Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

*|*

# 52013SC0055

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT /\* SWD/2013/055 final \*/**

  

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a space surveillance and
tracking support programme

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1........... Procedural issues and
consultation of interested parties.................................................... 5

1.1........ Identification................................................................................................................... 5

1.2........ Organisation and timing................................................................................................... 5

1.3........ Consultation and expertise.............................................................................................. 5

1.4........ Scrutiny by the Commission Impact Assessment Board................................................... 9

2........... Context........................................................................................................................ 10

3........... Problem definition......................................................................................................... 11

3.1........ The problems that require action................................................................................... 11

3.1.1..... Security of critical European
space infrastructure is not ensured...................................... 11

3.1.1.1.. Current situation in Europe............................................................................................ 12

3.1.1.2.. Situation at international level......................................................................................... 13

3.1.1.3.. Other actions to mitigate collision
risks.......................................................................... 14

3.1.2..... Increased collision risks due to
space debris.................................................................. 15

3.1.3..... Collision avoidance manoeuvres
shorten the lifetime of satellites..................................... 17

3.1.4..... Re-entry of debris or of controlled
spacecraft to Earth threaten the security of EU citizens 19

3.1.5..... Overview of estimated annualised
losses due to hazards from space debris:.................... 21

3.2........ Underlying drivers of the problem.................................................................................. 22

3.3........ Who is affected, in what ways and
to what extent?........................................................ 24

3.4........ Foreseen evolution of the problem................................................................................. 24

3.5........ EU right to act.............................................................................................................. 25

4........... Objectives.................................................................................................................... 25

5........... Policy options............................................................................................................... 27

5.1........ Option 1: Baseline scenario: No
EU financial involvement in SST................................... 30

5.2........ Option 2: Partnership approach –
EU funding for the European SST front desk function. 31

5.3........ Option 3: Partnership approach –
EU funding for networking and operation of sensor, processing and front desk
functions....................................................................................................................... 35

5.4........ Option 4: EU-led SST development
and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 3 to 5)..... 36

5.5........ Option 5: EU-led SST development
and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 10).......... 37

5.6........ Summary of the options................................................................................................ 38

5.6.1..... Governance.................................................................................................................. 38

5.6.2..... Data policy................................................................................................................... 38

5.6.3..... Service provision.......................................................................................................... 38

5.6.4..... Funding........................................................................................................................ 38

5.7........ Summary of stakeholder views on
the options................................................................ 39

6........... Analysis of impacts....................................................................................................... 40

6.1........ Impacts of option 1: baseline
scenario........................................................................... 41

6.2........ Impacts of options 2, 3 and 4........................................................................................ 43

6.3........ Impacts of option 5: EU-led SST
development and exploitation..................................... 46

7........... Comparing the options and
conclusions......................................................................... 49

7.1........ Summary of strengths and
weaknesses of the options..................................................... 49

7.2........ Comparison in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with agreed policies....... 50

8........... Monitoring and evaluation............................................................................................. 52

8.1........ Evaluation..................................................................................................................... 52

8.2........ Monitoring.................................................................................................................... 53

8.3........ Anti-fraud measures...................................................................................................... 54

ANNEX I: Glossary................................................................................................................... 55

ANNEX II: Stakeholder consultations and
results........................................................................ 57

ANNEX III: Overview of existing SSA/SST
capabilities.............................................................. 62

ANNEX IV: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON DEBRIS MITIGATION......................... 67

ANNEX V: Calculation methodology.......................................................................................... 70

ANNEX VI: Reference studies and documents............................................................................ 75

1.           Procedural
issues and consultation of interested parties

1.1.        Identification

Lead DG: DG Enterprise and Industry

Other involved DGs:

Agenda Planning/WP Reference: 2012/ENTR/021

1.2.        Organisation
and timing

This impact assessment
builds on an earlier impact assessment on the future EU involvement in space
which accompanied the Communication on "Elements for an EU strategy in
space for the benefit of EU citizens" adopted by the College on 4 April
2011[1].

This second and
more detailed impact assessment focuses exclusively on options concerning EU
involvement in the setting up of a European service to avoid collisions between
spacecraft and between spacecraft and debris and to monitor uncontrolled
re-entry of spacecraft which forms the basis for the protection of critical
European space infrastructure.

The Impact
Assessment Steering Group (IASG) set up to accompany the preparation of this
impact assessment met on 26 November 2010, 8 February 2011, 8 July 2011, 5
March 2012 and 15 March 2012. The following Commission services were invited to
participate in the IASG: DG SANCO, DG RTD, DG MOVE, DG ENER, DG BUDG, DG ECFIN,
DG RELEX, DG JRC, DG INFSO, DG ENV, DG ECHO, DG EMPL, DG EAC, DG HOME, the
Secretariat-General as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS).

1.3.        Consultation
and expertise

Over the past years, DG Enterprise and
Industry consulted different parties interested and involved in space affairs
on various areas of potential future EU activities in space and notably on the
development of a European Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) service. The
development of such service has also been the subject of political debate among
EU Ministers responsible for space. The conclusions of those debates are
reflected in several Council resolutions[2].

The main conclusions of these consultations
can be summarised as follows:

–
There is a consensus amongst Member States,
satellite operators and other stakeholders on the need to protect space
infrastructure, and notably to protect it against the risk of collision;

–
There is a political consensus among Member
States that the setting up of a European SST service should be led by the EU,
which has competence to coordinate the exploitation of space systems and has
also the competence and the mechanisms in place to deal with the security
dimension of such a service; Member States consider that ESA should support the
EU in this endeavour (and is doing so through its SSA preparatory programme[3]) but, as an R&D
organisation, does not have the competence and the mechanisms necessary to set
up and run a European SST service on its own.

–
There is a consensus among EU and ESA Member
States and experts that a future European SST service should link and build on
existing sensor capacity and develop it with new sensors; Member States
possessing sensor capacity and those willing to develop it should play a key
role in the setting up of the European SST service;

–
There is a consensus that the development of a
European SST service should be done in close cooperation with the United States
of America;

–
Public opinion is aware of and supports the need
to protect space infrastructure.

These consultations are explained in detail
below.

Consultations of national space
agencies, ministries and industry representatives

In 2009, a
series of bilateral meetings were held with national space agencies and
ministries in charge of space matters in Member States more actively involved
in space activities as well as with representatives of the European space
industry. From these bilateral meetings the following conclusions could be
drawn:

– The European Union has a very important role to play in space
matters. Together with Member States and ESA, the EU is one of the three main
players in the European space field, each of them having a specific and
distinct role. The EU has a political role and a political responsibility and
must aggregate and represent the interest of all, when deciding its involvement
in space;

– Stakeholders agree that the most urgent priorities for the EU are
the completion of the Galileo and Copernicus (new name for GMES) programmes (the
latter including reinforced security and climate change dimensions), in order
to start benefiting from the services they provide;

– The next priority for stakeholders, notably Member States, is the
protection of our space infrastructure. Our economy and the well being of our
citizens are increasingly dependent on space-based applications and we need to
acquire the capacity to protect them. Space Situational Awareness (SSA)[4] and notably SST is instrumental
to ensuring such protection;

–
There is also a consensus that the EU, ESA and
their Member States need to work together on all of the above.

In addition,
under the Spanish EU Presidency in 2009, a conference on space and security was
held to contribute to defining the role of European institutions and centres in
security programmes. In 2011, a conference on SSA under the Polish EU
Presidency examined the current situation with regard to SSA in Europe and led
to some first discussions on possible governance options.

Furthermore, the
Communication "Towards a space strategy for the European Union that
benefits the citizen"[5]
aimed at triggering a debate amongst stakeholders on future EU action in space
policy. The Council Conclusions adopted on 31 May 2011 in response to this
Communication confirmed space and security as a priority for EU action after
ensuring the implementation and sustainable exploitation of Galileo and Copernicus.

In 2010, relevant
target stakeholders were interviewed by an external contractor[6], in the context of a study to
support the preparation of the previous impact assessment accompanying the
Communication the EU strategy for space adopted in April 2011. A further study
was commissioned at the end of 2010 in support of the preparation of this
current impact assessment[7].
It included a series of stakeholder interviews with ESA, national space
agencies, national ministries responsible for space and industry
representatives with the aim to get input on the potential implication of the
EU in the setting up of a European SSA capability. The results of the study
launched in 2010, in particular the risks related to space debris and the
related estimated losses, have been presented to and discussed with Member
States in late Spring 2011.

An ex-post
evaluation of the European space policy is ongoing. However, its results will
not have any impact on this impact assessment, as the EU did so far not take
any action in the field of space surveillance and tracking apart from the
prospective studies referred to below.

Finally, in
general terms the policy options defined in chapter 5 of this impact assessment
report have been discussed with Member States representatives on a number of
occasions over the past two years. In these discussions, Member States
expressed a clear preference for an approach to the setting up of European SST
services along option 3 or an EU-led programme along options 4 or 5. Most
recently, SST governance options have been discussed with Member States in the
framework of the Enterprise and Industry DG led group of EU Member States space
policy experts on 23 March 2012 where all Member States signalled readiness to
support option 3. SSA data policy has been subject to discussion with the
Council's space working party in autumn 2011 where Member States broadly agreed
with the Commission's Staff Working Document setting out the key elements for
the future SSA data policy[8].

Consultations of the broad public

As concerns the
consultation of the broad public on space issues in general and SSA more
specifically, two surveys have been carried out over the past three years:

·
A Eurobarometer survey on the space activities
of the European Union was conducted by Gallup in July 2009
in order to examine EU citizens’ opinions and to assess: a) their awareness of
space activities of Europe and the European Union, and b) their perception of
these activities. The majority of European Union
citizens regard European space activities as important from the perspective of
the EU’s future global role: one in five citizens considered such activities very
important (20%) and a further 43% felt that space activities are important
in this respect. In total, almost two-thirds of Europeans share the view that
space activities are important for the future international position of the
European Union[9].
Overall, 67% of the survey respondents consider it important to develop space
based applications to improve citizens’ security.

·
A second public consultation was carried out via
the Commission's Interactive Policy Making (IPM) tool from 3 January to 15
March 2011. The survey focused on the public's opinion on possible EU action in
the domain of SSA and space exploration. In total, 608 contributions were
received from 25 Member States. The majority of respondents (around 38 %)
identified themselves as individuals. Around 14 % of the respondents were
representatives of larger or smaller businesses or business associations. SME
participation as well as the participation of public authorities (at European,
national or regional level) amounted to around 8 % each. The consultation also
prompted a number of separate position papers from industry provided in
addition to questionnaire replies[10].
As concerns SSA, a large majority of respondents (86%) were aware of and
felt concerned by hazards caused by space debris, space weather phenomena,
or Near Earth Objects (NEOs) to a wide range of space-based and ground-based
critical infrastructures and services. At the same time, 32% of the respondents
indicated that they had no dealings with space or the space sector. A large
majority of respondents (83%) felt that the EU should have its own capacities
to protect critical European satellites either in order to complement third
country capacities (57%) or to be autonomous from third country capacities
(26%). 89% expressed the opinion that the EU should play a role in building a
European SSA capability, which the EU should either set up alone or together
with its Member States. Only 5% of the respondents expressed the opinion that
the EU should not get involved in such capability building.

External expertise used

Two studies carried out by external
contractors in 2010 (Ecorys) and end 2010/beginning of 2011 (Booz &
Company) provided input alongside other sources to the preparation of this
impact assessment[11].
The Ecorys study underlined that EU action in space situational awareness
should be given priority to any future EU action in space going beyond Galileo
and Copernicus. The Booz & Company study provided valuable qualitative and
quantitative input to refine the problem definition related to the protection
of European space infrastructure and critical ground infrastructure, and helped
defining policy options and their impacts.

Furthermore, the definition of the various
policy options and their effect relies also heavily on ESA expertise. In the
framework of its ongoing SSA preparatory programme, ESA conducted a number of
technical studies to define SSA system requirements which led to useful
preliminary indications concerning the assets needed in order to respond to
civil user requirements defined in 2010 in collaboration with potential SSA
user communities and ESA Member States[12].

1.4.        Scrutiny by the Commission Impact Assessment Board

The Impact Assessment Board of the European
Commission assessed a draft version of the present impact assessment and issued
its opinion on 20/04/2012. The Impact Assessment Board made several
recommendations and, in the light of the
latter, the final impact assessment report:

·
Describes in a clearer way the problems that
need to be addressed, the nature and scope of the initiative proposed to
address these problems, the current situation with regard to space surveillance
and tracking activities in Europe (including an overview of existing SST relevant
assets owned by EU Member States) and elsewhere, and explains what other
long-term mitigation measures exist at international or multilateral level.

·
Strengthens the baseline scenario by describing
in more detail how the situation is expected to evolve in absence of any EU
initiative in the SST domain, including cooperation amongst Member States, and
why the baseline scenario would leave the problems unchanged. It also clarifies
the value-added of EU action in SST.

·
Describes more clearly and in a more structured
way the policy options proposed, their differences in terms of governance, data
policy, the difference in performance of the services provided, the new SST
assets needed to achieve the targeted service performance level, and the
related funding needs. A new chapter has been added to explain the position and
views of stakeholders on the options set out in the report. Two tables have
been added to facilitate the comparison between the options.

·
Assesses in more detail the impacts of the
options, in particular the expected economic and social impacts (by looking in
particular into impacts on citizen's health and security).

The Impact Assessment Board issued a second
opinion on the re-submitted impact assessment report on 20 June 2012 (written
procedure). In response, the report was further amended to take into account
the last remaining recommendations:

·
The impact analysis chapter describes in more
detail how the proposed governance of the European SST service will address
concerns related to the relationship between Member States involved in the SST
service provision and those benefiting from the service.

·
As concerns funding aspects, the report better
explains that the performance of the planned SST service is incremental and
that risks related to budgetary constraints at EU and Member States level could
be offset by down-scaling the system, for example in terms of sensors to be
included in the sensor function of the system, or in terms of new sensors to be
developed by Member States. Financial contributions from both the public and
private sector in form of service fees could be envisaged at a later stage.

·
The analysis of the safety impacts of all
options has been strengthened. Option 3 has been identified as the preferred
option in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with Member States'
political will and with other EU policies.

2.           Context

The Commission's
Communication "Towards a space strategy for the European Union that
benefits its citizens" adopted in April 2011 defines priorities for the future
involvement of the EU in space and sets out options for EU action. With
relevance to this impact assessment it underlines that:

(1)
Space infrastructure is critical infrastructure
on which services that are essential to the smooth running of our societies and
economies as well as our citizens's security depend. The protection of this
infrastructure was underlined as a major issue for the EU going beyond the
individual interests of individual satellite owners;

(2)
In view of ensuring such protection, it underlines
that the Union should define the organisation and governance of a European
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system taking into account its dual nature
and the need to ensure its sustainable exploitation as highlighted in the
Industrial Policy Communication adopted in October 2010.[13]

The need for European
action in the domain of SSA has been supported by Member States in several Council
Resolutions and orientations on the European Space Policy (ESP) jointly adopted by
the EU and the European Space Agency (ESA) at the 4th, 5th,
6th, 7th and 8th Space Council meetings held
in 2007, 2008 and 2009, 2010 and 2011as well in EU Council conclusions adopted
on 31 May 2011. These views are also shared by the European Parliament in its
report on the space strategy for the EU adopted on 30 November 2011[14].

If the policy
choice leads to EU intervention, this impact issessment (IA) will accompany a proposal
establishing a space surveillance and tracking support programme supporting the
setting up and operation of a European service to prevent collisions in space
and monitor un-controlled re-entry of spacecraft or parts thereof, which could
come into force during the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework from
2014-2020. This service will provide alerts to satellite operators and public
authorities to avoid collision during launch, in-orbit operations, and will
also inform relevant authorities of any potential danger for citizens and
ground infrastructure derived from uncontrolled re-entries of inactive
spacecraft or their debris into the Earth’s atmosphere.

This initiative
builds on past achievements in space research under the R&D framework
programmes. It is also closely linked to two other European space flagship
projects (Galileo and Copernicus) and will benefit other EU policies such as
security and defence, environment or health.

3.           Problem
definition

3.1.        The
problems that require action

3.1.1.     Security
of critical European space infrastructure is not ensured

Space-based systems enable a wide spectrum of applications
which play a fundamental role in our everyday reality (TV, Internet or GPS),
are critical to key areas of the economy, and help ensuring our security[15].

Space
infrastructures and derived services as well as space research have also become
critical for the implementation of EU policies[16], such
as transport, environment, climate change, maritime policies, development,
agriculture, security related policies including the CFSP/CSDP, as well as the
furthering of technical progress and industrial innovation and competitiveness.

With increasing dependance on space-based services, the
ability to protect space assets and infrastructures has become essential to our
society. Any shutdown of even a part of the space infrastructure could have
significant consequences for citizens’ safety and for the well-functioning of
economic activities, and would impair the organisation of emergency services[17].

With Galileo
and EGNOS, the EU itself has become owner of a growing fleet of satellites with
related ground based infrastructure. Furthermore, the EU is responsible for the
overall coordination of the ongoing GMES Initial Operations Programme including
its satellite segment and can be expected to continue to have such role in the
future. Thus, the EU will soon become one of the largest satellite operators in
Europe.

However, space
infrastructures are increasingly threatened by the risk of collision between
sapcecraft and, more importantly, between spacecraft and space debris. Space
debris has become the most serious threat to the sustainability of space
activities.

In order to
mitigate the risk of collision it is necessary to indentify and monitor satellites
and space debris, cataloguing their positions, and tracking their movements
(trajectory) when a potential risk of collision has been identified so that
satellite operators can be alerted to move their satellites. This activity is
known as space surveillance and tracking (SST).

A SST service comprises three basic
functions:

–
Sensor function, which through a network of
instruments such as radars and telescopes allows to identify and track
spacecraft and debris;

–
Processing function, through which the relative
orbit of spacecraft and debris can be catalogued and analysed to determine the
probability of collision or to determine the re-entry path of space objects;

–
Front desk function, which is responsible for
the actual provision of the SST services (such as collision or re-entry alerts)
to satellite operators and relevant authorities. At the same time, the front
desk will be the entry point for user requests for SST information which it
relays to the processing and sensor function.

It should be noted that SST is a dual-use
activity which can serve both civil and military user communities. Both civil
and military sensors can be used to provide SST services that respond to both
civil and military user needs[18]
- which are to a large degree identical.

Surveillance and tracking information is
highly security-sensitive. Uncontrolled dissemination of SST information
(revealing for example the existance and position of a sensitive military
satellite) could jeopardise national security interests. Cooperation amongst
actors within Europe (Member States, ESA and EU entities) requires a data
policy and a governance that takes into account these national security
concerns. It was for this reason, that Member States through the Space Council
turned to the EU with the request to play an active role in the development of
an SSA capability at European level, and to define its governance scheme and its
data policy.

The fact is that Europe has today no SST
service: existing sensors do not have adequate capacity to identify and track
objects in space, they are not linked so that they can be used as a network,
there is no adequate processing capacity in place and there is no front desk
function.

3.1.1.1.  Current
situation in Europe

The current situation in Europe with
regard to surveillance and tracking can be described as follows:

Sensor function

–
The French space agency CNES and the
French Army own radars and telescopes that can survey/observe space objects in
the low earth orbit region up to 2000 km used for Earth Observation satellites
such as the future Copernicus/GMES sentinels (GRAVES system) as well as to
survey higher orbits used mainly for navigation satellites such as Galileo or
communication satellites (TAROT telescope). UK's Chilbolton
meteorological radar allows to survey space objects in low earth orbit; its
Starbrook optical telescope is designed for surveying higher orbits. Germany
owns radars that would allow to track and characterise specific space objects
both in lower and higher orbits (TIRA and Effelsberg radiotelescope). Spain's
optical observatory in La Sagra could support space surveillance activities. Italy's
Croce del Nord radiotelescope and antenna could support tracking activities. In
addition some R&D, design and pre-development activities have been carried
out in the framework of the ESA "SSA preparatory programme"; these
include the development of two demonstrator SST radars. All of these
existing sensors have significant shortcomings. Some were developed developed
during the 1960s or 1970s for military purposes such as horizon monitoring in
view of potential launches of ballistic missiles. Some were developped for
research purposes. Most need substantial refurbishing and upgrading to become
operational and others are too limited in operational availability despite
potential high technical performance. None of them operate as a network and
even if they would their combined capacity would not be sufficient to deliver a
significant collision risk reduction.

Processing function

–
France and Germany have set up operational
national centres for surveillance and tracking that allow for analysis of
collision and re-entry risks. There is an early stage of European cooperation
and sharing of data as exemplified by the Fanco-German cooperation in the
operation of the French GRAVES surveillance radar and the German TIRA tracking
radar, or the coordinated cooperation of the ESA optical surveillance telescope
at Tenerife and the Swiss ZIMLAT telescope at Zimmerwald. These initiatives are
the result of the discussion on future development of a European SST service. However,
no broader cooperation among Member States emerged from these bilateral cooperation
arrangements. They also did not lead to the provision of operational SST
services available to satellite operators in Europe.

Front desk function

–
There is no SST front desk function.

3.1.1.2.  Situation
at international level

The overall situation of SST services at
international level is the following:

–
While all major space faring nations have their
own SSA systems to some extent, there is currently no operational global
system for space surveillance and tracking. However, the USA has today the
most extended sensor network, processing capacity and provides alerts (front
desk). The US SST system is owned and operated by the US Air Force. Most
public and commercial satellite operators in Europe depend today on collision
alerts provided by the US SST. However, these alerts often require verification
and refinement through further analysis by the spacecraft operator to avoid
risky or unnecessary mitigation measures (collision avoidance manoeuvres). US
SST information is not accurate enough and it could not prevent a major
catastrophe in terms of debris creation which was the collision between two
satellites in 2009[19].
In view of this and given that not all Member States and satellite operators
have the capacity to carry out the verification of US SST alerts, unnecessary
anticollision maneuvers are often required as a precaution.

–
The US system which has been operational since
the 1960's is aging. Therefore, in its space policy issued in June 2010[20], the US recognised that its
system requires updating and refurbishing to address the increasing need for
SST information. As this requires substantial investments, the US signalled
openness to stengthen international cooperation in this domain with actors that
can actively contribute to improve the quality of SST information. The
setting up of a European SST capability would allow the EU to collaborate with
and influence developments in the US as an equal partner with a view to
mutually enhancing SST performance.

–
Russia, China, Japan and India have surveillance
systems with limited geographical coverage and undisclosed performance
capacity. Russia and China are known to work on strengthening their capacities.
However, none of these systems are today open to cooperation with other
space-faring nations[21].

3.1.1.3.  Other
actions to mitigate collision risks

In addition to
avoidance manoeuvers there are other complementary measures that can be
undertaken to mitigate the increasing risk of collision or the consequences of
collisions:

–
Protecting satellites: Satellites can be hardened or shielded against the impact of space
debris. Research activities in this domain are ongoing. However, even the most
state of the art hardening or shielding technologies cannot prevent satellites
from being damaged from space debris;

–
Removal of space debris: Research and development efforts also focus on technologies to
remove space debris. However, work in this domain is at a very early stage, and
it is generally accepted that debris removal can only be an effective solution
in decades to come and cannot be expected to resolve the problem at hand;

–
Prevent the creation of space debris: The international community widely recognises the proliferation of
space debris as the current biggest threat to the sustainability of space
activities. There are several initiatives seeking to ensure the commitment of
space-faring nations to reducing the production of space debris when conducting
space activities through international instruments (see annex IV). The
International Space Code of Conduct proposed by the EU currently under
negotiation has received so far wide international support. However, important
as these instruments may be if their provisions are implemented, they will not
eliminate the problem that existing and future debris pose, they will just reduce
the exponential growth of space debris in the future[22].

Therefore the most viable way for
spacecraft operators to mitigate collision risks is today to undertake
collision avoidance manoeuvres.

3.1.2.     Increased
collision risks due to space debris

During the past half
century objects have been launched into space regularly, reaching a peak of 140
items per year during the Cold War. Every time a launch vehicle boosts a
satellite into space, some debris is produced. Examples of space debris are:
discarded rocket bodies, fuel tanks, satellite components, non-functional
satellites and debris from collisions and explosions[23]. This material,
orbiting the Earth at very high speed and in an uncontrolled manner, poses an
ever increasing potential risk for the launch of spacecrafts and of their
exploitation due to collision with other debris or other spacecrafts in orbit.

As a result of the current limitations of
space surveillance systems, a large proportion of the overall population of the
debris population is neither tracked or catalogued and is estimated by using
mathematical models with different results. According to latest estimates, there
are 16 000 objects orbiting Earth larger than 10 cm, which are catalogued and between
300 000 and 600 000 objects larger than 1 cm, not catalogued. According to ESA,
the population of objects larger than 1 cm will continue to grow, and will
reach a total of approximately 1 million debris in 2020. Furthermore, it is
estimated that there are more than 300 million objects larger than 1 mm[24].

The vast majority of these space objects
are not in deep space, but in the commercially most exploitable areas of the
outer space region. These include the Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) at 36 000
km altitude which is mainly used for satellite telecommunications (and EGNOS),
the Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) at around 20 000 km altitude where all satellite
navigation constellations orbit including the Galileo satellites, and the Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) (from around 600 to more than 2 000 km altitude) that is
mostly used for Earth Observation satellites such as the future European Copernicus/GMES
satellites.

At a speed of 10 km/s, space objects can
cause serious harm to operational spacecraft, from total destruction (which
would inevitably be the consequence of a collision with a space object larger
than 10 cm) to permanent damage to sub-systems or instruments on-board
spacecraft (which will be the minimum impact of a collision with a space object
larger than 1 cm).

The table
below provides a synthesis of NASA, ESA and Booz & Company estimates on
debris and possible damage to satellites.

Category || Definition || Estimated population || Potential risk to satellites

Traceable || Greater than 10 cm in diameter || 16,000 catalogued; 20,000 in total || Complete destruction

Potentially Traceable || Greater than 1 cm in diameter || up to 600,000 || Complete to partial destruction

Untraceable || Between 1 mm and 1 cm || More than 300 million || Degradation, loss of certain sensors or subsystems

Table 1 – NASA, ESA and Booz & Company estimates on debris and
possible damage to satellites[25].

According to data analysed by Booz &
Company, approximtely 950 active satellites were orbiting the Earth in January
2011 as well as a handful of additional spacecrafts such the International
Space Station (ISS) or vehicles to ferry to and from the space station. More
than 19 % of the active satellites are of European origin.

A particular and increasing source of
concern is the LEO region where the satellites of the European Copernicus
programme will be. For this region, NASA modelling estimates a risk of 8-9
collisions between catalogued objects over the next 40 years (that means one
collision every 5 years). Approximately 50% of these collisions are predicted
to lead to the complete distruction of the satellite[26]. This view is commonly
accepted and shared by UK analyses as well as by experts of the French space
agency CNES [27].

The collision risk with partially traceable
space debris (between 1 cm and 10 cm), is estimated at 1 every 3 years[28]. Collision with space debris
of this size is likely to lead to a complete or partial loss of the satellite.

In addition, taking into account debris
smaller than 1 cm and under the same assumptions made above, the risk of
collision with a satellite could rise drastically up to 500 every 3 years (i.e.
around 170 per year). This kind of collisions may lead just to minor failures
which, nonetheless, can have the effect of shortening the lifetime of a
satellite[29].

Booz & Company,
taking the lowest risk assumption of 1 collision every 3 years for partically
catalogued debris globally in LEO as a basis, estimated Europe's economic risk
in the LEO region at a minimum indicative of 2.5 M€ per year over the next
decade[30].
This estimte takes into account the satellite's destruction and the income
shortfall generated by a 3 month service outage following the destruction.

Nonetheless, these estimates - already defined as
conservative by their authors - do not take into account the consequences over
the long term of collisions with debris smaller than 1
cm.

Geographical scope || Satellites in LEO || Satellite Loss probability (years) || Potential Satellite Losses (10 years) || Indicative economic damage (10 years in Mln Euro) || Annualized Economic damage (Mln Euro)

Asset || Service Outage

Global || 470 || ~1 every 3 years || 3 satellites || ~ 150 to 180 || ~ 5 to 6 || ~ 15 Million Euro

Europe || 68[31] || ~1 every 20 years || 0.5 satellite || ~ 25 || ~ 1 || ~ 2.5 Million Euro

Table 2: European and global economic risk of debris in LEO; source:
Booz & Company

3.1.3.     Collision
avoidance manoeuvres shorten the lifetime of satellites

As collision
risks for potentially traceable or untraceable debris is difficult to predict,
satellite operators tend to carry out avoidance manoeuvres on the basis of
alerts of close approaches of space debris. Modelling work at global level has
suggested that close approaches will rise from 13,000 a week in 2009 to 20,000
by 2019 and more than 50,000 by 2059, meaning satellite operators will have to
make four times as many avoidance manoeuvres in 2059 as in 2019.

As stated above, space agencies in Europe as well as ESA
rely on automated conjunction assessments and alerts from the US SST system. On
this basis the French space agency CNES, for example, perfoms its own estimates
and analysis, where necessary complemented by measures from its own
surveillance and tracking system GRAVES, and performs a collision avoidance
manoeuvre in case of elevated risks.

For the year
2010, CNES, operating a fleet of 17 satellites in LEO, reports almost 1
conjunction assessment risk per day, and 1 collision alert on average every 4
days. To mitigate collision risks it had to perform more than 1 collision
avoidance manouvre per month.

Similar
evidence is given by ESA sources and the German space agency DLR. In 2010, ESA
had on average 16 conjunction risks per satellite[32] and performed on average 3
collision avoidance manoeuvres per satellite. DLR reports more than 2
conjuction asessment risks per satellite and performed 1 collision avoidance
manoeuvre per satellite a year[33].

Combined data
from CNES, the German space agency DLR and ESA suggest 1.5 collision avoidance
manoeuvres per satellite per year in LEO. Considering that around 14% of the
470 satellites in LEO are European, this would imply around 100 collision
avoidance manoeuvres per year in LEO perfomed by European satellite operators
or EU Member States space agencies.

Collision risk
avoidance manoeuvres are also a problem in the GEO region, not necessarily
related to the need to avoid collision with debris, but due to the quantity of
satellites in this very confined area of outer space. Stakeholder interviews
carried out by Booz & Company revealed that an average GEO satellite
operator with a fleet of 20 satellites performs up to 50 collision avoidance
manoeuvres per year.

Each avoidance manoeuvre
requires fuel, which shortens the active life of satellites, or requires
additional fuel to be carried into orbit thus increasing the cost of launch[34]. Furthermore, due to the
inaccuracy of data related to the position of the objects in question, it can
be assumed that a good number of manoeuvres may not be indispensible but have
to be made as a precaution generating extra costs.

The table
below shows the estimated annualised costs of collision avoidance manoeuvres
which result in the shortening of satellites' lifetime. The table also
indicates the costs linked to the interruption of Earth observation data
collection and distribution which occurs during avoidance maneouvers of Earth
observation satellites in LEO[35]
[36]:

Europe || Collision Avoidance (yearly) || Impact over time (10 years) || Indicative economic effect (10 years) || Annualized economic effect

Total 68 satellites in LEO || ~ 90[37] || Life time shortening ~ 2900 weeks || ~ 1.2 billion Euro || ~ 120 Million Euro

32 satellites in LEO are Earth Observation satellite || ~ 45 || Days of EO loss of data ~ 450 days || ~ 8 Million Euro || ~ 0,8 Million Euro

~ 120 satellites in GEO || ~ 25[38] || Life time shortening ~ 700-750 weeks || ~ 150 – 200 million Euro || ~ 15-20 Million Euro

Table 3 – Annualised costs of collision avoidance manoeuvres in LEO
and GEO[39].

Accurate, timely and
complete space surveillance and tracking information is instrumental for the
protection of critical European infrastructures in space and for the secure and
safe operation of space-based services, as well as for the protection of the
population in case of re-entry events[40].

3.1.4.     Re-entry
of debris or uncontrolled spacecraft to Earth threaten the security of EU
citizens

Re-entries of spacecraft and debris to Earth
form an increasing hazard for the security of the Earth population. Whilst
active spacecraft re-entries into the dense layers of the atmosphere are
controlled (e.g. the US space shuttle, the Russian Soyuz, and the European
Automated Transfer Vehicle), inactive satellites and debris regularly re-enter
the atmosphere in an uncontrolled manner. These uncontrolled re-entries account
for more than 90% of all re-entries[41].

According to
the Aerospace Corporation Center for Orbital Debris studies, since the
beginning of space activities in 1957, more than 20,000 catalogued objects
re-entered the atmosphere, equivalent to more than one object per day on
average[42].
However, most debris have hit the Earth far from inhabited areas due to the
fact that 75% of the Earth surface is covered with water and only 25% of the
Earth's land mass is inhabited.

Nevertheless,
the ability to predit the trajectory of an object (which is highly dependant on
the survey and tracking capability of a space surveillance system) is essential
to mitigate risks related to re-entries. In controlled re-entry situations,
this may include the evacuation of a certain area of the ocean by stopping air
and sea traffic or boosting a spacecraft to remain on trajectory to a defined
impact footprint. In uncontrolled re-entry situations, trajectory information
is vital to alert local authorities of the impact assessment, or to take in
extreme cases measures such as the US shooting of a missile in February 2008 to
destroy their own military satellite.

According to
Booz & Company a total of 27 space debris have been found on the ground and
identified. Except for a few lightweight debris, the mass of these identified
debris vary from 10 kg to a maximum of 270 kg. Debris are estimated to hit the
ground at a speed of 30 km/h for lightweight debris and up to 300 km/h for the
heaviest ones. Fortunately, in the last 20 years the damages to property caused
by debris hitting the Earth have been marginal and no casualties have occurred.

However, uncontrolled re-entries can become
a particularly serious hazard to citizens' security and health when they
involve nuclear powered satellites. The most dangerous un-controlled re-entry
in the history of space missions in terms of the actual damages caused on Earth
occurred in January 1978, when the former USSR military nuclear powered
satellite Cosmos 954 hit the Canadian territory. When impacting with the denser
layers of the atmosphere the satellite broke up and a large number of
radioactive debris crashed on the Canadian regions of Northwest Territories,
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Almost all debris found of the ground were radioactive,
some of it proved to be of lethal radioactivity. The Canadian authorities in
charge of locating, recovering and cleaning-up the affected areas performed
these activities in two phases over 8 months. The total cost of these
activities incurred by various Canadian departments and agencies was reported at
$ 13.970.000 (at 1978 economic conditions). A few dozens of nuclear powered
satellites of similar design remain in orbit.[43]

Examples of unctrolled
re-entries over the past 15 years compiled by Booz & Company[44] illustrate the risks. Three of
the cases shown concern debris from European origin:

Date || Debris and event characteristics || Source of debris || Country of origin

Jan 1997 || A lightweight fragment of a debris (10 x 13 cm) grazed the shoulder of Mrs. L. Williams, whilst walking in Turley, Oklahoma, USA || Probably originating from a 2nd stage of a Delta II launcher || USA

April 2000 || A 270 Kg debris was found 20 km from the nuclear power plant of Koeberg, South Africa || 2nd stage of Delta II launcher || USA

Jan 2001 || A 70 kg debris was found 1km from the motorway linking Riyadh to the city of Taef in Saudi Arabia || Rocket motor of Delta II launcher || USA

March 2002 || A 49 kg debris landed in a house in Kasambya, Uganda || 3rd stage of Ariane 3 launcher || Europe

August 2002 || A 10 Kg debris landed near the village of Manzau, Angola || 3rd stage of Ariane 4 launcher || Europe

March 2008 || A 10 kg debris landed on a farm in Montividiu, Brazil || Probably from Atlas V launcher || USA

Sept 2011 || The UARS (Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite) breaks apart and lands in the Pacific Ocean far off the U.S. coast. Twenty-six satellite components, weighing a total of about 1,200 pounds, could have survived the re-entry and reach the surface of Earth. || The US NASA owned UARS (about 12 by 5 meters) was among the largest spacecraft to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere and make an uncontrolled descent. || USA

October 2011 || Satellite weighing 1.7 tons re-enters the atmosphere over the Bay of Bengal; not clear whether space debris reached the Earth's surface and no damage to property has been reported. || German DLR owned X-Ray Observatory satellite ROSAT || Europe

December 2011 || Re-entry with fireball observed above Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany; no damage reported; || Third stage of the Soyuz rocket that transported the Dutch astronaut André Kuipers to the ISS. || Russia

January 2012 || The Russian Marsian probe Phobos-Grunt threatens to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere over Europe; || Satellite experiencing failure during the launch phase || Russia

Table 4: Examples of debris hitting land in dangerous circumstances;
source: Booz & Company

With increasing population of satellites in
orbit, the number of uncontrolled re-entry events can be assumed to increase
over the coming years. Over the past 12 months, over fourty satellites and
upper stages of launchers have re-entered the atmosphere[45] and in the last 6 months the
US STRATCOM system issued three re-entry alerts: one for the US satellite UARS,
another for the German ROSAT satellite and the third for the Russian Mars
mission Phobos-Grunt. The three "threatening" probes eventually fell
safely in the seas.

While there is no doubt about the serious
risks posed by uncontrolled re-entries, it is not possible to estimate the
annualised losses that they may cause. This is because, among other
considerations, it is not possible to establish a statistic risk of
uncontrolled re-entry and it is also not possible to predict whether the
re-entry, if it happens, will cause or not damage on the ground.

3.1.5.     Overview
of estimated annualised losses due to hazards from space debris:

Section 3.1.2
estimates the annaulised economic impact for Europe resulting from collision
risks due to space debris. Section 3.1.3 estimates the annalised economic
impact of collision avoidance manoeuvres. The table below brings together these
figures[46].

The table also
includes an estimation of the possible annualised economic loss in light of the
future evolution of satellite market growth. According to Euroconsult[47], the satellite industry
launched an average of 76 satellites per year over the last ten years, ranging
between 60 and 90 units per year. Since the market is expected to grow by 50%
in the coming decade, with a total of 1,145 satellites to be built for launch
over 2011-2020, the launch rate for satellites will increase approximately at
the same level.

The table
below gives only a non-exhaustive overview of quantifiable estimated losses[48]. As indicated above, it is not
possible to estimate the annualised losses provoked by un-controlled
re-entries.

Loss type || Annualised loss

|| Actual || Actual + growth forecast (+50 %)

Direct loss of satellite due to collision || ~€ 2.5 Million || ~€ 3,75 Million

Life-time shortening of satellites in LEO due to collision avoidance || ~€ 120 Million || ~€ 180 Million

Loss of Earth Observation data in LEO due to collision avoidance manouevres || ~€ 0.8 Million || ~€ 1,2 Million

Life time shortening in GEO due to collision avoidance manouevres || ~€ 15-20 Million || ~€ 22,5 -30 Million

Total minimum annualised loss || ~€ 140 Million || ~€ 210 Million

Table 5 – Estimated loss due to space debris.

These costs are almost certainly just a
small fraction of possible non-quantified costs and, to some extent, the
non-quantifiable consequences that may result from the absence of a European space
surveillance and tracking capability. For example the loss of a satellite may
result in the loss of critical satellite communication capacity in an emergency
situation resulting in loss of life. Destruction or complete failure of a
satellite can result in serious disruption of economic activity (banking relies
increasingly on satellite communications) and could have an impact on client
business through loss of service. The loss of Earth observation capacity could
also have serious consequences in emergency and non-emergency situations.

3.2.        Underlying
policy considerations regarding the problem and the
design of the solutions

From discussions with stakeholders over the
past years, it became clear that the setting up of operational European SST
services will require the intervention of the EU.

3.2.1.     SST development must be led
by the EU

There is a consensus among EU and ESA Ministers
responsible for space that the development of this service is to be led by the
EU and not by the European Space Agency. This consensus is reflected in several
Space Council Resolutions mentioned in the impact assessment. In particular,
Member States asked the EU to define the governance and data policy for a
European SST service, to play an active role in the setting up of the European
service, and to make best use of sensors and expertise that already exists at
national and European level. Member States were also very explicit as to how
security concerns should be taken into account: SST sensors need to remain
under national control. Confidentiality of SST information was defined as the
key principle for the SST data policy (e.g. all information is to be
classified, to be declassified on a case by case basis only).

The reason for such position is not
formally recorded but emerged in numerous discussions: European SST service has
a security dimension (it allows gathering intelligence on States' civil and
military space infrastructure and operations) which the EU, unlike ESA, has
competence and is equipped to deal with. The TFEU grants the EU competence to
coordinate the exploitation of space activities and the TEU confers the EU
competence over security issues such as those that arise in the context of SST.
The EU has the necessary legislative capacity to put in place governance
mechanisms and a data policy for SST.

ESA, on the other hand, is a world-class
R&D agency designed to define and implement scientific, technology and
space application development programmes. ESA is neither conceived to do the
sort of complex policy and legislative work necessary to set up an SST system
where assets are largely in the hands of the military, nor has it been designed
to operate space-based services (a fact which ESA itself underlines in its
policy documents).

Arguably, Member States could set up a new
organisation to deal with SSA. Such organisation would have to have many of the
features that the EU already has. Therefore such new organisation would
generate duplications and inefficiency. In addition, some Member States have
expressed concerns that any solution outside the EU framework may be dominated
by those Member States that already possess today some sensor capacity
preventing others from developping their own in the framework of a truly
European service.

3.2.2.     Future SST must build on
exisitng assets and completed with new ones

There is a consensus among Member States
and experts that any SST development should capitalise and build on existing
assets which should be linked and operated as a network. There is also
convergence regarding the fact that current assets are insufficient to ensure a
minimum desirable level of performance. To reach this minimum desirable level
of performance new assets need to be built and integrated in an SST system.
These assets are primarily sensors such as tracking and surveillance radars and
telescopes.

3.2.3.     Governance: assets must
remain under the control of Member States

Over the years-long discussion regarding
the setting up of a European SST service, Member States possessing assets have
insisted on one crucial governance aspect: due to security concerns the sensor
and processing functions must, in any scenario, remain under the control of the
national competent authories (i.e. military authorities). The majority of
Member States possesing assets support the idea of that, for the purpose of
setting up a European SST service could form a consortium to run, Member States
possessing existing or new assets should form consortium to run, as a network,
both sensor and processing functions.

Member States are of the view that the
fornt desk funcion should be run either by the consortium itself or by another
body with adequate security credentials, such as the European Union Satellite
Center[49].

3.2.4.     Data policy: SST
information is classified

Under any scenario, SST data policy must
upheld the principle that information is by definition classified and it should
only be declassified on a case by case basis when the need arises.

3.2.5.     Funding

Member States are willing to make their
assets available for the setting up of the European SST service. They are of
the view that, in return, the development of the SST should involve EU funding
and should, as a minimum, cover operations directly linked to the setting up of
the European SST service. In addition to making their assets available, Member
States are open to contributing to it financially.

Although the overall benefits from the
proposed initiative are estimated to exceed the costs, SST services are mainly
of a public and precautionary nature which do not lend themselves to commercial
activity. While the introduction of a fee for both public and
private/commercial SST service users could be considered at a later stage to
cover operational costs, SST is not likely to be an activity to be started of
through private/commercial actors. Furthermore, those Member States owning
assets, for reasons of national security, would not collaborate with a commercial
actor in this sensitive domain.

3.3.        Who
is affected, in what ways and to what extent?

The most
affected groups include:

–
The EU, and more precisely the European
Commission, which is about to become a significant
European operator of space-based infrastructure;

–
Public/government entities and
administrations with legal and policy
responsibilities related to the management of public space activities and those
responsible for space security issues;

–
Public (national, European) and
private/commercial satellite operators having the
legal responsibility and effective control over operational or experimental
satellites;

–
Launch companies
share the same concerns as the satellite operators for the launch of satellites
or other spacecraft;

–
Space insurance companies will need space
surveillance data to improve their risk analysis and propose better tailored
products;

–
Public authorities and private/commercial
entities responsible for the operations of ground based infrastructures with
a satellite or space-based infrastructure component (such as financial
transaction networks, telecom networks or energy supply networks);

–
Public/governmental entities and administrations
with legal and policy responsibilities for civil protection early
warning, mitigation and response actions for situations where the re-entry of
space objects into the Earth's atmosphere threatens the property and life of
citizens or the security of critical ground infrastructure.

While the primary concern in setting up a
European SST service lies with the categories outlined above, the service may
also help international partners that do not possess such service. It has
already been mentioned earlier how the development of a European SST system can
be carried out in collaboration with the US.

3.4.        Foreseen
evolution of the problem

As previously
described (section 3.1.5), the number of active satellites in orbit is deemed
to increase by 50% in the next ten years. This would imply a simple raise of
50% of satellites in orbit only if the current operational satellites that will
have reached their end-of-life in that laps of time will be discarded (de-orbited
or re-orbited following debris mitigation guidelines). Taking into account the
fact that this assumption seems quite optimistic and that, for example, additional
launcher upper stages may be left in orbit after the launch of a satellite, it
is clear that the orbits' crowding will keep growing, raising further the level
of risks assessed in the previous sections.

Moreover, the number of tracked and catalogued
objects in orbit has increased by 100 % over the last 20 years (from 8,000 to
16,000 in 2012). As there is no visible sign for this trend to be reduced, with
current capabilities, the number of tracked and catalogued objects can be
estimated to be around 32,000 by 2032. The level of risk can be expected to
increase accordingly. The 2011 space security report states that although there
were no major fragmentations (events creating space debris) in 2010, the number
of catalogued objects increased by 800, mostly due to continued discovery and
cataloguing of debris from major fragmentation events in 2007 and 2009. A
significant number of debris will not reenter the Earth's athmosphere and
disintregrate in a relatively short period of time due to the athmospheric drag
and will remain a threat for decades and even centuries to operational
satellites and thus to the long-term sustainability of space activities.[50]

3.5.        EU
right to act

Article 189
TFEU introduces a right for the EU to act in drawing up a European Space
Policy, while building on past achievements at the level of ESA and Member
States, and gives the European Commission a clear mandate to exercise its right
of initiative. Space policy is defined as a shared competence between the EU
and its Member States.

Under section
3.2 there is a detailed explanation of the reasons why the EU is asked to
exercise its comptence in the specific domain of SST.

The EU does not
seek to replace initiatives taken by Member States individually or in the
framework of ESA. It seeks to complement actions taken at their level and
reinforce coordination where such coordination is necessary to achieve common
objectives.

The EU
involvement would be necessary to aggregate the investment required to fund
certain space projects, set in place governance arrangements, define a data
policy and ensure that existing and future capacities are broguht to work in a
coordianted and efficient manner ensuring a robust and interoperable system
benefiting all relevant European stakeholders.

Furthermore,
the proposed EU action does not seek to replace or duplicate existing
mitigation measures at international or multi-lateral level, such as the UN
guidelines for space debris mitigation or the EU proposal for an international
Code of Conduct on outer space activities. These measures will not solve the
problem at hand, but will reduce the growth of space debris in the long-term
(see the detailed description of this measures in annex IV).

4.           Objectives

4.1.        General
policy objectives

The general objective of the proposed
initiative is to safeguard the long-term availability and security of European
and national space infrastructures and services essential for the smooth
running of Europe’s economies and societies and for European citizens’
security.

4.2.        Specific
policy objectives

More specifically, the initiative aims at
increasing the EU’s capacity to:

–
Reduce the risks related to the launch of
European spacecrafts;

–
Assess and reduce the risks to in-orbit
operations of European spacecrafts in terms of collisions, and to enable
spacecraft operators to more efficiently plan and carry out mitigation measures
(e.g. more accurate collision avoidance manoeuvres; avoidance of unnecessary
manoeuvres which are risky in itself and reduce a satellite’s lifetime);

–
Survey uncontrolled re-entries of spacecraft or
their debris into the Earth’s atmosphere and provide more accurate and
efficient early warnings to national security and civil protection/disaster
management administrations with the aim to reduce the potential risks to the
security and health of European citizens and mitigate potential damage to
critical terrestrial infrastructure.

4.3.        Operational
objectives

In order to
realise the specific objectives, the continuous and sustainable provision of
SST information to European and national public and private/commercial users
needs to be ensured through:

–
The setting up of an operational space
surveillance and tracking capability at European level building on existing
European and national assets and capable of intregrating future new assets as
well as the implementation of an appropriate governance structure;

–
The definition and implementation of data policy
principles for the handling of SST information through the European SST
capability;

–
The definition and delivery of SST services open
to all European and national public and private/commercial actors who need SST
information; the services should respond to defined and agreed user
requirements.

–
Ensuring the necessary quality of SST services
and their efficient and sustainable operational provision:

–
Supervising the implementation and efficient
functioning of the proposed operational SST capability and the operational SST
services and by ensuring a sustainable EU funding contribution;

4.4.        Consistency
with other policies and objectives

The objectives
are coherent with Member States political will expressed in Council conclusions
as well as the objectives of the ongoing (and planned future) European GNSS
programmes and the GMES initial operations programme which aim at ensuring the
sustainable provision of European satellite navigation services or services for
environment monitoring or in support of security related activities. They are
also coherent with the objectives of space research activities carried under
the current EU framework programme for research and development (FP7) as well
as the planned Horizon 2020 programme. Furthermore, the proposed initiative's
objectives are consistent with the objectives set in the EU's policy related to
the protection of European critical infrastructure and the European Civil
Protection Mechanism.

As concerns activities beyond the EU
framework, the objectives of the proposed initiative are complementary with the
ongoing ESA SSA preparatory programme as well as national SSA activities.

5.           Policy
options

This impact assessment identifies five options
which - apart from the baseline scenario – seek to deliver the same output:
establishing a European service to avoid collisions in space and monitor
uncontrolled re-entries. However, they differ in terms of governance, funding
and the degree of performance that the service can deliver.

The selection of the options is based on
the following considerations some of which have been outlined in previous
sections and which can be summarised as follows:

(1)
European SST services should build on
existing European and national assets and competences and would entail the
development of additional ones;

(2)
SST capacity is incremental: SST is an activity that can be developed in an incremental and
modular way. New sensors or assets added to a European SST network can improve
the system's overall performance and the quality of the data and information it
provides;

(3)
Without prejudice of on-going budgetary
discussions, funding for a European SST service would come from
redeployment of budget from existing programmes foreseen for the next MFF
provided that such redeployment is compatible with the legal base of the
proposed programmes[51];

(4)
No risk of cost-overruns: SST performance is incremental and improvement of performance can
be achieved with relatively (compared with other space programmes) modest
investments. Any unlikely cost-overruns would be offset by down-scaling the
system (for example with regard to number of sensors included in SST sensors
function or new sensors to be developed by Member States), which can still
guarantee enhanced performance compared with the current situation. In
addition, to safeguard EU budget, EU funding provided under any of the options
would take the form of fixed contributions;

(5)
Strengthened cooperation with US on SSA: The US SST technology and architecture is old (with assets dating
back to the 60ies) and needs modernising. As part of its space policy, the US
has publicly stated its desire to collaborate internationally in this domain.
Collaboration between the US and the EU could improve the accuracy and quality
of SST overall and generate efficiency and savings. This two-way collaboration
is obviously only possible in so far as the EU develops SST capacity of its
own.

(6)
The performance of the service allows reducing
the risk of collision by a certain factor; the potential economic loss caused
by collision will be reduced by the same factor. As options 2, 3 and 4 are
variations of the same option and based on expert advice, the performance of
the service proposed in these options suggests a risk reduction by a factor
of 3 to 5. Option 5 which proposes a more performing service suggests a risk
reduction by a factor of 10.

(7)
Any enhancement of SST capacity will result in
improved ability to predict and monitor uncontrolled re-entries but we can not
establish a target for this. Therefore, the options are designed considering
only the target reduction of collision risk.

FROM PROBLEM DEFINITION TO OPTIONS

1. PROBLEM DEFINITION || 2. SOLUTION || 3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE DESIGN OF THE SOLUTION || 4. THE DESIGN Of THE SOLUTION: THE OPTIONS

Increasing number of sapcecraft and debris generate an increasing risk of collision. Collision can destroy or damage satellites. There is direct economic loss due to destruction or damage. There is indirect loss of revenue. There is unquantified indirect damage due to disruption of satellite service. Incraesing risk of uncontrolled re-entries that may cause damage on the ground. In Europe there is at present no adequate capacity to survey and track space objects and to alert stellite operators of the risk of collision. The capacity that exists allows to survey and track limited number of objects. The alerts given are inaccurate and often demand unecessary avoidance maneouvres that shorten the life of satellite. There is also no adequate capacity to monitor uncontrolled re-entries. || The baseline scenario would not make the problem go away, on the contrary it can only get worse. The problem cannot be solved through debris mitigation measures which can only prevent the problem from becoming exponentially worse. The solution to the problem is to have the means to survey and track space objects to determine the risk of collision and provide alerts when such risk arises. These means will also serve to better predict and monitor the uncontrolled re-entry of space objects in order to alert if necessary public authorities of any potential danger that these re-entries may generate. These means is what the report refers to as Surveillance and Tracking Service which consists of three functions: – Sensor function, which through a network of instruments such as radars and telescopes allows to identify and track spacecraft and debris; – Processing function, through which the relative orbit of spacecraft and debris can be catalogued and analysed to determine the probability of collision or to determine the re-entry path of space objects; – Front desk function, which is responsible for the actual provision of the SST services (such as collision or re-entry alerts) to satellite operators and relevant authorities. At the same time, the front desk will be the entry point for user requests for SST information which it relays to the processing and sensor function. || Discussions on the potential development of SST have revealed that Member States have converging strong views on the fact that SST must be developed in the framework of the EU and on the following issues: Architecture: A SST service must be developed building on existing assets owned by Member States and by adding new assets. Governance: The European SST service has a highly sensitive security dimension as it allows gathering intelligence on States' civil and military space infrastructure and operations. Member States have made clear that due to security concerns the sensor and processing functions must, in any scenario, remain under the control of the national competent authories (i.e. military authorities). Given such security concerns, front desk function must be entrusted to an entity that has solid security credentials. Data policy: There is a consensus among Member States that SST information is by definition classified and can only be declassified on a case by case basis where the need arises. Funding: Member States are of the view that the development of the SST should involve the EU funding, but they are open to contributing to it financially. || There are basically two broad options: status quo and the developing of a European SST service. There are however possible variations on the latter. In column number 3, a number of policy considerations are idenitfied. In this light, any of the options will build on the combination of existing and new assets and will have identical governance and data policy. Against this backdrop, the design of the options is guided by the degree of performance that they seek, i.e. the quantifiable reduction of collistion risk, and the way the funding contributions necessary for the setting up and operations of the European SST service are shared between the EU and the Member States. Following expert advice, for the purpose of this report two targets have been identified: – a reduction by a factor of 3 to 5 (options 2, 3 and 4) and – a reduction of 10 (option 5). Achiving these targets requires the addition of new assets to the existing ones and a certain investment: 60 M€ to achieve the factor 3 to 5 target, and 120 M€ to achieve the factor 10 target. Options 2 and 3 propose EU funding as an incentive for Member States to invest in the new European SST service. Options 4 and 5 propose EU funding for all costs linked to the setting up and operation of the European SST service.

5.1.        Option
1: Baseline scenario: No EU financial involvement in SST

Under the
baseline scenario the EU would not engage in any action or provide any support
(legal or financial) to the setting up and operational provision of European
SST services.

The reasons
underlying the need for EU intervention have been outlined under Section 3.2 of
this impact assessment.

Without the
preparation of an organisational framework setting out how the provision of
operational SSA services would be organised and without an agreed data policy
that would ensure the EU Member States that information related to sensitive
satellites or their existing sensors is handled with the necessary level of
confidentiality, there are no indications that EU Member States on their own
initiative would come to a broader cooperation on SST outside the EU framework.

The fact that
the need for setting up of European SSA services was highlighted in Space
Council Resolutions since 2007, but no initiative was taken by EU Member States
so far underpins the likelihood of this scenario.

Existing
sensors and expertise at Member States level, such as radars and telescopes or
SST data centres, that could form building blocks for a European SST system,
will remain fragmented and not inter-connected. Bilateral cooperation as
described in the problem definition may continue, but there are no indications
today that this may lead to more formal cooperation arrangements apart from the
cooperation between France and Germany which announced to interconnect their
existing sensors and data centres (GRAVES, TIRA), but which is still not an
operational reality.

Cooperation in
the SSA domain between a number of EU Member States (in their capacity of ESA
Member States) in the framework of ESA may continue. However, such cooperation
emerged in the context of a several year-long policy discussion for the setting
up of a European SST that is supposed to be led by the EU. If the EU does not
take action, the continued cooperation on SST amongst EU Member States in the
ESA framework is highly unlikely.

So far ESA has
carried out a number of preparatory studies to define civil SSA user
requirements, SSA system requirements, architecture options, and to develop two
demonstrator radars. The proposal for actions in 2013-2015 currently under
discussion indicates that the focus will be on space weather and NEO
monitoring, which are typical R&D activities and have no significant
security dimension. As concerns space surveillance and tracking, the current
draft programme proposal suggests continuing the development, testing and
validation of SST sensors (the already launched development of two demonstrator
radars as well as three telescopes), the development of a secured network
between existing sensors and the testing of pre-cursor SST services. These
activities must be seen as technical support within the overall framework of an
EU-led development of a European SST service to which assets developed through
ESA will also contribute.

Taking into
account the fact that Member States do not see the development of a European
SST service as a mission to be entrusted to ESA as explained in section 3.2, the
setting up of operational SST services at European level under the baseline scenario
cannot be expected.

Cooperation
between EU Member States and third countries is expected to remain at the
current status: The US are expected to remain the only space-faring nation that
shares SST information with public and private/commercial European satellite
operators on an individual basis. However, as set out in the problem definition
chapter of this report, the information provided by the US is not accurate
enough to efficiently plan and carry out collision avoidance manoeuvres.
Operators that do not have the means to refine such information, or cannot get
help in time from Member States that do possess such means, are forced to carry
out sometimes unnecessary avoidance manoeuvres as a precaution.

The EU in its
role as owner and operator of the EGNOS and Galileo would have to rely on the
US SST and make arrangements with those Member States that have SST assets to
ensure refined assessments of collision risks and to accompany collision avoidance
manoeuvres.

Even in the
absence of EU intervention, the US is likely to improve its SST capacity.
However, it is not possible to predict whether, on what basis and with which
degree of accuracy the US will continue to provide SST information to third
parties. It is certain that the US will take such decision as a function, first
and foremost, of US own national interests.

As concerns
other mitigation measures to reduce collision risks for satellites, a number of
actions may be taken including action at international level with the objective
to limit the growth of space debris as illustrated under chapter 3.1.1.3.

These
international mitigation measures seek to prevent the exponential growth of
debris and may only be effective in the long-term, if indeed they are
implemented. However, these actions cannot replace short-term mitigation
measures such as collision avoidance manoeuvres.

5.2.        Option
2: Partnership approach – EU funding for the European SST front desk function

This option
would seek a reduction of the collition risk by a factor of 3 to 5 and
therefore a reduction of economic loss due to satellite failure or destructions
by the same factor. There is convergence among experts that in order to achieve
such reduction the sensor function must be developped linking and operating as
a netwok existing assets and adding to this network 1 tracking radar, 1
surveillance radar and 8 telescopes. These assets should be linked by secured
lines. The processing function must be set up including in particular a robust
data center. A front desk must also be set up.

This would
require an overall investement, coming from EU and Member States, of some 60 M€
per annum (for details see annex V on the calculation method). According to the
most conservative estimate the current anualised estimated loss of 140 M€ would
be reduced to between 28 to 46 M€.

In this option,
operational European SST services would be set up in partnership with EU Member
States owning relevant assets. The EU would define the legal framework for the
setting up and operations of European SST services on the basis of existing
sensors and capacities as well as those Member States may decide to develop
(for instance in the follow-up programme to the ongoing ESA SSA preparatory
programme to be decided at the ESA Ministerial Council in November 2012).

This option is
based on the so-called small option in the study carried out by Booz &
Company. Further discussions and verifications with experts from ESA and
national space agencies led to converging views on the new infrastructure
elements needed to reach the targeted performance levels of the European SST
service indicated above and the cost estimates.

5.2.1.     Governance

The EU, through
an appropriate legal instrument, would define the roles and responsibilities of
each actor in the implementation and operation of the proposed European SST
capability which comprises of three functions:

–
the sensor function (consisting of a
network of existing and new SST sensors connected amongst each other and with
the SST data processing centres),

–
the processing function (consisting of a
combination of existing SST data centres and analytical expertise to process
the data captured by the SST sensors, merge it with US SST data, build a
European catalogue of space objects, analyse collision risks and re-entry risks
etc), and

–
a front desk function (handles the
dissemination of SST information, e. g.collision risk alerts during launch and
in-orbit operations and re-entry early warning alerts, to European users
through defined SST services).

The governance framework would also define
the services to be provided in accordance with defined user requirements, set
out data policy principles, and define coordination and monitoring mechanisms
to ensure the overall functioning of the European SST service, the
implementation of the services and the agreed data policy, as well as the
contacts with service users.

As explained
under section 3.2, Member States have made clear that the sensor and processing
function must remain under the control of competent national authorities (i.e.
military authorities). Therefore, a consortium set up by competent
authorities of Member States would be responsible for the sensor and the
processing functions of the European SST capability. The consortium should
be open to all EU Member States and European actors that are ready to
contribute SST sensors or other relevant capacities or expertise. The
consortium members will retain the full control over their assets, and will be
responsible for their operation, maintenance and upgrading/further development.
The consortium will also be responsible for the implementation and the
operation of the secured network interconnecting sensors and the processing
function. The processing function will consist of centres at Member States
level (both France and Germany have set up such “precursor” national centres)
and a central data center. In line with the role of the processing function
explained above, the consortium would build and operate a European catalogue of
space objects and provide analytical support to the front desk function. The
interior organisation of the consortium would be the responsibility of the
Member States constituting it on the basis of broad terms of reference to be
provided by the European Commission. France and Germany declared readiness to
form the nucleus for such a consortium on the basis of their existing assets.

The front
desk function would be entrusted to an existing operational entity/agency
with suitable security credentials and a proven capacity to handle SST
information in a secured environment (for example the EU Satellite Centre
provided that it will be given an appropriate mandate by its Member States[52]). The front desk ensures the
provision of SST services open to all European and national public and
private/commercial users.

The European
Commission would not engage in any day to day operational activity, but
would ensure the overall coordination of the SST functional elements. To
this end, it would set up and chair a board consisting of the members of the
Consortium and the European SST front desk.

5.2.2.     Service
provision

The services to be provided would be
defined by the European Commission based on the civil-military SSA user
requirements approved by Member States in October 2011(see footnote 18):

SST service groups || Users

Collision avoidance: Services related to the risk assessment of a collision between spacecraft or between spacecraft and space debris and the generation of collision avoidance alerts; || · Operators of public/governmental, scientific and commercial spacecraft within the EU and third countries; · Military spacecraft operators; · Launch service providers; · Government services that have legal and policy responsibilities related to the management of public space activities; · Space insurance companies and banks that provide financing for space actors; · ESA, EU

Detection and characterisation of on-orbit fragmentations: Services to detect and assess the risks of on-orbit fragmentation events (explosions or break-ups that lead to the creation of space debris) or collisions, and to issue alerts where required; || · Public (civil or military) and commercial spacecraft operators and launch service providers; · Government services that have legal and policy responsibilities related to the management of public space activities; · Space insurance companies and banks that provide financing for space actors; · International scientific community interested in orbital debris population; · Defence/governmental community in case such collisions could have an intentional nature (such as so called anti-satellite (ASAT) tests which aim at intentionally destroy a satellite); · ESA, EU

Re-entry predictions for hazardous space objects: Services to assess risky re-entries of space objects into the Earth's atmosphere, predict the time and location of impact, and initiate alert procedures to predefined points of contact || · Public (civil or military) and commercial spacecraft operators and launch service providers; · Government services that have legal and policy responsibilities related to the management of public space activities; · Space insurance companies and banks that provide financing for space actors; · Governmental civil protection services · ESA, EU

5.2.3.     Data
policy

The Commission
in cooperation with EEAS and Member States is already working on principles for
the SST data security policy. The SST data security policy will define the
framework for the acquisition, handling, processing and distribution of SST
data derived from the observation of space objects, information related to the
SSA systems and its various components (functioning, availability, precision
etc) as well as information related to the users.

The most
stringent requirements on confidentiality of SST information are imposed by the
defence community[53]
in order to protect sensitive governmental space assets of Member States and
allies. Uncontrolled disclosure of information related to these assets
(including information concerning their existence, orbital parameters, space
manoeuvres in view of military or intelligence operations), as well as
information revealing interest expressed for specific assets or systems or
information related to the characteristics of military SST sensors, could jeopardise
national security.

In accordance
with these needs, SST related information concerning objects detected through
the SST sensors will be considered classified by default. Information about an
object may only be declassified if it is cleary identified as a non-sensitive
object. At any time, when there is a risk of collision or a hazardous re-entry
involving a classified object, an ad-hoc decision shall be taken on the risk of
declassification. The processing function of the proposed European SST system
will be reponsible for taking such decisions based on the agreed data policy.
No declassification decision will be taken without involving the actor
responsible for the object.

5.2.4.     Funding

The overall
costs of the setting up and operation of the European SST capability would be
co-funded by the Member States constituting the consortium and the EU in the
manner describe below.

The Member
States participating in the consortium would provide funding for:

–
all capital investments related to the setting
up of the sensor function including the development of new assets and its full
operation;

–
the capital investment for the setting up of the
processing function;

–
the secured network to inter-connect sensors and
the processing function

–
The maintenance and operational costs of the
sensors and processing functions necessary for the Europan SST service;

The costs for
the acquisition of new assets (1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking radar and 8
telescopes, the required equipment to network existing assets and the
processing function and a data center) necessary to guarantee the targeted
collision risk reduction factor of 3 to 5 is estimated at 50 M€ per annum.
Costs for the operations of sensors and processing functions can be estimated
at 8 M€ per annum[54].

The total
contribution of Member States participating in the consortium would be around
58 M€.

The EU would
provide funding for:

– the setting up and operation of the front desk function, namely the
staff required to run such service (estimated at 6 FTE) the acquisition of the
necessary hardware and software, the maintenance of such equipement and
overheads[55].

Funding of the SST front desk function can
be estimated at an average of 2 M€ per year. Therefore, the total contribution
of the EU would be 2 M€.

As explained on page 24, the provision of SSA
services is not likely to be an activity to be started through private or
commercial actors. Member States owning relevant SST assets are not willing to
collaborate with a commercial actor in this sensitive domain as commercial
actors do not meet the security requirements identified to protect national
security interests. However, similar to ongoing US STRATCOM reflections, the
generation of revenues through the introduction of service fees for both public
SST service users (who are not part of the consortium) and private/commercial
users could be envisaged in the longer run – once the planned European SST
services have reached a stable operational stage and the necessary quality
level. The introduction of service fees could be examined in the context of the
evaluation of the initative's implemementation.

5.3.        Option
3: Partnership approach – EU funding for networking and operation of sensor, processing
and front desk functions

This option is identical to option 2 in all
respects except as regards the distribution of funding provided by the
consortium of Member States and the EU.

Under this option Member States
participating in the consortium would fund:

–
the capital investments related to the setting
up of the sensor function including the development of new assets and its full
operation;

–
the capital investment for the setting up of the
processing function;

–
The capital investments for the secured network
to inter-connect sensors and the processing function;

As in option 2, the acquisition of new
assets (1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking radar and 8 telescopes, the required
equipment to network existing assets and a data centre) necessary to guarantee
the targeted collision risk reduction factor of 3 to 5 is estimated at 50 M€
per annum.

The total contribution from Member States
in the consortium would be some 50 M€ per annuum(see also annex V on the
calculation method).

The EU would fund:

–
The operational costs of the sensors and
processing functions necessary for the Europan SST service;

–
the setting up and operation of the front desk
function, namely the staff required to run such service (estimated at 6 FTE),
the acquisition of the necessary hardware and software, the maintenance of such
equipement and overheads.

The EU funding
contribution would amount to 10 M€ per annum (8 M€ for maintenance and
operation of the sensor and processing function and 2 M€ for the front desk
function).

As in option 2, the introduction of service
fees could be examined in the context of the evaluation of the initative's
implementation.

5.4.        Option
4: EU-led SST development and funding (risk reduction factor of 3 to 5)

As in option 2
and 3, this options assumes the development of 1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking
radar, 8 telescopes for both surveillance and tracking and a data centre. The
risk reduction factor would be identical to that under options 2 and 3, but
there would be differences in terms of governance and funding because the EU
would be the system owner and would fund the totality of the costs directly
linked to the European SST service.

The EU defines
the related legal framework (including data policy), and takes the full
responsibility for the development of the structures needed to federate
existing national and European sensors and capacities and to ensure the
provision of SST services.

The Commission
would engage in public procurement processes and would become owner of SST
infrastructure elements where necessary.

5.4.1.     Governance

The sensor
function would be a shared responsibility of Member States and the EU as it would
comprise existing assets remaining under the control and responsibility of
Member States and European assets developed and owned by the EU. For the same
reasons, the processing function would be largely the responsibility of Member
States, but it would have to involve the EU to a larger extent than options 2
and 3.

Following the
same logic as in previous options, e. g. to entrust the sensor function and the
processing function to a consortium of Member States to meet Member States'
security concers, the management of the new EU-funded assets would be entrusted
to the consortium, and the front desk function to an entity with adequate
security credentials such as the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC).

The European
Union would be the owner of any new assets procured for the setting up of the
European SST service, would be responsible for the overall political
supervision and would oversee the execution of the programme. Given that the EU
would be the main architect and source of funding for the European SST service,
it would have greater responsibility than under options 2 and 3.

5.4.2.     Data
policy

Data security
policy would be identical as in the options 2 and 3.

5.4.3.     Service
provision

Service
provision would be identical as in options 2 and 3.

5.4.4.     Funding

Under this option the EU would fund:

–
the capital investments related to the setting
up of the sensor function including the development of new assets;

–
the capital investment for the setting up of the
processing function;

–
The secured network to inter-connect sensors and
the processing function;

–
The operational costs of the sensors and
processing functions necessary for the Europan SST service;

–
the setting up and operation of the front desk
function, namely the staff required to run such service (estimated at 6 FTE)
the acquisition of the necessary hardware and software, the maintenance of such
equipement and overheads.

As in option 2 and 3, the acquisition of
new assets (1 surveillance radar, 1 tracking radar and 8 telescopes, the
required equipment to network existing assets and a data centre) necessary to
guarantee the target collision risk reduction factor of 3 to 5 is estimated at
50 M€ per annum.

The EU funding contribution towards
maintenance and operation costs of sensors and processing funcion would amount
to 8 M€ for maintenance and operation of the sensor and processing function;
the EU funding of the front desk function would amount to 2 M€.

Total
contribution from the EU would amount to some 60 M€ per annum (see also annex V
on calculation method).

5.5.        Option
5: EU-led SST development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of10)

Option 5
follows the same logic as option 4, but seeks to reduce the risk of collision
by a factor of 10 and consequently of the estimated losses above a factor of
10. This option requires the acquisition of 2 surveillance radars, 2 tracking
radars and 14 telescopes.

The development
of new sensors to complement existing national sensors would increase the
system's capacity to detect space objects in terms of geographic coverage and
size of objects. As a consequence, this option would improve the quality and
accuracy of the SST services provided.

This option is
based in the medium option in the study carried out by Booz & Company. As
all the previuos options, option 5 would also leverage on existing sensors in
Europe.

5.5.1.     Funding

Funding would follow the same logic as in
option 4 but with double the number of new assets (2 surveillance radars, 2
tracking radars and 14 telescopes) which also implies enhanced processing
capacity as well as a higher performing service.

EU funding can be estimated at some 120 M€
per year for the period 2014-2020 (see also annex V on the calculation method).

5.6.        Summary
of the options

Option 1: Baseline || Option 2 || Option 3 || Option 4 || Option 5

5.6.1.     Governance

Non existent || EU provides the legal framework Consortium of Member States own and operate sensor and processing function EU entity entrusted with front desk function EU ensures overall running of the system in partnership with Member States || EU provides the legal framework EU funds and owns new assets Consortium of Member States own exisiting assets Consortium operates sensor and processing fucntion, including those owned by EU EU entity entrusted with front desk function EU has a much stronger grip of the development of SST than in options 2 & 3 EU ensures overall running of the system in partnership with Member States. It has greater responsibility than in options 2 and 3

5.6.2.     Data policy

Non existent || Developed as part of the EU framework

5.6.3.     Service provision

Non existent || 24/7 service -Risk collision reduction by factor 3 to 5 || 24/7 service – Collision risk reduction by factor 10

5.6.4.     Funding

Undetermined || Consortium funds sensor and processing funcions and new assets – 58 M€/year EU funds front desk – 2 M€/year || Consortium funds new assets – 50 M€/year EU funds operations of sensor, precessing and front desk functions – 10 M€/year || EU funds new assets and operations of sensor, processing and front desk function – 60 M€/year || EU funds new assets and operations of sensor, processing and front desk function – 120 M€/year

5.7.        Summary
of stakeholder views on the options

There are two broad categories of
stakeholders: public authorities and industry.

The idea of developing a European SST
service has been under discussion for a number of years. The building blocks of
the options presented have all been discussed with stakeholders either
bilaterally or multilaterally on numerous occasions.

Industry could be roughly grouped in two
categories: manufacturing industry and commercial satellite operators. Both
groups are strongly in favour of the setting up of a European SST capacity.
Manufacturing industry is clearly in favour of the option that guarantees the
highest investment and therefore the highest industrial return. Satellite
operators are concerned with the performance of the system and favour the
highest possible performance. They are however concerned that high performance
would not result in any additional costs imposed on them.

Industry has not expressed particular views
on governance, which is understood to be a political issue, or data policy. As
regards, service provision, satellite operators underline the need for accurate
and timely information, which is the objective under any of the suggested
options.

As far as Member States are concerned, some
of them have far clearer and stronger position on these matters than others.

All Member states agree on the need to set
up a European SST service. They all agree that such service should build on
existing assets and this is foreseen in options 2 to 5. All Member States are
in agreement with the governance suggested in the options: e. g. a consortium
of Member States being entrusted with the operation of the sensor and
processing functions. One Member State has indicated on a number of occasions
that it would prefer that a European entity be set up to to handle these
functions but accepts the governance arrangements proposed in the suggested
options provided that the consortium is not reserved to Member States that
currently possess relevant assets and that it guarantees the involvement of all
Member States willing to contribute to these functions, which will indeed be
the case.

All Member States agree on the proposed
data policy, which is identical for all the options and, in brief, foresees
that data on space objects is by definition classified information and it is
only disclosed on a case by case basis when required. A data policy based on
this guiding principle and involvement of Member States owning existing SST
sensors in the governance of the planned European SST service, would in
particular meet the security concerns of those Member States where existing
assets are under military control. No further trade-offs would be needed to
ensure military participation in a European SST service open to both public
(civil and military) and private/commercial operators and authorities.

As far as service provision is concerned,
all Member States are open to the idea that a front desk function be strongly
linked but differentiated from the sensor and processing function and entrusted
to an organisation with a record as service provided and suitable credentials
in the security domain, such as the European Union Satellite Centre. One
particular Member State is strongly in favour of such idea.

As regards the target performance of the
system, this issue was put to Member States during the presentation of the
study carried out by Booz & Company. It is clear from the discussions that
were held in that context and elsewhere that they are rather in favour on
building on existing assets and adding the minimum necessary to guarantee an
improvement in relation with the current situation. This is confirmed by the
developments being suggested in the context of ESA's SSA preparatory programme.
Member States are therefore in favour of an improved performance of the order
suggested in options 2 to 4.

Ideally, all Member States would like the
EU to fund the totality of a European SST service. However, for some Member
States, the interest in developing an SST capability is closely linked with the
desire to support national industry active in this domain. The EU can not
guarantee geo-return and therefore, from some Member States' perspective, there
would be a drawback in the options suggesting the EU fully funding European SST
service.

Notwithstanding the above, Member States
understand budgetary constraints and are aware of the possible difficulties in
redeploying the budget necessary to secure full EU funding of the European SST
service. In this context, Member States have made clear that, as a minimum, the
EU should cover the operations of the sensor, processing and front desk
functions necessary to establish a European SST service, and have shown
willingness to fund the development additional capacities that could contribute
to it.

As concerns other space faring nations, in
particular the US signalled openness to strengthened cooperation with other
space-faring nations provided that the international partner has the
appropriate credentials to ensure the confidentiality of the SST data received.

Taken all of the above into account, while
Member States would potentially be open to any the options proposed, their most
favoured options are 3 and 4.

6.           Analysis
of impacts

The methodology
applied for assessing the impacts of the options set out in chapter 5 is based
on the following:

·
Space activities undertaken by space faring
nations are often driven by strategic and security considerations. These
considerations are particularly relevant for space surveillance and tracking
activities. Furthermore, governance and funding issues can have a strategic
impact. Therefore, options will also be assessed in view of their strategic and
governance impacts. The strategic impacts section will focus on whether the
option provides strategic independence and knowledge, whether it provides
significant political "currency" for Europe to be seen as a credible
partner which can contribute to international cooperation, whether the options
contribute to overcoming fragmentation of efforts.

·
The economic impacts section will focus on the
industrial return of the options, and to which level the option contributes to
reducing risks that have an economic impact.

·
As concerns social impacts two aspects will be
considered: the creation of jobs and the impact of the threats that can be
monitored via an SSA system on citizens' security and health.

·
Finally, the assessment of environmental impacts
will focus on the proliferation of space debris.

·
The problem definition section of this impact
assessment report underlined the lack and fragmentation of available
information, (case) studies or statistics which made it in many cases difficult
to quantify the risks and potential losses linked to the problems identified.
It is possible to quantify the minimum economic losses linked the risk of
collision which can be estimated on the basis of object that can be tracked
today. However it is not possible to quantify risks related to uncontrolled
re-entries, which can only be illustrated through anecdotal evidence.
Consequently, the assessment of the impacts of the various options will be a
mix of qualitative and quantitative impacts.

6.1.        Impacts
of option 1: baseline scenario

6.1.1.     Strategic
and governance impact

Under the
baseline scenario, the EU would take no action to promote the setting up of
operational SST services at European level. This would have no impact on the implementation
of the EU flagship programmes Galileo and Copernicus, but their long-term
security and sustainable exploitation could be affected.

SST activities
in Europe would remain limited and fragmented – apart from some bilateral
cooperation (e.g. between France and Germany) which, incidentally, has emerged
in the context of the discussion of an EU-led development of a European SST
service. In absence of any incentive or European framework, it is quite
unlikely that any broader cooperation between Member States with a view to the
setting up of a European SST capability would develop. Without EU involvement,
there are no grounds to believe that Member States will take the necessary
steps to set up of adequate coordination mechanisms and operating structures
necessary for SST services.

However, should
some form of cooperation emerge including assets owned by Member States other
than France and Germany, there is a consensus among SST experts that this will
not reduce the current level of collision risk.

European
cooperation with the US would remain at current bilateral level. A substantial
number of European spacecraft operators as well as civil protection authorities
at EU and Member States level may remain dependant solely on the, for now,
freely available (but not accurate enough) US SST information in a critical area
of their space activities.

6.1.2.     Economic
impact

The problems
identified in section 3 would not be addressed and are likely to aggravate over
the coming years. With increasing space activity and increasing space debris,
economic losses due to launch failures, satellite loss or damage, and service
outages are expected to increase.

Industrial activity in SST in Europe would
stay at current limited level. In absence of EU involvement, and in the light
of years of political discussion on the development of a European SST service,
there is no ground to believe that ESA could undertake the actions that are
described under options 2 to 4 and spur some industrial activity in this
domain. For the reasons spelled out throughout this impact assessment, this
appears rather unlikely to happen.

6.1.3.     Social
impact

In absence of
EU action and the fact that Member States do not seem to be ready to engage in
major SST development activities in the framework of ESA, the impact on job
creation of this option is negligible.

As operational
European SST services (including re-entry warning services) do not exist today
and are not likely to be set up without any EU support, Europe would not
increase its capacity to survey controlled or uncontrolled re-entries of space
debris into the Earth's atmosphere. Re-entry warnings and alerts would continue
to be provided in a sporadic and uncoordinated manner. Security threats from
uncontrolled re-entries of space debris into the Earth's atmosphere as
explained in the problem definition section would not be addressed or
mitigated. With increasing space activity, the risks to the security and health
of European citizens or the security of critical ground-based infrastructure
risks to increase.

6.1.4.     Environmental
impact

The main
environmental benefit of building a European SST capability is related to the
outer space environment and the ability to monitor the evolution of debris and
debris clouds. As described in more detail in the problem definition, a large
proportion of the space debris population (around 95% overall) is currently not
catalogued. The population of 'potentially traceable' debris (e.g. 1 cm to 10
in diameter) is estimated using different mathematical models which lead to
large differences in results with estimates varying by a factor of 2 to 3.
However, all estimates agree on the constant and significant growth of the
debris population in the future (in fact each collision between space objects
leads to an exponential growth of the debris population[56]) and the need for action to
preserve the space environment.

Recent theories
concerning the generation of space debris clouds resulting from in-orbit
collisions which significantly contribute to the growth of the debris
population and which may, in the long-term prevent the scientific and
commercial exploitation of "crowded" orbits such as LEO have to some
extent been confirmed by the Iridium 33 collision. This collision produced a
debris cloud of 1875 catalogued debris, and an undefined number of
un-catalogued debris which is likely to be in the order of some thousand.

Recent UN and
NASA studies underlined the risk of growth of debris in LEO which would
continue to grow even if all launch activities (and thus the further use of
space) would stop. Space debris presents particular characteristics in the GEO
region which are not yet fully understood (why, for example, there is a
tendency of debris concentration close to positions occupied by satellites).
These phenomena can be better understood through SST. It is worth noting that the
members of the International Telecommunication Union recently agreed to
consider GEO as a unique natural resource with an economic value of
approximately 70 Billion US$ per year.

International mitigation measures have been
approved at UN level. In addition, in 2009 the EU presented a proposal for an
international Code of Conduct proposing a set of transparency and
confidence-building measures with the aim of preventing the creation of space
debris. These measures will have a long-term effect by influencing spacecraft
operators' behaviour. However, improved capacity to monitor the debris
population is considered the most effective short-term effort to mitigate the
risk of space debris creation and thus contribute to preserve space as a
natural resource. While under the baseline scenario, the EU would continue to
act on long-term measures through its proposal for an international Code of
Conduct, it would not make any efforts with a short-term effect to preserve the
usability of certain orbits such as LEO. Ultimately this could jeopardise the
sustainable provision of public services based on Earth observation satellites
which are relevant for the implementation of European and national policies in
various policy domains including environment or climate change policies.

Another aspect
to consider is linked to the problem of un-controlled re-entries of space
debris which has been analysed in the problem definition. Incidences involving
space debris from nuclear powered satellites or satellites with dangerous substances
on board (such as hydrazine) can become seriously harmful events for the
environment as well as for the health of citizens. An example may illustrate
the scale of the problem: In 1978, the nuclear powered Cosmos 954 satellite hit
the Canadian soil. Radioactive debris was found over a large territory
throughout several Canadian provinces. Cleaning-up operations lasted 8 months
at reported costs of around 14 Million US$ at the time (equivalent to 40-50
Million US$ today). While SST systems cannot prevent such incidences, they are
the basis for taking mitigating measures based on state of the art early
warning services and responding as efficiently as possible to potential (catastrophic)
events on the ground.

6.2.        Impacts
of options 2, 3 and 4

Options 2, 3 and 4 all seek a target
reduction of risk collision of a factor of 3 to 5 (as explained in chapter
6.2.2) through a similar architecture, and data policy. They all envisage the
same level of funding for the establishment of a European SST service. The difference
lies in the split between EU and Member States contributions which implies
differences in the governance for option 4 (see summary table 5.6.4).

As impacts are a direct consequence of the
performance of the system (i.e. reduction of the risk of collision) and the
investment which are the same for the three options, the three options would in
principle deliver the same impacts.

However, the options may not be equally
likely to materialise. The strengths and weaknesses of the options is analysed
under section 7.1.

6.2.1.     Strategic
impact

Data security
policy principles would be identical to all options. A key principle of the
data policy applied for the handling of SST data in the proposed organisational
framework is to consider all space objects confidential from the outset.
Information about space objects detected will only be declassified on a case by
case basis and distributed only when it has been identified as a non-sensitive
object.

The proposed
governance scheme will allow Member States to actively contribute and safeguard
their national security interests. Furthermore, Member States would under any
of these options be responsible for operating the sensor and processing
functions, including the establishment and maintenance of a European catalogue
of space objects which will allow them to control the
classification/declassification process.

The involvement
of the EU in the governance of the European SST service (through an EU entity
acting as an SST service front desk), and the fact that the consortium will be
open to Member States owning relevant assets and capacities should disperse
concerns expressed by those Member States that have no such capacities today
(see also pages 23 and 40).

These options
would build on existing international cooperation with the US. The US system
requires updating and refurbishing to address the increasing need for SST
information. As this requires substantial investments, the US signalled
openness to stengthen international cooperation in this domain with actors that
can actively contribute to improve the quality of SST information. The setting
up of a European SST capability would allow the EU to collaborate with the US
as an equal partner with a view to mutually enhancing SST performance.

Furthermore,
these options would strengthen Europe's independent access to space (an
objective of the European space policy and highlighted by Member States in
several Council Resolutions) and its capacity to make independent decisions
concerning the safety of spacecraft operations. Europe currently strongly
relies on information from the US to obtain clearance to launch and gain access
to space (e.g. Arianespace confirmed that it is dependant on information from
the US to obtain to determine the viability of its launch path with regard to
risks of collisions with satellites or space debris[57]).

The EU's
financial contribution foreseen in options 2 and 3 would provide a different
level of incentive for the Member States consortium to engage in the necessary
capital investments related to the setting up of the European SST capability
(e.g. investments necessary to create a secured sensor network, to refurbish
and modernise existing sensors and develop new ones).

The assumption
that Member States are willing to develop such assets is based on bilateral
discussions and on the current proposals for the second phase of the ESA SSA
preparatory programme 2013-2015, which makes proposals in this direction.

Option 4
suggests that the EU would fund all the costs linked to the European SST service.
This would still require the participation of Member States with existing
assets, though they would not incur in any of the extra cost of a European SST
service.

Any of these
options would ensure a truly European SST service which would respond to defined
and agreed European SST user requirements and needs and be available to all
European public and private/commercial users. However the different options
have different strengths and weaknesses and present different risks in terms of
effectiveness and efficiency which are compared under sections 7.1 and 7.2
respectively.

6.2.2.     Economic
impact

The proposed
initiative would improve the European SST service's ability to detect hazardous
situations and provide more accurate SST information (conjunction assessments
and trajectory data) for the launch and in-orbit operation of satellites. It
would imply a reduction of the risk of satellite losses and the number of
collision avoidance manoeuvres leading to a reduction of economic losses (see
problem definition section).

According to
ESA expertise one can assume a linear correlation between the increase in
tracking capacity and the reduction of risks and potential quantified annual
losses (as identified in chapter 3 and summarised in chapter 3.1.5.). The SST
capability under these options would target a reduction of collision risk by a
factor of 3 to 5 and would therefore lead to a reduction of losses due to
collisions by a factor 3 to 5 by 2020[58]
implying a possible reduction of the estimated annual losses of 93-112 M€.

As pointed out
in the problem definition section, European operators of spacecraft in LEO face
around 13 conjunction assessment risks per satellite a year. Leading space
agencies in Europe, such as CNES, DLR and ESA, rely on initial data from the US
surveillance system to estimate conjunction assessment risks for their own
satellites which needs to be complemented with measurements based on their own
surveillance assets as the information the US is ready to share without
jeopardizing national and military security interests. While the SST capability
proposed in the options 2, 3 and 4 would not preclude continued cooperation
with the US, which can result in even higher performance through the pooling of
resources, they would significantly improve the ability and quality of European
operators to carry out their own complementary risk assessments.

These options
would build on existing SST sensors and human expertise and foresee the
development of new SST sensors. Using as reference the defence sector from
which ground based technology used for SST (e.g. radars) originates, Booz &
Company suggests that the development of new sensors foreseen in these options
is likely to have a multiplier effect in terms of industrial activity of 2.3.
Considering only that the investment in new assets would amount to roughly 50
M€ per annum (which do not take into account ICT for processing and front desk
functions), i.e. 350 M€ over the seven year period 2014-2020, the total
industrial return can be estimated at 805 M€ which is a rather conservative
estimate. Would we apply the multiplier effect usually applied for investments
in space programmes (4.8), the industrial return could be estimated at 1680 M€[59]. SMEs in the sector are
expected to benefit from this industrial activity as the development of SST
sensors often requires niche technologies often produced by SMEs. SME
participation does not require specific measures and is not expected to imply
specific burdens.

6.2.3.     Social
impact

Using the Booz
& Company study as a reference, the estimated number of permanent staff
generated by options 2, 3 or 4 would be around 50. On the basis of their own
experience, national and ESA experts consider this a very conservative
estimate, but will nevertheless be used here due to the lack of a more precise
estimate.

The proposed
action will lead to an improvement of Europe's ability to predict and survey
re-entries of space debris into the Earth’s atmosphere, and thus help reducing
the risks to the security and health of European citizens and the security of
terrestrial critical infrastructures. The problem definition section of this
report highlighted that on average 1 debris per day hits the Earth (and the
trend is rising). While these incidences have so far not led to casualties,
debris from inactive satellites or rockets varying between 10 kg to 270 kg can
cause severe material damage and should be considered a security and health
hazard. Due to lack of any quantitative data and studies on material damage
caused by un-controlled re-entries it is unfortunately not possible at this
point of time to quantify this positive impact.

6.2.4.     Environmental
impact

These options
would increase Europe's capacity to monitor uncontrolled re-entries of space
debris and to put in place a coherent and clear procedure to issue meaningful
and timely warnings to national security authorities.

A recent re-entry event may illustrate the
improvements that could be achieved through a more coordinated approach to
re-entry warnings at European level: In mid-January 2012, the Russian Marsian
probe Phobos-Grunt, which encountered a failure during the launch phase,
re-entered the Earth's atmosphere in an un-controlled way. For the first time,
the US State Department provided the EU with Tracking and Impact Prediction (TIP)
Alert Messages. The Crisis Management and Planning Department (CMPD) within the
European External Action Service (EEAS) acting as contact point relayed the
information to other EU actors and to Member States' national security
authorities via the Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC). The US
also alerted ESA. In parallel, the Russian authorities alerted some EU Member
States space agencies including the German space agency DLR which relayed the
information to other national space agencies. None of the actors involved was
informed about others being contacted. As a result, national authorities
received partly diverging warnings from different sources through different
channels.

6.3.        Impacts
of option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation

6.3.1.     Strategic
impact

In addition to
the strategic impacts outlined for the previous options, option 5 could clearly
increase the EU's strategic potential to strengthen and intensify cooperation
in SST with other space-faring nations (notably the US) through established
political channels.

In this option,
the EU would have the full control over the setting up of the European SST
capability, and that the initiative is open to all EU Member States that wish
to participate. It would also ensure that the operational SST services to be
set up would correspond to agreed European user requirements and that they are
open to all European users.

6.3.2.     Economic
impact

The EU SST
programme proposed in this option implies the development/procurement of new
SST assets for the amount of 810 M€. Booz & Company suggests that
investments made in the development of ground-based infrastructure as suggested
in this option is likely to have a multiplier effect in terms of industrial
activity of 2.3. This would result in a direct and indirect industrial turnover
between 1.9 billion € and 3.9 M€ depending on the multiplier used (see chapter
6.2.2.).

Applying the
same approach to estimate the reduction of economic losses likely to be brought
about by option 3, it could be estimated that option 5 could reduce the risks
identified in the problem definition by a factor of 10 or above. This would
imply a possible reduction of estimated annual losses due to collisions of 126
M€.

6.3.3.     Social
impact

The EU SST
programme foresees the development of a number of new SST assets and the
setting up of a new or the extension of existing SST data centres which will
require permanent staffing to ensure operations on a 24/7 basis. Based on
estimates from Booz & Company, the potential for the creation of permanent
jobs in the engineering and data analyst domain would be around 100 new jobs
across Europe.

As option 2, 3
and 4, this option would lead to an improvement of Europe's ability to predict
re-entries of space debris into the Earth’s atmosphere. Option 5 provides a
potential to reduce risks to the security of European citizens and critical
terrestrial infrastructure even further.

6.3.4.     Environmental
impact

As in options
2, 3 and 4, this option would strengthen Europe's capacity to monitor the
debris population, avoid collisions, and thus to mitigate the risk of further
space debris creation.

According to
Booz & Company option 5 would allow the detection of debris up to 3 to 5 cm
which are today not catalogued. This would significantly increase Europe's
capacity the risk of debris clouds and their long-term proliferation in Low
Earth Orbit.

6.3.5.     Overview of impacts

|| Strategic impacts || Economic impacts || Social impacts || Environmental impacts

Option 1: Baseline || SST activities in Europe remain fragmented apart from some bilateral cooperation; no European SST service to emerge in absence of EU action. Cooperation with US remains at current bilateral level; continued high dependency of European operators on US SST information. || Risks related to collisions and uncontrolled re-entries will not be addressed and are likely to increase as space activities increase; increase of economic losses due to launch failures, satellite loss or damage, and service outages expected. Industrial activity in SST in Europe expected to stay at current limited level. || Impact on job creation is negligible. Services for survey of re-entries are not likely to emerge in absence of EU action; alerts and warnings are likely to continue to be issued in a sporadic + uncoordinated manner; risks to security and health of citizens from un-controlled re-entries are expected to increase with increasing space activity; || Europe's capacity to monitor the evolution of space debris and debris clouds would not improve; also its capacity to avoid the creation of new space debris would not increase. Risk related to re-entries that may have serious impacts on environment are likely to increase.

Options 2, 3 and 4 || Proposed governance and data policy allows MS to actively contribute in the European SST service and safeguard national security interests. Option 2 and 3 provide incentives for MS to invest in setting up of European SST service and develop new assets. Option 4 also builds on MS contributions, but funding for new assets is ensured by the EU. Setting up of European SST service allows to collaborate with EU as an equal partner with a view to mutually enhance SST performance. Europe's independent access to space would be strengthened (e.g. proper and more accurate information to clear launches). || SST capability under these options targets a collision risk reduction by a factor 3 to 5 by 2020. This suggests a reduction of the losses by the same factor, meaning a reduction of the estimated annual economic losses of 93 to 112 M€. Industrial activity due to development of new assets (350 M€ in 2014-2020) is expected to have a multiplier effect of at least 2.3 leading to a total industrial turnover of 805 M€. || Creation of around 50 jobs in Europe estimated; Europe's ability to predict and survey re-entries would be improved and reduce the risks to the security and health of citizens and the security of critical terrestrial infrastructure (increase and positive impact not quantifiable). || Options increase Europe's capacity to detect debris not catalogued today, monitor the evolution of space debris and predict un-controlled re-entries. Setting up of European SST service allows putting in place a coherent procedure for re-entry warnings and alerts for public authorities, thus increasing the effectiveness of re-entry warning and alert services.

Option 5 || Governance: EU has full control over the setting up of the European SST service. Option 5 would further strengthen Europe's potential to strengthen cooperation with other space-faring nations on SST (notably US). || SST capability under this option targets a collision risk reduction by a factor 10. This implies a reduction of estimated economic annual losses of 126 M€. Industrial activity of 810 M€ during 2014-2020 can be expected to lead to total industrial turnover of at least 1900 M€. || Creation of around 100 new jobs in Europe expected. Europe's ability to predict and survey re-entries would be improved further than in options 2, 3 and 4 and further reduce the risk to the security and health of citizens and the security of critical terrestrial infrastructure (increase and positive impact not quantifiable). || As in option 2, 3 and 4, this option would further increase Europe's capacity to monitor the evolution of space debris and predict un-controlled re-entries. SST service would allow detecting debris up to 3-5 cm (today not catalogued).

7.           Comparing
the options and conclusions

7.1.        Summary
of strengths and weaknesses of the options

|| Strengths || Weakness

Option 1: Baseline || A limited service is provided by the US at no cost. Public funds may be diverted to other priorities. || The risk of collision remains and will get worse. EU unable to protect critical space infrastructure. Negative strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It does not meet either Member States or industry expectations.

Option 2 || A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. Several Member States have given indications of their willingness to develop additional SST assets in the framework of an EU-led SST initiative. This option comforts Member States' perception that developing their own assets guarantees that their investment benefits national industry. || This option requires significant funding from both the EU and from Member States willing to develop new assets. Although there is evidence that some Member States are indeed supportive of this idea and willing to develop new assets, the EU does not have full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. The EU investment does not cover an important part of the costs directly linked with the setting up of a European SST; i.e. the operations of the sensor and processing function. It does not meet Member States' expectations that as a minimum the EU would cover the operational costs of the European SST service and therefore may not provide sufficient incentive for Member States to invest.

Option 3 || As in option 2, a collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. Several Member States have given indications of their willingness to develop additional SST assets in the framework of an EU-led SST initiative. This option comforts Member States' perception that developing their own assets guarantees that their investment benefits national industry. This option meets Member States expectations that as a minimum the EU would cover the operational costs of the European SST service. || As in option 2, this option requires significant funding from both the EU and from Member States willing to develop new assets. Although there is evidence that some Member States are indeed supportive of this idea and willing to develop new assets, the EU does not have full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service.

Option 4 || A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It gives the EU practically full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. Some Member States would welcome higher funding from the EU as this guarantees the setting up of an EU SST service and would give tem the choice of either invest further in SST or in other space projects. || As sole contributor, the EU has a higher responsibility for the overall system and in particular it has to supervise the acquisition of new assets. As the EU funding for SST is to be redeployed from other sources, the amount required under this option would impose a non-negligible burden on those sources.

Option 5 || A collision risk reduction of 10 is targeted. This option provides the most positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It gives the EU practically full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. Some Member States would welcome higher funding from the EU as this guarantees the setting up of an EU SST service and would give tem the choice of either invest further in SST or in other space projects. || As sole contributor, the EU has a higher responsibility for the overall system and in particular it has to supervise the acquisition of new assets. As the EU funding for SST is to be redeployed from other sources, the amount required under this option can only be made available through very significant cuts in other programmes and would require very difficult trade offs.

7.2.        Comparison in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with agreed policies

The table
below provides an overview of the various options in terms of their
effectiveness, their efficiency and their coherence with agreed policy
objectives expresses in Council conclusions or other policy documents:

Options || Effectiveness || Efficiency || Coherence

Option 1 || Baseline scenario: would not achieve specific objectives of this action. || No resources needed; no improvement of the current problem situation; || This option is not consistent with Member States political will expressed in several Council conclusions which ask the EU to take an active role in the setting up of an operational SSA capability at European level. It is also not consistent with the objectives of the European space policy.

Option 2 || This option could achieve the specific objectives. It would allow diminishing risks related to the loss of satellites as well as domino effects due to spacecraft destruction. The option would bring about important strategic, economic, social and environmental benefits resulting from reducing the risk of disruption of satellite based services, and better control of spacecraft re-entries. However it may not provide a sufficient incentive for Member States to invest in additional assets and the target collision risk reduction may not be achieved. || Option 2 involves minimum EU expenditure of 2 M€ and Member States would contribute 50 M€. From a purely EU budgetary perspective could be the most efficient. Member States expectations is that, as a minimum, EU funding covers all the operation costs linked of the European SST service, which is not the case under this option. This may discourage Member States to invest in new assets. Discussions over this issue may result in inefficiencies and in the European SST not being implemented. The EU would not be involved in the development of SST infrastructure, it would not be responsible or own SST assets, and would not be involved in operational activities. || This option would meet the objectives set in past Council conclusions and the European space policy. It is also coherent with the EU2020 strategy. SSA does represent certain potential for innovation and growth. Its main purpose is the protection of space infrastructure that represents the basis for downstream services that may generate innovation and growth as well as to reduce risks to the security of European citizens and critical terrestrial infrastructure to the extent possible.

Option 3 || This option could achieve the specific objectives in the manner described in option 2. Unlike option 2 it does provides a solid incentive for Member States to invest in additional assets necessary to reach the target collision risk reduction. || Option 3 entails an estimated expenditure of 10 M€ per year on average for a system whose total cost would be 50 M€. From an EU budgetary perspective is an efficient option. This option meets Member States expectations that, as a minimum, EU funding covers all the operation costs linked of the European SST service. It offers a strong incentive for the European SST service to be set up. As in option 2, the EU would not be involved in the development of SST infrastructure, it would not be responsible or own SST assets and would not be involved in operational activities. || Same as option 2.

Option 4 || European SST would be fully funded by the EU and does not depend on MS funding. The EU would, in principle, guarantee that the specific objectives – as described in option 2 - are achieved. As SST is to be funded through redeployment of existing funding instruments, finding 60 M€ represents a much higher burden than the amounts under options 2 or 3. This is a significant risk for the effectiveness of this option. || Option 4 entails annual EU funding of 60 M€. From an EU budgetary perspective is less efficient than either options 2 or 3. However, under this option success does not depend on MS contribution. Under this option new assets would be fully funded by the EU, which implies that the EU would be the owner of such assets. In addition, as the sole contributor and even if most of the tasks are externalised, the EU would bear a higher responsibility for the system than in options 2 and 3, where the responsibility would be largely shared with MS. This imposes a burden on the EU which renders this option less efficient than options 2 and 3. || Same as option 2.

Option 5 || This option guarantees, in principle achieving all the objectives. In addition it would allow the setting up of a European SST service whose performance would be better than that under options 2, 3 and 4 leading to higher risk reduction, and more significant economic and social impacts. However the problem related to redeployment would be aggravated under this option as the amount required would be 120 M€. This would be a risk for the effectiveness of this option. || Option 5 entails annual EU funding of 120 M€. From an EU budgetary perspective is less efficient than any of the other options. However, as in option 4, under this option success does not depend on MS contribution. The same issues related to ownership of assets and higher responsibility identified under option 4 arise under option 5 and would be aggravated by the larger investment required. However, under option 4 this drawback would be compensated by the gains in terms of reduction of economic loss as well as positive economic and social impacts. || The coherence with European Space Policy and the Europe 2020 agenda is guaranteed as in the previous options. Under option 5 the impacts in terms of industrial return and job creations are higher than in the other options given the higher investment involved.

While option 2
would be the most efficient in view of the EU financial involvement required,
there is a risk that it may not lead to the envisaged performance of the
European SST service and, as a result, to a reduced effectiveness of the
proposed initiative. A relatively modest increase of EU financial involvement
(compared to other EU space programmes) as suggested in option 3 would provide
a far better basis to achieve the objectives set and reach the targeted
collision risk reduction. Option 5 would be the most effective one in terms of
the reduction of collision risks. However, it lacks efficiency as it would not
make use of existing Member States assets and capacities, and may be difficult
to implement in the short-term. Therefore, option 3 has been identified as the
preferred option in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence with
Member States political will and other EU policies.

8.           Monitoring and evaluation

8.1.        Evaluation

The proposed
action to be taken by the EU will have to be defined through a legal proposal.
In accordance with provisions made therein, ongoing evaluation of the
implementation of the proposed initiatives and the achievement of objectives
set will be undertaken by:

–
A Board which will oversee and advise on the
implementation and operation of the functional elements of the European SST
capability to be set up. The Board shall be composed of the Member States
constituting the consortium to operate the sensor and processing segments of
the SST capability, the Commission and other EU actors concerned, the entity
representing the EU front desk responsible for the SST service segment.

–
The Commission through regular meetings with the
SST user communities;

A mid-term and ex-post evaluation will be
carried out on the basis of the above indicators

–
The impact of the proposed initiative could be
measured on the basis of the widespread use of the SST services through
European and national users; the actual reduction of loss of satellites and
unnecessary collision avoidance manoeuvres, the increased efficiency of collision
avoidance manoeuvres or re-entry early warnings. The evaluation of these
impacts would mainly be based on feedback provided by the SST user communities.

8.2.        Monitoring

The Commission
will ensure that grant agreements or contracts under the framework of the
proposed initiative provide for supervision and financial control by the
Commission, if necessary by means of on-the-spot checks, sample checks, and
audits by the Court of Auditors On the basis of the results of the on-the-spot
checks, the Commission will ensure that, if necessary, the scale or the
conditions for allocation of the funding contribution originally approved as
well as the timetable for payments are adjusted.

In addition to the financial supervision,
the Commission will put in place mechanisms to ensure the continuous quality of
the SST services provided. This will be realised by measuring users'
satisfaction on one side and by technical audits on the other side. Finally, as
stated above, the Commission will organise regular meetings with user
communities to ensure that services respond to user needs.

Indicators to
monitor the achievement of the objectives could be:

Objectives || Indicators

General objective: ||

Safeguard the long-term availability and security of European and national space infrastructures and services essential for the smooth running of Europe’s economies and societies and for European citizens’ security || · Absence of collision · No disruption of satellite or launch operations due to difficulties in risk analysis

Specific objectives: ||

· Reduce the risks related to the launch of European spacecrafts; · Assess and reduce the risks to in-orbit operations of European spacecrafts in terms of collisions, and to enable spacecraft operators to more efficiently plan and carry out mitigation measures (e.g. more accurate collision avoidance manoeuvres; avoidance of unnecessary manoeuvres which are risky in itself and reduce a satellite’s lifetime); · Survey uncontrolled re-entries of spacecraft or their debris into the Earth’s atmosphere and provide more accurate and efficient early warnings to national security and civil protection/disaster management administrations with the aim to reduce the potential risks to the security of European citizens and mitigate potential damage to critical terrestrial infrastructure. || · No disruption of launches due to uncertainty of collision risk. · Existence of necessary and properly operational sensor and processing capacity to asses and reduce collision risks. · Positive feedback from operators regarding mitigation measures collected through regular surveys. · Established and properly operating sensor and processing capacity to monitor re-entries. · Existence of a fully operational service and establishment of an agreed procedure to provide early warnings to civil protection and disaster management authorities.

Operational objectives: ||

· The setting up of an operational space surveillance and tracking capability at European level building on existing European and national assets and capable of integrating future new assets as well as the implementation of an appropriate governance structure; · The definition and implementation of data policy principles for the handling of SST information through the European SST capability; · The definition and delivery of SST services open to all European and national public and private/commercial actors who need SST information; the services should respond to defined and agreed user requirements. · Ensuring the necessary quality of SST services and their efficient and sustainable operational provision: · Supervising the implementation and efficient functioning of the proposed operational SST capability and the operational SST services and by ensuring a sustainable EU funding contribution. || · All relevant existing national assets and future assets are effectively integrated within the governance structure. · Data policy is actually defined and effectively implemented within the three functions of the European SST service. · All services are formally defined. The SST front desk function is set up, manned and operational according to defined requirements. · Definition of quality standards. Mechanisms are established to collect feedback from operators on the quality of the SST service. Positive feedback received from operators. · Effective supervision mechanisms are in place with clear tasks, timetables and milestones

8.3.        Anti-fraud measures

The setting up
of the operational SST capability and SST services will take place through the
Commission's partners: The consortium of Member States owning relevant SST
assets which will be responsible for setting up and operating the SST sensor
network and the SST information processing segment as well as the EU entity
that will act as the EU front desk and be responsible for the provision of the
SST services (possibly the EU satellite centre provided that it is given a
mandate by the EU Member States).

EU funding is proposed to be provided
through grant agreements which will allow for appropriate financial control
through the Commission. The proposed EU initiative to set up and operate
European SST services, stipulates that the Commission will
ensure that, when actions financed under this initiative are implemented,
financial interests are protected by the application of preventive measures
against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities, by means of
effective checks and by the recovery of amounts unduly paid and, if
irregularities are detected, by effective, proportional and dissuasive
penalties.

ANNEX I: Glossary

CNES,
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales:

The French Space Agency

ESA, European Space Agency

Inter-governmental organisation established
in 1975 to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes,
co-operation among European States in space research and technology and their
space applications. Today, 18 European Countries are ESA Member States:
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and United Kingdom.

GMES, Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (now called
Copernicus)

European
initiative for the implementation of information services dealing with
environment and security. Copernicus is based on observation data received from Earth
Observation satellites and ground based information. These data are
coordinated, analysed and prepared for end-users. It develops a set of services
for European citizens helping to improve their quality of life regarding
environment and security. Copernicus plays a strategic role in supporting major
EU policies by its services.

Launchers

Rocket-based systems that deliver payloads
(satellites, manned vehicles, etc.) into space. They can be heavy, medium and
small, according to the relative weight of payloads that a particular launcher
can carry into space.

LEO, Low Earth Orbit

Generally considered to be an orbit at an
altitude of 400 to 1000 km.

Meteor

Brief streak of light seen in the night sky
when a speck of dust burns up as it enters the upper atmosphere. Also known as
a shooting star or falling star.

Meteorite

A fragment of rock that survives its fall
to Earth from space. Usually named after the place where it fell.

Meteoroid

A piece of rock or dust in space with the
potential to enter Earth's atmosphere and become a meteor or meteorite.

NEO, Near Earth Objects

Asteroids or
comets whose orbit brings them into close proximity with the Earth (less than
1.3 astronomical unit a unit defined by the Earth – Sun distance).

Payload

Equipment carried by a spacecraft. A
product becomes a payload once it is intended to fly on board a spacecraft.

Satellite

A man-made object (such as a spacecraft)
placed in orbit around the Earth, another planet or
the Sun.

Soyuz Launcher

A launcher system developed by the Soviet
Union, also used as a medium-lift launcher for Europe.

Spacecraft

Artificial satellite. Term often used
before a satellite is placed in orbit around the Earth, when it is transporting
something or when it is being sent into deep space.

Space weather

The changing conditions in interplanetary
space caused by fluctuations in the solar wind.

SSA, Space Situational Awareness

Comprehensive
knowledge, understanding and maintained awareness of the population of space
objects (spacecraft such as satellites or space debris), of the space
environment, and of the existing threats/risks to space operations. SSA systems
rely on ground or space based tracking and monitoring sensors.

The Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
Preparatory Programme is a new initiative of ESA, accepted at the November 2008
Ministerial Conference in The Hague.
SSA includes activities in three main domains: space surveillance, space
weather and Near Earth Objects (NEOs).

ANNEX II: Stakeholder
consultations and results

(1)
List of stakeholders consultations

(a)
Bilateral meetings held in 2009 by DG ENTR with
MS actively involved in the space sector: Germany, France, UK, Spain, Italy;
industry association;

(b)
Interviews of relevant stakeholders, conducted
by Ecorys in the context of the “Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”
(December 2009-January 2010);

(c)
Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of
the European Union conducted by Gallup in July 2009;

(d)
Contributions and speeches of the conference
“Space policy: a powerful ambition for the EU”, Brussels, 15-16 October 2009;

(e)
Stakeholder consultation in the framework of the
"Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020" carried out by Ecorys in
cooperation with TNO on behalf of the European Commission; final report of 4
July 2010;

(f)
Events under Spanish EU Presidency:

(g)
Workshop on Space and Security, 10-11 March
2010, Madrid, Spain;

(h)
Conference on governance of European Space
programmes, 3-4 May 2010 Segovia, Spain;

(i)
ESA contribution to the definition of future EU
space activities;

(j)
Public consultation via the Commission's
Interactive Policy Making (IPM) tool from 3 January to 15 March 2011;

(k)
Stakeholder consultation in the framework of the
study on "Evaluation of options for a space programme in 2014-2020"
carried out by Booz & Company on behalf of the European Commission; final
report of 16 May 2011;

(l)
Seminar on Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
under the Polish EU Presidency on 29 September 2011 in Warsaw;

(2)
Conclusions Conference on Space and
Security, Madrid 10-11 March 2011

The Workshop
emphasised the relevance of space to security users as a tool with the potential
to address specific needs, in particular that of timely response. Being one
tool of many, space can provide the most added-value when seamlessly integrated
with others. To achieve this, effective integration of space technologies such
as Earth observation (and especially GMES), satellite communication and
navigation (Galileo with its PRS) will be required. In parallel, the way the
space systems interact and network with ground based and airborne platforms
needs to be further looked into.

Services of the
EU Council and the European Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and
the European Space Agency (ESA) have been working together on the
identification of security related user requirements under the umbrella of the
Structured Dialogue on Space and Security. The new Crisis Management and
Planning Directorate of the Council offers the potential for genuine synergies
between civilian and military effort, and will continue to contribute to the
ongoing developments in space and security. The expertise of the EUSC in
analyzing EO data and disseminating geospatial products for security
applications should be taken in due account in the implementation of GMES
security services.

Concerning the
security dimension of GMES, workshop participants recognised the progress made
to date. Recommendations have been made on how GMES should support EU border
surveillance (in particular EUROSUR), while work on the identification of user
requirements for GMES to support EU External Action has begun. GMES security
services to be developed on the basis of these requirements will complement the
support provided by GMES to Emergency Response.

The complexity
of integrating both civil and military requirements has been illustrated by the
cooperation on Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which is the first European
space initiative to consider dual use dimensions from the outset. ESA, in the
framework of its SSA preparatory programme, has been mandated to gather
civilian SSA user requirements and design the technical architecture of what
could become a European capacity. The European Defence Agency is currently
drafting military requirements for SSA. The EU Council and European Commission,
together with potential SSA contributors, will have to define the governance
model and the related data policy for an operational European SSA system. The
EUSC data model could be considered in this context.

Discussions on
effective synergies and the governance of GMES and SSA highlighted the
importance of national assets as essential components of any European Space
system responding to security objectives. These national assets could be
complemented by European capabilities when needed, while avoiding unnecessary
duplication. As an example, Spain presented its National Earth Observation
Satellite Programme consisting of an optical and a radar satellite (PAZ) that
will be operated together and have been
designed to serve the needs of security and non-security users both at national
and international level in the context of GMES and other cooperation
programmes.

The European
Space Policy highlights the need for the European Union, ESA and their Member
States to increase synergies between their security and defence space
activities and programmes. The Structured Dialogue has started this process.
The Workshop highlighted the need to increase and expand this coordination. It
also suggested the setting up of an appropriate coordination platform with
Member States owning relevant assets.

These issues
should be further explored during a dedicated follow-up seminar planned for
summer 2010 with a view to provide input for a discussion at ministerial level
in an appropriate setting.

(3)
Conclusions Conference on Governance of
European Space Programmes, Segovia, Spain, 3-4 May 2010

Europe needs
space. It needs strategic space capabilities and efficient space-based services
to ensure the wellbeing of our citizens and as a tool to support public
policies. It needs to exploit these capabilities and services to their maximum
potential.

Europe needs a
range of activities and organisations to meet its wide range of objectives for
space. How these interact in the short- and longer-term will be the key
determinant of Europe’s continuing success in space.

The Conference
has recognised that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty presents an
opportunity to further develop the institutional framework for Space activities
in Europe. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides
a legal basis and an explicit competence in Space for the EU. This competence,
which is shared with the Member States, calls upon the EU “to coordinate the
effort needed for the exploitation and exploration of space” and to “establish
any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency”. It then consolidates
the triangle of European space actors i.e. the EU, ESA and their respective
Member States.

Governance
arrangements are a tool to deliver objectives. Clarity of vision and objectives
must come first.

The current
institutional set-up for the European Space Policy – the EC/ESA Framework
Agreement which entered into force in 2004 – has provided a solid foundation
for coordinating and aligning the space activities of the EU and ESA. This
arrangement works well but may have to evolve at the end of the current
analysis, in view of Art. 189 TFEU and in order to expand the opportunities for
Space in Europe.

The Conference recognised
that the existing institutional asymmetries between the two organisations
(supranational v. intergovernmental) pose a number of challenges which will
have to be addressed. Along with the growing EU role in space, Member States
also value intergovernmental ways of working within ESA as a research and
development agency. Efficient collaboration will require adaptation, including
possibly through continued institutional convergence between the EU and ESA.
ESA, its Member States and the EU have to explore the different scenarios for
the evolution of this collaboration.

Industrial
policy and technology policy are inextricably linked. The Conference recognised
the importance of a coherent framework for Space Industrial policy in Europe.
The peculiarities of the space sector call for a combination of measures at EU,
ESA and Member States level in order to create the right environment that will
nurture a competitive industry and ensure a fair and balanced participation of
all industrial actors, including in particular SMEs. These measures must and
will continue to evolve.

The Conference
identified procurement as the major but not the only instrument driving
industrial policy. Other instruments should continue to be promoted. At the EU
level, examples include instruments such as FP7, CIP and structural funds, as
well as EIB loans and EIF guarantees. While taking full advantage of the
existing EU, ESA and Member States industrial policy instruments, other
instruments could be designed as incentives for the European space industry to
maintain and improve its competitiveness and develop technologies, applications
and services which are innovative, sustainable, reliable, cost-effective and
efficiently respond to growing societal needs in Europe.

The Conference
widely recognized the technical expertise of ESA in designing and procuring
European Space Programmes. Despite difficulties, the first EU flagship projects
in Space, GMES and Galileo, are moving closer to fruition. Future industrial
policy should allow for the development of mechanisms to enable EU-ESA
cooperation in Space. Past experiences, in these programmes and also in
ESA-EUMETSAT programmes, provide valuable lessons in the governance of future
endeavours.

In future
programmes, governance arrangements will have to be put in place from the
beginning, which should guarantee the efficiency of public investments in
Space, the long-term sustainability of the programmes and their optimum
utilisation as well as ensuring motivation of Member States to continue their
volunteer investments in space. Continuity between the research and development
and exploitation phases will have to be ensured. While it will be impossible to
find ‘one-size-fit-all’ solution for all the programmes that could be conceived
in the future, a degree of coherence will be necessary.

The EU identity
in security and defence matters has been reinforced. Security and defence
policy is in an evolutionary period. The EU has a competence in foreign and
security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy,
in conformity with the TEU. Space actions may serve foreign and security
(including defence) policy goals.

Governance of
space activities related to security and defence needs will have to reflect
that evolution.

(4)
Polish EU Presidency seminar on Space
Situational Awareness
Warsaw 29 September 2011 – Summary of Presidency conclusions presented at the
meeting

·
Seminar participants reiterated the need to
ensure the protection of European space infrastructure against hazards from
space debris and space weather phenomena. They also underlined the need for
Europe to develop proper capabilities to ensure such protection, notably the
development of an SSA capability at European level to provide more reliable
information to European satellite operators.

·
Recognising the dual-use nature of SSA and
taking into account its particular security dimension, Member States reiterated
that a future SSA capability at European level should make the widest possible
use of existing national and European assets, capacities and expertise, and
ensure a balanced involvement and development of SSA competences and capacities
in Europe (important point for PO Presidency).

·
Member States underlined that the definition of
an SSA data policy scheme as well as an SSA governance scheme are a
pre-condition for their willingness to engage in the development of an SSA
capability at European level, in particular for those Member States owning
national assets which could form part of a European SSA capability.

·
In that context, Member States welcomed the work
done so far by the European Commission and the EU External Action Service
(EEAS) in collaboration with ESA, EDA, and Member States to define aggregated
civil-military SSA user requirements to be endorsed by Member States through
the EU Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC) as the basis for future
discussions on SSA governance.

·
They welcomed the intention to involve the national
security agencies – assembled in the EU Council's Security Committee (CSC) – in
the definition of the SSA data policy scheme, in particular by seeking their
advice on data security aspects. Data security aspects need to be taken into
account in all stages of the development of a European SSA capability, as well
as in all preparatory activities such as the data policy schemes to be
developed for the exploitation of the breadboard radars and pre-operational SSA
services to be developed in the framework of the ESA SSA preparatory programme.

·
With regard to the forthcoming ESA Ministerial
Council, Member States called on the EU and ESA to exploit synergies and ensure
complementarity in the planning and implementation of current and future SSA
related activities.

·
Member States urged the European Commission and
the EEAS to swiftly advance with the work on defining an SSA governance scheme
and an SSA data policy scheme with the aim to come forward with first concrete
proposals in view of a decision to be made on an ESA SSA follow-on programme at
the ESA Ministerial scheduled for end of 2012.

·
International cooperation in SSA is essential to
ensure the reliability and improve the completeness/quality of SSA information
available to satellite and space system operators, and ultimately to strengthen
the protection of space infrastructure. Member States welcomed discussions
launched with the US - by ESA at technical level and by the EEAS and the
European Commission at political level - to explore areas for cooperation in
SSA including the sharing of SSA service products, the sharing of SSA
observation data in medium term, as well as the potential inter-operability of
systems and the sharing of real-time data and products as a potential long-term
objective. These discussions should be reinforced and extended to address
issues related to data protection and security needs as compatibility in these
domains will be essential for future cooperation.

ANNEX III: Overview
of existing SSA/SST capabilities

(5)
European assets

Activities in
the area of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) are being conducted both at
European and national level. A number of Member States have developed SSA
capabilities, many of which – in particularly tracking and satellite imaging
facilities – are owned and operated by national defence agencies. In Europe,
such facilities are available in France, Germany, Norway and the UK, the latter
two being part of the US anti missile defence network. Some facilities are also
operated by space agencies, e.g. optical telescopes for surveying the Geostationary orbit (GEO). An overview of
existing space surveillance assets in Europe prepared by ONERA[60] in 2007 on behalf of ESA[61] found that more than 65 % of
existing sensors for the Low-Earth orbit (LEO) area are partially or fully
operated by ministries of defence-related institutions.

Existing radar capabilities such as the
GRAVES system or the Armor radar in France (see description below) are owned
and operated by the Air Force. Operational since December 2005, the GRAVES
radar produces surveillance and tracking data used for cataloguing space
objects in the framework of a dominant military interest. More specific radars
such as Armor (under the responsibility of the French Navy) have direct
military uses and may contribute to the surveillance, tracking and
characterisation of space objects. In Germany, the main radar equipment
FGAN-TIRA is run by research teams from the High Frequency Physics and radar
Techniques (FHR)[62],
with a special partnership with the German Ministry of Defence, a dominant user
of the radar capability for space imagery. The list attached at the end provides
an overview of the main European space surveillance and tracking resources.

Since January 1, 2009 ESA has been
implementing a preparatory SSA Programme as an optional programme with 13
participating Member States at present (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland, the UK). The programme, which is running since 2008
and for which the next phase should be approved in November 2012, should lay
the groundwork of a future European SSA system. Its primary focus has been
mainly on the definition of user requirements, a series of studies to design
system requirements and architecture options, the development of demonstrator
sensors (notably 2 demonstrator tracking radars), and preparatory work towards
pre-cursor services in the domains of surveillance and tracking, space weather
and NEO monitoring.

(6)
The US Space Surveillance Network

The US Department of Defence established a
space surveillance network as early as 1957. The system was built up
progressively by networking different observation capabilities, some of which
were initially developed for ballistic missile detection. Access to this database
has subsequently been made available to any (registered) user. Today, the US
Space Surveillance Network (SSN) represents the reference for all space
surveillance information across the world. ESA, EU and ESA Member States
authorities and space agencies acting as operators of space systems as well as
European commercial operators today rely to a large extent on the US SSN.

However, the US system has some aging
capabilities and faces new challenges with the increasing orbital population.
The US, while planning investments for the modernization of its capabilities, recognises
today the need to widen international cooperation and in the different fields
covered by SSA, and looks at earmarking potential domains for increased
trans-Atlantic cooperation on SSA, in support of common civil, commercial and
military requirements. The new US national space policy adopted on 28.06.2010
makes specific reference to the need for international measures to promote safe
and responsible operations in space through improved information collection and
sharing for space object collision avoidance.

(7)
Other space surveillance activities

The Russian federation, via the Russian
military space forces, operates space surveillance capabilities independent of
its ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) assets. These systems have performed
various military and civil roles, including the analysis of the surface impact
point of the Mir Space Station and identification of space debris[63]. Russian companies are in a position to offer or sell space
surveillance data to external entities.

China, since
joining the Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC) in 1995, also maintains its
own catalogue of space objects. Space surveillance is an area of growth for
China with reported investments in phased-array radar technology and optical
telescopes for debris monitoring since 2003. In 2005, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences established a Space Object and Debris Monitoring and Research Center
at Purple Mountain Observatory that employs researchers to develop a debris
warning system for China’s space assets.

(8)
International cooperation

For SSA international cooperation plays a
very important role. Today international cooperation efforts in the area of
space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness are largely dominated by
the existence of the US space surveillance network. This system makes
non-sensitive information freely available over the internet (a subset of the
US space surveillance catalogue of orbiting objects.) There is also bilateral
cooperation between the US and some European states, between US agencies (NASA,
NOAA) and ESA, as well as ad hoc cooperation with commercial and
national satellite operators in case the US system detects a collision threat.

There is today a growing awareness of the
desirability of enhanced cooperation between the US system and a future
autonomous European SSA system. Both sides have expressed willingness to take
the existing cooperation further during recent high-level meetings, including,
for instance, a EU-US space dialogue held in April 2010 in Washington, DC.

To facilitate such cooperation, the EU is
already making funding available through the FP7 Space Theme: e.g. a number of
projects have been selected in 2010 which include US partners (as well as
partners from the Ukraine, South Africa and India). These projects address, among
others, space surveillance and anti-collision issues.

At the level of space agencies, cooperation
takes place in the context of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination
Committee established in 1993. IADC comprises 12 national major space agencies
including NASA, Roscosmos, Jaxa, ESA and some of the European space agencies (CNES,
UK Space Agency, ASI, and DLR). Its primary purposes are to exchange
information on space debris research activities between member space agencies,
to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research, to review
the progress of ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify debris
mitigation options. In 2002, the IADC adopted a set of recommendations for
debris mitigation, which has achieved wide international recognition (Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC, 2002). The UN Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) developed these recommendations into a set of
guidelines, which were adopted by the UN in 2008. These guidelines for good
conduct in space are voluntary and non-binding. At technical and commercial
level, the recommendations are translated into international engineering
standards, such as International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) or
European Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ESS).

(9)
Examples of existing European
capabilities for space surveillance and tracking

Optical sensors[64]:

Tenerife: ESA operates a space debris telescope on Tenerife that covers a
sector of 120° of the GEO ring. From single observations, initial orbits can be
derived which are generally adequate for re-acquisition of the object within
the same night, and which can then be successively improved. The Optical Ground
Station (OGS), installed in the Teide observatory 2400 m above the sea level,
was built as part of ESA long-term efforts for research in the field of
inter-satellite optical communications. The original purpose of the station,
equipped with a telescope (1m aperture), is to perform the in-orbit test of
laser telecommunications terminals on board of satellites in Low Earth Orbit
and Geostationary Orbit. Since 2001, the ESA survey of Space Debris in the
Geostationary Orbit and the Geostationary Transfer Orbit is also being carried
out with a devoted wide field camera to determine the orbital parameters of
debris objects. The Optical Ground Station was inaugurated in 1995. The
Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias participated in the integration of the
station instruments and has since then been in charge of the station operation.
This is the contribution of ESA to the worldwide common efforts on this task
with NASA and NASDA (National Aerospace and Defence Agency of Japan).

TAROT: CNES uses observation time of the TAROT telescope (Télescope à
Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires) in France to survey the GEO ring.
TAROT’s primary mission is to detect the optical afterglow of gamma-ray bursts.
A companion telescope, TAROT-S has been deployed in Chile. Since 2004, CNES
observes satellites in the geostationary orbit with this network of robotic
ground based fully automated telescopes. The system makes real time processing
and its wide field of view is useful for detection, systematic survey and
tracking both catalogued and uncatalogued objects.

Starbrook: The then British National Space Centre (now UK Space Agency) has
sponsored the Starbrook wide-field telescope as an experimental survey sensor
since 2006. The telescope is located at Troodos/Cyprus, It can detect GEO
objects down to 1.5 m sizes (visual magnitude of +14).

ZIMLAT/ZimSMART: The Astronomical Institute of the University of Bern (AIUB)
operates a ZIMLAT telescope. From its location in Zimmerwald/Switzerland, the
telescope covers a sector of 100° of the GEO ring. The primary applications of
ZIMLAT are astrometry and laser ranging. However, up to 40% of its night-time
observations are used for follow-ups of GEO objects discovered by the ESA
telescope at Tenerife. ZIMLAT was complemented in 2006 by the 20 cm ZimSMART
telescope (Zimmerwald Small Aperture Robotic Telescope).

SPOC and
ROSACE: SPOC (Système Probatoire d’Observation du
Ciel) is part of the French DGA network of target tracking systems. The ROSACE
and TAROT telescopes are used by CNES for observation of GEO objects > 50
cm. TAROT detects the objects, ROSACE determines their orbit.

PIMS: The PIMS telescope (Passive Imaging Metric Sensor) is owned by the
UK Ministry of Defence. They monitor objects in GEO > 1m. They are stationed
in Gibraltar, Cyprus and Herstmonceux (East Sussex, UK).

Radar sensors[65]:

Fylingdales: A most powerful space surveillance sensor located in Fylingdales
(UK) and operated by the British/US armed forces. Most of the activities are
geared to the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) early warning and space surveillance
mission.

Globus II: A second facility associated with the US SSN is the Norwegian
Globus II radar. It is located in Vardø, at the northernmost tip of Norway. Due
to special bilateral agreements between the US SSN and the operators of
Fylingdales and Globus II, data from these sites have so far not been available
for unclassified use within Europe.

GRAVES: The French GRAVES system (Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille
Spatiale) is presently the only European installation outside the US SSN that
can perform space surveillance in the classical sense. GRAVES is owned by the
French Ministry of Defence and operated by the French air force. GRAVES started
operational tests in 2001. Routine operations started in 2005. The system
produces a ‘self-starting’ catalogue which can be autonomously built up and
maintained. It is limited to objects of typically 1 m size and larger in low
Earth orbits (LEO) up to an altitude of 1000 km. The object catalogue contains
currently about 2500 objects. Object data of GRAVES are used for target
allocation of other radars.

TIRA: The German FGAN Radar belongs to the Research Establishment for
Applied Science at Wachtberg (organisational arrangements are currently changed
to create a legal position, to be able to use the radar operationally for SSA
and not only for research). In its tracking mode, the TIRA system determines
orbits from direction angles, range, and Doppler for single targets. The modes
include target tracking and imaging (for identification). The detection size
threshold is about 2 cm at 1000 km range, 40 cm in GEO orbit. For statistical
observations this sensitivity can be enhanced to about 1 cm, when operating
TIRA and the nearby Effelsberg 100 m radio telescope in a bistatic beam-park
mode with TIRA as transmitter and Effelsberg as receiver.

FS Monge: DGA/DCE, the Systems Evaluation and Test Directorate of the French
Ministry of Defence, is operating several radar and optical sensors throughout
France. The most powerful of these systems, Armor, is located on the tracking
ship Monge. The two radars are dedicated to tracking tasks, based on high
resolution angular and range data. Other less powerful radars are the Atlas,
the Bearn and the Savoie.

Chilbolton: The Chilbolton radar is located in Winchester, UK, operated by the
Radio Communications Research Unit (RCRU) of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
(RAL). It is mainly used for atmospheric and ionospheric research. With a
planned upgrade the radar will be able to track LEO objects down to 10 cm sizes
at 600 km altitude.

In-situ sensors[66]:

SODAD
(Orbital System for the Active Detection Of. Debris) are French space debris
detectors currently in orbit (1 on ISS and 3 on satellite SAC-D) measuring the
flux of micrometeriods (natural) and microorbital debris (manmade).

ANNEX IV: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON DEBRIS MITIGATION

This Annex provides details on initiatives related
to the mitigation of space debris which have been developed at international
level. The impact assessment report refers to these initiatives in pages 23 and
40 of the main report as well as in pages 59 and 60 of Annex III.

(10)
Initiative of general scope

Name of the initiative: International Space Code of Conduct on outer space activities

Forum: International
negotiations led by the European Union. The Council Working Group on Global
Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN) is in charge of the discussions at EU
institutional level.

Objective: The
objective of this initiative is to design a comprehensive international code
which is revised and negotiated following discussions between the EU with third
countries, with a view to it being ratified by as many countries as possible.
The initiative was proposed UN Resolution 61/75 of 6 December 2006 on
transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.

Content: The
draft code covers the full range of space objects and activities, whether
civilian or military and contains commitments based on transparency and
confidence-building measures (such as a general commitment to advance adherence
to international law instruments on space activities), measures on space debris
control and mitigation as well as cooperation mechanisms in the domain of space
activities. As regards debris mitigation, negotiations have show fluctuations
as to the extent of the mention of space debris control and mitigation
measures. The last version of 2011, following the comments of the US, merely
includes a one sentence commitment "to take appropriate measures to limit
the generation of long-lived debris", whereas the 2010 version also
included a mention of the non-binding UN General Assembly Resolution 62/217
adopting the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the UNCOPUOS (see below).

Developments and expected evolution: A first draft was published in December 2008 and led to a first
round of international consultations in 2009, its revision in 2010, and in September 2010 the Council invited the High Representative
to pursue consultations with third countries on the basis of this revised draft,
which are still ongoing. Upon finalization, all States will be invited to
adhere on a voluntary basis. The current perspective, confirmed at Council
level, is the possibility of opening the Code for signature at an ad hoc
diplomatic conference to take place possibly mid-2013. In order to get to this
diplomatic conference, there will be a series of multilateral experts meetings,
open to the participation of all States, the fist one of which is foreseen to
take place in Vienna on 5 June 2012.

(11)
Initiatives exclusively related to debris
mitigation measures

Name of the initiative: The IADC and the Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, 2002

Forum: Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC) The IADC is
an international agency level forum for the worldwide coordination of
activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space. It is
worth highlighting the fact that the IADC is internationally recognised as a
space debris centre of competence. It includes member agencies from Italy,
France, China, Canada, Germany, ESA, India, Japan, the US, Ukraine, Russia and
the UK. The IADC meetings take place in different Member States.

Objective: The
main purpose of the IADC itself is to exchange information on space debris
research activities between member space agencies, to facilitate opportunities
for cooperation in space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing
cooperative activities, and to identify debris mitigation options. In this
context, it feeds the work of the UNCOPUOS with its presentations and findings.
The IADC has developed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2002 upon
invitation of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS. These
guidelines are not mandatory for States or manufacturers, although in many
cases they have become a commonly accepted practice in the space manufactory
industry.

Content: The
IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines are a comprehensive document that describes
best existing practices for limiting of space debris, includes the proposals on
debris mitigation and contains technical information to help establish mission
requirements for planned and existing space systems. As an example, the IADC
guidelines include, among others, guidelines on limiting debris released during
normal operations or on minimising the potential for on-orbit break-ups.

Developments
and expected evolution: the IADC guidelines have
been complemented by Support Documentation in 2004 and amended in 2007. The
guidelines are translated into international engineering standards at technical
and commercial level, such as International Organisation for Standardisation
(ISO) or European Cooperation for Space Standardisation (ESS). Moreover, as
explained below, the UNCOPUOS has developed its own version on the basis of the
IADC Guidelines that was later adopted by the UN General Assembly.

Name of the initiative: UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines

Forum: United
Nations – General Assembly - UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS). This committee was set up by the UN General Assembly in 1959 to
review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space,
to devise programmes in this field to be undertaken under UN auspices, to
encourage continued research on legal and scientific problems linked to space
exploration and exploitation.

Objective: similar
to the IADC guidelines, which have served as inspiration to the UNCOPUOS, the
UN guidelines intend to curtail the generation of potentially harmful space
debris and prevent further pollution of the space environment.

Content: The
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS developed the IADC
Guidelines into its own set of guidelines. The IADC Guidelines are the basis
for the UNCOPUOS guidelines and therefore the content is similar.

Developments and expected evolution: The guidelines were approved in 2007 by the 63 Member nations of
the UNCOPUOS as voluntary high-level mitigation measures and then were endorsed
by the UN General Assembly in 2008 in its Resolution 62/217 on the
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Further to this
endorsement there has been no major development in this forum in the following
years. The fact that the UN guidelines have been adopted by the General
Assembly could be interpreted as an attempt to raise awareness of the importance
of the issue at international level, although resolutions of the UN General
Assembly are not binding to UN Member States.

Name of the initiative: European Code of Conduct

Forum: National
space agencies in Europe including ESA. This initiative is another has been
developed by space agencies in Europe since the mid-1990s and referred to as
the "European Code of Conduct." The Code has been signed by ASI
(Italian Space Agency), BNSC (British National Space Centre), CNES (French
Space Agency), DLR (German Space Agency) and ESA in 2006.

Objective:
In line with the other initiatives listed in this section, the objective these
guidelines is to help to technically manage the space debris hazard, namely in
the design and operation of space systems that will avoid or minimise the
generation of space debris.

Content: The
European Code of Conduct is another set of guidelines that has been developed
to be used by projects to assist in the early consideration of measures to
reduce space debris while also giving an insight into necessary future
practices. The core elements of this Code of Conduct are in line with the IADC
Guidelines and UN COPUOS guidelines seen above. Nonetheless, the Code of
Conduct provides greater detail and rationale.

Developments and expected evolution: Besides the signature of the Code by the above national space
agencies, ESA has developed their own "Requirements on Space Debris
Mitigation for Agency Projects" in order to tailor the Code of Conduct to
the specific needs of ESA projects. These instructions came into force in 2008
and are applicable to procurements of space systems (launchers, satellites and
inhabited objects) by ESA. Compliance with its provisions is voluntary,
although recommended.

Other conferences and fora active in the
research of debris mitigation: other instances deal with the issue of debris
mitigation and foster discussion from a more theoretical perspective. Research
initiatives and studies are presented at the quadrennial series of the
ESA-organised European Conferences on Space Debris and at dedicated sessions of
IAC (International Astronautical Congress) and COSPAR (Committee on Space
Research) congresses.

ANNEX V: Calculation
methodology

The impact
assessment provides quantitative estimates of the impact of proposed SSA/SST
activities on the basis of available data. This annex explains the methodology
followed.

The parameters
taken into consideration are the following:

– On January 2011, there were approximately 950 satellites in orbit
around the Earth (GEO, LEO, MEO and elliptical orbits). 68
out of 470 satellites in LEO (14.46%) and ~120 out of 390 satellites in GEO
(30.76%) had EU contractors/owners[67];

–
According to Euroconsult, the average satellite
price over the next decade will be $99 million and the satellite launch average
price is predicted to remain flat, at $51 million[68]; for launches in LEO, the
average price is estimated at $8 million[69].

–
The average number of catastrophic collisions with
catalogued objects in LEO during the next 40 years is one every 5 years[70]; for partially traceable
debris the average number of collisions raises up to 1 every 3 years[71].

–
The average number of catastrophic collisions at
GEO is 1 every 155 years[72],
therefore negligible for the purpose of our calculations; the risk in Medium
Earth Orbits is also considered negligible;

–
For the purpose of calculation we assume that
collisions take place at satellite's mid life and its cost at this stage would
be 50% of its average cost ($99 million), namely $49,5 million;

–
For the purpose of this calculation $1 = € 1;

Calculation of annual direct loss due to
collision (satellite's loss) in LEO:

Number of collisions concerning the total
satellite population over 10 years in LEO (at one collision every 3 years) ~=
3.3 collisions;

Number of EU satellites affected by
collisions in the next 10 years [3.3 collisions x 14.46% of EU satellites over
the total satellite population] ~= 0.5;

Annualised cost of satellite loss over a 10
year period in LEO [0.5 x (satellite cost at midlife, i.e. $49.5 million + cost
of launch, i.e. $8 million)/10 years] = ~$2.9 million. However, in its study
Booz and Company retains an approximated figure of ~$2.5 million in order to
take into account the most conservative estimates at each intermediate stage of
the calculation.

Calculation of annual indirect loss due
to collision (service outage) in LEO:

–
Annual average value of satellite services/year
for an EO satellite ~= 6M€[73]

–
Annual average value of satellite services/year
for a Mobile Satellite services satellite ~= 8M€[74]

–
The minimum service outage considered is 3
months. This leads to a yearly loss between (6M€/12 months)\*3 months~=1,5 M€ et
(8 M€/12 months)\*3 months~=2 M€/year

The economic loss for LEO satellites over
10 years is then approximately between 5 M€ [1,2 M€/year x (3.3 probability of
collision over 10 years)] and more than 6 M€ [2M€/year x (3.3 probability of
collision over 10 years)].

For Europe, only 68 satellites out of 470
have to be considered in the calculation: 14,46% of the amount between 5 and 6
M€ that the Booz report approximated to 1M€ over 10 years.

Calculation of annual indirect loss (shortening
of satellites' lifetime) due to avoidance manoeuvres in LEO[75]:

–
For a satellite in general, the average lifetime
shortening of a collision avoidance manoeuvre is 3 weeks;

–
1.5 avoidance collision manoeuvres per
satellite/year are considered;

–
90% of avoidance manoeuvres in LEO lead to
significant consumption of propellant.

–
Average lifetime for a LEO satellite is 3 to 5
years

Lifetime shortening over 10 years for
European satellites [(68 European satellites x 1.5 avoidance collision
manoeuvres per satellite/year x 3 weeks of lifetimes shortening per manoeuvre)
x 10 years x 0.9] ~= ~2700/2900 weeks in order to take into account the most
conservative estimates at each intermediate stage of the calculation.

Equivalent in additional satellites needed
to compensate the lifetime shortening over 10 years [(2700/2900 weeks / 52
weeks per year)/ 5 years lifetime of a LEO satellite] ~=10 to 11 satellites

Indicative economic impact over 10 years
[(99 M€ cost of a satellite + 8 M€ cost for the launch) x 10 to 11 satellites]
~=1.2 B€ or 120 M€ per year

Calculation of annual indirect loss due
to Earth observation loss of data due to avoidance manoeuvres in LEO[76]:

–
32 out of 68 European satellites are Earth
Observation satellites

–
24 hours are necessary after each avoidance
manoeuvre to recalibrate the optical devices and instruments;

Lack of data acquisition over 10 years [(32
satellites x 1.5 avoidance collision manoeuvres per satellite/year x 1 day x 10
years] ~= 450 days (=1.23 years)

–
6 M€ is the estimated value in terms of sales
over a year for Earth Observation's data for 1 satellite

Economic impact of lack of data acquisition
over 10 years [6 M€ x 1.23 years] ~= 8 M€ or 0.8 M€ per year

Calculation of annual indirect loss due
to avoidance manoeuvres in GEO[77]:

–
For a fleet of 20 satellites in GEO, a European
satellite operator performs 3 to 5 large manoeuvres per year (large fly-by),
i.e. 0.21 manoeuvres per satellite per year.

Lifetime shortening over 10 years for
European satellites [(120 European satellites in GEO x 0.21 avoidance collision
manoeuvres per satellite/year x 3 weeks of lifetimes shortening per manoeuvre)
x 10 years] ~= 700-750 weeks

Equivalent in additional satellites needed
to compensate the lifetime shortening over 10 years [(700/750 weeks / 52 weeks
per year)/ 10 to 15 years lifetime of a GEO satellite] ~=1 satellite

Indicative economic impact over 10 years is
then of 150 to 200 M€ (average cost of a GEO telecom satellite launch included)
or 15-20 M€ per year.

Costing of the European SST service

The
costing is based on combined information from several sources, notably the
European Space Agency and information gathered by Booz & Company and
contained in the Space Situational awareness section of its study
"Evaluation of options for a space programme in 2014". Information
was also received from experts in space national agencies and other entities on
a confidential basis which have helped in elaborating the estimates below.

On
this basis, for options 2, 3 and 4 the following assumptions have been made
regarding new assets would be as follows:

·
A new surveillance radar would cost between 150
and 200 M€; for the purpose of calculation we use 175 M€;

·
A new tracking radar would cost 40 M€;

·
A telescope for surveillance and tracking would
cost 10 M€

·
A data centre for surveillance and tracking
would cost 50 M€

Experts estimate that in order to achieve a
target reduction of risk collision by a factor of 3 to 5, it would be necessary
to acquire 1 new tracking radar and 1 new surveillance radar, 8 new telescopes
for surveillance and tracking and one data centre. This represents a total of
345 M€ and an annualised cost of some 49 M€.

As the costs figures are estimates and
include a certain margin for error, for simplicity sake the total figure for
new assets has been rounded to 50 M€ in the impact assessment.

The secured networking, operations and
maintenance of existing and new assets for the sole purpose of European SST
service can be estimated at annual cost of 8 M€. This amount has been estimated
including information provided on a confidential basis and takes into account
the shared use of assets for the European SST service and for Member States own
purposes.

The setting up (ICT equipment), operation (6
FTE) and maintenance of a front desk function has been estimated at an average
annual cost of 2 M€.

The total cost in options 2, 3 and 4 would
amount to an estimated annual amount of 60 M€.

Option
5 corresponds broadly to the "Medium option" of Booz & Company
which estimates de annual cost at 124 M€. Again, for the sake of simplicity we
have rounded this figure to 120 M€ in the impact assessment.

ANNEX VI: Reference
studies and documents

External studies performed by
contractors:

(8)
Study on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020,
Ecorys Nederland BV for the European Commission, final report of 4 July 2010;
contract no. SI2.541751

(9)
Study "Evaluation of options for a European
space programme in 2014-2020; Booz & Company, final report of May 2011;
contract no. 30-CE-036363/00-01

(10)
Commission Staff Working Paper "European
Space Situational Awareness high-level civil-military user requirements, SEC
(2011) 1247 of 12.10.2011. The document was jointly prepared by the European
Commission services and the European External Action Service and approved by
the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 18 November 2011.

(11)
Commission Staff Working Paper "Discussion
note on space situational awareness data policy, SEC(2011) 1246 final of
12.10.2011

References to the EU policy
documents:

(12)
4th Space Council Resolution, “Resolution on the
European Space Policy”, 22 May 2007;
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10037.en07.pdf

(13)
5th Space Council Resolution, “Taking forward
the European Space Policy”, 26 September 2008; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\_Data/docs/pressData/en/intm/103050.pdf

(14)
6th Space Council Resolution, “The contribution
of Space to innovation and competitiveness in the context of the European
Economic Recovery Plan and further steps”, 29 May 2009;
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/files/policy/6th\_space\_council\_en.pdf

(15)
7th Space Council Resolution, '' Global
challenges: taking full benefit of European space systems'', 25 November 2010; http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st16/st16864.en10.pdf

(16)
Council Resolution "Orientations concerning
added value and benefits of space for the security of European citizens"
of 6 December 2011; Council document 18232/11; http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st17/st17828-re01.en11.pdf

(17)
''Towards a space strategy for the European
Union that benefits its citizens'' Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions (Sec(2011) 381 final);
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/files/policy/comm\_native\_com\_2011\_0152\_6\_communication\_en.pdf

Surveys
and consultations conducted/commissioned by the EU:

(18)
Eurobarometer survey on the space activities of
the European Union, 272, Gallup in July 2009; http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/\_getdocument.cfm?doc\_id=5333

(19)
Public consultation carried out via the
Commission's Interactive Policy Making (IPM) tool, 2011;
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item\_id=5307&tpa=141&tk=&lang=en

Other
sources:

(20)
AGI - Center for Space Standards and Innovation,
Iridium collision report; http://celestrak.com/events/collision/

(21)
Characterizing the Space Debris Environment with
a variety of SSA sensors, presentation NASA Orbital debris program office, G.
Stansbery July 2010

(22)
International Academy of Astronautics, Position
Paper on orbital debris, 2001
http://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1301/sp1301.pdf

(23)
NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News, volume 14
& 15 of January 2010 and January 2011, NASA Orbital Debris Program Office http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/index.html

(24)
NASA Space Science Data Center Master Catalogue,
http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=1995-033B"

(25)
NASA Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer – WISE-
fact sheet, September 2009;
http://www.nasa.gov/mission\_pages/WISE/main/index.html

(26)
Presentation "French Policy for Space
Sustainability" at the ISU Symposium, 21st February 2012, CNES

(27)
Recovered debris list, Aerospace, Centre for
Orbital and Re-entry Debris Studies
http://reentrynews.aero.org/recovered.html

(28)
Requirements for Candidate Assets and SSA Gap
Analysis of 2007, EADS;
http://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1301/sp1301.pdf

(29)
Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2020,
Report, Euroconsult 2011

(30)
Space debris- ESA, 2009;
http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space\_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF\_0.html
.

(31)
Space debris, Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology (UK); http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

(32)
Space Security Report 2010, Space Security
Organisation; http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2010.reduced.pdf

(33)
Space debris and the cost of Space Operations,
in Proceedings of Fourth IAASS Conference ''Making Safety Matter'', Huntsville,
Alabama, USA, Aerospace Corporation 19-21 May 2010

(34)
US Stratcom Fact Sheet Re-entry Assessment,
February 2008; http://reentrynews.aero.org/past.html

(35)
USC Satellite database;
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear\_weapons\_and\_global\_security/space\_weapons/technical\_issues/ucssatellite-database.html.

(36)
Description of the ESA "Space Situational
Awareness Preparatory Programme (SSA-PP)", ESA;
http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMYTICKP6G\_0.html

(37)
The impact of space environment on space
systems, 6th Spacecraft Technology Conference, Aerospace Corporation, 2000

(38)
Active debris removal - An essential Mechanism
for ensuring the safety and sustainability of outer space; report of the
international interdisciplinary congress on space debris remediation and
on-orbit satellite servicing; UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;
Vienna, 6-17 February 2012;

(39)
Space debris - on collision course for insurers?
The implications of debris colliding with operational satellites from a
technical, legal and insurance perspective; study prepared by Swiss Reinsurance
Company Ltd., 2011;
http://media.swissre.com/documents/Publ11\_Space+debris.pdf

[1]               COM (2011) 152 final

[2]               The Space Council is the concomitant meeting of the
EU Council (competitiveness) and the ESA Ministerial Council. With the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU Council's (competitiveness)
responsibilities were enlarged to address space policy matters in 2010. The
Space Council or EU Council Resolutions or Conclusions referring to the need to
set up an SSA capability at European level are: Council Resolution "Taking
forward the European Space Policy" of 26 September 2008 (Council document
13569/08); Council Resolution on "The contribution of space to innovation
and competitiveness in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan, and
further steps of 29 May 2009 (10500/09); Council Resolution "Global
challenges: Taking full benefit of European space systems" of 25 November
2010 (16864/10); Council conclusions "Towards a space strategy for the EU
that benefits its citizens" of 31 May 2011; and the Council conclusions
"Orientations concerning the added value and benefits of space for the
security of European citizens" of 6 December 2011 (18232/11).

[3]               In the framework of its SSA preparatory programme
launched in 2009 with a budget of around 55 M€, ESA conducts a number of
technical studies to define SSA user requirements, system requirements as well
as technical architecture options. This work provided useful indications
concerning the assets needed in order to respond to civil user requirements.
Furthermore, the programme included the development of 2 surveillance
demonstrator radars.

[4]               Space Situational Awareness (SSA) refers to the
protection of space infrastructure from collision with space objects (which
would be a satellite or space debris) or asteroids or meteoroids (summarised as
Near Earth Objects) and from solar radiation (the so called space weather).
While these threats are often discussed together – and for this reason this
report refers in some cases to SSA – the present impact assessment report
concerns only the threats from space debris.

[5]               COM(2011) 152 final of 4.4.2011

[6]               “Study
on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April
2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[7]               Evaluation of options for an EU space programme
2014-2020, Booz & Company, Final report of 16 May 2011, contract no; 30-CE-036363/00-01

[8]               Commission Staff Working Paper "Discussion note
on space situational awareness data policy", SEC(2011) 1246 final of 12
October 2011. This document is currently discussed within the Council Security
Committee and will serve the basis for the Committee’s concrete recommendations
for SST data policy.

[9]               http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item\_id=3749.

[10]             http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item\_id=5307&tpa=141&tk=&lang=en

[11]             “Study
on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April
2010, contract n. SI2.541751.

[12]             ESA SSA Mission Requirements Document (SS-MRD) Revision
3; final version as presented to the ESA SSA Programme Board in its meeting on
2 May 2011.

[13]             Commission Communication "An integrated industrial
policy for the globalisation era – putting competitiveness and sustainability
at centre stage", COM(2010) 614 final of 27.10.2010

[14]             For references to the Space Council and EU Council
(competitiveness) Resolutions and Conclusions see footnote 2. On 30 November
2011, the European Parliament adopted a report on the Commission's on a a space
strategy for the European Union that benefits its citizens (2011/2148(INI)).

[15]             As
regards space applications: GPS, Internet services routed by satellite, TV
broadcast by satellite. For examples of spin-offs from Space R&D activities
to applications used in everyday life, consult
http://www.esa.int/esaCP/GGGIPLH3KCC\_Improving\_0.html
http://www.sti.nasa.gov/tto/Spinoff2009/pdf/spinoff2009.pdf

[16]             Applications
from Earth observation, navigation and telecommunication satellites are
important for issues such as transport, agriculture, fishery, science,
environment, health and security.

[17]             For example, communication systems, electrical power
grids, and financial networks all rely on satellite timing for synchronisation.
The provision of satellite-based rapid mapping services is indispensible for
today's crisis management.

[18]             Common civil and military SSA user requirements have
been set out in the document “European Space Situational Awareness high-level
civil-military user requirements” jointly prepared by the European Commission
services and the European External Action Service (EEAS), SEC (2011) 1247 of
12.10.2011 and approved by the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC)
in its plenary meeting on 18 November 2011.

[19]             Since the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium, satellite collision
which the US system did not detect in time, there has been an increased push in
the U.S. to strengthen its capability for conjunction analysis — e.g. the
ability to accurately predict high-speed collisions between two orbiting
objects. A new Space Fence, currently under development, is expected to cost
more than 1 billion US$ to design and procure. The system, with a target
completion date of 2015, will likely include a series of S-band radars in at
least three separate locations; Space Security 2011Report (complement
reference)

[20]             United States of America, National Space Policy, 28
June 2010

[21]             This analysis relies on the study carried out by Booz
& Company which provides a broad overview of SSA systems in space faring
nations.

[22]             According to UN and NASA research, space debris will
continue to grow, even if all activities in space would be stopped. Source:
Ecorys study which quotes NASA researcher Donald Kessler: "The future
debris environment will be dominated by fragments resulting from random
collisions between objects in orbit, and that environment will continue to
increase, even if we do not launch any new objects into orbit."

[23]             On February 11 2009 about 800 pieces of debris were
generated by a collision between a US and a defunct Russian satellite. A
similar number of debris was generated by a Chinese anti-satellite test in
2007. Such 'accidents' can generate a chain reaction that would destroy most
satellites in a given orbit, knowing that the speed of a satellite and debris
is 10 km/second.

[24]             “Study
on the EU Space Programme 2014-2020”, Ecorys, Draft Final Report, 18 April
2010, contract n. SI2.541751 and Study "evaluation of options for a space
programme in 2014-2020", Booz & Company., Final report, 16 May 2011,
contract n. ENTR/2009/050 lot 1.

[25]             http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Space\_Debris/SEM2D7WX3RF\_0.html.

[26]             NASA Orbital Debris, Quarterly News, Vol. 14, issue of
January 2010.

[27]             http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

[28]             2011 Study of Booz & Co.

[29]             The satellite Jason 1 was hit twice by untracked small
debris (2002 and 2005) leading to minor failures. CNES, Presentation
"French Policy for Space Sustainability" at the ISU Symposium, 21st
February 2012

[30]             The Booz & Company estimates are based on the
following assumptions (see also annex V): Average satellite manufacturing costs
are around 99 Million €; a launch to LEO costs indicatively 8 Million € per
satellite; the satellite loss will occur in the middle of its lifetime;
economic damage due to service outage has been calculated on the assumption
that the replacement of the satellite could lead to 3 month service outage
(rather conservative scenario) and data available concerning the global market
for Earth observation data sales and mobile satellite services which can be
considered to be the most common satellites in LEO.

[31]             68 European satellites out of a total of 470 globally
in LEO. Being the number of European satellites one seventh of the total
number, the probability of an impact for them is considered as seven times less
than the total.

[32]             Using the ESA operated Envisat, ERS-1 and ERS-2
satellites as a reference

[33]             Using the DLR operated TerraSAR-X, TanDEM-X, GRACE 1
and GRACE 2 as a reference.

[34]             http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf.

[35]             In general, there is no interruption of services during
avoidance manoeuvres for satellites in GEO.

[36]             Detailed rationale and calculations can be found in the
annex V "Calculation methodology" or at page 123 to 125 of the Booz
& C. report

[37]             Not all (but 90 % of) avoidance manoeuvres in LEO lead
to a significant consumption of propellant. Therefore, Booz & Company
calculated the annualised economic effects of collision avoidance manoeuvres on
the basis of 90 manoeuvres per year instead of 100.

[38]             Only 10 % of the avoidance manoeuvres in GEO lead to a
significant consumption of propellant (e.g. only in case of large fly-bys).
Therefore, Booz & Company calculated the annualised economic effects of
collision avoidance manoeuvres on the basis of 25 manoeuvres per year instead
of 250.

[39]             Source: Booz & Company

[40]             There could be significant negative economic,
environmental and social impact generated if debris from spacecraft fall on the
surface of the Earth, notably if the spacecraft are powered by nuclear fuel, as
is the case with a small number of them today.

[41]             Aerospace Corporation, Center for Orbital Debris
Studies

[42]             US Stratcom Fact Sheet Re-entry Assessment, February
2008

[43]             Booz and Company and http://www.space4peace.org/ianus/npsm3.htm

[44]             The non-comprehensive list of examples provided by Booz
and Company were updated with recent re-entry examples; sources include: www.dlr.de; http://earthsky.org/space/where-will-nasas-uars-satellite-land;
http://news.discovery.com/space/santa-soyuz-reentry-europe-sighting-111226.html

[45]             Aerospace Corporation, Centre for Orbital Debris
Studies, http://reentrynews.aero.org/past.html

[46]             The calculation is explained in detail in annex V and
is based on the estimated annual revenue of Earth Observation Satellites and
the risk of destruction of a European EO satellite.

[47]             Satellites to be Built & Launched by 2020

[48]             Detailed explanation in the annex "Calculation
Methodology".

[49]             The European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) is an agency
of the EU Council that currently provides geospatial imagery information
services and products with various levels of classification to a variety of
users, both civil and military, at the EU Council, the Commission and in EU Member
States. EUSC services are based on data stemming from existing national public
satellite systems, private/commercial systems, or systems owned by third
countries or international organisations.

[50]             Space Security Report 2011

[51]             The Commission’s proposal for the future EU budget
under the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 does
not foresee a specific budget support to the setting up of operational European
SST services. As the protection of space infrastructure during launch and
in-orbit operations is to be considered an integral part of the operator's
responsibilities, the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the
implementation and exploitation of European satellite navigation systems (COM(2011) 814 final of 30.11.2011) includes
provisions for a limited funding contribution to the proposed activity.
Redeployment of budget under other possible future EU financing instruments
could be examined. Taking into account this constraint, the EU funding
contribution to a European SST activity would have to be limited.

[52]             Recent discussions within EUSC Board reveal openness to
go in this direction.

[53]             See footnote 18 on the common civil-military SSA user
requirements approved by Member States in 2011.

[54]             See details in annex V.

[55]             Operational costs the EU front desk function have been
estimated on the basis of current EUSC man/hour costs for Earth Observation
imagery analysts and the assumption that 6 analysists would be required to man
the front desk. .

[56]             ESA estimates the number of 'potentially traceable'
debris to grow to almost 1 million by 2020.

[57]             Booz & Company, stakeholder interviews;

[58]             See also Booz & Company based on stakeholder
interviews.

[59]             2.3 corresponds to the multiplier effect usually
applied to investments made in the defence sector; 4.8 corresponds to the
multiplier effect usually applied to investments made in the space sector for
programmes with scientific content; the see Booz & Company, page 247 on the
basis of Oxford economics, the economic case for investing in the UK defence
industry, September 2009 and Danish agency for science and innovation,
Evaluation of Danish Industrial Activities in the European Space Agency, March
2008.

[60]             Office
national d'études et recherches aérospatiales.

[61]             Study on capability gaps concerning Space Situational
Awareness, ONERA, 2007.

[62]             Under the auspices of the Research Establishment for
Applied Science – FGAN.

[63]             http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveillance.html

[64]             Optical telescopes suitable for observation of the
Geostationary (GEO) ring at 36000 km altitude and (Medium Earth Orbit) MEO at
23000 km where Galileo satellites will be placed.

[65]             Radar stations suited for observation of the Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) region up to 2000 km.

[66]             Sensors that measure flow of small objects such as
micrometeriods and microdebris. Such sensors are mounted on space craft (ISS,
Space shuttle, satellites)

[67]             Booz & C. figures based on: Satellite database of
the Union of Concerned Scientists available at http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear\_weapons\_and\_global\_security/space\_weapons/technical\_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.
These figures have negligibly evolved in one year's time: 1st January 2012, 67
out of 471 for LEO and 123 out of 420 for GEO. Nonetheless, the 2011 figures
are used for consistency with the rest of the information collected in the
timeframe taken into consideration by the study of Booz & C.

[68]             “Satellites to be
Built & Launched by 2018, World Market Survey”, Euroconsult, http://www.euroconsult-ec.com/research-reports/space-industry-reports/satellites-to-be-built-launched-by-2018-38-29.html

[69]             Euroconsult and Futron data, Booz & Co analysis

[70]             http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/upload/postpn355.pdf
Page 2 Chart 2

[71]             Booz & C. report

[72]             http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session\_5\_William\_Ailor.pdf

[73]             Report of Booz & Company: "It has been also
considered that the most common satellites in LEO (i.e. the ‘typical victim’ of
a collision) are either Earth Observation (EO) or Mobile Satellite Service
(MSS) satellites. Since the global market of EO data sales/year is
approximately 830 Mln Euro, and the global market of MSS services/year is
approximately 1800 Mln Euro\*; a conservative estimate (assuming the ratio of
market value of satellite services per satellite will not change in the coming
years\*\*) would suggest that the value of the service outage/disruption of the
‘typical victim’ is an hypothetical average service value of a LEO satellite
over a year (i.e. indicatively 7 to 8 M€ in service revenues, averaging between
a EO and an MSS considering number of satellites) and scaled that value down to
the assumed 3 months service outage period (i.e. indicatively 1.5 to 2 Million
Euro per satellite loss)." \*Satellite Industry Association, State of the
Satellite Industry Report, June 2010; \*\*The Booz & Company analysis based
on current market data shows an indicative ~ 6 Million Euro as an average value
of satellite services per satellite a year for an EO satellite, and ~ 8 Million
Euro as an average value of satellite services for an MSS satellite.

[74]             Report of Booz & Company; see footnote 73.

[75]             Report of Booz & Company, pages 123 to 125.

[76]             Ibid.

[77]             Ibid.

[Top](#document1)