Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

## C 333
# Official Journal
#### of the European Union

**Volume 57**
##### English edition Information and Notices 24 September 2014

_Notice to reader_

This publication contains written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers
given by a European Union institution.
For each question and answer, the original language version is presented before a possible translation.
In some cases, it is possible that the answer is given in a language other than the question. This depends
on the working language of the committee requested to provide the answer.
These questions and answers are published in accordance with Rules 117 and 118 of the Rules of
Procedure of the European Parliament.
All questions and answers can be accessed via the website of the European Parliament (Europarl) under
the heading ‘Parliamentary questions’:
_http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html_

_ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR POLITICAL GROUPS_
PPE Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the
European Parliament
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
NI Non-attached Members

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 1

IV

_(Notices)_

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES

AND AGENCIES

###### EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

**WRITTEN QUESTIONS WITH ANSWER**

**Written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given**

**by a European Union institution**

(2014/C 333/01)

Contents Page

**E-002190/14** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ NATO ballistic missile defence system for defending the continent

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 16

**E-002948/14** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Changes in Greek law on strikes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 17
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 18

**E-002949/14** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission requirement that proposals made by a third party, a non-EU organisation, be implemented in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 20

**E-002950/14** by Daciana Octavia Sârbu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cumulative effects of pesticide residues and conflicts of interest

Versiunea în limba română ........................................................................................................................................................................ 21
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 22

**E-002951/14** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Facebook groups and hatred towards animals

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 24

**E-002952/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inequality of income distribution

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 26

C 333 / 2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-002953/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Improvised solutions in the fiscal adjustment programmes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 27
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 41

**E-002954/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europe 2020

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 27
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 41

**E-002955/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 27
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 41

**E-002956/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Long-term poverty

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 42

**E-002957/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fiscal adjustment programmes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 42

**E-002959/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Gender gap

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 42

**E-003026/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Eurogroup decision regarding a ‘haircut’ of insured deposits in Cyprus

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 43

**E-003027/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Democratic legitimacy of Troika policies

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 43

**E-003028/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact on Cyprus of PSI in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 43

**E-003029/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Troika and increasing poverty and inequality in the Memorandum countries

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 30
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 44

**E-003030/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Troika and the Lisbon strategy and Europe 2020

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 30
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 44

**E-003031/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Troika and systems of industrial relations and wage formation

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 44

**E-003032/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Troika and health systems

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 45

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 3

**E-003489/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Violation of the Treaties by the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 45

**E-003491/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Unacceptable behaviour by the European Central Bank in shaping Member States' adjustment programmes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 46

**E-003493/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Conflict of interest the European Central Bank (ECB)

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 46

**E-003494/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Participation of the social partners in designing Troika programmes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 33
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 46

**E-003497/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Increase in solidarity between vulnerable groups

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 33
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 47

**E-003509/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Role of the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 33
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 47

**E-003593/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Failure to implement proposals contained in the European Parliament's resolution of 6 July 2011 on the economic and
social crisis

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 47

**E-003594/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Role of the Commission in the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 48

**E-003623/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Job recovery plans

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 34
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 48

**E-003624/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Deregulation of labour relations

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 48

**E-003629/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Study of the social and economic consequences of the crisis

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 49

**E-003630/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible corrective measures and incentives by the ILO and the Council of Europe

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 49

**E-003631/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Support for children with special needs and persons with disabilities

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 50

C 333 / 4 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-003661/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Need for transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 50

**E-003663/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Revision of the MoUs

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 37
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 50

**E-003665/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Assuming responsibility for the operations of the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 37
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 51

**E-003667/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Insufficient democratic accountability of the Troika

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 37
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 51

**E-003669/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Debt sustainability in the euro area programme countries

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 51

**E-003821/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Prolongation of fiscal adjustment timeframes

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 52

**E-003823/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Issue of ‘contingent convertible bonds’

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 52

**E-003825/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tax evasion, tax fraud and the financial situation in the euro area programme countries

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 52

**E-003827/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use made of bail-out funds in the programme countries

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 53

**E-002958/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Health

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 54
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 55

**E-002960/14** by Amelia Andersdotter to the Commission
_Subject:_ Staff representative contract mismanagement

Svensk version ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 56
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 57

**E-002961/14** by Amelia Andersdotter to the Commission
_Subject:_ Failure by Sweden to notify substantial state aid

Svensk version ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 58
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 59

**E-002962/14** by Patrizia Toia and Herbert Dorfmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Credit Unions — Report on macroeconomic imbalances

Deutsche Fassung ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 60
Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 62
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 63

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 5

**E-002963/14** by Rolandas Paksas to the Commission
_Subject:_ Economic and social situation of people with disabilities

Tekstas lietuvių kalba .................................................................................................................................................................................. 64
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 65

**E-002964/14** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ ING

Nederlandse versie ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 66
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 68

**E-002965/14** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Safer shopping in the EU

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 69
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 70

**E-002967/14** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU Member States arming the Russian Army and Navy

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 71
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 72

**E-002968/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Children in Syria

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 73
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 74

**E-002969/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Children with unknown fathers

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 75
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 76

**E-002970/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Female genital mutilation

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 77
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 78

**E-002971/14** by Pino Arlacchi to the Commission
_Subject:_ The cost of money in Italy — Households and SMEs pay the price

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 79
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 81

**P-002972/14** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Law on the ownership of water resources in Portugal

Versão portuguesa ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 83
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 84

**E-002973/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Digital Agenda: basic broadband for all

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 85
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 86

**E-002974/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Support for Internet entrepreneurs in the EU

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 87
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 88

**E-002975/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Measures promoted by Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 to reduce the EU's vulnerability in the event of possible
interruption of the gas supply from Russia

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 89
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 90

**E-002976/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Specific measures for re-industrialising the European Union

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 91
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 92

C 333 / 6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-002977/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Flag changes on European vessels

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 93
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 94

**E-002978/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ International scientific cooperation — EU external delegations

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 95
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 96

**E-002979/14** by Ana Gomes to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Additional Protocol II and revision of international humanitarian law

Versão portuguesa ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 97
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 98

**E-002980/14** by Ana Gomes to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Women in armed conflicts

Versão portuguesa ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 99
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 100

**E-002981/14** by Ana Gomes to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Protection of children in armed conflicts

Versão portuguesa ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 101
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 102

**E-002982/14** by Ana Gomes to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Non-state armed groups' compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL)

Versão portuguesa ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 103
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 104

**E-002983/14** by Ana Gomes and Sylvie Guillaume to the Commission
_Subject:_ Extradition of Aleksandr Pavlov to Kazakhstan

English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 105

**E-002984/14** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Effects of noise on health

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 106
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 107

**E-002985/14** by Raül Romeva i Rueda, Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Maria Badia i Cutchet,
Raimon Obiols, Willy Meyer and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potential violation by the Spanish State of clause 5 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC in relation to temporary judges'
access to public positions

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 108
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 111

**E-002986/14** by Raül Romeva i Rueda, Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Maria Badia i Cutchet,
Raimon Obiols, Willy Meyer and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potential violation of clause 5 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC by the Spanish State through abuse of the temporary
recruitment of interim judges

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 108
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 111

**E-002987/14** by Raül Romeva i Rueda, Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Maria Badia i Cutchet,
Raimon Obiols, Willy Meyer and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potential non-compliance by the Spanish State with Clause Four of Council Directive 1999/70/EC on the equal
treatment of fixed-term workers

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 109
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 112

**E-002988/14** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Air quality in Inca (Balearic Islands)

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 114
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 115

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 7

**E-002989/14** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Using digital data to improve the European tourism industry

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 116
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 117

**E-002991/14** by Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reusing industrial buildings

Versiunea în limba română ........................................................................................................................................................................ 118
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 119

**P-002992/14** by Holger Krahmer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Industrial renaissance in the supply of raw materials

Deutsche Fassung ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 120
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 121

**E-002993/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 122
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 123

**E-002994/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Council
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 124
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 125

**E-002995/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 126
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 127

**E-002996/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Council
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 128
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 129

**E-002997/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 130
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 131

**E-002998/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Personal data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 132
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 133

**E-002999/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Personal data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 134
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 135

**E-003002/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Participative business management

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 136
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 137

**P-003003/14** by Nikola Vuljanić to the Council
_Subject:_ Crisis in Ukraine

Hrvatska verzija .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 138
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 139

**P-003004/14** by Nadja Hirsch to the Commission
_Subject:_ 2014-2020 work programme of the European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services (ENLETS)

Deutsche Fassung ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 140
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 141

C 333 / 8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-003005/14** by Rosa Estaràs Ferragut to the Commission
_Subject:_ Studies on the seasonal variations in tourism

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 142
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 143

**E-003006/14** by Salvador Sedó i Alabart to the Commission
_Subject:_ Anti-Europeanism

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 144
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 145

**E-003007/14** by Salvador Sedó i Alabart to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europe is losing its technological competitiveness

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 146
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 147

**E-003008/14** by Salvador Sedó i Alabart to the Commission
_Subject:_ SMEs and Horizon 2020

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 148
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 149

**E-003009/14** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potential fraudulent use of public funds from the ESF

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 150
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 151

**E-003010/14** by Christel Schaldemose to the Commission
_Subject:_ Energy labelling

Dansk udgave .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 152
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 153

**E-003011/14** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Challenges posed by the centralised procedure for switching medicines to non-prescription status

English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 154

**E-003012/14** by Marlene Mizzi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Responsibilities of bloggers, page and profile administrators on social media

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 155
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 156

**E-003013/14** by Franziska Keller to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD)

Deutsche Fassung ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 157
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 158

**E-003016/14** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Euromed programme on culture

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 159
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 160

**E-003017/14** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Execution of a European arrest warrant: the Sophie Toscan du Plantier case

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 161
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 162

**E-003019/14** by Giancarlo Scottà to the Commission
_Subject:_ Measures for controlling the brandy maturing process

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 163
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 164

**E-003020/14** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Civilian drones

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 165
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 166

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 9

**E-003022/14** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tobacco Directive

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 167
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 168

**E-003023/14** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Ocean Energy Forum

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 169
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 170

**E-003024/14** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Monitoring of NO 2 emissions

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 171
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 172

**P-003025/14** by Mark Demesmaeker to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inquiry into state aid

Nederlandse versie ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 173
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 174

**P-003033/14** by Marielle de Sarnez to the Commission
_Subject:_ Public consultation procedure on the inclusion of a dispute settlement mechanism in the future EU-US TTIP trade
agreement

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 175
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 176

**P-003034/14** by Iva Zanicchi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Clarification on the marketing of coloured ‘sambuca’ drinks, with particular reference to the law on compound terms

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 177
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 178

**E-003035/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Industrial policy ancillary measures

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 179
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 180

**E-003036/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Erasmus+ programme

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 181
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 182

**E-003037/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Article 174: territorial cohesion and insularity

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 183
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 184

**E-003038/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC)

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 185
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 186

**E-003039/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) II

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 187
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 188

**E-003040/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ SMEs: eco-design advisory services

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 189
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 190

**E-003041/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ The Troika and the Lisbon strategy and Europe 2020

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 191
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 192

C 333 / 10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-003042/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ The Troika and systems of industrial relations and wage formation

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 193
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 194

**E-003043/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ The Troika and health systems

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 195
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 196

**E-003044/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ Eurogroup decision regarding a ‘haircut’ of insured deposits in Cyprus

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 197
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 198

**E-003045/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ Democratic legitimacy of Troika policies

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 199
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 200

**E-003046/14** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Council
_Subject:_ Troika and rise in poverty and inequalities in Memorandum countries

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 201
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 202

**E-003047/14** by Oreste Rossi and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Conflict of interest regarding German nationalism and European elections -- establishing a uniform set of electoral rules

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 203
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 204

**E-003048/14** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data protection

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 205
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 206

**E-003050/14** by Oreste Rossi and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Female condoms ignored by healthcare institutions

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 207
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 208

**E-003051/14** by Oreste Rossi and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reliability of China's macroeconomic data

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 209
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 210

**E-003052/14** by Oreste Rossi and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ The drinking game that is taking the Internet by storm

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 211
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 212

**E-003053/14** by Oreste Rossi and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inadequate thermal insulation: a senseless waste of energy that puts up bills and increases global warming

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 213
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 214

**P-003054/14** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund following extreme weather conditions in the Var and Alpes-Maritimes
departments

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 215
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 216

**E-003055/14** by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Irregularities regarding the use of EU funding in former East Germany

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 217
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 218

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 11

**E-003056/14** by Françoise Grossetête to the Commission
_Subject:_ Social dumping in the road haulage industry

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 219
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 221

**E-003058/14** by Rosa Estaràs Ferragut to the Commission
_Subject:_ Publication of call for proposals relating to dual vocational training

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 222
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 223

**E-003059/14** by Rosa Estaràs Ferragut to the Commission
_Subject:_ Aid under the programme Erasmus + for disabled people

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 224
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 225

**E-003061/14** by David Martin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Interpretation of Directive 2002/49/EC and its application

English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 226

**E-003062/14** by Salvador Sedó i Alabart to the Council
_Subject:_ Chapter 23 of accession negotiations

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 227
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 228

**P-003063/14** by Jens Rohde to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fisheries negotiations between the EU and Norway

Dansk udgave .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 229
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 230

**E-003065/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reinforcing the Enterprise Europe network

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 231
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 232

**E-003066/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ Situation of ESF investment in the Balearic Islands

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 233
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 234

**E-003067/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ European strategy for key enabling technologies

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 235
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 236

**E-003068/14** by Teresa Riera Madurell to the Commission
_Subject:_ European strategy for more growth and jobs in maritime and coastal tourism

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 237
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 238

**E-003069/14** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Colombia — Complaint against the Spanish multinational Prosegur

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 239
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 240

**E-003070/14** by Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández to the Commission
_Subject:_ Deaths in Ceuta (2)

Versión española ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 241
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 242

**E-003071/14** by Takis Hadjigeorgiou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Revival of the issue of a regulation on direct trade

Ελληνική έκδοση ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 243
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 244

C 333 / 12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**E-003072/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Women in decision-making roles in the media

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 245
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 246

**E-003073/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Performing arts in the EU-28

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 247
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 248

**E-003074/14** by Claudette Abela Baldacchino to the Commission
_Subject:_ Gender training in the EU-28

Verżjoni Maltija ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 249
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 250

**E-003075/14** by Fiona Hall to the Commission
_Subject:_ Collection of data following EU neonicotinoid ban

English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 251

**E-003076/14** by Keith Taylor to the Commission
_Subject:_ Protection of dolphins and small cetaceans from hunting

English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 252

**E-003077/14** by Syed Kamall, Sven Giegold and Wolf Klinz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implementation of the Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and auditing for
the period of 2014-2020

Deutsche Fassung ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 253
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 255

**E-003078/14** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Abuse of European women

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 257
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 258

**E-003079/14** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon, Jean-Pierre Audy, Alain Cadec, Françoise Grossetête, Tokia Saïfi, Constance Le
Grip and Elisabeth Morin-Chartier to the Commission
_Subject:_ Wiretapping in France

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 259
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 260

**E-003080/14** by Patrick Le Hyaric to the Commission
_Subject:_ Agreement with Google

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 261
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 262

**E-003081/14** by Gilles Pargneaux to the Commission
_Subject:_ Seafood labelling fraud

Version française ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 263
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 264

**E-003082/14** by Ruža Tomašić to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Commission's role in the fight for gender equality

Hrvatska verzija .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 265
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 266

**E-003083/14** by Matteo Salvini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Risks relating to the failure to decontaminate and reclaim the land around the former Stoppani factory in Arenzano and
Cogoleto (Liguria)

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 267
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 268

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 13

**E-003084/14** by Oreste Rossi, Paolo Bartolozzi, Sergio Berlato, Lara Comi, Elisabetta Gardini, Giovanni La Via, Erminia
Mazzoni, Aldo Patriciello, Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris and Salvatore Tatarella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Authorisation of nutrition and health claims provided for by the EFSA: what cost to SMEs?

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 269
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 270

**E-003085/14** by Franco Bonanini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sea farm in Lavagna (Genoa)

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 271
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 272

**E-003086/14** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potential funding for the production of the ‘Bird Detector’ device

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 273
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 274

**E-003087/14** by Sergio Berlato to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact of the movement of animals for adoption

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 275
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 276

**E-003088/14** by Barbara Matera to the Commission
_Subject:_ Forced sterilisation of women in Peru

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 277
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 278

**E-003090/14** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Artificial uteruses and abominations of science

Versione italiana .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 279
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 280

**E-003091/14** by Patricia van der Kammen to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tariff quotas for garlic

Nederlandse versie ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 281
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 282

**E-003092/14** by Esther de Lange to the Commission
_Subject:_ Teff

Nederlandse versie ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 283
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 284

**E-003093/14** by Filip Kaczmarek to the Commission
_Subject:_ Chechen refugees in the EU

Wersja polska .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 285
English version ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 286

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 15

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002190/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(25 febbraio 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Sistema balistico di difesa NATO per la difesa del continente

Il cacciatorpediniere statunitense USS Donald Cook, dotato dell'innovativo sistema di difesa balistico Aegis, sarà basato
permanentemente in Europa, in seno alla strategia NATO di difesa missilistica. Dato che oramai nel mondo le capacità balistiche di
diversi Stati stanno aumentando, strumenti difensivi in grado di intercettare e distruggere minacce di questo genere sono
indispensabili per l'Europa. Questo sistema è completato dal sistema radar basato in Turchia, dai missili olandesi, tedeschi e
americani stazionati sul confine sud-est del continente e dal sistema di comando e controllo di base a Ramstein, in Germania.

Si tratta di un sistema altamente innovativo e integrato, in grado di proteggere l'intero continente.

In merito a questo sistema, ritiene la Commissione che eventuali sovrapposizioni tra NATO e UE (nell'applicazione della politica di
sicurezza e difesa comune) possano rischiare di aumentare in maniera inefficiente i costi della difesa europea, sottraendo risorse
economiche preziose in un momento di restrizione dei bilanci nazionali europei della difesa?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(8 luglio 2014)_

Riguardo al sistema a cui si fa riferimento nell'interrogazione, né l'UE in generale, né la sua Politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune
(PSDC), in particolare, partecipano allo sviluppo delle capacità di difesa antimissili balistici nel contesto dell'Unione europea o
sostengono tale sviluppo. Non ci sono e non potrebbero esserci sovrapposizioni fra la NATO e l'UE in quest'ambito. La PSDC, che è
parte integrante della politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell'Unione europea, mira a fornire risposte alle crisi che possono
verificarsi nel mondo, consentendo così all'UE di svolgere un ruolo completo di promozione della sicurezza a livello internazionale.
La PSDC fornisce una capacità operativa, basata su risorse sia civili sia militari, che l'Unione può impiegare in missioni di gestione
delle crisi.

C 333 / 16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002190/14**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(25 February 2014)_

_Subject:_ NATO ballistic missile defence system for defending the continent

The destroyer USS Donald Cook, equipped with the innovative Aegis ballistic missile defence system, will be permanently based in
Europe, at the heart of the NATO missile defence strategy. Since the ballistic capabilities of various states around the world are
currently increasing, defensive tools able to intercept and destroy threats of this kind are indispensable for Europe. This system is
complemented by the radar system based in Turkey, by Dutch, German and American missiles located on the south-eastern border
of the continent, and by the command and control system based at Ramstein, Germany.

This is a highly innovative, integrated system, capable of protecting the entire continent.

With regard to this system, does the Commission consider that any overlap between NATO and the EU (in the application of the
security and common defence policy) may risk increasing the costs of European defence inefficiently, diverting precious economic
resources at a time of restrictions in European national defence budgets?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2014)_

Regarding the system referred to in the Question, neither the EU in general nor its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in
particular is involved in developing or in supporting the development of ballistic missile defence capabilities in the EU framework.
There is no overlap, nor can there be any, between NATO and the EU in this area. CSDP, which is an integral part of the EU's
Common Foreign and Security Policy, focuses on providing responses to crises which may arise in the world, thus enabling the EU to
play a full role as a security provider on the international stage. CSDP provides an operational capacity, drawing on both civilian and
military assets, which the Union can use for crisis management missions.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 17

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002948/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Αλλαγές στον ελληνικό νόμο περί απεργιών

Ο έλληνας Πρωθυπουργός στις 07/11/2012 διαβεβαίωνε κατηγορηματικά τον ελληνικό λαό από την ελληνική Βουλή ότι «αυτά είναι τα
τελευταία επώδυνα μέτρα, δηλαδή τα τελευταία που αφορούν περικοπές μισθών, συντάξεων και κοινωνικών επιδομάτων. Τα τελευταία. Και
όποια πρόσθετη διόρθωση χρειαστεί στο μέλλον, θα προκύψει από πάταξη της φοροδιαφυγής και από μείωση της δημόσιας σπατάλης. Είναι
επίσης η πρώτη φορά που μπαίνει τέτοια ρήτρα στη δανειακή συμφωνία». Επιπρόσθετα, η Επιτροπή, στην απάντησή της Ε-010950/2013,
τόνιζε με τον πιο κατηγορηματικό τρόπο, αναφορικά με ενδεχόμενη απαίτηση της Τρόικα για τον περιορισμό του δικαιώματος των απεργιών
στη Ελλάδα, ότι τέτοιου είδους μέτρα «δεν αποτελούν μέρος των όρων πολιτικής που συμφωνήθηκαν μεταξύ της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης, του
ΔΝΤ, της ΕΚΤ και της Επιτροπής εκ μέρους των κρατών μελών της ζώνης του ευρώ στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος οικονομικής
προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα».

Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες, στις πρόσφατες διαπραγματεύσεις της Τρόικα με την ελληνική κυβέρνηση πριν τη διεξαγωγή της συνόδου του
Eurogroup στις 10 Μαρτίου, η πλευρά των δανειστών ζητά από την ελληνική κυβέρνηση μια σειρά από νέες αλλαγές που συντείνουν στη
μείωση των μισθών, των συντάξεων και των επιδομάτων, αλλά και στις εργασιακές σχέσεις, μεταξύ των οποίων, και το θεσμικό και νομικό
πλαίσιο της διεξαγωγής των απεργιών. Με δεδομένα τα παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει υπάρξει στο Μνημόνιο Συνεργασίας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ-ΕΚΤ η ρήτρα που αναφέρει ο έλληνας Πρωθυπουργός, με την οποία «δεν θα
υπάρξουν νέα μέτρα, πέρα από αυτά που ψηφίστηκαν με το τρίτο μνημόνιο και ότι οποιαδήποτε μελλοντική προσαρμογή θα γίνει μόνο
από την πάταξη της φοροδιαφυγής»; Εάν όχι, ο έλληνας Πρωθυπουργός είχε πληροφορηθεί για το περιεχόμενο του Μνημονίου;

2. Τι μεσολάβησε μέσα σε τρεις μήνες και σήμερα η Τρόικα εξετάζει την αλλαγή του νομοθετικού πλαισίου το οποίο συντείνει στον
ουσιαστικό περιορισμό στην άσκηση του συνταγματικού δικαιώματος της απεργίας από τους έλληνες εργαζόμενους;

3. Υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες, μπορεί να μεταπείσει τον ελληνικό λαό που πιστεύει ότι τα Μνημόνια, που έχουν καταστρέψει την οικονομία
και την κοινωνία της χώρας μας, δεν είναι παρά το όχημα για την αποκλειστική εξυπηρέτηση των συμφερόντων των δανειστών, του
ΣΕΒ, των μεγάλων εργοδοτών, αλλά και των «επενδυτών» που σπεύδουν να λεηλατήσουν τη δημόσια περιουσία;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(28 Μαΐου 2014)_

Το ελληνικό πρόγραμμα έχει σταθεροποιήσει την ελληνική οικονομία και τον χρηματοπιστωτικό τομέα, αποκατέστησε τη δημοσιονομική
βιωσιμότητα, θέτει δε τις βάσεις για την επιστροφή σε βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και δημιουργία θέσεων απασχόλησης.

Η καταπολέμηση της φοροδιαφυγής αποτελεί την κύρια μεταρρύθμιση του προγράμματος. Η φορολογία αναδιαμορφώθηκε, ενώ συστήθηκε
ημιαυτόνομη φορολογική διοίκηση. Εφαρμόζεται πρόγραμμα για την ενίσχυση της είσπραξης φόρων και της καταπολέμησης της
φοροδιαφυγής και της διαφθοράς. Τούτο θα βελτιώσει την ασφάλεια των φορολογουμένων και θα συμβάλει στη δημιουργία καλύτερου
επιχειρηματικού περιβάλλοντος ( [1] ).

Όπως επισημάνθηκε στις απαντήσεις σε προηγούμενες ερωτήσεις του κ. βουλευτή, η Επιτροπή, σε συνεργασία με την ΕΚΤ και ΔΝΤ,
βρίσκονται σε συνεχή διάλογο με τις ελληνικές αρχές για ευρύ φάσμα θεμάτων που μπορούν να συντελέσουν στην καλύτερη λειτουργία της
ελληνικής οικονομίας. Συναφώς, οι αρχές συμφώνησαν να αξιολογήσουν το πλαίσιο για τη συνδικαλιστική δράση και τις απεργιακές
κινητοποιήσεις. Η αξιολόγηση αυτή δεν στοχεύει επ' ουδενί στον περιορισμό των συνταγματικών δικαιωμάτων των εργαζομένων. Τουναντίον,
στοχεύει στη διαφύλαξη του δικαιώματος εργασίας, την προώθηση δημιουργικών σχέσεων μεταξύ των κοινωνικών εταίρων, την αποφυγή
αναίτιας διατάραξης των εργασιών των επιχειρήσεων και τη διασφάλιση ότι το πλαίσιο για τις συνδικαλιστικές δράσεις είναι ώριμο και
ευθυγραμμισμένο με τις διεθνείς συμβάσεις. Το πρώτο βήμα είναι η επανεξέταση του υφισταμένου πλαισίου με γνώμονα τις βέλτιστες
πρακτικές σε άλλες χώρες, η οποία αναμένεται να γίνει μέχρι τον ερχόμενο Ιούνιο. Αυτή θα περιλαμβάνει επισκόπηση των εν λόγω πρακτικών,
στηριζόμενη σε τεκμηριωμένες και επικαιροποιημένες πληροφορίες, καθώς και των σχετικών διεθνών συμβάσεων (συμπεριλαμβανομένης της
ΔΟΕ) που ισχύουν στην Ελλάδα. Αναμένεται από τις ελληνικές αρχές, στο πλαίσιο της επανεξέτασης, να συζητήσουν με τους κοινωνικούς
εταίρους τις αλλαγές που κρίνονται αναγκαίες και ενδεχομένως να τις υιοθετήσουν ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες, βλ. κεφάλαιο 3.2.2. Η μεταρρύθμιση της φορολογικής πολιτικής, στη σελίδα 30 της έκθεσης που ακολουθεί της τέταρτης επανεξέτασης του

δεύτερου προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα είναι διαθέσιμη στη διεύθυνση:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/op192_en.htm

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες, βλ. κεφάλαιο 3.4.1. Μεταρρύθμιση της αγοράς εργασίας, σελ. 47.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

C 333 / 18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002948/14**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Changes in Greek law on strikes

On 7 November 2012 the Greek Prime Minister, speaking in the Hellenic Parliament, categorically assured the Greek people that
‘these are the last painful measures, i.e. the last involving cuts in wages, pensions and social benefits. The last. And any additional
adjustment that is needed in future will result from clamping down on tax evasion and reducing public sector waste. It is also the first
time that such a clause has been included in the loan agreement.’ Furthermore, the Commission in its answer to Written Question E010950/2013 had stressed in the most unequivocal manner, with respect to any requirement by the Troika that the right of strikes in
Greece be restricted, that such measures ‘are not part of the policy conditionality agreed between the Greek Government, the IMF, the
ECB and the Commission on behalf of the euro area Member States in the context of the economic adjustment programme for
Greece.’

However, it is reported that, in the recent negotiations between the Troika and Greek Government prior to the Eurogroup meeting
on 10 March, the creditors’ side asked the Greek Government to introduce a number of changes that will lead to a reduction in
wages, pensions and benefits but will also affect labour relations, including the institutional and legal framework for taking strike
action. In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Has the clause mentioned by the Greek Prime Minister that ‘any additional adjustment that is needed in future will result from
clamping down on tax evasion’ been included in the EU-IMF ‐ECB Memorandum of Understanding? If not, was the Greek
Prime Minister informed about the content of the Memorandum?

2. What has occurred within the last three months to move the Troika to consider changing the legislative framework in order
substantially to restrict Greek workers’ constitutional right to take strike action?

3. The Greek people are convinced that the Memoranda that have destroyed the Greek economy and Greek society are merely a
vehicle designed exclusively to serve the interests of creditors, the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, major employers and of
‘investors’ who are scrambling to pillage public assets. In the light of the above, how can it make them change their minds?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 May 2014)_

The Greek programme has stabilised Greece's economy and financial sector, restored fiscal sustainability, and is putting the basis for
the return of sustainable growth and employment creation.

The fight against tax evasion is a key reform of the programme. Taxation has been reshaped and a semi-autonomous revenue
administration has been created. A programme is being implemented to reinforce tax collection and support the fight against tax
evasion and corruption. This will improve the security of taxpayers and contribute to a better business environment ( [1] ).

As pointed out in replies to earlier questions by the Honourable Member, the Commission, together with the ECB and the IMF, are
engaged in a regular dialogue with the Greek authorities on a broad range of issues that may have the potential to lead to a better
functioning Greek economy. In this context, the authorities have agreed to assess the framework for trade union operations and
industrial action. The assessment is by no means aimed at restricting workers' constitutional rights. On the contrary, it aims at
safeguarding the right to work, promoting constructive relations between social partners, avoiding any undue disruption of the
operations of firms and ensuring that the framework for trade unions' operations is mature and aligned with international
conventions. The first step is a review of the existing framework against best practices in other countries, due by this June. This will
include an overview of such practices based on solid and up-to-date information, and of the relevant international conventions
(including ILO's) that apply to Greece. Building on the review, the authorities are expected to discuss with social partners any changes
deemed necessary and eventually adopt them ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) For further details please see Chapter 3.2.2. Tax policy reform on page 30 of report following the 4th review of The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for

Greece at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/op192_en.htm

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) For further details please see Chapter 3.4.1. Labour market reforms on page 47.

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 19

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002949/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Απαίτηση Επιτροπής για εφαρμογή προτάσεων τρίτου Οργανισμού, εκτός ΕΕ, στην Ελλάδα

Στην 3η αναθεώρηση του 2ου Οικονομικού Προγράμματος Προσαρμογής (Ιούλιος 2013), στο σημείο 79 παρ. 2, αναφέρεται ότι «Με την
υποστήριξη του ΟΟΣΑ, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση … του διοικητικού φόρτου στις αρχές του επόμενου έτους». Η πρώτη από τις 2 αξιολογήσεις
του ΟΟΣΑ, που αναφέρονται στο κείμενο αυτό, περιλαμβάνουν 329 προτάσεις, τις οποίες καλείται η ελληνική κυβέρνηση από την τρόικα να
εφαρμόσει στο σύνολό τους. Δεδομένου ότι ο ΟΟΣΑ είναι Οργανισμός ανεξάρτητος τόσο από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, όσο και από το ΔΝΤ
και την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα, οι οποίες απαρτίζουν την τρόικα, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

α) Έχει ελέγξει τη συμβατότητα των 329 αυτών προτάσεων με την κοινοτική νομοθεσία; Εάν ναι, πόσες και ποιες από αυτές θα έπρεπε να
έχουν ήδη εφαρμοσθεί ως επιβαλλόμενες από την Κοινοτική Νομοθεσία περί ανταγωνισμού; Γιατί δε ζητά την εφαρμογή τους μέσα από την
πάγια Κοινοτική Νομοθεσία; Γιατί δίνει επιπλέον θεσμική δυνατότητα παρέμβασης σε τρίτους Οργανισμούς, όπως ο ΟΟΣΑ και το ΔΝΤ;

β) Στις περιπτώσεις προτάσεων που η Κοινοτική Νομοθεσία θεωρεί συμβατές, με την έννοια ότι αφήνονται στη δικαιοδοσία των κρατών
μελών, η απαίτηση της τρόικα για ευθυγράμμιση δεν εμποδίζει την άσκηση των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων της Ελλάδας, που έχουν μείνει
εκτός κοινοτικής ρύθμισης; Σ' αυτές τις περιπτώσεις δεν δίνεται η αθέμιτη δυνατότητα στα κράτη μέλη δανειστές της Ελλάδας να επιβάλλουν
πχ, τα εμπορικά τους συμφέροντα, απαιτώντας την πλήρη ευθυγράμμιση με τις προτάσεις του ΟΟΣΑ;

γ) Από πότε και με ποιον τρόπο έχει αποκτήσει το δικαίωμα η Επιτροπή να απαιτεί την εφαρμογή των προτάσεων ενός ανεξάρτητου
οργανισμού σε ένα κράτος μέλος της ΕΕ; Υπάρχουν ή έχουν ζητηθεί από τον ΟΟΣΑ αντίστοιχες εκθέσεις για άλλα κράτη μέλη; Έχουν
υποχρεωθεί ή θα υποχρεωθούν από την Επιτροπή αυτά τα κράτη μέλη να προχωρήσουν στην εφαρμογή των προτάσεών του; Εάν όχι, γιατί
προτείνεται κάτι τέτοιο στην Ελλάδα;

δ) Προτίθεται για κάθε μία από τις 329 προτάσεις του ΟΟΣΑ που ζητά να εφαρμόσει η Ελλάδα, να τεκμηριώσει τη νομιμότητα της
απαίτησής της, με βάση την Κοινοτική Νομοθεσία;

ε) Τι προβλέπει η δεύτερη έκθεση του ΟΟΣΑ για το διοικητικό φόρτο για τις επιχειρήσεις; Ποιοι είναι οι 13 τομείς που αναφέρονται;
Πότε θα δημοσιοποιηθεί; Με ποιον τρόπο θα εφαρμοσθεί;

**Απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(20 Μαΐου 2014)_

Ο ΟΟΣΑ υλοποίησε ένα σχέδιο αξιολόγησης του ανταγωνισμού στην Ελλάδα το οποίο έφερε στο φώς ευρύ φάσμα ρυθμιστικών περιορισμών,
όσον αφορά τον ανταγωνισμό, σε τέσσερεις τομείς: τουρισμός, λιανικό εμπόριο, επεξεργασία τροφίμων και οικοδομικά υλικά. Ως μέρος των
δεσμεύσεων που ανέλαβε η ελληνική κυβέρνηση στο πλαίσιο της 4ης αναθεώρησης του 2ου προγράμματος, οι αρχές άρχισαν να εφαρμόζουν
τις συστάσεις της μελέτης τον Απρίλιο του 2014 ( [1] ).

Εναπόκειται στις ελληνικές αρχές να αποφασίσουν σχετικά με τον συγκεκριμένο τρόπο εφαρμογής των συστάσεων, εξασφαλίζοντας την
τήρηση της νομοθεσίας της Ένωσης. Η εφαρμογή των συστάσεων οφείλει να εγκριθεί από το ελληνικό Κοινοβούλιο.

Η ανάλυση και οι συστάσεις πολιτικής του ΟΟΣΑ χρησιμοποιούνται ευρέως για την ενημέρωση των πολιτικών αποφάσεων των κρατών μελών
του. Η Επιτροπή πιστεύει ότι η δέουσα εφαρμογή των συστάσεων του ΟΟΣΑ στην Ελλάδα είναι σημαντική διαρθρωτική μεταρρύθμιση για
την ενίσχυση της ανταγωνιστικότητας η οποία είναι ουσιαστικής σημασίας για τη βελτίωση του επιχειρηματικού περιβάλλοντος και την
αύξηση του ανταγωνισμού. Η επίτευξη αυτών των στόχων είναι καίριας σημασίας για τη δημιουργία σταθερής βάσης προκειμένου να υπάρξει
βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και δημιουργία θέσεων απασχόλησης στην Ελλάδα.

Με στόχο να μειωθεί ο διοικητικός φόρτος για τις επιχειρήσεις κατά 25%, η κυβέρνηση ενέκρινε ένα πρώτο πακέτο απλουστεύσεων τον
Μάρτιο του 2014 και προτίθεται να θεσπίσει συστάσεις σε 13 τομείς, οι οποίες καταρτίσθηκαν με την υποστήριξη του ΟΟΣΑ, μέχρι τον
Ιούνιο του 2014. Οι εν λόγω τομείς είναι η φορολογική νομοθεσία, το εταιρικό δίκαιο και οι ετήσιοι λογαριασμοί, ο τομέας των δημοσίων
συμβάσεων, η γεωργία, το εργασιακό περιβάλλον και οι εργασιακές σχέσεις, το περιβάλλον, η ασφάλεια τροφίμων, η ενέργεια, η αλιεία, οι
τηλεπικοινωνίες, οι στατιστικές, τα φαρμακευτικά προϊόντα και ο τουρισμός.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp192_en.pdf

C 333 / 20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002949/14**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Commission requirement that proposals made by a third party, a non-EU organisation, be implemented in Greece

The third review of the second Economic Adjustment Programme (July 2013) states in Section 79, paragraph 2, that: ‘With the
support of the OECD, the Government plans to introduce legal changes …in the area of administrative burden early next year.’ The
first of the two OECD assessments referred to in this document contains 329 recommendations, which the Troika is calling upon the
Greek Government to apply in their entirety. Since the OECD is an organisation independent both of the Commission and of the IMF
and the European Central Bank, which make up the Troika, will the Commission say:

(a) Has it verified whether these 329 proposals are compatible with Community law? If so, how many and which of these should
have already been applied under EU competition Law? Why does it not demand the implementation of these measures
through established Community legislation? Why is it giving third party organisations, such as the OECD and the IMF,
additional institutional capacity to intervene?

(b) In the case of proposals that are deemed compatible with Community law and fall within the jurisdiction of the Member States,
does the Troika’s requirement that Greece fall into line with these proposals not encroach upon Greece’s sovereign rights,
which have remained outside the scope of Community rules? In these cases, is it not unlawfully giving those Member States
that are Greece’s creditors the possibility of imposing their commercial or other interests on the country, by requiring full
alignment with the OECD’s proposals?

(c) Since when — and how — has the Commission acquired the right to require that proposals made by an independent body be
implemented in an EU Member State? Has the OECD issued similar reports for other Member States or has it been asked to do
so? If so, have those Member States been compelled by the Commission — or will they be — to implement its proposals? If
not, why is this being proposed in the case of Greece?

(d) For each of the 329 OECD recommendations which it is requiring Greece to implement, does it intend to provide evidence of
the legitimacy of its requirement, based on EC law?

(e) What provision does the second OECD report make concerning the administrative burden for enterprises? What are the 13
sectors to which it refers? When will it be published? How will it be implemented?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The OECD has carried out a competition assessment project in Greece which has identified a wide range of regulatory constraints on
competition in four sectors: tourism, retail trade, food processing and construction materials. As part of the commitments made by
the Greek Government in the context of the 4th review of the 2nd programme, the authorities begun to implement the
recommendations of the study in April 2014 ( [1] ).

It is for the Greek authorities to decide the specific way in which the recommendations are implemented, ensuring that EU legislation
is respected. The implementation of the recommendations has to be approved by the Greek Parliament.

OECD analysis and policy recommendations are widely used to inform policy decisions in its Members. The Commission believes
that adequate implementation of the OECD recommendations in Greece is a crucial competition-enhancing structural reform which
is essential to improve the business environment and raise competitiveness. Achieving these objectives is of great importance to set a
solid basis for sustainable growth and employment creation in Greece.

With the objective of reducing administrative burden on business by 25%, the Government adopted a first package of simplifications
in March 2014 and intends to adopt recommendations in 13 sectors, developed with support of the OECD, by June 2014. These
sectors are tax law, company law and annual accounts, public procurement, agriculture, working environment and employment
relations, environment, food safety, energy, fisheries, telecommunications, statistics, pharmaceuticals and tourism.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp192_en.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 21

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002950/14**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(12 martie 2014)_

_Subiect:_ Efectele cumulative ale reziduurilor de pesticide și conflictele de interese

Un raport recent publicat de _PAN Europe_ ilustrează preocupările cu privire la efectele posibile ale expunerii la reziduuri de pesticide
multiple. Raportul afirmă că obiectivitatea Organizației Mondiale a Sănătății (OMS) și a Autorității Europene pentru Siguranță
Alimentară (EFSA) în această chestiune a fost compromisă pe o perioadă de mulți ani și că riscul de expunere la pesticide multiple a
fost, prin urmare, subestimat de către aceste organisme oficiale. Aceasta înseamnă că politica de reglementare a favorizat interesele
industriei pesticidelor în detrimentul sănătății consumatorilor ( [1] ).

Raportul aduce aprecieri eforturilor DG SANCO de a aborda conflictele de interese în cadrul EFSA, dar remarcă faptul că situația ar
putea fi îmbunătățită și mai mult. Raportul recomandă, printre altele, ca Comisia să împiedice grupurile de lobby ale industriei să
utilizeze finanțare din partea UE din programul-cadru pentru a promova interesele industriei.

Având în vedere cele de mai sus:

1. Ce măsuri va lua Comisia pentru a se asigura că efectele cumulative ale reziduurilor de pesticide multiple sunt luate în
considerare în mod corespunzător în evaluările de risc?

2. Sunt aplicate măsuri care să garanteze faptul că programele de finanțare ale UE nu sprijină grupurile de lobby ale industriei? În
caz contrar, vor fi adoptate astfel de măsuri?

**Răspuns dat de dl Borg în numele Comisiei**

_(28 aprilie 2014)_

Comisia lucrează împreună cu statele membre, Autoritatea Europeană pentru Siguranța Alimentară (EFSA) și oameni de știință
independenți în ceea ce privește o metodologie care să permită luarea în considerare a efectelor cumulative și sinergice ale
pesticidelor. Întrucât dezvoltarea unei noi metodologii de evaluare a riscurilor cumulative este extrem de complexă, finalizarea
metodologiei complete va avea încă nevoie de timp, atât la nivel de evaluare a riscurilor, cât și la nivel de gestionare a riscurilor.
Cererea recent publicată „ _Evaluarea riscurilor pentru sănătate ale expunerii umane combinate la mai multe substanțe toxice alimentare_ ” din
cadrul cererii din 2014 privind securitatea alimentară durabilă, în cadrul inițiativei „Orizont 2020”, va permite continuarea cercetării
și inovării în acest domeniu important. EFSA stabilește în prezent grupe de pesticide cu efecte similare. Aceste avize științifice sunt
disponibile pe pagina web a EFSA ( [2] ).

Regulile de participare ale programelor-cadru de cercetare succesive europene, adoptate de Consiliu și de Parlamentul European,
stabilesc condițiile precise de participare. Orizont 2020 permite participarea oricărei entități juridice stabilite într-un stat membru
sau într-o țară asociată sau înființată în temeiul dreptului Uniunii, a oricărei organizații internaționale de interes european, precum și
a oricărei entități juridice stabilite într-o țară terță identificată în programul de lucru.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.pan-europe.info/Resources/Reports/PANE%20-%202014%20-%20A%20Poisonous%20injection.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/

C 333 / 22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002950/14**

**to the Commission**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(12 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Cumulative effects of pesticide residues and conflicts of interest

A recent report published by PAN Europe outlines concerns about the possible effects of exposure to multiple pesticide residues. It
claims that the objectivity of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on this issue has
been compromised over a period of many years and that the risks of exposure to multiple pesticides has therefore been
underestimated by these official bodies. This means that regulatory policy has favoured the interests of the pesticide industry over
consumer health ( [1] ).

The report praises the efforts of DG SANCO in addressing conflicts of interest at the EFSA but notes that the situation could be
improved further. The report recommends, _inter alia_, that the Commission prevent industry lobby groups from using EU funding
from the framework programme to further the interests of industry.

In view of the above:

1. What action is the Commission taking to ensure that the cumulative effects of multiple pesticide residues are being given due
consideration in risk assessments?

2. Are there any measures in place to ensure that EU funding programmes do not support industry lobby groups? If not, will such
measures be adopted?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 April 2014)_

The Commission is working with the Member States, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and independent scientists on a
methodology to take into account cumulative and synergistic effects of pesticides. Since the development of a new methodology for
cumulative risk assessment is extremely complex, the finalisation of the full methodology will still need some time, both at risk
assessment as well as at risk management level. The recently published call ‘Assessing the health risk of combined human exposure to
multiple food-related toxic substances’, under the Sustainable Food Security Call 2014 of Horizon 2020, will allow the continuation
of research and innovation in this important area. EFSA is currently establishing groups of pesticides with similar effects. These
scientific opinions are available on the EFSA webpage ( [2] ).

The rules for participation of successive European research framework programmes, adopted by the Council and the European
Parliament, set out the precise conditions for participation. Horizon 2020 allows for the participation of any legal entity established
in a Member State or associated country, or created under Union law, any international European interest organisation and any legal
entity established in a third country identified in the work programme.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.pan-europe.info/Resources/Reports/PANE%20-%202014%20-%20A%20Poisonous%20injection.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 23

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002951/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Gruppi su Facebook e odio verso gli animali

Internet, il web e in particolare i social network stanno diventando veicolo per la propagazione di comportamenti criminali verso gli
animali. Circolano in rete video di violenze sugli animali, già da tempo, dal famoso caso della ragazza russa che buttò dei cuccioli di
cane in un fiume, passando per la «modella» che uccideva gli animali coi tacchi a spillo, fino ai casi più recenti di due giovani francesi
che lanciavano il primo un gatto, il secondo un cane di grossa taglia, contro un muro per semplice divertimento, tutto questo,
ovviamente, filmandosi e mettendo online il video. Appaiono sempre più gruppi sui social network che propagandano
l'eliminazione e la violenza contro gli animali, come il «Fronte Nazionale per l'abbattimento dei carlini», che minaccia torture e
uccisione di questi cani di piccola taglia, senza che sia ben chiaro se le intenzioni siano macabre ed ironiche — in ogni caso qui si va
oltre l'ironia e il sarcasmo — o se siano serie e criminali, in tal caso andrebbero perseguite con urgenza. Tutto ciò avviene mentre
sono ancora ampiamente diffusi video pornografici con animali, che si riescono a trovare sul web.

La Commissione:

1. è in grado di monitorare i comportamenti illegali sul web nei confronti degli animali?

2. Come può intervenire per fare in modo che tali comportamenti vengano eliminati?

3. Non ritiene di dovere inserire anche la violenza e l'odio contro gli animali nei suoi programmi contro l'hate speech online?

4. Non ritiene nello stesso tempo necessario aprire un serio dibattito sulle possibili normative sul benessere animale da applicare
al web in caso di minacce e comportamenti criminali affinché siano identificati rapidamente i responsabili?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(19 maggio 2014)_

Tale questione non è di competenza della Commissione europea.

La Commissione europea sta svolgendo uno studio sul benessere di cani e gatti coinvolti in pratiche commerciali nel quadro della
strategia dell'Unione europea per la protezione e il benessere degli animali 2012-2015 ( [1] ). Alla luce di tale studio, che è previsto si
concluda entro il 2014, la Commissione valuterà se sia il caso di prendere iniziative specifiche in questo campo nel rispetto delle
competenze conferitele dal trattato sull’Unione europea.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 6 final.

C 333 / 24 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002951/14**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(12 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Facebook groups and hatred towards animals

The Internet, and social networks in particular, have become a vehicle for the dissemination of criminal acts against animals. Animal
cruelty videos have been circulating on the Internet for some time now, from the infamous case of the Russian girl throwing puppies
into a river, to the ‘model’ who killed animals using stiletto heels, to the more recent cases of two young Frenchmen who decided to
throw an animal (a cat and a large dog, respectively) against a wall — just for fun. All filmed, of course, and posted online. More and
more groups calling for the slaughter and violent abuse of animals are appearing on social media, such as the Italian Fronte Nazionale
per l'abbattimento dei carlini, which threatens the torture and killing of pugs; it is not clear whether the intention is merely macabre
and ironic — at any rate, in this case it goes beyond irony and sarcasm — or serious and criminal, in which case there is cause for
urgent action. Meanwhile, pornographic videos involving animals are also widely available on the Internet.

1. Does the Commission have the capability to monitor illegal online activity involving animals?

2. What action can the Commission take to stamp out such behaviour?

3. Does the Commission not agree that it should also include violence and hatred against animals in its programmes to tackle
online hate speech?

4. Does the Commission also not consider it time to launch a serious debate on possible animal welfare legislation applicable to
the Internet in the event of threats and criminal behaviour so that those responsible can be identified quickly?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 May 2014)_

This does not fall under the competence of the European Commission.

The European Commission is performing, within the framework of the EU strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 20122015 ( [1] ), a study on the welfare of dogs and cats involved in commercial practices. In the light of this study, which is expected to be
finalised by the end of 2014, the Commission will consider if it is necessary to take specific initiatives in this field with due regard to
the competences conferred by the Treaty to the European Union.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 6 final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 25

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002952/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ H ανισότητα της κατανομής του εισοδήματος

«Αριθμητικά στοιχεία της Eurostat και της Επιτροπής, καθώς και διάφορες άλλες μελέτες, καταδεικνύουν ότι, σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις, η
ανισότητα της κατανομής του εισοδήματος αυξήθηκε ανάμεσα στο 2008 και το 2012, και ότι οι περικοπές στα κοινωνικά επιδόματα και τα
επιδόματα ανεργίας, καθώς και οι μειώσεις των μισθών λόγω διαρθρωτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων, αυξάνουν τα επίπεδα της φτώχειας, ενώ
διαπιστώνονται και σχετικά υψηλά επίπεδα φτώχειας εργαζομένων, λόγω των χαμηλών κατώτατων μισθών που περικόπτονται ή παγώνουν».

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει επικαιροποιήσει το πρόγραμμα, τους στόχους και τα μέτρα πρόληψης και καταπολέμησης τέτοιων ανισοτήτων που αφορούν
α) στην κατανομή εισοδήματος, β) στις περικοπές κοινωνικών επιδομάτων, γ) στα επιδόματα ανεργίας δ) στους μισθούς, και ε) στην
καταπολέμηση της φτώχειας;

2. Πώς αντιμετωπίζει γενικά τις κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις των μέτρων λιτότητας;

**Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(12 Μαΐου 2014)_

Η στρατηγική «Ευρώπη 2020» παρέχει το πλαίσιο για να επιτευχθεί ανάπτυξη χωρίς αποκλεισμούς. Ένας από τους πέντε πρωταρχικούς
στόχους σχετίζεται με τη μείωση κατά 20 εκατομμύρια του πληθυσμού που ζει σε συνθήκες φτώχειας ή κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού στην ΕΕ έως
το 2020. Ο στόχος αυτός εξακολουθεί να ισχύει και είναι το σημείο αναφοράς για τις προσπάθειες των κρατών μελών και της ΕΕ για τη
διασφάλιση της ανάπτυξης χωρίς αποκλεισμούς.

Οι κατευθυντήριες γραμμές της πολιτικής που περιλαμβάνονται στο πλαίσιο του ευρωπαϊκού εξαμήνου σε συγκεκριμένα κράτη μέλη και στις
κοινωνικές επενδύσεις και τις δέσμες μέτρων για την απασχόληση, εκφράζουν τη θέση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τους τρόπους βελτίωσης των
πολιτικών για την κοινωνική προστασία και την αγορά εργασίας με σκοπό την αποτελεσματικότερη καταπολέμηση της φτώχειας και του
κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού. Με τις συστάσεις σχετικά με τις φορολογικές πολιτικές προς τα κράτη μέλη που εκδόθηκαν στο πλαίσιο του
ευρωπαϊκού εξαμήνου, τα κράτη μέλη κλήθηκαν να εξετάσουν τις ανάγκες των ευάλωτων ομάδων όσον αφορά τη μετατόπιση φόρων, και να
προωθήσουν την απασχόληση για τους εργαζομένους χαμηλού εισοδήματος, ιδιαιτέρως με στοχευμένη μείωση των φορολογικών βαρών.
Ωστόσο, η κοινωνική προστασία και η σχεδίαση των συστημάτων παροχών εξακολουθούν να αποτελούν αποκλειστική αρμοδιότητα των
κρατών μελών.

Η Επιτροπή γνωστοποίησε τα στοιχεία που αναλύθηκαν από το μοντέλο Euromod για τον αντίκτυπο των αλλαγών στα συστήματα
φορολογίας και κοινωνικών παροχών μέχρι τα μέσα του 2013. Τα στοιχεία επιβεβαιώνουν ότι τα καλά μελετημένα μέτρα μπορούν να
συμβάλουν ώστε να αποφευχθεί να πλήττονται τα νοικοκυριά χαμηλού εισοδήματος περισσότερο από τα άλλα. Μάλιστα, μόνο σε μερικές
χώρες υπάρχουν ενδείξεις αρνητικού αντίκτυπου ( [1] ). Μια πιο πρόσφατη ανάλυση των μοντέλων φορολόγησης-παροχών στην Ευρώπη
μπορείτε να βρείτε στον ιστότοπο του Euromod ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Βλ. κυρίως την τριμηνιαία επισκόπηση της εργασιακής και κοινωνικής κατάστασης στην ΕΕ — Μαρτίου 2013 και Μαρτίου 2014, η οποία είναι διαθέσιμη στη διεύθυνση:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=113 και http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1852&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/working-papers

( **|**

C 333 / 26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002952/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Inequality of income distribution

Figures published by Eurostat and the Commission and various other studies show that, in some cases, the inequality of income
distribution increased between 2008 and 2012, and that cuts in social and unemployment benefits and reductions in wages due to
structural reforms are increasing poverty levels. Moreover, relatively high levels of poverty have been found among workers due to
low minimum wages being cut or frozen.

Will the Commission say:

1. Has it updated the programme, targets and measures designed to prevent and combat such disparities regarding (a) income
distribution, (b) cuts in social benefits, (c) unemployment benefits (d) wages and (e) poverty?

2. How does it view the social impact of the austerity measures in general?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

The Europe 2020 strategy provides for the framework to deliver on inclusive growth. One of the five headline targets is related to the
reduction by 20 million of the population living in poverty or social exclusion in the EU by 2020. This target is still valid and is the
anchor for Member States and EU effort in ensuring inclusive growth.

The policy guidance given in the context of the European Semester to specific Member States and in the Social Investment and
Employment Packages express the Commission position on ways to improve social protection and labour market policies in order to
combat more effectively poverty and social exclusion. Tax policy recommendations to Member States given under the European
Semester have also urged Member States to consider the needs of vulnerable groups in tax shifts, and to promote employment of low
income earners by targeted reductions of the tax burden in particular. However, social protection and design of benefit schemes
remain an exclusive competence of the Member States.

The Commission has made available evidence elaborated from the Euromod model about the impact of changes in tax and benefit
systems until mid-2013. It confirms that well designed measures can help to avoid that low income households are more affected
than others. In fact, there are signs of regressive impacts only in a few countries ( [1] ). More recent analysis of the tax-benefit models in
Europe can be found on Euromod website ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See notably EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review — March 2013 and March 2014, which can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=113 and http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1852&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/working-papers

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 27

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002953/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Αυτοσχέδιες λύσεις στα προγράμματα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής

«Η απουσία ευρωπαϊκών θεσμικών οργάνων και ευρωπαϊκών χρηματοδοτικών μηχανισμών οδήγησε στην ανάγκη εξεύρεσης αυτοσχέδιων
λύσεων όσον αφορά τα προγράμματα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (σε Ελλάδα, Ιρλανδία, Κύπρο, Πορτογαλία) με αποτέλεσμα να
συναφθούν χρηματοοικονομικές και θεσμικές συμφωνίες εκτός της κοινοτικής μεθόδου». Αυτά επισημαίνει στην έκθεσή της
(2014/2007(ΙΝΙ)) η Επιτροπή Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων, ενώ στο ίδιο πνεύμα αναφέρει ότι «η ΕΚΤ έχει λάβει αποφάσεις
εκτός του πεδίου αρμοδιοτήτων της». Με δεδομένο τον ρόλο της Επιτροπής ως θεματοφύλακα των Συνθηκών, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή να
σχολιάσει:

1. Κατά πόσον ο ρόλος αυτός έχει τηρηθεί χωρίς παρεκκλίσεις καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της κρίσης;

2. Αν η Επιτροπή θεωρεί ότι μόνο τα θεσμικά όργανα με γνήσια δημοκρατική λογοδοσία πρέπει να καθοδηγούν την πολιτική διαδικασία
σχεδιασμού και εφαρμογής των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής για χώρες που αντιμετωπίζουν σοβαρές οικονομικές δυσκολίες, γιατί
έχει συγκατατεθεί στο ρόλο και τη δράση της δημοκρατικά ανομιμοποίητης τρόικα;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002954/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ευρώπη 2020

Στην έκθεση της Επιτροπής Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων (2014/2007(ΙΝΙ)), η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει ότι μόνο η σημαντική
αντιστροφή των σημερινών τάσεων θα καταστήσει εφικτή για ολόκληρη την ΕΕ την επίτευξη των στόχων της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020».

Καλείται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

1. να αναλύσει εκτενέστερα το σκεπτικό της, αξιολογώντας την μέχρι τώρα πρόοδο στην επίτευξη των στόχων της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη
2020» και να εξηγήσει πώς προτίθεται να πετύχει έμπρακτα την αντιστροφή των σημερινών τάσεων·

2. να προτείνει συγκεκριμένο οδικό χάρτη προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση.

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002955/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Η απασχόληση και οι κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας

Η Επιτροπή Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων, στην έκθεσή της αναφορικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές
του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)), εκφράζει την ανησυχία της για το γεγονός ότι η βραχυπρόθεσμη και
μακροπρόθεσμη κοινωνική και οικονομική κατάσταση στις εν λόγω χώρες εντείνει τις περιφερειακές και εδαφικές ανισότητες, υπονομεύοντας
έτσι τον δεδηλωμένο στόχο της ΕΕ για την ενδυνάμωση της περιφερειακής συνοχής στο εσωτερικό της.

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

1. Συμφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω εκτιμήσεις;

2. Αν όντως υπονομεύεται η περιφερειακή συνοχή, τότε ποια διορθωτικά μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει για να τερματίσει αυτό το πρόβλημα;

C 333 / 28 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002956/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Μακροπρόθεσμη φτώχεια

«Στις χώρες υπό δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή που αντιμετωπίζουν δημοσιονομική κρίση έχει αυξηθεί ο αριθμός των ατόμων που απειλούνται
από τη φτώχεια ή τον κοινωνικό αποκλεισμό. Τα στατιστικά αυτά στοιχεία κρύβουν μια πολύ πιο σκληρή πραγματικότητα, που συνίσταται
στο ότι το χαμηλότερο κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕγχΠ συνεπάγεται επίσης χαμηλότερο όριο της φτώχειας, το οποίο σημαίνει ότι άνθρωποι που μέχρι
προσφάτως χαρακτηρίζονταν φτωχοί, σήμερα θεωρείται ότι δεν ζουν πλέον σε συνθήκες φτώχειας, καθώς η πτώση του ΑΕγχΠ, η
δραστικότατη μείωση των δημόσιων και ιδιωτικών επενδύσεων και η μείωση των επενδύσεων στον τομέα της έρευνας και ανάπτυξης
συντελούν στη μείωση του δυνητικού ΑΕγχΠ και δημιουργούν μακροπρόθεσμη φτώχεια».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή αν συμφωνεί με την πιο πάνω διαπίστωση της έκθεσης της Επιτροπής Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων
(2014/2007(INI)) και ποια μέτρα λαμβάνει για να αντιμετωπίσει τη δραστικότατη μείωση των επενδύσεων και τη μακροχρόνια φτώχεια και,
κυρίως, για να στηρίξει την φτωχολογιά.

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002957/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Προγράμματα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής

Η Επιτροπή Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων εκφράζει τη λύπη της για το γεγονός ότι τα προγράμματα δημοσιονομικής
προσαρμογής (σε Ελλάδα, Ιρλανδία, Κύπρο, Πορτογαλία) σχεδιάστηκαν χωρίς επαρκή μέσα για την εκτίμηση των συνεπειών μέσω μελετών
αντίκτυπου ή συντονισμού με την Επιτροπή Απασχόλησης, την Επιτροπή Κοινωνικής Προστασίας, το Συμβούλιο Απασχόλησης, Κοινωνικής
Πολιτικής, Θεμάτων Υγείας και Προστασίας του Καταναλωτή (EPSCO) ή τον Επίτροπο που είναι αρμόδιος για θέματα απασχόλησης και
κοινωνικών υποθέσεων. Δεν ζητήθηκε η γνώμη της Διεθνούς Οργάνωσης Εργασίας (ΔΟΕ). Δεν ζητήθηκε η γνώμη των συμβουλευτικών
φορέων που έχουν θεσπιστεί από τη Συνθήκη και ειδικά της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής και Κοινωνικής Επιτροπής (ΕΟΚΕ) και της Επιτροπής
των Περιφερειών (ΕτΠ).

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή, ως θεματοφύλακας των Συνθηκών:

1. Γιατί δεν πραγματοποιήθηκαν μελέτες αντικτύπου;

2. Γιατί δεν προηγήθηκε συντονισμός και δεν ζητήθηκε η γνώμη των προαναφερθέντων φορέων;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002959/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Χάσμα ανάμεσα στα δύο φύλα

«Οι διεθνείς και κοινωνικοί οργανισμοί έχουν προειδοποιήσει ότι το νέο σύστημα μισθολογικής κλίμακας, βαθμοδοσίας και απολύσεων στον
δημόσιο τομέα θα επιφέρει χάσμα ανάμεσα στα δύο φύλα. Επισημαίνει ότι η Διεθνής Οργάνωση Εργασίας (ΔΟΕ) έχει εκφράσει ανησυχίες
σχετικά με τον δυσανάλογο αντίκτυπο που έχουν οι νέες ευέλικτες μορφές απασχόλησης στις αμοιβές των γυναικών. Σημειώνει επίσης ότι η
ΔΟΕ έχει ζητήσει από τις κυβερνήσεις να παρακολουθούν τον αντίκτυπο της λιτότητας στις αμοιβές ανδρών και γυναικών στον ιδιωτικό
τομέα. Παρατηρεί με ανησυχία ότι το μισθολογικό χάσμα μεταξύ ανδρών και γυναικών δεν μειώνεται πλέον στις χώρες που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής, και στις οποίες οι ανισότητες ξεπερνούν τον μέσο όρο της ΕΕ. Υπογραμμίζει ότι οι μισθολογικές
ανισότητες και η μείωση του ποσοστού απασχόλησης των γυναικών απαιτούν μεγαλύτερη προσοχή από τα κράτη μέλη που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς τοποθετείται όσον αφορά τις πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις της Επιτροπής Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού
Κοινοβουλίου (2014/2007(ΙΝΙ));

2. Ποια μέτρα λαμβάνει για πρόληψη, καταστολή και αντιμετώπιση του δυσανάλογου αντίκτυπου που έχουν στο γυναικείο φύλο οι νέες
ευέλικτες μορφές απασχόλησης και η λιτότητα στις αμοιβές ανδρών και γυναικών;

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 29

3. Ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει, στα κράτη μέλη που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής, για αντιμετώπιση
των μισθολογικών ανισοτήτων και της μείωσης του ποσοστού απασχόλησης των γυναικών;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003026/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Απόφαση Eurogroup για κούρεμα εγγυημένων καταθέσεων στην Κύπρο

Στη διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) αναφέρεται, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι υπήρξε: «έλλειψη επαρκούς αιτιολόγησης ως προς το πώς
έγινε δεκτό από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και τους υπουργούς Οικονομικών της ΕΕ να συμπεριληφθούν οι εγγυημένες καταθέσεις» στο
κούρεμα των καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες (bail-in).

Ερωτείται η Επιτροπή:

1. Θεωρεί ότι η απόφαση του Eurogroup για κούρεμα των εγγυημένων καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες ήταν νόμιμη και σύμφωνη
με το ευρωπαϊκό κεκτημένο;

2. Αν, όπως υπονοεί η Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, η απόφαση δεν ήταν νόμιμη, ποιοι ευθύνονται για την παράνομη αυτή
απόφαση και ποιες συνέπειες θα υποστούν για την παρανομία που διέπραξαν και η οποία είχε αρνητικότατες επιπτώσεις για την Κύπρο
και το λαό της;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003027/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Δημοκρατική νομιμοποίηση πολιτικών της Τρόικας

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) καταλογίζει σοβαρές ευθύνες στην Τρόικα και στα θεσμικά όργανα της ΕΕ.

Μεταξύ άλλων: «καταγγέλλει την έλλειψη διαφάνειας στις διαπραγματεύσεις για τα μνημόνια συνεννόησης· διαπιστώνει την ανάγκη να
αξιολογηθεί κατά πόσον τα επίσημα έγγραφα κοινοποιούνταν με σαφήνεια και εξετάζονταν εγκαίρως από τα εθνικά κοινοβούλια και το
Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και σε ποιο βαθμό συζητούνταν επαρκώς με τους κοινωνικούς εταίρους· επισημαίνει περαιτέρω ότι οι πρακτικές
αυτές, που σημαίνουν ότι οι πληροφορίες παραμένουν πίσω από κλειστές πόρτες, ενδέχεται να έχουν αρνητικό αντίκτυπο στα δικαιώματα των
πολιτών, στη σταθερότητα της πολιτικής κατάστασης των εμπλεκόμενων χωρών και στην εμπιστοσύνη των πολιτών στη δημοκρατία και στο
ευρωπαϊκό εγχείρημα».

Η Επιτροπή ερωτάται τα ακόλουθα:

1. Συμφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις που περιέχονται στην Έκθεση του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Θεωρεί ότι με τις πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις εγείρεται όντως πρόβλημα δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης βασικών πολιτικών αποφάσεων
της ΕΕ;

3. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει ώστε να αποκατασταθούν οι συνθήκες δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης των αποφάσεων των θεσμικών οργάνων
της ΕΕ;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003028/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Συνέπειες του Ελληνικού PSI για την Κύπρο

Στη διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) αναφέρεται μεταξύ άλλων:

C 333 / 30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

«όταν τέθηκε ζήτημα συμμετοχής του ιδιωτικού τομέα (PSI) στην Ελλάδα, δεν εξετάστηκαν επαρκώς οι επιπτώσεις στο τραπεζικό σύστημα της
Κύπρου … ενώ υποστηρίζεται επίσης ότι για μια ακόμη φορά προστατεύτηκαν περιουσιακά στοιχεία που συνδέονταν με ορισμένα
μεγαλύτερα κράτη μέλη».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Συμφωνεί ότι όντως παραγνωρίστηκαν οι συνέπειες του Ελληνικού PSI στο τραπεζικό σύστημα και την οικονομία της Κύπρου;

Σε ποιο βαθμό αξιολογεί η ίδια ότι οι εξελίξεις σε σχέση με το ελληνικό PSI επιβάρυναν την Κύπρο, αναγκάζοντας τελικά την κυπριακή
κυβέρνηση να ζητήσει την ένταξη σε πρόγραμμα στήριξης;

Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να με ενημερώσει ποια ήταν, κατά την άποψη της, «τα περιουσιακά στοιχεία που συνδέονταν με ορισμένα μεγαλύτερα
κράτη μέλη» και τα οποία προστατεύτηκαν, καθώς επίσης και ποια ήταν τα μεγαλύτερα κράτη μέλη στα οποία αναφέρεται η Έκθεση;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003029/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και αύξηση της φτώχειας και των ανισοτήτων στις χώρες του Μνημονίου

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) εκφράζει λύπη για το γεγονός ότι:

«τα μέτρα που εφαρμόστηκαν προκάλεσαν βραχυπρόθεσμα αύξηση των ανισοτήτων στην κατανομή του εισοδήματος· … η αύξηση των
ανισοτήτων αυτών στις τέσσερις χώρες ξεπέρασε τον μέσο όρο· … οι περικοπές στις κοινωνικές παροχές και υπηρεσίες και η αύξηση της
ανεργίας η οποία προέκυψε … καθώς και οι μειώσεις στους μισθούς, οδηγούν στην αύξηση των επιπέδων της φτώχειας».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Μπορεί να με εφοδιάσει με συγκριτικά στοιχεία για την εξέλιξη των ανισοτήτων στην κατανομή των εισοδημάτων και των επιπέδων της
φτώχειας στις χώρες του Μνημονίου, πριν και μετά την υπαγωγή τους σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής;

2. Ποια μέτρα και πολιτικές προτίθεται να προωθήσει για μείωση των ανισοτήτων και της φτώχειας στις χώρες του Μνημονίου και
γενικότερα στην ΕΕ;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003030/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και στρατηγικές της Λισαβόνας και «Ευρώπη 2020»

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) παρατηρεί, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι:

«οι συστάσεις που περιλαμβάνονται στα μνημόνια συνεννόησης είναι αντίθετες προς την πολιτική εκσυγχρονισμού που εκπονήθηκε με τη
στρατηγική της Λισαβόνας και τη στρατηγική Ευρώπη 2020».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ασπάζεται το πιο πάνω συμπέρασμα της Έκθεσης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Πώς προτίθεται να ενεργήσει ώστε η στρατηγική της Λισαβόνας και η στρατηγική Ευρώπη 2020 να προχωρήσουν ομαλά και να
υλοποιηθούν με επιτυχία;

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 31

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003031/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και συστήματα εργασιακών σχέσεων και διαμόρφωσης των μισθών

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) υπενθυμίζει, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι: «χρειάζεται αναπροσαρμογή των μνημονίων συνεννόησης
προκειμένου να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις πρακτικές και τους θεσμικούς μηχανισμούς διαμόρφωσης των μισθών και το εθνικό πρόγραμμα
μεταρρυθμίσεων του οικείου κράτους μέλους στο πλαίσιο της στρατηγικής της Ένωσης για την ανάπτυξη και την απασχόληση, σύμφωνα με
τον κανονισμό αριθ. 472/2013 (άρθρο 7 παράγραφος 1)».

Παρόμοιες απόψεις για την ανάγκη σεβασμού των θεσμοθετημένων μηχανισμών της αγοράς εργασίας εκφράζονται επίσης από τη Διεθνή
Οργάνωση Εργασίας.

Καλείται η Επιτροπή να απαντήσει στα εξής ερωτήματα:

1. Συμφωνεί ότι υπήρξαν παραβιάσεις των θεσμοθετημένων μηχανισμών διαμόρφωσης των μισθών, κατ' απαίτηση της Τρόικας, σε χώρες
του Μνημονίου;

2. Η παράκαμψη του κοινωνικού διαλόγου σε τόσο σοβαρά θέματα συμβάλλει στη διατήρηση των συνθηκών κοινωνικής ηρεμίας και
γαλήνης, κάτι που είναι απολύτως απαραίτητο σε συνθήκες οικονομικής κρίσης;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003032/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και συστήματα υγείας

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) αποδοκιμάζει το γεγονός ότι:

«τα προγράμματα για την Ελλάδα, την Ιρλανδία και την Πορτογαλία περιλαμβάνουν μια σειρά από αναλυτικές οδηγίες για τη μεταρρύθμιση
των συστημάτων υγείας και περικοπές συναφών δαπανών … τα προγράμματα αυτά δεν δεσμεύονται από τον Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών
Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή από τις διατάξεις των Συνθηκών, και ιδίως το άρθρο 168 παράγραφος 7 της ΣΛΕΕ·».

Στην Κύπρο τα μέτρα που εφαρμόστηκαν, με απαίτηση της Τρόικας, έχουν δημιουργήσει τεράστια προβλήματα στον τομέα της δημόσιας
υγείας και στα δημόσια νοσηλευτήρια, τα οποία αδυνατούν να ανταποκριθούν στις ανάγκες των πολιτών.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Αποδέχεται τον ισχυρισμό της Έκθεσης ότι «τα προγράμματα αυτά δεν δεσμεύονται από τον Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή από τις διατάξεις των Συνθηκών, και ιδίως το άρθρο 168 παράγραφος 7 της ΣΛΕΕ»;

2. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει ώστε οι πολίτες στις χώρες του Μνημονίου να έχουν πρόσβαση σε μια ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη που
αρμόζει σε πραγματικούς ευρωπαίους πολίτες;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003489/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Παραβίαση των Συνθηκών από Ευρωομάδα και Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «επισημαίνει την ευθύνη της Ευρωομάδας που επέτρεψε στην ΕΚΤ να
ενεργεί στο πλαίσιο της Τρόικας, ενώ υπενθυμίζει ότι η αποστολή της ΕΚΤ οριοθετείται από τη ΣΛΕΕ στους τομείς της νομισματικής
πολιτικής και της χρηματοπιστωτικής σταθερότητας και ότι η συμμετοχή της ΕΚΤ στη διαδικασία λήψης αποφάσεων σχετικά με τη
δημοσιονομική, φορολογική και διαρθρωτική πολιτική δεν προβλέπεται στις Συνθήκες.»

Ερωτάται σχετικά η Επιτροπή:

C 333 / 32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

1. Θεωρεί ότι υπάρχει όντως ευθύνη της Ευρωομάδας για τις αποφάσεις που λήφθηκαν για στήριξη των χωρών του Μνημονίου, καθώς
και παραβίαση των Συνθηκών της ΕΕ, όπως υπονοεί το Κοινοβούλιο;

2. Συμφωνεί ότι η συμμετοχή της ΕΚΤ στη διαδικασία λήψης αποφάσεων σχετικά με θέματα δημοσιονομικής, φορολογικής και
διαρθρωτικής πολιτικής των κρατών μελών δεν προβλέπεται στις Συνθήκες;

3. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει ώστε να διορθωθεί η κατάσταση και να υπάρχει μελλοντικά πλήρης συμμόρφωση όλων των Θεσμικών Οργάνων
της ΕΕ με τις πρόνοιες των Συνθηκών;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003491/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανεπίτρεπτη συμπεριφορά της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας στη διαμόρφωση των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής κρατών μελών

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) προσάπτονται έμμεσες πλην σαφείς κατηγορίες κατά της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας,
ότι άσκησε ανεπίτρεπτη επιρροή «σε φορείς λήψης αποφάσεων, τουλάχιστον όσον αφορά την αναδιάρθρωση του ελληνικού χρέους, όταν η
ΕΚΤ επέμενε να αποσυρθούν οι ρήτρες συλλογικής δράσης (CAC) από τα κρατικά ομόλογα που είχε στην κατοχή της, τις ενέργειες
επείγουσας ενίσχυσης της Κύπρου υπό μορφή ρευστότητας, καθώς και, στην περίπτωση της Ιρλανδίας, τη μη συμμετοχή των ομολογιούχων
αυξημένης εξοφλητικής προτεραιότητας στην εσωτερική διάσωση».

Στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου, αυτό ισοδυναμούσε με αδικαιολόγητη φόρτωση χρέους ύψους 9,5 δισ. ευρώ στη μεγαλύτερη τράπεζα της
Κύπρου, ένα ποσό που υπερβαίνει το 50% του ΑΕΠ της χώρας.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς αξιολογεί τις επισημάνσεις του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τις ενέργειες της ΕΚΤ;

2. Θεωρεί ότι η συμπεριφορά της ΕΚΤ ήταν ορθολογιστική και συμβατή με το πραγματικό συμφέρον της ευρωπαϊκής οικονομίας, καθώς
και με τα συμφέροντα των κρατών μελών που βρίσκονται σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής;

3. Πώς μπορούν να αποκατασταθούν οι ζημιές που υπέστησαν οι τρεις προαναφερόμενες χώρες, λόγω της εκβιαστικής και
συμφεροντολογικής συμπεριφοράς της ΕΚΤ;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003493/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Σύγκρουση συμφερόντων Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (ΕΚΤ)

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) επισημαίνεται ότι υπήρξε «πιθανή σύγκρουση συμφερόντων μεταξύ του τρέχοντος ρόλου
της ΕΚΤ στην Τρόικα ως “τεχνικού συμβούλου” και της θέσης της ως πιστωτή των τεσσάρων κρατών μελών, καθώς και της εντολής της βάσει
της Συνθήκης, επειδή έχει συναρτήσει τις δράσεις της με αποφάσεις στις οποίες συμμετέχει και η ίδια»

Η Επιτροπή καλείται να απαντήσει τα εξής ερωτήματα:

1. Θεωρεί ότι υπήρξε όντως σύγκρουση συμφερόντων αναφορικά με την ΕΚΤ και τη δράση της στα προγράμματα προσαρμογής των
χωρών που έχουν υπαχθεί σε Μνημόνιο;

2. Γεννάται θέμα δεοντολογίας για την ΕΚΤ, από τις πιο πάνω επισημάνσεις;

3. Υπάρχει, κατά την άποψη της Επιτροπής, θέμα παραβίασης των Συνθηκών και του ευρωπαϊκού κεκτημένου, λόγω της δραστηριότητας
της ΕΚΤ στα πλαίσια της Τρόικας;

4. Προτίθεται η Επιτροπή να αναλάβει οποιαδήποτε πρωτοβουλία για το θέμα;

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 33

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003494/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Συμμετοχή κοινωνικών εταίρων στο σχεδιασμό προγραμμάτων της Τρόικα

Στην Έκθεση Cerkas ( [1] ) τονίζεται πως: «θα έπρεπε να είχε ζητηθεί η γνώμη των κοινωνικών εταίρων σε εθνικό επίπεδο ή να είχε επιτραπεί η
συμμετοχή τους στον αρχικό σχεδιασμό των προγραμμάτων» που αφορούσαν την εφαρμογή μνημονίων στις τέσσερις χώρες: Ελλάδα, Κύπρο,
Ιρλανδία και Πορτογαλία.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ενημέρωσε η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή τα κράτη μέλη περί τούτου;

2. Πίεσε έγκαιρα προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση;

3. Ζήτησε σεβασμό και επαναφορά του κοινού διαλόγου;

4. Σε ποιο βαθμό επηρεάζει τις αποφάσεις της Τρόικα;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003497/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Αύξηση αλληλεγγύης μεταξύ ευάλωτων ομάδων

Στην έκθεση Cerkas ( [2] ) τονίζεται πως «η αυξημένη κοινωνική φτώχεια στις τέσσερις χώρες (Ελλάδα, Ιρλανδία, Κύπρος, Ισπανία) έχει ως
αποτέλεσμα την αύξηση της αλληλεγγύης μεταξύ των πιο ευάλωτων ομάδων χάρις σε προσπάθειες ιδιωτών, οικογενειακών δικτύων και
οργανώσεων παροχής βοήθειας».

Τονίζεται παράλληλα «ότι αυτός ο τύπος παρέμβασης δεν πρέπει να καταστεί διαρθρωτική λύση του προβλήματος, ακόμη κι αν ανακουφίζει
την κατάσταση των πιο στερημένων και αναδεικνύει την αξία της ιδιότητας του ευρωπαίου πολίτη».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Τι πράττει ή τι προτίθεται να πράξει η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ώστε να αποφύγει αυτό το ενδεχόμενο;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003509/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ο ρόλος της Τρόικας

Μετά από έρευνα σε βάθος, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ενέκρινε τις εκθέσεις των επιτροπών ECON και EMPL σχετικά με τον ρόλο που
διαδραματίζουν οι Τρόικες· οι εν λόγω εκθέσεις περιλαμβάνουν προτάσεις που προβλέπουν τη σταδιακή κατάργηση του θεσμού της Τρόικας
και, μακροπρόθεσμα, την αντικατάστασή του με ένα κατάλληλο θεσμικό όργανο της ΕΕ, ένα Ευρωπαϊκό Νομισματικό Ταμείο. Το
Κοινοβούλιο έστειλε επίσης σαφές μήνυμα ότι δεν πρόκειται πλέον να δεχτεί μια Ευρώπη με Τρόικες, σημειώνοντας ότι η Ευρωομάδα είναι ένα
άτυπο φόρουμ των υπουργών οικονομικών της ζώνης του ευρώ, το οποίο δεν λογοδοτεί σε κανέναν.

Σε ποιο βαθμό συμμερίζεται η Επιτροπή την άποψη του Κοινοβουλίου ότι χρειαζόμαστε στο μέλλον ένα άλλο σύστημα, το οποίο θα
χαρακτηρίζεται από λογοδοσία και νομιμότητα, και ποια μέτρα λαμβάνει η Επιτροπή για την εφαρμογή της πρότασης αυτής;

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Έκθεση σχετικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης

του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Έκθεση σχετικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης

του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|**

C 333 / 34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003593/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Μη εφαρμογή προτάσεων που περιέχονται στο ψήφισμα του Κοινοβουλίου της 6ης Ιουλίου 2011 σχετικά με την οικονομική και
κοινωνική κρίση

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο, «εκφράζει τη λύπη του για το γεγονός ότι οι προτάσεις που περιέχει το
ψήφισμά του της 6ης Ιουλίου 2011 σχετικά με την χρηματοπιστωτική, οικονομική και κοινωνική κρίση δεν ελήφθησαν επαρκώς υπόψη από
το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο· υπογραμμίζει ότι η εφαρμογή τους θα είχε συμβάλει θετικά στην οικονομική και κοινωνική σύγκλιση εντός της
Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Ένωσης, εξασφαλίζοντας παράλληλα πλήρη δημοκρατική νομιμοποίηση στα μέτρα συντονισμού των
οικονομικών και δημοσιονομικών πολιτικών·».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Συμφωνεί η Επιτροπή με τις πιο πάνω εκτιμήσεις του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Ασπάζεται την άποψη που εκφράζεται στην Έκθεση του Κοινοβουλίου, ότι η εφαρμογή των εισηγήσεών του «θα είχε συμβάλει θετικά
στην οικονομική και κοινωνική σύγκλιση εντός της Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Ένωσης»;

3. Γιατί, κατά την άποψη της Επιτροπής, σχεδόν τρία χρόνια μετά το ψήφισμα του Ιουλίου 2011, οι εισηγήσεις του Κοινοβουλίου
εξακολουθούν να μη λαμβάνονται υπόψη από το Συμβούλιο;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003594/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ρόλος της Επιτροπής στην Τρόικα

Στη διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «αμφισβητεί τον διπλό ρόλο της Επιτροπής στην Τρόικα, τόσο ως
εκπροσώπου των κρατών μελών όσο και ως θεσμικού οργάνου της ΕΕ· θεωρεί ότι υπάρχει δυνητική σύγκρουση συμφερόντων στην Επιτροπή
ανάμεσα στον ρόλο της στην Τρόικα και την ευθύνη της ως θεματοφύλακα των Συνθηκών και του κοινοτικού κεκτημένου … τονίζει ότι αυτή
η κατάσταση έρχεται σε αντίθεση με τον κανονικό ρόλο της Επιτροπής, σύμφωνα με τον οποίο η Επιτροπή ενεργεί ως ανεξάρτητος εντολέας
που προστατεύει το συμφέρον της ΕΕ και εξασφαλίζει την εφαρμογή των κανόνων της ΕΕ εντός των ορίων που θεσπίζονται από τις
Συνθήκες·».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς σχολιάζει τις πιο πάνω εκτιμήσεις του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Δημιουργείται θέμα διάστασης απόψεων μεταξύ δύο βασικών Θεσμικών Οργάνων της Ένωσης; Αν ναι, πώς μπορεί να επιλυθεί το
πρόβλημα;

3. Τι επιπτώσεις μπορεί να έχει για την Ένωση η κατάσταση την οποία θίγει το Κοινοβούλιο;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003623/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Σχέδια ανάκαμψης της απασχόλησης

«Ο μόνος τρόπος για να εδραιωθεί η μακροοικονομική προσαρμογή και να διορθωθούν οι ανισορροπίες του δημόσιου τομέα (όπως το χρέος
και το έλλειμμα) στις χώρες που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής είναι, από κοινού με τα θεσμικά όργανα της ΕΕ,
να εφαρμόσουν σχέδια ανάκαμψης της απασχόλησης, με σκοπό την επαρκή αποκατάσταση των οικονομιών τους ώστε να ανακτηθεί η
κοινωνική κατάσταση της περιόδου προ των προγραμμάτων». Αυτό τονίζεται στην έκθεση (2014/2007(ΙΝΙ)) του Ευρωκοινοβουλίου που
ψηφίστηκε πρόσφατα.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 35

1. Προτίθεται η ίδια να αναλάβει μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία και να ετοιμάσει σχέδιο ανάκαμψης της απασχόλησης; Γιατί δεν το έχει ήδη
πράξει, με δεδομένη την αυξητική τάση που παρατηρείται στην γενική ανεργία και την ανεργία των νέων;

2. Πόσο αισιόδοξη είναι η ίδια η Επιτροπή πως είναι εφικτή η ανάκτηση της κοινωνικής κατάστασης της περιόδου προ των
προγραμμάτων;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003624/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Aπορρύθμιση εργασιακών σχέσεων

«Τα προγράμματα που σχεδιάστηκαν για τις χώρες των μνημονίων επιτρέπουν ενίοτε σε εταιρείες να απαλλάσσονται από τις υποχρεώσεις που
απορρέουν από τις συλλογικές συμβάσεις και να επανεξετάζουν τις κλαδικές συμβάσεις, με άμεσες επιπτώσεις για τη δομή και τις αξίες των
συλλογικών διαπραγματεύσεων που προβλέπονται στα αντίστοιχα εθνικά συντάγματα». Αυτά επισημαίνει η Επιτροπή Εμπειρογνωμόνων της
ΔΟΕ, σύμφωνα με την έκθεση (2014/2007(ΙΝΙ)), καταδικάζοντας την υπονόμευση της αρχής της συλλογικής εκπροσώπησης, η οποία θέτει
υπό αμφισβήτηση την αυτόματη ανανέωση των συμφωνιών επί συλλογικών συμβάσεων, που σε ορισμένες χώρες είναι πολύ σημαντική, και
έχει ως αποτέλεσμα τη σημαντική μείωση του αριθμού των ισχυουσών συλλογικών συμβάσεων.

«Καταδικάζει επίσης τη μείωση των κατώτατων μισθών και το πάγωμα των ονομαστικών κατώτατων μισθών», τονίζοντας πως η κατάσταση
αυτή ήταν το αποτέλεσμα του περιορισμού των διαρθρωτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων στο πεδίο της απορρύθμισης των εργασιακών σχέσεων και της
περικοπής των μισθών, γεγονός που έρχεται σε αντίθεση προς τους γενικούς σκοπούς της ΕΕ και προς τις πολιτικές της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη
2020».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή, ως θεματοφύλακας των Συνθηκών και των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων:

1. Συμφωνεί ή διαφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω υποδείξεις της ΔΟΕ;

2. Αν διαπιστώνει και η ίδια τέτοιου είδους σοβαρές παραβιάσεις στις συλλογικές συμβάσεις, στις μειώσεις των κατώτατων μισθών, καθώς
επίσης περικοπές μισθών, που ναρκοθετούν θεμελιώδη κεκτημένα και αρχές της ΕΕ, πώς αντιδρά και τι προτίθεται να πράξει για να τις
τερματίσει;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003629/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Εκπόνηση μελέτης των κοινωνικών/οικονομικών συνεπειών της κρίσης

Στην έκθεση Cerkas ( [3] ) καλείται η Επιτροπή να εκπονήσει λεπτομερή μελέτη των κοινωνικών και οικονομικών συνεπειών της οικονομικής και
χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης και των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής που εφαρμόζονται για την αντιμετώπισή της στις χώρες των μνημονίων.

Τονίζει πως πρέπει να γίνουν πλήρως κατανοητές τόσο οι βραχυπρόθεσμες όσο και οι μακροπρόθεσμες συνέπειες στα συστήματα
απασχόλησης και κοινωνικής προστασίας και όσον αφορά το ευρωπαϊκό κοινωνικό κεκτημένο, ιδίως όσον αφορά την καταπολέμηση της
φτώχειας, τη διατήρηση του δέοντος κοινωνικού διαλόγου και την ισορροπία μεταξύ ευελιξίας και ασφάλειας στις εργασιακές σχέσεις.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Προτίθεται να εκπονήσει μια τέτοια μελέτη;

2. Αν ναι, προτίθεται να αξιοποιήσει συμβουλευτικούς φορείς, καθώς επίσης και την Επιτροπή Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικής Προστασίας
και την ΕΟΚΕ;

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Έκθεση Cerkas σχετικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της
ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)).

C 333 / 36 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003630/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Πιθανά διορθωτικά μέτρα και κίνητρα από ΔΟΕ και ΣτΕ

Στην έκθεση Cerkas ( [4] ) καλείται η Επιτροπή να ζητήσει από τη Διεθνή Οργάνωση Εργασίας (ΔΟΕ) και το Συμβούλιο της Ευρώπης (ΣτΕ) να
καταρτίσουν ειδικές εκθέσεις σχετικά με πιθανά διορθωτικά μέτρα και κίνητρα τα οποία είναι αναγκαία για τη βελτίωση της κοινωνικής
κατάστασης στις χώρες των μνημονίων, τόσο για τη χρηματοδότηση όσο και τη βιωσιμότητα των δημόσιων οικονομικών τους. Καλείται
επίσης η Επιτροπή να διασφαλίσει την πλήρη συμμόρφωση με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Χάρτη και το Πρωτόκολλό του, καθώς και με τις
βασικές συμβάσεις της ΔΟΕ και το Πρωτόκολλο 94, δεδομένου ότι οι υποχρεώσεις που απορρέουν από τα μέσα αυτά θίγονται από την
οικονομική και χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση και από τα μέτρα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής και τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις που ζητεί η
Τρόικα.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Γιατί δεν ζήτησε έγκαιρα από τη ΔΟΕ και το ΣτΕ να καταρτίσουν τέτοιες ειδικές εκθέσεις προτού αναθέσει στην τρόικα τη διαχείριση
της κρίσης, ώστε να προλάβει τις αρνητικές αλυσιδωτές συνέπειες;

2. Πώς προτίθεται να δράσει ώστε να διασφαλίσει πλήρη συμμόρφωση με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Χάρτη και το Πρωτόκολλό του,
καθώς επίσης και με τις βασικές συμβάσεις της ΔΟΕ και το Πρωτόκολλο 94;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003631/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Στήριξη παιδιών με ειδικές ανάγκες και προσώπων με αναπηρία

Στην έκθεση Cerkas ( [5] ) τονίζεται πως, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις θυσίες στις οποίες έχουν προβεί οι τέσσερεις χώρες των μνημονίων, πρέπει να
δοθεί στήριξη με κατάλληλους χρηματοδοτικούς πόρους, όπου αυτό ενδείκνυται, και για τη στήριξη των εκπαιδευτικών υπηρεσιών, ιδίως
εκείνων που έχουν ως ομάδα-στόχο τα παιδιά με ειδικές ανάγκες και τα πρόσωπα με αναπηρία. Τονίζεται επίσης η ανάγκη ανανέωσης του
κοινωνικού διαλόγου.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Προτίθεται να ζητήσει από την ΕΚΤ και την Ευρωομάδα να επανεξετάσουν και να αναθεωρήσουν, όπου είναι απαραίτητο, και μάλιστα
το ταχύτερο δυνατόν, τα έκτακτα μέτρα που έχουν τεθεί σε εφαρμογή και να αξιολογήσει, ειδικά, τις επιπτώσεις σε παιδιά με ειδικές
ανάγκες και τα πρόσωπα με αναπηρία;

2. Είναι σε θέση η Επιτροπή να γνωρίζει και να παρουσιάσει συγκριτικό πίνακα για ευρωπαϊκά και εθνικά κονδύλια που διατίθεντο για
παιδιά με ειδικές ανάγκες και για πρόσωπα με αναπηρία πριν και μετά την κρίση στις χώρες των μνημονίων;

3. Ποια μέτρα λαμβάνει σήμερα η Επιτροπή για να στηρίζει παιδιά με ειδικές ανάγκες και πρόσωπα με αναπηρία;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003661/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανάγκη διαφανούς και δεσμευτικού εσωτερικού κανονισμού για τη συνεργασία μεταξύ των θεσμικών οργάνων εντός της Τρόικας

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «ζητεί, σαν πρώτο βήμα, τη θέσπιση σαφούς, διαφανούς και δεσμευτικού
εσωτερικού κανονισμού για τη συνεργασία μεταξύ των θεσμικών οργάνων εντός της Τρόικας και τον καταμερισμό καθηκόντων και ευθυνών
στο πλαίσιο αυτό· πιστεύει ένθερμα ότι απαιτείται σαφής καθορισμός και καταμερισμός καθηκόντων προκειμένου να ενισχυθεί η διαφάνεια,
να καταστεί δυνατός ένας αποτελεσματικότερος δημοκρατικός έλεγχος των δραστηριοτήτων της Τρόικας και να στηριχθεί η αξιοπιστία του
έργου της».

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Έκθεση Cerkas σχετικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της

ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Έκθεση Cerkas σχετικά με τις πτυχές της απασχόλησης και τις κοινωνικές πτυχές του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας (ΕΚΤ, Επιτροπή και ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της

ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 37

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Συμφωνεί ότι όντως υπάρχει θέμα ανεπαρκούς συνεργασίας μεταξύ των θεσμικών οργάνων της ΕΕ που μετέχουν στην Τρόικα;

2. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει για βελτίωση της συνεργασίας και τον καλύτερο καταμερισμό καθηκόντων και ευθυνών, όπως εισηγείται το
Κοινοβούλιο;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003663/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Αναθεώρηση μνημονίων συνεννόησης

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «ζητεί να λάβει η Τρόικα υπόψη την τρέχουσα συζήτηση σχετικά με τους
δημοσιονομικούς πολλαπλασιαστές και να εξετάσει την αναθεώρηση των μνημονίων συνεννόησης, με βάση τα τελευταία εμπειρικά
αποτελέσματα».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Υπάρχει αξιόπιστη μαρτυρία ότι κατά την εφαρμογή των μνημονίων έγιναν λάθη σχετικά με τους δημοσιονομικούς πολλαπλασιαστές;
Αν ναι, πώς και σε ποιο βαθμό επηρέασαν τα λάθη αυτά τις χώρες που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής;

2. Ποιος φέρει την ευθύνη για τα λάθη που έχουν γίνει, και πώς μπορούν να αποκατασταθούν οι αρνητικές συνέπειες των λαθών αυτών;

3. Τίθεται για την Επιτροπή θέμα αναθεώρησης των μνημονίων συνεννόησης; Αν ναι, υπό ποιες προϋποθέσεις και συνθήκες μπορεί ή
επιβάλλεται να γίνει κάτι τέτοιο;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003665/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανάληψη ευθύνης για τις δραστηριότητες της Τρόικας

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «καλεί την Ευρωομάδα, το Συμβούλιο και το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο να
αναλάβουν πλήρη ευθύνη για τις δραστηριότητες της Τρόικας».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς αξιολογεί την πιο πάνω εισήγηση του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Ποιες επιπτώσεις μπορεί να έχει, για την Ένωση και τα κράτη μέλη που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, τυχόν υλοποίηση
της πιο πάνω πρότασης του Κοινοβουλίου;

3. Προτίθεται να αναλάβει οποιαδήποτε πρωτοβουλία για υλοποίηση της πρότασης του Κοινοβουλίου;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003667/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανεπαρκής δημοκρατική λογοδοσία της Τρόικας

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «επισημαίνει τη γενικά ανεπαρκή δημοκρατική λογοδοσία της Τρόικας σε
εθνικό επίπεδο στις χώρες που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

C 333 / 38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

1. Ασπάζεται την πιο πάνω άποψη του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Αν όντως υπάρχει θέμα ανεπαρκούς λογοδοσίας, τι χρειάζεται να γίνει για να διορθωθούν τα πράγματα;

3. Προτίθεται να αναλάβει κάποια πρωτοβουλία προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003669/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Βιωσιμότητα του χρέους στα κράτη μέλη του Μνημονίου

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο, «ζητεί από την Τρόικα να εκπονήσει νέες εκτιμήσεις βιωσιμότητας του
χρέους και, επειγόντως, να αντιμετωπίσει την ανάγκη μείωσης του βάρους του ελληνικού δημόσιου χρέους, … υπενθυμίζει ότι υφίστανται
διάφορες δυνατότητες για μια αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους … στις οποίες συμπεριλαμβάνονται η ανταλλαγή ομολόγων, η επέκταση της λήξης
των ομολόγων και η μείωση των τοκομεριδίων».

Παρόμοια κατάσταση επικρατεί και στην Κύπρο, όπου το δημόσιο χρέος αυξάνεται με ραγδαίους ρυθμούς, ενώ αν αρθούν οι περιορισμοί στη
διακίνηση κεφαλαίων, το τραπεζικό σύστημα της χώρας κινδυνεύει με μαζικές εκροές κεφαλαίων και πλήρη κατάρρευση.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Συμμερίζεται την εκτίμηση του Κοινοβουλίου ότι απαιτείται επανεκτίμηση της βιωσιμότητας του χρέους σε χώρες του Μνημονίου;

2. Κρίνει ότι οι προτεινόμενες από το Κοινοβούλιο εναλλακτικές μορφές αναδιάρθρωσης χρέους (ανταλλαγή ομολόγων, επέκταση λήξης
ομολόγων και μείωση των τοκομεριδίων) θα μπορούσαν να βοηθήσουν την Κύπρο και την Ελλάδα να αντιμετωπίσουν τα προβλήματά

τους;

3. Οι πιο πάνω εναλλακτικές μορφές αναδιάρθρωσης χρέους λήφθηκαν υπόψη κατά τη λήψη των αποφάσεων για την Κύπρο; Αν ναι, γιατί
απορρίφθηκαν και αντ' αυτών χρησιμοποιήθηκε η μέθοδος του κουρέματος καταθέσεων;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003821/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Παράταση των χρονοδιαγραμμάτων δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής στις χώρες του Μνημονίου

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «υποστηρίζει μια επιφυλακτική παράταση των χρονοδιαγραμμάτων
δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής που έχουν ήδη υλοποιηθεί στο πλαίσιο των μνημονίων συνεννόησης, καθώς έχουν υποχωρήσει οι φόβοι μιας
γενικής κατάρρευσης· υποστηρίζει την εξέταση πρόσθετων προσαρμογών υπό το φως των περαιτέρω μακροοικονομικών εξελίξεων».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Δεδομένων των οικονομικών και κοινωνικών επιπτώσεων από την εφαρμογή των Μνημονίων, θεωρεί χρήσιμη και υλοποιήσιμη την
εισήγηση του Κοινοβουλίου για παράταση των χρονοδιαγραμμάτων δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής;

2. Αν όχι, τι είναι εκείνο που εμποδίζει την υιοθέτηση της εισήγησης του Κοινοβουλίου;

3. Ποιες πρόσθετες προσαρμογές θα μπορούσαν να γίνουν, όπως ζητά το Κοινοβούλιο, λαμβανομένης υπόψη και της σχετικής
οικονομικής ανάκαμψης που παρατηρείται στη ζώνη του ευρώ;

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 39

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003823/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Έκδοση «υπό αίρεση μετατρέψιμων ομολόγων»

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο, «συνιστά να εξεταστεί περαιτέρω από την Επιτροπή, την Ευρωομάδα και το
ΔΝΤ η έννοια των “υπό αίρεση μετατρέψιμων ομολόγων”, βάσει της οποίας η απόδοση των νεοεκδιδόμενων τίτλων δημόσιου χρέους στα
κράτη μέλη που λαμβάνουν συνδρομή συνδέεται με την οικονομική ανάπτυξη».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Θεωρεί ότι η έκδοση «υπό αίρεση μετατρέψιμων ομολόγων» θα μπορούσε να βοηθήσει τις χώρες του Μνημονίου να εξέλθουν
γρηγορότερα από την κρίση;

2. Υπάρχουν οποιοιδήποτε κίνδυνοι για την ευρωπαϊκή οικονομία οι οποίοι συνδέονται με τυχόν υιοθέτηση της πιο πάνω εισήγησης του
Κοινοβουλίου;

3. Προτίθεται να μελετήσει περαιτέρω ή/και να υιοθετήσει την πιο πάνω εισήγηση;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003825/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Φοροδιαφυγή, φορολογική απάτη και δημοσιονομική κατάσταση στις χώρες του Μνημονίου

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο θέτει θέμα φοροδιαφυγής και φορολογικής απάτης στα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ
και «συνιστά τη θέσπιση εκτελεστικών μέτρων με στόχο τη δίκαιη συνεισφορά όλων των μερών στα φορολογικά έσοδα».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ασπάζεται τις εκτιμήσεις του Κοινοβουλίου περί ύπαρξης φορολογικής απάτης και άδικης κατανομής των φορολογικών βαρών μεταξύ
των διαφόρων μερών;

2. Προτίθεται να μελετήσει το θέμα της φοροδιαφυγής και της φορολογικής απάτης στις χώρες του Μνημονίου, και γενικότερα στην ΕΕ,
και να θεσπίσει εκτελεστικά μέτρα καταπολέμησης του φαινομένου;

3. Σε ποιο βαθμό θα μπορούσε η καταπολέμηση της φοροδιαφυγής και της φορολογικής απάτης να συμβάλει στην επίλυση του
δημοσιονομικού προβλήματος; Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να με εφοδιάσει με συγκριτικά στοιχεία για το μέγεθος του προβλήματος στα
κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ;

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003827/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Χρησιμοποίηση πόρων της διάσωσης στις χώρες του Μνημονίου

Στη διερευνητική έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)), το Κοινοβούλιο «ζητεί να δημοσιοποιηθεί ο τρόπος με τον οποίο χρησιμοποιήθηκαν οι
χρηματοδοτικοί πόροι της διάσωσης· τονίζει ότι θα πρέπει να διευκρινίζεται η ποσότητα των πόρων που διοχετεύθηκαν στη χρηματοδότηση
των ελλειμμάτων, στη χρηματοδότηση της δημόσιας διοίκησης και στην αποπληρωμή των ιδιωτών πιστωτών».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Κατέχει και μπορεί να με εφοδιάσει με τα πιο πάνω στοιχεία που αφορούν την περίπτωση του προγράμματος προσαρμογής της
Κύπρου;

2. Προτίθεται μελλοντικά να δημοσιοποιεί τα στοιχεία στα οποία αναφέρεται το Κοινοβούλιο, πιο πάνω;

C 333 / 40 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

3. Πώς αξιολογεί τον τρόπο αξιοποίησης των πόρων της διάσωσης που δόθηκαν μέχρι σήμερα στην Κύπρο;

4. Κρίνει ότι οι πόροι που προνοούνται στο Μνημόνιο και ο τρόπος αξιοποίησής τους είναι ικανοποιητικοί για την εξυγίανση και
επανεκκίνηση της κυπριακής οικονομίας;

**Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(20 Μαΐου 2014)_

H Επιτροπή θα ενημερώσει το Κοινοβούλιο σχετικά με τις απαντήσεις της στις εκθέσεις 2013/2277(INI) και 2014/2007(INI), σύμφωνα με
τους ισχύοντες κανόνες που αφορούν την παρακολούθηση από την Επιτροπή των μη νομοθετικών ψηφισμάτων του Κοινοβουλίου.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 41

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002953/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Improvised solutions in the fiscal adjustment programmes

‘The absence of the European institutions as well as that of European financial mechanisms meant that the programmes had to be
improvised (in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal), leading to financial and institutional agreements outside the community
method.’ This is stated in the report (2014/2007 (INI)) of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, which continues in the
same spirit, stating ‘the ECB has taken decisions that fall outside its mandate’. Given the Commission’s role as guardian of the
Treaties, will it say:

1. To what extent has this role been respected without any exceptions throughout the duration of the crisis?

2. If it considers that the only those European institutions with genuine democratic accountability should direct the political
process of planning and implementing the adjustment programmes for countries facing severe financial difficulties, why did it
consent to the role and actions of Troika which has no democratic legitimacy?

**Question for written answer E-002954/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Europe 2020

In the report tabled by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (2014/2007 (INI)), the European Parliament ‘recognises
that only a strong reversal of current trends will make it possible for the entire EU to meet the Europe 2020 targets.’

In view of the above, will the Commission:

1. Analyse in greater detail the points made in this report, and evaluate progress to date in achieving the objectives of the ‘Europe
2020’ strategy and explain how it intends to bring about in practice a reversal of current trends?

2. Propose a specific roadmap to this end?

**Question for written answer E-002955/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, in its report on employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the
Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme countries (2014/2007 (INI)), voices its concern about the
fact that the short and long-term social and economic situation in these countries is exacerbating regional and territorial inequalities,
thereby undermining the EU’s declared objective of strengthening regional cohesion within the EU.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with the above assessments?

2. If regional cohesion is indeed being undermined, what corrective measures will it take to solve this problem?

C 333 / 42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Question for written answer E-002956/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Long-term poverty

‘…in most cases the level of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has increased; … moreover… these statistics hide a much
harsher reality, which is that when GDP per capita falls, the poverty threshold also falls, meaning that people who until recently were
considered to be in poverty are now considered to be out of poverty; … in the countries undergoing adjustment and budgetary crisis,
the fall in GDP, the slump in public and private investment and the drop in R&D investment are leading to a reduction of the
potential GDP and creating long-term poverty’.

Does the Commission agree with the above finding of the report by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (2014/2007
(INI))? What steps is it taking to address the slump in investment and the phenomenon of long-term poverty and, above all, to
support the poor?

**Question for written answer E-002957/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Fiscal adjustment programmes

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs regrets the fact that the programmes in question (in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and
Portugal) were designed without sufficient means to assess their consequences using impact studies or through coordination with the
Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council
(EPSCO) or the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs. Neither the ILO, nor the consultative bodies established by Treaty,
in particular the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), were consulted.

In view of the above, will the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, say:

1. Why were no impact studies carried out?

2. Why was there no prior coordination and why were the above organisations not consulted?

**Question for written answer E-002959/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Gender gap

The report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (2014/2007 (INI)): ‘Notes that international
and social organisations have warned that the new pay-scale, grading and dismissals system in the public sector will have a gender
gap impact; notes that the ILO has expressed concern over the disproportionate impact of new flexible forms of employment on
women’s pay; notes, furthermore, that the ILO has asked governments to monitor the impact of austerity on remuneration of men
and women in the private sector; notes with concern that the gender pay gap has ceased to narrow in countries undergoing
adjustment, where the disparities are wider than the EU average; maintains that wage inequalities and the falling female employment
rate need to receive greater attention in the Member States undergoing adjustment.’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. What is its position on the above findings of the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs
(2014/2007 ( INI ) )?

2. What measures is it taking to prevent, eliminate and address the disproportionate impact of new flexible forms of employment
on women and of austerity on the wages of men and women?

3. What steps will it take in those Member States undergoing adjustment in order to address pay disparities and the decline in
women’s employment rate?

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 43

**Question for written answer E-003026/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Eurogroup decision regarding a ‘haircut’ of insured deposits in Cyprus

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to
the euro area programme countries (2013/2277 (INI) notes, _inter alia_, ‘the lack of sufficient explanation as to how the inclusion of
insured depositors was signed off by the European Commission and EU finance ministers’ in the ‘haircut’ on insured deposits in
Cypriot banks (bail-in).

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it consider that the decision by the Eurogroup regarding a haircut of insured deposits in Cypriot banks was lawful and in
accordance with the Community _acquis_ ?

2. If, as implied by the European Parliament Report, the decision was not legal, who is responsible for this illegal decision and
what consequences will they suffer for committing this illegal act which has had very negative consequences for Cyprus and its
people?

**Question for written answer E-003027/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Democratic legitimacy of Troika policies

In its report on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI)), the
European Parliament indicates that the Troika and EU institutions bear a serious burden of responsibility.

In particular: it ‘regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the need to evaluate whether formal documents were
clearly communicated to and considered in due time by the national parliaments and the European Parliament and adequately
discussed with the social partners; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices, which involve keeping information
behind closed doors, on citizens’ rights, on the stability of the political situation in the countries concerned and on the trust of
citizens in democracy and the European project’.

In view of this:

1. Does the Commission concur with the findings of the European Parliament report?

2. Does it consider that the above findings bring to light a genuine problem regarding the democratic legitimacy of fundamental
political decisions by the EU?

3. What action will it take to restore the democratic legitimacy of decision making by the EU institutions?

**Question for written answer E-003028/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Impact on Cyprus of PSI in Greece

In its report on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro programme countries (2013/2277(INI)) the European
Parliament notes that:

‘When it came to PSI in Greece, the knock-on effects on the Cyprus banking system … were not sufficiently considered and it is also
suggested that assets relating to some larger Member States were again protected.’

In view of this:

Does the Commission concur that the impact of the PSI in Greece on the banking system and economy of Cyprus was not in fact
fully recognised?

C 333 / 44 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

To what extent does it consider that the consequences of PSI in Greece have affected Cyprus, finally forcing the Cyprus Government
to seek inclusion in the programme of assistance?

Can the Commission give further details regarding the protected assets ‘relating to some larger Member States’ and identify the larger
Member States to which the report refers?

**Question for written answer E-003029/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and increasing poverty and inequality in the Memorandum countries

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) regrets the fact that:

‘the measures implemented have led in the short term to a rise in income distribution inequality; … there has been an above-average
rise in such inequalities in the four countries; … cuts in social benefits and services and rising unemployment resulting from
measures contained in the programmes …, as well as wage reductions, are raising poverty levels’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Can it provide me with comparative data on the evolution of inequality in income distribution and poverty levels in the
Memorandum countries before and after their subjection to an adjustment programme?

2. What measures and policies does it intend to promote to reduce inequality and poverty in the Memorandum countries and in
the EU generally?

**Question for written answer E-003030/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and the Lisbon strategy and Europe 2020

The European Parliament Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) notes, _inter alia_, that: ‘the recommendations contained in the MoUs are at odds with the modernisation
policy drawn up in the form of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy.’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it endorse the above conclusion of the European Parliament Report?

2. What action will it take to ensure that the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy progress smoothly and are
successfully implemented?

**Question for written answer E-003031/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and systems of industrial relations and wage formation

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277 (INI) recalls that ‘the MoUs need to be adapted in order to take into account the practice and institutions for
wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s strategy for
growth and jobs as set out in Regulation No 472/2013 (Article7(1))’.

Similar views on the need to respect institutionalised labour market mechanisms have also been voiced by the International Labour
Organisation.

In view of the above, will the Commission answer the following questions:

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 45

1. Does it agree that there have been violations of institutionalised wage formation mechanisms, at the Troika’s request, in
countries subject to the Memoranda?

2. Does bypassing the social dialogue on such serious issues help maintain the conditions of social peace and tranquillity which
are absolutely essential in times of economic crisis?

**Question for written answer E-003032/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and health systems

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) regrets ‘the inclusion in the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal of a number of detailed
prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; …the fact that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7) TFEU’.

In Cyprus the measures implemented, at the demand of the Troika, have created huge problems for public health and public
hospitals, which are unable to meet the needs of citizens.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it accept the claim made in the report that ‘the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7) TFEU’?

2. What will it do so that citizens in Memorandum countries have access to a healthcare system worthy of European citizens?

**Question for written answer E-003489/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Violation of the Treaties by the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank

In the European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)), Parliament ‘points to the responsibility of the Eurogroup in allowing the ECB to act within the Troika,
but recalls that the ECB’s mandate is circumscribed by the TFEU to the areas of monetary policy and financial stability and that
involvement of the ECB in the decision-making process related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not foreseen by the
Treaties’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it consider that the Eurogroup really bears responsibility for the decisions taken to support the Memorandum countries
and the violation of the EU Treaties, as Parliament has implied?

2. Does it agree that the ECB’s involvement in decision-making on matters relating to the budgetary, fiscal and structural policies
of Member States is not foreseen by the Treaties?

3. What will it do to remedy the situation and ensure that in future all EU institutions fully comply with the provisions of the
Treaties?

C 333 / 46 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Question for written answer E-003491/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Unacceptable behaviour by the European Central Bank in shaping Member States' adjustment programmes

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) accuses the European Central Bank indirectly but clearly of exerting unacceptable influence ‘on decisionmakers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt restructuring, where the ECB insisted that CACs were to be removed from government
bonds it held, the Cypriot ELA operations, and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in.’

In the case of Cyprus, this meant unjustifiably encumbering the largest bank in Cyprus with a debt of EUR 9.5 billion, which
amounted to more than 50% of the country’s GDP.

Will the Commission say:

1. How does it assess the points made by the European Parliament about the actions of the ECB?

2. Does it consider that the conduct of the ECB was rational and compatible with the real interests of the European economy and
the interests of the adjustment programme Member States?

3. What can be done to repair the damage suffered by the three abovementioned countries due to the blackmail and self-serving
conduct of the ECB?

**Question for written answer E-003493/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Conflict of interest the European Central Bank (ECB)

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) points out that there was a ‘potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika
as technical advisor and its position as creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty as it has made its
own actions conditional on decisions it is itself part of’.

In view of the above, will the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Does it consider that there was in fact a conflict of interest with respect to the ECB and its action in the adjustment
programmes of Memorandum countries?

2. Do the above points create an ethical issue for the ECB?

3. Do the activities of the ECB as part of the Troika, in the Commission’s opinion, constitute a possible violation of the Treaties
and the _acquis communautaire_ ?

4. Will it take an initiative on this issue?

**Question for written answer E-003494/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Participation of the social partners in designing Troika programmes

The Cercas Report ( [1] ) stresses that ‘the social partners at national level should have been consulted or involved in the initial design of
programmes’ relating to the implementation of Memoranda in the four countries: Greece, Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Report on Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme countries
(2014/2007(INI)).

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 47

1. Did the Commission notify Member States about this?

2. Did it urge action in this connection at an early stage?

3. Did it call for the public dialogue to be reintroduced and respected?

4. To what extent does it influence the Troika’s decisions?

**Question for written answer E-003497/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Increase in solidarity between vulnerable groups

The Cercas ( [2] ) report stresses that ‘the increasing social poverty in the four countries (Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain) is also
producing an increase in solidarity among the most vulnerable groups, thanks to private efforts, family networks and aid
organisations’

However, it also stresses that ‘this type of intervention should not become the structural solution to the problem, even if it alleviates
the situation for the most deprived and shows the qualities of the European citizenship.’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

What is it doing — or does it intend to do — to prevent this occurring?

**Question for written answer E-003509/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(24 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Role of the Troika

After an in-depth investigation, the European Parliament approved the reports of the ECON and EMPL Committees on the role of the
Troikas, setting out proposals that included phasing out the Troika institutions and replacing them in the longer term with a proper
EU institution: a European Monetary Fund. Parliament has also sent a clear message that it will no longer accept this Europe of the
Troikas, noting that the Eurogroup is an informal forum of eurozone finance ministers who are not accountable to anyone.

To what extent does the Commission endorse Parliament’s view that we need another system for the future that is accountable and
legitimate, and what steps is the Commission taking to implement this proposal?

**Question for written answer E-003593/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Failure to implement proposals contained in the European Parliament's resolution of 6 July 2011 on the economic and social
crisis

In the European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard
to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI)), Parliament: ‘Deplores the fact that the European Council did not sufficiently
take into account the proposals contained in its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis; emphasises
that implementing them would have fostered economic and social convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union and would
have afforded measures to coordinate economic and budgetary policy full democratic legitimacy.’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with the above views expressed by Parliament?

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Report on Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme countries
(2014/2007(INI)).

C 333 / 48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

2. Does it share the view expressed in Parliament’s report that implementing its recommendations ‘would have fostered
economic and social convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union’?

3. Why, in its opinion, are Parliament’s recommendations still not being taken into account by the Council almost three years
after the resolution of July 2011?

**Question for written answer E-003594/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Role of the Commission in the Troika

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament: ‘Questions the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU
institution; asserts that there is a potential conflict of interest within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its
responsibility as guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire …; points out that such a situation contrasts with the
Commission’s normal role, which is to act as an independent principal protecting the EU interest and ensuring the implementation
of EU rules within the limits established by the Treaties’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say

1. How does it evaluate the above views expressed by Parliament?

2. Is a divergence of views opening up between two major institutions of the Union? If so, how can this problem be solved?

3. What possible implications does the situation raised by the Parliament have for the Union?

**Question for written answer E-003623/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Job recovery plans

The recently adopted European Parliament report (2014/2007 (INI)) stresses that ‘…the programme countries should, together with
the EU institutions, put in place job recovery plans to restore their economies sufficiently to recover the social situation of the preprogramme period, since this is necessary if their macroeconomic adjustment is to be consolidated and the imbalances of their
public sectors, such as the debt and the deficit, to be equilibrated’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Will it take such an initiative itself and to draw up a job recovery plan? Why has it not already done so, given the upward trend
in overall unemployment and youth unemployment?

2. How optimistic is the Commission itself that it is possible to ‘recover the social situation of the pre-programme period’?

**Question for written answer E-003624/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Deregulation of labour relations

According to report 2014/2007(INI), the report by the ILO Expert Committee notes that ‘the programmes designed for the

[programme] countries in some cases allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage
agreements, which has direct consequences for the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the
respective national constitutions’ and condemns ‘the undermining of the principle of collective representation, which puts into
question the automatic renewal of bargaining agreements that, in some countries, is important, as a consequence of which the
number of collective agreements in force has fallen substantially’.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 49

It also ‘condemns the cut in minimum wages and the freezing of nominal minimum wages and stresses that this situation is the
consequence of having limited structural reforms involving only the deregulation of labour relations and wage cuts, which runs
counter to the EU’s general objectives and the policies of the Europe 2020 strategy’.

As the guardian of the Treaties and of fundamental rights, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with the above comments by the ILO?

2. Has it too identified such serious infringements in collective agreements and minimum wage cuts and wage cuts which
undermine fundamental EU _acquis_ and principles, what is its reaction and what does it intend to do to put a stop to this?

**Question for written answer E-003629/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Study of the social and economic consequences of the crisis

The Cercas report ( [3] ) calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the economic
and financial crisis, and the adjustment programmes carried out in response to it in the four countries concerned.

It also stresses that a precise understanding is needed of both the short-term and long-term effects on employment and social
protection systems, and on the European social acquis, with particular regard to the fight against poverty, the maintenance of good
social dialogue and the balance between flexibility and security in labour relations.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it intend to draw up such a study?

2. If so, will it utilise consultative bodies, as well as the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee and the EESC?

**Question for written answer E-003630/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Possible corrective measures and incentives by the ILO and the Council of Europe

The Cercas Report ( [4] ): ’Invites the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective
measures and incentives needed to improve the social situation in these countries, their funding and the sustainability of public
finances, and to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter, with the Protocol thereto and with the ILO’s Core
Conventions and its Convention 94, since the obligations deriving from these instruments have been affected by the economic and
financial crisis and by the budgetary adjustment.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Why did it not request the ILO and the Council of Europe in good time to draw up such special reports in order to forestall
negative chain reactions before commissioning the Troika with the task of managing the crisis?

2. What action will it take to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter, with the Protocol thereto and with the
ILO’s Core Conventions and its Convention 94?

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The Cercas Report on Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme

countries (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) European Parliament report on Employment and Social Aspects of the Role and Operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to Euro Area

Programme Countries (2014/2007(INI)).

( **|**

C 333 / 50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

**Question for written answer E-003631/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Support for children with special needs and persons with disabilities

The Cerkas report ( [5] ) emphasises that, taking into account the sacrifices which the programme countries have made, support must be
provided with sufficient financial resources, where appropriate, for the support of education services, in particular those targeting
children with special needs and persons with disabilities. It also emphasises the need to renew social dialogue.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it intend to ask the ECB and the Eurogroup to review and revise, where appropriate and as soon as possible, the
exceptional measures that have been put in place and, specifically, to assess the impact on children with special needs and
persons with disabilities?

2. Is the Commission in a position to disclose and present a comparative table of European and national appropriations for
children with special needs and persons with disabilities before and after the crisis in the programme countries?

3. What measures is the Commission currently taking to support children with special needs and persons with disabilities?

**Question for written answer E-003661/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(25 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Need for transparent and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika

In the European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard
to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI)), Parliament: ‘Calls, as a first step, for the establishment of clear, transparent
and binding rules of procedure for the interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks and
responsibility therein; strongly believes that a clear definition and division of tasks is needed in order to enhance transparency and to
enable a stronger democratic control over and underpin the credibility of the work of the Troika’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree that insufficient interaction between the EU institutions within the Troika is indeed a problem?

2. What will it do to improve this interaction and achieve a better allocation of tasks and responsibilities, as recommended by
Parliament?

**Question for written answer E-003663/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Revision of the MoUs

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament: ‘Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider revision of
the MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does any reliable evidence exist that errors have occurred in respect of the fiscal multipliers during the implementation of the
MoUs? If so, how and to what extent have these errors affected the euro area programme countries?

2. Who bears responsibility for these errors, and how can the damage they have caused be repaired?

3. Can it envisage a revision of the MoUs? If so, under what conditions and circumstances can or, indeed, must this occur?

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Cerkas report on employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro area programme countries
(2014/2007(INI)).

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 51

**Question for written answer E-003665/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Assuming responsibility for the operations of the Troika

In the European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
[countries (2013/2277(INI)), Parliament: ‘Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2277(INI))
for the operations of the Troika’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. How does it view the above recommendation by Parliament?

2. What impact could the implementation of the above proposal by Parliament have on the Union and those of its Member States
under adjustment programmes?

3. Does it intend to take any initiative to implement Parliament’s proposal?

**Question for written answer E-003667/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Insufficient democratic accountability of the Troika

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament: ‘Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at
national level.’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with the above view expressed by Parliament?

2. If the Troika is indeed insufficiently accountable, what needs to be done to remedy the situation?

3. Will it take some initiative to this end?

**Question for written answer E-003669/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(26 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Debt sustainability in the euro area programme countries

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament: ‘Asks the Troika to proceed to new debt sustainability assessments and, as a matter of urgency, to
address the need to reduce the Greek public debt burden …; recalls that a number of possibilities exist for a debt restructuring, …
including bond swapping, extending bond maturities and reducing coupons’.

A similar situation exists in Cyprus, where the public debt is soaring, and if restrictions on movement of capital are lifted, the
country’s banking system will be at risk from massive capital outflows and face total collapse.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it agree with Parliament’s view that a re-assessment of the debt sustainability is needed in the euro area programme
countries?

2. Does it consider that the alternative forms of debt restructuring proposed by Parliament (bond swapping, extending bond
maturities and reducing coupons) could help Cyprus and Greece to tackle their problems?

C 333 / 52 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

3. Were the abovementioned alternative forms of debt restructuring taken into account in decisions regarding Cyprus? If so, why
were they rejected and why was a ‘haircut’ made on deposits instead?

**Question for written answer E-003821/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Prolongation of fiscal adjustment timeframes

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)), Parliament ‘supports the cautious prolongation of fiscal adjustment timeframes that have already been fulfilled in
the memoranda as fears of general meltdown receded; supports considering further adjustments in light of further macroeconomic
developments’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Given the economic and social impact of the implementation of the memoranda, does it consider that Parliament’s
recommendation about the prolongation of fiscal adjustment timeframes is useful and feasible?

2. If not, what stands in the way of the adoption of Parliament’s recommendation?

3. What further adjustments, as requested by Parliament, could be made, taking into account the economic recovery in the euro
area?

**Question for written answer E-003823/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Issue of ‘contingent convertible bonds’

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament: ‘Recommends that the Commission, the Eurogroup and the IMF should explore further the concept of
“contingent convertible bonds”, where the returns of newly issued sovereign debt in Member States under assistance are linked to
economic growth’

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it believe that the issue of ‘contingent convertible bonds’ could help programme countries emerge more rapidly from the
crisis?

2. Are there any risks to the economy of the EU associated with the adoption of the above recommendation by Parliament?

3. Will it further study and/or adopt the above recommendation?

**Question for written answer E-003825/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Tax evasion, tax fraud and the financial situation in the euro area programme countries

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)), Parliament raises the issue of tax evasion and tax fraud in the EU Member States and ‘recommends implementing
measures that would make all parties contribute fairly to tax revenues’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it endorse Parliament’s views on the existence of tax fraud and the unfair distribution of tax burdens among the various
parties?

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 53

2. Does it intend to study the issue of tax evasion and tax fraud in the programme countries, and the EU in general, and to adopt
implementing measures to combat this phenomenon?

3. To what extent could the fight against tax evasion and tax fraud help solve the fiscal problem in the programme countries? Can
it provide comparative data on the magnitude of the problem in the EU Member States?

**Question for written answer E-003827/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Use made of bail-out funds in the programme countries

In its report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries
(2013/2277(INI)) Parliament:

‘Calls for the publication of the use made of bail-out funds; stresses that the quantity of funds channelled to finance the deficits, fund
the government and repay private creditors should be clarified’.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Does it have available the above information concerning the Cyprus adjustment programme? If so, can it forward it?

2. Does it intend in future to publish the above information referred to by Parliament?

3. How does it assess the use made of the bail-out funds granted to Cyprus so far?

4. Is it satisfied with the funding provided for in the Memorandum and the way in which these funds are being used, given the
task of streamlining and relaunching the Cypriot economy?

**Joint answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The Commission will inform Parliament of its replies to the reports 2013/2277(INI) and 2014/2007(INI), in accordance with the
rules in force concerning the follow-up by the Commission regarding non-legislative resolutions of Parliament.

C 333 / 54 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002958/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Υγεία

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει καταβάλει σε συνεργασία με τα κράτη μέλη, οποιεσδήποτε στοχευμένες προσπάθειες για τον εντοπισμό των υπαρχουσών
ελλείψεων στα συστήματα υγείας, λόγω των οριζόντιων περικοπών στους προϋπολογισμούς για την υγεία, στις χώρες των μνημονίων;

2. Έχει διαπιστώσει ότι η εφαρμογή της συμμετοχής στις ιατρικές δαπάνες θα μπορούσε να οδηγήσει τους ασθενείς στην καθυστερημένη
αναζήτηση περίθαλψης, μεταθέτοντας κατ' αυτόν τον τρόπο την οικονομική επιβάρυνση στα νοικοκυριά;

3. Έχει διαπιστώσει ότι οι μειώσεις μισθών για τους επαγγελματίες στον τομέα της υγείας έχουν αρνητικές επιπτώσεις στην ασφάλεια των
ασθενών και αν έχουν προκαλέσει τη μετανάστευση των εν λόγω επαγγελματιών;

4. Πώς προτίθεται να αντιμετωπίσει, μόνη ή σε συνεργασία με το Συμβούλιο, όλες αυτές τις αλυσιδωτές επιπτώσεις της κρίσης στον
τομέα της υγείας;

**Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(20 Ιουνίου 2014)_

Τα κράτη μέλη που ακολουθούν πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής έχουν υπογράψει ένα μνημόνιο συνεννόησης με την τρόικα που
προσδιορίζει τις απαραίτητες, σύμφωνα και με τις δύο πλευρές, μεταρρυθμίσεις στο σύστημα υγείας για την ενίσχυση της οικονομικής
αποδοτικότητας της περίθαλψης και τη διατήρηση του ελέγχου των δημοσίων δαπανών, εξασφαλίζοντας την πρόσβαση σε υψηλής ποιότητας
περίθαλψη. Με βάση τα διδάγματα που αντλήθηκαν από τις μεταρρυθμίσεις του συστήματος υγείας κατά τα τελευταία έτη, η Επιτροπή
εξέδωσε πρόσφατα ανακοίνωση ( [1] ) στην οποία παρουσιάζει ένα σύνολο «παραγόντων ανθεκτικότητας» που καθιστούν δυνατή την
προσαρμογή των συστημάτων υγείας στο μεταβαλλόμενο περιβάλλον τους με έναν οικονομικά αποδοτικό τρόπο. Η ανακοίνωση παρουσιάζει
επίσης την ατζέντα της ΕΕ για την υποστήριξη των κρατών μελών, ούτως ώστε να καταστούν τα συστήματα υγείας τους πιο προσιτά,
αποτελεσματικά και ανθεκτικά.

Σε γενικές γραμμές, οι δαπάνες υγειονομικής περίθαλψης έχουν την τάση υψηλής συγκέντρωσης, όπου περίπου το 5% των ασθενών
αντιπροσωπεύουν σχεδόν το ήμισυ των συνολικών δαπανών. Κατά συνέπεια, τα κράτη μέλη εφαρμόζουν συνήθως καθεστώτα απαλλαγών από
τη συμμετοχή σε ιατρικές δαπάνες, ώστε να εξασφαλίζεται η πρόσβαση όλων στην ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη. Τα διαθέσιμα δεδομένα ( [2] )
δεν δείχνουν συνολική επιδείνωση όσον αφορά την πρόσβαση στις υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες. Ωστόσο, αυτό δεν ισχύει για όλα τα κράτη μέλη,
δεδομένου ότι υπάρχουν διαφορές μεταξύ των χωρών.

Μια μελέτη που χρηματοδοτήθηκε από την ΕΕ με τίτλο «Η κινητικότητα των επαγγελματιών υγείας και των συστημάτων υγείας» ( [3] ) παρέχει
στοιχεία από 17 ευρωπαϊκές χώρες και αποδεικνύει οτι, ενώ τα επίπεδα των μισθών διαδραματίζουν καίριο ρόλο, άλλοι παράγοντες όπως οι
κακές συνθήκες εργασίας και η έλλειψη επαγγελματικής εξέλιξης, αποτελούν επίσης αιτίες μετανάστευσης των επαγγελματιών του τομέα της
υγείας. Η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει στοιχεία που να αποδεικνύουν οτι οι χαμηλότεροι μισθοί είχαν επιπτώσεις στην ασφάλεια των ασθενών.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τα αποτελεσματικά, προσιτά και ανθεκτικά συστήματα υγείας, COM(2014)215, βλ.

http://ec.europa.eu/health/healthcare/docs/com2014_215_final_el.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Έρευνα της Eurostat για το εισόδημα και τις συνθήκες διαβίωσης (SILC), δεδομένα για την περίοδο 2007-2012 σχετικά με τις ακάλυπτες ιατρικές ανάγκες για υγειονομική

περίθαλψη οι οποίες φέρονται να είναι «υπερβολικά δαπανηρές», βλ. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Η κινητικότητα των επαγγελματιών υγείας και τα συστήματα υγείας, στοιχεία από 17 χώρες, Ευρωπαϊκό Παρατηρητήριο Πολιτικών και Συστημάτων Υγείας (2011), βλ.

http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory/activities/research-studies-and-projects/prometheus

( **|**

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 55

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002958/14**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Health

Will the Commission say:

1. Has it made any targeted efforts, in collaboration with Member States, to identify existing shortcomings in the health systems
resulting from horizontal cuts in the health budgets of the countries subject to the Memoranda?

2. Has it found that the enforcement of participation in medical costs could lead patients to delay seeking medical care, thereby
transferring the financial burden to households?

3. Has it found that wage reductions for professionals in the health sector are having a negative impact on patient safety and have
caused these professionals to emigrate?

4. How will it, alone or in cooperation with the Council, address all these knock-on effects of the crisis in the health sector?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 June 2014)_

Member States under an economic adjustment programme have signed with the Troika a Memorandum of understanding which
identifies health system reforms that both sides agree are necessary to enhance the cost-effectiveness of care and keep public
expenditures under control, while guaranteeing access to high quality care. Drawing on lessons learnt from health system reforms in
recent years, the Commission has recently adopted a communication ( [1] ) in which it presents a set of ‘resilience factors’ that enable
health systems to adapt to their changing environment in a cost-effective manner. The communication further presents an EU
agenda to support Member States in making their health systems more accessible, effective and resilient.

In general, healthcare costs tend to be highly concentrated, with about 5% of patients accounting for nearly half of all costs.
Consequently, Member States usually apply systems of exemptions to participation in medical costs, so as to ensure access for all to
medical care. Available data ( [2] ) do not show an overall deterioration in access to health services. Nevertheless, this is not true for all
Member States as there is variation between countries.

An EU funded study on ‘Health Professional Mobility and Health Systems’ ( [3] ) provides evidence from 17 European countries that,
while wage levels play a key role, other factors such as poor working conditions and lack of career progression are also causes of
emigration amongst health professionals. The Commission has no evidence that lower wages have had an impact on patient safety.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Communication from the Commission on effective, accessible and resilient health systems, COM(2014) 215, see

http://ec.europa.eu/health/healthcare/docs/com2014_215_final_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Eurostat Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) data for 2007-2012 on unmet medical needs for healthcare reported to be ‘too expensive’, see

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Health Professional Mobility and health systems, Evidence from 17 countries, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (2011), see

http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory/activities/research-studies-and-projects/prometheus

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( **|**

C 333 / 56 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002960/14**

**till kommissionen**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Angående:_ Bristfällig hantering av kontrakt för personalföreträdare

I artikel 149a i förordning (EG, Euratom) nr 2342/2002 (ändrad genom förordning (EG, Euratom) nr 478/2007) och den nästan
identiska artikel 162 i förordning (EU) nr 1268/2012 anges att genomförandet av ett kontrakt inte får inledas förrän kontraktet har
undertecknats. I punkt 26 i mål T-498/09 P-DEP inför tribunalen tycks det framgå att kommissionens rättstjänst i åtminstone ett fall
har brutit mot denna princip genom att underteckna ett kontrakt med en extern advokat först efter det att denne slutfört sina
avlönade tjänster på uppdrag av kommissionen, som dess företrädare i ett personalmål. Tribunalen ansåg inte att det försenade
undertecknandet var relevant för detta specifika fall. Följande frågor syftar till att ta reda på vilka uppföljningsåtgärder som vidtogs av
kommissionen och huruvida det finns ett systematiskt problem:

1. Skulle kommissionen rubricera beteendet som beskrivs i punkt 26 i mål T-498/09 P-DEP som ett brott mot de ovan nämnda
lagarna?

2. Har detta mål lett till åtgärder eller utredningar av Europeiska byrån för bedrägeribekämpning, kommissionens utrednings‐
och disciplinbyrå eller andra kommissionsorgan? Vad blev i så fall resultatet av dessa åtgärder beträffande

a) de ansvariga tjänstemännen?

b) den externa parten i det berörda kontraktet (den externa advokaten)?

c) uppföljningsåtgärder för att undvika och hantera liknande situationer i framtiden?

3. Var situationen som beskrivs i mål T-498/09 P-DEP en engångsföreteelse eller känner kommissionen till liknande mål och/eller
omständigheter?

**Svar från José Manuel Barroso på kommissionens vägnar**

_(14 maj 2014)_

Kommissionen vill först och främst konstatera att det försenade undertecknandet av kontraktet med kommissionens externa jurist i
Mål T-498/09 P beaktades i den ersättning för rättegångskostnader som nämns i frågan. Tvärtom vad som anges i frågan avfärdades
dock detta inte som irrelevant. I målet tog den sökande uttryckligen upp frågan om en eventuell överträdelse av budgetförordningen,
och tribunalen fastställde att detta inte hade någon betydelse för det arbete som i praktiken utförts av juristen eller kommissionens
rätt till ersättning för kostnaderna (som var den rätt som den sökande bestred med det här argumentet). Kommissionen vill i
synnerhet hänvisa till punkterna 25–27 i tribunalens beslut. Det bör också poängteras att sökandens överklagande av detta beslut
avvisades av domstolen.

På begäran av sökanden i ovannämnda mål granskade Olaf ärendet och avslutade det utan åtgärd.

Kommissionen gör sitt yttersta för att följa de bestämmelser som nämns i frågan. Det kan dock vid enstaka tillfällen hända att inte
samtliga formaliteter som krävs för undertecknandet av ett kontrakt helt har uppfyllts vid den tidpunkt då kommissionen i syfte att
försvara unionens rättsliga intressen ber juristen att börja arbeta med ett ärende. Detta beror i de flesta fall på de snäva tidsgränser
som gäller för kommissionen. Sådana avvikelser från de tillämpliga bestämmelserna övervakas genom kommissionens system för
intern kontroll och antalet avvikelser från procedurreglerna (ICS n° 8) registreras i den årliga verksamhetsrapporten från
kommissionens rättstjänst.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 57

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002960/14**

**to the Commission**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Staff representative contract mismanagement

Article 149a of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 (as amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 478/2007) and the almost
identical Article 162 of Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 state: ‘Implementation of a contract may not start before the contract is
signed.’ Paragraph 26 of the General Court Case T‐498/09 P-DEP seems to indicate that at least in one case the Legal Service of the
Commission has violated this principle by signing a contract with an external lawyer only after the latter had already finished
providing remunerated services requested by the Commission in representing it in a staff case. The Court did not find the delayed
signing to be relevant for this specific case. The following questions aim to find out what follow-up action was taken by the
Commission and whether there is a systematic problem.

1. Would the Commission classify the behaviour as described in paragraph 26 of Case T-498/09 P-DEP as a breach of the
abovementioned laws?

2. Has this case led to actions or investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office, the Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the
Commission or other Commission bodies? If so, what was the outcome of these actions in relation to:

(a) the responsible acting officials?

(b) the external partner of the concerned contract (external lawyer)?

(c) follow-up measures to avoid and deal with similar situations in the future?

3. Was the situation described in Case T-498/09 P-DEP a one-off event or is the Commission aware of other similar cases and/or
circumstances?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2014)_

The Commission would first note that the question of the delayed signature of the signature of the contract with the Commission's
external lawyer in Case T-498/09 P was dealt with in the costs order mentioned in the question. Contrary to what is stated in the
question, the matter was not merely dismissed as irrelevant. The applicant in that case expressly raised the question of a possible
infringement of the Financial Regulation and the General Court held that it had no bearing on the reality of the work done by the
lawyer, or the Commission's right to recover the costs (which was precisely the right which the applicant contested with this
argument). The Commission would refer in particular to grounds 25-27 of the order. It should also be pointed out that the
applicant's appeal against this order was dismissed by the Court of Justice as inadmissible.

At the request of the applicant in the abovementioned case, OLAF did indeed look at this matter and closed the file with no further
action.

The Commission strives to ensure utmost respect for the provisions mentioned in the question. Nonetheless, it may occasionally
happen that all the formalities needed for signature of a contract are not yet fully accomplished at the time where the Commission
asks the lawyer, in the interest of the defence of the Union's legal interests, to start working on the file; in most cases this is due to
short court deadlines imposed on the Commission. Such cases of derogation from applicable rules are monitored through the
Commission's system of internal control, and the number of derogations from procedural rules (ICS n° 8) is recorded in the
Commission Legal Service's Annual Activity Report.

C 333 / 58 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002961/14**

**till kommissionen**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Angående:_ Sveriges underlåtenhet att anmäla ansenligt statligt stöd

I ärendet om statligt stöd nr N 67/2008 (Polen – Google Polen Sp. z.o.o.) ( [1] ), som anmäldes till kommissionen av de polska
myndigheterna i februari 2008, underrättades kommissionen om de polska myndigheternas avsikt att investera 4 032 258 euro i
anläggningar och utrustning för Google Polen Sp. z o. o. Det statliga stödet godkändes.

När de svenska myndigheterna beviljade ett belopp på 100 miljoner svenska kronor (eller 67 miljoner svenska kronor) till Facebook
för grundandet av en datacentral i norra Sverige 2012 – en summa som i euro motsvarar ett betydligt högre belopp än det som de
polska myndigheterna anmälde – anmäldes detta dock inte till kommissionen på något sätt som är sökbart i kommissionens
databaser om anmälningar och ärenden om statligt stöd.

Åtgärden blev omstridd i Sverige ( [2] ). Kan kommissionen fastställa att Sverige följde de tillämpliga bestämmelserna om statligt stöd?
Vilka åtgärder kan kommissionen vidta för att komma tillrätta med medlemsstaters underlåtenhet att följa de tillämpliga
bestämmelserna om statligt stöd?

**Svar från Joaquín Almunia på kommissionens vägnar**

_(29 april 2014)_

De svenska myndigheterna följde alla tillämpliga bestämmelser när de beviljade 10 721 782 euro i stöd till Pinnacle Sweden AB (ett
svenskt dotterbolag inom Facebookgruppen).

Stödet gavs enligt en stödordning för regional utveckling (XR72/2007) inom ramen för gruppundantagsförordning
(EG) nr 1628/2006 som rör regionalt investeringsstöd. Enligt artikel 8.2 i förordningen ska medlemsstaterna fylla i och skicka in ett
informationsformulär till kommissionen när regionalstöd ges på grundval av en befintlig regional stödordning till ett stort
investeringsprojekt.

En sammanfattning av de lämnade uppgifterna finns på webbplatsen för GD Konkurrens med referensnummer SA.33900 ( [3] ).
Observera att projektet i fråga inte är sökbart i stödregistret på webbplatsen för GD Konkurrens eftersom det gavs enligt en
stödordning (XR 72/2007) med gruppundantag och därför inte var anmälningspliktigt till kommissionen.

När kommissionen får kännedom om stöd som beviljats olagligt kan den undersöka fallet, och om stödet befinns strida mot
materiella regler för statligt stöd åläggs den berörda medlemsstaten normalt sett att återkräva det olagliga och oförenliga stödet samt
ränta från mottagarna.

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/224203/224203_852543_35_1.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://op.se/lanet/ostersund/1.4752002-naringsdepartementet-forsvarar-sig-forstar-att-det-ar-tungt-att-florlora
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/msf_2014.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 59

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002961/14**

**to the Commission**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Failure by Sweden to notify substantial state aid

In the state aid case No N 67/2008 (Poland — Google Poland Sp. z o. o.) ( [1] ), notified to the Commission by the Polish authorities in
February 2008, the latter alerted the Commission to their intention of investing EUR 4 032 258 in facilities and equipment for
Google Poland Sp. z o. o. The state aid was approved.

However, when the Swedish authorities granted an amount of SEK 100 million (or SEK 67 million) to Facebook for the
establishment of a data centre in northern Sweden in 2012 — a sum equivalent in euros to an amount clearly larger than that
notified by the Polish authorities — this was not notified to the Commission in any form that is searchable in the Commission’s
databases on notifications and state aid cases.

The measure sparked controversy in Sweden ( [2] ). Can the Commission establish that Sweden followed the applicable rules on state
aid? What measures can the Commission undertake to remedy failures by Member States to follow the applicable rules on state aid?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2014)_

The Swedish authorities have respected all applicable rules in granting EUR 10 721 782 of aid to Pinnacle Sweden AB (a Swedish
Facebook group subsidiary).

The aid was granted under a regional development aid scheme (XR72/2007 **)** implemented under the Regional aid Block Exemption
Regulation no 1628/2006. Article 8(2) of this regulation requires Member States to complete and submit an information form to the
Commission when granting regional aid on the basis of an existing regional aid scheme to a large investment project.

A summary of the information submitted is published on DG Competition's website under the reference SA.33900 ( [3] ). Please note
that the particular project is not searchable on the Competition web-page case register as it was granted under a block exempted aid
scheme (XR 72/2007) and as such was not notifiable to the Commission.

When the Commission becomes aware of aid that is granted illegally, it may investigate the case and if it concludes that this aid
violates substantive state aid rules, it will normally order the Member State concerned to recover the illegal and incompatible aid
together with interest from the beneficiaries.

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( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/224203/224203_852543_35_1.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://op.se/lanet/ostersund/1.4752002-naringsdepartementet-forsvarar-sig-forstar-att-det-ar-tungt-att-florlora
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/msf_2014.pdf

C 333 / 60 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002962/14**

**an die Kommission**
**Patrizia Toia (S&D) und Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)**

_(13. März 2014)_

_Betrifft:_ Genossenschaftsbanken — Bericht über makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte

Am 5. März hat die GD ECFIN einen Bericht über makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte veröffentlicht. In Bezug auf Italien wird auf
die Genossenschaftsbanken hingewiesen, die mit ihrer angeblichen „fragmentierten“ Struktur eine Schwachstelle im System seien.
Anhand des Systems der Genossenschaftsbanken wird deutlich, dass die sogenannte „Fragmentierung“ — also die Tatsache, dass es
Genossenschaftsbanken gibt, die bestimmten Gebietskörperschaften gehören und von ihnen verwaltet und geleitet werden — nicht
als Schwäche anzusehen ist.

Das Netzwerk der Genossenschaftsbanken ermöglicht es stattdessen, die sich aus der Größe der einzelnen lokalen Banken
ergebenden Einschränkungen zu überwinden und eventuellen Problemen vorzubeugen bzw. diese zu lösen, ohne dabei die
Unterstützung durch die öffentliche Hand in Anspruch nehmen zu müssen.

Der Marktanteil der Genossenschaftsbanken bei der Unterstützung von Familien und Unternehmen liegt für die an
Handwerksbetriebe ausgegebenen Darlehen bei 22 %, für die an landwirtschaftliche Betriebe ausgegebenen Darlehen bei 18 %, für
die an Fremdenverkehrsunternehmen ausgegebenen Darlehen bei 12 % usw. Die Genossenschaftsbanken haben die Krise nicht
verursacht und halten keine faulen Wertpapiere. In den letzten fünf Jahren, in denen die als Aktiengesellschaften verfassten Banken
ihre Beschäftigtenzahlen verringert haben, haben die Genossenschaftsbanken diese erhöht und damit ihre antizyklische Funktion
erneut unter Beweis gestellt, wobei sie gleichzeitig 18 % der liquiden Mittel, die von der „Cassa Depositi e Prestiti“ (Depositen- und
Darlehenskasse) für die KMU zu Verfügung gestellt wurden, an diese ausgegeben haben.

Die Genossenschaftsbanken verfügen über ein Kapital von mehr als 20 Mrd. Euro, mit einer harten Kernkapitalquote (Tier-1-Kapital),
die im Durchschnitt über 14 % liegt, was weit über die Anforderungen von Basel III hinausgeht. Sie gehören zu den am höchsten
kapitalisierten Banken des gesamten Systems und haben zumindest 70 % der jährlichen Reingewinne in ihre nicht verfügbaren
Rücklagen einfließen lassen (der Anteil liegt tatsächlich bei fast 90 %).

Kann die Kommission die Gründe erläutern, warum die Genossenschaftsbanken angeblich nicht geeignet sind, Finanzmittel an die
Wirtschaft weiterzuleiten?

Auf welcher Grundlage behauptet sie, dass die Gesellschafterstruktur von Genossenschaftsbanken eventuell erforderliche
Kapitalerhöhungen verhindere?

Kann die Kommission angesichts der Feststellungen des IWF, der GD ENTR und der GD MARKT, die die Genossenschaftsbanken als
wichtigen Bestandteil der Vielfalt des Bankensektors ansehen, mit der die Stabilität und die Lebenserhaltung der KMU gesichert wird,
erläutern, auf welcher Grundlage es möglich ist, die Genossenschaftsbanken einerseits als starke Elemente und gleichzeitig als
„schwächstes Glied“ des gesamten Systems anzusehen?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

_(30. April 2014)_

Die Bewertung von Genossenschaftsbanken im Bericht über die vertiefte Prüfung Italiens 2014 ( [1] ) betrifft eher große börsennotierte
„banche populari“ als das Segment der kleineren „banche di credito cooperativo“. Bestimmte Charakteristika der
Unternehmensverfassung von Genossenschaftsbanken, wie etwa Stimmrechtsbeschränkungen, Obergrenzen für die
Kapitalbeteiligung und Gesellschafterbeschränkungen, könnten für große „banche populari“, die überregional tätig sind, komplexere
Geschäftsmodelle haben und dem Marktdruck stärker ausgesetzt sind, ungeeignet sein. Diese Besonderheiten der
Unternehmensverfassung können es den einzelnen Anteilseignern erschweren, tatsächlich Kontrolle auszuüben, und der
betreffenden Bank bei der Beschaffung neuen Kapitals auf dem Markt im Weg stehen. Folglich sind diese Banken stärker von interner
Kapitalbeschaffung bzw. Unterstützung durch ihre Anteilseigner abhängig.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Siehe http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp182_en.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 61

Die meisten der großen „banche populari“ zählen zur zweiten Gruppe der italienischen Banken, die einer umfassenden Bewertung
durch die EZB unterzogen wurden. Wie aus Tabelle 1 in Box 2.1 des Berichts über die vertiefte Prüfung ersichtlich ist, haben die auf
den Rängen 6-15 gelisteten Banken (zweite Gruppe) eine durchschnittliche Kernkapitalquote von 8,6 %, was unter dem Durchschnitt
von 11,2 % der Top-5-Banken liegt. Sowohl die Banca d'Italia ( [2] ) als auch der IWF ( [3] ) haben die großen „banche populari“ aufgerufen,
ihre Schwächen in der Unternehmensverfassung (z. B. durch Umwandlung in Aktiengesellschaften) zu beseitigen. Zudem stellte der
IWF in seinem 2013 durchgeführten Stresstest fest, dass große „banche populari“ mit die schwächsten Ergebnisse lieferten ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Siehe http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/integov/2013/roma_071013/visco_071013.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Siehe http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13299.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Siehe http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13300.pdf

C 333 / 62 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002962/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Patrizia Toia (S&D) e Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)**

_(13 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Banche di credito cooperativo (BCC) — Rapporto sugli squilibri macroeconomici

Il 5 marzo la DG ECFIN ha pubblicato un rapporto sugli squilibri macroeconomici. Con riferimento all'Italia si sofferma sulle banche
mutualistiche e cooperative che, con la propria presunta struttura «frammentata», costituirebbero elemento di debolezza. Il sistema
delle BCC dimostra che la cosiddetta «frammentazione» — cioè la presenza di cooperative bancarie mutualistiche possedute,
amministrate e gestite dalle comunità delle quali sono espressione — non è sinonimo di debolezza.

Il network associativo delle BCC consente, infatti, di superare i limiti della dimensione delle singole banche di prossimità e di
prevenire e risolvere eventuali situazioni di criticità (self-help), senza dover ricorrere ad alcun sostegno pubblico.

Il modello cooperativo mutualistico sostiene le famiglie e le imprese con quote di mercato di assoluto valore: 22 % del totale del
credito alle imprese artigiane, 18 % alle imprese agricole, 12 % alle imprese del turismo, ecc. Le BCC non hanno causato la crisi e non
detengono titoli tossici. Negli ultimi cinque anni, mentre le banche S.p.a. riducevano gli impieghi, le BCC li hanno aumentati,
confermando la propria funzione anticiclica, incanalando anche il 18 % delle risorse liquide messe a disposizione delle PMI dalla
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.

Le BCC complessivamente presentano un patrimonio di oltre 20 miliardi di euro, con un capitale di base di classe 1 medio superiore
al 14 per cento, ben oltre i requisiti di Basilea 3. Sono banche tra le più patrimonializzate del sistema e destinano a riserva indivisibile
almeno il 70 per cento degli utili netti annuali (tale percentuale sfiora nei fatti il 90 per cento).

Può chiarire la Commissione i motivi per i quali le BCC sarebbero inadatte a trasmettere i finanziamenti all'economia?

Su quale base sostiene che la loro struttura societaria impedisca aumenti di capitale, ove necessari?

Alla luce di quanto affermato dal FMI, dalla DG ENTR e dalla DG MARKT, che considerano le BCC una piena espressione di quella
biodiversità del settore bancario che assicura stabilità e linfa vitale alle PMI, può chiarire su quali basi le BCC possano essere, da una
parte, considerate elementi di forza e contemporaneamente «anello debole» dell'intero sistema?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2014)_

Nell'analisi approfondita 2014 per l'Italia ( [1] ), la valutazione delle banche cooperative si riferisce alle grandi «banche popolari» quotate
piuttosto che al segmento delle piccole «banche di credito cooperativo». Le particolari caratteristiche della governance tipica del
modello della banca cooperativa, ad esempio le restrizioni del diritto di voto, i massimali in materia di possesso di azioni e le
restrizioni in materia di affiliazione possono essere inadeguate nel caso delle grandi «banche popolari» che hanno un'ampia
diffusione geografica, modelli di business più complessi e una maggiore esposizione alle pressioni del mercato. Queste caratteristiche
di governo societario possono impedire ai singoli azionisti di esercitare un controllo efficace e alle banche in questione di reperire
nuovi capitali sul mercato. Di conseguenza, queste banche dipendono maggiormente dal capitale interno o dal sostegno dei loro soci.

La maggior parte delle grandi «banche popolari» sono incluse nel «secondo livello» delle banche italiane che sono soggette ad una
valutazione globale da parte della BCE. Come riportato nella tabella 1 del riquadro 2.1 dell'analisi approfondita, le banche nei posti
da 6 a 15 della classifica («secondo livello») hanno in media un coefficiente di capitale primario di classe 1 dell'8,6 %, al di sotto della
media dell'11,2 % registrata per le prime 5 banche. Sia la Banca d'Italia ( [2] ) che l'FMI ( [3] ) hanno invitato le grandi «banche popolari» ad
affrontare le carenze in materia di governo societario (ad esempio con la trasformazione in società per azioni). Infine l'FMI ha
constatato che le grandi «banche popolari» sono state tra gli istituti che hanno registrato i peggiori risultati nelle prove di stress
2013 ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Cfr. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp182_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Cfr. http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/integov/2013/roma_071013/visco_071013.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Cfr http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13299.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Cfr http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13300.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 63

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002962/14**

**to the Commission**
**Patrizia Toia (S&D) and Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Credit Unions — Report on macroeconomic imbalances

On 5 March, DG Ecofin published a report on macroeconomic imbalances. With regard to Italy, the report focuses on mutual and
cooperative banks which, with their presumed ‘fragmented’ structure, are seen as a weak link. The credit union system in Italy is
proof that this ‘fragmentation’ — i.e. a system of mutual and cooperative banks managed and run by communities, of which they are
an expression — is not synonymous with weakness.

The associative network of credit unions in fact makes it possible to overcome the limitations imposed by the size of individual local
banks and to prevent and resolve critical situations (self-help), without resorting to any form of public support.

The mutual cooperative model supports families and businesses and its market share speaks for itself: 22% of total lending to small
businesses, 18% to farms, 12% to tourist enterprises, etc. The credit unions did not cause the financial crisis and do not hold toxic
assets. Over the past five years, while incorporated banks have put a squeeze on credit, mutual banks have increased their lending,
confirming their anti-cyclical role, channelling 18% of the liquidity made available to SMEs by Italy’s national financing body _Cassa_
_Depositi e Prestiti_ .

In total, credit unions hold assets worth over 20 billion euro, with a Tier 1 capital on average of over 14%, well above the
requirements of Basel III. They are among the most capitalised banks in the system and allocate at least 70% of annual net profits to
indivisible reserves (this percentage is actually close to 90%).

Can the Commission clarify why credit unions are considered incapable of transferring funds to the economy?

What are the grounds for claims that their corporate structure prevents increases in capital, where necessary?

In light of the findings of the IM, DG ENTR and DG MARKT, who consider credit unions to encapsulate the biodiversity of the
banking sector, offering stability and a lifeline to SMEs, can the Commission clarify how credit unions can be considered to constitute
a strong point yet at the same time be deemed to be a ‘weak link’ in the system as a whole?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2014)_

In the 2014 In-Depth Review of Italy ( [1] ), the assessment of cooperative banks concerns large listed ‘banche popolari’ rather than the
segment of smaller ‘banche di credito cooperativo’ (‘mutual banks’). Particular corporate governance features typical of cooperative
banking models, such as voting right restrictions, share ownership ceilings and membership restrictions may not be adequate in the
case of large ‘banche popolari’ with a wide geographical reach, more complex business models and more exposure to market
pressure. These corporate governance features may render it difficult for individual shareholders to exert effective control and for the
banks in question to raise new capital on the market. Consequently, these banks are more dependent on internal capital generation
or support by their members.

Most of the large ‘banche popolari’ are included in the ‘second tier’ of Italian banks that are subject to the ECB's comprehensive
assessment. As shown in Table 1 of Box 2.1 in the IDR, the top 6-15 (‘second tier’) banks have an average core tier 1 capital ratio of
8.6%, below the average 11.2% for the top-5 banks. Both Bank of Italy ( [2] ) and the IMF ( [3] ) have been calling upon large ‘banche
popolari’ to address their corporate governance weaknesses (e.g. by converting themselves into joint-stock companies). Finally, the
IMF found that large ‘banche popolari’ were among the weakest performers in its 2013 stress tests ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2014/pdf/ocp182_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/integov/2013/roma_071013/visco_071013.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13299.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13300.pdf

C 333 / 64 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)_

**Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002963/14**

**Komisijai**
**Rolandas Paksas (EFD)**

_(2014 m. kovo 13 d.)_

_Tema:_ Neįgaliųjų ekonominė ir socialinė padėtis

Europos finansinė ir ekonominė krizė tapo ir socialine bei žmogaus teisių krize. Nedarbas, skurdas ir atskirtis auga visoje Sąjungoje.

Socialinės paslaugos yra labai svarbios siekiant užtikrinti neįgaliųjų teisę į nepriklausomą gyvenimą ir galimybę dalyvauti
visuomenės gyvenime. Tai yra teisės, kurios turi būti užtikrintos pagal JT neįgaliųjų teisių konvenciją.

Kokių veiksmų ketina imtis Komisija, vykdydama savo makroekonominę politiką, kad būtų pasiekta pažanga įgyvendinant JT
konvenciją?

Kokias specialias priemones ketina įgyvendinti Komisija, kad būtų skatinama parama užimtumui ir stiprinamos socialinės apsaugos
sistemos?

Ar svarstoma galimybė reformuoti Europos semestro procesą taip, kad būtų užtikrintas didesnis ES makroekonomikos politikos ir
socialinės įtraukties bei skurdo mažinimo tikslų suderinamumas?

Ar numatoma sukurti specialią strategiją dėl neįgaliųjų užimtumo, socialinės įtraukties ir skurdo mažinimo su numatytais
konkrečiais tikslais?

**J. Hahno atsakymas Komisijos vardu**

_(2014 m. gegužės 22 d.)_

Nors socialinės paslaugos ir socialinė politika visų pirma priklauso ES valstybių narių kompetencijai, Komisija jas ragina imtis
atitinkamų reformų, kad apsaugotų pažeidžiamiausius asmenis nuo krizės padarinių, skatindama neįgaliųjų socialinę įtrauktį,
galimybes įsidarbinti ir švietimą 2010‐2020 m. Europos strategija dėl negalios ( [1] ), Europos semestru ir socialinių investicijų
dokumentų rinkiniu ( [2] ). Siekiama, kad veiksmai, kurių imamasi pagal šias politikos sistemas, atitiktų Jungtinių Tautų neįgaliųjų teisių
konvenciją, kurios šalis yra ES. Pagal Bendrųjų nuostatų reglamentą ( [3] ) Europos struktūrinių ir investicinių fondų programomis
2014‐2020 m. laikotarpiu taip pat turėtų būti laikomasi Jungtinių Tautų neįgaliųjų teisių konvencijos reikalavimų.

Per Europos semestrą Komisija pabrėžia šių nepalankioje padėtyje esančių ir labiausiai nuo darbo rinkos atskirtų asmenų grupių
įtrauktį ir nagrinėja priemones, kurių imasi valstybės narės, kad pagerintų neįgaliųjų padėtį.

Socialinių investicijų dokumentų rinkiniu siekiama gerinti žmonių gebėjimus dalyvauti visuomeniniame ir ekonominiame gyvenime
bei įveikti riziką. Į tai atsižvelgdamos valstybės narės turi skirti ne mažiau kaip 20 % Europos socialinio fondo išteklių socialinei
įtraukčiai skatinti, kovoti su skurdu ir bet kokia diskriminacija, įskaitant projektus, kuriais remiamas neįgaliųjų užimtumas.

2013 m. spalio mėn. komunikate Komisija siūlo plėtoti socialinį ekonominės ir pinigų sąjungos matmenį stiprinant užimtumo ir
socialinių pokyčių priežiūrą bei tvirčiau koordinuojant užimtumo ir socialinę politiką per Europos semestrą. Tai bus toliau plėtojama
2014‐2015 m. vykdant strategijos „Europa 2020“ laikotarpio vidurio peržiūrą.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 636 galutinis.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 83 galutinis.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 1303 galutinis.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 65

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002963/14**

**to the Commission**
**Rolandas Paksas (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Economic and social situation of people with disabilities

The European financial and economic crisis has become a social and human rights crisis as well. Unemployment, poverty and
exclusion are growing across the EU.

Social services are crucial to ensuring that people with disabilities can enjoy the right to an independent life and the opportunity to
participate in public life. These are rights which must be guaranteed under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.

What action will the Commission take in carrying out its macroeconomic policies in order to achieve progress in the
implementation of the UN Convention?

What measures will the Commission implement in order to promote support for employment and to strengthen social security
systems?

Is the Commission considering reforming the European Semester process so as to ensure that the EU’s macroeconomic policy and
social inclusion objectives and those of poverty reduction are made more compatible?

Are there any plans to develop a specific strategy for the employment of people with disabilities, social inclusion and poverty
reduction laying down clear-cut objectives?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

While social services and policies are primarily the competence of EU Member States, the Commission encourages them to
undertake adequate reforms to protect the most vulnerable from the consequences of the crisis by promoting social inclusion,
employability and education of people with disabilities through the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 ( [1] ), the European
Semester and the Social Investment Package ( [2] ). The actions undertaken within these policy frameworks aim to be in line with the
Uncrpd, to which the EU is a Party. The European Structural and Investment Funds programs should also follow the requirements of
the Uncprd in the 2014-2020 period, according to the Common Provisions Regulations ( [3] ).

In the context of the European Semester, the Commission puts emphasis on inclusion of those disadvantaged groups farthest away
from the labour market and examines the measures that Member States take to improve the situation of persons with disabilities.

The Social Investment Package aims at raising people's capacity to participate in society and the economy and their capability to cope
with risks. In line with this, Member States shall allocate at least 20% of European Social Fund resources to ‘promoting social
inclusion, combating poverty and any discrimination’, including projects supporting the employment of people with disabilities.

In its communication of October 2013, the Commission proposes to develop the social dimension of EMU, through reinforced
surveillance of employment and social developments and strengthened coordination of employment and social policies within the
European Semester. This will be further developed in the framework of the mid-term review of the Europe 2020 strategy, carried out
during 2014 and 2015.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 636 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 83 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 1303 final.

C 333 / 66 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002964/14**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(13 maart 2014)_

_Betreft:_ ING

Op 11 maart 2014 heeft de directeur Particulier van de ING-bank, Hans Hagenaars, het plan gepubliceerd om bedrijven, tegen
betaling, inzicht te geven in het betalingsgedrag van de klanten van de bank. Daartoe heeft de bank een team samengesteld om de
betalingen van ING-klanten te analyseren. De ING gaat dit jaar van start met een proef met een bestand van enkele duizenden
klanten. De bank geeft aan dat aan ING-klanten van tevoren toestemming zal worden gevraagd alvorens van hun persoonsgegevens
gebruik wordt gemaakt.

1. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat voor het aanbieden van betalingsgegevens door de ING niet alleen de betalingen worden
geanalyseerd van de klanten die daarvoor toestemming hebben gegeven, maar van alle klanten? Dus ook van klanten die daarvoor
geen toestemming hebben gegeven.

Dat uiteindelijk alleen de gegevens van de klanten die daarvoor toestemming hebben gegeven worden verkocht doet daarbij niet ter
zake.

2. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat de verkoop van betalingsgegevens van de klanten van de bank inhoudt dat daarmee de
gegevens van deze klanten voor andere doeleinden worden gebruikt dan waarvoor zij zijn verzameld?

3. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat een dergelijk voorbijgaan aan de doelstelling niet strookt met de door het Europees
Parement aangenomen richtlijn ter bescherming van natuurlijke personen in verband met de verwerking van persoonsgegevens en
evenmin met de huidige richtlijn?

4. Is de Commissie van mening dat de verhandeling van klantgegevens door de ING het vertrouwen van burgers in banken
verkleint?

5. Zo ja, wat betekent het gedrag van de ING voor het streven van de EU om het elektronisch betalingsverkeer te stimuleren ten
koste van cashbetalingen?

6. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat de verhandeling van klantgegevens door de ING de doelstellingen van de EU ondermijnt?

7. Mogen de burgers dit keer rekenen op maatregelen van de Commissie tegen het schenden van de privacyrichtlijn in
tegenstelling tot de terughoudende opstelling van de Commissie bij het beantwoorden van mijn vragen over Equens
(E-006024/2013)?

8. Welke maatregelen is de Commissie van plan te nemen tegen de ING?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**

_(2 juni 2014)_

Het analyseren en doorverkopen aan bedrijven van betalingsgegevens van bankklanten staat gelijk aan gegevensverwerking.
Derhalve zijn op deze activiteiten de EU-wetgeving inzake gegevensbescherming, met name Richtlijn 95/46/EG ( [1] ), en de nationale
omzettingswetgeving van toepassing.

Richtlijn 95/46/EG bepaalt onder andere dat persoonlijke gegevens op eerlijke en rechtmatige wijze moeten worden verwerkt, voor
welbepaalde, uitdrukkelijk omschreven en gerechtvaardigde doeleinden, en vervolgens niet mogen worden verwerkt op een wijze die
onverenigbaar is met die doeleinden (doelbindingsbeginsel). Deze regels zijn ook van toepassing op de verwerking van
betalingsgegevens. In de voorgestelde herziene richtlijn betalingsdiensten ( [2] ) wordt hier expliciet naar verwezen in artikel 84.

Wanneer banken de gegevens van hun klanten doorverkopen, is het moeilijk om de impact hiervan op het EU-beleid en het algemene
vertrouwen in de markt in te schatten. Op het scorebord van de consumentenmarkten voor 2013 waren bancaire diensten echter
nog steeds de cluster met de laagste score, in het bijzonder wat betreft het vertrouwen in dienstaanbieders en algemene
klantentevredeheid.

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⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlijn 95/46/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 24 oktober 1995 betreffende de bescherming van natuurlijke personen in verband met de verwerking

van persoonsgegevens en betreffende het vrije verkeer van die gegevens (PB L 281 van 23.11.1995, blz. 31).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 547 final.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 67

Naast de informatie die de Commissie reeds heeft verstrekt in haar antwoord op vraag E‐006024/2013, benadrukt de Commissie dat
zij geen bevoegdheid heeft om op te treden tegen privéondernemingen indien zij de regelgeving inzake gegevensbescherming niet
naleven. Onverminderd de bevoegdheden van de Commissie als hoedster van de Verdragen, zijn het de nationale
gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten en de rechtbanken die op dit gebied verantwoordelijk zijn. Zij staan zowel voor het toezicht op de
naleving van deze regelgeving in, als voor het waarborgen van het vertrouwen in de correcte verwerking van persoonsgegevens door
deze privéondernemingen.

C 333 / 68 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002964/14**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ ING

On 11 March 2014, the Director of Private Banking at ING Bank, Hans Hagenaars, published a plan to supply businesses — in return
for payment — with information about the payments made by the bank’s customers. For this purpose, the bank has put together a
team to analyse the payments made by ING’s customers. ING intends to launch a trial this year, using a database of a few thousand
customers. The bank has stated that ING’s customers will be asked for their consent in advance before their personal data are used.

1. Does the Commission agree that, in order to supply payment data, ING will analyse the data not only of the customers who
have consented but of all customers, including therefore those who have not consented? The fact that ultimately only the data of
customers who have consented will be sold is irrelevant from this point of view.

2. Does the Commission agree that selling bank customers’ payment data means that the data will be used for purposes other than
those for which they were gathered?

3. Does the Commission agree that such disregard for the purpose of data-gathering breaches the European Parliament directive
for the protection of natural persons in connection with the processing of personal data, or with the current directive?

4. Will ING’s marketing of customer data damage public confidence in banks?

5. If so, what implications does ING’s conduct have for the EU’s efforts to encourage electronic payments at the expense of cash
payments?

6. Does the Commission agree that ING’s marketing of customer data undermines the aims of the EU?

7. Can the public this time expect measures from the Commission to tackle the breach of the privacy directive, in contrast to the
reticent attitude which it adopted in answering my questions about Equens (E-006024/2013)?

8. What measures will the Commission take against ING?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 June 2014)_

Analysing and selling information on payments made by bank customers to businesses constitute processing of personal data. EU
data protection law, in particular Directive 95/46/EC ( [1] ) and the national legislations transposing it, apply to this processing activity.

Directive 95/46/EC provides amongst others that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and not be further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (purpose limitation principle).
These rules also apply to the processing of payments data. In the proposed revised Payment Services Directive ( [2] ) this is explicitly
indicated in Article 84.

It is difficult to assess the impact of banks' marketing of customer data on EU policies and public confidence in the market. However,
according to the 2013 Consumer Markets Scoreboard, banking services remain the lowest performing market cluster, notably with
regard to trust in providers and overall consumer satisfaction.

In addition to the information provided in its reply to E-006024/2013 the Commission underlines that it has no competence to take
any action against private sector companies for lack of compliance with data protection rules. Without prejudice to the powers of the
Commission as guardian of the Treaties, it is the responsibility national data protection authorities and the courts to monitor
compliance and ensure confidence in the correct handling of personal data by these private companies.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24.10.1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and

on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 547 final.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 69

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002965/14**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Bezpieczniejsze zakupy w UE

Nowe przepisy, wprowadzone we wszystkich krajach członkowskich, wzmocniły prawa obywateli Wspólnoty, jeżeli chodzi
o zakupy online lub w sklepach. Dzięki nowym rozwiązaniom kupujący będą mieli większą ochronę i to bez względu na to, gdzie
w UE dokonują zakupów. Według nowych zasad, klienci mają dwa tygodnie na zwrot towaru, gdy z dowolnego powodu zmienią
zdanie po wykonaniu zakupu w Internecie.

1. Czy konsumenci będą mieli prawo odstąpienia od zakupu treści cyfrowych, takich jak pliki muzyczne lub wideo?

2. Czy prawo do odstąpienia umowy będzie przysługiwało w przypadku pilnych napraw i prac konserwacyjnych?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johannesa Hahna w imieniu Komisji**

_(7 maja 2014 r.)_

Nowa dyrektywa 2011/83/UE (dyrektywa w sprawie praw konsumentów), która ma wejść w życie w całej UE w dniu 13 czerwca
2014 r., wzmacnia prawa konsumentów, w szczególności w przypadku sprzedaży na odległość, np. za pośrednictwem internetu.
Jednym z podstawowych unijnych praw konsumenckich w przypadku umów zawieranych na odległość i umów zawieranych poza
lokalem przedsiębiorstwa jest prawo do odstąpienia od umowy.

Prawo do odstąpienia od umowy przewidziane w dyrektywie w sprawie praw konsumentów ma również zastosowanie do umów
o dostawę treści cyfrowych, takich jak pliki zawierające muzykę lub filmy, zawieranych na odległość lub poza lokalem
przedsiębiorstwa. Jednakże, w przypadku gdy treści cyfrowe dostarczane są na zaplombowanym nośniku danych (takim jak DVD),
konsument traci prawo do odstąpienia od umowy, jeżeli otworzy zapieczętowane opakowanie (art. 16 lit. i)). W sytuacji, gdy treści
cyfrowe dostarczane są poprzez pobieranie czy poprzez odbiór danych przesyłanych strumieniowo w Internecie (tj. nie są
dostarczone na materialnym nośniku), konsument traci prawo do odstąpienia od umowy w przypadku wyraźnego wyrażenia zgody
na rozpoczęcie wykonania umowy i przyjęcia do wiadomości, że w związku z tym utraci prawo odstąpienia od umowy (art. 16
lit. m)).

Odnośnie do pilnych napraw i konserwacji, zgodnie z art. 16 lit. h), prawo do odstąpienia od umowy nie ma zastosowania do
umów, w przypadku których konsument wyraźnie zażądał od przedsiębiorcy, aby przyjechał do niego w celu przeprowadzenia
takich prac. Jeżeli przy okazji takiej wizyty przedsiębiorca świadczy dodatkowo inne usługi niż te, których konsument wyraźnie
zażądał, lub dostarcza towary inne niż części zamienne, które muszą być wykorzystywane do konserwacji lub naprawy, prawo do
odstąpienia od umowy ma zastosowanie do tych dodatkowych usług lub towarów.

C 333 / 70 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002965/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Safer shopping in the EU

New legal provisions introduced in all EU Member States have strengthened the rights of EU residents when making purchases on the
Internet or in shops. These new rules will give consumers greater protection, regardless of where in the EU they carry out their
purchases. Under the new rules, customers have two weeks to return goods if they change their minds for any reason after making a
purchase over the Internet.

1. Will consumers have the right to withdraw from purchases of digital content, such asmusic files or videos?

2. Will the right to rescind a contract be applicable to urgent repairs and conservation work?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2014)_

The new Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU (CRD), which is due to enter into application across the EU on 13 June 2014,
strengthens the rights of consumers, in particular in distance sales such as on the Internet. One of the main EU consumer rights in
distance and off-premises contracts is the right of withdrawal.

The right of withdrawal under the CRD will also apply to contracts for the supply of digital content, such as music files or videos,
concluded at distance or off-premises. However, where digital content is supplied on a sealed data carrier (such as DVD), the
consumer loses the right of withdrawal when unsealing it (Article 16(i)). Where digital content is supplied by downloading or
streaming on the Internet (i.e., it is not provided on a tangible medium), the consumer loses the right of withdrawal if he expressly
agrees to start the performance of the contract and acknowledges that he thereby loses the right of withdrawal (Article 16(m)).

As regards urgent repairs and maintenance, according to Article 16(h), the right of withdrawal does not apply to contracts where the
consumer has specifically requested a visit from the trader for the purpose of carrying out such works. If, on the occasion of such
visit, the trader provides services in addition to those specifically requested by the consumer or goods other than replacement parts
necessarily used in carrying out the maintenance or in making the repairs, the right of withdrawal applies to those additional services
or goods.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 71

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002967/14**

**do Komisji**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ W sprawie dozbrajania rosyjskiej armii i marynarki wojennej przez kraje UE

W dniu 5 marca br. we Francji zaczęto testować nowoczesny okręt wojenny klasy Mistral, zbudowany z przeznaczeniem dla
rosyjskiej marynarki wojennej. Moskwa zamówiła dwie tego typu jednostki z opcją zakupu kolejnych dwóch. Jeden z pierwszych
okrętów ma trafić na wyposażenie Floty Czarnomorskiej. Także dostawy broni dla rosyjskiej armii płyną głównie z Francji, a odbywa
się to niestety przy aprobacie Niemiec czy Włoch, również czerpiących zyski ze współpracy w tym zakresie.

Systematyczne zwiększanie potencjału militarnego Rosji nie jest obojętne dla krajów obawiających się agresji ze strony tego
państwa. W obliczu wciąż niezwykle napiętej sytuacji na granicy ukraińsko-rosyjskiej oraz deklarowanego Ukrainie politycznego
i gospodarczego wsparcia ze strony Unii Europejskiej zwracam się z zapytaniem:

1. Czy w opinii Komisji ww. przypadki dozbrajania Rosji pozostają w zgodzie z bieżącą unijną polityką względem Moskwy?

2. Czy Komisja rozważa podjęcie kroków względem państw realizujących współpracę wojskową z Rosją, celem jej ograniczenia,
bądź zastopowania?

3. Czy Komisja przedstawiła lub zamierza przedstawić Radzie ewentualne zastrzeżenia w przedmiotowej sprawie?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Komisji Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji**

_(20 maja 2014 r.)_

W odpowiedzi na bezprawną aneksję Krymu Rada Europejska przyjęła w marcu 2014 r. środki ograniczające w postaci zakazu
wydawania wiz i zamrożenia aktywów względem osób odpowiedzialnych za działania podważające integralność terytorialną,
suwerenność i niezależność Ukrainy.

Rada Europejska ostrzegła, że wszelkie dalsze kroki podjęte przez Federację Rosyjską w celu zdestabilizowania sytuacji na Ukrainie
pociągną za sobą dodatkowe i dalekosiężne konsekwencje dla stosunków z Rosją w wielu różnych dziedzinach gospodarki. Rada
Europejska zwróciła się do Komisji i państw członkowskich o przygotowanie ewentualnych ukierunkowanych środków.

Na obecnym etapie brak jest na szczeblu UE środków ograniczających wobec handlu bronią z Rosją, ale kilka państw członkowskich
zawiesiło lub zrewidowało swoje pozwolenia na wywóz broni do Rosji.

Wywóz broni reguluje wspólne stanowisko UE 2008/944/WPZiB. Wspólne stanowisko przewiduje, że państwa członkowskie UE
muszą ocenić wywóz broni według kryteriów w nim określonych, dotyczących między innymi bezpieczeństwa sojuszników
i państw zaprzyjaźnionych, ryzyka niestabilnej sytuacji w regionie oraz zachowania państwa-odbiorcy z punktu widzenia prawa
międzynarodowego. Zgodnie ze wspólnym stanowiskiem ostateczne decyzje o wywozie podejmowane po takiej ocenie ryzyka leżą
jednak w gestii władz krajowych.

C 333 / 72 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002967/14**

**to the Commission**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ EU Member States arming the Russian Army and Navy

On 5 March 2014, tests began in France on a modern Mistral‐class warship constructed for the Russian navy. Moscow has ordered
two such ships and has the option of purchasing another two. One of the first ships is to form part of the Black Sea Fleet. What is
more, arms deliveries to the Russian Army are mainly flowing from France, and this is going on with the approval of Germany and
Italy, both of which are profiting from their cooperation in this area.

The systematic strengthening of Russia’s military potential is a matter of no small concern to those countries that fear aggression
from that country. Against the backdrop of the still tense situation on the Ukraine‐Russia border and the EU’s pledge to provide
Ukraine with political and economic support:

1. Does the Commission feel that the aforementioned instances of arms being supplied toRussia are in accordance with current
EU policy towards Russia?

2. Does the Commission plan to take steps against countries engaging in militarycooperation with Russia with a view to limiting
or halting such cooperation?

3. Has the Commission passed on — or does it intend to pass on — any concerns that it mighthave on this matter to the Council?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

In reaction to the illegal annexation of Crimea, the European Councill adopted restrictive measures in March 2014, in the form of
visa bans and asset freeze on persons responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine.

The European Council has warned that any further steps by the Russian Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead
to additional and far reaching consequences for relations with Russia in a broad range of economic areas. The European Council has
asked the Commission and the Member States to prepare possible targeted measures.

At this stage, there is no restrictive measures at EU level on arms trade with Russia, but several Member States have suspended or
reviewed their export licences for arms exports to Russia.

Arms exports are regulated by EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Under the Common position, EU Member States have to
assess arms exports against the criteria set out in the Common Position, which _inter alia_ addresses the security of allies and friendly
countries, the risk of regional instability and the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to international law. The final export
decisions made after such risk assessment however remain at national discretion according to the Common Position.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 73

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-002968/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ It-tfal fis-Sirja

Il-15 ta' Marzu 2014 se jkun it-tielet anniversarju mill-bidu tal-kunflitt fis-Sirja. Għal kważi tliet snin, batew wisq nies innoċenti fisSirja — speċjalment it-tfal tas-Sirja. Skont l-istimi, miljun tifel u tifla għadhom jgħixu f'żoni taħt assedju.

1. X'azzjoni qed tieħu l-Kummissjoni biex issalva lil dawn it-tfal u lill-familji tagħhom?

2. Il-Kummissjoni tinsab imħassba wkoll dwar il-fatt li sena oħra kkaratterizzata mill-kunflitt tista' twassal għat-telfa ta'
ġenerazzjoni sħiħa fis-Sirja u r-reġjun kollu?

3. Il-Kummissjoni b'liema mod kienet ta' għajnuna fejn tidħol l-assistenza umanitarja fil-ġlieda kontra din it-traġedja umana?

4. Il-Kummissjoni kif beħsiebha timpenja ruħha fi sforzi futuri favur ir-rikonċiljazzjoni u t-tolleranza fir-reġjun?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mir-Rappreżentanta Għolja/il-Viċi President Ashton f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(24 ta' Ġunju 2014)_

Il-Kummissjoni hija mħassba ħafna dwar is-sofferenza kbira li qed iġarrbu t-tfal fis-Sirja, kif ukoll ir-refuġjati f'pajjiżi ġirien. Meta
wieħed iqis li s-sitwazzjoni umanitarja diffiċli ħafna fis-Sirja qed taffettwa lil dawk l-aktar vulnerabbli, bħal ma huma t-tfal, il-pajjiżi
tal-UE jappellaw lill-partijiet kollha fil-kunflitt biex jirrispettaw il-liġi umanitarja internazzjonali u biex jieħdu miżuri konkreti biex
itejbu u jiżguraw aċċess umanitarju bla xkiel lil dawk fil-bżonn u li jiżguraw il-protezzjoni tat-tfal. Għal dan il-għan, l-UE laqgħet ladozzjoni tar-riżoluzzjoni tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti numru 2139 dwar is-sitwazzjoni umanitarja fis-Sirja tat22 ta' Frar 2014.

L-UE, inklużi l-Istati Membri tagħha, li rrispondiet bl-akbar donazzjonijiet għall-kriżi Sirjana, bl-għoti ta' aktar minn EUR 2.8 biljun
f'assistenza umanitarja u ta' żvilupp, kienet ukoll qed tiffinanzja diversi azzjonijiet li jindirizzaw direttament is-sitwazzjoni tat-tfal
affettwati mill-kunflitt u bl-iskop li tittaffa s-sitwazzjoni, sew fi ħdan is-Sirja kif ukoll fil-pajjiżi ġirien.

L-UE hija konxja tal-importanza li tingħata edukazzjon ta' appoġġ lit-tfal, b'mod partikolari f'sitwazzjonijiet ta' kriżi, sabiex ma jiġrix
li tintilef ġenerazzjoni sħiħa fis-Sirja u fir-reġjun. Għal dan il-għan, l-UE hija waħda mis-sostenituri ewlenin tar-reazzjoni edukattiva
għall-kriżi Sirjana u pprovdiet, sa mill-bidu tal-kriżi, EUR 167 miljun f'sostenn għall-ħtiġijiet ta' edukazzjoni tat-tfal fis-Sirja u f'pajjiżi
ġirien affettwati mill-kriżi tas-Sirja. L-UE hija impenjata li tkompli tagħti s-sostenn tagħha fil-qasam tal-edukazzjoni fis-Sirja, u filpajjiżi li bħalissa qed jilqgħu numri kbar ta' refuġjati mis-Sirja.

C 333 / 74 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002968/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Children in Syria

15 March 2014 will mark the third year of the Syrian conflict. For nearly three years, too many innocent people in Syria have
suffered — above all the children of Syria. It is estimated that one million children are still under siege.

1. What action is the Commission taking to save these children and their families?

2. Does the Commission share the concern that another year of conflict could mean the loss of a whole generation in Syria and
the region?

3. How has the Commission helped with humanitarian assistance to combat this human tragedy?

4. How does the Commission intend to engage in future efforts for reconciliation and tolerance in the region?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 June 2014)_

The Commission is deeply concerned by the terrible suffering of the children inside Syria as well as refugees in neighbouring
countries. Given that the extremely difficult humanitarian situation in Syria is affecting the most vulnerable, like children, the EU
continues to call on all parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law and to take concrete measures to improve
and secure safe, unfettered humanitarian access to those in need and to ensure the protection of children. To this end, the EU
welcomed the adoption of the UNSC resolution 2139 on the humanitarian situation in Syria of 22 February 2014.

The EU, including its Member States, as the biggest donor in response to the Syria crisis, with more than EUR 2.8 billion in
humanitarian and development assistance, has also been financing several actions which address directly the situation of the children
affected by the conflict and with the aim to alleviating their situation, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries.

The EU is aware of the importance of supporting education for children, particularly in crisis situations, in order to avoid the loss of a
whole generation in Syria and the region. To this end, the EU is one of the main supporters of the education response to the Syrian
crisis and has provided since the start of the crisis EUR 167 million in support of education needs of children in Syria and in
neighbouring countries affected by the Syrian crisis. The EU is committed to continue support in the field of education in Syria and in
the countries which are currently hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 75

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-002969/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ Tfal b'missirijiet mhux magħrufa

It-tagħrif mogħti fil-Parlament Malti f'Jannar 2014 jindika li s-sena l-oħra f'Malta, ġew irreġistrati 185 tarbija b'missier mhux
magħruf. Iċ-ċifri maħruġin f'Ottubru 2012 urew li matul l-10 snin ta' qabel, kienu ġew irreġistrati 2,776 tarbija b'missier mhux
magħruf. F'1412-il każ, l-omm kellha bejn 20 u 29 sena. 905t itrabi ġew reġistrati bħala wlied ommijiet iżgħar minn 19-il sena u
b'missirijiet mhux magħrufa.

1. Tista' l-Kummissjoni tagħtina l-aktar figuri reċenti dwar il-għadd ta' trabi li twieldu fl-EU28 fl-aħħar 5 snin u li missierhom
mhux magħruf?

2. Hemm evidenza konsiderevoli mir-riċerka li t-tfal f'familji f'ġenitur wieħed jiffaċċjaw riskju akbar ta' faqar. X'inhuma listrateġiji adottati mill-Kummissjoni għas-salvagwardja tal-futur ta' dawn it-tfal?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Andor f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(27 ta' Mejju 2014)_

1. Il-Kummissjoni ma għandhiex aċċess għal ċifri dwar l-għadd ta' trabi mwielda fl-UE minn missier mhux magħruf.

2. Il-Kummissjoni hija konxja ħafna tal-fatt li t-tfal imrobbija f'familji ta' ġenitur waħdu huma esposti għal riskju għoli ta' faqar
u/jew ta' esklużjoni soċjali. Fi Frar 2013, il-Kummissjoni adottat il-Pakkett ta' Investiment Soċjali tagħha li jinkludi, fost l-oħrajn, irRakkomandazzjoni intitolata “L-investiment fit-tfal — niksru ċ-ċiklu tal-iżvantaġġ” ( [1] ).

L-Istati Membri mhux biss għandhom jaċċertaw li l-ġenituri (waħedhom) ikunu jistgħu jaħdmu u jirċievu salarju diċenti, iżda
għandhom jieħdu ħsieb ukoll li jkun hemm biżżejjed servizzi għall-indukrar tat-tfal, li l-ġenituri jistgħu jaffordjaw. Jeħtieġ li jingħata
appoġġ xieraq għad-dħul, b'mod partikulari permezz ta' ħelsien mit-taxxa jew krediti tat-taxxa, benefiċċji għall-familji u għat-tfal,
benefiċċji għall-alloġġ, u skemi ta' dħul minimu. Jeħtieġ li t-tfal, partikularment dawk l-aktar żvantaġġati, ikollhom aċċess ukoll għal
servizzi ta' kwalità, bħal servizzi ta' edukazzjoni bikrija u ta' kura tat-tfal (ECEC, _Early Childhood Education and Care_ ), li kapaċi jiżvolġu
rwol kruċjali fit-tnaqqis tal-inugwaljanza mill-bidu nett. Il-parteċipazzjoni tat-tfal f'attivitajiet ta' wara l-iskola hija importanti wkoll
biex jinkiser iċ-ċiklu ta' żvantaġġ, filwaqt li t-tfal iridu jkunu involuti minn kmieni fid-deċiżjonijiet legali li jolqtuhom.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ara http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1060&langId=mt.

C 333 / 76 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002969/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Children with unknown fathers

Information given in the Maltese Parliament in January 2014 indicates that last year in Malta 185 newborns were registered as having
an unknown father. Figures issued in October 2012 showed that over the previous 10 years 2 776 babies were registered as having
an unknown father. In 1 412 cases the mother was in her twenties. There were 905 babies registered as born to mothers aged under
19 and having unknown fathers.

1. Can the Commission provide us with the latest figures on the numbers of babies born to unknown fathers in the EU28 in the
last 5 years?

2. There is considerable research evidence that children in lone-parent families are at increased risk of poverty. What strategies are
being adopted by the Commission to safeguard the future of these children?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 May 2014)_

1. The Commission does not dispose of EU-wide figures on the numbers of babies born to unknown fathers.

2. The Commission is very aware of the fact that children raised in lone-parent families run a high risk of poverty and/or social
exclusion. In February 2013 the Commission adopted its Social Investment Package which among other things contains a
recommendation on ‘Investing in children — breaking the cycle of disadvantage’ ( [1] ).

Member States should not only make sure that work for (lone) parents pays but also that there is enough affordable childcare.
Adequate income support needs to be provided through in particular tax relief or credits, family and child benefits, housing benefits
and minimum income schemes. Children, and in particular the most disadvantaged, need also access to quality services such as early
childhood education and care services (ECEC), which can play an essential role in reducing inequality from the start. Child
participation in after-school activities is also important to break the cycle of disadvantage while children need to be involved early on
in legal decisions that affect them.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1060&langId=en

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 77

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-002970/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ Mutilazzjoni tal-ġenitali femminili

Il-mutilazzjoni tal-ġenitali femminili (MĠF), forma speċifika ta' vjolenza, hi projbita fl-Istati Membri kollha, iżda fl-ebda wieħed
minnhom ma kien hemm kundanni penali għal dan ir-reat.

Minħabba li l-livelli ta' protezzjoni u ta' aċċess għas-servizzi għall-vittmi tal-MĠF fl-Istati Membri tal-UE jvarjaw, l-istituzzjonijiet talUE jista' jkollhom rwol unifikatur fil-qawmien tal-kuxjenza u l-promozzjoni tal-aqwa prattiku fl-UE kollha, għall-prevenzjoni ta' din
il-forma ta' vjolenza u biex tiġi provduta kura xierqa għall-vittmi. Approċċ ċentrali jkun aktar effettiv biex jiġi eliminat dan ilfenomenu.

1. Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdilna l-aħħar ċifri dwar l-għadd ta' każijiet ta' MĠF fl-UE28?

2. F'eżerċizzju ta' konsultazzjoni pubblika dwar il-MĠF mwettaq mill-Kummissjoni f'Mejju 2013, il-partijiet konċernati kollha
qablu li l-UE jeħtieġ li tiżviluppa pjan ta' azzjoni koerenti u komprensiv biex titratta din il-problema. X'segwitu se tagħmel ilKummissjoni fuq dawn ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet?

3. Il-Kummissjoni b'liema modi se tiżgura implimentazzjoni effettiva tad-Direttiva dwar id-Drittijiet tal-Vittmi, inkluż id-dritt ta'
aċċess għal servizz ta' appoġġ għall-vittmi ta' MĠF u t-taħriġ għall-professjonisti li jaħdmu ma' dawn il-vittmi?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Hahn f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(6 ta' Mejju 2014)_

1. Ma hemm l-ebda ċifri tal-UE disponibbli dwar il-MĠF, dwar l-għadd ta’ vittmi jew bniet li jinsabu f’dan ir-riskju. Huma
disponibbli xi stimi fir-rapport “Female genital mutilation in the EU and Croatia” ( [1] ) li sar mill-Istitut Ewropew għall-Ugwaljanza bejn
il-Ġeneri. Madankollu, dawn l-istimi mhumiex neċessarjament komparabbli minħabba li huma bbażati fuq metodi differenti u sorsi
differenti.

2. Il-Kummissjoni u s-Servizz Ewropew għall-Azzjoni Esterna adottaw Komunikazzjoni fuq l-Eliminazzjoni tal-Mutilazzjoni
Ġenitali Femminili fil-25/11/2013 ( [2] ) fejn iddefinixxew lista ta’ miżuri konkreti li għandhom jittieħdu fis-snin li ġejjin.

3. Għall-protezzjoni u l-appoġġ tal-vittmi ta’ reati, il-Kummissjoni nidiet id-Direttiva orizzontali 2012/29/UE li tistabbilixxi
standards minimi fir-rigward tad-drittijiet, l-appoġġ u l-protezzjoni tal-vittmi kollha tal-kriminalità, inklużi l-vittmi tar-reat talMĠF ( [3] ). Id-Direttiva se tiżgura drittijiet proċedurali fi proċedimenti kriminali, l-aċċess għal servizzi ta’ appoġġ ġenerali u speċjalizzati
u valutazzjoni individwali tal-ħtiġijiet tal-vittmi. Fuq il-bażi ta’ din il-valutazzjoni individwali, se tinħoloq firxa sħiħa ta’ miżuri
speċjali biex jipproteġu u jappoġġaw lill-vittmi vulnerabbli tal-kriminalità. Il-perjodu ta’ traspożizzjoni għall-Istati Membri se jiskadi
fis-16 ta’ Novembru 2015. Attwalment, il-Kummissjoni qed tassisti lill-Istati Membri fit-traspożizzjoni korretta u fil-ħin billi toħroġ
dokument ta’ gwida, torganizza workshops u laqgħat ta’ esperti. Il-Kummissjoni sejra wkoll tniedi sejħa għal proposti biex
timplimenta Proġett Pilota, kif mitlub mill-Parlament Ewropew, biex jiġu żviluppati moduli ta’ tagħlim elettroniku li għandhom lgħan li jżidu l-għarfien tal-professjonisti li jaħdmu ma’ persuni milquta mill-MĠF.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/female-genital-mutilation-in-the-european-union-and-croatia-report
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1396004887289&uri=CELEX:52013DC0833
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Madankollu, l-għan ta’ din id-Direttiva mhuwiex li jiġu kriminalizzati ċerti atti jew imġiba fl-Istati Membri. Jekk id-Direttiva hijiex se tapplika u tiddefinixxi bħala

“vittma” persuna li kienet vittma ta’. Imġiba speċifika jiddependi fuq jekk dawn l-atti humiex reati kriminali u jistgħu jitħarrku skont il-liġi nazzjonali tal-Istati Membri.

C 333 / 78 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002970/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Female genital mutilation

Female genital mutilation (FGM), a specific form of violence, is outlawed in all Member States, yet none of them has seen any
convictions for this offence.

Given the varying levels of protection and access to services for FGM victims in the EU Member States, the EU institutions can play a
unifying role in raising awareness and promoting exchange of best practices throughout the EU, in order to prevent this form of
violence and provide proper care to victims. A central approach will do more to eliminate this.

1. Can the Commission provide us with the latest figures on the number of cases of FGM in the EU28?

2. In a public consultation exercise on FGM carried out by the Commission in May 2013, all stakeholders agreed that the EU
needs to develop a coherent and comprehensive action plan to tackle this problem. How will the Commission follow up on these
recommendations?

3. In what ways is the Commission ensuring effective implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive, including the right to
access FGM victim support services and the training of professionals who work with these victims?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

1. There are no EU-figures available on FGM on the number of victims or on girls at risk. Some estimates are available in the
report ‘Female genital mutilation in the EU and Croatia’ ( [1] ) made by the European Institute for Gender Equality. However, these
estimates are not necessarily comparable because they are based on different methods and different sources.

2. The Commission and the European External Action Service adopted a communication on Eliminating Female Genital
Mutilation on 25.11.2013 ( [2] ) defining a list of concrete measures to be taken in the coming years.

3. To protect and support victims of crimes, the Commission initiated the horizontal Directive 2012/29/EU establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of all victims of crime, including victims of FGM crime ( [3] ). The directive
will ensure procedural rights in criminal proceedings, access to general and specialist support services and an individual assessment
of the victims' needs. On the basis of this individual assessment, a whole range of special measures will be put in place to protect and
support vulnerable victims of crime. The transposition period for Member States will expire on 16 November 2015. Currently, the
Commission is assisting Member States with correct and timely transposition by issuing a guidance document, organising
workshops and expert meetings. The Commission will also launch a call for proposals to implement a Pilot Project, as requested by
the European Parliament, to develop e-learning modules that aim at increasing the knowledge of professionals working with persons
affected by FGM.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/female-genital-mutilation-in-the-european-union-and-croatia-report
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1396004887289&uri=CELEX:52013DC0833
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) However, the object of this directive is not to criminalise certain acts or behaviours in the Member States. Whether the directive will apply and define as a ‘victim’ a

person who has been a victim of specific conducts depends on whether such acts are criminalised and prosecutable under national law in the Member States.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 79

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002971/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(13 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Costo del denaro in Italia — Danni a famiglie e PMI

Il costo del denaro nell'area dell'euro è dello 0,25 per cento. Tuttavia sia le famiglie che le piccole e medie imprese che abbiano la
necessità di far fronte a difficoltà quotidiane ovvero di produrre fornendo lavoro e contribuendo al PIL, sanno perfettamente quanto
irreale sia chiedere al sistema bancario italiano prestiti ad un tasso significativamente inferiore al limite previsto dalla legge per la
configurazione del reato di usura.

L'ultima rilevazione del tasso soglia per i mutui con garanzia ipotecaria effettuata da Banca d'Italia stabilisce i seguenti tassi di
interesse medi per i mutui nel periodo dal 1 [o ] luglio al 30 settembre 2013 con applicazione dal 1 [o ] gennaio al 31 marzo 2014:

|Mutui con garanzia ipotecaria|Tassi medi|Tassi soglia di usura|
|---|---|---|
|Tasso fisso|5,11 %|10,3875 %|
|Tasso variabile|3,81 %|8,7625 %|

Le banche italiane inoltre applicano spesso una serie di commissioni che, se aggiunte al calcolo per la determinazione del tasso soglia,
darebbero luogo al reato di usura. Ciò è contrario alla legge ed infatti, secondo la Corte Suprema di Cassazione, le banche italiane, per
evitare il reato di usura, devono includere nel calcolo per la verifica del superamento del tasso di soglia usurario, anche il tasso di
mora e le commissioni di massimo scoperto.

Si precisa che la norma per il calcolo del tasso soglia per l'usura dal 14 maggio 2011 prevede che si aumenti il tasso effettivo globale
medio (TEGM) di un quarto, aggiungendo poi un margine di ulteriori quattro punti percentuali. La differenza tra il limite e il tasso
medio non può essere superiore a otto punti percentuali.

Può la Commissione verificare che il metodo di calcolo introdotto di recente nella legislazione italiana (decreto legge 70/2011) sia
compatibile con le politiche di regolazione dell'attività bancaria dell'Unione europea e con la necessità di proteggere i cittadini e le
imprese dalle banche, le quali possono arrivare a imporre tassi di interesse superiori a 10 punti percentuali al costo del denaro
previsto nell'area dell'euro?

Può inoltre verificare con adeguate indagini se gli accordi di cartello tra le banche italiane, più volte denunciati anche dall'Autorità
antitrust, ma ignorati da Banca d'Italia, non costituiscano una violazione delle norme sulla concorrenza impedendo, di fatto, l'accesso
delle banche europee al mercato italiano?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2014)_

La legislazione dell'UE non disciplina il livello dei tassi debitori offerti ai consumatori. Tuttavia, la direttiva 2008/48/CE ( [1] ) obbliga i
creditori a fornire indicazioni su tutti i costi pertinenti di un credito al consumo nelle pubblicità e nelle informazioni precontrattuali.
La direttiva 2014/17/UE ( [2] ) contiene disposizioni analoghe. Tali norme consentono ai consumatori di fare una scelta informata e
decidere se sottoscrivere o meno un determinato contratto di credito.

Per quanto riguarda la legislazione in materia di protezione dei consumatori, le clausole contrattuali non negoziate individualmente
che determinano, a danno del consumatore, un significativo squilibrio tra le parti andrebbero considerate come abusive e non
vincolanti a norma della direttiva 93/13/CEE ( [3] ).

La direttiva 2005/29/CE ( [4] ) non vieta le pratiche usurarie in quanto tali. Tuttavia, impedisce agli operatori commerciali di agire in
contrasto con gli obblighi di diligenza professionale e di provocare distorsioni nel comportamento dei consumatori. Nel settore dei
servizi finanziari gli Stati membri possono adottare norme più prescrittive al fine, ad esempio, di vietare in tutti i casi i crediti usurari.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2008/48/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 23 aprile 2008 relativa ai contratti di credito ai consumatori e che abroga la direttiva 87/102/CEE

del Consiglio, GU L133 del 22.5.2008, pag. 66.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2014/17/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 4 febbraio 2014 in merito ai contratti di credito ai consumatori relativi a beni immobili residenziali

e recante modifica delle direttive 2008/48/CE e 2013/36/UE e del regolamento (UE) n. 1093/2010, GU L60 del 28.2.2014, pag. 34.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Direttiva 93/13/CEE del Consiglio del 5 aprile 1993 concernente le clausole abusive nei contratti stipulati con i consumatori, GU L 95 del 21.4.1993, pag. 29.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2005/29/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio dell'11 maggio 2005 relativa alle pratiche commerciali sleali delle imprese nei confronti dei

consumatori nel mercato interno e che modifica la direttiva 84/450/CEE del Consiglio e le direttive 97/7/CE, 98/27/CE e 2002/65/CE del Parlamento europeo e del
Consiglio e il regolamento (CE) n. 2006/2004 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, GU L 149 dell'11.6.2005, pag. 22.

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

C 333 / 80 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

La Commissione non ritiene che vi sia una comparabilità diretta tra il tasso di riferimento a breve termine e i tassi di prestito effettivi,
a causa delle differenze a livello di scadenza, collateralizzazione e rischi.

Per garantire un effettivo rispetto delle norme di concorrenza dell'UE, le autorità nazionali per la concorrenza applicano, come la
Commissione, gli articoli 101 e 102 ( [5] ) agli accordi e alle pratiche che potrebbero incidere sugli scambi tra gli Stati membri. La
Commissione è al corrente delle varie decisioni prese dall'autorità italiana per la concorrenza. Se quest'ultima dovesse adottare una
decisione che individua una violazione degli articoli 101 o 102 da parte delle banche italiane, tale decisione è giuridicamente
vincolante e non può essere ignorata dalla Banca d'Italia.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Del TFUE.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 81

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002971/14**

**to the Commission**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The cost of money in Italy — Households and SMEs pay the price

The cost of money in the Eurozone is 0.25%. However, both households and small and medium-sized businesses, who face the daily
struggle of producing, providing employment and contributing to GDP, know perfectly well how unrealistic it would be to ask the
Italian banking system for a loan at a rate significantly lower than the limit laid down by law for the purposes of defining usury.

The most recent report on the threshold rate for mortgage loans released by the Bank of Italy establishes the following average
interest rates for mortgages for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2013, with application from 1 January to 31 March 2014:

|Mortgage loans|Average rates|Usury threshold rates|
|---|---|---|
|Fixed rate|5.11%|10.3875%|
|Variable rate|3.81%|8.7625%|

Italian banks often also charge a range of commissions which, if added to the calculation to determine the threshold rate, would give
rise to usury. This is against the law and in fact, according to the Supreme Court, in order to avoid usury Italian banks should include,
in the calculation for checking whether the usury threshold rate has been exceeded, both the rate for arrears and overdraft fees.

It is worth noting that, since 14 May 2011, the rules for the calculation of the usury threshold rate provide for an increase in the
average overall effective rate in Italy (TEGM) of one quarter, adding a further margin of four percentage points. The difference
between the limit and the average rate cannot be more than eight percentage points.

Can the Commission confirm that the calculation method recently introduced in Italian legislation (Decree-Law 70/2011) is
compatible with European Union banking regulation policies and with the need to protect people and businesses from banks, which
may succeed in charging interest rates that are more than 10 percentage points above the cost of money in the Eurozone?

Can the Commission also make the relevant enquiries to ascertain whether cartel agreements between Italian banks, repeatedly
denounced even by the Antitrust Authority, but ignored by the Bank of Italy, constitute a breach of unfair competition legislation by
actually preventing European banks from accessing the Italian market?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

The level of borrowing rates offered to consumers is not regulated by Union law. However Directive 2008/48/EC ( [1] ) obliges creditors
to provide information on all the relevant costs of a consumer credit in advertising and pre-contractual information.
Directive 2014/17/EU ( [2] ) contains similar provisions. Such rules allow consumers to make an informed decision whether to enter in
a given credit contract or not.

In relation to consumer legislation, non-individually negotiated contract terms causing a significant imbalance between the parties to
the detriment of the consumer should be regarded as unfair and not binding under Directive 93/13/EEC ( [3] ).

As regards Directive 2005/29/EC ( [4] ), while it does not prohibit usurious practices _per se_, its provisions prevent traders from acting
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and distorting the economic behaviour of consumers. In the area of financial
services, Member States are allowed to adopt more prescriptive rules with a view, for instance, to prohibit in all circumstances
usurious credit.

The Commission does not consider there is a direct comparability between the short-term policy rate and the effective lending rates,
due to different maturity, collateralization and risks.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council

Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L133, 22.5.2008, p. 66.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable

property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L60, 28.2.2014, p.34.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 095, 21.4.1993, p. 29.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal

market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22.

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

C 333 / 82 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

In order to ensure effective enforcement of the Community competition rules, National Competition Authorities apply, like the
Commission, Articles 101 and 102 ( [5] ) to agreements and practices which may affect trade between Member States. The Commission
is aware of the various decisions taken by the Italian competition authority. If the Italian competition authority adopts a decision
finding a breach of Articles 101 or 102 by the banks in Italy, this is legally binding and cannot be ignored by the Bank of Italy.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Of the TFEU.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 83

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-002972/14**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(13 de março de 2014)_

_Assunto:_ Lei de titularidade dos recursos hídricos em Portugal

Em Portugal, pela Lei n.° 78/2013, de 21 de novembro de 2013, procedeu-se à primeira alteração da Lei n.° 54/2005, de 15 de
novembro de 2013, que regula a titularidade dos recursos hídricos, nomeadamente o n.° 1 do artigo 15.°, que estabelece que quem
pretenda obter o reconhecimento da sua propriedade sobre parcelas de leitos ou margens das águas do mar pode obter esse
reconhecimento por via judicial, intentando a correspondente ação judicial junto dos tribunais comuns até 1 de julho de 2014,
devendo, para o efeito, provar documentalmente que tais terrenos eram, por título legítimo, objeto de propriedade particular ou
comum antes de 31 de dezembro de 1864 ou, se se tratar de arribas alcantiladas, antes de 22 de março de 1868.

A alteração legislativa em causa tem como consequência que os proprietários de bens imóveis situados numa faixa de 50 metros de
largura contados da margem das águas do mar, ou de 30 metros das restantes águas navegáveis ou flutuáveis, mesmo os que têm a
sua propriedade devidamente regularizada e registada junto da competente Conservatória de Registo Predial, podem ver a sua
propriedade não reconhecida pelo Estado, caso não intentem a referida ação judicial no prazo apontado ou não consigam reunir a
prova documental exigida.

A prova documental em causa, ou seja, de que tais terrenos eram, por título legítimo, objeto de propriedade particular ou comum
antes de 31 de dezembro de 1864, ou, se se tratar de arribas alcantiladas, antes de 22 de março de 1868, é particularmente difícil de
obter e reunir, dada a antiguidade da mesma e a dispersão das fontes.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

Face ao disposto no artigo 17.° da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia, que estatui que todas as pessoas têm o direito
de fruir dos seus bens legalmente adquiridos, de os utilizar, de dispor deles e de os transmitir em vida ou por morte, que ninguém
pode ser privado da sua propriedade, exceto por razões de utilidade pública, nos casos previstos na lei e mediante justa
indemnização, considera que a citada Lei e as obrigações e condições que dela decorrem para o reconhecimento da propriedade
privada cumprem e respeitam este direito fundamental?

**Resposta dada por Michel Barnier em nome da Comissão**

_(23 de maio de 2014)_

A Comissão só há pouco tempo teve conhecimento da lei portuguesa n.° 54/2005 de 15 de novembro através de algumas queixas. A
sua compatibilidade com o direito da UE está a ser avaliada e, se necessário, a Comissão tomará as devidas medidas para garantir o
pleno respeito do direito da União. Convém assinalar, no entanto, que a Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE apenas vincula os
Estados-Membros na medida em que apliquem o direito da UE. Assim, a lei portuguesa apenas pode ser considerada uma violação do
direito de propriedade garantido pela Carta, se a mesma lei for uma transposição de legislação da União Europeia.

Ao mesmo tempo, poderá ser do interesse dos proprietários em causa recorrer para as autoridades administrativas ou judiciais
portuguesas. São os tribunais e os órgãos administrativos nacionais os principais responsáveis por garantir que as autoridades dos
Estados-Membros cumpram o direito da UE.

C 333 / 84 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002972/14**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Law on the ownership of water resources in Portugal

In Portugal Law No 78/2013 of 21 November 2013 has, for the first time, amended Law No 54/2005 of 15 November 2005
governing the ownership of water resources, and in particular Article 15(1) thereof, to the effect that persons wishing to be
recognised as the owners of stretches of river-bed or seashore may obtain the corresponding legal recognition by applying to an
ordinary court no later than 1 July 2014 and, to that end, furnishing documentary evidence that the land in question was legitimately
held in individual or common ownership before 31 December 1864 or, in the case of sheer cliffs, before 22 March 1868.

What the change in the law means for owners of property situated within 50 metres of the shoreline or 30 metres of other waterways
or navigable waters is that, even when their ownership has been regularised and registered with the appropriate Land Registry Office,
it might not be recognised by the State if they fail to start the abovementioned legal procedure within the specified time limit or have
been unable to assemble the supporting documents required.

The documents in question, that is to say, evidence that the land concerned was legitimately held in individual or common
ownership before 31 December 1864 or, in the case of sheer cliffs, before 22 March 1868, are particularly difficult to obtain and
assemble, given their age and the fact that the relevant sources of information are scattered over wide areas.

Article 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates that ‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or
her lawfully acquired possessions’ and that ‘No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the
cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation’. That being the case, does the Commission
consider that the above law and the obligations and conditions applying under it to the recognition of private ownership satisfy, and
are compatible with, this fundamental right?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2014)_

The Commission has only recently been made aware of the Portuguese law No 54/2005 of 15 November 2005 by a number of
complaints. It is currently assessing its compatibility with EC law and, if need be, will take appropriate action to ensure full respect of
EC law. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights only binds the Member States in so far as
they implement EC law. Thus, the Portuguese Law can only be viewed as a breach of the right to property as guaranteed by the
Charter if it implemented European Union law.

At the same time, it might be in the interest of the property owners concerned to seek redress from the Portuguese administrative or
judicial authorities. It is national courts and administrative bodies that are primarily responsible for ensuring that the authorities of
the Member States comply with EC law.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 85

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002973/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Agenda Digital: banda ancha básica para todos

La Agenda Digital Europea marca una serie de objetivos concretos y ambiciosos en materia de banda ancha. Entre ellos hay uno que
ya debería haberse alcanzado en 2013: la cobertura de banda ancha básica para el 100 % de los ciudadanos de la UE.

Acabado 2013, el objetivo sigue sin cumplirse. Si bien es cierto que se ha avanzado mucho en cobertura, también es cierto que el
objetivo se fijó precisamente con ambición y no se ha alcanzado.

En la opinión de la Comisión, ¿cuáles son las causas principales del incumplimiento? ¿Qué medidas están ya en marcha para
solventar esta situación, habida cuenta del retraso que llevamos? ¿Está la Unión en el buen camino para cumplir el resto de los
objetivos?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Kroes en nombre de la Comisión**

_(23 de abril de 2014)_

La UE ha logrado su objetivo de conseguir en 2013 la banda ancha para todos ya que, desde octubre del año pasado, todos los
hogares de la UE pueden disfrutar de una conexión de banda ancha básica gracias a la disponibilidad en todo su territorio de la banda
ancha por satélite. Esta tecnología puede conectar a los tres millones de ciudadanos de la UE que hasta ahora han estado excluidos de
la sociedad y la economía digitales. Se trata, en particular, de las zonas rurales y aisladas, sin conexión a Internet móvil o fijo, en las
que el despliegue de la banda ancha es más dificultoso y caro.

Los modernos satélites de banda ancha bidireccional en la banda KA pueden proporcionar velocidades de descarga de hasta 20
Megabits por segundo. Actualmente existen proveedores en todos los Estados miembros de la UE que ofrecen servicios con costes de
consumo cada vez más bajos. Como parte de su estrategia para conseguir los demás objetivos de banda ancha de la Agenda Digital, la
Comisión ha estado trabajando en medidas para impulsar la inversión en las redes de alta velocidad de nueva generación y, al mismo
tiempo, promover la competencia, reducir el coste de despliegue de este tipo de redes y mejorar la coordinación de los derechos de
uso del espectro radioeléctrico en Europa, que son todos elementos importantes que se complementan con el paquete de medidas
propuesto «Continente conectado».

Para promover la financiación pública, especialmente en las zonas rurales, la Comisión ha revisado en enero de 2013 sus directrices
para la aplicación de las normas sobre ayudas estatales de la UE al sector de la banda ancha. Además, las TIC y la banda ancha serán
uno de los cuatro principales objetivos temáticos en los que los Estados miembros tendrán que concentrar la utilización del Fondo
Europeo de Desarrollo Regional en el próximo período de programación 2014-2020. En el último período 2007-2013, se
programaron 2 200 millones de euros para proyectos de banda ancha ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Enlaces útiles para más información: http://www.broadbandforall.eu

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connected-continent-single-telecom-market-growth-jobs
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/broadband-strategy-policy

C 333 / 86 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002973/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Digital Agenda: basic broadband for all

The European Digital Agenda sets out a number of ambitious specific goals for broadband, including one that ought to have been
achieved already in 2013, namely basic broadband coverage for 100% of EU citizens.

2013 has ended and this goal has not been achieved yet. While it is true that a lot of progress has been made in terms of coverage, the
fact is that this goal was set to be ambitious and it has not been reached.

In the Commission’s opinion, what are the main reasons for this failure? What measures are being adopted to solve this problem,
bearing in mind the delay that has occurred? Is the EU on the right path to comply with the other objectives?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2014)_

The EU has achieved its 2013 target of broadband for all, because since October last year every EU household can have a basic
broadband connection, thanks to pan-EU availability of satellite broadband. This technology can bring the 3 million EU citizens
online who have so far been excluded from the digital society and economy. This concerns in particular isolated and rural areas
without a fixed or mobile Internet connection, where a broadband rollout is more cumbersome and expensive.

Modern bi-directional KA-band broadband satellites can provide download speeds up to 20 Megabits per second. Providers exist
now in every EU Member State, offering services at ever lower consumer costs. As part of its strategy to achieve the other broadband
goals of the Digital Agenda, the Commission has been working on measures to promote investment in high-speed next generation
networks while enhancing competition, reducing the cost of roll-out of such networks and the coordination of radio spectrum in
Europe, which are all important elements further complemented by the proposed ‘Connected Continent’ package.

To further promote public funding especially in rural areas the Commission has in January 2013 also revised its guidelines for the
application of EU state aid rules to the broadband sector. Moreover, ICT and broadband will be one of the four main thematic
objectives on which Member States will have to concentrate the use of European Regional Development Fund in the next
programming period 2014-2020. In the last period 2007-2013, EUR 2.2 billion were programmed on broadband projects ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Useful Links for more information : http://www.broadbandforall.eu

http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connected-continent-single-telecom-market-growth-jobs
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/broadband-strategy-policy

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 87

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002974/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Apoyo a los emprendedores en la web en la EU

La Comisión Europea, en su Comunicación «Una industria europea más fuerte para el crecimiento y la recuperación económica» ( [1] ),
de octubre de 2012, anunciaba que propondría un plan de acción relativo al emprendimiento en el cual formularía recomendaciones
a los Estados miembros sobre la mejora de las condiciones marco y las medidas de apoyo para el emprendimiento (noviembre de
2012), tomando asimismo medidas suplementarias para estimular la utilización de las tecnologías digitales y del comercio
electrónico. La Comisión también señalaba que propondría acciones específicas en el primer trimestre de 2013 para apoyar a los
emprendedores en la _web_ en la EU.

¿Cuáles son estas acciones específicas para apoyar a los emprendedores en la _web_ ? ¿Cuál es su grado de desarrollo?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Kroes en nombre de la Comisión**

_(6 de mayo de 2014)_

En el Plan de acción sobre emprendimiento 2020 ( [2] ), la Comisión anunció medidas específicas en favor de los emprendedores en la
web en Europa. Desde entonces se han registrado notables progresos a través de una serie de actividades amparadas en la marca
Startup Europe ( [3] ). El objetivo general es ayudar a los emprendedores tecnológicos a iniciar sus actividades, crecer y permanecer en
Europa. Uno de los logros es el manifiesto del club de líderes europeos de empresas de nueva creación ( [4] ) en favor del
emprendimiento y la innovación para impulsar el crecimiento en la EU. Contiene 22 recomendaciones sobre las acciones necesarias
a nivel de la UE para fomentar aún más el crecimiento de la economía de Internet.

Se ha estimulado y apoyado la creación de redes entre aceleradores ( [5] ), capitalistas de riesgo ( [6] ) y plataformas de financiación
participativa ( [7] ) a fin de facilitar el intercambio de información y mejores prácticas, incrementar el flujo de capital riesgo y
financiación participativa en las empresas web de nueva creación y facilitar a las partes interesadas una plataforma común en la que
poder expresar sus opiniones.

En lo que se refiere a la ayuda financiera, la fase 3 de la Asociación Público-Privada sobre la Internet del Futuro (FI-PPP) ( [8] ) ofrece un
apoyo sustancial a las PYME innovadoras y a los emprendedores en la web para el uso de las tecnologías desarrolladas en el marco del
programa. La primera convocatoria de propuestas de Horizonte 2020 ( [9] ) ofrecerá apoyo adicional a los emprendedores en la web
financiando nuevos servicios transfronterizos cuyo objetivo sea ayudar a las empresas tecnológicas de nueva creación prometedoras
a iniciar e intensificar de forma eficiente sus actividades en toda Europa.

A fin de acelerar la transformación digital de las empresas ya existentes de todos los sectores de la economía a través del uso de
tecnologías digitales avanzadas, la Comisión ha puesto en marcha la iniciativa sobre emprendimiento digital ( [10] ). En febrero de 2014
se creó un foro político estratégico sobre el emprendimiento digital con el objetivo de reforzar el diálogo con la industria, la ciencia y
la sociedad civil ( [11] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)0582.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 795 final de 9.1.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/web-entrepreneurs
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://startupmanifesto.eu/
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.acceleratorassembly.eu/
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://webinvestorsforum.eu/
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://www.crowdfundingnetwork.eu/
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/future-internet-public-private-partnership
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/86-ict-13-2014.html
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/digital-enterpreneurship/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) La Comisión ha puesto en marcha diversas medidas de apoyo al emprendimiento digital, entre las que cabe citar la «herramienta de seguimiento del emprendimiento

digital», que vigila las tendencias principales de la tecnología y el mercado, las oportunidades comerciales emergentes, los nuevos paradigmas de negocio y las
iniciativas políticas pertinentes en toda Europa; una gran campaña paneuropea de sensibilización sobre el emprendimiento digital destinada a catalizar y apoyar
nuevas ideas de negocio; un ecosistema europeo eMentors para inspirar y prestar apoyo a los nuevos emprendedores e intraemprendedores e iniciativas orientadas al
análisis de las competencias digitales y la capacitación para el liderazgo electrónico. Se espera que el informe del foro estratégico se publique a más tardar en
noviembre de 2014.

C 333 / 88 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002974/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Support for Internet entrepreneurs in the EU

In its communication ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’ ( [1] ) of October 2012, the European
Commission announced that it would propose an action plan for entrepreneurship in which it would make recommendations to
Member States on improving the framework conditions and measures of support for entrepreneurship (November 2012). It would
also adopt additional measures to stimulate the use of digital technologies and electronic trade. The Commission also said that it
would propose specific steps in the first quarter of 2013 to support Internet entrepreneurs in the EU.

What are these specific steps to support Internet entrepreneurs? What progress has been made?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

In the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action plan ( [2] ) the Commission announced specific actions to support web entrepreneurs in Europe.
Considerable progress has been achieved since then through a series of activities grouped under the Startup Europe ( [3] ) brand. The
overall goal is to support tech entrepreneurs to start, grow and stay in Europe. One achievement is the Startup Europe Leaders Club
Manifesto ( [4] ) for entrepreneurship and innovation to power growth in the EU. It contains 22 recommendations on action needed at
EU level in order to further stimulate the growth of the Internet economy.

Networking amongst accelerators ( [5] ), venture capitalists ( [6] ) and crowdfunding platforms ( [7] ) has been encouraged and supported, as a
way of facilitating exchange of information and best practices, increasing the flow of venture capital and crowdfunding into web
start-ups and giving the stakeholders a common platform to express their views.

In terms of financial support, the Future Internet Public Private Partnership (FI-PPP) phase 3 ( [8] ) offers substantial support to
innovative SMEs and web entrepreneurs to use the technologies developed within this programme. The first call for proposals in
Horizon 2020 ( [9] ) will offer additional support to web entrepreneurs by funding new cross-border services aimed at helping
promising tech start-ups to efficiently launch and scale up their operations across Europe.

In order to accelerate the digital transformation of existing businesses from all sectors in the economy through the use of advanced
digital technologies, the Commission has deployed the Digital Entrepreneurship initiative ( [10] ). A Strategic Policy Forum on Digital
Entrepreneurship has been set up in February 2014 to reinforce the dialogue with industry, science and civil society ( [11] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 0582.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 795 final of 9.1.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/web-entrepreneurs
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://startupmanifesto.eu/
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.acceleratorassembly.eu/
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://webinvestorsforum.eu/
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://www.crowdfundingnetwork.eu/
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/future-Internet-public-private-partnership
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/86-ict-13-2014.html
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/digital-enterpreneurship/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) The Commission has launched a number of actions to support digital entrepreneurship, such as the Digital Entrepreneurship Monitor, a tool to monitor the key

technological and market trends, up-coming business opportunities, new business paradigms and relevant policy initiatives all over Europe; a major pan-European
awareness raising campaign on Digital Entrepreneurship to catalyse and support new business ideas; a European eMentors ecosystem to inspire and support new
entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs and initiatives to analyse digital competences and e-leadership skills. The report of the Strategic Forum is expected by
November 2014.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 89

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002975/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Medidas propiciadas por el Reglamento (UE) n° 994/2010 para reducir la vulnerabilidad de la UE ante una potencial
interrupción de suministro de gas ruso

Como resultado de la crisis del gas de enero del 2009, hubo durante dos semanas un corte de suministro del gas natural destinado a
la UE de aproximadamente un 30 % que afectó primordialmente a los hogares, y con especial crudeza a los hogares más pobres.

Aunque en aquella ocasión la interrupción de suministro obedeció a una disputa comercial entre Naftogaz y Gazprom, el conflicto
político recientemente abierto en Ucrania podría llevar a una situación similar.

Por otro lado, los precios del gas natural ya han subido un 6 % en los mercados, mientras que las acciones de Gazprom han bajado un
10 %. El precio del crudo también ha experimentado un incremento de casi un 2 %. Todo ello hace suponer un incremento del precio
de la energía a muy corto plazo.

¿En qué medida ha conseguido el Reglamento (UE) n° 994/2010 sobre medidas para garantizar la seguridad del suministro de gas
mejorar la situación de vulnerabilidad de los ocho Estados miembros más expuestos a posibles interrupciones del suministro de gas
natural procedente de Rusia a través del corredor ucraniano?

¿Qué impacto económico prevé la Comisión a corto plazo sobre la incipiente recuperación de la economía europea? Y, a más largo
plazo, ¿no cree la Comisión que será necesario reforzar los incentivos para mejorar las interconexiones entre Estados miembros y
acordar un objetivo vinculante del 10 % de capacidad de interconexión?

**Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de mayo de 2014)_

El Reglamento (UE) n° 994/2010 sobre medidas para garantizar la seguridad del suministro de gas ha mejorado considerablemente el
nivel de preparación de la Unión Europea ante sucesos que pudieran deteriorar el suministro de gas. De conformidad con lo
dispuesto en dicho Reglamento, los Estados miembros han llevado a cabo evaluaciones de riesgo obligatorias, basadas en las cuales se
han elaborado planes de medidas preventivas y de emergencia. Asimismo, han adoptado una serie de medidas de apoyo, entre ellas la
mejora de las infraestructuras. La Comisión presentará un informe sobre la aplicación de dicho Reglamento antes de finales de año.

En respuesta a la petición del Consejo Europeo de marzo de 2014 de realizar un análisis en profundidad, la Comisión está analizando
las consecuencias de potenciales perturbaciones del abastecimiento energético en Europa y está preparando un plan detallado sobre
la forma de reducir la dependencia energética. La publicación de estos documentos está prevista para junio de 2014.

El Reglamento (UE) n° 347/2013 sobre las infraestructuras energéticas transeuropeas prevé medidas eficaces, financieras y no
financieras, para mejorar la capacidad de interconexión entre los Estados miembros a través de los denominados proyectos de interés
común (PIC). Con la elaboración de la primera lista a escala de la Unión, que incluye 132 PIC en el ámbito de la electricidad,
aumentará la capacidad de interconexión de todos los Estados miembros, salvo uno, hasta situarse muy por encima del 10 % de aquí
a 2020. En 2015 se adoptará una nueva lista, que podría añadir nuevos PIC. En lo que se refiere a los objetivos vinculantes en relación
con la capacidad de interconexión, la Comisión los está examinando en consonancia con la solicitud del Consejo Europeo de marzo
de este año.

C 333 / 90 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002975/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Measures promoted by Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 to reduce the EU's vulnerability in the event of possible interruption of
the gas supply from Russia

As a result of the gas crisis in January 2009, there was a cut of approximately 30% in the supply of natural gas sent to the EU, which
lasted two weeks and mainly affected families, particularly the poorest families.

Although on that occasion the interruption of the supply was due to a trade dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the political
conflict that has recently arisen in Ukraine might lead to a similar situation.

Furthermore, the market prices of natural gas have already risen by 6%, while Gazprom’s share price has fallen by 10%. The price of
crude has also risen by almost 2%. This all suggests that the price of energy is going to increase in the very short term.

To what extent has Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard the security of the gas supply managed to
improve the situation of vulnerability experienced by the eight Member States that are most exposed to possible interruptions in the
supply of natural gas from Russia via the Ukrainian corridor?

What financial impact on the incipient recuperation of the European economy does the Commission envisage in the short term?
Looking further ahead, does the Commission not believe that it will be necessary to reinforce incentives for improving the
interconnections among Member States and to agree on a binding objective of 10% of interconnection capacity?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of the gas supply has notably improved the level of
preparedness of the EU with regard to events that could deteriorate the gas supply. As required by this regulation, Member States
have carried out mandatory Risk Assessments based on which Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans have been developed.
They have also adopted a series of supporting measures, including improvements in infrastructure. The Commission will present a
report on the implementation of this regulation by the end of the year.

In response to the March 2014 European Council's request for an in-depth analysis, the Commission is currently analysing the
consequences of potential disruptions to Europe's energy supplies and is preparing a comprehensive plan on how the energy
dependence can be reduced. These documents are planned to be published by June 2014.

Regulation (EU) 347/2013 on trans-European energy infrastructure implements effective non-financial and financial measures to
enhance interconnection capacities between Member States through so called projects of common interest (PCIs). With the
implementation of the first Union-wide list, consisting of 132 PCIs in the field of electricity, interconnection capacity for all but one
Member State will increase to well above 10% by 2020. A new Union-wide list, potentially adding new PCIs, will be adopted in 2015.
Regarding binding objectives for interconnection capacity, the Commission is examining those in line with the request from the
European Council of March this year.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 91

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002976/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Acciones concretas para la reindustrialización de la Unión Europea

La Comisión ha declarado en reiteradas ocasiones que el objetivo de su política industrial es revitalizar la economía de la Unión
Europea mediante el apoyo a los esfuerzos de reindustrialización con arreglo a la voluntad de la Comisión de que la industria
manufacturera represente el 20 % del PIB antes de 2020.

¿Podría indicar la Comisión cuáles son sus acciones y medidas concretas de apoyo a la reindustrialización de la Unión y los medios
para financiarlas?

¿Podría señalar la Comisión si existen estudios empíricos o previsiones verosímiles que indiquen que el objetivo del 20 % es
alcanzable?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(7 de mayo de 2014)_

La reciente Comunicación sobre política industrial «Por un renacimiento industrial europeo» ( [1] ) describe las diversas medidas que se
han adoptado y que resultan necesarias para velar por que despegue el crecimiento industrial en la EU. Concretamente, apela a
integrar las cuestiones relativas a competitividad industrial en todos los ámbitos de las políticas europeas e identifica actuaciones
dirigidas a propiciar un entorno más favorable a las empresas, facilitar el acceso a los factores de producción, aumentar al máximo el
potencial del mercado interior, fomentar la internacionalización de las empresas y facilitar la movilidad laboral. Destaca asimismo la
necesidad de utilizar los recursos financieros para la innovación industrial y la «especialización inteligente» —más de
180 000 millones EUR para el periodo 2014-2020— de que disponen el Programa para la Competitividad de las Empresas y para las
Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (COSME), los Fondos Estructurales y Horizonte 2020.

La Comisión considera que será difícil, si bien no imposible, alcanzar el objetivo de que la actividad manufacturera represente el 20 %
del PIB. De hecho, algunos Estados miembros (Alemania, Chequia, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, Hungría, Irlanda, Lituania y Rumanía) ya lo
han alcanzado o superado. Sin embargo, la meta principal que se persigue es reforzar el mensaje de que la competitividad se sitúa en
el centro de las políticas europeas. La tendencia descendente que el peso de la actividad manufacturera en el conjunto de la economía
lleva protagonizando durante largo tiempo no es irreversible, tal y como ponen de manifiesto los recientes avances de la economía
estadounidense; con las medidas necesarias, lo mismo puede suceder en la EU.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 014 final.

C 333 / 92 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002976/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Specific measures for re-industrialising the European Union

The Commission has repeatedly stated that the aim of its industrial policy is to revitalise the economy of the European Union by
supporting re-industrialisation efforts, pursuant to the Commission’s goal of seeing manufacturing amount to 20% of GDP by 2020.

Could the Commission say what specific measures and steps it is taking to support the re-industrialisation of the EU and what
resources are being used to finance them?

Could the Commission say whether any empirical research has been carried out or if there are credible forecasts indicating that the
20% goal is achievable?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2014)_

The recent Industrial Policy Communication ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’ ( [1] ) takes stock of the different measures taken
and needed to assure that industrial growth takes off in the EU. In particular it calls for mainstreaming of industrial competitiveness
concerns across all areas of European policy and identifies actions to generate a more business friendly environment, ease access to
production inputs, maximise the potential of the internal market, foster internationalization of firms and facilitate labour mobility. It
also highlights the need to use the financial resources available for industrial innovation and smart specialization, over
EUR 180 billion during the period 2014-2020, from COSME, Structural Funds and Horizon 2020.

The Commission believes that it will be difficult but not impossible to achieve the aspirational goal of 20% GDP for manufacturing.
As a matter of fact, some Member States (CZ; DE; IE; LT; HU; RO; SI and SK) have already reached or surpassed it. However the main
objective of this goal is to reinforce the message of putting competitiveness at the core of European policies. The secular diminishing
trend of manufacturing in the economy is not irreversible as it has been shown by recent developments in the US economy, and with
the necessary measures this could also happen in the EU.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 014 final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 93

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002977/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Cambio de bandera en embarcaciones europeas

Cada vez hay más patrones que optan por abanderar sus embarcaciones en Estados miembros diferentes de los suyos de origen. La
razón principal reside en evitar normativas nacionales estrictas para beneficiarse de otras menos exigentes.

Cierto es que al cambio de nacionalidad náutica puede acceder cualquier ciudadano europeo con un barco de uso exclusivamente
privado y con un eslora menor de 24 metros. Sin embargo, ante tal situación, ¿no sería aconsejable armonizar la legislación europea
en este ámbito para que los requisitos para abanderar una embarcación sean más homogéneos en todo el territorio de la Unión?

De no avanzar hacia esta armonización o hacia una legislación común se corre el riesgo de que los Estados flexibilicen sus
legislaciones. Es decir, los Estados pueden verse tentados a rebajar los requisitos para atraer a los patrones europeos y aumentar así
los ingresos que se derivan de abanderar una embarcación. Es verdad que en algunos casos parece necesaria cierta flexibilización,
pero, llevada al extremo, puede conducir a una reducción de la seguridad en el mar. Los principales atractivos de las legislaciones más
blandas son unos plazos menos exigentes para revisiones de seguridad, unos requisitos de equipo de seguridad a bordo menos
severos o incluso la no obligatoriedad del título de navegación. Dado que no mantener unos estándares mínimos necesarios en estos
ámbitos supondría un riesgo evidente, ¿no cree la Comisión que se debería actuar a nivel de la Unión?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(5 de mayo de 2014)_

Las características ambientales y de seguridad de las embarcaciones de recreo con una eslora inferior a 24 metros se hallan reguladas
a escala de la UE por la Directiva 94/25/CE. La Directiva abarca las características de diseño y construcción de las embarcaciones, así
como requisitos específicos sobre emisiones sonoras y de escape. Esta legislación ha facilitado en gran medida la protección de la
competencia, los consumidores y el medio ambiente, así como el comercio internacional en el sector. Si bien regula aspectos
ambientales y de seguridad, esta Directiva del mercado interior no se refiere al uso de embarcaciones de recreo. La Directiva
94/25/CE, relativa a las embarcaciones de recreo, fue revisada por la Directiva 2013/53/UE, que será aplicable a partir del 18 de
enero de 2016. La revisión no afecta a las cuestiones que se mencionan anteriormente.

En su reciente comunicación sobre una estrategia europea para un mayor crecimiento y empleo en el turismo costero y marítimo ( [1] ),
la Comisión reconoce, no obstante, que las diferencias existentes entre los Estados miembros en lo relativo a las competencias que se
exigen a los patrones de yates y las obligaciones sobre cualificaciones y equipos de seguridad pueden limitar el desarrollo
transfronterizo e incidir en el mercado de trabajo del sector náutico. La Comisión, por tanto, ha propuesto evaluar la necesidad de
que la UE redacte disposiciones respecto de los equipos de seguridad en el marco del turismo náutico, así como requisitos sobre
cualificaciones que deban reunir los patrones profesionales de yates y que deban observarse en el ámbito de la navegación de recreo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2014)86 final de 20.2.2014.

C 333 / 94 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002977/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Flag changes on European vessels

More and more skippers are choosing to register their boats under the flags of Member States other than that of the country of origin.
The main reason for this is to avoid strict national regulations and take advantage of others that are more lenient.

While it is true that any European citizen can change their nautical nationality as regards a boat for solely private use that is less than
24 metres long, would it not be advisable, nevertheless, to harmonise EU legislation in this area so that the requirements for
registering vessels under flags were more homogenous throughout the Union?

If progress is not made towards harmonisation or common legislation, there is a danger that States may make their laws more
flexible. In other words, countries may be tempted to relax their requirements in order to attract European skippers and thus increase
their revenue from registering vessels under their flags. The fact is that some relaxation may be needed in certain cases, but, if taken
too far, this may lead to a reduction in safety at sea. The main attractions of countries with more lenient laws are less strict time
periods for safety checks, less strict requirements for on-board safety equipment and even a lack of any obligation to hold navigation
qualifications. Given that failing to maintain certain minimum obligatory standards in these areas would entail a clear risk, does the
Commission not believe that steps should be taken at an EU-wide level?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 May 2014)_

Safety and environmental features of a recreational craft less than 24 metres long are regulated at EU level by Directive 94/25/EC.
The directive covers design and construction characteristics of a craft as well as specific requirements on noise and exhaust
emissions. This legislation has largely facilitated competition, consumer and environment protection, and international trade in the
sector. While regulating safety and environmental aspects, this internal market Directive does not cover the use of recreational craft.
The Recreational Craft Directive 94/25/EC was revised by Directive 2013/53/EU applicable as of 18 January 2016. The issues
mentioned above are not altered by the revision.

In its recent Communication on a ‘European strategy for more growth and jobs in coastal and maritime tourism’ ( [1] ), the Commission
has, nevertheless, acknowledged that differences between the Member States in terms of competences required from yacht skippers
and obligations for qualifications and safety equipment can limit cross-border development and affect the nautical job market. The
Commission therefore proposed to assess the need for EU action on provisions for nautical tourism safety equipment as well as on
qualification requirements for professional yacht skippers and recreational boating.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 86 final of 20.2.2014.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 95

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002978/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Cooperación científica internacional — delegaciones exteriores de la UE

Algunas delegaciones exteriores de la UE cuentan con la figura de consejero/a de ciencia y tecnología, lo cual constituye una
excelente oportunidad debido a la importancia de cooperar en estas materias con terceros países. Los beneficios de una cooperación
en ciencia y tecnología son mutuos para la UE y para los terceros países.

¿Podría informarnos la Comisión de la presencia de estos consejeros en las delegaciones exteriores de la UE? ¿Es frecuente que existan
secciones o unidades de cooperación en ciencia y tecnología en las delegaciones? ¿Existen estas unidades en delegaciones en países
con los que la cooperación científica y tecnológica es clave, como podría ser Estados Unidos, los BRIC o potencias científicas y
tecnológicas de Asia?

**Respuesta de la alta representante y vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(20 de mayo de 2014)_

La UE tiene actualmente consejeros de investigación e innovación en siete Delegaciones (Unión Africana/Adís Abeba, Brasil, China,
India, Japón, Rusia y Estados Unidos). Además, en las Delegaciones en Australia, Egipto, Israel y Corea del Sur disponemos de agentes
locales a jornada completa dedicados a la investigación y la innovación. Esta lista coincide casi totalmente con la lista de los diez
socios estratégicos de la Unión.

Sin embargo, la diplomacia en el ámbito de la ciencia no se limita a esos países. Para dar solo un ejemplo, un servicio de la Comisión
(DG RTD) remitió a principios de este mes documentación de promoción sobre Horizonte 2020 a todas las Delegaciones de la UE
para su posterior distribución, en el marco de una cooperación regular e intensa con el SEAE.

Así pues, para responder a la preocupación expresada por Su Señoría, están cubiertos los Estados Unidos, los países BRIC y los
principales centros científicos y tecnológicos.

C 333 / 96 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002978/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ International scientific cooperation — EU external delegations

Certain external delegations of the EU include advisors on science and technology, which, because of the importance of cooperating
in these areas with third countries, represents an excellent opportunity for doing so. The benefits from collaboration in science and
technology are mutual for both the EU and these third countries.

Could the Commission inform us about the presence of such advisors in external delegations of the EU? Is the existence of sections or
units of cooperation in science and technology common in the delegations? Do such units exist in delegations to countries with
which cooperation in science and technology is crucial, such as the United States, the BRIC countries and the scientific and
technological power-houses of Asia?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The EU currently has Research and Innovation Counsellors in 7 Delegations (African Union /Addis Ababa; Brazil; China, India,
Japan, Russia, United States). In addition, in the Delegations in Australia, Egypt, Israel and South Korea, we have full time local staff
dedicated to research and innovation. This list almost perfectly matches the list of the 10 strategic partners of the Union.

However, science diplomacy is not limited to these countries. To give only one example, earlier this month, a Commission service
(DG RTD) transmitted promotion materials on Horizon 2020 to all EU Delegations for further distribution, in the framework of a
regular and intense cooperation with the EEAS.

So, to answer the concern of the Honourable Member of the Parliament, the United States, the BRIC countries and the main scientific
and technological power-houses are covered.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 97

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002979/14**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**
_(13 de março de 2014)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Protocolo Adicional II e revisão do direito internacional humanitário

Embora ofereça proteção aos civis que se veem confrontados com conflitos armados, o Protocolo Adicional II das Convenções de
Genebra de 1949 ainda não define claramente o que se entende por agentes armados não estatais, nem inclui critérios para a
aplicação do conceito de responsabilidade penal individual.

Qual é a posição da UE quanto ao direito internacional humanitário, e, em particular, em relação ao Protocolo Adicional II no que se
refere aos conflitos armados não internacionais?

Pretende a UE encorajar os Estados-Membros a fazerem avançar a revisão do direito internacional humanitário?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(10 de junho de 2014)_

A União Europeia é um dos grandes defensores do direito internacional humanitário (DIH), bem como dos princípios humanitários,
e continua a aplicar as diretrizes da UE sobre o DIH, adotadas em 2005 e atualizadas em 2009, que são utilizadas como instrumento
para promover a observância do DIH por Estados terceiros e intervenientes não estatais.

No seu Quadro Estratégico e Plano de Ação para os Direitos Humanos e a Democracia, de 2012, a UE comprometeu-se a recorrer de
forma mais sistemática ao diálogo político e a campanhas de diligências para incentivar os países terceiros a ratificarem os principais
instrumentos do DIH e cumprirem as obrigações que dele decorrem. Para o efeito, a UE está a realizar uma campanha a favor da
ratificação dos Protocolos Adicionais I e II.

A UE e os seus Estados-Membros estão convencidos de que a aplicação efetiva a nível nacional do direito internacional humanitário e
de outros instrumentos jurídicos pertinentes em vigor que tenham um impacto sobre o direito internacional humanitário constitui
uma questão prioritária. Estão atualmente em curso consultas relativas ao reforço da observância do DIH, organizadas pelo Governo
suíço e pelo CICV, tendo em vista a elaboração de um relatório a apresentar na 32. [a] Conferência Internacional da Cruz Vermelha e do
Crescente Vermelho, em 2015.

C 333 / 98 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002979/14**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Additional Protocol II and revision of international humanitarian law

While Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 offers protections to civilians facing non-international armed
conflicts, it still lacks a clear definition of non-state armed actors and fails to include criteria for applying the concept of individual
criminal responsibility.

What is the EU’s position on international humanitarian law, and more specifically on Additional Protocol II regarding noninternational armed conflicts?

Is the EU looking to encourage the Member States to push forward the agenda for revising international humanitarian law?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 June 2014)_

The EU is a major advocate for International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and humanitarian principles and continues to implement
the EU Guidelines on IHL, adopted in 2005 and updated in 2009, which serve as a tool to promote compliance with IHL by third
states and non-state actors.

In its 2012 Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the EU pledged to make more systematic use of
political dialogue and demarche campaigns to encourage third countries to ratify core IHL instruments and implement IHL
obligations. To this end, the EU is conducting a campaign for the ratification of Additional Protocols I and II.

The EU and its Member States are convinced that national implementation and enforcement of existing international humanitarian
law and other relevant existing legal instruments which have an impact on international humanitarian law are a continuous matter of
priority. Consultations directed by the Swiss Government and the ICRC with regard to strengthening compliance are on-going with a
view to a report to the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in 2015.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 99

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002980/14**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**
_(13 de março de 2014)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — As mulheres nos conflitos armados

A UE reconhece a importância da necessidade de proteger as mulheres da violência nos conflitos armados, tal como o demonstram
as numerosas leis e políticas que elaborou, bem como as resoluções aprovadas pelo Parlamento sobre este assunto, juntamente com
as do Conselho de Segurança da ONU.

Que medidas empreendeu a UE no sentido de complementar os esforços para aplicar as resoluções da ONU sobre as mulheres, a paz
e a segurança no domínio dos conflitos armados não internacionais?

Que iniciativas concretas está a UE a desenvolver para prevenir situações de violência sexual nos conflitos armados não
internacionais?

Qual é a posição da UE relativamente à prevenção através da colaboração com grupos armados não estatais a fim de acabar com o
uso de violência, responsável por amplas violações dos direitos humanos e outros crimes graves nos conflitos armados não
internacionais?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(24 de junho de 2014)_

A proteção contra a violência ligada a questões de género é uma das prioridades do Quadro Estratégico da UE e do Plano de Ação da
UE para os Direitos Humanos e a Democracia.

A UE trabalha em estreita colaboração com as Nações Unidas, em especial com o Gabinete da Representante Especial sobre a
Violência Sexual em Conflitos, o Gabinete do Alto Comissariado para os Direitos do Homem e a ONU Mulheres.

A UE foi muito ativa na adoção da Declaração do G8 de 2013 sobre a prevenção da violência sexual em situações de conflito e está a
implementar iniciativas e projetos concretos sobre este tema. Em 2013, a UE lançou um projeto na República Democrática do
Congo, no montante de 25 milhões de EUR, que incide na mudança de comportamento e mentalidade, na emancipação das
mulheres, na luta contra a impunidade e na reforma do setor da segurança. No norte da Nigéria está prestes a ser lançado um projeto
de 10 milhões de EUR para garantir a participação das mulheres no processo de consolidação da paz.

No quadro da «Nova Iniciativa Europeia para a Formação em Gestão Civil de Crises» (ENTRI) ao abrigo do Instrumento de
Estabilidade, a UE está a apoiar ações de formação sobre a violência sexual. Os convites à apresentação de propostas, geridos a nível
local e regional ao abrigo do Instrumento de Estabilidade para ações da sociedade civil, centram-se no desenvolvimento de
mecanismos que permitam dar uma melhor resposta à violência ligada ao género em situações de crise e de conflito e integrar a
dimensão do género e da prevenção da violência contra mulheres e raparigas como aspetos transversais das questões de consolidação
da paz.

As linhas de orientação da União Europeia relativas à promoção do direito internacional humanitário (DIH) estabelecem um quadro
jurídico segundo o qual temos o dever de assegurar a promoção do DIH e combater a impunidade. Estas orientações, consentâneas
com o empenhamento da UE e dos Estados-Membros no DIH, pretendem abordar a questão da observância do DIH pelos Estados
terceiros e, se for o caso, pelos intervenientes não estatais que operam em Estados terceiros.

C 333 / 100 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002980/14**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Women in armed conflicts

The EU recognises the importance of the need to protect women from violence in armed conflicts, as can be seen from the numerous
laws and policies it has enacted and from the resolutions adopted by Parliament on this subject, alongside those of the UN Security
Council.

What action has the EU taken to supplement efforts to implement UN resolutions on women, peace and security in the area of noninternational armed conflicts?

What is the EU doing to prevent sexual violence from occurring in non-international armed conflicts?

What is the EU’s position on prevention by means of engaging with non-state armed groups in order to stop the use of violence
leading to extensive human rights violations and other serious crimes in non-international armed conflicts?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 June 2014)_

Protection against gender-based violence is one of the priorities under the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human
Rights and Democracy.

The EU cooperates closely with the UN, in particular with the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as UN Women.

The EU has been very active in adopting the 2013 G8 Declaration on preventing sexual violence in conflict and is implementing
concrete projects and initiatives on the topic. In 2013 a EUR 25 million EU project was launched in the Republic Democratic of
Congo focusing on behaviour and mentality change, women empowerment, fight against impunity and security sector reform. A
EUR 10 million project is about to be launched in the northern Nigeria to ensure the participation of women in the peace building

process.

Under the well-established Instrument for Stability ‘Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management’ (ENTRi) the EU
is supporting training activities addressing sexual violence. Local and regionally managed Instrument for Stability calls for proposals
for civil society actions focus on the development of mechanisms to better respond to gender-based violence in situations of crisis
and conflict and to mainstream gender and violence against women and girls prevention as cross-cutting aspects of peace building
issues.

The EU Guidelines on promotion of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) set out a legal framework by which we have a duty to
ensure we promote IHL and fight impunity. They are in line with the commitment of the EU and its Member States to IHL, and aim to
address compliance with IHL by third States, and, as appropriate, non-State actors operating in third States.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 101

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002981/14**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**
_(13 de março de 2014)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Proteção de crianças em conflitos armados

A proteção de crianças em conflitos armados é uma prioridade para a UE, conforme definido nas Diretrizes da UE sobre as Crianças e
os Conflitos Armados. A UE entendeu também dar o seu apoio à Resolução 1612 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas,
adotada em 2005, que propunha a criação de um mecanismo internacional de vigilância e de informação, com vista a proteger as
crianças envolvidas em conflitos armados.

Na resolução exorta-se o Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas a pôr em prática um mecanismo de vigilância e de informação que
incida sobre as partes envolvidas em conflitos armados enumeradas nos anexos do relatório do Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas.
No entanto, importa registar que os anexos não incluem diversos países onde se continua a recrutar e utilizar crianças‐soldado. Além
disso, inúmeras partes referidas nos anexos não constituem grupos armados não estatais.

Que medidas está a UE a tomar para proteger as crianças contra o recrutamento e a sua utilização enquanto crianças-soldado por
grupos armados não estatais que não constam dos anexos do relatório do Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas e que, por conseguinte,
não estão sujeitos ao mecanismo de vigilância e de informação proposto pela Resolução 1612 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações
Unidas?

Além disso, em diversos casos, grupos armados não estatais perturbaram gravemente atividades educativas nas sociedades onde
operam. Que iniciativas está a UE a desenvolver para impedir ataques por parte de grupos armados não estatais em escolas, em
especial por grupos que não estão sujeitos ao mecanismo de vigilância e de informação proposto pela Resolução 1612 do Conselho
de Segurança das Nações Unidas?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(22 de maio de 2014)_

Proteger as crianças das consequências dos conflitos armados é uma prioridade da política externa da UE. Por isso, a UE alinha a sua
política com a das Nações Unidas, procedendo anualmente à atualização de uma lista abrangente de grupos armados estatais e não
estatais que recrutam ou utilizam crianças. A UE apoia a iniciativa «Crianças, Não Soldados» da Representante Especial do SecretárioGeral, Leila Zerrougui, e da Unicef e, em fevereiro de 2014, as Delegações da UE exortaram os ministros responsáveis dos oito países
que figuram na lista a aderirem à iniciativa e a executarem os planos de ação respetivos.

O Conselho Europeu identificou recentemente sete países piloto que receberão apoio da UE para a execução dos planos de ação
assinados pela ONU e pelos intervenientes estatais e não estatais. Embora todos esses países figurem no relatório anual do SecretárioGeral, a UE, através dos seus programas humanitários e de desenvolvimento, intervém também noutros países em que existem
crianças em risco de serem recrutadas ou utilizadas por grupos armados. As necessidades mais urgentes das crianças atingidas por
conflitos armados são cobertas pela ajuda humanitária da UE. Por exemplo, a iniciativa da UE «Crianças da Paz» já beneficiou cerca de
108 000 crianças afetadas por conflitos. A UE tem em conta o impacto a mais longo prazo sobre as crianças nos projetos financiados
pelos diferentes instrumentos de desenvolvimento e tenciona incluir nos documentos de programação da ajuda para o período
2014-2020 apoio para as crianças afetadas por conflitos armados.

Em 2011, a União Europeia apoiou firmemente a adoção da Resolução 1998 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, presidido pela
Alemanha, que condenou, entre outros, todos os ataques a escolas e hospitais, perpetrados tanto por grupos estatais como não
estatais, e alargou a lista de violações graves contra as crianças que está na base da lista constante do relatório anual do SecretárioGeral que inclui os ataques a escolas e hospitais. A aplicação desta resolução é uma prioridade para a UE. A Resolução mais recente
do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, 2143 de 7 de março de 2014, adotada sob a presidência do Luxemburgo, vai mais longe na
tentativa de erradicar os ataques a escolas e hospitais.

C 333 / 102 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002981/14**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Protection of children in armed conflicts

The protection of children in armed conflicts is a priority for the EU, as outlined in the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed
Conflict. The EU has also given its willing support to UN Security Council Resolution 1612, adopted in 2005, which proposed that
an international monitoring and reporting mechanism be set up with the aim of protecting children involved in armed conflicts.

The resolution urged the UN Secretary-General to implement such a monitoring and reporting mechanism for those parties involved
in armed conflicts that are listed in annexes to the UN Secretary-General’s report. However, it is important note that the annexes fail
to list several countries in which child soldiers continue to be recruited and used. Moreover, a large number of the parties mentioned
in the annexes are non-state armed groups.

What measures is the EU taking to protect children from being recruited and used as child soldiers by non-state armed groups not
listed in the annexes to the UN Secretary-General’s report and, hence, not subject to the monitoring and reporting mechanism
proposed in UN Security Council Resolution 1612?

In addition, in several instances non-state armed groups have disrupted educational activities in the societies in which they operate.
What steps is the EU taking to prevent attacks by non-state armed groups on schools, in particular groups not subject to the
monitoring and reporting mechanism proposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1612?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

The protection of children from the effects of armed conflict is a priority in EU foreign policy, and the EU has aligned its policy with
that of the United Nations, which annually updates a comprehensive list of state and non-state armed groups that recruit or use
children. The EU supports the ‘Children, Not Soldiers’ initiative of the UN SRSG, Leila Zerrougui, and Unicef, and in February 2014,
EU Delegations lobbied ministers in the eight countries concerned to join the initiative and to implement their respective Action
Plans.

The European Council recently identified seven pilot countries in which the EU will support the implementation of the action plans
signed by the UN and relevant state or non-state actors. While all of those countries are listed in the UN Secretary General's annual
report, the EU is also engaged, through its humanitarian and development programmes, in other countries where children are at risk
of recruitment and use by armed groups. The most urgent needs of children affected by armed conflict are covered by the EU's
humanitarian aid. For example, the EU's Children for Peace initiative has reached out to approximately 108 000 children in a range
of conflict-affected. The longer-term impact of conflict on children is addressed through projects funded by the EU's various
development instruments, and the EU's intention is to include support to children affected by armed conflict in the assistance
programming documents for 2014-2020.

The EU strongly supported the adoption in 2011 of UN Security Council Resolution 1998, under the German UNSC presidency,
which i.e. condemned all attacks on schools and hospitals, whether carried out by state or non-state armed groups, and expanded the
list of grave violations against children that result in a listing in the Secretary General's annual report to include attacks on schools
and hospitals. The implementation of that resolution remains a priority for the EU. The most recent UN Security Council Resolution
2143 of 7 March 2014, adopted under the Luxembourg UNSC presidency, further tries to eradicate attacks on schools and hospitals.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 103

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002982/14**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**
_(13 de março de 2014)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — A observância do Direito Internacional Humanitário (DIH) por grupos armados não estatais

No seu Quadro Estratégico para os Direitos Humanos e a Democracia, de 2012, a UE afirmou que continuaria a apoiar a divulgação
do DIH a todas as partes em conflito, inclusive os grupos armados não estatais ( [1] ).

Além disso, as Diretrizes da UE sobre os direitos humanos e o direito internacional humanitário destacam que a União tem por
objetivo influenciar os países terceiros e grupos não estatais no sentido da aplicação das normas, dos padrões e instrumentos
internacionais e regionais em matéria de direitos humanos, bem como do direito internacional humanitário ( [2] ).

Que trabalho tem sido realizado pela UE para assegurar que os grupos armados não estatais se comprometem a cumprir o direito
internacional humanitário, em consonância com o Quadro Estratégico, e para acompanhar esse processo?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(10 de junho de 2014)_

A União Europeia é um dos grandes defensores do direito internacional humanitário (DIH), bem como dos princípios humanitários,
e continua a aplicar as diretrizes da UE sobre o DIH, adotadas em 2005 e atualizadas em 2009, que são utilizadas como instrumento
para promover a observância do DIH por Estados terceiros e intervenientes não estatais.

A UE continua a apoiar a divulgação do DIH a todas as partes em conflito, inclusive os grupos armados não estatais, com o objetivo
de promover o cumprimento do DIH e garantir o acesso humanitário. Entre os exemplos concretos da sua ação incluem-se o apoio
financeiro concedido pela UE a um projeto, executado pela Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fundação Suíça para a Desminagem)
e o Geneva Call (Apelo de Genebra), destinado a ministrar formação a intervenientes armados não estatais no domínio do direito
internacional humanitário e normas humanitárias conexas. A UE financiou igualmente um projeto executado pela Cruz Vermelha
finlandesa destinado a aumentar a sensibilização para o direito internacional humanitário e os princípios humanitários por parte das
organizações humanitárias europeias e dos seus parceiros de execução em países propensos a conflitos ou em situação pós-conflito.
Além disso, a UE presta atualmente apoio financeiro a um projeto de reforço da capacidade do CICV em matéria de formação e
divulgação do DIH junto de militares, forças de segurança e intervenientes não estatais armados nos principais países afetados por
conflitos: Iraque, Colômbia e a RDC. Além disso, a UE está igualmente a financiar um projeto da Swiss Foundation for Mine Action e
do Geneva Call que prevê ações de formação sobre direito internacional humanitário para intervenientes armados não estatais no
Sudão; esta ação apoiará também a organização de uma reunião dos signatários dos Atos de Compromisso para rever e promover a
aplicação desses mesmos Atos.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC8308123ENC.pdf

C 333 / 104 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002982/14**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Ana Gomes (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Non-state armed groups' compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL)

In its 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, the EU stated that it would ‘continue to support IHL
dissemination to all warring parties, including armed non-State actors’ ( [1] ).

In addition, the EU Guidelines on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law highlight the EU’s objective ‘to influence third
countries and non-state actors to implement international and regional human rights norms, standards and instruments, as well as
international humanitarian law’ ( [2] ).

How is the EU working to engage and monitor non-state armed groups on their compliance with international humanitarian law, in
line with its Strategic Framework?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 June 2014)_

The EU is a major advocate for International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and humanitarian principles and continues to implement
the EU Guidelines on IHL, adopted in 2005 and updated in 2009, which serve as a tool to promote compliance with IHL by third
states and non-state actors.

For the specific purpose of promoting compliance with IHL and safeguarding humanitarian access, the EU continues to support IHL
dissemination to all warring parties, including armed non-State actors. Concrete examples include EU financial support to a project,
implemented by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action and Geneva Call, to provide training in international humanitarian law and
related humanitarian norms to armed non-state actors. The EU also funded a project by the Finnish Red Cross on increasing
awareness of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles among European humanitarian organisations and their
implementing partners working in conflict-prone or post-conflict countries. In addition, the EU is currently providing financial
support to a project enhancing ICRC's capacity to provide IHL training and dissemination for military/security forces and armed
non-state actors in key conflict affected countries: Iraq, Colombia and DRC. Also, the EU is also currently funding the Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action and Geneva Call for a project under which trainings of armed non-state actors on IHL will take place in
Sudan; the action will also support a meeting of signatories of the Deeds of Commitment in order to review and promote the
implementation of the Deeds.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC8308123ENC.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 105

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002983/14**

**to the Commission**
**Ana Gomes (S&D) and Sylvie Guillaume (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Extradition of Aleksandr Pavlov to Kazakhstan

Aleksandr Pavlov, former head of security of Mukhtar Ablyazov, is a Kazakh dissident and the main opposition figure to the current
President, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The Spanish Council of Ministers has recently approved Mr Pavlov’s extradition to Kazakhstan. The decision was taken without
informing him or his lawyer. To date, the government has not officially informed Mr Pavlov of the decision, and his lawyer found out
almost by chance, via informal channels. Such secrecy may be considered an attempt to render impossible the immediate appeal to
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Spanish National High Court (Audiencia Nacional) has issued a temporary
injunction, pending the final decision in the asylum appeal procedure.

The Spanish newspaper _El País_ reported that the Kazakh Ambassador to Spain had attempted to influence National Court judges to
approve the extradition, and that a Spanish judge was pressing the competent court division to carry out the extradition, as a Kazakh
military plane was awaiting Pavlov to take him to Kazakhstan. If these reports are verified, they will call into question the impartiality
of the decision and the independence of the judiciary, clearly indicating the political nature of the case. Worrying comparisons could
also be drawn with the case of Alma Shalabayeva, which took place in Italy at the end of May 2013.

If extradited to Kazakhstan, Pavlov would risk facing ill treatment or even death. As a number of international reports have
demonstrated, he could not expect a fair and impartial trial.

Is the Commission monitoring the respect of human rights pursuant to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Article 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for this case specifically?

Has the Commission urged the Spanish authorities to ensure that Mr Pavlov’s rights are respected and that the scenario of the case of
Alma Shalabayeva is not repeated?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The Commission is following closely the case of Mr Aleksandr Pavlov. Regarding the questions pertaining to extradition, this is under
the competence of Member States and is done in accordance with national law and international treaties.

The EU consistently raises human rights issues in its political dialogue with Kazakhstan at all levels, and in detail in the framework of
the annual Human Rights Dialogue, which last time took place on 27 November 2013 in Astana. The importance of implementing
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol was
particularly emphasised.

C 333 / 106 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002984/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(13 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Rumore e salute

In un lungo articolo pubblicato su «Lancet» da un gruppo di esperti di diverse discipline della Commissione internazionale sugli
effetti biologici del rumore (ICBEN) si afferma che viviamo assediati dai suoni, senza renderci conto dei danni che questo comporta,
non solo all'apparato uditivo, ma anche a quello cardiovascolare e nervoso, che si traducono in una lunga serie di disturbi e in vere e
proprie malattie, tra l'altro, dai costi altissimi. Scopriamo ad esempio che nel mondo il rumore ha compromesso l'udito di 1,3
miliardi di persone, tanto negli Usa quanto in Europa, e che le cadute associate a questo deficit, negli ultimi vent'anni, sono
aumentate del 20 %. Traffico (strade e gomme), musica, frastuono e ronzii costanti assediano i cittadini con suoni esagerati, causando
stress, cardiopatie, danni dell'udito e cadute. Eppure l'UE con la direttiva 2002/49/CE impegnava gli Stati membri a completare la
divisione in zone acustiche delle città con più di 250 000 abitanti entro il 2007 e poi i centri urbani con più di 100 000 residenti
entro il 2012.

1. Può la Commissione indicare quali Stati hanno rispettato la direttiva nei tempi previsti?

2. Per gli Stati non in regola sono previste sanzioni?

3. Potrebbe chiedere agli Stati membri di vietare la musica ad alto volume nei rifugi e nelle stazioni in alta montagna, in riva al
mare e comunque nei luoghi nei quali la gente intende riposare ed essere a contatto con la natura?

4. Perché non prevede l'organizzazione di corsi ad hoc per amministratori pubblici, così poco sensibili alla questione
dell'inquinamento acustico?

5. Ha proposte in cantiere per la riduzione del rumore derivante dal manto stradale e dagli pneumatici degli autoveicoli, oltre che
dai motori?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(23 maggio 2014)_

La direttiva sul rumore ambientale ( [1] ) richiede una mappatura acustica e la preparazione di piani d'azione per gli agglomerati e le
principali strade, ferrovie e aeroporti e contiene una serie di diversi obblighi e termini per gli Stati membri. La maggior parte degli
Stati membri — con l'eccezione della Lituania che si è conformata a tutti i requisiti della direttiva — non ha ancora applicato
integralmente tutte le disposizioni della stessa.

La Commissione segue da vicino l'attuazione della direttiva sul rumore ambientale e intende assicurarne il rispetto con tutti gli
strumenti legali a sua disposizione.

Il rumore derivante dalle attività domestiche e il rumore provocato dai vicini — ad esempio musica suonata ad alto volume — sono
esclusi dall'ambito di applicazione della direttiva sul rumore ambientale. Tuttavia, la direttiva chiede che i piani d'azione degli Stati
membri siano finalizzati ad evitare aumenti del rumore nelle zone silenziose ( [2] ).

Per quanto riguarda gli aspetti tecnici della direttiva sul rumore ambientale, la Commissione è in contatto con gli esperti degli Stati
membri e del SEE. Essa ritiene tuttavia che l'organizzazione di corsi ad hoc per amministratori pubblici — se ritenuti necessari dagli
Stati membri — sia di competenza delle autorità nazionali, regionali o locali.

I limiti di emissione sonora dei veicoli a motore sono oggetto di un regolamento ( [3] ) di recente pubblicazione mentre gli pneumatici
dei veicoli a motore sono disciplinati da una legislazione specifica ( [4] ). Per quanto riguarda il manto stradale, le informazioni
trasmesse dagli Stati membri nella mappatura acustica delle strade prevista dalla direttiva sul rumore ambientale potrebbero
costituire la base di un futuro lavoro di ricerca sulla classificazione delle superfici stradali.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 189 del 18.7.2002, pag. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Zone silenziose negli agglomerati o in aperta campagna che devono essere definite dalle autorità competenti.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Non ancora pubblicato. Per ulteriori informazioni consultare il sito: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-363_en.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) GU L 200 del 31.7.2009, pag. 1.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 107

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002984/14**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Effects of noise on health

According to a long article published in _The Lancet_ by a group of experts in various medical disciplines belonging to the International
Commission on the Biological Effects of Noise (ICBEN), we live our lives surrounded by a barrage of noise, without realising the
damage that this causes not only to our hearing, but also to the cardiovascular and nervous systems. This damage is linked to a long
list of disorders and diseases, which in turn generate extremely high healthcare costs. For example, the article reveals that noise has
impaired the hearing of some 1.3 billion people in the USA and Europe, and that the number of falls resulting from hearing problems
has increased by 20% in the last 20 years. People are being assaulted by noise from traffic (roads and tyres), music and the constant
din of everyday life, leading to stress, heart disease, hearing problems and falls. However, under EU Directive 2002/49/EC Member
States were required to have completed strategic noise mapping of towns and cities with over 250 000 inhabitants by 2007, and of
urban centres with more than 100 000 residents by 2012.

1. Can the Commission say which Member States complied with the directive by the time limit laid down?

2. Can penalties be imposed on Member States which have not complied?

3. Will the Commission urge Member States to ban the playing of loud music in mountain huts and resorts, in seaside areas or
indeed any places where people go to rest and be in contact with nature?

4. Will the Commission consider organising ad hoc courses for public officials, whose awareness of the issue of noise pollution is
so low?

5. Does the Commission have plans to reduce the noise generated by road surfaces and vehicle tyres, as well as by engines?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2014)_

The Environmental Noise Directive ( [1] ) requires noise mapping and preparation of action plans for agglomerations and major roads,
railways and airports and contains a number of different obligations and deadlines for Member States. While most Member States have not
fully implemented all provisions of the directive, Lithuania has currently complied with all its requirements.

The Commission closely monitors the implementation of the Environmental Noise Directive and will ensure its respect, using the
available legal instruments.

Noise from domestic activities and noise created by neighbours — such as playing loud music — is excluded from the scope of the
Environmental Noise Directive. However, the directive requires that action plans of Member States protect quiet areas ( [2] ) against an
increase in noise.

The Commission is in contact with experts from Member States and the EEA on the technical aspects of the Environmental Noise
Directive. It however considers the organisation of ad hoc courses for public officials — if considered necessary by Member States —
as a task for the national, regional or local competent authorities.

Noise emission limits of motor vehicles have just been addressed by a new Regulation ( [3] ), and tyres for motor vehicles are addressed
by specific legislation ( [4] ). Regarding road surfaces, the information presented by Member States in the noise road maps provided for
by the Environmental Noise Directive could form the basis of future research work on road surface classification.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) quiet areas in an agglomerations or in open country, to be delimited by the competent authorities.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Not yet published, more information can be found at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-363_en.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 200, 31.7.2009.

C 333 / 108 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002985/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) y Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Posible incumplimiento de la cláusula 5 de la Directiva 1999/70/CE del Consejo por parte del Estado español respecto al
acceso a la función pública de la judicatura temporal

En su respuesta a nuestra pregunta E‐010480/2013 ( [1] ), la Comisión nos informa de que ha iniciado un proceso de investigación al
Estado español por posible infracción de la cláusula 5 de la Directiva 1999/70/CE. Debe hacerse mención expresa del arcaico sistema
de acceso a la carrera judicial llamado de «turno libre» ( [2] ), proveniente del siglo XIX, que consiste en superar dos exámenes orales
memorísticos de casi 400 temas ( [3] ) que el opositor debe preparar privadamente con un miembro integrante de la carrera judicial o
fiscal, llamado «preparador», quien obtiene importantísimos ingresos económicos mensuales ( [4] ). Este sistema requiere dedicación
exclusiva y excluyente, que impide realizar trabajo o labor alguna ( [5] ). El perverso sistema de acceso excluye a los ciudadanos sin
recursos económicos, a los profesionales juristas con larga experiencia forense o docente, entre ellos a la judicatura eventual, pues el
llamado «cuarto turno» o sistema de ingreso profesional es absolutamente residual ( [6] ), vulnerando así el acceso a la función pública en
condiciones de igualdad conforme a los principios de mérito y capacidad, ya que el ciudadano medio no puede abonar los 300 euros
mensuales o más al preparador (al que solo puede acceder un sector privilegiado económicamente de la sociedad), por lo que se
convierte en un sistema clasista y de castas. Por tanto, el sistema no solo excluye la profesionalidad y a los menos favorecidos
económicamente, sino también a las personas que superen una determinada edad, debido al sistema excluyente y exclusivo de
preparación y pese a un mejor expediente académico, experiencia profesional y mérito, lo que supone una evidente discriminación
indirecta por razón de edad, jactándose de ello el propio poder judicial ( [7] ). La paradoja llega al absurdo en el caso de los jueces
eventuales a quienes se niega la posibilidad real de acceso y, por ende, a ser contratados de forma indefinida pese a llevar años
ejerciendo el cargo y demostrando su valía, de tal forma que se perpetúa la utilización abusiva de la contratación temporal para
mantener un sistema con alto rendimiento económico para las altas instancias judiciales en España, encargadas de discriminar a la
judicatura eventual.

¿Considera la Comisión que España aplica de manera correcta y efectiva la cláusula 5 del Acuerdo marco incorporado en la Directiva
1999/70/CE del Consejo, de 28 de junio de 1999, que establece genéricamente «medidas destinadas a evitar la utilización abusiva» de
la contratación temporal? ¿Considera la Comisión que se está incumpliendo la Directiva 2000/78/CE del Consejo, de 27 de
noviembre de 2000, relativa al establecimiento de un marco general para la igualdad en el empleo y la ocupación, por la que se
prohíbe la discriminación indirecta por motivos de edad?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002986/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) y Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Posible incumplimiento de la cláusula 5 de la Directiva 1999/70/CE del Consejo por parte del Estado español por la
utilización abusiva de la contratación temporal en la judicatura eventual

En su respuesta a nuestra pregunta E-010480/2013 ( [8] ) la Comisión nos indica que ha iniciado una investigación sobre una posible
infracción de la cláusula 5 de la Directiva 1999/70/CE en el Estado español. Debe relacionarse, en cuanto a tal investigación, que —
existiendo la figura de la judicatura eventual desde 1986 ( [9] ) hasta la actualidad ( [10] )— ni la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, ni el
Reglamento de la Carrera Judicial, ni el Estatuto Básico del Empleado Público —únicas normas que regulan la judicatura eventual; por
tanto, el Estado español— han implementado medida alguna de las establecidas en la cláusula 5.1 del Acuerdo Marco anexo a la
Directiva 1999/70/CE, ni ninguna otra medida legal equivalente y eficaz para prevenir abusos como consecuencia de la utilización
sucesiva de contratos de duración determinada en el colectivo de jueces sustitutos o eventuales. Al contrario de lo establecido en la
Directiva 1999/70/CE, tras veinticinco años de existencia, y toda vez que muchos de los integrantes del colectivo de jueces eventuales
han sido contratados sucesivamente durante decenios, cubriendo las acuciantes necesidades de planta judicial en el Estado, con la

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=ES
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Servicios/Acceso_a_la_Carrera_Judicial__Jueces_y_Fiscales
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/02/05/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-2234.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20130310/espana/negocio-preparadores-20130310.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.mundiario.com/articulo/politica/la-existencia-de-la-escuela-judicial-no-aminora-los-males-de-las-oposiciones-en-espana/

20130211235741003989.html

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/09/24/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-9898.pdf
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://www.poderjudicial.es/portal/site/cgpj/menuitem.0cb0942ae6fbda1c1ef62232dc432ea0
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=ES
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1986-10971
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2012/07/19/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-9670.pdf

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 109

modificación de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial por la Ley Orgánica 8/2012 y el Real Decreto 700/13 trata el Estado español de
eliminar y fulminar al colectivo y, en consecuencia, de no aplicar la normativa europea. El ordenamiento jurídico español no
contempla, pues, medidas contra los abusos de la contratación de duración determinada cometidos contra el colectivo de jueces
sustitutos y magistrados suplentes ni tampoco que se pueda transformar su relación contractual en indefinida, lo cual sí ha sido
regulado expresamente en el ámbito de los trabajadores del sector privado sometidos a relación laboral ( [11] ). Atendiendo a las
anteriores consideraciones y a la sentada doctrina del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea que se desprende de las sentencias
Adeneler (asunto C‐212/04) ( [12] ) y Marosu y Sardino (asunto C-53/04) ( [13] ):

¿Podría informarnos la Comisión de los resultados de dicha investigación en relación con una posible infracción por el Estado
español de la cláusula 5 del Acuerdo Marco de la Directiva 1999/70/CE en cuanto a las «medidas destinadas a evitar la utilización
abusiva» de la contratación temporal en la judicatura eventual? ¿Deben ser de aplicación a la judicatura eventual las normas de
conversión de sucesión de contratos de duración determinada en indefinidos que resultan de aplicación a los trabajadores del ámbito
privado sometidos a relación laboral?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002987/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) y Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Posible incumplimiento de la Cláusula Cuarta de la Directiva 1999/70/CE del Consejo por parte del Estado español sobre
igualdad de trato a la judicatura temporal

En su respuesta a nuestra pregunta E-010480/2013 ( [14] ) la Comisión nos indica que ha iniciado un proceso de investigación al Estado
español por posible infracción de la cláusula quinta de la Directiva 1999/70/CE. No puede disociarse tal investigación de la posible
infracción de igualdad de trato y no discriminación al colectivo de Jueces eventuales recogido en la cláusula Cuarta de la Directiva
1999/70/CE . Debe referirse que en España coexisten dos tipos de jueces profesionales, los «titulares» con contrato indefinido y los
«sustitutos» con contrato eventual (arts. 298.2, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ) ( [15] ) y 91 Reglamento de la Carrera Judicial
(RCJ) ( [16] )). Los sustitutos o eventuales son nombrados anualmente por concurso de méritos por el Consejo General del Poder Judicial
e incluidos en una lista de funcionarios con contrato eventual ( [17] ). Ambos tipos de jueces ejercen idénticas funciones jurisdiccionales,
con las mismas incompatibilidades y prohibiciones (Arts. 201.4, 389 a 397 LOPJ y 101 RC), y así ha sido reconocido por la STS de
8 de noviembre de 2012 ( [18] ). Conviene destacar que existen entre el cuerpo de Jueces titulares, los llamados «de Adscripción
Territorial» cuya labor es realizar, sustituciones, suplencias y refuerzos idénticamente que los «sustitutos». Pero mientras los titulares
son retribuidos mensualmente con cotización continua a la Seguridad Social, inclusive los de adscripción Territorial y en expectativa
de destino, los sustitutos, perciben salario y cotizan a la Seguridad Social exclusivamente por los días que son llamados, pese a
idéntica labor jurisdiccional y realización de suplencias, sustituciones y refuerzos. En caso contrario, no perciben salario alguno, no
cotizan a la Seguridad Social, carecen de cobertura médica y no pueden desarrollar otro trabajo o profesión —salvo la docencia—
por las incompatibilidades que les exigen disponibilidad y dedicación absolutas. Dicha situación, tras la drástica reducción de la
partida presupuestaria del Ministerio de Justicia de 25 M € en 2012 a 8 M € en 2013 ( [19] ), ha convertido las listas de jueces eventuales
en listas del hambre, sin posibilidades reales de trabajar y con una desprotección social absoluta. Todo ello, tras más de 25 años de
labor continua, fraudulentamente interina.

¿Considera la Comisión que se está cumpliendo correcta y efectivamente la Cláusula Cuarta sobre la igualdad de trato y no
discriminación de la Directiva 1999/70/CE del Consejo (28 de junio de 1999) relativa al acuerdo marco de la CES, UNICE, CEEP
sobre el Trabajo de duración determinada, al colectivo de judicatura eventual en el Estado español?

**Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(5 de mayo de 2014)_

Las investigaciones acerca del cumplimiento por parte del sistema judicial español de la Directiva 1999/70/CE, sobre el trabajo de
duración determinada ( [20] ), a las que se refieren Sus Señorías y que la Comisión anunció en su respuesta a la pregunta escrita
E-010480/2013 todavía no han finalizado. La Comisión ha pedido aclaraciones a las autoridades españolas y completará su análisis
basándose en su respuesta y en la información proporcionada por los denunciantes.

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( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/sec_leyes/trabajo/estatuto06/Apdo_3_4_estatuto.pdf
( **|** ⋅12∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CJ0212:ES:PDF
( **|** ⋅13∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CJ0053:ES:PDF
( **|** ⋅14∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=ES
( **|** ⋅15∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1985/BOE-A-1985-12666-consolidado.pdf
( **|** ⋅16∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/05/09/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-8049.pdf
( **|** ⋅17∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2012-11230
( **|** ⋅18∙ **|** ) http://www.elderecho.com/administrativo/Tribunal-Supremo-Contencioso-Administrativo-Sentencia-EDJ_EDEFIL20121128_0008.pdf
( **|** ⋅19∙ **|** ) http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215197982506/Estructura_P/1215198316441/Detalle.html, 2012 — pagina 11— partida 112 [a] – 125,

25 668,08 M €. 2013 — pagina 10 partida 112 [a] – 125, 8 540,39 M €.

( **|** ⋅20∙ **|** ) Directiva 1999/70/CE del Consejo, de 28 de junio de 1999, relativa al Acuerdo marco de la CES, la UNICE y el CEEP sobre el trabajo de duración determinada

(DO L 175 de 10.7.1999, p. 43).

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C 333 / 110 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

La Directiva 1999/70/CE no regula todos los aspectos del empleo de duración determinada. No regula, por ejemplo, los métodos y
procedimientos utilizados para la contratación de personal con contrato de duración determinada. Por consiguiente, no corresponde
a la Comisión investigar el procedimiento de contratación al que aluden Sus Señorías.

Por otro lado, la asignación de funciones y responsabilidades judiciales no guarda relación con las condiciones de empleo de los
jueces y, por tanto, no entra en el ámbito de aplicación de la Directiva 1999/70/CE ni del Derecho del Trabajo de la UE en general.

Por último, la Comisión, basándose en la información facilitada, no ha detectado ninguna incompatibilidad entre la legislación
española mencionada por Sus Señorías y la Directiva 2000/78/CE ( [21] ). No parece existir nexo alguno entre el sistema de selección
descrito y la edad de los candidatos.

En cualquier caso, esta Directiva ha sido correctamente transpuesta en España. Por tanto, si una persona considera que ha sido objeto
de discriminación debido a su edad, puede iniciar los procedimientos legales previstos en el Derecho nacional e impugnar las posibles
infracciones ante los tribunales nacionales.

( **|** ⋅21∙ **|** ) Directiva 2000/78/CE del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 2000, relativa al establecimiento de un marco general para la igualdad de trato en el empleo y la ocupación
(DO L 303 de 2.12.2000, p. 16).

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 111

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002985/14**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Potential violation by the Spanish State of clause 5 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC in relation to temporary judges' access
to public positions

In its answer to our Question E‐010480/2013 ( [1] ), the Commission informed us that it had launched an investigation into a potential
violation of clause 5 of Directive 1999/70/EC by the Spanish State. Specific mention should be made of the archaic ‘turno libre’ (‘free
turn’) system for accessing careers in the judiciary ( [2] ). Designed in the 19th century, it consists of two oral examinations on nearly
400 topics ( [3] ) to be memorised, which candidates must prepare for privately with a member of the judiciary or a public prosecutor —
a ‘preparer’ — who earns a huge amount of money from the process each month ( [4] ). The system requires candidates to dedicate their
time exclusively to preparing for the examinations, preventing them from doing any other kind of work ( [5] ). The illogical access
system rules out anyone lacking sufficient financial resources and legal professionals with significant court or teaching experience —
including interim judges — as the ‘cuarto turno’ (‘fourth turn’) professional admission system is minimal in scope ( [6] ). This means that
equal access is not guaranteed, since merit and ability are not the main criteria, as the average person cannot pay the preparer the
monthly fee of EUR 300 plus (which is only viable for the most affluent members of society). Due to the exclusive nature of the
preparations, it has become a classist caste system which is unreachable not only to professionals and anyone on low income, but
also to older people, despite the fact that they are more deserving, better qualified and have greater professional experience; the
Spanish judiciary itself has brazenly admitted to blatant indirect age discrimination ( [7] ). Strangest of all is the position of interim
judges who, despite years on the job proving their worth, are denied access to permanent contracts. Temporary recruitment is thus
being abused to prop up a system which is extremely lucrative for the upper echelons of the Spanish judiciary, who are systematically
discriminating against interim judges.

Does the Commission believe that Spain is correctly and effectively applying clause 5 of the framework Agreement in Council
Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, which lists general ‘measures to prevent abuse’ of temporary recruitment? Does the
Commission believe that Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment
in employment and occupation, which prohibits indirect discrimination based on age, is being violated?

**Question for written answer E-002986/14**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Potential violation of clause 5 of Council Directive 1999/70/EC by the Spanish State through abuse of the temporary
recruitment of interim judges

In its answer to our Question E-010480/2013 ( [8] ) the Commission told us that it had launched an investigation into a potential
violation of clause 5 of Directive 1999/70/EC by the Spanish State. An investigation such as this should take account of the fact that,
despite the interim judiciary having been set up in 1986 ( [9] ) and still being in existence ( [10] ), neither the Organic Law on the Spanish
Judiciary, nor the regulations on the Judicial Career, nor the Basic Statue of Public Employment (the only regulations governing the
interim judiciary) — nor, by extension, the Spanish State — have introduced any of the measures listed in clause 5.1 of the
framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, or any other equivalent and effective legal measures to prevent abuse
arising from the use of successive fixed-term contracts in the employment of substitute or interim judges. Contrary to
Directive 1999/70/EC, and despite the fact that the interim judiciary has been in existence for 25 years — many of its members
having been in continuous employment for decades owing to Spain’s urgent need for judges — the Spanish State is attempting to get
rid of it altogether by means of Organic Law 8/2012 amending the Organic Law on the Spanish Judiciary and Royal Decree 700/13,
and consequently avoid complying with European regulations. Spanish law does not contain any measures to prevent the abuse of
substitute judges and replacement magistrates through the use fixed-term contracts, nor can these contracts be made permanent —

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=EN
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Servicios/Acceso_a_la_Carrera_Judicial__Jueces_y_Fiscales
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/02/05/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-2234.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.laverdad.es/murcia/v/20130310/espana/negocio-preparadores-20130310.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.mundiario.com/articulo/politica/la-existencia-de-la-escuela-judicial-no-aminora-los-males-de-las-oposiciones-en-espana/

20130211235741003989.html

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/09/24/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-9898.pdf
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://www.poderjudicial.es/portal/site/cgpj/menuitem.0cb0942ae6fbda1c1ef62232dc432ea0
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=EN
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1986-10971
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=EN

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C 333 / 112 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

despite the existence of specific provisions to that effect in private sector employment law ( [11] ). In the light of the aforesaid and the
settled CJEU case-law in the ‘Adeneler’ (Case C‐212/04) ( [12] ) and ‘Marosu and Sardino’ (Case C‐53/04) judgments ( [13] ):

Could the Commission give us the results of the investigation into a potential violation by the Spanish State of clause 5 of Council
Directive 1999/70/EC concerning ‘measures to prevent abuse’ of the temporary recruitment of interim judges? Should private sector
regulations governing the upgrading of successive fixed-term contracts to permanent ones also apply to the interim judiciary?

**Question for written answer E-002987/14**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE), Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE), Maria**

**Badia i Cutchet (S&D), Raimon Obiols (S&D), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL) and Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Potential non-compliance by the Spanish State with Clause Four of Council Directive 1999/70/EC on the equal treatment of
fixed-term workers

In its answer to our Question E-010480/2013 ( [14] ), the Commission told us that it was investigating Spain for a possible breach of
Clause Five of Directive 1999/70/EC. This investigation cannot be separated from the potential infringement concerning the equal
treatment and non-discrimination relating to the group of fixed-term judges set out in Clause Four of Directive 1999/70/EC. It must
be pointed out that there are two types of professional judge in Spain: permanent judges, with a contract for an undetermined period,
and substitute judges, with a fixed-term contract (Art. 298.2 of the Organic Law of the Spanish Judiciary ( [15] ) and Art. 91 of the
regulations on the Judicial Career ( [16] )). Substitute or fixed-term judges are appointed annually through a competition based on merit
and are included on a list of public servants with a fixed-term contract ( [17] ). Both types of judge exercise the same jurisdictional
powers, with the same restrictions and limitations on holding multiple posts (Arts. 201.4, 389 to 397 of the Organic Law of the
Spanish Judiciary and Art. 101 of the regulations on the Judicial Career), as recognised by the Supreme Court ruling of
8 November 2012 ( [18] ). It should be highlighted that amongst the body of permanent judges there are also judges appointed
regionally, whose job is to serve as substitutions, replacements and support in the same way as substitute judges. However, whereas
permanent judges are paid monthly and make continuous payments towards Social Security, including these regional judges and as
expected by their role, substitute judges receive a salary and pay into Social Security only on days on which they are called up, despite
carrying out the same jurisdictional work and serving as substitutions, replacements and support. If they are not called up, they do
not receive a salary or make any Social Security payments, they are not afforded healthcare cover and they are not permitted to hold
any other job or profession — except for lecturing — due to the restrictions placed on them that require their constant availability
and dedication. Following a drastic reduction in the budget allocated by the Ministry of Justice from EUR 25m in 2012 to EUR 8m in
2013 ( [19] ), this situation has worsened with the lists of part-time judges becoming lists of competitors, without any real possibility of
work and a complete lack of social protection. All of this comes after 25 years of continued service, which is falsely classed as
temporary.

Does the Commission believe that Clause Four of Council Directive 1999/70/CE (28 June 1999) on equal treatment and nondiscrimination is being applied correctly and effectively, with respect to the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, for the group of fixed-term judges in Spain?

**Joint answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 May 2014)_

The investigations into the Spanish judicial system’s compliance with Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-term work ( [20] ) to which the
Honourable Members refer and which were announced in the Commission’s answer to Written Question E‐010480/2013 are still in
progress. The Commission has asked the Spanish authorities for clarifications and will complete its analysis on the basis of their reply
and the information provided by the complainants.

Directive 1999/70/EC does not regulate all aspects of fixed-term employment. It does not, for instance, regulate the methods and
procedures applied for the recruitment of fixed-term staff. As a consequence, it is not for the Commission to query the recruitment
procedure which the Honourable Members outline.

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( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/sec_leyes/trabajo/estatuto06/Apdo_3_4_estatuto.pdf
( **|** ⋅12∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CJ0212:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅13∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CJ0053:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅14∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-010480&language=ES
( **|** ⋅15∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/1985/BOE-A-1985-12666-consolidado.pdf
( **|** ⋅16∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/05/09/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-8049.pdf
( **|** ⋅17∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2012-11230
( **|** ⋅18∙ **|** ) http://www.elderecho.com/administrativo/Tribunal-Supremo-Contencioso-Administrativo-Sentencia-EDJ_EDEFIL20121128_0008.pdf
( **|** ⋅19∙ **|** ) http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215197982506/Estructura_P/1215198316441/Detalle.html

2012 — pagina 11 - partida 112 A - 125 EUR 25 668.08 million. 2013 — pagina 10 partida 112 [a] 125. EUR 8 540.39 million.

( **|** ⋅20∙ **|** ) Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ L 175,

10.7.1999, p 43.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 113

Furthermore, the allocation of judicial duties and responsibilities has no connection with the conditions of employment of judges
and therefore does not fall within the scope of Directive 1999/70/EC or EU labour law in general.

Finally, on the basis of the information provided, the Commission does not detect any incompatibility between the Spanish
legislation mentioned by the Honorary Members and Directive 2000/78/EC ( [21] ). There seems to be no link between the described
selection system and the age of the candidates.

In any event, this directive has been correctly transposed in Spain. Therefore, if a person believes that she or he has been
discriminated on the basis of her/his age, she/he can initiate legal proceedings provided for in the national law and contest possible
offences before the national courts.

( **|** ⋅21∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, p. 16, of
2.12.2000.

C 333 / 114 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002988/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Calidad del aire en Inca (Islas Baleares)

Considerando que en el municipio de Inca (Islas Baleares) el Gobierno de las Islas Baleares llevó a cabo una campaña de vigilancia de
la calidad del aire entre el 12 de febrero y el 29 de abril de 2011 y que el valor promedio de NO 2 alcanzado entre los dos puntos
donde se efectuó fue de 57 μg/m [3] ; considerando que en uno de los puntos donde se realizó la campaña el nivel de NO 2 fue de
62 μg/m [3], con un total de 5 superaciones del límite horario para la protección de la salud (200 μg/m [3] ) en el período analizado,
llegando a un máximo de 274 μg/m [3] ; considerando que el Gobierno Balear realizó una segunda campaña de vigilancia entre el 18 de
abril y el 25 de junio de 2013, siendo una de las conclusiones que el valor de inmisión de NO 2 alcanzó un valor anual medio
ponderado de 44 μg/m [3] y que los valores correspondientes a los meses de enero-marzo es probable que superen de forma
significativa el nivel de 40 μg/m [3] legislativamente establecido; considerando que los valores registrados de O 3 superaron en
19 ocasiones el valor octohorario de 120 μg/m [3], con un máximo de 136 μg/m [3],

Considerando que la Directiva 2008/50/CE sobre calidad del aire tiene como objetivo reducir la contaminación a niveles que limiten
al mínimo los efectos perjudiciales para la salud humana y el medio ambiente, y mejorar la información proporcionada a los
ciudadanos sobre los riesgos a los que se exponen; considerando que esta Directiva contempla que «cuando los niveles de
contaminantes en el aire ambiente superan cualquier valor límite o valor objetivo, así como el margen de tolerancia correspondiente
en cada caso, los Estados miembros elaboran planes de calidad del aire para esas zonas o aglomeraciones con el fin de conseguir el
valor objetivo o el valor límite previamente definido»; considerando que ni el ayuntamiento del municipio de Inca ni el Gobierno
Balear han exigido la elaboración de un plan de calidad del aire para reducir los niveles de los contaminantes,

¿Conocía la Comisión los elevados niveles de contaminación atmosférica en el municipio de Inca? ¿Considera la Comisión que, tal y
como indica la Directiva 2008/50/CE, debería exigir al Estado español o, en su defecto, al Gobierno Balear que elaborasen un plan de
calidad del aire para reducir los niveles de contaminantes? ¿Qué medidas piensa tomar la Comisión para garantizar el cumplimiento y
aplicación de la Directiva 2008/50/CE en las Islas Baleares, ante el caso expuesto anteriormente en la ciudad de Inca?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de mayo de 2014)_

Las campañas de medición de corta duración como las que menciona Su Señoría puede aportar información útil, pero sus resultados
deben interpretarse con prudencia. Los valores límite pertinentes en este contexto son el valor límite horario de NO 2 de 200 µg/m [3],
que no puede superarse más de 18 veces por año civil; el valor límite medio anual de 40 µg/m [3] para el NO 2 ; y el valor objetivo
octohorario de 120 µg/m [3] para el ozono que no puede superarse más de 25 días por año civil, promediados en un periodo de tres
años.

Ninguna de las dos campañas de control pone de manifiesto un incumplimiento del valor límite horario del NO 2 o del valor objetivo
octohorario del ozono, y los resultados de las campañas no pueden extrapolarse a escala del año civil o a las medias anuales de forma
concluyente.

Las autoridades españolas, en sus últimos informes anuales (para el año civil 2012), han informado del cumplimiento del valor límite
del NO 2 y del valor objetivo del ozono en la zona denominada «resto de Mallorca» dentro de la cual se encuentra la zona de Inca. Un
plan de calidad del aire únicamente es necesario en caso de superación del valor límite o del valor objetivo (artículo 23 de la Directiva
2008/50/CE ( [1] ).) Las autoridades españolas, en cualquier caso, tienen obligación de seguir controlando los niveles de concentración
de contaminantes y, si se confirma una situación de superación de acuerdo con la legislación aplicable de la UE, de informar sobre
ella y emprender las acciones necesarias para que el período de superación sea lo más breve posible.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DO L 152 de 11.6.2008, p. 1.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 115

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002988/14**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Air quality in Inca (Balearic Islands)

In view of the fact that the Government of the Balearic Islands conducted a campaign to monitor the air quality in the municipality of
Inca between 12 February and 29 April 2011, and the average NO 2 value between the two points where this monitoring was carried
out was 57 μg/m [3] ; in view of the fact that the level of NO 2 at one of the points where the monitoring was carried out was 62 μg/m [3],
with a total of five instances during the period under analysis when the hourly limit for the protection of human health (200 μg/m [3] )
was exceeded, reaching a peak of 274 μg/m [3] ; in view of the fact that the Balearic Government carried out a second monitoring
campaign between 18 April and 25 June 2013, one conclusion of which was that the NO 2 emission value reached a weighted
average annual value of 44 μg/m [3] and it is likely that these values will significantly exceed the legally established limit of 40 μg/m [3 ]

between January and March; in view of the fact that the O 3 values that were recorded exceeded the 8-hour value of 120 μg/m [3] on 19
occasions, reaching a maximum of 136 μg/m [3] .

In view of the fact that the aim of Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality is to reduce pollution to levels that minimise the
harmful effects on human health and the environment, and to improve the information provided to people on the risks to which
they are exposed; in view of the fact that this directive considers that ‘where, in given zones or agglomerations, the levels of
pollutants in ambient air exceed any limit value or target value, plus any relevant margin of tolerance in each case, Member States
shall ensure that air quality plans are established for those zones and agglomerations in order to achieve the predefined limit value or
target value’; in view of the fact that neither the municipal council of Inca nor the Balearic Government have commissioned an air
quality plan to reduce levels of pollution.

Is the Commission aware of the excessive levels of air pollution in the municipality of Inca? Does the Commission believe that, as
provided for by Directive 2008/50/CE, it should insist that Spain or, in its place, the Balearic Government put in place an air quality
plan to reduce pollution levels? What measures does the Commission intend to take in order to ensure that directive 2008/50/EC is
complied with and applied in the Balearic Islands, given the aforementioned case in the town of Inca?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

Short-term measuring campaigns like the ones mentioned by the Honourable Member can provide useful information, but their
results must be interpreted with caution. The relevant limit values in this context are the hourly limit value of 200 μg/m [3] for NO 2 not
to be exceeded more than 18 times per calendar year; the annual average limit value of 40 µg/m [3] for NO 2 ; and the 8-hour target value
for O 3 of 120 μg/m [3] not to be exceeded on more than 25 days per calendar year averaged over three years.

Neither of the two monitoring campaigns shows a breach of the hourly NO 2 limit value or of the 8-hourly O 3 target value, and the
results of the campaigns cannot be extrapolated to the calendar year time scale or to annual averages in a straightforward manner.

The Spanish authorities, in their last annual report (for the calendar year 2012), have reported compliance with the NO 2 limit value
and O 3 target value in the ‘Resto Mallorca’ zone within which Inca is situated. An air quality plan is required only in the case of
exceedance of the target and/or limit value (Article 23 of Directive 2008/50/EC ( [1] )). The Spanish authorities are in any case required
to continue to monitor the pollutant concentration levels and, if an exceedance situation according to the applicable EU legislation is
confirmed, to report it and to take the necessary action to keep the exceedance period as short as possible.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 152/1, 11.6.2008.

C 333 / 116 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002989/14**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Utilisation des données numériques au service de l'industrie touristique européenne

Comme le démontre l'ouvrage intitulé «Big Data: la révolution des données est en marche» de Viktor Mayer-Schönberger et Kenneth
Cukier, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une hyperinflation des données numériques. Alors qu'en 2000, un quart seulement des
informations consignées dans le monde existaient au format numérique, en 2013, le numérique représentait plus de 98 % du total,
avec une masse d'information estimée à mille deux cents exaoctets (milliards de milliards d'octets). L'ampleur des données
disponibles et leur analyse par des méthodes statistiques et des algorithmes, grâce au développement d'outils informatiques
surpuissants, rendent désormais les comportements humains plus facilement analysables et prévisibles.

L'utilisation de ces données numériques, dans le respect de la vie privée, constitue une filière d'avenir de la plus haute importance
stratégique et économique pour l'Union européenne, les applications étant infinies et le gisement d'emplois étant considérable,
notamment dans le domaine du tourisme. À terme, le phénomène «Big Data» permettra d'adapter, via des études de marché
prédictives, l'offre touristique au comportement réel des touristes avec des effets sur la programmation, la communication et les
transports. À titre d'exemple, en 2013, Marseille Capitale culturelle a expérimenté un vaste système de suivi des pratiques
touristiques basé sur l'analyse des signaux émis par les téléphones portables, permettant de mesurer la fréquentation des évènements
et les flux de touristes (volume et destination).

1. La Commission compte-elle exploiter le potentiel de «Big Data» en matière d'observation touristique au service d'une véritable
stratégie touristique européenne?

2. Compte tenu du coût important de la collecte des données non structurées, notamment pour les TPE du secteur touristique
européen, comment la Commission compte-elle soutenir les investissements dans les outils d'analyse de ces données?

**Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission**

_(16 mai 2014)_

La Commission reconnaît que l'analyse des données volumineuses constitue l'une des nouvelles technologies qui changent
l'économie. Elle prend donc actuellement des mesures concrètes conformément aux conclusions du Conseil d'octobre 2013, qui
reconnaissent les données volumineuses et l'informatique en nuage comme des priorités stratégiques pour l'Europe. En plus du plan
d'action européen «Entrepreneuriat 2020», la Commission travaille sur un éventuel cadre stratégique général pour l'Europe qui
permettrait de faire des données volumineuses un atout pour l'innovation fondée sur les données.

Plusieurs initiatives ont été lancées pour examiner le potentiel des données volumineuses en matière statistique, comme il est décrit,
par exemple, dans le mémorandum de Scheveningen sur les données volumineuses ( [1] ).

Dans le secteur du tourisme, le plan d'action actuel qui figure dans la communication ( [2] ) de 2010 affirme la nécessité d'une action
fiable fondée sur les connaissances pour stimuler la compétitivité du secteur. En ce qui concerne les statistiques du tourisme, la
Commission a lancé une étude afin d'évaluer la faisabilité de l'utilisation des données de positionnement au moyen des applications
mobiles; ses résultats sont attendus pour mai 2014. Ces données devraient avoir un effet positif sur la disponibilité future des
statistiques, y compris dans le secteur du tourisme.

La Commission encourage les États membres à utiliser des moyens de collecte modernes et à mieux intégrer les différents domaines
statistiques afin de maximiser les économies d'échelle et l'interoperabilité des sources, ce qui réduirait la charge et les coûts pour les
entreprises. Par exemple, au cours de la période 2010-2012, la Commission a lancé un projet ( [3] ) de collecte et diffusion automatisées
des données statistiques sur l'hébergement.

En ce qui concerne toutes les initiatives susmentionnées, il demeure évidemment important d'assurer une pleine conformité avec les
règles européennes et nationales applicables en matière de protection des données personnelles.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.cros-portal.eu/news/scheveningen-memorandum-big-data-and-official-statistics-adopted-essc
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0352:FIN:FR:PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.cros-portal.eu/content/tourism

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 117

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002989/14**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Using digital data to improve the European tourism industry

As Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier have shown in their study entitled ‘Big data: a revolution that will transform how
we live, work, and think’, in recent years the volume of data stored digitally has increased at a dizzying rate. In 2000, only a quarter of
the world’s data existed in digital format. By 2013 this proportion had risen to over 98%, equivalent to an estimated 1 200 exabytes
(one exabyte is 1018 bytes) of digital data worldwide. The sheer quantity of data now available and the statistical methods and
algorithms used to analyse it (thanks to the development of super-powerful computer programs) are making it easier to analyse and
predict human behaviour.

The ability to make use of digital data whilst still respecting privacy will be of great strategic and economic importance to the EU in
the future, as this data has limitless applications and offers considerable potential for job creation, in particular in the tourism
industry. The ‘big data’ revolution and predictions based on market research are helping the tourism industry to adapt to tourists’
changing needs, and this in turn is influencing decisions on scheduling, communication and transport. For instance, when Marseille
was the European capital of culture in 2013, the local authorities tested a system which used mobile phone signals to track the
number of tourists attending events all over the city and thus monitor tourism trends.

1. Does the Commission intend to use the big data revolution to its advantage and monitor tourism patterns with a view to
developing a European tourism strategy?

2. Given the significant cost of collecting raw data, particularly for micro-enterprises operating in the European tourism sector,
how will it encourage investment in software capable of processing the data collected?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

The Commission recognises that big data analytics is one of the new technologies that are changing the economy. Therefore it is
taking concrete steps in line with the Council Conclusions of October 2013 in which Big Data and Cloud Computing were
recognised as strategic priorities for Europe. In addition to the European Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan, it is working on a
possible overarching strategic framework for Europe that has the potential to make Big Data work for European data-driven
innovation.

Several initiatives were launched to explore the potential of Big Data for statistics, e.g. as described in the Scheveningen
Memorandum on Big Data ( [1] ).

In the tourism sector the current action plan embedded in the 2010 Communication ( [2] ) outlines the need for a reliable knowledge
based action to stimulate the competitiveness of the sector. In tourism statistics, a study by the Commission was launched to assess
the feasibility of using mobile positioning data, with the results to be available in May 2014. It is expected that mobile positioning
data will have a positive influence on the availability of statistics in the future, including in the area of tourism.

The Commission is encouraging Member States to use modern collection means and to better integrate different areas of statistics so
as to maximise economies of scale and interoperability of sources, thereby reducing the burden and costs for enterprises. For
example in 2010-12, the Commission set up a project ( [3] ) on automated data collection and reporting in accommodation statistics.

With respect to all of the abovementioned initiatives it remains of course important that full compliance with the applicable EU and
national rules on the protection of personal data is ensured.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.cros-portal.eu/news/scheveningen-memorandum-big-data-and-official-statistics-adopted-essc
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0352:FIN:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.cros-portal.eu/content/tourism

C 333 / 118 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002991/14**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(13 martie 2014)_

_Subiect:_ Reutilizarea clădirilor industriale

Delocalizarea unor societăți comerciale în afara Uniunii Europene sau închiderea unor întreprinderi tradiționale din diverse motive
lasă, de cele mai multe ori, în urma lor o serie de imobile industriale care fac parte din patrimoniul industrial și cultural local, regional
și național.

Acest patrimoniu nu aparține doar patronilor societăților în cauză, ci reprezintă totodată și moștenirea lăsată de lucrători, prin
activitatea depusă în aceste locații și viața lor de zi cu zi, semn al diversității societății din regiunea respectivă.

De multe ori, sediile acestor societăți au fost proiectate și construite de nume mari din domeniul arhitecturii, lucru care le conferă o
valoare istorică suplimentară, incluzându-le totodată în istoria arhitecturii și istoria industrială și socială a țării respective.

Cum intenționează să sprijine Comisia eforturile autorităților locale și regionale pentru reclasarea, transformarea și reutilizarea
clădirilor industriale sau din alte sectoare, inclusiv din zone portuare, și transformarea lor în clădiri de utilitate publică — de exemplu
sedii de campusuri universitare, parcuri industriale destinate cercetării și inovării sau chiar locuințe care respectă noile norme de
eficiență energetică, dar păstrând totodată identitatea acestor imobile?

**Răspuns dat de dl Hahn în numele Comisiei**

_(12 mai 2014)_

Pentru a sprijini direcționarea eficientă a creșterii inteligente, durabile și favorabile incluziunii, luând în considerare principalele
provocări la nivel teritorial ale diferitelor tipuri de teritorii, unsprezece obiective tematice ( [1] ) au fost identificate în Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 1303/2013 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului de stabilire a unor dispoziții comune privind fondurile structurale și de
investiții europene (fondurile ESI).

În acest cadru, este responsabilitatea statelor membre să elaboreze programe pentru utilizarea fondurilor ESI concentrându-le pe
priorități care stabilesc obiective specifice în cadrul cărora vor avea cea mai mare valoare adăugată și cel mai puternic impact.

Fondurile ESI completează intervențiile de la nivel național, regional și local și sunt puse în aplicare în conformitate cu principiul
subsidiarității. Este responsabilitatea statelor membre să selecționeze proiecte pentru finanțare în conformitate cu prioritățile și
obiectivele lor.

Fondul european de dezvoltare regională în special poată să cofinanțeze proiecte care vizează transformarea regiunilor industriale
aflate în declin, în timp ce Fondul de coeziune poate să cofinanțeze investițiile în domeniul mediului, inclusiv în domenii legate de
dezvoltarea și energia durabilă care prezintă beneficii pentru mediu.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Acestea includ: consolidarea cercetării, a dezvoltării tehnologice și a inovării; îmbunătățirea competitivității întreprinderilor mici și mijlocii, sprijinirea tranziției către
o economie cu emisii reduse de carbon în toate sectoarele, conservarea și protecția mediului și promovarea utilizării eficiente a resurselor.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 119

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002991/14**

**to the Commission**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Reusing industrial buildings

The relocation of businesses outside the European Union and closure of traditional firms for various reasons have left behind a series
of industrial buildings that form part of the local, regional and national industrial and cultural heritage.

This heritage does not belong only to the owners of the businesses concerned but represents a legacy handed down by workers,
through the work they carried out and their daily lives, and is a sign of the diversity to be found in the region's society.

In many cases, the firms' main buildings were planned and built by leading architects, and this gives them added historical
importance as they form part of the architectural, industrial and social history of the countries concerned.

How will the Commission support efforts being made by local and regional authorities to reclassify, transform and re-use industrial
buildings or buildings in other sectors, including ports, and convert them into buildings that will benefit the public — such as
university campuses, industrial parks for research and innovation, or houses that meet the new energy efficiency requirements while
preserving the buildings' identity?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

To support effective targeting of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, taking into account the key territorial challenges of the
various types of territories, eleven thematic objectives ( [1] ) have been identified in the regulation (EU) No1303/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds).

Under this framework, it is the responsibility of Member States to draw up programmes for the use of ESI Funds concentrating them
on priorities setting out specific objectives where they will have the greatest added value and impact.

ESI Funds complement national, regional and local interventions and are implemented in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity. It is the Member States' responsibility to select projects for financing in line with their priorities and objectives.

The European Regional Development Fund in particular can co-finance projects aiming at converting declining industrial regions
while the Cohesion Fund can co-finance investment in the environment, including areas related to sustainable development and
energy which present environmental benefits.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Including: strengthening research, technological development and innovation; enhancing competitiveness of SMEs, supporting the shift towards a low-carbon
economy in all sectors and preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency.

C 333 / 120 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002992/14**

**an die Kommission**
**Holger Krahmer (ALDE)**

_(13. März 2014)_

_Betrifft:_ Wiedererstarken der Industrie im Bereich der Rohstoffversorgung

Rohstoffe sind für das vor kurzem von der Kommission geforderte Widererstarken der europäischen Industrie von entscheidender
Bedeutung. In den Strategien der Kommission wie der Rohstoffinitiative und der europäischen Innovationspartnerschaft für
Rohstoffe wurde zur Kenntnis genommen, dass Metalle und Mineralstoffe die Grundlage aller industriellen Prozesse und Produkte
sind. Gemäß kürzlich durchgeführten Untersuchungen gibt es in der EU noch immer wertvolle unerschlossene Minerallagerstätten.
Die EU führt aber weiterhin einen Großteil der von der Industrie benötigten Rohstoffe aus Drittstaaten ein und setzt sich somit
unlauteren Handelspraktiken aus, wie sich an den kürzlich auferlegten Handelsbeschränkungen für seltene Erden aus China erkennen
lässt, die für Technologien für saubere Energie und High-Tech-Produkte (z. B. Smartphones) benötigt werden.

Beabsichtigt die Kommission, weitere Maßnahmen zur Förderung der Gewinnung metallischer und nichtmetallischer Mineralstoffe
in der EU zu ergreifen, um die Abhängigkeit der EU von der Einfuhr und die damit verbundenen zusätzlichen Kosten für die
europäische Industrie und die Mitgliedstaaten zu verringern?

Beabsichtigt die Kommission neben den in ihrer jüngsten Mitteilung mit dem Titel „Für ein Widererstarken der europäischen
Industrie“ (KOM(2014)0014) angekündigten Maßnahmen insbesondere:

—
die Auswirkungen kumulativer Kosten auf die europäische Bergbauindustrie zu bewerten?

—
weitere Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um die Öffentlichkeit für die Rolle und die Bedeutung industrieller Tätigkeiten in der EU —
auch im Bereich der Rohstoffversorgung — zu sensibilisieren?

—
den Austausch bewährter Verfahren hinsichtlich der Raumordnungspolitik in den einzelnen Staaten und der nationalen
Zulassungsverfahren für die Exploration und Gewinnung von Bodenschätzen zu fördern?

**Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission**

_(8. Mai 2014)_

Aspekte, die den Wettbewerb betreffen, werden in der laufenden Studie „Competitiveness of the EU mineral raw materials sector:
non-energy extractive industries and recycling industries“ (Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Mineralienrohstoffsektors der EU: Gewinnung
von nichtenergetischen Rohstoffen und Recycling) angesprochen. Die Kommission beabsichtigt vorerst nicht, die Auswirkung
kumulativer Kosten auf die europäische Bergbauwirtschaft zu bewerten.

Die Sensibilisierung der Öffentlichkeit stellt ein Kernthema der EU-Rohstoffpolitik dar und der strategische Durchführungsplan der
EIP ( [1] ) für Rohstoffe enthält einen speziellen Aktionsbereich „Public Awareness, Acceptance and Trust“ (Öffentliche Sensibilisierung,
Akzeptanz und Vertrauen). Die Kommission bietet bereits Hochschultage in Mitgliedstaaten an, unterstützt den von IMA-Europe
organisierten Mineralientag und plant, sich für ein von der Organisation European Federation of Geologists vorgeschlagenes
„Mineralienjahr“ einzusetzen.

Um die Abhängigkeit der Wirtschaft von kontinuierlich teurer werdenden und oft importierten Primärrohstoffen zu verringern,
fördert die Kommission die Ressourceneffizienz durch eine Initiative der Strategie Europa 2020 ( [2] ), den Fahrplan für ein
ressourcenschonendes Europa ( [3] ), und die bevorstehende Mitteilung zur Kreislaufwirtschaft.

Der Austausch bewährter Verfahren ist in der Rohstoffpolitik der EU verankert und wird von der EIP für Rohstoffe durch den
Aktionsbereich Minerals Policy Framework (Rahmenbedingungen der Mineralienpolitik) im strategischen Durchführungsplan
nachdrücklich unterstützt. Elemente von bewährten Verfahren können bereits dem Bericht „Report on National Minerals Policy
Indicators — Framework conditions for the sustainable supply of raw materials in the EU“ und dem Projekt „Evaluation and
Exchange of Good Practice for the Sustainable Supply of Raw Materials within the EU“ (Bewertung und Austausch von bewährten
Verfahren für die nachhaltige Rohstoffversorgung der EU) entnommen werden, die die Bereiche Politik- und
Informationsrahmenbedingungen, Governance, Planung und Genehmigung von Flächennutzung sowie die Kommissionsleitlinie für
die Gewinnung von nichtenergetischen Rohstoffen im Einklang mit den Natura-2000-Anforderungen abdecken.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Europäische Innovationspartnerschaft.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)21; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32011L0021&from=EN
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)571; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0571&from=EN

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 121

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002992/14**

**to the Commission**
**Holger Krahmer (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Industrial renaissance in the supply of raw materials

Raw materials are of crucial importance for the European industrial renaissance recently called for by the Commission. Metals and
minerals are the very foundation of all industrial processes and products, as has been acknowledged in Commission policy actions
such as the Raw Materials Initiative and the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials. Recent surveys show that Europe
still has valuable unexploited mineral deposits. However, Europe continues to import a vast majority of the raw materials needed by
its industry from third countries and thus exposes itself to unfair trade practices, as shown by the recent trade restrictions on Chinese
rare earths that are essential for clean energy technologies and high tech products (e.g. smartphones).

In order to reduce Europe’s import dependency and the associated additional costs for its industry and the Member States, does the
Commission plan to take any further action to encourage mining of both metallic and non-metallic minerals in the EU?

In particular, in addition to the actions announced in its recent communication entitled ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’
(COM(2014)0014), does the Commission plan:

—
to carry out a cumulative cost impact assessment for the European mining industry?

—
to take further action to increase public awareness of the role and importance of industrial activities in Europe, including in the
raw materials supply sector?

—
to encourage the exchange of best practices in relation to national land use planning policies and permit procedures applicable
to mining exploration and extraction activities?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2014)_

Competitiveness aspects are addressed in an on-going study on ‘Competitiveness of the EU mineral raw materials sector: non-energy
extractive industries and recycling industries’. In the short term, the Commission does not intend to launch a cumulative cost impact
assessment for the European mining industry.

Public awareness is a central topic of the EU Raw materials policy and the EIP ( [1] ) on Raw materials includes a ‘Public Awareness,
Acceptance and Trust’ Action Area in its Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP). The Commission already organises University days in
Member States and supports the Minerals Day organised by IMA Europe, and plans to support a ‘Minerals Year’ proposed by the
European Federation of Geologists.

The Commission is promoting resource efficiency to reduce industry dependency on increasingly expensive and often imported
virgin raw materials through its Europe 2020 Flagship initiative ( [2] ), the Roadmap to a resource efficient Europe ( [3] ) and the upcoming
Communication on the Circular Economy.

Exchange of best practice is embedded in the EU raw materials policy and strongly supported by the EIP on Raw materials through its
SIP Action Area: Minerals Policy Framework. There are already existing elements of best practice in the ‘Report on National Minerals
Policy Indicators Framework conditions for the sustainable supply of raw materials in the EU’ and good practice project ‘Evaluation
And Exchange Of Good Practice For The Sustainable Supply Of Raw Materials Within The EU’ covering the areas of policy and
information framework, governance, land-use planning and permitting as well as Commission Guidance on undertaking non-energy
extractive activities in accordance with Natura 2000 requirements.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Innovation Partnership.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1398844469500&uri=CELEX:32011L0021
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 571 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1398844604430&uri=CELEX:52011DC0571

C 333 / 122 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002993/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

Les informations fournies par la Commission et le département du Trésor des États-Unis ne précisent pas de quelle manière les
agences de renseignement américaines ont accès aux messages financiers SWIFT dans l'Union européenne: en interceptant les
données transitant sur le réseau SWIFT ou en se connectant aux systèmes d'exploitation, voire aux réseaux de communication des
banques? Y procèdent-elles seules ou en coopération avec des agences de renseignement nationales européennes? Avec ou sans
recours aux canaux bilatéraux existants en matière d'entraide et de coopération judiciaire?

La Commission pourrait-elle nous apporter des éclaircissements sur le sujet et trancher la question?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Malmström au nom de la Commission**

_(19 mai 2014)_

Lors des consultations au titre de l'article 19 de l'accord TFTP UE-USA (ci-après dénommé «l'accord»), le département du Trésor
américain a fourni des assurances écrites selon lesquelles le gouvernement américain n'a pas, depuis l'entrée en vigueur de la
convention, intercepté des messages financiers SWIFT dans l'UE, sauf comme autorisé par l'accord. Les assurances fournies par le
département du Trésor des États-Unis ne se limitaient pas à l'activité du Trésor des États-Unis. Il y était expressément fait référence au
gouvernement américain dans son ensemble.

Comme établi dans son préambule, l'accord est sans préjudice des autres accords ou dispositions en matière répressive ou en matière
d'échange d'informations conclus entre les parties, ou entre les États-Unis et les États membres. Dans ses lettres du 18 septembre et
du 8 novembre 2013 adressées à la Commission, qui ont été communiquées à la commission des libertés civiles du Parlement
européen, David S. Cohen, sous-secrétaire pour le terrorisme et le renseignement financier au sein du département américain du
Trésor, fournit des exemples de cas où les États-Unis pourraient obtenir certains messages en format swift de parties autres que
SWIFT. La Commission maintient son engagement d'examiner attentivement la mise en œuvre de l'accord TFTP à la fois au cours des
prochains mois et à plus long terme.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 123

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002993/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

The information supplied by the Commission and the US Treasury Department does not say how American intelligence agencies
access SWIFT financial messages in the EU. Do they intercept data transmitted on the SWIFT network or do they connect to banks’
operating systems or even their communication networks? Do they act alone or do they work with national intelligence agencies of
European countries? Do they employ existing bilateral mutual assistance and judicial cooperation channels or do they dispense with
them?

Could the Commission shed further light on this matter so as to establish the truth once and for all?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 May 2014)_

During the consultations under Article 19 of the EU-US TFTP Agreement (‘Agreement’), the US Treasury Department provided
written assurances that the US government has not, since the Agreement entered into force, collected any financial payment
messages from SWIFT in the EU, except as authorised by the Agreement. The US Treasury Department did not limit its assurances to
the activity of the US Treasury; it specifically referenced the US government as a whole.

As stated in its preamble, the Agreement is without prejudice to other law enforcement or information sharing agreements or
arrangements between the Parties or between the United States and Member States. In his letters of 18 September and
8 November 2013 addressed to the Commission, which were shared with the EP Civil Liberties Committee, David S. Cohen, Under
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, provided examples of cases when the U.S.
side could obtain certain SWIFT-formatted messages from parties other than SWIFT. The Commission remains committed to closely
scrutinise the implementation of the TFTP Agreement both over the coming months and in the longer term as well.

C 333 / 124 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002994/14**

**au Conseil**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

Lors des votes de la session de mars 2014, le Parlement a demandé officiellement que le Conseil approuve sans délai la proposition de
règlement du Parlement européen relatif aux modalités d'exercice du droit d'enquête du Parlement européen et abrogeant la
décision 95/167/CE (Euratom, CECA) du Parlement européen, du Conseil et de la Commission, présentée sur la base de l'article 226
du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et adoptée par le Parlement européen le 23 mai 2012.

Quelle est la réaction du Conseil? Compte-t-il enfin accéder à notre demande?

Est-il favorable à notre proposition de révision du traité afin d'étendre les pouvoirs d'enquête du Parlement et de couvrir ainsi, sans
restrictions ni exceptions, tous les domaines de compétence ou d'activité de l'Union, sans oublier l'introduction de la possibilité
d'interroger sous serment?

**Réponse**
_(13 mai 2014)_

Le Conseil n'a pas connaissance de discussions sur le rapport MARTIN qui auraient eu lieu lors de la période de session de mars 2014,
à laquelle l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence dans sa question, ni de demandes officielles adressées au Conseil à cet égard.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 125

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002994/14**

**to the Council**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

At the March 2014 part-session, Parliament officially called on the Council to consent without further delay to the proposal for a
regulation of the European Parliament on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry
and repealing Decision 95/167/EC (Euratom, ECSC) of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, submitted on the
basis of Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and adopted by Parliament on 23 May 2012.

What is the Council’s response? Does it intend to meet Parliament’s call?

Does it support our proposal that the Treaty be revised in order to extend Parliament’s inquiry powers to cover, without restrictions
or exceptions, all fields of Union competence or activity and to include the possibility of questioning under oath?

**Reply**
_(13 May 2014)_

The Council is not aware of any discussions on the Martin report, nor of any official calls on the Council relating thereto, at the
March 2014 part session to which the Honourable Member has referred in his question.

C 333 / 126 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002995/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

L'amélioration de la transparence et des normes de sécurité pour les télécommunications et les communications en ligne est un
principe nécessaire pour un meilleur régime de protection des données.

Dès lors, la Commission pourrait-elle présenter une proposition législative relative à des conditions générales normalisées pour les
télécommunications et les communications en ligne et charger une autorité de contrôle de vérifier le respect de ces conditions
générales?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Kroes au nom de la Commission**

_(23 mai 2014)_

Les mesures nationales mettant en œuvre la directive 2002/58/CE du 12 juillet 2002 sur la vie privée et les communications
électroniques ( [1] ), mise à jour en 2009 dans le contexte des modifications apportées au cadre réglementaire des communications
électroniques, imposent des obligations en matière de sécurité et de transparence aux fournisseurs de services de communications
électroniques, tels que les opérateurs de télécommunications et les fournisseurs d'accès à l'internet qui offrent de tels services. Ces
mesures nationales exigent également des fournisseurs de services qu'ils notifient aux personnes concernées les violations de données
à caractère personnel susceptibles de porter atteinte à leurs données à caractère personnel ou à leur vie privée.

Les mesures nationales mettant en œuvre la directive 95/46/CE ( [2] ) relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du
traitement des données à caractère personnel, qui s'applique aux services en ligne, établissent des obligations similaires en matière de
transparence et de sécurité. La proposition de règlement général sur la protection des données ( [3] ) renforce les obligations en matière
de transparence, entre autres, en exigeant la fourniture d'informations faciles à comprendre.

Les deux directives susmentionnées prévoient que les États membres mettent en place des autorités nationales compétentes pour
faire appliquer les dispositions nationales les mettant en œuvre.

La Commission est tenue de réexaminer périodiquement le cadre réglementaire des communications électroniques. Elle étudie
actuellement les avantages d'une réglementation horizontale qui prévoirait les mêmes règles pour un même service, quel qu'en soit le
fournisseur. La question soulevée par l'Honorable Parlementaire pourrait faire l'objet du prochain réexamen.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2002/58/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 12 juillet 2002 concernant le traitement des données à caractère personnel et la protection de la vie

privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques (directive vie privée et communications électroniques) (JO L 201 du 31.7.2002, p. 37). Modifiée par la
directive 2009/136/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 25 novembre 2009 modifiant la directive 2002/22/CE concernant le service universel et les droits des
utilisateurs au regard des réseaux et services de communications électroniques, la directive 2002/58/CE concernant le traitement des données à caractère personnel et
la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques et le règlement (CE) n [o] 2006/2004 relatif à la coopération entre les autorités nationales
chargées de veiller à l'application de la législation en matière de protection des consommateurs (JO L 337 du 18.12.2009, p. 11).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 95/46/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 24 octobre 1995 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à

caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données (JO L 281 du 23.11.1995, p. 31).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère

personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données (règlement général sur la protection des données), COM(2012) 11 final.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 127

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002995/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

Improved transparency and safety standards for online and telecommunications services is a necessary principle with a view to a
better data protection regime.

Could the Commission, therefore, put forward a legislative proposal on standardised general terms and conditions for online and
telecommunications services, and mandate a supervisory body to monitor compliance with them?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2014)_

National measures implementing Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications of 12 July 2002 ( [1] ), updated in
2009 in the context of the amendments to the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework, impose security and
transparency obligations upon providers of electronic communication services such as Telcos and ISPs when they offer such services.
National measures also require them to notify individuals in case of personal data breaches that are likely to adversely affect their
personal data or privacy.

National measures implementing Directive 95/46/EC ( [2] ) on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal,
which applies to online services, set forth similar transparency and security requirements. The proposed General Data Protection
Regulation ( [3] ) reinforces transparency obligations, among others, by requiring the provision of easy to understand information.

Both Directives require Member States to set forth competent national authorities to enforce the national provisions implementing
the directives.

The Commission is obliged to periodically review the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework. The Commission is
considering the advantages of horizontal regulation, with the same rules for the same service regardless of who provides it. The issue
raised by the honourable Member could be considered in the next review.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the

electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37‐47. Amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communication sector and Regulation (EC) No2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection
laws, OJL 337, 18.12.2009, p. 11-36.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data

and on the free movement of such data .
Official Journal L 281, 23.11.1995 p. 31-50.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free

movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

C 333 / 128 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002996/14**

**au Conseil**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

Dans son vote lors de la session de mars 2014, le Parlement a demandé officiellement au Conseil de ne se lancer dans aucun autre
accord ou mesure sectoriel avec les États-Unis en matière de transfert de données à caractère personnel à des fins policières, tant que
l'accord‐cadre sur la protection des données ne sera pas entré en vigueur.

Quelle est la réaction du Conseil?

**Réponse**
_(13 mai 2014)_

Le rapport auquel l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence n'a pas été discuté au sein du Conseil. Celui-ci a donné mandat à la
Commission pour négocier l'accord UE/États-Unis relatif à la protection des données et appuie la Commission dans ces négociations.

Le Conseil ne peut pas conjecturer sur d'éventuels futurs accords sectoriels de partage des données avec les États-Unis. Toutefois, le
Conseil souhaiterait souligner que, en vertu de l'article 218 du TFUE, il n'a pas la possibilité de «se lancer» dans un accord avec des
pays tiers. Le Conseil peut seulement adopter un mandat de négociation en vue d'un accord international à la suite d'une
recommandation de la Commission à cet effet. De même, le Conseil ne peut adopter une décision autorisant la signature d'un accord
international que sur proposition de la Commission. En outre, le Conseil ne peut adopter une décision portant conclusion d'un tel
accord international que sur proposition de la Commission et après avoir obtenu l'approbation du Parlement.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 129

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002996/14**

**to the Council**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

In its vote during the March 2014 part-session, Parliament officially asked the Council not to initiate any new sectorial agreements or
arrangements with the United States for the transfer of personal data for law enforcement purposes as long as the Umbrella
Agreement on data protection has not entered into force.

What is the Council's reaction?

**Reply**
_(13 May 2014)_

The report to which the Honourable Member refers has not been discussed in the Council. The Council has given a mandate to the
Commission to negotiate the EU-US Data Protection Agreement and supports the Commission in those negotiations.

The Council cannot speculate about any future sectoral data-sharing agreements with the United States. However, the Council would
like to point out that under Article 218 TFEU there is no scope for the Council to ‘initiate’ any agreement with third countries. Any
negotiation mandate for an international agreement can only be adopted by the Council following a recommendation to that end by
the Commission. Likewise, any decision on signing an international agreement can be taken by the Council only on a proposal from
the Commission. Moreover, the Council can adopt a decision on concluding such an international agreement only on a proposal
from the Commission and after having obtained the consent of the Parliament.

C 333 / 130 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002997/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

Le Parlement a invité durant la session plénière du mois de mars la Commission à réaliser, avant juillet 2014, une évaluation de
l'applicabilité du règlement (CE) n [o] 2271/96 aux cas de conflits de législations lors de transferts de données à caractère personnel.

La Commission compte-t-elle accéder à la demande du Parlement et motiver, le cas échéant, sa décision?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Reding au nom de la Commission**

_(6 juin 2014)_

Le règlement (CE) n [o] 2271/96 du Conseil protège les personnes physiques ou morales de l'UE ou les personnes opérant dans l'UE
contre l'application extraterritoriale de sanctions concernant l'embargo économique et financier de Cuba par les États-Unis et
l'interdiction de certains investissements en Iran et en Libye.

Ce règlement a été adopté sur la base des ex-articles 73 C et 113 du traité CE. Ses objectifs et son champ d'application ne concernent
pas les aspects relatifs à la protection des données à caractère personnel mentionnés par l'Honorable Parlementaire.

La question du traitement des données à caractère personnel des personnes résidant dans l'Union par un responsable du traitement
établi en dehors de l'Union fait l'objet des propositions de la Commission en vue de la réforme de la protection des données au sein de
l'UE ( [1] ), actuellement examinée par les colégislateurs

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 10 final: et COM(2012) 11 final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 131

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002997/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

At its March part-session, Parliament called on the Commission to carry out, before July 2014, an assessment of the applicability of
Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 to cases of conflict of laws for transfers of personal data.

Does the Commission intend to comply with Parliament’s request? If not, will it give the reasons for its decision?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 June 2014)_

Council Regulation (EC) 2271/96 provides protection to EU natural or legal persons or persons operating in the EU against the extraterritorial application of sanctions concerning the economic and financial embargo of Cuba by the USA and the prohibition of
certain investments in Iran and Libya.

This regulation was adopted on the basis of former Articles 73C and 113 of the EC Treaty. Objectives and scope are distinct from the
personal data protection issues raised by the Honourable Member.

The question of the process of personal data subjects residing in the Union by a controller established outside the Union is addressed
in the Commission's proposals for EU data protection reform ( [1] ) currently discussed by co-legislators

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 10 final: and COM(2012) 11 final.

C 333 / 132 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002998/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données à caractère personnel

La Commission pourrait-elle, comme le demande et l'a voté le Parlement, présenter des mesures prévoyant la suspension immédiate
de sa décision 2000/520/CE relative à la pertinence de la protection assurée par les principes de la «sphère de sécurité» et par les
questions souvent posées y afférentes, publiés par le ministère du commerce des États-Unis d'Amérique?

Que compte-t-elle faire pour inviter par conséquent les autorités des États-Unis à présenter une proposition de nouveau cadre pour
les transferts de données à caractère personnel de l'Union européenne vers les États-Unis, qui respecte les exigences de protection des
données de la législation de l'Union et garantisse un degré de protection adéquat?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Reding au nom de la Commission**

_(2 juin 2014)_

La Commission a analysé le régime de la sphère de sécurité et a publié, le 27 novembre 2013, deux communications.

La communication sur la sphère de sécurité identifie treize recommandations nécessaires pour assurer la continuité de la protection
des données conformément aux normes de l'UE. Ces treize recommandations concernent quatre grands domaines susceptibles d'être
améliorés: transparence, possibilité de recours efficace, mise en œuvre efficace et limitations de l'accès par les autorités des États-Unis.

La communication intitulée «rétablir la confiance dans les flux de données entre l'Union européenne et les États-Unis d'Amérique»
indique clairement que les mesures à prendre doivent être définies avant l'été 2014 et devraient être mises en œuvre le plus
rapidement possible. La Commission réexaminera ensuite le fonctionnement du régime de la sphère de sécurité au vu de la mise en
œuvre de ces recommandations. Ce processus plus large de réexamen devrait impliquer une consultation ouverte et un débat au
Parlement européen.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 133

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002998/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Personal data protection

Further to Parliament’s calls and the recent vote in plenary, will the Commission put forward measures which provide for the
immediate suspension of Decision 2000/520/EC on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles
and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce?

How does it intend to put pressure on the US authorities to propose a new framework governing transfers of personal data from
the EU to the USA which meets the data protection requirements laid down in EC law and guarantees proper data protection?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 June 2014)_

The Commission has analysed the Safe Harbour regime and on 27 November 2013 issued two Communications.

The Commission Communication on the Safe Harbour of 27 November identifies 13 points necessary to ensure the continuity of
data protection according to EU standards. The 13 recommendations concern four major areas of improvement: transparency,
possibility of effective redress, effective enforcement and limitations of access by public authorities.

The Commission Communication on Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows of 27 November makes clear that remedies must be
identified by summer 2014 and should be implemented as soon as possible. The Commission will then review the functioning of the
Safe Harbour scheme based on the implementation of these recommendations. This broader review process should involve open
consultation and a debate in the European Parliament.

C 333 / 134 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002999/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données à caractère personnel

La Commission compte-t-elle répondre favorablement à la double demande du Parlement de présenter, d'ici à décembre 2014, une
évaluation complète du cadre américain applicable en matière de respect de la vie privée pour ce qui est des activités commerciales,
policières et de renseignement, et de formuler des recommandations concrètes en l'absence de législation générale sur la protection
des données aux États-Unis?

Dans quelle mesure la Commission travaille-t-elle de concert avec les autorités des États-Unis pour établir un cadre juridique
garantissant un degré élevé de protection des données à caractère personnel lorsqu'elles sont transférées aux États-Unis et à qui
incombe‐t‐il de veiller à l'équivalence des cadres européen et américain de respect de la vie privée?

**Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission**

_(2 mai 2014)_

Le 27 novembre 2013, la Commission a adopté une communication ( [1] ) sur le rétablissement de la confiance dans les flux de données
entre l'Union européenne et les États-Unis dans laquelle elle invite ces derniers à trouver, d'ici à l'été 2014, des solutions aux
inquiétudes des citoyens européens en ce qui concerne les programmes de surveillance de masse et à les mettre en œuvre dans les
meilleurs délais. La Commission a également adopté une communication ( [2] ) sur le fonctionnement de la sphère de sécurité, où elle
dresse la liste des questions que les États-Unis doivent régler pour améliorer le dispositif de protection des données mis en place
en 2000 et permettre ainsi la libre circulation des données à caractère personnel entre l'UE et les entreprises situées sur le territoire
américain qui respectent les règles de la sphère de sécurité. La Commission a adressé treize recommandations aux États-Unis en vue
de renforcer ce dispositif. Les mesures à prendre devraient être définies d'ici à l'été 2014 et être mises en œuvre le plus rapidement
possible. La Commission évaluera sur cette base le fonctionnement de la sphère de sécurité.

En outre, l'Union européenne et les États-Unis se sont engagés à négocier rapidement, d'ici à l'été 2014, un véritable accord global de
protection des données pour les échanges de données dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale, y
compris le terrorisme. Cet accord permettra de garantir un niveau élevé de protection des données à caractère personnel aux citoyens
des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, notamment par l'instauration de droits opposables et de mécanismes efficaces de recours
juridictionnel. Les États-Unis et l'Union s'efforceront aussi d'améliorer l'utilisation de l'accord d'entraide judiciaire dans les cas où
l'accès à des données détenues par des entreprises privées est nécessaire à des fins coercitives.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 846.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 847.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 135

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002999/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Personal data protection

Does the Commission intend to present a comprehensive assessment of the US privacy framework, covering commercial, law
enforcement and intelligence activities, by December 2014, and, in the absence of a general data protection law in the United States,
draw up specific recommendations, as called for by Parliament?

How is the Commission working with the US authorities to establish a legal framework which would guarantee a high level of
protection when personal data is transferred to the United States? Who will be responsible for ensuring that the European and US
privacy frameworks are consistent with each other?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

On 27 November 2013 the Commission adopted a communication ( [1] ) on Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows in which the
Commission called on the US to identify remedies for the concerns expressed by European citizens in relation to mass surveillance
programmes, by summer 2014, and implement them as soon as possible. The Commission also adopted a communication ( [2] ) on the
Functioning of the Safe Harbour, which identified a range of issues that need to be addressed by the US to improve the data
protection scheme put in place in 2000 to allow free flow of personal data between the EU and companies in the US adhering to Safe
Harbour. The Commission made thirteen recommendations to the US to reinforce the scheme. Remedies should be identified by
summer 2014 and implemented as soon as possible. On that basis the Commission will assess the functioning of the Safe Harbour.

In addition, the EU and the US are committed to expediting negotiations on a meaningful and comprehensive data protection
umbrella agreement for data exchanges in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including terrorism, by
summer 2014. The agreement will ensure a high level of protection of personal data for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, in
particular, through enforceable rights and effective judicial redress mechanisms. The US and the EU will also improve the use of the
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement when data held by private companies is needed for law enforcement purposes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 846.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 847.

C 333 / 136 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003002/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Gestion participative en entreprise

1. La Commission nous rejoint-elle dans l'idée qu'il faut, au niveau du dialogue social, encourager la mise en place de cadres
légaux permettant la gestion participative en démocratie directe dans l'entreprise?

2. La Commission, dans ce cadre, pourrait-elle reconnaître la gestion participative des entreprises d'économie sociale comme un
exemple innovant de participation des travailleurs à la gestion de leur entreprise grâce à son processus démocratique de prise de
décision, intégrant également les orientations stratégiques et la répartition des résultats de l'entreprise?

**Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission**

_(12 juin 2014)_

1. Le plan d'action sur le droit européen des sociétés et la gouvernance d'entreprise ( [1] ) expose les initiatives prises par la
Commission en vue de mettre en place un droit des sociétés et un cadre de gouvernance d'entreprise modernes et efficaces pour les
entreprises, les investisseurs et les salariés européens. Il est en effet capital de disposer d'un cadre efficace étant donné que les
entreprises bien gérées sont susceptibles d'être à la fois plus compétitives et plus viables à long terme, contribuant ainsi à la croissance
économique et à la création d'emplois. Selon la Commission, l'intérêt des salariés pour la viabilité de leur entreprise est un élément
qui devrait être pris en considération dans la conception de tout cadre de gouvernance. La participation du personnel à la gestion de
leur entreprise peut passer par l'information, la consultation et la participation au conseil d'administration. Mais elle peut également
prendre la forme d'une participation financière, notamment via l'actionnariat salarié. Dans le but de compiler les pratiques nationales
dans ce domaine, la Commission mène actuellement un projet pilote pour la promotion de l'actionnariat et de la participation
des salariés.

2. Comme souligné dans l'initiative pour l'entrepreneuriat social ( [2] ) de la Commission et dans la «déclaration de Strasbourg» de
janvier 2014, une caractéristique commune des entreprises sociales est le mode d'organisation ou le système de propriété qui reflète
leur mission, s'appuyant sur des principes démocratiques ou participatifs, ou visant à la justice sociale.

La Commission considère la gestion participative comme une caractéristique fondamentale des entreprises sociales. Dans le
règlement EaSI ( [3] ), par exemple, une «entreprise sociale» est définie par le fait d'être «gérée dans un esprit d'entreprise, de manière
responsable et transparente, notamment en associant ses employés, ses clients et les parties prenantes concernées par ses activités
économiques».

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)740 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)682 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 2, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) n [o] 1296/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 décembre 2013 établissant un programme de l'Union

européenne pour l'emploi et l'innovation sociale (EaSI) et modifiant la décision n° 283/2010/UE instituant un instrument européen de microfinancement Progress en
faveur de l'emploi et de l'inclusion sociale.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 137

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003002/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Participative business management

1. Does the Commission agree that, in an effort to improve industrial relations, steps should be taken to promote the
establishment of legal frameworks which give employees to a real say in the running of the companies they work for?

2. Does it regard the participative management approach employed in social enterprises as an innovative way of involving
employees in the management of the companies they work for, given the approach’s emphasis on democratic decision-making
processes which offer employees a role in setting the company’s strategic goals and a share of any profits?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 June 2014)_

1. The action plan on European company law and corporate governance ( [1] ) outlines the initiatives the Commission is taking to
develop a modern and efficient company law and corporate governance framework for European undertakings, investors and
employees. An effective framework is indeed of crucial importance considering that well-run companies are likely to be more
competitive and more sustainable in the long term, thus contributing to economic growth and job creation. The Commission
believes that employees’ interest in the sustainability of their company is an element that should be considered in the design of any
governance framework. Employees’ involvement in the affairs of their company may take the form of information, consultation and
participation in the board. But it can also relate to forms of financial involvement, particularly to employees becoming shareholders.
In order to gather national practices in this area, the Commission is currently carrying out a Pilot Project on the promotion of
employee ownership and participation

2. As pointed out in the Commission’s Social Business Initiative ( [2] ) and in the ‘Strasbourg Declaration’ of January 2014, a
common characteristic of social enterprises is the method of organisation or ownership system which reflects their mission, using
democratic or participatory principles or focusing on social justice.

The Commission regards the participative management approach as a core feature of social enterprises. In the EaSI Regulation ( [3] ),
e.g. one of the characteristics that defines a ‘social enterprise’ is the fact that it ‘is managed in an entrepreneurial, accountable and
transparent way, in particular by involving workers, customers and stakeholders affected by its business activities’.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 740 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 682 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 2(1) of the regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on a European Union Programme for Employment and Social

Innovation (‘EaSI’) and amending Decision No 283/2010/EU establishing a European Progress Microfinance Facility for employment and social inclusion.

C 333 / 138 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Hrvatska verzija)_

**Pitanje za pisani odgovor P-003003/14**

**upućeno Vijeću**
**Nikola Vuljanić (GUE/NGL)**

_(13. ožujka 2014.)_

_Predmet:_ Kriza u Ukrajini

Trenutna politička i gospodarska situacija u Ukrajini predstavlja brojne izazove za zemlju i poziva na izravan i odlučan odgovor
Europske unije.

To da EU šalje nejasne poruke, kao što trenutno radi, može samo doprinijeti dodatnom zaoštravanju krize.

Uz nedavnu političku nestabilnost i krizu Krimskog poluotoka, Ukrajina je također suočena s mogućnošću nacionalnog bankrota i
krajnje joj je potrebna financijska pomoć kako bi se vratila stabilnost i spriječilo gospodarska previranja i društvene nemire.

Među proeuropskim snagama u Ukrajini postoje očekivanja da će sporazum o pridruživanju na koncu dovesti do punopravnog
članstva u EU-u.

Koje je stajalište Vijeća u vezi s mogućnošću i perspektivom punopravnog članstva Ukrajine u EU-u u budućnosti, posebno
razmatrajući postojanje ruskih vojnih baza na Krimu koje Rusija očito nema namjeru ukloniti?

U svjetlu pregovora o sankcijama protiv Rusije, koliko daleko su države članice spremne ići s vlastitim sankcijama ako Rusija ne
odgovori na pritisak EU-a? Koje su neke od razmatranih mjera?

Je li Vijeće razmotrilo mogućnost pomaganja Ukrajini u pregovaranju privremene odgode plaćanja duga s inozemnim financijskim
institucijama kako bi se ublažila njezina financijska kriza?

**Odgovor**
_(28. svibnja 2014.)_

Kako se navodi od sastanka na vrhu Europske unije i Ukrajine u Parizu 2008. te kako je potvrđeno u preambuli Sporazuma o
pridruživanju, čije su političke odredbe potpisane 21. ožujka 2014., EU prihvaća težnje Ukrajine u pogledu Europe te pozdravlja
njezinu europsku orijentaciju, uključujući obvezu stvaranja istinske i održive demokracije te tržišne ekonomije. Vijeće je 14. travnja
2014. ponovno naglasilo predanost EU-a potpisivanju preostalih odredaba Sporazuma o pridruživanju, uključujući odredbe o
detaljnom i sveobuhvatnom području slobodne trgovine, što prije nakon predsjedničkih izbora 25. svibnja ( [1] ). U Zaključcima Vijeća
od 3. ožujka 2014. navodi se da Sporazum o pridruživanju ne predstavlja konačan cilj suradnje između EU-a i Ukrajine ( [2] ).

Pored obustave pregovora s Ruskom Federacijom o viznim pitanjima, kao i novom sporazumu, prema odluci šefova država ili vlada
EU-a od 6. ožujka 2014., Vijeće je 17. ožujka odlučilo uvesti ograničenja putovanja i zamrzavanje imovine protiv osoba odgovornih
za djelovanja koja narušavaju ili prijete teritorijalnoj cjelovitosti, suverenosti i neovisnosti Ukrajine. Slijedom toga, Europsko vijeće je
20. ožujka odobrilo proširenje popisa osoba koje bi trebale podlijegati zabrani dodjele vize i zamrzavanju imovine.

Vijeće je podsjetilo da bi bilo kakvi daljnji koraci Ruske Federacije u svrhu destabilizacije stanja u Ukrajini prouzročili dodatne i
dalekosežne posljedice za odnose u velikom broju gospodarskih područja između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne
strane, i Ruske Federacije, s druge strane.

Europska Komisija dogovorila je 5. ožujka paket potpore za pomoć u stabilizaciji gospodarske i financijske situacije u Ukrajini,
pomoć u tranziciji, poticanju političkih i gospodarskih reformi i podupiranju uključivog razvoja u korist svih Ukrajinaca. Tim bi se
paketom mogla pribaviti potpora od najmanje 11 milijardi EUR u kreditima i bespovratnim sredstvima tijekom sljedećih godina iz
proračuna EU-a i međunarodnih financijskih institucija sa sjedištem u EU-u. Ta bi se potpora pružila povrh značajnog financiranja
od strane Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda i Svjetske banke.

Kao dio paketa potpore, Vijeće je 14. travnja 2014. donijelo odluku kojom se osigurava do 1 milijarde EUR za Ukrajinu u
makrofinancijskoj pomoći, koja bi mogla biti isplaćena nakon postizanja sporazuma o programu gospodarske reforme između tijela
Ukrajine i Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda. Ova će pomoć dopuniti ranije dogovorenu makrofinancijsku pomoć EU-a u iznosu do
610 milijuna EUR, koja preostaje za isplatu.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142223.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141291.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 139

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003003/14**

**to the Council**
**Nikola Vuljanić (GUE/NGL)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Crisis in Ukraine

The current political and economic situation in Ukraine is presenting a number of challenges for the country and calls for a direct and
decisive response from the European Union.

The EU sending unclear messages, as it is now doing, can only contribute to further escalation of the crisis.

Along with the recent political instability and the crisis of the Crimean peninsula, Ukraine is also facing the possibility of national
bankruptcy and is in dire need of financial aid in order to restore stability and prevent economic and social turmoil.

Amongst the pro-European forces in Ukraine there are expectations that an association agreement will eventually lead to full EU
membership.

What is the Council’s position regarding the possibility and the perspective of full EU membership for Ukraine in the future,
especially when taking into consideration the existence of Russian military bases in Crimea which Russia obviously has no intention
of removing.

In the light of the talks on sanctions against Russia, how far are the Member States willing to go with their sanctions if Russia does
not respond to EU pressure? What are some of the measures considered?

Has the Council considered the option of assisting Ukraine in negotiating a temporary debt moratorium with foreign financial
institutions in order to alleviate its financial crisis?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2014)_

As has been stated since the 2008 EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris and is confirmed in the preamble to the Association Agreement, the
political provisions of which were signed on 21 March 2014, the EU acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and
welcomes its European choice, including its commitment to building a deep and sustainable democracy and market economy. On
14 April 2014, the Council reiterated the EU's commitment to sign the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement,
including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as soon as possible after the presidential elections on 25 May ( [1] ). The
Council conclusions of 3 March 2014 noted that the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine
cooperation ( [2] ).

In addition to suspending talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and the New Agreement, as decided by the EU Heads of
State or Government on 6 March 2014, the Council decided on 17 March to introduce travel restrictions and an asset freeze against
persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
Subsequently, the European Council on 20 March agreed to expand the list of individuals to be subject to visa ban and asset freeze.

The Council recalled that any further steps by the Russian Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to additional
and far reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas between the European Union and its Member States,
on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand.

The European Commission agreed on 5 March a package of support to help stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine,
assist with the transition, encourage political and economic reforms and support inclusive development for the benefit of all
Ukrainians. This package could bring support of at least EUR 11 billion in loans and grants over the coming years from the EU
budget and EU-based international financial institutions. This would be in addition to the significant funding provided by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

As part of the package of support, the Council adopted on 14 April 2014 a decision to provide up to EUR 1 billion to Ukraine in
macro-financial assistance which could be disbursed once an agreement is reached between the authorities of Ukraine and the
International Monetary Fund on an economic reform programme. This assistance will complement previously agreed macrofinancial assistance from the EU of up to EUR 610 million which remains to be disbursed.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142223.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141291.pdf

C 333 / 140 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-003004/14**

**an die Kommission**
**Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)**

_(13. März 2014)_

_Betrifft:_ Arbeitsprogramm des Europäischen Netzwerks für technische Dienste bei der Strafverfolgung (ENLETS) im
Zeitraum 2014-2020

Am 4. Dezember 2013 hat das Generalsekretariat des Rates dem Ständigen Ausschusses für die operative Zusammenarbeit im
Bereich der inneren Sicherheit (COSI) das Arbeitsprogramm des Europäischen Netzwerks für technische Dienste bei der
Strafverfolgung (ENLETS) ( [1] ) im Zeitraum 2014-2020 übermittelt und den Ausschuss aufgefordert, dieses zu befürworten. In dem
Schriftstück werden die geplanten Aktivitäten von ENLETS, seine kurz-, mittel- und langfristigen Ziele sowie sein Mittelbedarf in
einem ausführlichen Aktionsplan für die Jahre 2014 und 2015 dargelegt.

Innerhalb seiner mittelfristigen Leistungsziele plant ENLETS ein Programm zur Verbreitung und Umsetzung bewährter Verfahren,
das zu erheblichen Bedenken im Zusammenhang mit der Privatsphäre der Bürgerinnen und Bürger der EU und seiner Vereinbarkeit
mit europäischen und nationalen Prinzipien zum Schutz der Grundrechte führt. Bei den gewählten Themen, etwa einer
automatischen Erkennung von Nummernschildern, offener Informationsgewinnung oder Möglichkeiten zum ferngesteuerten
Anhalten von Fahrzeugen (eine technische Lösung, die standardmäßig in Autos für den europäischen Markt eingebaut werden
könnte) wurde bereits auf die Unvereinbarkeit mit den verfassungsmäßigen Grundprinzipien der Mitgliedstaaten hingewiesen.
Weiterhin bestehen ggf. Risiken für Privatsphäre oder Grundrechte.

Sind der Kommission die Tätigkeiten von ENLETS bekannt bzw. kontrolliert sie diese? Wurde die Kommission bei der Erstellung des
ENLETS-Arbeitsprogramms konsultiert? Nahm sie daran teil?

Kann die Kommission mitteilen, ob die Einhaltung der Verträge, der Charta der Grundrechte und bestehender Rechtsvorschriften
durch auf EU-Ebene angestrebte Maßnahmen gefährdet wäre, etwa durch eine automatische Nummernschilderkennung oder den
standardmäßigen Einbau von Geräten in alle Autos für den EU-Markt, mit denen eine Lokalisierung und ein Anhalten aus der Distanz
möglich ist?

Kann die Kommission Einzelheiten vergangener, aktueller und geplanter Mittel aus dem EU-Haushalt für die Tätigkeiten von ENLETS
vorlegen, einschließlich möglicher Auswirkungen im Rahmen der EU-Finanzierungsprogramme für das Europäische Amt für
Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF), den Fonds für die innere Sicherheit sowie Horizont 2020?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(7. Mai 2014)_

Aufgabe des Europäischen Netzwerkes für technische Dienste bei der Strafverfolgung (ENLETS), dem Vertreter der
EU-Mitgliedstaaten angehören, ist die Erfassung von Nutzeranforderungen, die Überprüfung neuer Technologien und bewährter
Verfahren und die Sensibilisierung für diese Technologien und Verfahren sowie Benchmarking und Beratung. Diese Rolle wurde in
den Schlussfolgerungen des Rates vom Juni 2013 zur verstärkten Einbeziehung der für die innere Sicherheit zuständigen Behörden
in die sicherheitsbezogene Forschung und Industriepolitik erneut bekräftigt ( [2] ).

Als Folgemaßnahme zu den Schlussfolgerungen des Rates legte ENLETS dem Ständigen Ausschuss für die operative Zusammenarbeit
im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit des Rates im Dezember 2013 ein vorläufiges Arbeitsprogramm für 2014-2020 vor. Die
Kommission war auf dieser Sitzung vertreten und erhielt ebenfalls das Dokument, in dem ENLETS sein vorgesehenes
Arbeitsprogramm vorstellte. Die Kommission wirkte jedoch nicht an der Erstellung des ENLETS-Arbeitsprogramms mit, und alle im
Ratsdokument 17365/13 ( [3] ) vorgeschlagenen Aktivitäten gehen auf das Netzwerk zurück.

Die Kommission verfolgt die Arbeiten und Aktivitäten von ENLETS. Sie stellt Mittel für einige Aktivitäten von ENLETS zur
Verfügung, die der Verbreitung bewährter Verfahren durch ein auf 24 Monate angelegtes Projekt mit der Bezeichnung EDBP
(ENLETS Disseminates Best Practices) dienen, das im Rahmen des Programms „Kriminalprävention und Kriminalitätsbekämpfung“
unterstützt wird.

Die Kommission unterstützt keine Aktivitäten, die mit der Charta der Grundrechte oder einschlägigen Rechtsvorschriften auf
nationaler oder EU-Ebene nicht vereinbar sind, und würde dies auch nicht tun. Die Kommission hat ENLETS aufgefordert zu
gewährleisten, dass seine Arbeit in dieser Hinsicht keinen Anlass zu etwaigen Missverständnissen gibt.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ratsdokument 17365/13.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137399.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2017365 %202013 %20INIT

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 141

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003004/14**

**to the Commission**
**Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ 2014-2020 work programme of the European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services (Enlets)

On 4 December 2013, the General Secretariat of the Council communicated to the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation
on Internal Security (COSI) the 2014-2020 work programme of the European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services
(Enlets) ( [1] ), inviting the COSI to endorse it. The document outlines the activities envisaged by Enlets, its short-, mid‐ and long-term
objectives and its resource needs, in a detailed action plan for 2014 and 2015.

Under its short-term objectives for deliverables, Enlets plans to execute a programme for the dissemination and implementation of
best practices which raises serious concerns regarding the privacy of EU citizens and compliance with EU and national basic
principles for the protection of fundamental rights. The topics selected, such as ‘Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)’,
‘Open Source Intelligence’ and ‘Remote Stopping Vehicles’ (a technological solution that could become a ‘build-in standard’ for all
cars entering the European market), have already been identified as being in contradiction with basic constitutional principles at
Member State level, and may present a risk with regard to privacy or fundamental rights.

Is the Commission aware of, and monitoring, the activities of Enlets? Was the Commission consulted on, or did it participate actively
in, the preparation of the 2014-2020 Enlets work programme?

Could the Commission comment on the compliance with the Treaties, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and existing legislation
of policy initiatives carried out and supported at EU level involving automatic number plate recognition or the installation in every
car entering the European market of a build-in standard allowing remote localisation and stopping?

Could the Commission provide details of any past, current or envisaged funding from the EU budget for activities undertaken by
Enlets, including potential on-going applications under the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Internal Security Fund and Horizon
2020 EU funding programmes?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2014)_

The European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services (Enlets) is a network composed of representatives of EU Member
States, which aims at gathering user requirements, monitoring and raising awareness of new technology and best practices,
benchmarking and giving advice. This role was further emphasised in Council conclusions in June 2013 on strengthening the
internal security authorities’ involvement in security-related research and industrial policy ( [2] ).

As a follow up to the Council conclusions, Enlets presented a preliminary work programme for 2014-2020 to the Standing
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security in the Council in December 2013. The Commission was represented at
this meeting, and also received the document that Enlets presented on its proposed work programme. However, the Commission did
not participate in the preparation of the Enlets work programme, and the activities proposed in Council document 17365/13 ( [3] ) are
entirely those of the network.

The Commission follows Enlets' work and activities. It provides funding for some Enlets activities in dissemination of best practice
via a 24-month project entitled EDBP (Enlets Disseminates Best Practices), supported under the programme ‘Prevention of and Fight
against Crime’.

The Commission does not and would not support any activities which are not compliant with the Charter of Fundamental Rights or
relevant legislation at EU or national level. The Commission has asked Enlets to ensure that their work does not give rise to any
possible misunderstanding in this regard.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council document 17365/13.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137399.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2017365%202013%20INIT

C 333 / 142 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003005/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Estudios sobre la estacionalidad del turismo

El turismo es la tercera actividad socioeconómica de la UE y supone el principal recurso para muchas regiones comunitarias y una
relevante implicación de las microempresas y PYME en el sector. Así pues, la industria turística en Europa es una industria potente,
estable y creciente.

No obstante, no está exenta de graves problemas entre los que la estacionalidad es, sin duda, uno de los más importantes por su
nefasta repercusión en las rentas del trabajo, actuales y futuras, por su repercusión negativa en la rentabilidad empresarial, por el
elevado gasto público en forma de prestaciones de desempleo y por la baja utilización de la planta productiva y profesional como
industria.

Por otra parte, se ha de tener en cuenta que la estacionalidad no es una especie de fenómeno incontrolable, pues existen variables
sobre las que actuar.

Además, cabe destacar que, si bien es cierto que algunas variables escapan de la capacidad de maniobra, otras sí pueden ser
controladas, aunque para ello se requiera un esfuerzo importante en investigación, innovación, coordinación y cooperación.

A la vista de lo anterior,

1. ¿Ha realizado la Comisión algún estudio sobre el problema de la estacionalidad y sus posibles soluciones?

2. ¿Tiene pensado la Unión Europea financiar o facilitar ayudas de carácter económico para realizar estudios sobre la materia
expuesta?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de mayo de 2014)_

De acuerdo con su Comunicación de 2010 sobre el turismo ( [1] ), la Comisión considera que una mejor utilización de las
infraestructuras turísticas existentes y del personal en las temporadas baja y media podría permitir a las empresas mejorar la
utilización de sus infraestructuras y su productividad, favoreciendo la estabilidad y la motivación de la mano de obra.

Desde 2009, en el marco de la iniciativa «Calypso: turismo para todos», la Comisión ha analizado los distintos aspectos de la
estacionalidad del turismo en Europa y ha realizado sondeos, consultas y seminarios específicos para intercambiar información sobre
el alcance de las actuales políticas para combatir dicha estacionalidad ( [2] ).

Además, en 2010 la Comisión llevó a cabo un estudio detallado sobre los intercambios turísticos en Europa y la manera de fomentar
la prolongación de la temporada turística ( [3] ) que analizó el mercado potencial y buscó la forma de mejorar los patrones estacionales
en Europa. El estudio se centró en ejemplos concretos de buenas prácticas de mecanismos que aumentan los intercambios turísticos
en temporada baja en Europa para favorecer su transferibilidad y ayudar a otros países y regiones a desarrollar enfoques similares. El
estudio incluye un compendio detallado de buenas prácticas y fichas de perfiles de cada país.

Desde 2012, la Comisión se ha centrado más en las personas de edad avanzada (Calypso+). Recientemente, ha iniciado un amplio
proceso de consultas con diversos agentes públicos y privados sobre la iniciativa Europa, el mejor destino de las personas mayores
que, en línea con la iniciativa Calypso, aspira a crear mecanismos de coordinación para aumentar los flujos de turistas mayores
dentro y fuera de Europa en las temporadas baja y media ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 352 final de 30.6.2010.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Para más información: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_es.htm#h2-2
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) El informe completo puede cargarse en el siguiente sitio web de la Comisión:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/files/docs/calypso/calypso_study_annexes_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Para más información: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/tourism-seniors/index_es.htm

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 143

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003005/14**

**to the Commission**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Studies on the seasonal variations in tourism

Tourism is the third largest socioeconomic activity in the European Union. As the principal resource for many regions in the EU, the
sector plays a significant role for microenterprises and SMEs. The tourism industry in Europe is therefore a strong, stable and
growing one.

However, it is not immune to serious problems, chiefly the seasonal nature of the industry, with its damaging effect on current and
future income, its negative influence on profits, the increased public expenditure in the form of unemployment benefits, and
consequently the low usage of the production and professional facilities as an industry.

It should nevertheless be recognised that the seasonal nature of the industry is not a factor that cannot be controlled as there are
variables that can be manipulated.

Moreover, it must be said that, although many variable factors are beyond control, others may indeed be controlled, even though a
significant effort may be required in terms of research, innovation, coordination and cooperation.

In view of the foregoing,

1. Has the Commission carried out any study on the problem of the seasonal variances in thetourism industry and investigated
possible solutions?

2. Does the European Union intend to finance or provide financial aid to carry outstudies on this subject?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

In line with its 2010 Communication on tourism ( [1] ), the Commission acknowledges that better use of existing tourist infrastructure
and staff in the low-medium seasons could enable businesses to make better use of their infrastructure and improve their
productivity, providing a more stable and motivated workforce.

Since 2009, in the framework of the initiative ‘Calypso — tourism for all’, the Commission has looked into the different aspects of
tourism seasonality in Europe and conducted research, consultations and carried out dedicated workshops to exchange information
about the scope of existing policies to combat seasonality ( [2] ).

Further to this, in 2010, the Commission carried out an in-depth study on tourism exchanges in Europe and ways to extending the
seasonality spread ( [3] ), which analysed the potential market and looked into ways of improving seasonality patterns in Europe. The
study looked into concrete examples of good practice of mechanisms which increase low-season tourism exchanges in Europe, with
an aim to promote their transferability and take-up as well as assisting other countries and regions to develop similar approaches.
The study includes a detailed compendium of good practice and dedicated country profile fiches.

Since 2012, the Commission has focused more extensively on the seniors group (Calypso+), and has recently engaged in a broad
consultation process with various public and private actors on the initiative ‘Europe, the best destination for seniors’, which, in
continuity with the Calypso initiative, aims at setting up coordination mechanisms to increase low/medium season flows for senior
tourists within Europe and from third countries ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 352 final of 30.6.2010.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm#h2-2
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The full report can be uploaded on the following Commission website:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/files/docs/calypso/calypso_study_annexes_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/tourism-seniors/index_en.htm

( **|**

C 333 / 144 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003006/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Antieuropeísmo

Ahora que estamos a las puertas de las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo vemos cómo se van intensificando las posiciones
antieuropeístas de algunas formaciones en buena parte de los países de la Unión Europea.

A menudo desde los Estados miembros se ha querido culpar a Europa de los males de la crisis minimizando o simplemente
ignorando lo que no se ha hecho bien en la política interna de cada uno de los respectivos países. De la misma manera, hemos visto
en no pocas ocasiones cómo los Gobiernos de los Estados se han atribuido el mérito de las acciones u obras a las que ha contribuido
decisivamente la Unión Europea. El resultado ha sido una simplificación de los hechos que ha calado en la sociedad. La sociedad ha
entendido, porque así se lo han querido hacer ver sus políticos, que la crisis ha sido peor por las imposiciones europeas. Esto, que
evidentemente no es cierto, ha hecho que hayan calado con más fuerza las posiciones de los euroescépticos y de los contrarios más
radicales a la construcción europea.

Ante esta constatación, ¿qué mecanismos tiene previstos la Comisión para revertir esta tergiversación de la realidad?

¿Considera que los Gobiernos de los países de la Unión Europea deberían consensuar posiciones para explicar el significado y la
importancia que tiene la UE en sus respectivas sociedades, con el fin de evitar precisamente que haya un crecimiento del
antieuropeísmo basado en la desinformación?

**Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(24 de abril de 2014)_

La Comisión se ha esforzado siempre en corregir la información inexacta o la que induzca a error no solo en lo relativo a la crisis sino
sobre todos los aspectos de la UE. Estos esfuerzos incluyen acciones en los medios de comunicación y en sitios web dedicados a
cuestiones particulares (por ejemplo, el presupuesto de la UE) o a situaciones específicas de los países (por ejemplo, el trabajo de la
Representación en el Reino Unido). Más recientemente, este trabajo se ha ampliado a los medios sociales con el blog «Setting the facts
straight», creado el año pasado. La red de centros de información Europe Direct (alrededor de quinientos en toda la UE) también
desempeña un importante papel facilitando información a nivel local.

La Comisión ha tratado asimismo de comunicarse con la gente a través del Año Europeo de los Ciudadanos, del programa Europa
con los Ciudadanos y de la reciente serie de Diálogos con los ciudadanos. Se han celebrado más de cincuenta diálogos en todos los
Estados miembros con la participación de la mayoría de los comisarios europeos, generalmente junto con diputados al Parlamento
Europeo y políticos nacionales, regionales o locales.

La Comisión cree que los Gobiernos de los Estados miembros podrían desempeñar un papel más importante a la hora de explicar
Europa a los ciudadanos y de fomentar la creación de un verdadero espacio público europeo en el que se discutan los problemas
europeos desde un punto de vista europeo. La Comisión ya está trabajando con los Estados miembros para informar a los
ciudadanos, por ejemplo a través de «Europe around the corner». Esta herramienta en línea, que conecta las páginas web nacionales al
sitio web europeo, muestra a los ciudadanos cómo se utilizan los fondos de la UE en proyectos realizados en sus comunidades y
regiones.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 145

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003006/14**

**to the Commission**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Anti-Europeanism

Now that European Parliament elections are just around the corner, we are seeing how the anti-European stance of certain groups is
intensifying in a good number of countries in the European Union.

Many people in these Member States blame Europe for the negative effects of the financial crisis, playing down or simply ignoring the
mistakes made within the internal politics of each of the respective countries. Equally, we have seen on many occasions how the
governments of the Member States have taken credit for actions and efforts in which the European Union has played a key role. This
has resulted in a simplification of the facts that have filtered through to society, which is under the impression, as its politicians
would have it believe, that the crisis has worsened due to European intervention. This clearly fallacious idea has become deeply
embedded in the minds of Eurosceptics and radical groups that staunchly oppose European integration.

In view of this observation, what measures does the Commission have in mind to reverse this distorted view of reality?

Does it believe that the governments of the countries of the European Union should agree on a stance to explain the significance and
importance of the EU within the respective societies, with a view to specifically preventing an increase of anti-European scepticism
based on inaccurate information?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2014)_

The Commission has consistently made efforts to correct inaccurate or misleading information about all aspects of the EU, not just
the crisis. These efforts include actions in the media and through websites which tackle particular issues (such as the EU budget) or
country-specific situations (such as the work of the Representation in the UK). More recently, this work has expanded to the social
media, with the ‘Setting the facts straight’ blog set up last year. The network of Europe Direct Information Centres (of which there are
around 500 across the EU) also plays an important role in providing information locally.

The Commission has also sought to engage with people through the European Year of Citizens, the Europe for Citizens programme
and the recent series of Citizens' Dialogues. Over 50 Dialogues have been held, covering all Member States, with most European
Commissioners participating, usually alongside Members of the European Parliament and national, regional or local politicians.

The Commission believes that the governments of Member States could play a more prominent role in explaining Europe to citizens
and in fostering the creation of a true European public space in which European issues are discussed from a European point of view.
The Commission is already working with Member States to inform citizens, for instance via Europe around the corner. This webbased tool linking national webpages to the European website shows citizens how EU funds are being used on projects in their
communities and regions.

C 333 / 146 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003007/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Europa pierde competitividad tecnológica

Recientemente hemos sabido que entre las cien primeras empresas tecnológicas del mundo, solo ocho son europeas. Un dato
preocupante si se tiene en cuenta que, hace tan solo unos años, Europa era líder en muchos ámbitos tecnológicos y científicos.

En los últimos años, la Unión Europea ha ido perdiendo terreno en la carrera tecnológica mundial frente a Estados Unidos. La
estrategia de innovación definida en el programa 2020 parece haberse quedado obsoleta.

1. ¿Qué opinión le merece a la Comisión el informe publicado la semana pasada por la consultora AT Kearney en el que advierte
de la multiplicación del retraso tecnológico de la UE en los próximos años?

2. ¿Cómo pretende la Comisión volver a situar el sector tecnológico europeo en la primera línea mundial?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Kroes en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de mayo de 2014)_

El mencionado estudio indica algunas de las dificultades que es preciso superar para lograr la competitividad, en particular, la
inexistencia de un mercado único, la dificultad de conseguir aportaciones de capital, la escasez de ingenieros y la ausencia de espíritu
empresarial.

Las propuestas de la Comisión para garantizar la competitividad del sector tecnológico quedaron reflejadas en la Agenda Digital para
Europa (ADE) ( [1] ) de 2010, y en su ulterior revisión de 2012 ( [2] ). El propósito de la ADE es contribuir a que los ciudadanos y empresas
de Europa saquen el máximo partido de las tecnologías digitales. Es la primera de las siete iniciativas emblemáticas de Europa 2020,
estrategia de la UE en favor de un crecimiento inteligente, sostenible e integrador. La ADE contiene 13 objetivos específicos ( [3] ) que
sintetizan la transformación digital que deseamos conseguir. Los avances hacia el logro de estos objetivos se miden a través del
«marcador» anual de la ADE ( [4] ). En septiembre de 2013, la Comisión presentó una propuesta relativa a un mercado único de las
telecomunicaciones, actualmente en trámite legislativo, cuyo propósito es recuperar la posición de liderazgo en las TIC y estimular la
innovación y el desarrollo económico en todos los sectores.

La competitividad de la UE se verá asimismo reforzada tras la adopción del primer programa de trabajo de Horizonte 2020 ( [5] ). Este
programa incluye un pilar de liderazgo industrial encaminado a acelerar el desarrollo de las tecnologías e innovaciones que
sustentarán la actividad empresarial del mañana, así como a ayudar a las PYME innovadoras europeas a convertirse en empresas
líderes en el mundo.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 245.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 784.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/about-our-goals
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/scoreboard
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Decisión C (2013) 8631 de la Comisión Europea, de 10 diciembre de 2013.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 147

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003007/14**

**to the Commission**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Europe is losing its technological competitiveness

We recently learned that only eight of the top 100 technology companies in the world are European. This is certainly a cause for
concern given that, just a few years ago, Europe was the global leader in many technological and scientific fields.

In recent years, the EU has been losing ground to the United States in global technology. The innovation strategy set out in the 2020
programme seems to have become obsolete.

1. What is the Commission’s view on the report published last week by the consultancy firm AT Kearney, which warns of the
increasing technological shortfall in the European Union over the coming years?

2. What does the Commission intend to do to ensure that the European technological sector returns to its top position in the
global ranking?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

The study identifies some of the challenges to be overcome to achieve competitiveness, in particular, the lack of a single market, the
difficulty to get equity financing, the shortage of engineers and the lack of entrepreneurial spirit.

The Commission proposals to ensure the technology sector becomes competitive were set out in the Digital Agenda for Europe
(DAE) ( [1] ) in 2010 and its subsequent review in 2012 ( [2] ). The DAE aims to help Europe's citizens and businesses to get the most out of
digital technologies. It is the first of seven flagships initiatives under Europe 2020, the EU's strategy to deliver smart sustainable and
inclusive growth. The DAE contains 13 specific goals ( [3] ) which encapsulate the digital transformation which we want to achieve.
Progress against these targets is measured in the annual DAE Scoreboard ( [4] ). In September 2013, the Commission tabled a proposal
for a Telecoms Single Market, currently in the legislative process, aimed at regaining the leadership position in ICT and to stimulate
innovation and economic development across sectors.

EU competitiveness will be further enhanced following the adoption of the first work programme of Horizon 2020 ( [5] ). This includes
an Industrial Leadership pillar to speed up development of the technologies and innovations that will underpin tomorrow's
businesses and help innovative European SMEs to grow into world-leading companies.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 245.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 784.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/about-our-goals
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/scoreboard
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) European Commission Decision C (2013)8631 of 10 December 2013.

C 333 / 148 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003008/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Las pymes y Horizonte 2020

La columna vertebral de la economía de la Unión Europea son las pymes. No en vano representan el 99 por ciento de la economía del
sector privado, dando trabajo a dos de cada tres personas de la Unión en este sector.

La Unión Europea ha hecho, a pesar de la crisis, un ingente esfuerzo para revitalizar las pymes con la puesta en marcha del programa
Horizonte 2020 que, con un presupuesto de 80 000 millones de euros para los próximos 7 años, está destinado a facilitar la
financiación de todos aquellos proyectos que supongan investigación e innovación en las pymes europeas.

Ante un proyecto tan ambicioso, resultaría decepcionante que las iniciativas de la Unión Europea en este sentido no fueran conocidas
por todos los interesados.

Por ello, ¿cree la Comisión que los Estados miembros están dedicando suficiente información para que el programa Horizonte 2020
llegue a todas los pequeñas y medianas empresas de la Unión Europea?

¿Considera que hay que potenciar aún más los mecanismos y medios destinados a la promoción de Horizonte 2020?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Geoghegan-Quinn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(6 de mayo de 2014)_

Horizonte 2020 ofrece a los emprendedores más brillantes e innovadores de Europa un abanico complementario de medidas de
apoyo (subvenciones, apoyo a la capacidad de innovación, acceso al capital y al crédito).

La campaña de comunicación de Horizonte 2020 cuenta con dos vertientes que actúan en paralelo: una dirigida a la audiencia
general no especializada y otra a las partes interesadas (participantes antiguos y potencialmente nuevos, incluidas las PYME), a través
de una campaña de relaciones con los medios de comunicación y mediante la coordinación con los difusores de información a nivel
nacional y regional:

—
puntos nacionales de contacto (incluidos los específicos para PYME) — apoyo a nivel nacional

—
red Enterprise Europe (EEN) ( [1] ) — apoyo a nivel regional (PYME)

—
Representaciones Permanentes y Delegaciones de la Comisión — estrecha colaboración para los comunicados de prensa o los
actos nacionales de lanzamiento

—
redes de partes interesadas — difusión hacia posibles nuevos interesados.

Los Estados miembros pueden complementar los esfuerzos de la Comisión para llegar a las PYME y sus entidades de apoyo
movilizando y orientando activamente a las PYME interesadas por la investigación y la innovación hacia las oportunidades más
adecuadas para ellas. Por este motivo los servicios de la Comisión, con sus iniciativas de información sobre el apoyo a las PYME
enmarcadas en Horizonte 2020, se han dirigido específicamente a los miembros de los puntos nacionales de contacto y de la red
Enterprise Europe, que pueden estar en contacto permanente con las audiencias diana sobre el terreno y hacerlo en su propia lengua.
La Comisión insta a los Estados miembros a seguir invirtiendo en estas entidades, y a reforzarlas incluso, en tanto que intermediarios
y asistentes eficaces en el apoyo de la UE a las PYME.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://een.ec.europa.eu/

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 149

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003008/14**

**to the Commission**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ SMEs and Horizon 2020

SMEs are the backbone of the European Union’s economy. It is little wonder they represent 99% of the private sector economy,
providing work for two thirds of the EU population in this sector.

In spite of the financial crisis, the EU has made enormous efforts to rejuvenate SMEs by launching the Horizon 2020 programme,
which has been allocated EUR 80 billion over the next 7 years in order to help finance all those projects that involve research and
innovation in SMEs in Europe.

With such an ambitious project, it would be disappointing if EU initiatives like these were not made known to all those concerned.

Therefore, does the Commission believe that Member States are providing a sufficient amount of information about the Horizon
2020 programme so that it reaches all small and medium-sized business in the European Union?

Does the Commission believe that it should further boost the mechanisms and measures aimed at promoting Horizon 2020?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

Horizon 2020 offers a complimentary range of support measures (grants, innovation capacity support, access to debt and equity) to
Europe’s brightest innovative entrepreneurs.

The Horizon 2020 communications campaign has two strands working in parallel: to the general (non-specialised audience) and to
stakeholders both old and potentially new participants, including SMEs, via a media relations campaign and by coordinating with
multipliers at national and regional level:

—
National Contact Points (incl. SME NCPs) — national level support

—
Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) ( [1] ) — regional level support (SMEs)

—
Commissions' Permanent Representations and Delegations — close collaboration for press briefings, National Launch events

—
Stakeholder Networks — multipliers to potentially new stakeholders

Member-States can complement the Commission’s efforts to reach out to SMEs and their support entities by mobilising and actively
guiding research & innovation-driven SMEs to the opportunities best fit for them. That is why Commission services, with its
information initiatives on SME support under Horizon 2020, has specifically targeted National Contact Points and Enterprise Europe
Network members, as they have the capacity to continuously link with target audiences on the ground and in their own language.
The Commission would encourage Member States to continue investing in and even reinforce these entities as effective brokers and
facilitators of EU support to SMEs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://een.ec.europa.eu/

C 333 / 150 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003009/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(13 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Posible uso fraudulento de ayudas públicas del FSE

Las políticas aplicadas por la Unión Europea se financian mediante el presupuesto comunitario. Los Tratados de la UE insisten sobre
la necesidad de llevar una buena administración y corregir las actuaciones que pudieran afectar a los intereses financieros europeos.

A raíz de varias investigaciones oficiales en España, se está conociendo la posible distracción fraudulenta de ayudas públicas del
Fondo Social Europeo (FSE) en el marco del Programa Operativo Regional del FSE 2007-2013 Madrid, subvenciones que deberían
haberse destinado íntegramente a la promoción del empleo (concretamente para las iniciativas de formación continua).

En todo caso, siendo tan claras las disposiciones del Derecho de la Unión Europea y teniendo competencia la Oficina de Lucha contra
el Fraude para perseguir la incorrecta utilización de fondos públicos, pregunto a la Comisión:

¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión del inicio de algún procedimiento para comprobar que se han utilizado de manera correcta las
cuantiosas ayudas europeas en los cursos de formación para trabajadores celebrados por los organismos competentes de la
Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid?

**Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(5 de mayo de 2014)_

La Comisión tiene conocimiento de que las autoridades españolas han iniciado varios procedimientos de investigación en relación
con cursos de formación, en particular en la Comunidad de Madrid. Inmediatamente después de la publicación en la prensa, la
Comisión informó a la OLAF y pidió a las autoridades nacionales que gestionan el Fondo Social Europeo (FSE) que comprobaran si el
presunto caso de fraude alegado estaba cofinanciado por el FSE o si solo afectaba al presupuesto nacional, y que tomaran las
correspondientes medidas correctoras y preventivas.

En la actualidad, la autoridad de gestión nacional del FSE en España está realizando verificaciones en lo que respecta a varios artículos
publicados en la prensa, según los cuales se podría haber producido un uso indebido del FSE.

Por lo general, la Comisión lleva a cabo periódicamente un seguimiento de la aplicación de las medidas financiadas por el FSE, a
través de distintos instrumentos, incluidas las comisiones de control y las reuniones de análisis anuales. Por lo que se refiere a la
gestión financiera, la Comisión supervisa de cerca la ejecución financiera de los citados fondos y lleva a cabo periódicamente
controles y auditorías. En todos los casos, si se detectan deficiencias o irregularidades en los sistemas de gestión y control, la
Comisión aplica los procedimientos previstos en los reglamentos.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 151

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003009/14**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Potential fraudulent use of public funds from the ESF

Policies implemented by the European Union are financed by the Community budget. EU treaties insist on the necessity of proper
administration and rectifying any actions that might affect European financial interests.

As a result of various official investigations in Spain, a potential case of misappropriation of public funds from the European Social
Fund (ESF) has come to light in the Regional Operational Programme of the 2007-2013 Madrid ESF. These subsidies should have
been destined entirely to promote jobs (specifically continuous training initiatives).

In any case, given that the regulations of European Union law regulations are very clear and that the European Anti-Fraud
Office exercises the right to pursue cases of misuse of public funds, I ask:

Is the Commission aware of any investigations that have been initiated to verify the correct use of the large sums of European funds
on training courses for employees organised by competent bodies in the Autonomous Community of Madrid?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 May 2014)_

The Commission is aware of various investigation procedures being undertaken by the Spanish authorities in relation to training
courses, including in the Madrid region. Immediately after the publications in the press, the Commission informed OLAF and
requested to the national authority managing the European Social Fund (ESF) to verify if the alleged potential fraud was co-funded by
the ESF or is only having an impact on national budget, and to take the corresponding corrective and preventive measures.

At present the national management authority of the ESF in Spain is undertaking verifications regarding various articles published in
the press supposing possible misuse of ESF.

In general terms, the Commission follows up the implementation of the ESF regularly through different tools including the annual
Monitoring Committees and Examination Meetings. As regards the financial management, the Commission closely monitors the
financial execution and carries out regular controls and audits. The Commission in all cases applies the procedures foreseen in the
regulations whenever deficiencies in the management and control systems or irregularities have been detected.

C 333 / 152 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-003010/14**

**til Kommissionen**
**Christel Schaldemose (S&D)**

_(13. marts 2014)_

_Om:_ Energimærkning

En ny dansk undersøgelse viser, at mere end hvert tredje produkt har fejl i energimærkningen. Det er et stort problem, fordi
energimærket er forbrugernes vejledning, når de køber nye produkter. Der var flere forskellige fejl. Enten var mærket mangelfuldt,
forkert eller slet ikke til stede.

Forbrugerne kigger først og fremmest på prisen, men ofte er der mange penge at spare på et energimærket køleskab, fordi det bruger
meget mindre strøm. Det er derfor også vigtigt af miljømæssige årsager, at forbrugerne kan stole på energimærkningen.

Mit spørgsmål til Kommissionen er derfor:

Hvad mener Kommissionen, at der kan gøres for at sikre, at eksempelvis køleskabe lever op til energimærkningen?

Hvem har ifølge Kommissionen ansvaret for fejlene?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Günther Oettinger**

_(29. april 2014)_

Forhandlerne er ansvarlige for manglende energimærkning og for energimærker, der er anbragt på det forkerte produkt.
Leverandørerne er ansvarlige for energimærker, der indeholder forkerte oplysninger. Det hører dog ind under
markedsovervågningen at sikre, at den slags situationer ikke opstår.

Medlemsstaternes markedsovervågningsmyndigheder skal gennemføre relevante undersøgelser af passende omfang og pålægge
effektive, forholdsmæssige og afskrækkende sanktioner, hvis reglerne ikke bliver overholdt. Kommissionen foreslog i februar
2013 en ny markedsovervågningsforordning ( [1] ) i forbindelse med produktlovgivningen for at forbedre markedsovervågningen i
medlemsstaterne. Desuden er den for øjeblikket i gang med at revidere direktivet om energimærkning ( [2] ) og overvejer, hvorvidt det er
nødvendigt med yderligere foranstaltninger for at forbedre markedsovervågningen specifikt på dette område.

Ydermere supplerer Kommissionen den nationale markedsovervågningsindsats inden for energiprodukter gennem samfinansiering
ved hjælp af Intelligent Energi — Europa og aktioner under Horisont 2020, der beskæftiger sig med grænseoverskridende aktiviteter,
der har med markedsovervågning at gøre. Den undersøgelse ( [3] ), som det ærede medlem henviser til, blev gennemført i samarbejde
med en af disse aktioner, nemlig Marketwatch-projektet ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/safety/psmsp/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Direktiv 2010/30/EU.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://taenk.dk/nyheder/energimaerkning-er-fyldt-med-fejl.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.eaci-projects.eu/iee/page/Page.jsp?op=project_detail&prid=2644.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 153

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003010/14**

**to the Commission**
**Christel Schaldemose (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Energy labelling

A new Danish study shows that more than one in three products have errors in their energy labelling. This is a serious problem,
because energy labelling acts as a signpost to consumers when they purchase new products. The errors noted were of several
different kinds, with the label either being incomplete, incorrect or simply missing.

Consumers look first and foremost at the price, but a lot of money can often be saved on an energy-labelled refrigerator, because it
uses much less electricity. There are therefore also important environmental reasons for consumers to be able to rely on energy
labelling.

In the light of the above:

What does the Commission consider can be done to ensure that refrigerators, for example, are compliant with energy labelling
requirements?

In the Commission’s view, who is responsible for the errors?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2014)_

Dealers are responsible for missing labels and for labels that are affixed to the wrong appliance. Suppliers are responsible for labels
that give incorrect information. However, it is the responsibility of market surveillance to ensure that such situations do not occur.

Member States' market surveillance authorities have to perform appropriate checks on an adequate scale and provide for effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties in case of non-compliance. In order to improve Member States' market surveillance the
Commission proposed a new market surveillance regulation for product legislation in February 2013 ( [1] ). The Commission is
currently reviewing the Energy Labelling Directive ( [2] ) and is considering whether any further measures are necessary to improve
market surveillance specifically for this sector.

Furthermore, in the area of energy-related products the Commission complements national market surveillance efforts through cofinancing of Intelligent Energy Europe and Horizon 2020 actions that address cross-border activities related to market surveillance.
The study the Honourable Member refers to ( [3] ) was done in collaboration with one of those actions: the ‘Marketwatch’ project ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/safety/psmsp/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2010/30/EU.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://taenk.dk/nyheder/energimaerkning-er-fyldt-med-fejl
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.eaci-projects.eu/iee/page/Page.jsp?op=project_detail&prid=2644

C 333 / 154 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003011/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Challenges posed by the centralised procedure for switching medicines to non-prescription status

The centralised authorisation procedure for new medicines has largely been a single market success story. As a result, most new
medicines are now authorised in this way. A prescription medicine with a proven safety and efficacy profile may subsequently be
considered for a ‘switch’ to non-prescription status. However, a medicine can only be switched in an ‘all or nothing’ manner across
the Union.

Member States have diverse regulatory and health system approaches to the provision of non‐prescription medicines, whereby some
regulators will consider a medicine appropriate for non-prescription status in the specific context of their health system, while others
may not. This prevents consumers from accessing treatments that are considered appropriate in the context of their health system.

In the strategy for the pharmaceutical sector currently being drafted within DG Enterprise and Industry, will the Commission address
the challenges posed by the centralised procedure for switching medicines to non-prescription status?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2014)_

Medicinal products authorised through the centralised procedure can be placed on the market in any of the EU Member States. In
view of this, the EU legislation on medicinal products ( [1] ) provides, as the co-legislators considered it appropriate, that all elements of
the marketing authorisation have to be harmonised, including their prescription status as pointed out by the Honourable Member.

The Commission has always been fostering the cooperation, exchange of knowledge and experiences of interested stakeholders.
Notably the Process on corporate responsibility in the field of pharmaceuticals ( [2] ) (2010-2013), fostered cooperation among
Member States and relevant stakeholders in order to find common, non-regulatory approaches to timely and equitable access to
medicines after their marketing authorization. One of the groups which operated under this initiative was ‘Promoting good
governance for non-prescription drugs’; its final report is now published ( [3] ). Keeping in mind the diversity of health systems and
attitudes towards non-prescription medicines in Europe, the objective of the group was to identify the necessary elements to ensure
availability, uptake and informed use of these products. One of the recommendations of the group concerns the essential elements
for a successful switch, as agreed through consensus between members of the group.

The Commission has not yet finalised the preparation of a specific document on the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and

supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines agency, OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p1 and Directive2001/83/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311, 28.11.2001,
p. 67.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7870
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/competitiveness/process_on_corporate_responsibility/plat‐form_access/index_en.htm#h2

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 155

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-003012/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Marlene Mizzi (S&D)**

_(13 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ Ir-responsabbiltajiet tal-bloggers, tal-amministraturi tal-paġni u tal-profili fil-midja soċjali

Għall-kuntrarju għall-edituri tal-gazzetti, ma jistgħux jiġu mħarrka l-bloggers u l-amministraturi tal-paġni u l-profili ta' Facebook u
pubblikazzjonijiet tal-midja soċjali simili meta dawn jippermettu kummenti libellużi u malafamanti fuq is-siti tagħhom.

Il-possibbiltà li jittellgħu kummenti taħt psewdonimi spiss twassal għal rimarki offensivi, gideb sfaċċat u cyberbullying.

Mingħajr ma nixtieq nillimita l-libertà ta' espressjoni, nixtieq niġbed l-attenzjoni għall-fatt li l-amministraturi ta' blogs u paġni talinternet, ma jistgħux jitqiesu ġuridikament responsabbli għall-pubblikazzjonijiet tagħhom u dan qed iwassal għal aktar diskors ta'
mibegħda qawwi, lingwaġġ offensiv, kummenti libellużi u malafamanti u cyberbullying b'dannu għall-persuni indifiżi fil-mira. Irraġuni mogħtija hi li s-servers tal-utenti jinsabu f'pajjiż barrani u għaldaqstant, mhumiex koperti mil-leġiżlazzjoni tal-pajjiż fejn
għandu d-domiċilju tiegħu l-awtur tal-ksur (blogger/amministratur).

Il-Kummissjoni taħseb li hemm bżonn tħeġġeġ lill-Istati Membri jintroduċu leġiżlazzjoni li żżomm lill-amministraturi u lill-bloggers
responsabbli u jkunu jistgħu jiġu mħarrka fil-pajjiż tad-domiċilju għall-kummenti li jippermettu jiġu ppubblikati fuq is-siti tagħhom,
bħal ma huma l-edituri tal-gazzetti?

Il-Kummissjoni taħseb li tali liġi kieku twassal għal tnaqqis fl-abbuż kommess minn persuni li jinħbew wara l-psewdonimi biex
jimmalafamaw u jattakkaw vittmi magħżula, u f'każijiet ta' cyberbullying?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Hahn f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(6 ta' Mejju 2014)_

Il-Kummissjoni attwalment ma għandha l-ebda pjan li tipproponi leġiżlazzjoni li tirregola l-malafama fil-livell tal-Unjoni, kemm jekk
offlajn kif ukoll jekk onlajn. Barra minn hekk, il-Kummissjoni ma għandhiex pjanijiet li tipproponi li tiġi rregolata l-anonimità
onlajn.

Rigward diskors ta’ mibegħda razzista u ksenofobika, il-Kummissjoni tindika li l-Artikolu 9 tad-Deċiżjoni Qafas 2008/913/ĠAI dwar
il-ġlieda kontra ċerti forom u espressjonijiet ta’ razziżmu u ksenofobija jistipula li l-Istati Membri għandhom jieħdu l-miżuri
meħtieġa sabiex jiżguraw li l-ġuriżdizzjoni tagħhom testendi għal każijiet fejn reati ta' diskors ta’ mibegħda jitwettqu permezz ta’
sistema ta’ informazzjoni u l-ħati jew il-materjali ospitati f’dik is-sistema jkunu jinsabu fit-territorju tiegħu.

Il-Programm Internet Iktar Sikur jikkofinanzja hotlines fl-Istati Membri li jittrattaw rapporti ta’ kontenut illegali u tista’ tkopri forom
differenti ta’ diskors ta’ mibegħda, skont il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali relevanti.

Kif spjegat fit-tweġiba għall-mistoqsija E-006770/12, l-Artikolu 6 ta’ Direttiva 2010/13/UE (AVMSD), jipprevedi li l-Istati Membri
għandhom jiżguraw b’mezzi xierqa li s-servizzi tal-medja awdjoviżiva pprovduti minn fornituri ta' servizzi tal-medja taħt ilġuriżdizzjoni tagħhom ma jkun fihom l-ebda inċitament għall-mibegħda bbażata fuq ir-razza, is-sess, ir-reliġjon jew in-nazzjonalità.
Hija primarjament il-kompetenza tal-Istati Membri li jeżaminaw il-ħtieġa li jintervjenu fuq il-bażi tal-liġi nazzjonali.

C 333 / 156 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003012/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marlene Mizzi (S&D)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Responsibilities of bloggers, page and profile administrators on social media

Unlike newspaper editors, bloggers and administrators of Facebook pages and profiles and similar social media publications are not
liable to prosecution when allowing libellous or slanderous comments on their sites.

The possibility of posting comments behind a nom de plume often gives rise to offensive remarks, blatant lies and cyberbullying.

Without wishing to restrict the right to free speech, I would like to point out that the legal impossibility of holding the administrators
of blogs and Internet pages responsible and accountable for their publications is resulting in increasingly strong hate speech,
offensive language, libellous and slanderous comments and cyberbullying at the expense of helpless targets. The reason given is that
the servers of the users are in a foreign country and thus not covered by legislation in the country where the offender
(blogger/administrator) is domiciled.

Does the Commission think that it needs to encourage Member States to introduce legislation which would hold administrators and
bloggers responsible and liable to prosecution in their country of domicile for the comments they allow to be published on their
sites, just as newspapers editors are?

Does the Commission think that such a law would lead to a reduction in abuse committed by persons hiding behind a nom de plume
to smear and attack chosen victims, and in instances of cyberbullying?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

The Commission has currently no plans to propose legislation to regulate defamation at Union level, whether off-line or online.
Furthermore, the Commission has no plans to propose regulating online anonymity.

With regard to racist and xenophobic hate speech, the Commission points out that Article 9 of Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA
on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia stipulates that Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that their jurisdiction extends to cases where hate speech crimes are committed through an information system
and the offender or materials hosted in that system are found within its territory.

The Safer Internet Programme co-funds hotlines in Member States which deal with reports of illegal content and may cover different
forms of hate speech, depending on the relevant national legislation.

As outlined in reply to Question E-006770/12, Article 6 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU (AVMSD),
provides that Member States shall ensure by appropriate means that audiovisual media services provided by media service providers
under their jurisdiction do not contain any incitement to hatred based on race, sex, religion or nationality. It is primarily the
competence of the Member States to examine the need to intervene on the basis of national law.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 157

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003013/14**

**an die Kommission**
**Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13. März 2014)_

_Betrifft:_ Die Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (THIP) und die Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität

Der Handelsvertreter der Vereinigten Staaten, Michael Froman, hat im Rahmen der Verhandlungen mit der Kommission über die
Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (THIP) Bedenken in Bezug auf die Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität geäußert
und anschließend dem US-Kongress gegenüber unlängst erklärt: „Ich teile Ihre Bedenken in Bezug auf die Richtung der Vorschläge
der Europäischen Union für eine Änderung der Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität. Für besonders bedenklich halte ich die
unzureichende Transparenz und Beteiligung der Öffentlichkeit an dem Prozess, und ich habe diese Anliegen den leitenden Beamten
der Kommission gegenüber bei mehreren Gelegenheiten zur Sprache gebracht, so auch im Rahmen der Transatlantischen Handelsund Investitionspartnerschaft (THIP). Wir werden weiter darauf dringen, dass die Kommission die Ansichten der Interessenträger,
darunter US-Raffinerien, bei der Ausarbeitung dieser Änderungen berücksichtigt“ ( [1] ).

1. Haben der US-Handelsvertreter Froman und die Kommission die Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität im Rahmen der
THIP-Verhandlungen erörtert?

2. Kann die Kommission Auskunft darüber geben, wann und in welcher Form Bedenken hinsichtlich der Richtlinie über
Kraftstoffqualität vorgebracht wurden sowie wann und wie die Kommission darauf reagiert hat?

3. Kann die Kommission versichern, dass die verzögerte Umsetzung der Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität nicht auf die
Intervention der US-Regierung bezüglich dieser Richtlinie zurückzuführen ist?

4. Kann die Kommission klarstellen, ob die Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität Gegenstand der THIP ist, wobei zu berücksichtigen
ist, dass diese Richtlinie ausdrücklich von den Verhandlungen über das Wirtschafts- und Handelsabkommen zwischen der EU und
Kanada (CETA) ausgenommen wurde?

**Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission**

_(11. Juni 2014)_

1. Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität wurde im Rahmen der Transatlantischen Handels- und
Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP) nicht erörtert.

2. Der Kommission ist bekannt, dass beispielsweise der amerikanische Verband der Kraftstoff- und Mineralölhersteller (American
Association of Fuel and Petroleum Manufacturers — AFPM) auf den Veranstaltungen für Interessenträger in Washington (Juli 2013)
und in Brüssel (Februar 2014) Bedenken vorgebracht hat.

3. Der Prozess der Umsetzung der Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität und die TTIP-Verhandlungen hängen in keiner Weise
miteinander zusammen.

4. Nach dem Vorschlag der EU sollen im Rahmen der TTIP Energie- und Rohstofffragen behandelt werden. Über den genauen
Gehalt der zu behandelnden Fragen laufen derzeit jedoch noch Gespräche zwischen den Vertragsparteien. Die Umsetzung der
Richtlinie über Kraftstoffqualität wurde in diesem Zusammenhang nicht angesprochen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/michael-froman_n_3984115.html

www.energypost.eu/eu-us-trade-deal-matters-energy-sector/
www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-tar-sands-law-cost-oil-firms-news-530835

C 333 / 158 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003013/14**

**to the Commission**
**Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD)

US Trade Representative Michael Froman recently reported to the US Congress after raising concerns about the Fuel Quality
Directive (FQD) with the Commission in the context of the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP):
‘I share your concerns regarding the European Union’s development of proposals for amendments to the Fuel Quality Directive. Of
particular concern has been the lack of adequate transparency and public participation in the process, and I have raised these issues
with senior Commission officials on several occasions, including in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP). We continue to press the Commission to take the views of stakeholders, including U.S. refiners, under
consideration as they finalise these amendments’ ( [1] ).

The Commission is asked to clarify the following:

1. Have USTR Froman and the Commission discussed the FQD in the context of negotiations on the TTIP?

2. Can the Commission provide details of when and how concerns about the FQD were raised and also when and how the
Commission responded to these representations?

3. Can the Commission assure the Committee that the delayed implementation of the FQD is not due to the representations
made by the US Government in relation to it?

4. Can the Commission clarify whether or not the FQD falls within the scope of the TTIP, considering that it has been explicitly
excluded from the negotiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 June 2014)_

1. The implementation of the Fuel Quality Directive has not been discussed in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations.

2. The Commission is aware that e.g. the American Association of Fuel and Petroleum Manufacturers (AFPM) raised concerns
during the stakeholder's events in Washington (July 2013) and in Brussels (February 2014).

3. The process of implementation of the Fuel Quality Directive and the TTIP negotiations are not linked at all.

4. The EU is proposing to address issues of energy and raw materials under TTIP. However, the exact content of the issues to be
covered is subject to on-going discussions between the Parties. The implementation of the Fuel Quality Directive has not been
suggested in the context.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/michael-froman_n_3984115.html

http://www.energypost.eu/eu-us-trade-deal-matters-energy-sector/
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-tar-sands-law-cost-oil-firms-news-530835

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 159

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003016/14**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Programme Euromed pour la culture

Dans le cadre du processus de Barcelone de 1995, le partenariat social, culturel et humain est devenu l'un des trois piliers essentiels
du partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Ce volet est alimenté par trois programmes régionaux: Euromed Héritage, Euromed Audiovisuel
et Euromed Jeunesse, poursuivis dans le cadre de l'Union pour la Méditerranée.

S'inscrivant dans le cadre de la politique européenne de voisinage et doté d'un budget de 17 millions d'euros, Euromed Héritage IV
(2008-2012) a eu pour but d'aider les populations à s'approprier leur propre héritage culturel, national et régional, en facilitant
l'accès à l'éducation et à la connaissance du propre patrimoine culturel.

1. La Commission a-t-elle réalisé une évaluation de l'impact du programme Euromed Héritage IV?

2. La Commission pourrait-elle nous éclairer sur les règles applicables en matière de visibilité du financement européen dans le
cadre de ce programme favorisant la conservation du patrimoine culturel des pays de la Méditerranée? Quelles mesures ont été prises
pour diffuser largement les résultats du programme?

3. Quel rôle ont joué le secrétariat de l'Union pour la Méditerranée et la fondation Anna Lindh dans la réalisation et la promotion
des résultats du programme?

4. La Commission envisage-t-elle de renouveler le programme Euromed Héritage IV pour la période 2014-2020 afin d'améliorer
la formation et l'accès à la connaissance dans le domaine du patrimoine culturel?

**Réponse donnée par M. Füle au nom de la Commission**

_(13 mai 2014)_

1. La Commission a organisé une conférence finale pour évaluer les résultats et l'impact de ce programme ( [1] ). En outre, un livre ( [2] )
a été publié pour témoigner des résultats du programme ( [3] ). Dans son budget de 2014, la Commission a prévu une évaluation
ex post externe du programme.

2. Dans chaque contrat signé dans le cadre du programme figuraient des articles garantissant une publicité adéquate de la
contribution financière de l'UE. Un responsable de la communication était chargé du site web ( [4] ), des contacts avec les journalistes, du
soutien aux projets de subvention et de la stratégie de communication. Le programme a engendré 107 courriels d'alerte,
21 communiqués de presse, 50 nouvelles et événements, 19 ciblages de projets, 25 exposés lors d'événements internationaux tandis
que 61 articles ont été publiés dans la presse. Le site web a enregistré la visite de 101 488 personnes différentes entre 2009 et 2013.

3. Les deux organisations (Fondation Anna Lindh et Union pour la Méditerranée) ont reçu du matériel de communication produit
dans le cadre du programme et ont été invitées à participer à la conférence finale.

4. La Commission a lancé un nouveau programme régional intitulé MedCulture (2014-2017) qui porte notamment sur le
patrimoine culturel de la région. En fonction des résultats de l'évaluation qui aura lieu en 2014, la Comission décidera des
perspectives et moyens de continuer à soutenir la protection et la préservation du patrimoine culturel dans la région du Sud de la
Méditerranée, conformément aux priorités de coopération définies dans les documents de programmation.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/intern.cfm?lng=fr&menuID=16&submenuID=22&subsubmenuID=34
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Mediterranean cultural heritage, a manual for good practice (Le patrimoine méditerranéen, un vademecum de bonnes pratiques.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/intern.cfm?menuID=9&submenuID=7&idnews=832
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/

C 333 / 160 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003016/14**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Euromed programme on culture

Under the 1995 Barcelona process, the social, cultural and human partnership became one of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's
three fundamental pillars. It is catered for by three regional programmes: Euromed Heritage, Euromed Audiovisual and Euromed
Youth, which continue under the umbrella of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Embedded in the European Neighbourhood Policy, Euromed Heritage 4 (2008-2012) has a budget of EUR 17 million. Its objective
was to assist local populations to appropriate their own national and regional cultural heritage by facilitating access to education and
knowledge about their own cultural heritage.

1. Has the Commission carried out an impact assessment of the Euromed Heritage 4 programme?

2. Could the Commission clarify for us the rules applicable to the visibility of EU funding for this programme which contributed
to the conservation of cultural heritage in the Mediterranean countries? What steps have been taken to circulate information on the
outcome of this programme to a wide audience?

3. What role did the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Anna Lindh Foundation play in producing and
promoting the programme's outcome?

4. Does the Commission envisage repeating the Euromed Heritage 4 programme in the period 2014-2020 in order to improve
training and access to knowledge in the cultural heritage field?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2014)_

1. The Commission organised a final conference in order to evaluate the results and impacts of this programme ( [1] ). Furthermore, a
book ( [2] ) showcasing the results of the programme has been published ( [3] ). In its 2014 budget, the Commission has foreseen an
external _ex-post_ evaluation of the programme.

2. Each contract signed in the framework of the programme included articles ensuring that the EU financial contribution was
given adequate publicity. A communication officer was responsible for the website ( [4] ), contacts with journalists, support to the grant
projects and communication strategy. The programme produced 107 e‐mail alerts, 21 press releases, 50 news and events, 19 Focus
on projects, 25 presentations at international events and had 61 articles published in the press. The website received 101,488
individual visitors between 2009 and 2013.

3. Both organisations (Anna Lindh Foundation and the Union for the Mediterranean) were recipients of the communication
material produced by the programme and they were invited to attend the final conference.

4. The Commission has launched the new regional programme MedCulture (2014-2017) which, _inter alia_, targets the cultural
heritage in the region. Based on the results of the planned 2014 evaluation, a decision will be taken by the Commission on
opportunities and means to continue supporting the protection and preservation of cultural heritage in the southern Mediterranean
region in line with the priorities for cooperation defined in the programming documents.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/intern.cfm?menuID=16&submenuID=22&subsubmenuID=34
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Mediterranean Cultural Heritage, A Manual For Good Practice.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/intern.cfm?menuID=9&submenuID=7&idnews=832
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.euromedheritage.net/

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 161

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003017/14**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Exécution d'un mandat d'arrêt européen: l'affaire Sophie Toscan du Plantier

En 1996, Sophie Toscan du Plantier, de nationalité française, est assassinée en Irlande. Un suspect est identifié mais il ne sera
finalement pas poursuivi par la justice irlandaise. En 2008, la justice française ouvre sa propre instruction puis émet un mandat
d'arrêt européen (MAE) en 2010 contre ce suspect.

Deux ans plus tard, en appel, la Cour suprême de Dublin rejette le MAE au motif qu'il n'y a pas de réciprocité entre les législations
irlandaise et française.

Face à ce refus, en 2012, les parties civiles ont souhaité que la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne (CJUE) soit saisie, mais leur
plainte n'a pas été transmise par la DG Justice au motif qu'avant le 1 [er] décembre 2014, la Commission européenne n'était pas
compétente pour engager des procédures d'infraction contre un État n'ayant pas mis sa législation nationale pénale en conformité
avec le droit européen.

1. La réciprocité entre les législations pénales nationales est-elle une condition de l'exécution d'un MAE? Si tel n'est pas le cas,
l'Irlande n'a-t-elle pas failli à son devoir de transposition de la décision cadre de 2002 en y intégrant une condition de réciprocité qui
va à l'encontre de l'esprit du texte?

Bien que les décisions laissent aux États membres une marge de manœuvre importante quant à leur application et qu'elles ne sont pas
pourvues d'effets directs, la jurisprudence de 2005 de la CJUE (affaire Pupino C-105/03) reconnait des effets directs aux décisions en
insistant sur leur nature commune avec les directives.

2. En l'espèce, cette jurisprudence ne pourrait-elle pas s'appliquer à l'affaire Sophie Toscan du Plantier?

3. La Commission pourrait-elle envisager, à partir du 1 [er] décembre 2014, d'engager une procédure d'infraction à l'encontre de
l'Irlande, comme l'autorise le traité de Lisbonne, pour qu'elle mette sa législation pénale interne en conformité avec la décision-cadre
de 2002?

**Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission**

_(19 mai 2014)_

La Cour de justice a estimé que le principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, qui constitue la «pierre angulaire» de la coopération judiciaire,
implique que, conformément à l'article 1er, paragraphe 2, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JHA du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative au
mandat d'arrêt européen, les États membres sont en principe tenus de donner suite à un mandat d'arrêt européen. Ils sont tenus soit
d'exécuter, soit de ne pas refuser d'exécuter un tel mandat, et ne peuvent subordonner son exécution à certaines conditions que dans
les cas énumérés aux articles 3 à 5 de la décision-cadre ( [1] ).

La Cour suprême irlandaise a estimé que la remise n'était pas possible dans le cas d'espèce, en vertu de l'article 4, paragraphe 7,
point b), de la décision-cadre relative au mandat d'arrêt européen, tel qu'interprété par la juridiction irlandaise, ainsi que par référence
au principe d'interprétation conforme établi dans l'arrêt Pupino, et appliqué aux circonstances de l'espèce.

L'interprétation faisant autorité du droit de l'UE relève de la compétence exclusive de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne (CJUE).
Toutefois, l'Irlande n'a pas accepté la compétence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes dans le domaine de la justice
et des affaires intérieures. C'est pourquoi le tribunal irlandais n'a pas pu, ainsi que l'ont souligné les juges irlandais en l'espèce,
soumettre une demande de décision préjudicielle à la Cour de justice au sujet de l'interprétation de l'article 4, point 7), lettre b) de la
décision-cadre.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Voir par exemple l'affaire C-168/13 PPU.

C 333 / 162 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003017/14**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Execution of a European arrest warrant: the Sophie Toscan du Plantier case

In 1996, Frenchwoman Sophie Toscan du Plantier was murdered in Ireland. A suspect was identified, but he was never prosecuted by
the Irish authorities. In 2008, the French authorities launched their own investigation, and in 2010 issued a European arrest warrant
(EAW) against the suspect.

Two years later, after hearing an appeal, the Supreme Court of Ireland rejected the EAW, citing a lack of reciprocity between Irish and
French law.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision, in 2012 the plaintiffs attempted to bring the case before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), but DG Justice has not forwarded their complaint on the grounds that, until 1 December 2014, the
Commission does not have the power to instigate infringement proceedings against a state whose national criminal law does not
comply with EC law.

1. Is reciprocity between different countries’ national criminal law a precondition for the execution of an EAW? If not, has Ireland
not failed to meet its obligation to transpose the 2002 framework decision correctly by incorporating a reciprocity condition which
is at odds with the spirit of the text?

Although framework decisions do not have direct effect and give the Member States considerable leeway to decide how they should
be applied, a 2005 CJEU judgment (‘Pupino’ Case, C‐105/03) acknowledges that they can have direct effect owing to their similarity
to directives.

2. Could this judgment not apply to the Sophie Toscan du Plantier case?

3. Would the Commission consider instigating infringement proceedings against Ireland after 1 December 2014, as authorised
under the Treaty of Lisbon, to make its national criminal law comply with the 2002 framework decision?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 May 2014)_

The Court of Justice ruled that the principle of mutual recognition, which is the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation, means that,
pursuant to Article 1(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant, Member
States are in principle obliged to give effect to a European arrest warrant. They are either obliged to execute, or may not refuse to
execute, such a warrant, and they may make its execution subject to conditions only in the cases listed in Articles 3 to 5 of the
framework Decision ( [1] ).

The Irish Supreme Court found that the surrender was not possible in this case pursuant to Article 4.7(b) of the framework Decision
on the European arrest warrant, as interpreted by the Irish court and with reference in the judgments to the principle of conforming
interpretation in the Pupino case, and applied in the particular circumstances of this case.

The authoritative interpretation of EC law remains within the sole remit of the European Court of Justice (CJEU). However, Ireland
did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Justice and Home Affairs matters. Therefore it was not possible for the Irish
Court, as the Irish Judges in this case noted, to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice in respect of the interpretation of
Article 4.7(b) of the FD-EAW.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See for instance Case C-168/13 PPU.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 163

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003019/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Giancarlo Scottà (EFD)**

_(13 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Misure di controllo dell'invecchiamento del brandy

Il regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 15 gennaio 2008 relativo alla definizione, alla
designazione, alla presentazione, all'etichettatura e alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche delle bevande spiritose contempla, al
numero 5 dell'allegato II, il brandy o Weinbrand, definito come bevanda spiritosa … «ii) invecchiata in recipienti di quercia per
almeno un anno o per almeno sei mesi se la capacità dei recipienti di quercia è inferiore a 1 000 litri».

L'articolo 12, paragrafo 3, del citato regolamento recita che «nella designazione, nella presentazione o nell'etichettatura di una
bevanda spiritosa può essere precisato un periodo di invecchiamento … purché la bevanda spiritosa sia stata invecchiata sotto
controllo fiscale o sotto un controllo che offra garanzie equivalenti.»

L'articolo 24 del citato regolamento prevede altresì che:

1. «Gli Stati membri provvedono al controllo delle bevande spiritose. Essi adottano le misure necessarie per garantire l'osservanza
delle disposizioni del presente regolamento e designano in particolare l'autorità competente o le autorità responsabili dei
controlli riguardo agli obblighi stabiliti dal presente regolamento conformemente al regolamento (CE) n. 882/2004.

2. Gli Stati membri e la Commissione si comunicano reciprocamente le informazioni necessarie per l'applicazione del presente
regolamento.

3. La Commissione, in consultazione con gli Stati membri, assicura l'applicazione uniforme del presente regolamento …».

Poiché risulta che alcuni Stati membri non abbiano adottato le misure necessarie per garantire l'osservanza delle disposizioni e
designato l'autorità competente o le autorità responsabili dei controlli, non rispettando in tal modo il paragrafo 1 dell'articolo 24 e
non garantendo, quindi, la corretta applicazione del paragrafo 3 dell'articolo 12, si chiede alla Commissione:

1. se è al corrente di queste inadempienze;

2. se non ritiene sia venuta meno la reciproca comunicazione citata al paragrafo 2 dell'articolo 24;

3. quali azioni intende intraprendere al fine di garantire che la concorrenza nel mercato del brandy non sia turbata dalla mancata
attuazione armonizzata delle disposizioni sull'invecchiamento?

**Risposta di Dacian Cioloș a nome della Commissione**

_(12 maggio 2014)_

Garantire l'osservanza degli obblighi di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008 ( [1] ) è compito degli Stati membri, che sono tenuti ad
istituire un sistema di controlli ufficiali a norma del regolamento (CE) n. 882/2004 ( [2] ). Quest'ultimo regolamento dispone che i
controlli ufficiali siano eseguiti periodicamente, in base a una valutazione dei rischi e con frequenza appropriata e invoca l'adozione
di misure volte a eliminare i rischi e ad applicare correttamente la normativa alimentare dell'UE.

Rappresentanti dei distillatori europei hanno riferito ai servizi della Commissione situazioni di apparente applicazione diseguale
negli Stati membri del regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008, in particolare riguardo alla conformità del brandy alla corrispondente
definizione e alle norme sull'indicazione dell'invecchiamento delle bevande spiritose sulle etichette. Di conseguenza, i servizi della
Commissione hanno sollecitato informazioni più precise in merito al mercato in cui sono state rinvenute le bottiglie di brandy non
conformi alle norme UE e all'entità della commercializzazione di tale prodotto illecito. A tutt'oggi, non sono pervenute informazioni
dettagliate in merito.

La questione sarà sottoposta agli Stati membri nella prossima riunione del Comitato per le bevande spiritose.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 15 gennaio 2008, relativo alla definizione, alla designazione, alla presentazione,

all'etichettatura e alla protezione delle indicazioni geografiche delle bevande spiritose (GU L 39 del 13.2.2008, pag. 39).

( ⋅2∙ ) GU L 165 del 30.4.2004.

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C 333 / 164 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003019/14**

**to the Commission**
**Giancarlo Scottà (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Measures for controlling the brandy maturing process

Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description,
presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks includes brandy or _Weinbrand_ in category No 5
in Annex II, in which it is defined as ‘a spirit drink […] matured for at least one year in oak receptacles or for at least six months in
oak casks with a capacity of less than 1 000 litres’.

Article 12(3) of the above-cited Regulation stipulates that ‘a maturation period […] may […] be specified in the description,
presentation or labelling of a spirit drink […] provided that the spirit drink was aged under revenue supervision or supervision
affording equivalent guarantees’.

It is further stipulated in Article 24 of the above-cited Regulation that:

‘1. Member States shall be responsible for the control of spirit drinks. They shall take the measures necessary to ensure
compliance with the provisions of this regulation and in particular they shall designate the competent authority or authorities
responsible for controls in respect of the obligations established by this regulation in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 882/2004.

2. Member States and the Commission shall communicate to each other the information necessary for the application of this
regulation.

3. The Commission, in consultation with the Member States, shall ensure the uniform application of this regulation […]’.

It has emerged that several Member States have not taken the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions and have
not designated the competent authority or authorities responsible for controls, thereby breaching Article 24(1) and thus not
ensuring the correct application of Article 12(3).

1. Can the Commission indicate whether it is aware of these infringements?

2. Does it consider that the requirement of reciprocal communication cited in Article 24(2) has also not been met?

3. What actions does it intend to take in order to ensure that the brandy market does not become any less competitive due to the
maturing provisions not being universally applied?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloș on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

The responsibility for enforcing the obligations established in Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 ( [1] ) lies with Member States which are
required to establish a system of official controls in accordance with Regulation 882/2004 ( [2] ). Regulation 882/2004 requires official
controls to be carried out regularly, on a risk basis, with appropriate frequency and calls for measures to be taken to eliminate risk
and enforce EU food law.

The Commission services have been alerted by representatives of EU distillers of the apparent contrasting enforcement, within
Member States, of Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, in particular as regards the compliance of brandy with the corresponding
definition and with the rules on the indication of the age of spirit drinks on labels. The Commission services have therefore requested
more precise information about the marketing place where the bottles of brandy non-compliant with EU rules have been found and
the extent of the marketing of such unlawful product. To this date, no detailed information has been received.

This issue will be brought to the attention of Member States in the framework of the next meeting of the Committee for Spirit Drinks.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the

protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks, OJ L 39, 13.2.2008.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 165, 30.4.2004.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 165

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003020/14**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Cywilne samoloty bezzałogowe

Według raportu „Eurodrones, Inc.” Organizacji Statewatch Unia Europejska wydała co najmniej 315 milionów euro na rozwój
przemysłu cywilnych samolotów bezzałogowych. Jednak ten temat jest spychany na boczny tor w debacie publicznej. Organizacja
podkreśla, że badania o teoretycznie cywilnym charakterze w rzeczywistości mogą służyć rozwojowi technologii wojskowych.
Środki pieniężne trafiają nie tylko do firm cywilnych, lecz także do koncernów zbrojeniowych. Statewatch alarmuje, że
implementacja dronów w cywilnej przestrzeni publicznej dokonuje się na naszych oczach. Dowodem ma być informacja, że
„osobiste zasługi co najmniej tuzina urzędników” na tym polu zostały nagrodzone przez grupę UVS International, lobbującą na
rzecz rozwoju technologii dronów. Statewatch podkreśla, że dalszy rozwój w takim kierunku może doprowadzić do militaryzacji
[i represyjnego użycia samolotów bezzałogowych. Będzie to miało bezpośrednie przełożenie na prawa człowieka i prywatność](http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/query,prawa%20cz%B3owieka,szukaj.html)
obywateli Unii Europejskiej.

1. Czy Komisja mogłaby przedstawić raport kontroli nad rozwojem bezzałogowych technologii?

2. Dlaczego Komisja unika publicznej debaty w sprawie bezzałogowych dronów?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Michela Barniera w imieniu Komisji**

_(6 maja 2014 r.)_

Sprawozdanie przedstawia nieprawdziwy obraz badań związanych z dronami. Finansowanie badań mających na celu opracowanie
technologii związanych z dronami w siódmym programie ramowym (7PR) w ramach badań nad bezpieczeństwem reprezentuje
kwotę liczoną najwyżej w dziesiątkach milionów euro, ponieważ wykorzystanie dronów stanowi jedynie niewielki element tych
projektów.

Wszelkie propozycje dotyczące finansowania w ramach programu „Horyzont 2020” (H2020) są sprawdzane na wielu etapach.
Pierwszy etap tej kontroli polega na ogólnej ocenie przeprowadzanej przez niezależnych ekspertów, po czym następuje ocena
etyczna tych projektów, z którymi zdaniem ekspertów wiążą się zagadnienia natury etycznej (obejmuje to aspekty związane
z prawami człowieka i prywatnością) ( [1] ), ( [2] ). Wszelkie badania w ramach 7PR i H2020 koncentrują się wyłącznie na zastosowaniach
cywilnych ( [3] ).

Po przeprowadzeniu tych etapów stworzony ranking przedkładany jest do zatwierdzenia państwom członkowskim ( [4] ).

Również każdy już realizowany projekt, w przypadku którego pojawiły się zagadnienia natury etycznej może również stać się
przedmiotem kontroli etycznych ( [5] ), ( [6] ).

Komisja nie uchyla się od publicznej debaty na temat bezzałogowych dronów. W dniu 8 kwietnia 2014 r. Komisja przyjęła
komunikat w sprawie cywilnego wykorzystania dronów ( [7] ), określając główne elementy swojej przyszłej polityki oraz zapowiadając
szereg konkretnych inicjatyw. W zależności od wyników licznych wstępnych działań ( [8] ) Komisja zamierza przedstawić,
w odpowiednich przypadkach, projekty legislacyjne mające usunąć wątpliwości hamujące rozwój europejskiego rynku oraz dać
europejskim obywatelom gwarancje wysokiego poziomu ochrony bezpieczeństwa i prywatności. Komisja wszczęła już dyskusję na
temat zagadnień związanych z etyką i prywatnością w kontekście dronów z Europejską Grupą do spraw Etyki w Nauce i Nowych
Technologiach oraz Grupą Roboczą Art. 29 ( [9] ). Trwa realizacja badania dotyczącego zagadnień związanych z etyką i prywatnością
odnoszących się do dronów, któremu towarzyszyć będą w bieżącym roku dwa publiczne warsztaty ( [10] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Zob. art. 13 ust. 3 i art. 14 zasad uczestnictwa w programie „Horyzont 2020” oraz art. 19 rozporządzenia ustanawiającego program „Horyzont 2020”.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Zob. http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89827/privacy_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Zob. art. 19 ust. 2 rozporządzenia ustanawiającego program „Horyzont 2020” –

http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/funding/reference_docs.html

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Parlament Europejski otrzymuje wnioski z wszystkich posiedzeń Komitetu ds. Programu „Horyzont 2020”.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Zob. art. 18 ust. 6 zasad uczestnictwa w programie „Horyzont 2020”.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Szczegółowy przegląd tego procesu dostępny jest w internetowym podręczniku programu „Horyzont 2020” na stronie portalu dla uczestników tego programu:

http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/funding/guide.html

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 0207 final.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Obejmuje to ocenę skutków i konsultacje społeczne.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) Grupa Art. 29 składa się z przedstawicieli krajowych organów ochrony danych.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) Komisja planuje również wszczęcie publicznej debaty na większą skalę poprzez szereg inicjatyw mogących obejmować organizację dużej konferencji w 2015 r. oraz

badanie Eurobarometru.

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C 333 / 166 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003020/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Civilian drones

According to a report entitled ‘Eurodrones Inc.’ published by the Statewatch organisation, the European Union has spent at least
EUR 315 million on developing the civilian drone industry. This issue is, however, largely sidelined from public debate. Statewatch
stresses that research of a supposedly civilian character could in fact assist the development of military technology. Funds are not
only being directed to civilian companies, but to major arms firms as well. Statewatch warns that drones are becoming part of
civilian public space before our very eyes. As evidence, the report states that the ‘personal commitment and contribution’ of at least a
dozen officials ‘to promoting the insertion of unmanned aircraft into non‐segregated airspace’ have been rewarded by UVS
International, a group lobbying for the development of drone technology. Statewatch stresses that continued moves in this direction
could lead to the militarisation and repressive use of unmanned aircraft. This would have a direct impact on EU citizens’ human
rights and privacy.

1. Could the Commission submit a report on the checks to which the development of dronetechnology is subject?

2. Why is the Commission shying away from a public debate on unmanned drones?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

The report gives a misleading picture of drones-related research. The funding to research aiming to develop drones-specific
technologies in FP7 security research only amounts in the tens of millions of Euros since the use of drones is only a small component
of these projects.

Any proposal for funding in H2020 has to pass several checks. The first step consists of a general evaluation performed by
independent experts, followed by an ethical review for those proposals which were earmarked as ethically sensitive (this includes
human rights and privacy aspects) by the evaluators ( [1] ) ( [2] ). All research in FP7 and H2020 focuses exclusively on civilian
application ( [3] ).

Once these steps have been finalised, the subsequent ranking list is presented to the Member States for approval ( [4] ).

Any on-going project which may have been earmarked as ethically sensitive can also be subject to ethical audits ( [5] ) ( [6] ).

The Commission is not shying away from a public debate on unmanned drones. The Commission adopted a communication on the
civil use of drones on 8 April 2014 ( [7] ), setting out the main elements of its future policy and announcing a number of concrete
initiatives. Depending on the outcome of a number of preliminary steps ( [8] ), the Commission intends to bring forward, where
appropriate, legislative proposals to remove legal uncertainties that hinder the development of the European market and to give
European citizens confidence that high levels of protection in terms of safety, security and privacy will be assured. The Commission
has already engaged discussions on the ethical and privacy issues of drones with the European Group on Ethics and the article 29
Working Party ( [9] ). A study on drones ethics and privacy issues is on the way and will be accompanied this year by two public
workshops ( [10] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See Articles 13.3 and 14 of the Horizon 2020 Rules for Participation and Article 19 of the regulation establishing Horizon 2020.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89827/privacy_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) See Article 19.2 — of the regulation establishing Horizon 2020 — http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/funding/reference_docs.html
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) The European Parliament receives the conclusions of all H2020 Programme Committee meetings.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) See Article 18.6 of the H2020 Rules for Participation.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) A detailed overview on this process can be found on the H2020 Online Manual on the Horizon 2020 Participant Portal website:

http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/funding/guide.html

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) COM(2014)207 final.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) This includes an impact assessment and a public consultation.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) The article 29 Working Group is composed of representatives from the national Data Protection Authorities.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) The Commission also plans to launch public debate on a larger scale through a number of initiatives that may include a large conference in 2015 and Eurobarometer

survey.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 167

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003022/14**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Dyrektywa tytoniowa

Nowa dyrektywa tytoniowa została przyjęta przez Parlament Europejski. Zabrania ona sprzedawania papierosów mentolowych. Do
2020 r. kraje członkowskie będą musiały zlikwidować ten rodzaj papierosów z rynku.

1. Polska jest jednym z ważniejszych eksporterów papierosów mentolowych. Nowa dyrektywa uderza w polskich producentów.
Czy Komisja zamierza w jakiś sposób pomóc poszkodowanym producentom?

2. Uważam, że dyrektywa może spowodować przeniesienie handlu papierosami mentolowymi do szarej strefy. Jakie działania
podejmie Komisja, aby nie doszło do takiej sytuacji?

3. Dyrektywa spowoduje także, że papierosy mentolowe będą przemycane spoza Unii. W kraju takim jak Polska, będzie to
bardzo odczuwalne. Jak Komisja zamierza zwalczać proceder nielegalnego przemytu mentolowych papierosów spoza Unii
Europejskiej do krajów Wspólnoty?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonia Borga w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 kwietnia 2014 r.)_

W przeprowadzonej przez Komisję ocenie skutków ( [1] ), którą załączono do wniosku ustawodawczego dotyczącego nowej
dyrektywy w sprawie wyrobów tytoniowych, wykazano, że papierosy o aromacie charakterystycznym, takim jak mentol, mogą
sprzyjać wzrostowi spożycia np. dzięki temu, że łagodzą one ostrość tytoniu, czynią papierosy bardziej atrakcyjnymi, szczególnie
dla młodych ludzi, lub stwarzają fałszywe wyobrażenie, że są one mniej szkodliwe niż inne. W tym kontekście Komisja
zaproponowała zakaz wyrobów o aromacie charakterystycznym. Zarówno Parlament Europejski, jak i Rada zatwierdziły ten
wniosek. W Radzie wszystkie państwa członkowskie oprócz jednego opowiedziały się za zmienioną dyrektywą, która również
w Parlamencie została przyjęta zdecydowaną większością głosów.

Uważa się, że ryzyko, iż taki zakaz stosowania aromatów charakterystycznych można obejść poprzez nielegalny handel, jest
ograniczone. Niektórzy obywatele, którzy palą papierosy mentolowe, mogą zastąpić je innymi produktami. Oczekuje się, że inni
mogą rzucić palenie. Pozostali palacze mogą przywozić produkty przeznaczone do indywidualnego spożycia, wracając z pobytu za
granicą. Należy zauważyć, że nowa dyrektywa w sprawie wyrobów tytoniowych zawiera zdecydowane środki, aby skutecznie
zmierzyć się z ryzykiem nielegalnego handlu. W szczególności wprowadza ona system śledzenia ruchu i pochodzenia oraz system
zabezpieczeń, które mają zagwarantować zgodność z przepisami. Środki te ułatwią również nadzór rynku i egzekwowanie prawa.

Ponadto – tak jak zauważył już szanowny Pan Poseł – dla produktów o znaczącym udziale w rynku, np. papierosów mentolowych,
przewidziano czteroletni okres przejściowy.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2012) 0452 final.

C 333 / 168 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003022/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Tobacco Directive

A new Tobacco Directive has been adopted by Parliament which bans the sale of menthol cigarettes. Member States will have until
2020 to remove menthol cigarettes from their markets.

1. Poland is a major exporter of menthol cigarettes, and this new directive strikes a blow against Polish cigarette producers. Does
the Commission intend to provide some sort of support to affected producers?

2. I feel that the directive could lead to the trade in menthol cigarettes being transferred to the black economy. What steps will the
Commission take to prevent this from happening?

3. The directive will also lead to menthol cigarettes being smuggled from outside the EU. In a country such as Poland, the effects
of this will be very keenly felt. How does the Commission intend to combat the illegal smuggling of menthol cigarettes into EU
Member States from non‐EU countries?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2014)_

The Commission's impact assessment ( [1] ) accompanying the legislative proposal for the new Tobacco Products Directive has
demonstrated that cigarettes with characterising flavours, such as menthol, can facilitate smoking uptake e.g. by reducing the
harshness of tobacco, by rendering cigarettes more attractive in particular to young people, or by creating a false impression of being
less harmful. In this light the Commission proposed to prohibit products with characterising flavours. The European Parliament and
the Council have now endorsed this proposal. In the Council, all Member States but one voted in favour of the revised Directive,
which was also adopted by a very large majority in the Parliament.

The risk that such prohibition of characterising flavours may be circumvented through illicit trade is considered limited. Some of the
citizens who smoke menthol cigarettes are expected to switch to other products, others are expected to stop smoking and yet again
others may import products for personal consumption when travelling abroad. It is important to note that the new Tobacco
Products Directive contains strong measures to effectively address the risk of illicit trade. In particular it introduces a tracking and
tracing system and security features to ensure compliance. These measures will also facilitate market surveillance and law
enforcement.

In any event — as pointed out by the Honourable Member — a transitional period of four years is foreseen for products with a
significant market share, e.g. menthol cigarettes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD (2012) 452 final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 169

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003023/14**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Forum ds. energii mórz i oceanów

Unia Europejska zmierza do opracowania bezpiecznego i wiarygodnego źródła energii odnawialnej. Forum ds. energii mórz
i oceanów jest nową inicjatywą, która ma pomóc w opracowaniu tego źródła. Planowane jest wsparcie rozwijającego się sektora
„niebieskiej energii”, który obejmuje technologie przetwarzania w energię elektryczną energii fal morskich, wahań temperatury
wody i przypływów, poprzez połączenie teorii i praktyki.

1. Jak Komisja zamierza rozwiązać problem skomplikowanego procesu przyznawania licencji na taką działalność?

2. W jaki sposób będą finansowane nowe źródła energii odnawialnej?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Marię Damanaki w imieniu Komisji**

_(12 maja 2014 r.)_

Komisja przyznaje, że obecne procedury dotyczące licencjonowania i udzielania zgody są skomplikowane.

Tworzone obecnie Forum ds. Energii Mórz i Oceanów ma na celu szczegółowe zbadanie trudności związanych z wydawaniem
licencji i udzielaniem zgody, aby możliwe było uzyskanie porozumienia między organami państw członkowskich
i przedstawicielami sektora na temat sposobów, w jakie można by je skutecznie rozwiązać. Informacje zgromadzone w ramach
dyskusji zostaną wykorzystane do sporządzenia katalogu najlepszych praktyk uzupełnionego studiami przypadków. W razie
konieczności mogłyby one zostać wykorzystane na późniejszym etapie do opracowania szczegółowych wytycznych, dzięki którym
zmniejszyłoby się obciążenie zarówno organów publicznych, jak i podmiotów realizujących projekty.

Na forum spotkają się przedstawiciele organów krajowych, banków, prywatnych sponsorów i podmiotów realizujących projekty,
aby poddać analizie procesy w zakresie finansowania i inwestycji oraz omówić najlepsze sposoby uruchomienia niezbędnych
inwestycji. Możliwości finansowania są dostępne w ramach programu „Horyzont 2020”, programu NER 300 oraz programu
finansowego Europejskiego Banku Inwestycyjnego w zakresie energii odnawialnej, jednak można nadal zachęcać inwestorów
prywatnych do dalszego wykorzystywania możliwości, jakie oferuje rozwój sektora energii mórz i oceanów.

C 333 / 170 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003023/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Ocean Energy Forum

The European Union is aiming to develop a safe and reliable source of renewable energy. The Ocean Energy Forum is a new initiative
designed to help develop such an energy source. There are plans to support the ‘blue energy’ sector, which incorporates technologies
to generate electricity from wave power, water temperature variations and currents by bringing together theory and practice.

1. How does the Commission intend to deal with the complexities of granting licences forsuch activities?

2. How will these new sources of renewable energy be financed?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

The Commission recognises that the current practices on licensing and consenting procedures are challenging.

The EU Ocean Energy Forum which is being set up aims to examine the difficulties with licensing and consent in detail to get a
common understanding between Member State authorities and industry on how these could be effectively tackled. Information
gathered from these discussions will be used to compile a catalogue of best practice, complemented by case studies. If necessary,
these could possibly be used at a later stage to develop specific guidelines which would ease the burden on both public authorities
and project developers.

The Forum will also look at finance and investment, bringing together national authorities, banks, private financiers and project
developers to discuss how best to trigger the necessary investment. While funding opportunities are available within Horizon 2020,
the NER300 programme and the renewable energy funding programme of the European Investment Bank, private investors may still
be encouraged further to seize the opportunities that the ocean energy industry could offer.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 171

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003024/14**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Kontrola emisji NO 2

Komisja Europejska rozpoczęła postępowanie przeciwko Wielkiej Brytanii, która nie spełniła wymagań ustalonych przez Unię
Europejską dotyczących ograniczenia smogu dwutlenku azotu. Być może też kilka innych państw zostanie postawionych przed
Trybunałem. Dwutlenek azotu (NO 2 ) pochodzi głównie z silników diesel. Powoduje on astmę i inne problemy oddechowe, oraz
choroby płuc. Według Jenny Jones, członka partii Zielonych w londyńskim zgromadzeniu, zanieczyszczenie powietrza powoduje
około 4200 przedwczesnych śmierci w Londynie każdego roku.

1. Dlaczego Komisja zdecydowała się pozwać Wielką Brytanię w pierwszej kolejności?

2. Czy Komisja zamierza w najbliższej przyszłości skontrolować Polskę?

3. Ograniczenie emisji NO 2 wiąże się ze sporymi kosztami dla państw członkowskich. Czy w związku z tym Komisja przewiduje
dodatkowe fundusze dla państw na rzecz ograniczenia emisji dwutlenku azotu?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 maja 2014 r.)_

1. Komisja postanowiła wszcząć postępowanie w sprawie uchybienia zobowiązaniom państwa członkowskiego przeciwko
Wielkiej Brytanii, ponieważ zaistnienie przedmiotowego naruszenia wynikało z corocznych sprawozdań przedstawionych Komisji.
Ponadto naruszenie to było przedmiotem orzeczenia Sądu Najwyższego Zjednoczonego Królestwa z dnia 1 maja 2013 r. Sąd
Najwyższy Zjednoczonego Królestwa zwrócił się także do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej o wydanie orzeczenia
w trybie prejudycjalnym – na podstawie art. 267 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej – dotyczącego niektórych kwestii
związanych z interpretacją dyrektywy, w związku z czym Komisja musiała zająć stanowisko w tym względzie.

2. Obecnie w odniesieniu do wszystkich państw członkowskich, w których wartości dopuszczalne dla NO 2 zostały przekroczone
w ciągu ostatnich trzech lat, prowadzi się dochodzenie mające na celu doprowadzenie do wszczęcia ewentualnego postępowania
o naruszenie.

3. Pomoc finansowa UE była i jest nadal udzielana państwom członkowskim, które decydują się na uwzględnienie kwestii
poprawy jakości powietrza w umowach partnerskich i programach operacyjnych w ramach europejskich funduszy strukturalnych
i inwestycyjnych.

C 333 / 172 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003024/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Monitoring of NO 2 emissions

The Commission has launched an infringement procedure against the United Kingdom, which has failed to fulfil the obligations set
by the European Union as regards reducing nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) smog. There is also a possibility that several other Member States
will have proceedings brought against them at the Court of Justice. NO 2 originates mainly in diesel engines. It causes asthma, other
respiratory problems and lung diseases. According to Jenny Jones, a Green Party member of the London Assembly, air pollution
causes some 4 200 premature deaths in London each year.

1. Why did the Commission decide to initiate proceedings against the United Kingdom first?

2. Does it intend to carry out monitoring in Poland in the immediate future?

3. Reducing NO 2 emissions entails huge expenditure for the Member States. Does the Commission, therefore, plan to provide
Member States with additional funds to help them to reduce NO 2 emissions?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2014)_

1. The Commission decided to launch an infringement against the UK because, in addition to the evidence of a breach resulting
from the annual reports submitted to the Commission, such a breach was the subject of a UK Supreme Court ruling on 1 May 2013.
The UK Supreme Court also referred certain questions of interpretation of the directive to the Court of Justice of the European Union
for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Commission had to take
a position in this respect.

2. All Member States where the NO2 limit values have been exceeded in the past three years are currently under investigation with
a view to possible infringement action.

3. EU funding has been and remains available to Member States that decide to include air quality in their partnership agreements
and operational programmes under the European Structural and Investment Funds.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 173

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-003025/14**

**aan de Commissie**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 maart 2014)_

_Betreft:_ Onderzoek naar staatssteun

Op 3 april 2012 kondigde de Commissie aan een onderzoek te starten naar staatssteun in de Belgische garantieregeling voor
aandeelhouders in financiële coöperaties (zaak SA.33927). De betrokken coöperanten hebben alle belang bij een snelle beslissing.
Hetzelfde geldt voor de Europese Commissie zelf, die bij het lang aanslepen van dit dossier geen goede beurt maakt inzake
doortastend bestuur. Vandaar dat ik graag antwoord ontvang op volgende vragen:

1. Wanneer heeft België zijn antwoord bezorgd op brief C(2012)2282 van 3 april 2012?

2. Is er sindsdien nog formele communicatie geweest met België in deze zaak? Zo ja, van wanneer dateert de laatste
communicatie en waar ging het over?

3. Wanneer vond de laatste vergadering plaats tussen Commissaris Almunia en het DG Mededinging in deze zaak? Welke
beslissingen zijn er toen genomen?

4. Klopt het dat DG Mededinging in deze zaak reeds een beroep gedaan heeft op jurist-vertalers om een ontwerp-beslissing te
vertalen? Op welke datum leverden die mensen hun werk op?

5. Klopt het dat er reeds een beslissing is in deze zaak? Klopt het dat deze de Belgische regeling aanmerkt als Staatssteun? Klopt
het dat er reeds een ontwerp-persbericht is over deze beslissing? Klopt het dat er voor dit persbericht eveneens reeds een
beroep gedaan is op jurist-vertalers?

6. Klopt het dat de beslissing of het persbericht reeds neergelegd werd bij de griffie, en nadien teruggetrokken werd? Op welke
datum gebeurde dit en wat was de reden voor het terugtrekken?

7. Is er mondeling of informeel gecommuniceerd door de Commissaris of de ambtenaren van het directoraat-generaal
Mededinging, met beleidsverantwoordelijken van de lidstaat gedurende de laatste zes maanden? Zo ja, met wie en wanneer?
Kan een overzicht van de communicatie worden verstrekt?

8. Heeft de lidstaat op enige formele of informele manier verzocht om een eventuele beslissing of communicatie uit te stellen tot
de verkiezingen van mei 2014? Zo ja, door wie gebeurde dit en op welk moment? Heeft de Commissaris zijn akkoord gegeven
om de beslissing of communicatie uit te stellen tot na de verkiezingen?

9. Hoe evalueert de Commissie deze gang van zaken en hoe schat de Commissie het beeld van de publieke opinie wat betreft
doortastend bestuur van de Commissie in, indien dergelijke beslissing effectief pas na de verkiezingen bekendgemaakt wordt,
al dan niet op verzoek van de lidstaat, terwijl 800 000 coöperanten al meer dan twee jaar wachten op duidelijkheid?

**Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie**

_(1 juli 2014)_

De Commissie kan zich niet uitlaten over staatssteunzaken waarin nog steeds een formeel onderzoek loopt.

Wil de Commissie lopende onderzoeken goed kunnen voeren en ervoor zorgen dat lidstaten en ondernemingen hun verplichtingen
uit hoofde van het Unierecht nakomen, dan is het van het grootste belang dat de onderzoeksstrategie en de planning van de
procedurele stappen vertrouwelijk blijven.

De Commissie neemt nota van de opmerking van het geachte Parlementslid dat de coöperatieve vennoten op een eindbesluit
wachten. De Commissie kan begrijpen dat deze vennoten snel een besluit vastgesteld willen zien, maar niettemin is zij verplicht een
zorgvuldig en diepgaand onderzoek te voeren naar alle staatssteunaspecten van de maatregel om tot een passend en goed
onderbouwd besluit te komen.

C 333 / 174 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003025/14**

**to the Commission**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Inquiry into state aid

On 3 April 2012, the Commission announced that it intended to initiate an inquiry into state aid in the Belgian guarantee scheme for
shareholders in financial cooperatives (Case SA.33927). The members of such cooperatives have a strong interest in a quick decision.
The same applies to the Commission itself, which will not excel itself through effective governance if this inquiry drags on.

1. When did Belgium answer letter C(2012)2282 of 3 April 2012?

2. Has there been any formal communication with Belgium about this case since then? If so, what was the date of the most recent
communication, and what did it concern?

3. When was the last meeting held between Commissioner Almunia and DG Competition regarding this case? What decisions
were taken then?

4. Is it true that DG Competition has already called on the services of legal translators to have a draft decision translated? On what
date did they deliver their work?

5. Is it true that a decision has already been taken on this case? Is it true that this decision defines the Belgian scheme as state aid? Is
it true that a press release has already been drafted on this decision? Is it true that the services of legal translators were also called
upon for the press release?

6. Is it true that the decision or the press release has already been lodged with the registry, but subsequently withdrawn? On what
date did this occur, and what was the reason for withdrawal?

7. Have the Commissioner or officials from DG Competition communicated verbally or informally with policy-makers of the
Member State during the past six months? If so, with whom and when? Can an overview of the communication be provided?

8. Has the Member State requested in any formal or informal manner that any decision or communication be postponed until the
elections in May 2014? If so, who made this request and when? Did the Commissioner approve the postponement of the decision or
communication until after the elections?

9. What is the Commission’s assessment of this sequence of events, and what impression does the Commission suppose that the
public will receive of the effectiveness of the Commission’s governance if such a decision is indeed published only after the elections,
whether or not at the request of the Member State, while 800 000 cooperative members have already been waiting for a decision for
more than two years?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 July 2014)_

The Commission cannot comment on state aid cases which are still subject to a formal investigation.

In order to protect the effective conduct of pending investigations and its capacity to ensure that Member States and undertakings
comply with their obligations under European Union law, it is of utmost importance that the Commission’s investigative strategy
and planning of procedural steps remain confidential.

The Commission takes note of the Honourable Member's remark that the cooperative members are waiting for a final Decision.
While it understands their interest in a swift adoption of the decision, the Commission is nevertheless under an obligation to conduct
a careful and in-depth investigation into all state aid aspects of the measure so as to reach an appropriate and well-founded decision.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 175

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-003033/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE)**

_(14 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Consultation publique sur la mise en place d'un mécanisme de règlement des différends investisseur-État dans le futur accord
TTIP entre l'Union européenne et les États-Unis

Le 21 janvier 2014, la Direction générale du commerce de la Commission européenne a annoncé qu'elle mènera une consultation du
public européen sur les dispositions liées à l'investissement dans le futur accord commercial entre l'Union européenne et les ÉtatsUnis, et en particulier sur l'inclusion d'un mécanisme de règlement des différends investisseur-État (MRD/ISDN).

1. Cette consultation est ouverte jusqu'en juin, privant de fait le Parlement européen de sa participation. Pourquoi la consultation
ne peut-elle être menée jusqu'en décembre afin que le prochain Parlement puisse s'exprimer au cours de la nouvelle législature?

2. Quelles conclusions la Commission compte-t-elle tirer de cette consultation et quelles en seront les implications pour:

a. les négociations en cours avec les États-Unis?

b. les autres négociations commerciales dans lesquelles l'Union européenne est engagée et qui contiennent des dispositions
relatives à l'investissement, à savoir les accords de libre-échange Union européenne-Canada, Union européenne-Japon et
Union européenne-Singapour?

**Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission**

_(28 avril 2014)_

La période de 90 jours pour la consultation publique est conforme à la politique de consultation de la Commission. Dans ce cas
particulier, elle permettra à la Commission de prendre en considération les contributions pendant les négociations. Tous les citoyens
de l'Union européenne sont invités à participer à cette consultation publique.

La Commission continuera de discuter régulièrement avec le Parlement de son approche de la protection des investissements dans le
cadre du partenariat transatlantique de commerce et d'investissement (TTIP), conformément aux dispositions du traité de Lisbonne et
de l'accord-cadre sur les relations entre le Parlement européen et la Commission révisée en 2010. Cette consultation publique ne
limite en aucune manière les prérogatives du Parlement d'exprimer son avis sur les négociations, s'il l'estime opportun. Plus
généralement, le Parlement continuera de jouer un rôle clé dans les discussions ultérieures au sujet des accords de protection des
investissements de l'UE et la Commission s'est clairement engagée à continuer d'interagir avec le Parlement dans ce domaine.

Une fois le processus de consultation achevé, la Commission a l'intention de faire le bilan et d'affiner son approche des négociations
sur le TTIP, en prenant en considération toutes les remarques au sujet de cette approche. Le Parlement sera dûment informé.

Cette consultation publique porte sur l'approche qu'a l'Union européenne de la protection des investissements dans le cadre du TTIP.
En tant que telle, elle n'aura aucune implication directe pour les autres négociations de l'UE en matière d'investissements. La
Commission prendra néanmoins dûment en considération tous les commentaires et avis généraux exprimés par les citoyens de
l'Union.

C 333 / 176 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003033/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Public consultation procedure on the inclusion of a dispute settlement mechanism in the future EU-US TTIP trade agreement

On 21 January 2014, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade announced its decision to hold an EU-wide public
consultation procedure on the investment provisions of a future EU-US trade agreement, specifically on the inclusion of an investorto-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism.

1. The consultation period runs only until June, meaning that Parliament will be unable to contribute. Why can the consultation
period not be extended to December, to give the new Parliament an opportunity to state its position?

2. What conclusions does the Commission expect to draw from this consultation, and what implications will it have for:

a. the on-going negotiations with the US?

b. other EU trade negotiations which involve investment provisions, namely the EU‐ Canada, EU-Japan and EU-Singapore free
trade agreements?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 April 2014)_

The 90-day period for the public consultation is in line with the consultation policy of the Commission. In this particular case, it will
allow the Commission to take the contributions into account during the negotiations. All citizens of the European Union are
welcome to participate to this public consultation.

The Commission will continue to regularly discuss with Parliament its approach to investment protection in the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and of the 2010 revised Framework Agreement
on Relations between the European Parliament and the Commission. This public consultation does not limit in any way the
Parliament’s prerogatives to express its views, whenever it deems fit, on the negotiations. More generally, the Parliament will
continue to play a key role on the further discussions about EU investment protection agreements and the Commission is fully
committed to continue to interact with Parliament in this regard.

Once the consultation process is completed, the Commission intends to take stock and refine its approach in the TTIP negotiations,
taking into consideration all the feedback received on its proposed approach. The Parliament will be duly informed.

This public consultation concerns the European Union’s approach to investment protection in the TTIP. As such it will not have any
direct implications for other EU investment negotiations. The Commission will however give due consideration to all the general
comments and views expressed by EU citizens.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 177

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-003034/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Iva Zanicchi (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Chiarimenti relativi alla commercializzazione di sambuche colorate con particolare riferimento al quadro normativo in
materia di termini composti

Nella sua risposta all'interrogazione parlamentare E-012362/2013, la Commissione ha chiarito che la commercializzazione di
Sambuche colorate costituisce una violazione del regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008 in materia di denominazione, presentazione ed
etichettatura di bevande alcoliche.

Tuttavia, secondo l'interpretazione della Commissione, il regolamento consentirebbe l'utilizzo della denominazione «Sambuca» in
termini composti (ad esempio «Sambuca e fragola»), a condizione che tutto l'alcol provenga dalla bevanda alcolica in questione (nel
caso specifico, quindi, l'anice che costituisce la base del liquore Sambuca). Questa interpretazione è ulteriormente corroborata dalle
norme del regolamento (UE) n. 716/2013, la cui entrata in vigore è prevista per l'1 marzo 2015.

Ciò premesso, con particolare riferimento al quadro normativo in materia di termini composti, si domanda alla Commissione di
chiarire:

1. in che misura, nel predisporre tali disposizioni, ha tenuto conto del fatto che la produzione tradizionale di Sambuca implica
l'utilizzo di alcol proveniente da distillati di origine diversa (patata, vinaccia, grano) oltre che l'anice e che, se tutto l'alcol
provenisse dall'anice, ne risulterebbe una bevanda imbevibile?

2. come intende assicurare che gli Stati membri garantiscano il rispetto della normativa vigente in materia di termini composti
nel periodo che precede l'entrata in vigore del regolamento (UE) n. 716/2013?

3. l'applicabilità delle norme sui termini composti a ipotesi di travisamento dei requisiti essenziali delle bevande protette, come è
la natura incolore della Sambuca.

**Risposta di Dacian Cioloș a nome della Commissione**

_(9 aprile 2014)_

Secondo l'allegato II del regolamento (CE) n. 110/2008 ( [1] ) si intende per _«sambuca»_ : _«… il liquore incolore aromatizzato all'anice: i)_
_contenente distillati di anice verde (Pimpinella anisum L.), di anice stellato (Illicium verum L.) o di altre erbe aromatiche, …»_ . Secondo il
medesimo allegato, si intende per _«liquore»_ : _«… la bevanda spiritosa … ottenuta mediante aromatizzazione di alcole etilico di origine agricola_
_o di un distillato di origine agricola o di una o più bevande spiritose o di una miscela di tali prodotti, …»_ . Ne deriva che la «sambuca», come gli
altri liquori, può essere prodotta con alcole etilico di origine agricola e con distillati di origine agricola.

Il regolamento (CE) n. 716/2013 ( [2] ) stabilisce, fra l'altro, le norme di etichettatura per l'impiego di termini composti che
comprendono il nome di una categoria di bevanda spiritosa. Per dare agli Stati membri il tempo necessario per recepire tali norme,
l'applicazione degli articoli 3 e 4 del suddetto regolamento è stata posticipata al 1 [o ] marzo 2015.

Come rilevato nella risposta della Commissione all'interrogazione E-12362/2013 ( [3] ), una bevanda spiritosa può recare sull'etichetta
un termine composto contenente il nome di una categoria di bevanda spiritosa e il nome di un prodotto alimentare che vi è stato
aggiunto, per esempio _«sambuca alla fragola»_, solo se l'alcole contenuto nel prodotto finale proviene esclusivamente dalla bevanda cui
è fatto riferimento nel termine composto, in questo caso la «sambuca».

Il prodotto alimentare aggiunto può modificare il colore della categoria di bevanda spiritosa utilizzata. L'informazione corretta è data
al consumatore mediante il termine composto riportato sull'etichetta, che non può apparire in caratteri di dimensioni maggiori
rispetto a quelli della denominazione di vendita.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 39 del 13.2.2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) GU L 201 del 26.07.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

C 333 / 178 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003034/14**

**to the Commission**

**Iva Zanicchi (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Clarification on the marketing of coloured ‘sambuca’ drinks, with particular reference to the law on compound terms

In its answer to Question E-012362/2013 the Commission stated that the marketing of coloured products bearing the name
‘sambuca’ is contrary to Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 on the description, presentation, and labelling of spirit drinks.

However, according to the Commission’s interpretation, the regulation does allow the word ‘sambuca’ to be used in compound terms
(‘strawberry sambuca’, for example), provided that the alcohol originates entirely from the spirit drink referred to (in this case from
anise, the basic constituent of sambuca liqueur). This interpretation is further supported by Regulation (EU) No 716/2013, which is
due to enter into force on 1 March 2015.

In the light of the foregoing, and with particular reference to the law on compound terms, can the Commission answer the following
questions:

1. When it drew up the above provisions, how far did the Commission allow for the fact that the traditional sambuca production
method uses alcohol distilled from other ingredients (potato, marc, grain) as well as anise and that if sambuca were made only
with alcohol produced from anise, it would be undrinkable?

2. How will it make Member States ensure compliance with the rules on compound terms until Regulation (EU) No 716/2013
has entered into force?

3. Can the rules on compound terms be considered applicable when essential defining characteristics of protected drinks — the
colourlessness of sambuca being one example — are turned on their head?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloș on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 April 2014)_

Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 ( [1] ) defines ‘ _sambuca_ ’ as: ‘ _… a colourless aniseed-flavoured liqueur: (i) containing distillates of anise_
_(Pimpinella anisum L.), star anise (Illicium verum L.) or other aromatic herbs, ..._ ’. According to the same Annex, ‘ _liqueur_ ’ is ‘ _… a spirit drink_
_… produced by flavouring ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin or a distillate of agricultural origin or one or more spirit drinks or a mixture thereof,_
_…_ ’. Therefore, ‘ _sambuca_ ’, as other liqueurs, may be produced with ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and distillate of agricultural
origin.

Regulation (EC) No 716/2013 ( [2] ) establishes, among others, the labelling rules for the use of compound terms that include the name
of a spirit drink category. In order to give to Member States the time needed to implement these rules, the application of Articles 3
and 4 of that regulation have been deferred until 1st March 2015.

As pointed out in the answer of the Commission to Question E-12362/2013 ( [3] ), a spirit drink can bear on its label a compound term
combining the name of a spirit drink category and the name of a foodstuff that has been added to it, for example ‘ _strawberry sambuca_ ’,
only if the alcohol contained in the final product comes exclusively from the spirit drink mentioned in the compound term, in this
case ‘ _sambuca_ ’.

The added foodstuff may modify the colour of the spirit drink category used. The correct information of the consumer is conveyed
through the compound term indicated on the label, which may not appear in a larger font size than that of the sales denomination.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 39, 13.2.2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 201, 26.7.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 179

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003035/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Medidas de acompañamiento de la política industrial

En su Comunicación «Una industria europea más fuerte para el crecimiento y la recuperación económica» de octubre de 2012, la
Comisión Europea anunció la elaboración y aplicación de un plan de acción horizontal para impulsar la demanda de bienes y
servicios europeos innovadores. Además la Comisión asumió el compromiso de establecer una red de aprendizaje sobre la
innovación en el lugar de trabajo en Europa para promover la productividad laboral y la calidad de los puestos de trabajo, así como la
ejecución de un plan de acción para acelerar la generalización del diseño en la política de innovación.

¿Podría señalar la Comisión cuáles son las medidas contempladas en el plan de acción horizontal para impulsar la demanda de bienes
y servicios europeos innovadores, y cuál es su grado de aplicación? ¿Cuál es el estado de desarrollo de la red de aprendizaje sobre la
innovación en el lugar de trabajo en Europa para promover la productividad laboral y la calidad de los puestos de trabajo? En fin,
¿cuál es el grado de ejecución del plan de acción para acelerar la generalización del diseño en la política de innovación?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(6 de mayo de 2014)_

La Comisión presentó en enero de 2014 un informe sobre el estado de realización de todas las acciones propuestas en la
Comunicación sobre política industrial de 2012 ( [1] ). A finales de 2012, comenzó a aplicar un plan de acción horizontal para impulsar
la demanda de bienes y servicios innovadores europeos ( [2] ). La Comisión presta apoyo financiero al desarrollo de seis programas que
aspiran a estimular la demanda de innovaciones industriales en mercados específicos. Además, la Comisión puso en marcha en enero
de 2014 un sistema de seguimiento de la innovación impulsada por la demanda a fin de medir el impacto de las políticas
relacionadas con ella y difundir los conocimientos sobre estas.

En abril de 2013, la Comisión puso en funcionamiento la Red Europea de Innovación en el Lugar de Trabajo ( [3] ) para recabar y
difundir pruebas de que la modernización del lugar de trabajo no solo mejora las condiciones de trabajo, sino también su
rendimiento en términos de productividad, innovación y competitividad.

El documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión «Aplicación de un plan de acción para la innovación en materia de diseño» ( [4] )
describe catorce líneas de actuación para acelerar la incorporación del diseño a las políticas de innovación en los ámbitos europeo,
nacional y regional y promover un uso más amplio del diseño en la industria europea, así como en el sector público, a fin de
fomentar la creación de valor, la competitividad y el uso eficiente de los recursos. En este contexto, la Comisión cofinancia desde
enero de 2014 la Plataforma Europea de Diseño Innovador ( [5] ), herramienta de apoyo a la aplicación del plan de acción en materia de
diseño.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2014) 14.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Estudio Developing an evaluation and progress methodology to underpin the intervention logic of the Action Plan to Boost Demand for European Innovation

(Desarrollo de una metodología de evaluación y avance como fundamento del plan de acción para impulsar la demanda de innovación europea)
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/action-plan-methodology-final-report_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/workplace-innovation/euwin/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 380, de 23 de septiembre de 2013.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) www.designplatform.eu.

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C 333 / 180 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003035/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Industrial policy ancillary measures

In its communication ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’ of October 2012, the European
Commission announced that it would draw up and implement a horizontal action plan to boost demand for innovative European
goods and services. The Commission also committed itself to establishing a learning network on workplace innovation in Europe to
promote labour productivity and the quality of jobs and also implementing an action plan for accelerating the take-up of design in
innovation policy.

Could the Commission say what measures are contemplated in the horizontal action plan to boost demand for innovative European
goods and services and to what extent they have been applied? What is the state of implementation of the learning network on
workplace innovation in Europe to promote labour productivity and the quality of jobs? Lastly, to what extent has the action plan for
accelerating the take-up of design in innovation policy been implemented?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

The Commission reported in January 2014 on the state of implementation of all actions proposed in the Industrial Policy
Communication of 2012 ( [1] ). The Commission started to implement a horizontal action plan to boost demand for innovative
European goods and services in late 2012 ( [2] ). The Commission provides financial support for the development of six roadmaps to
boost demand for industrial innovations in specific markets. Furthermore, the Commission launched in January 2014 an innovation
demand-side monitoring system to measure the impact of demand-side policies and spread the knowledge about demand-side
innovation policies.

In April 2013, the Commission launched the European Workplace Innovation Network ( [3] ) to collect and disseminate evidence that
modernising the workplace leads to both better working conditions and increased performance in terms of productivity,
innovativeness and competitiveness.

The Commission staff working document ‘Implementing an Action Plan for Design-Driven Innovation’ ( [4] ) describes 14 action lines
to accelerate the take-up of design in innovation policies at European, national and regional levels and to promote the increased use
of design in European industry as well as in the public sector to promote value creation, competitiveness and efficient use of
resource. In this context, the Commission is co-financing since January 2014 the European Design Innovation Platform ( [5] ) as a
support tool for implementing the action plan for design-driven innovation.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2014) 14.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Study ‘Developing an evaluation and progress methodology to underpin the intervention logic of the action plan to Boost Demand for European Innovation’

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/action-plan-methodology-final-report_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/workplace-innovation/euwin/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) SWD (2013)380 of 23 September 2013.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) www.designplatform.eu

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 181

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003036/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Programa Erasmus+

Las becas Erasmus están sufriendo recortes en algunos países europeos como España, a pesar de que la UE ha incrementado la partida
presupuestaria de estas becas. Por consiguiente, a los estudiantes españoles les resultará más difícil poder disfrutar durante su carrera
universitaria del intercambio estudiantil que, no olvidemos, enriquece a nuestros jóvenes para ser más competitivos en una época en
la que la tasa de paro es muy elevada.

Dado el recorte que amenaza la partida nacional que complementa las becas Erasmus, ¿cree la Comisión que la regularización de las
ayudas complementarias que dan los Estados miembros podría evitar las acciones irresponsables de algunos Estados miembros?

¿Considera viable la Comisión marcar unas cuantías mínimas y máximas por alumno que los países deban aportar para así garantizar
el mayor impacto posible de las becas Erasmus y, al mismo tiempo, asegurar cierta igualdad independientemente del lugar de origen
del estudiante becado?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Vassiliou en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de abril de 2014)_

Los estudiantes Erasmus reciben una beca con cargo al presupuesto de la UE para ayudarles por el aumento de gastos que supone un
período de movilidad para el estudio o la formación en el marco del programa Erasmus+. La Comisión Europea también anima a los
Estados miembros a que complementen el presupuesto de la UE con financiación nacional adicional, a fin de completar la beca de la
UE o de ayudar financieramente a un mayor número de estudiantes. Sin embargo, el importe que asignen a ello es una decisión que
incumbe únicamente al Estado miembro de que se trate, dentro de sus posibilidades presupuestarias nacionales, y la Unión Europea
no tiene competencia para regular esta ayuda complementaria. Aproximadamente la mitad de los países participantes en el programa
Erasmus+ proporcionarán esta ayuda adicional en 2014-15, ofreciendo los importes que consideren adecuados en función de su
contexto nacional.

La Comisión Europea considera que el nivel de las becas para estudiantes propuesto en el marco de Erasmus+ es justo, y que es más
transparente que con el programa anterior. Las autoridades nacionales deciden anualmente el importe exacto que recibe cada
estudiante, entre el nivel mínimo y el nivel máximo que establece la Comisión Europea, basándose en la demanda de plazas y en el
nivel de la cofinanciación nacional. Por tanto, distintos niveles de cofinanciación entre países se integran en este nuevo mecanismo,
en el que una menor cofinanciación a nivel nacional puede compensarse mediante becas de la UE más cuantiosas, dentro de los
límites mínimo y máximo, mientras que una mayor financiación adicional a escala nacional puede permitir a los países a reducir la
proporción de la UE en la beca que recibe cada estudiante, a fin de aumentar al máximo el número de estudiantes que ejercen la
movilidad. Así queda garantizado un cierto nivel de igualdad para los estudiantes por lo que se refiere al nivel de las becas.

C 333 / 182 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003036/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Erasmus+ programme

Erasmus grants are being cut in some European countries such as Spain, despite the fact that the EU has increased the level of funding
for these grants in the budget. Spanish students will therefore find it more difficult to benefit from student exchanges during their
university careers, which, let us not forget, enrich our young people to make them more competitive at a time when the
unemployment rate is very high.

In the light of the cuts threatening the national funding that supplements Erasmus grants, does the Commission believe that
regularisation of this additional aid provided by the Member States might impede certain irresponsible action by some States?

In the Commission’s opinion, would it be viable to set some minimum and maximum amounts per student that countries ought to
contribute, in order to ensure that the Erasmus grants have the greatest possible impact and, at the same time, guarantee a certain
level of equality irrespective of where each student in the programme comes from?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 April 2014)_

Erasmus students receive a grant from the EU budget to contribute to their increased costs incurred during a study or training
mobility abroad with the Erasmus+ programme. The European Commission also encourages Member States to complement the EU
budget with additional national funding, to top-up the EU grant and/or to fund more students. However the amount that they devote
to this is a decision which rests entirely with the Member State concerned within the context of their national budgetary possibilities,
and the European Union has no competence to regulate this additional aid. About half of the Erasmus+ Programme Countries will
provide such additional support in 2014-15, offering amounts that they consider appropriate according to their national context.

The European Commission believes that the level of the student grant proposed under Erasmus+ is fair, and more transparent than
under the previous programme. The exact amount a student receives, between the minimum and maximum level set by the
European Commission, is decided annually by the national authorities based on the demand for places and the level of national cofinancing. Different levels of co-financing between countries are therefore integrated into this new arrangement, where lower cofinancing at national level can be compensated by higher EU grants, within the minimum and maximum of the range, while higher
additional funding at national level can enable countries to reduce the EU portion of the grant to each student so as to maximise the
number of mobilities. A certain level of equality is therefore ensured for students in terms of grant level.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 183

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003037/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Artículo 174, cohesión territorial e insularidad

Tras la reforma del Tratado de Lisboa, con el artículo 174 del TFUE la cohesión territorial pasa a ser un objetivo de la Unión. En este
mismo artículo se establece que la UE se propondrá reducir las diferencias de desarrollo entre regiones. Asimismo, se dice
explícitamente que se prestará especial atención a las regiones que padecen desventajas naturales permanentes como, por ejemplo,
las regiones insulares.

¿Podría señalarnos la Comisión, como guardiana de los Tratados, cómo se está prestando esta especial atención a las regiones
insulares europeas? Al parecer, ni en la legislación europea ni en las políticas y programas de la UE esta especial atención no es
evidente.

El nuevo período de programación 2014-2020 ofrecía un excelente marco para traducir las disposiciones de los Tratados en
acciones prácticas. ¿Podría la Comisión ilustrarnos sobre si sus propuestas legislativas relativas a programas de financiación e
inversión para 2014-2020 cumplían con el requerimiento de especial atención fijado en los Tratados? ¿Se refleja este requisito en los
programas finalmente aprobados o en otros actos legislativos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de mayo de 2014)_

La sección 6.5 del Marco Estratégico Común, que se establece en el anexo I del Reglamento (UE) n [o] 1303/2013 ( [1] ) (el Reglamento
sobre disposiciones comunes relativas a los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos o «el RDC») exige a los Estados miembros y
las regiones que se aseguren de que «el enfoque general de promover un crecimiento inteligente, sostenible e integrador en los
ámbitos de que se trate (…) tenga en cuenta los problemas específicos de las regiones ultraperiféricas, las regiones más
septentrionales con muy baja densidad de población y las regiones insulares, transfronterizas y de montaña». Esta obligación se
refuerza para los programas cofinanciados por el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, en los que debe prestarse «particular
atención a la superación de las dificultades específicas de dichas zonas» [artículo 10 del Reglamento (UE) n [o] 1301/2013 ( [2] )].

A estos efectos, se facilitan una serie de instrumentos, como la modulación de las tasas de cofinanciación para los «Estados miembros
insulares que puedan optar a ayudas del Fondo de Cohesión y otras islas, excepto aquellas en las que esté situada la capital de un
Estado miembro o que tengan una conexión fija con el continente» [artículo 121, apartado 4, letra a), del RDC], la inversión
territorial integrada (artículo 36 del RDC) o el desarrollo local participativo (artículos 32 a 35 del RDC).

La Comisión está evaluando actualmente los proyectos de acuerdos de asociación y los programas y velará por que tengan
debidamente en cuenta estas disposiciones.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Reglamento (UE) n [o] 1303/2013 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 2013, por el que se establecen disposiciones comunes relativas al

Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, al Fondo Social Europeo, al Fondo de Cohesión, al Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural y al Fondo Europeo Marítimo
y de la Pesca, y por el que se establecen disposiciones generales relativas al Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, al Fondo Social Europeo, al Fondo de Cohesión y al
Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de la Pesca, y se deroga el Reglamento (CE) n [o] 1083/2006 del Consejo (DO L 347 de 20.12.2013).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Reglamento (UE) n [o] 1301/2013 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 2013, sobre el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional y sobre

disposiciones específicas relativas al objetivo de inversión en crecimiento y empleo y por el que se deroga el Reglamento (CE) n [o] 1080/2006 (DO L 347
de 20.12.2013).

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C 333 / 184 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003037/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Article 174: territorial cohesion and insularity

After the reform of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 174 of the TFEU introduced territorial cohesion as an aim of the Union. This Article
also lays down that the EU shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions. It also states
explicitly that special attention is to be paid to regions that suffer from permanent natural handicaps, such as island regions.

Could the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, inform us as to how the aforementioned special attention is being paid to the
insular regions of Europe? It would appear that such special attention is rather conspicuous by its absence both in EU legislation and
in the Union’s policies and programmes.

The new 2014-2020 programming period offered an excellent framework to transpose treaty provisions into practical measures.
Could the Commission inform us as to whether its proposals for legislation relating to programmes of financing and investment for
2014-2020 complied with the requirement for special attention set out in the Treaties? Has this requirement been complied with in
the programmes that were finally approved or in other legislation?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

Section 6.5 of the Common Strategic Framework, set out in Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 ( [1] ) (the Common Provisions
Regulation for the ESI Funds or ‘the CPR’) requires Member States and regions to ‘ensure that the overall approach to promoting
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the areas concerned (…) takes account of the specific challenges of the outermost regions,
the northernmost regions with a very low population density and of island, cross-border or mountain regions’. This obligation is
reinforced for programmes co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, where ‘particular attention should be paid to
addressing the specific difficulties’ of these areas (Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 ( [2] )).

For these purposes, the regulations provide a number of instruments, such as modulation of co-financing rates for ‘island Member
States eligible under the Cohesion Fund, and other islands except those on which the capital of a Member State is situated or which
have a fixed link to the mainland’ (Article 121(4)(a) of the CPR), Integrated Territorial Investments (Article 36 of the CPR) or
Community-led Local Development (Articles 32 to 35 of the CPR).

The Commission is currently assessing draft Partnership Agreements and programmes and will ensure that they duly take account of
these provisions.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional

Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries
Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime
and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006,OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on specific

provisions concerning the Investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006,OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 185

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003038/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Oficina de Investigación y Disciplina (IDOC)

La Comisión Europea estableció en 2004 la Oficina de Investigación y Disciplina (IDOC, en sus siglas inglesas) con el cometido
principal de llevar a cabo investigaciones administrativas con objeto de esclarecer la violación por parte de los funcionarios y otros
empleados de la Comisión de las disposiciones estatutarias y otras normas de aplicación.

Trascurridos diez años desde su creación, ¿qué evaluación hace la Comisión de su funcionamiento?

¿Ha llevado a cabo o piensa emprender algún análisis sobre el impacto de esa unidad administrativa?

¿Cuántos casos ha instruido desde el año 2010 y cuál ha sido la duración media de los mismos? ¿Ha evaluado el coste medio
(recursos humanos y materiales) por investigación? ¿Qué porcentaje de los casos investigados ha resultado en la imposición de una
sanción grave?

Por último, ¿qué problemas han identificado los diversos órganos de control relativos al procedimiento y a las garantías procesales
del personal sometido a investigación?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šefčovič en nombre de la Comisión**

_(3 de junio de 2014)_

La Comisión considera que la IDOC desempeña un papel fundamental para garantizar el cumplimiento de las estrictas normas de
buena conducta que la Comisión espera de su personal. Aunque su política de buena conducta hace hincapié en la prevención y la
concienciación, la Comisión debe ser capaz de reaccionar adecuadamente antes los pocos casos en que se infringen las normas
pertinentes.

Es imposible evaluar la incidencia de este organismo en relación con el supuesto que no existiera. No obstante, es evidente que la
experiencia adquirida por este organismo especializado garantiza un tratamiento profesional de las supuestas infracciones de las
obligaciones del personal, en interés tanto de la Comisión como del personal afectado.

Desde 2010, el desglose es el que figura en el anexo 1. Como se ha solicitado, únicamente figuran las sanciones graves, es decir, las
sanciones con repercusiones financieras. El número de asuntos representa toda la información recibida tenida en cuenta en la
evaluación. Hay que observar que no existe una correlación directa entre las investigaciones y las sanciones, ya que hay
investigaciones que se archivan sin más y, al contrario, una investigación no siempre precede los procedimientos disciplinarios,
especialmente si los hechos correspondientes están lo suficientemente probados desde el principio.

La Comisión no considera útil calcular el coste medio por investigación. Los recursos destinados a una posible investigación varían
en función de una serie de factores, tales como la complejidad, la gravedad o la urgencia del asunto de que se trate.

Las garantías procesales de las personas objeto de investigación son amplias y se establecen en la legislación aplicable ( [1] ). No han
suscitado denuncias o críticas por parte de los organismos de control pertinentes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Anexo IX del Estatuto de los funcionarios y Decisión de la Comisión relativas al desarrollo de las investigaciones administrativas y de los procedimientos
disciplinarios, de 28 de abril de 2004, C(2004) 1588 final/4.

C 333 / 186 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003038/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC)

In 2004 the European Commission set up the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC), whose primary role is to carry out
administrative inquiries with a view to clarifying any infringement by Commission officials or other staff of applicable statutory
provisions or other rules.

Ten years after it was set up, what is the Commission’s assessment of its operation?

Has the Commission carried out any analysis of the impact of this administrative body or is it planning to do so?

How many cases has it dealt with since 2010 and how long do its inquiries last on average? Has the Commission calculated the
average cost (in human and material resources) of each inquiry? In what proportion of the cases it has investigated have serious
penalties been imposed?

Lastly, what problems have the various different monitoring bodies identified with respect to the procedure and the procedural
guarantees of the personnel under investigation?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 June 2014)_

The Commission considers that IDOC plays an essential role in ensuring compliance with the high ethical standards that the
Commission expects from its staff. While its ethics policy puts the emphasis on prevention and awareness-raising, the Commission
must be able to react adequately in the few instances that the relevant rules are breached.

It is impossible to measure the impact of this body against a hypothetical baseline scenario where no such body would exist. It is
obvious, however, that the expertise acquired by this specialised body ensures a professional handling of alleged infringement to the
staff obligations, in the interest of both the Commission and the staff members concerned.

Since 2010 the breakdown is as demonstrated in Annex1. As requested, only serious sanctions, i.e. sanctions with a financial impact,
are included. The number of cases represents all incoming information taken into assessment. It should be noted that there is no
direct correlation between inquiries and sanctions: inquiries may be closed without follow-up, and conversely, disciplinary
procedures are not always preceded by an inquiry, in particular if the facts provided are sufficiently established from the onset.

The Commission does not consider it useful to calculate the average cost per inquiry. The resources committed to any inquiry vary
according to a number of relevant factors, such as the complexity, the gravity or the urgency of the case at hand.

The procedural guarantees of any person under investigation are extensive and are laid down in the relevant legislation ( [1] ). They have
not led to complaints or criticism from the relevant monitoring bodies.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and Commission Decision on the conduct of administrative inquiries and disciplinary procedures of 28.4.2004, C(2004) 1588
final/4.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 187

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003039/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Oficina de Investigación y Disciplina (IDOC) II

La decisión de la Comisión Europea por la que se crea la Oficina de Investigación y Disciplina (IDOC, en sus siglas inglesas) asigna
administrativamente esta unidad a la Dirección General de Personal y Administración. El director general de esta Dirección es, en la
mayoría de los casos, la autoridad facultada para imponer una sanción disciplinaria.

¿Considera la Comisión adecuado que la instrucción de los casos y la imposición de las sanciones se lleven a cabo bajo una misma
autoridad? ¿No sería más lógico que instrucción y sanción fueran realizadas por unidades funcional y jerárquicamente
independientes? ¿Ha contemplado la conveniencia de delegar en la OLAF las tareas de investigación administrativa?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šefčovič en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de junio de 2014)_

Existe una clara separación de tareas entre la OLAF y las instancias disciplinarias de cada institución. La Comisión Europea no
considera que se haría un uso adecuado de los recursos si la OLAF efectuara todas las investigaciones administrativas para todas las
instituciones. Esto queda confirmado por el Reglamento de la OLAF ( [1] ).

Cabe señalar que se consulta a la OLAF sobre cada investigación administrativa prevista en la CE, y que, si la OLAF decide investigar
el asunto ella misma, la Oficina de Investigación y Disciplina (IDOC) se abstiene de realizar una investigación sobre los mismos
hechos, a no ser que se haya acordado otra cosa ( [2] ).

La CE asegura a Su Señoría que la organización de la IDOC incluye los necesarios controles y contrapesos para garantizar el pleno
respeto de los principios de imparcialidad, objetividad y equidad en sus deliberaciones y en las decisiones por las que se imponen
sanciones disciplinarias.

Las normas pertinentes ( [3] ) establecen que el Director y los demás miembros de la IDOC ejercen sus competencias de investigación
administrativa de forma independiente. En el ejercicio de dichas competencias no pueden ni solicitar ni recibir instrucciones.

El Director General de la Dirección General de Recursos Humanos y Seguridad está facultado para imponer solo sanciones
menores ( [4] ), previa audiencia del interesado. Además, en el caso de los altos directivos, esta facultad de imponer sanciones menores es
ejercida por el miembro de la CE responsable de la RH.

Si se plantea una sanción más grave con un impacto financiero, el Consejo de Disciplina debe ser consultado. Este organismo
independiente, presidido por una persona procedente de fuera, escucha a la persona concernida, analiza el caso y formula una
recomendación.

En estos casos más serios, la facultad de imponer sanciones se ejerce a un nivel superior (Decisión conjunta de tres Directores
Generales, o incluso del Colegio). Todas las decisiones finales pueden, obviamente, recurrirse ante los tribunales competentes.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) El artículo 5, apartado 1, del Reglamento n° 883/2013 establece que: «Por lo que respecta a las investigaciones internas, se tendrá especialmente en cuenta la

institución, órgano u organismo que esté en mejores condiciones de llevarlas a cabo, habida cuenta especialmente de la naturaleza de los hechos, la incidencia
financiera real o potencial del asunto, y la posibilidad de cualquier consecuencia judicial».

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Artículo 4, apartado 2, de la Decisión de la Comisión citada en la nota 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Artículo 3 de la Decisión de la Comisión sobre la realización de investigaciones administrativas y procedimientos disciplinarios, de 28 de abril de 2004, C (2004)

1588 final/4.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) (Advertencias por escrito y amonestaciones).

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

C 333 / 188 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003039/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) II

The decision of the European Commission which set up the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) assigned this department in
administrative terms to the Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration. The Director General of this section is, in most
cases, the person authorised to impose disciplinary penalties.

Does the Commission consider it to be appropriate that the same body should be responsible both for investigating cases and for
imposing penalties? Would it not be more logical for investigation and penalising to be carried out by departments that are
independent both hierarchically and operationally? Has it considered whether tasks of administrative inquiry should be delegated to
the OLAF?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 June 2014)_

There is clear separation of tasks between OLAF and disciplinary responsibilities of each institution. The EC does not consider it an
appropriate use of resources to have OLAF carry out all administrative inquiries for all institutions. This is confirmed in the OLAF
Regulation ( [1] ).

It should be noted that OLAF is consulted on each envisaged administrative inquiry in the EC, and that, if OLAF decides to investigate
the case itself, IDOC refrains from conducting an inquiry into the same facts unless specifically agreed otherwise ( [2] ).

The EC wishes to reassure the Honourable Member that the set-up of IDOC includes the necessary checks and balances to ensure full
respect for the principles of impartiality, objectivity and fairness in its proceedings and decisions imposing disciplinary penalties.

The relevant rules ( [3] ) provide that the Director and other members of IDOC exercise their powers of administrative inquiry
independently. In the exercise of those powers, they must neither seek nor receive instructions.

The Director-General of DG Human Resources and Security is empowered to impose minor sanctions ( [4] ) only, after hearing the
person concerned. In addition, for senior managers, this power to impose minor sanctions is exercised by the member of the EC
responsible for HR.

If a more serious sanction with a financial impact is envisaged, the Disciplinary Board must be consulted. This independent body,
chaired by an external Chairperson, hears the person concerned, reviews the case and makes a recommendation.

In these more serious cases, the power to impose sanctions is exercised on a higher level (joint decision of 3 Directors-General or
even the College). All final decisions are of course subject to judicial review by the relevant courts.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 5(1) of Regulation no. 883/2013 provides that: ‘…with regard to internal investigations, specific account shall be taken of the institution, body, office or

agency best placed to conduct them, based, in particular, on the nature of the facts, the actual or potential financial impact of the case, and the likelihood of any
judicial follow-up’.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Article 4(2) of the Commission Decision referred to in footnote 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 3 of the Commission Decision on the conduct of administrative inquiries and disciplinary procedures of 28.4.2004, C(2004) 1588 final/4.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Written warnings and reprimands.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 189

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003040/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ PYME: Servicios de asesoría en el ámbito del diseño ecológico

La Comisión Europea, en su Comunicación «Una industria europea más fuerte para el crecimiento y la recuperación económica» de
octubre de 2012, se comprometió a aplicar los reglamentos específicos sobre diseño ecológico a los productos industriales,
incluyendo, en especial, aquellos que tienen un impacto significativo sobre el entorno durante su ciclo de vida; a apoyar el logro más
rápido y menos oneroso de los objetivos relativos a la política de diseño ecológico por medio de acuerdos sectoriales voluntarios; a
revisar conjuntamente la Directiva sobre el etiquetado energético y determinados aspectos de las directivas sobre diseño ecológico
para maximizar su eficacia; y a apoyar los servicios de asesoría en el ámbito del diseño ecológico por medio de la red Enterprise
Europe Network para abordar mejor las necesidades de las pequeñas y medianas empresas (PYME).

¿Cuáles son las medidas concretas adoptadas por la Comisión para apoyar la asesoría a las PYME en el ámbito del diseño ecológico?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de mayo de 2014)_

Se ha creado una acción específica para promover el diseño ecológico de los fabricantes en las PYME ( [1] ) como parte del Programa
Marco de Competitividad e Innovación 2007-2013. Participan en esta acción (de abril de 2013 a diciembre de 2014) cofinanciada,
de 4,5 millones EUR, cinco consorcios activos en varios Estados miembros. El objetivo de la acción específica, coordinada por
Enterprise Europe Network (EEN), es concienciar a las PYME sobre las ventajas competitivas que pueden derivarse si se adopta el
diseño ecológico como estrategia empresarial.

Esta iniciativa de veintiún meses supondrá la concienciación básica de más de 5 000 PYME en relación con el diseño ecológico; de
estas, alrededor de 2 000 continuarán las acciones de formación a través de auditorías en línea y formación interna; finalmente, es
posible que unas 250 PYME adopten una formación completa en el ámbito del diseño ecológico para rediseñar uno o más de sus
productos o sus procesos. Gestiona el proyecto la Agencia Ejecutiva para las PYME, en colaboración con la Comisión.

Expertos en diseño ecológico procedentes de consultorías y universidades forman al personal regional de la EEN y a los especialistas
locales en el ámbito del medio ambiente en estrategias, formación y herramientas en materia de diseño ecológico. El personal local
transmite estos conocimientos específicos a las PYME, incorporando los conocimientos en materia de diseño ecológico para su
futuro uso una vez finalizado el proyecto. Se aprovechan las buenas prácticas sectoriales (p.ej. construcción o embalaje), la cadena de
[valor y los vínculos geográficos (www.ecodesign-een.eu).](http://www.ecodesign-een.eu/)

Se llevará a cabo una revisión _ex-post_ de la acción específica, a fin de analizar si deben lanzarse y cofinanciarse futuras iniciativas en el
periodo 2014-2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Convocatoria (2012) ENT/CIP/12/D/N04S00.

C 333 / 190 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003040/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ SMEs: eco-design advisory services

In its communication ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’ of October 2012, the European
Commission undertook as follows: to apply the specific regulations on eco-design to industrial products, including, in particular,
those that produce a significant impact on the environment during their life cycle; to support faster and cheaper delivery of ecodesign policy objectives through sectoral voluntary agreements; to jointly review the directive on energy labelling and certain aspects
of the eco-design Directives to maximise their effectiveness; and to support eco-design advisory services through the Enterprise
Europe Network to better address the needs of SMEs.

What specific measures has the Commission adopted to support advisory services for SMEs in the ambit of ecological design?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

A Specific Action to Promote Ecodesign by SME Manufacturers ( [1] ) was part of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework
Programme (CIP) 2007-13. Five multi-Member State consortia are participating in this EUR 4.5 million co-financed action
(April 2013 to December 2014). The aim of the Specific Action, coordinated by the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN), is to make
SMEs aware of competitive advantages that can be derived from adopting ecodesign as a business strategy.

The 21-month undertaking will raise basic awareness of ecodesign in over 5000 SMEs, from which around 2000 SMEs will take the
training further via onsite audits and in-house training, resulting in possibly some 250 SMEs utilising full ecodesign training to
redesign one or more of their products or processes. The project is being managed by the Executive Agency for SMEs, in
coordination with the Commission.

Ecodesign experts from consultancies or academia train regional EEN staff and local environmental specialists in ecodesign strategies,
teaching and tools. Local staff pass on this expertise to SMEs, embedding ecodesign knowledge for future use beyond the life of this
project. Good practice via sectoral (e.g., construction, packaging), value chain and geographical linkages are being exploited
[(www.ecodesign-een.eu).](http://www.ecodesign-een.eu/)

The Specific Action will be reviewed _ex-post_, to analyse whether further related initiatives might be pursued and co-funded during the
period 2014-2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Call (2012) ENT/CIP/12/D/N04S00.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 191

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003041/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και στρατηγικές της Λισαβόνας και «Ευρώπη 2020»

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) παρατηρεί, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι:

«οι συστάσεις που περιλαμβάνονται στα μνημόνια συνεννόησης είναι αντίθετες προς την πολιτική εκσυγχρονισμού που εκπονήθηκε με τη
στρατηγική της Λισαβόνας και τη στρατηγική Ευρώπη 2020».

Ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

1. Ασπάζεται το πιο πάνω συμπέρασμα της Έκθεσης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Πώς προτίθεται να ενεργήσει ώστε η στρατηγική της Λισαβόνας και η στρατηγική Ευρώπη 2020 να προχωρήσουν ομαλά και να
υλοποιηθούν με επιτυχία;

**Απάντηση**
_(28 Μαΐου 2014)_

Το Συμβούλιο δεν συζήτησε την έκθεση που συνέταξε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας για το ρόλο και τις εργασίες της
Τρόικας (Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα/ΕΚΤ και Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο/ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που
έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, με το σκεπτικό ότι θα τύχει καλύτερης εξέτασης από τα ίδια τα όργανα που συναποτελούν την
Τρόικα.

Ωστόσο, ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας απάντησε τον Ιανουάριο του 2014 στο από 21ης Νοεμβρίου 2013 αίτημα που απηύθυνε ο
Πρόεδρος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου (ECON) του ΕΚ προς την Επιτροπή, την
ΕΚΤ, το ΔΝΤ, την Ευρωομάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο για την υποβολή προτάσεων προς στήριξη της εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας έκθεσης
για την αξιολόγηση της δομής, του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής. Η απάντηση, την οποία δημοσίευσε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο στην ιστοσελίδα της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και
Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων, απηχεί σαφώς τη θέση της Ευρωομάδας έναντι των ευρύτερων θεμάτων που πραγματεύεται η έκθεση.

C 333 / 192 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003041/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and the Lisbon strategy and Europe 2020

The European Parliament Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) notes, _inter alia_, that: ‘the recommendations contained in the MoUs are at odds with the modernisation
policy drawn up in the form of the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy.’

In view of the above, will the Council say:

1. Does it endorse the above conclusion of the European Parliament Report?

2. What action will it take to ensure that the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy progress smoothly and are
successfully implemented?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2014)_

The Council has not discussed the European Parliament's own-initiative report on the role and operations of the Troika
(Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) in euro area programme countries on
the grounds that it would be best addressed by the Troika institutions themselves.

However, the Eurogroup President did respond in January 2014 to the request of 21 November 2013 from the Chair of the
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) to the European Commission, the ECB, the IMF, the Eurogroup and the
European Council for input to support the own-initiative report evaluating the structure, role and operations of the Troika actions in
euro area programme countries. The response, which was published by the European Parliament on the ECON website, clearly sets
out the Eurogroup's position on the broader issues considered by the report.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 193

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003042/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και συστήματα εργασιακών σχέσεων και διαμόρφωσης των μισθών

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) υπενθυμίζει, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι: «χρειάζεται αναπροσαρμογή των μνημονίων συνεννόησης
προκειμένου να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις πρακτικές και τους θεσμικούς μηχανισμούς διαμόρφωσης των μισθών και το εθνικό πρόγραμμα
μεταρρυθμίσεων του οικείου κράτους μέλους στο πλαίσιο της στρατηγικής της Ένωσης για την ανάπτυξη και την απασχόληση, σύμφωνα με
τον κανονισμό (EE) αριθ. 472/2013 (άρθρο 7 παράγραφος 1)».

Παρόμοιες απόψεις για την ανάγκη σεβασμού των θεσμοθετημένων μηχανισμών της αγοράς εργασίας εκφράζονται επίσης από τη Διεθνή
Οργάνωση Εργασίας.

Το Συμβούλιο καλείται να απαντήσει στα εξής ερωτήματα:

1. Συμφωνεί ότι υπήρξαν παραβιάσεις των θεσμοθετημένων μηχανισμών διαμόρφωσης των μισθών, κατ' απαίτηση της Τρόικας, σε χώρες
του Μνημονίου;

2. Η παράκαμψη του κοινωνικού διαλόγου σε τόσο σοβαρά θέματα συμβάλλει στη διατήρηση των συνθηκών κοινωνικής ηρεμίας και
γαλήνης, κάτι που είναι απολύτως απαραίτητο σε συνθήκες οικονομικής κρίσης;

**Απάντηση**
_(28 Μαΐου 2014)_

Το Συμβούλιο δεν συζήτησε την έκθεση που συνέταξε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο (ΕΚ) εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας για το ρόλο και τις εργασίες
της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, με το σκεπτικό ότι θα τύχει
καλύτερης εξέτασης από τα ίδια τα όργανα που συναποτελούν την Τρόικα.

Ωστόσο, ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας απάντησε τον Ιανουάριο του 2014 στο από 21ης Νοεμβρίου 2013 αίτημα που απηύθυνε ο
Πρόεδρος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων (ECON) προς την Επιτροπή, την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα, το
Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο, την Ευρωομάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, για την υποβολή προτάσεων προς στήριξη της εξ ιδίας
πρωτοβουλίας έκθεσης για την αξιολόγηση της δομής, του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ
που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής. Η απάντηση, την οποία δημοσίευσε το ΕΚ στην ιστοσελίδα της ECON, απηχεί σαφώς τη
θέση της Ευρωομάδας έναντι των ευρύτερων θεμάτων που πραγματεύεται η εν λόγω έκθεση. Υπογραμμίζεται συγκεκριμένα ότι τα
προγράμματα μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής και τα αντίστοιχα προαπαιτούμενα αποτελούν προϊόν κοινής συμφωνίας μεταξύ των
δημοκρατικά εκλεγμένων κυβερνήσεων των κρατών μελών που αιτούνται τη χορήγηση οικονομικής βοήθειας και εκείνων των κρατών μελών
της ευρωζώνης που ενεργούν πρωτίστως ως πιστωτές. Αυτού του είδους οι συμφωνίες συνήφθησαν με πλήρη σεβασμό προς τις εθνικές
κοινοβουλευτικές και κυβερνητικές διεργασίες εξέτασης όλων των κρατών μελών, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και εκείνων που ζητούσαν να τους
χορηγηθεί βοήθεια.

Το Συμβούλιο συμφώνησε ότι, κατά την κατάρτιση των προγραμμάτων μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής, θα λαμβάνονται υπόψιν οι
πρακτικές και τα όργανα για τη διαμόρφωση των μισθών και το εθνικό μεταρρυθμιστικό πρόγραμμα του εν λόγω κράτους μέλους, στο
πλαίσιο της στρατηγικής της Ένωσης για την ανάπτυξη και την απασχόληση ( [1] ). Υπογραμμίστηκε επίσης ότι, για να υπάρξει επιτυχία, η
εφαρμογή των πολιτικών και των μεταρρυθμίσεων απαιτούν δέσμευση, συναίνεση στο εσωτερικό των κυβερνήσεων και στις περισσότερες
περιπτώσεις σε συμφωνία με τις εθνικές παραδόσεις, και με σεβασμό στην αυτονομία τους, στενή συνεργασία με τους κοινωνικούς εταίρους
και άλλους ενδιαφερομένους ( [2] ).

Τέλος, το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο υπογραμμίζει πόσο σημαντικό είναι να ενισχυθεί ο κοινωνικός διάλογος με τη συμμετοχή των κοινωνικών
εταίρων τόσο σε επίπεδο κρατών μελών όσο και σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο, ιδίως στο πλαίσιο του Ευρωπαϊκού Εξαμήνου, με στόχο να ενισχυθεί η
οικείωση των συμπερασμάτων και των συστάσεών του σε ολόκληρη την Ένωση ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 140/1 της 27.5.2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 7477/14, σ. 7.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) EUCO 169/13, σ. 14.

C 333 / 194 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003042/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and systems of industrial relations and wage formation

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277 (INI) recalls that ‘the MoUs need to be adapted in order to take into account the practice and institutions for
wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s strategy for
growth and jobs as set out in Regulation No 472/2013 (Article7(1))’.

Similar views on the need to respect institutionalised labour market mechanisms have also been voiced by the International Labour
Organisation.

In view of the above, will the Council answer the following questions:

1. Does it agree that there have been violations of institutionalised wage formation mechanisms, at the Troika’s request, in
countries subject to the Memoranda?

2. Does bypassing the social dialogue on such serious issues help maintain the conditions of social peace and tranquillity which
are absolutely essential in times of economic crisis?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2014)_

The Council has not discussed the European Parliament's (EP) own-initiative report on the role and operations of the Troika in euro
area programme countries on the grounds that it would be best addressed by the Troika institutions themselves.

However, the Eurogroup President did respond in January 2014 to the request of 21 November 2013 from the Chair of the
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) to the Commission, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the Eurogroup and the European Council for input to support the own-initiative report evaluating the structure, role and
operations of the Troika actions in euro area programme countries. The response, which was published by the EP on the ECON
website, clearly sets out the Eurogroup's position on the broader issues considered by the report. It underlines that macroeconomic
adjustment programmes and their conditionality are the product of joint agreements reached between the democratically elected
governments of the Member States requesting financial assistance and those of the euro area Member States ultimately acting as
creditors. These agreements were concluded in full respect of the national parliamentary and governmental scrutiny procedures of all
Member States, including those requesting assistance.

The Council has agreed that when macroeconomic adjustment programmes are drawn up, these shall take into account the practice
and institutions for wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the
Union’s strategy for growth and jobs ( [1] ). It has also stressed that to be successful, the implementation of policies and reforms require
buy-in, consensus within government and in most cases and in line with national traditions, and respecting their autonomy, close
interaction with social partners and other stakeholders ( [2] ).

Moreover, the European Council has underscored the importance of enhancing the social dialogue involving the social partners both
at Member State and European level, in particular in the context of the European Semester, with the objective of enhancing the
ownership of its conclusions and recommendations across the Union ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 140/1 27.5.2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 7477/14 p. 7.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) EUCO 169/13, p. 14.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 195

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003043/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και συστήματα υγείας

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) αποδοκιμάζει το γεγονός ότι:

«τα προγράμματα για την Ελλάδα, την Ιρλανδία και την Πορτογαλία περιλαμβάνουν μια σειρά από αναλυτικές οδηγίες για τη μεταρρύθμιση
των συστημάτων υγείας και περικοπές συναφών δαπανών … τα προγράμματα αυτά δεν δεσμεύονται από τον Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών
Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή από τις διατάξεις των Συνθηκών, και ιδίως το άρθρο 168 παράγραφος 7 της ΣΛΕΕ».

Στην Κύπρο τα μέτρα που εφαρμόστηκαν, με απαίτηση της Τρόικας, έχουν δημιουργήσει τεράστια προβλήματα στον τομέα της δημόσιας
υγείας και στα δημόσια νοσηλευτήρια, τα οποία αδυνατούν να ανταποκριθούν στις ανάγκες των πολιτών.

Ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

1. Αποδέχεται τον ισχυρισμό της Έκθεσης ότι «τα προγράμματα αυτά δεν είναι σύμφωνα με τον Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή τις διατάξεις των Συνθηκών, και ιδίως το άρθρο 168 παράγραφος 7 της ΣΛΕΕ»;

2. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει ώστε οι πολίτες στις χώρες του Μνημονίου να έχουν πρόσβαση σε μια ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη που
αρμόζει σε ευρωπαίους πολίτες;

**Απάντηση**
_(28 Μαΐου 2014)_

Το Συμβούλιο δεν συζήτησε την έκθεση που συνέταξε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας για το ρόλο και τις εργασίες της
Τρόικας (Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα/ΕΚΤ και Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο/ΔΝΤ) όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που
έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, με το σκεπτικό ότι θα τύχει καλύτερης εξέτασης από τα ίδια τα όργανα που συναποτελούν την
Τρόικα.

Ωστόσο, ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας απάντησε τον Ιανουάριο του 2014 στο από 21ης Νοεμβρίου 2013 αίτημα του Προέδρου της
Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων (ECON) του ΕΚ προς την Επιτροπή, την ΕΚΤ, το ΔΝΤ, την Ευρωομάδα και το
Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο για την υποβολή προτάσεων προς στήριξη της εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας έκθεσης για την αξιολόγηση της δομής, του
ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής. Η
απάντηση, την οποία δημοσίευσε το ΕΚ στην ιστοσελίδα της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων, απηχεί σαφώς τη θέση
της Ευρωομάδας έναντι των ευρύτερων θεμάτων που πραγματεύεται η έκθεση. Υπογραμμίζεται συγκεκριμένα ότι τα προγράμματα
μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής και τα αντίστοιχα προαπαιτούμενα αποτελούν προϊόν κοινής συμφωνίας μεταξύ των δημοκρατικά
εκλεγμένων κυβερνήσεων των κρατών μελών που αιτούνται τη χορήγηση οικονομικής βοήθειας και εκείνων των κρατών μελών της ευρωζώνης
που ενεργούν πρωτίστως ως πιστωτές. Αυτού του είδους οι συμφωνίες συνήφθησαν με πλήρη σεβασμό προς τις εθνικές κοινοβουλευτικές και
κυβερνητικές διεργασίες εξέτασης όλων των κρατών μελών, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και εκείνων που ζητούσαν να τους χορηγηθεί οικονομική
βοήθεια. Την ευθύνη του σχεδιασμού των προγραμμάτων και των μέτρων που προβλέπονταν σε αυτά είχαν οι αρχές των κρατών μελών που
ζητούσαν να τους χορηγηθεί οικονομική βοήθεια.

Ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας κατέστησε εξάλλου σαφές ότι ως εναλλακτική επιλογή σε σχέση με την παρεχόμενη βοήθεια μέσω των
προγραμμάτων μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής προέβαλε η άτακτη χρεοκοπία. Ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο θα είχε άκρως αρνητικές συνέπειες
για τους πολίτες των συγκεκριμένων κρατών μελών. Τα προγράμματα προσαρμογής βοήθησαν τα συγκεκριμένα κράτη μέλη να περιορίσουν,
στο μέτρο του δυνατού, τις αρνητικές συνέπειες της διαδικασίας προσαρμογής αφού συμβάλλουν στη διόρθωση σημαντικών εσωτερικών και
εξωτερικών ανισορροπιών.

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 168 παρ. 7 της ΣΛΕΕ, τα κράτη μέλη έχουν την ευθύνη για την παροχή υγειονομικών υπηρεσιών και ιατρικής
περίθαλψης καθώς και για την κατανομή των πόρων που διατίθενται για τις υπηρεσίες αυτές _._ Επιπλέον, όλα τα κράτη μέλη δεσμεύονται
πλήρως από την Ευρωπαϊκή Σύμβαση των δικαιωμάτων του ανθρώπου.

C 333 / 196 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003043/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Troika and health systems

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(INI)) regrets ‘the inclusion in the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal of a number of detailed
prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; …the fact that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7) TFEU’.

In Cyprus the measures implemented, at the demand of the Troika, have created huge problems for public health and public
hospitals, which are unable to meet the needs of citizens.

In view of the above, will the Council say:

1. Does it accept the claim made in the report that ‘the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7) TFEU’?

2. What will it do so that citizens in Memorandum countries have access to a healthcare system worthy of European citizens?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2014)_

The Council has not discussed the European Parliament's (EP) own-initiative report on the role and operations of the Troika
(Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) in euro area programme countries on the
grounds that it would be best addressed by the Troika institutions themselves.

However, the Eurogroup President did respond in January 2014 to the request of 21 November 2013 from te Chair of the Economic
and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) to the Commission, the ECB, the IMF, the Eurogroup and the European Council for input
to support the own-initiative report evaluating the structure, role and operations of the Troika actions in euro area programme
countries. The response, which was published by the EP on the ECON website, clearly sets out the Eurogroup's position on the
broader issues considered by the report. It underlines that macroeconomic adjustment programmes and their conditionality are the
product of joint agreements reached between the democratically elected governments of the Member States requesting financial
assistance and those of the euro area Member States ultimately acting as creditors. These agreements were concluded in full respect of
the national parliamentary and governmental scrutiny procedures of all Member States, including those of the Member States
requesting assistance. The ownership of the design of the programmes and the measures that these have included has always rested
with the authorities of the Member States requesting assistance.

The Eurogroup President was also clear that the alternative to the assistance provided through macroeconomic adjustment
programmes was disorderly default. This would have had extremely negative consequences for the citizens of the Member States in
question. Adjustment programmes have helped these Member States to limit, as far as possible, the negative impacts of the
adjustment process as they correct significant internal and external imbalances.

According to Article 168(7) TFEU, Member States are responsible for the delivery of health services and medical care, including the
allocation of the resources assigned to these services _._ Additionally, all Member States are fully bound by the European Convention on
Human Rights.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 197

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003044/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Απόφαση Eurogroup για κούρεμα εγγυημένων καταθέσεων στην Κύπρο

Στη διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί
σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) αναφέρεται, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι υπήρξε: «έλλειψη επαρκούς αιτιολόγησης ως προς το πώς
έγινε δεκτό από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και τους υπουργούς Οικονομικών της ΕΕ να συμπεριληφθούν οι εγγυημένες καταθέσεις» στο
κούρεμα των καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες (bail-in).

Ερωτείται το Συμβούλιο:

1. Θεωρεί ότι η απόφαση του Eurogroup για κούρεμα των εγγυημένων καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες ήταν νόμιμη και σύμφωνη
με το ευρωπαϊκό κεκτημένο;

2. Αν, όπως υπονοεί η Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, η απόφαση δεν ήταν νόμιμη, ποιοι ευθύνονται για την παράνομη αυτή
απόφαση και ποιες συνέπειες θα υποστούν για την παρανομία που διέπραξαν και η οποία είχε αρνητικότατες επιπτώσεις για την Κύπρο
και το λαό της;

**Απάντηση**
_(13 Μαΐου 2014)_

Όπως αναφέρεται στη δήλωση της 16ης Μαρτίου 2013 και επιβεβαιώθηκε στις 25 Μαρτίου 2013 ( [1] ), η Ευρωομάδα θεωρεί ότι, κατ' αρχήν, η
οικονομική βοήθεια στην Κύπρο δικαιολογείται προκειμένου να διασφαλιστεί μέσω της παροχής οικονομικής βοήθειας ύψους δέκα
δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ η χρηματοπιστωτική σταθερότητα τόσο στην Κύπρο όσο και στη ζώνη του ευρώ στο σύνολό της. Η Ευρωομάδα
εξέφρασε ικανοποίηση σχετικά με τα σχέδια αναδιάρθρωσης του χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα που υπέβαλαν οι κυπριακές αρχές, σύμφωνα με το
παράρτημα της δήλωσης της 25ης Μαρτίου 2013. Τα μέτρα αυτά θέτουν τη βάση για την αποκατάσταση της βιωσιμότητας του
χρηματοπιστωτικού τομέα. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, διασφαλίζουν όλες τις καταθέσεις κάτω των 100 000 ευρώ, σύμφωνα με τις αρχές της ΕΕ.

Επιπλέον, η Ευρωομάδα εξέφρασε ικανοποίηση για τη δέσμευση των κυπριακών αρχών να λάβουν πρόσθετα μέτρα. Στα μέτρα αυτά
περιλαμβάνονται η αύξηση του φόρου επί των εσόδων των κεφαλαίων και η αύξηση του νόμιμου φορολογικού συντελεστή για τα έσοδα των
εταιρειών.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/404933/EG%20EG%20Statement%20on%20CY%2025%2003%202013.pdf

C 333 / 198 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003044/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Eurogroup decision regarding a ‘haircut’ of insured deposits in Cyprus

The European Parliament report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to
the euro area programme countries (2013/2277 (INI) notes, _inter alia_, ‘the lack of sufficient explanation as to how the inclusion of
insured depositors was signed off by the European Commission and EU finance ministers’ in the ‘haircut’ on insured deposits in
Cypriot banks (bail-in).

In view of the above, will the Council say:

1. Does it consider that the decision by the Eurogroup regarding a haircut of insured deposits in Cypriot banks was lawful and in
accordance with the Community _acquis_ ?

2. If, as implied by the European Parliament Report, the decision was not legal, who is responsible for this illegal decision and
what consequences will they suffer for committing this illegal act which has had very negative consequences for Cyprus and its
people?

**Reply**
_(13 May 2014)_

As indicated in the statement of 16 March 2013 and reconfirmed on 25 March 2013 ( [1] ), the Eurogroup considered that, in principle,
financial assistance to Cyprus was warranted to safeguard financial stability in Cyprus and the euro area as a whole through the
provision of financial assistance for an amount of up to EUR 10 billion. The Eurogroup welcomed the plans presented by the Cyprus
authorities for restructuring the financial sector as specified in the annex to its statement of 25 March 2013. These measures form
the basis for restoring the viability of the financial sector. In particular, they safeguard all deposits below EUR 100 000 in accordance
with EU principles.

The Eurogroup also welcomed the Cyprus authorities' commitment to take further measures. These measures include the increase of
the withholding tax on capital income and of the statutory corporate income tax rate.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/404933/EG%20EG%20Statement%20on%20CY%2025%2003%202013.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 199

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003045/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Δημοκρατική νομιμοποίηση πολιτικών της Τρόικα

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικα στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) καταλογίζει σοβαρές ευθύνες στην Τρόικα και στα θεσμικά όργανα της ΕΕ.

Μεταξύ άλλων: «καταγγέλλει την έλλειψη διαφάνειας στις διαπραγματεύσεις για τα μνημόνια συνεννόησης· διαπιστώνει την ανάγκη να
αξιολογηθεί κατά πόσον τα επίσημα έγγραφα κοινοποιούνταν με σαφήνεια και εξετάζονταν εγκαίρως από τα εθνικά κοινοβούλια και το
Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και σε ποιο βαθμό συζητούνταν επαρκώς με τους κοινωνικούς εταίρους· επισημαίνει περαιτέρω ότι οι πρακτικές
αυτές, που σημαίνουν ότι οι πληροφορίες παραμένουν πίσω από κλειστές πόρτες, ενδέχεται να έχουν αρνητικό αντίκτυπο στα δικαιώματα των
πολιτών, στη σταθερότητα της πολιτικής κατάστασης των εμπλεκόμενων χωρών και στην εμπιστοσύνη των πολιτών στη δημοκρατία και στο
ευρωπαϊκό εγχείρημα».

Το Συμβούλιο ερωτάται τα ακόλουθα:

1. Συμφωνεί με τις πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις που περιέχονται στην Έκθεση του Κοινοβουλίου;

2. Θεωρεί ότι με τις πιο πάνω διαπιστώσεις εγείρεται όντως πρόβλημα δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης βασικών πολιτικών αποφάσεων
της ΕΕ;

3. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει ώστε να αποκατασταθούν οι συνθήκες δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης των αποφάσεων των θεσμικών οργάνων
της ΕΕ;

**Απάντηση**
_(28 Μαΐου 2014)_

Το Συμβούλιο δεν συζήτησε την έκθεση που συνέταξε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο (ΕΚ) εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας για το ρόλο και τις εργασίες
της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής, με το σκεπτικό ότι θα τύχει
καλύτερης εξέτασης από τα ίδια τα όργανα που συναποτελούν την Τρόικα.

Ωστόσο, ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας απάντησε τον Ιανουάριο του 2014 στο από 21ης Νοεμβρίου 2013 αίτημα που απηύθυνε ο
Πρόεδρος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων (ECON) του ΕΚ προς την Επιτροπή, την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα,
το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο, την Ευρωομάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, για την υποβολή προτάσεων προς στήριξη της εξ ιδίας
πρωτοβουλίας έκθεσης για την αξιολόγηση της δομής, του ρόλου και των εργασιών της Τρόικας όσον αφορά τις χώρες της ζώνης του ευρώ
που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής. Η απάντηση, την οποία δημοσίευσε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο στην ιστοσελίδα της
Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων, απηχεί σαφώς τη θέση της Ευρωομάδας έναντι των ευρύτερων θεμάτων που
πραγματεύεται η εν λόγω έκθεση. Υπογραμμίζεται συγκεκριμένα ότι τα προγράμματα μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής και τα αντίστοιχα
προαπαιτούμενα αποτελούν προϊόν κοινής συμφωνίας μεταξύ των δημοκρατικά εκλεγμένων κυβερνήσεων των κρατών μελών που αιτούνται
τη χορήγηση οικονομικής βοήθειας και εκείνων των κρατών μελών της ευρωζώνης που ενεργούν πρωτίστως ως πιστωτές. Αυτού του είδους οι
συμφωνίες συνήφθησαν με πλήρη σεβασμό προς τις εθνικές κοινοβουλευτικές και κυβερνητικές διεργασίες εξέτασης όλων των κρατών μελών,
συμπεριλαμβανομένων και εκείνων που ζητούσαν να τους χορηγηθεί βοήθεια. Τηρήθηκαν σε πολλές περιπτώσεις οι εθνικές διεργασίες
εξέτασης και για μεμονωμένες εκταμιεύσεις στο πλαίσιο της υλοποίησης των προγραμμάτων. Αυτό είχε ως αποτέλεσμα ότι η εξέταση των
όρων των προγραμμάτων οικονομικής προσαρμογής πραγματοποιήθηκε στο μέγιστο δυνατό βαθμό από την κυβέρνηση και το κοινοβούλιο
σε εθνικό επίπεδο, όπου αναλήφθηκε και η τελική ευθύνη για τη χρηματοδότηση και υλοποίηση των προγραμμάτων. Την ευθύνη του
σχεδιασμού των προγραμμάτων και των μέτρων που προβλέπονταν σε αυτά είχαν οι αρχές των κρατών μελών που ζητούσαν να τους
χορηγηθεί βοήθεια. Άλλωστε, πολλά επιμέρους μέτρα αποτέλεσαν αντικείμενο συζήτησης και ψήφισης στα εθνικά κοινοβούλια των
συγκεκριμένων κρατών μελών.

Ο Πρόεδρος της Ευρωομάδας κατέστησε εξάλλου σαφές ότι ως εναλλακτική επιλογή σε σχέση με την παρεχόμενη βοήθεια μέσω των
προγραμμάτων μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής προέβαλε η άτακτη χρεοκοπία. Ένα τέτοιο ενδεχόμενο θα είχε άκρως αρνητικές συνέπειες
για τους πολίτες των συγκεκριμένων κρατών μελών. Τα προγράμματα προσαρμογής βοήθησαν τα συγκεκριμένα κράτη μέλη να περιορίσουν,
στο μέτρο του δυνατού, τις αρνητικές συνέπειες της διαδικασίας προσαρμογής αφού συμβάλλουν στη διόρθωση σημαντικών εσωτερικών και
εξωτερικών ανισορροπιών.

C 333 / 200 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003045/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Democratic legitimacy of Troika policies

In its report on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries (2013/2277(INI)) the
European Parliament indicates that the Troika and EU institutions bear a serious burden of responsibility.

In particular: it ‘regrets the lack of transparency in the MOU negotiations, notes the need to evaluate whether formal documents were
clearly communicated to, and considered in due time by, the national parliaments and the European Parliament and adequately
discussed with the social partners; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices, which involve keeping information
behind closed doors, on citizens’ rights, on the stability of the political situation in the countries concerned and on the trust of
citizens in democracy and the European project.’

In view of this:

1. Does the Council concur with the findings of the European Parliament report?

2. Does it consider that the above findings bring to light a genuine problem regarding the democratic legitimacy of fundamental
political decisions by the EU?

3. What action will it take to restore the democratic legitimacy of decision-making by the EU institutions?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2014)_

The Council has not discussed the European Parliament's (EP) own-initiative report on the role and operations of the Troika in euro
area programme countries on the grounds that it would be best addressed by the Troika institutions themselves.

However, the Eurogroup President did respond in January 2014 to the request of 21 November 2013 from the Chair of the
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) to the Commission, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the Eurogroup and the European Council for input to support the own-initiative report evaluating the structure, role and
operations of the Troika actions in euro area programme countries. The response, which was published by the EP on the ECON
website, clearly sets out the Eurogroup's position on the broader issues considered by the report. It underlines that macroeconomic
adjustment programmes and their conditionality are the product of joint agreements reached between the democratically elected
governments of the Member States requesting financial assistance and those of the euro area Member States ultimately acting as
creditors. These agreements were concluded in full respect of the national parliamentary and governmental scrutiny procedures of all
Member States, including those of the Member States requesting assistance. These national scrutiny procedures have, in many cases,
also applied to individual disbursements of funding once programmes have been underway. This has meant that an extremely high
level of governmental and parliamentary scrutiny of the terms of economic adjustment programmes has taken place at national level,
where the ultimate responsibility was taken for programme financing and implementation. The ownership of the design of the
programmes and the measures that these have included has always rested with the authorities of the Member States requesting
assistance. Many of the individual measures taken were also debated and voted through the national parliaments of these Member
States.

The Eurogroup President was also clear that the alternative to the assistance provided through macroeconomic adjustment
programmes was disorderly default. This would have had extremely negative consequences for the citizens of the Member States in
question. Adjustment programmes have helped these Member States to limit, as far as possible, the negative impacts of the
adjustment process as they correct significant internal and external imbalances.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 201

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003046/14**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Τρόικα και αύξηση της φτώχειας και των ανισοτήτων στις χώρες του Μνημονίου

Η διερευνητική Έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις εργασίες της Τρόικας στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε
πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) εκφράζει λύπη για το γεγονός ότι: «τα μέτρα που εφαρμόστηκαν προκάλεσαν βραχυπρόθεσμα
αύξηση των ανισοτήτων στην κατανομή του εισοδήματος· … η αύξηση των ανισοτήτων αυτών στις τέσσερις χώρες ξεπέρασε τον μέσο όρο· …
οι περικοπές στις κοινωνικές παροχές και υπηρεσίες και η αύξηση της ανεργίας η οποία προέκυψε … καθώς και οι μειώσεις στους μισθούς,
οδηγούν στην αύξηση των επιπέδων της φτώχειας».

Ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

Μπορεί να με εφοδιάσει με συγκριτικά στοιχεία για την εξέλιξη των ανισοτήτων στην κατανομή των εισοδημάτων και των επιπέδων της
φτώχειας στις χώρες του Μνημονίου, πριν και μετά την υπαγωγή τους σε πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής;

Ποια μέτρα και πολιτικές προτίθεται να προωθήσει για μείωση των ανισοτήτων και της φτώχειας στις χώρες του Μνημονίου και γενικότερα
στην ΕΕ;

**Απάντηση**
_(4 Ιουνίου 2014)_

Το Συμβούλιο δεν διαθέτει τα συγκριτικά στοιχεία στα οποία αναφέρεται η αξιότιμη κυρία Βουλευτής. Δεν συζήτησε την έκθεση
πρωτοβουλίας του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου για τον ρόλο και τις ενέργειες της Επιτροπής, της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (ΕΚΤ) και
του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου (ΔΝΤ) στις χώρες του ευρώ που έχουν υπαχθεί σε πρόγραμμα.

Η αξιότιμη κυρία Βουλευτής θα βρει πληροφορίες στην έκθεση της Επιτροπής Κοινωνικής Προστασίας ( [1] ) σχετικά με την ανάπτυξη των
κοινωνικών πολιτικών προστασίας στην ΕΕ από τον Ιανουάριο του 2012 έως τον Ιούνιο του 2013. Η έκθεση εξετάζει τις μεταρρυθμίσεις
κοινωνικής προστασίας στα κράτη μέλη που εφαρμόζουν προγράμματα οικονομικής προσαρμογής. Στα συμπεράσματα αυτής της
έκθεσης ( [2] ), που εγκρίθηκαν από το Συμβούλιο (Απασχόληση, Κοινωνική Πολιτική, Υγεία και Καταναλωτές) στις 15 Οκτωβρίου 2013,
αναφέρεται ότι τα κράτη μέλη που εφαρμόζουν προγράμματα οικονομικής προσαρμογής έδειξαν εξαιρετική προσήλωση στις
μεταρρυθμίσεις. Διαπιστώνεται ότι πολλά από τα μέτρα ενίσχυσαν τα οικεία συστήματα κοινωνικής προστασίας, ενώ άλλα απέτυχαν να
ανακόψουν την άνοδο της φτώχειας. Η έκθεση τονίζει επίσης ότι, όταν μία χώρα αντιμετωπίζει χαμηλή ανάπτυξη και αύξηση της ανεργίας, τα
κριτήρια καταλληλότητας και επιλεξιμότητας των παροχών κοινωνικής προστασίας πρέπει να ανταποκριθούν σε μια διττή πρόκληση:
ενθάρρυνση των ικανών προς εργασία να επιστρέψουν σύντομα στην αγορά εργασίας και εξασφάλιση επαρκούς εισοδηματικής στήριξης για
πρόσωπα που την χρειάζονται εντός και εκτός αγοράς εργασίας. Τα μέτρα που έχουν ήδη ληφθεί σε επίπεδο ΕΕ για την καταπολέμηση της
φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού περιλαμβάνουν το πρόγραμμα Εγγύηση για τη Νεολαία.

Σε γενικές γραμμές, με τα προγράμματα οικονομικής προσαρμογής ασχολείται κυρίως το Eurogroup. O Πρόεδρος του Eurogroup
ανταποκρίθηκε στο αίτημα του Προέδρου της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων να συμβάλει στην υποβολή προτάσεων
προς στήριξη της εξ ιδίας πρωτοβουλίας έκθεσης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου τον Ιανουάριο του 2014.

Ο Πρόεδρος του Eurogroup τόνισε την άποψή του ότι παρόλο που παραμένουν σημαντικές προκλήσεις, μεταξύ των οποίων και εξαιρετικά
υψηλά επίπεδα ανεργίας, τα μέτρα που έχουν έως τώρα ληφθεί στην ευρωζώνη παράγουν αποτελέσματα. Τα δημόσια οικονομικά έχουν μπει
ξανά σε βιώσιμη τροχιά, οι οικονομίες γίνονται πιο ανταγωνιστικές καθώς οι αγορές εργασίας γίνονται πιο ευέλικτες, τα εμπόδια πρόσβασης
σε επαγγέλματα και αγορές αίρονται, οι φορολογικές υπηρεσίες εκσυγχρονίζονται και αναλαμβάνονται συνταξιοδοτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις.
Χάρη σε αυτά τα δύσκολα αλλά αναγκαία μέτρα, και σε μια σειρά από άλλες σημαντικές προσπάθειες σε όλη την ευρωζώνη,
συμπεριλαμβανομένης της οικονομικής διακυβέρνησης και αξιόπιστων στεγανών ασφάλειας, εξασφαλίστηκε η δημοσιονομική σταθερότητα
και τέθηκαν τα θεμέλια για βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη και δημιουργία θέσεων απασχόλησης σε όλη την ευρωζώνη.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 13958/13 ADD 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 13958/2/13 REV 2.

C 333 / 202 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003046/14**

**to the Council**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Troika and rise in poverty and inequalities in Memorandum countries

The enquiry report by the European Parliament on the role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area programme
countries (2013/2277(ΙΝΙ)) ‘regrets that the measures implemented have led in the short term to a rise in income distribution
inequality; notes that there has been an above-average rise in such inequalities in the four countries; notes that cuts in social benefits
and services and rising unemployment resulting from measures …, as well as wage reductions, are raising poverty levels’.

In view of this:

Can the Council provide comparative data on changes in income distribution inequality and poverty levels in the Memorandum
countries before and after they entered the adjustment programme?

What measures and policies does it intend to push forward in order to reduce inequalities and poverty in the Memorandum countries
and the EU in general?

**Reply**
_(4 June 2014)_

The Council is not in possession of the comparative data referred to by the Honourable Member. It has not discussed the European
Parliament's own-initiative report on the role and operations of the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in euro area programme countries.

The Honourable Member will find information in the Social Protection Committee's report ( [1] ) on the development of social
protection policies in the EU between January 2012 and June 2013. The report considers the social protection reforms in Member
States implementing economic adjustment programmes. The conclusions of that report ( [2] ), approved by the Council (EPSCO) on
15 October 2013, indicate that the Member States implementing Economic Adjustment Programmes have shown an extraordinary
commitment to reforms. It finds that many of the measures taken have strengthened social protection systems, while others have
failed to halt the rise of poverty. The report also stresses that, when a country is faced with low growth and rising unemployment, the
adequacy and eligibility criteria of social protection benefits need to respond to the twofold challenge of stimulating those able to
work to return quickly to the labour market and ensuring adequate income support for persons in need both in and out of the labour
market. Measures that have already been undertaken at EU level to combat poverty and social exclusion include the Youth Guarantee
Scheme.

More broadly, economic adjustment programmes are mainly dealt with by the Eurogroup. The Eurogroup President responded to
the request by the Chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for input to support the European Parliament's owninitiative report in January 2014.

The Eurogroup President outlined his view that, while important challenges remain, including unacceptably high levels of
unemployment, measures undertaken to date across the euro area are delivering results. Public finances are being put back on a
sustainable footing, economies are being made more competitive as labour markets are made more flexible, entry barriers to
professions and markets are being dismantled, tax administrations are being modernised and pension reforms are being undertaken.
Thanks to these difficult but necessary measures, and to a range of other significant efforts across the euro area, including reinforced
economic governance and credible firewalls, financial stability has been safeguarded and the foundations have been laid for
sustainable growth and job creation across the euro area.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 13958/13 ADD 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 13958/2/13 REV 2.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 203

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003047/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) e Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Conflitto d'interesse riguardante il nazionalismo tedesco e le elezioni europee — stabilire un insieme uniforme di regole
elettorali

Con la sentenza del 29 febbraio 2014 la Corte costituzionale tedesca ha stroncato la soglia del 3 % istituita per legge ai fini
dell'elezione degli eurodeputati, stabilendo che la partecipazione dei piccoli partiti non complica significativamente la formazione
delle maggioranze. Ciò consente ai piccoli partiti antieuropei come l'NPD neonazista di eleggere rappresentanti nel Parlamento
europeo. Attualmente non esiste un diritto UE comune che disciplini il processo elettorale; ogni Stato membro, invece, stabilisce le
proprie regole per eleggere i rappresentanti. La prospettiva di avere un Parlamento europeo funzionante e in grado di adottare
decisioni fondamentali per il futuro dell'Unione europea verrebbe seriamente ostacolata dalla partecipazione di gruppi antieuropei e
neonazisti, che recentemente sono in aumento in molti paesi europei.

La Commissione sta monitorando la crescita dei gruppi antieuropei e neonazisti negli Stati membri? Quali misure intende adottare
per eliminare i problemi che hanno dato origine a tali gruppi estremisti nell'UE, e rinforzare nel contempo la convinzione e la fiducia
negli ideali europei?

La Commissione sta valutando la possibilità di istituire un insieme uniforme di regole che disciplinino il processo per eleggere gli
eurodeputati? In caso di risposta affermativa, qual è la soglia considerata appropriata per proteggere la democrazia e agevolare il
processo decisionale nell'Unione?

La Commissione è preparata ad affrontare il coinvolgimento di gruppi estremisti nella struttura europea? Quali misure sta valutando
per controbilanciare le proposte antieuropee?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(22 maggio 2014)_

L'articolo 223, paragrafo 1, del TFUE prevede che sia il Parlamento europeo, e non la Commissione, a elaborare un progetto volto a
stabilire le disposizione necessarie per permettere l'elezione dei suoi membri. Attualmente, a norma dell'articolo 3 dell'Atto del 1976
relativo all'elezione dei rappresentanti dell'Assemblea a suffragio universale diretto, gli Stati membri possono prevedere la fissazione
di una soglia minima per l'attribuzione dei seggi, che non deve essere fissata a livello nazionale oltre il 5 % dei suffragi espressi ( [1] ).

L'Unione europea si fonda su una serie di valori — rispetto della dignità umana, libertà, democrazia, uguaglianza, Stato di diritto,
diritti umani — comuni agli Stati membri (articolo 2 del TUE).

In forza della decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI del Consiglio ( [2] ), gli Stati membri sono tenuti a punire l'istigazione pubblica e
intenzionale alla violenza o all'odio nei confronti di un gruppo di persone, o di un suo membro, definito in riferimento alla razza, al
colore, alla religione, all'ascendenza o all'origine nazionale o etnica.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 278 dell'8.10.1976, pag. 1. Atto modificato dalla decisione del Consiglio 2002/772/CE, Euratom (GU L 283 del 21.10.2002, pag. 1).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI del Consiglio, del 28 novembre 2008, sulla lotta contro talune forme ed espressioni di razzismo e xenofobia mediante il diritto

penale (GU L 328 del 6.12.2008, pag. 55-58).

C 333 / 204 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003047/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Conflict of interest regarding German nationalism and European elections -- establishing a uniform set of electoral rules

In a judgment of 29 February 2014, the German Constitutional Court struck down a 3% threshold set by law for the election of
MEPs, ruling that the participation of small parties would not significantly complicate the formation of majorities. This move will
allow smaller anti-European parties, such as the neo-Nazi NPD party, to elect representatives to the European Parliament. There is
currently no common EC law regulating the electoral process; rather, every Member State sets its own rules for electing
representatives. The prospect of having a functioning European Parliament able to take critical decisions for the future of the
European Union would be significantly hindered by the participation of anti-European and neo-Nazi groups, which have recently
been on the rise in many European countries.

Is the Commission monitoring the growth of anti-European and neo-Nazi groups in the Member States? What measures will it take
to eliminate the problems that have given rise to such extremist groups within the EU, while at the same time reinforcing EU citizens’
belief and trust in European ideals?

Is the Commission considering establishing a uniform set of rules governing the process of electing MEPs? If so, what threshold
would be considered appropriate in order to protect democracy and facilitate decision-making within the Union?

Is the Commission prepared to deal with the involvement of extremist groups in the European structure? What measures is it
considering with a view to counterbalancing anti-European proposals?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

In accordance with Article 223(1) TFEU, it is not for the Commission, but for the European Parliament to draw up a proposal to lay
down the provisions necessary for the European Parliament elections. Currently, in accordance with Article 3 of the 1976 Act
concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage ( [1] ), Member States may set a
minimum threshold for the allocation of seats, which may not exceed 5% of votes cast at national level.

The European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights; these values are common to the Member States (Article 2 TEU).

Furthermore Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA ( [2] ) obliges all Member States to make punishable the intentional public
incitement to violence or hatred targeted against a group of people or a member of such group defined by reference to race, colour,
religion, descent, or ethnic or national origin.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 1. The 1976 Act was amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002, p. 1).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal

law, OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, p. 55‐58.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 205

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003048/14**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Protection des données

Comment la Commission réagit-elle au fait que trois des principaux systèmes informatisés de réservation utilisés par les compagnies
aériennes partout dans le monde sont basés aux États-Unis et que les données PNR sont sauvegardées dans des systèmes en nuage
opérant sur le sol américain et régis par le droit américain?

Cela est-il vraiment conforme aux dispositions en matière de pertinence de la protection des données?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Malmström au nom de la Commission**

_(19 mai 2014)_

L'accord PNR avec les États-Unis régit les conditions de transfert, d'accès et d'utilisation de ces données. Comme indiqué à l'article 2
de l'accord, les règles et les mesures de sauvegarde prévues dans l'accord s'appliquent au traitement des données PNR de tous les
transporteurs aériens assurant des vols de passagers entre l'Union européenne et les États-Unis, indépendamment de l'endroit où le
transporteur aérien conserve ses données PNR. Par conséquent, les limitations strictes et les garanties effectives prévues dans l'accord
pour le traitement des données PNR s'appliquent également aux données PNR stockées par les transporteurs aériens dans les
systèmes informatisés de réservation basés aux États-Unis ou dans les systèmes d'informatique en nuage qui opèrent sur le sol
américain.

C 333 / 206 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003048/14**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Data protection

What is the Commission’s response to the fact that three of the main computerised reservation systems used by airlines throughout
the world are based in the United States and that PNR data is backed up in cloud systems operating on US soil under US law?

Does this really comply with the relevant legal provisions concerning data protection?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 May 2014)_

The PNR Agreement with the US regulates the conditions under which such data can be transferred, accessed and used. As set out in
Article 2 of the Agreement, the rules and safeguards contained in the Agreement apply to the processing of PNR data of all air
carriers operating passenger flights between the EU and the United States, irrespective of where the air carrier stores its PNR data.
Consequently, the strict limitations and effective safeguards for the processing of PNR data that are set out in the Agreement also
apply to PNR data stored by air carriers in reservation systems based in the United States or in cloud systems operating on US soil.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 207

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003050/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) e Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Preservativo femminile ignorato nelle strutture sanitarie

In occasione della Giornata internazionale della donna, la Lega italiana per la lotta contro l'Aids (Lila) è tornata a porre l'attenzione
sull'importanza della contraccezione femminile e della prevenzione delle malattie trasmesse per via sessuale.

Il preservativo per le donne in Italia è pressoché sconosciuto: assente da qualsiasi programma di prevenzione sanitaria, è reperibile a
pagamento al costo di sette euro per tre pezzi, mentre andrebbe pubblicizzato e diffuso gratuitamente, cosa che attualmente avviene
solo nei nostri centri. Del resto è notorio che l'80 per cento dei contagi di Hiv è dovuto proprio ai rapporti senza profilattico.

Il femidom è presente in tutti i programmi dell'Onu e anche in Italia e in Europa dovrebbe essere a disposizione della popolazione
femminile. Occorre promuovere il suo utilizzo e informare piuttosto i ginecologi, affinché possano consigliarlo alle loro pazienti di
modo che siano poi loro a decidere se utilizzarlo o meno. Negli Stati Uniti viene distribuito gratuitamente da anni, in Europa la
percezione dell'importanza di questo strumento, che garantisce piena autonomia alla donna, è cambiata di pochissimo.

Considerato che, dopo il calo a metà degli anni 2000, le statistiche dell'Istituto superiore di sanità testimoniano che nel 2012 la
proporzione dei contagi di malattie sessualmente trasmissibili nella popolazione femminile è tornato a crescere (3041 maschi e 810
femmine), e che in totale, nel periodo tra 1985 e il 2011, nel nostro paese sono state segnalate 52 629 nuove diagnosi di infezione da
Hiv,

può la Commissione indicare:

1. se intende condurre nuovi studi per capire perché il femidom è così poco utilizzato?

2. se intende valutare i risultati di tale studio e fornire raccomandazioni su possibili revisioni delle linee guida relative?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(14 maggio 2014)_

La Commissione è a conoscenza di studi che confermano che il preservativo femminile è uno dei metodi per ridurre il rischio di
infezioni sessualmente trasmissibili (IST) ( [1] ) ( [2] ).

Il 14 marzo 2014 la Commissione europea ha pubblicato il «Piano d'azione in materia di HIV/AIDS nell'UE e nei paesi vicini: 20142016», che include azioni volte a prevenire nuove infezioni da HIV, e in particolare ad intensificare la cooperazione con il settore
privato per sviluppare e attuare iniziative di lotta all'HIV/AIDS. Tale azione si prefigge, tra l'altro, di rendere più economiche e
accessibili le misure di prevenzione dell'HIV, inclusi i preservativi femminili e maschili ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Female Condom. A Powerful tool for protection (UNFPA) https://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2006/female_condom.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Use-effectiveness of the female versus male condom in preventing sexually transmitted disease in women. French PP, Latka M, Gollub EL, Rogers C, Hoover DR, Stein

ZA Sex Transm Dis. 2003 maggio; 30(5):433-9.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Piano d'azione in materia di HIV/AIDS nell'UE e nei paesi vicini: 2014-2016: http://ec.europa.eu/health/sti_prevention/docs/ec_hiv_actionplan_2014_en.pdf

( **|**

C 333 / 208 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003050/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Female condoms ignored by healthcare institutions

To mark International Women’s Day, LILA (the Italian league for the fight against AIDS) once again highlighted the importance of
female contraception and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases.

Female condoms, or ‘femidoms’, are practically unheard of in Italy: they are not included in any health protection programmes, and a
pack of three costs seven euros; however, they should be better publicised and made available for free in more places, rather than just
in Italian clinics as they are at present, especially as it is a widely known fact that 80% of all HIV transmissions are due to unprotected

sex.

The femidom features in every UN programme, and should also be made more freely available to women in Italy and the rest of
Europe. Its use needs to be promoted and gynaecologists need to be made more aware of it, so that they can advise their patients who
can then decide whether or not to use it. Femidoms have been distributed for free in the United States for years, but in Europe the
perception of how important these devices are has barely changed, even though they guarantee complete independence to women.

In 2012, the Italian National Health Institute revealed that the proportion of women infected by sexually transmitted diseases was
once again rising (810 women compared to 3 041 men) after falling in the mid-2000s. In total, there were 52 629 new diagnoses of
HIV in Italy between 1985 and 2011.

1. In light of the above, does the Commission intend to conduct fresh studies to find out why the femidom is used so sparingly?

2. If so, does it intend to assess the results of these studies and give recommendations on possible amendments to the relevant
guidelines?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2014)_

The Commission is aware of studies confirming that female condoms are one of the methods to reduce the risk of sexually
transmitted infections (STIs) ( [1] ) ( [2] ).

On 14th March 2014 the European Commission published the ‘Action Plan on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries:
2014-2016’ which includes actions on the prevention of new HIV infections, and particularly to intensify cooperation with the
private sector to develop and implement initiatives addressing HIV/AIDS. Amongst others this action is intended to increase
affordability and accessibility of HIV prevention measures including female and male condoms ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Female Condom. A Powerful tool for protection (UNFPA) https://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2006/female_condom.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Use-effectiveness of the female versus male condom in preventing sexually transmitted disease in women. French PP, Latka M, Gollub EL, Rogers C, Hoover DR, Stein

ZA Sex Transm Dis. 2003 May; 30(5):433-9.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Action Plan on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries: 2014-2016: http://ec.europa.eu/health/sti_prevention/docs/ec_hiv_actionplan_2014_en.pdf

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 209

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003051/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) e Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Attendibilità dati macroeconomici della Cina

L'affidabilità dei dati macroeconomici sfornati dagli uffici statistici della Repubblica popolare cinese è sempre più messa in
discussione da analisti ed esperti.

La versione ufficiale attribuisce all'economia cinese doti di invulnerabilità e stabilità che mai nessun sistema-paese ha sognato di
avere: tassi reali di incremento del PIL superiori al 6 % l'anno da circa 25 anni, inflazione contenuta, espansione del ceto medio,
consumi e mercato immobiliare costantemente al rialzo. Il tutto accompagnato da una perenne stabilità del governo, notorio frutto
della repressione militare disinvoltamente esercitata dal partito unico. Tutto bene o tutto troppo bello per essere vero? Il problema è
che nessuno lo sa. E questo è molto preoccupante e pericoloso. In tanti cominciano a dubitare della piena affidabilità dei dati
provenienti dall'Estremo Oriente: le statistiche macroeconomiche ufficiali denotano volatilità e andamenti sempre più spesso
incomprensibili. Selezionando infatti dalla popolazione dei valori del PIL il valore più frequente (8 %) si nota come l'inflazione cinese
ha registrato nel tempo una varianza dei corrispondenti tassi d'inflazione assolutamente estemporanei: 2,5 %; 4 %; -1 %; 1 %; 0 %,
solo per citare quelli più frequenti.

Domenica notte è stato comunicato il dato cinese sulle esportazioni di febbraio, risultato pari a -18 %; Dato ancora più stupefacente
se considerato rispetto al valore medio delle previsioni degli analisti, che era pari al +7,5 %. Se la realtà dei fatti risulta così
radicalmente differente dalle previsioni, il rischio che la base dati sia sballata è troppo forte per non prevedere foschi scenari futuri: un
_crack_ immobiliare, innescato dal credito troppo facile e dal conseguente « _sboom_ » dei prezzi delle nuove costruzioni.

Può pertanto la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. Intende esprimersi riguardo alla liceità di tali dati?

2. Intende approfondire eventuali indagini per fornire dati più accurati?

3. Intende esprimersi rispetto a misure per controbattere eventuali scenari macroeconomici negativi nei prossimi anni causati da
un crack del sistema cinese?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

_(20 maggio 2014)_

Migliorare la qualità e la disponibilità delle informazioni statistiche nazionali nei paesi terzi rientra fra le responsabilità delle
rispettive autorità statistiche nazionali.

Anche se la Cina sottoscrive le norme volontarie dell’FMI sulla diffusione dei dati generali (per i paesi con sistemi statistici meno
sviluppati), è uno dei soli due paesi del G20 che non hanno ancora adottato le norme speciali per la diffusione dei dati economici e
finanziari (un riferimento creato per i paesi con sistemi finanziari più sviluppati che possono accedere ai mercati mondiali dei
capitali).

Nelle sue previsioni economiche periodiche, la Commissione analizza i rischi potenziali associati agli sviluppi nei paesi terzi. Le
previsioni economiche della Commissione dell’autunno 2013 presentano un’analisi delle potenziali ricadute di un rallentamento dei
mercati emergenti:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee7_en.pdf

C 333 / 210 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003051/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Reliability of China's macroeconomic data

The reliability of the macroeconomic data published by the statistical offices of the People’s Republic of China is increasingly being
called into question by analysts and experts.

According to the official data, China’s economy has reached levels of prosperity and stability that no other national economic system
could ever dream of attaining: the country’s annual GDP has risen by more than 6% for around 25 years running, inflation has been
contained, the middle class is continuing to expand, consumption rates are constantly rising, and the growth of the property market
is showing no signs of slowing. All of this is accompanied by perpetual government stability which, as we all know, has been
achieved by the military repression confidently exerted by the single-party State. So, is everything in China really that perfect, or is it
simply too good to be true? The problem is that nobody really knows, and this is very alarming and dangerous. Many people are now
beginning to question whether the information being supplied by the country is wholly reliable, with the official macroeconomic
statistics revealing inconsistencies and trends that are becoming increasingly bizarre. Indeed, when China’s GDP was growing by 8%
per year (the mode value), the corresponding inflation rates that were recorded varied greatly over time, in a completely
unpredictable way: 2.5%; 4%; ‐1%; 1%; 0% (and that’s just citing the most common rates recorded).

On Sunday night, China revealed that its exports for the month of February had dropped by 18%, in stark contrast to the 7.5% rise
that analysts had predicted. While the figures actually recorded continue to deviate so radically from the forecasts made, there is too
great a risk that they have been miscalculated, and the consequences could be very grim indeed: for instance, the property market
could collapse, owing to credit being made too easily accessible and the prices of new-builds falling dramatically as a result.

1. Does the Commission intend to give an opinion on the reliability of these data?

2. Does it intend to investigate the situation further, so that more accurate data may be obtained?

3. Does it intend to give an opinion on the measures needed to combat any negative macroeconomic scenarios in the years ahead
that may be brought about by a collapse of the Chinese economy?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

Improving the quality and availability of national statistical information in third countries is the responsibility of the respective
national statistical authorities.

While China subscribes to the IMFs voluntary General Data Dissemination Standards (for countries with less developed statistical
systems), it is one of only two G20 economies that do not yet subscribe to the Special Data Dissemination Standards for economic
and financial data (a benchmark designed for countries with more developed financial systems that may seek access to global capital
markets).

The Commission analyses potential risks associated with developments in third countries in its regular economic forecasts. An
analysis of potential spill over effects from a slowdown in emerging markets can be found in the Commission's Autumn 2013
Economic Forecast: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee7_en.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 211

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003052/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) e Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Il gioco alcolico che «conquista il network»

Da qualche settimana, su un famoso social network, si assiste a un folle gioco conosciuto come Nek Nomination: una sfida all'ultimo
drink che i giovani lanciano attraverso un video postato sulla propria pagina del social network, mettendosi alla prova a bere quanto
più gli riesce in condizioni estreme.

Le regole del gioco sono molto semplici: si pubblica la propria bravata e si nomina qualche amico affinché in 24 ore realizzi il video e
nomini altre persone invitandole a bere.

La sfida alcolica multimediale, che ha avuto origine in Australia, in pochi mesi ha «conquistato» ragazzi di tutto il mondo, tra cui
europei e italiani.

Purtroppo la Nek Nomination è vissuta dai ragazzi come una sfida per mostrare il proprio valore personale e per indurre l'altro a
confrontarsi a una catena inebriante.

Una sfida a colpi di drink o shot i cui effetti possono essere deleteri e devastanti, considerati la giovane età dei partecipanti, l'assenza
di regole e controlli e l'abuso di alcol in solitudine, chiusi in camera davanti al monitor del computer in attesa delle notifiche «mi
piace» dagli amici.

L'effetto è a macchia d'olio e corre on-line: se ne parla fra i banchi di scuola e il video diventa la dimostrazione, una testimonianza di
quanto si è forti.

Considerato che:

—
la Nek Nomination ha già causato la morte di 2 ragazzi di 19 e 22 anni;

—
l'Europa è al primo posto per consumo di alcol e da anni si cerca di promuovere campagne contro l'abuso di tale prodotto per
ridurre in modo significativo le problematiche ad esso connesse;

può la Commissione indicare se:

1. non ritenga che il messaggio, diffuso tramite il social network, induca i giovani ad abusare di un prodotto altamente pericoloso
per la loro salute fisica e mentale?

2. intende prendere provvedimenti per arginare questo fenomeno, almeno a livello europeo?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(2 maggio 2014)_

La Commissione segue con attenzione la situazione relativa ai rischi legati all'abuso di bevande alcoliche ed è consapevole del
fenomeno diffuso tra i giovani nei media sociali, denominato «neknomination», che consiste nell'ingerire grandi quantità di alcol in
un breve lasso di tempo e nello sfidare gli altri a fare altrettanto. La Commissione non dispone tuttavia ancora di informazioni
affidabili sulla diffusione del fenomeno della «neknomination» tra i giovani in tutta Europa.

La protezione dei giovani e dei bambini, nonché la riduzione del consumo pericoloso e nocivo di alcol tra i giovani, sono affrontate
nel quadro di uno dei temi prioritari della strategia del 2006, volta ad affiancare gli Stati membri nei loro sforzi per ridurre i danni
derivanti dal consumo di alcol ( [1] ). In questo ambito il comitato per le politiche e le azioni nazionali in materia di alcol sta elaborando
un piano d'azione biennale sui giovani e sull'assunzione occasionale di alcol in misura smodata («binge drinking»). Detto piano
d'azione costituirà un riferimento per gli Stati membri e altri soggetti interessati allo scopo di attuare azioni intese a ridurre, nello
specifico, l'assunzione occasionale di alcol in misura smodata tra i giovani.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0625en01.pdf

C 333 / 212 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003052/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The drinking game that is taking the Internet by storm

For several weeks now, a demented game called ‘NekNomination’ has been prevalent on a well-known social network. The game is
essentially a drinking challenge that involves young people posting, on their home page, a video of themselves drinking as much as
they can, often in extreme conditions.

The rules of the game are very simple: the ‘player’ displays their own act of ‘bravado’ for all to see, and then nominates some of their
friends to perform a similar stunt; these friends then have 24 hours to put up their own videos, after which they challenge other
people to drink, and so on.

This Internet drinking challenge, which has its roots in Australia, has, in the space of just a few months, grown hugely popular
amongst young people from all over the world, including those in Italy and the rest of Europe.

Sadly, many young people see NekNomination as a challenge through which they can prove their own self-worth and persuade
others to climb aboard the express train to drunken oblivion.

The drinks and shots that are imbibed as part of the drinking challenge can have harmful and even devastating effects, given the
young age of the participants, the absence of any rules or controls, and the fact that they are drinking excessively on their own, shut
away in their rooms in front of a computer screen, waiting for their friends to ‘like’ their video.

The phenomenon is spreading online like wildfire: pupils are furtively talking about it in classrooms, and the videos posted are being
increasingly regarded as shows of strength and bravery.

Given that:

—
NekNomination has already caused the deaths of two young men aged 19 and 22;

—
more alcohol is consumed in Europe than anywhere else, and campaigns have been mounted for years to combat alcohol
abuse in order to significantly reduce the problems associated with it,

Can the Commission please answer the following questions:

1. Does it not believe that the message that is being spread across the social network essentially encourages young people to
abuse a substance that is highly dangerous to their physical and mental health?

2. Does it intend to take any action to curb this phenomenon, at least on a European level?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

The Commission is carefully following the situation regarding risks involved in inappropriate consumption of alcoholic drinks and is
aware of the social media phenomenon of young people called ‘neknomination’, consisting in ingesting large amounts of alcohol in a
short period and challenging others to do the same. However, the Commission has no reliable information yet on the extent to
which ‘neknomination’ is practiced by young people across Europe.

The protection of young people and children as well as the reduction of hazardous and harmful drinking among young people are
addressed in one of the priority themes of the 2006 Strategy to support Member States to reduce alcohol related harm ( [1] ). In this
context, the Committee on National Alcohol Policy and Action is currently preparing a 2-year Action Plan on youth and heavy
episodic drinking (binge drinking). This Action Plan will provide a reference for Member States and other stakeholders to implement
actions to reduce in particular heavy episodic drinking among young people.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0625en01.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 213

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003053/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) e Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Inadeguato isolamento termico: uno spreco di energia insensato che fa aumentare le bollette e il riscaldamento globale

Recentemente è stato redatto uno studio grazie al quale è emerso che una corretta progettazione degli edifici comporta numerosi
vantaggi quali la riduzione della spesa energetica e una migliore qualità della vita e della sicurezza degli inquilini.

Sono stati analizzati 500 edifici di 47 città italiane costruiti dal dopoguerra ad oggi, ottenendo risultati decisamente sconfortanti che
hanno rivelato un panorama edilizio poco attento all'efficienza e al benessere dei cittadini; è notevole la criticità anche negli edifici
costruiti dopo la direttiva europea del 2002, ovvero in un periodo storico in cui era stata delineata con chiarezza la direzione che il
settore avrebbe dovuto adottare. Non si salvano nemmeno le costruzioni che si autodefiniscono «biocase».

Se da un lato uno dei principali problemi emersi dal rapporto è la mancanza di un adeguato isolamento termico dell'involucro,
dall'altro si riscontra anche come una corretta riqualificazione energetica potrebbe dar luogo a risultati significativi in termini di
riduzione delle dispersioni e dei consumi.

Accanto a un patrimonio edilizio «energivoro» e insicuro, anche nelle strutture destinate all'istruzione, si aggiungono i problemi
legati alla normativa nazionale e l'articolato e inadeguato quadro di regole stabilite dalle diverse regioni, talvolta addirittura
discordanti per quanto riguarda controlli e sanzioni.

L'innovazione ambientale è, infatti, l'unica valida alternativa per combattere la crisi che per sei anni ha tenuto sotto scacco il settore
delle costruzioni, producendo oltre 600 mila disoccupati.

Considerato che è necessario prevedere interventi tempestivi che possano rilanciare il settore, percorrendo diverse strade in parallelo
tra cui:

—
aumentare controlli e sanzioni per garantire ai cittadini le prestazioni energetiche e la sicurezza degli edifici;

—
rendere obbligatoria la progettazione in Classe A per gli edifici superiori a determinate dimensioni;

—
assegnare premi alle ristrutturazioni edilizie ed energetiche, finanziando gli interventi di riqualificazione e soprattutto
snellendo le procedure amministrative;

può la Commissione indicare se:

1. intende sostenere studi internazionali europei su tale tematica?

2. intende fornire raccomandazioni su possibili revisioni delle linee guida relative?

**Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione**

_(6 maggio 2014)_

1. Per sfruttare il potenziale degli edifici adeguatamente isolati cui fa riferimento l’onorevole parlamentare, gli Stati membri sono
tenuti a recepire la direttiva 2010/31/UE ( [1] ) e ad attuarne le prescrizioni. La direttiva 2012/27/UE ( [2] ) include misure in materia di
efficienza energetica dell’edilizia e deve essere recepita nell’ordinamento nazionale entro il 5.6.2014.

2. La direttiva 2010/31/UE comprende prescrizioni vincolanti in tema di prestazione energetica nell’edilizia per gli edifici di
nuova costruzione, per gli edifici esistenti sottoposti a ristrutturazioni importanti e per gli elementi edilizi che fanno parte
dell’involucro dell’edificio e hanno un impatto significativo sulla prestazione energetica dell’involucro dell’edificio quando sono
rinnovati o sostituiti. Questa parte può effettivamente richiedere prescrizioni obbligatorie nazionali in materia di isolamento.

3. In base al principio di sussidiarietà gli Stati membri sono responsabili della corretta attuazione di tali obblighi a livello
nazionale. La Commissione monitora e garantisce una corretta attuazione. Nell’aprile del 2012 la Commissione ha deferito l’Italia
alla Corte di giustizia per inadempimento rispetto alla direttiva 2002/19/CE. Nel gennaio del 2013 la Commissione ha inviato
all’Italia un parere motivato relativo alla mancata comunicazione delle misure di attuazione necessarie ai fini del recepimento della
direttiva 2010/31/UE nell’ordinamento nazionale.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2010/31/UE (GU L 153 del 18.6.2010, pag. 1).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2012/27/UE (GU L 315 del 14.11.2012, pag. 1).

C 333 / 214 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003053/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE) and Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Inadequate thermal insulation: a senseless waste of energy that puts up bills and increases global warming

A report has recently been published that shows the many benefits of properly insulated buildings, such as lower energy bills, better
living conditions and increased safety for residents.

The report examined 500 buildings in 47 different Italian towns and cities, all built between 1945 and the present day. The results
obtained were decidedly discouraging, and revealed the scant regard paid by the construction industry in matters concerning
efficiency and citizens’ well-being. It was particularly dismaying to see that buildings constructed after the European directive of
2002, which clearly set out the direction in which the sector needed to follow in this matter, still failed to meet the required
standards. Even the buildings self-styled as ‘bio-houses’ were not up to scratch.

While one of the main problems to emerge from the report was a lack of adequate thermal insulation provided in the envelopes of
buildings, it was also observed how energy-related renovations, if carried out properly, could generate significant reductions in
energy leakages and consumption rates.

Besides unsafe, ‘energy-guzzling’ buildings (which also include schools and universities), there are also problems associated with
national legislation and the rather disjointed and inadequate regulatory framework put in place by the different Italian regions, with
regulations on inspections and sanctions sometimes even contradicting each other.

Environmental innovation is the only viable way of combating the crisis that has held back the construction industry for the past six
years, with over 600 000 people losing their jobs.

In order to reinvigorate the sector, prompt actions need to be taken that focus on a number of different avenues at the same time,
such as:

—
increasing inspections and imposing harsher sanctions in order to guarantee the required levels of building safety and energy
performance to citizens;

—
making Class A insulation compulsory for buildings larger than a predetermined size;

—
awarding prizes to building and energy-related renovation schemes, funding refurbishment projects, and above all reducing
the amount of red tape involved.

1. Taking the above into account, does the Commission intend to back Europe-wide studies on this issue?

2. Does it intend to make any recommendations on possible amendments to the relevant guidelines?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

1. To tap the potential of properly insulated buildings that the Honourable Member has mentioned, Member States must fully
transpose Directive 2010/31/EU ( [1] ) and implement its requirements. Directive 2012/27/EU ( [2] ) includes additional building efficiency
measures and must be transposed into national law by 5.6.2014.

2. Directive 2010/31/EU includes mandatory energy performance requirements for new buildings, existing building that undergo
a major renovation and building elements, including retrofitted or replaced elements part of the building envelope that have a
significant impact on the energy performance of the building envelope. This may well include national mandatory requirements on
insulation.

3. Following the subsidiarity principle Member States are responsible for properly implementing these requirements at national
level. The Commission monitors and ensures proper implementation. In April 2012 the Commission referred Italy to Court for
failure to fully comply with Directive 2002/91/EC. In January 2013, the Commission addressed a reasoned opinion for noncommunication of the necessary implementing measures for the transposition of Directive 2010/31/EU to Italy.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2010/31/EU, OJ L 153 of 18.6.2010, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2012/27/EU, OJ L 315 of 14.11.2012, p.1.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 215

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-003054/14**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(14 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Intervention du Fonds de Solidarité de l'Union européenne suite aux intempéries dans le Var et les Alpes-Maritimes

Les pluies torrentielles qui se sont abattues sur le Sud de la France aux mois de décembre et de janvier 2014 ont entraîné des crues
exceptionnelles dans les départements du Var et des Alpes-Maritimes. L'état de catastrophe naturelle a donc été reconnu dans des
dizaines de communes par les arrêtés du 31 janvier (INTE1402377A) et du 27 février 2014 (INTE1404399A). L'intervention du
Fonds de solidarité de l'Union européenne s'avère plus que nécessaire pour faire face aux dégâts matériels que ces intempéries ont
engendrés.

Le FSUE devant être sollicité par les États membres, la Commission est-elle en relation avec l'État français à ce sujet?

**Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission**

_(23 avril 2014)_

Au cours des derniers mois, la Commission s'est régulièrement entretenue avec les autorités françaises, qui sont informées des
conditions et procédures d'activation du Fonds de solidarité. À ce jour, les autorités françaises n'ont pas introduit de demande
d'intervention du Fonds de solidarité dans le cadre des événements survenus dans les départements du Var et des Alpes-Maritimes, ni
fait part de leur intention d'y recourir.

C 333 / 216 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003054/14**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund following extreme weather conditions in the Var and Alpes-Maritimes departments

The torrential rain which battered the south of France in December 2013 and January 2014 caused severe flooding in the Var and
Alpes-Maritimes departments. A state of natural disaster was subsequently declared in dozens of communes by means of the orders
of 31 January (INTE1402377A) and 27 February 2014 (INTE1404399A). Assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) will be
essential to efforts to repair the damage caused by the extreme weather conditions.

In view of the fact that Member States must apply for EUSF funding, has the Commission been liaising with the French Government
on this issue?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2014)_

Over the past months the Commission has been in regular contact with the French authorities who are aware of the conditions and
procedures for activating the Solidarity Fund. So far, the French authorities have not submitted an application for Solidarity Fund
assistance relating to the events in the Var and Alpes-Maritimes departments or signalled their intention of doing so.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 217

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003055/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Παρατυπίες στην χρήση κοινοτικών κονδυλίων στην τέως Ανατολική Γερμανία

Ο Επίτροπος κ. ΗΑΗΝ απάντησε στην ερώτηση μου Ε-000337/2014 παραδεχόμενος ότι υπήρξαν παρατυπίες στην χρήση των κοινοτικών
κονδυλίων στις περιοχές της τ. Ανατολικής Γερμανίας και προσθέτει: «ωστόσο από την σύγκριση περιπτώσεων παρατυπιών υλοποίησης σε
άλλες περιφέρειες και κράτη μέλη, δεν διαπιστώθηκαν ανωμαλίες στις ανατολικές περιφέρειες».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Συγκρίνονται τα μεγέθη παρατυπιών στο εσωτερικό της Γερμανίας (δηλαδή μεταξύ της τέως Δυτικής και της τέως Ανατολικής
Γερμανίας) καθώς και οι παρατυπίες στην τ. Ανατολική Γερμανία με αυτές που σημειώθηκαν σε άλλα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, και όπου
εντοπισθούν οι μικρότερες «συγχωρούνται», και θεωρείται ότι δεν υπήρξε «ανωμαλία»;

2. Ποια τα ποσά που ανακτήθηκαν από την Γερμανία για αυτές τις παρατυπίες από το 1990 ως σήμερα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(23 Μαΐου 2014)_

1. Μέχρι την υποβολή της ερώτησης E-000337/2014 του κ. Βουλευτή, η Επιτροπή δεν είχε προχωρήσει σε ειδική σύγκριση του επιπέδου
των σφαλμάτων μεταξύ ανατολικής και δυτικής Γερμανίας σε όλες τις περιόδους προγραμματισμού. Η ανάλυση κινδύνου πραγματοποιήθηκε
σε κάθε περίοδο προγραμματισμού στο επίπεδο ομόσπονδων κρατιδίων (Länder) ή προγραμμάτων. Όταν έχει ζητηθεί η συγχρηματοδότηση
των δαπανών από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης (ΕΤΠΑ) και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο (ΕΚΤ), τα σφάλματα που
εντοπίζονται πρέπει να συνεπάγονται δημοσιονομικές διορθώσεις. Η Επιτροπή δεν αναγνωρίζει ότι οι «λιγότερο σημαντικές περιπτώσεις» θα
«συγχωρούνταν», όπως αναφέρεται στην ερώτηση.

Όσον αφορά το ποσό των δημοσιονομικών διορθώσεων που αναφέρθηκαν για τις περιόδους 1994-1999, 2000-2006 και 2007-2013 έως
τις 31 Δεκεμβρίου 2013 από τα προγράμματα ΕΤΠΑ και ΕΚΤ της ανατολικής Γερμανίας, ανέρχεται σε 275,1 εκατ. ευρώ και 11,4 εκατ.
ευρώ, αντίστοιχα. Συνολικά για τη Γερμανία, οι δημοσιονομικές διορθώσεις που αναφέρθηκαν ανέρχονται σε 357,8 εκατ. ευρώ για το ΕΤΠΑ
και 37,6 εκατ. ευρώ για το ΕΚΤ.

Το ποσοστό των παρατυπιών (που οδηγούν σε δημοσιονομικές διορθώσεις) στη Γερμανία αποτελεί το 18,2% των συνολικών δημοσιονομικών
διορθώσεων σε επίπεδο ΕΕ για τα προγράμματα του ΕΤΠΑ του 1994-1999, το 0,5% για το 2000-2006 και το 1% για το 2007-2013
(καθεστώς από τις 31 Δεκεμβρίου 2013). Τα αντίστοιχα αριθμητικά στοιχεία για το ΕΚΤ είναι τα εξής: 0,03% για την περίοδο 1994-1999,
1,4% για την περίοδο 2000-2006 και 1,6% για την περίοδο 2007-2013.

2. Οι δημοσιονομικές διορθώσεις σε ανοικτά προγράμματα θα πρέπει να αφαιρούνται από τις μελλοντικές αιτήσεις πληρωμών προς την
Επιτροπή. Όταν καθοριστούν, μετά το κλείσιμο ενός προγράμματος, τα ποσά επιστρέφονται στον προϋπολογισμό της ΕΕ μέσω της
Επιτροπής. Για τη Γερμανία, τα ποσά των 357,8 εκατ. ευρώ και 37,6 εκατ. ευρώ που αναφέρονται ανωτέρω έτυχαν ανάλογης μεταχείρισης.

C 333 / 218 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003055/14**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Irregularities regarding the use of EU funding in former East Germany

In reply to my question for written answer E-000337/2014, Commissioner Hahn indicated that irregularities had occurred regarding
the use of EU funding in East Germany, while adding: ‘however the comparison with cases of implementation irregularities in other
regions of Member States has not revealed any anomalies in the Eastern regions’.

In view of this:

1. Can the Commission say whether a comparison is being made between the extent of the irregularities within Germany (that is
to say between former West and East Germany) and between former East Germany and other EU Member States, the least
significant cases being ‘overlooked’ with the result that no ‘anomalies’ emerge?

2. What amounts have been repaid by Germany in connection with these irregularities from 1990 to the present?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2014)_

1. Until the Honourable Member's Question E-000337/2014, the Commission had not specifically compared the level of errors
between eastern and western Germany across all programming periods. The risk analysis was made in each programming period
down to the level of the _Länder_ or programmes. When expenditure has been claimed for co-financing with the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF), errors detected must give rise to financial corrections. The
Commission does not recognise that ‘least significant cases’ would be ‘overlooked’ as indicated in the question.

The amount of financial corrections reported for the periods 1994-99, 2000-06 and 2007-2013 as of 31 December 2013 by eastern
Germany ERDF programmes reaches EUR 275.1 million and EUR 11.4 million for the ESF. For Germany as a whole, the financial
corrections reported reach EUR 357.8 million for the ERDF and EUR 37.6 million for the ESF.

The level of irregularities (leading to financial corrections) in Germany made up 18.2% of the EU-wide total financial corrections for
1994-99 ERDF programmes, 0.5% for 2000-06, and 1.0% for 2007-2013 (status as of 31 December 2013). The equivalent figures
for the ESF are: 0.03% for 1994-99, 1.4% for 2000-06, 1.6% for 2007-2013.

2. Financial corrections in open programmes should be deducted from future payment claims to the Commission. When they are
established after the closure of a programme, they lead to a reimbursement to the EU budget via the Commission. For Germany, the
EUR 357.8 million and EUR 37.6 million quoted above have been treated accordingly.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 219

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003056/14**

**à la Commission**
**Françoise Grossetête (PPE)**

_(14 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Dumping social dans le secteur des transports routiers

Le transport routier de marchandises est aujourd'hui touché par un problème majeur de concurrence européenne. Nos transporteurs
sont gravement affectés par le système actuel de cabotage, qui permet à une entreprise européenne, suite à un trajet international, de
réaliser, à titre temporaire, un transport intérieur sur le territoire national d'un État membre.

De plus, ils sont exposés à un fort dumping social puisque la législation permet à des entreprises de transport européennes d'effectuer
des transports régionaux, nationaux et internationaux beaucoup moins chers entre des pays dont elles ne sont pas issues. Cette
concurrence déloyale est catastrophique pour nos transporteurs, entraînant bon nombre de salariés et d'entreprises vers le chômage
et la précarité.

De façon à éviter les abus, les règlements (CE) n [o] 561/2006 et (CE) n [o] 1072/2009 ont permis la mise en place d'un certain nombre de
garde-fous. Malheureusement, aucun document spécifique ne permet de contrôler ces opérations et il est très difficile, voire
impossible, de s'assurer du respect par les entreprises de cette réglementation.

Ces transports parasites font subir une énorme pression aux entreprises des pays d'accueil. Soumises à des coûts plus élevés et
incapables de lutter contre cette concurrence déloyale, nombreuses sont celles qui doivent licencier ou mettre la clé sous la porte. Le
manque criant d'harmonisation sociale et fiscale en Europe fait ainsi subir à nos travailleurs un dumping social insupportable.

Les dérives sont facilitées par le fait que la législation en vigueur ne prévoit pas de délai de retour du véhicule et de son équipage au
port d'attache. Une évolution de la législation, visant à introduire une obligation de retour toutes les trois semaines au port d'attache,
permettrait par exemple de corriger en partie la situation actuelle.

En conséquence, la Commission européenne envisage-t-elle de prendre des mesures afin de définir un cadre consolidé pour le
cabotage, d'une part, et de réformer le règlement (CE) n [o] 561/2006 de façon à mieux lutter contre les situations de concurrence
déloyale, d'autre part?

**Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission**

_(12 mai 2014)_

Le cabotage est défini, au sens du règlement n [o] 1072/2009 ( [1] ), comme «des transports nationaux pour compte d'autrui assurés à titre
temporaire dans un État membre d'accueil, dans le respect [dudit] règlement». Les transporteurs ne peuvent effectuer plus de trois
opérations de cabotage dans les sept jours qui suivent un transport international. Le marché du cabotage est de ce fait très limité. Le
cabotage représente moins de 4 % de l'ensemble des volumes de marchandises transportés par route en France et ne risque donc pas
d'avoir une incidence considérable sur la concurrence dans le secteur du transport routier de marchandises en France. La
Commission a étudié cette question plus en détail dans le rapport sur l'état du marché du transport routier dans l'Union
européenne ( [2] ).

De plus, les transporteurs sont soumis à un cadre réglementaire destiné à assurer des conditions de travail adéquates, qui comprend
notamment des dispositions d'exécution spécifiques ( [3] ). La Commission travaille en étroite collaboration avec les États membres et
les parties prenantes pour assurer la mise en œuvre effective de ces dispositions.

Une révision des règlements (CE) n [o] 1072/2009 et (CE) n [o] 1071/2009 ( [4] ) est envisagée. L'objectif serait de clarifier et de simplifier
certaines dispositions qui sont actuellement comprises et appliquées différemment selon les États membres, y compris celles relatives
au cabotage, et de contribuer ainsi à assurer une application plus efficace et plus cohérente de la réglementation et à garantir l'égalité
des conditions de concurrence dans le secteur du transport routier de marchandises.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 1072/2009 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 21 octobre 2009 établissant des règles communes pour l'accès au marché du transport

international de marchandises par route (refonte), JO L 300 du 14.11.2009.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 222 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Alors que le règlement (CE) n° 561/2006 contient des dispositions relatives aux temps de conduite et de repos, la directive 2002/15/CE fixe quant à elle des limites en

ce qui concerne le temps de travail des travailleurs mobiles. Si ces actes législatifs comprennent des dispositions d'exécution, la directive 2006/22/CE est un
instrument spécifique destiné à améliorer le respect de la législation sociale dans le domaine des transports par route.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 1071/2009 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 21 octobre 2009 établissant des règles communes sur les conditions à respecter pour exercer

la profession de transporteur par route, et abrogeant la directive 96/26/CE du Conseil, JO L 300 du 14.11.2009.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

C 333 / 220 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

Dans la perspective d'une future révision éventuelle du cadre réglementaire, la Commission a l'intention de lancer une évaluation ex
post de la législation sociale dans le domaine des transports par route. Dans le cadre de la huitième initiative exposée dans le Livre
blanc de 2011 sur les transports ( [5] ), la Commission a invité les partenaires sociaux européens du secteur à réfléchir sur les possibilités
d'évolution en matière de normes de travail et se propose de soutenir, s'ils le souhaitent, les travaux conjoints qu'ils réaliseront à cette
fin.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Livre blanc: Feuille de route pour un espace européen unique des transports — Vers un système de transport compétitif et économe en ressources, COM(2011) 0144
final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 221

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003056/14**

**to the Commission**
**Françoise Grossetête (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Social dumping in the road haulage industry

Commercial road haulage is currently affected by a major European competition problem. Our hauliers are severely disadvantaged
by the current cabotage system, which enables a European business, upon completing an international journey, to provide domestic
transport on a temporary basis within the national territory of another Member State.

Furthermore, our hauliers are exposed to severe social dumping, since the law permits European transport businesses to provide
regional, national and international transport much more cheaply between countries which are not their own. This unfair
competition is a disaster for our hauliers, and is pushing many employees and businesses towards joblessness and the brink of
collapse.

To prevent abuse, Regulations (EU) no 561/2006 and (EU) no 1072/2009 have allowed a certain number of safeguards to be
established. Unfortunately, there is no specific document that enables checks to be performed on these journeys and it is very
difficult, not to say impossible, to ensure that businesses comply with these rules.

These parasitic journeys put businesses in the host country under enormous pressure. Higher costs mean they are unable to
withstand this unfair competition, and many have had to either make redundancies or close down. The blatant lack of social and tax
harmonisation in Europe is thus subjecting our workers to an intolerable level of social dumping.

Abuse is facilitated by the fact that the law currently does not require a vehicle and its crew to return to their home base within a
specific time period. Changing the law so as to introduce, for example, a mandatory return to base every three weeks would enable
the current situation to be partially rectified.

Hence: does the European Commission intend to take measures in order, firstly, to establish a consolidated cabotage framework and,
secondly, to revise Regulation (EU) no 561/2006 so as to fight more effectively against instances of unfair competition?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

Cabotage is defined under Regulation 1072/2009 ( [1] ) as ‘national carriage for hire or reward carried out on a temporary basis in a host
Member State, in conformity with this regulation’. Hauliers may not perform more than three cabotage operations in the seven days
following an international carriage. As a result, the market for cabotage is very limited. Cabotage represents less than 4% of all road
haulage volumes in France, and is therefore unlikely to have a serious impact on competition in the French road haulage sector. The
Commission explored this subject in more detail in the report on the State of the Union Road Transport Market ( [2] ).

Furthermore, hauliers are subject to a regulatory framework intended to ensure adequate working conditions, including dedicated
enforcement provisions ( [3] ). The Commission works closely with Member States and stakeholders to ensure an effective
implementation of these provisions.

A revision of Regulations (EC) No 1072/2009 and No 1071/2009 ( [4] ) is being considered. The aim would be to clarify and simplify
certain provisions which at present are understood and applied differently in Member States, including those relating to cabotage,
thus contributing to more effective and consistent enforcement of the rules and to ensuring a level playing field in the road haulage

sector.

In preparing a possible future revision of the regulatory framework, the Commission intends to launch an _ex-post_ evaluation of the
social legislation in road transport. Under initiative eight of the Transport White Paper of 2011 ( [5] ), the Commission has invited the
European social partners of the sector to reflect on possible developments in the working standards and it intends to support, if they
so wish, the social partners' joint work to this end.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage

market (recast), OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2014) 222.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) While Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 sets provisions regarding driving time and rest periods, Directive 2002/15 lays down limits to the working time of mobile

workers. While these pieces of legislation include provisions on enforcement, Directive 2006/22 is a dedicated instrument intended to improve enforcement of social
legislation in road transport.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) N) 1071/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be

complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC, OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) White paper: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area — Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, COM(2011)0144 final.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

C 333 / 222 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003058/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Publicación de la convocatoria de propuestas sobre la formación profesional dual

La formación profesional dual es el conjunto de las acciones e iniciativas formativas mixtas de empleo y formación que tienen por
objeto la cualificación profesional de los trabajadores en un régimen de alternancia de actividad laboral en una empresa con la
actividad formativa recibida en el marco del sistema de formación profesional para el empleo o del sistema educativo.

En la actualidad, a la vista del buen resultado que este sistema ha conseguido, una mayoría de países europeos empiezan a adoptar
este sistema dual para la formación de los trabajadores más jóvenes y conseguir reducir las altas cifras de paro juvenil.

Teniendo en cuenta que el empleo es un elemento esencial para conseguir la inserción en la sociedad de las personas con
discapacidad, y una de las formas más importantes de promover su independencia y dignidad, la integración laboral de las personas
con discapacidad es absolutamente necesaria para lograr una verdadera integración social. No obstante, de media, sólo el 46 % de las
personas con una discapacidad moderada y el 24 % de las personas con una discapacidad severa tienen trabajo en la EU, siendo por
tanto tasas muy superiores a las de las personas sin discapacidad.

Considerando la respuesta de la Comisión Europea, con fecha de 11 de febrero del 2014 (código E-013368/2013), a mi pregunta
parlamentaria, en la que se hace referencia a la futura publicación de una convocatoria especial de propuestas relativas a la formación
dual dirigida a los ministerios nacionales responsables de los aprendizajes.

¿Cuándo piensa la Comisión que se llevará a cabo dicha publicación?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Vassiliou en nombre de la Comisión**

_(28 de abril de 2014)_

La Comisión desea informar a Su Señoría de que la convocatoria «Autoridades nacionales para la formación de aprendices» se publicó
el 26 de marzo de 2014.

El plazo de presentación de las propuestas finaliza el 26 de junio de 2014. El texto de la convocatoria puede consultarse en la
dirección siguiente:
https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/funding/ka3-support-for-policy-reformnational-authorities-for-apprenticeships-eacea132014_en

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 223

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003058/14**

**to the Commission**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Publication of call for proposals relating to dual vocational training

Dual vocational training comprises joint educational initiatives and action involving training at work and at school, with the aim of
facilitating professional qualifications for workers in a system whereby they alternate working in a business with training received in
the ambit either of a vocational employment training regime or of the education system.

At present, in view of the good results achieved by this approach, most European countries are beginning to adopt this dual system
to train younger employees and reduce the high rates of youth unemployment.

Bearing in mind that employment is essential for integrating people with disabilities into society and one of the most important ways
of promoting their independence and dignity, incorporating disabled people into the world of work is vital for true social integration.
On average, however, only 46% of people with a moderate disability and 24% of those with a severe disability are currently in
employment in the EU. Employment rates are much higher among people without a disability.

Considering the Commission's answer of 11 February 2014 to my parliamentary question (E‐013368/2013), which refers to the
future publication of a special call for proposals in relation to dual training, addressed to national ministries responsible for
apprenticeships, when does the Commission think that this publication will take place?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 April 2014)_

The Commission wishes to inform the honourable Member that the call ‘National Authorities for Apprenticeships’ was published on
26 March 2014.

The deadline for the submission of proposals is 26 June 2014. The text of this call can be found at the following location:
https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/funding/ka3-support-for-policy-reformnational-authorities-for-apprenticeships-eacea132014_en

C 333 / 224 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003059/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Ayuda del programa Erasmus + a la discapacidad

Dado que una atención temprana que suponga enriquecer el medio educativo de los niños con discapacidad tiene efectos muy
positivos sobre su desarrollo neuropsicológico;

Considerando que, en los últimos años, la investigación científica se ha centrado en conocer la especificidad de cada síndrome con
discapacidad cognitiva o del desarrollo. Estos avances implican investigar qué mutaciones se producen en determinados genes de
cada tipo de discapacidad que afectan a la salud, a la memoria, a la percepción, al aprendizaje, al lenguaje. Si conocemos esto, es
posible diseñar métodos más directos y eficaces para conocer los problemas de salud o tratar las limitaciones cognitivas y enseñar a
pensar, hablar, leer, escribir, comportarse, etc.;

Teniendo en cuenta la importancia que tiene en la escuela inclusiva que los profesores, y especialmente el personal de apoyo, tengan
una formación específica en el cuidado y la educación de personas con discapacidad (síndrome de Down, autismo, parálisis cerebral,
déficit auditivo, etc.);

Resaltando que, en la actualidad, la falta de formación de los profesores y del personal de apoyo de personas con discapacidad es una
carencia generalizada del sistema educativo;

Destacando el artículo 20 de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad;

Considerando la Estrategia Europea sobre Discapacidad 2010-2020;

Recordando la respuesta de la Comisión Europea, con fecha de 12 de febrero del 2014 (código E-014042/2013), a mi pregunta
parlamentaria, en la que se hace referencia al nuevo programa Erasmus +;

1. ¿Podría informar la Comisión de con qué acciones y/o medidas concretas piensa el programa Erasmus + ampliar la ayuda
facilitada por los programas de Aprendizaje Permanente y Juventud en Acción a los grupos que fomentan la participación de los
estudiantes con discapacidad en la educación y la formación?

2. ¿Dónde se puede encontrar desarrollada dicha información ?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Vassiliou en nombre de la Comisión**

_(28 de abril de 2014)_

En el marco de Erasmus _+_, la asistencia a grupos desfavorecidos y vulnerables se integra en todas las posibilidades de financiación que
ofrece el programa. Las normas de admisibilidad a actividades concretas se definen en la guía del programa y en las diversas
convocatorias de propuestas.

Las personas con discapacidad se beneficiarán de las ayudas por motivo de necesidades especiales, las cuales cubren costes
adicionales relacionados directamente con su participación en el programa. Concretamente, se invita a las agencias nacionales
encargadas de adoptar el programa a escala nacional a que destinen fondos a permitir que las personas con necesidades especiales
viajen al extranjero para completar un periodo de estudios o realizar prácticas profesionales. Estos fondos cubren las adaptaciones
concretas que deban llevarse a cabo en función de las necesidades del interesado; en el curso académico 2011/12 —último año sobre
el que se dispone de estadísticas— hicieron posible que trescientos treinta y seis estudiantes con necesidades especiales participaran
en Erasmus. Por otra parte, cada centro de educación superior participante debe garantizar que los estudiantes Erasmus _+_ tengan
acceso a todos los servicios de asistencia previstos, donde se incluyen aquellos para estudiantes con discapacidad.

En lo relativo a la enseñanza escolar, Erasmus _+_ permite a los maestros seguir desarrollándose profesionalmente, incluso en el ámbito
de la enseñanza a alumnos con discapacidad. Las asociaciones estratégicas entre escuelas y otras organizaciones activas en el ámbito
de la enseñanza escolar pueden asimismo abarcar cuestiones relacionadas con la enseñanza a niños con discapacidad.

En el marco de Erasmus _+_, la Comisión también brinda respaldo financiero a la Agencia Europea para una Educación Especial e
Integradora y coopera con ella ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Agencia Europea para una Educación Especial e Integradora: http://www.european-agency.org/

Véase asimismo la respuesta a la pregunta E-014042/2013.
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2013-014042+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES)

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 225

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003059/14**

**to the Commission**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Aid under the programme Erasmus + for disabled people

Given that early intervention that enriches the educational environment of children with disabilities tends to produce very positive
effects on their neuropsychological development;

Considering that in recent years the focus of scientific research has been on understanding the specific nature of each syndrome
involving cognitive or developmental disability. These advances entail investigating what mutations are produced in certain genes in
each type of disability affecting health, memory, perception, language or learning ability. If we know this, we can design more direct
and effective methods for investigating health problems and addressing cognitive limitations, teaching people with disabilities how
to think, speak, read, write, conduct themselves, etc.;

Bearing in mind how important it is that teachers, and especially support staff, in inclusive schools have had specific training in the
care and education of people with disabilities (e.g. Down’s syndrome, autism, cerebral palsy, hearing impairment, etc.);

Considering in particular that there is currently a general lack of training among teachers and support staff for people with
disabilities throughout the education system;

Underlining the provisions of Article 20 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

Considering the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020;

Bearing in mind the answer of the European Commission, dated 12 February 2014 (code E‐014042/2013), to my parliamentary
question, which refers to the new Erasmus + programme;

1. Could the Commission say what specific action and/or measures are planned for the Erasmus + programme to expand the
support provided by the Lifelong Learning and Youth in Action programmes to groups promoting the participation of students with
disabilities in education and training?

2. Where can details of this information be found?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 April 2014)_

Within Erasmus _+_, support for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups is mainstreamed across all funding opportunities available under
the programme. Eligibility rules for specific activities are defined in the programme Guide and in the different Calls for Proposals.

People with disabilities will benefit from special needs support which covers additional costs directly related to their participation in
the programme. In particular, National Agencies in charge of implementing the programme at national level are encouraged to
earmark funds to allow people with special needs to go abroad for a period of study or a traineeship. These funds cover specific
arrangements depending on the learners' needs. They allowed 336 students with special needs to participate in Erasmus during the
academic year 2011-12 (the last year for which statistics are available). Moreover, each participating Higher Education Institution is
required to guarantee access for Erasmus+ students to all student support services including those offered for students with
disabilities.

Regarding school education, Erasmus+ offers opportunities to teachers to further their professional development, including in
relation to the teaching of pupils with disabilities. The strategic partnerships between schools and other organisations active in the
field of school education may also cover topics related to teaching children with disabilities.

Within Erasmus+, the Commission also supports financially and cooperates with the European Agency for Special Needs and
Inclusive Education ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education: http://www.european-agency.org/
See also answer to Question E-014042/2013 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html).

C 333 / 226 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003061/14**

**to the Commission**
**David Martin (S&D)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Interpretation of Directive 2002/49/EC and its application

Can the Commission supply an interpretation of Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and the
application thereof, with regard to what obligation there is at regional and local level to comply with both the letter and the spirit of
the directive?

Specifically, could it confirm that where the directive originally required the production of strategic noise mapping for
agglomerations of > 250 000 inhabitants, which has since been supplemented by further mapping for agglomerations of > 100 000
inhabitants, there is an obligation for planners and local authorities to consider the outcome of such mapping in determining the
appropriateness of development applications and/or the imposition of planning restrictions?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

According to the Environmental Noise Directive 2002/49/EC ( [1] ), Member States have to establish noise maps and, based on the
results of these noise maps, adopt action plans to tackle the impacts of excessive noise.

Regarding the production of action plans for agglomerations, it is entirely up to Member States to decide on the specific content of
their action plans. There are no specific obligations at regional or local level, but both national and regional/local authorities may be
involved, depending on the national implementation provisions. The directive provides for the noise action plans to be modified by
Member States when a major development occurs affecting the existing noise situation.

In addition to the Environmental Noise Directive, noise emission limits of motor vehicles have recently been addressed by a new
Regulation ( [2] ), and new EU rules to improve noise around airports have just been agreed ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Not yet published, more information can be found at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-363_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Not yet published, more information can be found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/141821.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 227

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003062/14**

**al Consejo**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ El capítulo 23 de las negociaciones de adhesión

El Parlamento Europeo ha aprobado su informe más crítico hasta la fecha sobre los progresos realizados por Turquía en su adhesión
a la UE. Sin duda, son muchas las razones para inquietarse seriamente por los recientes acontecimientos registrados en Turquía,
donde están en juego el Estado de Derecho y las libertades fundamentales.

En sus observaciones finales durante el debate en el Pleno del 11 de marzo de 2014, el Comisario Füle expresó cierta sorpresa ante el
escepticismo del Parlamento en relación con la apertura de nuevos capítulos en las negociaciones de adhesión con Turquía.

Al menos uno de los capítulos sigue siendo clave para entablar con Turquía un diálogo constructivo con miras a la obtención de
resultados en el ámbito del sistema judicial y de los derechos fundamentales: se trata del capítulo 23.

Tal y como ha señalado la Comisión en distintas ocasiones, la UE debe seguir siendo el punto de referencia para las reformas en
Turquía.

En este contexto, ¿podría señalar el Consejo qué es lo que le impide establecer unos criterios de referencia para la apertura del
capítulo 23 de las negociaciones de adhesión?

**Respuesta**
_(4 de junio de 2014)_

El Consejo desea señalar que las negociaciones de adhesión se llevan a cabo en una Conferencia Intergubernamental, de conformidad
con procedimientos establecidos fijados en el marco negociador correspondiente para cada Estado candidato. Con arreglo a estos
procedimientos, corresponde al Consejo, pronunciándose por unanimidad sobre una propuesta de la Comisión, establecer criterio de
referencia de apertura, cuando proceda, para el inicio de las negociaciones del capítulo 23 con Turquía.

C 333 / 228 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003062/14**

**to the Council**
**Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE)**

_(14 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Chapter 23 of accession negotiations

Parliament has adopted its most critical report yet on the progress made by Turkey towards EU accession. Undoubtedly, there are
reasons for serious concern about recent developments in Turkey, where the rule of law and fundamental freedoms are at stake.

In his closing remarks during the plenary debate of 11 March 2014, Commissioner Füle expressed some surprise at Parliament’s
scepticism about opening new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations.

At least one chapter remains key in engaging with Turkey in a constructive dialogue with a view to delivering results in the area of the
judiciary and fundamental rights. I am referring to Chapter 23.

As the Commission has already stated on a number of occasions, the EU should continue to be the benchmark for reforms in Turkey.

In this connection, what is keeping the Council from establishing opening benchmarks for Chapter 23 of the accession negotiations?

**Reply**
_(4 June 2014)_

The Council wishes to point out that accession negotiations are conducted in an Intergovernmental Conference, in accordance with
established procedures set out in the relevant Negotiating Framework for each candidate country. Under these procedures it is for the
Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission, to lay down opening benchmarks, where appropriate, for the
opening of negotiations on Chapter 23 with Turkey.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 229

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse P-003063/14**

**til Kommissionen**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(17. marts 2014)_

_Om:_ Fiskeriforhandlinger mellem EU og Norge

Onsdag den 12. marts 2014 indgik EU-Kommissionen og Norge en aftale om fordelingen af fiskekvoter i de fælles farvande.

I perioden fra den 1. januar 2014 til indgåelsen af aftalen har de norske myndigheder opretholdt et forbud mod fiskeri i de norske
dele af Nordsøen og Skagerrak for europæiske fiskere.

Kan Kommissionen oplyse, om den finder, at det er i overensstemmelse med normal praksis og gældende fiskeriaftaler mellem EU og
Norge, at de norske myndigheder kan lukke de norske farvande for europæiske fiskere, sådan som det har været tilfældet i år?

Kan Kommissionen oplyse, hvad den agter at gøre for at undgå en lignende situation under kommende fiskeriforhandlinger med
Norge?

Kommissionen bedes oplyse, om den finder det rimeligt, at EU yder kompensation til de fiskere fra EU-medlemslande, som har lidt
tab som følge af fangstforbuddet i de norske farvande?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Maria Damanaki**

_(12. maj 2014)_

Med indgåelsen af en bilateral fiskeriaftale mellem EU og Norge for 2014 har EU-fartøjer kunnet genoptage deres fiskeriaktiviteter i
norske farvande. Da der ikke var nogen aftale og dermed intet grundlag for fiskeri, blev EU-fartøjer forment adgang til fiskeri i norske
farvande, og omvendt blev norske fartøjer forment adgang til Unionens farvande. Kommissionen anser dette for normal praksis.

Kommissionen beklager denne midlertidige afbrydelse af adgangen til norske farvande. Denne usædvanlige forsinkelse kunne være
undgået, hvis Norge var gået med til at adskille den bilaterale fiskeriaftale fra forhandlingerne om makrel. Med aftalen om en ordning
for makrel for 2014-2018 mellem EU, Norge og Færøerne bør vi kunne undgå lignende afbrydelser af fiskeriet de kommende år.

Med hensyn til kompensation til fiskerne finder Kommissionen, at der ikke er noget retligt grundlag for kompensation som følge af
manglende adgang til norske farvande. Der kan derfor ikke blive tale om krav på kompensation.

C 333 / 230 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003063/14**

**to the Commission**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Fisheries negotiations between the EU and Norway

On Wednesday, 12 March 2014 the Commission and Norway concluded an agreement on the sharing of fisheries quotas in their

common waters.

During the period from 1 January 2014 until the conclusion of the agreement the Norwegian authorities maintained a ban by EU
vessels on fishing in the Norwegian parts of the North Sea and Skagerrak.

Does the Commission consider that it is in accordance with normal practice and existing EU-Norway fisheries agreements for the
Norwegian authorities to be able to close Norwegian waters to EU fishing vessels as it has done this year?

What does the Commission propose to do to avoid a similar situation during future fisheries negotiations with Norway?

Does the Commission consider it reasonable for the EU to pay compensation to fishermen from EU Member States who have
suffered losses as a result of a fishing ban in Norwegian waters?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 May 2014)_

With agreement reached between the EU and Norway on bilateral arrangements for 2014, EU vessels were able to recommence their
fishing activities in Norwegian waters. In the circumstances of no agreement, and therefore no basis for fishing arrangements, EU
vessels were excluded from fishing in Norwegian waters and similarly, Norwegian vessels were excluded from Union waters. The
Commission considers that this is normal practice.

Whilst the Commission regrets this temporary interruption of access to Norwegian waters, had Norway agreed to separate the
bilateral arrangements from the mackerel negotiations, this exceptional delay in reaching agreement could have been avoided. With
the agreement on a mackerel arrangement for the period 2014 to 2018 between the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, we should be
able to avoid similar interruptions in fishing practices in the coming years.

As regards compensation for fishermen, in the view of the Commission, there is no legal basis for compensation as a result of the
lack of access to Norwegian waters, and therefore the issue of compensation does not arise.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 231

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003065/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Fortalecimiento de la red Enterprise Europe

En su Comunicación titulada «Por un renacimiento industrial europeo», de enero de 2014, la Comisión anunció que reforzaría la red
Enterprise Europe, a fin de fortalecer el apoyo a las PYME en el mercado interior y desarrollar la asistencia para facilitar el acceso a la
financiación, mejorar su eficiencia energética y de los recursos y para aumentar la capacidad de gestión de la innovación de las PYME.

¿Podría informar la Comisión sobre las medidas que ha adoptado o tiene previsto adoptar para reforzar la red Enterprise Europe?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de mayo de 2014)_

Se encuentra en marcha una convocatoria de propuestas ( [1] ) para renovar la Red Enterprise Europe a partir del 1 de enero de 2015. En
el pliego de condiciones se definen actividades básicas para la Red basándose en las actividades y los puntos fuertes actuales, pero con
tareas adicionales en áreas prioritarias.

Una de estas tareas adicionales son servicios de orientación sobre el acceso a la financiación. Un grupo de trabajo ha reunido las
mejores prácticas sobre servicios de orientación en relación con el acceso a la financiación y los programas de financiación europeos
(incluido a nivel regional).

Esta Red también ayudará a las PYME a incrementar su eficiencia en el uso de los recursos mediante actividades de sensibilización,
intercambio de información, transferencia de las mejores prácticas o bien a través de la optimización de su base de datos de
transferencia de tecnología en lo que se refiere a las tecnologías de eficiencia climática y de los recursos.

Los socios de la Red proporcionarán los paquetes de servicios (financiados por Horizonte 2020), incluida una evaluación de la
capacidad de gestión de la innovación. En el caso de los beneficiarios del instrumento de las PYME de Horizonte 2020, esta tarea de
orientación se utilizará para identificar tutores adecuados para abordar los obstáculos al crecimiento. Los servicios pueden dar lugar a
nuevas posibilidades de financiación en la fase de comercialización de este instrumento.

Otras medidas:

La finalidad de esta convocatoria es reforzar la integración regional de la Red mediante la cooperación con otros proveedores
regionales de apoyo a las PYME.

Los socios de la Red deberán promoverla activamente y utilizar las herramientas de desarrollo de marcas para mejorar la visibilidad
de la Red.

Se espera que los socios de la Red cooperen activamente entre sí para reforzar la creación de redes internas, con actividades tales
como grupos sectoriales, grupos de trabajo e intercambio de buenas prácticas.

Los socios de la Red también deberán adherirse a principios de calidad basados en un código de conducta, con indicadores claros de
resultados y de impacto.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Sitio web de la Red: http://een.ec.europa.eu/
Historias de éxito de la Red: http://een.ec.europa.eu/success-stories/list

C 333 / 232 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003065/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Reinforcing the Enterprise Europe network

In its communication ‘For a European industrial renaissance’ of January 2014, the Commission announced that it would reinforce
the Enterprise Europe network to strengthen support for SMEs in the internal market and develop assistance to facilitate access to
finance, improve energy and resource efficiency and increase innovation management capacity for SMEs.

Could the Commission provide any information on the measures it has adopted or plans to adopt to strengthen the Enterprise
Europe network?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

A call for proposals ( [1] ) is currently open to renew the Enterprise Europe Network as from 1 January 2015. The terms of reference
define core activities for the Network, building on the current activities and strengths, but with additional tasks in priority areas.

One of these additional tasks is advisory services on access to finance. A working group gathered best practice on advisory services
for access to finance and European (incl. regional) funding programmes.

The Network will also help SMEs to increase their resource efficiency by awareness raising activities, exchange of information,
transfer of best practice or by optimising its technology transfer database with regards to climate and resource efficiency
technologies.

Network partners will provide service packages (financed by Horizon 2020) including an innovation management capacity
assessment. For beneficiaries of the Horizon 2020 SME instrument this consulting task will be used to identify suitable coaches to
address barriers to growth. The services may lead to additional funding opportunities in the commercialisation phase of this
instrument.

Other measures:

The call aims at strengthening the regional embedding of the Network by cooperating with other regional SME support providers.

Network partners will be required to actively promote the Network and use the branding tools to improve the Network’s visibility.

Network partners will be expected to actively cooperate with each other to strengthen internal networking with activities such as
sector groups, working groups and exchange of good practice.

Network partners will also have to adhere to quality principles based on a code of conduct with clear performance and impact
indicators.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Network's website: http://een.ec.europa.eu/
Network's Success Stories: http://een.ec.europa.eu/success-stories/list

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 233

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003066/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Situación de las inversiones a través del FSE en las Illes Balears

Según el Programa Operativo de las Illes Balears del Fondo Social Europeo para el período 2007-2013, el FSE debía atender a las
prioridades y los objetivos de dicha región en materia de educación y formación, al incremento de la participación de las personas
económicamente inactivas en el mercado de trabajo, a la lucha contra la exclusión social, al fomento de la igualdad entre hombres y
mujeres y a la no discriminación.

Es sabido que la situación del desempleo sigue siendo tal vez el mayor problema socioeconómico en las Illes Balears y la situación en
materia de educación y formación, como consecuencia de las reformas impulsadas por los Gobiernos español y balear, está causando
importantes conflictos en el seno de la sociedad balear.

¿Cree la Comisión que la inversión a través del Fondo Social Europeo está contribuyendo a las prioridades fijadas en Illes Balears al
principio del período de programación 2007-2013?

Aunque probablemente aún sea pronto para hacer evaluaciones cualitativas completas del impacto del Fondo, es interesante ver
algunos datos cuantitativos. ¿Podría informarnos la Comisión de las cifras de los compromisos contraídos por las Illes Balears en el
marco de este Fondo durante el período 2007-2013?

¿Podría también informarnos acerca de los pagos efectuados hasta la fecha de hoy?

**Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de mayo de 2014)_

La estrategia global del Fondo Social Europeo (FSE) en las Islas Baleares para 2007-2013 se elaboró sobre la base de las Directrices
estratégicas comunitarias, el Programa Nacional de Reforma, y el Marco Estratégico Nacional de Referencia. Su objetivo era aumentar
el nivel de cualificación de los trabajadores, mejorar la participación en el mercado laboral (en particular la de las mujeres, los
trabajadores de cierta edad y los jóvenes), luchar contra el abandono escolar prematuro y promover la integración de los grupos
desfavorecidos.

En julio de 2012 y julio de 2013, las autoridades españolas presentaron solicitudes para la revisión del Programa Operativo regional
debido a los cambios en la situación socioeconómica. Las propuestas estaban destinadas a aumentar el apoyo a la población
desempleada y a los grupos en riesgo de exclusión social y a reforzar las medidas de lucha contra el abandono escolar prematuro.

La Comisión lleva a cabo periódicamente un seguimiento de la aplicación del FSE a través de distintos instrumentos, incluidas las
Comisiones de Control y las Reuniones de Análisis anuales. Cada año, la Comisión evalúa también el Informe Anual de Seguimiento
de cada programa y los indicadores obtenidos ( [1] ).

Hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2013, la Comisión ha recibido solicitudes de pago intermedios para este Programa Operativo regional
por un importe total de 15,9 millones de euros, lo que representa el 50,72 % de los recursos totales del FSE asignados para el período
2007-2013.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Los informes anuales de ejecución para el Programa Operativo de las Islas Baleares se pueden consultar en la siguiente dirección electrónica:
http://www.empleo.gob.es/uafse/es/gestionando/informesAnuales/index.html

C 333 / 234 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003066/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Situation of ESF investment in the Balearic Islands

In line with the European Social Fund’s Operative Programme of the Balearic Islands for the period 2007-2013, the ESF should
address the priorities and goals of this region in the areas of education and training, raising the participation of economically inactive
people in the labour market, fighting against social exclusion, promoting equality between women and men and eliminating
discrimination.

It is well known that unemployment is still probably the biggest socioeconomic problem in the Balearic Islands. Moreover, as a result
of the reforms in education and training implemented by the Spanish and Balearic governments, the situation in that area is giving
rise to significant conflict in Balearic society.

Does the Commission believe that the investment through the European Social Fund is contributing to the priorities established in
the Balearic Islands at the start of the 2007-2013 programme period?

Although it is probably too soon to carry out a complete qualitative assessment of what impact the Fund has had, it would be
interesting to have certain quantitative data. Could the Commission provide any information regarding the figures for the
commitments undertaken by the Balearic Islands in the framework of the Fund for the period 2007-2013?

Could it also inform us as to the payments made to date?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2014)_

The overall strategy for the European Social Fund (ESF) in the Balearic Islands for 2007-2013 was formulated on the basis of the
Community Strategic Guidelines, the National Reform Programme and the National Strategic Reference Framework. It aimed to
increase the qualification level of workers, to improve the participation in the labour market (in particular for women, workers of a
certain age and young people), to combat the early school leaving and to promote the integration of disadvantaged groups.

In July 2012 and July 2013, the Spanish authorities submitted requests for the revision of the regional operational programme as a
consequence of the changes in the socioeconomic situation. The proposals had aimed to increase the support for the unemployed
population and the groups at risk of social exclusion, and strengthen the measures to fight the early school leaving.

The Commission follows up the implementation of the ESF regularly through different tools including the annual Monitoring
Committees and Examination Meetings. Yearly the Commission also evaluates the Annual Implementation Report of each
programme and indicators achieved ( [1] ).

Till 31st of December 2013, the Commission has received interim payment requests for this regional operational programme for a
total amount of EUR 15.9 million euros which represents 50.72% of the total ESF resources allocated for the period 2007-2013.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The Annual Implementation Reports for the Operational Programme of Balearic Islands are available at the following website:
http://www.empleo.gob.es/uafse/es/gestionando/informesAnuales/index.html

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 235

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003067/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Estrategia europea para las tecnologías facilitadoras esenciales

En su Comunicación titulada «Una industria europea más fuerte para el crecimiento y la recuperación económica» de octubre de
2012, la Comisión Europea se comprometió a llevar a cabo una estrategia europea para las tecnologías facilitadoras esenciales (TFE),
velando por una mejor coordinación de las políticas tecnológicas de la UE y los Estados miembros, la financiación de los proyectos
esenciales de demostración, de cadenas de producción piloto y de TFE interdisciplinarias, así como el rápido desarrollo del mercado
interior de productos basados en las TFE.

¿Podría detallar la Comisión cuál es el estado de desarrollo de la citada estrategia europea para las tecnologías facilitadoras esenciales?
¿Podría informarnos la Comisión sobre los proyectos esenciales de demostración ya financiados o en vías de financiación?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(28 de mayo de 2014)_

En la actualidad, se está poniendo en práctica la estrategia europea para las TFE con el fin de eliminar la brecha en materia de
innovación en relación con estas tecnologías.

Se han logrado importantes avances en la adaptación y la adecuación de las políticas y los instrumentos europeos en apoyo de las
TFE. En este momento, las TFE son una prioridad en el marco de Horizonte 2020, con un presupuesto específico de casi 6 millones
de euros, lo que incluye un 30 % para actividades TFE interdisciplinarias. En el primer programa de trabajo para el periodo 2014‐
2015 se prevén cadenas de producción piloto TFE en cuatro áreas con un elevado interés industrial y potencial de innovación
(producción de alto rendimiento, energía incorporada, estructuras inteligentes y procesos industriales que utilizan recursos
renovables, identificadas por el Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre las TFE ( [1] )).

Además, las TFE son ahora una prioridad de los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos (FEIE). Dos de cada tres regiones
registradas en la plataforma de especialización inteligente indican una prioridad relacionada con las TFE. Se ha permitido la
combinación de Horizonte 2020 y los FEIE a fin de hacer posible un apoyo público conjunto a proyectos industriales ambiciosos. El
Banco Europeo de Inversiones ha establecido las TFE como prioridad; en aplicación del Memorando de Entendimiento entre la
Comisión y el BEI firmado en febrero de 2013, los préstamos del BEI a proyectos de TFE se han incrementado un 60 % en 2013 en
comparación con 2012 (hasta un total de 4 400 millones de euros de líneas de crédito firmadas en 2013).

Se ha creado un Observatorio de las TFE ( [2] ). Asimismo, se han puesto en marcha otras acciones con el fin de estimular importantes
proyectos industriales ( [3] ), promover las capacidades multidisciplinarias requeridas ( [4] ) y facilitar el acceso de las PYME a las
plataformas tecnológicas de TFE ( [5] ).

Hay proyectos de demostración que ya recibieron financiación con cargo al Séptimo Programa Marco. Diecinueve cadenas de
producción piloto, a través de las iniciativas tecnológicas conjuntas ENIAC y ARTEMIS, han recibido casi 2 000 millones de euros de
financiación combinada; en 2012 se pusieron en marcha dos acciones de demostración y siete proyectos piloto en el marco del
Programa de apoyo a las TIC.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Véase el informe de situación de la ejecución presentado por el Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre las TFE a la Comisión en su segunda reunión en Bruselas el 16 de julio

de 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/kets/hlg_ket_status_implementation_report_final_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) www.ketsobservatory.eu y https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ketsobservatory/sites/default/files/newsletter/kets_observatory_newsletter_issue_01.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) El proyecto de Comunicación sobre proyectos importantes de interés común europeo (en el que se hace referencia a las TFE) puede consultarse en la siguiente

dirección: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_cei/draft_communication_ipcei_es.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Proyecto «Vision and Sectoral Pilot on Skills for Key Enabling Technologies»; Comunidad de conocimiento e innovación (CCI) sobre fabricación con valor añadido.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Estudio «Cooperation between KETs Technology Centres of Excellence». El instrumento de las PYME en Horizonte 2020 incluye el acceso de las PYME a las

plataformas tecnológicas.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

C 333 / 236 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003067/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ European strategy for key enabling technologies

In its communication ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’ of October 2012, the European
Commission committed itself to implementing a European Strategy for Key Enabling Technologies (KETs), ensuring better
coordination of EU and Member State technology policies, the funding of essential demonstration, pilot line and cross-cutting KET
projects, and the timely development of the internal market for KET-based products.

Could the Commission specify what state of development the aforementioned European Strategy for Key Enabling Technologies has
reached? Could the Commission provide any information on the essential demonstration projects that have already received funding
or are awaiting funding?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 May 2014)_

The implementation of the European strategy for KETs in order to close the innovation gap in KETs is on-going.

Significant progress has been made in adapting and aligning European instruments and policies in support of KETs. KETs are now a
priority under Horizon 2020 with a dedicated budget of almost EUR 6 billion, including 30% for cross-cutting KETs activities. The
first work programme 2014‐2015 calls for KETs pilot lines in four areas of high industrial interest and innovation potential (highperformance production, embedded energy, smart structures, and industrial processes using renewable resources identified by the
KETs High-level Group ( [1] )).

In addition, KETs are now a priority for the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). Two out of three regions registered in
the smart specialisation platform indicate a KETs-related priority. Combining Horizon 2020 and ESIF has been made possible to
allow combined public support for ambitious industrial projects. KETs have been identified as a priority by the European Investment
Bank; following the memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the EIB signed in February 2013, EIB lending to
KETs projects has increased by 60% in 2013 compared to 2012 (to EUR 4.4 billion signed credit lines in 2013).

A KETs Observatory has been established ( [2] ). Further actions are being launched to stimulate important industrial projects ( [3] ), to
promote required multidisciplinary skills ( [4] ) and to facilitate access of SMEs to KETs technology platforms ( [5] ).

Demonstration projects already received funding in FP7. 19 pilot lines through the JTIs ENIAC and Artemis received nearly
EUR 2 billion combined funding; 2 demonstration actions and 7 pilots were launched in 2012 under the ICT Policy Support
Programme.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See Status implementation report presented by the KETs High-Level Group to the Commission at its second meeting in Brussels on 16 July 2013:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/kets/hlg_ket_status_implementation_report_final_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) www.ketsobservatory.eu and https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ketsobservatory/sites/default/files/newsletter/kets_observatory_newsletter_issue_01.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The draft Communication on Important Projects of Common European Interest (with reference to KETs) is available at

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_cei/draft_communication_ipcei_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Project ‘Vision and Sectoral Pilot on Skills for Key Enabling Technologies’; Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC) on Added Value Manufacturing.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Study ‘Cooperation between KETs Technology Centres of Excellence’. The SME Instrument in Horizon 2020 covers access for SMEs to technology platforms.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 237

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003068/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Estrategia europea para un mayor crecimiento y empleo en el turismo costero y marítimo

En el año 2012, la Comisión Europea lanzó una consulta pública sobre «Los retos oportunidades en relacijon al turismo marítimo y
costero en la EU». Una vez analizados los resultados de dicha consulta, en la que hubo participación de todos los sectores, la
Comisión presentó la «Estrategia europea para un mayor crecimiento y empleo en el turismo costero y marítimo».

En dicha estrategia se habla de la desventaja adicional en lo que se refiere a la accesibilidad de las islas y otros destinos remotos y su
gran dependencia de conexiones marítimas, planteando costes de transporte, de estacionalidad o de conectividad con el continente.

Por ello, la Comisión señala en dicha estrategia que encargará la realización de un estudio sobre la mejora de la conectividad de las
islas y diseñará estrategias turísticas innovadoras para las mismas.

¿Tiene la Comisión una idea aproximada sobre cuándo se realizará este estudio?

¿Tiene la Comisión alguna idea preconcebida del contenido del estudio y de qué aspectos concretos se analizarán?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

_(22 de mayo de 2014)_

Como seguimiento de la Comunicación titulada «Una estrategia europea para un mayor crecimiento y empleo en el turismo costero y
marítimo», la Comisión lanzará en el último trimestre de 2014 un estudio con el fin de analizar las posibles alternativas de mejora de
la conectividad insular y de diseñar estrategias turísticas innovadoras para las islas (remotas).

El objetivo esencial del estudio será determinar cómo suprimir los obstáculos a la conectividad de las islas y proponer estrategias
innovadoras que permitan atraer a turistas fuera de las temporadas principales. Aunque sus condiciones de realización específicas
siguen todavía en fase de preparación, el estudio tendrá que abordar los retos más importantes a los que se enfrenta el crecimiento
azul con el turismo costero que llega a las islas, haciendo especial hincapié en el caso de las islas remotas. Entre esos retos figuran
fundamentalmente la estacionalidad de los servicios de transporte, la falta de interconectividad de los modos de transporte y la
sobredependencia de un modelo de turismo basado primordialmente en el sol y la playa. El estudio deberá aportar una visión global
de la naturaleza de los problemas de conectividad y de sus causas y efectos y tendrá que proponer los medios que puedan solucionar
esos problemas, incluida la identificación de formas de turismo innovadoras y de mejores prácticas.

C 333 / 238 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003068/14**

**to the Commission**
**Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ European strategy for more growth and jobs in maritime and coastal tourism

In 2012 the European Commission launched a public consultation on ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Maritime and Coastal
Tourism in the EU’. After the results of this consultation, in which all sectors took part, had been analysed, the Commission
presented the ‘European strategy for more growth and jobs in maritime and coastal tourism’.

This strategy refers to the additional handicap in terms of accessibility suffered by islands and other remote destinations and their
great dependence on maritime services, which poses problems of transport costs, seasonality and connectivity with the mainland.

The Commission therefore undertook in the context of this strategy to contract a study on how to improve island connectivity, and
to design innovative tourism strategies for islands.

Does the Commission know approximately when this study will be carried out?

Does the Commission have any preconceived idea as to what the contents of the study might be and what aspects are to be
examined?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

In the follow-up of the strategy for more Growth and Jobs in Coastal and Maritime Tourism, the Commission will launch a study
exploring options to improve island connectivity and innovative tourism strategies for (remote) islands in the fourth quarter of
2014.

The main aim of the study will be to identify ways to tackle obstacles to island connectivity and suggest innovative strategies for
attracting tourism outside main seasons. While the specific terms of reference for the study are still under preparation, the study will
address the main challenges for blue growth for coastal tourism in islands, with a particular emphasis on remote islands. These
challenges include seasonality of transport services, lack of interconnectivity of transport modes and overdependency on a sun-andbeach based tourism model. The study should provide for a comprehensive overview of the nature of the connectivity problems, its
causes and impacts, and suggest possible ways to overcome these challenges, including the identification of innovative forms of
tourism and best practices.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 239

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003069/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Colombia — Denuncia contra la multinacional española Prosegur

Según una denuncia recibida por la Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) de Colombia, la Compañía Transportadora de Valores Prosegur,
multinacional española, estaría comprando y amenazando a trabajadores para que renuncien a la convención colectiva y a su
sindicato y se acojan a un Pacto Colectivo propuesto por la empresa. Ya en 2010, los directivos de la empresa ofrecieron a cada
trabajador sindicalizado 4 millones de pesos (equivalente a aproximadamente 2 000 euros) para que renunciara al sindicato y a la
convención colectiva, dinero que tendría que reembolsar en caso de que volviera a afiliarse al sindicato. Y esta misma estrategia la
volvió a aplicar en diciembre de 2013, cuando renovó el Pacto Colectivo, esta vez con una vigencia de 5 años, y ofreció 2 millones de
pesos (equivalente a aproximadamente 1 000 euros) a cada trabajador sindicalizado para que renunciara a la convención colectiva.

Según la denuncia que recibimos, no es la única medida antisindical que realizaría esa multinacional española. Comentan que «al
interior de la empresa existe una especie de apartheid. Los trabajadores están divididos en dos categorías: los sindicalizados y los no
sindicalizados. A estos últimos los denomina “grupo de los UNO”, y para diferenciarlos les dio botones para portar en el pecho».

Teniendo en cuenta que la UE ratificó un TLC con Colombia y que en su capítulo de desarrollo sostenible incluye el respeto a las
normas de la OIT, ¿qué prevé hacer la UE ante casos como estos que representan una persecución sindical?

¿Qué mecanismo tiene la Unión Europea para ejercer control sobre las actividades de sus empresas en Colombia?

Ante casos como estos, que nos muestran que la responsabilidad social corporativa como mecanismo voluntario no es suficiente,
¿qué legislación vinculante para las empresas que actúan en terceros países prevé elaborar la UE?

**Respuesta de la alta representante y vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(20 de mayo de 2014)_

La Comisión no está al corriente de las acusaciones vertidas en la pregunta de Su Señoría. La responsabilidad de velar por el respeto
de la legislación laboral de Colombia, incluidas las disposiciones relativas a la libertad de afiliación a un sindicato, recae
principalmente en las autoridades del país y la UE no dispone de ningún medio para efectuar sistemáticamente un seguimiento de las
prácticas de empresas concretas en terceros países. Dicho esto, la Comisión considera que, si bien la responsabilidad social de las
empresas no debe ser jurídicamente vinculante, las empresas de la UE que operen en terceros países deben comportarse de forma
socialmente responsable y atenerse a las normas pertinentes. Por lo tanto, la Delegación de la UE en Colombia recabará más
información sobre este asunto.

Las instituciones creadas en el marco del Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes entre Colombia y Perú, por una parte, y la Unión Europea,
por otro, y en concreto el Subcomité de Comercio y Desarrollo Sostenible, facilitan un marco en el que puede debatirse el respeto de
la legislación pertinente por parte de las empresas y considerarse posibles nuevas medidas.

C 333 / 240 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003069/14**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Colombia — Complaint against the Spanish multinational Prosegur

According to a complaint received by the Colombian National Union School (ENS), the Compañía Transportadora de Valores
Prosegur, a Spanish multinational, is allegedly threatening and buying off workers to get them to waive their rights under the
collective agreement and renounce their trade union and instead to subscribe to a Collective Pact proposed by the company. Back in
2010 the company’s board offered each employee who was a union member 4 million pesos (equivalent to about EUR 2 000) to
leave the union and renounce the collective agreement, on condition that, if they went back to the union again, they would have to
pay back this money. They used the same strategy again in December last year, when the Collective Pact was renewed, this time for
5 years — they offered each unionised worker 2 million pesos (equivalent to about EUR 1 000) to renounce the collective agreement.

According to the complaint received, this is not the only anti-union action taken by this Spanish multinational. It is alleged that
‘within the company there is a sort of apartheid operating. Workers are divided into two categories: union members and non-union
members. This latter group are referred to as the “UNO group” and they have been given buttons to wear on their chests to
differentiate them from the others.’

Bearing in mind that the European Union has entered into an FTA with Colombia, which in the section on sustainable development
includes compliance with ILO regulations, what does the EU intend to do in cases such as this one involving the persecution of trade
unions?

What mechanisms does the EU have available to exercise control over the activities of its companies in Colombia?

In cases such as these, which show us that corporate social responsibility as a voluntary mechanism is not enough, what legislation
that is binding on companies operating in third countries does the EU envisage drawing up?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The Commission is not aware of the allegations contained in the Honourable Member's question. The responsibility to ensure the
respect of Colombia's labour legislation, including the provisions on freedom to join a union, falls primarily on the country's
authorities and the EU has no means to systematically monitor the practices in individual companies in third countries. This being
said, the Commission believes that, while corporate social responsibility should not be legally-binding, EU companies acting in third
countries should behave in a socially responsible manner and abide by the relevant rules. The EU Delegation in Colombia will
therefore seek additional information on this case.

The institutions set up in the framework of the Multi-Party Trade Agreement between Colombia and Peru on the one hand and the
European Union on the other hand, in particular the sub-committee on trade and sustainable development, provide a framework in
which the respect of relevant legislation by companies can be discussed and possible further action be considered.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 241

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003070/14**

**a la Comisión**
**Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)**

_(17 de marzo de 2014)_

_Asunto:_ Muertes en Ceuta (2)

En su respuesta a mi pregunta P-001397/2014 sobre la muerte de 15 inmigrantes en Ceuta el 6 de febrero la Comisaria Malmströn
me contesta que las autoridades españolas han respondido el pasado 20 de febrero a las explicaciones pedidas por la Comisión sobre
lo sucedido.

Según informaciones publicadas por la prensa y que tienen su origen en ONG que trabajan sobre el terreno, algunos de los cuerpos
de los fallecidos y de las personas ingresadas en centros hospitalarios presentaban lesiones atribuibles al uso de material
antidisturbios .

En la información enviada por las autoridades españolas:

¿Se hace alguna referencia al uso de material antidisturbios por parte de la Guardia Civil durante el incidente? En caso afirmativo
¿reconocen las autoridades españolas que el material antidisturbios fue utilizado contra personas que estaban nadando en el mar?

¿Se hace alguna referencia a las lesiones producidas tanto a las personas fallecidas como a las heridas?

¿Qué consideración le merecen a la Comisión las informaciones sobre la tipología de las lesiones que presentan tanto las personas
fallecidas como las heridas? ¿Considera la Comisión que pueden ser indicios de malos tratos? ¿Considera la Comisión ese hecho
compatible con el acervo comunitario?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión**

_(6 de mayo de 2014)_

A la Comisión le preocupa la situación de Ceuta y Melilla.

Mediante carta de 20 de febrero de 2014, las autoridades españolas informaron a la Comisión de que, en el incidente de Ceuta al que
hace referencia Su Señoría, se utilizó material antidisturbios, incluidas pelotas de goma. Dicha carta hacía también referencia a la
intervención del Ministro de Interior español en el Congreso de los Diputados, el 13 de febrero de 2014, en la que explicó las
circunstancias que rodearon el incidente en cuestión. La Comisión también fue informada de que este mismo incidente está siendo
investigado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción n° 6 de Ceuta y está a la espera del resultado de esta investigación, del
que ha solicitado a las autoridades españolas ser informada tan pronto como esté disponible.

C 333 / 242 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003070/14**

**to the Commission**
**Iñaki Irazabalbeitia Fernández (Verts/ALE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Deaths in Ceuta (2)

In her answer to my Question P‐001397/2014 relating to the death of 15 immigrants in Ceuta on 6 February 2014, Commissioner
Malmström replied that the Spanish authorities responded to the Commission’s request for an explanation of the incident on
20 February 2014.

According to information published by the press, which originates from NGOs working on the ground in Ceuta, some of the bodies
of those killed and some of the people admitted to hospital had injuries attributable to the use of riot control weapons.

In the information sent by the Spanish authorities:

Is any reference made to the use of riot control weapons by the Spanish Civil Guard during the incident? If so, do the Spanish
authorities acknowledge that the riot control weapons were used against people who were swimming in the sea?

Is any reference made to the injuries caused to both the people killed and those injured?

What consideration will the Commission give to the information concerning the kind of injuries sustained by those killed and
injured? Does the Commission think that this may be an indication of ill-treatment? Does the Commission consider that fact to be
compatible with the body of EC law?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

The Commission is concerned about the situation in Ceuta and Melilla.

By letter of 20 February 2014, the Commission was informed by the Spanish authorities that riot equipment including rubber bullets
were used in the Ceuta incident being referred to by the Honourable Member. That letter also referred to the intervention of the
Spanish Minister of Interior in the Spanish Parliament on 13 February 2014, where he explained the circumstances surrounding that
incident. The Commission was also informed that that same incident is being investigated by the Ceuta Court of First Instance and
Preliminary Investigations No 6. The Commission is awaiting the outcome of this investigation and it has requested the Spanish
authorities to inform it of that outcome as soon as it is available.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 243

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003071/14**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Takis Hadjigeorgiou (GUE/NGL)**

_(17 Μαρτίου 2014)_

_Θέμα:_ Επαναφορά του κανονισμού για το απ' ευθείας εμπόριο

Δημοσιεύματα στον κυπριακό Τύπο φέρουν κύκλους στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, και ειδικότερα την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, να τροχοδρομούν και
να επαναφέρουν θέμα απευθείας εμπορίου με τα κατεχόμενα σε δοκιμαστική βάση στην βάση εισήγησης του Ευρωβουλευτή Νίκολο Ρινάλτι
που έγινε στην Επιτροπή ΙΝΤΑ στις 13 Μαρτίου 2014.

Η πρόταση του κυρίου Ρινάλντι, ο οποίος είναι και εισηγητής της σχετικής έκθεσης για τον κανονισμό, υποβλήθηκε αιφνιδιαστικά στις 13
Μαρτίου και εισηγείται όπως ο κανονισμός υποβληθεί εκ νέου προς έγκριση με τις πιο κάτω τέσσερεις νέες αλλαγές:

—
«Μετονομασία του σε προσωρινές/μεταβατικές πρόνοιες για τη διευκόλυνση του εμπορίου για το βόρειο τμήμα της Κυπριακής
Δημοκρατίας, ως μέρος της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας»

—
Σύσταση εποπτικού οργάνου για διαχείριση των εμπορικών συναλλαγών

—
Πενταετής δοκιμαστική περίοδος εφαρμογής

—
Δημιουργία συνθηκών αύξησης του όγκου εμπορικών συναλλαγών.

Υπενθυμίζεται ότι η συγκεκριμένη πρόταση/πρωτοβουλία έρχεται σε αντίθεση με την τελευταία γνωμάτευση της Νομικής Υπηρεσίας του
Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου καθώς και της Επιτροπής Νομικών (JURI) για το θέμα στην οποία επισημαίνεται συναφώς ότι η νομική βάση που
επέλεξε η Επιτροπή για υιοθέτηση του κανονισμού δεν είναι κατάλληλη (καθώς κάνει αναφορά σε τρίτη χώρα αντί σε κατεχόμενα εδάφη
χώρας κράτους μέλους της ΕΕ) και ενδεχόμενη υιοθέτησή του θα υπονόμευε τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

Επίσης η πρόταση για «απευθείας εμπόριο» αντιβαίνει την απόφαση της ΕΕ για «οικονομική ενίσχυση της τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας, με
έμφαση στην οικονομική ολοκλήρωση της νήσου και στη βελτίωση των επαφών μεταξύ των δύο κοινοτήτων με σκοπό την επανένωση της
Κύπρου».

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη την επανέναρξη των συνομιλιών, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή αν συμφωνεί πως η επαναφορά του ζητήματος ξανά εγκυμονεί
τον κίνδυνο αποδυνάμωσης των κινήτρων για επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος.

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(19 Μαΐου 2014)_

Η πρόταση της Επιτροπής για κανονισμό του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με τους ειδικούς όρους εμπορικών συναλλαγών με τις περιοχές της
Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας στις οποίες η κυβέρνηση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας δεν ασκεί αποτελεσματικό έλεγχο ( [1] ) υποβλήθηκε από την
Επιτροπή το 2004 μετά τα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου, της 26ης Απριλίου 2004, με τα οποία καλούσε την Επιτροπή να προτείνει μέτρα
για να δοθεί τέλος στην απομόνωση της Τουρκοκυπριακής Κοινότητας και για να διευκολυνθεί η επανένωση της Κύπρου με την καθιέρωση
ενός κλασικού τύπου καθεστώτος εμπορικών παραχωρήσεων, ενθαρρύνοντας έτσι την οικονομική ανάπτυξη της Τουρκοκυπριακής
Κοινότητας.

Η πρόταση εκκρεμεί επί του παρόντος ενώπιον του Κοινοβουλίου, το οποίο, με την Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας, απέκτησε αρμοδιότητα
συναπόφασης σε εμπορικά θέματα.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2004)466 τελικό.

C 333 / 244 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003071/14**

**to the Commission**
**Takis Hadjigeorgiou (GUE/NGL)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Revival of the issue of a regulation on direct trade

It has been reported in the Cypriot press that circles in the European Union, and in particular the Commission, are preparing to
revive the issue of direct trade with the occupied territories in Cyprus experimentally on the basis of a recommendation made by
Niccolò Rinaldi, MEP, at an INTA Committee meeting on 13 March 2014.

The proposal by Mr Rinaldi, who is also the rapporteur of the report on the regulation, was presented unexpectedly on 13 March and
recommends that the regulation be resubmitted for approval with the following four new changes:

—
‘A more appropriate title would be: Temporary/transitional provisions in order to facilitate trade for the Northern part of the
Republic of Cyprus as part of the Republic of Cyprus’;

—
The establishment of a supervisory body in charge of dealing with trade;

—
A five-year trial implementation period;

—
Creating the conditions to increase the volume of trade.

It should be recalled that this proposal/initiative is at odds with the recent opinion of the European Parliament’s Legal Service and of
the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on the subject which notes in that regard that the legal basis chosen by the Commission for the
adoption of the regulation is not appropriate (as it refers to a third country rather than to the occupied territories of an EU Member
State) and that such a regulation would undermine the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus.

Also the proposal for ‘direct trade’ is contrary to the EU decision on providing financial support for the Turkish Cypriot community,
with emphasis on the economic integration of the island and on improving contacts between the two communities, aimed at the
reunification of Cyprus.

Given the resumption of talks, does the Commission agree that putting this issue back on the agenda runs the risk of weakening the
incentives to solve the Cyprus problem?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 May 2014)_

The Commission proposal for a Council regulation on special conditions for trade with the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control ( [1] ) was presented by the Commission in 2004
following the conclusions of the Council of 26 April 2004, which called on the Commission to bring forward measures to put an
end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by providing a classical trade
concession regime, and thus encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The proposal is currently pending with the Parliament which acquired co-decision powers on trade issues through the Lisbon Treaty.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2004) 466 final.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 245

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-003072/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ In-nisa fir-rwoli ta' teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet fil-midja

Studju mwettaq mill-Istitut Ewropew għall-Ugwaljanza bejn is-Sessi (EIGE) wera li n-nisa huma sottorappreżentati f'impjiegi u rwoli
li jinvolvu teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet fl-istazzjonijiet tar-radju. L-istudju wera li kienu biss 34 % tal-persuni fl-ogħla livell ta' teħid ta'
deċiżjonijiet fl-10 stazzjonijiet tar-radju inklużi fl-istudju tal-EIGE li kienu nisa. 16 % biss ta' dawn in-nisa joperaw fil-livell ta' uffiċjal
kap eżekuttiv, u l-lat organizzattiv għadu f'idejn l-irġiel b'mod ċar.

Abbażi tar-rapport tal-EIGE, il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea wasal għal konklużjonijiet dwar “Advancing Women’s Roles as DecisionMakers in the Media” (It-Titjib tar-Rwoli tan-Nisa bħala Persuni Involuti fit-Teħid ta' Deċiżjonijiet fil-Midja) ( [1] ). Bi qbil mas-sejbiet, ilKunsill jitlob lill-Istati Membri u lill-Kummissjoni jieħdu miżuri attivi biex irawmu l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fil-livelli kollha tassettur tal-midja, li jinkludi iktar rwoli ta' teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet lin-nisa. Il-Kunsill talab ukoll li tiżdied is-sensibilizzazzjoni rigward lugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fis-settur tal-midja u l-iskambju ta' prattika tajba bejn l-Istati Membri f'dan il-qasam sabiex jiġi faċilitat ilproċess ta' kisba ta' soċjetà ugwali għas-sessi kollha.

1. Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi l-iktar data reċenti dwar in-numru ta' nisa li jinsabu fi rwoli tal-midja fl-UE28?

2. Il-Kummissjoni x'qed tagħmel biex tiżgura li jkun hemm iktar nisa impjegati fis-settur tal-midja, u jingħataw pożizzjonijiet ta'
teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet?

3. X'azzjonijiet qed jittieħdu bien tiġi eliminata l-immaġni sterjotipika tan-nisa fil-midja?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Kroes f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(13 ta' Mejju 2014)_

Skont l-istħarriġ tal-Eurostat dwar il-Forza tax-Xogħol, b'kollox fl-2013 kien hemm 6,26 miljun persuna fl-UE jaħdmu fis-settur talInformazzjoni u l-Komunikazzjoni ( [2] ), li 1,92 miljun minnhom kienu nisa u 4.33 miljun kienu rġiel. Is-sehem tan-nisa li jaħdmu fissettur huwa 30,8 %. F'dan is-settur kien hemm 541 000 maniġer ( [3] ), li 128 000 minnhom kienu nisa u 412 000 kienu rġiel. Dan
jirrappreżenta 23,7 % tal-maniġers nisa li jaħdmu fis-settur.

Il-Kummissjoni tappoġġa l-impjiegi tan-nisa u l-bilanċ tar-rwoli fit-teħid ta' deċiżjonijiet fis-setturi ekonomiċi kollha. L-azzjonijiet
tal-Kummissjoni huma miġbura fit-taqsimiet 1 u 3 tar-rapport dwar il-Progress fl-ugwaljanza bejn in-nisa u l-irġiel fl-2013, li ġie
ppubblikat f'April 2014 ( [4] ).

Skont id-Direttiva 2010/13/UE dwar l-AVMS (is-Servizzi tal-Midja Awdjoviżiva), l-Istati Membri għandhom jiżguraw li lkomunikazzjoni kummerċjali ma tkunx tinkludi jew tippromwovi d-diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq is-sess, ir-razza jew l-oriġini
etnika, in-nazzjonalità, ir-reliġjon jew it-twemmin, id-diżabbiltà, l-età jew l-orjentazzjoni sesswali.

Il-Kummissjoni timmonitorja l-applikazzjoni tar-regoli AVMSD dwar il-komunikazzjoni kummerċjali fl-Istati Membri. Waqt ilmonitoraġġ tagħha, il-Kummissjoni analizzat l-aktar 100 spot ta' reklamar imxandra f'għadd ta' pajjiżi. Instabet rappreżentazzjoni
sterjotipata tar-rwoli tas-sessi f'21 % sa 36 % tal-ispots analizzati. Madankollu, huwa diffiċli li wieħed isostni li din irrappreżentazzjoni sterjotipata toħloq diskriminazzjoni pprojbita mill-AVMSD.

Permezz ta' studji u skambji ta' prattiki, il-Kummissjoni teżamina wkoll il-mekkaniżmi fis-seħħ fl-Istati Membri bħalma huma lkoregolamentazzjoni u l-kodiċi tal-kondotta.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/137546.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) L-Informazzjoni u l-Komunikazzjoni huma ddefiniti bħala taqsima J fil-Klassifikazzjoni Statistika tal-Attivitajiet Ekonomiċi (NACE Rev.2).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Il-maniġers huma ddefiniti bħala kategorija 1 fil-Klassifika Internazzjonali Standard tal-Impjiegi (ISCO-08).
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/swd_2014_142_en.pdf

C 333 / 246 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003072/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Women in decision-making roles in the media

A study carried out by the European Institute of Gender Equality (EIGE) has shown that women are under-represented in jobs and
decision-making roles in radio stations. The study revealed that only 34% of the top-level decision-makers at the 10 radio stations
included in the EIGE study are women. Only 16% of these women operate at CEO level, and the organisational culture remains
largely masculine.

Based on the EIGE report, the Council of the European Union has drawn conclusions on ‘Advancing Women’s Roles as DecisionMakers in the Media’ ( [1] ). In line with the findings, the Council calls on the Member States and the Commission to take active measures
to foster gender equality at all levels of the media sector, which includes giving more women decision-making roles. The Council also
calls for increased awareness of gender equality within the media sector and the exchange of good practices between Member States
in this area in order to facilitate the process of achieving a gender equal society.

1. Can the Commission provide the latest data on the number of women who are engaged in media roles in the EU-28?

2. What is the Commission doing to ensure that more women are employed in the media sector, and are given decision-making
positions?

3. What actions are being taken to help eliminate the stereotypical portrayal of women in the media?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2014)_

According to the Eurostat Labour Force survey, in 2013 in the EU there were a total of 6.26 million persons working in the
Information and Communication sector ( [2] ), of which 1.92 million women and 4.33 million men. The share of women working in
the sector is 30.8%. In this sector there were 541 thousand managers ( [3] ), of which 128 thousand women and 412 thousand men.
This represents a 23.7% of women managers in the sector.

The Commission supports women's employment and gender balance in decision-making in all economic sectors. The Commission's
actions are summarised in sections 1 and 3 of the report on Progress on equality between women and men in 2013, which was
released in April 2014 ( [4] ).

According to the AVMS (Audiovisual Media Services) Directive 2010/13/EU, Member States shall ensure that commercial
communications, shall not include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, nationality, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

The Commission monitors the application of the AVMSD rules on commercial communications in the Member States. In its
monitoring, the Commission analysed the 100 most frequently broadcast advertising spots in a number of countries. Stereotyped
representation of sex roles is present in 21% to 36% of the analysed spot. However, it is difficult to make the case that such
stereotyped representation would constitute discrimination prohibited by the AVMSD.

The Commission also examines the mechanisms such as co-regulation and codes of conduct in place in Member States through
studies and exchanges of practices.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/137546.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Information and Communication defined as section J in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities (NACE Rev.2).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Managers defined as Category c in the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08).
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/swd_2014_142_en.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 247

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-003073/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ L-arti tal-ispettaklu fl-UE 28

Ċifri uffiċjali ppubblikati mill-Uffiċċju Nazzjonali tal-Istatistika f'Malta fis-7 ta' Marzu 2014 juru li kien hemm total ta' 9 135 student
li rċevew xi forma ta' tagħlim fl-arti tal-ispettaklu matul is-sena akkademika 2012-2013. Ir-riżultati juru li 150 minn dawk li ħadu
sehem fl-istħarriġ (tuturi fl-iskejjel u tuturi privati) offrew tagħlim lil 50 student jew inqas, filwaqt li t-38 l-oħra kellhom il-possibilità
li jakkomodaw aktar minn 50 student. Uħud mill-istituzzjonijiet jispeċjalizzaw f'dixxiplina waħda, filwaqt li oħrajn joffru approċċ
aktar olistiku permezz tat-taħlit ta' tliet forom ewlenin ta' arti tal-ispettaklu: id-drama, iż-żfin u l-mużika. L-istatistika wriet ukoll li
mid-9 135 student li rreġistraw, 50.1 % studjaw iż-żfin, 25.2 % il-mużika u 24.7 % id-drama. 6 956 minnhom kienu studenti ta' sess
femminili, li jikkostitwixxu 76.1 % tat-total.

1. Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi ċ-ċifri l-aktar reċenti, maqsuma skont l-Istat Membru, il-ġeneru u l-età, għall-għadd ta' individwi
fl-UE 28 li attwalment qed jirċievu xi forma ta' tagħlim fl-arti tal-ispettaklu?

2. F'Novembru 2013, il-Parlament Ewropew approva aktar appoġġ finanzjarju għall-programm Ewropa Kreattiva. Dan ilprogramm b'liema mod qiegħed jassisti fl-iżvilupp tal-karriera taċ-ċittadini Ewropej li huma involuti fl-arti tal-ispettaklu?

3. L-arti tal-ispettaklu għandha rwol ewlieni fl-ekonomija tal-UE, u l-istudji juru li s-setturi kulturali u kreattivi jikkostitwixxu
massimu ta' 4.5 % tal-PDG tal-Ewropa. Il-Kummissjoni x'qiegħda tagħmel biex tiżgura li l-Ewropa tibqa' minn ta' quddiem nett f'dan
il-qasam?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Vassiliou f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(15 ta' Mejju 2014)_

Minħabba l-kompetenzi limitati tagħha fil-qasam tal-arti tal-ispettaklu, il-Kummissjoni ma tistax tipprovdi d-dejta mitluba millOnorevoli Membru. Madankollu, iċ-ċifri rilevanti u d-dejta ta’ referenza jistgħu jinsabu f’diversi rapporti abbozzati mill-partijiet
interessati ewlenin ( [1] ).

Il-programm Ewropa Kreattiva jimmira biex jappoġġa l-forom kollha tal-arti u l-kultura mingħajr ma jagħti prijorità speċjali lil xi
settur partikolari. Proġetti li jinvolvu l-arti tal-ispettaklu jistgħu jiġu appoġġjati f’ħafna modi, permezz ta’ proġetti ta’ Kooperazzjoni u
Pjattaformi tas-sottoprogramm Kultura. Pereżempju, proġetti li jtejbu l-ħiliet u l-kompetenzi tal-professjonisti jew li jippromwovu lkarrieri internazzjonali ta’ artisti emerġenti jistgħu jirċievu finanzjament. Il-Kapitali Ewropej tal-Kultura jirrappreżentaw opportunità
oħra għall-operaturi kulturali li jaħdmu fl-arti tal-ispettaklu biex jiżviluppaw u jimplimentaw l-attivitajiet.

Il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni tal-2012 dwar il-promozzjoni tas-setturi kulturali u kreattivi għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi fl-UE ( [2] )
stiednet lill-Istati Membri biex jiżviluppaw strateġiji fuq ħafna livelli sabiex jittejjeb il-potenzjal tal-kultura u l-kreattività, u biex dawn
jitqiegħu fuq quddiem nett fl-aġendi tal-iżvilupp nazzjonali. L-azzjonijiet mill-Istati Membri qed jiġu kkomplementati mill-inizjattivi
tal-UE li jappoġġjaw il-ħolqien ta’ ekosistemi kreattivi fis-setturi kollha u li jiffukaw fuq ħames fatturi li jixprunaw l-politika: liżvilupp tal-ħiliet, it-titjib tal-aċċess għall-finanzi, it-tkabbir tas-suq tax-xogħol, l-espansjoni tal-firxa internazzjonali, u t-tisħiħ tarrabtiet bejn il-politiki u s-setturi.

Il-komunità kulturali — inkluż fil-qasam tal-arti tal-ispettaklu — għandha tkompli tisfrutta kemm tista’ kull opportunità ta’
finanzjament fil-livell tal-UE lil hinn mill-Ewropa Kreattiva: Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Investiment, COSME, Erasmus + u Orizzont 2020.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Eurostat Cultural statistics Pocket book (b’mod partikolari t-Taqsima 3):

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-32-10-374/EN/KS-32-10-374-EN.PDF
Arts and Cultural Education at school in Europe: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/113EN.pdf
Art for Art’sake : the Impact of Arts Education : http://www.oecd.org/edu/ceri/arts.htm

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0537/COM_COM(2012)0537_EN.pdf

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⋅2∙ **|** )

C 333 / 248 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003073/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Performing arts in the EU-28

Official figures published by the National Statistics Office in Malta on 7 March 2014 show that a total of 9 135 students received a
form of instruction in performing arts during the academic year 2012-2013. Survey results indicated that 150 respondents (schools
and private tutors) offered tuition to 50 students or less, while the remaining 38 had the possibility of accommodating more than 50
pupils. Some institutions specialised in one discipline, while others offered a more holistic approach through a combination of the
three main forms of performing arts: drama, dance and music. The statistics also showed that of the 9 135 students enrolled, 50.1%
studied dance, 25.2% music and 24.7% drama. Some 6 956 were female students, accounting for 76.1% of the total.

1. Can the Commission provide the latest figures, grouped by Member State, gender and age, for the number of individuals in the
EU-28 who are currently receiving some form of instruction in performing arts?

2. In November 2013, the European Parliament approved increased financial support for the Creative Europe Programme. In
what ways is this programme helping the career development of European citizens who are involved in performing arts?

3. Performing arts play a major role in the EU economy, and studies show that the cultural and creative sectors account for up to
4.5% of Europe’s GDP. What is the Commission doing to ensure that Europe remains a world leader in this area?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2014)_

Given its limited competences in the field of performing arts, the Commission cannot provide the data requested by the Honourable
Member. However, relevant figures and benchmark data can be found in various reports drafted by key stakeholders ( [1] ).

The Creative Europe programme seeks to support all forms of arts and culture without giving special priority to any sector. Projects
involving performing arts can be supported in many ways, through Cooperation projects and Platforms under the Culture subprogramme. For example, projects to improve skills and competences of professionals or to promote international careers of
emerging artists can receive funding. The European Capitals of Culture represent another opportunity for cultural operators working
in performing arts to develop and implement activities.

The 2012 Commission communication on promoting the cultural and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU ( [2] ) called on
Member States to develop multi-layered strategies to enhance the potential of culture and creativity, and to place them high on
national development agendas. Actions by Member States are complemented by EU initiatives supporting the emergence of creative
ecosystems across sectors and focusing on five policy drivers: developing skills, improving access to finance, enlarging the
marketplace, expanding international reach, and reinforcing links between policies and sectors.

The cultural community — including in the field of the performing arts — should continue to make the most of all funding
opportunities at EU level beyond Creative Europe: Structural and Investment Funds, COSME, Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Eurostat Cultural statistics Pocket book (in particular Section 3): http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-32-10-374/EN/KS-32-10-374-EN.PDF

Arts and Cultural Education at school in Europe: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/thematic_reports/113EN.pdf
Art for Art'sake : the Impact of Arts Education : http://www.oecd.org/edu/ceri/arts.htm

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0537/COM_COM(2012)0537_EN.pdf

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⋅2∙ **|** )

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 249

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-003074/14**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 ta' Marzu 2014)_

_Suġġett:_ Taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru fl-UE28

F'Jannar 2014, il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea talab lill-Istati Membri jagħmlu progress fit-taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru. L-Istati Membri
ntalbu jsaħħu l-isforzi biex jintegraw l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fl-oqsma kollha ta' politika governattiva fil-livelli kollha. Wieħed millmezzi ssuġġeriti biex iseħħ dan huwa permezz ta' żvilupp ta' metodi u għodod faċilment applikabbli għall-integrazzjoni tas-sessi,
inkluż taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru, valutazzjoni tal-impatt fuq il-ġeneru, l-ibbaġitjar għall-ġeneru, l-immonitorjar u l-valutazzjoni.
Tqiegħdet enfasi ċara fuq il-promozzjoni tal-użu ta' dawn l-għodod fil-prattika. Barra minn hekk, il-Kunsill enfasizza l-importanza
tal-kompetenza dwar l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fost il-persunal billi ħeġġeġ lill-Istati Membri jsaħħu l-għarfien espert fl-ugwaljanza
bejn is-sessi u l-integrazzjoni tas-sessi fost il-ħaddiema tal-gvern f'bosta setturi differenti. L-Istati Membri qablu li t-taħriġ dwar ilġeneru għandu jiġi pprovdut fuq bażi regolari u għandu wkoll iqis il-bżonnijiet tal-parteċipanti.

1. Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipprovdi data dwar ir-realtajiet attwali fir-rigward tat-taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru fl-Unjoni Ewropea?

2. Xi strateġiji qed jiġu implimentati għal iktar fehim tal-bżonnijiet tal-bosta protagonisti fil-qasam tat-taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru u
biex tittejjeb il-kwalità ta' tali taħriġ u tiżdied l-effikaċja tiegħu?

3. Il-Kummissjoni x'qed tagħmel biex tipprovdi pjattaforma għan-netwerking u l-iskambju wiċċ imb'wiċċ ta' informazzjoni u ta'
prattika tajba bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE dwar it-taħriġ dwar il-ġeneru?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sur Hahn f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(2 ta' Mejju 2014)_

L-Istitut Ewropew għall-Ugwaljanza bejn is-Sessi reċentement ippubblika rapport ( [1] ) li jippreżenta l-politiki u l-prattiki ta’ taħriġ dwar
l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fl-Unjoni Ewropea. Ir-rapport huwa kkumplimentat minn riċerka li tiġbor fil-qosor fatturi li jinfluwenzaw
l-implimentazzjoni effettiva ta’ taħriġ dwar l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi, approċċ gradwali għal kwalità tat-taħriġ dwar l-ugwaljanza
bejn is-sessi u prattiki tajba. L-Istitut Ewropew għall-Ugwaljanza bejn is-Sessi organizza wkoll konferenza dwar it-tema ta’ taħriġ
dwar l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi li fiha pparteċipaw rappreżentanti mill-Kummissjoni.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Il-preżentazzjoni tat-taħriġ dwar l-ugwaljanza bejn is-sessi fl-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Kroazja ppubblikat f’Ġunju 2013, u huwa disponibbli fuq:
http://eige.europa.eu/content/publications.

C 333 / 250 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003074/14**

**to the Commission**
**Claudette Abela Baldacchino (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Gender training in the EU-28

In January 2014, the Council of the European Union called on the Member States to progress with gender training. Member States
were called upon to strengthen efforts to mainstream gender equality in all governmental policy areas at all levels. One of the
suggested ways of doing this is through developing easily applicable gender mainstreaming methods and tools, including gender
training, gender impact assessment, gender budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. A clear emphasis was put on the promotion of the
use of these tools in practice. Moreover, the Council emphasised the importance of gender equality competence among responsible
staff by urging the Member States to strengthen expertise in gender equality and gender mainstreaming among public officials across
different sectors. The Member States agreed that gender training should be provided on a regular basis and it should also take into
account the needs of the participants.

1. Can the Commission provide data on the present realities with regards to gender training in the European Union?

2. What strategies are being implemented to better understand the needs of various actors in the field of gender training and
improve the quality of this training and increase its effectiveness?

3. What is the Commission doing to provide a platform for networking and face-to-face exchange of information and good
practices between EU Member States on gender training?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

The European Institute for Gender Equality recently published a report ( [1] ) mapping policies and practices of gender training in the
European Union. The report is complemented by research summarising factors influencing effective implementation of gender
training, a step-by-step approach to quality in gender training and good practices. The European Institute for Gender Equality also
organised a conference on the theme of gender training in which representatives from the Commission participated.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Mapping gender training in the European Union and Croatia published in June 2013 and available at: http://eige.europa.eu/content/publications

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 251

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003075/14**

**to the Commission**

**Fiona Hall (ALDE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Collection of data following EU neonicotinoid ban

With regard to the EU’s two-year moratorium from December 2013 on three neonicotinoid chemicals found in pesticides, how will
new data and evidence regarding bee numbers in Member States be collected during and after the moratorium?

In particular, will the Commission be looking to Member State governments to provide information on bee numbers or will this
information be gathered from other sources?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 May 2014)_

The restrictions of the conditions of approval of active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid and the prohibition
of use and sale of seed treated with those substances as laid down in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/2013 ( [1] )
were introduced because following the review carried out by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), it was clear that the
approval criteria provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 ( [2] ) were no longer satisfied. The Commission will initiate
a review of the measures within two years of the entry into force.

The number of bees in Member States was not measured for such restrictions and will not be assessed in the framework of the review
of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/2013. Honeybee colony mortality in general is monitored in the Epilobee
project for which a first year report is available ( [3] ).

However, the Commission will ask EFSA to review the new scientific information which will be submitted by the applicants, the
Member States and any other relevant stakeholders. Dedicated field studies on honeybee mortality and sublethal effects caused by
exposure to the neonicotinoids may be part of the documentation for the review.

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( **|**
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**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:139:0012:0026:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:309:0001:0050:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/live_animals/bees/docs/bee-report_en.pdf

C 333 / 252 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003076/14**

**to the Commission**
**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Protection of dolphins and small cetaceans from hunting

I have been contacted by a constituent who has expressed concern over the annual practice of hunting, killing and capturing
dolphins and pilot whales off the coast of Japan, notably in the village of Taiji.

On 24 January 2014, the international NGO Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC) announced that Italy had become the third EU
Member State, along with Germany and the UK, to officially condemn this cruel practice.

With reference to Written Questions E-006124/2009, E-005539/2011, and E-012425/2011 in which my colleagues raised similar
concerns, the Commission answered in 2010, 2011 and 2012 that it was seeking to ensure the conservation of small cetaceans on a
global scale by bringing them under the control of the International Whaling Commission (IWC).

Can the Commission give me updated information on the steps it has taken to secure the expansion of the scope of the IWC to
include small cetaceans?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 May 2014)_

The European Union has observer status at the International Whaling Commission and is represented therein by the Commission.
Therefore, the position of the Union in this forum is expressed by Member States acting jointly in the interest of the Union.

At the last meeting of the IWC, held in Panama in 2012, a proposal tabled by Monaco for a resolution on highly migratory cetaceans
in the high seas was debated, but no consensus could be reached. The matter of the protection of small cetaceans will continue to be
discussed in future meetings of the IWC.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 253

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003077/14**

**an die Kommission**
**Syed Kamall (ECR), Sven Giegold (Verts/ALE) und Wolf Klinz (ALDE)**

_(17. März 2014)_

_Betrifft:_ Umsetzung des Unionsprogramms zur Unterstützung spezieller Tätigkeiten im Bereich Rechnungslegung und
Abschlussprüfung für den Zeitraum 2014-2020

Laut der Anforderung gemäß Erwägung 5 des Unionsprogramms zur Unterstützung spezieller Tätigkeiten im Bereich
Rechnungslegung und Abschlussprüfung für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)) müssen die „internationalen
Rechnungsstandards […] in einem transparenten, demokratisch rechenschaftspflichtigen Prozess aufgestellt werden“. Könnte die
Kommission erklären, welche Reformen sie durchzuführen gedenkt, um sicherzustellen, dass die Arbeit des „International
Accounting Standards Board“ (IASB), seine Einstellungsverfahren und Tätigkeiten und seine Beziehungen zu Einrichtungen des
nichtöffentlichen Sektors und zu Hoheitsgebieten, in denen die Internationalen Rechnungslegungsstandards (IFRS) nicht angewandt
werden, vollständig transparent und demokratisch rechenschaftspflichtig sind?

Laut der Anforderung gemäß Erwägung 5 des Unionsprogramms zur Unterstützung spezieller Tätigkeiten im Bereich
Rechnungslegung und Abschlussprüfung für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)) muss den Unionsinteressen — darunter
der Beibehaltung des Grundsatzes, dass Abschlüsse ein den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen entsprechendes Bild vermitteln, verlässlich
und verständlich, vergleichbar und relevant sein sollten — in diesem internationalen Standardsetzungsprozess gebührend Rechnung
getragen werden, um zu gewährleisten, dass die Interessen der Union geachtet werden und globale Standards qualitativ hochwertig
und mit Unionsrecht vereinbar sind. Könnte die Kommission vor diesem Hintergrund:

1. ausführlich darlegen, wie sie gewährleisten wird, dass das IASB diese Interessen im Rahmen seiner Konsultation zum
Rahmenkonzept umfassend berücksichtigt;

2. ausführlich darlegen, wie sie vorzugehen gedenkt, falls das IASB beschließt, den Aspekt der Vorsicht und andere damit
verbundene Konzepte nicht in das überarbeitete Rahmenkonzept aufzunehmen; und

3. erklären, wie sie sicherstellen wird, dass die Abschlüsse vergleichbar und relevant sind, da die Europäische Wertpapier- und
Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA) in ihrem Bericht mit dem Titel „Review of Accounting Practices“ (Überprüfung der
Rechnungslegungsverfahren) vor Kurzem zu dem Schluss gekommen ist, dass die Informationen, die in den unter Anwendung
der IFRS erstellten Jahresabschlüssen zur Verfügung gestellt werden, nicht ausreichen oder nicht ausreichend strukturiert sind,
um einem Vergleich der Finanzinstitutionen zu ermöglichen?

Laut der Anforderung gemäß Erwägung 15 des Unionsprogramms zur Unterstützung spezieller Tätigkeiten im Bereich
Rechnungslegung und Abschlussprüfung für den Zeitraum 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)) sollten „EFRAG [Europäische
Beratergruppe für Rechnungslegung] und IASB […] alle erforderlichen Schritte zur Vermeidung von Interessenkonflikten
unternehmen, einschließlich Offenlegungsanforderungen, die an die Funktion und Verantwortlichkeiten der verschiedenen
Kategorien von Mitarbeitern angepasst sind, die von diesen Organisationen beschäftigt werden“. Könnte die Kommission darlegen,
wie sie sicherstellen wird, dass die Organisationen diesen Anforderungen entsprochen haben, innerhalb welcher Fristen die
Organisationen diese Schritte umsetzen müssen und wie diese Informationen der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht werden?

**Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission**

_(16. Mai 2014)_

1. Der IASB arbeitet gemäß den Grundsätzen der Transparenz und der Rechenschaftspflicht:

—
Der IASB untersteht der Aufsicht von Treuhändern, die wiederum vom Monitoring Board überwacht werden ( [1] ).

—
Alle Sitzungen des IASB sind öffentlich; seine Entwürfe für Standards sind Gegenstand öffentlicher Konsultationen ( [2] ).

—
Die Mitglieder des IASB werden von Treuhändern im Rahmen eines transparenten und offenen Verfahrens ausgewählt ( [3] ).

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Satzung der IFRS Foundation:

http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/IFRS-Foundation-Constitution-January-2013.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Handbuch für den Konsultationsprozess („Due Process Handbook“):

http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/Due-Process-Handbook/Pages/Due-Process-Handbooks.aspx.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Verfahren für die Auswahl von IASB-Mitgliedern:

http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Members-of-the-IASB/Documents/Process-for-Board-recruitment-2014.pdf

( **|**

( **|**

C 333 / 254 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

—
Treuhänder, IASB und Mitarbeiter unterliegen bestimmten Grundsätzen für den Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten und sind
demnach verpflichtet, sämtliche Interessen offenzulegen ( [4] ).

Die Kommission wird bis Ende 2014 in ihrem Bericht zur Bewertung der IAS-Verordnung auch auf die IFRS-Governance eingehen.

2. In ihrer Mitteilung zur langfristigen Finanzierung der europäischen Wirtschaft fordert die Kommission den IASB auf, sich mit
der Frage des Anlagehorizonts und insbesondere der Wiedereinführung des Vorsichtsprinzips in sein Rahmenkonzept zu befassen.
Die Kommission wird sich als Mitglied des Monitoring Board dafür stark machen.

3. Die ESMA-Empfehlungen aus ihrer Überprüfung der Rechnungslegungsverfahren 2013 („Review of Accounting Practices“)
werden von nationalen Finanzinstituten und Rechnungsprüfern umgesetzt. Wie im Bericht dargelegt, überwacht die ESMA den
Umsetzungsprozess. Darüber hinaus wird die Kommission die Rolle der ESMA für die Rechnungslegung im Rahmen der
anstehenden Überarbeitung der Verordnung zur Errichtung der ESMA überprüfen. Schließlich dürften neue Vorschriften für die
Beaufsichtigung und Offenlegung sowie deren Umsetzung durch den einheitlichen Aufsichtsmechanismus zu einer besseren
Vergleichbarkeit zwischen Finanzinstituten führen.

4. Die Reform der EFRAG schreitet unter der Aufsicht von Herrn Philippe Maystadt gut voran. Der Aufsichtsrat hat am 24. März
2014 Entwürfe zur Änderung der EFRAG-Satzung genehmigt. Die EFRAG-Generalversammlung wird diese im Juni annehmen. Die
Kommission wird dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat in den kommenden Wochen über die EFRAG-Reformen Bericht

erstatten.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Grundsätze für den Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten:
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/IASC-Foundation-Policies/Documents/Conflictofinterestpolicy.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 255

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003077/14**

**to the Commission**
**Syed Kamall (ECR), Sven Giegold (Verts/ALE) and Wolf Klinz (ALDE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Implementation of the Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and auditing for the
period of 2014-2020

In view of the requirement in Recital 5 of the Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and
auditing for the period of 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)), which states that ‘international accounting standards need to be
developed under a transparent and democratically accountable process’, could the Commission explain what reforms it will
introduce to ensure that the work of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), its recruitment processes and activities,
and its interaction with non-public sector entities and non-IFRS (international financial reporting standards) jurisdictions are fully
transparent and democratically accountable?

In view of the requirement in Recital 5 of the Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and
auditing for the period of 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)), which states that ‘to ensure that the interests of the Union are respected
and that global standards are of high quality and compatible with Union law, it is essential that the interests of the Union are
adequately taken into account in that international standard-setting process [including] the maintenance of the principle that
financial statements should give a “true and fair view”, and should be reliable and understandable, comparable and relevant’, could
the Commission:

1. detail how it will ensure that such interests are fully taken into account by the IASB as part of its consultation on the
conceptual framework;

2. detail what it will do if the IASB decides not to include prudence and other related concepts in the revised conceptual
framework; and

3. explain how it intends to ensure that accounts are comparable and relevant, given that the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) recently concluded in its ‘Review of Accounting Practices’ that ‘the information provided [in financial
statements prepared under IFRS] was not sufficient or not sufficiently structured to allow comparability among financial
institutions’?

In view of the requirement in Recital 15 of the Union programme to support specific activities in the field of financial reporting and
auditing for the period of 2014-2020 (2012/0364(COD)), which requires that ‘EFRAG [European Financial Reporting Advisory
Group] and the IASB should take all appropriate steps to avoid conflicts of interests, including disclosure requirements adapted to
the function and responsibilities of the different categories of staff employed by those organisations’, could the Commission confirm
how it intends to ensure that these organisations have done this, within what timeframe it expects these organisations to have put in
place those steps, and how this information will be made available to the public?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

1. The IASB respects the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities:

—
The IASB is overseen by Trustees which in turn are overseen by the Monitoring Board ( [1] ).

—
All meetings of the IASB are held in public and its draft standards put to public consultations ( [2] ).

—
IASB members are selected by Trustees through an open and transparent procedure ( [3] ).

—
Trustees, IASB and staff are subject to a ‘conflict of interest’ policy which requires them to disclose any interest ( [4] ).

The Commission will report by the end of 2014 on IFRS governance in its report from the evaluation of the IAS Regulation.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) IFRS Foundation’s Constitution:

http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/IFRS-Foundation-Constitution-January-2013.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Due Process Handbook: http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/Due-Process-Handbook/Pages/Due-Process-Handbooks.aspx
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Procedure for appointing IASB members: http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Members-of-the-IASB/Documents/Process-for-Board-recruitment-2014.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Conflict of interest policy: http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/IASC-Foundation-Policies/Documents/Conflictofinterestpolicy.pdf

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C 333 / 256 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

2. As set out in its communication on long-term financing the Commission invites the IASB to consider the issue of investment
horizons, paying particular attention to reintroducing prudence into its Conceptual Framework. The Commission will use its
position as a member of the Monitoring Board to put forward this view.

3. ESMA’s recommendations from its 2013 Review of Accounting Practices are followed up by national financial institutions and
auditors. As stated in the resulting report, ESMA is monitoring implementation progress. The Commission will also review the role
of ESMA in relation to accounting in the upcoming review of the regulation establishing ESMA. Finally, new prudential and
disclosure rules and their implementation by the Single Supervisory Mechanism are expected to ensure further comparability among
financial institutions.

4. The reform of EFRAG is making good progress under the supervision of Mr Philippe Maystadt. The Supervisory Board
approved draft amendments to EFRAG bylaws on 24 March 2014. EFRAG’s General Assembly shall approve them in June. In the
coming weeks the Commission will report to the EP and to the Council on EFRAG reforms.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 257

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003078/14**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(17 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Maltraitances à l'égard des femmes européennes

Selon le nouveau rapport publié par l'Agence des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne en date du 4 mars 2014, un tiers des
femmes sont victimes de violences physiques ou sexuelles en Europe. Plus précisément, sur 42 000 Européennes interrogées,
62 millions ont été victimes de violence physique et/ou sexuelle depuis l'âge de 15 ans, 22 % ont fait l'objet de violence physique
et/ou sexuelle perpétrée par un(e) partenaire intime et 5 % des femmes ont été violées.

1. Face à ces résultats alarmants, quelles suites la Commission compte-t-elle donner à cette étude qui met en lumière l'ampleur des
violences faites aux femmes à l'échelle européenne?

Selon cette même étude, les femmes d'Europe du Nord semblent être les plus nombreuses à souffrir de violences physiques ou
sexuelles. Au Danemark, plus d'une personne interrogée sur deux (52 %) avoue avoir été victime de maltraitance. La Finlande (47 %),
la Suède (46 %), et les Pays-Bas (45 %).

2. Quelles orientations la Commission entend-elle donner aux États membres pour renforcer leurs politiques nationales de lutte
contre les violences faites aux femmes et corriger le déséquilibre qui existe entre les États membres, afin de garantir aux femmes
européennes un cadre sûr et efficace au sein de l'Union?

Par ailleurs, l'Agence appelle les États membres de l'UE à ratifier la Convention du Conseil de l'Europe sur la prévention et la lutte
contre la violence à l'égard des femmes et la violence domestique, dite Convention d'Istanbul. À ce jour, seuls l'Autriche, l'Italie et le
Portugal ont ratifié cette Convention.

3. La Commission envisage-t-elle d'encourager les États membres à signer cette Convention afin de protéger les droits
fondamentaux des femmes et de poursuivre le renforcement de l'action menée par l'UE dans ce domaine?

**Réponse donnée par M. Hahn au nom de la Commission**

_(6 mai 2014)_

1. La Commission a déclaré à maintes reprises, en dernière date le 24 février 2014 ( [1] ), devant le Parlement européen, qu'elle restait
déterminée à tirer pleinement parti des compétences de l'Union européenne et à soutenir les États membres dans la prévention et la
lutte contre toutes les formes de violence à l'égard des femmes au sein de l'UE.

2. La Commission aide activement les États membres en établissant des lignes directrices pour la mise en œuvre des mesures
adoptées récemment dans le domaine de la justice civile et pénale, en particulier la directive 2012/29/UE ( [2] ) et le règlement
n° 606/2013 relatif à la reconnaissance mutuelle des mesures de protection en matière civile ( [3] ), qui complète la directive relative à la
décision de protection européenne applicable en matière de droit pénal ( [4] ). Elle veille également à ce que les États membres
transposent et appliquent correctement la législation.

En outre, la Commission est fermement décidée à continuer de soutenir les projets de lutte contre les violences infligées aux femmes
menés sur le terrain, par le truchement du programme Daphné III et, à l'avenir, dans le cadre du futur programme «Droits, égalité et
citoyenneté». La Commission soutient également les États membres dans la prévention des violences envers les femmes grâce à des
échanges de bonnes pratiques ( [5] ) et des actions de sensibilisation. Elle participe actuellement au financement de 13 campagnes et
actions nationales d'information en matière de violences faites aux femmes, pour un montant total de 3,7 millions d'euros.

3. La Commission invite de nouveau les États membres à signer et à ratifier la convention du Conseil de l'Europe sur la prévention
et la lutte contre la violence à l'égard des femmes et la violence domestique.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20140224&secondRef=ITEM-024&language=EN&ring=A7-2014-0075
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2012/29/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 25 octobre 2012 établissant des normes minimales concernant les droits, le soutien et la protection

des victimes de la criminalité et remplaçant la décision-cadre 2001/220/JAI du Conseil. Le délai de transposition est fixé au 16 novembre 2015.
http://eurex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0057:0073:EN:PDF

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:181:0004:0012:fr:PDF
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:338:0002:0018:FR:PDF
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) [http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/review-seminars/seminars_2012/violence_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/review-seminars/seminars_2012/violence_en.htm)

et http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/review-seminars/seminars_2013/vaw_en.htm

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C 333 / 258 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003078/14**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Abuse of European women

According to the new report published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on 4 March 2014, one in three
women has been a victim of physical or sexual violence in Europe. More specifically, on the basis of the 42 000 European women
interviewed, 62 million have been a victim of physical and/or sexual violence since the age of 15, 22% have been the object of
physical and/or sexual violence at the hands of an intimate partner and 5% of women have been raped.

1. In light of these alarming results, how does the Commission intend to follow up this study that casts light on the extent of the
violence that women are subjected to throughout Europe?

According to this same study, it appears to be the women of northern Europe who suffer the most from physical or sexual violence.
In Denmark, more than one out of every two persons interviewed (52%) admits to having been a victim of abuse, followed by Finland
(47%), Sweden (46%) and the Netherlands (45%).

2. What guidance does the Commission intend to give the Member States with a view to strengthening their national policies on
combating violence against women and rectifying the imbalance that exists between the Member States in order to guarantee
European women a secure and effective framework within the Union?

Moreover, the Agency has appealed to the EU Member States to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and
combating violence against women and domestic violence, referred to as the Istanbul Convention. To date, only Austria, Italy and
Portugal have ratified this convention.

3. Does the Commission intend to encourage the Member States to sign this convention with a view to protecting the
fundamental rights of women and attempting to reinforce the action taken by the EU in this area?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2014)_

1. The Commission has stated repeatedly before the European Parliament, and most recently, on 24 February 2014 ( [1] ), its
continued determination in making full use of the EU competences and supporting the Member States in preventing and combating
all forms of violence against women within the EU.

2. The Commission is actively assisting all Member States with guidance in implementing the recent legal measures adopted in the
criminal and civil justice area, in particular Directive 2012/29/EU ( [2] ) and Regulation No 606/2013 on the mutual recognition of civil
law protection measures ( [3] ) complementing the directive on the European protection order applicable in criminal matters ( [4] ) and is
also vigilant in ensuring that Member States transpose and apply the laws correctly.

The Commission is also committed to continuing to support projects for combating VAW at the grass-roots level. This was done by
the Daphne III programme and will continue with the future Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme. The Commission also
supports Member States in preventing VAW through exchanges of good practices ( [5] ) and awareness-raising activities. Presently, the
Commission is co-funding 13 national information campaigns and activities on VAW, for a total of 3.7 million euros.

3. The Commission repeatedly calls on the Member States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and
combating violence against women and domestic violence.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20140224&secondRef=ITEM-024&language=EN&ring=A7-2014-0075
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of

victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. The transposition deadline is 16 November 2015.
http://eurex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0057:0073:EN:PDF

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:181:0004:0012:en:PDF
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:338:0002:0018:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/review-seminars/seminars_2012/violence_en.htm and

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/other-institutions/good-practices/review-seminars/seminars_2013/vaw_en.htm

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24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 259

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003079/14**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Alain Cadec (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE),**

**Tokia Saïfi (PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE) et Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (PPE)**

_(17 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Écoutes téléphoniques en République française

Nicolas Sarkozy, ancien président de la République française, son avocat et plusieurs ministres ont été mis sur écoute par des juges
d'instruction. Par ailleurs, le bureau et le domicile de son avocat ont été perquisitionnés, et cela en l'absence de preuve claire de délit.
Plus de 500 avocats se sont indignés du «danger pour la démocratie de telles dérives» et ont rappelé «l'impérieuse nécessité de
protéger le secret professionnel».

Par ailleurs, la garde des Sceaux, Christiane Taubira, a publiquement affirmé le 10 mars 2014 ne pas avoir été informée de ces mises
sur écoute, ce qui a été démenti par le Premier ministre Jean-Marc Ayrault et par un courrier qui lui avait été adressé par le procureur
général, le 26 février, à ce sujet.

L'article 2 du traité sur l'Union européenne rappelle que l'Union est fondée sur l'état de droit, ce qui implique l'indépendance du
pouvoir judiciaire par rapport au pouvoir exécutif.

L'article 7 de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux garantit le droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale, du domicile et des
communications.

En outre, la directive 2013/48/UE relative au droit d'accès à un avocat rappelle dans son considérant 33 et son article 4 l'obligation
pour les États membres de respecter la confidentialité des communications entre les suspects et leur avocat, y compris des
conversations téléphoniques.

L'importance du plein respect de la confidentialité entre un avocat et son client est confirmée par la jurisprudence de la Cour
européenne des Droits de l'homme, comme dans l'arrêt KOPP c. SUISSE du 25 mars 1998 et l'arrêt Zagaria autres c. Italie, du
7 juillet 2008.

Aussi, sur la base des éléments précités, la Commission peut-elle indiquer:

1. si elle estime que la mise sur écoute téléphonique, sans preuve raisonnable de délit, contrevient au droit européen?

2. si la mise sur écoute de conversations entre un avocat et son client contrevient aux droits fondamentaux européens?

3. pourquoi elle n'a pas encore réagi alors qu'elle a toujours promu une «France de la justice»?

4. comment elle compte réagir au présent cas de figure?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Reding au nom de la Commission**

_(5 juin 2014)_

La directive 2013/48/UE dispose que les États membres respectent la confidentialité des communications entre les suspects ou les
personnes poursuivies et leur avocat dans l'exercice du droit d'accès à un avocat prévu par la présente directive. Le délai de mise en
œuvre est fixé au 27 novembre 2016.

C 333 / 260 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003079/14**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Alain Cadec (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Tokia Saïfi**

**(PPE), Constance Le Grip (PPE) and Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Wiretapping in France

Nicolas Sarkozy, former President of the French Republic, his lawyer and several ministers have had their phones tapped on the
orders of examining magistrates. In addition, the office and home of his lawyer have been raided, in the absence of any clear evidence
of a crime having been committed. A group of more than 500 lawyers have expressed their outrage at the ‘danger to democracy of
such abuses’ and have reiterated ‘the urgent need to protect professional secrecy’.

Furthermore, the Minister of Justice, Christiane Taubira, publicly stated on 10 March 2014 that she had not been informed of these
wiretaps. This was denied by Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and in a letter sent to her by the Public Prosecutor on 26 February.

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that the Union is founded on the rule of law, which implies that the judiciary is
independent of the executive.

Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, home and
communications.

Moreover, Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer stipulates, in Recital 33 and Article 4, that Member States are
required to respect the confidentiality of communication between suspects and their lawyers, including telephone conversations.

The importance of full respect for confidentiality between lawyer and client has been corroborated by the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights, as in the judgments Kopp v Switzerland of 25 March 1998 and Zagaria v Italy of 7 July 2008.

Accordingly, on the basis of the above, can the Commission say:

1. whether it considers that wiretapping, without reasonable proof of an offence, is in breach of EC law;

2. whether the wiretapping of conversations between a lawyer and his client infringes EU fundamental rights;

3. why it has not yet reacted, when it has always promoted a ‘France of justice’;

4. what action it intends to take in response to this matter?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 June 2014)_

Directive 2013/48/EU stipulates that Member States shall respect the confidentiality of communication between suspects or accused
persons and their lawyer in the exercise of the right of access to a lawyer provided for under this directive. The deadline for
implementation is 27 November 2016.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 261

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003080/14**

**à la Commission**
**Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)**

_(17 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Accord avec Google

La Commission européenne a, le 5 février 2014, publié un communiqué de presse ( [1] ) annonçant avoir obtenu de Google une
proposition d'engagements améliorée dans le cadre de l'enquête sur un abus de position dominante dans les domaines de la
recherche en ligne et des annonces publicitaires liées aux recherches en ligne. Google accepterait maintenant de garantir que
lorsqu'elle promeut ses propres services de recherche spécialisés sur sa page web (par exemple pour des produits, des hôtels, des
restaurants, etc.), les services de trois concurrents apparaissent de manière clairement visible pour les utilisateurs.

Le commissaire à la concurrence a envoyé une note explicative à tous les députés indiquant les raisons de la décision de trouver un
accord avec Google au sujet de l'affichage de ses concurrents dans ses résultats de recherche en ligne. Cependant, la Commission
reconnaît que la proposition «ne garantit pas une égalité de traitement» avec ses concurrents.

La Commission devra notifier par courrier aux 18 sociétés plaignantes (Microsoft, Expedia, etc.) l'invalidation de leur recours contre
Google. La Commission explique dans les lettres que la nouvelle offre soumise par Google prend en compte les principaux
problèmes de concurrence et que les autres craintes soulevées par les plaignants sont infondées.

1. Sachant que les sociétés plaignantes pourront utiliser ces lettres pour des actions judiciaires contre la décision de la
Commission et que la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne pourrait être saisie en vue de statuer sur la légitimité du choix de la
Commission, la Commission a-t-elle évalué au préalable les possibles actions en justice des sociétés plaignantes, la plupart en
provenance des États‐Unis?

2. Le grand marché transatlantique (en discussion en ce moment et sous le feu des projecteurs eu égard aux possibles actions en
justice contre des sociétés européennes) aurait-il aussi des implications dans les domaines de la recherche en ligne et des annonces
publicitaires liées à cette activité?

**Réponse donnée par M. Almunia au nom de la Commission**

_(17 juin 2014)_

La Commission confirme que les plaignants dans cette affaire seront informés dans les semaines à venir des raisons pour lesquelles
elle estime que les engagements proposés par Google sont de nature à répondre aux préoccupations de la Commission. Les
plaignants auront par la suite la possibilité de faire connaître leur point de vue à la Commission avant que cette dernière ne prenne
une décision finale sur la nécessité ou non de rendre les engagements pris par Google juridiquement contraignants. Les lettres dites de
pré-rejet ne constituent qu'une étape intermédiaire de la procédure; il serait donc prématuré de prévoir toute éventuelle action en
justice future intentée par un ou plusieurs plaignants (19 plaignants à ce jour).

Il est également trop tôt pour se prononcer sur les conséquences des négociations en cours concernant l'éventuel partenariat
transatlantique de commerce et d'investissement sur la recherche en ligne et les annonces publicitaires liées à cette activité.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) IP/14/116.

C 333 / 262 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003080/14**

**to the Commission**
**Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Agreement with Google

On 5 February 2014, the Commission published a press release ( [1] ) announcing that it has obtained an improved commitments
proposal from Google in the context of the antitrust investigation on online search and search advertising. In its proposal, Google
has now accepted to guarantee that whenever it promotes its own specialised search services on its web page (e.g. for products,
hotels, restaurants, etc.), the services of three rivals will also be displayed in a way that is clearly visible to users.

The Commissioner for Competition sent an explanatory note to every MEP clarifying the rationale behind the decision to reach an
agreement with Google on the subject of its rivals being displayed in its online search results. However, the Commission
acknowledges that the proposal ‘does not guarantee equal treatment’ with its rivals.

The Commission is going to send the 18 complainant companies (Microsoft, Expedia, etc.) letters informing them of the invalidity of
their complaints against Google. In the letters, the Commission will explain that the new Google offer addresses the key competition
concerns and that the other issues raised by the complainants are unfounded.

1. In the knowledge that the complainant companies will be able to use these letters for legal actions against the Commission’s
decision, and that the European Court of Justice may be called upon to decide on the legitimacy of the Commission’s choice, has the
Commission evaluated, in advance, the potential legal actions of the complainant companies, the majority of which come from the
United States?

2. Would the transatlantic free‐trade area (which is currently under discussion and is under the spotlight in view of the potential
legal actions against European companies) also have implications for online search and search advertising?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 June 2014)_

The Commission can confirm that in the coming weeks, it will inform the complainants in this case of the reasons why it believes
Google's proposed commitments are capable of addressing the Commission's concerns. The complainants will then have the
opportunity to make their views known to the Commission before the Commission takes a final decision on whether to make
Google's commitments legally binding on Google. The so-called pre-rejection letters are an intermediary step in the proceedings and
it is therefore premature to speculate on possible future legal actions by one or more (of the now 19) complainants.

It is similarly premature to speculate about the implications for online search and search advertising of the on-going negotiations
relating to the potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) IP/14/116.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 263

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003081/14**

**à la Commission**
**Gilles Pargneaux (S&D)**

_(17 mars 2014)_

_Objet:_ Fraude à l'étiquetage des produits de la mer

Les associations BLOOM et Oceana, des chercheurs de l'Inserm et du Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle ainsi que du
magazine _Terra_ _eco_ ont évalué la traçabilité de la filière poisson en France.

Ces derniers se sont associés pour mener une enquête inédite en France sur la fraude à l'étiquetage du poisson. Pendant un an, dix
régions ont été échantillonnées et près de 400 échantillons récoltés aux rayons frais des grandes surfaces, dans les poissonneries, les
restaurants, dans les plats préparés et les produits surgelés.

Cette étude a démontré que la substitution d'espèces en France demeure rare, avec un taux de fraude qui se situe à 3,5 %.

Les résultats de cette enquête sont à comparer avec les études similaires menées dans divers pays de l'Union européenne.

Les taux de fraude à l'étiquetage sont très élevés dans certains États membres: 32 % de fraude en Italie, 30 % rien que sur le merlu en
Espagne, 19 % sur le cabillaud en Irlande.

La Commission peut-elle indiquer si elle entend élaborer prochainement une stratégie européenne pour lutter contre la fraude à
l'étiquetage dans le secteur des produits de la mer?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(20 mai 2014)_

La Commission a connaissance de l'étude à laquelle l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence. D'une manière plus large, elle suit
avec beaucoup d'attention les travaux entrepris à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur l'Union pour évaluer l'ampleur des cas de substitution
d'espèces de poissons.

Il ressort des résultats disponibles que les différences entre l'espèce réelle et les indications données au consommateur varient en
fonction de l'espèce, des pays et du lieu de la chaîne alimentaire. Il arrive parfois, cependant, que de fortes divergences apparaissent.

À la suite du scandale de la viande de cheval, la Commission a décidé de prendre des mesures afin de renforcer la capacité du système
de contrôle de l'Union dans son ensemble à détecter et contrecarrer les fraudes alimentaires. L'un des principaux objectifs est
d'améliorer les capacités des États membres, qui sont responsables de la réalisation de contrôles destinés à vérifier que les produits
alimentaires placés sur le marché sont conformes aux règles nationales et européennes pertinentes. Il est par ailleurs essentiel de
faciliter l'assistance et la coopération administratives entre les autorités nationales chargées de faire respecter la réglementation en cas
d'infractions transfrontalières.

Dans le cas spécifique des fraudes à l'étiquetage concernant les espèces de poissons, la Commission analyse à l'heure actuelle les
méthodes de détection disponibles dans le cadre les contrôles officiels avant de se prononcer sur la nécessité de prendre des mesures
supplémentaires, sous la forme, par exemple, de plans de contrôle coordonnés conformément à l'article 53 du règlement (CE)
n [o] 882/2004 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 882/2004 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relatif aux contrôles officiels effectués pour s'assurer de la conformité avec la

législation sur les aliments pour animaux et les denrées alimentaires et avec les dispositions relatives à la santé animale et au bien-être des animaux, JO L 165 du
30.4.2004, p. 1.

C 333 / 264 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003081/14**

**to the Commission**
**Gilles Pargneaux (S&D)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Seafood labelling fraud

Traceability in the fish industry in France has been tested by the BLOOM and Oceana organisations, by researchers from Inserm (the
National Institute of Health and Medical Research) and the National Natural History Museum and by _Terra Eco_ magazine.

These organisations joined forces in France to conduct a unique investigation into labelling fraud in relation to fish. Over the course
of a year, ten regions were sampled and nearly 400 samples were collected from the refrigerated aisles of supermarkets, fishmongers,
restaurants, ready meals and frozen foods.

The study showed that species substitution remains rare in France, with fraud at a level of 3.5%.

The results of this inquiry can be compared to similar studies carried out in various European Union countries.

In some countries, the level of labelling fraud is very high: 32% fraud in Italy, 30% of hake alone in Spain, 19% of cod in Ireland.

Can the Commission state whether it will soon draw up a European strategy to combat labelling fraud in the seafood sector?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The Commission is aware of the study mentioned by the Honourable Member. More generally it closely monitors the works
undertaken within or outside the EU aiming to assess the magnitude of fish species substitution.

The available results lead to conclude that discrepancies between the real species and the information conveyed to the consumer
occur to different extents according to the species, the countries and the place of the food chain. However they are sometimes
detected in significant proportion.

Following the horse meat scandal the Commission has decided to undertake actions to strengthen the ability of the EU control
system as a whole to detect and counter food fraud. A key objective is to improve the capabilities of the Member States which are
responsible for carrying controls to verify that food products placed on the market comply with the relevant national and EU rules. It
is also considered critical to facilitate administrative assistance and cooperation among national enforcers in the case of cross border
violations.

In the particular case of mislabelling of fish species, the Commission is currently investigating the detection methods available in the
context of official controls before deciding for any further action, for instance in the form of coordinated control plans in accordance
with Article 53 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed
and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 265

_(Hrvatska verzija)_

**Pitanje za pisani odgovor E-003082/14**

**upućeno Komisiji**
**Ruža Tomašić (ECR)**

_(17. ožujka 2014.)_

_Predmet:_ Uloga Europske komisije u borbi za ravnopravnost spolova

Svi statistički podatci govore da je postotak nezaposlenih žena u Europskoj uniji zamjetno veći od onog nezaposlenih muškaraca, da
su žene lošije plaćene za svoj rad i da popunjavaju manje od 10 % rukovodećih pozicija u tvrtkama.

Smatram nedopustivim nastavak takve prakse te držim da moramo biti ustrajni, ali i puno brži i učinkovitiji nego dosad, u
implementaciji najviših civilizacijskih normi u Europskoj uniji.

S obzirom na to da je stavkom 1. članka 157. Ugovora iz Lisabona državama članicama dana obveza poštovanja i primjene načela
jednake plaće žena i muškaraca za jednak rad ili rad jednake vrijednosti, željela bih znati što Europska komisija kao „čuvar ugovora”
planira učiniti kako bi države članice brže i dosljednije primijenile navedeno načelo.

Koje alate Komisija može koristiti kako bi navela vlade država članica da ozbiljnije shvate to pitanje te na nacionalnoj razini iznađu
rješenja kojima bi se stalo na kraj diskriminaciji žena?

**Odgovor g. Hahna u ime Komisije**

_(7. svibnja 2014.)_

Borba protiv diskriminacije u plaćama i razlike u plaći između spolova jedan je od prioriteta koje je Komisija postavila u Strategiji za
ravnopravnost žena i muškaraca za razdoblje od 2010. do 2015 ( [1] ).

Komisija će u idućim godinama stavljati naglasak na praćenje ispravne primjene i provedbe odredaba o jednakoj plaći iz Direktive
2006/54/EZ ( [2] ) na nacionalnoj razini te na pružanje podrške državama članicama i drugim dionicima u pravilnom provođenju i
primjeni postojećih pravila. U skladu s tim Komisija je 6. prosinca 2013. donijela Izvješće o primjeni Direktive 2006/54/EZ ( [3] ), pri
čemu je poseban naglasak stavljen na procjenu primjene odredaba o jednakoj plaći u praksi. Izvješću su priložena četiri praktična
dokumenta kojima se nastoji pomoći poslodavcima, socijalnim partnerima, nacionalnim tijelima i nacionalnim sudovima da
učinkovitije primjenjuju nacionalne zakone o jednakoj plaći te da žrtvama diskriminacije po potrebi omoguće lakše ostvarivanje
njihovih prava ( [4] ).

Osim toga, 7. ožujka 2014. Komisija je donijela Preporuku o jačanju načela jednake plaće za muškarce i žene putem
transparentnosti ( [5] ). Cilj je Preporuke promicati i olakšavati učinkovitu primjenu načela jednake plaće u praksi i pomoći državama
članicama i drugim dionicima u pronalasku najboljeg pristupa za smanjenje preostalih razlika u plaći između spolova. U Preporuci se
naglasak stavlja na transparentnost plaća koja je ključna za učinkovitu primjenu načela jednake plaće. Ona predstavlja skup
konkretnih mjera za pomoć državama članicama pri uvođenju prilagođenog pristupa za poboljšanje transparentnosti plaća,
ostavljajući im pritom slobodu da odaberu najprikladnije mjere s obzirom na domaće okolnosti.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 491 završna verzija.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) SL L 204, 26.7.2006.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 861 završna verzija, .

dostupno na http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0861:FIN:EN:PDF.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) SWD (2013) 512 završna verzija,.

dostupno na http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0512:FIN:EN:PDF.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) SL L 69, 8.3.2014.

dostupno na http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:069:0112:0116:EN:PDF.

( **|**

( **|**

C 333 / 266 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003082/14**

**to the Commission**

**Ruža Tomašić (ECR)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ The Commission's role in the fight for gender equality

All statistical data show that the percentage of unemployed women in the European Union is markedly higher than the percentage of
unemployed men, that women are paid less for their work and that they occupy less than 10% of directorship positions in
companies.

I feel that this situation cannot be allowed to continue. We must be persistent, but we must also be much faster and more effective
than we have been until now in implementing the highest standards of civilisation in the European Union.

The Member States are required, under Article 157(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, to ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and
female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied. Given that, what steps does the Commission — as guardian of the
Treaties — plan to take to ensure that the Member States apply this principle more swiftly and consistently?

What tools can the Commission use to induce the Member States to take this issue more seriously and to come up with solutions at
national level that would put an end to discrimination against women?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2014)_

Tackling pay discrimination and the gender pay gap is one of the Commission priorities in its Strategy for equality between women
and men 2010-2015 ( [1] ).

The Commission's focus for the coming years will be to monitor the correct application and enforcement of the equal pay provisions
of Directive 2006/54/EC ( [2] ) at national level and to support Member States and other stakeholders with the proper enforcement and
application of the existing rules. In that vein, the Commission has adopted on 6 December 2013 a Report on the application of
Directive 2006/54/EC ( [3] ), particularly focusing on assessing the application of the provisions on equal pay in practice. The report is
accompanied by four practical documents aiming to help employers, social partners, national authorities and national courts to
more effectively apply the national law on equal pay and to facilitate it for victims of discrimination to enforce their rights where
necessary ( [4] ).

Moreover, on 7 March 2014 the Commission has adopted a recommendation on strengthening the principle of equal pay between
men and women through transparency ( [5] ). The recommendation aims to promote and facilitate the effective application of the
principle of equal pay in practice and assist Member States and other stakeholders in finding the right approaches to reducing the
persisting gender pay gap. The recommendation focuses on pay transparency, which is essential for the effective application of the
equal pay principle. It presents a tool box of concrete measures designed to assist Member States in taking a tailor-made approach to
improving pay transparency, leaving Member States flexibility to decide which of the measures are most appropriate in their
domestic circumstances.

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( **|**
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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 491 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 204, 26.7.2006.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 861 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0861:FIN:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 512 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0512:FIN:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) OJ L 69, 8.3.2014, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:069:0112:0116:EN:PDF

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 267

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003083/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ I rischi derivanti dalla mancata messa in sicurezza e bonifica dell'area dell'ex fabbrica Stoppani in Arenzano e Cogoleto
(Liguria)

La Luigi Stoppani S.p.A., società produttrice di cromo esavalente, sostanza altamente nociva, ha operato nei comuni di Arenzano e
Cogoleto (provincia di Genova, regione Liguria) per quasi 100 anni, vendendo in regime di monopolio con margini ed utili
stratosferici; lo Stato italiano si rese complice per i mancati controlli.

Da diversi anni è in atto, ad opera di una struttura commissariale, la messa in sicurezza del sito propedeutica alla successiva bonifica
ma, a causa dei mancati stanziamenti economici nei bilanci dello Stato, le operazioni stanno andando a rilento e ad oggi sono
praticamente ferme. Ogni anni gli enti locali devono attivarsi con fatica per la dichiarazione di stato di emergenza da parte del

governo.

In questi giorni abbiamo appreso dai media notizie allarmanti circa la discarica di Molinetto, un'area abbandonata nel territorio del
comune di Cogoleto, «senza alcun presidio e in un completo stato di abbandono con situazioni di emergenza ambientali derivanti dal
pericolo di sversamento di percolato» su cui ci risulta che la Commissione europea abbia già avviato una procedura d'infrazione.

L'ente commissariale, che attualmente gestisce per conto del governo l'area interessata, avrebbe infatti indetto una gara d'appalto in
base alla quale il vincitore potrà ricavare profitti sversando altri 50mila metri cubi di rifiuti pericolosi provenienti da altri siti
produttivi.

La direttiva 35 del 2004 definisce le norme sulla responsabilità in materia di prevenzione e riparazione del danno ambientale ed è
stata recepita dall'Italia con il decreto legislativo 152 del 2006.

È stata informata la Commissione dalle autorità italiane dell'attuale situazione di grave pericolo per l'ambiente ed i cittadini?

La mancata bonifica non rappresenta una grave violazione delle norme stabilite dalle Istituzioni europee?

In caso affermativo, che azioni intende intraprendere la Commissione per costringere il governo italiano a porre in essere
immediatamente i necessari interventi per completare la messa in sicurezza dell'intera area coinvolta e la successiva bonifica?

Risulta alla Commissione che tra i fondi stanziati per gli interventi della bonifica mai realizzata siano stati inseriti anche fondi di
provenienza europea?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(26 maggio 2014)_

La discarica di Molinetto sul sito dell’ex stabilimento Stoppani di Cogoleto (Liguria) è una delle discariche oggetto della procedura
d’infrazione 2011/2215 in corso, volta a garantire che le autorità italiane adottino le misure necessarie per mettere le discariche in
conformità con il diritto dell’UE. La Commissione terrà conto delle informazioni comunicate dall’onorevole deputato nel quadro di
tale procedura d’infrazione.

Secondo le informazioni fornite dall’autorità di gestione del programma per la Liguria, cofinanziato dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo
regionale (FESR), la bonifica in questione non è stata cofinanziata dal FESR durante i periodi di programmazione 2000-2006 e 20072013.

C 333 / 268 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003083/14**

**to the Commission**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Risks relating to the failure to decontaminate and reclaim the land around the former Stoppani factory in Arenzano and
Cogoleto (Liguria)

Luigi Stoppani SpA, a company producing hexavalent chromium, a highly noxious substance, has been operating monopolistically
in the towns of Arenzano and Cogoleto (Province of Genoa, Liguria Region) for nearly 100 years, with stratospheric profit margins.
The Italian Government has been complicit in this, due to its lack of monitoring and supervision.

For several years now, under the responsibility of a Special Commissioner, the site has been undergoing a process of
decontamination to make it safe in preparation for its subsequent reclamation. However, due to a lack of funding from the state
budget, the work is proceeding slowly and is currently virtually at a standstill. Each year the local authorities have to take tiresome
action to persuade the government to declare a state of emergency.

We have recently learned, from the media, some alarming news about the Molinetto landfill, an abandoned area in the municipality
of Cogoleto, which is allegedly totally unsupervised and in a complete state of disrepair, with ‘environmental emergencies stemming
from the danger of leachate spillage’. The Commission has apparently already initiated an infringement procedure in relation to this
site.

The Special Commissioner, who is currently managing the area concerned on behalf of the government, has apparently issued a call
for tenders on the basis of which the company which secures the contract will be able to make a profit by pouring in another 50 000
cubic metres of hazardous waste from other production sites.

Directive 2004/35/EC lays down rules on liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage and has
been incorporated into Italian law by Legislative Decree 152 of 2006.

Have the Italian authorities informed the Commission of the serious threat currently being posed to the environment and citizens?

Is the failure to clean up and reclaim the land not a serious breach of the rules laid down by the EU institutions?

If so, what action will the Commission take to force the Italian Government to immediately take the necessary measures to complete
the decontamination of the entire area and its subsequent reclamation?

Can the Commission say whether the funds allocated for this non-existent reclamation include any EU funds?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 May 2014)_

The Molinetto landfill, within the site of the former Stoppani factory (Cogoleto, Liguria), is one of the landfills covered by the
ongoing infringement procedure 2011/2215, which is aimed at ensuring that the Italian authorities take the necessary measures to
make landfills compliant with EC law. In the framework of this infringement procedure, the Commission will take account of the
information provided by the Honourable Member.

According to the information provided by the Managing Authority of the programme for Liguria co-funded by the European
regional development fund (ERDF), the reclamation at issue was not co-financed by the ERDF either during the 2000-2006 or 20072013 programming periods.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 269

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003084/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Sergio Berlato (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Giovanni La Via**

**(PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE) e Salvatore Tatarella (PPE)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Autorizzazione delle indicazioni nutrizionali e sulla salute previste dall'EFSA: quali costi per le PMI

Il regolamento (CE) n. 1924/2006 prevede che tutte le indicazioni nutrizionali e sulla salute debbano essere scientificamente fondate
e possano essere apposte sull'etichetta solo previa autorizzazione della Commissione europea.

Il regolamento (CE) n. 353/2008, nel fissare le norme d'attuazione per la valutazione delle domande che autorizzano le indicazioni
sulla salute previste dall'articolo 15 del regolamento (CE) n. 1924/2006, stabilisce criteri scientifici estremamente rigorosi. Nello
specifico la valutazione funzionale all'autorizzazione dell'indicazione sulla salute, condotta dall'EFSA (Autorità europea per la
sicurezza alimentare), esige il ricorso a test clinici su individui sani, in doppio cieco contro placebo, i cui risultati, pubblicati su riviste
scientifiche prestigiose, vengono sottoposti alla revisione di altri ricercatori prima della pubblicazione.

Il ricorso a tali studi e la predisposizione di un dossier scientifico funzionale all'autorizzazione comporta costi superiori ai
500 000 euro.

Un siffatto onere comporta, di fatto, un'applicazione elitaria del regolamento e un'esclusione de facto a carico delle PMI che, a fronte
di simili costi, rinunciano ad investire in ricerca e innovazione.

Anche i consumatori ne risultano danneggiati, con un pregiudizio alle loro possibilità di scelte informate d'acquisto in linea con le
loro caratteristiche fisiologiche ed esigenze dietetiche.

In considerazione di tale premessa, può la Commissione indicare:

1. se abbia preso in considerazione la possibilità di prevedere forme di aiuto di natura economica a favore delle PMI del settore
alimentare che vogliano predisporre un dossier funzionale all'autorizzazione di un'indicazione sulla salute per uno specifico
alimento;

2. se intenda, nel contesto della prevista revisione del regolamento (CE) n. 1924/2006, ridurre l'onerosità della predisposizione di
un dossier funzionale all'autorizzazione di un'indicazione sulla salute;

3. come intenda eventualmente garantire alle PMI l'accesso all'utilizzo di un'indicazione sulla salute per un prodotto alimentare?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(13 maggio 2014)_

Il regolamento (CE) n. 1924/2006 mira a garantire il funzionamento efficace del mercato interno e al tempo stesso un elevato livello
di protezione dei consumatori per quanto riguarda le indicazioni nutrizionali e sulla salute. Va notato che l'uso di indicazioni sulla
salute è su base volontaria.

Tale regolamento non prevede un sostegno finanziario per le PMI. Ad oggi, sono state autorizzate 254 indicazioni sulla salute che
possono essere utilizzate da qualunque operatore del settore alimentare, purché siano rispettati i principi e le condizioni generali
stabiliti nel regolamento (CE) n. 1924/2006 ( [1] ) e le condizioni d'uso specifiche previste per ciascuna indicazione sulla salute. Solo
quattro indicazioni sulla salute (delle 254 autorizzate), cui è stata concessa la protezione dei dati oggetto di proprietà industriale per
un periodo di cinque anni successivamente alla loro autorizzazione, sono soggette a restrizioni d'uso a favore di un solo operatore
specifico. Dopo il periodo di cinque anni e se l'indicazione soddisfa ancora le condizioni stabilite nel regolamento, essa può essere
utilizzata da tutti gli operatori, purché siano rispettati i principi generali e le condizioni specifiche.

La fondatezza scientifica di una nuova indicazione sulla salute, pur richiedendo una valutazione del più alto livello possibile, non
necessita di nuove prove scientifiche. La maggior parte delle indicazioni sulla salute è stata suffragata da studi pubblicamente
disponibili. Solo le poche indicazioni sulla salute cui è stata concessa la protezione dei dati oggetto di proprietà industriale sono state
autorizzate sulla base di studi scientifici non pubblicati protetti da proprietà industriale.

Il registro dell'UE contenente l'elenco di tutte le indicazioni nutrizionali e sulla salute autorizzate, è pubblicamente disponibile alla
seguente pagina web: http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:404:0009:0025:IT:PDF

C 333 / 270 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003084/14**

**to the Commission**
**Oreste Rossi (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), Sergio Berlato (PPE), Lara Comi (PPE), Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Giovanni La Via**

**(PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE) and Salvatore Tatarella (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Authorisation of nutrition and health claims provided for by the EFSA: what cost to SMEs?

Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 states that all nutrition and health claims must be scientifically substantiated and can appear on
labels only with the prior authorisation of the European Commission.

Regulation (EC) No 353/2008, in establishing implementing rules for applications for authorisation of health claims as provided for
in Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, lays down extremely rigorous scientific criteria. In particular, the assessment of
applications for the authorisation of health claims, conducted by the EFSA (European Food Safety Authority), requires the use of
clinical trials on healthy individuals, in double blind against a placebo, whose results, published in prestigious scientific journals, are
subject to peer review before publication.

The use of these studies and the preparation of a scientific dossier for authorisation imply costs in excess of EUR 500 000.

This high cost in effect implies elitist implementation of the regulation and the effective exclusion of SMEs which, faced with such
costs, are no longer investing in research and innovation.

Consumers are also prejudiced because of the impact on their ability to make informed choices in accordance with their
physiological characteristics and dietary requirements.

In view of all this, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Has it considered the possibility of providing financial help for SMEs in the food industry that wish to prepare an application
dossier for authorisation of a health claim for a particular food product?

2. Does it, as part of the planned revision of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, intend to reduce the requirements concerning the
preparation of an application dossier for authorisation of a health claim?

3. Is it intending to guarantee SMEs access to the use of a health claim for a food product?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2014)_

Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 aims at ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market whilst providing a high level of
consumer protection with regard to nutrition and health claims. It should be noted that the use of health claims is voluntary.

This regulation does not foresee a financial help for SMEs. To date, 254 health claims have been authorised and may be used by any
food business operator as long as the general principles and conditions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 ( [1] ), as well as the
specific conditions of use set for each health claim, are respected. Only four health claims (out of the 254 authorised), which have
been granted the protection of proprietary data during a five-year period following their authorisation, are restricted of use for the
benefit of a specific operator only. After the five years period and if the claim still meets the conditions laid down in the regulation
the claim can be used by all operators if the general principles and the specific conditions are respected.

The scientific substantiation of a new health claim, whilst requiring an assessment of the highest possible standard, does not
necessitate new scientific evidence. The majority of health claims have been substantiated by publicly available studies. Only the few
so-called proprietary health claims have been authorised on the basis of proprietary, unpublished, scientific studies.

The EU Register of nutrition and health claims lists all authorised health claims and it is publicly available on this web page:
http://ec.europa.eu/nuhclaims/

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:404:0009:0025:EN:PDF

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 271

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003085/14**

**alla Commissione**

**Franco Bonanini (NI)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Impianto di maricoltura presso Lavagna

Considerato che è attualmente operativo un impianto di maricoltura presso Lavagna (provincia di Genova), in Italia, al centro di una
zona di elevato valore paesaggistico, ambientale e turistico;

considerato che Lavagna si trova all'interno dell'area marina internazionale denominata «Santuario internazionale dei cetacei del Mar
Ligure» istituita nel 1993 dai governi di Italia, Francia e Principato di Monaco e che il tratto di mare interessato dal Santuario è una
porzione di Mediterraneo estremamente ricca di vita pelagica, e senz'altro la più importante dell'intero bacino per via delle
popolazioni di cetacei che ospita;

vista la presenza nell'area di numerosi siti di importanza comunitaria — SIC, previsti dalla direttiva 92/43/CEE del Consiglio
(«direttiva Habitat»), tra cui i siti «Fondale Golfo di Rapallo (IT1332673) e Fondali Punta Sestri» (IT1333372), ubicati nelle immediate
vicinanze della maricoltura e caratterizzati da una prateria di posidonia oceanica;

considerato che la maricoltura può rappresentare, come ormai attestato da numerosi studi internazionali e come ripreso dal
rapporto ambientale del programma operativo pesca 2007/2013 del ministero delle Politiche agricole, redatto in adempimento della
direttiva 2001/42/CE, un rischio effettivo per l'ambiente con possibili molteplici effetti negativi sia sugli ecosistemi acquatici sia
sull'ambiente circostante (quali residui inquinanti degli impianti stessi, contaminazioni patologiche, immissione di enormi quantità
farmaci nell'ambiente, squilibri biologici determinati da fuoriuscite sempre possibili di pesci allevati nelle comunità acquatiche
naturali);

considerato che la maricoltura può determinare conseguenze negative per il benessere e le condizioni di salute dei pesci (tanto quelli
allevati quanto quelli liberi presenti nel mare circostante);

può la Commissione far sapere se ritenga la permanenza di tale impianto di maricoltura a Lavagna compatibile con i principi della
direttiva 2001/42/CE (direttiva VAS), della direttiva 92/43/CEE («direttiva Habitat»), del regolamento (CE) n. 1198/2006 del
Consiglio, nonché con le disposizioni della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sulla biodiversità e con le altre iniziative anche
recentemente promosse dalla Commissione europea in tema di biodiversità e acquacoltura (tra cui il programma generale di azione
in materia di ambiente fino al 2020 e la strategia sulla biodiversità fino al 2020)?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(11 giugno 2014)_

La rete Natura 2000 istituita dalla direttiva Habitat ( [1] ) mira a promuovere lo sviluppo sostenibile delle aree naturali. Non è un sistema
di riserve naturali in senso stretto, tale da escludere ogni attività umana.

L'acquacoltura (maricoltura) nei siti Natura 2000 o nelle loro vicinanze può essere compatibile con i principi della direttiva Habitat. È
compito delle autorità competenti degli Stati membri assicurare che le attività umane non provochino il degrado degli habitat dei siti
e non rechino disturbi significativi alle specie per cui i siti sono stati designati. Gli Stati membri devono garantire che eventuali piani
o progetti suscettibili di avere effetti significativi sui siti Natura 2000 siano sottoposti a una valutazione. In caso di conclusioni
negative della valutazione e in mancanza di soluzioni alternative, un progetto può essere autorizzato soltanto per motivi imperativi
di rilevante interesse pubblico, adottando obbligatoriamente misure compensative adeguate.

Per assistere gli Stati membri nell'interpretazione e nella corretta applicazione delle disposizioni summenzionate, la Commissione ha
elaborato una serie di documenti interpretativi e di orientamento metodologico per settore ( [2] ), che comprendono anche il
settore dell'acquacoltura ( [3] ).

Sulla base delle informazioni di cui dispone attualmente, la Commissione non ha motivo di ritenere che l'impianto di maricoltura di
Lavagna sia in violazione della normativa ambientale dell'Unione.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 92/43/CEE del Consiglio, del 21 maggio 1992, relativa alla conservazione degli habitat naturali e seminaturali e della flora e della fauna selvatiche, GU L 206

del 22.7.1992 _._

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/Aqua-N2000 %20guide.pdf

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C 333 / 272 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003085/14**

**to the Commission**

**Franco Bonanini (NI)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Sea farm in Lavagna (Genoa)

A sea farm is currently operational in Lavagna (province of Genoa), Italy, which is at the heart of an area of great natural beauty that
is valuable for its environment and tourism.

Lavagna is located in an international marine area known as the ‘International Ligurian Sea Cetacean Sanctuary’, which was
established in 1993 by the governments of Italy, France and Monaco. The stretch of sea covered by the Sanctuary is a part of the
Mediterranean that is extremely rich in pelagic species, and is certainly the most important part of the entire sea because of the
whales and dolphins that populate it.

The area has numerous sites of Community importance (SCI) provided for by Council Directive 92/43/EEC (‘Habitats Directive’),
including the ‘Fondale Golfo di Rapallo’ (IT1332673) and the ‘Fondali Punta Sestri’ (IT1333372), which are in the immediate vicinity
of the sea farm and characterised by a meadow of Posidonia oceanica.

As has now been evidenced by numerous international studies and as stated in the environmental report of the 2007-2013
Operational Programme for Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, drawn up in compliance with Directive 2001/42/EC,
mariculture (sea farming) can pose a genuine risk to the environment. It can have many possible negative effects on both aquatic
ecosystems and the surrounding environment (such as polluting residues from the farm itself, pathological contamination, the
release of huge amounts of pharmaceutical drugs into the environment and biological imbalances caused by farmed fish escaping, as
is always possible, into natural aquatic communities).

Mariculture can also have a negative impact on the well-being and health of fish (both on the farmed fish and those living freely in the
surrounding sea).

Given the above, does the Commission think the existence of such a sea farm in Lavagna is compatible with the principles of
Directive 2001/42/EC (the SEA Directive), Directive 92/43/EEC (Habitats Directive) and Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006, in
addition to the provisions of the UN Convention on Biodiversity and other initiatives also recently promoted by the Commission
relating to biodiversity and aquaculture (including the General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 and the Biodiversity
Strategy to 2020)?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 June 2014)_

The Natura 2000 network established under the Habitats Directive ( [1] ) aims to promote the sustainable development of natural areas.
It should not be seen as a system of strict nature reserves from which all human activities would be excluded.

Aquaculture (sea farms), in or around Natura 2000 sites, can be compatible with the principles of the Habitats Directive. It is up to
the relevant authorities in the Member States to ensure that human activities do not cause the deterioration of the sites' habitats or
any significant disturbance of the species for which the sites have been designated. Member States must ensure that any plan or
project likely to have significant effects on Natura 2000 sites is subject to an assessment. In case of a negative assessment and in the
absence of alternative solutions, the project can be authorised only for imperative reasons of overriding public interest and if
adequate compensatory measures are adopted.

In order to assist Member States in the understanding and correct application of the abovementioned provisions, the Commission
has produced a number of general and sector specific interpretative and methodological guidance documents ( [2] ), including for the
aquaculture sector ( [3] ).

On the basis of the information currently available to the Commission, the Commission has no reason to believe that the sea farm in
Lavagna is not in compliance with EU environmental legislation.

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**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 92/43//EEC of 21.5.1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/Aqua-N2000%20guide.pdf

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 273

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003086/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Possibili finanziamenti per la realizzazione del dispositivo «Bird Detector»

La MESAR S.r.l., nata nel 1986 e attiva in 10 paesi, opera nel campo della progettazione e costruzione elettronica e ha iniziato a
sviluppare fin dall'inizio una propria tecnologia specifica nel settore civile e industriale . La società si è fortemente specializzata sulla
conversione di potenza, trasmissione dati in radiofrequenza o fibra ottica, conversione dati su diversi protocolli, elettronica di
controllo e sistemi integrati di alimentazione in sicurezza assoluta. I principali campi di applicazione sono: 1. ferroviario rotabile 2.
infrastruttura ferroviaria 3 avionico/Air Traffic Control

In particolare, la MESAR S.r.l. ha focalizzato la propria attività nella soluzione delle problematiche legate al «bird striking» ovvero
all'impatto con i volatili che causa spesso danni disastrosi: dal 1910 si sono verificati infatti 350 decessi in campo militare e 250 in
campo civile. Tale fenomeno accade più frequentemente durante il decollo o l'atterraggio e in voli a bassa quota.

La tecnologia prevede quindi la realizzazione di un sistema di Bird Detector, cioè un radar di scoperta tridimensionale in grado di
rilevare la presenza e la traiettoria di volatili lungo i percorsi di volo, sulle piste di decollo e atterraggio e in tutta la zona aeroportuale
ATZ, con un principio di funzionamento molto semplice ma efficace.

Il sistema di inclinazione e posizionamento del radar, trasmette un impulso elettromagnetico capace di rilevare la fauna volatile
presente nel sito e, tramite un software di elaborazione, svolge un algoritmo valido ad identificare uccelli in volo su aree di potenziale
pericolo per il traffico aereo, prevenendo così danni causati a persone, volatili e al veivolo.

Tutto ciò premesso, può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. sono previsti finanziamenti per il progetto suesposto?

2. Come viene affrontata tale problematica negli altri Paesi UE e quali soluzioni sono state adottate?

3. Qual è il quadro generale della situazione?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

_(15 maggio 2014)_

1. La Commissione informa l'onorevole deputato che non esistono progetti di ricerca in materia di prevenzione dell'impatto con i
volatili finanziati nell'ambito dei programmi di ricerca del 7 [o] PQ o di SESAR. Non è previsto alcun finanziamento nell'ambito di
Orizzonte 2020.

2. Per ridurre al minimo i rischi di collisione tra aeromobili e volatili, gli operatori aeroportuali, in base alla situazione locale,
istituiranno strumenti e procedure, e comunicheranno con altre autorità se il pericolo di impatto con i volatili si estende oltre il
perimetro aeroportuale. Il gestore dell'aeroporto introdurrà innanzitutto misure adeguate a scoraggiare l'avvicinamento dei volatili
all'aeroporto. Le misure che comprendono il rilevamento dei volatili, ad esempio i radar citati dall'onorevole deputato
nell'interrogazione, possono essere utili anche per avvertire i controllori del traffico aereo di un imminente pericolo specifico. I
mezzi e le procedure disponibili per allontanare e rilevare gli uccelli sono numerosi e di norma saranno selezionati sulla base di
condizioni locali e del parere di esperti. Non esiste una soluzione standard, né a livello dell'UE né a livello internazionale, ma sono
disponibili orientamenti dell'Agenzia europea per la sicurezza aerea (EASA) e dell'Organizzazione internazionale dell'aviazione civile
(ICAO) nonché di varie altre organizzazioni e imprese impegnate nel settore.

3. Il regolamento (UE) n. 139/2014 della Commissione ( [1] ) ha istituito un quadro giuridico dell'UE per assicurare che i gestori
aeroportuali applichino le procedure e i mezzi necessari per ridurre il pericolo di impatto con i volatili.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 139/2014 della Commissione, del 12 febbraio 2014, che stabilisce i requisiti tecnici e le procedure amministrative relativi agli aeroporti ai sensi
del regolamento (CE) n. 216/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (GU L 44 del 14.2.2014).

C 333 / 274 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003086/14**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Potential funding for the production of the ‘Bird Detector’ device

MESAR s.r.l., which was established in 1986 and is active in 10 countries, operates in the field of electronic design and manufacture
and from the outset began to develop its own specific technology in the civil and industrial sector. The company is highly specialised
in power conversion, radiofrequency and fibre-optic data transmission, data conversion on various protocols, control electronics
and integrated power supply systems with absolute security. The main areas of application are: 1. Rolling stock 2. Rail infrastructure
3. Avionics/Air Traffic Control

MESAR s.r.l.’s activities have focused specifically on solving the problem of bird strikes, i.e. collisions with birds that often cause
catastrophic damage: since 1910, bird strikes have led to 350 military deaths and 250 civilian deaths. This phenomenon is more
common during take‐off and landing and when flying at low altitude.

The technology therefore provides for the production of a Bird Detector system, i.e. a radar with three-dimensional detection which
is able to identify the presence and trajectory of birds along the flight path, on runways and in the entire ATZ airport area. This radar
operates on a very simple yet effective principle.

The radar’s incline and positioning system transmits an electromagnetic pulse which is able to detect winged fauna present in the site
and, by using processing software, performs an algorithm which can identify birds flying in areas which are potentially dangerous to
air traffic, thereby preventing damage to people, birds and the aircraft.

In the light of the above, can the Commission clarify the following:

1. Is any funding being provided for the above project?

2. How is this issue dealt with in other EU countries and what solutions have been implemented?

3. What is the general framework for this situation?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2014)_

1. The Commission informs the Honourable Member that there are no research projects in the area of bird strike prevention being
funded under any of the research programmes FP7 or SESAR. No funding is anticipated under Horizon 2020.

2. In order to minimise the risk of collisions between birds and aircraft, airport operators will, based on the local situation,
establish means and procedures and also communicate with other authorities if the bird hazard extend beyond the airport boundary.
The airport operator will primarily introduce measures suited to deter birds from the airport. Measures that include detection of
birds, such as radars mentioned in the question from the Honourable Member, can also be helpful to warn air traffic controllers of a
specific imminent hazard. The means and procedures available to deter and detect birds are numerous and will typically be selected
on the basis of local conditions and expert advice. There is no standard solution neither at EU level nor internationally, but guidance
is available from the European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (‘ICAO’) as well as a
number of other organisations and companies engaged in this area.

3. A legal framework has been established in the EU by Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 ( [1] ) to ensure airport operators
apply the necessary means and procedures to reduce the bird strike hazard.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 of 12 February 2014 laying down requirements and administrative procedures related to aerodromes pursuant to
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 44, 14.2.2014.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 275

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003087/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Impatto del traffico di animali destinati alle adozioni

Il traffico di animali destinati alle adozioni è un fenomeno che sta assumendo dimensioni di assoluta rilevanza all'interno dell'Unione
europea. Se, infatti, da un lato tale fenomeno viene presentato come frutto della solidarietà e con ampie ricadute di utilità sociale,
dall'altra cela evidenti rischi di natura sanitaria, sociale, ed economica. I rischi di natura sanitaria sono legati principalmente alla
mancanza di controlli su questi animali, spesso trasportati da una parte all'altra dell'Europa, senza alcuna garanzia sanitaria
(obbligatoria invece per gli animali commerciati legalmente). Il mezzo principale per l'organizzazione di tale spostamento è quasi
sempre Internet e gli animali sono trasferiti con potenziali patologie virali, batteriche e parassitarie, spesso con rischio di diffusione
anche verso gli esseri umani. Addirittura in certi casi, ad esempio gli animali affetti da leishmaniosi, sono trasferiti proprio perché
malati, senza alcuna considerazione per l'evidente rischio di zoonosi. Le implicazioni di natura sociale sono legate alla proliferazione,
quanto meno sospetta, di ONLUS attorno a questo genere di attività. Associazioni prive di finalità di lucro, la cui presunta utilità
sociale consente loro di accedere a fonti di finanziamento di vario genere, compresi i fondi europei.

Un secondo problema sociale nasce dalla diffusione esponenziale di animali da compagnia non correttamente socializzati, animali
esposti a fortissimi rischi di problematiche comportamentali che finiscono per interessare più o meno direttamente le istituzioni
pubbliche e la società civile, con ricadute in termini di contenziosi legali, danni a cose e persone, necessità di assistenza sanitaria, ecc.
Inoltre le adozioni da altri Stati sostituiscono quelle dei cani disponibili in loco, lasciando questi ultimi a carico delle rispettive
collettività. Non va, tuttavia, sottovalutato nemmeno l'aspetto economico. Si tratta infatti di pratiche che scavalcano il normale
commercio di animali. In tal modo vengono meno le entrate erariali e si distorcono le corrette leggi del mercato, con grave
nocumento per il fisco, l'agricoltura (allevamento) e il commercio. Vi sono, infine, delle ricadute sul mercato nero (tali traffici sono
senza alcun controllo) delle cosiddette «donazioni» che si accompagnano alle adozioni, che sfuggono regolarmente a qualsiasi
controllo fiscale, e all'interesse economico nel mantenere cani in canile a carico delle istituzioni locali aumentando invece l'interesse
per le adozioni (sorretto da robuste campagne mediatiche di cui sarebbe interessante valutare la reale consistenza economica) di cani
provenienti da altre realtà straniere con il risultato che si lasciano in sede gli animali per i quali si ricevono i contributi.

Premesso ciò, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza di questa problematica;

2. quali provvedimenti intende proporre al fine di governare e controllare questo genere di traffico di animali.

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(2 maggio 2014)_

Nel quadro della strategia dell'Unione europea per la protezione e il benessere degli animali 2012-2015 ( [1] ) la Commissione europea
sta svolgendo uno studio sul benessere di cani e gatti oggetto di pratiche commerciali. Qualora i risultati di tale studio indichino che
queste pratiche commerciali comportano rischi per la salute, la Commissione prenderà in considerazione le opzioni più adeguate per
la protezione della salute umana e animale.

A questo riguardo la Commissione rimanda altresì alla sua risposta alla QE E-004938/2013 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 6 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

C 333 / 276 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003087/14**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Impact of the movement of animals for adoption

The movement of animals for adoption is reaching alarming proportions in the European Union. Although, on the one hand, it is
being portrayed as a healthy symptom of solidarity with many useful social benefits, on the other it entails obvious health, social and
economic risks. The health risks are mainly linked to the lack of checks on these animals, which are often transported from one part
of Europe to another without any health certificates (which are compulsory for legally traded animals). Transportation is almost
always organised on the Internet, and animals are being moved when they might be suffering from viruses, bacterial infections or
parasites, which could in many cases be passed on, including to humans. In some cases, for example, animals suffering from the
Mediterranean disease leishmaniasis are actually being moved because they are sick, without any consideration for the obvious risk
of spreading animal diseases among humans. The social implications are linked to the somewhat dubious proliferation of not-forprofit organisations in connection with these activities. These organisations are assumed to be conducting socially useful activities,
which gives them access to funding from various sources, including European funds.

Another social problem is emerging as a result of the exponential increase in the number of pets that are not properly socialised —
animals with a high risk of developing behavioural problems, which end up having a more or less direct impact on public authorities
and society at large because they cause legal disputes, damage to property, personal injuries, the need for healthcare, etc. Also, people
are adopting dogs from other Member States instead of from within their local area, which means that local organisations are being
left to take care of dogs seeking adoption. Nor should the economic connotations be under-estimated. We are talking about practices
that are supplanting normal trade in animals. This means that tax revenue is falling and the correct laws of the market are being
distorted, with seriously damaging effects for the tax authorities, livestock farming and trade. Lastly, there are black-market
implications (there are no checks on animals being moved in this way) in that the so-called ‘donations’ for adopted animals are often
not subject to any fiscal control, and there is a financial pay-off in keeping dogs in sanctuaries run by local institutions and
promoting adoptions of dogs from foreign countries instead (supported by vigorous media campaigns whose real economic value it
would be interesting to assess), with the result that the animals for which donations are received remain in the sanctuaries.

1. Is the Commission aware of this issue?

2. What provisions is it planning to recommend in order to govern and control animal movements of this kind?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2014)_

The European Commission is performing, within the framework of the EU strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 20122015 ( [1] ), a study on the welfare of dogs and cats involved in commercial practices. If the outcome of that study indicates health risks
arising from those commercial practices, the Commission will consider appropriate options for the protection of human and animal
health.

On this issue, the Commission also refers to its reply to Written Question E-004938/2013 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 6 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 277

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003088/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Barbara Matera (PPE)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Sterilizzazioni forzate per le donne in Perù

Le sterilizzazioni forzate, promosse dal governo peruviano di Fujimori alla fine degli anni Novanta, sono state studiate con l'obiettivo
di ridurre il tasso di natalità in diverse zone del paese, soprattutto nelle campagne dove le nascite erano elevate e questo
rappresentava un grave problema per i diritti delle donne peruviane.

Amnesty International ha promosso una petizione a livello mondiale su questo tema che riguarda diversi paesi del mondo, ed in
particolare il Perù, affinché non venga negato a tali donne l'accesso alla giustizia.

Gli interventi di sterilizzazione, promossi come «atti volontari», prevedevano la chiusura delle tube. Tra il 1999 e il 2000 sono state
sterilizzate circa 350 000 donne in Perù e molte di esse, spesso giovani e con molti figli, denunciarono di essere state costrette a
subire le operazioni.

Le donne hanno dato il loro consenso firmando apposite documentazioni pur non sapendo leggere, fidandosi degli emissari del
ministero della Salute e senza avere modo di accedere alle informazioni necessarie.

Le sterilizzazioni erano state studiate appositamente per un target ben definito, quello delle contadine analfabete, le quali venivano in
molti casi spinte ad accettare gli interventi in cambio di riso, zucchero e medicinali.

Spesso gli interventi chirurgici avvenivano in modo veloce e senza le misure adeguate in ambito di sicurezza sanitaria e questo ha
comportato per molte donne conseguenze invalidanti, oltre a casi di decessi dovuti a complicazioni post operatorie e alle precoci
dimissioni dai centri ospedalieri.

Molte donne non hanno avuto modo di accedere al sistema giudiziario per denunciare queste misure governative, per individuare i
responsabili di questa assurda strategia e per ottenere dei risarcimenti.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza di questi episodi che hanno colpito le donne peruviane e che colpiscono ogni anno molte donne anche in
altri paesi del mondo;

2. quali strumenti di sostegno può fornire alle donne che hanno subito tali pratiche, per fare in modo che abbiano un libero
accesso alla giustizia e maggiori garanzie affinché i loro diritti non vengano nuovamente calpestati?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(20 maggio 2014)_

L'AR/VP è a conoscenza dei casi di sterilizzazione in Perù. Attraverso i suoi servizi, in particolare la delegazione dell'UE in Perù, ha
seguito da vicino l'indagine della Commissione speciale del Congresso e quella svolta dal pubblico ministero. L'UE ha preso atto della
decisione del pubblico ministero di denunciare sei medici per violazioni dei diritti umani e sterilizzazioni forzate, ma di sospendere il
procedimento contro l'ex presidente, A. Fujimori, e alcuni ex ministri. L'UE è al corrente del fatto che diverse organizzazioni della
società civile, sia peruviane che internazionali, hanno fortemente criticato questa decisione. La delegazione dell'UE a Lima è in
contatto con queste organizzazioni e con il Mediatore peruviano ed è stata informata che le vittime delle sterilizzazioni stanno
pensando di domandare alla Commissione interamericana per i diritti umani di programmare una visita in Perù del relatore per i
diritti delle donne al fine di valutare il caso. L'UE si avvale di tutti gli strumenti a sua disposizione, soprattutto il dialogo bilaterale e la
cooperazione, per promuovere e rafforzare il rispetto dei diritti umani, specialmente dei gruppi più vulnerabili (donne, bambini e
popolazioni indigene). L'UE finanzia in particolare attività mirate a promuovere la parità uomo-donna in Perù e ha finanziato
progetti per agevolare l'accesso alla giustizia, soprattutto nelle regioni di Ayacucho e Amazonas.

C 333 / 278 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003088/14**

**to the Commission**
**Barbara Matera (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Forced sterilisation of women in Peru

Forced sterilisations, which were instigated by Alberto Fujimori’s Peruvian Government at the end of the nineties, were designed to
reduce the birth rate in various parts of the country, particularly in rural areas where birth rates were high. This campaign
represented a serious problem when it came to the rights of Peruvian women.

Amnesty International has launched a global petition on this subject, which affects various countries in the world, in particular Peru,
so that these women are not denied access to justice.

The sterilisations, which are publicised as being ‘voluntary acts’, involve blocking, cutting or sealing the fallopian tubes. Between
1999 and 2000, these operations were carried out on approximately 350 000 women in Peru. Many of these women, who were
often young and had several children, claim to have been forced to undergo the operation.

The women consented by signing the appropriate documentation, but as they could not read they relied upon the representatives
from the Ministry of Health and were unable to access the necessary information.

The sterilisations were designed specifically for a clearly defined target: illiterate women from rural communities. In many cases,
these women were encouraged to undergo the operation in exchange for rice, sugar and medicines.

The operations were often carried out hurriedly and without adequate sanitary protection measures in place. Many women have
been left with devastating injuries, and deaths have also occurred as a result of post-operative complications and following
premature discharge from hospital.

Many women have been unable to access the judicial system to report these governmental measures, to identify those responsible for
this preposterous strategy and to receive compensation.

In the light of the above:

1. Can the Commission indicate whether it is aware of these practices to which Peruvian women have been subjected and which
are also affecting many women in other countries of the world each year?

2. What instruments can it provide to support women who have endured these practices to allow them free access to justice and
to provide them with greater guarantees that their rights won’t be disregarded again?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 May 2014)_

The HR/VP is aware of the case of sterilisations in Peru, having followed closely through her services, notably the EU Delegation in
Peru, the investigation of the Congressional Special Commission, as well as the investigation carried by the Public Prosecutor. The EU
took note of the decision of the Public Prosecutor to denounce six doctors for human rights violations and forced sterilisations but to
suspend the case against the former President A. Fujimori and some of the former ministers. The EU is conscious of the fact that
several Peruvian and international civil society organisations have strongly criticised this decision. The EU Delegation in Lima is in
contact with these organisations and the Peruvian Ombudsman and has been informed that the victims of the sterilisations consider
requesting the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to program a visit of the Women rights' Rapporteur to Peru to assess
the case.

The EU is making use of the instruments at its disposal, notably the bilateral dialogue and cooperation, to promote and enhance the
respect of the human rights, especially of the most vulnerable groups (women, children and indigenous people). The EU is notably
financing activities aiming to promote sexual rights in Peru and has also financed projects in the field of access to justice, notably in
the regions of Ayacucho and Amazonas.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 279

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003090/14**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(17 marzo 2014)_

_Oggetto:_ Uteri artificiali e obbrobri della scienza

La genetista britannica Aarathi Prasad scrive nel suo saggio «Storia naturale del concepimento. Come la scienza può cambiare le
regole del sesso» che con la scienza sarà possibile fare figli senza ricorrere al sesso e senza dovere portare avanti la gestazione, grazie
all'utilizzo di un «utero artificiale esterno». Un'ipotesi che fa rabbrividire al solo pensiero, portata avanti con furore ideologico dalla
scienziata sostenitrice dei «parti verginali», secondo cui «i ruoli sessuati assegnati in base al genere sono stati usati per opprimere le
donne e giustificare i pregiudizi contro gli omosessuali.» La ricercatrice Hung-ching Liu della Cornell University di New York sta già
lavorando alla costruzione di un utero artificiale esterno e alla creazione di ovuli e spermatozoi artificiali. Ma che umanità può avere
la persona, se è frutto di una creazione artificiale e non dell'amore di due genitori? Comprendiamo gli aiuti della scienza alle coppie
che non possono avere figli, ma qui si sta andando molto oltre: si sta prefigurando un mondo in cui a dare la vita non sarà più la
natura ma le macchine, in cui la nascita di bambini e bambine sarà determinata in laboratorio con un'eugenetica non lontana dal
programma nazista Aktion 4.

Può la Commissione precisare quanto segue:

1. è al corrente di questa situazione?

2. Sa dirci se questo tipo di ricerche è regolamentato all'interno degli Stati membri?

3. Può garantire che non offrirà alcun tipo di finanziamento a ricerche scientifiche di questo tipo?

4. Non ritiene di dovere valutare, vista la crescente importanza della DG JRC e della Commissione stessa in questo settore,
l'apertura di un centro di studi bioetici che approfondisca e apra un dibattito su tali temi, per evitare che tali mostruose ipotesi
fantascientifiche non si realizzino in UE?

**Risposta di Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione**

_(22 maggio 2014)_

1. e 3. La Commissione è a conoscenza della situazione alla quale fa riferimento l'onorevole deputata. Il programma Orizzonte 2020
di ricerca e innovazione (2014-2020) non finanzia nessuna ricerca in questo settore.

2. La Commissione non dispone di informazioni sull'eventuale regolamentazione di questo tipo di ricerche all'interno degli Stati
membri. L'articolo 19 del regolamento che istituisce Orizzonte 2020 ( [1] ) stipula che «tutte le attività di ricerca e innovazione condotte
nell'ambito di Orizzonte 2020 rispettano i principi etici e la pertinente normativa nazionale, dell'Unione e internazionale, ivi
compresa la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea e la Convenzione europea sui diritti dell'uomo e i suoi protocolli
addizionali».

Ai sensi dell'articolo 13 del regolamento sulle norme di partecipazione e diffusione ( [2] ), «le proposte che vanno contro i principi etici
fondamentali o la normativa vigente in materia o che non sono conformi alle condizioni stabilite nella decisione n. 2013/743/UE ( [3] ),
nel programma di lavoro, nel piano di lavoro o nell'invito a presentare proposte possono essere escluse in ogni momento dalle
procedure di valutazione, selezione e aggiudicazione». Al riguardo, la Commissione sottopone sistematicamente tutte le proposte a
un esame rigoroso che naturalmente tiene anche conto delle questioni etiche.

4. In seno alla Commissione, il Gruppo europeo per l'etica delle scienze e delle nuove tecnologie fornisce pareri indipendenti sugli
aspetti etici della scienza e della tecnologia, in modo da dare fondamento al sostegno programmatico che l'istituzione eroga alle
attività scientifiche.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1291/2013 (GU L 347 del 20.12.2013).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1290/2013 (GU L 347 del 20.12.2013).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Decisione del Consiglio (GU L 347 del 20.12.2013).

C 333 / 280 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003090/14**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Artificial uteruses and abominations of science

British geneticist Aarathi Prasad writes in her essay ‘Like a Virgin: How Science is Redesigning the Rules of Sex’ that science will make
it possible to have children without having sex and without having to sustain a pregnancy, thanks to the use of an ‘external artificial
uterus’. The mere idea sends chills down one’s spine, and is being expounded with ideological furore by the scientist behind the
‘virgin births’, according to whom ‘the sexual roles assigned on the basis of gender have been used to oppress women and to justify
prejudice against homosexuals.’ Researcher Hung-ching Liu from Cornell University in New York is already working on the
construction of an external artificial uterus and the creation of artificial egg and sperm cells. But what humanity could a person have
who is the product of an artificial creation and not of the love of two parents? We understand the help that science can offer to
couples who are unable to have children, but this goes far beyond that: anticipating a world in which it is not nature that produces
life but machines, where the birth of children will be brought about in the laboratory using eugenics that are not too far removed
from Action T4, Nazi Germany’s euthanasia programme.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Is it aware of this situation?

2. Can it tell us whether this type of research is regulated within Member States?

3. Can it guarantee that it will not offer any funding whatsoever to scientific research of this kind?

4. Does it not think, given the growing importance of the Directorate-General Joint Research Centre and of the Commission itself
in this field, that it should consider opening a bioethical studies centre to investigate and open up a debate on these issues, in
order to prevent these abhorrent science fiction theories from becoming a reality in the EU?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

1 and 3. The Commission is aware of the situation referred to by the Honourable Member. In this respect, Horizon 2020, the EU
funding Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) does not fund any research in this area.

2. The Commission doesn't have information whether this type of research is regulated within Member States. The relevant
legislation, Article 19 of the regulation establishing Horizon 2020 ( [1] ) stipulates that ‘all the research and innovation activities carried
out under it shall comply with ethical principles and relevant national, Union and international legislation, including the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights and its Supplementary Protocols.’

As Article 13 of the regulation on rules for participation and dissemination ( [2] ) specifies, ‘a proposal which contravenes any
applicable legislation, or which does not fulfil the conditions set out in Decision No 2013/743/EU ( [3] ), in the work programme, in the
work plan or in the call for proposals may be excluded from the evaluation, selection and award procedures at any time’. In this
context, the Commission systematically carries out a thorough review of all proposals, where ethical issues are of course taken into

account.

4. Within the Commission, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies provides independent advice on
ethical aspects of science and technology, underpinning policy support for scientific activities of the Institution.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 — OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1290/2013‐ OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Council Decision — OJ L 347, 20.12.2013.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 281

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003091/14**

**aan de Commissie**
**Patricia van der Kammen (NI)**

_(17 maart 2014)_

_Betreft:_ Tariefcontingenten voor knoflook

In 2010 heeft de Europese Commissie de toewijzingssystematiek voor Chinese knoflookquota gewijzigd. Waar voorheen een
historisch referentievolume gold, diende vanaf dat moment een gemiddeld productievolume over drie jaar als basis voor de nieuwe
aanvraag. Op basis van cijferlogica zou deze systematiekwijziging geen grote schommelingen in de toewijzingsvolumes van
individuele importeurs met zich mee moeten brengen. Vreemd genoeg is daarvan echter wel sprake.

Onderzoeksbureau Olaf heeft bij de handel in knoflook voor miljoenen aan fraude in de steekproefonderzoeken aangetroffen.

De Commissie meldt op een informatieverzoek van de bibliotheek van het Parlement dat zij geen informatie wil verstrekken over de
nationale aanvraag‐ en toewijzingsvolumes, omdat het om vertrouwelijke bedrijfsgegevens zou gaan.

1. Is de Commissie met de PVV van mening dat het argument van de Commissie om volume-informatie op het aggregatieniveau
van de lidstaat niet te willen verschaffen vanwege bedrijfsvertrouwelijkheid, per definitie alleen geldig is als er sprake is van slechts
één aanbieder? In haar beantwoording aan de bibliotheek heeft de Commissie gesproken over „een gering aantal aanbieders”. Is de
Commissie met mij van mening dat haar argument dus mank gaat?

2. Kan de Commissie dus de volgende informatie aan mij verstrekken, zonder te verwijzen naar deze niet-valide reden voor het
niet verstrekken van de informatie: een overzicht van de jaarlijkse quotumaanvragen en ‐toewijzingen PER LIDSTAAT van Chinese
knoflook, te starten vanaf 2003? Meer specifiek:

—
hoeveelheidsaanvraag voor A-licenties per lidstaat per jaar, in ton volume, uitgesplitst naar traditionele en nieuwe importeurs;

—
hoeveelheidsaanvraag voor B-licenties per lidstaat per jaar, in ton volume, uitgesplitst naar traditionele en nieuwe importeurs;

—
hoeveelheid toegekend voor A-licenties per lidstaat, in ton volume, uitgesplitst naar traditionele en nieuwe importeurs;

—
hoeveelheid toegekend voor B-licenties per lidstaat, in ton volume, uitgesplitst naar traditionele en nieuwe importeurs.

**Antwoord van de heer Cioloș namens de Commissie**

_(22 mei 2014)_

1. De Commissie gaat niet akkoord dat het beschermen van de commerciële belangen van een natuurlijke of rechtspersoon
overeenkomstig artikel 4, lid 2 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1049/2001 ( [1] ) enkel een geldig argument is als er maar één aanbieder actief
is. Ook wanneer er een gering aantal aanbieders actief is, kunnen de voorgenoemde belangen worden geschaad aangezien het
mogelijk is om van gegevens op aggregatieniveau de afzonderlijke toewijzingen af te leiden.

2. Omwille van dezelfde reden die in het eerste antwoord werd uiteengezet, kan de Commissie geen overzicht geven van de
jaarlijkse quotumaanvragen en ‐toewijzingen voor Chinese knoflook per lidstaat en vanaf 2003.

„B-licenties” worden aan alle importeurs toegekend zonder enige toewijzingscoëfficiënt en zonder onderscheid tussen „traditionele”
en andere importeurs ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Verordening (EG) nr. 1049/2001 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 30 mei 2001 inzake de toegang van het publiek tot documenten van het Europees

Parlement, de Raad en de Commissie, PB L 145 van 31.5.2001.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Hoofdstuk III van Verordening (EG) nr. 341/2007 van de Commissie van 29 maart 2007 houdende opening en vaststelling van de wijze van beheer van

tariefcontingenten en instelling van een stelsel van invoercertificaten en certificaten van oorsprong voor uit derde landen ingevoerde knoflook en bepaalde andere
landbouwproducten, PB L 90 van 30.3.2007.

( **|**

C 333 / 282 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003091/14**

**to the Commission**
**Patricia van der Kammen (NI)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Tariff quotas for garlic

In 2010 the Commission amended the quota allocation system for Chinese garlic. Whereas in the past a historical reference volume
had applied, from that date an average production volume over three years served as the basis for new applications. From a
mathematical point of view this change of system should not have led to any major fluctuations in the volumes allocated to
individual importers. Strangely, though, it seems to have done so.

In spot checks, the EU’s investigation agency OLAF has detected fraud to the tune of millions of euro in the garlic trade.

In response to an information request from Parliament’s library, the Commission said that it was not prepared to supply any
information on national application and allocation volumes, because these were confidential commercial data.

1. Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom that its argument, based on commercial confidentiality, for not
wishing to provide information on volume at Member State aggregation level, by definition only holds water if there is only one
supplier? In its reply to Parliament’s library, the Commission referred to a ‘small number of suppliers’. Does the Commission agree
that its argument falls down on this point?

2. Can the Commission therefore please provide me with the following information, without pleading this invalid reason for not
providing it: a summary of the annual quotas for Chinese garlic applied for and allocated PER MEMBER STATE, starting in 2003.
Specifically:

—
quantity applied for under ‘A’ licences per Member State per year, by volume (intonnes), broken down by traditional and new
importers;

—
quantity applied for under ‘B’ licences per Member State per year, by volume (intonnes), broken down by traditional and new
importers;

—
quantity allocated under ‘A’ licences per Member State per year, by volume (intonnes), broken down by traditional and new
importers;

—
quantity licences allocated under ‘B’ licences per Member State per year, by volume(in tonnes), broken down by traditional and
new importers?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2014)_

1. The Commission does not agree that the protection of the commercial interests of natural or legal persons as set out in
Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 ( [1] ) ‘holds water’ only in circumstances involving a single supplier. When the number
of suppliers is small, the said interests could be harmed inasmuch as aggregate figures may permit to infer individual allocations.

2. For the reason set out under the first reply, the Commission is not in a position to provide a summary of the annual quotas for
Chinese garlic applied for and allocated per Member State, starting in 2003.

‘B’ licences are issued to all importers without any allocation coefficient and without any distinction between ‘traditional’ and other
importers ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and

Commission documents, OJL 145, 31.5.2001.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Chapter III of Commission Regulation (EC) No 341/2007 of 29 March 2007 opening and providing for the administration of tariff quotas and introducing a system

of import licences and certificates of origin for garlic and certain other agricultural products imported from third countries. OJ L 90. 30.3.2007.

( **|**

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 283

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003092/14**

**aan de Commissie**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(17 maart 2014)_

_Betreft:_ Teff

Teff is een glutenvrije graansoort met een hoge voedingswaarde, die oorspronkelijk afkomstig is uit Ethiopië. In 2004 sloot een
Nederlands bedrijf een zogenaamde regeling voor de toegang en batenverdeling (ABS-overeenkomst) voor dit graan met Ethiopië.
Een studie van het Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) geeft een uitvoerige analyse van de implementatie van deze overeenkomst, die voor
Ethiopië op een grote teleurstelling is uitgelopen, omdat de Nederlandse partner in 2009 failliet ging en er derhalve van een
winstdeling, die nog nauwelijks op gang was gekomen, geen sprake meer is.

Gelijktijdig met de formalisering van de ABS-overeenkomst vroeg het bedrijf een octrooi aan bij het Europese Octrooibureau (EPO)
voor de verwerking en het commercialiseren van teffmeel en andere vormen van eerste verwerking van teffgraan. Dit octrooi, waarin
geen relatie met de ABS-overeenkomst is opgenomen, is in 2007 goedgekeurd door het EPO onder referentie EP1646287. De
eigendom ervan is vóór het faillissement overgegaan op twee aandeelhouders van het bedrijf en is blijven voortbestaan. Dit tot
ergernis van Ethiopië, dat nu geen andere ABS-overeenkomsten meer kan aangaan met bedrijven uit de landen waar het octrooi
geldt. Door de onduidelijke situatie omtrent dit octrooi, wordt het graan en het meel weinig verwerkt in de Europese Unie. De FNIstudie zet vraagtekens bij de reikwijdte van het octrooi zelf.

Inmiddels is op bescheiden schaal de teffproductie in de EU op gang gekomen. Deze productie en de verwerking ervan worden in
de EU sterk belemmerd door de onduidelijke situatie omtrent dit octrooi, dat naar de letter iedere verwerking van teff binnen de EU
monopoliseert. Ook in de FNI-studie worden vraagtekens gezet bij deze vrijwel onbeperkte reikwijdte van het octrooi.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van dit controversiële octrooi?

2. Deelt de Commissie de conclusie van het FNI-rapport dat de uitvoering van de ABS-overeenkomst mislukt is en dat de
reikwijdte van het octrooi onnodig breed is?

3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat het teffgraan een veelbelovend gewas aan het worden is voor de EU, zowel voor de Europese
landbouw als voor consumenten?

4. Is de Commissie bereid zich in te zetten om een normaal gebruik van dit graan in de EU mogelijk te maken, dat in
overeenstemming is met het Europese mededingingsrecht?

**Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie**

_(16 mei 2014)_

1. De Commissie is op de hoogte van octrooi EP1646287, dat van kracht is ondanks aanvankelijke tegenstand en een
beroepsprocedure die later werd stopgezet

2. De Commissie was niet op de hoogte van het FNI-verslag. Het ABS-akkoord waarnaar wordt verwezen, is een privaatrechtelijke
overeenkomst waarvoor de Commissie niet bevoegd is en waarover zij dus geen uitspraken kan doen. Hetzelfde geldt voor de
conclusies van het FNI-verslag over de tenuitvoerlegging van het ABS-akkoord.

Over het algemeen kan de Commissie zich niet uitspreken over de reikwijdte van octrooien, ook niet als die zijn uitgereikt door het
Europees Octrooibureau (EPO). Dat is immers een orgaan van een internationale organisatie, dat is gebonden aan een specifieke reeks
procedures en regels is gebonden die in het Europees Octrooiverdrag zijn opgenomen. De Commissie benadrukt dat volgens die
regels de periode reeds is verstreken waarin de geldigheid van het octrooi via de gecentraliseerde procedure van het EPO kon worden
aangevochten. Het staat partijen echter nog steeds vrij om het octrooi via de nationale rechtbanken aan te vechten.

3. De gemeenschappelijke marktordening voor landbouwproducten bevat geen maatregelen om de productie van bepaalde
graangewassen te stimuleren ter vervanging van andere. Overeenkomstig de recente marktgerichte hervormingen van het GLB
kunnen boeren hun productiekeuzes vrij afstemmen op veranderingen in de marktvraag.

4. Op basis van de informatie die in de vraag wordt verstrekt, ziet de Commissie geen verband met de mededingingsregels van
de EU. Om deze regelgeving te kunnen toepassen moet er eerst concurrentieverstorend gedrag worden vastgesteld in de vorm van
overeenkomsten, besluiten of praktijken, of misbruik van een machtspositie. In de verstrekte informatie is er geen sprake van
dergelijke elementen.

C 333 / 284 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003092/14**

**to the Commission**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Teff

Teff is a highly nutritious, gluten-free cereal originating in Ethiopia. In 2004, a Dutch business concluded an access and benefit
sharing agreement (ABS agreement) for this cereal with Ethiopia. A study by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) gives a detailed
analysis of the implementation of this agreement, which has proved to be a serious disappointment for Ethiopia because the Dutch
partner went bankrupt in 2009 and the profit-sharing, which had as yet hardly got under way, therefore ceased.

At the same time as the ABS agreement was formally concluded, the business applied to the European Patent Office (EPO) for a
patent on the processing and marketing of teff flour. In 2007, the EPO approved this patent (reference no EP1646287), which does
not make any reference to the ABS agreement. Before the bankruptcy occurred, ownership of the patent was transferred to two
shareholders in the business, and it remained in force. This has been an annoying state of affairs for Ethiopia, which can no longer
conclude ABS agreements with businesses from the countries where the patent applies. Because of the confused situation relating to
the patent, neither the cereal nor the flour is processed much in the European Union. The FNI study questions the scope of the patent
itself.

Teff production has now begun on a modest scale in the EU. Teff production and processing are seriously hampered in the EU by the
confused situation relating to the patent, which, taken at face value, monopolises all processing of teff in the EU. The FNI study also
expresses doubts about this virtually unlimited scope of the patent.

1. Is the Commission aware of this controversial patent?

2. Does the Commission agree with the conclusion in the FNI report that the implementation of the ABS agreement has failed and
that the scope of the patent is unnecessarily broad?

3. Does the Commission agree that teff is becoming a very promising crop for the EU ‐– both for European farmers and for
consumers?

4. Will the Commission seek ways of enabling this cereal to be put to normal use in the EU, in a way which accords with
European competition law?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2014)_

1. The Commission is aware of patent EP1646287 which is in force, despite earlier opposition and appeal which were later
withdrawn.

2. The Commission has not been aware of the FNI report. The referred ABS agreement is a private law contract on which the
Commission has no competence to comment. The same goes for the conclusions of the FNI report as to what regards the
implementation of the ABS agreement.

Generally speaking, the Commission is also not in a position to comment on the scope of patents, including those granted by the
European Patent Office (EPO) which is a body of an international organisation governed by a specific set of procedures and rules
incorporated in the European Patent Convention. The Commission notes that under those rules, the period for challenging the
validity of the patent in question through the EPO's central procedure has passed. Parties remain however free to launch challenges
before national courts.

3. The common organisation of markets in agricultural products does not foresee any measures promoting the production of
certain cereals in replacement of others. In line with the increased market orientation achieved through recent reforms of the CAP,
farmers are free to respond to market demand through their production choices.

4. Based on the information available in the question the Commission does not see the relevance of EU competition rules. The
application of EU competition rules would require the identification of an anticompetitive behavior in the form of agreements,
decisions or practices or an abuse of a dominant position. Presence of such elements does not follow from the information provided.

24.9.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 333 / 285

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003093/14**

**do Komisji**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

_(17 marca 2014 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Napływający do UE uchodźcy z Czeczenii

Mimo zakończonej wojny w Czeczenii ludzie uciekają ze swojej ojczyzny w poszukiwaniu bezpieczeństwa, pracy i godnego życia.
W pierwszej połowie 2013 r. wniosek o status uchodźcy złożyło 10 407 osób. Dla porównania w 2012 r. takich wniosków złożono
10 753.

Ludzie ubiegający się o status uchodźcy wjeżdżają do Polski, aby zaraz pojechać dalej: najczęściej do Niemiec, Francji czy krajów
Beneluksu.

Zgodnie z prawem unijnym osoba o statusie uchodźcy może poruszać się i przebywać w strefie Schengen przez 90 dni bez prawa do
pracy. Człowiek, który dopiero ubiega się o taki status, nie ma prawa przekraczania granic.

Do momentu rozpatrzenia wniosku cudzoziemiec może zamieszkać w ośrodku albo samemu wynająć mieszkanie. W ośrodku ma
zapewnione wyżywienie, zgodne z jego kulturą i religią, naukę polskiego, a dzieci – szkołę. Pomoc obejmuje również lekarza.
W samej Czeczenii organizowanie takich wyjazdów do Europy stanowi poważny biznes. Pośrednicy zarabiają na niewiedzy swoich
klientów.

Z monitoringu sytuacji w Czeczenii nie wynika, aby ostatnio sytuacja jej mieszkańców się pogorszyła, mimo to w ciągu ostatnich 20
lat ten kraj opuściło 20 proc. ludności.

Obywatele Czeczenii żyją w pewnym zawieszeniu, mimo zakończonej wojny nie chcą osiedlać się i odbudowywać swojej ojczyzny.

W związku z powyższym zwracam się do Komisji z następującymi pytaniami:

1. Czy Komisja ma plan wspierania Czeczenów?

2. Czy Komisja rozważa wsparcie państw członkowskich UE, do których przyjeżdżają obywatele Czeczenii?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Cecilię Malmström w imieniu Komisji**

_(21 maja 2014 r.)_

Z informacji Eurostatu wynika, że liczba wniosków o udzielenie azylu w UE składanych przez obywateli Federacji Rosyjskiej nadal
malała w czwartym kwartale 2013 r. Liczba ta znacznie spadła w szczególności w Niemczech i Polsce, tj. w krajach najbardziej
dotkniętych napływem tych wnioskodawców (odpowiednio o –55 % i –71 %).

Komisja nie zapewnia osobom ubiegającym się o azyl i uchodźcom bezpośredniej pomocy. Niesie ona pomoc w celu wspierania
i poprawy działań podejmowanych przez państwa członkowskie w celu pełnego i właściwego wdrożenia unijnego dorobku
prawnego w dziedzinie azylu, w szczególności zapewnienia odpowiednich warunków przyjmowania wysiedleńców i osób
ubiegających się o ochronę międzynarodową oraz jej beneficjentów (niezależnie od kraju pochodzenia).

W tym względzie zwraca się uwagę Szanownego Pana Posła na możliwości finansowania w ramach AMIF-u ( [1] ) (Fundusz Azylu,
Migracji i Integracji), który ma wkrótce wejść w życie.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Tekst nie został jeszcze opublikowany w Dzienniku Urzędowym.

C 333 / 286 EN Official Journal of the European Union 24.9.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003093/14**

**to the Commission**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

_(17 March 2014)_

_Subject:_ Chechen refugees in the EU

Although the war is over in Chechnya, people are still leaving the country in search of work and a safer, better life. In the first half of
2013, 10 407 people applied for refugee status, as against a figure of 10 753 for 2012 as a whole.

People come to Poland to apply for refugee status with a view to moving immediately on to other Member States (principally
Germany, France and the Benelux countries).

Under EC law, anyone who has refugee status may travel and stay within the Schengen area for 90 days, without being entitled to
work there. However, until such time as that status is granted, applicants may not leave the country they are in.

People applying for refugee status may stay in a centre or in rented accommodation while their applications are being considered. In
such centres, they are provided with food (with due regard for their cultural and religious practices), Polish lessons and schooling for
their children. They are also given medical care. In Chechnya, organising travel to the EU for such persons has become a real
business, with traffickers taking advantage of the fact that their ‘clients’ do not know the rules to make big money.

People still want to leave Chechnya despite the fact that the general situation in the country has not deteriorated in recent times. Over
the past 20 years, 20% of the Chechen population has left the country.

Although the war has ended, Chechens are living in a permanent state of uncertainty, and many are unwilling to stay in the country
to help rebuild it.

1. In view of this situation, does the Commission intend to provide the Chechens with assistance?

2. Is it looking into whether support should be provided for the Member States that are having to deal with the problem of people
coming in from Chechnya?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2014)_

Based on Eurostat information, asylum applications in the EU from nationals of the Russian Federation continued to decrease in the
fourth quarter of 2013. The numbers dropped significantly especially in Germany and Poland, the countries most affected by this
flow (with ‐55% and ‐71% respectively).

The Commission does not provide direct assistance to asylum-seekers or refugees. It provides assistance in order to support and
improve the efforts made by the Member States to fully and properly implement the Union asylum acquis, in particular to grant
appropriate reception conditions to displaced persons and applicants for, and beneficiaries of international protection
(notwithstanding their country of origin).

In this respect, the attention of the Honourable Member is drawn to the funding possibilities under the AMIF ( [1] ) (Asylum, Migration
and Integration Fund) which is soon to enter into force.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Publication in the Official Journal pending.

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)
ISSN 1725-2423 (paper edition)

# Publications Office of the European Union EN

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