Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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# 52013SC0425

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Annex VI to the IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations /\* SWD/2013/0424 final \*/**

  

Competitiveness proofing of EU
nuclear safety legislative revision

Ex-ante
evaluation of competitiveness impacts of the Commission's policy proposal on
revision of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) nuclear safety
legislative framework

Working
Paper

Client: European Commission, DG
Enterprise

Rotterdam, 10
September 2012

Client: European Commission, DG
Enterprise

Rotterdam, 10 September 2012

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Preface  4

1    Background and Objectives of the Study  5

1.1      Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom on a community framework
for nuclear safety  5

1.1.1    Contents of directive 2009/71  5

1.1.2    Impact Assessment Results for the original nuclear safety
Directive  5

1.2      Possible changes to the legislative framework  6

1.2.1    The interim stress test report and competiveness proofing  6

1.2.2    Baseline and revision scenarios  7

1.3      Objectives of the study  9

2    Description of the EU Nuclear Energy Sector 10

2.1      Nuclear power plants and nuclear power generation  10

2.2      Nuclear energy sector: vendors, regulators and research  13

2.2.1    Nuclear power plant vendors  14

2.2.2    Nuclear safety regulators  18

2.2.3    Technical support and research organisations  19

2.3      Value chains  21

2.4      Directly affected sectors: Productivity and competitiveness
performance  23

2.4.1    Nuclear plant operators/utilities  23

2.4.2    Providers of technology for nuclear power plants  27

3    Assessment of Competitiveness Impacts  31

3.1      Likely impact of proposed legislative revision on cost and
price competitiveness  31

3.1.1    Directly affected sectors  31

3.1.2    Indirectly affected sectors  34

3.2      Likely impact of proposed legislative revision on sectors
capacity to innovate  35

3.2.1    Directly affected sectors  35

3.2.2    Indirectly affected sectors  37

3.3      Likely impact of proposed legislative revision on sector’s
international competitiveness  37

3.3.1    Directly affected sectors  37

3.4      Summary of main impacts  39

Annex 1 –
Bibliography  41

Preface

Ecorys Nederland BV - on behalf of the
WIFO led Consortium – was contracted to conduct the study  d “Ex-ante
evaluation of competitiveness impacts of the Commission’s policy proposal on
the revision of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) nuclear safety
legislative framework”  under the framework contract n° ENTR/2009/033.

This working paper  presents the main
findings of the study, and includes a concise executive summary and
conclusions. The working paper serves as a direct input into the overall
regulatory impact assessment, to be finalised in September 2012 in time for the
IA Board meeting of October / November 2012.

The study team consisted of Drs. Koen
Rademaekers (team leader), Dr Floor Smakman (senior analyst) and Roel van der Veen
(junior analyst).

This study was commissioned and
financed but the European Commission. The views expressed herein are those of
the Contractor, and do not represent an official view of the Commission

1
Background and Objectives of the Study

In this chapter,
we describe shortly the current nuclear safety directive – the objectives of
this directive and the results of the initial impact assessment for this
directive – the proposed changes to the current legislation and the objectives
of this study.

1.1
Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom on a community
framework for nuclear safety

In 2009, the
nuclear safety directive ‘Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom on a community
framework for nuclear safety’ saw the daylight. The Council Directive
2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of
nuclear installations sets up a legally binding framework based upon internationally
recognised principles and obligations, underlying a nuclear safety legislative,
administrative and organisational system.

1.1.1
Contents of directive 2009/71

The objectives
of the directive, as stated in the original text are:

(a) to establish
a Community framework in order to maintain and promote the continuous
improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation;

(b) to ensure
that Member States shall provide for appropriate national arrangements for a
high level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the general public against
the dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations.

1.1.2
Impact Assessment Results for the original nuclear
safety Directive

The directive
2009/71 is aimed at establishing a regulatory framework on a community level
and ensuring some health related arrangements on a member state level. The
nature of the regulations is such that it will hardly affect the costs and/or
competitiveness of the nuclear sector. The (ex-ante) EC and UK impact
assessments of the directive thus find that the directive will have little
impact.

According to the
EC impact assessment[1], the
Euratom directive will have a positive effect on the competitiveness of the
nuclear sector. It is argued that implementing rigorous safety and quality
standards allows greater standardization of designs and shorter and more
predictable licensing processes, thus mitigating construction risks. These
decreased risks are thought to reduce the interest rates for loans for nuclear
operators.

A second impact
assessment of the Euratom directive was done by the Department of Energy and
Climate Change of the UK. Their conclusion regarding competitiveness is that
the directive “will not directly or indirectly limit the range of operators.
Nor will it limit the licence holders’ ability to compete or reduce their
incentives to compete rigorously.”[2]

1.2
Possible changes to the legislative framework

Following the
nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan, the
European Council of 24/25 March 2011 highlighted the importance of nuclear
safety in the EU and beyond. It concluded that the safety of all EU nuclear
power plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and
transparent risk and safety assessment ('stress tests').

It has also
mandated the European Commission to "review the existing legal and
regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and
"propose by the end of 2011 any improvements that may be necessary".
In response to this mandate, the Commission included initial views on potential
areas of legislative improvement in the Communication on the interim report on
the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ('stress tests') of nuclear power
plants in the European Union (Commission interim stress tests report) – Section
3 therein.

The nuclear
safety legislative revision process would complement or strengthen certain
aspects related to the regulation of nuclear safety, drawing from the results
of the EU comprehensive risk and safety assessments and the evolution of the
existing international trend supporting the improvement of the nuclear safety
standards and legislation. Important is that the requirements will be of a more
specific and practical nature than those in the current directive and as such, compulsory
to implement.

The revisions
are expected to aim at[3]:

·
Implementation of severe
accident management guidelines and emergency operating procedures for all plant
states,

·
Seismic and flooding
reinforcements

·
Increasing of
electrical autonomy in case of off-site power loss

1.2.1
The interim stress test report and competiveness
proofing

As stated in the
Commission interim stress tests report, the Commission sees scope for
legislative improvement in the following areas:

1)
Improving technical
measures for safety, and strengthening the necessary oversight to ensure full
implementation;

2)
Improving the
governance as well as the legal framework of nuclear safety;

3)
Improving emergency
preparedness and response;

4)
Reinforcing the EU
nuclear liability regime and

5)
Enhancing scientific
and technological competence.

The Commission
has made proposals for the first three areas, which are now subject to a
regulatory Impact Assessment under the guidance of an inter-service IA Steering
Committee, led by DG ENER.D1

The proposed
changes are likely to have a direct impact on nuclear power plant operators and
providers of technology for nuclear power plants, and an indirect impact on
electricity providers and consumers. Therefore, as part of the overall IA,
competitiveness proofing is necessary on selected policy options.

1.2.2
Baseline and revision scenarios

The policy
options to be studied include a baseline scenario of no legislative action and
a scenario with legislative action at the Euratom level. Both scenarios will
also have implications at Member States’ level (see table 1 below).

Table 1 Policy scenarios for competitiveness proofing

Euratom level || EU Member States level

Baseline scenario ||

· No new legislative action at Euratom level || · Continuing the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Directive – for the time being, due to the fact that the 2009 Directive had to be imple,mented by Member States into national legislation only very recently, little or no experience with practical implementation has so far been gained. However, the impacts are estimated to be marginal (compared to the situation before the introduction of the directive) due to the generic nature of the safety provisions of the Directive. · Implementing in parallel on a voluntary basis and in a non-verifiable manner the measures arising from the EU ‘stress tests’ process (i.e. national ‘stress tests’ results and specific recommendations of the peer review teams)

Legislative action at Euratom level ||

· Amending the existing Nuclear Safety Directive by complementing the General Safety Principles by introducing quantitative technical EU-wide minimum Safety Criteria in the Directive for the various stages of the lifetime of nuclear installations. Such criteria would then make the safety standards accessible for control (i.e. verifiable). || · Transposing the amendments to the existing Nuclear Safety Directive. · Implementing the amended Nuclear Safety Directive. · Implementing in parallel the measures arising from the EU ‘stress tests’ process (i.e. national ‘stress tests’ results and specific recommendations of the peer review teams).

Given the nature
of the 2009 EU nuclear safety Directive[4] and the
conclusions of the impact assessment, we assume that this Directive did not
significantly change the nuclear power sector (mainly due to the fact that the
– so far – voluntary IAEA safety principles can be assumed to have, although in
different ways, already been implemented by essentially all EU Member States.

For this study,
we take the investment plans as they existed before the Fukushima accident as a
baseline scenario, given the fact that essentially no data is available on the
impacts of the implementation of the initial Directive (see above). As such,
the impacts discussed in chapter 3, are the expected impacts related to
expected legislative action (as explained in table 1) or in other words, impacts
related to the post Fukushima period.

At this moment,
the European Commission is drafting the revision of the current directive in
response to the Fukushima accident, the exact contents of which are not known
yet.

The key areas
that are considered for improvement (and will most likely feature in some way
in the new legislation) were outlined in the European Nuclear Safety Regulators
group (ENSREG) Peer Review Report[5] based
on the stress tests performed on European NPPs. The report identified four main
areas of improvement at European level:

1)
European guidance on
assessment of natural hazards and margins. The peer review Board recommended that WENRA,
involving the best available expertise from Europe, develop guidance on natural
hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and extreme weather
conditions, as well as corresponding guidance on the assessment of margins
beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects.

2)
Periodic safety
reviews. The peer review
Board recommends that ENSREG underline the importance of periodic safety
review. In particular, ENSREG should highlight the necessity to re-evaluate
natural hazards and relevant plant provisions as often as appropriate but at
least every 10 years.

3)
Containment
integrity: Urgent
implementation of the recognised measures to protect containment integrity is a
finding of the peer review that national regulators should consider. The
measures to be taken can vary depending on the design of the plants. For water
cooled reactors, they include equipment, procedures and accident management
guidelines to:

-
depressurize the
primary circuit in order to prevent high-pressure core melt;

-
prevent hydrogen
explosions;

-
prevent containment
overpressure.

4)
Prevention of
accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences. Necessary implementation of measures
allowing prevention of accidents and limitation of their consequences in case
of extreme natural hazards is a finding of the peer review that national regulators
should consider. Typical measures which can be considered are bunkered
equipment to prevent and manage severe accident including instrumentation and
communication means, mobile equipment protected against extreme natural
hazards, emergency response centres protected against extreme natural hazards
and contamination, rescue teams and equipment rapidly available to support
local operators in long duration events

The measures
thus include a mix of investment and instalment of new equipment, development
of new procedures and management practices as well as regular reviews and
assessments based on clearly formulated guidelines. They would involve actions
at the level of the plant operators as well as at the level of national
regulators.

1.3
Objectives of the study
Objectives

This study aims
to provide an empirical ex-ante evaluation of the impacts of the proposed
options on competitiveness and identify corrective or mitigating measures if
needed in line with Task 3 of the specific contract on Competitiveness
Proofing: “Data collection and analytical work on the impact of the preferred
options on the competitiveness of EU industry.”

Competitiveness impact assessment dimensions

As stated in the
Commission’s Operational Guidance for Competitiveness Proofing the relevant
dimensions of competitiveness are:

1. Cost competitiveness (cost of inputs,
capital, and labour; other compliance costs; cost of production, distribution
and after sales service; and price of outputs).

2. Capacity to innovate (capacity to produce
and bring R&D to the market; capacity for product and process innovation;
and access to risk capital).

3. International competitiveness (market
shares internal and external markets; revealed comparative advantage).

The study assessed the impact of the policy
options along these three dimensions.

Scope

The study concerns a basic assessment, and
includes a qualitative assessment with basic quantification of the magnitude of
the impacts, their timing, duration and risks and uncertainties.

The sector concerned is understood to
include:

·
The EU nuclear energy
sector: power plant vendors, nuclear power plant operators / utilities, nuclear
safety regulators, technical support organisations (safe operations of plants),
and research / academia (knowledge base).

·
The sector’s product:
the safe generation of electricity at competitive prices for industry and
private consumers.

·
The sector’s value
chain across the lifecycle of nuclear generation - from uranium mining[6]  all the way to radio-active waste
management.

The focus
of the study has been on the following directly affected sectors:

nuclear
power plant operators and providers of technology for nuclear power plants

Indirectly
affected sectors included in the study are electricity providers and consumers.

Political
influences on the nuclear industry are beyond the scope of this study. This
study aims to assess the consequences of the revised directive, based on
economic considerations.

2
Description of the EU Nuclear Energy Sector
2.1
Nuclear power plants and nuclear power
generation

In 2011, the
nuclear power sector produced 27.4% of the EU’s electricity in 132 reactors[7]. About half of the generation capacity is
located in France, where over 75% of the electricity is produced in nuclear
power plants (NPPs). NPP are in operation in 14 EU MS.[8]

The amount of
nuclear energy produced in these NPPs was equivalent to just over 236.5 million
tonnes of oil equivalent power. Table 2 provides an overview of production by
MS.

Table 1   EU primary nuclear power generation\* 2005-2010 (1,000 tonnes of oil
equivalent)

Year Country || 2005 || 2006 || 2007 || 2008 || 2009 || 2010 || Share of total 2010

EU27 || 257,516 || 255,499 || 241,410 || 241,909 || 230,767 || 236,563 || 100.0%

Belgium || 12,277 || 12,032 || 12,440 || 11,754 || 12,181 || 12,367 || 5.2%

Bulgaria || 4,826 || 5,042 || 3,798 || 4,088 || 3,958 || 3,956 || 1.7%

Czech Rep. || 6,405 || 6,744 || 6,775 || 6,872 || 7,042 || 7,248 || 3.1%

Denmark || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Germany || 42,061 || 43,148 || 36,251 || 38,305 || 34,806 || 36,257 || 15.3%

Estonia || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Ireland || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Greece || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Spain || 14,842 || 15,510 || 14,214 || 15,212 || 13,610 || 15,991 || 6.8%

France || 116,474 || 116,128 || 113,430 || 113,357 || 105,693 || 110,539 || 46.7%

Italy || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Cyprus || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Latvia || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Lithuania || 2,713 || 2,279 || 2,582 || 2,597 || 2,846 || 0 || 0.0%

Luxembourg || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Hungary || 3,585 || 3,487 || 3,799 || 3,836 || 3,991 || 4,078 || 1.7%

Malta || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Netherlands || 1,031 || 895 || 1,083 || 1,075 || 1,091 || 1,024 || 0.4%

Austria || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Poland || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Portugal || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0 || 0.0%

Romania || 1,433 || 1,453 || 1,989 || 2,896 || 3,031 || 2,998 || 1.3%

Slovenia || 1,518 || 1,431 || 1,469 || 1,618 || 1,480 || 1,459 || 0.6%

Slovakia || 4,626 || 4,702 || 4,004 || 4,356 || 3,686 || 3,819 || 1.6%

Finland || 6,003 || 5,909 || 6,042 || 5,922 || 6,069 || 5,881 || 2.5%

Sweden || 18,670 || 17,277 || 17,275 || 16,480 || 13,458 || 14,917 || 6.3%

UK || 21,054 || 19,463 || 16,258 || 13,539 || 17,824 || 16,029 || 6.8%

\* The heat
produced in a reactor as a result of nuclear fission is regarded as primary
production of nuclear heat, or in other words nuclear energy. It is either the
actual heat produced or calculated on the basis of reported gross electricity
generation and the thermal efficiency of the nuclear plant.

Source:
Eurostat, SBS

The table
clearly illustrates the geographical concentration of the sector in some MS
(notably Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK, as well as several
of the newer MS).

It has been
estimated that the nuclear sector employs approximately 500,000 people in the
EU, directly and indirectly. Adding to this number "induced" jobs
then leads to a grand total of around 900,000 persons employed. The
corresponding total "valued added" for the European economy can be
estimated to be approximately 70 Billion per year.[9]

Age and cost structures of EU NPPs

Most of the
reactors in the EU27 have been constructed between 1960 and 1980, with only few
new constructions in the EU27 since 1990. The mean age of NPPs in the EU is
currently 28 years (Figure 1 ).

Figure 1 Age of the European
nuclear power plants as of 1 May 2012

Source: Schneider
and Froggatt, 2012

The costs of
nuclear energy are mainly determined by the construction costs of the power
plant (funding for nuclear waste and dismantling costs is generated from funds
accumulated during the NPP operational period). The investment for a new NPP is
estimated to be in the range of € 2 to 3.5 billion (for 1,000 MWe to 1,600 MWe
respectively)[10], but
these figures are highly debated since recent NPP construction projects have often
gone far over budget.

The weight of
the different factors that make up the production cost of nuclear electricity
is displayed in the figure below. The cost structure for the various generation
options is given for a weighted average cost of capital of 5% and 10%
respectively.

Figure 2 Cost structure of power generation

\* The fuel costs for nuclear include the costs
for reprocessing or disposal of the spent fuel.

Source:
NEA/IEA 2010

The figure shows
that – as already mentioned above – the investment cost for a new NPP is the
main component determining the cost of nuclear power. It is important to note
that this cost structure does of course NOT apply to existing NPPs that have
already been amortised. In this case the investment costs have already been
paid for and the production costs will be much lower. Figure 1 shows that the ‘mean’
age of NPPs is 28 years. Although the depreciation period of a NPP differs per
country and per operator, it is typically well below 28 years. In France, the
country with the largest nuclear reactor fleet in Europe, 75% of the reactors
were already amortised in 2010[11]. This
figure is more or less similar for the rest of Europe, with the exception of
Eastern Europe, where few but relatively new power plants are operating[12].

Nuclear energy prices

The price of
electricity on the market is determined by the marginal costs of the most
expensive power plant operational at a given time. These marginal costs are the
costs of producing an additional MWh of electricity. There is no additional
investment in the power plant required for each additional unit of energy
produced, so the marginal costs are determined by the fuel costs and variable
O&M costs only. Figure 2 shows that these marginal costs of nuclear power
production are the lowest of all conventional power production. Nuclear power
plants, due to their low marginal (fuel + O&M) production costs and their
long start up and shut down periods, are used as ‘base load’ power. This means
that these plants are producing power almost continuously, except during the
maintenance period.

The figure below
shows the order of dispatch for power plants, according to their marginal
costs.

Figure 3 The merit order, dispatch of power plants

Source: Sensfuß,
Frank & Ragwitz, Mario & Genoese, Massimo, 2008, "The merit-order
effect: A detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity
generation on spot market prices in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier,
vol. 36(8), pages 3076-3084, August.

Figure 3 shows
that the electricity price is determined by the most expensive (highest
marginal costs) power plant that is dispatched at that particular moment. All
power that is produced at that moment is bought for this price. The high margin
on nuclear power is needed to recoup the higher investment costs.

Gas turbines are
most easy to regulate and are thus most suitable to respond to rapid changes in
demand or supply. The electricity price in the European market is therefore
typically determined by the marginal cost of gas generated electricity (at the
far right of Figure 3).

Since nuclear
power is ‘base load’ electricity, its marginal production costs does not
directly influence the market price of electricity. Even doubling the marginal
costs of nuclear power production would not influence the electricity price, as
can be seen in Figure 3. In this sense, nuclear provides a key contribution to
ensuring affordability of energy in the EU.

2.2
Nuclear energy sector: vendors, regulators and
research

Apart from the NPPs as described above,
the nuclear energy sector also comprises a number of supplying and supporting
industries. The most important players in the nuclear sector are briefly
described below.

2.2.1
Nuclear power plant vendors

Nuclear power plant vendors include
suppliers of a wide variety of specialised equipment, services and other inputs
to NPP operators to support the construction, refurbishment / repairs and
operation of NPPs. This includes companies active in the design, engineering
and construction (including refurbishment) of NPPs, Uranium suppliers[13], and processing of nuclear fuel (UF6
conversion, uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication services). In addition, a
special category of vendors can be distinguished at the back-end of NPP
operations and the nuclear fuel cycle: companies providing services for the
collection and treatment of nuclear waste including spent fuel processing and
recycling facilities.

Unfortunately most of these vendors fall
under broader industry categories in the relevant statistical databases. For
instance, there is no separate category for construction of NPPs in SBS. The
sector code that relates to NPPs is 25.30 (Manufacture of steam generators,
except central heating hot water boilers), which includes steam generators for
non-nuclear facilities as well. Likewise nuclear waste collection and treatment
is included in the same category as all other hazardous waste collection and
treatment. In addition, many NPP vendors are integrated companies, conducting
both design & construction and waste management activities.

PRODCOM does provide data on the sales
value of nuclear reactors and parts of nuclear reactors. As Figure 4 illustrates, EU total production value of nuclear reactors has
increased between 2005 and 2010, although it seems to have levelled off in the
last few years.

Figure 4 Sales  value of nuclear reactors produced (EU27) 2005 – 2010 (millions
of EUR)

 Source: PRODCOM

Figure 5 below presents the sales value for parts of nuclear reactors, which
is clearly substantially higher than that for nuclear reactors. This is likely
to be due to the fact that few new plants have been built since the 1990s and
most construction thus involved refurbishment and replacement investments for
existing plants.

Figure 5 Sales value of parts of nuclear reactors produced (EU27) 2005 – 2010
(million EUR)

Source:
PRODCOM

Unfortunately data by individual country
are rather incomplete (most likely due to sensitivity issues), making it hard
to establish with certainty which countries produced these reactors and parts.
This segment is highly concentrated though and it is clear that the major
producers include France, Spain, and the UK, while likely Germany accounts for
part of the production as well (no data were available for Germany).

To complete this picture, we have
consulted a number of industry sources to provide additional data and
information on vendors in the nuclear energy sector, as presented below.

Nuclear fuel processing

There are only a few nuclear fuel
processing plants in the EU and world wide. This includes AREVA in France and Sellafield
Ltd in the UK.

Design engineering and construction of nuclear power
plants

A number of big specialised engineering
companies in the EU are involved in the construction of NPPs. These include
notably AREVA, the biggest nuclear power group globally (French, state owned), ENSA
(Spain) and Babcock from the UK. In Germany, Siemens was responsible for
building all 17 of Germany's existing nuclear power plants. But more recently,
the firm has limited itself to providing the non-nuclear parts of plants being
built by other firms, including current projects in China and Finland.

Nuclear waste collection and management

Nuclear waste collection and processing
is a highly regulated and scrutinized part of the nuclear energy chain and is
often directly governed by state owned or linked organisations, such as the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in the UK.

Nuclear power is the
only large-scale energy-producing technology which takes full responsibility
for all its wastes and fully costs this into the product (i.e. electricity).
The cost of managing and disposing of nuclear power plant wastes is estimated
to represent about 5% of the total cost of the electricity generated.[14] Used
nuclear fuel may be treated as a resource for recycling or simply as a waste.
In most EU MS (e.g. France, UK, Germany) fuel is reprocessed.

Three types of
radio-active waste can be distinguished:

1.
Low-level waste (LLW) is generated from hospitals
and industry, as well as the nuclear fuel cycle. It comprises paper, rags,
tools, clothing, filters etc., which contain small amounts of mostly
short-lived radioactivity. It comprises some 90% of the volume but only 1% of
the radioactivity of all radioactive waste.

2.
Intermediate-level waste (ILW) contains higher
amounts of radioactivity and some requires shielding. It typically comprises
resins, chemical sludges and metal fuel cladding, as well as contaminated
materials from reactor decommissioning. Smaller items and any non-solids may be
solidified in concrete or bitumen for disposal. It makes up some 7% of the
volume and has 4% of the radioactivity of all radioactive waste.

3.
High-level waste (HLW) arises from the 'burning' of
uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor. HLW contains the fission products and
transuranic elements generated in the reactor core. It is highly radioactive
and hot, so requires cooling and shielding. It can be considered as the 'ash'
from 'burning' uranium. HLW accounts for over 95% of the total radioactivity
produced in the process of electricity generation.[15]

Clearly HLW is an
important waste stream from the nuclear energy sector.

The nuclear and
radioactive waste management industries work to well-established safety
standards. International and regional organisations such as the IAEA, NEA
(OECD), the European Commission (EC) and the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) develop standards, guidelines and
recommendations under a framework of co-operation to assist countries in
establishing and maintaining national standards. National policies, legislation
and regulations are all developed from these internationally agreed standards,
guidelines and recommendations. [16]Nuclear
waste management is regulated at the EU level. As radioactive waste is not only
produced in MS with NPP for electricity generation, but also by many other
applications (e.g. radiotherapies or industrial tests) its safe management is
considered relevant for all Member States.

On 19 July 2011,
the Council adopted the "radioactive waste and spent fuel management
directive". The Directive entered into force in September 2011, and Member
States have to submit the first national programmes in 2015. It requires that all Member States deal with
radioactive waste in a responsible and transparent manner and establish
national frameworks and programs for the management of all types of radioactive
waste and spent fuel.

While low and medium
level radioactive waste is increasingly being taken care of, there is not yet a
single final repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. It is
likely, however, that the first such repositories will be opened between 2020
and 2025 in several EU Member States.[17]

National policies dictate
the waste management for used fuel and HLW from nuclear power reactors in EU
MS. See Table 2 below.

Table 2 Waste management for used fuel and HLW from nuclear
power reactors in a number of EU MS

Country || Policy || Facilities and progress towards final repositories

Belgium || Reprocessing || Central waste storage at Dessel Underground laboratory established 1984 at Mol Construction of repository to begin about 2035

Finland || Direct disposal || Program start 1983, two used fuel storages in operation Posiva Oy set up 1995 to implement deep geological disposal Underground research laboratory Onkalo under construction Repository planned from this, near Olkiluoto, open in 2020

France || Reprocessing || Underground rock laboratories in clay and granite Parliamentary confirmation in 2006 of deep geological disposal, containers to be retrievable and policy "reversible" Bure clay deposit is likely repository site to be licensed 2015, operating 2025

Germany || Reprocessing but moving to direct disposal || Repository planning started 1973 Used fuel storage at Ahaus and Gorleben salt dome Geological repository may be operational at Gorleben after 2025

Spain || Direct disposal || ENRESA established 1984, its plan accepted 1999 Central interim storage at Villar de Canas from 2016 (volunteered location) Research on deep geological disposal, decision after 2010

Sweden || Direct disposal || Central used fuel storage facility – CLAB – in operation since 1985 Underground research laboratory at Aspo for HLW repository Osthammar site selected for repository (volunteered location)

United Kingdom || Reprocessing || Low-level waste repository in operation since 1959 HLW from reprocessing is vitrified and stored at Sellafield Repository location to be on basis of community agreement New NDA subsidiary to progress geological disposal

Soure:
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf04.html

Companies specialising in solutions at
the back-end of the fuel cycle – spent fuel processing plants – mostly focus on
their domestic markets, although some international trade does take place,
mostly under contracts with foreign utilities. Limited trade is probably in
part due to the fact that reprocessing technology is highly sensitive from a
non-proliferation point of view – as such reprocessing is limited to a small
number of countries or subject to multilateral control.

In general, utilities remain responsible
for the management of radioactive waste arising in their plants, at least until
it is transferred to a national authority or agency responsible for its
disposal.[18]

Utilities may outsource part of waste
treatment, e.g. from decommissioning, to specialised companies, often operating
in different parts of the nuclear energy cycle.

Integrated services

Given the fact that the nuclear energy
sector is such a highly specialised and heavily regulated sector, many vendors
provide services throughout the lifecycle of nuclear power plants, integrating
design, operations, management and waste management activities. State owned
AREVA, mentioned above, is an example of such an organisation. The box below
provides an example of a privately owned integrated services company in the
UK.

Babcock International Group – Nuclear
Division

Babcock is the UK's largest specialist
nuclear support services organisation, employing over 3,500 nuclear engineers,
scientists and technicians. The company provides solutions for the entire
nuclear lifecycle, from design and build, through operation and maintenance, to
decommissioning, waste management and remediation.

Examples of projects that the company
works on include, e.g. at the back-end of the cycle a contract to manage the
decommissioning, demolition and clean-up of the Dounreay nuclear site. This
contract was awarded to BDP (a joint venture between Babcock, CH2M Hill and
URS) by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), and involved a share
transfer making BDP the new Parent Body Organisation for Dounreay. In relation
to design and construction, Babcock in alliance with URS, has been awarded a
specialist design, engineering and safety case assessment contract of up to 15
years by Sellafield Ltd. The contract, known as the Design Services Alliance
(DSA), will deliver design, engineering and safety case assessments to a range
of different project types. These include new assets (such as new
infrastructure, or nuclear waste processing or storage facilities);
modification of assets (including refurbishment or enhancement of plant and
equipment) to support production or decommissioning; safety cases and
engineering studies to support continued operation of facilities; and
operations support.

Source: http://www.babcockinternational.com/about-us/divisions/support-services/nuclear/

2.2.2
Nuclear safety regulators
At EU level

At the EU level, the nuclear energy
sector is regulated by the Euratom Treaty and the European Nuclear Safety
REgulators Group (ENSREG). This is an independent authoritative expert body composed
of senior officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety authorities from
all 27 member states in the EU. ENSREG was established as the High Level Group
on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management.

ENSREG’s aims are to maintain and further
improve the:

·
Safety of nuclear installations in the EU;

·
Safety of the management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste in the EU;

·
Financing of the decommissioning of nuclear
installations in the EU.

At MS level

While only 16 MS have NPPs on their
territory, all have a national regulator responsible for nuclear safety, e.g.
in relation to medical and industrial radioactive sources. The table below
provides an overview of all national regulators.

Figure 6 EU National Regulators for Nuclear Energy and Waste

EU MS || National Regulator

Austria || Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management.

Belgium || Federal Agency for Nuclear Control; ONDRAF (National Agency for radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials).

Bulgaria || Nuclear Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Bulgaria.

Cyprus || Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.

Czech Republic || State Office for Nuclear Safety.

Denmark || National Institute of Radiation Protection; Danish Emergency Management Agency.

Estonia || Estonian Radiation Protection Centre.

Finland || STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority); Ministry of Employment and the Economy.

France || ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority); Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning.

Germany || Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.

Greece || Greek Atomic Energy Commission.

Hungary || Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority.

Ireland || Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland.

Italy || National Agency for the Protection of Environment (ISPRA, ex-APAT); Ministry of Economic Development.

Latvia || Radiation Safety Centre; Ministry of the Environment.

Lithuania || Lithuanian State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (VATESI).

Luxembourg || Ministry of Health.

Malta || Radiation Protection Board.

The Netherlands || Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation.

Poland || National Atomic Energy Agency.

Portugal || The Centre for Nuclear Physics of the Lisbon University; Nuclear Technology Institute.

Romania || National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control; National Agency for Radioactive Waste.

Slovak Republic || Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic.

Slovenia || Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration.

Spain || Nuclear Safety Council; Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade.

Sweden || SSM (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority).

United Kingdom || Office for Nuclear Regulation (An agency of the Health and Safety Executive).

Source: ENSREG
(www.ensreg.eu/members-glance/national-regulators)

2.2.3
Technical support and research organisations
Technical support organisations

Technical support organisations in the
sector comprise notably testing and certification companies. Precise data on
the number such organisations specialised in nuclear related testing is not
readily available (the SBS sector ‘Technical testing and analysis’ includes a
wide variety of testing activities, including testing of physical
characteristics and performance of materials, such as strength, thickness,
durability, radioactivity, etc. and certification of products, including
consumer goods, motor vehicles, aircraft, pressurised containers, nuclear
plants etc.). In addition, testing, assessments and verification take place in
public institutions as well.

Examples of testing and safety
organisations specialised in nuclear safety testing include e.g. the German
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) – a non-profit,
independent organisation – which  carries out research and surveys in the area
of reactor safety, radioactive waste management as well as radiation and
environmental protection; Belgian AVN/VNS,  a licensed agency for inspection
and safety review of nuclear installations; and the French IRSN, a national
public expert organisation in nuclear and radiological risks – as a research
and expert appraisal organization, IRSN acts as support for the public
authorities competent in nuclear safety and radiation protection for civil and
defense activities, and safety of nuclear facilities and materials within the
framework of international treaties.

According to the Council Directive
2009/71/EURATOM

“In the past, self-assessments have been
carried out in Member States in close connection with international peer
reviews under the auspices of the IAEA as International Regulatory Review Team
or Integrated Regulatory Review Service missions. These self-assessments were
carried out and these missions were invited by Member States on a voluntary
basis in the spirit of openness and transparency. Self-assessments and
accompanying peer reviews of the legislative, regulatory and organisational
infrastructure should be aimed at strengthening and enhancing the national
framework of  Member States, whilst recognising their competencies in ensuring
nuclear safety of nuclear installations on their territory. The self-assessments
followed by international peer reviews are neither an inspection nor an audit,
but a mutual learning mechanism that accepts different approaches to the
organisation and practices of a competent regulatory authority, while
considering regulatory, technical and policy issues of a Member State that
contribute to ensuring a strong nuclear safety regime.”

The nature of the 2009 Directive retained
the principle of voluntary assessments. With the new proposed legislative
changes (binding EU regulations) there will likely be an emphasis on mandatory regular
reviews and assessments and possibly the role of external, either public or
private testing and certification bodies could become more important.

Research / academia establishing knowledge base

The nuclear energy sector is firmly
embedded in civil and military research and numerous research institutions and
programmes exist at EU and MS level in support of the sector. Much of the
research takes place or is funded by the public sector. For instance, R&D
in the French nuclear programme amounted in 2010 to about 1 billion Euro a year
(see footnote 26)).

At EU level, research takes place under
the FP research programmes. In FP7 Euratom there are two associated specific
programmes, one covering indirect actions in the fields of fusion energy
research and nuclear fission and radiation protection, the other covering
direct actions in the nuclear field undertaken by the Commission's Joint
Research Centre (JRC).

Table below summarises the amounts which
have been allocated since FP4 Euratom in the research projects on fusion,
fission and radiation protection and in the JRC

Table 3   Fund allocations FP4-7 Euratom (Eur million)

N° FP || Period || Fusion || Fission || JRC || Total

FP4 || 1994-1998 || 794 || 170 || 271 || 1,235

FP5 || 1998-2002 || 788 || 191 || 281 || 1,260

FP6 || 2002-2006 || 824 || 209 || 319 || 1,352

FP7 || 2007-2011 || 1947 || 287 || 517 || 2,751

Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/research\_en.htm

In addition to the support to R&D
projects through the FP Euratom, the EU is actively involved in two important
initiatives regarding Fission and Fusion: (1) The Sustainable Nuclear Energy
Technology Platform (SNETP) (launched in 2007) aimed at coordinating Research,
Development, Demonstration and Deployment (RDD&D) in the field of nuclear
fission energy. It gathers stakeholders from industry (technology suppliers,
utilities and other users), research organisations including Technical Safety
Organisations (TSO), universities and national representatives. (2) A Joint
Undertaking for fusion and the Development of Fusion Energy, established to
promote scientific research and technological development in the field of
fusion.[19]

Other research initiatives at EU level
include e.g. NUGENIA, an EU level network organisation promoting R&D by
bringing together key actors in the sector – from industry, research, safety
organisations and academia – committed  to develop joint R&D projects in
the field of nuclear fission technologies, with a focus on Generation II and
III nuclear plants.[20]

All MS with NPPs, but even some without,
have dedicated research institutions and agencies for nuclear energy research.
In some case (e.g. Sweden) these are private institutions, in other they are
Government owned (e.g. France). Generally these institutions or their
fore-runners were established when the first nuclear plants were built and / or
as part of the miltary complex.

Many cooperate in associations and
networks with the industry and with similar organisations in other MS or even
internationally.

2.3
Value chains

The two key
value chains related to the nuclear energy sector revolve around the production
of nuclear power plants and the production of electricity using nuclear energy.
These two value chains are depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8 below.

Figure 7 Nuclear energy cycle: production of nuclear plants

Figure 8 Nuclear energy cycle: production of electricity using nuclear energy

When identifying
and assessing potential impacts of the proposed legislative changes these value
chains serves as a basis for tracing direct and indirect impacts further up and
downstream in the chain. In addition, the impacts may be felt outside the
chain, e.g. through knock-on effect on electricity prices and the effects of
these on other – especially energy intensive – sectors.

In our
assessment we focus on the segment within the value chain where direct effects will
be felt, i.e. nuclear power production), while merely describing qualitatively
the further impact along the chain..

In addition, we
focus mostly on the Member States where the nuclear energy sector  plays an
important role in overall energy generation.

2.4
Directly affected sectors: Productivity and
competitiveness performance
2.4.1
Nuclear plant operators/utilities

Before the Fukushima incident the
expansion of the nuclear industry was already restrained by high construction
costs and fierce competition with fossil and renewable generation. According to
a report by the MIT on ‘The Future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima’ “it is clear
that the accident at Fukushima will contribute to a reduction in future trends
in the expansion of nuclear energy”[21].
A review by the UBS –‘Can Nuclear Power Survive Fukushima’ - estimates “the
capital costs for new nuclear to be US$5,000-6,000/kW in the US and Europe and
about US$2,000/kW in China—about two to eight times the cost of new
fossil-fuelled capacity. In this situation, we think investor-owned utilities
are unlikely to consider nuclear a good risk-reward option.”[22] In a comment on his paper[23] regarding the costs of nuclear energy, Cooper (2010) argued that
"(….) nuclear construction is not only unaffordable now, but it is very
likely to become even more cost prohibitive”. The investment risk of building
new NPPs is thus considerable and may become prohibitively high.

Having said that, as most of the European NPPs are already amortised they
are highly profitable[24].
Extending the lifetime of these old power plants has the lowest levelised costs
of electricity generation[25]. As an
example, the figure below depicts the projected cost of electricity in Belgium
from nuclear plants with an extended lifetime, LTO 10 and 20 years, compared to
alternative sources. This example is representative for most other major
nuclear energy producers in the EU.

Figure 9 Projected costs of electricity generation in Belgium, at 8% real
discount rate (in USD2010/MWh)

Source: OECD/NEA, 2012
Knowledge & capital intensity

As was described
in section 2.1, nuclear power plants are highly capital intensive with high
initial investment costs. In addition, the sector relies on advanced knowledge,
as becomes clear from the substantial R&D[26] investments and the large number of
technological and research institutions supporting the sector.

Most EU MS, even
those with just moderate nuclear energy sectors (e.g. the Netherlands) have
dedicated research institutions and much of the R&D in the sector is
conducted in public institutions, or in partnerships (e.g. industry
associations), often involving different MS or even international partners.
Examples are the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, the French Commissariat a
l’Energie Atomique (CEA) and public company Studsvik in Sweden. This is
illustrative of the fact that the sector was originally strongly publicly
driven (State-owned), yet also reflects high costs of R&D, and issues of
national strategic importance (safety and security). Many MS, e.g. France,
Belgium, Germany, have also built research reactors.

Clearly,
knowledge and R&D are crucial elements of the sector’s competitiveness and
the EU nuclear sector, with its long history, is among the most advanced
sectors globally.

To support knowledge
development and the retention and development of the necessary knowledge and
skills in the sector, several initiatives promote nuclear education and
training in the EU. For instance, the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN),
a non profit international organization established in 2003, is aimed the
preservation and further development of expertise in the nuclear fields by
higher education and training (e.g. harmonisation of nuclear MA and PhD
curricula across MS). The organisation has 64 members, including mostly
academic organisations, technological institutes, etc. across Europe.

World market shares

In terms of
nuclear energy production, the EU accounts for approximately a third of all
NPPs and almost 30% of uranium needs globally. Moreover, the EU has the largest
share of ‘nuclear electricity’ in its total generated electricity (30% compared
to 13.5% on average globally). See Table 4.

Table 4 World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements (2012)

COUNTRY\*\*\* || Nuclear electricity generation (2011 ) || Reactors operable\* (sept. ’12) || Reactors under construction\*\* (sept. ’12) ||  uranium required 2012

billion kWh || % e || No. || No. ||  tonnes U

Argentina || 5,9 || 5.0% || 2 || 1 || 124

Armenia || 2,4 || 33.2% || 1 || 0 || 64

Bangladesh || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Belarus || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Belgium || 45,9 || 54.0% || 7 || 0 || 995

Brazil || 14,8 || 3.2% || 2 || 1 || 321

Bulgaria || 15,3 || 32.6% || 2 || 0 || 313

Canada || 88,3 || 15.3% || 17 || 3 || 1,694

Chile || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

China || 82,6 || 1.8% || 15 || 26 || 6,550

Czech Republic || 26,7 || 33.0% || 6 || 0 || 583

Egypt || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Finland || 22,3 || 31.6% || 4 || 1 || 471

France || 423,5 || 77.7% || 58 || 1 || 9,254

Germany || 102,3 || 17.8% || 9 || 0 || 1,934

Hungary || 14,7 || 43.2% || 4 || 0 || 331

India || 18,9 || 3.7% || 20 || 7 || 937

Indonesia || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Iran || 0 || 0.0% || 1 || 0 || 170

Israel || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Italy || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Japan || 156,2 || 18.1% || 50 || 3 || 4,636

Jordan || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Kazakhstan || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Korea DPR (North) || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Korea RO (South) || 147,8 || 34.6% || 23 || 4 || 3,967

Lithuania || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Malaysia || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Mexico || 9,3 || 3.6% || 2 || 0 || 279

Netherlands || 3,9 || 3.6% || 1 || 0 || 102

Pakistan || 3,8 || 3.8% || 3 || 2 || 117

Poland || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Romania || 10,8 || 19.0% || 2 || 0 || 177

Russia || 162 || 17.6% || 33 || 10 || 5,488

Saudi Arabia || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Slovakia || 14,3 || 54.0% || 4 || 2 || 307

Slovenia || 5,9 || 41.7% || 1 || 0 || 137

South Africa || 12,9 || 5.2% || 2 || 0 || 304

Spain || 55,1 || 19.5% || 8 || 0 || 1,355

Sweden || 58,1 || 39.4% || 10 || 0 || 1,394

Switzerland || 25,7 || 40.8% || 5 || 0 || 527

Thailand || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Turkey || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

Ukraine || 84,9 || 47.2% || 15 || 0 || 2,348

UAE || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 1 || -

United Kingdom || 62,7 || 17.8% || 16 || 0 || 2,096

USA || 790,4 || 19.2% || 104 || 1 || 19,724

Vietnam || 0 || 0.0% || 0 || 0 || -

WORLD\*\* || 2518 || 13.5% || 433 || 65 || 67,990

EU || 861,5 || 30.3% || 132 || 4 || 19,449

EU share world || 34.2% || n.a. || 30.5% || 6.2% || 28.6%

\* Operable =
Connected to the grid;

\*\* Under
Construction = first concrete for reactor poured, or major refurbishment under
way;

\*\*\* While some
countries in the list do not currently have any operable NPPs or NPPs under
construction, they may have planned or proposed plants (e.g. Poland, Thailand,
and Vietnam).

Source: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htmlhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html

Reactor data:
WNA to 1/9/12 (excluding 8 shut-down German units)

IAEA- for
nuclear electricity production & percentage of electricity (% e) (13/4/12).

WNA: Global
Nuclear Fuel Market report Sept 2011 (reference scenario) - for Uranium
requirements.

NB: New plants coming on line are largely balanced by old plants being
retired. Over 1996-2009, 43 reactors were retired as 49 started operation.
There are no firm projections for retirements over the period covered by this
Table, but WNA estimates that at least 60 of those now operating will close by
2030, most being small plants. The 2011 WNA Market Report reference case has
156 reactors closing by 2030, and 298 new ones coming on line.

While the EU is
the dominant producer and consumer of nuclear energy, planned or proposed[27] new capacity is mostly taking place
outside the EU and especially in emerging markets and the Middle East. For
instance, China has 51 planned and 120 proposed new reactors, India has 18
planned and 39 proposed and Russia has 17 planned and 24 proposed new reactors.[28]

As regards trade in nuclear energy,
France is the world’s largest net exporter of electricity from nuclear generation,
as it has very low cost of generation. Estimated benefits from this export are
EUR 3 billion per year.[29]

Comparative advantages

As was indicated in section 2.1, the
average age of EU NPP is 28 years, implying that production costs are relatively low as investment
costs have been largely paid off. This is a comparative advantage vis-à-vis
countries relying on newer NPPs.

While the EU
nuclear energy sector is at the forefront of technology development and use and
has a highly skilled labour force, some concerns exist over the future supply
of skilled labour. A 2008 study commissioned by the EC found that the number of
new graduates and the attractiveness of nuclear studies has decreased and
shortages in the near future are likely (see box below). This causes some
concern for the future competitiveness situation of the EU sector vis-à-vis the
sector in emerging economies in particular, where knowledge and skills are
quickly being developed.

Nuclear Safety in a Situation of Fading
Nuclear Experience

In 2008, the European Commission launched
and published a study entitled Nuclear Safety in a Situation of Fading Nuclear
Experience with the aim of analysing the availability of nuclear safety staff.
This study revealed a situation of concern for the period to 2020, based on the
following facts:

·
the number of students and graduates with a
strong background in nuclear sciences is insufficient;

·
the nuclear sector does not attract university
graduates;

·
continuing education for nuclear sector staff is
not ensured.

The study thus demonstrated the need for a
regular supply and demand analysis at EU level concerning the qualitative and
quantitative needs for new staff and continuous monitoring of the challenges
identified.

Proposed initiatives included the enhancement
of university studies in nuclear sciences and techniques by the Commission. The
ENEN Association, would have a role to play in this respect. In addition the
introduction of incentives for graduates to take up jobs in the nuclear sector
was proposed and in January 2010, the European Nuclear Energy Leadership
Academy (ENELA) was established by a number of leading European companies in
the nuclear energy sector, including AREVA, Axpo, EnBW, E.ON Kernkraft, URENCO
and Vattenfal, to provide young science graduates, or managers with experience,
with the skills and expertise they will need to become future leaders in the
field of nuclear energy.

Other proposed initiatives included the
development of post-graduate and professional training, and the improvement of
expertise and mobility.

Source:
http://europa.eu/legislation\_summaries/energy/nuclear\_energy/en0034\_en.htm

Competition, concentration, structure

The nuclear energy production sector
(NPPs) is a highly concentrated sector with relatively few and  large
operators. It is also concentrated in a limited number of countries within EU
and globally. Barriers to entry are high as the sector is highly regulated
(licences, restrictions), often has substantial state involvement and initial investment
cost are (prohibitively) high.

2.4.2 Providers of technology for nuclear power plants

As discussed above, the nuclear industry
provides a wide variety of specialised equipment and services to support the
construction and operation of NPPs. “The markets to provide these have changed
substantially as they have evolved from the government-led early stages of the
nuclear industry to predominantly competitive, commercial markets today.”[30]

The high tech and knowledge intensive
nature  of the nuclear energy production segment applies to the entire nuclear
energy sector. This is also reflected in the fact that the various actors in
the sector – NPP operators, utilities and vendors – are all represented in the
research and education networks and associations at EU and national MS levels
(see above). Often these networks also have strong international (extra-EU)
links

World market share

We were not able to calculate world
market shares for EU nuclear energy products, but below we present trade data
for six specific product categories based on COMTRADE and PRODCOM databases and
our own calculations.

Clearly, the EU has trade surpluses in
all but one of the product categories in 2010 and for most product this surplus
has been consistent albeit decreasing, while in the category Nuclear
reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances it concerns a
sizeable trade and trade-surplus.

Table 5   EU exports and imports of nuclear energy products 2007-2010 (millions
of EUR)

Year || 2007 || 2008 || 2009 || 2010 || 2011

Product || Imp || Exp || Balance || Imp || Exp || Balance || Imp || Exp || Balance || Imp || Exp || Balance || Imp || Exp || Balance

Spent (irradiated) fuel elements (cartridges) of nuclear reactors || 0,15 || 0,26 ||            0,11 ||            0,08 ||            0,20 ||            0,12 ||            0,00 ||            0,00 ||            0,00 || 0,00 ||            0,17 || 0,17 ||            0,00 ||            0,00 || 0,00

Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof || 229.679,33 || 335.624,35 ||  105.945,03 ||  244.281,02 ||  378.777,38 ||  134.496,36 ||  184.725,47 ||  299.040,19 ||  114.314,72 || 218.113,90 ||  330.718,51 || 112.604,61 ||  242.148,32 ||  359.315,19 ||  117.166,87

Nuclear reactors; fuel elements (cartridges), non-irradiated, for nuclear reactors; machinery & apparatus for isotopic separation. || 329,89 || 342,42 ||          12,54 ||        275,15 ||        493,75 ||        218,60 ||        404,23 ||        558,85 ||        154,61 || 677,41 ||        501,29 || -176,12 ||        677,57 ||        838,85 || 161,28

Nuclear reactors || 0,01 || 12,31 || 12,29 || 0,01 || 3,88 || 3,88 || 0,00 ||         10,31 || 10,31 || 0,10 || 4,39 || 4,29 ||            0,01 ||            0,83 || 0,82

Fuel elements (cartridges), non-irradiated || 296,87 || 178,22 ||       -118,65 ||        223,12 ||        249,31 ||          26,19 ||        328,87 ||        251,87 ||         -77,00 || 611,01 ||        147,33 || -463,68 ||        607,35 ||        400,74 || -206,61

Parts of nuclear reactors || 32,98 || 151,61 ||        118,63 ||          51,96 ||        237,17 ||        185,21 ||          73,36 ||        173,49 ||        100,13 || 63,88 || 203,81 || 139,93 ||          69,41 ||        259,67 || 190,26

Source: Eurostat and own calculations

Comparative advantages

EU MS, particularly countries with a
clear nuclear strategy such as France, have since long been active in
developing nuclear technology for different applications (power generation,
combined power & heat generation, industrial applications, research
applications, medicine), and reactors, fuel products and various related
services are major export products for these countries.

Competition, concentration, structure

Competition in NPP vendor markets is
quality/technology/skills based. Generally the markets for NPP vendors are
highly concentrated, with the market for uranium enrichment and fuel processing
at the extreme end, with the biggest suppliers having more than 30% of the
market and others 20-30%. Other segments are less concentrated and generally
the market is not as extremely concentrated as other engineering based
industries with complex high tech products such as the aerospace industry.[31]

Some of the
biggest global NPP vendors are EU companies, such as French AREVA and Spanish
Ensa. However, most of the vendors are multinational companies with their
original bases in the major nuclear energy markets such as Canada, but with
operations worldwide, including in the EU.

3
Assessment of Competitiveness Impacts
3.1
Likely impact of proposed legislative revision
on cost and price competitiveness
3.1.1
Directly affected sectors
Nuclear power plant operators

Additional direct costs

The exact nature
of the proposed changes for the directive is not known yet. Following the
Fukushima accident, national regulators all over the world have reviewed the
safety of their nuclear sector. Subsequently, regulators came up with
recommendations for new legislation.

The French
Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) issued recommendations to tighten safety
regulations[32].
Following these recommendations, the Court of Audit of France (Cour des
comptes) assessed the financial consequences of implementing these regulations
in France. The nuclear sector in France had already planned €50b of long term
operation (LTO) investments for the coming 15 years. The necessary measures to
comply with the ASN recommendations would require investments adding up to
around €10b for this period[33]. Part
of these proposed measures, worth €5b, were already planned within the initial €50b
package. Thus the required additional investments due to tightened regulations
are the remaining €5b, adding up to a total investment of €55b, an estimated 10%
cost increase. This corresponds with the estimated additional post-Fukushima
LTO investments that some other European countries have reported[34].

Expected safety
investments have been published for some other countries (USA, Japan) as well
but there is no clear distinction made between the initially planned (baseline)
investments and the Fukushima-induced investments.

Required investments
in power plants are expected to be the main direct financial consequence of the
revised directive. Operation and maintenance costs of nuclear power plants do
not seem to be affected by the new measures[35].

Additional indirect costs

The new regulations will apply to the
operation of nuclear power plants and thus are not expected to have any effect
on the cost (per unit) of inputs such as fuel and labour. While additional
capital investments will have to be made, these fall under compliance cost, as
discussed above.

The new regulation is also not expected
to affect the behaviour of suppliers / vendors, although it may provide
opportunities for the latter as existing plants will need to be refurbished.

Impacts on consumer choice and retail prices

The new nuclear
safety regulations are not expected to have any direct influence on the
electricity prices. As explained in section 2.1, nuclear energy is base load
power and its marginal costs (i.e. the combined costs of variable O&M and
fuel) will not influence the electricity price, unless these costs increase to
the extent that nuclear becomes the option with the highest marginal costs. As
explained before, this would require these costs to increase dramatically –
much more dramatically than our estimated increase due to the new regulations.
The new regulations will not influence the fuel price, and the operation and
maintenance costs are also not expected to be affected significantly (as noted above).
Hence, we do not expect the revised directive to have a direct influence on the
electricity price.

A potential
indirect effect could follow from the possibility that new standards will force
an operator to shutdown a NPP. In that case, additional capacity is needed to
compensate for the loss of the NPP. This additional capacity may be more
expensive than the one that previously determined the market price, thus
resulting in an increased market price.

Whether plants
will be decommissioned due to the new regulations is subject to debate. A
Vermont law school report concludes that “the increase in safety requirements
may call license extensions and uprating of existing reactors into question”[36], whereas
the Nuclear Energy Institute said it is unlikely that tightened regulations
will lead to any plant shut-downs[37].
Other factors may play a much bigger role in this respect.

Another effect of
the new directive could be that increasing costs due to tightened regulations
force electricity producers to increase the production price of all power
plants in their portfolio to remain profitable, including those that determine
the market price. In this case the electricity price could be affected.

However, in both
the aforementioned scenarios, a potential increase of the electricity price is
expected to be small.

Concluding, the
production costs of nuclear energy has hardly any impact on the market price of
electricity in the short term. In the long term, an increase of production
costs could result in a lower share of nuclear energy in the EUs energy mix.
The electricy price could be influenced in function of the chosen replacement
capacity.  .

Qualitative assessment of the magnitude of cost impacts

Tightened
regulations are expected to increase the capital costs of new NPPs and demand
significant investments for existing facilities. Accidents with nuclear power
plants in the past have proven to cause a trend break in the investment costs
for nuclear power. The figure below shows the construction costs of nuclear
power plants before and after the Three Mile Island (TMI) (aka Harrisburg)
incident in the US. Note that this figure concerns new plants.

Figure
10 Nuclear construction cost: reactors
completed before and after TMI

Given the fact
that the newest NPPs (Generation 3) will probably already comply with most or
all of the new regulations, the additional investment in EU NPPs due to
Fukushima will be very small. Preliminary calculations in Japan suggest that
the additional safety measures there will increase the cost of building a
nuclear reactor by about 5%[38]. This
percentage may be lower in the EU as the risks from natural hazards are lower
and the current public pressure for strict legislation is probably not as high
as in Japan.

The potential
effects of new legislation on the construction of new power plants will mainly
be felt in the long term. Most nuclear operators in Europe are currently aiming
at a lifetime extension of their NPPs. In this scenario, most existing operating
NPPs will be decommissioned between 2030 and 2050[39]. The majority of new nuclear power plants
thus has to come on line in roughly the same period. The effect of more
stringent safety legislation on new construction will thus be felt mainly in
the long term.

The consequences
for existing nuclear power plants in Europe are expected to be much smaller.
Substantial investments in the nuclear power sector were already envisaged in
the BAU scenario. As most of the European NPPs are already amortised they are
highly profitable[40]. Extending
the lifetime of these old power plants has the lowest levelised costs of
electricity generation[41].

Although the
required investment to comply with new regulations can be substantial for some
NPPs, they are expected to remain profitable. Based on the data available
today, the additional investments due to post-Fukushima safety requirements are
within 10-15% of the investments that were already planned to extend the
lifetime of aging NPPs. In this scenario, the continued operation of NPPs will
remain profitable[42]. This
percentage would correspond to Fukushima induced investments at the EU level of
roughly €10b in the period 2012-2020[43].

Another point to
be considered is related to insurance costs and liability. Although,  increased
efficiency and level of detail of safety regulation could save costs for
insurance and liability, it will probably be outweighted by the increased pressure on operators to
comply with regulations before governments agree to back them up financially in
the case of an accident (also due to the financial consequences of Fukushima.

Finally, there is
little information on the consequences of these investments for the financial
position of the nuclear operators. Goldman Sachs mentioned “the potential
squeeze from additional nuclear safety costs” as one of the key uncertainties
for the shares of EDF[44] (the
French utility and the world’s largest nuclear power operator). The financial
markets seem to have little confidence in the profitability of new nuclear
power. “The announcement of starting a new project is now enough to shave
significant value from any utility share price, while companies rethinking
nuclear projects are being rewarded with multiples re-ratings”[45].

Concluding, the
already high investment costs for new nuclear power plants will slightly
increase as a result of the revised directive. However, most existing NPPs in
the EU are already amortised and highly profitable. The required additional
investments of 10-15% will likely not threaten this profitability.

3.1.2
Indirectly affected sectors

Since we do not
expect the electricity price  to be directly affected by the new
legislation, the impact on electricity providers and consumers is also expected
to be small. Still, the new legislation may have other indirect
consequences for costs in this market. For these impacts, we distinguish
between those caused by the required investments in the existing reactor fleet
and the potential impacts of the construction of new reactors.

Existing NPPs

An estimated €10b
of additional investments is required to comply with upcoming safety
legislation. This investment is expected to generate roughly 10,000 jobs during
the period in which the plants are upgraded[46].
This number includes both directly and indirectly induced jobs. An additional
10,000 jobs is a modest increase on a European scale, given the fact that the
sector employs, directly and indirectly, an estimated 900,000 people[47].
Moreover, they concern temporary ‘jobs’, which most likely will be filled by
existing staff of specialised technology and services suppliers to NPPs.

An important
factor in the future of nuclear energy is the public opinion. The Fukushima
accident has put additional pressure on the public support for nuclear energy.
When a required investment in the nuclear sector with a magnitude of around
€10b becomes public, this may have additional negative consequence for the
support base for nuclear power.

New NPPs

In an EC non-paper
on the contribution of nuclear energy to growth and jobs in the EU, the job
consequences for the nuclear industry were assessed for a scenario where
nuclear has a 20% share in the European power generation in 2050. This scenario
was taken from the Energy Roadmap 2050[48],
and is lower than the projected 28% share by the industry[49].

In this scenario
there would be significant new nuclear construction between 2025 and 2045 to
compensate for the expected decommissioning of many existing plants in that
period. This new construction is projected to directly create and indirectly
induce a total of 250,000 jobs. Any negative consequences of new regulations
for new construction plans will thus have negative consequences for the
generation of nuclear related employment as well. It is difficult to predict
the actual job creation and even more difficult to make any estimation of the
possible prevented job creation due to the new regulations.

Many of the
expected revisions of the directive concern revisions of the regulatory and
management framework, such as improving guidance and safety reviews. This will
not only require a substantial effort from the operators but also from
regulators. Besides the financial impact, this will also have consequences for staff
requirements. There is already a lack of skilled personnel in the nuclear
industry[50]. This is
a growing concern since many of the specialists are approaching retirement.
Additional safety requirements will put an extra pressure on the staff and will
thus likely exacerbate this problem.

The expected
cost increase of NPP construction due to more regulation could maybe lead to
further reluctance  by investors to reconsider investments in nuclear power
(due to the already existing high administrative, technological, environmental
and financial barriers, not forgetting public opinion and politics). This could
lead to fewer orders for new construction and thus also for the supplying third
parties. On the other hand, the required retrofits due to tightened regulations
will provide them with extra work.

As the
regulation is not directed at waste management as such (a separate Directive
already governs this segment) we expect no impacts here.

3.2
Likely impact of proposed legislative revision
on sectors capacity to innovate
3.2.1
Directly affected sectors
Capacity for in-house R&D

To compensate
for the additional investment costs, NPP operators may have to cut expenses
elsewhere. When facing budget cuts, R&D expenditures tend to be among the
first areas to be targeted. When utilities decide to reduce their R&D
expenses, they will most likely cut on fundamental research activities[51]. The focus of their investments is
expected to be on performance enhancement and finding solutions to problems
they are confronted with. One of these problems may be the increased safety
demands. As such, tightening regulations may spur some safety related
innovation.

As indicated,
however, the profitability of EU nuclear generation is still comparatively high
and knowledge, R&D and innovation are cornerstones of the sector’s
competitiveness, so it seems unlikely that plant operators will cut their
research budgets substantially, although working in partnership with other
institutions may become even more common, especially at EU level.

Capacity for R&D externalisation

As much of the R&D that takes place
in the sector already involves public institutions or specialised organisations
funded either by the industry or public money, it is unlikely that the revised
regulations would affect the capacity of the sector to externalise R&D.
This seems more dependent on general trends in the sector (e.g. reduced
interest in the sector) than on the legislation per se.

Capacity for in-house product and process innovation,
supply of skills and VC

The revised regulation is not foreseen to
have any noticeable impact on the capacity for in-house product and process
innovation and supply of skills. If anything the new guidelines and
requirements may encourage innovation as a means to comply, but also to enhance
competitiveness, as similar processes are taking place world-wide. The required
additional skills would most likely be related to procedures and management,
which likely could be developed in-house with proper training and assistance
from designated institutions. The cost for this form part of compliance cost
(see section 3.1). The only issues here may be the threat of skilled labour
shortages in the near future, however the new regulation has no specific
bearing on this issue.

The extent to which venture capital could
still be obtained for investments in the sector is hard to predict, but
unlikely to be strongly affected by the regulation as such. Again, this depends
much more on issues such as perceived risk and yield of the investment, which
in turn is more related to the long term prospects of the nuclear energy sector
in the EU and the cost of alternatives. It is possible that the revised
legislation would be seen as reducing risks, which could have a positive effect
on VC availability. It could also be argued, however, that news of further cost
increases to the already high investment costs for new NPP could scare
potential investors off.

Capacity to produce and acquire industrial patents

The capacity to innovate is often
measured by looking at the number of patent applications. Based on this
measure, Carrere, Hamanaka & Lévêque (2010)[52] considered the innovation trends in
nuclear energy generation between 1978 and 2005. They found that innovation in
nuclear energy was strongly related to oil prices:

“When oil price (Refiner Acquisition Cost
of Imported Crude Oil, inflation adjusted) increases, grants and subsidies for
nuclear R&D also increase, and consequently the number of patent applications.”

In addition they found that while
innovations in clean tech increased since the early 1990s, innovation in
nuclear by contrast declined. Both sources of energy generation have a low
carbon footprint, but clearly there has been more interest in clean tech
development than in nuclear development. This trend is likely to have continued
in recent years.

Finally, national policy towards nuclear
energy did not necessarily seem to play a substantial role, as the authors also
found that Germany seemed to innovate more in nuclear technology than France,[53] despite the latter actively promoting
nuclear energy and the former actively discouraging it.

Overall, we therefore expect the revised
regulations to have a minor impact on the sector’s capacity to produce patents,
as this is more driven by other factors (which to some extent are taking place
as part of the baseline developments) and therefore would not be attributable
to the revised legislation.

To the extent that the revised
regulations require new or improved equipment, some of the innovations thus
stimulated could be considered for patent applications by nuclear power
generators or their direct suppliers. This is dependent on whether the required
adjustments can be made with existing technology or would require new or
substantially adjusted technologies.

As the
regulation is not directed at waste management as such (a separate Directive
already governs this segment) we expect no impacts here.

3.2.2 Indirectly affected sectors

Considering the limited direct expected
impacts of the revised legislation, indirect impacts on the innovation capacity
of electricity suppliers and consumers are not foreseen. The main indirect
impact channel is through cost / prices; the nature of business for indirectly
affected sectors will not be changed.

3.3
Likely impact of proposed legislative revision
on sector’s international competitiveness
3.3.1
Directly affected sectors

International trade and competition

Only France is a
net exporter of nuclear generated electricity and its exports are all destined
to other EU countries and Switzerland. However, since the electricity price  is
unlikely to be affected and since post Fukushima similar adjustment are
expected to take place worldwide and especially in developed countries, this
trade is not expected to be affected by the revised legislation.

The construction
industry for nuclear power plants is highly globalised, and highly concentrated.
European constructors like French Areva and Spanish Ensa compete with Japanese,
Korean and American companies for NPP construction contracts. They will all
have to meet the same requirements of their client. These requirements are
expected to be similar for most of the main nuclear players as the safety
regulations are reviewed in many countries following the Fukushima accident. To
the extent that other countreis will follow suit in making similar safety
regulations compulsory and vendors can capitalise on the fact that they have
had to adjust their products and services already and can apply this to international
markets, there may even be a slight first mover advantage for EU nuclear energy
sector vendors..

Competitive position in single and external market

Increasing
homogeneity in safety regulations in Europe will create a level playing field
and as such improve the conditions for a healthy competition. Currently,
differences in safety regulation between European countries is seen to distort
technology competitiveness and market competition[54].

As the revised legislation would be
effected at the Euratom level, implications would be similar for all EU MS,
although costs may vary considering the current state of the sector in the
specific MS and the extent to which under national regulations/initiatives
and/or as part of the previous revisions adjustments have already been made.

Particularly for the sub-segment of
testing and certification organisations, the market may actually grow due to
the new regulation, creating more work and possibly jobs.

The competitive position of the sector in
global markets is not expected to change significantly due to the revised
regulation, although on-going other trends may affect this position. With the
rise of nuclear energy generation capacity in emerging markets, EU knowledge,
technology and standards, could become a source of competitiveness in its own
right and the adjustments made based on the revised legislation could add to
this body of knowledge, which could be in demand for developments elsewhere.
This would apply to NPP operators as well as providers of technology, providing
best international practices.

3.4
Summary of main impacts

Competitive impact || Nuclear energy sector || Timing of impacts || Risk and uncertainty

Directly || Indirectly

Cost and price competitiveness || 1.NPP operators 2.NPP vendors || || 1. ST: 0 / LT: – 2. ST: 0 / LT: – || 1. ST: Low, LT: High 2. ST: Low, LT: High

|| Electricity suppliers &  consumers || ST: 0 /LT: 0 || Low

Capacity to innovate || 1.NPP operators 2.NPP vendors || || ST: 0 / LT: 0 ST: 0 / LT: + || 1. Low 2. High

|| Electricity suppliers &  consumers || ST/LT: 0 || Low

International competitiveness || 1.NPP operators 2.NPP vendors || || ST: 0 / LT: 0 ST: 0 / LT: + || 1. Low 2. Low

|| Electricity suppliers &  consumers || ST: 0 / LT: 0 || Low

Note: ST: Short
Term; LT: Long Term; 0 means that we don’t expect any impact; -: a negative
impact; +: a positive impact

Cost and price competitiveness

The chance seems small that the new
regulations will render existing plants unprofitable; the required investments
to comply with new regulations add a mere 10-15% to already planned LTO[55] investments. We therefore believe short
term risks are low for NPP operators. The economics of new NPPs, however, are
uncertain but appear to be under pressure and may be at a tipping point.
Additional investments triggered by new regulations, although relatively small,
could prove to be the drop that makes the bucket overflow. The risk is that
there will be hardly any new NPP construction and the share of nuclear energy
in the EUs energy mix will decrease. Many orders for new NPPs are currently put
on hold and the future development for new NPPs is uncertain. On the short
term, this is partly compensated by the additional work that is required for
the refurbishment of the existing plants.

The production costs of nuclear power do
not directly influence the retail price of electricity. There may be effects,
but they will be indirect and limited, both on the short and the long term.

Capacity to innovate

R&D and innovation are cornerstones
of the sector’s competitiveness, so it seems unlikely that plant operators will
cut their research budgets substantially. Stricter safety standards force NPP
vendors to come up with (innovative) solutions. This may increase the focus on
R&D. Yet the risk is high; with an uncertain long-term future for  nuclear
fission, the innovative capacity of vendors is equally uncertain.

Considering the limited direct expected
impacts of the revised legislation, indirect impacts on the innovation capacity
of electricity suppliers and consumers are not foreseen. The main indirect
impact channel is through cost / prices, the nature of business for indirectly
affected sectors will not be changed.

International competitiveness

The competition of nuclear power
producers with competitors outside of Europe is very limited. Theoretically,
less strict regulations in for instance Russia could allow Russian operators to
provide their electricity at lower rates. This risks seems low as for instance
grid connections would have to be increased substantially.

A competitiveness impact for vendors, if
any, could consist of the first mover advantage enforced by the legislation.

Annex 1 – Bibliography

           EC, 2012, non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy
to growth and jobs in the EU.

           EDF, A utility opinion about the impact of the European
Research Area. Jean-Pierre HUTIN, Director, EDF

           ASN,
2012, Evaluations complémentaires de la sûreté des installations nucléaires
prioritaires au regard de l’accident survenu à la centrale de Fukushima
Daiichi, RAPPORT IRSN N° 708

           CEC,
2009, IMPACT ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}, COMMISSION
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying document to the Proposal for a COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety IMPACT
ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}

           Cooper, M., 2010, Policy Challenges of Nuclear Reactor Construction,
Cost Escalation and Crowding Out Alternatives: Lessons From the U.S. and France
for the Effort to Revive the U.S. Industry With Loan Guarantees and Tax
Subsidies (September, 2010):
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/IEE/20100909\_cooperStudy.pdf.

           Cooper, M., 2012, “Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Economics,
Fukushima Reignites the Never-Ending Debate: Nuclear Safety at an Affordable
Cost, Can We Have Both? Is Nuclear Power Not Worth the Risk at Any Price?”,
Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School, March 2012

           Cour des comptes, 2012, Les coûts de la filière
électronucléaire : Rapport public thématique. Cour des
Comptes, janvier 2012, 430 p.

           Cour des Comptes, 2012, The costs of the nuclear power
sector - Summary in English (Report), Cour des Comptes, January 2012

           DECC, 2011, Transposition of Council Directive
Establishing a Community Framework for the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear
Installations (Euratom 2009/71), IA No: HSE0058 Date: 21/07/2011

           EC, 2012, non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy
to growth and jobs in the EU

           'Energy roadmap 2050' (COM(2011) 885 final of 15 December
2011

           ENSREG (2012) www.ensreg.eu/members-glance/nuclear-eu

           ENSREG, 2012, Peer review report - Stress tests performed
on European nuclear power plants. Accessed at:
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EU%20Stress%20Test%20Peer%20Review%20Final%20Report\_0.pdf

           Eurelectric Power Choices Scenario 2010

           Fabrice Carrere, Blaise Hamanaka and François Lévêque,
Mines ParisTech, posted May 9th, 2010:
http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/05/09/innovation-trends-in-nuclear-power-generation/

           Florence School of Regulation, 2011, Competition, Energy
Law and Nuclear Safety Regulation. François Lévêque and Florent Silve, 
Professor of Law and Economics, Mines ParisTech Sciences-­‐Po
Paris Florence School of Regulation EU Energy Law & Policy Workshop -­‐
20 May 2011

           http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/research\_en.htm

           http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/waste\_management/waste\_management\_en.htm

           http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-15/japan-s-nuclear-safety-steps-may-cost-19-billion-yen-per-reactor.html

           http://www.energysolutions.ie/Europe%E2%80%99s\_Aging\_Nuclear\_Power\_Plants/Default.396.html

           http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/13/us-usa-nuclear-idUSTRE76C4BO20110713

           http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html

           Interview with Michael Sailer from the Eco-Institute in
Darmstadt Copyright: Goethe-Institut e. V., Online-Redaktion, August 2006

           Lekander, et al., 2011, Can Nuclear Power Survive
Fukushima, UBS, April 4

           MIT, 2012, The Future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima,
Paul L. Joskow and John E. Parsons, February 2012 CEEPR WP 2012-001

           OECD/NEA, 2012, Study on the Economics of Long Term
Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov. R. Cameron, IAEA-CN-194-005

           Personal communication with Alexey Lokhov, Nuclear energy
analyst at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)

           Schneider M., Froggatt, A., 2012, World Nuclear Industry
Status Report 2012

           Signature Global analysis, 2012, Nuclear Renaissance:
What’s next after Fukushima?

           Taylor, M. (2008) Market competition in the nuclear
industry. Facts and opinions, NEA News 2008 – No. 26

           The EU has virtually no internal uranium supply but is
dependent for this on the main suppliers globally, such as Australia, Canada
and Kazakhstan (among others). Some uranium is produced as a result of
decommissioning activities, e.g. in Germany. Given the fact that the EU Uranium
supply is negligible, this sub-sector will not be considered further.

           The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2012, 5:16 a.m. ET,
UPDATE: EDF Keeps Its Guidance Despite Lower Nuclear Output,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120731-705439.html

           WNA (2010),
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf04.html

           WNA, July 2012
(/www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.html)

           www.nugenia.org/

P.O. Box 41753006 AD Rotterdam

The Netherlands

Watermanweg 44

3067 GG Rotterdam

The Netherlands

T +31 (0)10 453 88 00

F +31 (0)10 453 07 68

E netherlands@ecorys.com

W www.ecorys.nl

[1]      CEC, 2009, IMPACT ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final}
{SEC(2008) 2893}, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying document to
the Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (Euratom) setting up a Community framework
for Nuclear Safety IMPACT ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}

[2]       DECC, 2011, Transposition
of Council Directive Establishing a Community Framework for the Nuclear Safety
of Nuclear Installations (Euratom 2009/71), IA No: HSE0058 Date: 21/07/2011

[3]      ENSREG, 2012,
Peer review report - Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants.
Accessed at:
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EU%20Stress%20Test%20Peer%20Review%20Final%20Report\_0.pdf

[4]      i.e. making the voluntary overall IAEA safety principles
mandatory and binding rules for all EU Member States.

[5]      ENSREG, Stress
Test Peer Review Board. Peer review report : Post-Fukushima accident. Stress
tests performed on European nuclear power plants. v

[6]      While uranium
mining is part of the nuclear power value chain, it will not be included under
the scope of this study as it concerns largely non-European assets..

[7]      Schneider M., Froggatt, A., 2012, World Nuclear
Industry Status Report 2012

[8]      ENSREG (2012) www.ensreg.eu/members-glance/nuclear-eu

[9]      Source: EC,
2012, non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy to growth and jobs in the
EU.

[10]      CEC, 2009, IMPACT
ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING
DOCUMENT Accompanying document to the Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
(Euratom) setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety

[11]     Cour des Comptes, 2012, The costs of the nuclear power
sector - Summary in English (Report), Cour des Comptes, January 2012

[12]      http://www.energysolutions.ie/Europe%E2%80%99s\_Aging\_Nuclear\_Power\_Plants/Default.396.html

[13]     The EU has
virtually no internal uranium supply but is dependent for this on the main
suppliers globally, such as Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan (among others).
Some uranium is produced as a result of decommissioning activities, e.g. in
Germany. Given the fact that the EU Uranium supply is negligible, this
sub-sector will not be considered further.

[14]     WNA (2010), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf04.html

[15]     Ibid.

[16]     Ibid.

[17]     http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/waste\_management/waste\_management\_en.htm

[18]     Taylor, M.
(2008) Market Competition in the Nuclear Industry. Facts and opinions, NEA News
2008 – No.26

[19]     http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/research\_en.htm

[20]      www.nugenia.org/

[21]     MIT, 2012, The Future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima,
Paul L. Joskow and John E. Parsons, February 2012 CEEPR WP 2012-001

[22]      Lekander, et al.,
2011, Can Nuclear Power Survive Fukushima, UBS, April 4

[23]      Cooper, M., 2010,
Policy Challenges of Nuclear Reactor Construction, Cost Escalation and Crowding
Out Alternatives: Lessons From the U.S. and France for the Effort to Revive the
U.S. Industry With Loan Guarantees and Tax Subsidies (September, 2010):
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/IEE/20100909\_cooperStudy.pdf.

[24]      Interview with
Michael Sailer from the Eco-Institute in Darmstadt Copyright: Goethe-Institut
e. V., Online-Redaktion, August 2006

[25]     OECD/NEA, 2012, Study on the Economics of Long Term
Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov. R. Cameron, IAEA-CN-194-005

[26] R&D in the nuclear sector is a broad topic. It consists of improving
competitiveness  (fuel management, reliability, availability, lifetime
extension, etc....), improving safety & radioprotection and emission
control, developing long term solutions for reducing nuclear waste, increasing
proliferation resistance and also the development of sustainable nuclear fuel cycles. Knowing also that many
R&D investments are done by the public sector, that there is an overlap
between civil and military applications and overall, data lacks (even on
national level), it is not possible to give a clear figure about the R&D
share. From the literature (Cour des comptes, 2012), we know that total R&D
in the French nuclear programme is about  1 billion euro a year (1056 million
euros in 2010). However, knowing that most R&D in the nuclear sector comes
from public programmes, the share of R&D in the total cost structure of
nuclear energy producers is limited. We take as example EDF. The R&D EU budget
for EDF in 2010, allocated to nuclear, was  295 M€ (of which 158M€ internal,
the rest with partners). This money is mainly targeted at the following
research areas: safety and public acceptance, cost-effectiveness, lifetime
management, and preparing for the future.. Given EDF’s turonover of more than 50 billion euro,
the nuclear R&D investment is raher small (less than 1%).

Source: Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire, Jan. 2012,
Cour des Comptes.

[27]     Planned =
Approvals, funding or major commitment in place, mostly expected in operation
within 8-10 years; Proposed = Specific program or site proposals, expected
operation mostly within 15 years.

[28]      http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html

[29]      WNA, July 2012 (/www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.html)

[30]     Taylor, M. (2008) Market competition in the nuclear industry.
Facts and opinions, NEA News 2008 – No. 26

[31]     Taylor, M.
(2008) Market competition in the nuclear industry. Facts and opinions, NEA News 2008 – No. 26

[32]
    ASN, 2012, Evaluations complémentaires de la
sûreté des installations nucléaires prioritaires au regard de l’accident
survenu à la centrale de Fukushima Daiichi, RAPPORT IRSN N° 708

[33]      Cour
des comptes, 2012, Les coûts de la filière électronucléaire : Rapport public
thématique. Cour des Comptes,
janvier 2012, 430 p.

[34]      OECD/NEA, 2012,
Study on the Economics of Long Term Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov. R. Cameron,
IAEA-CN-194-005

[35]      Personal
communication with Alexey Lokhov, Nuclear energy analyst at the OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA)

[36]     Cooper, M., 2012, “Nuclear Safety and Nuclear
Economics, Fukushima Reignites the Never-Ending Debate: Nuclear Safety at an
Affordable Cost, Can We Have Both? Is Nuclear Power Not Worth the Risk at Any
Price?”, Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School, March
2012

[37]      http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/13/us-usa-nuclear-idUSTRE76C4BO20110713

[38]      http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-15/japan-s-nuclear-safety-steps-may-cost-19-billion-yen-per-reactor.html

[39]      EC, 2012,
non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy to growth and jobs in the EU

[40]      Interview with
Michael Sailer from the Eco-Institute in Darmstadt Copyright: Goethe-Institut
e. V., Online-Redaktion, August 2006

[41]     OECD/NEA, 2012, Study on the Economics of Long Term
Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov. R. Cameron, IAEA-CN-194-005

[42]     OECD/NEA, 2012, Study on the Economics of Long Term
Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov. R. Cameron, IAEA-CN-194-005

[43]      EC, 2012,
non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy to growth and jobs in the EU

[44]      The Wall Street
Journal, July 31, 2012, 5:16 a.m. ET, UPDATE: EDF Keeps Its Guidance Despite
Lower Nuclear Output, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120731-705439.html

[45]      Signature Global
analysis, 2012, Nuclear Renaissance: What’s next after Fukushima?

[46]      EC, 2012, non-paper on the contribution of
nuclear energy to growth and jobs in the EU

[47]      EC, 2012, non-paper on the contribution of nuclear energy to
growth and jobs in the EU

[48]      'Energy roadmap
2050' (COM(2011) 885 final of 15 December 2011

[49]      Eurelectric Power
Choices Scenario 2010

[50]      CEC, 2009, IMPACT
ASSESSMENT {COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING
DOCUMENT Accompanying document to the Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
(Euratom) setting up a Community framework for Nuclear Safety IMPACT ASSESSMENT
{COM(2008) 790 final} {SEC(2008) 2893}

[51]     A utility opinion about the impact of the European
Research Area. Jean-Pierre HUTIN, Director, EDF

[52]     Fabrice
Carrere, Blaise Hamanaka and François Lévêque, Mines ParisTech, posted May 9th,
2010: http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2010/05/09/innovation-trends-in-nuclear-power-generation/

[53]      This finding was based on the so-called innovation index, defined
as the number of yearly national patent applications in nuclear technology
divided by the number of yearly national patent applications in all
technological fields, on which Germany scored higher than France.

[54]      Florence School of
Regulation, 2011, Competition, Energy Law and Nuclear Safety Regulation.
François Lévêque and Florent Silve,  Professor of Law and Economics, Mines
ParisTech Sciences-­‐Po Paris
Florence School of Regulation EU Energy Law & Policy Workshop -­‐ 20 May 2011

[55]     long term operation

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