Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

**COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES**

Brussels, 10.05.1995
COM(95) 171 final

**COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL**

**CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT**

**FOR PEACEFUL** **NUCLEAR** **COOPERATION BETWEEN THE**

**EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND**

**THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Draft

COUNCIL DECISION

**approving** **the** **conclusion** **by the**
**Commision** **of** **an Agreement** **for** **peaceful nuclear co-operation**
**between** **the** **European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)**
**and** **the** **Government** **of** **the United States** **of** **America**

(presented by the Commission)

**COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL**

**CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT**

**FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE**

**EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND**

**THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF** **AMERICA**

_**^**_

**I.** **Introduction**

1. The co-operation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the
United States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy dates back to the late 1950's.
It was consolidated in a bilateral agreement that entered into force in 1960 and
will expire on 31 December 1995. A new co-operation agreement to replace the
existing one has been negotiated on the basis of negotiating Directives proposed
by the Commission and adopted by the Council on 16/12/1991. The successful
conclusion of these negotiations is the basis of this Communication to the Council
with its explanatory memorandum.

2. The co-operation developed over the last 35 years under this agreement is valued
as highly positive by both parties. For the European Union it has provided the
framework to import from the US essential materials, equipment and technology
that made it possible for the European nuclear industry to reach eventually a high
level of maturity. For the United States, peaceful nuclear co-operation with
Euratom provided a major and reliable nuclear trading partner with which there
was, since the beginning, a large degree of agreement on nuclear non-proliferation
issues which opened the way to the full commitment to the multilateral nuclear
non-proliferation regime that both the E.U. and the U.S. share today.

3. Both parties had therefore a favourable predisposition to negotiate a new
cooperation agreement. The degree of interest was however not the same, and as
regards Euratom it was greatly influenced by the adoption by the U.S. Congress
in 1978 of the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which introduced stricter
requirements - including some of a bilateral nature    - for U.S. peaceful cooperation with other countries. While Euratom and the U.S. realised that the
continuation of their bilateral co-operation in a field as sensitive as nuclear energy
was politically important, both sides started the negotiations with specific
priorities and not necessarily compatible agendas.

4. For the U.S. Administration it was particularly important to confirm in a new
agreement the vested rights that in its view result from the earlier nuclear exports
to Europe as well as to cast the new agreement within the basic requirements of
present U.S. law. The Commission, the Member States and the nuclear industry
of the Community were reluctant to envisage conditions for cooperation that - in
spite of the formally reciprocal character of all provisions     - could in practice
introduce and expand in an unpredictable manner consent rights on U.S.-obligated
nuclear material present in the E.U. and thus jeopardize the long term stability
that the Community nuclear industry needs for planning and carrying out its
activities.

_**\**_ _**<X**_

**5.** **It was important for both sides to successfully conclude a cooperation agreement,**
**and also as far as possible, to** **reach** **agreement within a timeframe that avoided**
**a lapse of the present Agreement. In the absence of an agreement, trade in US**
**obligated materials with the EU both directly and via third countries, such as**
**deliveries of US-obligated spent fuel from** **Japan and** **Switzerland for reprocessing**
**in the EU, would be halted. A lapse with no agreement in prospect, because of**
**its knock-on effects for third** **countries'** **fuel cycle choices, would be likely to**
**cause uncertainty and disruption in the international nuclear fuel market. Over a**
**lapse of many years, EU reprocessing and other fuel cycle business worth up to**
**10** **bn ECU could be at stake, and a similar amount of potential business possibly**
**lost by the US. However, a short lapse (for istance for the completion of US**
**Congressional approval procedures), while not without costs for EU industry in**
**rearranging business, would be unlikely to inflict major damage on the industry**
**EU dependency on US supplies is decreasing, and most of the spent fuel from**
**third countries is already inside the Union. It should be noted that in 1994, there**
**was an average stock in the territory of the European Union of 341 tonnes of**
**plutonium. Some** **31%** **of this is US obligated.**

**II.** **Summary of the negotiations**

**6.** **In view of the expiration of the current** **Euratom/U.S.** **Nuclear Co-operation**
**Agreement (signed in 1960)** **on 31.12.95, the Commission approved a**
**Communication to the Council for negotiating directiveson 23.7.91 and the**
**Council adopted these directives on** **16.12.91.** **The EU legal basis for negotiation**
**was the Euratom Treaty and the U.S. basis its domestic legislation - the Nuclear**
**Non-Proliferation** **Act of 1978** **(NNPA).** **Negotiations opened in 1992. Good**
**progress was made during 1992 and 1993 in agreeing texts, in particular, on**
**industrial** **and** **commercial co-operation, nuclear research** **and** **development, nuclear**
**safety and some aspects of safeguards, non-proliferation and related matters.**
**However, some difficulties were caused by U.S. requirements to insert in the**
**Agreement certain conditions stemming largely from U.S. domestic legislation -**
**the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978** **(NNPA).**

**7.** **Early in 1994 a high level** **démarche** **was made by the Commission to U.S.**
**Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher. The Commission advised the U.S.**
**that a waiver was the best solution to these problems. The U.S. Secretary of**
**State advised the Commission in June** **1994** **that the U.S. Government would not**
**be using this waiver but committed the U.S. side to flexibility in its negotiating**
**position. Faced with this situation, Commission negotiators strove to obtain**
**equivalent mechanisms that would provide,** **in** **practice, the same kind of long-term**
**assurances and predictability needed for the E.U. nuclear programmes and**
**international** **trade. The General Affairs Council of** **19/20** **December** **1994,** **while**
**confirming the December** **1991** **negotiating mandate, asked the Commission to**
**continue to explore possible solutions. Accordingly, the Commission negotiators**
**explored, in depth, a solution consisting of improving substantially the U.S.**
**original offer of advance generic prior consent on a programmatic basis.**

**8.** **The Commission considers that a draft agreement has been reached which fully**
**meets the requirements of the negotiating directives laid down by the Council and**

which preserves Euratom's essential interests.. Throughout all the lengthy period
of the negotiations, which started in March 1992 and involved fifteen formal
negotiating sesssions, the relevant Working Group of the Council (AQG) has been
associated in an unprecedented way withall steps and developments. Innumerable
meetings of the AQG, supplemented by frequent ad hoc information meetings in
die Commission's premises, have permitted the Commission to provide to Member
States prompt, in-depth and exhaustive information, to examine thoroughly with
them each issue at stake, and to receive from them an input that the Commission
has highly valued and that has contributed significantly to the ad-referendum
agreement which was finally reached with the US.

9. Given the extended negotiation period and the long procedures necessary for the
approval of theAgreement by the Council of Ministers and the US Congress (6-9
months), there has been an interest on both sides to conclude the Agreement as
soon as possible, so that the undesirable lapse of Agreement at the end of 1995
can be avoided. The strong economic interest of EU industry is for there to be no
gap between the expiry of the current agreement and the entry into force of a new
agreement.

**III.** **The results of the negotiations**

10. A primary objective of the negotiations was to agree on a legal framework which
would guarantee to European nuclear industry, whenever it operates with U n obligated materials, security of supply, stability and long-term predictability. The
Commission considers that these objectives have been attained, since the new
agreement, which will remain in force for at least 30 years, followed possibly by
subsequent 5-year roll-over periods, guarantees the following framework as long
as it remains in force :

any non-sensitive nuclear activities, as well as enrichment up to 20 %,
irradiation of fissile materials, and post-irradiation examination involving
chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material will be
freely and unconditionally allowed;

retransfers to third countries will take place according to procedures set
out in the agreed minute;

storage of sensitive fissile material will be possible in any facility that
meets the usual physical protection levels;

reprocessing and alteration in form or content of sensitive fissile materials
will take place under a generic programmatic consent, in facilities forming
part of the peaceful programme delineated by each Party; such generic
consent will, in normal circumstances, be defacto irrevocable, and
therefore valid in practice for the entire life of the agreement.

11. Against this general background, a number of specific difficult issues have been
successfully resolved as follows:

12. One of the major issues of particular concern to E.U. industry was the U.S. claim
for extension of U.S. obligations to non-U.S. items as a result of certain basic

**industrial operations, e.g. in power reactors for generating electricity. The U.S.**
**side finally conceded that there would be no practical change in the status quo**
**(under the current** **Euratom/U.S.** **Agreement) in these areas. .**

**13.** **Another special problem was the applicability of national legislation to operations**
**within the scope of this Agreement; in particular the E.U. could not accept that**
**a change in the U.S. NNPA, which Congress could make at any time, could lead**
**to U.S. action amounting to a determination to change the terms of co-operation.**
**In spite of U.S. strong resistance** **the** **Commission has secured an Article to protect**
**the E.U. position in this connection (Article 13).**

**14.** **As regards exchanges of technology and certain components a side-letter to the**
**proposed Agreement includes terms which are in E.U. interests.**

**15.** **In the area of nuclear safeguards, the text of the proposed Agreement confirms**
**that if, for any reason, I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards**
**were not being applied in the Community then co-operation could continue fully**
**under Euratom safeguards only. This is a useful guarantee and also a further**
**recognition of the non-proliferation credentials of the Community.**

**16.** **Furthermore, the U.S. had declined up to now to terminate its separate bilateral**
**nuclear agreements with Portugal, Spain,** **Austria,** **Finland and Sweden still in**
**force. Such termination was however a political priority for the Commission. It**
**has now been ensured that these agreements will be terminated on favourable**
**terms and that future relevant co-operation will take place under the proposed new**
**Agreement on more favourable terms for the EU than under these Member** **States'**
**existing agreements with the U.S.**

**17.** **Further issues to which attention should be drawn are:**

**a)** **Alteration in** **form** **or content of certain strategic material**
**The scope of such alterations is limited. In particular, processing and**
**production operations by E.U. industry for overseas customers (where**
**original U.S. supplies are involved) will continue without hindrance.**

**b)** **Storage of certain strategic material**
**The Commission has ensured that storage no longer falls** **under the**
**programmatic prior consent mechanism; only physical protection and**
**security aspects are relevant. These will pose no problems for Member**
**States.**

**c)** **Indefinite duration of consent rights (i.e. in the event the Agreement is**
**terminated or suspended - Article 14)**
**The Commission has not accepted wide U.S. claims for indefinite duration**
**of consent rights on the existing very large inventory of material already**
**transferred under the current agreement. The regime that would continue**
**to apply would be that of** **the** **current Agreement but including permanent**
**retransfer consent. Duration of consents relating to certain key fuel cycle**
**activities involving** **U.S.** **supplied material under the new Agreement will**

**be discussed by the Parties whenever the Agreement will terminate** _**[ l]**_ **and,**
**in case of disagreement, will be deferred to the decision of an arbitral**
**Tribunal. The result cannot be forecast at this stage, but achieving a**
**mutually agreed framework for later consultations on the extent of duration**
**of consent rights has been a key element in reaching agreement on a final**
**text.**

**d)** **Suspension of programmatic consent rights**

**(i)** **the programmatic consent rights** **may only** **be suspended if, after**
**full consultations, there is objective evidence to show that the**
**Union has committed a fundamental breach of the international**
**non-proliferation regime or unless the safeguarding or physical**
**protection of the installation concerned are seriously and directly**
**threatened. Given the non-proliferation commitments of Member**
**States of the European Union and their powers in this context to**
**enforce due application of safeguards and physical protection, this**
**means that the rights can be considered as de facto non-revocable;**

**(ii)** **even in the extremely unlikely event of such a suspension of the**
**consent rights, the Union retains all the rights existing under the**
**current** **Euratom/U.S.** **Agreement on a quantity of US- obligated**
**nuclear material equivalent to that on the inventory at the time of**
**the entry into force of the new Agreement.**

**The many other important operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. enrichment of**
**material and production of electricity, continue on the same basis as at present.**

**e)** **Automatic retransfer consent**
**For a wide range of exports of nuclear material the Commission has**
**obtained what is, in practice, an irrevocable advance consent for exports**
**(where U.S. obligated materials** **are involved) to proceed to those**
**countries which, as a minimum, meet non-proliferation** **requirements**
**acceptable to the Community. This is a major improvement on the current**
**regime** **(case^by-case** **U.S. prior** **consent) and brings** **considerable** **long-term**
**security to the** **E.U.'s** **international nuclear trade.**

**f)** **International obligation exchanges**
**The Community has obtained agreement** **to** **the principle of such exchanges**
**which allow, where feasible, book transfers of material internationally thus**
**avoiding the considerable costs of physical transfers as well as the**
**attendant need for safety and security measures during such transport.**

**After 30 years, but with automatic 5-year roll-over periods.**

**2)**

g) Special arrangements with Japan and Switzerland
The advantageous retransfer provisions set out in the Exchange of Notes
dated 18 July 1988 between the Commission and the United States have
been further improved in that these provisions remain in effect for the life
of this new Agreement and may only be suspended under the same
conditions as those applying to the Agreement. The provisions now also
extend to mixed oxide nuclear fuel. In a note attached to the proposed
Agreement the United States makes the political commitments that it will
apply such an arrangement to imports from and re-exports to Switzerland,
provided a U.S./Switzerland nuclear agreement continues to exist. These
arrangements are of particular value to the Union's reprocessing and mixed
oxide fuel fabrication operations which involve a substantial number of
jobs and generate large export revenue.

h) Commercial guarantees
Articles 3 and 4 provide for appropriate industrial and commercial cooperation, better procedures of handling licences for exports and the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material and information. The text of
Article 10 of the Agreement comprises a comprehensive set of commercial
guarantees of non-interference by the U.S. in the Union's domestic
operations and international trade (and vice versa). These are essential to
the Union's nuclear industry, especially since a significant quantity of USobligated material is already inside the EU. Paragraph 11 of the Agreed
Minute C further states that the consents embodied in the Agreement may
not be suspended owing to differences over the nature of the Parties'
peaceful nuclear programmes or fuel cycle choices, or for purposes of
obtaining commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering
the peaceful nuclear programmes or activities in the Community, the
Member States of the Community or the United States, or their peaceful
nuclear co-operation with third countries. This is the first time that the
U.S. has even given such extensive and important guarantees to a trading
partner.

**IV.** **Final overall** Assessment

18. The political and commercial importance of the Agreement should not be
underestimated. The positive results can be summarised as follows :

a) The nuclear energy aspects
As an important energy source for the Union (35% of all electricity is
nuclear produced), it was necessary to ensure that industrial and trade
aspects relating in particular to security of nuclear supply and
competitivity were secured by the Agreement. This Memorandum
demonstrates that, both within the Union and internationally, significant
advantages have been obtained in this respect. Although the E.U. is no
longer dependent on the U.S. in the nuclear sector, the Agreement forms
a secure and favourable basis for considerable co-operation and trade
between the E.U. and U.S. nuclear industries as well as a number of third

countries, and provides a durable framework for this trade to expand in the
future according to the commercial choices and needs of the E.U. nuclear

industry. It also responds effectively to the objectives of the Commission's
recent Energy Green paper.

b) Bilateral EC/US aspects
The differences of views, finally resolved, concerning U.S. claims for
consent rights should not overshadow the overall picture. The Union and
the United States are the two major players in this peaceful use of nuclear
energy. (Japan's position is of course also significant). The U.S. voiced
the view that it would be inconceivable not to have an Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the Union. This new Agreement
constitutes a strong expression of the political and economic value of the
partnership that exists between the U.S. and the Union reaffirmed in the
Joint Declaration on E.C./U.S. relations of November 1990. There is also
no doubt that certain key third countries such as Japan will also welcome
this Agreement as bringing stability to nuclear co-operation and trading in
the industrialised world.

c) International Non-Proliferation aspects
The European Union, its Member States and the United States have
indisputable non-proliferation credentials. These form a key basis of the
co-operation. Any form of co-operation under the Agreement is for
peaceful use only. Article 11 records that all material is subject to
international instruments dealing with their physical protection and
security. In addition safety aspects are covered. The Agreement ensures
that internationally accepted levels of non-proliferation and physical
protection apply indefinitely to all material and sets an appropriate
example for other countries.

19. It should be noted that this reciprocal Agreement must, of course, also be
approved by the U.S. Congress.

**V.** **Conclusion**

20. In conclusion, the Commission considers that the benefits and the satisfactory
provisions obtained constitute an Agreement which can suitably replace the
current Nuclear Agreement that expires at the end of 1995. The Commission
considers that the proposed new Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation between the
European Atomic Energy Community and the United States:

complies in all respects with the negotiating directives issued by the
Council on 16.12.1991;

guarantees to the European nuclear industries the stability, the long-term
predictability and all the assurances that they need;

will provide a significant contribution to strengthening the E.U./U.S.A.
overall relationship.

21. The Commission therefore invites the Council to approve the Decision set out in
the Annex.

Draft

**Council Decision approving the conclusion by the**
**Commision of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation**

**between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)**

**and the Government of the United States of America**

```
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

```

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and
in particular the second paragraph of Article 101 thereof,

Having regard to the draft decision presented by the Commission,

WHEREAS the Commission has carried out negotiations in accordance with Council
directives, adopted by Council Decision of 16.12.1991, for an Agreement between the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the United States of
America,

WHEREAS the conclusion by the Commission of that Agreement should be approved,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS

Sole Article

The conclusion by the Commission of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation
between the European Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the United States
is hereby approved.

The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.

Done in Brussels

For the Council,
The President

**?**

**AGREEMENT FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES**

**OF NUCLEAR ENERGY BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY**

**COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY** **COMMUNITY,** **HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO**
**AS** **"THE** **COMMUNITY", AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF**
**AMERICA, HEREINAFTER REFERRED** **TO** **AS "THE UNITED STATES** **OF** **AMERICA";**

**PREAMBLE**

**Whereas the Community and the United States of America concluded an Agreement which**
**entered into force on 27 August 1958 and an Additional Agreement for Co-operation which**
**entered into force on 25 July 1960, as subsequently amended, which expire on 31 December**
**1995;**

**Whereas the Community and the United States of America recognise the value of their past**
**co-operation** **in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and wish to provide for renewed** **co-**
**operation on the basis of equality, mutual** **benefit,** **reciprocity and without prejudice to the**
**respective powers of each Party;**

**Whereas the Community and the United States of America are convinced that by**
**strengthening and expanding their partnership on an** **equal footing** **they will contribute to**
**continued international stability as well as to political and economic progress;**

**Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America have attained**
**a comparable advanced level in the use of nuclear energy for electricity production, in the**
**development of their nuclear industries and in the security afforded by their respective laws**
**and regulations concerning health, safety, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the**
**protection of the environment;**

**Whereas it is** **necessary** **to establish the conditions** **governing** **transfers of nuclear items**
**between the Community and the United States of America, to ensure continued compliance**
**with the requirement for free movement of such items within the Community and to avoid**
**interference in nuclear programmes in place in the Community and the United States of**
**America as well as in their international trading relations;**

**Whereas all Member States of the Community and the United States of America are** **Parties**
**to the Treaty on the** **Non-Proliferation** **of Nuclear Weapons, hereinafter referred to** **as** **"the**
**Non-Proliferation** **Treaty";**

**Whereas the Community, its Member States, and the United States of America are committed**
**to ensuring that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes**
**are carried out in a manner consistent with the objectives of that Treaty;**

**Whereas nuclear safeguards are applied in the Community pursuant to the Treaty establishing**
**the European Atomic Energy Community;**

**Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America reaffirm their**
**support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, hereinafter referred to as "the IAEA",**
**and of its safeguards system;**

**Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly**
**committed to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation and related safeguards**
**regimes;**

**Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly**
**committed to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and are Parties to the**
**International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;**

**Whereas it is desirable to facilitate, as appropriate, trade, exchanges and co-operation**
**activities at an industrial and commercial scale, including peaceful international co-operation**
**with third Parties, in accordance with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;**

**Whereas it is also desirable to set up a framework for exchanges of information and for**
**consultations** **between** **the Parties on nuclear matters of common interest;**

**Whereas co-operation should extend to nuclear research and development on nuclear safety**
**and to regulatory and operational aspects of radiological protection;**

**Whereas co-operation relating to nuclear fission research and development in such fields as**
**safety, radiological protection, health and the environment, and safeguards may be subject to**
**specific agreements between the Community and the United States of America;**

**Whereas the Community and the United States of America contribute to international** **co-**
**operation in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion and, in particular, to the activities**
**of the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER);**

**Whereas it is appropriate that the nuclear co-operation Agreements concluded between, on the**
**one hand, the United States of America and, on the other hand, the Republic of Austria, the**
**Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of**
**Finland before their accession to the European Community be terminated upon the entry into**
**force of the present Agreement;**

**Whereas likewise the United States of America is prepared to terminate any nuclear** **co-**
**operation agreement it may have with third states acceding to the Community,**

**HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:**

_**1**_ **O**

**Article 1**

**SCOPE OF CO-OPERATION**

**1.** **The Parties may co-operate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the following**

**areas:**

**A)** **Nuclear fission research and development on such terms as may be agreed**
**between the Parties;**

**B)** **Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence,** **as** **set out in Article**
**2;**

**C)** **Facilitation of exchange and** **co-operation** **activities at an industrial or**
**commercial scale between persons and undertakings;**

**D)** **Subj** **ect to the provisions of this** **Agreement,** **supply between the Parties of** **non-**
**nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment and** **provision** **of** **nuclear** **fuel**
**cycle services, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third**
**countries;**

**E)** **Exchange of information on major international questions related to nuclear**
**energy, such as promotion** **of** **development in the field of international nuclear**
**safeguards and non-proliferation within areas of mutual interest and**
**competence, including collaboration with the IAEA on safeguards matters and**
**dn** **the interaction between nuclear energy and the environment;**

**F)** **Controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects;**

**G)** **Other areas of mutual interest.**

**2.** **The co-operation referred to in this Article, as between the Parties, may also take place**
**between persons and undertakings established in the respective territories of the Parties.**

**Article 2**

**CO-OPERATION ON NUCLEAR RESEARCH** **AND** **DEVELOPMENT**

**1.** **The Parties may co-operate in nuclear research and development including the**

**following activities, in so far as they are covered by the respective nuclear research and**
**development programmes of the Parties:**

**a.** **nuclear safety, including regulatory and operational aspects of radiological**
**protection;**

**b.** **development of nuclear energy including, inter alia, research into new reactors,**
**decommissioning of nuclear installations, radiological safety research into**

_**4s\**_

**waste management and disposal and interaction between nuclear energy and**
**the environment;**

**c.** **nuclear safeguards;**

**d.** **research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including, inter** **-alia,** **bilateral**
**activities** **and** **contributions towards multilateral projects such as the**
**International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).**

**2.** **Co-operation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training,**
**exchange of personnel, meetings, exchanges of samples, materials and instruments for**
**experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.**

**3.** **Information arising from the implementation of this article which, in the judgement**
**of the appropriate authorities of the Parties, should be placed in the public domain may be**
**so disseminated by them in a consolidated or other appropriate form, subject to the Guidelines**
**set out in Annex B.**

**Article 3**

**INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CO-OPERATION**

**In** **conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Parties**
**undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and**
**technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, the Parties**
**will facilitate, as appropriate, commercial** **relations** **between persons and undertakings**
**involving nuclear co-operation.**

**Such co-operation may include, but is not limited to:**

**investments;**
**joint ventures;**

**environmental aspects at industrial or commercial scale;**
**trade in nuclear items,** **non-nuclear** **material and technical and specialised services as**
**specified in Article 4;**
**licensing arrangements between persons and undertakings in the territory of either**
**Party.**

**4** **2L**

Article 4

NUCLEAR **TRADE**

**1.** The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves, in the mutual interests
of .industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries
and either Party of items obligated to the other Party.

2. Authorisations, including export and import licences as well as authorisations or
consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movements
on the territories of the Parties shall not be used to restrict trade. The relevant authority shall
act upon applications for such authorisations as soon as possible after submission and without
unreasonable expense. Appropriate administrative procedures shall be in place to ensure
respect of this provision.

Article 5

**ITEMS** **SUBJECT** **TO THE AGREEMENT**

**1.** Non- nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment transferred between the Parties or
their respective persons or undertakings, whether directly or through a third country, shall
become subject to this Agreement upon their entry into the territorial jurisdiction of the
receiving Party, provided that the supplying Party has notified the receiving Party in writing
of the intended transfer and the receiving Party has acknowledged in writing the receipt of
this notification.

2. Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment referred to in this Article shall
remain subject to the provisions of this Agreement until it has been determined, in-accordance
with the procedures set out in the Administrative Arrangement:

that such items have been retransferred beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving Party;
that nuclear material or non-nuclear material are no longer usable for any nuclear
activity relevant from the point of view of international safeguards or have become
practically irrecoverable;
or that equipment is no longer usable for nuclear purposes.

Article 6

SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards required under this Agreement shall be those applied by the Community
pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and by the IAEA pursuant to the following safeguards
agreements, as relevant, as they may be revised and replaced so long as coverage as required
by the Non-Proliferation Treaty is provided for:

**/)3**

**3)**

**(a)** **the agreement between the Community, its non-nuclear weapon Member States**
**and the IAEA., which entered into force on 21.2.1977;**

**(b)** **the agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom of Great Britain**
**and Northern Ireland and the IAEA., which entered into force on 14.08.78;**

**(c)** **the agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA, which entered**
**into force on 12.9.1981;**

**(d)** **the agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA, which**
**entered into force on 9.12.1980;**

**2.** **(A)** **Nuclear material transferred to the Community pursuant to this Agreement, and**

**special fissionable material used in or produced** **through** **the use of any non-**
**nuclear material, nuclear material or** **equipment,** **so transferred, shall be subject**
**to the relevant agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.**

**(B)** **Nuclear material transferred to the United States pursuant to this Agreement,**
**and special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of any**
**non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment, so transferred, shall be**
**subject to the agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d) of this Article.**

**3.** **In the event that any of the IAEA safeguards agreements referred to in paragraph**
**1(a),** **(b) or (c) are not being applied,**

**(a)** **the Community shall enter into an agreement or** **agreements** **with the IAEA for**
**the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent**
**to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c)**
**or,** **if that is not possible,**

**(b)** **the Community shall give the United States of America an assurance that**
**safeguards are being applied by the Community which provide for effectiveness and**
**coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by**
**paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c). In the fulfillment of obligations arising from these**
**paragraphs, the United States of America hereby recognizes the unique role and**
**importance of the Euratom safeguards system and of** **its** **application in the Community**
**pursuant to the Euratom Treaty. In this context, the United States of America further**
**takes note that the IAEA, pursuant to the safeguards agreements concluded with the**
**Community and its Member States as well as in subsequent implementing**
**arrangements shall take due account, inter alia, of the effectiveness of the**
**Community's system of safeguards enabling the IAEA to deploy an inspection effort**
**less than** **that** **applied under other safeguards agreements in which there are**
**comparable nuclear facilities producing, processing, using or storing safeguarded**
**nuclear material where a regional safeguards system does not exist.**

**(c)** **In the event that conditions arise which do not permit application of such**
**safeguards by the Community, the Parties shall immediately establish safeguards**
**arrangements for the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and**

**4** **S**

**coverage equivalent to that provided** **by** **the safeguards agreements required by**
**paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c) of this Article.**

**4.** **In the event that the** **IAEA,** **safeguards Agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d) of this**
**Article, is not being applied,**

**(a)** **the United** **States** **of America shall enter into an agreement or agreements with**
**the IAEA for the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and**
**coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreement required by**
**paragraph 1(d) of this Article; or, if that is not possible,**

**(b)** **the Parties shall immediately establish safeguards arrangements for the**
**application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage**
**equivalent to that provided by the** **safeguards** **agreement required by paragraph**
**1(d) of this Article.**

**Article 7**

**PEACEFUL USE**

**1.** **Co-operation** **under this Agreement shall be carried out for peaceful purposes.**

**2.** **Non-nuclear material, nuclear material** **and** **equipment transferred pursuant to this**
**Agreement and special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such items**
**shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or** **development** **of any**
**nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.**

**Article 8**

**NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE** **ACTTVITIES**

**1.** **The nuclear fuel cycle activities carried out pursuant to this Agreement include :**

**(A)** **Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty**
**percent in the isotope 235, of** **uranium** **transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well**
**as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred.**
**Enrichment of such uranium to more than twenty percent in the isotope 235 and**
**reenrichment of such uranium already enriched to more than twenty percent in the**
**isotope 235 may be carried out according to** **conditions** **agreed upon in writing which**
**shall be the subject of consultations between the Parties within 40 days of the receipt**
**of a request from either Party.**

**(B)** **Irradiation within** **the** **territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium,**
**uranium-233, high enriched uranium** **and** **irradiated nuclear material transferred**
**pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear**
**material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred;**

_**Af**_

**(C)** **Retransfer to third countries according to procedures set out in the Agreed**
**Minute of:**

**(i)** **low enriched uranium, non-nuclear material, equipment and source material**
**transferred pursuant to this Agreement or of low enriched uranium produced**
**through the use of nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to this**
**Agreement, for nuclear fuel cycle activities other than the production** **of** **HEU;**

**(ii)** **irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated**
**nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material,**
**nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for**
**storage or disposal not** **involving** **reprocessing;**

**(iii)** **other nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and other special**
**fissionable material produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear**
**material or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for other fuel**
**cycle activities including those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of** **this** **Article.**

**(D)** **Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of**
**irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear**
**material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material**
**or equipment so transferred.**

**The following nuclear fuel cycle activities may be** **carried** **out pursuant to this**
**Agreement within the territorial jurisdiction of** **either** **Party in facilities forming part**
**of the delineated peaceful nuclear programs described in Annex A:**

**A)** **Reprocessing of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and**
**nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear**
**material or equipment so transferred;**

**B)** **Alteration in form or content of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched**
**uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the**
**use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred;**

**The following nuclear materials:**

**(i) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium, if not contained in irradiated**
**nuclear fuel, transferred pursuant to this Agreement;**

**(ii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered from nuclear**
**material transferred pursuant to this Agreement;**

**(iii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered from nuclear**
**material used in equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement**

**may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of**
**physical protection that are set out in Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/Rev.**

_**4£**_

1/Part 1 (Guidelines for nuclear transfers) as it may be revised and accepted by the
Parties and the Member States of the Community.

Each Party shall record its facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A
Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make
changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written
acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after
the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification
has been received.

If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being
fully complied with, immediate consultations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 12.2 of this Agreement may be called for.

The Parties shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary corrective
measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels
of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. If this proves not
to be feasible, the nuclear material in question shall be transferred for storage at
another appropriate, listed facility.

Article 9

**INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS EXCHANGES**

The Parties shall establish expeditious procedures to be applied when nuclear material is to
be made subject to this Agreement or removed from the coverage of this Agreement. These
procedures shall include provisions on international exchanges of obligations, which will be
set out in the Administrative Arrangement, provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 16.

Article 10

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. The terms of this Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and with due regard
to the legitimate commercial interests, whether international or domestic, of either Party.

2. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed :

(a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either
Party;

(b) to avoid interference in such activities; v_

(c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic
and safe conduct of such activities;

**-1T-**

(d) to take full account of the long-term requirements of the nuclear energy
programmes in place in the Community and in the U.S.A.

3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used for the purpose of :

(a) securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, or of restricting trade to
the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hampering
their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;

(b) interfering with the nuclear policy or programmes of either Party nor for
hindering the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

_(c)_ impeding the free movement of nuclear material, non-nuclear material and
equipment within the territory of the Community.

4. In exercising the rights arising from other nuclear co-operation agreements it might
have concluded with third parties, each Party to this agreement will pay due regard to the
legitimate commercial interests of the other Party; in case of difficulty either Party may call
for consultations which shall take place within 40 days, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 12.

Article 11

**PHYSICAL PROTECTION**

**1.** Nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable
material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or
equipment so transfened shall be subject to adequate measures of physical protection.

2. Such physical protection measures shall be at levels which shall satisfy the criteria set
out in Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/Revl/Parti (Guidelines for nuclear
transfers) as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the
Community. As a supplement to this document, the Member States of the Community, the
Commission of the European Communities (as appropriate), and the United States of America
will refer, when applying these measures, to the recommendations of IAEA document
INFCIRC 225/Rev.3 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as it may be revised and
accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the Community.

3. International transport of nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall be subject
to the provisions of the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (INFCIRC 274/Rev.l), as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the
Member States of the Community.

_**4%**_

**Article 12**

**CONSULTATION AND ARBITRATION**

**1.** **The Parties shall consult** **at** **the request of either of them to promote co-operation under**
**this Agreement and to ensure its effective implementation. A Joint Committee shall be**
**established for these purposes. This Committee** **will** **also consult on nuclear questions of**
**mutual interest and any other significant matters relating to the** **co-operation** **envisaged by this**
**Agreement. A Joint Technical Working** **Group** **reporting to the Joint Committee will be set**
**up to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangement referred**
**to** **in** **Article 16.**

**2.** **The Parties shall consult, at the request of either of** **them,** **on any question arising out**
**of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.**

**3.** **Any dispute arising out of** **the** **interpretation or application of** **this** **Agreement shall be**
**settled by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or other similar procedure or, if both Parties**
**agree, by submission to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed of three arbitrators**
**appointed in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. Each Party shall designate one**
**arbitrator and the two arbitrators so** **designated** **shall elect a** **third,** **a national of** **a** **country other**
**than the United States or a Member State of** **the** **Community, who shall be the Chairman. If,**
**within thirty days of the request for arbitration, a Party has not designated an arbitrator, the**
**other Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an**
**arbitrator. The same procedure shall** **apply** **if, within thirty days of the designation or**
**appointment of** **the** **second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been** **elected,** **provided that**
**the third arbitrator so appointed shall not be a national of** **the** **United States or of** **a** **Member**
**State of** **the** **Community.** **All** **decisions shall require the concurrence of** **two** **arbitrators. The**
**arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be**
**binding on the Parties.**

**Article 13**

**SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION**

**A. CIRCUMSTANCES**

**1.** **If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time following the entry**

**into force of this Agreement:**

**(a)** **materially acts in violation of the fundamental provisions of Articles 4, 5, 6,**
**7, 10** **or 11** **of the Agreement or contravenes a decision of** **the** **arbitral tribunal**
**refened to in Article 12 of this Agreement, or**

**(b)** **takes action of** **any** **kind which results in a material violation of** **its** **obligations**
**under this Agreement, including prevention of nuclear trade envisaged under**
**this Agreement,**

_**h**_ **9**

**the other Party shall have the right to cease further co-operation under this Agreement or to**
**suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, this Agreement.**

**2.** **If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time following entry into**
**force of** **this** **Agreement terminates or abrogates a safeguards agreement with the Agency and**
**the safeguards agreement so terminated or abrogated has not been replaced by an equivalent**
**safeguards agreement when appropriate and relevant, the other Party shall have the right to**
**require the return in whole or in part of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment**
**transferred pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable material produced through the**
**use of such items.**

**3.** **If the Community or a non-nuclear weapon State member of the Community detonates**
**a nuclear explosive device, the Government of the United States of America shall have the**
**right specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.**

**4.** **If a** **nuclear-weapon-State** **member of the Community detonates a nuclear explosive**
**device using any item subject to this Agreement, the United States shall have the right**
**specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.**

**5.** **If the United States of America detonates a nuclear explosive device using any item**
**subject to this Agreement, the Community shall** **hâve** **the** **right** **specified in paragraph 2 of this**
**Article.**

**B.** **IMPLEMENTATION**

**6.** **Before either Party decides to take action pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 5 above, the**
**Parties** **shall hold consultations for the purpose of taking corrective measures and shall**
**carefully consider the effects of such action, taking into account the need to make such other**
**appropriate arrangements as may be required and, in particular, to ensure security and**
**continuity of supply and adequate time for replacement and further to honour** **commitments**
**to third countries and their industrial entities.**

**7.** **Before taking action under this Article, the Parties shall consider whether the facts**
**triggering.such** **steps were caused deliberately.**

**8.** **Action under this Article shall only be taken if** **the** **other Party fails to take corrective**
**measures within an appropriate period of** **time following** **consultations.**

**9.** **If either Party exercises its right, pursuant to paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, to**
**require the return of any items, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the**
**control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof**
**and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items**
**is to be required, the Parties shall determine jointly the relevant quantity of nuclear items,**
**taking account of** **the** **circumstances involved. The Parties shall further satisfy themselves that**
**full safety, radiological and physical protection measures, in accordance with their existing**
**obligations, are taken in relation to the return of the items, that no unreasonable risks are**
**incurred and that the return of items takes place in a manner consistent with all the relevant**
**laws and regulations of the Parties.**

**2o**

**Article 14**

**DURATION AND AMENDMENT**

**1.** **This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange**
**diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary for**
**its entry into force have been** **completed.**

**2.** **This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of thirty years and shall continue**
**in force thereafter for additional periods of five** **years** **each. Either Party may, by** **giving** **six**
**months'** **written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at** **the** **end of the initial**
**thirty year period or at the end of any subsequent five year period.**

**3.** **Notwithstanding the termination or suspension of this Agreement, the rights and**
**obligations pursuant to Articles 6, 7, 8.1.(C) and** **11** **and to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10,** **11**
**and 12 of the Agreed Minute shall continue in effect.**

**4.** **If a Party gives to the other Party the written notice provided for in paragraph 2, or**
**if a Party** **suspends** **or terminates this Agreement pursuant to Article 13.1, the Parties shall**
**hold consultations as soon as possible** **but** **not later** **than** **one month afterwards, for the purpose**
**of deciding** **jointly** **whether, in addition to those referred to** **in** **paragraph 3 of this Article,**
**further rights and obligations arising out of this** **Agreement,** **and in particular out of Article**
**8.1 (A), 8.1.(B), 8.1.(D), 8.2. and 8.3. and the Agreed Minute relating thereto, shall continue**
**in** **effect.**

**5. If the Parties are unable to reach a joint decision pursuant to** **paragraph** **4,**

**a.** **quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the inventory described in Article**
**20.1.,** **and items of equipment described in Article 20.2., shall continue to** **be**
**subject to the provisions of Articles 8.1.(A), 8.1.(B), 8.1.(D), 8.2., 8.3. and**
**Article 13 and their Agreed Minute but only to the extent** **covered** **by** **the**
**Agreements referred to in Article 19.**

**b.** **The** **question** **whether further rights and obligations, in addition to those**
**referred** **to** **in paragraph 3 and subparagraph (a) of this paragraph of this**
**Article, shall continue in effect** **in** **relation to nuclear material and equipment**
**not covered by sub-paragraph (a), and to** **all** **non-nuclear material, shall be**
**submitted to an arbitral tribunal** **composed** **pursuant to Article 12.3. The**
**tribunal shall** **make its decision on the basis of the application of** **the** **rules and**
**principles of international** **law,** **and** **in particular the Vienna Convention on the**
**Law of Treaties.**

**c.** **If the arbitral tribunal decides that rights and obligations other than those**
**referred to in** **paragraph** **3 of this Article shall not** **continue** **in effect with**
**respect to non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment subject to**
**arbitration pursuant to subparagraph (b), either Party shall have the right to**
**require, subject to the procedures provided for in Article 13.9, the return of**

**2-7**

**=U**

**such non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment in the territory of**
**the other Party on the day of termination of this Agreement.**

**d.** **Until the Parties reach a joint decision or the arbitral tribunal renders its**
**decision, this Agreement will remain in force notwithstanding the written**
**notice pursuant to para. 2.**

**6.** **The Parties may consult, at the request of either, on possible amendments to this**
**Agreement, particularly to take account of international developments in the field of nuclear**
**safeguards. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall**
**enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each**
**other that their respective internal procedures necessary for its entry into force have been**
**completed.**

**Article 15**

**MULTIPLE OBLIGATIONS**

**1.** **The Parties shall endeavour to avoid any difficulties arising out of the overlapping of**
**obligations on nuclear material as a result of the application of several agreements concerning**
**international trade.**

**2.** **The Parties shall promote multilateral consultations with a view to achieving mutually**
**satisfactory solutions at international level.**

**Article 16**

**ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT**

**1.** **The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative**
**Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this**
**Agreement.**

**2** **The principles of fungibility, equivalence and proportionality shall apply to nuclear**
**material subject to the Agreement and the detailed provisions thereof will be set out in the**
**Administrative Arrangement.**

**3.** **An Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended**
**by written agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Parties.**

_**I**_ _**h**_

**Article 17**

**INTELLECTUAL** **PROPERTY**

**1.** **The Parties shall apply international rules they have both formally accepted governing**
**the treatment of** **intellectual** **property and technology transfers to intellectual property created**
**or transferred and technology transferred pursuant to this Agreement.**

**2.** **Annex (B) shall apply to intellectual property created or transfened and technology**
**transferred pursuant to this** **Agreement.**

**3.** **The Parties shall** **ensure** **that individual agreements they enter into pursuant to Annex**
**B are consistent with this Agreement and with any additional rules concerning treatment of**
**sensitive or confidential information in the nuclear field that may** **be** **agreed by the Parties.**

**Article 18**

**STATUS OF** **ANNEXES**

**The Annexes form an integral part of this Agreement and, unless expressly provided**
**otherwise, a reference to this Agreement includes its Annexes.**

**Article 19**

**TERMINATION** **OF** **EXISTING AGREEMENTS**

**1.** **The Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the**
**Government of the United States of America that entered into force on 27 August 1958 and**
**the Additional Agreement for Co-operation that entered into force on 25 July 1960, as**
**subsequently amended, shall be terminated upon the** **entry** **into force of this Agreement.**

**2.** **The bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements that the United States of America has**
**concluded with the Republic of** **Austria,** **on** **11** **July** **1969,** **the Kingdom of** **Spain,** **on 20 March**
**1974,** **the Portuguese Republic, on** **16 May** **1974,** **the Kingdom of Sweden, on 19 December**
**1983,** **and the Republic of** **Finland,** **on 2 May 1985, shall be terminated upon the entry into**
**force of** **this** **Agreement. The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out**
**of such agreements shall be replaced by those of this Agreement.**

**3.** **The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out of a nuclear** **co-**
**operation agreement between the United States of** **America** **and any third State that accedes**
**to the Community after the entry into force of this Agreement shall be replaced by those** **of**
**this Agreement upon accession by that State to the Community. The rights and obligations**
**with respect to other areas of** **nuclear** **co-operation shall be the subject of negotiations between**
**the Community, the United States of America and the third state concerned, in** **accordance**
**with the provisions of Article 106 of the Euratom Treaty.**

_**2-3**_

**the Community, the United States of America and the third state concerned, in accordance**
**with the provisions of Article** **106** **of the Euratom Treaty.**

**Article 20**

**INITIAL INVENTORIES**

**1.** **The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the inventory of nuclear material**
**formerly subject to the agreements referred to in Article** **19** **from the date such agreements**
**are terminated pursuant to the provisions of that Article.**

**2.** **The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to equipment and non-nuclear material**
**transferred pursuant to the agreements referred to in Article 19 only to the extent covered by**
**those agreements.**

**3.** **The inventories of nuclear material, equipment and non-nuclear material subject to the**
**agreements referred to in Article 19 shall be approved by the appropriate authorities of the**
**Parties.**

**Article 21**

**DEFINITIONS**

**For the purposes of this Agreement:**

**1.** **"Parties"** **means the Government of the United States of America and the European**
**Atomic Energy Community.**

**2.** **a)** **"Community" means** **both:**

**I.** **the legal person created by the Treaty establishing the European**
**Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Party to this Agreement;**
**II.** **the territories to which the Euratom Treaty applies;**

**b)** **"within the Community" means within the territories to** **which** **the Euratom**
**Treaty applies;**

**c)** **"beyond the Community" has the corresponding meaning.**

**3.** **"Appropriate authority" means, in the case of the United States of** **America,** **the**
**Department of** **State;** **in the case of** **the** **Community, the European Commission, or such other**
**authority as the Party concerned may at any time notify to the other Party;**

**4.** **"Equipment" means any reactor as a complete unit, other than one designed or used**
**primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium-233 or any other item so designated**
**jointly by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.**

**2y**

**5.** **"Non-nuclear** **material"** **means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use**
**in a** **reactor** **to slow down** **high** **velocity neutrons and increase** **the** **likelihood of further**
**fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties;**

**6.** **"Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material.**
**"Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature;**
**uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal,**
**alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the**
**foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to**
**time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the Agency may**
**determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties.** **"Special**
**fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope** **233**
**or 235, any substance containing one or more of** **the** **foregoing, and such other substances as**
**the Board of Governors of the Agency may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate**
**authorities of** **both** **Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source** **material".**
**Any determination by the** **Board** **of Governors of the Agency under Article XX of that**
**Agency's Statute or** **otherwise** **that amends the list of materials** **considered** **to be "source**
**material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when**
**both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such**
**amendment.**

**7.** **"High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to more than twenty percent in**
**the isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233);** **"low** **enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to**
**twenty percent or less in the isotope 235** **(and/or** **uranium 233);**

**8.** **The following definitions relate to Article 17 and Annex B:**

**- "Cooperative activity" means any joint activity carried on under this Agreement,**
**and includes joint research.**

**- "Information" means scientific or technical data, results or methods of research and**
**development stemming from the joint research and any other information deemed**
**necessary to be provided or exchanged under this Agreement or research pursuant**
**thereto.**

**- "Joint research" means research undertaken jointly by the Parties directly or on**
**their behalf by a person, legal entity, research institute or other body designated by**
**a Party or research undertaken jointly by participants.**

**- "Participant" means a person, legal entity, research institute or other body**
**participating in joint research but not on behalf of one of the Parties.**

**9.** **"Persons and undertakings" means any natural person who, and any undertaking or**
**institution, whatever its public or private legal status, which pursues all or any of** **its** **activities**
**within the Community or in the territory of** **the** **United States of America within the scope of**
**this Agreement.**

#### **_zs_**

**10.** **"Alteration in form or content" means conversion of plutonium, high** **enriched**
**uranium or uranium 233 or fabrication of fuel containing plutonium, high enriched uranium**
**or uranium 233; it does not include post irradiation examination involving chemical**
**dissolution or separation, dissasembly or reassembly of fuel assemblies, irradiation,**
**reprocessing or enrichment.**

**11.** **"Storage facility" means any facility (or any part of a facility so designated by**
**inclusion in one of the lists referred to in Article 8.3) the primary purpose and function of**
**which is the separate storage of sensitive nuclear** **material** **as described in paragraphs (i), (ii)**
**and (iii) of Article 8.3 under adequate conditions of control, safety and safeguards as well as**
**of physical protection as described in Article** **11.2.**

**In witness whereof the** **undersigned,** **being duly authorized thereto by the Government of the**
**United States and the European Atomic Energy Community respectively, have signed this**
**Agreement.**

**Done at Brussels on** **1995** **and at Washington on** **1995, in**
**duplicate.**

**For the European Atomic Energy Community,** **For the United States of America**

**2£**

**AGREED MINUTE**

**During the negotiation of the Agreement for** **Co-operation** **in the peaceful uses of nuclear**
**energy between the United States of America and the Community signed today, the following**
**understandings, which shall** **be** **an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.**

**A. PEACEFUL PURPOSES**

**1.** **The Parties agree that, with reference to Article 7, "peaceful purposes" includes**
**provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network or production of**
**radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in a military hospital.**

**B.** **NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES**

**2.** **Upon entry into force of** **this** **Agreement, the Parties shall exchange lists of third**
**countries to which retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(i) may be made by the other Party.**
**Eligibility for continued inclusion on such lists shall be based, as a minimum, upon**
**satisfaction of the fojlowing criteria :**

**third countries must** **have** **made effective non-proliferation commitments, normally by**
**being party to, and in full respect of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation**
**Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco and by being in compliance with the conditions of**
**INFCIRC** **254/Rev.l/Partl,** **and**

**in case of retransfer of items obligated to the United States from the territory of the**
**Member States of the Community, third countries must be party to a nuclear** **co-**
**operation agreement with the United States.**

**3.** **Should retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(ii) and (iii) be requested in the future**
**by a Party, a list of** **third** **countries to which such retransfers may be made, shall be provided**
**by the other Party. In this connection, the Parties shall take into account the following**
**additional criteria:**

**consistency of the proposed action with the guidelines contained in IAEA document**
**INFCIRC** **225/Rev.3** **and with the provisions of IAEA document INFCIRC** **274/Rev.** **1,**
**as they may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States;**

**the nature and content of the peaceful nuclear programs of the third country in**
**question;**

**the potential proliferation and security implications of the transfer for either Party or**
**a Member State of the Community.**

**^**

**4.** **Either Party may add eligible third countries to its lists at any time. Either Party may**
**delete third countries from its lists following consultations with the other Party. Neither Party**
**shall delete third countries from its lists for the purpose of obtaining commercial advantage**
**or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear programmes of the other Party**
**or its peaceful nuclear co-operation with third countries. The Parties will co-operate in efforts**
**to obtain as soon as possible on a generic basis a confirmation from the third** **countries** **on the**
**lists that any retransferred items will be subject to any agreement for co-operation in force**
**between the receiving country and the non-retransferring Party. The receipt of such**
**confirmation shall not constitute a pre-condition for the addition of a third country to the**
**lists.**

**5.** **The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the**
**provisions set out in the Exchange of Notes dated** **18** **July 1988 between the Commission of**
**the** **European Communities and the United States Mission to the European Communities**
**concerning the Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between**
**the United States of America and Japan shall remain in effect as long as this Agreement**
**remains in force. The Parties confirm that the above-mentioned provisions shall apply, inter**
**alia, to plutonium contained in mixed oxide fuel. The consents granted therein may be**
**suspended only if an event of the same or greater degree of seriousness as those referred to**
**in paragraph 8 arises which directly threatens either the retransfer or the activities involving**
**the retransferred plutonium in Japan.**

**6.** **With reference to paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement and notwithstanding**
**paragraph 6 of Article 14, either Party, acting through its appropriate authorities, may make**
**changes to the peaceful nuclear programmes it has delineated by notifying the other Party in**
**writing in accordance with the procedures set forth below and receiving a written**
**acknowledgement.**

**7.** **Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the**
**notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received.**

**Intended changes in delineated programmes shall receive the fullest possible consideration**
**during consultations under the Agreement, which may include discussions on safeguards.**

**(A)** **For an addition of a facility within its territorial jurisdiction to the peaceful nuclear**
**programme delineated by the Community, the notification shall contain:**

**(i)** **the name, type and location of** **the** **facility and its existing or planned capacity;**

**(ii)** **a confirmation that the Euratom Safeguards Regulation 3227/76, as amended,**
**is fully applied;**

**(iii)** **for a facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections pursuant to a safeguards**
**agreement referred to in paragraph** **1** **(a), (b) or (c) of Article 6, a confirmation**
**that relevant safeguards arrangements have been agreed upon with the IAEA**
**and that those arrangements will permit the IAEA to exercise fully its rights**
**pursuant to the aforementioned safeguards agreements, in the light of how**
**these agreements are implemented during the life of this Agreement and so as**
**to enable the IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection goal.**

_**2%**_

**(iv)** **such non-confidential information as is** **available** **to the Community on the**
**IAEA safeguards approach and information on Euratom safeguards relevant to**
**the facility;**

**(v)** **a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by Article** **11** **of**
**this Agreement will be applied.**

**(B)** **For an addition of a facility within its territorial jurisdiction to the** **delineated**
**peaceful nuclear programme of the United States, the notification shall contain:**

**(i)** **the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or planned**
**capacity;**

**(ii)** **for facilities licensed or certified by the United States Nuclear**
**Regulatory Commission, a confirmation that the Fundamental Nuclear**
**Material Control Plan, describing how the requirements of the U.S.**
**Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 74,** **as;** **amended, will be**
**met, has been approved for the facility; for United States Department**
**of Energy civil facilities, a confirmation that the** **facility** **is in**
**compliance with the requirements of the Department of Energy Order**
**5633.3B,** **"Control** **and Accountability of Nuclear Materials," and**
**associated guides, as amended;**

**(iii)** **for** **à** **facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections pursuant to the**
**safeguards agreement referred to in paragraph 1** **(d)** **of Article 6, a**
**confirmation that** **the** **relevant safeguards arrangements have been**
**agreed** **upon with the IAEA and that those arrangements Will permit the**
**IAEA to exercise fully its rights pursuant to the aforementioned**
**safeguards agreement, in the light of how this agreement is**
**implemented during the life of this Agreement and so as to enable the**
**IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection goal;**

**(iv)** **information on the basic features contained in the Fundamental Nuclear**
**Material** **Control Plan or the compliance with the Department of**
**Energy** **Order refened to above, and such non-confidential information**
**as is available to the United States on the IAEA safeguards approach;**
**and**

**(v)** **a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by Article**
**11** **of this Agreement will be applied.**

**(C)** **Either Party may delete a facility from the peaceful nuclear programme it has**
**delineated, by. providing to the other Party a notification containing the facility name and**
**other relevant information available.**

_**-D**_

8. A. The activities referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Agreementmay
proceed as long as those provisions continue in effect with respect to the peaceful
nuclear programme delineated by a Party, unless the other Party considers, pursuant
to the procedures set out below, that these activities should be suspended on the basis
of objective evidence that their continuation would entail a serious threat to the
security of either Party or of a Member State jof the Community, or a significant
increase in the risk of a nuclear proliferation, resulting from a situation of the same
or greater degree of seriousness as the following:

a) **With regard to the Community** :

(i) a non-nuclear-weapon State member of the Community detonates a nuclear
weapon or any other nuclear explosive device;

(ii) a nuclear-weapon State member of the Community detonates a nuclear weapon
or any other nuclear explosive device using any item subject to this
Agreement;

(iii) a Member State of the Community or the Community, as relevant, materially
violates, terminates, or declares itself not to be bound by, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreements referred to in Article 6.1, or the
Guidelines applicable to the transfers of nuclear items laid down in document
INFCIRC 254/Rev 1./Parti, as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties;

(iv) a Member State of the Community retransfers an item subject to this
Agreement to a non-nuclear-weapon State which has not concluded a fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA;

(v) a Member State of the Community is subjected to measures taken by the
Board of Governors of the IAEA, pursuant to Article 19 of the relevant
safeguards Agreement referred to in Article 6.1.(a), (b) or (c);

(vi) acts of war or serious internal disturbances preventing the maintenance of law
and order, or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, that
threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such
activities.

(b) **With** regard to **the** United **States:**

(i) the United States detonates a nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive
device using any item subject to this Agreement;

(ii) the United States materially violates, terminates or declares itself not to be
bound by, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreement
referred to in Article 6.1.(d), or the Guidelines applicable to the transfers of
nuclear items laid down in document INFCIRC 254/Rev. 1/Part 1, as it may be
revised and accepted by the Parties;

**3o**

**(iii)** **the** **United** **States retransfers an item subject to this Agreement to a non-**
**nuclear-weapon** **state which has not concluded a full-scope safeguards**
**agreement with the IAEA;**

**(iv)** **the United States is** **subjected** **to measures taken by the Board of Governors of**
**the IAEA, pursuant to Article 19 of the safeguards agreement refened in**
**Article** **6.l.(d);**

**(v)** **acts of** **war** **or serious internal disturbances preventing the maintenance of law**
**and order or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, that**
**threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such**
**activities.**

**B.** **The Party considering that such objective** **evidence** **may exist,** **shall** **consult**
**with the other Party, at** **Cabinet** **level for the United States and at European**
**Commission level for the Community, before** **Teaching** **any decision.**

**C.** **Any such decision that such objective evidence does exist, and that activities**
**referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 should therefore be suspended, shall be taken**
**only by the President of the United States or by the Council of the** **European** **Union,**
**as the case may be, and shall be notified in writing to the other Party.**

**D.** **Any decision taken by a Party pursuant to this** **paragraph** **shall apply to the**
**activities of the other Party referred to in Article 8, paragraph 2 of this Agreement,**
**taken as a whole.**

**E.** **The Parties confirm that, as of the time of entry into force of** **this** **Agreement,**
**there exists no objective evidence of** **any** **of** **the** **threats referred to above and that they**
**do not foresee any such threats developing in the future.**

**9.** **Actions of governments of** **third** **countries or events beyond the territorial jurisdiction**
**of either Party shall not be used as a basis for invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 with**
**respect to activities or facility operations within that Party's territorial jurisdiction unless, due**
**to such actions or events, those activities or facility operations would clearly result in a**
**significant increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in a serious threat to the security of**
**the Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8.**

**10.** **The Party invoking the provisions of** **paragraph** **8 shall keep under constant review the**
**development of the situation which prompted the decision and shall withdraw its invocation**
**as soon as warranted.**

**11.** **The provisions of paragraph 8 shall not be invoked due to differences over the nature**
**of the Parties' peaceful nuclear programmes or fuel cycle choices, or for the purpose of**
**obtaining commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear**
**programmes or activities of the other Party, or its** **peaceful** **nuclear co-operation with third**
**countries.**

_**O**_ _**1**_

12. Any decision to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8 shall only be taken in the most
extreme circumstances of exceptional concern from a non-proliferation or security point of
view and shall be applied for the minimum period of time necessary to deal in a manner
acceptable to the Parties with the exceptional case.

13. Should the activities agreed upon in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement be
suspended, as provided in paragraph 8, quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the
inventory described in Article 20.1 shall, at the option of the Party against which the
suspension is applied, be regarded during such suspension as subject to this Agreement but
only to the extent covered by the agreements referred to in Article 19.

C. **PROPORTIONALITY**

14. For the purpose of implementing the provisions of Article 8 and paragraphs 2-5 of
Article 13 with respect to special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear
material and/or non-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the Agreement, when such nuclear
material and/or non-nuclear material is used in equipment not so transferred, such provisions
shall be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material produced that represents the
ratio of transferred nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material used in the production of the
special fissionable material to the total amount of nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material
so used.

**D.** **RESULTING OBLIGATIONS**

15. The obligations arising out of Articles 6, 7 and 11 in relation to special fissionable
material produced through the use of nuclear material subject to the Agreement in equipment
not transferred under the Agreement may be satisfied without specific tracking of that special
fissionable material. When such special fissionable material is subsequently used in equipment
not so transferred, that equipment shall, during such use, be operated for peaceful applications
only.

E. SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION

16. Both sides regard it as extremely unlikely that actions would be taken by the
Community, its Member States or the United States of America which would cause the other
Party to invoke the rights specified in Article 13. Nonetheless this Article reflects the firm
conviction of both Parties that they would view with the utmost concern acts constituting a
material violation or breach of non-proliferation commitments by any country and that
appropriate actions such as those provided for in Article 13 would be taken by the
Community, its Member States or the United States of America in response to any material
violation of non-proliferation commitments.

17. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the
definition of material violation or breach contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties.

**3^**

**18.** **Additionally, a determination as to whether there has been a material violation of the**
**fundamental safeguards** **commitments** **contained in the safeguards agreements referred to in**
**Article 6.1. or in such other agreement as may amend or replace them, would only be made**
**by the President of the United States of America or the Council of the European Union, as**
**relevant. In making such a determination, a crucial factor will be whether the Board of**
**Governors of the Agency has made a finding of non-compliance.**

**S3**

ANNEX A (Art. 8)

EURATOM DELINEATED PEACEFUL **PROGRAM**

**REPROCESSING FACILITIES**

CÔGEMA - ETABLISSEMENT DE LA HAGUE

COGEMA - USINE UP-1

BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic

AEA TECHNOLOGY

LA HAGUE

MARCOULE

SELLAFIELD

DOUNREAY

**ALTERATION IN FORM OR** CONTENT **FACILITIES**

BELGONUCLEAIRE - USINE DE FABRICATION MOL

D'ELEMENTS PU

FRANCE

FRANCE

UNITED

KINGDOM

UNITED

KINGDOM

BELGIUM

BELGIUM

ŒRMANY

FRANCE

FRANCE

FRANCE

FRANCE

UNITED

KINGDOM

UNITED

KINGDOM

FBFC INTERNATIONAL - ASSEMBLAGE DES

COMBUSTIBLES MOX

SIEMENS BRENNELEMENTEWERK 
BETRIEBSTEIL MOX-VERARBEITUNG

CERCA/ETABLISSEMENT DE ROMANS

SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE DE COMBUSTIBLE

NUCLEAIRE

COGEMA - COMPLEXE DE FABRICATION

DES COMBUSTIBLES

ETABLISSEMENT MELOX

AEA TECHNOLOGY - MTR FUEL

BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic MOX FACILITY

### **3**
## **_1_**

DESSEL

HANAU

ROMANS

SUR ISERE

VEUREY

CADARACHE

MARCOULE

DOUNREAY

SELLAFIELD

```
SEBNEJAD/TU5 7

4/26/93

                   ANNEX A

        U.S. DELINEATED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM

I. Facilities for reprocessing or alteration in form or
content of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched uranium in
an aggregate quantity exceeding one (1) effective kilogram.

           A. REPROCESSING FACILITIES

                  None

```

B. FACILITIES FOR ALTERATION IN FORM OR CONTENT

CONVERSION PLANTS

_**MU^WL&J&CUXXCW**_ `TYPE` `LICENSED` `CAPACITJC`

```
Nuclear Fuel Services Uranium downblending 7,000 kgs U-235.
P.O. Box 337, MS123
Erwin, TN 37650

```

```
Radiochemi st reprocessing Pilot Plant
Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab
P.O. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37830

```

```
Conversion Less than 1000 kg
             of HEU and more
             than 100 kg of
             U-233.

```

2 . FUEL FABRICATION AND PROCESSING PLANTS

NAME and LOCATION T£PE LJ^Ej^ED_CAJÇACXCX

G e n e r a l Atomics

P . O . Box 81608
```
San Diego, CA 92138

```

```
Fuel fabrication for >20% enr U, 100 kg
TRIGA research U-235.

reactors

```

```
II. Facilities for reprocessing or alteration in form or content
of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched uranium in an
aggregate quantity not to exceed one (1) effective kilogram do
not require specification.

```

**S ^**

**Annex B**

**Intellectual** **Property Rights**

**Pursuant to Article 17 of this** **Agreement,** **rights to intellectual property created or furnished**
**under this Agreement shall** **be** **allocated as provided in this Annex.**

**I.** **Application**

**This annex is applicable to all cooperative activities undertaken pursuant to this**
**Agreement, except as otherwise specifically agreed.**

**II.** **Qwnership.** **Allocation and Exercise of Rights**

**1.** **For purposes of this** **Agreement,** **"intellectual** **property" shall have the meaning**
**found in Article 2 of the Convention establishing the World** **Intellectual** **Property**
**Organisation, done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967.**

**2.** **This Annex addresses the allocation of rights, interests and royalties between the**
**Parties and participants. Each Party shall ensure that the other Party may obtain the**
**rights to** **intellectual** **property allocated to it in accordance with this Annex. This**
**Annex does not otherwise alter or prejudice the allocation between a Party and its**
**nationals, which shall be determined by that Party's laws and practices.**

**3.** **Termination or expiry of this Agreement shall not affect rights or obligations under**
**this Annex.**

**4.** **a) In the case of cooperative activities between the Parties, intellectual property**
**arising from joint** **research,** **i.e., cooperative research supported by both** **Parties,**
**shall be treated in a Technology Management Plan according to the following**
**principles** **:**

**i.** **The Parties shall notify each other within a reasonable time of any**
**intellectual property rights arising under this** **Agreement** **(or relevant implementing**
**arrangements).**

**ii.** **Unless otherwise agreed, rights and interests in intellectual property**
**created during joint research shall be exploitable by either Party without territorial**
**restriction.**

**iii.** **Each Party shall seek protection for the intellectual property to which it**
**obtains rights and interests under the Technology Management Plan in a timely**
**fashion.**

**36**

**iv.** **Each Party shall have a** **non-exclusive,** **irrevocable,** **royalty-free license**
**to use any intellectual property arising under the Agreement for** **research** **and**
**development purposes only.**

**v.** **Visiting** **researchers** **shall receive intellectual property rights and royally**
**shares earned by the host institutions from licensing of such intellectual properly**
**rights under the policies of the host institutions.**

**b) In all other cases, to the extent required by its laws and regulations, each Party**
**shall require all its participants to enter into** **specific** **agreements** **concerning** **the**
**implementation of joint research and the respective rights and obligations of the**
**participants. With respect** **to** **intellectual property, the agreement will normally**
**address, among other** **things,** **ownership, protection, user rights for research and**
**development purposes, exploitation and** **dissemination,** **including arrangements for**
**joint** **publication,** **the rights and obligations of visiting researchers and dispute**
**settlement procedures.** **The agreement may also address foreground and**
**background** **information,** **licensing and deliverables.**

**While maintaining the conditions of competition in areas afTected by the**
**Agreement,** **each Party shall endeavour to** **ensure** **that rights acquired pursuant to**
**this Agreement and arrangements made under it are exercised in such a way as to**
**encourage, in particular i) the use of information created, or otherwise made**
**available, under the** **Agreement** **and its dissemination in so far as this is in**
**accordance both with the** **conditions** **set out in this Agreement, the provisions of**
**section IV hereof** **and** **any** **rules** **which may be in force under the** **Parties'** **domestic**
**laws governing treatment of sensitive or confidential information in the nuclear**
**field, and ii) the** **adoption** **and implementation of international standards.**

**HI.** **Copyright works**

**Consistent** **with the terms of this** **Agreement,** **copyright belonging to the Parties or to**
**participants shall be accorded treatment consistent with** **Agreement** **on Trade Related**
**Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights administered by the World Trade Organization.**

**IV.** **Scientific Literary Works**

**Subjea to the treatment provided for undisclosed information in section V, the**
**following procedures shall apply:**

**1.** **Each Party shall be entitled to a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free licence in**
**all countries to translate, reproduce, and publicly distribute information contained**
**in** **scientific** **and technical journals, articles, reports, books, or other** **media,** **directly**
**arising from joint research pursuant to this Agreement by or on behalf of the**
**Parties.**

**39-**

All publicly distributed copies of a cqpyrighted work prepared under this provision
shall indicate the names of the authors of the work unless an author explicitly
declines to be named. They shall also bear a clearly visible acknowledgment of the
cooperative support of the Parties. '

V. Undisclosed Information

**i.**

A. Documentary undisclosed informationon

1. Each Party and the participants shaljl identify at the earliest possible moment the

information that they wish to remain undisclosed in relation to this Agreement,
taking account, inter alia, of the following criteria :

**i**

     - the infonnation is secret in the sjense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration or assembly of its components, generally known or readily
accessible by lawful means ;

|

     - the infonnation has actual or potential commercial value by virtue of its secrecy;

**i**

     - the information has been subjject to steps that were reasonable under the
circumstances by the person lawfully in control, to maintain its secrecy;

i
The Parties or the participants may- in certain cases agree that, unless otherwise
indicated, parts or all of the infonnation provided, exchanged or created in the
course of joint research pursuant to this Agreement may not be disclosed.

2. Each Party or participant. shall (ensure that undisclosed infonnation under the
Agreement and its ensuant privileged nature is readily recognisable as such by the
other Party or participant, for example by means of an appropriate marking or
restrictive legend. This also applips to any reproduction of the said information, in
whole or in pan.

A Party or participant receiving undisclosed infonnation pursuant to such agreement
shall respect the privileged natuife thereof. These limitations shall automatically
terminate when this infonnation is disclosed by the owner without restriction.

3. Undisclosed information communicated under this Agreement may be disseminated
by the receiving Party or participlant to persons employed by the receiving Party or
participant including its contractors, and other concerned departments of the Party
or participant authorised for the;specific purposes of the joint research underway,
provided that any undisclosed information so disseminated shall be protected to the
extent provided by each Party's laws and regulations and shall be readily
recognisable as such, as set out labove.

**2>K**

**B.** **Non-documentary** **undisclosed** **information**

**Non-documentary undisclosed or other confidential or privileged information provided**
**in** **seminars** **and other meetings arranged under the** **Agreement,** **or information arising**
**from the attachment of** **staff,** **use of facilities, or joint projects, will be treated by the**
**Parties or their designees according to the principles specified for documentary**
**information in the** **Agreement,** **provided, however,** **that** **the recipient of such undisclosed**
**or other confidential or privileged information has been made aware in writing of the**
**confidential character of the information communicated not later than the time such a**

**communication is made.**

**C.** **Control**

**Each** **Parry** **shall endeavour to ensure that undisclosed infonnation received by it under**
**this Agreement shall be controlled as provided herein. If one of** **the** **Parties becomes**
**aware that it will be, or may be reasonably expected to become, unable to meet the**
**non-dissemination provisions of paragraphs A** **and** **B above, it shall immediately inform**
**the other Party. The Parties** **shall** **thereafter consult to define an appropriate course of**
**action.**

**VI.** **Dispute Settlement and New Types and Unforeseen Intellectual Property**

**1.** **Disputes** **between** **the Parties** **concerning** **intellectual property shall be resolved in**
**accordance with Article 12 of** **this** **Agreement.**

**2.** **In the event either Party or a participant** **concludes** **that a new type of intellectual**
**property not** **covered** **in a TMP or agreement between participants may result from**
**a cooperative** **activity** **undertaken pursuant to this** **Agreement,** **or if** **other** **unforeseen**
**difficulties arise, the Parties shall enter into immediate discussions with the object**
**of assuring that the protection, exploitation and dissemination of the intellectual**
**property in question are adequately provided for in their respective territories.**

**33**

**E.C.** **Side Letter on Issue of Export Licences**

**Sir,**

**I have the honour to refer to Article 4.2 of** **the** **Agreement for** **co-operation** **in the peaceful**
**uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United**
**States of America.**

**With regard to the implementation of that Article it is my understanding that we have**
**agreed on the following. Authorisations, including export and import licences as well as**
**authorisations or consents to third parties relating to trade, industrial** **operations** **or nuclear**
**material movements on the territories of the Parties should generally be issued within a period**
**of** **two** **months of** **a** **submission to the relevant authority. Nuclear trade between the European**
**Community and the U.S. should be facilitated and encouraged; it is recognised that reliability**
**of supply is essential and that industry in the Community and in the U.S.A. needs continuing**
**reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation**
**of nuclear installations; it is further recognised that undue delays in the grant of export**
**licences and other relevant authorisations including import licences would be inconsistent with**
**the sound and efficient administration of this agreement.**

**I wish to recall that, in accordance with Article 10 of** **the** **Agreement, the Parties will not**
**interfere in the nuclear programmes of** **each** **other; they recognise that the European Union,**
**its Member States and the U.S.A. are equally strongly committed to international nuclear**
**non-proliferation and safeguards regimes .**

**In the negotiation of** **the** **Agreement the Parties took due note of the undertakings which**
**had been entered into in this field.**

**The Parties express their full confidence in each other's compliance with such**
**undertakings. Accordingly the parties, in the grant of licences for the export of** **items** **pursuant**
**to this agreement, will refrain from requiring additional confirmation from the other party**
**and its relevant persons, undertakings or authorities about full compliance with these**
**commitments.**

**In this context, it is further agreed that if the relevant authority considers that an**
**application cannot be processed within the target two months period, it shall immediately**
**provide a reasoned information to the submitting persons or undertakings. In the event of a**
**refusal to authorise an application or of a delay exceeding four months from the date of the**
**first application, the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent**
**consultations under Article 12 of the Agreement which shall take place at the earliest**
**opportunity, and in any case not later than 30 days after such request.**

**I would appreciate your confirmation that you share the understandings recorded in this**
**letter.**

**Please accept, Sir, etc.**

**Ho**

**Note on Switzerland**

**I have the honour to refer to the Agreement for** **co-operation** **in** **the** **peaceful uses of**
**nuclear energy between the European Atomic** **Energy** **Community and the United States of**
**America (hereinafter referred to as** **"the** **U.S./Euratom** **Agreement") and in particular to Article**
**8.1..C** **(iii) of that Agreement.**

**I have the** **honour** **further to confirm that the United States is negotiating a new**
**peaceful nuclear** **co-operation** **agreement with the Swiss Federation, and that the United States**
**is** **prepared** **to offer long-term prior consent to the Swiss Federation for the transfer of**
**irradiated nuclear material subject to such an agreement into Euratom for reprocessing and**
**for storage of the recovered plutonium and its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements. The**
**United States is** **also** **prepared, in connection with a new peaceful nuclear** **co-operation**
**agreement with the Swiss Federation, to offer long-term, prior consent to Euratom to the**
**retransfer of Swiss plutonium, including such plutonium contained in MOX fuel elements,**
**subject to the U.S./Euratom Agreement to** **Switzerland** **for use in that country's -peaceful**
**nuclear programme.**

**Ml**

**SIDE LETTER ON SENSITIVE NUCLEAR**

**TECHNOLOGY AND REACTOR TECHNOLOGY**

**I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear**
**energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America,**
**signed**

**Sensitive Nuclear Technology**

**The** **Government of the United States notes that the Agreement does not provide for the**
**transfer of sensitive nuclear technology or any component or group of components which are**
**essential to the operation of** **a** **complete uranium** **enrichment,** **nuclear fuel processing or heavy**
**water production facility. The Government of the United** **States** **confirms to the European**
**Community that sensitive nuclear technology, defined as any information (including**
**information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part**
**thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design,**
**construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel**
**reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but not including**
**Restricted** **Data** **[(1)]** **,** **may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for co-operation**
**pursuant to sections 127 and 128 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act). The transfer of a**
**reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water facility or a major critical component thereof may**
**take place only pursuant to an agreement for co-operation.**

**Reactor Technology**

**The Government of** **the** **United States** **further** **confirms that nuclear power reactor technology**
**may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for co-operation.**

**Non-nuclear material other than the one defined in Article 21.5 of the Agreement, e.g.**
**zirconium and its alloys and compounds may be transferred from the United States of**
**America to persons and undertakings in the Community outside an agreement for** **co-**
**operation.**

**The Government of the United States** **notes** **that Sensitive Technology and Reactor**
**Technology may be transferred from the European Community to the United States outside**
**an agreement for co-operation between them.**

**The Government of the United States avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the**
**European Commission the assurance of its highest consideration.**

**(I)** **Restricted** **Data" means any data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of**
**nuclear weapons, (2) the production of special fissionable material or (3) the use of special**
**fissionable material in the production of energy, but does not include data of a Party which**
**it has declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data.**

##### **_U_**

**Proposed reply to side letter on Sensitive Nuclear Technology**
**and Reactor Technology**

**The European** **Commission** **presents its compliments to the Mission of the United** **States** **of**
**America to the European** **Union** **and has the honour to ackowledge receipt of the letter, dated**

**from the Mission concerning sensitive nuclear technology and** **reactor** **technology,**
**a copy of** **which** **is attached.**

**The Commission wishes to inform the Mission that it has taken due note of the contents of**

**this letter.**

**The Commission avails itself of** **this** **opportunity to renew to the Mission of the United States**
**of America to the European Union the assurance of its highest consideration.**

###### **Vi**

**Declaration-on** **Non-Proliferation Policy**

**1.** **On the occasion of the signature of the new Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful**
**uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the**
**United States of** **America,** **the United States of America and the** **European** **Union have**
**decided to record the following understandings.**

**2.** **The United States and the European Union re-affirm their support for strengthening**
**nuclear non-proliferation measures on a worldwide** **basis;** **their commitment**
**increasingly to open peaceful nuclear trade and technology for states that abide by**
**accepted international non-proliferation rules; and their opposition to controls that**
**unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly restrain worldwide growth and**
**opportunity in the peaceful nuclear area.**

**3.** **The United States and the European Union are committed to ensuring that research**
**on,** **and development and use of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are carried out**
**in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of**
**Nuclear Weapons ("the Treaty"),** **to** **which the United States of America and all**
**Member States of the Community are parties. They affirm their intention to work**
**closely together and with other interested states to urge universal adherence to the**
**Treaty. They share the view that the Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-**
**proliferation regime, and that an effective non-proliferation regime is necessary to**
**achieve a full realization of** **the** **peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and the objectives**
**of Article IV of the Treaty. They further share the view that assurance of non-**
**proliferation has an important bearing on assurance of supply and that recognition of**
**this relationship has proved important in many deliberations on measures to facilitate**
**international nuclear trade and co-operation.**

**4.** **The United States of America and the European Union consider that nuclear non-**
**proliferation policy, as reflected in the Agreement, fully meets U.S. and E.U. present**
**and foreseeable proliferation concerns.**

**5.** **Neither expects any policy changes or other circumstances to take place that would**
**adversely affect the terms for co-operation established by the Agreement including,**
**in particular, those terms relating to agreement for certain activities to be carried out**
**on an assured, secure and uninterrupted basis over the life of the Agreement.**

**6.** **The United States and the European Union acknowledge that inclusion of reciprocal**
**consent provisions in the Agreement does not reflect a lack of confidence in the**
**nuclear non-proliferation credentials of either Party.**

**7.** **The United States furthermore confirms its readiness to engage in negotiations with**
**Euratom pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article** **14** **concerning elimination of provisions**
**contained in Article 8.2 of the Agreement, in so far as improvements in the global**
**non-proliferation environment lead to changes in the U.S. position regarding consent.**

**WV**

**8.** **The** **United** **States and the European Union fully support the International** **Atomic**
**Energy Agency (IAEA) and its role in reducing the risk of** **proliferation.They**
**recognize the IAEA's** **safeguards** **system as an essential element of the international**
**non-proliferation regime. They have confidence in the IAEA safeguards system,** **while**
**recognizing the need for** **the** **continuation of work on improvement of that system**
**especially** **in countries of proliferation concern. They share the view that non-nuclear**
**weapon states having nuclear facilities that are not under** **IAEA** **safeguards should put**
**such facilities under IAEA safeguards, and that adherence to the Treaty is the best**
**way to achieve this result.**

**9.** **The United States and the European Union are prepared to continue to take** **such** **steps**
**as are necessary to allow the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively and efficiently and**
**to attain its inspection goals at nuclear facilities in their respective jurisdictions in**
**accordance, respectively with the safeguards agreement between the Agency and** **the**
**United States of America and the safeguards agreements between the Agency, the**
**Community and the** **Member** **States of the Community.**

**10.** **The United States further recognizes that pursuant to the Euratom Treaty, the**
**Community has to make certain,** **by** **appropriate supervision, that** **nuclear materials**
**are not diverted to purposes other than those for** **which** **they are intended, and that to**
**this end safeguards are applied in accordance with Chapter VII of the EURATOM**
**Treaty. The United States and the European Union share the view that the**
**Community's regional safeguards system makes** **an** **important** **and** **valuable contribution**
**to** **the achievement of non-proliferation goals and the above-mentioned objectives.**

**11** **The United** **States** **of America, the Community, and all its Member States recall that**
**they are parties to the International Convention of** **the** **Physical Protection of Nuclear**
**Material, the** **provisions** **of which are important to the prevention of the illicit**
**circulation of nuclear material. The United States and the Member States of the**
**Community affirm their intention to ensure application of adequate physical protection**
**to the use, storage and transport of nuclear material** **within** **their respective**
**jurisdictions.**

**12.** **The United States of America and all Member States of the Community recall that**
**they** **adhere** **to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of the Nuclear Suppliers Group**
**(NSG). The United States of America and all Member States of the** **Community** **that**
**presently export nuclear commodities also participate in the NPT Exporters**
**Committee. The United States and the European Union re-affirm their shared view that**
**the common nuclear non-proliferation** **export** **policies and practices reflected in the**
**NSG and the NPT Exporters Committee Guidelines play an essential role in ensuring**
**that peaceful nuclear cooperation is carried out under appropriate conditions and**
**controls. The United States and the European Union stress in particular the importance**
**of** **the** **NSG policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities, present and**
**future,** **as a** **condition** **for transfer to any non-nuclear weapon state of any nuclear**
**facilities, equipment, components or materials on the NSG trigger list** **and** **of** **the** **NSG**
**arrangement for** **the** **control of nuclear-related** **dual-use** **equipment, material and** **related**
**technology.** **They** **also reaffirm their intention to exercise caution and restraint in the**

_**y**_ _**s**_

**export of sensitive items such as reprocessing and enrichment equipment and**
**technology, recovered plutonium, and highly enriched uranium.**

**13.** **The United States and the European Union affirm their intention to** **co-operate** **with**
**each other and with other interested states to urge all nuclear suppliers to adhere to**
**the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and otherwise to** **conduct** **nuclear export**
**policies in a manner that contributes to the prevention of nuclear proliferation.**

**14.** **The United States and the European Union acknowledge that the separation, storage,**
**transportation, and use of plutonium call for the continuation of measures to ensure**
**the avoidance of risk of nuclear proliferation; they are determined to continue to**
**support the strengthening of international safeguards and other non-proliferation**

**measures.**

**Signed at** **on** **1995**

**For the United States of America** **for the European** **Union**

**V6**

**U.S. Draft Side Letter**

**I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for** **co-operation** **in the peaceful uses of**
**nuclear energy between the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy**
**Community signed ......** **(hereinafter** **referred to as "the Agreement"), and in particular to**
**paragraph** **2** **of Article 7 of the Agreement, which provides that "Non-nuclear** **material,** **nuclear**
**material and equipment transferred pursuant to this** **Agreement,** **and special fissionable**
**material used in or** **produced** **through the use of such items shall not be** **used** **... for any**
**military purpose."**

**In consequence of** **this** **provision, any U.S. nuclear** **co-operation** **with the Community**
**or a Member State for** **military** **purposes would necessarily take place outside the scope of the**
**Agreement and** **would** **require a separate agreement for** **co-operation** **specifically intended to**
**further such military** **purposes.** **I can** **confirm on** **behalf of the Government of the United**
**States that such nuclear** **co-operation** **with a Member State for military purposes will be**
**suitably considered when circumstances so warrant.**

**Signed at Washington on** **1995.**

# **n**

**ISSN 0254-1475**

**COM(95)** **171 final**

## **DOCUMENTS**

**EN** **12** **U**

**Catalogue number :** **CB-CO-95-209-EN-C**

**ISBN 92-77-88931-4**

**Office** **for** **Official Publicatioas of the European Communities**

**L-2985** **Luxembourg**