Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 6.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 342/167 |

---

P9\_TA(2022)0040

Implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2021

European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021 (2021/2183(INI))

(2022/C 342/14)

The European Parliament,

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2014 on the use of armed drones [(1)](#ntr1-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0001), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility [(2)](#ntr2-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0002), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its position of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework [(3)](#ntr3-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0003), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report [(4)](#ntr4-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0004), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the Annual report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report [(5)](#ntr5-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0005), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP [(6)](#ntr6-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0006), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy [(7)](#ntr7-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0007), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products [(8)](#ntr8-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0008), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its position of 28 April 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, and of the Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information [(9)](#ntr9-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0009), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations [(10)](#ntr10-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0010), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities [(11)](#ntr11-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0011), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [(12)](#ntr12-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0012), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 [(13)](#ntr13-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0013), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the document entitled ‘Implementation Plan on Security and Defence’, presented to the Council by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 14 November 2016, and to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, which set out a new level of ambition for the EU in security and defence, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council on 19 November 2018, on the establishment of a civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP) compact, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2018 on Women, Peace and Security, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on youth, peace and security of 7 June 2018 and to the Council conclusions on youth in external action of 5 June 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2020 on the 2020 Strategic Review of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on a renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new agenda for the Mediterranean of 16 April 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on the European Union’s integrated strategy in the Sahel of 16 April 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the CSDP, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2021 on EUFOR Operation Althea, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 October 2021 on hybrid attacks instrumentalising migrants launched by the Belarusian regime, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 adopted during the European Council on 20 June 2019, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration of the members of the European Council with the Member States of the G5 Sahel of 28 April 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council’s Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security as adopted on 5 October 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 9 November 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the report on the annual defence review of the European Defence Agency presented to the Council at its meeting of 20 November 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States [(14)](#ntr14-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0014), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States [(15)](#ntr15-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0015), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 [(16)](#ntr16-C_2022342EN.01016701-E0016), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748, 2021/749 and 2021/750 of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO military mobility project, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by VP/HR on 28 June 2016, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 March 2014, entitled ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy’ (JOIN(2014)0009), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action’ (JOIN(2017)0021), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the President von der Leyen’s State of the Union addresses of 2020 and 2021 and their accompanying letters of intent, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Annual Work Programme of the European Defence Fund for 2021, adopted by the Commission on 30 June 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors Review No 09/2019 of 12 September 2019 on European defence, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the two Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2014 and 10 July 2018, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the sixth progress report of 17 May 2021 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the EU-United States summit statement entitled ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’ of 15 June 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Russia’s violation of Member States’ airspace and maritime borders, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to China’s increasing economic and military presence in the Mediterranean and African countries, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism, primarily from groups such as ISIS, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence, space capabilities and quantum computing which present new opportunities for mankind, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the final communiqué issued by the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) extraordinary summit of 8 September 2021, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 that aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0358/2021), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| A. | whereas in 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the rise in global threats and the Union’s vulnerability due to its external dependencies; whereas the pandemic has expanded the concept of security and strategic autonomy to cover health, technological and economic concerns; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| B. | whereas Europe is facing a rapid and lasting deterioration in its strategic environment; whereas terrorism remains a major threat; whereas states are expressing their ambitions for more power and pursuing expansion strategies that involve the use of armed force; whereas the result of such strategies is a risk of militarising the sea, space, the Arctic and cyberspace, as well as reviving the arms race; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| C. | whereas the proliferation of cyber-attacks against strategic infrastructure during the COVID-19 crisis, and more recently the Pegasus affair, are examples that justify the rapid development of protective measures against the most recent forms of cyber-threat and the most advanced spying techniques; whereas the EU has committed to investing EUR 1,6 billion in response capacity and the deployment of cybersecurity tools for public authorities, enterprises and individuals, and to increasing cooperation between the public and private sectors in this field; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| D. | whereas Parliament, as the forum for the expression of European democracy, is a target; whereas the digitalisation of activities resulting from teleworking during the COVID-19 pandemic has only increased our exposure to current threats; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| E. | whereas, through the military capabilities of its Member States, the EU has a total budget of EUR 395 billion, putting it in second place globally; whereas Europe’s capabilities are fragmented and suffer from duplication, gaps and a lack of interoperability; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| F. | whereas the increasing complexity of threats is linked to technological development, the digitalisation of societies and the integration of international economies; whereas, as a result, hybrid threats are proliferating, combining military and/or non-military means such as disinformation, the use of migration for blackmail, cyber-attacks or economic pressure that run counter to European interests and values and constitute a growing threat to the security of the EU, its enterprises, its public services and its citizens; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| G. | whereas, in order to address the risks of crisis that are multiplying at the Union’s borders and in the areas in which it has interests, the Member States have committed to providing rapid response capabilities in line with the EU’s headline goals, in particular battlegroups; whereas these suffer from various limitations in political, organisational and financial terms; whereas, as a result, they have never been deployed; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| H. | whereas an unprecedented build-up of Russian forces in and around Ukraine linked with demands put forward by Kremlin could — if not countered — lead to the return of spheres of influence in Europe and cut short the ambitions of the EU’s eastern partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, to join NATO; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I. | whereas the international community, and especially the EU, has a commitment to the Sahel and to Mali in particular; whereas the Malian junta has welcomed and already uses Russian military instructors and mercenaries connected to the so-called Wagner group to participate in military activities in Mali; whereas that firm has committed atrocities in every location where it has intervened; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| J. | whereas the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return to power of the Taliban is leading to an increased terrorist risk for the region and also beyond it; whereas the EU deployed a CSDP mission, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) from 2007 to 2016), and granted EUR 17 billion to Afghanistan; whereas during the withdrawal, Member States depended on the United States, which deployed 6 000 soldiers to secure Kabul airport within a very short time, making it possible to evacuate European citizens as well as Afghan nationals who were in danger; whereas, in this situation, the EU was unable to put an air bridge in place or to coordinate its own evacuations; whereas if the EU had to run an operation similar to the evacuation from Kabul, it would not, as things currently stand, be able to take decisions swiftly, deploy troops or successfully implement evacuations or air bridges effectively and proactively; whereas, therefore, the EU and its Member States must urgently learn all the lessons of the Afghan crisis in order to strengthen the EU’s capacity to act autonomously in similar circumstances; whereas the Strategic Compass should make it possible to set the EU’s level of ambition, in particular in terms of the lessons learned from the Afghan failure; |

Developing an EU security and defence doctrine using the Strategic Compass to drive strategic autonomy

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. | Stresses that the EU is facing:  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | new and evolving threats emanating from both state and non-state actors in a multipolar world, such as terrorism, the rise of authoritarianism, hybrid threats through hybrid warfare means such as cyber-attacks, and the instrumentalisation of migration, disinformation and foreign interference, which have blurred the lines between war and peace, increasing threats to natural resources, energy security, and climate change; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | increased militarisation around the world, with recurring global power competition with an increasing military dimension and rising geopolitical tensions, an age of ‘unpeace’ characterised by hostile competition, reduced disarmament efforts and international arms control regimes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, and the use of chemical weapons; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | a still unstable neighbourhood, both in the East and in the South; |   considers that instability and unpredictability on the Union’s borders and in its immediate neighbourhood (North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, etc.), as well as in its extended neighbourhood (Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.), together with Russian aggression against Ukraine and Georgia pose both a direct and indirect threat to the security of the continent; stresses the inextricable link between internal and external security; acknowledges that active engagement in the neighbourhood is in the interests of the European Union; stresses the importance of stability in the Western Balkans; notes with concern the increasing militarisation of the Crimean Peninsula and the attempts by the Russian Federation to destabilise the Black Sea region; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2. | Strongly condemns the Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine, as well as the Kremlin’s demand to halt the further expansion of NATO and reshape the European security architecture based on an outdated idea of ‘spheres of influence’; underlines the fact that each democratic country is free to choose its own alliances and in this regard, strongly supports the pro-western aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, including their membership of NATO and future EU accession; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3. | Notes that 2020 was dominated by the COVID-19 pandemic and numerous challenges to the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy, which exposed our insufficient coordination and dependencies on the rest of the world; stresses that the EU must learn lessons from this with a view, in particular, to reinforcing digital and technological sovereignty and overall strategic autonomy as an international actor, and its capacity and willingness to decide and act autonomously, if needed, in foreign affairs, security and defence matters and to re-evaluate its dependencies on actors that do not share the same values; reiterates the need for the Union to also strengthen its autonomy in healthcare; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4. | Welcomes the launch of the work on the Strategic Compass, an unprecedented strategic reflection exercise, which should be completed in March 2022; stresses that the development of the Strategic Compass is a starting point for implementing a common European defence in line with the provisions laid out in Article 42(2) TEU, and for defining CSDP, and that it should constitute a major step towards a genuine European defence union which takes into account the specific constitutional situation of some Member States; considers that the Strategic Compass should develop greater cohesion in the sphere of security and defence; stresses that — in a highly multipolar world with increased competition between superpowers — the combined weight of the Union can contribute to ensuring the security of EU Members and that a robust EU defence policy is needed for the EU to have the means to effectively work towards peace, human security, democracy and sustainable development; highlights that a European defence union would be a part of the EU’s stated objective of achieving strategic autonomy; notes that, in this context, the response to the external security challenges of the Union and its Member States lies primarily in the affirmation and practical implementation of capacities for a better assessment of crisis situations, faster decision-making and more robust action where circumstances so require, autonomously where necessary, in order to defend its interests and values, while respecting alliances and partnerships; notes that it would develop greater coherence of the Union in security and defence; believes that there is an urgent need to develop a true European security and defence union which encompasses all military and civilian security aspects, instruments, budgets and capabilities and the whole cycle of conflict from prevention to post-conflict stabilisation, and which is based on a modern, progressive and strong human security concept which addresses the security demands of EU citizens, local populations and the security and stability of state institutions; urges the EU to enhance its institutional capacities for conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and de-escalation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 5. | Emphasises the importance of supporting it with a 360 degree threat analysis; stresses that the Strategic Compass must be the EU’s ambitious response to this analysis, whose findings must be subject to a regular and realistic review aiming to develop a mechanism for a continuous threat assessment and parliamentary consultation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 6. | Stresses that the Strategic Compass must make it possible to strengthen the Union’s capacity to act as an increasingly credible strategic partner and a global actor for peace which strengthens and defends a rules-based international system and multilateral cooperation, as well as the ability to act autonomously if necessary; stresses that this exercise must be regularly updated and set out an ambitious course, with the aim of being realistic and operational and include a timetable for the implementation of decisions and monitoring mechanisms; stresses that the exercise must enable the Union to make consistent and effective progress towards a coherent defence policy, a common strategic culture, a common understanding of the EU’s strategic challenges and the capacity to anticipate threats, and provide for rapid and coordinated reaction, future scenarios for intervention and a capacity for autonomous resilience so that the EU is able to mobilise resources on the basis of solidarity, in line with the Treaties, when a Member State is threatened and when international peace, security and stability are challenged outside the EU, and ultimately to ensure the protection of European citizens, interests and values; recalls that the EU’s current level of ambition for security and defence, as set out in the 14 November 2016 Council conclusions, includes responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and ‘protecting the Union and its citizens’; underlines the importance of the integrated approach as a basis of the EU response to conflicts and crises; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 7. | Stresses the importance of Parliament, particularly its Subcommittee on Security and Defence, receiving regular updates and reports on the implementation of the Strategic Compass from the European External Action Service (EEAS) once the Strategic Compass has been approved in March 2022; |

CSDP missions and operations in 2020 — assessment and recommendations

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 8. | Recalls that the Union is currently deploying 11 civilian missions and seven military missions and operations; recalls that only three of these are operations with an executive mandate: European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia Operation ATALANTA, EUNAVFOR Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) and the EU military force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA); recalls the EU’s overall engagement in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa through six civilian missions (the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Somalia) and six military missions (the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), EUTM Somalia, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI); notes that these missions and operations have not yet realised their full potential and are suffering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected their activity and limited their effectiveness; suggests that the budget, planning and equipment of EU CSDP missions and operations be assessed in the light of the lessons learned from COVID-19 and therefore considers a review of results and possibly adapting their mandate as part of the standard strategic review of a mission; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 9. | Underlines the importance for the Union of sustainable stability, human security and prosperity in its neighbourhood; notes that CSDP military missions are now almost exclusively focused on the training of armed forces (EUTMs), with no executive dimension and limited support; considers that, without affecting the non-executive dimension of these missions, their mandate should be strengthened, emphasising coaching, in order to enable European advisers to verify on the ground as precisely as possible whether the training programmes have been properly implemented and whether they are in line with the operational needs of the local armed forces; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 10. | Stresses that the delivery of arms under the umbrella of the European Peace Facility should be in full respect of the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, and include effective transparency provisions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 11. | Deplores the actions of the coup leaders in Mali; is deeply concerned at the lack of essential state services in Mali and in the Sahel in general; expresses its deep concern at deteriorating security in the region; is deeply concerned by the UN Secretary-General’s reports which list serious past and ongoing human rights abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including alleged war crimes, committed by armed groups including terrorist groups, Malian armed forces and other G5 Sahel armed forces; deeply deplores impunity in this respect and underlines that such ongoing crimes also undermine European and international efforts to create a secure and safe environment and combat armed groups and terrorists; stresses the increasing involvement of hostile actors in a region that is vital to our security, which could jeopardise the EU and Mali’s common objective of human security, peace, stability and sustainable development in the country, where other actors that do not necessarily share the same ethical principles as the EU and its Member States are willing to fill capability gaps, regardless of respect for the rule of law international standards or the law of war; expresses its grave concern at the growing influence of foreign private military companies and the possible plans of the Malian government to initiate cooperation with a private Russian military company, the Kremlin proxy Wagner Group, on training of its armed forces; points out that such cooperation is incompatible with security and defence cooperation with the EU, in particular EUTM Mali, and would therefore require the EU to reassess its engagement in Mali; urges the current Malian authorities to refrain from contracting the Wagner Group and allowing its personnel to enter Malian territory; underlines, more generally, the need to closely monitor the actions of private security and military companies which are increasing their global footprint in vulnerable areas including Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, and recalls the importance of keeping Parliament briefed on the matter; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 12. | Notes the announcement of the reorganisation of French military action in the Sahel, in conjunction and in consultation with our international and African partners; stresses that these developments should take place in close consultation with all international partners, particularly European ones, present in the Sahel; welcomes the continued commitment of the EU and the Member States to the stabilisation of the G5 Sahel countries, in particular through support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, by strengthening the EU’s CSDP missions and the growing involvement of European Member States’ armed forces in the Takuba Task Force; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 13. | Welcomes the adaptation of the new extended mandate of EUTM Mali; calls for strengthening structural cooperation and non-executive support to the armed forces and for speeding up the regionalisation process which enables the mission to provide military assistance to the armed forces of the G5 countries and in particular to Burkina Faso and Niger, which will have implications for international, European and African partners; underlines the possibilities opened up by the European Peace Facility with regard to the delivery of equipment intended for the training of the Malian armed forces, which will be essential for strengthening the action and the effectiveness of European action; is convinced that the EU needs to rapidly and effectively increase its capabilities to provide equipment so that EUCAP and EUTM missions do not lose their credibility with local authorities, provided that those security forces comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and are under democratic control; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 14. | Calls on the Member States to provide a significant contribution to EUTM Mali's consultancy activity and to send the staff able to contribute to it; recalls that in the Sahel, the regionalisation process of CSDP must continue to strengthen cooperation and coordination with international actors as well as with the EU Member States involved in the region, through ongoing initiatives such as the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S); underlines that the EU is also providing robust support for the operationalisation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and its related police component; welcomes the new EU Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, which includes a broader approach focused on strengthening governance and which places particular emphasis on the need to reinforce state presence and public services in the countries of the region; underlines the efforts made by EUCAP Sahel Mali to support the deployment of Malian security forces in central Mali; underlines the efforts of EUCAP Sahel Niger to assist Niger with the development of a national defence and security policy; recalls that the regionalisation of CSDP actions supports the EU’s integrated approach to the Sahel and that, as such, the actions of the regional advisory and coordination cell (RACC) must continue; believes that a regionalised approach to the CSDP in the Sahel is relevant but requires clearer organisation and coordination between current CSDP civilian and military missions, local actors and other international organisations such the UN peacekeeping mission — the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) — and the operations led by the French military; insists that a substantial effort to assist Burkina Faso is required, given the intensity of the threats that faced by this country with limited capacity; recalls that to be lastingly effective, military and security responses must be accompanied by concrete and visible measures to provide essential services for the population; underlines the importance of being able to more actively support the states bordering the Gulf of Guinea so that they can to counter the growing terrorist threat they face; stresses the need to pay particular attention to the growing instability in the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa regions and the important implications that developments in these regions have not only for the African continent but also for the European Union; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 15. | Welcomes the discussions under way on the participation of Mozambique and India in CSDP missions and operations in Africa; welcomes Georgia’s active participation in the CSDP actions and in particular its participation in training missions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 16. | Recalls that the security situation in Somalia is of great concern and a source of destabilisation throughout the Horn of Africa and even beyond; stresses that Al-Shabab remains one of the most powerful terrorist organisations linked to Al-Qaeda and that this should encourage Member States to consider greater participation in European missions and operations in this strategic region and the provision of the assets needed for them; stresses that strengthening the framework of EUTM Somalia with an advisory capacity in command structures allows for significant influence to be exercised on how operations are carried out within the multilateral military assistance framework; stresses that EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUCAP and EUTM Somalia form a coherent whole supporting the Union’s Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa; welcomes the crucial role played by Operation ATALANTA in the fight against piracy and trafficking in the Horn of Africa, thereby successfully protecting World Food Programme Vessels as well as that of EUCAP Somalia in advising the federal and regional authorities of Puntland and Somaliland on the development of coastguard activities and maritime police; underlines that the EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa region remains relevant for strengthening the capacity of Somali security forces and also notes the need to improve their effectiveness; welcomes and further encourages the participation of like-minded partners in order to ensure safe waterways in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean; calls for an integrated approach to tackle the development and governance issues driving piracy; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 17. | Notes with concern the deteriorating political and security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR); calls for the restoration of an inclusive dialogue between the Government, the democratic opposition and civil society, and for the revitalisation of the peace agreement; deplores that since 2018 the President of the CAR has turned to the Wagner Group, a private military company and Russian proxy, which is responsible for war crimes and grave violations of human rights in the CAR; is concerned about the impact of this decision on the viability and effectiveness of the training mission for Central African troops; denounces the growing threats and hostile incidents targeting the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by certain local and foreign armed forces, including foreign security companies, and the disinformation campaigns targeting Union action; welcomes and fully supports the establishment of the EU Advisory Mission in the CAR (EUAM RCA); welcomes the action of the EUTM mission, in particular the training of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and its contribution to the overall process of security sector reform (SSR) coordinated by MINUSCA, and fully supports it; insists on the need to communicate with the population on the objectives and progress of the mission; stresses the importance of assessing the real capacity of the EU to respond to the FACA’s equipment needs, as part of the strategic review to be held in the first half of 2022; insists that support within the framework of the European Peace Facility for units formed by the EUTM must be conditional on the CAR authorities promoting positive developments in the political, internal and regional situation; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 18. | Recalls the strategic importance of the Mozambique channel; welcomes the commitment of the Member States and the VP/HR to respond to the growing terrorist threat in Cabo Delgado and is concerned about the risk of this threat spreading in the area; welcomes the decision of the Council to launch the European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique); notes the use of the European Peace Facility to cover the common costs of EUTM Mozambique and to provide military equipment; calls on the Council and the EEAS to make the best use of the European Peace Facility and take advantage of this experience for the improvement and expansion of the European Peace Facility in the future; notes that the EUTM meets a specific objective, namely training special forces units to combat the Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region, including the jihadist movement Ansar al-Sunna; calls for its deployment as soon as possible given the situation; urges Member States to contribute to the force generation for the mission more equitably; underlines the need for a comprehensive long-term coherent strategy for Mozambique, which also needs to fight Islamist insurgencies to address governance deficiencies and development needs in order to achieve a sustainable solution to the conflict; stresses the need to make sure that the government forces abide by international humanitarian law and that perpetrators of extrajudicial executions, acts of torture, looting and other abuses are brought to justice; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 19. | Welcomes the Council’s unequivocal commitment to Operation EUFOR Althea as stated in its conclusions of 18 October 2021 with the renewal of operation Althea in 2020 and with the refocusing of its mandate to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) authorities to maintain a safe and secure environment, as well as through the third strategic review of the operation presented in June 2021; recalls that this mission paved the way towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of BiH, and that this mission still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of BiH and the region; recalls that the experiences and lessons learned from this mission are of substantial value to all current and future military and civilian CSDP missions and operations; is alarmed by possible unconstitutional and secessionist actions by the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, Milorad Dodik, which undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement and therefore security and peace in the region as a whole; stresses that a sufficient over-the-horizon reinforcement capability still needs to be maintained in order to allow for a rapid reaction in case the security situation deteriorates; notes that this mission could be enhanced by secure information and communication channels to Member State capitals and the improvement of open source intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities; stresses the importance of continuing secondary demining activity and the collective training of BiH armed forces; urges the Member States to fulfil their commitments regarding force generation for Althea; looks forward to Ukraine’s participation in the Althea mission; recognises the important cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, notably through EUFOR Althea mission, whose operation headquarters are located at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) thanks to the Berlin Plus Arrangement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 20. | Notes with satisfaction the results of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia); approves its extension for a period of two years; stresses the need for further reflection on CSDP commitments in the region; strongly condemns Russia’s illegal occupation and militarisation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia in violation of international law, which poses a serious threat to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region and Europe as a whole; is concerned about the deteriorating security situation in the occupied territories of Georgia and about the activities of the Russian Federation, which are destabilising peace and security in the EaP region; urges the EU to keep demanding Russia to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and to fulfil its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular to withdraw all its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia; denounces illegal detentions and kidnappings of Georgian citizens and the increased ‘borderisation’ activities along the Administrative Boundary Line; is concerned about the disinformation campaigns targeting the EUMM Georgia mission and calls for strengthening its capacities for monitoring, analysis and strategic communication; reaffirms its unwavering support to the EaP countries, and in particular for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders; encourages the EU to strengthen its engagement in peaceful conflict resolution throughout the EaP region; reiterates its call for the EU to ensure that the security dimension of EaP countries is properly reflected in the Strategic Compass and to consider launching a series of security compacts — frameworks for increased investment and assistance in security, military, intelligence and cyber cooperation — with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as associated countries, in order to strengthen their resilience and security; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 21. | Notes the reinforcement of the EU advisory mission in Iraq (EUAM) with the inclusion of support to the implementation of the internal security reform and the implementation of national strategies to fight and prevent terrorism (including the fight against violent extremism) and organised crime, with specific reference to border management, financial crime, in particular corruption, money laundering and trafficking in cultural heritage property; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 22. | Calls for the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and to clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that in Iraq, depriving some communities of their cultural heritage and historical roots has made them more vulnerable to radicalisation; recalls that EUAM Iraq is the only CSDP mission or operation that has a cultural heritage protection component included in its mandate in order to provide assistance and education to local partners in addressing security challenges related to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a similar component in other missions and operations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 23. | Encourages the deployment of members of the European Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) mission to Tripoli, from which it will carry out its activities; proposes that this mission, which is engaged in supporting the Libyan authorities to dismantle the organised criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism in the areas of border management, should continue to explore within the framework of a regional strategy the possibilities of support for the EU-led development of the border capacities of the Sahel States in connection with CSDP missions in the Sahel (in particular EUCAP Sahel Niger); express its concerns at the fate of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Libya; calls for the closure of detention facilities for migrants by the Libyan authorities and militias; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 24. | Welcomes the launch of the CSDP operation in the Mediterranean, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI and its renewal until 31 March 2023; stresses its key role in the implementation of the arms embargo on Libya in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2526 (2020); highlights that capacity building is disrupting human and weapons trafficking; the fact that, in 2020, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI received many refusals to allow inspections, even on Turkish vessels; calls for a transparent communication from the EEAS on this issue; notes that to date EUNAVFOR MED has very few assets, significantly limiting its capabilities; is concerned by the fact that NATO, which is active in the area through Operation Sea Guardian, is not effectively collaborating by means of increased cooperation cohesion or by sharing information and resources; stresses the strategic importance of public communication about the mission and its boardings of vessels, friendly approaches and inspections, including refusals; stresses the international obligations on search and rescue of people in distress at sea in full compliance with maritime law; calls for the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean, having become an actor able to guarantee the stability of the region; welcomes the results of the EU Liaison and Planning Cell (EULPC) in providing security, intelligence and planning expertise to EU actors in Brussels and on the ground or at sea(EU delegation, EUBAM, EUNAVFOR MED) and to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL); |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 25. | Regrets Turkey’s overall destabilising role in many areas of concern in the EU and its neighbourhoods, which threatens regional peace, security and stability; is extremely concerned by, and strongly condemns Turkey’s illegal activities and threats of military action against EU Member States, in particular Greece and Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean and its newly announced illegal activities within Cypriot and Greek maritime zones; notes efforts to de-escalate tension, but regrets provocative actions, threats of aggression against operation MED IRINI by Turkish military vessels, in violation of international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States; reiterates the Union’s readiness to use all instruments and options at its disposal, including those under Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States, as well as to uphold regional stability; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 26. | Commends the work of European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes the EEAS’s needs assessment report on the professional military education (PME) sector in Ukraine and welcomes the ongoing work in scoping possible EU engagement in Ukraine on its basis, complementing the efforts made by Ukraine and its international partners in reforming PME the country; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 27. | Calls for a revitalisation of the civilian CSDP through the implementation of the 22 commitments in the Civilian CSDP Compact; stresses that the Strategic Compass must set the ambition of renewing the civilian CSDP, and that Compact 2.0 should be adopted in a timely manner; supports the idea that the Compass should outline fundamental aspects of civilian CSDP, including civilian capability development beyond 2023; supports the idea that strategic priorities for civilian CSDP should be linked to the annual review process of the Compact; stresses the need for a stronger link between CSDP, Justice and Home Affairs and Commission-led action, when appropriate and with due respect for the different tasks and procedures of both policies prescribed by the Treaty, and the other relevant crisis management actors in order to enhance CSDP contribution to the Union’s response to security challenges; calls on the EU to reflect and act on the current procedures for mission deployment with a view to making the decision-making process prompter and more efficient; believes that the EU should continue its comprehensive assessment of the EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Somalia and EUAM RCA civilian missions, and review their mandate, budget and human resources, ensuring that they meet real needs, in order to foster their operation ability and effectiveness; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 28. | Acknowledges the contribution of CSDP missions and operations to peace security and stability, but points to the persistent structural weakness and lengthy decision-making processes for CSDP civilian and military missions and operations; stresses the importance of providing military missions with more flexible and more robust mandates which are tailored to the situation on the ground; calls for changes to CSDP structures and procedures so that missions can be deployed in faster, more flexible and more coherent ways; underlines the urgent need for closer linkages between current ad hoc European operations and CSDP military missions or operations, especially when dealing with an urgent crisis or guaranteeing access to contested strategic areas; emphasises that any future mandates must have a clear a comprehensive exit strategy combined with a list of the resources needed for this purpose; stresses the need for all the missions, and in particular military missions, to work with locals to build capacity within reasonable time with a view to allowing a sustainable exit; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 29. | Stresses the need for regular, systematic and transparent evaluation of all CSDP missions and operations on the basis of relevant strategic and operational criteria; calls on the VP/HR to launch process to learn the lessons from past and ongoing missions, operations and actions, and to focus on which political, institutional, but also socioeconomic circumstances have to be met for security and defence actions to effectively support lasting peacebuilding and the strengthening of sustainable and democratic governance structures; considers it necessary to delegate more operational responsibilities for the conduct and management of missions and operations to their military command; calls more generally for EU military structures to be systematically involved in all policies and instruments with an impact on the operational engagement of European armed forces, and in particular in the work of the EDF Programme Committee; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 30. | Is deeply concerned about the low force generation for operations and missions, and strongly urges the Member States to address this matter as soon as possible; urges the EU and its Member States to give CSDP missions and operations the necessary personnel, training and capabilities to fulfil their mandates and to become more alert and more resilient under less propitious conditions; highlights in this regard the ‘Crisis Response Operation Core’ PESCO project currently under discussion, which aims to improve the force generation process; regrets at the same time that up to now only six Member States participate in this PESCO project; calls on the Council and the Commission to make full use of the European Peace Facility and possibilities for funding from the Union’s budget provided for by the Treaties in order to facilitate force generation as well as military deployments; supports third country participation in CSDP operations and missions when in line with European interests and values; believes that this participation should be expanded when and where appropriate; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 31. | Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats stemming in particular from Russia, and China, but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions and operations directly, destabilising whole regions and delegitimising the EU’s missions abroad; calls for a structured response to these threats by CSDP missions and operations as a matter of urgency; underlines in this regard the need for joint efforts by EU, Member States and partner countries, including in anticipation of hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, and of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks; welcomes the creation of the crisis response capacity reserve for CBRN incidents; urges the EEAS to provide concrete support to CSDP missions and operations through strategic communication; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 32. | Calls for the strengthening of the Union’s command structures, in particular the Military Staff (EUMS) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which must be provided with the necessary personnel, equipment and resources as soon as possible, and be able to exchange classified information in a secure way, including with Member States and missions or operations; deplores, in this regard, the postponement of the transition to phase 2 of the MPCC and calls on the Member States to fully honour their commitments to enable it; stresses the importance of making the MPCC a true fully-fledged command and control structure (HQ) as soon as possible, capable of providing a forward-looking and strategic anticipation function, of directing operations and European missions with the responsiveness and flexibility required by the strategic context and to strengthen the strategic operational autonomy of Europeans; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 33. | Highlights that women’s participation in CSDP missions contributes to the effectiveness of the mission and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of equal rights for women and men worldwide; calls for a more systematic implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and of UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), and for the strengthening of the EU’s WPS and YPS agenda; calls for meaningful gender mainstreaming in the formulation of the CSDP, in particular through a better gender balance in the personnel and leadership of CSDP missions and operations and specific training for the personnel deployed; calls for measures to ensure a working environment free of sexual and gender-based harassment; reiterates its call for gender analysis to be included in new CSDP instruments, including the European Defence Fund (EDF)and the European Peace Facility; welcomes the fact that all civilian CSDP missions have now appointed a gender adviser and calls on the military CSDP missions to do likewise; encourages EU Member States to put forward women as candidates for existing vacancies; regrets that the number of women working in CSDP missions and especially in military operations remains very low; urges the EEAS to promote the need for a concrete target for increasing the number of women in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations; urges the Member States to look at ways to strengthen recruitment and retention policies and promote women’s participation in peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions; stresses the need to include a new EU budget line that would finance the position of gender advisers in military CSDP missions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 34. | Awaits the joint communication on a strategic approach to supporting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, announced in the 2020 State of the Union (SOTEU) letter of intent, which it considers a timely revision of the 2006 EU Concept for Support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); underlines the importance of SSR as a priority, in particular for our CSDP missions; calls therefore on the Commission and the EEAS to enlarge the upcoming joint communication on DDR to SSR and capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD) in order to achieve a consistent, coherent and profoundly renewed Union approach towards security assistance for third countries; calls for consistency between CSDP instruments and EU development aid; |

Anticipating and managing crises

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 35. | Welcomes the cooperation capacity of European armies in helping citizens in the fight against the pandemic in 2020; is of the view that the valuable contribution of the armed forces during the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the importance of the use of Member States’ military assets and capabilities in support of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism; calls on the EU and the Member States to seriously consider and make full use of detailed arrangements for the implementation of Article 44 TEU in order to enable the Union to respond rapidly, effectively and with the necessary flexibility to security crises with a strong collective EU dimension, including by allowing an ad hoc operation that is already being carried out by a group of Member States to subsequently receive an ex post EU mandate; welcomes the positive pooling and coordinating role played by air forces during the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular transfers for medical treatment and deliveries of equipment between Member States, as well as the synergies created with NATO allies’ infrastructures and assets for airlifts and transportation of essential equipment; welcomes in particular the role of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) in the evacuation and transfer of patients and delivery of medical supplies during the pandemic; encourages generally the use of military air mobility, including transport, in-flight refuelling and aeromedical evacuation in Europe, which ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of military air transport efforts in Europe; invites, in this respect, Member States to consider the joint development of this strategic defence equipment and encourages the creation of an EU emergency military unit with the aim of facilitating the cross-border use of military logistical capabilities to face emergencies, in order to allow greater coordination, synergy and solidarity in the provision of assistance to civil support operations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 36. | Supports the ambition of creating a ‘rapid entry force’ advocated by the VP/HR which should include a multinational land brigade of around 5 000 troops and air, maritime and special forces components that can be mobilised in a security emergency; recalls that the EU today lacks the land, sea and air know-how and capabilities necessary to conduct first-entry operations to restore security in a theatre; believes that it is realistic and necessary that, as a first step, the Member States agree within the framework of the Strategic Compass on the circumstances which would make it necessary to mobilise such a force, and agree on one or several operational scenarios, including within extremely short timeframes; recalls, however, that in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding, , despite the possibility of deploying them on several occasions; recalls the need to make them operational by conducting regular field exercises; deplores the Member States’ lack of commitment to the battlegroups both in political and practical terms; criticises the fact that only one battlegroup, led by Italy, was operational in 2021; is concerned by the weakness of strategic planning for 2022 and 2023 and calls for its revision; calls for Member States to increase their commitment to the EU’s military capacities; states that the concept of a rapid deployment force needs to provide added value in comparison to EU battlegroups; calls, therefore, on the Council and the Commission to thoroughly assess, explore and develop options for setting up a standing force which is permanently stationed and trains together; believes that the new ‘rapid entry force’ should either be the result of the ambitious reform of the battlegroups or completely replace them in order to avoid further capability duplications in the EU’s CSDP; shares the level of ambition set by the VP/HR in terms of the robustness of the EU's military tools, especially ad hoc instruments; calls on the Council and the EEAS to study how to best organise the deployment of the EU battlegroups or a new ‘rapid entry force’, the implementation of Article 44 TEU, and the still unexploited operational component of PESCO; expects that the articulation of these elements must enable the EU and its Member States to rapidly and effectively respond to crises in its neighbourhood by military means, and conduct the tasks set forth in Article 43(1) TEU, also known as the Petersberg Tasks; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 37. | Stresses the importance of accurate and timely intelligence for supporting decision-making and ensuring secure missions and operations, and better combating influence and disinformation campaigns targeting them; calls on the EEAS to put in place an intelligence capacity in operations theatres by creating intelligence units in all CSDP missions and operations, which would feed intelligence in real time to the EU Intelligence and Analysis Centre (EU IntCen), the EUMS and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) to support decision-making; underlines, more generally, that the work of EU IntCen and EUMS Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT) is dependent on the willingness of Member States to share information and calls for EU IntCen’s financial and technical resources to be increased; agrees with the analysis of the Commission President in her 2021 SOTEU address that the EU needs to improve intelligence cooperation; stresses the importance of situational awareness and of coordination between national intelligence services, and welcomes the President of the Commission’s call for an EU joint situation awareness centre, a crucial tool to improve strategic foresight and the EU’s strategic autonomy; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 38. | Welcomes the establishment of the EPF in 2020; recalls that the EPF will be able to provide the Union with the capacity to respond more rapidly and effectively to current security challenges and therefore calls for it to be swiftly made operational; stresses that the requisite equipment, including lethal equipment where relevant and necessary, and training must be delivered in the relevant operation theatres, taking into account the geographically balanced nature of the facility, with full respect for the eight criteria of Common Position 944, human rights and humanitarian law, subject to a comprehensive ex ante risk assessment and permanent monitoring by the EU level of the supply of military technology to third country actors and effective transparency provisions; stresses that the EEAS must closely monitor and ensure the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to our partners under the EPF, bearing in mind the EPF’s 360 degree approach; points out that the EPF does not solely address the provision of equipment to partners but also functions as a funding option for the common costs of military operation within the CSDP that should be used to the necessary extent; undertakes to ensure coherence and complementarity between CSDP missions and operations, the Union’s financial instrument NDICI and the EPF; reiterates its call for the creation of a new administrative division within the EEAS to manage this new instrument; stresses the need to use the Strategic Compass to develop a clear vision on how the Member States want to use EPF in the short-, medium- and long-term; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 39. | Welcomes the EEAS roadmap of November 2020 on climate change and defence which includes concrete actions addressing the increasingly relevant climate/security nexus; underlines the increasingly frequent occurrence of natural disasters, global pandemics, or human-made disasters, which like cyber- and hybrid threats add to current security challenges and hence require additional resources; encourages the Union and its Member States to develop their capabilities to address these new challenges; stresses that addressing these new security challenges should not divert resources from traditional, conventional defence and security capabilities; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 40. | Considers the instrumentalisation of migration flows through the EU’s eastern external borders coupled with disinformation campaigns to be a form of combined hybrid warfare that aims to intimidate and destabilise the EU; calls on the Union to develop relevant legislation providing necessary safeguards to effectively react and respond to the instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes by third countries, to ensure the effective protection of the EU’s external borders and the protection of human rights and human dignity, and to adopt measures to prevent irregular crossings; reiterates its solidarity with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the face of the Lukashenko regime’s instrumentalisation of migration to destabilise the EU; |

A more resilient Union: ensuring access to contested strategic spaces and enhancing mutual assistance and security between Member States

Defending freedom of movement at sea

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 41. | Points out that, given current maritime geopolitical tensions, the Union must defend universal values and principles, the UN Charter, international law such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), multilateralism and international cooperation, and protect its interests by guaranteeing freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and offshore infrastructure; recalls that the Union’s maritime interests are closely linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its citizens, and that approximately 90 % of the Union's external trade and 40 % of its internal trade is transported by sea; underlines European Union’s competences and power, in particular normative, in the field of resilience; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 42. | Reiterates the need to strengthen the Union’s role as a provider of international maritime security; calls on the Union to build on and develop its CSDP naval operations in order to provide a strong platform to further develop a more permanent operational commitment at international level; calls for consideration to be given to the possibility of organising regular naval exercises that should combine manned and unmanned assets whenever possible in order to enhance interoperability; considers it very important for the Union to maintain a stable and secure environment in the seas surrounding it; notes with concern that the Coordinated Annual Defence Review (CARD) has recognised that maritime command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are ‘significant gaps’; welcomes the six PESCO projects focused on developing maritime capabilities, as well as the joint naval capability development programmes; underlines the need for the Union and NATO to cooperate closely to adopt an effective common approach to threats to maritime security, such as cross-border and organised crime, including organised criminal networks involved in trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs trafficking, smuggling and illegal fishing; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 43. | Welcomes, in this context, the launch of the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) concept and a pilot project in the Gulf of Guinea; calls for this concept, based on a needs analysis, to which includes the possibility of contributing to de-escalation of regional tensions, to be extended to other areas of interest, in particular the Indo-Pacific region, in order to ensure and safeguard Europe’s international stance and values; calls for this concept and relevant ongoing missions to be evaluated and debated in Parliament; also calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to security and defence aspects in the next update of its communication on international ocean governance scheduled for 2022; calls on maritime Member States to strengthen their military naval capabilities to address both asymmetric and conventional threats to maritime security, freedom of navigation and the EU’s blue economy; calls for the EU to update its maritime security strategy by 2022; welcomes the launch in early 2020 of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz mission (EMASOH), and supports its dual objective: ‘to guarantee a safe navigation environment, and to ease the current regional tensions’; welcomes the ‘comprehensive and coordinated’ strategic review of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia, and EUCAP Somalia and their extension, with a view to encompassing all security aspects; |

Countering hybrid threats

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 44. | Condemns the malicious acts committed against Member States, such as hybrid attacks instrumentalising migration; calls on the Union and the Member States to improve their capabilities to identify hybrid threats; insists that the Union and the Member States react firmly and in a coordinated manner against any new malicious, illegal or destabilising cyber-activity by making full use of the instruments available to the EU and in coordination with its partners; calls on Member States to improve national cyber defence capabilities; calls on the Union to work towards the creation of a legal instrument to respond to hybrid threats and to develop a comprehensive cyber-capacity including secure networks, communications and information-sharing, training and exercises, including through PESCO projects, and making good use of the EU cyber-diplomacy toolbox; calls for an urgent revision of the cyber defence policy framework in order to increase the prevention, attribution, deterrence and responsiveness capacity of the Union and its Member States by strengthening their position, situational awareness, tools and procedures; underlines the need for all EU institutions and EU Member States to cooperate at all levels to build a cybersecurity strategy, whose main objective should be to further strengthen resilience, and to develop common, and also better, national, robust civilian and military cyber-capabilities and cooperation in order to respond to lasting security challenges; welcomes therefore the 2021 SOTEU announcement of a European cyber defence policy; welcomes the increased cooperation among Member States on cyber defence in the framework of PESCO, including cyber rapid response teams; recalls that the successful implementation of EU missions and operations is increasingly dependent on uninterrupted access to a secure cyberspace, and thus requires robust and resilient cyber-operational capabilities, as well as adequate responses to attacks against military installations, missions and operations; recognises that, to a certain degree, cyber defence is more effective if it also contains some offensive means and measures, provided that their use is compliant with international law; is concerned about the dependence of the EU and its Member States on foreign tools to guarantee their cybersecurity; stresses the need to foster a cybersecurity culture within European public and private entities, including through the introduction of devoted courses and curricula; notes the important training work carried out by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) on cyber defence, and welcomes in this respect the establishment of the cyber education, training, evaluation and exercise (ETEE); stresses that ESDC should benefit from structural Union funding in order to be able to enhance its contribution to fostering the EU’s cyber defence skills, especially given the increased need for top level cyber experts; recognises the growing importance of cyber and automated intelligence capabilities; stresses that these are threats to all the Member States and EU institutions; urges all EU institutions and Member States to continue to improve their cyber and automated technologies, and further encourages cooperation on these technological advances; recommends that options to foster the cyber capability-building of our partners should be explored, such as extending the mandate of EU training missions to also comprise cyber defence issues or launching civilian cyber missions; welcomes the imposition of sanctions against Russian, Chinese and North Korean perpetrators of cyber-attacks, including WannaCry, NotPetya and Operation Cloud Hopper; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 45. | Calls on the EEAS to create an EU toolkit, in line with the European democracy action plan, intended not only to focus on enhancing Member States’ and stakeholders’ resilience to disinformation, but also to set mandatary requirements for social platforms and to allow citizens to make informed decisions, and also to improve the EU’s ability to strengthen the fight against disinformation and deliberate malicious behaviour, in order to identify attribute, deter, counter and sanction them; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 46. | Insists, in view of the evolution of this threat and the necessary adaptation of our institutions, that measures be put in place in the European institutions, including Parliament, to consolidate its internal capacities; stresses the importance of the inter-institutional coordination put in place by the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU Institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU); urges the European institutions, in particular the Commission, to make the necessary human resources available to strengthen CERT-EU; urges the VP/HR, in this regard, and/or the Member States to increase financial and personnel resources in order to strengthen the EU’s ability to defend itself against cyber-attacks; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 47. | Calls for mutual operational assistance between Member States to be enhanced; stresses the importance of carrying out additional exercises based on crisis management scenarios; urges Member States to reach, upon completion of the Strategic Compass, an ambitious common understanding on Articles 42(7) TEU and 222 TFEU, including on the activation of Article 222 TFEU and Article 42(7) TEU in a hypothetical cyberattack scenario; stresses, in this respect, that the conditions for activating Article 42(7) TEU and the modalities of the assistance required have never been clearly defined, and calls for a more operational implementation of this tool; |

Preserving the Union’s space and air sovereignty

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 48. | Calls on the Union to develop a space defence strategy in order to preserve the autonomous and undisrupted access of the EU and its Member States to space assets at all times; insists on the need to promote the emergence of a common European strategic culture of security and defence in space, to reduce strategic dependencies and to improve the operational governance of European space programmes, eventually aiming at strategic autonomy in all the other domains; supports initiatives aimed at boosting EU space policy, including the ambitious new EU space programme, which must seek to protect current and past European space assets; encourages the Union to improve its situational awareness and geo-intelligence support by strengthening its expertise capacities through the EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN) and those of the Member States in order to ensure the link between the CSDP and the EU space programme via Galileo, in particular the PRS and Copernicus, to take advantage of investment possibilities (in particular under Horizon Europe and the EDF) and to explore other possible synergies between space and defence (including capabilities); stresses the importance of the Union having autonomous access to space and its own launchers; insists that the Union should lead the way in strengthening the increasingly contested area of international space law; calls on the EU and its Member States to actively promote international initiatives on disarmament in space; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 49. | Warns that outer space has the potential to quickly become a military arena if the right international legal instruments are not put in place; insists that the Union should lead the way in strengthening the increasingly contested area of international space law, strive to prevent the weaponisation of space by working towards a comprehensive international legal instrument, and foster alliances, international cooperation and multilateral solutions in this regard; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 50. | Welcomes the proposal for a new European secure connectivity project, including quantum satellites; calls for the rapid completion of this project, in order to improve the level of telecommunications security in the Union; underlines the growing risk of cyber and physical attacks on European and Member State satellites; insists on the need to prevent such attacks and to put in place defensive mechanisms against them; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 51. | Is worried by the continued increase in space debris, especially in low orbit, which puts our satellite capabilities at risk, and by the number of microsatellites; stresses that new mega-constellations of satellites further increase the risk of collision; welcomes the work in progress on the development of a European policy for the management of space traffic, and calls for the intensification of negotiations in order to arrive at international responses to this; considers that one of the concrete achievements of such a policy should lead to an improvement in the capacity for monitoring space debris; suggests that SATCEN be commissioned to analyse and draft a report on the safety and/or vulnerabilities of the EU and Member State satellites to space debris, cyber-attacks and direct missile attack; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 52. | Notes the important work conducted by EU SATCEN; regrets that the funding of SATCEN missions cannot benefit from the long-term programming of the EU budget and stresses that EU SATCEN should benefit from structural Union funding to be able to maintain its contributions to the Union’s actions, in particular in order to provide high-resolution satellite imaging in support of CSDP missions and operations; considers that SATCEN's technological development needs should be taken into account in the EDF work programme; suggests creating a geospatial data analysis community within the framework of PESCO; believes that SATCEN must play a major role in this context; suggests that an agreement be signed by Parliament and SATCEN allowing Parliament to have access to the imagery and analysis services of the centre that it deems useful for information and for developing its positions and decision-making, in full compliance with SATCEN’s confidentiality and security procedures; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 53. | Insists that freedom of air traffic must be maintained; calls on the Union to protect itself against any threat to civil aviation or any failure to respect its airspace, and to defend international aviation safety in cooperation with NATO’s air policing mission and with the EU’s partners; calls on the VP/HR begin work to assess the advisability of extending the concept of a coordinated maritime presence to the air environment; |

Protecting strategic infrastructure

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 54. | Highlights the new threats facing Europe, including economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, elections interference and intellectual property (IP) theft; notes that these threats so far do not trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article 42(7) TEU, but that a collective response should be given to them; calls for increased European coordination to assess, analyse and prevent further hybrid attacks by some international actors; calls for current Union instruments to be made operational so that they can contribute more effectively to preventing and countering hybrid threats and to protecting critical infrastructure and the functioning of our democratic institutions, as well as to securing our supply chains, while considering current structures and a new possibility to execute collective countermeasures part of the wider hybrid toolbox; underlines the urgent need for European institutions, agencies and other bodies to develop their strategic communication capabilities, to equip themselves with secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity to attacks, and to greatly increase their resilience; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 55. | Calls on the Union to put into practice the lessons learned from exercises based on Article 42(7) TEU scenarios and to develop a flexible and non-binding analysis for its activation in order to strengthen mutual assistance and solidarity between Member States; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 56. | Stresses that optical fibre cables are the backbone of our digital economies in the internet worldwide, through which 97 % of all internet traffic passes; stresses that although these cables are a central and indispensable part of the EU’s critical infrastructure and are therefore of great geopolitical importance, they have recently been the targets of sabotage or foreign espionage operations; considers that the EU should prioritise the security and protection of these cables; calls for the EU to put in place an EU optical fibre cable security programme, including research, coordination, policy development, incident reporting, investigating and monitoring and coastguard training; points out that our modern economies in general, but also defence and security industries in particular, strongly depend on semi-conductors; welcomes in this regard the President of the Commission’s announcement that the shortage of semi-conductors should be addressed by strengthening research, design and production in the EU through a European chips act; strongly underlines in this context the role of the European defence and security industry in the EU, as it provides the means to guarantee the safety of European citizens as well as the sustainable economic development of the Union; welcomes EU efforts to achieve these aims and the creation of the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA); |

Developing civilian and military capabilities, improving processes and development and ensuring their coherence

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 57. | Notes that the pandemic has exposed our vulnerabilities, weaknesses and ongoing challenges; notes that the EU did not have the full capacities and capabilities to ensure the safe and coordinated evacuation of its citizens from Afghanistan during the chaotic military evacuation of Kabul International Airport; calls, therefore, for a thorough evaluation; calls for political willingness to also act during emergencies and crisis in a rapid, effective and clear manner and for a reduction in Europe’s strategic dependencies, including when they affect Europe’s capacity for military action; recalls the objective of strengthening the strategic autonomy of the European Union so that it can be a credible strategic partner, which is demanding and capable of defending its interests and values; welcomes in this regard the work and initiatives of the Commission and the activities of the EEAS; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 58. | Welcomes the progress made to allow the development of new European military capabilities in connection with the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) by strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which is crucial for achieving strategic autonomy; underscores the importance of a strong, competitive and innovative EDTIB, combined with the emergence of an EU defence equipment market which fully respects internal market rules and the EU’s Common Position on arms exports; calls on the Commission to learn the useful lessons from these instruments for EDF with the aim of achieving operational results; welcomes the adoption of the EDF Regulation and the clear rules it sets out; recalls the highly sensitive and strategic nature of defence research, both for industrial competitiveness and for the EU’s strategic autonomy; considers that in order to preserve the competitiveness of the EDTIB, it is essential to support the access of its companies to bank and non-bank financing; underlines that defence production is largely dual in nature and serves the civilian domain; calls on the Commission to ensure that the European ecolabel, while encouraging industry to be more environmentally friendly, preserves the competitiveness of the European defence industry, particularly since it plays an important role for the strategic autonomy of the EU; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 59. | Encourages the establishment of efficient governance involving the Commission and the Member States for the management of projects at both state and industry level; recommends to the Commission that it should explore options to ease the bureaucratic burden in order to facilitate participation of companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in EDF projects; encourages initiatives such as EDIDP, PESCO and EDF to facilitate SME involvement by increasing efforts to support incubation and capital investment; recommends setting up a joint mechanism for field testing of capabilities developed in the framework of EDIDP and EDF in order to facilitate the integration of these capabilities in national armies; welcomes the provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive (Directive 2009/81/EC) that aim to foster cooperative procurement in defence, and calls on the Member States to make full use of the development efforts undertaken under the EDF as well as to ensure that an adequate level of economies of scale is achieved; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 60. | Compels the Commission to continue its efforts to counter the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, which is still leading to unnecessary duplication and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence spending by the Member States; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 61. | Deplores the reduction in the amounts assigned under the MFF to the EDF and military mobility, which makes coherence between Union defence initiatives (PESCO, CARD, EDF and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)) even more necessary; stresses, in this regard, the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA); recalls the conclusions of the first CARD and, in particular, the importance of increasing consistency between European capability prioritisation initiatives and the national planning processes, especially in the long term, in order to genuinely meet the needs of the armed forces; calls on the Council and the Commission to further integrate CARD recommendations in future EDF work programmes and PESCO projects in order to improve coherence between these instruments; recalls, in this regard, the ultimate responsibility of the Member States to achieve the objective of coherence of the European capability landscape, in particular in the areas identified by the CARD report; recalls also the importance of the commitment of the Member States, made in different frameworks, to maintain a sustained pace of defence investment and to use the opportunities of the EDF to stimulate new investment; underlines that adequate levels of financial resources, personnel and assets are essential to ensuring that the Union has the strength and ability to promote peace and security within its borders and in the world; calls for a budget increase for the EDF after 2027; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 62. | Takes note of the launch of the NATO innovation fund on emerging and disruptive technologies, which was signed by 16 EU Member States and the UK; highlights that this fund addresses topics also covered within the EDF, and therefore calls on all participating EU Member States to ensure complementarity with the EDF in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 63. | Calls for EU Member States that are NATO Allies to aim to ensure that their national defence budgets amount to at least 2 % of their GDP; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 64. | Stresses that PESCO and the EDF are first and foremost tools at the service of the Union and its Member States; stresses that PESCO and the EDF must make it possible to enhance defence cooperation with high European added value between Member States; recalls, therefore, the objectives of strengthening the strategic autonomy of the Union, increasing the operationality of European forces and interoperability of defence systems, reducing the fragmentation of the capability landscape and the European defence market for these initiatives, supporting the competitiveness of the EDTIB, strengthening strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, improving operational capability and reducing fragmentation of the European defence market; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 65. | Regrets the accumulated delay in revising the decision on PESCO governance; recalls the need to develop financial incentives; recalls that third country participation in individual PESCO projects must be decided on a case-by-case basis, when such participation is in the strategic interest of the Union, particularly for the provision of technical expertise or additional capabilities, and be carried out in a highly conditional manner and on the basis of established and effective reciprocity; asks to be fully involved in the decision to open any PESCO project to third party participation; welcomes the initial stages of the military mobility project and calls for the subsequent stages to be implemented swiftly; welcomes the participation of the United States, Norway and Canada in the military mobility project; welcomes the bilateral partnerships on security and defence dialogue, in particular with Canada and Norway, two important contributors to CSDP missions and operations; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 66. | Stresses that the EDF must promote the build-up and consolidation of European industrial sectors and European industrial champions, and foster the competitiveness of SMEs by means of multiannual programming logic incorporating the development of technological and capability roadmaps in order to ensure the necessary predictability which is indispensable for complex long-term projects, and to take advantage of civilian-defence synergies; insists therefore on the need to establish synergies with different Union policies, and in particular Horizon Europe and the European space programme, in order to allow an effective concentration of EDF resources on military issues in a narrow sense; welcomes the Commission action plan for synergies between civil, defence and space industries, which promotes innovation in dual-use goods; calls on the Union and the Commission to systematically take into account the contribution of the EDTIB to the strategic autonomy of the Union in all its policies; calls on the Commission to also present a specific industrial strategy for the EDTIB; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 67. | Welcomes the fact that the PESCO strategic review has led to a reduction in the number of projects, which are more focused, and to an increase in its political monitoring; reminds Member States of the importance of meeting their commitments in this framework in order to make projects more efficient and achieve full operational capacity on schedule, and in particular before 2025; expects therefore the next strategic review to also include a thorough assessment which must lead to the delivery of PESCO project results; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 68. | Backs the Commission proposal for VAT exemption for defence equipment designed and developed within the EU, which is a positive measure seeking to standardise practices at global level and foster European strategic autonomy; |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 69. | Considers that the Strategic Compass capabilities basket should have the following objectives:  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | define clear priorities for the revision of the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and subsequent cycles of the main objectives (i.e. Headline Goals (HLG)), |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | streamline the planning and capability development processes (CDP, HLG/High Impact Capability Goal (HICG), PESCO, CARD) and maintain coherence of results with the relevant NATO processes, in particular the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | integrate EU military capability development processes, defence planning processes, and make the best use of EU defence initiatives through PESCO and CARD, |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | focus on a small number of projects which are consistent with CSDP objectives, are needed for achieving EU’s level of ambition, strengthen Member States’ capabilities, are operational and provide European added value; | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 70. | Stresses that the digital sector is an area of opportunity where there are also significant threats of malicious action against our security and democracies by state and non-state actors, erasing the lines laid down in the law of armed conflict, and that this sector transcends borders; believes that it is necessary to go further to guarantee Europeans’ access to this now disputed sector, and to develop a culture of security and solidarity between Europeans as well as effective tools to achieve this; calls for particular attention to be paid to the impact of emerging technologies so as to ensure that they are applied and used throughout the Union, facilitate research and innovation and enhance the Union’s resilience, keeping in mind the need to control their use and specifically to:  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | analyse the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on security and defence, including the malicious use of this type of technology and the use of AI by Member States against these threats; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | underline the importance of an innovative and competitive EDTIB (which is the means to respond to the needs defined by Member States and the EU) as well as to identify strengths and vulnerabilities; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | ensure the security of supply chains (both inside and outside the EU), including for raw materials, critical components and technologies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | — | share alerts, information and threats in real time through the connection of operational centres; | |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 71. | Calls, therefore, for the EU to take the lead in global efforts to set up a comprehensive regulatory framework for the development and use of AI-enabled weapons; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the European Council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems; insists on the need to start international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons; supports work on lethal autonomous weapons systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which currently is the only international forum where these issues are discussed; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 72. | Welcomes the renewed commitment of the Member States to the Common Position as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 and underlines the importance of a thorough assessment of applications for authorisation to export technology and military equipment, in accordance with the criteria set out therein; notes that Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 and the corresponding conclusions of 16 September 2019 reflect a growing awareness among Member States of the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European level on arms exports; welcomes the efforts made to increase transparency and the public and parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports; calls for joint efforts to improve risk assessments, end user checks and post-shipment verifications; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 73. | Is of the firm view that, as the EU is increasingly ambitious on defence issues, there is a need for greater convergence and consistency in the Member States’ arms export policies; calls on Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment as been amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560, and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability; calls for a consultation mechanism to be put in place among Member States to assess compliance with the Common Position; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 74. | Takes note of joint efforts of some Member States to develop essential future capabilities outside the EU framework, in particular the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS); highlights that these projects are important for strengthening European military capabilities in general; highlights that the results of the first CARD, which identified modernisation and the acquisition of main battle tank systems as a focus area for cooperation; recommends that the Member States in question explore additional cooperation and funding possibilities at the European level, especially the EDF, in order to make full use of the European defence industries’ innovation potential and achieve greater economies of scale; considers in this context that the Tempest project led by the United Kingdom in which EU Member States also participate is an unnecessary duplication of FCAS and therefore encourages the states participating in both projects to combine both projects in order to a achieve economies of scale as well as to ensure interoperability between the EU and the UK; stresses in this context the necessity for close cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters, building stronger defence partnerships and supporting the autonomy of partner countries; |

Building stronger defence partnerships and supporting the sovereignty of partner countries

Defending multilateralism on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 75. | Calls for support to be given to strengthening and preserving the arms control architecture in Europe in a context of gradual erosion marked by the United States’ and Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies; calls for disarmament regimes and forums to be actively supported and strengthened in every aspect: universalisation, support for implementation, political and institutional support, and financial support; calls on the Union to pay particular attention to CBRN risk in the context of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with particular emphasis on the prohibition regime and conventional obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the fight against impunity; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 76. | Welcomes the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START Treaty) and laments the end of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF); notes the proliferation of hypersonic missiles; believes that the European Union should contribute to preventing an international hypersonic missile arms race; reaffirms its full support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime; reiterates its calls for the adoption of concrete and effective measures during the 10th NPT Review Conference; insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 77. | Reiterates its continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the best possible means of obtaining assurances of non-proliferation in Iran; welcomes the resumption of talks, and calls on all parties to return to full compliance; calls on the Union to ensure that obligations under the CWC are met by all parties and to fight against impunity; calls for the EU and its Member States to strive for a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention establishing verification mechanisms to be concluded; |

Strengthening dialogue, partnerships and cooperation on security and defence

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 78. | Stresses that the Union should adopt a strategic approach to its mutually beneficial partnerships based, in particular, on shared values and principles on the defence of its interests and its aim to achieve strategic autonomy; underlines that it is in the Union’s interest to act together with partners, in full respect of alliances, with strategic autonomy being a part of the multilateral framework; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 79. | Calls for even deeper cooperation with international organisations and in particular with the UN, including between CSDP missions and peacekeeping operations, especially on joint theatres; stresses the importance of cooperation with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on security; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 80. | Underlines the need to strengthen EU-US transatlantic cooperation on the basis of an equal partnership based on shared values and objectives, while respecting the other party’s autonomy, interests and aspirations; welcomes the establishment of an EU-US strategic dialogue on security and defence with a view to contributing to a mutually beneficial and balanced transatlantic relationship; welcomes in particular the ongoing or upcoming EU-US dialogues on China, Russia and the Indo-Pacific; stresses the operational dimension of the partnership and the importance of ensuring that the Union maintains its strategic autonomy, in particular as regards the United States’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR); welcomes the relevance of this format for dealing with hybrid threats; welcomes, in this regard, the involvement of third countries in the EDA on the basis of administrative agreements, provided that it is accompanied by legally binding quid pro quo measures and safeguards to protect the defence and security interests of the Union and its Member States; regrets the fact that there was scant consultation and information of EU Allies on the Afghanistan withdrawal and on the AUKUS trilateral security pact; underlines that this should remind the EU once more of the urgent need to deliver on EU defence in order to ensure the EU’s ability to be a global player for peace; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 81. | Points out that the necessary cooperation with NATO enshrined in Article 42(2) of the North Atlantic Treaty must develop with due regard for the specific characteristics and roles of NATO and the EU, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; calls for a stronger NATO supported by a stronger European Union (the European pillar within NATO) and wishes to see very tangible development in the EU-NATO partnership, particularly in view of the growing hybridisation of threats, and which should include parameters which are not directly military in the strategic competition in peacetime; acknowledges that for new threats on European soil, such as disinformation, IP theft, economic coercion or cyber sabotage, the European Union is strengthening its capabilities in order to become a security provider; stresses that the current strategic situation calls for NATO’s unequivocal support for European initiatives on defence, including capability, while respecting the prerogatives of each organisation; recalls the importance of fully implementing the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement and of allowing the communication of classified documents between both organisations; considers that the work being carried out in parallel on both the EU’s Strategic Compass and the expected update of NATO’s Strategic Concept represents a unique opportunity to establish clear priorities and coherence as well as identify additional synergies in order to strengthen the transatlantic bond and further EU-NATO cooperation; calls, in this context, for NATO’s new strategic concept to take into account and to be coherent with the EU’s Strategic Compass; recognises NATO’s role as the cornerstone of collective security for those Member States that are also NATO members; notes with concern, however, that deep and persistent divergences with one non-EU-NATO ally are hampering cooperation between the two organisations and undermining solidarity between the Member States, particularly in the strategic area of Eastern Mediterranean; looks forward to the new EU-NATO Joint Declaration; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 82. | Notes the potential exponential increase in threats from extremists following NATO’s withdrawal and the subsequent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan; calls for a thorough reflection on lessons learned from Afghanistan and for an active strategy in the region to mitigate the impact of Afghanistan being a new safe breeding ground for extremism and terrorism; reaffirms that every effort must be made to safeguard the security and human rights of Afghans and to protect them from violence, persecution and being killed; stresses the need to continue evacuations, in particular of those who have worked for the EU; notes that the withdrawal from Afghanistan has highlighted the need for the EU to increase its share of responsibility in global security, and for it to contribute meaningfully to strengthening its capabilities and capacities; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 83. | Calls for closer relations with the democratic states in the Indo-Pacific region, and in specific policy sectors (cybersecurity, hybrid, maritime, arms control etc.), with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with Latin American partners; highlights the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, which is of significant interest for EU; notes with increasing concern China’s steadily growing arms build-up and military posture, in particular the reported test of a hypersonic missile and the increasing violations of Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone; calls for all parties concerned to resolve their differences through peaceful means and to de-escalate the tensions as well as to refrain from taking unilateral action to change the status quo; calls on all parties to adhere to the principles of international law, most in particular UNCLOS; highlights the increasing relevance of disinformation originating in the Indo-Pacific which threatens to undermine EU activities in the region and therefore calls on the Council and the Commission to tackle this challenge in a similar way to disinformation originating from the eastern flank of EU; notes with serious concern the recent display of force and escalating tensions in regional hotspots such as the South and East China Sea and Taiwan Strait; underlines that peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific regions is of great importance to the EU and its Member States; expresses grave concern over China’s continued military manoeuvers in the Taiwan Strait, including those aimed at Taiwan or taking place in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone; calls on the PRC to desist from this military sabre-rattling, which poses serious threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region; reiterates the need for dialogue, without coercion or destabilising tactics by either side; stresses its opposition to any unilateral action that may undermine the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, and that any change to cross-Straits relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens; highlights that China’s increasingly belligerent attitude towards certain states and territories is a cause for concern; stresses that the EU should undertake an assessment of the possible consequences of a regional conflict on the EU’s security, which should also weigh up how the EU should respond to a deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; welcomes the currently ongoing discussion on Japan’s participation in EUTM Mali and Mozambique. and on Indian participation in African CSDP operations and missions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 84. | Welcomes the signing of the Strategic Military and Defence Cooperation Agreement between Greece and France as a positive step towards European strategic autonomy and the creation of a true and functioning European Defence Union; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 85. | Underlines the geopolitical importance of the Union taking lead responsibility for its regional stability, security and prosperity and preventing destabilising processes in the EU neighbourhood in the East, South and the Arctic; recognises the growing political, economic, environmental, security and strategic value of the Arctic Circle; urges the Member States to continue cooperation with the Arctic Council on all issues of interest to the EU and to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region; notes the emerging security challenges in the Arctic caused by the changing environment and the growing geopolitical interest in the region; underlines the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CSDP; stresses that the EU must have a clear vision of its role in Arctic security matters and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 86. | Acknowledges the importance of CSDP involvement in the Eastern Neighbourhood; supports the deepening of military and security cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries to maintain stability at the borders of the Union; reiterates its call for developing a more active EU role in the peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts and in the prevention of any future conflicts in the region; calls for support to be provided to Eastern Partnership countries and the involvement of interested Eastern Partnership countries in the activities of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; calls for setting up an EU Strategic Communications-Eastern Partnership cooperation platform to address issues related to tackling disinformation with a view to improving the resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 87. | Recognises the contribution of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to CSDP missions and operations; supports closer defence and security cooperation with these valued partners; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 88. | Reiterates its strong condemnation of Russia’s aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine, notably the substantial military build-up at Ukraine’s borders and in the Donbas, the occupied Crimean peninsula and Belarus, the continuous financial and military support for armed groups in the Donbas, the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the blockade of the Sea of Azov and repeated cyber and other hybrid attacks against Ukraine; underlines that Russia’s military build-up and repeated breach of the ceasefire represent a threat to peace, stability and security in Europe; calls on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces from the Ukrainian borders and stop threatening its neighbours; recalls that the Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements are the only diplomatic initiatives that aim to end hostilities between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk and calls for support for efforts to restart Normandy Format talks and achieve tangible results; commends the considerable efforts to sustain intense cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the United States and among Member States as regards the situation; calls for increased and credible military and security assistance to Ukraine, according to its needs, including by mobilising the European Peace Facility; encourages the Member States to increase their bilateral military and security assistance to Ukraine; acknowledges the first meeting of the EU-Ukraine cyber dialogue and stands ready to support, if needed, an increase in EU cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine; welcomes the launch of EU-Ukraine dialogue on cybersecurity and encourages similar engagement with other interested Eastern Partnership countries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 89. | Regrets the lack of a security and defence cooperation partnership between the UK and the EU on account of the British Government’s lack of interest, despite the assurances given in the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK; underlines the need for an agreement on EU-UK foreign policy and security cooperation in order to be able to better tackle common global security challenges; calls on the UK Government to open up negotiations for establishing strong cooperation on foreign policy, security, defence, and capability development; calls for a closer cooperation and stronger partnership to be built up with relevant African organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the Southern African Development Committee (SADC), G5 Sahel, the Pan African Parliament, promoting a greater parliamentary role in Africa; calls on the EU, further, to keep its commitments made at the Fourth EU-African Summit to support economic and political stability and to further support the capabilities of the African Standby Force; emphasises, given the cyclical nature of conflicts in the region, the need for more political engagement with the governments supported by the EU in order to ensure greater transparency, combat corruption, cultivate inclusivity and engage with citizens in an effort to curb the explosion of armed and ethnic conflicts in Africa; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 90. | Calls for cooperation on training and military capacity building with partner countries weakened by conflicts or regional threats or targeted by malicious foreign interference; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 91. | Recognises the role of the increased flow of illicit money to tax havens and the risk they pose in terms of increased militarisation, the financing of terrorist activities and worsening global instability; calls for more actions to curb money laundering, and empowering partners, especially in Africa and Latin America, by means of mechanisms to curb murky financial transactions involving tax haven authorities; |

Improving European governance of the CSDP

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 92. | Welcomes the fact that the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) has started operations; welcomes the announcement that a European Defence summit will be held in early 2022, as well as the fact that the President of the European Council declared 2022 the year of European defence; expects both initiatives to bring a new impetus for further development of the European Defence Union; calls on citizens, academia, civil society organisations and the private sector to express their expectations on CSDP architecture, peace, defence, the security agenda, the Strategic Compass and the role of the EU in the world in the course of the Conference on the Future of Europe; calls on EU institutions to take such expectations on-board by translating them into concrete proposals and actions; underlines the importance of improving the tools available to civil society for ensuring its meaningful involvement in the formulation and oversight of defence policy; calls for the establishment of a fully-fledged Security and Defence Committee in Parliament and for the formalisation of an EU Council of Defence Ministers; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 93. | Recalls the role played by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; calls on the Member States to assess a reform of the decision-making process, in particular Article 31 TEU, extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to EU foreign and security policy in areas relating to CSDP, as well as exploring the full use of ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance the EU's solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 94. | Points out that Parliament should be consulted in advance and be properly informed about the planning, modification and possibility of ending CSDP missions; underlines the need for Parliament to be actively involved in the evaluation of CSDP missions and operations with a view to reinforcing their transparency and their political and public support; considers that its recommendations should be duly taken into account; is determined to play its full role in scrutinising the Global Europe instrument, in particular its peace and security dimension, and in the implementation of the EDF; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 95. | Stresses the need to develop ever closer cooperation with national parliaments on CSDP matters in order to reinforce accountability and scrutiny and to strengthen defence diplomacy; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 96. | Stresses that Parliament should be regularly informed and consulted on the implementation of PESCO, given its essential linkage with the various financial instruments of the CSDP, in particular the EDF, over which Parliament exercises scrutiny; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 97. | Insists on the importance of effective linkages between different EU governance structures (Commission, EEAS, EDA, etc.), and on need to foster good relations with the European Parliament, as the sole body representing Union citizens, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 98. | Will pay particular attention to ensuring that the special nature of military affairs is better reflected in European Union law; recalls, to this end, that Parliament is in favour of preserving the military’s status, which meets the very specific requirements of the military profession and constitutes the guarantee of the armed forces’ effectiveness in each of the Member States; calls for the intelligence services’ intervention capacities to be preserved, as these services cannot carry out their task of protecting national security without retaining access to connection data provided in full, as a preventive measure, for a sufficient period of time and under the supervision of the national courts and the European Convention on Human Rights; takes notes of Council’s adoption of its general approach on the Single European Sky package; recalls the need to safeguard Member States’ sovereignty and European armed forces’ freedom to act; recalls, in respect of the provision of services, the national security imperatives relating to access, reliability and integrity of data, and insists that the inclusion of military safeguard clauses in EU regulations should make it possible to meet this twofold challenge; |

o

o o

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 99. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the European Commission and competent Commissioners such as the Commissioner for Internal Market, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of NATO, the EU agencies in the space, security and defence fields, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |

---

---

[Top](#document1)