Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| 15.2.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 44/1 |

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Developing a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean — the benefits for island Member States’ (exploratory opinion for the Cyprus Presidency)

2013/C 44/01

Rapporteur: Mr DIMITRIADIS

On 22 May 2012, Andreas MAVROYIANNIS, Deputy Minister to the President for European Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, asked the European Economic and Social Committee, on behalf of the forthcoming Cyprus Presidency, to draw up an exploratory opinion on:

Developing a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean — the benefits for island Member States.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 21 November 2012.

At its 485th plenary session, held on 12 and 13 December 2012 (meeting of 12 December), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 147 votes to 1 with 5 abstentions.

1.   Conclusions

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| 1.1 | The EESC believes that despite the very fragile and still indeterminate situation prevailing in the Mediterranean, the conditions are in place for multilevel dialogue to begin between the Commission, the Member States, the countries involved in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, local and regional authorities and civil society to establish a Mediterranean macro-regional strategy (divided into two parts) that will meet the needs of the region by strengthening its international competitiveness[(1)](#ntr1-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0001). |

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| 1.2 | The EESC concedes that the Mediterranean region is geographically very large and has varying economic, social, political and cultural features, and countries with different systems and infrastructures (EU countries, non-EU countries with EU candidate status, and non-EU countries taking part in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation). For this reason it is proposed that two subregional policies (for the eastern and western Mediterranean) should be set up, which would be complementary, coordinating their work with each other and with that of the macro-regional Adriatic-Ionian strategy. |

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| 1.3 | The EESC takes note of the decisions taken by the Council and the concurring view of the European Parliament that a macro-regional strategy should not require more money, more regulation or new management bodies (the three ‘noes’), but it believes that funding is needed for technical assistance to collect data and promote the necessary structural projects. |

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| 1.4 | The EESC believes that funding sources in the form of the considerable resources that have already been committed by the EU for measures and programmes through the structural funds and the financing instruments of the EIB represent adequate means that must be used transparently as well as flexibly. It also advocates the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean investment bank through the EIB, as well as an open policy on funding from various financial bodies (KfW, EBRD, World Bank, African Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank). |

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| 1.5 | The EESC believes that subregional cooperation must be consolidated without delay by boosting the trade, tourism and industrial links of the southern Mediterranean countries. |

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| 1.6 | The EESC believes that the necessary political decisions must be taken by the Council in order to remove outstanding issues so that the Union for the Mediterranean can be a body responsible for strategic planning and implementing the new macro-regional policy. |

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| 1.7 | The EESC believes that prompt approval by the Council of the Adriatic-Ionian Strategy (see Council Conclusions of 24 June 2011) will open the way for establishing a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean. |

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| 1.8 | The EESC believes that Cyprus and Malta will play a particularly important role in any new strategy framed by the EU, as will all the islands of the Mediterranean, which face a very difficult situation owing to their poor connections and communications with the continental EU Member States. |

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| 1.9 | The EESC draws attention to the considerable importance for the wider Mediterranean region of stimulating agricultural production. |

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| 1.10 | The EESC believes it is necessary to generally improve maritime and air links between the countries of the Mediterranean and, more broadly, with the rest of the EU. |

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| 1.11 | The EESC considers that the present opinion will serve to open a dialogue on the new Mediterranean macro-regional strategy and submit the main issues of the strategy for consultation. The Committee explicitly undertakes to continue working on this very important issue by producing further opinions that explore in more detail and depth all of the questions addressed in this opinion. |

2.   Introduction

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| 2.1 | On assuming the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2012, Cyprus prioritised the drawing up of an opinion on A macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean that would focus on how such a strategy could benefit the island countries. |

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| 2.2 | The decision to task the EESC with drawing up this opinion can be attributed to the role that the Committee has played in producing advisory opinions that express and represent the views of civil society organisations in the Member States, thus strengthening participatory democracy in the EU. |

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| 2.3 | The topic was selected following the successful framing of macro-regional approaches for the Baltic Sea region[(2)](#ntr2-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0002) – as well as the macro-regional strategies for the Danube, the Adriatic and Ionian region, and the Atlantic – since the Mediterranean is a region with particular characteristics and consequent needs. |

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| 2.4 | The objective of this strategy will be to create policies helping countries in the Mediterranean region to strengthen their economic and social relations, and to cooperate in resolving common problems, allowing the region to become internationally competitive, prosperous, safe and environmentally sustainable. Such a macro-regional strategy will also coordinate all the policies, objectives and measures of EU bodies with those of the Member States, the regions, local economic and social councils, and all stakeholders in the Mediterranean, in particular small and isolated island Member States in the region. |

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| 2.5 | The strategy is also expected to resolve the problems caused by the current economic crisis, by accelerating rates of growth, creating job opportunities and reducing unemployment. |

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| 2.6 | To this end, the opinion adopts the definition used by the Commission[(3)](#ntr3-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0003), whereby a macro-regional strategy is considered to be a strategy for a region that comprises territories in different countries and regions that have shared features, such as a single maritime or other type of space, or which face the same challenges, such as development problems, climate change, limited economic and cultural exchanges, etc. Macro-regional strategies are approaches that draw on existing instruments, programmes and funding and deploy them to achieve the specific goals set for the macro-region, while aiming to include public and private sources in their planning so as to match broader policies with available funding (EU, national, regional). They also facilitate convergence between the resources of the regions and those of the various Member States, based on the implementation of coordinated ‘governance’, and the creation of ‘mutual benefit’ for all parties. |

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| 2.7 | In view of the shifting and very unsettled political and social conditions prevailing in the countries of the southern Mediterranean following the recent uprisings, the EU has established a new approach to the region which it calls the ‘partnership for democracy and shared prosperity’. This partnership will reward those countries that make progress in implementing the necessary reforms based on specific and measurable goals[(4)](#ntr4-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0004). |

3.   Challenges faced by the Mediterranean region

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| 3.1 | It is worth noting that given the plethora of programmes and initiatives already devised both for the wider Mediterranean region (the Euro-Mediterranean relationship, also known as the Barcelona Process) and for more specific regions of the Mediterranean, such as the Ionian and Adriatic (territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean through the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region), this new macro-regional strategy should encompass all the countries of the Mediterranean, namely EU Member States (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta) and third countries (Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco). |

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| 3.2 | Before outlining the framework of objectives and policies, the challenges which the region faces must be defined. |

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| 3.2.1 | The Mediterranean, and in particular the eastern Mediterranean, is very important historically, and comprises EU Member States as well as countries outside the EU that are at different stages of development. Because the Mediterranean has been populated and a centre of business and intensive circulation of goods, people and shipping since ancient times, it is characterised by substantial flows of people and trade yet economic relations between the countries of the region remain very limited; for instance, there are no direct flights or sea connections between the countries of the eastern Mediterranean. Those who see ‘Euro-Mediterranean cooperation’ as regrettably limited to cooperation between the countries of the southern Mediterranean and the EU, or to bilateral relations between those countries and certain EU Member States, understand the reality of the situation. |

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| 3.2.2 | It should be noted that the prevailing economic imbalances, different levels of development and wealth, as well as the frequent tensions, particularly at the present time, in the region mean that movement of people has taken on the dimensions of permanent economic migration (legal and illegal)[(5)](#ntr5-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0005). This is having negative effects in both countries of origin and destination countries, with movements of people seeking political asylum a particularly serious aspect of the problem. |

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| 3.2.3 | The Mediterranean region remains a breeding-ground of political instability and armed conflict, with undesirable loss of life, destruction of property, and consequences for business and trade, as well as the environment. Furthermore, since the start of the Arab uprisings there has been a pressing need to formulate a strategy to reinforce economic and social ties between countries in the region, with an EU initiative that will be built through democratic dialogue with both governments and civil society[(6)](#ntr6-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0006), demonstrating that the EU effectively stands alongside the peoples of the southern Mediterranean[(7)](#ntr7-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0007). |

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| 3.2.4 | The region is rich in valuable raw materials, above all energy reserves in the wider Middle East and North Africa region. An important development is the recent discovery of new natural gas reserves, which are expected to yield new, and more stable, sources of energy for the EU. However, it is necessary to ensure a secure environment and to improve sea, air and other communication routes between the countries of the Mediterranean and the rest of the world, with particular emphasis on merchant shipping, which is an important economic activity in the region. |

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| 3.2.5 | It has been observed that years of resource use, farming, recent and frequent droughts, overfishing, as well as dense marine traffic, have resulted in pollution, with negative effects on marine life and coastlines, which are affecting tourism. Agricultural activity is yielding steadily fewer and inferior agricultural products[(8)](#ntr8-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0008), while marine assets have been gradually eroded and a decrease in fishing yields can be observed. |

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| 3.2.6 | A common feature of all the Mediterranean countries is the important role of the tourism industry in providing employment and generating growth; promoting tourism cooperation between countries in the region must therefore be a key plank of the strategy, with the aim of addressing serious problems, especially seasonality. |

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| 3.2.7 | Finally, use of internet technology and communications is limited, especially on the southern side of the Mediterranean, and there is a dearth of research activity and innovation, which are essential elements in a modern economy. Connectivity between the Mediterranean countries is very limited. |

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| 3.3 | It should be noted that economic, political and social relations between the countries of North Africa are particularly underdeveloped, so that what is referred to as Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is effectively limited to certain countries. At the same time, the programmes that the EU has implemented in the region have had limited success, owing to a shortage of capable local partners, to corruption[(9)](#ntr9-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0009) and to inadequate understanding of local mores, traditions and social perceptions. The Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, has had poor results, while neither the MEDA programme nor the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) have so far had the anticipated effect in terms of properly promoting EU cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean basin. |

4.   Objectives of a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean

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| 4.1 | In light of the challenges described above, it is proposed that the main objectives of a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean should be: |

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| 4.1.1 | to achieve sustainable development while strengthening the competitiveness of the economies and countries in the region, so as to respond to the current international economic crisis, creating job opportunities and reducing unemployment; |

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| 4.1.2 | to strengthen relations between the Mediterranean countries and make them a bridge between the EU, the Middle East and Africa, with the aim of establishing peace, prosperity and regional cohesion; |

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| 4.1.3 | to frame an ambitious energy policy serving the interests both of countries in the region and of the EU, given the need for the Union to ensure a diversity of energy suppliers and reduce its reliance on Russia; |

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| 4.1.4 | to boost the free movement of goods, services, capital and people between the non-EU Mediterranean countries; |

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| 4.1.5 | to improve connectivity so as to ensure fast and unhindered access to goods, people and services, with the focus on safe transport of energy goods; |

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| 4.1.6 | to strengthen the role of small EU island Member States in the Mediterranean – i.e. Cyprus and Malta – by setting up specific initiatives to improve relations with the Mediterranean partners, especially by expanding internet links between these countries and the rest of the world; |

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| 4.1.7 | to promote job-creation programmes for population groups that require special attention (women[(10)](#ntr10-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0010), young people, people with special needs, etc.) |

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| 4.2 | The aim of the macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean (divided into subregional strategies for the eastern and western Mediterranean) must be to make the region really pioneering in terms of business, tourism, culture, ideas, innovation, research and educational activities, transforming it into an area of peace so that there can be sustainable social development and prosperity. |

5.   Strategic approach to the Mediterranean macro-region

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| 5.1 | The above analysis can be used to identify the main elements of a strategy, based on the following six pillars, which are consistent with the Europe 2020 strategy[(11)](#ntr11-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0011). |

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| 5.1.1 | The first pillar concerns economic cooperation and development coupled with the objectives of sustainability, including far-reaching action on the economy, e.g.:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | establishing a long-term strategy within the CAP to promote sustainable farming activity, backed up by training, technology, innovation and research; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | implementing policies to expand aquaculture; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | strengthening SMEs, which are the backbone of local economies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | liberalising trade between countries in the region; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | combating corruption, which destroys economic and social structures and reduces competitiveness; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | promoting tourism and cultural development, with the emphasis on transnational cooperation, attracting foreign investment, developing cruise tourism with a range of destinations, enhancing the cultural heritage, and upgrading beaches to quality-flag level. | |

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| 5.1.2 | The second pillar relates to environmental protection and combating climate change, in particular:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | conserving marine and underwater resources by renewing fish stocks and minimising the problems of climate change; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | taking additional measures to protect coastlines; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | stepping up cooperation between countries in the region to protect and ensure fair distribution of limited water resources; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | applying the principles of sustainability in sea transport by using new technologies for shipping traffic that will lower operating costs and reduce CO2 emissions. | |

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| 5.1.3 | The third pillar is about transport and ensuring sea and air connectivity and safe transport of goods and people. This would include:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | strengthening and improving merchant shipping through cooperation between the countries of the Mediterranean, and ensuring secure conditions for international sea, coastal and air routes; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | improving air and sea connections between Mediterranean regions, between the eastern and western Mediterranean, and with the rest of the EU; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | creating new shipping routes and improving existing ones, especially to ensure safe and competitive connections for the island Member States. | |

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| 5.1.4 | The fourth pillar is cooperation in the sphere of energy [(12)](#ntr12-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0012), concerning hydrocarbons and renewable energy sources, as well as safe transport of energy from producer countries to the EU and elsewhere. The long-term objective of creating an EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community is a bold, but necessary, plan. This objective will call for the framing of a multilevel energy policy for the Mediterranean with a view to:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | exploitation of newly discovered sources of natural gas and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | discovery and exploitation of new natural gas reserves; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | development of renewable energy sources through regional initiatives such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan, Dii - Renewable energy bridging continents, and Medgrid; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | integration of the southern Mediterranean region into the EU internal energy market. | |

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| 5.1.5 | The fifth pillar concerns innovation and competitiveness. The strategy must capitalise on the opportunities provided by existing EU initiatives in the sphere of research and innovation, so as to improve competitiveness and further the prosperity of people and countries in the wider Mediterranean region, by:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | promoting educational reform and adapting education systems to current development requirements, with workforce training and continuing training policies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | providing for closer cooperation in research and technology between universities, businesses and research bodies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | promoting exchange programmes for scientific staff and students (e.g. Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci programmes); |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | stepping up cooperation between countries on upgrading IT connections and improving internet access. | |

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| 5.1.6 | The sixth pillar is about immigration and mobility[(13)](#ntr13-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0013), which means promoting legal, managed migration, respect for international asylum law, a reduction in illegal immigration, measures against criminal human trafficking networks, and protection of human rights during border controls.   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | Strengthened cooperation in monitoring immigration and movements of people between countries of origin, transit countries and host countries, which are generally EU Member States. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | — | Improved transport flows, guaranteed safe passage ensured, and a new, comprehensive EU asylum policy, based on:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | the priorities of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS); |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | improved police cooperation to prevent and combat cross-border crime. | | |

6.   Prerequisites for achieving the goals of the macro-regional development strategy in the Mediterranean

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| 6.1 | The macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean (divided into two subregional strategies) will be implemented within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy, existing EU programmes and funding measures[(14)](#ntr14-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0014), and using EU initiatives such as the INTERACT programme to provide technical assistance and training[(15)](#ntr15-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0015). But it will be necessary to create a new management mechanism and improve administrative functioning. The macro-regional strategy should offer new approaches which will benefit the countries concerned, with the prospect of practical measures or policies that can be implemented effectively. |

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| 6.2 | The Mediterranean strategy (subdivided into the eastern and western Mediterranean strategies) will draw on all existing measures and will be linked to the relevant external relations aspects of the approach to the Mediterranean. It will focus on achieving more effective coordination of European Commission action and policies with those of the Member States, regions, local authorities and other players in order to achieve good results. |

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| 6.3 | Recognising the crucial role played by the Mediterranean, the EU decided at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in 2008 to reinforce cooperation directly by setting up a permanent mechanism to be called the Union for the Mediterranean[(16)](#ntr16-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0016). The original mechanism, launched in Barcelona with high hopes, was tasked with specific projects in relation to marine pollution, maritime safety, energy and development of economic links between all the countries belonging to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Unfortunately, the Union for the Mediterranean has so far shown very disappointing results. |

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| 6.4 | Macro-regions do not have strictly defined borders, and the issues that they choose to focus on must reflect the agreed challenges and commonalities that can be addressed and must be linked to other macro-regional strategies established by the EU, implementing a defined mix of policies and measures selected by the participating countries. |

7.   Measures needed to implement the new strategy

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| 7.1 | Within the above framework, the macro-regional strategy approach for the Mediterranean should comprise the following specific measures: |

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| 7.1.1 | Development of an appropriate coordination-management mechanism for implementing the macro-regional strategy that can coordinate the large number of EU bodies and local authorities involved. The following approach is therefore proposed:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | coordination of measures under the macro-regional strategy by the Commission (DG Regio in cooperation with the EEAS) to make this an official EU policy; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | framing of two subregional macro-strategies for the Mediterranean – one for the eastern Mediterranean and the other for the western Mediterranean – to reflect their particular economic, social, geographical and cultural characteristics. The two subregional strategies, together with the Adriatic-Ionian strategy, would cover the whole of the Mediterranean; |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | — | The EESC also suggests taking as a working model systems that have been used under the EU Atlantic Strategy (DG MARE), namely:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | 1. | Launching two forums on the Mediterranean (eastern and western) on the initiative of DG Regio, which will report on the situation in each region and propose action plans. The forums would be made up of representatives from the European institutions (Commission, Parliament, EESC and CoR), representatives from the Mediterranean governments, and representatives of local and regional authorities and civil society. |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | 2. | The forums would be supported by two steering committees. |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | 3. | The Commission and governments would assess the final proposals of the forums. | | |

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| 7.1.2 | Implementation of EU ‘good neighbour’ policy. The approach to macro-regional strategies hitherto has been limited to implementing EU internal policies. However, to be effective, such a strategy in the Mediterranean where many non-EU countries are involved requires implementation of elements of external policy, obviously with the emphasis on EU ‘good neighbour’ policy. |

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| 7.1.3 | Framing policies on: |

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| 7.1.3.1 | workforce training and education; |

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| 7.1.3.2 | improving internet and IT communications and ongoing improvement of online services in e-government; |

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| 7.1.3.3 | joint planning of research and innovation to support sustainable development and professional training; |

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| 7.1.3.4 | ensuring free transit by sea and movement of goods, people and energy by implementing a policy of safe and cheap transport connections and creating new shipping routes; improving merchant shipping; |

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| 7.1.3.5 | effective sea and air connectivity for all parts of the Mediterranean and the rest of the world; |

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| 7.1.3.6 | expanding trade and political relations by creating free trade areas based on existing Euro-Mediterranean agreements and removing import duties, and coordinated measures such as regulatory convergence; |

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| 7.1.3.7 | measures in the sphere of competition, public procurement, protection of investments and health and plant health issues. |

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| 7.1.4 | Cross-border and interregional cooperation projects can be funded from existing sources, i.e. the EU Structural Funds[(17)](#ntr17-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0017), from contributions by the Member States, contributions by other donor countries (e.g. Norway and Switzerland), from the European Investment Bank (EIB)[(18)](#ntr18-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0018), provided through FEMIP (the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership)[(19)](#ntr19-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0019), use of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and budget allocations for the Union for the Mediterranean, where local authorities, private stakeholders and NGOs are able to take part. |

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| 7.1.5 | The new macro-regional strategy must be operationally linked with other EU policies, such as the Europe 2020 strategy, cohesion policy, the new Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, the Connecting Europe Facility and the trans-European transport, telecommunications and energy networks, the Horizon 2020 programme, the Digital Agenda, the COSME programme and, in particular, the Integrated Maritime Policy, as well as policy on the CEAS[(20)](#ntr20-C_2013044EN.01000101-E0020). |

8.   Role of islands in the new macro-regional strategy

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| 8.1 | It is an undeniable fact that no comprehensive, permanent strategy has been established to date at EU level in the particular interests of the EU's island Member States (Cyprus and Malta), which face problems in areas such as transport and energy. Poor accessibility is preventing completion of the internal market. |

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| 8.2 | A new macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean will accurately identify connectivity approaches for Cyprus and Malta, and so establish the proper preconditions for deployment of EU funding. |

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| 8.3 | Cyprus (in the eastern Mediterranean) and Malta (in the western Mediterranean) could play a specific role in implementing and managing the new macro-regional strategy as the headquarters of any management bodies set up in or transferred to the region. |

9.   Potential role of the EESC in the macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean

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| 9.1 | In cooperation with the economic and social councils of the Member States in the Mediterranean and the equivalent bodies (where they exist) in the countries of North Africa, as well as civil society organisations, the EESC has decided to organise a meeting of Euro-Mediterranean economic and social councils, which is expected to be called soon. |

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| 9.2 | The EESC has the experience and knowledge to be a member of any forums for the Mediterranean that are set up. |

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| 9.3 | The EESC intends to continue drawing up specific opinions that explore the macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean in more detail. |

Brussels, 12 December 2012.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Staffan NILSSON

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