Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

23 July 2025 ([\*](#Footnote*))

( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU word mark Magic Crown – Earlier EU word mark Crown – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑436/24,

**Löwen Entertainment GmbH,** established in Bingen am Rhein (Germany), represented by W. Mosing, lawyer,

applicant,

v

**European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),** represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

**Wazdan Holding LTD,** established in Larnaca (Cyprus), represented by D. Hasik, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of A. Marcoulli, President, V. Tomljenović and W. Valasidis (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

**Judgment**

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Löwen Entertainment GmbH, seeks the annulment and the alteration of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 25 June 2024 (Case R 2415/2023-2) (‘the contested decision’).

**Background to the dispute**

2        On 2 March 2022, the intervener, Wazdan Holding LTD, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO for the word sign Magic Crown.

3        The mark applied for covered goods and services in, following the restriction made in the course of the proceedings before EUIPO, Classes 9, 28 and 41 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 9: ‘Sound transmitting apparatus; Apparatus for the transmission of images; Apparatus for the reproduction of images; Sound reproduction apparatus; Apparatus for recording images; Sound recording apparatus; Coin-operated mechanisms; Computer gaming software; Information technology and audiovisual equipment; Computer programs, downloadable; Downloadable software; Computer programmes for interactive television and for interactive games and/or quizzes; Software and applications for mobile devices; None of the aforesaid goods [services] being in relation to music, radio or radio broadcasting or television broadcasting; All of the aforementioned goods for use in connection with games and casino, gaming and gambling services’;

–        Class 28: ‘Counters [discs] for games; Table-top games; Amusement game machines; Gaming machines for gambling; Coin-operated amusement machines; Arcade game machines; Dice; Apparatus for games; Automatic coin-operated games; Amusement machines, automatic and coin-operated; Coin-operated amusement gaming machines; Mechanical games; Hand-held consoles for playing video games; Games; Arcade games; Electronic games; None of the aforesaid goods [services] being in relation to music, radio or radio broadcasting or television broadcasting’;

–        Class 41: ‘Casino, gaming and gambling services; Gambling services; On-line gaming services; Electronic games services; Arcade game services; Gaming services for entertainment purposes; Electronic game services provided by means of the internet; Wagering services; Game services provided online from a computer network; Entertainment information; Interactive computer game services; Organisation of sporting events; Amusement arcades; Bookmaking [turf accountancy]; Betting services; Providing casino facilities [gambling]; Entertainment services; Cultural activities; Organising of entertainment competitions; None of the aforesaid goods [services] being in relation to music, radio or radio broadcasting or television broadcasting’.

4        On 12 May 2022, the applicant filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services referred to in the previous paragraph.

5        The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark Crown, filed on 3 January 2008 and registered on 9 August 2012 under No 6 609 333, covering goods and services in, inter alia, Classes 9, 28 and 41 corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 9: ‘Sound recording and reproduction apparatus, and parts for these goods; computers, microprocessors, data recording apparatus, data printers, automatic apparatus for identifying data carriers, including identity cards and credit cards, bank notes and coins; apparatus operated by the insertion of magnetic cards and/or by means of microprocessor chip devices; machine-readable data carriers equipped with computer programs (included in Class 9); printed, electronic circuits, the aforesaid goods exclusively in connection with automatic coin or token-operated gaming (amusement) machines and/or systems of automatic coin or token-operated gaming (amusement) machines; automatic coin or token-operated gaming (amusement) machines adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; amusement apparatus adapted for use with an external display screen or monitor; musical juke boxes; games consoles for connecting to an external screen or monitor, and control apparatus for games consoles; installations, equipment or parts thereof, for exchanging money, for securing money, processing money, including circulating money in connection with coin-operated gaming and amusement apparatus; electronic security apparatus and installations consisting thereof, in particular for buildings, enterprises, arcades, vehicles, ships, aircraft, coin-operated gaming and amusement apparatus, included in Class 9; electric and electronic apparatus and instruments for statistical analysis for coin-operated automatic gaming and amusement machines, and for the development thereof (included in Class 9); ticket dispensers for issuing prize vouchers and cash registers (automatic distribution machines)’;

–        Class 28: ‘Games (included in Class 28), electronic darts, tables for indoor football, pool, snooker (games), coin and token-operated automatic gaming machines’;

–        Class 41: ‘Entertainment, namely providing of entertainment, amusement and relaxation services; amusement arcades with automatic entertainment machines’.

6        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

7        On 9 October 2023, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition.

8        On 7 December 2023, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Opposition Division.

9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion. In particular, in the light of the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark and the low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs at issue, resulting from the weak distinctive character of the common element ‘crown’, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public with a level of attention varying from average to high, also in relation to identical goods and services.

**Forms of order sought**

10      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul and alter the contested decision;

–        order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs, including those incurred in the proceedings before EUIPO.

11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

12      The intervener contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

**Law**

13      In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. It raises, in essence, two complaints, the first alleging incorrect consideration of the impact of the distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue on the overall impression created by those signs, and the second alleging incorrect assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

14      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

15      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, *Laboratorios RTB* v *OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS)*, T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

16      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, *Commercy* v *OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel)*, T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

***The relevant public***

17      In the contested decision, first, the Board of Appeal found that the goods and services covered by the signs at issue were aimed in part at the general public and in part at a public of specialists, particularly in the gaming and gambling industry, and that the relevant public’s level of attention varied from average to high, depending on the goods and services concerned. Second, the Board of Appeal stated that the relevant territory was that of the European Union.

18      There is nothing in the case file which makes it possible to call into question those assessments, which are not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.

***The comparison of the goods and services at issue***

19      It is apparent from paragraphs 20 and 21 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal found, inter alia, that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for were identical or at least similar to those covered by the earlier mark.

20      There is nothing in the case file which makes it possible to call into question those assessments, which are not, moreover, disputed by the applicant.

***The comparison of the signs at issue***

21      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, *OHIM* v *Shaker*, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

22      In the present case, before addressing the question of the visual, phonetic and conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, it is necessary to examine the assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of those signs carried out by the Board of Appeal.

*The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue*

23      For the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (judgments of 13 June 2006, *Inex* v *OHIM – Wiseman (Representation of a cowhide)*, T‑153/03, EU:T:2006:157, paragraph 35, and of 27 February 2008, *Citigroup* v *OHIM – Link Interchange Network (WORLDLINK)*, T‑325/04, not published, EU:T:2008:51, paragraph 66).

24      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the common element ‘crown’ in the signs at issue had a weak distinctive character in relation to the goods and services at issue and that the element ‘magic’ in the mark applied for also had a weak distinctive character. In assessing the visual similarity of the signs at issue, it noted that, on account of its position at the beginning of the mark applied for, the element ‘magic’ would attract the attention of the relevant public and that, despite its weak distinctive character, that element would not be disregarded by that public.

25      First, the applicant submits that the Opposition Division correctly found that the element ‘crown’ had no meaning directly linked to the goods and services concerned and that it therefore had a normal degree of distinctiveness. It adds, in essence, that even with a low degree of distinctiveness, that element, common to the signs at issue, will have an impact on the overall impression created by those signs. Second, the applicant submits that the additional element ‘magic’ in the mark applied for, which has ‘an even lower – or at least equally low – degree of distinctiveness’ than that of the element ‘crown’, will have an insignificant impact on the overall impression produced by those signs.

26      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

27      In the present case, it should be noted that the mark applied for consists of two word elements, namely the words ‘magic’ and ‘crown’, whereas the earlier mark consists of a single word element, namely the word ‘crown’.

28      In the first place, as regards the common word element ‘crown’ of the signs at issue, it should be noted that that element will be perceived, at the very least, by the English-speaking part of the relevant public as a reference to a ‘crown’ relating to a royal family and therefore to the superior quality of the goods or services covered by those signs.

29      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that terms referring in particular to royalty, such as the word ‘crown’, may be used, in a laudatory sense, emphasising the positive characteristics of the goods and services at issue and their quality (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2023, *Worldwide Brands and Guangdong Camel Apparel* v *EUIPO – Guangdong Camel Apparel and Worldwide Brands (CAMEL CROWN)*, T‑562/21 and T‑590/21, not published, EU:T:2023:440, paragraphs 116 and 117).

30      In addition, as is apparent from paragraph 30 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘crown’ has a weak distinctive character is supported by the evidence submitted by the intervener, which shows that consumers are exposed to that term in combination with other elements in the gaming market. That evidence includes, first, the presence, in the register, of numerous EU trade marks containing the word element ‘crown’ and covering goods and services in Classes 9, 28 and 41 and, second, extracts from online gambling sites.

31      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was right to find that the relevant public might attribute to the word ‘crown’ a laudatory character as to the quality of the goods and services covered by the marks at issue and that, as a result, that word had a weak distinctive character.

32      In any event, it must be stated that the applicant merely repeats the Opposition Division’s finding that the word ‘crown’ has a normal distinctive character, without, however, putting forward specific arguments in support of that claim.

33      In the second place, as regards the word ‘magic’ in the mark applied for, it should be noted that the applicant does not dispute the Board of Appeal’s finding that that term will be perceived by the relevant public ‘as denoting something wonderful, efficient or exceptional’. It must be held that, in the light of that meaning, the term ‘magic’ has only a low degree of distinctiveness in relation to the goods and services at issue.

34      Furthermore, the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of establishing that the element ‘magic’ has ‘an even lower – or at least equally low – degree of distinctiveness’ than that of the element ‘crown’.

35      In so far as the mark applied for is a relatively short word sign, the word element ‘magic’ placed at the beginning of that mark cannot be regarded as capable of attracting the consumer’s attention more than the word element ‘crown’ at the end of that mark. Therefore, none of those word elements can be disregarded in the comparison of the signs.

*Visual comparison*

36      In paragraphs 33 to 35 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree. In reaching that conclusion, it found that, although the mark applied for consists of the weakly distinctive element ‘crown’, included in its entirety in the earlier mark, that coincidence has only a limited impact on the overall visual impression of those marks, the similarity of which was offset by the additional element ‘magic’, placed at the beginning of the mark applied for.

37      The applicant submits, in essence, that the signs at issue are visually similar to an average to high degree. According to the applicant, the overall visual impression produced by the signs at issue is similar on account of the coincidence of the word element ‘crown’ and the weaker, or at least equally weak, character of the additional element ‘magic’.

38      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

39      First of all, it is true that it is apparent from the case-law that, where an earlier mark is entirely contained in the mark applied for, that is a factor to be taken into consideration in assessing the similarity between those two marks (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2018, *holyGhost* v *EUIPO – CBM (holyGhost)*, T‑439/16, not published, EU:T:2018:197, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). However, it is also apparent from the case-law that the importance of a weakly distinctive element included in both signs must be evaluated and reduced accordingly (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2024, *House of Prince* v *EUIPO – Biały (AROMA KING)*, T‑118/23, not published, EU:T:2024:778, paragraph 47). In the present case, as noted in paragraph 30 above, the word ‘crown’ has only a weak distinctive character and its impact is therefore reduced on the overall impression of the signs at issue.

40      In addition, it should be noted that the signs at issue differ in the additional element ‘magic’ in the mark applied for. The earlier mark consists of a single word element, whereas the mark applied for is composed of two word elements, thus having a different structure.

41      It follows that the Board of Appeal was correct to find that the signs at issue were visually similar to a low degree.

*Phonetic comparison*

42      In paragraphs 36 and 37 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue had a low degree of phonetic similarity, emphasising the limited impact of the common element ‘crown’, on account of its weak distinctive character, the presence of the element ‘magic’, placed at the beginning of the mark applied for, and the fact that the earlier mark was shorter than the mark applied for.

43      The applicant, in essence, merely refers to the Opposition Division’s decision according to which the signs at issue have an average to high degree of phonetic similarity.

44      In the present case, it should be noted that the pronunciation of the signs at issue differs in the first part of the mark applied for, namely the element ‘magic’, and coincides in the common element ‘crown’. Those signs therefore differ in the number of syllables, given that the mark applied for has three syllables, whereas the earlier mark consists of only one. Therefore, the mark applied for is longer to pronounce than the earlier mark, as the Board of Appeal essentially noted in paragraph 36 of the contested decision.

45      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the signs at issue were phonetically similar to a low degree.

*Conceptual comparison*

46      In paragraphs 38 and 39 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were conceptually similar to a low degree, in so far as they coincided in the meaning of the weakly distinctive word ‘crown’ and differed in the conceptual difference brought about by the word ‘magic’, the impact of which remained limited on account of its weak distinctive character.

47      The applicant refers, in essence, to the Opposition Division’s decision according to which the signs at issue have an average to high degree of conceptual similarity.

48      In that regard, first, it should be noted that the earlier mark consists solely of the word element ‘crown’, which will be associated with a crown or with goods and services of superior quality. Second, the mark applied for consists of the word element ‘magic’, which will be associated with magic or something exceptional, and the word element ‘crown’. Consequently, the mark applied for, taken as a whole, could be understood by the relevant public as (i) a ‘magic crown’, (ii) lauding a crown of superior quality or (iii) referring to goods and services of superior and exceptional quality.

49      Therefore, the signs at issue share the meaning relating to goods and services of superior quality arising from the element ‘crown’.

50      However, it is apparent from the case-law that, where the signs at issue share only a weakly distinctive word, the conceptual similarity must be regarded as low (judgment of 9 April 2025, *Allsize* v *EUIPO – Sjóklæðagerðin (North 56-4)*, T‑209/24, not published, EU:T:2025:381, paragraph 55).

51      In addition, since the element ‘magic’ of the mark applied for may be understood as referring to something exceptional, it does not introduce a significant conceptual difference from the element ‘crown’. However, it qualifies and accentuates the concept conveyed by that element.

52      In that context, there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that there was a low degree of conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.

53      That finding cannot be called into question by the case relied on by the applicant and which gave rise to the judgment of 26 July 2023, *CAMEL CROWN* (T‑562/21 and T‑590/21, not published, EU:T:2023:440). In the latter judgment, the Court concluded that there was at least an average degree of conceptual similarity between the word sign CAMEL CROWN and the figurative sign camel active, because they shared the concept of the common element ‘camel’, which was more distinctive than the terms ‘crown’ and ‘active’. By contrast, in the present case, the signs at issue share the meaning of the common element ‘crown’, which has only a weak distinctive character.

***The likelihood of confusion***

54      According to settled case-law, a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, *Canon*, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, *Mast-Jägermeister* v *OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others)*, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

55      With regard to an earlier mark with a weak distinctive character, and which thus has a lesser capacity to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, the degree of similarity between the signs should be high to justify a likelihood of confusion, or this would risk granting excessive protection to that mark and its proprietor. That excessive protection could therefore adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law, if, in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the mere presence of such elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking into account the remainder of the specific factors in the present case (see judgment of 13 September 2023, *Korres* v *EUIPO – Naos (EST.KORRES 1996 HYDRA-BIOME)*, T‑328/22, not published, EU:T:2023:533, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

56      In the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal took into account the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark and the low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the signs at issue, resulting from their common element ‘crown’, which had a weak distinctive character in relation to the goods and services at issue. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of interdependence, it concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public with an average to high level of attention, even in respect of identical goods and services.

57      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was no likelihood of confusion. According to the applicant, having regard to the coincidence in the common element ‘crown’ and the limited impact of the element ‘magic’ on the overall impression of the marks at issue, it is likely that the relevant public will perceive the mark applied for ‘as a sub-brand or another variation of the earlier … mark, that is configured in a different way according to the type of goods or services that it designates’. Accordingly, the similarity resulting from the common element ‘crown’, which, moreover, constitutes the earlier mark in its entirety, cannot be offset by the additional element in the mark applied for, since that element has no decisive influence on the overall impression of those marks. According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal’s finding leads to the earlier mark’s lack of protection against signs containing the word ‘crown’ with an additional element.

58      In addition, the applicant claims that the contested decision is vitiated by an inadequate statement of reasons, in view of the fact that the Board of Appeal did not provide any explanations as regards, in particular, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

59      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

60      In that regard, first, as stated in paragraph 19 above, it should be recalled that the goods and services applied for were identical or, at the very least, similar to the goods and services covered by the earlier mark.

61      Second, the signs at issue have a low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity, in view of the differences arising from the presence of the element ‘magic’ in the mark applied for and the fact that the signs coincide only in the weakly distinctive element ‘crown’, to which consumers are commonly exposed in the gaming market.

62      Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, where the earlier trade mark and the sign for which registration is sought coincide in an element that is weakly distinctive with regard to the goods and services at issue, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not often lead to a finding that that likelihood exists (judgment of 18 June 2020, *Primart* v *EUIPO*, C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 53; see also, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2019, *Hansson*, C‑705/17, EU:C:2019:481, paragraph 55).

63      It is also apparent from the case-law that, where the elements of similarity between two signs arise from the fact that they share a component with a weak distinctive character, the impact of such elements of similarity on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion is itself low (see judgment of 22 February 2018, *International Gaming Projects* v *EUIPO – Zitro IP (TRIPLE TURBO)*, T‑210/17, not published, EU:T:2018:91, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

64      Third, it follows from paragraphs 28 to 31 above that the earlier mark, consisting of the single word element ‘crown’, has only a weak inherent distinctive character. As is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 55 above, excessive protection of a trade mark with a weak distinctive character could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law.

65      Fourth, the applicant has not adduced any evidence capable of establishing that the relevant public might perceive the mark applied for ‘as a … variation of the earlier … mark, that is configured in a different way according to the type of goods or services that it designates’.

66      Accordingly, it must be held that, in the light of the low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the signs at issue and the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that there was no likelihood of confusion, despite the identical or similar nature of the goods and services at issue.

67      Lastly, it should be noted that the reasoning followed in the contested decision concerning the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion set out, in a clear and unequivocal manner, contrary to what the applicant claims, the essential considerations on the basis of which the Board of Appeal found that Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 did not preclude, in the present case, registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods and services concerned. Consequently, the applicant’s line of argument alleging a failure to state reasons must be rejected.

68      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the applicant’s single plea in law must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

**Costs**

69      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

70      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener. By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened, EUIPO must, as a hearing has not been organised, be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Dismisses the action;**

2.      **Orders Löwen Entertainment GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Wazdan Holding LTD;**

3.      **Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Marcoulli | Tomljenović | Valasidis |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 July 2025.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| V. Di Bucci |  | L. Truchot |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Registrar |  | President |

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[\*](#Footref*)Language of the case: English.

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