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# 51997IP0040

**Resolution on the general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties** 
  
*Official Journal C 033 , 03/02/1997 P. 0066*

  

B4-0040/97

Resolution on the general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions of 17 May 1995 ((OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56.)), 13 March 1996 ((OJ C 96, 1.4.1996, p. 77.)), 14 November 1996 ((Minutes of that date, Part II, Item 9.)) and 11 December 1996 ((Minutes of that date, Part II, Item 1(a).)),

A. whereas the Florence European Council asked for a general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties to be prepared for the European Council meeting in Dublin, addressing three main objectives:

- bringing the Union closer to its citizens,

- strengthening and broadening the CFSP, with the aim of achieving greater consistency and efficiency,

- ensuring, with an eye to enlargement, the proper functioning of the institutions and the efficiency of the decision-making process,

B. whereas the Irish Presidency's draft must be assessed in the light of these objectives; whereas it only reflects the current state of negotiations, but whereas, pursuant to Article B of the TEU, any revision of the Treaty must not only maintain in full the acquis communautaire, but actually build on it,

C. noting that the Irish Presidency's text pays tribute to the contribution made by the European Parliament to the work of the Intergovernmental Conference through its two observers, but stressing nevertheless that it in no way considers itself bound as an institution by the interim results and that it remains free to make a political assessment during the course of and at the end of the Conference,

D. noting that the European Council of 13 and 14 December 1996 considered that the draft Treaty tabled by the Presidency provided a good basis for continuing negotiations; considering, on the contrary, that the draft is evidence of the lack of ambition on the part of certain Member States to carry out genuine far-reaching reforms; whereas, in these circumstances, it is important to consolidate the provisions which fulfil those objectives in that text, as otherwise the European Parliament could not approve the final amendments to the Treaty,

SECTION I - AN AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Chapter 1 - Fundamental rights and non-discrimination

1. Notes the provisions concerning fundamental rights, but regrets the fact that no proposal has been made concerning citizens' direct contact with the Community and their participation in its institutions;

2. Welcomes the insertion of the clause on non-discrimination, but considers that it should be directly applicable and that the role of the European Parliament must be strengthened by means of the codecision procedure in what is an important area of citizens' rights;

3. Reiterates its position regarding the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and calls for Article L of the TEU to be amended in such a way as to bring the matters covered by the three pillars within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, where protection of those rights is concerned, and for the provision of a clear legal basis permitting direct access by individuals to the Court of Justice in the event of fundamental rights being violated by an act of a Union institution;

4. Regrets the lack of provisions concerning the rights of nationals of third countries who are legally resident in the Union and states once again that the Treaty must guarantee them respect for human rights, equal treatment and non-discrimination as regards social, economic and cultural rights;

5. Declares that the right of association in political parties operating at European level necessitates a modification of the Treaty in accordance with the proposals of the Greek, Italian and Austrian Governments; recalls in this connection the proposals contained in its resolution of 10 December 1996 on the constitutional status of European political parties ((Minutes of that date, Part II, Item 5.));

6. Regrets that the right to information and the right to express views on Community policies are not recognized as a general principle;

7. Calls for the introduction of a uniform electoral procedure in accordance with the German proposal and, at the very least, the inclusion in the Treaty of a binding timetable;

Chapter 2 - Free movement of persons, asylum and immigration

8. Condemns the risk of sham communitization and therefore calls for application in full of Community procedures and full involvement of Community institutions, including the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, in those areas of home affairs and justice policy that are to be transferred from the intergovernmental to the Community sphere, particularly in so far as the general outline for a draft Treaty:

(a) envisages the framing of procedures for exceptions where judicial control is concerned (Article G(4));

(b) does not come out clearly in favour of the use of qualified majority voting within the Council or of the codecision procedure (Article G(2) and (3));

9. Calls, however, for the following areas to be transferred to the EC Treaty:

(a) the fight against drug-trafficking;

(b) the fight against international crime, including trafficking in human beings;

(c) judicial and administrative cooperation in civil and commercial matters;

10. Notes with interest the Presidency's suggestion of using the method of 'target deadlines' for achieving the objectives identified in the sphere of justice and home affairs and, in particular, of an overall target date for the matters concerned (Article B of the Treaty on European Union); calls in particular for the free movement of persons to be finally guaranteed throughout the Union by a fixed and definite date;

Chapter 3 - Security and safety of persons

11. Calls for the use of qualified majority voting in the Council and for the European Parliament to have the power of codecision also in respect of normal legislative acts in the sphere of home affairs and justice;

12. Endorses the proposals made by the Irish Presidency for provisions on police cooperation and the operational capacity of Europol (Article K.1(b)), provided that a binding timetable is adopted; considers, however, such a detailed list of measures and tasks not to be appropriate in the context of a Treaty of such fundamental nature;

13. Considers that the provisions envisaged both for the new title of the Treaty establishing the European Community and for Title VI of the Treaty on European Union should be further strengthened and augmented to a considerable extent; considers that, to that end, the following aspects should now be examined in detail with a view to their approval by the Intergovernmental Conference:

(a) the question of a more substantial transfer to the Community 'pillar', along the lines proposed by the Belgian Government (retention of Title VI solely for judicial and police cooperation);

(b) the benefits of a phased approach to communitization, as suggested in the joint memorandum from the Benelux countries, the German and French Governments and, specifically in connection with the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement, the Netherlands delegation;

(c) the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, in connection with Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, as proposed by the German and French Governments and, concerning police cooperation, the Spanish and Belgian Governments;

(d) the prospects that a formula for enhanced cooperation, as put forward by the German and French Governments, might offer;

(e) the development of provisions directed towards the introduction of a minimum common base for describing offences and punishments and towards facilitating the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions and civil and criminal judicial assistance;

SECTION II - THE UNION AND THE CITIZEN

Chapter 4 - Employment

14. Alerts the IGC to the danger of confining itself to an agreement on a title or chapter on employment which has no substance; considers that the IGC must therefore examine in more detail the proposal submitted by Parliament's two representatives, in particular as regards the coordination of macroeconomic policies with a view to promoting employment;

15. Endorses the proposal of the Irish Presidency regarding employment, particularly the implementation of incentive measures (Article 5);

16. Considers, however, that the provisions envisaged should be strengthened:

(a) by guaranteeing that the broad lines of employment policy and of economic policy are consistent with each other;

(b) by making the objective of promoting employment as binding as that covered by the guiding principles laid down in Article 3a of the Treaty, and by making Community action in this sphere a common policy (new point before Article 3(i));

(c) by setting out the principles likely to underpin the formulation of employment policy;

(d) by specifying that the common economic institutions and the broad lines of economic policy must be conceived so as to give appropriate priority to the achievement or maintenance of a high level of employment;

(e) by increasing the involvement of the European Parliament and cooperation with the social partners in the drafting of the annual economic report and the report on the employment situation submitted to the European Council (Article 4(1));

(f) by clarifying the proposed procedure (Article 4(1) and (5));

(g) by clearly requiring the Council to react and make use of the instruments provided for by the Treaty in the event of rising or persistent unemployment;

17. Warns of the dangers which could arise if progress towards economic union were to lag too far behind the introduction of monetary union and an independent central bank;

Chapter 5 - Social provisions

18. Calls for the incorporation, in its entirety, of the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to Protocol No 14, and considers that there should be a detailed debate within the IGC on the substantive improvements to be made thereto;

19. Endorses the proposal by the Irish Government to introduce into the Treaty a provision enabling the Community to take direct steps to combat social exclusion;

20. Calls for the inclusion in the Treaty of an explicit reference to public services as one of the elements of the rights of citizens of the Union, with a view to strengthening economic and social cohesion and the protection of users; calls for such rights and objectives to be accompanied, with a view to their effective implementation, by a redefinition of the resources and powers of the Union's institutions;

Chapter 6 - Environment

21. Welcomes the proposed new references to sustainable development and to the fuller integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of a wide range of Community policies and activities;

Chapter 7 - Consumer policy

22. Welcomes the proposed new Article 129a as a further step towards the definition of a genuine consumer policy within the Treaty and believes that, as a last resort, this policy should become a common policy of the Union;

Chapter 7a - Tourism

23. Regrets the failure to include a specific reference to tourism and reiterates its view that tourism, in its European dimension, should form an independent and well-differentiated common policy with a legal basis and a chapter of its own in the revised Treaty;

Chapter 8 - Transparency

24. Considers that the Irish Presidency's draft text on transparency, while providing for certain improvements in this area, is still much too cautious and limited in scope:

(a) the proposed statement of the principle of openness in Article A of the TEU, while better than nothing, is much too weakly worded;

(b) the proposed right of access to documents is a positive development, as is the suggestion that general principles and limits governing the exercise of that right should be decided in accordance with the codecision procedure; such general principles should include the notion that access to documents is the normal rule, subject only to a few carefully defined exceptions, decided upon by a two-thirds qualified majority;

(c) the idea of the Council meeting in public in its legislative capacity needs to be properly established, so that at least the first discussion and the final decision are made in public;

(d) implementing rules should not be left to institutions' internal rules of procedure;

Chapter 9 - Subsidiarity

25. Reiterates its position that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as set out in Article 3b of the Treaty, should be properly upheld and applied;

SECTION III - AN EFFECTIVE AND COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY

Chapter 10 - The common foreign and security policy: objectives, means and structures

26. Welcomes the inclusion of an article on political solidarity, which should also include a clause on financial solidarity, and the specification of the objectives of the CFSP, particularly in respect of safeguarding the integrity of the Union;

27. Notes a declaration, to be included in the Final Act, concerning a new policy planning and early warning capability entailing, for the first time, the involvement of the WEU through the presence in the unit of some of its personnel and reiterates its request that this unit should be managed by the Commission in close cooperation with the Secretary-General of the Council;

28. Notes that the Irish Presidency's text is not such as to give the Union effective instruments for establishing a genuine CFSP and in particular has the serious weaknesses indicated below on which genuinely more detailed negotiations are needed:

(a) the member of the Commission responsible for the CFSP should represent the EU in the CFSP, in close cooperation with the Council Presidency;

(b) rejects the introduction of a new veto procedure in areas where qualified majority voting is already provided for; appropriate mechanisms should be set up to ensure that a Member State cannot unilaterally block any decision-making; recalls in this context the Italian document of 25 October 1996 and its general approach in favour of increased use of qualified majority voting in the decision-making process;

(c) the unilateral strengthening of the role of the Secretary-General of the Council is unacceptable; believes, however, that serious thought will need to be given to the idea of appointing an individual with a political background to be responsible for the CFSP but without any kind of responsibility within the general secretariat of the Council (the possibility of a Commissioner appointed according to special procedures and responsible to the Council could be envisaged);

(d) the proposal in the German non-paper of 6 June 1996 and the Italian document of 25 October 1996 that Article J.8 should be amended so as to introduce qualified majority voting as the basic rule and that when a Member State requests unanimity for a decision, the request may be rejected by a qualified majority, is a positive step; the possibility of constructive abstention is appropriate in view of the fact that the other Member States will benefit from political and financial solidarity in the application of the decisions taken;

(e) the conflict prevention capabilities of the EU should be better defined and strengthened; a policy of conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts should become a pillar of a common defence and security policy;

(f) it is unacceptable for operational expenditure to be deemed to be expenditure necessarily resulting from the Treaty within the meaning of Article 203 of the EC Treaty;

Chapter 11 - External economic relations

29. Considers that the measures proposed in the draft Treaty as regards external economic relations are far too limited in scope, in view of the weaknesses of the existing Treaty articles, and of the current entirely inadequate role of the European Parliament in this area;

30. Expresses its serious concern that the Presidency proposal to restrict the assent procedure to enlargements and to association agreements would actually lead to a reduction in the existing powers of the European Parliament pursuant to Article 228;

31. Reiterates its demand that Article 113 be split into an article providing a legal basis for acts of a legislative nature, on which the European Parliament would be involved in codecision, and an article providing a legal basis for international agreements, on which the European Parliament would be involved by means of assent;

32. Welcomes the Irish Presidency proposal to make the Commission the sole negotiator for multilateral agreements in the fields of services, intellectual property and direct foreign investment; insists, however, that the Council act by a qualified majority in this field and that the proposed declaration be modified to provide that the Commission would conduct negotiations with maximum transparency vis-à-vis the European Parliament as well as vis-à-vis Member States; considers, furthermore, that these principles must also be applied in respect of bilateral agreements in the aforementioned sectors;

Chapter 12 - Security and defence

33. Notes with satisfaction the demonstration of the political will to make practical progress in the area of defence; wonders, nevertheless, about the implications of any rapid moves towards integration on military and defence matters without simultaneous progress being made regarding the CFSP; notes that the Presidency document has the following positive aspects:

(a) it reformulates the objectives of the CFSP in the field of security and defence;

(b) it incorporates the objectives of the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty;

34. Calls for more detailed consideration of the following questions:

(a) the authority of the Union over the WEU should be clearly established and, as proposed in the Franco-German document, considers that the IGC should lay down definite target dates for certain stages in the ultimate integration of the WEU into the EU;

(b) a protocol, accession to which would be optional, setting out the current mutual defence commitments of full members of the WEU should be annexed to the Treaty;

(c) calls for a decision-making mechanism to be agreed on for issues with military implications that prevents decisions from being blocked without requiring every Member State to provide troops or equipment of its own;

(d) a common arms policy, including the control of manufacture and exports, as put forward by the Italian proposal, should be included as an objective of the CFSP, in connection with the strengthening of the security of the Union and its Member States;

Chapter 13 - Legal personality of the Union

35. Welcomes the incorporation of a new article into the TEU giving the Union legal personality; finds, nonetheless, that the procedure whereby the Council is to act unanimously to conclude agreements on behalf of the Union, after consulting the EP, is not acceptable;

36. Reiterates its position that all international agreements binding on the Community should be subject to assent;

SECTION IV - THE UNION'S INSTITUTIONS

General institutional issues

37. Again expresses its strong regret that the Presidency has not put forward formal Treaty texts, and in some cases not even possible options, as regards most of the key institutional issues facing the Conference; considers that, without satisfactory solutions to these problems, the IGC will have failed completely in its central tasks of increasing democracy and efficiency within the existing EU, and the whole process of further EU enlargement will have been endangered;

Chapter 14 - European Parliament

38. Considers, in this context, that the Irish Presidency text has made a few positive proposals in this regard but, nevertheless, has not adequately taken account of the need to reinforce democratic control at EU level:

(i) the text proposes extension of the codecision procedure on the basis of objective criteria rather than on a case-by-case basis, but does not draw the conclusion that the proposal to extend codecision to the entire area of standard secondary legislation as put forward by the Commission and Parliament is the only proposal on the table and should therefore be followed up;

(ii) the Presidency's text completely fails to tackle the issues of:

- the extension of the assent procedure to all constitutional issues such as reform of the Treaties, Article 235 and own resources, and also to all international agreements;

- the full attainment of budgetary codecision;

- an enhanced European Parliament role in the appointment of the President and Members of the Commission;

- a reinforced European Parliament role in nominations, with assent as regards appointment to the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors;

- the reform of the existing complex and insufficiently democratic and transparent system of commitology;

- the responsibilities of the European Parliament in deliberating on and evaluating policies;

39. Welcomes the Presidency's proposal to simplify the codecision procedure, which goes in the direction suggested by the European Parliament; considers, however, that it should be made clearer that, if the Council makes any changes to a text examined by the EP, the latter should always be given a second reading; believes, moreover, that the suggested time limits and the other issues such as the possible reduction in the size of delegations to the Conciliation Committee or an increase in the proportion of permanent members should be discussed jointly by the Council and Parliament with the aim of improving the efficiency of the conciliation procedure;

Chapter 15 - Council

40. Strongly regrets the fact that the Presidency, in spite of noting that a case-by-case approach is hardly likely to lead to satisfactory results, has failed to put forward specific proposals on extending qualified majority voting in the Council, such as for example its extension in principle to all standard secondary legislation;

41. Notes that the Presidency has strongly hinted that a dual majority voting system in the Council, whether of votes and population or of population and number of Member States, might be preferable to a simple reweighting of Council votes as the best solution to the problem of voting balance between larger and smaller Member States; calls for the concept of dual majorities to be clarified as soon as possible (i.e. which thresholds are applied to which issues);

Chapter 16 - Commission

42. Reiterates its position that at the present stage the number of members of the Commission must be at least equal to the number of Member States; notes that there is a consensus on strengthening the powers of the President of the Commission; insists that the role and independence of the Commission, and its right of initiative, must be maintained;

43. Warns against a certain tendency to strengthen the powers of the Council at the expense of the other institutions; reiterates, in this connection, its commitment to balance between the institutions and, more particularly, to the maintenance of the Commission's monopoly of the right of initiative in legislative matters; underlines, moreover, the need for the Commission to represent the Community within its terms of reference;

Chapter 17 - Court of Justice

44. Considers that the terms for referrals to the Court of Justice should be widened to enable the European Parliament to bring actions before the Court on the same terms as the Commission and the Council, and that the Court of Auditors, the ECB, the Committee of the Regions and the ESC should be able to bring actions before the Court when one of their rights is infringed; reiterates its request that judges of the Court of Justice should have a single non-renewable term of nine years as of their first appointment;

Chapter 18 - Other institutional issues - Budgetary procedures and control of fraud - Committee of the Regions

45. Strongly regrets that the EP's repeated requests for the unification of the budget and the simplification of budgetary procedures, as well as for the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and for the granting of assent by the EP on own resources decisions, have been completely ignored in the Presidency text, and that the European Parliament has been explicitly excluded from any meaningful role in the financing of the second and third pillars;

46. Calls for a strengthening of the Presidency proposal, which takes up a Danish Government proposal on the fight against fraud, particularly the prevention of irregularities in the management of Community funds and the punishment of offences which affect the financial interests of the Community;

47. Welcomes the proposal to delete Protocol No 16 on the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, so allowing the latter greater administrative autonomy; supports the proposal from the German delegation seeking to extend the areas in which the Committee of the Regions is consulted;

Chapter 19 - National parliaments

48. Affirms its support for the conclusions of the Dublin COSAC (Conference of bodies concerned with Community affairs in the parliaments of the European Community) meeting in October 1996;

49. Welcomes the inclusion of a new protocol on the role of national parliaments and the idea of more timely information being provided to national parliaments on Commission consultation documents and all proposals for legislation, including the introduction of a new four-week minimum period for national parliamentary examination of such texts;

50. Notes with concern that the Presidency's draft proposal goes much further than the COSAC's own conclusions in including a specific reference to COSAC in the declaration or a protocol, and fears that this could lead to the institutionalization of COSAC's role, a highly undesirable trend towards duplication of the role of the European Parliament and an undesirable institutionalization of such duplication; calls on the governments not to allow the national parliaments to be overridden on this issue, for example, in respect of restrictions on the subjects to be considered or of the form in which opinions are expressed and, instead, primarily to have regard to the ideas of the national parliaments themselves;

SECTION V - ENHANCED COOPERATION - 'FLEXIBILITY'

51. Declares that any decision on 'enhanced cooperation' has become a central issue at the IGC where it should be tackled clearly and without ambiguity and considers that this issue must be examined in detail, involving consideration of the role of the Commission, the decision-making process, the minimum number of participating Member States, the role of the EP and financial arrangements;

52. Is convinced that the procedure involving enhanced cooperation, which is currently under discussion and which would enable some Member States to go further than others (institutional flexibility), is highly problematic and requires more detailed discussion; takes the view that, if the institutional unity and the objectives of the European Union are not to be jeopardized, such a procedure must in any case always remain an exception and that the relevant arrangements for this procedure must be consistent with the decision-making procedures of the Community and the Union and transitional in nature and should, whatever happens, be accompanied by the requisite support measures for those Member States not taking part, so that all those states wishing to participate can do so within an acceptable period; any enhanced cooperation that may transpire, apart from respecting the principles already set out by the Florence European Council, must in no way jeopardize either the prerogatives of the Commission or the role and unique character of the EP;

SIMPLIFICATION OF THE TREATIES

53. Deems it essential for the work on simplifying the Treaties, taking into account the bestowal of legal personality on the Union, to result in a merger of the four Treaties (EU, EC, ECSC and Euratom), without jeopardizing the acquis communautaire;

54. Calls on the Netherlands Presidency to conduct the negotiations with the aim of providing, in the future Treaty, a satisfactory response to the objectives set out, and points out that enlargement should necessarily be preceded by an ambitious and far-reaching institutional reform;

55. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Commission and the other Community institutions.

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