules and conformity assessments for trade in goods; reiterates its call for the EU and the UK to come to an agreement for the UK dynamic alignment as regards SPS measures; highlights that customs cooperation between the EU and the UK is important in order to support compatibility in customs legislation and procedures, and to promote trade facilitation; acknowledges that the UK has diversified trade away from the EU and recognises the importance of greater investment in direct ferry services to reduce the current administrative burden for road travel; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 29. | Calls on the Commission to ensure that the EU and the UK cooperate closely on the subject of customs, including by ensuring an effective exchange of information, constructive dialogue and effective methods of cooperation between customs administrations, with the aim of simplifying clearance processes in order to minimise administrative and financial costs for all stakeholders; calls further on the Commission to perform regular reviews and evaluations in order to reduce unjustified regulatory and administrative barriers and to ensure that established cooperation mechanisms remain effective and future-proofed; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 30. | Highlights that the full implementation of border checks under the UK Border Target Operating Model will bring about additional costs and less flexibility for EU exporters and will lead to further disruptions in the value chain, especially for perishable products, and that effective digital solutions are urgently needed; considers as a positive sign the fact that the UK is taking a similar approach to the EU on risk categories and the use of data and digitalisation to streamline the process; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 31. | Underlines that, although interim arrangements offered by the EU have temporarily improved the situation, structural solutions are needed for the UK to accept EU paperless certificates; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 32. | Recalls that, as a consequence of a separate SPS regulatory regime on human, plant and animal health following its withdrawal from the EU’s single market and Customs Union, the UK is subject to all EU rules applicable to third countries not dynamically aligning with EU legislation; notes that the provisions on SPS measures largely reflect the WTO rules in these areas; takes note of the fact that post-Brexit, the EU and UK remain important trading partners for agri-food products and that from January to October 2022, EU exports to the UK reached EU 39,5 billion, a 15 % increase compared to 2021, while the UK was the third most important partner for the EU in terms of agri-food imports [(14)](#ntr14-C_202404222EN.000101-E0014); urges the Trade Specialised Committee on SPS measures to continue its work swiftly to develop a digital certificate that provides a compatible and effective solution that respects high shared safety standards, especially in the light of the upcoming launch of the UK Border Target Operating Model, and to bring the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed and the UK food safety alert system into a close working relationship, with the aim of delivering comprehensive protection in the EU, the UK and beyond; notes the challenges of applying rules consistently regarding the movement of UK-produced ingredients that are required by EU manufacturers; calls on the UK Government to expedite the transition to a digital system and to support an SPS agreement, as an alignment of this type in the field of agri-food exports and imports would reduce the administrative and financial burden on both sides, and facilitate EU-UK agri-food trade, including trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 33. | Recalls the TCA’s chapter on digital trade, which includes the explicit prohibition of data localisation requirements or the mandatory disclosure of source code, while at the same time preserving the EU’s right to adopt regulations on personal data protection requirements; highlights the importance of the two personal data adequacy decisions granted by the EU on 28 June 2021 regarding the UK’s personal data protection regime, which allow for the continued exchange of personal data between EU and UK operators; notes the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill that was tabled by the UK Government in July 2022; recalls that any lack of recognition of adequacy between the EU and the UK would pose significant challenges for businesses in the EU and the UK; welcomes the regulatory cooperation on non-personal data transfers and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 34. | Welcomes the announcement by the UK Government in November 2022 that the deadline for the implementation of the UK Conformity Assessment (UKCA) marking for products placed on the market of Great Britain would be extended; welcomes the announcement of the UK Government recognising the EU's product safety symbol indefinitely in 18 areas; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 35. | Recalls that the TCA includes a chapter on the needs and interests of micro enterprises and SMEs; acknowledges that the administrative burden associated with adapting to the new regime for trade under the TCA has impacted particularly heavily on these business, which have fewer resources to adapt to new trading arrangements; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 36. | Highlights the importance and commends the ongoing work of the Trade Partnership Committee and of the specialised and trade specialised committees, and urges the parties to fully explore their potential as bilateral bodies established under the TCA that can discuss issues of shared strategic importance, address all implementation issues in a direct manner and pool information and expertise; invites the Commission to continue the good practice of keeping the European Parliament fully and immediately informed of the ongoing work of and developments in these committees; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 37. | Stresses the need for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the UK to maintain the current, fair and rules-based international trade order; calls in this regard for additional joint efforts in working towards an inclusive and comprehensive reform of the WTO, answering the current and future challenges in a deeply interlinked world, and actively working against any new danger of divisions in the global political and economic order, by jointly taking responsibility for contributing to the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 38. | Recognises the need to continue the ongoing progress towards ensuring the availability of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland in order to maintain animal welfare and food security; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 39. | Recalls the ongoing legislative work to revise the pharmaceutical legislation, which will also aim to ease the historical dependency of markets in Cyprus, Ireland and Malta on medicines supplies from or that transit through the UK; stresses the need to ensure the availability, affordability and security of supply of medicines and a strategic approach to pharmaceuticals in the environment to tackle pharmaceutical pollution; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 40. | Welcomes the provisions on cooperation on health security that enable the parties and the Member States’ competent authorities to exchange relevant information, but regrets that this cooperation has been limited to assessing ‘significant’ public health risks and to coordinating measures that could be required to protect public health; underlines how the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the case for stronger cooperation on health matters, as well as a structured and regular two-way communication between authorities and stakeholders to better react to crisis situations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 41. | Points out that future changes to labelling regulations in the EU will be particularly challenging for companies using the same packaging in both the EU and UK markets; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 42. | Calls on the Commission to prepare a table comparing tariff rate quotas, customs duties and non-tariff barriers for different product categories for EU-UK trade and EU trade with other partners; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 43. | Stresses the importance of Article 96 of the TCA on cooperation on market surveillance and non-food product safety and compliance; calls, therefore, on the Commission to implement it without delay; calls for the development of joint initiatives and projects, as well as for the establishment of dedicated ways of communication and coordination between the EU and the UK, in order to facilitate the exchange of information, best practices and technical expertise in the areas of market surveillance and product safety; stresses the need for regular monitoring and evaluation of and reporting on progress made in the cooperation efforts stipulated in Article 96; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 44. | Reiterates the need to cooperate on promoting transparent and reasonable rates for international roaming services in order to protect EU and UK consumers; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 45. | Points out that, for EU-UK trade relations, particular attention should be paid to the four economic sectors laid out by the European Committee of the Regions [(15)](#ntr15-C_202404222EN.000101-E0015) that could be most affected by the impact of Brexit, namely vehicles, electrical machinery, wood products and furniture, and agricultural products; |

Level playing field

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 46. | Urges the UK Government and Parliament to acknowledge the complications that would stem from any unnecessary systematic regulatory divergence, in particular for the protection of employment and social rights, the environment, personal data, State aid, digital trade and taxation, which could only create additional issues as regards level playing field commitments in the TCA, as well as for EU and UK businesses and EU-UK trade; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 47. | Calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament fully and immediately informed about all complications that may jeopardise the level playing field and fair competition for EU businesses and workers; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 48. | Welcomes the amendment of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act that replaced the previous sunset clause with a schedule of laws to be revoked at the end of 2023; notes that the adoption of the law remains a cause of concern, and stresses that the European Parliament will continue to follow relevant legislative developments in the UK; regrets the adoption of the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill, which risks undermining the commitments on non-regression as regards labour standards; stresses that these pieces of legislation have serious implications for workers’ rights, in particular the fundamental rights of freedom of association and to organise, and the right to collective bargaining and collective action, including the right to strike; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 49. | Acknowledges the Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Bill that was passed into law in England on 23 March 2023, which revises the rules for the release and marketing of, and risk assessments related to gene-edited, precision-bred plants and animals by removing them from the regulatory system for genetically modified organisms; is highly concerned about regulatory divergence in this area; stresses the need to maintain strong SPS controls at the EU border, as fully provided for under EU law, to ensure that unauthorised products or those without proper labelling cannot enter the EU food chain; stresses furthermore the need for a level playing field and fair competition for EU producers and consumers in this regard; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 50. | Calls for EU-UK regulatory cooperation to be strengthened to ensure that both the EU and the UK are aware of upcoming legislative work programmes and any related potential future legislative divergence before their implementation to minimise likely divergences; calls for the EU-UK PPA to have an enhanced role in facilitating and scrutinising regulatory cooperation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 51. | Calls on the Commission to continue to closely monitor regulatory divergences in the UK, which could pose a risk of non-compliance with the TCA, notably in areas relevant to the level playing field such as subsidy control, taxation, labour and social standards, the environment and the climate; calls on the Commission to provide the European Parliament and the public with access to the data obtained, by publishing annual reports; recognises the importance of such a tracking mechanism for ensuring informed decision-making, enhancing public trust and facilitating a deeper understanding of post-Brexit context; considers, in this context, that the active involvement of the business, SME and industry associations, as well as trade unions, the DAG and the Civil Society Forum, provides a valuable contribution to the process; highlights the particular challenge that monitoring and managing regulatory divergence poses for Northern Ireland and underscores the need to ensure adequate early warning mechanisms; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 52. | Takes note of the fact that the new UK subsidy control regime under the Subsidy Control Act 2022 came into force in January 2023; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the application of the Subsidy Control Act 2022; echoes the Commission’s concerns about stated plans to introduce so-called free ports, and notes that the EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation [(16)](#ntr16-C_202404222EN.000101-E0016) entered into force in July 2023; calls for increased cooperation between the EU and the UK on subsidies, pursuant to Article 366 of the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 53. | Notes that the TCA introduces a mechanism whereby either party can adopt appropriate rebalancing measures in response to adverse material impacts on trade or investment arising from significant divergences between parties; recalls that in order to enable the EU to exercise its rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA in an effective and timely manner, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a regulation covering the implementation and enforcement of the agreements; is content that this regulation will provide a legal basis for the Commission to adopt, amend, suspend or repeal, as appropriate, by means of implementing acts, a number of measures provided for in both agreements; underlines that both parties are empowered to act unilaterally to protect their interests without first engaging in an arbitration procedure, in particular, in cases where a subsidy risks causing a significant negative effect on trade or investment between the parties; |

Specific sectoral issues and thematic cooperation

Environment and climate

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 54. | Recalls the EU’s climate ambition to reach a 55 % reduction in EU net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels, and to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, as enshrined in the European Climate Law [(17)](#ntr17-C_202404222EN.000101-E0017) and as operationalised in the recently adopted ‘Fit for 55’ package of legislation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 55. | Calls on the Commission to monitor the practical implementation, ambition and effectiveness of the UK emission trading system (ETS); to consider that, should significant differences emerge between the two systems, this could lead to a distortion of the level playing field and should thus be taken into account in the application of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM); and to explore opportunities for bilateral cooperation, including the linking of the UK ETS with the EU ETS without undermining the integrity and effectiveness of the EU ETS, similar to the agreement between the EU and the Swiss Confederation on the linking of their greenhouse gas ETSs; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 56. | Recalls that, between 2026 and 2034, the EU will phase in a CBAM for iron, steel, cement, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, as well as indirect emissions under certain conditions, to ensure that EU and global climate efforts are not undermined by production being relocated from the EU to countries with less ambitious policies; welcomes the fact that the UK Government has launched an inquiry into a UK CBAM to look at the role that it could play in addressing potential carbon leakage and meeting the UK’s environmental objectives, while also considering the wider impacts, risks and opportunities that might arise; calls on the Commission to monitor the UK’s CBAM policy and to explore opportunities for cooperation in order to raise the level playing field and climate protection globally; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 57. | Recalls that the TCA requires that parties do not weaken or reduce their levels of social, labour or environmental protection below those in place at the end of the transition period in 2020 (non-regression), and that a party can take appropriate rebalancing measures to offset any (adverse) ‘material impacts on trade or investment’ arising from ‘significant divergences’ between parties; recalls that existing commitments and ambitions on climate change, in particular on climate neutrality by 2050, remain in place for both parties; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 58. | Underlines how, prior to the UK withdrawal, there were a number of infringement cases brought by the Commission against the UK in the environmental field, including for air and water quality; underlines how, given their transboundary nature, divergence in environmental protection in these areas could jeopardise air and water quality in the EU; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 59. | Takes note of the creation of the UK Office for Environmental Protection in November 2021, under the Environment Act 2021; calls on the Commission to monitor whether the office is provided with sufficient powers and resources to be able to effectively enforce the environmental rules, in line with the UK’s TCA obligations, and whether the UK’s environmental commitments and secondary legislation are being effectively implemented and enforced; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 60. | Notes that, in December 2022, the UK Government published a first set of legally binding environmental targets under the Environment Act 2021 and that, in January 2023, it published the Environmental Improvement Plan 2023; calls for a close and upward alignment of EU and UK targets on climate and environmental protection and for level playing field conditions to be respected; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 61. | Recalls that the UK is no longer part of the European Chemicals Agency or bound by the European Economic Area-based regulatory framework for chemicals (EU REACH); underlines how the UK’s new regulatory framework (UK REACH) must demonstrate the same robustness and transparency as EU REACH; calls on the Commission to monitor whether there is any regulatory regression or divergence of the UK’s chemicals safety management from EU REACH, in particular in view of the upcoming revision of EU REACH; calls on the Commission to work with the UK authorities to ensure a closely aligned regulatory framework that should aim to ensure the highest possible standard of chemicals safety management in the EU and the UK; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 62. | Calls for the UK Government and Parliament to closely cooperate with the EU on attaining the goals set out by the UN Climate Change Conference, including through their respective trade policies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 63. | Calls for the EU and the UK to work together to strengthen global climate protection by capitalising on the close cooperation developed in response to the energy security challenges posed by Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; |

Financial services

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 64. | Notes the limited nature of the TCA in relation to financial services; recognises that this absence is a consequence of the desire of the UK not to discuss other areas of mutual interest as part of the TCA negotiations; welcomes the plans to establish a joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum to facilitate dialogue and cooperation on financial services issues [(18)](#ntr18-C_202404222EN.000101-E0018); recalls that this forum would not constitute a formal part of the TCA and should not provide the same level of access or cooperation as a comprehensive financial services agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 65. | Notes that the British Government’s Future Regulatory Framework Review and the subsequently published Financial Services and Markets Bill [(19)](#ntr19-C_202404222EN.000101-E0019), which proposes to repeal, replace, or amend retained EU law in the area of financial services, as well as to delegate greater responsibility to UK regulators, demonstrates a desire to adopt divergent regulations from the EU in respect of financial services; underlines that excessive regulatory divergences may have a negative impact on financial cooperation between the UK and the EU and could undermine financial flows and the activities of financial entities; welcomes the EU’s recent progress on legislation in respect of financial services, even where this may result in regulatory divergence from the UK, including with respect to cryptocurrencies, sustainable finance, taxonomy, listing and anti-money laundering; acknowledges, however, that the UK and the EU may adopt different regulatory approaches in the area of financial services and may not necessarily maintain a harmonised regulatory regime; supports the EU’s legislative progress in this area; stresses, however, the benefits of future regulatory cooperation and of engaging in the development and integration of international standards; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 66. | Notes the ambition of the UK to establish itself as a global centre for digital finance and crypto assets through a number of regulatory and supervisory initiatives; stresses the importance of developing a coordinated approach and enhanced cooperation in the area of crypto regulation and supervision in order to effectively address and mitigate the risks for consumer protection, market integrity and money laundering, as well as their environmental impact, and in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 67. | Notes that the TCA offers the EU an opportunity to develop and strengthen its own financial services infrastructure and expertise in order to promote business competitiveness, investment, economic stability and consumer protection; strongly supports the completion of the capital markets union and the banking union, based on an approach that is outward-looking, innovative and competitive; acknowledges that the City of London remains a global centre for financial services with a global reach that EU business could benefit from accessing [(20)](#ntr20-C_202404222EN.000101-E0020); recognises the importance of a strong financial services sector for both the EU and the UK and supports efforts to enhance the EU’s financial services infrastructure and expertise; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 68. | Strongly supports continued cooperation between the EU and the UK in areas related to financial, economic and monetary affairs that are of mutual interest, including tackling international money laundering and terrorist financing, countering harmful tax regimes, implementing sanctions, tackling customs fraud, ensuring a level playing field and promoting global financial stability; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 69. | Recalls that Gibraltar is considered by the Commission [(21)](#ntr21-C_202404222EN.000101-E0021) to be a territory that suffers from strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing system, which constitute significant threats to the financial system of the EU; urges the Commission to include provisions in the agreement with the UK on Gibraltar that guarantee anti-money laundering and terrorist financing standards equivalent to those of the EU; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 70. | Recognises that the close economic links between Ireland and Northern Ireland will continue despite the latter being part of a designated third country; supports an acknowledgement of these economic links, including with respect to the supervision of transactions between both jurisdictions; calls for measures to ensure that such links are not disrupted by any changes in regulatory or legal frameworks, particularly in respect of services provided to consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises, which cannot take advantage of being mobile; emphasises the importance of maintaining and further developing close economic ties and minimising disruption in the aftermath of Brexit, particularly with respect to this relationship; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 71. | Recognises that following the entry into force of the TCA, a number of financial services firms based in London announced intentions to establish a new presence in the EU and relocate some assets to the EU, with estimates suggesting 44 % of the UK’s largest financial services firms announcing plans to move some staff or operations [(22)](#ntr22-C_202404222EN.000101-E0022) though the number of jobs that have relocated out of London thus far is only 7 000 and far below the initial estimates of 75 000 [(23)](#ntr23-C_202404222EN.000101-E0023); supports the efforts of the Member States to seek to attract post-Brexit business investment; notes that several EU cities have been the focus of financial service industry investment post-Brexit, including Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Dublin; notes that the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) ‘Peer review into the NCAs’ handling of relocation to the EU in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU’ [(24)](#ntr24-C_202404222EN.000101-E0024) has identified some shortcomings in relation to how Member States’ competent authorities have handled the relocation process; in this context, points to the best practices identified in the peer review report, as well as to ESMA’s sector-specific principles on relocations from the UK to the EU-27 [(25)](#ntr25-C_202404222EN.000101-E0025); welcomes the European Supervisory Authorities’ continued monitoring of supervisory practices in assessing the relocation of firms to the EU [(26)](#ntr26-C_202404222EN.000101-E0026); stresses the need to continue working to complete the Banking Union and deepen the Capital Markets Union in order to prevent the further concentration of financial hubs and to reap the benefits of efficiencies of scale; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 72. | Recalls the commitment, in the first Joint Declaration accompanying the TCA, to signing an MoU on financial services regulatory cooperation between the EU and the UK, which would not be a legal document but would provide a basis for regular, structured engagement; notes that this memorandum has been finalised and adopted by the Commission; welcomes the successful signing of bilateral MoUs between EU and UK regulators and supervisors at both EU and Member State level, including between the Financial Conduct Authority and the European Banking Authority and ESMA, a multilateral MoU with EU and European Economic Area National Competent Authorities; and individual MoUs with National Competent Authorities [(27)](#ntr27-C_202404222EN.000101-E0027); |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 73. | Welcomes the signing of the MoU on Financial Services Cooperation between the EU and the UK by the Commission and HM Treasury, establishing a framework for financial services regulatory cooperation, including the Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum; stresses that the parties to the forum should engage in the spirit of sincere cooperation and use the forum to identify and address mutual threats to financial stability and consumer protection, to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as to address new developments and innovations in the markets; stresses that the forum must operate in a transparent manner with stakeholder engagement as appropriate; monitors with interest potential future discussions on equivalence decisions, in line with the activities set out in the MoU, where outcomes are consistent with EU standards and objectives, with the aim of providing greater market access benefits, and recalls that equivalence remains a unilateral and autonomous process; |

Energy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 74. | Highlights, against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the ongoing energy crisis, the renewed importance of strengthening cooperation on energy between the EU and the UK so that they do not put each other at risk; stresses the importance of maximising mutual benefits to the largest extent possible, in an integrated and interconnected energy system based on common technical and market principles; notes that energy trading between the EU and the UK increased considerably throughout 2022; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 75. | Calls for a balanced and coordinated approach towards achieving Green Deal and REPowerEU objectives and energy independence for both the EU and UK; calls on both parties to strengthen technological cooperation, skills development and exchange of data in the energy sector; highlights the importance of R&D cooperation, including within the Euratom framework, in the field of critical technologies necessary for the digital and green transition; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 76. | Despite the fact that the UK and the EU reaffirmed their ambitions for energy efficiency and renewable energy for 2030, regrets the UK Government’s recent changes in climate policies, namely the postponement to 2035 of the ban on sales of new petrol and diesel cars and of the phase-out of new gas-fired boilers for heating homes; welcomes the MoU on offshore energy cooperation; highlights that cooperation in the development of renewable technologies is important for both the Union and the United Kingdom and calls for the further development of energy technologies in line with climate change objectives; calls for the establishment of an effective framework for trading arrangements for electricity flows and for energy market stability and predictability, so as to prevent price and market manipulations; calls for accelerating the deployment of renewable energies in the North Sea while ensuring good spatial planning; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 77. | Is concerned about the results of the joint cost-benefit analysis presented by the respective transmission system operators in May 2021, which highlighted a high risk of market manipulation and disruption; recalls that the proposal to revise the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) [(28)](#ntr28-C_202404222EN.000101-E0028) contains new provisions regarding market surveillance for generators from third countries and that these would apply to the UK, with a view to increasing market stability and predictability; encourages both parties to step up their efforts to develop trading arrangements for electricity flows between the EU and the UK, as provided for in Article 312 of the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 78. | Recalls that maintaining solid ties between the UK’s and the EU’s energy markets, including by making full use of existing and planned electricity interconnections, is in everyone’s own best interest and calls for coordinated EU-UK critical infrastructure development, especially in the energy sector, to enhance its robustness and lower the chances of infrastructure disruptions and energy supply failures; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 79. | Emphasises the unique situation of the island of Ireland in relation to electricity trade with the United Kingdom and underlines that any disruption to the Single Electricity Market would have negative implications for consumers and businesses on the island of Ireland; calls for the continued application of the EU energy acquis in Northern Ireland as it is necessary for ensuring continuity for the Single Electricity Market on the island of Ireland following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 80. | Underlines that existing energy legislation does not directly address any aspects of EU-UK relations and calls for stronger cooperation in this area, in particular on reducing energy demand, promoting energy efficiency and renewable generation capacities, given the clear link between the two sides and the fact that any decisions made affect them both; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 81. | Believes that common rules for offshore renewable energy and for pipeline infrastructure are essential for facilitating commercial agreements in these areas with the UK, in light of the second edition of the North Sea summit held in Ostend in April 2023 where it was agreed to exploit renewable energy potential in a more coordinated way; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 82. | Is concerned that no major long-term agreement to trade electricity between the UK and the EU was reached; takes note of the fact that the North Sea is a powerhouse for renewable energy and highlights the renewable energy potential of the UK’s shores for the EU; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 83. | Considers that an agreement on energy cooperation, which should be aligned with the overall agreement on future relations and based on robust governance and a level playing field, would be in the mutual interest of both parties to guarantee continued energy flows, as the current energy provisions of the TCA are due to expire in June 2026, although these can be extended; |

Fisheries

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 84. | Points out that the full impact of Brexit is not yet fully known, not least because the full implementation of the TCA in relation to fisheries is still ongoing and will only be completed after the transition period ends on 30 June 2026; highlights the importance of a faithful implementation of the TCA, considering that issues are still emerging; agrees with the Commission’s implementation report that ‘certain challenges remain’, such as the implementation of the electricity trading arrangements and the full and correct implementation of the provisions on fisheries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 85. | Calls on the Commission to take all the necessary measures to ensure that reciprocal access to waters and fisheries resources is maintained after 30 June 2026 and that there are no further quota reductions for EU fishers; calls for the exchange of fishing quotas between the parties to be streamlined and manageable for the sector; urges the Commission to keep all negotiation channels with the UK open in order to find stable, lasting solutions that are beneficial to both parties, to provide stable and predictable conditions for fishers and the fishing sector as a whole and to cover the time period beyond 2026; recalls the coinciding validity periods of the TCA’s provisions on energy and on reciprocal access to waters and fisheries resources and notes the implicit link between these two sectoral domains in the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 86. | Notes the unique situation of Ireland owing to its border with Northern Ireland, the ‘voisinage’ agreement for reciprocal access to the 0-6 nautical mile zone and its historical dependence on reciprocal access to UK waters; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 87. | Expresses its deep concern at the uncertainty created by the review clause (Article 510) under Heading Five (Fisheries) of Part Two of the TCA, which will be applied four years after the end of the adjustment period; calls on the Commission to swiftly, steadfastly and transparently engage in negotiations on a multiannual post-2026 agreement, while ensuring stability, economic viability and predictability for the sector; highlights that this agreement must be linked to the overall review of the TCA and must not allow further losses in shared quotas for the EU; stresses, in this regard, the importance of keeping all aspects of the TCA interlinked, in particular of linking access to the single market for the UK to the TCA’s fisheries provisions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 88. | Reiterates that reciprocal, continued access to waters and fisheries resources must be considered as a key part of relations between the EU and the UK and must, therefore, be dealt with in conjunction with the numerous issues relating to trade and access to the single market; reminds the Commission that it is essential to ensure that, as of 2026, the TCA is applied in a stable and sustainable manner following the transition period; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 89. | Recalls that, should the UK decide to limit the access of EU fishing vessels to British waters at the end of the adjustment period, the EU would be able to take measures to protect its interests; recalls that, in accordance with the TCA itself, these measures include the re-establishment of tariffs or quotas on the UK’s fish imports and the suspension of other parts of the TCA should there be a risk of serious economic or social difficulties for the EU’s fishing communities; stresses that, in this regard, the EU should consider linking other specific parts of the TCA, such as the UK’s access to the European electricity market, as well as other relevant sectors under the TCA, with the EU’s access to British waters and fisheries resources; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 90. | Calls on the UK to refrain from adopting any discriminatory unilateral technical measures; reiterates that the TCA provides that technical measures should be proportionate, should be based on the best scientific advice, should apply equally to vessels from both parties and must be notified in advance; stresses the role of the Specialised Committee on Fisheries in seeking a common approach on technical measures and in discussing any measures for which one party may give notice to the other; recalls that the TCA obliges each party to precisely justify the non-discriminatory nature of any measures in this area and recalls the need to ensure long-term environmental sustainability, on the basis of scientifically verifiable data; reiterates that it is highly desirable for the UK to stick as closely as possible to EU rules; stresses that there should be more coordination with the EU on this and that there should be proper procedures for notification and participation; calls on the Commission to be particularly vigilant about whether these conditions are complied with and to strongly respond if the UK acts in a discriminatory manner; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 91. | Highlights, in particular, that the designation of marine protected areas must be non-discriminatory, based on science and proportionate; emphasises that marine protected areas should be established with well-defined conservation objectives and should not be used as a tool to restrict foreign access to waters; regrets, in this regard, the unilateral approach that the UK has taken in relation to designating areas with restrictions for fisheries around the Dogger Bank and the fact that the UK is planning to use these areas for other economic activities; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 92. | Opposes all decisions taken unilaterally that establish fishing opportunities that contravene international law or go against the best scientific advice available and thus call into question the credibility of international agreements and undermine the sustainability of the exploitation of shared resources; urges the Commission to take any necessary and proportionate measures to resolve disputes with the international partners concerned and to assure compliance with international obligations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 93. | Recalls that Brexit changed the relations among countries in the north Atlantic; believes that Brexit should not be used to manipulate the distribution of quotas in the Northern Agreements; insists that the historical distribution of fishing opportunities, always set based on the best available scientific data and advice, should be respected; calls on the Commission to find stable and long-term fishing management arrangements with its counterparts in the north-east Atlantic; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 94. | Expresses concern about the licensing of EU vessels; notes that vessels under 12 metres were among those most severely harmed by delays in granting fishing licences or by declined licences, owing to the fact that many of them were not equipped with vessel monitoring systems during the entire reference period; regrets that the TCA did not take into account the rules in place on vessel monitoring systems under EU regulations that also bound the UK before Brexit; urges the Commission to continue its efforts to come to an agreement on the unresolved licensing issues, including the level of access for licensed fishing vessels in the waters of the UK and the Crown Dependencies, and to develop a future licensing system jointly with the UK that works in practice; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 95. | Notes that the issues regarding the licensing of EU vessels have a large impact on small-scale fishers, especially those from the north of France and Normandy, as these vessels are not able to change their fishing areas; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 96. | Urges the parties to the TCA to strengthen their efforts to promote sustainable fishing and good fisheries governance internationally, by promoting the establishment of regional fisheries management organisations; urges the Commission, in particular, to cooperate with the British authorities and the other parties involved on establishing a regional fisheries management organisation in the southern Atlantic; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 97. | Expresses its concern about the impact of the displacement of fishing effort following the implementation of the TCA, especially in the Channel; calls for the Commission to propose a regional management plan for the Channel and the North Sea to mitigate this impact and to avoid overfishing; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 98. | Welcomes the fact that both the EU and the UK are members of the IUU Fishing Action Alliance, established in June 2022 to foster ambition and action in the fight against IUU fishing at international level; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 99. | Reiterates its call for the Commission to embrace its role as the EU’s representative in dealings with non-EU countries, so that it can propose enhanced participatory management models and co-management in cross-border situations with non-EU countries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 100. | Emphasises the need to ensure that the work of the Specialised Committee on Fisheries is transparent and that Parliament is regularly updated about this work and the decisions taken; |

Social security coordination

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 101. | Notes with satisfaction that the implementation of the Protocol on Social Security Coordination under the TCA has been unproblematic thus far and that no structural problems were identified in 2021 or 2022; stresses, however, the importance of having a dynamic Protocol, which aligns with the revisions of the Social Security Coordination regulations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 102. | Notes that in 2021, amendments to the annexes of the Protocol were adopted by the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination in order to confirm that Member States continue to allow workers posted to or from the UK to be covered by the sending state’s social security legislation under specific conditions; further notes that in 2022, preparatory steps were taken to implement the financial provisions concerning the reimbursement of the cost of sickness benefits in kind provided by a state other than the competent one; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 103. | Welcomes the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination’s adoption of Decision 1/2023 approving the use of the Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information (EESSI) under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement [(29)](#ntr29-C_202404222EN.000101-E0029) in the context of the Protocol, as well as considering that relevant parts of the Decisions and Recommendations of the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems should be made applicable in the context of the Protocol by means of a Specialised Committee Recommendation; reiterates its call on Member States to ensure that the EESSI becomes fully functional as soon as possible and to make use of the opportunities provided by existing EU funds to fully implement the EESSI and further digitalise public administration; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 104. | Expresses concerns regarding recent developments that may undermine the level playing field provisions of the TCA in the labour and social sphere in the UK; strongly regrets in this regard the July 2022 repeal of the prohibition of employment agencies in providing temporary staff to replace workers taking part in industrial action, which undermines the right of workers to take collective action, including the right to strike; calls on the UK Government to take the necessary measures to uphold the level playing field principles outlined in the articles of the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 105. | Notes that in June 2021 the UK Government announced its intention to establish a single enforcement body for employment rights tasked with ensuring centralised supervision of its labour laws [(30)](#ntr30-C_202404222EN.000101-E0030) in order to improve the coordination and effectiveness of existing bodies and expanding enforcement into new areas; notes, however, that to date no further progress has been made on the proposal; calls on the Commission to continue to closely monitor the enforcement of relevant labour and social standards, as required by the TCA, and any developments in this regard, and to continue its efforts with the UK Government to ensure full compliance with the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 106. | Strongly regrets the UK’s discriminatory treatment of workers from five EU Member States in 2021 as regards reduced fees for long-term work visas; further regrets the UK’s subsequent renunciation of Article 18(2) of the European Social Charter and consequent removal of work-related visa fee reductions for all EU citizens as of February 2022; calls on the Commission to take all measures necessary in this regard and continue to raise this issue through the Partnership Council and the Specialised Committee on Level Playing Field for Open and Fair Competition and Sustainable Development; |

Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 107. | Recalls that the application of Part Three of the TCA on law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is under the condition that the respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the commitment to high-level protection of personal data; recalls the importance of effective, close and mutually beneficial law enforcement and judicial cooperation between the EU and the UK in view of their geographical proximity and shared challenges; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 108. | Emphasises that the ECHR is a legally binding instrument in the UK and that legislative proposals should be compatible with its standards and in line with the rights and freedoms therein; underlines that Article 524 of the TCA provides that cooperation between the EU and the UK is based on the importance of giving effect to the rights and freedoms in that convention domestically; expresses its concerns over discussions in the UK on leaving the ECHR and recalls the concerns expressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in this regard [(31)](#ntr31-C_202404222EN.000101-E0031); recalls the provision in the TCA on the possible termination of this part of the TCA in the event that the UK or a Member State denounces the ECHR; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 109. | Expresses its deep concern over current legislative processes in the UK that would put these conditions at risk, namely the Retained EU Law Bill, the Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (DPDI2) and the Illegal Migration Bill; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 110. | Recalls that Part Three of the TCA allows for extended data flows between the EU and the UK, such as the exchange of DNA data, passenger name record data and criminal record information; underlines, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance that the UK ensures that the level of protection is essentially equivalent to that afforded by the European Union in order to avoid putting EU standards and therefore EU citizens’ fundamental rights at risk when sharing data with the UK; calls, therefore, on the Commission to closely scrutinise the impact that the DPDI2 has on the data protection rights of EU citizens; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 111. | Underlines the serious risk of the onward transfer of personal data to non-EU countries that do not provide for an adequate level of protection; recalls that a primary data recipient may only transfer personal data onwards if the recipient is also subject to rules affording an adequate level of protection; stresses, therefore, that the UK must ensure that its data transfers to non-EU countries are based on appropriate safeguards and that a level of data protection equivalent to that afforded by the European Union is guaranteed; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 112. | Stresses that enacting the UK’s DPDI2 in its current form could further jeopardise the adequacy decision granted to the UK; recalls that the Commission has pledged to closely monitor the situation and repeal the adequacy decisions if privacy is no longer ‘essentially equivalent’ in the UK; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 113. | Strongly regrets the provisions in the new DPDI2 that would introduce new delegated legislative powers for the UK Government to legalise data processing for national security, law enforcement, and public authorities’ access to personal data held by private entities; is deeply concerned by the introduction of delegated legislative powers that provide for some fundamental aspects of data protection law to be changed by the UK Government through secondary legislation; stresses the risks that these delegated powers pose to legal certainty and the future of the UK’s adequacy decision; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 114. | Condemns the UK’s general and broad exemption from the data protection principles and data subject rights for the processing of personal data, set out in its Data Protection Act, for immigration purposes; believes that the exemption in cases in which giving effect to data subjects’ rights would jeopardise effective immigration control or in the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control does not comply with the principle of legal certainty and therefore is not sufficient to prevent arbitrary decision-making; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the evolution of the judicial review process of the DPDI2 regarding the immigration exemption; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 115. | Expresses its concern that the UK’s proposed DPDI2 would allow for automated decision-making; stresses that this bill would deprive individuals of their right, protected in the EU under the EU General Data Protection Regulation [(32)](#ntr32-C_202404222EN.000101-E0032) and internationally under the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing (including profiling) that has either a legal or similarly significant effect on them; calls on the Commission to closely and continuously monitor the situation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 116. | Strongly regrets the provisions in the UK’s new DPDI2 that weaken the obligations for data controllers and processors, including the new provisions that only require a senior responsible individual to be appointed when carrying out processing, which is likely to result in a high risk to individuals; regrets, equally, the provisions removing the requirement to designate a non-UK based representative for data controllers and processors that is subject to UK data protection rules, and those eliminating the obligation to consult with the UK data protection supervisory authority prior to processing when the controller’s assessment indicates that the processing is likely to result in a high risk; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 117. | Expresses its concern over clauses in the UK’s new DPDI2 that would undermine the independence of the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) and introduce powers that allow the government to interfere with the ICO exercising its functions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 118. | Highlights that the UK data protection supervisory authority has found multiple instances of enforcement failures and that its statistics show very low rates of hard enforcement; recalls that, in order to ensure a high level of data protection, the anticipated rules must be enforced and individuals must have access to an effective complaints procedure; is also concerned about the change introduced to the refusal to act on a complaint and the inclusion of criteria such as the resources available to the Commissioner, which will have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the complaints; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 119. | Recalls that the UK’s mass surveillance programmes do not comply with standards that are essentially equivalent to EU data protection rules; reiterates its call on the UK to take into consideration the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this field; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 120. | Urges the UK to fulfil the data protection requirements for the processing of passenger name record data, in line with Article 552 of the TCA; regrets the long transition period of three years, which is delaying the implementation of the requirement to delete passengers’ personal data after their departure from the country; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 121. | Underlines that Article 541 of the TCA provides for an amendment procedure in the event that EU law under the Prüm framework is amended substantially; recalls, therefore, that the UK’s participation in the newly revised Prüm framework is not automatic and should be conditional on the UK maintaining its current human rights standards and ensuring an adequate data protection framework and effective legal safeguards, which are essential prerequisites for enabling police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 122. | Recalls that the two adequacy decisions for the UK expire in 2025 and that the Commission can intervene at any point if the UK deviates from the level of data protection currently in place; recalls that to benefit from these adequacy decisions, the UK is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and it must adhere to the ECHR; points out that, with regard to the necessary revision of the adequacy decision for the transfer of personal data to the UK in two years, it is of the utmost importance that guaranteeing the rights protected under the ECHR be non-negotiable and that the European Parliament closely and regularly monitors any non-compliance; calls on the UK authorities to refrain from adopting any legislation that would jeopardise the adequate level of protection; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 123. | Strongly regrets the substantial increase in the number of EU citizens who have been denied entry into the UK and subsequently returned after the end of the transition period; regrets the fact that the UK applied differentiated treatment in terms of visa fees for the citizens of a number of EU countries; is concerned that visa procedures for EU citizens are lengthy and cumbersome; calls on the UK not to discriminate against EU citizens on the basis of their nationality, both in terms of registration in the EU settlement scheme and of mobility and visa issues; stresses that such practices go against the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination set out in the TCA and calls on the Commission to closely monitor these developments; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 124. | Recalls that the fundamental right to a fair trial includes, among other things, the right to information, the right to interpretation and translation, the right to have a lawyer, the right to be presumed innocent and the right to be present at trial, as well as special safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings and the right to legal aid, which must also be ensured in the course of judicial cooperation in criminal matters with non-EU countries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 125. | Recalls that, in order to ensure effective extradition procedures, an arrest warrant must be executed as a matter of urgency and, in the event that a person does not consent to the extradition, a hearing must take place within 21 days of the arrest; recalls that, in order to safeguard the fundamental right to a fair trial, these time limits must not be exceeded; calls on the UK to respect the time limits established in the TCA to facilitate the application of mutual legal assistance between the Member States and the UK; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 126. | Recalls that, pursuant to Article 525(1) of the TCA, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Union and the UK is based on the Parties’ long-standing commitment to ensuring a high level of protection of personal data, including in relation to cooperation with Europol and Eurojust; insists that personal data exchanges with the Justice and Home Affairs Agencies should be allowed only where the EU data protection standards are guaranteed and human rights are respected; |

Participation in Union programmes

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 127. | Recalls that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement includes a part on UK participation in Union programmes, sound financial management and financial provisions; considers that the conditions and rules set out therein constitute a fair basis for UK participation and would help to ensure the protection of the Union’s financial interests; considers that third country participation in Union programmes provides considerable benefits to the EU and helps strengthen ties between the EU and its partners; regrets, however, the general lack of a regional dimension and of Interreg programmes with the UK as a non-EU country partner; reiterates its call [(33)](#ntr33-C_202404222EN.000101-E0033) to explore possibilities for the participation of the UK and parts of the UK in Union programmes; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 128. | Deplores the fact that the UK lost access to EU research programmes as a result of its withdrawal from the EU, and highlights the importance and the mutual benefits of continued cooperation in research and innovation between the EU and the UK; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 129. | Welcomes the political agreement reached by the Commission and the UK Government on the UK’s association to Horizon Europe and Copernicus, to the extent that it finally provides clarity for all beneficiaries involved in the programmes in the UK and in Europe; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 130. | Underlines that agreement on the UK’s association to Horizon Europe applies only to the current programme, and is without prejudice to the UK’s participation in and financial contribution to future EU research programmes; calls for the full involvement of the European Parliament in the future implementation of the UK’s association to Horizon Europe and future EU research programmes; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 131. | Emphasises that a fair balance must be struck between the UK’s contributions to Horizon Europe and the Copernicus programme and the benefits it will receive in return, including the need to take into account the wider benefits stemming from EU-UK cooperation; welcomes the Commission’s forthcoming attitude in the renegotiation of UK contributions and expects the UK to adopt a like-minded, flexible approach; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 132. | Expresses concern about the new budgetary arrangement concerning the UK’s financial contribution to Horizon Europe in the event of underperformance, as this differs from the procedure and principles originally set out in the TCA; regrets the fact that the new agreement includes an automatic correction mechanism for the UK’s financial contribution with retroactive effect, which was not negotiated as part of the TCA; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 133. | Deeply regrets the unilateral, political decision of the UK Government not to participate in the Erasmus+, Creative Europe and European Solidarity Corps programmes, despite the openness shown by the EU negotiating team; is convinced that this decision leads to a lose-lose outcome, depriving people and organisations in the EU and in the UK of life-changing opportunities through exchange and cooperation projects; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 134. | Notes that numerous education, culture and youth stakeholders, both in the EU and the UK, are calling for the UK to be associated with Erasmus+, Creative Europe, the European Solidarity Corps and Horizon Europe once more; calls for the issue to be addressed in different political contexts and for practical, intermediary solutions to be explored to mitigate the loss of opportunities; underlines that, should the UK wish to re-associate with EU programmes, its financial contribution should be fair and ensure the inclusiveness and diversity of participants in the programmes; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 135. | Acknowledges the excessive bureaucracy created by the withdrawal of the UK from the EU; notes with concern the uncertainties and difficulties created for students, teachers, artists and cultural professionals willing to learn, teach, perform and work in the UK, in particular the lack of available information on administrative requirements, and the unprecedented administrative burden on the UK’s and Member States’ consulates and administrations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 136. | Notes with satisfaction that numerous EU and UK education, youth and cultural institutions and organisations continue their relations on a bilateral basis despite the lack of funding and increased administrative burden and obstacles; is concerned that not all organisations may be able to afford the additional human resources required to maintain or pursue those connections; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 137. | Underlines the significant benefits of the Erasmus+ programme not only for higher education students, vocational education and training (VET) students, adult learners and young people, but also for teachers, academics, researchers, administrative staff and generally for educational institutions and society as a whole, which cannot be measured by the size of its financial envelope; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 138. | Regrets the narrowness of the ‘value for money’ approach adopted by the UK Government regarding Erasmus+, which disregards the numerous benefits in terms of exchange of knowledge and transferrable skills for students, teachers and administrative staff, the contribution of the programme to diversity on campuses and in educational institutions, increased mutual understanding, a reduction in prejudice and discrimination, exposure of UK learners and teachers to their fellow Europeans, and its contribution to broadening participants’ perspectives and opportunities, as well as to improving their employability; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 139. | Welcomes the remarks made by Minister for Europe Leo Docherty acknowledging that participation in Erasmus+ had been ‘very beneficial’ for the UK [(34)](#ntr34-C_202404222EN.000101-E0034); |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 140. | Notes that at the time of the EU referendum in 2016, as many as 5 % of students in the UK were EU citizens from the other 27 Member States [(35)](#ntr35-C_202404222EN.000101-E0035), making them an important part of the total body of foreign students in the UK; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 141. | Notes that some Erasmus+ projects from the 2014-2020 programming period, in which UK organisations were participating, were still ongoing in May 2023, making it difficult to properly assess the full impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the Erasmus+ programme; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 142. | Notes the creation of the Turing scheme by the UK Government; regrets, however, that this programme only covers outgoing student mobility, and does not cover the youth and sport sectors [(36)](#ntr36-C_202404222EN.000101-E0036); notes that the Turing scheme, which applies the UK Government’s ‘value for money’ approach, cannot therefore be seen as an equivalent replacement for Erasmus+; underlines the importance of staff mobility currently not covered by the Turing scheme; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 143. | Acknowledges that concerns expressed by UK stakeholders about the operation of the Turing scheme in comparison to Erasmus+ include the absence of provisions to support staff mobility, limited funding for non-university exchanges and the need to resubmit funding bids on an annual basis [(37)](#ntr37-C_202404222EN.000101-E0037); |

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|  | 144. | Welcomes the new possibility for Erasmus+ mobility grant beneficiaries to dedicate 20 % of the grant funding to outgoing international mobility outside the 33 Erasmus+ programme countries; notes, however, that this share cannot be dedicated entirely to one specific partner country, and manifestly does not replace the missed opportunities resulting from the UK’s withdrawal from the Erasmus+ programme; |

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|  | 145. | Welcomes the creation of the Taith programme by the Welsh Government, covering both incoming and outgoing mobility; notes that this programme, like the Turing scheme, does not cover the sport sector, but it does support mobility actions for sports teams; |

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|  | 146. | Welcomes the work currently being undertaken by the Scottish Government to create a similar programme, covering both incoming and outgoing mobility; invites the Scottish Government to consider covering, through its programme, the same areas of education and training, youth and sport as Erasmus+; |

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|  | 147. | Welcomes the decision of the Irish Government to fund Erasmus+ mobility for students from universities in Northern Ireland, irrespective of their nationality, by enrolling them in Irish universities for the duration of their exchange; takes note of the work currently being undertaken by the Irish Government to develop a similar scheme for VET students; |

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|  | 148. | Is concerned about the significant drop in the number of EU students studying at UK universities, which fell by as much as 50 % in the case of first year students between 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, in contrast to student numbers from other regions [(38)](#ntr38-C_202404222EN.000101-E0038); underlines that this situation is clearly linked to the UK’s withdrawal from the Erasmus+ programme, the end of equal treatment rules for tuition fees and scholarships for EU students and the difficulty of obtaining a student visa; notes that European students contributed to diversity across a broad range of subjects, whereas non-EU international students tend to be more concentrated in particular subject areas such as engineering and business; notes that UK universities welcome an increasing number of foreign students, notably from India and China [(39)](#ntr39-C_202404222EN.000101-E0039) [(40)](#ntr40-C_202404222EN.000101-E0040), which contribute to their financial stability; |

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|  | 149. | Notes that many UK universities can be considered among the best in the world [(41)](#ntr41-C_202404222EN.000101-E0041); notes that the end of cooperation projects between these universities and EU universities is detrimental to research and academic excellence in Europe; |

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|  | 150. | Notes that 11 UK universities are partners in alliances through the European Universities initiative; regrets that their participation will end when the first-generation alliances expire (at the end of 2024); notes that UK universities are allowed to be part of European Universities alliances, but can no longer be included in the governance structure, which de facto relegates them to the status of second-class partner; encourages their continued partnership through the European Universities initiative; |

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|  | 151. | Notes that the numerous partnerships that UK universities had with their EU counterparts through the Erasmus+ programme have to be re-negotiated bilaterally one by one, posing the risk that some smaller universities will be excluded; |

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|  | 152. | Reiterates that research cooperation between universities in Europe, especially in the fields of science and innovation, is instrumental in this regard; |

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|  | 153. | Highlights that all interested neighbouring and like-minded countries, including the UK, are welcome to seek association with the Erasmus+ programme and thus contribute to European education systems; regrets that the UK is not participating in the initiatives and measures designed to establish a genuine European Education Area by 2025, further denting cooperation; |

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|  | 154. | Underlines that the UK continues to participate in the European Higher Education Area (‘Bologna process’); urges the UK, the Commission and the Member States to continue their work towards full mutual recognition of academic qualifications; |

Culture

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|  | 155. | Regrets the absence of any provisions linked to culture and the cultural and creative sectors in the TCA following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the end of UK participation in free movement, resulting in administrative obstacles facing touring artists, especially for emerging and independent artists; |

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|  | 156. | Encourages new and continuous cooperation between EU and UK artists and other professionals in the cultural and creative sectors and industries; regrets that the number of EU citizens working in the cultural and creative sectors and industries in the UK has dropped since Brexit; |

Youth

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|  | 157. | Regrets the absence of any provisions relating to youth, youth exchanges and projects, youth dialogue and volunteering in the TCA; is concerned that almost none of the youth projects previously funded by Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps involving school-age children are now being funded through the UK Government’s Turing scheme; notes that school trips and youth mobility are hindered by the new UK entry rules and the need for schools to pay for a visa for every student; calls, therefore, for the creation of a youth group travel scheme for young people under 18; |

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|  | 158. | Notes that the ‘au pair’ sector has been severely affected by Brexit and the UK’s new immigration rules, as the au pairs from the EU cannot benefit from the Youth Mobility Scheme visa as au pairs from selected countries outside the EU can; highlights that all interested neighbouring and like-minded countries, including the UK, are welcome to seek association with the European Solidarity Corps programme, which fosters volunteering opportunities and collaboration between young people across Europe; |

Sport

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|  | 159. | Regrets the absence of any provisions linked to capacity-building of grassroots and professional organisations, partnerships and exchanges in the fields of sports and esports in the TCA, which negatively affects the sport sector in both the EU and the UK; notes that the Turing programme replacing the Erasmus+ programme does not have a part dedicated to sport, creating a gap with regard to sport cooperation projects; |

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|  | 160. | Notes that the UK sport sector no longer relies on the Court of Justice ruling in the Bosman case of 15 December 1995 [(42)](#ntr42-C_202404222EN.000101-E0042), which allowed for the free movement of players and athletes within the EU; notes with concern that this situation, together with the requirement for a work permit to play in the UK, adversely affects the participation of EU athletes in UK teams or professional competitions by potentially limiting their number; |

Affected regions

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|  | 161. | Underlines the importance of quantifying the effects, including the social impact, of the TCA at regional level in order to adopt tailored measures for the most impacted regions and their communities and private and public businesses; calls on the Commission to assist the Member States in using the funds under the BAR more effectively and to their full extent to promote and support affected sectors such as the fisheries sector and coastal communities; calls, in particular, for dedicated support for the SMEs that are located in border regions and whose businesses are particularly dependent on the UK market; |

Cooperation in foreign and security policy

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|  | 162. | Regrets that, apart from the areas of cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, the TCA does not include provisions on cooperation in foreign policy and defence, owing to UK’s unwillingness to negotiate on such provisions; given the active role the UK has played in European security and defence, commends the UK’s contributions to supporting the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine; recalls, however, in the light of the attack on the European security architecture by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, that the signing of a structured framework for cooperation on foreign and security affairs between the EU and the UK would be more effective than the current ad hoc cooperation; highlights the need to intensify the dialogue with the UK on possible avenues for structured and regular dialogue, cooperation and coordination on foreign, security and defence policy, in line with the provisions of the political declaration of 2021 and including in the framework of the EU-NATO partnership, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the European Political Community (EPC) and other international forums; underlines the importance of coordinating sanctions regimes; welcomes the discussion on common foreign policy and security in the EU-UK PPA; |

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|  | 163. | Welcomes the strong cooperation and coordination between the EU and the UK in response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the EU and the UK to maintain the strongest possible unity within the international community in condemning Russia’s actions and defending the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law and the rules-based international order within the UN and its charter and other multilateral forums; calls for equally strong cooperation and coordination regarding Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction; calls on the authorities of the UK and the EU to work in coordination on the possible use of frozen Russian assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine; |

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|  | 164. | Welcomes the good coordination between the EU and the UK on sanctions against Russia; calls for further intensification of the enforcement of sanctions; welcomes the joint missions to third countries by officials from the EU and the UK for the effective implementation of the sanctions; |

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|  | 165. | Recognises that there is untapped potential for EU-UK subnational cooperation, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood, in areas of mutual interest, such as mobility – including of military personnel and assets – the sustainable management of the North Sea, the Channel and the Irish Sea, trade, climate action, education, digitalisation, human and social rights, and security in initiatives for bilateral and multilateral cooperation between EU and UK regions, such as the Straits Committee, possibly through a specific EU interregional cooperation programme, provided that the UK Government financially contributes to this programme and that participating regions are adequately consulted and involved in its development; |

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|  | 166. | Calls on the Commission to maximise the potential of the relationship between the EU and the UK in ways that benefit both parties through friendly cooperation on common issues in international forums and with regard to third countries, in particular to achieve the highest level of ambition regarding climate action and to coordinate efforts to advance the ecological transition of all sectors in a just and inclusive way, while strengthening industrial sovereignty and international competitiveness; |

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|  | 167. | Calls for the strengthening of cooperation in the field of cybersecurity, owing to its implications for both the EU and the UK on a wide range of areas of mutual interest, particularly in the digital and financial sectors, and information technology, defence, energy and research and development; |

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|  | 168. | Welcomes the first two meetings of the EPC in October 2022 and in June 2023 as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation between European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening the security of the European continent and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; welcomes the fact that 44 countries took part in the first meeting in Prague and 45 countries in the second meeting in Chișinău, including key partners such as the UK; |

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|  | 169. | Calls for the stronger involvement of the UK in European security and defence projects; welcomes, in this context, the decision of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) members and the Council of 14 November 2022 to invite the UK to join the Military Mobility PESCO project, which would improve mutual rapid security and defence assistance; calls on the Member States to sign the administrative agreement on Military Mobility with the UK as soon as possible; |

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|  | 170. | Urges the UK to further cooperate with the EU on pressing strategic challenges by ensuring the complementarity and effectiveness of actions; points out that the parallel projects for developing future combat air systems can be an inefficient use of resources and that the 2022 common security and defence policy annual report recommends that the projects should be merged; proposes to launch a meaningful dialogue also on other weapons systems, military technology and related innovations, with a particular focus on ensuring the efficiency of spending and investments, and the technical interoperability of armed forces and weapons systems; °  ° ° |

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|  | 171. | Calls on the Commission to closely monitor whether the TCA is applied correctly, to take corrective actions when necessary and to explore possible avenues for further cooperation in the light of existing and future challenges; |

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|  | 172. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom. |

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4222/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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