Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

ISSN 1725-2431
## C 6 E
# Official Journal
#### of the European Union

**Volume 57**
##### English edition Information and Notices 10 January 2014

_Notice to reader_

This publication contains written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers
given by a European Union institution.
For each question and answer, the original language version is presented before a possible translation.
In some cases, it is possible that the answer is given in a language other than the question. This depends
on the working language of the committee requested to provide the answer.
These questions and answers are published in accordance with Rules 117 and 118 of the Rules of
Procedure of the European Parliament.
All questions and answers can be accessed via the website of the European Parliament (Europarl) under
the heading ‘Parliamentary questions’:
_http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html_

_ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR POLITICAL GROUPS_
PPE Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the
European Parliament
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
NI Non-attached Members

### **EN**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 1

IV

_(Notices)_

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES

AND AGENCIES

###### EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

**WRITTEN QUESTIONS WITH ANSWER**

**Written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given**

**by a European Union institution**

(2014/C 6 E/01)

**Contents** **Page**

**E-002607/13** by Amelia Andersdotter to the Commission
_Subject:_ Follow-up to US Special 301 Reports in relation to EU development policy

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 25
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 26

**E-002608/13** by Brian Simpson, Saïd El Khadraoui, Michael Cramer, Georges Bach, Michel Dantin, Ismail Ertug,
Nathalie Griesbeck, Jörg Leichtfried, Eva Lichtenberger, Hubert Pirker, Dominique Riquet and Sabine Wils to the
Commission
_Subject:_ Information and studies on longer heavier vehicles (LHVs)

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 27
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 28
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 29
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 30

**E-002609/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Commission should ban the use of aspartame

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 31
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 32

**E-002610/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Commission should resolve the problem of late payments by the public administration in Italy

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 33
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 34

**E-002611/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Commission should protect European honey

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 35
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 36

C 6 E / 2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002612/13** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Closure of a factory in Bari — EU initiatives for its reopening

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 37
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 38

**E-002613/13** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Case of international abduction of two children

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 39
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 40

**E-002614/13** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Applicable jurisdiction

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 41
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 42

**E-002615/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Portugal and Ireland: agreement in principle on extending payment deadlines

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 43
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 44

**E-002638/13** by Nigel Farage to the Commission
_Subject:_ EUROGENDFOR X

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 45

**P-002640/13** by Theodoros Skylakakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Increase in borrowing by political parties without being subject to credit criteria

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 46
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 47

**P-002641/13** by Tomasz Piotr Poręba to the Commission
_Subject:_ Withholding of EU funding for a number of ROP projects in Podkarpackie province

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 48
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 49

**E-002642/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Dicalcium phosphate manufactured by Ercros in Flix, Tarragona

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 50
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 52

**E-002643/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Ercros' labour force adjustment plan (ERE) in Flix, Tarragona

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 54
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 56

**E-002644/13** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tackling poverty and social exclusion through social housing schemes in Europe

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 58
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 59

**E-002645/13** by Catherine Stihler to the Commission
_Subject:_ Distance Selling Directive

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 60

**E-002646/13** by Emma McClarkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission response to the horsemeat scandal

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 61

**E-002647/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda, Marije Cornelissen and Karima Delli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Suicides following evictions in Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 62
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 64
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 66
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 68

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 3

**E-002648/13** by Sergio Berlato to the Commission
_Subject:_ Clarification regarding Italian legislation on GMOs

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 70
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 71

**P-002649/13** by Alyn Smith to the Commission
_Subject:_ Proposed Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 72

**E-002650/13** by Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo to the Commission
_Subject:_ Combating illegal fishing

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 73
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 74

**E-002651/13** by Christel Schaldemose to the Commission
_Subject:_ Packaging of medicinal products

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 75
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 76

**E-002652/13** by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU funding for Albania

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 77
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 78

**E-002653/13** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reduction in excise duties on fuel

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 79
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 80

**E-002654/13** by Pino Arlacchi to the Council
_Subject:_ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition operations

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 81
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 83

**E-002655/13** by Pino Arlacchi to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — UK arms sales to Sri Lanka

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 85
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 86

**E-002656/13** by Aldo Patriciello to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU policies for the disabled and visually impaired

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 87
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 89

**E-002657/13** by Lucas Hartong and Laurence J.A.J. Stassen to the Council
_Subject:_ Follow-up questions concerning subsidies granted to Egypt

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 91
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 92

**E-002658/13** by Lucas Hartong to the Commission
_Subject:_ Software drama in the European Schools

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 93
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 95

**E-002661/13** by Satu Hassi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Vertical monopoly in the drinks packaging recycling system

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 97
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 98

**P-002662/13** by Kyriacos Triantaphyllides to the Commission
_Subject:_ Scandal of horsemeat in food for human consumption

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 99
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 100

C 6 E / 4 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**P-002663/13** by Michał Tomasz Kamiński to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU-Taiwan trade relations

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 101
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 102

**E-002664/13** by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Legality of reforestation works under the ‘Alexandros Baltatzis’ programme

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 103
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 104

**E-002665/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU actions curbing the export and misuse of ICT in human rights violations

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 105
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 107

**E-002666/13** by Jim Higgins to the Commission
_Subject:_ Labelling of honey

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 109

**P-002667/13** by Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Assistance for Lorca under the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 110
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 112

**P-002668/13** by José Manuel Fernandes to the Commission
_Subject:_ Making use of farm surpluses

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 113
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 114

**E-002669/13** by Antolín Sánchez Presedo to the Commission
_Subject:_ Norwegian recognition of the pension rights of seamen who worked on ships flying the Norwegian flag
before 1994

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 115
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 116

**E-002670/13** by Andreas Schwab, Pablo Arias Echeverría and Pablo Zalba Bidegain to the Commission
_Subject:_ Digital Single Market and SMEs

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 117
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 119
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 121

**E-002671/13** by Vicky Ford to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tree research

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 123

**E-002672/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Citizens disappointed in the European Union

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 124
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 125

**E-002673/13** by Gaston Franco to the Commission
_Subject:_ Entry into force of the EU Timber Regulation

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 126
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 127

**E-002674/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU action to safeguard Marseille soap

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 128
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 129

**E-002675/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Adoptions in Turkey

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 130
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 131

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 5

**E-002676/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Preventive EU controls of EU co-financing for the rebuilding of the City of Science in Naples

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 132
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 133

**E-002677/13** by Tomasz Piotr Poręba to the Commission
_Subject:_ Ban on the publication of the Polish weekly ‘W Sieci’

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 134
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 135

**E-002678/13** by Åsa Westlund to the Commission
_Subject:_ Developments in Burma

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 136
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 138

**P-002679/13** by Franziska Keller to the Commission
_Subject:_ Everything But Arms (EBA) investigation in Cambodia

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 139
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 140

**E-002680/13** by Amelia Andersdotter to the Commission
_Subject:_ New review of the database protection directive

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 141
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 142

**E-002681/13** by Hélène Flautre to the Commission
_Subject:_ Granting Mayotte the status of an outermost region and implementing the _acquis communautaire_ in the
area of fundamental rights, immigration and asylum

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 143
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 144

**E-002682/13** by Wim van de Camp to the Commission
_Subject:_ Import duties imposed on European products by China and India

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 145
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 146

**P-002683/13** by Véronique De Keyser to the Commission
_Subject:_ Israeli buses and apartheid

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 147
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 148

**E-002684/13** by Santiago Fisas Ayxela to the Commission
_Subject:_ Support for volunteering

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 149
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 151

**E-002686/13** by Santiago Fisas Ayxela to the Commission
_Subject:_ Homophobia in Belarus

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 152
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 153

**E-002687/13** by Santiago Fisas Ayxela to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cooperation against drug-trafficking mafia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 154
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 155

**E-002688/13** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ Particulate matter — violations and opportunities for improvement

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 156
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 158

**E-002689/13** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ Recycling of rare earth metals from electronic waste

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 160
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 162

C 6 E / 6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002690/13** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ The migration of poverty and the abuse of social welfare schemes in the EU

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 164
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 166

**E-002691/13** by Chris Davies to the Commission
_Subject:_ Re-use and recycling of printer cartridges

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 168

**E-002692/13** by Aldo Patriciello to the Commission
_Subject:_ Access to books for the visually impaired

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 169
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 170

**E-002693/13** by Matteo Salvini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact of abolition of duties on imports from Pakistan on the textile and shoe industry and on consumer
health

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 171
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 173

**E-002694/13** by Karl-Heinz Florenz, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Małgorzata Handzlik, Alojz Peterle and Anne Delvaux to
the Commission
_Subject:_ Moratorium or partial ban on neonicotinoids, postponement of vote

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 175
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 176
Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 177
Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 178

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 179
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 180

**E-002695/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Match funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 181

**E-002696/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implementation of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for
the protection of laying hens (Welfare of Laying Hens Directive)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 182

**E-002697/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Liberalisation of the EU labour market from January 2014

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 183

**E-002698/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Union's activities in Haiti

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 184

**E-002699/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ eTwinning network in Northern Ireland

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 185

**E-002700/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ A2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and the labour market

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 186

**E-002701/13** by Glenis Willmott to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact of internal EU migration

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 187

**E-002702/13** by Béla Kovács to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rule of law in Moldova

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 188
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 189

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 7

**E-002703/13** by Cecilia Wikström to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inclusion of libel law under Rome II

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 190
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 191

**E-002704/13** by Bas Eickhout to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC on renewable energy

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 192
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 193

**P-002705/13** by Marco Scurria to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Members of the Sahrawi intergroup refused entry to Morocco

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 194
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 195

**P-002706/13** by Carl Schlyter to the Commission
_Subject:_ Nanosilver in the Commission's promotional products

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 196
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 197

**E-002707/13** by Ivailo Kalfin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Unfair commercial practices in the retail sector

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 198
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 199

**E-002709/13** by David Martin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Journey times in the case of combined road-sea transport of animals

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 200

**E-002710/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reliance on the Internet: risk of excluding the elderly

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 201
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 202

**E-002711/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Football — illegitimate state aid

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 203
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 204

**E-002712/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europol — match-fixing

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 205
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 206

**E-002713/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — North Korea: strengthening of international sanctions

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 207
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 208

**E-002714/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Small-scale fishing: increase in EU co-financing

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 209
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 210

**E-002715/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Worsening of the EU recession

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 211
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 212

**E-002716/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Agriculture: cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 213
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 214

C 6 E / 8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002717/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria: kidnapping of UN observers

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 215
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 216

**E-002718/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria: call to arm the rebels

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 217
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 218

**E-002719/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Azorean waters: protection of biogeographically sensitive areas

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 219
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 220

**P-002720/13** by Esther Herranz García to the Commission
_Subject:_ Promotion of beef

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 221
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 222

**E-002722/13** by Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón to the Commission
_Subject:_ Request for documentation on Spain's compliance with Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 223
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 224

**E-002723/13** by Renate Sommer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Labelling of fructose for consumers with an intolerance

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 225
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 226

**E-002725/13** by Andrea Zanoni to the Commission
_Subject:_ Waste treatment in Zero Branco (Treviso), possibly in breach of the EIA Directive 2011/92/EU and the
Waste Directive 2008/98/EC

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 227
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 228

**E-002726/13** by Claudio Morganti to the Commission
_Subject:_ Issues relating to Tuscany's airports

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 229
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 230

**E-002727/13** by Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Support for organisations defending the rights of crime victims

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 231
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 232

**E-002728/13** by Marek Henryk Migalski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Belarusian preventive watch list

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 233
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 234

**E-002729/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro and Jacek Włosowicz to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Islamist terror groups in Syria

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 235
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 236

**E-002730/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — the European External Action Service's protection of freedom of religious belief

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 237
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 238

**E-002731/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 239
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 240

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 9

**E-002732/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ Environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 241
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 242

**E-002733/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Arrest of Christians in the Libyan city of Benghazi

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 243
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 244

**E-002734/13** by Hannu Takkula to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inclusion of Hezbollah on list of terrorist organisations

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 245
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 246

**E-002735/13** by Hannu Takkula to the Commission
_Subject:_ Democratisation in Egypt

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 247
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 248

**E-002736/13** by José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — EU-Armenia relations

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 249
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 250

**E-002737/13** by Sylvana Rapti and Spyros Danellis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Discriminatory treatment of Greek-registered commercial motor vehicles by the Turkish authorities

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 251
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 252

**E-002738/13** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ ECJ judgment against Ellinika Nafpigeia AE (‘Greek Shipyards Ltd’)

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 253
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 254

**E-002739/13** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sustainability and Use of Renewable Energy Sources in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 255
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 256

**E-002741/13** by Amelia Andersdotter to the Commission
_Subject:_ What specific basis exists for the realisation of fully automated image reporting?

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 257
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 258

**E-002742/13** by Carlos Coelho and Mário David to the Commission
_Subject:_ Schengen Visas — refusal of entry

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 259
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 260

**P-002743/13** by Sajjad Karim to the Commission
_Subject:_ Investigation into DuPont and Honeywell regarding 1234yf and the directive on mobile air-conditioning
systems (MAC Directive)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 261

**P-002744/13** by Toine Manders to the Commission
_Subject:_ European noise standards for rail transport

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 262
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 263

**E-002745/13** by Monika Panayotova to the Commission
_Subject:_ Youth Guarantee

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 264
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 266

C 6 E / 10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002746/13** by Monika Panayotova to the Commission
_Subject:_ A Cooperation and Verification Mechanism exit strategy and Bulgaria's accession to Schengen

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 267
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 268

**E-002747/13** by Andrés Perelló Rodríguez to the Commission
_Subject:_ State aid for football clubs in Valencia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 269
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 270

**E-002748/13** by Jutta Steinruck to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europe-wide job placement services

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 271
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 272

**E-002749/13** by Jörg Leichtfried to the Commission
_Subject:_ Kindle e-book reader — deletion of purchased e-books on closure of an Amazon account

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 273
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 274

**E-002751/13** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Presence of pesticide residues in olive oil exported to the USA

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 275
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 276

**E-002752/13** by Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz and Lívia Járóka to the Commission
_Subject:_ Pay discrepancies between men and women

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 277
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 278

**E-002753/13** by Toine Manders to the Commission
_Subject:_ Distortion of the internal market

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 279
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 280

**E-002754/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VAT rate on e-books

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 281
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 282

**E-002755/13** by Monika Panayotova to the Commission
_Subject:_ Labour market flexibility and security (flexicurity)

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 283
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 284

**E-002756/13** by Sophocles Sophocleous to the Commission
_Subject:_ Food scandal

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 285
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 286

**E-002757/13** by Sophocles Sophocleous to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible haircut on deposits and increase in corporation tax in Cyprus

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 287
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 288

**E-002758/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Compatibility between the EU ETS and WTO: new evidence for assessing loss of sectoral competitiveness

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 289
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 291

**E-002759/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Gluten-free foods: what progress is being made?

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 293
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 294

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 11

**E-002760/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Black market in human bodies: what controls are there on the certification of human body parts coming
from third countries?

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 295
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 297

**E-002761/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible new governance standards and models for European museums

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 299
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 300

**E-002763/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Radioactive traces in the meat of some wild boar

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 301
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 302

**E-002764/13** by Francesco De Angelis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cost of national mobile services compared with the Eurotariff for roaming services

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 303
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 304

**E-002775/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Capping

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 305
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 319

**E-002776/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Clarification of funds allocated to Portugal

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 305
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 319

**E-002777/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Clarification of Cohesion Policy funds

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 306
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 320

**E-002778/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Review clause

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 306
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 320

**E-002779/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Stimulating economic growth and job creation

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 307
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 321

**E-002780/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 308
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 321

**E-002781/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Youth Employment 1

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 308
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 321

**E-002782/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Youth Employment 2

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 309
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 322

**E-002783/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Financial envelopes

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 309
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 323

C 6 E / 12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002784/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Balance in the budget cut

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 310
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 323

**E-002785/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 311
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 324

**E-002786/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation: 150 km

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 311
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 324

**E-002787/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Common Agricultural Policy

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 312
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 325

**E-002788/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Horizon 2020

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 313
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 325

**E-002789/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Negotiations with the European Parliament

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 313
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 326

**E-002790/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Budget allocation for each Member State

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 314
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 326

**E-002791/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — advocating growth

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 314
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 327

**E-002792/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ European budget — Less funding for the Connecting Europe Facility

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 315
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 327

**E-002793/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Budget cuts for trans-European policies

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 316
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 328

**E-002794/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Outermost regions

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 316
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 328

**E-002795/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Treaty of Lisbon

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 317
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 329

**E-002796/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU budget — Europe 2020 strategy

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 318
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 329

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 13

**E-002797/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ State aid for Bankia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 331
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 332

**E-002798/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ The ‘Monday effect’ — Supplementary question to Question E-000207/13

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 333
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 334

**E-002799/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Systematic delay in tax rebates to companies

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 335
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 336

**E-002800/13** by Charalampos Angourakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Guaranteed rights for social and political movement in Colombia

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 337
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 338

**E-002801/13** by Philippe Boulland to the Commission
_Subject:_ Enhanced competences for EFSA

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 339
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 340

**E-002802/13** by Corien Wortmann-Kool to the Commission
_Subject:_ Naiades programme

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 341
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 342

**E-002804/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Members of the Commission and Working Time Directive rules

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 343

**E-002805/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fish discards in waters covered by the CFP

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 344

**E-002806/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fraud involving EU grants

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 345

**E-002807/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Functions hosted in Brussels for the benefit of EU diplomats

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 346

**E-002808/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ International organisations to which the EU sends delegates

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 347

**E-002822/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — International entities to which the European External Action Service is accredited

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 347

**E-002809/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Military staff working for the EU

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 348

**E-002810/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU military staff posted to non-EU headquarters

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 349

**E-002811/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU battlegroups: declared capabilities and key assets

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 350

C 6 E / 14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002812/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Register of national military units and assets available to the common foreign and security
policy

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 351

**E-002813/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU decision-making under qualified majority voting

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 352

**E-002814/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Accidents and injuries — EU Agency for Safety and Health at Work

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 353

**E-002815/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU employees claiming diplomatic immunity

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 354

**E-002816/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU staff arrests

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 355

**E-002817/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 356

**E-002818/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — total workforce

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 357

**E-002819/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — employment of EU nationals and local staff

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 358

**E-002820/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — vehicle fleet

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 359

**E-002821/13** by David Campbell Bannerman to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Art commissioned by the European External Action Service

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 360

**E-002823/13** by Nuno Teixeira, Spyros Danellis, Izaskun Bilbao Barandica, Dominique Vlasto, Luis de Grandes
Pascual, Carlo Fidanza, Jim Higgins and Giommaria Uggias to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU tourism management crisis group

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 361
Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 363
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 365
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 367

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 369
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 371

**E-002824/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Initiatives to support speech and language therapy

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 373
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 374

**E-002825/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Success of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 375
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 376

**E-002826/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Red tape in exports

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 377
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 378

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 15

**E-002827/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Final allocation of funds to Greece under the 2013 general programme entitled Solidarity and
management of migration flows (Solid)

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 379
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 380

**E-002828/13** by Louis Michel to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Camp Liberty

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 381
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 382

**E-002830/13** by Judith A. Merkies to the Commission
_Subject:_ Transport of animals above 35 °C

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 383
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 384

**E-002831/13** by Mark Demesmaeker to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU reaction to Prime Minister Erdoğan's comments on Zionism

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 385
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 386

**E-002832/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro and Jacek Olgierd Kurski to the Commission
_Subject:_ State of the shipbuilding industry in the EU

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 387
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 388

**E-002833/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro and Jacek Olgierd Kurski to the Commission
_Subject:_ North-South Transport Corridor

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 389
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 390

**E-002834/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro and Jacek Olgierd Kurski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 391
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 392

**E-002835/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ Execution of European Arrest Warrants

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 393
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 394

**E-002836/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact of the climate and energy package on the mining machinery industry

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 395
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 396

**E-002837/13** by Zbigniew Ziobro to the Commission
_Subject:_ Biofuel in the European Union

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 397
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 398

**E-002838/13** by Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă to the Commission
_Subject:_ Forest management by forest owners

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 399
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 400

**E-002839/13** by Peter Liese, Linda McAvan, Jo Leinen, Chris Davies, Bas Eickhout and Sabine Wils to the
Commission
_Subject:_ Debate on the 2030 climate and energy package

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 401
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 402
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 403

C 6 E / 16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002840/13** by Gaston Franco to the Council
_Subject:_ Statute for European foundations

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 404
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 405

**E-002843/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ New case of violence against women in the Maldives

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 406
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 407

**E-002844/13** by Aldo Patriciello to the Commission
_Subject:_ Short selling

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 408
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 409

**E-002845/13** by Aldo Patriciello to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fall in university enrolment

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 410
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 411

**E-002846/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Combating drug trafficking: EU-CELAC cooperation

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 412
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 414

**E-002847/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Communicating EU achievements

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 415
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 416

**E-002848/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ From Erasmus to Goethe

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 417
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 418

**E-002849/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ The tax evasion of large companies once again

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 419
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 420

**E-002850/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Catalogue of old trees and other forest-related measures

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 421
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 422

**E-002851/13** by Ismail Ertug to the Commission
_Subject:_ Domestic violence in Turkey

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 423
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 424

**E-002852/13** by Alyn Smith to the Commission
_Subject:_ Horizon 2020 and outreach

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 425

**E-002853/13** by Alyn Smith to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU-UNAWE project and outreach

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 426

**E-002854/13** by Marita Ulvskog, Anna Hedh, Jens Nilsson, Åsa Westlund, Göran Färm and Olle Ludvigsson to
the Commission
_Subject:_ Positive action plan to counter discrimination against people on grounds of their sexual orientation or
gender

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 427
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 428

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 17

**P-002855/13** by Alfredo Antoniozzi to the Commission
_Subject:_ New multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020 and youth unemployment in Europe

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 429
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 430

**E-002857/13** by Filiz Hakaeva Hyusmenova to the Commission
_Subject:_ Protecting democracy and fundamental rights

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 431
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 432

**E-002858/13** by Edite Estrela to the Commission
_Subject:_ Eurobarometer results on ‘European Union citizenship’

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 433
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 434

**E-002859/13** by Sonia Alfano, Kriton Arsenis, Gaston Franco, Jacqueline Foster, Julie Girling, Mikael Gustafsson,
Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska, Dan Jørgensen, Jörg Leichtfried, Kartika Tamara Liotard, David Martin, Cristiana
Muscardini, Bill Newton Dunn, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Pavel Poc, Raül Romeva i Rueda, Daciana Octavia Sârbu,
Joanna Senyszyn, Keith Taylor, Janusz Wojciechowski and Andrea Zanoni to the Commission
_Subject:_ International Fund for Animal Welfare report on the Economics of Japanese Whaling

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 435
České znění ........................................................................................................................................................................ 436
Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 437
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 438
Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 439
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 440
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 441

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 442
Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 443
Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 444

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 445

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 446
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 447

**E-002860/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ Re-examination of the decision for closure of unit 3 and unit 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 448
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 450

**E-002863/13** by Saïd El Khadraoui to the Commission
_Subject:_ Launch of the ‘European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings’ (ERRU)

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 452
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 453

**E-002864/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ The protection of birds in Gallecs

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 454
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 455

**E-002865/13** by Dan Jørgensen to the Commission
_Subject:_ The effect of electrosmog on bee behaviour

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 456
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 457

**E-002867/13** by Jutta Steinruck to the Commission
_Subject:_ Child labour in the Uzbek cotton industry

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 458
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 459

**E-002868/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Council
_Subject:_ Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 460
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 462

C 6 E / 18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002869/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 463
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 465

**E-002870/13** by Kyriacos Triantaphyllides to the Commission
_Subject:_ Concerns over closed detention centre for migrants in Kareç, Albania

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 467
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 468

**E-002871/13** by Paweł Robert Kowal and Marek Henryk Migalski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Public consultation by the Commission on the extraction of shale gas

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 469
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 470

**E-002872/13** by Roger Helmer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Asbestos

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 471

**E-002873/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Council
_Subject:_ Alleged presence of foreign jihadists in Syria

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 473
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 475

**E-002874/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Hamas prevents opening of cargo crossing

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 477
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 478

**E-002875/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Stability in Central Asia

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 479
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 480

**E-002876/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriage in South Sudan

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 481
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 483

**E-003102/13** by Fiorello Provera to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriages in South Sudan

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 482
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 483

**E-002877/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Threats to UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 485
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 487

**E-002878/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Deeply offensive comments made by Egyptian women's rights activist

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 488
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 489

**E-002879/13** by Matteo Salvini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Harmonisation of the laws on the disposal of asbestos and on compensation for individuals with severe
asbestos-related diseases

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 490
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 492

**E-002880/13** by Josefa Andrés Barea to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bankia preferred shares

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 493
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 495

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 19

**E-002881/13** by Michael Theurer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Waste of EU funding

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 496
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 497

**E-002882/13** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Restructuring of tax services in Greece and European best practices

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 498
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 499

**E-002883/13** by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Delays in ratification of the International Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of
the Prespa Park area

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 500
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 502

**E-002884/13** by Nessa Childers to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sugary drinks

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 504

**E-002885/13** by Romana Jordan and Karl-Heinz Florenz to the Commission
_Subject:_ Timing and other provisions related to the new carbon leakage list

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 505
Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 506
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 507

**E-002886/13** by Stephen Hughes to the Commission
_Subject:_ Incandescent light bulbs

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 508

**E-002887/13** by Esther de Lange to the Commission
_Subject:_ ETS for greenhouse horticulture businesses

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 509
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 510

**P-002888/13** by Geoffrey Van Orden to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU funding available to alleviate the costs of immigration from other Member States

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 511

**P-002889/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 512
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 513

**E-002890/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Forced debt cancellation

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 514
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 515

**E-002891/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Supplementary question to Question E-000098/2013

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 516
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 517

**E-002892/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Amendment of Directive 84/500/EEC (II)

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 518
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 519

**E-002893/13** by Rosa Estaràs Ferragut to the Commission
_Subject:_ Review of the European Disability Strategy

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 520
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 521

C 6 E / 20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002894/13** by Antolín Sánchez Presedo to the Commission
_Subject:_ Free trade agreement with Thailand and child labour in the canning industry

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 522
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 523

**E-002896/13** by Mario Borghezio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Costs incurred by the Greek Government for the construction of the mosque in Athens

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 524
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 525

**E-002897/13** by Esther de Lange and Ivo Belet to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs and the situation in Spain

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 526
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 527

**E-002898/13** by Esther de Lange and Ivo Belet to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 528
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 529

**E-002899/13** by Mark Demesmaeker, Ivo Belet and Philippe De Backer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Covenant on demographic change

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 530
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 531

**E-002900/13** by Mark Demesmaeker and Ivo Belet to the Commission
_Subject:_ Minimum income in Europe

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 532
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 533

**P-002901/13** by Josef Weidenholzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Elections in Cambodia

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 534
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 535

**E-002902/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Creation of an independent fiscal council in accordance with the regulation resulting from proposal
2011/0386(COD)

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 536
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 537

**E-002903/13** by Keith Taylor to the Commission
_Subject:_ Clarifications regarding Transparency Register review

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 538

**E-002905/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Electronic cigarettes: clarifications on marketing in Member States and the scientific studies carried out

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 539
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 540

**E-002906/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Horsemeat scandal: possible link with the crisis in the equestrian sector

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 541
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 542

**E-002907/13** by Filip Kaczmarek to the Commission
_Subject:_ Arms trade between Belarus and Sudan

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 543
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 545

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 21

**E-002909/13** by Ulrike Lunacek, Bart Staes and Franziska Keller to the Council
_Subject:_ European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation and its president

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 546
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 548
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 550
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 552

**E-002913/13** by Jean-Jacob Bicep to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Fundamental rights in Tibet

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 554
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 556

**E-002914/13** by Jean-Jacob Bicep to the Commission
_Subject:_ Common fisheries policy (CFP) and the outermost regions of the European Union

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 557
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 558

**P-002915/13** by Kriton Arsenis to the Commission
_Subject:_ ‘Fast-tracking’ investments in Toplou

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 559
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 560

**E-002916/13** by Andrés Perelló Rodríguez to the Commission
_Subject:_ Speed limit and increased emissions

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 561
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 563

**E-002918/13** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inclusion of persons with disabilities in EU external action

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 565

**E-002919/13** by Franziska Katharina Brantner to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Private military and security companies at EU delegations and missions

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 566
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 567

**E-002920/13** by Jutta Steinruck to the Commission
_Subject:_ Relocation

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 568
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 569

**E-002921/13** by Matteo Salvini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Presence of caesium-137 in boars in Valsesia and the European Union's nuclear policies

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 570
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 571

**E-002922/13** by Ryszard Antoni Legutko to the Commission
_Subject:_ Vaccination against infectious diseases

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 572
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 573

**E-002923/13** by Ryszard Antoni Legutko to the Commission
_Subject:_ Progress made by Wrocław in preparing for its role as European Capital of Culture in 2016

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 574
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 575

**E-002924/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ European values first and foremost

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 576
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 578

**E-002925/13** by Saïd El Khadraoui to the Commission
_Subject:_ Money laundering

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 579
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 581

C 6 E / 22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**E-002926/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ ‘Aesthetic’ excision

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 583
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 584

**E-002927/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Gambling and minors

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 585
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 586

**E-002928/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Counterfeit Italian food products

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 587
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 589

**E-002929/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU-Cuba relations

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 590
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 591

**E-002930/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Relations between the EU and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 592
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 594

**E-002931/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Exclusion of biologists from the field of human genetics

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 595
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 597

**E-003357/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Barriers to free competition between various clinical genetics and human genetics professionals

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 595
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 597

**E-002932/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Delay by Spanish Government in drafting and adopting river basin management plans in compliance
with Directive 2000/60/EC

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 599
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 600

**E-002933/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bees and a pesticide ban

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 601
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 602

**E-002934/13** by Ismail Ertug to the Commission
_Subject:_ Legal situation of Alevi assembly houses in Turkey

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 603
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 604

**E-002935/13** by Maria Eleni Koppa to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tackling unemployment at a time of crisis

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 605
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 607

**E-002936/13** by Keith Taylor and Michael Cramer to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Tourism Indicators System and animal welfare

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 608
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 609

**E-002937/13** by Michael Cramer and Franziska Keller to the Commission
_Subject:_ Karpaz: destruction of protected habitats of endangered species

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 610
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 611

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 23

**E-002938/13** by Lambert van Nistelrooij and Romana Jordan to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cost-effectiveness of investments in energy efficiency projects in public buildings

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 612

Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 614
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 616

**E-002939/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Changing the tax system to encourage supermarkets to redistribute food

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 618
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 620

**E-003730/13** by Dominique Vlasto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Combating the problem of food wastage — VAT

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 618
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 620

**E-002940/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ European industrial strategy

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 622
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 624

**E-002941/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Joint investment in the technologies of tomorrow

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 626
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 627

**E-002942/13** by Cristiana Muscardini, Niccolò Rinaldi, Sonia Alfano, Tiziano Motti and Andrea Zanoni to the
Commission
_Subject:_ Use of psychotropic drugs on animals

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 628
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 629

**E-002943/13** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible funding for companies active in the road transport, removals and warehousing sector

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 630
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 632

**E-002944/13** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible funding for the creation of a refuge for women who are victims of violence

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 634
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 635

**E-002945/13** by Rolandas Paksas to the Commission
_Subject:_ Application of the modulation of direct payments in the transitional period

Tekstas lietuvių kalba ....................................................................................................................................................... 636
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 637

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 25

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002607/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Uppföljning av USA:s Special 301-rapporter i förhållande till EU:s utvecklingspolitik

Vad gäller de effekter som USA:s Special 301-rapporter får för länder som tar emot utvecklingsstöd från EU har jag
tagit upp frågan om att utvecklingsstödet för institutionell stabilitet och utbildningssystem eventuellt inte får önskad
effekt.

I kommissionsledamot De Guchts svar på min fråga E-011001/2012 uppgav han följande: ”Kommissionen
övervakar inte systematiskt och har inte utvärderat de bilaterala diplomatiska förbindelserna i fråga om immateriella
rättigheter mellan USA och andra tredjeländer, inbegripet de som tar emot utvecklingsbistånd från EU. Dessutom har
inga [fall rapporterats] till kommissionen […]”.

Om kommissionen inte systematiskt övervakar de faktorer som kan inverka på dess politik, och dessa faktorers effekt
på användningen av skattebetalarnas pengar, kan den då förklara vad som görs för att se till att utvecklingsstödet inte
spenderas på ett sätt som omintetgörs genom andra länders åtgärder?

Med tanke på att kommissionen har medgett att det inte finns något övervakningssystem och att stödmottagarna inte
rapporterar några problem som skulle kunna leda till att deras stöd ifrågasätts, kan kommissionen då förklara vilka
åtgärder den har vidtagit för att se till att de länder som erhåller utvecklingsstöd faktiskt är på väg mot institutionell
stabilitet, bättre tillgång till utbildning och yttrandefrihet på en nivå som åtminstone motsvarar den som finns i EU?

**Svar från Karel De Gucht på kommissionens vägnar**

_(3 maj 2013)_

Kommissionen har inga belägg eller upplysningar som ger fog för parlamentsledamotens oro för att en amerikansk
rapport om immateriella rättigheter kan leda till negativa effekter på EU:s utvecklingspolitik eller den institutionella
stabiliteten, tillgången till utbildning och yttrandefriheten i länder som får utvecklingsstöd från EU.

EU och dess medlemsländer ger omfattande stöd som rör immateriella rättigheter till utvecklingsländerna och de
minst utvecklade länderna, eftersom länderna ofta efterfrågar den här typen av stöd för att främja sin utveckling ( [1] ).

Kommissionen kontrollerar regelbundet om partnerländerna har blivit bättre på bland annat goda styrelseformer och
ekonomisk förvaltning. Rapporterna från de oberoende utvärderingarna av kommissionens program finns på
[webbplatsen: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm)

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Mer information om EU:s och medlemsländernas program för tekniskt stöd avseende immateriella rättigheter finns på GD Handels webbsidor:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=328

C 6 E / 26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002607/13**

**to the Commission**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Follow-up to US Special 301 Reports in relation to EU development policy

Regarding the impact of United States Special 301 Reports on countries receiving EU development aid, I have raised
the issue that development aid for institutional stability and educational systems might not be having the desired
effect.

Commissioner De Gucht’s answer to my Written Question E-011001/2012 stated that: ‘The Commission does not
systematically monitor and has not made an evaluation of the bilateral diplomatic relations in the area of intellectual
property between the United States of America and other third countries, including those benefiting from EU
development aid. Additionally, no cases have been reported to the Commission […].’

If the Commission does not systematically monitor the factors that might have an impact on its policies, and the
effect of those factors on the usage of taxpayers’ money, can it explain what means are in place to ensure that
development aid is not being spent in ways that are made useless by other countries’ actions?

Moreover, as the Commission has admitted that there is no monitoring system and that the aid recipients themselves
do not report issues that might call their aid into question, can it explain what measures have been taken in order to
ensure that the countries benefiting from development aid are in fact on the road towards institutional stability, better
access to education and a level of freedom of speech or expression that is at least on a par with that of the EU?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The Commission has no evidence or information to support the Honourable Member’s concerns about the potential
negative impact that a United States report on intellectual property may have on the European Union’s development
policies or on the institutional stability, access to education and freedom of speech or expression in countries
benefiting from EU development aid.

The EU and its Member States are actually major providers of aid to developing and least developed countries in the
areas of intellectual property, as this kind of assistance is often requested by these countries to support their
development ( [1] ).

The Commission regularly monitors the progress of its partner countries in areas such as good governance and
financial management. It has a comprehensive programme of independent evaluation of its programmes and the final
reports of these strategic evaluations are published on its website at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Detailed information about the EU and Member State technical assistance programmes dedicated to IPR is available at DG Trade’s websites:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=328

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 27

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002608/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel**

**Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger**

**(Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) und Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(6. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Informationen und Untersuchungen zu längeren und schwereren Fahrzeugen

Bei der öffentlichen Anhörung zur Überarbeitung der Richtlinie 96/53/EG im Jahr 2012 hat die Kommission
ausdrücklich erklärt, dass ihre Haltung zu längeren und schwereren Lastkraftwagen bezüglich Infrastruktur,
Verkehrssicherheit, Umwelt und Verlagerung auf alternative Verkehrsträger nicht ausgereift sei und sie das Thema der
Erweiterung/Einschränkung des Einsatzes von schwereren und/oder längeren Fahrzeugen daher nicht antasten wolle.

Hat die Kommission in der Zwischenzeit weitere Untersuchungen vorgenommen oder plant sie dies? Verfügt die
Kommission mittlerweile über Informationen, die ihr tiefere Einblicke in die Auswirkungen längerer und schwererer
Fahrzeuge auf die Infrastruktur, die Verkehrssicherheit, die Umwelt und die Verlagerung auf alternative
Verkehrsträger verschaffen?

Wenn ja, wie sehen die erwarteten Auswirkungen auf die Infrastruktur, die Verkehrssicherheit, die Umwelt und die
Verlagerung auf alternative Verkehrsträger aus?

In ihrer Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E‐010127/2012 vom 15. Januar 2013 erklärt die Kommission
ausdrücklich, dass sie über neue Entwicklungen in Mitgliedstaaten, in denen längere Lastkraftwagen auf Dauer
eingesetzt werden, sowie über sämtliche Entscheidungen, die im Rahmen von Versuchen mit Fahrzeugen, die die
Höchstmaße überschreiten, getroffen werden, informiert sei. Die Kommission gibt ebenfalls an, dass sie bereit sei,
diese Informationen zeitnah mit dem Parlament zu teilen. Wann wird die Kommission dies tun?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

Im Einklang mit den Schlussfolgerungen der öffentlichen Anhörung von 2012 hat die Kommission beschlossen, in
ihren Vorschlag ( [1] ) zur Änderung der Richtlinie keine Bestimmungen aufzunehmen, die die in Artikel 4 vorgesehenen
Ausnahmen dahin gehend ändern würden, den Verkehr von längeren oder schwereren Fahrzeugen auszuweiten oder
einzuschränken. Wie vom Parlament bei mehreren Anlässen im vergangenen Jahr gefordert, nutzte die Kommission
allerdings die Gelegenheit zur Präzisierung des Wortlauts von Artikel 4 im Sinne ihrer Rechtsauslegung des
bestehenden Textes, die dem Parlament in dem Schreiben von Vizepräsident Kallas vom 13. Juni 2012 mitgeteilt
wurde. Die Bestimmung lässt die derzeitige Bedeutung der Richtlinie unberührt und hat somit keine wirtschaftlichen
oder sonstigen Auswirkungen. Daher wurden auch keine weiteren Studien zu dem Thema in Auftrag gegeben.

Am 23. April 2013 stellte Vizepräsident Kallas den Vorschlag im Ausschuss für Verkehr und Fremdenverkehr (TRAN)
vor, und die Kommission ist bereit, dem Parlament alle weiteren Informationen über Entwicklungen und Erfahrungen
aus Versuchen mit längeren Lkw mitzuteilen, sobald ihr solche Informationen vorliegen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Änderung der Richtlinie 96/53/EG vom 25. Juli 1996 zur Festlegung

der höchstzulässigen Abmessungen für bestimmte Straßenfahrzeuge im innerstaatlichen und grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr in der Gemeinschaft
sowie zur Festlegung der höchstzulässigen Gewichte im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr, KOM(2013)195.

C 6 E / 28 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002608/13**

**à la Commission**
**Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE),**

**Michel Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D),**
**Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) et Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(6 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Informations et études sur les véhicules plus longs et plus lourds

À l'occasion de sa consultation publique de 2012 sur la révision de la directive 96/53/CE, la Commission a clairement
précisé que, dans le domaine des camions plus longs et plus lourds, elle n'avait pas arrêté sa position concernant les
infrastructures, la sécurité routière, l'environnement et le transfert modal, et qu'elle ne se pencherait donc pas sur la
question de savoir s'il convient d'étendre ou de réduire l'utilisation des véhicules plus longs et/ou plus lourds.

La Commission a-t-elle réalisé d'autres études entre-temps ou prévoit-elle de le faire? Dispose-t-elle désormais
d'informations qui lui permettent de mieux comprendre l'incidence des véhicules plus longs et plus lourds sur les
infrastructures, la sécurité routière, l'environnement et le transfert modal?

Dans l'affirmative, quelle est l'incidence escomptée dans ces différents domaines?

Dans sa réponse à la question écrite E-010127/2012 du 15 janvier 2013, la Commission indique clairement avoir
connaissance d'éléments nouveaux sur l'utilisation habituelle de camions plus longs dans certains États membres,
ainsi que de toutes les décisions relatives aux essais de véhicules dépassant les dimensions maximales. La Commission
déclare également qu'elle est disposée à communiquer ces informations au Parlement en temps utile. Quand la
Commission compte-t-elle le faire?

**Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission**

_(6 mai 2013)_

La Commission a décidé, dans la droite ligne des conclusions de la consultation publique qu'elle a menée en 2012, de
ne pas introduire, dans sa proposition ( [1] ) de révision de la directive, de dispositions qui modifieraient la portée des
dérogations au titre de l'article 4 de la directive dans le sens d'une extension ou d'une limitation du recours à des
véhicules plus longs et/ou plus lourds. Comme l'a demandé le Parlement à plusieurs reprises l'année dernière, la
Commission a cependant saisi l'occasion pour clarifier le texte de l'article 4 conformément à l'interprétation juridique
qu'elle a faite du texte existant et que le Vice-président, M. Kallas, a communiquée au Parlement dans sa lettre du
13 juin 2012. Dès lors que cette disposition préserve tout simplement le sens existant de la directive, elle n'entraîne
aucune nouvelle incidence, qu'elle soit économique ou autre. Aucune nouvelle étude sur la question n'a donc été
commandée.

M. Kallas a présenté la proposition à la commission TRAN le 23 avril 2013, et la Commission est disposée, si des
informations pertinentes venaient à paraître, à partager avec le Parlement toute information nouvelle en sa possession
concernant le déroulement et les enseignements de la mise en circulation à titre expérimental des méga poids lourds.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Proposition de directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil modifiant la directive 96/53/CE du 25 juillet 1996, fixant, pour certains véhicules

routiers circulant dans la Communauté, les dimensions maximales autorisées en trafic national et international et les poids maximaux autorisés en
trafic international, COM(2013)195.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 29

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002608/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel**

**Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger**

**(Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) en Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(6 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Informatie over en onderzoeken naar ecocombi's (LZV's)

In haar openbare raadpleging over de herziening van Richtlijn 96/53/EG heeft de Commissie duidelijk verklaard dat
haar standpunt over langere en zwaardere vrachtautocombinaties — oftewel ecocombi's — nog niet weloverwogen
was met betrekking tot infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen vervoerswijzen, en dat
zij daarom nog geen uitspraken kon doen over de uitbreiding/vermindering van het gebruik van zwaardere en/of
langere vrachtautocombinaties.

Heeft de Commissie in de tussentijd aanvullende onderzoeken uitgevoerd, of is zij dat van plan? Beschikt de
Commissie nu over informatie die haar in staat stelt een grondiger inzicht te ontwikkelen in de effecten van
ecocombi's op de infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen vervoerswijzen?

Zo ja, wat zijn de verwachte effecten op de infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen
vervoerswijzen?

In haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-010127/2012 van 15 januari 2013 verklaart de Commissie duidelijk dat zij
op de hoogte wordt gebracht van nieuwe ontwikkelingen in de lidstaten die op permanente basis gebruikmaken van
langere vrachtautocombinaties en van eventuele besluiten die worden genomen op het vlak van proeven met
voertuigen die de maximale afmetingen overschrijden. Voorts zegt de Commissie dat zij bereid is dergelijke
informatie te zijner tijd met het Parlement te delen. Wanneer gaat de Commissie dit doen?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(6 mei 2013)_

Overeenkomstig de conclusies van de openbare raadpleging van 2012 heeft de Commissie besloten om geen
bepalingen toe te voegen aan haar voorstel ( [1] ) tot herziening van de richtlijn die de werkingssfeer van de vrijstellingen
krachtens artikel 4 van de richtlijn zouden wijzigen met het doel het gebruik van langere of zwaardere voertuigen uit
te breiden of te beperken. Zoals het Parlement het voorbije jaar verschillende keren heeft verzocht, heeft de
Commissie van de gelegenheid gebruikgemaakt om de tekst van artikel 4 te verduidelijken overeenkomstig de
juridische interpretatie van de Commissie van de bestaande tekst zoals die is meegedeeld in de brief van vicevoorzitter
Kallas van 13 juni 2012. Aangezien in deze bepaling de bestaande betekenis van de richtlijn wordt behouden, heeft ze
dus geen economische of andere gevolgen. Derhalve is geen opdracht gegeven tot aanvullende onderzoeken over dit
onderwerp.

Op 23 april 2013 heeft vicevoorzitter Kallas het voorstel gepresenteerd aan de TRAN-commissie. De Commissie blijft
bereid informatie over ontwikkelingen en ervaringen op het gebied van proeven met lange vrachtwagens met het
Parlement te delen, zodra zulke ervaring beschikbaar wordt.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Voorstel voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/53/EG van 25 juli 1996 houdende vaststelling,

voor bepaalde aan het verkeer binnen de Gemeenschap deelnemende wegvoertuigen, van de in het nationale en het internationale verkeer
maximaal toegestane afmetingen, en van de in het internationale verkeer maximaal toegestane gewichten.

C 6 E / 30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002608/13**

**to the Commission**
**Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel**

**Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger**

**(Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) and Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Information and studies on longer heavier vehicles (LHVs)

In its 2012 public consultation on the revision of Directive 96/53/EC, the Commission clearly stated that its position
on longer and heavier lorries was not a mature position as regards infrastructure, road safety, the environment and
modal shift, and that as such the Commission would not touch on the issue of extending/reducing the use of heavier
and/or longer vehicles.

Has the Commission undertaken any further studies in the meantime, or does it plan to do so? Does the Commission
now hold information that allows it to develop a more in-depth understanding of the impact of LHVs on
infrastructure, road safety, the environment and modal shift?

If so, what are the expected impacts on infrastructure, road safety, the environment and modal shift?

In its answer to Written Question E-010127/2012 of 15 January 2013, the Commission clearly states that it is
informed of new developments in Member States using longer trucks on a permanent basis and of any decisions taken
in the field of trials with vehicles exceeding the maximum dimensions. The Commission also states that it is ‘ready to
share such information with the Parliament in due course’. When will the Commission do so?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

In line with the conclusions of the public consultation carried out in 2012, the Commission has decided not to
introduce any provisions in its proposal ( [1] ) to revise the directive which would modify the scope of the derogations
under Art. 4 of the directive with the aim of extending or limiting the use of longer or heavier vehicles. As requested
by the Parliament on numerous occasions over the past year, the Commission did however take the opportunity to
clarify the text of Art. 4 in line with the Commission's legal interpretation of the existing text as communicated to the
Parliament by VP Kallas' letter of 13 June 2012. Since this provision merely preserves the existing meaning of the
directive, it has no economic or other impact. Therefore no further studies on the subject have been commissioned.

Vice-President Kallas presented the proposal before the TRAN committee on 23.4.2013 and the Commission remains
available to share any further information it possesses with the Parliament on developments and experiences from
trials regarding longer trucks as relevant information becomes available.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/53/EC of 25 July 1996 laying down for certain road

vehicles circulating within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum
authorised weights in international traffic, COM(2013) 195.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 31

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002609/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ La Commissione vieti l'utilizzo dell'aspartame

Uno studio svolto dai ricercatori dei National Institutes of Health statunitensi ha rilevato come le depressioni siano
più frequenti tra i consumatori di bevande edulcorate artificialmente rispetto ai consumatori di bevande zuccherate.
L'aspartame, già accusato di provocare tumori, sarebbe quindi alla base anche di altre patologie.

La Commissione, alla luce delle ricerche che ne hanno ampiamente dimostrato la tossicità per l'organismo umano,
non ritiene opportuno vietare l'utilizzo di tale sostanza all'interno dell'UE?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(18 aprile 2013)_

La Commissione ha dato incarico all'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare (EFSA) di effettuare una nuova
valutazione sulla sicurezza dell'aspartame entro Maggio 2013.

In base alle conclusioni di questa futura valutazione la Commissione prenderà all'occorrenza i provvedimenti
adeguati così da garantire ai consumatori la sicurezza nell'impiego dell'aspartame come dolcificante.

C 6 E / 32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002609/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The Commission should ban the use of aspartame

A study carried out by researchers from the US National Institutes of Health has found that depression occurs more
frequently among consumers of artificially sweetened drinks than among consumers of sugared drinks. It therefore
appears that aspartame, already accused of causing cancer, is also responsible for other illnesses.

In the light of the studies that have amply demonstrated the toxicity of this substance for humans, does the
Commission not consider that its use within the EU should be banned?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

The Commission has mandated the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to carry out a full re-evaluation of the
safety of aspartame by May 2013.

Based on the conclusions of this full re-evaluation, the Commission will, if needed, take appropriate measures to
ensure that the use of aspartame as a sweetener remains safe for the consumer.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 33

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002610/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ La Commissione provveda a risolvere il problema dei ritardi di pagamento della pubblica amministrazione in
Italia

La differenza fra i tempi di pagamento da parte delle pubbliche amministrazioni ai loro fornitori fra l'Italia e i Paesi
europei è in costante aumento. In Italia occorrono 180 giorni per saldare una fattura, in Germania 37 giorni, in Gran
Bretagna 43, in Svezia 24. Al momento si è giunti a 100 miliardi non riscossi dalle imprese per crediti nei confronti
degli enti pubblici.

L'Italia è stata la prima nazione a ratificare la direttiva 2011/7/UE relativa alla lotta contro i ritardi di pagamento nelle
transazioni commerciali che obbligherebbe la pubblica amministrazione a saldare i pagamenti entro 30 giorni, ma in
Italia alcuni decreti — quali quello firmato da Enrico Bondi — hanno permesso ad ospedali e alle aziende sanitarie
locali di ritardare i pagamenti fino a 120 giorni.

La Commissione intende aprire una procedura di infrazione nei confronti dell'Italia per correggere questa situazione?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

La direttiva 2011/7/UE stabilisce che gli enti pubblici sono tenuti a effettuare i pagamenti relativi agli scambi di beni e
servizi entro 30 giorni o, in casi eccezionali, entro 60 giorni. A causa della situazione particolare del sistema sanitario
tuttavia l'articolo 4, paragrafo 4, della direttiva contempla la possibilità di posticipare il pagamento fino a 60 giorni
per gli «enti pubblici che forniscono assistenza sanitaria e che siano stati debitamente riconosciuti a tal fine». In caso di
deroga lo Stato membro è tenuto a presentare una relazione alla Commissione entro il 16 marzo 2018.

Per quanto riguarda il caso dell’Italia, il 9 novembre 2012 il governo ha recepito la direttiva sopracitata col decreto
legislativo n. 192/2012. Nei mesi di dicembre 2012 e marzo 2013 la Commissione ha scritto al Ministro dello
sviluppo economico, delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti chiedendo delucidazioni in merito ad alcuni aspetti della
normativa italiana. La Commissione sta procedendo ad un’analisi giuridica dei documenti ricevuti dal governo
italiano nell’intento di verificare che i provvedimenti nazionali siano conformi alla direttiva.

La Commissione ha indicato al governo italiano di essere disposta a discutere riguardo agli ulteriori aspetti tecnici con
gli enti nazionali competenti.

Se l'analisi giuridica non sarà conforme alle condizioni di cui alla direttiva in quanto garante del trattato la
Commissione potrà prendere provvedimenti e, all’occorrenza, iniziare procedimenti per infrazione.

C 6 E / 34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002610/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The Commission should resolve the problem of late payments by the public administration in Italy

The difference between Italy and other European countries in terms of the time taken by public administrations to pay
their suppliers is constantly increasing. In Italy it takes 180 days to pay an invoice; in Germany it takes 37 days, in the
United Kingdom 43 days, and in Sweden 24 days. Currently, there is a total of EUR 100 billion in outstanding debts
owed to businesses by public administrations.

Italy was the first country to ratify Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions,
which would oblige the public administration to make payments within 30 days. However, in Italy certain decrees —
such as the one signed by Enrico Bondi — have allowed hospitals and local health authorities to delay payments by up
to 120 days.

Does the Commission intend to initiate infringement proceedings against Italy to remedy this situation?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

Directive 2011/7/EU obliges public authorities to pay for goods and services within 30 calendar days or, in very
exceptional circumstances, within 60 days. Due to the particular challenges in the healthcare systems, however,
Article 4(4) of the directive states that countries may extend the time-limits up to a maximum of 60 calendar days for
‘public entities providing healthcare which are duly recognised for that purpose’. If a Member State decides to grant
this derogation, it should send a report to the Commission by 16 March 2018.

As regards the particular case of Italy, the government transposed the directive on 9 November 2012, by Legislative
Decree No 192/2012. In December 2012 and March 2013, the Commission wrote to the Minister of Economic
Development, Infrastructure and Transport, asking for clarifications on some aspects of the Italian legislation. The
Commission is currently undertaking a legal analysis of the clarification received by the Italian Government, to verify
whether the national measure conforms with the directive.

The Commission has also informed the Italian Government about the Commission's availability to further discuss any
technicality with the competent national authorities.

Should the legal assessment reveal non-compliance with the requirements of the directive, the Commission, in its role
as Guardian of the Treaty, may take the necessary action, including where appropriate infringement procedures.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 35

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002611/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ La Commissione protegga il miele europeo

Le recenti decisioni in materia di etichettatura del miele, e la decisione di rivedere la proposta di direttiva, dopo gli
studi di impatto che sono stati intrapresi dalla Commissione su richiesta del Parlamento europeo, indicano la
necessità di applicare norme a tutela della produzione europea di miele. Attualmente ben il 40 % del miele consumato
nell'Unione europea, è importato da Paesi extra-UE quali la Cina e l'Argentina.

Quali controlli sanitari impone la Commissione a tali importazioni e con quali risultati?

La Commissione non ritiene che sia necessaria una etichettatura più restrittiva per il miele importato, onde garantire
la piena e completa visibilità nel caso siano presenti componenti contenenti OGM?

La Commissione intende contrastare l'uso di mescolare miele di provenienza extra-UE con miele UE onde garantire la
completa tracciabilità del prodotto?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(25 aprile 2013)_

1. Il miele può essere importato solo dai paesi terzi che abbiano un piano di sorveglianza dei residui approvato per
tale prodotto di base e figurino nell'elenco di cui all'allegato della decisione 2011/163/UE della Commissione ( [1] ). I
paesi terzi sono tenuti a presentare i loro piani ed i risultati della sorveglianza dei residui su base annua. Gli Stati
membri sono inoltre tenuti a campionare le partite di miele al punto d'importazione nell'UE (nell'ambito di
applicazione della direttiva 97/78/CE sui controlli veterinari). Eventuali risultati non conformi devono essere riportati
tramite il sistema di allarme rapido per gli alimenti ed i mangimi (RASFF) ( [2] ). Da gennaio 2010 fino ad oggi sono stati
riportati venti risultati non conformi per residui di medicinali ad uso veterinario, quattordici dei quali riguardavano il
miele importato da paesi terzi. In tale situazione gli Stati membri sono tenuti a prendere i provvedimenti del caso.

2. La Commissione ritiene che le norme di etichettatura per gli organismi geneticamente modificati autorizzati
nell'UE sancite dalla relativa legislazione ( [3] ), compresa la soglia di etichettatura dello 0,9 %, siano applicabili al miele
come a qualsiasi altro prodotto alimentare. Non esistono ragioni obiettive per trattare il miele come un'eccezione.

3. Le norme in tema di tracciabilità sono applicabili al miele come a qualsiasi altro prodotto alimentare. A norma
della direttiva 2001/110/CE del Consiglio concernente il miele ( [4] ), il paese o i paesi d'origine in cui il miele è stato
raccolto devono essere indicati sull'etichetta; se tuttavia il miele è originario di più Stati membri o paesi terzi
l'indicazione può essere sostituta, a seconda del caso, da «miscela di mieli originari della CE», «miscela di mieli non
originari della CE» o «miscela di mieli originari e non originari della CE».

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 70 del 17.3.2011, pag. 40.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 1829/2003 relativo agli alimenti e ai mangimi geneticamente modificati, GU L 268 del 18.10.2003.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) GU L 10 del 12.1.2002, pag. 47.

C 6 E / 36 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002611/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The Commission should protect European honey

Recent decisions on the labelling of honey, and the decision to review the proposal for a directive — following the
impact studies undertaken by the Commission at the request of the European Parliament — highlight the need to
apply rules to protect the European honey sector. Currently, as much as 40% of honey consumed in the European
Union is imported from non-EU countries such as China and Argentina.

What public health controls does the Commission apply to these imports, and what have the results been?

Does the Commission not believe that more restrictive labelling is needed for imported honey, to ensure full and
complete visibility in cases where it includes ingredients containing GMOs?

Does the Commission intend to combat the practice of mixing honey from outside the EU with EU honey, so as to
ensure the full traceability of the product?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 April 2013)_

1. Honey can only be imported from third countries which have an approved residue monitoring plan for this
commodity and are listed in the annex to Commission Decision 2011/163/EU ( [1] ). Third countries must submit their
plans and results of residues monitoring on an annual basis. Additionally the Member States must sample
consignments of honey at the point of import into the EU (within the scope of the veterinary checks
Directive 97/78/EC). Non-compliant results are to be reported under the RASFF ( [2] ). From January 2010 to date, 20
non-compliant results for residues of veterinary medicines have been reported, 14 of which concerned honey
imported from third countries. The Member States are obliged to take measures in such situation.

2. The Commission considers that the labelling rules for EU authorised GMOs set out in the GMO legislation ( [3] ),
including the 0.9% labelling threshold, apply equally to honey as to any other foodstuff. There is no objective reason
to make an exception for honey.

3. Traceability rules apply to honey as to any other foodstuff. In accordance with Council
Directive 2001/110/EC ( [4] ) relating to honey, the country or countries of origin where the honey has been harvested
shall be indicated on the label; however if the honey originates in more than one Member State or third country that
indication may be replaced as appropriate by ‘blend of EC honeys’, ‘blend of non-EC honeys’ or ‘blend of EC and nonEC honeys’.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 70/40, 17.3.2011.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on GM food and feed; OJ L 268, 18.10.2003.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p.47.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 37

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002612/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Chiusura di stabilimento a Bari, iniziative europee per il suo rilancio

Un noto produttore giapponese di pneumatici ha comunicato pochi giorni fa la sua decisione di chiudere, entro il
2014, la sua fabbrica a Modugno, in provincia di Bari (Italia), dove lavorano attualmente 950 persone. Lo
stabilimento in questione è uno degli 8 impianti della nota marca di pneumatici in Europa: gli altri si trovano in
Spagna, Francia, Polonia ed Ungheria. La scelta è stata presa a seguito della crisi economica che ha colpito duramente
il settore, e in particolare dell'andamento dei profitti dell'azienda in questione. In Europa le vendite di gomme per auto
sono calate da quota 300 milioni di unità nel 2011 a 261 milioni nel 2012, con una flessione del 13 % e a fronte di
previsioni che non danno come probabile un ritorno ai livelli del 2011 almeno fino al 2020.

Data, infine, la competizione dei produttori dei Paesi emergenti nel settore dei pneumatici di primo livello, le priorità
di produzione dell'azienda sono cambiate per concentrarsi su segmenti di produzione diversi. Proprio questa svolta
nella strategia di fabbricazione, insieme alle perdite di bilancio, starebbe alla base della decisione di chiudere
l'impianto di Modugno.

Tutto ciò premesso:

1. vista l'importanza occupazionale che l'azienda riveste per la regione, valuterà la Commissione ogni possibilità
per evitare la chiusura dello stabilimento, anche attraverso l'impegno specifico di fondi europei (fondi FESR
stanziati ma non ancora spesi, fondi Horizon 2020, intervento della BEI)?

2. Quali ulteriori iniziative intende assumere al fine di garantire il rilancio dell'attività industriale e i livelli di
occupazione nella zona industriale di Modugno (Bari)?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

1. Qualsiasi aiuto concesso all'impresa cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato costituirebbe un aiuto di Stato ai
sensi del trattato e dovrebbe essere autorizzato dalla Commissione. Prima del rilascio di una simile autorizzazione
non è possibile stanziare fondi.

2. Per quanto concerne il Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR), il programma regionale Puglia e il
programma nazionale Ricerca e competitività offrono un'ampia varietà di misure per promuovere le attività
economiche in Puglia. Per quanto concerne il Fondo sociale europeo, il programma dell'FSE può intervenire con
misure volte a promuovere la riqualificazione dei lavoratori in mobilità o ad aggiornare le loro competenze in vista di
possibili cambiamenti nel sistema di produzione. In linea con il principio di gestione condivisa usato per l'attuazione
della politica di coesione, la selezione dei singoli progetti da cofinanziarsi ad opera del FESR o dell'FSE rientra nelle
responsabilità delle autorità di gestione dei programmi summenzionati, a livello regionale e nazionale.

C 6 E / 38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002612/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Closure of a factory in Bari — EU initiatives for its reopening

A few days ago, a well-known Japanese tyre manufacturer announced its decision to close, by 2014, its factory at
Modugno in the province of Bari (Italy), which currently employs 950 people. The factory in question is one of the
manufacturer’s eight European plants; the others are in Spain, France, Poland and Hungary. The decision was taken as
a result of the economic crisis, which has hit the sector badly, and particularly because of the company’s falling
profits. In Europe, sales of car tyres have fallen by 13% from around 300 million units in 2011 to 261 million in
2012, with forecasts suggesting that there will be no return to 2011 levels until at least 2020.

In view of the competition from producers in the emerging countries in the premium tyre sector, the company has
switched its production priorities to concentrate on different product segments. It is this change of manufacturing
strategy, together with the loss of profit, that appears to lie behind the decision to close the Modugno plant.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Given this company’s importance for the region in terms of employment, will the Commission look into every
possible option for avoiding the closure of the factory, including the specific commitment of European funds
(ERDF funds allocated but not yet spent, Horizon 2020 funds, intervention by the EIB)?

2. What other measures does the Commission intend to take to revive industrial activity and employment in the
industrial zone of Modugno?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

1. Any aid to the company to which the Honourable Member refers, would constitute state aid in the sense of the
Treaty and would have to be authorised by the Commission. Prior to such authorisation, no EU funds can be
allocated.

2. As far as the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is concerned, the Apulia regional programme and
the national Research & Competitiveness programme offer a wide variety of measures to promote economic activities
in the Apulia region. As far as the European Social Fund is concerned, the ESF programme can intervene through
measures aimed at fostering the requalification of workers in mobility or at adapting their skills to possible changes in
the production system. In line with the shared management principle used for the implementation of cohesion policy,
the selection of individual projects to be co-financed by the ERDF or the ESF is the responsibility of the managing
authorities of the aforementioned programmes, at regional and national level.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 39

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002613/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Caso di sottrazione internazionale di due minori

In seguito alla separazione di un cittadino tedesco, residente in Belgio, e di una cittadina olandese, due minori (di 9 e 6
anni) sono stati portati via dalla madre dal luogo di residenza abituale in Olanda.

A conclusione del procedimento svoltosi dinanzi al tribunale competente in Olanda, la sentenza ha stabilito il divieto
per la donna di lasciare il paese senza il previo accordo del padre, avendo i genitori l'affido congiunto dei figli.

Nonostante il divieto impostole dalla sentenza, la madre ha portato i bambini, presumibilmente, in Francia e da allora
il padre non ne ha più avuto alcuna notizia.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se la normativa europea applicabile in materia di riconoscimento di sentenze straniere sia di applicazione nel
caso in esame;

2. nel caso positivo, quali siano le misure concrete previste dalla legislazione europea affinché sia disposto il
rientro dei minori presso la loro residenza abituale nei Paesi Bassi;

3. se la legislazione europea applicabile al caso in esame imponga altresì alle autorità degli Stati membri coinvolte
tempi brevi predefiniti per la risoluzione di tali controversie?

**Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

_(22 maggio 2013)_

Le informazioni fornite dall'onorevole deputato non consentono alla Commissione di stabilire se il regolamento (CE)
n. 2201/2003 ( [1] ) (il regolamento Bruxelles II _bis_ ) sia applicabile al caso dei due minori.

La Commissione non è pertanto nella posizione di esprimersi in merito a possibili misure concrete per risolvere il
caso in oggetto.

I casi di trasferimento illecito o mancato ritorno del minore in uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui tale minore
aveva la sua residenza abituale immediatamente prima del suo trasferimento o del suo mancato rientro sono
disciplinati dal regolamento Bruxelles II _bis_ . Il regolamento in oggetto stabilisce norme uniformi in materia di
sottrazione di minori transfrontaliera nell'UE e mette a disposizione del genitore leso nei suoi diritti una procedura
rapida per il rientro di un minore coinvolto in un trasferimento illecito o in un mancato ritorno. A tal fine, per
ottenere una decisione dell'autorità giurisdizionale in merito al rientro del minore, il regolamento prevede un periodo
massimo di sei settimane a partire dalla presentazione della domanda per il ritorno del minore. Il regolamento
stabilisce inoltre un periodo di un mese a partire dall'emanazione di un provvedimento contro il ritorno per l'inoltro
dei documenti del caso all'autorità giurisdizionale o all'autorità centrale nello Stato membro di origine del minore.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 338 del 23.12.2003, pag. 1.

C 6 E / 40 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002613/13**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Case of international abduction of two children

Following the separation between a German man, resident in Belgium, and a Dutch woman, two children (aged 9 and
6) were taken away from the mother from their place of habitual residence in the Netherlands.

At the conclusion of the proceedings before the competent court in the Netherlands, the woman was prohibited from
leaving the country without the prior consent of the father, given that the parents shared custody of their children.

Despite the ban imposed on her by the judgment, the mother took the children, presumably to France, since when the
father has not heard from them.

In light of the above, can the Commission say:

1. whether the applicable European legislation regarding recognition of foreign judgments also applies in the
present case;

2. if so, what concrete measures does European legislation provide so as to order the return of the children to their
habitual residence in the Netherlands;

3. whether the European legislation applicable to this case also imposes strict timeframes on the authorities of the
Member States involved to resolve such disputes?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

On the basis of the information provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission is not in a position to
establish whether Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 ( [1] ) (‘the Brussels IIa regulation’) is applicable in the case of the two
minors.

The Commission is therefore not in a position to advise on concrete measures that could be taken to resolve the case
in point.

In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child in a Member State other than the Member State in which the child
was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, the Brussels IIa regulation applies. This
regulation lays down uniform rules on the subject of cross-border parental child abduction in the EU and makes
available to a left-behind parent an expeditious procedure for obtaining the return of a child who has been wrongfully
removed or retained. To this end, it provides for a maximum period of six weeks for obtaining a decision from the
court on the return of the child, starting from the lodging of a return application, and a one-month deadline for the
transmission of documents to the court with jurisdiction or the central authority in the Member State of origin of the
child after a non-return order is issued.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 41

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002614/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Giurisdizione applicabile

Un cittadino italiano e una cittadina britannica hanno contratto matrimonio in Italia, ivi stabilendo la residenza
coniugale. Dalla coppia è nato un figlio. La nascita è avvenuta in Gran Bretagna per volere della madre e con il
consenso del padre. La moglie ha trascorso i mesi precedenti al parto in Gran Bretagna presso la propria famiglia di
origine e dopo la nascita del figlio non ha fatto più ritorno in Italia. A seguito di questa situazione si è creato un
conflitto sulla giurisdizione applicabile.

In effetti l'articolo 8 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 sancisce, ai fini della determinazione della giurisdizione
applicabile, il principio della «residenza abituale del minore esistente al tempo della proposizione della domanda»
quale titolo attributivo della competenza, allorquando, nei casi di divorzio, separazione personale ed annullamento
del matrimonio, la domanda verta anche sui profili della responsabilità genitoriale.

Nel caso di specie, il minore non è mai stato in Italia, è cittadino britannico e ha la residenza abituale in Inghilterra,
dove stabilmente vive fin dalla nascita.

D'altra parte l'articolo 3 del suddetto regolamento sancisce che sono competenti a decidere sulle questioni inerenti al
divorzio, alla separazione o all'annullamento del matrimonio le autorità giurisdizionali dello Stato membro nel cui
territorio si trova la residenza abituale dei coniugi o l'ultima residenza abituale dei coniugi se uno di essi vi risiede

ancora.

Potrebbe la Commissione chiarire:

1. se la legislazione dell'Unione ed in particolare il regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 sono sufficienti a dirimere un
caso come quello in esame oppure vi sia una incongruenza nella normativa europea;

2. nel caso positivo, quale dei due principi definiti dal regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativi alla decisione sulla
competenza giurisdizionale dovrebbe prevalere;

3. nel caso negativo, se intende presentare proposte legislative al Parlamento ed al Consiglio volte a precisare
meglio i criteri per l'attribuzione della competenza sulla giurisdizione applicabile in casi simili a quello in
esame?

**Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

_(22 maggio 2013)_

Nell'ambito del diritto di famiglia, il regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 ( [1] ) (il regolamento Bruxelles II bis) stabilisce
norme chiare e lineari sulla competenza giurisdizionale e sul riconoscimento e l'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia
matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, al fine di risolvere le controversie transfrontaliere
sull'affidamento all'interno dell'UE.

Le disposizioni in materia di giurisdizione di cui all'articolo 3 del regolamento Bruxelles II bis si limitano a disciplinare
il divorzio, la separazione personale dei coniugi e l'annullamento del matrimonio. Non vi è nessuna sovrapposizione
con la competenza giurisdizionale in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, che è sancita dall'articolo 8 e succ. del
medesimo regolamento.

La Commissione sta svolgendo il primo riesame periodico del regolamento Bruxelles II bis. Sulla base degli esisti di
tale riesame, la Commissione valuterà la necessità di ulteriori interventi legislativi.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 338 del 23.12.2003, pag. 1.

C 6 E / 42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002614/13**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Applicable jurisdiction

An Italian man and a British woman were married in Italy, establishing their marital residence there. A son was born
to the couple. The birth took place in the United Kingdom at the behest of the mother and with the father’s consent.
The wife spent the months prior to the birth in the United Kingdom with her family of origin and after the son’s birth
did not return to Italy. This has led to a conflict over the applicable jurisdiction.

Indeed, Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 lays down, for the purpose of determining the applicable
jurisdiction, the principle of ‘habitual residence of the child when the application was made’ as a title conferring
jurisdiction, whereas, in cases of divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment, the application also concerns
aspects of parental responsibility.

In this case, the child has never been in Italy, is a British citizen and has his habitual residence in the United Kingdom,
where he has lived ever since birth.

On the other hand, Article 3 of the regulation states that the courts of the Member State in whose territory the
spouses are habitually resident — or were last habitually resident insofar as one of them still resides there — are
competent to decide on matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment.

Could the Commission clarify:

1. whether EU legislation, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, is sufficient to settle a case such
as this, or whether there is an inconsistency in EU legislation;

2. if so, which of the two principles laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning applicable
jurisdiction should prevail;

3. if not, whether it intends to propose legislation to Parliament and the Council to clarify the criteria for
conferring applicable jurisdiction, in cases such as the present one?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

In the area of family law, Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 ( [1] ) (‘the Brussels IIa regulation’) provides for clear and
consistent rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters of parental
responsibility to settle cross-border custody disputes within the EU.

The jurisdiction rules set out in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa regulation are limited to divorce, legal separation and
marriage annulment. There is no overlap with the grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, which
can be found in Article 8 et seq. of the Brussels IIa regulation.

The Commission is currently in the process of carrying out the first regular review of the Brussels IIa regulation. Based
on this assessment, the Commission will examine the need of any further legislative action.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 43

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002615/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(6 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Portugal e Irlanda: acordo de princípio — extensão dos prazos de pagamento

Os ministros das Finanças da União Europeia chegaram no dia 5 de março de 2013 a um acordo de princípio com
vista à extensão dos prazos para pagamento dos empréstimos solicitada por Portugal e pela Irlanda, no quadro dos
respetivos programas de assistência financeira.

Os 27 concordaram em solicitar à «troika» que avance agora com uma proposta com as melhores opções possíveis
para cada um dos dois países, tanto para os empréstimos concedidos ao abrigo do Fundo Europeu de Estabilização
Financeira (FEEF) como do Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade Financeira (MEEF).

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Como avalia o acordo de princípio alcançado no dia 5 de março de 2013, nomeadamente quanto à sua
necessidade e oportunidade?

2. Em seu entender, que novas condições devem constar dos programas de assistência financeira?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Uma extensão dos prazos de vencimento dos empréstimos da UE a Portugal e à Irlanda poderá ser útil, dado que tal
contribuirá para suavizar os perfis de amortização da dívida de ambos os países e isentar o período pós-programa de
amortizações para o MEEF e o FEEF, facilitando o regresso duradouro aos mercados. As grandes necessidades anuais
de financiamento podem ser uma fonte de vulnerabilidade para o acesso ao mercado em condições razoáveis,
especialmente quando os níveis da dívida são já elevados (como é o caso da Irlanda e de Portugal). O restabelecimento
do financiamento privado é um dos principais objetivos de ambos os programas.

Neste contexto, o Conselho Ecofin mandatou a Troica e o FEEF para analisar opções para a extensão dos prazos de
vencimento dos empréstimos do MEEF e do FEEF (comunicação Ecofin de 5 de março) e o Eurogrupo acordou
prolongar o prazo dos empréstimos do FEEF (ver declaração de 16 de março do Eurogrupo). A análise deve ser
apresentada na reunião do Ecofin de 23 de abril.

A eventual decisão de prolongar os prazos de vencimento dos empréstimos está nas mãos dos Estados-Membros e das
instituições da UE, no que diz respeito ao FEEF e ao MEEF.

Ambos os países são atualmente objeto de um programa de ajustamento económico. Os programas destinam-se a
restabelecer a sustentabilidade orçamental, favorecer o crescimento económico e a salvaguarda da estabilidade
financeira.

C 6 E / 44 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002615/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Portugal and Ireland: agreement in principle on extending payment deadlines

On 5 March 2013, EU finance ministers reached an agreement in principle on the extension of loan-repayment
deadlines requested by Portugal and Ireland, in the context of their respective financial assistance programmes.

The 27 agreed to ask the Troika to suggest the best possible options for each of the two countries, for loans granted
under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM).

1. What is the Commission’s view of the agreement in principle of 5 March 2013, particularly in terms of whether
it is necessary and appropriate?

2. What does it think the new conditions for the financial assistance programmes should be?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

An extension of the maturity of EU loans to Portugal and Ireland could be useful because this will help to smooth the
debt redemption profiles of both countries and free the post-programme period from EFSM/EFSF redemptions,
thereby facilitating a resumption of durable market access. Large financing needs in single years can be a source of
vulnerability for market access at reasonable terms, especially when debt levels are already high (as it is the case in
Ireland and Portugal). Re-establishing private funding is a key objective of both programmes.

Against this background, the Ecofin Council mandated the Troika and the EFSF to look into options for lengthening
the maturities of EFSM and EFSF loans (Ecofin statement of 5 March) and the Eurogroup agreed to a lenghtening of
EFSF loans in principle (see Eurogroup statement of 16 March). The analysis shall be presented the Ecofin meeting on
23 April.

The eventual decision to lengthen the maturities of these loans is in the hands of the EU Member States and the EU
institutions, as regards the EFSF and the EFSM.

Both countries are currently subject to an economic adjustment programme. The programmes aim at restoring fiscal
sustainability, enhancing economic growth and safeguarding financial stability.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 45

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002638/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nigel Farage (EFD)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EUROGENDFOR X

On 24 January 2013, the _New Statesman_ magazine reported that in Greece, during the past few weeks, offices of the
governing parties and homes of pro-government journalists have been firebombed and the headquarters of the Prime
Minister’s conservative New Democracy party sprayed with machine-gun fire, and that, days later, a bomb exploded
at a shopping mall belonging to the country’s second wealthiest citizen.

A former Greek Ambassador, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, predicts that an ‘explosion’ of civil unrest will occur when
retroactive and sizeable tax bills come due in the coming months.

The Greek army has reportedly promised not to intervene, and the Greek Government has turned to private security
firms rather than trust the underpaid Greek police to keep order.

How does the Commission propose to ensure the safety of the Troika on its visits to Greece, given that on the
occasion of Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Athens the Greek Government felt it necessary to flood the streets with more
than 7 000 police officers?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 April 2013)_

It should be noted that as regards the visits of the Troika, the Commission is responsible for ensuring security of the
Commission representatives within the Troika.

In order to ensure their security when travelling or staying in Greece, security measures are carried out by the
competent Commission services in close cooperation with the Greek police authorities and with the security
departments of the other Troika members on the basis of security assessments conducted in view of each particular
mission.

Depending on the identified safety and security threats, security measures can range from discreet monitoring actions
up to a more visible close protection scheme.

C 6 E / 46 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002640/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)**

_(6 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αύξηση δανεισμού πολιτικών κομμάτων χωρίς τραπεζικά κριτήρια

Στην ερώτησή μου E-011048/2011, σχετικά με την χρηματοδότηση των πολιτικών κομμάτων, στην οποία ερωτάτο η
Επιτροπή αν θεωρεί σημαντικό «να αποτρέψει να χρησιμοποιηθούν τα χρήματα των ευρωπαίων φορολογουμένων για νέα
δάνεια χωρίς τραπεζικά κριτήρια στα κυβερνητικά κόμματα, που θα αλλοιώσουν την ανεπηρέαστη έκφραση της βούλησης
του ελληνικού λαού», η Επιτροπή δήλωσε ότι ανησυχεί για κάθε ενδεχόμενο ηθικού κινδύνου που σχετίζεται με το
πρόγραμμα για την Ελλάδα και δεσμεύτηκε ότι «Όσον αφορά την αναμενόμενη ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών, θα
ληφθούν μέτρα για να διασφαλιστεί η τήρηση των αρχών της δίκαιης μεταχείρισης, της αμεροληψίας και της ανεξαρτησίας
από πολιτικές επιρροές». Σύμφωνα με τους ισολογισμούς της Νέας Δημοκρατίας και του ΠΑΣΟΚ, το 2012 τα δύο κόμματα,
εμφανίζουν αύξηση του δανεισμού τους (και τα δύο μαζί, σχεδόν 30 εκ. ευρώ), παρά το γεγονός ότι ήδη από το 2011 ήταν
υπερδανεισμένα και ήταν προφανές ότι δεν επρόκειτο να πληρώσουν τα χρέη τους. Η αύξηση του δανεισμού την εκλογική
χρονιά, όταν με τραπεζικά κριτήρια έπρεπε να χρησιμοποιήσουν την κρατική επιχορήγηση για την εξυπηρέτηση των δανείων
τους, είναι μια παραβίαση της ουσίας της δημοκρατικής διαδικασίας.

Τα δύο κόμματα, με τα δάνεια που πήραν από τις τράπεζες, (οι οποίες ήταν σε απόλυτη εξάρτηση από το κράτος και από την
χρηματοδότηση με ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους) είχαν εκλογικά το οικονομικό πλεονέκτημα όχι μόνο σε θέματα διαφήμισης αλλά
ακόμα και στην μεταφορά των ψηφοφόρων τους, επηρεάζοντας έτσι αθέμιτα την έκφραση της βούλησης του ελληνικού
λαού.

Ουσιαστικά, επιτράπηκε στα δύο κόμματα, να αυξήσουν το δανεισμό τους, παραβιάζοντας τα θεμιτά τραπεζικά κριτήρια,
παρά τη δέσμευση της Επιτροπής για το αντίθετο, παρά το γεγονός ότι στο τέλος του 2011 ήδη ο δανεισμός τους
ξεπερνούσε τα 230 εκ. ευρώ και παρά το γεγονός ότι την ίδια χρονιά η πιστωτική επέκταση του ιδιωτικού τομέα μειωνόταν.

Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι τήρησε την ως άνω δέσμευσή της;

Θεωρεί ότι οι ανωτέρω εξελίξεις θίγουν και το οικονομικό συμφέρον της ΕΕ (μέσω του δανεισμού των κομμάτων χωρίς
τραπεζικά κριτήρια, από τράπεζες οι οποίες είναι εξαρτημένες από την ΕΚΤ και τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Σταθερότητας
«ESM»);

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(18 Απριλίου 2013)_

Όσον αφορά την αναμενόμενη ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ανταποκρίθηκε στη δέσμευσή της
να λάβει μέτρα για να διασφαλιστεί η τήρηση των αρχών της δίκαιης μεταχείρισης, της αμεροληψίας και της ανεξαρτησίας
από πολιτικές επιρροές.

Το ζήτημα αυτό συζητήθηκε με τις ελληνικές αρχές κατά την πρώτη επανεξέταση του δεύτερου προγράμματος οικονομικής
προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα, η οποία ολοκληρώθηκε τον Δεκέμβριο του 2012. Τα μέτρα που ελήφθησαν στο πλαίσιο της
ανακεφαλαιοποίησης των βασικών τραπεζών, σύμφωνα με το μνημόνιο συμφωνίας, παράγραφος 3.4.2. (διασφαλίσεις για τη
σταθερότητα και τη βιωσιμότητα του χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος), περιλαμβάνουν το διορισμό εντολοδόχων
παρακολούθησης σε όλες τις τράπεζες που τελούν υπό αναδιάρθρωση (το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του ελληνικού τραπεζικού
συστήματος).

Οι εντολοδόχοι παρακολούθησης άρχισαν τη δραστηριότητά τους στις 16 Ιανουαρίου 2013 και δραστηριοποιούνται στο
πλαίσιο αυστηρώς καθορισμένων καθηκόντων ώστε να ελέγχουν και να παρακολουθούν εκ του σύνεγγυς τις τραπεζικές
δραστηριότητες. Ακόμη και ελλείψει εγκεκριμένου σχεδίου αναδιάρθρωσης, οι εντολοδόχοι επαληθεύουν επί του παρόντος
την ορθή διακυβέρνηση και τη χρήση κριτηρίων εμπορικής βάσης σε σημαντικές αποφάσεις πολιτικής (συμπεριλαμβανομένης
και της δανειοδότησης). Αυτό περιλαμβάνει επίσης την παρακολούθηση των πράξεων δανειοδότησης των πολιτικών
κομμάτων.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 47

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002640/13**

**to the Commission**
**Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Increase in borrowing by political parties without being subject to credit criteria

My Question E-011048/2011 on the funding of political parties asked the Commission whether it considered it
important ‘to prevent European taxpayers’ money being used for new loans to the governing parties, without these
being subject to credit criteria, which would stand in the way of the free expression of the will of the Greek people’. In
its answer, the Commission stated that it was ‘concerned about any risk of moral hazard related to the programme for
Greece’ and made a commitment that: ‘Regarding the expected recapitalisation of banks, measures will be put in place
to ensure that the principles of fair treatment, impartiality and independence from political influence are observed’.
According to the balance sheets of New Democracy and PASOK, in 2012 the two parties increased their borrowing
(their combined borrowing rose by almost EUR 30 million), despite the fact that since 2011 they had been overindebted and it had been clear that they would not be repaying their debts. This increase in borrowing in an election
year when they should have used State grants, subject to credit criteria, to service their loans is a violation of the very
essence of the democratic process.

With their loans from the banks (which were totally dependent on the State and funding from European funds), the
two parties enjoyed a financial advantage in the elections not only in terms of advertising but also in providing
transport for their voters. They were thus able unfairly to influence the free expression of the will of the Greek people.

Essentially, the two parties were allowed to increase their borrowing, in breach of the legal credit criteria, despite the
Commission’s commitment that this would not occur, and despite the fact that at the end of 2011 their borrowing
had already exceeded EUR 230 million and that in same year the credit growth of the private sector was in decline.

Does the Commission consider that it has honoured the commitment referred to above?

Does it consider that these developments affect the financial interests of the EU (through the borrowing of the
political parties without being subject to credit criteria from banks which are dependent on the ECB and the European
Stability Mechanism ‘ESM’)?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

Regarding the expected recapitalisation of banks, the European Commission has followed up on its commitment to
put measures in place to ensure that the principles of fair treatment, impartiality and independence from political
influence are observed.

This issue was discussed with Greek Authorities during the first review of the Second Economic Adjustment
Programme for Greece, which finished in December 2012. The measures put in place in the context of the
recapitalisation of core banks, according to the memorandum of understanding, Paragraph 3.4.2. (Safeguards to
ensure stability and viability of the financial system), include the appointment of monitoring trustees in all banks
under restructuring (the major part of Greek banking system).

The monitoring trustees started their activity on 16 January 2013 and they work within strictly defined terms of
reference to closely monitor and follow bank operations. Even in the absence of an approved restructuring plan, the
trustees are currently verifying proper governance and the use of commercial basis criteria in key policy decisions
(including lending). This includes also monitoring lending transactions with political parties.

C 6 E / 48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-002641/13**

**do Komisji**
**Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)**

_(6 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wstrzymanie unijnych dotacji na część projektów realizowanych w ramach RPO przez województwo
podkarpackie

Dnia 26-ego lutego 2013 r. Komisja Europejska skierowała do marszałka województwa podkarpackiego Mirosława
Karapyty pismo, w którym rekomendowała wstrzymanie unijnych dotacji na część projektów realizowanych
w ramach Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego (RPO) przez województwo podkarpackie. Sprawa wywołuje wiele
kontrowersji i w związku z tym potrzeba jak najszybszego jej wyjaśnienia. W nawiązaniu do tej sprawy chciałem
prosić Komisję Europejską o uściślenie następujących kwestii:

1. Jaka jest skala nieprawidłowości, którą podejrzewa Komisja w tym przypadku? Jaką dokładnie kwotę może
stracić województwo podkarpackie z 5 mld PLN przyznanych mu w ramach RPO na lata 2007-2013?

2. Czy rekomendacja o wstrzymaniu wypłat ze środków unijnych na niektóre projekty realizowane w ramach
RPO wydana przez Komisję oznacza _de facto_ konieczność zablokowania tychże wypłat przez województwo
podkarpackie?

3. Jakie dokładnie projekty w ramach RPO przez województwo podkarpackie są zagrożone utratą
dofinansowania z funduszy unijnych?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johannesa Hahna w imieniu Komisji**

_(10 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

1. Komisja nie posiada informacji dotyczących szczegółów dochodzenia prowadzonego przez Centralne Biuro
Antykorupcyjne ani na temat konkretnych projektów, w których potencjalnie mogą występować nieprawidłowości.
Nie jest zatem możliwe podanie kwot, których to dotyczy. Komisja oczekuje, że organ zarządzający przekaże jej takie
informacje, jeśli zostaną one udostępnione przez organy prowadzące dochodzenie.

2. Komisja zaleca wstrzymanie się od poświadczania wydatków powiązanych z projektami, w których
potencjalnie mogą występować nadużycia lub nieprawidłowości. W związku z niedawną odmową przekazania przez
prokuraturę szerszych szczegółów na temat prowadzonego dochodzenia organowi zarządzającemu instytucja
certyfikująca podjęła decyzję o wycofaniu najnowszego wniosku o płatność. Instytucje odpowiedzialne za program
powinny nawiązać kontakt z odpowiednimi organami krajowymi w celu uzyskania informacji koniecznych do
określenia, których projektów to dotyczy. Przepisy UE przewidują, że instytucja certyfikująca odpowiedzialna jest za
poświadczanie, że deklarowane wydatki są zgodne z obowiązującymi przepisami unijnymi i krajowymi. Dlatego też
Komisja zmuszona jest przeprowadzić dodatkowe weryfikacje. Przed zakończeniem tych weryfikacji Komisja nie
będzie rozpatrywać wniosków o płatności okresowe.

3. Komisja aktualnie nie posiada informacji na temat szczegółów dotyczących konkretnych projektów, w których
potencjalnie mogą występować nieprawidłowości. Zgodnie z najnowszymi informacjami dostępnymi Komisji, organ
prowadzący dochodzenie odmówił przekazania organowi zarządzającemu wszelkich szczegółów na temat tego
dochodzenia. W niniejszych okolicznościach nie jest możliwe precyzyjne wskazanie, kiedy Komisja będzie miała
dostęp do tych informacji.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 49

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002641/13**

**to the Commission**
**Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Withholding of EU funding for a number of ROP projects in Podkarpackie province

On 26 February 2013, the Commission sent a letter to the leader of the Podkarpackie provincial executive,
Mirosław Karapyta, recommending that EU funds be withheld for a number of projects being carried out by the
Podkarpackie provincial executive as part of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP). The case has raised a storm
of controversy, so it must be clarified as quickly as possible. In this connection, could the Commission please answer
the following questions:

1. What scale of irregularities does the Commission suspect in this case? What precise sum does Podkarpackie
province stand to lose of the PLN 5 billion allocated to it under the ROP for 2007‐2013?

2. Does the Commission’s recommendation to withhold payment of EU funds for a number of ROP projects
represent a _de facto_ obligation for the Podkarpackie province to block those payments?

3. What specific ROP projects are threatened with losing EU funding in Podkarpackie province?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 April 2013)_

1. The Commission has no information on the details of the ongoing Central Anti-Corruption Bureau
investigation or on the specific projects, which — potentially — may be affected by irregularities. It is therefore
impossible to indicate in monetary terms any sums affected. The Commission expects to receive this information
from the managing authority, if made available by the investigating authorities.

2. The Commission recommends not certifying expenditure related to projects, which — potentially — may be
affected by fraud or irregularities. Due to the recent refusal of the prosecutor to provide the managing authority with
more details about the ongoing investigation, the certifying authority itself decided to withdraw the most recent
payment claim. The programme authorities should liaise with the relevant national authorities to obtain the
information necessary to identify the projects concerned. Under EU legislation, the certifying authority is responsible
for certifying that expenditure declared complies with applicable EU and national rules. Therefore, the Commission
has to carry out additional verifications. Until these verifications are completed, the Commission will not process
future applications for interim payments.

3. The Commission has at present no information on the details of the specific projects, which — potentially —
may be affected by irregularities. According to the latest information available to the Commission, the investigating
authorities refused to share any detailed information on the ongoing investigation with the managing authority. In
these circumstances it is not possible to indicate precisely when such information will become available to the
Commission.

C 6 E / 50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002642/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Fosfato bicálcico de Ercros en Flix, Tarragona

El fosfato bicálcico producido por la empresa Erkimia, del grupo Ercros en Flix, contiene elementos radiactivos, según
consta en los análisis realizados en el producto de un saco de los que comercializa Ercros por los laboratorios CRIIRAD (Comisión Regional Independiente de Información francesa sobre la Radiactividad) de Valence, Francia, y por el
IRSN (Instituto de Protección y de Seguridad Nuclear) de París ( [1] ).

El plomo 210 y el polonio 210 son elementos de radiotoxicidad muy elevada, que se acumulan en el organismo y
pueden suponer un riesgo para la salud de las personas que los ingieren. El fosfato bicálcico es un aditivo que se utiliza
como reforzante del calcio, que entra en la cadena alimentaria porque se utiliza en la alimentación de animales que
luego son de consumo humano.

Erkimia fabrica cada año 100 000 toneladas de fosfato bicálcico y Ercros, principal fabricante de fosfato bicálcico de
España, titular de Erkimia, fabrica 100 000 toneladas más en Cartagena, a partir de la misma materia prima, las
fosforitas procedentes de los yacimientos de fosfatos de Bou Cra, en el Sahara Occidental. Ecros ha anunciado
recientemente un expediente de regulación de empleo que afectará al 75 % de su plantilla laboral. Sin embargo Ercros
mantendrá en funcionamiento la planta de fosfato dicálcico para la alimentación animal en Flix.

La Directiva 96/29/Euratom, traspuesta por el Real Decreto 783/2001, establece en el Título IV, artículo 5, apartado
1: «Queda prohibida la adición de sustancias radiactivas en la producción de alimentos, juguetes, adornos personales y
cosméticos y la importación, exportación o movimiento intracomunitario de dichos bienes cuando lleven
incorporadas sustancias radiactivas». El Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, el 19 de octubre de 2004, indicó que se debería
requerir al titular de Erkimia que realice los estudios necesarios para determinar el impacto radiológico de los
procesos de dicha instalación.

¿Conoce la Comisión la situación? ¿Pedirá a la Generalitat y al Estado español que inicien una investigación que
permita eliminar cualquier riesgo para la salud de las personas por la adición del fosfato bicálcico fabricado por
Erkimia en la cadena alimentaria?

¿Qué medidas tomará la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria (EFSA)? En caso en que se demostrase la
existencia de productos radioactivos, ¿acusaría a Ercros de delito contra la salud pública y de incumplimiento de las
normas vigentes?

**Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

1-2. La Comisión está al tanto de que el procesamiento del material básico específico identificado puede generar
niveles significativos de radionucleidos en los efluentes, desechos, residuos y productos. Está al tanto asimismo de que
el fosfato dicálcico que puede usarse como aditivo alimentario y en los piensos puede contener trazas de los
radionucleidos presentes en la mena de fosfato original.

3-4. La correspondiente legislación de la UE exige que los alimentos y los piensos sean auténticos y seguros. La
presencia de sustancias radiactivas en el fosfato de calcio, se utilice como aditivo alimentario o en piensos, nunca ha
sido notificada a través del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales
(RASFF). No existe ninguna legislación específica sobre la presencia de radionucleidos naturales en los alimentos y los
piensos.

La seguridad de los fosfatos en tanto que aditivos alimentarios fue evaluada por el Comité Científico de la
Alimentación Humana, sin que se señalara ningún motivo concreto de preocupación. En caso de existir indicios de
que el fosfato dicálcico utilizado en la alimentación animal puede suponer un riesgo para la salud animal o humana, la
Comisión encargará a la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria la realización de una evaluación del riesgo ( [2] ).

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) https://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article18233.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) La Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria volverá a evaluar los fosfatos dicálcicos en tanto que aditivos alimentarios a más tardar en 2018;

en esta nueva evaluación se estudiarán todos los problemas potenciales para la seguridad, incluida la radiactividad.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 51

La presencia de radionucleidos naturales en los alimentos o los piensos no se considera una «adición deliberada» con
arreglo a la Directiva 96/29/Euratom, motivo por el cual no existe infracción de dicha Directiva. La Directiva exige
que la autorización de los productos de consumo que contengan sustancias radiactivas sea objeto de una justificación
previa y confía a los Estados miembros el control reglamentario. La Comisión publicó unas directrices que sirven de
base para la armonización de los criterios y procedimientos entre los Estados miembros ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Guidelines for regulatory control of consumer products containing radioactive substances in the European Union, Radiation Protection Issue
No.147, Luxemburgo, Oficina de Publicaciones Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas, 2007, ISBN 978.92-79-05651-2.

C 6 E / 52 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002642/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Dicalcium phosphate manufactured by Ercros in Flix, Tarragona

Tests carried out on one sackful of the product by the Commission for Independent Research and Information on
Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) laboratory in Valence, France, and the Paris-based French Institute for Radiological
Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) have shown that the dicalcium phosphate manufactured in Flix, Tarragona, by
the company Erkimia (part of the larger Ercros group, which markets the product) contains radioactive elements ( [1] ).

Lead-210 and polonium-210 are highly radiotoxic elements which remain in the body and pose a health hazard if
ingested. Dicalcium phosphate, an additive used as a calcium supplement, is present in the food chain because it is
used to feed animals intended for human consumption.

Erkimia produces 100 000 tonnes of dicalcium phosphate annually and Ercros, its parent company and the main
manufacturer of dicalcium phosphate in Spain, produces another 100 000 tonnes in Cartagena from the same raw
material, i.e. phosphate sourced from the phosphate mines of Bou Craa in Western Sahara. Ercros recently announced
plans to make up to 75% of its workforce redundant. Nevertheless, Ercros will continue to run the plant in Flix to
produce dicalcium phosphate for animal feed.

Article 5(1) of Title II of Royal Decree 783/2001, which transposed Council Directive 96/29/Euratom into national
law, states that: ‘It is prohibited to add radioactive substances in the production of foodstuffs, toys, personal
ornaments and cosmetics, and to import, export or transport such goods within the European Union’. On
19 October 2004 the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council said that the owner of Erkimia should be required to carry out
testing into the radiological impact of the manufacturing processes carried out at the Erkimia plant.

Is the Commission aware of this situation? Is the Commission going to ask the Catalan Government and the Spanish
Government to launch an investigation with a view to eliminating any potential risk to human health posed by
allowing dicalcium phosphate manufactured by Erkimia to enter the food chain?

What measures will the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) take? If it is proven that the dicalcium phosphate
contains radioactive elements, will the Commission charge Ercros with committing a crime against public health and
failing to comply with the relevant legislation?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

1-2. The Commission is aware that the processing of identified, specific source material may result in significant levels
of radio nuclides in effluents, residues, waste materials and products. The Commission is also aware that dicalcium
phosphate which can be used as food additive and feed material may contain traces of the radio nuclides present in
the original phosphate ore.

3-4. EU food law requires feed and food to be genuine and safe. The presence of radioactive substances in calcium
phosphate, whether used as food additive or feed material, was never notified through the Rapid Alert System for
Food and Feed (RASFF). There is no specific legislation on the presence of natural radionuclides in feed and food.

The safety of phosphates as food additive was assessed by the Scientific Committee on Food, resulting in no specific
concern. If there is evidence that dicalcium phosphate used in animal feed might cause a risk to animal or human
health, the Commission will mandate the European Food Safety Authority to undertake a risk assessment ( [2] ).

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⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) https://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article18233.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The European Food Safety Authority will re-evaluate calcium phosphates as food additives by 2018; this re-evaluation will consider all potential

safety issues including radioactivity.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 53

The presence of naturally occurring radionuclides in food or feed is not regarded as a ‘deliberate addition’ in the sense
of Directive 96/29/Euratom, hence there is no infringement of this directive. The directive requires that authorisation
of consumer products containing radioactive substances is subject of prior justification and entrusted the regulatory
control to Member States. The Commission published respective guidelines providing the basis for harmonisation of
criteria and procedures among Member States ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Guidelines for regulatory control of consumer products containing radioactive substances in the European Union, Radiation Protection Issue
No 147,Luxembourg, Office for Official publications of the European communities,2007, ISBN 978.92-79-05651-2.

C 6 E / 54 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002643/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ ERE de la empresa Ercros en Flix, Tarragona

La empresa química Ercros anunció ( [1] ) que despedirá a 198 trabajadores de diversas plantas productivas ubicadas en
Flix, Tarragona, tras obtener pérdidas por importe de 12,13 millones de euros en 2012. La empresa también cerrará la
fábrica de Cartagena (Murcia) y realizará otros ajustes.

Ercros ha presentado un expediente de regulación de empleo correspondiente e iniciará el proceso de negociación. La
Federación de Industria de CC.OO. ha denunciado que el expediente de regulación de empleo (ERE) afecta al 75 % de
la plantilla y pone en peligro un centenar de empleos indirectos, afectando gravemente a la comarca de la Ribera
d'Ebre.

El grupo químico Ercros destinó el pasado año 690 000 euros a la remuneración de los miembros de su consejo de
administración. El pasado año, los consejeros ejecutivos percibieron 525 000 euros, en tanto que los independientes
recibieron 124 000 euros y otros externos 41 000 euros.

Ecros mantendrá en funcionamiento la planta de fosfato dicálcico para la alimentación animal en Flix, a pesar de que
contiene elementos radiactivos, tal y como lo indicaron estudios de los laboratorios CRII-RAD (Comisión Regional
Independiente de Información francesa sobre la Radiactividad) de Valence, Francia, y del IRSN (Instituto de Protección
y de Seguridad Nuclear) de París, lo que ha contaminado el río y alrededores.

¿Conoce la Comisión este ERE? Dada la importancia de la empresa para la población de la Ribera d'Ebre y conociendo
las últimas cifras de desempleo de España, ¿consideraría la posibilidad de otorgar financiación del Fondo Europeo de
Adaptación a la Globalización (FEAG) o de otro fondo europeo a la empresa?

¿Cree la Comisión que cualquier ayuda de Europa, debe estar estrictamente ligada a la reconversión industrial de la
empresa para que deje de contaminar el medioambiente y acabe con la producción de fosfato radiactivo?

¿Considera también la Comisión que dicha ayuda europea debería condicionar el nivel de retribución que se otorga a
los consejeros ejecutivos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

La Comisión no tiene conocimiento de los despidos en las plantas de Ercros. Si bien la Comisión está profundamente
preocupada por las consecuencias sociales y económicas de los mismos, no tiene competencia para interferir en las
decisiones empresariales en relación con el cierre de plantas, por lo que insta a las empresas y a las partes interesadas a
que se anticipen a las reestructuraciones en la medida de lo posible y las gestionen de forma socialmente responsable.

España tiene la posibilidad de solicitar ayudas del FEAG ( [2] ) siempre que los despidos puedan vincularse a la
globalización. Su Señoría puede ponerse en contacto con el punto de contacto de FEAG España ( [3] ) para enterarse de si
se está elaborando alguna solicitud al respecto.

En cuanto al FSE, el PO ( [4] ) para Cataluña ( [5] ) incluye actividades que promueven la empleabilidad, donde se concentran
casi dos tercios de los fondos. Los trabajadores en paro pueden beneficiarse de estas acciones ejecutadas por el _Servei_
_d'Ocupació de Catalunya_ .

Por lo que se refiere al FEDER, en el marco del PO Cataluña 2007-2013 se han asignado 360 millones de euros a la
economía del conocimiento y la innovación y al desarrollo del espíritu empresarial, incluido el objetivo de aumentar
el apoyo a las PYME y a la innovación, la competitividad del espíritu empresarial y el acceso a la financiación. Siempre
que cumpla los criterios de elegibilidad Ercros podrá beneficiarse de estas acciones, gestionadas por el organismo
intermedio ( [6] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20130220/54365572404/ercros-despedira-a-198-trabajadores-de-plantas-quimicas-de-flix.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Puede encontrarse informacion detallada pertinente en el sitio web del FEAG: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=es
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Programa operativo.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) 2007-2013.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Generalitat de Catalunya, Suddirecció General de Programació.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 55

La Comisión no está en posición de hacer declaraciones sobre la remuneración de los consejeros ejecutivos en casos
individuales. No obstante, es importante contar con unos sistemas de gobernanza empresarial adecuados a fin de
evitar los conflictos de interés y proteger los intereses de los accionistas y otras partes interesadas ( [7] ). La Comisión
también considera que es importante moderar las retribuciones de los directivos cuando las empresas se enfrentan a
condiciones económicas difíciles.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Véanse la Recomendación 2004/913/CE de la Comisión, de 14 de diciembre de 2004, relativa a la promoción de un régimen adecuado de

remuneración de los consejeros de las empresas con cotización en bolsa y la Recomendación 2009/385/CE de la Comisión, de 30 de abril
de 2009, que complementa las Recomendaciones 2004/913/CE y 2005/162/CE en lo que atañe al sistema de remuneración de los consejeros de
las empresas que cotizan en bolsa.

C 6 E / 56 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002643/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Ercros' labour force adjustment plan (ERE) in Flix, Tarragona

The chemical company Ercros has announced that it is going to make 198 employees redundant from a number of
the plants that it operates in Flix, Tarragona, after making losses of EUR 12.13 million in 2012 ( [1] ). The company is
also going to close a plant in Cartagena, Murcia, and carry out further restructuring.

Ercros has issued a labour force adjustment plan and is due to begin negotiations. The trade union Federación de
Industria affiliated to the CCOO claims that the redundancy plans will affect 75% of the company’s workforce and
jeopardise some 100 indirect jobs, thereby seriously affecting the whole Ribera d’Ebre region.

Last year Ercros spent a total of EUR 690 000 paying its board of directors, of which EUR 525 000 went to executive
directors, EUR 124 000 to independent members and EUR 41 000 to external members.

Ercros is going to continue to run the plant in Flix that produces dicalcium phosphate for animal feed, despite the fact
that tests carried out by the laboratories of the Commission for Independent Research and Information on
Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) in Valence, France, and the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety
(IRSN) in Paris have shown that the phosphate produced by Ercros contains radioactive elements, with the result that
the nearby river and the surrounding area are now contaminated.

Is the Commission aware of Ercros’ redundancy plans? Given that this company is important for people living in the
Rivera d’Ebre region and in the light of the latest unemployment figures in Spain, will the Commission consider
giving Ercros assistance through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) or another European fund?

Does the Commission believe that any EU funding should be strictly conditional on the industrial reconversion of the
company in order to prevent further environmental pollution and ensure that the company stops manufacturing
radioactive phosphate?

Does the Commission also think that any EU funding should be granted only on condition that pay scales for the
company’s executive directors are revised?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of the redundancies in Ercros' plants. While the Commission is deeply concerned with
their social and economic consequences, it has no powers to interfere in company decisions to close plants but it
urges companies and stakeholders to anticipate restructuring as far as possible and to manage it in a socially
responsible way.

Provided that the redundancies can be linked to globalisation, Spain has the possibility to apply for support from the
EGF ( [2] ). The Honourable Member may wish to communicate with the EGF Spain ( [3] ) contact point in order to know
whether any application is being prepared.

As for the ESF, the OP ( [4] ) for Cataluña ( [5] ) includes activities to promote of employability where almost two thirds of
the funds are concentrated. Unemployed workers can benefit from these actions implemented by the _Sevei d'Ocupació_
_de Catalunya_ .

As regards ERDF, the OP Catalonia 2007-2013 has allocated EUR 360 million to knowledge economy and
innovation and entrepreneurship development. This includes the objective to enhance the support to SME and
innovation and entrepreneurship competitiveness and access to financing. Ercros may benefit from these actions
managed by the intermediate body ( [6] ), if it fulfils the eligibility criteria.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20130220/54365572404/ercros-despedira-a-198-trabajadores-de-plantas-quimicas-de-flix.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) European Globalisation Fund
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The relevant details can be found on the EGF website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=es
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Operational Programme.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) 2007-2013.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Generalitat de Catalunya, Suddirecció General de Programació.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 57

The Commission is not in a position to comment on the remuneration of directors in individual cases. However, it is
important that appropriate corporate governance systems are in place to prevent conflicts of interest and protect the
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders ( [7] ). The Commission also considers that executive pay restraint is
important when companies face challenging economic conditions.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Cf. Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of

listed companies and Commission Recommendation 2009/385/EC of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and
2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies.

C 6 E / 58 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002644/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(6 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αντιμετώπιση της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού μέσα από προγράμματα κοινωνικής στέγασης στην
Ευρώπη

Η κοινωνική στέγαση, ως εργαλείο αντιμετώπισης της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού, περιλαμβάνει μια σειρά
δράσεων που προσφέρουν ευκαιρίες πρόσβασης στη στέγαση σε συμπολίτες μας που δεν διαθέτουν επαρκή οικονομικά μέσα.
Τέτοιου είδους δράσεις εφαρμόζονται στα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης ως κοινωνικές επενδύσεις που συμβάλλουν
παράλληλα στην προαγωγή της ανάπτυξης και την ενίσχυση της απασχόλησης. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο και βάσει των έκτακτων
κοινωνικών συνθηκών που αντιμετωπίζει η Ευρώπη, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες θεωρεί ως τις βασικότερες και πιο ενδεδειγμένες δράσεις κοινωνικής στέγασης;

2. Ποια κράτη μέλη δεν διαθέτουν προγράμματα κοινωνικής στέγασης;

3. Στο πλαίσιο ανταλλαγής βέλτιστων πρακτικών, πώς κρίνει την υιοθέτηση τέτοιου είδους δράσεων σε κράτη μέλη που
βρίσκονται σε καθεστώς δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής και εμφανίζουν ανησυχητικούς κοινωνικούς δείκτες, όπως η
Ελλάδα;

4. Πόσο συμβατές είναι οι περικοπές σε τομείς κοινωνικών επενδύσεων, όπως η κοινωνική στέγαση, με τους στόχους της
στρατηγικής ΕΕ2020 για τη μείωση της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού;

5. Υπάρχουν διαθέσιμα κονδύλια από τα Ευρωπαϊκά Διαρθρωτικά Ταμεία για την ενίσχυση της χρηματοδότησης σε
δράσεις κοινωνικής στέγασης με δεδομένη τη ραγδαία αύξηση των νοικοκυριών που αδυνατούν να ανταποκριθούν με
επάρκεια στις απαιτούμενες δαπάνες για την εξασφάλιση κατοικίας;

**Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(6 Μαΐου 2013)_

Το μέγεθος των αποθεμάτων κοινωνικών κατοικιών διαφέρει από το ένα κράτος μέλος στο άλλο, ωστόσο όλα τα κράτη μέλη
υποστηρίζουν προγράμματα στέγασης. Τα κράτη μέλη έχουν την κύρια αρμοδιότητα για την εφαρμογή στεγαστικής
πολιτικής. Η Επιτροπή τα υποστηρίζει, αντιμετωπίζοντας τα προβλήματα στέγασης μέσω της γενικής της στρατηγικής για την
κοινωνική ένταξη και παρακολουθεί την υλοποίηση των σχετικών δράσεων, καθώς και τις ανισορροπίες στην αγορά στέγης.

Η σύσταση που εξέδωσε η Επιτροπή το 2008 για την ενεργητική ένταξη ( [1] ) καλεί τα κράτη μέλη να προωθήσουν την
κοινωνική ένταξη παρέχοντας βασικές υπηρεσίες, όπως υπηρεσίες στεγαστικής βοήθειας και εργατικών κατοικιών. Το πλαίσιο
της ΕΕ για εθνικές στρατηγικές ένταξης των Ρομά ( [2] ) αναγνωρίζει τη στέγαση ως βασικό τομέα παρέμβασης. Η δέσμη
κοινωνικών επενδύσεων ( [3] ) παρέχει καθοδήγηση σχετικά με τον καλύτερο τρόπο στόχευσης των κοινωνικών επενδύσεων με
σκοπό την επίτευξη των στόχων της στρατηγικής ΕΕ2020 για την καταπολέμηση της κρίσης με τη χρήση κονδυλίων της ΕΕ.
Η δέσμη διερευνά σειρά καλών πρακτικών που μπορούν να εφαρμόσουν τα κράτη μέλη ώστε να βελτιώσουν την πρόσβαση σε
οικονομικά προσιτή στέγαση και να προλάβουν, κατ' αυτό τον τρόπο, το φαινόμενο των αστέγων.

Τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της ΕΕ μπορούν να χρηματοδοτήσουν επενδύσεις σε κοινωνικές κατοικίες για περιθωριοποιημένες
πληθυσμιακές ομάδες, υπηρεσίες για τους αστέγους, προγράμματα αποϊδρυματοποίησης και επανένταξης. Στο επόμενο
πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο ( [4] ), προτείνεται να αφιερωθεί το 20% της χρηματοδότησης του ΕΚΤ ( [5] ) στην κοινωνική
ένταξη, μεταξύ άλλων στην πολιτική αντιμετώπισης του προβλήματος των αστέγων. Μια από τις προτεραιότητες που
προτείνονται για χρηματοδότηση από το ΕΤΠΑ ( [6] ) μετά το 2014 είναι η «προώθηση της κοινωνικής ένταξης και η
καταπολέμηση της φτώχειας, η στήριξη για φυσική και οικονομική αναζωογόνηση υποβαθμισμένων αστικών και αγροτικών
κοινοτήτων», επομένως συμπεριλαμβάνονται οι ολοκληρωμένες στεγαστικές επενδύσεις.

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⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Σύσταση της Επιτροπής 2008/867/EC σχετικά με την ενεργητική ένταξη των ατόμων που είναι αποκλεισμένα από την αγορά εργασίας.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής COM(2011)173 με τίτλο: Πλαίσιο της ΕΕ για εθνικές στρατηγικές ένταξης των Ρομά μέχρι το 2020.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Για περισσότερα στοιχεία σχετικά με τη δέσμη κοινωνικών επενδύσεων, επισκεφθείτε τη διεύθυνση

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Μεταξύ 2014-2020.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 59

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002644/13**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tackling poverty and social exclusion through social housing schemes in Europe

Social housing, as a tool for tackling poverty and social exclusion, comprises a series of measures that offer access to
housing for those of our fellow citizens who would not normally be able to afford any. Such schemes exist in most EU
Member States as a social investment helping to boost growth and employment. In this context and in the light of the
exceptional social conditions facing Europe, will the Commission say:

1. What are most basic and most appropriate social housing measures?

2. Which Member States do not have any social housing schemes?

3. As regards exchanges of best practices, how does it view the adoption of such schemes in Member States that
are subject to a fiscal adjustment regime and report alarming social indicators, such as Greece?

4. How compatible are cuts in social investment sectors, such as social housing, with the objectives of the
EU2020 strategy for reducing poverty and social exclusion?

5. Are any appropriations available from the European Structural Funds to boost funding for social housing
schemes, given the rapid increase in the number of households that cannot afford housing?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The size of social housing stocks is different in the Member States but they all have supported housing schemes.
Member States have the primary competence for implementing housing policies. The Commission supports them
addressing housing problems through its general social inclusion strategy and monitors the implementation of
relevant actions as well as housing market imbalances.

The 2008 Recommendation on Active Inclusion ( [1] ) called on Member States to foster social inclusion through
providing essential services such as housing support and social housing. The EU Framework for national Roma
integration strategies ( [2] ) recognises housing as a key area of intervention. The Social Investment Package ( [3] ) provides
guidance on how best to target social investment to reach the EU2020 targets against the crisis with the use of EU
funds. The Package explores a set of good practices how Member States may improve access to affordable housing
and thus preventing homelessness.

The EU Funds can finance social housing investments for marginalised populations, homeless services,
deinstitutionalisation and reintegration programmes. For the next multiannual financial framework ( [4] ), 20% of the
ESF ( [5] ) is proposed to be devoted to social inclusion, including homelessness policies. A proposed priority for the
ERDF ( [6] ) post-2014 is ‘promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, support for physical and economic
regeneration of deprived urban and rural communities’, thus encompassing integrated housing investments.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Commission Recommendation 2008/867/EC on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Communication COM(2011)173 on an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) For more information on the Social Investment Package, please visit http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Between 2014-2020.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) European Social Fund.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) European Regional Development Fund.

C 6 E / 60 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002645/13**

**to the Commission**
**Catherine Stihler (S&D)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Distance Selling Directive

Under the Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC, information must be provided to the consumer by the seller. The seller
must give consumers information about the goods or services that they are thinking of buying. This includes a
description of the goods or service, the price of the goods or service, delivery and any cancellation rights, and
information about the seller.

However, what is the situation when an online company such as Amazon acts as a service provider and not the seller,
and the seller is outside the EU?

What obligations does the service provider have to consumers, who are not always made aware that they are buying
goods or a service from a seller outside the EU?

Are there any obligations on companies that act as transactional intermediaries?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC (to be replaced by the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU as from
13 June 2014) provides a number of legal rights for consumers, including the right to comprehensive information
before the purchase, which has to be provided in a clear and comprehensible manner (Article 4). The suppliers must
comply with the information requirements provided in the Distance Selling Directive also where they use an
intermediary for marketing their products to EU consumers. The identity of the supplier and its address are amongst
the information requirements expressly provided in Article 4(1).

Member States have transposed the Distance Selling Directive into their national laws and are responsible for
ensuring adequate and effective means for enforcement of the consumer rights under the directive.

Furthermore, the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC provides in Article 10(1) minimum information requirements
that have to be presented clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguously prior to the placement of the order by the
seller of a good or a service if established in the EU, even if the intermediary service provider is established outside
the EU. Additionally, in case of EU-established seller contract terms and general conditions must be made available to
the consumer who concludes contracts online in a manner that allows their storage and reproduction (Article 10(3)).
These will normally provide for the identification of the supplier of a good or a service that is subject to the contract.

It should be noted that intermediary service provider, established inside or outside the EU, is not subject to these
obligations.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 61

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002646/13**

**to the Commission**
**Emma McClarkin (ECR)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Commission response to the horsemeat scandal

Following the recent horsemeat scandal which has caused outrage across Europe, it is clearer than ever that
consumers should have better information about the meat products they buy, including how the meat is produced.

1. Can the Commission comment on the recent horsemeat scandal?

2. Given that the Commission places great emphasis on animal welfare and the role of consumers, can the
Commission state what actions it will be taking to ensure that full traceability information is available in meat
production for the benefit of the consumer?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 April 2013)_

1. To date, there is no indication on the subject which raises a safety issue, as horse meat can be destined for
human consumption. However, the falsification of labels misleads the consumers as regards the content of foods and
therefore constitutes fraud in food labelling. Indeed, under existing rules, ( [1] ) the labelling of foods must not mislead
the consumer as to their nature, origin and content and all ingredients must be labelled. Finally, the labelling of foods
containing meat must also indicate the animal species concerned.

2. A comprehensive system of food safety rules is already in place at Union level, including traceability
requirements for foods of animal origin; ( [2] ) it is because of this system that the origin and extent of the fraudulent
actions in question were quickly identified.

Food business operators are primarily responsible for ensuring that the products placed on the market comply with
Union food law requirements, while national competent authorities are responsible for enforcement by conducting
appropriate controls and imposing dissuasive and effective penalties.

The Commission has been active both on political and technical levels in coordinating the pending investigations in
the Member States concerned. To this end, the Commission adopted a recommendation ( [3] ) which calls for EU-wide
controls at retail level in order to identify the scale of any misleading labelling practices as to the presence of beef as
well as official controls to detect possible residues of phenylbutazone, a veterinary drug whose use is allowed only in
non-food producing animals. A summary of all findings will be available by April 2013. Depending on the
assessment of the findings, the Commission will decide on an appropriate course of action.

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⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States

relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 931/2011 on the traceability requirements set by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European

Parliament and of the Council for food of animal origin, OJ L 242, 20.9.2011, p. 2.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Commission Recommendation of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices

(2013/99/EU), OJ L 48, 21.2.2013, p. 28.

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C 6 E / 62 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002647/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) y Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Suicidios como consecuencia de los desahucios en España

Algunos Estados miembros, como es el caso de España, hacen frente a la trágica situación derivada de los suicidios de
personas tras haber sido desahuciadas de sus hogares.

El Gobierno español no ha adoptado ningún tipo de medida para abordar este asunto, y el Consejo tampoco ha
remitido recomendación específica alguna para España al respecto.

El 16 de febrero de 2013, tuvieron lugar grandes manifestaciones en todo el territorio español organizadas por la
«Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca», y el Congreso de los Diputados ha admitido a trámite una iniciativa
ciudadana respaldada por 1 402 854 firmas.

A pesar de que las instituciones financieras que reciben fondos de rescate de la UE se han apropiado de viviendas
vacías, ni los Estados miembros ni la troika están presionando para que estos inmuebles se oferten en el mercado de
alquiler o en el de viviendas sociales. Aunque el verdadero problema del sector financiero es el nivel que ha alcanzado
la deuda dentro del sector de la construcción, los Gobiernos de varios Estados miembros han dejado que sean los
hogares los que paguen más por la crisis.

A pesar de la propuesta de directiva de la Comisión sobre los contratos de crédito para bienes inmuebles de uso
residencial (COM(2011)0142) que se está negociando actualmente, numerosas familias que contrajeron hipotecas
han sido víctimas de ejecuciones judiciales abusivas. Hasta que la directiva sea adoptada, convendría establecer un
procedimiento excepcional que velase por los derechos a la vivienda de los propietarios de inmuebles en toda la UE.

1. ¿Anticipará la Comisión la adopción de la directiva propuesta y actuará urgentemente a fin de erradicar los
desahucios y detener la creciente crisis social a través del rechazo a una legislación nacional que obligue a las víctimas
de desalojos a seguir reembolsando sus préstamos hipotecarios incluso después de haber sido expulsados de sus
antiguas propiedades?

2. ¿Recomendará la Comisión que los Estados miembros que reciben ayuda financiera de la UE (Grecia, Portugal,
España e Irlanda) establezcan un plan de vivienda social, en coordinación con las instituciones financieras que reciben
fondos de rescate de la UE, con objeto de adjudicar viviendas vacías a aquellas personas necesitadas?

3. ¿Incluirá la Comisión este aspecto en las recomendaciones específicas por país para el Semestre Europeo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(7 de mayo de 2013)_

Si bien, en principio, los procedimientos de liquidación de deudas corresponden a la jurisdicción de las
administraciones nacionales afectadas, no deben obstaculizar la aplicación de las reglas de la UE para la protección de
los consumidores, como declaró recientemente el Tribunal de Justicia en una sentencia sobre el procedimiento
español ( [1] ).

La propuesta de directiva sobre los contratos de crédito para bienes inmuebles de uso residencial ( [2] ) cubre
fundamentalmente la fase precontractual. Esta propuesta se está debatiendo actualmente en el Consejo y el
Parlamento Europeo, y la Comisión tiene la intención de desempeñar un papel constructivo en este proceso.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 14 de marzo de 2013, Aziz (C-415/11).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)142.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 63

Uno de los aspectos que considera la Comisión en su análisis de los mercados inmobiliarios es la mejor utilización del
parque de viviendas. El documento de trabajo que acompaña a la propuesta de directiva estudia medidas para impedir
las ejecuciones hipotecarias ( [3] ). El «paquete de inversión social» ( [4] ) propone buenas prácticas a los Estados miembros a
fin de evitar que aumente el número de personas sin hogar como consecuencia de los desahucios. Por ejemplo, las
agencias de alquiler social pueden ser una manera innovadora de movilizar las viviendas de propiedad privada que no
están alquiladas ( [5] ). En cualquier caso, la competencia principal en la formulación de las políticas de vivienda sigue
recayendo en los Estados miembros. En 2012 se dirigieron recomendaciones específicas a varios Estados miembros
(como los Países Bajos y el Reino Unido) sobre este asunto. En el caso de España, las recomendaciones específicas por
país de 2012 también hacían referencia a la necesidad de reducir los incentivos fiscales que favorecen la propiedad
frente al alquiler. En cuanto a los Estados miembros sometidos a un programa completo de ajuste macroeconómico,
las recomendaciones específicas por país hacen referencia a las disposiciones de sus respectivos memorandos de
acuerdo (véanse las recomendaciones de 2012 dirigidas a Grecia, Irlanda, Portugal y Rumanía). Por ejemplo, el
Memorando de Acuerdo con Portugal establece el objetivo de «una mejor utilización del parque de viviendas». La
Comisión continuará dando especial prominencia a los asuntos relacionados con la vivienda en sus recomendaciones.

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( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Commission Staff Working Paper on national measures and practices to avoid foreclosure procedures for residential mortgages loans

SEC(2011) 357. Véase http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Para más información sobre el paquete de inversión social:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=es&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Paquete de inversión social — Commission Staff Working Document on Confronting Homelessness in the European Union. SWD(2013) 42 final.

Véase http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en

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C 6 E / 64 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002647/13**

**à la Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) et Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Suicides provoqués par des expulsions en Espagne

Certains États membres, comme l'Espagne, se trouvent confrontés à la situation tragique de personnes qui se suicident
après avoir été expulsées de leurs maisons.

Le gouvernement espagnol n'est pas intervenu sur cette question et le Conseil n'a envoyé aucune recommandation
spécifique à l'Espagne à cet égard.

De grandes manifestations, organisées par l'association «Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca» (Mouvement en
faveur des victimes de crédits hypothécaires), ont eu lieu dans toute l'Espagne le 16 février 2013 et une initiative
citoyenne a été déposée auprès de la chambre basse du Parlement espagnol avec le soutien de 1 402 854 signatures.

Bien que les établissements financiers renfloués par des fonds de l'Union européenne soient propriétaires de maisons
inhabitées, ni les États membres ni la troïka ne font en sorte que ces bâtiments soient mis sur le marché locatif ou
viennent renforcer le parc de logements sociaux. Tandis que le véritable problème du secteur financier réside dans le
niveau de la dette au sein du secteur de la construction, plusieurs gouvernements des États membres ont fait peser sur
les ménages le plus lourd tribut de la crise.

En dépit de la proposition de directive de la Commission sur les contrats de crédit relatifs aux biens immobiliers à
usage résidentiel (COM(2011)0142), actuellement en cours de négociation, de nombreuses familles détenant des
prêts hypothécaires ont été victimes de saisies abusives. Il convient de mettre en place, jusqu'à l'adoption de la
directive, une procédure exceptionnelle dans l'ensemble de l'Union pour garantir les droits au logement des personnes
qui sont propriétaires de leur logement.

1. La Commission entend-elle anticiper l'adoption de la proposition de directive et agir de toute urgence de
manière à limiter les expulsions et à endiguer une crise sociale, en évitant une législation nationale qui obligerait les
personnes expulsées à poursuivre le remboursement de leur prêt hypothécaire, même après leur expulsion d'un
logement qu'elles ne possèdent plus?

2. La Commission compte-t-elle recommander que les États membres bénéficiaires d'une aide financière de l'Union
européenne (la Grèce, le Portugal, l'Espagne et l'Irlande) établissent un plan en matière de logement social en
coordination avec les établissements financiers renfloués par des fonds de l'Union, de manière à rapprocher les
logements vacants des personnes ayant besoin de logement?

3. La Commission intégrera-t-elle cet aspect dans sa recommandation spécifique par pays pour le semestre
européen?

**Réponse donnée par M. Rehn au nom de la Commission**

_(7 mai 2013)_

Les procédures de règlement des dettes relèvent en principe de la compétence des autorités nationales concernées.
Toutefois, elles ne devraient pas empêcher l'application des règles de l'UE en matière de protection des
consommateurs, comme l'a récemment déclaré la Cour de justice dans un arrêt concernant la procédure espagnole ( [1] ).

La proposition de directive sur les contrats de crédit relatifs aux biens immobiliers à usage résidentiel ( [2] ) couvre
essentiellement la phase précontractuelle. Elle est actuellement examinée par le Conseil et le Parlement européen. et la
Commission entend jouer un rôle constructif dans ce processus.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Voir l'arrêt de la Cour de justice du 14 mars 2013 dans l'affaire C-415/11, Aziz.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)142.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 65

Dans son analyse des marchés du logement, la Commission attache de l'importance notamment à une meilleure
utilisation du parc immobilier et dans un document de travail de ses services accompagnant la proposition de
directive, elle étudie les mesures visant à éviter les saisies ( [3] ). Le train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux ( [4] )
propose de bonnes pratiques aux États membres afin d'éviter que les personnes ne se retrouvent sans-abri en raison
d'une expulsion. Par exemple, les agences immobilières sociales peuvent constituer un moyen innovant pour
exploiter des biens privés qui ne sont pas loués ( [5] ). L'élaboration des politiques de logement relève néanmoins
principalement de la compétence des États membres. Plusieurs États membres (par ex. les Pays-Bas et le RoyaumeUni) ont reçu des recommandations spécifiques par pays en matière de logement en 2012. Pour l'Espagne, les
recommandations spécifiques de 2012 portaient aussi sur la nécessité de réduire les avantages fiscaux liés à
l'acquisition d'un logement, par opposition à la location. Pour les États membres disposant d'un programme complet
d'ajustement macroéconomique, les recommandations faisaient référence aux dispositions des protocoles d'accord
respectifs (voir les recommandations 2012 adressées à la Grèce, l'Irlande, le Portugal et la Roumanie). Par exemple,
l'un des objectifs fixés dans le protocole d'accord avec le Portugal était de «mieux utiliser le parc immobilier». La
Commission continuera d'accorder une attention particulière aux questions de logement dans ses recommandations.

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Document de travail des services de la Commission sur les mesures et pratiques nationales destinées à éviter les procédures de saisie concernant les

prêts hypothécaires au logement, SEC (2011)357. Voir:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Pour en savoir plus sur le train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux — Document de travail des services de la Commission intitulé «Confronting Homelessness in the

European Union» (Lutter contre le problème des sans-abri dans l'Union européenne). SWD(2013) 42 final. Voir:
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

C 6 E / 66 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002647/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) en Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Zelfmoorden na huisuitzettingen in Spanje

In sommige lidstaten, waaronder Spanje, komt de tragische situatie voor dat mensen zelfmoord plegen nadat zij uit
hun woning zijn gezet.

De Spaanse overheid neemt geen enkele maatregel tegen dit probleem, en de Raad heeft Spanje er geen specifieke
aanbevelingen over gedaan.

Op 16 februari 2013 vonden er in heel Spanje grote demonstraties plaats, georganiseerd door de vereniging
„Plataforma de afectados por la hipoteca” (platform voor hypotheekslachtoffers), en er is bij het Spaanse parlement
een burgerinitiatief ingediend met 1 402 854 medeondertekenaars.

Terwijl financiële instellingen die steun ontvangen uit EU-noodfondsen eigenaar zijn van leegstaande woningen,
oefenen de lidstaten noch de Trojka druk uit om deze gebouwen op de huurmarkt te plaatsen of als sociale woning
aan te merken. En hoewel de schuldenlast van de bouwsector het echte probleem van de financiële sector vormt,
hebben meerdere lidstaten de hoogste prijs van de crisis bij huisbewoners neergelegd.

Ondanks het Commissievoorstel voor een richtlijn over woningkredietovereenkomsten (COM(2011)0142),
waarover momenteel wordt onderhandeld, zijn veel gezinnen met een hypotheek het slachtoffer geworden van
oneerlijke gedwongen verkopen. In afwachting van de goedkeuring van de richtlijn zou een bijzondere procedure
moeten worden ingevoerd om de woonrechten van woningeigenaren in de hele Unie te waarborgen.

1. Gaat de Commissie vooruitlopen op de goedkeuring van de voorgestelde richtlijn en snel maatregelen nemen
om huisuitzettingen te verzachten en een groeiende maatschappelijke crisis een halt toe te roepen, onder meer door
een einde te maken aan nationale regelgeving die op straat gezette mensen verplicht hun hypotheek door te betalen
nadat zij uit hun woning zijn gezet?

2. Gaat de Commissie aanbevelen dat de lidstaten die financiële hulp ontvangen van de Unie (Griekenland,
Portugal, Spanje en Ierland) in samenwerking met de financiële instellingen die steun uit noodfondsen ontvangen een
sociaal woonplan opzetten om lege woningen te koppelen aan woningzoekenden?

3. Gaat de Commissie dit aspect opnemen in haar landenspecifieke aanbeveling voor het Europees semester?

**Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie**

_(7 mei 2013)_

Schuldvereffeningsprocedures vallen in principe onder de bevoegdheid van de betrokken nationale autoriteiten. Zoals
reeds is bepaald in een recent arrest van het Hof van Justitie over de Spaanse procedure ( [1] ), mogen deze procedures de
toepassing van de EU-voorschriften inzake consumentenbescherming echter niet belemmeren.

Het voorstel voor een richtlijn inzake woningkredietovereenkomsten ( [2] ) heeft voornamelijk betrekking op de
precontractuele fase. Het voorstel wordt op dit moment besproken in de Raad en het Europees Parlement. De
Commissie wil hierbij een constructieve rol spelen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Zie het arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 14 maart 2013 in zaak C-415/11, Aziz.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 142 definitief.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 67

Het beter aanwenden van de woningvoorraad is een van de punten waar de Commissie rekening mee houdt wanneer
zij huizenmarkten analyseert. In het werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie bij het voorstel voor de
richtlijn worden maatregelen onderzocht om gedwongen verkopen te voorkomen ( [3] ). In het pakket socialeinvesteringsmaatregelen ( [4] ) worden goede praktijken voor lidstaten voorgesteld om te voorkomen dat mensen
dakloos worden door huisuitzettingen. Zo kunnen sociale verhuurkantoren een innovatieve wijze zijn om
onverhuurde privé-eigendommen aan te bieden ( [5] ). In eerste instantie blijven de lidstaten echter bevoegd voor het
opstellen van een huisvestingsbeleid. Verschillende lidstaten (onder meer Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk)
hebben in 2012 landenspecifieke aanbevelingen over huisvesting gekregen. Voor Spanje is in deze aanbevelingen
eveneens verwezen naar de behoefte om het woningbezit fiscaal minder voordelig te maken ten opzichte van
huurformules. Voor lidstaten met een volwaardig macro-economisch aanpassingsprogramma is in de aanbevelingen
verwezen naar de bepalingen/voorwaarden van het respectieve memorandum van overeenkomst (zie de
aanbevelingen van 2012 voor Griekenland, Ierland, Portugal en Roemenië). Zo noemt het memorandum van
overeenkomst met Portugal „een beter gebruik van de woningvoorraad” als doel. De Commissie blijft in haar
aanbevelingen een bijzondere nadruk leggen op de huisvestingsproblematiek.

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie betreffende nationale maatregelen en praktijken om executieprocedures voor

hypotheekleningen voor woningen te voorkomen (SEC(2011) 357).
Zie http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Meer informatie over het pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen is beschikbaar op

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en & catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen — werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie betreffende de bestrijding van dakloosheid in de

Europese Unie. SWD(2013) 42 final. Zie http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

C 6 E / 68 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002647/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) and Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Suicides following evictions in Spain

Some Member States, such as Spain, face the tragic situation of people committing suicide after having been evicted
from their homes.

The Spanish Government is not taking any form of action on this issue, and the Council has not sent any specific
recommendation to Spain with regard to it.

Large demonstrations, organised by the organisation ‘Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca’ (‘Platform for
Mortgage Victims’), were held all over Spain on 16 February 2013, and a citizens’ initiative has been introduced in the
Spanish lower house of parliament with the support of 1 402 854 signatures.

While financial institutions that receive EU bailout funds own houses that are empty, neither the Member States nor
the Troika are pushing to have these buildings put on the rental market or in the social housing stock. While the real
problem for the financial sector is the level of debt within the construction sector, several Member State governments
have let households pay the heaviest price of the crisis.

Notwithstanding the Commission proposal for a directive on credit agreements relating to residential property
(COM(2011)0142), currently under negotiation, many families holding mortgages have been the victims of abusive
foreclosures. Until the directive is adopted, an exceptional procedure should be introduced in order to guarantee the
housing rights of homeowners throughout the EU.

1. Will the Commission anticipate the adoption of the proposed directive and act urgently to mitigate evictions
and stem a mounting social crisis, avoiding national legislation that would force those evicted to continue making
mortgage payments even after they have been ejected from their former property?

2. Will the Commission recommend that the Member States receiving financial help from the EU (Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Ireland) establish a social housing plan in coordination with financial institutions receiving EU
bailout funds, in order to match empty houses with people in need of housing?

3. Will the Commission include this aspect in its country-specific recommendation for the European Semester?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

Debt settlement procedures are in principle within the jurisdiction of the national authorities concerned. However,
they should not hinder the application of EU consumer protection rules, as stated in a recent Court of Justice ruling
concerning the Spanish procedure ( [1] ).

The proposal for a directive on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property ( [2] ) mainly covers the precontractual phase. However, the proposal is currently under discussion in the Council and the European Parliament.
The Commission intends to play a constructive role in this process.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See Court of Justice judgment of 14 March 2013, in Case C-415/11, _Aziz_ .
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)142.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 69

Using the housing stock better is one of the considerations of the Commission when analysing housing markets. A
Staff Working Document accompanying the directive proposal explores measures to prevent foreclosures ( [3] ). The
Social Investment Package ( [4] ) proposes good practices for Member States to prevent homelessness due to evictions.
For example social renting agencies can be an innovative way to mobilise privately owned unrented property ( [5] ). Still,
the design of housing policies remains the primary competence of Member States. Several Member States (e.g., the
Netherlands and the UK) received housing-related country-specific recommendations (CSR) in 2012. For Spain, the
2012 CSRs also referred to the need of reducing tax-induced bias towards home-ownership, as opposed to renting.
For Member States with a full macroeconomic adjustment programme, the CSRs refer to the provisions of the
respective Memorandum of Understanding (MoU; see the 2012 CSRs for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania). For
example, the MoU with Portugal sets the objective to ‘make better use of the housing stock’. The Commission will
continue giving a special prominence to housing issues in its recommendations.

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Commission Staff Working Paper on national measures and practices to avoid foreclosure procedures for residential mortgages loans, SEC(2011)

357. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) More information on the Social Investment Package can be found at

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Social Investment Package, Commission Staff Working Document on Confronting Homelessness in the European Union. SWD(2013) 42 final.

See http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en

( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 70 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002648/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Chiarimenti sulla normativa italiana in materia di OGM

Con riferimento alla risposta della Commissione all'interrogazione E-008252/2012 sul tema «Limiti e divieti alla
coltivazione di OGM a livello nazionale», si interroga la Commissione per chiedere ulteriori chiarimenti circa la
normativa italiana in materia di OGM.

Alcune notizie apparse sulla stampa italiana fanno riferimento a una richiesta ufficiale di informazioni della
Commissione europea al Governo italiano e alla Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia in merito alle leggi nazionali e regionali
sulla coltivazione di sementi geneticamente modificate.

In tale richiesta la Commissione europea sembrerebbe invitare le autorità italiane a fornire delle risposte sulla vigenza
e applicabilità di alcune norme riguardanti, fra l'altro, l'autorizzazione nazionale alla coltivazione di OGM e il divieto
regionale di coltivazione di OGM della Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia.

Potrebbe la Commissione fornire un aggiornamento sullo stato della procedura, precisando in particolare:

1. se abbia ricevuto risposta dalle autorità italiane; e

2. eventualmente sulla base delle risposte date, se ritenga opportuno procedere ulteriormente e in quale maniera?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 aprile 2013)_

1. La Commissione ha ricevuto una risposta dalle autorità italiane.

2. La Commissione sta attualmente esaminando tale risposta. Se del caso si avvieranno i procedimenti appropriati.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 71

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002648/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Clarification regarding Italian legislation on GMOs

With reference to the Commission’s answer to Question No E-008252/2012 on ‘GMO crops: national restrictions
and prohibition’, the Commission is asked to provide further clarification regarding Italian legislation on GMOs.

Reports in the Italian press refer to a formal request for information from the European Commission to the Italian
Government and the Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia regarding the national and regional laws on the cultivation of
genetically-modified seeds.

In its request, the European Commission seems to be asking the Italian authorities to provide answers on the validity
and applicability of certain rules concerning, among other things, national authorisation for the cultivation of GMOs
and the regional ban on cultivation of GMOs in the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region.

Can the Commission provide an update on the status of the procedure, stating in particular:

1. Whether it has received a reply from the Italian authorities; and

2. If so, on the basis of the answers given, whether it deems it appropriate to proceed further and how?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

1. The Commission has received a reply from the Italian authorities.

2. The Commission is currently assessing the reply. Appropriate proceedings will be initiated if and as necessary.

C 6 E / 72 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002649/13**

**to the Commission**
**Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Proposed Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020

The proposed Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014‐2020 appear to pay little heed to the fact that, since the adoption of
the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has been in force,
emphasising the need to pay special attention to territories beset by permanent and severe geographic and
demographic handicaps, including island regions. The proposed guidelines also seem at odds with the recent Council
conclusions on the Multiannual Financial Framework, which state: ‘The special situation of island regions also needs
to be taken into account’ (Point 27 of the European Council’s Conclusions, 7‐8 February 2013).

An example of the absurdity of the situation that these proposed guidelines would create is the case of the Shetland
Islands, a remote Scottish archipelago located in the North Sea and having a population of 23 000. Although its own
population density at NUTS III level is slightly higher (15h/km [2] ), this island region is part of the Highlands and Islands
NUTS II area, which has a density below 12.5h/km [2] . Under the current proposals and applying the proposed criteria
for eligibility, Shetland would find most of its territory listed in the same ‘non-assisted area’ category as major
economic centres such as London, Paris or Frankfurt. Only its very small outlying islands (with a population of under
5 000) would remain within the scope of Article 107.3(c).

Does the Commission not think that granting ‘predefined’ area status under Article 107.3(c) to islands, or at least to
islands below a reasonable threshold of population (e.g. 100 000), would more adequately address the recognised
needs of these territories without undermining the functioning of the internal market or expanding significantly the
ceiling of EU population under assisted area status?

Furthermore, does the Commission not agree that applying such rules to sparsely populated areas has not led to any
market disturbances so far, and that this would be unlikely to be the case if such rules were applied tomorrow to
islands whose economy is characterised by isolation, a very small proximity market and obvious shortfalls in
economies of scale?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the Shetland Islands situation. In the draft guidelines on regional aid for 2014-2020,
given the difficulties in defining general rules to cover all situations across the EU, the choice to designate islands on
the basis of new population thresholds would in any case create disparities in the treatment of islands.

Criterion 3 in paragraph 153(d) of the draft guidelines is sufficient to allow Member States to designate as nonpredefined ‘c’ areas islands that have either a GDP per capita below the EU-27 average, or an unemployment rate
above 115% of the national average, or less than 5 000 inhabitants. This would cover all islands for which a
derogation under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU is justified by commonly accepted socioeconomic indicators.

On the basis of 2007-2009 data, the GDP per capita of the Shetland Islands is 106.2% of the EU-27 average, and the
unemployment rate 85% of the national average. Thus, they could not be designated as ‘c’ areas, but small islands with
less than 5 000 inhabitants could.

The Commission cannot confirm that state aid in sparsely populated areas could not lead to market disturbances, but
even if risks of distortion of competition could be ruled out, it is not in the common interest to predefine many
regions as ‘c’ areas, as this would leave little flexibility to intervene in areas with higher needs.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 73

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002650/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)**

_(6 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Lucha contra la pesca ilegal

Interpol ha puesto en marcha el proyecto SCALE, una iniciativa mundial destinada a detectar, reprimir y combatir los
delitos pesqueros que suponen un coste estimado anual de 17 620 millones de euros para la economía mundial y
están relacionados con otras formas de delincuencia transnacional grave, como la corrupción, el blanqueo de
capitales, la trata de personas y el narcotráfico.

Este proyecto está financiado por el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Noruega, el organismo noruego para la
cooperación al desarrollo (NORAD) y la ONG «The Pew Charitable Trusts». En el marco de esta iniciativa, además de
concienciar sobre los delitos pesqueros, se coordinarán operaciones encaminadas a luchar contra este tipo de
actividades delictivas, desmantelar las rutas de tráfico y armonizar los esfuerzos en materia de aplicación de la ley a
escala nacional y regional.

Se estima que una quinta parte del pescado que sale del mar es ilegal, no declarado o no reglamentado, y el problema
se está agravando porque las nuevas tecnologías permiten a los barcos de pesca estar en el mar más tiempo y realizar
un arrastre cada vez más profundo.

¿Está participando la Comisión de algún modo en este proyecto tan interesante?

¿Qué medidas emplea la Comisión para poder detectar el fraude en el etiquetado del pescado y por ende contra la
protección de los consumidores?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

El Reglamento de la UE sobre la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada ( [1] ) constituye la base para combatir las
actividades pesqueras ilegales en aguas de la UE y de fuera de la UE.

Para afrontar mejor todos los aspectos del fenómeno, la Comisión ha reforzado la cooperación con otras
organizaciones intergubernamentales como Interpol. Conforme a la resolución aprobada por el Parlamento Europeo
en 2011 ( [2] ), Interpol ha creado un grupo permanente de trabajo sobre delitos pesqueros para combatir la pesca ilegal
y todas las actividades delictivas ligadas a ella (como el fraude aduanero, la corrupción e infracciones de la legislación
laboral). La Comisión participa en ese grupo de trabajo en calidad de observador.

El fraude en el etiquetado del pescado puede no estar ligado directamente a la pesca ilegal. Según diversos estudios e
investigaciones realizados en la EU, ese fraude suele producirse en las etapas finales de la cadena de suministro y afecta
a pescado barato que se etiqueta como especies populares más caras. Los productos de la pesca se caracterizan por
una enorme variedad de especies. Los controles pueden mejorarse mediante requisitos de trazabilidad. Las pruebas de
ADN son una posibilidad prometedora, especialmente para los productos que ya han sido transformados.

La Comisión ha incluido en su propuesta de nuevo Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca una línea de ayuda específica
para reforzar los controles de la cadena de comercialización y de las obligaciones de etiquetado. Los controles corren
a cargo de las administraciones nacionales competentes.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Reglamento (CE) n [o] 1005/2008 del Consejo, por el que se establece un sistema comunitario para prevenir, desalentar y eliminar la pesca ilegal, no

declarada y no reglamentada (DO L 286 de 29.10.2008, p. 1).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Resolución 2010/2210(INI): «La lucha contra la pesca ilegal a escala mundial — El papel de la UE».

( **|**

C 6 E / 74 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002650/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Combating illegal fishing

Interpol has launched Project Scale, a global initiative to detect, suppress and combat fisheries crime, which is
estimated to cost the global economy EUR 17 620 million each year and is linked to other forms of serious
transnational crime, including corruption, money laundering, and human and drugs trafficking.

This project is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation (NORAD) and the NGO the Pew Charitable Trusts. In addition to raising awareness of fisheries crime,
Project Scale will coordinate operations to target this criminal activity, disrupt trafficking routes and harmonise
national and regional law enforcement efforts.

One fifth of the fish that come out of the water is believed to be illegal, unreported or unregulated, and the problem is
getting worse because new technologies allow fishing boats to stay at sea longer and trawl ever deeper.

Is the Commission taking part in this extremely interesting project?

What measures does the Commission deploy to detect fraudulent mislabelling of fish, which undermines consumer
protection?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The EU Regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Regulation) ( [1] ) provides the platform to
combat illegal fishing activities in EU waters and in waters outside the EU.

In order to better tackle all the aspects of the phenomenon, the Commission has reinforced its cooperation with other
intergovernmental organisations like Interpol. In line with the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in
2011 ( [2] ), Interpol has set up a permanent Fisheries Crime Working Group in order to address illegal fishing and all
related criminal activities (e.g. customs fraud, corruption and breaches of labour law). The Commission participates as
observer to the Working Group that promotes actions against illegal fishing and all related criminal activities.

On the other hand, fraud on fish labelling may not be directly linked to illegal fishing. According to studies and
enquiries conducted in the EU it often takes place at the final stages of the supply chain and concerns cheap fish
labelled as popular and more expensive ones. Fish products are characterised by a very large number of species.
Traceability requirements can help to improve controls. DNA testing is a promising development in particular for
products that have already been processed.

The Commission has included in its proposal for a new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund specific support to
strengthen controls of the marketing chain and labelling obligations. Controls are conducted by relevant national
administrations.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 286/1, 29.10.2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Resolution 2010/2210(INI) on ‘Combating illegal fishing at the global level — the role of the EU’.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 75

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002651/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Christel Schaldemose (S&D)**

_(6. marts 2013)_

_Om:_ Indpakning af medicin

Som led i at involvere borgerne mere i EU — citizens-dialogen — har jeg modtaget et forslag fra en borger. Ideen er så
god, at jeg straks skynder mig at stille spørgsmålet videre til Kommissionen.

Borgeren spørger, om der er nogle EU-regler i dag eller nogle på vej, der stiller krav til pakningerne af medicin.
Medicinpakninger kan i dag være svære at håndtere for borgere med handicap. Fx svagtseende kan have svært ved at
genkende pakningen og dosere mængden, andre handicappede kan have svært ved at åbne medicinpakningen.

Jeg er godt klar over, at der er mange hensyn at tage, når medicin pakkes. Hensynet til piratkopiering, hensynet til
utilgængelighed for børn etc. Men det er en god ide at overveje fælles minimumsregler for indpakning af medicin. På
den måde kan vi sikre alle handicappede borgere adgang til at kunne klare deres medicin selv.

Hvad er Kommissionens opfattelse af den ide? Er der standarder eller regler på vej på EU‐plan? Er der vejledninger på
vej?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg**

_(9. april 2013)_

EU-lovgivningen om lægemidler ( [1] ), som fastslår de oplysninger, der skal optræde på indlægssedlen til et lægemiddel,
tager højde for handicappedes særlige behov. Lovgivningen fastsætter, at lægemidlets navn skal angives i blindeskrift
på emballagen. Derudover sørger indehavere af markedsføringstilladelser for, at indlægssedlen på anmodning fra
patientsammenslutninger gøres tilgængelig i formater, der egner sig for blinde og svagsynede.

Kommissionen skal forelægge en rapport for Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om bl.a. indlægssedlen, og hvordan den
kan forbedres yderligere for bedre at opfylde patienternes behov. Til dette formål har Kommissionen bestilt en
undersøgelse om vurderingen af læsbarheden af indlægssedlen, som er i gang, og som skulle være tilgængelig i
efteråret.

For yderligere oplysninger henviser Kommissionen det ærede medlem til sine tidligere svar på spørgsmål
E-005012/11 og E-003968/2012 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direktiv 2001/83/EF, EFT L 311 af 28.11.2001, s. 67.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/da/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 76 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002651/13**

**to the Commission**
**Christel Schaldemose (S&D)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Packaging of medicinal products

As part of the initiative to involve citizens more in the EU — the citizens’ dialogue — I received a suggestion from a
citizen. The idea is such a good one that I am passing the question on to the Commission straight away.

The citizen asks whether there are any EU rules currently in existence or in the pipeline that lay down requirements
concerning the packaging of medicinal products. Medicinal product packaging can at present be difficult for citizens
with disabilities to cope with. For example, people with impaired vision can find it difficult to recognise the packaging
and administer the dose, and people with other disabilities can find it difficult to open medicinal product packaging.

I appreciate that there are many things that need to be taken into consideration when medicinal products are
packaged, such as counterfeiting, keeping the product out of the reach of children, etc. However, it is a good idea to
consider common minimum rules for the packaging of medicinal products. This would enable us to ensure that all
people with disabilities were able to cope with their medicines themselves.

What is the Commission’s view of this idea? Are there any standards or rules in the pipeline at EU level? Are there any
guidelines in preparation?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 April 2013)_

The EU legislation on medicinal products ( [1] ) which determines the information that should appear on the package
leaflet of a medicinal product pays attention to the special needs of disabled patients. It provides that the name of the
medicinal product must be expressed in Braille format on the packaging. In addition, marketing authorisation holders
shall ensure that the package information leaflet is made available on request from patients' organisations in formats
appropriate for the blind and partially-sighted.

The Commission has to present a report to the Parliament and the Council on, _inter alia_, the package leaflet and how it
could be further improved in order to better meet the needs of patients. For that purpose, the Commission has
commissioned a study on the assessment of the readability of the package leaflet which is ongoing and which should
be available this autumn.

For further information, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its previous answers to questions
E-005012/11 and E-003968/2012 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2001/83/EC, OJ L 311, of 28.11.2001, p. 67.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 77

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002652/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(6 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Κοινοτικές χρηματοδοτήσεις προς την Αλβανία

Η Αλβανία συμπεριφέρεται με σκληρότητα στους 400 000 Έλληνες που ζουν στην Βόρεια Ήπειρο, καθώς και στους Ρομά,
ενώ υιοθετεί και επιθετική τακτική κυρίως προς την Ελλάδα, κάτι που φάνηκε και με την απροθυμία της να συνεργαστεί στην
οριστική επίλυση του ζητήματος του καθορισμού της Αποκλειστικής Οικονομικής Ζώνης μεταξύ των δύο χωρών.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Ποια είναι τα συνολικά κονδύλια που έλαβε από την ΕΕ η Αλβανία ως δωρεάν και δανειακή ενίσχυση από το 2000 ως
σήμερα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(26 Απριλίου 2013)_

Η χρηματοδοτική στήριξη της EΕ προς την Αλβανία δεν παρέχεται μέσω άτοκων δανείων.

Την περίοδο 2001-2006, χορηγήθηκε στην Αλβανία συνολικό πόσο ύψους 260 εκατ. ευρώ στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος
CARDS (πρόγραμμα κοινοτικής βοήθειας για την αναδιάρθρωση, την ανάπτυξη και τη σταθεροποίηση) με τη μορφή άμεσων
επιχορηγήσεων.

Από το 2007 η Αλβανία λαμβάνει οικονομική στήριξη από τον Μηχανισμό Προενταξιακής Βοήθειας (ΜΠΒ). Κατά την
περίοδο προγραμματισμού 2007-2013, το σύνολο των κονδυλίων που θα διατεθούν από τον ΜΠΒ στην Αλβανία ανέρχεται
σε 589 εκατ. ευρώ περίπου.

C 6 E / 78 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002652/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU funding for Albania

Albania treats the 400 000 Greeks living in Northern Epirus and the Roma harshly, while adopting an aggressive
stance particularly towards Greece: this can be seen in its unwillingness to cooperate in finally resolving the problem
of determining the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two countries.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

What is the overall amount of funding that Albania has received from the EU as aid in the form of interest-free loans
since the year 2000?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

EU financial support to Albania is not provided via interest-free loans.

During the period 2001-2006 a total of EUR 260 million under the CARDS programme was allocated to Albania in
the form of direct grants.

Since 2007 Albania benefits from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). In the programming period
2007-2013, the total allocation to Albania under IPA amounts to approximately EUR 589 million.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 79

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002653/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(6 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Μείωση του Ειδικού Φόρου Κατανάλωσης στα καύσιμα

Τα περισσότερα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά αντιμετωπίζουν εξαιρετικά δύσκολή οικονομική κατάσταση αλλάζοντας άρδην τις
καταναλωτικές τους συνήθειες, δεδομένου ότι η πλειοψηφία αυτών βρίσκονται σε οικονομικό αδιέξοδο και στα όρια της
επιβίωσης. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί η πρωτοφανής και δραματική μείωση της κατανάλωσης στο πετρέλαιο
θέρμανσης κατά 70% έως 80% σε όλη την Ελλάδα, σε σχέση με το προηγούμενο έτος. Ο εξαπλασιασμός του φόρου στο
πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης και η εξίσωσή του με το πετρέλαιο κίνησης έκανε δυσβάσταχτο το κόστος της θέρμανσης για τους
πολίτες και ώθησε τους περισσότερους καταναλωτές να στραφούν σε οικονομικότερους τρόπους για να ζεσταθούν, ενώ
πολλοί ήταν εκείνοι που εξαιτίας της δύσκολης οικονομικής τους κατάστασης στερήθηκαν και αυτού του αγαθού.

Παρότι αυξήθηκε ο φόρος στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης, σύμφωνα με στοιχεία της Πανελλήνιας Ομοσπονδίας Πρατηριούχων
Εμπόρων Καυσίμων, χρησιμοποιώντας τα επίσημα στοιχεία του υπουργείου Οικονομικών, παρατηρείται στον εν λόγω τομέα
ότι τα φορολογικά έσοδα από ΕΦΚ (ειδικό φόρο κατανάλωσης) και ΦΠΑ του κράτους όχι μόνο δεν αυξήθηκαν, αλλά
μειώθηκαν σημαντικά, λόγω της πρωτοφανούς μείωσης της κατανάλωσης. Σύμφωνα με τα παραπάνω ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις τέτοιων μέτρων για το κοινωνικό σύνολο σε μια περίοδο συρρίκνωσης
των εισοδημάτων και έκρηξης της ανεργίας, τη ραγδαία μείωση της κατανάλωσης με τα ανάλογα αποτελέσματα στα
έσοδα του κράτους καθώς και ότι οι έλεγχοι δείχνουν ότι περίπου το 20% των πρατηρίων διακινεί νοθευμένα καύσιμα
στην αγορά, ως μέλος της τρόικας κρίνει ότι πρόκειται για ένα αποτελεσματικό μέτρο για την αύξηση των εσόδων του
κράτους και για την πάταξη του λαθρεμπορίου;

2. Ως συμβουλευτικό μέλος για τη δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή της χώρας και δεδομένου ότι οποιεσδήποτε αλλαγές
μπορούν να προκαλέσουν «χαλάρωση» των δημοσιονομικών στόχων, προτίθεται να προβεί σε μελέτη αντικτύπου σε
συνεργασία με τις ελληνικές αρχές, διερευνώντας κατά πόσο μια επικείμενη μείωση στον εν λόγω φόρο για θα
μπορούσε να αποδώσει δυνητικά περισσότερα έσοδα στα ταμεία του κράτους;

3. Αποκλείει το ενδεχόμενο η μείωση του φόρου στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης να μπορεί να αποτελέσει ισοδύναμο μέτρο,
αυξάνοντας την κατανάλωση και τα έσοδα και παράλληλα μειώνοντας ένα σημαντικό βάρος στους οικογενειακούς
προϋπολογισμούς;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(3 Ιουνίου 2013)_

Από τον Οκτώβριο του 2011 ως τον Μάιο του 2012, ο ειδικός φόρος κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης ήταν
60 ευρώ ανά 1 000 λίτρα, ενώ ο ειδικός φόρος κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο κίνησης 412 ευρώ ανά 1 000 λίτρα. Αυτή η
διαφορά προκάλεσε περιπτώσεις απάτης με αντικείμενο τη χρήση πετρελαίου θέρμανσης στις μεταφορές. Συνεπώς, η
ελληνική κυβέρνηση, μετά από διαβουλεύσεις με την Επιτροπή, την ΕΚΤ και το ΔΝΤ, αποφάσισε την εξομοίωση των δύο
φόρων σε 330 ευρώ από τον Οκτώβριο του 2012.

C 6 E / 80 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002653/13**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Reduction in excise duties on fuel

Most Greek households are facing an extremely difficult economic situation. They are radically changing their
consumption habits, since most are on a very tight budget and are barely able to survive. A telling example is the
unprecedented and dramatic reduction in consumption of heating oil by between 70% and 80% in Greece as a whole,
compared to the previous year. The six-fold increase of the tax on heating oil and the decision to price it on a par with
diesel have put the cost of heating oil beyond people’s means and prompted most consumers to switch to cheaper
ways to keep warm. Many others have gone without heating altogether on account of the difficult economic
situation.

Although the tax on heating oil has increased, the Panhellenic Federation of Fuel Service Station Dealers, drawing on
official Ministry of Finance data, has noted in this connection that tax revenue from the State excise duty and VAT not
only have failed to increase, but have decreased significantly due to the unprecedented decline in consumption. In
view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Bearing in mind the negative impact of such measures on society as a whole at a time of shrinking revenues and
burgeoning unemployment and the sharp reduction in consumption and the effect this has had on State
revenue and given that checks show that approximately 20% of filling stations are selling adulterated fuel, does
it consider, as a member of the Troika, that this is an effective means of increasing State revenue and combating
trafficking?

2. Given that any changes may cause a ‘relaxation’ of budgetary targets, does it intend, as an advisory member on
the fiscal adjustment programme for Greece, to draw up an impact study, in cooperation with the Greek
authorities, to investigate whether a reduction in this excise duty could potentially yield more revenue for the
State coffers?

3. Does it rule out the possibility that a reduction in the tax on heating oil could have an equivalent effect, namely
by increasing consumption and thereby revenue, while at the same time significantly reducing the burden on
family budgets?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 June 2013)_

Between October 2011 and May 2012, the excise duty rate on gas oil used for heating purposes was EUR 60 per
1000 litres, whereas the excise duty rate imposed on gas oil used for transportation purposes was EUR 412 per 1000
litres. This difference in excise duties provoked an incentive for fuel fraud for heating oil to be used for transportation
purposes. The Greek Government, after conversation with the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, therefore decided
to equalize the two rates at EUR 330 from October 2012.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 81

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002654/13**

**al Consiglio**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Le operazioni di extraordinary rendition della CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

Un nuovo rapporto pubblicato questo mese dalla Open Society Justice Initiative denuncia l'ampiezza del ricorso da
parte della CIA alle extraordinary renditions — la pratica di rapire sospetti terroristi e trasferirli in paesi in cui si
reputa che si torturino i prigionieri durante gli interrogatori. Secondo il rapporto, 54 paesi hanno partecipato al
programma statunitense di detenzione segreta. In molti di questi paesi, lo stato di diritto è debole o inesistente, come
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egitto, Malesia e Somalia. Ma ancora più allarmante è la collusione di democrazie più che
mature come il Belgio, la Finlandia e la Danimarca, che, secondo il rapporto, hanno consentito alla CIA di utilizzare i
loro aeroporti e il loro spazio aereo per i voli connessi alle operazioni di extraordinary rendition. Inoltre, la relazione
afferma che Gran Bretagna, Italia, Germania e Australia hanno contribuito a interrogare uno o più sospetti e hanno
permesso o attivamente contribuito al loro trasferimento verso paesi noti per torturare i prigionieri. Il Parlamento ha
più volte ribadito la sua condanna delle pratiche di extraordinary rendition, le prigioni segrete e le torture.

Da i fatti denunciati dalla relazione dell'Open Society Justice Initiative:

—
può il Consiglio rilasciare una dichiarazione in cui conferma la partecipazione di Stati membri dell'UE al
programma della CIA?

—
Il Consiglio potrebbe organizzare audizioni con le pertinenti agenzie di sicurezza dell'UE, in particolare
Europol, Eurojust e il coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE, per chiarire la loro conoscenza della partecipazione
di Stati membri al programma della Cia, e la reazione dell'UE?

—
Il Consiglio è disposto a proporre disposizioni di salvaguardia onde garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani nella
condivisione delle attività di intelligence, e una precisa delimitazione dei ruoli tra attività di intelligence e di
polizia in modo che i servizi segreti non siano autorizzati ad esercitare i poteri di arresto e detenzione?

**Risposta**
_(17 giugno 2013)_

Il Consiglio ha dichiarato a più riprese che la lotta al terrorismo deve essere condotta nel pieno rispetto del diritto
internazionale, in particolare, del diritto internazionale dei diritti umani, del diritto internazionale umanitario e del
diritto internazionale dei rifugiati, e che l'esistenza di centri di detenzione segreti in cui le persone detenute si trovano
in una situazione di vuoto giuridico non è conforme al diritto internazionale. Esiste un dialogo regolare tra i
consulenti giuridici UE e USA sugli aspetti della lotta al terrorismo relativi al diritto internazionale, nel cui ambito
sono discusse questioni quali l'arresto, la detenzione, l'interrogatorio e il trasferimento di terroristi sospetti. Nel
quadro di tale dialogo l'UE rileva l'importanza del rispetto del diritto internazionale e dei diritti umani, ma le
specifiche attività dei servizi di intelligence non vi vengono trattate.

Nella _«Dichiarazione congiunta dell'Unione europea e dei suoi Stati membri e degli Stati Uniti d'America sulla chiusura del_
_centro di detenzione di Guantanamo Bay e sulla futura cooperazione in materia di lotta al terrorismo sulla base di valori condivisi,_
_del diritto internazionale e del rispetto dello stato di diritto e dei diritti dell'uomo_ », del giugno 2009, si afferma che «gli sforzi
per combattere il terrorismo dovrebbero essere realizzati in modo rispondente allo stato di diritto, nel rispetto dei
nostri valori comuni e in ottemperanza ai nostri rispettivi obblighi nel quadro del diritto internazionale, in
particolare, del diritto internazionale dei diritti umani, del diritto internazionale dei rifugiati e del diritto
internazionale umanitario». Si afferma inoltre che l'UE e gli USA ritengono che gli sforzi per combattere il terrorismo
realizzati con queste modalità ci mettano in condizioni di maggiore forza e sicurezza. Le due parti accolgono con
favore la determinazione degli Stati Uniti d'America di chiudere il centro di detenzione assieme ad altre iniziative
intraprese, fra cui l'approfondito riesame delle politiche USA in materia di detenzione, trasferimento, processi e
interrogatori nella lotta al terrorismo ed una maggiore trasparenza sulle prassi applicate in passato relativamente a
queste politiche, come pure l'eliminazione dei centri di detenzione segreti. L'UE ha fornito un contribuito alle task
force per il riesame delle politiche in materia di detenzione, interrogatori e trasferimento (una lettera a nome del
Consiglio al segretario di Stato e al segretario della difesa, copresidenti, e un briefing del coordinatore antiterrorismo
dell'UE) per garantire il rispetto dei suddetti principi nell'attuazione delle politiche USA.

C 6 E / 82 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Quanto alle garanzie volte ad assicurare il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, le istituzioni, gli organi e gli organismi
dell'UE sono tenuti a rispettare la Carta dei diritti fondamentali. Il medesimo obbligo si applica agli Stati membri
quando attuano il diritto dell'Unione. Tuttavia, poiché, in base all’articolo 4, paragrafo 2 del trattato sull’Unione
europea, l'UE non ha competenza riguardo alle attività dei servizi di intelligence nazionali che si occupano di
questioni di sicurezza nazionale, il Consiglio non è in grado di adottare disposizioni giuridiche UE che vincolino gli
Stati membri in relazione ai ruoli da assegnare a tali servizi.

Ciononostante, tutti gli Stati membri sono parti contraenti della Convenzione europea di salvaguardia dei diritti
dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali. Tutti gli atti nazionali, inclusi quelli compiuti dai servizi di intelligence, sono
soggetti alla giurisdizione della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, che è competente a dichiarare se tali atti rispettano
o no i diritti e le libertà fondamentali riconosciuti nella suddetta convenzione.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 83

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002654/13**

**to the Council**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition operations

A new report published this month by the Open Society Justice Initiative denounces the extent of the CIA’s use of
extraordinary rendition — the practice of abducting suspected terrorists and transferring them to countries with
reputations for torturing prisoners during interrogations. According to the report, 54 countries participated in the US
secret detention program. In many of these countries, the rule of law is weak or nonexistent, such as in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia and Somalia. But even more alarming is the collusion of full-fledged democracies such as
Belgium, Finland and Denmark, which, according to the report, have allowed their airports and airspace to be used for
flights associated with CIA rendition operations. Moreover, the report states that Britain, Italy, Germany and Australia
have helped interrogate one or more suspects and either allowed or actively aided in their transfers to countries
known for torturing prisoners. Parliament has on many occasions reiterated its condemnation of the practices of
extraordinary rendition, secret prisons and torture.

Given the facts denounced by the Open Society Justice Initiative report:

Could the Council issue a declaration acknowledging EU Member States’ involvement in the CIA programme?

Could the Council hold hearings with the relevant EU security agencies, in particular Europol, Eurojust and the EU
Counter-terrorism Coordinator, to clarify their knowledge of Member States’ involvement in the CIA programme,
and the EU’s response?

Is the Council willing to propose safeguards so as to guarantee respect for human rights in intelligence-sharing
activities, and a strict delimitation of roles between intelligence and law-enforcement activities so that intelligence
agencies are not permitted to assume powers of arrest and detention?

**Reply**
_(17 June 2013)_

The Council has stated on a number of occasions that the fight against terrorism has to take place in full respect of
international law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, and that the existence
of secret detention facilities where detained persons are kept in a legal vacuum is not in conformity with international
law. There is a regular dialogue between EU and US legal advisers on the international law aspects of the fight against
terrorism, where questions such as the arrest, detention, interrogation and transfer of terrorist suspects are discussed.
In this dialogue, the EU stresses the importance of respect for international law and human rights, but the specific
activities of intelligence services are not addressed.

In the ‘Joint Statement of the European Union and its Member States and the United States of America on the Closure
of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and Future Counterterrorism Cooperation, based on Shared Values,
International Law, and Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights’ of June 2009, it was stated that ‘efforts to
combat terrorism should be conducted in a manner that comports with the rule of law, respects our common values,
and complies with our respective obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law,
refugee law, and humanitarian law’. It was also stated that the EU and US consider that efforts to combat terrorism
conducted in this manner make us stronger and more secure. Both sides welcomed the determination of the United
States of America to close the facility together with other steps taken, including the intensive review of its detention,
transfer, trial and interrogation policies in the fight against terrorism and increased transparency about past practices
in regard to these policies, as well as the elimination of secret detention facilities. The EU has provided a contribution
to the Detention, Interrogation and Transfer Policy Review Task Forces (a letter on behalf of the Council to the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, co-chairs, and a briefing by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) to
ensure respect for the above principles in the implementation of US policies.

As for safeguards aimed at guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights, EU institutions, offices and bodies are
required to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The same obligation applies to the Member States when
they implement Union law. However, given that in the light of Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union
the EU does not have competence regarding the activities of national intelligence services dealing with national
security issues, the Council is not in a position to adopt EU legal provisions which would bind Member States in
relation to the roles to be given to those services.

C 6 E / 84 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Nevertheless, all Member States are contracting parties to the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. All national acts, including those carried out by the intelligence services, are subject to the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which is competent to declare whether such acts do or do not
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in that Convention.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 85

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002655/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Vendite di armi del Regno Unito allo Sri Lanka

Secondo dati raccolti dal database del governo britannico per il controllo delle esportazioni strategiche dal CAAT
(Campagna contro il commercio di armi), il governo britannico sta vendendo armi di piccolo calibro e munizioni per
milioni di sterline allo Sri Lanka, nonostante la disastrosa situazione dei diritti umani nel paese.

Infatti, le statistiche tratte dal database mostrano che l'anno scorso sono stati venduti al governo dello Sri Lanka
articoli che vanno da fucili d'assalto e fucili a canna liscia a congegni di mira, fino a pistole e munizioni.

Tutto questo avviene nonostante che il Foreign Office britannico e del Commonwealth classifica ancora lo Sri Lanka
come «paese a rischio» per le violazioni dei diritti umani. Il governo dello Sri Lanka è stato accusato della brutale
repressione della minoranza tamil. Inoltre, in un aggiornamento di dicembre, il Foreign Office ha detto che la
situazione dei diritti umani è stata caratterizzata da andamenti negativi.

1. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è consapevole del fatto che il Regno Unito sta vendendo
equipaggiamenti militari allo Sri Lanka?

2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è del parere che queste vendite di armi costituiscono una violazione del
codice di condotta dell'Unione europea sulle esportazioni di armi?

3. Che genere di passi ha in programma di effettuare la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per porre termine a
questa situazione e promuovere una più restrittiva applicazione dei criteri della posizione comune dell'Unione
europea sulle esportazioni di armi da parte degli Stati membri?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(24 aprile 2013)_

La posizione comune 2008/944/PESC del Consiglio sul controllo delle esportazioni di attrezzature militari (che ha
sostituito il codice di condotta dell’Unione europea per le esportazioni di armi) prevede che le decisioni di autorizzare
o vietare le esportazioni di armi siano di competenza nazionale. Tuttavia le licenze di esportazione di armi concesse
dagli Stati membri devono essere valutate in base agli otto criteri fissati nella posizione comune ed è possibile che altri
Stati membri esprimano parere contrario su operazioni analoghe.

Dato che non esiste alcun embargo dell’UE sulle vendite di armi allo Sri Lanka, ciascuno Stato membro decide se
rilasciare le licenze di esportazione in base a una valutazione dei rischi guidata dai suddetti principi.

Gli Stati membri hanno l’obbligo di dichiarare le esportazioni di armi a livello dell’UE e le informazioni sono
pubblicate in relazioni annuali ( [1] ).

La posizione comune sul controllo delle esportazioni di attrezzature militari è attualmente in fase di riesame con le
rispettive conclusioni del Consiglio adottate il 19 novembre 2012. Sono state sollevate alcune questioni, attualmente
in discussione presso gli organi competenti del Consiglio, per migliorare ulteriormente l’attuazione della posizione

comune.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Le relazioni sono disponibili all’indirizzo:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_it.htm

C 6 E / 86 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002655/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — UK arms sales to Sri Lanka

According to figures collected from the British Government’s database for strategic export controls by the Campaign
Against Arms Trade (CAAT), the British Government is selling millions of pounds worth of small arms and
ammunition to Sri Lanka despite the country’s dire human rights record.

Indeed, statistics taken from this database show that items ranging from assault rifles and shotguns through to
weapon sights, pistols and ammunition were sold last year to the Government of Sri Lanka.

All this occurs despite the fact that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office still classifies Sri Lanka as a ‘country
of concern’ for human rights abuses. The Government of Sri Lanka has been accused of the brutal repression of its
Tamil minority. Moreover, in a December update, the Foreign Office said that the human rights situation there had
been marked by negative developments.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware that the UK is selling military equipment to Sri Lanka?

2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative consider these arms sales to be an infringement of the EU Code of
Conduct on Arms Exports?

3. What kind of measures is the Vice-President/High Representative planning to take in order to put an end to this
situation and promote a stricter implementation of the criteria of the EU Common Position on arms exports by
Member States?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

Under the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on the control of export of military equipment (previously
the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports), decisions on whether to authorise or deny arms exports remain a national
responsibility of Member States. However, the arms export licences granted by the Member States have to be assessed
against the eight criteria laid down in the Common Position and Member States have to take into account possible
denials issued by other Member States for similar transactions.

Given that there is no EU embargo on arms sales to Sri Lanka, each Member State decides whether to issue arms
export licences based on a risk assessment guided by the abovementioned principles.

Member States are under an obligation to report their arms exports at EU level, and the information is made public
through annual reports ( [1] ).

The Common Position on the control of export of military equipment is currently under review with respective
Council Conclusions adopted on 19 November 2012. A number of issues have been identified for further improving
the implementation of the Common Position, and these are currently being discussed by the relevant Council bodies.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) All reports are accessible at:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 87

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002656/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(6 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Politiche comunitarie per i disabili e gli ipovedenti

Nell'ambito dell'armonizzazione del diritto comunitario con la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle
persone con disabilità e in occasione del terzo Parlamento europeo delle persone con disabilità, che si è riunito a
Bruxelles il 5 dicembre 2012, il Consiglio dell'Unione europea ha stabilito che dovrebbe essere istituito un quadro per
monitorare, proteggere e promuovere l'attuazione della Convenzione, che comprenderà la commissione per le
petizioni del Parlamento europeo, il Mediatore europeo, così come l'Agenzia dell'Unione europea per i diritti
fondamentali, la Commissione europea e il Forum europeo della disabilità.

Facendo riferimento alla circolare UICI n. 302/2012, si fa appello alle istituzioni europee e ai loro organismi
consultivi nell'ambito delle rispettive attribuzioni e competenze, agli Stati membri dell'UE, alle parti sociali, alla
società civile, alle ONG, alle Organizzazioni delle Persone Disabili (OPD) e alle altre parti interessate, affinché
prendano disposizioni adeguate a garantire l'attuazione dei diritti delle persone con disabilità in Europa e in tutte le
organizzazioni internazionali di cui le istituzioni europee ed i loro membri fanno parte, riconoscendo quanto segue:

I. L'Europa si doterà di un nuovo piano per l'occupazione, la crescita e l'inclusione sociale per le persone con
disabilità — nuove strategie per uscire dalla crisi.

II. L'Europa garantirà che il sostegno finanziario sarà utilizzato in primo luogo per occuparsi dei più bisognosi
dell'Unione europea e non creerà maggiore esclusione.

III. L'Europa deve attuare pienamente i diritti umani delle persone con disabilità.

IV. L'Europa deve completare i diritti di cittadinanza per le persone con disabilità.

V. L'Europa garantisce il sostegno politico per l'attuazione della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle
persone con disabilità.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Quali sono i metodi attraverso i quali la Commissione intende promuovere l'attuazione dei suddetti obiettivi?

2. Nello specifico, quali sono le azioni che la Commissione intende avviare per migliorare le condizioni di vita
delle persone con disabilità all'interno dell'Unione?

**Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

_(7 maggio 2013)_

Nella Strategia europea sulla disabilità 2010-2020 ( [1] ) la Commissione, agendo nell'ambito delle competenze
conferitele dai trattati, ha delineato i piani di attuazione della convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone
con disabilità (UNCRPD) e le azioni per il periodo 2010-2015 ( [2] ). Per informazioni dettagliate, la Commissione invita
l'onorevole parlamentare a consultare la risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-000118/2013.

Conformemente all'UNCRPD, l'UE assiste gli Stati membri nella promozione di condizioni di vita autonoma per le
persone con disabilità. La Commissione invita gli Stati membri a utilizzare i fondi dell'UE per finanziare, ad esempio,
la formazione e la riqualificazione nella transizione dai centri di assistenza residenziale ai servizi assistenziali di
comunità e promuove buone condizioni di lavoro, sviluppando meccanismi di finanziamento per l'assistenza
personale, l'assistenza residenziale a livello delle comunità e misure di riabilitazione, e investendo in infrastrutture
accessibili e capaci di favorire l'integrazione.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0636:en:NOT.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010SC1324:EN:NOT.

C 6 E / 88 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Il pacchetto normativo proposto dalla Commissione sui Fondi strutturali e d'investimento europei per il periodo
2014-2020 individua diversi settori di intervento per rispondere alle esigenze delle persone con disabilità. In
determinate circostanze tematiche e generali ex-ante (quali l'attuazione e l'applicazione della convenzione delle
Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità ( [3] )), le priorità di investimento del Fondo sociale europeo (FSE) e
del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale dovrebbero contribuire con investimenti mirati a migliorare la qualità di vita
delle persone con disabilità. La Commissione ha proposto che almeno il 25 % del bilancio della politica di coesione sia
destinato all'FSE e che il 20 % dei finanziamenti a titolo dell'FSE sia impiegato per l'obiettivo tematico dell'inclusione
sociale.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Attualmente in corso di discussione nell'ambito della consultazione a tre.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 89

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002656/13**

**to the Commission**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU policies for the disabled and visually impaired

As part of the harmonisation of EC law with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and to mark the occasion of the third European Parliament of Persons with Disabilities, which met in Brussels on
5 December 2012, the Council of the European Union has determined that there should be a framework to monitor,
protect and promote the implementation of the Convention, which will include the European Parliament’s
Committee on Petitions, the European Ombudsman, as well as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights,
the European Commission and the European Disability Forum.

With reference to the Italian Union of the Blind and Partially Sighted’s circular No 302/2012, we call upon the EU
institutions and their advisory bodies within the limits of their respective powers and competences, upon EU Member
States, social partners, civil society, NGOs, Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) and other stakeholders,
to take appropriate measures to ensure implementation of the rights of people with disabilities in Europe and in all
international organisations to which the EU institutions and their Member States belong, acknowledging the
following points:

I. Europe shall introduce a new plan for employment, growth and the social inclusion of people with disabilities
— new strategies for resolving the crisis.

II. Europe shall ensure that financial support will be used primarily to take care of the most deprived citizens in
the European Union and will not create greater social exclusion.

III. Europe must fully implement the human rights of people with disabilities.

IV. Europe must extend citizenship rights for people with disabilities.

V. Europe shall guarantee political support for the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

In view of this, will the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What methods does the Commission intend to use to promote the implementation of the above objectives?

2. Specifically, what actions does the Commission intend to take to improve the living conditions of persons with
disabilities in the EU?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

Acting within the limits of competences conferred to it by the Treaties, the Commission has laid out its plans for
implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in the European
Disability Strategy 2010-2020 ( [1] ) and its list of actions for 2010-2015 ( [2] ). For specific details, the Commission would
refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000118/2013.

In line with the UNCRPD, the EU supports the Member States in promoting independent living for persons with
disabilities. The Commission encourages Member States to use the EU funds for instance to finance training and
requalification of carers in the transition from institutional to community-based care and promoting sound working
conditions, developing personal assistance funding schemes, community-based residential support and rehabilitation measures, and investing in accessible and inclusive infrastructure.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0636:en:NOT.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010SC1324:EN:NOT.

C 6 E / 90 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

The regulatory package on European Structural and Investment Funds for 2014-2020, as proposed by the
Commission, identifies several fields of intervention addressing the needs of disabled people. In particular thematic
and general _ex-ante_ conditionalities (like the implementation and application of the UN Convention on the rights of
persons with disabilities ( [3] )), European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional Development Fund investment
priorities should contribute by targeted investments to improving the quality of life of people with disabilities. The
Commission proposed that at least 25% of cohesion policy budget be allocated to the ESF and that 20% of ESF
funding targets the social inclusions thematic objective.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Under discusion in the context of the trilogue.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 91

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002657/13**

**aan de Raad**
**Lucas Hartong (NI) en Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)**

_(6 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Vervolgvragen subsidieverlening aan Egypte

Zondag 13 januari jl. werd door de heer Van Rompuy aan de Egyptische president Morsi bekend gemaakt dat de Raad
voornemens is 5 miljard euro ter beschikking te stellen aan Egypte in het kader van „het democratiseringsproces”. De
Raad beantwoordde onze eerste set vragen op 27 februari (E-001277/2013). In dat kader de volgende vervolgvragen:

1. In zijn beantwoording geeft de Raad aan dat „de voorzitter van de Europese Raad verwees naar de totale
financiële inspanning die onder voorwaarden ter beschikking wordt gesteld via verschillende financiële
mechanismen waarover de Commissie en financiële instellingen (zoals de EIB en EBRD) beschikken”. Kan de
Raad aangeven op welk moment de heer Van Rompuy toestemming heeft verkregen van de Commissie om
uitspraken namens die Commissie en haar „financiële instellingen” te doen richting Egypte?

2. De Raad schrijft dat de heer van Rompuy „slechts de aangeboden steun heeft bevestigd die in beginsel reeds
door de bevoegde instanties is goedgekeurd”. Kan de Raad aangeven wat er precies met „in beginsel” wordt
bedoeld en op welke begrotingslijnen van de Commissie en „bevoegde instanties” de heer Van Rompuy doelde?

3. Kan de Raad aangeven voor welke precieze doeleinden deze 5 miljard is toegezegd? Wie zijn de begunstigden
die dit geld gaan ontvangen?

4. Is de Raad van mening dat het een wijs besluit is geweest om zoveel geld ter beschikking te stellen aan het land
Egypte nu het de laatste maanden steeds treuriger is gesteld met de rechtsstaat?

**Antwoord**

_(15 mei 2013)_

Het is niet aan de Raad om commentaar te leveren op antwoorden op parlementaire vragen die door de voorzitter van
een andere instelling zijn gegeven.

C 6 E / 92 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002657/13**

**to the Council**
**Lucas Hartong (NI) and Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Follow-up questions concerning subsidies granted to Egypt

On Sunday, 13 January 2013, Mr Van Rompuy informed President Morsi of Egypt that the Council intended to make
EUR 5 billion available to Egypt to promote ‘the democratisation process’. The Council replied to our first set of
questions on 27 February (E-001277/2013). In that context, I would like to pose the following follow-up questions:

1. In its reply, the Council indicates that ‘The President of the European Council was referring to the total financial
effort … being made available, subject to conditionality, through different financial mechanisms at the disposal
of the Commission and financial institutions (such as the EIB and EBRD)’. Can the Council specify exactly when
Mr Van Rompuy obtained authorisation from the Commission to make statements on behalf of the
Commission and its ‘financial institutions’ in respect of Egypt?

2. The Council writes that Mr Van Rompuy was only ‘repeating … offers already approved in principle by the
appropriate authorities’. Can the Council indicate what precisely it means by ‘in principle’ and to which budget
lines of the Commission and the ‘appropriate authorities’ Mr Van Rompuy was referring?

3. Can the Council specify for which particular purposes these EUR 5 billion have been pledged? Who are the
beneficiaries who will receive this money?

4. Does the Council believe that it was a wise decision to make so much money available to Egypt, given the fact
that the situation in relation to the rule of law in that country has been increasingly dismal over recent months?

**Reply**
_(15 May 2013)_

It is not for the Council to comment on replies to parliamentary questions given by the President of another
institution.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 93

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002658/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Lucas Hartong (NI)**

_(6 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Software drama bij Europese Scholen

Uit het „Report on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2011” ( [1] ) blijkt dat in 2003 het
project „Odyssee” werd gelanceerd: een school management systeem. Het had in 2008 operationeel moeten zijn,
maar op 8 mei 2012 werd besloten het hele project te stoppen omdat er enorm veel fouten („bugs”) in zaten en de
leverancier feitelijk niet in staat was het product fatsoenlijk en werkend af te leveren. Schade tot dan toe: 2 miljoen
euro. Dezelfde leverancier blijkt nu bezig om een ander softwarepakket te leveren voor het financieel management
van de scholen, genaamd „Cobee”. In dat kader de volgende vragen:

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven om welk exact schadebedrag het gaat inzake „Odyssee” en op welke begrotingslijn
dit drukt?

2. Kan de Commissie aangeven welke leverancier voor dit financiële drama verantwoordelijk was/is en of zij
voornemens is de geleden schade te verhalen op de betreffende leverancier? Zo nee, waarom niet?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven wie verantwoordelijk was/is voor het onbegrijpelijke besluit om toch weer met
dezelfde leverancier in zee te gaan, ditmaal voor „Cobee”?

4. Waarom heeft de Europese Rekenkamer dit weer moeten ontdekken en is er op geen enkele wijze eerder
informatie hieromtrent naar buiten gekomen vanuit de Europese Scholen zelf of de Commissie? Is de
Commissie het met de PVV eens dat zelfs het meest elementaire financiële toezicht ernstig heeft gefaald?

5. Is de Commissie voornemens het management en met name de Raad van Toezicht van de Europese Scholen
hierop aan te spreken? Zo nee, waarom niet?

**Antwoord van de heer Šefčovič namens de Commissie**

_(2 mei 2013)_

De Europese Scholen (ES) worden beheerd door een intergouvernementele organisatie. In deze organisatie heeft de
Commissie slechts 1 van de 28 stemmen. Aangezien de Commissie niet de ordonnateur van de ES is, gaat het
secretariaat-generaal van de ES onafhankelijk contracten voor haar eigen IT-instrumenten aan. De volgende
informatie kon worden verkregen:

1. Het „Odyssee”-contract is in 2005 afgesloten op basis van een openbare aanbesteding in 2003. De laatste
tranche is in december 2010 uitbetaald, maar aanpassingen aan het nieuwe regelgevende kader die moesten
worden opgenomen, zorgden voor extra kosten. In 2012 werd duidelijk dat verdere aanpassingen te veel
zouden kosten en is besloten om het contract op te zeggen. Voor de reeds geleverde diensten is een bedrag van
in totaal 2,1 miljoen euro uit begrotingslijn BC 60 70 01 van de begroting voor de ES betaald.

2. Aangezien was voldaan aan de taken in het contract, is er geen geld teruggevorderd.

3. Na een openbare aanbesteding in november 2008 hebben de ES de opdracht „New Cobee” aan dezelfde
leverancier gegund. Op dat moment was er geen reden om aan te nemen dat „Odyssee” vier jaar later zou
worden stopgezet. De opdracht voor „New Cobee” is gegund aan het bedrijf dat op dat moment het meest
geschikt werd geacht om het werk uit te voeren. De regels voor het plaatsen van overheidsopdrachten ( [2] ) zijn
hierbij strikt in acht genomen.

4. In maart 2012 heeft de Commissie in de begrotingscommissie (BC) van de ES vragen gesteld over de oplevering
van „New Cobee”. In de begrotingscommissie van maart 2013 heeft zij geweigerd extra middelen te besteden
aan „New Cobee”, dat nog steeds niet geheel naar behoren werkte. De laatste twee tranches zijn sinds 2010
ingehouden.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/18736747. PDF.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Overeenkomstig de financiële voorschriften in het document 2011-07-D-17-en-4 van de Europese Scholen.

C 6 E / 94 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

De ES zoeken juridisch advies om het contract te beëindigen voor onrechtmatige gebrekkige nakoming. In dit
stadium is er nog geen definitief besluit genomen.

5. De Commissie zal de kwestie aan de orde stellen in de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur van april 2013.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 95

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002658/13**

**to the Commission**
**Lucas Hartong (NI)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Software drama in the European Schools

According to the ‘Report on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2011’ ( [1] ), the ‘Odyssee
project’, a school management system, was launched in 2003. It was supposed to become operational in 2008, but it
was decided on 8 May 2012 to stop the entire project because of enormous numbers of software errors (‘bugs’) and
because the supplier was not actually able to deliver the product in proper and working condition. The loss incurred
to date amounted to EUR 2 million. The same supplier now appears to be engaged in providing another software
package, known as ‘Cobee’, for the financial management of the schools. In that context, I would like to pose the
following questions:

1. Can the Commission indicate what the exact loss is with respect to ‘Odyssee’ and which budget line this is in?

2. Can the Commission indicate which supplier was/is responsible for this financial drama and whether it intends
to recover the loss suffered from the relevant supplier? If not, why not?

3. Can the Commission indicate who was/is responsible for the incomprehensible decision to go into business yet
again with the same supplier, this time for ‘Cobee’?

4. Why did the European Court of Auditors have to discover this once again and did neither the European Schools
nor the Commission provide any prior information about this in any way? Does the Commission agree with
the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) that there has been a serious failure of even the most basic financial supervision
in this case?

5. Does the Commission intend to call the management, especially the Supervisory Board of the European
Schools, to account on this matter? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The European Schools (ES) are managed by an intergovernmental organisation in which the Commission has only
one vote out of 28. The Commission not being its Authorising Officer, the Secretariat-General of the ES concludes
contracts for its own IT tools independently. But the following information could be obtained:

1. The ‘Odyssee’ contract was concluded in 2005 on the basis of a call for tender in 2003. The last instalment was
paid in December 2010, but adaptations to the new regulatory framework needed to be integrated incurring an
additional cost. In 2012, it became clear that further adaptations would be too costly and therefore the contract
was terminated. A total amount of EUR 2.1 million has been paid from budget line BC 60 70 01 of the ES
budget for the services already performed.

2. No recovery was requested as the tasks in the contract were fulfilled.

3. Following a call for tender in November 2008 the ES awarded a contract called ‘New Cobee’ coming from the
same supplier. At that time, there was no reason to believe that ‘Odyssee’ would be abandoned four years later.
The contract for ‘New Cobee’ was awarded to the company deemed the most suitable to perform the work at
the time, in strict compliance with the rules for procurement. ( [2] )

4. The Commission raised questions regarding the delivery of the ‘New Cobee’ in the Budgetary Committee (BC)
of the ES in March 2012 and refused a possible additional budget for the still not fully functional ‘New Cobee’
in the BC of March 2013. The last two instalments have been held back since 2010.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/18736747.PDF
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) According to the Financial regulations of the ES document: 2011-07-D-17-en-4

C 6 E / 96 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

The ES have been seeking legal advice to terminate the contract for wrongful improper performance. No final
decision has been taken yet at this stage.

5. The Commission will raise the issue in the Board of Governors’ meeting of April 2013.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 97

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002661/13**

**komissiolle**
**Satu Hassi (Verts/ALE)**

_(6. maaliskuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Vertikaalinen monopoli juomapakkausten kierrätysjärjestelmässä

Suomessa juomapakkausten kierrätys perustui vuoteen 2005 asti pääosin uudelleentäytettäviin lasi‐ ja
muovipulloihin. Vuonna 2008 uudelleenkäytettävät muovipullot korvattiin pehmeillä PET-pulloilla, joiden
materiaali voidaan käyttää uudelleen. Sekä uudelleenkäytettävien että materiaalina hyödynnettävien
juomapakkausten kierrätyksen hallinnoinnista vastaa Suomen Palautuspakkaus Oy (PALPA), josta puolet omistavat
vähittäiskauppaketjut ja toisen puolen panimoteollisuuden yritykset. Panttijärjestelmän korkeat
liittymiskustannukset (7 600 euroa) tekevät siitä eksklusiivisen.

PALPA:lla on voittoa tavoittelemattoman yrityksen asema, mutta tosiasiassa sille kertyy voittoa panteista, joita ei
palauteta kuluttajille. Esimerkiksi Norjassa erotus maksetaan valtiolle, jos panteista ei palauteta vähintään 95 %.
Pirkanmaan ympäristökeskuksen tilaston mukaan vuosien 2005–2011 panttinetto lienee yli 100 miljoonaa euroa.
PALPA maksaa käsittely‐ ja kuljetuskorvauksia kaupalle ja panimoille, eli omistajilleen.

Siirtymää uudelleenkäytettävistä pulloista pulloihin ja metallitölkkeihin, joista vain materiaali käytetään uudelleen,
ajoivat isot kauppaketjut, sillä niiden käsittely kaupoissa on halvempaa.

Koska vähittäiskaupan yritykset omistavat merkittävän osan PALPA:sta, toiminta lähenee vertikaalista monopolia,
jossa kierrätysjärjestelmän omistaja voi vaikuttaa eri pakkausmuotojen markkina-asemaan tavalla, joka ei ole
ympäristön kannalta välttämättä paras, ja myös syrjiä pienempiä toimijoita.

Pitääkö komissio PALPA:n monopoliasemaa ja sen panteista keräämiä voittoja EU:n kilpailu‐ ja jätelainsäädännön
mukaisena? Ellei, mihin toimiin komissio aikoo ryhtyä?

**Janez Potočnikin komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(14. toukokuuta 2013)_

Pakkauksista ja pakkausjätteistä annetun direktiivin 94/62/EY ( [1] ) 7 artiklan 1 kohdassa velvoitetaan jäsenvaltiot
ottamaan käyttöön palautus-, keruu- ja hyödyntämisjärjestelmiä. Kyseisen artiklan mukaan asianomaisten alojen
talouden toimijoiden on voitava osallistua näihin järjestelmiin. Järjestelmiä on sovellettava syrjimättä
tuontituotteisiin, myös järjestelmiin pääsyä koskevien yksityiskohtaisten sääntöjen ja pääsystä mahdollisesti
perittävien maksujen osalta, ja järjestelmät on suunniteltava siten, että vältetään kaupan esteet ja kilpailun
vääristyminen perustamissopimuksen mukaisesti.

Komission tiedonannossa juomapakkauksista, panttijärjestelmistä ja tavaroiden vapaasta liikkuvuudesta ( [2] )
selvennetään, että jäsenvaltiot voivat valita, ylläpitävätkö asianomaiset täyttäjät/toimiala näitä järjestelmiä
vapaaehtoispohjalta vai perustetaanko niitä varten kansallinen lainsäädäntökehys. Tässä valinnassa on noudatettava
direktiivin 94/62/EY 7 artiklaa ja perustamissopimuksen asiaankuuluvia määräyksiä, jotka koskevat tavaroiden
vapaata liikkuvuutta ja kilpailun vääristymistä koskevaa kieltoa.

Suomi on ottanut käyttöön kansallisen lainsäädäntökehyksen palautus- ja keruujärjestelmiä ( [3] ) varten.

Jos määräävässä markkina-asemassa oleva yritys vastaa asianomaisesta järjestelmästä niin, että se johtaa syrjintään tai
asettaa kohtuuttomia ehtoja, tilanteessa saatetaan rikkoa SEUT-sopimuksen 102 artiklaa, joka kieltää määräävän
markkina-aseman väärinkäytökset. Komission käytettävissä olevien tietojen mukaan PALPAn tapaus ei viittaa
tällaiseen väärinkäytökseen Suomessa. Komissio ryhtyy tarvittaessa epäröimättä toimiin, mikäli uusia todisteita
väärinkäytöksistä ilmenee.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) EYVL L 365, 31.12.1994.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) EUVL C 107, 9.5.2009.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Jätelaki/Avfallslag (646/2011); Suomen Säädöskokoelma 646/2011, 21.6.2011.

C 6 E / 98 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002661/13**

**to the Commission**
**Satu Hassi (Verts/ALE)**

_(6 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Vertical monopoly in the drinks packaging recycling system

Until 2005 the recycling of drinks packaging in Finland was based mainly on reusable glass and plastic bottles. In
2008 the reusable plastic bottles were replaced with soft PET bottles, the material of which can be recycled. The
recycling of both the reusable bottles and the drinks packaging made from recyclable material is managed by the firm
of Suomen Palautuspakkaus Oy (Palpa), half of which is owned by retail chains and the other half by breweries. The
high cost of joining the drinks deposit system (EUR 7600) makes this an exclusive club.

Palpa’s position is that of a not-for-profit undertaking, but in fact it makes a profit from the deposits, which are not
returned to the consumer. In Norway, for example, if at least 95% of the deposits are not returned, the balance is paid
to the state. Statistics from the Tampere Region environmental centre show that the net takings in deposits from
2005 to 2011 were some EUR 100 million. Palpa pays handling and transport compensation to the drinks trade and
breweries, which are its owners.

The move from reusable bottles to bottles and cans of which only the material is recycled was driven by the big
commercial chains, as it reduces handling costs in shops.

Because the retail firms own a significant share in Palpa, its activity is close to a vertical monopoly in which the owner
of the recycling system can influence the market position of the various packaging forms in a way which is not
necessarily better for the environment, and also discriminates against smaller operators.

Does the Commission consider that Palpa’s monopoly and the profit it collects from deposits is in accordance with
EU legislation on competition and waste? If not, what measures does the Commission propose to take?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

Article 7(1) of Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste ( [1] ) obliges Member States to set up return,
collection and recovery systems. According to this Article these systems shall be open to the participation of the
economic operators of the sectors concerned. They shall apply to imported products under non-discriminatory
conditions, including the detailed arrangements and any tariffs imposed for access to the systems, and shall be
designed so as to avoid barriers to trade or distortions of competition in conformity with the Treaty.

The communication from the Commission on beverage packaging, deposit systems and free movement of goods ( [2] )
clarified that Member States may choose to have such systems operated on a voluntary basis by the fillers/industry
itself, or set up a national framework. Either choice has to comply with Article 7 of Directive 94/62/EC and with the
relevant provisions of the Treaty regarding the free movement of goods and the prohibition of distortions of
competition.

Finland has installed a national framework for return and collection systems ( [3] ).

Where the operation of such system by a dominant company leads to discrimination or to the imposition of unfair
conditions, there may be a breach of Article 102 TFEU that prohibits abuses of dominant position. In the case of
Palpa, the information available to the Commission does not indicate such an abuse in Finland. The Commission will
not hesitate to take action should new evidence come into its possession indicating such abuse.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 365, 31.12.1994.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ C 107, 9.5.2009.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Jätelaki/Avfallslag (646/2011); Suomen Saadoskokoelma 646/2011, 21/06/2011.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 99

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002662/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)**

_(7 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διατροφικό σκάνδαλο με κατανάλωση κρέας αλόγου

Το διατροφικό σκάνδαλο με την κατανάλωση εκατοντάδων ή και χιλιάδων τόνων αλογίσιου κρέατος, έχει συγκλονίσει την
Ευρώπη. Πολλές εταιρείες που ασχολούνται με τον τομέα των τροφίμων απέσυραν προϊόντα τους και χιλιάδες καταναλωτές
έχουν πέσει θύματά τους. Πιο ανησυχητικό είναι το ενδεχόμενο να καταναλώθηκαν ζώα που πέρασαν από θεραπεία
φαινυβουλταζόνης.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι σε χώρες όπου καταναλώνουν άλογο, το κρέας του θεωρείται ακριβό και η ύπαρξή του σε μπιφτέκια
και προμαγειρεμένα φαγητά δημιουργεί εύλογες ανησυχίες για την ποιότητά του.

Τα ευρήματα τι καταδεικνύουν τελικά για την ποιότητά του; Χρησιμοποιήθηκαν υπολείμματα και όργανα; Μπροστά στο
δίλημμα, απ' την μια των αυξημένων ελέγχων για την προστασία της υγείας των καταναλωτών και απ' την άλλη της εξάλειψης
των περιττών εμποδίων, πού θεωρεί η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ότι πρέπει να δοθεί μεγαλύτερο βάρος;

**Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(18 Απριλίου 2013)_

Μετά τα πρώτα πορίσματα στην απάτη με κρέας αλόγου σε προϊόντα βοδινού κρέατος, χωρίς να αναγράφεται στη
συσκευασία τους, ελήφθη άμεση δράση. Τα κράτη μέλη πραγματοποιούν δοκιμές DNA για κρέας αλόγου σε προϊόντα
βοδινού κρέατος καθώς και δοκιμές για την απουσία καταλοίπων φαινυλοβουταζόνης σε κρέας αλόγου, σύμφωνα με τον
κανονισμό της Επιτροπής που εκδόθηκε στις 19 Φεβρουαρίου 2013 ( [1] ).

Οι δοκιμές αυτές συνεχίστηκαν τον Μάρτιο. Τα θετικά αποτελέσματα κοινοποιούνται αμέσως και, μέχρι τις 15 Απριλίου
2013, αναμένεται η επισκόπηση των αποτελεσμάτων. Η Επιτροπή θα υποβάλει έκθεση.

Η κατάσταση δεν δείχνει ότι υπάρχει κρίση όσον αφορά τη δημόσια υγεία ή την ασφάλεια των τροφίμων. Το θέμα
εξακολουθεί να αποτελεί ζήτημα παραπλανητικής επισήμανσης και όχι ασφάλειας. Τα προβλήματα έγκεινται στην εφαρμογή
της νομοθεσίας και όχι στη νομοθεσία καθεαυτή, όμως, όπως και με κάθε υπόθεση που σχετίζεται με τα τρόφιμα, θα πρέπει να
εξαχθούν συμπεράσματα και, αν χρειάζεται, να γίνουν οι απαραίτητες αλλαγές υπό το πρίσμα της αποκτηθείσας εμπειρίας.

Η Επιτροπή δεν διαπιστώνει κάποια αντίφαση ανάμεσα στην εφαρμογή των κανόνων της ΕΕ, τις αυστηρές υγειονομικές
επιθεωρήσεις και την εξάλειψη περιττών εμποδίων. Συζητούνται με τα κράτη μέλη συγκεκριμένες δράσεις για την
καταπολέμηση της απάτης με τρόφιμα, τη βελτίωση των προγραμμάτων δοκιμής ή την τροποποίηση των υφιστάμενων
κανόνων, π.χ. σχετικά με διαβατήρια αλόγων.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Σύσταση της Επιτροπής 2013/99/ΕΕ, της 19ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013, για την εφαρμογή συντονισμένου προγράμματος με σκοπό να διαγνωστεί η
συχνότητα δόλιων πρακτικών στην εμπορία ορισμένων τροφίμων (ΕΕ L 48 της 21.2.2013).

C 6 E / 100 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002662/13**

**to the Commission**
**Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Scandal of horsemeat in food for human consumption

Europe has been shaken by a recent scandal involving hundreds or even thousands of tonnes of horsemeat being used
to produce food for human consumption. Many companies in the food sector have now withdrawn their products
and thousands of consumers have been affected. The greatest concern has been caused by the possible consumption
of horsemeat from animals treated with phenylbutazone.

In countries where it is regularly consumed, horsemeat is normally considered an expensive commodity and its
presence in hamburgers and precooked foods hence gives rise to justifiable concerns as to the quality thereof.

In view of this:

What has been revealed by meat quality investigations? Was the food in question found to contain scraps and animal
organs? Faced with the choice of more stringent health inspections for the protection of consumers on the one hand
and the elimination of unnecessary obstacles on the other, to which does the Commission consider that greater
importance should be attached?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

Following the first findings of the fraud on unlabelled horsemeat in beef products immediate action has been taken.
Member States are carrying out DNA testing for horsemeat in beef products and testing for the absence of
phenylbutazone residues in horsemeat in accordance with the Commission Recommendation adopted on
19 February 2013 ( [1] ).

These tests continued in March. Positive results are communicated immediately and an overview of the results is
expected by 15 April 2013. The Commission will produce a report.

The situation does not point to a public health or food safety crisis. The issue remains one of fraudulent labelling not
one of safety. Problems lie in the implementation of legislation and not in the legislation itself, but as with any foodrelated affair, lessons must be learnt and, if necessary, appropriate changes are to be made in the light of experience
gained.

The Commission does not see any contradiction between enforcement of EU rules, strict health inspections and the
elimination of unnecessary obstacles. Specific actions for fighting food fraud, improving testing programmes or
modify the current rules for example about horse passports are being discussed with the Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Commission Recommendation 2013/99/EU of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of
fraudulent practices in the marketing of certain foods (OJ L 48, 21.2.2013).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 101

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-002663/13**

**do Komisji**
**Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

_(7 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Stosunki handlowe UE-Tajwan

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-5942/09 Komisja stwierdziła: „strona europejska
podkreśliła, że większość obaw UE związanych z handlem dwustronnym z Tajwanem to bariery pozataryfowe
o charakterze regulacyjnym, które utrudniają dostęp do rynku tajwańskiego, i potrzebne są postępy w tej kwestii na
istniejących forach dwustronnych”. Czy w opinii Komisji osiągnięto wystarczający postęp? Jeżeli nie, jakie kwestie
pozostają do rozstrzygnięcia?

Czy Komisja podziela zdanie, że rozpoczęcie negocjacji w sprawie umowy o współpracy gospodarczej/umowy
o wolnym handlu z Tajwanem ułatwiłoby osiągnięcie wzajemnie korzystnego rozwiązania w odniesieniu do
wskazanych wyżej kwestii?

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003047/2011 Komisja stwierdziła: „Komisja stale
zachęca Tajwan do stosowania norm międzynarodowych i powstrzymywania się od przyjmowania odrębnych norm
dla Tajwanu”. Czy w odniesieniu do norm, o których wspomniała Komisja, osiągnięto wystarczający postęp?

Jakie konkretnie „odrębne normy dla Tajwanu” miała Komisja na myśli?

W ostatnim sprawozdaniu Parlamentu Europejskiego w sprawie rocznego sprawozdania Rady dla Parlamentu
Europejskiego na temat wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa (12562/2011-P7_TA(2012)0334)
stwierdza się, że „bliższe związki gospodarcze z Tajwanem mogą ułatwić UE dostęp do chińskiego rynku”. Wzywa się
także Komisję i Radę do „ułatwienia negocjacji w sprawie umowy o współpracy gospodarczej między UE
a Tajwanem”.

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003047/2011 Komisja stwierdziła: „Komisja uważa,
że pytanie, czy [bliższe stosunki między UE a Tajwanem] mogą skutkować ułatwieniem dostępu do chińskiego
rynku, zależy w dużym stopniu od wyników współpracy gospodarczej między stronami prowadzonej na podstawie
ramowej umowy o współpracy gospodarczej i umów powiązanych”. Ponieważ zawarto ramową umowę
o współpracy gospodarczej między Tajwanem i Chinami kontynentalnymi, czy Komisja jest zdania, że zawarcie
przez UE umowy o współpracy gospodarczej/umowy o wolnym handlu z Tajwanem mogłoby usprawnić dostęp
przedsiębiorstw europejskich do rynku chińskiego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(5 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Kwestie barier pozataryfowych stanowią istotną część rozmów toczących się w ramach dobrze ugruntowanego
dialogu handlowego pomiędzy Tajwanem a Unią Europejską. Specjalne grupy robocze spotykają się dwa razy w roku
w celu omówienia przeszkód technicznych w handlu oraz problemów sanitarnych i fitosanitarnych, odnosząc pewne
pozytywne rezultaty, jak na przykład w przypadku tajwańskiego rozporządzenia D 401 w sprawie produktów
wysokiego napięcia, czy eksportu żywych ptaków z UE. Jednak w dalszym ciągu trwają prace w związku z wnioskiem
pięciu państw członkowskich o pozwolenie na eksport wieprzowiny i mięsa drobiowego. W tym zakresie Komisja
oczekuje konstruktywnych postępów do czasu następnych dorocznych konsultacji.

Jeśli chodzi o szczegółowe normy, przykładowo UE zażądała od Tajwanu przestrzegania międzynarodowych
standardów Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych dotyczących części
samochodowych. Rozmowy w tej kwestii w dalszym ciągu trwają.

Umowy o wolnym handlu są narzędziem mogącym ułatwić dostęp do rynku, należy jednak zauważyć, że umowa
z Chinami – ramowa umowa o współpracy gospodarczej (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement – ECFA) –
jak na razie okazała się być względnym sukcesem. Zakres liberalizacji jest raczej ograniczony, a nawet w sektorach
objętych liberalizacją przedsiębiorstwa UE zdają się nie wykorzystywać jeszcze ECFA bardzo aktywnie.

C 6 E / 102 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002663/13**

**to the Commission**
**Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU-Taiwan trade relations

In its answer to Written Question E-5942/09, the Commission stated: ‘The European side underlined that most of the
EU’s bilateral trade concerns with Taiwan were non-tariff barriers of a regulatory nature, which made access to
Taiwan’s market difficult and that there is a need to make progress on this in the existing bilateral fora’. In the
Commission’s opinion, has sufficient progress been made? If not, what issues remain to be solved?

Does the Commission agree that launching negotiations for an ECA/FTA with Taiwan would facilitate reaching a
mutually beneficial solution regarding the trade concern mentioned above?

In its answer to Written Question E-003047/2011, the Commission further stated that it ‘has consistently
encouraged Taiwan to apply international standards and to refrain from adopting standards specific to Taiwan’. Has
enough progress been made regarding the standards referred to by the Commission?

What specific ‘standards specific to Taiwan’ did the Commission have in mind?

The recent report of Parliament on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the CFSP
(12562/2011-P7_TA(2012)0334) notes that ‘closer economic ties with Taiwan could improve the EU’s market
access to China’. It also urges the Commission and Council to ‘facilitate the negotiation of an EU-Taiwan Economic
Cooperation Agreement’.

Finally, the Commission’s answer to Written Question E-003047/2011 stated: ‘The Commission considers that the
question of whether this [closer economic ties between the EU and Taiwan] might result in improvements in access
also to the Chinese market depends in large measure on the results of the ongoing economic cooperation being
pursued between those parties under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and related agreements’.
Since the ECFA between Taiwan and mainland China has been concluded, is the Commission of the opinion that
concluding an ECA/FTA between the EU and Taiwan would improve access to the Chinese market for European
businesses?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 April 2013)_

Non-tariff issues constitute a significant part of the discussions taking place in the framework of the well-established
trade dialogue between Taiwan and the European Union. Dedicated working groups meet twice a year on technical
barriers to trade or sanitary and phytosanitary related concerns, with some positive results, for example, on the
Taiwanese regulation D 401 on high voltage products or on the export of live birds from the EU. Work is, however,
still ongoing regarding the application of five Member States to be authorised to export pork and poultry meat for
which the Commission is expecting constructive developments by the next annual consultations.

As far as the specific standards are concerned, the EU has, for instance, requested Taiwan to follow international
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe standards for car parts. Discussions on the matter continue to this
date.

While Free Trade Agreements are a possible tool to facilitate market access, it should be noted that the agreement
with China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) seems to be only a qualified success so far. The
liberalisation scope is rather limited and even in the liberalised sectors, EU companies seem not to utilise ECFA yet
very actively.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 103

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002664/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Νομιμότητα έργων αναδάσωσης που εντάσσονται στο «Αλέξανδρος Μπαλτατζής»

Σύμφωνα με την υπ’ αριθμόν 168608/442/19-3-2012 απόφαση του Ειδικού Γραμματέα Δασών το έργο «Αναδασώσεις για
την αποκατάσταση κατεστραμμένου φυσικού τοπίου στην περιφέρεια του ελατοδάσους Λαμπείας-Αστρά-ΚρυόβρυσηςΤσίπιανα Δήμου Αρχαίας Ολυμπίας» εντάχθηκε στο Πρόγραμμα «Αγροτική Ανάπτυξη της Ελλάδας 2007-2013 —
Αλέξανδρος Μπαλτατζής». Ο προϋπολογισμός είναι 4 013 113 ευρώ για αναδάσωση 2 130 στρεμμάτων, ενώ το έργο
συγχρηματοδοτείται από την ΕΕ, με ποσοστό 79,37%, και ποσοστό εθνικής συμμετοχής 20,63%. Όπως, όμως, ισχυρίζονται
κάτοικοι της περιοχής, η προς αναδάσωση περιοχή δεν έχει καεί ποτέ και δεν υπάρχουν κενά δασοκάλυψης που να
δικαιολογούν το έργο. Tην παραμονή των Χριστουγέννων του 2012, το Δασαρχείο του Πύργου υπέγραψε με ιδιώτη
εργολάβο την υπ' αριθμ. πρωτ. 5.888 Σύμβαση Κατασκευής του Έργου συνολικού προϋπολογισμού 3 765 887,21 ευρώ,
ενώ στις 14.1.2013, το Δασαρχείο Πύργου με την υπ' αριθμ. πρωτ. 94 απόφασή του ορίζει ως επιβλέποντα του έργου
δασολόγο, ο οποίος με βάση, το πόρισμα των επιθεωρητών Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, που εστάλη πρόσφατα στον εισαγγελέα
Πλημμελειοδικών Ηλείας, φέρεται, μαζί με ακόμη έναν δασικό υπάλληλο, να αποχαρακτηρίζουν υπέρ ιδιώτη δημόσιες
δασικές εκτάσεις που κάηκαν από την καταστροφική και φονική πυρκαγιά το καλοκαίρι του 2007, στην Ηλεία. O
εισαγγελέας πλημμελειοδικών Ηλείας διέταξε την Δευτέρα 4 Μαρτίου κατεπείγουσα προκαταρκτική εξέταση για το αδίκημα
της απάτης σε βάρος του ελληνικού δημοσίου. Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει ζητήσει ή πρόκειται να ζητήσει αναλυτική ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με τη σκοπιμότητα του
έργου και την νομιμότητα των διαδικασιών που ακολουθήθηκαν για την ανάθεσή του;

2. Προτίθεται να αναπτύξει μηχανισμό παρακολούθησης και αξιολόγησης των αποτελεσμάτων και των επιδόσεων
προγραμμάτων αναδάσωσης σε διάφορες χώρες, τα οποία χρηματοδοτούνται από ευρωπαϊκά ταμεία, ώστε να
αξιοποιούνται αποτελεσματικότερα οι πόροι που αφορούν στα δάση;

**Απάντηση του κ. Cioloş εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(2 Μαΐου 2013)_

1. Στο πλαίσιο της κοινής διαχείρισης (άρθρο 7 και τίτλος VI του κανονισμού (EΚ) 1698/2005 ( [1] ) του Συμβουλίου),
εναπόκειται σε κάθε κράτος μέλος να εφαρμόσει το οικείο πρόγραμμα αγροτικής ανάπτυξης (ΠΑΑ) με αποτελεσματικό,
αποδοτικό και ορθό τρόπο και να εξασφαλίσει την αποτελεσματική προστασία των δημοσιονομικών συμφερόντων της
Κοινότητας με i) διαχειριστική αρχή που θα ορίσει, ii) διαπιστευμένο οργανισμό πληρωμών και iii) οργανισμό πιστοποίησης.
Η Επιτροπή δεν έχει πληροφορίες για τα συγκεκριμένα έργα αναδάσωσης που εκτελούνται με βάση το ελληνικό ΠΑΑ ή για
τυχόν νομικές ενέργειες στις οποίες έχουν προβεί οι ελληνικές αρχές. Η Επιτροπή θα ζητήσει πάντως σχετικές πληροφορίες
από το κράτος μέλος και, εάν χρειασθεί, θα λάβει κατάλληλα μέτρα για να εξασφαλίσει τη συμμόρφωση με τη χρηστή
δημοσιονομική διαχείριση του Ευρωπαϊκού Γεωργικού Ταμείου Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης (ΕΓΤΑΑ).

2. Η αξιολόγηση των αποτελεσμάτων και των επιδόσεων των μέτρων αναδάσωσης εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα του
εκάστοτε κράτους μέλους. Ένα κοινό σύστημα παρακολούθησης και αξιολόγησης καθιστά δυνατή την παρακολούθηση και
τη μέτρηση των επιδόσεων των παρεμβάσεων πολιτικής που χρηματοδοτούνται από το ΕΓΤΑΑ (μεταξύ των οποίων και τα
μέτρα αναδάσωσης). Ωστόσο, η αξιολόγηση μεμονωμένων προγραμμάτων αγροτικής ανάπτυξης είναι και παραμένει ευθύνη
των κρατών μελών.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 277 της 21.10.2005.

C 6 E / 104 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002664/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Legality of reforestation works under the ‘Alexandros Baltatzis’ programme

The project entitled ‘Reforestation of afflicted areas of the pine forest in the region of Lampeia-Astra-KryovrysiTsipiana in the Municipality of Archaia Olympia’ was included in the ‘Alexandros Baltatzis Programme for Rural
Development in Greece 2007‐2013’ under decision No 168608/442 adopted on 19 March 2012 by the Special
Secretary for Forests. It has a budget of EUR 4 013 113 for the reforestation of 2 130 decares and is being co-financed
from an EU contribution of 79.37% and a national contribution of 20.63%. However, according to local residents, the
area which is to be reforested has never been damaged by fire and there are no gaps in the tree cover which justify the
project. On Christmas Eve in 2012, the Pyrgos Forestry Commission signed contract No 5.888 with a private
contractor to complete the project at a total cost of EUR 3 765 887.21 and, on 14 January 2013, the Pyrgos Forestry
Commission adopted decision No 94 appointing a forestry expert to oversee the project. According to a report by
public inspectors which was recently sent to the prosecution service of the Ileia Lower Criminal Court, he and another
Forestry Commission employee appear to have reclassified forest areas afflicted by the catastrophic and fatal fire in
Ileia in the summer of 2007 for the benefit of a private individual. On Monday, 4 March, the prosecution service of
the Ileia Lower Criminal Court ordered an urgent preliminary investigation into fraud against the Greek State. In view
of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Has it requested or does it intend to request detailed information from the Greek authorities on the practical
effects of the project and the legality of the procedures applied in order to award it?

2. Does it intend to introduce a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the results and performance of
reforestation programmes in various countries funded by European funds, so that funds ring-fenced for forests
can be used more effectively?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

1. In the context of shared management (Article 7, and Title VI of Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005 ( [1] )), it is the
responsibility of each Member State to implement its rural development programme (RDP) in an efficient, effective
and correct way and to ensure that the Community's financial interests are effectively protected through (i) a
designated managing authority, (ii) an accredited paying agency and (iii) a certifying body. Therefore, the Commission
does not have any information on the specific reforestation projects implemented under the Greek RDP or on any
legal procedures undertaken by the Greek authorities. However, the Commission will request information from the
Member State on this issue and if needed, it will take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with sound financial
management of the European Agricultural Development Fund (EAFRD).

2. Evaluation of the results and performance of reforestation measures falls under the competence of each Member
State. A common monitoring and evaluation system allows for an effective monitoring and measurement of the
performance of the policy interventions funded by the EAFRD (including reforestation measures). However, the
evaluation of individual Rural Development Programmes is and will remain the responsibility of the Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 105

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002665/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(7 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ EU-maatregelen ter verhindering van de uitvoer van ICT die vervolgens wordt misbruikt in het kader van
schendingen van de mensenrechten

—
Gezien eerdere vragen aan de Commissie over de uitvoer door de EU van ICT en het gebruik van deze ICT bij
mensenrechtenschendingen, met name vragen E-007752/2012 ( [1] ), E-006777/2012 ( [2] ) en E-010306/2011 ( [3] ), en de
antwoorden van de Commissie hierop; gezien het verslag over een strategie voor digitale vrijheid in het buitenlands
beleid van de EU (hierna „de strategie” genoemd) dat het Parlement op 11 december 2012 heeft goedgekeurd; gezien
de wetgevingsresolutie van het Parlement van 23 oktober 2012 in het kader van procedure 2011/0310(COD) en de
reactie van de Commissie op de goedgekeurde tekst;

—
gezien het verslag over de openbare raadpleging die is uitgevoerd in het kader van het groenboek
COM(2011)393 ( [4] ) („het verslag”);

—
overwegende dat er op 20 november 2012 werd ( [5] ) gemeld dat het Zweedse telecommunicatiebedrijf Ericsson
het grootste telecombedrijf van Iran momenteel helpt om zijn netwerk uit te breiden en tot 2021 ook een andere
Iraanse operator zal ondersteunen;

—
overwegende dat het Britse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in zijn verslag van 2012 over actie betreffende de
mensenrechten ( [6] ) de aanbeveling deed dat de Britse regering een kader vastlegt voor het controleren van de levering
door Britse onderdanen of door in het VK gevestigde bedrijven van telecommunicatievoorzieningen waarvan met
redelijke zekerheid kan worden vermoed dat ze zullen worden gebruikt om de vrijheid van meningsuiting op het
internet aan banden te leggen, en overwegende dat de Britse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken dit voorstel vervolgens
heeft onderschreven ( [7] ):

1. Hoe en wanneer wil de Commissie de strategie in haar toekomstige beleidsmaatregelen en optreden opnemen
en/of ten uitvoer leggen?

2. Hoe en wanneer wil de Commissie de in het verslag vermelde problemen met betrekking tot de mensenrechten
aanpakken, onder meer door middel van een herziening van haar kader voor tweeërlei gebruik en aan de hand
van wetgevingsvoorstellen ter vergroting van de transparantie en verantwoordingsplicht van EU-bedrijven (zie
alinea 28 van de strategie)?

3. Zijn de zakelijke activiteiten van Ericsson verenigbaar met de EU-sancties tegen Iran? Is de Commissie van plan
een specifiek onderzoek te openen naar de huidige activiteiten van Ericsson in Iran en indien nodig een
inbreukprocedure te starten tegen Zweden wegens de niet-uitvoering van EU-sancties?

4. Op welke manier werkt de Commissie samen met de lidstaten van de EU om ervoor te zorgen dat de sancties
tegen Syrië en Iran ten volle worden uitgevoerd en nageleefd?

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-007752+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-006777+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-010306+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-iran-ericsson-idUSBRE8AJ1F420121120.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm [2] 01213/cmselect/cmfaff/116/11610.htm
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/british-government-welcomes-foreign-affairs-committee-recommendation-to-control.

C 6 E / 106 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie**

_(23 mei 2013)_

1 en 2. De EU erkent het belang van de bevordering van mensenrechten en vrijheid van meningsuiting in verband met
nieuwe communicatietechnologieën en stelt alles in het werk om te zorgen voor een duidelijk
mensenrechtencomponent bij de ontwikkeling van beleidsmaatregelen en programma's voor cyberveiligheid, de
bestrijding van cybercriminaliteit, internetbeheer en andere relevante beleidsgebieden. De Commissie heeft
raadplegingen opgestart over de toepassing van de verordening inzake uitvoercontrole op sommige gevoelige
technologieën die kunnen worden gebruikt op een wijze die in strijd is met de mensenrechten. Zij heeft eveneens het
belang van uitvoercontroles op ICT ( [8] ) benadrukt in haar recente werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie
„Strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world — A report on the public
consultation launched under the Green Paper COM(2011) 393” ( [9] ), waarin de antwoorden van verschillende
belanghebbenden worden besproken. De Commissie zal de beleidsopties in dit verband beoordelen in het kader van
de voorbereidingen voor een mededeling die is gepland voor 2013.

3 en 4. De beperkende maatregelen van de EU met betrekking tot de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran omvatten een
verbod op de levering van apparatuur, technologie of software aan Iran die in de eerste plaats is bedoeld voor de
monitoring en interceptie van communicatie via internet of telefoon, zoals is bepaald in bijlage IV bij Verordening
(EU) nr. 359/2011 van de Raad ( [10] ). Soortgelijke maatregelen zijn van toepassing op Syrië overeenkomstig
Verordening (EG) nr. 36/2012 van de Raad ( [11] ). De sancties omvatten geen verbod op het leveren van andere
goederen of diensten in de telecommunicatiesector. De handhaving van deze verordeningen is de primaire
bevoegdheid van de lidstaten. Hierbij is het de taak van de Commissie om toezicht te houden op deze handhaving en,
indien nodig, inbreukprocedures in te leiden overeenkomstig artikel 258 VWEU.

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⋅8∙ **|** )
⋅9∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Informatie en communicatietechnologie.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 7 final.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) Verordening (EU) nr. 359/2011 van de Raad van 12 april 2011 betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen bepaalde personen, entiteiten en

lichamen in verband met de situatie in Iran, PB L 100 van 14.4.2011.

( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) Verordening (EU) nr. 36/2012 van de Raad van 18 januari 2012 betreffende beperkende maatregelen in het licht van de situatie in Syrië en tot

intrekking van Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011, PB L 16 van 19.1.2012.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 107

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002665/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU actions curbing the export and misuse of ICT in human rights violations

— Having regard to earlier questions and the Commission’s answers regarding EU exports of ICT and its use in
human rights violations, particularly E-007752/2012 ( [1] ), E-006777/2012 ( [2] ) and E-010306/2011 ( [3] ); the report on
‘A Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Strategy’) as adopted by Parliament on
11 December 2012; Parliament’s legislative resolution of 23 October 2012 under procedure file 2011/0310(COD)
and the Commission’s response to the text adopted;

— having regard to the report on the public consultation carried out under Green Paper COM(2011)393 ( [4] ) (the
‘Report’);

— whereas on 20 November 2012 it was reported ( [5] ) that the Swedish telecommunications firm Ericsson is working
with Iran’s largest telecom operator to expand its network and will support another Iranian mobile operator until
2021;

—
whereas the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in its 2012 report on human rights work ( [6] )
recommended that the British Government ‘set out the scope for controlling the supply by UK nationals, or by
companies based in the UK, of telecommunications equipment for which there is a reasonable expectation that it
might be used to restrict freedom of expression on the Internet’, a position subsequently endorsed ( [7] ) by the British
Foreign Secretary:

1. How and when will the Commission include/implement the strategy in its future policies/actions?

2. How and when will the Commission address human rights concerns, as included in the report, through a
revision of the Commission’s dual-use framework, as well as through legislative proposals increasing
transparency and accountability for EU companies (paragraph 28 of the strategy)?

3. Are Ericsson’s business dealings compatible with EU sanctions against Iran? Will the Commission open a
specific investigation into Ericsson’s ongoing business in Iran and, if necessary, launch infringement
proceedings against Sweden for failing to implement EU sanctions?

4. How does the Commission work with the EU Member States to ensure full implementation and enforcement of
sanctions against Syria and Iran?

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-007752+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-006777+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-010306+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-iran-ericsson-idUSBRE8AJ1F420121120.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/116/11610.htm
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/british-government-welcomes-foreign-affairs-committee-recommendation-to-control.

C 6 E / 108 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2013)_

1-2. The EU recognises the importance of the promotion of human rights and freedom of expression in relation to
new communication technologies and endeavours to ensure that a clear human rights perspective is present in the
development of policies and programmes relating to cyber security, the fight against cyber crime, Internet governance
and other related policies. The Commission has initiated consultations regarding the application of the Export
Control Regulation to certain sensitive technologies that could be used in violation of human rights and has
highlighted the issue of ICT ( [8] ) export controls in its recent Commission Staff Working Document ‘Strategic export
controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world — A report on the public consultation launched
under the Green Paper COM(2011) 393’ ( [9] ) which reviews responses received from various stakeholders. The
Commission will assess policy options in this respect as part of preparations for a communication planned in 2013.

3-4. The EU’s restrictive measures in view of the human rights situation in Iran include a prohibition on the supply to
Iran of equipment, technology or software for use primarily for monitoring or interception of Internet or telephone
communication as listed in Annex IV of Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 ( [10] ); similar measures apply vis-à-vis
Syria under Council Regulation (EC) No 36/2012 ( [11] ). The sanctions do not include a prohibition on the supply of
other goods or services in the telecommunications sector. The primary responsibility for enforcement of these
regulations rests with Member States. The Commission’s role in this regard is to oversee such enforcement and to
initate infringement procedures in accordance with Article 258 TFEU as appropriate.

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⋅8∙ **|** )
⋅9∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Information and Communication Technology.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 7 final.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in

view of the situation in Iran, OJ L 100, 14.4.2011.

( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing

Regulation (EU) No 442/2011, OJ L 16, 19.1.2012.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 109

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002666/13**

**to the Commission**

**Jim Higgins (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Labelling of honey

The practical effect of the classification of pollen as a constituent of honey in the proposal for a directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/110/EC relating to honey will be that the presence
of authorised genetically modified (GM) pollen in honey will not require labelling unless it exceeds 0.9% of the overall
honey weight.

How does the Commission plan to protect the rights of consumers to transparent labelling?

How can consumers make an informed decision when the presence of GM pollen is not marked on the label of honey
products?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

The objective of the proposal by the Commission is not to prevent consumers from being informed of the presence of
authorised GM pollen in honey, but to clarify that pollen is a constituent of honey, in line with international
standards. This amendment will restore honey as a natural product made by bees and only composed of constituents.
In this context, the GMO legislation ( [1] ) adopted by the European Parliament and the Council sets out a labelling
threshold of 0.9% under which presence of authorised GMOs in foodstuff does not have to be labelled when this
presence is adventitious or technically unavoidable. The Commission considers that this labelling threshold applies
equally to honey as to any other foodstuff and that there are no objective reasons to make a special treatment for
honey.

The Commission considers that the development of ‘GM free’ labelling schemes by private operators or public
authorities can permit consumers to select products avoiding any GM presence if they so wish. The Commission has
launched a study to gain a better understanding of the scopes and specifications of these labels in the EU and to assess
the need for a possible harmonisation of this field. The results of the study will be published in 2013.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on GM food and feed, OJ L 268, 18.10.2003.

C 6 E / 110 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-002667/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Plan de ayuda para Lorca con cargo al Fondo de Solidaridad de la Unión Europea (FSUE)

El 11 de mayo de 2011, la ciudad de Lorca (Murcia) se vio afectada por dos terremotos consecutivos de una magnitud
de 5,2 en la escala de Richter, en los cuales fallecieron 9 personas y unas 300 resultaron heridas. La catástrofe causó
daños generalizados en residencias (más de 100 000 personas fueron evacuadas), graves deterioros en empresas,
infraestructuras básicas e instalaciones, así como importantes perturbaciones en las redes de carreteras locales. Los
daños a los monumentos arquitectónicos de la ciudad también afectaron significativamente al sector turístico de la
región lo que mermó aún más la dañada economía local. Un año después, el 22 de septiembre de 2012, las
inundaciones acaecidas en el mismo municipio causaron más de 10 muertos e innumerables pérdidas personales y
materiales que se sumaron a los destrozos provocados por los terremotos.

Ambas catástrofes naturales han conducido a la zona a una situación crítica que exige el mayor grado de solidaridad
europea. Debido a ello en julio de 2011, las autoridades españolas presentaron una solicitud de ayuda del FSUE con el
objetivo de cubrir gastos de emergencia en la reconstrucción del municipio. Dicha ayuda fue aprobada por la
Comisión movilizando la cláusula relativa a «catástrofes regionales extraordinarias» del FSUE. El pasado mes de
diciembre de 2012, el Comisario de Política Regional de la UE, Johannes Hahn, comprobó sobre el terreno los graves
daños producidos por ambas catástrofes y anunció que a finales de junio de 2013 se entregaría a Lorca todo el dinero
del FSUE que esté disponible para complementar las ayudas aprobadas en 2011.

En este sentido, ¿podría informarnos la Comisión del plan de ayuda que se ha diseñado para Lorca con cargo al FSUE
desde 2011?

¿Qué grado de ejecución ha tenido hasta el momento?

¿Cuenta la Comisión con una jerarquía de prioridades de tal forma que el gran número de personas que han quedado
sin vivienda pueda tener garantizada una vivienda digna con la mayor brevedad posible?

¿Podría darnos la Comisión una estimación de la cuantía del remanente del FSUE que ha anunciado que se entregará a
Lorca en junio de 2013?

**Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de abril de 2013)_

A raíz del terremoto que sacudió Lorca, la Comisión concedió a España una ayuda financiera con cargo al Fondo de
Solidaridad de la UE por un importe de 21,07 millones de euros. El convenio entre España y la Comisión establece
que la subvención se utilice para:

—
restablecer el buen funcionamiento de las infraestructuras relacionadas con las carreteras y los ferrocarriles, los
servicios de salud pública y la educación, los sistemas de suministro de agua y de tratamiento de aguas
residuales y la red pública de carreteras, y

—
proveer alojamiento temporal, financiar servicios de socorro (incluidas tiendas de campaña), vivienda social y
bienes y servicios de primera necesidad para los ciudadanos, así como proteger los bienes y a las personas.

Con arreglo a las normas que regulan el Fondo de Solidaridad, la utilización de la subvención es responsabilidad de las
autoridades españolas. En febrero, los servicios de la Comisión se reunieron con las autoridades españolas en Lorca
para supervisar el progreso que se había hecho en la ejecución del convenio de subvención, que finalizará no más
tarde de julio de 2013.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 111

En diciembre de 2012, España presentó una solicitud de ayuda en relación con las inundaciones en Andalucía, Murcia
y Valencia. En la actualidad, la Comisión está terminando de evaluar si la solicitud cumple los requisitos necesarios
para que se le conceda financiación del Fondo de Solidaridad. Si así fuera, la Comisión pedirá al Parlamento y al
Consejo que pongan a disposición de España los créditos presupuestarios necesarios. El importe de la subvención del
Fondo de Solidaridad se calcula en función de la cuantía de los daños.

C 6 E / 112 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002667/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Assistance for Lorca under the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)

On 11 May 2011, the town of Lorca (Murcia) was struck by two consecutive earthquakes measuring 5.2 on the
Richter scale, killing nine people and injuring some 300 others. The disaster caused widespread damage to homes
(more than 100 000 people had to be evacuated), businesses, basic infrastructure and facilities, as well as considerable
disruption to local road networks. Damage to the town’s historic architectural monuments also had a significant
impact on tourism in the region, further harming the already weakened local economy. One year later, on
22 September 2012, Lorca was hit by floods that killed 10 people and inflicted personal and material loss on a large
scale, compounding the damage caused by the earthquakes.

The two natural disasters have left the region in a critical state and in need of maximum European solidarity.
Accordingly, in July 2011 the Spanish authorities submitted a request for EUSF assistance with the aim of covering
the emergency costs of rebuilding the town. The Commission approved the aid request under the ‘extraordinary
regional disaster’ clause of the EUSF. In December 2012, Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for Regional Policy, visited
Lorca to see for himself the serious damage caused by the two natural disasters and announced that in late June 2013,
Lorca would be given all the EUSF money available to top up the funding it received in 2011.

Can the Commission explain what sort of EUSF assistance plan for Lorca has been drawn up since 2011?

How much progress has been made so far on implementing the plan?

Does the Commission have a hierarchy of priorities in order to ensure that the large numbers of people made
homeless by the natural disasters are guaranteed to be given decent housing as soon as possible?

Can the Commission provide an estimate of how much is left in the EUSF budget, money which the Commission has
pledged to give Lorca in June 2013?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 April 2013)_

Following the earthquake in Lorca the Commission granted EU Solidarity Fund financial aid to Spain amounting to
EUR 21.07 million. The agreement concluded between Spain and the Commission foresees that the grant is used for:

—
the restoration to working order of infrastructure related to roads and railways, public health services and
education, water supply systems and waste water treatments, public road network; and

—
the provision of temporary accommodation and funding rescue services (including tents), social housing,
providing immediate goods and services to the population, protection of people and goods.

Under the rules governing the Solidarity Fund, the implementation of the grant is the responsibility of the Spanish
authorities. In February, the Commission services met with the Spanish authorities in Lorca to monitor progress in
implementation which has to be completed by July 2013.

In December 2012, Spain presented an application relating to floods in Andalusia, Murcia and Valencia. The
Commission is currently completing its assessment of whether the application meets the criteria of the Solidarity
Fund. If this is the case, the Commission will request the Parliament and the Council to make the necessary budget
appropriations available. The amount of Solidarity Fund grant is calculated in relation to the amount of damage.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 113

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-002668/13**

**à Comissão**
**José Manuel Fernandes (PPE)**

_(7 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Aproveitamento dos excedentes agrícolas

Tendo em conta o objetivo da Estratégia UE 2020 de reduzir em, pelo menos, 20 milhões o número de pessoas em
risco (ou em situação) de pobreza ou exclusão social e considerando que o aproveitamento dos excedentes agrícolas,
em oposição ao seu desperdício, é uma opção inteligente, sensata e sustentável, que potencia o bem-estar dos
cidadãos comunitários, pergunto à Comissão qual o destino que pretende dar aos excedentes agrícolas da União
Europeia e qual a quantidade média anual de cada tipo de excedente agrícola na UE?

**Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloş em nome da Comissão**

_(5 de abril de 2013)_

O nível de excedentes agrícolas tem diminuído consideravelmente, após as reformas operadas na PAC desde 1992. As
aquisições por intervenção pública são limitadas a certos cereais, arroz _paddy,_ carne de bovino, manteiga e leite em pó
desnatado, e a sua aplicação limita-se aos períodos de perturbação do mercado. No final da campanha de 2012, as
existências resultantes das intervenções públicas foram absorvidas para todos os produtos elegíveis, com exceção de
certas quantidades marginais de cevada e leite em pó desnatado, que foram atribuídas ao programa de 2012 para a
distribuição de géneros alimentícios às pessoas mais necessitadas da UE.

C 6 E / 114 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002668/13**

**to the Commission**
**José Manuel Fernandes (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Making use of farm surpluses

Bearing in mind the EU 2020 strategy objective of reducing the number of people at risk of (or suffering from)
poverty or social exclusion by at least 20 million, and given that making use of farm surpluses rather than wasting
them is an intelligent, logical and sustainable option that will boost the well-being of Community citizens, can the
Commission say what it intends to do with farm surpluses in the European Union? What is the average annual
amount of each type of farm surplus in the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 April 2013)_

The level of farm surpluses has declined considerably after subsequent CAP reforms since 1992. Public intervention
purchases are limited to certain cereals, paddy rice, beef, veal, butter and skimmed milk powder and their application
reduced to times of market disturbances. At the end of the 2012 marketing year public intervention stocks were
depleted for all eligible products except for marginal quantities of barley and skimmed milk powder, allocated to the
2012 food distribution programme for the most deprived persons in the EU.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 115

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002669/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Reconocimiento por Noruega de los derechos de pensión a marineros que trabajaron en embarcaciones bajo
pabellón noruego antes de 1994

En el año 2008 dirigí a la Comisión Europea y al Consejo las preguntas E-1587/2008 y E-1588/2008 sobre el
reconocimiento por Noruega de los derechos sociales de marineros de la UE que trabajaron regularmente en
embarcaciones bajo pabellón noruego y que fueron adquiridos antes del año 1994.

Esta misma cuestión fue objeto de las peticiones 475/2010 y 1326/2010, presentadas ante la Comisión de Peticiones
del Parlamento Europeo, en cuyo debate participé, y, más recientemente, de la pregunta E-009577/2011 planteada
por el diputado Alejandro Cercas, Portavoz de Empleo y Asuntos Sociales del Grupo de la Alianza Progresista de los
Socialistas y Demócratas.

La Comisión se ha mostrado favorable a la celebración de acuerdos bilaterales para la solución de estos casos y su
intervención, como mediador con las autoridades noruegas, ha sido solicitada expresamente por la Comisión de
Peticiones del Parlamento.

Dadas la ausencia de progresos desde que la Comisión tiene constancia oficial del problema y la falta de protección de
los afectados ya jubilados, ¿qué nueva información tiene la Comisión sobre este tema? ¿Qué nuevas iniciativas ha
emprendido o tiene pensado adoptar para favorecer acuerdos bilaterales entre los Estados afectados, como defiende el
Consejo, y dar cumplimiento a la posición expresada por la Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento Europeo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(7 de mayo de 2013)_

Como se ha indicado en la respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-9577/2011, la Comisión no dispone de instrumentos para
pedir a Noruega la afiliación retroactiva de los marineros españoles que trabajaron en embarcaciones noruegas antes
de 1994.

Sin embargo, el Reglamento (CE) n° 883/2004 ofrece a las autoridades competentes de los Estados miembros la
posibilidad de celebrar acuerdos bilaterales en beneficio de determinadas personas o categorías de personas
(artículo 16). En aras de la justicia social, las autoridades competentes de España y Noruega podrían, por tanto,
ponerse en contacto para celebrar un acuerdo bilateral de este tipo en interés de los trabajadores en cuestión. La
Comisión anima a los Estados interesados en este sentido, pero no tiene competencias para pedirles que lleguen a un
acuerdo.

C 6 E / 116 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002669/13**

**to the Commission**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Norwegian recognition of the pension rights of seamen who worked on ships flying the Norwegian flag
before 1994

In 2008 I submitted Written Questions E-1588/2008 and E-1587/2008 to the Commission and to the Council on
Norway’s recognition of the social rights of EU seamen who regularly worked on ships flying the Norwegian flag and
who were hired before 1994.

This same issue was the subject of Petitions 475/2010 and 1326/2010 submitted to the European Parliament’s
Committee on Petitions, the debate in which I took part, and more recently was the subject of Written Question E009577/2011 raised by MEP Alejandro Cercas, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats’
Spokesperson for Employment and Social Affairs.

The Commission has supported bilateral agreements to settle these cases, and the Committee on Petitions has
specifically requested that it act as mediator, along with the Norwegian authorities.

Given the lack of progress since the Commission took official note of the issue and given the lack of protection for
affected retirees, what new information does the Commission have on this issue? What new initiatives has it launched
or is it considering adopting to promote bilateral agreements between the states concerned, as advocated by the
Council, and to implement the Committee on Petitions’ request?

_(Version française)_

**Réponse donnée par M. Andor au nom de la Commission**

_(7 mai 2013)_

Ainsi qu'il a été signalé dans la réponse à la question écrite E-9577/2011, la Commission ne dispose pas d'instruments
pour demander à la Norvège l'affiliation rétroactive de marins espagnols qui ont travaillé sur les bateaux norvégiens
avant 1994.

Toutefois, le règlement 883/2004 donne la possibilité aux autorités compétentes des États membres de conclure des
accords bilatéraux dans l'intérêt de certaines personnes ou catégories de personnes (article 16). Dans un souci de
justice sociale, les autorités compétentes espagnoles et norvégiennes pourraient donc se mettre en contact en vue de
conclure un tel accord bilatéral dans l'intérêt des travailleurs en question. La Commission encourage la conclusion
d'un tel accord, mais elle n'a aucune compétence pour demander aux États impliqués d'arriver à un accord.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 117

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002670/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) y Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ El mercado único digital y las PYME

El mercado único digital debe representar una oportunidad para que toda empresa pueda desarrollar su actividad en
todos los Estados miembros. Así pues, la compleción del mercado único digital es un factor determinante para un
mercado único competitivo que aporte crecimiento y empleo y beneficie tanto a los consumidores como a las
empresas en el comercio transfronterizo. Esto es especialmente cierto en el caso de las PYME, que suponen el 99 % de
las empresas europeas y, en consecuencia, son la fuerza motriz de la economía europea.

No obstante y a pesar de diversas directivas y reglamentos, todavía perduran importantes obstáculos tras 20 años de
mercado único. Algunas empresas todavía encuentran trabas cuando ofrecen bienes y servicios en otros Estados
miembros. Un ejemplo concreto lo encarna un comerciante en línea de España que vende naranjas y mandarinas
frescas, que los consumidores deberían poder recibir mediante envío ultrarrápido. Sin embargo, si desea ampliar su
negocio a un Estado miembro vecino, más allá de la frontera española, se exige que esta empresa se establezca en el
Estado miembro de destino, al que también debe pagar IVA.

En este contexto, deseamos formular a la Comisión las siguientes preguntas:

1. ¿Tras la evaluación de este caso concreto, puede la Comisión precisar si el trato que recibe esta empresa es
coherente con la legislación europea vigente, es decir, con la Directiva sobre los derechos de los consumidores,
la Directiva sobre comercio electrónico y otras disposiciones?

2. En general, ¿cómo está apoyando la Comisión a las PYME en lo que se refiere a la eliminación de los obstáculos
al comercio en el mercado único y, en especial, en el contexto del fomento del comercio electrónico
transfronterizo?

3. A raíz de la revisión de la iniciativa en favor de las pequeñas empresas (SBA) y el informe de iniciativa propia del
Parlamento P7_TA(2012)0387 en 2012, ¿qué más medidas está adoptando la Comisión para posibilitar que las
PYME actúen en todo el mercado único y para seguir aplicando las acciones expuestas en la SBA?

4. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos que afrontan más comúnmente las empresas, como este comerciante de naranjas, a
la hora de operar en el plano transfronterizo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión está de acuerdo con Sus Señorías sobre la importancia de la plena realización del mercado único digital.
Las PYME que desean beneficiarse de las ventajas del mercado único digital siguen enfrentándose a demasiados
obstáculos. No obstante, la Comisión no está en condiciones de comentar este caso concreto, especialmente teniendo
en cuenta el carácter general de la información facilitada.

La Comunicación sobre el comercio electrónico de 2012 ( [1] ) señalaba los obstáculos más importantes que había que
abordar de forma prioritaria. Entre ellos se hallan la falta de confianza en los pagos en línea y en los servicios de
entrega, la ausencia de información adecuada en relación con las vías de recurso y la complejidad de los sistemas del
IVA.

La Comisión ha propuesto un plan de acción coherente para eliminar los obstáculos detectados que forma parte de un
mayor compromiso de la UE con el fomento de la sociedad de la información ( [2] ). El 23 de abril de 2013 se publicó un
informe sobre su estado de ejecución ( [3] ).

La «Small Business Act» para Europa y su revisión también establecen varias acciones para mejorar el acceso de las
PYME al Mercado Único.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 942 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Comunicación de la Comisión «Una Agenda Digital para Europa», COM(2010) 245 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

C 6 E / 118 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Por último, la Comisión fomenta también la utilización de las redes existentes para proporcionar a los comerciantes
en línea información sobre sus obligaciones y las oportunidades que ofrece la venta en los países de la UE. Además, el
Plan de acción sobre emprendimiento 2020 recientemente adoptado supone un plan de acción global que
comprende la inversión en educación en el espíritu empresarial, un mejor acceso a la financiación y más facilidad para
la transmisión de empresas.

Tras el Consejo Europeo de primavera, la Comisión presentará un informe, antes de octubre, sobre los obstáculos que
quedan por abordar a fin de garantizar la realización de un auténtico mercado único digital para 2015.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 119

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002670/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) und Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)**

_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Digitaler Binnenmarkt und KMU

Der europäische Binnenmarkt muss jedem Unternehmen die Möglichkeit bieten, seine Geschäftstätigkeit in allen
Mitgliedstaaten auszuüben. Die Verwirklichung des digitalen Binnenmarkts ist daher ein ausschlaggebender Faktor
für einen wettbewerbsfähigen Binnenmarkt, der für Wachstum und Beschäftigung sorgt und sowohl den
Verbrauchern als auch den Unternehmen im grenzüberschreitenden Handel zugute kommt. Dies gilt insbesondere
für KMU, die 99 % der europäischen Unternehmen ausmachen und somit die treibende Kraft der europäischen
Wirtschaft darstellen.

Trotz verschiedener Richtlinien und Verordnungen bestehen nach 20 Jahren Binnenmarkt auch heute noch
erhebliche Hemmnisse. Einige Firmen stoßen immer noch auf Hindernisse, wenn sie Güter und Dienstleistungen in
anderen Mitgliedstaaten anbieten. Ein Beispiel ist ein spanischer Online-Händler, der frisch geerntete Orangen und
Mandarinen verkauft, die den Kunden sehr schnell geliefert werden können sollten. Wenn die Firma jedoch ihr
Geschäft über die Grenzen Spaniens hinaus auf einen angrenzenden Mitgliedstaat ausweiten möchte, ist sie
gezwungen, sich auch im Bestimmungsland niederzulassen, wo sie dann ebenfalls umsatzsteuerpflichtig wird.

1. Kann die Kommission nach einer Bewertung dieses konkreten Falls darlegen, ob die Behandlung dieser Firma
den geltenden europäischen Rechtsvorschriften, d. h. der Richtlinie über Verbraucherrechte, der Richtlinie über den
elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr und anderen Vorschriften entspricht?

2. Wie unterstützt die Kommission KMU im Allgemeinen bei der Überwindung von Handelshemmnissen im
Binnenmarkt und insbesondere im Rahmen der Förderung des grenzüberschreitenden elektronischen
Geschäftsverkehrs?

3. Welche weiteren Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission nach der Überarbeitung des „Small Business Act“ (SBA)
und des Initiativberichts P7_TA(2012)0387 des Parlaments, um es den KMU zu ermöglichen, im gesamten
Binnenmarkt zu agieren, und um die im SBA festgelegten Maßnahmen weiter umzusetzen?

4. Welches sind die häufigsten Hemmnisse, auf die Unternehmen wie dieser Orangenhändler stoßen, wenn sie
grenzüberschreitend tätig sind?

**Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Mai 2013)_

Die Kommission stimmt den Herren Abgeordneten hinsichtlich der Bedeutung der Verwirklichung des digitalen
Binnenmarkts zu. KMU, die die Vorteile des digitalen Binnenmarkts nutzen wollen, stoßen nach wie vor auf zu viele
Hindernisse. Die Kommission ist jedoch insbesondere angesichts des allgemeinen Charakters der bereitgestellten
Informationen nicht in der Lage, zu diesem spezifischen Fall Stellung zu nehmen.

In der Mitteilung über den elektronischen Handel ( [1] ) von 2012 wurden die wichtigsten Hindernisse benannt, die
vorrangig angegangen werden müssen. Dazu zählen unter anderem das mangelnde Vertrauen in elektronische
Zahlungen und Zustelldienste, das Fehlen angemessener Informationen in Bezug auf Rechtsmittel und die
Komplexität der Mehrwertsteuersysteme.

Die Kommission hat einen kohärenten Aktionsplan vorgeschlagen, um im Rahmen einer umfassenderen
Verpflichtung der EU zur Förderung der Informationsgesellschaft die festgestellten Hindernisse zu beseitigen ( [2] ). Am
23. April 2013 wurde ein Bericht über den Stand der Umsetzung veröffentlicht ( [3] ).

Der „Small Business Act“ für Europa und seine Überarbeitung sahen ebenfalls mehrere Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung
des Zugangs von KMU zum Binnenmarkt vor.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)942 endg.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Mitteilung der Kommission „Eine digitale Agenda für Europa“, KOM(2010)245 endg.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

C 6 E / 120 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Die Kommission fördert auch die Nutzung bestehender Netze, um Online-Händler über ihre Pflichten und die
Chancen von Verkäufen in andere EU-Länder zu informieren. Des Weiteren enthält der kürzlich angenommene
Aktionsplan für unternehmerische Initiative 2020 einen detaillierteren Aktionsplan, der Investitionen in die
Erziehung zu unternehmerischer Initiative, besseren Zugang zu Finanzmitteln und einfachere
Unternehmensübertragungen umfasst.

Nach der Frühjahrstagung des Europäischen Rates wird die Kommission vor Oktober über die verbleibenden
Hindernisse berichten, die in Angriff genommen werden müssen, um die Vollendung eines voll funktionsfähigen
digitalen Binnenmarkts bis 2015 zu gewährleisten.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 121

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002670/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) and Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Digital Single Market and SMEs

The European Single Market must represent an opportunity for every business to develop its activity in all the
Member States. The completion of the Digital Single Market is thus a key factor for a competitive Single Market,
providing for growth and employment and benefiting both consumers and businesses in crossborder trade. This
especially applies to SMEs, which make up 99% of European businesses and are therefore the driving force in the
European economy.

Nevertheless, and despite various directives and regulations, important barriers still remain after 20 years of the Single
Market. Some companies still encounter obstacles when offering goods and services in other Member States. One
particular example is an online trader from Spain selling freshly harvested oranges and mandarins which consumers
should be able to receive by superfast delivery. However, if it wishes to expand its business beyond the Spanish
borders to a neighbouring Member State, this company is required to establish itself in the destination Member State,
to which it also has to pay VAT.

Against this background we would like to ask the Commission:

1. Can the Commission, after an assessment of this concrete case, state whether the treatment of this company is
in line with current European legislation, i.e. the consumer rights directive, the e-commerce directive and other
provisions?

2. How is the Commission supporting SMEs in general when tackling trade barriers in the Single Market, and in
particular in the context of promoting crossborder e-commerce?

3. Following the revision of the Small Business Act (SBA) and Parliament’s own-initiative report
P7_TA(2012)0387 in 2012, what further measures is the Commission adopting to enable SMEs to act within
the entire Single Market, and to further implement the actions laid down in the SBA?

4. What are the most common barriers that businesses such as this orange trader face when operating on a
crossborder basis?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Members on the importance of the completion of the Digital Single
Market SMEs wishing to benefit from the Digital Single Market are still faced with too many obstacles. The
Commission is however not in a position to comment on this specific case, notably in view of the general nature of
the information provided.

The E-commerce Communication ( [1] ) of 2012 identified the most important obstacles to be addressed as a matter of
priority. These include, among others, the lack of trust in online payments and in delivery services, the absence of
adequate information in relation to redress and the complexity of the VAT systems.

The Commission proposed a coherent action plan to remove the obstacles identified, as part of a wider EU
commitment aimed at promoting the information society ( [2] ). A report on the state of implementation has been
published on 23 April 2013 ( [3] ).

The ‘Small Business Act’ for Europe and its Review also provided for several actions to enhance SMEs access to the
Single Market.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 942 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Communication ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’, COM(2010) 245 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

C 6 E / 122 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Finally the Commission is also encouraging the use of existing networks to provide online dealers with information
on their obligations and on the opportunities offered by sale in EU countries. Furthermore, the recently adopted
Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan provides a comprehensive action plan which encompasses investing in
entrepreneurship education, better access to finance and easier business transfers.

Following the Spring European Council, the Commission will report before October on the remaining obstacles to be
tackled so as to ensure the completion of a fully functioning Digital Single Market by 2015.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 123

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002671/13**

**to the Commission**

**Vicky Ford (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tree research

Could the Commission provide figures on how many research projects concerning tree and crop diseases have been
funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and how much money each of these projects was
awarded?

Could the Commission outline how it proposes to address research into tree and crop diseases, in particular under
Horizon 2020?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

The Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) is currently
supporting 3 projects ( [1] ) and one ERA-NET ( [2] ) on tree pest and diseases control for a total EU contribution of
EUR 12 million, and 8 projects ( [3] ) and one ERA-NET ( [4] ) on crop protection for a total EU contribution of
EUR 31 million.

In addition, the present and last FP7 call for proposals of Theme 2 ‘Biotechnologies, Agriculture and Food’ (KBBE),
include the following topics addressing trees and crops health related issues, with a total allocation of EUR 17.5
million:

—
KBBE.2013.1.2.04: Control of pests and pathogens in fruit tree crops, with a budget allocation of EUR 6
million

—
KBBE.2013.1.2.05: Biological control agents in agriculture and forestry for effective pest and pathogens
control, with a budget allocation of EUR 9 million

—
KBBE.2013.1.2.06: Improved coordination and collaboration for EU plant health reference collection, with a
budget allocation of EUR 0.5 million

—
KBBE.2013.1.4.02: Integrated Pest Management — ERANET, with a budget allocation of EUR 2 million

Research activities addressing plant health and protection issues will be considered under Horizon 2020 ( [5] ), especially
within the Societal Challenge 2 ‘Food Security, Sustainable Agriculture, Marine and Maritime Research and the
Bioeconomy’.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ISEFOR, NOVELTREE, REPHRAME, For more information, see FP7 Interim Catalogue:

http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/catalogue_of_projects_web_small.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) FORESTERRA ERA-NET: http://193.146.122.109/fores/foresterra/
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) QDETECT, PALM PROTECT, PRATIQUE, PURE, TESTA, QBOL, SHARCO, CO-FREE.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) EUPHRESCO II ERA-NET: http://www.euphresco.org/
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents

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C 6 E / 124 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002672/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(7 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Burgers teleurgesteld in de Europese Unie

Begin maart 2013 publiceerde de Commissie de eerste resultaten van de in november 2012 uitgevoerde
Eurobarometer-enquête „De publieke opinie in de Europese Unie”, waarbij de aandacht vooral gericht was op de
uitkomsten van de 27 lidstaten ( [1] ).

1. Heeft de Commissie al conclusies getrokken op basis van de uitkomst van deze enquête?

2. Is de Commissie van mening dat haar programma om de crisis te bestrijden is mislukt, gezien het feit dat slechts
23 % van de geënquêteerden de EU beschouwt als de instantie die het best in staat is om effectief actie te ondernemen
tegen de gevolgen van de economische en financiële crisis?

3. Welke conclusie trekt de Commissie uit het feit dat slechts 30 % van de geënquêteerden een positief beeld heeft
van de EU? Met welke beleidswijzigingen denkt zij de Europese Unie aantrekkelijker te maken voor de burgers?

4. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat deze uitkomsten duidelijk aantonen dat de burgers zich het best
vertegenwoordigd voelen door hun nationale parlementen en dat de EU derhalve lijdt aan een democratisch deficit en
een gebrek aan legitimiteit?

5. In hoeverre verwerkt de Commissie dergelijke resultaten die de mening van de burgers weergeven in haar
beleidsmaatregelen? Is zij van mening dat dit een belangrijk instrument is voor het opstellen van voorstellen en
uitvoeringsmaatregelen?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**

_(2 mei 2013)_

1) De eerste resultaten van de in november 2012 uitgevoerde standaard-Eurobarometerenquête 78 zijn op
20 december 2012 bekend gemaakt. Ter gelegenheid daarvan werd een persbericht uitgegeven.

2) Uit de resultaten van de enquête blijkt de burgers de EU als de meest doeltreffende actor zien om de gevolgen
van de financiële en economische crisis effectief aan te pakken. Zowel de nationale regeringen als de G20 en het IMF
zijn lager gerangschikt dan de EU.

3 & 4) Uit Eurobarometer 78 blijkt dat de burgers meer vertrouwen hebben in de EU dan in de nationale regeringen
en parlementen. De Commissie is ervan overtuigd dat een succesvol sterk op de burger gericht beleid het vertrouwen
nog zal doen toenemen. Die benadering behelst ook een doeltreffende communicatie en bewustmaking.

De Commissie erkent uiteraard de fundamentele rol die de nationale parlementen spelen in het democratisch leven
van de lidstaten en het belang ervan voor de Europese burgers, overeenkomstig het Verdrag.

5) Op de vergaderingen van de Commissie wordt de informatie uit de Eurobarometer-enquêtes regelmatig
geëvalueerd.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 125

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002672/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Citizens disappointed in the European Union

At the beginning of March 2013 the Commission published the first results of the Eurobarometer survey ‘Public
opinion in the European Union’, carried out in November 2012, with the focus on the results obtained in the
27 Member States ( [1] ).

1. Has the Commission already drawn conclusions from the results of this survey?

2. Does the Commission consider its crisis management programme to be a failure, in the light of the fact that only
23% of respondents see the EU as the agent best able to take effective action against the effects of the economic and
financial crisis?

3. What does the Commission conclude from the fact that only 30% of respondents have a positive image of the
EU? What policy changes is it planning to make the European Union more attractive to the citizens?

4. Does the Commission agree with me that these results clearly express the fact that citizens feel best represented
by their national parliaments, and that the EU is therefore suffering from a democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy?

5. What use does the Commission make in its policymaking measures of such results reflecting the opinion of the
citizens? Does it consider this to be an important tool when drawing up proposals and implementing measures?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

1. The first results of the Standard Eurobarometer survey 78 carried out in November 2012 were made public on
20 December 2012. A press release was issued on that occasion.

2. According to the survey results, the EU is considered by its citizens as being the most able actor to take effective
action against the effects of the financial and economic crisis. National governments, the G20 and the IMF all come
after the EU.

3 and 4. Trust in the EU is higher than in national governments and Parliaments, as Eurobarometer 78 shows. The
Commission is convinced that the success of a strong citizen‐ oriented policy will also lead to an increase in
confidence. Strong communication and awareness raising is also part of their approach.

The Commission of course acknowledges that the role of national parliaments is absolutely fundamental to the
democratic life of Member States and also for European citizens, as foreseen in the Treaty.

5. The Commission regularly reviews the information produced by Eurobarometer surveys in its meetings.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

C 6 E / 126 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002673/13**

**à la Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Entrée en vigueur du règlement sur le bois de l'Union européenne

Au moins 20 % du bois et des produits forestiers qui pénètrent dans l'Union européenne sont d'origine illégale. Afin
de lutter contre ce trafic, l'Union s'est dotée du règlement sur le bois (RBUE), entré en vigueur le 3 mars dernier.

Conformément à ce règlement, les opérateurs (importateurs et exploitants forestiers européens), les premiers à mettre
les produits sur le marché, ont l'obligation de s'assurer de l'origine licite de leurs approvisionnements et de la justifier,
via un système de diligence raisonnée.

— Comment la Commission compte-t-elle s'assurer de la mise en œuvre de ce règlement?

— Dispose-t-elle d'une analyse de l'état de préparation des opérateurs européens à l'application du système de la
diligence raisonnée? Quels sont les dispositifs d'accompagnement qui pourraient être activés en cas de nécessité?

— Quel est le nombre d'États membres qui ont, à ce jour, désigné l'administration responsable des contrôles et établi
le régime de sanctions liés à l'application du RBUE?

**Réponse donnée par M. Potočnik au nom de la Commission**

_(25 avril 2013)_

Comme l'exige le règlement (UE) n [o] 995/2010 [1] (le règlement «Bois»), la Commission a déjà adopté deux actes non
législatifs en 2012 [2] . La Commission a également rédigé un document d'orientation portant sur le règlement «Bois» en
étroite collaboration avec les États membres (EM).

La Commission collabore avec les autorités nationales compétentes, plus particulièrement dans le cadre du comité
chargé de l'application des réglementations forestières, de la gouvernance et des échanges commerciaux, où sont
discutées les questions relatives à l'application du règlement «Bois», y compris l'état de préparation des opérateurs à
l'application du règlement.

La Commission collabore également avec des associations professionnelles et des fédérations de parties intéressées de
l'Union européenne, notamment des opérateurs, pour fournir des explications aux membres de ces organisations et
contribuer à leur préparation aux nouvelles obligations déterminées dans le règlement «Bois».

La Commission a mis sur pied une campagne de communication avec pour objectif d'aider les autorités nationales
compétentes à sensibiliser les parties concernées, et de diffuser l'information concernant la nouvelle législation à
toutes les parties intéressées au niveau national.

Tous les États membres ont désigné des autorités compétentes en vertu du règlement «Bois», et une liste à jour est
disponible sur le site internet de la direction générale de l'environnement. La plupart des États membres préparent
actuellement des sanctions, dont certaines découleront de la législation en vigueur.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Relatif à l'exonération du droit à l'importation, pour certains produits du secteur céréalier, prévue par les accords entre la Communauté

européenne et la République de Pologne, la République de Hongrie, la République Tchèque et la République Slovaque. JO L 196 du 19.8.1995.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Règlement délégué (UE) n° 363/2012 de la Commission du 23 février 2012 relatif aux règles de procédure concernant la reconnaissance et le

retrait de la reconnaissance des organisations de contrôle conformément au règlement (UE) n° 995/2010 du Parlement européen et du Conseil
établissant les obligations des opérateurs qui mettent du bois et des produits dérivés sur le marché.
Règlement d'exécution (UE) n° 607/2012 de la Commission du 6 juillet 2012 sur les modalités d'application relatives au système de diligence,
ainsi qu'à la fréquence et à la nature des contrôles à effectuer auprès des organisations de contrôle conformément au règlement (UE) n° 995/2010
du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant les obligations des opérateurs qui mettent du bois et des produits dérivés sur le marché.

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 127

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002673/13**

**to the Commission**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Entry into force of the EU Timber Regulation

At least 20% of the timber and forestry products which enter the European Union have been illegally harvested. The
EU adopted the Timber Regulation (EUTR), which entered into force on 3 March 2013, in order to combat this
trafficking.

The regulation obliges operators (importers and European forest owners) which place products on the market for the
first time to ensure that their supplies are obtained from a legal source and to substantiate this using a due diligence
system.

— How does the Commission intend to ensure that this regulation is implemented?

— Does it have access to any studies analysing the preparations made by European operators with a view to applying
the due diligence system? Are there any supporting measures which could be put in place if necessary?

— To date, how many Member States have appointed an administrative body which will be responsible for carrying
out checks and established a system of penalties for violations of the EUTR?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 April 2013)_

As required by Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 ( [1] ) (the EUTR), the Commission already adopted in 2012 two nonlegislative acts ( [2] ). The Commission also elaborated a Guidance document for the EUTR in close collaboration with
Member States (MS).

The Commission is working with national competent authorities in particular within the setting of the Forest Law
Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) committee where issues regarding the implementation and enforcement
of the EUTR, including the readiness of operators to apply the regulation, are discussed.

The Commission also works with EU professional associations and federations of stakeholders, notably operators, to
explain and help prepare their members for the new obligations laid down on the EUTR.

The Commission elaborated a communication campaign aimed at assisting the national competent authorities to
raise awareness and disseminate information regarding the new legislation amongst national stakeholders.

All MS have designated competent authorities under the EUTR and an updated list is available on the website of the
Directorate General for the Environment. The majority of MS are in a process of establishing penalties; some of which
will derive from existing legislation.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Relating to the exemption from the import duty for certain products in the cereals sector laid down in the Agreements between the European

Community and the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. OJ L 196, 19.8.1995.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission delegated Regulation of 23.2.2012 on the procedural rules for the recognition and withdrawal of recognition of monitoring

organisations as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the obligations of
operators who place timber and timber products on the market.
Commission implementing Regulation (EU) No 607/2012 of 6 July 2012 on the detailed rules concerning the due diligence system and the
frequency and nature of the checks on monitoring organisations as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and
of the Council laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market.

( **|**

C 6 E / 128 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002674/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ L'UE intervenga a tutela del sapone di Marsiglia

Il 90 % del sapone di Marsiglia arriva in Francia, e in particolare in Provenza, dalla Cina, dalla Turchia, dalla Malaysia e
anche dall'Italia: contiene grasso animale e profumazioni varie e, quindi, non rispetta il canone marsigliese che
prevede che il sapone di Marsiglia tradizionale sia realizzato con il 72 % di oli vegetali e non contenga alcun grasso
animale, né profumo né colorante e che sia, di conseguenza, biodegradabile e ipoallergenico.

Quello tradizionale, inoltre, richiede cinque fasi e 10 giorni di lavorazione, mentre quello taroccato ha il pregio di
costare molto meno.

A Marsiglia ci sono solo due aziende che ancora producono il vero sapone, una delle quali, tra l'altro, sull'orlo del
fallimento.

1. Alla Commissione è pervenuta dalla Francia la richiesta dell'istituzione dell'IGP per il sapone di Marsiglia, onde
tutelarlo dalla concorrenza sleale da parte dei Paesi sopra citati e proteggere le uniche due aziende francesi (e quindi i
loro lavoratori) che ancora lo producono in modo tradizionale?

2. Qualora la Commissione abbia già ricevuto la richiesta per l'IGP, come intende procedere?

3. Secondo la Commissione, i prodotti utilizzati nel sapone contraffatto possono nuocere alla salute dei
consumatori e all'ambiente?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2013)_

1.-2. Attualmente a livello dell'Unione europea, non vi è un sistema specifico, uniformemente applicabile, di
protezione dell'indicazione geografica (IG) per i prodotti non agricoli, come ad esempio il sapone di Marsiglia.

Pertanto, la Commissione non ha ricevuto dalla Francia una richiesta di protezione IG per il sapone di Marsiglia.

Per informazione, la Commissione ha fatto eseguire uno studio sulla protezione IG in relazione ai prodotti non
agricoli sul mercato interno, studio che è stato pubblicato di recente ( [1] ). Inoltre, il 22 aprile 2013 essa ha organizzato
un'audizione pubblica ( [2] ) per discutere lo studio e sentire i punti di vista degli stakeholder. Alla luce dei risultati di
queste consultazioni la Commissione deciderà i passi successivi da adottare.

3. La Commissione non dispone di informazioni su tutti gli ingredienti usati per la fabbricazione dei prodotti in
questione e non può pertanto esprimere commenti sulla loro sicurezza. Tuttavia, tutti i prodotti cosmetici immessi
sul mercato dell'UE devono rispettare le disposizioni della legislazione sui cosmetici ( [3] ), la quale prevede che i
cosmetici devono essere sicuri per la salute umana. Spetta alle autorità nazionali competenti far rispettare la
legislazione sui cosmetici, assicurando anche il controllo del mercato, e le stesse autorità devono assicurare che sul
mercato dell'UE siano presenti soltanto prodotti a norma.

Si noti che la legislazione sui cosmetici non vieta in generale l'uso di sostanze o miscele di origine animale. Essa però
vieta i materiali di categoria 1 e di categoria 2 quali definiti dal regolamento (CE) n. 1069/2009 sui sottoprodotti di
origine animale ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/geo-indications/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Le parti interessate sono invitate a registrarsi all'indirizzo:

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130422_geo-indications-public-hearing-agenda_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) La direttiva 76/768/CEE, del 27 luglio 1976, concernente il ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri relative ai prodotti cosmetici (GU

L 262 del 27.9.1976, pag. 169) sarà sostituita l'11 luglio 2013 dal regolamento (CE) n. 1223/2009 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del
30 novembre 2009, sui prodotti cosmetici (GU L 342 del 22.12.2009, pag. 59), che diverrà pienamente applicabile a decorrere da tale data.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) GU L 300 del 14.11.2009, pag. 1.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 129

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002674/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU action to safeguard Marseille soap

Out of all Marseille soap, 90% comes to France, and Provence in particular, from China, Turkey, Malaysia, and, for
that matter, Italy: it contains animal fat and various scents and therefore does not conform to the regulations on
Marseille soap-making, which stipulate that traditional Marseille soap should contain 72% vegetable oils and no
animal fat, scent, or colouring whatsoever and hence that it should be biodegradable and hypoallergenic.

The traditional soap, moreover, is made in five stages over 10 days, whereas the concocted variety has the merit of
costing much less.

In Marseille, there are only two companies still producing the true soap, and one of them is on the verge of
bankruptcy.

1. Has the Commission received any request from France to establish a PGI (protected geographical indication) for
Marseille soap in order to protect it from unfair competition from the above countries and safeguard the last two
French companies (and consequently their workers) still using the traditional production process?

2. If the Commission has already received a PGI request, how does it propose to deal with it?

3. Does the Commission think that the ingredients used in the fake soap could damage consumers’ health and the
environment?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2013)_

1 and 2. Currently, at European Union level, there is no specific, uniformly applicable system of geographical
indication (GI) protection for non-agricultural products, such as for example Marseille soap.

The Commission has therefore not received a request from France to establish a PGI for Marseille soap.

For information, the Commission ordered a study on GI protection for non-agricultural products in the internal
market, which was recently published ( [1] ). In addition, it organised a public hearing on 22 April 2013 ( [2] ) to discuss the
study and listen to stakeholders' views. In light of the outcome of these consultations, the Commission will decide on
the appropriate way forward _._

3. The Commission does not have information regarding all the ingredients used in the products in question, and
therefore cannot comment on their safety. However, any cosmetic product placed on the EU market must comply
with the requirements under the Cosmetics legislation ( [3] ), which foresees that cosmetics must be safe for human
health. Enforcement of the Cosmetics legislation, including market surveillance, is the responsibility of the competent
national authorities, which must ensure that only compliant products can be found on the EU market.

It should be noted that the Cosmetics legislation does not prevent the use of substances or mixtures of animal origin
in general. Nevertheless, it bans Category C and Category C materials as defined in the animal by-products Regulation
(EC) No 1069/2009 ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/geo-indications/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Interested stakeholders are invited to register under http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130422_geo-indications
public-hearing-agenda_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ L 262,

27.9.1976, p. 169) will be repealed on 11 July 2013 by Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
30 November 2009 on cosmetic products (OJ L 342, 22.12.2009, p. 59), which will become fully applicable as from that date.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

C 6 E / 130 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002675/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Adozioni in Turchia

Il premier turco Erdogan è nuovamente intervenuto reclamando indietro i bambini che, a suo dire, sono stati sottratti
a famiglie «turche musulmane», per essere adottati da famiglie «europee cristiane».

Questi bimbi sarebbero circa 5.000 e, secondo Sefer Ustun, Presidente della Commissione diritti umani della Grande
Assemblea turca, «avrebbero il sacrosanto diritto di crescere in una famiglia vicina alla loro cultura».

1. La Commissione non ritiene che questa ennesima esternazione sia una provocazione nei confronti dell'UE e che
il premier Erdogan, conscio che l'opinione dei cittadini turchi relativa all'adesione della Turchia all'UE è in netto
ribasso, tenti di strumentalizzare la questione delle adozioni a danno dei bambini stessi?

2. La Commissione come intende intervenire sulla questione?

**Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione**

_(13 maggio 2013)_

La Commissione è a conoscenza della questione sollevata dall'onorevole deputato, che è invitato a consultare la
risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-001846/2013 presentata dall'onorevole Stassen.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 131

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002675/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Adoptions in Turkey

The Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdoğan, has again spoken out to reclaim children who, in his opinion, have been
taken away from ‘Turkish Muslim’ families so that they may be adopted by ‘European Christian’ families.

Approximately 5 000 children are said to be involved, and according to Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Chair of the Committee
for Human Rights of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, they have the sacrosanct right to grow up in a home
environment that is similar to their culture.

1. Does the Commission not consider this latest pronouncement to be a provocation against the EU and that
Prime Minister Erdoğan, aware that the Turkish citizens’ opinion of Turkey’s accession to the EU is in sharp decline, is
trying to exploit the adoption issue to the detriment of the children?

2. What action does the Commission intend to take on this matter?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the issue raised by the Honourable Member and would like to refer to its answer to
previous Question E-001846/2013 by Ms Stassen.

C 6 E / 132 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002676/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Preventivi controlli UE al cofinanziamento UE per la ricostruzione della Città della Scienza di Napoli

La Commissione europea si è resa disponibile a valutare il cofinanziamento per la ricostruzione della Città della
Scienza di Napoli, recentemente distrutta da un incendio di probabile origine criminale (camorra).

Tenendo conto, come si apprende da fonti di stampa, che sono già stati cofinanziati vari progetti legati alla Città della
Scienza, si chiede:

la Commissione europea può specificare quando è stato erogato e che periodo copre il cofinanziamento «Corporea»,
progetto dal valore di 5,6 milioni?

«Campania Innovazione» beneficia del FESR (Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale) per il periodo 2007-2013 per
innovazione e ricerca: la Commissione europea può specificare l'ammontare di tale beneficio?

Qual è l'importo (o qual è la percentuale sul totale della spesa) che la Commissione intende erogare per la
ricostruzione della Città della Scienza, come intende monitorare il corretto utilizzo di questi ulteriori cofinanziamenti
e, in particolare, non ritiene necessario accertare preventivamente e che i finanziamenti pregressi non abbiano già
dato luogo ad infiltrazioni da parte della camorra, e che le opere relative alla ricostruzione della Città della Scienza
siano non solo regolarmente assoggettate a gare d'appalto europee, ma anche controllate, e in sede di progettazione, e
in sede di realizzazione da una Commissione appositamente inviata in loco dall'UE?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

Il progetto «Corporea» è cofinanziato dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) nell'ambito dei programmi
destinati alla Campania durante i periodi 2000-2006 e 2007-2013. Il finanziamento complessivo del progetto
ammonta a 16 milioni di euro, di cui 2,8 milioni rientrano nel FESR. Il progetto, che secondo le informazioni
disponibili non ha subito danni a seguito dell'incendio, dovrà essere portato a termine ed essere operativo entro i
termini previsti.

Nell'ambito del progetto Campania 2007-2013 60 milioni di euro, di cui 32 milioni a carico del FESR, sono stati
destinati al progetto «Campania innovazione». La Commissione finora ha pagato il contributo del FESR solo
parzialmente, per un importo pari a 13,5 milioni di euro.

La Commissione intende cofinanziare la ricostruzione della «Città della Scienza» nell’ambito del progetto di bonifica
del sito di Bagnoli. La Commissione sta collaborando con le autorità italiane per individuare il metodo di intervento
più appropriato; al momento peraltro non è ancora possibile quantificare con precisione l'importo degli aiuti.

La Commissione non è a conoscenza di eventuali abusi o usi illegali dei fondi UE per quanto riguarda il progetto di
cofinanziamento della «Città della Scienza». Qualora vi fossero elementi di prova tali da attestare tali abusi la
Commissione prenderebbe tutti i provvedimenti del caso, ivi compresa la sospensione parziale o totale dei
finanziamenti, in collaborazione con lo Stato membro interessato, così da garantire che i fondi UE siano impiegati nel
rispetto delle prescrizioni giuridiche applicabili. Secondo il principio della gestione condivisa, che regola le politiche
di coesione, spetta _in primis_ agli Stati membri prevenire, individuare e rettificare frodi e irregolarità nonché recuperare
le eventuali somme indebitamente versate. Gli Stati membri sono tenuti a informare la Commissione in merito alle
irregolarità eventualmente riscontrate e all’iter delle procedure amministrative e giuridiche.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 133

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002676/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Preventive EU controls of EU co-financing for the rebuilding of the City of Science in Naples

The Commission is willing to consider co-financing for the rebuilding of the City of Science in Naples which was
recently destroyed by a fire, probably of criminal origin (the Camorra).

Bearing in mind, as reported in the press, that various City of Science projects have already been co-financed, can the
Commission specify when the co-financing for the ‘Corporea’ project, worth EUR 5.6 million, was provided and what
period it covers?

‘Campania Innovazione’ is funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the 2007‐2013 period
with regard to innovation and research: can the Commission specify the amount of this funding?

What amount (or what percentage of the total expenditure) does the Commission intend to provide to rebuild the
City of Science and how does it intend to check that this additional co-financing is used properly? In particular, does it
not consider it necessary to establish in advance that none of the previous funding has been misappropriated by the
Camorra, and that the City of Science reconstruction works are not only duly offered under EU calls for tender, but
are also monitored, both at the planning stage and at the construction stage, by a committee specially sent there by
the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The ‘Corporea’ project was co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under the Campania
programmes in the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 period. The total cost of the project is EUR 16 million, of which
EUR 2.8 million from the ERDF. The project, which according to current information was not affected by the fire, will
have to be completed and rendered operational within the current period.

The ‘Campania innovazione’ project was granted EUR 60 million under the 2007-2013 Campania programme, of
which EUR 32 million from the ERDF. Up to now, the Commission has paid EUR 13.5 million out of the ERDF.

The Commission is willing to co-finance the reconstruction of the ‘Città della Scienza’ in the framework of the Bagnoli
site rehabilitation. The Commission is working with the Italian authorities to identify the most appropriate course of
action; at this moment it is too early to quantify the possible amounts.

The Commission is not aware of any improper or illegal use of EU funds linked to the co-financing of ‘Città della
Scienza’. Should evidence in this respect emerge, it will take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Member
State, including suspension of part or all payments, to ensure that the EU funding is spent in accordance with all
applicable legal requirements. In line with the shared management principle used for the implementation of cohesion
policy, Member States are however in the first instance responsible for the prevention, detection and correction of
fraud and irregularities as well as the recovery of amounts unduly paid. Member States have the duty to notify the
Commission of all irregularities and keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings.

C 6 E / 134 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002677/13**

**do Komisji**
**Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)**

_(7 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Zakaz wydawania ogólnopolskiego tygodnika „W Sieci”

1 marca b.r. wydawca opiniotwórczego polskiego tygodnika „W Sieci” otrzymał decyzję Sądu Okręgowego
z Warszawy wskazującą, iż tygodnik może naruszać interesy wydawnictwa Presspublika (obecnie Gremi Media),
które dysponuje subdomeną internetową _W sieci opinii_ (wsieci.rp.pl). Decyzja ta, o charakterze natychmiastowej
wykonalności, stanowi w konsekwencji zakaz wydawania tygodnika pod obecną nazwą do zakończenia procesu.
Działania sądu podjęte w tak szybkim czasie i w takim trybie sprawiają wrażenie rozstrzygnięcia sporu sądowego
przed jego rozpatrzeniem i są wykonaniem wyroku przed jego wydaniem. Należy zauważyć, że zastosowana wobec
tygodnika „W Sieci” metoda pozwala zablokować praktycznie każdą niewygodną dla władzy nową inicjatywę
medialną.

Przedstawione powyżej fakty wskazują, iż decyzja w sprawie tygodnika „W Sieci” może mieć charakter polityczny. Po
odmówieniu Telewizji Trwam miejsca na multipleksie cyfrowej telewizji naziemnej MUX-1 jest to już drugi
w krótkim czasie rażący przypadek ograniczenia wolności mediów w Polsce.

Rolą Komisji Europejskiej jest stanie na straży wolności słowa i mediów w Unii Europejskiej. W związku z tym
chciałbym zwrócić się z następującym pytaniem: Czy Komisja świadoma jest ww. kolejnego, jawnego przypadku
naruszenia wolności mediów w Polsce?

Czy w związku z nasilającymi się przypadkami naruszania wolności mediów m.in. w Polsce Komisja zamierza
wdrażać zalecenia raportu opublikowanego w styczniu 2013 r. przez niezależną Grupę Wysokiego Szczebla
w Sprawie Wolności i Pluralizmu Mediów?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Neelie Kroes w imieniu Komisji**

_(26 czerwca 2013 r.)_

Zgodnie z art. 51 ust. 1 Karty jej postanowienia mają zastosowanie do państw członkowskich wyłącznie wówczas,
gdy stosują one prawo UE. Ponadto art. 6 ust. 1 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej stanowi, że „postanowienia Karty
w żaden sposób nie rozszerzają kompetencji Unii określonych w Traktatach”.

W przypadku tygodnika „W Sieci” Komisja nie jest w stanie ustalić, czy Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie oparł swoje
postanowienie na przepisach wdrażających prawo unijne, a zatem ocenić, w jaki sposób art. 11 ma zastosowanie,
ponieważ dokładny tekst odnośnego postanowienia nie jest dostępny dla Komisji w momencie przygotowywania
niniejszej odpowiedzi.

Ponadto wydaje się, iż z pytania Pana Posła wynika, że Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie jak dotąd podjął jedynie
postanowienie w sprawie środków tymczasowych w odniesieniu do tygodnika „W Sieci”. Ponieważ ostateczna
decyzja w sprawie własności domeny nie zapadła, wydawcy tygodnika „W Sieci” nadal dysponują możliwością
obrony swojego stanowiska przed sądem.

Jeśli chodzi o niezależne sprawozdanie grupy wysokiego szczebla ds. wolności i pluralizmu mediów, Komisja
zapoczątkowała niedawno dwukrotnie konsultacje społeczne – jedne w sprawie zaleceń grupy i drugie konkretnie na
temat niezależności krajowych organów regulacyjnych sektora audiowizualnego. Przy podejmowaniu decyzji
w sprawie możliwych dalszych działań, w tym ewentualnych działań legislacyjnych w dziedzinie niezależności
organów sektora audiowizualnego, w granicach kompetencji Unii Europejskiej, pod uwagę zostaną wzięte wyniki
tych konsultacji, jak również najnowsze sprawozdania Parlamentu Europejskiego, w szczególności sprawozdania Pań
Posłanek Weber i Schaake.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 135

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002677/13**

**to the Commission**
**Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Ban on the publication of the Polish weekly ‘ _W Sieci_ ’

On 1 March 2013, the publisher of the opinion-forming Polish weekly news magazine ‘ _W Sieci_ ’ was informed of a
decision taken by the Warsaw District Court stating that the weekly could damage the interests of the ‘Presspublika’
publishing house (currently Gremi Media), which owns the Internet subdomain ‘ _W Sieci_ Opinii’ (wsieci.rp.pl). This
decision — to be implemented with immediate effect — effectively constitutes a ban on the publication of the weekly
under its current name until such time as the trial is concluded. The Court’s hasty actions and the manner in which
they were taken create the impression that the Court has already reached a verdict on the case before it has been
examined, and they constitute the execution of a judgment before judgment has been handed down. It is noteworthy
that the methods used against ‘ _W Sieci_ ’ could be used to block practically any new media initiative that inconveniences
the Polish Government.

These facts show that the decision taken in the ‘ _W Sieci_ ’ case may have had a political character. Following on from the
refusal to grant ‘Telewizja Trwam’ broadcasting rights on the MUX‐1 digital terrestrial television multiplex, this is the
second blatant case in which the Polish media have had their freedom of expression restricted in a short period of
time.

The Commission’s role is to uphold freedom of expression and of the media in the European Union. I should
therefore like to ask whether the Commission is aware of the above case, which is yet another clear violation of media
freedom in Poland?

In connection with these increasingly frequent infringements of media freedom, _inter alia_ in Poland, does the
Commission intend to implement the recommendations set out in the report published in January 2013 by the
independent High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 June 2013)_

According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing European
Union law. Moreover, Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union states that, ‘the provisions of the Charter shall
not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.’

In the case of the weekly news magazine ‘ _W Sieci_ ’, the Commission is not in a position to establish if the Warsaw
District Court based its decision on provisions implementing Union law and therefore assess how Article 11 is
applicable, as the exact text of this decision is not accessible to the Commission at the time of writing.

Also, it appears from the question of the Honourable Member that the Warsaw District Court has so far taken only
decision on provisional measures in the case of weekly news magazine ‘ _W Sieci_ ’. As the final decision on the
ownership of the domain name has not been taken, the publishers of the weekly news magazine ‘ _W Sieci_ ’ still have
possibilities to defend their position before the Court.

As regards the independent report of the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, the Commission has
recently launched two public consultations, one on the recommendations of the group and one specifically on the
independence of National Audiovisual Regulatory Authorities. The decision on any possible follow-up actions,
including a possible legislative action in the field of independence of audiovisual authorities, within the limits of the
competences of the European Union, will take account of the responses to those consultations, as well as the most
recent reports by the European Parliament, especially the Weber and the Schaake reports.

C 6 E / 136 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002678/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Åsa Westlund (S&D)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Utvecklingen i Burma

Många positiva steg har tagits de senaste åren i Burma. Men repressiva lagar tillämpas fortfarande. Bara i november
och december åtalades åtta aktivister för fredliga demonstrationer med hjälp av kapitel 505(b) i Burmas strafflag. Den
nya demonstrationslagen når inte upp till internationella standarder; tal med ”felaktigt” innehåll kan leda till fängelse
och slagord måste godkännas på förhand. Nuvarande reformer i Burma har varit toppstyrda och civilsamhället
begränsas fortfarande från att delta i politiken.

1. På vilka sätt arbetar kommissionen med att uppmana Burmas regering att inleda politiska dialoger med alla
etniska grupper och civilsamhället?

2. Hur påverkar kommissionen Burma för att få landet att garantera mötesfrihet, organisationsfrihet och
yttrandefrihet?

Den humanitära situationen i delstaten Rakhine och Kachin i Burma är akut. Våld mot civila har rapporterats och
nödställda rohingyafamiljer som befinner sig utanför läger nås inte av hjälp och även i internflyktinglägren är
situationen kritisk enligt Läkare utan gränser. Även Human Rights Watch har dokumenterat de grava MRkränkningar som civila i konfliktområdet utsatts för av Burmas armé, såsom sexuellt våld och tortyr.

3. Vilka åtgärder har kommissionen vidtagit i sina relationer med landet för att förmå president Thein Sein att
tillåta humanitär hjälp till alla delar av Rakhine‐ och Kachinstaten, verka för tolerans och ge rohingyafolket
medborgerliga rättigheter?

4. Hur jobbar kommissionen med att kräva att kriget i Kachinstaten och dessa allvarliga brott mot mänskliga
rättigheter i Burma upphör?

**Svar från Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar**

_(23 april 2013)_

Europeiska unionen välkomnar de förbättringar i situationen i Burma när det gäller de mänskliga rättigheterna som
uppnåtts tack vare reformerna under senare tid, men den är förstås också medveten om de utmaningar som landet
står inför, särskilt de ihållande spänningarna mellan olika befolkningsgrupper i delstaten Rakhine och konflikten i
delstaten Kachin.

EU tar löpande upp frågor som rör de mänskliga rättigheterna och situationen för minoriteter med Burmas
statsförvaltning, även på högsta nivå, såsom under Burmas utrikesministers och landets presidents besök i Bryssel
tidigare i år. EU-sidan manade vid dessa tillfällen åter till en öppen, inkluderande dialog med alla berörda parter i
landet.

Unionen är också mycket aktiv i FN-organ. Den var en av initiativtagarna till den resolution om situationen i Burma
när det gäller de mänskliga rättigheterna som antogs enhälligt den 21 mars vid tjugoandra sessionen i FN:s råd för de
mänskliga rättigheterna. I resolutionen behandlas de kvarstående problemen i fråga om de mänskliga rättigheterna
och behovet av att sörja för obehindrat tillträde för humanitärt bistånd till delstaten Kachin.

Unionen har hela tiden funnits med i främsta ledet bland dem som drivit på för att finna lösningar på
rohingyaminoritetens svåra situation. Kommissionens ordförande José Manuel Barroso manade vid Burmas president
U Thein Seins besök till åtgärder för att trygga obehindrat tillträde för humanitärt bistånd. Han pekade också på
behovet av att den burmesiska regeringen finner hållbara lösningar, bl.a. genom att ge rohingyaminoriteten
medborgarskap och främja försoning mellan befolkningsgrupper.

Nationell försoning i Burma är en central komponent i landets omvandlingsprocess. EU strävar efter att bidra till fred
och stabilitet genom kapacitetsuppbyggnad och utökat bistånd på områden såsom hälso‐ och sjukvård, utbildning
och försörjningsmöjligheter.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 137

Europeiska unionen kommer att fortsätta att ta upp de frågor som nämns ovan i sina löpande kontakter med den
burmesiska statsförvaltningen och i internationella forum. Den kommer också att fortsätta att tillhandahålla direkt
bistånd på fältet.

C 6 E / 138 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002678/13**

**to the Commission**
**Åsa Westlund (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Developments in Burma

There have been many positive steps in recent years in Burma. However, repressive laws are still enforced. As recently
as November and December, eight activists were charged under Chapter 505(b) of Burma’s penal code because they
took part in peaceful demonstrations. The new laws on demonstrations do not meet international standards; those
who make statements with ‘wrong’ content can end up in prison and slogans must be approved beforehand. Present
reforms in Burma have been led from the top and civil society is still subject to restrictions on taking part in politics.

1. In what ways is the Commission encouraging the Burmese Government to open political dialogue with all
ethnic groups and civil society?

2. In what ways is the Commission encouraging Burma, to ensure that Burma guarantees freedom of assembly,
freedom of association and freedom of expression?

The humanitarian situation in Rakhine and Kachin states in Burma is very serious. Violence against civilians has been
reported, aid is not reaching distressed Rohingya families who are not in camps and the situation is also critical in the
camps for internally displaced persons according to Médecins sans frontières. Human Rights Watch has also
documented serious human rights violations, such as sexual violence and torture, which civilians in the conflict zone
are being subjected to by the Burmese army.

3. What measures has the Commission taken in its relations with Burma to persuade President Thein Sein to allow
humanitarian aid to get to all parts of Rakhine and Kachin states, to promote tolerance and to give the Rohingya
people civil rights?

4. How is the Commission working to secure an end to the war in Kachin state and these serious human rights
violations in Burma?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2013)_

The European Union welcomes improvements to the situation of human rights achieved through a series of recent
reforms, but recognises the challenges ahead and in particular the persistance of inter-communal tensions in Rhakine
state and the conflict in Kachin state.

Human rights concerns including the situation of minorities are constantly raised with the government, including at
highest level as during the visits of the Foreign Minister and of President U Thein Sein earlier this year. At that
occasion EU interlocutors again encouraged open and inclusive dialogue with all national stakeholders.

The EU is also very active in UN bodies: In the 22nd session of the UN Human Rights Council the EU was again in the
lead of sponsors for the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar adopted with unanimity on
21 March, which addresses remaining human rights concerns and needs to grant unhindered humanitarian access to
Kachin state.

The EU has always been at the forefront of those urging for solutions to the plight of the Rohingya. During the visit of
President U Thein Sein, President Barroso urged for measures to ensure unhindered access of humanitarian assistance.
He also repeated calls for the government to find durable solutions, including by providing citizenship to the
Rohingya minority, and promote reconciliation.

National reconciliation in Myanmar/Burma is a key element of its overall transtion. The EU is seeking to contribute to
peace and stabilty through capacity building and increased assistance in health, education and livelihoods.

The EU will continue to raise the above matters in its ongoing interaction with the government and in international
fora, while providing direct assistance on the ground.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 139

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002679/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ „Alles außer Waffen“ (Everything but Arms — EBA) — Ermittlungen in Kambodscha

Es gibt umfassende Hinweise darauf, dass in Kambodscha schwerwiegende Menschenrechtsverletzungen im
Zusammenhang mit Landverteilungsmaßnahmen stattgefunden haben. Der VN-Sonderberichterstatter für
Menschenrechte in Kambodscha legte im September 2012 einen Bericht ( [1] ) vor, in dem er auf hinreichend belegte
schwerwiegende und weit verbreitete Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Zusammenhang mit
Landverteilungsmaßnahmen hinwies. Außerdem empfahl das Parlament in seiner Entschließung vom 26. Oktober
2012 ( [2] ), die EBA-Präferenzen für Zucker und andere Agrarerzeugnisse aus Kambodscha wegen des offensichtlichen
Zusammenhangs zwischen Zuckerausfuhren in die EU und Problemen mit Land-Konzessionen zeitweilig

auszusetzen.

1. Plant die Kommission die Einleitung von EBA-Ermittlungen und falls ja, wann?

2. Falls nicht, welche Gründe gibt es dafür, keine Ermittlungen einzuleiten, angesichts des Berichts des
VN-Sonderberichterstatters und anderer Gremien sowie in Kenntnis der Tatsache, dass die Maßnahmen, die die
kambodschanische Regierung ergriffen hat — wie beispielsweise die Richtlinie vom 7. Mai 2012 — die
Menschenrechtslage bisher nicht verbessert haben?

**Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission**

_(12. April 2013)_

Die EU ist besorgt über die Auswirkungen von Landkonzessionen wirtschaftlicher Natur in Kambodscha und hat in
diesem Zusammenhang einige diplomatische Bemühungen unternommen. Deren letzte war das Treffen zwischen
dem für Handel zuständigen Kommissar und dem kambodschanischen Handelsminister Cham Prasidh Anfang
März 2013 am Rande der Ministertagung zwischen dem Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen ( _Association of Southeast_
_Asian Nations_, ASEAN) und der EU in Hanoi, bei dem der kambodschanische Ansprechpartner eine erkennbar
größere Bereitschaft zeigte, etwas gegen das Problem zu unternehmen.

Was die Präferenzen im Rahmen des Abkommens „Alles außer Waffen“ betrifft, so prüft die Kommission
fortwährend, ob die Bedingungen für die Einleitung von Rücknahmeverfahren erfüllt sind. Sie hat die Entwicklungen,
die in den Berichten des Sonderberichterstatters Professor Subedi beschrieben werden, positiv vermerkt. Sie wird
zudem die Schlussfolgerungen des Menschenrechtsrates sowie der Überwachungseinrichtungen der wesentlichen
Menschrechtsübereinkommen aufmerksam verfolgen, um festzustellen, ob ernsthafte und systematische
Menschenrechtsverletzungen stattfinden. Die Kommission bleibt wachsam und ist bereit, geeignete Maßnahmen zu
treffen, wenn die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen vorliegen.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-63-Add1_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dase/dv/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_/1129_13_epres_cambodia_1

0oct12_de.pdf

C 6 E / 140 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002679/13**

**to the Commission**
**Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Everything But Arms (EBA) investigation in Cambodia

There is extensive evidence that serious human rights violations connected to land concessions have occurred in
Cambodia. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia presented a report in
September 2012 ( [1] ), referring to ‘well-documented serious and widespread human rights violations associated with
land concessions’. Moreover, in its resolution of 26 October 2012 ( [2] ), Parliament recommended a temporary
suspension of the EBA initiative on sugar and other agricultural products from Cambodia because of the obvious link
between sugar exports to the EU and problems with land concessions.

1. Is the Commission considering launching an EBA investigation, and, if so, when?

2. If not, what are the reasons for not launching an investigation, given the report by the UN Special Rapporteur
and other bodies, and knowing that the measures taken by the Cambodian Government — such as the directive of
7 May 2012 — have not improved the human rights situation so far?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 April 2013)_

The EU is concerned about the impact of economic land concessions in Cambodia and has deployed a range of
diplomatic efforts in this regard. The latest was the meeting early March 2013 between the Commissioner responsible
for Trade and Cambodian Trade Minister Cham Prasidh on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)-EU Ministerial in Hanoi, where the Cambodian counterpart demonstrated a visibly improved commitment
to tackle the issue.

Regarding EBA preferences, the Commission continuously examines whether the conditions for the activation of
withdrawal procedures are met. The Commission has taken good note of the developments described in the reports
by the Special Rapporteur Professor Subedi and will follow closely the conclusions by the Human Rights Council and
the monitoring bodies of the individual core human rights conventions, with a view to ascertain whether serious and
systematic violations occur. The Commission remains vigilant and will be ready to take appropriate action if the legal
requirements are met.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-63-Add1_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dase/dv/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_/1129_13_epres_cambodia_1

0oct12_en.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 141

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002680/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Ny översyn av direktivet om skydd av databaser

2006 drog kommissionen slutsatsen i sin utvärdering av _sui generis_ -skyddet för databaser ( [1] ) att den ekonomiska
påverkan av _sui generis_ -rätten för produktion av databaser inte går att styrka. Det nya instrumentet, som infördes för
att främja produktionen av databaser i Europa, har inte haft någon styrkt påverkan på produktionen av databaser.

[…] Är _sui generis_ -skyddet därför nödvändigt för en blomstrande databasindustri? Utifrån empiriska belägg är det i
detta skede oklart om behovet finns.

Nyligen, då stora datamängder har varit på allas läppar vad gäller flera intressanta affärsmöjligheter inom många
sektorer, har frågan om skydd för databaser inom unionen återigen kommit på tal.

På vilket sätt arbetar kommissionen för att utvärdera påverkan av direktivet om skydd för databaser vad gäller målen
och ambitionerna för den digitala agendan?

Planerar kommissionen att genomföra en ny översyn av direktivet?

**Svar från Michel Barnier på kommissionens vägnar**

_(15 maj 2013)_

Genom direktiv 96/9/EG ( [2] ) harmoniserades de olika nationella regelverken för skydd av databaser. Syftet var att
skapa likvärdiga förutsättningar och en attraktiv miljö för investeringar på detta område. Samtidigt vill man genom
direktivet skydda databasanvändarnas berättigade intressen.

I sitt meddelande av den 18 december 2012 ( [3] ) fastställer kommissionen en strategi för de kommande två åren för att
säkerställa en effektiv digital inre marknad på upphovsrättens område. Tanken är att man 2014 ska besluta om
huruvida lagförslag med nya bestämmelser ska läggas fram.

Även om direktiv 96/9/EG inte uttryckligen nämns i kommissionens meddelande av den 18 december 2012 utesluter
inte kommissionen att detta direktiv kommer att tas med i översynen av EU:s upphovsrättsliga regelverk.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 96/9/EG av den 11 mars 1996 om rättsligt skydd för databaser (EGT L 77, 27.3.1996, s. 20).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Meddelande från kommissionen om innehåll i den digitala inre marknaden (KOM(2012) 789 final).

C 6 E / 142 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002680/13**

**to the Commission**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ New review of the database protection directive

In 2006, the Commission concluded in its evaluation of sui generis database protection ( [1] ) that ‘the economic impact
of the “sui generis” right on database production is unproven. Introduced to stimulate the production of databases in
Europe, the new instrument has had no proven impact on the production of databases./…/ Is “sui generis” protection
therefore necessary for a thriving database industry? The empirical evidence, at this stage, casts doubts on this
necessity.’

Recently, with ‘Big Data’ becoming a buzzword for many interesting business opportunities in several sectors, the
issue of database protection in the Union has come up again.

How is the Commission working to evaluate the impact of the database protection directive on the goals and
ambitions of the Digital Agenda?

Is the Commission planning to conduct a new review of the directive?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

Directive 96/9/EC ( [2] ) harmonised the hitherto divergent national rules on the protection of databases in order to
create a level playing field and an attractive environment for the investment in databases. At the same time, the
directive aims at safeguarding the legitimate interests of users of databases.

In its communication of 18 December 2012 ( [3] ), the Commission has set out its strategy for the next two years in
order to ensure an effective digital single market in the area of copyright with a view to a decision in 2014 whether to
table legislative reform proposals.

Although Directive 96/9/EC is not specifically mentioned in the Commission's Communication of
18 December 2012, the Commission does not exclude that this directive could be part of that review of the EU
copyright legislative framework.

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( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (OJ 1996 L 77, p. 20).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Communication from the Commission of 18 December 2012 on content in the Digital Single Market (COM(2012) 789 final).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 143

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002681/13**

**à la Commission**
**Hélène Flautre (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Passage de Mayotte au statut de RUP et acquis communautaire en matière de droits fondamentaux,
d'immigration et d'asile

Après être devenu département français en mars 2011, le territoire de Mayotte obtiendra, le 1 [er ] janvier 2014, le
statut de région ultrapériphérique (RUP). La Commission prépare actuellement une proposition visant à définir les
mesures transitoires et dérogatoires au droit communautaire dont bénéficiera le département de Mayotte. La loi
française n [o] 012-1270 du 20 novembre 2012 relative à la régulation économique outre-mer et portant diverses
dispositions relatives aux territoires d'outre-mer prévoit la possibilité pour le gouvernement de modifier l'ordonnance
n [ o] 2000-373 du 26 avril 2000 relative aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers à Mayotte, afin notamment
de la mettre en conformité avec le droit communautaire.

Les législations et des pratiques dérogatoires actuelles en matière d'immigration et d'asile conduisent à des violations
claires de l'acquis communautaire sur le territoire de Mayotte. Absence de recours effectif, exercice marginal du
contrôle juridictionnel, rétention massive des migrants, notamment de mineurs, sont autant d'exemples de violations
des droits en matière de retour. D'ailleurs, la Cour européenne des Droits de l'homme réunie en grande chambre a
affirmé le 13 décembre 2012 que les procédures d'exception appliquées dans certaines terres d'outre-mer (ici la
Guyane, où le requérant avait été reconduit à la frontière avant une décision du tribunal administratif) de la France
violent le droit à un recours effectif garanti par l'article 13 de la Convention. En matière d'asile, de nombreux
manquements quant à l'accueil et à la procédure régissant les demandes d'asile sont régulièrement constatés:
expulsion au cours d'une demande d'asile, absence d'hébergement ou d'allocation compensatoire.

1. La Commission prévoit-elle d'inclure dans sa proposition des mesures transitoires ou dérogatoires à l'acquis en
matière d'asile et de migration et à la charte européenne des droits fondamentaux, pour la RUP de Mayotte? Dans
l'affirmative, quelles seraient-elles?

2. Quelles propositions la Commission pourrait-elle adopter afin d'assurer le respect de l'acquis communautaire en
matière d'immigration, d'asile et de droits fondamentaux sur le territoire de Mayotte lors de son accession au statut
de RUP?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Malmström au nom de la Commission**

_(24 avril 2013)_

La Commission, ayant analysé la demande des autorités françaises en faveur d'une dérogation à l'article 13,
paragraphe 2, de la directive sur les retours ( [1] ) et à l'article 13, paragraphe 5, de la directive sur les normes d'accueil ( [2] ),
considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'accorder de mesures transitoires ou de dérogations à l'acquis de l'UE en la matière.

Cette analyse préliminaire ne remplace pas le contrôle a posteriori qui sera effectué, selon les procédures prévues à
l'article 258 du TFUE, de la transposition et de l'application à Mayotte de l'acquis de l'UE dans le domaine de
l'immigration et de l'asile. Aucune proposition n'est nécessaire pour assurer la conformité avec l'acquis de l'UE. La
France, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de cet acquis sur le territoire de Mayotte, est tenue de respecter les
dispositions de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2008/115/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 2008 relative aux normes et procédures communes applicables

dans les États membres au retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2003/9/CE du Conseil du 27 janvier 2003 relative à des normes minimales pour l'accueil des demandeurs d'asile dans les États membres.

( **|**

C 6 E / 144 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002681/13**

**to the Commission**
**Hélène Flautre (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Granting Mayotte the status of an outermost region and implementing the _acquis communautaire_ in the area of
fundamental rights, immigration and asylum

After becoming a French department in March 2011, Mayotte will be granted the status of an outermost region on
1 January 2014. The Commission is currently drafting a proposal setting out the transitional measures and
derogations from EC law which will be granted to the department of Mayotte. The French Act No 2012‐1270 of
20 November 2012 on economic regulation in overseas territories and containing various provisions on overseas
territories allows the government to amend Ordinance No 2000‐373 of 26 April 2000 on the conditions for entry
and residence of third-party nationals in Mayotte, with the particular aim of bringing the latter into line with EC law.

The legislation and derogations currently in force in the area of immigration and asylum result in clear violations of
the _acquis communautaire_ in Mayotte. The lack of an effective remedy, the infrequency of judicial reviews and the huge
number of migrants who are detained, in particular minors, are just a few examples of ways in which rights of return
are violated. On 13 December 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the
exceptional procedures applied in certain overseas territories (in this case Guyana, where the petitioner had been
returned to the border before a decision had been handed down by an administrative court) by France violated the
right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention. Shortcomings are regularly reported in
respect of the reception of asylum-seekers and the procedure for handling asylum requests: these include expulsion
during the asylum process and a lack of accommodation or compensation.

1. Is the Commission planning to propose that the outermost region of Mayotte should be granted transitional
measures or derogations from the _acquis_ in the area of asylum and migration and from the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights? If so, which?

2. What proposals could the Commission adopt in order to guarantee that Mayotte complies with the _acquis_
_communautaire_ in the area of immigration, asylum and fundamental rights once it has gained the status of an
outermost region?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

Following the analysis of the French request for derogations from Article 13 (2) of Return Directive ( [1] ) and Article 13
(5) of Reception Conditions Directive ( [2] ), the Commission considers that there is no need to grant any transitional
measures or derogations from the EU _acquis_ in this area.

This preliminary analysis is without prejudice to the future monitoring of the transposition and application of the EU
_acquis_ in Mayotte in the area of asylum and migration, which will follow procedures provided under Article 258
TFEU. No proposals are needed to ensure compliance with the EU _acquis._ France shall be bound by the provisions of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union when the abovementioned _acquis_ is implemented in
Mayotte.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December on common standards and procedures in Member States

for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers.

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 145

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002682/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Wim van de Camp (PPE)**

_(7 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Invoerrechten door China en India op Europese producten

Uit een interview met Wim van de Leegte (CEO VDL) in het opinieblad Forum van VNO-NCW ( [1] ), blijkt dat China en
India nog steeds onevenredige invoerrechten heffen op producten uit de Europese Unie.

1. Heeft de Commissie kennisgenomen van het interview met Wim van der Leegte in het Blad Forum
(Forum 4/28.02.2013)?

2. Kan de Commissie aangeven in hoeverre zij tevreden is over de handelsrelatie tussen de Europese Unie en
China/India?

3. Kan de Commissie een overzicht geven over de voortgang in de onderhandelingen met China en India over de
onevenredige invoerrechten die zij heffen op Europese producten?

4. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat de invoerrechten van China en India een gelijk speelveld in de wereld
tegenhouden?

**Antwoord van de heer De Gucht namens de Commissie**

_(18 april 2013)_

Uit de bilaterale handelsbetrekkingen van de EU met India en China komen een aantal uitdagingen voort. Daarom
werkt de Commissie aan verbetering van de situatie en aan vermindering van de bestaande problemen door
voortgaande dialoog en samenwerking, maar ook, waar nodig, door het gebruik van geschillenbeslechting. De EU
voert onderhandelingen met India over een vrijhandelsovereenkomst.

De door India en China geheven tarieven zijn in overeenstemming met hun respectieve verbintenissen bij de
Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO). In het geval van China waren de tarieven het onderwerp van onderhandelingen
voorafgaand aan China’s toetreding tot de WTO in 2001. De tarieven vormen een belangrijk onderdeel van de
onderhandelingen over een vrijhandelsovereenkomst met India.

India en China passen douanerechten toe binnen de beperkingen van hun WTO-verbintenissen, net als alle andere
leden van de WTO met inbegrip van de EU. De EU is van mening dat vrijhandel bijdraagt aan wereldwijde
economische groei en werkgelegenheid, en daarom bevordert zij een verstrekkende liberalisering van de handel met
inbegrip van de afschaffing of vermindering van tarieven op multilateraal en bilateraal niveau.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.vno-ncw.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Forumartikelen/Forum_0413_vdLeegte_17967.pdf

C 6 E / 146 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002682/13**

**to the Commission**
**Wim van de Camp (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Import duties imposed on European products by China and India

An interview with Wim van de Leegte (CEO VDL) in the Forum of the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and
Employers (VNO-NCW) newspaper ( [1] ) reveals that China and India are still imposing disproportionate import duties
on products from the European Union.

1. Is the Commission aware of the interview with Wim van der Leegte in the Forum newspaper
(Forum 4/28.2.2013)?

2. Can the Commission indicate to what extent it is satisfied with trade relations between the European Union and
China/India?

3. Can the Commission give an assessment of progress in negotiations with China and India on the
disproportionate import duties which they are imposing on European products?

4. Does the Commission share the view that the import duties imposed by China and India prevent a global level
playing field?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

EU bilateral trade relationship with India and China present a number of challenges. For this reason, the Commission
is working to improve the situation and to reduce the existing problems by ongoing dialogue and cooperation, but
also by resorting to dispute settlement when necessary. With India, the EU is engaged in negotiations for a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA).

The tariffs levied by India and China are subject to their respective commitments in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). For China, the tariffs were the subject of negotiation before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. For India,
tariffs form an important part of the FTA negotiations.

India and China apply customs duties within the limits of their WTO commitments, as do all other WTO members
including the EU. The EU believes that free trade contributes to global economic growth and job creation, and
therefore promotes an ambitious trade liberalisation agenda including the elimination or reduction of tariffs at
multilateral and bilateral level.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.vno-ncw.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Forumartikelen/Forum_0413_vdLeegte_17967.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 147

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-002683/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique De Keyser (S&D)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Autobus israéliens et apartheid

Depuis ce 4 mars 2013, les autorités israéliennes ont autorisé deux compagnies de transport à mettre en place des
autobus distincts, les uns réservés aux Israéliens, les autres aux Palestiniens.

L'objectif serait d'éviter que des Palestiniens empruntent des autobus où seraient montés des colons israéliens habitant
dans les colonies illégales, comme le sont toutes les colonies, vis-à-vis du droit international.

Si cela se vérifie et se confirme, cette mesure incontestablement ségrégationniste (quelles que soient les motivations
qui pourraient être avancées par les autorités israéliennes) rappelle fortement la situation qu'ont vécue, il y a quelques
années, les populations africaines, en Afrique du Sud, avec l'apartheid et, il y a quelques décennies, aux États-Unis.

Cette situation est sans conteste contraire à la fois à la déclaration des Droits de l'homme, à la charte des droits
fondamentaux et au droit européen.

Quelle va être la réaction de la Commission? Des sanctions sont-elles imaginables et envisagées?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission**

_(16 avril 2013)_

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a connaissance de cette décision. Il semble que le ministère des transports
justifie l'ouverture de nouvelles lignes d'autobus par le fait qu'elles facilitent le transport d'un plus grand nombre de
travailleurs palestiniens en Israël et qu'il n'ait pas émis d'instructions ou d'interdictions empêchant aux travailleurs
palestiniens de prendre les autobus publics en Israël ou en Cisjordanie. Les délégations de l'Union européenne à TelAviv et à Jérusalem‐Est suivront attentivement l'évolution de cette situation, en particulier afin de vérifier si des
Palestiniens titulaires de permis d'entrée sur le territoire d'Israël, qui ont, dès lors, le droit d'utiliser les transports
publics, sont autorisés ou non à prendre les autobus publics de leur choix.

L'UE n'encourage pas le recours aux sanctions commerciales dans ses relations bilatérales avec Israël. Le commerce est
perçu comme un facteur de croissance, ce pourquoi il convient de n'envisager d'adopter des restrictions commerciales
que si tout autre instrument fait défaut, ce qui n'est pas le cas dans le cadre des relations bilatérales de l'UE avec Israël.
L'UE ne prévoit pas non plus de recourir à l'interdiction d'importer des produits provenant des colonies, ni
d'encourager la participation au boycottage de telles importations.

C 6 E / 148 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002683/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique De Keyser (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Israeli buses and apartheid

Since 4 March 2013, the Israeli authorities have been allowing two transport companies to run separate bus services
for Israelis and Palestinians.

It appears that this measure is intended to ensure that Palestinians do not take the same buses as Israelis living in the
illegal settlements (all Israeli settlements are considered illegal under international law).

If this turns out to be true, and whatever the justification put forward by the Israeli authorities, this undeniably
segregationist measure is strongly reminiscent of the situation of black Africans a few years ago under apartheid in
South Africa and a few decades ago in the USA.

There is no doubt that the current situation is at odds with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EC law.

How is the Commission going to respond to the situation in Israel? Will it consider imposing sanctions?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 April 2013)_

The HR/VP is aware of this decision. It is understood that the Ministry of Transport takes the position that the new
bus lines were opened to facilitate the transportation of an increased number of Palestinian workers to Israel and that
it has not issued any instruction or prohibition that prevents Palestinian workers from riding the public bus lines in
Israel or in the West Bank. The EU Delegations in Tel Aviv and East Jerusalem will closely follow further
developments on this issue, especially whether Palestinians who hold entrance permits to the State of Israel and who
are therefore by law allowed to use public transportation, are prohibited or not from using the public bus lines of
their choice.

The EU does not promote the use of trade sanctions in the context of bilateral EU-Israel relations. Trade is seen as an
element of growth creation and therefore trade bans could only be considered when there is no other instrument at
reach, which is not the case on bilateral EU-Israeli relations. Neither is resorting to banning the import of settlement
products envisaged by the EU, nor the encouragement of participation in boycotts against such imports.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 149

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002684/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Apoyo al voluntariado

Desde el inicio de la crisis económica en España, los índices de pobreza no paran de aumentar. Esta pobreza se hace
patente especialmente en los barrios más humildes de las ciudades, donde han surgido iniciativas como la apertura de
nuevos comedores sociales y de lucha contra los desahucios.

Por desgracia, las autoridades municipales y la administración pública se ven desbordadas y debe ser el tercer sector y
la sociedad civil quienes atiendan a los más desfavorecidos de forma voluntaria, a pesar de que en muchas ocasiones
no les damos la importancia que merecen.

La Unión Europea reconoció esta labor con el año europeo del voluntariado. No solo por su labor contra la crisis, sino
también por el importante papel del voluntariado en muchos otros ámbitos como el deporte o los movimientos
escoltas.

Ante esta situación y en la línea de seguir apoyando el voluntariado:

¿Considera adecuado la Comisión establecer algún tipo de reconocimiento a todas las iniciativas y voluntarios que
ayudan a los que más sufren esta crisis?

¿Está previsto elaborar un Estatuto del Voluntario?

¿Qué balance hace la Comisión del año europeo del voluntariado?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(24 de abril de 2013)_

Uno de los objetivos del año Europeo del Voluntariado 2011 era recompensar y reconocer las actividades de
voluntariado a fin de ofrecer incentivos apropiados a las personas, las empresas y las organizaciones de desarrollo del
voluntariado a nivel de la UE y de los Estados miembros.

En 2011, la Comisión organizó una serie de actividades para promover el reconocimiento del voluntariado. La
primera conferencia temática del Año Europeo se dedicó al reconocimiento y la validación de las capacidades y
competencias adquiridas a través del voluntariado. A nivel nacional, se celebraron en toda la UE gran número de
actividades para reconocer y agradecer la labor de los voluntarios.

Los resultados y el impacto globales del Año Europeo fueron positivos ( [1] ). El Año Europeo fomentó la creación de
redes, aumentó la sensibilización sobre el voluntariado y contribuyó al desarrollo de estrategias y legislación sobre el
voluntariado.

A partir de los resultados del Año Europeo, la Comisión seguirá promoviendo el voluntariado a través de sus
programas de financiación ( [2] ).

La Recomendación del Consejo sobre la validación del aprendizaje no formal e informal, de 20 de diciembre de de
2012, invita a los Estados miembros a establecer para 2018, a más tardar, disposiciones para su validación. Los
representantes del sector del voluntariado deben participar como partes interesadas cuando se diseñen y apliquen
dichas disposiciones. Este sector estará también representado en el Grupo Consultivo para el Marco Europeo de
Cualificaciones, que realizará el seguimiento de la Recomendación.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/eyv2011_final_report_es.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) El programa actual «Juventud en Acción», la propuesta de programa «Erasmus para todos» y los programas actuales y futuros «Europa con los

Ciudadanos».

C 6 E / 150 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

En esta fase, la Comisión no prevé proponer un Estatuto del Voluntario, pero remite a la «Carta Europea de Derechos y
Responsabilidades de los Voluntarios», elaborada por el Foro Europeo de la Juventud, que es uno de los documentos
desarrollados durante el Año Europeo como base para el seguimiento adecuado por las partes interesadas del
voluntariado y las autoridades nacionales pertinentes.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 151

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002684/13**

**to the Commission**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Support for volunteering

Poverty rates in Spain have continued to rise since the start of the economic crisis. This poverty is particularly evident
in the poorest neighbourhoods of cities where initiatives such as opening soup kitchens and fighting against evictions
have been launched.

Unfortunately, local authorities and the civil service have been overwhelmed and it is the non-profit sector and civil
society that have had to cater to those most in need voluntarily, even though they often do not receive the credit they
deserve.

The European Union acknowledged this work with the European Year of Volunteering. This not only recognised
volunteering’s role in combating the crisis, but also its importance in many areas such as sport and related

movements.

Given this situation and in order to continue supporting volunteering:

Does the Commission believe that it is appropriate to give some sort of recognition to all of the initiatives and
volunteers helping those who are worst affected by the crisis?

Is it planning to draft a Volunteering Statute?

What is its assessment of the European Year of Volunteering?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

One of the objectives of the European Year (EY) of Volunteering 2011 was to reward and recognise voluntary
activities to provide appropriate incentives for individuals, companies and volunteer development organisations at
EU and Member State level.

In 2011, the Commission organised a series of activities to promote the recognition of volunteering. The first
thematic conference of the EY was devoted to the recognition and validation of skills and competences acquired
through volunteering. At national level, a large number of activities took place throughout the EU to recognise and
thank volunteers.

The overall results and impact of the EY were positive ( [1] ). The EY stimulated the development of networks, increased
awareness of volunteering and contributed to the development of national strategies and legislation on volunteering.

Based on the results of the EY, the Commission will continue to promote volunteering through its funding
programmes ( [2] ).

The Council Recommendation on the validation of non-formal and informal learning of 20/12/2012 invites Member
States to set up arrangements for validation by 2018. Representatives of the voluntary sector should be involved as
stakeholders when designing and implementing validation arrangements. The voluntary sector will also be
represented in the EQF Advisory Group for the follow up to the recommendation.

At this stage, the Commission does not envisage proposing a volunteering Statute, but refers to the ‘European Charter
of the rights and responsibilities of volunteers’, drawn up by the European Youth Forum, and which is among the
documents development during the EY as a basis for appropriate follow-up by volunteering stakeholders and the
relevant national authorities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/eyv2011_final_report_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The current Youth in Action programme, the proposed Erasmus for All programme and the current and future Europe for Citizens programmes.

C 6 E / 152 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002686/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Homofobia en Bielorrusia

Aunque Bielorrusia despenalizó la homosexualidad en 1991, la homofobia sigue presente y en aumento. El último
ejemplo de esta creciente homofobia lo tenemos en el rechazo al grupo de Derechos LGBT GayBelarus.

GayBelarus solicitó, a principios de este año, que su organización fuera oficialmente registrada como ONG, ya que sin
el registro la organización no puede operar legalmente. En enero supieron que su solicitud había sido rechazada por el
Ministerio de Justicia argumentando que «la organización no tiene en sus estatutos las cláusulas sobre el apoyo a la
madurez social y el desarrollo integral de la juventud bielorrusa».

¿Cuál es la opinión de la Comisión ante este tipo de conductas homofóbicas en nuestro mismo continente?

¿Se plantea la Comisión algún tipo de apoyo o reconocimiento explícito a la organización GayBelarus?

¿No cree la Comisión que se deben tomar más medidas de apoyo a los jóvenes homosexuales especialmente en países
donde no se ven reconocidos sus derechos?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(29 de abril de 2013)_

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta lamenta cualquier tipo de comportamientos y actitudes homófobas y apoya
con firmeza los derechos de la Comunidad LGBT, ya sea en Europa o en cualquier otra parte del mundo.

La UE ha puesto en marcha diversas medidas en Bielorrusia con el fin de apoyar los derechos de los homosexuales y
otros grupos vulnerables contra actos discriminatorios. La UE ha expresado también en repetidas ocasiones a las
autoridades bielorrusas su preocupación sobre las dificultades a que se enfrentan las organizaciones de la sociedad
civil para poder ser registradas y actuar sin limitaciones políticas ni administrativas.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 153

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002686/13**

**to the Commission**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Homophobia in Belarus

Although Belarus decriminalised homosexuality in 1991, homophobia still exists and is on the rise. The latest
example of growing homophobia is the rejection of the LGBT rights group GayBelarus.

At the start of the year, GayBelarus requested that the organisation be officially registered as an NGO, as it cannot
operate legally without this registration. In January it learned that its application had been rejected by the Ministry of
Justice, which claimed that the organisation’s statutes did not contain clauses supporting the social maturity and
comprehensive development of Belarusian young people.

What is the Commission’s view of this type of homophobic behaviour in our own continent?

Is it planning to provide any kind of support to or explicit recognition of GayBelarus?

Does it not believe that further measures should be taken to support young homosexuals, particularly in countries
where their rights are not recognised?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2013)_

The High Representative/Vice-President deplores all kind of homophobic behaviour and attitudes against
homosexuals and firmly support LGBT rights, be it in Europe or any other part of the world.

Different measures have been put in place by the EU in Belarus in order to support the rights of homosexuals and
other vulnerable groups against discriminatory acts. The EU has also on repeated occasions expressed its concern to
Belarusian authorities about the difficulties civil society organisations face in getting registered and being able to
operate free of administrative and political constraints.

C 6 E / 154 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002687/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Colaboración contra la mafia del narcotráfico

El pasado 18 de febrero de 2013 los Mossos d'Esquadra (la policía regional de Cataluña) detuvieron en Barcelona a
dos supuestos miembros de la N'drangheta, la mafia de la región italiana de Calabria, a los que acusa también de un
delito de tráfico de drogas.

Atendiendo a la facilidad de movimiento y circulación en la Unión Europea, al Espacio Schengen, y al aumento de los
delitos a nivel comunitario:

¿Cuáles son las medidas de la Comisión para luchar contra las mafias del narcotráfico que operan a nivel europeo?

¿Se plantean nuevas medidas para reforzar los controles fronterizos en las rutas a través de las cuales se consigue
droga?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(3 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión no emprende medidas operativas de carácter coercitivo, pero respalda la cooperación de las autoridades
de los Estados miembros en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas, concretamente mediante
su apoyo a las agencias de la UE competentes en la materia, como Europol, Eurojust o Frontex. El Informe sobre el
mercado de drogas de la UE ( _EU Drugs Market Report (_ [1] _)_ ) ofrece información más detallada sobre las actividades de
tráfico de las distintas sustancias y las respuestas europea e internacional a esos delitos.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Para más información, véase: Observatorio Europeo de las Drogas y de las Toxicomanías, Europol, Informe sobre el mercado de drogas de la UE:
análisis estratégico (EU Drugs Market Report, A Strategic Analysis), Luxemburgo, Oficina de Publicaciones de la Unión Europea, 2013.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 155

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002687/13**

**to the Commission**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cooperation against drug-trafficking mafia

In Barcelona on 18 February 2013, the Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalonian regional police) arrested two suspected
members of ’Ndrangheta, the Calabrian Mafia, for alleged drug trafficking.

Given the ease of movement and circulation within the EU, the Schengen Area and increased crime throughout the
Union:

What measures is the Commission taking to combat drug-trafficking mafia operating in the EU?

Is it planning new measures to strengthen border controls on routes used to acquire drugs?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The Commission does not undertake operational law enforcement measures. The Commission supports the
cooperation of Member States' authorities in combating organised crime and drug trafficking, in particular, e.g., by
supporting relevant EU agencies such as Europol, Eurojust or Frontex. The recently published EU Drugs Market
Report ( [1] ) provides more detailed information on trafficking activities as regards different substances and the
responses at European and international level to these trafficking activities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See in more detail European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Europol, EU Drugs Market Report, A Strategic Analysis,
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013.

C 6 E / 156 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002688/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Feinstaub — Verstöße und Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten

In der Stadt Graz und dem österreichischen Bundesland Steiermark wurden systematisch die Bestimmungen der
Feinstaubrichtlinie übertreten. Des Weiteren scheint derzeit im Zuge der Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise wenig
Interesse an selbst gesetzten Verpflichtungen zu bestehen.

Auch ist der in der EU ab 2015 gesetzte Grenzwert von 20 Mikrogramm pro Kubikmeter Luft bei kleinsten
Feinstaubpartikeln (PM 2,5) doppelt so hoch wie der von der WHO empfohlene.

Eine der wirksamsten Maßnahmen, um den Feinstaub zu binden, ist ferner die Begrünung von Fassaden und Dächern.
Mehr Grünraum in der dritten Dimension wirkt sich überdies auf den Lebensraum von Pflanzen und Tieren sowie auf
das Wohlbefinden von Menschen positiv aus.

1. Warum werden Verstöße gegen die Feinstaubrichtlinie durch die Republik Österreich seit einem halben Jahr
nicht weiterverfolgt?

2. Welche Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union sind bei der Feinstaubbekämpfung außer Österreich noch
säumig?

3. Wie ist der diesbezügliche Verfahrensstand etwaiger Vertragsverletzungsverfahren?

4. Warum ist der ab 2015(!) festgesetzte Schwellenwert der EU bei kleinsten Feinstaubpartikeln, dem sogenanntem
Ultra-Feinstaub, doppelt so hoch wie der zurzeit von der WHO empfohlene?

5. Sieht die Kommission Möglichkeiten zur Anreizsetzung oder für verpflichtende rechtliche Maßnahmen in der
Begrünung von Häuserfassaden und ‐dächern?

6. Falls es hier Überlegungen gibt, wie ist der Stand der Dinge?

7. Welche zwingenden Maßnahmen plant die EU in diesem Kalenderjahr 2013 zur Eindämmung des Feinstaubs
und des Kohlendioxidausstoßes?

**Antwort von Herrn Potočnik im Namen der Kommission**

_(26. April 2013)_

1./2. Es gab tatsächlich Untersuchungen zu Verstößen gegen die Richtlinie 2008/50/EG über Luftqualität und saubere
Luft für Europa ( [1] ), und Österreich ist einer von 17 Mitgliedstaaten, gegen die wegen Überschreitung der
PM 10 -Grenzwerte Vertragsverletzungsverfahren eingeleitet wurden. Hierzu verweisen wir den Herrn Abgeordneten
auf die diesbezügliche Pressemitteilung vom 24. Januar 2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-47_de.htm

3. Was Österreich betrifft, so befindet sich das Vertragsverletzungsverfahren in der Phase des ergänzenden
Aufforderungsschreibens, in das Graz und das österreichische Bundesland Steiermark einbezogen sind.

4. Die Menge an PM 2,5 ist eine Teilmenge der PM 10, für die schon 1999 in den EU-Rechtsvorschriften Grenzwerte
festgesetzt wurden. Zudem tritt der Grenzwert für PM 2,5 zwar erst 2015 in Kraft, der Zielwert gilt jedoch schon seit
dem 1. Januar 2010. Die neuesten WHO-Leitwerte für PM 2,5 beruhen auf einem stufenweisen Ansatz (allmähliche
Senkung auf 35, 25, 15 und 10 µg/m [3] ). Der EU-Grenzwert beträgt 25 µg/m [3] und ist bis 2015 zu erreichen, als nächste
Stufe ist ein (Richt-)Grenzwert von 20 ug/m [3] für das Jahr 2020 vorgesehen. Das Zwischenziel der WHO für die Stufe
2 beträgt 25 µg/m [3] (ohne Fristen). Insofern steht das EU-Recht mit den Empfehlungen der WHO im Einklang. Aber es
muss natürlich mehr getan werden, um die ehrgeizigsten, im spezifischen Leitwert von 10 µg/m [3] festgesetzten Ziele
der WHO-Empfehlungen zu verwirklichen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2008/50/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 21. Mai 2008 über Luftqualität und saubere Luft in Europa, ABl. L 152
vom 11.6.2008.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 157

5./6. Die Begrünung von Dächern, eine von vielen Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Luftqualität und zur Anpassung
an den Klimawandel in städtischen Gebieten, kommt bereits in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten für Fördermaßnahmen
infrage.

7. Das Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission für 2013 umfasst bereits eine Überprüfung des EU-Regelungsrahmens
zur Luftqualität, wobei auch etwaige andere Maßnahmen zum besseren Schutz gegen die Auswirkungen der
Luftverschmutzung untersucht werden sollen.

C 6 E / 158 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002688/13**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Particulate matter — violations and opportunities for improvement

The provisions of the directive on particulate matter have been systematically violated in the city of Graz and the
Austrian federal state of Steiermark. There also appears to be little interest at present in meeting self-imposed
commitments, due to the effects of the financial crisis.

The limit value of 20 mg/m [3] for the smallest particulate matter (PM 2.5 ), which will apply in the EU from 2015, is twice
as high as that recommended by the WHO.

One of the most effective ways of binding particulate matter is to ‘green’ the walls and roofs of buildings. Expanding
three-dimensional green space also has a positive impact on plant and animal habitats and on the wellbeing of
individuals.

1. Why have no attempts been made over the past six months to investigate violations of the directive on
particulate matter by the Republic of Austria?

2. Which other Member States apart from Austria are also lagging behind in terms of reducing levels of particulate
matter?

3. What is the current status of any infringement proceedings that have been initiated?

4. Why is the threshold value to be imposed by the EU from 2015(!) for the smallest particulate matter, known as
ultra-fine particulate matter, twice as high as that currently recommended by the WHO?

5. Does the Commission believe that any opportunities exist to offer incentives or impose legal obligations to
green the walls and roofs of houses?

6. What is the current status of any considerations in this direction?

7. What compulsory measures is the EU planning in the calendar year 2013 to restrict emissions of particulate
matter and carbon dioxide?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

1 and 2. Failures to comply with the provisions of the Ambient Air Quality Directive (Directive 2008/50/EC ( [1] )) have
been investigated indeed and Austria is one of the seventeen Member States for which infringement procedures are
being pursued, with regard to the breach of PM 10 limit values. The Honourable Member may wish to refer to the press
release of 24 January 2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-47_en.htm

3. As regards Austria, the infringement procedure is at the stage of additional letter of formal notice, which
includes Graz and the Steiermark State.

4. PM 2.5 are a fraction of PM 10, for which limit values have been laid down in EU legislation already in 1999.
Moreover, while the limit value for PM 2.5 will enter into force in 2015, the target value is already in force since
1 January 2010. The latest WHO guideline values for PM 2.5 are based on a stage approach (successive levels of 35, 25,
15 and 10 µg/m [3] ). The EU limit value is 25 µg/m [3] to be met by 2015 and a stage 2 (indicative) limit value of 20 ug/m [3 ]

for year 2020. The WHO interim target for stage 2 is 25 µg/m [3] (without deadlines). The EU legislation is therefore in
line with the WHO recommendations. However, it is clear that more has to be done to reach the highest level of
ambition recommended by the WHO as laid down in the specific guideline value of 10 µg/m [3] .

5 and 6. Green roofs, one of many possible measures to improve air quality and adaptation to climate change in
urban areas, are already eligible for incentives in several Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, OJ L 152,
11.6.2008.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 159

7. The Commission work programme for 2013 includes a review of the EU air policy framework which will also
look into possible further measures, as appropriate, to deliver enhanced protection from the impacts of air pollution.

C 6 E / 160 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002689/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Recycling seltener Erdmetalle aus Eletronik-Schrott

Es ist wohlbekannt, dass im sogenannten Elektro-Schrott eine Vielzahl seltener Erdmetalle enthalten ist, wie z. B.
Gold, Kupfer, Kobalt, Wolfram, Indium, Germanium, Tantal, Metalle der seltenen Erden, Platin-Gruppen-Metalle usw.

Diese sind für viele derzeitige High-Tech-Produkte, Zukunftstechnologien, Medizin und Forschung — um nur ein
paar Bereiche zu nennen — unabdingbar. In Europa hat man im 20. Jahrhundert mehrfach die Erfahrung gemacht,
wie sehr Industrie und Forschung durch den Mangel solch wichtiger Stoffe abgewürgt werden können. Derzeit
werden große Mengen dieser wertvollen Rohstoffe durch gedankenlose Entsorgung insbesondere von
Konsumprodukten wie z. B. Handys und PCs verschwendet. Gleichzeitig steigt der Bedarf kontinuierlich, was sich
selbstverständlich durch steigende Preise bemerkbar macht.

Da die Entsorgungswirtschaft bei vielen dieser seltenen Stoffe bereits aufgrund der dadurch zu erzielenden Erlöse
einen hohen Anreiz hat, diese Stoffe wiederzuverwerten, liegt der Schwerpunkt des Verbesserungspotenzials
vornehmlich auf der Produktions‐ und Konsumentenseite. Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Hat die Kommission bisher Vorschläge in der Hand, auf diese abzusehende Angebots-Nachfrage-Schere im
Hinblick auf die Wiederverwertung der Stoffe zu reagieren?

2. Falls ja, wie gestalten sich diese Vorschläge? Sind eher weiter gehende gesetzliche Verordnungen, inklusive
entsprechender Sanktionierung, zur Produktion und Entsorgung von Elektro-Schrott angedacht oder soll der
Schwerpunkt auf belohnende Anreize gelegt werden?

3. Wäre im Hinblick auf die Konsumenten auch eine Mischung beider Aspekte vorstellbar, beispielsweise durch
einen Preisaufschlag, samt Zertifikat zum Produkt (insbesondere für teure Produkte mit vielen wichtigen
Rohstoffen), welcher bei fachgerechter Entsorgung wieder erstattet würde?

4. Gibt es Überlegungen der Entsorgungswirtschaft, weiter gehende Anreize zu bieten, um auch seltene Metalle,
bei welchen sich eine Wiedergewinnung aufgrund des zu hohen Aufwands im Moment noch nicht rentiert,
attraktiver für ein Recycling zu machen?

**Antwort von Herrn Potočnik im Namen der Kommission**

_(8. Mai 2013)_

Die WEEE-Richtlinie ( [1] ) enthält verbindliche allgemeine Ziele für Sammlung, Verwertung und Recycling von Elektro‐
und Elektronik-Altgeräten (WEEE — waste electrical and electronic equipment). Diese Ziele wurden in der neuen
WEEE-Richtlinie ( [2] ) verschärft, ferner wurde eine Rücknahmeverpflichtung für sehr kleine WEEE (z. B. Handys)
eingeführt, die zu einer wesentlich effizienteren Sammlung führen wird. In der Richtlinie sind auch die
Verabschiedung von Maßnahmen zur Sensibilisierung der Verbraucher und eine angemessene Kennzeichnung der auf
den Markt gebrachten Produkte vorgesehen.

Die Kommission erteilte den europäischen Normenorganisationen einen Auftrag zur Entwicklung von Normen für
die Behandlung von WEEE.

Produktspezifische Anforderungen für seltene Erdmetalle können im Rahmen der Ökodesign-Richtlinie ( [3] ) festgelegt
werden. Die Methodik für Ökodesign ( [4] ) wurde um einen Indikator für kritische Rohstoffe (CRM — Critical Raw
Materials) erweitert, um mögliche Designoptionen zu erleichtern, bei denen CRM-Bauteile ersetzt werden oder eine
Verwertung dieser Bauteile erleichtert wird.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2002/96/EG über Elektro- und Elektronik-Altgeräte (WEEE), ABl. L 37 vom 13.2.2003.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2012/19/EU über Elektro- und Elektronik-Altgeräte (WEEE) (Neufassung), ABl. L 197 vom 24.7.2012.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2009/125/EG, ABl. L 285 vom 31.10.2009.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) MEErP: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/ecodesign/methodology/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 161

Die Herausforderung der WEEE-Verfolgung ist Thema eines von der EU finanzierten Projekts mit Pilotinitiativen in
der Tschechischen Republik und in Spanien (WEEE TRACE).

Derzeit werden Kriterien für das Ende der Abfalleigenschaft ( [5] ) entwickelt, um das Recycling zu erleichtern und die
Nachfrage nach Sekundärrohstoffen durch verbindliche hohe Materialqualitäts-Standards zu stimulieren.

Weitere Maßnahmen zur Entwicklung und Einführung von Recyclingsystemen und ‐technologien sowie zur
Verbesserung der Recyclingrate seltener Metalle in Europa werden im Rahmen der Europäischen
Innovationspartnerschaft für Rohstoffe ( [6] ) erörtert.

Die Kommission arbeitet an einer Ex-Post-Bewertung des EU- _Acquis_ im Abfallbereich, sie stützt sich dabei auf eine
Studie von 2012, bei der der Nutzen wirtschaftlicher Instrumente für das Management spezifischer Abfallströme in
verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten untersucht wurde (Systeme der Herstellerverantwortung, verursacherbezogene
Systeme (Pay-As-You-Throw) und Besteuerung von Deponien und Verbrennung).

( **|**

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) In Einklang mit Artikel 6 der Abfallrahmenrichtlinie:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/end_of_waste.htm

( **|**

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Eine Mitteilung der Kommission zu diesem Thema soll noch vor Ende 2013 angenommen werden:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/innovation-partnership/

C 6 E / 162 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002689/13**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Recycling of rare earth metals from electronic waste

It is widely known that electronic waste contains many rare earth metals, such as gold, copper, cobalt, tungsten,
indium, germanium, tantalum, rare earth metals, platinum group metals etc.

These are indispensable for many of the high-tech products currently manufactured, as well as for future
technologies, medicine and research, to name but a few sectors. The history of Europe in the 20th century provides us
with many examples of the extent to which industry and research can be stifled by a lack of such key substances. At
present, large quantities of these valuable raw materials are wasted because they are disposed of carelessly, in
particular those contained in consumer products such as mobile phones and PCs. At the same time, rising prices are
of course evidence that demand is continuously on the up.

Since the waste management industry already has a major incentive to recycle many of these rare substances as a
result of the potential revenues that can be generated, the potential for improvements lies mainly on the production
and consumer side. This raises the following questions:

1. Has the Commission drafted with any proposals yet in response to this foreseeable mismatch between supply
and demand for the recycling of these substances?

2. If so, what do these proposals look like? Do they feature harder-hitting legal regulations on the production and
disposal of electronic waste, including the relevant sanctions, or do they focus on incentives instead?

3. As far as consumers are concerned, would it be feasible to implement a mixture of both approaches, for
example price increases together with product certificates and refunds once an item has been disposed of
correctly, in particular expensive products with many key raw materials?

4. Is the Commission considering offering further incentives to the waste management industry to make recycling
a more attractive option for rare metals which cannot yet be reclaimed profitably due to the effort involved?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

The WEEE Directive ( [1] ) contains binding overall targets for the collection, recovery and recycling of WEEE. These were
raised in the new WEEE Directive ( [2] ) and a take-back obligation for very small WEEE (e.g. mobile phones) was
introduced which should increase collection significantly. The directive also requires adoption of measures towards
consumer awareness and appropriately marking of products placed on the market.

The Commission gave a mandate to the European standardisation organisations for the development of standards for
the treatment of WEEE.

Product specific requirements on rare earth metals can be established under the Ecodesign Directive ( [3] ). A Critical Raw
Materials (CRM) indicator was added to the Ecodesign methodology ( [4] ) to facilitate possible design options that
substitute or make it easier to recover CRM components.

The challenge of tracking WEEE is being addressed in an EU-funded project with pilot initiatives in the Czech
Republic and Spain (WEEE TRACE).

End-of-waste criteria ( [5] ) are being developed to facilitate recycling and stimulate demand for secondary raw materials
by requiring high material quality standards.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (OJ L 37, 13.2.2003).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2012/19/EU on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (recast) (OJ L 197, 24.7.2012).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/125/EC (OJ L 285, 31.10.2009).
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) MEErP: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/ecodesign/methodology/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) In accordance with Article 6 of the Waste Framework Directive: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/end_of_waste.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 163

Additional measures to develop and roll-out recycling systems and technologies and improve the rate of recycling of
rare metals in Europe are being discussed in the framework of the European Innovation Partnership on Raw
Materials ( [6] ).

The Commission is undertaking an _ex-post_ evaluation of the EU waste _acquis_, taking into account a 2012 study that
looked into the use of economic instruments to the management of specific waste stream directives in different
Member States (producer responsibility schemes, pay-as-you-throw schemes and taxes for landfill and incineration).

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) A relevant Commission communication is planned for adoption before the end of 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/rawmaterials/innovation-partnership/

C 6 E / 164 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002690/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Armutswanderung und Sozialleistungsmissbrauch in der EU

Die Kohäsionspolitik der EU ist eine offene Bestätigung zum Teil starker Unterschiede wirtschaftlicher Leistungskraft.
Gleichzeitig soll Schengen den unkontrollierten Grenzübertritt im Mitgliedsraum ermöglichen. Da die Nivellierung
wirtschaftlicher Leistungskraft, wenn überhaupt, langsam erfolgt, ist die logische Konsequenz eine starke
Bevölkerungsmigration.

Die anstehende Schengenerweiterung um Rumänien und Bulgarien wurde nun vorerst vertagt. Die bisher erfolgte
Armutswanderung ohne Schengen hat in den letzten 5 Jahren für eine Einwanderung von ca. 800 000 Menschen aus
Rumänien und Bulgarien nach Deutschland gesorgt. Der überwiegende Teil ist leider unausgebildet — auch viele
Analphabeten sind darunter. Die Befürchtung vieler europäischer Bürger ist ein massiver Missbrauch der
Sozialleistungen der Mitgliedstaaten. So zeigt sich in Deutschland, dass dort ansässige Roma in rapide wachsenden,
ghettoähnlichen Armutsbehausungen unter furchtbaren hygienischen Bedingungen wohnen. Viele halten sich durch
Ein- bis Zwei-Eurojobs und sogar Prostitution, organisiert durch Verwandte oder auch Schlepper, über Wasser und
leben von der Hand in den Mund. Ihr Zugang zu Sozialleistungen wird durch die Ausstellung eines Gewerbescheines
erwirkt — alleine in Berlin-Neukölln gibt es einzelne Adressen an denen 200 Betriebe von Roma angemeldet sind.
Trotzdem ziehen sie ein „Leben“ in Deutschland gegenüber dem in der alten Heimat vor. Aus diesen Umständen
ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Wie steht die Kommission zu dem grundsätzlichen Dilemma stark unterschiedlicher Wirtschaftskraft
(Reichtum, Lohn, Kaufkraft, Sozialleistungen) einerseits und Schengen-Grenzen andererseits unter den
EU-Mitgliedstaaten?

2. Wird die Armutswanderung von der Kommission zum Teil als vorteilhaft angesehen, da auf diese Weise die
wirtschaftliche Anpassung beschleunigt wird, indem reichere Länder nun viel Geld zur Finanzierung der
zugewanderten Bedürftigen detachieren müssen und so eine wirtschaftliche Nivellierung beschleunigt wird?

3. Welche Lösungen hat die Kommission um dieser fundamentalen Problematik zu begegnen?

4. Was würde die Kommission bei zwei Alternativen zur Bekämpfung dieses Problems des Missbrauchs von
Sozialleistung präferieren: Die Übernahme der Sozialleistungen durch das jeweilige EU-Herkunftsland des
zugezogenen EU-Bürgers oder die nachhaltige Ausweisung von EU-Bürgern, welche das Sozialsystem
nachweislich missbrauchen?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

Die Freizügigkeit ist eine Grundfreiheit, die gemäß den EU-Verträgen allen Unions-Bürgerinnen und ‐Bürgern zusteht.

Die Mobilität der Arbeitskräfte wirkt sich positiv auf die Wirtschaft aus. Studien zeigen, dass Wanderarbeitnehmer
aus anderen EU-Ländern das BIP des Aufnahmelandes erheblich steigern können.

Leistungen der sozialen Sicherheit und die diesbezüglichen Anspruchsvoraussetzungen sind in den nationalen
Rechtsordnungen festgelegt. Die EU-Rechtsvorschriften sorgen für die Koordinierung der Systeme der sozialen
Sicherheit der Mitgliedstaaten, nicht jedoch für eine Harmonisierung. Die Mitgliedstaaten verfügen über die
erforderlichen rechtlichen und verwaltungstechnischen Möglichkeiten, um zu prüfen, ob Begünstigte tatsächlich
einen Anspruch haben, ohne dabei jedoch zusätzliche Auflagen ausschließlich für Wanderarbeitnehmer festzulegen.

Statistiken (z. B. Eurobarometer zur Mobilität, EU-Arbeitskräfteerhebung) belegen, dass die Beschäftigungs‐ und
Arbeitsmöglichkeiten die Hauptanreize für Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind, in einen anderen Mitgliedstaat zu ziehen.

Die Kommission unterstützt aktiv Maßnahmen zur Förderung der Integration von Wanderarbeitnehmern und zur
Bekämpfung von Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung, auch in den Herkunftsländern der Wanderarbeitnehmer. Dies
steht im Einklang mit dem Ziel der Strategie Europa 2020, bis zum Jahr 2020 mindestens 20 Millionen Menschen aus
Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung herauszuführen und eine Beschäftigungsquote von 75 % zu erreichen.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 165

Die Kommission weist den Herrn Abgeordneten insbesondere auf den EU-Rahmen für nationale Strategien zur
Integration der Roma bis 2020 hin. Mit diesem Rahmen sollen die nationalen Politikmaßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten
(in den Bereichen Beschäftigung, Bildung, Gesundheit und Wohnraum) gestärkt und überwacht und EU-Mittel zur
Unterstützung konkreter Projekte für Roma-Gemeinschaften mobilisiert werden, insbesondere aus dem ESF und dem
EFRE.

C 6 E / 166 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002690/13**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The migration of poverty and the abuse of social welfare schemes in the EU

The EU’s cohesion policy is clear confirmation of the sometimes major differences between its Member States in
terms of economic performance. Yet at the same time the aim of Schengen is to allow uncontrolled border crossings
within the EU. Since differences in economic performance are being eliminated slowly, if at all, the logical
consequence is the large-scale migration of populations.

The forthcoming enlargement of the Schengen area to include Romania and Bulgaria has been delayed for the time
being. Yet even without Schengen, poverty migration has so far resulted in the immigration of approximately
800 000 people from Romania and Bulgaria to Germany over the past five years. Unfortunately most of them are
untrained, and many are illiterate. Many European citizens fear widespread abuse of the Member States’ social welfare
schemes. The Roma population in Germany, for example, lives in rapidly expanding ghetto-like slums in terrible
sanitary conditions. Many of the people in these slums live from hand to mouth, keeping themselves afloat with lowpaid community work or even prostitution, organised by relatives or people smugglers. They secure access to social
welfare benefits on the basis of licences to trade, and in Berlin-Neukölln alone there are certain addresses which have
been used to register 200 Roma-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, they prefer this ‘life’ in Germany to that in their
former home country. These circumstances beg the following questions:

1. What is the Commission’s position on the fundamental dilemma between the greatly varying economic
performance (wealth, wages, purchasing power, social welfare benefits) of the EU Member States on the one
hand, and Schengen borders on the other hand?

2. Does the Commission regard the migration of poverty as a benefit in some respects, given that it accelerates
economic adjustment by forcing wealthier countries to spend a great deal of money on deprived immigrants,
thus reducing economic differences more rapidly?

3. What solutions can the Commission suggest to overcome this fundamental problem?

4. Which of these two alternatives would the Commission prefer in order to combat the abuse of social welfare
schemes: the payment of social welfare benefits for EU immigrants by the relevant Member State of origin, or
the permanent expulsion of EU citizens who can be proven to have abused the social welfare system?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

Free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom enjoyed by all EU citizens under the terms of the EU Treaties.

Labour mobility is good for the economy. Studies show that migrant workers from other EU countries can boost the
host country's GDP considerably.

Social security benefits and the conditions for entitlement to them are defined by national law. EC law provides for
the coordination of the Member States’ social security systems excluding any harmonisation. Member States have the
necessary legal and administrative possibilities to carry out verifications on the beneficiaries to determine their
entitlement but without imposing additional conditions only to the migrants.

According to statistical evidence (e.g. eurobarometers on mobility, EU labour force survey), the main incentives for
citizens moving to another Member State are related to employment and work prospects.

The Commission is actively supporting measures to promote the integration of migrant workers and to fight poverty
and social exclusion, including in the countries of origin of migrant workers. This is in line with the Europe 2020
objective to lift at least 20 million people from the risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2020 and reach an
employment rate of 75% by that same year.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 167

The Commission draws in particular the attention of the Honourable Member to the EU Framework for National
Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020. This framework aims at enhancing and monitoring Member States' national
policies (in employment, education, health and housing) and mobilising EU funds, in particular the ESF and the ERDF,
to support concrete projects for Roma communities.

C 6 E / 168 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002691/13**

**to the Commission**
**Chris Davies (ALDE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Re-use and recycling of printer cartridges

Is the Commission able to confirm that some 400 million inkjet cartridges and some 150 million printer toner
cartridges are placed on the EU market each year?

Can the Commission confirm that more than 70% of used inkjet cartridges and some 30% of used toner cartridges
still end up in landfill?

What specific EU legislation, if any, places a responsibility on producers to ensure that these products are disposed of
in accordance with the waste hierarchy, with priority being attached to their re-use and recycling?

Does the Commission intend to put forward proposals for strengthening the responsibility of producers to ensure
that these sophisticated products — which often contain rare earth metals — are not simply dumped in landfill at the
end of their lives?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

The Commission is not in the position to confirm the specific data mentioned by the Honourable Member. The data
that the Commission has are available on its web-page ( [1] ) and are not linked specifically to ink cartridges.

Concerning the last two questions, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written
Question E-004493/2012 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application?home.do?language=EN.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 169

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002692/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Accesso ai libri per ipovedenti

L'Associazione europea dei ciechi (EBU) ha richiamato ripetutamente l'attenzione sull'importanza della conclusione
da parte dell'Organizzazione mondiale per la proprietà intellettuale (WIPO), di un trattato internazionale vincolante
che garantisca alle persone cieche, ipovedenti e con difficoltà di lettura di poter usufruire liberamente dei libri scritti in
Braille, a grandi caratteri e in formato audio, prodotti in tutti i Paesi e protetti dal diritto d'autore. Attualmente, le
statistiche dicono che solo il 5 % dei libri sul mercato sono accessibili ai ciechi e agli ipovedenti dei paesi sviluppati, e
meno dell'1 % dei testi è disponibile per le persone con problemi di vista nei paesi in via di sviluppo.

La Commissione petizioni ha presentato nel gennaio 2012 un'interrogazione alla Commissione europea e al
Consiglio europeo per chiedere chiarimenti circa la loro posizione nell'ambito dei negoziati WIPO.

Inoltre, la Commissione petizioni ha redatto una risoluzione che è stata approvata il 16 febbraio 2012 dalla plenaria
del Parlamento europeo, nella quale si chiede al Consiglio e alla Commissione di promuovere un trattato WIPO
giuridicamente vincolante sulla disciplina per il copyright per i libri e le stampe prodotti per i ciechi e ipovedenti.

L'Organizzazione Mondiale per la Proprietà intellettuale (WIPO) sta considerando l'adozione di tale trattato, ma fino a
ora alcuni fra i membri europei di tale organizzazione si sono opposti a standard globali e stringenti che sanciscano
un tale diritto. Per questo i testi disponibili in formato Braille, a caratteri ingranditi o in digitale, restano sempre
troppo pochi e la situazione non è omogenea da Paese a Paese.

In occasione della discussione in Commissione petizioni del 12 luglio 2012, la Commissione europea si è detta
pronta a riceverne mandato dal Consiglio europeo per negoziare un trattato WIPO vincolante che garantisca l'accesso
ai libri per ciechi e ipovedenti, modificando nettamente la sua posizione precedentemente espressa a favore di un
trattato facoltativo.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

—
Ritiene la Commissione che sia necessario verificare il livello di attuazione di tali policies a livello comunitario?

—
Ritiene la Commissione che la stipula di un trattato vincolante con la WIPO sia sufficiente a garantire la piena
accessibilità ai libri da parte dei ciechi e degli ipovedenti?

—
Quali eventuali ulteriori passi intende effettuare la Commissione a favore di questa categoria?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione**

_(8 maggio 2013)_

1. Nel mese di ottobre 2012 il Consiglio ha autorizzato la Commissione a negoziare un trattato vincolante con
l'Organizzazione mondiale per la proprietà intellettuale (WIPO). Il Consiglio ha inoltre determinato le direttive di
negoziato per le disposizioni sostanziali del trattato che la Commissione è invitata a seguire nel corso dei negoziati.
Nel mese di dicembre 2012 l'Assemblea della WIPO ha deciso di organizzare una conferenza diplomatica a giugno
2013 a Marrakech per concludere i negoziati. Nel frattempo si sono svolte diverse tornate di negoziati preliminari per
assicurare l'esito positivo della conferenza diplomatica.

2.-3. Secondo la Commissione, il futuro trattato può fornire un contributo significativo per migliorare l'accesso ai
libri da parte di non vedenti e ipovedenti, soprattutto se contiene disposizioni che garantiscano la certezza giuridica
per quanto riguarda lo scambio transfrontaliero di libri in formato accessibile. La Commissione favorisce inoltre la
cooperazione volontaria fra editori e organizzazioni dei non vedenti per assicurare ai gruppi interessati un accesso ai
libri quanto più ampio possibile.

C 6 E / 170 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002692/13**

**to the Commission**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Access to books for the visually impaired

The European Blind Union (EBU) has repeatedly drawn attention to the importance of the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO) concluding a binding international treaty to ensure that people who are blind, visually impaired
or have reading difficulties are able to freely use books in braille, large print or audio format produced in all countries
and protected by copyright. Currently, according to the statistics, only 5% of the books on the market are accessible
to blind and partially sighted people in developed countries and less than 1% of books are available to visually
impaired people in developing countries.

In January 2012 the Committee on Petitions submitted a question to the Commission and the Council to ask for
clarification as to their position in the WIPO negotiations.

In addition, the Committee on Petitions drafted a resolution that was adopted on 16 February 2012 by the European
Parliament in plenary session, in which the Council and the Commission were asked to promote a legally binding
WIPO treaty on copyright rules for books and printed matter for the blind and visually impaired.

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is considering the adoption of such a treaty but, hitherto, some
of the European members of that organisation have expressed their opposition to stringent global standards that
sanction such a right. That is why there are still too few texts available in braille, large print or digital format and the
situation is very different from country to country.

During the debate in the Committee on Petitions meeting of 12 July 2012, the Commission said it was willing to
accept a mandate from the Council to negotiate a binding WIPO treaty guaranteeing access to books for the blind and
visually impaired, thereby significantly changing its previous position in favour of an optional treaty.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following questions:

—
Does it consider it necessary to ascertain the level of implementation of these policies at EU level?

—
Does it believe that the conclusion of a binding treaty with WIPO is sufficient to ensure that the blind and
visually impaired have full access to books?

—
What, if any, further steps will the Commission take to assist this category of person?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

1. In October 2012, the Council authorised the Commission to negotiate a binding treaty in WIPO. The Council
also determined the negotiating directives for the substantive provisions of the treaty that the Commission is invited
to follow during those negotiations. In December 2012, the General Assembly of WIPO decided to call a diplomatic
conference to conclude the negotiations. It will take place in June 2013 in Marrakesh. In the meantime, several rounds
of preliminary negotiations have taken place in order to ensure the positive outcome of the diplomatic conference.

2-3. In the Commission’s view, the future treaty can make a significant contribution to improving access to books by
print disabled persons, in particular if it will contain provisions that create legal certainty for the cross-border
exchange for accessible format books. The Commission also fosters voluntary cooperation between publishers and
organisations of the blind in order to ensure that print disabled persons have the broadest possible access to books.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 171

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002693/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Conseguenze sull'industria tessile e calzaturiera e sulla salute dei consumatori, della soppressione dei dazi
sulle importazioni dal Pakistan

Il Parlamento europeo approvava, in data 25 ottobre 2012, un regolamento contenente una serie di misure atte a
favorire lo sviluppo economico e sociale del Pakistan incoraggiando l'esportazione dei prodotti locali.

Tali misure consistevano essenzialmente nell'esenzione dal pagamento dei dazi doganali sull'importazione di
determinate categorie merceologiche (principalmente prodotti tessili e calzaturieri) dal Pakistan verso l'Unione
europea, esenzione che resterà in vigore fino al 31 dicembre 2013; il regolamento subordinava peraltro il permanere
di tale esenzione al rispetto ed alla tutela, da parte delle autorità pakistane, dei diritti umani in genere e, in particolare,
dei diritti dei lavoratori.

Tuttavia, allo stato attuale non vi sono ragioni evidenti per ritenere che tale provvedimento abbia effettivamente
contribuito a migliorare le condizioni di vita del popolo pakistano, con particolare riguardo agli strati sociali più
deboli; inoltre la violazione dei diritti umani, dei diritti politici e dei diritti sindacali è tuttora un fenomeno diffuso in
Pakistan e non si ravvisano sforzi significativi da parte delle autorità locali per mutare tale situazione.

È invece chiaro che detto accordo va a danneggiare la produzione interna dell'Unione, che vanta un notevole numero
di eccellenze proprio in campo tessile e calzaturiero, le quali tuttavia non posso competere con prodotti provenienti
da Paesi in via di sviluppo come il Pakistan, dove il costo del lavoro è infimo proprio a causa del mancato rispetto dei
diritti dei lavoratori.

Infine, è opportuno sottolineare che i prodotti in questione, essendo realizzati con standard e metodologie non
paragonabili a quelli europei, potrebbero nuocere gravemente alla salute, come dimostrato dalla recente
individuazione di elevate quantità di cromo in prodotti calzaturieri, prodotti con materiale importato di origine
incerta e commercializzati in Svizzera.

Chiediamo pertanto alla Commissione:

—
Quali sono stati e quali saranno in futuro gli effetti della soppressione dei dazi sulle merci provenienti dal
Pakistan, sull'industria tessile e calzaturiera europea ed italiana?

—
Considerati gli effetti nefasti di tale provvedimento sulle suddette imprese italiane ed europee, nonché i possibili
rischi per la salute dei consumatori, non sarebbe auspicabile rivedere i termini del regolamento di cui sopra?

**Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione**

_(24 maggio 2013)_

Le misure in questione sono state introdotte dal regolamento (UE) n. 1029/2012 ( [1] ) in risposta alle alluvioni che
hanno devastato parti del Pakistan nell'estate 2010 e arriveranno a scadenza alla fine del 2013. L'obiettivo è stimolare
l'attività economica nei settori chiave dell'esportazione in Pakistan. Le preferenze sono tra l'altro condizionate al fatto
che il Pakistan non si impegni in violazioni serie e sistematiche dei diritti umani, compresi i diritti basilari in tema di
lavoro, dei principi fondamentali della democrazia e dello stato di diritto. Per il momento la Commissione non
dispone di elementi che consentano di presumere un mancato rispetto di tali condizioni da parte del Pakistan.

Il regolamento prevede inoltre che entro i due anni successivi alla sua scadenza, la Commissione presenterà al
Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio una relazione sugli effetti delle misure. Tale relazione dovrebbe comprendere
un'analisi dettagliata degli effetti delle misure sull'economia del Pakistan e del loro impatto sugli scambi e sulle entrate
tariffarie dell'Unione nonché sull'economia e l'occupazione nell'Unione. All'atto di elaborare tale relazione la
Commissione dovrà tener conto in particolare degli effetti delle preferenze commerciali autonome in termini di
creazione di posti di lavoro, eradicazione della povertà e sviluppo sostenibile della popolazione lavorativa e dei poveri
in Pakistan.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1029/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2012, recante preferenze commerciali autonome
d'urgenza per il Pakistan, GU L 316 del 14.11.2012.

C 6 E / 172 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

È troppo presto per analizzare gli effetti del regolamento. Tuttavia, dai dati disponibili, le importazioni dal Pakistan
nei settori in questione hanno registrato un lieve aumento a fine gennaio 2013 a petto di un calo relativo delle
importazioni UE negli stessi settori da paesi terzi.

Quanto alla sicurezza dei prodotti, i prodotti in questione sono soggetti agli stessi standard e alle stesse disposizioni
che si applicano a tutte le importazioni che arrivano nell'UE.

Considerate le circostanze la Commissione non ravvisa per ora la necessità di rivedere i termini del regolamento.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 173

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002693/13**

**to the Commission**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Impact of abolition of duties on imports from Pakistan on the textile and shoe industry and on consumer
health

On 25 October 2012 the European Parliament adopted a regulation setting out a range of measures to promote the
economic and social development of Pakistan by encouraging the export of local products.

Those measures consisted essentially of the exemption from import duties for certain categories of goods (mainly
textiles and footwear) from Pakistan to the European Union; the exemption will remain in force until
31 December 2013. Moreover, under that regulation, such exemption was contingent upon compliance with and
protection of human rights in general and the rights of workers in particular, by the Pakistani authorities.

However, at present there are no obvious reasons to believe that this measure has actually helped to improve the
living conditions of the Pakistani people, particularly with regard to the weaker sections of society. Furthermore, the
violation of human, political and trade union rights is still widespread in Pakistan and no significant efforts appear to
have been made by the local authorities to change this situation.

It is, however, clear that this agreement is damaging the internal production of the EU, which lays claim to great
excellence precisely in the textile and footwear fields. The EU cannot, however, compete with products from
developing countries such as Pakistan, where the cost of labour is very low precisely because workers' rights are not
respected.

Lastly, it should be stressed that since the products in question are made by using standards and methods that are not
comparable to those used in Europe, they could cause serious harm to health, as demonstrated by the recent discovery
of large quantities of chromium in footwear produced from imported material of uncertain origin and marketed in
Switzerland.

Can the Commission therefore say:

—
What has been, and what will be, the impact of the abolition of customs duties on goods from Pakistan on the
European and Italian textile and shoe industry?

—
Given the adverse effects of this measure on the Italian and European companies in question, as well as the
possible risks to consumer health, would it not be preferable to revise the terms of the regulation mentioned
above?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2013)_

The measures in question were introduced by Regulation (EU) No 1029/2012 ( [1] ) in response to devastating flooding
in parts of Pakistan in summer 2010 and are running to the end of 2013. The objective is to stimulate economic
activity in Pakistan's core export sectors. The preferences are conditional, _inter alia_, on Pakistan not engaging in
serious and systematic violations of human rights, including core labour rights, fundamental principles of democracy
and the rule of law. At this stage, the Commission has not received evidence that Pakistan has not been fulfilling these
conditions.

The regulation also provides that no later than two years after its expiry, the Commission will submit a report to
Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the measures. That report should include a detailed analysis of the
effects of the measures on the economy of Pakistan and their impact on trade and the Union's tariff income as well as
on the Union economy and jobs. In reporting, the Commission should take into account in particular the effects of
the autonomous trade preferences in terms of job creation, poverty eradication and the sustainable development of
Pakistan's working population and poor.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1029/2012 of Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 introducing emergency autonomous trade preferences for
Pakistan, OJ L 316, 14.11.2012.

C 6 E / 174 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

It is too soon to analyse the effects of the regulation at this point in time. However, from available data, imports from
Pakistan in the sectors in question have shown a slight increase in end January 2013, against a relative decline in EU
imports in the same sectors from third countries.

On the question of product safety, the products in question are subject to the same standards and requirements as all
imports into the EU.

Under these circumstances, the Commission does not see the need to revise the terms of the regulation at this point in
time.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 175

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002694/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) und Anne**

**Delvaux (PPE)**
_(7. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Moratorium für bzw. teilweises Verbot von Neonicotinoiden, verschobene Abstimmung

Die EFSA identifizierte Anfang 2013 von drei Neonicotinoid-Insektiziden (Clothianidin, Imidacloprid und
Thiamethoxam) ausgehende Risiken für Bienen. Zwar konnte die EFSA die Risikobewertung aufgrund von
mangelnden Informationen in einigen Fällen nicht abschließen, doch entschloss sich die Kommission daraufhin
am 31.1. — wohl auch im Hinblick auf das Vorsorgeprinzip —, sich für ein auf zwei Jahre begrenztes teilweises
Verbot der drei fraglichen Neonicotinoide einzusetzen, das für den Anbau von Mais, Sonnenblumen, Raps und
Baumwolle gelten sollte. Für Wintergetreide und Pflanzen, die keine Bienen anziehen, sollten die Pestizide weiter
erlaubt blieben. Das Verbot sollte bereits im Sommer in Kraft treten. Nun wurde jedoch — nach
Presseinformationen — die ursprünglich für Ende Februar angesetzte Abstimmung abgesagt. Die Kommission müsse
weiter mit den Mitgliedstaaten verhandeln, heißt es. Verschiedene Umweltorganisationen nennen als Grund für die
Verschiebung Einflussnahme der Chemieindustrie.

1. Aus welchen Gründen hat die Kommission die Abstimmung verschoben?

2. Welche Gesichtspunkte bzw. welche neuen Entwicklungen haben dazu geführt, dass die Kommission die
Chance für ein Verbot nun anders bewertet als noch vor wenigen Wochen?

3. Hatte die Kommission vor der Erklärung, sie wolle ein Verbot durchsetzen, eine Bewertung eventueller
Folgewirkungen bzw. Klagen eingeholt?

4. Welche weiteren Forschungen wird die Kommission in Auftrag geben (über die EFSA o. ä.), um die Risiken
konkret(er) einschätzen zu können?

**Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission**

_(22. April 2013)_

1. Die Abstimmung wurde aus verfahrenstechnischen Gründen vom 25. Februar auf den 15. März 2013
verschoben.

2. Die Kommission hat ihren Standpunkt nicht geändert. Der Maßnahmenentwurf wurde erörtert und wird dem
Ständigen Ausschuss für die Lebensmittelkette und Tiergesundheit am 14. und 15. März 2013 zur Abstimmung
vorgelegt.

3. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage verweist die Kommission die Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die Anfrage
zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E‐001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. Hierzu verweist die Kommission die Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die Anfrage zur schriftlichen
Beantwortung E‐001942/2013 ( [2] ). Darüber hinaus hat sich die Kommission verpflichtet, jegliche neuen
wissenschaftlichen Informationen, die verfügbar gemacht werden, unverzüglich an die Europäische Behörde für
Lebensmittelsicherheit weiterzuleiten.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html)
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 176 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002694/13**

**à la Commission**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE)**

**et Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Moratoire sur les néonicotinoïdes ou interdiction partielle, vote reporté

L'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) a identifié début 2013 des risques pour les abeilles résultant de
l'utilisation de trois insecticides néonicotinoïdes (la clothianidine, l'imidaclopride et le thiaméthoxame). L'EFSA n'a
certes pas pu finaliser l'évaluation des risques dans tous les cas, en raison d'un manque d'informations, mais le
31 janvier, la Commission a décidé, également eu égard au principe de précaution, de se prononcer en faveur d'une
interdiction partielle d'une durée de deux ans des trois néonicotinoïdes en question dans la culture du maïs, du
tournesol, du colza et du coton. Pour les céréales d'hiver et les plantes qui n'attirent pas d'abeille, l'utilisation de ces
pesticides reste autorisée. L'interdiction devait déjà entrer en vigueur cet été. Or, selon des informations publiées dans
la presse, le vote à ce sujet, qui était à l'origine prévu pour le mois de février, a été annulé. Le communiqué indiquait
que la Commission devait poursuivre ses négociations avec les États membres. Selon diverses organisations de
défense de l'environnement, le report du vote serait dû à une intervention de l'industrie chimique.

1. Pour quelles raisons la Commission a-t‐elle reporté le vote?

2. Quels sont les aspects ou les nouveaux développements qui ont conduit la Commission à évaluer la possibilité
d'interdire ces pesticides d'une manière différente par rapport à il y a seulement quelques semaines?

3. Avant de déclarer qu'elle comptait imposer une interdiction, la Commission avait‐elle demandé une évaluation
des incidences ou recueilli des plaintes?

4. Quelles recherches supplémentaires la Commission va‐t‐elle commander (à l'EFSA ou autres) pour pouvoir
évaluer les risques de façon plus précise?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(22 avril 2013)_

1. Le vote a été reporté du 25 février au 15 mars 2013 pour des raisons de procédure.

2. La Commission n'a pas modifié sa position. La mesure proposée a été examinée et mise aux voix à la réunion
que le Comité permanent de la chaîne alimentaire et de la santé animale a tenue les 14 et 15 mars 2013.

3. La Commission renvoie les auteurs de la question à sa réponse à la question écrite E‐001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. Elle les renvoie également à sa réponse à la question écrite E‐001942/2013 ( [2] ). De surcroît, elle entend
soumettre sans retard à l'évaluation de l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments toute nouvelle information
d'ordre scientifique en la matière.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 177

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002694/13**

**do Komisji**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) oraz Anne**

**Delvaux (PPE)**
_(7 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Moratorium na stosowanie neonikotynoidów lub częściowy zakaz ich stosowania, odłożone głosowanie

Na początku 2013 r. EFSA określił ryzyko związane z działaniem trzech insektycydów zawierających
neonikotynoidy (klotianidyna, imidachlopryd i tiametoksam) na pszczoły. Choć w kilku przypadkach EFSA nie mógł
przeprowadzić oceny ryzyka z powodu braku informacji, to jednak Komisja postanowiła w dniu 31 stycznia br. –
zapewne również ze względu na zasadę ostrożności – opowiedzieć się za wprowadzeniem częściowego, dwuletniego
zakazu stosowania trzech ww. neonikotynoidów przy uprawie kukurydzy, słonecznika, rzepaku i bawełny.
Stosowanie pestycydów byłoby nadal dozwolone dla zbóż ozimych i roślin, które nie wabią pszczół. Zakaz miał
wejść w życie już w lecie br. Jednak według doniesień prasowych głosowanie przewidziane początkowo na koniec
lutego zostało anulowane. Podobno Komisja musi prowadzić dalsze negocjacje z państwami członkowskimi. Różne
organizacje działające na rzecz ochrony środowiska wymieniają wpływ przemysłu chemicznego jako powód
odłożenia głosowania.

1. Dlaczego Komisja odłożyła głosowanie?

2. Jakie czynniki lub jakie nowe wydarzenia sprawiły, że obecnie Komisja inaczej ocenia szansę na wprowadzenie
zakazu niż jeszcze kilka tygodni temu?

3. Czy przed złożeniem oświadczenia o chęci wprowadzenia zakazu Komisja zasięgnęła opinii na temat jego
ewentualnych skutków lub skarg?

4. Jakie dalsze badania zleci Komisja (EFSA lub innym podmiotom), aby móc konkretnie(j) oszacować ryzyko?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonia Borga w imieniu Komisji**

_(22 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

1. Z przyczyn proceduralnych głosowanie przełożono z dnia 25 lutego 2013 r. na dzień 15 marca 2013 r.

2. Komisja nie zmieniła swego stanowiska. Projekt środka poddano dyskusji i przedłożono pod głosowanie
w Stałym Komitecie ds. Łańcucha Żywnościowego i Zdrowia Zwierząt w dniach 14-15 marca 2013 r.

3. Komisja uprzejmie prosi Panie i Panów Posłów o zapoznanie się z odpowiedzią udzieloną na pytanie
wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej nr E‐001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. Komisja uprzejmie prosi Panie i Panów Posłów o zapoznanie się także z odpowiedzią udzieloną na pytanie
wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej nr E‐001942/2013 ( [2] ). Komisja dokłada ponadto wszelkich starań, aby
przedstawiać bez zbędnej zwłoki pod ocenę Europejskiego Urzędu ds. Bezpieczeństwa Żywności wszelkie nowe
informacje naukowe, które zostaną jej udostępnione.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/pl/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/pl/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 178 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002694/13**

**za Komisijo**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) in Anne**

**Delvaux (PPE)**
_(7. marec 2013)_

_Zadeva:_ Moratorij na neonikotinoide oz. njihova delna prepoved, preloženo glasovanje

Evropska agencija za varnost hrane (EFSA) je v začetku leta 2013 odkrila, da so trije insekticidi na osnovi
neonikotinoida (klotianidin, imidakloprid in tiametoksam) nevarni za čebele. EFSA v nekaterih primerih zaradi
pomanjkanja informacij sicer ni mogla zaključiti ocene tveganja, kljub temu pa se je Komisija 31. januarja odločila –
bržkone tudi na podlagi previdnostnega načela – za uvedbo dvoletne delne prepovedi uporabe treh spornih
neonikotinoidov, ki velja za pridelavo koruze, sončnic, ogrščice in bombaža. Za zimska žita in rastline, ki ne
privlačijo čebel, naj bi bila še naprej dovoljena uporaba teh pesticidov. Prepoved bi morala začeti veljati že poleti. Zdaj
pa je bilo, sodeč po objavah v medijih, glasovanje, ki je bilo predvideno konec februarja, odpovedano. Po navedbah
naj bi se morala Komisija še naprej pogajati z državami članicami. Različne okoljevarstvene organizacije kot razlog za
preložitev navajajo vpliv kemične industrije.

1. Na podlagi katerih razlogov je Komisija preložila glasovanje?

2. Kateri vidiki oziroma katera nova spoznanja so privedla do tega, da Komisija zdaj drugače ocenjuje možnosti za
prepoved kot pred zgolj nekaj tedni?

3. Ali je Komisija, preden je oznanila namero o uvedbi prepovedi, pridobila oceno morebitnih posledic oziroma
pritožb?

4. Katere nadaljnje raziskave bo Komisija naročila (na primer prek Evropske agencije za varnost hrane), da bi lahko
natančno oziroma natančneje ocenila tveganja?

**Odgovor komisarja Tonia Borga v imenu Komisije**

_(22. april 2013)_

1. Glasovanje je bilo iz proceduralnih razlogov prestavljeno s 25. februarja 2013 na 15. marec 2013.

2. Komisija ni spremenila svojega stališča. Osnutek ukrepa je bil obravnavan in predložen v glasovanje Stalnemu
odboru za prehranjevalno verigo in zdravje živali v času od 14. do 15. marca 2013.

3. Komisija želi poslance opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. Komisija želi poslance opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-001942/2013 ( [2] ). Pri tem se tudi
zavezuje, da bo brez nepotrebne zamude Evropski agenciji za varnost hrane v oceno predložila vse razpoložljive nove
znanstvene informacije.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 179

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002694/13**

**komissiolle**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) ja**

**Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(7. maaliskuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Neonikotinoidien käytön keskeyttäminen tai niiden osittainen kieltäminen ja äänestyksen lykkääminen

Euroopan elintarviketurvallisuusviranomainen EFSA totesi vuoden 2013 alussa, että kolmesta hyönteismyrkyissä
käytettävästä neonikotinoidista (klotianidiinista, imidaklopridista ja tiametoksaamista) aiheutuu riskejä mehiläisille.
EFSA ei puutteellisten tietojen vuoksi kyennyt eräissä tapauksissa saattamaan riskien arviointia päätökseen, mutta
komissio – oletettavasti osin ennalta varautumisen periaatteen takia – päätti 31. tammikuuta asettaa kyseiset kolme
neonikotinoidia kahden vuoden ajaksi osittaiseen kieltoon. Kieltoa oli määrä soveltaa maissin, auringonkukkien,
rapsin ja puuvillan viljelyssä. Torjunta-aineiden käyttö talviviljalajeille ja mehiläisiä houkuttelemattomille kasveille
olisi ollut edelleen sallittua. Kiellon oli tarkoitus tulla voimaan jo kesällä. Lehtitietojen mukaan alun perin helmikuun
loppuun kaavailtu äänestys on nyt peruttu. Syyksi on ilmoitettu, että komission on jatkettava neuvotteluja
jäsenvaltioiden kanssa. Erilaisten ympäristöjärjestöjen mielestä lykkäämisen syynä on kemianteollisuuden
vaikutusvalta.

1. Miksi komissio lykkäsi äänestystä?

2. Mitkä seikat tai millainen uusi kehitys on johtanut siihen, että komissio suhtautuu nyt mahdolliseen kieltoon
toisin kuin vielä muutama viikko sitten?

3. Oliko komissio teettänyt arvioinnin mahdollisista seurauksista tai hankkeista ennen kuin se ilmoitti aikeestaan
kieltää nämä aineet?

4. Mitä muita selvityksiä komissio aikoo teettää (EFSA:lla tai muulla sen tapaisella instanssilla) kyetäkseen
arvioimaan riskejä konkreettisesti/konkreettisemmin?

**Tonio Borgin komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(22. huhtikuuta 2013)_

1. Äänestystä lykättiin 25. päivästä helmikuuta 2013 15. päivään maaliskuuta 2013 menettelyllisistä syistä.

2. Komissio ei muuttanut kantaansa. Toimenpideluonnoksesta keskusteltiin, ja se siirrettiin äänestettäväksi
elintarvikeketjua ja eläinten terveyttä käsittelevässä pysyvässä komiteassa 14.–15. maaliskuuta 2013.

3. Komissio pyytää arvoisia parlamentin jäseniä tutustumaan vastaukseen, jonka se on antanut kirjalliseen
kysymykseen E‐001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. Komissio pyytää arvoisia parlamentin jäseniä tutustumaan vastaukseen, jonka se on antanut kirjalliseen
kysymykseen E‐001942/2013 ( [2] ). Lisäksi komissio on sitoutunut toimittamaan kaikki mahdolliset saataville tulevat
uudet tieteelliset tiedot ilman aiheetonta viivytystä Euroopan elintarviketurvallisuusviranomaiselle arviointia varten.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 180 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002694/13**

**to the Commission**
**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) and Anne**

**Delvaux (PPE)**
_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Moratorium or partial ban on neonicotinoids, postponement of vote

At the start of 2013 the EFSA identified a number of risks posed to bees by three neonicotinoid insecticides
(clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam). Although the EFSA could not finalise the risk assessment due to
shortcomings in the available data, on 31 January the Commission decided — presumably guided by the
precautionary principle — to call for a partial two-year ban on the three neonicotinoids in question, which would
have applied to the cultivation of maize, sunflowers, rape and cotton. The use of pesticides on winter cereals and
plants which do not attract bees would still have been allowed. The ban would have entered into force in the summer.
According to the press, however, the vote which was originally scheduled for the end of February has now been
cancelled, apparently because the Commission needs to negotiate further with the Member States. Various
environmental organisations have suggested that the vote has been postponed because of pressure from the chemical
industry.

1. On what grounds has the Commission postponed the vote?

2. What factors or new developments have led to the Commission changing its position on the possibility of a ban
it proposed a few weeks ago?

3. Before announcing its intention to impose a ban, did the Commission obtain an assessment of its potential
impact or the claims to which it may give rise?

4. What other research will be commissioned by the Commission, via the EFSA or similar bodies, in order to allow
the risks to be evaluated in (more) detail?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

1. The vote was postponed from 25 February 2013 to 15 March 2013 for procedural reasons.

2. The Commission did not change its position. The draft measure was discussed and put forward for a vote on the
Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health on 14-15 March 2013.

3. The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question E‐001323/2013 ( [1] ).

4. The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question E‐001942/2013 ( [2] ).
Furthermore, the Commission is committed to submit any new scientific information which will be made available
without undue delay to the European Food Safety Authority for assessment.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 181

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002695/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Match funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)

In many European regions such as Northern Ireland, SMEs have particular difficulties accessing loan capital to matchfund the EU funding streams.

Does the Commission have a plan which will complement the Horizon 2020 programme and help SMEs access
funding?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Horizon 2020 will, in addition to its targeted grant-based support for research‐ and innovation driven SMEs (the SME
Instrument and the Eurostars Joint Programme), also provide financial instruments for innovative SMEs. These
financial instruments will include equity finance focusing on companies in their early stage (seed and start-up) as well
as a specific loan guarantee facility to encourage lending by banks and other financial institutions to SMEs investing in
research and innovation. Further accompanying measures (mentoring and coaching) for new business and SMEs are
foreseen to increase their investor-readiness and improve their access to finance.

The financial instruments of Horizon 2020 will be complemented by those of the Commission’s COSME
programme ( [1] ). COSME will support venture capital funds that provide equity to enterprises in their expansion and
growth stage, and it will also have a loan guarantee facility providing (counter-)guarantees to financial intermediaries
lending to SMEs. The focus will be on supporting access to finance for viable SMEs with a higher risk profile.

The Commission will implement the aforementioned SME-related financial instruments of Horizon 2020 and
COSME in conjunction with each other.

In addition to Horizon 2020 and COSME, support to SMEs' access to finance might be provided through operational
programmes co-financed by European Structural and Investment Funds (for the period 2014-2020) and
implemented by the managing authorities in Member States. Such finance for SMEs could be made in various forms
including equity, loan finance and loan guarantees.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (2014 — 2020), COM(2011) 834 final, 30.11.2011 .

C 6 E / 182 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002696/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Implementation of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the
protection of laying hens (Welfare of Laying Hens Directive)

Conventional cages for hens were due to be phased out by the Member States by 1 January 2012.

Will the Commission provide details of the Member States which remain non-compliant with the Welfare of Laying
Hens Directive?

Further, will the Commission provide details of the level of compliance with the Welfare of Laying Hens Directive for
each of the 27 Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

To date two Member States remain non-compliant not having managed to fully phase out unenriched cages for laying
hens ( [1] ). The number of hens still kept in unenriched cages represents roughly 4% of the total EU laying hen flock. The
infringement case against these two Member States is still pending and more specific data can thus not be provided.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens; OJ L 203, 3.8.1999, p. 53.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 183

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002697/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Liberalisation of the EU labour market from January 2014

Unrestricted access to the EU labour market will be available to all EU citizens from 1 January 2014. The Commission
will be aware of the many reports that suggest that upwards of 300 000 citizens could migrate to the United Kingdom
within the first five years following this liberalisation.

Does the Commission have plans to help alleviate the pressure on Member States that are expected to receive an
influx of migrants?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The Commission does not consider it necessary to make any specific plans to meet what the Honorable Member
refers to as an expected increased influx of migrants following the expiry of the transitional restrictions on Bulgarian
and Romanian citizens on 1st January 2014. The freedom of movement of workers is one of the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and an essential component of the Single Market.

Previous experience of post-enlargement mobility point to an overall positive impact of mobility flows of workers on
the economies and labour markets of receiving countries. The Commission has summarised its analysis in its 2008
and 2011 Reports on the functioning of the transitional arrangements ( [1] ), which were based on detailed analysis
published in the 2008 _Employment in Europe_ report and 2011 _Employment and social developments in Europe_ review.

Moreover, intra-EU labour mobility provides a much needed flexibility to EU labour markets since workers tend to
move where jobs are, and may move back home if circumstances change, including on the labour market. This has
been confirmed by the trends in mobility flows observed during the recession in 2009.

The Fund functions under shared management, meaning that the Operational Programmes laying down the priorities
for funding are negotiated with the European Commission, but are implemented by the Member States at the
appropriate territorial level, to respond properly to the needs ‘on the ground’.

The European Social Found is the main EU instrument to support employability and promote employment. It can be
used for example to improve the skills of migrant workers.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011)729 and SEC(2011)1343 and COM(2008) 765.

C 6 E / 184 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002698/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Union's activities in Haiti

Can the Commission provide an update on the European Union’s activities in Haiti?

Does the Commission plan to continue with a programme of humanitarian aid in this country?

Has the European Union’s focus in Haiti moved from humanitarian aid to development aid in order to assist with the
ongoing infrastructure, social and economic problems throughout the region?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

As regards the humanitarian response to the earthquake that hit Haiti in Jan. 2010 and to other crises such as the
cholera epidemic and tropical storms Isaac and Sandy, the EU has allocated between 2010 and 2012 EUR 195 million
for assistance in the sectors of shelter, food, water and sanitation, health, protection and disaster risk reduction. In
2013, EUR 18.5 million are allocated to accelerate the exit of people still living in camps and the fight against cholera.

In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU has continued to provide cooperation assistance to Haiti aimed at supporting
reconstruction, eradicating poverty and encouraging long-term socioeconomic development. Out of the EUR 522
million ( [1] ) pledged by the EU as a response to the earthquake, EUR 434 million (86%) have been committed and
EUR 189 million (36%) actually disbursed. Additional EUR 102 million were also earmarked under other EU
programmes (Food Facility, Food Security Thematic Programme and the MDG initiative).

EU assistance to Haiti over the last three years has been implemented in a difficult context characterised by political
tensions, lack of an effective government for several months and weakness of the Haitian State administration, further
worsened by the human and material losses caused by the earthquake.

The programming of EU assistance under the 11th EDF, covering the period 2014-2020, is underway. Particular
attention will be given to ensuring transition between emergency/humanitarian response and more structural
development assistance, an approach already started under the 10th EDF, in particular in areas such as food security
and housing/urban development.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Includes EUR 460 million pledged at the March 2010 New York Donors conference + EUR 62 million of additional post-earthquake pledge.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 185

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002699/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ eTwinning network in Northern Ireland

The Commission has run a very successful ‘eTwinning’ network which has thus far encouraged 100 000 schools in
33 countries to talk to each other via the Internet, and I was pleased to see it recently extended to schools in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Does the Commission have any plans in place to encourage more schools to participate?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 April 2013)_

Building on the success of eTwinning in European countries participating in the Lifelong Learning Programme, the
European Commission extended it to five Eastern partnership countries on a pilot basis, under the label eTwinning
[Plus: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-183_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-183_en.htm)

Following the Arab spring and its renewed Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commission is now planning to
extend eTwinning Plus to Tunisia. Negotiations are well advanced and a selection of Tunisian schools will join the
scheme during spring 2013. A similar offer was made to Egypt, but the European Commission has not yet received an
answer from the Egyptian authorities.

Under the MFF 2014-2020, the Commission proposal for a new education and training programme, ‘Erasmus for
All’, foresees an expanded role for eTwinning, with an upgraded platform, new services offered to schools and a much
larger offer of online training opportunities for teachers. The European Commission runs communication campaigns
at the beginning and at the end of every school year in order to encourage more schools to participate.

C 6 E / 186 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002700/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ A2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and the labour market

The ‘A2 countries’, Bulgaria and Romania, committed themselves to taking steps towards combating the spread of
corruption and organised crime and properly policing their borders prior to the lifting of the restrictions on access to
the EU labour market scheduled for 1 January 2014.

Can the Commission confirm that the A2 countries have fulfilled the commitments which were agreed with the EU?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2013)_

The lifting of the restrictions on access to the EU labour market for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens has never been
conditional. All such restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian citizens will end 7 years after accession, that is on
1 January 2014.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 187

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002701/13**

**to the Commission**
**Glenis Willmott (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Impact of internal EU migration

Freedom of movement is a central principle of the EU. The movement of citizens between Member States can help
boost local economies and allows European citizens to experience different cultures and ways of life. However,
inward migration of citizens from other EU Member States can sometimes place added pressures on local services
such as jobs, education, and health, while resources available to deal with these pressures have become scarcer due to
cuts and other austerity measures in many Member States.

1. Has the Commission carried out an assessment of the impact on local communities of the arrival and settlement
of citizens from other EU Member States?

2. In the light of increased austerity measures reducing the availability of previously used funding streams, would
the Commission consider widening the scope of funding programmes such as the Asylum and Migration Fund and
the Integration Fund to include EU migrants?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The Commission recently commissioned a study on the evaluation of the impact of free movement of EU citizens at
local level. For the purpose of this evaluation, six cities which have put in place policies and measures to facilitate the
successful inclusion and participation of EU citizens moving there from other Member States have been selected as
test cases. On this basis, the study should analyse the economic and social impacts of Directive 2004/38/EC on free
movement on the local communities and deliver a catalogue of best practices. The study is expected to be finalised in
the autumn.

As regards funding, the Commission would like to mention the European Social Fund, which supports actions in
Member States under several priorities, including ‘specific actions to increase the participation of migrants in
employment and thereby strengthen their social integration’. These actions include guidance, language training and
validation of competences and acquired skills. The ESF is not limited to third country-nationals and its financing can
involve EU workers who have exercised intra-EU mobility.

On the other hand, the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals and the Asylum and Migration
Fund are part of the EU's common immigration policy (Article 79 TFEU), which aims at ensuring efficient
management of migration flows and fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the EU. EU citizens
do not belong to the target group and they cannot be subject to integration measures restricting their right of
movement. The legal situation of both populations is different and the Commission cannot design a Fund structure
ending the targeting on the basis of nationality, asdifferent legal bases are applicable.

C 6 E / 188 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-002702/13**

**a Bizottság számára**

**Kovács Béla (NI)**
_(2013. március 7.)_

_Tárgy:_ A jogállamiság helyzete Moldovában

Orosz sajtóhírek arról számoltak be, hogy Moldova főügyésze, Valeriu Zubko lemondott, miután kiderült, hogy
információkat titkolt el egy 2012. december 23-án Moldovában bekövetkezett vadászbalesettel kapcsolatosan. E
sajtóértesülések szerint maga Valeriu Zubko, Dorin Recean belügyminiszter, továbbá bírák, a moldovai
titkosszolgálat tagjai és más állami hivatalnokok vadászaton vettek részt, amelynek során egy üzletembert halálos
lövés ért. A balesetről azonban csak két héttel később számoltak be egy informátor kezdeményezésére. Az eset a
Moldovában uralkodó átláthatóságot és a jogállamiságot illető aggasztó állapotokat tükrözi.

Tudná-e a Bizottság az ügyre vonatkozó tényeket tisztázni és ismertetni, hogy milyen fellépéseket szándékozik tenni
a tekintetben, hogy Moldovában javuljon a jogállamiság helyzete, biztosítva legyen a bűnüldöző szervek
tisztviselőinek átláthatósága és a bírói testület megreformálása?

**Štefan Füle válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. május 3.)_

A szóban forgó ügyben a moldovai parlament ad hoc bizottság keretében vizsgálódott, amely 2013. február 15-én
tette közzé jelentését. Ahogy az Ön számára is ismeretes, a moldovai fél lépéseket tett az ügyben, és Zubco főügyészt
februárban leváltották.

Összességében elmondható, hogy az EU Moldovával kapcsolatos programjának legfőbb pontja a jogállam
tiszteletben tartása. Miután a moldovai kormány előállt egy, a nemzetközi partnereivel folytatott konzultációk
eredményeit megfelelően tükröző stratégiával, 2011-ben a Bizottság jelentős támogatást terjesztett ki az
igazságszolgáltatás és a bűnüldözés terén végzett reformok elősegítésére.

A keleti partnerség integrációs és együttműködési programjával kiegészített támogatási csomag jelentős költségvetési
támogatást tartalmaz, amely arra irányul, hogy Moldovát ambiciózus célok elérésére ösztönözze az alábbiakat
illetően: az érintett területek intézményi és jogalkotási reformja (ideértve az állami pénzügyek elszámoltathatóságát),
a bírói kar reformja, az előzetes eljárás keretében végzett vizsgálatok eljárási módjának a reformja, a bírósági ítéletek
végrehajtása, a fiatalkorúakra vonatkozó igazságszolgáltatási rendszer reformja, a korrupció elleni küzdelem az
érintett területeken, valamint az emberi jogok védelme az igazságszolgáltatási és bűnüldözési eljárások során
(ideértve az ombudsman intézményének megerősítését).

A tervek szerint az EU emellett 10 millió EUR összegű technikai segítségnyújtással támogatja az igazságügyi reform
előkészítését és koordinációs mechanizmusát. Ezzel egyidejűleg a belügyminisztérium reformját magas szintű
tanácsadás révén segítik, ami arra irányul, hogy megtörténjen az intézmény demilitarizációja és szolgáltatásorientálttá
alakítása. Végezetül, az EU a demokrácia és az emberi jogok európai eszköze keretében is biztosít segítségnyújtást.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 189

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002702/13**

**to the Commission**

**Béla Kovács (NI)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rule of law in Moldova

It has been reported in the Russian press that the Attorney-General of Moldova, Valeriu Zubko, has resigned
following allegations that he concealed information about a hunting accident that occurred in Moldova on
23 December 2012. According to these press reports, Mr Zubko himself, the Interior Minister Dorin Recean, judges,
members of the Moldovan secret services and other state officials all took part in a hunting party during which a
businessman was fatally shot. However, the incident was only made public two weeks later on the instigation of a
whistleblower, and this circumstance sends out alarming signals regarding transparency and the rule of law in
Moldova.

Can the Commission clarify the facts of this case and state what action it is taking with regard to improving the rule of
law in Moldova, ensuring transparency on the part of Moldova’s law enforcement officers and reforming its judiciary?

**Answer given by Commissioner Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The facts of this case have been investigated by an ad-hoc commission of the Moldovan Parliament, which released its
report on 15 February 2013. As you will know, the Moldovan side has taken action, and Prosecutor-General Zubco
was dismissed in February.

On a more systemic note, ensuring respect for the rule of law is on the top of the EU-Moldova agenda. In 2011, the
Commission extended massive support to help reform the justice and law enforcement areas, as the Moldovan
Government came up with a strategy, which duly reflected consultations with its international partners.

The support package, which was further topped up with the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation
programme, includes a large budget support operation to help Moldova achieve ambitious benchmarks with respect
to: institutional and legislative reform (including public finance accountability) in the relevant areas; reform of the
judiciary; reform of the pre-judicial investigation process; enforcement of Court's decisions; reform of the juvenile
justice system; fight against corruption in the relevant areas; and the protection of human rights in justice and law
enforcement procedures (including the enhancement of the Ombudsman's institution).

EU support foresees also EUR 10 million of technical assistance to support the coordination mechanism and
preparations of the justice reform. At the same time, reform of the Ministry of Interior is supported through highlevel advice with a view to de-militarise the institution and turn it into a service-oriented one. Finally, assistance is
provided through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

C 6 E / 190 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002703/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Införandet av lagar om ärekränkning i Rom II

I maj 2012 antog parlamentet ett lagstiftningsbetänkande på eget initiativ om ändring av förordning
(EG) nr 864/2007 om tillämplig lag för utomobligatoriska förpliktelser (Rom II).

I sitt betänkande uppmanade parlamentet kommissionen att ”lägga fram ett förslag om tillägg till Rom IIförordningen i form av en bestämmelse som reglerar tillämplig lag på utomobligatoriska förpliktelser till följd av
kränkning av privatlivet och rättigheter som rör personlighetsskyddet, även ärekränkning”.

Europeiska medier är verksamma i en allt mer gränsöverskridande miljö och antalet gränsöverskridande rättstvister
om påstådda kränkningar av privatlivet och personlighetsskyddet, inbegripet ärekränkning, kommer sannolikt att
öka. Med beaktande av detta är det av största vikt att våra medier känner till vad de får och inte får publicera för att
hålla sig till nationella bestämmelser om skydd av privatlivet. Medieföretag måste givetvis förväntas vara medvetna
om vilka nationella lagar om privatlivet och ärekränkning som gäller i det land där det redaktionella ansvaret ligger
och dit publiceringen eller sändningen i huvudsak riktas. Det är dock parlamentets tydliga ståndpunkt att
medieföretag inte kan förväntas känna till alla nyanser av 27 olika nationella lagstiftningar om ärekränkning och
rätten till privatliv.

Brist på tydlighet inom detta område kan utgöra ett hot mot tryckfriheten i Europa och leda till självcensur eller till att
det uppkommer hinder på den inre marknaden för att medieföretag tillämpar en begränsad spridning utanför sina
huvudsakliga målländer av rädsla för att bryta mot någon annan medlemsstats lagstiftning om ärekränkning och
rätten till privatliv.

Vilka åtgärder planerar kommissionen att vidta avseende det mycket tydliga budskap som en överväldigande
majoritet ställde sig bakom i det lagstiftningsbetänkande på eget initiativ som antogs av parlamentet?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar**

_(6 maj 2013)_

Kommissionen har tagit del av Europaparlamentets resolution av den 10 maj 2012 med rekommendationer om
ändring av förordning (EG) nr 864/2007 om tillämplig lag för utomobligatoriska förpliktelser (Rom II).

Förordningens räckvidd har definierats efter intensiva förhandlingar mellan rådet och Europaparlamentet. Detta visar
att frågan är mycket känslig, komplicerad och svår.

Efter det att förordningen antogs har kommissionen följt utvecklingen i medlemsstaterna och kommer i slutet av
2013 att utfärda en rapport om tillämpningen av förordningen. Härvid kommer Europaparlamentets synpunkter att
beaktas.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 191

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002703/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Inclusion of libel law under Rome II

In May 2012 Parliament adopted an own-initiative legislative report on amending Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

In its report, Parliament called on the Commission to submit a proposal designed to add to the Rome II Regulation a
provision to govern the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights
relating to personality, including defamation.

Europe’s media are operating in an ever more strongly crossborder environment, and there is likely to be a rise in
crossborder litigation in cases of alleged violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.
In this context, it is crucial that our media know what they may or may not publish, in order to be in line with
national provisions protecting privacy. A media outlet must obviously be expected to be aware of the national laws
regarding privacy and defamation in place in the country where its editorial control is exercised and to which its
publication or broadcasting service is principally directed. It is, however, the clear view of Parliament that media
outlets cannot be expected to be aware of all the nuances of 27 different national legislations on defamation and
rights of privacy.

A lack of clarity in this field could pose a threat to the freedom of the press in Europe and lead to self-censorship or to
the creation of barriers in the internal market, with media outlets limiting circulation outside of their main target
countries for fear of liability under other Member States’ privacy and defamation legislation.

What measures does the Commission intend to take with respect to the very clear message, sent out by an
overwhelming majority, that is contained in the legislative own-initiative report adopted by Parliament?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The Commission took carefully note of the European Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2012 with recommendations
to the Commission on the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations (Rome II).

The exclusion from the scope is the result of very intense negotiations between the Council and the Parliament. This
shows that the matter is highly sensitive, complex and difficult.

Following the adoption of the regulation, the Commission has been also following closely the developments in
Member States. The Commission will issue a report on the application of the regulation by the end of 2013. In this
context the suggestions made by the European Parliament will be carefully considered.

C 6 E / 192 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002704/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Implementatie van de Richtlijn hernieuwbare energie 2009/28/EG

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de verschillende eisen en beperkingen die lidstaten stellen bij de
implementatie van de dubbeltellingregeling (zoals caps op dubbeltellende biobrandstoffen, eisen met betrekking tot
de herkomst van de grondstoffen voor dubbeltellende biobrandstoffen en zwaardere weging van eerste generatie
biobrandstoffen van eigen bodem of geproduceerd in de EU)?

2. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat de gefragmenteerde implementatie van de dubbeltellingregeling ertoe leidt
dat er geen geharmoniseerde markt voor geavanceerde biobrandstoffen in Europa is?

3. Zijn de inbreukprocedures tegen lidstaten vanwege de onjuiste implementatie van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG
afgerond? Wat is de reden voor de vertraging in het afdwingen van een tijdige omzetting van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG?

4. Op welke wijze zorgt het ILUC-voorstel van de Commissie van 17 oktober 2012 voor meer harmonisatie?

5. Is de incorrecte en vaak protectionistische wijze waarop de dubbeltellingregeling en andere onderdelen van de
Richtlijn hernieuwbare energie zijn geïmplementeerd, zoals bijvoorbeeld de eis dat biobrandstoffen door een
nationale instantie zijn gecertificeerd of de zwaardere weging van biobrandstoffen die in het eigen land zijn
geproduceerd, in strijd met het handelsrecht, zoals de Europese bepalingen over het vrij verkeer? Indien ja, is de
Commissie voornemens op deze grond procedures te starten?

**Antwoord van de heer Oettinger namens de Commissie**

_(18 april 2013)_

1) De uitvoering van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG inzake hernieuwbare energie (richtlijn hernieuwbare energie) is de
verantwoordelijkheid van de lidstaten. Binnen het kader van de interne energiemarkt beschikken de lidstaten over een
ruime mate van flexibiliteit bij het ontwerpen van steunregelingen die het gebruik van energie uit hernieuwbare
bronnen bevorderen. De diensten van de Commissie hebben verschillende klachten over de uitvoering van de richtlijn
hernieuwbare energie ontvangen die momenteel worden onderzocht om na te gaan of er gerechtelijke stappen
moeten worden ondernomen.

2) In artikel 21, lid 2, van de richtlijn hernieuwbare energie is bepaald dat de bijdrage van biobrandstoffen op basis
van afval, residuen, non-food cellulosemateriaal en lignocellulosisch materiaal dubbel zo groot moet zijn als die van
andere biobrandstoffen. In de richtlijn wordt niet in detail bepaald welke grondstoffen onder deze bepaling vallen. De
lidstaten beschikken dus over flexibiliteit bij de toepassing van de regels inzake dubbeltelling. Bijgevolg kan de
nationale wetgeving in dit verband van lidstaat tot lidstaat verschillen.

3) Op dit moment lopen er 17 inbreukprocedures voor de niet-kennisgeving van omzettingsmaatregelen
overeenkomstig Richtlijn 2009/28/EG. Aangezien de staten een groot aantal bepalingen blijven aanmelden, is het
controleren van die aangemelde bepalingen een tijdrovend en ingewikkeld proces.

4) Het voorstel inzake indirecte veranderingen in het landgebruik van 17 oktober 2012 ( [1] ) zorgt voor een betere
harmonisatie in zoverre dat het twee lijsten met grondstoffen bevat die dubbel of vierdubbel moeten worden geteld
voor de doelstelling van 10 % in de transportsector. Het voorstel omvat echter geen vereisten voor de wijze waarop
lidstaten het gebruik van biobrandstoffen moeten aanmoedigen.

5) De diensten van de Commissie hebben verschillende klachten ontvangen over de uitvoering van de richtlijn
hernieuwbare energie, met inbegrip van de regels inzake dubbeltelling. Deze klachten worden momenteel
onderzocht.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 595 final.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 193

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002704/13**

**to the Commission**
**Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC on renewable energy

1. Is the Commission aware of the various requirements and constraints set by Member States when implementing
the double counting scheme (such as caps on double counting biofuels, requirements concerning the origin of the raw
materials for double counting biofuels and heavier weighting of home-grown first generation biofuels or those
produced in the EU)?

2. Does the Commission agree that the piecemeal implementation of the double counting scheme is giving rise to
a lack of harmonisation in the European market for advanced biofuels?

3. Have the infringement proceedings against Member States for improper implementation of
Directive 2009/28/EC been completed? What is the reason for the delay in enforcing a timely transposition of
Directive 2009/28/EC?

4. How does the Commission ILUC proposal of 17 October 2012 provide for greater harmonisation?

5. Is the incorrect and often protectionist way in which the double counting scheme and other elements of the
Renewable Energy Directive have been implemented, such as for example the requirement for biofuels to be certified
by a national authority or the heavier weighting of home-grown biofuels, contrary to commercial law, including the
European provisions on freedom of movement? If so, does the Commission intend to start proceedings on this basis?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

1. The implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC (RED) on renewable energy is the responsibility of the Member
States. Within the framework of the Internal Energy Market Member States have considerable flexibility in the design
of the support schemes promoting the use of energy from renewable sources. The Commission services have received
several complaints concerning the implementation of the RED which are currently scrutinised in order to establish
whether legal action is necessary.

2. Article 21.2 of the RED lays down that the contribution made by biofuels produced from wastes, residues, nonfood cellulosic material, and ligno-cellulosic material shall be considered to be twice that made by other biofuels. The
RED does not define in detail which feedstock falls under this clause. Therefore, Member States have flexibility
implementing the double counting rules. As a consequence national legislation differs among Member States in this
respect

3. Presently, 17 infringement cases for non-communication of transposition measures under
Directive 2009/28/EC are open. Checking the legislation notified by Member States is a lengthy and complex process
as Member States continue to notify a large number of legal acts.

4. The proposal on Indirect Land Use Changes of 17 October 2012 ( [1] ) provides for greater harmonisation in so far
as it includes two lists of feedstock that would need to be counted double or quadruple towards the 10% target in the
transport sector. The proposal does not, however, include any requirements how Member States should promote
consumption of biofuels.

5. The Commission services have received several complaints concerning the implementation of the RED
including the double counting rules which are currently being scrutinised.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 595 final.

C 6 E / 194 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-002705/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Marco Scurria (PPE)**

_(7 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Eurodeputati dell'Intergruppo Sahrawi bloccati in Marocco

Nell'ambito delle attività e delle iniziative condotte nel contesto dell'Intergruppo per il Sahara occidentale, quattro
deputati del Parlamento europeo hanno deciso di recarsi in visita nella zona per verificare le condizioni di vita della
popolazione e il rispetto dei diritti umani.

Il 6 marzo 2013 gli onorevoli Ivo Vajgl, Vincent Ramòn Garcés, Isabella Lovin e Willy Meyer sono partiti alla volta di
Laayoune, la principale città dei territori occupati.

Non appena arrivati all'aeroporto di Casablanca i quattro deputati sono stati fermati dalle autorità marocchine, gli è
stato impedito di continuare il viaggio verso Laayoune e sono stati obbligati a fare immediato rientro a Madrid o
Parigi, le città da cui provenivano.

1. Cosa intende fare laVicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per tutelare il diritto dei deputati del Parlamento
europeo di svolgere la loro attività politica?

2. Quali azioni saranno intraprese nei confronti del Marocco, che ha impedito la circolazione dei deputati europei
sul suo territorio?

3. È giusto che un paese con cui l'Unione europea stipula accordi impedisca a dei deputati di circolare?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(24 aprile 2013)_

L’AR/VP è al corrente delle circostanze in cui un gruppo di membri del Parlamento europeo che si dirigeva verso il
territorio del Sahara occidentale è stato bloccato dalle autorità marocchine.

La questione sarà sollevata con le autorità marocchine. L’AR/VP è consapevole delle difficoltà legate alla questione del
Sahara occidentale e ritiene che le parti debbano sforzarsi di adottare un approccio più costruttivo per poter condurre
un dialogo e consentire agli osservatori internazionali di recarsi in buona fede nel Sahara occidentale.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 195

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002705/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marco Scurria (PPE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Members of the Sahrawi intergroup refused entry to Morocco

On 6 March 2013, as part of the activities of the Western Sahara intergroup, four MEPs — Ivo Vajgl, Vicente Miguel
Garcés Ramón, Isabella Lövin and Willy Meyer — left for Laayoune, the main town in the occupied territories, with
the intention of looking into the living conditions of the local population and the human rights situation in the area.

As soon as they landed at Casablanca airport, the four MEPs were stopped by the Moroccan authorities, told that they
could not travel on to Laayoune and obliged to take the next plane back to Madrid or Paris, from whence they had

come.

1. How does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to ensure that MEPs are able to go about their
parliamentary business without hindrance?

2. What steps will be taken vis-à-vis the Morocco authorities in response to their refusal to allow the MEPs to travel
inside their country?

3. Is it acceptable for a country with which the Union has agreements in place to restrict the movement of MEPs in
this way?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The HR/VP is aware of the circumstances under which a group of Members of the European Parliament was turned
back by Moroccan authorities en route to the territory of Western Sahara.

This issue will be raised with the Moroccan authorities. The HR/VP is aware of the difficulties of the Western Sahara
issue and believes parties should make efforts to enable a more constructive approach through which dialogue is
possible and visits to Western Sahara undertaken in good faith by international observers are allowed.

C 6 E / 196 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-002706/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Nanosilver i kommissionens profilmaterial

Med tanke på strategin för minskad användning av antibiotika och antibakteriella medel är det med förvåning jag
noterar att kommissionen producerat profilmaterial (pennor) som innehåller nanosilver. Med denna typ av produkt
skapar man oro för bakterier och motverkar med kommissionens egna material strategin i fråga.

Pennorna påstås dessutom vara gröna och miljövänliga för att de inte innehåller DEHP, ftalater och decaBDE. Det är
positivt att pennorna ifråga innehåller mindre farliga kemikalier men det är högst felaktigt att framhäva produkter
med nanosilver som miljövänliga och upprörande att kommissionen använder sig av falska argument.

Att kommissionen framhäver av att pennorna är fria från decaBDE (flamskyddsmedel) kan också ifrågasättas. Brukar
pennor på EU:s marknad innehålla flamskyddsmedlet decaBDE? Om så inte är fallet är omnämnandet minst sagt
vilseledande.

1. Om pennor brukar innehålla decaBDE har kommissionen planerat att åtgärda detta?

2. Kommer kommissionen att dra tillbaka dessa pennor?

3. Kommer kommissionen i sin miljöpolicy för profilmaterial utveckla en strategi för att undvika att detta eller
liknande sker igen?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar**

_(11 april 2013)_

Kommissionen har ingen information om användningen av detta ämne i pennor eller om eventuella risker
förknippade med detta.

Kommissionen försöker alltid att använda miljövänligt material i sitt arbete. Alla kommissionens upphandlingar
utförs i enlighet med EU:s miljölagstiftning. Kriterier för miljöanpassad offentlig upphandling och en uppsättning
verktyg finns på webbplatsen för generaldirektoratet för miljö.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 197

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002706/13**

**to the Commission**
**Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Nanosilver in the Commission's promotional products

In view of the strategy for reducing the use of antibiotics and antibacterial agents, I am surprised to see that the
Commission has produced promotional items (pens) that contain nanosilver. Use of this type of product in the
Commission’s own promotional material runs counter to the Commission’s strategy.

Moreover, the pens are said to be green and environmentally friendly because they do not contain DEHP, phthalates
and decaBDE. It is positive that the pens in question contain fewer dangerous chemicals but it is highly misleading to
advertise products containing nanosilver as environmentally friendly and shocking that the Commission makes use
of false arguments.

It is also questionable for the Commission to emphasise that the pens do not contain decaBDE (flame retardant). Is it
usual for pens on the EU market to contain the flame retardant decaBDE? If this is not the case, mentioning it is, to say
the least, misleading.

1. If it is usual for pens to contain decaBDE, does the Commission intend to do something about this?

2. Will the Commission withdraw these pens?

3. Will the Commission develop a strategy for promotional products in its environment policy, to prevent this or a
similar situation occurring again?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 April 2013)_

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that it has no information about the use of this
substance in pens and of any potential related risk.

In addition, all Commission services give priority to the use of eco-friendly material in their work. Also, all
Commission public procurement actions are carried out in conformity with the environmental legislation endorsed
by the EU (‘Green Public Procurement’ criteria and toolkit available by Directorate General Environment).

C 6 E / 198 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002707/13**

**до Комисията**
**Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)**

_(7 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Нелоялни търговски практики в търговията на дребно

Големите вериги за хранителни стоки ограничават достъпа на малки и средни производители на пазара. Неотдавнашно
проучване, направено в България, показа, че под 20 % от стоките, които се продават в големите вериги, са български.
Като основна причина за този дисбаланс професионалното сдружение на работодателите — Съюз „Произведено в
България“, което е автор на изследването, посочва нелоялните търговски практики. В частност търговските отстъпки,
които се предлагат на вносителите на хранителни продукти, се различават съществено от тези за българските
производители. Докато за първите те са 5—15%, за българските производители, които представляват почти изцяло
микропредприятия, малки и средни предприятия, те са 20—60%. По този начин малките производители и доставчици
биват лишени априори от повече от половината от своята печалба.

Тъй като големите вериги в огромното си мнозинство са собственост, регистрирана в други държави — членки на ЕС, и
са значим участник в общия европейски пазар, бих искал да попитам:

Предвижда ли Европейската комисия мерки, чрез които да запази възможността за равен достъп до пазара на малки и
средни производители, участващи във веригата на доставки на големите вериги?

Възнамерява ли Комисията да предложи обща регулация в тази област, тъй като проблемът обхваща повече от една
страна членка? И каква е посоката, в която службите на ЕК работят в този смисъл?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Barnier от името на Комисията**

_(26 април 2013 г.)_

1. Европейската комисия е наясно с нелоялните търговски практики (НТП) във веригата за доставка на хранителни
стоки и вредните въздействия, които това може да има върху икономически зависимите търговски партньори, много от

които са малки предприятия.

Форумът за по-добре функционираща верига на предлагането на храни, създаден от Комисията през 2010 г., потвърди
нуждата от насърчаване на по-добри взаимоотношения между предприятията. В този контекст основните
заинтересовани страни предложиха доброволна рамка за прилагане на принципите на добрите практики в тази област.

Освен това борбата срещу НТП е едно от действията, заложени в Европейския план за действие в областта на
търговията на дребно, приет от Комисията на 31 януари 2013 г. За да се съберат доказателства за проблема,
последиците от него и възможните решения, Комисията прие Зелена книга относно НТП по веригата за доставки на
хранителни и нехранителни стоки, която беше представена за обществена консултация. В този контекст службите на
Комисията също започнаха работа за извършване на анализ на въздействието, с който да се оцени как въпросът за НТП
най-удачно би могъл да бъде разгледан. Посочената оценка на въздействието ще разгледа внимателно последиците от

тези практики върху по-малките участници на пазара.

2. В оценката на въздействието ще се анализират възможните последици от НТП върху единния пазар и ще се
разгледат редица варианти за справяне с НТП, вариращи от механизми за саморегулация до законодателство. В тази
връзка Комисията ще следи отблизо въвеждането на посочената по-горе доброволна инициатива и ще предприеме
необходимите стъпки.

Освен това Комисията провежда тръжна процедура за извършване на проучване, чиято цел е, _inter alia_, да изясни дали
концентрацията на продажбата на храни на дребно влияе върху избора и иновациите в хранителните продукти ( [1] ).
Резултатите от това проучване ще бъдат включени в разискванията относно последиците от НТП и най-добрите начини

за справяне с тях.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) За повече информация: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/calls/tenders_open.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 199

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002707/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Unfair commercial practices in the retail sector

The big food chains are restricting small and medium-sized producers’ access to the market. Recent research carried
out in Bulgaria reveals that less than 20% of the products on sale in the big food chains are of Bulgarian origin. The
‘Made in Bulgaria’ Union, the employers’ association that conducted the research, points to unfair commercial
practices as a major cause of this imbalance. In particular, the commercial discounts applied for food importers are
substantially different from those for Bulgarian producers: 5-15% for the former, as opposed to 20-60% for the
Bulgarian producers, almost all of whom are micro-enterprises or SMEs. Small producers and suppliers are thus
deprived up front of more than half their profit.

Since the great majority of the big chains are registered in other EU Member States and are major players in the
European single market, I should like to know:

—
whether the Commission plans to take steps to secure market access on equal terms for small and mediumsized producers who are part of the big groups’ supply chain?

—
whether the Commission intends to bring forward a proposal for a general regulation on this problem, as it
concerns more than one Member State; and what is the thrust of the Commission’s efforts to that end?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

1. The European Commission is aware of unfair trading practices (UTPs) in the food supply chain and the harmful
effects these may have on economically dependent trading partners, many of which are small businesses.

The Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, set up by the Commission in 2010, acknowledged the need
to promote better business-to-business relationships. In this context, major stakeholders put forward a voluntary
framework to implement principles of good practice.

Moreover, tackling UTPs is one of the actions identified in the European Retail Action Plan, adopted by the
Commission on 31 January 2013. In order to gather evidence on the problem, its effects and possible resolutions, the
Commission has adopted a Green Paper on UTPs in the food and non-food supply chain. A public consultation has
been launched on the basis of the Green Paper. In this context, Commission staff has also started to work on an
impact analysis assessing how the question of UTPs could be best dealt with. This Impact Assessment will carefully
consider the effects of such practices on smaller players.

2. The aforementioned Impact Assessment will analyse the possible effects of UTPs on the Single Market and
consider a number of options addressing UTPs, ranging from self-regulatory mechanisms to legislation. In this
context, the Commission will follow closely the uptake of the aforementioned voluntary initiative and will take the
necessary steps.

In addition, the Commission is also tendering a study seeking to shed light, _inter alia_, on the evolution of choice and
innovation in food products and its links with food retail's concentration ( [1] ). The results of this study will feed into the
debate on the effects of UTPs and the best ways to address them.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) More information is available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/calls/tenders_open.html

C 6 E / 200 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002709/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Martin (S&D)**

_(7 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Journey times in the case of combined road-sea transport of animals

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 stipulates that pigs can only be transported for a
maximum period of 24 hours, after which they must be unloaded and rested for at least 24 hours before being
transported onwards. However, the regulation contains derogations to this rule in certain cases of combined road-sea
transport (point 1.7 of Chapter V, Annex 1).

Animal welfare organisations have recently exposed documented cases of pigs being transported by road and sea
without being unloaded during the sea journey.

1. Does the Commission agree that substituting part of a road transport journey for transport by sea, without any
unloaded rest time, is contrary to the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005?

2. Does the Commission agree that Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 should be revised in order to remedy this
unsatisfactory situation?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

1. Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport ( [1] ) does not prevent the use of sea
transport as a substitute for road transport. The Commission therefore does not see that this would be contrary to the
scope of the regulation, as long as the requirements of Article 3(a) to minimise the length of the journey, as well as the
journey and resting times for the species concerned, are met.

According to point 1.7(b), Chapter V of Annex I to Regulation 1/2005, after the sea leg of a journey, unless it can be
included in the general maximum allowed journey time ( [2] ), animals must be unloaded in the vicinity of the port, and
rest for at least 12 hours. How to calculate the journey and resting times when part or parts of a journey are
undertaken via roll-on/roll-off ferries are explained in the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/06 ( [3] ).

2. The derogation from the maximum transport time as laid down in point 1.7(a) of Chapter V of Annex I to
Regulation 1/2005, is in the view of the Commission necessary when animals are transported by sea. If this
derogation was not in place, certain regions of the EU would not be able to transport animals to other regions,
including mainland Europe, as animals cannot be unloaded during the sea leg of a journey.

The Commission therefore does not agree that sea journeys longer than the maximum allowed transport time should
be banned, and does not plan any revision of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) As laid down in point 1.4 of Chapter V of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=277/06&td=ALL.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 201

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002710/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Aposta na internet: risco de exclusão dos mais idosos

A senhora Vice-Presidente Neelie Kroes, responsável pela Agenda Digital, declarou recentemente que «todos os
Europeus deveriam estar online» enfatizando a necessidade de desenvolver as capacidades dos cidadãos neste domínio
e o reforço da segurança das comunicações e transações feitas por intermédio da internet.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
Não considera que a ênfase colocada na internet arrisca alienar da vida ativa os cidadãos de mais idade?

—
Não crê que, não obstante a necessária aposta nesta forma de comunicação tão importante, se devem acautelar
os interesses daqueles que são menos aptos a usá-la e permitir que o acesso a serviços e a comunicação não lhes
seja coartado na prática?

—
Conhece ou estará disposta a avaliar os níveis de infoexclusão na União Europeia e o risco da alienação dos
mais idosos da participação ativa no espaço público e na vida social por via daquela rede?

**Resposta dada por Neelie Kroes em nome da Comissão**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Os números sobre a infoinclusão indicam claramente a existência de um fosso entre gerações. Os adultos mais velhos
participam significativamente menos nas comunicações e transações em linha do que as pessoas das gerações mais
novas. No entanto, os dados disponíveis mostram que a utilização regular da Internet pelos utilizadores com idades
compreendidas entre os 55 e os 74 anos progrediu, passando de 28 % em 2008 para 42 % em 2012, e convém não
esquecer que os jovens utilizadores das TIC de hoje serão os utilizadores mais idosos de amanhã.

A Comissão está de facto particularmente atenta à inclusão no mundo digital dos mais idosos. Com a proposta de
diretiva recentemente lançada relativa ao envelhecimento ativo e saudável, o acesso aos organismos públicos e a
outros sítios e aplicações Web está a ser melhorado para todos e, por conseguinte, também para os mais idosos.
Durante o ano de 2012, Ano Europeu do Envelhecimento Ativo, muitas atividades foram consagradas à inclusão
digital e desde há vários anos que a Comissão cofinancia a investigação e a inovação neste domínio. Alguns recursos
do 7.° Programa-Quadro e do futuro programa Horizonte 2020 destinam-se especialmente a estas atividades, bem
como a projetos de investigação e inovação sobre soluções TIC que possam contribuir para responder ao desafio
demográfico.

Os factos revelam que tais soluções encontram facilmente aceitação junto dos utilizadores, desde que sejam bem
concebidas e se garanta o envolvimento e a formação dos utilizadores finais. Até agora, foram cerca de 100 as
organizações de utilizadores finais que estiveram envolvidas em projetos de investigação e inovação financiados pela
UE. Um exemplo é o projeto CommonWell, que envolve mais de quinhentos cidadãos séniores, bem como as pessoas
que lhes prestam assistência. Os utilizadores dos serviços ficaram muito satisfeitos com os serviços integrados de
cuidados de saúde que receberam, assentes nas novas tecnologias informáticas. As opiniões dão conta de uma maior
sensação de segurança, menos tensão para os prestadores de cuidados e melhor apoio em situações críticas. Os
resultados podem ser consultados em: http://commonwell.eu/commonwell-home/

C 6 E / 202 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002710/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Reliance on the Internet: risk of excluding the elderly

Vice-President Neelie Kroes, responsible for the Digital Agenda, recently said that all Europeans should be online, and
stressed the need to develop citizens’ skills in this area and to strengthen the security of online communication and
transactions.

— Does the Commission not believe that the emphasis placed on the Internet may put older citizens at risk of missing
out on an active life?

— Does it not agree that, notwithstanding the need to invest in this very important means of communication, the
interests of those who are less able to use it should be considered and their access to services and communication
should not be limited in practical terms?

— Is it aware of, or prepared to evaluate, the levels of information exclusion in the European Union and the risk of
excluding the elderly from active participation in the public arena and from social interaction using this network?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

Figures on e-Inclusion clearly indicate a generation gap. Older adults take part significantly less in on line
communication and transactions than people from younger generations. Yet, data show that the regular use of
Internet by users aged 55-74 has progressed from 28% in 2008 up to 42% in 2012, and the ICT users of today will be
the older ICT users of tomorrow.

The Commission does pay a lot of attention to the e-Inclusion of older adults. With the recently launched proposal
for a directive on Active and Healthy Ageing the access of public bodies and other websites and applications is being
improved for all, so also for older adults. During the 2012 European Year of Active Ageing many activities were
devoted to Digital Inclusion, and for several years the Commission has been co-financing research and innovation in
this field. Certain resources from the 7th Framework programme and the forthcoming Horizon 2020 programme are
especially allocated to these activities and also to research and innovation projects on ICT-based solutions that can
help to address the demographic challenge.

The facts show that such solutions do find easily user acceptance, provided good design and close involvement and
training of end-users is ensured. Up to now one hundred end user organisations have been involved in EU funded
research and innovation projects. An example is the CommonWell project involving over five hundred older citizens
as well as their carers. Service users were very happy with the integrated eCare services they received. An improved
sense of security and safety, reduced stress for carers and better support in critical situations were reported. The
results can be found at http://commonwell.eu/commonwell-home/

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 203

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002711/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Futebol — apoios públicos ilegítimos

Notícias recentes dão conta que a Comissão estará a investigar clubes de futebol holandeses — PSV, NEC e Willem II
— bem como as autarquias em que aqueles se encontram sedeados — Eindhoven, Nijmegen e Tilburg — devido a
eventuais apoios públicos ilegitimamente recebidos por aqueles.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

— Tem conhecimento de casos idênticos?

—
Não considera natural que as autarquias procurem apoiar os clubes desportivos que com elas se identificam e
que constituem uma mais-valia para as respetivas economias locais?

—
Em que medida os apoios concedidos são ilegítimos?

—
Dispõe de dados acerca da capacidade de atração de receitas e de investimentos para determinadas localidades
motivada pela notoriedade e atividade de clubes desportivos?

—
De um modo mais global, está em condições de avaliar a importância da «economia do desporto» no quadro
europeu?

**Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão**

_(17 de abril de 2013)_

Em 6 de março de 2013, a Comissão deu início a uma investigação aprofundada para saber se as medidas levadas a
cabo por cinco municípios dos Países Baixos a favor dos clubes locais de futebol profissional cumprem as regras
relativas aos auxílios estatais da UE. A Comissão está a analisar os procedimentos noutros Estados-Membros que
foram levados ao seu conhecimento.

Para esse efeito, em outubro de 2012, a Comissão enviou um pedido de informação a todos os Estados-Membros no
que diz respeito à organização do futebol profissional nos seus respetivos países.

A Comissão reconhece a importância que os municípios atribuem aos seus clubes de futebol. No entanto, como o
Vice-Presidente Almunia e o Presidente da UEFA Platini declararam num comunicado conjunto, a 21 de março de
2012, os clubes de futebol profissional devem subsistir pelos seus próprios meios. Os clubes de futebol profissional
estão ativos em muitos mercados: participam em competições; compram, vendem e alugam jogadores; celebram
acordos de patrocínio; ocupam-se da comercialização de produtos; radiodifusão; acordos de publicidade. O apoio
público financeiro a este tipo de clubes é por conseguinte, suscetível de distorcer a concorrência e de afetar o
comércio entre os Estados-Membros. Esse tipo de apoio deve ser notificado à Comissão para aprovação prévia, o que,
neste caso, as autoridades neerlandesas não fizeram.

Segundo os resultados de um estudo recente da UE [1], a percentagem do desporto na economia da UE, expressa em
valor acrescentado bruto (VAB), é de 1,76 %, enquanto a contribuição dos postos de trabalho relacionados com o
desporto para o emprego total é de 2,12 %.

A Comissão não dispõe de dados sobre receitas e investimentos a nível local que pudessem ser atribuídos à fama e às
atividades dos clubes desportivos.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20121119-study-contrib-sport-economic-growth_en.htm

C 6 E / 204 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002711/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Football — illegitimate state aid

Recent reports reveal that the Commission will investigate several Dutch football clubs (PSV, NEC and Willem II) and
the municipalities in which they are based (Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Tilburg) due to the possibility that they have
received illegitimate state aid.

— Is the Commission aware of any other cases like this?

— Does it not think it natural for the municipalities to support the sports clubs with which they identify themselves
and which generate revenue for their local economies?

— In what way is this aid illegitimate?

— Does it have data on certain locations’ ability to attract revenue and investment due to the fame and activities of
sports clubs?

— Is it able to make a general assessment of the importance of the ‘sports economy’ to the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

On 6 March 2013, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into whether measures by five municipalities in
the Netherlands in favour of local professional football clubs comply with EU State aid rules. The Commission is also
looking at measures in other Member States which were brought to its attention.

To this end, in October 2012, the Commission sent a request for information to all Member States concerning
professional football arrangements in their respective countries.

The Commission acknowledges the importance municipalities attach to their football clubs. However, as VicePresident Almunia and President Platini of UEFA declared in a joint statement on 21 March 2012, professional
football clubs should live within their means. Professional football clubs are active in many markets: participating in
competitions; buying, selling and leasing players; sponsorship deals; merchandising; broadcasting; publicity
agreements. Public financial support to such clubs is therefore likely to distort competition and affect trade between
Member States. Such aid must be notified to the Commission for prior approval, which the Dutch authorities in this
case have failed to do.

According to the results of a recent EU study ( [1] ), the share of sport in the EU economy, expressed in Gross Value
Added (GVA), is 1.76%, while the contribution of sport-related employment to total employment amounts to 2.12%.

The Commission does not have data on revenue and investment at local level which could be attributed to the fame
and activities of sport clubs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20121119-study-contrib-sport-economic-growth_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 205

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002712/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Europol — manipulação de resultados desportivos

A Europol anunciou recentemente que 425 jogadores, árbitros, dirigentes e outros funcionários eram suspeitos de
envolvimento num processo de manipulação de resultados de cerca de 380 jogos de futebol nos Países Baixos,
Alemanha, Turquia, Áustria, Suíça, Hungria e Eslovénia.

Esta descoberta coloca em causa a verdade desportiva e lança as maiores dúvidas sobre o modo como operam as
empresas e sociedades que controlam clubes desportivos e aos meios a que recorrem para assegurar os melhores
resultados.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

— Tem conhecimento de casos idênticos?

—
Tratando-se de um modo particular de violação da concorrência e sabendo-se a importância que o desporto
hoje ocupa nas sociedades europeias, não considera que, juntamente com os Estados-Membros, devem ser
tomadas medidas que previnam, reprimam e combatam situações como as relatadas e assegurem o fair-play e o
respeito pela verdade desportiva?

**Resposta dada por AndroullaVassiliou em nome da Comissão**

_(16 de abril de 2013)_

A Comissão está a par dos episódios de manipulação dos resultados graças à sua cooperação com os EstadosMembros, nomeadamente no quadro do Grupo de Peritos sobre a Boa Governação no Desporto, criado com base no
Plano de Trabalho da UE para o Desporto 2011. A Comissão gostaria de remeter o Senhor Deputado para as suas
respostas às perguntas escritas E-010132/2012, E-000964/2013 e E-001039/2013 ( [1] ), para uma panorâmica das
medidas planeadas para proteger a integridade do desporto a nível da UE.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 206 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002712/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Europol — match-fixing

Europol recently announced that 425 players, match officials, managers and other club officials are suspected of
involvement in the match-fixing of approximately 380 football games in the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Austria,
Switzerland, Hungary and Slovenia.

This discovery calls into question the integrity of sporting events and raises serious doubts about the way in which
companies and associations that control sports clubs operate and the lengths they go to in pursuit of the best results.

— Is the Commission aware of any other cases like this?

— Since match-fixing undermines competition and given the importance that sport holds today in European society,
does the Commission agree that it, together with the Member States, should take measures to prevent, dismantle and
combat schemes such as this and ensure fair play and respect for sporting integrity?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 April 2013)_

The Commission is aware of episodes of match-fixing thanks to its cooperation with Member States, notably in the
framework of the Expert Group on Good Governance in Sport created on the basis of the 2011 EU Work Plan for
Sport. The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its answers to written questions
E-010132/2012, E-000964/2013 and E-001039/2013 ( [1] ) for an overview of planned measures to protect the
integrity of sport at EU level.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 207

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002713/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Coreia do Norte — reforço das sanções internacionais

Notícias recentes dão nota que as Nações Unidas reforçaram as sanções contra a Coreia do Norte como resposta ao
terceiro ensaio nuclear realizado por este país. Do lado norte-coreano sucedem‐se ameaças diversas, em particular
contra a Coreia do Sul, e multiplicam-se os exercícios militares em larga escala. A Austrália objetou à reabertura da
embaixada da Coreia do Norte no seu território.

Assim, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

—
Atendendo a que a situação da Coreia do Norte aparenta agravar-se a grande velocidade, considera expectável
uma maior firmeza internacional contra as autoridades deste país?

—
Dispõe de informações acerca do estado em que se encontra a sua população?

—
Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos Estados-Membros na busca de uma solução duradoura para esta
questão?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(15 de maio de 2013)_

A série de violações das suas obrigações jurídicas internacionais por parte da Coreia do Norte, através do ensaio de
mísseis em dezembro último, o ensaio de um engenho nuclear no passado mês de fevereiro e a ameaça anunciada em
2 de abril de reativar as instalações nucleares de Yongbyon deram origem a uma reação de condenação firme por
parte da comunidade internacional, como demonstrado pelas recentes resoluções do Conselho de Segurança da ONU
sobre a RPDC. Uma prioridade para a diplomacia da UE consiste em ajudar a manter essa firmeza e em persuadir a
Coreia do Norte a alterar o seu comportamento. A UE está em estreito contacto com outros parceiros-chave.

No que diz respeito à situação do povo coreano do Norte, não dispomos de informações exaustivas ou
pormenorizadas, mas temos informação suficiente saber que a situação em termos de segurança alimentar é frágil,
que existe uma grave escassez de energia e que não existem mudanças positivas relativas aos direitos humanos. A UE
já mantém um pequeno programa de assistência humanitária para grupos especialmente vulneráveis.

A UE continuará a trabalhar em estreito apoio ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, transpondo as suas
medidas restritivas sobre a RPDC para o direito da UE. A UE insta ainda a que o processo de Conversações a Seis seja
restabelecido o mais rapidamente possível. A UE exortou inúmeras vezes a que a Coreia do Norte adote um caminho
construtivo e dialogue com os seus vizinhos e a comunidade internacional de forma a alcançar o bem-estar do seu

povo.

C 6 E / 208 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002713/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — North Korea: strengthening of international sanctions

Recent reports state that the United Nations has strengthened sanctions against North Korea in response to the
country conducting its third nuclear test. North Korea has made various threats, particularly against South Korea, and
large scale military exercises are on the increase. Australia has objected to the North Korean embassy being reopened
in its territory.

— Given that the North Korean situation seems to be deteriorating rapidly, does the Vice-President/High
Representative believe that greater international resolve against Pyongyang is to be expected?

— Does she have information on the situation of the North Korean people?

— What role should the European Union and the Member States play in seeking a lasting solution to this problem?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

North Korea's serial violations of its international legal obligations through the missile test last December, the test of a
nuclear device last February and the threat announced on 2 April to restart the disabled plutonium reactor at the
Yongbyon site have drawn a unified reaction of condemnation from the international community as witnessed by the
recent UNSC Resolutions on the DPRK. A priority now for EU diplomacy is to help maintain that unity and to
persuade North Korea to change its behaviour with that objective. The EU is in close contact with other key partners.

As regards the situation of the North Korean people, we have no detailed or comprehensive information, but, we have
enough information to know that the food security situation is fragile, there are severe energy shortages and there is
no positive change in the human rights situation. The EU already maintains a small programme of humanitarian
assistance for especially vulnerable groups.

The EU will continue to work in close support of the UNSC, including through transposing its restrictive measures on
the DPRK into EC law. The EU also presses for the Six Party Talks process to be revived as soon as possible. The EU
called repeatedly on North Korea to take a constructive path and, re-engaged with neighbours and international
community to work for the well-being of its people.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 209

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002714/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Pesca artesanal: aumento da comparticipação europeia

A senhora Comissária Maria Damanaki revelou que a comparticipação europeia de projetos relacionados com a pesca
artesanal irá aumentar de 50 para 70 %, beneficiando desta forma regiões cujas frotas sejam maioritariamente
constituídas por embarcações dedicadas à pesca daquele tipo.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
Prevê um aumento significativo de projetos apresentados para comparticipação?

—
Sabendo-se que os pescadores de mais idade nem sempre têm a informação e instrução bastantes para que lhes
seja possível apresentar pedidos de apoio comunitário, através de que formas pretende dar a conhecer este
aumento da comparticipação e torná-lo operacionalizável pelos que dele efetivamente necessitam?

—
O maior foco que pretende dar ao apoio às comunidades costeiras passa ou poderá passar por uma maior
divulgação dos meios comunitários à disposição das mesmas? Em que termos poderia processar-se esta
divulgação?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

Na sua proposta relativa a um novo Fundo Europeu dos Assuntos Marítimos e das Pescas (FEAMP), a Comissão
recomenda que se reforce o apoio à implementação da política comum das pescas (PCP) reformada. Uma vez que esta
inclui medidas de particular interesse para as frotas de pequena pesca e que a intensidade do auxílio prestado a estas
frotas será maior, a Comissão prevê uma percentagem mais elevada de procura por parte do setor da pequena pesca.

Em conformidade com o princípio da gestão partilhada em que assenta o FEAMP, os Estados‐Membros são
responsáveis pela promoção dos fundos. A Comissão assegurará que os Estados-Membros tirem pleno partido destas
possibilidades nos respetivos programas operacionais FEAMP, bem como na execução dos mesmos.

A nível local, cabe aos grupos de ação local da pesca (GAL-Pesca) assegurar a divulgação do financiamento disponível
ao abrigo do FEAMP. Dado que disporão de um orçamento específico para «custos operacionais e de animação» que
pode representar até 25 % dos fundos disponíveis, estes grupos deverão estar em condições de atingir um público

vasto.

C 6 E / 210 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002714/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Small-scale fishing: increase in EU co-financing

Commissioner Maria Damanaki has revealed that EU co-financing for projects related to small-scale fishing will
increase from 50% to 70%, thereby benefiting regions whose fleets mainly consist of vessels dedicated to this type of
fishing.

— Does the Commission expect a significant increase in the number of projects applying for co-financing?

— Given that older fishermen do not always have sufficient information and training to be able to apply for
Community support, how will the Commission publicise this increase in co-financing and make it available to those
who genuinely need it?

— Is the aim to provide more aid to coastal communities being achieved, or could it be achieved, through greater
awareness of the EU funds available to these communities? How can such awareness be raised?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

In its proposal for a new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), the Commission recommends to provide
greater support to the implementation of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). As the latter involves
measures of particular interest for small-scale fishing fleets, and as a higher aid intensity will be offered to these fleets,
the Commission expects a higher proportion of demands from the small-scale sector.

In line with the principle of shared management upon which the EMFF is based, the Member States are responsible for
promoting the funds. The Commission will ensure that they do take full advantage of such possibilities in their EMFF
Operational Programmes and in their implementation.

At local level, it is the role of the Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) to communicate on the EMFF funding
available locally. Given that they will have access to a specific budget for ‘running costs and animation’ which can
represent up to 25% of available funds FLAGs they should be able to reach out for a wide public.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 211

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002715/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Agravamento da recessão europeia

Segundo o mais recente relatório do Eurostat, a recessão europeia agravou-se no último trimestre de 2012.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
Que avaliação faz desta situação? E que avaliação faz do impacto que ela tem na vida das pessoas e das
empresas? Dispõe de dados a este respeito?

—
Em que medida as economias europeias, em particular as da zona euro, estarão aptas a inverter este estado de
coisas? Através de que meios e instrumentos?

—
Quais poderão ser os principais motores da tão desejada retoma da economia europeia?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(11 de abril de 2013)_

A Comissão avalia a situação económica da UE nas suas Previsões Económicas Europeias, sendo as últimas as
Previsões de inverno de 22 de fevereiro de 2013 ( [1] ). Estas revelaram, entre outros elementos, que embora as condições
dos mercados financeiros na UE tenham melhorado substancialmente desde o último verão, a atividade económica
foi dececionante no segundo semestre de 2012. Contudo, os principais indicadores sugerem que o PIB da UE já
atingiu o seu ponto mais baixo e espera-se que a atividade económica registe uma aceleração progressiva. A retoma
do crescimento será inicialmente impulsionada pelo aumento da procura externa. Prevê-se que os investimentos e o
consumo internos recuperem mais tarde ao longo do ano e, até 2014, prevê-se igualmente que a procura interna
assuma o papel de principal motor do crescimento do PIB. Contudo, o mercado de trabalho continua a suscitar graves
preocupações. Prevê-se que em alguns trimestres o emprego registe uma nova contração e o desemprego permaneça
inaceitavelmente elevado o que acarreta graves consequências sociais.

A avaliação da situação efetuada pela Comissão e a sua posição relativamente às medidas apropriadas que se devem
tomar para estimular o crescimento e a criação de emprego constam da sua Análise Anual do Crescimento (AAC) de
2013 ( [2] ). A AAC apela a que se prossiga uma consolidação orçamental diferenciada e favorável ao crescimento,
restabelecendo as condições normais de concessão de crédito à economia, incentivando o crescimento bem como a
competitividade, combatendo o desemprego e as consequências sociais da crise e modernizando a administração
pública. O alívio sentido nos mercados financeiros e a potencial recuperação têm de ser utilizados para impulsionar
com determinação a agenda política de modo a assegurar a sustentabilidade das finanças públicas, ultrapassar a
fragmentação financeira, implementar reformas estruturais de apoio ao crescimento, aumentar o emprego e reforçar
a arquitetura da UEM.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2013_winter_forecast_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) A Comissão enunciou as suas prioridades para 2013 na Análise Anual de Crescimento publicada a 28 de novembro de 2012.

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2013_pt.pdf

C 6 E / 212 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002715/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Worsening of the EU recession

According to the latest Eurostat report, the EU recession worsened in the last quarter of 2012.

— What is the Commission’s assessment of this situation? What is its assessment of the impact that the recession is
having on companies and on people’s lives? Does it have any data in this regard?

— To what extent are the EU economies, particularly those in the euro area, capable of reversing this state of affairs?
What means and instruments can they use?

— What might be the main engines to drive the long-awaited EU economic recovery?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 April 2013)_

The Commission assesses the economic situation in the EU in its European Economic Forecasts, the latest being the
Winter Forecast of 22 February 2013 ( [1] ). It showed among other things that while financial market conditions in
the EU have improved substantially since last summer, economic activity was disappointing in the second half of
2012. However, leading indicators suggest that GDP in the EU is now bottoming out and we expect economic activity
to gradually accelerate. The pick-up in growth will initially be driven by increasing external demand. Domestic
investment and consumption are projected to recover later in the year, and by 2014 domestic demand is expected to
take over as the main driver of strengthening GDP growth. The labour market, however, remains a serious concern.
Employment is forecast to shrink further for some quarters and unemployment remains unacceptably high with
grave social consequences.

The Commission's assessment of the situation and views on the appropriate actions to stimulate growth and job
creation are set out in its Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 2013 ( [2] ). The AGS calls for pursuing differentiated, growthfriendly fiscal consolidation, restoring normal lending to the economy, promoting growth and competitiveness,
tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis and modernising public administration. The relief in
financial markets and the prospective recovery have to be used to press ahead relentlessly with the policy agenda to
ensure the sustainability of public finances, overcome financial fragmentation, implement growth-supporting
structural reforms, lift employment and strengthen the architecture of EMU.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2013_winter_forecast_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The Commission has set out its priorities for 2013 in the Annual Growth Survey, published on 28 November 2012,

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2013_en.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 213

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002716/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Agricultura: cooperação Portugal/Moçambique

Os ministros da Agricultura de Portugal e de Moçambique defenderam recentemente, em Maputo, que a investigação
e a formação de recursos humanos são áreas com potencial para a cooperação bilateral no setor. «A investigação será
área de consolidação e expansão» na cooperação entre os dois países, afirmou o ministro moçambicano da
Agricultura, José Pacheco, após um encontro com a sua homóloga portuguesa, Assunção Cristas. A formação de
recursos humanos, «para aumentar a produtividade», e a irrigação, «onde a experiência portuguesa pode ser muito
útil», foram outras áreas destacadas pelo ministro.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
Que apoio dá a Moçambique nas áreas da investigação agrária e da formação de recursos humanos no setor?

—
A verificar-se uma intensificação da cooperação entre Portugal e Moçambique naqueles domínios e se tal lhe for
solicitado pelas partes, admite dar também o seu contributo para criar ainda maiores sinergias e potenciar o
desenvolvimento rural de Moçambique?

**Resposta dada por Andris Piebalgs em nome da Comissão**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

A Comissão assinou recentemente uma convenção de financiamento no âmbito da iniciativa relativa aos Objetivos de
Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM) em Moçambique, que pretende acelerar a concretização do ODM 1c (redução da
fome). Moçambique foi o maior beneficiário desta iniciativa, tendo-lhe sido atribuído um montante de 67 milhões de

euros.

As atividades, que incluem uma vertente substancial de investigação orientada para o setor das sementes com o
objetivo de aumentar a utilização de sementes melhoradas, contribuirão para lançar variedades de sementes
melhoradas, bem como para produzir sementes para variedades de sementes melhoradas. O quadro institucional e
político, bem como o serviço nacional de sementes, serão apoiados ativamente (1 milhão de euros).

Estão previstas várias atividades de desenvolvimento de competências (recursos humanos), que beneficiarão de um
financiamento superior a 13,5 milhões de euros e contemplarão, nomeadamente, as escolas para agricultores, os
formadores para estas escolas, os sistemas de senhas para a distribuição de fatores de produção, o comércio de fatores
de produção e de produtos, as organizações de agricultores, o pessoal do Ministério das Pescas, os sistemas de
informação sobre os mercados e a pesca comercial.

A UE é atualmente um grande parceiro de cooperação no setor da agricultura e procura assegurar que seja envidado
um esforço coletivo para apoiar o CAADP ( [1] ) em Moçambique. Por conseguinte, a UE já está empenhada em apoiar
uma maior sinergia neste setor e em fomentar o desenvolvimento rural no país; a iniciativa ODM mencionada supra
prevê também o apoio ao programa do Governo Pronea ( [2] ), destinado a reforçar os serviços de extensão prestados aos
agricultores. Será importante melhorar a ligação entre as atividades de investigação e de extensão. Neste contexto, o
reforço da cooperação com Portugal seria acolhido favoravelmente.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Programa Integrado para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura em África.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Programa nacional de extensão agrícola.

C 6 E / 214 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002716/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Agriculture: cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique

In a recent visit to Maputo, Portugal and Mozambique’s Ministers for Agriculture said that research and the training of
human resources were areas in which there was potential for bilateral cooperation in the agricultural sector.
Following a meeting with his Portuguese counterpart — Assunção Cristas — Mozambique’s Minister for Agriculture,
José Pacheco, said that research was an area in which to consolidate and expand cooperation between the two
countries. He also made reference to the training of human resources, to increase productivity, and irrigation, where
Portuguese experience could prove very useful.

— What support does the Commission currently give to Mozambique for agricultural research and for the training of
human resources in the sector?

— In view of the increased cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique in these areas, and if requested by the
parties, will it also help to create greater synergies and to promote rural development in Mozambique?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission has recently signed a Financing Agreement for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) initiative
in Mozambique, which seeks to accelerate the achievement of MDG 1c (reduction in hunger). Mozambique was the
largest beneficiary of this initiative, receiving an allocation of EUR 67 million.

The activities include a substantial research element focused upon the seeds sector, with the aim of increasing the
usage of improved seeds. Activities will help the release of improved seed varieties, as well as the production of seed
for improved seed varieties. There will be active support to the institutional and policy framework and the national
seed service (EUR 1 million).

A range of capacity building activities (human resources) with funding of over EUR 13.5 million are planned; these
include Farmer Field Schools, trainers for these schools, voucher schemes for input distribution, input-output trading
and farmers organisations, staff in the fisheries ministry, market information systems and commercial fishing.

The EU is currently acting as lead cooperating partner in the agriculture sector, seeking to ensure a collective effort is
engaged in support to the CAADP ( [1] ) process in Mozambique. Thus the EU is already engaged in supporting greater
synergy in this sector and in fostering rural development in Mozambique; the abovementioned MDG initiative
programme also provides support to the Government's PRONEA programme ( [2] ) to strengthen the extension service
provided to farmers. It will be important to improve the linkages between research and extension activities. Increased
cooperation with Portugal would be welcome in this context.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) National Agricultural Extension Programme.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 215

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002717/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Síria — rapto de observadores das Nações Unidas

Vinte e um observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina foram raptados por rebeldes sírios nas
imediações dos montes Golã.

Neste contexto, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

—
Tem conhecimento desta situação?

—
Considera que esta situação poderá pôr em causa a credibilidade externa e a imagem de unidade que vem sendo
veiculada pelas forças que lutam contra o regime de Assad?

—
Em que medida o rapto destes observadores põe em causa a estabilidade da fronteira entre a Síria e Israel?

—
A VP/HR contactou a resistência síria a este respeito? E Israel? Que respostas obteve?

—
Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos «países amigos da Síria» neste particular?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

Em 7 de março de 2013, o porta-voz da AR/VP emitiu uma declaração dando conta da sua preocupação com a
detenção de mais de 20 observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina, membros da Força das Nações
Unidas de Observação da Separação (UNDOF) nos montes Golã. Catherine Ashton exortou à boa e célere cooperação
das partes para resolver a situação o mais rapidamente possível, a todas as partes envolvidas para que se abstenham de
quaisquer ações que possam ter efeitos negativos na estabilidade regional e ao respeito das resoluções do Conselho de
Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU) e do estatuto da Força das Nações Unidas de Observação da Separação
(UNDOF).

A UE condena as detenções e ações arbitrárias, como a tomada de reféns, dado que constituem graves violações do
direito internacional. A UE considera inaceitável qualquer ataque às Nações Unidas e ao seu pessoal e exigiu a
libertação imediata e incondicional dos observadores.

A UE está profundamente empenhada na segurança de Israel e aborda frequentemente as ameaças potenciais
enfrentados por Israel, que valoriza o trabalho das missões da UNDOF.

C 6 E / 216 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002717/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria: kidnapping of UN observers

Twenty-one Filipino UN observers have been kidnapped by Syrian rebels near the Golan Heights.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this situation?

— Does she believe that this situation may jeopardise the external credibility and the image of unity being conveyed
by forces fighting against the Assad regime?

— To what extent does this kidnapping jeopardise the stability of the Syria‐Israel border?

— Has she contacted the Syrian resistance on this matter? Has she contacted Israel? What answers has she received?

— What role should the EU and the ‘Friends of Syria’ play in this situation?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2013)_

On 7 March 2013, the spokesperson of the HR/VP issued a statement stating that she was alarmed by the detention of
more than 20 peacekeepers from the Philippines, members of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF) on the Golan. She called for good and swift cooperation of the parties to resolve the situation as soon as
possible and to all the parties involved to refrain from any actions that may have negative effects on regional stability
and to respect UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the status of the UN Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF).

The EU condemns arbitrary detentions and actions such as hostage-taking as they are serious breaches of
international law. The EU considers any attacks on the UN and its personnel unacceptable and demanded at the time
the immediate and unconditional release of the peacekeepers.

The EU is fundamentally committed to the security of Israel and the EU frequently discusses potential threats faced by
Israel, which values the work of the UNDOF mission.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 217

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002718/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Síria — apelo ao armamento dos rebeldes

O general Salim Idris, líder do Exército Livre da Síria — Free Syrian Army — esteve recentemente em Bruxelas e,
numa conferência de imprensa conjunta com o deputado Guy Verhofstadt, apelou à União Europeia para que
ajudasse a armar as forças rebeldes.

Assim, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

—
Tem conhecimento deste apelo?

—
Que comentário lhe merece?

—
Sabendo-se que vinte e um observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina foram raptados por
rebeldes sírios nas imediações dos montes Golã, em que medida esta circunstância poderia pôr em causa o
objetivo do general Salim Idris?

—
Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos «países amigos da Síria» neste tocante?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice‐Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(1 de julho de 2013)_

A AR/VP encontrou‐se com o general Idriss durante a visita deste a Bruxelas.

Na sequência da reunião de 18 de fevereiro do Conselho dos Negócios Estrangeiros, foi tomada, em 1 de março, a
decisão de prorrogar as medidas restritivas contra a Síria por um período de três meses e de as alterar «por forma a
prestar um maior apoio não letal e assistência técnica para a proteção dos civis». As disposições relativas ao embargo
de armas foram alteradas para permitir a exportação de equipamento não mortífero e a prestação de assistência
técnica à coligação na proteção dos civis. A assistência técnica será canalizada através da SOC. A essa decisão seguiu‐
se a tomada pelo Conselho dos Negócios Estrangeiros em 27 de maio, sobre as medidas relativas ao armamento. Os
Estados‐Membros comprometeram‐se a proceder, no âmbito das suas políticas nacionais, em conformidade com os
princípios estabelecidos pela Declaração do Conselho, adotada em 27 de maio. Neste contexto, salienta‐se igualmente
que, nesta fase, os Estados‐Membros não avançarão para a entrega de equipamento militar e que o Conselho reverá a
sua posição antes de 1 de agosto de 2013, com base num relatório da AR/VP, após consulta ao Secretário‐Geral da
ONU, sobre a evolução da iniciativa EUA‐Rússia e sobre o empenho das partes sírias.

A UE prosseguirá os trabalhos em curso, de avaliação e revisão das sanções, de acordo com a evolução no terreno, a
fim de apoiar e ajudar a oposição.

A AR/VP emitiu uma declaração sobre a retenção de tropas de manutenção da paz em que solicitava a sua libertação,
o que veio a ocorrer pouco depois.

A UE continua a trabalhar no âmbito do Grupo dos Amigos da Síria e com outras partes interessadas, principalmente
com Lakhdar Brahimi, representante especial conjunto da Liga dos Estados Árabes e das Nações Unidas, no sentido de
encontrar uma solução pacífica para o conflito.

C 6 E / 218 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002718/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria: call to arm the rebels

General Salim Idris, leader of the Free Syrian Army, was recently in Brussels and, at a joint press conference with Guy
Verhofstadt MEP, called on the European Union to help arm the rebel forces.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this call?

— What is her opinion of it?

— To what extent is General Salim Idris’ request undermined by the fact that 21 Filipino United Nations observers
have been kidnapped by Syrian rebels near the Golan Heights?

— What role should the EU and the ‘Friends of Syria’ play in this regard?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 July 2013)_

HR/VP met General Idris during his visit in Brussels.

Following the 18 February FAC, the decision was made on 1 March to renew the restrictive measures against Syria for
a further three months and to amend them ‘to provide greater non-lethal support and technical assistance for the
protection of civilians’. The arms embargo provisions were amended to be able to export non-lethal equipment and
provide technical assistance to the Coalition for the protection of civilians. The technical assistance will be channelled
through the SOC. This decision was followed by the one taken at the 27 May FAC with regard to the measures on
arms. Member States committed to proceed in their national policies in accordance with the principles set out in the
Council Declaration adopted on 27 May. In this context, it is also underlined that Member States will not proceed at
this stage with the delivery of military equipment and that the Council will review its position before 1 August 2013
on the basis of a report by the HR/VP, after having consulted the UN Secretary General, on the developments related
to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties.

The EU will continue the work underway to assess and review the sanctions, in line with developments on the ground,
in order to support and help the opposition.

The HR/VP has issued a statement regarding the detention of the peacekeepers calling for their release, which
happened soon after.

The EU continues to work within the Friends of Syria group and with other stakeholders, most importantly the Joint
Special Representative of the League of Arab States and the UN, Mr L. Brahimi to bring about a peaceful solution to
the conflict.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 219

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002719/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Mares dos Açores: proteção das zonas biogeograficamente sensíveis

A senhora Comissária Maria Damanaki foi questionada, durante a sua visita ao arquipélago dos Açores, sobre se a
Comissão defenderia junto do Conselho, no quadro das negociações sobre a Política Comum de Pescas, a proteção
das zonas biogeograficamente sensíveis dos mares dos Açores.

A comunicação social dá nota que a resposta da senhora Comissária terá sido: «penso que isso é algo que teremos de
fazer. Eu admiro os pescadores locais, porque usam bons métodos, amigos do ambiente — eles respeitam o stock,
respeitam o peixe — e, por isso, gostaríamos de respeitar o seu esforço, protegendo as áreas, os _stocks_ de peixe. É o
mínimo que podemos fazer».

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
De que formas procurará sensibilizar o Conselho para esta questão?

—
Face à admiração que, pela voz da senhora Comissária, justamente manifesta pelos pescadores açorianos,
através de que medidas e de que meios concretizará o apoio que merecem e a proteção que reclamam?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(26 de abril de 2013)_

A Comissão assegurou-se de que o Conselho tem plena consciência da importância biológica da zona em torno dos
Açores e da necessidade de proteger os habitats de profundidade. O Conselho procedeu a um debate aprofundado
sobre esta questão, em especial aquando da adoção do Regulamento (CE) n.° 1568/2005 ( [1] ) que altera o Regulamento
(CE) n.° 850/98 respeitante à proteção dos recifes de coral de profundidade dos efeitos da pesca em determinadas
zonas do oceano Atlântico.

A Comissão dedica especial atenção à pequena pesca nas águas dos Açores e noutras regiões ultraperiféricas e remete
o Senhor Deputado para a resposta dada à pergunta escrita E‐002596/2013.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 252 de 28.9.2005.

C 6 E / 220 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002719/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Azorean waters: protection of biogeographically sensitive areas

During her visit to the Azores, Commissioner Maria Damanaki was asked whether the Commission and the Council
would call for the protection of biogeographically sensitive areas in Azorean waters, during negotiations on the
common fisheries policy.

According to the media, the Commissioner replied that this was something that needed to be done. She added that
she admired local fishermen for using good, eco-friendly methods and for respecting both stock and fish, which is
why the Commission wanted to respect their efforts by protecting these areas and their fish stocks. She stated that this
was the least the Commission could do.

— How will the Commission try and make the Council aware of this issue?

— Given the Commissioner’s obvious admiration for Azorean fishermen, what action and measures will it take to
provide them with the support they deserve and the protection they are seeking?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

The Commission has ensured that the Council is well aware of the biological importance of the area around the
Azores and of the need to protect its deep-water habitats. The Council undertook detailed discussions on this issue in
particular during the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 ( [1] ) amending Regulation (EC) No 850/98 as regards
the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of fishing in certain areas of the Atlantic Ocean.

The Commission is giving a special consideration to small-scale fisheries around Azores and other outermost regions.
The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-002596/2013 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 252, 28.9.2005.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) In course.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 221

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-002720/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Esther Herranz García (PPE)**

_(8 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Promoción de la carne de vacuno

En los últimos días estamos asistiendo a una escalada mediática sobre la inclusión de carne de caballo en los
preparados cárnicos elaborados con vacuno.

Evidentemente, estas noticias están generando una disminución de la confianza del consumidor en todos los
preparados cárnicos y, especialmente, los elaborados con vacuno, con la consiguiente reducción del consumo de
carne de vacuno, cuya tendencia lamentablemente viene disminuyendo en los últimos años sin que se realice acción
correctora alguna por parte de la Comisión.

Dado que el sector de la carne de vacuno es una víctima colateral de esta situación, ¿qué medidas piensa adoptar la
Comisión para normalizar el consumo de carne de vacuno?

¿Tiene pensado la Comisión realizar algún tipo de acción o campaña que contrarreste la actual presión mediática y
que frene la caída de consumo de carne de vacuno?

**Respuesta del Sr. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Hasta el momento, no hay indicios de se haya producido una caída del consumo de carne de vacuno como
consecuencia del llamado escándalo de la carne de caballo. Es más, algunas fuentes indican un cambio positivo en la
actitud de los consumidores hacia la carne de vacuno producida al amparo de regímenes de certificación de la calidad.

En cualquier caso, la UE dispone cada año de fondos para cofinanciar medidas de información y promoción de
productos [Reglamento (CE) n° 3/2008 del Consejo ( [1] )], incluida la carne de vacuno producida con arreglo a un
régimen comunitario o nacional de certificación de la calidad.

Además, para tranquilizar a los consumidores, la Comisión adoptó inmediatamente después de que comenzara la
crisis una recomendación sobre un plan coordinado de control, cofinanciado por la Unión, que aboga por efectuar en
toda la UE controles de los alimentos que contengan carne de vacuno, para detectar los casos de fraude en el
etiquetado, y de la carne de caballo destinada al consumo humano.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DO L 3 de 5.1.2008.

C 6 E / 222 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002720/13**

**to the Commission**
**Esther Herranz García (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Promotion of beef

In recent days there has been widespread media outrage over horsemeat found in prepared meat products labelled as
beef.

The news has clearly damaged consumer confidence in all prepared meat products, especially those made with beef,
and has resulted in a drop in beef consumption, which has unfortunately been declining for some years without
prompting the Commission to take any remedial action.

Given that this scandal has caused significant collateral damage to the beef sector, what action does the Commission
intend to take to restore normal beef consumption levels?

Does the Commission plan to take any action or launch a campaign to counter the effects of the current adverse
media publicity and to curb the fall in beef consumption?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

There is so far no evidence of a drop in beef consumption as a result of the so-called horsemeat scandal and even
certain sources indicate a positive change in consumer's behaviour regarding beef meat that is produced under
certified quality schemes.

In any case, every year EU promotion funds are made available for the co-financing of information and promotion
measures (Council Regulation (EC) 3/2008 ( [1] )) including promotion measures for beef meat — produced in
accordance with a Community or a national quality scheme.

Furthermore, with the view to reassure consumers, the Commission has responded in the immediate aftermath of the
crisis by adopting a recommendation on a coordinated control plan, which is co-financed by the Union, calling for
EU-wide controls on food containing beef meat to detect fraudulent labelling as well as on horse meat destined for
human consumption.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 3, 5.1.2008.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 223

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002722/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón (S&D)**

_(8 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Solicitud de documentación sobre el cumplimiento dado por España al Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012

El día 22 de febrero de 2013 solicité a la Comisión Europea que me enviara copia de la documentación remitida por el
Gobierno de España en cumplimiento de la normativa fijada por el Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012. El día 26 de
febrero recibí una comunicación escrita donde se me indicaba que no tenían autorización para que me fuera enviada
la documentación solicitada.

Como miembro titular de la Comisión de Mercado Interior y Protección del Consumidor, sigo teniendo un gran
interés en conocer la información remitida por el Gobierno de España a la Comisión en cumplimiento del
Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012. Ante esta negativa, me gustaría conocer cuál es el fundamento jurídico sobre el que
se sustenta la no transmisión de dicha información a un diputado europeo que tiene interés en conocerla.

**Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión**

_(3 de mayo de 2013)_

El Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012 establece la posibilidad de que los Estados miembros puedan solicitar a la
Comisión autorización para mantener en vigor, negociar o firmar acuerdos bilaterales de inversión con terceros
países. Concretamente, establece dicho Reglamento la obligación de que la Comisión remita al Parlamento la
siguiente información:

1. La Comisión dispone hasta el 8 de mayo de 2013 para publicar en el _Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea_ la lista de
los acuerdos firmados antes del 1 de diciembre de 2009 que le hayan sido notificados por los Estados
miembros; también compete a la Comisión publicar cada doce meses una lista completa con todos los acuerdos
que le hayan sido notificados.

2. La Comisión ha de informar al Parlamento Europeo de su decisión de autorizar a los Estados miembros a iniciar
negociaciones, firmar o permitir la entrada en vigor de acuerdos bilaterales de inversión.

3. El Comité para los Acuerdos de Inversión, que asiste a la Comisión en la aplicación del mencionado
Reglamento, está sujeto al procedimiento consultivo del artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n° 182/2011. Por
consiguiente, también se aplica en este caso el artículo 10 de este último Reglamento, por el que se regula la
información sobre las deliberaciones de los comités.

4. Antes del 10 de enero de 2020 la Comisión ha de presentar al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo un informe
sobre la aplicación del Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012.

La Comisión lamenta que se haya producido un malentendido acerca de la petición que le ha sido dirigida. Si bien es
cierto que el Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012 impide que la Comisión pueda revelar toda notificación de las
autoridades españolas que equivalga a confirmar la celebración de unas negociaciones que podrían estar todavía en
curso, con sumo gusto compartirá la Comisión cualquier información sobre tratados bilaterales de inversión ya
celebrados y que sean de dominio público.

En el enlace que figura en la nota a pie de página hallará Su Señoría todos los datos sobre los 69 tratados bilaterales de
inversión celebrados por España ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.comercio.gob.es/es-ES/inversiones-exteriores/acuerdos-internacionales/acuerdos-promocion-proteccion-reciproca-inversionesappris/Paginas/lista-appri-vigor.aspx

C 6 E / 224 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002722/13**

**to the Commission**
**Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Request for documentation on Spain's compliance with Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012

On 22 February 2013, I asked the Commission to send me a copy of the documentation submitted by the Spanish
Government in compliance with the rules established by Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012. On 26 February, I received
a written communication stating that they were not authorised to send me the requested documentation.

As a full member of the Committee on the internal market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), I am still very interested
in finding out about the information submitted by the Spanish Government to the Commission in compliance with
Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012. In the light of this refusal, I would like to know what the legal basis is for not
transmitting this information to a Member of the European Parliament who is interested in finding out about it.

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

Regulation (EC) No 1219/2012 provides for the possibility for Member States to request authorisation from the
Commission to maintain in force, negotiate or sign, bilateral investment agreements with third countries. It provides
specifically for the information of Parliament as follows:

1. The Commission shall publish in the _Official Journal_ by 8 May 2013, the list of agreements signed before
1 December 2009 and notified by Member States and shall also publish annually the list of notified agreements.

2. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament of its decisions to authorise Member States to enter into
negotiations, sign or allow the entry into force of bilateral investment agreements.

3. The Committee for Investment Agreements, which assists the Commission in implementing the regulation, is
subject to the advisory procedure of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 182/2011. Therefore, Article 10 of that
regulation, on the information of committee proceedings, applies as well.

4. The Commission shall present to Parliament and to Council a report on the application of Regulation (EC)
No 1219/2012 by 10 January 2020.

The Commission regrets that there seems to be a misunderstanding on the request which was put to it. While the
Commission cannot disclose the Spanish notification under Regulation (EC) No 1219/2012 as such because it does
entail confirmation on ongoing negotiations, the Commission is more than happy to share information on already
concluded Spanish BITs which are in the public domain.

Details on the 69 BITs of Spain can be found at the following link ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.comercio.gob.es/es-ES/inversiones-exteriores/acuerdos-internacionales/acuerdos-promocion-proteccion-reciproca-inversionesappris/Paginas/lista-appri-vigor.aspx

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 225

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002723/13**

**an die Kommission**

**Renate Sommer (PPE)**

_(8. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Kennzeichnung von Fructose für Verbraucher mit einer Unverträglichkeit

In der EU leiden zahlreiche Menschen an einer Fructosemalabsorption. Allein in Deutschland sind schätzungsweise
2 von 3 Kindern und jeder 3. Erwachsene von einer solchen Lebensmittelunverträglichkeit betroffen (Quelle:
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ernährung).

Die Unverträglichkeit von Fructose, welche vor allem in Früchten, Honig und auch immer mehr Obstsäften und
Erfrischungsgetränken vorkommt, führt zu Magen‐ und Darmbeschwerden und kann langfristig sogar zu einer
Vergrößerung der Leber führen. Betroffenen Verbrauchern wird daher geraten, die Aufnahme von Fructose
einzuschränken oder Fruchtzucker gänzlich zu vermeiden.

Normalerweise können Verbraucher mit Allergien oder Unverträglichkeiten mögliche allergene Stoffe durch den
Blick auf das Zutatenverzeichnis identifizieren. Da Fructose gemäß dem aktuellen Lebensmittelrecht allerdings unter
die allgemeine Definition von Zucker fällt, sind Hersteller nicht dazu verpflichtet, Fructose als solche zu
kennzeichnen, sondern erfüllen mit der Angabe „Zucker“ im Zutatenverzeichnis die Angabepflicht. Folglich können
Verbraucher, die unter einer Fructosemalabsorption leiden, nicht immer eindeutig erkennen, ob Lebensmittel
Fructose enthalten.

1. Ist sich die Kommission der Problematik des zunehmenden Einsatzes von Fructose insbesondere in
Erfrischungsgetränken bewusst?

2. Plant die Kommission, die Definition von Zucker zu spezifizieren und die Verpflichtung zur Kennzeichnung
von Fructose einzuführen?

**Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission**

_(7. Mai 2013)_

Gemäß den EU-Rechtsvorschriften über die Kennzeichnung von Lebensmitteln ( [1] ) müssen Lebensmittelzutaten auf
dem Etikett mit ihrem spezifischen Namen, wie er in den EU-Rechtsvorschriften oder nationalen Bestimmungen
vorgesehen ist, bezeichnet werden.

Diesbezüglich enthält die Richtlinie 2001/111/EG über bestimmte Zuckerarten für die menschliche Ernährung ( [2] ) die
Bestimmung des Begriffs „Fruktose“ und beschränkt die Verwendung dieser Bezeichnung auf Erzeugnisse, die
bestimmte Merkmale aufweisen. Fruktose fällt nicht unter die allgemeine Definition von Zucker und ist daher in der
Zutatenliste mit der spezifischen offiziellen Bezeichnung „Fruktose“ anzugeben.

Was Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit Allergien und Unverträglichkeiten aufgrund von Fruktose anbelangt, möchte
die Kommission die Frau Abgeordnete auf die Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E‐002310/2012 ( [3] ) verweisen. In
diesem Zusammenhang ist zu betonen, dass das in dieser Antwort genannte wissenschaftliche Gutachten der
Europäischen Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit aufgrund der Komplexität der Arbeiten und der Tatsache, dass
manche der diesbezüglichen Projekte noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, erst in der ersten Jahreshälfte 2014 erwartet
wird.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2000/13/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. März 2000 zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der

Mitgliedstaaten über die Etikettierung und Aufmachung von Lebensmitteln sowie die Werbung hierfür, ABl. K 109 vom 6.5.2000, S. 29.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2001/111/EG des Rates vom 20. Dezember 2001 über bestimmte Zuckerarten für die menschliche Ernährung, ABl. L 10

vom 12.1.2002, S. 53.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html

( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 226 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002723/13**

**to the Commission**

**Renate Sommer (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Labelling of fructose for consumers with an intolerance

Numerous people in the EU suffer from fructose malabsorption. In Germany alone, it is estimated that two out of
three children and one in three adults are affected by this type of food intolerance (source: German Nutrition Society
(DGE)).

An intolerance of fructose, which is found, in particular, in fruit, honey and an increasing number of fruit juices and
soft drinks, results in gastro-intestinal ailments, and in the long term can even lead to enlargement of the liver. The
consumers affected by this are therefore advised to limit their intake of fructose or to avoid it completely.

Consumers with allergies and intolerances can normally identify possible allergenic substances by looking at the list
of ingredients. However, as fructose falls within the general definition of sugar under current food legislation,
manufacturers are not obliged to label fructose as such, but meet their information obligation by indicating ‘sugar’ in
the ingredients list. Consequently, consumers suffering from fructose malabsorption are not able to ascertain for
certain whether foods contain fructose.

1. Is the Commission aware of the problem of the increasing use of fructose, in particular in soft drinks?

2. Does it plan to make the definition of sugar more specific and introduce a labelling obligation for fructose?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

According to the EU legislation on food labelling ( [1] ), food ingredients shall be designated on the label by their specific
name as provided in the EU legislation or national provisions.

In this regard, Directive 2001/111/EC relating to certain sugars intended for human consumption ( [2] ) establishes the
definition of ‘fructose’ and allows the use of this designation only to products containing specific characteristics. As
such, fructose does not fall under the general definition of sugar and therefore, must be mentioned in the list of
ingredients by its specific legal name — ‘fructose’.

For aspects related to the allergies and intolerances caused by fructose, the Commission would like to refer the
Honourable Member to the answer given to the Written Question E‐002310/2012 ( [3] ). In this regard, it should be
highlighted that due to the complexity of the work and the fact that certain projects on the matter are still ongoing;
the scientific opinion of the European Food Safety Authority referred to in the answer is only expected in the first half
of 2014.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States

relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2001/111/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to certain sugars intended for human consumption, OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 53.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 227

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002725/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Trattamento di rifiuti a Zero Branco (TV) in possibile violazione delle direttive «VIA» 2011/92/UE e «Rifiuti»
2008/98/CE

La Mestrinaro S.p.A., sita a Zero Branco (TV), dedita, tra l'altro, all'attività di riutilizzo di inerti e sottoprodotti
industriali, nel 2004 presentava un progetto finalizzato a ottenere l'aumento delle quantità e qualità di rifiuti speciali
(pericolosi e non pericolosi) trattabili; l'azienda, che ha sede nel mezzo di una zona residenziale e agricola, famosa per
la produzione di Radicchio Rosso di Treviso IGP, veniva autorizzata dalla Giunta regionale del Veneto a iniziare i
lavori, grazie alla delibera n. 882 del 7 aprile 2009 di approvazione del progetto, in seguito al favorevole parere
obbligatorio della Commissione VIA (Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale) regionale. Tale atto veniva annullato con
ordinanza del Consiglio di Stato del 29 settembre 2009, n. 4962 ( [1] ) per irregolarità nella valutazione della
compatibilità territoriale e ambientale del progetto medesimo e a causa della sussistenza di una condanna definitiva
per il reato di traffico illecito di rifiuti a carico del legale rappresentante dell'azienda stessa.

La Mestrinaro S.p.A. chiedeva quindi alla Giunta regionale del Veneto un riesame del progetto, ottenendo una
seconda approvazione dello stesso (previo secondo parere favorevole della Commissione regionale VIA) grazie alla
delibera n. 100 del 26 gennaio 2010; anche tale atto, tuttavia, veniva annullato dal Consiglio di Stato con sentenza del
28 dicembre 2011, n. 6917 ( [2] ). In forza di ciò, il comune di Zero Branco (TV) decideva di emanare un'apposita
ordinanza ( [3] ) (poi sospesa dal TAR del Veneto ( [4] )) volta a intimare la demolizione dei fabbricati nel frattempo costruiti
dall'azienda, e la Provincia di Treviso chiedeva l'allontanamento dei rifiuti non conformi già ricevuti. L'azienda
provvedeva solo parzialmente all'allontanamento ( [5] ), lamentando difficoltà concernenti i rifiuti solidi aventi codice
CER 19 13 02 ( [6] ), a causa, a suo giudizio, dell'eccessivo costo dell'operazione ( [7] ); la Provincia, quindi, decideva di
venire incontro alle esigenze economiche dell'azienda autorizzando il trattamento di tali rifiuti non conformi ( [8] ). A
questo punto, la Mestrinaro S.p.A. ripresentava per la terza volta il progetto ottenendo il terzo parere positivo della
Commissione regionale VIA, preludio della probabile imminente emanazione di una terza delibera autorizzativa da
parte della Giunta regionale del Veneto.

La Commissione è a conoscenza di quanto esposto? Quali iniziative intende intraprendere per controllare il rispetto
della normativa comunitaria applicabile a tale controversa vicenda?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(16 aprile 2013)_

In base agli elementi forniti dall’onorevole deputato, la Commissione non individua, in questa fase, alcuna violazione
della direttiva 2008/98/CE ( [9] ) relativa ai rifiuti. Inoltre, quanto alle presunte violazioni della direttiva 2011/92/UE ( [10] )
concernente la valutazione dell’impatto ambientale, non rientra tra i ruoli istituzionali della Commissione
commentare procedimenti giudiziari nazionali in corso di competenza di uno Stato membro.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ordinanza di accoglimento dell'appello del comune di Zero Branco contro l'ordinanza del TAR (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) del Veneto

15.07.2009, n. 723.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Sentenza di accoglimento dell'appello del comune di Zero Branco contro la sentenza del TAR del Veneto 5.11.2010, n. 5981.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Ordinanza del Comune di Zero Branco n. 1 del 28.2.2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) In seguito all'accoglimento del ricorso dell'azienda da parte del TAR del Veneto con ordinanza 7.6.2012, n. 352.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Conferendo i rifiuti presso la Discarica CO.VE.RI. S.c.a.r.l. di Silea (TV).
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) In base alle categorie di cui alla decisione della Commissione europea 2000/5320/CE.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Come risulta da una comunicazione della Mestrinaro S.p.A. inviata alla Provincia di Treviso il 22.06.2012.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Decreto della Provincia di Treviso n. 684 del 19.11.2012.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) GU L 312 del 22.11.2008.
( ⋅10∙ ) GU L 26 del 28.1.2012.

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C 6 E / 228 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002725/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Waste treatment in Zero Branco (Treviso), possibly in breach of the EIA Directive 2011/92/EU and the Waste
Directive 2008/98/EC

In 2004, Mestrinaro S.p.A., in Zero Branco (Treviso), a company which, among other things, re-uses inert waste and
industrial by-products, submitted a project seeking to obtain an increase in the quantity and quality of special waste
(both hazardous and non-hazardous) it could treat. The company, which is based in the middle of a residential and
agricultural area that is famous for the production of _Radicchio Rosso di Treviso_ IGP, received authorisation from the
Regional Council of Veneto to start the work in question, further to Resolution No 882 of 7 April 2009 approving
the project, in the wake of the compulsory favourable opinion of the regional EIA (Environmental Impact
Assessment) Committee. This act was subsequently cancelled by Order No 4962 ( [1] ) of the Council of State of
29 September 2009, due to irregularities in the assessment of the spatial and environmental compatibility of the
project and because the legal representative of the company had been convicted of the crime of illegal waste
trafficking.

Mestrinaro S.p.A. then asked the Regional Council of Veneto to review the project, obtaining a second approval of the
same project (after a second favourable opinion by the regional EIA Committee), through Resolution No 100 of
26 January 2010. This act, too, however, was cancelled by the Council of State in its judgment No 6917 of
28 December 2011 ( [2] ). Because of this, the municipality of Zero Branco decided to issue a special order ( [3] ) (later
suspended by the Regional Administrative Court of Veneto ( [4] )) for the demolition of the buildings which had, in the
meantime, been built by the company; the Province of Treviso also called for the removal of the non-compliant waste
which had already been received.

The company removed the waste only partially ( [5] ), claiming it was having difficulties with the solid waste bearing the
code 19 13 02 ( [6] ), because, in its opinion, the operation was too costly ( [7] ). The Province, therefore, decided to meet
the company half way and authorised the treatment of such non-compliant waste ( [8] ). At that point, Mestrinaro S.p.A.
submitted its project for the third time, obtaining a third positive opinion from the regional EIA Committee, which is
likely to lead to the imminent issuance of a third resolution by the Regional Council of Veneto approving the project.

Is the Commission is aware of this? What steps will it take to monitor compliance with the Community rules
applicable to this controversial matter?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 April 2013)_

Based on the elements provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission cannot detect at this stage any violation
of Directive 2008/98/EC ( [9] ) on waste. Furthermore, regarding the alleged breaches of Directive 2011/92/EU ( [10] ) on
Environmental Impact Assessment, it is not the institutional role of the Commission to comment on ongoing
national legal proceedings pertaining to a Member State.

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⋅7∙ **|** )
⋅8∙ **|** )
⋅9∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) An order upholding the appeal by the municipality of Zero Branco against Order No 723 of the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of Veneto of

15.7.2009.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) A judgment upholding the appeal by the municipality of Zero Branco against Order No 5981 of the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of

Veneto of 5.11.2010.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Order No 1 of the Municipality of Zero Branco of 28.2.2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Further to the upholding of the company's appeal by the Veneto TAR, through Order No 352 of 7.6.2012.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Sending the waste to the CO.VE.RI. S.c.a.r.l. landfill of Silea (Treviso).
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) In accordance with the categories under Commission Decision 2000/5320/EC.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) See letter sent by Mestrinaro S.p.A. to the Province of Treviso on 22.6.2012.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Decree No 684 of the Province of Treviso of 19.11.2012.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) OJ L 312, 22.11.2008.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 229

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002726/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Claudio Morganti (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Problematiche degli aeroporti toscani

Nei giorni scorsi è stata presentata dalla Giunta Regionale Toscana una Variante al PIT (Piano di Indirizzo Territoriale)
che prevede anche la costruzione di una nuova pista dell'Aeroporto di Firenze, convergente e parallela all'Autostrada
A11.

Da più parti vi sono timori che questa nuova opera possa arrecare notevoli disagi e danni ambientali, come del resto
segnalato da un rapporto ambientale dell'Arpat (Agenzia regionale per la protezione ambientale della Toscana): il
passaggio di numerosi aerei sopra un'area fortemente urbanizzata come quella di Prato (terza città dell'Italia centrale
per numero di abitanti) causerebbe infatti un notevole incremento del livello di inquinamento acustico in diverse
zone della città e nei Comuni limitrofi.

Il Parlamento europeo si è recentemente espresso per una maggiore tutela della popolazione rispetto
all'inquinamento acustico aeroportuale, seguendo nei fatti le linee già delineate dalla Commissione europea nella sua
comunicazione 828 del 2011.

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza di questo progetto? Come intervengono nella questione le direttive VAS
(2001/42/CE) e VIA (2011/92/UE)? Sono state correttamente applicate?

2. Non ritiene auspicabile, nell'ottica di una migliore integrazione e per sviluppare a pieno le potenzialità della
Regione, puntare su un unico aeroporto, che per molti aspetti non può che essere Pisa, e sviluppare al meglio i
collegamenti di questo scalo con il resto delle destinazioni regionali?

3. Non ritiene inoltre che lo scalo di Pisa possa rientrare a pieno titolo tra i core network aeroportuali della rete
TEN-T europea, come invece escluso dal recente Piano Nazionale per lo Sviluppo Aeroportuale del Governo italiano?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

1. La Regione Toscana ha comunicato alla Commissione che il piano di indirizzo territoriale è attualmente oggetto
di una valutazione ai sensi della direttiva 2001/42/CE ( [1] ) sulla valutazione ambientale strategica (VAS) e che, inoltre,
sarà svolta una valutazione conformemente alla direttiva 2011/92/UE ( [2] ) sulla valutazione di impatto ambientale
(VIA) riguardante la nuova pista dell'aeroporto di Firenze nella fase di definizione del progetto. La Regione Toscana ha
altresì confermato alla Commissione che la valutazione di impatto ambientale terrà conto della valutazione
ambientale strategica.

2. La Commissione sta valutando un progetto di infrastruttura riguardante la costruzione di una ferrovia leggera
fra l'aeroporto di Pisa e la stazione centrale della città, presentato per ottenere un cofinanziamento a titolo del Fondo
europeo di sviluppo regionale nell'ambito del programma operativo regionale 2007-2013.

3. Sulla base della metodologia di pianificazione della rete TEN-T ( [3] ), non è possibile includere l'aeroporto di Pisa
nella rete centrale TEN-T in quanto non soddisfa i criteri corrispondenti: Pisa non è un aeroporto di un nodo urbano
centrale (capitale di uno Stato membro, area MEGA secondo l'atlante ESPON del 2006, conurbazione con oltre 1
milione di abitanti); inoltre, con i suoi 4,5 milioni di passeggeri all'anno, l'aeroporto di Pisa non raggiunge la soglia di
volume di circa 7,8 milioni di passeggeri. Anche il volume del traffico merci dell'aeroporto si attesta al di sotto della
soglia richiesta.

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 197 del 21.7.2001.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) GU L 26 del 28.1.2012.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/doc/web_methodology.pdf

C 6 E / 230 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002726/13**

**to the Commission**
**Claudio Morganti (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Issues relating to Tuscany's airports

In recent days, an amendment to the Territorial Policy Plan has been submitted to the Regional Council of Tuscany,
providing for the construction of a new runway at Florence airport, convergent and parallel with respect to the A11
motorway.

Various parties are voicing fears that this new project could cause serious environmental disturbances and damage, as
highlighted in an environmental report produced by ARPAT (Regional Agency for Environmental Protection in
Tuscany): countless aeroplanes flying over a densely built-up area such as Prato (the third largest city of central Italy in
terms of inhabitants) would significantly increase the noise pollution level in various parts of the city and in
neighbouring towns.

Recently, the European Parliament came out in favour of affording greater protection to the population from noise
pollution from airports, following, in practice, the guidelines already laid down by the Commission in its
communication No 828 of 2011.

1. Is the Commission aware of this project? What part do the SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment)
(2001/42/EC) and EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) (2011/92/EU) Directives play in this matter? Have they
been applied correctly?

2. With a view to better integration and to fully develop the potential of the region, does the Commission not
consider it desirable to focus on a single airport, which in many ways can only be Pisa, and maximise development of
the links from this airport to the other regional destinations?

3. Furthermore, does it not believe that Pisa airport could be a fully fledged part of the core airport networks of the
trans-European transport network (TEN-T), whereas it was excluded from the recent National Airport Development
Plan prepared by the Italian Government?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

1. The Tuscany Region has informed the Commission that an assessment according to Directive 2001/42/EC ( [1] )
(on Strategic Environment Assessment or SEA) is currently ongoing on the Territorial Policy Plan ( _Piano di Indirizzo_
_Territoriale_ ) and that, furthermore, an assessment according to 2011/92/EU ( [2] ) (on Environmental Impact Assessment
or EIA) will be carried out on the new runway at Florence Airport in the project definition phase. The Tuscany Region
also confirmed to the Commission that the EIA procedure will take into account the results of the SEA procedure.

2. The Commission is currently assessing an infrastructure project relating to the construction of a light railway
line between the Pisa airport and the Pisa main train station submitted for co-financing by the European Regional
Development Fund in the framework of the 2007-2013 Regional Operational Programme.

3. Based on the TEN-T planning methodology ( [3] ), it is not possible to include Pisa airport in the TEN-T core
network, as it does not fulfil any of the corresponding criteria: Pisa is not an airport of an urban core node (MS capital,
MEGA city according to ESPON atlas 2006, conurbation of more than 1 million inhabitants); nor does it, with about
4.5 million passengers per year, reach the volume threshold of about 7.8 million passengers. The airport's throughput
of air cargo also falls below the required threshold.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 197, 21.7.2001.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/doc/web_methodology.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 231

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002727/13**

**do Komisji**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wsparcie dla organizacji broniących praw ofiar przestępstw

Komisja Europejska w wielu swoich programach wspiera organizacje pozarządowe. Do naszego biura wpłynęło
pytanie od organizacji świadczącej pomoc ofiarom przestępstw oraz walczącej z korupcją dotyczące wsparcia
finansowego dla takich organizacji ze środków unijnych.

1. Czy Komisja wspiera takie inicjatywy z budżetu UE?

2. Z jakich funduszy udzielane jest to wsparcie i jak o nie aplikować?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji**

_(22 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Komisja może udzielić wsparcia organizacji pozarządowej świadczącej pomoc ofiarom przestępstw i zwalczającym
korupcję w ramach programów szczegółowych „Wymiar sprawiedliwości w sprawach karnych” (JPEN, zarządzanego
przez DG ds. Sprawiedliwości) oraz „Zapobieganie i walka z przestępczością” (ISEC, zarządzanego przez DG do
Spraw Wewnętrznych).

Informacje na temat celów tych programów, możliwości finansowania oraz procedur aplikacyjnych odnaleźć można
na stronie Internetowej Komisji:

[JPEN: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm)

[ISEC: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm)
[and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm)

C 6 E / 232 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002727/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Support for organisations defending the rights of crime victims

The Commission provides non‐governmental organisations with support through many of its programmes. An
organisation that helps the victims of crime and combats corruption recently contacted our office with a query
concerning EU funding for such organisations.

1. Does the Commission provide support for such initiatives from the EU budget?

2. From what funds is this support allocated, and what is the application procedure?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

The Commission can fund a non-governmental organisation that supports victims of crime and combats corruption
under the Criminal Justice Support Programme (‘JPEN’, managed by DG Justice) and the Prevention of and Fight
against Crime (‘ISEC’, managed by DG HOME).

Information about the objectives, funding possibilities and procedures under these programmes is found on the
Commission's website:

[JPEN: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm)

[ISEC: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm)
[and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm)

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 233

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002728/13**

**do Komisji**
**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Białoruska lista prewencyjna

Władze białoruskie wprowadziły kolejne prawo wymierzone przeciwko działalności niezależnych organizacji
pozarządowych. Opiera się ono na rejestracji prewencyjnej, która w założeniach jest formą zapobiegania
przestępstwom, gdyż mają się na niej znajdować osoby, które zagrażają bezpieczeństwu, jednak w praktyce zasady
wpisywania na ową listę są zupełnie subiektywne i niejasne. Policja oraz inne organy państwowe mogą wpisać do
rejestru prewencyjnego te osoby, które ich zdaniem przyczyniły się do szkody państwa lub są zagrożeniem dla
bezpieczeństwa.

Zgodnie z ustawą organy państwowe nie mają obowiązku informowania obywateli o tym, że zostali wpisani na listę
rejestracji prewencyjnej. Zapis ten jest trudny dla organizacji pozarządowych, których członkowie znaleźli się na
takiej liście. Jeśli bowiem przewodniczący NGO wpisany do rejestru nie podejmie żadnych niezbędnych kroków
w ciągu 2 miesięcy od daty wpisania na listę, jego organizacja jest likwidowana. Wydaje się, iż prawo to będzie
stosowane jako mechanizm represji i pozbywania się organizacji niewygodnych dla reżimu.

W związku z powyższym pragnę zapytać Komisję, czy ma zamiar interweniować poprzez swoją delegaturę
w Mińsku w kwestii subiektywności nowego białoruskiego prawa.

Czy Komisja, w ramach promowania europejskich wartości i praworządności, ma zamiar pomóc organizacjom
pozarządowym, którym z powodu nowych zapisów grozi lub będzie grozić zamknięcie?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji**

_(17 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Unia Europejska, w szczególności poprzez swoją delegację w Mińsku, uważnie monitoruje sytuację w dziedzinie
praw człowieka na Białorusi i znany jest jej nowy prezydencki dekret w jeszcze większym stopniu komplikujący życie
organizacjom pozarządowym i prywatnym przedsiębiorstwom. UE wykorzystuje każdą okazję, aby przypomnieć
władzom Białorusi o potrzebie poprawy sytuacji w dziedzinie praw człowieka, wspierania demokracji
i praworządności. UE zaproponuje również na sesji Rady Praw Człowieka w czerwcu 2013 r. odnowienie mandatu
specjalnego sprawozdawcy ds. sytuacji w zakresie praw człowieka na Białorusi.

Pomoc UE dla Białorusi skupia się bezpośrednio i pośrednio na wsparciu związanym z potrzebami obywateli
i z demokratyzacją. Unia Europejska nadal udziela wsparcia organizacjom społeczeństwa obywatelskiego
i niezależnym mediom na Białorusi w rozwijaniu ich możliwości instytucjonalnych w przedłużającej się sytuacji
stosowania przez władze środków represyjnych.

C 6 E / 234 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002728/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Belarusian preventive watch list

The Belarusian authorities have introduced yet another law targeting the activities of independent non‐governmental
organisations. The law is based on preventive registration, which is seen as a means of preventing crime by including
the names of people who pose a security threat. However, the rules relating to inclusion on this list are, in practice,
utterly subjective and unclear. The police and other state bodies may include people on the list if, in their opinion,
they have contributed to harming the state or if they pose a security threat.

Under the new law, state bodies are not obliged to notify citizens if they are included on the preventive watch list. This
clause makes it difficult for NGOs whose members are on the list, since NGO directors who are on the list and who do
not take the necessary steps within two months from the date of their inclusion will have their organisations closed
down. It appears that this law will be used as a means to persecute and get rid of organisations that are inconvenient
to the regime.

Does the Commission intend to make representations through its delegation in Minsk with regard to the subjective
character of the new Belarusian law?

Does the Commission intend, as part of efforts to promote European values and the rule of law, to provide assistance
to NGOs which are threatened — or will be threatened — with closure by the new law?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

The EU, in particular through its Delegation in Minsk, is monitoring closely the situation of human rights in Belarus
and is aware of a new presidential decree which further complicates the life of NGOs and private companies. The EU
takes every opportunity to remind the Belarusian authorities of the need to improve the human rights situation, to
promote democracy and the rule of law. The EU will also propose a renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur
on human rights situation in Belarus at the June 2013 session of the Human Rights Council.

EU assistance to Belarus focuses directly and indirectly on supporting the needs of the population and
democratisation. The EU continues to support civil society organisations and the independent media in Belarus to
develop their institutional capacity in a prolonged situation of repressive measures.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 235

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002729/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Terrorystyczne ugrupowania islamskie w Syrii

Wielu analityków zajmujących się konfliktem w Syrii wskazuje na rosnący wpływ grup islamskich w szeregach
rebeliantów. Wśród nich znaczącą rolę odgrywają Al Nusra Front oraz Syryjski Front Islamski. Oskarża się je
o koneksje z Al Kaidą oraz rekrutowanie mudżahedinów z Afganistanu, Bośni, Kosowa i Albanii. Gen Salim Idriss,
szef Syryjskiej Wolnej Armii, podczas swojej wizyty w Parlamencie Europejskim potwierdził stawiane obu
ugrupowaniom zarzuty. Podczas dwóch lat trwania konfliktu opisywane organizacje wzięły na siebie
odpowiedzialność za przygotowanie i przeprowadzanie wielu ataków bombowych. Wskazuje się również na ich
zbrodnie przeciw ludzkości popełniane na zajętych terenach, w tym masowe mordowanie oraz wypędzanie
chrześcijan i Alawitów. Przywódcy Al Nusry nie kryją swoich ideologicznych zapędów kontynuowania dżihadu przy
pomocy zdobytych w Syrii środków finansowych i militarnych.

1. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia ewentualne zagrożenie dla Europy oraz Bliskiego
Wschodu ze strony wspomnianych ugrupowań Al Nusra Front oraz Syryjskiego Frontu Islamskiego?

2. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel zgadza się z twierdzeniem, iż oba ugrupowania stosując akty
terroru wobec ludności cywilnej, w tym masowo mordując chrześcijan i Alawitów, popełniają zbrodnie przeciw
ludzkości?

3. Unia Europejska na liście organizacji terrorystycznych umieściła Al Kaidę oraz Partię Walczących Kurdystanu.
Oba ugrupowania mają szerokie powiązania z organizacją Al Nusra, dostarczając jej materiałów szkoleniowych,
broni oraz ludzi. Czy wobec tego Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel rozważa uznanie przez Unię
Europejską organizacji Al Nusra Front z Syrii za organizację terrorystyczną?

4. Które ugrupowania walczące w Syrii są beneficjentami unijnej pomocy?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(6 maja 2013 r.)_

UE współpracuje z Narodową Koalicją Syryjskich Sił Rewolucyjnych i Opozycyjnych oraz jej przewodniczącym
Mu’azem al-Khatibem w celu pokojowego rozwiązania konfliktu. UE zachęca Koalicję między innymi do
podtrzymania zobowiązania do przestrzegania zasad praw człowieka i demokracji, dlatego też nie wspiera żadnych
ugrupowań, które sprzeciwiają się tym wartościom.

UE przyjęła z zadowoleniem pracę Niezależnej Międzynarodowej Komisji Dochodzeniowej w Sprawie Syrii.
W ostatnim sprawozdaniu Komisja wyszczególnia nadużycia popełnione w Syrii, w tym zbrodnie przeciwko
ludzkości. Sprawozdanie uwzględnia bezprawne morderstwa chrześcijan, bombardowania okolic zamieszkiwanych
przez chrześcijan i druzów w Damaszku oraz masakry i egzekucje alawickich żołnierzy i ludności cywilnej bez
należytego procesu. UE angażuje się w doprowadzenie do rozliczenia osób odpowiedzialnych za owe zbrodnie.
Warto odnotować, iż niektórzy, jak na przykład przewodniczący Koalicji, Mu’az al-Khatib, uważają, że podłoże tego
konfliktu nie jest religijne.

Państwa członkowskie nie dyskutowały na temat kwestii wpisania Frontu Al-Nusra na listę organizacji
terrorystycznych. UE nie udziela pomocy ugrupowaniom zbrojnym.

C 6 E / 236 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002729/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Islamist terror groups in Syria

Many analysts of the conflict in Syria point out the growing influence of Islamist groups in the ranks of the rebels.
Among these groups, the al‐Nusra Front and the Syrian Islamic Front play a major role. They are accused of having
links with al‐Qaida and of recruiting mujahideen from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. During his visit to
the European Parliament, General Salim Idriss, the Chief of Staff of the Free Syrian Army, confirmed the accusations
levelled at the two groups. In the two years since the conflict began, these groups have been responsible for preparing
and carrying out numerous bombings. There are also indications that they have committed crimes against humanity
in areas which they occupy, including mass killings and the expulsion of Christians and Alawites. The leaders of the
al‐Nusra Front do not hide their ideological drive to use the financial and military aid that they receive in Syria to
continue to wage jihad.

1. How does the Vice‐President/High Representative assess the potential threat to Europe and the Middle East
posed by the al‐Nusra Front and the Syrian Islamic Front?

2. Does the VP/HR agree that the acts of terrorism carried out against the civilian population by the two groups,
including massacres of Christians and Alawites, constitute crimes against humanity?

3. The EU has included al‐Qaida and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party on its list of terrorist organisations. Both groups
have broad ties to the al-Nusra Front, providing it with training equipment, weapons and people. In this connection,
is the VP/HR considering having the EU declare the al‐Nusra Front a terrorist organisation?

4. Which groups engaged in fighting in Syria are recipients of EU assistance?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The EU has been working with the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and its leader Muaz al-Khatib towards a
peaceful resolution of the conflict. The EU encourages the SOC to remain committed to the respect of the principles
of human rights and democracy, among other things, and thus does not support any groups that go against these
values.

The EU has welcomed the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry. Its recent report details
abuses, among them crimes against humanity, committed in Syria. It lists instances of unlawful killings of Christians,
bombing of Christian and Druze neighbourhoods in Damascus as well as massacres and executions of Alawite
soldiers and civilians without due process. The EU is committed to ensuring accountability for such crimes. It is
important to note that some, like the leader of the SOC, Moaz al-Khatib, believe that the lines of conflict are not
sectarian.

There have been no discussions about putting the al-Nusra Front on the list of terrorist organisations among the
Member States. The EU is not providing assistance to armed groups.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 237

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002730/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Ochrona wolności do wyznania podejmowana przez
Europejską Służbę Działań Zewnętrznych

W styczniu 2011 r. Parlament Europejski przyjął rezolucję „sytuacja chrześcijan w kontekście wolności wyznania”.
Rezolucja nie tylko zwracała uwagę na przypadki łamania praw chrześcijan i potępiała je, lecz wskazywała
i zobowiązywała Wiceprzewodniczącą/Wysoką Przedstawiciel do konkretnych działań.

1. W punkcie 13 rezolucja zobowiązywała do pilnego przedstawienia strategii UE na rzecz egzekwowania prawa
człowieka do wolności wyznania, w tym listy sankcji przeciwko państwom, które świadomie unikają chronienia
wyznań. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel zrealizowała ten postulat? Proszę o przesłanie strategii
oraz wyników jej realizacji w roku 2012.

2. Jakie działania podejmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby wzmocnić kwestie poszanowania
wolności religijnej i wolności wyznania? Szczególnie w państwach, wskazanych np. przez coroczne raporty
organizacji Open Doors, w których wolność ta stanowi niedostępne dla wielu dobro. Jakie instrumenty można
zastosować, aby zapewnić zagrożonym wspólnotom chrześcijańskim bezpieczeństwo i ochronę, bez względu na to,
gdzie się w świecie znajdują?

3. Jak Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych zrealizowała punkt 104 „rezolucji Parlamentu Europejskiego
w sprawie rocznego sprawozdania dotyczącego praw człowieka na świecie oraz polityki Unii Europejskiej w tym
zakresie, w tym wpływu na strategiczną politykę UE w dziedzinie praw człowieka” z 30 marca 2012 r.?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(23 maja 2013 r.)_

W konkluzjach „w sprawie nietolerancji, dyskryminacji i przemocy ze względu na wyznanie lub przekonania”,
przyjętych w lutym 2011 r. na wniosek Wysokiej Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącej, Rada potwierdziła silne
zaangażowanie UE w promocję i ochronę wolności religii lub przekonań, w sposób wolny od wszelkiej
dyskryminacji. ESDZ, pod kierownictwem Wysokiej Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącej, wykorzystuje pełen
zakres możliwości w celu zaangażowania się w sprawę wolności religii lub przekonań na poziomie dwustronnym
i wielostronnym, za pośrednictwem dialogów dotyczących praw człowieka, oświadczeń, działań dyplomatycznych,
szczególnie odnośnie do sytuacji krajów, w których promocja i obrona wolności religii lub przekonań stanowią jedną
z ważniejszych kwestii. UE podjęła starania w celu zdobycia silnego międzyregionalnego poparcia, zwłaszcza na
forum ONZ, w walce przeciwko nietolerancji religijnej oraz wsparła inicjatywy w dziedzinie dialogu
międzykulturowego i międzyreligijnego dążące do złagodzenia wszelkich pojawiających się napięć.

W celu dalszej intensyfikacji i uwidocznienia działań UE do planu działania przyjętego przez Radę w czerwcu 2012 r.
włączono opracowanie publicznych wytycznych UE w sprawie wolności religii lub przekonań, wraz ze
strategicznymi ramami UE dotyczącymi praw człowieka i demokracji. Wytyczne zapewnią urzędnikom UE
szczegółowe i konkretne mechanizmy działania. Przede wszystkim przypomną one, że państwa mają nadrzędny
obowiązek ochrony podlegających ich jurysdykcji wyznawców wszystkich religii, a także osób o przekonaniach
nieteistycznych i ateistycznych.

Odnośnie do pkt 104 sprawozdania R. Howitta, ESDZ pracuje nad zwiększeniem swoich możliwości w zakresie
rozpowszechniania kwestii wolności religii lub przekonań we wszystkich dyrekcjach, zwłaszcza poprzez specjalne
szkolenia na ten temat. Ponadto roczne sprawozdanie na temat praw człowieka i demokracji na świecie zawiera
obecnie specjalny rozdział, w którym szczegółowo omawia się działania ESDZ w dziedzinie wolności religii lub
przekonań.

C 6 E / 238 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002730/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — the European External Action Service's protection of freedom of religious belief

In January 2011, Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation of Christians in the context of freedom of religion.
This resolution not only drew attention to and condemned instances in which Christians’ rights were violated, it also
proposed specific actions and called for the Vice‐President/High Representative to implement them.

1. Point 13 of the resolution calls for an EU strategy on enforcing the human right to freedom of religion,
including a list of measures against states who knowingly fail to protect religious denominations, to be presented as a
matter of urgency. How has the Vice‐President/High Representative translated this demand into reality? I should be
grateful if you would provide me with the strategy and the results of its implementation in 2012.

2. What steps is the VP/HR taking to place greater emphasis on the issue of respect for freedom of religion and
freedom of belief, particularly in countries identified in the Open Doors organisation’s annual reports as places where
this freedom is denied to many? What instruments can be used to ensure the safety of threatened Christian
communities, regardless of where they are in the world?

3. How has the EEAS implemented point 104 of Parliament’s resolution of 30 March 2012 on the Annual Report
on Human Rights in the World and the European Union’s policy on the matter, including implications for the EU’s
strategic human rights policy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2013)_

In the conclusions ‘on intolerance, discrimination and violence on the basis of religion or belief’ adopted in
February 2011 on the HR/VP's proposal, the Council reaffirmed the strong commitment of the EU to the promotion
and protection of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) without any discrimination. Under the guidance of the HR/VP,
the EEAS has been using the full range of possibilities to engage on FoRB at bilateral and multilateral levels, through
human rights dialogues, statements, demarches, especially on the situation of countries where the promotion and
defense of FoRB is a major issue. The EU endeavoured to rally strong cross-regional support, notably at the UN, in the
fight against religious intolerance and supported initiatives in the field of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue
with a view to defuse tensions wherever they appear.

In order to further enhance EU action and make it more visible, the development of EU public guidelines on FoRB has
been included in the action plan adopted by the Council in June 2012, alongside with the EU Strategic Framework on
Human Rights and Democracy. The guidelines will provide EU officials with specific and concrete action
mechanisms. They will notably recall that States have a primary duty to protect believers of all faiths living under their
jurisdiction, as well as people holding non-theistic or atheistic beliefs.

As regards point 104 of the Howitt report, the EEAS is working on reinforcing its capacity to mainstream FoRB
across directorates, notably through specific trainings on the issue. Furthermore, the annual Report on Human Rights
and Democracy in the World now contains a specific chapter addressing in depth the activities of the EEAS in the field
of FoRB.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 239

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002731/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Konflikt między Chinami a Japonią o wyspy Senkaku

Od dłuższego czasu trwa starcie Chin z Japonią o sporne wyspy Senkaku. Oba państwa wysuwają sprzeczne żądania
do tego bogatego w zasoby terytorium. Wsparte oczekiwaniami społeczeństwa decydują się również na częste
pokazy siły. W ostatnim czasie okręty chińskie wielokrotnie, zdaniem Tokio, symulowały atak na wyspę oraz
naruszały wody terytorialne Japonii. Ze względu na kontekst historyczny oba państwa wydają się posiadać mandat
do sprawowania władzy nad wyspami.

1. Jaką strategię przyjmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel względem konfliktu między Japonią,
a Chinami?

2. Kto według Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel ma prawo do posiadania wysp Senkaku?

3. Jakie działania podejmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby złagodzić konflikt między obiema
stronami?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(7 maja 2013 r.)_

Z uwagi na znaczące interesy UE w tym regionie Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca z niepokojem śledzi
rozwój wydarzeń na obszarach morskich Azji Wschodniej. W oświadczeniu wydanym dnia 25 września 2012 r.
Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wezwała wszystkie zaangażowane strony do poszukiwania
pokojowych i opartych na współpracy rozwiązań, zgodnych z prawem międzynarodowym.

UE nie przyjmuje stanowiska wobec zasadności/legalności odnośnych roszczeń stron dotyczących wysp
Diaoyu/Senkaku, jednak wyraża poważne obawy, że błędna ocena lub wypadek mogą doprowadzić do
niebezpiecznej eskalacji napięcia. Dalsze zaostrzenie sytuacji może mieć poważny wpływ na bezpieczeństwo w tym
regionie i światową gospodarkę. Może to również wpłynąć na sprawy UE, która posiada w tym regionie znaczące
interesy handlowe, gospodarcze oraz polityczne i która zaangażowana jest w strategiczne partnerstwa z obydwiema
stronami.

Dlatego też UE wykorzystuje wszystkie dostępne środki, by nakłonić obydwa kraje do unikania wszelkich działań
prowokacyjnych i zachęca je do podejmowania wysiłków mających na celu zmniejszenie napięcia. UE wspiera
pogląd, że długotrwałe rozwiązanie sporu pomiędzy tymi dwoma państwami powinno odbyć się na zasadzie
konstruktywnego dialogu i negocjacji oraz zgodnie z prawem międzynarodowym, w szczególności Konwencją
Narodów Zjednoczonych o prawie morza. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca będzie w dalszym ciągu
angażować się po chińskiej i japońskiej stronie tego sporu oraz zachęcać oba państwa do zapanowania nad sytuacją
w sposób prowadzący do stabilności, przewidywalności i dobrobytu w tym regionie.

C 6 E / 240 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002731/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands

Tensions between China and Japan have been high for some time over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Both nations
assert conflicting claims to this resource‐rich territory. Buoyed by public expectations, they also carry out frequent
shows of strength. According to Tokyo, Chinese vessels have recently conducted numerous simulated attacks on the
islands and made incursions into Japanese territorial waters. Given the historical background, it seems that both
countries have a claim to govern the islands.

1. What is the Vice‐President/High Representative’s strategy for dealing with this dispute between Japan and
China?

2. In the VP/HR’s view, which country’s claim to govern the Senkaku Islands is legitimate?

3. What steps is the VP/HR taking to de‐escalate tensions between the two countries?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

With its significant interests in the region, the HR/VP is following with concern developments in East Asia's maritime
areas. In a statement issued 25th September 2012, the High Representative/Vice-President urged all parties concerned
to seek peaceful and cooperative solutions in accordance with international law.

The EU takes no view regarding the legitimacy/legality of the respective claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, but
is deeply concerned that a miscalculation or an accident could lead to a dangerous escalation of tensions. Further
exacerbation risks severe impact on the regional security and the global economy. This would also affect EU's
interests, which has high commercial, economic and political stakes in the region, and which is engaged in strategic
partnerships with both sides.

The EU therefore uses all available means to urge both countries to avoid any provocative action and encourages
them to make every effort to de-escalate tension. The EU promotes the view that a long-term resolution of the
differences between the two countries should be sought through constructive dialogue and negotiation and based on
international law, in particular on the Unclos. The HR/VP will continue to engage with both the Chinese and Japanese
sides on this issue, and encourage them to manage the situation in a way which is conducive to stability, predictability
and prosperity in the region.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 241

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002732/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Skutki szczelinowania hydraulicznego dla środowiska

W listopadzie 2011 r. Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny opublikował raport pt. „Ocena oddziaływania na środowisko
procesu szczelinowania hydraulicznego wykonanego w otworze Łebień LE-2H”. Aktualnie jest to jedyne badanie
wykonane w terenie i w oparciu o uwarunkowania geologiczne UE. W listopadzie 2012 r. Komisja zapowiedziała
rozpoczęcie w 2013 r. inicjatywy, która ma zbadać skutki szczelinowania hydraulicznego dla środowiska.

1. Czy w swoich badaniach, ocenach i analizach dotyczących szczelinowania Komisja uwzględni raport
przedstawiony przez Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny?

2. Z jakich innych materiałów ma zamiar korzystać? Jakim ośrodkom zlecono przygotowanie oraz
przeprowadzenie badań dotyczących szczelinowania w Europie?

3. Polska ma aktualnie największe doświadczenia w procesie poszukiwania gazu łupkowego w Unii Europejskiej –
czy Komisja zamierza prowadzić w czasie przygotowywania swojego raportu konsultacje z Polską?

4. Kiedy Komisja planuje zakończyć przygotowywanie raportu dotyczące szczelinowania hydraulicznego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji**

_(17 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

1+2. Ocena skutków inicjatywy Komisji „Ramy oceny dotyczące środowiska, klimatu i energii, umożliwiające
bezpieczne niekonwencjonalne wydobycie węglowodorów” odbywa się na podstawie obecnie dostępnych
informacji. Przy dokonywaniu oceny uwzględniane są doświadczenia z Ameryki Północnej, gdzie wydobycie gazu
łupkowego odbywa się na skalę handlową, a także, w stosownych przypadkach, doświadczenia zdobyte podczas
poszukiwań w Europie.

3. Komisja prowadzi regularne konsultacje z państwami członkowskimi, w tym Polską, w ramach technicznej
grupy roboczej ds. aspektów środowiskowych niekonwencjonalnych paliw kopalnych, w szczególności gazu
łupkowego.

4. Komisja planuje zakończenie swoich prac w zakresie wyżej wspomnianej inicjatywy przed końcem 2013 r.

C 6 E / 242 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002732/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing

In November 2011, the Polish Geological Institute published a report assessing the environmental impact of the
hydraulic fracturing process carried out at the Łebień LE-2H well. It is currently the only study to have been carried
out _in situ_ and on the basis of EU geological criteria. In November 2012, the Commission announced the launch of an
initiative in 2013 that would study the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing.

1. Will the Commission take the Polish Geological Institute’s report into consideration in its studies, analyses and
evaluations of hydraulic fracturing?

2. What other materials does the Commission intend to draw upon? What institutes have been charged with
preparing and conducting the research into hydraulic fracturing in Europe?

3. Given that Poland is currently the EU Member State with the greatest experience of shale gas exploration, does
the Commission intend to carry out consultations with Poland when preparing the report?

4. When does the Commission plan to complete preparations for the report on hydraulicfracturing?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

1+2. The Impact Assessment for the Commission initiative for an ‘Environmental, climate and energy assessment
framework to enable safe and secure unconventional hydrocarbon extraction’ is carried out on the basis of currently
available information. The assessment takes into consideration experience from North America, where shale gas
extraction is taking place at a commercial scale, as well as experience gained with explorations in Europe, where
relevant.

3. The Commission is regularly consulting Member States, including Poland, in the context of the Technical
Working Group on environmental aspects of unconventional fossil fuels, in particular shale gas.

4. The Commission plans to finalise its work on the abovementioned initiative by the end of 2013.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 243

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002733/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Zatrzymanie chrześcijan w libijskim Bengazi

W libijskim mieście Bengazi zatrzymano ponad 40 chrześcijańskich kupców. Oskarżono ich o posiadanie Biblii,
dewocjonaliów oraz wizerunków Jezusa Chrystusa. Podejrzewano ich o szerzenie chrześcijaństwa. Organizacja Open
Doors od dłuższego czasu zwraca uwagę na pogarszającą się sytuację chrześcijan mieszkających w Libii. W ostatnim
raporcie sklasyfikowała ona Libię na 17. miejscu pośród krajów, które prześladują wyznawców Chrystusa.

1. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia ograniczenia wolności wiary w Libii? Jakie działania
podejmuje w imieniu UE, aby zagwarantować możliwość zrzeszania się oraz wolności praktyk w Libii?

2. Czy rozważa się powiązanie unijnej pomocy finansowej na odbudowę Libii z wprowadzeniem przez Trypolis
praw zapewniających wolność wyznania i zrzeszania się?

3. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia wpływ „arabskich wiosen” na sytuację chrześcijan
w Afryce Północnej?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

1. UE jest zaniepokojona niedawnymi doniesieniami o atakach na mniejszość chrześcijańską w Libii, ponieważ
wolność religii i przekonań należy do kanonu powszechnie obowiązujących praw człowieka, które należy chronić.

Dnia 13 marca 2013 r. delegatura UE wydała oświadczenie, w którym w imieniu szefów misji UE wyraziła swoje
głębokie zaniepokojenie traktowaniem osób zatrzymanych na podstawie zarzutów o rzekomy prozelityzm w Libii
i ich długotrwałym przetrzymywaniem w areszcie. Ponadto UE zwróciła się do władz Libii o zagwarantowanie
odpowiedniego traktowania wszystkich zatrzymanych i zapewnienie im odpowiednich warunków zgodnie
z międzynarodowymi standardami oraz międzynarodowymi zobowiązaniami Libii. Delegatura UE podkreśliła, że
wolność religii i przekonań należy do kanonu powszechnych praw człowieka, które powinny być chronione
wszędzie i przysługiwać każdemu człowiekowi.

2. Obecnie stosunki dwustronne między UE a Libią nie opierają się na żadnym kompleksowym i prawnie
wiążącym porozumieniu. UE pragnie rozpocząć negocjacje prowadzące do zawarcia wspomnianego
kompleksowego porozumienia tak szybko, jak to możliwe, a kwestia ta jest obecnie przedmiotem rozmów
z władzami libijskimi. UE będzie domagać się umieszczenia w tekście przyszłego porozumienia odniesienia do praw
człowieka.

3. UE nadal wyraża poważne obawy w związku z coraz bardziej napiętą sytuacją między grupami religijnymi
w regionie Maghrebu oraz ogólnymi ograniczeniami prawa do wolności wyznania i przekonań. W ramach dialogu
z liderami i ogółem społeczeństwa UE stale podkreśla, iż broni zasady wolności religii i przekonań jako
fundamentalnego prawa, które powinno przysługiwać zarówno osobom mieszkającym w UE, jak i poza nią.

C 6 E / 244 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002733/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Arrest of Christians in the Libyan city of Benghazi

More than 40 Christian merchants have been arrested in the Libyan city of Benghazi. They are charged with being in
possession of Bibles, devotional items and images of Jesus Christ. The merchants are suspected of spreading
Christianity. The Open Doors organisation has long been drawing attention to the worsening situation of Christians
living in Libya. In its latest report, the organisation places Libya in 17th place among countries that persecute
Christians.

1. What is the Vice‐President/High Representative’s assessment of the restrictions onfreedom of religion in Libya?
What action is the VP/HR undertaking to guaranteefreedom of association and worship in Libya?

2. Is consideration being given to making EU financial assistance for Libya’s reconstructioncontingent upon
Tripoli introducing laws to ensure freedom of religion and ofassociation?

3. What is the VP/HR’s assessment of the Arab Spring’s impact on the situation ofChristians in North Africa?

**ENE-002733/2013Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the**

**Commission**
_(24 April 2013)_

1. The EU is concerned about recent reports of attacks against the small Christian minority in Libya as freedom of
religion or belief is a universal human right which needs to be protected.

The EU Delegation issued a statement on 13 March 2013 expressing on behalf of all EU Heads of Mission its deep
concerns about the continued detention and the treatment of persons held on alleged charges of proselytism in Libya.
Furthermore, the EU requested the Libyan authorities to ensure adequate conditions and treatment of all detainees in
accordance with international standards and Libya's international obligations. The EU Delegation underlined that
freedom of religion or belief is a universal human right which needs to be protected everywhere and for everyone.

2. Currently, bilateral relations between the EU and Libya are not based on a comprhensive, legally binding,
agreement. The EU is keen to start the negotiations of such a comprehensive agreement as soon as possible and this
matter is currently under discussion with the Libyan authorities. The EU will demand to include in the text of a future
agreement a reference to human rights.

3. The EU remains concerned about increased tensions among religious groups in the Maghreb region as well as
restrictions imposed on freedom of religion and belief in general. In its dialogue with leaders and the societies at large,
the EU stresses that the EU defends the principle that freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental right to which
everyone is entitled, outside and within the EU.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 245

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002734/13**

**komissiolle**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(8. maaliskuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Hizbollah-järjestö terroristilistalle

Hizbollah on aseellista toimintaa harjoittava järjestö, jonka on todettu syyllistyneen kansainväliseen terrorismiin.
Hizbollahin terroritoiminta on ulottunut jopa Euroopan unionin alueelle, kun viime kesänä itsemurhapommittaja
iski bussiin Bulgariassa.

Tämän johdosta haluankin kysyä, milloin komissio toteaa Hizbollah-järjestön terroristijärjestöksi ja kohtelee sitä sen
mukaisella tavalla?

**Korkean edustajan, varapuheenjohtaja Ashtonin komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(4. kesäkuuta 2013)_

Burgasin iskua tutkitaan parhaillaan, ja tarkoituksena on selvittää sekä tekijät että kaikki olosuhteet. Bulgarian
viranomaiset ovat ilmoittaneet tekevänsä asiassa yhteistyötä libanonilaiskollegojensa kanssa.

Kysymys Hizbollahin mahdollisesta luokittelusta terroristijärjestöksi ei kuulu komission toimivaltaan, sillä
terroristijärjestöjä koskevan EU:n luettelon muuttaminen edellyttää EU:n jäsenvaltioiden yksimielistä päätöstä.
Hizbollahista on tässä yhteydessä keskusteltu monesti, mutta jäsenvaltiot eivät ole koskaan päässeet yksimielisyyteen.
Yksityiskohtaisia tietoja järjestön liittämisestä EU:n luetteloon on annettu komission vastauksessa kirjalliseen
kysymykseen E-001611/2013 ( [1] ).

Jos käynnissä olevissa tutkinta‐ ja oikeusmenettelyissä käy ilmi Hizbollahin osallisuus iskuun, EU harkitsee erilaisia
reagointivaihtoehtoja, joihin saattaa kuulua ryhtyminen toimiin EU-tason tutkinnallisen ja oikeudellisen yhteistyön
puitteissa sekä mahdollisten muutosten tekeminen tiettyjen järjestöjen, yhteisöjen ja henkilöiden luetteloihin. EU ja
sen jäsenvaltiot keskustelevat asianmukaisesta reagointitavasta, kunhan kaikki tutkinnassa selviävät seikat ovat
tiedossa.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq

C 6 E / 246 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002734/13**

**to the Commission**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Inclusion of Hezbollah on list of terrorist organisations

Hezbollah is an armed organisation which has been shown to be guilty of international terrorism. Its terrorist activity
even spread to the territory of the European Union when a suicide bomber attacked a bus in Bulgaria last summer.

I should therefore like to ask when will the Commission declare Hezbollah a terrorist organisation and treat it
accordingly?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 June 2013)_

The Burgas attack is subject to ongoing investigations, which aim at identifying the perpetrators and all
circumstances. The Bulgarian authorities informed of their cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts in this
regard.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, amendments to the EU list of terrorist
organisations are not in the remit of the Commission; they require a unanimous decision by EU Member States.
Hizbullah was, in this context, discussed on several occasions in the past, but there has never been consensus among
Member States. Details on the procedure for the designation of an organisation in the EU list has been provided in the
Commission’answer to Written Question E-001611/2013 ( [1] ).

Should the ongoing investigative and judicial processes bear implications for Hizbullah, the EU will consider a range
of options to respond, which could include steps in the framework of investigative and judicial cooperation at EU
level; as well as possibilities of amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons. The EU and
Member States will discuss the appropriate response based on all elements identified by the investigators.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 247

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002735/13**

**komissiolle**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(8. maaliskuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Egyptin demokratisoitumiskehitys

Demokratisoitumisen odotettiin pääsevän liikkeelle Egyptissä ns. arabikevään tapahtumien seurauksena ja vallan
vaihtumisen myötä. Näin ei kuitenkaan näytä tapahtuneen. Tällä hetkellä ihmisoikeustilanne Egyptissä on huonompi
kuin edellisen hallinnon aikana. Nuorten laaja tyytymättömyys ilmenee muiden muassa monenlaisena väkivaltana ja
levottomuutena kaduilla. Yksi syy tähän on siinä, että yliopistojärjestelmä toimii edelleen vanhakantaisen mallin
mukaan. Egyptissä olisikin toteutettava kiireellisesti kattava koulutusjärjestelmän uudistus.

Demokratian vahvistaminen on yksi EU:n tavoitteista Egyptissä, samoin kuin koko Lähi-idän alueella. Tämän
tavoitteen saavuttamiseksi EU on käyttänyt suuria summia erilaisiin kehityshankkeisiin ja myönteistä kehitystä
tukeviin projekteihin. Koulujen ja yliopistojen uudistamisen ja kehittämisen kautta pitkän tähtäimen tavoitteet
voisivat toteutua tehokkaasti. Koulutusvientiin panostamalla ja yliopistokoulutusta kehittämällä voidaan
demokratian juurtumista Egyptissä vauhdittaa nykyistä tehokkaammin.

Aikooko komissio siirtää Egyptiin tähdätyn tukensa painopistettä koulutusviennin ja koulutusjärjestelmän
uudistamisen suuntaan?

**Štefan Fülen komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(13. toukokuuta 2013)_

Komissio on samaa mieltä arvoisan parlamentin jäsenen kanssa siitä, että Egyptin koulutusjärjestelmän perusteellinen
uudistaminen on keskeinen tavoite. Komissio toteaa kuitenkin, että ennen kuin EU:n tukea opetusalalle lisätään,
tarvitaan lisätietoja, jotta nykyistä poliittista ympäristöä ja uuden opetusministerin poliittisia painopisteitä voitaisiin
arvioida riittävän hyvin. Virallisesti ilmoitettuihin uusiin painopisteisiin kuuluvat teknisten alojen koulutus,
mahdollisuus laadukkaaseen peruskoulutukseen, keskittyminen tieteeseen ja teknologiaan sekä luku‐ ja
kirjoitustaitoon uudelleen panostaminen.

On myös muistettava, että EU tukee jo opetusalaa 140 miljoonan euron alakohtaisella tukiohjelmalla, joka saadaan
päätökseen toukokuussa 2013. Ohjelmassa tehdään muutoksia koulutusjärjestelmään, jotta kaikille lapsille voitaisiin
tarjota laadukasta opetusta tasapuolisin, kustannustehokkain ja taloudellisesti kestävin ehdoin. Teknisten alojen
ammattikoulutuksen tukemista jatketaan viisivuotisella ohjelmalla, joka alkaa vuonna 2013 (50 miljoonaa euroa).

Korkeakoulutuksen saralla Egypti on viimeisten kymmenen vuoden ajan hyötynyt merkittävästi TEMPUS-ohjelmasta:
Egypti on mukana 33 hankkeessa eli 30 prosentissa kaikista hyväksytyistä hankkeista EU:n eteläisellä naapurialueella.
Egypti osallistuu myös Erasmus Mundus ‐ohjelmaan, josta rahoitetaan eurooppalaisten ja eteläisen Välimeren
yliopistojen välisiä kumppanuussuhteita, jotka mahdollistavat opiskelijoiden ja henkilökunnan liikkuvuuden:
860 henkilökunnan jäsentä, opiskelijaa ja tutkijaa on saanut apurahoja vuodesta 2007 lähtien.

C 6 E / 248 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002735/13**

**to the Commission**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Democratisation in Egypt

Democratisation was expected to get under way in Egypt as a consequence of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the change of
regime. However, this does not seem to have happened. At the moment, the human rights situation in Egypt is worse
than under the previous government. High youth unemployment is reflected, _inter alia_, in many forms of violence and
unrest on the streets. One reason is that the university system is still operating according to a primitive model. There
is an urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the education system in Egypt.

Fostering democracy is one of the EU’s objectives in Egypt, as it is in the Middle East as a whole. In order to attain this
objective, the EU has spent large sums on various types of development project and on projects in support of positive
development. By reforming and developing schools and universities, long-term objectives could be attained
effectively. Investing in exports of educational expertise and developing university education will enable democracy
to take root in Egypt, accelerating this process more effectively than at present.

Will the Commission adjust the focus of its aid for Egypt so as to assign higher priority to exporting educational
expertise and to reform of the education system?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that a comprehensive reform of the education system in Egypt
is a key priority. The Commission notes, however, that more information is needed to adequately assess the present
policy environment and the political priorities of the new Minister of Education before stepping up EU support to the
sector. Formally declared new priorities include technical education, access to quality basic education, a focus on
science and technology and a renewed emphasis on literacy.

In this context, it should be recalled that the EU is already supporting the education sector through a EUR 140 million
Sector Support Programme that will be completed in May 2013. The programme introduces changes in the education
system so as to provide quality education to all children under equitable, cost-effective and financially sustainable
terms. Technical Vocational Education and Training will continue to be supported through a five‐year Programme
starting in 2013 (EUR 50 million).

In the field of higher education, Egypt has for the past 10 years benefited considerably from the TEMPUS programme.
Egypt is involved in 33 projects or 30% of all accepted projects in the Southern Neighbourhood. Egypt is also
participating in Erasmus Mundus, which funds partnerships between European and South Mediterranean universities
leading to student and staff mobility (860 staff, students and researchers have benefited from scholarships/fellowships
since 2007).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 249

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002736/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)**

_(8 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Relaciones UE-Armenia

En relación con el excelente nivel de relaciones alcanzado entre la Unión Europea y Armenia, que pronto se
materializarán con la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación entre ambas partes, me gustaría, en primer lugar, subrayar el
enorme progreso realizado en estos dos últimos años.

Por otra parte, el Parlamento Europeo ha puesto de manifiesto en varias resoluciones su apoyo a la excelente iniciativa
de desplegar en ese país el _EU Advisory Group_ (grupo consultivo de la UE), que ha desempeñado un papel determinante
en dicho progreso.

Sin embargo, desde comienzos de 2012, las constantes interferencias de la Delegación de la Unión Europea en
Armenia, así como la deliberada marginación de las instituciones nacionales en la toma de decisiones, absolutamente
contraria a la filosofía y la base legal del proyecto, están seriamente restando efectividad a este excelente formato de
cooperación.

Asimismo, esta inaceptable actitud, no representativa del excelente nivel de entendimiento alcanzado con ese país,
está generando un profundo malestar en el Jefe del Gobierno así como en el Parlamento del citado país que podría
llegar a afectar al conjunto de nuestras relaciones.

¿Qué medidas piensa tomar el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior para atajar esta situación y recuperar la confianza
de las Instituciones armenias?

¿Cómo se piensa instruir a la Delegación de la Unión Europea en Armenia para evitar semejantes acciones
absolutamente contrarias al espíritu de nuestras relaciones?

¿Qué acciones propone la Comisión para restablecer la legítima implicación de las Autoridades armenias en la toma
de decisiones del _EU Advisory Group_ (grupo consultivo de la UE) y cómo se podría reforzar esta efectiva herramienta de
cooperación?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(7 de mayo de 2013)_

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta comparte plenamente la opinión de que el grupo consultivo de la UE (EUAG)
ha sido un excelente instrumento de cooperación en las relaciones de la UE con Armenia.

Asimismo desea asegurarle que no ha habido intención de suprimir ni restringir el apoyo consultivo. El mandato de la
Delegación de la UE para gestionar y supervisar el proyecto está claramente definido, al igual que el papel del PNUD
como socio de ejecución. En caso de que persistieran los problemas percibidos actualmente, mencionados en la
pregunta de Su Señoría, la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta le agradecería que volviese a llamarle la atención al
respecto.

Quisiera también asegurarle que, con miras a la próxima nueva fase de las relaciones entre la UE y Armenia regidas
por el Acuerdo de Asociación, la UE tiene previsto incrementar su apoyo consultivo a la parte armenia en el marco del
proyecto. Por mencionar un ejemplo, se ha publicado un puesto adicional de asesor ante la Asamblea Nacional para
ayudar al Parlamento armenio a ampliar sus capacidades institucionales a fin de hacer frente a la labor de
aproximación de la legislación armenia a la de la UE.

Por lo que respecta a la legítima y adecuada participación de las autoridades armenias en la gestión del proyecto, dicha
participación está garantizada en el marco del comité consultivo del EUAG, el órgano del proyecto que implica
directamente a los beneficiarios en la toma de decisiones. El comité se reúne trimestralmente y sus decisiones se
consideran obligatorias. Dentro de este marco, los beneficiarios han sido sistemáticamente consultados en lo que
respecta a los informes y los planes de trabajo, y también han participado en los comités de selección de asesores.

C 6 E / 250 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002736/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — EU-Armenia relations

With regard to the excellent level of relations established between the European Union and Armenia, which will soon
be consolidated with the signing of the Association Agreement between the two parties, I should like, first of all, to
highlight the enormous progress that has been achieved in the last two years.

Furthermore, Parliament has displayed, in various resolutions, its support for the superb initiative to deploy in this
country the EU Advisory Group, which has played a defining role in this progress.

However, since the beginning of 2012, the constant interference from the European Union Delegation in Armenia,
and the deliberate marginalisation of national institutions from decision making, in complete contradiction to the
philosophy and legal basis of the project, are seriously undermining the effectiveness of this excellent cooperation
format.

In addition, this unacceptable attitude, which is not representative of the admirable level of understanding reached
with this country, is generating a profound sense of unease in the Head of Government, as well as in the Armenian
Parliament, which could affect all of our relations.

What measures does the European External Action Service (EEAS) intend to take in order to contain this situation and
regain the trust of the Armenian institutions?

How does it intend to instruct the European Union Delegation in Armenia so as to avoid similar actions which
completely contradict the spirit of our relations?

What actions is the Commission proposing in order to re-establish the legitimate involvement of the Armenian
authorities in the decision making of the EU Advisory Group, and how could this effective cooperation tool be
strengthened?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The HR/VP fully shares the view that EUAG has been an excellent cooperation instrument in the EU relations with
Armenia.

The HR/VP would like to assure you that there has been no intended suppression or restriction of advisory support.
The mandate of the EU Delegation in the management and oversight of the project is clearly defined, as is the role of
UNDP as the implementing partner. In case currently perceived problems, mentioned in the honourable member's
question, would persist, the HR/VP would be grateful for these being brought again to her attention.

The HR/VP would also like to re-assure you that in view of forthcoming new stage of relations between EU and
Armenia, governed by the Association Agreement, the EU plans to further increase its advisory support to the
Armenian side in the framework of the project. As an example, an additional seconded post of advisor to the National
Assembly has been published in order to assist the Armenian parliament in increasing its institutional capacities to
tackle the task of approximation with EU legislation.

Regarding the legitimate and appropriate involvement of the Armenian authorities in the management of the project,
it is assured in the framework of the Advisory Board of the EU Advisory Group. It is the project body when involves
the beneficiaries directly in the decision making. The board meets on a quarterly basis and its decisions are considered
mandatory. Within its framework, the beneficiaries have been consistently consulted on reports, work plans and have
also participated in the selection committees of advisors.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 251

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002737/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Sylvana Rapti (S&D) και Spyros Danellis (S&D)**

_(8 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διακριτική μεταχείρηση των μηχανοκίνητων οχημάτων ΔΧ που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες από τις τουρκικές αρχές

Η τουρκική κυβέρνηση με την απόφασή 2010/945, που δημοσιεύτηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης (T.C.
Resmi Gazete) στις 14 Οκτωβρίου 2010 με αριθμό 27729, περιόρισε την απαλλαγή από τους ειδικούς φόρους
κατανάλωσης στα 200 λίτρα καυσίμων ως μέγιστη ποσότητα μόνο για τα εμπορικά οχήματα και τα ιδιωτικά κοντέινερ που
φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες. Στην εν λόγω απόφαση, η τουρκική κυβέρνηση επικαλείται την αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας στον
περιορισμό που εφαρμόζεται στην ποσότητα αυτοτελών καυσίμων που μπορούν να έχουν στις κανονικές αποθήκες τους τα
εμπορικά σχήματα με τουρκικές πινακίδες κατά την είσοδό τους στην Ελλάδα.

Ωστόσο, η αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας δεν μπορεί να εφαρμοστεί στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση με
σχετική Υπουργική απόφαση Δ18Α5017560/2010 που δημοσιεύτηκε στην Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης στις 10 Μαΐου
2010, Τεύχος Β, αριθμός 610, δεν εφαρμόζει τον περιορισμό αυτόν στα μηχανοκίνητα οχήματα δημοσίας χρήσης
μεταφοράς εμπορευμάτων που φέρουν τουρκικές πινακίδες, αλλά, όπως διακρίνεται από τον τίτλο της απόφασης και από το
περιεχόμενό της, ο περιορισμός αυτός απευθύνεται σε όλα τα οχήματα που εισέρχονται οδικώς στην Ελλάδα από τρίτες
χώρες προς την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (στην προκειμένη περίπτωση Αλβανία, π.Γ.Δ.Μ. και Τουρκία) χωρίς να γίνεται κάποια
αναφορά στην εθνικότητα των οχημάτων.

Όπως είναι προφανές, η ανωτέρω πρακτική της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης αποτελεί διακριτική μεταχείριση των μηχανοκίνητων
οχημάτων δημοσίας χρήσης που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες.

Έχοντας υπόψη το καθεστώς της Τουρκίας ως υποψήφιας για προσχώρηση χώρας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, καθώς και τη
Συμφωνία Σύνδεσης του 1963, γνωστή ως «Συμφωνία της Άγκυρας», συγκεκριμένα δε το άρθρο 9 με το οποίο εισάγεται η
αρχή της μη διάκρισης στις σχέσεις Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (τότε ΕΟΚ) και Τουρκίας, ερωτάται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή:

—
Αυτή η πρακτική άμεσης διάκρισης των τουρκικών αρχών να επιβάλλουν τέτοιου είδους περιορισμό αποκλειστικά στα
μηχανοκίνητα οχήματα δημοσίας χρήσης που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες παραβιάζει το δίκαιο της Ευρωπαϊκής
Ένωσης;

—
Αν η πρακτική αυτή πράγματι αποτελεί παραβίαση του δικαίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, σε τι ενέργειες προτίθεται να
προβεί (ή έχει προβεί) η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή για την αντιμετώπιση της παράνομης αυτής πρακτικής;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(26 Απριλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση των προβλημάτων που προέκυψαν με την τουρκική απόφαση 2010/945, που δημοσιεύτηκε στην
Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης της Τουρκίας στις 14 Οκτωβρίου 2010 με αριθμό 27729, με την οποία η τουρκική
κυβέρνηση περιόρισε την απαλλαγή από τους ειδικούς φόρους κατανάλωσης το πολύ σε 200 λίτρα καυσίμων μόνο για τα
εμπορικά οχήματα και τα ιδιωτικά εμπορευματοκιβώτια που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες.

Εκ πρώτης όψεως, η εν λόγω απόφαση θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί ως παράβαση των σχετικών διατάξεων της συμφωνίας
σύνδεσης ΕΕ-Τουρκίας του 1963, ιδίως του άρθρου 9, και του πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου του 1970.

Η Επιτροπή θα θέσει το ζήτημα στις τουρκικές αρχές στο κατάλληλο επίπεδο.

C 6 E / 252 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002737/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sylvana Rapti (S&D) and Spyros Danellis (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Discriminatory treatment of Greek-registered commercial motor vehicles by the Turkish authorities

By its Decision 2010/945, published in the Official Government Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on
14 October 2010 under number 27729, the Turkish government limited the exemption from excise duty to a
maximum of 200 litres of fuel solely in respect of commercial vehicles and private containers bearing Greek
registration plates. In that decision, the Turkish government invokes the principle of reciprocity as regards the
reduction applied to the amount of duty-free fuel that commercial vehicles fitted with Turkish plates may carry in
their normal tanks when entering Greece.

However, the principle of reciprocity does not apply in the present case. The Greek Government in the Ministerial
Decision in question, namely D18A5017560/2010, published in the Government Gazette of 10 May 2010, Volume
II, No 610, does not apply such a restriction only to commercial motor vehicles transporting goods bearing Turkish
number plates, but, as the title of the decision and its contents indicate, to all vehicles entering Greece by road from
third countries to the European Union (i.e. Albania, FYROM and Turkey). It makes no reference to the country in
which the vehicles are registered.

This action by the Turkish government clearly constitutes discriminatory treatment of commercial motor vehicles
bearing Greek registration plates.

Given the status of Turkey as a candidate country for accession to the European Union and the Association
Agreement of 1963, known as the ‘Ankara Agreement’, and in particular Article 9 which introduces the principle of
non-discrimination in relations between the European Union ( the then EEC) and Turkey, will the Commission say:

—
Does this act of direct discrimination by the Turkish authorities in imposing such a restriction solely to
commercial motor vehicles bearing Greek number plates violate EC law?

—
If this act is indeed a violation of EC law, what does it intend to do (or has it done) to address this violation?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the problems created by the Turkish Decision 2010/945, published in the Official
Government Gazette of Turkey on 14 October 2010 under number 27729, with which the Turkish Government
limited the exemption from excise duty to a maximum of 200 litres of fuel solely for commercial vehicles and private
containers bearing Greek registration plates.

At first sight, the said decision could be considered as contravening the relevant provisions of the EU-Turkey
Association Agreement of 1963, in particular its Article 9, and of the Additional Protocole of 1970.

The Commission will raise the issue with the Turkish authorities at the appropriate level.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 253

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002738/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(8 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Απόφαση του ΔΕΚ σε βάρος της «Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ»

Παρά τις συνεχείς επαφές με κυβερνητικούς παράγοντες και τις ελπίδες που καλλιεργήθηκαν ότι θα επιτραπεί στην εταιρία
«Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ» να αναλαμβάνουν παραγγελίες εμπορικών πλοίων, προκειμένου να αντιμετωπισθεί το τεράστιο
πρόβλημα της ανεργίας των ελλήνων, και ιδιαίτερα της ναυπηγοεπισκευαστικής ζώνης, το Δικαστήριο Ευρωπαϊκών
Κοινοτήτων (υπόθεση C 246/12 P) επιδίκασε στην εταιρία πρόστιμο, συνολικού ύψους περίπου 310 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ. Το
γεγονός αυτό θα σημάνει το οριστικό κλείσιμο των ναυπηγείων, αφού είναι βέβαιο ότι η σημερινή ιδιοκτησία της «Ελληνικά
Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ» δεν προτίθεται να πληρώσει το ποσό αυτό, που άλλωστε προέρχεται από χρέη που υποτίθεται ότι υπήρχαν
πριν τη μεταβίβαση της εν λόγω επιχείρησης σε αυτήν.

Με δεδομένα τα ανωτέρω, αλλά και τις τεράστιες ευθύνες που έχει η Επιτροπή για το κατάντημα των ναυπηγείων στην
Ελλάδα, όπου σήμερα οι εργαζόμενοι έχουν φτάσει να εργάζονται μία ημέρα την εβδομάδα, να τους οφείλονται
δεδουλευμένα πολλών μηνών, αλλά επιπλέον να απειλούνται και με απόλυση από πιθανό κλείσιμο των ναυπηγείων, ερωτάται
η Επιτροπή:

—
Με την ανωτέρω απόφαση του ΔΕΚ, τι προβλέπουν οι σχετικοί κανονισμοί για την «ανάκτηση ενισχύσεων»; Τι
προβλέπεται για την περίπτωση αδυναμίας ή άρνησης απόδοσης του «προστίμου» από την ελεγχόμενη εταιρία;

—
Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει προκειμένου τα ναυπηγεία να ανασυγκροτηθούν συνεχίζοντας τη λειτουργία τους, με
πλήρη απασχόληση των εργαζομένων σε αυτά, με όλες τους τις δραστηριότητες, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των
εμπορικών πλοίων αλλά και της δυνατότητας εξαγωγών σε τρίτες χώρες;

**Απάντηση του κ. Almunia εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(8 Μαΐου 2013)_

Σύμφωνα με την απόφαση της Επιτροπής του 2008, η Ελλάδα πρέπει να ανακτήσει από τα Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία (ΕΝΑΕ) την
παράνομη ενίσχυση που είχε προηγουμένως χορηγηθεί. Ως εκ τούτου, δεν τίθεται θέμα επιβολής προστίμου στην ΕΝΑΕ. Το
2010, η Επιτροπή (με βάση το άρθρο 346 της ΣΛΕΕ) είχε αποδεχθεί μια περιορισμένη ανάκτηση, με αντάλλαγμα μια σειρά
δεσμεύσεων, που προσφέρθηκαν από την Ελλάδα (και ιδίως την απαγόρευση των μη στρατιωτικών δραστηριοτήτων για 15
χρόνια, την πώληση των μη στρατιωτικών περιουσιακών στοιχείων του ναυπηγείου, που δεν έχει ακόμη πραγματοποιηθεί, και
την επιστροφή στο Δημόσιο των εκτάσεων που της είχαν παραχωρηθεί).

Η αλλαγή ιδιοκτησίας δεν θίγει τις υποχρεώσεις που έχουν αναληφθεί από την εταιρεία.

Προτεραιότητα για την Ελλάδα και την ΕΝΑΕ είναι η τήρηση των υποχρεώσεων που αναλήφθηκαν το 2010.

Η εναλλακτική λύση είναι η πλήρης εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης, η οποία θα ελευθερώσει το ναυπηγείο από την
απαγόρευση των μη στρατιωτικών δραστηριοτήτων. Αν η ΕΝΑΕ δεν είναι σε θέση να επιστρέψει τις ενισχύσεις, θα πρέπει να
προβλεφθεί η εκκαθάρισή της. Πράγματι, η παύση των δραστηριοτήτων της εταιρείας και η πώληση των περιουσιακών της
στοιχείων θα επέτρεπε σε άλλους δυνητικά ενδιαφερόμενους επενδυτές να αποκτήσουν αυτά τα περιουσιακά στοιχεία, και,
χωρίς τα βάρη του παρελθόντος, να κάνουν την καλύτερη δυνατή χρήση τους.

Η Επιτροπή υπογραμμίζει το γεγονός ότι η υποχρέωση να διασφαλιστεί η εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης βαρύνει την
Ελλάδα.

Στις 28 Ιουνίου 2012 (υπόθεση C-485/10, Επιτροπή κατά Ελλάδας), το Δικαστήριο απεφάνθη ότι η Ελλάδα παρέβη τις
υποχρεώσεις που υπέχει βάσει της Συνθήκης με την μη εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης της 2ας Ιουλίου 2008.

Σύμφωνα με τη νομοθεσία της ΕΕ, εάν η Επιτροπή κρίνει ότι ένα κράτος μέλος δεν έχει συμμορφωθεί με απόφαση του
Δικαστηρίου των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, η Επιτροπή μπορεί να λάβει μέτρα σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 260 της ΣΛΕΕ.

C 6 E / 254 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002738/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ ECJ judgment against Ellinika Nafpigeia AE (‘Greek Shipyards Ltd’)

Despite constant contacts between ‘Greek Shipyards Ltd’ and government officials and the hopes that had been
encouraged that this undertaking would be permitted to take orders for commercial vessels, thereby partly addressing
the huge problem of unemployment among Greeks, especially in the shipbuilding sector, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities (Case C 246/12 P) has imposed a fine on the undertaking totalling approximately
EUR 310 million. This will mean the definitive closure of the shipyards, since it is certain that the current ownership
of ‘Greek Shipyards Ltd’ does not intend to pay this amount, which is, incidentally, due to debts that supposedly preexisted the transfer to it of that undertaking.

In view of the above, and also the Commission’s overwhelming responsibility for the plight of the shipyards in
Greece, where employees, who already work a one-day week and are due many months’ pay, are now also threatened
with dismissal due to the possible closure of the shipyards, will the Commission say:

—
In the context of the above ECJ judgment, what provision do the relevant laws make regarding the ‘recovery of
aid’? What provisions exist regarding a situation in which the undertaking in question fails or refuses to pay the
‘fine’?

—
What steps will it take so that the shipyards restructure and continue to operate, providing full employment for
shipyard workers in all areas of activity, including the construction of commercial vessels and the possibility of
exporting to third countries?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Under the 2008 Commission decision, Greece must recover from Hellenic Shipyards (HSY) illegal aid previously
granted to it. Therefore, there can be no question of a fine imposed on HSY. In 2010, the Commission (based on
Article 346 TFEU) accepted a limited recovery, in exchange for a number of commitments, offered by Greece (in
particular the ban on civil activities for 15 years, the sale of the yard's civil assets, which has not taken place yet, and
the return to the State of the concessionary land).

The change of ownership does not affect the commitments entered into by the company.

The priority for Greece and HSY should be to honour the commitments entered into in 2010.

The alternative is full implementation of the recovery decision, which would free the yard from the ban on civil
activities. If HSY is not in a position to pay back the aid, its liquidation could be envisaged. Indeed, the termination of
the company and the sale of its assets would allow other potentially interested investors to acquire these assets, and,
free of the burden of the past, to make the best possible use of them.

The Commission emphasises the fact that the obligation to ensure implementation of the recovery decision lies with
Greece.

On 28 June 2012 (Case C-485/10, Commission against Greece), the Court of Justice ruled that Greece had failed to
fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by not implementing the recovery decision of 2 July 2008.

According to EU rules, if the Commission considers that a Member State has not complied with a judgment of the
Court of Justice, the Commission may pursue the matter in accordance with Article 260 TFEU.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 255

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002739/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(8 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Βιωσιμότητα και αξιοποίηση των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα

Το Υπουργείο Ενέργειας και Κλιματικής Αλλαγής (ΥΠΕΚΑ), ανακοίνωσε πρόσφατα ότι συνυπέγραψε με το Γερμανικό
Υπουργείο Περιβάλλοντος, Προστασίας της Φύσης και Πυρηνικής Ασφάλειας (BMU) και την Ομάδα Δράσης (Task Force)
για την Ελλάδα, Κοινή Δήλωση Προθέσεως για συνεργασία στην αναμόρφωση του κλάδου των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών
Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα.

Σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση, στόχος της συνεργασίας είναι η «προετοιμασία ενός Οδικού Χάρτη, και η κατάρτιση της
στρατηγικής για την εφαρμογή των απαιτούμενων μεταρρυθμίσεων που θα εξασφαλίσουν τη βιωσιμότητα του κλάδου των
Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα, και παράλληλα η δημιουργία ενός υγιούς επενδυτικού περιβάλλοντος για τη
βέλτιστη δυνατή αξιοποίηση του ενεργειακού δυναμικού της χώρας».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

—
Πιστεύει ότι υπάρχουν προβλήματα με τη βιωσιμότητα του κλάδου των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα;
Ποια είναι αυτά; Τι στοιχεία μπορεί να δώσει σχετικά;

—
Θεωρεί ότι δεν είναι υγιές το επενδυτικό περιβάλλον που υπάρχει για τη βέλτιστη αξιοποίηση του ενεργειακού
δυναμικού της χώρας; Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει;

**Απάντηση του κ. Oettinger εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(24 Απριλίου 2013)_

1. Στο πλαίσιο στήριξης για εγκαταστάσεις που παράγουν ηλεκτρική ενέργεια στην Ελλάδα από ανανεώσιμες πηγές
ενέργειας, έχει συσσωρευτεί στο παρελθόν σημαντικό ποσό χρέους κυρίως λόγω των υπερβολικά υψηλών τιμολογίων
τροφοδότησης ορισμένων τεχνολογιών, ιδίως των φωτοβολταϊκών, και της ανεπαρκούς χρηματοδότησης για την κάλυψη των
αντίστοιχων δαπανών. Η εξέλιξη αυτή επιδεινώθηκε από άλλες διαρθρωτικές ελλείψεις στην αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας,
καθώς και από αναποτελεσματικές διοικητικές διαδικασίες. Το τελευταίο αυτό πρόβλημα είχε ως αποτέλεσμα τη συσσώρευση
αδειών παραγωγής που καθιστά ολοένα και πιο δύσκολο τον σχεδιασμό της εξέλιξης του κόστους του καθεστώτος στήριξης,
καθώς και τις αναγκαίες ενισχύσεις του δικτύου σύμφωνα με την πραγματική ανάπτυξη. Λεπτομερείς και επικαιροποιημένες
πληροφορίες διατίθενται στην ιστοσελίδα του ελληνικού φορέα λειτουργίας της αγοράς ( [1] ).

2. Η Επιτροπή συνεργάζεται με τις ελληνικές αρχές και άλλους ενδιαφερόμενους φορείς για να στηρίξει την
ολοκληρωμένη μεταρρύθμιση του ρυθμιστικού και νομοθετικού πλαισίου για τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα
με στόχο τη μεγιστοποίηση της οικονομικής απόδοσης, την εξασφάλιση της εμπιστοσύνης των επενδυτών και τη
μακροπρόθεσμη βιωσιμότητα των μηχανισμών στήριξης. Οι ελληνικές αρχές έχουν ήδη λάβει μέτρα για την αντιμετώπιση των
θεμάτων που επισημάνθηκαν και περαιτέρω μέτρα θα ληφθούν στο εγγύς μέλλον. Επιπλέον, όπως αναφέρει το Αξιότιμο
Μέλος, υπεγράφη πρόσφατα δήλωση προθέσεων μεταξύ της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης, της γερμανικής κυβέρνησης και της
Επιτροπής, η οποία προβλέπει τεχνική βοήθεια για τον σκοπό αυτό.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Πιο πρόσφατη (Φεβρουάριος 2013) επικαιροποίηση σχετικά με την ανάπτυξη και όσον αφορά τον ειδικό λογαριασμό ΑΠΕ είναι διαθέσιμη στον δικτυακό
τόπο: http://www.lagie.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDSHE/MiniaiaDeltiaEL/2013_02_Miniaio_Deltio_EL_APE_SITHYA.pdf

C 6 E / 256 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002739/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Sustainability and Use of Renewable Energy Sources in Greece

The Greek Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Change recently announced that it had signed, with the
German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and the Task Force for Greece,
a Joint Declaration of Intent on cooperation in reforming the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece.

According to the announcement, the aim of this cooperation is to prepare a roadmap and formulate a strategy for
implementing the necessary reforms to ensure the sustainability of the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece,
while creating a healthy investment environment for the optimal use of the country’s energy potential.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

—
Does it believe there are problems with the sustainability of the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece? If
so, what are they? What evidence can it provide for this?

—
Does it take the view that Greece lacks the healthy investment environment needed for the optimal use of its
energy potential? If so, what steps will it take to remedy this?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

1. The support framework for renewable energy installations generating electricity in Greece has in the past been
accumulating a substantial amount of debt mainly due to excessively high feed-in tariffs for some technologies, in
particular photovoltaics, and insufficient funding to cover the corresponding expenditures. This development was
exacerbated by other structural deficiencies in the electricity market as well as inefficient administrative procedures.
The latter problem led to a backlog of production licenses rendering it increasingly difficult to plan the evolution of
the cost of the support scheme, as well as the necessary grid reinforcements according to actual deployment. Detailed
and up to date information can be found on the website of the Greek market operator ( [1] ).

2. The Commission cooperates with the Greek authorities and other stakeholders to support a comprehensive
reform of the regulatory and legislative framework for renewable energy in Greece to maximise cost-efficiency, secure
investor confidence and provide long-term sustainability to support schemes. The Greek authorities have already
taken measures to address the issues identified and further steps will be taken in the near future. Furthermore, as
mentioned by the Honourable Member, a Declaration of Intent was recently signed between the Greek Government,
the German Government and the Commission, which provides for technical assistance to that effect.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Most recent (February 2013) update on the development of deployment and as regards the RES special account can be found under:
http://www.lagie.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDSHE/MiniaiaDeltiaEL/2013_02_Miniaio_Deltio_EL_APE_SITHYA.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 257

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002741/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(8 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Särskild grund för förverkligandet av en helt automatiserad bildrapportering?

I sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-011539/2012 angav kommissionen att för att kunna uppfylla den globala
alliansens mål skulle ”företagen […] använda ett helt automatiskt system, specifikt inriktat på att hitta och rapportera
endast kända och kontrollerade barnpornografiska bilder och skulle inte granska eller avslöja några andra uppgifter”.

Den globala alliansen är en uttryckligen icke-rättslig ansträngning. På exakt vilken grund avser kommissionen eller
alliansen att se till att ”företagen [använder] ett helt automatiskt system, specifikt inriktat på att hitta och rapportera
endast kända och kontrollerade barnpornografiska bilder och skulle inte granska eller avslöja några andra uppgifter”?

Har kommissionen eller alliansen en strategi för att se till att just denna förväntning uppfylls i praktiken, ja eller nej?

**Svar från Cecilia Malmström på kommissionens vägnar**

_(24 april 2013)_

Såsom förklaras i svaret på den skriftliga frågan E-011539/12 som parlamentsledamoten hänvisar till, är syftet med
det operativa mål som anges i förklaringen vid upprättandet av den globala alliansen för sexuella övergrepp mot barn
på internet att uppmuntra leverantörer av elektroniska tjänster och internettjänster att _frivilligt_ använda målinriktade
åtgärder för att hitta bilder på sexuella övergrepp mot barn i deras system. Såsom parlamentsledamoten mycket
riktigt påpekar är den globala alliansen för sexuella övergrepp mot barn på internet en icke-rättslig ansträngning. Den
bygger på att de deltagande staterna åtar sig att ställa upp vissa gemensamma politiska mål. Det operativa mål som
anges ovan är ett sätt att bidra till att förverkliga dessa politiska mål för ett visst land, men det kommer an på varje
enskilt deltagande land att utifrån sin specifika situation besluta vilka lagstiftningsåtgärder eller andra åtgärder som
det vidtar för att uppnå målen.

C 6 E / 258 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002741/13**

**to the Commission**
**Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ What specific basis exists for the realisation of fully automated image reporting?

In its response to Written Question E-011539/12, the Commission indicated that in order to fulfil the goals of the
Global Alliance, ‘[c]ompanies would use a fully automated system to specifically target, find and report only known
or vetted child pornography images, without examining or revealing any other data’.

The Global Alliance is an explicitly non-legislative endeavour. On what specific basis does the Commission or the
Alliance plan to ensure that ‘[c]ompanies would use a fully automated system to specifically target, find and report
only known or vetted child pornography images, without examining or revealing any other data’?

Specifically — yes or no — does the Commission or the Alliance have a strategy to ensure that the aforementioned
expectation is realised in practice?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

As explained in the answer to Written Question E-011539/12 which the Honourable Member refers to, the objective
of the operational goal provided for in the Declaration on the Launch of the Global Alliance against Child Sexual
Abuse Online is to encourage electronic/Internet service providers to _voluntarily_ employ targeted measures to find
child sexual abuse images on their systems. As the Honourable Member rightly points out, the Global Alliance against
Child Sexual Abuse Online is a non-legislative endeavour. It relies on the commitment of the participating states to a
set of shared policy targets. The operational goal identified above is one possible way to contribute to realising these
policy targets for a given state, but it is up to each participating state to decide, in accordance with its specific
situation, which legislative or non-legislative actions it will undertake to reach the targets.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 259

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002742/13**

**à Comissão**
**Carlos Coelho (PPE) e Mário David (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Vistos Schengen — recusa de entrada

Têm sido apresentadas inúmeras queixas por parte de nacionais de países terceiros relativamente ao facto de lhes ser
recusada entrada no espaço Schengen, apesar de possuírem um visto válido para esse efeito.

Apesar de estarem em posse de um visto uniforme (visto válido para a totalidade do território dos Estados-Membros),
o qual foi emitido pelo Estado-Membro de destino principal da visita (após ter sido verificado que o requerente
cumpre todas as condições de entrada ao abrigo do Código das Fronteiras Schengen, se não representa um risco em
termos de imigração clandestina ou uma ameaça à segurança do Estado-Membro e se tenciona deixar o território
antes do fim de validade do visto), esses nacionais de países terceiros têm sido alvo de uma recusa de entrada numa
fronteira externa de outro Estado-Membro que não o responsável pela emissão do visto.

Gostaríamos de saber se, para a Comissão, estamos perante uma violação das regras de Schengen, ou, caso considere
que assim não é, se pode explicar as regras jurídicas que servem de base à possibilidade de um Estado-Membro poder
recusar a entrada de um nacional de um país terceiro detentor de um visto uniforme válido para uma estada de curta
duração (emitido de acordo com as regras previstas no Código de Vistos).

Caso exista uma base jurídica que permita este tipo de recusas de entrada, gostaríamos de saber sobre quem é que
recai esse poder de decisão.

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

_(14 de maio de 2013)_

Nos termos do artigo 30.° do Código de Vistos ( [1] ), «a mera posse de um visto uniforme (…) não confere um direito de
entrada automático». Quando se apresentam nas fronteiras externas, os titulares de vistos devem poder provar que
preenchem as condições de entrada (artigo 5.°, n.° 1, do Código das Fronteiras Schengen) ( [2] ). As autoridades dos
Estados‐Membros são obrigadas a comunicar esta informação às pessoas a quem emitem vistos.

A Comissão tem conhecimento de casos em que um Estado‐Membro recusa a entrada e anula um visto válido emitido
por outro Estado‐Membro, apesar do princípio de reconhecimento mútuo de vistos emitidos por outros Estados‐
Membros para efeitos de entrada e permanência no espaço Schengen. Se uma pessoa for titular de um visto de entrada
única ou de um visto de entradas múltiplas é porque o Estado‐Membro emissor competente considerou que estão
preenchidas as condições atrás referidas. Este deve ser o elemento principal da avaliação efetuada quando essa pessoa
pretende entrar num Estado‐Membro diferente do que emitiu o visto. Nessas circunstâncias, a recusa «automática» de
entrada ou a anulação «automática» do visto emitido por outro Estado‐Membro é incompatível com o princípio do
reconhecimento mútuo dos vistos Schengen. Não obstante, um Estado‐Membro pode recusar a entrada quando o
titular do visto não puder provar que preenche as condições de entrada. Se se afigurar que o visto foi obtido de forma
fraudulenta, por exemplo com base em informações falsas, o visto também pode ser anulado.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamento (CE) n.° 810/2009, JO L 243 de 15.9.2009, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulamento (CE) n.° 562/2006, JO L 105 de 13.4.2006, p. 1.

C 6 E / 260 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002742/13**

**to the Commission**
**Carlos Coelho (PPE) and Mário David (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Schengen Visas — refusal of entry

There have been numerous complaints made by third-country nationals who have been refused entry to the Schengen
area, despite holding a visa valid for this purpose.

Despite holding a uniform visa (a visa valid for the entire Schengen area), issued by the Member State whose territory
constitutes the main destination of the visit (after it has been confirmed that the applicant meets all of the entry
requirements set out in the Schengen Borders Code and does not represent a risk of clandestine immigration or a
threat to the security of the Member State and intends to leave the territory before the visa expires), these thirdcountry nationals have been refused entry at an external border of a Member State other than that which issued the
visa.

In the Commission’s view, does this constitute a violation of the Schengen rules or is this not the case? Can it explain
the legal rules used as the basis for a Member State refusing entry to a third-country national holding a uniform visa
valid for a short-term stay (issued in accordance with the rules set out in the Visa Code)?

Should there be a legal basis for refusing entry in this way? Who holds the power of decision?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

According to the Visa Code ( [1] ) Article 30 the ‘mere possession of a uniform visa… shall not confer an automatic right
of entry’. Visa holders must, when presenting themselves at the external borders, be in a position to prove that they
fulfil the entry conditions (Article 5(1) of the Schengen Borders Code) ( [2] ). Member States' authorities are obliged to
inform a person to whom a visa has been issued of the above.

The Commission is aware of cases where a Member State has refused entry and annulled a valid visa issued by another
Member State despite the principle of mutual recognition of visas issued by other Member States for the purpose of
entry into and stay in the Schengen area. If a person holds a single entry visa or a multiple entry visa, it means that the
competent, issuing Member State has assessed that the person concerned fulfils the above criteria. That should be the
prevailing element in the assessment when such persons wish to enter a Member State different from the one that
issued the visa. In such circumstances an ‘automatic’ refusal of entry and the ‘automatic’ annulment of the visa issued
by another Member State would be incompatible with the principle of mutual recognition of Schengen visas.
Nevertheless, a Member State is entitled to refuse entry when a visa holder is unable to prove that he/she fulfils the
entry conditions. Where it appears that the visa was obtained fraudulently, for instance on the basis of false
information, the visa may also be annulled.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) 810/200, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 261

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002743/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sajjad Karim (ECR)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Investigation into DuPont and Honeywell regarding 1234yf and the directive on mobile air-conditioning
systems (MAC Directive)

With the refrigerant 1234yf being adopted to comply with the MAC Directive, there is uncertainty surrounding the
implementation of this directive. Deep concerns have been raised regarding the safety and supply issues of 1234yf.

The Directorate General for Competition has announced that it is investigating DuPont and Honeywell regarding
1234yf production in 2011.

1. What is the current stage of the Directorate General for Competition’s investigation into the agreements
between DuPont and Honeywell?

2. Does the Directorate General for Competition realise that its investigation into DuPont and Honeywell is having
a strong effect on the industry, particularly as many companies have been unable to make investment decisions in
time to meet the requirements of the directive?

3. Furthermore, does the Directorate General for Competition realise that all delays benefit the only two players
that can supply 1234yf as a direct result of the very agreements that are currently the subject of the antitrust
investigation?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 April 2013)_

The Commission is currently pursuing an investigation involving Honeywell and DuPont following complaints
alleging breaches of both Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in the field of automotive refrigerants.

The Commission is aware of the importance of the refrigerants issue for both the car industry and chemical suppliers.
However, competition investigations involving complex factual and legal issues inevitably take some time to resolve.

This is a highly commercially sensitive issue from the point of view of the complainants, the target companies, and
the sectors involved as a whole. For these reasons, and in line with general practice, the Commission cannot disclose
precise details of the investigative steps that it is taking.

The Commission's Directorate-General for Competition is carrying out a thorough investigation taking also into
account, as appropriate, the market developments.

C 6 E / 262 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-002744/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Toine Manders (ALDE)**

_(8 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Europese geluidsnormen voor treinverkeer

Tijdens de plenaire vergadering in Straatsburg heeft het Europees Parlement de nieuwe geluidsnormen voor
motorvoertuigen vastgesteld. In veel lidstaten hebben veel Europese burgers ook last van geluidsoverlast door treinen,
in het bijzonder hogesnelheidstreinen. Om eerlijke concurrentie te garanderen zouden alle treinen aan dezelfde
maximale geluidsnorm moeten voldoen om op de interne markt te mogen worden gebracht.

1. Is de Commissie voornemens om ook voor treinen geluidsnormen vast te stellen op Europees niveau?

2. Zo ja, wanneer is er een Commissievoorstel te verwachten? Zo nee, hoe gaat de Europese Commissie dan
burgers beschermen tegen geluidsoverlast van treinen?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(10 april 2013)_

1. De Commissie heeft op Europees niveau reeds geluidsnormen voor treinen vastgesteld: het besluit van de
Commissie betreffende technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit — geluidsemissies (TSI
geluidsemissies) ( [1] ) heeft betrekking op het geluid van conventionele treinen, en de beschikking van de
Commissie betreffende technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit — rollend hogesnelheidsmaterieel ( [2] ),
heeft betrekking op onder meer de geluidsemissies van hogesnelheidstreinen.

2. Aangezien bovengenoemde besluiten betrekking hebben op vergunningen voor nieuw rollend materieel, heft
de Commissie maatregelen getroffen om ook het bestaande rollend materieel stiller te laten rijden:

a. De richtlijn tot instelling van één Europese spoorwegruimte (Richtlijn 2012/34/EU ( [3] )) voorziet in de
mogelijkheid om de infrastructuurheffingen die spoorwegmaatschappijen moeten betalen, te differentiëren op
basis van het geluidsniveau van de goederenwagons;

b. de financieringsfaciliteit voor Europese verbindingen (COM(2011)665/3) voorziet in de mogelijkheid tot
medefinanciering door de EU van de uitrusting van bestaande goederenwagons met stille remblokken zodat ze
minder geluidshinder veroorzaken.

Ten slotte kan de Richtlijn 2002/49/EG (richtlijn omgevingslawaai ( [4] )) de problemen verlichten op plaatsen waar de
blootstelling aan lawaai het grootst is. Krachtens deze richtlijn zijn de lidstaten verplicht om geluidsbelastingkaarten
op te maken van alle voornaamste infrastructuren, met inbegrip van de spoorweginfrastructuur, en op basis daarvan
actieplannen op te stellen om de blootstelling aan lawaai in de buurt van de hotspots die tijdens het in kaart brengen
zijn geïdentificeerd, te verminderen.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Besluit van de Commissie van 4 april 2011 betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „rollend materieel

— geluidsemissies” van het conventionele trans-Europese spoorwegsysteem (2011/229/EU).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Beschikking van de Commissie van 21 februari 2008 betreffende de technische specificatie inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „rollend

materieel” van het trans-Europese hogesnelheidsspoorwegsysteem (2008232/EG).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Richtlijn 2012/34/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 21 november 2012 tot instelling van één Europese spoorwegruimte, PB L 343

van 14.12.2012.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Richtlĳn 2002/49/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 25 juni 2002 inzake de evaluatie en de beheersing van omgevingslawaai —

Verklaring van de Commissie in het Bemiddelingscomité over de richtlĳn inzake de evaluatie en de beheersing van omgevingslawaai, PB L 189 van
18.7.2002.

( **|**

( **|**

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 263

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002744/13**

**to the Commission**
**Toine Manders (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European noise standards for rail transport

At the part-session in Strasbourg, the European Parliament adopted the new noise standards for motor vehicles. In
many Member States, numerous members of the public are also disturbed by rail noise, particularly from high-speed
trains. In order to ensure fair competition, all trains ought to be required to comply with the same noise standard in
order to be placed on the internal market.

1. Will the Commission also adopt noise standards for trains at European level?

2. If so, when can a Commission proposal be expected? If not, how will the Commission protect the public against
noise nuisance from trains?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 April 2013)_

1. The Commission already adopted noise standards for trains at the European level: Commission Decision on
Technical Specifications for Interoperability — Noise (TSI Noise) ( [1] ) deals with noise of conventional trains and
Commission Decision on Technical Specifications for Interoperability — High-speed rolling stock ( [2] ) deals with
high-speed trains, also in relation to noise.

2. As the abovementioned decisions concern authorisations of new rolling stock, the Commission adopted
measures that would enable rendering also existing rolling stock more silent:

a. Directive establishing a single European railway area (Directive 2012/34/EU ( [3] )) provides for a possibility to
differentiate infrastructure charges paid by train operators in respect of the noise levels of the wagons;

b. The Connecting Europe Facility (COM(2011)665/3) provides for a possibility for the EU to co-fund the
retrofitting of existing freight wagons with silent brake blocks, in order to make them less noisy.

Finally, Directive 2002/49/EC (Environmental Noise Directive ( [4] )) can help to alleviate problems where noise
exposure is high. It requires Member States to elaborate noise maps concerning major infrastructures including rail
and, on that basis, draw up action plans in order to reduce noise exposure near to hot spots identified in the mapping.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Commission decision of 4 April 2011 concerning the technical specifications of interoperability relating to the subsystem ‘rolling stock — noise’

of the trans-European conventional rail system (2011/229/EU).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission decision of 21 February 2008 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the ‘rolling stock’ sub-system of the

trans-European high-speed rail system (2008/232/EC).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area,

OJ L 343, 14.12.2012.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of

environmental noise — Declaration by the Commission in the Conciliation Committee on the directive relating to the assessment and
management of environmental noise, OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.

( **|**

( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 264 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002745/13**

**до Комисията**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Гаранция за младежта

Имайки предвид високите нива на безработица сред младите и стремежа за устойчив, приобщаващ и интелигентен
растеж, с какво новата финансова рамка 2014—2020 г. ще допринесе за развитието на младите и учащите се
европейски граждани и как тя ще се превърне от финансов ресурс в устойчива инвестиционна рамка за отделните
държави членки?

Според проучване на Световната организация на труда за въвеждането на Гаранцията за младежта само за държавите от
еврозоната ще са необходими 21 млрд. евро. В тази връзка считате ли, че определените 6 милиарда евро за
инициативата „Младежка заетост“ са достатъчен ресурс за реално подпомагане и предпоставка за постоянна работа на
младите хора от слаборазвитите региони в 27-те държави членки?

В ЕС едва 15—20% от учениците, които по време на средното си образование са участвали в програма за създаване на
малко предприятие, впоследствие започват собствена стопанска дейност. Техният брой е от три до пет пъти по-голям
в сравнение с броя на предприемачите като процент от общото население. Вземайки предвид и факта, че според
проучване на Евробарометър 58% от европейските граждани предпочитат да бъдат служители, а едва 37 %
предпочитат да бъдат самостоятелно заети:

—
какви конкретни мерки ще бъдат предприети за прилагането на Плана за действие в областта на
предприемачеството до 2020 г.?

—
какви други стъпки предвижда Европейската комисия за въвеждане на обучение по предприемачество в
образователните системи на държавите членки и за стимулиране по този начин на предприемаческия дух сред
младите хора в ЕС?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Андор от името на Комисията**

_(3 май 2013 г.)_

В Предложението за регламент относно Европейския социален фонд (ЕСФ) за периода 2014 — 2020 г. е определен
специален инвестиционен приоритет за устойчивото интегриране на пазара на труда на младите хора, неангажирани с
трудова дейност, образование или обучение. В изпратени на държавите членки ( [1] ) през 2012 г. документи за
изразяване на позиция са очертани приоритетите по отношение на подкрепата по линия на европейските структурни и
инвестиционни фондове в периода 2014 — 2020 г. От ДЧ, към които в рамките на европейския семестър през 2012 г.
са отправени специфични за всяка държава препоръки по отношение на младежта, се очаква да предвидят достатъчно
средства в тази област.

Чрез ИМЗ ( [2] ), средствата по която възлизат на 6 млрд. евро, ще бъде предоставена подкрепа специално за младите хора
в региони с младежка безработица над 25 % по линия на ЕСФ, както и допълнителна финансова подкрепа. ИМЗ следва
да подсили, а не да замени подкрепата по линия на ЕСФ за мерките с насоченост към младежта. Определеният дял от
ЕСФ в размер на 3 млрд. евро представлява само минимално изискване.

В Плана за действие „Предприемачество 2020 г.“ ( [3] ) се призовава за предприемане на съвместни действия на всички
равнища в три области на действие, първата от които е образованието по предприемачество. В допълнение към
инициативите на ЕК, в плана ДЧ се приканват да гарантират, че основното умение „предприемачество“ ще бъде
застъпено в учебните програми за всички нива на образование преди края на 2015 г., и да осигурят поне една
възможност за придобиване на практически опит в областта на предприемачеството преди напускане на системата на
задължителното образование.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ДЧ.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Инициатива за младежка заетост COM (2013)144, 145, 146 от 12 март 2013 г.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promoting-entrepreneurship.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 265

В Съобщението на Комисията „Преосмисляне на образованието“ ( [4] ) също се призовава за придобиване на практически
опит в реални условия в периода на училищното образование. ЕК в сътрудничество с ОИСР е в процес на разработване
на рамка за университетите в областта на предприемачеството. Подобна рамка ще бъде разработена за училищата и
институциите за професионално образование и обучение (ПОО). Допълнителни насоки за политиката се очаква да
бъдат публикувани през есента на 2013 г.

В съвместен документ на ЕК-ОИСР относно политиката в областта на младежкото предприемачество ( [5] ) са дадени
примери за различни практики на включване в училищните учебни програми на обучение по предприемачество.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 669 final, 20 ноември 2012 г.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.oecd.org/regional/leed/Youth%20Policy%20Brief.pdf, 2012 г.

C 6 E / 266 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002745/13**

**to the Commission**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Youth Guarantee

Having regard to the high levels of youth unemployment and the pursuit of sustainable, inclusive, smart growth, what
contribution will the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework make to the career development of young people
and those in education, and how will that contribution translate from a financial resource into a sustainable
investment framework in the various Member States?

According to International Labour Organisation research, it will cost EUR 21 billion to introduce the Youth
Guarantee in the eurozone countries alone. Does the Commission consider that the EUR 6 billion earmarked for the
‘Youth employment’ initiative represents a sufficient resource from which to provide real support and create the
conditions necessary for getting young people from under-developed regions in the 27 Member States into
permanent employment?

Between 15% and 20% of students in the EU who participate in a mini-company programme in secondary school will
later start their own company, a figure that is about three to five times that for the general population. Bearing in
mind too that, according to research by Eurobarometer, being an employee is the preferred career option for 58% of
Europeans, while just 37% would rather be self-employed:

—
what practical measures are to be taken to implement the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan, and

—
what other steps does the Commission intend to take to introduce entrepreneurship training into the Member
States’ education systems and thus encourage a spirit of entrepreneurship among young people in the Union?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The proposal for the 2014-2020 ESF regulation identifies a dedicated investment priority for the sustainable labourmarket integration of young people not in employment, education or training. Position Papers sent to each Member
State ( [1] ) in 2012 outline priorities for European Structural and Investment Funds support in 2014-2020. MS with a
country specific recommendation on youth in the 2012 European Semester are expected to allocate adequate
resources to youth.

The YEI ( [2] ), amounted to EUR 6 billion, will provide specific support to young people in regions with youth
unemployment rates above 25%, through ESF funding and a top-up allocation. The YEI should enhance and not
replace ESF support to youth measures. The earmarked ESF share of EUR 3 billion represents only a minimum
requirement.

The Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan ( [3] ) calls for joint action at all levels in three action pillars, the first being
entrepreneurship education. In addition to EC initiatives, the Plan invites MS to ensure that the key competence
‘entrepreneurship’ is embedded into curricula across all levels of education before the end of 2015 and to offer the
possibility of at least one practical entrepreneurial experience before leaving compulsory education.

The EC Communication ‘Rethinking Education’ ( [4] ) also calls for a practical entrepreneurial exercise during school life.
The EC has, in collaboration with OECD, been developing a framework for entrepreneurial universities. A similar
framework will be prepared for schools and VET institutions. Further policy guidance is to be published in autumn
2013.

A joint EC-OECD policy brief on youth entrepreneurship ( [5] ) provides examples of various practices of
entrepreneurship training's inclusion into school curricula.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) MS.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Youth Opportunity Initiative COM(2013)144, 145, 146 of 12 March 2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promoting-entrepreneurship.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 669 final, 20 November 2012.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.oecd.org/regional/leed/Youth%20Policy%20Brief.pdf, 2012.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 267

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002746/13**

**до Комисията**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Стратегия за освобождаване от Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка — Присъединяване на България
към Шенген

1. Вземайки под внимание, че в обсега на Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка се осъществява наблюдение и
оценка в областта на борбата с корупцията, не считате ли, че след въвеждането от 2013 г. на практиката за изготвяне
на редовни европейски антикорупционни доклади за всички държави членки (вкл. и тези по Механизма за
сътрудничество и проверка), възниква риск от припокриване на дейностите в тази сфера? Още повече, че ЕК потвърди в
мониторинговите си доклади за България и Румъния от юли 2012 г., че необходимата законодателна и
институционална рамка в сферата на правосъдието и вътрешните работи е вече налична и следва да се оцени нейното
ефективно прилагане. В тази връзка не считате ли, че е необходимо изготвянето на стратегия за освобождаване от
Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка (т.нар. CVM Exit Strategy) и превръщането на инициативата за подготовка на
антикорупционни доклади в инструмент за бъдещо сътрудничество и координация с компетентните национални
органи в държавите членки?

2. Все по-често в предизборната реторика в някои от държавите членки присъединяването към Шенген се обвързва
с Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка. В тази връзка считате ли, че присъединяването на България към Шенген
следва да се възприема като самостоятелен процес, включващ обективна оценка на постигнатото — без прилагане на
двойни стандарти, и обвързването му с Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Барозу от името на Комисията**

_(25 април 2013 г.)_

1. Няма официална връзка между механизма за сътрудничество и проверка и доклада на ЕС за борбата с
корупцията. Механизмът за сътрудничество и проверка беше създаден през декември 2006 г. като средство след
присъединяването за мониторинг за конкретни области, предизвикващи загриженост, и той включва ясни показатели,
обхващащи не само борбата с корупцията, но също така и съдебната реформа, а в случая на България — и борбата с
организираната престъпност. Според решението за създаване на механизма той ще се прилага, докато показателите
бъдат „задоволително изпълнени“. Следователно прекратяването на механизма за сътрудничество и проверка е изцяло
в ръцете на двете държави членки. Бъдещият механизъм на ЕС за докладване относно борбата с корупцията има за цел
да събира данни от различни източници, което да позволи на Комисията да очертае точна картина на усилията за
борба с корупцията във всички държави — членки на ЕС. Неговият обхват е различен от механизма за сътрудничество
и проверка. Посланията за борбата с корупцията в рамките на тези два различни инструмента трябва да бъдат
съгласувани, тъй като действително е налице тематично препокриване.

2. Няма правна връзка между механизма за сътрудничество и проверка и присъединяването към Шенгенското
пространство. Именно инструментите, налични в рамките на Шенген, както и тези, които се обсъждат понастоящем в
подобрен механизъм за оценка и наблюдение на Шенген, са правилните инструменти за справяне с възможните
недостатъци при граничния контрол, а не механизмът за сътрудничество и проверка, който има различен обхват.
Комисията няма да подкрепи каквато и да била официална връзка между тези два процеса. Това не би било в
съответствие с шенгенските критерии за оценка. От своя страна Комисията многократно е изразявала ясно своята пълна
подкрепа за присъединяването на Румъния и България към Шенгенското пространство, както и усилията на

председателствата в тази посока.

C 6 E / 268 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002746/13**

**to the Commission**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ A Cooperation and Verification Mechanism exit strategy and Bulgaria's accession to Schengen

1. Bearing in mind that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) includes monitoring and assessment
of measures to combat corruption, does the Commission not consider that, following the introduction from 2013 of
the practice of preparing regular EU anti-corruption reports for each Member State (including those subject to the
CVM), there will be a risk of overlap here? The question is particularly pertinent as the Commission stated in its
July 2012 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania that the necessary legal and institutional framework for
justice and home affairs was already in place and that what was now needed was to assess the effectiveness of its
application. Therefore, does the Commission not think that a ‘CVM exit strategy’ needs to be prepared and that the
anti-corruption reports initiative needs to be turned into a tool for future cooperation and coordination with the
relevant national authorities in the Member States?

2. Increasingly, in pre-election rhetoric in some Member States, the question of accession to Schengen is being
linked to the CVM. Does the Commission consider that Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen ought to be seen as an
independent process which includes objective assessments of progress, without applying double standards and
linking it to the CVM?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 April 2013)_

1. There is no formal connection between the CVM and the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The CVM was established
in December 2006, as a post-accession monitoring tool for specific areas of concern, and it comprises clear
benchmarks covering not only fight against corruption, but also justice reforms and, in the case of Bulgaria, fight
against organised crime. According to the decision establishing the CVM, the mechanism will stay in place until the
benchmarks are ‘satisfactorily fulfilled’. The exit from the CVM is thus entirely in the hands of the two Member States.
The future EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism aims at gathering data from various sources, which would then
enable the Commission to draw an accurate picture of the anti-corruption efforts in all EU Member States. This is a
different scope than the CVM. The messages passed on the fight against corruption in these two different instruments
will have to be coherent, as there is indeed a topical overlap.

2. There is no legal link between the CVM and the accession to the Schengen zone. The tools already available
under Schengen, as well as those currently being discussed under an improved Schengen evaluation and monitoring
mechanism, are the right tools to address any possible shortcoming in border controls, not the CVM, which has a
different scope. The Commission will not support any formal link being made between these two processes. This
would not be in line with the Schengen evaluation criteria. For its part, the Commission has made clear repeatedly
that it fully supports Romania and Bulgaria's accession to Schengen as well as the Presidencies' efforts in this
direction.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 269

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002747/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)**

_(8 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Ayudas públicas a clubes de fútbol de la Comunidad Valenciana

En julio de 2011, el Gobierno de la Generalitat Valenciana decidió avalar préstamos por valor de 118 millones de
euros a los clubes de fútbol Valencia C.F., Elche C.F., y Hércules C.F., todos ellos sociedades anónimas deportivas de
titularidad privada.

Ante el impago de estas tres sociedades, la Generalitat Valenciana tiene que hacer frente actualmente al pago de unas
deudas por valor de 118 millones de euros. El Gobierno Valenciano ya ha pagado 4,9 millones de euros por los
intereses de la deuda de 86 millones de euros contraída por el Valencia C.F. con la entidad bancaria Bankia.

Sin menoscabo del sentimiento que simbolizan los distintos clubes de fútbol para los aficionados, la ciudad y la región
que representan, tenemos que distinguir lo que es el deporte, los sentimientos, la afectividad y la buena gestión de los
fondos públicos.

En el contexto socioeconómico actual, en el que se están produciendo recortes y privatizaciones de los servicios
públicos que ponen en riesgo servicios públicos básicos para los ciudadanos como la salud y la educación, resulta
censurable que, al mismo tiempo, se esté avalando con fondos públicos, cuando no nacionalizando, clubes de fútbol
de titularidad privada con el fin de salvarlos de quiebras económicas provocadas por la mala gestión de sus
responsables.

1. ¿Está investigando la Comisión las ayudas públicas que han recibido los distintos clubes de fútbol de la
Comunidad Valenciana por parte del Gobierno regional valenciano?

2. ¿Son estas ayudas públicas compatibles con el artículo 107 del TFUE y con las líneas directrices de la UE sobre
ayudas de Estado de salvamento y de reestructuración de empresas en crisis?

3. ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión en relación con este asunto y qué clubes de fútbol están siendo
investigados?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(17 de abril de 2013)_

La Comisión está al corriente de las noticias sobre préstamos y avales del Estado a tres clubes de fútbol de la
Comunidad Valenciana. La Comisión ha recabado del Gobierno español información acerca de los tres clubes, por lo
que todavía no está en condiciones de evaluar la compatibilidad de esas medidas con el artículo 107 del Tratado de
Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.

C 6 E / 270 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002747/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ State aid for football clubs in Valencia

In July 2011, the Government of the Autonomous Community of Valencia decided to grant loans in the amount of
EUR 118 million to the football clubs Valencia C.F., Elche C.F. and Hércules C.F., all of which are privately owned
limited sports companies.

As these three companies have defaulted on the loans, the Valencian Government is now having to pay debts of
EUR 118 million. The Valencian Government has already paid EUR 4.9 million in interest on the EUR 86 million debt
owed by Valencia C.F. to the bank Bankia.

Without playing down what the various football clubs mean to the fans, the town and the region they represent, a
distinction needs to be drawn between sport, feelings, emotion and the sound management of public funds.

In the current socioeconomic climate, in which public services are being cut and privatised, jeopardising basic public
services such as healthcare and education, it is reprehensible that public funds are being used at the same time to bail
out privately owned football clubs, when they are not being nationalised, to save them from bankruptcy as a result of
mismanagement on the part those running them.

1. Is the Commission investigating the state aid that several football clubs in Valencia have received from the
Valencian Regional Government?

2. Is this state aid compatible with Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and
with the EU guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty?

3. What action does the Commission intend to take on this matter and which football clubs are being investigated?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

The Commission is aware of reports about loans and State guarantees for three football clubs in Valencia. The
Commission has asked the Spanish Government for information regarding the three clubs, so is not yet in a position
to assess the compatibility of these measures with Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 271

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002748/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(8. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Europaweite Arbeitsvermittlung

Zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich wurde in Kehl das erste Büro für grenzüberschreitende Arbeitsvermittlung
eröffnet. Trotz der Freizügigkeit in der EU ist es für Arbeitssuchende und Arbeitgeber noch immer nicht
selbstverständlich, eine Arbeitsstelle im Nachbarland anzunehmen, beziehungsweise dort einen Bewerber zu suchen.

Um der Arbeitslosigkeit in der Europäischen Union zu begegnen, ist es wichtig, den europäischen Arbeitsmarkt durch
den Ausbau der Vernetzung der Arbeitsagenturen zu stärken. Insbesondere in Grenzregionen, in denen es kaum
Sprachbarrieren gibt, ist die Arbeitsannahme interessant, da sie nicht mit einem Umzug des Suchenden verbunden ist.

1. Strebt die Kommission die Errichtung weiterer Einrichtungen dieser Art an, und sollen diese ausschließlich in
Grenzregionen liegen?

2. Sieht die Kommission eine anteilige Finanzierung durch die entsprechenden Länder vor oder durch die
Europäische Union?

3. Sieht die Kommission bei der Ausgestaltung der Arbeitsvermittlung auch eine individuelle Beratung der
Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber vor?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

1. Der Rechtsrahmen der EU zur Förderung der Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer
innerhalb der Union, d. h. die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 492/2011, überlässt den Mitgliedstaaten die Entscheidung über
die Gestaltung der Arbeitsverwaltungen und damit auch die Gestaltung der grenzübergreifenden Arbeitsvermittlung.
Gemäß dieser Verordnung sorgt EURES, das Netz der europäischen öffentlichen Arbeitsverwaltungen und der
Kommission, dafür, dass die Arbeitsverwaltungen aller Mitgliedstaaten sowie Norwegens, Islands, Liechtensteins und
der Schweiz Stellenangebote und Stellengesuche in der Union austarieren und Arbeitnehmer in
Beschäftigungsverhältnisse vermitteln. Hierunter fallen auch Dienstleistungen für Grenzregionen. So können die
Mitgliedstaaten Strukturen für eine Zusammenarbeit und die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen speziell für
Grenzregionen einrichten.

2. Die Kommission stellt Finanzhilfen für Dienstleistungen bereit, die die Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen von EURES
erbringen. Hierunter fallen Informationstätigkeiten, der Abgleich von Stellenangebot und ‐nachfrage und die
Vermittlung in Grenzregionen sowie in ein anderes Land. Für den Zeitraum ab 2014 basiert die finanzielle
Unterstützung auf den Ergebnissen der Beratungen über das Programm für sozialen Wandel und soziale Innovation
und den Europäischen Sozialfonds.

3. Die Arbeitsverwaltungen und weitere Partner (wie die Sozialpartner) bieten im Rahmen von EURES auch eine
individuelle Beratung für Arbeitsuchende an, die eine Anstellung in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat suchen, wie auch für
Arbeitgeber, die Arbeitskräfte aus anderen EU‐Ländern anwerben möchten.

C 6 E / 272 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002748/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Europe-wide job placement services

The first office for cross-border job placement between Germany and France has been opened in Kehl. Despite free
movement in the EU, accepting a job in a neighbouring country or seeking an applicant from there is still not selfevident for job seekers and employers.

In order to tackle unemployment in the European Union it is important to strengthen the European labour market by
expanding the network of employment agencies. In border regions in particular, where there are unlikely to be any
language barriers, job acceptance is interesting, as the job seeker does not need to move location.

1. Is the Commission aiming to establish more agencies like this one, and is it the intention for these to be located
exclusively in border regions?

2. Does it intend the financing to be shared by the relevant Member States or by the European Union?

3. With regard to the structuring of the job placement service, is it also planning to provide individual advice to
workers and employers?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

1. The EU framework to facilitate the freedom of movement for workers within the Union, i.e. Regulation
No 492/2011, leaves to the Member States to decide on the organisation of the employment services, including as
regards cross border placements. Pursuant to this regulation, EURES, the network of European employment services
and the Commission, ensures the intra-EU clearing of vacancies and applications for employment and the resultant
placing of workers in employment by employment services in all Member States, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Switzerland. This includes services for border regions. Member States may decide to set up specific cooperation and
service structures for border regions.

2. The Commission provides grants for services offered in the Member States in the framework of EURES. This
includes information, matching and placement services for cross-border and cross-country mobility. Funding as of
2014 is dependent on the outcome of the negotiations on the Programme on Social Change and Innovation and the
European Social Fund.

3. In the framework of EURES employment services and other partners such as social partners provide individual
advice for both, jobseekers that are interested in working in other European countries and employers searching to
recruit from other European countries.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 273

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002749/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)**

_(8. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ E-Book-Reader Kindle — Löschen von erworbenen E-Books bei Kündigung von Amazon-Account

Das Online-Versandhaus „Amazon“ bietet seinen Kunden mit dem E-Book-Reader „Kindle“ ein digitales Gerät zum
Lesen von online erworbenen Büchern an. Diese „E-Books“ können in einer virtuellen Bibliothek über einen
Amazon-Account erworben und nach Erwerb uneingeschränkt gelesen werden.

Anscheinend soll jedoch bei einer Kündigung dieses Amazon-Accounts auch die gesamte erworbene
Online-Büchersammlung gelöscht werden.

1. Ist der Kommission dieser Umstand bekannt?

2. Ist diese Sachlage rechtlich mit dem Konsumentenschutz vereinbar?

3. Muss der Kunde in solch einem Fall nicht bei Eröffnung eines Accounts über diese Bedingungen informiert
werden?

4. Plant die Kommission behördliche Untersuchungen in diese Richtung?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(2. Mai 2013)_

Die Verbraucherschutzvorschriften der EU gelten auch für den Verkauf digitaler Produkte an EU-Verbraucher. Sie
stellen sicher, dass den Verbrauchern alle erforderlichen Informationen zur Verfügung stehen, damit sie eine fundierte
Kaufentscheidung treffen können.

Nach der Richtlinie 97/7/EG über den Verbraucherschutz bei Vertragsabschlüssen im Fernabsatz und nach der
Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken im binnenmarktinternen Geschäftsverkehr zwischen
Unternehmen und Verbrauchern sind die Händler verpflichtet, Informationen über die wesentlichen Merkmale der
von ihnen angebotenen Waren und Dienstleistungen zur Verfügung zu stellen. In der Richtlinie 2011/83/EU über die
Rechte der Verbraucher, die in Kürze an die Stelle der Richtlinie über den Fernabsatz treten wird, ist ferner festgelegt,
dass die Händler die Verbraucher über Funktionsweise und Interoperabilität der von ihnen angebotenen digitalen
Inhalte informieren müssen.

Jede allgemeine Vertragsklausel, die die Verfügbarkeit käuflich erworbener Inhalte an die Laufzeit eines Kundenkontos
bindet, muss ebenfalls nach der Richtlinie 93/13/EWG über missbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen
geprüft werden. Dieser Richtlinie zufolge sind Vertragsklauseln untersagt, die ein erhebliches und ungerechtfertigtes
Missverhältnis der vertraglichen Rechte und Pflichten der Vertragspartner zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers
verursachen.

Es liegt vorrangig in der Zuständigkeit der mitgliedstaatlichen Behörden und Gerichte, für eine ordnungsgemäße
Umsetzung dieser Richtlinien zu sorgen. In Fällen, in denen mehrere EU-Mitgliedstaaten von unlauteren
Geschäftspraktiken von Händlern betroffen sind, arbeitet die Kommission jedoch unter Berücksichtigung aller
maßgeblichen Umstände mit den mitgliedstaatlichen Durchsetzungsbehörden zusammen, um eine wirksamere
Zusammenarbeit zu erzielen. Ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dem digitalen Markt, der in der im Mai 2012
verabschiedeten Europäischen Verbraucheragenda als ein Schlüsselbereich ausgewiesen ist.

C 6 E / 274 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002749/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Kindle e-book reader — deletion of purchased e-books on closure of an Amazon account

With the ‘Kindle’ e-book reader, the online retailer Amazon offers its customers a digital device for reading books
purchased online. These e-books can be obtained from a virtual library via an Amazon account and, after purchase,
can be read without restriction.

On closure of this Amazon account, however, it appears that the entire online collection of books purchased is
deleted.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation?

2. Is this situation compatible with consumer protection law?

3. In a case like this, should a customer not be informed of these conditions when opening an account?

4. Is the Commission planning any official investigations in this regard?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

EC law on consumer protection applies to the sale of digital products to EU consumers, and ensures that they receive
all necessary information in order to make an informed decision.

The Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC require traders to
provide information on the main characteristics of the goods or services they put on offer. The Consumer Rights
Directive 2011/83/EU, which will soon replace the Distance Selling Directive, specifically requires traders to provide
consumers with information about the functionality and interoperability of the digital content they put on offer.

Any standard contractual term limiting the availability of purchased content to the account duration also has to be
assessed in light of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. This directive prohibits the use by
companies of standard contractual terms, which cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to
the detriment of consumer.

Whilst it is the primary competence of national authorities and courts to ensure the correct enforcement of these
Directives, in light of all relevant circumstances,the Commission is working with national enforcement authorities to
ensure more effective cooperation in cases where several EU Member States are affected by unfair practices of a trader.
In particular, it is giving specific attention to the digital market in line with the priorities identified in the European
Consumer Agenda adopted in May 2012.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 275

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002751/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Presenza di fitofarmaci nell'olio di oliva esportato negli USA

Da diversi anni oramai gli esportatori italiani di olio extravergine di oliva nazionale ravvisano notevoli difficoltà nella
commercializzazione verso gli Stati Uniti (quale paese importatore) a causa della presenza nel prodotto di residui di
Clorpirifos Etile, un pesticida il cui utilizzo è autorizzato in Italia e in Europa sulla coltura olivicola (regolamento (CE)
n. 149/2008). Negli Stati Uniti l'impiego del fitofarmaco menzionato, adoperato per contrastare gli attacchi della
«mosca olearia», benché ammesso e autorizzato su diverse colture, in forza del Code of Federal Regulation non può
essere utilizzato nelle produzioni olivicole. Sicché l'olio UE importato dagli USA viene sottoposto a procedure di
verifica da parte del FDA preordinate ad accertare l'assenza del fitofarmaco in questione nel prodotto: nella ipotesi in
cui tale accertamento abbia esito negativo, sono avviate procedure di allerta in tutto il territorio nazionale.

Attualmente più dell’80 % degli olii extravergine prodotti in Italia e venduti negli Stati Uniti d'America sono bloccati
nei container presso i porti di New York e Seattle per un totale di 98 container.

È questo il risultato di un recente controllo che la dogana america ha predisposto su campioni nei vari container, dove
si sono riscontrati valori pari allo 0.015-0.020 ppm, su olio extravergine di oliva, che significa una presenza minima
di questo principio attivo, mentre ai produttori americani è consentito una presenza massima di Clorpirifos Etile di
0.100 ppm.

Tutto ciò premesso e considerato che l'Unione consente la presenza di questo insetticida pari a 0.250 ppm su tutte le
colture agricole, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. per quale motivo fino ad oggi non si è trovato un accordo bilaterale con gli Stati Uniti per tale sostanza, e se
intende aprire al più presto un negoziato con la FDA americana, eventualmente attraverso un'apposita istanza
da sottoporre all'EPA (Registration Division) che ha il potere di decidere di modificare il Code of Federal
Regulation (in particolare il cap. 40 che concerne la protezione ambientale) con riferimento al Clorpirifos in
agricoltura e nei cibi;

2. quali ulteriori iniziative intende assumere al fine di garantire un libero scambio tra le due parti ed evitare che
misure sanitarie e fitosanitarie come quelle descritte possano trasformarsi in vere e proprie barriere
internazionali all'esportazione di prodotti UE (ad esempio, tramite il riconoscimento dell'equivalenza di
determinate norme in regola con gli standard internazionali come previsto dal Codex Alimentarius nell'ambito
del WTO e dell'accordo Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement sottoscritto nel 2008)?

**Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione**

_(22 maggio 2013)_

La Commissione è stata informata di recente del problema in cui si imbattono gli esportatori italiani di olio d'oliva
extravergine verso gli Stati Uniti nel caso in cui l'olio contenga residui del pesticida clorpirifos etile. Sebbene tale
sostanza sia ampiamente utilizzata negli USA e sebbene si sia stabilito un limite massimo di residui per altri prodotti,
l'uso di clorpirifos etile negli alimenti attualmente non è autorizzato dalle autorità statunitensi e pertanto non è stato
definito nessun limite massimo di residui per l'olio di oliva.

Di conseguenza, qualsiasi traccia della sostanza nell'olio di oliva importato negli USA porta al rifiuto della partita. La
Commissione è a stretto contatto con le autorità competenti italiane e sosterrà un'eventuale richiesta di approvazione
della sostanza nell'olio di oliva o un'eventuale petizione alle autorità statunitensi per la definizione di una tolleranza
all'importazione.

C 6 E / 276 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002751/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Presence of pesticide residues in olive oil exported to the USA

For several years now, Italian exporters of national extra virgin olive oil have been having considerable difficulty in
selling their product to the United States (as the importing country) due to the presence of residues of Chlorpyrifosethyl, a pesticide whose use is authorised in Italy and Europe in olive cultivation (Regulation (EC) No 149/2008).

This pesticide, which is used to counter the attacks of the olive fly, is accepted and authorised in the United States for
use on various crops, but under the Code of Federal Regulation it cannot be used for olive oil production.
Accordingly, all EU oil imported by the US is subject to prior checks by the FDA to ascertain that there are no traces of
the pesticide in question in the product; where the results of the tests are negative, alert procedures are activated
throughout the United States.

At present, over 80% of the extra virgin olive oil produced in Italy and sold in the United States remains blocked in 98
containers at the ports of New York and Seattle.

This is the result of recent checks that the US customs carried out on samples in different containers, where values
equal to 0.015-0.020 ppm were found in extra virgin olive oil; this means that the presence of this active substance
was minimal, when US producers are allowed a maximum Chlorpyrifos-ethyl level of 0.100 ppm.

Given the above, and since the EU allows this insecticide to be present in amounts equal to 0.250 ppm in all
agricultural crops, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Why has a bilateral agreement with the United States in relation to that substance not yet been reached? Will
the Commission start negotiations with the FDA as soon as possible, if necessary through a special application
to be submitted to the EPA (Registration Division), which has the power to decide whether to amend the Code
of Federal Regulation (in particular Chapter 40 concerning environmental protection) with reference to
Chlorpyrifos in agriculture and food?

2. What further action does it intend to take in order to ensure free trade between the two parties and prevent
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, such as those described, from becoming real international barriers to the
export of EU products (for example, through recognition of the equivalence of certain standards that comply
with international standards, as required by the WTO's Codex Alimentarius and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement signed in 2008)?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

The Commission has been recently informed of the problem faced by Italian exporters of extra virgin olive oil to the
United States (US) in cases where the oil contains residues of the pesticide chlorpyrifos-ethyl. Although this substance
is widely used in the US and a maximum residue limit has been established for other products, the use of chlorpyrifosethyl in olive cultivation is currently not authorised by the US authorities and therefore no maximum residue limit
has been established for olive oil.

As a result, any trace of the substance in olive oil being imported into the US leads to the refusal of the shipment. The
Commission is in close contact with the Italian competent authorities and will support any submission for the
approval of the substance in olive oil or any petition for the establishment of an import tolerance to the US
authorities.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 277

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-002752/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE) és Járóka Lívia (PPE)**

_(2013. március 8.)_

_Tárgy:_ A nemek közötti bérkülönbségekről

Az Európai Unióról szóló szerződés 157. cikke kimondja: minden tagállamnak biztosítani kell annak az elvnek az
alkalmazását, hogy a férfiak és a nők egyenlő vagy egyenlő értékű munkáért egyenlő díjazást kapjanak. Az Európai
Unióban a nők azonban átlagosan 17 százalékkal keresnek kevesebbet a férfiaknál – derül ki a Workania kutatásából.
Az előző évekhez hasonlóan a legnagyobb differencia a 35–44 éves munkavállalóknál van, valamint a diplomások és
a magasabb pozíciók esetében. A 45–54 éveseknél 25 százalék, a 35–44 évesek között pedig 26 százalék a differencia
a két nem fizetése között. A legkisebb, 11 százalékos lemaradás a 24 év alatti, jórészt pályakezdő nőknél van, 34 éves
kor alatt pedig átlagosan 18 százalék a különbség. A diploma sem feltétlenül garancia az egyenlőségre: főiskolai
végzettséggel ugyanis a gyengébbik nem képviselői 25 százalékkal, egyetemi diplomával pedig átlagosan 23
százalékkal alacsonyabb fizetésre számíthatnak.

Nagyobbak az eltérések a pozíciószintek szerinti összehasonlításnál: míg a felső vezető nők átlagosan negyedével
kevesebbet kapnak, mint a férfiak, addig a segédmunkásoknál csupán 5 százalék a különbség. A középvezetők
esetében és a szolgáltatási szférán belül 16 százalék, az irodai dolgozóknál 10 százalék a különbség.

1. Nem gondolja-e azt a Bizottság, hogy a negatív trendek megfordításához szükség lenne egy átfogó uniós
szabályozásra a béreket illetően?

2. Milyen módszereket javasolna a Bizottság a nemek közti bérolló megszüntetésére uniós szinten?

**Viviane Reding válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. május 16.)_

1. Az EUMSZ és a 2006/54/EK irányelv ( [1] ) rögzíti az egyenlő díjazás elvét. A Bizottság a következő évekre szóló
egyik célkitűzése keretében figyelemmel kíséri a fenti irányelv egyenlő díjazásra vonatkozó rendelkezéseinek
megfelelő alkalmazását és érvényre juttatását, valamint támogatni fogja a tagállamokat és más érdekelt feleket a
meglévő szabályok helyes alkalmazásában és érvényesítésében.

2. A nők és férfiak közötti egyenlőségről szóló stratégia (2010–2015) prioritásai közé tartozik a nemek közötti
bérszakadék leküzdése. A figyelemfelkeltő tevékenységek nagyon fontosak a kérdés napirenden tartásában. 2013.
február 28-án a Bizottság harmadik alkalommal megrendezte az egyenlő díjazás európai napját ( [2] ) és kiadott egy új
brosúrát ( [3] ). A Bizottság nemek közötti egyenlőséggel foglalkozó honlapja ( [4] ) információkkal és példákkal szemlélteti
a nemek közötti bérszakadék leküzdésére irányuló nemzeti szintű fellépéseket.

2012-ben a Bizottság útjára indította az „egyenlőség kifizetődő” elnevezésű kezdeményezést, amely célja, hogy
segítse felhívni a vállalatok figyelmét a nemek közötti bérszakadékra. A kezdeményezés keretében rendezett képzési
tevékenységek és kidolgozott eszközök révén kívánják felhívni a vállalatok figyelmét a nemek közötti egyenlőség és
az egyenlő fizetés gazdasági előnyeire. Ezen túlmenően 2013. március 21-én Brüsszelben tapasztalatcserére
lehetőséget nyújtó platformként üzleti fórumot ( [5] ) tartottak a vállalkozások számára.

A nemek közötti egyenlőség egyben az Európa 2020 stratégia egyik fontos prioritása. A Bizottság az európai
szemeszter során országspecifikus ajánlásokat ( [6] ) intéz a tagállamokhoz a nemek közötti bérszakadékot kiváltó
okokhoz ( [7] ) kapcsolódóan.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )
⋅7∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács 2006. július 5-i 2006/54/EK irányelve a férfiak és nők közötti esélyegyenlőség és egyenlő bánásmód elvének a

foglalkoztatás és munkavégzés területén történő megvalósításáról (átdolgozott szöveg), HL L 204., 2006.7.26., 23–36. o.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-165_hu.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-pay-gap/index_hu.htm
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/equality-pays-off/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_hu.htm
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Többek között a hozzáférhető és megfizethető gyermekgondozási lehetőségek hiánya, illetve az adókedvezmény-rendszereknek a második kereső

munkavállalása ellen ható hiányosságai.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

C 6 E / 278 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002752/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE) and Lívia Járóka (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Pay discrepancies between men and women

Article 157 of the Treaty on European Union states that each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal
pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied. However, a study by Workania
shows that in the EU, women earn on average 17% less than men. As in previous years, the biggest differences are
among employees aged between 35 and 44 and among graduates and holders of higher positions. The difference is
25% for the 45-54 age group and 26% for the 35-44 age group. The smallest discrepancy — 11% — can be found
among women under 24, most of whom are at the beginning of their careers. In the case of women under 34 the
difference is 18%. Nor does a higher education qualification guarantee equal pay: members of the weaker sex who
have finished college can expect to be paid 25% less, whilst the figure for those with a university degree is 23%.

The differences are greater among holders of higher positions: whilst women in top managerial posts are paid on
average 25% less than their male counterparts, this figure drops to 5% in the case of unskilled workers. In the case of
middle managers and in the service sector it is 16% and for office workers 10%.

1. Does the Commission not think that comprehensive EU legislation on pay is needed in order to reverse these
negative trends?

2. What methods would the Commission propose to eliminate the gender pay gap at EU level?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2013)_

1. The principle of equal pay is enshrined in the TFEU and is incorporated in Directive 2006/54/EC ( [1] ). One of the
Commission's priorities for the coming years will be to monitor the correct application and enforcement of the equal
pay provisions of this directive and to support Member States and other stakeholders with the proper enforcement
and application of the existing rules.

2. Tackling the gender pay gap is one of the priorities in the strategy for equality between women and men 20102015. Awareness-raising activities are very important to keep the issue high in the agenda. On 28 February 2013 the
Commission held the third European Equal Pay Day ( [2] ) and presented a new brochure ( [3] ). The Commission's gender
equality website ( [4] ) provides information and examples of actions at national level to tackle the gender pay gap.

In 2012, the Commission started an initiative to help raising awareness in companies about the gender pay gap,
‘Equality Pays Off’. It is doing so through the organisation of training activities and preparation of tools for companies
to raise awareness on the ‘business case’. Moreover, a business forum, a platform of knowledge exchange for
companies, was organised in Brussels on 21 March ( [5] ).

Gender equality is an important priority in the Europe 2020 strategy. During the course of the European Semester the
Commission is addressing country specific recommendations ( [6] ) to Member States on issues relating to some of the
root causes associated with the gender pay gap ( [7] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )
⋅7∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal

opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast); OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23-36.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-165_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-pay-gap/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/equality-pays-off/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Such as lack of available and affordable childcare or disincentives for second earners stemming from inefficiently designed tax-benefit systems.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 279

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002753/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Toine Manders (ALDE)**

_(8 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Verstoring van de interne markt

In sommige EU-landen zoals Nederland worden vormen van schonere autotechnieken fiscaal gunstiger behandeld
dan andere nieuwe technieken die ook leiden tot minder CO 2 uitstoot. Dat komt omdat Nederland in haar fiscale
beleid alleen kijkt naar de CO 2 uitstoot bij het verbruik.

Het gevolg in Nederland is dat vooral hybride en semi-elektrische auto's met een 0 % bijtelling worden gestimuleerd
en andere schone, nieuwe technieken als groengas worden verdrongen. Feitelijk worden bepaalde technieken
gestimuleerd en ontstaat er te weinig marktwerking voor het terugdringen van de CO 2 uitstoot. De Nederlandse vorm
van stimulering past ook niet binnen de kaders van de duurzame energierichtlijn (2009/28/EG).

1. Deelt de Commissie bovenstaande analyse?

2. Kan de Commissie een inventarisatie maken van alle verschillende fiscale stimuleringregelingen van
autotechnieken en brandstoffen in de verschillende lidstaten maken om te bezien hoe groot dit probleem is?

3. Is Commissie voornemens om deze vorm van marktverstoring aan te pakken? Zo nee, waarom niet?

**Antwoord van de heer Tajani namens de Commissie**

_(30 april 2013)_

Het onlangs gepubliceerde werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie „Guidelines on financial incentives for
clean and energy efficient vehicles” ( [1] ) bevat aanbevelingen voor door de lidstaten uit te voeren maatregelen aan de
vraagzijde. Zo wordt een evenredigheid van de stimuleringsmaatregelen aanbevolen, waarbij de lidstaten ertoe
worden aangemoedigd hun drempelwaarden zodanig te definiëren dat geen al te verschillende financiële
ondersteuning wordt gegeven voor voertuigen met soortgelijke milieuprestaties.

De bij de typegoedkeuringstest gemeten CO 2 -emissies vormen een geschikte en aanbevolen referentie om de
drempelwaarden voor financiële stimuleringsmaatregelen vast te stellen.

Bovendien wordt aanbevolen om financiële stimuleringsmaatregelen technisch neutraal te houden zodat zij
verschillende aandrijftechnologieën en een grote diversiteit aan alternatieve brandstoffen bestrijken.

Er bestaat geen algemene verplichting dat de lidstaten de Commissie op de hoogte brengen van al hun verschillende
fiscale stimuleringsregelingen voor autotechnologieën en ‐brandstoffen. Daarom is de Commissie niet in staat een
inventaris van die maatregelen op te stellen.

Met de publicatie van de richtsnoeren beoogt de Commissie de lidstaten een referentiekader te bieden voor de
uitvoering van nationale maatregelen aan de vraagzijde. Daartoe worden in het document de beste praktijken
vastgesteld en worden de lidstaten aangemoedigd om hun activiteiten te coördineren zodat onnodige verstoringen
van de interne markt worden vermeden.

Voorts stelde de Commissie een herziening van de energiebelastingrichtlijn ( [2] ) voor om ervoor te zorgen dat alle als
motorbrandstof gebruikte energieproducten eerlijk fiscaal belast worden door het belastingniveau afhankelijk te
maken van hun energie-inhoud en CO 2 ‐gehalte.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 27 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 169 definitief.

C 6 E / 280 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002753/13**

**to the Commission**
**Toine Manders (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Distortion of the internal market

In some EU countries like the Netherlands forms of cleaner automotive technology receive more favourable fiscal
treatment than other new technologies which also produce lower CO 2 emissions. This is because Dutch fiscal policy
only considers consumption-based CO 2 emissions.

In the Netherlands this results in mainly hybrid and semi-electric cars with 0% aggregation being promoted while
other clean, new technologies like green gas are sidelined. The fact is that certain technologies are promoted and
market forces are too ineffective in pushing back CO 2 emissions. What is more, the Dutch form of promotion does
not fall within the framework of the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC).

1. Does the Commission share the aforementioned analysis?

2. Can the Commission make an inventory of all the different fiscal incentive schemes for automotive technologies
and fuels in the different Member States in order to see the extent of this problem?

3. Does the Commission intend to tackle this form of market distortion? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The recently published Staff Working Document ‘Guidelines on financial incentives for clean and energy efficient
vehicles’ ( [1] ) lays down recommendations for demand-side measures implemented by Member States. One of the
recommendations refers to proportionality of the incentives, thus encouraging Member States to apply thresholds in
such a way that the difference in terms of financial support between vehicles with a similar environmental
performance is not excessive.

The CO 2 value measured during the type-approval test is a valid and recommended reference for establishing
thresholds for financial incentives.

In addition, it is recommended for financial incentives to be technically neutral, thus covering a range of powertrain
technologies and a wide portfolio of alternative fuels.

As there is no general obligation for Member States to inform the Commission about all their different fiscal incentive
schemes for automotive technologies and fuels, the Commission is not in a position to make an inventory of these

measures.

With the publication of the Guidelines the Commission intends to provide a reference for Member States when
implementing national demand-side measures. To this end, the document identifies best practices and encourages
Member States to coordinate their activities in order to avoid unnecessary distortions of the internal market.

Furthermore the Commission proposed a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive ( [2] ) which aims at providing a fair
tax treatment to all energy products used as motor fuel by setting taxation levels on the basis of their energy and CO 2

content.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2013) 27 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 169 final.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 281

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002754/13**

**do Komisji**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(8 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Stawka podatku VAT na e-booki

W lutym Komisja Europejska zapowiedziała skierowanie do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości spraw przeciwko Francji
i Luksemburgowi za zastosowanie obniżonych stawek VAT na książki elektroniczne (e-booki). Komisja
poinformowała jednocześnie, że kwestia opodatkowania e-booków będzie rozwiązywana w ramach prac nad
zmianami obowiązujących obecnie stawek VAT.

Kwestia tego podatku jest szeroko komentowana i problematyczna także dla innych państw członkowskich, w tym
Polski.

Zwracam się zatem do Komisji z prośbą o informację, na jakim etapie aktualnie znajdują się prace nad zapowiedzianą
rewizją przepisów podatkowych?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji**

_(18 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

8 października 2012 r. Komisja rozpoczęła publiczną konsultację w sprawie przeglądu istniejących przepisów
dotyczących obniżonych stawek podatku VAT ( [1] ). Celem tej konsultacji było zebranie uwag odpowiednich
zainteresowanych stron na temat trzech głównych zasad przeglądu określonych w komunikacie w sprawie
przyszłości podatku VAT ( [2] ). Zasada równego traktowania towarów i usług tego samego rodzaju jest szczególnie
istotna w rozwiązywaniu problemu konwergencji środowiska internetowego i fizycznego.

Wspomniana konsultacja jest częścią ogólnego procesu oceny zainicjowanego w 2012 r. i trwającego w dalszym
ciągu. Będzie ona uwzględniona podczas przygotowywania nowego wniosku w sprawie stawek podatku VAT. Jednak
Komisja nie podjęła jeszcze żadnych decyzji w sprawie polityki dotyczącej przyszłego zakresu stosowania
obniżonych stawek VAT.

Do tego czasu należy stosować obowiązujące przepisy dotyczące podatku VAT. Komisja postanowiła wnieść skargę
przeciwko Francji i Luksemburgowi do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w związku ze stosowaniem
obniżonych stawek VAT na książki elektroniczne (e-booki), gdyż jest to niezgodne z obowiązującym prawem UE.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/article_4209_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 851 final z 6.12.2011 – Komunikat Komisji w sprawie przyszłości podatku VAT – W stronę prostszego, solidniejszego

i wydajniejszego systemu podatku VAT dostosowanego do jednolitego rynku.

C 6 E / 282 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002754/13**

**to the Commission**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VAT rate on e-books

In February 2013, the Commission announced that cases against France and Luxembourg regarding the application
of reduced VAT rates for e‐books would be referred to the European Court of Justice. The Commission also pointed
out that the issue of the taxation of e‐books would be addressed as part of the revision of current VAT rates.

This controversial tax has also been the cause of much debate in other Member States, including Poland.

In this connection, can the Commission say what stage has been reached in work on the announced revision of tax
provisions?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

On 8 October 2012 the Commission launched a public consultation on the review of existing legislation on reduced
VAT rates ( [1] ). The aim was to gather feedback from relevant stakeholders as regards the three guiding principles for
the review which are set out in the communication on the future of VAT ( [2] ). The principle of equal treatment of
similar goods and services is particularly relevant in addressing the challenge of convergence between the online and
physical environment.

This consultation is part of the overall assessment process launched in 2012 which is still ongoing. It will feed into the
preparation of a new proposal on VAT rates. The Commission has however not yet taken any policy decisions on the
future scope of the reduced VAT rates.

Meanwhile, the current VAT legislation needs to be respected. The application of VAT reduced rates on e-books is not
in line with existing EC law, therefore the Commission has decided to refer France and Luxembourg to the Court of
Justice of the European Union for applying a reduced rate of VAT to e-books.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/2012_vat_rates_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 851 final of 6.12.2011 — Communication on the future of VAT Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored

to the single market.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 283

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002755/13**

**до Комисията**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Гъвкавост и сигурност на пазара на труда (flexicurity)

Като се има предвид, че концепцията „flexicurity“ е ключов елемент в Европейската стратегия за заетост и че
интегрираната политика на баланс между гъвкавост и сигурност съответно е ключов фактор за модернизацията на
трудовите пазари и за постигане на целите по заетостта, предвидени в стратегията „Европа 2020“, считате ли, че:

1. Въвеждането на почасова заетост в държавите членки дава своите резултати в условията на икономическа криза
и спомага за намаляване нивата на безработица, най-вече сред младите хора в ЕС?

2. „Flexicurity“ ще се превърне в инструмент за устойчив, приобщаващ и интелигентен растеж в контекста на
„Европа 2020“?

3. Разполагате ли с добри примери в тази насока и ако да, бихте ли ги посочили във Вашия отговор?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Андор от името на Комисията**

_(3 май 2013 г.)_

В Пакет за заетостта, разработен от Комисията, тя изразява становището, че осигуряването на плавен преход между
различни работни места е ключов аспект на балансираните и ефективни реформи на пазара на труда ( [1] ). Както е
предвидено в стратегията „Европа 2020“, комбинацията от гъвкавост и подходящи мерки за сигурност ще допринесе за
това европейските пазари на труда да станат по-динамични и устойчиви по отношение на процесите на икономическо

адаптиране.

Заетостта при непълно работно време допринася в значителна степен за създаването на работни места в периода на
криза, когато местата на пълно работно време намаляват ( [2] ). Този вид заетост улеснява участието на пазара на труда,
особено за жените и младите хора. При все това чрез добра правна уредба следва да се гарантира, че работниците
приемат работата на непълно работно време доброволно и че им се предоставя подходяща степен на социална закрила.

В по-общ план разработването на гъвкави режими на работа представлява ключова стъпка в посока на модернизиране
на пазара на труда ( [3] ). Сумираното изчисляване на работното време и режимите на работа при непълно работно време в
Германия или договорите с механизъм за солидарност в Италия представляват изключителни примери за това как
европейските предприятия се справят с кризата, като същевременно подобряват устойчивостта на пазара на труда ( [4] ).
Постигането на договореност между социалните партньори даде възможност за съчетаване на предимствата на поголямата вътрешна гъвкавост за предприятията със запазването на работните места. Комисията насърчава понататъшните усилия за прилагане на подобни стратегии за уредба на работното време.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Към възстановяване и създаване на работни места“, COM (2012) 173 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Съвместен доклад за заетостта за 2012 г.“, COM(2012) 750 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Годишен обзор на растежа 2013 г.“, COM (2012) 750 final.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Работен документ на службите на Комисията (2012 г.), „Отворени, динамични и приобщаващи пазари на труда“, SWD(2012) 97 final.

C 6 E / 284 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002755/13**

**to the Commission**
**Monika Panayotova (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Labour market flexibility and security (flexicurity)

Given that the concept of flexicurity is a key element in the European employment strategy and that the integrated
policy of balancing flexibility with security is thus a crucial factor in labour market modernisation and the
achievement of the Europe 2020 employment targets:

1. Does the Commission consider that the development of part-time employment in the Member States is proving
useful against the background of economic crisis and that it will help to reduce levels of unemployment,
particularly among young people in the Union; and

2. Does it believe that flexicurity will become a tool for sustainable, integrated and smart growth in the context of
the Europe 2020 strategy?

3. Are there good examples of developments along these lines and, if so, could the Commission please refer to
them in its answer?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

In its Employment Package, the Commission considers that securing labour market transitions is a key aspect of
balanced and effective labour market reforms ( [1] ). In the perspective of the EU2020 strategy, the combination of
flexibility with appropriate security arrangements will contribute to making European labour markets more dynamic
and resilient to the processes of economic adjustment.

Part-time employment has accounted for a significant share of the job growth during the crisis facing the contraction
of full-time positions ( [2] ). It favours labour market participation, notably of women and young people. However, good
regulation should ensure the voluntarily take-up of part-time work and adequate level of social protection for
workers.

Overall, developing flexible working arrangements constitutes a key step for labour market modernisation ( [3] ).
Working time accounts and short-time work arrangements in Germany or solidarity contracts in Italy represent
outstanding examples of how European companies have weathered the crisis while at the same time improving the
resilience of the labour market ( [4] ). Social partners' agreement allowed to combining the advantages of more internal
flexibility for firms with the protection of workers' jobs. The Commission encourages the further pursuit of such
strategies of work time management.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Commission (2012) ‘Towards a Job rich Recovery’, COM(2012) 173 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) European Commission (2012) ‘Joint Employment Report 2012’, COM(2012) 750 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) European Commission (2012), ‘Annual Growth Survey 2013’, COM(2012) 750 final.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Commission Staff Working Document (2012), ‘Open, dynamic and inclusive labour markets’, SWD(2012) 97 final.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 285

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002756/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)**

_(8 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διατροφικό σκάνδαλο

Μετά την αποκάλυψη του πρόσφατου σκανδάλου του εντοπισμού αλογίσιου κρέατος σε συσκευασμένα προϊόντα, έρχεται
στην επιφάνεια νέο σκάνδαλο για ύπαρξη βακτηρίων σε τάρτες σοκολάτας που πωλούνταν από γνωστό σουηδικό όμιλο.

Με βάση την δήλωση εκπροσώπου του ομίλου, το επίπεδο συγκέντρωσης αυτών των βακτηρίων δεν δημιουργεί σοβαρό
πρόβλημα για τη δημόσια υγεία. Ωστόσο, κάτι τέτοιο δεν δικαιολογεί τέτοια περιστατικά και αναδεικνύει το πρόβλημα
περιορισμένου ή ελλειμματικού έλεγχου από τις υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες κάποιων κρατών μελών καθώς επίσης και το γεγονός
ότι υπάρχει πρόβλημα στην αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού τροφίμων.

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

Ποια η έκβαση της έρευνας μέχρι τώρα;

Ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει;

Προτίθεται να διασφαλίσει τον αποτελεσματικότερο έλεγχο από τις υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες των κρατών μελών, και κατά
πόσον πρόκειται να επιβληθούν κυρώσεις για παραλείψεις των απαραίτητων ελέγχων στα τρόφιμα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(9 Απριλίου 2013)_

Την ευθύνη για την επιβολή της νομοθεσίας περί τροφικής αλυσίδας φέρουν τα κράτη μέλη ( [1] ), τα οποία υποχρεούνται να
καθιερώσουν σύστημα επίσημων ελέγχων, ώστε να εξακριβώνουν τη συμμόρφωση των εταιρειών με τα προβλεπόμενα και να
επιβάλλουν κυρώσεις σε περιπτώσεις μη συμμόρφωσης. Όσον αφορά τις κυρώσεις, η νομοθεσία περί τροφικής αλυσίδας
απαιτεί να είναι αποτελεσματικές, ανάλογες της παράβασης και αποτρεπτικές, όμως το είδος και το ύψος τους επαφίεται στη
διακριτική ευχέρεια των κρατών μελών.

Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί τακτικά τη συνέπεια των κρατών μελών ως προς τη διενέργεια ελέγχων, πραγματοποιώντας μεταξύ
άλλων και επιτόπιους ελέγχους. Ως θεματοφύλακας των συνθηκών, η Επιτροπή θα λάβει τα κατάλληλα μέτρα όταν
αντιληφθεί ότι κάποιο κράτος μέλος συστηματικά αποτυγχάνει να επιβάλλει τις διατάξεις της ΕΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένων
διαδικασιών επί παραβάσει, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 121 ΣΛΕΕ.

Μέχρι στιγμής, δεν συντρέχει λόγος να αμφισβητείται η αποτελεσματικότητα των ελέγχων που έχουν καθιερώσει τα κράτη
μέλη. Ωστόσο, η επικείμενη πρόταση περί επίσημων ελέγχων θα έχει ως στόχο την περεταίρω ενίσχυση του υφιστάμενου
συστήματος, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των κυρώσεων.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 882/2004 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 29ης Απριλίου 2004, για τη διενέργεια επισήμων ελέγχων της

συμμόρφωσης προς τη νομοθεσία περί ζωοτροφών και τροφίμων και προς τους κανόνες για την υγεία και την καλή διαβίωση των ζώων, ΕΕ L 165 της
30.4.2004, σ. 1.

C 6 E / 286 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002756/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Food scandal

The scandal of horsemeat in prepared meals which broke recently has now been succeeded by news of another
scandal involving bacteria in chocolate cakes sold by a well-known Swedish group.

According to a statement given by the group’s spokesman, the level of concentration of the bacteria does not
represent a serious problem to public health. However, that is no excuse for such occurrences and it highlights the
problem of limited or unsatisfactory controls by public health services in certain Member States and the fact that there
is a problem in the food supply chain.

Will the Commission therefore say:

What is the outcome of the investigation so far?

What measures does it intend to take?

Does it intend to take measures to ensure that public health services in the Member States carry out more effective
controls and does it intend to impose sanctions when the necessary food controls fall short?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 April 2013)_

The responsibility for enforcing food chain legislation lies with Member States ( [1] ), which are required to establish a
system of official controls to verify compliance by operators with requirements deriving therefrom and sanction noncompliances. As regards sanctions, food chain legislation requires that they should be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive but leaves Member States discretion as to their type and level.

The Commission regularly monitors delivery by the Member States of their control duties, including through on-thespot audits. As the guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will take appropriate measures when it becomes aware
of a failure by a Member State to systematically enforce EU provisions, including the launching of infringement
procedures in accordance with Article 258 TFEU.

So far, there is no reason to believe that the official controls systems established in Member States are ineffective.
Notwithstanding this, the forthcoming proposal on official controls will aim at further strengthening the existing
system, including as regards sanctions.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the
verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 287

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002757/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)**

_(8 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Πιθανότητα κουρέματος των καταθέσεων και αύξηση εταιρικού φόρου στην Κύπρο

Δηλώσεις, που είδαν το φως της δημοσιότητας μετά την συνάντηση του Eurogroup, άφησαν ανοικτό το θέμα του
κουρέματος των καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες αλλά και της αύξησης του εταιρικού φόρου, ενδεχόμενα που, μόνο με
την αναφορά τους, ταράζουν την οικονομική σταθερότητα της Κύπρου.

Για ποιο λόγο πιστεύει η Επιτροπή πως δεν έχουν συζητηθεί παρόμοια ενδεχόμενα σε χώρες που έγιναν δέκτες βοήθειας από
τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης όπως για παράδειγμα την Ιρλανδία, η οποία όπως και η Κύπρος έχει χαμηλό εταιρικό
φόρο και το χρέος της ήταν επίσης τραπεζικό;

Η περίπτωση κουρέματος καταθέσεων δεν έχει συζητηθεί για κανένα άλλο κράτος μέλος. Αντιλαμβάνεται η Επιτροπή πως σε
μια τέτοια περίπτωση θα προκαλούσε χρηματοπιστωτικό πανικό, όχι μόνο στην Κύπρο αλλά και σε άλλες χώρες της
Ευρωζώνης;

Πού πιστεύει η Επιτροπή πως στηρίζεται αυτή η διαφορετική αντιμετώπιση;

Πώς σχολιάζει η Επιτροπή την εκροή δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ από τις καταθέσεις των κυπριακών τραπεζών από την αρχή
του 2013 λόγω της συζήτησης περί κουρέματος των καταθέσεων;

Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει για να προστατευτεί το χρηματοοικονομικό σύστημα της Κύπρου αλλά και της Ευρωζώνης;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Κύπρος αποτελεί ειδική περίπτωση λόγω του μεγέθους του τραπεζικού της τομέα (7 έως 8 φορές το ΑΕΠ), σε συνδυασμό
με τη δομή του, το επίπεδο των αναλαμβανόμενων κινδύνων και την ανεπαρκή εποπτεία. Τα μέτρα είναι προσαρμοσμένα στην
πολύ ιδιαίτερη περίπτωση της Κύπρου και έχουν ως στόχο την αποκατάσταση της βιωσιμότητας ενός μικρότερου τραπεζικού
τομέα εξασφαλίζοντας συγχρόνως την προστασία όλων των καταθέσεων κάτω των 100 000 ευρώ σύμφωνα με τους κανόνες
της ΕΕ.

C 6 E / 288 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002757/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Possible haircut on deposits and increase in corporation tax in Cyprus

Statements published in the wake of the Eurogroup meeting left open the question of a haircut on deposits in Cypriot
banks and an increase in corporation tax, the mere mention of which has undermined financial stability in Cyprus.

Why, in the Commission’s view, were similar moves not discussed in countries in receipt of assistance from the
European Stability Mechanism, such as Ireland which, like Cyprus, has low corporation tax and also had a banking
debt?

The possibility of a haircut on deposits was not discussed for any other Member State. Does the Commission realise
that this would cause financial panic, not only in Cyprus, but also in other countries in the euro area?

What, in the Commission’s view, is the cause of this differentiated approach?

What comments does the Commission have to make on the flight of billions of euros from deposits in Cypriot banks
since early 2013, as a result of the debate about a haircut on deposits?

What measures does it intend to take in order to protect the financial system in both Cyprus and the euro area?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

Cyprus is a unique case because of the size of its banking sector (7 to 8 times GDP), combined with its structure, level
of risk-taking and suboptimal supervision. So measures are tailor-made to the very exceptional situation in Cyprus in
order to restore the viability of a smaller banking sector while, at the same time, protecting all deposits below
EUR 100 000 in accordance with EU rules.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 289

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002758/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Compatibilità tra ETS e WTO: nuove evidenze per valutare la perdita di competitività del settore

Già nel 2011 in seno alla Commissione si evidenziava una forte divergenza di posizioni in merito alla proposta sulla
direttiva sull'efficienza energetica. In particolare, sin da allora si rilevava come il rischio maggiore fosse un
«drammatico declino nei prezzi della CO 2 ». Come a dire che invece di investire in efficienza energetica è meglio avere
un prezzo della CO 2 molto alto per finanziare gli onerosissimi investimenti in nuova produzione energetica,
rinnovabili e non solo. Basti pensare che ora si sta anche valutando di finanziare scorte di riserva poiché le rinnovabili
non possono garantire una produzione costante 24h/24.

Da sempre l'entusiasmo per i dazi sulle emissioni solleva dubbi sulla legittimità nell’ambito delle regole del
commercio internazionale. Il principio del libero scambio sancisce che i paesi dovrebbero produrre beni e servizi sulla
base dei loro vantaggi comparati. Imporre aggravi sulle emissioni per svalutare le industrie, i prodotti e i servizi ad alta
intensità di carbonio è un anatema a questo principio, perché distrugge ogni vantaggio comparato. In coerenza con i
principi del libero scambio, Pascal Lamy, Direttore generale del WTO, aveva infatti fatto notare che «il WTO consente
ai membri una certa flessibilità nell'adottare politiche frontaliere di aggiustamento per livellare i costi connessi ai
controlli sulle emissioni di carbonio, fin tanto che non distorcono o impediscono il commercio; ma come strumento
di policy le tariffe doganali sulle emissioni di carbonio sono progettate deliberatamente per distorcere gli scambi».
Imporre dazi sulle emissioni aumenta, di fatto, la tensione tra il «carbon pricing» e la capacità di ogni paese di sfruttare
il proprio vantaggio comparato, costringendo a svalutare industrie, prodotti e servizi ad alta intensità di emissioni.

Tali misure violerebbero il GATT, in particolare gli articoli I e III, nonché la clausola di nazione più favorita,
richiedendo ai paesi di offrire ai membri del WTO lo stesso trattamento riservato alla nazione con le condizioni
migliori. È evidente che la violazione di tale principio, in quanto si impone una barriera commerciale ad alcuni paesi
membri del WTO, ma non ad altri. Anche a voler ricorrere all'escamotage dell'esenzione secondo l'art. XX(g) del
GATT, rimarrebbe la necessità di soddisfare i test prescritti nella conclusione, ovvero che «non venga applicato in
modo tale da costituire uno strumento di discriminazione arbitraria o ingiustificabile tra paesi dove prevalgono le
stesse condizioni, o una restrizione camuffata del commercio internazionale».

Ritiene la Commissione di dover fornire nuove evidenze di certezza dell'attuale sistema ETS rispetto alla conformità
dei principi WTO e rispetto alla perdita di competitività dell'industria del settore?

**Risposta di Connie Hedegaard a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

Il pacchetto dell'UE su clima ed energia del 2008 ( [1] ) comprende la riduzione delle emissioni di gas serra, la quota di
energia rinnovabile e gli obiettivi di efficienza energetica. Le direttive collegate, presentate successivamente o
modificate dopo l'adozione del pacchetto, includono anche la riduzione di emissioni ai sensi della decisione di
condivisione degli sforzi ( [2] ), nell'ambito della quale rientrano molte delle misure di efficienza energetica. Il sistema EU
ETS copre il 45 % circa delle emissioni dell'UE. Se gli Stati membri intendono conseguire gli obiettivi in materia di
energia rinnovabile, dovranno effettuare ingenti investimenti per ammodernare le reti, costruire stazioni di
trasferimento e potenziare le capacità di stoccaggio.

La Commissione ha valutato le possibilità offerte dalle misure di adeguamento alle frontiere per il carbonio, che
restano uno strumento utilizzabile, ma ritiene che attualmente non vadano attuate in via unilaterale. La Commissione
ha scelto l'assegnazione gratuita, integrata dalle norme in materia di rilocalizzazione delle emissioni di carbonio, che
stabilisce una quota più elevata di assegnazione gratuita ( [3] ) ai settori ritenuti esposti a un grave rischio di
rilocalizzazioni delle emissioni di carbonio. Esistono inoltre quote notevoli di crediti internazionali che possono
essere utilizzati a fini di restituzione. La Commissione ritiene pertanto che le misure di salvaguardia in vigore
proteggano adeguatamente la competitività dell'industria europea.

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st17215.en08.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF.

C 6 E / 290 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

La compatibilità delle misure di adeguamento alle frontiere per il carbonio con l'Organizzazione mondiale del
commercio (OMC) è al centro di un dibattito di lunga data. L'opinione prevalente è che la valutazione finale dovrebbe
dipendere dalla struttura giuridica dettagliata delle misure di adeguamento per il carbonio. La complessità della
discussione accademica sulla frammentazione della legislazione internazionale, come per esempio le differenze fra i
regimi dell'OMC e della convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici (UNFCCC), illustra la
possibilità di interpretazioni diverse del quadro giuridico. L'attuale sistema ETS è pienamente conforme ai principi
dell'OMC.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 291

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002758/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Compatibility between the EU ETS and WTO: new evidence for assessing loss of sectoral competitiveness

There was already a clear divergence in 2011 among the positions prevailing within the Commission regarding the
proposal for a directive on energy efficiency. Since then, it has been claimed that the greatest risk is a ‘sharp fall in the
price of CO2.’ In other words, instead of investing in energy efficiency, it would be better to have a very high CO2
price so as to provide funding for the huge investments in new energy production, renewable and otherwise. The fact
that discussions are ongoing to fund stockpiling, given that renewables cannot guarantee constant round-the-clock
production, springs to mind.

Despite enthusiasm for carbon tariffs, doubts remain about their legitimacy under the rules of international trade. The
principle of free trade states that countries should produce goods and services on the basis of their comparative
advantages. Placing tariffs on emissions to devalue carbon-intensive industries, products and services is an anathema
to this principle, because it destroys any comparative advantage. Consistent with the principles of free trade, WTO
Director-General, Pascal Lamy, has in fact pointed out that ‘the WTO allows members certain flexibilities to adopt
border adjustment policies to equalize costs related to carbon controls, as long as they do not distort or disrupt trade,
but as policy instruments carbon tariffs are deliberately designed to distort trade.’ Imposing carbon tariffs further
exacerbates the tension between carbon pricing and each country’s capacity to exploit their comparative advantage
by forcing the devaluation of their carbon-intensive industries, goods and services.

Such measures would violate the GATT, particularly Articles I and III, as well as the most-favoured-nation clause,
requiring countries to provide WTO members with the same treatment as the nation with the most favourable
treatment. It is clear that this principle is violated, given that it would impose a trade barrier on some WTO members,
but not on others. Even if one were to use sleight of hand, by invoking exemption under GATT Article XX(g), there
would still be a need to meet the requirements set out in the conclusion, namely that ‘such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’.

Does the Commission consider that it should come up with new clear-cut evidence that the current ETS system is
compliant with WTO principles as well as on the loss of sectoral competitiveness?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package ( [1] ) includes GHG emission reductions, share of renewable energy and
targets for energy efficiency. Related Directives subsequently introduced or amended after its adoption include also
emission reductions under the Effort Sharing Decision ( [2] ), under which many of the energy efficiency measures fall.
The EU ETS covers about 45% of the EU emissions. For the Member States to meet their renewable energy targets,
considerable investments will be necessary to upgrade grids, build transfer stations and storage capacities.

The Commission has investigated possibilities of the border carbon adjustments (BCA), which remain as a possible
tool, but considers that currently they should not be unilaterally implemented. The Commission has opted for free
allocation that is complemented by the rules on carbon leakage, which provide a higher share of free allocation ( [3] ) to
those sectors deemed exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage. Also there are considerable amounts of
international credits that can be used for surrendering purposes. The Commission therefore believes that the
safeguarding measures put in place adequately protect competitiveness of the European industry.

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st17215.en08.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF.

C 6 E / 292 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

The compatibility of border carbon adjustments with WTO law is subject to a long-standing debate and the prevailing
view is that the final assessment would depend on the detailed legal design of the scheme imposing BCAs. The
complexity of academic discussion about fragmentation of international law such as differences of the WTO and
UNFCCC regimes well illustrates potential different interpretations of the legal frameworks. The current ETS system is
fully compliant under the WTO regime.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 293

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002759/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Alimenti senza glutine: quali passi avanti

Attualmente le disposizioni sull'uso delle menzioni «senza glutine» e «con contenuto di glutine molto basso» sono
contenute nel regolamento (CE) n. 41/2009 relativo alla composizione e all'etichettatura dei prodotti alimentari adatti
alle persone intolleranti al glutine. Tuttavia la questione in diritto viene traslata dal menzionato regolamento al
regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 attraverso un atto delegato e un atto di esecuzione.

Nella stesura degli atti di cui al regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 si prevede che: «nella preparazione ed elaborazione
degli atti delegati, la Commissione dovrebbe provvedere alla contestuale, tempestiva e appropriata trasmissione dei
documenti pertinenti al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio». Alla luce delle disposizioni di cui alla Comunicazione

[COM(2009)0673 del 9.12.2009] e della risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 5.5.2010 sul potere di delega
legislativa, può la Commissione far sapere se:

—
ritiene, a tale ultimo fine, di dover provvedere alla consultazione di esperti per la predisposizione di atti delegati
e di esecuzione;

—
può riferire se intende consultare esperti nazionali, la società civile, rappresentanti di gruppi d'interesse,
imprese, parti sociali, accademici o persino deputati o organi del Parlamento europeo?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 aprile 2013)_

Durante i recenti negoziati sulla proposta della Commissione in merito a un regolamento volto a rivedere il quadro
giuridico applicabile agli alimenti destinati a particolari usi nutrizionali ( [1] ), si è concordato che le regole per l'uso delle
indicazioni «senza glutine» e «con contenuto di glutine molto basso» andrebbero trasferite al regolamento (UE) n.
1169/2011 ( [2] ). A tal fine la Commissione dovrà modificare l'articolo 36, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (UE) n.
1169/2011 mediante un atto delegato, costituendo così la base legale necessaria per l'adozione di regole armonizzate
sulle indicazioni in questione e, quindi, un atto di esecuzione che definirà le regole in merito all'uso di tali indicazioni.

Come indicato al considerando 58 del regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011, durante i lavori preparatori degli atti delegati
la Commissione intende svolgere adeguate consultazioni, anche a livello di esperti. Il Parlamento europeo ed il
Consiglio verranno informati delle riunioni di gruppi di esperti e riceveranno in maniera contestuale, tempestiva e
appropriata tutti i documenti pertinenti.

Una volta adottato l'atto delegato di cui sopra, la preparazione e l'adozione del pertinente atto di esecuzione saranno
soggette alla procedura di esame prevista all'articolo 48, paragrafo 2, dello stesso regolamento. Il Parlamento europeo
verrà informato per il tramite del Registro comitatologia delle riunioni del comitato pertinente composto di
rappresentanti degli Stati membri, e dei documenti pertinenti.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo agli alimenti destinati ai lattanti e ai bambini e agli alimenti destinati a

fini medici speciali, COM(2011)353 def., 2011/0156(COD).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2011, relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli

alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la
direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva
2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004
della Commissione, GU L 304 del 22.11.2011, pag. 18.

( **|**

C 6 E / 294 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002759/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Gluten-free foods: what progress is being made?

Currently, provisions governing use of the terms ‘gluten-free’ or ‘very low gluten’ are included in Regulation (EC)
No 41/2009 concerning the composition and labelling of foodstuffs suitable for people intolerant to gluten.
However, in law, the issue is being passed from the aforementioned Regulation to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 by
means of a delegated act and an implementing act.

With regard to drafting the acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, the following is laid down: ‘the
Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure simultaneous, timely and appropriate
transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council’. Given the provisions of
Communication COM(2009)0673 of 9 December 2009 and of the European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010
on the power of legislative delegation, can the Commission state:

—
whether, with the latter aim in mind, it believes that it should consult experts when preparing delegated and
implementing acts;

—
whether it intends to consult national experts, civil society, representatives of interest groups, businesses, social
partners, academics or even European Parliament Members or bodies?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

During recent negotiations on the Commission's proposal for a regulation to revise the legislative framework
applicable to foods for particular nutritional uses ( [1] ), it was agreed that the rules on the use of the statements ‘glutenfree’ and ‘very low gluten’ should be transferred under Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ( [2] ). To this purpose, the
Commission will have to amend Article 36(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 by way of a delegated act, thus
providing the necessary legal basis for the adoption of harmonised rules on the statements at issue and, subsequently,
an implementing act that will set out the rules on the use of these statements.

As indicated in recital (58) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, the Commission intends to carry out appropriate
consultations during its preparatory work on delegated acts, including at expert level. The European Parliament and
the Council will be informed of any expert group meetings and will receive all relevant documents in a simultaneous,
timely and appropriate manner.

Once the delegated act mentioned above is adopted, the preparation and adoption of the relevant implementing act
will be subject to the examination procedure foreseen in Article 48(2) of the same Regulation. The European
Parliament will be informed through the Comitology Register of any meetings of the relevant committee, composed
of representatives of Member States, and relevant documents.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on food intended for infants and young children and on food for special

medical purposes, COM(2011) 353 final, 2011/0156 (COD).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to

consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304,
22.11.2011, p. 18.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 295

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002760/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Mercato nero di corpi umani: quali controlli sulla certificazione di parti del corpo umano provenienti da
Paesi terzi?

In tutto il mondo è diffusa un'ampia rete internazionale di prodotti medici e dentistici che quotidianamente vengono
impiantati nei corpi di migliaia di persone. Resta alta la preoccupazione, nella comunità medica, per quelli che
possono essere i rischi d'infezione, e contagi di epatite e Hiv, nei casi in cui al momento dell'espianto non siano
seguite le procedure e le prassi sancite da norme europee, come la direttiva 2010/53/UE.

Una recente inchiesta giornalistica condotta, in undici Paesi, da un gruppo di giornalisti afferenti all'International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (IciJ), ha rilevato che non ci sono controlli sufficienti per verificare che le parti
del corpo umano siano raccolte in modo etico e legale. In particolare, negli ultimi anni, si è diffuso il commercio di
tessuti umani, poiché la pratica del trapianto di pelle è ormai consolidata e di semplice esecuzione. È stato riscontrato
che in Paesi come l'Ucraina, prossima all'entrata nell'Unione europea, esiste un sistema commerciale che tratta ed
espianta parti di corpo umano dai cadaveri, senza previo consenso delle famiglie direttamente coinvolte. Anche in
Slovacchia si esportano parti di cadaveri umani verso la Germania, sede di multinazionali che certificano ed esportano
tali parti umane verso altri Paesi, soprattutto in America.

Considerato che: — la direttiva 2005/36/CE stabilisce che il reperimento di un organo (previa sua caratterizzazione)
vada effettuato presso centri specializzati e sotto la supervisione di un medico e che debba essere un atto volontario e
non remunerato, sono a chiedere alla Commissione se:

—
sia consapevole della presenza di questa rete di commercio attiva sul territorio europeo;

—
sia a conoscenza che la pratica dell'espianto avviene in Paesi non ancora membri dell'UE, senza il consenso dei
familiari, tanto che la stessa polizia locale sta indagando sulla legittimità di questa pratica, e che la seguente
certificazione avviene in uno Stato membro;

—
intenda intraprendere un'indagine specifica per verificare che le aziende seguano meticolosamente le direttive
europee, poiché si sta parlando pur sempre della vita delle persone che riceveranno un trapianto, nonché della
sofferenza di coloro che affrontano la perdita di un loro caro e non sono a conoscenza dell'espianto già
effettuato.

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 aprile 2013)_

La Commissione condivide le preoccupazioni dell’onorevole parlamentare sulle notizie diffuse recentemente dalla
stampa che hanno portato alla luce casi che danno adito a sospetti di attività illegali e fraudolente connesse al
commercio di cellule e tessuti umani. La Commissione è a conoscenza del fatto che nel settore in esame sono attivi
anche alcuni operatori commerciali o privati oltre alle banche pubbliche dei tessuti che operano in molti Stati
membri. La Commissione è altresì a conoscenza degli elementi che lasciano supporre che le disposizioni riguardo al
consenso alla donazione non sono state rispettate per alcuni tessuti e cellule prelevati nei paesi terzi e
successivamente importati nell’UE.

Le disposizioni di base riguardo alla qualità e alla sicurezza dei tessuti e delle cellule destinati all'applicazione
sull’uomo, comprese quelle attinenti al consenso alla donazione, sono contenute nella direttiva 2004/23/CE ( [1] ) e nella
relativa normativa di attuazione, ossia nelle direttive 2006/17/CE ( [2] ) e 2006/86/CE ( [3] ). Queste disposizioni si
applicano alle banche dei tessuti pubbliche, private e commerciali. L'articolo 9, paragrafo 1, della direttiva
2004/23/CE dispone che i tessuti e le cellule importati nell’Unione europea da paesi terzi devono essere conformi alle
norme di qualità e sicurezza secondo quanto stabilito nella suddetta direttiva.

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 102 del 7.4.2004, pag. 48.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) GU L 38 del 9.2.2006, pag. 40.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) GU L 294 del 25.10.06, pag. 32.

C 6 E / 296 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

All’interno di ciascuno Stato membro le autorità nazionali o regionali competenti in tema di tessuti e cellule sono
responsabili dell’autorizzazione e del controllo di tutti gli istituti dei tessuti compresi quelli che importano tessuti e
cellule da paesi terzi. A seguito dei sospetti sollevati nei recenti comunicati stampa la Commissione è stata informata
in merito ad alcune ispezioni effettuate nel quadro di un’indagine sulle pratiche oggetto della denuncia. Da quanto
risulta alla Commissione l’inchiesta è tuttora in corso e le conclusioni non sono ancora state rese note.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 297

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002760/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Black market in human bodies: what controls are there on the certification of human body parts coming from
third countries?

Across the world, there is a vast international network of medical and dental products that are implanted into the
bodies of thousands of people every day. There is still great concern among the medical community about the
possible risks of infection and the spread of hepatitis and HIV in cases where — at the time of removal of the body
part concerned — the procedures and practices sanctioned by European legislation, such as Directive 2010/53/EU,
are not followed.

A recent press investigation, carried out in eleven countries by a group of journalists belonging to the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), revealed that there are insufficient controls for verifying that body parts
have been collected legally and ethically. In particular, the trade in human tissue has grown over the last few years,
since skin grafts are now commonplace and easy to perform. It was found that in countries such as Ukraine, which
will shortly be joining the EU, there is a commercial network that handles and removes body parts from corpses,
without the prior consent of the families directly affected. In Slovakia too, human body parts are exported to
Germany, where multinational companies certify those parts and export them to other countries, especially America.

Directive 2005/36/EC stipulates that the procurement of an organ (after characterisation) must be carried out in
specialised centres and under the supervision of a doctor, and that the donation must be voluntary and unpaid.

Can the Commission answer the following:

—
Is it aware of the existence of this commercial network operating in Europe?

—
Is it aware that the body parts are being removed in countries that are not yet members of the EU, without the
consent of relatives, to such an extent that local police forces are investigating the legality of this practice, and
that the subsequent certification is taking place in a Member State?

—
Does it intend to carry out a specific investigation to check that the companies involved are complying
scrupulously with the European directives? What is at stake here is quite simply the lives of transplant
recipients, as well as the suffering of those who have to face the loss of a loved one and are unaware that a body
part has already been removed.

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

The Commission shares the Honourable Member's concern on the recent press reports which brought to light
suspected cases of illegal and fraudulent activities related to the tissues and cells sector. The Commission is aware that
in the tissue and cells sector, in addition to the public tissue banks that operate in many Member States, commercial
or private operators are also active in the sector. The Commission is also aware of the allegations that have been made
suggesting that the requirements for donor consent were not met for certain tissues and cells procured in third
countries and subsequently imported into the EU.

The minimum requirements for quality and safety of tissue and cells intended for human application, including
requirements related to donor consent, are set out in Directive 2004/23/EC ( [1] ) and its implementing legislation,
Directives 2006/17/EC ( [2] ) and 2006/86/EC ( [3] ). These requirements apply on public as well as on private or
commercial tissue banks. Article 9(1) of Directive 2004/23/EC states that tissue and cells imported into the EU from
third countries shall meet standards of quality and safety equivalent to the ones laid down in this directive.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 102/48,7.4.2004 .
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 38/40, 9.2.2006 .
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 294/32, 25.10.2006.

C 6 E / 298 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Within each Member State the tissue and cells national or regional competent authorities are responsible for the
authorisation and inspection of all tissue establishments including those importing tissues and cells from third
countries. Following the suspicions raised in the recent press reports, the Commission has been made aware of
inspections that have taken place in the framework of an investigation into these alleged practices. As far as the
Commission is aware this investigation is ongoing and its findings have not yet been finalised.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 299

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002761/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Nuovi possibili standard e modelli di gestione per i musei europei

Con il decreto legge 22 giugno 2012, n. 83 il governo italiano ha deciso di rinnovare la forma giuridica della
pinacoteca di Brera. In occasione dell'ampliamento degli spazi e del riordino della sede espositiva, ha colto l'occasione
per dare un nuovo assetto al museo, trasformandolo in una fondazione di partecipazione. Tale modello non
rappresenta una novità, essendo già stato applicato in altre situazioni. La sua prima adozione risale al 2004, quando la
veste giuridica del museo delle antichità egizie è cambiata da museo statale a fondazione pubblico-privata. La gestione
dei musei italiani avviene sia in forma diretta, attraverso le strutture interne alla pubblica amministrazione, sia in
forma indiretta, mediante un soggetto «terzo». A livello locale vi è stata maggiore innovazione, con il ricorso a
strumenti come l'istituzione, l'azienda speciale, le associazioni, le fondazioni o le società di capitali. A livello statale si
sono avute le esperienze dei poli museali e delle fondazioni di partecipazione. Nell'affidamento della gestione tuttavia
vi sono criticità nei rapporti tra i soggetti interessati ameno sotto quattro aspetti: il rapporto fra il proprietario del
bene e l'ente gestore; il rapporto fra il soggetto preposto alla tutela e l'ente gestore; le fonti di finanziamento; la
gestione del personale.

In particolare è evidente come una gestione diretta dei siti statali sia gravata da numerosi disincentivi verso un
management virtuoso. Paradossale appare soprattutto l'assenza di autonomia finanziaria: se i ricavi dei biglietti non
rimangono all'istituzione, che incentivi si avranno ad aumentare il numero di visitatori? La mancata autonomia è
disincentivante anche nella ricerca di contributi propri attraverso le attività di fund raising o di affitto di sale per
eventi.

Considerato che: i musei sono una delle grandi risorse culturali dell'Europa; nel rispetto del principio di sussidiarietà il
settore è oggetto di una cooperazione tra Stati membri e Commissione;

chiedo alla Commissione:

—
è possibile elaborare linee guida davvero innovative per la gestione del patrimonio culturale volte alla
realizzazione di sistemi integrati di gestione?

—
quali nuovi spunti stanno emergendo a livello europeo dalla progressiva armonizzazione delle politiche
gestionali dei musei?

**Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

Conformemente all'articolo 167 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea gli interventi dell'Unione nel
campo della cultura si limitano a incoraggiare la cooperazione tra gli Stati membri e, se necessario, ad appoggiare e ad
integrare le azioni di questi ultimi, tra l'altro per quanto concerne la conservazione e salvaguardia del patrimonio
culturale di importanza europea.

La cooperazione con gli Stati membri nel campo della cultura si configura nel «metodo di coordinamento aperto»
(MCA). Essa è volontaria e mira a migliorare il processo decisionale grazie allo scambio delle migliori pratiche.

Le materie per le attività del MCA sono definite nel «Piano di lavoro per la cultura» 2011-2014 ( [1] ) che è stato adottato
dagli Stati membri. Nell'elenco delle materie da trattare è compreso il patrimonio culturale, ma non vi rientrano
tematiche specifiche d'ordine gestionale. Qualsiasi tentativo di armonizzare i sistemi di gestione dei musei
costituirebbe in ogni caso una violazione del trattato e del principio di sussidiarietà.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU C 325 del 2.12.2010.

C 6 E / 300 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002761/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Possible new governance standards and models for European museums

With Decree-Law No 83 of 22 June 2012, the Italian Government decided to update the legal status of the Pinacoteca
di Brera art gallery. The government took advantage of the extension of the site and the reorganisation of the
exhibition area to give the museum a new structure, transforming it into a participatory foundation. This model is not
new, insofar as it has already been applied in other situations. Its first adoption dates back to 2004, when the legal
status of the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities was changed from a public museum to a public/private foundation.
Italian museums are governed both directly, through internal public administration structures, and indirectly,
through third parties. At local level there has been greater innovation, with the use of models such as institutions,
special agencies, associations, foundations or joint-stock companies. At national level there have been experiments
with _‘poli museali_ ’ (groups of museums) and participatory foundations. When deciding on the form of governance,
however, there are some problematic issues in terms of the relations between the interested parties with regard to at
least four aspects: the relationship between the owner of the asset and the governing body; the relationship between
the person appointed to safeguard the asset and the governing body; the sources of funding; and the management of
staff.

In particular, it is clear that direct governance of state-owned sites is affected by many disincentives to good
management. Above all, the lack of financial autonomy seems irrational: if the income from ticket sales is not kept by
the institution, what incentives are there to increase the number of visitors? This lack of autonomy is also a
disincentive to seeking contributions through fund-raising activities or the letting of spaces for events.

Museums are one of Europe’s great cultural resources. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the sector is
now the subject of cooperation between Member States and the Commission.

Can the Commission answer the following:

—
Is it possible to draw up truly innovative guidelines for the governance of our cultural heritage that are geared
towards the creation of integrated governance systems?

—
What new ideas are emerging at European level from the progressive harmonisation of museum governance
policies?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

According to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, actions by the Union in the field of
culture are limited to encouraging cooperation among Member States and, if necessary, supporting and
implementing their actions, _inter alia_, in view of the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European
significance.

The cooperation with Member States in the field of Culture takes the form of ‘the Open Method of Coordination’
(OMC). It is voluntary and aims at improving policy-making by exchanging best practices.

[Topics for OMC work are defined by the ‘Work Plan for Culture’ 2011-2014 (](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:325:0001:0009:EN:PDF) [1] ) which was adopted by the Member
States. While cultural heritage is included in the list of topics, the specific issue of governance is not. Any attempt to
harmonise museum governance systems would in any case be in breach of the of the Treaty and subsidiarity principle.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ C 325, 2.12.2010.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 301

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002763/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Tracce radioattive nella carne di alcuni cinghiali

Premesso che nella carne di alcuni cinghiali catturati in Valsesia (Italia-Piemonte) è stata accertata la presenza di
consistenti tracce di «Cesio 137», pericolosissime in caso di consumo della carne da parte dell'uomo,

la Commissione non intende accertare se tale situazione sia da collegarsi ancora agli eventi di Chernobyl o, piuttosto,
da mettersi in collegamento con l'eventuale fuoriuscita di fumi radioattivi delle centrali atomiche transalpine
consideratane la vicinanza geografica con il Piemonte?

**Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione**

_(26 aprile 2013)_

Il 21 marzo 2013 una comunicazione ( _news notifìcation_ 13-693) è stata distribuita mediante il sistema di allarme
rapido per gli alimenti e i mangimi (RASFF) relativa al rilevamento di un livello di radioattività troppo elevato nei
cinghiali provenienti dall'Italia. I controlli sono stati effettuati su campioni prelevati nell'ambito di un'indagine sulla
trichinellosi, una malattia parassitaria che colpisce prevalentemente suini e cinghiali. Nella comunicazione si segnala
inoltre che all'inizio del marzo 2013 il ministro italiano della Sanità ha organizzato un incontro di coordinamento
urgente con tutte le autorità competenti al fine di discutere il problema.

La Commissione è del parere che tali conclusioni non siano collegate a perdite di effluenti radioattivi provenienti da
centrali nucleari transalpine.

Tuttavia, alla luce dell'esperienza acquisita dopo l'incidente di Chernobyl, la Commissione è consapevole del fatto che,
in alcune regioni degli Stati membri che sono state colpite da livelli elevati di ricadute radioattive a seguito
dell'incidente di Chernobyl, non è da attendersi una diminuzione significativa nella contaminazione da cesio
radioattivo in alcuni prodotti selvatici provenienti da ambienti naturali e seminaturali nel corso dei prossimi decenni.
In effetti è noto che, per questi prodotti, la contaminazione da cesio radioattivo dipende principalmente dal periodo
fisico di semitrasformazione di questo radionuclide, pari a circa 30 anni. Secondo l'atlante relativo ai livelli di cesio in
Europa dopo l'incidente di Chernobyl ( [1] ), il Piemonte settentrionale (Italia) fa parte delle regioni interessate e pertanto
un elevato livello di cesio 137 potrebbe, ad esempio, essere trovato nelle carni di cinghiale.

Al fine di sensibilizzare la popolazione di queste regioni in merito alla persistente contaminazione di alcuni prodotti
selvatici, la Commissione ha adottato, il 14 aprile 2003, una raccomandazione agli Stati membri sulla protezione e
l'informazione del pubblico ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Atlas of caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl Accident, ISBN 92-828-3140-X, Ufficio delle pubblicazioni ufficiali delle Comunità

europee 1998.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Raccomandazione 2003/274/Euratom della Commissione, del 14 aprile 2003, sulla protezione e l'informazione del pubblico per quanto riguarda

l'esposizione risultante dalla continua contaminazione radioattiva da cesio di taluni prodotti di raccolta spontanei a seguito dell'incidente
verificatosi nella centrale nucleare di Chernobyl (GU L 99 del 17.04.2003, pag. 55). In base a tale raccomandazione, tutti gli Stati membri
interessati devono prendere le disposizioni idonee per garantire che i livelli massimi in termini di cesio-134 e cesio-137 di cui all'articolo 3 del
regolamento (CEE) n. 737/90 (attualmente il regolamento (CE) n. 733/2008) siano rispettati nell'Unione in particolare per l'immissione sul
mercato della selvaggina. Inoltre, gli Stati membri devono informare la popolazione dei rischi sanitari connessi, nelle regioni in cui esiste un
rischio potenziale che tali prodotti superino i livelli massimi consentiti e devono anche informare la Commissione e informarsi reciprocamente
circa i casi registrati dei prodotti in questione immessi sul mercato dell'Unione che eccedano i livelli massimi mediante il sistema unionale di
allarme rapido di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 178/2002, e i provvedimenti presi in risposta alla suddetta raccomandazione.

( **|**

C 6 E / 302 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002763/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Radioactive traces in the meat of some wild boar

Given that high levels of caesium-137 have been found in the meat of some wild boar caught in Valsesia (Piedmont,
Italy), levels which would be extremely dangerous in the event that this meat was eaten by humans,

does the Commission intend to establish whether this situation can still be linked to the Chernobyl incident or rather,
whether it can be linked to the possible emission of radioactive fumes from transalpine nuclear power plants, given
their proximity to Piedmont?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

On 21 March 2013, a news notification 13-693 was distributed in the Rapid Alert System for Feed and Food (RASFF)
regarding the findings of too high level of radioactivity in wild boar from Italy. The controls were done on samples
taken as part of a trichinellosis survey, a parasitic disease predominantly affecting pigs and wild boars. The message
further mentions that the Italian Minister for Health has called for an urgent coordination meeting in early
March 2013 with all competent authorities to address the problem.

The Commission is of the opinion that these findings are not linked to releases of radioactive effluents from
transalpine nuclear power plants.

However, in the light of the experience gained since the Chernobyl accident, the Commission is aware that, in some
regions of the Member States that were affected by high levels of fallout following the Chernobyl accident, no
significant decrease in contamination by radioactive caesium of certain wild products coming from natural and semi
natural environments is to be expected over the next few decades. Indeed, it is recognised that for these products, the
radioactive caesium contamination depends mainly on the physical half-life of this radionuclide which is
approximately 30 years. According to the Atlas of Caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident ( [1] ), the
north Piedmont (Italy) is part of the regions concerned and therefore high level of caesium 137 could, for example, be
found in meat of wild boar.

With a view to raising awareness amongst the population of these regions regarding the persistent contamination of
certain wild products, the Commission adopted, on 14 April 2003, a recommendation to the Member States on the
protection and information of the public ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Atlas of caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident, ISBN 92-828-3140-X, Office for Official Publications of the European

Communities, 1998.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Recommendation No 2003/274/Euratom on the protection and information of the public with regard to exposure resulting from

the continued radioactive caesium contamination of certain wild food products as a consequence of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power
station (OJ L 99, 17.4.2003, p. 55). According to this recommendation, all Member States concerned should take appropriate steps to ensure that
the maximum permitted levels in terms of caesium-134 and caesium-137 referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 737/90 (now Regulation
(EEC) No 733/2008) are respected in the Community for the placing on the market of wild game in particular. In addition, Member States should
inform the population, in regions where there is a potential for such products to exceed the maximum permitted levels, of the health risk involved.
They should also inform the Commission and each other of recorded cases of such products placed on the Community market exceeding the
maximum permitted levels through the Community Rapid Alert System laid down in Regulation (EC) 178/2002, and the action taken in response
to this recommendation.

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 303

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002764/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Francesco De Angelis (S&D)**

_(8 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Costo dei servizi mobili nazionali rispetto all'Eurotariffa per i servizi in roaming

Considerato che il Regolamento (UE) n. 531/2012 pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale dell'Unione europea il
30 giugno 2012 ha fissato dei cap (retail e wholesale) alle tariffe delle comunicazioni voce, SMS e dati in roaming
all'interno dell'UE.

Tenuto conto che il costo della sola terminazione in alcuni Paesi europei, tra i quali l'Italia, ha un valore medio di circa
4 cent, e dunque pari al doppio del valore massimo stabilito dalla Commissione per il totale dei costi di gestione,
rendendo paradossalmente l'SMS wholesale più economico in un ambito di roaming rispetto ad un ambito nazionale.

Constatato che in Italia, nonostante numerosi MVNO abbiano chiesto alla NRA di intervenire sul mercato della
terminazione SMS in modo da favorire la concorrenza e garantire agli operatori virtuali di poter competere con le
offerte flat o bundle degli operatori di rete, la NRA italiana ha deciso di non intervenire lasciando che il mercato si
autoregoli. Tuttavia questa autoregolamentazione sta avvenendo a discapito dei consumatori e degli operatori
virtuali.

Come intende procedere la Commissione onde garantire il rispetto dei criteri di libera concorrenza, a vantaggio dei
consumatori e dei MVNO?

**Risposta di Neelie Kroes a nome della Commissione**

_(16 aprile 2013)_

Come giustamente osservato dall’onorevole parlamentare, i mercati (nazionali) dei servizi di terminazione SMS in
Italia non sono soggetti a regolamentazione nell’ambito del quadro normativo dell’UE. I prezzi della fornitura dei
rispettivi servizi sono stabiliti dagli operatori di telecomunicazioni in funzione della pressione concorrenziale
incontrata. A causa delle caratteristiche economiche dei servizi SMS (come l’esistenza di aggregatori
all’ingrosso/operatori di transito e la pressione concorrenziale da parte di altri servizi quali, ad esempio, la
messaggistica istantanea), la Commissione, nella sua raccomandazione sui mercati rilevanti del 2007 (2007/879/CE)
ha considerato che i mercati degli SMS solitamente non sono suscettibili di una regolamentazione ex ante. Nel caso in
cui circostanze nazionali giustifichino un intervento normativo, la piena competenza e responsabilità di imporre una
regolamentazione ex ante nei mercati di terminazione degli SMS spetta alle autorità nazionali di regolamentazione
(ANR), come l’AGCOM in Italia (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni). È interessante notare che, fino a poco
tempo fa, soltanto le ANR di Francia, Danimarca e Polonia avevano imposto una regolamentazione ex ante nei
mercati di terminazione SMS. Inoltre, in caso di abuso di posizione dominante, ad esempio in caso di fissazione di
prezzi eccessivi, le autorità garanti della concorrenza (in Italia l’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato,
AGCM) possono intervenire ai sensi della legislazione sulla concorrenza. Per dare un quadro completo si segnala che
la raccomandazione sui mercati rilevanti del 2007 summenzionata è attualmente in corso di revisione e che
l’adozione di una raccomandazione rivista è prevista per il secondo trimestre del 2014. A tal riguardo, la
Commissione sta esaminando attentamente il mercato di terminazione degli SMS.

C 6 E / 304 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002764/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francesco De Angelis (S&D)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cost of national mobile services compared with the Eurotariff for roaming services

Regulation (EU) No 531/2012, published in the _Official Journal of the European Union_ on 30 June 2012, set retail and
wholesale caps on tariffs for voice calls, SMS and data roaming within the EU.

The termination charge alone in some EU countries — including Italy — averages around EUR 0.04, which is double
the maximum established by the Commission for total management costs. Paradoxically, this makes wholesale SMS
roaming charges cheaper than national charges.

In Italy, despite the fact that numerous mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) have asked the national regulatory
authority (NRA) to take action on the SMS termination market to promote competition and ensure that virtual
operators can compete with network operators’ flat rates or bundle offers, the Italian NRA has decided not to step in,
leaving the market to regulate itself. However, this self-regulation is working to the detriment of consumers and
virtual operators.

What action does the Commission intend to take to ensure compliance with the principles of free competition, for
the benefit of consumers and MVNOs?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 April 2013)_

As the Honourable Member rightly points out the (national) markets for SMS termination services in Italy are not
subject to regulation under the EU Regulatory Framework. The prices for the provision of the respective services are
set by the telecommunication operators, subject to the prevailing competition constraints. Due to the economic
characteristics of SMS services (such as the existence of wholesale aggregators/transit operators and competitive
pressure stemming from other services like for example instant messaging) the Commission in its 2007
Recommendation on relevant markets (2007/87/EC) considered that the SMS markets are usually not susceptible to
_ex ante_ regulation. The National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), including AGCOMin Italy, retain, however, the full
competence and responsibility to impose _ex ante_ regulation on SMS termination markets, in case national
circumstances would justify regulatory intervention. It is worth noting that until recently only the NRAs in France,
Denmark and Poland imposed _ex ante_ regulation in SMS termination markets. Moreover, in case of an abuse of a
dominant position, for example by way of excessive pricing, the competition authorities (in Italy the Autorità Garante
della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM) could intervene on the basis of competition law. By way of background, the
abovementioned 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets is currently under review, and a revised
Recommendation is scheduled to be adopted by the second quarter of 2014. The market for SMS termination is being
duly considered by the Commission in this respect.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 305

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002775/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Capping

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma
redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.

—
Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou
seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de
Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de
afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros.

—
O limite máximo que cada Estado-Membro poderá receber da Política de Coesão é reduzido de 2,5 % para
2,35 % do PIB. Para os Estados-Membros que entraram antes de 2013 e cujo PIB per capita médio entre 2008 e
2010 foi inferior a -1 %, o nível máximo de transferência de verbas deve subir 10 %, atingindo os 2,59 %.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual a percentagem de verbas europeias face ao PIB que Portugal recebeu em 2007-2013?

2. Segundo as projeções elaboradas pela Comissão, será Portugal afetado por este limite máximo de dotação
financeira?

3. Qual o PIB per capita de Portugal entre 2008 e 2010?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002776/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Clarificação de verbas que Portugal receberá

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;

—
Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do
Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro
do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros),
perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos
do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;

—
Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai
beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas
Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de
10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias;

—
Portugal deverá receber assim 27,7 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 19,6 mil milhões de euros serão para a
Política de Coesão e 8,1 mil milhões de euros para a Política Agrícola Comum, e que 4,5 mil milhões de euros
são do Pilar I (Ajudas diretas aos agricultores) e 3,6 mil milhões de euros para o Pilar II (Desenvolvimento
Rural);

C 6 E / 306 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

—
O país sai ainda beneficiado por ter conseguido negociar dois envelopes específicos de apoio, um de mil
milhões de euros na Política de Coesão e outro de 500 milhões de euros no Desenvolvimento Rural, sendo que
este último não necessita de taxa de cofinanciamento até 2016, constituindo um apoio direto concedido ao
Estado-Membro.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Pode confirmar que Portugal irá realmente receber 27,7 mil milhões de euros?

2. Como se distribuem os 27,7 mil milhões de euros pelos vários fundos europeus de apoio(e.g.: FEDER, FSE,
Fundo de Coesão, Cooperação Territorial Europeia)?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002777/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Clarificação de verbas da Política de Coesão

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;

—
Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do
Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro
do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros),
perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos
do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;

—
Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai
beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas
Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de
10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias;

—
Portugal deverá receber assim 27,7 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 19,6 mil milhões de euros serão para a
Política de Coesão e 8,1 mil milhões de euros para a Política Agrícola Comum, e que 4,5 mil milhões de euros
são do Pilar I (Ajudas diretas aos agricultores) e 3,6 mil milhões de euros para o Pilar II (Desenvolvimento
Rural);

—
O país sai ainda beneficiado por ter conseguido negociar dois envelopes específicos de apoio, um de mil
milhões de euros na Política de Coesão e outro de 500 milhões de euros no Desenvolvimento Rural, sendo que
este último não necessita de taxa de cofinanciamento até 2016, constituindo um apoio direto concedido ao
Estado-Membro.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como se distribuem os 19,6 mil milhões de euros entre financiamento atribuído ao Estado-Membro e às
Regiões Portuguesas?

2. Qual o montante que será destinado a cada uma das Regiões Portuguesas, nomeadamenteao Norte, Centro,
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve, Madeira e Açores?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002778/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Cláusula de revisão

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 307

—
No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma
redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.

—
Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou
seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de
Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de
afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros;

—
Em 2016 serão revistos os valores da Política de Coesão para o período de 2017 a 2020. Serão utilizados os
valores do PIB per capita regional de 2014 e 2015 e o valor do PIB per capita a nível nacional de 2012. Só serão
realizados ajustamentos caso exista uma divergência de verbas superior ou inferior a 5 % e estes não poderão
ser superiores a 4 mil milhões de euros;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Não considera que esta cláusula de revisão, a realizar em 2016, poderá afetar os investimentos já planeados e
calendarizados pela globalidade das regiões europeias e dos Estados-Membros?

2. No caso de uma região perder verbas da Política de Coesão, mas já ter projetos cabimentados a médio / longo
prazo, como poderá financiar os investimentos em causa?

3. Está ciente das implicações que esta cláusula de revisão poderá gerar, nomeadamente ao nível da retração de
investimentos estratégicos importantes para a União Europeia?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002779/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Estimular o crescimento económico e geração de emprego

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
O documento reforça o que já tinha sido definido na anterior reunião de 22 e 23 de novembro, dado assumir
que o orçamento «deve atuar como catalisador do crescimento e do emprego em toda a Europa, servindo
nomeadamente como alavanca para os investimentos produtivos e os investimentos em capital humano. No
futuro, no âmbito do QFP 2014-2020, a despesa deverá ser mobilizada a favor do crescimento, do emprego, da
competitividade e da convergência, em estreita consonância com a Estratégia Europa 2020»;

—
O Conselho salienta ainda que: «Só haverá uma retoma do crescimento sustentável e do emprego se for seguida
uma abordagem coerente e assente numa base alargada, conjugando uma consolidação orçamental inteligente
que preserve o investimento no crescimento futuro com políticas macroeconómicas sólidas e uma estratégia
ativa em prol do emprego que preserve a coesão social».

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Na globalidade do orçamento definido no último Conselho Europeu, entende que existe a preocupação
manifestada pelos Estados-Membros de estimular o crescimento económico e a geração de emprego?

2. Quais as políticas europeias que considera prioritárias para alcançar esse desiderato estratégico?

C 6 E / 308 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002780/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Cooperação Territorial Europeia

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma
redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.

—
Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou
seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %;

—
O orçamento da Política de Coesão para 2014-2020 é assim de 325,2 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 8,9 mil
milhões de euros são destinados à Cooperação Territorial Europeia. Verifica-se uma redução de -24,7 % face à
proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;

—
À semelhança dos restantes projetos europeus, nomeadamente de investigação e inovação ou Mecanismo
Interligar a Europa, também a criação de redes territoriais foi drasticamente afetada;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os motivos subjacentes que levaram à redução drástica de 25 % nos projetos de Cooperação Territorial
Europeia?

2. Entende que a nova disposição orçamental irá colocar em causa os objetivos definidos pela Comissão Europeia
de estimular uma crescente cooperação entre regiões e países europeus?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002781/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Emprego Jovem 1

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
No sentido de combater o grave flagelo social verificado nas camadas mais jovens da população resultante do
elevado valor do desemprego jovem, o Presidente do Conselho, Herman Van Rompuy, propôs que fosse criada
uma Iniciativa de Emprego Jovem, com as seguintes características:

—
Estão orçamentados 6 mil milhões de euros, sendo a origem do financiamento como segue:

3 mil milhões de euros não é mais dinheiro atribuído aos Estados-Membros, mas sim uma pré‐afetação do
Fundo Social Europeu que cada Estado-Membro já iria receber. Na globalidade da UE, a verba é calculada de
acordo com o número global de desempregados nestas regiões europeias;

3 mil milhões de euros são uma nova rubrica financeira que ficará no âmbito do subcapítulo da Política de
Coesão (1b). Este valor será atribuído aos Estados-Membros e acrescentado ao valor do Fundo Social Europeu.

—
O orçamento destina-se a apoiar os seguintes programas europeus de juventude:

Garantia Jovem; Metodologia para Formação; Aliança para a Aprendizagem; Rede EURES;

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 309

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. A verba a afetar por cada Estado-Membro ao emprego jovem no âmbito do Fundo Social Europeu será
semelhante à verba atribuída pela Comissão Europeia na nova rubrica orçamental que foi agora definida?

2. Estas verbas serão atribuídas aos Estados-Membros e geridas por eles próprios ou irão permanecer no
orçamento europeu e serão geridas pela Comissão Europeia?

3. No caso de serem geridas pelos Estados-Membros, como sabe que irão implementar osprogramas que pretende
colocar em prática?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002782/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Emprego Jovem 2

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
No sentido de combater o grave flagelo social verificado nas camadas mais jovens da população resultante do
elevado valor do desemprego jovem, o Presidente do Conselho, Herman Van Rompuy, propôs que fosse criada
uma Iniciativa de Emprego Jovem, com as seguintes características:

—
Estão orçamentados 6 mil milhões de euros, sendo a origem do financiamento como segue:

3 mil milhões de euros não é mais dinheiro atribuído aos Estados-Membros, mas sim uma pré-afetação do
Fundo Social Europeu que cada Estado-Membro já iria receber. Na globalidade da UE, a verba é calculada de
acordo com o número global de desempregados nestas regiões europeias;

3 mil milhões de euros são uma nova rubrica financeira que ficará no âmbito do subcapítulo da Política de
Coesão (1b). Este valor será atribuído aos Estados-Membros e acrescentado ao valor do Fundo Social Europeu.

—
Serão elegíveis as Regiões europeias (NUTS 2) com nível de desemprego jovem superior a 25 %. As Regiões
elegíveis e o número de jovens desempregados serão obtidos com base nos valores estatísticos do Eurostat de final de
2012, que deverão ser publicados brevemente.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento do número de regiões europeias em que a taxa de desemprego jovem é superior a 25 %?
Quantas são e em que países estão localizadas?

2. Como se irão distribuir os 6 mil milhões de euros entre todas as regiões europeias com mais de 25 % de
desemprego jovem?

3. Será elaborado algum rácio que tenha em conta as regiões com menor taxa de desemprego jovem, conforme
sucede em Espanha ou na Grécia, ou apenas será tido em conta a globalidade das regiões afetadas?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002783/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Envelopes financeiros

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

C 6 E / 310 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

—
No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma
redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.

—
Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou
seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de
Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de
afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros que são repartidos da seguinte forma entre vários
Estados-Membros: Espanha: 1 824 milhões de euros, Hungria: 1 560 milhões de euros Grécia: 1 375 milhões
de euros, Itália: 1 500 milhões de euros, Portugal: 1 000 milhões de euros, República Checa: 900 milhões de
euros, Alemanha: 710 milhões de euros, França: 200 milhões de euros, Malta: 200 milhões de euros, Chipre:
150 milhões de euros, Bélgica: 133 milhões de euros, Irlanda: 100 milhões de euros, Eslovénia: 75 milhões de
euros, Ceuta e Melilla: 50 milhões de euros e Programa PEACE: 150 milhões de euros.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que a atribuição direta de envelopes financeiros aos Estados-Membros em detrimento de políticas
que beneficiem as regiões menos desenvolvidas irá prejudicar os objetivos definidos na Política de Coesão?

2. Quais os critérios que levaram a que alguns Estados-Membros recebessem envelopes financeiros superiores aos
vizinhos europeus?

3. Qual o destino estratégico que será dado a estes envelopes específicos adicionais, nomeadamente se visam
alcançar objetivos do FEDER, do FSE ou do Fundo de Coesão?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002784/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Equilibrio na redução orçamental

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do
orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de
euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a
competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de
-20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia.

—
À redução de 73 248 milhões de euros verificada nas rubricas orçamentais que estão consagradas dentro do
QFP, é necessário acrescentar a transferência de políticas de fora do QFP para dentro do QFP (e.g.: ITER, GMES,
Reserva para crises no setor agrícola) que levaram um corte de 9 293 milhões de euros. Devido ao facto de
agora estarem incluídas no QFP, quer dizer que os restantes projetos dos referidos capítulos (e.g.: subcapítulo
1a) — Competitividade para o crescimento e o emprego ou capitulo 2 — Crescimento Sustentável) terão uma
maior redução orçamental.

—
Ou seja, para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na
reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se
encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de
euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a
menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que existiu um equilíbrio entre as reduções orçamentais verificadas a nível interno e externo do
Quadro Financeiro Plurianual?

2. Quais os motivos que levaram a que 3 das políticas europeias tenham transitado para dentro do QFP,
nomeadamente os projetos ITER, GMES e Reserva Agrícola e outras não?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 311

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002785/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Em termos das rubricas orçamentais que constam fora do QFP, é importante ressalvar que 3 das políticas
europeias transitaram para dentro do QFP, nomeadamente os projetos ITER e GMES e a Reserva para crises no
setor agrícola, estando já contabilizadas estas perdas nos valores do próprio QFP.

—
Num momento em que muitas das empresas europeias estão a deslocalizar internamente a sua atividade
industrial ou a transferir os seus processos produtivos para países fora da UE, onde o custo de mão-de-obra é
mais baixo, era importante que a União Europeia apoiasse todos os trabalhadores que fossem despedidos
devido às consequências derivadas da globalização.

—
Sucede-se que o Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização, que começará também a apoiar as atividades
agrícolas, além das industriais, vê a sua dotação orçamental fortemente reduzida em 65 %, passando de um
valor inicial de 3 000 milhões de euros para 1 848 milhões de euros, dificultando assim a receção de fundos
europeus por parte dos trabalhadores que poderiam ter formação para se adequarem às novas necessidades do
mercado de trabalho.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Entende que o orçamento apresentado irá ser suficiente para acudir aos trabalhadores de centenas de empresas
que têm deslocalizado a sua atividade industrial?

2. Sendo o orçamento do Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização drasticamente inferior ao apresentado
inicialmente pela Comissão Europeia, considera ponderar a elegibilidade dos agricultores nesta política
europeia?

3. Como se poderá apoiar a entrada no mercado de trabalho de tantos trabalhadores que ficam desempregados
devido à globalização, quando o orçamento em causa para os próximos 7 anos é tão reduzido?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002786/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Cooperação Territorial Europeia — 150 km

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro se realizou o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;

—
No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma
redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %; comparando com a
proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja,
aproximadamente 4,15 %;

—
O orçamento da Política de Coesão para 2014-2020 é, assim, de 325,2 mil milhões de euros, sendo 8,9 mil
milhões de euros destinados à cooperação territorial europeia; verifica-se uma redução de 24,7 % face à
proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;

C 6 E / 312 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

—
As regiões a apoiar serão as regiões NUTS 3 situadas ao longo de todas as fronteiras terrestres internas e
externas, bem como todas as regiões de nível NUTS 3 da União situadas ao longo das fronteiras marítimas,
separadas por uma distância máxima de 150 quilómetros, sem prejuízo dos eventuais ajustamentos necessários
para assegurar a coerência e a continuidade das zonas abrangidas pelos programas de cooperação no período
de programação de 2007-2013; este facto consta inclusivamente das notas de conclusões, ao contrário do que
se tem verificado nas anteriores versões que têm circulado entre Estados-Membros e instituições;

—
Em janeiro deste ano, em conjunto com os colegas eurodeputados provenientes das Regiões Ultraperiféricas,
enderecei uma carta ao Presidente do Conselho a alertar para esta injustiça territorial;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento dos motivos que levaram a que o Conselho não considerasse as especificidades das Regiões
Ultraperiféricas no programa de Cooperação Territorial Europeia?

2. Quais as ações que entende desenvolver para repor alguma justiça na atribuição de verbas a estas regiões
europeias, face a outros países europeus que irão receber financiamento, mas que não pertencem à União
Europeia, como é o caso de Andorra, Suíça ou Noruega?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002787/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Política Agrícola Comum

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro se realizou o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;

—
Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do
orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de
euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a
competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de
-20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia;

—
O Eixo 2, denominado de Crescimento Sustentável, é reduzido em 13 293 milhões de euros, observando-se
uma redução orçamental de 3,44 % face à proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;

—
Sucede que este Eixo passa a incluir o financiamento de 2 800 milhões de euros (reserva para crise no setor
agrícola) que anteriormente estava consagrada fora do QFP;

—
No entanto, não se compreende em que sub-eixo do Eixo 2 este financiamento adicional será inscrito, não se
podendo, assim, entender a real diminuição orçamental de todos os sub-eixos em causa;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera apropriados os novos valores orçamentais da Política Agrícola Comum? Como se justifica que ela
continue a ser a principal política europeia, em detrimento de uma aposta crescente na investigação e inovação
ou na competitividade das PME?

2. Em qual dos sub-eixos do eixo 2 (Crescimento Sustentável) serão cabimentados os 2 800 milhões de euros
referentes à reserva agrícola?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 313

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002788/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Horizonte 2020

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação (Horizonte
2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de transportes,
energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).

—
A Política de Investigação e Inovação da UE (Horizonte 2020) é reduzida de 80 mil milhões de euros para 70
mil milhões de euros, uma redução de 12,5 %;

—
Ao inverso, os Estados Unidos da América e países em desenvolvimento, nomeadamente os BRIC, continuam a
investir elevados montantes nas áreas da investigação, desenvolvimento e inovação, entendendo que só assim
se podem tornar mais competitivos à escala global;

—
São aprofundadas as sinergias a criar entre o Horizonte 2020 e os fundos estruturais, por forma às regiões com
menor desempenho e menos desenvolvidas criarem polos de excelência.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais as áreas da Política de Investigação e Inovação do Horizonte 2020 que serão mais afetadas com a redução
orçamental definida pelo Conselho Europeu?

2. Considera que o orçamento acordado para esta área é suficiente para fazer face aos grandes desafios que a
Europa tem pela frente à escala global?

3. Quais as prioridades estratégicas e políticas para os próximos anos, tendo em vista que sem um orçamento
adequado é difícil apoiar de forma enfática as PME, Universidades, Centros Tecnológicos, Parques Industriais ou
Investigadores?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002789/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Negociações com o Parlamento Europeu

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados‐Membros na reunião do
Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro
do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros),
perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos
do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;

—
No sentido de se chegar a um acordo entre as instituições europeias e não atrasar a entrada em execução do
orçamento, assim como os diversos regulamentos e políticas que ainda deverão ser redigidos, entende-se que
deverá existir um processo negocial que conduza à aprovação de um orçamento europeu para o período 20142020;

—
No entanto, entende-se que é necessário implementar algumas medidas que melhorem o orçamento europeu e
que não prejudiquem as pessoas e as empresas;

C 6 E / 314 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu a implementar uma maior flexibilidade entre todos os
capítulos do orçamento e anualmente, por forma a que possa existir uma real transferência de verbas entre
políticas europeias e assim uma execução total dos pagamentos?

2. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu ao nível da revisão do orçamento europeu no final de 2016,
por forma a que não exista um orçamento de austeridade durante 7 anos?

3. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu com vista a aumentar os recursos próprios do orçamento
europeu, diminuindo assim as transferências dos Estados‐Membros, podendo estes investir o mesmo montante
em outras políticas nacionais que criem emprego e riqueza?

4. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu no intuito de reforçar os poderes do Parlamento na adoção
do próximo QFP 2021-2027, nomeadamente ao nível do processo legislativo.

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002790/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Orçamento atribuído a cada Estado-Membro

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados‐Membros na reunião do
Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro
do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros),
perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos
do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.

—
Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai
beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas
Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de
10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias.

—
Tendo em linha de conta a informação disponibilizada pela comunicação social, a globalidade dos EstadosMembros perde 13,1 % entre ambos os quadros financeiros, um valor superior em 3,6 pontos percentuais face
ao que Portugal irá perder.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o orçamento atribuído a cada Estado-Membro nas áreas da Política Agrícola Comum e da Política de
Coesão no período 2007-2013?

2. Quanto é que cada Estado-Membro irá receber nas áreas da Política Agrícola Comum e da Política de Coesão no
período 2014-2020?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002791/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Preconizar o crescimento

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 315

—
A UE não pode ter um orçamento de austeridade devido ao facto de ser o único motor de crescimento e criação
de emprego que irá existir na UE;

—
Os orçamentos de austeridade impostos aos Estados-Membros pela Troika, onde se inclui a Comissão Europeia
e o Banco Central Europeu, são apenas para os próximos 3 anos e não para 7 anos como é a duração do
orçamento da UE;

—
A UE não pode ter um orçamento restritivo para um período de 7 anos, dado que será impossível cumprir com
os objetivos e metas delineados na Estratégia «Europa 2020»;

—
No final das medidas de austeridade que os Estados-Membros estão a implementar, é necessário investir para
criar crescimento e emprego e nada melhor do que o orçamento europeu para contribuir para a geração de
riqueza;

—
Cerca de 94 % do orçamento europeu é destinado a projetos de investimento e criação de emprego e apenas
6 % são para financiar a máquina burocrática da UE;

—
A contribuição dos Estados-Membros para o orçamento europeu acaba por lhes ser devolvida sob a forma de
novos projetos de investimento que irão criar emprego e riqueza nas regiões europeias;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera viável que a Comissão tenha um orçamento de austeridade durante um período tão longo e com
objetivos definidos para a próxima década?

2. Como pretende alavancar o crescimento económico que tem vindo a preconizar nas várias intervenções
públicas dos Comissários Europeus por essa Europa fora?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002792/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Redução orçamental do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação (Horizonte
2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de transportes,
energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).

—
CEF: Orçamento global reduz de 50 mil milhões para 29,3 mil milhões de euros — a transferência do Fundo de
Coesão é mantida em 10 mil milhões de euros;

—
Transportes: reduz de 31,7 mil milhões de euros para 23,2 mil milhões de euros (já inclui transferência do
Fundo de Coesão no valor de 10 mil milhões de euros);

—
TIC: reduz de 9,2 mil milhões para mil milhões de euros;

—
Energia: reduz de 9,1 mil milhões para 5,1 mil milhões de euros;

—
A transferência do montante do Fundo de Coesão para o CEF já está definida. Cada Estado‐Membro tem direito
a receber, na exata proporção em que contribuiu para o Fundo de Coesão, verbas para investir nos 3 setores
estratégicos. Os fundos não utilizados até 31 de dezembro de 2016 poderão ser reafetados a novos projetos
mediante novos convites à apresentação de propostas de caráter concorrencial.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera os montantes acordados suficientes para implementar as redes europeias ambicionadas, sobretudo
nas áreas dos Transportes, TIC e Energia?

C 6 E / 316 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

2. Com apenas mil milhões de euros, não considera que estão em causa todos os projetos de banda larga e
tecnologia digital que a Comissão ambicionava desenvolver e que foram apresentados na iniciativa
emblemática da Estratégia Europa 2020 «Agenda Digital»?

3. Com uma redução de aproximadamente 50 % considera possível continuar a desenvolver um mercado único
de energia que contribua para diminuir os custos energéticos das empresas europeias?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002793/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Redução orçamental políticas transeuropeias

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do
orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de
euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a
competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de
-20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia.

—
Neste caso, considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação
(Horizonte 2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de
transportes, energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).

—
Importa ainda destacar que a redução orçamental também afeta as áreas da Segurança e Cidadania e da Europa
Global, verificando-se assim um equilíbrio nos cortes das políticas internas com outras políticas externas da UE.

—
Por fim, ressalva-se que as duas maiores políticas europeias, nomeadamente a Política Agrícola Comum e a
Política de Coesão sofreram ligeiras reduções, mas que no contexto global acabaram por reforçar a sua posição
no orçamento europeu.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os motivos que levaram os Estados-Membros a diminuírem de forma mais drástica as verbas orçamentais
que são geridas pela Comissão Europeia em detrimento das que são geridas pelos 27 países europeus?

2. Entende que a redução orçamental das políticas transeuropeias afetará a boa execução das mesmas?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002794/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Regiões Ultraperiféricas

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;

—
Segundo a nova proposta do Conselho, as críticas de que as Regiões mais desenvolvidas tinham tido um corte
inferior ao das Regiões Ultraperiféricas acabaram por ser atendidas pelos restantes Estados-Membros;

—
Neste sentido, as Regiões Ultraperiféricas e as Regiões escassamente povoadas têm assim um financiamento de
30 euros / por habitante, subindo para 1,4 mil milhões de euros em detrimento dos 926 milhões de euros
apresentados inicialmente pela Comissão Europeia;

—
Comparando com o anterior período de programação em que receberam um apoio de 1,738 mil milhões de
euros, verifica-se uma redução de 351 milhões de euros, equivalente a 20,2 % (antes o corte chegava aos 47 %);

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 317

—
Chama-se ainda à atenção para o facto do «Projeto de Conclusões» apresentado pelo Conselho referir
explicitamente que será ainda necessário ter em atenção a situação especial das regiões insulares, sem no
entanto definir financiamento nem qualquer outro critério de apoio;

—
Importa salvaguardar o facto das Regiões Ultraperiféricas também serem consideradas regiões insulares.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Na União Europeia, quantas regiões insulares existem e quais são?

2. Sabendo que o financiamento às RUP e Regiões escassamente povoadas é de 30 euros / habitante e estando
definido o orçamento global desta rubrica, como é que a Comissão Europeia irá ter «em atenção a situação
especial das regiões insulares»?

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002795/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Tratado de Lisboa

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
O orçamento europeu é de apenas 1 % do PIB da globalidade dos Estados-Membros, ao contrário do verificado
nos EUA em que o orçamento, em 2012, representou 22,8 % do PIB nacional (na média, entre 1971 e 2008 o
orçamento dos EUA foi de 20,6 % da riqueza nacional);

—
O orçamento da UE é 33 vezes mais pequeno que o dos EUA e 44 vezes mais pequeno que a soma da
globalidade dos orçamentos dos 27 Estados-Membros;

—
Este orçamento demonstra uma falta de ambição europeia para competir à escala global;

—
O Conselho aprovou um orçamento em que existe um gap entre dotações de compromisso e dotações de
pagamento na ordem dos 40 mil milhões de euros, quando o Tratado de Lisboa proíbe linearmente a existência
de défices europeus;

—
Em 2012, já existiu um problema de pagamentos de compromissos assumidos e autorizados pelos EstadosMembros, tendo sido adotado um orçamento anual revisto;

—
Os compromissos são para um período de 10 anos, enquanto os pagamentos são apenas para um período de 7
anos, de que resulta a diferença orçamental de 40 mil milhões de euros;

—
Os 22 mil milhões de euros da reserva de eficiência da Política de Coesão apenas irão ser pagos em 2020,
20221 e 2022, pelo que já irão transitar para o próximo QFP, diminuindo assim o suposto défice que dizem
existir;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual a análise que faz deste crescente fosso orçamental entre dotações de autorização e dotações de
pagamento?

2. Considera que este diferencial coloca em causa o estipulado no Tratado de Lisboa, nomeadamente o facto do
orçamento europeu não poder ter um défice orçamental?

3. Quando é que acredita que a União Europeia poderá ter realmente um orçamento adequado para fazer face às
suas necessidades de crescimento?

C 6 E / 318 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002796/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Orçamento Europeu — Estratégia «Europa 2020»

Tendo em conta que:

—
A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por
Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

—
Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do
Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro
do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros),
perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos
do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.

—
O Conselho salienta ainda que: «Só haverá uma retoma do crescimento sustentável e do emprego se for seguida
uma abordagem coerente e assente numa base alargada, conjugando uma consolidação orçamental inteligente
que preserve o investimento no crescimento futuro com políticas macroeconómicas sólidas e uma estratégia
ativa em prol do emprego que preserve a coesão social».

—
A Comissão Europeia definiu a sua estratégia «Europa 2020», tendo sido elencadas 7 iniciativas emblemáticas e
vários objetivos para serem concretizados na presente década;

—
A UE não pode ter um orçamento restritivo para um período de 7 anos, dado que será impossível cumprir com
os objetivos e metas delineados na Estratégia «Europa 2020»;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que o orçamento aprovado pelo Conselho Europeu coloca em causa os objetivos e metas da
Estratégia «Europa 2020»?

2. Com menos 95 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, menos 8,5 % do orçamento europeu que o apresentado pela
Comissão Europeia, quais serão as iniciativas emblemáticas que mais serão afetadas com esta redução
orçamental?

3. Como explica à população em geral que a União Europeia vai ter um orçamento restritivo para os próximos 7
anos mas que, em contrapartida, estabeleceu metas ambiciosas para crescer e se desenvolver?

**Resposta conjunta dada por Janusz Lewandowski em nome da Comissão**

_(24 de abril de 2013)_

A Comissão entende que as conclusões do Conselho Europeu sobre o Quadro Financeiro Plurianual (QFP) constituem
a base da posição do Conselho nas próximas negociações com o Parlamento Europeu (PE), que deverá dar a sua
aprovação relativamente ao Regulamento QFP. O PE, na resolução de 13 de março de 2013, definiu a sua posição
sobre as referidas conclusões e conferiu um mandato claro à sua equipa de negociação para que conduza as
negociações sobre um pacote global. Por conseguinte, a Comissão convida o Senhor Deputado a apresentar
diretamente ao Conselho Europeu todas as questões relativas a dados pormenorizados sobre as conclusões do
Conselho Europeu e ao motivo pelo qual os Chefes de Estado e de Governo assumiram determinadas posições.

A Comissão teria preferido que do Conselho Europeu tivessem resultado reduções menos significativas em termos de
pagamentos e de autorizações em comparação com as suas propostas. Os níveis aprovados pelos Chefes de Estado e
de Governo estão aquém do nível de ambição que a Comissão considera desejável face ao desafio de promover o
crescimento e o emprego na UE nos próximos anos. Simultaneamente, a Comissão considera que ainda podem ser
aprovadas melhorias significativas nas negociações entre o PE e o Conselho. Sem antecipar de forma alguma o alcance
e o teor dessas negociações, é evidente que uma maior flexibilidade deveria ser uma componente fundamental do
acordo relativo ao QFP.

A Comissão está empenhada em envidar todos os esforços ao seu alcance para facilitar um acordo entre o PE e o
Conselho o mais rapidamente possível no intuito de garantir o início atempado da próxima geração de programas
plurianuais.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 319

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002775/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Capping

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007‐2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of
EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately
4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy’s overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they
approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion.

— The cap on Cohesion Policy funding for each Member State has been reduced from 2.5% to 2.35% of GDP. For
Member States that joined before 2013 and whose average GDP per capita between 2008 and 2010 was less than 1%,
the maximum amount of funds transferred should increase by 10% to 2.59%.

1. What percentage of EU funds, in relation to GDP, did Portugal receive in 2007‐2013?

2. According to the Commission’s forecasts, will Portugal be affected by this funding cap?

3. What was Portugal’s GDP per capita between 2008 and 2010?

**Question for written answer E-002776/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Clarification of funds allocated to Portugal

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by
President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
(EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than
the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council’s negotiations,
as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%,
while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% of its total EU funding.

— Portugal is therefore set to receive EUR 27.7 billion, EUR 19.6 billion of which will be allocated under the
Cohesion Policy and EUR 8.1 billion under the common agricultural policy: EUR 4.5 billion under Pillar I (direct aid
to farmers) and EUR 3.6 billion under Pillar II (rural development).

— The country has also benefited from negotiations on two specific financial support envelopes, receiving
EUR 1 billion under the Cohesion Policy and a further EUR 500 million for rural development; the latter requires no
co-financing until 2016, and thereby constitutes direct support to the Member State.

1. Can the Commission confirm that Portugal will receive EUR 27.7 billion?

2. How will the EUR 27.7 billion be distributed among the various EU support funds (for example, the ERDF, ESF,
Cohesion Fund and European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation)?

C 6 E / 320 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Question for written answer E-002777/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Clarification of Cohesion Policy funds

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
(EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than
the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council’s negotiations,
as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%,
while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% its total EU funding.

— Portugal is therefore set to receive EUR 27.7 billion, EUR 19.6 billion of which will be allocated under the
Cohesion Policy and EUR 8.1 billion under the common agricultural policy: EUR 4.5 billion under Pillar I (direct aid
to farmers) and EUR 3.6 billion under Pillar II (rural development).

— The country has also benefited from negotiations on two specific financial support envelopes, receiving
EUR 1 billion under the Cohesion Policy and a further EUR 500 million for rural development; the latter requires no
co-financing until 2016, and thereby constitutes direct support to the Member State.

1. How will the EUR 19.6 billion be distributed among funding allocated to the Member State and that allocated to
the Portuguese regions?

2. How much will be allocated to each of the Portuguese regions: the North, the Centre, Lisbon and the Tagus
Valley, the Alentejo, the Algarve, the Azores and Madeira?

**Question for written answer E-002778/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Review clause

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007‐2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of
EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately
4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy’s overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they
approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion.

— In 2016 Cohesion Policy allocations will be revised for the period 2017‐2020 using the cumulated regional GDP
observed for the years 2014‐2015 and the cumulated national GDP for 2012. Adjustments to these allocations will
only be made if there is a cumulative divergence of more than +/-5%. The total net effect of these adjustments may not
exceed EUR 4 billion.

1. Does the Commission not think that the 2016 review clause may affect investments that have already been
planned and scheduled within the European regions and the Member States?

2. If a region loses its Cohesion Policy allocations, but has already scheduled medium‐ to long-term projects, how
will it then finance these?

3. Is it aware of the implications of the review clause, particularly regarding the withdrawal of key EU strategic
investments?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 321

**Question for written answer E-002779/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Stimulating economic growth and job creation

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— This document supports what was set out at the previous meeting of 22 and 23 November: that the EU budget
‘must be a catalyst for growth and jobs across Europe, notably by leveraging productive and human capital
investments. Within the future Multiannual Financial Framework [2014‐2020] spending should be mobilised to
support growth, employment, competitiveness and convergence, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.’

— The Council also maintains that: ‘Sustainable growth and employment will only resume if a consistent and broadbased approach is pursued, combining smart fiscal consolidation that preserves investment in future growth, sound
macroeconomic policies and an active employment strategy that preserves social cohesion.’

1. In the light of the budget set at the last European Council, does the Commission believe that Member States are
focused on increasing economic growth and job creation?

2. Which European policies does it believe are essential to achieving this strategy?

**Question for written answer E-002780/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007‐2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of
EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately
4.15%.

— The Cohesion Policy budget for 2014‐2020 is EUR 325.2 billion, EUR 8.9 billion of which is earmarked for
European Territorial Cooperation. This is a reduction of 24.7% compared with the Commission’s initial proposal.

— Just as with other European projects, particularly those concerning research and innovation and the Connecting
Europe Facility, the creation of territorial networks has also been severely affected.

1. What are the underlying reasons for the drastic 25% reduction in allocations for European Territorial
Cooperation projects?

2. Does the Commission believe that the new budget allocation will jeopardise the Commission’s objective to
stimulate further cooperation between European regions and countries?

**Question for written answer E-002781/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Youth Employment 1

The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

C 6 E / 322 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

With the aim of tackling the serious social challenges suffered by the youngest members of society due to high youth
unemployment levels, President Van Rompuy proposed the creation of a Youth Employment Initiative with the
following features:

—
A budget of EUR 6 billion, funded as follows:

EUR 3 billion will no longer be allocated to the Member States but instead will be pre-allocated to the European Social
Fund that each Member State would already receive. Throughout the EU, this sum is calculated according to the total
level of unemployment in each European region.

EUR 3 billion will be assigned to a new budget heading under sub-heading 1b on Cohesion Policy. This sum will be
allocated to the Member States and added to the sum from the European Social Fund.

— The budget is aimed at supporting the following European youth schemes: the Youth Guarantee scheme; the
Youth in Action Programme; the European Alliance for Apprenticeships; the EURES network.

1. Will the amount allocated to each Member State for youth employment under the European Social Fund be
similar to that allocated by the Commission under this new budget heading?

2. Will these funds be allocated to and managed by the Member States, or will they remain part of the EU budget
and be managed by the Commission?

3. If they are to be managed by the Member States, how will the Commission ensure that they are used to fund the
proposed schemes?

**Question for written answer E-002782/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Youth Employment 2

The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

With the aim of tackling the serious social challenges suffered by the youngest members of society due to high youth
unemployment levels, President Van Rompuy proposed the creation of a Youth Employment Initiative with the
following features:

A budget of EUR 6 billion, funded as follows:

—
EUR 3 billion will no longer be allocated to the Member States but instead will be pre-allocated to the European
Social Fund that each Member State would already receive. Throughout the EU, this sum is calculated according
to the total level of unemployment in each European region.

—
EUR 3 billion will be assigned to a new budget heading under sub-heading 1b on Cohesion Policy. This sum
will be allocated to the Member States and added to the sum from the European Social Fund.

—
The European (NUTS 2) Regions with youth unemployment levels over 25% will be eligible. The eligible
regions and levels of youth unemployment will be based on Eurostat statistics from the end of 2012, which will
be published shortly.

1. Is the Commission aware of the number of European regions which have over 25% youth unemployment?
How many are there, and in which countries are they?

2. How will the EUR 6 billion be shared between the European regions which have over 25% youth
unemployment?

3. Will the Commission set a ratio that takes account of regions with lower youth unemployment rates, such as
those in Spain and Greece, or will it only take account of the affected regions as a whole?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 323

**Question for written answer E-002783/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Financial envelopes

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007‐2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of
EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately
4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy’s overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they
approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion, to be divided as follows: Spain:
EUR 1.824 billion, Hungary: EUR 1.56 billion, Greece: EUR 1.375 billion, Italy: EUR 1.5 billion, Portugal:
EUR 1 billion, Czech Republic: EUR 900 million, Germany: EUR 710 million, France: EUR 200 million, Malta:
EUR 200 million, Cyprus: EUR 150 million, Belgium: EUR 133 million, Ireland: EUR 100 million, Slovenia:
EUR 75 million, Ceuta and Melilla: EUR 50 million, PEACE Programme: EUR 150 million

1. Does the Commission believe that the direct allocation of financial envelopes to the Member States at the
expense of policies that benefit less developed regions will jeopardise the Cohesion Policy’s objectives?

2. What were the criteria that led to some Member States receiving more substantial financial envelopes than their
European neighbours?

3. What is the strategic goal of these additional specific financial envelopes, particularly in the context of achieving
ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund objectives?

**Question for written answer E-002784/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Balance in the budget cut

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by
President Herman Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to
the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside
for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million,
which is around 20% less than the Commission’s initial proposal.

— As well as cuts of EUR 73.248 billion to budget lines financed under the MFF, various policies — including ITER,
GMES and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — previously outside the MFF, have been transferred into
the framework, leading to EUR 9.293 billion in cuts. Remaining projects under these chapters (for example: subheading 1a — Competitiveness for growth and jobs and heading 2 — Sustainable growth) will see further budget
cuts, since they are now covered by the MFF.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the MFF (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF
(EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the
Commission.

1. Does the Commission believe that a balance has been struck between cuts made to budget lines both within and
outside the MFF?

2. Why have three EU policies — ITER, GMES and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — been
transferred into the MFF when others have not?

C 6 E / 324 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Question for written answer E-002785/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by
President Herman Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings outside the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), three EU policies — ITER,
GMES, and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — were transferred into the MFF, with these losses already
accounted for in the MFF values.

— At a time when many European companies are internally relocating their industrial activity or are transferring their
production processes to countries with lower labour costs outside the EU, it is important that the EU support all
workers who have been laid off as a result of globalisation.

— The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which will also begin to support agricultural as well as industrial
activities, has seen its budget drastically cut by 65%, from an initial EUR 3 billion to EUR 1.848 billion. This makes it
difficult for workers, who could be trained to suit the changing needs of the labour market, to access EU funds.

1. Does the Commission believe that the new budget will be enough to support the workers of hundreds of
companies that have relocated their industrial activity?

2. As the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund’s budget is drastically lower than the Commission’s initial
proposal, will it reconsider farmers’ eligibility under this EU policy?

3. How can we help the numerous workers, laid off due to globalisation, re-enter the labour market, when the
corresponding budget for the next seven years is so small?

**Question for written answer E-002786/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation: 150 km

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007‐2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of
EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%. Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion,
which is approximately 4.15%.

— The Cohesion Policy budget for 2014‐2020 is EUR 325.2 billion, EUR 8.9 billion of which is earmarked for
European Territorial Cooperation. This is a reduction of 24.7% compared with the Commission’s initial proposal.

— The supported regions will be NUTS 3 regions located along all internal and external land borders as well as
NUTS 3 regions located along maritime borders, separated by a maximum distance of 150 kilometres,
notwithstanding any possible adjustments required to ensure the coherence and continuity of the areas covered by
the cooperation programmes for the 2007‐2013 programming period. This fact is stated in the notes of the
conclusions but did not appear in previous versions distributed to the Member States and to institutions.

— In January of this year, together with fellow MEPS from the outermost regions, I addressed a letter to the President
of the Council to alert him to this territorial injustice.

1. Does the Commission know why the Council did not consider the specific characteristics of the outermost
regions in the European Territorial Cooperation programme?

2. What actions will it take to ensure that these European regions receive a more just allocation of resources in
relation to European countries such as Andorra, Switzerland and Norway that will receive funding despite not
belonging to the EU?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 325

**Question for written answer E-002787/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Common Agricultural Policy

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to
the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside
for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million,
which is around 20% less than the Commission’s initial proposal.

— The budget for Axis 2, known as Sustainable Growth, has been cut by EUR 13.293 billion, which is a reduction of
3.44% compared with the Commission’s initial proposal.

— This Axis includes funding of EUR 2.8 billion (the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector) which was
previously not included within the MFF.

— However, it is not clear to which sub-axis of Axis 2 this additional funding will be assigned; consequently, the real
budget cut for all relevant sub-axes cannot be discerned.

1. Does the Commission believe that the new budgetary figures for the common agricultural policy are
appropriate? How is it possible to justify its continuing status as a main European policy at the expense of increasing
commitment to research and innovation or to the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises?

2. To which of the sub-axes of Axis 2 (sustainable growth) will the EUR 2.8 billion intended for the agricultural
reserve be assigned?

**Question for written answer E-002788/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Horizon 2020

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— There have been major budget cuts to policies for research and innovation (Horizon 2020), education, training,
youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy and telecommunications networks (Connecting
Europe Facility).

— The EU’s Research and Innovation Policy (Horizon 2020) budget has been cut from EUR 80 billion to
EUR 70 billion, a reduction of 12.5%.

— By contrast, the United States and developing countries, specifically the BRIC nations, continue to invest
significant sums in research, development and innovation on the understanding that only by doing so can they
become more competitive on a global scale.

— Deeper synergies between Horizon 2020 and the Structural Funds will allow poorer performing and lessdeveloped regions to create centres of excellence.

1. Which areas of the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Policy will be most affected by the budget cuts
outlined by the Council?

2. Does the Commission believe that the budget agreed in this area is sufficient to meet the great challenges facing
Europe on a global scale?

3. What are the strategic and political priorities for the next few years, bearing in mind that without an adequate
budget it is difficult to provide solid support to SMEs, universities, technology centres, industrial parks and
researchers?

C 6 E / 326 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Question for written answer E-002789/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Negotiations with the European Parliament

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
(EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than
the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— To enable the European institutions to reach an agreement and to prevent any delay in the implementation of the
budget and the various regulations and policies that must be drawn up, it is clear that negotiations must take place
that lead to the approval of an EU budget for the period 2014‐2020.

— However, some measures must be introduced to improve the EU budget without being detrimental to either
citizens or companies.

1. Is the Commission prepared to support Parliament in introducing greater flexibility between all of the budget
chapters each year in order to create a real carry-over of appropriations between European policies, thereby ensuring
that payments are fully implemented?

2. Is it prepared to support Parliament in reviewing the EU budget at the end of 2016 to prevent the possibility of
an austerity budget lasting seven years?

3. Is it prepared to support Parliament in increasing the resources of the EU budget, thereby decreasing transfers
from Member States, which can invest the same sum in other national policies creating jobs and wealth?

4. Is it prepared to support Parliament in strengthening its powers related to the passing of the next MFF (2021‐
2027), specifically in terms of the legislative procedure?

**Question for written answer E-002790/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Budget allocation for each Member State

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
(EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than
the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council’s negotiations,
as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%,
while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% of its total EU funding.

— Media reports suggest that the Member States as a whole will lose 13.1% compared with the last MFF, which is over
3.6 percentage points more than Portugal will lose.

1. What was the budget allocation for each Member State under the common agricultural policy and the Cohesion
Policy for the period 2007‐2013?

2. How much will each Member State receive under the common agricultural policy and the Cohesion Policy for
the period 2014‐2020?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 327

**Question for written answer E-002791/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — advocating growth

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The EU cannot implement an austerity budget, since the budget is the only engine for growth and job creation at
its disposal.

— The austerity budgets imposed by the Troika — which includes the Commission and the European Central Bank
— correspond to the next three years, not to seven years like the EU budget.

— The EU cannot implement a restricted budget for seven years, as it will be impossible to achieve the Europe 2020
strategy’s goals and targets.

— Following the austerity measures being implemented by the Member States, investment is needed to create growth
and jobs; the EU budget is the best way to foster wealth creation.

— Around 94% of the EU budget goes towards investment and job creation projects while only 6% is used to fund the
EU’s administrative machine.

— The Member States’ contributions to the EU budget are ultimately returned to them in the form of new investment
projects, which will create wealth and jobs in the European regions.

1. Does the Commission believe that such a long-term austerity budget, including goals set for the next decade, is
viable?

2. How does it intend to foster the economic growth that various Commissioners have been advocating in their
speeches all over Europe?

**Question for written answer E-002792/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European budget — Less funding for the Connecting Europe Facility

The European Council of 7 and 8 February 2013 endorsed the new draft conclusions proposed by the Council
President, Herman Van Rompuy.

Swingeing cuts are to be made in the budgets for research and innovation policies (Horizon 2020), education,
training, youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy, and telecommunications networks
(Connecting Europe Facility).

CEF: the overall budget has been reduced from EUR 50 000 million to EUR 29 300 million; there has been no change
regarding the EUR 10 000 million to be transferred from the Cohesion Fund.

Transport: the budget has been reduced from EUR 31 700 million to EUR 23 200 million (allowing for the EUR 10
000 million to be transferred from the Cohesion Fund).

ICT: the budget has been reduced from EUR 9 200 million to EUR 1 000 million.

Energy: the budget has been reduced from EUR 9 100 million to EUR 5 100 million.

The transfer from the Cohesion Fund to the CEF has been finally agreed. The amounts that the individual Member
States will be entitled to receive, exactly in proportion to their contributions to the Cohesion Fund, are intended to
finance investment in the three key sectors. Funds which have not been used by 31 December 2016 may be
reallocated to new projects on the basis of new competitive calls for proposals.

C 6 E / 328 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

1. Does the Commission consider that the amounts granted will be sufficient to complete the projected European
networks, especially in the fields of transport, ICT, and energy?

2. Does it not believe that the meagre funding, only EUR 1 000 million, will jeopardise all the broadband and
digital technology projects which it was aiming to pursue under the Digital Agenda, a flagship initiative of the Europe
2020 strategy?

3. Given that the funding has been cut by roughly 50%, does it see any prospect of further progress on a single
energy market to lower the energy bills for European industry?

**Question for written answer E-002793/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Budget cuts for trans-European policies

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to
the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside
for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million,
which is around 20% less than the Commission’s initial proposal.

— There have been major budget cuts to policies for research and innovation (Horizon 2020), education, training,
youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy and telecommunications networks (Connecting
Europe Facility).

— Notably, the budget cut also affects the areas of Security and European Citizenship and Global Europe, to strike a
balance between cuts to both internal and external EU policies.

— Finally, there will be slight cuts to the two largest EU policy areas — the common agricultural policy and the
Cohesion Policy — however, their overall share of the EU budget will ultimately increase.

1. What were the Member States’ motives for making the most drastic cuts to the budget lines managed by the
Commission rather than those managed by the 27 Member States?

2. Does the Commission believe that budget cuts to trans-European policy areas will prevent them from being well
implemented?

**Question for written answer E-002794/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Outermost regions

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— Under the new Council proposal, Member States accepted criticism that cuts to the more developed regions had
been smaller than those to the outermost regions.

— Consequently, the outermost regions and the sparsely populated regions will receive funding of EUR 30 per
inhabitant, with the Commission’s initial proposal of EUR 926 billion rising to EUR 1.4 billion.

— This is a reduction of EUR 351 million compared with the last programming period, when these regions received
EUR 1.738 billion. This equates to a 20.2% cut (the previous cut was 47%).

— Moreover, the Council’s ‘Conclusions’ explicitly mention the continued need to take account of the special
situation of island regions, but do not set out funding or any other form of support.

— It is important to safeguard the outermost regions’ status as island regions.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 329

1. How many island regions are there in the EU and what are they?

2. Given that funding for the outermost regions and the sparsely populated regions is EUR 30 per inhabitant, and
since the overall budget for this heading has been set, how will the Commission take account of ‘the special situation
of island regions’?

**Question for written answer E-002795/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Treaty of Lisbon

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— The EU budget represents just 1% of Member States’ total GDP, compared with the 2012 US budget which
amounted to 22.8% of national GDP (on average US budgets between 1971 and 2008 have equated to 20.6% of
national wealth).

— The EU budget is 33 times smaller than that of the US and 44 times smaller than the budgets of all 27 Member
States put together.

— This budget demonstrates the EU’s lack of ambition to compete at a global level.

— The Council has adopted a budget with a EUR 40 billion shortfall between commitment appropriations and
payment appropriations; the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly prohibits EU budget deficits.

— In 2012 there have already been problems regarding Member States accepting and authorising commitment
appropriations, with a revised annual budget having been adopted.

— Commitment appropriations are valid for a 10-year period, while payment appropriations are only valid for a
seven-year period, resulting in the EUR 40 billion budget gap.

— The EUR 22 billion Cohesion Policy performance reserve will be paid in 2020, 2021 and 2022 and will therefore
carry over to the next MFF, thereby reducing the supposed deficit that is said to exist.

1. What is the Commission’s view of the growing budget gap between commitment appropriations and payment
appropriations?

2. Does this gap comply with the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon, specifically in view of the fact that EU
budget deficits are prohibited?

3. When does it realistically believe that the EU will have a budget that adequately meets its growth needs?

**Question for written answer E-002796/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU budget — Europe 2020 strategy

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van
Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February,
we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
(EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than
the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— The Council also maintains that: ‘Sustainable growth and employment will only resume if a consistent and broadbased approach is pursued, combining smart fiscal consolidation that preserves investment in future growth, sound
macroeconomic policies and an active employment strategy that preserves social cohesion.’

C 6 E / 330 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

— The Commission has set out its Europe 2020 strategy, listing seven flagship initiatives and several goals to be
achieved this decade.

— The EU cannot implement a restricted budget for seven years, as this would make it impossible to achieve the
Europe 2020 strategy’s goals and targets.

1. Does the Commission believe that the budget adopted by the Council jeopardises the Europe 2020 strategy’s
goals and targets?

2. With cuts of EUR 95 billion to the EU budget, an 8.5% reduction on the Commission’s proposal, which of these
flagship initiatives will be hardest hit?

3. How will it explain to the general public that the EU will implement a restricted budget for the next seven years
despite having set ambitious growth and development targets?

**Joint answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The Commission understands that the European Council conclusions on the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)
represent the basis for the Council’s position in the upcoming negotiations with the European Parliament (EP), which
needs to give its consent to the MFF Regulation. The EP has defined its position on these European Council
conclusions in its resolution of 13 March 2013 and has given a strong mandate to its negotiating team to conduct the
negotiations on an overall package. The Commission would invite you therefore to address directly to the European
Council all questions related to the details of the European Council conclusions and why Heads of State and
Government have taken certain positions.

The Commission would have preferred an outcome from the European Council that made less significant reductions
in payments and commitments compared to its proposals. The levels agreed by Heads of State and Government are
below the level of ambition that the Commission considers desirable given the challenge of promoting growth and
jobs across the EU in the coming years. At the same time, the Commission considers that substantial improvements
to the European Council conclusions may still be agreed in the negotiations between the EP and the Council. Without
prejudging in any way the scope and content of these negotiations, it is clear that increased flexibility should be a
crucial component of the MFF agreement.

The Commission is committed to do everything in its power to facilitate an agreement between the EP and the
Council at the earliest opportunity to ensure the timely start of the next generation of multi-annual programmes.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 331

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002797/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(8 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Ayudas de Estado a Bankia

La prensa se ha echo eco de que la Comisión Europea considera ayudas de Estado la diferencia de 12 000 millones
entre el precio pagado por Sareb por los activos de Bankia y su precio de mercado. Según la información, la Comisión
considera que Sareb es una entidad pública, pues su deuda es mucho mayor que su capital ( [1] ).

A la luz de lo anterior:

1. ¿Confirma la Comisión que considera a Sareb como una entidad pública?

2. ¿Considera la Comisión que esta diferencia de 12 000 millones debe ser sumada al total de deuda pública del
Estado?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Con arreglo a las normas sobre ayudas estatales de la UE, una medida es constitutiva de ayuda estatal si se cumplen
determinados criterios jurídicos, conforme a lo dispuesto en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y de
acuerdo con una jurisprudencia reiterada. Una medida es ayuda pública si implica la utilización de recursos estatales
(incluidos los de organismos privados creados por el Estado), entraña ventajas para una empresa o actividad, es
selectiva, falsea la competencia y tiene repercusiones en los intercambios comerciales dentro de la UE. El concepto de
ayuda estatal se interpreta en un sentido amplio.

En cambio, el concepto de hacienda pública se refiere a la carga presupuestaria del Estado.

Estos conceptos diferentes pueden tener consecuencias muy diversas. Por ejemplo, con arreglo a la normativa
comunitaria sobre las ayudas estatales, una medida puede ser constitutiva de ayuda estatal, aunque no tenga
incidencia en la hacienda pública. Al contrario, una medida puede tener repercusiones en las cuentas públicas y no ser
considerada ayuda estatal.

En la Decisión de 28 de noviembre de 2012, la Comisión consideró que el traspaso de activos de promociones
inmobiliarias de Bankia/BFA a Sareb era constitutivo de ayuda, ya que se cumplían todos los criterios pertinentes. La
Comisión (Eurostat) no considera Sareb una entidad pública a efectos de la hacienda pública. Es de titularidad
mayoritariamente privada, su único objeto es hacer frente a la crisis financiera, se ha creado por un período
determinado y prevé pérdidas pequeñas si se comparan con el tamaño total del pasivo. De esto se desprende que el
importe de 12 000 millones EUR no debe sumarse al déficit y la deuda de las administraciones públicas en las cuentas
nacionales.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/03/07/bruselas-considera-ayudas-de-estado-12000-millones-que-bankia-recibio-de-sareb116355/

C 6 E / 332 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002797/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(8 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ State aid for Bankia

Accounts in the press report that the Commission is considering state aid with a difference of EUR 12 000 million
between the price paid for Bankia’s assets by Sareb and its market price. According to the information provided, the
Commission considers Sareb to be a public entity, and hence its debt is much greater than its capital ( [1] ).

In light of this:

1. Can the Commission confirm that it considers Sareb to be a public entity?

2. Is the Commission of the opinion that this difference of EUR 12 000 million should be added to the State’s total
public debt?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

Under EU State aid rules, a measure constitutes state aid if certain legal criteria are fulfilled, as set out in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union and in line with a comprehensive body of case law. A measure is public aid if
it involves State resources (including from private bodies established by the State), constituting an advantage for an
undertaking or activity, is selective, distorts competition and has an impact on trade within the EU. The concept of
state aid is given a broad interpretation.

In contrast, the concept of public finance tries to capture the fiscal burden for the State.

Those different concepts can lead to very different outcomes. For instance, under EU State aid rules, a measure can
constitute state aid but have no public finance implications. Conversely, a measure can have public finance
implications without being considered as state aid.

In the decision of 28 November 2012, the Commission considered that the transfer of Real Estate Development assets
from BFA/Bankia to SAREB constituted aid, as all the relevant criteria were fulfilled. The Commission (Eurostat) does
not consider SAREB to be a public entity for the purpose of public finance. It is majority privately owned, has a
purpose solely to address the financial crisis, is established with a temporary duration, and has expected losses that are
small in comparison with the total size of the liabilities. It follows that the amount of EUR 12 000 million is not to be
added to the deficit and debt of general government in the national accounts.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/03/07/bruselas-considera-ayudas-de-estado-12000-millones-que-bankia-recibio-de-sareb116355/

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 333

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002798/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ «Efecto lunes» — Pregunta complementaria a la pregunta E-000207/13

En fechas anteriores presenté una pregunta parlamentaria basada en un trabajo académico ( [1] ) en la que planteaba la
sospecha de que las empresas petroleras manipulaban los precios de los carburantes según el día de la semana ( [2] ). La
Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) del Estado español ha abierto un expediente informativo a las petroleras por el
llamado «efecto lunes», que consiste en que los operadores bajan los precios ese día de la semana —cuando la
Comisión Europea recoge datos para las estadísticas— y vuelven a subirlos a partir del martes.

En su respuesta a dicha pregunta, la Comisión afirma: «No obstante, la Comisión no dudará en actuar, por sí misma o
en coordinación con la autoridad de competencia española, si recibe suficiente información que indique una
conducta colusoria o un comportamiento abusivo de las distintas empresas del mercado del combustible, sea por
propia iniciativa, sea por presiones del Gobierno». También dice que «conoce las asimetrías en el ritmo con que los
precios al por menor, antes de impuestos, se ajustan a las variaciones de los precios internacionales de los carburantes,
pero que nunca ha tenido indicios, directamente o a resultas de las investigaciones nacionales llevadas a cabo hasta el

momento».

A la luz de lo anterior, ¿piensa la Comisión investigar ahora la existencia del «efecto lunes» en el precio del petróleo?

En caso de que se confirme su existencia, ¿piensa proponer medidas de sanción para las empresas petroleras
involucradas?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(3 de mayo de 2013)_

En su respuesta a la pregunta E-000207/13 planteada previamente, la Comisión indicó que las asimetrías en la
velocidad a la que los precios al por menor, antes de impuestos, se adaptan a las variaciones de los precios del
combustible internacional (el fenómeno llamado en inglés rockets and feathers, o «cohetes y plumas») han sido
examinadas a nivel nacional, más recientemente, por parte de la UK Office of Fair Trading. Además, la Comisión
Nacional de la Competencia analizó detenidamente este fenómeno en 2012, al igual que el Bundeskartellamt alemán
en su investigación sobre el sector de los combustibles de 2011. En esta última investigación, la autoridad nacional de
la competencia alemana llevó a cabo un análisis pormenorizado de los precios de las estaciones de servicio en cuatro
áreas metropolitanas durante el período comprendido entre enero de 2007 y junio de 2010, gracias al cual concluyó
que los precios de los combustibles llegaban a su punto álgido los viernes y a su punto más bajo los domingos y los
lunes. A pesar de algunas teorías económicas que justificarían estos resultados empíricos, la autoridad nacional de la
competencia alemana no excluyó que las asimetrías observadas fueran el resultado de conductas contrarias a la
competencia, pero fue incapaz de proporcionar argumentos concluyentes de que lo fueran. Tampoco ninguna otra
autoridad nacional de la competencia que haya examinado el fenómeno _rockets and feathers_ o «efecto lunes» ha podido
demostrar que sea resultado de prácticas anticompetitivas.

Aunque la Comisión, a falta de indicios claros de que las empresas petroleras ejerzan prácticas contrarias a la
competencia, no tiene por ahora intención de investigar este fenómeno, no dudará en actuar si se presentan nuevas
pruebas concluyentes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/07/economia/1362683839.html

C 6 E / 334 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002798/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The ‘Monday effect’ — Supplementary question to Question E-000207/13

On a previous occasion, I presented a parliamentary question based on an academic piece of work ( [1] ) in which the
suspicion was raised that oil companies were manipulating fuel prices according to the day of the week ( [2] ). Spain’s
National Energy Commission has opened an inquiry into the oil companies concerning the so‐called ‘Monday effect’,
which involves operators lowering prices on this particular day of the week, when the Commission collects its
statistical data, and then raising them again from Tuesday.

In its answer to this question, the Commission states: ‘However, the Commission will not hesitate to act, alone or in
conjunction with the Spanish competition authority, if it receives sufficient information to suggest collusive or unfair
behaviour from the various companies in the fuel market, whether on their own initiative or as a result of government
pressure’. It also says that it is ‘aware of the imbalances in the rate with which retail prices vary, before taxes, with the
fluctuations in international fuel prices, but that it has never had evidence of this, either directly or as a result of
national inquiries carried out thus far’.

In light of the above, is the Commission now considering investigating the existence of the ‘Monday effect’ in petrol
pricing?

Should the Commission confirms its existence, is it planning to propose sanctions on the oil companies involved?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

In its answer to previous Question E-000207/13, the Commission indicated that the asymmetries in the speed at
which pre-tax retail prices adjust to variations in international fuel prices — the so-called ‘rockets and feathers’
phenomenon — has been examined at national level, most recently by the UK Office of Fair Trading. Also, the
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia has carefully analysed this phenomenon in 2012, as has the German
Bundeskartellamt in its Fuel Sector Inquiry of 2011. In the latter inquiry, the German national competition authority
(NCA) carried out a detailed analysis of petrol stations' prices in four metropolitan areas over the period January 2007
— June 2010, finding that fuel prices were the highest on Fridays and the lowest on Sundays and Mondays. Despite
some economic theories that would justify these empirical findings, the German NCA did not exclude that the
asymmetries observed were the result of anticompetitive conducts, but was unable to provide conclusive arguments
that they were. No other NCA that has examined the ‘rockets and feathers’ or ‘Monday effect’ phenomenon has been
able to show that it is the result of anticompetitive practices either.

While the Commission, in the absence of clear indications of anticompetitive practices by oil companies, does not
currently intend to investigate this phenomenon, it will not hesitate to act if presented with new, compelling
evidence.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/07/economia/1362683839.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 335

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002799/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Retraso sistemático en las devoluciones impositivas a empresas

En los últimos dos meses de 2012, la Agencia Tributaria ha recortado hasta un 91 % las devoluciones de impuestos
como el de Sociedades y un 50 % los de IVA o IRPF para disminuir el dato de déficit público. Según el Informe de
Recaudación Tributaria de diciembre, Hacienda ha devuelto a los contribuyentes 3 791 millones de euros menos que
en 2011, con lo que el déficit disminuye en casi 4 décimas. Sin ese colchón, el dato de déficit público habría sido
del 7,1 % ( [1] ).

Respecto al Impuesto sobre Sociedades, Hacienda apenas ha devuelto 79 millones de euros frente a los 934 millones
que devolvió en el mismo mes del año pasado. En el caso del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF), las
devoluciones a los contribuyentes se han reducido a la mitad: Hacienda apenas ha devuelto 248 millones frente
a los 538 que retornó el pasado año. De igual modo, en el caso de las devoluciones por IVA, el Estado las ha recortado
a la mitad y ha pagado 1 499 millones frente a los 3 472 millones que entregó el año pasado.

1. ¿Conoce la Comisión estos datos?

2. ¿Cree la Comisión que el retraso en las devoluciones a las empresas distorsiona el dato de déficit público
para 2012?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión**

_(14 de junio de 2013)_

Los datos publicados por la Agencia Tributaria española se registran de acuerdo con la contabilidad de caja, mientras
que los datos que deben transmitirse a Eurostat a efectos de las cuentas nacionales y del procedimiento de déficit
excesivo deben generarse según el principio de devengo. En el pasado, las autoridades estadísticas españolas se
basaron en los datos de la contabilidad de caja en relación con las devoluciones de impuestos, también en las cuentas
nacionales, debido a la regularidad que caracterizaba a las devoluciones de impuestos. Sin embargo, los datos de 2012
facilitados a Eurostat el 1 de abril de 2013 han sido corregidos por las autoridades estadísticas españolas. En la
comunicación de datos a Eurostat de abril de 2013 relativa al procedimiento de déficit excesivo se han trasladado ya
al año 2012 la parte de las devoluciones abonadas en 2013 pero correspondientes a 2012.

1. La Comisión está al corriente de las cifras publicadas por la Agencia Tributaria de España.

2. Se han corregido los datos facilitados a Eurostat en abril de 2013 y los datos de devoluciones relativas a 2012
que se abonaron en 2013 se han consignado en el año 2012 de conformidad con el principio de devengo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://vozpopuli.com/economia/22440-hacienda-retiene-3-800-millones-de-euros-en-devoluciones-para-cuadrar-el-dato-de-deficit

C 6 E / 336 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002799/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Systematic delay in tax rebates to companies

In the last two months of 2012, the Spanish Tax Office cut corporation tax rebates by up to 91% and VAT or personal
income tax (IRPF) rebates by up to 50% to reduce the public deficit figure. According to a tax revenue report from
December, the Spanish Treasury has granted taxpayer rebates of EUR 3 791 million less than in 2011, in which time
the deficit has fallen by almost four tenths. Without this buffer, the public deficit would have been 7.1% ( [1] ).

With regard to corporation tax, the Ministry of Finance has only paid out EUR 79 million in rebates compared with
the EUR 934 million in the same month of the previous year. In the case of personal income tax (IRPF), taxpayer
rebates have been halved, the Ministry only paying out EUR 248 million compared with the EUR 538 million last
year. Similarly, VAT rebates have been halved by the State, which has paid EUR 1 499 million, compared with the
EUR 3 472 million last year.

In view of the above, can the Commission state:

whether it is aware of these figures;

whether it believes that the delay in providing rebates to companies has distorted the public deficit figure for 2012?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 June 2013)_

Data published by the Spanish Tax Agency are recorded on a cash basis while data for the purposes of the national
accounts and EDP reporting to Eurostat should be based on accrual data. In the past, the Spanish statistical authorities
used cash data for tax reimbursements (rebates) also in national accounts, due to the regularity shown in the pattern
of tax refunds. The 2012 data reported to Eurostat on 1 April 2013 has however been corrected by the Spanish
statistical authorities. The part of the reimbursements paid in 2013, relating to 2012, has been moved back to the
year 2012 when reporting data to Eurostat in the April 2013 EDP notification.

1. The Commission is aware of the figures published by the Spanish Tax Authority.

2. The data reported to Eurostat in April 2013 has been corrected and the data referring to 2012, paid in 2013,
has been moved back to year 2012 in line with the accrual principle.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://vozpopuli.com/economia/22440 ‘Ministry of Finance withholds EUR 3 800 million in tax rebates to help deficit statistics’.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 337

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002800/13**
**προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος)**

**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ VP/HR — Να εγγυηθεί η Κολομβία τα δικαιώματα του κοινωνικού και πολιτικού κινήματος

Στην Κολομβία συνεχίζεται με αμείωτη ένταση το όργιο δολοφονιών, απαγωγών, καταναγκαστικού εκτοπισμού και
φυλάκισης εναντίον μελών και στελεχών του λαϊκού κινήματος, τόσο από την Κολομβιανή κυβέρνηση, όσο και από τις
παραστρατιωτικές οργανώσεις που υποστηρίζονται από τους κρατικούς μηχανισμούς. Τα τελευταία 20 χρόνια πάνω από
2 900 συνδικαλιστές και περισσότερα από 4 500 στελέχη της Union Patriotica και άλλων οργανώσεων του λαϊκού
κινήματος έχουν δολοφονηθεί.

Η Διεθνής Ομοσπονδία Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων έχει καταγράψει περισσότερους από 3 000 δολοφονημένους αθώους
επιστρατευμένους νεαρής ηλικίας που εκτελέστηκαν εξωδικαστικά από τον στρατό της Κολομβίας. Υπάρχουν ακόμα 9 500
πολιτικοί κρατούμενοι και 5 500 000 εκτοπισμένοι ως αποτέλεσμα των επιχειρήσεων των παραστρατιωτικών οργανώσεων.

Οργανώσεις του λαϊκού κινήματος της Κολομβίας, μεταξύ των οποίων και το Κοινωνικό και Πολιτικό Κίνημα «Marcha
Patriotica», απαιτούν από την Κυβέρνηση να σεβαστεί να παρέχει πολιτικές εγγυήσεις για τη ζωή και τη φυσική ακεραιότητα
των μελών τους.

Το Κίνημα της «Marcha Patriotica» αντιπροσωπεύει μεγάλο αριθμό συνδικαλιστικών ενώσεων και οργανώσεων, οργανώσεις
φοιτητών και νεολαίας, οργανώσεις αγροτών εκπαιδευτικών και διανοούμενων της χώρας. Τάσσεται υπέρ των διαδικασιών
ειρήνευσης στην Κολομβία με κοινωνική δικαιοσύνη και με μέτρα υπέρ των φτωχών αγροτών και των εργαζομένων της χώρας.

Πώς τοποθετείται η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος της ΕΕ στο δίκαιο αίτημα της Marcha Patriotica στην κυβέρνηση της Κολομβίας να
παρέχει εγγυήσεις για την ελεύθερη δράση, τη ζωή και τη σωματική ακεραιότητα των μελών της, καθώς και στην απαίτηση για
την απελευθέρωση των 9 500 πολιτικών κρατουμένων;

**Απάντηση της Ύπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(24 Απριλίου 2013)_

Η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος/Αντιπρόεδρος (ΥΕ/ΑΠ) δηλώνει εκ νέου ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καταδικάζει σθεναρά τη χρήση βίας.
Η ΕΕ έχει ζητήσει επανειλημμένα από την κυβέρνηση να λάβει αποτελεσματικά μέτρα για να κατοχυρώσει την ασφάλεια
ευάλωτων τμημάτων του πληθυσμού και απειλούμενων προσώπων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων πολιτικών και κοινωνικών
ακτιβιστών και υπερασπιστών των δικαιωμάτων του ανθρώπου, μεταξύ των οποίων περιλαμβάνεται και η περίπτωση της
Marcha Patriótica. Η ΕΕ είναι ενήμερη για επιθέσεις, εξαφανίσεις και απειλές κατά ορισμένων μελών της οργάνωσης, και
παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς τις εν λόγω υποθέσεις.

Η ΥΕ/ΑΠ συγχαίρει τη Marcha Patriótica για τη δέσμευσή της υπέρ της ειρήνης, όπως και όλων των άλλων παραγόντων που
συμβάλλουν στην αναζήτηση ειρηνικής επίλυσης της εσωτερικής σύγκρουσης στην Κολομβία. Επισημαίνει ότι η Marcha
Patriótica και η ομάδα «Κολομβιανοί για την ειρήνη» διοργάνωσαν διαδήλωση στη Μπογκοτά στις 9 Απριλίου με σκοπό να
εκφράσουν την υποστήριξή τους στις διεξαγόμενες ειρηνευτικές συνομιλίες με τους αντάρτες των FARC, στην οποία ο
Πρόεδρος Santos και άλλοι πολιτικοί ανακοίνωσαν ότι θα συμμετάσχουν.

C 6 E / 338 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002800/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Guaranteed rights for social and political movement in Colombia

The wave of murders, kidnappings, forced displacement and imprisonment of members and cadres of the popular
movement, both by the Colombian government and by paramilitary organisations supported by the State continues
in Colombia unabated. Over the last 20 years, more than 2 900 trade unionists and more than 4 500 cadres of the
_Union Patriotica_ and other popular movements have been murdered.

The International Federation for Human Rights has identified more than 3 000 innocent young conscripts who have
fallen victim to extrajudicial killings by the Colombian army. There are still 9 500 political prisoners and 5 500 000
persons have been displaced as a result of operations by paramilitary organisations.

Organisations of the popular movement in Colombia, including the _Marcha Patriotica_, are calling on the government
to provide political guarantees for the life and physical integrity of their members.

The _Marcha Patriotica_ represents a large number of trade union associations and organisations, student and youth
organisations and organisations of farmers, teachers and intellectuals in the country. It supports the peace process in
Colombia, calling for social justice and measures for the benefit of poor farmers and workers in the country.

What is the EU High Representative’s opinion on the just demand made by _Marcha Patriotica_ to the government of
Colombia to guarantee the freedom of action, life and physical integrity of its members and its demand that 9 500
political prisoners be released?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The HR/VP reiterates the EU's firm condemnation of the use of violence. The EU has consistently called on the
government to take effective measures to ensure the safety of vulnerable parts of the population and of persons under
threat, including political and social activists, and human rights defenders. This includes the case of the Marcha
Patriótica. The EU is aware of attacks and threats against and disappearances of some of the organisation's members,
and are following these cases closely.

The HR/VP commends the Marcha's commitment to peace, as she does that of all other actors contributing to the
search for a peaceful solution to Colombia's internal conflict. She notes that the Marcha and the group Colombians
for Peace are organising a demonstration in Bogota on 9 April to express support for the ongoing peace talks with the
FARC guerrilla, which President Santos and other politicians in office have said they will join.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 339

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002801/13**

**à la Commission**
**Philippe Boulland (PPE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Compétences renforcées pour l'EFSA

Le scandale de la viande de cheval qui a éclaté en Europe a révélé des failles dans le système des contrôles sanitaires
effectués par les États membres.

L'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) fournit aux États membres, qui sont chargés d'effectuer les
contrôles nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité alimentaire, des conseils scientifiques sur les risques existants ou
émergents. L'EFSA ne se limite pour le moment qu'à un rôle consultatif et informatif.

Alors que le contrôle des aliments relève de la compétence des États membres, la France a vu son nombre d'experts
vétérinaires diminuer de 20 % en 7ans (4 600 en 2013). La baisse du nombre d'experts n'est-elle pas liée à la hausse du
nombre de scandales et de fraudes consécutive à la baisse du nombre de contrôles?

Il semble y avoir un parallèle entre la baisse du nombre d'experts et la hausse du nombre de scandales et de fraudes
consécutive à la baisse du nombre de contrôles.

La Commission envisagerait-elle de renforcer les pouvoirs de l'EFSA, qui pourrait imposer une obligation de moyens
aux États membres (par la mise en place d'un nombre de contrôles obligatoires dans les pays européens) et non une
simple obligation de résultat en matière de sécurité alimentaire dans le marché intérieur?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(30 avril 2013)_

Le domaine de compétence de l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) se limite à l'évaluation des
risques, sur la base du principe de séparation entre l'évaluation des risques et la gestion des risques.

Cette séparation vise à garantir l'indépendance du conseil scientifique ( [1] ). L'EFSA est une agence autonome, et son
comité scientifique et ses groupes scientifiques qui fournissent les avis scientifiques sont constitués d'experts
indépendants.

Les institutions de l'UE sont responsables de la gestion des risques (politique, législation et contrôles).

La responsabilité du respect de la législation alimentaire incombe aux États membres ( [2] ), qui sont priés d'instaurer un
système de contrôles officiels pour s'assurer du respect, par les opérateurs, des exigences légales et de sanctionner les
infractions. Dans le cas évoqué par l'Honorable Parlementaire, les systèmes de contrôles officiels ont bien fonctionné
et permis de détecter des violations des règles applicables. De plus, la Commission a adopté le 19 février 2013 un plan
de contrôle coordonné demandant aux États membres de réaliser: a) des tests ADN permettant de détecter la présence
de viande de cheval et b) des contrôles permettant de détecter la présence de phénylbutazone dans la viande de cheval.
La Commission a pris en charge une partie du coût de ces tests.

La Commission estime que la séparation des responsabilités en matière d'évaluation et de gestion des risques est
essentielle et n'a pas l'intention de modifier le domaine de compétence de l'EFSA.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 178/2002 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 28 janvier 2002 établissant les principes généraux et les prescriptions

générales de la législation alimentaire, instituant l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments et fixant des procédures relatives à la sécurité des
denrées alimentaires, JO L 31 du 1.2.2002, p. 1. Règlement modifié en dernier lieu par le règlement (CE) n° 1642/2003 (JO L 245 du 29.9.2003,
p. 4).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 882/2004 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relatif aux contrôles officiels effectués pour s'assurer de la

conformité avec la législation sur les aliments pour animaux et les denrées alimentaires et avec les dispositions relatives à la santé animale et au
bien-être des animaux, JO L 165 du 30.4.2004, p. 1.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

C 6 E / 340 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002801/13**

**to the Commission**
**Philippe Boulland (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Enhanced competences for EFSA

The horsemeat scandal that broke out in Europe has revealed flaws in the system of health checks carried out by
Member States.

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) provides Member States, which are responsible for carrying out the
necessary checks to ensure food safety, with scientific advice on existing or emerging risks. At present, EFSA only has
an advisory and informative role.

Whereas food control is a matter for Member States, France has seen the number of its veterinary experts drop by
20% in 7 years (4 600 in 2013). Is the drop in the number of experts not linked to the rise in the number of scandals
and frauds following the fall in the number of checks?

There seems to be a link between the drop in the number of experts and the rise in the number of scandals and frauds
following the fall in the number of checks.

Does the Commission plan to increase EFSA’s remit, enabling it to impose a best endeavours obligation on Member
States (by setting up various compulsory checks in European countries) and not simply an obligation to achieve a
result in terms of food safety within the internal market?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) remit is limited to risk assessment on the basis of the principle of
separation of risk assessment and risk management.

This separation was made in order to ensure the independence of scientific advice ( [1] ). EFSA is an autonomous agency
and its Scientific Committee and Panels providing the scientific opinions are composed of independent experts.

The EU institutions are responsible for risk management (policy, legislation and controls).

The responsibility for enforcing food legislation lies with Member States ( [2] ) which are required to establish a system of
official controls to verify compliance by operators with legal requirements and to sanction non-compliance. In the
case referred to by the Honourable Member, the national official controls systems have worked well and have allowed
the identification of violations of applicable rules. In addition, on 19 February 2013, the Commission adopted a
coordinated control plan asking Member States to perform: a) DNA testing for horsemeat and b) controls for the
detection of Phenylbutazone in horsemeat. The Commission paid part of the costs of the testing.

The Commission considers that the separation of the responsibilities of risk assessment and risk management is
essential and does not intend to change EFSA's remit.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and

requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31,
1.2.2002, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1642/2003, (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003, p. 4).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the

verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 341

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002802/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)**

_(11 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ NAIADES-programma

In mei 2013 lanceert de Europese Commissie het langverwachte Naiades II-actieplan voor de periode 2014-2020.

Dit ambitieuze vervolgprogramma voorziet in het versterken van het aandeel van de binnenvaart en het versterken
van zijn milieubonus tegen 2020. De binnenvaart levert maar liefst een CO 2 ‐besparing tussen 43 % en 63 % in
vergelijking met het wegvervoer en levert dus een belangrijke bijdrage aan de resource efficiency en CO 2        uitstootvermindering van ons transportsysteem.

De binnenvaart is een onmisbare schakel in het oplossen van de oplopende files en capaciteitstekorten op de weg. Het
fileprobleem brengt veel kosten met zich mee en tast het concurrentievermogen van onze bedrijven aan. In landen als
Nederland is een substantiële verhoging van het modale aandeel van de binnenvaart onontbeerlijk om een verdere
verkeerstoename in goede banen te leiden.

Ondertussen leidt het MFF-akkoord (2014-2020) binnen de Raad tot een vermindering van het transportbudget van
het Connecting Europe Facility-programma.

1. Hoe ziet de Commissie de voortgang van het Naiades II-programma met een verminderd budget, wetende dat
bij de mid-term review van het eerste Naiades-programma (SEC(2011)0453 final) al aan het licht kwam dat de
implementatie door onvoldoende middelen tekort is geschoten?

2. Welke maatregelen beschouwt de Commissie als belangrijk voor het versterken van het modale aandeel van de
binnenvaart en het versterken van zijn milieubonus?

3. Welk minimumbudget acht de Commissie noodzakelijk om deze maatregelen daadwerkelijk en efficiënt te
implementeren?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(30 april 2013)_

De Commissie is van mening dat de binnenvaart als rendabele, energie-efficiënte en veilige wijze van vervoer een
belangrijke rol moet spelen in het vervoerssysteem van de EU. Om het aandeel van de binnenvaart te versterken en de
milieuprestaties ervan te verbeteren, is de Commissie voornemens om het NAIADES-actieplan ( [1] ) te herzien voor de
periode 2013-2020. Het actieplan spitst zich toe op de kwaliteitsaspecten van deze wijze van vervoer, met inbegrip
van een verbetering van het infrastructuurnetwerk voor de binnenvaart, innovatie, emissiereductie, banen en
vaardigheden, en de integratie van de binnenvaart in de multimodale logistieke keten.

Op EU-niveau is de financiering van het plan afkomstig uit de financieringsfaciliteit voor Europese verbindingen
( _Connecting Europe Facility_ — CEF) ( [2] ) voor investeringen in infrastructuur en voor het milieuvriendelijker maken van
de vloot, en uit Horizon 2020, het kaderprogramma voor innovatie, onderzoek en ontwikkeling. De specifieke
maatregelen van het plan en de financiering ervan worden uitgewerkt wanneer de details van de CEF en van het
Horizon 2020-kaderprogramma bekend zijn. Deze worden momenteel besproken in de Raad en in het Parlement.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2006) 6 definitief.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665.

C 6 E / 342 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002802/13**

**to the Commission**
**Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Naiades programme

In May 2013 the Commission will be launching the long-awaited Naiades II action plan for the 2014-2020 period.

This ambitious follow-up programme aims to produce an increase in the share of traffic carried by inland waterways
and boost its environmental subsidy until 2020. Transport by inland waterways delivers a sizeable CO 2 saving of
between 43 and 63% in comparison to road transport and thus delivers an important contribution to resource
efficiency and CO 2 emissions reduction for our transport system.

Transport by inland waterways has a vital part to play in solving the problems of ever-increasing traffic jams and
capacity shortfalls on our roads. The issue of traffic jams gives rise to major costs and affects the competitiveness of
our businesses. In countries like the Netherlands, a substantial increase in the modal share of inland waterways
transport is indispensable in order to manage further increases in traffic volume.

Meanwhile, the agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) in the Council will result in a
reduction of the budget for the Connecting Europe Facility.

1. How does the Commission see the way forward for the Naiades II programme with a smaller budget, given that
we have already seen from the mid-term review of the first Naiades programme (SEC(2011)0453 final) that there
were shortcomings in implementation as a result of insufficient funds?

2. What measures does the Commission view as important in order to increase inland waterways transport’s
modal share and to boost its environmental subsidy?

3. What minimum budget does the Commission view as necessary for the proper and efficient implementation of
these measures?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission considers that inland waterway should play an important role as an economic, energy-efficient and
safe mode of transport for the EU transport system. In order to help inland waterway transport to increase its modal
share and to improve its environmental performance, the Commission is planning the renewal of the NAIADES
action programme ( [1] ) for the period 2013-2020. The programme will focus on the quality aspects of this transport
mode including improvement of the inland waterway infrastructure network, innovation, emission reduction, jobs
and skills and the integration of inland waterway transport into the multimodal logistic chain.

At EU level, the financing of the programme will come from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) ( [2] ) for infrastructure
investments and for the greening of the fleet as well as from Horizon 2020 for innovation and research and
development. The details of the specific actions of the programme and their financing will be worked out when the
details of the CEF and Horizon 2020 instruments which are currently under discussion in the Council and Parliament
are known.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2006) 6 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 343

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002804/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Members of the Commission and Working Time Directive rules

Have any current members of the Commission worked in excess of the hours allowed under the rules of the Working
Time Directive ?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

The directive concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time No 2003/88/EC ( [1] ) allows in its
Article 17§1 point a) for derogations from certain provisions of the directive, including the limit to working time, in
the case of managing executives, and persons in similar positions, who can decide autonomously on the duration of
their own working time. The Members of the Commission are not subject to this directive.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9.

C 6 E / 344 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002805/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fish discards in waters covered by the CFP

What is the Commission’s current estimate of fisheries discards — by species — in waters covered by the common
fisheries policy?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 May 2013)_

The most recent assessment on discarding was carried out by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 2005
who estimated global discards at around 7 million tonnes from a global catch of around 80 million tonnes. The total
level of discards within waters covered by the common fisheries policy (CFP) was estimated around 1.4 million tonnes
with discards highest in the North Atlantic including the North Sea (13% of total catches). In other areas covered by
the CFP, for example in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the FAO put discards at 4.9% of catches, while in the Baltic,
the rate was only 1.4% on average.

As part of the impact assessment to support the CFP reform ( [1] ), an assessment of the extent of discarding across EU
fisheries was carried out. Discard rates by fishery were classified as high (greater than 40% of total catches), medium
(between 15-39%) or low (less than 15%) based on the best available data. Examples of fisheries identified in this study
with high discard rates (up to 70%) included mixed demersal trawl fisheries widespread in the North Atlantic and in
Mediterranean as well as flatfish beam trawl fisheries in the North Sea and dredge fisheries in the Mediterranean.
Pelagic fisheries in the North Atlantic along with cod fisheries in the Baltic have low discarding rates.

In the framework of the Reform of the CFP the Commission has proposed to gradually phase out discarding. The
European Parliament in its position emerging from Plenary on 6 February 2013 and the Council in its General
Approach of 26 February 2013 supported this.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 345

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002806/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fraud involving EU grants

How many cases of fraud involving EU grants have led to (i) a criminal prosecution and (ii) a prison sentence over the
last five years?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission doesn't have separate statistics on cases of fraud involving EU grants which have led to a criminal
prosecution and a prison sentence. However, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the most
recent annual report of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF ( [1] )), in which he will find in Section 3.4 ‘Monitoring
phase’, in the Table 6 ‘Overview of progress on judicial actions in actions created between 2006-2011’ on page 22
information concerning the judicial follow-up of all files transmitted by OLAF to the Member States authorities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/2011/olaf_report_2011_en.pdf

C 6 E / 346 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002807/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Functions hosted in Brussels for the benefit of EU diplomats

Can the Commission list all functions hosted in Brussels over the last two years for the benefit of diplomats accredited
to the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 April 2013)_

The European Commission confirms that the President, Vice-Presidents and Members of the College offer a New Year
reception for the diplomatic corps accredited to the EU, once a year, normally in January.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 347

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002808/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ International organisations to which the EU sends delegates

Would the Commission list the international organisations to which the EU sends delegates, indicating the role of
the EU in relation to that body (observer, voting member, etc)?

**Question for written answer E-002822/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — International entities to which the European External Action Service is accredited

Can the Vice-President/High Representative list all international entities to which the European External Action
Service is accredited?

**Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The EU participates in numerous international organisations and follows their deliberations closely and on a regular
basis. The activities of these organisations are covered either by staff of the relevant EU Delegations and/or by
Brussels-based officials.

In most international organisations/fora, the EU has observer status and no voting rights. Exceptions to this rule apply
include FAO, WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission where the EU participates as a member with equivalent
rights.

A table indicating the status of the EU in the main international organisations and UN bodies is attached to this

answer.

C 6 E / 348 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002809/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Military staff working for the EU

How many military staff, by nationality and by rank, work for the EU?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 May 2013)_

In accordance with the High Representative's decision of 23 March 2011 establishing the rules applicable to national
experts seconded to the European External Action Service (EEAS), there are 176 military staff in the EU Military Staff
in the EEAS. The ranks and nationalities are presented in the table in annex, sent directly to the Honourable Member
and to Parliament's Secretariat. The Honourable Member is also invited to consult the reply to previous Written
Question E-002810/2013. Furthermore, there are 32 military experts working in the EEAS crisis structures (CMPD,
CPCC and INTCEN). Such expertise also exists in some of the EU agencies such as the European Defense Agency.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 349

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002810/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU military staff posted to non-EU headquarters

Can the Commission say how many EU military staff are posted to non-EU headquarters, and where?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

The EU Military Staff has a Liaison Officer to the UN in New York, USA, and a Liaison Cell of four military in NATO
HQ SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

In addition there is a temporary Liaison Officer to Ecowas HQ in Abuja, Nigeria, related to the logistic support of
the EU to Ecowas AFISMA in Mali.

C 6 E / 350 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002811/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU battlegroups: declared capabilities and key assets

Can the Commission provide a list of EU battlegroups, with associated declared capabilities and key assets?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

All provided Battlegroups (BG) as shown in the BG roster comply with the requirements stated in the EU BattlegroupConcept.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 351

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002812/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Register of national military units and assets available to the common foreign and security policy

Can the Vice-President/High Representative please indicate the extent of the current register of national military units
and assets designated as being available to the common foreign and security policy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), developed in 2003, defined the EU's autonomy in decision-making
and the voluntary nature of the commitments made. It introduced three classified catalogues to be used in the
development of EU military capabilities:

(1) Requirements Catalogue (RC), identifying the agreed military capabilities required to pursue the EU military
level of ambition set in the Headline Goal (HLG) 2010;

(2) Force Catalogue (FC), compiling the voluntary Member States’ contributions in terms of capabilities;

(3) Progress Catalogue (PC), presenting the prioritised capability shortfalls and the related operational risks.

The FC presents the military capabilities, which Member States could make available to EU CSDP operations against
the required capabilities as defined in the RC. Thus, the FC forms a detailed basis for determining the deficits possibly
leading to capability shortfalls.

Since, as stated in the CDM, the FC is not based on firm Member States commitments but on their voluntary and
preliminary pledges, the EEAS has only a snapshot of the potential availability of military capabilities for CSDP needs
for a designated target year. For that reason, Member States contributions to the FC are periodically collected. The
next FC will be developed in the autumn of 2013. At no stage are Member States obliged to contribute to operations
or missions. Absolute provision will be subject to a case by case basis for specific operations/missions based on
consensus among the 27 EU Member States.

C 6 E / 352 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002813/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU decision-making under qualified majority voting

Can the Commission say what proportion of EU decision-making is currently assessed as falling under qualified
majority voting? Please provide a breakdown by subject area.

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The decision-making procedures that involve qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of the EU are clearly set
out in the Treaties. As regards legislative procedures, approximately four fifths of the legal bases for the adoption of
legislative acts provide for QMV. Parliament made an in-depth analysis of legislative and non-legislative procedures in
its ‘Resolution of 20 February 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2007/2286(INI)) ( [1] ). It is not for the Commission to
make assessments about actual proportions of decision-making involving QMV in the Council.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-55.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 353

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002814/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Accidents and injuries — EU Agency for Safety and Health at Work

Can the Commission provide a list of all accidents and injuries over the past five years (for which figures are available)
that have been declared as occurring: (i) in the EU Agency for Safety and Health at Work, EU-OSHA; (ii) in the health
and safety unit of the responsible DG?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

1. Following the Eurostat methodological definition of the ESAW data collection, which defines an ‘accident at
work’ as ‘a discrete occurrence in the course of work which leads to physical or mental harm’, one accident at work
occurred at the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work from 2010 to 2013;

2. Following the same Eurostat definition, no accidents at work occurred in the Health, Safety and Hygiene at
Work Unit of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion from 2007 to April 2013

C 6 E / 354 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002815/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU employees claiming diplomatic immunity

Can the Commission indicate the number of cases since 2000 in which EU employees have claimed diplomatic
immunity?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

The Commission would point out that it receives the occasional request from national judicial authorities for a waiver
of the immunity its staff members enjoy, whether under the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic
relations when they are posted outside the territory of the Union, or under Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and
Immunities of the European Union.

According to the data held by the Commission, we are able to inform the Honourable Member that, since
January 2010, the Commission has received six requests for a waiver of immunity from legal proceedings for a
member of its staff, to which the Commission responded favourably.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 355

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002816/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU staff arrests

Can the Commission state the number of occasions on which EU staff have been arrested for each year since 2000,
indicating the country of arrest and the charges brought?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The Commission does not have centralised data regarding EU staff on this issue.

The Commission would point out that the definition of arrest varies from one Member State to another.

C 6 E / 356 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002817/13**

**to the Commission**
**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission

Can the Commission provide copies of the findings of its Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) for each year
from 2009 onwards?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2013)_

The Commission will send directly to the Honourable Member and to the Parliament's Secretariat copies of the annual
reports of its Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, which lists the
sanctions per category and gives a brief summary of the relevant facts. The report for 2012 is currently under
preparation and is therefore not yet available.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 357

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002818/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — total workforce

Can the Vice-President/High Representative indicate the total workforce of the European External Action Service,
including locally employed staff, and give comparative figures for the diplomatic services of each Member State?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The European External Action Service (EEAS) currently employs 3 392 staff altogether, 1 450 in Brussels and 1 942
in EU Delegations (of which 1134 EEAS local agents).

The EEAS does not have official figures for the staffing of EU national foreign ministries. Furthermore, it is difficult to
compare these services on a reliable basis as national practices can vary considerably, in particular when it comes to
aid management or consular matters. Finally, the EEAS is not represented in EU Member States whereas this is
generally an important component of national diplomatic services.

There are however a series of studies undertaken by academic institutions that provide some indications of orders of
magnitude of the different services.

C 6 E / 358 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002819/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — employment of EU nationals and local staff

Can the Vice-President/High Representative say how many (i) EU nationals and (ii) locally employed staff are currently
employed by the European External Action Service, by location?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The European External Action Service (EEAS) currently employs 3392 staff altogether, 1450 in Brussels and 1942 in
EU Delegations. In the EU Delegations, the EEAS has 808 EU expatriate staff (EU civil servants, seconded national
experts, EU contract agents and Young Professionnals) and 1134 EEAS local agents.

Deatailed chart by location can be found in annex, which is sent directly to the Honourable Member and to
Parliament's Secretariat.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 359

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002820/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — European External Action Service — vehicle fleet

Can the Vice-President/High Representative state the size of the vehicle fleet of the European External Action Service
(EEAS)? What is the average price of an EEAS vehicle? What is the most common vehicle used by the EEAS?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

In Brussels, there is no EEAS vehicle fleet. Through a Service Level Agreement, the Commission (Office des
Infrastructures de Bruxelles) makes vehicles available to senior EEAS staff on a limited basis.

In the 141 Delegations, the size of the vehicle fleet is about 650 cars (including the armoured cars) which are used by
EEAS and COM staff. Cars are used for service purpose only, including diplomatic activities and visits to development
projects inside the countries. The number of cars in each Delegation depends on their size, the local security
environment and transport systems. Cars are usually bought locally if possible and EU public procurement rules are
followed when purchasing. With the exception of the armoured cars, the average prize is EUR 25 000. Delegations
use a range of vehicles for different purposes (official cars for Heads of Delegations, general service cars and 4X4
vehicles for field visits).

C 6 E / 360 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002821/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Art commissioned by the European External Action Service

Can the Vice-President/High Representative list the works of art commissioned by the European External Action
Services, along with their cost, since it was established? What is the process for deciding upon new art for EU
embassies/missions?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The EEAS has not commissioned any art works to decorate its delegation since 1 January 2011 and the tight EEAS
budget does not leave any margin for any spending on art. Occasionally, the EEAS, and EU Delegations, have
benefited from protocol gifts of works of art from international partners.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 361

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002823/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis**

**de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) y Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Grupo de crisis de la UE para la gestión turística

La industria del turismo en la EU genera alrededor del 5 % del PIB de la Unión y emplea a cerca del 5,2 % de la
población activa total. Es más, si se toman también en consideración los servicios relacionados con el turismo, las
cifras ascienden al 10 % del PIB y al 12 % de la población activa total.

En algunas regiones de la Unión, el turismo es la actividad económica principal. Por ello, los efectos de una catástrofe
natural o de otro tipo de desastre pueden resultar insoportables tanto para las economías locales como para los
Estados miembros implicados, no solo debido a los esfuerzos de reconstrucción y rehabilitación, sino también por la
disminución de los ingresos por turismo. Esto ocurre porque los medios de comunicación tienden de forma inevitable
a distorsionar la situación real, lo cual trae consigo graves consecuencias para la imagen del destino turístico.

La crisis económica y monetaria está provocando un estancamiento e incluso una recesión en el sector turístico de
algunas regiones de la UE.

El Tratado de Lisboa confiere nuevas competencias compartidas a la Unión, incluida la promoción de acciones o de
instrumentos capaces de crear un valor añadido europeo mediante el desarrollo de estrategias transnacionales,
consistentes en el intercambio de buenas prácticas, la accesibilidad a los datos y el análisis de estos.

Entre los beneficiarios del programa COSME (Programa para la Competitividad de las Empresas y para las Pequeñas y
Medianas Empresas) se incluyen las PYME del sector turístico, al que se destinan 131 millones de euros de los
2 500 millones que conforman el presupuesto total.

1. A la vista de las competencias compartidas que confiere el Tratado de Lisboa, ¿estáconsiderando la Comisión
establecer un pequeño grupo o un organismo para gestionar las situaciones de crisis y proporcionar asistencia en
materia de turismo a los medios decomunicación y a los operadores, con el objetivo de disminuir las
consecuenciasnegativas de la transmisión de información engañosa que puede dañar la imagen turísticade un lugar?

2. En caso afirmativo, ¿sobre qué base se desarrollaría este pequeño grupo u organismo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión reconoce que las catástrofes naturales y otras situaciones de peligro pueden tener efectos importantes en
la industria del turismo y, en general, en las economías locales de las regiones y los Estados miembros afectados. Estos
y aquellas son los principales responsables de gestionar las emergencias en sus territorios respectivos y de decidir si
necesitan ayuda exterior.

A nivel europeo, la Comisión puede facilitar apoyo a través del Mecanismo de Protección Civil de la Unión ( [1] ), que
facilita la cooperación en las intervenciones de protección civil en caso de emergencias graves. Sin embargo, con
arreglo al principio de subsidiariedad, solo ofrece su apoyo a petición del país afectado. Esto puede ocurrir cuando la
preparación de este país ante una catástrofe no es suficiente para darle una respuesta adecuada con los recursos
disponibles ( [2] ).

En cuanto a las crisis posteriores a las catástrofes a las que se refiere Su Señoría, la Comisión ya ha tomado medidas en
relación con la información engañosa en este contexto sobre la situación de varios destinos dentro de la Unión
Europea. Por el momento, la Comisión no ha recibido ninguna solicitud de creación de un organismo específico para
prestar asistencia en temas turísticos a los medios de comunicación y a los operadores, pero está dispuesta a seguir
estudiando con los Estados miembros y la industria turística si conviene crear tal grupo u organismo, y cuáles han de
ser sus competencias.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Un ejemplo reciente en este sentido es la intervención del Mecanismo de Protección Civil de la Unión para apoyar la lucha contra los incendios

forestales ocurridos en Portugal en septiembre de 2012.

C 6 E / 362 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Además, la Red de Respuesta ante Emergencias Turísticas ( [3] ), bajo la responsabilidad de la Organización Mundial del
Turismo, ayuda a mejorar el bienestar de los pasajeros y a limitar el efecto de las catástrofes naturales y de origen
humano sobre el turismo.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 363

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002823/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE),**

**Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) και Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ομάδα αντιμετώπισης κρίσης στη διαχείριση του ενωσιακού τουρισμού

Η τουριστική βιομηχανία της ΕΕ αποδίδει περίπου το 5% του συνολικού ΑΕγχΠ της Ένωσης, αντιστοιχώντας περίπου στο
5,2% του συνολικού εργατικού δυναμικού· αν ληφθούν υπόψη και οι υπηρεσίες που συνδέονται με τον τουρισμό, τα
αντίστοιχα ποσοστά ξεπερνούν το 10% του ΑΕγχΠ και 12% του εργατικού δυναμικού.

Σε μερικές ευρωπαϊκές περιφέρειες ο τουρισμός είναι η βασική οικονομική δραστηριότητα, οι δε επιπτώσεις από μια φυσική
καταστροφή ή άλλο κίνδυνο μπορεί να αποδειχθούν αβάσταχτες για τις τοπικές οικονομίες και το πληγέν κράτος μέλος, όχι
μόνο από την άποψη των προσπαθειών ανοικοδόμησης και αποκατάστασης αλλά και εξαιτίας της πτώσης των εσόδων από
τον τουρισμό, δεδομένου ότι τα ΜΜΕ τείνουν πάντα να διαστρεβλώνουν την πραγματικότητα, πράγμα που επιφέρει
αρνητικότατες επιπτώσεις στην τουριστική εικόνα του τόπου.

Η οικονομική και νομισματική κρίση προκαλεί στασιμότητα και σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις ύφεση στην τουριστική
δραστηριότητα ορισμένων περιφερειών της ΕΕ.

Η Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας έχει δώσει νέες συντρέχουσες αρμοδιότητες στην Ένωση, όπως η προώθηση μέτρων ή μέσων που
μπορούν να δημιουργήσουν ευρωπαϊκή προστιθέμενη αξία μέσω της αναπτύξεως διακρατικών στρατηγικών, χάρη στην
ανταλλαγή βέλτιστων πρακτικών και τη διαθεσιμότητα και ανάλυση δεδομένων.

Στους δικαιούχους του προγράμματος COSME (Ανταγωνιστικότητα των Επιχειρήσεων και των ΜΜΕ) περιλαμβάνονται ΜΜΕ
του τουριστικού τομέα, ενώ 131 εκατ. ευρώ από το συνολικό του προϋπολογισμό 2,5 δισ. ευρώ για την περίοδο
2014-2020 διατίθενται στον τουρισμό.

1. Με δεδομένες τις συντρέχουσες αρμοδιότητες που προβλέπει η Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας, εξετάζει η Επιτροπή το
ενδεχόμενο να συγκροτήσει μία μικρή ομάδα ή/και φορέα για τη διαχείριση κρίσεων μετά από καταστροφές και την
προσφορά υπηρεσιών σχετικών με τον τουρισμό στα μέσα ενημέρωσης και στους πράκτορες, με σκοπό να αμβλύνονται οι
αρνητικές επιπτώσεις από τη διάδοση παραπλανητικών πληροφοριών που μπορεί να καταστρέψουν την εικόνα ενός
τουριστικού προορισμού;

2. Αν ναι, σε ποια βάση μπορεί να αναπτυχθεί μια τέτοια μικρή ομάδα ή/και φορέας;

**Απάντηση του κ. Tajani εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει ότι οι φυσικές και άλλες καταστροφές μπορεί να επιφέρουν σημαντικά πλήγματα στην τουριστική
βιομηχανία και γενικώς στις τοπικές οικονομίες των περιφερειών και των κρατών μελών. Τα κράτη μέλη και οι περιφέρειές
τους φέρουν την κύρια ευθύνη για τη διαχείριση των καταστάσεων έκτακτης ανάγκης στην επικράτειά τους, καθώς και για τη
λήψη απόφασης ως προς το κατά πόσον χρειάζονται εξωτερική βοήθεια.

Σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο, η Επιτροπή μπορεί να παράσχει υποστήριξη μέσω του μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας της ΕΕ ( [1] ), ο
οποίος διευκολύνει την συνεργασία στις επεμβάσεις παροχής βοήθειας πολιτικής προστασίας, σε περιπτώσεις έκτακτης
ανάγκης. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με την αρχή της επικουρικότητας, η εν λόγω υποστήριξη παρέχεται μόνο κατόπιν αιτήματος της
πληγείσας χώρας. Αυτό μπορεί να συμβεί αν η πληγείσα χώρα δεν είναι επαρκώς προετοιμασμένη, όσον αφορά τους
διαθέσιμους πόρους ( [2] ), για την αντιμετώπιση της καταστροφής.

Σχετικά με την ερώτηση του αξιότιμου βουλευτή ως προς τη διαχείριση καταστάσεων κρίσης μετά από καταστροφές, η
Επιτροπή έχει ήδη λάβει μέτρα όσον αφορά τις παραπλανητικές πληροφορίες σχετικά με την κατάσταση μετά από
καταστροφές σε διάφορους προορισμούς εντός της ΕΕ. Προς το παρόν, η Επιτροπή δεν έχει λάβει καμία αίτηση σύστασης
ειδικού φορέα για την παροχή βοήθειας στο πλαίσιο της προώθησης του τουρισμού στα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης και στους
τουριστικούς πράκτορες, αλλά είναι πρόθυμη να εξετάσει περαιτέρω από κοινού με τα κράτη μέλη και τη βιομηχανία
τουρισμού κατά πόσον θα πρέπει να συσταθεί μια τέτοια ομάδα ή φορέας και ποιες θα πρέπει να είναι η αρμοδιότητές τους.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Ένα πρόσφατο παράδειγμα υπό αυτή την έννοια είναι η παρέμβαση του μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας της ΕΕ στο πλαίσιο της στήριξης της

Πορτογαλίας για την καταπολέμηση των δασικών πυρκαγιών τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2012.

C 6 E / 364 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Επιπλέον, το δίκτυο Tourism Emergency Response Network ( [3] ) (TERN) για την αντιμετώπιση καταστάσεων έκτακτης
ανάγκης, υπό την αιγίδα του Παγκόσμιου Οργανισμού Τουρισμού (UNWTO), συμβάλλει στη βελτίωση της ευημερίας των
ταξιδιωτών και στην άμβλυνση των επιπτώσεων των φυσικών και των ανθρωπογενών καταστροφών στον τομέα του
τουρισμού.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 365

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002823/13**

**à la Commission**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE),**

**Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) et Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Groupe de crise sur la gestion du tourisme dans l'Union

L'industrie du tourisme génère quelque 5 % du PIB total de l'Union et emploie environ 5,2 % de la main d'œuvre
totale; lorsqu'on y ajoute les services liés au tourisme, les chiffres s'élèvent à plus de 10 % du PIB et 12 % de la main
d'œuvre.

Dans certaines régions d'Europe, le tourisme est la principale activité économique. Les répercussions d'une
catastrophe naturelle ou d'un autre type de risque peuvent s'avérer impossibles à assumer pour les économies locales
et l'État membre concerné, non seulement en raison des efforts nécessaires à la reconstruction et à la remise en état,
mais aussi à cause de la baisse des recettes touristiques résultant de l'image faussée que les médias ont inévitablement
tendance à présenter et qui a des conséquences désastreuses sur la réputation de la destination.

La crise économique et monétaire provoque une stagnation, voire une récession, de l'activité touristique dans
certaines régions de l'Union.

Le traité de Lisbonne a conféré de nouvelles compétences partagées à l'Union, telles que la promotion d'actions ou
d'instruments capables de créer une valeur ajoutée européenne par le développement de stratégies transnationales, au
moyen de l'échange de bonnes pratiques, ainsi que de la mise à disposition et de l'analyse de données.

Le programme pour la compétitivité des entreprises et des PME (COSME) compte des PME du secteur du tourisme
parmi ses bénéficiaires. Sur son budget total de 2,5 milliards d'euros pour la période 2014-2020, 131 millions d'euros
sont alloués au tourisme.

1. Au vu des compétences partagées prévues par le traité de Lisbonne, la Commission envisage-t-elle de créer un
petit groupe et/ou un organe qui serait chargé de gérer les situations de crise survenant à la suite d'une catastrophe et
de fournir une assistance en matière de tourisme aux médias et aux opérateurs, afin de réduire les répercussions
négatives que peut avoir la diffusion d'informations trompeuses susceptibles d'anéantir la réputation d'une
destination?

2. Dans l'affirmative, sur quelle base un tel petit groupe et/ou organe pourrait-il être créé?

**Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission**

_(16 mai 2013)_

La Commission est consciente que les catastrophes naturelles et les autres risques majeurs peuvent avoir de graves
conséquences sur l'activité touristique et, en général, sur les économies locales des régions et des États membres
concernés. C'est aux États membres et à leurs régions qu'appartient la responsabilité primaire de gérer les urgences se
déclarant sur leur territoire et de décider s'ils ont besoin d'une assistance extérieure.

Au niveau européen, la Commission peut fournir une aide par l'intermédiaire du mécanisme de protection civile de
l'UE ( [1] ), qui facilite la coopération en ce qui concerne les interventions de secours relevant de la protection civile en cas
d'urgence majeure. Cependant, conformément au principe de subsidiarité, le mécanisme n'est activé que si le pays
touché le demande, ce qui peut se produire lorsque les ressources du pays en question ne lui permettent pas de réagir
efficacement à une catastrophe naturelle ( [2] ).

Pour ce qui est de la question de l'Honorable Parlementaire relative à la gestion des situations de crise postérieures aux
catastrophes, la Commission a déjà pris des mesures concernant les informations trompeuses circulant sur ce type de
situation dans différentes destinations touristiques au sein de l'UE. Pour le moment, la Commission n'a pas reçu de
demande de création d'un organe spécifique susceptible de fournir une assistance «Tourisme» aux médias et aux
opérateurs, mais elle est disposée à examiner avec les États membres et les professionnels du tourisme si un tel groupe
ou organe devrait être créé et quel devrait être son mandat.

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( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_fr.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Parmi les exemples récents, on peut citer l'intervention du mécanisme de protection civile de l'UE pour soutenir le Portugal dans la lutte contre les

feux de forêt qui ont ravagé le pays en septembre 2012.

C 6 E / 366 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

En outre, le Tourism Emergency Response Network ( [3] ) (réseau d'intervention d'urgence dans le domaine du tourisme,
TERN), placé sous la responsabilité de l'Organisation mondiale du tourisme (OMT), contribue à améliorer le bien-être
des voyageurs et à réduire l'impact des catastrophes naturelles et d'origine humaine sur le tourisme.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 367

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002823/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis**

**de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) e Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Gruppo UE di gestione delle crisi nel settore del Turismo

L'industria del turismo dell'UE crea circa il 5 % del PIL dell'Unione e rappresenta circa il 5,2 % della forza lavoro totale;
se si considerano anche i servizi connessi il dato sale oltre il 10 % del PIL e il 12 % della forza lavoro complessiva.

Per talune regioni d'Europa il turismo è la principale attività economica e gli effetti negativi a seguito di una calamità
naturale o altri rischi possono diventare insopportabili per le economie locali e per gli Stati membri, non solo per gli
sforzi di ricostruzione e riabilitazione, ma anche a causa di una diminuzione delle entrate da turismo, dato che i media
inevitabilmente tendono a distorcere la realtà, con conseguenze enormi per l'immagine della destinazione colpita.

Le crisi economiche e monetarie creano stagnazione e, in alcuni casi, recessione dell'attività turistica in alcune regioni
dell'Unione europea.

Il Trattato di Lisbona offre nuove competenze condivise all'Unione quali la promozione di azioni o di strumenti in
grado di creare un valore aggiunto europeo attraverso lo sviluppo di strategie transnazionali, attraverso lo scambio di
buone prassi e della disponibilità e analisi dei dati.

Il programma COSME (Programma per la competitività delle imprese e delle PMI) comprende le PMI del turismo con
131 milioni per il turismo su una proposta di bilancio di 2,5 miliardi di euro per il 2014-2020.

1. Alla luce delle competenze condivise contemplate nel Trattato di Lisbona, la Commissione considererà la
creazione di un piccolo gruppo e/o di un organismo per la gestione della crisi conseguente a un disastro, che assista,
in una prospettiva turistica, i media e gli operatori con lo scopo di ridurre gli effetti negativi di una pubblicità errata
che può distruggere l'immagine di una destinazione?

2. In caso affermativo, su quali basi si potrebbe sviluppare siffatto piccolo gruppo e/o organismo?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2013)_

La Commissione riconosce che le catastrofi naturali o pericoli critici di altra natura possano avere gravi ripercussioni
sul settore del turismo e, in generale, sulle economie locali delle regioni e degli Stati membri interessati.La
responsabilità primaria per la gestione delle emergenze sul proprio territorio e per un'eventuale richiesta di assistenza
esterna spetta agli Stati membri e alle loro regioni.

A livello europeo la Commissione può fornire sostegno mediante il meccanismo di protezione civile dell'UE ( [1] )che, in
caso di gravi emergenze, facilita la cooperazione nel corso degli interventi di soccorso della protezione civile. Essa
tuttavia rende disponibile tale sostegno solamente su richiesta dello stato colpito in ottemperanza al principio di
sussidiarietà. Ciò può verificarsi se il livello di preparazione alle catastrofi di un determinato paese si dimostra in un
caso specifico insufficiente a fornire una risposta adeguata in termini di risorse disponibili ( [2] ).

Per quanto riguarda la domanda dell'onorevole parlamentare in tema di gestione delle situazioni di crisi in seguito a
una catastrofe, la Commissione ha già preso provvedimenti in merito ad informazioni fuorvianti sulla situazione
esistente in destinazioni turistiche differenti dell'Unione in seguito alla catastrofe. Per il momento la Commissione
non ha ricevuto richieste relative all'istituzione di un organismo specifico per l'assistenza ai media e agli operatori in
tema di turismo. Ciononostante è sua intenzione svolgere ulteriori indagini in collaborazione con gli Stati membri e il
settore turistico al fine di verificare l'effettiva necessità di istituire tale organismo e, al caso, stabilirne i compiti.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) A questo proposito un esempio recente è costituito dall'intervento del meccanismo di protezione civile dell'UE a sostegno del Portogallo nella

lotta agli incendi boschivi del mese di settembre 2012.

C 6 E / 368 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Sotto la responsabilità dell'Organizzazione Mondiale del Turismo (OMT) il Tourism Emergency Response Network ( [3] )
(TERN) contribuisce inoltre a migliorare il benessere dei viaggiatori e ad alleviare gli effetti sul turismo delle catastrofi
naturali nonché di quelle causate dall'uomo.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 369

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002823/13**

**à Comissão**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis**

**de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) e Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Grupo de gestão da crise do turismo na UE

O setor do turismo gera cerca de 5 % da totalidade do PIB da União, representando aproximadamente 5,2 % do total
da força de trabalho. Se os serviços relacionados com o turismo também forem tidos em conta, os números
ascenderão a mais de 10 % do PIB e a 12 % da mão de obra, respetivamente.

Em algumas regiões da Europa, o turismo é a principal atividade económica e as consequências de um desastre natural
ou de qualquer outra catástrofe poderão não ser suportáveis para as economias locais ou para o Estado-Membro em
causa, tendo em conta, não só os esforços de reconstrução e reabilitação, mas também a queda das receitas no setor,
na medida em que os meios de comunicação social, numa circunstância dessas, tenderão inevitavelmente a distorcer a
situação real, com consequências imprevisíveis para a reputação de um determinado destino turístico.

A crise económica e monetária está a gerar situações de estagnação e, em alguns casos, de recessão na atividade
turística em algumas das regiões da União Europeia.

O Tratado de Lisboa atribuiu novas competências partilhadas à União, como é o caso do fomento de ações ou
instrumentos capazes de criar valor acrescentado europeu através do desenvolvimento de estratégias transnacionais,
por via do intercâmbio de práticas de excelência e da disponibilização e análise de dados.

Os beneficiários do Programa COSME (Competitividade das Empresas e das Pequenas e Médias Empresas) incluem as
PME do setor do turismo, estando 131 milhões de euros de um orçamento total que ascende a 2,5 mil milhões de
euros para o período 2014-2020 reservados para a atividade turística.

1. À luz das competências partilhadas conferidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa, estará a Comissão a ponderar a criação
de um pequeno grupo e/ou organismo para gerir as situações de crise após a ocorrência de desastres e para prestar um
tipo de assistência vocacionada para o turismo, tanto aos meios de comunicação social, como aos operadores, com o
propósito de minorar os efeitos negativos da transmissão de informação enganosa e passível de destruir a reputação
de um destino?

2. Em caso de resposta afirmativa, em que bases poderá alicerçar-se um grupo e/ou organismo de tão pequenas
dimensões?

**Resposta dada por Antonio Tajani em nome da Comissão**

_(16 de maio de 2013)_

A Comissão reconhece que as catástrofes naturais ou outras calamidades podem ter um impacto importante na
indústria do turismo e, de um modo geral, nas economias locais das regiões e dos Estados-Membros em causa. Os
Estados-Membros e as respetivas regiões são os primeiros responsáveis por gerir as situações de emergência no seu
território e decidir da necessidade de ajuda externa.

A nível europeu, a Comissão pode prestar apoio através do mecanismo de proteção civil da UE ( [1] ), que facilita a
cooperação em intervenções de socorro da proteção civil em caso de situações de emergência grave. No entanto, em
conformidade com o princípio da subsidiariedade, este mecanismo apenas disponibiliza apoios a pedido do país
afetado. Tal pode acontecer se, em caso de catástrofe, o país em causa não estiver suficientemente preparado para dar
uma resposta adequada em termos dos recursos que tem disponíveis ( [2] ).

Relativamente à pergunta dos Senhores Deputados sobre a gestão de situações de crise após a ocorrência de
catástrofes, a Comissão já interveio no que respeita à transmissão de informações enganosas sobre a situação póscatástrofe em diferentes destinos da UE. De momento, a Comissão não recebeu qualquer pedido de criação de um
organismo específico para prestar assistência na área do turismo aos meios de comunicação social e aos operadores,
mas está disposta a analisar de forma mais aprofundada, em cooperação com os Estados-Membros e o setor do
turismo, a pertinência da criação de um grupo ou organismo desse tipo e o eventual mandato.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Um exemplo recente é a intervenção do mecanismo de proteção civil da UE em apoio do combate aos incêndios florestais de Portugal, em

setembro de 2012.

C 6 E / 370 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Além disso, a rede de resposta a situações de emergência no turismo ( [3] ), sob a responsabilidade da Organização
Mundial do Turismo (OMT), contribui para melhorar o bem-estar dos viajantes e atenuar o impacto no setor do
turismo de catástrofes naturais e provocadas pelo homem.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 371

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002823/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis**

**de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) and Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU tourism management crisis group

The EU’s tourism industry generates around 5% of the Union’s total GDP, accounting for some 5.2% of the total
labour force; if tourism-related services are also taken into account, the figures become more than 10% of GDP and
12% of the workforce, respectively.

In some European regions, tourism is the main economic activity, and the fallout from a natural disaster or other
hazard can prove impossible for the local economies and the Member State concerned to bear, not only in view of the
reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts but also because of the fall in income from tourism, given that the media
inevitably tend to distort the real situation, with huge consequences for the destination’s image.

The economic and monetary crisis is creating stagnation and in some cases recession in tourist activity in some
regions in the EU.

The Treaty of Lisbon has conferred new shared competences on the Union, such as the promotion of actions or
instruments capable of creating European added value through the development of transnational strategies, by means
of the exchange of best practice and the availability and analysis of data.

The beneficiaries of the COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises)
programme include SMEs in the tourism sector, with EUR 131 million out of its total budget of EUR 2.5 billion for
the period 2014-2020 being allocated to tourism.

1. In view of the shared competences conferred by the Treaty of Lisbon, is the Commission considering setting up
a small group and/or body to manage post-disaster crisis situations and provide tourism-related assistance to the
media and to operators, with the aim of diminishing the negative effects of the relaying of misleading information
which can destroy a destination’s image?

2. If so, on what basis might such a small group and/or body be developed?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2013)_

The Commission acknowledges that natural disasters or other critical hazards can have major impacts on the tourism
industry and, generally, on the local economies of the regions and Member States concerned. It is the Member States
and their regions that bear the primary responsibility for managing emergencies on their territories and for deciding
whether they need external assistance.

At European level, the Commission can provide support through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism ( [1] ) which
facilitates cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies. However, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it only makes support available on request of the affected country. This
may arise if the affected country’s preparedness for a disaster is not sufficient to provide an adequate response in
terms of available resources ( [2] ).

On the Honourable Member’s question related to managing post-disaster crisis situations, the Commission has
already taken action with regard to misleading information on the post-disaster situation in different EU destinations.
For the moment, the Commission has not received any request to set up a dedicated body to provide tourism-related
assistance to the media and to operators but it is willing to further investigate with the Member States and the tourism
industry whether such a group or body should be set up and what its remit should be.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) A recent example in this sense is the intervention of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in support of Portugal’s fight against forest fire in

September 2012.

C 6 E / 372 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Furthermore, the Tourism Emergency Response Network ( [3] ) (TERN) under the responsibility of the World Tourism
Organisation (UNWTO) helps improve the well-being of travellers and to mitigate the impacts of natural and manmade disasters on tourism.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 373

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002824/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Πρωτοβουλίες για τη στήριξη της λογοθεραπείας

Με αφορμή την Ευρωπαϊκή Ημέρα Λογοθεραπείας (6 Μαρτίου) ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

—
Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με το ποσοστό των παιδιών που εκτιμάται πως αντιμετωπίζει διαταραχές στην ανάπτυξη,
στην κατανόηση και στην έκφραση του λόγου στην ΕΕ;

—
Καθώς η καθιέρωση της ευρωπαϊκής ημέρας συνιστά και πρωτοβουλίες προς την κατεύθυνση της έγκαιρης διάγνωσης
των διαταραχών αυτών, είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για τις πρόσφατες δράσεις της στον συγκεκριμένο
τομέα:

**Απάντηση της κ. Βασιλείου εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(14 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει συγκριτικά στοιχεία για την ΕΕ.

Η ομάδα εμπειρογνωμόνων υψηλού επιπέδου για τον αλφαβητισμό, την οποία έχει καταρτίσει η Επιτροπή, υπογράμμισε τη
σημασία της έγκαιρης διάγνωσης των γλωσσικών προβλημάτων. Η τελική της έκθεση ( [1] ) (η οποία δημοσιεύθηκε τον
Σεπτέμβριο του 2012) ανέφερε ότι η έγκαιρη αντιμετώπιση των γλωσσικών προβλημάτων μπορεί να αποτρέψει την εξέλιξή
τους σε μεγαλύτερα εκπαιδευτικά εμπόδια στο μέλλον. Η γλωσσική αξιολόγηση θα πρέπει να ακολουθήσει το παράδειγμα
των επιτυχών προγραμμάτων για την υγεία, τα οποία ελέγχουν την ακοή, την όραση και την ομιλία των μικρών παιδιών και
παρέχουν αξιόπιστη πρόσβαση στην επαγγελματική υποστήριξη που χρειάζονται προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσουν σχετικά
προβλήματα.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/education/literacy/what-eu/high-level-group/documents/literacy-final-report_en.pdf

C 6 E / 374 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002824/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Initiatives to support speech and language therapy

Following the European Day of Speech and Language Therapy on 6 March, will the Commission say:

—
Does it have statistics on the estimated percentage of children with speech development, comprehension and
expression difficulties in the EU?

—
As the European Day was adopted in order to promote initiatives to foster the early diagnosis of such
difficulties, is the Commission able to report any recent action in this particular sector?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

The Commission does not have comparable data for the EU.

The High Level Group of experts in the field of Literacy that was established by the Commission stressed the
importance of early diagnosis of language problems. Its final report ( [1] ) (published in September 2012) stated that, if
language problems are addressed early, they can be prevented from growing into much bigger educational obstacles
later. Language assessment should follow the example of successful health programmes which screen young children
for hearing, eyesight and speech and provide reliable access to the professional support they need to overcome
difficulties.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/education/literacy/what-eu/high-level-group/documents/literacy-final-report_en.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 375

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002825/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αποτελεσματικότητα του Προγράμματος Αμέσων Νομισματικών Συναλλαγών (OMT)

Το Πρόγραμμα Αμέσων Νομισματικών Συναλλαγών (OMT), που ανακοινώθηκε στις αρχές Σεπτεμβρίου 2012 από την ΕΚΤ,
αποσκοπούσε μεταξύ άλλων στην αντιμετώπιση του προβλήματος δανεισμού των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων στην ΕΕ. Μισό
χρόνο αργότερα, προκύπτει ότι επιχειρήσεις σε κράτη μέλη που βρίσκονται σε ύφεση καταβάλλουν ολοένα και υψηλότερους
τόκους δανεισμού. Για παράδειγμα, τον Ιανουάριο 2013, το σχετικό επιτόκιο ανήλθε στο 5,8% στην Ιταλία και στο 6% στην
Ισπανία, από 5,55% και 5,65% αντίστοιχα πριν λίγους μήνες, εγείροντας εκ των πραγμάτων ερωτηματικά για την
αποδοτικότητα του μέτρου.

—
Ποίοι κατά την Επιτροπή, οι λόγοι της πολύ περιορισμένης επιτυχίας του συγκεκριμένου μέτρου;

—
Εκτιμά ότι ο συγκεκριμένος μηχανισμός χρειάζεται είτε να ενισχυθεί είτε να αναμορφωθεί;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Μαΐου 2013)_

Καταρχάς, η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι η νομισματική πολιτική αποτελεί αποκλειστική αρμοδιότητα της ΕΚΤ, η οποία δρα με
πλήρη ανεξαρτησία σύμφωνα με την εντολή της που ορίζεται από τη Συνθήκη.

Δεύτερον, οι Άμεσες Νομισματικές Συναλλαγές θα ληφθούν υπόψη για μελλοντικές υποθέσεις σχετικά με προγράμματα
μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής ή προληπτικά προγράμματα του ΕΤΧΣ/ΕΜΣ. Μπορούν επίσης να ληφθούν υπόψη για
κράτη μέλη, τα οποία επί του παρόντος υπόκεινται σε προγράμματα μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής, όταν αποκτήσουν εκ
νέου πρόσβαση στις αγορές ομολόγων ( [1] ). Οι ΟΝΣ δεν έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί ακόμη.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html

C 6 E / 376 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002825/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Success of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme

One of the aims of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme announced by the ECB in early
September 2012 was to address the problem of borrowing by small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU. Six
months later, it would appear that enterprises in the Member States in recession are paying increasingly higher
borrowing rates. For example, in January 2013, the interest rate was 5.8% in Italy and 6% in Spain, compared with
5.55% and 5.65% a few months ago, thereby begging questions as to the success of the measure.

—
What, in the Commission’s view, are the reasons for the very limited success of this particular measure?

—
Does it consider that this particular mechanism needs to be strengthened or revised?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

First of all, the Commission recalls that monetary policy is the exclusive competence of the ECB, which acts in full
independence in line with its mandate set out by the Treaty.

Secondly, Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic
adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes. They may also be considered for Member States currently
under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access ( [1] ). The OMT has
not been yet used.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 377

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002826/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Γραφειοκρατία στις εξαγωγές

Παρόλο που το κόστος της γραφειοκρατίας είναι δύσκολο να εκτιμηθεί σε όρους ΑΕΠ, είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η
Επιτροπή για τον χρόνο που απαιτείται κατά μέσο όρο για την εξαγωγή προϊόντων από την Ελλάδα; Ποιος είναι ο ευρωπαϊκός
μέσος όρος και σε ποια κράτη μέλη παρατηρείται ο μικρότερος χρόνος;

**Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή γνωρίζει τα στοιχεία που ζητήθηκαν, τα οποία παρέχονται από την Εθνική Στρατηγική και Οδικό Χάρτη της
Ελλάδας για τη Διευκόλυνση του Εμπορίου ( [1] ). Στο έγγραφο αυτό (στις σελίδες 15 και 16), γίνεται αναφορά στην έκθεση της
Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας «Doing Business — Trading Across Border» ( [2] ). Σύμφωνα με την έκθεση αυτή, απαιτούνται 19
ημέρες για την εξαγωγή προϊόντων από την Ελλάδα, ενώ ο μέσος όρος όλων των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ είναι 11 ημέρες. Ο
βραχύτερος χρόνος για εξαγωγή προϊόντων στην ΕΕ είναι 5 ημέρες στη Δανία και την Εσθονία, ενώ τη δεύτερη θέση κατέχουν
οι Κάτω Χώρες με 6 ημέρες. Αυτά τα αριθμητικά στοιχεία αντιπροσωπεύουν τον συνολικό αριθμό ημερών που απαιτούνται
για την εξαγωγή ενός προϊόντος, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της έκδοσης των απαραίτητων εγγράφων (πιστοποιητικών, αδειών),
της εσωτερικής μεταφοράς, των τελωνειακών διαδικασιών και της διακίνησης σε λιμένες/τερματικούς σταθμούς.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.mindev.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Greece_Trade_Facilitation_Strategy_Roadmap_Oct-2012.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders

C 6 E / 378 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002826/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Red tape in exports

Although the cost of red tape is hard to estimate in terms of GDP, is the Commission able to tell me how long it takes
on average to export products from Greece? What is the European average and which Member States have the
shortest time?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the requested figures, which are provided by the National Trade Facilitation Strategy and
Roadmap for Greece ( [1] ). In this document (on page 15 and 16), reference is made to the ‘World Bank Doing Business
— Trading Across Border’ Report ( [2] ). According to this report, it takes 19 days to export goods from Greece, whereas
the average of all EU Member States is 11 days and the shortest export time in the EU is 5 days in Denmark and
Estonia, followed by 6 days in the Netherlands. These figures represent the overall number of days needed to export a
product, including the issuance of the necessary documents (certificates, licences), the inland transport, the customs
procedures and the port/terminal handlings.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.mindev.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Greece_Trade_Facilitation_Strategy_Roadmap_Oct-2012.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 379

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002827/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Οριστική κατανομή κονδυλίων προς την Ελλάδα του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση
μεταναστευτικών ροών» για το 2013

Είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για την οριστική κατανομή των κονδυλίων προς την Ελλάδα, βάσει των τεσσάρων
Ταμείων του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση μεταναστευτικών ροών», για το έτος 2013;

**Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(2 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η κατανομή των κονδυλίων για την Ελλάδα από τα τέσσερα Ταμεία του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση
των μεταναστευτικών ροών» για το 2013 έχει ως εξής:

Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων
2013: 44 033 646 ευρώ

Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Επιστροφής
2013: 35 544 340 ευρώ

Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο για τους Πρόσφυγες
2013: 3 163 323 ευρώ

Ταμείο ένταξης των υπηκόων τρίτων χωρών
2013: 4 178 416 ευρώ

Όσον αφορά το Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων, η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι το 20% της αντίστοιχης γραμμής του
προϋπολογισμού τέθηκε σε αποθεματικό από την αρμόδια για τον προϋπολογισμό αρχή. Εάν δεν αποδεσμευθεί το
αποθεματικό, ενδέχεται μείωση 20% των κονδυλίων από το Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων για όλα τα κράτη μέλη για το 2013.

C 6 E / 380 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002827/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Final allocation of funds to Greece under the 2013 general programme entitled Solidarity and management of
migration flows (Solid)

Is the Commission in a position to advise me of the final allocation of funds to Greece based on the four funds of the
2013 Solid general programme?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The breakdown of the allocations for Greece under the four Funds of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and
Management of Migration Flows’ for 2013 is indicated below.

External Borders Fund — 2013: EUR 44 033 646

European Return Fund — 2013: EUR 35 544 340

European Refugee Fund — 2013: EUR 3 163 323

European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals — 2013: EUR 4 178 416

As regards the External Borders Fund, the Commission recalls that 20% of the respective budget line was put into
reserve by the budgetary authority. If the reserve is not released, there could be a 20% reduction of 2013 allocations
under the External Borders Fund for all the Member States.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 381

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002828/13**
**à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

**Louis Michel (ALDE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ VP/HR — Camp Liberty

Suite à l'attaque du 9 février 2013, perpétrée contre les réfugiés iraniens du camp Liberty, qui avait fait six morts et
plus de soixante blessés, le sort de ces 3 400 personnes occupe à nouveau l'actualité internationale et nécessite plus
que jamais une solution.

Cette attaque survient près d'un an après le début du transfert des 3 400 réfugiés iraniens du camp d'Ashraf (au nord
de Bagdad), contrôlé par le Conseil national de la résistance iranienne, traqué par l'Iran. Les conditions de vie et de
sécurité du camp Liberty ont déjà été le sujet de vives critiques par le passé. Or, ce transfert n'a fait qu'accroitre les
conditions de vie précaires de ces réfugiés. Pourtant, le 30 janvier 2012, le HCR considérait que le camp Liberty était
en mesure d'accueillir des résidents. Le représentant du Secrétaire général de l'ONU en Irak, Martin Kobler, avait
d'ailleurs affirmé, dans un communiqué publié le 31 janvier 2012, que «les structures et installations du camp Liberty
sont conformes aux normes humanitaires internationales». Le gouvernement irakien actuel, proche de l'Iran, paraît
peu soucieux du sort de ces réfugiés iraniens et les considère plutôt comme un fardeau. Il est évident que la sécurité
des résidents du camp n'est actuellement plus assurée de façon conforme aux termes de la convention IV de Genève.

Quelles sont les mesures que la Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante de la Commission a l'intention de prendre pour
assurer la sécurité de ces réfugiés?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission**

_(13 mai 2013)_

L'Union européenne s'intéresse de très près à la question de la réinstallation des anciens résidents du camp d'Ashraf et
souscrit aux initiatives visant à trouver une solution pacifique et harmonieuse à ce véritable problème de Droits
de l'homme.

À maintes reprises, M [me] Ashton a souligné qu'elle soutenait pleinement le processus actuel, mené sous les auspices des
Nations unies, ainsi que M. Martin Kobler, le représentant spécial du secrétaire général. Le Haut commissariat des
Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) conduit actuellement, comme prévu, les procédures de vérification et de
«détermination du statut de réfugié» des résidents hébergés au lieu de transit temporaire que constitue le camp
de Hurriya.

La réinstallation dans des pays tiers est la seule solution pacifique et durable. Il est à présent crucial, ainsi que
M [me ] Ashton l'a souligné dans sa déclaration du 20 mars, que les résidents recommencent à coopérer pleinement avec
les Nations unies et acceptent les propositions de réinstallation offertes par des pays tiers, de sorte que ce processus
essentiel puisse se dérouler sans retard. La Commission appuie ce processus par son projet «soutien à la résolution du
problème des camps d'Ashraf et de Hurriya» doté d'un budget de 12 millions d'euros. L'objectif général est de
promouvoir une solution pacifique et durable pour les résidents du camp. Les premières actions sont actuellement
mises en œuvre par le bureau des Nations unies pour les services d'appui aux projets (UNOPS) et par le HCR.

Les attaques du 9 février contre le camp de Hurriya ont été publiquement condamnées par l'Union. Elles ont été
revendiquées par Jaish al-Mukhtar, une aile militante du Hezbollah en Irak. Le gouvernement iraquien a réagi
rapidement par l'envoi d'équipes en vue de sécuriser la zone autour du camp et de prêter assistance en fournissant le
transport médical. Le premier ministre a constitué un comité chargé d'enquêter sur cet incident. Ces attaques
rappellent l'urgence d'accélérer le processus de réinstallation mené sous les auspices des Nations unies avec à la fois la
coopération des résidents et celle des pays tiers qui sont prêts à les accueillir.

C 6 E / 382 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002828/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Louis Michel (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Camp Liberty

Following the attack of 9 February 2013 against the Iranian refugees at Camp Liberty, which killed six and injured
over sixty, the fate of these 3 400 people is once again at the forefront of international news and requires more than
ever a solution.

This attack occurred roughly one year after the 3 400 Iranian refugees started to be transferred from the Ashraf camp
(north of Baghdad), controlled by the National Council of Resistance of Iran and hunted down by Iran. Living
conditions and security at Camp Liberty have already been heavily criticised in the past. This transfer has only
worsened the poor living conditions for these refugees. Yet, on 30 January 2012, the HCR considered that Camp
Liberty was fit for receiving residents. Martin Kobler, representative of the UN Secretary-General in Iraq, had even
confirmed in a press release dated 31 January 2012 that the ‘buildings and facilities at Camp Liberty comply with
international humanitarian standards’. The current Iraqi government, close to Iran, appears uninterested in these
refugees’ fate, considering them a burden instead. It is plain to see that the safety of the Camp residents is no longer
assured as required under the Geneva Convention IV.

What measures does the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission intend to take to ensure these
refugees’ safety?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

The EU follows the issue of resettlement of the former residents of Camp Ashraf very closely and supports efforts to
find a peaceful and orderly solution to what is a human rights issue.

The HR/VP has repeatedly stressed her full support to the ongoing process facilitated by the UN and to Martin Kobler,
the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is
proceeding as foreseen with the verification and ‘refugee status determination’ of the residents who are staying at the
temporary transit location, Camp Hurriya.

Resettlement to third countries is the only peaceful and durable solution. It is crucial now, as the HR/VP stressed in
her statement of 20 March, that the residents resume their full cooperation with the UN and accept the resettlement
offers made by third countries, so that this crucial process can proceed without delays. The Commission supports this
process through its 12 Million EUR project ‘Support to resolving the situation of Camp Ashraf / Camp Hurriya’. The
overall objective is to promote a peaceful and sustainable solution for the Camp residents. First actions are currently
being implemented through UNOPS and UNHCR.

The attacks of 9 February on Camp Hurriya were condemned publicly by the EU. Jaish al-Mukhtar, a militant wing of
Hizbullah in Iraq, claimed responsibility for these attacks. The Iraqi Government responded rapidly by dispatching
teams to secure the area around the camp and assisting with medical transportation. The Prime Minister formed a
committee to investigate the incident. The attacks remind us of the urgency to accelerate the UN-facilitated
resettlement process, with the cooperation of both the residents and third countries that are ready to receive them.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 383

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002830/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Judith A. Merkies (S&D)**

_(11 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Dierentransport boven de 35°C

Verordening nr. 1/2005 bepaalt dat veevoertuigen tijdens transporten van meer dan acht uur, uitgerust moeten zijn
met een ventilatiesysteem die de temperatuur binnen de 5 °C en 30 °C houdt, met een marge van 5 °C.

De reden hiervoor is dat het welzijn van dieren wordt aangetast bij zeer hoge of lage temperaturen, vooral tijdens
langdurige ritten.

Toch liggen, vooral in Zuid-Europese landen en tijdens de zomer, temperaturen vaak veel hoger.

1) Welke maatregelen vindt de commissie dat lidstaten moeten nemen om dierenwelzijn te waarborgen wanneer
ontdekt wordt dat de temperatuur in veevervoerscompartimenten de 35 °C overschrijdt? Is het in een dergelijke
noodsituatie mogelijk om dieren over te plaatsen?

2) Heeft de Commissie informatie over het aantal boetes en het aantal noodmaatregelen die de lidstaten in 2011
hebben genomen voor inbreuk op de verordening rondom temperatuur van langdurige transporten?

3) Is de Commissie de mening toegedaan dat een terugdringing van vervoertijd naar maximaal acht uur, zoals
1,1 miljoen Europese burgers verzocht hebben in een petitie, een aanzienlijke bijdrage levert aan de bescherming van
dierenwelzijn?

**Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie**

_(30 april 2013)_

1. Artikel 23, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 inzake de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer ( [1] ) luidt
als volgt: „Indien een bevoegde autoriteit constateert dat een bepaling van deze verordening niet wordt […] nageleefd,
neemt zij de nodige maatregelen om het welzijn van de dieren te beschermen of gelast zij de persoon die voor de
dieren verantwoordelijk is, zulks te doen.” De genomen maatregelen mogen geen onnodig of extra dierenleed
veroorzaken en moeten in verhouding staan tot de ernst van de risico's in kwestie.

In artikel 23, lid 2, van die verordening worden mogelijke maatregelen vermeld die de bevoegde autoriteiten mogen
eisen, waaronder uitladen van de dieren in geschikte huisvesting totdat het probleem is opgelost.

2. Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 bepaalt niet dat de lidstaten bij de Commissie verslag moeten uitbrengen over het
aantal boetes of het aantal noodmaatregelen voor inbreuken met betrekking tot de temperatuur. De Commissie
beschikt dan ook niet over deze informatie.

3. De Commissie verwijst naar haar antwoord op E-007313/2012 ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 van de Raad van 22 december 2004 inzake de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer en daarmee

samenhangende activiteiten; PB L 3 van 5.1.2005, blz. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

( **|**

C 6 E / 384 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002830/13**

**to the Commission**
**Judith A. Merkies (S&D)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Transport of animals above 35 °C

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 lays down that vehicles for animal transport must, for journeys exceeding eight
hours, be fitted with a ventilation system that keeps temperatures between 5 and 30 °C, with a margin of 5 °C.

The reason for this is that the wellbeing of animals is affected by very high or low temperatures, especially during long
journeys.

Temperatures are often much higher than this, however, especially in the countries of southern Europe.

1. What measures does the Commission believe that Member States need to take in order to ensure animal welfare
when it is discovered that the temperature in animal transport compartments exceeds the 35 °C limit? Is it possible to
relocate the animals in an emergency of this kind?

2. Does the Commission have any information on the number of fines imposed and emergency measures taken by
the Member States in 2011 in relation to violations of the regulation in respect of the temperature during long
journeys?

3. Does the Commission consider that a reduction in journey times to a maximum of eight hours, as 1.1 million
European citizens have requested via a petition, would make a considerable contribution to the protection of animal
welfare?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

1. According to Article 23 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport ( [1] ),
‘Where a competent authority finds that any provision of this regulation is not being complied with […] it shall take,
or require the person responsible for the animals to take, any necessary action required to safeguard the welfare of the
animals.’ The action taken shall not cause unnecessary or additional suffering to the animals and shall be
proportionate to the seriousness of the risks involved.

Article 23 (2) of that regulation establishes a list of possible actions that the competent authorities may require
including unloading the animals in a suitable accommodation until the problem is solved.

2. Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 does not require the Member States to inform the Commission on the number of
fines imposed, or of emergency measures taken in respect of violations in respect of temperature. The Commission
therefore does not have this information.

3. The Commission would refer to its reply to E-007313/2012 ( [2] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005,

p. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 385

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002831/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)**

_(11 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Reactie EU na uitspraken Erdogan over zionisme

Eind februari deed premier Erdogan van Turkije een boude uitspraak. Tijdens een forum van de Verenigde Naties (VN)
over de „Alliance of Civilizations” in Wenen zette Erdogan het zionisme, de staatsideologie van Israël, op gelijke
hoogte met „fascisme, antisemitisme en islamofobie” als een misdaad tegen de menselijkheid.

Het beleid van de staat Israël, — hoe vatbaar voor kritiek ook —, over één kam scheren met de misdaden van de nazi’s
komt in de internationale gemeenschap over als een banalisering van het antisemitisme dat in de Holocaust
uitgemond is. Verontwaardigde reacties bleven dan ook niet uit (Israëls premier Netanyahu, de Amerikaanse minister
van buitenlandse zaken Kerry, Ban Ki Moon, de secretaris-generaal van de VN, de Duitse minister van Buitenlandse
Zaken Guido Westerwelle).

De Commissie heeft bij mijn weten niet gereageerd. Waarom heeft zij, als instantie die met Turkije onderhandelt over
zijn eventuele toetreding tot de Europese Unie, niet gereageerd op de uitspraken van de Turkse premier?

Passen de uitspraken van Erdogan binnen de Europese waarden waarvan de EU vindt dat die moeten worden
gerespecteerd door kandidaat-lidstaten?

Welke gevolgen hebben Erdogans uitspraken voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen van Turkije met de EU?

**Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie**

_(15 mei 2013)_

De Commissie sluit zich aan bij de opmerkingen van de secretaris-generaal van de Verenigde Naties, Ban Ki-Moon, die
in zijn verklaring stelt dat als de opmerking van premier Erdogan over het zionisme op de juiste manier is
geïnterpreteerd, zijn opmerking niet enkel fout was, maar ook indruist tegen de beginselen waar de Alliantie van
beschavingen op steunt.

Wat de toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije betreft, verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar het
onderhandelingskader dat in 2005 unaniem is aangenomen door de EU en waarin de doelstellingen, regels en
procedures voor deze onderhandelingen, alsook de voorwaarden voor vooruitgang zijn bepaald.

C 6 E / 386 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002831/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU reaction to Prime Minister Erdoğan's comments on Zionism

At the end of February, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made an outspoken statement. During a United
Nations forum about the ‘Alliance of civilisations’ in Vienna, Mr Erdoğan equated Zionism, the State ideology of
Israel, with ‘fascism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia’ as a crime against humanity.

Putting the policy of the State of Israel — however much scope there may be to criticise it — on a par with the crimes
of the Nazis is something that the international community will view as a trivialisation of the anti-Semitism that
found its expression in the Holocaust. There was no lack of indignant reactions (amongst others from Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US Secretary of State John Kerry, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle).

To my knowledge, the Commission has not reacted. Why has it, the institution that is negotiating with Turkey about
the latter’s potential accession to the European Union, not reacted to these comments by Turkey’s Prime Minister?

Do Mr Erdoğan’s comments fit in with the European values that the EU believes must be respected by candidate
States?

What consequences will Mr Erdoğan’s comments have for Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

The Commission shares the remarks made by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has issued a
statement saying that if Mr Erdogan's comment about Zionism was interpreted correctly, it was not only wrong but
also contradicts the very principles on which the Alliance of Civilisations is based.

As for the accession negotiations with Turkey, the Commission invites the Honourable Member to refer to the
Negotiating Framework, unanimously adopted by the EU in 2005, which sets the objectives, rules and procedures of
these negotiations, as well as the conditions for progress.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 387

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002832/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Stan przemysłu stoczniowego w Unii Europejskiej

1. Jak Komisja ocenia stan przemysłu stoczniowego w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich?

2. W których państwach członkowskich kryzys najmocniej dotknął przemysł stoczniowy?

3. Jakie działania podejmuje Komisja w celu pomocy dla firm sektora stoczniowego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wiceprzewodniczącego Antonia Tajaniego w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Po okresie bardzo dobrej koniunktury, której szczyt przypadł na rok 2007, branża stoczniowa w Europie i na świecie
znalazła się w głębokim kryzysie. Świadczy o tym spadek produkcji w tej branży w UE o ponad połowę – z 4,5 mln
CGT ( [1] ) w 2007 r. do 2 mln CGT w roku 2012.

Według statystyk CESA i SEA Europe ( [2] ) największy spadek produkcji odnotowano w Danii, Finlandii, Niemczech,
Włoszech, Niderlandach i Hiszpanii. Bardziej istotne niż różnice między państwami członkowskimi są jednak różnice
między poszczególnymi segmentami rynku. Podczas gdy produkcja standardowych statków towarowych, takich jak
kontenerowce, niemal całkowicie zanikła, w niektórych segmentach produkcji wyspecjalizowanej (np. statki
obsługujące instalacje morskie) koniunktura jest bardzo dobra, a segmenty statków wycieczkowych i megajachtów
wykazują stosunkową odporność.

W ramach inicjatywy Europa 2020 Komisja opracowała niedawno – we współpracy z branżą i wszystkimi innymi
głównymi zainteresowanymi stronami – strategię „LeaderSHIP 2020” ( [3] ). W sprawozdaniu poświęconym tej strategii
podkreślono, że konieczne jest zwiększenie ekologiczności i efektywności energetycznej transportu morskiego oraz
dywersyfikacja przemysłu stoczniowego w kierunku nowych obszarów działalności gospodarczej, takich jak
wytwarzana na morzu energia wiatrowa i energia morska.

Sprawozdanie to zawiera szereg zaleceń w czterech kluczowych obszarach (kwalifikacje i zatrudnienie, dostęp do
rynku i uczciwe warunki rynkowe, dostęp do finansowania oraz badania, rozwój i innowacje) do uwzględnienia
w perspektywie krótko- i średniookresowej celem utrzymania wzrostu oraz wymagających wysokich kwalifikacji
miejsc pracy w europejskiej branży stoczniowej.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) CGT (compensated gross ton) = skompensowana tona brutto.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Dostępnych w sprawozdaniach tych zrzeszeń europejskiego przemysłu stoczniowego: CESA (Community of European Shipyards’ Associations),

Annual report 2007/08; SEA Europe (European Ships and Maritime Equipment Association), Market Monitoring Report, marzec 2013 r.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Odpowiednie sprawozdanie dostępne jest pod następującym adresem:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/files/shipbuilding/leadership2020-final-report_en.pdf

( **|**

C 6 E / 388 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002832/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ State of the shipbuilding industry in the EU

1. What is the Commission’s assessment of the state of the shipbuilding industry in the individual Member States?

2. In which Member States has the crisis had the greatest impact on the shipbuilding industry?

3. What steps is the Commission taking to assist shipbuilding companies?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2013)_

After a strong boom, which reached its peak in 2007, the European and global shipbuilding markets entered into a
deep crisis. As a result EU shipbuilding production decreased by more than half from 4.5 million cgt ( [1] ) in 2007 to 2.0
cgt in 2012.

According to statistics from CESA and SEA Europe ( [2] ), production decreased strongest in Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. More important than differences between Member States are, however,
differences between market segments. While the production of standard cargo vessels such as container vessels
almost disappeared, some specialised market segments such as off-shore support vessels are booming while cruise
vessels and mega-yachts show some resilience.

In the framework of the Europe 2020 initiative, the Commission, in cooperation with the industry and all other
relevant stakeholders, recently elaborated the LeaderShip 2020 strategy ( [3] ). The report stresses the need for the
greening of shipping, energy efficiency and the diversification into new maritime markets, such as off-shore wind
power and marine energy.

The report provides a series of recommendations in four key areas (employment and skills, market access and fair
market conditions, access to finance, research, development and innovation) for the short and medium term to
safeguard growth and high-value employment in the European maritime industry.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Cgt= compensated gross tons.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) CESA = Community of European Shipyards’ Associations, Annual report 2007/08

SEA Europe = European Ships and Maritime Equipment Association, Market Monitoring Report, March 2013.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The LeaderShip 2020 report is available on:

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/files/shipbuilding/leadership2020-final-report_en.pdf

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 389

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002833/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Korytarz transportowy Północ-Południe

Od dłuższego czasu eksperci zajmujący się rynkiem transportowym w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej wskazują na
konieczność szybkiego rozwoju połączeń transportowych pomiędzy południem oraz północną regionu.
Zwiększenie przepustowości umożliwi wzmocnienie współpracy handlowej oraz otwarcie gospodarek Węgier,
Słowacji i Czech na nowe rynki zbytu. Poprawi również sytuację na rynku pracy w portowych miastach
przeładunkowych w Polsce, takich jak np. Szczecin, Gdynia i Gdańsk.

1. Czy Komisja Europejska zdecydowała już, jaki wariant korytarza transportowego Północ-Południe jest
najbardziej efektywny i ekonomicznie opłacalny dla Europy?

2. Jakie środki i z jakich programów Komisja zamierza przeznaczyć w najbliższych latach na realizację
programów transportowych łączących północ i południe Europy Środkowej?

3. Czy trasa S7 stanowiąca wariant jednego z korytarzy transportowych biegnących przez Polskę została
uwzględniona w unijnym planie budowy transeuropejskich sieci transportowych?

4. Jakie środki Komisja zamierza przeznaczyć na rozbudowę portów na Bałtyku. Jakie ośrodki otrzymają
dofinansowanie?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Siima Kallasa w imieniu Komisji**

_(6 maja 2013 r.)_

W 2011 r. Komisja przedstawiła projekt zmian w wytycznych dotyczących rozwoju transeuropejskiej sieci
transportowej ( [1] ) (TEN-T) oraz nowy instrument finansowania „Łącząc Europę” ( [2] ) (CEF). Obie propozycje przechodzą
właśnie procedurę ustawodawczą.

Sieć bazowa TEN-T połączy stolice, największe aglomeracje i główne porty przy pomocy tras kolejowych
i drogowych oraz śródlądowych dróg wodnych (w stosownych przypadkach). Aby wdrożyć sieć bazową, Komisja
zaproponowała korytarze multimodalne przewidujące zwiększoną integrację poszczególnych rodzajów transportu,
ich interoperacyjność oraz koordynację inwestycji, robót budowlanych i zarządzania infrastrukturą. Jednym z 10
zaproponowanych korytarzy sieci bazowej jest korytarz „Bałtyk-Adriatyk”, który przebiega przez Polskę od granicy
z Litwą i portów w basenie Morza Bałtyckiego do granic z Republiką Czeską i Słowacją. Ponieważ korytarz ten jest
z definicji multimodalny, obejmuje on szereg równoległych tras drogowych, takich jak S7 w Polsce.

Instrument „Łącząc Europę” będzie finansować projekty dotyczące sieci bazowej i priorytetów horyzontalnych.
Zgodnie z pierwotną propozycją Komisji, środki przydzielone na ten instrument wyniosły 31,7 mld EUR, z czego
10 mld EUR – przeniesione z Funduszu Spójności – zarezerwowano dla kwalifikujących się państw członkowskich.
80-85 % tych środków zostanie wykorzystane w ramach wieloletnich programów prac na projekty wymienione
w załączniku do CEF. Projekty drogowe kwalifikują się do korzystania z wymienionej kwoty 10 mld EUR tylko
wtedy, gdy mają charakter transgraniczny. Projekty drogowe dotyczące sieci TEN-T mogą kwalifikować się także do
finansowania z Funduszu Spójności i Europejskiego Funduszu Rozwoju Regionalnego (EFRR). Rada obniżyła jednak
pulę środków dla instrumentu „Łącząc Europę” (CEF) oraz wysokość kwoty przeznaczonej na transport.

Do korzystania ze środków CEF kwalifikują się także porty sieci bazowej, w tym połączenia między portami i rozwój
platform multimodalnych, jak również innowacyjne projekty w portach sieci bazowej, takich jak Gdynia, Gdańsk,
Szczecin i Świnoujście.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 650.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665.

C 6 E / 390 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002833/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ North-South Transport Corridor

For some time now, experts in central and eastern Europe's transport market have been pointing out the need to
rapidly develop transport links between the North and the South of the region. Increasing capacity would make it
possible to strengthen trade links and open up the economies of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as new
export markets. It would also improve the situation on the labour market in Polish cities with cargo ports, such as
Szczecin, Gdynia and Gdańsk.

1. Has the Commission already decided which North‐South Transport Corridor route wouldbe most effective and
economically beneficial for Europe?

2. What funds — drawn from what programmes — does the Commission intend to earmark inthe coming years
for the execution of transport programmes to link northern and southernCentral Europe?

3. Has the S7 route — one of the possible routes for a transport corridor running throughPoland — been
considered in the EU’s plans for the construction of trans‐Europeantransport networks?

4. What funds does the Commission intend to allocate for the reconstruction of Baltic ports?What facilities will
receive financing?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

In 2011 the Commission proposed revised Guidelines for the Trans-European Transport Network ( [1] ) (TEN-T) and a
new funding instrument, the ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ ( [2] ) (CEF). Both are now in the legislative procedure.

The TEN-T core network will connect capitals, major agglomerations and main ports by rail, road and inland
waterways (where relevant). To implement the core network the Commission proposed multi-modal corridors
providing for greater modal integration, interoperability and coordination of investments, works and management of
the infrastructure. Among the 10 core network corridors proposed, the ‘Baltic Adriatic Corridor’ goes through Poland
from the border with Lithuania and ports in the Baltic Sea to the borders with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Being
multi-modal by definition it includes parallel high-quality roads like the S7 in Poland.

The CEF will finance projects on the Core Network and horizontal priorities. As originally proposed by the
Commission, it had an allocation of EUR 31.7 billion, including EUR 10 billion transferred from the Cohesion Fund
reserved for eligible Member States. 80 to 85% of the money will be spent through multiannual work programmes for
projects listed in the CEF Annex. Road projects are eligible under the EUR 10 billion only when they are cross-border.
Road projects on the TEN-T network can also be eligible for funding under the Cohesion Fund and the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The Council has however reduced the CEF envelope and the amount for
transport.

Ports of the Core network are also eligible to the CEF, including port interconnections and the development of
multimodal platforms but also innovative projects in Core Network Ports like Gdynia, Gdansk, Szczecin and
Świnoujście.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 650.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 391

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002834/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Broń chemiczna zatopiona w Bałtyku

Jak oceniają historycy po II wojnie światowej ukryto w Bałtyku ok. 60 tys. ton amunicji chemicznej, w tym od 12 000
do 13 000 ton bojowych środków trujących. Obecnie znane są trzy rejony zatapiania: Głębia Bornholmska – na
wschód od Bornholmu, Mały Bełt i południowo-zachodnia część Głębi Gotlandzkiej. Akweny te są oznakowane na
mapach nawigacyjnych.

Zdaniem ekologów zatopiona amunicja chemiczna to tykająca bomba ekologiczna, mogąca wybuchnąć w każdym
momencie. Stanowi zagrożenie zarówno dla wrażliwego i kruchego ekosystemu Bałtyku, jak również dla zdrowia
i życia mieszkańców wybrzeży. Szacuje się, iż w przypadku uwolnienia się ze zbiorników jednej szóstej zatopionych
substancji chemicznych, życie w Morzu Bałtyckim i przy jego brzegach mogłoby ulec zniszczeniu na ponad 100 lat.

1. Czy Komisja Europejska posiada informacje dotyczące broni chemicznej składowanej na dnie Bałtyku?

2. Jak wysokie, zdaniem Komisji, jest zagrożenie związane ze składowiskami? Czy Komisja podziela zdanie
ekspertów mówiące o ewentualnym zagrożeniu zniszczenia ekosystemu Bałtyku w przypadku uszkodzenia
pojemników z bronią chemiczną?

3. Jakie środki zostały podjęte przez Komisję w celu zabezpieczenia i usunięcia szkodliwych materiałów?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji**

_(17 maja 2013 r.)_

UE wspiera realizowany na Morzu Bałtyckim projekt „CHEMSEA – poszukiwanie amunicji chemicznej i ocena”, aby
zlikwidować istniejące braki w wiedzy na temat amunicji chemicznej dzięki opracowaniu map i charakterystyki
składowisk tej amunicji, opracować wytyczne w celu ograniczenia potencjalnych zagrożeń dla środowiska i rybaków
oraz aby przygotować regionalny plan awaryjny na wypadek wycieku.

Ponadto Komisja Ochrony Środowiska Morskiego Bałtyku (HELCOM), której stroną jest UE, powołała ad hoc grupę
ekspertów do spraw zatopionej amunicji chemicznej. Grupa ma za zadanie zgromadzenie informacji na temat
działalności dumpingowej po II wojnie światowej, zidentyfikowanie problemów i opracowanie zaleceń i wytycznych
dotyczących zatopionej amunicji chemicznej.

C 6 E / 392 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002834/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea

Historians estimate that around 60 000 tonnes of chemical weapons — including between 12 000 and 13 000
tonnes of toxic warfare agents — were secretly dumped in the Baltic Sea after the Second World War. Currently, three
dumping sites have been identified: the Bornholm Trench (to the East of Bornholm), the Little Belt and the south‐
western part of the Gotland Trench. These bodies of water are identified on navigation charts.

Ecologists warn that the dumped chemical weapons are a ticking time bomb that could blow up at any moment. They
pose a threat to the sensitive and fragile Baltic ecosystem, as well as to the health and lives of coastal residents.
According to estimates, if just one‐sixth of the dumped chemicals leaked from their containers, life in the Baltic Sea
and coastal regions could be wiped out for over 100 years.

1. Does the Commission have any information on the chemical weapons abandoned at the bottom of the Baltic
Sea?

2. In the Commission’s view, how high is the risk posed by the dumping sites? Does the Commission agree with
experts who state that the Baltic ecosystem could be destroyed in the event that the containers holding the chemical
weapons are damaged?

3. What steps has the Commission taken to secure and remove harmful materials?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 May 2013)_

The EU supports the Baltic Sea project ‘CHEMSEA — chemical munitions search and assessment’, to close knowledge
gaps on chemical munitions by mapping and characterising these dumping sites, developing guidelines in order to
reduce potential threats to the environment and fishermen and to prepare a region-wide contingency plan to deal
with cases of leakage.

In addition, the Baltic Sea Regional Convention (Helcom), to which the EU is a party, has established an ad hoc expert
group on dumped chemical munitions to compile information on dumping activities after World War II, identify
obstacles and develop recommendations and guidelines on dumped chemical munitions.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 393

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002835/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wykonanie Europejskiego Nakazu Aresztowania

1. Jaka była liczba wniosków o zastosowanie ENA kierowana do poszczególnych państw członkowskich (proszę
o rozbicie danych według państw członkowskich kierujących wniosek), a jaka liczba wniosków została zrealizowana
w poszczególnych latach 2010‐2012?

2. Jaki był przeciętny czas realizacji ENA, od chwili jego złożenia do faktycznego wydania osoby oskarżonej,
w ww. okresie? W których państwach członkowskich czas realizacji nakazu aresztowania był najdłuższy i dlaczego?

3. Które z państw członkowskich najczęściej odrzucały wnioski o użycie ENA i z jakiego powodu?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji**

_(18 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Informacja, o którą zwraca się Szanowny Pan Poseł, zawarta jest w zestawieniu statystyk dotyczących europejskiego
nakazu aresztowania, wydawanych przez Radę corocznie od 2005 r. ( [1] ) Zgromadzone dane porównawcze dotyczą
2011 r. W kwietniu 2011 r. Komisja opublikowała trzecie sprawozdanie z realizacji europejskiego nakazu
aresztowania ( [2] ) wraz z załączonym dokumentem roboczym służb Komisji. Dokument ten zawiera między innymi
tabelę z danymi na temat wydanych i wykonanych europejskich nakazów aresztowania, średniego czasu
potrzebnego na wydanie osoby oraz średniej liczby wydanych osób na podstawie dostępnych w tym czasie
informacji przekazanych przez Radę. Komisja wskazała w swoim sprawozdaniu niedociągnięcia obecne w aktualnym
kwestionariuszu oraz opracowała nowy kwestionariusz, który jest omawiany przez grupę roboczą Rady do spraw
współpracy w sprawach karnych. Komisja ma nadzieję, że kwestionariusz zostanie wkrótce sfinalizowany i że
przyczyni się on do poprawy jakości dostępnych statystyk na temat europejskiego nakazu aresztowania.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Rada 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11

COPEN 83; 9200/7/12 COPEN 97.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 175 final i SEC(2011) 430.

( **|**

C 6 E / 394 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002835/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Execution of European Arrest Warrants

1. How many requests for the execution of European Arrest Warrants (ENAs) have been referred to individual
Member States (please break down the data by Member State issuing the request), and how many requests were
executed each year from 2010 to 2012?

2. What was the average execution time for ENAs, from the moment in which the ENA was issued to the actual
extradition of the suspect, in the aforementioned period? Which Member States had the longest ENA execution times
and why?

3. Which Member States most frequently rejected requests for ENAs and for what reasons?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

The information requested by the Honourable Member is contained in collated European arrest warrant (EAW)
statistics issued by the Council on a yearly basis since 2005 ( [1] ). The collated figures are for 2011. In April 2011, the
Commission issued the third implementation report on the EAW ( [2] ) and the accompanying staff document. In it the
Honourable Member will find a table of the EAWs issued and executed, the average times of surrender and the average
numbers that consent to surrender based on the information from the Council available at the time. In its report the
Commission pointed out the shortcomings of the current questionnaire and the Commission has since developed a
new questionnaire, which is under discussion at the Council working group on cooperation in criminal matters and it
is hoped will soon be finalised and will improve the quality of the available statistics on the EAW.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11

COPEN 83; 9200/7/12COPEN 97.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 175 final and SEC(2011) 430.

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 395

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002836/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wpływ pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego na przemysł produkujący maszyny górnicze

Zapisy pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego bardzo mocno wpływają na produkcję węgla w Unii Europejskiej. Wraz
z kolejnymi ograniczeniami zmniejsza się ilość wydobywanego surowca oraz jego cena. Dlatego dziś, mimo
posiadania znacznych zasobów węgla, UE jest jego importerem. Regionalne firmy zamykają kopalnie lub
w najlepszym wypadku nie decydują się na otwarcie nowych, nie widząc realnego zysku.

Niepewność dalszego kierunku rozwoju polityki klimatycznej powoduje wstrzymanie wielu inwestycji w sektorze
węglowym, np. w Trzebini w Małopolsce.

1. Jak Komisja ocenia wpływ zapisów pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego na sektor węgla kamiennego
w Europie? Które państwa stracą najwięcej? Proszę o podział na kraje członkowskie.

2. Jak pakiet wpłynie na kondycję przemysłu zajmującego się produkcją maszyn górniczych? Również proszę
o podział na konkretne państwa członkowskie.

3. Jakie działania planuje podjąć Komisja w ciągu najbliższych siedmiu lat, aby zminimalizować straty
w przemyśle produkującym maszyny górnicze?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji**

_(7 maja 2013 r.)_

1. i 2.Pakiet klimatyczno-energetyczny ma na celu zmniejszenie emisji gazów cieplarnianych poprzez m.in.
wspieranie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych i efektywności energetycznej. We wszystkich scenariuszach dotyczących
zużycia energii i wytwarzania energii elektrycznej przewiduje się nieznaczne zmniejszenie do 2020 r. udziału węgla
w koszyku energetycznym UE. Fakt zastąpienia w koszyku energetycznym USA znacznych ilości węgla gazem
zapewnia obecnie Europie dodatkowe tanie źródło importu węgla, wzmacniając tym samym konkurencyjność
elektrowni węglowych, ale jednocześnie stanowi konkurencję dla węgla wydobywanego w Europie. Jeśli chodzi
o zrównoważone długoterminowe wykorzystanie węgla, kluczowe znaczenie będzie miało wdrożenie dyrektywy
w sprawie wychwytywania i składowania dwutlenku węgla i skuteczna demonstracja projektów CCS wspierana przez
program NER 300.

Powyższe aspekty będą miały wpływ na przemysł węglowy w UE. Komisja Europejska nie dysponuje jednak
szczegółowymi ocenami dotyczącymi poszczególnych państw członkowskich.

3. Celem europejskiego partnerstwa innowacji w dziedzinie surowców jest zapewnienie zrównoważonych dostaw
surowców dla Europy. W partnerstwie tym uczestniczą przedstawiciele producentów urządzeń górniczych.
Planowana realizacja partnerstwa ma zapewnić osiągnięcie – do roku 2020 – kilku istotnych rezultatów, mających
znaczenie dla przemysłu urządzeń górniczych, m.in. przeprowadzenie 10 działań pilotażowych w zakresie
innowacyjnych technologii i poprawę ram regulacyjnych dla sektora górniczego w UE.

C 6 E / 396 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002836/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Impact of the climate and energy package on the mining machinery industry

The provisions of the climate and energy package have a profound effect on coal production in the EU. They lead —
in conjunction with other restrictions — to a reduction in the amount of coal extracted and in its price. This is why
the EU — in spite of its significant coal reserves — is now an importer of coal. Regional firms are closing down mines
or, in the best case scenario, deciding against opening new mines in view of the lack of potential for profit.

Uncertainty as to the future path that climate policy will take is resulting in many investments in the coal sector being
withheld, as is the case in Trzebinia, in Małopolska province.

1. What is the Commission’s assessment of the impact of the climate and energy package on the coal industry in
Europe? Which countries stand to lose the most? Please break this down by Member State.

2. How will the package affect the mining machinery industry? Please break this down by individual Member
States.

3. What steps does the Commission plan to take over the next seven years with a view tominimising losses for the
mining machinery industry?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

1 and 2. The climate and energy package aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among others by promoting
renewable energy and energy efficiency. All energy consumption and electricity generation scenarios anticipate a
slight reduction in the contribution of coal to the EU energy mix by 2020. Currently, replacement of significant coal
volumes by gas in the US power generation mix provides additional cheap coal import source for Europe,
strengthening the competitiveness of coal-fired power generation but indeed competing with European coal. In view
of the longer term sustainability of coal, implementation of the Carbon Capture and Storage directive and its
successful demonstration, as facilitated by the NER 300 programme, are of key importance.

These factors impact the coal extraction industry in the EU. However, the European Commission does not possess a
detailed country-level assessment for each Member State.

3. The European Innovation Partnership on raw materials aims to ensure the sustainable supply of raw materials
to Europe. Mining equipment producers are represented in the Partnership. The Partnership plans to deliver by 2020
several major results relevant to mining machinery industry, including 10 innovative technology pilot actions and an
improved regulatory framework for the mining sector in the EU.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 397

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002837/13**

**do Komisji**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Biopaliwa w Unii Europejskiej

W dyrektywie 2009/30/WE z 2009 r. Komisja Europejska promuje wykorzystanie biopaliw jako narzędzia służącego
do zmniejszenia emisji CO 2, przy jednoczesnym zwiększeniu profitów dla rolników. Według założeń Komisji
dyrektywa powinna być implementowana do 2013 r. Tymczasem grupa brytyjskich uczonych z uniwersytetu
w Leicester w przeprowadzonych przez siebie analizach stwierdziła, że jej wprowadzenie spowoduje zwiększenie
niedoborów żywności, cen produktów rolnych oraz odwrotnie niż zapowiadała Komisja wzrost emisji CO 2 . Wyniki
badań wraz z komentarzem zostały opublikowane w gazecie Nature Climate Change.

1. Czy Komisja zapoznała się z wynikami badań dotyczącymi oddziaływania biopaliw na rynek produktów
spożywczych oraz emisję CO 2 ? Czy Komisja podziela to stanowisko?

2. Jak Komisja ocenia wspomniane badania?

3. Czy i kiedy Komisja zamierza zweryfikować zapisy dyrektywy wprowadzającej biopaliwa?

4. Jak według Komisji wpłynie ona na ceny produktów spożywczych w poszczególnych krajach? Proszę o podział
na państwa członkowskie.

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji**

_(8 maja 2013 r.)_

1.–2. Komisja wie, że na Uniwersytecie Leicester prowadzone są badania dotyczące emisji gazów cieplarnianych
z plantacji palm olejowych na torfowiskach tropikalnych. Jednakże Komisja nie posiada informacji na temat prac
tych naukowców w zakresie emisji gazów cieplarnianych i cen żywności związanych ogólnie z biopaliwami.

Zgodnie z prawodawstwem UE ( [1] ), które ma zastosowanie zarówno do biopaliw produkcji krajowej, jak
i importowanych, produkcja biopaliw nie może doprowadzić do przekształcenia obszarów o dużej różnorodności
biologicznej lub o znacznych zasobach węgla, takich jak lasy lub torfowiska. Ponadto biopaliwa muszą emitować co
najmniej 35 % mniej gazów cieplarnianych niż paliwa kopalne. W związku z powyższym Komisja nie uważa, aby
wyniki wspomnianego badania podważały podejście UE do biopaliw.

3. W październiku 2012 r. Komisja przyjęła wniosek mający na celu ograniczenie ilości biopaliw produkowanych
z upraw roślin spożywczych, które mogą być zaliczane na poczet celów UE na rok 2020 do 5 % łącznego zużycia
energii w sektorze transportu. Co więcej, wniosek przewiduje dodatkowe zachęty dla biopaliw, które nie stwarzają
dodatkowego zapotrzebowania na grunty ( [2] ). Niektóre aspekty dyrektyw w sprawie energii odnawialnej i w sprawie
jakości paliw zostaną poddane przeglądowi przed końcem 2014 r.

4. Zastosowanie ziarna do produkcji bioetanolu w UE stanowiło 3 % całkowitego wykorzystania zbóż w latach
2010‐2011 i szacuje się, że spowodowało wzrost cen o 1‐2 % na światowych rynkach zbóż. Szacowany skutek
cenowy stosowania biodiesla w UE dla upraw oleistych roślin spożywczych w latach 2008 i 2010 wynosił 4 % ( [3] ).
Informacje na temat wpływu dyrektywy na ceny żywności w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich są dostępne
w sprawozdaniach państw członkowskich z postępów w dziedzinie energii odnawialnej ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Dyrektywy 2009/28/WE i 2009/30/WE.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Wniosek jest dostępny na stronie: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/land_use_change_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Sprawozdanie z postępów w dziedzinie energii odnawialnej COM (2013) 175 final.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm

C 6 E / 398 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002837/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Biofuel in the European Union

In Directive 2009/30/EC of 2009, the Commission promotes the use of biofuels as a means of reducing CO 2
emissions while at the same time increasing profits for farmers. The Commission plans for the directive to be
implemented by 2013. Meanwhile, in a study carried out by a group of British academics from the University of
Leicester, it was found that the introduction of this directive would lead to an increase in food shortages and in prices
of agricultural products, as well as a rise in CO 2 emissions. This contradicts the Commission’s predictions. The study’s
findings and comments were published in the Nature Climate Change journal.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the findings of the study on biofuels’ impact on the food market and on CO 2
emissions? Does the Commission hold a similar view?

2. What is the Commission’s assessment of this study?

3. Does the Commission intend to review the directive’s provisions concerning the introduction of biofuels? If so,
when?

4. In the Commission’s view, what impact will the directive have on food prices in individual Member States?
Please break this down by Member State.

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

1-2. The Commission is aware of research carried out at the University of Leicester on greenhouse gas emissions
from palm oil plantations on tropical peatland. However, the Commission is not aware of work by these researchers
on greenhouse gas emissions and food prices related to biofuels in general.

In accordance with EU legislation ( [1] ) that applies equally to domestically produced and imported biofuels, production
of biofuels is not allowed to lead to conversion of areas of high biodiversity or high carbon stocks such as forests and
peatland. Moreover, biofuels are required to save at least 35% GHG emissions compared to fossil fuels. The
Commission therefore does not consider that the EU's approach on biofuels is put into question by the results of the
study mentioned.

3. In October 2012, the Commission adopted a proposal to limit the amount of biofuels produced from food
crops that can count towards the EU target for 2020 to 5% of overall energy consumption in transport. Moreover, the
proposal provides additional incentives for biofuels that do not create an additional demand for land ( [2] ). Certain
aspects of the Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives are to be reviewed before end of 2014.

4. Grain use for bioethanol production in the EU constituted 3% of total cereal use in 2010/2011 and is estimated
to have increased prices by 1%-2% on the global cereals market. The estimated price effect of the EU biodiesel
consumption on food oil crops for 2008 and 2010 was 4% ( [3] ). Information on the impact of the directive on food
prices in individual Member States is available in the Member States' renewable energy progress reports ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directives 2009/28/EC and 2009/30/EC.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The proposal is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/land_use_change_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Renewable Energy Progress report COM(2013) 175 final.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 399

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002838/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(11 martie 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Gestionarea pădurilor de către proprietarii de păduri

Gestionarea pădurilor în contextul schimbărilor climatice a devenit o provocare pentru proprietarii acestora, mai ales
când este vorba de persoane private.

Acești proprietari doresc să știe cum să acționeze, ce măsuri să ia pentru a preîntâmpina uscarea arborilor și ce esențe
de pomi să replanteze în cazul tăierii arborilor bolnavi și uscați.

Cum intenționează Comisia să sprijine eforturile autorităților locale și naționale în vederea sensibilizării proprietarilor
de păduri privind replantările de arbori și alegerea celor mai adaptate esențe pentru condițiile climatice actuale,
precum și schimbul de experiență între actorii locali și regionali din domeniu cu scopul identificării și aplicării celor
mai bune practici?

**Răspuns dat de dl Potočnik în numele Comisiei**

_(30 aprilie 2013)_

Politica forestieră și gestionarea pădurilor țin de domeniul de competență al statelor membre. Cu toate acestea, statele
membre pot folosi bugetul UE pentru a sprijini măsurile din sectorul forestier.

Regulamentul privind dezvoltarea rurală 1698/2005 ( [1] ) prevede cofinanțare din partea UE pentru măsurile în sectorul
forestier în scopul de a ajuta statele membre în aplicarea programelor și strategiilor forestiere naționale sau regionale,
inclusiv modalități de abordare a efectelor schimbărilor climatice.

Propunerea de regulament privind dezvoltarea rurală elaborată de Comisie pentru perioada 2014-2020

[COM(2011) 627/3], în prezent supusă procedurii legislative ordinare, include o serie de măsuri privind sectorul
forestier printre care se numără și investițiile în ameliorarea rezilienței și a valorii ecologice a ecosistemelor forestiere.
Mai mult, propunerea prevede și posibilitatea de a oferi consiliere proprietarilor de păduri, cu privire la aspecte legate
de performanțele de mediu ale exploatației forestiere.

În plus, mediul și atenuarea efectelor schimbărilor climatice, precum și adaptarea la acestea constituie acum
obiectivele transversale ale politicii de dezvoltare rurală. Propunerea menționată anterior obligă statele membre să
instituie rețele rurale naționale care ar putea fi utilizate și pentru facilitarea schimbului de bune practici și de
experiență între diferiții actori ai dezvoltării rurale.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1698/2005 al Consiliului din 20 septembrie 2005 privind sprijinul pentru dezvoltare rurală acordat din Fondul European
Agricol pentru Dezvoltare Rurală (FEADR), JO L 277, 21.10.2005.

C 6 E / 400 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002838/13**

**to the Commission**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Forest management by forest owners

Forest management in the context of climate change has become a challenge for forest owners, especially in the case
of private individuals.

These owners want to know how to act, what measures to take to prevent trees drying out and what tree species to
replant when sick and dried out trees are cut down.

How does the Commission intend to support the efforts of local and national authorities in raising awareness
amongst forest owners of the replanting of trees and the selection of the species best adapted to the current climatic
conditions, as well as the exchange of experience between local and regional actors in the field in order to identify and
apply the best practices?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

Forest policy and forest management lie within the competence of Member States. However, Member States can make
use of the EU budget for supporting forest related actions.

The Rural Development Regulation (RDR) 1698/2005 ( [1] ) provides for EU co-financing for forest related measures to
help Member States implementing their national or regional forest programmes and strategies, including ways to
address the effects of climate change.

The Commission's RDR proposal for the period 2014-2020 [COM(2011)627/3], which is currently subject to the
ordinary legislative procedure, includes a set of forestry measures among which investments improving the resilience
and environmental value of forest ecosystems. Moreover, it also provides for the possibility to provide advice to forest
holders on issues linked to the environmental performance of the forest holding.

In addition, the environment and climate change mitigation and adaptation have been made the cross-cutting
objectives of rural development policy. The abovementioned proposal obliges Member States to establish national
rural network which could also be used to facilitate exchanges of practices and experiences between different actors of
rural development.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD), OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 401

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002839/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

**und Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(11. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Diskussion über „Klima 2030“ und das Energiepaket

Kann die Kommission bestätigen, dass die Position des Europäischen Rates vom März 2011 ( [1] ), die Position der
letzten Tagung des Rates (Umwelt) vom Dezember 2012 ( [2] ) und die Entschließung des Parlaments vom
15. März 2012 zu dem „Fahrplan für den Übergang zu einer wettbewerbsfähigen CO 2 -armen Wirtschaft bis 2050“, in
der die Senkung der Treibhausgasemissionen bis zum Jahr 2050 im Vergleich zu 1990 um 80 bis 95 % vorgeschlagen
wird, Leitgrundlagen ihres Vorschlags zum energie‐ und klimaschutzpolitischen Rahmen für das Jahr 2030 sein
werden?

Beabsichtigt die Kommission, in den Rahmen für 2030 auch verbindliche Ziele für erneuerbare Energien und die
Energieeffizienz einzubeziehen, zumal diese als „No-regret“-Optionen in dem Energiefahrplan für 2050 bezeichnet
wurden?

**Antwort von Frau Hedegaard im Namen der Kommission**

_(8. Mai 2013)_

Wie bereits im Grünbuch „Ein Rahmen für die Klima‐ und Energiepolitik bis 2030“ (KOM(2013)169) dargelegt, sollte
der Rahmen die längerfristige Perspektive berücksichtigen, die von der Kommission 2011 in den Fahrplänen bis 2050
vorgegeben wurde. Diese Fahrpläne wurden in Einklang mit dem Ziel ausgearbeitet, die THG-Emissionen im Rahmen
der notwendigen Bemühungen der als eine Gruppe betrachteten Industrieländer bis 2050 um 80-95 % gegenüber
dem Stand von 1990 zu verringern. Es besteht ein breiter Konsens darüber, dass Zwischenziele für die
THG-Emissionsminderungen ein notwendiger Schritt sind, um der Zielvorstellung einer Reduzierung um 80-95 %
bis 2050 gerecht zu werden. In dem Grünbuch werden die Entschließungen des Europäischen Parlaments zu den
Fahrplänen bis 2050 gewürdigt, die Rolle der erneuerbaren Energien und Energieeffizienz unterstrichen und
Überlegungen zu den Zielvorgaben bis 2030 angestellt. Die Ergebnisse der mit dem Grünbuch eingeleiteten
öffentlichen Konsultation wird die Kommission in die Ausarbeitung des Rahmens für 2030 einfließen lassen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

C 6 E / 402 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002839/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE) en**

**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(11 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Debat over het klimaat‐ en energiepakket tot 2030

Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat de piketpalen voor haar voorstel inzake het beleidskader 2030 voor energie en
klimaat zullen worden gevormd door het standpunt van de Europese Raad van maart 2011 ( [1] ), het standpunt van de
recente Energieraad van december 2012 ( [2] ) en de resolutie van het Parlement van 15 maart 2012 over „een routekaart
naar een concurrerende koolstofarme economie in 2050”, waarin het als streefdoel voor de Unie voorstelde dat de
uitstoot van broeikasgassen in 2050 80 % tot 95 % lager moet zijn dan in 1990?

Is de Commissie van plan in het kader voor 2030 ook bindende streefcijfers voor hernieuwbare energie en energieefficiëntie op te nemen, omdat die in de routekaart voor het energiebeleid tot 2050 worden genoemd als opties die
alleen maar voordeel opleveren?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie**

_(8 mei 2013)_

Zoals aangegeven in het Groenboek „Een kader voor het klimaat‐ en energiebeleid voor 2030” (COM(2013)169),
moet dit kader rekening houden met de langeretermijnvisie die de Commissie in 2011 heeft uiteengezet in de
Routekaarten/stappenplannen tot 2050. Deze routekaarten/stappenplannen zijn ontwikkeld in overeenstemming
met de doelstelling om de uitstoot van broeikasgassen tegen 2050 met 80-95 % te hebben verminderd, vergeleken
met de niveaus van 1990, als onderdeel van de noodzakelijke gezamenlijke inspanningen van de ontwikkelde landen.
Er bestaat een brede consensus dat tussentijdse streefwaarden voor broeikasgasemissiereducties een noodzakelijke
stap vormen om een vermindering van 80-95 % tegen 2050 te verwezenlijken. In het Groenboek worden de
resoluties van het Europees Parlement over de routekaarten/stappenplannen tot 2050 alsmede de belangrijke rol die
voor hernieuwbare energie en energie-efficiëntie is weggelegd erkend, en het omvat overwegingen ten aanzien van
streefcijfers tot 2030. De Commissie zal de resultaten van de openbare raadpleging die met het Groenboek in gang is
gezet, bij haar continue voorbereidingen met betrekking tot het kader voor 2030 betrekken.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 403

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002839/13**

**to the Commission**
**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

**and Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Debate on the 2030 climate and energy package

Can the Commission confirm that the guiding basis for its proposal on the 2030 energy and climate policy
framework will be constituted by the European Council position of March 2011 ( [1] ), the position of the recent
Environment Council meeting of December 2012 ( [2] ) and Parliament’s resolution of 15 March 2012 on ‘a Roadmap
for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, which proposed an objective for the Union of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared with 1990?

Does the Commission envisage that the 2030 framework will also include binding targets for renewable energy and
energy efficiency, given that these are the ‘no regrets’ options set out in the energy roadmap for 2050?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

As indicated in the Green Paper ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’ (COM(2013)169), the
framework should take into account the longer term perspective which the Commission laid out in 2011 in the 2050
Roadmaps. These Roadmaps were developed in line with the objective of reducing GHG emissions by 80 to 95% by
2050 compared to 1990 levels as part of necessary efforts by developed countries as a group. There is a broad
consensus that interim targets for GHG emissions reductions will be a necessary step to reach the aspiration of an 8095% reduction by 2050. The Green Paper acknowledges the European Parliament's resolutions on the 2050
Roadmaps, the important roles of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and it includes considerations on 2030
targets. The outcome of the public consultation launched by the Green Paper will feed into the Commission's ongoing
preparations for the 2030 framework.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

C 6 E / 404 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002840/13**

**au Conseil**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Statut sur les fondations européennes

Dans le cadre de l'Acte pour le marché unique, la Commission a proposé la mise en place d'un statut de fondation
européenne.

Les fondations dépensent collectivement 150 milliards d'euros par an et représentent près de 1 million d'emplois au
sein de l'Union européenne. Les missions et les objectifs qu'elles portent individuellement recoupent le plus souvent
des préoccupations transnationales ou transfrontalières. Dans le but de faciliter leurs activités, le statut sur les
fondations européennes est un outil d'intégration au potentiel très important.

Le 8 février 2012, la Commission a proposé un projet sur ce texte. Depuis cette date, le calendrier semble se ralentir.

Dans ce contexte, pourquoi le Conseil n'a‐t‐il pas fait de ce projet une priorité dans son programme de travail 2013?
Est‐il envisageable de parvenir à une adoption durant le premier semestre 2013? Quelles sont les mesures
actuellement mise en œuvre pour l'adoption de cette proposition?

**Réponse**
_(28 mai 2013)_

La proposition de règlement du Conseil relatif au statut de la fondation européenne (FE) ( [1] ) est actuellement examinée
au sein des instances préparatoires du Conseil. Compte tenu de la complexité de cette proposition, il est peu probable
qu'elle soit adoptée au cours du premier semestre de 2013.

Étant donné qu'il faut établir des priorités, les dernières présidences du Conseil ont concentré leurs efforts, dans le
domaine du droit des sociétés, sur les grands dossiers législatifs ayant d'importantes incidences économiques et qui
sont adoptés selon la procédure législative ordinaire, telle que la directive comptable et l'ensemble de textes sur le
contrôle des comptes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Doc. 6580/12.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 405

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002840/13**

**to the Council**

**Gaston Franco (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Statute for European foundations

As part of the Single Market Act, the Commission proposed the creation of a European Foundation Statute.

Foundations spend a total of EUR 150 billion every year and represent close to 1 million jobs in the European Union.
The missions and goals that they each have very often reflect transnational or cross-border concerns. Aiming to
facilitate their work, the European Foundation Statute is an integration tool with a very high potential.

On 8 February 2012, the Commission proposed a draft text. Since then, nothing seems to have happened.

In this context, why hasn’t the Council made this project a priority in its 2013 work programme? Would it be
possible to adopt this project during the first semester of 2013? What measures are currently being implemented for
this proposal to be adopted?

**Reply**
_(28 May 2013)_

The proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE) ( [1] ) is currently under discussion
in the preparatory bodies of the Council. Given the complexity of the proposal, its adoption within the first semester
of 2013 is unlikely.

Taking into account the need to prioritise, the main efforts of the last Council presidencies in the area of company law
have been concentrated on the large legislative files with major economic impact and which are to be adopted under
the ordinary legislative procedure, such as the Accounting Directive and the auditing package.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 6580/12.

C 6 E / 406 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002843/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Nuovo caso di violenza sulle donne nelle Maldive

Sull'isola di Feydhoo, nell'arcipelago delle Maldive, una ragazza di 15 anni è stata condannata a 100 frustate che
riceverà al compimento dei 18 anni di età e a 8 mesi di arresti domiciliari da scontare immediatamente, in quanto
accusata di aver avuto rapporti sessuali prima del matrimonio infrangendo così la legge coranica in vigore nel Paese.
Dalle indagini portate avanti dalla polizia è risultato che la ragazza fosse sottoposta da anni a violenze sessuali da
parte del patrigno, attualmente indagato per stupro, ma ancora non processato.

Considerato:

—
che le Maldive hanno sottoscritto accordi internazionali che prevedono il rispetto dei diritti umani;

—
che l'Alto Rappresentante per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza dell'Unione europea ha rilasciato
l'1 marzo una dichiarazione ufficiale nella quale richiama il governo locale, chiedendo il rispetto dei diritti
umani;

—
che il governo del Paese ha dichiarato che si sarebbe impegnato per modificare la sentenza;

—
e alla luce della risposta alla mia interrogazione numero E-007966/2012, dove la Commissione ha affermato
che «Il documento di strategia nazionale (2007-2013), che ha descritto l'assistenza prevista dell'UE alle Maldive,
si concentra sulla democratizzazione e il buon governo; i settori in cui è prevista la cooperazione sono i diritti
umani e il sostegno alle riforme istituzionali, in particolare nei settori della sicurezza e della giustizia»;

può la Commissione:

—
informare circa l'andamento del caso sopra descritto;

—
indicare come procede il processo di democratizzazione del Paese;

—
indicare come intende supportare concretamente il rispetto dei diritti delle donne nelle Maldive?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(26 aprile 2013)_

Nella dichiarazione rilasciata il 1 [o] marzo 2013, l'AR/VP ha esortato il governo delle Maldive a ritirare l'imputazione e
annullare la sentenza, e si registrano segnali positivi in tal senso. È stata condotta anche una campagna pubblica
online per protestare contro la fustigazione.

Le elezioni presidenziali, previste per settembre 2013, accentrano le speranze di trovare un compromesso tra le forze
politiche del paese. L'Unione europea ha richiesto elezioni «credibili, trasparenti, inclusive e pienamente
rappresentative» e ha esortato il governo delle Maldive a dare seguito alle raccomandazioni contenute nella relazione
della Commissione d'inchiesta nazionale del 2012, che evidenziano, tra l'altro, una serie di questioni attinenti ai diritti
umani. Le Maldive sono uno dei paesi pilota dove l'UE è impegnata a dare sostegno alla democrazia; in tal senso sono
stati definiti un «profilo democrazia» e un piano d'azione dettagliati.

Durante le sue visite alle Maldive la delegazione dell'Unione europea di Colombo, Sri Lanka, incontra regolarmente la
società civile, i gruppi di protezione dei diritti delle donne e la Commissione maldiviana per i diritti umani. La
delegazione collabora inoltre strettamente con il consigliere per i diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite a Mali su questioni
relative ai diritti umani.

L'Unione europea è pronta a sostenere interventi nel settore dei diritti delle donne tramite inviti concorrenziali a
presentare proposte su linee di bilancio tematiche, sebbene lo strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani
(EIDHR) non preveda dotazioni specifiche per le Maldive.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 407

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002843/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ New case of violence against women in the Maldives

On the island of Feydhoo, in the archipelago of the Maldives, a 15-year-old girl has been sentenced to 100 lashes,
which she will receive when she turns 18, and eight months’ house arrest, starting immediately. She was charged with
having had sexual relations before marriage, infringing the Koranic law in force in that country. Police investigations
have shown that the girl had for years been subjected to sexual violence by her stepfather, who is currently under
investigation for rape, but has not yet been tried.

— The Maldives have signed international agreements enshrining respect for human rights.

— On 1 March the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued an official
statement rebuking the government of the Maldives and calling for human rights to be respected.

— The country’s government stated that it would seek to change the sentence.

— In answer to my question E-007966/2012, the Commission stated ‘The Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013)
which outlined the EU's planned assistance to the Maldives focuses on democratisation and governance; areas
foreseen for cooperation are human rights and support for institutional reform, in particular policy in the fields of
security and justice’.

In view of the above, can the Commission:

—
provide information on the progress of the case described above;

—
indicate how the country’s democratisation process is faring;

—
indicate how it intends to provide material support for respect of women’s rights in the Maldives?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

In her statement of 1 March 2013, the HR/VP urged the Government of Maldives to abandon the prosecution and
retract the sentence. Positive indications have been received in this regard. There has also been a public campaign
online to protest against the flogging.

The presidential elections, scheduled for September 2013, are seen as the best hope to bridge the gap between the
political forces in the country. The European Union has called for ‘credible, transparent, inclusive and fully
representative’ elections. It has also urged the Government of Maldives to implement the recommendations of the
report of the 2012 National Commission of Inquiry (CoNI) which highlighted _inter alia_ a number of human rights
issues. The Maldives is one of the pilot countries for the EU's democracy support, including a detailed democracy
profile and an action plan.

The European Union's Delegation, based in Colombo, Sri Lanka, meets regularly with civil society, including women's
rights groups and with the Maldivian Human Rights Commission during its visits to the Maldives. It also cooperates
closely on human rights issues with the human rights adviser of the United Nations who is resident in Male.

The European Union also stands ready to support interventions in the field of women's rights on the basis of
competitive calls for proposals on thematic budget lines, although there is no country-specific envelope for the
Maldives under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

C 6 E / 408 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002844/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Vendite allo scoperto

Facendo riferimento al recente caso della Saipem, società controllata al 42,9 % dalla ENI, il cui titolo è stato sospeso
per eccesso di ribasso, la Consob ha avviato accertamenti sull'operazione di collocamento del 2,2 % del capitale di
Saipem, realizzata da Bank of America Merrill Lynch prima dell'annuncio del _profit warning_ a mercati chiusi. Più nello
specifico, le azioni sono state vendute, tramite _accelerated bookbuilding_, a 31 euro, mentre il titolo è sceso in chiusura
addirittura a quota 20 euro.

In ragione del sospetto che la società abbia commesso un abuso di mercato tramite l'utilizzo di informazioni riservate,
la Consob ha avviato i necessari monitoraggi e, con delibera n. 18454, ha vietato le vendite allo scoperto sul titolo
Saipem per la giornata di giovedì 31 gennaio 2013, in virtù dell'applicazione dell'articolo 23 del regolamento (UE) n.
236/2012 relativo alle vendite allo scoperto, poiché la variazione di prezzo è stata superiore alla soglia del 10 %.

Considerato che a livello UE esiste il meccanismo di controllo che ha conferito alla BCE il ruolo di vigilanza su tutte le
banche in seno al territorio europeo, e constatando l'esistenza del predetto atto UE finalizzato alla regolamentazione e
alla trasparenza di taluni aspetti del mercato azionario, voglia la Commissione, alla luce di tutto quanto fin qui
esposto, rispondere al seguente quesito:

Reputa la Commissione che sia auspicabile attivarsi al fine di consentire alla BCE di rendere la propria attività di
controllo maggiormente capillare in modo da avere la possibilità di vigilare o regolare anche le cosiddette «vendite
allo scoperto»?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione**

_(2 maggio 2013)_

Il regolamento dell'UE sulle vendite allo scoperto e sulla copertura del rischio di inadempimento dell’emittente ( [1] ) è
entrato in vigore il 1° novembre 2012. La vigilanza sulle attività di vendita allo scoperto rientra fra le responsabilità
delle autorità nazionali competenti.

Per quanto riguarda la vigilanza da parte della BCE, il 19 marzo 2013 è stato raggiunto un accordo politico sulle
proposte della Commissione riguardanti un meccanismo di vigilanza unico (regolamento sul meccanismo di
vigilanza unico e regolamento EBA modificato). Il regolamento sul meccanismo di vigilanza unico conferisce compiti
specifici alla BCE in materia di politiche riguardanti la vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi nell'area dell'euro.

I compiti di vigilanza della BCE sono chiaramente limitati alla vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi, come stabilito
dalla direttiva 2006/48/CE. La BCE dovrà assicurare che gli enti creditizi rispettino le norme in materia di vigilanza
prudenziale fissate dai rispettivi atti dell'Unione conformemente alle disposizioni della direttiva 2006/48/CE (per es.
requisiti patrimoniali e gestione del rischio). I compiti della BCE non includono il monitoraggio delle attività
specifiche del mercato. Per quanto riguarda le vendite allo scoperto, la Commissione ritiene che il quadro legislativo
dell'UE in materia assegni poteri chiaramente definiti ai regolatori nazionali affinché intervengano, se necessario, in
stretta collaborazione con l’Autorità europea dei mercati e valori mobiliari (ESMA). L'ESMA deve intervenire quando
le minacce alla stabilità finanziaria hanno dimensione transfrontaliera.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 236/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 14 marzo 2012, relativo alle vendite allo scoperto e a taluni aspetti
dei contratti derivati aventi ad oggetto la copertura del rischio di inadempimento dell’emittente (credit default swap), GU L 86, pag. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 409

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002844/13**

**to the Commission**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Short selling

With reference to the recent case of Saipem, a company in which ENI has a 42.9% holding and whose shares have
been suspended as a result of an excessive fall in share price, Consob, the Italian regulatory body, has initiated checks
on the placement of 2.2% of Saipem’s capital carried out by Bank of America Merrill Lynch prior to the
announcement of the profit warning, when markets were closed. The details are that the shares were sold in
accelerated book build transactions at EUR 31, while the share price fell at the close to a level of EUR 20.

Because of its suspicions that the company had been guilty of market abuse by taking advantage of confidential
information, Consob initiated the necessary monitoring and, under Decision No 18454, prohibited short selling of
Saipem shares for the day of Thursday, 31 January 2013. This decision was taken under Article 23 of Regulation (EU)
No 236/2012 on short selling, since the price had changed by more than the threshold of 10%.

Since at EU level there is a control mechanism allocating to the European Central Bank (ECB) the role of supervising
all banks in European territory, and since there exists the abovementioned EU legal act designed to govern and ensure
the transparency of certain aspects of the stock market, could the Commission respond to the following question in
the light of all the above?

Does the Commission believe it is desirable to take action to allow the ECB to extend its monitoring activities so that
it may monitor or regulate short selling too?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The EU Regulation on short selling and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) ( [1] ) entered into application on 1 November 2012.
The supervision short selling activities is entrusted to national competent authorities.

As far as supervision by the ECB is concerned, a political agreement on the Commission proposals for a Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM Regulation and amended EBA Regulation) was reached on 19 March 2013. The SSM
Regulation confers specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions established within the euro area.

The scope of the ECB’s supervisory tasks is explicitly limited to prudential supervision of credit institutions as defined
in Directive 2006/48/EC. The ECB will be responsible for ensuring that credit institutions comply with the standards
set out in the relevant Union acts on prudential supervision as provided in Directive 2006/48/EC (e.g. capital
requirements, risk management). It does not include monitoring of specific market activities. As regards short selling,
the Commission believes that the EU legislative framework concerning short selling provides clear powers for
national regulators to intervene when necessary, in close coordination with the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA), and for ESMA itself to act in cases where threats to financial stability have cross-border
implications.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of Credit
Default Swaps (OJ L 86/1).

C 6 E / 410 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002845/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Iscrizioni universitarie in calo

Secondo quanto prefigurato dall'analisi di DATAGIOVANI sul calo delle immatricolazioni universitarie nell'ambito di
studi umanistici e sociali in Italia e in Europa, riportata in data 4 febbraio 2013 dal Consiglio Universitario Nazionale,
attualmente le società europee stanno escludendo un'enorme fascia di talento umano prontamente disponibile;
inoltre, la comparazione dei tassi d'iscrizione all'istruzione superiore in Europa con quelli di altre parti del mondo è
fortemente preoccupante e richiede di intervenire. Ampliare l'accesso all'istruzione superiore non significa aprire le
porte a studenti meno qualificati, ma piuttosto sostenere tutti gli studenti che abbiano il potenziale di partecipare
all'istruzione superiore, a beneficio proprio e della società. Questo significa coinvolgere una gamma crescente di
studenti con differenti motivazioni e interessi: non solo offrendo percorsi formativi per una crescita professionale
adattata a un mercato del lavoro in rapido cambiamento, ma anche tenendo conto della domanda sempre più forte di
possibilità di crescita personale tramite l'arricchimento culturale che le università offrono.

Considerando le linee guida sull'istruzione permanente in Europa tracciate nella Carta delle Università europee
sull'apprendimento permanente, le università rientrano tra le istituzioni chiamate a dare una risposta a tali questioni,
avendo la particolare funzione di offrire a studenti che seguono percorsi di apprendimento permanente un'istruzione
superiore universitaria basata sulla ricerca. Tutto ciò considerato, le università europee non possono tuttavia
concretizzare tali impegni senza azioni concertate da parte dei governi e dei partner regionali nel garantire le risorse
necessarie e un contesto giuridico appropriato. L'assunzione di tali impegni è pertanto richiesta tanto alle università
quanto ai governi, per assicurare un contesto favorevole, affinché le università possano sviluppare il loro contributo
all'apprendimento equo e paritario.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere al seguente quesito:

—
reputa la Commissione che siano auspicabili una sensibilizzazione e un apporto concreto ai singoli Stati
membri per migliorare e armonizzare i vari sistemi scolastici?

**Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

_(14 maggio 2013)_

Nella sua comunicazione del 2011 «Un progetto per la modernizzazione dei sistemi di istruzione superiore in
Europa», la Commissione ribadisce il ruolo cruciale dell'istruzione superiore nel rendere disponibile il capitale umano
altamente qualificato, i risultati della ricerca e il potenziale di innovazione di cui l'Europa ha bisogno. La
comunicazione sottolinea l'importanza di assicurare che un numero sufficiente di persone, in particolare giovani,
possano accedere all'istruzione superiore e concluderla con un diploma, di accrescere la qualità e la pertinenza delle
attività di insegnamento, di ricerca e di innovazione e di creare le condizioni opportune per il finanziamento e la
governance del settore dell'istruzione superiore.

Il processo inter-governativo di Bologna ha portato a tutta una serie di riforme volte a rendere i sistemi di istruzione
superiore in Europa più coerenti e compatibili. Tuttavia, non è tra gli obiettivi dell'Unione europea promuovere o
imporre un modello unico di istruzione superiore nell'Unione. Di fatto, come stabilisce l'articolo 165 del trattato sul
funzionamento dell'Unione europea, il contenuto e l'organizzazione dei sistemi di istruzione competono unicamente
agli Stati membri. L'obiettivo è piuttosto quello di aiutare le autorità nazionali e le istituzioni di istruzione superiore a
sviluppare sistemi di istruzione superiore di alta qualità in grado di rispondere ai bisogni socioeconomici. L'Unione
europea offre il suo aiuto facendo opera di analisi e formulando raccomandazioni, anche nel contesto del semestre
europeo, nonché incoraggiando la cooperazione tra gli Stati membri, tra l'altro tramite dei propri programmi specifici
nel campo dell'istruzione e della formazione e dei Fondi strutturali.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 411

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002845/13**

**to the Commission**
**Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fall in university enrolment

According to the analysis by Datagiovani of the fall in university enrolments in humanities and social studies in Italy
and Europe, reported on 4 February 2013 by the Italian National University Council, European societies are currently
missing out on a huge pool of readily available human talent. Furthermore, a comparison of higher education
participation rates in Europe with those in other world regions makes disturbing reading and calls for action.
Widening access to higher education is not about introducing less qualified students, but rather about supporting all
learners with the potential to benefit both themselves and society through participating in higher education. This
means reaching out to an increasingly broad range of learners with different motivations and interests: not only
offering programmes for professional development adapted to a fast-changing labour market, but also catering for
the growing demand for personal development opportunities through the cultural enrichment that universities offer.

In view of the guidelines on lifelong learning in Europe set out in the European Universities’ Charter on Lifelong
Learning, the universities are among a spectrum of institutions that need to respond to these issues. They have a
particular opportunity to provide research-based higher education for lifelong learners. Despite all this, Europe’s
universities cannot fulfil these commitments without concerted action by governments and regional partners to
provide appropriate legal environments and funding. These commitments are therefore expected from both
universities and governments, to ensure that a suitable environment is created for universities to develop their
contribution to fair and equal learning.

Could the Commission therefore reply to the following question:

— Does the Commission believe it is desirable to raise awareness in individual Member States and make a concrete
contribution to them to improve and harmonise the various different education systems?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

In its 2011 Communication ‘An agenda for the modernisation of Europe's higher education systems’, the
Commission stresses the crucial role of higher education in delivering the highly-skilled human capital, research
output and innovation potential that Europe needs. The communication highlights the importance of ensuring a
sufficient number of people — in particular young people — are able to access and graduate from higher education,
of enhancing the quality and relevance of teaching, research and innovation activities and creating effective
conditions for funding and governance within the higher education sector.

The inter-governmental Bologna Process has led to a range of reforms aiming to make higher education systems in
Europe more coherent and compatible. However, it is not the objective of the European Union to promote or impose
a single model of higher education in the Union. In fact, according to Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, the content and organisation of education systems is the sole responsibility of the Member
States. Rather efforts are focused on helping national authorities and higher education institutions to develop
effective, high quality systems of higher education, which respond to social and economic needs. The European
Union provides this support through analysis and policy recommendations — including in the context of the
European Semester — through facilitating policy cooperation between Member States and through its dedicated
education and training programmes and the Structural Funds.

C 6 E / 412 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002846/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(11 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Combate ao tráfico de drogas: cooperação UE-CELAC

Considerando:

—
Que a Declaração de Santiago, assinada a 27 de janeiro de 2013 pela União Europeia (UE) e pela Comunidade
de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC), explicita que ambos os blocos políticos irão desenvolver
esforços concretos no que diz respeito ao combate ao tráfico de drogas e estupefacientes através do reforço de
mecanismo de cooperação já existente;

—
O processo de ratificação nacional relativo ao Diálogo Político e à Cooperação entre a Comunidade Andina de
Nações e a UE e Declaração Conjunta aprovada na XI Reunião de Diálogo Especializado a Alto Nível sobre as
Drogas entre a Comunidade Andina de Nações, realizada nos últimos dois dias de outubro do ano transato;

—
Que os objetivos da Estratégia da União Europeia de Luta contra as Drogas para 2005‐2012 consideravam a
necessidade de reduzir a oferta de tais substâncias, nomeadamente através da cooperação internacional entre os
Estados-Membros e países terceiros;

—
Que, de acordo com o Departamento de Estado do Governo dos EUA, vários membros da CELAC
(«Commonwealth» das Bahamas, Belize, Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia, República da Colômbia, República da
Costa Rica, República Dominicana, República do Equador, República de El Salvador, República de Guatemala,
República do Haiti, República das Honduras, Jamaica, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, República de Nicarágua,
República do Panamá, República do Peru e a República Bolivariana da Venezuela) são os principais produtores
de droga a nível mundial;

Pergunta-se à Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia e a Alta Representante da União Europeia para os Negócios
Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança:

1. Quais os mecanismos e/ou iniciativas de cooperação entre os países da UE e da CELAC no que diz respeito ao
combate contra as redes de tráfico de drogas/estupefacientes?

2. Qual o grau de eficácia de eficácia de tais mecanismos?

3. Existem dados estatísticos que expressem os resultados dessa cooperação?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(6 de maio de 2013)_

A UE e a CELAC cooperam entre si para combater o tráfico de droga em três grandes domínios, em consonância com
a estratégia de luta contra a droga da UE: o diálogo político, a cooperação para o desenvolvimento e os acordos sobre
questões relacionadas com a droga. Desde 1999, existe um diálogo birregional com a região da CELAC. Ao abrigo
deste quadro, realizam-se anualmente várias reuniões do comité técnico e uma reunião de alto nível que têm por
objeto, nomeadamente, as questões do tráfico de droga e da criminalidade organizada. A região andina tem também
uma estratégia política com a UE em matéria de luta contra a droga. A UE está atualmente a preparar o lançamento de
um diálogo específico sobre a droga com o Brasil, sendo essa questão igualmente tratada no diálogo geral com o
México, o Peru, a Colômbia, a Bolívia, e a América Central.

O Copolad é um dos principais programas regionais ou transregionais financiados pela UE, ativo desde 2011 e
destinado a reforçar a capacidade de participação dos países CELAC na formulação de políticas sólidas de luta contra a
droga com vista à redução tanto da oferta como da procura. Outro programa importante é o programa «Rota da
cocaína», ativo desde 2009, que visa lutar contra o tráfico de droga, sobretudo de cocaína, entre os países produtores e
os consumidores através da África Ocidental. Aborda questões como o branqueamento de capitais, a cooperação
policial e controlo dos aeroportos e portos marítimos. A UE está igualmente envolvida em iniciativas de
desenvolvimento alternativo, especialmente na região andina.

A UE tem também sete acordos no domínio específico do controlo dos precursores de drogas com a Bolívia, a
Colômbia, o Chile, o Equador, o México, o Peru e a Venezuela.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 413

Tanto o programa Copolad como o programa «Rota da cocaína» são objeto de reexames intercalares separados. Os
resultados estarão disponíveis este ano. Para estatísticas gerais em matéria de luta contra a droga na UE, o OEDT ( [1] )
acompanha a situação no que se refere às novas drogas, níveis de consumo e dependência na UE.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Observatório Europeu da Droga e da Toxicodependência.

C 6 E / 414 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002846/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Combating drug trafficking: EU-CELAC cooperation

— The Santiago Declaration signed on 27 January 2013 by the EU and the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) states that both political blocs will make concrete efforts to combat drug and narcotics
trafficking by strengthening the existing cooperation mechanism.

— A national ratification process took place regarding political dialogue and cooperation between the Andean
Community (CAN) and the EU, and a Joint Declaration was adopted at the EU‐CAN 11th High-Level Specialised
Dialogue on Drugs held on 30 and 31 October 2012.

— The EU Drugs Strategy (2005‐2012) deemed it necessary to reduce the supply of such substances, particularly
through international cooperation between the Member States and third countries.

— According to the US State Department, several CELAC members (Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru
and Venezuela) are leading drug producers at a global level.

1. What EU‐CELAC cooperation mechanisms and/or initiatives are in place to combat drug/narcotics trafficking
networks?

2. How effective are these mechanisms?

3. Are there any statistics showing the results of this cooperation?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The EU and CELAC cooperate against drug trafficking in three basic areas, in line with the EU Drugs Strategy: political
dialogue, development cooperation and agreements on drug-related issues. Since 1999 a bi-regional dialogue exists
with the CELAC region. Under this framework, several technical committee meetings and one High Level Meeting are
held every year covering, among other issues, drug trafficking and organised crime. The Andean region also has a
dedicated political structure with the EU on drugs. The EU is currently preparing the launching of a specific dialogue
on drugs with Brazil, and the issue is also dealt with in general dialogues with Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and
Central America.

COPOLAD is one of two outstanding regional or trans-regional programmes financed by the EU, active since 2011
and aimed at enhancing the capacity of participating CELAC countries in formulating sound drug policies both in
supply and demand reduction. Another is the Cocaine Route programme, active since 2009, aimed at fighting drug
trafficking mainly of cocaine from producing to consumer countries, via West Africa. It tackles issues such as money
laundering, police cooperation as well as air- and seaport control. The EU is also involved in alternative development
initiatives especially in the Andean region.

The EU also has seven agreements in the specific field of the control of drug precursors with Bolivia, Colombia, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.

Both COPOLAD and the Cocaine Route programmes are undergoing separate mid-term reviews. Results will be
available this year. For general statistics on drugs in the EU, the EMCDDA ( [1] ) monitors the situation as regards new
drugs, levels of consumption and addiction within the EU.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug Addictions.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 415

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002847/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Comunicación de los logros europeos

Algunas encuestas de opinión están destacando el progresivo incremento del número de ciudadanos europeos que
muestra su decepción con respecto a las instituciones europeas. Es cierto que un análisis consciente y bien razonado
de la opinión ciudadana pondría de manifiesto que los sentimientos están entremezclados y que las dificultades
económicas, la crisis y las incertidumbres son las que abonan en gran medida ese alejamiento de un proyecto europeo.

Resulta indispensable facilitar la máxima información de cuanto se hace en las instituciones europeas y, aunque es
cierto que en Bruselas hay muy buenos corresponsales de los grandes medios de información europeos, hay que
reconocer que, a veces, son escasos el impacto y la repercusión de sus crónicas en medio de otras informaciones
nacionales. Por ello, me permito trasladar a la Comisión Europea la siguiente cuestión:

¿No cree que, junto a medidas que incrementen el apoyo a la labor que hacen los corresponsales de los medios de
comunicación de los distintos países europeos, la Comisión debería planificar alguna campaña de publicidad
institucional ofreciendo, por ejemplo, cada mes un logro muy concreto de la actuación de las instituciones europeas?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(14 de mayo de 2013)_

Las encuestas de opinión del Eurobarómetro muestran el impacto de la crisis económica sobre la imagen que los
ciudadanos tienen de la Unión Europea. En este contexto, además del trabajo realizado para mejorar nuestros
servicios para los corresponsales acreditados de los medios de comunicación, la Comisión intenta siempre poner de
manifiesto los logros de la Unión Europea a través del sitio web Europa y las redes sociales. Estos canales, en los que se
utiliza siempre la lengua correspondiente, representan la manera más rentable de hacer llegar ejemplos y logros que
son importantes para ciudades y regiones. Además, se subrayan y explican constantemente los esfuerzos y el progreso
hechos a fin de crear el marco necesario para una recuperación satisfactoria de la crisis durante seminarios
organizados por la Comisión con periodistas que normalmente no están acreditados en Bruselas, sino que están
basados en sus respectivos Estados miembros.

Las Representaciones de la Comisión, las Oficinas de Información del Parlamento Europeo y los más de quinientos
Centros de Información de Europe Direct de los Estados miembros utilizan asimismo a diario, en su comunicación
con la prensa y el público, logros concretos que demuestran el valor añadido que aporta a nivel local la UE.

C 6 E / 416 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002847/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Communicating EU achievements

Some opinion polls are highlighting the gradual increase in the number of EU citizens expressing their
disappointment with regard to the European institutions. It is clear that a conscious and well-reasoned analysis of
citizen opinion would reveal that these feelings are mixed, and that the economic difficulties, the crisis and the
uncertainties are greatly fuelling this distancing from the European project.

It is therefore essential that as much information as possible should be provided regarding how much is being done in
the European institutions and, though it is true that there are very good correspondents in Brussels representing the
leading European media, it must be recognised that the impact and effect of their reports in national media is
sometimes minimal. Allow me, therefore, to ask the Commission the following question:

Does it not think that, together with measures to increase support for the work done by the correspondents
representing the various EU countries’ media, the Commission should plan some sort of institutional publicity
campaign illustrating, for example, a very concrete achievement each month resulting from the actions of the
European institutions?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

Eurobarometer opinion polls show the impact of the economic crisis on the image of the European Union. Against
this background, beyond the work done to improve our services for the accredited media correspondents, the
Commission consistently tries to highlight the achievements of the European Union via the Europa website and social
media channels. This is the most cost-effective way to showcase examples and achievements which are relevant to
people's regions or cities and are explained in the relevant language. Furthermore, the efforts and advances in creating
the necessary framework for a fair recovery from the crisis are constantly highlighted and explained during journalist
seminars organised by the Commission and normally targeting journalists not accredited in Brussels but based in
their Member States.

Concrete achievements demonstrating the added value that the EU brings in a local context are also used on a daily
basis by the Representations of the Commission, the European Parliament Information Offices and by the more than
500 Europe Direct Information Centres across the Member States in their communications with the press and the
public.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 417

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002848/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ De Erasmus a Goethe

Es unánime la opinión del gran éxito del programa Erasmus. Ha posibilitado que más de dos millones y medio de
estudiantes europeos hayan estudiado en distintas universidades europeas. Pero, sobre todo, contribuye al
fortalecimiento de la Unión Europea con una ciudadanía más consciente de las ventajas de este proyecto europeo. De
ahí que, junto al avance de este programa para jóvenes, podrían ponerse en marcha otras actuaciones de intercambio
que beneficien a otros ciudadanos europeos.

1. ¿No cree la Comisión que podrían realizarse otros programas de estancia en los países europeos, por ejemplo,
uno para que las personas jubiladas pudieran disfrutar de unas semanas de descanso en un balneario o en una zona de
montaña o costera de Europa?

2. Si Erasmo de Rotterdam fue un acertado ejemplo de estudio, ¿no cree la Comisión que Wolfgang Goethe,
incansable viajero por Europa, podría bautizar este programa?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(7 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión reconoce lo importante que es fomentar las actividades turísticas transnacionales a fin de promover la
ciudadanía europea y apoyar el crecimiento y el empleo en la EU. De conformidad con el Tratado de Lisboa, su papel
se limita a apoyar, coordinar y complementar las acciones de los Estados miembros.

En esta línea, la Comisión puso en marcha en mayo de 2012 la iniciativa «Turismo Senior» a fin de definir unas
condiciones marco que fomentaran, entre otras cosas, la organización de determinados viajes combinados
transnacionales destinados a esta franja de la población en concreto para hacer así aumentar el número de viajeros
mayores en Europa ( [1] ). La iniciativa reconoce el importante potencial de generar turismo que poseen las personas
mayores, que disfrutan tanto de poder adquisitivo como de tiempo libre. Así pues, desea incentivar la creación de un
mercado interior transnacional para viajeros mayores en el interior de la UE, en particular durante la temporada
baja ( [2] ) en los diferentes Estados miembros, con el fin de mejorar la competitividad del sector turístico y de promover
el desarrollo regional en base a la diversidad en la EU.

En los próximos meses se publicará una convocatoria de propuestas para apoyar esta iniciativa. La Comisión propone
poner en marcha esta «iniciativa senior» en el ámbito del turismo como proyecto piloto, desempeñando con ello el
papel de facilitador para apoyar, coordinar y complementar las acciones desarrolladas por los Estados miembros y
otras partes interesadas en este ámbito, sobre la base de asociaciones entre los sectores público y privado, incluidas las
PYME.

A continuación, la Comisión evaluará la iniciativa, incluidos la dimensión de comunicación y marketing y un posible
«patrocinador» para la misma. En este contexto, la Comisión aprecia la sugerencia de Su Señoría.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Esta iniciativa se centrará en los ciudadanos europeos de más de 55 años, lo que representa alrededor del 25 % de la población de la UE.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) La iniciativa contribuiría a mitigar los efectos negativos que la estacionalidad tiene sobre la competitividad de la industria turística de la UE, la

motivación y el progreso profesional de los trabajadores y la utilización, mejorable, de las bazas naturales, culturales y materiales, así como las
infraestructuras de los destinos turísticos de la UE.

C 6 E / 418 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002848/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ From Erasmus to Goethe

Opinion is unanimous as regards the great success of the Erasmus programme, which has made it possible for more
than two and a half million European students to study at various EU universities. Above all, however, it helps to
strengthen the European Union, with citizens who are more aware of the advantages of this EU project. Hence,
together with the advancement of this programme for young people, other exchange activities could be established
which are of benefit to other EU citizens.

1. Does the Commission not think that it could carry out other stay programmes in EU countries, such as one that
enables retired persons to enjoy several weeks’ rest and relaxation at a health resort or in a mountainous or coastal
area of Europe, for example?

2. If Erasmus of Rotterdam was a wise exemplar of study, does the Commission not think that Wolfgang Goethe,
tireless traveller throughout Europe, could be patron to this programme?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The Commission recognises the importance of fostering transnational tourism activities to reinforce European
citizenship and to support growth and jobs in the EU. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, its role is limited to
supporting, coordinating and complementing Member States’ actions.

In line with this, in May 2012, the Commission launched a ‘senior tourism initiative’ to define the framework
conditions to enhance senior travel in Europe, encouraging, amongst others, the set-up of specific transnational travel
packages for this target population ( [1] ). The initiative acknowledges the important tourism-generating potential of the
senior population, which includes individuals with both purchasing power and leisure time. It therefore wishes to
incentivise the creation of an EU transnational domestic market for senior travel, in particular during low season ( [2] ) in
the different EU Member States, thereby improving tourism competitiveness and promoting regional development on
the basis of EU diversity.

A call for proposals will be published in the next few months to support this initiative. The Commission proposes to
launch this ‘senior initiative’ in the tourism field as a pilot, acting as a facilitator to support, coordinate and
complement actions as developed by Member States and other stakeholders in this field, on the basis of public-private
partnerships including SMEs.

The Commission will then assess the initiative, including the communication and marketing dimension as well as a
possible ‘patron’ for it. In this context, the Commission appreciates the Honourable Member’s suggestion.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) This initiative will target European citizens over 55 years old, which represent around 25% of the EU population.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The initiative would contribute to mitigating the negative effects that seasonality has on the competitiveness of the EU tourism industry, on the

motivation and career development of its workforce and on the sub-optimal use of the natural, cultural and physical assets and infrastructures of
the EU tourism destinations.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 419

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002849/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ De nuevo sobre la elusión impositiva de las grandes empresas

Las noticias relativas a la paradoja que existe entre los grandes beneficios obtenidos por conocidas empresas y su
reducida contribución impositiva se han multiplicado en las últimas semanas. Por ejemplo, la filial de Google en
España ha declarado unas ventas superiores a los 38 millones de euros en 2011; sin embargo, el resultado de su base
liquidable es negativo. Y la filial de Apple, con unas ventas de más de 20 millones, ha declarado pérdidas a la Agencia
Tributaria española. Y así podría seguir con otros ejemplos que aparecen en los medios de comunicación europeos,
porque a muchos inquietan esas prácticas tributarias que desvían cuantiosos beneficios a Irlanda o a Luxemburgo.

Con anterioridad ya he manifestado mi preocupación ante la Comisión Europea (preguntas E‐007799/2012 o
E-010066/2012) y las respuestas que he recibido resultan insatisfactorias, porque renuncian a afrontar el problema
de manera armonizada en el ámbito europeo y esperan una propuesta a nivel mundial.

Soy consciente de que la mejor solución debería ser única, ante empresas que negocian en todo el mundo. Sin
embargo, en estos momentos este objetivo es inalcanzable; de ahí que muchos países europeos (Francia, España,
Alemania, Gran Bretaña, entre otros) estén intentando resolver esas situaciones de manera individual.

Por ello, insisto en preguntar:

1. ¿Por qué renuncia la Comisión Europea a establecer un criterio armonizado para todos los Estados miembros,
lo que haría desaparecer la competencia tributaria entre los mismos?

2. ¿Por qué no estudia la Comisión la sustitución de tratados bilaterales de doble imposición por una normativa
única para toda la Unión Europea?

3. ¿Por qué no analiza la Comisión la verdadera relevancia de las filiales y sucursales que tienen actuaciones
sustanciales y significativas en el negocio del grupo empresarial con objeto de considerarlas «establecimientos
permanentes»?

4. ¿Por qué no introduce los criterios formulados en el Informe de la OCDE sobre la erosión de las bases
imponibles y el traslado de beneficios?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

La propuesta de la Comisión relativa a una base imponible consolidada común del impuesto de sociedades aborda
muchos de los problemas que plantea la coexistencia de veintisiete regímenes diferentes de impuestos de sociedades,
mediante la armonización de la base imponible de ese impuesto. Esta propuesta se está debatiendo actualmente en el
Consejo y corresponde ahora a los Estados miembros alcanzar un acuerdo. La Comisión, en su Comunicación
COM(2011) 712 sobre «La doble imposición en el mercado único», ha determinado varias medidas para aquellas
actividades transfronterizas que en la actualidad dan lugar a situaciones de doble imposición o de doble no
imposición. El Plan de Acción de 6 de diciembre y, en concreto, la Recomendación C(2012) 8806 sobre la
planificación fiscal agresiva, siguen insistiendo en este aspecto y recomiendan a los Estados miembros que incluyan en
sus respectivos convenios fiscales una cláusula de doble no imposición. La Plataforma de Buena Gobernanza Fiscal
supervisará las recomendaciones y aportará ideas para posibles nuevas iniciativas.

La definición de «establecimiento permanente» se basa en directrices de la OCDE respetadas a nivel mundial. La
necesidad de actualizar o no esta definición es uno de los asuntos que actualmente está revisando la OCDE en su
informe sobre la erosión de las bases imponibles y el traslado de beneficios [Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)],
en el que también trabaja la Comisión. En su anteriormente mencionada Recomendación sobre la planificación fiscal
agresiva, la Comisión también ha propuesto una norma general común de lucha contra el fraude que permita a los
Estados miembros adoptar medidas eficaces contra mecanismos artificiales como filiales o sucursales que no cuentan
con un verdadero carácter comercial. El informe BEPS de la OCDE, por su parte, aún no ha propuesto nuevos
criterios, solo describe los actuales problemas fiscales internacionales. Para junio de 2013 está previsto un Plan de
Acción de la OCDE en el que se identificarán posibles respuestas y metodologías, se establecerá un calendario y se
señalarán los recursos necesarios para su ejecución.

C 6 E / 420 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002849/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The tax evasion of large companies once again

Reports concerning the paradox between the huge profits earned by well‐known companies and their low tax
contribution have increased significantly in recent weeks. For example, Google’s subsidiary in Spain has declared sales
of more than EUR 38 million in 2011. Profits from its tax base, however, are negative. Moreover, Apple’s subsidiary,
with sales of more than EUR 20 million, has declared losses to the Spanish Tax Office. I could continue in this vein
with other examples that appear in the European media, because many people are concerned by these tax practices
that divert substantial profits to Ireland or Luxembourg.

I have already previously expressed my concern to the Commission (questions E‐007799/2012 and
E-010066/2012), and the answers I have received are unsatisfactory because they fail to tackle the problem in a
harmonised manner at European level and are waiting for a proposal at the global level.

I am aware that the best solution should be unique, in view of companies that trade across the world; however at
present this objective is out of reach. Hence many EU countries (France, Spain, Germany and Great Britain, among
others) are attempting to resolve these situations individually.

That is why I again ask:

1. Why the Commission declines to establish a harmonised criterion for all Member States that would make tax
competition between them disappear?

2. Why the Commission does not investigate substituting bilateral double taxation agreements with a single
regulation for the entire European Union?

3. Why the Commission does not analyse the true relevance of subsidiaries and branches with substantial and
significant activity in their company group’s business with the objective of considering them ‘permanent
establishments’?

4. Why it does not introduce the criteria drawn up in the OECD report on the erosion of tax bases and profit
shifting?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission's proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base addresses many of the problems posed
by the co-existence of 27 different corporate tax systems by harmonising the corporate tax base. It is currently
discussed in Council and it is now for the Member States to reach agreement. Where cross border activities currently
lead to double taxation or double non-taxation, the Commission in its communication on double taxation in the
single market, COM(2011) 712, has identified several actions. The 6 December Action Plan and specifically the
recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning, C/2012/8806, follows up on this and recommends Member States
include a double non-taxation clause in their tax treaties. The Platform for Tax Good Governance will monitor the
recommendations and provide input for possible further initiatives.

The definition of a permanent establishment is based on globally respected OECD guidelines. Whether this requires
updating is one of the topics currently reviewed by the OECD in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.
The Commission participates in this work. In its Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning referred to above, the
Commission has also proposed a common General Anti Abuse Rule that would allow Member States to take effective
action against artificial arrangements, such as subsidiaries or branches lacking true economic substance. As regards
the OECD BEPS report, there are no new criteria proposed yet. It describes current international tax problems. An
OECD Action Plan is planned for June 2013 to identify possible responses and methodologies, to set a timetable and
indicate the necessary resources for implementation.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 421

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002850/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Catálogo de árboles centenarios y otras medidas forestales

Al hilo de un concienzudo informe científico publicado en la conocida revista _Science_ relativo al grave deterioro de los
árboles centenarios, propuse a la Comisión hace varias semanas algunas medidas, entre ellas, la difusión de un
catálogo de árboles, así como destinar un pequeño porcentaje de las inversiones en infraestructuras a la repoblación
forestal (pregunta E-000374/2013). En la respuesta que he recibido se me indica que «la Comisión no tiene previsto
elaborar un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios» y que «la Comisión no tiene intención de influir en las decisiones
que adopten los Estados miembros en materia de gestión de obras públicas».

Aún advirtiendo la contundencia de estas contestaciones, insisto en preguntar a la Comisión:

1. ¿No cree que la difusión de un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios tendría muchas ventajas, entre las que
estarían, por ejemplo, contribuir a enraizar mejor (ya que de bosques hablamos) el conocimiento por los
ciudadanos de los distintos ecosistemas europeos, lo que a su vez ayudaría, sin duda, a su mejor protección?

2. ¿Es consciente la Comisión de que configurar tal catálogo resultaría muy económico?

3. ¿Qué criterios tiene la Comisión para realizar un vídeo de promoción como el de «la ciencia es cosa de chicas» y
rechazar considerar la publicidad del patrimonio forestal europeo?

4. En ningún momento he propuesto que se influya en la gestión de las obras públicas nacionales. Si se hubiera
leído bien mi pregunta se habría advertido que lo que proponía era que se destinara a proyectos de restauración
forestal un pequeño porcentaje de los presupuestos de las obras públicas comunitarias (por ejemplo, el 0,5 %).
De ahí que insista, una vez más: ¿por qué no se destina un pequeño porcentaje de los proyectos comunitarios a
repoblar zonas que lleven un sello de la financiación europea?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de abril de 2013)_

La difusión de un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios puede contribuir a una mayor sensibilización sobre los
ecosistemas europeos y mejorar, de este modo, su conservación. Este objetivo se ha alcanzado ya a través de una serie
de publicaciones sobre grandes árboles centenarios en los Estados miembros, incluidas algunas publicadas por
asociaciones de dendrología. Como ya se ha indicado en la respuesta a la pregunta E-000374/2013, los anexos de la
Directiva sobre hábitats de la UE ( [1] ) incluyen especies en peligro de extinción y y los tipos de ecosistema forestal (es
decir, hábitats naturales) que requieren medidas de protección o conservación.

La Comisión pone en marcha actividades de comunicación si considera que estas suponen un valor añadido en
términos de apoyo a las políticas y prioridades europeas, en función del presupuesto disponible.

Las medidas de desarrollo rural a que se refiere la Comisión en su respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-00374/2013 ya
incluyen ayudas a medidas medioambientales en el sector de la silvicultura, incluida la repoblación forestal, que, desde
el punto de vista medioambiental, aportan un valor añadido a través de inversiones no productivas.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 92/43/CEE, DO L 206 de 22.7.1992.

C 6 E / 422 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002850/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Catalogue of old trees and other forest-related measures

Following a thorough scientific report published in the well-known magazine _Science_ regarding the rapid global
decline in large old trees, I proposed some measures to the Commission several weeks ago, including distributing a
catalogue of trees, as well as allocating a small percentage of infrastructure investment to reforestation
(question E-000374/2013). The answer that I received states that ‘the Commission is not planning to establish a
catalogue of large old trees’ and that ‘the Commission does not intend to influence Member States in their choice of
managing public works’.

Whilst I realise that these answers are conclusive, I again ask the Commission:

1. Does it not think that there would be many benefits in distributing a catalogue of large old trees, for example
that it would better root (since we are talking about forests) what citizens know about the different European
ecosystems, undoubtedly in turn helping to better protect them?

2. Is the Commission aware that compiling such a catalogue would be very cost-effective?

3. What criteria does the Commission have for producing a promotional video such as ‘science is for girls’ but
refusing to consider publicising Europe’s forest heritage?

4. At no point have I proposed that the Commission should influence the management of public works. If it had
read my question properly, it would have noted that what I was proposing was that a small amount of money
(roughly equal to 0.5% of the budget for EU public works, for example) be allocated to forest reforestation
projects. I therefore ask once more: Why does it not allocate a small percentage of EU project funding to
repopulating areas that carry the stamp of European financing?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 April 2013)_

The distribution of a catalogue of large old trees can help raising awareness on European ecosystems and thus
improving their protection. This aim is already reached by a series of publications on old large trees in the Member
States, including those published by dendrology associations. As already indicated in the reply to Question
E-000374/2013, the annexes of the EU Habitats Directive ( [1] ) include species in danger of extinction and the types of
forest ecosystem (i.e. natural habitats) that require protection/conservation measures.

The Commission's communication activities are put in place where they are judged to add value in terms of
supporting European policies and priorities and according to available budgets.

The rural development measures the Commission refers to in its reply to Written Question E-00374/2013 already
provide support for forest-related environmentally targeted actions, including reforestation with enhanced
environmental values through non-productive investment.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 92/43/EEC (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 423

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002851/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Ismail Ertug (S&D)**

_(11. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Häusliche Gewalt in der Türkei

In seinem Bericht „He loves you, he beats you“ von 2011 hat die Organisation Human Rights Watch die Rechte der
Frauen in der Türkei, insbesondere im Bereich der häuslichen Gewalt, genauestens unter die Lupe genommen.
Abschließend wurden im Bericht Empfehlungen u. a. an die Europäische Kommission abgegeben wie folgende:

_„Include a detailed analysis of domestic violence and the Turkish government’s progress and failings to address it in the 2011 and_
_subsequent progress reports on Turkey“_

(Aufnahme einer ausführlichen Analyse der Situation bezüglich häuslicher Gewalt und der Fortschritte bzw. der
Untätigkeit der türkischen Regierung in den Bericht über 2011 und die anschließenden Türkei-Fortschrittsberichte)

Im Türkei-Fortschrittsbericht 2012 der EU-Kommission konnte bedauerlicherweise eine solche detaillierte Analyse
nicht gefunden werden.

1. Kann die Kommission erklären, warum in einem so fundamentalen Bereich eine solche Analyse nicht für
notwendig erachtet wird?

2. Wie will die Kommission sicherstellen, dass die Türkei in diesem Bereich ihren „Verpflichtungen“ nachkommt,
solange die Kommission sich selbst keinen genauen Überblick über die Lage verschafft?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**

_(2. Mai 2013)_

Die Themen Frauenrechte und Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Türkei werden von der Kommission aufmerksam
verfolgt, bei jeder geeigneten Gelegenheit mit den türkischen Behörden erörtert und u. a. in den jährlichen
Fortschrittsberichten ( [1] ) behandelt.

Wie vom Rat und Parlament gefordert, beziehen sich diese Berichte auf die im Hinblick auf die Beitrittskriterien,
darunter die Grundrechte, relevanten Entwicklungen im jeweiligen Berichtszeitraum.

Der Kommission sind die Themen Frauenrechte und Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Türkei ein besonderes
Anliegen. Um in diesem Bereich weitere Fortschritte zu erzielen, wird die Kommission diese auch weiterhin
aufmerksam verfolgen und mit den türkischen Behörden und allen Interessengruppen — u. a. im Rahmen der
Finanzhilfe — eng zusammenarbeiten.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_de.htm

C 6 E / 424 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002851/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ismail Ertug (S&D)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Domestic violence in Turkey

In its report ‘He loves you, he beats you’ from 2011, the organisation Human Rights Watch placed the rights of
women in Turkey, in particular in the area of domestic violence, squarely under the microscope. The report
concluded with recommendations for the European Commission, among others, as follows:

‘Include a detailed analysis of domestic violence and the Turkish government’s progress

and failings to address it in the 2011 and subsequent progress reports on Turkey’

Turkey’s 2012 progress report by the Commission, regrettably, contained no such detailed analysis.

1. Can the Commission explain why, in such a fundamental area, an analysis of this kind was not considered
necessary?

2. How will the Commission ensure that Turkey fulfils its ‘obligations’ in this area if it does not itself obtain an
accurate overview of the situation?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The Commission follows closely women's rights and gender equality issues in Turkey, raises them with the Turkish
authorities on all appropriate occasions and reports on them including in the yearly Progress Reports ( [1] ).

These reports refer to developments over the reporting period, under the accession criteria, including fundamental
rights, as requested by the Council and the Parliament.

The Commission attaches great importance to women's rights and gender equality issues in Turkey. The Commission
will continue following these issues closely and working with the Turkish authorities and all stakeholders, also by
means of the financial assistance, to achieve further progress.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 425

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002852/13**

**to the Commission**
**Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Horizon 2020 and outreach

EU Universe Awareness (EU-UNAWE) is a highly successful project funded until December 2013 as a result of
Amendment 898 of the European Parliament to the 2009 space research budget of the Commission’s DG Enterprise
and Innovation. This programme is part of the International Astronomical Union’s strategy of using astronomy to
further global development. It uses astronomy and space to inspire young children in five EU Member States and
South Africa, with the emphasis on disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, EU-UNAWE is one of the few existing
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) projects that fully meet the demands of Written Declaration 45/2011, in which
Parliament urged the Commission to support radio astronomy as a tool for stimulating capacity-building in Africa.

The Commission is setting great store by Horizon 2020 making the Integrating Projects (IP) and ideas generated by
EU-funded research available to as wide a range of stakeholders as possible. While this is very much to be
commended, what further consideration has the Commission given to the desirability of a wider outreach
requirement for EU-funded science to mesh with the national educational programmes, especially for early-years
pupils? A blue skies science like astronomy has considerable wider benefits in educational terms and as a means of
enthusing the next generation of scientists and innovators. Would the Commission consider a formal requirement
that a percentage of each Horizon 2020 grant be allocated to outreach and publicity work?

Would the Commission agree that this would put a vast resource at the disposal of the EU’s schools and teachers, to
enthuse the next generation as well as to underline the wider benefits of EU-funded research?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

The EU-UNAWE project is indeed providing a very useful contribution to the education of young children. It also
most certainly will help to motivate young Africans to look for a future occupation at the Square Kilometer Array in
South Africa, one of the largest astronomical instruments ever built. Futhermore, the space research unit of DG
Enterprise and Industry has created a smartphone application for both IOS and Android, which gives information on
the EU-UNAWE project and indeed all FP7 space projects as part of its outreach efforts, including a quiz section
directed at young users.

In recognition of the essential role of education and public information on space related actions of the EU for young
generations, the Commission intends to support specific initiatives on education and outreach activities in the
Horizon 2020 Space programme and, when the subject matter of a research project lends itself to educational
outreach, projects will be encouraged to produce materials for use in schools and universities.

The Commission is also engaged in the ‘Space Expo’, a mobile exhibition, which travels to cities all over Europe and
shows the magic of the Universe and demonstrates European efforts in Earth observation, satellite navigation as well
as telecommunication and the exploration of our solar system, aimed at raising the awareness of the general public,
including specific visits for local schools. So far, more than 100,000 visitors and about 250 school classes with their
teachers have visited the exhibition and were enthusiastic about the beautiful decoration and informative
presentation by space experts. This kind of outreach activity will be continued.

C 6 E / 426 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002853/13**

**to the Commission**
**Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU-UNAWE project and outreach

EU Universe Awareness (EU-UNAWE) is a highly successful project funded up to December 2013 as a result of
Parliament’s Amendment 898 to the 2009 space budget of DG Enterprise and Innovation. This programme is part of
the International Astronomical Union’s strategy to use astronomy for global development. It uses astronomy and
space to inspire young children in five Member States and in South Africa, with emphasis on disadvantaged
communities. Furthermore, EU-UNAWE is one of the few existing projects under the Seventh Framework Programme
for Research that fully satisfy Parliament’s Written Declaration 45/2011 on science capacity-building in Africa, in
which Parliament urges the Commission to support radio astronomy as a tool for stimulating capacity-building there.

Building on the successful experience with EU-UNAWE, what steps does the Commission plan to take to facilitate
support for the continuation of this programme and expand its reach in order to enable the participation of
additional Member States, associated states and other countries with which the Union wishes to strengthen its links in
science and technology?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

The EU-UNAWE project is indeed providing a very useful contribution to the education of young children. In
recognition of the essential role of education and public information on space related actions of the EU for young
generations, we intend to support specific initiatives on education and outreach activities in the Horizon 2020 Space
programme. As such, and notwithstanding the fact that the main focus of our calls will be on research and technology
development, the Commission may consider opening topics in this direction over the course of the Horizon 2020
calls.

The Honourable Member should also refer to the response to Parliamentary Question E-002852/2013 for further
details on ongoing outreach activities.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 427

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002854/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Marita Ulvskog (S&D), Anna Hedh (S&D), Jens Nilsson (S&D), Åsa Westlund (S&D), Göran Färm (S&D) och**

**Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Aktiv handlingsplan för att motverka diskriminering av människor på grund av sexuell läggning eller
könstillhörighet

Vid flera tillfällen har en aktiv handlingsplan efterfrågats för att motverka diskriminering och särbehandling av
människor på grund av sexuell läggning eller könstillhörighet.

Trots att såväl Europaparlamentet och EESK begärt en handlingsplan har kommissionens vice ordförande och
kommissionär för rättvisa, grundläggande rättigheter och medborgarskap Viviane Reding hittills inte tagit initiativ till
en sådan handlingsplan.

EU-kommissionen är sedan tidigare väl medveten om den diskriminering och de trakasserier HBTQ-personer utsätts
för. Fördomar och diskriminerande handlingar kräver aktiva åtgärder.

Mot denna bakgrund bes kommissionen klargöra följande punkter:

1. Vilka är skälen till att handlingsplanen ännu inte finns på plats?

2. När avser kommissionen ta fram denna handlingsplan?

3. Vilka övriga åtgärder avser EU-kommissionen vidta för att säkerställa att arbetet mot diskriminering mot
HBTQ-personer integreras i EU:s alla politikområden?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar**

_(18 april 2013)_

Kommissionen bedriver en aktiv politik mot diskriminering i medlemsstaterna på grund av sexuell läggning ( [1] ) och
har hittills inte ansett det nödvändigt att lägga fram en handlingsplan för det arbetet. Kommissionen prioriterar i
nuläget att se till att gällande lagstiftning och politiska insatser faktiskt tillämpas. Jag tänker bland annat på förbudet
mot diskriminering utifrån sexuell läggning som fastställs i artikel 21 i Europeiska unionens stadga om de
grundläggande rättigheterna, eller på diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning som även förbjuds
genom rådets direktiv 2000/78/EG. Framstegen i arbetet mot homofobi presenteras varje år i årsrapporten om
tillämpningen av stadgan om de grundläggande rättigheterna.

Kommissionen har uppmanat Europeiska unionens byrå för grundläggande rättigheter att samla fakta om homo‐ och
transfobi för att få ett tydligare grepp om hets, brott och våld som riktas mot HBT-personer i medlemsstaterna och
Kroatien. Utifrån resultaten av undersökningen kommer kommissionen att se över behovet av ytterligare insatser på
området i framtiden.

Kommissionen kommer att fortsätta utnyttja dagens välfungerande samarbete med sina olika avdelningar, övriga EUinstitutioner och det civila samhället för att diskrimineringsförbudet mot olika grupper, däribland HBT-personer, ska
beaktas i all ny EU-lagstiftning.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Mer information om EU:s åtgärder på området finns här: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/orientation/index_sv.htm

C 6 E / 428 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002854/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marita Ulvskog (S&D), Anna Hedh (S&D), Jens Nilsson (S&D), Åsa Westlund (S&D), Göran Färm (S&D) and**

**Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Positive action plan to counter discrimination against people on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender

On several occasions, a positive action plan has been requested to counter discrimination against, and the special
treatment of, people on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender.

Despite both Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee having called for an action plan, the
Commission’s Vice-President and Commissioner responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, Viviane
Reding, has yet to take the initiative to draw up such a plan.

The Commission has been well aware for some time of the discrimination and harassment suffered by LGBT people.
Prejudices and discriminatory actions require active measures.

In view of this, could the Commission clarify the following:

1. What are the reasons for still not having this action plan in place?

2. When does the Commission intend to draw up this action plan?

3. What other steps does the Commission intend to take to ensure that the work to prevent discrimination against
LGBT people is integrated into all EU policy areas?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

The Commission conducts an active policy to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Member
States ( [1] ) and it has not considered necessary so far to present such action plan. The Commission's current priority is
to ensure that current legislative and policy instruments are effectively implemented. This includes the prohibition of
discrimination based on sexual orientation enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and discrimination based on sexual orientation in the area of employment prohibited though
Council Directive 2000/78/EC. The progress in the fight against homophobia is presented every year in the Annual
Reports on the application of the Charter.

The Commission has asked the Fundamental Rights Agency to collect data on homophobia and transphobia in order
to establish a more comprehensive picture on hate speech, crime and violence directed against LGBT people in the
Member States and Croatia. On the light of the results of this survey, the Commission will analyse the need of carrying
out additional activities in this area in the future.

The Commission will continue using the existing and well-established cooperation mechanisms between different
Commission services, EU institutions and civil society to mainstream non-discrimination in all EU policies for
different groups, including LGBT people.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) More information on EU action in this area can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/orientation/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 429

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-002855/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Nuovo quadro finanziario 2014-2020 e disoccupazione giovanile in Europa

Il Consiglio dell'Unione europea ha raggiunto un accordo politico durante il vertice tenutosi a Bruxelles il 7 e
8 febbraio 2013. Questo accordo prevede una riduzione dell'8 %, rispetto al 2012, del tetto massimo di spesa per
l'Unione europea.

Secondo alcune organizzazioni giovanili (tra cui Youth Intergroup) questo taglio andrà a gravare sugli investimenti in
aree di particolare interesse per i giovani come ricerca, innovazione e formazione. Programmi di formazione come
«Erasmus for All» o di ricerca come «Horizon 2020» rischiano di subire grossi tagli rispetto alla proposta originale
della Commissione che prevedeva un aumento del 70 % dei fondi destinati all'istruzione.

Per «Youth Guarantee», fondo dedicato alla creazione di nuovi posti di lavoro nei paesi con alto tasso di
disoccupazione giovanile, sono stati destinati 6 miliardi di euro. Secondo l'Organizzazione Internazionale del Lavoro,
sarebbe necessario un investimento di circa 21 miliardi di euro affinché lo «Youth Guarantee» possa avere un impatto
significativo sul mercato del lavoro giovanile. Se a questi dati si aggiunge una riduzione pari a circa 14 miliardi di euro
degli stanziamenti destinati all'istruzione e alla ricerca rispetto alla proposta originale di Van Rompuy e la recente
difficoltà dell'Unione europea di rispettare le scadenze dei pagamenti, il rischio per i programmi destinati alla
gioventù europea sembra ancora maggiore.

Alla luce dei dati Eurostat, da cui emerge una situazione allarmante della disoccupazione giovanile in Europa (con
picchi fino al 26 % in Spagna e 27 % in Grecia), sarebbe importante sapere se il Consiglio è a conoscenza del rapporto
sopra citato dell'Organizzazione Internazionale del Lavoro e se dispone di dati sull'impatto che i finanziamenti ora
proposti dal Consiglio avrebbero sull'occupazione giovanile in Europa.

Può la Commissione far sapere quali misure intende intraprendere per far sì che gli investimenti dedicati ai giovani
creino un'occupazione stabile di lungo periodo?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

_(17 aprile 2013)_

Il pacchetto per l'Occupazione giovanile ( [1] ) propone quattro iniziative per affrontare le sfide a breve termine e quelle
strutturali che sottendono la crisi della disoccupazione giovanile: una raccomandazione del Consiglio che prevede un
sistema di garanzia per i giovani, accolta dal Consiglio il 28 febbraio 2013 ( [2] ), che accresce la disponibilità di tirocini e
apprendistati qualitativamente validi sulla base di un quadro europeo per la qualità degli apprendistati e di
un'Alleanza europea per gli apprendistati e migliora la mobilità dei giovani lavoratori. L'attuazione di queste misure
sarà sostenuta finanziariamente dal Fondo sociale europeo e dall'iniziativa a favore dell'occupazione giovanile (YEI) ( [3] )
che è cofinanziata dal FSE.

Questi sforzi dovrebbero favorire un'occupazione stabile e durevole dei giovani se saranno integrati da altre misure
per accrescere l'offerta di posti di lavoro, come proposto nel pacchetto Occupazione dell'aprile 2012 ( [4] ), atte a
stimolare la domanda di lavoro, valorizzando appieno le potenzialità di creazione di lavoro delle industrie chiave e
mobilitando gli strumenti finanziari dell'UE a sostegno della creazione di posti di lavoro.

Nel contesto del Semestre europeo 2012 la Commissione ha emanato raccomandazioni per paese a quasi tutti gli
Stati membri in relazione alle tematiche che interessano i giovani, raccomandazioni che sono state adottate dal
Consiglio nel 2012. La Commissione segue gli sviluppi che si registrano sui mercati del lavoro nazionali e le misure
intraprese. Essa presenterà la propria valutazione di insieme nel contesto del Semestre europeo 2013.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)727-728 — 729 final del 5 dicembre 2012.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06944.en13.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM (2013)144, 145, 146 del 12 marzo 2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) COM(2012)173 final del 18 aprile 2012.

C 6 E / 430 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002855/13**

**to the Commission**
**Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ New multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020 and youth unemployment in Europe

At the European Council Summit of 7 and 8 February 2013 in Brussels, political agreement was reached to cap EU
expenditure at a level 8% below that of 2012.

A number of youth organisations (including Youth Intergroup) have expressed concern that the cuts will seriously
compromise investment in areas of particular importance to young people, such as research, innovation and training.
Funding for training and research programmes, for example ‘Erasmus for All’ or ‘Horizon 2020’ respectively, is likely
to be far below the amount quoted in the Commission’s initial proposal, which envisaged a 70% increase in
appropriations for education.

EUR 6 billion has been earmarked for the ‘Youth Guarantee’ fund for job creation in countries with high levels of
youth unemployment. However, according to the International Labour Organisation, investment totalling
EUR 21 billion would be necessary for it to have any significant impact. This can only serve to undermine still further
programmes intended for young people in Europe, particularly in view of the fact that appropriations for education
and research are EUR 14 billion below the amount initially proposed by Mr Van Rompuy, in addition to which the EU
has recently had difficulties in making payments on schedule.

In the light of the alarming Eurostat youth unemployment figures for Europe (peaking to 26% in Spain and 27% in
Greece), it is important to establish whether the Council is aware of the above report by the International Labour
Organisation and whether it fully appreciates the anticipated impact of its financial recommendations on youth
unemployment in Europe.

In view of this:

What measures are being envisaged by the Commission to ensure that investment intended to benefit young people
leads to stable and long-term employment?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

The Youth Employment Package ( [1] ) proposes four initiatives to tackle both the short-term and structural challenges
behind the youth unemployment crisis: a Council Recommendation on Establishing a Youth Guarantee, agreed upon
by the Council on 28 February 2013 ( [2] ), increasing the supply of quality traineeships as well as apprenticeships
through a Quality Framework on Traineeships and a European Alliance for Apprenticeships and improving the
mobility of young workers. The implementation of these measures will be financially supported by the European
Social Fund and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) ( [3] ) which is co-funded by the ESF.

These efforts should support the stable and long-term employment for young people if they are complemented by
other measures to boost the number of jobs on offer, as proposed by the Employment Package of April 2012 ( [4] ), such
as encouraging labour demand, fully exploiting the job creation potential of key industries; and mobilising EU
financial instruments in support of job creation.

In the context of the 2012 European Semester, the Commission issued relevant Country Specific Recommendations
to nearly all Member States on youth-related areas, which were adopted by the Council in 2012. The Commission is
monitoring the developments in the national labour markets and the measures undertaken. It will present its overall
assessment in the context of the 2013 European Semester.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 727-728 — 729 final of 5 December 2012.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06944.en13.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013)144, 145, 146 of 12 March 2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 173 final of 18 April 2012.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 431

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002857/13**

**до Комисията**
**Filiz Hakaeva Hyusmenova (ALDE)**

_(11 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Защита на демокрацията и основните права

Следващият мониторингов доклад за България по механизма за сътрудничество и контрол е предвиден за декември
2013 г. Както стана ясно, редица страни членки незаконно обвързаха приемането на България в Шенгенското
пространство с резултатите от докладите на Комисията в областта на съдебната система и правовия ред. Доколкото тези
мнения се явяват непреодолима пречка за приемането на България в Шенген, възможно ли е и какъв е механизмът ЕК
да подготви и изнесе междинен доклад, който би отразил евентуалния напредък на страната по препоръките на
Комисията (държави като Холандия, Германия, Австрия и Финландия приеха за несправедливо за България да няма
междинен доклад, какъвто имаше за Румъния)?

В ЕП се проведе дебат за демокрацията и свободата в България, провокиран от покушението срещу лидера на
либералната партия Движение за права и свободи д-р Ахмед Доган. Евродепутати отправиха апел към ЕК за
наблюдение на разследването и делото по този случай. Счита ли Комисията, че разкриването на обективната истина
има високо значение в обществен и политически план за страната и намира ли за удачно да включи към делата, които
наблюдава в правосъдната система на България, провеждането на горепосоченото досъдебно производство и съдебно
дело?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Барозу от името на Комисията**

_(7 май 2013 г.)_

Комисията подкрепя присъединяването на България към Шенгенското пространство. Тя е подчертавала по редица
поводи, че не е в подкрепа на въвеждането на каквато и да било формална връзка или обусловеност между Механизма
за сътрудничество и проверка (МСП) и присъединяването на България и Румъния към Шенгенското пространство.
Наскоро тази позиция бе потвърдена отново на пленарно заседание на ЕП в рамките на изявлението на Комисията
относно МСП, направено на 13 март 2013 г. Предвижда се следващите доклади по МСП за България и Румъния да
бъдат публикувани преди края на 2013 г. По своя инициатива и във всеки един момент Комисията може да реши да
приеме допълнителни доклади, ако прецени, че това е необходимо с оглед развитието на събитията.

Комисията осъди опита за покушение срещу д-р Ахмед Доган, извършен през януари 2013 г., като призова българските
власти да проведат пълно разследване на случилото се и да подведат под отговорност извършителите. Тя следи
напредъка по случая като част от по-обширните си задължения за мониторинг съгласно МСП. Най-общо казано,
Комисията вярва, че наличието на добре функционираща съдебна система и зачитането на върховенството на закона са
предпоставки за съществуването на устойчиво и демократично общество.

C 6 E / 432 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002857/13**

**to the Commission**
**Filiz Hakaeva Hyusmenova (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Protecting democracy and fundamental rights

The next monitoring report on Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is scheduled for
December 2013. As it became clear, a number of Member States have illegally involved Bulgaria’s entry into the
Schengen Area with the results from the reports by the Commission on the judicial system and the rule of law. Insofar
as these opinions appear to be an insurmountable obstacle for Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen, would it be possible
and what would be the mechanism for the European Commission to prepare and deliver an interim report reflecting
the possible progress the country has made regarding the Commission’s recommendations (countries such as the
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Finland believed that it was unfair for Bulgaria not to have an interim report, since
there was one for Romania)?

There was a debate in the European Parliament about democracy and freedom in Bulgaria on account of the
attempted assassination of Dr Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the liberal party the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
MEPs called on the Commission to monitor the investigation and trial in this case. Does the Commission believe that
the course of justice is of great importance in the social and political plan for the country, and does it believe that it is
appropriate to include the implementation of the above pre-trial proceedings and court proceedings in cases seen in
the Bulgarian judicial system?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

The Commission supports Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen Area. The Commission has on numerous occasions
repeated that it does not support any formal link or conditionality between the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism (CVM) and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area. This position was latest
reiterated before the EP Plenary, when the Commission delivered its statement on the CVM on the 13 March 2013.
The next CVM reports for both Bulgaria and Romania are planned before the end of 2013. The Commission can at its
own initiative and at any moment decide to adopt additional reports, if it considers that developments so require.

The Commission has condemned the assault attempt against Dr Ahmed Dogan in January 2013 and called on the
Bulgarian authorities to fully investigate the events and bring those responsible to justice. The Commission is
following the developments in the case as part of its wider monitoring obligations under the CVM. In a general sense,
the Commission believes that a well-functioning judicial system and the respect for rule of law is a prerequisite for a
sustainable, democratic society.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 433

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002858/13**

**à Comissão**
**Edite Estrela (S&D)**
_(11 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Resultados do Eurobarómetro sobre «cidadania da União Europeia»

—
Tendo em conta os resultados do Eurobarómetro de fevereiro de 2013 sobre «a cidadania da União Europeia»;

—
Tendo em conta que o sentimento de cidadania europeia não é correspondido pelo conhecimento dos direitos
associados à cidadania europeia, com apenas 36 % dos inquiridos a nível europeu a afirmarem que os conhecem;

—
Tendo em conta que a sondagem sugere ainda que, 27 anos depois da adesão de Portugal, o grau de interação
dos portugueses com outras realidades da União Europeia é muito baixo;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que medidas pensa adotar para promover um sentimento pró-europeu nos diferentes Estados‐Membros e para
dar a conhecer de maneira mais eficaz os direitos decorrentes da cidadania europeia?

**Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

O inquérito Eurobarómetro sobre a perceção da cidadania na UE mostra que a vasta maioria (88 %) das pessoas em
Portugal está familiarizada com o termo «cidadão europeu» — isto é mais 11 pontos percentuais do que em 2011, e
uma clara maioria (59 %) diz que sente que é cidadão da UE. No que diz geralmente respeito ao nível de informação
sobre os seus direitos ao abrigo da legislação da UE, a percentagem de cidadãos portugueses que se sentiram bem
informados (32 %) está muito perto da média da UE (36 %) e representa um aumento de 6 % comparado a 2007 —
uma tendência evidente nos Estados-Membros (+5 % no mesmo período).

No Relatório de Cidadania da UE de 2010, a Comissão identificou a falta de acesso fácil dos cidadãos à informação
sobre os seus direitos como um dos obstáculos principais que os cidadãos da UE enfrentam quando procuram exercer
os direitos europeus. Por forma a sensibilizá-los, a Comissão centrou os seus esforços nomeadamente no
desenvolvimento do «Europe Direct» e do portal web «A sua Europa», que funciona como um ponto de informação
único sobre os direitos da EU, e propôs-se a designar o ano de 2013 como o «Ano Europeu dos Cidadãos». Ao longo
deste ano, a Comissão estará a trabalhar no sentido de os cidadãos para os seus direitos europeus em Portugal e no
restante território da UE.

O Relatório de Cidadania da UE de 2013, esperado para 8 de maio, apresentará outras ações previstas pela Comissão
para remover os obstáculos que persistem sobre o usufruto dos direitos dos cidadãos da UE, no sentido de fazer da
cidadania europeia uma realidade tangível nas suas vidas quotidianas.

A Comissão já deu início a uma série de diálogos e debates com os cidadãos sobre o futuro da Europa, os quais com o
envolvimento pessoal de vários membros do Colégio, conjuntamente com deputados do Parlamento Europeu e
líderes locais e nacionais, darão uma contribuição concreta para o envolvimento com os cidadãos e a promoção de
uma melhor compreensão da União Europeia e das suas políticas.

C 6 E / 434 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002858/13**

**to the Commission**
**Edite Estrela (S&D)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Eurobarometer results on ‘European Union citizenship’

— In the light of the Eurobarometer results on ‘European Union citizenship’ from February 2013;

— Given that the sense of European citizenship is not matched by awareness of the rights associated with European
citizenship, as only 36% of those surveyed throughout Europe said that they were familiar with their rights;

— Given that the survey also suggests that, 27 years after Portugal’s accession, the level of interaction between the
Portuguese and other areas of the European Union is still extremely low;

1. What measures will the Commission adopt to promote pro-European sentiment throughout the different
Member States and to more effectively raise awareness of European citizens’ rights?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

The Eurobarometer survey on EU Citizenship shows that the vast majority (88%) of people in Portugal are familiar
with the term ‘EU citizen’ — this is 11 percentage points more than in 2007, and a clear majority (59%) say they feel
that they are a citizen of the EU. As regards the level of information generally on their rights under EC law, the
percentage of Portuguese citizens who feel well informed (32%) is very close to the EU average (36%) and represents
an increase of 6% compared to 2007 — a trend evident in all Member States (+5% in the same period).

In the 2010 EU Citizenship Report, the Commission identified the lack of easily accessible information to citizens on
their rights as one of the main obstacles that EU citizens face when seeking to exercise their EU rights. To improve
their awareness the Commission focused its efforts notably on developing Europe Direct and the Your Europe web
portal into a ‘one-stop shop’ information point on the rights of citizens in the EU and proposed to designate 2013 is
the ‘European Year of Citizens’. Throughout this year, the Commission is working to raise awareness of European
Citizens’ rights in Portugal and across the rest of the EU.

The 2013 EU Citizenship Report, due on 8th May, will present further actions envisaged by the Commission to
remove persistent obstacles to citizens’ enjoyment of their EU rights so as to make EU citizenship a tangible reality in
their daily lives.

The Commission has already started a series of dialogues with citizens and debates about the future of Europe. With
the personal involvement of many members of the College, together with MEPs and national and local political
leaders, these make a concrete contribution to engaging with citizens and promoting better understanding of the EU
and its policies.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 435

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002859/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) y**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal sobre la rentabilidad de la caza de ballenas por
parte Japón

A la luz del informe «La rentabilidad de la caza de ballenas por parte de Japón» que el Fondo Internacional para el
Bienestar Animal ha publicado recientemente, basado en los resultados de las principales agencias con sede en Japón
y, en gran medida, en los propios datos del Gobierno de Japón, y habida cuenta de la respuesta del Comisario
Potocnik a la pregunta escrita E-002263/2012 y de la respuesta del Comisario De Gucht a la pregunta escrita E012352/2011:

¿Es consciente la Comisión del informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal o considera debatir con
funcionarios japoneses sobre la evidencia del uso de capital público y del desvío de fondos de ayuda al tsunami para
fomentar la industria ballenera poco rentable y la falta de valor científico de la denominada «caza científica de
ballenas» practicada por Japón, antes de lanzarse a entablar negociaciones comerciales con Japón?

¿Puede asegurar la Comisión que toda disposición relativa al comercio y al desarrollo sostenibles en cualquier futuro
acuerdo comercial entre la UE y Japón garantizará también una aplicación efectiva del Convenio Internacional para la
Regulación de la Pesca de la Ballena y del Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica?

**Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión**

_(24 de abril de 2013)_

La Comisión conoce el informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal «La rentabilidad de la caza de
ballenas por parte de Japón» y lo está estudiando.

La UE integra consideraciones de sostenibilidad a su política comercial, especialmente negociando compromisos
sobre el medio ambiente y normas laborales en acuerdos bilaterales de libre comercio, y realizando evaluaciones de
impacto sobre la sostenibilidad en relación con las negociaciones comerciales.

Por lo que se refiere a las negociaciones sobre el acuerdo de libre comercio con Japón, el objetivo de la Comisión es
que tal acuerdo contenga un capítulo amplio y ambicioso sobre comercio y desarrollo sostenible, que debería
abordar, entre otras, la conservación, la gestión duradera y el fomento del comercio de recursos naturales —incluidos
los pesqueros— sostenibles y obtenidos legalmente. De ese modo, dicho capítulo sobre comercio y desarrollo
sostenible ha de contribuir a la aplicación efectiva por parte de Japón de los acuerdos multilaterales sobre medio
ambiente, en particular el Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica y la Convención sobre el Comercio Internacional de
Especies Amenazadas de Fauna y Flora silvestres. La Comisión considera que las disposiciones en materia de comercio
y desarrollo sostenible deben perseguir un alto nivel de protección medioambiental y laboral.

En cuanto a la cuestión específica de la pesca de la ballena, la UE ha expresado con frecuencia su posición divergente
con Japón y, sin duda, seguirá haciéndolo en los foros pertinentes.

C 6 E / 436 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(České znění)_

**Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-002859/13**

**Komisi**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

**a Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11. března 2013)_

_Předmět:_ Zpráva Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) o hospodářských aspektech japonského lovu
velryb

S ohledem na nedávno zveřejněnou zprávu Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) o hospodářských
aspektech japonského lovu velryb („The Economics of Japanese Whaling“), která vychází ze závěrů předních
japonských agentur a ve značné míře i z údajů samotné japonské vlády, a s ohledem na odpověď komisaře Potočnika
na otázku k písemnému zodpovězení E-002263/2012 a odpověď komisaře De Guchta na otázku k písemnému
zodpovězení E-012352/2011:

Je si Komise vědoma zveřejnění této zprávy a/nebo hodlá před zahájením obchodních jednání s Japonskem
diskutovat se zástupci japonských orgánů o důkazech o používání veřejných prostředků a zpronevěřování fondů na
zmírnění následků tsunami ve prospěch podpory nevýdělečného velrybářského odvětví a o tom, že nebyl prokázán
vědecký přínos tzv. lovu velryb pro vědecké účely?

Zajistí ustanovení o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji v jakékoli budoucí obchodní dohodě mezi EU a Japonskem, že
bude účinně uplatňována Mezinárodní úmluva o regulaci velrybářství (ICRW) a Úmluva o biologické rozmanitosti
(CBD)?

**Odpověď Karla De Guchta jménem Komise**

_(24. dubna 2013)_

Komise si je vědoma zprávy Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) „The Economics of Japanese Whaling“
a zkoumá ji.

EU do své obchodní politiky začleňuje zřetele udržitelnosti, zejména vyjednáváním závazků v oblasti životního
prostředí a pracovních norem v dvoustranných dohodách o volném obchodu a prováděním posouzení dopadů na
udržitelnost v souvislosti s obchodními jednáními.

Pokud jde o jednání o dohodě o volném obchodu s Japonskem, cílem Komise je zahrnout do této dohody ambiciózní
a zevrubnou kapitolu o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji, jež by měla mimo jiné řešit ochranu legálně nabytých
a udržitelných přírodních zdrojů, včetně zdrojů rybolovných, udržitelné hospodaření s nimi a podporu obchodu
těmito zdroji. Kapitola o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji by tedy měla přispět k tomu, aby Japonsko účinně provedlo
mnohostranné dohody o životním prostředí, včetně Úmluvy o biologické rozmanitosti (CBD) a Úmluvy
o mezinárodním obchodu ohroženými druhy volně žijících živočichů a planě rostoucích rostlin (CITES). Komise
zastává názor, že ustanovení o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji by měla směřovat k vysoké úrovni ochrany životního
prostředí a zaměstnanosti.

Pokud jde o konkrétní otázku lovu velryb, EU již mnohokrát Japonsku vyjádřila svůj rozdílný postoj a bude tak
v příslušných souvislostech bezpochyby činit i nadále.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 437

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002859/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) og**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11. marts 2013)_

_Om:_ IFAW-rapport om økonomien for japansk hvalfangst

I lyset af den nyligt offentliggjorte IFAW-rapport »The Economics of Japanese Whaling«, som blev udført af førende
Japanbaserede agenturer og i høj grad var baseret på den japanske regerings egne oplysninger og på baggrund af
kommissær Potocniks svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-002263/2012 samt i lyset af kommissær De Guchts svar på
skriftlig forespørgsel E-012352/2011, opfordres Kommissionen til at svare på følgende:

Er Kommissionen bekendt med IFAW's rapport, og/eller vil Europa-Kommissionen, forud for lanceringen af
handelsforhandlinger med Japan indlede en drøftelse med de japanske embedsmænd om beviset for anvendelsen af
offentlige midler og omdirigerede midler fra fonde for støtte til tsunamiofre til at støtte den urentable hvalindustri og
manglen på videnskabelig værdi af såkaldt japanske »videnskabelig hvalfangst«?

Vil bestemmelserne om handel og bæredygtig udvikling i en fremtidig handelsaftale mellem EU og Japan også sikre en
effektiv gennemførelse af ICRW (den internationale konvention om regulering af hvalfangst) og konventionen om
den biologiske mangfoldighed (CBD)?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Karel De Gucht**

_(24. april 2013)_

Kommissionen er bekendt med IFAW's rapport om »The Economics of Japanese Whaling« og er ved at gennemgå
denne.

EU integrerer bæredygtighedshensyn i sin handelspolitik, især ved at forhandle om forpligtelser vedrørende miljø- og
arbejdsstandarder i bilaterale frihandelsaftaler og ved at foretage bæredygtighedsvurderinger i forbindelse med
handelsforhandlinger.

Med hensyn til frihandelsforhandlingerne med Japan er det Kommissionens mål i frihandelsaftalen at få indarbejdet et
ambitiøst og omfattende kapitel om handel og bæredygtig udvikling, der bl.a. skal vedrøre spørgsmål om bevarelse og
bæredygtig forvaltning af naturressourcer samt fremme af handel med lovligt erhvervede bæredygtige
naturressourcer, herunder fiskeressourcer. Kapitlet om handel og bæredygtig udvikling skal således bidrage til, at
Japan effektivt gennemfører multilaterale miljøaftaler, herunder konventionen om biologisk mangfoldighed (CBD) og
konventionen om international handel med udryddelsestruede vilde dyr og planter (CITES). Kommissionen er af den
opfattelse, at bestemmelser om handel og bæredygtig udvikling bør tage sigte på et højt beskyttelsesniveau for miljøet
og arbejdstagerne.

Hvad angår det specifikke spørgsmål om hvalfangst har EU ved mange anledninger givet udtryk for, at den har en
anden tilgang end Japan, og vil uden tvivl fortsætte med at gøre dette i relevante sammenhænge.

C 6 E / 438 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002859/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) und**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Bericht des Internationalen Tierschutz-Fonds über wirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkte des Walfangs in Japan

Die Kommission wird vor dem Hintergrund des unlängst veröffentlichten IFAW-Berichts zu wirtschaftlichen
Gesichtspunkten des Walfangs in Japan („The Economics of Japanese Whaling“), der auf Erkenntnisse führender
japanischer Agenturen gestützt wird und in weiten Teilen auf Angaben der japanischen Regierung beruht, und
angesichts der Antwort von Kommissionsmitglied Poto auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-002263/2012 und der Antwort
von Kommissionsmitglied De Gucht auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-012352/2011 um Beantwortung der
nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

Hat die Kommission Kenntnis von dem IFAW-Bericht und/oder wird sie vor Aufnahme von Handelsverhandlungen
mit Japan mit japanischen Beamten über Nachweise über die Nutzung öffentlicher Gelder und die Umleitung von
Tsunami-Hilfsgeldern zur Förderung der nicht gewinnbringenden Walfangindustrie sprechen, und über den
fehlenden wissenschaftlichen Wert des sogenannten „Walfangs zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken“ in Japan?

Wird in den Bestimmungen zum Handel und zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung in einem künftigen Handelsabkommen
der EU und Japans darüber hinaus die effiziente Umsetzung des Internationalen Walfangübereinkommens (ICRW)
und des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt (CBD) sichergestellt?

**Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission**

_(24. April 2013)_

Die Kommission hat Kenntnis von dem Bericht des IFAW über die wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkte des Walfangs in
Japan erhalten und prüft ihn derzeit.

Die EU bringt Überlegungen zur Nachhaltigkeit in ihre Handelspolitik ein, vor allem indem sie bei bilateralen
Freihandelsabkommen Verpflichtungen in Bezug auf Umwelt und arbeitsrechtliche Standards aushandelt und im
Rahmen von Handelsgesprächen auf Nachhaltigkeit abstellende Folgenabschätzungen durchführt.

Was die Verhandlungen über ein Freihandelsabkommen mit Japan angeht, so strebt die Kommission ein
ambitioniertes und umfassendes Kapitel zum Thema „Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung“ an, in dem u. a. die
Erhaltung und die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung legal erworbener und nachhaltiger natürlicher Ressourcen (z. B.
Fischereiressourcen) sowie die Förderung des Handels mit diesen Ressourcen behandelt wird. So sollte das Kapitel
über Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung zur effektiven Umsetzung multilateraler Umweltübereinkommen durch
Japan beitragen, u. a. des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt und des Übereinkommens über den
internationalen Handel mit gefährdeten Arten freilebender Tiere und Pflanzen. Nach Auffassung der Kommission
sollte bei Bestimmungen über Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung ein hohes Umwelt‐ und Arbeitsschutzniveau
angestrebt werden.

In Bezug auf die konkrete Frage des Walfangs hat die EU Japan immer wieder darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass sie
eine andere Auffassung vertritt, und wird dies fraglos auch in Zukunft in entsprechenden Zusammenhängen tun.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 439

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002859/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) και**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Έκθεση του Διεθνούς Ταμείου για την Προστασία των Ζώων (IFAW) σχετικά με τις οικονομικές παραμέτρους της
ιαπωνικής φαλαινοθηρίας

Υπό το πρίσμα της πρόσφατα δημοσιευμένης έκθεσης του IFAW σχετικά με τις οικονομικές παραμέτρους της ιαπωνικής
φαλαινοθηρίας, η οποία βασίστηκε σε ευρήματα κορυφαίων οργανισμών με έδρα την Ιαπωνία και, σε μεγάλο βαθμό, στα ίδια
τα στοιχεία της ιαπωνικής κυβέρνησης, και υπό το πρίσμα της απάντησης του Επιτρόπου Potocnik στην ερώτηση με αίτημα
γραπτής απάντησης E-002263/2012 και της απάντησης του Επιτρόπου De Gucht στην ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής
απάντησης E-012352/2011:

Είναι ενήμερη η Επιτροπή σχετικά με την έκθεση του IFAW και/ή προτίθεται, πριν από την έναρξη εμπορικών
διαπραγματεύσεων με την Ιαπωνία, να συζητήσει με τους Ιάπωνες αξιωματούχους τα αποδεικτικά στοιχεία όσον αφορά τη
χρήση δημόσιων κονδυλίων και την εκτροπή πόρων αρωγής σε σχέση με το τσουνάμι για σκοπούς υποστήριξη της μη
κερδοφόρας βιομηχανίας φαλαινοθηρίας, καθώς και την έλλειψη επιστημονικής αξίας όσον αφορά την αποκαλούμενη
«φαλαινοθηρία για επιστημονικούς σκοπούς» της Ιαπωνίας;

Θα εξασφαλίζουν οι διατάξεις σχετικά με το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη σε κάθε μελλοντική εμπορική συμφωνία ΕΕΙαπωνίας και την αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή της Διεθνούς Σύμβασης για τη ρύθμιση της φαλαινοθηρίας (ICRW) και της
Σύμβασης για τη βιολογική ποικιλότητα (CDB);

**Απάντηση του κ. De Gucht εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(24 Απριλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή είναι ενήμερη για την έκθεση του διεθνούς ταμείου για την προστασία των ζώων (IFAW) σχετικά με τις
οικονομικές παραμέτρους της ιαπωνικής φαλαινοθηρίας και τη μελετά.

Για τη χάραξη της εμπορικής της πολιτικής, η ΕΕ λαμβάνει υπόψη της τον παράγοντα της βιωσιμότητας, κυρίως
προβαίνοντας σε διαπραγματεύσεις για περιβαλλοντικά και εργασιακά πρότυπα στο πλαίσιο διμερών συμφωνιών ελεύθερων
συναλλαγών (ΣΕΣ) και διενεργώντας εκτιμήσεις των επιπτώσεων στη βιωσιμότητα κατά τις εμπορικές διαπραγματεύσεις.

Όσον αφορά τις διαπραγματεύσεις για τη σύναψη συμφωνιών ελεύθερων συναλλαγών με την Ιαπωνία, ο στόχος της
Επιτροπής είναι να συμπεριλάβει στις ΣΕΣ ένα φιλόδοξο και ολοκληρωμένο κεφάλαιο για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη
ανάπτυξη, το οποίο θα πρέπει να καλύπτει, μεταξύ άλλων, τη διατήρηση, τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση και την προώθηση του
εμπορίου των νομίμως απεκτηθέντων και βιώσιμων φυσικών πόρων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των αλιευτικών πόρων. Το
κεφάλαιο για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη, θα πρέπει, κατά συνέπεια, να συμβάλλει στην αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή
πολυμερών περιβαλλοντικών συμφωνιών (ΠΠΣ) εκ μέρους της Ιαπωνίας, μεταξύ των οποίων συγκαταλέγεται η σύμβαση για
τη βιολογική ποικιλότητα (ΣΒΠ) και η σύμβαση για το διεθνές εμπόριο ειδών άγριας πανίδας και χλωρίδας που απειλούνται
με εξαφάνιση (CITES). Η Επιτροπή υιοθετεί την άποψη ότι οι διατάξεις για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη θα πρέπει να
αποσκοπούν σε υψηλό επίπεδο περιβαλλοντικής και εργασιακής προστασίας.

Σχετικά με το ειδικό ζήτημα της φαλαινοθηρίας, η ΕΕ έχει εκφράσει τη διαφορετική προσέγγισή της με την Ιαπωνία σε πολλές
περιπτώσεις και, αναμφίβολα, θα εξακολουθήσει να το πράττει σε συναφή πλαίσια.

C 6 E / 440 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002859/13**

**à la Commission**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR),**

**Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE),**
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D),**

**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D),**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D),**

**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) et Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Rapport du Fonds international pour la défense des animaux sur l'économie de la filière japonaise de chasse à la
baleine

Le Fonds international pour la défense des animaux (IFAW) a récemment publié un rapport sur l'économie de la filière
japonaise de chasse à la baleine qui se fonde sur les conclusions d'agences renommées, situées au Japon, et, dans une
large mesure, sur les propres données du gouvernement japonais. Vu les réponses écrites au nom de la Commission
par M. Potočnik, à la question E-002263/2012, et par M. De Gucht, à la question E-012352/2011:

La Commission a-t-elle pris connaissance du rapport de l'IFAW et/ou a-t-elle l'intention, avant de lancer des
négociations commerciales avec le Japon, de débattre avec les autorités japonaises des preuves d'un recours aux
subventions publiques et du détournement de fonds de secours aux victimes du tsunami pour soutenir une industrie
baleinière qui n'est pas même rentable, ainsi que de l'absence de toute valeur scientifique à ce que le Japon appelle une
chasse «scientifique»?

Les clauses sur le commerce et le développement durable dans tout futur accord commercial entre l'Union
européenne et le Japon garantiront-elles la mise en œuvre effective de la Convention internationale pour la
réglementation de la chasse à la baleine et de la Convention sur la diversité biologique?

**Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission**

_(24 avril 2013)_

La Commission a pris connaissance du rapport de l'IFAW sur l'économie de la filière japonaise de chasse à la baleine et
est en train de l'examiner.

L'Union européenne tient compte d'aspects liés à la durabilité dans sa politique commerciale, notamment en
négociant des engagements sur les normes de l'environnement et du travail dans le cadre des accords bilatéraux de
libre-échange et en réalisant des évaluations de l'impact des négociations commerciales sur le développement durable.

Concernant les négociations pour un accord de libre-échange avec le Japon, l'objectif de la Commission est d'inclure
un chapitre ambitieux et exhaustif sur le commerce et le développement durable, qui devrait, entre autres, porter sur
la conservation, la gestion durable et la promotion du commerce des ressources naturelles légales et durables, y
compris celles de la pêche. Ce chapitre devrait donc contribuer à l'application effective par le Japon d'accords
multilatéraux sur l'environnement (AME), dont la convention sur la diversité biologique (CBD) et la convention sur le
commerce international des espèces de faune et de flore sauvages menacées d'extinction (CITES). La Commission
estime que les dispositions relatives au commerce et au développement durable devraient viser un niveau élevé de
protection en matière d'environnement et de travail.

Pour ce qui est de la problématique plus spécifique de la chasse à la baleine, l'UE a exprimé à de nombreuses occasions
sa différence d'approche avec le Japon et continuera certainement de le faire dans les contextes appropriés.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 441

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002859/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) e**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Relazione del Fondo internazionale per il benessere degli animali sull'economia della filiera giapponese di
caccia alla balena

Il Fondo internazionale per il benessere degli animali (IFAW) ha di recente pubblicato una relazione sull'economia
della filiera giapponese di caccia alla balena, che si basa sulle conclusioni di agenzie rinomate, con sede in Giappone,
e, in larga misura, su dati del governo giapponese. Alla luce delle risposte scritte del commissario Potočnik,
all'interrogazione E-002263/2012, e del commissario M. De Gucht, all'interrogazione E-012352/2011,

È la Commissione a conoscenza della relazione dell'IFAW e/o intende, prima di avviare negoziati commerciali con il
Giappone, discutere con le autorità giapponesi le prove di utilizzo di aiuti pubblici e di sottrazione di fondi destinati
alle vittime dello tsunami, a favore di un'industria baleniera non redditizia, nonché dell'assenza di qualsiasi valore
scientifico di quella che il Giappone chiama una caccia «scientifica»?

Le clausole sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile di qualsiasi accordo commerciale fra l'Unione europea e il
Giappone garantiranno l'attuazione effettiva della Convenzione internazionale sulla regolamentazione della caccia
alle balene (ICRW) e della Convenzione sulla diversità biologica (CDB)?

**Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione**

_(24 aprile 2013)_

La Commissione è a conoscenza della relazione IFAW sull'economia della filiera giapponese di caccia alla balena e la
sta esaminando.

L'UE integra considerazioni in tema di sostenibilità nella sua politica commerciale, in particolare negoziando impegni
in tema di standard ambientali e lavorativi nel contesto degli accordi bilaterali di libero scambio (ALS) ed effettuando
valutazioni d'impatto di sostenibilità in relazione ai negoziati commerciali.

Per quanto concerne i negoziati di ALS con il Giappone, l'obiettivo della Commissione è includere nell'ALS un
capitolo ambizioso e estensivo sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile che dovrebbe tra l'altro affrontare la
conservazione, la gestione sostenibile e la promozione del commercio di risorse naturali legalmente ottenute e
sostenibili, tra cui le risorse alieutiche. Il capitolo sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile dovrebbe pertanto
contribuire all'efficace attuazione da parte del Giappone degli accordi ambientali multilaterali (MEA), tra cui la
Convenzione sulla biodiversità (CBD) e la Convenzione sul commercio internazionale delle specie di flora e di fauna
selvatiche minacciate di estinzione (CITES). La Commissione ritiene che le disposizioni contenute nel capitolo
Commercio e sviluppo sostenibile dovrebbero mirare ad un livello elevato di protezione dell'ambiente e delle
condizioni lavorative.

Per quanto concerne la questione specifica della caccia alla balena, l'UE ha espresso al Giappone in diverse occasioni la
propria diversità di vedute e certamente continuerà a farlo nei contesti pertinenti.

C 6 E / 442 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002859/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR),**

**Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE),**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski**

**(ECR) en Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Verslag van het Internationaal Fonds voor dierenwelzijn (IFAW) over de rendabiliteit van de Japanse
walvisvangst

In het licht van het onlangs door het IFAW gepubliceerde verslag met de titel „De rendabiliteit van de Japanse
walvisvangst”, dat is gebaseerd op conclusies van vooraanstaande, in Japan gevestigde instellingen en grotendeels ook
op eigen gegevens van de Japanse regering, en gezien het antwoord van commissaris Potocnik op schriftelijke vraag E002263/2012 en het antwoord van commissaris De Gucht op schriftelijke vraag E-012352/2011, wordt de
Commissie verzocht de volgende vragen te beantwoorden:

Kent zij dit verslag van de IFAW en/of beoogt zij, voorafgaand aan de onderhandelingen over een
vrijhandelsovereenkomst met Japan, bij de Japanse autoriteiten aan de orde te stellen dat het gebruik van
overheidsgeld en het misbruik van tsunamihulpfondsen voor de ondersteuning van de onrendabele walvisvaart
bewezen is, en dat Japans zogeheten „wetenschappelijke walvisvangst” geen wetenschappelijke waarde heeft?

Bieden de bepalingen over handel en duurzame ontwikkeling in een eventuele toekomstige handelsovereenkomst
tussen de EU en Japan de garantie dat het Internationale Verdrag tot Regeling van de Walvisvangst (ICRW) en het
Verdrag inzake biologische diversiteit (CDB) effectief ten uitvoer worden gelegd?

**Antwoord van de heer De Gucht namens de Commissie**

_(24 april 2013)_

De Commissie is zich bewust van het verslag van de IFAW over „de rendabiliteit van de Japanse walvisvangst” en doet
hier onderzoek naar.

De EU integreert duurzaamheidsoverwegingen in haar handelsbeleid, met name door te onderhandelen over
verplichtingen met betrekking tot milieu en arbeidsvoorwaarden in bilaterale vrijhandelsovereenkomsten en door
duurzaamheidseffectbeoordelingen uit te voeren ten opzichte van handelsbesprekingen.

Ten aanzien van de vrijhandelsovereenkomsten met Japan, stelt de Commissie zich ten doel om een ambitieus en
uitgebreid hoofdstuk over handel en duurzame ontwikkeling op te nemen in de vrijhandelsovereenkomst, waarin
onder andere het behoud, het duurzaam beheer en de bevordering van handel in rechtmatig verkregen duurzame
natuurlijke hulpbronnen — waaronder visbestanden — aan de orde zou moeten komen. Het hoofdstuk over handel
en duurzame ontwikkeling zou zo kunnen bijdragen aan de effectieve implementatie in Japan van de multilaterale
milieuovereenkomsten (MEA’s), waaronder het Verdrag inzake biologische diversiteit (CBD) en de Overeenkomst
inzake internationale handel in bedreigde in het wild levende dier‐ en plantensoorten (CITES). De Commissie is van
mening dat bepalingen met betrekking tot handel en duurzame ontwikkeling gericht moet zijn op een hoog niveau
van milieu‐ en arbeidsbescherming.

Wat betreft de walvisvangst heeft de EU meerdere malen kenbaar gemaakt dat haar aanpak verschilt met die van
Japan; zij zal hier ongetwijfeld mee door blijven gaan als de context zich daartoe leent.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 443

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002859/13**

**do Komisji**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**
**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) oraz**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Sprawozdanie Międzynarodowego Funduszu na rzecz Zwierząt (IFAW) dotyczące ekonomiki japońskiego
wielorybnictwa

W świetle nowo opublikowanego sprawozdania IFAW pt. „The Economics of Japanese Whaling” („Ekonomika
japońskiego wielorybnictwa”), opartego na wynikach czołowych agencji mających siedziby w Japonii oraz,
w znacznej mierze, na danych samego rządu japońskiego, a także w związku z odpowiedzią komisarza J. Potočnika
na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002263/2012 i odpowiedzią komisarza K. De Guchta na pytanie
wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-012352/2011:

Czy Komisja wie o sprawozdaniu IFAW i/lub czy przed rozpoczęciem negocjacji handlowych z Japonią omówi
z urzędnikami japońskimi kwestię dowodów na wspieranie nieprzynoszącego zysków wielorybnictwa z pieniędzy
publicznych oraz przez przekierowywanie środków finansowych przeznaczonych na łagodzenie skutków tsunami,
a także kwestię braku wartości naukowej prowadzonych w Japonii tzw. połowów wielorybów w celach naukowych?

Czy postanowienia dotyczące handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju we wszelkich przyszłych umowach handlowych
między UE a Japonią będą zapewniać również skuteczne stosowanie Międzynarodowej konwencji o uregulowaniu
połowów wielorybów (ICRW) oraz Konwencji o różnorodności biologicznej (CDB)?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)_

Komisja przyjęła do wiadomości sprawozdanie Międzynarodowego Funduszu na rzecz Zwierząt (IFAW) dotyczące
ekonomiki japońskiego wielorybnictwa i obecnie poddaje je analizie.

UE wprowadza kwestie związane ze zrównoważonym rozwojem do swojej polityki handlowej przede wszystkim
przez negocjowanie zobowiązań dotyczących ochrony środowiska i norm pracy w ramach dwustronnych umów
o wolnym handlu i przeprowadzanie ocen skutków w kontekście zrównoważonego rozwoju w związku
z negocjacjami handlowymi.

W przypadku rokowań w sprawie umowy o wolnym handlu z Japonią, celem Komisji jest umieszczenie w umowie
ambitnego i kompleksowego rozdziału dotyczącego handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju, który powinien między
innymi dotyczyć ochrony zasobów naturalnych, zrównoważonego zarządzania nimi oraz promowania handlu
legalnie pozyskanymi oraz zrównoważonymi zasobami naturalnymi, w tym zasobami rybnymi. Rozdział dotyczący
handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju powinien zatem przyczynić się do skutecznego wdrożenia przez Japonię
wielostronnych umów środowiskowych, w tym Konwencji o różnorodności biologicznej (CBD) oraz Konwencji
o międzynarodowym handlu dzikimi zwierzętami i roślinami gatunków zagrożonych wyginięciem (CITES). Komisja
uważa, że przepisy dotyczące handlu oraz zrównoważonego rozwoju powinny mieć na celu ustanowienie wysokiego
poziomu ochrony środowiska i ochrony pracy.

W odniesieniu do kwestii wielorybnictwa, UE wielokrotnie informowała Japonię o stosowaniu odmiennego podejścia
do tego zagadnienia i będzie to nadal czynić w stosownych kontekstach.

C 6 E / 444 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002859/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) şi**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 martie 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Raportul Fondului Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor privind aspectele economice ale vânătorii de
balene din Japonia

Având în vedere cel mai recent raport publicat de Fondul Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor, intitulat
„Aspectele economice ale vânătorii de balene din Japonia”, bazat pe concluziile unor agenții importante din Japonia și,
într-o mare măsură, chiar pe date ale guvernului japonez, răspunsul comisarului Potocnik la întrebarea cu solicitare
de răspuns scris E-002263/2012 și răspunsul comisarului De Gucht la întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E012352/2011:

Este Comisia la curent cu raportul Fondului Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor și/sau intenționează, înainte de
lansarea negocierilor comerciale cu Japonia, să discute cu demnitarii japonezi pe tema utilizării evidente a banilor
publici și a fondurilor destinate întrajutorării victimelor tsunamiului pentru a sprijini industria neprofitabilă a
vânătorii de balene și pe tema lipsei valorii științifice a așa-numitei „vânători de balene din motive științifice”?

Vor garanta dispozițiile în materie de comerț și dezvoltare durabilă din cadrul unui viitor acord în domeniul
comerțului între UE și Japonia punerea în aplicare efectivă a Convenției Internaționale privind Reglementarea Vânării
Balenelor (ICRW) și a Convenției privind diversitatea biologică (CBD)?

**Răspuns dat de dl De Gucht în numele Comisiei**

_(24 aprilie 2013)_

Comisia este la curent cu raportul IFAW intitulat „Aspectele economice ale vânătorii de balene din Japonia” și este în
curs de examinare a acestuia.

UE include criterii de durabilitate în politica sa comercială, în special prin negocierea de angajamente privind
standardele de mediu și de muncă în cadrul acordurilor bilaterale de liber schimb (ALS) și prin efectuarea de evaluări
ale impactului asupra durabilității în legătură cu negocierile comerciale.

În ceea ce privește negocierile ALS cu Japonia, obiectivul Comisiei este să includă în ALS un capitol ambițios și
cuprinzător privind comerțul și dezvoltarea durabilă, care ar aborda, printre altele, conservarea, gestionarea durabilă
și promovarea comerțului cu resurse naturale obținute în mod legal și durabil, inclusiv resursele piscicole. Capitolul
privind comerțul și dezvoltarea durabilă ar trebui, prin urmare, să contribuie la implementarea efectivă de către
Japonia a acordurilor multilaterale de mediu (AMM), inclusiv a Convenției privind diversitatea biologică (CBD) și a
Convenției privind comerțul internațional cu specii ale faunei și florei sălbatice pe cale de dispariție (CITES). Comisia
consideră că dispozițiile în materie de comerț și dezvoltare durabilă ar trebui să vizeze un nivel ridicat de protecție a
mediului și a muncii.

În ceea ce privește chestiunea specifică a vânătorii de balene, UE și-a exprimat în repetate rânduri abordarea
divergentă față de Japonia și va continua fără îndoială să facă acest lucru în contextele relevante.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 445

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002859/13**

**komissiolle**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR),**

**Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE),**
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D),**

**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D),**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D),**

**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) ja Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11. maaliskuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Kansainvälisen eläinten hyvinvointia edistävän rahaston raportti Japanin harjoittaman valaanpyynnin
taloudellisista näkökohdista

Kansainvälinen eläinten hyvinvointia edistävä rahasto (IFAW) julkaisi äskettäin raportin Japanin harjoittaman
valaanpyynnin taloudellisista näkökohdista (The Economics of Japanese Whaling). Raportti perustui johtavien
Japanissa toimivien virastojen havaintoihin ja suurelta osin Japanin hallituksen omiin tietoihin. Komission jäsen
Potocnik vastasi kirjalliseen kysymykseen E‐002263/2012 ja komission jäsen De Gucht kirjalliseen
kysymykseen E-012352/2011. Voiko komissio nyt vastata seuraaviin kysymyksiin:

Onko komissio tietoinen IFAW:n raportista ja/tai aikooko komissio ennen tulevia Japanin kanssa käytäviä
kauppaneuvotteluja keskustella Japanin viranomaisten kanssa todisteista, että julkisia varoja on käytetty ja
hyökyaaltoavustusvaroja on suunnattu kannattamattoman valaanpyyntiteollisuuden tukemiseen, ja että Japanin niin
kutsutulta ”tieteelliseltä valaanpyynniltä” puuttuu tieteellinen arvo?

Varmistavatko kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevat määräykset mahdollisissa tulevissa EU:n ja Japanin
kauppasopimuksissa myös valaanpyynnin säätelyä koskevan kansainvälisen yleissopimuksen ja biologista
monimuotoisuutta koskevan yleissopimuksen tehokkaan täytäntöönpanon?

**Karel de Guchtin komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(24. huhtikuuta 2013)_

Komissio on tietoinen Japanin harjoittaman valaanpyynnin taloudellisia näkökohtia koskevasta IFAW:n raportista ja
tarkastelee sitä parhaillaan.

EU sisällyttää kestävää kehitystä koskevat näkökohdat kauppapolitiikkaansa erityisesti neuvottelemalla ympäristö- ja
työnormeja koskevista sitoumuksista kahdenvälisissä vapaakauppasopimuksissa ja laatimalla kauppaneuvottelujen
vaikutusta kestävään kehitykseen koskevia arviointeja.

Japanin kanssa käytävien vapaakauppasopimusneuvottelujen yhteydessä komission tavoitteena on sisällyttää
vapaakauppasopimukseen kunnianhimoinen ja kattava kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskeva luku, jossa olisi
käsiteltävä muun muassa laillisesti saatujen ja kestävien luonnonvarojen, kuten kalavarojen, suojelua, kestävää hoitoa
ja niillä käytävän kaupan edistämistä. Kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevan luvun pitäisi siis edistää monenvälisten
ympäristösopimusten tehokasta täytäntöönpanoa Japanissa. Näitä ovat esimerkiksi biologista monimuotoisuutta
koskeva yleissopimus sekä villieläimistön ja ‐kasviston uhanalaisten lajien kansainvälistä kauppaa koskeva
yleissopimus. Komission mielestä kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevilla määräyksillä olisi pyrittävä
korkeatasoiseen ympäristön‐ ja työelämän suojeluun.

EU on useaan otteeseen ilmaissut olevansa valaanpyynnin suhteen eri linjoilla kuin Japani ja toimii asiaankuuluvissa
yhteyksissä epäilemättä vastaisuudessakin näin.

C 6 E / 446 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002859/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) och**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 mars 2013)_

_Angående:_ Internationella djurskyddsfondens (IFAW) rapport om ekonomin för japansk valfångst

Mot bakgrund av den rapport som nyligen offentliggjorts av IFAW om ekonomin för japansk valfångst, som bygger
på rön från ledande japanskbaserade byråer och till stor del på egna data från den japanska regeringen, samt mot
bakgrund av kommissionsledamot Potocniks svar på skriftlig fråga E-002263/2012 och kommissionsledamot De
Guchts svar på skriftlig fråga E-012352/2011 uppmanas kommissionen att svara på följande frågor:

Känner kommissionen till IFAW:s rapport och/eller kommer kommissionen, innan handelsförhandlingar med Japan
inleds, att med japanska tjänstemän diskutera de bevis som finns på att offentliga medel och förskingrade medel från
hjälpfonder för tsunamidrabbade har använts till att stödja den olönsamma valfångstindustrin samt bristen på
vetenskapligt värde vad gäller Japans så kallade vetenskapliga valfångst?

Kommer villkoren för handel och hållbar utveckling i eventuella framtida handelsavtal mellan EU och Japan även att
garantera ett verkningsfullt genomförande av den internationella konventionen för reglering av valfångsten och
konventionen om biologisk mångfald?

**Svar från Karel De Gucht på kommissionens vägnar**

_(24 april 2013)_

Kommissionen känner till IFAW:s rapport om de ekonomiska aspekterna av japansk valfångst och håller på att
granska den.

EU tar i sin handelspolitik hänsyn till hållbarhetsfrågor, framför allt genom att förhandla fram åtaganden om miljöoch arbetsnormer i bilaterala frihandelsavtal och genom konsekvensbedömningar av hållbarheten i samband med
handelsförhandlingar.

I förhandlingarna om ett frihandelsavtal med Japan vill kommissionen att avtalet ska innehålla ett ambitiöst och
omfattande kapitel om handel och hållbar utveckling. Det ska bland annat behandla bevarande, hållbar förvaltning
och främjande av handel med lagligen erhållna och hållbara naturresurser, däribland fiskeresurser. Kapitlet om handel
och hållbar utveckling bör därför bidra till att Japan effektivt genomför multilaterala miljöavtal, bland annat
konventionen om biologisk mångfald och konventionen om internationell handel med utrotningshotade arter av
vilda djur och växter (Cites). Kommissionen anser att bestämmelser om handel och hållbar utveckling ska syfta till en
hög nivå av miljö- och arbetarskydd.

När det gäller den specifika frågan om valfångst har EU vid flera tillfällen uttryckt att vi har ett annat synsätt än Japan
och kommer utan tvekan att fortsätta att göra det i relevanta sammanhang.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 447

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002859/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling**

**(ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg**
**Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill**

**Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana**

**Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) and**

**Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(11 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ International Fund for Animal Welfare report on the Economics of Japanese Whaling

In the light of the newly published IFAW report ‘The Economics of Japanese Whaling’, which was based on the
findings of leading Japan-based agencies and, to a large extent, on the government of Japan’s own data, and in view of
Commissioner Poto’s response to Written Question E-002263/2012 and Commissioner De Gucht’s response to
Written Question E-012352/2011:

Is the Commission aware of IFAW’s report and/or will it, in advance of launching trade negotiations with Japan,
discuss with Japanese officials the evidence of the use of public money and diversion of tsunami relief funds to
support the unprofitable whaling industry and the lack of scientific value of Japan’s so-called ‘scientific whaling’?

Will the provisions on trade and sustainable development in any future EU-Japan trade deal also ensure the effective
implementation of the International Convention on the regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CDB)?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The Commission is aware of IFAW’s report on ‘The Economics of Japanese Whaling’ and is examining it.

The EU integrates sustainability considerations into its trade policy, most notably by negotiating commitments on
environment and labour standards in bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and by carrying out sustainability impact
assessments in relation to trade negotiations.

With regard to FTA negotiations with Japan, the Commission’s objective is to include in the FTA an ambitious and
comprehensive chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development, which should _inter alia_ address the conservation,
sustainable management and promotion of trade in legally obtained and sustainable natural resources, including
fishery resources. The chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development should therefore contribute to Japan’s effective
implementation of Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs), including the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The
Commission takes the view that provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development should aim at a high level of
environmental and labour protection.

Regarding the specific issue of whaling, the EU has expressed its difference of approach with Japan on numerous
occasions and will no doubt continue to do so in relevant contexts.

C 6 E / 448 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002860/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(12 март 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Преразглеждане на решението за затваряне на трети и четвърти блок на АЕЦ Козлодуй

През последните няколко седмици в България се наблюдава изостряне на социалното напрежение, което доведе до
масови протести и политическа криза, като правителството подаде оставка. Станахме свидетели на вече десетки случаи
на хора, които отнеха своя живот и този на членовете на своите семейства, поради немотия и бедност, най-драстичният
от тях със самозапалилия се Пламен Горанов. Причината за тези трагични събития е проста — средна заплата от 300
евро и средна пенсия от 100 евро, които са напълно недостатъчни за достоен живот. В тази връзка през 2007 г.
Комисията отговори на мой въпрос, като заяви, че официално никога не е било вземано решение от колегиума им за
поставяне на изискване към България да затвори 4-те малки блока на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ (Въпрос Н-0191/07 ( [1] )). Трябва
да се има предвид, че при доходи, с които не могат да бъдат посрещнати основните нужди за физическо оцеляване, се
стига до пряко нарушаване на членове1 и 2 от Хартата за основните права на ЕС — правото на достойнство и правото
на живот. Ниските доходи и огромните сметки за отопление и електроенергия създават допълнителен проблем от
европейска величина — 6 от 10 млади хора декларират твърдо намерение да емигрират. В същото време и може би
точно поради тази причина, на България се отказва приемане в Шенген. За справяне със създалата се тежка социална и
икономическа ситуация, моля Комисията да отговори на следните въпроси:

1. Смята ли Комисията за възможно, с цел намаляване на социалната тежест от високите сметки за ток,
преразглеждането на разпоредбите, касаещи затварянето на 3-ти и 4-ти блок на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ от Договора за
присъединяване на България и Румъния по опростената процедура, предвидена в член 48 от ДЕС?

2. Ако Комисията смята първото за невъзможно, би ли предприела мерки, при които средствата, компенсиращи
затварянето на блоковете, да бъдат пренасочени и съответно увеличени, за изграждане на нова ядрена мощност в
рамките на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“?

3. Смята ли Комисията, че нищожните доходи и липсата на капитали са пречка за пълното въвеждане на
европейските стандарти за качество в България, при което много български производства фалират и се затваря
омагьосан кръг на бедност, който води до масова емиграция и социално напрежение в целия ЕС, и какви мерки
могат да се предприемат за допълнителното отлагане на това въвеждане?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Йотингер от името на Комисията**

_(24 май 2013 г.)_

1. Опростената процедура за преразглеждане, посочена от уважаемия член на Парламента, не може да се прилага по
отношение на разпоредбите на договорите за присъединяване ( [2] ).

2. България се е ангажирала да затвори и да изведе от експлоатация блокове 3 и 4 на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ като изрично
условие за присъединяването си към ЕС съгласно своя договор за присъединяване.

ЕС вече предостави на България значителна финансова помощ за намаляване на финансовата тежест, произтичаща от
разходите по това ранно затваряне и извеждане от експлоатация на посочените блокове ( [3] ).

По-голямата част от определените за целта финансови средства по настоящата многогодишна финансова рамка вече са
усвоени. Освен това понастоящем се водят преговори за допълнително увеличаване на финансовата подкрепа за
периода 2014—2020 г. ( [4] ). Държавите членки носят обаче крайната отговорност за финансирането и предприемането
на самостоятелни действия за извеждането от експлоатация.

Поради това Комисията не смята за целесъобразен варианта с пренасочване на средствата, предназначени за извеждане

от експлоатация, към изграждането на нови мощности.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH(2007)0191_EN.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) По-специално опростената процедура за преразглеждане, предвидена в член 48, параграф 6 от Договора за Европейския съюз (ДЕС), се отнася до

евентуално преразглеждане на разпоредбите на третата част на Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз (ДФЕС).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) В тази помощ бяха включени и мерки, насочени към модернизацията на конвенционалното производство на енергия, постигане на широкомащабна

енергийна ефективност, насърчаване на използването на възобновяеми енергийни източници и подобряване на сигурността на енергийните

доставки.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Предложение на Комисията за регламент на Съвета относно помощта от Съюза за програмите за подпомагане на извеждането от експлоатация на

ядрени съоръжения в България, Литва и Словакия; COM(2011) 783 окончателен.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 449

3. Съществуването на европейски стандарти за качество гарантира доброто функциониране на европейския
вътрешен пазар. Въвеждането на такива стандарти в България би довело до разширяване на пазарите за износ на
българските производители, което от своя страна ще даде тласък на националната икономика.

Комисията е поела ангажимент да увеличи подкрепата си за българските граждани, за да могат те да подобрят своите
условия на живот, и по-специално енергийните характеристики на жилищата си. Комисията оказва подкрепа за
инвестиции в енергийната ефективност на жилищния сектор в България чрез специална схема, по която се предоставят
общо 25 млн. евро по линия на Европейския фонд за регионално развитие. Целта е съществуващата понастоящем схема
да бъде пренесена и да придобие по-мащабни измерения в периода 2014—2020 г.

C 6 E / 450 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002860/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Re-examination of the decision for closure of unit 3 and unit 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant

Over the last few weeks there has been an exacerbation of social tensions in Bulgaria, which has led to mass protests
and a political crisis, prompting the Cabinet to resign. We have already seen dozens of cases of people taking their
own lives and those of their family members because of penury and poverty, the most drastic of them being that of
Mr Plamen Goranov, who died from self-immolation. The reason for these tragic events is simple — the average
salary is equivalent to EUR 300 and the average pension is equivalent to EUR 100, which are utterly inadequate for
leading a decent life. In this connection, in 2007 the Commission responded to my question by stating that it had not
taken any official decision on requiring Bulgaria to close the four lesser-capacity units of the Kozloduy NPP (Question
Н-0191/07 ( [1] )). It must be borne in mind that such levels of income, which are insufficient to meet the basic needs for
survival, lead to a direct violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union —
the right to human dignity and the right to life. The combination of low income and enormous heating and electricity
bills is likely to create an additional problem on a Europe-wide scale — 6 out of 10 young people declare a firm
intention to emigrate. At the same time, and perhaps precisely for this reason, Bulgaria is being denied accession to
Schengen. In order to deal with the existing complicated social and economic situation, I would ask the Commission
to respond to the following questions:

1. Would the Commission consider it possible, in order to alleviate the social burden of high electricity bills, to reexamine the provisions concerning the closure of unit 3 and unit 4 of the Kozloduy NPP in the Treaty of
Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, by applying the simplified revision procedure provided for
in Article 48 TEU?

2. If the Commission considers the first option to be impossible, would it take measures to redirect and
respectively increase the funds provided to compensate for the decommissioning of the units, for the purpose
of building new nuclear capacity within the Kozloduy NPP?

3. Does the Commission consider the paltry incomes and the lack of capital to be obstacles to the introduction of
European quality standards in Bulgaria, driving many Bulgarian industries out of business and locking people
into a vicious circle of poverty, leading to mass emigration and social tensions across the EU, and what
measures could be taken to further postpone this introduction?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2013)_

1. The simplified revision procedure mentioned by the Honourable Member cannot be applied to the provisions of
Treaties of Accession ( [2] ).

2. Bulgaria committed itself to close and decommission units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear plant, as an express
condition for its accession to the EU, according to its Treaty of Accession.

The EU has already provided Bulgaria with considerable financial assistance for the mitigation of the financial burden
represented by the early closure and decommissioning costs of these units ( [3] ).

Most of the funds allocated under the current multiannual financial framework have already been committed. In
addition, there are ongoing negotiations for a further extension of the financial support for the period 2014-2020 ( [4] ).
It remains, however, the ultimate responsibility of Member States to take over financial responsibility and ownership
for decommissioning.

Thus, the Commission does not consider it an appropriate option to redirect the decommissioning funds for the
building of new capacity.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH(2007)0191_EN.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) More specifically, the simplified revision procedure provided for in Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) relates to the possible

revision of provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) This assistance has also included measures for the modernisation of conventional energy production, large-scale energy efficiency, enhancement

of renewable energy sources and improvement of energy supply security.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Proposal of the Commission for a Council regulation on Union support for the nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes in Bulgaria,

Lithuania and Slovakia of 24 November 2011; COM(2011) 783 final.

( **|**

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 451

3. The existence of European quality standards ensures the smooth operation of the European internal market. The
introduction of such standards in Bulgaria would expand the export markets for Bulgarian producers, thus
stimulating the national economy.

The Commission is committed to extend its support to Bulgarian citizens to achieve better living conditions and
increase in particular the energy performance of their homes. The Commission supports energy efficiency
investments in the housing sector in Bulgaria through a dedicated scheme with an overall allocation of
EUR 25 million funded by the European Regional Development Fund. The aim is to replicate the ongoing scheme at a
more ambitious scale for the period 2014-2020.

C 6 E / 452 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002863/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(12 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Opstart van de „European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU)”

Artikel 2 van Verordening (EU) Nr. 1213/2010 van de Commissie van 16 december 2010 tot vaststelling van
gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van
wegvervoerondernemingen, bepaalt dat tegen 31 december 2012 de database „European Registers of Road Transport
Undertakings (ERRU)” operationeel moet zijn. Dit register zou de verschillende bevoegde autoriteiten in staat moeten
stellen te controleren of bepaalde wegvervoerondernemingen in andere lidstaten de regels effectief naleven. Een
dergelijk controlemechanisme blijkt uiterst noodzakelijk teneinde eerlijkere concurrentie in de markt van het
wegvervoer te garanderen.

Aangezien de datum voor toepassing inmiddels verstreken is, mag men ervan uitgaan dat de Europese Commissie
deze koppeling van nationale registers heeft opgestart. Het Europees Parlement heeft hierover echter nog geen nadere
informatie ontvangen.

1. Heeft de Commissie daadwerkelijk al stappen ondernomen ter koppeling van de nationale elektronische
registers? Is het ERRU operationeel?

2. Zal de Commissie het Europees Parlement verder op de hoogte houden van de vorderingen alsook van de
mogelijke problemen die zich in de toekomst zouden kunnen voordoen?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(23 april 2013)_

De Commissie heeft de nodige stappen genomen om een onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers
te bevorderen binnen de deadline die is vastgesteld in Verordening (EU) nr. 1213/2010 van 16 december 2010 tot
vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van
wegvervoerondernemingen ( _European registers of road transport undertakings_ — ERRU ( [1] )). Het ERRU-systeem is echter
nog niet volledig operationeel omdat de meerderheid van de lidstaten onvoldoende op de koppeling was voorbereid.
Er moet worden opgemerkt dat het uitblijven van een koppeling met ERRU niet betekent dat lidstaten niet verplicht
zijn om via hun nationale contactpunten informatie over wegvervoerondernemingen uit te wisselen (artikel 18 van
Verordening (EG) nr. 1071/2009 ( [2] )).

In maart 2013 heeft de Commissie 21 EU Pilot-procedures (pre-inbreukprocedures) geopend tegen lidstaten die op
dat moment nog steeds niet het nodige hadden gedaan om de onderlinge koppeling tot stand te brengen. De
Commissie houdt het Parlement op de hoogte van de vorderingen in dit verband.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) PB L 335 van 18.12.2010.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Verordening (EG) van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 21 oktober 2009 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels betreffende de

voorwaarden waaraan moet zijn voldaan om het beroep van wegvervoerondernemer uit te oefenen; PB L 300 van 14.11.09.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 453

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002863/13**

**to the Commission**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Launch of the ‘European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings’ (ERRU)

Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1213/2010 of 16 December 2010 establishing common rules
concerning the interconnection of national electronic registers of road transport undertakings, stipulates that by
31 December 2012 the database ‘European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings’ (ERRU) must be operational.
This register should enable the various competent authorities to verify whether specific road transport undertakings
in other Member States are complying with the rules effectively. Such a control mechanism appears essential to
ensure fairer competition in the road transport market.

As the application date has now expired, one may assume that the Commission has launched this linking-up of
national registers. However, Parliament has not yet received any further information in this regard.

1. Has the Commission already taken steps to link up the national electronic registers? Is the ERRU operational?

2. Will the Commission continue to keep Parliament informed about progress in this regard as well as possible
problems which may arise in the future?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2013)_

The Commission has taken all necessary steps to facilitate an interconnection of the national electronic registers
within the deadline set in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1213/2010 of 16 December 2010 establishing commun
rules concerning the interconnection of national electronic registers on road transport undertakings (ERRU) ( [1] ).
Nevertheless, the ERRU system is not yet fully operational due to a lack of readiness for connection of the majority of
the Member States. It must be noted that a lack of connection to ERRU does not discharge Member States from an
obligation to exchange information about the transport undertakings via their national contact points (Article 18 of
Regulation (EC) 1071/2009 ( [2] )).

In March 2013 the Commission opened 21 EU-Pilot (pre-infringement) cases against those Member States who failed
to carry out the necessary interconnection actions by that time. The Commission will keep Parliament informed
about the progress in this regard.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 335, 18.12.2010.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be

complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator; OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

C 6 E / 454 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002864/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(12 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Protección de las aves en Gallecs

Gallecs es un espacio natural protegido ubicado en el Vallés, provincia de Barcelona. Dicho núcleo rural es el hábitat
natural y el refugio de aves migratorias y otras especies animales silvestres, muchas de ellas especies protegidas.

La caza con escopeta está prohibida en Gallecs, pero no así la cetrería (caza con aves rapaces y vuelo de rapaces) o la
captura de fringílidos. Esta práctica es contraria a la normativa europea, ya que vulnera la Directiva 2009/147/CE por
la que, según su artículo 5, letra a), queda prohibido matar o capturar de forma intencionada, sea cual fuera el método
empleado, a todas las especies de aves que viven normalmente en estado salvaje en el territorio europeo de los Estados
miembros.

Además, dicha Directiva señala que corresponde a los Estados miembros tomar todas las medidas necesarias para
preservar, mantener o restablecer una diversidad y una superficie suficiente de hábitats para todas las especies de aves
contempladas en la misma. Si bien es cierto que Gallecs se encuentra dentro del PEIN (Plan de Espacios de Interés
Natural), este espacio rural sigue siendo objeto de muchos intereses.

Teniendo en cuenta esta normativa:

1. ¿Qué medidas de protección de las aves migratorias puede aplicar la Comisión?

2. ¿Qué medidas de protección para la preservación del hábitat natural de dichas aves propone adoptar?

3. ¿Estaría dispuesta a incluir el espacio natural de Gallecs en la Red Natura 2000?

3. ¿Puede incentivar una mayor protección por parte de la normativa catalana y española?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(19 de abril de 2013)_

1. La Comisión trabaja para garantizar la aplicación y el cumplimiento plenos de la Directiva sobre aves ( [1] ), que
establece un régimen global de protección de todas las especies de aves silvestres que están presentes de forma natural
en la Unión Europea, incluidas las especies de aves migratorias.

2. La Comisión continuará trabajando para velar por que los Estados miembros adopten las medidas necesarias
para garantizar la plena conformidad con la Directiva sobre aves, incluidas las disposiciones para preservar, mantener
o restablecer una diversidad y una superficie suficiente de hábitats para todas las especies de aves contempladas en la
Directiva.

3. Los Estados miembros son responsables de designar los lugares más adecuados como zonas de protección
especial, que automáticamente pasan a formar parte de la red Natura 2000. Sobre la base de las pruebas científicas
disponibles, la Comisión considera que la red de zonas de protección especial en España proporciona actualmente
una protección suficiente a todas las especies de aves relacionadas en el anexo I de la Directiva sobre aves. Por lo tanto,
no tiene intención de promover la inclusión del espacio natural Gallecs en la red Natura 2000.

4. La Comisión no dudará en adoptar todas las medidas necesarias, incluidas acciones legales, para garantizar el
pleno cumplimiento de lo establecido en la Directiva sobre aves.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 2009/147/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 30 de noviembre de 2009, relativa a la conservación de las aves silvestres
(DO L 20 de 26.1.2010, p. 7).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 455

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002864/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The protection of birds in Gallecs

Gallecs is a protected natural area located in Vallés, in the province of Barcelona. This rural hamlet is the natural
habitat and sanctuary of migratory birds and other wild animal species, many of which are protected species.

Hunting with rifles is prohibited in Gallecs, but falconry is not (hunting with birds of prey and flying birds of prey) nor
is capturing finches. This practice is contrary to European legislation, insofar as it infringes Directive 2009/147/EC
whereby, according to Article 5(a), it shall be prohibited to deliberately kill or capture by any method any species of
bird that normally lives in the wild in the European territory of the Member States.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Directive notes that Member States shall take the requisite measures to preserve,
maintain or re‐establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the species of birds referred to therein. While
Gallecs is indeed within the PEIN (Plan for Areas of Natural Interest), this rural area remains subject to many different
interests.

Taking into account this legislation:

1. What measures can the Commission take to protect migrating birds?

2. What measures does it intend to take to protect the natural habitat of the aforementioned birds?

3. Is it prepared to include the Gallecs natural area in the Natura 2000 network?

4. Can it encourage greater protection under Catalan and Spanish legislation?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 April 2013)_

1. The Commission works to ensure full implementation and enforcement of the Birds Directive ( [1] ), which
provides a comprehensive scheme of protection for all wild bird species naturally occurring in the European Union,
including migratory bird species.

2. The Commission will continue to work to ensure that Member States undertake the necessary measures to
ensure full compliance with the provisions of the Birds Directive, including provisions for the preservation,
maintenance and re-establishment of a sufficient diversity area of habitats for all the species of birds referred to in the
directive.

3. Member States are responsible for designating the most suitable sites as Special Protection Areas, which
automatically become part of the Natura 2000 network. On the basis of the available scientific evidence, the
Commission considers that the Special Protection Area network in Spain currently provides sufficient protection to
all species of birds listed in Annex I of the Birds Directive. It therefore does not intend to promote the inclusion of the
Gallecs natural area in the Natura 2000 network.

4. The Commission will not hesitate to take any necessary measures, including legal action, to ensure full
compliance with the provisions of the Birds Directive.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 30 November 2009, on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20/7,
26.1.2010).

C 6 E / 456 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002865/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D)**

_(12. marts 2013)_

_Om:_ Elektrosmogs påvirkning af biers adfærd

Flere undersøgelser har vist, at biers adfærd bliver påvirket af elektromagnetisk stråling (elektrosmog). Eksempelvis
viser et studie fra 2011 fra Punjab University, at stråling fra mobiltelefoner påvirker biers adfærd, bl.a. ved at føre til
nedsat motorisk aktivitet og tegn på stress ( [1] ). Endnu en undersøgelse fra den schweiziske biolog og biekspert Daniel
Favre viser, at elektromagnetiske stråler sammen med bl.a. pesticider kan være en faktor i det drastiske fald i antallet af
honningbier i verden ( [2] ).

Elektrosmog bliver ydermere koblet sammen med bikollaps (CCD — Colony Collapse Disorder) ( [3] ), hvor bikolonier
kollapser, fordi bierne pludselig forlader deres kube.

Bier er særdeles afgørende insekter for miljøet. Deres bestøvning af planter og afgrøder er uvurderlig for vores
økosystem og landbrug. Det er derfor vigtigt, at årsagerne til faldet i bibestanden i Europa undersøges grundigt for på
denne måde at finde løsninger på problemet. Derfor vil jeg bede Kommissionen besvare følgende spørgsmål:

—
Er Kommissionen bekendt med elektrosmogs påvirkning af biers adfærd?

—
Hvordan vil Kommissionen undersøge sammenhængen mellem elektromagnetisk stråling og CCD?

—
Hvilke initiativer vil Kommissionen tage for at forhindre negativ påvirkning af biers adfærd fra elektrosmog?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg**

_(8. maj 2013)_

I Kommissionens svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E‐005654/2011, E-010188/2011 og E-010355/2012 gives der
omfattende oplysninger om de EU-foranstaltninger, der er blevet truffet for at beskytte tamme bier og støtte
biavlssektoren ( [4] ).

I Kommissionens meddelelse om honningbiers sundhed ( [5] ) og på dens særlige websted om bier ( [6] ) gives der yderligere
oplysninger om, hvordan Kommissionen, på grundlag af videnskabelige udtalelser fra Den Europæiske
Fødevaresikkerhedsautoritet (EFSA) og med bistand fra EU-referencelaboratoriet for biers sundhed (EURL), vurderer
situationen vedrørende biers sundhed, og hvilke foranstaltninger der er blevet truffet (f.eks. om de frivillige
overvågningsundersøgelser ( [7] ) af tab af honningbikolonier, der er iværksat i sytten medlemsstater).

Kommissionen er bekendt med, at der i nogle få artikler har været skrevet om de mulige negative virkninger, som
elektromagnetisk stråling kan have på biers adfærd. Ud fra de forholdsvis få foreliggende videnskabelige oplysninger
anfører EFSA og EURL ikke, at elektromagnetisk stråling kan være blandt de væsentligste faktorer, der udgør en
betydelig risiko for biers sundhed.

Derudover og som led i en indsats, der rækker ud over biers sundhed, overvåger Kommissionen med bistand fra Den
Videnskabelige Komité for Nye og Nyligt Identificerede Sundhedsrisici (VKNNPS ( [8] )) regelmæssigt de videnskabelige
fremskridt, der gøres med hensyn til beskyttelse mod virkningerne af elektromagnetiske felter, og de tilhørende
forskningsprojekter ( [9] ).

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⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Artikel fra Toxicology International: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3052591/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Artikel fra ABC News: http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/cellphones-contribute-bee-colony-decline-study-suggests/story?id=13597625,

Artikel fra The Daily Mail: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1385907/Why-mobile-phone-ring-make-bees-buzz-Insects-infuriatedhandset-signals.html

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Artikel fra International Journal of Environmental Science: http://www.ipublishing.co.in/jesvol1no12010/EIJES2044.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/da/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) KOM(2010)0714 endelig.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/financing_en.htm
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 457

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002865/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dan Jørgensen (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ The effect of electrosmog on bee behaviour

Several studies have shown that the behaviour of bees is affected by electromagnetic radiation (electrosmog). For
example, a study from 2011 carried out at Punjab University shows that radiation from mobile telephones affects bee
behaviour by, among other things, leading to reduced motor activity and signs of stress ( [1] ). Another study by the
Swiss biologist and bee expert, Daniel Favre, shows that electromagnetic radiation, together with other factors such as
pesticides, may be contributing to the dramatic decline in the honeybee population around the world ( [2] ).

Electrosmog is also implicated in Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD) ( [3] ), where bee colonies collapse because the bees
suddenly abandon their hive.

Bees are insects that are particularly important for the environment. Their pollination of plants and crops is
invaluable for our ecosystems and agriculture. It is therefore important for the causes of the decline in bee
populations in Europe to be investigated thoroughly in order to find solutions to the problem.

— Is the Commission aware of the effect of electrosmog on bee behaviour?

— How will it investigate the link between electromagnetic radiation and CCD?

— What initiatives will it take to prevent electrosmog having a negative impact on bee behaviour?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Comprehensive information on the EU actions to protect domestic bees and support to the beekeeping sector has
been provided in the Commission replies to Written Questions E‐005654/2011, E-010188/2011, and
E-010355/2012 ( [4] ).

Further information on the Commission's assessment of the bee health situation and the actions undertaken, based on
the scientific opinions provided by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the assistance of the EU reference
laboratory for bee health (EURL), is provided in the Commission's Communication on Honeybee Health ( [5] ) and in its
dedicated bee home page ( [6] ) (e.g. voluntary surveillance studies ( [7] ) on honeybee colony losses currently ongoing in
17 Member States).

The Commission is aware of a few articles on the possible negative effects of electromagnetic radiation on bee
behaviour. From the rather small amount of scientific information available, EFSA and the EURL do not indicate that
electromagnetic radiations could be amongst the major factors posing a significant risk to bee health.

In addition to all the above and beyond bee health, the Commission monitors regularly the state of the science in the
area of protection against electromagnetic fields effects with the help of the Scientific Committee on Emerging and
Newly Identified Health risks (SCENIHR ( [8] )) and the related research projects ( [9] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article from Toxicology International: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3052591/
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Article from ABC News: http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/cellphones-contribute-bee-colony-decline-study-suggests/story?id=13597625,

Article from The Daily Mail: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1385907/Why-mobile-phone-ring-make-bees-buzz-Insectsinfuriated-handset-signals.html

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article from the International Journal of Environmental Science: http://www.ipublishing.co.in/jesvol1no12010/EIJES2044.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 714 final.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/financing_en.htm
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

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C 6 E / 458 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002867/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(12. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Kinderarbeit in usbekischer Baumwollindustrie

Von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern aus meinem Wahlkreis bin ich auf das Problem von Kinderarbeit in der
Baumwollindustrie in Usbekistan hingewiesen worden.

Schulen werden während der Baumwollernte geschlossen, und Kinder, einige nicht älter als neun Jahre, werden für
geringes oder kein Entgelt zum Baumwollpflücken gezwungen. Schüler, die ihre Planziele nicht erreichen oder die
Arbeit verweigern, werden geschlagen oder müssen mit einem Schulausschluss rechnen. Menschenrechtsgruppen
schätzen die Zahl der jährlich betroffenen Kinder auf über hunderttausend. Trotz Zusicherung der usbekischen
Regierung, die Zwangsarbeit von Kindern sei seit 2008 gesetzlich verboten, fanden sich weitere Beweise erzwungener
Kinderarbeit während der Baumwollernte 2010 in Usbekistan, die von Regierung und Beamten organisiert wurde.

Der größte Abnehmer usbekischer Baumwolle ist der europäische Markt.

Daher möchte ich fragen:

1. Ist sich die Kommission dieses Sachverhalts bewusst?

2. Sind Maßnahmen geplant, die vergünstigten Tarife für usbekische Baumwollimporte in die EU aufzuheben?

3. Sind Maßnahmen geplant, um gegen die Zwangsarbeit von Kindern in der usbekischen Baumwollproduktion
vorzugehen?

**Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

Das Problem der Kinderarbeit ist wesentlicher Bestandteil der von der EU gegenüber Usbekistan verfolgten
Menschenrechtsagenda. Die EU hat das Thema bei jeder Gelegenheit im Rahmen ihrer bilateralen Kontakte auch auf
höchster politischer Ebene angesprochen. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass bei der Baumwollernte 2012 eine positive
Entwicklung festzustellen war, da die jüngsten Schüler weniger zur Erntearbeit herangezogen wurden. Zwangsarbeit
scheint jedoch immer noch verbreitet zu sein und wir müssen uns daher weiterhin dafür einsetzen, dass die
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Usbekistan und der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) wieder aufgenommen wird.

Usbekistan ist in das Allgemeine Präferenzsystem der EU (APS) einbezogen. Diese Präferenzen können ausgesetzt
werden, wenn ein Land auf der Grundlage von Schlussfolgerungen der Überwachungsstellen, d. h. in diesem Fall von
Schlussfolgerungen der ILO, für schwerwiegende und systematische Verstöße gegen die in den APS-Übereinkommen
verankerten Grundsätze verantwortlich gemacht wird. Der Fall Usbekistan wird auf der ILO-Konferenz im Juni 2013
erörtert werden; dort wird auch geprüft werden, ob auf der Grundlage der ILO-Schlussfolgerungen die Möglichkeit
der Rücknahme der Präferenzen untersucht werden sollte.

Darüber hinaus hat sich die EU bemüht, diesbezügliche Kooperationsmaßnahmen zu entwickeln. Mitte 2012 wurde
eine Finanzierungsvereinbarung über ein mit 10 Mio. EUR ausgestattetes Programm zur Entwicklung des ländlichen
Raums unterzeichnet, das die Diversifizierung der Landwirtschaft fördern und die Abhängigkeit von der
Baumwollmonokultur verringern soll.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 459

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002867/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Child labour in the Uzbek cotton industry

Some of my constituents have drawn my attention to the problem of child labour in the cotton industry in
Uzbekistan.

Schools are closed during the cotton harvest and children, some of them no older than nine, are forced to pick cotton
for little or no financial reward. Schoolchildren who fail to reach their targets or who refuse to work are beaten or
threatened with expulsion from school. Human rights groups estimate that over one hundred thousand children are
affected each year. Despite assurances from the Uzbek Government that forced labour among children has been
prohibited by law since 2008, there was further evidence of forced child labour during the 2010 cotton harvest in
Uzbekistan which was organised by the government and its officials.

The biggest market for Uzbek cotton is in Europe.

1. Is the Commission aware of this issue?

2. Are there plans to discontinue the reduced tariffs for Uzbek cotton imports into the EU?

3. Are there plans for action against forced labour among children in Uzbek cotton production?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The issue of child labour forms an essential part of the EU human rights agenda with Uzbekistan. The EU has raised
this issue on every occasion in its bilateral contacts including at the highest political level. Overall, it is good to note
that the 2012 cotton harvest marked a positive evolution, with the recourse to the youngest schoolchildren working
with the harvest curbed. Still it seems forced labour is employed and we shall therefore keep advocating the
resumption of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Uzbekistan benefits from the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). These preferences can be suspended if a
country is responsible for serious and systematic violations of principles laid down in GSP conventions on the basis of
the conclusions of monitoring bodies, i.e., in this case conclusions of the ILO. The case of Uzbekistan will be
discussed during the ILO Conference in June 2013, and will examine whether a withdrawal investigation is warranted
on the basis of its conclusions

The EU has also sought to develop relevant cooperation responses. A EUR 10 million Rural Development programme
was signed in mid-2012 to promote agriculture diversification and diminish reliance on cotton monoculture.

C 6 E / 460 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002868/13**

**aan de Raad**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(12 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties

Op 5 februari 2013 verklaarde de Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, dat de bom die in
een bus in Burgas was ontploft, met de dood van vijf Israëlische toeristen en de Bulgaarse chauffeur tot gevolg, in
verband gebracht kon worden met de Libanese organisatie Hezbollah ( [1] ). De directeur van Europol, RobWainwright,
bevestigde dat het bewijs, de inlichtingen en het patroon van de recente aanvallen allemaal in de richting van
Hezbollah wezen ( [2] ). Dit is niet de eerste terroristische aanval die in verband is gebracht met deze organisatie. Sinds
de oprichting als gewapende organisatie in 1982 is een groot aantal aanvallen toegeschreven aan Hezbollah, meestal
op westerse of joodse doelwitten. Meer recentelijk was Hezbollah betrokken bij de crisis in Syrië, door steun te
verlenen aan de gewelddadige campagne van Bashar al-Assad tegen de Syrische bevolking. Tevens heeft de organisatie
zich beziggehouden met illegale activiteiten in Europa ( [3] ) en was in 2005 in verband gebracht met de moord op de
president van Libanon, Rafic Hariri ( [4] ). Naar aanleiding van die moordaanslag heeft het Parlement een resolutie ( [5] )
aangenomen waarin de aanval werd veroordeeld en de Raad werd opgeroepen alle nodige maatregelen te treffen om
Hezbollah aan banden te leggen, aangezien er duidelijk bewijs was van de terroristische activiteiten van die
organisatie. Het is daarom hoog tijd dat Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties wordt gezet.

1. Kan de Raad toelichten waarom Hezbollah niet op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties is geplaatst?
Zo niet, waarom niet?

2. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat het verleden van Hezbollah, uitmondend in de recente aanval op grondgebied van
de Europese Unie in Burgas, geen twijfel laat dat Hezbollah een terroristische organisatie is?

3. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat het plaatsen van Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties zou
bijdragen aan het inperken van de terroristische activiteiten die deze organisatie kan uitvoeren met behulp van haar
financiële tegoeden, ondergrondse groepen en activiteiten in de EU?

4. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat, aangezien de leiding van zowel de militante als de politieke vleugel van Hezbollah
in handen zijn van dezelfde persoon, het moeilijk is onderscheid te maken tussen de legitieme en de terroristische
activiteiten?

5. Is de Raad bereid om, gezien het verleden en de betrokkenheid van Hezbollah bij de aanval in Burgas, er bij de
lidstaten op aan te dringen Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties te plaatsen?

**Antwoord**
_(17 juni 2013)_

Wijzigingen van de lijsten van aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten en personen zijn gebaseerd op juridische en
politieke overwegingen, en zijn onderworpen aan een beoordeling door de lidstaten. Het hoofddoel van een
aanwijzing is de aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten of personen de toegang tot financiële activa en gerelateerde
diensten onder EU-jurisdictie te ontzeggen.

Wat betreft de mogelijkheid om Hezbollah aan te wijzen als terroristische organisatie, wordt erop gewezen dat voor
iedere wijziging van de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties een unanieme beslissing van alle lidstaten nodig is. De
plaatsing van Hezbollah op de lijst is bij verschillende gelegenheden besproken, maar er was nooit unanieme steun
van de lidstaten.

De aanslag in Burgas wordt momenteel onderzocht, met het doel de omstandigheden van de aanslag te analyseren en
de daders te identificeren. De Bulgaarse autoriteiten hebben verklaard dat zij nauw samenwerken met de Libanese
autoriteiten.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) P6_TA(2005)0076.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 461

Indien uit het opsporingsonderzoek en de gerechtelijke procedures blijkt dat Hezbollah bij de zaak betrokken is, zal
de EU zich beraden op een reactie. De besprekingen over een passende reactie zullen gebaseerd zijn op alle elementen
die door de speurders in kaart worden gebracht.

C 6 E / 462 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002868/13**

**to the Council**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

On 5 February 2013 the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, said that the bomb on a bus in Burgas
which killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian driver had been linked to the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah ( [1] ).
The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, confirmed that the evidence, intelligence and the pattern of recent attacks
all pointed to Hezbollah ( [2] ). This is not the first terrorist attack that has been linked to the group. Since it was
established as an armed organisation in 1982, many different attacks, usually on Western or Jewish targets, have been
attributed to Hezbollah. More recently, Hezbollah has been involved in the crisis in Syria, backing Bashar al-Assad’s
violent campaign against the Syrian people. It also conducts illegal activities in Europe ( [3] ), and in 2005 was linked to
the assassination of the Lebanese President, Rafic Hariri ( [4] ). In the aftermath of that assassination, Parliament adopted
a resolution ( [5] ) in which it condemned the attack and urged the Council to take all necessary steps to curtail
Hezbollah, considering that there was clear evidence of its terrorist activities. The time has come to place Hezbollah
on the EU list of terrorist organisations.

1. Is the Council willing to explain why Hezbollah has not been placed on the EU terrorist list? If not, why not?

2. Does the Council agree that the history of Hezbollah, culminating in the recent attack on European Union soil
in Burgas, confirms that this group is indeed a terrorist group?

3. Does the Council agree that putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorist list would help curb the terrorist activities
carried out by it through its financial assets, support cells and activities in the EU?

4. Does the Council agree that, since the leadership of Hezbollah’s militant wing and its political wing are in the
hands of the same person, the distinction between legitimate and terrorist activities is difficult to make?

5. Is the Council willing, in light of Hezbollah’s history and its link to the attack in Burgas, to urge the Member
States to add Hezbollah to the EU list of terrorist organisations?

**Reply**
_(17 June 2013)_

Amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons are based on legal as well as political
considerations, subject to assessment by Member States. Depriving the targets of a designation of access to any
financial assets and related services under EU jurisdiction is the principal goal of any designation.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, all amendments to the EU list of
terrorist organisations require a unanimous decision by all Member States. The addition of Hezbollah to the list has
been discussed on several occasions, but there has never been unanimous support from Member States.

The Burgas attack is currently the subject of investigations, which aim to examine the circumstances of the attack and
identify the perpetrators. The Bulgarian authorities have stated that they are cooperating closely with their Lebanese
counterparts.

Should these investigative and judicial processes bring to light any implications for Hezbollah, the EU will consider
how it might respond. Discussions on an appropriate response will be based on all elements identified by the
investigators.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) P6_TA(2005)0076.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 463

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002869/13**
**aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)**

**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(12 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ VP/HR — Hezbollah op EU-lijst met terroristische organisaties

Op 5 februari 2013 verklaarde de Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, dat de bom die in
een bus in Burgas was ontploft, met de dood van vijf Israëlische toeristen en de Bulgaarse chauffeur tot gevolg, in
verband gebracht kon worden met de Libanese organisatie Hezbollah ( [1] ). De directeur van Europol, RobWainwright,
bevestigde dat het bewijs, de inlichtingen en het patroon van de recente aanvallen allemaal in de richting van
Hezbollah wezen ( [2] ). Dit is niet de eerste terroristische aanval die in verband is gebracht met deze organisatie. Sinds
de oprichting als gewapende organisatie in 1982 is een groot aantal aanvallen toegeschreven aan Hezbollah, meestal
op westerse of joodse doelwitten. Meer recentelijk was Hezbollah betrokken bij de crisis in Syrië, door steun te
verlenen aan de gewelddadige campagne van Bashar al-Assad tegen de Syrische bevolking. Tevens heeft de organisatie
zich beziggehouden met illegale activiteiten in Europa ( [3] ) en was in 2005 in verband gebracht met de moord op de
president van Libanon, Rafic Hariri ( [4] ). Naar aanleiding van die moordaanslag heeft het Parlement een resolutie ( [5] )
aangenomen waarin de aanval werd veroordeeld en de Raad werd opgeroepen alle nodige maatregelen te treffen om
Hezbollah aan banden te leggen, aangezien er duidelijk bewijs was van de terroristische activiteiten van die
organisatie. Het is daarom hoog tijd dat Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties wordt gezet.

1. Kan de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger toelichten waarom Hezbollah niet op de EU-lijst van
terroristische organisaties is geplaatst? Zo niet, waarom niet?

2. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat het verleden van Hezbollah, uitmondend in de
recente aanval op grondgebied van de Europese Unie in Burgas, geen twijfel laat dat Hezbollah een terroristische
organisatie is?

3. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat het plaatsen van Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van
terroristische organisaties zou bijdragen aan het inperken van de terroristische activiteiten die deze organisatie kan
uitvoeren met behulp van haar financiële tegoeden, ondergrondse groepen en activiteiten in de EU?

4. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat, aangezien de leiding van zowel de militante
als de politieke vleugel van Hezbollah in handen zijn van dezelfde persoon, het moeilijk is onderscheid te maken
tussen de legitieme en de terroristische activiteiten?

5. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger bereid om, gezien het verleden en de betrokkenheid van
Hezbollah bij de aanval in Burgas, er bij de lidstaten op aan te dringen Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische
organisaties te plaatsen?

**Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie**

_(30 mei 2013)_

De Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en de directeur van Europol hadden het in de verklaringen waar het
geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst over een redelijk vermoeden wat de betrokkenheid van Hezbollah betreft, maar
zagen af van beslister bewoordingen.

Wat betreft de mogelijkheid om Hezbollah aan te wijzen als terroristische organisatie, wordt erop gewezen dat voor
iedere wijziging van de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties een unanieme beslissing van alle lidstaten nodig is.
Hezbollah is in dit verband in het verleden reeds bij verschillende gelegenheden besproken, maar het is nooit tot een
consensus tussen de lidstaten gekomen.

Het onderzoek naar de daders en de omstandigheden van de aanslag in Burgas loopt nog. De Bulgaarse autoriteiten
hebben verklaard dat zij hiervoor samenwerken met hun Libanese tegenhangers.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) P6_TA(2005)0076.

C 6 E / 464 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Wijzigingen van de lijst van terroristische organisaties, entiteiten en personen berusten op zowel wettelijke als
politieke overwegingen en worden beoordeeld door de lidstaten. Het hoofddoel van een aanwijzing is de aangewezen
organisaties, entiteiten of personen de toegang tot financiële activa en gerelateerde diensten onder EU-jurisdictie te
ontzeggen. De afbakening van het voorwerp van de aanwijzing, met inbegrip van het onderscheid dat al dan niet kan
worden gemaakt, zou afhangen van de bovenvermelde overwegingen.

Indien het opsporingsonderzoek en de gerechtelijke procedures gevolgen hebben voor Hezbollah, zal de EU
verschillende opties overwegen om hierop te reageren, waaronder maatregelen in het kader van de samenwerking op
het gebied van recherche en justitie op EU-niveau en wijzigingen van de lijsten van aangewezen organisaties,
entiteiten en personen. De EU en de lidstaten zullen zich op basis van alle elementen die door de onderzoekers in
kaart zijn gebracht op een passende reactie beraden.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 465

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002869/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

On 5 February 2013 the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, said that the bomb on a bus in Burgas
which killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian driver had been linked to the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah ( [1] ).
The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, confirmed that the evidence, intelligence and the pattern of recent attacks
all pointed to Hezbollah ( [2] ). This is not the first terrorist attack that has been linked to the group. Since it was
established as an armed organisation in 1982, many different attacks, usually on Western or Jewish targets, have been
attributed to Hezbollah. More recently, Hezbollah has been involved in the crisis in Syria, backing Bashar al-Assad’s
violent campaign against the Syrian people. It also conducts illegal activities in Europe ( [3] ), and in 2005 was linked to
the assassination of the Lebanese President, Rafic Hariri ( [4] ). In the aftermath of that assassination, Parliament adopted
a resolution ( [5] ) in which it condemned the attack and urged the Council to take all necessary steps to curtail
Hezbollah, considering that there was clear evidence of its terrorist activities. The time has come to place Hezbollah
on the EU list of terrorist organisations.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative willing to explain why Hezbollah has not been placed on the EU
terrorist list? If not, why not?

2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that the history of Hezbollah, culminating in the recent
attack on European Union soil in Burgas, confirms that this group is indeed a terrorist group?

3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorist list would help
curb the terrorist activities carried out by it through its financial assets, support cells and activities in the EU?

4. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that, since the leadership of Hezbollah’s militant wing and its
political wing are in the hands of the same person, the distinction between legitimate and terrorist activities is difficult
to make?

5. Is the Vice-President/High Representative willing, in light of Hezbollah’s history and its link to the attack in
Burgas, to urge the Member States to add Hezbollah to the EU list of terrorist organisations?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 May 2013)_

The statements by the Bulgarian Minister of Interior as well as Europol's Director, as referred to in the Honourable
Member's question, spoke about a reasonable assumption with regard to Hizbullah's involvement, while refraining
from more definite formulations.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, all amendments to the EU list of terrorist
organisations require a unanimous decision of Member States. Hizbullah was, in this context, discussed on several
occasions in the past, but there has never been consensus among Member States.

The Burgas attack is subject to ongoing investigations, which aim at identifying the perpetrators and all
circumstances. The Bulgarian authorities informed of their cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts in this
regard.

Amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entitites and persons are based on legal as well as political
considerations, subject to assessment by Member States. Depriving the targets of a designation of access to any
financial assets and related services under EU jurisdiction is the principal goal of any designation. The targetting of the
designation, including what distinctions can or cannot be made, would be a matter of the aforementioned
considerations.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) P6_TA(2005)0076.

C 6 E / 466 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Should the ongoing investigative and judicial processes bear implications for Hizbullah, the EU will consider a range
of options to respond, which could include steps in the framework of investigative and judicial cooperation at EU
level; as well as possibilities of amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons. The EU and
Member States will discuss the appropriate response based on all elements identified by the investigators.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 467

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002870/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανησυχίες σχετικά με το κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης για μετανάστες στο Kareç, Αλβανία

Κατά τη διάρκεια της επίσκεψής του στην Αλβανία τον Δεκέμβριο του 2011, ο ειδικός εισηγητής των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για τα
Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα των Μεταναστών εξέφρασε την ανησυχία του σχετικά με το κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης στο Kareç. Το
κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης του Kareç, το οποίο άνοιξε το 2010, κατασκευάσθηκε κυρίως με χρηματοδότηση από την
Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Τα ζητήματα της προσβασιμότητας, των συνθηκών κράτησης, των νομικών διασφαλίσεων σύμφωνα με το
νόμο και στην πράξη καθώς και η μεταχείριση των κρατουμένων, που αναφέρονται ρητώς στην έκθεση του ειδικού εισηγητή
των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, είναι συνεπώς ιδιαίτερα ανησυχητικά.

Στην έκθεση αναφέρονται, ειδικότερα: οι κακές οδικές συνθήκες, οι οποίες παρεμποδίζουν τους κρατούμενους από το να
απολαύουν του δικαιώματος της νομικής υπεράσπισης και της ανεξάρτητης παρακολούθησης εκ μέρους εθνικών και διεθνών
οργάνων· οι υποδομές και η οργάνωση του κέντρου· οι κακές συνθήκες διαβίωσης και υγιεινής, όπως το κρύο και η υγρασία
και η έλλειψη υπαίθριων διευκολύνσεων ή δραστηριοτήτων, οι οποίες θυμίζουν εκείνες μιας φυλακής μεσαίας έως υψηλής
ασφάλειας· οι εσωτερικοί κανονισμοί, οι οποίοι περιέχουν διατάξεις που επιτρέπουν την παρουσία ανηλίκων στο κέντρο· και η
έλλειψη κατάλληλης ενημέρωσης σε γλώσσα που ομιλείται από τους κρατούμενους σχετικά με τα δικαιώματά τους και τους
λόγους της κράτησής τους.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τη συμφωνία επανεισδοχής μεταξύ Αλβανίας και της ΕΕ, η οποία τέθηκε σε ισχύ την 1η Μαΐου 2006 και
προϋποθέτει πλήρη σεβασμό των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και των θεμελιωδών ελευθεριών, πού βασίσθηκε η
χρηματοδότηση αυτού του κέντρου κράτησης από την ΕΕ;

Η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε άποψη όσον αφορά τον αρχιτεκτονικό σχεδιασμό και τον εσωτερικό κανονισμό του κέντρου;

Είναι ενήμερη η Επιτροπή σχετικά με την κατάσταση που περιγράφεται ανωτέρω; Εάν ναι, ποια μέτρα έχει λάβει προκειμένου
να διορθωθεί η κατάσταση; Εάν όχι, ποια συγκεκριμένα μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει τώρα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(8 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή έχει παράσχει στήριξη στην αλβανική κυβέρνηση για τη θέσπιση και την εφαρμογή αποτελεσματικού συστήματος
όσον αφορά τη μετανάστευση, το άσυλο, την επιστροφή και την επανεισδοχή μεταναστών σύμφωνα με τα ενωσιακά και τα
διεθνή πρότυπα. Η ανάπτυξη αρμόζοντος θεσμικού πλαισίου για τη διαχείριση της μετανάστευσης, σύμφωνα με τα
ευρωπαϊκά πρότυπα, αποτελεί μέρος των δεσμεύσεων της χώρας, ιδίως σε σχέση με την ελευθέρωση του καθεστώτος
θεωρήσεων με την ΕΕ.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η Επιτροπή έχει παράσχει στήριξη για την κατασκευή του κέντρου κράτησης στο Kareci. Το έργο
σχεδιάστηκε σε στενή συνεργασία με τον Διεθνή Οργανισμό Μετανάστευσης (ΔΟΜ). Τα κονδύλια της ΕΕ κάλυψαν τις
οικοδομικές εργασίες και την επίβλεψή τους. Ο ΔΟΜ παρείχε επίσης συμβουλές σχετικά με τους εσωτερικούς κανονισμούς
του Κέντρου.

Μετά την ολοκλήρωση της κατασκευής, η Επιτροπή (μέσω της Αντιπροσωπείας της ΕΕ στα Τίρανα) έθεσε στις αλβανικές
αρχές θέματα που επηρεάζουν τη λειτουργία του Κέντρου, ιδίως τη συντήρηση του χώρου και την οδική πρόσβαση. Κατόπιν
τούτου, στις αρχές του 2013 ξεκίνησαν εργασίες για την αναβάθμιση της οδικής πρόσβασης. Με τον ίδιο τρόπο, οι αρχές
έχουν επίσης κληθεί να επιλύσουν άλλα προβλήματα συντήρησης που επηρεάζουν τις συνθήκες υγιεινής του Κέντρου.

Επιπλέον, το 2010 εφαρμόστηκε σχέδιο της ΕΕ για την κατάρτιση του προσωπικού του κέντρου κράτησης όσον αφορά τα
ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και την καταπολέμηση των βασανιστηρίων, τις βέλτιστες πρακτικές και την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών
και, τέλος, τις θεωρητικές αρχές και το νομικό πλαίσιο της μετανάστευσης.

Η Επιτροπή θα συνεχίσει να παρακολουθεί με τις αλβανικές αρχές τα θέματα που έθεσε το αξιότιμο μέλος.

C 6 E / 468 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002870/13**

**to the Commission**
**Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Concerns over closed detention centre for migrants in Kareç, Albania

During his visit to Albania in December 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
expressed his concern about the closed detention centre in Kareç. The Kareç closed detention centre, which opened in
2010, was constructed primarily with funding from the European Union. The issues of accessibility, detention
conditions, legal safeguards in law and practice and the treatment of detainees, which are explicitly mentioned in the
UN Special Rapporteur’s report, are therefore particularly worrying.

The report mentions, in particular: the ‘bad road conditions, which seriously obstruct the enjoyment of detainees’
right to legal defence and independent monitoring by national and international bodies’; the centre’s infrastructure
and organisation; the poor living and hygienic conditions, such as cold and humidity and the lack of outdoor facilities
or activities, which recall those of ‘a mid‐ to high-security prison’; the internal regulations, which contain provisions
allowing the presence of ‘minors’ in the centre; and the lack of adequate information in a language commonly spoken
by detainees about their rights and the reasons for their detention.

Taking into account the readmission agreement between Albania and the EU, which entered into force on
1 May 2006 and presupposes full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, on what basis was this
detention centre funded by the EU?

Did the Commission have any say in the architectural planning and internal regulation of the centre?

Is the Commission aware of the situation described above? If so, what steps has it taken to remedy the situation? If
not, what concrete steps will it take now?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

The Commission has provided support to the Albanian government in establishing and implementing an effective
migration, asylum, return and readmission system in compliance with EU and international standards. The
development of an adequate and institutional framework for migration management, in accordance with European
standards is part of the country's commitments, notably in the context of visa liberalisation with the EU.

In this context the Commission has provided support to the construction of the detention centre in Kareci. The design
of the project has been closely coordinated with the International Organisation of Migration (IOM). EU funds covered
the actual building works and their supervision. The IOM advised also on internal regulations of the centre.

Following the finalisation of the construction, the Commission (through the EU Delegation in Tirana) has raised with
the Albanian authorities issues affecting the functioning of the centre, notably as regards maintenance of the site and
access road. As a result works for the upgrading of the access road were launched at the beginning of 2013. Likewise,
the authorities have also been called to remedy other problems of maintenance affecting the hygienic conditions of
the centre.

Moreover, an EU project provided training to staff of the detention centre in 2010 on human rights and the fight
against torture, on best practices and exchange of information, and on migration concepts and legal background.

The Commission will continue the monitoring of the issues raised by the honourable Member with the Albanian
authorities.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 469

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002871/13**

**do Komisji**
**Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR) oraz Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(12 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Konsultacje społeczne Komisji Europejskiej w sprawie wydobycia gazu łupkowego

Komisja Europejska rozpoczęła pod koniec grudnia 2012 r. konsultacje społeczne w sprawie wydobycia gazu
łupkowego, które docelowo mają służyć zmianom prawnym dotyczącym poszukiwań i eksploatacji węglowodorów
ze źródeł niekonwencjonalnych na terenie Unii Europejskiej. Struktura ankiety dot. wydobycia gazu łupkowego nie
odpowiada jednak standardom obiektywności i rzetelności, przy przeprowadzaniu badań socjologicznych: Użyte
w tytule sformułowanie „niekonwencjonalne paliwa kopalne” może sugerować, że gaz z łupków jest gazem
niekonwencjonalnym (a przecież mowa tu o tym samym gazie, tylko złoża wydobycia są inne), a w konsekwencji
zrodzić postawę podejrzliwości, nastawiając respondenta negatywnie do całego badania. Pytania o korzyści jak
i ryzyka wypływające z wydobycia gazu z łupków nie zostały sformułowane w zbalansowany sposób, obowiązujący
w tego typu ankietach: 11 z nich omawia aspekty pozytywne, a aż 18 aspekty negatywne.

Treść merytoryczna pytań wymaga od respondenta wiedzy specjalistycznej z omawianej dziedziny, a przecież celem
badania jest poznanie opinii publicznej, a nie eksperckiej. Również przez pierwsze 30 dni konsultacji, ankieta
dostępna była tylko w trzech językach europejskich, co znacznie ograniczyło możliwość partycypacji
w konsultacjach wielu obywatelom Unii Europejskiej.

Niezrozumiałe jest także, dlaczego respondenci ze wszystkich krajów Unii Europejskiej pytani są o wydanie opinii
ogólnej na temat eksploatacji łupków na terenie całej Europy, a nie konkretnego kraju, z którego pochodzą.

Tu warto podkreślić, że dla dobra rozwoju tego sektora, regulacje dotyczące wydobycia gazu z łupków, powinny
zostać rozpatrywane na poziomie krajów zainteresowanych i uwzględniać czynniki lokalne, traktując sprawę
w sposób indywidualny, a nie na poziomie ogólnoeuropejskim. W wielu krajach, np. w Polsce, istnieją już
odpowiednie regulacje prawne, traktat lizboński również potwierdza zwierzchność prawa narodowego nad
surowcami kopalnymi, w tej sytuacji nie ma potrzeby tworzenia rozwiązań ponadnarodowych.

1. Jakie cele chce osiągnąć Komisja rozpisując ankietę?

2. Czy projekt ankiety podawany był ekspertyzie socjologicznej i czyjej?

3. Czy planowane jest ponowne zgodne z warsztatem socjologicznym sformułowanie ankiety?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji**

_(3 maja 2013 r.)_

1. Celem konsultacji publicznych, których dotyczy pytanie Szanownego Pana Posła, jest przeprowadzenie
konsultacji z odpowiednimi zainteresowanymi stronami oraz społeczeństwem w kontekście rozwoju „ram oceny
dotyczących środowiska, klimatu i energii, umożliwiających niekonwencjonalne wydobycie węglowodorów”
przewidzianych w Programie prac Komisji na rok 2013.

2. Odpowiedź na pytanie Szanownego Pana Posła brzmi: nie.

3. Komisja uważa, że ankieta została opracowana w rzetelny sposób i nie planuje powtórzenia przedmiotowych
konsultacji społecznych.

C 6 E / 470 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002871/13**

**to the Commission**
**Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR) and Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Public consultation by the Commission on the extraction of shale gas

In late December 2012, the Commission launched a public consultation on the extraction of shale case, with a view to
amending legislation on the exploration for and extraction of hydrocarbons from unconventional sources in the
European Union. However, the structure of the questionnaire on the extraction of shale gas does not meet the
standards of objectivity and reliability required for sociological research: the use of the phrase ‘unconventional fossil
fuels’ in the title could suggest that shale gas is an unconventional gas, although it is the same as other natural gases,
just extracted from different deposits; this may make respondents suspicious and put them off the research in general.
The questions relating to the benefits and risks of the extraction of shale gas have not been worded in the balanced
way which is obligatory for such questionnaires: 11 of them relate to positive aspects, whereas 18 relate to negative
aspects.

The content of the questions requires specialist knowledge from respondents on the area in question, although the
aim of the research is to identify the opinions of the public, not experts. In addition, for the first 30 days of the
consultation the survey was only available in three European languages, which significantly limited the opportunity
for many EU citizens to take part in the consultation.

It is also hard to understand why respondents from all EU Member States have been asked to give their general
opinion on shale extraction throughout Europe, rather than in their specific home countries.

It is worth highlighting the fact that the development of this sector would benefit from regulations on the extraction
of shale gas being examined at the level of the countries involved, taking local factors into account and using an
individualised approach, rather than examining regulations at European level. The relevant legislative provisions are
already in place in many countries, for example Poland, and the supremacy of national legislation in the area of fossil
fuels was confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which means that there is no need for supranational solutions.

1. What aims did the Commission wish to achieve by publishing this survey?

2. Were experts in the field of sociology asked to review the draft questionnaire, and if so who were they?

3. Are there any plans to issue a revised questionnaire which complies with sociological principles?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

1. The purpose of the public consultation mentioned by the Honourable Member is to consult with relevant
stakeholders and with the public in the context of the development of an ‘environmental, climate ahand energy
assessment framework to enable safe and secure unconventional hydrocarbon extraction’, as foreseen in the 2013
Commission Work Programme.

2. The answer to the question of the Honourable Member is No.

3. The Commission considers the questionnaire as balanced and has no plans to repeat the public consultation.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 471

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002872/13**

**to the Commission**
**Roger Helmer (EFD)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Asbestos

In 2003, the Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment undertook a scientific review of
the EU directive on chrysotile (white asbestos) ( [1] ), comparing chrysotile and its substitutes and concluding that there
was a lack of data regarding substitutes.

In 2009 the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) gave its opinion during the legislative debate on the
codification of Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos.
The workers and employers of the 27 Member States gathered in the EESC said:

‘2.2.5. There are some shortcomings in respect of the codification of the recitals. Several of the recitals appearing in
previous directives are not included in the codification. In some cases, these omissions represent more than purely
editorial changes. They affect fundamental aspects which the EU legislator has judged important to draw attention to.

2.2.6. This is the case of recital (2) of Directive 2003/18/EC where the EU legislator points out the importance of a
preventative approach, with regard to substitute fibres for asbestos. This is particularly important to ensure that
alternatives used do not pose any health problems’ ( [2] ).

I understand that the Commission subsequently decided to remove the second statement — recital (2) — of the ‘old’
Directive.

Given that asbestos is no longer used in the EU and that millions of workers in the EU are therefore exposed to
substitutes, can the Commission:

1. explain the scientific reasoning behind the removal of recital (2) of Directive 2003/18/EC;

2. state what progress has been made towards establishing whether there are substitutes for chrysotile that pose
measurably less health risks;

3. clarify its position on the level of health risk posed by both white asbestos and its alternatives?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2013)_

1. Any changes made to Directive 2003/18/EC during codification are not done for any scientific reason, since the
process simply involves consolidating a number of acts to form a single act and does not affect the substance of the
acts undergoing codification.

The placing on the market of articles containing asbestos fibres is prohibited in the EU, pursuant to entry 6 of
Annex XVII to REACH (Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006. For articles which were already installed and/or in service
before 1 January 2005, Member States may allow their sale in their entirety, under specific conditions ensuring a high
level of protection of human health (paragraph 2 of entry 6 of Annex XVII to REACH).

Therefore asbestos, including chrysotile, has already effectively been substituted in the EU, with the only exception of
chrysotile-containing diaphragms for electrolysis installations. The CSTEE opinion quoted by the Honourable
Member indicated in its conclusions that ‘ _CSTEE reiterates its previous conclusion that the evidence for harmful potential is_
_more extensive for chrysotile than for its organic substitutes_ ’.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2003/18/EC.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council

on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work‐ COM(2009) 71 final/2 — 2006/0222 (COD) — OJ C 2009,
306/15.

C 6 E / 472 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

In this sense it must be noted that registration obligations under REACH for those placing in the market substances
used as alternatives to asbestos require that safe use of these substances to be assured. Furthermore, the Commission
has requested ECHA to prepare a dossier in accordance with Article 69 of REACH with a view of prohibiting the use
of asbestos containing diaphragms. The availability of alternatives presenting lower risks in this application will be
assessed in this study.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 473

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002873/13**

**al Consiglio**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Presunta presenza di jihadisti stranieri in Siria

Il 6 marzo 2013 un certo numero di fonti di informazione riferiva che i funzionari degli Stati Uniti sono preoccupati
per la crescita del numero di video jihadisti che mostrano musulmani radicali di lingua inglese che esortano i giovani
musulmani dall'Europa e non solo a recarsi in Medio Oriente, e in particolare in Siria, per unirsi ad elementi affiliati ad
al-Qaeda. L'agenzia Reuters ha fatto notare che stanno emergendo video che mirano a suggestionare i militanti
descrivendo passo a passo le istruzioni su come costruire bombe e altri dispositivi progettati per uccidere.

In precedenza, nel mese di febbraio, un gruppo di consulenza con sede a New York osservava che sono apparsi
almeno due video con un uomo che descrive se stesso come mujahid americano o combattente della guerra santa, che
parla del proprio coinvolgimento con i ribelli siriani e chiede che altri vengano a unirsi a lui.

Il governo britannico è anche preoccupato per il flusso di militanti islamisti in Siria. Un certo numero di agenzie di
intelligence occidentali sospettano che 60 o 70 cittadini britannici stiano attualmente combattendo in Siria, e molti
stanno aderendo a al-Nusra, un gruppo jihadista estremista collegato ad al-Qaeda. Molte di queste persone sono
attratte nella regione attraverso questi video in lingua inglese. In Siria, i comandanti dell'esercito libero siriano, come
ad esempio Abdel al-Salam Tabsah, dicono che gli stranieri che si uniscono a gruppi come al-Nusra «sono estremisti
islamici e danno una errata interpretazione dell'Islam». Un altro comandante FSA osserva che: i jihadisti vengono
dall'estero a cercare il martirio, mentre la gente del posto [lotta] per soldi. Molti di loro hanno una famiglia da
sfamare, e si uniranno a chiunque paghi loro un salario.

1. Il Consiglio è a conoscenza della crescita del materiale estremista in lingua inglese e dei video online che
attraggono jihadisti in Siria?

2. Quali passi sta effettuando il Consiglio o gli Stati membri per controllare i video online e i siti web progettati per
portare combattenti stranieri in Siria per unirsi a gruppi estremisti come al-Nusra?

3. Alla luce dei presunti numerosi cittadini del Regno Unito attualmente in Siria, quali sono alcune stime secondo
il Consiglio quanto al numero complessivo di cittadini europei che combattono nella regione?

4. Quali passi sta effettuando il Consiglio per combattere «il turismo jihadista» in Siria?

**Risposta**
_(11 settembre 2013)_

Il Consiglio è ben consapevole della questione dei vari materiali che hanno lo scopo di attrarre jihadisti in Siria.

Negli ultimi mesi il Consiglio è stato impegnato a discutere la questione dei combattenti stranieri in Siria che può
porre seri problemi alla sicurezza in Europa. L'UE sta elaborando una risposta alla questione a tutti i livelli (Stati
membri e UE), affrontando tutti i pertinenti problemi di sicurezza interna ed esterna.

Nella sessione del 6 e 7 giugno 2013, il Consiglio ha discusso in maniera approfondita la questione dei combattenti
stranieri e rimpatriati sotto il profilo dell'antiterrorismo, in particolare per quanto riguarda la Siria, sulla base di un
documento preparato dal coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE.

Il Consiglio ha espresso ampio sostegno al documento e al pacchetto di misure proposto ed ha incaricato i pertinenti
gruppi di lavoro di preparare, se del caso, misure di esecuzione. Ha inoltre invitato il coordinatore antiterrorismo a
presentare una relazione sull'attuazione delle misure proposte nel dicembre 2013.

La questione dei combattenti stranieri è stato uno dei cinque temi principali individuati dal coordinatore
antiterrorismo dell'UE per orientare il dibattito nella sessione del Consiglio di marzo sulle implicazioni per la
sicurezza della situazione nel Sahel/Maghreb.

Le azioni proposte dal coordinatore antiterrorismo riguardano:

C 6 E / 474 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

—
la necessità di una valutazione comune del fenomeno dei giovani europei che vanno in Siria per la jihad e la
necessità di ottenere una migliore visione dei diversi gruppi che combattono in Siria;

—
le misure per impedire la partenza dei giovani per la Siria ed offrirgli assistenza al ritorno;

—
la segnalazione degli spostamenti e la risposta della giustizia penale;

—
la cooperazione con i paesi terzi.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 475

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002873/13**

**to the Council**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Alleged presence of foreign jihadists in Syria

On 6 March 2013 a number of news sources reported that officials in the United States are concerned by the increase
in the numbers of jihadist videos which feature English-speaking radical Muslims who inspire young Muslims from
Europe and elsewhere to travel to the Middle East, and in particular to Syria, to join elements affiliated with al-Qaeda.
The news agency Reuters noted that English-language videos are surfacing which aim to inspire militants by featuring
step-by-step instructions on how to build bombs and other devices designed to kill.

Earlier in February, a New York-based consultancy group noted that at least two videos have appeared featuring a
man describing himself as an ‘American mujahid’ or holy warrior, who talks about his involvement with Syrian rebels
and calls for other individuals to come and join him.

The British Government is also concerned by the flow of Islamist militants into Syria. A number of Western
intelligence agencies suspect that 60 or 70 British citizens are currently fighting in Syria, and many are joining alNusra, an extreme jihadist group linked with al-Qaeda. Many of these individuals are drawn to the region through
these English-language videos. In Syria, commanders of the Free Syrian Army, such as Abdel al-Salam Tabsah, say that
foreigners joining groups such as al-Nusra ‘are Islamic extremists and have an erroneous interpretation of Islam’.
Another FSA commander notes: ‘Jihadists from abroad come seeking martyrdom, whereas the locals [fight] for
money. Many of them have families to feed, and they will join whoever pays them a wage’.

1. Is the Council aware of the growth in English-language online extremist material and videos which are drawing
jihadists into Syria?

2. What steps are being taken by the Council or the Member States to monitor online videos and websites which
are designed to bring foreign fighters to Syria to join extremist groups such as al-Nusra?

3. In light of the alleged numbers of UK citizens currently in Syria, what are some estimates according to the
Council regarding the overall total number of EU citizens fighting in the region?

4. What steps is the Council taking to combat ‘jihad tourism’ to Syria?

**Reply**
_(11 September 2013)_

The Council is well aware of the issue of various materials that aim to draw jihadists into Syria.

Over recent months, the Council has been engaged in discussions on the issue of foreign fighters operating in Syria
which may pose a serious problem to European security. The EU is developing a response to this issue at all levels
(Member States and the EU), addressing all relevant internal and external security issues.

At its meeting on 6-7 June 2013, the Council had an in-depth discussion on the issue of foreign fighters and returnees
from a counter-terrorism perspective, in particular with regard to Syria, on the basis of a document prepared by
the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator (CTC).

The Council expressed broad support for the paper and the package of suggested measures and tasked its relevant
working groups to prepare the implementing measures where necessary. It also invited the CTC to present a report on
the implementation of the proposed measures in December 2013.

The issue of foreign fighters was one of the five major topics identified by the EU CTC in order to steer the debate at
the Council in March on the security implications of the situation in the Sahel/Maghreb.

The actions proposed by the CTC relate to:

—
the need for a common assessment of the phenomenon of these young Europeans going to Syria for the Jihad
and the need to get a better picture of the different groups fighting in Syria;

C 6 E / 476 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

—
measures to prevent youngsters from departing to Syria and to offer assistance upon their return;

—
detection of travel movements and the criminal justice response;

—
cooperation with third countries.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 477

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002874/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Hamas impedisce l'apertura del valico per il transito di merci

Il 4 marzo 2013, l'Associated Press ha riferito che, secondo un portavoce militare israeliano, Hamas a Gaza ha
esercitato pressioni su un imprenditore palestinese per mantenere la chiusura del checkpoint Kerem Shalom, che è
l'unico valico per merci con Israele. Secondo il maggiore Guy Inbar la riapertura del valico era prevista per il 4 marzo,
tuttavia l'operatore ha detto che non sarebbe andato al lavoro.

Kerem Shalom è attualmente controllato dall'autorità palestinese, ma Hamas vuole averne la competenza. Questo
punto di controllo è fondamentale in quanto fornisce l'accesso alla maggior parte dei beni di consumo che vengono
utilizzati dai palestinesi. È stato chiuso per una settimana dopo che i militanti a Gaza avevano lanciato un razzo sulla
città israeliana di Ashkelon.

Israele sta operando per alleggerire le restrizioni sul flusso degli essenziali materiali da costruzione che sono necessari
per la ricostruzione civile all'interno della striscia di Gaza, ma la tensione politica tra Hamas e Fatah potrebbe
vanificare questo sforzo.

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante in materia di controversie sul checkpoint Kerem
Shalom al confine tra Gaza e Israele?

2. Quali misure sono state adottate dal Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per garantire la sicurezza e
l'affidabilità del trasporto merci nella striscia di Gaza?

3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari UE nella regione per quanto riguarda le tensioni di Hamas con l'autorità
palestinese sul checkpoint Kerem Shalom?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(6 maggio 2013)_

Attualmente non ci sono funzionari dell’Autorità palestinese sulla parte palestinese del valico di frontiera di Karem
Abu Salem. Tuttavia, l’impresa che opera su quella parte del confine ha ricevuto l’autorizzazione da parte dell’Autorità
palestinese. L’UE non è stata in grado di verificare gli eventi citati dall’onorevole deputato nell’interrogazione.

L’UE ha ribadito a più riprese che la situazione nella Striscia di Gaza è insostenibile e continua a lavorare con le parti
interessate per operare un cambiamento radicale della situazione nella Striscia di Gaza, in linea con la risoluzione
1860 del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU del 2009. L’UE continua ad invocare un'apertura immediata, permanente e
incondizionata dei valichi di frontiera per permettere il flusso dell'aiuto umanitario, delle merci e delle persone da e
verso Gaza.

Da novembre 2005 a giugno 2007 la missione dell'UE di assistenza alle frontiere a Rafah ha monitorato le operazioni
presso il valico di frontiera tra la Striscia di Gaza ed Egitto, dopo l’accordo sulla circolazione e l’accesso concluso il
15 novembre 2005 tra Israele e l’Autorità palestinese. Da allora la missione è rimasta a disposizione delle parti, in
attesa di una soluzione politica e pronta a intervenire di nuovo con brevissimo preavviso. **In base agli accordi del**
2005, la presenza dell’UE **come parte terza tiene conto delle preoccupazioni di Israele riguardo alla sicurezza e**
**garantisce la libertà di circolazione agli 1,5 milioni di palestinesi che vivono nella** Striscia di Gaza **.**

C 6 E / 478 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002874/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Hamas prevents opening of cargo crossing

On 4 March 2013, the Associated Press reported an Israeli military spokesman as saying that Hamas in Gaza has
exerted pressure on a Palestinian contractor to keep the Kerem Shalom checkpoint — the only cargo crossing with
Israel — closed. According to Major Guy Inbar, the crossing was expected to be opened on 4 March, but the operator
said he would not come to work.

Kerem Shalom is currently controlled by the Palestinian Authority, but Hamas wants to operate it instead. This
checkpoint is crucial, as it provides access for most of the consumer goods used by Palestinians. It was closed for a
week after militants in Gaza fired a rocket at the Israeli town of Ashkelon.

Israel has been working to ease restrictions on the flow of essential building materials needed for civil reconstruction
inside the Gaza Strip. Political tension between Hamas and Fatah could, however, hamper these efforts.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding disputes over the Kerem Shalom
checkpoint on Gaza’s border with Israel?

2. What steps have been taken by the Vice-President/High Representative to help ensure the security and reliability
of cargo transports into the Gaza Strip?

3. What is the assessment of EU officials in the region regarding Hamas’ tensions with the Palestinian Authority
over the Kerem Shalom checkpoint?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

There are currently no officials of the Palestinian Authority on the Palestinian side of the Karem Abu Salem border.
However the company operating on that side of the border does so with the approval of the Palestinian Authority.
The EU has not been able to verify the events referred to in the question by the Honourable Member.

The EU has stated on a number of occasions that the situation in the Gaza Strip is unsustainable. It continues to work
with the parties in the region towards a fundamental change in the situation in the Gaza Strip, in line with UNSC
Resolution 1860 (2009). The EU continues to call for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of
crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip.

During the period of its operation from November 2005 to June 2007, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
monitored the operations of the border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, after Israel and the
Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access on 15 November 2005. Since then, the
mission has remained on standby, awaiting a political solution and ready to re-engage at very short notice. Under the
2005 Agreements, the EU third-party presence takes into account Israel's security concerns and ensures the freedom
of movement of the 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 479

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002875/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Stabilità in Asia centrale

A metà febbraio 2013, due ex ambasciatori USA— John Herbst e William Courtney — hanno scritto un commento
per Radio Free Europe sulle probabili minacce che possono emergere una volta che le truppe occidentali in
Afghanistan saranno ritirate nel 2014, e più in particolare i rischi per la stabilità nei vicini Stati dell'Asia centrale. Gli
stupefacenti e la militanza sono le due principali preoccupazioni. Anche con la creazione dell'esercito nazionale
afghano, i talebani manterranno il controllo in molte aree pashtun, e saranno attivi all'esterno del paese.

I talebani sono stati determinanti nel sostenere altri gruppi islamici radicali della regione, come il Movimento islamico
dell'Uzbekistan (IMU), che opera anche in Tagikistan e Kirghizistan. Nel 2004 è emerso un gruppo estremista
scissionista chiamato Unione della Jihad islamica (IJU) che ha rivendicato una serie di attentati suicidi in Uzbekistan di
cui sono state bersaglio le ambasciate degli Stati Uniti e di Israele. Attualmente si ritiene che sia l'IMU che l'IJU siano
rifugiati in Pakistan, ma senza le truppe NATO nella regione è probabile che tornino negli Stati dell'Asia centrale.

Per quanto riguarda la droga, senza sorveglianza efficace i civili afghani torneranno in numero maggiore alla
coltivazione del papavero, che ha un diffuso effetto a catena in tutta l'Asia centrale, la Russia e l'Europa.

I due ex diplomatici statunitensi hanno quindi suggerito che è di fondamentale importanza che si concludano accordi
con i governi dell'Asia centrale per migliorare i metodi di condivisione delle informazioni di intelligence su
terrorismo, droga e minacce criminali. Hanno inoltre suggerito che la cooperazione con paesi come la Russia e la Cina
è importante per contenere i problemi comuni che potrebbero emergere una volta che la NATO sia fuori
dall'Afghanistan.

1. Qual è la posizione della Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante dell'UE quanto al coordinamento della politica di
sicurezza nei confronti dell'Asia centrale e dell'Afghanistan allorché le forze della NATO partiranno il prossimo anno?

2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è disposta ad avviare un dialogo con la Cina e la Russia, al fine di
sostenere gli Stati dell'Asia centrale preoccupati per i rischi posti dalla militanza e dal previsto aumento del traffico di
droga?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(6 giugno 2013)_

La prospettiva del ritiro dell’ISAF dall’Afghanistan nel 2014 è, in effetti, fonte di crescente preoccupazione per la
sicurezza della regione. Unitamente ai paesi dell’Asia centrale, l’UE si adopera per affrontare questioni di interesse
comune in materia di sicurezza, anche per quanto riguarda l’Afghanistan; nel giugno 2012 il Consiglio «Affari esteri»
ha approvato una revisione della strategia per l’Asia centrale adottata dal Consiglio europeo nel giugno 2007, nella
quale si proponeva di avviare un dialogo ad alto livello sulla sicurezza tra l’UE e i paesi dell’Asia centrale. Una prima
riunione di tale dialogo si terrà a Bruxelles all’inizio dell’estate prossima.

L’UE è fortemente impegnata in Afghanistan e manterrà tale impegno ancora per molti anni. L’appoggio alla polizia
civile e allo Stato di diritto resterà un elemento chiave del sostegno fornito dall’UE all’Afghanistan negli anni a venire.
Nei prossimi anni sarà importante continuare a rafforzare le sinergie tra i nostri programmi di assistenza nei paesi
dell’Asia centrale e in Afghanistan, in particolare per quanto riguarda i programmi nelle regioni frontaliere e attorno
ad esse, per promuovere la sicurezza e la cooperazione regionale.

L’Unione europea è impegnata nel dialogo politico con la Russia e la Cina, che contempla gli sviluppi riguardanti
l’Afghanistan e l’Asia centrale, comprese le questioni legate al traffico di droga. Tali problemi vanno affrontati
attraverso una stretta collaborazione e il coordinamento tra i soggetti internazionali e regionali: la Russia e la Cina
hanno chiaramente un ruolo importante da svolgere al riguardo.

C 6 E / 480 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002875/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Stability in Central Asia

In mid-February 2013, two former US Ambassadors — John Herbst and William Courtney — wrote a commentary
for Radio Free Europe which discussed the threats that are likely to emerge once Western troops pull out of
Afghanistan in 2014, and more specifically the risks to stability in neighbouring Central Asian states. Narcotics and
militancy are two chief concerns. Even with the creation of the Afghan National Army, the Taliban will maintain
control in most Pashtun areas, and will be active outside the country.

The Taliban has been instrumental in supporting other Islamist radical groups in the region, such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which also operates in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, an extremist splinter
group called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) emerged, taking credit for a number of suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and
targeting the US and Israeli Embassies. Both the IMU and IJU are currently believed to be taking refuge in Pakistan, but
without NATO troops in the region they are also likely to head back into Central Asian states.

As regards narcotics, without effective oversight Afghan civilians will again turn in greater numbers to poppy
cultivation, which has a widespread knock-on effect throughout Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

The two retired US diplomats have therefore suggested it is crucial that arrangements be made with Central Asian
governments to improve methods of sharing intelligence information on terrorism, narcotics and criminal threats.
They have also suggested that cooperation with states such as Russia and China is important to contain the common
problems that could emerge once NATO is out of Afghanistan.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding EU security coordination policy
towards Central Asia and Afghanistan once NATO forces depart next year?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to initiate a dialogue with China and Russia in order to
support Central Asian states concerned about the risks posed by increased militancy and the expected increase in the
narcotics trade?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 June 2013)_

The perspective of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 is indeed creating increased concern about security
developments in the region. The EU is actively engaged with Central Asian countries on security issues of shared
concern, including those related to Afghanistan, and in June 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council approved a Review of
the Central Asia Strategy adopted by the European Council in June 2007, that included a proposal to launch a High
Level Security Dialogue between the EU and Central Asian countries. A first meeting of the EU-Central Asia High
Level Security Dialogue will be held in Brussels early summer this year.

The EU is heavily engaged in Afghanistan and will continue to be so for many years to come. Support to civilian
policing and rule of law will remain key elements of EU support to Afghanistan in the years to come. Over the coming
years it will be important to continue to enhance the synergy between our assistance programmes in Central Asian
countries and Afghanistan, notably as regards programmes in and around border areas, to promote security and
regional cooperation.

The EU is engaged in political dialogue with both Russia and China and developments relating to Afghanistan and
Central Asia form part of that dialogue, including issues related to drug trafficking. These challenges need to be
tackled through close cooperation and coordination among international and regional actors and Russia and China
clearly have an important role to play.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 481

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002876/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan

In una relazione stilata all'inizio di marzo 2013 sul problema dei matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan, Human Rights
Watch denuncia come questi aggravino il divario fra i sessi esistente nel paese in materia di istruzione e
contribuiscano a diffondere problemi di salute. Secondo le statistiche è sposato il 48 % delle ragazze di età compresa
tra i 15 e i 19 anni. Inoltre ve ne sono alcune che sono mogli a soli 12 anni.

Le giovani che non vogliono sposarsi e oppongono resistenza si ritrovano prive di qualsiasi forma di tutela. Spesso il
matrimonio viene loro imposto perché le famiglie sono interessate al pagamento della dote o perché le ragazze sono
sospettate di aver avuto rapporti sessuali prematrimoniali. Purtroppo le ragazze non sanno di avere diritto a ricevere
aiuto e quelle che cercano di ottenerlo vanno spesso incontro a gravi conseguenze per mano delle loro stesse famiglie.
Pare ad esempio che una ragazza di 17 anni proveniente dalla regione dello Stato dei laghi sia stata legata a un albero e
picchiata a morte per aver rifiutato di sposarsi.

I matrimoni infantili hanno gravi ripercussioni poiché interrompono il percorso formativo delle ragazze e le
espongono a un maggiore rischio di subire violenze e abusi. Questa situazione pregiudica lo sviluppo economico e
sociale del Sud Sudan. Nel 2011 infatti solo il 39 % degli studenti della scuola primaria e il 30 % di quelli della scuola
secondaria era di sesso femminile. Inoltre per le ragazze che si sposano giovanissime e rimangono incinte il rischio di
andare incontro a complicanze durante il parto è maggiore.

Il direttore della divisione per i diritti delle donne di Human Rights Watch ha dichiarato che le giovani che hanno il
coraggio di opporsi al matrimonio prematuro hanno un estremo bisogno di tutela, sostegno e istruzione.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Quali misure sta adottando il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di garantire che il Sud Sudan ratifichi
accordi internazionali quali la Convenzione sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di discriminazione contro le
donne (CEDAW) e la Convenzione sui diritti e il benessere del fanciullo (CRC)?

2. Quali azioni sta intraprendendo l'Unione europea, attraverso il programma di aiuti in Sud Sudan, per
incoraggiare le ragazze a completare la propria istruzione e contribuire a migliorarne l'accesso alla tutela
giuridica e sociale in caso di matrimonio forzato?

3. Quali misure sta inoltre adottando per contribuire a migliorare l'assistenza sanitaria e il sostegno alle ragazze
del Sud Sudan che rischiano di andare incontro a complicanze dovute alla gravidanza? Si stanno compiendo
degli sforzi per sollecitare il governo a far conoscere, attraverso campagne di educazione alla salute pubblica, i
pericoli legati alla gravidanza in giovanissima età?

C 6 E / 482 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003102/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(19 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan

Nel marzo 2013, Human Rights Watch ha presentato una relazione in cui denuncia un numero considerevole di
matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan. La maggior parte di questi concerne ragazze costrette a sposarsi malgrado il loro
rifiuto. È sposato circa il 48 % delle giovani con un'età compresa tra i 15 e i 19 anni e si registrano anche casi di
ragazze al di sotto di questa età. La maggior parte di esse è stata costretta a contrarre matrimonio con uomini molto
più anziani, in cambio di una dote costituita da mucche, denaro o altri doni in natura, e la resistenza che hanno
opposto al matrimonio o ai rapporti sessuali è stata punita in modo violento, con percosse, stupro o persino
omicidio.

Le ragazze sposate non possono andare a scuola. A ciò si aggiunge il fatto che i parti prematuri comportano ulteriori
complicazioni di salute. Come riportato infatti dal Fondo delle Nazioni Unite per la popolazione, per le ragazze di età
compresa tra i 15 e 19 anni il rischio di morire durante il parto è doppio rispetto a quello corso delle donne adulte,
mentre per le ragazze al di sotto dei 15 anni è cinque volte superiore.

Nel 2008 il Sudan ha adottato il Child Act, il quale è entrato in vigore nel 2009. Il Sud Sudan non ha ancora firmato la
Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo. Ad oggi mancano nel paese un'attuazione e un'applicazione
efficaci delle leggi e delle politiche che garantirebbero i diritti dei minori, la parità di genere, l'istruzione e la salute.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza dell'elevato tasso di incidenza dei matrimoni infantili in
Sud Sudan?

2. Quali misure ha adottato il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di promuovere i diritti dei bambini in
Sud Sudan attraverso l'adesione del paese alla Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo?

**Risposta congiunta di Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(6 maggio 2013)_

L’AR/VP deplora l’elevato numero di matrimoni infantili nel Sud Sudan. L’UE solleva puntualmente questo problema
presso il governo del Sud Sudan, richiamando la sua attenzione sull’importanza di firmare e ratificare le Convenzioni
internazionali sui diritti dell’uomo, comprese la Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo e la Convenzione
sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di discriminazione contro le donne. Nell’ambito di tal dialogo con il governo, l’UE
offre un sostegno alle istituzioni competenti e alla società civile per garantire l’accesso, rafforzare le capacità di
attuazione e favorire la rottura con le tradizioni socioculturali profondamente radicate.

L’UE ha fornito al Sud Sudan ingenti aiuti allo sviluppo nel periodo 2011-2013, dando priorità all’istruzione (41,5
milioni di euro) e all’assistenza sanitaria (61,5 milioni di euro). I programmi finanziati dall’UE in questi settori
pongono un forte accento sulla necessità di investire nelle ragazze e nelle donne e colmare ed eliminare le disparità tra
i sessi che ostacolano lo sviluppo. Una componente degli attuali programmi dell’UE consiste nel migliorare l’accesso
agli studi e il tasso di scolarizzazione delle ragazze e di proseguimento degli studi nel campo dell’istruzione primaria. I
programmi dell’UE per la salute tengono conto dell’allarmante tasso di mortalità e promuovono la formazione delle
ostetriche, di cui ne mancano circa 2 000 a livello nazionale. A prtire dal 2014, l’istruzione di base basic education e
l'assistenza sanitaria di base continueranno ad essere un elemento prioritario per l’UE nel Sud Sudan. Non appena
quest’ultimo avrà ratificato l’accordo di Cotonou, l’UE prevede di fornire ulteriori aiuti allo sviluppo per investire nelle
ragazze e nelle donne.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 483

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002876/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriage in South Sudan

In early March 2013, Human Rights Watch wrote a report on the problem of child marriage in South Sudan. The
report exposes the way child marriage exacerbates the country’s gender gap in education and contributes to
widespread health problems. According to statistics, 48% of South Sudanese girls aged 15 to 19 are married, with
some brides as young as 12 years old.

Girls who do not wish to marry and who resist are left with no form of protection. Girls are often forced into
marriages because their families wish to receive dowry payments or because they are suspected of having had
premarital sex. Unfortunately, girls do not know that they have the right to receive help — and those who try to do so
often suffer severe consequences at the hands of their families. One 17-year-old girl from the Lakes State region, who
had refused the hand of a man in marriage, was allegedly tied to a tree and beaten to death.

The repercussions of child marriage are serious since it disrupts a girl’s education, putting her at higher risk of
violence and abuse. This jeopardises South Sudan’s economic and social development. In 2011, only 39% of primary
school students, and 30% of secondary students, were female. Also, girls who marry too young and become pregnant
run greater risk of suffering complications when delivering a child.

The Director of Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Division has stated that ‘girls who have the courage to refuse
early marriages are in dire need of protection, support, and education’.

1. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to ensure South Sudan ratifies international
agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and
the Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (CRC)?

2. What steps is the EU taking, via its aid programme in South Sudan, to encourage girls to complete their
education and help improve their access to legal and social protection in cases of forced marriage?

3. What steps is the EU taking to help improve healthcare and support for girls in South Sudan who are at risk of
complications due to pregnancy? Are any efforts being made to urge the government to expose, via public health
education campaigns, the dangers of young teenage pregnancies?

**Question for written answer E-003102/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(19 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriages in South Sudan

In March 2013 Human Rights Watch reported a significant number of child marriages in South Sudan. Most of these
concerned girls forced to marry despite their refusal. About 48% of the girls were 15 to 19 years old at marriage and
cases of even younger girls were reported. Most of the girls were forced to be married in exchange for a dowry of
cows, money or other gifts in kind. The majority of girls were forced to marry much older men, and their resistance to
marriage or sexual intercourse was violently punished by beating, rape or even murder.

Married girls cannot go to school, and premature births cause further health complications. As reported by the UN
Population Fund, the risk of dying in childbirth for girls aged between 15 and 19 is twice — and for girls under 15 five
times — that for adult women.

In 2008 Sudan adopted the Child Act, which came into force in 2009. South Sudan has not yet signed the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The country has hitherto been lacking effective implementation and
enforcement of laws and policies which would guarantee children rights, gender equality, education and health.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the high incidence of child marriage in South Sudan?

C 6 E / 484 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

2. What measures has the Vice-President/High Representative taken to promote children’s rights in South Sudan
through the country’s accession to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child?

**Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The HR/VP deplores the high number of child marriages in South Sudan. The EU regularly raise these concerns with
the Government of South Sudan, and impress on it the importance of signing and ratifying the international
conventions on human rights, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.. As part of this dialogue with the Government, the EU
offers support to the relevant institutions and civil society to ensure accession, strengthen capacities for
implementation and break with deep-rooted socio-cultural traditions.

The EU has a significant development aid portfolio in South Sudan for the period 2011-2013, which prioritises
education (EUR 41.5 million) and health (EUR 61.5 million). EU-funded programmes in these sectors put a strong
emphasis on the need to invest in girls and women and close the gender disparities that act as a barrier to
development. A strong component of the ongoing EU programmes in education is to improve the access, enrolment
and retention of girls in primary education, and the EU programmes in health take account of the alarming mortality
rate and support the training of midwifes, of whom there is a deficit of about 2 000 nationwide. For the period as
from 2014, basic education and basic health will continue to be a priority of the EU in South Sudan, with further EU
development aid devoted to investing in girls and women once South Sudan ratifies the Cotonou Agreement.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 485

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002877/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Minacce per le forze di pace delle Nazioni Unite nelle alture del Golan

Il 6 marzo 2013 il New York Times ha riferito che i combattenti ribelli siriani avevano catturato 20 caschi blu delle
Nazioni Unite sulle alture del Golan, confrontandoli con il termine di 24 ore dopo il quale sarebbero stati trattati
come «prigionieri di guerra».

Due video sono stati postati da un gruppo chiamato Martiri della Brigata Yarmouk, che si è assunto la responsabilità
della cattura delle forze di pace. I video mostrano membri di questo gruppo in piedi davanti a veicoli delle Nazioni
Unite catturati. I ribelli si riferiscono alle Nazioni Unite così: «Sono agenti di Israele, il regime siriano e le Nazioni
Unite e tutti i paesi europei, e il regime di Assad, sono tutti agenti di Israele!».

Un portavoce del gruppo ha detto: «Deteniamo le forze della Forza di disimpegno degli osservatori delle Nazioni
Unite fino al ritiro delle forze di Bashar al-Assad dal villaggio di al-Jamla e la sua periferia vero le loro posizioni.
Chiediamo all'America, alle Nazioni Unite e al Consiglio di Sicurezza che le forze di Assad si ritirino per ottenere la
loro liberazione. Non li rilasceremo che dopo il ritiro delle forze del regime di Bashar al-Assad dalla periferia del
villaggio di al-Jamla, che si trova al confine con Israele».

Questo episodio è la più grave minaccia per la sicurezza del personale delle Nazioni Unite in Siria da quando la rivolta
è iniziata due anni fa, e ci sono preoccupazioni per quanto riguarda la stabilità delle alture del Golan, che potrebbe
costituire una seria sfida per Israele e anche portare a un intervento israeliano.

1. Quali passi sta effettuando la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per monitorare la situazione sulle alture del
Golan dato il potenziale estendersi del conflitto se i caschi blu non fossero in grado di pattugliare e osservare questo
confine fragile?

2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante ha in programma di discutere eventuali piani di emergenza con il nuovo
Segretario di Stato e il Segretario generale dell'ONU ove la sicurezza sul confine Siria-Israele continuasse a
deteriorarsi?

3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari dell'UE nella regione sui gruppi, quali la Brigata dei Martiri di Yarmouk e
loro affiliati? Ci sono altri gruppi estremistici che rappresentano lo stesso pericolo per gli osservatori stranieri e le
forze di pace delle Nazioni Unite?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

L'UE segue costantemente la situazione nella zona di separazione e delimitazione ed è in contatto con i servizi
preposti delle Nazioni Unite (ONU) per quanto riguarda lo scambio di informazioni, sia sugli sviluppi e sulle relative
valutazioni che su proprie proposte di piani.

Nelle zone di separazione e delimitazione non sono in corso missioni dell'UE, né l'UE dispone di un mandato
operativo. È l'ONU l'organizzazione incaricata di questo compito. Qualsiasi eventuale iniziativa di pianificazione
comune d'emergenza fra le parti indicate nell'interrogazione deve essere presa su richiesta dell'ONU.

Per quanto riguarda la minaccia agli osservatori stranieri e ai caschi blu dell'ONU, il personale straniero è esposto al
rischio di rapimenti a causa dell'elevata instabilità della regione e dell'assenza di controllo statale. Attualmente i
combattimenti si stanno intensificando in particolare nella zona meridionale della Siria, per cui aumenta il rischio di
azioni collaterali.

C 6 E / 486 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

I Martiri della Brigata Yarmouk, un gruppo che opera nel settore meridionale delle alture del Golan, non risultano
essere affiliati ad una struttura più grande. È difficile etichettare i gruppi armati che si confrontano in Siria. Ciò a causa
di una combinazione di fattori: atteggiamento radicale dei gruppi armati, cooperazione tattica che coinvolge l'intero
spettro ideologico, retorica pseudo-islamica (al fine di attrarre fondi da reti islamiste). Anche i gruppi di opposizione
islamisti più radicali però, compreso il Fronte Al-Nusra, si sono astenuti dal prendere di mira o minacciare interessi o
funzionari occidentali in Siria. Si ritiene che i gruppi armati meglio organizzati (Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra, Liwa alTawhid) non costituiscano, per il momento, una minaccia per obiettivi stranieri, in quanto sono più disciplinati e
compiono operazioni ben organizzate, evitando di colpire obiettivi civili o di coinvolgerli in altro modo.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 487

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002877/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Threats to UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights

On 6 March 2013 the _New York Times_ reported that Syrian rebel fighters had captured 20 UN peacekeepers in the
Golan Heights, confronting them with a 24-hour deadline after which they would be treated as ‘prisoners of war’.

Two videos have been posted by a group called the Martyrs of the Yarmouk Brigade, which has taken responsibility
for the capture of the peacekeepers. The videos feature members of this group standing in front of captured UN
vehicles. The rebels refer to the UN thus: ‘They are agents of Israel, the Syrian regime and the United Nations and all
the European countries, and the Assad regime; they are all agents of Israel!’

A spokesman for the group has said: ‘We are holding the forces of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
until the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad’s forces from the village of al-Jamla and its outskirts to their positions. We ask
America, the United Nations and the Security Council that Assad’s forces withdraw to obtain their release. We won’t
release them until after the withdrawal of the forces of the regime of Bashar al-Assad from the outskirts of the village
of al-Jamla, which is on the border with Israel’.

This incident is the most serious threat to the safety of UN personnel in Syria since the uprising began two years ago,
and there are concerns regarding the stability of the Golan Heights which could pose a serious challenge for Israel and
even lead to an Israeli intervention.

1. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to monitor the situation in the Golan Heights,
given the potential for conflict overspill if UN peacekeepers are not able to patrol and observe this fragile border?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative planning to discuss contingency plans with the new US Secretary of
State and the UN Secretary-General if security on the Syria-Israel border continues to deteriorate?

3. What is the assessment of EU officials in the region regarding groups such as the Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade
and their affiliation? Are there any other extremist groups which pose the same danger to foreign observers and UN
peacekeepers?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 May 2013)_

The EU is constantly monitoring the situation in the area of separation and limitation. The EU is also liaising with
relevant United Nations (UN) services with regard to information sharing, both on developments and assessments of
future developments and own proposed plans.

The EU is not conducting any mission in the areas of separation and limitation nor does it have a mandate for this.
The UN is the organisation responsible for this task. Any possible initiation of joint contingency planning between
the parties indicated in the question would have to be initiated upon a request from the UN.

Concerning the threat to foreign observers and UN peacekeepers, foreign personnel are exposed to kidnapping risk
due to the high instability and lack of state control. At this moment, fighting is intensifying particularly in Southern
Syria so the risk for collateral action is rising.

Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade is a group that operates in the area of Southern Golan Heights, without a clear affiliation
to a larger structure. It is difficult to label armed groups in the Syrian confrontation due to a mix of factors: radical
posture of armed groups, tactical cooperation across entire ideological spectrum, false Islamist rhetoric (to attract
funds from Islamist networks). Nonetheless, even the radical Islamist opposition groups, including Al-Nusra Front,
have abstained to target or even threaten Western interests or officials in Syria. It is assessed that better organised
armed groups (Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra, Liwa al-Tawhid) do not represent, for the moment, a threat for foreign
targets because they are more disciplined and have well organised operations, which avoid targeting civilians or
involving them in other ways.

C 6 E / 488 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002878/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Commenti altamente offensivi di un'attivista egiziana per i diritti delle donne

L'8 marzo 2013 il Dipartimento di Stato americano avrebbe dovuto conferire il premio «International Women of
Courage» all'attivista per i diritti delle donne Samira Ibrahim. La decisione è stata tuttavia giustamente congelata dopo
che si è scoperto che la donna aveva scritto una serie di tweet offensivi in cui pare avesse esaltato, tra l'altro, l'attentato
dello scorso luglio a Burgas, in Bulgaria, in cui sono rimasti tragicamente uccisi dei civili, e avesse detto che i leader
dell'Arabia Saudita sono più sporchi degli ebrei. L'attivista ha addirittura inneggiato scandalosamente ad al-Qaeda in
occasione dell'anniversario dell'11 settembre, augurandosi che l'America possa bruciare tutti gli anni.

È stato riferito che Samira Ibrahim non avanzerà le proprie scuse per i tweet altamente offensivi e profondamente
inaccettabili, nonostante il Dipartimento di Stato americano avesse voluto assegnarle un premio per il coraggio
dimostrato nel denunciare gli abusi sessuali subiti in Piazza Tahrir nel 2011 quando, assieme ad altre attiviste, è stata
sottoposta a test di verginità.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante rispetto alla comprensibile decisione del
Dipartimento di Stato americano di non conferire il premio all'attivista Samira Ibrahim?

2. Quali misure sta adottando il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di garantire che gli attivisti che si
battono per i diritti umani e che godono del sostegno dell'Unione europea e beneficiano dei suoi programmi
aderiscano ai principi e ai valori universali ritenuti fondamentali dalla stessa?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

L'AR/VP prende atto della decisione del Dipartimento di Stato degli Stati Uniti di non assegnare il premio all'attivista
Samira Ibrahim.

Il sostegno dell'UE alla società civile costituisce una componente essenziale della politica europea di vicinato riveduta,
che si basa sulla responsabilità reciproca e sull'impegno condiviso a favore dei valori universali dei diritti dell'uomo,
delle libertà fondamentali, della democrazia e dello stato di diritto. Il sostegno finanziario alle ONG è generalmente
prestato tramite inviti a presentare proposte e durante il processo di selezione dei progetti finanziabili l'Unione
europea svolge una valutazione accurata ed esauriente delle proposte di progetto, che devono anche rispettare i
principi alla base dei diritti dell'uomo. Inoltre, se nel corso dell'attuazione del progetto le attività del beneficiario, il
suo comportamento manifesto e le sue dichiarazioni pubbliche contrastano con le norme internazionali in materia di
diritti umani e con i principi e i valori democratici dell'UE, il sostegno dell'UE può essere sospeso ed infine revocato.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 489

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002878/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Deeply offensive comments made by Egyptian women's rights activist

On 8 March 2013, the US State Department had planned to give the International Women of Courage award to
women’s rights activist Samira Ibrahim. However, the decision was rightly shelved after it was discovered that she had
written a series of offensive tweets, in which she allegedly praised, _inter alia_, the bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria last July
which tragically resulted in civilian deaths, and called the leaders of Saudi Arabia ‘dirtier than the Jews’. She even
outrageously praised al-Qaeda on the anniversary of 9/11 with the statement: ‘Today is the anniversary of 9/11. May
every year come with America burning’.

It has been reported that Ibrahim will not apologise for the highly offensive and deeply unacceptable tweets, even
though the State Department had wanted to give her an award for her bravery in speaking out against the sexual
abuse she had suffered in Tahrir Square in 2011. She, along with other women activists, was subjected to virginity

tests.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding the US State Department’s
understandable decision not to grant an award to activist Samira Ibrahim?

2. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to ensure that human rights activists who are
recipients of EU support and programmes adhere to the same universal principles and values which are fundamental
to the EU itself?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 May 2013)_

The HR/VP takes note of the US State Department’s decision not to grant an award to activist Samira Ibrahim.

EU's support to civil society is a key component of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, which is based on
mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, fundamental freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law. Financial Support to NGOs is generally channelled through call for proposals, and
during the selection process of potential EU funded projects, the EU engages in a careful and comprehensive
evaluation of project proposals that need to be also compliant with human rights principles. Furthermore, if during
project implementation the beneficiary's activities, his/her known behaviour and public statements go against
international standards for Human Rights and EU democratic principles and values, the EU support could be
suspended and ultimately stopped.

C 6 E / 490 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002879/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(12 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Armonizzazione delle normative sullo smaltimento dell'amianto e sugli indennizzi ai soggetti portatori di
gravi patologie asbesto-correlate

In considerazione dell'eccezionale potenzialità morbigena delle fibre di asbesto, più noto come amianto (o anche con
la denominazione commerciale di eternit), la Regione Lombardia ha stabilito, con la Legge Regionale del 31 luglio
2012, n. 14, diverse misure atte a favorire la bonifica dai materiali contenenti amianto in tutto il territorio regionale,
con particolare riguardo a coperture in lamiera per edifici.

Tali misure vanno ad aggiungersi ad un vasto corpo normativo di livello sia regionale sia nazionale, avente per
oggetto la graduale e tassativa eliminazione di tutti i manufatti contenenti amianto.

In tutti gli Stati membri dell'Unione sono ormai vietate o limitate a pochissimi impieghi in cui tale materiale risulta
insostituibile la produzione e la commercializzazione di manufatti contenenti amianto. Tuttavia, la normativa in
materia di smaltimento di detto materiale e quella in materia di indennizzi e trattamenti previdenziali per chi avesse
contratto gravi patologie a causa dell'esposizione a polvere di asbesto (pleuromi, asbestosi, tumori di vario genere)
risultano tuttora abbastanza disomogenee all'interno dell'UE.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. in che modo intende incoraggiare gli Stati membri ad uniformare le normative concernenti lo smaltimento in
sicurezza di materiali contenenti amianto nel territorio dell'UE;

2. in che modo intende favorire un'armonizzazione delle varie normative nazionali in materia di indennizzi e
trattamenti pensionistici diretti a soggetti che abbiano contratto, sul lavoro o per esposizione ambientale,
patologie asbesto-correlate?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

1. La Direttiva 87/217/CEE concernente la prevenzione e la riduzione dell’inquinamento dell’ambiente causato
dall’amianto ( [1] ) prevede misure per controllare le emissioni di amianto durante la demolizione, la decontaminazione e
lo smaltimento. In particolare, occorre garantire che nel corso del trasporto e del deposito di rifiuti contenenti
amianto, né fibre né polveri di questo materiale siano immesse nell’atmosfera e che non fuoriescano liquidi che
possano contenere fibre di amianto. Se i rifiuti contenenti amianto vengono collocati in discarica, devono essere
trattati, imballati o ricoperti, per evitare la dispersione nell’ambiente di particelle del materiale.

La direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti ( [2] ), che tratta anche i rifiuti contenenti amianto, impone agli Stati membri di
garantire che la gestione dei rifiuti sia effettuata senza danneggiare la salute umana. A tal fine, si applicano particolare
disposizioni alla produzione, alla raccolta e al trasporto dei rifiuti pericolosi, nonché al loro stoccaggio e trattamento.
I rifiuti pericolosi non possono essere mescolati ad altre categorie di rifiuti pericolosi o con altri rifiuti, sostanze o
materiali.

La direttiva 1999/31/CE relativa alle discariche di rifiuti ( [3] ) e la decisione 2003/33/CE del Consiglio che stabilisce
criteri e procedure per l’ammissione dei rifiuti nelle discariche ( [4] ) si applica anche ai rifiuti di amianto.

In questo momento, la Commissione ritiene che non sia necessaria un’ulteriore iniziativa legislativa per lo
smaltimento sicuro dei materiali contenenti amianto.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 85 del 28.3.1987, pag. 40.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) GU L 312 del 22.11.2008, pag. 3.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) GU L 182 del 16.7.1999, pag. 1.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) GU L 11 del 16.1.2003, pag. 27.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 491

2. Commissione rinvia l’onorevole parlamentare alle risposte fornite alle interrogazioni scritte E‐002575/2013,
E-009411/2012 ed E-004035/2012, anch’esse concernenti le questioni sollevate. Va segnalato inoltre che il 3 e
4 dicembre 2013 si terrà a Bruxelles una conferenza sulle malattie professionali.

C 6 E / 492 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002879/13**

**to the Commission**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Harmonisation of the laws on the disposal of asbestos and on compensation for individuals with severe
asbestos-related diseases

In view of the exceptional pathogenic risks associated with asbestos fibre (also known under the trading name of
‘Eternit’), the Region of Lombardy has laid down, in Regional Law No 14 of 31 July 2012, various measures to
encourage the cleaning up of materials containing asbestos throughout the region, with particular reference to sheet
roofing for buildings.

These measures are in addition to a huge body of legislation at both regional and national level, designed to bring
about the gradual and mandatory removal of all manufactured products containing asbestos.

In all EU Member States the production and marketing of manufactured products containing asbestos is now
prohibited or restricted to a very small number of cases in which there is no substitute for the material. However,
legislation on the disposal of asbestos and on compensation and social welfare payments for persons who have
contracted severe diseases as a result of exposure to asbestos dust (pleuroma, asbestosis, tumours of various types)
still varies considerably within the EU.

1. How will the Commission encourage Member States to standardise the law on safe disposal of materials
containing asbestos within EU territory?

2. How will it promote the harmonisation of the various national laws on compensation and direct benefit
payments to individuals who have contracted asbestos-related diseases at work or through environmental exposure?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2013)_

1. Directive 87/217/EEC on the prevention and reduction of environmental pollution by asbestos ( [1] ) provides for
measures to control asbestos emissions during demolition, decontamination and disposal operations. In particular, it
has to be ensured that during the transport and deposition of asbestos-containing waste, no asbestos fibres or dust are
released into the air and that no liquids which may contain asbestos fibres are spilled. Where asbestos-containing
waste is landfilled, it has to be treated, packaged or covered, so that the release of asbestos particles is prevented.

Directive 2008/98/EC ( [2] ) on waste, which covers asbestos waste, requires Member States to ensure that waste
management is carried out without endangering human health. To this end, particular provisions apply for the
production, collection and transportation of hazardous waste, as well as its storage and treatment. Hazardous waste
shall not be mixed, either with other categories of hazardous waste or with other waste, substances or materials.

Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste ( [3] ) and Council Decision 2003/33/EC establishing criteria and
procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfills ( [4] ) also apply to asbestos waste.

The Commission considers that no further legislative initiative is required at this time regarding safe disposal of
materials containing asbestos.

2. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to written questions E-002575/2013,
E-009411/2012 and E-004035/2012, which also address the issues raised. It should also be highlighted that a
conference on occupational diseases will be held on the 3rd and 4th of December 2013 in Brussels.

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 85, 28.3.1987, p. 40.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 27.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 493

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002880/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)**

_(12 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Preferentes de Bankia

A finales de este mes se cumple el plazo para cerrar la operación de las preferentes de Bankia. Miles de pequeños
inversores confiaron su dinero, sus ahorros, a lo que creían que era un fondo de inversión sin riesgo, a un producto
financiero de gran complejidad que les ha provocado. La solución que se les ofrece es que acepten una quita de
entorno a un 30 % y que canjeen el resto por acciones de la entidad. Cabe recordar que, al día de hoy, el precio de una
acción de Bankia es de 0, 26 € y que probablemente va a descender.

Para participar en esta operación, que parece ser que será arbitrada por un organismo imparcial, se pide a los
ahorradores que firmen un compromiso de que no acudirán a los tribunales. Si no aceptan esta operación, entran en
un futuro y una situación de total incertidumbre y tendrían que optar por una demanda judicial individual para
intentar que se anule la compra y poder recuperar la totalidad de la cantidad invertida por vía judicial.

De este oscuro proceso la única información disponible es la que se publica en prensa. El Gobierno español echa la
culpa a «Bruselas» de todo lo que es negativo para los ciudadanos, contribuyendo así a la pérdida de credibilidad de las
instituciones.

— ¿Qué papel está desempeñando la Comisión en relación con el establecimiento del proceso de liquidación de las
preferentes?

— ¿Qué garantías ha previsto la Comisión para los inversores a fin de que reciban la mejor compensación posible?

— ¿Qué considera la Comisión que deben hacer los inversores que fueron engañados sin paliativos al habérseles
vendido un producto supuestamente sin riesgo? ¿Pondrá trabas la Comisión o aceptará las trabas del Gobierno
español para que intenten recuperar la totalidad de su dinero por la vía judicial?

— ¿Qué medidas está adoptando la Comisión para que los afectados sean informados del proceso que se seguirá y las
garantías que tendrán?

— ¿Está supervisando la Comisión las actuaciones que los bancos rescatados con dinero público llevan a cabo,
concretamente en lo que se refiere a los ciudadanos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(22 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión está haciendo un seguimiento del programa de reestructuración del sector financiero español, de
acuerdo con el Memorando de Entendimiento entre el Gobierno español y el Eurogrupo de julio de 2012.

El Memorando de Entendimiento establece las condiciones de recapitalización pública de los bancos españoles a fin
de garantizar que cumplen las normas en materia de competencia y ayudas estatales de la UE. La participación de los
accionistas y los acreedores subordinados en la reestructuración (conocida como el «reparto de cargas») de los bancos
beneficiarios de ayudas estatales es una característica clave del Memorando de Entendimiento. Además, el principio
del «reparto de cargas» exige que dichos tenedores de títulos hagan frente a las pérdidas que hayan sufrido los bancos
en dificultades antes de que lo hagan los contribuyentes.

Las acciones ordinarias, los instrumentos híbridos (tales como las participaciones preferentes) y la deuda subordinada
tienen una cierta capacidad de absorción de pérdidas. El método para determinar cómo se reparte esta carga se recoge
en las decisiones de la Comisión por las que se aprueba el plan de reestructuración para cada uno de los bancos
implicados.

Para obtener más información sobre el tratamiento de las acciones ordinarias y las participaciones preferentes
emitidas por BFA/Bankia, puede consultarse el comunicado de prensa del FROB de 22 de marzo de 2012
(www.FROB.es), que proporciona información bastante detallada sobre muchas de las cuestiones que plantea Su
Señoría en su carta.

C 6 E / 494 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

La Comisión es muy consciente de la supuesta práctica de algunos bancos consistente en vender de manera abusiva
determinados tipos de valores que están ahora sometidos al reparto de cargas. Sin embargo, considera que este es un
asunto que han de abordar las autoridades nacionales competentes caso por caso. El papel de la Comisión se limita a
elaborar una legislación de la UE que las autoridades nacionales son responsables de hacer cumplir en sus respectivos
países.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 495

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002880/13**

**to the Commission**
**Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Bankia preferred shares

The deadline to cease operating Bankia preferred shares falls at the end of this month. Thousands of small investors
entrusted their money, their savings, to what they believed was a risk-free investment fund, which in fact was a highly
complex financial product which has proved vexatious. The solution offered to investors was to accept a write-down
of approximately 30% and to swap the remainder for shares in the bank. It should be noted that, currently, a Bankia
share is worth EUR 0.26, and that figure is likely to fall.

In order to participate in this operation, which apparently will be arbitrated by an impartial body, savers have been
requested to sign an agreement that they will not go to court. If they do not accept this operation, their future will be
one of total uncertainty and they will have to resort to individual lawsuits to try and annul purchases and recover the
total amount invested through legal proceedings.

The only information available about this opaque process is that which can be read in the press. The Spanish
Government blames ‘Brussels’ for everything that adversely affects its nationals, thus contributing to the institutions’
loss of credibility.

— What role is the Commission playing in establishing the procedure for winding up the preferred shares?

— What guarantees has the Commission put in place to ensure that investors receive the best possible compensation?

— What does the Commission think that investors, who were clearly cheated and mis-sold a supposedly risk-free
product, should do? Will it set obstacles, or accept the Spanish Government’s obstacles, to those attempting to
recover all their money through legal proceedings?

— What measures is it taking so that those concerned are informed about the procedure to be followed and the
guarantees they will have?

— Is it supervising the actions being taken by the banks that have been bailed out with public money, in particular
those regarding the public?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

The Commission now monitors the programme to restructure the Spanish financial sector, as outlined in the
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Spanish Government and the Eurogroup in July 2012.

The MoU sets out conditions for public recapitalisation of Spanish banks to ensure that they satisfy EU competition
and state aid rules. The participation of equity holders and junior creditors in restructuring efforts (known as ‘burden
sharing’) of the banks in receipt of state aid is a key feature of the MoU. Moreover, the principle of burden sharing
requires that these securities holders should bear losses incurred by troubled banks before the taxpayer does.

Ordinary shares, hybrid instruments (such as preference shares) and subordinated debt all have, to some degree, a
capacity for loss absorption. The method for determining how this burden is shared is outlined in Commission
decisions approving the restructuring plan for each of the banks involved.

Further information on the treatment of ordinary and preference shares issued by BFA/Bankia can be found in the
press release of the FROB of 22 March 2012 (www.FROB.es), which provides fairly detailed information on many of
the issues raised in your letter.

The Commission is well aware of the alleged practice by some banks of misselling certain types of security that are
now subject to burden sharing. The Commission considers that this is, however, a matter for the national relevant
authorities to address on a case-by-case basis. The Commission's role is limited to enacting EU-wide legislation that
national authorities are responsible for enforcing in their respective countries.

C 6 E / 496 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002881/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Michael Theurer (ALDE)**

_(12. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Verschwendung von EU-Fördermitteln

Laut Presseberichten ( [1] ) bekam die Stadt Cottbus am 7.12.2010 einen Zuwendungsbescheid über rund 5 Mio. EUR
von Brandenburgs Umwelt‐ und Gesundheitsministerium, um die Bahnhofsstraße der Stadt Cottbus von einer
4-spurigen zu einer 2-spurigen Straße rückzubauen. Die Mittel stammen aus dem Europäischen Fonds für regionale
Entwicklung (EFRE).

Damit sollte, laut Europäischer Union, eine Senkung der Feinstaubwerte unter den Grenzwert (ab 2011), sowie eine
Senkung der Stickstoffdioxidbelastung auf den Grenzwert (ab 2015) erreicht werden.

Laut Umweltbundesamt ( [2] ) sind die Grenzwerte für Feinstaub (PM 10 ), die 50 µg/m [3] betragen, bis zum 8. März 2013 in
nur 3 Monaten auf der Bahnhofsstraße bereits 14 Mal überschritten worden.

1. Welche Grundlagen nahm man zum Anlass, die EFRE-Mittel für das oben genannte Projekt freizugeben?

2. Was passiert, wie im obigen Beispiel, mit den ausgezahlten EFRE-Mitteln bei einem nicht-Erreichen der
geplanten Ziele?

3. Gibt es Evaluierungen seitens der Kommission in Bezug auf eine erfolgreiche bzw. gescheiterte Umsetzung von
mit EU-Mitteln geförderten Projekten?

4. Welche Konsequenzen zieht die Kommission aus Fehlinvestitionen in Projekte wie die des Umbaus der
Bahnhofsstraße in Cottbus?

**Antwort von Herrn Hahn im Namen der Kommission**

_(13. Mai 2013)_

1. Die umweltverträgliche Sanierung der Bahnhofstraße in Cottbus wurde nach der Richtlinie „Umweltschutz“ des
Ministeriums für Umwelt, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz von Brandenburg mit Mitteln aus dem EFRE gefördert.
Der Luftreinhalteplan muss die Richtlinie 2008/50/EG berücksichtigen. Die Maßnahme wurde primär konzipiert, um
die Einhaltung der EU-Grenzwerte der Luftqualität gemäß der Richtlinie 2008/50/EG für Feinstaub PM 10 und
Stickstoffdioxid (NO 2 ) zu erreichen. Die Baumaßnahme wurde in nur zwei Jahren realisiert. Die Freigabe für den
Verkehr erfolgte am 4.12.2012.

2. Die Festlegung von Grenzwerten, die Beurteilung der Luftqualität und der Nachweis der Wirkung von
Maßnahmen und Programmen erfolgt gemäß Richtlinie 2008/50/EG immer bezogen auf ein Kalenderjahr. Die
Konzentration von Feinstaub PM 10 ist abhängig von meteorologischen Bedingungen. Diesem Umstand hat der
Richtliniengeber Rechnung getragen, indem er für eine Überschreitung des Tagesgrenzwertes für PM 10 eine
Überschreitung an bis zu 35 Tagen im Kalenderjahr als zulässig erklärt hat. In den Heizungsmonaten im Winter gibt
es immer mehr Tage, in denen die Grenzwerte überschritten werden. Diese Grenzwertüberschreitungen im Winter
dürfen aber nicht auf das ganze Jahr hochgerechnet werden.

3. Evaluierungen der EFRE-Programme werden sowohl durch die Mitgliedstaaten als auch durch die Kommission
durchgeführt. Die Kommission ist im wesentlichen für die ex post Bewertung der Programme zuständig, diese werden
veröffentlicht. Evaluierungen zum EFRE sind unter der folgenden Webadresse verfügbar:

[http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm)

4. Die Kommission stuft dieses Projekt gegenwärtig nicht als Fehlinvestition ein.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.mugv.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/lbm1.c.380831.de und

http://www.lr-online.de/regionen/Geld-fuer-Ausbau-der-Bahnhofstrasse;art96090,3135511

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.env-it.de/umweltbundesamt/luftdaten/trsyear.fwd?comp=PM1

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 497

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002881/13**

**to the Commission**
**Michael Theurer (ALDE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Waste of EU funding

According to press reports ( [1] ), the city of Cottbus received a grant approval on 7 December 2010 of around
EUR 5 million from the Ministry for the Environment and Health of the State of Brandenburg to restore Cottbus’
Bahnhofsstraße from a four-lane highway to its original two-lane layout. The funds came from the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF).

According to the European Union, this would result in a reduction in particulate matter values to below the limit
value (from 2011), and a reduction in nitrogen dioxide levels to the limit value (from 2015).

According to the German Environmental Protection Agency ( [2] ), up to 8 March 2013, the limit values for particulate
matter (PM 10 ) measuring 50 µg/m [3] had already been exceeded 14 times on Bahnhofsstraße in just 3 months.

1. What information was used as the basis for the decision to approve the ERDF funds for this project?

2. What happens to the ERDF funds paid out if the planned targets are not achieved, as in this case?

3. Does the Commission carry out assessments in relation to the successful or unsuccessful implementation of
projects supported with EU funds?

4. What conclusions does the Commission draw from the failure of investments in projects like the redevelopment
of Bahnhofsstraße in Cottbus?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

1. The environmentally sustainable alterations to the Bahnhofstraße in Cottbus were subsidised in accordance
with the ‘Environmental Protection’ Directive of the Brandenburg Ministry of the Environment, Health and Consumer
Protection using ERDF resources. The air quality plan must take account of Directive 2008/50/EC. The project was
designed first and foremost to achieve compliance with the EU air-quality limit values for particulate matter (PM10)
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). The work was completed in only two years, and the road was reopened for traffic on
4 December 2012.

2. Limit values are fixed, air quality assessed and the impact of measures and programmes demonstrated in
accordance with Directive 2008/50/EC, always with reference to a calendar year. The concentration of particulate
matter (PM10) depends on meteorological conditions. This was taken into account when the directive was drafted, by
allowing the daily limit value for PM10 to be exceeded on up to 35 days per calendar year. During the winter months
when heating systems are in use, there are always more days when the limit values are exceeded. However, the
number of days when limit values are exceeded in winter should not be extrapolated to the entire year.

3. Assessments of ERDF programmes are undertaken both by the Member States and by the Commission. The
Commission is mainly responsible for _ex-post_ evaluations of programmes, which are published. ERDF evaluations are
[available at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm)

4. As things stand, the Commission does not regard this project as an investment failure.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.mugv.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/lbm1.c.380831.de and

http://www.lr-online.de/regionen/Geld-fuer-Ausbau-der-Bahnhofstrasse;art96090,3135511

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.env-it.de/umweltbundesamt/luftdaten/trsyear.fwd?comp=PM1

( **|**

C 6 E / 498 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002882/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αναδιάρθρωση φορολογικών υπηρεσιών στην Ελλάδα και ευρωπαϊκές βέλτιστες πρακτικές

Σε απάντησή της η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή (E-011435/2012) σε ερώτησή μου για τις αρνητικές συνέπειες που θα έχει η
κατάργηση των εφοριών (ΔΟΥ) στα ελληνικά νησιά, αναφέρεται σε μια σειρά από συγκεκριμένα μέτρα εκσυγχρονισμού των
φορολογικών υπηρεσιών, καθώς επίσης και συγκεκριμένων βέλτιστων πρακτικών που θα μπορούσαν να ενισχύσουν την
αποτελεσματικότητα του φορολογικού μηχανισμού στην Ελλάδα.

Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η απάντησή σας γνωστοποιεί ότι «Έχει ήδη δρομολογηθεί μεγάλη επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών
καθώς και η δημιουργία τοπικών σημείων επαφής για την παροχή συνδρομής στους φορολογούμενους (κυρίως για τη
συμπλήρωση της δήλωσης)» και αναφερόμενη γενικότερα στο πρόβλημα της φοροδιαφυγής, κάνει λόγο για «ευρωπαϊκές
βέλτιστες πρακτικές» που θα προωθήσουν ένα «βελτιωμένο δίκτυο τοπικών εφοριών, με ηλεκτρονικές υπηρεσίες και
τηλεφωνικά κέντρα» και ένα «σύστημα αξιολόγησης κινδύνου ώστε να έχουν τη δυνατότητα οι ειδικευμένες ομάδες ελέγχου
και είσπραξης να αναζητούν τους φορολογούμενους που δεν είναι συνεπείς προς τις υποχρεώσεις τους».

Κατόπιν των παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πότε θα δρομολογηθεί η «επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών» και η δημιουργία «τοπικών σημείων επαφής»;

2. Ποιο είναι το ακριβές χρονοδιάγραμμα για την υλοποίηση των παραπάνω δράσεων; Υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένοι πόροι,
εθνικοί ή κοινοτικοί, που θα χρηματοδοτήσουν την υλοποίησή τους; Εάν ναι, ποιοι είναι αυτοί;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση είναι υπεύθυνη για τη φορολογική διοίκηση.

Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία που έχει στη διάθεσή της η Επιτροπή, η επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών στη φορολογική
διοίκηση συνιστά μία συνεχή διαδικασία, η οποία θα ολοκληρωθεί σταδιακά μέσα στο 2013. Η επιτυχία της εξαρτάται από
την εγκατάσταση νέας υποδομής ΤΠ για τη φορολογική διοίκηση, της TAXIS-online, που αναμένεται να ολοκληρωθεί σε
όλες τις Δ.Ο.Υ. έως το τέλος του Σεπτεμβρίου 2013. Τοπικά σημεία επαφής για τη φορολογική διοίκηση («Κέντρα
Εξυπηρέτησης Φορολογικών Υπηρεσιών» ή ΚΕΦΥ) έχουν ήδη δημιουργηθεί. Το ελληνικό Υπουργείο Οικονομικών τον
Οκτώβριο του 2012 ανέφερε την ύπαρξη 99 τέτοιων κέντρων.

Η διαδικασία αναβάθμισης των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών για τον φορολογούμενο υποστηρίζεται από πόρους της ΕΕ μέσω
του επιχειρησιακού προγράμματος «Ψηφιακή Σύγκλιση». Όσον αφορά περαιτέρω λεπτομερή στοιχεία σχετικά με το
χρονοδιάγραμμα και εθνικούς πόρους, το ελληνικό Υπουργείο Οικονομικών είναι αρμοδιότερο για τυχόν ερωτήσεις.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 499

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002882/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Restructuring of tax services in Greece and European best practices

In its answer (E-011435/2012) to my question about the negative impact of closing tax offices on Greek islands, the
Commission referred to a series of specific measures to modernise tax services and specific best practices that could
improve the efficacy of the tax system in Greece.

In fact, in that answer, the Commission advised me that plans had already been made to expand _e‐services_ across the
country and to establish local contact points to provide assistance to taxpayers (mainly with their tax returns). It also
referred generally to the problem of tax evasion and mentioned European best practices that would promote an
improved network of local tax offices, with _e‐services_ and call centres and a risk assessment system to enable specialist
audit and collection teams to identify taxpayers not paying their taxes on time.

1. When will the expansion of _e_ -services and the establishment of local contact points be implemented?

2. What is the precise timetable for implementing these actions? Have either national or EU resources been ringfenced for these actions? If so, what resources?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2013)_

The Greek Government is responsible for revenue administration.

According to the information available to the Commission, the expansion of e-services in the tax administration is an
ongoing process, gradually continuing to be implemented in the course of 2013. It's success is contingent on the
deployment of the new IT infrastructure for the tax administration, TAXIS-online, now expected to be finalised for all
tax offices by the end of September 2013. Local contact points for the tax administration (‘Tax Service Centers’ or
KEFs) have already been created. The Greek Ministry of Finance in October 2012 indicated the existence of 99 such

centers.

The process of upgrading of electronic services for the taxpayer is supported by EU resources through the operational
programme for digital convergence. Regarding further details on timetable and national resources, the Greek Ministry
of Finance is in a better position to provide answers.

C 6 E / 500 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002883/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(12 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Καθυστερήσεις για την κύρωση της διεθνούς συμφωνίας για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη του πάρκου
Πρεσπών

Στις 2 Φεβρουαρίου του 2010, η Ελλάδα, η Αλβανία, η πΓΔΜ, οι 3 χώρες που μοιράζονται τις Πρέσπες, αλλά και η
Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή υπέγραψαν τη διεθνή συμφωνία για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη του πάρκου Πρεσπών ( [1] ).
Η συμφωνία καλεί τις 3 χώρες να εφαρμόσουν κοινά σχέδια και προγράμματα για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη
της περιοχής με γνώμονα την προστασία της βιοποικιλότητας. Η ΕΕ (Συμβούλιο και Κοινοβούλιο) ενέκρινε τη συμμετοχή της
στη συμφωνία στις 4.10.2011 ( [2] ). Η Αλβανία δε χρειάζεται επικύρωση καθώς δεσμεύεται με υπογραφή Υπουργού, ενώ στις
23.7.2012 το Κοινοβούλιο της πΓΔΜ ενέκρινε, χωρίς καμία αρνητική ψήφο, το νομοσχέδιο κύρωσης της διεθνούς
συμφωνίας ( [3] ). Οι ΜΚΟ και τοπικοί φορείς από τις 3 χώρες είναι έτοιμοι να εργαστούν και να στηρίξουν την υλοποίηση των
συμφωνηθέντων ( [4] ). Παρά ταύτα, σήμερα, 37 μήνες μετά την υπογραφή της, η συμφωνία παραμένει ανενεργή εξαιτίας του
γεγονότος ότι η Ελλάδα δεν την έχει ακόμα επικυρώσει, αν και η υπογραφή της συμφωνίας είχε αποτελέσει πρωτοβουλία της
τότε ελληνικής κυβέρνησης ( [5] ).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Έχει ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με την αιτία αυτής της πολύ μεγάλης καθυστέρησης για την κύρωση μιας
διεθνούς συμφωνίας που είναι απαραίτητη για την αποτελεσματική προστασία ενός τόσο σημαντικού οικοτόπου;

Σε τι ενέργειες προτίθεται να προβεί προκειμένου να επικυρωθεί η συγκεκριμένη συμφωνία που η ίδια η ΕΕ έχει κυρώσει
δεδομένου ότι οι διακρατικές συμφωνίες σχετικά με τις διεθνείς λεκάνες απορροής της Ελλάδας με τρίτες χώρες αποτελεί
προτεραιότητα για την Επιτροπή, σύμφωνα με την απόφαση του Συμβουλίου της 27ης Ιουνίου 2006 ( [6] );

**Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(8 Μαΐου 2013)_

Η Ελλάδα δεν ενημέρωσε την Επιτροπή για τους λόγους για τους οποίους καθυστέρησε να κυρώσει τη «Συμφωνία
προστασίας και αειφόρου ανάπτυξης της περιοχής του πάρκου Πρεσπών».

Ωστόσο, δεδομένου ότι η εν λόγω συμφωνία έχει κυρωθεί από την ΕΕ, η Ελλάδα δεσμεύεται ήδη από αυτήν λόγω της
συμμετοχής της ΕΕ, όσον αφορά τα θέματα που εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα της ΕΕ.

Η οδηγία-πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (ΟΠΥ) ( [7] ) προβλέπει ότι για τις διεθνείς περιοχές λεκανών απορροής ποταμών που εκτείνονται
πέρα από τα όρια της ΕΕ — όπως η λεκάνη απορροής ποταμών των Πρεσπών — τα κράτη μέλη προσπαθούν να παράγουν
ενιαία σχέδια διαχείρισης λεκανών απορροής ποταμών (ΣΔΛΑΠ) και, όταν αυτό δεν είναι δυνατόν, ένα σχέδιο το οποίο
καλύπτει τα μέρη των διεθνών περιοχών λεκανών απορροής ποταμών που περιλαμβάνονται στο έδαφός τους, κατά προτίμηση
σε συντονισμό με τα κράτη μέλη που μοιράζονται την περιοχή της λεκάνης απορροής ποταμού.

Η Ελλάδα δεν δημοσίευσε το ΣΔΛΑΠ για τις δικές της 14 περιοχές λεκανών απορροής ποταμών έως τις 22 Δεκεμβρίου
2009, όπως απαιτείται από την οδηγία-πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (ΟΠΥ). Η Επιτροπή κίνησε διαδικασία επί παραβάσει κατά της
Ελλάδας (υπόθεση C 297/11) και το Δικαστήριο της ΕΕ καταδίκασε την Ελλάδα στις 19 Απριλίου 2012. Μετά την έκδοση
της απόφασης, οι ελληνικές αρχές ενημέρωσαν την Επιτροπή ότι όλα τα ΣΔΛΑΠ θα πρέπει να εγκριθούν έως το τέλος
του 2013.

Τον Απρίλιο του 2013, η Επιτροπή ενημερώθηκε επίσημα για την έγκριση 5 σχεδίων διαχείρισης λεκανών απορροής ποταμών
(ΣΔΛΑΠ), αλλά η Ελλάδα δεν έχει ακόμη υποβάλει έκθεση σχετικά με το ΣΔΛΑΠ της Δυτικής Μακεδονίας (GR09), όπου
περιλαμβάνεται το ελληνικό έδαφος της διασυνοριακής λεκάνης των Πρεσπών.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=9102
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=14802
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.spp.gr/spp/epikirosi%20symfonias_fyrom_23.7.12.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.spp.gr/spp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=6%3A2010-03-04-13-52-03&id=127%3A1-2013-2000-2013
&lang=el

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Κοινή δήλωση Γιώργου Παπανδρέου, Σαλί Μπερίσα και Νίκολα Γκρουέφσκι 27.11.2009

http://www.spp.gr/spp/prime%20ministers%20joint%20communique_pyli%202009_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Council Decision of 26 June 2006 «on the participation of the EC in negotiations aiming at the conclusion of international river basin agreements

to improve cooperation in European river basins shared between certain Member States and Third Countries», σελ. 26
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/90281.pdf

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2000/60/ΕΚ, ΕΕ L 327 της 22.12.2000.

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( **|**

( **|**

⋅7∙ **|** )

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 501

Η Επιτροπή θα συνεχίσει να ενθαρρύνει την Ελλάδα να κυρώσει τη συμφωνία των Πρεσπών και, μόλις υποβληθεί η έκθεση
σχετικά με το ΣΔΛΑΠ για τη Δυτική Μακεδονία, θα εξετάσει εάν έχουν τηρηθεί οι απαιτήσεις της ΟΠΥ, επίσης και όσον
αφορά διεθνείς λεκάνες απορροής ποταμών.

C 6 E / 502 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002883/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Delays in ratification of the International Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the
Prespa Park area

On 2 February 2010, Greece, Albania and the FYROM, the three countries bordering Prespa, and the European
Commission signed an International Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Prespa Park
area ( [1] ). This agreement calls on these three countries to apply joint plans and programmes for the protection and
sustainable development of the area, predicated on protecting biodiversity. The EU (Council and Parliament)
approved its participation in this agreement on 4 October 2011 ( [2] ). Albania has no need to ratify it, as it is bound by
the minister’s signature and the FYROM Parliament unanimously passed a bill ratifying the international agreement
on 23 July 2012 ( [3] ). NGOs and local bodies from all three countries are ready to work and support the
implementation of the agreed terms ( [4] ). However, today, 37 months after it was signed, the agreement has not been
activated because Greece has still not ratified it, even though the signing of this agreement was an initiative of the
Greek Government at the time ( [5] ).

Have the Greek authorities informed the Commission of the reason for this massive delay in ratifying an international
agreement needed for the effective protection of such an important habitat?

What action does the Commission intend to take to obtain ratification of this agreement, which has been ratified by
the EU, given that transnational agreements on international river basins between Greece and third countries are a
Commission priority under the Council Decision of 27 June 2006 ( [6] )?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Greece has not informed the Commission of the reasons for its delay in ratifying the ‘Agreement on the Protection
and Sustainable Development of the Prespa Park Area’.

However, since the Agreement in question has been ratified by the EU, Greece is already bound by it through the EU
participation, in relation to matters within EU competence.

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) ( [7] ) requires that for international river basin districts extending beyond the EU
boundaries — such as the Prespa river basin — Member States endeavour to produce a single River Basin
Management Plans (RBMPs) and, where this is not possible, a plan that covers the parts of the international river basin
district within their territory, preferably in coordination with the states that share the river basin district.

Greece did not publish the RBMP for its 14 river basin districts by 22 December 2009 as required by the WFD. The
Commission opened an infringement procedure against Greece (Case C‐297/11) and the EU Court of Justice
condemned Greece on 19 April 2012. Following the judgment, the Greek authorities informed the Commission that
all RBMP should be adopted by the end of 2013.

In April 2013 the Commission has been officially informed of the adoption of 5 RBMPs, but Greece has not yet
reported on the RBMP of Western Macedonia (GR09) which includes the Greek territory of the transboundary Prespa
basin.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=9102
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=14802
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.spp.gr/spp/epikirosi%20symfonias_fyrom_23.7.12.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.spp.gr/spp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=6%3A2010-03-04-13-52-03&id=127%3A1-2013-2000-2013
&lang=en

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Joint statement by George Papandreou, Sali Berisha and Nikola Gruevski of 27 November 2009.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Council Decision of 26 June 2006 on the participation of the EC in negotiations aiming at the conclusion of international river basin agreements

to improve cooperation in European river basins shared between certain Member States and Third Countries, p. 26,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/90281.pdf

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

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( **|**

( **|**

⋅7∙ **|** )

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 503

The Commission will continue to encourage Greece to ratify the Prespa Agreement and, once the RBMP for western
Macedonia is reported, will analyse whether the requirements of the WFD have been respected including with regard
to international river basins.

C 6 E / 504 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002884/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nessa Childers (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Sugary drinks

Losing weight is much harder than gaining it, so prevention really is better than cure. Prevention starts with a healthy
diet and regular exercise.

In addition, modern lifestyles — both at work and at play — are becoming more sedentary, while our diets have
become richer to match our rising prosperity. Public health initiatives are being launched across Europe to get people,
especially children, eating healthily and taking up active pursuits.

1. Are the Member States open to placing limits on soda drink bottle, can and container sizes in their domestic
markets?

2. Will the Commission consider such limits at EU level?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

Since 2007, the Commission has promoted EU action to enhance physical activity levels and promote healthier diets
as set out in the strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related Health issues ( [1] ) — including
through partnerships with Member States and EU Stakeholders.

The strategy is implemented through the High Level Group for Nutrition and Physical Activity ( [2] ) and the EU Platform
for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health ( [3] ). In the High Level Group, the Commission works closely with
Member States on issues such as food reformulation. In the EU Platform, the Commission encourages EU
stakeholders to commit to concrete actions on diet and physical activity; industry partners are for example
encouraged to engage in the reformulation of food and non-alcoholic beverages and in reducing portion size.

It is essential that actions on diet and health continue to be developed and carried out by Member States at regional
and local levels. The Commission is not aware of Member States' plans to place limits on the size of soda drink bottles,
cans or containers. The Commission does not foresee the introduction of EU limits on sugary drinks.

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( **|**

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2007) 279.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 505

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002885/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Romana Jordan (PPE) und Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)**

_(12. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Zeitplan und sonstige Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf die neue CO 2 -Emissionsliste

Die Kommission beabsichtigt offensichtlich, die Erarbeitung der Liste von Bereichen in der Europäischen Union, bei
denen ein erhebliches Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO 2 -Emissionen angenommen wird, gemäß Artikel 10a,
Absatz 13 der Richtlinie über den Emissionshandel (EHS) ( [1] ) voranzubringen. Dieser Artikel bestimmt: „Bis zum
31. Dezember 2009 und danach alle fünf Jahre legt die Kommission […] ein Verzeichnis der Sektoren bzw.
Teilsektoren gemäß Absatz 12 […] fest“ („Anlagen in Sektoren bzw. Teilsektoren, in denen ein erhebliches Risiko der
Verlagerung von CO 2 -Emissionen besteht“). Das neue Verzeichnis sollte daher bis Ende 2014 erstellt sein.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

1. Welchen Zeitplan hat die Kommission für den Abschluss der Überarbeitung desVerzeichnisses der
CO 2 -Emissiossionsliste im Auge?

2. Auf welche Methode wird die Kommission bei dieser neuen Bewertung zurückgreifen?

3. Auf welche Art und Weise werden die Interessenträger und insbesondere die in der Liste aufgeführte Industrie
bei der erneuten Überprüfung konsultiert und eingebunden?

4. Auf welche Datenquellen wird die Kommission zurückgreifen und wie wird die Frage gelöst, ob die Daten auch
zutreffen?

5. Wird die Kommission bei der Erstellung der CO 2 -Emissionsliste auch eine zeitliche Verlagerung des EHS und
seiner Auswirkungen auf den CO 2 -Markt berücksichtigen? Falls dies der Fall ist: Wie wird der Preis für
CO 2 -Emissionen bestimmt?

**Antwort von Frau Hedegaard im Namen der Kommission**

_(3. Mai 2013)_

Gemäß der EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie hat die Kommission den Auftrag, für den Zeitraum 2015-2019 ein neues
Verzeichnis hinsichtlich der Verlagerung von CO 2 -Emissionen zu erstellen, und zwar auf Grundlage der in dieser
Richtlinie festgelegten Kriterien. Das Ziel dieser Aktualisierung ist es, zu gewährleisten, dass die EU über eine
Regelung für die Verlagerung von CO 2 -Emissionen verfügt, die sich eng an der tatsächlichen Situation in den
betreffenden Sektoren ausrichtet. Die Kriterien für die Festlegung des Verzeichnisses hinsichtlich der Verlagerung von
CO 2 -Emissionen bleiben gegenüber der bestehenden Liste unverändert, allerdings könnten einige Parameter
angepasst werden, um die jüngsten Daten und die vorbereitenden Arbeiten für diese Bewertung, die noch nicht
abgeschlossen sind, zu berücksichtigen.

Der neue Beschluss mit einem Verzeichnis der Sektoren, von denen angenommen wird, dass sie einem erheblichen
Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO 2 -Emissionen ausgesetzt sind, wird rechtzeitig für die Zuteilung 2015 in Kraft sein;
daher ist seine offizielle Annahme bis Mitte 2014 vorgesehen, wobei das Ausschussverfahren lange vor diesem
Zeitpunkt eingeleitet werden wird.

Die Interessenvertreter werden im Wege von Online-Konsultationen und Tagungen befragt. Für die Zwecke dieser
Aufgabe wird die Kommission auf amtliche Daten von Eurostat und den Mitgliedstaaten zurückgreifen. Bei Zweifeln
an der Zuverlässigkeit der Daten wird mit den betreffenden Sektoren Kontakt aufgenommen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Siehe die Richtlinie 2009/29/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 23. April 2009 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG

zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des Gemeinschaftssystems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten, ABl. L 140
vom 5.6.2009.

C 6 E / 506 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002885/13**

**za Komisijo**
**Romana Jordan (PPE) in Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)**

_(12. marec 2013)_

_Zadeva:_ Časovno načrtovanje in druge določbe, povezane z novim seznamom ogljikovih emisij

Vtis je, da namerava Komisija nadaljevati pripravo seznama sektorjev v Evropski uniji, v katerih je znatno tveganje
selitev ogljikovih emisij, kakor zahteva člen 10a(13) direktive o sistemu trgovanja z emisijami ( [1] ). V skladu s tem
členom „Komisija do 31. decembra 2009 in vsakih 5 let po tem datumu /…/ določi seznam sektorjev ali delov
sektorjev iz odstavka 12“ (naprave v sektorjih ali delih sektorjev, ki so izpostavljeni visokemu tveganju premestitve
emisij СО 2 ). Novi seznam bi moral biti torej oblikovan do konca leta 2014.

1. Za kdaj je predviden dokončni pregled tega seznama?

2. Katero metodologijo bo Komisija uporabila za to ponovno oceno?

3. Kako se bo posvetovala z zainteresiranimi stranmi, predvsem s sektorji s seznama, in jih vključila v proces
ponovne ocene?

4. Katere vire podatkov bo uporabila in kako bo rešila pomisleke glede točnosti podatkov?

5. Ali bo pri sestavljanju seznama preučila učinke zamika dražbe v okviru sistema trgovanja z emisijami in njegove
vplive na trg ogljika? In kako se bo v tem primeru določala ceno ogljika?

**Odgovor Connie Hedegaard v imenu Komisije**

_(3. maj 2013)_

V skladu z direktivo o ETS je Komisija pooblaščena, da na podlagi meril, določenih v navedeni direktivi, določi nov
seznam selitev emisij СО 2 za obdobje 2015–2019. S to posodobitvijo naj bi se zagotovilo, da ima EU takšen režim
selitev emisij СО 2, ki dejansko odraža položaj v zadevnih sektorjih. Merila, na podlagi katerih se določi seznam selitev
emisij СО 2, so nespremenjena v primerjavi z obstoječim seznamom, vendar se nekateri parametri lahko prilagodijo
tako, da se upoštevajo nedavni podatki, pripravljalno delo za to oceno pa še poteka.

Novi sklep s seznamom sektorjev, ki veljajo za izpostavljene visokemu tveganju selitve emisij СО 2, bo pravočasno
pripravljen za dodelitev pravic za leto 2015, kar pomeni, da se njegovo sprejetje načrtuje za sredino leta 2014,
postopek komitologije pa se bo začel že dolgo pred tem.

Zainteresirane strani bodo v posvetovanjih sodelovale prek spletnih posvetovanj in srečanj. V ta namen bo Komisija
uporabila uradne podatke, ki jih zagotavljajo Eurostat in države članice. V primeru dvoma v zanesljivost podatkov
bodo vzpostavljeni stiki z zadevnimi sektorji.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) prim. Direktiva 2009/29/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. novembra 2008 o spremembi Direktive 2003/87/ES zaradi vključitve
letalskih dejavnosti v sistem za trgovanje s pravicami do emisije toplogrednih plinov v Skupnosti (UL L 140, 5.6.2009, str. 3).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 507

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002885/13**

**to the Commission**
**Romana Jordan (PPE) and Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Timing and other provisions related to the new carbon leakage list

It seems that the Commission intends to press ahead with the preparation of the list of sectors in the European Union
deemed at significant risk of carbon leakage, as required by Article 10a, paragraph 13, of the Emissions Trading
System (ETS) Directive ( [1] ). In accordance with the provisions of this article, ‘by 31 December 2009 and every five
years thereafter […] the Commission shall determine a list of the sectors or subsectors referred to in paragraph 12’
(‘installations in sectors or subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage’). The new list should
thus be completed by the end of 2014.

1. What is the envisaged timeline for finalising the revision of the carbon leakage list?

2. What methodology will the Commission use for this reassessment?

3. How will the stakeholders, in particular the industries on the list, be consulted and involved in the reassessment
exercise?

4. What sources of data will the Commission use and how will concerns about data accuracy be addressed?

5. Will the Commission consider the effects of ETS backloading and its impact on the carbon market when
drawing up the carbon leakage list? If so, how will the carbon price be determined?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The ETS Directive mandates the Commission to determine a new carbon leakage list for the period 2015-2019, based
on criteria laid down in that directive. The objective of this update is to ensure that the EU has a carbon leakage
regime that is closely aligned to the real situation of the concerned sectors. The criteria to determine the carbon
leakage list remain unchanged compared to the existing list, but some parameters might be adjusted to take into
account recent data and the preparatory work for this assessment is ongoing.

The new decision containing a list of sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage will be in
place in time for 2015 allocation, and is therefore intended to be formally adopted by mid-2014, with the
Comitology process starting well before that time.

Stakeholders will be consulted by means of online consultations and stakeholder meetings. For the purposes of the
exercise the Commission will use official data provided by Eurostat and the Member States. In case of doubts on the
reliability of data, contacts will be taken with concerned sectors.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) cf. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009.

C 6 E / 508 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002886/13**

**to the Commission**
**Stephen Hughes (S&D)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Incandescent light bulbs

With the legislation (Regulation (EC) No 244/2009) which phased out incandescent light bulbs now implemented, is
the Commission still satisfied with the opinion given in 2009 by the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly
Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) on light sensitivity? This opinion stated that ‘it has never been conclusively and
convincingly shown that there exist any connections between electromagnetic fields (EMF) and the symptoms that are
reported by persons with so-called electromagnetic hypersensitivity, although their symptoms are real and in many
cases severe’, adding: ‘There is no scientific evidence of correlation between EMF from compact fluorescent lamps, and
symptoms and disease’.

Does the Commission consider that a lack of scientific evidence does not mean there are no negative health risks?

Will the Commission fund peer-reviewed research in this area in order to ensure that, should health risks exist, they
will be identified?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) further evaluated the health
effects of artificial light in its opinion of 2012 ( [1] ), based on a mandate of the Commission. The Commission would
refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions 1940/2013 by Mrs Fiona Hall, 4836/2012 by
Mr David Martin, and 7245/2012 by Mr Franz Obermayr for further information.

Regarding potential health risks related to electromagnetic fields, the Commission would refer the Honourable
Member to its answer to written question 3593/2011 by Mrs Marielle de Sarnez.

Regarding the likelihood of negative health risks, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer
to written question 8247/2012 by Mrs Angelika Werthmann.

Regarding the funding of research, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written
question 1940/2013.

The Commission relies on the best available scientific evidence. If new evidence became available indicating that
compact fluorescent lamps do involve a health risk, the Commission would take the necessary action.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Opinion on Health Effects of Artificial Light of 19 March 2012:
http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_035.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 509

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002887/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(12 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ ETS voor glastuinbouwbedrijven

In antwoord op vraag E-007462/2012 over ETS voor glastuinbouwbedrijven geeft de Commissie aan dat er geen
andere lidstaten buiten Nederland zijn die installaties van de tuinbouwsector welke onder het toepassingsgebied van
de ETS-richtlijn vallen, expliciet hebben uitgesloten. De Commissie geeft verder aan dat voor de derde handelsperiode
(2013-2020) installaties (zoals warmtekrachtkoppelinginstallaties) alleen van de EU-ETS uitgesloten kunnen worden
als die een nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen hebben van minder dan 35 MW.

Voor het bepalen of het maximale vermogen van 35MW is bereikt op een bepaald bedrijf, is het van belang te weten
of dit vermogen voor iedere afzonderlijke installatie geldt, of dat dit voor alle machines samen geldt die op een
bedrijfsterrein staan opgesteld.

1. Wat moet volgens de Commissie verstaan worden onder het begrip „installatie” zoals dat in de EU ETS
Richtlijn wordt gebruikt? Moet hieronder worden verstaan iedere afzonderlijke installatie, of moet onder dit begrip
worden verstaan alle installaties samen die op één locatie/inrichting staan opgesteld?

2. Kortom, behoort een locatie met 3 installaties, die ieder individueel een nominaal thermisch vermogen hebben
van minder dan 35 MW, maar samen meer dan 35 MW, onder de ETS richtlijn of onder nationale regelingen te
vallen?

3. Hoe hebben de lidstaten deze definitie van „installatie” uit de ETS richtlijn in nationale wetgeving omgezet?
Hebben zij dit op dezelfde manier gedaan? Of zijn er lidstaten die voor de berekening van het vermogen afzonderlijke
installaties nemen en andere lidstaten die het geheel van het opgesteld vermogen op één locatie samen nemen?

4. De Commissie gaf in het antwoord ook aan dat het ETS voornamelijk bedoeld is voor op grotere installaties en
dat er nationale regelingen zijn voor kleinere. Als gevolg hiervan zou het level playing field tussen bedrijven in
dezelfde sector aangetast kunnen worden. In hoeverre hebben lidstaten mogelijkheden om een aantasting van het
level playing field te corrigeren tussen enerzijds bedrijven met installaties die onder ETS vallen en anderzijds bedrijven
die onder nationale regelingen vallen?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie**

_(30 april 2013)_

1. De term „installatie” wordt gedefinieerd in artikel 3, punt e), van de EU-ETS-richtlijn: „ _vaste technische eenheid_
_waarin één of meer van de in bijlage I genoemde activiteiten plaatsvinden alsmede andere, daarmee rechtstreeks samenhangende_
_activiteiten plaatsvinden, die technisch in verband staan met de op die plaats ten uitvoer gebrachte activiteiten en gevolgen kunnen_
_hebben voor de emissies en de verontreiniging_ ”. Een van de activiteiten van de lijst van bijlage I bij de ETS-richtlijn is het
„verbranden van brandstof in installaties met een nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van meer dan 20 MW […]”.

2. In bijlage I bij de ETS-richtlijn is bepaald dat het nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van alle technische
eenheden die deel uitmaken van een installatie bij elkaar opgeteld moeten worden wanneer men wil vaststellen of het
totale nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van de installatie meer bedraagt dan 20 MW. Dit wordt gewoonlijk de
„cumulatieregel” genoemd. Als dit het geval is dan valt de installatie onder de EU-ETS. De drempel van 35 MW is
slechts van toepassing als moet worden besloten of een installatie in aanmerking komt voor uitsluiting van de ETSregeling onder voorbehoud van gelijkwaardige maatregelen overeenkomstig artikel 27 van de richtlijn.

3. Aangezien de cumulatieregel algemeen aanvaard wordt en deel uitmaakt van het wetgevend kader is er geen
reden om aan te nemen dat deze niet consequent is toegepast. Dat vooral glastuinbouwbedrijven in Nederland de
20 MW-drempel lijken te overschrijden heeft te maken met bepaalde specifieke eigenschappen van de Nederlandse
tuinbouwsector, en niet met een inconsistente toepassing van de cumulatieregel.

4. Emissies uit installaties die tot dezelfde sector behoren maar niet onder de ETS-regeling vallen, vallen onder de
beschikking inzake de verdeling van de inspanningen, die de niet-ETS-emissies dekt. Hierdoor kunnen lidstaten
beleidsmaatregelen op elkaar afstemmen teneinde verstoring van de mededinging te voorkomen.

C 6 E / 510 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002887/13**

**to the Commission**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(12 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ ETS for greenhouse horticulture businesses

In answer to Question E-007462/2012 on ETS for greenhouse horticulture businesses, the Commission states that no
other Member State apart from the Netherlands has explicitly excluded those horticulture sector installations which
are covered by the scope of the ETS Directive. The Commission further states that, for the third trading period (2013‐
2020), installations (such as cogeneration plants) may only be excluded from the EU ETS if they have a rated thermal
input of less than 35 MW.

To determine whether the maximum capacity of 35 MW has been reached at a particular firm, it is important to know
whether this capacity applies to each individual installation or to all the machines located together at an industrial
site.

1. What does the Commission understand by the term ‘installation’ as used in the EU ETS Directive? Must this be
taken to mean each individual installation, or must this term be understood to mean all the installations located
together at one location/establishment?

2. In short, is a location with three installations, each with an individual rated thermal input of less than 35 MW,
but with a combined input of more than 35 MW, covered by the ETS Directive or by national regulations?

3. How have the Member States transposed this definition of ‘installation’ from the ETS Directive into national
legislation? Have they done so in the same way? Do some Member States calculate the capacity based on individual
installations while other Member States use the total combined capacity at one location?

4. In its answer, the Commission also stated that the ETS is primarily intended for larger installations and that
national regulations apply to smaller ones. Consequently, the level playing field between firms in the same sector
might be affected. To what extent do Member States have the opportunity to correct distortions in the level playing
field between firms with installations covered by the ETS on the one hand and firms covered by national regulations
on the other?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

1. The term ‘installation’ is defined in Article 3(e) of the EU ETS Directive : ‘a stationary technical unit where one or
more activities listed in Annex I are carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical
connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution’. One
of the activities listed in Annex I of the ETS Directive is ‘Combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated thermal
input exceeding 20 MW […]’.

2. The ETS Directive stipulates in Annex I that one needs to add together the rated thermal inputs of all technical
units belonging to an installation […] when calculating whether the total rated thermal input of the installation
exceeds the 20 MW. This is commonly referred to as the ‘aggregation rule’. If it does, the installation is covered by
the EU ETS. The 35 MW threshold is only relevant when deciding whether an installation is eligible for exclusion
from the ETS subject to equivalent measures according to Article 27 of the directive.

3. As the aggregation rule is commonly accepted and part of the legal framework, there is no reason to assume
that it has not been applied consistently. The reason why primarily Dutch greenhouse horticulture businesses seem to
exceed the 20 MW is related to certain specificities of the Dutch horticulture sector rather than to an inconsistent
application of the aggregation rule.

4. Emissions from installations belonging to the same sector but not covered by the ETS are covered by the Effort
Sharing Decision, dealing with non-ETS emissions, which enables Member States to align policy measures in order to
avoid competition distortions.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 511

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002888/13**

**to the Commission**
**Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU funding available to alleviate the costs of immigration from other Member States

What funding is available from the EU to pay for the additional costs placed on local authorities resulting from a large
influx of citizens from another EU Member State (I am thinking particularly of housing and health costs and the need
for bilingual assistants in schools and additional language teachers and facilities)?

What proposals does the Commission intend to make to ensure that a host country is not required to pay social
benefits to a migrant’s family when they are still living in the country of origin?

What proposals does the Commission intend to make to ensure that medical costs of a migrant to another EU
country are paid by that person’s country of origin?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2013)_

The EU's Structural Funds aim to reduce differences in prosperity and living standards across EU Member States and
regions, and therefore promote economic and social cohesion. The ESF ( [1] ) besides promoting employment also
supports social inclusion and combatting poverty. The related investments in housing, health infrastructure and
urban development are supported by the ERDF ( [2] ). For the period 2014-2020 the Commission proposed investment
priorities aiming at strengthening this approach. Innovative approaches could also be funded to respond to societal
challenges such as intra-EU migration.

An employed or self-employed person active in a Member State is subject to social security legislation of that Member
State ( [3] ). This means that such a person is entitled to social security coverage, including family benefits and healthcare,
on the same terms as nationals of that Member State. The applicable Regulation ( [4] ) provides that a person is entitled to
family benefits in accordance with the legislation of the competent Member State, including for his/her family
members residing in another Member State, as if they were residing in the former State. This principle is in place since
over 50 years and works well. Migrant workers have to pay both social security contributions and taxes in the
competent State and contribute to the economic growth of this State.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Social Fund.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) European Regional Development Fund.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 11-3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social

security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004 (Corrigendum OJ L 200, 7.6.2004), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1224/2012
(OJ L 349, 19.12.2012).

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Article 67 of the same regulation.

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

C 6 E / 512 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-002889/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(13 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Regulamento (UE) n. [o] 29/2013 de 15 de janeiro de 2013

Tendo em conta que:

—
O Regulamento (UE) n. [o] 29/2013 da Comissão, de 15 de janeiro de 2013, que proíbe a pesca de peixe-espadapreto nas águas da UE e águas internacionais das subzonas VIII, IX e X pelos navios que arvoram o pavilhão de
Portugal refere que as capturas da unidade populacional esgotaram a quota atribuída para 2012;

—
Considera, por conseguinte, necessário proibir as atividades de pesca dessa unidade populacional, cuja quota
considera esgotada com efeitos a 19 de dezembro de 2012, sendo proibido manter a bordo, transladar,
transbordar ou desembarcar capturas dessa unidade populacional efetuadas por esses navios após a data
indicada;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Referindo-se o regulamento ao esgotamento da quota de capturas para o ano 2012, qual é a quota de capturas
fixada para o ano 2013?

2. Caso não esteja ainda fixada, para quando se prevê a fixação da quota para o ano 2013?

3. A proibição estabelecida abrange todos os tipos de arte e frota com pavilhão português?

4. Quais são os tipos de navios de pesca que estão excluídos da aplicação do regime de gestão do esforço de pesca?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Em conformidade com o Regulamento (UE) n.° 1262/2012 do Conselho, de 20 de dezembro de 2012, foi atribuída a
Portugal, para 2013, uma quota de 3 659 toneladas de peixe-espada-preto nas águas da UE e nas águas internacionais
das subzonas VIII, IX e X. A proibição estabelecida no Regulamento (UE) n.° 29/2013 da Comissão, de 15 de janeiro
de 2013, refere-se apenas à quota de pesca atribuída a Portugal para 2012.

Esta proibição afeta todos os tipos de artes de pesca e navios que arvoram o pavilhão de Portugal. O Regulamento (CE)
n.° 2347/2002 do Conselho, de 16 de dezembro de 2002, estabelece o regime de esforço de pesca aplicável aos
navios que pescam as unidades populacionais de profundidade, incluindo o peixe-espada-preto. Ao abrigo deste
regime, só os navios que possuem autorizações para a pesca de profundidade são autorizados a exercer uma pesca
dirigida às espécies de profundidade, estando sujeitos a restrições do esforço.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 513

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002889/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013

Commission Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013 establishing a prohibition of fishing for black
scabbardfish in EU and international waters of VIII, IX and X by vessels flying the flag of Portugal states that the 2012
quota for catches of this stock has been exhausted.

The regulation therefore deems it necessary to prohibit fishing activities for the stock in question and considers the
quota to be exhausted as of 19 December 2012, stating that it shall be prohibited to retain on board, relocate,
tranship or land fish from that stock caught by those vessels after that date.

Can the Commission answer the following:

1. As the regulation refers to the exhaustion of the fishing quota for 2012, what quota has been set for 2013?

2. If the 2013 quota has not yet been established, when will this be done?

3. Does the above prohibition affect all types of fishing gear and Portuguese-flagged vessel?

4. What types of fishing vessel are excluded from the scope of the fishing effort regime?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1262/2012 of 20 December 2012, for 2013 a quota of 3659 tonnes
of black scabbard fish in EU and international waters of VIII, IX and X has been allocated to Portugal. The prohibition
laid down in Commission Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013 refers only to the fishing quota allocated
to Portugal for 2012.

This prohibition affects all types of fishing gear and Portuguese-flagged vessels. Council Regulation (EC)
No 2347/2002 of 16 December 2002 establishes the fishing effort regime applicable to vessels fishing for deep-sea
stocks including black scabbard fish. Under this regime only vessels holding deep-sea fishing permits are allowed to
target deep-sea species and are subject to effort restrictions.

C 6 E / 514 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002890/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Condonación obligada de deudas

Una multinacional catalana de hemoderivados cobró en 2012 deudas del Gobierno español por valor de
157 millones de euros, pero a cambio fue obligada a condonar 11,6 millones en concepto de intereses adeudados por
la Seguridad Social ( [1] ).

Por otro lado, en el artículo 3, letra e), de la Directiva 2000/35/CE se dice: «salvo que el deudor no sea responsable del
retraso, el acreedor tendrá derecho a reclamar al deudor una compensación razonable por todos los costes de cobro
que haya sufrido a causa de la morosidad de éste.»

A la luz de lo anterior:

¿Investigará la Comisión si la empresa citada no solo no ha cobrado a tiempo, en su relación con la Administración
española, sino que además ha sido obligada a condonar 11,6 millones de euros?

¿Cree la Comisión que estas prácticas están de acuerdo con la Directiva 2000/35/CE?

¿Cree la Comisión que estas prácticas están de acuerdo con el principio de seguridad jurídica? ¿Y con el artículo 173
del TUE sobre política industrial?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(6 de mayo de 2013)_

Como ya se ha mencionado en las respuestas a preguntas anteriores (E-000533/2012, E‐003060/2012,
E-000531/2012, E-000026/2011 y E-000027/2011) ( [2] ), la Directiva 2000/35/CE ha sido sustituida por la Directiva
2011/7/UE, que todos los Estados miembros tuvieron que transponer con fecha límite de 16 de marzo de 2013.

España transpuso la Directiva 2011/7/UE el 24 de febrero de 2013 mediante el Real Decreto‐ley 4/2013.

La Comisión quisiera destacar que el acreedor tiene el derecho, pero no la obligación, de pedir intereses de demora o
una compensación por los costes de cobro.

Por regla general, una vez que se hayan adoptado medidas nacionales de transposición satisfactorias, las infracciones
de la legislación nacional deben resolverse normalmente ante los tribunales nacionales. Por tanto, deben buscarse vías
de recurso adecuadas para garantizar la correcta aplicación de las normas de desarrollo nacionales.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.expansion.com/agencia/efe/2013/03/10/18149820.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 515

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002890/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Forced debt cancellation

In 2012, a Catalan multinational in the blood products industry collected debts from the Spanish Government to the
value of EUR 157 million, but in exchange was forced to write off EUR 11.6 million in the way of interest owed by the
Social Security administration ( [1] ).

However, Article 3(e) of Directive 2000/35/EC states: ‘unless the debtor is not responsible for the delay, the creditor
shall be entitled to claim reasonable compensation from the debtor for all recovery costs incurred through the latter’s
late payment.’

Will the Commission investigate whether the aforementioned company has not only not been paid on time, in its
dealings with the Spanish authorities, but has also been forced to write off EUR 11.6 million?

Does the Commission think that these practices comply with Directive 2000/35/EC?

Does the Commission think that these practices comply with the principle of legal certainty and with Article 173 of
the Treaty on European Union, with regard to industrial policy?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

As already mentioned in replies to previous questions (E-000533/2012, E-003060/2012, E-000531/2012, E000026/2011, E-000027/2011) ( [2] ) Directive 2000/35/EC has been replaced by Directive 2011/7/EU that all Member
States had to transpose by 16 March 2013.

Spain transposed Directive 2011/7/EU on 24 February 2013 by means of R.D.L 4/2013.

The Commission would like to emphasise that the creditor has a right and not an obligation to ask for interest for late
payment and compensation for the recovery costs.

As a general rule, once satisfactory national transposition measures have been adopted, contraventions of the
national legislation ought normally to be resolved before the national courts. Therefore, appropriate redress should
be sought by securing the proper application of the national implementing legislation.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.expansion.com/agencia/efe/2013/03/10/18149820.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 516 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002891/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Pregunta complementaria a E-000098/2013

Respecto a la patente única europea, la Comisión decía tener datos sobre el impacto que puede tener sobre las PYME.
Aún así, como el Estado español e Italia no participan del acuerdo por cooperación reforzada, sus empresas y sus
particulares no podrán hacer uso de esta figura para patentar sus innovaciones. En todo caso, sólo podrán acceder a
una patente única europea si tienen una filial en uno de los Estados miembros firmantes.

Además, según la Comisión en su respuesta a la pregunta E-000098/2013: «En el marco del sistema actual, cuesta
unos 36 000 euros obtener protección mediante patente en el conjunto de Europa. Este coste bajará
considerablemente gracias al nuevo sistema: el coste de obtener la protección mediante patente unitaria en 25 Estados
miembros será inferior a 5 000 euros después de que termine el período transitorio y menos de 6 500 euros durante
el período de transición, lo que redundará en beneficio sobre todo de las PYME.»

A la luz de lo anterior,

¿Puede confirmar la Comisión que las empresas y particulares con sede legal en el Estado español no podrán hacer uso
de la patente única europea?

¿Cree la Comisión que la imposibilidad de utilizar este instrumento y la bajada de costes que supone perjudica la
competitividad de las PYME españolas con relación a sus competidoras europeas?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión quiere aclarar que los inventores españoles e italianos, al igual que el resto de inventores establecidos o
residentes en el territorio de los 25 Estados miembros participantes, podrán hacer uso del futuro sistema de patentes y
beneficiarse, por tanto, de la consiguiente reducción de los costes y cargas administrativas del mismo. La no
discriminación entre los Estados miembros constituye uno de los requisitos básicos de la cooperación reforzada.

La Comisión también desea subrayar que el TJUE, en su Decisión de 16 de abril, ha resuelto que la decisión por la que
se autoriza la cooperación reforzada para la creación de protección mediante una patente unitaria no perjudica al
mercado interior y no constituye una discriminación para los intercambios entre Estados miembros y respeta las
competencias, los derechos y las obligaciones de aquellos Estados miembros que no participan en ellas (artículos 326
y 327 del TFUE — asuntos acumulados C-274/11 y C-295/11).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 517

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002891/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Supplementary question to Question E-000098/2013

With regard to the single European patent, the Commission has said that it has data on the impact this could have on
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, since Spain and Italy are not participating in the enhanced
cooperation procedure, their enterprises and citizens will not be able to use this mechanism to patent their
innovations. In any event, they will only be able to obtain a single European patent if they have a subsidiary in one of
the signatory Member States.

In addition, in its answer to Question E-000098/2013 the Commission states: ‘under the current system, it costs
about EUR 36 000 to obtain patent protection for the whole of Europe. These costs will be considerably reduced
under the new system: the cost to obtain unitary patent protection for 25 Member States will be less than EUR 5 000
after the end of the transitional period (less than EUR 6 500 during the transitional period). This will in particular
benefit SMEs.’

Can the Commission confirm that enterprises and individuals established in Spain will not be able to use the single
European patent?

Does the Commission believe that the fact that Spanish SMEs cannot use this instrument and benefit from the
attendant reduced costs will harm their competitiveness in relation to their European competitors?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 May 2013)_

The Commission would like to clarify that Spanish as well as Italian inventors will be able to benefit from the future
patent system and thus from the associated reduction of cost and administrative burdens in the same way as inventors
established/resident within the territory of the 25 participating Member States. Non-discrimination between the
Member States is one of the basic requirements for enhanced cooperation.

The Commission would also like to underline that the CJEU, in its decision of 16 April, has decided that the decision
authorising the enhanced cooperation for the creation of unitary patent protection does not undermine the internal
market or constitute a discrimination in trade between Member States and respects the competences, rights and
obligations of those Member States which do not participate in it (Art. 326 and 327 TFEU — Joined Cases C‐274/11
and C‐295/11).

C 6 E / 518 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002892/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Modificación de la Directiva 84/500/CEE (II)

En referencia a la respuesta E-009038/2012, del Sr. Šefčovič en nombre de la Comisión, del pasado 28 de noviembre
de 2012: « _Con objeto de determinar la acción futura, la Comisión lleva a cabo una consulta con los Estados miembros y la_
_industria sobre posibles soluciones, entre otras, nuevas pruebas de laboratorio que reflejen los usos que hacen los consumidores de_
_los MCA de cerámica y la necesidad de adoptar medidas con respecto a las importaciones procedentes de terceros países»._

Los empresarios de cerámica catalanes están muy preocupados porque si finalmente se modifica la Directiva
84/500/CEE, con la posible reducción de los niveles de cesión de cadmio y plomo de la cerámica en 400 veces los
niveles actuales, ellos no podrán hacer frente al coste que significaría para sus fábricas este cambio en la normativa, en
el contexto actual de crisis económica en el Estado español. ¿Ya ha terminado la Comisión las consultas a los Estados
miembros y a la industria?

¿Cuándo tiene previsto la Comisión emitir una respuesta definitiva sobre la posible modificación de la Directiva
84/500/CEE?

**Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión**

_(24 de abril de 2013)_

La Comisión todavía no ha concluido sus consultas sobre la reducción de los límites de cesión de plomo y cadmio
fijados en la actualidad por la Directiva 84/500/CEE del Consejo ( [1] ).

El laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea para materiales en contacto con alimentos, situado en el Centro
Común de Investigación de la Comisión Europea, en Ispra (Italia), está en la actualidad desarrollando y evaluando
posibles nuevas pruebas de laboratorio para ser utilizadas en este contexto. Dicho laboratorio de referencia está
consultando a todas las partes interesadas pertinentes sobre asuntos relacionados con estas pruebas. Se espera que
este trabajo esté concluido para finales de 2013.

La Comisión decidirá sus próximas actuaciones a partir de las nuevas consultas a los Estados miembros y a la industria
tan pronto como haya suficiente claridad en torno a los métodos de ensayo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DO L 277 de 20.10.1984.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 519

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002892/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Amendment of Directive 84/500/EEC (II)

In his answer of 28 November 2012 to Question E-009038/2012, Mr Šefčovič, on behalf of the Commission, stated:
‘[t]o determine further action the Commission is consulting with Member States and industry on potential solutions,
amongst others new laboratory tests which better reflect the way ceramic food contact materials (FCMs) are used by
consumers and the necessity of measures regarding imports from third countries’.

Catalan ceramics business owners are very concerned: if Directive 84/500/EEC is amended, with a potential reduction
in the migration levels of cadmium and lead from ceramics by a factor of 400 from current levels, they will not be
able to meet the cost that this change in the law would involve for their factories, in view of the current economic
crisis in Spain. Has the Commission already completed its consultations with Member States and industry?

When does the Commission plan to give a final answer on the possible amendment of Directive 84/500/EEC?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The Commission has not yet concluded its consultations on the reduction of the limits for the release of lead and
cadmium currently set out by Council Directive 84/500/EEC ( [1] ).

The European Union reference laboratory for food contact materials, hosted by the Directorate General Joint
Research Centre of the European Commission in Ispra, Italy, is currently developing and evaluating possible new
laboratory tests to be used in this context. The reference laboratory consults with all relevant stakeholders on matters
relating to these tests. This work is expected to be concluded by the end of 2013.

The Commission will determine its actions on the basis of further consultations with the Member States and industry
as soon as sufficient clarity on the testing methods is obtained.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 277, 20.10.1984.

C 6 E / 520 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002893/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Seguimiento de la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad

En noviembre de 2010, la Comisión aprobó la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad 2010-2020, la cual proporciona
un marco de acción a escala europea y nacional con el objetivo de que las personas con discapacidad puedan disfrutar
de todos sus derechos, y beneficiarse plenamente de una participación en la economía y la sociedad europea.

El 23 de diciembre de 2010, la UE ratificó la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con
discapacidad (UNCRPD), convirtiéndose así en la primera entidad supranacional que ha llegado a ser parte oficial de la
Convención, asumiendo por tanto los deberes y obligaciones impuestos por la misma.

Considerando que la Estrategia 2010-2020 se centra en potenciar los derechos de las personas con discapacidad y
ayuda a cumplir las disposiciones de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con
discapacidad,

Considerando que el artículo 35 de la Convención establece que los Estados Partes presentarán al Comité de las
Naciones Unidas encargado de su implementación, un informe exhaustivo sobre las medidas que hayan adoptado
para cumplir sus obligaciones conforme a la Convención y sobre los progresos realizados al respecto en el plazo de
dos años a partir de la entrada en vigor de la Convención en el Estado Parte de que se trate,

Considerando que en la propia Estrategia 2010-2020 se menciona que a finales del presente año, la Comisión
Europea informará sobre los avances logrados mediante la Estrategia, concretamente sobre la puesta en práctica de
medidas, los progresos nacionales y el informe que remite la UE al Comité de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos
de las Personas con Discapacidad.

1. ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión a fin de realizar un seguimiento exhaustivo sobre la aplicación
efectiva de la Estrategia, y así poder evaluar su impacto real en los Estados miembros?

2. ¿En qué estado se encuentran los informes que la UE, como parte de la Convención, debe presentar al Comité de
las Naciones Unidas para cumplir con lo dispuesto en el artículo 35?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(3 de mayo de 2013)_

Según se anunciaba en la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad 2010-2020, la Comisión presentará a finales de 2013
un informe sobre los progresos alcanzados gracias a dicha iniciativa. Se ha iniciado para ello un estudio especializado
independiente ( [1] ) cuyo proceso de preparación incluirá también consultas con las partes interesadas, concretamente
representantes de los Estados miembros en el Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre Discapacidades, y de las organizaciones de
personas con discapacidades.

Conforme establece el Código de conducta entre el Consejo, los Estados miembros y la Comisión, que fija los
dispositivos internos para la aplicación, por parte de la Unión Europea, del Convenio de las Naciones Unidas sobre los
Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad ( [2] ), así como para su representación en ese foro, la Comisión está
elaborando el informe requerido por el artículo 35 de la CNUDPD sobre las materias de competencia de la Unión. El
Informe de la UE seguirá las directrices del Comité de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con
Discapacidad para los documentos específicamente recogidos en los Tratados que deben presentar los Estados parte
conforme al artículo 35 de la CNUDPD ( [3] ).

El estudio mencionado aportará además datos objetivos y elementos de análisis en los que se apoyará la Comisión
para la preparación del Informe de la UE para la CNUDPD.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Convocatoria de licitación JUST/2012/DISC/PR/0072/A4 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/2012_209634_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 2010/C 340/08, punto 12 c).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD-C-2-3.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 521

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002893/13**

**to the Commission**
**Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Review of the European Disability Strategy

In November 2010, the Commission approved the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, which set out a
framework of action at EU and national level with the aim of ensuring that persons with disabilities can enjoy all their
rights and fully benefit from participation in the economy and European society.

On 23 December 2010, the EU ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities
(UNCRPD), thus becoming the first supranational entity to become an official party to the Convention, thereby
assuming the duties and obligations imposed by it.

The strategy 2010-2020 focuses on strengthening the rights of persons with disabilities and helping to fulfil the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities.

Article 35 of the Convention establishes that the state parties shall submit to the United Nations committee
responsible for its enforcement, a thorough report on the measures that they have adopted to fulfil their obligations
in accordance with the Convention and on the progress achieved in that respect in the two years from the entry into
force of the Convention in the state party concerned.

The strategy 2010-2020 itself mentions that at the end of this year, the Commission will report on the progress made
under the strategy, specifically on the implementation of measures, progress at national level and the report that
the EU submits to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of People with Disabilities.

1. What action is the Commission planning to take in order to conduct a thorough review of the effective
implementation of the strategy, and thus be able to assess its true impact in the Member States?

2. What form will the reports take which the EU, as a party to the Convention, must submit to the United Nations
Committee in order to comply with the provisions of Article 35?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

As announced in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, the Commission will by the end of 2013 report on
progress achieved through the strategy. An external expert study has been launched ( [1] ) and the preparatory process
will also include consultation with the relevant stakeholders, in particular Member States representatives through the
Disability High-Level Group and organisations of persons with disabilities.

As stipulated in the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out
internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ( [2] ), the Commission is preparing the Union Report
required by Art. 35 of the UNCRPD in respect of matters falling within the Union competence. The EU Report will
follow the reporting guidelines of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on treaty-specific
documents to be submitted by states parties under Article 35 of the CRPD ( [3] ).

The mentioned study will also provide factual data and analysis to support the Commission in the preparation of
the EU CRPD Report.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Open invitation to tender JUST/2012/DISC/PR/0072/A4 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/2012_209634_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 2010/C 340/08, point 12(c).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD-C-2-3.pdf

C 6 E / 522 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002894/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Acuerdo de Libre Comercio con Tailandia y trabajo infantil en el sector conservero

Recientemente se han iniciado las negociaciones para un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre la UE y Tailandia, tercer
socio comercial europeo en la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN), con un comercio bilateral de
más de 30 mil millones EUR (exportaciones de la UE de 14,8 mil millones e importaciones de 16,9 mil millones). La
UE es el principal inversor internacional en este país.

Hace algunas semanas la organización finlandesa Finnwatch denunciaba la realización de trabajos infantiles y la
existencia de abusos laborales en dos de las principales fábricas tailandesas de conservas de atún que abastecen el
mercado de la UE y de los EE.UU. (Unicord y Thai Union Manufacturing).

Habida cuenta de lo que antecede,

1. ¿Puede indicar la Comisión si tiene conocimiento de estas denuncias de trabajos infantiles y abusos laborales en
el sector conservero tailandés?

2. ¿Qué medidas de control existen para evitar que los productos producidos sin respetar los derechos
fundamentales accedan al mercado europeo e internacional?

3. ¿Qué nuevas garantías tiene previsto introducir en el nuevo Acuerdo de Libre Comercio para asegurar una
competencia justa y evitar una concurrencia desleal?

En cuanto al contenido estrictamente comercial del Acuerdo, ¿evitará la Comisión que las condiciones arancelarias y
no arancelarias para el comercio de conservas de atún puedan dañar injustificadamente al sector europeo?

**Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión tiene constancia del estudio de Finnwatch. A este respecto, la Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su
respuesta a la pregunta E-00618/2013 ( [1] ).

La Comisión trabaja en estrecha colaboración con la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), que hace un
seguimiento de la aplicación de las normas del trabajo por parte de Tailandia en virtud de los Convenios de la OIT,
incluido el sector de la pesca. Además, para la UE es muy importante que se incluyan disposiciones sobre comercio y
desarrollo sostenible en las negociaciones para un acuerdo de libre comercio (ALC) con Tailandia que se han iniciado
recientemente. Promover la aplicación efectiva de las normas fundamentales del trabajo, incluida la eliminación del
trabajo infantil, constituye una parte importante de este objetivo. Las disposiciones definitivas en materia de comercio
y desarrollo sostenible del ALC también podrían proporcionar un marco para el diálogo en este ámbito, en particular
con las partes interesadas pertinentes.

La Comisión es plenamente consciente de que la industria de pescado y marisco envasados es un elemento delicado
en esta negociación. Teniendo esto en cuenta, en el acuerdo definitivo la UE intentará alcanzar un equilibrio razonable
entre sus intereses de importación y exportación, a fin de tener en cuenta las necesidades de los proveedores de
materias primas, los productores y los consumidores, garantizando al mismo tiempo de manera adecuada la
protección de los intereses legítimos de este sector de la UE.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 523

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002894/13**

**to the Commission**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Free trade agreement with Thailand and child labour in the canning industry

Negotiations have recently begun for a free trade agreement between the EU and Thailand, the third largest EU trading
partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with bilateral trade of more than EUR 30 billion (EU
exports of EUR 14.8 billion and imports of EUR 16.9 billion). The EU is the main international investor in this
country.

Several weeks ago, the Finnish organisation Finnwatch reported on the practice of child labour and labour abuses in
two of the main tinned tuna factories in Thailand that supply the EU and US markets (Unicord and Thai Union
Manufacturing).

1. Can the Commission state whether it is aware of these reports of child labour and labour abuses in the Thai
canning industry?

2. What controls are there to prevent products produced without respecting the fundamental rights from gaining
access to the European and international market?

3. What new guarantees does the Commission plan to introduce in the new free trade agreement to ensure fair
competition and prevent unfair competition?

With regard to the strictly trade-related content of the agreement, will the Commission prevent tariff and non-tariff
conditions for the tinned tuna trade from unjustifiably damaging the European sector?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the Finnwatch study. In this regard, it refers the Honourable Member to its reply to
Question E-00618/2013 ( [1] ).

The Commission works closely with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which monitors the
implementation of labour standards by Thailand under the ILO Conventions, including in the fisheries sector.
Furthermore, the EU attaches great importance to including provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development in the
recently launched Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand. Promoting the effective implementation
of core labour standards, including the elimination of child labour, forms an important part of this objective. The final
trade and sustainable development provisions in the FTA could also provide a framework for dialogue in this area,
including with relevant stakeholders.

The Commission is well aware of the sensitivities of the EU canned fish and seafood industry in this negotiation.
Bearing that in mind, in the final agreement the EU will seek to strike a balance between its import and export
interests, to take into account the needs of suppliers of raw materials, producers, and consumers, while adequately
safeguarding legitimate interests of the EU sector.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm.

C 6 E / 524 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002896/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(13 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Costi sostenuti dal governo greco per la costruzione della moschea ad Atene

Il quotidiano «Ta Nea» rivela che, nonostante l'economia in profonda crisi, la recessione arrivata al sesto anno
consecutivo e rigide misure di austerità che hanno falcidiato stipendi e pensioni, il governo greco ha deciso di
spendere 846 000 EUR per costruire la prima moschea di Atene destinata ai residenti di fede islamica.

Recentemente si è tenuto a Istanbul un vertice del Consiglio di cooperazione fra Grecia e Turchia, rappresentato dai
rispettivi Primi ministri. Sul tavolo delle discussioni vi era anche il progetto per la costruzione della moschea nella
capitale greca con la collaborazione finanziaria del governo turco.

La Commissione europea sta finanziando questo progetto? E, in caso affermativo, ritiene utile questo intervento
finanziario vista la grave crisi che l'Europa sta attraversando?

**Risposta di Olli Rehn a nome della Commissione**

_(4 giugno 2013)_

Le questioni sollevate dall'onorevole deputato non formano oggetto di discussione nel contesto del secondo
programma di aggiustamento economico per la Grecia. Secondo le informazioni fornite dalle autorità greche, il
progetto cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato non è cofinanziato dall'UE (FESR e FC).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 525

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002896/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mario Borghezio (EFD)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Costs incurred by the Greek Government for the construction of the mosque in Athens

According to the newspaper _Ta Nea_, despite the profound economic crisis, the sixth consecutive year of recession and
harsh austerity measures which have decimated wages and pensions, the Greek Government has decided to spend
EUR 846 000 on building the first mosque in Athens, for Muslim citizens.

The Greek-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council recently met in Istanbul, with the two prime ministers
representing their countries. The agenda included the plan for the construction of the mosque in the Greek capital,
with financial assistance from the Turkish Government.

Is the Commission financing this project? If so, does it consider this financial assistance to be helpful given the serious
crisis Europe is currently undergoing?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 June 2013)_

The issues raised by the Honourable Member are not being discussed in the context of the Second Economic
Adjustment Programme for Greece. According to the information provided by the Greek authorities, the project to
which the Honourable Member refers is not co-financed by EU funding (ERDF and CF).

C 6 E / 526 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002897/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Esther de Lange (PPE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onderzoek Europese Commissie naar mogelijke staatssteun Nederlandse clubs en de Spaanse situatie

Op 6 maart startte de Commissie een grondig onderzoek naar overheidsfinanciering van vijf Nederlandse
profvoetbalclubs. In vier gevallen gaat het daarbij om bedragen rond de 2 miljoen euro.

In september 2002 oordeelde de Commissie dat „er onvoldoende redenen waren” om verder onderzoek te doen naar
het voordeel dat de voetbalclub Real Madrid genoot met de herbestemming van de gronden die de club in eigendom
had en dat opliep tot 600 miljoen euro, omdat het herdefiniëren van „de nieuwe bestemming van het betrokken
terrein geen betrekking blijkt te hebben op enige directe of indirecte overdracht van middelen door de stad Madrid of
door de autonome gemeenschap van Madrid”.

Oordeelt de Commissie dat het onderscheid tussen de twee bovengenoemde zaken billijk is in het licht van een
eerlijke concurrentie tussen voetbalclubs?

Heeft de Commissie alle rechtsargumenten uit bestaande rechtspraak nauwkeurig bestudeerd om na te gaan of het
Verdrag inderdaad uitsluit een onderzoek te openen naar de steun aan voetbalclub Real Madrid?

**Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie**

_(27 mei 2013)_

De feiten in deze twee zaken met betrekking tot professionele voetbalclubs verschillen sterk op enkele belangrijke
punten. Het gaat met name om de vraag of een voordeel voor een club al dan niet het gevolg is van staatssteun.

De Commissie is van mening dat elke zaak moet worden beoordeeld op basis van de relevante feiten. Bijgevolg
kunnen verschillen in de relevante feiten leiden tot verschillende resultaten bij de juridische beoordeling ervan. Dit is
met name het geval wanneer de wetgeving zelf, alsook alle juridische argumenten uit de bestaande rechtspraak,
zorgvuldig worden afgewogen.

De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van rechtspraak over het begrip staatsmiddelen die aanleiding geeft tot een
heropening van het onderzoek naar Real Madrid uit 2002. Zij is echter wel een klacht aan het onderzoeken over een
recentere en mogelijk bevoordelende ruil van onroerend goed tussen deze club en de stad Madrid.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 527

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002897/13**

**to the Commission**
**Esther de Lange (PPE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs and the situation in Spain

On 6 March the Commission began a thorough investigation into public funding at five Dutch professional football
clubs. Four cases involve amounts of approximately EUR 2 million.

In September 2002 the Commission decided that ‘there were insufficient grounds’ for further investigation of the
benefit enjoyed by the football club Real Madrid due to the rezoning of land in its possession, which amounted to
600 million euros, because the redefinition of ‘the new qualification of the terrain in question does not appear to
involve any direct or indirect transfer of resources by either the city of Madrid or the Autonomous Community of
Madrid’.

Does the Commission take the view that the distinction between the two aforementioned cases is reasonable in view
of fair competition between football clubs?

Has the Commission studied all the legal arguments from existing case-law carefully to determine whether the Treaty
actually precludes the opening of an investigation into aid for the football club Real Madrid?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 May 2013)_

Important elements of the facts in the two cases regarding professional football clubs are substantially different. This
concerns in particular the issue of whether an advantage for a club is the consequence of the involvement of State
financial resources.

The Commission takes the view that each case has to be assessed on the basis of the relevant facts. Thus, differences in
the relevant facts may lead to different results of their legal assessment. This is in particular the case where the law
itself and all the legal arguments from existing case-law are carefully considered.

Regarding Real Madrid, the Commission is not aware of any jurisprudence regarding the notion of State resources
that would call for a reopening of the investigation of 2002. However, it is looking into a complaint regarding a more
recent possibly advantageous real property swap between this club and the City of Madrid.

C 6 E / 528 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002898/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Esther de Lange (PPE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onderzoek Europese Commissie naar mogelijke staatssteun Nederlandse clubs

Op 6 maart maakte de Commissie via een persbericht ( [1] ) bekend dat er een onderzoek gestart zal worden naar
mogelijke staatssteun door een vijftal Nederlandse gemeenten aan de betaaldvoetbalclubs (NEC, MVV, Willem II, PSV
en FC Den Bosch) binnen hun gemeente. De Commissie geeft in hetzelfde persbericht aan op deze zaken geattendeerd
te zijn door bezorgde burgers, en naar aanleiding daarvan informatie opgevraagd te hebben. Die informatie is de basis
voor verder onderzoek.

1. Zijn de klachten van bezorgde burgers de enige aanleiding geweest tot het onderzoek naar de betreffende
gemeenten?

2. Zo ja, is de Commissie met ons van mening dat er in dat geval een gevaar van willekeur ontstaat?

3. Zo nee, welke andere bronnen van informatie, signalen of mogelijke aanleidingen heeft de Commissie om het
onderzoek naar deze gemeenten te starten?

4. In welke lidstaten heeft de Commissie op dit moment verzoeken tot informatie uitstaan, en op welke gemeenten
en voetbalclubs hebben deze informatieaanvragen betrekking?

**Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie**

_(24 april 2013)_

De Commissie heeft van burgers klachten over de maatregelen in kwestie ontvangen. Over sommige daarvan is ook
bericht door de pers. Geen van de maatregelen is op voorhand bij de Commissie aangemeld, zoals artikel 108,
lid 3, VWEU voorschrijft. In dat geval is het de taak van de Commissie om in te grijpen overeenkomstig artikel 10,
lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 van de Raad, waarin is bepaald dat „indien de Commissie, uit welke bron
ook, over informatie beschikt met betrekking tot beweerdelijk onrechtmatige steun, zij die informatie onverwijld aan
een onderzoek onderwerpt”. De Commissie deelt bijgevolg niet het standpunt van de geachte Parlementsleden dat
haar onderzoek naar die maatregelen willekeurig dreigt te zijn.

De Commissie levert geen commentaar op lopende onderzoeken die niet tot het publieke domein behoren. Over de
volgende onderzoeken is reeds verslag uitgebracht in antwoorden aan het Europees Parlement of door de pers:

—
onderzoek naar de regeling voor belasting‐ en socialezekerheidsverplichtingen van Spaanse voetbalclubs;

—
klacht over de verkoop van een stuk grond tussen de stad Madrid en Real Madrid in 2011;

—
onderzoek naar een maatregel van de regio Valencia ten gunste van drie voetbalclubs in financiële
moeilijkheden in 2013;

—
klachten over vermeende steun aan Tottenham Hotspurs en West Ham;

— klacht over vermeende steun aan niet-erkende Zweedse voetbalclubs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-192_nl.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 529

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002898/13**

**to the Commission**
**Esther de Lange (PPE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs

In a press release on 6 March ( [1] ), the Commission announced that an investigation was to be opened into possible
public funding by five Dutch municipalities of professional football clubs (NEC, MVV, Willem II, PSV and
FC Den Bosch) within their municipality. In the same press release, the Commission stated that it was alerted to these
cases by concerned citizens, and consequently asked for information in this regard. This information forms the basis
of further investigation.

1. Were concerned citizens’ complaints the only reason for the investigation into the municipalities concerned?

2. If so, does the Commission share our view that in that case there is a risk of arbitrariness?

3. If not, what other sources of information, signals or possible reasons does the Commission have for starting an
investigation into these municipalities?

4. In which Member States does the Commission currently have outstanding requests for information, and to
which municipalities and football clubs do these requests for information relate?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The Commission had received complaints from citizens about the interventions in question, some of which had also
been reported in the press. None of the interventions had been notified in advance to the Commission, as prescribed
in Article 108(3) TFEU. In this situation, the Commission has a duty to intervene in accordance with Article 10(1) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 stating that ‘where the Commission has in its possession information from
whatever source regarding alleged unlawful aid, it shall examine that information without delay.’ The Commission
therefore does not share the view of the Honourable Members that its investigation into those measures risks being
arbitrary.

The Commission cannot comment on pending investigations which are not in the public domain. The following
investigations have been reported in replies to the European Parliament or in the press:

—
investigation of the treatment of tax and social security liabilities of Spanish football clubs;

—
complaint about a land transaction between the city of Madrid and Real Madrid in 2011;

—
investigation of an intervention by the Valencia region in 2013 in favour of three football clubs facing financial
difficulties;

—
complaints concerning alleged aid to Tottenham Hotspurs and West Ham;

—
complaint alleging aid to not incorporated Swedish football clubs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-192_nl.htm

C 6 E / 530 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002899/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE), Ivo Belet (PPE) en Philippe De Backer (ALDE)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen

2012 was het Europees Jaar van actief ouder worden en solidariteit tussen de generaties. De EU onderstreepte hiermee
de belangrijke bijdrage van ouderen aan de samenleving. Helaas moeten we vaststellen (Special Eurobarometer 393)
dat ouderen nog steeds discriminatie ondervinden bij de toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt en tot goederen en diensten.

Organisaties zoals onder andere AGE Platform Europe zijn daarom van mening dat de ontwikkeling van een
leeftijdsvriendelijke omgeving de actieve bijdrage van alle generaties aan de samenleving kan en moet ondersteunen.
Aanpassing van de werkomgeving aan de vergrijzende bevolking kan het verspillen van menselijk kapitaal tegengaan
en tegelijk een bijdrage leveren aan het halen van de Europa 2020-doelstellingen. Dit vergt een gecoördineerd beleid
op Europees, nationaal, regionaal en lokaal niveau vanuit eenzelfde visie op een maatschappij voor alle leeftijden.

In een brief van 3 oktober 2012 roept AGE Platform Europe de Commissie daarom op een Convenant rond
Demografische Veranderingen te lanceren naar analogie met de door de Commissie gesteunde „Covenant of Mayors
on energy and climate”. Dit convenant moet de lokale en regionale overheden, die oplossingen op het gebied van
innovatie, slimme gezondheid en beter leven — ter ondersteuning van het plan „Actief en gezond ouder worden” —
willen promoten, bijeen brengen. Dit voorstel vindt ook steun bij het Comité van de Regio's.

1. Heeft de voorzitter van de Commissie het schrijven het AGE Platform Europe goed ontvangen?

2. Hoe staat de Commissie tegenover de idee van een Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen?

3. Zal de Commissie actie ondernemen om de lancering van het Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen te
ondersteunen?

**Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie**

_(14 mei 2013)_

De Commissie is zich terdege bewust van het voorstel om een Burgemeestersconvenant rond demografische
veranderingen, zoals dat door het AGE Platform Europe en het Comité van de Regio's ondersteund wordt, op te
stellen. Steden zijn meestal verantwoordelijk voor het verschaffen van sociale, woon‐ en transportdiensten, voor
stedenbouwkundige planning en voor het organiseren van vrijetijds-, sociale en culturele activiteiten. Daarom spelen
lokale beleidsmakers een belangrijke rol bij het bevorderen van actief ouder worden en het verbeteren van de
levenskwaliteit van ouderen.

Om deze reden heeft de Commissie gedurende het Europees jaar van actief ouder worden en solidariteit tussen de
generaties van 2012 het netwerk van leeftijdsvriendelijke steden, dat door de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie (WHO)
geleid wordt, aangemoedigd. Eén van de acties van de Commissie in het kader van de follow-up van het Europees jaar
2012 betreft de voorbereiding van een gezamenlijk project met de WHO om de Global Age-friendly Cities Guide van
de WHO aan te passen aan de Europese context en de ontwikkeling van een meetinstrument. Dit project, waarin het
AGE Platform en netwerken van Europese regio's en steden (Eurocities, CEMR) betrokken zullen worden, zou
mogelijk kunnen bijdragen aan een Convenant rond demografische veranderingen. In het kader van het Europees
innovatiepartnerschap inzake actief en gezond ouder worden ( [1] ), streeft de actiegroep voor „Innovatie voor
ouderenvriendelijke gebouwen en steden en een ouderenvriendelijke woonomgeving” naar een EU-Convenant rond
demografische veranderingen. De belanghebbenden die meedoen met deze actiegroep zullen een campagne opzetten
en voeren om politieke steun voor een EU-Convenant rond demografische veranderingen op te bouwen. De
Commissie ondersteunt hun werk en kijkt uit naar de resultaten.

Om de toegankelijkheid van Europese steden voor gehandicapten en ouderen te bevorderen, reikt de Commissie sinds
2010 een jaarlijkse Access City Award uit ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) webgate.ec.europa.eu/eiponaha .
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/award/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 531

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002899/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE), Ivo Belet (PPE) and Philippe De Backer (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Covenant on demographic change

2012 was the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations, a way for the EU to underline the
important contribution of older people to society. Unfortunately, we must conclude (Special Eurobarometer 393)
that older people still experience discrimination when accessing the labour market and goods and services.

Organisations such as AGE Platform Europe, among others, therefore take the view that the development of an agefriendly environment can and must support the active contribution of all generations to society. Adjustment of the
working environment to the ageing population can counteract the wasting of human resources while at the same
time contributing to the attainment of the Europe 2020 objectives. This requires a coordinated policy at European,
national, regional and local level based on a single vision of a society for all ages.

In a letter of 3 October 2012, AGE Platform Europe therefore calls on the Commission to launch a Covenant on
demographic change by analogy with the ‘Covenant of Mayors on energy and climate’ supported by the Commission.
This covenant must bring together local and regional authorities that want to promote solutions in the field of
innovation, smart health and a better life — in support of the ‘Active and healthy ageing’ plan. This proposal is also
supported by the Committee of the Regions.

1. Was the letter from AGE Platform Europe well received by the President of the Commission?

2. How does the Commission view the idea of a Covenant on demographic change?

3. Will the Commission take action to support the launching of the Covenant on demographic change?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

The Commission is well aware of the proposal for creating a covenant of mayors on demographic change as
supported by the AGE Platform Europe and the Committee of the Regions. Cities are typically in charge of providing
social, housing and transport services, of urban planning and of organising leisure, social and cultural activities.
Therefore local policy-makers play a major role in promoting active ageing and improving the quality of life of older
people.

For this reason the Commission has promoted during the European Year 2012 for Active Ageing and Solidarity
between Generations the network of age-friendly cities run by the World Health Organisation (WHO). As a follow-up
action to the European Year 2012 the Commission is preparing a joint project with the WHO to adapt the Global
Age-friendly Cities Guide of WHO to the European context and to develop a monitoring tool. This project in which
the AGE Platform and networks of European regions and cities (Eurocities, CEMR) will be involved could possibly
contribute to Covenant on demographic change. In the frame of the European Innovation Partnership on Active and
Healthy Ageing (EIP on AHA) ( [1] ) the Action Group on ‘Innovation for age-friendly, buildings cities and environments’
promotes an EU covenant on demographic change. The stakeholders committed to this Action Group will build and
run a campaign to gather political support for an EU covenant on demographic change. The Commission is
supporting their work and looks forward to the outcomes.

In order to promote the accessibility of EU cities to disabled persons and older people, the Commission organises
since 2010 the annual Access City Award ( [2)]

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) webgate.ec.europa.eu/eiponaha
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/award/index_en.htm

C 6 E / 532 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002900/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Minimuminkomen in Europa

In zijn resolutie van 15 november 2011 over het Europees platform tegen armoede en sociale uitsluiting
(P7_TA(2011)0495) roept het Parlement de Commissie op om de mogelijkheden te onderzoeken voor het nemen
van een wetgevingsinitiatief voor een economisch duurzaam minimuminkomen. De economische recessie treft de
meest kwetsbare burgers in veel lidstaten het zwaarste. Ook het risico op armoede bij gepensioneerden dreigt onder
druk van de vergrijzing en de financiële crisis toe te nemen. Dit bemoeilijkt het behalen van de Europa 2020doelstelling voor armoedebestrijding.

1. Welke maatregelen heeft de Commissie genomen in opvolging van bovengenoemde resolutie van het
Parlement?

2. Overweegt de Commissie specifieke maatregelen te nemen in de strijd tegen armoede bij gepensioneerden?

3. Wat is de positie van de Commissie aangaande de invoering van een onvoorwaardelijk minimuminkomen voor
iedere burger?

**Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie**

_(7 mei 2013)_

1. Het bevorderen van het minimuminkomen blijft een van de pijlers van de aanbeveling van de Commissie van
2008 over actieve inclusie. In haar op 20 februari 2013 aangenomen pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen ( [1] ) en
het daaraan gehechte werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie over actieve inclusie geeft de Commissie een
gedetailleerde analyse van de manier waarop de lidstaten de aanbeveling ten uitvoer hebben gelegd, waaruit de beste
praktijken in de EU naar voren komen. De Commissie werkt op verzoek van het Europees Parlement momenteel aan
de uitvoering van een proefproject van 1 miljoen EUR (2011) ter bevordering van de totstandbrenging van een
minimuminkomennetwerk en zal in de komende maanden de aanbesteding voor het tweede proefproject (1 miljoen
euro, 2012) van start laten gaan om het belang van het beschermen van het minimuminkomen in de lidstaten nog
meer onder de aandacht te brengen.

2. In het algemeen zijn gepensioneerden beter beschermd in de crisis dan andere leeftijdsgroepen die uitkeringen
ontvangen ( [2] ). Toch onderstreept de Commissie en het Comité voor sociale bescherming in het verslag over de
adequaatheid van de pensioenen ( [3] ) hoe belangrijk de hoogte van pensioenuitkeringen is voor het behalen van de
doelstelling voor armoedebestrijding in het kader van Europa 2020. Bovendien volgt de Commissie in het kader van
het Europees semester de ontwikkelingen in de armoedecijfers voor personen van 65 jaar en ouder en overweegt zij
de lidstaten te vragen of het nodig is deze kwestie in de landspecifieke aanbevelingen aan te kaarten.

3. Het standpunt van de Commissie over de minimale inkomenssteun komt tot uiting in de aanbeveling van de
Commissie van 2008 over actieve inclusie ( [4] ), en korter geleden ook in het pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen,
waarin de Commissie onder meer heeft aangekondigd samen met de lidstaten een gemeenschappelijke methode voor
referentiebudgets te zullen ontwikkelen, die bij moet dragen tot het opzetten van doelmatige en passende
inkomenssteun waarin rekening wordt gehouden met sociale behoeften op lokaal, regionaal en nationaal niveau ( [5] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 83 definitief: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en & catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OESO: Pensions Outlook: http://www.aafp.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/OECD-Pensions-Outlook.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Verslag over de adequaatheid van de pensioenen in de EU 2010-2050: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7805&langId=en.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Aanbeveling van de Commissie van 3 oktober 2008 over de actieve inclusie van personen die van de arbeidsmarkt zijn uitgesloten (2008/867/EG,

PB L 307 van 18 november 2008).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Zie de Mededeling van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement, de Raad, het Europees Economisch en Sociaal Comité en het Comité van de

Regio’s Naar sociale investering voor groei en cohesie — inclusief de uitvoering van het Europees Sociaal Fonds 2014-2020, COM/2013/083
final.

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 533

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002900/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Minimum income in Europe

In its resolution of 15 November 2011 on the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion
(P7_TA(2011)0495), the European Parliament calls on the Commission to explore the possibilities of taking a
legislative initiative for an economically sustainable minimum income. The recession hits the most vulnerable citizens
in many Member States the hardest. The risk of poverty among pensioners is also in danger of increasing under the
pressure of ageing and the financial crisis. This is an obstacle to the achievement of the Europe 2020 objective of
poverty reduction.

1. What steps has the Commission taken following the aforementioned resolution by Parliament?

2. Is the Commission considering taking specific steps in the fight against poverty among pensioners?

3. What is the Commission’s position on the introduction of an unconditional minimum income for every citizen?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

1. Promoting minimum income remains one of the pillars of the Commission Recommendation of 2008 on active
inclusion. In its Social Investment Package ( [1] ) adopted on 20 February 2013 and the annexed Staff Working
Document on active inclusion, the Commission makes a detailed analysis on how Member States implemented the
recommendation, evidencing best practices across the EU. The Commission is currently implementing a European
Parliament commissioned Pilot Project of EUR 1 million (2011) to promote the creation of a minimum income
network and will be launching in the next months the tender for the second Pilot Project (EUR 1 million, 2012) to
further advance the importance of minimum income protection in the Member States.

2. Generally, pensioners have been better protected in the crisis than other age groups drawing transfer benefits ( [2] ).
Yet, in the report on Pension Adequacy ( [3] ) the Commission with the Social Protection Committee has highlighted the
importance of the level of pension benefits for the ability to achieve the Europe 2020 poverty reduction target.
Moreover, in the context of the European Semester the Commission is monitoring developments in poverty rates for
people aged 65 and above and considering whether there is a need to ask Member States to address this in the
Country Specific Recommendations.

3. The Commission position on minimum income support is reflected in the 2008 Recommendation on active
inclusion ( [4] ), and more recently, in the Social Investment Package in which the Commission, among others,
announced the development together with the Member States of a common methodology on reference budgets to
help designing efficient and adequate income support that takes into account social needs identified at local, regional
and national level ( [5] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 83 final : http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OECD: Pensions Outlook:: http://www.aafp.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/OECD-Pensions-Outlook.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Report on Pension Adequacy in the EU 2010-2050: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7805&langId=en.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) See Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market (2008/867/EC published in

the OJ L. 307/11 of 18.11.2008).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion — including implementing the European Social Fund 20142020 /* COM/2013/083 final */.

( **|**

C 6 E / 534 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002901/13**
**an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(13. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ VP/HR — Wahlen in Kambodscha

Kambodschanischen Medien zufolge plant die Europäische Union die für den 28. Juli 2013 anberaumten
Parlamentswahlen durch die Entsendung zweier technischer Experten zu unterstützen. Diese sollen dem von allen
oppositionellen Kräften im Land abgelehnten National Election Commitee zur Seite stehen. Das National Election
Commitee hat im Vorfeld der kommenden Wahlen in Kambodscha die beiden Mitglieder des Parlaments Sam Rainsy
und Tioulong Saumara von der Wählerliste gestrichen und sie so ihres Rechtes wieder anzutreten beraubt.

1. Welche Entwicklungen in Kambodscha haben die Hohe Vertreterin zu dieser Maßnahme bewogen?

2. Hat sich der Auswärtige Dienst der Europäischen Union mit der gegenwärtigen Situation der Versammlungs‐
und Redefreiheit in Kambodscha, einer unverzichtbaren Voraussetzung für freie Wahlen, auseinandergesetzt?

3. Ist der Hohen Vertreterin bewusst, dass mit dieser Entscheidung die Gefahr besteht, dass die Europäische Union
als Feigenblatt benutzt wird, um einem undemokratischen Regime Legitimität zu verschaffen?

**Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(22. April 2013)_

1. Nach drei aufeinanderfolgenden EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen (EU-EOM) in den Jahren 2002, 2003 und
2008 standen die nächsten Parlamentswahlen vom Juli 2013 in Kambodscha nicht auf der Prioritätenliste für die
EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen im Jahr 2013. Die Entscheidung wurde nach Konsultationen mit den
Mitgliedstaaten und dem Europäischen Parlament getroffen. Die technische Wahlexpertenmission, die ein sehr eng
gefasstes Mandat hat, besteht aus zwei Sachverständigen. Sie werden den Wahlprozess verfolgen, den EU-Organen
darüber Bericht erstatten und auf die Empfehlungen der bisherigen EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen hinweisen.

2. Bei seinem Treffen mit dem kambodschanischen Premierminister Hun Sen anlässlich seines Besuches vom
2. bis 4. November 2012 in Kambodscha hat der Präsident des Europäischen Rates nachdrücklich hervorgehoben,
wie wichtig die Wahrung der Menschenrechte und die Rechtsstaatlichkeit sind, um günstige Rahmenbedingungen für
transparente, demokratische und allen offen stehende Wahlen zu schaffen, bei denen die Wähler, die Kandidaten und
die Kommentatoren ihre grundlegenden politischen Rechte ausüben können.

Im Anschluss rief der Leiter der EU-Delegation in Kambodscha am 18. Februar 2013 den kambodschanischen
Premierminister Hun Sen im Rahmen einer Demarche auf, ein offenes und förderliches Klima für die Wahlen im
Juli 2013 zu schaffen, u. a. in den Bereichen Versammlungsfreiheit und Meinungsfreiheit.

3. Die beiden technischen Sachverständigen sind keine Wahlbeobachter, da es sich nicht um eine
EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmission handelt, bei der die Methodik für EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen angewandt wird.
Sie sollen vielmehr als Fachleute den EU-Organen ein besseres Verständnis der lokalen Gegebenheiten ermöglichen.
Die Unterstützung der Behörden gehört daher nicht zu ihrem Mandat. Sie werden zudem Neutralität wahren und mit
allen Interessengruppen einschließlich der Opposition zusammentreffen.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 535

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002901/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Elections in Cambodia

Reports in the Cambodian press state that the EU is planning to send two technical experts to assist with the
parliamentary elections, due to take place on 28 July 2013. Their task will be to assist the National Election
Committee, which is rejected by all opposition groups in the country. In the build-up to the elections, the National
Election Committee has removed the names of the MPs Sam Rainsy and Tioulong Saumara from the voting list,
thereby depriving them of their right to stand again.

1. What developments in Cambodia have caused the High Representative to take this step?

2. Has the EU’s External Action Service taken issue with the current situation of the freedom of assembly and of
speech in Cambodia, which are an essential precondition for free elections?

3. Is the High Representative aware that this decision might cause the EU to be used as a front, veiling an
undemocratic regime in a cloak of legitimacy?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 April 2013)_

1. After three consecutive EU Election Observation Missions (EU EOMs) in 2002, 2003 and 2008, the priority list
for the EU EOMs in 2013 did not include Cambodia for the next parliamentary elections of July 2013. This decision
was adopted after consultations with the Member States and Parliament. The technical Election Expert Mission of two
experts, whose mandate is much narrower, will follow the electoral process and report to the EU institutions, as well
as underlining past EU EOM’s recommendations.

2. In his meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on the occasion of his visit to the country on 24 November 2012, the President of the European Council strongly underlined the importance of respect for Human
Rights and the rule of law to create an environment conducive to transparent, democratic and inclusive elections,
where the voter, the candidate and the commentator can exert their basic political rights.

As a follow-up, on the18 February 2013, the Head of the EU Delegation to Cambodia delivered a démarche to
Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen, calling for an open and conducive environment for the upcoming elections in
July 2013, including freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.

3. The two technical experts will not be election obervers, as there is no EU EOM applying the EU Election
Observation methodology. They will rather be specialists to help the EU institutions understand the vicissitudes of the
local context. In this regard, their mandate is not to help the authorities. They will also be neutral and meet all
stakeholders in the process including the opposition.

C 6 E / 536 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002902/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Creación de un consejo presupuestario independiente según el reglamento derivado de la propuesta
2011/0386(COD)

El artículo 4 de la propuesta de Reglamento sobre disposiciones comunes para el seguimiento y la evaluación de
proyectos de planes presupuestarios y para la corrección del déficit excesivo de los Estados miembros de la zona del
euro dice que los Estados miembros deberán crear un consejo presupuestario independiente ( [1] ).

En su considerando 10 quater se pone el énfasis en que se debe mantener un control sobre la ejecución del
presupuesto y se dice literalmente: «Como primer paso, los Estados miembros interesados deben llevar a cabo una
evaluación global de la ejecución presupuestaria de las administraciones públicas y sus subsectores». El objetivo es que
el gobierno no tome decisiones de forma discrecional que puedan laminar las decisiones tomadas en los presupuestos.

En los próximos meses, el Gobierno español hará una propuesta de ley para la creación de un consejo presupuestario
independiente. En el Estado español ha habido en los últimos años problemas con una ejecución discrecional del
presupuesto por parte del Gobierno ( [2] ).

A la luz de todo lo anterior, ¿cree la Comisión que el consejo presupuestario independiente debería también tener
poderes para analizar y asegurar la correcta y rigurosa ejecución del presupuesto, de acuerdo con el reglamento
derivado de la propuesta 2011/0386(COD)?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(18 de abril de 2013)_

Los consejos presupuestarios independientes desempeñan una función esencial de cara a favorecer la aplicación de
una política presupuestaria eficaz, fiable y realista, que permita lograr unas finanzas públicas sólidas y sostenibles.
Esta función está actualmente reconocida no solo en la teoría económica, sino también como característica
fundamental del marco de gobernanza económica reforzada de la Unión Europea. Las principales iniciativas políticas
a escala europea (la Directiva 2011/85/UE del Consejo, sobre los requisitos aplicables a los marcos presupuestarios de
los Estados miembros ( [3] ), el Tratado de Estabilidad, Coordinación y Gobernanza en la Unión Económica y Monetaria,
y los futuros dos Reglamentos relativos a un seguimiento presupuestario reforzado) prevén la creación de esos
órganos presupuestarios independientes, y especifican una serie de cometidos fundamentales, que van desde el
control del cumplimiento de las normas presupuestarias nacionales (entre ellas, las que incorporan el objetivo
presupuestario a medio plazo al ordenamiento jurídico nacional) a la aplicación del mecanismo de corrección
presupuestaria nacional conexo a una norma sobre el equilibrio presupuestario en términos estructurales. El
desempeño de estos cometidos exige, entre otras cosas, el control de la ejecución presupuestaria (a fin de poder
verificar si se cumplen las normas presupuestarias nacionales, por ejemplo).

Más allá de los cometidos obligatorios, los Estados miembros son libres de dotar a sus consejos presupuestarios de
funciones más amplias, al objeto de obtener mayor beneficio de los análisis y opiniones independientes que aquellos
puedan proporcionar en relación con aspectos esenciales de las políticas presupuestarias.

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( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013/03/08/el-gobierno-creara-un-lsquosheriffrsquo-que-haga-cumplir-con-el-deficit--116491/
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20121003/54352219840/gobierno-ejecuto-catalunya-35-presupuestado-frente-111-madrid.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) DO L 306 de 28.11.1996, p. 1.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 537

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002902/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Creation of an independent fiscal council in accordance with the regulation resulting from proposal
2011/0386(COD)

Article 4 of the proposal for a regulation on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans
and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area states that Member States must
create an independent fiscal council ( [1] ).

Recital 10c stresses the fact that control should be maintained over the execution of the budget. It states: ‘[a]s a first
step, Member States concerned should carry out a comprehensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the
general government and its sub-sectors’. The aim is to avoid the government taking discretionary decisions which
might distort decisions taken in the budgets.

In the next few months, the Spanish Government will draw up a proposal for a law for the creation of an independent
fiscal council. In recent years, Spain has experienced problems with discretionary execution of the budget by the
government ( [2] ).

In view of the above, does the Commission think that the independent fiscal council should also have powers to
analyse and ensure the correct and rigorous execution of the budget, in accordance with the regulation resulting from
proposal 2011/0386(COD)?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 April 2013)_

Independent fiscal councils are instrumental in supporting the pursuit of an effective, credible and realistic fiscal
policy with a view to achieving sound and sustainable public finances. This role is now recognised not only in the
economic theory, but also as an essential feature of the strengthened economic governance framework in the
European Union. Major policy initiatives at European level (Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for
budgetary frameworks of the Member States ( [3] ), the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union and the forthcoming ‘Two-Pack’ regulation on enhanced budgetary monitoring)
mandate the setting-up of such independent fiscal institutions and lay down a set of core tasks ranging from
monitoring compliance with national fiscal rules (including those incorporating the medium-term budgetary
objective in the national law) to their role in the implementation of the national fiscal correction mechanism
associated to a structural budget balance rule. Fulfilling these tasks would require inter alia monitoring of budgetary
execution (to be able to check compliance with national fiscal rules, for example).

Beyond the mandatory requirements, the Member States are free to define a broader remit for their fiscal councils in
order to benefit more extensively from the independent assessments and opinions they could provide on key aspects
of the national fiscal policy-making.

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( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013/03/08/el-gobierno-creara-un-lsquosheriffrsquo-que-haga-cumplir-con-el-deficit--116491/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20121003/54352219840/gobierno-ejecuto-catalunya-35-presupuestado-frente-111-madrid.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011.

C 6 E / 538 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002903/13**

**to the Commission**
**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Clarifications regarding Transparency Register review

The interinstitutional agreement of June 2011 on the establishment of a joint European Commission‐Parliament
Transparency Register foresees that the register shall be subject to a review no later than two years following its entry
into operation.

A recent EU Citizens opinion survey ( [1] ) conducted in six EU countries (Austria, Czech Republic, France, the
Netherlands, and the UK) of over 6 000 respondents found that 80% believe there should be mandatory regulation of
lobbying to ensure a balanced participation of different interests in decision-making. This is in line with the European
Parliament Resolution of May 2011 in favour of a mandatory register for lobbyists.

In addition, in a speech given on March 15 ( [2] ) Commissioner Maros Sefcovic mentioned a meeting with European
Parliament Vice-President for Transparency Rainer Wieland, where they discussed the timeline and the process for the
review of the transparency register (‘We met a few days ago to set our course and I can assure you that we both take
the review process very seriously. This is why we have decided to take the necessary time to develop our analysis and
our reflections in a timespan that allows for a wide range of consultations to take place both internally and
externally.’).

1. Following this meeting, can the Commission clarify what the proposed timeline for this review is and what
concrete steps it will take to make it a fully participative and open process?

2. According to what the Commissioner and Vice-President discussed, can the Commission clarify how the
Commission and the Parliament intend to ensure that the views and suggestions of the citizens concerning
improvement of the current Transparency Register can be fully expressed and taken into account in the forthcoming
review process?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

The review is a joint exercise between the European Parliament and the European Commission. It will consider the
views expressed by stakeholders during the public consultation held last year and during the process itself. The
Commission cannot comment more until the instances of the Parliament have adopted their own decision on how
they wish to proceed.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.foeeurope.org/EUcitizenspoll
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-235_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 539

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002905/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(13 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Sigarette elettroniche: chiarimenti sulla commercializzazione negli Stati membri e sugli studi scientifici
effettuati

In seguito alla risposta ricevuta alla mia interrogazione E-000463/2013 sul livello di sicurezza delle sigarette
elettroniche, la Commissione può chiarire:

—
se vi sono Stati membri in cui le sigarette elettroniche sono commercializzate come prodotti medicinali;

—
se in questi Stati si applica quindi la legislazione farmaceutica per quanto riguarda le vendite al consumatore
finale;

—
se, considerata la grandissima diffusione sul territorio italiano di rivendite di questi prodotti, ha valutato il
danno economico e l'impatto su tale mercato, nel caso entrassero in vigore le modifiche proposte dalla
Commissione nel documento COM(2012)0788 e tali prodotti venissero venduti solo nelle farmacie;

—
se vi sono studi scientifici che dimostrano la non pericolosità delle sigarette elettroniche;

—
se le sigarette elettroniche possono essere considerate uno strumento utile per smettere di fumare?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(8 maggio 2013)_

Gli Stati membri hanno finora seguito impostazioni differenti nel regolamentare le sigarette elettroniche. Circa la metà
degli Stati membri considera le sigarette elettroniche e gli altri prodotti contenenti nicotina come prodotti medicinali per
analogia funzionale ( [1] ).

La valutazione della Commissione sulle ripercussioni economiche della proposta è riportata nella valutazione d’impatto
della Commissione ( [2] ). Si ritiene che la proposta della Commissione in merito alla revisione della direttiva relativa ai
prodotti del tabacco ( [3] ) non abbia grandi ripercussioni sul mercato italiano. La proposta stabilisce che i prodotti
contenenti un determinato livello di nicotina siano soggetti alla normativa sui prodotti medicinali.

Secondo quanto affermato nella valutazione d’impatto le sigarette elettroniche attualmente in commercio suscitano
qualche perplessità in quanto a salute e sicurezza. Secondo alcuni studi le sigarette elettroniche possono tuttavia
essere uno strumento utile per smettere di fumare.

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( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2012)452 definitivo.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) SWD(2012)452 definitivo.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012)0788.

C 6 E / 540 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002905/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Electronic cigarettes: clarifications on marketing in Member States and the scientific studies carried out

Following the answer received to my Question E-000463/2013 on the safety of electronic cigarettes, can the
Commission clarify:

—
whether there are Member States in which electronic cigarettes are marketed as medicinal products?

—
whether in those States pharmaceutical legislation therefore applies to sales to final consumers?

—
whether, in view of the extremely widespread sale of these products in Italy, it has assessed the economic
damage to and impact on this market in the event of the entry into force of the amendments proposed by the
Commission in document COM(2012)0788, under which such products would be sold only in pharmacies?

—
whether there are any scientific studies demonstrating that electronic cigarettes are not dangerous?

—
whether electronic cigarettes may be considered a useful tool for stopping smoking?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Member States have so far taken different regulatory approaches to address electronic cigarettes. About half of the
Member States have reported that they consider electronic cigarettes and other nicotine containing products as medicinal
products by function ( [1] ).

The Commission's assessment of the economic impacts of the proposal is set out in the Commission's Impact
Assessment ( [2] ). The Commission's proposal for a revised Tobacco Products Directive ( [3] ) is not expected to impact
disproportionately on the Italian market. The proposal foresees that products which contain a certain nicotine level are
subject to the medicinal products' legislation.

As illustrated by the impact assessment, electronic cigarettes which are currently on the market are associated with a
number of health and safety concerns. However, some studies highlight electronic cigarettes' potential as smoking
cessation aid.

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SWD(2012) 452 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) SWD(2012) 452 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012)0788.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 541

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002906/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(13 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Scandalo della carne di cavallo: possibile correlazione con la crisi del settore ippico

Si moltiplicano i casi di cronaca che vedono gruppi alimentari operativi in tutta Europa ritirare i propri prodotti a
base di carne di manzo perché contenenti anche di carne di cavallo.

Nella mia interrogazione E-000483/2012 avevo sollevato il problema della crisi del settore ippico in Italia e in Europa
e del rischio che migliaia di animali prima destinati alle corse venissero inviati alla macellazione.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. intende far partire un'indagine per accertare le responsabilità delle aziende coinvolte;

2. se ritiene sospetto il fatto che prima dell'esposizione mediatica nessuno dei controlli, che dovrebbero essere
obbligatori da parte delle società in questione, sulle materie prime utilizzate per i propri preparati avessero
rivelato la presenza di dna di cavallo;

3. se ritiene possibile un legame fra i fatti sopra descritti e il recente scandalo;

4. se ha valutato il rischio che i cittadini europei abbiano consumato o consumino carne di animali destinati alle
corse, spesso trattati con antibiotici, anabolizzanti e ormoni nocivi per la salute degli esseri umani?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(8 maggio 2013)_

La Commissione sta seguendo attentamente lo scandalo della carne di cavallo venduta come carne di manzo. Le
autorità competenti dei rispettivi Stati membri stanno indagando in collaborazione con le autorità di polizia e
l’EUROPOL in merito alla frode suddetta.

La normativa UE non vincola gli Stati ad effettuare controlli per rilevare i tipi di carne effettivamente contenuti nei
vari prodotti. In quanto primi responsabili dei prodotti posti in commercio gli operatori del settore alimentare
effettuano controlli in base alla valutazione dei rischi e ai loro rispettivi piani di controllo. Dopo gli scandali recenti gli
operatori del settore alimentare hanno aumentato sensibilmente i controlli in materia.

Ai sensi delle norme vigenti ( [1] ) l’etichettatura degli alimenti non deve trarre in inganno i consumatori quanto alla
natura e al contenuto dei prodotti; tutti gli ingredienti devono essere indicati sull’etichetta e le etichette degli alimenti
contenenti carni devono anche indicare le specie animali di provenienza.

La Commissione non è in possesso di prove attestanti il legame tra gli scandali recenti e ciò cui l’onorevole
parlamentare ha fatto riferimento nella Sua domanda precedente.

La raccomandazione 2013/99/UE della Commissione ( [2] ) dispone che si metta a punto un piano d’azione specifico per
individuare eventuali residui di fenilbutazone nella carne equina. Uno degli obiettivi di tale raccomandazione consiste
nel valutare i rischi rappresentati per i consumatori da eventuali residui della sostanza sopra menzionata. I risultati di
tale valutazione avvalorano l’ipotesi che la carne equina destinata al consumo umano abbia una probabilità minima di
contenere residui di fenilbutazone (solo lo 0,51 % dei campioni conteneva effettivamente questa sostanza).

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2000, relativa al ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri

concernenti l’etichettatura e la presentazione dei prodotti alimentari, nonché la relativa pubblicità, GU L 109 del 6.5.2000, pag. 29.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:048:0028:0032:it:PDF.

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C 6 E / 542 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002906/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Horsemeat scandal: possible link with the crisis in the equestrian sector

There are increasing reports of cases where commercial food groups operating throughout Europe are withdrawing
their beef and veal products because they also contain horsemeat.

In my Question E-000483/2012 I raised the issue of the crisis in the equestrian sector in Italy and Europe, and the risk
that thousands of animals that had formerly been involved in racing would be sent for slaughter.

1. Does the Commission intend to launch an investigation to ascertain the responsibilities of the firms involved?

2. Does it find it suspicious that prior to the recent media focus, none of the checks on the ingredients used for
their own products, which ought to have been mandatory for the companies in question, had revealed the presence of
horse DNA?

3. Does it believe that there may be a link between the facts described above and the recent scandal?

4. Has it assessed the risk that European citizens have consumed or are consuming meat from animals intended for
racing, which have often been treated with antibiotics, anabolic steroids and hormones that are harmful to human
health?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

The Commission is closely following the situation with regard to horsemeat sold as beef. The competent Authorities
in the Member States together with police authorities and Europol are investigating how this fraud was possible.

Tests on the presence of different meat in meat products are not compulsory in the EU legislation. Food business
operators, as prime responsible for the products placed on the market, carry out checks based on a risk evaluation and
according to their own control plans. With the recent scandal, food business operators substantially increased their
own controls in this respect.

Moreover, under existing rules ( [1] ), the labelling of foods must not mislead the consumer as to their nature and
content, all food ingredients must be indicated on the label and the labelling of foods containing meat must also
indicate the animal species concerned.

The Commission does not have evidence of a possible link between the recent scandal and the fact described in your
previous question you refer to.

Commission Recommendation 2013/99/EU ( [2] ) put in place a specific action plan for the research of phenylbutazone
residues in horse meat. The scope of this recommendation is, _inter alia_, to assess the possible risk for consumers
related to the presence of residues of this substance in horse meat. Assessment of the results of this action plan
demonstrates that the risk that horse meat destined to human consumption contains phenylbutazone residues is very
low (0.51% of the samples were positive for the presence of this substance).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States

relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:048:0028:0032:EN:PDF

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 543

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002907/13**

**do Komisji**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

_(13 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Handel bronią między Białorusią a Sudanem

Agencje prasowe poinformowały, że na sudańskich lotniskach zauważono dostawy rakiet i samolotów. Według
panelu ekspertów ONZ Sudan i Białoruś ponownie łamią rezolucję Rady Bezpieczeństwa, dotyczącą embarga na
zakup broni przez Sudan.

Wojska rządowe wykorzystują zakupione od Białorusi rakiety S-8 oraz silnie opancerzone samoloty szturmowe Su25 przeciwko powstańcom w Darfurze.

Według Amnesty International podobnych praktyk dopuszczały się również Rosja i Chiny. Między innymi AI
odkryło, że w latach 2007-2009 Sudan otrzymał 36 nowych śmigłowców szturmowych Mi-24 od Rosji. Broń
dostarczana do Sudanu jest używana w Darfurze zarówno bezpośrednio przez Sudańskie Siły Zbrojne, jak i przez
bojówki wspierane przez rząd, takie jak Ludowe Siły Obronne.

Sprzęt wojskowy jest wykorzystywany także przeciwko cywilom zamieszkującym miejscowości i obozy
przeciwników Omara al-Bashira.

Ciągłe dostawy broni powodują przedłużanie konfliktu i cierpienia ludności cywilnej.

W związku z tym pytam:

1. Jakie działania zamierza podjąć Komisja w celu poprawienia standardów handlu bronią oraz skuteczniejszego
monitorowania i egzekwowania przestrzegania embarga na obrót bronią z państwami objętymi sankcjami?

2. Czy Komisja zamierza podjąć jakieś kroki wobec Białorusi w związku z powyższą sprawą?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(3 maja 2013 r.)_

Dążenie do większej przejrzystości i odpowiedzialności w zakresie handlu bronią jest od dawna jednym
z priorytetów polityki zagranicznej UE, czego przykładem jest wsparcie i zaangażowanie UE w proces
przygotowywania traktatu o handlu bronią w ramach Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ), w sprawie
którego niedawno pomyślnie zakończono negocjacje. Kolejnym przykładem jest udzielanie pomocy wielu
państwom trzecim leżącym w bliskim sąsiedztwie UE celem wzmocnienia krajowych systemów kontroli wywozu
broni (por. w tej kwestii wsparcie finansowe UE udzielone na mocy decyzji Rady 2009/42/WPZiB ( [1] );
2010/336/WPZiB ( [2] ); 2009/1012/WPZiB ( [3] ) oraz 2012/711/WPZiB ( [4] )). Ponadto, zgodnie z rezolucjami Rady
Bezpieczeństwa ONZ 1556 (2004 r.) i 1591 (2005 r.), UE wprowadziła dla Sudanu pełne embargo na broń,
zabraniające także _expressis verbis_ wszelkich działań, których skutkiem lub celem jest obejście tego środka (decyzja
Rady 2011/423/WPZiB ( [5] )).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Decyzja Rady 2009/42/WPZiB z dnia 19 stycznia 2009 r. w sprawie wspierania, w ramach europejskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa, działań UE

mających na celu promowanie w krajach trzecich procesu prowadzącego do zawarcia traktatu o handlu bronią, Dz.U. L 17 z 22.1.2009.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 2010/336/WPZiB: Decyzja Rady 2010/336/WPZiB z dnia 14 czerwca 2010 r. w sprawie działań UE wspierających traktat o handlu bronią

w ramach europejskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U. L 152 z 18.6.2010.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Decyzja Rady 2009/1012/WPZiB z dnia 22 grudnia 2009 r. w sprawie wspierania działań UE mających na celu propagowanie wśród państw

trzecich kontroli wywozu uzbrojenia oraz zasad i kryteriów wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 348 z 29.12.2009.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Decyzja Rady 2012/711/WPZiB z dnia 19 listopada 2012 r. w sprawie wsparcia dla działań Unii mających na celu propagowanie wśród państw

trzecich kontroli wywozu uzbrojenia oraz zasad i kryteriów wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 321 z 20.11.2012.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Decyzja Rady 2011/423/WPZiB z dnia 18 lipca 2011 r. dotycząca środków ograniczających skierowanych przeciwko Sudanowi i Sudanowi

Południowemu i uchylająca wspólne stanowisko 2005/411/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 188 z 19.7.2011.

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( **|**

( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 544 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Odnośnie do kwestii białoruskich dostaw broni dla Sudanu, dochodzenie w sprawie domniemanych naruszeń
embargo na broń nałożonych przez ONZ należy do właściwych Komitetów Sankcji ONZ oraz państw
członkowskich ONZ, które powinny zapewniać skuteczne wprowadzanie w życie środków ONZ. Ze swojej strony
UE zabroniła wywozu na Białoruś broni oraz sprzętu, które mogą być wykorzystywane do stosowania
wewnętrznych represji na mocy decyzji Rady 2012/642/WPZiB ( [6] ). Dlatego też nie powinno być możliwe
wywożenie broni pochodzącej z UE z Białorusi do Sudanu.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Decyzja Rady 2012/642/WPZiB z dnia 15 października 2012 r. dotycząca środków ograniczających skierowanych przeciwko Białorusi, Dz.U.
L 285 z 17.10.2012.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 545

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002907/13**

**to the Commission**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Arms trade between Belarus and Sudan

Press agencies have reported that deliveries of rockets and aircraft have been observed at Sudanese airports.
According to a panel of UN experts, Sudan and Belarus are once again violating the Security Council resolution which
placed an embargo on the sale of arms to Sudan.

Government forces are using S‐8 rockets and heavily armoured Su‐25 attack aircraft purchased from Belarus against
rebels in Darfur.

According to Amnesty International, Russia and China are also guilty of similar violations. For example, it was
revealed by the organisation that Sudan received 36 new Mi‐24 attack helicopters from Russia between 2007 and
2009. The arms supplied to Sudan are used in Darfur both directly by the Sudanese Armed Forces and by
government‐backed militias such as the People’s Armed Forces.

The military equipment is also used against civilians living in villages and camps housing the opponents of Omar alBashir.

The constant supply of weapons means that the conflict and the suffering of the civilian population are prolonged.

I would therefore like to ask:

1. What steps does the Commission intend to take to improve standards in the arms trade and to ensure more
effective monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the embargo on arms trading with countries subject
to sanctions?

2. Does the Commission intend to take any action against Belarus in connection with this matter?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

Making arms trade more transparent and responsible is among the EU's longstanding foreign policy priorities as
exemplified by the EU support to and involvement in the Arms Trade Treaty process within the United Nations (UN)
where negotiations were recently successfully concluded. It is also exemplified by the assistance to a number of third
countries in the EU's close neighbourhood in establishing more robust national arms export control systems (cf. in
this regard the EU financial support provided by Council Decisions 2009/42/CFSP ( [1] ); 2010/336/CFSP ( [2] );
2009/1012/CFSP ( [3] ) and 2012/711/CFSP ( [4] )). In addition, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004)
and 1591 (2005), the EU has a full arms embargo in force against Sudan, also expressis verbis prohibiting any
activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measure (Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP ( [5] )).

With regard to the issue of Belarusian arms supplies to Sudan, the investigation of alleged violations of UN arms
embargoes is the responsibility of the relevant UN sanctions committees and UN Member States who should ensure
effective implementation of UN measures. For its part, the EU has already prohibited the export of arms as well as
equipment which might be used for internal repression to Belarus under Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP ( [6] ).
Therefore it should not be possible for arms of EU origin to be exported from Belarus to Sudan.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2009/42/CFSP of 19 January 2009 on support for EU activities in order to promote among third countries the process leading

towards an Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy, OJ L 17, 22.1.2009.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 2010/336/CFSP: Council Decision 2010/336/CFSP of 14 June 2010 on EU activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the

European Security Strategy, OJ L 152, 18.6.2010.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP of 22 December 2009 on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the

principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third countries, OJ L 348, 29.12.2009.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP of 19 November 2012 on support for Union activities in order to promote, among third countries, the control

of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, OJ L 321, 20.11.2012.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP of 18 July 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Sudan and South Sudan and repealing Common

Position 2005/411/CFSP, OJ L 188, 19.7.2011.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, OJ L 285, 17.10.2012.

( **|**

( **|**

( **|**

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C 6 E / 546 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002909/13**

**al Consejo**
**Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) y Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Fundación Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe y su Presidenta

Durante la Sexta Cumbre de Jefes de Estado de la Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe, celebrada en Madrid, en
mayo del 2010, se decidió la creación de una «Fundación Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe». Dicha
Fundación empezó a funcionar el 7 de noviembre del 2011, con sede en Hamburgo (Alemania). En la misma fecha, la
excomisaria Benita Ferrero Waldner fue nombrada Presidenta de la Fundación.

¿De qué manera se eligió la presidencia de dicha fundación? ¿Quiénes participaron en el comité de selección? ¿Quién
propuso a la candidata austriaca?`¿Cuál fue el mecanismo de selección? ¿Se necesitó unanimidad o mayoría
cualificada? ¿De qué manera se eligió al Director General de la Fundación, Jorge Valdez, exembajador del Perú y
diplomático de su país desde 1974?

¿Sabía el comité de selección que ya en 2010 el Defensor del Pueblo inició una investigación por presunto conflicto
de intereses de la excomisaria, por haber favorecido a las mismas empresas privadas a las que sirve como miembro e
incluso presidenta de los consejos directivos (o supervisores)? ¿Para cuándo se esperan los resultados de la
investigación?

¿Puede el previsto cambio de estatus de la Fundación, al pasar de entidad de derecho alemán a fundación
internacional, con inviolabilidad de la organización e inmunidad de su dirección, tal como aspira su presidenta, tener
como consecuencia la nulidad de la investigación del Defensor del Pueblo y sus resultados? ¿La inmunidad tendría
consecuencias retroactivas, dispensando a la presidenta de posibles consecuencias disciplinarias?

La agenda de actividades de la Fundación muestra hasta la fecha un intensivo empeño promotor de intereses de
empresas europeas. ¿Hay un mecanismo de seguimiento dentro de la estructura de la Fundación que vigile la
concesión de fondos europeos y contratos para empresas europeas, con el objetivo de poner luz roja, en caso de
evidente privilegio de empresas cercanas a la presidenta? ¿Cuántos casos hay hasta ahora? ¿Cuáles son las empresas
europeas activas en los proyectos Desertec en el Norte de Africa, Bii Nee Stepa II en el istmo mexicano, y la excavación
del canal de Panamá, con apoyo de algún fondo público europeo? ¿En cuáles de ellas tiene un cargo Benita FerreroWaldner?

¿La Presidenta tiene estatus de miembro u observadora para LAIF (Mecanismo de Inversión en América Latina)?

**Respuesta**
_(22 de julio de 2013)_

La creación de la Fundación UE-ALC fue acordada por los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE y de América Latina
y el Caribe en la Cumbre UE-ALC celebrada en Madrid en 2010, con el objetivo de «reforzar nuestra asociación
birregional y … suscitar el debate sobre las estrategias y acciones comunes, así como para mejorar su visibilidad (…)»
(apartado 34 de la Declaración final).

La candidatura de Benita Ferrero-Waldner a la Presidencia de la Fundación UE-ALC fue presentada conjuntamente por
los 27 Estados miembros de la UE en la XXXIII [a] Reunión de Altos Funcionarios UE-ALC (integrada por representantes
de la Unión Europea, los 27 Estados miembros de la UE y de 33 países de América Latina y el Caribe), celebrada en
Bruselas el 25 de enero de 2011; los países de ALC acogieron positivamente dicha candidatura. El nombramiento fue
aprobado por unanimidad en la XXXIV [a] Reunión de Altos Funcionarios UE-ALC, celebrada en Santiago de Chile el
29 de abril de 2011. Los altos funcionarios señalaron que la Sra. Ferrero‐Waldner, en calidad de antigua ministra de
Asuntos Exteriores de Austria y Comisaria de Asuntos Exteriores, cumplía el requisito de ser una personalidad muy
conocida y respetada tanto en América Latina y el Caribe como en Europa. En la misma sesión, el embajador peruano
Jorge Valdez fue designado por unanimidad para el cargo de Director Ejecutivo de la Fundación, de acuerdo con el
principio de que si el Presidente designado proviene de un país de la UE, el Director Ejecutivo designado debe provenir
de un país de ALC, y viceversa.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 547

El Defensor del Pueblo pidió a la Comisión información relativa a la autorización de la Sra. Ferrero-Waldner de ejercer
actividades después de dejar su cargo. La Comisión manifestó claramente en sus intercambios con el Defensor del
Pueblo Europeo que consideraba que las preocupaciones del solicitante no se justifican y que no había conflicto de
intereses u otra incompatibilidad entre las actividades autorizadas y el mandato anterior de la Sra. Ferrero-Waldner
como Comisaria. Aún no se han enviado a la Comisión las conclusiones finales del Defensor del Pueblo sobre la

denuncia.

El Consejo de Gobierno de la Fundación, integrado por la UE y los 60 países UE-ALC, es el responsable del
seguimiento y control de las actividades de la Fundación, su Presidente y su Director Ejecutivo en general. Un
representante [del Parlamento Europeo] de la Mesa Directiva de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria UE-América
Latina […] (EUROLAT) y uno de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria ACP-UE tienen derecho a asistir a las reuniones
del Consejo de Gobierno en calidad de observadores.

La Fundación UE-ALC está actualmente sometida a la Legislación alemana. Aún no han concluido las negociaciones
para un Acuerdo Internacional de la UE. Lo más probable es que cualquier inmunidad concedida al personal de la
Fundación UE-ALC se defina posteriormente en un « _Accord de Siège_ » que se negocie con las autoridades alemanas,
siguiendo las normas de la Convención de Viena de 1961. Es muy probable que sólo se aplique a los actos realizados
por el personal de la Fundación en su condición oficial.

La Fundación UE-ALC no es responsable de la asignación de fondos del proyecto. Los deberes del Presidente de la
Fundación UE-ALC incluyen la representación de la Fundación en sus relaciones exteriores, garantizando un papel
visible y representativo a través de contactos de alto nivel con las autoridades de países, instituciones y socios de
América Latina y el Caribe y de la UE. Fomentar los contactos entre las comunidades empresariales de la UE y América
Latina y el Caribe es pues parte integrante, pero ciertamente no exclusiva, de las funciones de la Fundación. En cuanto
al control de los gastos, el Director Ejecutivo se encarga de mantener un sistema de control financiero que permita, en
todo momento, garantizar la regularidad y transparencia de las transacciones financieras de la Fundación y la
coherencia de los compromisos y los gastos con las asignaciones presupuestarias. En este sentido, se espera que la
Fundación publique en su momento un resumen de las cuentas y balances auditados en su sitio web.

Según la información de que dispone el Consejo, la Fundación UE-ALC no esta implicada ni presente en el Mecanismo
de Inversión en América Latina (LAIF.)

C 6 E / 548 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002909/13**

**an den Rat**
**Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) und Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Stiftung Europäische Union-Lateinamerika/Karibik und deren Präsidentin

Während des sechsten Gipfeltreffens der Staatschefs der Europäischen Union, Lateinamerikas und der Karibik, das im
Mai 2010 in Madrid stattgefunden hat, wurde die Gründung einer „Stiftung Europäische
Union-Lateinamerika/Karibik“ beschlossen. Diese Stiftung mit Sitz in Hamburg (Deutschland) nahm ihre Arbeit am
7. November 2011 auf. Zum gleichen Zeitpunkt wurde das ehemalige Mitglied der Kommission Benita
Ferrero-Waldner zur Präsidentin der Stiftung ernannt.

Auf welche Weise wurde das Führungspersonal dieser Stiftung gewählt? Wer war Mitglied der Auswahljury? Von
wem wurde die österreichische Kandidatin vorgeschlagen? Wie gestaltete sich das Auswahlverfahren? War
Einstimmigkeit oder eine qualifizierte Mehrheit erforderlich? Auf welche Weise wurde der Generaldirektor der
Stiftung Jorge Valdez, ehemaliger Botschafter Perus und seit 1974 im diplomatischen Dienst seines Landes tätig,
gewählt?

War sich die Auswahljury der Tatsache bewusst, dass der Bürgerbeauftragte bereits im Jahr 2010 gegen das ehemalige
Mitglied der Kommission eine Untersuchung aufgrund eines mutmaßlichen Interessenkonflikts eingeleitet hat, da sie
dieselben Privatunternehmen begünstigt haben soll, bei denen sie als Mitglied oder sogar als Vorsitzende in
Verwaltungs- (oder Aufsichts)räten fungiert? Wann wird mit den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung gerechnet?

Kann die vorgesehene Satzungsänderung der Stiftung, wenn sie von einer deutschen Körperschaft des öffentlichen
Rechts in eine internationale Stiftung mit der damit einhergehenden Unantastbarkeit der Einrichtung und Immunität
des Führungspersonals umgewandelt wird, dazu führen, dass gemäß der Bestrebungen der Präsidentin die Ermittlung
des Bürgerbeauftragten und deren Ergebnisse nicht verwendet werden dürfen? Würde die Immunität rückwirkend
gelten, so dass der Präsidentin mögliche disziplinarrechtliche Konsequenzen erspart blieben?

Durch die Agenda der Stiftung werden derzeit ausgeprägte Bemühungen ersichtlich, die Interessen von europäischen
Unternehmen zu fördern. Existiert innerhalb der Struktur der Stiftung ein Kontrollmechanismus, durch den die
Bereitstellung von europäischen Geldern und von Verträgen für europäische Unternehmen überwacht wird, um im
Falle einer offensichtlichen Bevorzugung von der Präsidentin nahestehenden Unternehmen die rote Karte zu zeigen?
Um wie viele Fälle handelt es sich bislang? Welche europäischen Unternehmen sind mit Unterstützung eines
öffentlichen europäischen Fonds im Rahmen der Projekte DESERTEC in Nordafrika, BII NEE STIPA II am
mexikanischen Isthmus und bei den Aushubarbeiten am Panamakanal tätig? In welchen von ihnen hat Benita
Ferrero-Waldner ein Amt inne?

Hat die Präsidentin im Rahmen der Investitionsfazilität für Lateinamerika (LAIF) den Status eines Mitglieds oder den
eines Beobachters?

**Antwort**
_(22. Juli 2013)_

Die Gründung der EU-LAK-Stiftung wurde von den Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU, Lateinamerikas und der
Karibik auf dem Gipfeltreffen EU-LAK im Jahr 2010 in Madrid mit dem Ziel beschlossen, „die Partnerschaft zwischen
unseren Regionen zu stärken und … eine Debatte über gemeinsame Strategien und Aktionen anzuregen und deren
Außenwirkung zu erhöhen (…)“ (Nummer 34 der Schlusserklärung).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 549

Frau Benita Ferrero-Waldner wurde gemeinsam von den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf der XXXIII. Tagung der Hohen
Beamten EU-LAK (in der Zusammensetzung von Vertretern der EU, der 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und von 33 Staaten
Lateinamerikas und der Karibik) am 25. Januar 2011 in Brüssel für das Amt der Präsidentin der EU-LAK-Stiftung
vorgeschlagen; diese Entscheidung wurde von den LAK-Staaten begrüßt. Die Ernennung von Frau Benita
Ferrero-Waldner wurde auf der XXXIV. Tagung der Hohen Beamten EU-LAK am 29. April 2011 in Santiago de Chile
einstimmig beschlossen. Die Hohen Beamten stellten fest, dass Frau Ferrero-Waldner als ehemalige Außenministerin
Österreichs und Kommissionsmitglied für Außenbeziehungen die Voraussetzung erfüllt, eine sowohl in
Lateinamerika und der Karibik als auch in Europa bekannte und hochgeschätzte Persönlichkeit zu sein. Auf derselben
Tagung wurde der peruanische Botschafter Jorge Valdez einstimmig zum geschäftsführenden Direktor der Stiftung
ernannt, was dem Grundsatz entspricht, dass im Fall der Besetzung des Amtes des Präsidenten mit einem
EU-Staatsangehörigen der geschäftsführende Direktor Staatsangehöriger eines LAK-Landes sein sollte und
umgekehrt.

Die an die Kommission gerichtete Anfrage des Bürgerbeauftragten betrifft die Zulässigkeit der Tätigkeit von Frau
Ferrero-Waldner nach Ablauf ihrer Amtszeit. Die Kommission hat in ihren Kontakten mit dem Europäischen
Bürgerbeauftragten klar herausgestellt, dass die Bedenken des Beschwerdeführers ihres Erachtens nicht gerechtfertigt
sind und kein Interessenkonflikt oder sonstige Unvereinbarkeit zwischen den genehmigten Tätigkeiten von Frau
Ferrero-Waldner und ihrem vorherigen Mandat als Kommissionsmitglied vorliegt. Das abschließende Urteil des
Bürgerbeauftragten zu der Beschwerde ist der Kommission nicht zugeleitet worden.

Der Gouverneursrat der Stiftung, in dem die EU und 60 Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik vertreten sind, ist für
die Beaufsichtigung und Kontrolle der Tätigkeiten der Stiftung, ihres Präsidenten und ihres geschäftsführenden
Direktors zuständig. Ein Vertreter des Europäischen Parlaments im Exekutivbüro der Parlamentarischen
Versammlung Europa-Lateinamerika (EUROLAT) und ein Vertreter der Paritätischen Parlamentarischen
Versammlung AKP-EU können als Beobachter an den Sitzungen des Gouverneursrates teilnehmen.

Die EU-LAK-Stiftung unterliegt derzeit deutschem Recht. Die Verhandlungen über ein internationales Abkommen
der EU dauern noch an. Die Frage der etwaigen Immunität des Personals der EU-LAK-Stiftung wird aller
Wahrscheinlichkeit nach in einem Sitzabkommen geregelt, das nach den Bestimmungen des Wiener
Übereinkommens von 1961 mit den deutschen Behörden auszuhandeln sein wird. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass
dies nur die dienstlichen Handlungen des Personals der Stiftung betreffen wird.

Die EU-LAK-Stiftung ist nicht für die Zuweisung von Projektmitteln zuständig. Zu den Aufgaben des Präsidenten der
EU-LAK-Stiftung gehört es, die Stiftung nach außen zu vertreten, indem er durch hochrangige Kontakte mit Behörden
der Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik und den Mitgliedstaaten, Organen und Partnern der EU eine sichtbare und
repräsentative Rolle spielt. Die Intensivierung von Kontakten zwischen Unternehmen der EU und der Staaten
Lateinamerikas und der Karibik ist daher eine wesentliche, sicher aber nicht die ausschließliche Aufgabe der Stiftung.
Was die Überwachung der Ausgaben betrifft, so unterhält der geschäftsführende Direktor ein Finanzkontrollsystem,
das es jederzeit ermöglicht, die Ordnungsmäßigkeit und Transparenz der Finanztransaktionen der Stiftung und die
Vereinbarkeit der Mittelbindungen und Ausgaben mit den Mittelzuweisungen sicherzustellen. Diesbezüglich ist die
Stiftung gehalten, zu gegebener Zeit eine Zusammenfassung der Rechungsprüfungen und Bilanzen auf ihrer Website
zu veröffentlichen.

Nach den Informationen des Rates ist die EU-LAK-Stiftung an der Investitionsfazilität für Lateinamerika (LAIF) weder
beteiligt noch in ihr vertreten.

C 6 E / 550 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002909/13**

**aan de Raad**
**Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) en Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ De Stichting Europese Unie-Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied en de voorzitter daarvan

Op de zesde topbijeenkomst van de staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van de EU en Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch
gebied, die in mei 2010 plaatsvond in Madrid, is besloten om een „Stichting Europese Unie-Latijns-Amerika en het
Caribisch gebied” op te richten. Deze stichting, met hoofdkantoor in Hamburg (Duitsland), is sinds 7 november 2011
actief. Op diezelfde datum werd voormalig Europees commissaris Benita Ferrero-Waldner tot voorzitter van de
stichting benoemd.

Op welke wijze is de voorzitter van deze stichting gekozen? Wie waren de leden van het selectiecomité? Wie heeft de
Oostenrijkse kandidaat voorgesteld? Hoe verliep de selectie? Was er eenparigheid van stemmen of een gekwalificeerde
meerheid nodig? Hoe is de algemeen directeur van de stichting, Jorge Valdez, voormalig ambassadeur van Peru en
Peruaans diplomaat sinds 1974, gekozen?

Wist het selectiecomité dat het Openbaar Ministerie al in 2010 een onderzoek naar de voormalige commissaris
wegens vermoedelijke belangenvermenging heeft geopend omdat zij particuliere bedrijven zou hebben bevoordeeld
waarin zij lid of zelfs voorzitter van de raad van bestuur (of raad van toezicht) was? Wanneer worden de resultaten
van het onderzoek verwacht?

Kan de door de voorzitter gewenste wijziging van de statuten van de stichting, die van vereniging naar Duits recht zou
worden omgevormd tot internationale stichting, waardoor de organisatie en haar bestuur onschendbaar zouden
worden, tot gevolg hebben dat het onderzoek van het Openbaar Ministerie en de resultaten daarvan nietig worden?
Zou de onschendbaarheid terugwerkende kracht hebben, waardoor de voorzitter mogelijke disciplinaire gevolgen
zou ontlopen?

Tot nog toe blijkt uit de activiteitenagenda van de stichting dat zij zich sterk inspant om de belangen van Europese
bedrijven te behartigen. Is er binnen de structuur van de stichting een monitoringmechanisme om toezicht te houden
op de toekenning van Europese financiering en contracten aan Europese bedrijven, zodat het sein op rood kan
worden gezet in geval van duidelijke bevoordeling van bedrijven die nauwe banden hebben met de voorzitter?
Hoeveel gevallen zijn er tot nog toe? Welke Europese bedrijven zijn betrokken bij de projecten Desertec in NoordAfrika en Bii Nee Stipa II in de Mexicaanse landengte en bij het uitdiepen van het Panamakanaal? In welke van die
bedrijven heeft Benita Ferrero-Waldner een functie?

Heeft de voorzitter de status van lid of waarnemer bij de Investeringsfaciliteit voor Latijns-Amerika (LAIF)?

**Antwoord**
_(22 juli 2013)_

De staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van de EU, Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied hebben tijdens de top EULAC van Madrid in 2010 tot oprichting van de EU-LAC-stichting besloten om „ons biregionaal partnerschap te
versterken en … een debat op gang te brengen over gemeenschappelijke strategieën en acties alsook de zichtbaarheid
ervan te vergroten (…)” (punt 34 van de slotverklaring).

De kandidatuur van Benita Ferrero-Waldner voor het voorzitterschap van de EU-LAC-stichting is gezamenlijk door de
27 lidstaten van de EU voorgedragen tijdens de XXXIIIe bijeenkomst van hoge ambtenaren van de EU-LAC te Brussel
op 25 januari 2011 (waarop vertegenwoordigers van de EU, de 27 lidstaten van de EU en 33 Latijns-Amerikaanse en
Caribische landen aanwezig waren); de LAC-landen waren daarmee ingenomen. Haar benoeming werd unaniem
goedgekeurd tijdens de XXXIVe bijeenkomst van hoge ambtenaren van de EU-LAC te Santiago de Chile op 29 april
2011. De hoge ambtenaren namen er nota van dat mevrouw Ferrero-Waldner, als voormalig Oostenrijks minister
van Buitenlandse Zaken en Commissielid voor Externe Betrekkingen, voldeed aan de eis zowel in Latijns-Amerika en
het Caribisch gebied als in Europa een bekende en zeer gerespecteerde persoonlijkheid te zijn. Tijdens dezelfde
bijeenkomst werd de Peruviaanse ambassadeur Jorge Valdez met eenparigheid van stemmen tot uitvoerend directeur
van de stichting benoemd, volgens het principe dat indien de benoemde voorzitter afkomstig is uit een land van
de EU, de benoemde uitvoerend directeur uit een land van de LAC afkomstig moet zijn, en omgekeerd.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 551

Het onderzoek van de ombudsman richt zich op de Commissie wat betreft de toestemming voor de activiteiten van
mevrouw Ferrero-Waldner na haar ambt. De Commissie heeft in haar contacten met de Europese ombudsman
duidelijk verklaard dat de bezwaren van de klager volgens haar niet gerechtvaardigd zijn en dat er geen
belangenconflict of andere onverenigbaarheid is tussen de activiteiten waarvoor toestemming is verleend en het
voormalige mandaat van mevrouw Ferrero‐Waldner als Commissielid. De definitieve conclusies van de ombudsman
over de klacht zijn nog niet aan de Commissie toegezonden.

De raad van bestuur van de stichting, die is samengesteld uit de EU en de 60 landen van de EU‐LAC, is
verantwoordelijk voor het algemene toezicht en de algemene controle op de activiteiten van de stichting, haar
voorzitter en haar uitvoerend directeur. Eén vertegenwoordiger van het Europees Parlement in het uitvoerend bureau
van de Euro-Latijns-Amerikaanse Parlementaire Vergadering (Eurolat) en één van de Paritaire Parlementaire
Vergadering ACS-EU zijn gerechtigd de vergaderingen van de raad van bestuur als waarnemer bij te wonen.

De EU-LAC-stichting werkt momenteel onder Duits recht. De onderhandelingen over een internationale
overeenkomst van de EU lopen nog. Eventuele aan het personeel van de EU‐LAC‐stichting verleende immuniteit zal
later zeer waarschijnlijk worden vastgelegd in een „ _Accord de Siège_ ”, waarover met de Duitse autoriteiten zal worden
onderhandeld overeenkomstig de regels van het Verdrag van Wenen van 1961. Het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat
het alleen van toepassing zal zijn op handelingen die door personeelsleden van de stichting in hun officiële
hoedanigheid worden gesteld.

De EU-LAC-stichting is niet verantwoordelijk voor de toewijzing van projectfinanciering. De voorzitter van de EULAC-stichting heeft onder meer tot taak de stichting in haar externe betrekkingen te vertegenwoordigen en daarbij
een zichtbare en representatieve rol te spelen door middel van contacten op hoog niveau met autoriteiten van LatijnsAmerika en het Caribisch gebied en landen, instellingen en partners in de EU. Het bevorderen van contacten tussen
het bedrijfsleven van de EU, Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied maakt daarom integraal maar zeker niet
uitsluitend deel uit van de werkzaamheden van de stichting. Wat het toezicht op de uitgaven betreft, heeft de
uitvoerend directeur tot taak een systeem van financiële controle te handhaven waarmee te allen tijde de
regelmatigheid en de transparantie van de financiële transacties van de stichting alsook de samenhang van de
vastleggingen en de uitgaven met de begrotingstoewijzingen kunnen worden gewaarborgd. In dit verband wordt van
de stichting verwacht dat zij tijdig een overzicht van de gecontroleerde rekeningen en balansen op haar website
publiceert.

Volgens de informatie waarover de Raad beschikt, is de EU-LAC-stichting niet betrokken bij noch aanwezig in de
investeringsfaciliteit voor Latijns-Amerika (LAIF).

C 6 E / 552 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002909/13**

**to the Council**
**Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) and Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation and its president

During the Sixth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union, Latin America and the
Caribbean, held in Madrid in May 2010, the decision was taken to create a ‘European Union-Latin America and
Caribbean Foundation’. The foundation took up its activities on 7 November 2011 and is headquartered in Hamburg,
Germany. On the same date, former Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was appointed president of the
foundation.

How was the presidency of the foundation decided upon? Who took part in the selection panel? Who proposed the
Austrian candidate? What was the selection process? Was unanimity or a qualified majority required? How was the
foundation’s executive director, Jorge Valdez, former ambassador of Peru and a Peruvian diplomat since 1974,
chosen?

Was the selection panel aware that back in 2010 the European Ombudsman launched an investigation into an alleged
conflict of interests on the part of the former Commissioner, for having favoured the same private enterprises in
which she served on, or even chaired, the board of directors (or supervisory board)? When are the results of the
investigation due?

Could the foundation’s planned change of status, from an entity governed by German law to an international
foundation, meaning inviolability for the organisation and immunity for its directors, which its president is
advocating, result in the European Ombudsman’s investigation and its results becoming null and void? Will immunity
be retroactive, exempting the president from possible disciplinary measures?

The foundation’s agenda of activities has to date shown intensive efforts to promote the interests of European
enterprises. Is there a monitoring mechanism within the foundation’s structure to scrutinise the allocation of
European funds and contracts to European enterprises, with the aim of flagging up instances of enterprises close to
the president being given clear preferential treatment? How many cases have there been to date? Which European
enterprises are actively involved in the Desertec projects in North Africa, Bii Nee Stipa II in the Mexican isthmus, and
the excavation of the Panama Canal, with support from European public funds? In which of these enterprises does
Benita Ferrero-Waldner hold a post?

Does the president have member or observer status for the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF)?

**Reply**
_(22 July 2013)_

The creation of the EU-LAC Foundation was agreed by the EU and Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and
Government at the EU-LAC Summit held in Madrid in 2010, with the objective of ‘strengthening our bi-regional
partnership and … triggering debate on common strategies and actions as well as enhancing its visibility (…)’
(paragraph 34 of the Final Declaration).

The candidature of Benita Ferrero-Waldner for President of the EU-LAC Foundation was presented jointly by the 27
EU Member States at the XXXIII EU-LAC Senior Officials Meeting (composed of representatives of the EU, the 27 EU
Member States and 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries) held in Brussels on 25 January 2011; it was
welcomed with satisfaction by the LAC countries. Her appointment was agreed by unanimity at the XXXIV EU-LAC
Senior Officials Meeting held in Santiago de Chile on 29 April 2011. The Senior Officials noted that Ms FerreroWaldner, as former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commissioner for External Relations, fulfilled the
requirement to be a well-known and highly respected personality both in Latin America and the Caribbean and in
Europe. At the same meeting, Peruvian Ambassador Jorge Valdez was appointed by unanimity to the post of
Executive Director of the Foundation, according to the principle that if the appointed President comes from an EU
country, the appointed Executive Director should come from a LAC country, and vice versa.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 553

The Ombudsman enquiry is addressed to the Commission regarding the authorisation of Ms Ferrero-Waldner's postoffice activities. The Commission has clearly stated in its dealings with the European Ombudsman that it considers
that the complainant's concerns are not justified and that there is no conflict of interest or other incompatibility
between the authorised activities and Ms Ferrero-Waldner's previous mandate as Commissioner. The Ombudsman's
final conclusions on the complaint have not yet been sent to the Commission.

The Board of Governors (BoG) of the Foundation, composed of the EU and the 60 EU-LAC countries, is responsible of
the overall monitoring and control of the activities of the Foundation, its President and its Executive Director. One
European Parliament representative from the Executive Bureau of the EU-Latin America Joint Parliamentary
Assembly (EUROLAT), and one from the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, are entitled to attend meetings of the
BoG as observers.

The EU-LAC Foundation currently operates under the aegis of German Law. The negotiations for an International
Agreement of the EU are still ongoing. Any immunity granted to the staff of the EU-LAC Foundation will most likely
be defined subsequently in an ‘ _Accord de Siège_ ’ to be negotiated with the German authorities following the rules of the
1961 Vienna Convention. It is very likely that it will apply only to acts performed by the Foundation's staff in their
official capacity.

The EU-LAC Foundation is not responsible for allocating project funding. The duties of the President of the EU-LAC
Foundation include representing the Foundation in its external relations, ensuring a visible and representative role
through high-level contacts with authorities from Latin American and Caribbean and EU countries, institutions and
partners. Fostering contacts between EU and Latin American and Caribbean business communities is therefore an
integral but certainly not exclusive part of the Foundation's work. As for the monitoring of expenditure, the Executive
Director is tasked with maintaining a system of financial control that makes it possible, at all times, to ensure the
regularity and transparency of the Foundation's financial transactions and the consistency of the commitments and
expenses with budgetary allocations. In this regard, the Foundation will in due time be expected to publish a summary
of the audited accounts and balance sheets on its website.

According to the information available to the Council, the EU-LAC Foundation is neither involved nor present in the
Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF.)

C 6 E / 554 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002913/13**
**à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

**Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ VP/HR — Situation des droits fondamentaux au Tibet

Le 14 décembre 2012, Catherine Ashton, Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique
de sécurité et Vice-présidente de la Commission européenne, faisait une déclaration (17831/1/12 — Presse 535), au
sujet de la situation tragique au Tibet.

Cette déclaration faisait notamment écho à la résolution du Parlement européen du 14 juin 2012, qui appelait le
représentant spécial de l'Union européenne pour les Droits de l'homme à faire régulièrement état de la situation des
Droits de l'homme au Tibet, et qui demandait à la Vice-présidente de la Commission/Haute Représentante de l'Union
pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité de l'Union européenne de nommer un coordinateur spécial dont
le mandat consisterait à établir régulièrement des rapports sur le Tibet.

S'indignant expressément du recours croissant de certains tibétains à l'immolation, (situation effectivement alarmante
avec 107 immolations depuis 2009) Catherine Ashton a exprimé, en décembre 2012, ses inquiétudes face aux
restrictions des droits civils, politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels des tibétains. À cet égard, elle a sommé les
autorités chinoises de respecter le droit d'assemblée des Tibétains ainsi que leur liberté d'expression tout en
demandant la libération des prisonniers politiques détenus au seul motif de leur participation pacifique à des
manifestations. Par ailleurs, la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a appelé la Chine à garantir le libre accès des
journalistes et diplomates aux régions autonomes tibétaines.

Dans le contexte politique tragique que connait le Tibet, et sachant que sa situation ne semble pas s'améliorer depuis
le mois de décembre dernier, la Commission peut-elle nous fournir des éléments quant aux suites qui ont été données
à cette déclaration?

À titre d'exemple, l'envoi d'une mission au Tibet a-t-il été envisagé afin de rendre compte de la situation des droits
fondamentaux? La nomination d'un coordinateur spécial est-elle d'actualité? La situation du peuple tibétain a-t-elle été
régulièrement évoquée lors des différentes réunions avec des représentants de la République populaire de Chine?
Comment la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante compte-t-elle poursuivre le traitement de la situation au Tibet?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Catherine Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission**

_(22 mai 2013)_

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante partage les préoccupations de l'Honorable Parlementaire sur la situation des
Droits de l'homme au Tibet. Tout au long de l'année 2012, elle a accordé une attention particulière à ce thème,
comme en témoignent le discours qu'elle a prononcé devant le Parlement européen le 12 juin 2012 et sa déclaration
sur les immolations au Tibet du 14 décembre 2012. La situation dans les régions habitées par les Tibétains a été
évoquée à plusieurs reprises au sein du Conseil des Droits de l'homme et de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies.
Les préoccupations de l'UE ont également été exprimées lors de réunions bilatérales.

L'UE estime que le dialogue UE-Chine sur les Droits de l'homme constitue un canal important pour discuter des
questions liées aux Droits de l'homme en Chine.

L'UE a invité à plusieurs reprises les autorités chinoises à veiller au respect des droits civils, politiques, économiques,
sociaux et culturels du peuple tibétain, y compris de son droit à la liberté d'expression et à la liberté de réunion, ainsi
que de son droit d'avoir sa propre vie culturelle, de pratiquer sa propre religion et d'utiliser sa propre langue. Comme
la situation ne s'est guère améliorée, l'UE continuera d'agir dans ce domaine en 2013, en suivant la situation de près et
en soulevant la question dans le cadre du prochain dialogue UE-Chine sur les Droits de l'homme et au sein des
enceintes internationales.

L'UE n'a pas l'intention de nommer un coordinateur spécial pour le Tibet, étant donné que la Chine et les territoires
tibétains font également partie des questions relevant de la responsabilité du représentant spécial de l'UE pour les
Droits de l'homme, M. Stavros Lambrinidis.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 555

La délégation de l'UE en Chine suit de près l'évolution de la situation sur le terrain, notamment par des visites. Bien
que l'UE ait invité à plusieurs reprises les autorités chinoises à permettre aux diplomates et aux journalistes d'accéder
librement au Tibet, l'accès demeure restreint dans la plupart des régions habitées par les Tibétains.

C 6 E / 556 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002913/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Fundamental rights in Tibet

On 14 December 2012, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, issued a declaration (17831/1/12 — PRESSE 535) on the tragic
situation in Tibet. This declaration echoed the European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2012, which called on
the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to report regularly on the human rights situation in Tibet and urged
the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to
appoint a special coordinator with a mandate to report regularly on Tibet.

In December 2012, deeply concerned by the increasing number of Tibetans committing self-immolation (a
particularly alarming situation with 107 self-immolations since 2009), Baroness Ashton expressed her concerns
about curbs on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Tibetan people. In this regard, she called
upon the Chinese authorities to respect the rights of Tibetans to assembly and expression and to release political
prisoners detained solely for taking part in peaceful demonstrations. The High Representative also urged the Chinese
authorities to allow free access to all Tibetan autonomous areas for diplomats as well as for international journalists.

In view of the tragic political situation in Tibet and given that it does not seem to have improved since last December,
can the Commission say what action has been taken following this declaration?

Is there a plan to send a mission to Tibet to report on the fundamental rights situation there, for instance? Is the
appointment of a special coordinator in progress? Has the situation of the Tibetan people been regularly raised at the
various meetings with the representatives of the People’s Republic of China? How does the High Representative
intend to deal with the situation in Tibet?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2013)_

The HR/VP shares the Honourable Member's concern over the human rights situation in Tibet. Throughout 2012,
HR/VP paid particular attention to this topic, as exemplified by her speech before the European Parliament on
12 June 2012 and the statement on Tibetan self-immolations of 14 December 2012. The situation in Tibetaninhabited areas was raised several times at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly of the UN. The EU's
concerns were also raised during bilateral meetings.

The EU believes that the EU-China human rights dialogue constitutes an important channel for discussion of human
rights issues in China.

The EU has repeatedly called upon the Chinese authorities to ensure that the civil, political, economic, as well as social
and cultural rights of the Tibetan people are respected, including their right to freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly, as well as to enjoy their own culture, to practise their own religion and to use their own language. As the
situation has yet to improve, the EU will maintain its commitment in 2013, and will continue to monitor the
situation closely, raise it the framework of the next EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and international fora.

The EU does not intend to appoint a Special Coordinator for Tibet, as China and Tibetan areas are also part of the
issues covered by the EU's Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis.

The EU Delegation in China is closely following developments on the ground, including through visits. The EU has
repeatedly called on the Chinese authorities to allow unimpeded access to Tibet for diplomats and journalists.
Nevertheless, access remains restricted in most Tibetan-inhabited areas.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 557

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002914/13**

**à la Commission**
**Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et régions ultrapériphériques de l'Union européenne

La communication de la Commission COM(2012)0287 du 20 juin 2012 insiste sur la nécessité de promouvoir, dans
les régions ultrapériphériques (RUP) de l'Union, une économie plus efficace dans l'utilisation des ressources, plus verte
et plus compétitive, afin d'aider ces régions à devenir plus autonomes, plus solides sur le plan économique et mieux à
même de créer des emplois durables.

Le rapport sur la future politique commune de la pêche, voté et adopté au sein du Parlement il y a quelques mois, ne
contient pas l'article 349 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Cela signifie que les règles de la PCP
seront appliquées de façon indifférenciée pour les RUP françaises. Alors que le volet interne de la PCP encadre de
façon si drastique les aides à la structuration de la filière de la pêche, son volet externe conduit l'Union à encourager le
développement dans des pays potentiellement concurrents. En effet, l'Union conclut des accords de libre-échange
avec des pays situés dans l'environnement géographique direct des RUP françaises, fragilisant ainsi l'économie locale.

Il existe donc aujourd'hui des incohérences entre la politique commerciale de l'Union et les politiques internes en
matière de pêche.

1. Quelles clauses peuvent être mises en place pour assurer que les régions ultrapériphériques ne se trouvent pas
dans une situation de concurrence déloyale?

2. De quels instruments la Commission dispose-t-elle pour faciliter au maximum la jonction du volet interne et
externe de sa politique commune de la pêche?

3. Comment la Commission prend-elle en compte, dans les négociations des accords de partenariat dans le
domaine de la pêche, les objectifs spécifiques fixés par l'Union pour les RUP, et comment peut-elle évaluer les effets
sur ces régions et sur les pays et territoires d'outre-mer des accords commerciaux qu'elle négocie?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Damanaki au nom de la Commission**

_(3 juin 2013)_

La politique commune de la pêche (PCP) tient compte des circonstances particulières et des besoins spécifiques des
régions ultrapériphériques avec, par exemple, le règlement (CE) n° 791/2007 du Conseil instaurant un régime de
compensation des surcoûts qui grèvent l'écoulement de certains produits de la pêche provenant de régions
ultrapériphériques, à savoir des Açores, de Madère, des Îles Canaries, de la Guyane française et de la Réunion ( [1] ). Les
propositions de réforme de la PCP s'inscrivent dans cette ligne d'action, qu'elles améliorent même, la Commission
ayant proposé de l'élargir à toutes les régions ultrapériphériques de l'UE.

La dimension externe de la PCP, en particulier les négociations menées dans le cadre d'accords de partenariat dans le
domaine de la pêche et, à un niveau multilatéral, au sein des organisations régionales de gestion des pêches, implique
une consultation étroite des États membres, qui informent la Commission des besoins particuliers de leurs régions. De
plus, tout accord externe dans le contexte de la PCP doit obtenir, avant son adoption par le Conseil, le consentement
du Parlement européen, conformément à l'article 218 du TFUE.

En ce qui concerne les accords commerciaux, lorsqu'elle propose de négocier un nouvel accord, la Commission
fournit une analyse d'impact qui, le cas échéant, examine les intérêts des régions ultrapériphériques.

De plus, l'UE peut également tenir compte des intérêts des régions ultrapériphériques lors de la négociation d'un
accord commercial avec les pays voisins de celles-ci ou dans des accords commerciaux qui couvrent des biens et des
services produits dans les régions ultrapériphériques. Cette analyse est généralement effectuée dans le contexte d'une
évaluation de l'impact sur le développement durable.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 791/2007 du Conseil du 21 mai 2007 instaurant un régime de compensation des surcoûts qui grèvent l'écoulement de certains

produits de la pêche provenant de régions ultrapériphériques, à savoir des Açores, de Madère, des îles Canaries, de la Guyane française et de la
Réunion, JO L 176 du 6.7.2007.

C 6 E / 558 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002914/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Common fisheries policy (CFP) and the outermost regions of the European Union

The communication from the Commission COM(2012) 287 of 20 June 2012 stresses that a more resource-efficient,
greener and more competitive economy should be promoted in the outermost regions of the Union in order to help
those regions become more self-reliant, economically more robust and better able to create sustainable jobs.

The report on the future common fisheries policy adopted by Parliament a few months ago takes no account of
Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. That means that CFP rules will apply
indiscriminately to the French outermost regions. Whereas the internal dimension of the CFP limits subsidies for the
restructuring of the fisheries sector quite drastically, its external dimension means that the Union is encouraging
development in countries that are potential competitors. The Union is entering into free trade agreements with
countries that are in geographic proximity to French outermost regions, thereby undermining the local economy.

The Union’s trade policy is therefore out of line with its internal fisheries policies.

1. What measures can be taken to ensure that the outermost regions are not put at an unfair competitive
disadvantage?

2. What instruments does the Commission have to square the internal and external dimensions of its common
fisheries policy?

3. When negotiating fisheries partnership agreements, how does the Commission take account of the Union’s
specific objectives in respect of the outermost regions and what impact does the Commission think the trade
agreements it negotiates have on those regions and on overseas countries and territories?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 June 2013)_

The common fisheries policy (CFP) takes into account the special circumstances and special needs of outermost
regions, for instance, with Regulation (EC) No 791/2007 introducing a scheme to compensate for the additional costs
incurred in the marketing of certain fishery products from the outermost regions Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands,
French Guiana and Reunion ( [1] ). The proposals for the reform of the CFP continue this line of action and also improve
it since the Commission has proposed to enlarge it to all outermost regions of the EU.

The external dimension of the CFP, and in particular the negotiations conducted in the framework of fisheries
partnership agreements and, at the multilateral level, in regional fisheries management organisations, involves close
consultation with Member States, which transmit to the Commission the special needs of their regions. Furthermore,
any external agreement in the framework of the CFP requires, before its adoption by the Council, the consent of the
European Parliament, in accordance with Article 218 TFUE.

With regard to trade agreements, where the Commission proposes to negotiate a new agreement, it provides an
Impact Assessment and where relevant, this assessment looks at outermost regions (OR) interests.

In addition, the EU may also take account of the interests of the ORs during the negotiation of a trade agreement with
their neighbours or when trade agreements cover goods and services produced in the ORs. This analysis is usually
carried in the context of a Sustainable Impact assessment (SIA).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 791/2007 of 21 May 2007 introducing a scheme to compensate for the additional costs incurred in the marketing of
certain fishery products from the outermost regions the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, French Guiana and Réunion, OJ L 176, 6.7.2007.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 559

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002915/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(13 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ένταξη επένδυσης Τοπλού στο «fast track»

Σκιές διαπλοκής παρατηρούνται στο Υπουργείο Ανάπτυξης. Στις 12 Φεβρουαρίου 2013 κατατέθηκε στο ελληνικό
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας προσφυγή (αίτηση ακύρωσης) κατά της απόφασης της Διυπουργικής Επιτροπής Στρατηγικών
Επενδύσεων, με την οποία εντάχθηκε στις διαδικασίες «fast track» που προβλέπονται από το Ν. 3894/2010 το επενδυτικό
σχέδιο «ΙΤΑΝΟΣ ΓΑΙΑ». Το επενδυτικό σχέδιο αφορά την τουριστική ανάπτυξη πέντε ξενοδοχείων, συνολικής δυναμικότητας
1 936 κλινών, στη χερσόνησο Σίδερο του δήμου Σητείας που είναι ενταγμένη στο δίκτυο Natura (GR 4320006).
Η προσφυγή κατατέθηκε από κατοίκους της περιοχής στην οποία σχεδιάζεται να γίνει η επένδυση.

Οι προσφεύγοντες κάτοικοι κατέθεσαν επίσης αίτηση να τους χορηγηθούν από τη Γενική Γραμματεία Στρατηγικών
Επενδύσεων διοικητικά έγγραφα που αφορούν την έγκριση του επενδυτικού σχεδίου, ώστε να αναπτύξουν περαιτέρω,
ενώπιον του δικαστηρίου, τους λόγους της προσφυγής τους. Συγκεκριμένα, τα έγγραφα αυτά είναι η αίτηση της εταιρείας
προς την ελληνική διοίκηση και οι εισηγήσεις οργάνων του ελληνικού δημοσίου σχετικά με την πραγματοποίηση του
συγκεκριμένου επενδυτικού σχεδίου. Η αίτηση των κατοίκων για τη χορήγηση των εγγράφων αυτών απορρίφθηκε με την
αιτιολογία ότι δεν διαθέτουν έννομο συμφέρον.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τα παραπάνω,

—
Παραβιάζει η άρνηση παροχής των συγκεκριμένων πληροφοριών την οδηγία 2003/4 για την πρόσβαση του κοινού σε
περιβαλλοντικές πληροφορίες και τις σχετικές διατάξεις της συνθήκης του Άαρχους;

Επιπλέον, ο βασικός εταίρος και διαχειριστής (managing senior partner) της δικηγορικής εταιρείας που εμφανίζεται στην
ιστοσελίδα της εταιρείας που σχεδιάζει την επένδυση στην Κρήτη ως νομικός σύμβουλός της στην Ελλάδα, συμμετέχει
ταυτόχρονα ως μέλος στο διοικητικό συμβούλιο (ΔΣ) της υπηρεσίας «Invest in Greece» του υπουργείου. Το ΔΣ ενέκρινε στη
συνεδρίαση της 18.9.2012 την εισήγηση της «Invest in Greece» σχετικά με το συγκεκριμένο επενδυτικό σχέδιο.

—
Παραβιάζει τις διατάξεις του ευρωπαϊκού δικαίου το γεγονός ότι η έγκριση του συγκεκριμένου επενδυτικού σχεδίου
από τη Διυπουργική Επιτροπή βασίστηκε σε εισήγηση του «Invest in Greece» εγκεκριμένη από το ΔΣ στο οποίο συμμετέχει
το συγκεκριμένο μέλος;

**Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(17 Απριλίου 2013)_

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 1 της οδηγίας 2003/4/ΕΚ για την πρόσβαση του κοινού σε περιβαλλοντικές
πληροφορίες ( [1] ), οι δημόσιες αρχές οφείλουν να καθιστούν διαθέσιμες πληροφορίες ανάλογες με αυτές στις οποίες
αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου σε όποιον υποβάλλει σχετική αίτηση, χωρίς αυτός να χρειάζεται να
επικαλεσθεί οποιοδήποτε συμφέρον. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 4 παράγραφος 2 της εν λόγω οδηγίας, μια τέτοια
αίτηση μπορεί να απορριφθεί, εάν η δημοσιοποίηση των πληροφοριών θα μπορούσε να επηρεάσει αρνητικά τη λειτουργία της
δικαιοσύνης, τη δυνατότητα κάθε προσώπου για δίκαιη δίκη ή τη δυνατότητα της δημόσιας αρχής να διεξάγει έρευνα
ποινικού ή πειθαρχικού χαρακτήρα.

Όσον αφορά τη διαδικασία έγκρισης του σχεδίου και τη σύνθεση των εμπλεκόμενων φορέων, πρόκειται για ζητήματα που
εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα των κρατών μελών.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 41 της 14.2.2003, σ. 26-32.

C 6 E / 560 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-002915/13**

**to the Commission**

**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ ‘Fast-tracking’ investments in Toplou

There is evidence of a conflict of interests at the Greek Ministry of Development. On 12 February 2013 an appeal was
lodged with the Greek Council of State (revocation application) against the decision of the Interministerial Committee
for Strategic Investments to include the ‘ITANOS GAIA’ investment project in the fast-track procedure provided by
Law 3894/2010. This project concerns the development of five tourist hotels with a total capacity of 1 936 beds on
the Sidero Peninsula in the municipality of Sitia which forms part of the NATURA network (GR 4320006). The
appeal was lodged by residents of the area in which the proposed site of the investment project is located.

The applicants have also applied for the General Secretariat of Strategic Investments to grant them access to the
administrative documents relating to the approval of the project so as to enable them to further expound the reasons
for their action before the courts. The documents in question are the company's application to the Greek
administration and the recommendations by Greek public institutions relating to the implementation of this project.
The application by residents to obtain access to these documents was rejected on the grounds that they have no
legitimate interest in the matter.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

—
Does the refusal to provide such information constitute a violation of Directive 2003/4 on public access to
environmental information and the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention?

Moreover, the managing senior partner of the law firm who appears on the website of the company planning to
invest in Crete as its legal advisor in Greece is also a member of the board of directors of the Ministry’s ‘Invest in
Greece’ service. At is meeting of 18 September 2012, the Board approved the recommendation by ‘Invest in Greece’
regarding this specific project.

—
The project was approved by the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Investments on the recommendation
of ‘Invest in Greece’ which was approved by its Board of Directors, including the Board member in question. Does this
constitute a violation of the provisions of European law?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 April 2013)_

According to Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information ( [1] ) public authorities
are required to make available information of the kind referred to by the Honourable Member to any applicant at his
request, without him having to state an interest. Nevertheless, according to Article 4(2) of the same directive, such a
request can be refused if disclosure would adversely affect the course of justice, the ability of any person to receive a
fair trial or the ability of a public authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature.

As regards the approval procedure of a project and the composition of the involved bodies, these are matters which
fall within the competence of Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26‐32.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 561

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002916/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)**

_(13 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Límite de velocidad y aumento de las emisiones

El Gobierno de España acaba de decidir aumentar a 130 km/h el límite de velocidad para los vehículos que circulen
por autovías y autopistas, uniéndose así a los países de la UE donde los niveles de velocidad son más permisivos. La
Comisión Europea siempre ha dado una respuesta negativa a las numerosas solicitudes de armonización de los límites
de velocidad que ha recibido, tanto por parte de la industria como por parte de entidades ciudadanas, alegando que las
cuestiones de tráfico no son competencia comunitaria.

Sin embargo, cualquier aumento de los límites de velocidad comporta, además de mayor riesgo de accidentes, una
afección medioambiental negativa al suponer igualmente el aumento de los gases emitidos por los vehículos.
Respecto al riesgo de accidentes, la Comisión impulsó una Carta Europea de Seguridad Vial que en su momento fue
un instrumento acertado pero que, en la actualidad y con el aumento del parque móvil y decisiones como la del
Gobierno español, despierta dudas sobre su eficacia entre las asociaciones de afectados.

En lo concerniente a las emisiones, la Comisión es conocedora de que todo aumento de los límites de velocidad va a
suponer un incremento en las emisiones de gases de los vehículos, cosa que podría suponer una contradicción
respecto a los esfuerzos que la UE está exigiendo a sus Estados miembros para conseguir llegar a los compromisos
internacionales adquiridos sobre gases de efecto invernadero y sobre menor consumo de combustibles fósiles
perjudiciales para el medio ambiente y la salud.

Teniendo en cuenta que la aplicación del paquete climático sí que es competencia comunitaria:

¿No considera la Comisión que existe una contradicción entre sus objetivos en materia climática para 2020 y las
medidas nacionales sobre aumento de la velocidad que puedan estar tomando gobiernos como el español? ¿Piensa la
Comisión actuar en el marco de sus competencias para adaptar los límites de velocidad a los objetivos climáticos
de la UE?

¿No cree la Comisión que toda medida de aumento de velocidad en las vías rápidas podría estar fomentando la idea,
entre sectores como los jóvenes, de que la velocidad no es un factor de riesgo y, por lo tanto, contribuyendo al
aumento del número de accidentes que tanto ha intentado contrarrestar la Comisión con sus campañas
institucionales sobre seguridad vial?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Hedegaard en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de abril de 2013)_

Según una evaluación de la Comisión, la reducción de los límites de velocidad en las autopistas es uno de los medios
que permiten reducir las emisiones de CO 2 del transporte por carretera ( [1] ). Dicha evaluación indica que esta reducción
puede dar lugar a importantes ventajas colaterales como la mejora de la calidad del aire, la reducción del ruido y el
aumento de la seguridad.

En lo que atañe a los objetivos de la UE para 2020 en materia climática, la cuestión de las emisiones de CO 2 del
transporte se aborda en la Decisión sobre el esfuerzo compartido ( [2] ). Corresponde a los Estados miembros poner en
aplicación las políticas y medidas nacionales necesarias para garantizar el cumplimiento de los objetivos fijados en la
citada Decisión. La Comisión comprobará cada año el cumplimiento por parte de los Estados miembros de las
asignaciones anuales de emisiones fijadas en la Decisión. En caso de incumplimiento de la Decisión, el Estado
miembro deberá elaborar un plan de acción correctivo centrado en las políticas y medidas que vayan a ponerse en
aplicación a efectos de la consecución de los objetivos. No corresponde a la Comisión sugerir las políticas o medidas
que deben ponerse en aplicación, en su caso.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050? Appendix 11 Infrastructure and spatial policy, speed and traffic management; CE Delft & TNO (2009).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Decisión n° 406/2009/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de abril de 2009, sobre el esfuerzo de los Estados miembros para reducir

sus emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero a fin de cumplir los compromisos adquiridos por la Comunidad hasta 2020.

C 6 E / 562 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Los Estados miembros pueden fijar libremente los límites de velocidad en su red de carreteras. En esta decisión
influyen distintos factores tales como el medio ambiente, la situación y el diseño de las carreteras y del parque móvil,
los hábitos de conducción, etc. La Comisión no puede evaluar si el aumento del límite de velocidad de 120 km/h a
130 km/h en las autovías y autopistas españolas que, por otro lado, son más seguras que otros tipos de carreteras, va a
fomentar comportamientos de riesgo entre los jóvenes que podrían dar lugar a un aumento del número de accidentes.
No obstante, la Comisión seguirá intentando reducir a la mitad la cifra de muertes en las carreteras de aquí al final de
la presente década, a través de las iniciativas anunciadas en las orientaciones políticas europeas sobre seguridad vial de
2011-2020 ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 389 final.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 563

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002916/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Speed limit and increased emissions

The Spanish Government has recently decided to increase the speed limit to 130 km/h for vehicles travelling on main
roads and motorways, bringing it into line with EU countries where the speed limits are less restrictive. The
Commission has always turned down the numerous requests it has received for harmonisation of speed limits, from
the industry and from citizens’ organisations, on the grounds that traffic matters are not within Community
competence.

However, any increase in speed limit involves, in addition to an increased accident risk, a negative effect on the
environment because of increased vehicle emissions. With regard to the accident risk, the Commission initiated a
European Road Safety Charter, which was an appropriate tool at the time but which currently, and with the increasing
number of vehicles and decisions such as that of the Spanish Government, gives rise to doubts as to its effectiveness
amongst the associations concerned.

In terms of emissions, the Commission is aware that any increase in speed limits will lead to an increase in vehicle
emissions, something that could be at odds with the efforts that the EU is demanding from its Member States to meet
the international commitments undertaken on greenhouse gases and reduced consumption of fossil fuels that are
harmful to the environment and to health.

In view of the fact that enforcement of the climate package is indeed within Community competence:

Does the Commission not think that there is a contradiction between its climate objectives for 2020 and national
measures to increase speed limits that governments, such as the Spanish Government, are undertaking? Does the
Commission think that it is acting within its competences in adjusting speed limits to EU climate objectives?

Does the Commission not think that any measure to increase speed limits on fast roads could be promoting the idea,
amongst groups such as young people, that speed is not a risk factor, therefore contributing to an increase in the
number of accidents that the Commission has been trying to prevent with its institutional campaigns on road safety?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

An assessment for the Commission has shown that lower motorway speed limits are a possible instrument to reduce
road transport CO 2 emissions ( [1] ). This assessment showed that they can be accompanied by important co-benefits
including air quality improvements, lower noise and improved safety.

With regard to EU climate objectives for 2020, transport CO 2 emissions are covered by the Effort Sharing Decision ( [2] ).
It is for Member States to implement internal policies and measures in order to ensure their compliance with the
targets under the Effort Sharing Decision. The Commission will verify each year Member States’ compliance with the
Annual Emission Allocations set under the decision. In case of non-compliance with the decision, the Member State
will have to prepare a corrective action plan that will focus on policies and measures to be implemented in order to
achieve the targets. It would not be for the Commission to suggest which if any policies or measures should be
implemented.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050? Appendix 11 Infrastructure and spatial policy, speed and traffic management; CE Delft & TNO (2009).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their

greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020.

C 6 E / 564 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Member States are free to set speed limits on their road network. Such decisions are influenced by many different
factors, like environment, conditions and design of the roads and of the vehicle fleet, driving culture, etc. The
Commission cannot assess whether the increase of the speed limit from 120 km/h to 130 km/h on Spanish main
roads and motorways, which are much safer than other types of roads, would promote risky behaviour of young
people resulting in an increase of accidents. Nevertheless, the Commission will continue its work to halve road deaths
by the end of this decade through the initiatives announced in the European Road Safety Policy Orientations 20112020 ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 389 final.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 565

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002918/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Inclusion of persons with disabilities in EU external action

On 22 January 2011, the European Union ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD). This is the first human rights treaty to be ratified by the European Union as a regional integration
organisation and it represents an important step forward in increasing the protection of disability rights in Europe
and beyond.

The guiding principles enshrined in the CRPD are mirrored in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, which
should guide the work of the EU on this matter. Both the CRPD and the European Disability Strategy contain specific
provisions vis-à-vis the EU’s external action, with a specific focus on international cooperation and humanitarian aid.

In line with Article 35 of the CRPD, two years after its ratification the EU is required to report to the CRPD Committee
regarding the work it has carried out in the area of international cooperation. In this connection, who (or which
section) deals with the EU’s report on how persons with disabilities have been included in its external action?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

As stipulated in the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out
internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ( [1] ), the Commission will prepare the Union report
required by Art. 35 of the UNCRPD in respect of matters falling within the Union competence.

The EU Report is currently being prepared by the Commission in consultation with the EU Member States in the
competent Council working group. The report will also address measures taken and progress made in the field of
international cooperation with reference to the list of actions 2010-2015 of the Initial plan of Commission Staff
working document ‘European Disability Strategy 2010-2020’ ( [2] ).

Furthermore, the 2013 EU Disability High-Level Group Joint Report on the Implementation of the UNCRPD ( [3] ) will
include a special thematic chapter on disability and development cooperation, in view of the upcoming High-level
meeting of the UN General Assembly on disability and development on 23 September 2013.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 2010/C 340/08, point 12(c).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) SEC(2010) 1324 final 15.11.2010.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The HLG comprises Member State experts on disability matters and stakeholders, in particular organisations of persons with disabilities and

service providers. The annual HLG reports published since 2008 are available for download at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/document/index_en.htm#h2-5.

C 6 E / 566 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002919/13**
**an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

**Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**

_(13. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ VP/HR — Private Militär‐ und Sicherheitsunternehmen in Delegationen und Missionen der EU

Am 22. Februar 2013 erzielte eine Gruppe höchst unterschiedlicher Interessenträger, die sich aus Vertretern der
beteiligten Unternehmen, Zivilgesellschaften und Regierungen zusammensetzt, einen Konsens über den
Internationalen Verhaltenskodex für private Sicherheitsdienstleister (ICoC). Dieser unabhängige Governance‐ und
Aufsichtsmechanismus in Form einer „Satzung“ zielt darauf ab, dass die Umsetzung des Kodex stärker forciert wird.
Beinahe 600 private Militär‐ und Sicherheitsunternehmen haben den Kodex inzwischen unterzeichnet.

1. Welche Fortschritte hat der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst (EAD) innerhalb des letzten halben Jahres dabei
erzielt, die Vielzahl seiner Verträge an den ICoC anzupassen, wie in der Antwort auf die Schriftlichen
Anfragen P-006050/2012 und E-00655/2012 angekündigt wurde?

2. Wird der EAD angesichts der Tatsache, dass immer mehr private Militär‐ und Sicherheitsunternehmen dem
ICoC beitreten, ab sofort nur noch Verträge für seine Delegationen und Missionen mit Unternehmen abschließen, die
den ICoC unterzeichnet haben bzw. dessen Satzung mit Blick auf eine Mitgliedschaft in der ICoC-Assoziation
förmlich unterstützen?

**Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

1. Alle Sicherheitsunternehmen, mit denen die EAD-Zentrale Verträge geschlossen hat, sind Unterzeichner des
ICoC und haben damit begonnen, ihre Verfahren anzupassen, damit sie mit diesem Verhaltenskodex vereinbar sind.

2. Bei der Vergabe von Aufträgen an private Militär‐ und Sicherheitsunternehmen wollen wir vorbildliche
Verfahren einschließlich der Übernahme der ICoC-Normen anwenden, wenngleich die vollständige Einhaltung der
neuen Charta eine gewisse Zeit in Anspruch nehmen wird.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 567

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002919/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Private military and security companies at EU delegations and missions

On 22 February 2013, a multi-stakeholder group comprising representatives of signatory companies, civil society
and governments reached a consensus on the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). This independent governance and oversight mechanism, which
takes the form of ‘Articles of Association’, is aimed at strengthening the implementation of the ICoC. Almost 600
private military and security companies have signed the ICoC so far.

1. Over the last six months, what progress has the European External Action Service (EEAS) made in adapting its
broad range of contracts to bring them into line with the ICoC, as announced in the answer given to Written
Questions P‐006050/2012 and E‐006055/2012?

2. Following the increasing level of adherence to the ICoC and the multi-stakeholder consensus on an oversight
mechanism, will the EEAS from now on only conclude contracts for its delegations and missions with private military
and security companies which have signed the ICoC and formally endorsed its Articles of Association with a view to
becoming members of the ICoC Association?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

1. All of our current security contractors managed by Headquarters are signatories to the ICoC and they are
starting to adapt their procedures to be compliant with the document.

2. We aim to demonstrate best practice in our contracting of private military and security companies including
adherence to ICoC standards, although full compliance with the new Charter will take time.

C 6 E / 568 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002920/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(13. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Standortverlagerung

Die Firma ELOPAK wird 100 Arbeitsplätze ihrer Produktion in Speyer/Deutschland an den Produktionsstandort
Aarhus/Dänemark verlagern. Die Verlagerung erfolgt unter dem Aspekt der günstigeren Produktionsbedingungen
und der Kosteneinsparungen durch eine Produktion in Dänemark.

Kann die Kommission daher mitteilen, ob vonseiten der dänischen Regierung oder der EU direkt an den Konzern
ELOPAK finanzielle Anreize geschaffen wurden, um das Werk in Aarhus zu erweitern?

**Antwort von Herrn Almunia im Namen der Kommission**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

Der Kommission ist nicht bekannt, dass die Firma Elopak von den dänischen Behörden oder — im Rahmen der
Strukturfonds — von der EU Beihilfen erhalten hätte, um ihren Produktionsstandort in Aarhus zu erweitern. In jedem
Fall möchte die Kommission der Frau Abgeordneten mitteilen, dass das Gebiet der Stadt Aarhus, in dem sich die
Produktionsstätte der Firma Elopak befindet, nach den Leitlinien für staatliche Beihilfen mit regionaler Zielsetzung
2007-2013 (ABl. C 54 vom 4.3.2006) für regionale Investitionsbeihilfen nicht infrage kommt.

Außerdem möchte die Kommission darauf hinweisen, dass Elopak an dem aus dem Europäischen Sozialfonds
finanzierten Programm „KompetenceMidt“ teilgenommen hat, mit dem die Region Mitteljütland (Midtjylland)
Unternehmen über regionale Angebote zur beruflichen Bildung informiert. Zweck des Programms ist die
Höherqualifizierung der in diesen Unternehmen beschäftigten Arbeitnehmer. Die Informationen sind nicht auf die
einzelnen Unternehmen zugeschnitten, und das Programm sieht keine Beratungsangebote vor. Es dient lediglich
dazu, Unternehmen bei der Suche nach Berufsbildungsmöglichkeiten Hilfestellung zu geben.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 569

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002920/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Relocation

The company Elopak is relocating 100 jobs from its production plant in Speyer in Germany to its production site in
Aarhus, Denmark. The reasons for the relocation are the more favourable production conditions and the cost savings
that production in Denmark will entail.

Can the Commission therefore say whether the Danish Government or the EU has provided financial incentives
directly to the company Elopak to expand its plant in Aarhus?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(28 May 2013)_

The Commission has no information that aid was granted to Elopak by the Danish authorities or the EU in the
context of structural funds to expand its plant in Aarhus. In any event, the Commission wishes to inform the
Honourable Member of the Parliament that the area of the city of Aarhus where the Elopak plant is located is not
eligible for regional investment state aid under the Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013 (OJ C 54,
4.03.2006).

The Commission would also like to mention that Elopak has participated in the European Social Fund-financed
programme ‘KompetenceMidt’ (CompetenceMid), in which the region of Mid-Jutland informs businesses about the
vocational training offered in the region. The purpose of the programme is to increase the skills of the employees in
the businesses. The information is not tailor-made to the individual businesses and the programme does not offer
counselling. The programme only assists businesses in finding vocational training.

C 6 E / 570 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002921/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(13 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Presenza di cesio 137 nei cinghiali della Valsesia e politiche nucleari dell'Unione europea

Nel corso di analisi di routine svolte nelle passate settimane su cinghiali abbattuti in Valsesia (Piemonte) durante la
stagione di caccia appena conclusasi, è emersa la presenza, nel corpo di detti animali, di cesio 137, isotopo radioattivo
del cesio. In ragione di ciò, si è rilevata, in determinati organi degli animali in oggetto, in particolar modo nella lingua,
un'attività radioattiva pari a un massimo di 5.621 Becquerel per chilogrammo, ossia quasi dieci volte superiore al
livello massimo ammissibile per legge, che corrisponde a 600 Bq/Kg.

Stante i gravi rischi per la salute pubblica indotti dalla dispersione di sostanze fortemente radioattive nell'ambiente,
rischi ancor maggiori quando, come in questo caso, la contaminazione riguarda animali le cui carni sono destinate al
consumo alimentare umano, può la Commissione far sapere:

—
Se sta considerando o intende considerare la possibilità di istituire una commissione d'inchiesta ad hoc per
indagare sull'origine del cesio radioattivo riscontrato nei cinghiali e verificare l'eventuale presenza di detto
isotopo anche in altri esemplari di fauna selvatica stanziati nelle aree contigue o comunque prossime al
territorio della Valsesia, oltrepassando, se necessario, i confini nazionali italiani per verificare se il problema
sussiste anche nei territori francesi confinanti col Piemonte e

—
Se abbia o meno intenzione di elaborare, sul medio — lungo periodo, una nuova politica comune a livello
europeo sull'energia nucleare, considerato che il vecchio trattato EURATOM è rimasto quasi invariato dal
1957?

**Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione**

_(29 aprile 2013)_

1. La Commissione rimanda l'onorevole parlamentare alla risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-2763/2013
presentata dall'onorevole Borghezio.

2. Attualmente la Commissione non ritiene necessario modificare il trattato Euratom. Con il trattato di Lisbona,
entrato in vigore il 1° dicembre 2009, i leader dell'UE hanno approvato un numero limitato di modifiche al trattato
Euratom, ribadendo al tempo stesso la necessità che le disposizioni dello stesso continuino ad avere pieno valore
giuridico ( [1] ).

La Commissione monitora costantemente e, se necessario, modifica la legislazione secondaria Euratom in vigore in
relazione all'energia nucleare. Per esempio, ha già adottato una proposta di direttiva per norme fondamentali di
sicurezza ( [2] ) e intende proporre una revisione della direttiva sulla sicurezza nucleare per tenere conto delle lezioni
tratte dall'incidente di Fukushima e delle conclusioni delle prove di resistenza svolte di recente ( [3] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Cfr. in particolare il protocollo n. 2 che modifica il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea dell'energia atomica, GU C 306 del 17 dicembre

2007, pag. 199.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Proposta di direttiva del Consiglio che stabilisce norme fondamentali di sicurezza relative alla protezione contro i pericoli derivanti

dall'esposizione alle radiazioni ionizzanti, COM(2012)242.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Per maggiori informazioni, cfr. la comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio e al Parlamento europeo sulle valutazioni complessive dei rischi

e della sicurezza («prove di stress») delle centrali nucleari nell’Unione europea e attività collegate, COM(2012)571 final.

( **|**

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 571

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002921/13**

**to the Commission**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Presence of caesium-137 in boars in Valsesia and the European Union's nuclear policies

During routine tests carried out in recent weeks on boars killed in Valsesia (Piedmont) during the hunting season
which has just ended, the presence of caesium-137, a radioactive isotope of caesium, was detected in the bodies of the
animals. As a result, in specific organs in the animals, particularly the tongue, radioactive activity equal to a maximum
of 5.621 Becquerel per kilogram was detected, which is nearly 10 times higher than the maximum level of 600 Bq/Kg
permitted by law.

In view of the serious public health risks resulting from the dispersion of highly radioactive substances in the
environment, risks which are even higher when, as in this case, the contamination relates to animals whose meat is
eaten by humans, can the Commission say:

—
whether it is considering or will consider the possibility of setting up an ad hoc inquiry committee to
investigate the origin of the radioactive caesium found in the boars and to check whether this isotope is also
present in other woodland fauna living in neighbouring areas or in any case close to the territory of Valsesia,
going beyond Italian national borders, if necessary, to check whether there is also a problem in French territory
bordering Piedmont?

—
whether or not it intends, in the medium or long term, to draft a new common European policy on nuclear
energy, since the old Euratom Treaty has remained practically unchanged since 1957?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 April 2013)_

1. The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member of Parliament to the reply to the Written Question
E-2763/2013. The question was submitted by Mr Mario Borghezio.

2. The Commission does not currently consider it necessary to modify the Euratom Treaty. In the context of the
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, EU leaders agreed on a limited number of amendments
to the Euratom Treaty, while explicitly recalling the necessity that the provisions of this Treaty should continue to
have full legal effect ( [1] ).

The Commission is continuously monitoring, and if necessary revising, existing Euratom secondary legislation in
relation to nuclear energy. Thus, it has already adopted a proposal for a new Basic Safety Standards Directive ( [2] ) and it
intends to propose a revised Nuclear Safety Directive, guaranteeing that lessons learned from the Fukushima accident
and the conclusions of the recently conducted stress tests are properly taken into account ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See, in particular, Protocol No 2 amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; OJ C 306 of 17.12.2007, at p. 199.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Proposal for a Council Directive laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionizing radiation;

COM(2012) 242.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) For more information, see the Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety

assessments (‘Stress Tests’) of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities, COM(2012) 571 final.

( **|**

C 6 E / 572 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002922/13**

**do Komisji**
**Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)**

_(13 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Szczepienia przeciw chorobom zakaźnym

Od pewnego czasu toczy się dyskusja nad ilością szczepień, którym są poddawani mieszkańcy Europy. Wiadomym
jest, że szczepienia mają służyć zapobieganiu chorobom zakaźnym, jednakże trzeba zwrócić uwagę na to, że
pojawiają się również głosy, iż niektóre ze szczepień nie powodują zwiększenia odporności na choroby; a moda na
szczepienia wynika z działalności koncernów medycznych. Niepokój budzi to, że według niektórych ekspertów
szczepienia mogą prowadzić do poważnych komplikacji w przypadku wystąpienia skutków ubocznych.

Dyskusja na temat szczepień powinna toczyć się w gronie ekspertów zajmujących się tematyką szczepień, jednakże
nie rozstrzygając, która ze stron sporu ma rację, chciałbym zadać następujące pytania Komisji Europejskiej:

—
w jakim stopniu przepisy Unii Europejskiej regulują kwestie związane z przymusem szczepień dla obywateli
państw członkowskich?

—
czy Unia Europejska monitoruje dane dotyczące ilości osób, które co roku zapadają na choroby po
zastosowaniu szczepionek?

—
czy Unia Europejska posiada przepisy, które umożliwiają osobom poszkodowanym przez skutki uboczne
szczepionek uzyskanie odszkodowań od koncernów farmaceutycznych?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonia Borga w imieniu Komisji**

_(8 maja 2013 r.)_

Krajowe polityki w zakresie szczepień wchodzą w zakres wyłącznych kompetencji państw członkowskich. Komisja
wspiera państwa członkowskie w utrzymaniu lub zwiększeniu wskaźnika szczepień przeciw zwalczanym tą drogą
chorobom, na przykład w odniesieniu do szczepień u dzieci. W zaleceniu Rady 2009/1019/UE ( [1] ) w sprawie
szczepień przeciw grypie sezonowej nadal zachęca się do szczepienia osób z grup ryzyka, takich jak osoby starsze
i pracownicy opieki zdrowotnej.

Ponadto, zgodnie z prawem Unii Europejskiej szczepionki dopuszcza się do obrotu tylko wtedy, gdy dokonano
oceny ich jakości, bezpieczeństwa i skuteczności oraz gdy stwierdzono, że korzyści wynikające z ich stosowania
przeważają nad ryzykiem.

Komisja monitoruje dane dotyczące pacjentów, którzy w następstwie stosowania szczepionek chorują lub
doświadczają działań niepożądanych. Niezależnie od uzyskania pozwolenia na dopuszczenie do obrotu produkt
leczniczy podlega ścisłemu nadzorowi także po wprowadzeniu do obrotu. Europejska Agencja Leków jest
odpowiedzialna za wykrywanie, ocenę i minimalizowanie ryzyka związanego z niepożądanymi działaniami leków
oraz za informowanie o tym ryzyku.

Jeżeli chodzi o nadzór, Europejskie Centrum ds. Zapobiegania i Kontroli Chorób koordynuje nadzór nad chorobami
zaraźliwymi, w tym nad chorobami, którym zapobiega się poprzez szczepienia.

Wreszcie, odpowiedzialność cywilna i administracyjna za wszelkie skutki wywoływane przez leki, w tym
odszkodowania od firm farmaceutycznych, leży w zakresie kompetencji sądów krajowych i jest ustalana odrębnie dla
każdego przypadku. W niektórych przypadkach może mieć również zastosowanie odpowiedzialność za produkty
wadliwe określona w dyrektywie Rady 85/374/EWG ( [2] ).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:pl:PDF
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Dyrektywa Rady 85/374/EWG z dnia 25 lipca 1985 r. w sprawie zbliżenia przepisów ustawowych, wykonawczych i administracyjnych państw

członkowskich dotyczących odpowiedzialności za produkty wadliwe (Dz.U. L 210 z 7.8.1985).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 573

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002922/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Vaccination against infectious diseases

The number of vaccines being given to European citizens has been a subject of debate for some time. It is well known
that vaccines are intended to help prevent infectious diseases, but note should also be taken of the doubts that have
been voiced as to whether they do all increase resistance to disease, and claims that the fashion for vaccination is the
result of efforts by medical companies. It is concerning that some experts believe that vaccination can lead to serious
complications if side effects are experienced.

Debate on vaccination should continue among experts in the field, and without passing judgment on which side is
right, I would like to ask the Commission the following questions:

—
to what extent does European Union legislation regulate issues relating to the compulsory vaccination of
citizens of Member States?

—
does the European Union monitor data on the number of people who fall ill each year after being vaccinated?

—
has the European Union adopted any legislation allowing individuals who have been harmed by the side effects
of vaccines to receive compensation from the pharmaceutical companies involved?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

National Vaccination policies fall under the exclusive competence of the Members States. The Commission does
support the Member States in maintaining or increasing rates of vaccination against vaccine-preventable diseases, for
example as regards childhood vaccination. The Council Recommendation 2009/1019/EU ( [1] ) on Seasonal Influenza
vaccination further encourages vaccination among risk groups, such as the elder and healthcare workers.

In addition, European Union legislation foresees rules to ensure that a marketing authorisation is granted to a vaccine
only after its quality, safety and efficacy have been evaluated and a positive benefit-risk balance related to its use has
been concluded.

The Commission monitors data on patients who fall ill or suffer adverse reactions following the use of vaccines. After
its authorisation, the medicinal product is subject to strict post-marketing surveillance. The European Medicines
Agency is responsible for the detection, assessment, minimisation and communication relating to the risk of adverse
reactions of medicines.

As regards surveillance, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is coordinating the surveillance of
communicable diseases including vaccine preventable ones.

Finally, the civil and administrative liability for any consequence of a medicine, including compensation from the
pharmaceutical companies, is in the remit of the national courts and is decided upon on a case by case basis. The
liability for defective products as provided by Council Directive 85/374/EEC ( [2] ) can also be evoked in certain cases.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States

concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 7.8.1985).

C 6 E / 574 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002923/13**

**do Komisji**
**Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)**

_(13 marca 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Stan przygotowań Wrocławia do projektu Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury w roku 2016

Decyzją instytucji Unii Europejskiej Wrocław w roku 2016 stanie się Europejską Stolicą Kultury. W listopadzie br.
roku przedstawiciele Komisji Europejskiej mają przeprowadzić kontrolę stanu przygotowań Wrocławia.

W związku z powyższym proszę o odpowiedź na następujące pytania:

—
jaki stan przygotowań Wrocławia do projektu Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury zostanie w listopadzie br. uznany
przez Komisję za zadowalający?

—
jakie konkretne zadania związane z przygotowaniami do roku 2016 powinny zostać zrealizowane przez
Wrocław do listopada br.?

—
w jakim terminie zostaną przeprowadzone przez Komisję kolejne kontrole stanu przygotowań Wrocławia do
organizacji Europejskiej Komisji Kultury?

—
jakie obiekty kultury, instytucje zamierza Komisja skontrolować w listopadzie br.?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Androullę Vassiliou w imieniu Komisji**

_(8 maja 2013 r.)_

Mimo że ogólna odpowiedzialność za udaną realizacją obchodów Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury spoczywa na miastach
przyjmujących ten tytuł i odnośnych państwach członkowskich, na etapie przygotowawczym wspiera je komisja
monitorująco-doradcza.

W skład tej komisji wchodzi siedmiu niezależnych członków wyznaczonych przez instytucje europejskie. Komisja
obraduje dwukrotnie przed rozpoczęciem obchodów w celu udzielanie porad i podsumowania dotychczasowych
prac w zakresie przygotowań do obchodów. Ma to na celu pomoc miastom w opracowaniu wysokiej jakości
programu o wyraźnym wymiarze europejskim i uwzględniającego zaangażowanie obywateli. Jeśli chodzi o Wrocław,
pierwsze spotkanie monitorujące odbędzie się jesienią 2013 r., a drugie wiosną 2015 r.

Podczas pierwszego spotkania monitorującego miasta przedstawiają osiągnięte postępy w zakresie przygotowań
obchodów oraz są proszone o wypełnienie kwestionariusza. W tej kwestii miasta są proszone o zdanie relacji
z postępów w kontekście zaleceń, które wspomniana komisja sformułowała w momencie wyboru danego miasta.
Zalecenia te są opublikowane na stronie internetowej Komisji ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Zalecenia dla Wrocławia są dostępne na stronie: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc/ecoc/selection-reportpoland_en.pdf

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 575

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002923/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Progress made by Wrocław in preparing for its role as European Capital of Culture in 2016

It has been decided by the European Union institutions that Wrocław will become a European Capital of Culture in
2016. Commission representatives are to carry out checks in November 2013 to find out how preparations by
Wrocław are progressing.

I would therefore like to ask the Commission:

—
in November 2013, what will it regard as satisfactory progress by Wrocław in preparing for its role as European
Capital of Culture?

—
which concrete tasks relating to preparations for 2016 should Wrocław have completed by November 2013?

—
when will the Commission make further inspections of the progress made by Wrocław in its preparations to
organise the European Capital of Culture event?

— which cultural sites and institutions does the Commission intend to check in November 2013?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

While the overall responsibility for the successful implementation of the European Capital of Culture initiative falls
under the responsibility of the cities holding the title and the Member States concerned, a Monitoring and Advisory
Panel accompanies the cities during the preparation phase.

The Panel is composed of seven independent members designated by the European institutions. It is convened twice
before the beginning of the event in order to give advice on, and take stock of the preparation leading up to the event.
This is done with a view to helping the cities develop a high quality programme with a strong European dimension
and citizens' involvement. As regards Wrocław, the first monitoring meeting will take place in autumn 2013 and the
second in spring 2015.

At the first monitoring meeting cities present the progress which they have achieved in preparing for the event and
are invited to respond to a questionnaire. In this context, cities are asked to report on the progress they have made
with a view to the recommendations which the Panel gave at the time of selection. These recommendations are
published on the Commission website ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) For Wrocław it is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc/ecoc/selection-report-poland_en.pdf

C 6 E / 576 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002924/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(13 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Europese waarden boven alles

De Europese Unie verklaart dat vier lidstaten aandringen op een mechanisme ter bescherming van de „fundamentele
waarden” die het blok verenigen.

In een brief aan Commissievoorzitter José Manuel Barroso hebben de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van
Duitsland, Nederland, Finland en Denemarken gesteld dat de EU snel en doeltreffend moet kunnen reageren om de
naleving van de fundamentele waarden van het blok door de 27 lidstaten te verzekeren.

Hoewel in de brief geen enkele lidstaat met naam wordt genoemd, hebben Duitsland en andere lidstaten kritiek geuit
aan het adres van Hongarije wegens de schending van bepaalde rechten, zoals de onafhankelijkheid van de
rechterlijke macht, die van fundamenteel belang worden geacht voor de cohesie van het blok.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de inhoud van bovengenoemde brief?

2. Kan de Commissie nadere informatie verstrekken over het voorgestelde mechanisme ter bescherming van de
fundamentele waarden? Houden de voorgestelde wijzigingen verband met artikel 7 VEU?

3. Kan de Commissie een nadere definitie geven van wat een ernstige inbreuk op de fundamentele waarden van de
Europese Unie inhoudt, en concrete voorbeelden geven?

4. Hoe ziet de Commissie de verhouding tussen een geval waarbij een lidstaat een ernstige inbreuk op de
fundamentele waarden constateert en het beginsel van niet-inmenging in de interne aangelegenheden van soevereine
staten, een van de grondbeginselen van het internationale recht? Deelt de Commissie mijn mening dat ongefundeerde
kritiek van een lidstaat op een andere de soevereiniteit van de betrokken lidstaat ernstig ondermijnt?

5. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat indien het gemakkelijker wordt maatregelen te nemen uit hoofde van
artikel 7 VEU, dit betekent dat alweer bevoegdheden van de lidstaten worden overgeheveld naar de Europese Unie?

**Antwoord van de heer Barroso namens de Commissie**

_(2 mei 2013)_

1. De Commissie is op de hoogte van de inhoud van de brieven die zij ontvangt, en bijgevolg ook van de inhoud
van de brief waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst.

2. Er moet aan worden herinnerd dat de voorzitter van de Commissie in zijn State of the Union-toespraak van
september 2012 heeft benadrukt dat in een politieke unie ook de fundamenten waarop de Unie is gebouwd, moeten
worden versterkt. Deze grondslagen zijn de eerbiediging van de fundamentele waarden, van de rechtstaat en van
democratie. Hij heeft eveneens benadrukt dat de juridische en democratische structuur in sommige lidstaten onder
vuur lag en dat zo de beperkingen van de huidige institutionele regelingen aan het licht zijn gekomen. Er is een
bredere waaier van instrumenten nodig, die meer keuze geeft dan alleen die tussen de „soft power” van politieke
overreding en de „nucleaire optie” van artikel 7 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie. De Commissie is
ingenomen met het feit dat in de brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van Duitsland, Nederland, Finland en
Denemarken dezelfde kwestie aan de orde wordt gesteld.

3. Het geachte Parlementslid wordt verwezen naar de mededeling van de Commissie van 15 oktober 2003
(COM(2003) 606 definitief).

4. De Unie is gebouwd op de gemeenschappelijke waarden die in artikel 2 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese
Unie zijn neergelegd. De volledige eerbiediging van deze waarden door elke lidstaat, die verder gaat dan enkel de
naleving van de plichten die door het recht van de Unie zijn opgelegd, is essentieel voor de werking van de Unie en
van de regels en mechanismen die op grond van het recht van de Unie zijn vastgesteld, met name de regels en
mechanismen voor de samenwerking tussen autoriteiten van de lidstaten en voor de wederzijdse erkenning van
beslissingen.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 577

5. De Commissie is van mening dat nieuwe mechanismen voor de volledige eerbiediging van de waarden in
artikel 2 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie door de lidstaten, niet noodzakelijk afbreuk doen aan de
bevoegdheidsverdeling zoals die in de verdragen is vastgesteld.

C 6 E / 578 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002924/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(13 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European values first and foremost

The European Union has said that four Member States are urging the establishment of a mechanism to protect the
‘fundamental values’ that unite the bloc.

In a letter to Commission President José Manuel Barroso, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland
and Denmark said that the EU ‘must be able to react swiftly and effectively to ensure compliance’ by its 27 Member
States with the bloc’s basic values.

While the letter did not mention any specific Member State, Hungary has been criticised by Germany and other
countries for violating rights, such as the independence of the judiciary, that are seen as fundamental to the bloc’s
cohesion ( [1] ).

1. Is the Commission familiar with the content of the aforementioned letter?

2. Could the Commission provide further information about the proposed mechanism for the protection of
fundamental values? Are the proposed changes related to Article 7 TEU?

3. Could the Commission state the definition of a serious breach of the fundamental values of the European Union,
and give concrete examples?

4. What is the Commission’s opinion on the relationship between the case of one Member State determining a
serious breach of fundamental values and the principle of non‐intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states,
which is one of the basic principles of international law? Does the Commission share my opinion that unfounded
criticism of one Member State by another seriously undermines the sovereignty of the Member State concerned?

5. Does the Commission agree that the potential simplification of the application of measures under Article 7 TEU
would mean another shift of Member States’ competence to the European Union?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

1. The Commission is familiar with the content of the letters it receives, including that to which the Honourable
Member is referring.

2. It should be recalled that the President of the Commission in his speech on the state of the Union of
September 2012 has stressed that a political union also means that the foundations on which the Union is built must
strengthen: the respect for the fundamental values, for the rule of law and democracy. He also stressed that threats to
the legal and democratic fabric in some of the Member States revealed limits of the current institutional arrangements
within the Union and the need for a better developed set of instruments — not just the alternative between the ‘soft
power’ of political persuasion and the ‘nuclear option’ of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission
welcomes the fact that the letter of the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark now
raises the same issue.

3. The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's communication of 15 October 2003 (COM(2003)
606 final).

4. The Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Full
respect for these values by each MS — beyond mere compliance with precise obligations under Union law is vital for
the functioning of the Union and of the rules and mechanisms established under Union law, including notably those
providing for cooperation between Member States' authorities and for mutual recognition of decisions.

5. In the Commission's view new mechanisms aimed at ensuring full respect by Member States for the values
enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union do not necessarily affect the system of competences as laid
down in the treaties.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://mobile.blomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/eu-is-urged-to-set-up-mechanism-to-protect-basic-values.html

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 579

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002925/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(14 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Witwaspraktijken

Het effectief aanpakken van witwaspraktijken is een politieke prioriteit voor de EU. Het heeft er echter alle schijn van
dat sommige lidstaten gevoeliger zijn voor witwaspraktijken dan andere. Het Instituut voor Religieuze Werken, dat
bekendstaat onder het Italiaanse acroniem IOR, of nog algemener als de bank van het Vaticaan, bedient katholieke
kerkelijke instellingen, curies, en priesters en nonnen over de hele wereld, en beheert 33 404 rekeningen. Na de
aanvaring van de bank met de Italiaanse autoriteiten in 2010 riep paus Benedictus XVI het IOR op de internationale
normen voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken na te komen. Italiaanse aanklagers, die bang waren dat de bank van
het Vaticaan werd gebruik om geld wit te wassen voor Italiaanse criminele organisaties, legden beslag op 23 miljoen
EUR (27 miljoen USD) van de bezittingen van het IOR, na kennis te hebben genomen van verdachte transacties.

De Heilige Stoel onderwierp het IOR aan het toezicht van de waakhond voor witwaspraktijken van de Raad van
Europa, het Comité van deskundigen inzake de evaluatie van maatregelen ter bestrijding van het witwassen van geld
en de financiering van terrorisme (Moneyval). In zijn verslag van 4 juli 2012 verklaarde Moneyval dat het Vaticaan „in
korte tijd veel had bewerkstelligd” om de „bouwstenen” van een controlesysteem aan te leggen. De experts van
Moneyval „bevalen ten zeerste aan” dat er op de bank van het Vaticaan „in de nabije toekomst onafhankelijk toezicht
wordt uitgeoefend door een bedrijfseconomische toezichthoudende instantie”.

Tegen deze achtergrond wordt de Commissie verzocht de volgende vragen te beantwoorden:

1. Is zij zich bewust van deze aantijgingen met betrekking tot de kwetsbaarheid van het IOR op het gebied van
witwaspraktijken?

2. Deelt zij de conclusies die uiteengezet zijn in de samenvatting van het verslag van Moneyval ( [1] ), met name in de
paragrafen 17 en 18 op bladzijde 5, en zo ja, welke geschikte stappen overweegt zij te nemen om de
transparantie te verbeteren en pogingen tot witwaspraktijken te verijdelen?

3. Zal het IOR onder de toezichthoudende bevoegdheid van de ECB vallen als de verordening inzake de
bankenunie eenmaal is aangenomen?

**Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie**

_(8 mei 2013)_

Het aanpakken van witwaspraktijken is voor de Europese Commissie een belangrijke prioriteit. In de zogenaamde
antiwitwasrichtlijnen ( [2] ) is een deel van het kader voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken en terrorismefinanciering
in de EU uitgewerkt. De Commissie ziet toe op de toepassing van EU-wetgeving in alle lidstaten overeenkomstig de in
het Verdrag vastgelegde procedures.

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de beweringen over de kwetsbaarheid van het IOR en van de conclusies van het
Moneyval-verslag.

Noch de Heilige Stoel, noch Vaticaanstad zijn lidstaten van de EU. De EU heeft een monetaire overeenkomst gesloten
met Vaticaanstad en de Commissie ziet toe op de uitvoering ervan. Overeenkomstig een bijlage bij die overeenkomst
moet Vaticaanstad de EU-wetgeving, met inbegrip van de EU-wetgeving voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken, in
nationale wetgeving omzetten. De toepassing van de betreffende AML-wetgeving van de EU is middels een _motu_
_proprio_ van paus Benedictus XVI uitgebreid tot de Heilige Stoel.

De Commissie heeft vorig jaar de ontwikkelingen en de vorderingen van de Heilige Stoel met betrekking tot de
bestrijding van witwaspraktijken gevolgd. De wetgeving ter bestrijding van witwaspraktijken is op
30 december 2010 aangenomen ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL(2012)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) AML-richtlijn (anti money laundering — AML).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) De „wet betreffende de preventie en bestrijding van het witwassen van opbrengsten uit criminele activiteiten en uit de financiering van  terrorisme”

is in april 2011 in werking getreden.

C 6 E / 580 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

De Heilige Stoel is waarnemer bij Moneyval. De Commissie is ingenomen met de wederzijdse evaluatie die Moneyval
in 2011 heeft uitgevoerd. De Commissie zal verdere samenwerking tussen Moneyval en de Heilige Stoel steunen en
bijstand blijven verlenen om het kader voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken te verbeteren.

Onlangs is een politiek akkoord bereikt over het voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad waarin specifieke taken
betreffende het beleid op het gebied van het bedrijfseconomisch toezicht op kredietinstellingen, aan de ECB zouden
worden overgedragen. Dit voorstel maakt geen deel uit van de bijlage bij de monetaire overeenkomst tussen de EU en
Vaticaanstad.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 581

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002925/13**

**to the Commission**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Money laundering

Tackling money laundering effectively is a political priority for the EU. However, it seems that some Member States
are more vulnerable to money laundering abuses than others. For example, the Institute for Religious Works, known
by its Italian acronym IOR or — more commonly — as the Vatican Bank, serves Catholic church institutions, curia,
and priests and nuns around the world, and has 33 404 accounts. After it fell foul of Italian authorities in 2010, Pope
Benedict XVI ordered the IOR to bring itself into compliance with international standards on combatting money
laundering. Italian prosecutors, fearing that the Vatican Bank was being used to launder money for Italian criminal
syndicates, seized EUR 23 million (USD 27 million) of the IOR’s holdings after having taken note of suspicious
transactions.

The Holy See submitted the IOR to the supervision of the Council of Europe’s money-laundering watchdog, the
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(Moneyval). In its report of 4 July 2012, Moneyval stated that the Vatican had ‘come a long way in a short time’ to put
in place the ‘building blocks’ of a monitoring system. The Moneyval experts ‘strongly recommended’ that the Vatican
Bank should be ‘independently supervised by a prudential supervisor in the near future’.

In light of this, the Commission is asked to answer the following:

1. Is it aware of these allegations regarding the vulnerability of IOR to money laundering?

2. Does it share the conclusions presented in the executive summary of the Moneyval report ( [1] ), in particular
paragraphs 17 and 18 on page 5, and, if so, which appropriate steps is it considering taking to improve
transparency and tackle money laundering attempts?

3. Will the IOR fall under the supervisory authority of the ECB once the Banking Union Regulation is adopted?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Tackling money laundering is an important priority for the European Commission. The so-called AML Directives ( [2] )
set up part of the framework designed to fight money laundering and terrorist financing in the EU. The Commission
monitors the application of EU legislation in all Member States according to the procedures laid down in the Treaty.

The Commission is aware of the allegations regarding the vulnerability of IOR and of the conclusions of the Moneyval
report.

Neither the Holy See nor the Vatican City State are Member States of the EU. The EU has signed a Monetary
Agreement with the Vatican City State and the Commission is monitoring the implementation of this Agreement.
Pursuant to an annex to that Agreement, the Vatican City State has to transpose EU legislation including EU AML law
into national law. The application of the relevant EU AML law was extended to the Holy See by a _motu proprio_ of
Benedictus XVI.

The Commission followed up last year's developments and progress made by the Holy See as regards fight against
money laundering. AML legislation was adopted on 30 December 2010 ( [3] ).

The Holy See is an observer member of Moneyval. The Commission welcomes the mutual evaluation conducted by
Moneyval in 2011. The Commission will support further cooperation between Moneyval and the Holy See and
continue to offer assistance to improve the framework against money laundering.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL(2012)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Anti money laundering Directive.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ‘Law concerning the prevention and countering of the laundering of proceeds from criminal activities and of the financing of terrorism’ entered

into force in April 2011.

C 6 E / 582 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

A political agreeement was recently found on the proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the
ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. This proposal is not part of the
annex to the Monetary Agreement between the EU and the Vatican City State.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 583

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002926/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Escissione «estetica»

In una dichiarazione fatta dal deputato Ellouze del partito islamista Ennahda al giornale «Le Magreb» di Tunisi si
afferma che nelle regioni africane in cui fa caldo si è costretti a praticare alle ragazze l'escissione clitoridea per ragioni
terapeutiche. Secondo il parlamentare islamista l'ablazione sessuale non è una mutilazione, ma semplicemente una
pratica «estetica» e come tale, si suppone, assolutamente legittima per migliorare la bellezza del corpo femminile,
come avviene per altre parti come il volto o il seno. È vero che in un secondo momento il deputato ha dichiarato che
le sue affermazioni sono state deformate, ma è altrettanto vero che esse rispondono ad una concezione che si diffonde
sempre più ampiamente a giustificazione della pratica delle mutilazioni genitali femminili.

La Commissione, attraverso le dichiarazioni fatte ai parlamentari europei dal Commissario Reding il 6 marzo scorso,
ha preso ulteriormente posizione contro le mutilazioni genitali femminili (MGF) in occasione della Giornata della
Donna contro la violenza usata nei suoi confronti.

Può essa dire:

1. se condivide l'opinione che l'escissione in questione non è altro che un'operazione estetica e non una
mutilazione genitale;

2. se si rende conto che un'interpretazione simile dà il via libera alle mutilazioni genitali, negando la violenza
implicita praticata sul corpo femminile e l'attentato alla sua integrità;

3. se considera urgente realizzare campagne di sensibilizzazione al problema, prevedendo strumenti e prodotti
fruibili dalle comunità interessate, insieme alle associazioni femminili africane e a quelle che in Europa si
battono contro le MGF?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2013)_

Come ricordato nell'interrogazione, la Commissione condanna la pratica della mutilazione genitale femminile.

Per quanto riguarda la Tunisia, attualmente non esistono prove tangibili che la società tunisina mostri maggiore
tolleranza nei confronti della pratica della mutilazione genitale femminile o che la giustifichi. Dopo la rivoluzione,
l'associazione delle donne e le organizzazioni della società civile hanno difeso attivamente e rafforzato i diritti delle
donne.

L'UE promuove attivamente campagne di sensibilizzazione a questa problematica. Per esempio, ha sostenuto, in
collaborazione con l'UNICEF, il progetto «Contributing to the Abandonment of Social Norms Harmful to Girls and
Women: A Matter of Gender Equality» (Contribuire ad abbandonare norme sociali dannose per le ragazze e le donne:
una questione di parità fra uomo e donna), che ha offerto la possibilità di favorire il cambiamento di mentalità a
proposito di norme sociali profondamente radicate che prevedono pratiche dannose per i bambini, in particolare i
matrimoni infantili e la mutilazione genitale femminile/escissione clitoridea in diversi paesi africani.

Nel corso del 2013 la Commissione avvierà una serie di attività per affrontare questo tema. Il 6 marzo 2013 il
commissario responsabile di giustizia, diritti fondamentali e cittadinanza ha organizzato una tavola rotonda sulle
mutilazioni genitali femminili. I risultati di una consultazione pubblica lanciata lo stesso giorno serviranno a
sviluppare la politica della Commissione in materia. La Commissione fornirà inoltre assistenza agli Stati membri per
le attività di informazione e comunicazione volte a porre fine alla violenza contro le donne, anche a proposito delle
mutilazioni genitali femminili (mediante il programma Progress), e alle organizzazioni sul campo per i progetti tesi a
lottare contro le mutilazioni e altre pratiche dannose (mediante il programma Daphne).

C 6 E / 584 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002926/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ ‘Aesthetic’ excision

In a statement made to the Tunis newspaper ‘Le Maghreb’, Member of Parliament Habib Ellouze of the Islamist party
Ennahda claimed that in African regions with warm climates, clitoral excision has to be performed for therapeutic
reasons. He expressed the view that sexual ablation is not mutilation, but simply an ‘aesthetic’ practice, and thus,
presumably, entirely legitimate for the purpose of enhancing female beauty, in the same way as operations involving
other parts of the body such as the face or the breasts. Although Mr Ellouze subsequently stated that his comments
had been distorted, it is also true that they reflect an increasingly widely‐held conception justifying female genital
mutilation.

In a statement made by Commissioner Viviane Reding to MEPs on 6 March 2013, the Commission has adopted a
position against female genital mutilation (FGM) ahead of International Women's Day, taking a stand against the
violence involved in such practices.

Will the Commission say:

1. whether it agrees that this type of excision is a purely aesthetic operation and does not constitute genital
mutilation;

2. whether it is aware that an interpretation of this kind constitutes a green light for genital mutilation and denies
the implicit violence to which women's bodies are subjected and the attack on their physical integrity;

3. whether it considers awareness campaigns on this problem to be a matter of urgency, providing instruments
and mechanisms which can be used by the international community, in conjunction with women's
associations in Africa and in Europe currently fighting against FGM?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2013)_

As mentioned in the question, the Commission condemns the practice of female genital mutilation.

With regard to Tunisia, there is no tangible indication so far that Tunisian society would show a greater tolerance or
justify the practice of female genital mutilation. Since the revolution, women's association and civil society
organisations have been very active to defend and expand womens' rights.

The EU has been active to promote awareness campaigns on this issue. To give an exemple, in cooperation with
Unicef, the EU has supported the project ‘Contributing to the Abandonment of Social Norms Harmful to Girls and
Women: A Matter of Gender Equality’. The project provided the opportunity to promote change in deeply entrenched
social norms that uphold practices that are harmful to children, in particular child marriage and female genital
mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) in several African countries.

In 2013, the Commission will launch a series of activities to address FGM. On 6 March, the Member of the
Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship hosted a Round-Table on FGM. The results
of a public consultation launched the same day will feed into the Commission's policy development on FGM. The
Commission will also support Member States' information and communication activities aiming at ending violence
against women including FGM (through the Progress programme) and grass-root level organisations for projects
aiming at fighting FGM and other harmful practices (through the Daphne programme).

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 585

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002927/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Gioco d'azzardo e minori

Da una ricerca sulla condizione dell'infanzia e dell'adolescenza 2012 svolta da Eurispes e Telefono Azzurro emergono
alcuni dati sul fenomeno del gioco d'azzardo: l'8 per cento dei bambini tra i 7 e gli 11 anni gioca con i soldi online; il
15,3 per cento scommette in quelli offline. E ancora: gioca online il 12 per cento dei ragazzi tra i 12 e i 18 anni. Il 27
per cento punta soldi su giocate tradizionali. A un adolescente su quattro capita a volte di perdere tutti i soldi a
disposizione. Il 33,7 % dei più piccoli sceglie il «gratta e vinci», mentre l'11,4 % e l'11,1 % giocano rispettivamente alle
Lotterie e a Bingo. Gli adolescenti invece preferiscono Internet (39,9 per cento) o in sala giochi (17,8 per cento) o nelle
tabaccherie (14,4 per cento). A parte gli aspetti educativi che con l'azzardo non sono certamente da consigliare, è
sempre presente il rischio ludopatico. Questa patologia è in aumento in diversi Stati membri dell'Unione, alcuni dei
quali l'hanno inclusa come malattia riconosciuta dal Servizio sanitario nazionale.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se ritiene che il fenomeno possa rappresentare un handicap per una corretta formazione dei giovani verso la
maturità;

2. se, in analogia alla normativa in vigore per la protezione dei minori da Internet, reputa conveniente proibire ai
minori il gioco d'azzardo — compreso l'acquisto di «Gratta e vinci» e simili — nelle sale pubbliche e in tutti i
luoghi in cui si pratica, come si è fatto con le bevande alcooliche e con il tabacco;

3. per qual motivo non valuta l'opportunità di una raccomandazione agli Stati membri in questa materia?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione**

_(13 maggio 2013)_

1. La Commissione condivide le preoccupazioni sollevate dall'onorevole parlamentare. Una larga maggioranza di
bambini, e sempre più precocemente, utilizza Internet attraverso una serie di dispositivi connessi ( [1] ). È quindi
importante adottare misure protettive contro contenuti potenzialmente pericolosi, come il gioco d'azzardo,
agevolando al tempo stesso l'accesso di bambini e ragazzi ai vantaggi offerti da Internet per quanto riguarda attività
ricreative, forme di apprendimento e altre interazioni online positive.

La Commissione ritiene che gli Stati membri debbano disporre anche di misure preventive per impedire che gli
adolescenti abbiano accesso a lotterie e giochi d'azzardo offline.

2. Per quanto riguarda il gioco d'azzardo, non sono attualmente in vigore norme specifiche dell'UE in questa
particolare materia. È responsabilità degli Stati membri fissare i limiti di età per impedire che bambini e ragazzi
abbiano accesso a giochi di sorte e lotterie e possano acquistarli. L'applicazione effettiva delle norme in materia è
anch'essa di competenza degli Stati membri.

3. Come annunciato nella recente comunicazione sul gioco d'azzardo online ( [2] ), la Commissione intende adottare
una raccomandazione al fine di garantire un elevato livello di protezione dei consumatori di servizi di giochi
d'azzardo, inclusa la tutela di bambini e ragazzi. Tra i principi che vanno elaborati dovrebbero figurare l'accertamento
dell'età e dell'identità del giocatore.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) In Europa il 75 % dei giovani tra i 5 e i 17 anni usano Internet COM(2012)196 def. — Flash Eurobarometro 2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm

C 6 E / 586 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002927/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Gambling and minors

Research into the conditions of childhood and adolescence in 2012, conducted by Eurispes and Telefono Azzurro
(the ‘Blue Telephone’ helpline), has produced data on the incidence of gambling: 8% of children aged between 7 and
11 years gamble with money online; 15.3% place bets offline. In addition, 12% of children aged between 12 and
18 years engage in online gambling. 27% place money on traditional games. One adolescent in four loses all the
money he has. 33.7% of younger children choose scratch cards, while 11.4% and 11.1% respectively take part in
lotteries and bingo. Adolescents, on the other hand, prefer to play on the Internet (39.9%), in games halls (17.8%) or
in tobacconists' shops (14.4%). Apart from any educational aspects that may be involved which are certainly not to be
recommended in the case of games of chance, the risk of becoming addicted to gambling is ever‐present. This
pathology is on the increase in various Member States of the Union, some of which have included it as a disease
recognised by the national health service.

Can the Commission say:

1. Whether it considers that the phenomenon may represent a handicap to the proper development of young
people towards maturity?

2. Whether, by analogy with the legislation in force for the protection of minors from the Internet, it thinks it
appropriate to ban minors from games of chance — including the purchase of scratch cards or their equivalents
— in public gaming‐rooms and in all places where they are played, as is the case with alcoholic beverages and
tobacco?

3. Why it does not consider issuing a recommendation to the Member States on this matter?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

1. The Commission shares the concerns raised by the Honourable Member. A large majority of children use the
Internet, increasingly at younger ages through a range of connected devices ( [1] ). Therefore, it is important to take
protective measures against potentially harmful content such as gambling while at the same time facilitating access of
children and young people to the benefits of the Internet, such as leisure activities, learning and other positive online
interactions.

The Commission believes that preventive measures in the Member States should also be in place to preclude
adolescents from gaining access to lotteries and gambling offline.

2. As regards gambling, there is currently no EU specific legislation in force on this particular matter. It is the
Member States’s responsibility to set the age limits to preclude access or the sale of games of chance and lottery
products to children and young people. The effective enforcement of these rules is also the competence of the
Member States.

3. As announced in the recently adopted Communication ( [2] ) regarding online gambling, the Commission intends
to adopt a recommendation with the aim of providing a high level of common protection of consumers of gambling
services, including the protection of children and young people. The principles to be elaborated should include age
verification and player identification controls.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 75% of 5-17‐ year-olds in Europe use the Internet COM(2012) 196 final — Flash Eurobarometer 2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 587

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002928/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Prodotti alimentari italiani contraffatti

Un'inchiesta giornalistica realizzata dal programma televisivo «Striscia la Notizia» e messa in onda nella puntata di
domenica 10 marzo 2013 evidenzia come in un supermercato di Lindau, Germania, sono presenti e in vendita
alimenti e bevande prodotti in Germania, ma con chiari riferimenti a prodotti italiani. La produzione e la
distribuzione di prodotti con denominazioni quali «Parmesan», «Gorgonzola» o «Prosecco», realizzata da produttori in
zone ben lontane da quelle che danno a questi prodotti qualità e denominazione, è proibita dalle normative
comunitarie e costituisce una vera e propria falsificazione.

Può la Commissione riferire:

1. se è al corrente di questa situazione;

2. cosa intende fare per proteggere i produttori italiani e i consumatori tedeschi da questa falsificazione;

3. se ritiene che a fronte di tali situazioni sia urgente pensare a un'accelerazione dell'iter di approvazione del
regolamento sul «Made In»;

4. se ritiene necessario, come già ho evidenziato nella mia interrogazione sulle carni equine del 19 febbraio 2013
e nella mia proposta di risoluzione del 28 febbraio 2013, intensificare i controlli sulla provenienza e la qualità
dei prodotti alimentari?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(24 aprile 2013)_

Le denominazioni «Gorgonzola» e «Prosecco» godono di tutela in forza del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 ( [1] ) e del
regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 ( [2] ) e possono pertanto essere usate soltanto sui prodotti ottenuti nelle aree
geografiche definite e sulla base delle specifiche che si applicano a tali prodotti. Il termine «Parmesan» risulta evocare il
termine «Parmigiano Reggiano». L'uso della parola «Parmesan» per un formaggio che non rispetti il capitolato valido
per il «Parmigiano Reggiano» è stato pertanto ritenuto violare la protezione conferita a quest'ultimo dal regolamento
(UE) n. 1151/2012 ( [3] ).

Per quanto concerne la questione dei controlli ufficiali e dell'etichettatura d'origine quale strumento per prevenire le
frodi, la Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputata alla propria risposta alle interrogazioni scritte P-001731/2013 e E‐
001410/2013 ( [4] ). Le regole vigenti prescrivono l'indicazione d'origine sull'etichetta degli alimenti in tutti i casi in cui
la sua omissione potrebbe trarre in inganno i consumatori ( [5] ). Inoltre, l'etichettatura d'origine obbligatoria è prevista
attualmente per prodotti specifici come le carni bovine e i prodotti a base di carni bovine, l'olio d'oliva, la frutta e la
verdura, il vino, il miele e le uova. Le regole vigenti sono state rivedute di recente ( [6] ). A decorrere dal 13 dicembre
2014, l'etichettatura d'origine diverrà obbligatoria anche per le carni non trasformate preconfezionate di suini,
pollame, ovini e caprini.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 21 novembre 2012, sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e

alimentari, GU L 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio, del 22 ottobre 2007, recante organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli e disposizioni specifiche

per taluni prodotti agricoli (regolamento unico OCM), GU L 299 del 16.11.2007, pag. 1.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Causa C-132/05, sentenza della Corte (grande sezione) del 26 febbraio 2008, RACC. 2008, pag. I-00957.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2000, relativa al ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri

concernenti l'etichettatura e la presentazione dei prodotti alimentari, nonché la relativa pubblicità, GU L 109 del 6.5.2000, pag. 29.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2011, relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli

alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la
direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva
2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004
della Commissione, GU L 304 del 22.11.2011, pag.18.

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 588 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Inoltre, sempre dal 13 dicembre 2014, una dichiarazione volontaria che possa essere considerata alla stregua di
un'indicazione d'origine dovrebbe conformarsi alle nuove norme stabilite nel regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011. In
base a tali norme il paese d'origine degli alimenti trasformati non ottenuti completamente in un unico paese
corrisponde al paese dell'ultima trasformazione sostanziale dell'alimento. Se l'ingrediente principale è originario di un
luogo diverso, si dovrà anche indicare il paese d'origine o il luogo di provenienza di tale ingrediente.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 589

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002928/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Counterfeit Italian food products

An investigation carried out by the television programme ‘Striscia la Notizia’, which was broadcast during the show's
Sunday slot on 10 March 2013, revealed that a supermarket in Lindau in Germany is selling food and beverages that
have been produced in Germany but carry clear references to Italian products. The production and distribution of
products with names such as ‘Parmesan’, ‘Gorgonzola’ or ‘Prosecco’, manufactured by producers a long way from the
regions with which the quality and the name of those products is associated, is prohibited under EC law and amounts
to actual counterfeiting.

Can the Commission say:

whether it is aware of this situation?

what it intends to do to protect Italian producers and German consumers from such counterfeiting?

whether it considers that, faced with situations of this kind, the question of speeding up the process for adopting the
‘Made in’ regulation should be addressed as a matter of urgency?

whether it considers it necessary, as I pointed out in my question of 19 February 2013 on horsemeat and in my
motion for a resolution of 28 February 2013, to step up checks on the origin and quality of food products?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 April 2013)_

The names ‘Gorgonzola’ and ‘Prosecco’ enjoy protection under Regulations (EC) No 1151/2012 ( [1] ) and 1234/2007 ( [2] )
and may thus only be used on products produced in the geographical areas established in and according to the
specifications for these products. The term ‘Parmesan’ has been found to be an evocation of the term ‘Parmigiano
Reggiano’. Use of the word ‘Parmesan’ for cheese which does not comply with the specification for ‘Parmigiano
Reggiano’ has therefore been held to infringe the protection provided to the latter via regulation 1151/2012 ( [3] ).

As regards the issue of official controls and origin labelling as a tool to prevent fraud, the Commission refers the
Honourable Member to its reply to Written Questions P-001731/2013 and E‐001410/2013 ( [4] ). Existing rules require
the origin on the label of foods in all cases where its omission could mislead the consumer ( [5] ). Furthermore,
mandatory origin labelling is currently foreseen for specific products, such as beef and beef products, olive oil, fruit
and vegetables, wine, honey and eggs. The existing rules have been recently revised ( [6] ). As of 13 December 2014,
origin labelling will become mandatory also for prepacked unprocessed meat of pig, poultry, sheep and goat.
Moreover, any voluntary statement that can be considered as an indication of origin should, from
13 December 2014, comply with the new rules established in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. According to them,
the country of origin of processed foods not wholly obtained in one single country corresponds to the country of the
last substantial transformation of the food. If its primary ingredient originates from a different place, the country of
origin or place of provenance of this ingredient should be also provided.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural

products and foodstuffs, OJ 2012 L 343/1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for

certain agricultural products (single CMO Regulation), OJ 2007, L 299/1.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Case 132/05, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2008, ECR 2008 page I-00957.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States

relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to

consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304,
22.11.2011, p.18.

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

C 6 E / 590 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002929/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(14 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Relações entre a União Europeia e a República de Cuba

Considerando que:

—
Nos passados dias 26 e 27 de janeiro, se realizou, em Santiago do Chile, uma reunião de cúpula entre a
Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC) e a União Europeia (UE), que marca um
importante passo nas relações entre duas organizações regionais que, em conjunto, representam 60 países,
oferecendo igualmente uma oportunidade para se refletir sobre as áreas em que a cooperação deve ser
aprofundada;

—
A CELAC foi criada a 23 de fevereiro de 2011 e conta atualmente com 33 Estados membros, de entre os quais a
Venezuela, tendo como objetivo projetar a região à escala global em temas como o respeito do Direito
internacional, a igualdade entre Estados, o respeito pelos Direitos Humanos e a cooperação, contribuindo
também para facilitar a configuração de uma identidade regional própria e de posições latino‐americanas e
caribenhas comuns sobre a integração e o desenvolvimento;

—
As relações entre a UE e Cuba são enquadradas nos termos da Posição Comum adotada em 1996, tendo o
diálogo político até 2003 vindo a ser aprofundado em função de um abrangente leque de temas, incluindo
questões políticas, económicas, de Direitos Humanos, de cooperação para o desenvolvimento e de ordem
científica e cultural; e que, a 12 de maio de 2010, a Comissão adotou o primeiro documento estratégico
(«country strategic paper») entre a UE e Cuba, com uma atribuição de verbas na ordem dos 20 milhões de euros
para o período de 2011 a 2013, ao abrigo do Instrumento de Cooperação ao Desenvolvimento, orientado em
torno de três prioridades: segurança alimentar; ambiente e adaptação às alterações climáticas; e intercâmbio de
competências, formação e educação;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o atual ponto da situação nas relações entre a UE e Cuba?

2. Como pode a recente aproximação da UE à CELAC contribuir para o aprofundamento das relações entre a UE e
Cuba?

3. Quais as principais áreas de cooperação com interesse para a UE no quadro de um eventual aprofundamento
das relações entre a UE e Cuba?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante /Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(6 de maio de 2013)_

O diálogo político e a cooperação entre a UE e Cuba foram reatados em outubro de 2008. O diálogo político com
Cuba abrange uma série de questões, que incluem os direitos humanos e as liberdades fundamentais. Estas questões
são discutidas com as autoridades cubanas ao mais alto nível, tanto em Bruxelas como em Havana. A UE é o segundo
parceiro comercial mais importante e o maior investidor externo de Cuba.

A UE está a cooperar estreitamente com Cuba durante a sua Presidência da CELAC. A Presidência cubana mostrou
uma atitude positiva e construtiva, continuando a melhorar as relações UE-CELAC na sequência da recente cimeira de
Santiago do Chile.

Desde 2008, a UE disponibilizou cerca de 67 milhões de euros para a cooperação em matéria de reabilitação e
reconstrução pós-furacões, segurança alimentar, alterações climáticas e energias renováveis, cultura, educação,
setores sociais e autoridades locais. Cuba também participa em diversos programas regionais financiados pela UE. O
primeiro documento de estratégia/programa indicativo nacional para Cuba (adotado em 12 de maio de 2010)
disponibiliza um montante adicional de 20 milhões de euros entre 2011 e 2013 para a segurança alimentar, a
adaptação às alterações climáticas e o intercâmbio de peritos. São estes os domínios identificados para a cooperação
com Cuba.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 591

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002929/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU-Cuba relations

On 26 and 27 January 2013, a summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
and the EU was held in Santiago (Chile), marking a major step forward in relations between these two regional
groups, which represent a total of 60 countries, as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on areas in which
cooperation needs to be strengthened.

CELAC was created on 23 February 2011 and currently has 33 Member States, including Cuba. Its aim is to promote
the region at a global level in areas such as respect for international law, equality among states, respect for human
rights, and cooperation, as well as helping to build a regional identity and common Latin American and Caribbean
positions on integration and development.

EU-Cuba relations are framed by the Common Position adopted in 1996. The political dialogue which took place up
to 2003 was expanded to include a broad range of topics covering political, economic, human rights, development
cooperation and scientific and cultural issues. On 12 May 2010, the Commission adopted the first EU-Cuba country
strategic paper, with a budget allocation under the Development Cooperation Instrument of around EUR 20 million
for the 2011-2013 period, directed towards the three priorities of food safety, environment and adaptation to climate
change, as well as the exchange of expertise, training and education.

Can the Commission say:

1. What is the current state of EU-Cuba relations?

2. How can the EU’s recent closer involvement with CELAC help to strengthen EU-Cuba relations?

3. Which areas of cooperation are of most interest to the EU in terms of potentially strengthening its relationship
with Cuba?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The EU-Cuba political dialogue and cooperation were resumed in October 2008. Political dialogue with Cuba covers
a number of issues including human rights and fundamental freedoms. These questions are discussed with the Cuban
authorities at the highest level both in Brussels and in Havana. The EU is Cuba's second most important trading
partner and Cuba's biggest external investor.

The EU is cooperating closely with Cuba during its pro-tempore presidency of CELAC. The Cuban presidency has
shown a positive and constructive stance in continuing to improve EU-CELAC relations, following the recent Summit
in Santiago.

Since 2008, the EU has made available around EUR 67 million for cooperation on post-hurricane reconstruction and
rehabilitation, food security, climate change and renewable energy, culture, education, social sectors and local
authorities. Cuba also takes part in several EU-funded regional programmes. The first Country Strategy
Paper/National Indicative Programme for Cuba (adopted on 12 May 2010) makes available an additional
EUR 20 million between 2011 and 2013 for food security, climate change adaptation, and expertise exchanges. These
are the areas identified for cooperation with Cuba.

C 6 E / 592 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002930/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(14 de março de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Relações entre a União Europeia e a República Bolivariana da Venezuela

Considerando que:

—
Nos passados dias 26 e 27 de janeiro, se realizou, em Santiago do Chile, uma reunião de cúpula entre a
Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC) e a União Europeia (UE), que marca um
importante passo nas relações entre duas organizações regionais que, em conjunto, representam 60 países,
oferecendo igualmente uma oportunidade para se refletir sobre as áreas em que a cooperação deve ser
aprofundada;

—
A CELAC foi criada a 23 de fevereiro de 2011 e conta atualmente com 33 Estados membros, de entre os quais a
Venezuela, tendo como objetivo projetar a região à escala global em temas como o respeito do Direito
internacional, a igualdade entre Estados, o respeito pelos Direitos Humanos e a cooperação, contribuindo
também para facilitar a configuração de uma identidade regional própria e de posições latino‐‐americanas e
caribenhas comuns sobre a integração e o desenvolvimento;

—
As relações entre a UE e a Venezuela têm vindo a ser desenvolvidas numa base regional e bilateral,
nomeadamente através do diálogo institucional entre a UE e o Grupo do Rio; que, em 2012, a Venezuela se
tornou membro efetivo do Mercosul, passando a integrar o diálogo e as negociações conjuntas entre a UE e o
Mercosul com vista a um futuro acordo de associação; e que o documento estratégico da União («country
strategic paper») define dois setores específicos como principais áreas de cooperação, a saber, o apoio à
modernização do Estado e das instituições e a diversificação da economia;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o atual ponto da situação nas relações entre a UE e a Venezuela?

2. Como pode a recente aproximação da UE à CELAC contribuir para o aprofundamento das relações entre a UE e
a Venezuela?

3. Como pode o futuro acordo de associação entre a UE e o Mercosul contribuir para alcançar os objetivos de
apoio à modernização do Estado e das instituições, bem como de diversificação da economia?

4. Quais as principais áreas de cooperação com interesse para a UE no quadro de um eventual aprofundamento
das relações entre a União e a Venezuela?

5. Qual o papel da União Europeia no contexto da realização de novas eleições na Venezuela, ao abrigo de uma
relação renovada no quadro da cooperação entre as várias organizações que promovem a cooperação
birregional?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(2 de maio de 2013)_

A UE está pronta a reforçar as relações com a Venezuela, tanto através dos mecanismos de integração regional como
bilateralmente. Antevê potencial em novos setores de diálogo, inclusive sobre questões como a energia, a cooperação
económica, o ambiente e a integração regional.

A UE pretende igualmente promover a importância do Estado de direito, da democracia, do respeito pelos direitos
humanos e da proteção do ambiente, bem como o acesso da sua indústria ao mercado e a remoção dos entraves ao
comércio.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 593

No período 2007-2013, o montante total da cooperação financeira da UE para o desenvolvimento ascendeu a
14 milhões de euros, fortemente incidentes no apoio a organizações da sociedade civil. Durante o próximo Quadro
Financeiro Plurianual, a Venezuela terá direito a financiamento no âmbito do pacote regional. Continuarão
disponíveis outros instrumentos financeiros para atividades de cooperação (por exemplo, com organizações da
sociedade civil e operadores económicos).

C 6 E / 594 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002930/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Relations between the EU and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

On 26 and 27 January 2013, a summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
and the EU was held in Santiago (Chile), marking a major step forward in relations between these two regional
groups, which represent a total of 60 countries, as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on areas in which
cooperation needs to be strengthened.

— CELAC was created on 23 February 2011 and currently has 33 Member States, including Venezuela. Its aim is to
promote the region at a global level in areas such as respect for international law, equality among states, respect for
human rights, and cooperation, as well as helping to build a regional identity and common Latin American and
Caribbean positions on integration and development

— EU-Venezuela relations have been developed on a regional and bilateral basis, principally through institutional
dialogue between the EU and the Rio Group. In 2012 Venezuela became a full member of Mercosur, enabling it to
take part in the joint EU-Mercosur dialogue and negotiations towards a future association agreement. The country
strategic paper identifies two specific sectors as the main areas of cooperation: support to the modernisation of the
state and its institutions and diversification of the economy.

Can the Commission say:

1. What is the current state of EU-Venezuela relations?

2. How can the EU’s recent closer involvement with CELAC help to strengthen EU-Venezuela relations?

3. How will the future EU-Mercosur association agreement help to attain the objectives of supporting the
modernisation of the state and its institutions and economic diversification?

4. Which areas of cooperation are of most interest to the EU in terms of potentially strengthening its relationship
with Venezuela?

5. What role might the EU play in connection with the holding of fresh elections in Venezuela, as part of a
renewed relationship within the framework of cooperation between the various organisations working to
promote bi-regional cooperation?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2013)_

The EU is keen on strengthening the EU-Venezuela relations, both through regional integration mechanisms and
bilaterally. It sees potential in new areas of dialogue including on issues such as energy, economic cooperation,
environment and regional integration.

Furthermore the EU aims to promote the importance of the Rule of Law, democracy, the respect of human rights and
the protection of environment as well as promote market access for EU industry and removal of trade barriers.

Total funding for EU financial cooperation to development for 2007-13 was EUR 14 million. This was largely centred
on support to civil society organisations. During the next Multiannual Financial Framework, Venezuela will be
eligible for funding under the regional envelope. Other financial instruments will remain available for cooperation
activities e.g. with civil society organisations and economic operators.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 595

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002931/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Exclusión de biólogos en el campo de genética humana

El artículo 53, apartado 2, del TFUE reconoce la existencia de tres tipos de profesiones sanitarias, que son las médicas,
paramédicas y las farmacéuticas. Actualmente, los biólogos se encuentran excluidos del régimen específico de
reconocimiento automático de cualificaciones profesionales adoptado para la especialidad de la Genética Humana.

Los profesionales no médicos que trabajan en Genética Humana tienen la consideración de profesionales sanitarios
paramédicos, de acuerdo con el parecer del Comité Económico y Social Europeo y del Comité de Ministros de los
Estados miembros de la Unión.

La creación de la especialidad sanitaria de Genética únicamente para médicos es contraria al dictamen sobre el tema
«La asistencia sanitaria» del Comité Económico y Social Europeo, por el que se establece que «no es posible reconocer
nuevas especialidades médicas sin emprender en primer lugar una racionalización de las disciplinas médicas y una
revalorización de las profesiones paramédicas». Y a su vez es contraria a la recomendación CM/Rec (2010)11 del
Comité de Ministros de los Estados miembros, por el que se establece que los científicos del laboratorio de Genética
expertos en citogenética y genética molecular, deberían ser reconocidos como especialistas.

Por ello es difícil entender la exclusión de los biólogos que trabajan en el campo de la Genética Humana, de un sistema
específico de reconocimiento automático de cualificaciones profesionales reconocido en la Directiva 2005/36/CE.

1. ¿Por qué la Comisión continúa adoptando medidas en detrimento de profesiones emergentes como la de
biólogo?

2. ¿Cómo pretende pues facilitar la libre circulación de profesionales dentro de la Unión?

3. ¿Se plantea crear el título de Especialista en Genética Humana?

4. ¿Puede reconocer la capacidad de acceso al mismo por parte de los biólogos?

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003357/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(25 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Barreras a la libre competencia entre distintos profesionales de la genética clínica o genética humana

El artículo 53, apartado 2, del TFUE reconoce la existencia de tres tipos de profesiones sanitarias: médicas,
paramédicas y farmacéuticas. La Directiva 2005/36/CE establece un sistema general de reconocimiento automático
de cualificaciones profesionales y siete específicas para otras tantas profesiones, que son las de médico, enfermero
responsable de cuidados especiales, odontólogo, veterinario, matrona, farmacéutico y arquitecto. De estas siete
profesiones con reconocimiento específico de cualificaciones profesionales, al menos las de enfermero responsable de
cuidados especiales y de matrona son profesiones sanitarias paramédicas.

Por su parte, la Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11, del Comité de Ministros a los Estados miembros, de 29 de
septiembre de 2010, establece, en su apartado 8, que «los científicos del laboratorio de genética expertos en
citogenética y genética molecular deberán ser reconocidos como especialistas». Pero en cambio, el pasado 4 de marzo
de 2011, la UE publicó el Reglamento (UE) n° 213/2011 de la Comisión, de 3 de marzo de 2011, por el que se
modifican los anexos II y V de la Directiva 2005/36/CE, creando la especialidad de genética médica, con acceso
exclusivo para los médicos.

Este reglamento, además de no tener en cuenta la citada Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11, es un acto legislativo que
no se ajusta al dictamen «La asistencia sanitaria» del Comité Económico y Social Europeo, de 16 y 17 de julio de 2003
(DO C 234 de 30.9.2003, p. 36), en cuyo apartado 3.6.3 se explicita que «no es posible reconocer nuevas
especialidades médicas sin emprender en primer lugar una racionalización de las disciplinas médicas y una
revalorización de las profesiones paramédicas».

C 6 E / 596 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

¿Tiene previsto la Comisión llevar a cabo lo previsto en el apartado 8 de la Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11 y el
apartado 3.6.3 del dictamen «La asistencia sanitaria» de 16 y 17 de julio de 2003?

En caso contrario, ¿qué valoraciones ha hecho la Comisión para no tener en cuenta tales planteamientos?

En caso de no prever la creación de la especialidad de genética clínica o genética humana para las profesiones
paramédicas, ¿por qué considera la Comisión que el mantenimiento de la actual discriminación no implica una
restricción de la competencia?

**Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(8 de mayo de 2013)_

La Directiva 2005/36/CE ( [1] ) establece el marco europeo para el reconocimiento de las cualificaciones profesionales y
coordina además las condiciones mínimas de formación para siete profesiones, lo que permite el reconocimiento
automático de los títulos de formación que estas requieren. Los médicos especialistas en Genética Humana también
están cubiertos por este régimen, y veintiún Estados miembros participan actualmente en el reconocimiento
automático de esta especialidad médica. La admisión a la formación médica especializada está supeditada a la
conclusión de estudios básicos de medicina ( [2] ).

Para reconocer las cualificaciones de otras profesiones, esta Directiva prevé un estudio caso por caso que persigue el
reconocimiento mutuo del título de formación de que se trate (el llamado «Régimen general» ( [3] )). Los profesionales no
médicos, como los biólogos y los profesionales sanitarios paramédicos, pueden beneficiarse del reconocimiento de
sus títulos de formación en virtud de este sistema.

En diciembre de 2011, la Comisión presentó una propuesta ( [4] ) de modernización de dicha Directiva. En caso de
adoptarse, la propuesta prevé una nueva posibilidad de reconocimiento automático sobre la base de unos principios
comunes de formación, es decir, un conjunto común de conocimientos y competencias necesarios para el ejercicio de
una profesión específica. La propuesta, en la cual se fijan las condiciones y el procedimiento necesarios para
introducir estos nuevos principios, no excluye que este nuevo régimen pueda cubrir también a los profesionales no
médicos que trabajan en el campo de la Genética Humana.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 2005/36/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 7 de septiembre de 2005, relativa al reconocimiento de cualificaciones

profesionales (DO L 255 de 30.9.2005, p. 22).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Artículo 25 de la Directiva 2005/36/CE.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Capítulo I del título III de la Directiva 2005/36/CE.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Se espera lograr un acuerdo político sobre esta propuesta en junio, con miras a su adopción formal antes de finales de año.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 597

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002931/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Exclusion of biologists from the field of human genetics

Article 53(2) of the TFEU recognises the existence of three types of health profession: medical, paramedical and
pharmaceutical. At present, biologists are excluded from the specific regime for the recognition of professional
qualifications which was adopted for the specialised field of human genetics.

Non-medical professionals working in the field of human genetics are treated as paramedical health professionals, as
established by the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Ministers to EU Member States.

The creation of a health speciality in genetics which is only open to medical professionals contradicts the European
Economic and Social Committee’s opinion on healthcare, according to which ‘a rationalisation of medical disciplines
and an assessment of paramedical professions must take place before new medical specialities can be recognised’. It
also contravenes Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States, which
establishes that genetic laboratory scientists specialised in molecular and cytogenetics should be recognised as
specialists.

This makes it difficult to understand why biologists working in the field of human genetics should be excluded from
the specific system for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications recognised under
Directive 2005/36/EC.

1. Why does the Commission continue to adopt measures prejudicial to emerging professions such as biology?

2. How does this contribute to the free movement of professionals within the Union?

3. Is there any plan to create the category of ‘specialist in human genetics’?

4. Does the Commission accept that it should be possible for biologists should be admitted to this category?

**Question for written answer E-003357/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(25 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Barriers to free competition between various clinical genetics and human genetics professionals

Article 53(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) recognises the existence of three types of
health professionals: medical, allied and pharmaceutical. Directive 2005/36/EC establishes a general system for the
automatic recognition of professional qualifications and specific provisions for seven professions: doctor, special care
nurse, dentist, veterinary surgeon, midwife, pharmacist and architect. Of these seven professions, whose professional
qualifications are specifically recognised, special care nurse and midwife are regarded as allied health professions.

Meanwhile, paragraph 8 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of
29 September 2010 states that: ‘Genetic laboratory scientists with expertise in cytogenetics and molecular genetics
should be recognised as specialists.’ However, on 4 March 2011 the EU published Commission Regulation (EU)
No 213/2011 of 3 March 2011 amending Annexes II and V to Directive 2005/36/EC, creating the specialty of
medical genetics, with exclusive access for doctors.

As well as failing to take account of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11, this regulation does not comply with the
opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Healthcare’ of 16 and 17 July 2003 (OJ C 234 of
30 September 2003, p.36), paragraph 3.6.3 of which states that: ‘A rationalisation of medical disciplines and an
assessment of paramedical professions must take place before new medical specialities can be recognised.’

Will the Commission carry out the provisions of paragraph 8 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11 and
paragraph 3.6.3 of the opinion on ‘Healthcare’ of 16 and 17 July 2003?

If not, why has it decided to ignore these approaches?

C 6 E / 598 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Why does the Commission not interpret the failure to create the specialty of clinical genetics and human genetics for
allied health professions, and the maintenance of current discrimination, as a restriction on competition?

**Joint answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Directive 2005/36/EC ( [1] ) constitutes the European framework for the recognition of professional qualifications. For
seven professions, the directive even coordinates the minimum training conditions, which allow for the automatic
recognition of the professional qualifications concerned. This regime covers medical specialists in human genetics.
Currently 21 Member States are participating in the automatic recognition of this medical specialisation. Admission
to medical specialist trainings is contingent upon the completion of basic medical studies ( [2] ).

As for the recognition of qualifications of other professions, the directive foresees a case-by-case examination with
the objective of the mutual recognition of the qualification (the so-called general system ( [3] )). Non-medical
professionals, such as biologists and paramedical health professionals, can benefit from the recognition of their
professional qualifications under this system.

In December 2011, the Commission presented a proposal ( [4] ) for the modernisation of the directive. If adopted, the
proposal would introduce a new possibility for the automatic recognition based on common training principles, i.e. a
common set of knowledge and competences necessary for the pursuit of a specific profession. The proposal, which
sets out the conditions and the procedure necessary to introduce new principles, does not exclude that this new
regime might also cover non-medical professionals working in the field of human genetics.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2005/36/EC of Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255,

30.9.2005.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Article 25 of Directive 2005/36/EC.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Chapter I of Title III of Directive 2005/36/EC.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) It is expected that a political agreement should be reached on this proposal in June, with formal adoption before the end of the year.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 599

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002932/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Retraso del Estado español en la elaboración y aprobación de los planes hidrológicos de cuenca en
cumplimiento de la Directiva 2000/60/CE

En referencia a las respuestas parlamentarias de la Comisión E-001047/2011 ( [1] ), E-005592/2009 ( [2] ), E004005/2010 ( [3] ), E-004006/2010 ( [4] ), E-004007/2010 ( [5] ) y E-002229/2012 ( [6] ), sobre el retraso del Estado español
en la elaboración y aprobación de los planes hidrológicos de cuenca en cumplimiento de la Directiva 2000/60/CE y
en referencia a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea ( [7] ) del pasado 4 de octubre de 2012, ¿de qué
plazo dispone el Reino de España para dar cumplimiento a la sentencia?

En estos cuatro meses transcurridos desde la sentencia, ¿ha presentado el Reino de España alguna documentación a la
Comisión para dar cumplimiento a la sentencia? En caso afirmativo, ¿la podría ilustrar?

¿Puede informar la Comisión de la cantidad económica que han supuesto las costas de este juicio?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(26 de abril de 2013)_

El 25 de marzo de 2013, la Comisión envió a España una carta de emplazamiento, con arreglo al artículo 260 del
Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, porque las autoridades españolas no habían adoptado todas las
medidas necesarias para ejecutar la sentencia de 4 de octubre de 2012 en el asunto C 403/11.

Hasta la fecha, las autoridades españolas han adoptado, publicado y comunicado a la Comisión los planes
hidrológicos de cuenca correspondientes a cinco demarcaciones hidrográficas. Aún tienen que ser adoptados,
publicados y comunicados veinte planes más.

En lo que atañe a estos planes pendientes, España ha completado la fase de información y consultas públicas
correspondiente a once demarcaciones hidrográficas y ha iniciado esta fase para los planes correspondientes a otras
tres. Sin embargo, no ha iniciado aún los planes correspondientes a seis demarcaciones hidrográficas.

España tiene ahora la oportunidad de presentar sus observaciones. Si la Comisión considera, tras haber examinado
toda la información disponible, que España no ha adoptado las medidas necesarias para la ejecución de la sentencia,
podrá someter de nuevo el asunto al Tribunal con una propuesta de aplicación de una suma a tanto alzado o de una
multa coercitiva de un importe específico. La decisión final sobre la imposición de la sanción establecida en el
artículo 260 recae en el Tribunal de Justicia, que tiene plena competencia en este ámbito.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-001047+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2009-5592&language=ES
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4005&language=ES
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4006&language=ES
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4007&language=ES
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-002229+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0403:ES:HTML

C 6 E / 600 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002932/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Delay by Spanish Government in drafting and adopting river basin management plans in compliance with
Directive 2000/60/EC

Further to the Commission’s answers to Written Questions E-001047/2011 ( [1] ), E-005592/2009 ( [2] ), E004005/2010 ( [3] ), E-004006/2010 ( [4] ), E-004007/2010 ( [5] ) and E-002229/2012 ( [6] ), on the Spanish Government’s
delay in drafting and adopting river basin management plans in compliance with Directive 2000/60/EC, and in the
light of the EU Court of Justice ruling ( [7] ) of 4 October 2012, how long does Spain have to take action to comply with
this judgment?

Has Spain presented any documents to the Commission since the judgment was delivered four months ago to show
that it has complied with it? If so, could the Commission provide details?

Can the Commission say how much this court case cost?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2013)_

On 25 March 2013 the Commission sent a Letter to Spain of Formal Notice under Article 260 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union as the authorities had not taken all the necessary measures to comply with the
judgment of 4 October 2012, in Case C 403/11.

The authorities have to date adopted, published and communicated to the Commission the River Basin Management
Plans corresponding to five river basin districts. Twenty more plans are yet to be adopted, published and
communicated.

With regards to these outstanding plans, Spain has completed the public information and consultation stage
corresponding to eleven river basin districts, and has initiated this stage for the plans corresponding to three river
basin districts. However, Spain has not yet initiated it for the plans corresponding to six river basin districts.

Spain has now the opportunity to submit its observations. If the Commission considers, after having assessed all the
available information, that Spain has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, it may bring
again the case before the Court with a proposal for the application of a lump sum and/or penalty payment of a
specific amount. The final decision on the imposition of the sanctions laid down in Article 260 lies with the Court of
Justice, which has full jurisdiction in this area.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-001047+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2009-5592&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4005&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4006&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4007&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-002229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0403:ES:HTML.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 601

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002933/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 de marzo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Abejas y prohibición de plaguicidas

Es un hecho que las abejas de todo el mundo se están muriendo, lo que supone una amenaza para la biodiversidad y la
cadena alimentaria. Entre las causas de esta plaga destacan los plaguicidas neonicotinoides. Estos plaguicidas afectan
al sistema nervioso de las abejas, que pierden el sentido de la orientación, y les impiden regresar a las colmenas,
causándoles también parálisis y hasta la muerte.

Por ello resulta extraño que la Comisión Europea, conocedora del impacto tóxico de dichos plaguicidas, no haya
exigido a los Estados miembros el cumplimiento de la Directiva 21/2010/UE, que modifica el anexo I de la Directiva
91/414/CEE por lo que respecta a disposiciones específicas relativas a la clotianidina, el tiametoxam, el fipronil y el
imidacloprid, que obliga a los Estados miembros a poner «en marcha programas de seguimiento para verificar la
exposición real de las abejas melíferas a [estas sustancias] activas en zonas comúnmente utilizadas por las abejas para
libar o por apicultores».

Además, el Reglamento de la UE (CE) n° 1107/2009 sobre plaguicidas establece que ningún plaguicida puede ser
autorizado si tiene un efecto perjudicial sobre las abejas (artículo 4, apartado 2, letra b)).. El objetivo de este
Reglamento es garantizar un nivel elevado de protección del medio ambiente y la base de esta regulación es la
aplicación del principio de precaución. Sin embargo, hoy en día siguen siendo autorizados los neonicotinoides y el
Gobierno de España, hasta ahora, se ha opuesto a la prohibición de estos productos específicos. Si bien es cierto que la
Comisión se ha pronunciado al respecto, la medida continúa siendo débil, por lo que resulta recomendable una
prohibición total del uso de estos plaguicidas por parte de todos los Estados miembros.

Con ello, ¿pretende la Comisión integrar la apicultura como un activo prioritario dentro de su política ambiental?
¿Considera la Comisión la posibilidad de aplicar el principio de precaución? ¿Sabe la Comisión que cambiar los
métodos de producción hacia una agricultura sostenible crearía más de 1 millón de puestos de trabajo en la EU?
¿Podría incentivar a los Estados miembros a adoptar medidas de protección de las abejas no solo en el caso de los
cultivos de colza, maíz y girasol?

**Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión**

_(17 de mayo de 2013)_

La Comisión ruega a Su Señoría que consulte la respuesta dada a la pregunta escrita E-000450/2013 ( [1] ).

Los días 14 y 15 de marzo, la Comisión presentó asimismo al Comité Permanente de la Cadena Alimentaria y de
Sanidad Animal una propuesta que restringe de forma significativa el uso de los tres neonicotinoides tiametoxam,
clotianidina e imidacloprid. No obstante, la medida proyectada no obtuvo la mayoría cualificada, y la Comisión la
remitió al Comité de Apelación. El 29 de abril, este Comité no pudo emitir un dictamen. De conformidad con el
artículo 6, apartado 3, del Reglamento (UE) n° 182/2011 ( [2] ), la Comisión prevé adoptar el acto.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) DO L 55 de 28.2.2011, p. 13.

C 6 E / 602 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002933/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Bees and a pesticide ban

Bees are dying all over the world, which poses a threat to biodiversity and the food chain. One of the main causes of
the declining bee population is the use of neonicotinoid pesticides. Neonicotinoid pesticides damage the nervous
system of bees, causing them to lose their sense of direction and hampering their ability to navigate back to their
hives. Exposure to neonicotinoids can also paralyse or even kill bees.

Consequently, it is astonishing that the Commission — aware as it is of the toxic effect of neonicotinoid pesticides —
has not insisted that all EU Member States comply with Commission Directive 2010/21/EU amending Annex I to
Council Directive 91/414/EEC as regards the specific provisions relating to clothianidin, thiamethoxam, fipronil and
imidacloprid. This directive requires all Member States to ensure that ‘monitoring programmes are initiated to verify
the real exposure of honey bees to [these substances] in areas extensively used by bees for foraging or by beekeepers’.

Moreover, Article 4(2)b of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 on pesticides states that plant protection products that
have an adverse impact on bees are not authorised for use. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure a high level of
environmental protection, based on the application of the precautionary principle. However, neonicotinoids remain
legal and the Spanish Government still opposes a ban on such pesticides. While it is true that the Commission has
voiced its opposition to neonicotinoids, in reality the steps taken have had very little impact, which is why a total ban
on neonicotinoids should be imposed in all the Member States.

In this regard, is the Commission planning to incorporate beekeeping as a priority field in EU environmental policy?
Is it considering applying the precautionary principle? Is it aware that a shift in production methods towards
sustainable agriculture would create over one million jobs in the EU? Could the Commission encourage Member
States to adopt bee protection measures in relation to other crops as well as oilseed rape, maize and sunflowers?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 May 2013)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E 000450/2013 ( [1] ).

In addition, on 14-15 March the Commission presented to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal
Health a proposal to significantly restrict the use of the three neonicotinoids thiamethoxam, clothianidin and
imidacloprid. However, the draft measure did not get a qualified majority. The Commission referred the measure to
the Appeal Committee. On 29 April 2013 the Appeal Committee failed to deliver an opinion. In accordance with
Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the Commission will adopt the act ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 55, 28.2.2011.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 603

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002934/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Ismail Ertug (S&D)**

_(14. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Rechtliche Situation der alevitischen Cem-Häuser in der Türkei

Die Lage der Aleviten in der Türkei ist immer wieder Gegenstand von Diskussionen. Da ihre Cem-Häuser keinen
offiziellen Status in der Türkei besitzen, stoßen alevitische Bürger auf unüberwindbare bürokratische Hindernisse,
wenn sie neue Cem-Häuser zur Begehung ihrer religiösen Zeremonien eröffnen möchten.

1. Beobachtet die Kommission konkrete Schritte der türkischen Regierung, um den rechtlichen Status der
Cem-Häuser in der Türkei zu verbessern?

2. Sind der „Demokratischen Initiative“ der türkischen Regierung von 2009 konkrete Schritte zur Verbesserung
der Situation der Aleviten in der türkischen Gesellschaft gefolgt?

3. Was gedenkt die Kommission bezüglich dieser Themen zu unternehmen?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**

_(13. Mai 2013)_

Mit der von der türkischen Regierung unterstützten Öffnung zu den Aleviten von 2009 sollten Fortschritte bei den
wichtigsten Problemen der Gemeinschaft der Aleviten in dem Land erzielt werden. Sieben Workshops fanden mit
verschiedenen Gesellschafts‐ und Berufsgruppen und mit alevitischen Vertretern statt. Anschließend wurde im März
2011 ein Abschlussbericht veröffentlicht. Die Kommission hat diesen Prozess eingehend verfolgt und ist in ihren
jährlichen Fortschrittsberichten darauf eingegangen.

Allerdings gibt es (laut Fortschrittsbericht zur Türkei von 2012) keine konkreten Folgemaßnahmen zu der Öffnung.
Cem-Häuser wurden trotz Entscheidungen einiger Gerichte erster Instanz noch nicht offiziell als Gebetsstätten
anerkannt. Die Aleviten stoßen nach wie vor auf Schwierigkeiten bei der Einrichtung neuer Gebetsstätten. Das Urteil
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte Zengin/Türkei zu Religionskultur‐ und Ethikunterricht muss
noch umgesetzt werden.

Als Land, das über seinen EU-Beitritt verhandelt, muss die Türkei ein Umfeld im Einklang mit der Europäischen
Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (EMRK) schaffen, so dass die
Aleviten-Gemeinschaft keinerlei unangemessenen Zwängen unterworfen ist. Die Kommission wird weiterhin alle
damit zusammenhängenden Fragen, einschließlich der Rechte von Minderheiten wie den Aleviten, genau beobachten.

C 6 E / 604 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002934/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ismail Ertug (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Legal situation of Alevi assembly houses in Turkey

The situation of the Alevis in Turkey is a recurrent topic for discussion. As their assembly houses do not have any
official status in Turkey, Alevi citizens who wish to open new assembly houses in which to perform their religious
ceremonies face insuperable bureaucratic obstacles.

1. Has the Commission observed any practical measures by the Turkish Government to improve the legal status of
Alevi assembly houses in Turkey?

2. Was the Turkish Government’s ‘Democratic Initiative’ of 2009 followed by any practical steps to improve the
situation of the Alevis in Turkish society?

3. What does the Commission plan to do with regard to these subjects?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 May 2013)_

The 2009 Alevi opening, sponsored by the Turkish authorities, aimed at making headway on the main issues the
Alevi Community faces in the country. Seven workshops were held with different social and professional groups and
with Alevi representatives. Following these workshops, a final report was issued in March 2011. The Commission
followed this process closely and reported on it in its yearly Progress Reports.

However, (as reported in the 2012 Turkey Progress Report), a concrete follow-up of the opening is lacking. Cem
houses, despite decisions of some first-instance courts, have not yet been officially recognised as places of worship.
Alevis continue to experience difficulties in establishing new places of worship. The _Zengin v Turkey_ ECHR judgment
on religious culture and ethics classes has yet to be implemented.

Turkey, as a country negotiating its accession to the EU, needs to establish an environment in line with the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), so that the Alevi community can function without undue constraints. The
Commission will continue to monitor closely all related issues, including the rights of minorities such as the Alevis.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 605

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002935/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D)**

_(14 Μαρτίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αντιμετώπιση της ανεργίας στην περίοδο της κρίσης

Διαστάσεις ορμητικού ρεύματος έχει λάβει η μετανάστευση από την Ελλάδα νέων επιστημόνων και ειδικευμένου εργατικού
δυναμικού σε χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αλλά και σε τρίτες χώρες. Η ανάγκη των νέων για φυγή αποτυπώνεται πλήρως
στα στοιχεία της ευρωπαϊκής πύλης Europass. Η κύρια αιτία αυτού του φαινομένου είναι η ραγδαία αύξηση της ανεργίας, η
οποία σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία, το τρίτο τετράμηνο του 2012 άγγιξε το 25,6%, ποσοστό που κατατάσσει την Ελλάδα στην
πρώτη θέση της ΕΕ. Η φυγή στο εξωτερικό φαντάζει μονόδρομος, ιδιαίτερα για τους νέους (15-24 ετών) καθώς το ποσοστό
της ανεργίας έφτασε το 56,8%. Με ορατό πλέον τον κίνδυνο διάρρηξης του κοινωνικού ιστού και λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις
προβλέψεις για αρνητικό ρυθμό ανάπτυξης της ελληνικής οικονομίας και το 2013 (-4,4%), ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Προτίθεται να καταρτίσει ένα «Στρατηγικό Σχέδιο» για την αντιμετώπιση αυτών των έκτακτων συνθηκών, με στόχο την
απορρόφηση και την αξιοποίηση των πανεπιστημιακών αποφοίτων και του ειδικευμένου εργατικού δυναμικού από την
ελληνική αγορά εργασίας;

2. Θα καταρτίσει, στα πλαίσια της «δέσμης μέτρων για την απασχόληση», νέο πρόγραμμα δράσης που θα ανταποκρίνεται
στα νέα δεδομένα ώστε να επιτευχθούν οι στόχοι της «Ευρώπης 2020» για αύξηση της απασχόλησης σε ποσοστό 70%,
για γυναίκες και άνδρες ηλικίας 20-64 ετών;

3. Ποιες στοχευμένες δράσεις προτίθεται να αναλάβει για:

α) την αύξηση του ποσοστού των εργαζόμενων γυναικών, οι οποίες, σύμφωνα με την εαρινή έκθεση της Επιτροπής,
αποτελούν μόλις το 44,8% του συνολικού γυναικείου πληθυσμού ηλικίας 20-64 ετών.

β) την κατηγορία των μακροχρόνια ανέργων, μια κατηγορία που έχει ιδιαίτερα χαρακτηριστικά και χρίζει προσοχής καθώς
είναι πολύ ανησυχητικό το υψηλό ποσοστό, το οποίο στην περίπτωση της Ελλάδας αγγίζει το 15%.

γ) την κατηγορία των νέων ανέργων (25-30 ετών), καθώς δεν μπορούν να αποκτήσουν πρόσβαση στην αγορά εργασίας;

δ) την κατηγορία των ανέργων που πλησιάζουν στην ηλικία συνταξιοδότησης (50‐65 ετών) και καθίσταται αδύνατη η
πρόσβαση τους στην αγορά εργασίας;

**Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Μαΐου 2013)_

Ένα σχέδιο δράσης για την απασχόληση, όπως προβλέπεται στο πρόσφατο πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής,
αναμένεται να καταρτιστεί από τις ελληνικές αρχές. Κύριος στόχος του είναι, με τη βοήθεια πολιτικών για την αγορά
εργασίας που απευθύνονται σε εκείνους που έχουν μεγαλύτερη ανάγκη, να καταπολεμηθεί η ανεργία και ιδιαίτερα να
αποφευχθεί το να καταστεί μόνιμο το σημερινό υψηλό ποσοστό ανεργίας.

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο (EΚΤ) αποτελεί θεμελιώδες μέσο για την εφαρμογή ενεργών πολιτικών αγοράς εργασίας με
συνολικό προϋπολογισμό για την Ελλάδα περίπου 4,4 δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ. Οι ενέργειες που αναλαμβάνονται στο
πλαίσιο των επιχειρησιακών προγραμμάτων (ΕΠ) του ΕΚΤ απευθύνονται μεταξύ άλλων σε γυναίκες (επιχειρηματικότητα,
συνδυασμός προσωπικής και επαγγελματικής ζωής, κ.λπ.), νεολαία, άτομα που πλησιάζουν στη συνταξιοδότηση
(π.χ. μηχανισμός επιδότησης για πρόσληψη σε επιχειρήσεις τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης) και μακροχρόνια άνεργοι (ως οριζόντια
προτεραιότητα για όλα τα μέτρα). Το ΕΠ για την ανάπτυξη του ανθρώπινου δυναμικού ενισχύει την ικανότητα των εταιρειών
και των εργαζομένων να προσαρμοστούν στον διεθνή ανταγωνισμό και υποστηρίζει την πρόσβαση στην αγορά εργασίας για
το σύνολο του πληθυσμού, καθώς επίσης και για τις λιγότερο εκπροσωπούμενες και ευάλωτες ομάδες. Tο ΕΠ για το εθνικό
αποθεματικό για απρόβλεπτα υποστηρίζει με πιο συγκεκριμένο τρόπο ανθρώπους που έχουν επηρεαστεί από τις επιπτώσεις
των απρόβλεπτων κρίσεων, π.χ. με την παροχή βοήθειας για τη δημιουργία μιας επιχείρησης. Tο ΕΠ για την εκπαίδευση και τη
διά βίου μάθηση υποστηρίζει τη δημιουργία δεσμών μεταξύ εκπαίδευσης και αγοράς εργασίας.

C 6 E / 606 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

Στο πλαίσιο της πρωτοβουλίας για την παροχή ευκαιριών στους νέους, η Ελλάδα έχει λάβει μέτρα για να αντιμετωπίσει το
δραματικό επίπεδο ανεργίας των νέων με ένα προϋπολογισμό άνω των 600 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ (85% εκ των οποίων
προέρχεται από κονδύλια της ΕΕ) για να βοηθήσει 350 000 νέους ηλικίας έως 35 ετών. Αυτός ο προϋπολογισμός
προέρχεται κυρίως από τα προαναφερόμενα ΕΠ, ενώ το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης συμβάλλει επίσης
ουσιαστικά μέσω του ΕΠ για τον ανταγωνισμό και την επιχειρηματικότητα.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 607

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002935/13**

**to the Commission**
**Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tackling unemployment at a time of crisis

The flow of emigration of young graduates and skilled workers from Greece to other EU countries and third countries
has now become a torrent. The need for young people to flee the country is fully reflected in data of the European
portal Europass. The main factor responsible for this phenomenon is the rapid increase in unemployment, which was
running at 25.6% in the third quarter of 2012, giving Greece the highest unemployment rate in the EU. The exodus
abroad appears to be permanent, especially for young people (15-24 years of age) for whom the unemployment rate
is now 56.8%. Given the very real risk of destruction of the social fabric, and taking into account the renewed negative
growth forecasts for the Greek economy in 2013 (-4.4%), will the Commission say:

1. Will it draw up a ‘Strategic Plan’ to address these exceptional circumstances, so that the Greek labour market
can absorb and find jobs for university graduates and skilled workers?

2. Will it, as part of the ‘employment package’, draw up a new action plan to respond to the new data in order to
attain the ‘Europe 2020’ target of increasing employment to 70% for women and men between 20 and 64 years
of age?

3. What targeted actions does it intend to take:

(a) to increase the proportion of working women, who, according to the Commission's Spring Report, represent
only 44.8% of the total female population between 20 and 64 years of age?

(b) to assist the long-term unemployed, a category with special features that deserves particular attention, as the
proportion of such workers is alarmingly high and in Greece stands at 15%?

(c) to assist unemployed young people (25-30 years old), since they are unable to gain access to the labour market?

(d) to assist the unemployed who are approaching retirement age (50-65 years old) and find it impossible to access
the labour market?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

An Employment Action Plan, as foreseen in the recent Economic Adjustment Programme is to be formulated by the
Greek authorities. Its main objective is to fight against unemployment and in particular to prevent the currently high
unemployment from becoming permanent through labour market policies targeted to those most in need.

The European Social Fund (ESF) is a key instrument in implementing active labour market policies with a total budget
for Greece of approximately EUR 4.4 billion. Actions taken under the ESF operational programmes (OP) target _inter_
_alia_ women (entrepreneurship, reconciliation of personal and professional life, etc.), youth, people nearing retirement
(e.g. subsidy scheme for recruitment in local government enterprises) and long term unemployed (as a horizontal
priority for all measures). The Human Resources Development OP reinforces the ability of firms and workers to adapt
to international competition and supports access to the labour market for the general population but also for underrepresented and vulnerable groups. The National Contingency Reserve OP supports in a more targeted way people
affected by the consequences of unforeseen crises, e.g. by helping them set up a business. The Education and Lifelong
Learning OP supports the establishment of links between education and the labour market.

Under the Youth Opportunities Initiative, Greece has taken steps to tackle the dramatic levels of youth
unemployment with a budget of over EUR 600 million (85% of which comes from EU funds) to help 350 000
youngsters up to 35 years old. This budget comes mainly from the abovementioned OPs while the European Regional
Development Fund also contributes substantially through the Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship OP.

C 6 E / 608 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002936/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE) und Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)**

_(14. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Indikatorensystem für den Tourismus in Europa und der Tierschutz

Wir begrüßen die Neuigkeit, dass die Kommission ein Indikatorensystem für den Tourismus in Europa erarbeitet und
kürzlich eingeführt hat. Man kam um die Initiative, mit der Reiseziele in Europa für Nachhaltigkeit sensibilisiert und
hierzu ermutigt werden sollen, nicht umhin.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten

1. Kann die Kommission Einblick darüber verschaffen, in welcher Form und zu welchem Zeitpunkt die Initiative
durchgeführt wird und welche Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um die Mitgliedstaaten zur Annahme des Systems zu
ermutigen?

2. Der Tierschutz ist im Rahmen des Tourismus ein bedeutendes Thema, das allerdings noch nicht vom
Indikatorensystem erfasst ist: Kann die Kommission bestätigen, dass auch die Frage des Tierschutzes behandelt
werden wird?

**Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission**

_(30. April 2013)_

Das Europäische Tourismusindikatorensystem (ETIS) wurde am 22. Februar 2013 auf einer offenen Konferenz in
Brüssel erfolgreich vorgestellt. An der Veranstaltung nahmen etwa 250 Vertreter mehrerer öffentlicher und privater
europäischer Interessenträger im Bereich des Tourismus teil. Ziel der Kommission ist es nun, Reiseziele in der
gesamten EU zur Umsetzung des ETIS zu motivieren und von ihnen Rückmeldungen über die Effizienz des Systems
zu erhalten, damit sie es gegebenenfalls anpassen kann. Die Pilotphase, an der sich alle interessierten Reiseziele auf
freiwilliger Basis beteiligen können, wird etwa 18 Monate dauern.

Alle einschlägigen Unterlagen (das System und ein praktischer Leitfaden mit einer Nutzungsanleitung) sind auf der
Website Europa ( [1] ) veröffentlicht und stehen allen potenziellen Nutzern, etwa Organisationen zum
Reisezielmanagement oder ‐marketing, Fremdenverkehrsämtern, regionalen Behörden sowie Tourismusverbänden,
zur Verfügung.

Die Kommission wird fachliche Sitzungen zur Steuerung des Prozesses und zur Festlegung des Aktionsplans für die
nächsten 18 Monate veranstalten.

Von den 27 Basisindikatoren ist ein ganzer Abschnitt den Aspekten im Zusammenhang mit den
Umweltauswirkungen gewidmet. Darunter ist ein Indikator zum Schutz der Landschaft und der Artenvielfalt, der
implizit auch das Thema Tierschutz abdecken könnte. Nach Auswertung der Rückmeldungen der an der Pilotphase
teilnehmenden Reiseziele könnte die Kommission auch einen Vorschlag für einen besonderen Indikator zum
Tierschutz in Erwägung ziehen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/indicators/index_en.htm

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 609

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002936/13**

**to the Commission**
**Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE) and Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Tourism Indicators System and animal welfare

We welcome the news that the Commission has developed and recently launched the European Tourism Indicators
System. The initiative, intended to influence and encourage sustainability in European tourism destinations, is much
needed.

1. Would the Commission please provide an insight as to how and when this initiative will be implemented and
what actions will be taken to encourage Member States to adopt it?

2. As the welfare of animals used within tourism is an important issue, but one which does not yet seem to be
covered by the Indicators System, could the Commission please confirm that the issue of animal welfare will also be
addressed?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The European Tourism Indicator System (ETIS) was successfully presented in an open conference in Brussels on
22 February 2013. About 250 representatives from several EU public and private tourism stakeholders attended. The
Commission’s objective is now to motivate destinations to implement ETIS across the EU and gather their feedback
on the efficiency of the system for possible adjustments. The pilot phase will last for about 18 months and will be
open to all interested destinations on a voluntary basis.

All relevant documents (the System and a practical toolkit with instructions for use) are published on the Europa
website ( [1] ) and are at the disposal of all potential users, such as destination management organisations, destination
marketing boards, tourist boards, local/regional authorities, as well as tourism associations.

The Commission will organise technical meetings to steer the process and define the action plan for the next
18 months.

Within the set of 27 core indicators, an entire section is dedicated to environmental impact related aspects. This
section includes an indicator related to the landscape and biodiversity protection which implicitly could also refer to
the issue of animal welfare. After the assessment of the feedback provided by the destinations participating in the pilot
phase, the Commission could also envisage proposing a specific indicator targeting animal welfare.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/indicators/index_en.htm

C 6 E / 610 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002937/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE) und Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(14. März 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Karpasin: Zerstörung geschützter Habitate von bedrohten Tierarten

Bei der Halbinsel Karpaz (oder Karpasin) handelt es sich um eine der wertvollsten Naturschätze Nordzyperns. In dem
Gebiet finden sich wertvolle Habitate und dort leben Arten, die global und europaweit wichtig sind und streng
geschützt werden müssen. Zu den bedrohten Habitaten und Arten gehören unter anderem die mediterranen Küsten‐
und Bergwälder, anfällige Sanddünen am Meer, die kritisch gefährdete Mönchsrobbe und zwei Arten der gefährdeten
Meeresschildkröte. Im Frühjahr und Herbst ist die Halbinsel Karpasin zudem ein bedeutender Migrationskorridor für
Tausende von Vögeln. Aufgrund dieser hohen Schutzbedürftigkeit wurde dieses Gebiet unter der Bezeichnung
„Besonderes Schutzgebiet (BSG) Karpasin“ als mögliches Natura-2000-Projekt ausgewählt.

Wir sind nun darauf aufmerksam geworden, dass — ungeachtet der hohen ökologischen Bedeutung dieses
spezifischen Gebiets — im September 2013 eine dreitätige Veranstaltung, das Seidenstraßen-Festival, zu dem
80 000 Besucher erwartet werden, am Golden Beach und damit einem der anfälligsten Strände der Halbinsel,
stattfinden soll. Diese Pläne haben in Nordzypern und auch andernorts zu öffentlicher Empörung geführt, es wurde
eine Petition verfasst und den Behörden der türkisch-zyprischen Volksgemeinschaft überreicht. Ungeachtet dessen
und ohne vorherigen öffentlichen Dialog haben Planierraupen und Lastkraftwagen mit dem Ausbau der Straße zum
Golden Beach begonnen. In den Plattformen sozialer Netzwerke wurden Fotos verbreitet und so entstand die
„Initiative zum Schutz des Nationalparks Karpasin“, durch die die derzeitige Zerstörung im BSG verhindert werden
soll.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um die Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

1. Hat die Kommission in ihrer Eigenschaft als Verwaltungsbehörde der Natura-2000-Projekte Kenntnis von
diesen Vorhaben? Falls dies der Fall ist: Welche Maßnahmen beabsichtigt sie bei der gegenwärtigen Sachlage zu
ergreifen? Wird sie Untersuchungen im Hinblick auf das Ausmaß und die Umweltauswirkungen der
verursachten Schäden durchführen?

2. Wird eine derartige Zerstörung möglicher Natura-2000-Gebiete Gegenstand künftiger Gespräche der
Kommission und der türkisch-zyprischen Volksgemeinschaft sein?

3. Wurden EU-Mittel aus Fonds oder sonstige EU-Gelder zur Förderung oder (Ko‐)Finanzierung der
gegenwärtigen Infrastrukturen und/oder Fremdenverkehrsprojekte auf der Halbinsel Karpasin, und zwar
insbesondere für die vorgenannte Veranstaltung, beantragt oder bewilligt, und falls dies der Fall ist, um welche
Gelder handelt es sich?

4. Welche Maßnahmen gemäß den EU-Rechtsvorschriften wären in diesem Fall anwendbar, um den Schutz der
Habitate der gefährdeten Arten durchzusetzen?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. Mai 2013)_

Die Kommission verweist den Herrn Abgeordneten und die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antwort auf die schriftlichen
Anfragen P-001173/2013 und P-001217/2013 ( [1] ).

Die Kommission wird die Situation weiterhin genau beobachten und mit der türkisch-zyprischen Gemeinschaft
erneut über die Notwendigkeit des Schutzes des ökologisch empfindlichen Gebiets Karpasin/Karpaz im Allgemeinen
und des Golden Beach im Besonderen sprechen. In diesem Zusammenhang scheint aus Informationen, die die
Kommission vor kurzem erhielt, hervorzugehen, dass das Festival nicht in den besonderen Schutzgebieten stattfinden
wird.

Im Rahmen des Hilfeprogramms für die türkisch-zyprische Gemeinschaft finanziert die Kommission keine
Tätigkeiten, die mit dem Ausbau der erwähnten Straße oder dem Festival im Zusammenhang stehen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html)

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 611

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002937/13**

**to the Commission**
**Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE) and Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Karpaz: destruction of protected habitats of endangered species

The Karpaz peninsula (or Karpasia) is one of the most precious natural treasures of Northern Cyprus. The territory
offers precious habitats and is home to species which are important on a global and European scale and which need to
be strictly protected. The habitats and species under threat include, among others, Mediterranean coastal and
mountain forests, fragile coastal sand dunes, the critically endangered Monk Seal and two species of endangered sea
turtles. Each spring and autumn, the Karpaz peninsula is also an important migratory corridor for thousands of birds.
Due to its high sensitivity, this area, designated the Karpasia Special Environmental Protection Area (SEPA), has been
selected as a potential Natura 2000 project.

It has now come to our attention that, despite the high ecological significance of this specific area, a three-day event
— the Silk Route festival, which is expected to attract 80 000 visitors — is to be held in September 2013 on Golden
Beach, one of the most sensitive beaches on the peninsula. These plans have triggered public outrage in Northern
Cyprus and beyond, and a petition has been prepared and handed over to the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot
community. This notwithstanding, without any further public dialogue, bulldozers and trucks have begun work to
widen the road leading to Golden Beach. Photographs of this have circulated on social media platforms and have
given birth to the ‘Karpasia National Park Protection Initiative’ aiming to prevent the destruction that is taking place in
the SEPA.

1. Is the Commission, as managing authority of Natura 2000 projects, aware of these plans? If so, what does it
intend to do about the situation as it now stands? Will it carry out investigations into the extent and environmental
impact of the damage caused?

2. Will such destruction of potential Natura 2000 sites be addressed in future talks between the Commission and
the Turkish Cypriot community?

3. Have EU funds or any other EU sources of funding been requested or allocated for the purpose of promoting or
(co-)financing any current infrastructure and/or tourism projects on the Karpaz peninsula, in particular as regards the
aforementioned event, and, if so, which?

4. Under EC law, what measures would in this instance be applicable to enforce the protection of the habitats of
endangered species?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

The Commission refers the Honourable Members to its answer to previous written questions E-001173/2013 and
E-001217/2013 ( [1] ).

The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation and will again raise with the Turkish Cypriot
community the need to protect the environmentally sensitive area of Karpasia/Karpaz in general and the Golden
Beach in particular. In that respect, information received recently seems to indicate that the festival will not take place
in the Special Environment Protected Areas.

In the framework of its assistance programme to the Turkish Cypriot community, the Commission is not financing
any activities linked to the road construction or to the festival.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 612 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002938/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) en Romana Jordan (PPE)**

_(14 maart 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Rendabiliteit van investeringen in energie-efficiëntieprojecten in overheidsgebouwen

Sinds 2000 heeft de Europese Unie bijna 5 miljard EUR aan financiering uit het cohesiebeleid beschikbaar gesteld
voor de cofinanciering van energie-efficiëntiemaatregelen in de lidstaten. De Commissie deelt de
verantwoordelijkheid voor het gezonde financieel beheer van deze fondsen met de nationale en regionale autoriteiten.

Onlangs heeft de Rekenkamer onderzocht of deze investeringen in energie-efficiëntie uit hoofde van het cohesiebeleid
rendabel zijn. De Rekenkamer heeft audits uitgevoerd voor 24 investeringsprojecten voor overheidsgebouwen in
Tsjechië, Italië en Litouwen, omdat deze landen voor de periode 2007-2013 de hoogste subsidies hebben ontvangen
voor energie-efficiëntiemaatregelen op het vlak van cohesie en regionale ontwikkeling.

De Rekenkamer concludeerde dat er geen goede voorwaarden waren gesteld in de programmering en de financiering
om rendabele energie-efficiënte investeringen mogelijk te maken en dat de gecontroleerde energie-efficiëntieprojecten
in overheidsgebouwen niet rendabel waren. In het verslag staat vermeld dat slechts 10 % van de voor energieefficiëntie bestemde EU-cohesiefondsen correct besteed is. Volgens een van de leden van de Rekenkamer was bij het
besteden van het geld voor de renovatie van overheidsgebouwen energie-efficiëntie voor de lidstaten in het beste geval
slechts van secundair belang. Het doel moet weliswaar zijn om bij de besteding van overheidsgeld een duidelijk en
snel rendement van de investering te garanderen, maar de algemene beoordeling van de Rekenkamer is dat de
uitgaven in kwestie zich gemiddeld pas na 50 jaar uitbetalen.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de resultaten van dit verslag, en wat vindt zij van de conclusies van de
Rekenkamer?

2. Vindt de Commissie ook niet dat het concept van rendabiliteit — de beste verhouding tussen de ingezette
hulpmiddelen en de bereikte resultaten — het leidende beginsel moet zijn bij het investeren van cohesiefondsen?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven of de cohesiefondsen die zijn toegekend aan de particuliere sector doeltreffender
worden besteed, aangezien in het verslag van de Rekenkamer alleen werd gekeken naar investeringen door
overheidsinstanties?

4. Kan de Commissie commentaar geven op het idee om steden en plattelandsgebieden die duurzame
energieactieplannen hebben ontwikkeld en een bewezen staat van dienst hebben op het vlak van rendabiliteit,
voorrang te geven bij het toekennen van EU-fondsen?

5. Hoe kijkt de Commissie aan tegen het stellen van een vaste termijn, bijvoorbeeld 5 tot 10 jaar, voor de
maximale terugverdientijd, die per geval wordt bepaald voor elke afzonderlijke lidstaat?

6. Welke maatregelen zal de Commissie treffen om rendabele investeringen in energie-efficiëntie te waarborgen
met financiering uit het cohesiebeleid, en welke voorwaarden kan de Commissie stellen voor zulke investeringen?

**Antwoord van de heer Hahn namens de Commissie**

_(6 mei 2013)_

1. Het antwoord van de Commissie is opgenomen in het verslag van de Rekenkamer.

2. Een optimale verhouding tussen de ingezette middelen en de verkregen resultaten is een van de in het Financieel
Reglement opgenomen beginselen.

3. Hoewel er meer en meer wordt geïnvesteerd in de energie-efficiëntie van gebouwen en er verscheidene goede
voorbeelden zijn van bestaande programma's, is er zowel op Europees als op nationaal niveau nog maar weinig
informatie beschikbaar over de doeltreffendheid van de verschillende steunmaatregelen. Investeringen in energieefficiëntie zijn een nieuw gebied van het cohesiebeleid in de lopende periode; de resultaten van de steunmaatregelen
zullen in de evaluatie achteraf worden beoordeeld.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 613

4. De ontwikkeling van actieplannen voor duurzame energie en voor stedelijke mobiliteit moet worden
aangemoedigd en ondersteund als onderdeel van koolstofarme strategieën voor een betere coördinatie van sectorale
investeringen en als onderdeel van een bredere strategie voor stedelijke ontwikkeling. In het voorstel voor een
verordening over gemeenschappelijke bepalingen wordt voorgesteld om de methodologie en criteria voor de selectie
van projecten te laten onderzoeken en goedkeuren door comités voor toezicht op de programma's.

5. In het kader van langetermijninvesteringen in energie-efficiëntie is het niet zinvol om enkel en alleen de
terugverdienperiode in aanmerking te nemen. Investeringen in isolatie van gebouwen betreffen de langere termijn,
waarbij het terugverdieneffect in verhouding staat tot het niveau van renovatie. Om te voldoen aan de
energiedoelstellingen van de EU voor 2020 en daarna zullen allesomvattende renovaties nodig zijn, met
verbeteringen van de energie-efficiëntie die verder gaan dan de kostenoptimale niveaus. Dat zal op de langere termijn
nuttig zijn om verdere besparingen te creëren en te vermijden dat er over vijf tot vijftien jaar lock-in-effecten optreden
of extra werk nodig is, waardoor de totale investeringskosten zelfs nog hoger zouden oplopen.

6. De Commissie verwijst het geachte Parlementslid naar haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-000373/2013 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/nl/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 614 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002938/13**

**za Komisijo**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) in Romana Jordan (PPE)**

_(14. marec 2013)_

_Zadeva:_ Stroškovna učinkovitost naložb v energetsko učinkovitost projektov v javnih zgradbah

Od leta 2000 do danes je Evropska unija za kohezijsko politiko dala na voljo skoraj 5 milijard EUR, in sicer za
sofinanciranje ukrepov za energetsko učinkovitost v državah članicah. Komisija z nacionalnimi in regionalnimi
organi deli odgovornost za dobro finančno poslovodenje s temi sredstvi.

Računsko sodišče je nedavno ocenilo, ali so bile naložbe v energetsko učinkovitost v okviru kohezijske politike
stroškovno učinkovite. Revidiralo je 24 naložbenih projektov v javne zgradbe v Češki republiki, Italiji in Litvi, saj so te
države v obdobju 2007–2013 v okviru kohezije in regionalnega razvoja prejele največ finančne podpore za ukrepe
energetske učinkovitosti.

Ugotovilo je, da za programe in financiranje niso bili določeni pogoji, ki bi omogočili stroškovno učinkovite naložbe
v energetsko učinkovitost, in da revidirani projekti v javnih stavbah niso bili stroškovno učinkoviti. V poročilu je
navedlo, da je bilo samo 10 % kohezijskih sredstev EU, namenjenih energetski učinkovitosti, porabljenih pravilno.
Eden od članov Računskega sodišča je izjavil, da so države članice denar sicer porabile za obnovo javnih poslopij,
vendar je bila energetska učinkovitost pri tem v najboljšem primeru drugotnega pomena. Čeprav bi moral biti pri
uporabi javnega denarja glavni namen nedvoumna in čimprejšnja donosnost naložbe, je Računsko sodišče ocenilo, da
se bo poraba v teh primerih v povprečju povrnila v 50 letih.

1. Ali je Komisija seznanjena z ugotovitvami tega poročila in kakšno je njeno mnenje o zaključkih Računskega
sodišča?

2. Ali se Komisija strinja, da bi moral biti koncept stroškovne učinkovitosti – najboljše razmerje med vloženimi
sredstvi in doseženimi rezultati – vodilno načelo pri vlaganju kohezijskih sredstev?

3. Ali lahko Komisija glede na to, da je Računsko sodišče preučevalo samo naložbe javnih organov, pojasni, ali so
kohezijska sredstva, dodeljena zasebnemu sektorju, porabljena učinkoviteje?

4. Ali lahko Komisija izrazi stališče glede zamisli, da bi imela mesta in podeželska območja, ki so razvila trajnostne
energetske akcijske načrte in so se že večkrat izkazala kot strokovno učinkovita, prednost pri pridobivanju sredstev
EU?

5. Kaj Komisija meni o tem, da bi kot najdaljše možno obdobje odplačila določili fiksno obdobje, na primer od 5
do 10 let, in sicer od primera do primera po posameznih državah članicah?

6. Kako namerava Komisija ukrepati, da bo zagotovila stroškovno učinkovitost vlaganja sredstev kohezijske
politike v energetsko učinkovitost in kakšne pogoje lahko uvede za te naložbe?

**Odgovor g. Hahnona v imenu Komisije**

_(6. maj 2013)_

1. Odgovor Komisije je vključen v poročilo Računskega sodišča.

2. Najboljše razmerje med uporabljenimi sredstvi in doseženimi rezultati je eno od načel, navedenih v finančni
uredbi.

3. Kljub temu, da se naložbe v energijsko učinkovitost stavb povečujejo in je v uporabi že več dobrih primerov
shem, razpolagamo le z omejeno količino podatkov glede učinkovitosti različnih podpornih ukrepov, tako na ravni
EU kot na nacionalnih ravneh. Naložbe v energetsko učinkovitost so novo področje v kohezijski politiki tekočega
obdobja, zato bodo rezultati teh posegov ocenjeni v okviru postopka naknadnega ocenjevanja.

4. Razvoj akcijskih načrtov za trajnostno energijo in akcijskih načrtov za mobilnost v mestih bi bilo treba
spodbujati in podpirati kot del nizkoogljičnih razvojnih strategij za boljše usklajevanje sektorskih naložb in sicer kot
del širše strategije za razvoj urbanega okolja. Predlog uredbe o skupnih določbah določa, da odbori za spremljanje
programov preverijo in odobrijo metodologijo ter merila za izbor projektov.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 615

5. Osredotočanje zgolj na enostavno vračilno dobo ni primerno pri dolgoročnih naložbah v energetsko
učinkovitost. Naložbe v nameščanje izolacije je bolj dolgoročno, pri čemer so vračila sorazmerna s stopnjo prenove.
Da bi dosegli energetske cilje EU do leta 2020 in po njem, bo potrebno celostno prenoviti stavbe, pri čemer bodo
izboljšave energijske učinkovitosti presegale stroškovno optimalne ravni. Na dolgi rok bo tak pristop koristen, saj bo
ustvaril višje prihranke, izogniti pa se bo mogoče tudi dodatnim investicijskim stroškom, ki bi nastali z izvajanjem
dodatnih del v prihodnjem 5–15-letnem obdobju in stroškom zaradi zaprtih sistemov ( _lock-ins_ ).

6. Komisija želi spoštovano poslanko opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-000373/2013 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html;jsessionid=EDFEF9D4A06B8E29C0C3E5C8FC53C042.node2

C 6 E / 616 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002938/13**

**to the Commission**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) and Romana Jordan (PPE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cost-effectiveness of investments in energy efficiency projects in public buildings

Since 2000, the European Union has made almost EUR 5 billion worth of cohesion policy funding available for the
co-financing of energy efficiency measures in the Member States. The Commission has shared the responsibility for
the sound financial management of these funds with national and regional authorities.

Recently, the Court of Auditors assessed whether these cohesion policy investments in energy efficiency were costeffective. It audited 24 investment projects for public buildings in the Czech Republic, Italy and Lithuania, as these
were the countries that received most cohesion and regional development funding support for energy efficiency
measures in 2007-2013.

The Court of Auditors concluded that the right conditions in programming and financing had not been set to enable
cost-effective energy efficiency investments and that the audited energy efficiency projects in public buildings were
not cost-effective. The report states that only 10% of EU cohesion funds earmarked for energy efficiency were being
used correctly. According to one of the members of the Court, while Member States were using the money to
refurbish public buildings, energy efficiency was, at best, a secondary concern. While it should be the aim, when using
public money, to ensure a clear and swift return on investment, the general assessment of the Court is that, on
average, the spending involved would not be recouped for 50 years.

1. Is the Commission aware of the outcome of this report, and what is its opinion on the Court of Auditors’
conclusions?

2. Does the Commission agree that the cost-effectiveness concept — the best relationship between resources
employed and results achieved — should be the leading principle when investing cohesion funds?

3. Given that the Court of Auditors’ report only looked at investments made by public authorities, can the
Commission indicate whether cohesion funds allocated to the private sector are spent more effectively?

4. Can the Commission comment on the idea of granting cities and rural areas that have developed sustainable
energy action plans, and that have a proven track-record when it comes to cost-efficiency, priority access to EU funds?

5. How does the Commission look at setting a fixed range, such as 5-10 years, for the maximum payback period,
set on a case-by-case basis for each individual Member State?

6. What steps will the Commission take to ensure cost-effective investments in energy efficiency through cohesion
policy funding, and what conditions can the Commission introduce for such investments?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 May 2013)_

1. The Commission’s reply is included in the Court of Auditor’s report.

2. The best relationship between resources employed and results achieved is one of the principles listed in the
Financial Regulation.

3. Although investment in energy efficiency in buildings is increasing and there are several good examples of
schemes already in place, there is still only limited information on the effectiveness of different support measures,
both at EU and national levels. Energy efficiency investments are a new area for cohesion policy in the current period
and the results of the interventions will be evaluated in the _ex post_ evaluation exercise.

4. The development of sustainable energy action plans and urban mobility action plans should be encouraged and
supported as part of low-carbon strategies to facilitate coordination of sectoral investments and as part of a broader
urban development strategy. The draft Common Provisions Regulation proposes that programme monitoring
committees shall examine and approve the methodology and criteria for the selection of projects.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 617

5. The sole focus on a simple payback period is not appropriate in the context of long-term energy efficiency
investments. Investment in building insulation is longer-term, with paybacks proportionate to the level of renovation.
Comprehensive renovation of buildings will be needed in order to meet the EU energy targets for 2020 and beyond,
with energy efficiency improvements that go beyond cost-optimal levels. This will be valuable in a longer perspective,
to generate higher savings and avoid lock-ins and additional work in 5-15 years, which would make the total
investment costs even higher.

6. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000373/2013 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 6 E / 618 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002939/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Changement de système de taxes pour que les supermarchés redistribuent la nourriture

Certaines chaînes de supermarchés, sur ordre de marques, ont ordonné de détruire tous les lots de nourriture
contenant de la viande chevaline. Il est scandaleux de constater que des marques préfèrent jeter de la nourriture saine
aux ordures plutôt que d'en faire don à des associations ou de la vendre au rabais à des familles ayant du mal à boucler
les fins de mois. Des supermarchés préfèrent donc nourrir les rats plutôt que les gens.

Pour rappel, des millions de citoyens dépendent directement de l'aide aux plus démunis pour survivre et ce chiffre ne
cesse de croître alors que les moyens européens pour pallier à cette situation ne cessent de baisser.

Mais ce dossier particulier souligne une constante: de nombreux supermarchés préfèrent jeter leurs invendus plutôt
que de les redistribuer ou de les mettre à disposition des associations.

Une raison à cela: la TVA. Un supermarché qui jette ne paye pas la TVA alors que celui qui la distribue doit la payer. Le
système n'avait pas prévu qu'un jour la surproduction d'une part et le gaspillage d'autre part deviendraient
astronomiques, qui plus est dans une période de profonde crise économique et sociale.

Dès lors, il est devenu primordial que les autorités, en ce qui concerne la redistribution et la lutte contre le gaspillage,
mettent en place des outils incitatifs plutôt que dissuasifs.

1. Quelle est la position de la Commission sur la question d'un régime de TVA adapté qui incite la redistribution
plutôt que de l'en dissuader?

2. La Commission compte-t-elle tout mettre en œuvre pour corriger/adapter cela et mettre ainsi fin à un gaspillage
colossal de nourriture dont tant de démunis ou moins nantis pourraient profiter?

3. Quel levier la Commission entend-elle dans ce but (diplomatique, législatif, …)?

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003730/13**

**à la Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE)**

_(3 avril 2013)_

_Objet:_ Lutte contre le gaspillage alimentaire — TVA

Le gaspillage alimentaire s'aggrave d'année en année, alors que les matières premières se raréfient et que la
malnutrition s'étend en Europe. 89 millions de tonnes de nourriture sont jetées chaque année (soit
179 kg/an/personne), dont la majeure partie est pourtant saine et comestible.

Alors même que des millions citoyens dépendent directement de dons alimentaires, il semble nécessaire de rechercher
les causes de ce gaspillage afin de réduire ce phénomène et d'aider les plus démunis.

Parmi les raisons identifiées figure un système de TVA qui décourage les dons de la grande distribution en faveur des
banques alimentaires.

En effet, un supermarché qui jette des aliments approchant de la date limite de consommation ou endommagés ne
paye pas la TVA, alors que celui qui en fait don à des banques alimentaires y est assujetti, conformément à la directive
n [o] 2006/112/CE.

Au regard de ces éléments, et sachant que la Commission a prévu de publier une nouvelle communication en 2013
sur le gaspillage alimentaire, entend-elle proposer une révision du système de TVA qui s'applique aux dons de denrées
alimentaires, afin de lutter contre le gaspillage alimentaire et d'aider les plus démunis?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 619

**Réponse commune donnée par M. Šemeta au nom de la Commission**

_(7 mai 2013)_

Le 6 décembre 2011, la Commission européenne a présenté au Parlement européen, au Conseil et au Comité
économique et social européen une communication sur l'avenir de la TVA ( [1] ). Il a été reconnu que l'une des
caractéristiques essentielles d'un éventuel futur système de TVA de l'UE serait que celui-ci continue de remplir sa
fonction d'augmentation des recettes. Il s'agit donc de concevoir un système de TVA plus simple, plus solide et plus
efficace adapté au marché unique.

La mise en place de systèmes de TVA sur mesure afin de résoudre des problèmes concrets irait à l'encontre de la
simplicité et de l'efficacité du système, et nuirait à la neutralité de la taxe. Par conséquent, la Commission considère
que toute action visant à encourager une juste redistribution de la nourriture devrait plutôt être menée dans d'autres
domaines que la TVA.

Consciente des difficultés rencontrées par les citoyens de l'Union européenne, la Commission a discuté avec les États
membres des conséquences en matière de TVA du don de nourriture aux personnes démunies ( [2] ). Il a été convenu ( [3] )
que dans le cadre du don de nourriture, la valeur sur laquelle la TVA est calculée doit être ajustée selon les
circonstances et l'état des marchandises au moment où elles sont distribuées. Lorsque le don a lieu alors que la date de
consommation recommandée est proche ou que les marchandises ne peuvent plus être vendues, cette valeur devrait
être assez basse, voire proche de zéro.

Il revient aux États membres d'appliquer ce principe avec flexibilité afin de ne pas empêcher les assujettis de donner de
la nourriture à des associations caritatives.

La «communication sur l'alimentation durable» que la Commission entend adopter avant la fin de l'année 2013
comprend un chapitre sur la prévention et la réduction des pertes et du gaspillage de nourriture à toutes les étapes de
la chaîne d'approvisionnement sans que la sécurité alimentaire soit compromise. Les mesures concrètes qui seront
proposées ne sont pas encore déterminées. Une consultation publique sera ouverte en mai.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 851.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Lors de la 97 [e] réunion du comité de la TVA.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Les orientations convenues sont publiées à l'adresse:

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/vat_committee/2012_guidelines-vat-committeemeetings_fr.pdf

C 6 E / 620 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002939/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Changing the tax system to encourage supermarkets to redistribute food

Some supermarket chains have been instructed by food companies to dump all food products containing horsemeat.
It is outrageous that food companies should prefer to throw out perfectly good food, rather than donating it to
charities or selling it at a reduced price to families who find it difficult to make ends meet. It would appear that
supermarkets are keener to feed rats than people.

It should not be forgotten that millions of people depend entirely on EU aid for the most deprived in order to survive
and that this number is continuing to grow even as European resources set aside to address this problem are
continuing to dwindle.

This specific issue is part of a larger problem, however: many supermarkets prefer to throw away unsold produce,
rather than redistributing it or giving it to charity.

One reason for this is VAT. Supermarkets that throw out produce do not pay VAT, while those that redistribute
produce do. This system was not designed for an era in which overproduction and waste has reached astronomical
levels, what is more against the backdrop of a deep economic and social crisis.

It is now vital, therefore, that the authorities should take measures that incentivise food redistribution and that
combat waste, rather than encouraging it.

1. What view does the Commission take of the idea of introducing a tailored VAT system that would encourage
rather than discourage food redistribution?

2. Does the Commission intend make every effort to remedy the current state of affairs and put an end to the
colossal wastage of food that could be used to help the needy and the less fortunate?

3. What forms of pressure does the Commission intend to exert (through diplomacy, legislation, etc.)?

**Question for written answer E-003730/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE)**

_(3 April 2013)_

_Subject:_ Combating the problem of food wastage — VAT

The problem of food wastage is growing worse every year, even as basic resources are becoming increasingly scarce
and malnutrition is spreading in Europe. Eighty-nine million tonnes of food are thrown away each year
(179 kg/year/person), even though most of it is perfectly safe to eat.

At a time when millions of people are dependent on food donations, surely we must think carefully about the causes
of food wastage in an effort to reverse this trend and help those most in need.

One such cause often cited is a VAT system that discourages supermarkets from making donations to food banks.

In accordance with Directive 2006/112/EC, a supermarket which throws away food that is near its use-by date or
damaged does not pay VAT, whereas one which donates the products concerned to a food bank does.

Given that the Commission is planning to publish a new communication on food wastage in 2013, does it intend to
propose a revision of the VAT system as it applies to food donations, in order to combat the problem of food wastage
and help those most in need?

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 621

**Joint answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2013)_

On 6 December 2011, the European Commission presented a communication to the European Parliament, the
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Future of VAT ( [1] ). Recognising that one of the
fundamental features of a future EU VAT system is that it can continue to perform its function of raising revenues,
focus is on moving towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the Single Market.

Introducing tailored VAT systems to address concrete problems would run counter to the simplicity and efficiency of
the system and would hamper the neutrality of the tax. The Commission therefore believes that any action to
encourage a fair redistribution of food should rather be taken in areas other than VAT.

Conscious of the difficult situation that European citizens are facing the Commission has discussed with Member
States the VAT implications of donating foodstuff to the poor ( [2] ). It was agreed ( [3] ) that where foodstuff is donated, the
value on which the VAT is calculated would need to be adjusted according to the circumstances and the state the
goods are in at the moment they are donated. Where the donation takes place close to the best before date or where
goods are not fit for sale, that value should be fairly low, even close to zero.

It is up to the Member States to apply this principle with flexibility so as not to impede taxable persons from donating
foodstuff to charities.

The ‘Communication on Sustainable Food’ that the Commission intends to adopt before the end of 2013 will include
a chapter on the prevention and reduction of food losses and food waste at all the levels of the food chain without
compromising food safety. The precise measures that will be proposed are not decided yet. A public consultation will
be launched in May.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 851.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) At the 97th meeting of the VAT Committee.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The guidelines agreed are published at:.

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/vat_committee/2012_guidelines-vat-committeemeetings_en.pdf

C 6 E / 622 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002940/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Stratégie industrielle européenne

Les fermetures des usines Arcelor, PSA, Ford et de plusieurs sites d'Iveco en Europe, ou les restructurations comme
celle de Caterpillar illustrent bien les conséquences dramatiques de la crise économique et sociale pour les ouvriers de
l'automobile, les PME sous-traitantes et l'industrie européenne. Cette crise industrielle, nous aurions tort de la croire
limitée à l'automobile, à la sidérurgie ou au textile, car elle touche de plus en plus de secteurs à forte teneur
technologique. Un exemple: l'industrie des télécoms. Sur les huit industriels occidentaux qui dominaient le marché il y
a dix ans, seuls quatre existent encore aujourd'hui. Dans le même temps, deux industriels chinois, Huawei et ZTE, sont
devenus des champions mondiaux. 80 % des innovations et 75 % des exportations de l'UE proviennent de l'industrie.
Pour chaque emploi manufacturier, il s'en crée deux dans le secteur des services. Nous avons besoin d'industrie, et
nous pouvons la développer, en particulier si nous nous dotons d'une politique industrielle à 27 plutôt que de
27 politiques nationales.

1. Quelles sont les leçons que tire la Commission de ces milliers de restructurations et licenciements?

2. La Commission compte-t-elle mettre en place une stratégie européenne de compétitivité industrielle intégrée et
solidaire? Et si oui, laquelle?

3. À cette fin, que pense la Commission de l'idée de développer des politiques communes de formation
professionnelle et continue en termes de mobilité qui ne soient plus déconnectées de la production, de l'industrie?

4. La Commission compte-t-elle démultiplier les coopérations industrielles dans tous les secteurs et dans tous les
territoires via un cadre incitatif?

5. La Commission entend-elle mettre en place une stratégie d'action économique extérieure en nouant des
partenariats sur des projets d'intérêt commun avec les autres régions du monde?

6. Qu'en est-il du passeport européen pour les fonds de capital-risque, qui devrait améliorer l'accès des PME
innovantes aux financements?

**Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission**

_(17 mai 2013)_

1. La Commission a adopté en 2012 un livre vert sur les restructurations ( [1] ) et réfléchit actuellement à la meilleure
manière d'encourager le respect des bonnes pratiques.

2. La Commission a récemment actualisé sa politique industrielle ( [2] ) en se concentrant sur quatre domaines clés:
l'innovation industrielle, l'accès aux marchés, l'accès au financement ainsi que le capital humain et les compétences
professionnelles.

3. La Commission convient de la nécessité de politiques visant à la création d'emplois et d'outils permettant
d'anticiper les compétences requises à l'avenir. Le financement des conseils sectoriels européens pour les compétences
est destiné à renforcer la coopération avec les organismes d'enseignement et de formation.

4. Les propositions de la Commission pour le prochain cadre financier pluriannuel visent notamment à améliorer
la compétitivité, y compris au moyen du programme «Horizon 2020» pour la recherche et l'innovation et du
programme COSME.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) «Restructurations et anticipation du changement: quelles leçons tirer de l'expérience récente?», COM(2012) 7 final du 17 janvier 2012:.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0007:FIN:FR:PDF.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) «Une industrie européenne plus forte au service de la croissance et de la relance économique — Mise à jour de la communication sur la politique

industrielle», COM(2012) 582 final du 10 octobre 2012: .
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0582:FIN:FR:PDF.

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 623

5. La politique commerciale de l'UE consiste à renforcer les différents secteurs d'activité par divers moyens:
ouverture des marchés, diplomatie commerciale soutenant les intérêts de l'UE et exercice du droit d'accès non
discriminatoire au marché. La Commission organise aussi des «Missions pour la croissance» qui aident à créer des
partenariats et à nouer des relations commerciales.

6. Le règlement relatif aux fonds européens de capital-risque a été formellement approuvé en mars 2013 et devrait
entrer en vigueur cet été. Il fonctionnera comme un passeport volontaire valable à l'échelle de l'UE pour les
administrateurs des fonds de capital-risque et il simplifiera la mobilisation transfrontalière de fonds.

C 6 E / 624 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002940/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ European industrial strategy

The closure of Arcelor, PSA and Ford factories and a number of Iveco sites in Europe, and the restructurings carried
out by firms such as Caterpillar, are a clear sign of how hard the economic and social crisis has hit car workers,
subcontractor SMEs and, indeed, European industry as a whole. Because it would be wrong for anyone to think that
the industrial crisis is confined to traditional sectors such as the car, steel and textile industries. It is increasingly being
felt in high‐tech sectors, such as telecoms, as well. Of the eight western manufacturers that dominated the telecoms
market 10 years ago, only four are still in existence today. During the same period two Chinese manufacturers,
Huawei and ZTE, have become global leaders. Industry accounts for 80% of EU innovations and 75% of EU exports.
And for every manufacturing job, two jobs are created in the service sector. So we need industry. And we can help it
to develop, in particular by adopting an industrial policy for the EU as a whole rather than retaining 27 different
national policies.

1. What lessons has the Commission learned from the thousands of restructurings and redundancies that have
occurred?

2. Does it intend to establish an integrated, mutually supportive European strategy for industrial competitiveness?
If so, what form will it take?

3. In this context, what is its view on developing common policies on vocational training, lifelong learning and
mobility that reflect the needs of industry?

4. Does it plan to strengthen industrial cooperation in all sectors and throughout the EU through a system of
incentives?

5. Does it intend to establish an external economic action strategy that will forge partnerships with other parts of
the world on projects of shared interest?

6. What is the situation with regard to the European passport for venture capital funds, which should help
innovative SMEs to secure funding?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 May 2013)_

1. The Commission has adopted in 2012 a Green Paper on restructuring ( [1] ) and is currently considering how best
to encourage observance of best practices.

2. The Commission has recently updated its industrial policy ( [2] ) focusing on four key areas: industrial innovation;
access to markets; access to finance; human capital and skills.

3. The Commission agrees that policies aimed at job creation and tools to anticipate skills needs are necessary. The
financing of European Sector Skills Councils aims to strengthen cooperation with education and training providers.

4. The Commission proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework notably aim at boosting industry’s
competitiveness, including through the Horizon 2020 programme for research and innovation and the COSME
Programme.

5. EU trade policy is strengthening industries through various means: opening markets; trade diplomacy
supporting EU interests; enforcing rights to secure non-discriminatory market access. The Commission also organises
‘Missions for Growth’ that help forge partnerships and business relations.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ‘Restructuring and anticipation of change: what lessons from recent experience?’ (COM(2012)7 final of 17 January 2012), at: http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0007:FIN:EN:PDF

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’ (COM(2012) 582 final of 10 October 2012), at: http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0582:FIN:EN:PDF

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10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 625

6. The European Venture Capital Funds Regulation has been formally approved in March 2013. The regulation
should come into effect in the summer and will act as a voluntary EU-wide passport for VC fund managers and
simplify cross-border fundraising.

C 6 E / 626 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002941/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 mars 2013)_

_Objet:_ Investissement commun vers les technologies de demain

L'Europe est née d'une politique industrielle! Soixante ans après la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier,
pour retrouver l'audace des pères fondateurs, quels sont les plans et les perspectives imaginées par la Commission vers
de nouveaux investissements communs, orientés cette fois vers les technologies‐clés génériques — nanotechnologies,
micro et nanoélectronique, matériaux avancés, biotechnologies — et les biens et services nouveaux qu'elles
permettent de produire dans les secteurs des véhicules propres, de la construction durable, des réseaux intelligents et
de l'espace?

**Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission**

_(8 mai 2013)_

Les technologies clés génériques (TCG) ( [1] ) constituent l'une des priorités de la Commission, comme celle-ci l'a indiqué
dans sa communication sur la politique industrielle ( [2] ).

Afin d'encourager les investissements et conformément à sa communication sur les TCG ( [3] ), la Commission a accordé
une attention particulière à la recherche et à l'innovation et à leur déploiement industriel dans les instruments
stratégiques de l'Union européenne concernés (Horizon 2020, Fonds structurels, instruments financiers innovants
avec le soutien de la Banque européenne d'investissement). La proposition de la Commission pour Horizon 2020
prévoit près de sept milliards d'euros pour les TCG au titre de l'objectif «Primauté dans le domaine des technologies
génériques et industrielles» ( [4] ). Le financement combiné de projets est également encouragé ( [5] ).

La Commission mise sur le fort potentiel des TCG pour soutenir des domaines comme les transports propres, la
construction durable et les réseaux intelligents ( [6] ).

Les partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans des domaines clés constituent un moyen efficace de relever les défis les plus
exigeants pour l'industrie en matière de recherche et d'innovation.

Horizon 2020 s'appuiera sur les expériences des programmes antérieurs, comme le septième programme-cadre
(7 PC) ou le programme pour l'innovation et la compétitivité (CIP), et pourra apporter un soutien supplémentaire aux
entreprises communes, conformément à l'article 187 du traité. Parmi ces entreprises communes, figurent les
initiatives concernant les piles à combustible et hydragène (FCH), les transports aériens (Clean Sky), les médicaments
innovants (IMI), les systèmes informatiques embarqués (Artemis) et la nanoélectronique (ENIAC).

D'autres PPP relevant du 7 PC pourraient bénéficier d'une aide supplémentaire, comme «Usines du futur», «Bâtiments
économes en énergie», «Voitures vertes» et «Internet du futur». Dans le cadre du programme Horizon 2020, de
nouveaux PPP pourront également voir le jour, par exemple dans le domaine des industries de transformation et de la
photonique.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Les TCG sont: les nanotechnologies, la microélectronique et la nanoélectronique, les matériaux avancés, la photonique, la biotechnologie

industrielle et les systèmes de fabrication avancés.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) «Une industrie européenne plus forte au service de la croissance et de la relance économique», COM(2012)582.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) «Une stratégie européenne pour les technologies clés génériques — Une passerelle vers la croissance et l'emploi», COM(2012)341.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) «Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil portant établissement du programme-cadre pour la recherche et l'innovation

“Horizon 2020” (2014-2020)», COM(2011)809 final.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Grâce à Horizon 2020, aux Fonds structurels, aux prêts de la BEI et au secteur privé.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Auxquels il est fait référence dans la communication sur la politique industrielle et dans le plan d'action en faveur de l'éco-innovation —

«L'innovation pour un avenir durable — Le plan d'action en faveur de l'éco-innovation (PAEI)», COM(2011)899 final.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 627

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002941/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Joint investment in the technologies of tomorrow

Sixty years ago the founding fathers decided to take a new approach to industrial policy by establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community. The Commission is no doubt keen to show that such vision is not a thing of the past. If so,
what plans and ideas does it have for new joint investments, this time focusing on key enabling technologies —
nanotechnology, microelectronics, nanoelectronics, advanced materials and biotechnology — and the new goods
and services they can generate in sectors such as clean transport, sustainable construction, smart grids and space?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2013)_

Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) ( [1] ) are one of the Commission's priorities as set out in its Industrial Policy
Communication ( [2] ).

In order to favour investments and in line with its communication on KETs ( [3] ), the Commission has paid special
attention to R&I and their industrial deployment in relevant EU policy instruments (Horizon 2020, structural funds,
innovative financial instruments with the support of the European Investment Bank). The Commission's proposal for
Horizon 2020 includes almost EUR 7 billion for KETs under ‘Leadership in Enabling and Industrial Technologies’ ( [4] ).
The combined financing of projects is promoted ( [5] ).

The Commission counts on the strong potential that KETs have to support areas such as clean transport, sustainable
construction and smart grids ( [6] ).

Public private partnerships (PPPs) in key areas are considered an effective vehicle to address the most demanding R&I
challenges for industry.

Horizon 2020 will build on the experience from previous programmes such as FP7 or CIP (Competitiveness and
Innovation Programme), and may provide further support to Joint Undertakings under Article 187 of the Treaty. This
includes, e.g., Fuel Cells and Hydrogen (FCH), Clean sky, Innovative Medicines, Embedded computing systems
(ARTEMIS) and Nano-electronics (ENIAC).

Other PPPs under FP7, for which further support may be provided are, e.g., Factories of the Future, Energy-efficient
Buildings, the European Green Cars Initiative and Future Internet. New PPPs may also be launched under Horizon
2020, e.g., for the process industries and photonics.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) KETs are: nanotechnology, micro‐ and nano-electronics, advanced materials, photonics, industrial biotechnology, advanced manufacturing

systems.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) ‘A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’, COM(2012) 582.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ‘A European strategy for Key Enabling Technologies — A bridge to growth and jobs’, COM(2012) 341.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) ‘Establishing Horizon 2020 — The framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020)’, COM(2011) 809 final.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Through Horizon 2020, Structural Funds, EIB loans and the private sector.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Referred to in the Industrial Policy Communication and in the Eco-Innovation Action Plan — ‘Innovation for a sustainable Future — The Eco
innovation Action Plan (Eco-AP)’, COM(2011) 899 final.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

C 6 E / 628 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002942/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Tiziano Motti (PPE) e Andrea**

**Zanoni (ALDE)**
_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Uso di psicofarmaci negli animali

In più occasioni le istituzioni europee si sono giustamente occupate del benessere degli animali, mentre vi è una
sempre maggior presenza, nelle case dei cittadini europei, di animali d'affezione, da compagnia e di sostegno come i
cani educati all'aiuto delle persone disabili o al loro salvataggio in caso di calamità.

Purtroppo però sta prendendo sempre più piede l'utilizzo di psicofarmaci destinati a un uso umano, che vengono
spesso utilizzati per contenere «supposti» disturbi o patologie comportamentali, senza che spesso sia rispettato il
protocollo secondo cui è prevista l'obbligatorietà di accertamenti che escludano eventuali patologie organiche
attraverso specifici esami atti ad individuare appunto eventuali disfunzioni organiche.

L'utilizzo di tali psicofarmaci non può comunque contenere l'eventuale iperattività o aggressività dei cani nel lungo
periodo a patto di non pensare ad una loro vita da «sedati» contraria alla naturale essenza di qualunque essere vivente:
uno psicofarmaco comunque non educa il cane alla normale convivenza con gli esseri umani e con altri animali, ma
nel tempo può essere gravemente nocivo per la salute.

Può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. è a conoscenza di questa pratica e, nel caso non lo fosse, intende informarsi delproblema con un'indagine sia
presso le case farmaceutiche sia presso i sistemi veterinarinazionali degli Stati membri;

2. intende intervenire per scoraggiare tale uso e vietarlo al di fuori di eventuali comprovate etemporanee necessità
veterinarie?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(30 aprile 2013)_

La Commissione non è a conoscenza del tipo di abusi menzionati dagli onorevoli deputati.

Conformemente all'articolo 13 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea ( [1] ), si tiene conto del benessere
degli animali soltanto negli ambiti in cui il trattamento degli animali possa interferire con certe politiche dell'UE ( [2] ),
come quelle relative all'agricoltura o al mercato interno.

Pertanto, la questione rimane di competenza esclusiva degli Stati membri.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU C 83 del 30.3.2010, pag. 47.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Agricoltura, pesca, trasporti, mercato interno, ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico e spazio.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 629

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002942/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Tiziano Motti (PPE)**

**and Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Use of psychotropic drugs on animals

On several occasions the European institutions have rightly concerned themselves with animal welfare, while
European citizens have more and more pets and support animals such as dogs trained to help disabled people or to
rescue them from accidents.

Unfortunately, however, ever‐increasing use is being made of psychotropic drugs intended for human use, often to
address supposed disorders or behavioural problems, but without compliance with the protocol requiring checks to
rule out any organic pathologies by specific examinations carried out to precisely identify any organic problems.

However, the use of such psychotropic drugs over a long period to deal with cases of canine hyperactivity or
aggressiveness cannot but make one think of them as living sedated lives, contrary to the nature of any living being; a
psychotropic drug does not train a dog to live normally with human beings and other animals, but may over time be
seriously harmful to its health.

1. Is the Commission aware of this practice, and if not, will it look into the issue by making inquiries either to the
pharmaceutical companies or the national veterinary systems of the Member States?

2. Will the Commission intervene to discourage such use and ban it except in cases of confirmed and temporary
veterinary need?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of the type of abuses mentioned by the Honourable Member.

According to Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( [1] ), animal welfare is taken into
consideration only in areas where the treatment of animals may interfere with some EU policies ( [2] ), like agriculture or
internal market.

Therefore, this matter remains under the sole competence of the Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ C83, 30.3.2010, p. 47.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies.

C 6 E / 630 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002943/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Possibili finanziamenti per le imprese operanti nel settore dei trasporti su gomma, traslochi e depositi

Nel Comune di Civitavecchia è sorta nel 2010 un'impresa specializzata nei trasporti su gomma, traslochi su tutto il
territorio nazionale e internazionali e spedizioni con container per destinazioni intercontinentali, nonché in
numerosi altri servizi.

In seguito al consolidamento dell'attività, dell'esperienza e della clientela, tale impresa vorrebbe ampliare i propri
servizi con la costruzione di un centro di stoccaggio merci adiacente allo scalo portuale di Civitavecchia (Roma),
godendo così di una posizione strategica per il trasporto e lo stoccaggio delle merci. La realizzazione del progetto
prevede l'acquisto di numerosi container, di un autocarro e di un carrello elevatore, l'allestimento di un deposito nei
pressi del porto che possa ospitare almeno 100 contenitori e altresì di una struttura mobile utilizzabile anche come
ufficio, all'interno della quale un addetto sarà impiegato a registrare la qualità, quantità e tipologia delle merci in
deposito nonché le date di carico e scarico delle stesse merci.

Infine, il progetto prevede anche l'installazione di un impianto di videosorveglianza attivo 24h su 24h, che dovrà
coprire l'intero raggio della proprietà ed essere dotato di accesso remoto, tramite un software gestionale, al fine di
garantire la gestione a distanza di tutti i dati in tempo reale.

Premesso che servizi come quelli offerti da questa azienda non solo creano posti di lavoro ma contribuiscono a
migliorare la competitività europea e il buon funzionamento della rete transeuropea del trasporto (TEN-T) che ha
come obiettivo l'eliminazione delle strozzature, il rinnovo e miglioramento delle infrastrutture e lo snellimento delle
operazioni transfrontaliere di trasporto per passeggeri e imprese, si chiede alla Commissione di rispondere alle
seguenti domande:

1. Esistono finanziamenti per le imprese che operano nel settore dei trasporti, soprattutto nell'acquisto di beni
materiali?

2. Esistono finanziamenti per l'acquisto di software gestionali?

3. È in grado di fornire un quadro generale della situazione?

**Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione**

_(14 maggio 2013)_

Ai sensi dell'articolo 171, paragrafo 1, del TFUE ( [1] ), il sostegno finanziario dell'UE può essere concesso solo a progetti
di interesse comune individuati come tali dagli orientamenti dell'UE riguardanti gli obiettivi, le priorità e le linee
principali delle azioni previste nel settore delle reti transeuropee. I centri di stoccaggio di merci non sono considerati
una parte dell'infrastruttura TEN-T negli attuali orientamenti dell'UE per la TEN-T ( [2] ).

Il testo modificato degli orientamenti in materia di TEN-T ( [3] ), attualmente in corso di adozione da parte del
Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, comprende «l’infrastruttura necessaria per le operazioni di trasporto all’interno
dell’area portuale», oltre ai terminal merci e alle piattaforme logistiche ( [4] ). Tuttavia, il progetto di centro di stoccaggio
merci descritto dall'onorevole deputata non sembra rientrare in nessuna di queste due categorie di componenti
dell'infrastruttura TEN-T.

Le spese di acquisto del software potrebbero beneficiare di un co-finanziamento dell'UE per le TEN-T solo se sono
sostenute nell'ambito di un progetto di sviluppo dell'infrastruttura TEN-T e se il software è direttamente collegato allo
sviluppo o al funzionamento della rispettiva infrastruttura TEN-T.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Decisione n. 661/2010/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 7 luglio 2010, sugli orientamenti dell'Unione per lo sviluppo della rete

transeuropea dei trasporti, GU L 204 del 5.8.2010.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sugli orientamenti dell’Unione per lo sviluppo della rete transeuropea dei

trasporti, COM(2011)650 definitivo.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Articolo 24, paragrafo 1, lettera c), e articolo 32, COM(2011)650.

( **|**

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 631

In linea di principio, gli interventi a favore dello sviluppo economico delle imprese possono beneficiare di un cofinanziamento a titolo del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, nel rispetto di determinate disposizioni stabilite nei
regolamenti pertinenti dell'UE e nei programmi operativi.

Conformemente al principio della gestione condivisa applicato per l'amministrazione dei Fondi strutturali, la
selezione e l'attuazione del progetto rientrano tuttavia fra le responsabilità delle autorità nazionali. Per ottenere
maggiori informazioni sul tipo specifico di progetti che possono beneficiare di un co-finanziamento a titolo del
programma, la Commissione invita pertanto l'onorevole deputata a contattare direttamente l'autorità di gestione del
programma operativo regionale [5] .

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Autorità di gestione del programma operativo regionale della Regione Lazio 2007-2013
Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7 00145 Roma - adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it

C 6 E / 632 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002943/13**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Possible funding for companies active in the road transport, removals and warehousing sector

A company specialising in road transport, national and international removals and intercontinental container
shipping, as well as in various other services, has been established in the municipality of Civitavecchia since 2010.

Following consolidation of its activities, experience and customer base, the company would like to expand its services
by constructing a goods storage centre adjacent to the port of Civitavecchia (Rome), thus benefiting from a strategic
position for the transport and storage of goods. Implementation of the project involves the purchase of a large
number of containers and a lorry and a fork-lift truck, the fitting-out of a warehouse near the port, with the capacity
to accommodate at least 100 containers, and a mobile structure that can also be used as an office, in which an
employee will record the quality, quantity and type of goods stored and the dates of their loading and unloading.

Finally, the project also provides for the installation of a 24-hour video surveillance system, which must cover the
entire property and will be equipped with remote access, using business software, in order to ensure remote
management of all data in real time.

Given that services such as those offered by this company not only create jobs, but also help to improve Europe’s
competitiveness and the smooth operation of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), the purpose of which is
to eliminate bottlenecks, renew and improve infrastructure, and simplify cross-border transport for passengers and
businesses:

1. Can the Commission say whether there is funding for companies active in the transport sector, particularly for
the purchase of tangible fixed assets?

2. Is funding available for the purchase of business software?

3. Can the Commission provide an overall picture of the situation?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2013)_

According to Art. 171 (1) of TFEU ( [1] ), EU financial support can be provided only to projects of common interest
identified as such in EU guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the
sphere of trans-European networks. Goods storage centres are not considered as part of the TEN-T infrastructure in
the current EU TEN-T Guidelines ( [2] ).

The revised text of the TEN-T Guidelines ( [3] ) currently in the process of adoption by the Parliament and the Council,
includes ‘the infrastructure necessary for transport operations within the port area’, as well as freight terminals and
logistic platforms ( [4] ). However, the planned goods storage centre as described by the Honourable Member does not
appear to fit either of these two types of TEN-T infrastructure components.

Costs for software acquisition could be eligible for EU TEN-T co-funding only insofar as these costs are incured as part
of a TEN-T infrastructure development project and the software is directly linked to the development or operation of
the respective TEN-T infrastructure.

Interventions to support the economic expansion of enterprises are in principle eligible for co-financing from the
European Regional Development Fund, subject to specific provisions set in the relevant EU Regulations and in the
Operational Programmes.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Decision No 661/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans
European transport network, OJ L 204, 5.8.2010.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport

network, COM(2011) 650 final.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Art. 24(1)(c) and Art. 32-32, COM(2011) 650.

( **|**

( **|**

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 633

In line with the shared management principle used for the administration of Structural Funds, project selection and
implementation is, however, the responsibility of the national authorities. For more information on the specific type
of projects eligible to co-financing under the Programme, the Commission therefore suggests that the Honourable
Member contact directly the Managing Authority of the regional operational programme ( [5] ).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Autorità di gestione del programma operativo regionale della Regione Lazio 2007-2013 .

Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7 00145 Roma.
adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it.

C 6 E / 634 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002944/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(14 marzo 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Possibili finanziamenti per la realizzazione di un centro di accoglienza per donne vittime di violenza

Nuovi Orizzonti è un'associazione senza fini di lucro che si batte da anni contro ogni forma di violenza, soprusi,
maltrattamenti, stupri e mutilazioni genitali che le donne subiscono quotidianamente in ogni parte del mondo. Nella
sua attività d'informazione, raccolta di testimonianze, assistenza alle denunce e ai vari aspetti legati, supporto in
ospedale e lotta contro l'emarginazione sociale e la discriminazione razziale, tale associazione si avvale della
collaborazione di professionisti quali psichiatri, psicologi, psicoterapeuti e avvocati. Dal lavoro svolto fino ad ora è
nato il progetto GAD (Gruppo Autonomia Donne) che prevede la realizzazione in un'area industriale dismessa del
Comune di Collegno (TO) di un grande centro di accoglienza per donne con o senza figli, vittime di violenza o in
situazioni di disagio. Tale centro che potrà ospitare circa 900 persone potrebbe diventare un punto di riferimento
nazionale per l'accoglienza di donne provenienti da tutto il territorio nazionale offrendo un luogo sicuro e tutelato,
con percorsi di inserimento e di autonomia gestionale, permanenza temporanea e aiuti specifici come, ad esempio, un
servizio terapeutico di supporto del rapporto madre/figlio volto a recuperare o rafforzare le capacità genitoriali.

Al contempo tale associazione si prefigge di costituire una banca dati nazionale con lo scopo di raccogliere statistiche
sul fenomeno della violenza sulle donne e studiare strategie d'intervento mirate e più efficienti. Si vorrebbe, altresì,
creare una unità di strada, composta da una mediatrice culturale, un'assistente sociale e volontari, al fine di informare
le donne sulla prevenzione delle malattie sessualmente trasmissibili, come l'AIDS, e contro le gravidanze indesiderate.

Premesso ciò, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. esistono finanziamenti finalizzati alla realizzazione del centro di accoglienza;

2. esistono progetti simili finanziati con i fondi comunitari e se sì, quali;

3. è in grado di fornire un quadro generale della situazione?

**Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

_(3 maggio 2013)_

La Commissione è impegnata a dare una risposta politica forte per combattere tutte le forme di violenza contro le
donne, come confermato dal programma di Stoccolma e dalla Strategia per la parità tra donne e uomini (2010-2015).
Il programma Daphne III fornisce tuttavia un sostegno finanziario in questo settore per le misure «soft» (conferenze,
campagne di sensibilizzazione, attività di formazione, ecc.) mediante sovvenzioni per progetti transnazionali, ossia
progetti che coinvolgono almeno due organizzazioni di due Stati membri diversi.

Di conseguenza, la creazione di un centro di accoglienza in un sito industriale dismesso non può essere finanziata dal
programma DAPHNE III per due motivi: da una parte, l’atto di base del programma non prevede il finanziamento di
questo tipo di azioni e, dall’altra, poiché DAPHNE III riguarda solo i progetti transnazionali e il progetto in questione è
strettamente nazionale, quest’ultimo non può beneficiare di un finanziamento.

Alla luce delle suddette limitazioni imposte da DAPHNE III, nessun altro progetto analogo è stato finanziato da questo

programma.

Questo tipo di azione potrebbe essere finanziato mediante i fondi strutturali dell'UE, gestiti in maniera congiunta
affidando i compiti di attuazione ai singoli Stati membri.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 635

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002944/13**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Possible funding for the creation of a refuge for women who are victims of violence

_Nuovi Orizzonti_ is a non-profit association which has fought for years against all forms of violence, abuse,
mistreatment, rape and genital mutilation which women around the world endure every day. The association's work
involves raising awareness, gathering evidence, helping women report incidents and providing related support,
visiting victims in hospital and fighting against social exclusion and racial discrimination. For this it relies on input
from professionals such as psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists and lawyers. A project called _Gruppo_
_Autonomia Donne_ (Women's Independence Group) has been set up on the basis of the association's work so far. This
project intends to turn a disused industrial site in Collegno (Turin province) into a large refuge centre for women, with
or without children, who are victims of violence or experiencing difficult situations. Such a centre, which could
accommodate around 900 people, would become a national reference point, providing refuge for women from all
over Italy. It would offer a safe haven and support, helping women to integrate and to manage their affairs
independently as well as providing temporary accommodation and specific assistance, such as therapy focusing on
the mother-child relationship and aimed at regaining or improving parenting skills.

In parallel, the association has decided to build a national database to collect statistics relating to violence against
women, which it will use to develop targeted and more effective strategies for intervention. It would also like to create
a mobile unit, made up of a female cultural mediator, a social worker and volunteers, which would go out on the
streets to inform women about the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (such as AIDS) and of unwanted

pregnancy.

Given the above, could the Commission inform us whether:

1. there is funding available for the creation of the refuge centre;

2. similar projects have been funded using EU funding and if so, which;

3. it is able to give a general overview of the situation?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2013)_

The Commission is committed to a strong policy response to combat all forms of violence against women, as
confirmed in the Stockholm Programme and the strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015). The
Daphne III Programme provides however financial support in this field for ‘soft measures’ actions (conferences,
awareness raising campaign, training activities etc.) through grants awarded to transnational projects, i.e. projects
involving at least two organisations from two different Member States.

Consequently, the creation of a refuge centre after rehabilitation of a disused industrial site cannot be funded under
the DAPHNE III programme for two reasons: on one hand, the basic act of the programme does not allow to fund this
type of actions and, on the other hand, as the project is strictly national and DAPHNE III is only open to transnational
projects, it cannot receive a grant from this programme.

Therefore, taking into account the limitations of the DAPHNE III programme as mentioned above, no similar projects
have been financed under the programme.

This type of action could be funded through EU structural funds, which are implemented under shared management
where implementation tasks are delegated to Member States.

C 6 E / 636 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.1.2014

_(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)_

**Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002945/13**

**Komisijai**
**Rolandas Paksas (EFD)**

_(2013 m. kovo 14 d.)_

_Tema:_ Tiesioginių išmokų moduliacijos pereinamuoju laikotarpiu taikymas

Nuo šių metų Lietuvai, kaip ir kitoms naujosioms ES valstybėms narėms, pradėtas taikyti naujas išmokų skaičiavimo
būdas. Pagal tiesioginių išmokų moduliaciją žemės ūkio subjektams, kurių bendra Europos Sąjungos ir nacionalinių
išmokų už pieną, galvijus, žemės naudmenas ir kitos paramos suma viršija 5 000 EUR, šią sumą viršijanti paramos
suma mažinama 10 % sumažinant nacionalinę išmoką. Ūkininkams, kurių išmokos viršija 300 000 EUR,
finansavimas mažinamas 4 %.

Atkreiptinas dėmesys į tai, kad Lietuvos žemdirbiai konkuruoja su kitų ES valstybių ūkininkais vienoje produkcijos,
darbo jėgos ir žemės ūkio žaliavų rinkoje. Tačiau Lietuvių žemdirbių gaunamos tiesioginės išmokos gerokai mažesnės
už ES vidurkį, o gamybos sąnaudos beveik nesiskiria. Be to, nustatant pereinamąjį laikotarpį sudaromos nevienodos
konkurencinės sąlygos.

Ar, Komisijos nuomone, gali būti taikoma moduliacija naujoms ES valstybėms narėms pereinamuoju laikotarpiu?

Ar nebus iškreiptos konkurencijos sąlygos ir pažeisti teisėti Lietuvos žemdirbių lūkesčiai?

**D. Cioloşo atsakymas Komisijos vardu**

_(2013 m. balandžio 30 d.)_

Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentu (ES) Nr. 671/2012 ( [1] ) buvo iš dalies pakeistas Tarybos reglamentas (EB)
Nr. 73/2009 ( [2] ) ir įtraukta galimybė ES 10 valstybėms narėms, taikančioms vienkartinės išmokos už plotus schemą,
2013 m. skirti pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinę paramą pagal naują 133a straipsnį. Ta nuostata taip pat
reikalaujama, kad pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos skyrimo sąlygos būtų tokios pačios, kokiomis leista
išmokėti papildomas nacionalines tiesiogines išmokas (PNTI) 2012 m.

Pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr.73/2009 121 straipsnį 2012 m. ES 10 valstybėse narėse tiesioginių išmokų lygis
sudarė 90 proc. ES 15 valstybėse narėse taikomų tiesioginių išmokų lygio. Taikant Tarybos reglamento (EB)
Nr. 73/2009 7 straipsnyje numatytą moduliavimą (t. y. visas ūkininkui skiriamų tiesioginių išmokų sumas, didesnes
nei 5000 EUR, sumažinant 10 proc.), ES 15 valstybėse narėse tiesioginių išmokų, kurių sumos didesnės nei
5000 EUR, lygis taip pat sudarė 90 proc. taikomų tiesioginių išmokų lygio.

Todėl, pritaikius moduliavimą ir Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 73/2009 132 straipsnio 2 dalyje numatytą
mechanizmą, 2012 m. buvo būtinas tam tikras PNTI sumažinimas siekiant užtikrinti, kad tiesioginės paramos, kurią
ūkininkas turi teisę gauti, lygis neviršytų ES 15 valstybių narių lygio. Kadangi pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB)
Nr. 73/2009 133a straipsnį pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos skyrimo sąlygos turi būti tokios pačios,
kokiomis leista išmokėti PNTI 2012 m., pateiktame klausime nurodytas paramos mažinimo mechanizmas turi būti
taikomas ir pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinei paramai 2013 m.

Todėl pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos mažinimas 2013 m. yra grindžiamas ES teisės aktais ir
nepažeidžia teisėtų galimybių apsaugos principo ar konkurencijos taisyklių.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OL L 204, 2012 7 31.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OL L 30, 2009 1 31.

10.1.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 6 E / 637

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-002945/13**

**to the Commission**
**Rolandas Paksas (EFD)**

_(14 March 2013)_

_Subject:_ Application of the modulation of direct payments in the transitional period

The new method of calculating payments applies to Lithuania from this year onwards, as it does to the other new EU
Member States. Under the modulation of direct payments, farmers who receive the total amount of European Union
and national payments for milk, cattle, agricultural land and other support in excess of EUR 5 000, the amount of
support exceeding this amount is reduced by 10% by reducing the national payment. Financing is reduced by 4% for
farmers whose payments exceed EUR 300 000.

It should be noted that Lithuanian farmers compete with farmers from other Member States in production, labour
and agricultural raw material markets. However, Lithuanian farmers receive direct payments that are significantly
lower than the EU average, while there is virtually no difference in the cost of production. Furthermore, establishing a
transitional period creates unequal conditions of competition.

In the Commission’s opinion, can the modulation be applied to the new Member States during the transitional
period?

Would this not distort the conditions of competition and infringe the legitimate expectations of Lithuanian farmers?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2013)_

Regulation (EU) No 671/2012 ( [1] ) of the European Parliament and of the Council has amended Council Regulation
(EC) No 73/2009 ( [2] ) to include the possibility for EU-10 Member States applying the single area payment scheme to
grant transitional national aid in 2013 under a new Article 133a. That provision also requires that the conditions for
granting transitional national aid shall be identical to those authorised for the granting of complementary national
direct payments (CNDPs) in 2012.

In 2012, in accordance with Article 121 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 the level of direct payments in EU10 Member States was 90% of the level applicable in EU-15. Due to application of modulation provided in Article 7
of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (i.e. generally a 10% reduction for any amount of direct payments a farmer
would receive in excess of EUR 5 000), the level of direct payments in the EU-15 for amounts above EUR 5 000 was
also 90% of the level applicable.

As a consequence of modulation and the mechanism foreseen in Article 132(2) of Council Regulation (EC)
No 73/2009, a certain reduction of CNDPs was thus necessary in 2012 to ensure that the level of direct support a
farmer would be entitled to receive would not exceed the EU-15 level. As the conditions for granting the transitional
national aid shall, according to Article 133a of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, be identical to those authorised
for the granting of CNDPs in 2012, the mechanism of reduction referred to in the question also needs to be applied to
transitional national aid in 2013.

Therefore, reductions of the transitional national aid in 2013 follow from the EU legislation and do not infringe the
principle of protection of legitimate expectations or competition rules.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 204, 31.7.2012.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 30, 31.1.2009.

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