Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| 31.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 153/83 |

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Wednesday 16 November 2011  
Climate change conference in Durban

P7\_TA(2011)0504

European Parliament resolution of 16 November 2011 on the climate change conference in Durban (COP 17)

2013/C 153 E/10

The European Parliament,

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| — | having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, |

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| — | having regard to the results of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali in 2007 and to the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/COP 13), |

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| — | having regard to the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC and the fifth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP5) held in Copenhagen, Denmark, from 7 to 18 December 2009, and to the Copenhagen Accord, |

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| — | having regard to the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the UNFCCC and the sixth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP6), held in Cancún, Mexico, from 29 November to 10 December 2010, and to the Cancún Agreements, |

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| — | having regard to the forthcoming 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC and the seventh Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP7), to be held in Durban, South Africa, from 28 November to 9 December 2011, |

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| — | having regard to the EU climate and energy package of December 2008, |

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| — | having regard to Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community[(1)](#ntr1-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0001), |

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| — | having regard to its resolutions of 25 November 2009 on the EU strategy for the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change[(2)](#ntr2-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0002), of 10 February 2010 on the outcome of the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change (COP 15)[(3)](#ntr3-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0003) and of 25 November 2010 on the Climate Change Conference in Cancun[(4)](#ntr4-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0004), |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 4 February 2009 on ‘2050: The future begins today – Recommendations for the EU's future integrated policy on climate change’[(5)](#ntr5-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0005), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission White Paper on ‘adapting to climate change: towards a European Framework for action’ (COM(2009)0147) and to its resolution of 6 May 2010[(6)](#ntr6-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0006) thereon, and to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation of 9 May 2011[(7)](#ntr7-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0007), |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 May 2011 on the Commission Green Paper on forest protection and information in the EU: preparing forests for climate change[(8)](#ntr8-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0008), |

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| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 14 March 2011 on the follow-up to the Cancún Conference and to the ECOFIN Conclusions of 17 May 2011 on Climate Change, |

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| — | having regard to the decisions taken at the Tenth Conference of the Parties (COP 10) of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in particular the COP 10 (2010) Decision on Geoengineering, |

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| — | having regard to the joint statement of 20 December 2005 by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, and in particular points 22, 38, 75, 76 and 105 thereof[(9)](#ntr9-CE2013153EN.01008301-E0009), |

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| — | having regard to the Report of the House of Commons' Environmental Audit Committee, entitled ‘The impact of UK overseas aid on environmental protection and climate change adaptation and mitigation’, which was published on 29 June 2011, |

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| — | having regard to the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000, which set out the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as objectives established jointly by the international community for the elimination of poverty, |

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| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 25 June 2009 on integrating environment in development cooperation, |

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| — | having regard to the Nairobi Declaration of 25-29 May 2009 on the African Process for Combating Climate Change, |

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| — | having regard to the question of 27 September 2011 to the Council on the climate change conference in Durban (COP 17) (O-000216/2011 - B7-0639/2011) and to the question of 27 September 2011 to the Commission on the climate change conference in Durban (COP 17) (O-000217/2011 - B7-0640/2011), |

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| — | having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |

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| A. | whereas scientific evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the existence of climate change and its impacts, thus rendering international action imperative to meet one of the major challenges of the 21st century and beyond; |

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| B. | whereas a legally binding international agreement consistent with the principle of a ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ must remain the overall goal, thus recognising the leading role to be played by developed countries and the appropriate contribution to be made by developing countries; |

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| C. | whereas the existing commitments and pledges made under the Copenhagen Accord and formalised within the Cancún Agreements are insufficient to meet the objective of limiting the overall global annual mean surface temperature increase to 2 °C (‘the 2 °C objective’); |

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| D. | whereas the Commission roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050 and setting long-term targets reconfirms the EU’s objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 % by 2050 in order to keep climate change below 2 °C, whilst concluding that 80 % of the reduction by 2050 has to be achieved internally within the EU; |

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| E. | whereas it is important to build on the trust and transparency restored during the COP 16 Conference in Cancún, in order to maintain the political momentum required to pave the way for a comprehensive international agreement with concrete goals and corresponding policy measures; |

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| F. | whereas the Cancún Agreements urge developed countries to increase the ambition of their emission reduction targets, with a view to reducing their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent with the IPCC’s AR4 25-40 % range for 2020 as compared to 1990 levels; |

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| G. | whereas collective greenhouse gas emission reductions in the developed countries at the high end of the IPCC’s AR4 25-40 % range for 2020 as compared to 1990 levels are necessary for the 2 °C objective to be achieved with only a 50 % degree of probability; |

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| H. | whereas radical changes in the geo-political world over the past decades, with some developing countries now being major economic and political players, need to be taken into account, leading to a new balance of power and influence, entailing new roles and new responsibilities; |

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| I. | whereas European countries face critical choices to preserve their future prosperity and security, and whereas moving to a domestic greenhouse gas emissions reduction target which is in line with the EU’s climate objectives can be combined with a healthier economy, and an increase in green jobs and innovation; |

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| J. | whereas according to some estimates women represent 70 % of the poor worldwide, work two-thirds of the working hours but own less than 1 % of property, and are therefore less able to adapt, and more vulnerable, to climate change; |

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| K. | whereas Article 7 of the Cancun Agreements stresses that ‘gender equality and the effective participation of women and indigenous peoples are important for effective action on all aspects of climate change’; |

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| L. | whereas substantial differences in scope, structure and design exist between Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) reporting under the UNFCCC Convention and LULUCF accounting under the Kyoto Protocol, undermining Parties’ climate change mitigation efforts; |

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| M. | whereas accounting for ‘forest management’ activity, which is responsible for the majority of LULUCF sector emissions, is voluntary under the Kyoto Protocol; |

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| N. | whereas the 2010 World Development Report estimates that the overall incremental cost of mitigation and adaptation in poor countries will be between USD 170 billion and USD 275 billion per year by 2030; |

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| O. | whereas any climate-change agreement should take into account existing development processes both at international level (namely the MDGs and the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness) and at national level (National Adaptation Programmes of Action); |

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| P. | whereas EU aid should help developing countries to phase out high-carbon development and build up low-carbon infrastructure, and whereas EU aid should also support local economic development, green jobs and poverty reduction and must not be tied to the involvement of or used to subsidise EU businesses; |

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| Q. | whereas the current scale of the World Bank’s lending to support fossil fuel-powered energy generation must be in line with the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions; |

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| R. | whereas parliamentarians, especially from developing countries, can and should play a crucial role in this agenda, ensuring government accountability and effectiveness as well as providing a vital knowledge link with constituents, both aspects being important in ensuring a country’s resilience to climate change; |

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| S. | whereas the existing financial mechanisms are complex and fragmented; whereas the commitment to provide 0,7 % of GNP for ODA in order to achieve the MDGs has not been honoured by most donor countries; and whereas the financial mechanisms of the UNFCC depend on replenishments through voluntary contributions from donors; |

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| T. | whereas improvements in forest governance are a fundamental prerequisite for lasting reductions in deforestation; whereas climate negotiations need to reflect previous efforts to address problems of deforestation and forest degradation, such as the EU FLEGT Action Plan designed to curtail illegal logging by addressing forest governance; |

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| U. | whereas a common system to monitor the whole range of instruments available for adaptation funding should be set up in order to ensure an accountable and transparent funding system; |

Key Objectives

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| 1. | Urges the Parties to ensure the conclusion of a comprehensive, international, fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement post-2012, building on the international rules-based system of the Kyoto Protocol in line with the 2 °C objective and the peaking of global and national greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible; |

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| 2. | Calls on Heads of State and Government worldwide to demonstrate real political leadership and will during the negotiations and to give this issue the highest priority; |

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| 3. | Urges the EU publicly and unequivocally to confirm its strong commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and to take all necessary steps to avoid any gap between Kyoto Protocol commitment periods; calls, therefore, on the EU to declare openly prior to Durban that it is ready to continue with the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and, further, to define concrete steps to bridge ‘the gigatonne gap’, i.e. the difference between the current ambition levels and those required to keep global warming below 2 °C; calls on the EU to ensure that the gap is identified and quantified in Durban and to press for measures to close the gap; |

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| 4. | Recognises, however, that comparable progress under the Convention track is required to secure any post-2012 international, fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement that would meet the 2 °C objective; highlights, in that connection, the importance of (subglobal) alliances with the most progressive states as a means of lending further impetus to the negotiation process; calls for the COP to agree on a time-bound mandate to secure a legally binding agreement under the Convention to be implemented as soon as possible, and at the latest by 2015; recalls, in that connection, that the industrialised countries need to reduce their emissions by 25-40 % below 1990 levels by 2020, while the developing countries as a group should achieve a substantial deviation below the currently predicted emissions growth rate, of the order of 15-30 %, by 2020; |

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| 5. | Urges all international partners to close the gigatonne gap which exists between the scientific findings and the current Parties’ pledges, to come up with commitments and actions for emissions reductions which are more ambitious than those contained in the Copenhagen Accord, based on the principle of a ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, and to address emissions from international aviation and maritime transport and HFCs in order to ensure consistency with the 2 °C objective; notes that the detailed communication to Parties of where current pledges take us, and what more needs to be done, is an important step towards raising awareness among Parties and securing higher pledges; |

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| 6. | Emphasises the importance of progress at the Durban Conference in further implementing the Cancún Agreements, in establishing the peak date for global emissions and a global emissions reduction goal for 2050, defining a clear pathway towards 2050, including intermediate global emissions reduction goals, and agreeing on policy instruments to ensure that the objectives set are met, and in addressing the overall question of the future form of the commitments of both developed and developing countries; reiterates that, according to the scientific evidence presented by the IPCC, the 2 °C objective requires that global greenhouse gas emissions peak by 2015 at the latest and be reduced by at least 50 % as compared with 1990 by 2050 and continue to decline thereafter; |

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| 7. | Calls for the Durban Conference to define a process for addressing the adequacy of emission reduction pledges based on the peak year and the 2050 reduction goal as well as the 2 °C objective; |

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| 8. | Welcomes the roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon economy in 2050, setting long-term targets reconfirming the EU’s objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 % by 2050 in order to keep climate change below 2 °C; notes the conclusion that 80 % of the reduction by 2050 has to be achieved internally within the EU and that a linear reduction makes economic sense; |

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| 9. | Reiterates that cumulative emissions are decisive for the climate system; notes that even if it were to meet the 2050 targets on the basis of the pathway set out in the Commission roadmap, the EU would still be responsible in terms of greenhouse gas emissions for approximately double its per-capita share of the global 2 °C-compatible carbon budget, and that delaying emissions reductions increases the cumulative share significantly; |

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| 10. | Welcomes the Commission’s latest communications and its analyses of how a 30 % climate protection target can be achieved; supports the view set out therein that, regardless of the outcome of the international negotiations, it is in the EU’s own interest to aim for a climate protection target of over 20 %, since this would have the simultaneous effect of creating green jobs and boosting growth and security; |

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| 11. | On the basis of realistic expectations as to the likely outcomes of the COP 17, calls on the EU and the Member States to conclude as many partial agreements as possible, in areas such as science, technology transfer and LULUCF, in order to maintain overall positive progress in the negotiations, thereby creating certainty as to future climate change policies and negotiations; |

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| 12. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to develop a principle of ‘climate justice’; insists that the greatest injustice would occur if the EU did not tackle climate change, because poor people in poor countries would suffer in particular; |

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| 13. | Recalls that poor countries are the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have the least capacity to adapt; |

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| 14. | Points out that responses to climate change have an impact on gender equality at all levels and that, in order to ensure win-win solutions and to avoid aggravating inequalities, gender considerations should be integrated into climate policies, in line with global agreements on gender mainstreaming and the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; |

EU Strategy

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| 15. | Stresses the need for wider and more effective EU climate diplomacy by all EU institutions in advance of Durban (in particular regarding EU-Africa relations), which should seek to present a clearer EU profile on climate policy, bringing a new dynamic to the international climate negotiations and encouraging partners throughout the world also to introduce binding reductions in emissions and appropriate climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, in particular with reference to the EU proposal for full decarbonisation by 2050; |

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| 16. | Calls on the European Union to take the lead and push for an ambitious EU climate policy which reduces climate change in order to demonstrate the advantages of such a policy and encourage other countries to follow suit; |

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| 17. | Stresses, in this context, the importance of the European Union, as major player, speaking with ‘one voice’ in seeking an ambitious international agreement and a high level of ambition in the COP 17 negotiations and staying united in that regard; |

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| 18. | Emphasises the European Union’s unique position as a supranational entity which has - in order to make its working methods more effective - moved away from decision-making by unanimity to decision-making by qualified majority, which might also represent a way forward in the future for the UNFCCC; |

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| 19. | Emphasises that in order to provide new impetus and leverage for future negotiations, additional emphasis should be placed on the way that combating climate change can also offer economic possibilities and a pathway towards more resource-efficient societies in general; |

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| 20. | Is of the opinion that capacity-building - not only with regard to technology transfer, but in general - is of vital importance and that it requires an integrated approach and a streamlined institutional architecture encouraging synergies and coordination; |

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| 21. | Stresses the importance of the systematic integration of gender equality as a cross-cutting issue in the climate fund’s governance structure and operational guidelines; |

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| 22. | Points out that gender-balanced participation in decision-making covering all phases and aspects of funding is essential; calls on the EU to strive for female representation of at least 40 % in all relevant bodies; |

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| 23. | Highlights the fact that if the EU is reluctant to proceed to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol a very negative message will be sent to developing countries; |

Building on the Cancún Agreements at the Durban Conference

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| 24. | Welcomes the success achieved in reaching the Cancún Agreements at COP 16 in 2010, by acknowledging the global and urgent problem of climate change and by setting goals and laying down ways of tackling the problem, while restoring trust in the UNFCCC process as the means of finding a global solution to climate change; asks all the participants to maintain the positive atmosphere of the negotiations in Cancún and looks to the Durban Conference to make further progress towards the continuation and strengthening of the rules-based multilateral climate regime; |

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| 25. | Recalls in particular the acknowledgement of the 2 °C objective in the Cancún Agreements (including the recognition of the need to consider, in the context of a first review, strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1,5°), and the establishment of a process for defining the peak date of global emissions, a global emissions reduction goal for 2050 and policy measures to ensure that the objectives set are achieved; |

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| 26. | Calls on the Parties to use the Durban Conference to bring into operation the necessary agreed mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Committee, to focus on the development of the Technology Mechanism (including the Climate Technology Centre and Network) and the registry to record mitigation measures taken by developing countries seeking international support, and to address the remaining key issues and make progress on the issue of the legal form of a future post-2012 framework, including a timeline for securing agreement on that framework; |

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| 27. | Highlights the need for further efforts to be made at the Durban Conference to develop the transparency provisions for commitments and actions and the need to agree on a clear work programme in relation thereto, including Measurement, Reporting and Verification Systems (MRVs); |

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| 28. | Notes that there are still gaps in sectoral and non-market based approaches, and emphasises the need, in particular, to address the production and consumption of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol; notes that there is a need for a comprehensive international approach to non-CO2 climate-relevant anthropogenic emissions, not least because the cost of reducing these emissions is lower than that for the reductions envisaged in the carbon sector, even taking the current carbon price into account; calls for a reform of the project-based mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), whilst avoiding any lock-in to high-carbon infrastructure through the inappropriate use of flexible mechanisms, which would increase the overall cost of efforts to achieve the decarbonisation objective, through the introduction of stringent project-quality standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and reliable, verifiable and real additional emissions reductions that also support sustainable development in developing countries; endorses, moreover, the Commission’s view that sectoral mechanisms for economically more advanced developing countries should be agreed for the period beyond 2012, while high-quality CDM should remain available to LDCs; calls for any new international sectoral offset crediting mechanisms to ensure environmental integrity and incorporate climate benefits beyond the 15-30 % deviation from business as usual; |

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| 29. | Calls for the environmental effectiveness of Annex I emissions reduction targets to be the guiding principle as regards the EU approach to international accounting rules for forest management, to flexible mechanisms and to the banking towards post-2012 targets of any overachievement during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; |

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| 30. | Recognises the importance of proactive adaptation to the unavoidable consequences of climate change, in particular in the regions of the world most affected by a changing climate, and especially of protecting the most vulnerable groups within societies; therefore calls for an agreement in Durban with strong political and financial commitments to assist those developing countries in capacity-building; |

Financing

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| 31. | Recalls that developed countries have committed themselves to providing new and additional resources from public and private sources amounting to at least USD 30 billion in the period 2010-2012 and USD 100 billion per year by 2020, with special emphasis on the vulnerable and least-developed countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States to honour their commitments and guarantee that resources for adaptation and mitigation come on top of the 0,7 % ODA target and specify how much of the commitment will come from public funding; further stresses the need to mobilise both domestic and international resources from all possible sources to contribute to achieving this goal and to identify a path for additional emissions reduction measures during the period from 2013 to 2020; calls, further, on the Conference of the Parties to define a framework for climate financing during the intermediate period from 2013 to 2020; also stresses the need for such funding to be provided on the basis of fair, transparent and non-discriminatory rules coupled with effective capacity-building, the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environment-related goods, services and investment, concrete support for low-emission infrastructure and well-defined, predictable rules; |

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| 32. | Emphasises that a variety of sources is required, and calls on the Parties to explore further sources for long term-financing that will provide the required new, additional, adequate and predictable financial flows; |

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| 33. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to ensure comprehensive and transparent reporting on the implementation of ‘fast-start’ financing, as well as timely delivery to support the implementation of mitigation and adaptation action in developing countries, and stresses the need to avoid a financing gap after 2012 (when the fast-start finance period ends) and to work towards the identification of a path for scaling up climate funding from 2013 to 2020; |

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| 34. | Emphasises the importance of reliable statistics on emissions with comparable data and regular evaluation reports; |

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| 35. | Calls for the Durban Conference to take concrete steps in implementing the Cancun Agreements as regards long-term financing, including sources and scaling up from fast-start finance from 2013; calls, in this context, for the use of innovative sources of financing and for a tax on financial transactions to be established at international level and for the revenues to be used in particular to support climate action in developing countries, in line with objectives set under the UNFCCC; |

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| 36. | Calls on the Parties to bring the Green Climate Fund into full operation at the Durban Conference and to develop it in a way that ensures that the new fund is capable of supporting transformational changes towards low-carbon and climate-resilient development in developing countries; |

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| 37. | Calls on the Conference of the Parties to specify a definition of the ‘new and additional’ principle; |

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| 38. | Stresses the importance of predictability and continuity in climate financing; calls for full transparency and for adequate measures to ensure the scaling up of climate finance between 2013 and 2020; calls, in this regard, for an end to double accounting; |

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| 39. | Urges the Commission to define, as soon as possible, procedures and instruments for promoting and facilitating private-sector contributions to funding for developing countries; |

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| 40. | Calls on the Commission to ensure that agreements on international property rights concluded within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which are a key instrument for encouraging private-sector involvement in the spread of new technologies, are not called into question; |

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| 41. | Recalls that current climate-dedicated financial flows to developing countries, though growing, cover only a fraction (less than 5 %) of the estimated amounts that developing countries would need over several decades; |

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| 42. | Insists on the need to build up a coherent financial architecture for climate change in Durban, in particular to guarantee that there is no financing gap after 2012; stresses, in this context, that both new resources (i.e. Financial Transaction Tax, emission of Special Drawing Rights, shipping/aviation levies, etc.) and effective delivery mechanisms are needed; |

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| 43. | Advocates the establishment of a compliance mechanism to ensure a more effective delivery of commitments made with regard to greenhouse gas reduction, finance, technology and capacity building; |

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| 44. | Calls on donors to pledge the amount of funds for replenishment of the Global Environment Facility and, within this framework, to continue to give high priority to African countries and to allocate financial resources based on the needs and priorities of countries; |

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| 45. | Calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to build better links between the MDGs and climate change by incorporating impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change into projects and programmes aimed at achieving the MDGs, and into all broader strategies for poverty reduction and development policies; urges the Commission, in this context, to upgrade its financial reporting tool to facilitate financial analysis of EU climate-related commitments and step up climate mainstreaming in development policies; |

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| 46. | Recalls that only public funding is crucial for reaching the most vulnerable communities struggling to adapt to climate change, and help poor countries adopt sustainable development strategies; stresses, furthermore, that the Commission and Member State governments must make sure this funding is additional to existing aid targets, in line with Article 4(3) of the UNFCCC; calls on the Commission to provide, in line with the Bali Action Plan of December 2007, for ‘additional climate financing’ criteria in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner; |

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| 47. | Recalls that the ‘polluter pays’ principle is aimed at having a positive effect on reducing pollution, yet encounters difficulties in being implemented in developing countries; urges therefore that climate change funding for developing countries address this issue in more detail; |

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| 48. | Calls on the World Bank to ensure that its portfolio is ‘climate-smart’; |

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| 49. | Stresses that gender balance in all climate finance decision-making bodies should be guaranteed, including the Green Climate Fund Board and possible sub-boards for individual funding windows; underlines that members of civil society, including representatives of gender equality organisations and women’s groups, should be given opportunities for active participation in the work of the GCF Board and all of its sub-boards; |

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| 50. | Points out that gender inequalities in access to resources, including credit, extension services, information and technology, must be taken into account in developing mitigation activities; underlines that adaptation efforts should systematically and effectively address gender-specific impacts of climate change in the areas of energy, water, food security, agriculture and fisheries, biodiversity and ecosystem services, health, industry, human settlements, disaster management, and conflict and security; |

Transformation towards a sustainable economy and industry

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| 51. | Underlines that many countries are moving fast towards the new green economy, for various reasons, including climate protection, resource scarcity and efficiency, energy security, innovation and competitiveness; notes, for example, the magnitude of investment programmes dedicated to energy transition in countries such as the US, China and South Korea; calls on the Commission to analyse such programmes including their levels of ambition and to assess the risk of the EU losing its leadership; |

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| 52. | Welcomes these international moves and reiterates that internationally coordinated action helps to address the carbon leakage concerns of the relevant sectors concerned, in particular energy-intensive sectors; calls for an agreement to ensure an international level-playing field for carbon intensive industries; |

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| 53. | Is concerned that the financial and budgetary crisis affecting most of the industrialised economies has curbed the level of attention of governments towards the international climate negotiations in Durban; considers that the EU’s effort to transform its economy must not falter e.g. in order to avoid job leakage and in particular green job leakage, and that the EU must convince its partners worldwide, including China and the USA, that emission reductions are feasible without losing competitiveness and jobs, in particular if performed collectively; |

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| 54. | Stresses the need to develop and implement urgently a holistic raw-materials and resource strategy, including on resource efficiency, in all sectors of the economy in both developed and developing countries, in order to achieve long-term sustainable economic growth, and calls on the EU and its Member States to lead by example in this regard; calls on the EU and its Member States to support developing countries at both national and local level by making available expertise on sustainable mining, increased resource efficiency and reuse and recycling; |

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| 55. | Considers that sectoral approaches combined with economy-wide caps in industrialised countries can contribute to reconciling climate action with competitiveness and economic growth; stresses the importance of adopting a holistic, horizontal, sectoral approach to industrial emissions as an added value in connection with international negotiations and European CO2 targets; hopes that such an approach might also be part of a post-2012 international framework for climate action; |

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| 56. | Highlights the role of the CDM for European industry to achieve emission abatements and to accelerate technology transfer; recalls that the CDM needs to be reformed to require stringent project quality to guarantee the high standard of such projects, with reliable, verifiable and real additional emission reductions that also support sustainable development in such countries; considers that in the future the CDM should be limited to Least Developed Countries; |

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| 57. | Reiterates that a global carbon market would be a sound basis to achieve both substantial emission abatements and a level playing field for the industry; calls on the EU and its partners to find, in the immediate future, the most effective way of promoting links between the EU ETS and other trading schemes aiming for a global carbon market, ensuring greater diversity of abatement options, improved market size and liquidity, transparency and, ultimately, more efficient allocation of resources; |

Research and technology

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| 58. | Welcomes the agreement reached in Cancun on the Cancun Adaptation Framework to enhance action on adaptation to climate change, and on the establishment of a Technology Mechanism, including a Technology Executive Committee and a Climate Technology Centre and Network, to enhance technology development and transfer, striking the right balance between adaptation and mitigation and intellectual property rights in order to make this facility fully operational; |

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| 59. | Stresses that the development and deployment of breakthrough technologies hold the key to fighting climate change and, at the same time, convincing the EU’s partners worldwide that emissions reductions are feasible without losing competitiveness and jobs; calls for an international commitment to increase R&D investments in breakthrough technologies in the relevant sectors; considers it essential that Europe should lead by example by substantially increasing expenditure devoted to research on climate-friendly and energy-efficient industrial and energy technologies and that Europe should develop close scientific cooperation in this field with international partners, such as the BRIC countries and the United States; |

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| 60. | Considers that innovation is key to maintaining global warming below 2 °C and notes that there are different ways of encouraging innovation; calls on the Commission to assess the various mechanisms to reward frontrunner businesses which differ according to their capacity to trigger innovation and to transfer and deploy technologies globally; |

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| 61. | Highlights the importance of building closer cooperation between Europe and LDCs; calls, therefore, on the Commission to come forward in good time before Durban with ideas for common research programmes on alternative energy sources and on how the EU can encourage cooperation within various industrial sectors between developed and developing countries, with a specific focus on Africa; |

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| 62. | Urges the establishment of an institutional framework to tackle all aspects of technology development and transfer by putting, in particular, a special focus on Appropriate Technology (AT) that is designed with special consideration for the environmental, ethical, cultural, social, political, and economic aspects of the community for which it is intended; calls for the creation of patent pools, whereby a number of patents held by different entities, such as companies, universities or research institutes, are made available to others in a common pool for production or further research development; and calls for recognition of the right of developing countries to use to the full TRIPS flexibilities; |

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| 63. | Notes the huge potential for renewable energy in many developing countries; calls on the EU and its Member States to implement renewable energy projects in developing countries and to make available technology, expertise and investment; |

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| 64. | Considers that adequate research on migration as a result of climate change is necessary to address this issue properly; |

Energy, energy efficiency and resource efficiency

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| 65. | Regrets that energy savings potential is not adequately tackled internationally and in the EU; underlines that energy savings allow job creation, economic savings and energy security, competitiveness and emission cuts; calls on the EU to pay more attention to energy savings in international negotiations, be it when discussing technology transfer, development plans for developing countries or financial assistance; |

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| 66. | Considers it of the utmost importance for climate negotiations that industrialised countries fulfil their financing commitments undertaken in Copenhagen and Cancun; calls for a swift and internationally coordinated implementation of the Pittsburgh G-20 objective to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies over the medium term which would demonstrate an important contribution to climate protection and would be particularly relevant within the current context of public deficits in many countries; |

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| 67. | Points out that across the globe an estimated 2 billion people continue to lack access to sustainable and affordable energy; stresses the need to address the energy poverty issue in compliance with climate policy objectives; notes that energy technologies are available, addressing both global environmental protection and local development needs; |

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| 68. | Considers that Europe should support South African efforts to enable African countries to find partners and financing for investments in renewable energy and green technologies; |

Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)

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| 69. | Calls for an agreement in Durban on robust rules on LULUCF that strengthen the level of ambition of the Annex I Parties, are designed to deliver emissions reductions from forestry and land use, require that Annex I Parties account for any increases in emissions from LULUCF and are consistent with the Parties’ existing commitments to protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs in order to ensure the environmental integrity of the sector’s contribution to emissions reductions; in addition to sound LULUCF accounting, calls for policy measures to be defined in order to recognise the value of the carbon storage in harvested wood products; |

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| 70. | Considers that LULUCF reporting must be referenced to a fixed historical base year/period and applied across the Kyoto Protocol and Convention tracks; |

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| 71. | Calls in this respect for the mandatory inclusion of emissions (removals and releases) from forest management in Annex I Parties’ post-2012 LULUCF reduction commitments; |

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| 72. | Calls on the Commission, the Member States and all Parties to work in the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice as well as other international fora to establish a new UN definition of forests on a biome basis, reflecting the wide-ranging differences in biodiversity as well as carbon values of different biomes, while clearly distinguishing between native forests and those dominated by tree monocultures and non-native species; |

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| 73. | Notes with concern the assumption of carbon neutrality for biomass used for energy purposes which governs accounting under the UNFCCC; calls for the establishment of new and more robust accounting rules which reveal the true GHG saving potential of bioenergy; |

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| 74. | Encourages the establishment of a fund to reward or provide incentives for reducing emissions through sustainable land-management practices, including forest conservation, sustainable forest management, the avoidance of deforestation, afforestation and sustainable agriculture; |

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| 75. | Recalls that, in order to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation of forest, there is a need to shift away from a narrow process of quantification of forest carbon fluxes towards a broader approach, including the identification of the direct and underlying drivers of deforestation, based on a consultation process similar to the Voluntary Partnership Agreement consultation process; |

Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

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| 76. | Recognises the need for regulatory certainty in a long-term financing mechanism for REDD+; urges the Conference of Parties to define a mechanism to mobilise further funding for REDD+ from public as well as private sources; |

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| 77. | Highlights the need for further action at COP 17 to implement REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) and to address any possible shortcomings in this regard especially with regard to long-term financing and robust and transparent forest monitor systems and, particularly on the effective consultation with parties, indigenous and local communities; |

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| 78. | Stresses that the design of the REDD+ mechanism should ensure significant benefits for biodiversity and vital ecosystem services beyond climate change mitigation and should contribute to strengthening the rights and improving the livelihood of forest-dependent people, particularly of indigenous and local communities, |

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| 79. | Takes the view that the funding mechanism for REDD should be based on performance criteria, including on forest governance, and take into consideration the objectives of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 agreed under CBD COP 10 in Nagoya; |

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| 80. | Underlines the need to speed up public financing for performance-based REDD+ action rewarding reductions in deforestation in accordance with national baselines with a view to halting gross tropical deforestation by 2020 at the latest; |

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| 81. | Regrets that REDD funding is based on such a broad definition of forests that may include single species plantations of non-native species; considers that this definition may provide a perverse incentive to divert funding from the much needed protection of old and ancient forests to new commercial plantations and from innovation; |

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| 82. | Calls, furthermore, on the EU to make sure that REDD + includes safeguard mechanisms ensuring that the rights of the people living in the forests are not violated and that the loss of forests is efficiently halted; insists, in particular, that REDD+ should not undermine any advance made so far with FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade), especially regarding forest governance, clarification and recognition of customary tenures; |

Maritime transport and international aviation

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| 83. | Welcomes recent progress in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on the introduction of mandatory energy efficiency measures for international shipping, but notes that this can only be seen as a first step; calls on the EU to push for ambitious targets for emissions reductions in shipping to encourage further progress in the IMO in taking the necessary steps towards globally binding reductions in emissions from maritime transport within the UNFCCC; |

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| 84. | Wishes to highlight that, as a result of increases in ship traffic, emissions from maritime transport will increase despite these measures, since they apply to new ships only; is therefore of the opinion that alternative approaches (i.e. carbon pricing, further technology-centred measures also for existing ships) need to be stressed in this regard; |

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| 85. | Calls on the EU to ensure that the full impact of aviation is taken into account in an international agreement in the form of binding reduction targets for aviation, and urges all actors to make sure that these targets are backed up by enforcement structures; believes that resolution of this issue has become increasingly pressing and supports the inclusion of aviation in the European emissions trading system; |

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| 86. | Recognises the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and advocates the introduction of international instruments with global emission reduction targets to curb the climate impact of international aviation and maritime transport; |

European Parliament delegation

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| 87. | Believes that the EU delegation plays a vital role in the climate change negotiations, and therefore finds it unacceptable that Members of the European Parliament have been unable to attend the EU coordination meetings at previous Conferences of the Parties; expects at least the chairs of the European Parliament delegation to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings in Durban; |

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| 88. | Notes that, in accordance with the Framework Agreement concluded between the Commission and Parliament in November 2010, the Commission must facilitate the inclusion of Members of Parliament as observers in Union delegations negotiating multilateral agreements; recalls that, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty (Article 218 TFEU), Parliament must give its consent to agreements between the Union and third countries or international organisations; |

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| 89. | Recalls the obligation of Parties to the UNFCCC to encourage the widest participation in the UNFCCC process, including that of non-governmental organisations; calls for the participation at the COP 17 negotiations of the International Forum of Indigenous Peoples, since such peoples are particularly affected by climate change and climate change adaptation; |

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| 90. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU contracting parties. |

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