Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

30 April 2025 ([\*](#Footnote*))

( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU word mark VersionTech – Earlier EU word mark VERIZON – Relative ground for invalidity – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) )

In Case T‑242/24,

**Versiontech, Inc.,** established in Brooklyn, New York (United States), represented by I. Díaz de Bustamante y Terminel, lawyer,

applicant,

v

**European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),** represented by D. Gája, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

**Verizon Trademark Services LLC,** established in Washington DC (United States), represented by J. Bogatz, Y. Stone and J. Feigl, lawyers,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber),

composed of A. Marcoulli, President, V. Tomljenović and L. Spangsberg Grønfeldt (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

**Judgment**

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Versiontech, Inc., seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 March 2024 (Case R 31/2023-1) (‘the contested decision’).

**Background to the dispute**

2        On 10 September 2021, the intervener, Verizon Trademark Services LLC, filed with EUIPO, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1)), an application for a declaration of invalidity in respect of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed on 21 July 2017 in respect of the word sign VersionTech covering goods in Classes 9 and 11 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.

3        The application for a declaration of invalidity was based on the earlier EU word mark VERIZON, registered on 22 September 2016 for goods and services in Classes 9, 14, 16, 18, 24, 25, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Nice Agreement.

4        The application for a declaration of invalidity was directed against all the goods covered by the contested mark. Those included, inter alia, the following goods in Class 9 of the Nice Agreement, corresponding to the following description: ‘Digital video recorders; tablet computer; tablet computer cases; cases for mobile phones; mobile phone cases; laptop carrying cases; bags adapted for laptops; navigational instruments; display screen protectors in the nature of films for mobile phones; network routers; headphones; headsets for virtual reality games; chargers; wireless chargers; portable media players; data processing apparatus; computer peripheral devices; smart card readers; electronic notice boards; wearable activity trackers; smartphones; USB flash drives; e-books; time recording apparatus; time clocks [time recording devices]; cabinets for loudspeakers; dashboard cameras; selfie sticks; measuring instruments; USB cables; integrated circuits; fluorescent screens; protection devices for personal use against accidents; batteries, electric; power banks; theft prevention installations, electric’.

5        The ground relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity was that set out in Article 53(1)(a) of Council Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001), read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001).

6        On 14 December 2022, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity in its entirety. It held that, notwithstanding that some of the goods at issue were identical, the similarities between the signs were not sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.

7        On 5 January 2023, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Cancellation Division’s decision.

8        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 4 above, which it considered to be either identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark or similar to varying degrees to the goods and services covered by the earlier mark. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal annulled the decision of the Cancellation Division in part and declared the contested mark invalid for those goods, while dismissing the action as to the remainder.

**Forms of order sought**

9        The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision in so far as it declared the contested mark invalid;

–        maintain the registration of the contested mark in its entirety;

–        order the intervener to pay the costs incurred in respect of the present action and in respect of the proceedings before the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal.

10      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action in its entirety;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

11      The intervener contends, in essence, that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

**Law**

***The application for annulment of the contested decision***

12      Given the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 21 July 2017, which is decisive for the purpose of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the case are governed by the substantive provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 (see, to that effect, order of 5 October 2004, *Alcon* v *OHIM*, C‑192/03 P, EU:C:2004:587, paragraphs 39 and 40, and judgment of 23 April 2020, *Gugler France* v *Gugler and EUIPO*, C‑736/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:308, paragraph 3 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, since, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply on the date on which they enter into force (see judgment of 11 December 2012, *Commission* v *Spain*, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the case is governed by the procedural provisions of Regulation 2017/1001.

13      Consequently, in the present case, so far as concerns the substantive rules, the references to Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 and to Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision and by the parties in their pleadings must be understood as referring, respectively, to Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.

14      By its single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, the applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s finding that there is, in the present case, a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. In that regard, it mainly calls into question the Board of Appeal’s assessments relating to the similarity of the signs at issue.

15      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

16      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

17      The risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, *Laboratorios RTB* v *OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS)*, T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

18      For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, *Commercy* v *OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel)*, T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

19      It is in the light of those considerations that it must be examined whether, in the present case, the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

20      As a preliminary point, the Court considers that it must examine the merits of the single plea raised by the applicant as regards only the goods in Class 9 covered by the contested mark that are identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark. In the event that there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public in respect of those goods, the finding of no likelihood of confusion would apply a fortiori to the other goods covered by the contested mark which the Board of Appeal considered to be similar to varying degrees to the goods and services covered by the earlier mark. For that reason, the Court will examine below the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue only in respect of the goods that the Board of Appeal considered to be identical.

*The relevant public and its level of attention*

21      According to settled case-law, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, and whose level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, *Mundipharma* v *OHIM – Altana Pharma (RESPICUR)*, T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

22      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, like the Cancellation Division, that the goods covered by the signs at issue were aimed both at the general public and at professionals. The Board of Appeal also stated that the level of attention of the general public varied from average to high, depending on the nature of the goods at issue, the frequency of their purchase and their price. By way of illustration, it considered that a high level of attention was shown for some of the goods at issue, such as ‘electronic tablets’ and ‘navigation instruments’, while an average level of attention was shown for other goods, such as ‘mobile phone cases’ and ‘selfie sticks’. As regards the professionals, the Board of Appeal considered that their level of attention was inherently above average. Furthermore, having noted that the contested mark was composed of words that are perceived to have a meaning in German, the Board of Appeal decided to focus its examination on consumers in the European Union who understand German.

23      The applicant submits that, in relation to the goods covered by the signs at issue, the average consumer, whether that consumer is a member of the general public or a professional, will display an above average level of attention.

24      EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.

25      It must be stated that the applicant’s arguments do not take account of the Board of Appeal’s assessments as regards the variation in the relevant public’s level of attention depending on the goods at issue. Nor does the applicant take account of the considerable differences between the goods covered by the signs at issue in terms of their price, how technically sophisticated they are and their lifespan. It merely makes an unsubstantiated assertion. Consequently, there is no reason to call into question the assessments made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision.

*The comparison of the goods*

26      In assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, *Sanco* v *OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken)*, T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

27      In paragraphs 27 to 31 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld all the assessments made by the Cancellation Division relating to the comparison of the goods at issue. It thus found that part of the goods referred to in paragraph 4 above was identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark.

28      The applicant submits that the nature and intended purpose of most of the goods at issue covered by the contested mark are different from those of the goods in Class 9 covered by the earlier mark.

29      In so doing, the applicant merely reiterates before the Court the unsubstantiated argument which it had already put forward before the Board of Appeal, and which the Board of Appeal correctly rejected in the contested decision. There is therefore no reason to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment.

*The comparison of the signs*

30      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, *OHIM* v *Shaker*, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

–       *The distinctive and dominant elements of the signs at issue*

31      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the contested mark would be easily perceived as the juxtaposition of two individual elements, namely ‘version’ and ‘tech’. It took the view that the element ‘version’ would be understood, both in German and in English, as referring to a specific version of the goods at issue, since ‘it is customary, in particular in the field of the technical goods at issue, to offer them in different versions’, and that the element ‘tech’, which has found its way into German expressions, would be readily understood by the German-speaking public as being short for the English term ‘technology’.

32      Next, the Board of Appeal stated that, given that the element ‘tech’ was purely descriptive of the goods at issue and that the element ‘version’ admittedly had very limited distinctiveness in relation to those goods, but that consumers tended, in general, to focus their attention on the beginning of a sign, it was the element ‘version’ that would attract the attention of the relevant public. The element ‘tech’ could therefore have only a very limited impact on the comparison of the signs.

33      Last, the Board of Appeal stated that, since it has no meaning, the word element ‘verizon’ of the earlier mark was distinctive.

34      In that regard, the applicant submits, in essence, that, rather than breaking down the contested mark into two individual elements, the element ‘VersionTech’ must be taken as a whole, as the ‘distinctive and dominant element’ of the contested mark.

35      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. In particular, the intervener contends that the element ‘tech’, which is devoid of any distinctive character for the goods at issue, has no bearing on the comparison of the signs, so that, in reality, the elements to be compared are ‘version’ and ‘verizon’.

36      In essence, the applicant submits that the contested mark does not contain any element that is more dominant or more distinctive than another.

37      In that regard, first of all, it must be stated that the applicant has not put forward any arguments to dispute the Board of Appeal’s findings that the public will break the contested mark down into the two elements, ‘version’ and ‘tech’, that the first element is of very limited distinctiveness and that the second element is purely descriptive of the goods covered. There is no reason to call those findings into question.

38      Next, it must be borne in mind that the fact that one of the words making up a word mark is descriptive does not, in itself, allow the conclusion to be drawn that that word is insignificant in the overall impression produced by that mark (see judgment of 20 November 2024, *Laboratorio SYS* v *EUIPO – Dr.* *Babor (sYs)*, T‑39/24, not published, EU:T:2024:853, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, while in the present case the element ‘tech’ is purely descriptive of the goods at issue and therefore devoid of any distinctive character, the element ‘version’, which precedes it, is itself of very limited distinctiveness.

39      Last, it should be noted that the contested mark consists of a single word, since the word element ‘version’ is juxtaposed with the word element ‘tech’ without any form of separation. In that regard, the fact that the first letter of each of those elements is capitalised is immaterial since, as the Board of Appeal pointed out in paragraph 37 of the contested decision, it is irrelevant whether a word mark uses upper or lower case letters (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2024, *Stada Arzneimittel* v *EUIPO – Bioiberica (DAOgest)*, T‑396/23, not published, EU:T:2024:770, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). In that context, and since the element ‘tech’ is of not insignificant length (4 letters out of 11), it cannot be inferred from the fact that the element ‘version’ is at the beginning of the sign that the relevant public will focus its attention on that element.

40      Therefore, as the applicant submits, and even if the element ‘tech’ is less distinctive than the element ‘version’, that element must be taken into account in the comparison of the signs at issue.

–       *Visual similarity*

41      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier sign ‘verizon’ and the first element ‘version’ of the contested sign, that is to say the element to which consumers paid the most attention, had the same beginning ‘ver’ and ending ‘on’ and shared the letter ‘i’ in the middle. It then considered that the signs at issue differed only in the letter ‘z’ of the earlier mark, and the letter ‘s’ and the element ‘tech’ of the contested mark, noting that the latter had only a very limited impact on the visual comparison of the signs. The Board of Appeal concluded that the signs at issue were visually similar at least to an average degree.

42      The applicant submits, for its part, that the signs at issue are visually similar to a low degree.

43      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. In particular, EUIPO contends that the differences appearing in the middle of the earlier sign VERIZON and in the element ‘version’ of the contested sign, which are otherwise identical at their beginnings and endings, could go unnoticed by the relevant public. Furthermore, both EUIPO and the intervener observe that the letters ‘z’ and ‘s’ are visually similar.

44      In the present case, the marks at issue have 5 letters in common out of the 7 in the earlier mark and the 11 in the contested mark. Those marks share the same first three letters, namely ‘v’, ‘e’ and ‘r’, on the one hand, and the letters ‘o’ and ‘n’, on the other, although the latter do not occupy the same position within the signs, since they appear in the final part of the earlier mark and in the middle of the contested mark. It should be borne in mind that, according to case-law, what matters in the assessment of the visual similarity of two word marks is, rather, the presence, in each of them, of several letters in the same order (see judgment of 11 September 2024, *Borco-Marken-Import Matthiesen* v *EUIPO – Belles Marks (KINGSBURY)*, T‑603/23, not published, EU:T:2024:609, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

45      Taking into account the different lengths of the signs at issue and the absence of a significant number of common letters placed in the same order in those signs, and although the element ‘tech’ of the contested mark is devoid of any distinctive character (see paragraph 38 above), it must be held that the signs at issue, viewed as a whole, are visually similar to a low degree.

46      Consequently, the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in concluding that the signs at issue are visually similar at least to an average degree.

–       *Phonetic similarity*

47      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were phonetically similar at least to an average degree. It considered that the German-speaking public would pronounce the first element of the contested sign as ‘verzion’, which is very similar to the pronunciation of the earlier sign VERIZON, and that those signs also coincided in the pronunciation of their beginning ‘ver’ and ending ‘on’, as well as in the sound of the letter ‘i’ in their middle. Furthermore, in German, the stress is placed on the last syllable of the element ‘version’ of the contested sign and the last syllable of the earlier sign VERIZON.

48      The applicant disputes those assessments, arguing, in particular, that account should be taken of the pronunciation of the word ‘tech’. According to the applicant, the signs at issue are phonetically dissimilar.

49      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments by referring to the assessments made by the Board of Appeal.

50      In that regard, as the applicant correctly observes, the pronunciation of each of the signs at issue consists of three individual parts, namely ‘ver-sion-tech’ and ‘ve-ri-zon’. The signs also differ considerably both in their second syllables, namely ‘sion’ and ‘ri’ respectively, and in their endings (‘tech’ and ‘zon’). Likewise, the signs at issue have a different rhythm and intonation. In reality, they coincide only in their first syllable, which moreover is not stressed, and the remainder of the signs is pronounced very differently.

51      It must therefore be held that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found, the signs at issue are phonetically similar to a low degree.

–       *Conceptual similarity*

52      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the Board of Appeal noted, in relation to the contested mark, that it consisted of two individual elements, ‘version’ and ‘tech’, the former being understood, both in German and in English, as referring to a specific version of the goods at issue, and the latter as being short for the English term ‘technology’. By contrast, the earlier mark had no particular meaning in relation to the goods at issue. The Board of Appeal concluded that it was not possible to make a conceptual comparison of the signs at issue.

53      The applicant disputes the Board of Appeal’s assessment, arguing that the signs at issue are conceptually very different.

54      EUIPO acknowledges that there is a conceptual difference between the signs at issue.

55      In the first place, it is common ground between the parties that the earlier mark has no meaning for the relevant public.

56      In the second place, it is also common ground that the contested mark will be perceived as consisting of two elements, each of which has a clear meaning for the relevant public. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled out that, as the applicant submits, the contested mark will evoke the idea of a ‘technological version’ of the goods covered in the mind of the relevant public. For example, the ‘e-books’ covered by the contested mark constitute the technological version of paper books.

57      In any event, it should be noted that that mark will evoke at least one concept in the mind of the relevant public, namely the concept of technology.

58      Contrary to the findings of the Board of Appeal, where one of the marks at issue has a meaning from the perspective of the relevant public and the other mark has no meaning, it must be held that the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2017, *RP Technik* v *EUIPO – Tecnomarmi (RP ROYAL PALLADIUM)*, T‑768/15, not published, EU:T:2017:630, paragraphs 88 and 89). It must therefore be held that the marks at issue are conceptually dissimilar.

*The likelihood of confusion*

59      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, *Canon*, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, *Mast-Jägermeister* v *OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others)*, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

60      In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal held that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark was to be regarded as normal. It then held that, having regard to the level of attention of the relevant public, which varies from average to high depending on the nature of the goods covered by the signs at issue, the identical nature or similarity of the goods at issue, the at least average visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue and the fact that it was not possible to compare the signs conceptually and, last, in the light of the principle of interdependence, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the German-speaking part of the relevant public in respect of all the goods at issue.

61      The applicant submits that the significant visual, phonetic and conceptual differences between the signs at issue preclude any likelihood of confusion.

62      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. In particular, EUIPO argues that the conceptual difference between the signs at issue does not counterbalance the strong visual and phonetic similarity between them. It adds that the element ‘version’ of the contested mark is not ‘particularly distinctive’ in respect of the goods at issue.

63      It must be stated at the outset that there is no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding, which is not, moreover, disputed by the applicant, that the earlier mark had normal inherent distinctiveness.

64      However, as regards the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it must be observed that, despite the identity or similarity of the goods covered by the marks at issue and the normal inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. First, the relevant public displays a level of attention that varies from average to high. Second, the significant visual and phonetic differences between the signs at issue, including in their length, structure, rhythm and intonation, and the fact that they are conceptually different, are sufficient to preclude any likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.

65      It follows from all of the foregoing that the applicant is justified in claiming that the Board of Appeal infringed Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion.

66      Consequently, the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it upheld the intervener’s appeal against the Cancellation Division’s decision and declared the contested mark invalid in respect of all the goods referred to in paragraph 4 above, without there being any need to examine the other arguments put forward by the applicant in support of its single plea in law.

***The application for alteration of the contested decision***

67      Furthermore, by its second head of claim, asking the Court to maintain the registration of the contested mark in its entirety, the applicant has, in essence, made an application for the contested decision to be altered, for the purposes of Article 72(3) of Regulation 2017/1001. By that application, the Court has been asked to dismiss the intervener’s appeal before the Board of Appeal.

68      In that regard, it must be pointed out that, since the power of the Court to alter decisions under the abovementioned provision does not have the effect of conferring on that Court the power to substitute its own reasoning for that of a Board of Appeal or to carry out an assessment on which that Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a position, it must be exercised in situations in which the Court, after reviewing the assessment made by the Board of Appeal, is in a position to determine, on the basis of the matters of fact and of law as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take (judgment of 5 July 2011, *Edwin* v *OHIM*, C‑263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452, paragraph 72).

69      In the present case, it must be pointed out that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal adopted a position on whether there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, with the result that the Court has the power to alter that decision in that regard. As is apparent from paragraph 64 above, the Board of Appeal was required to find that there was no likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 4 above.

70      In those circumstances, it is appropriate, by altering the contested decision, to dismiss the appeal that the intervener brought before the Board of Appeal.

**Costs**

71      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

72      In the present case, since EUIPO has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs. Since the intervener has also been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

73      Furthermore, the applicant has claimed that the intervener should be ordered to pay the costs that the applicant incurred in the proceedings before EUIPO. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 190(2) of the Rules of Procedure, costs necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal are to be regarded as recoverable costs. However, that does not apply to costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the Cancellation Division (see judgment of 25 April 2013, *Bell & Ross* v *OHIM – KIN (Wristwatch case)*, T‑80/10, not published, EU:T:2013:214, paragraph 164 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the applicant’s request that the intervener, having been unsuccessful, should be ordered to pay the costs of the administrative proceedings before EUIPO can be allowed only as regards the costs necessarily incurred by the applicant for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Second Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 6 March 2024 (Case R 31/2023-1) in so far as it annulled the decision of the Cancellation Division of 14 December 2022 relating to the EU word mark VersionTech and declared that mark invalid;**

2.      **Dismisses the appeal brought by Verizon Trademark Services LLC before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division of 14 December 2022;**

3.      **Orders Verizon Trademark Services to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Versiontech, Inc. in the present proceedings and in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal;**

4.      **Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs.**

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| Marcoulli | Tomljenović | Spangsberg Grønfeldt |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 April 2025.

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| --- | --- | --- |
| V. Di Bucci |  | M. van der Woude |

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| Registrar |  | President |

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[\*](#Footref*)      Language of the case: English.

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