Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

ISSN 1725-2431
## C 124 E
# Official Journal
#### of the European Union

**Volume 56**
##### English edition Information and Notices 30 April 2013

_Notice to reader_

This publication contains written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers
given by a European Union institution.
For each question and answer, the original language version is presented before a possible translation.
In some cases, it is possible that the answer is given in a language other than the question. This depends
on the working language of the committee requested to provide the answer.
These questions and answers are published in accordance with Rule 117 of the Rules of Procedure of
the European Parliament.
All questions and answers can be accessed via the website of the European Parliament (Europarl) under
the heading 'Parliamentary questions':
_http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html_

_ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR POLITICAL GROUPS_
PPE Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the
European Parliament
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
NI Non-attached Members

### **EN**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 1

IV

_(Notices)_

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES

AND AGENCIES

###### EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

**WRITTEN QUESTIONS WITH ANSWER**

**Written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given**

**by a European Union institution**

(2013/C 124 E/01)

**Contents** **Page**

**E-003170/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Increased persecution of journalists in Cuba

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 13
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 14

**E-003172/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Answers to parliamentary questions

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 16

**E-003173/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ International adoptions. Regional agencies — a model for the future of Parliament's resolution of
19 January 2011

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 17
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 18

**E-003174/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Africa: the green economy, lack of regulation and market failures

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 19
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 21

**E-003175/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Hepatitis in the ‘Health for growth 2014-2020’ programme

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 22
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 23

**E-003176/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Medicines prescribed ‘off-label’ and counterfeit medicines

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 24
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 25

C 124 E / 2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**E-003177/12** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Dried-up rivers

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 26
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 27

**E-003179/12** by Georgios Papastamkos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Price transparency in the food supply chain

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 28
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 29

**E-003181/12** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Farmers’ markets and organic food markets in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 30
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 31

**E-003182/12** by Syed Kamall to the Commission
_Subject:_ UK Bangladesh Business Council (UKBBC)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 32

**E-003183/12** by Norica Nicolai to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — The right of European military personnel to appeal to the EU Ombudsman

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 33
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 34

**E-003184/12** by Janusz Wojciechowski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Monoculture farms in the European Union

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 35
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 36

**E-003185/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Pressure from Brussels for ‘low-cost’ high-speed rail

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 37
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 38

**E-003186/12** by Edite Estrela to the Commission
_Subject:_ Funding for the high-speed rail project in Portugal

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 39
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 40

**E-003187/12** by Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ Working conditions for Portuguese researchers

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 41
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 42

**E-003188/12** by Anna Rosbach to the Commission
_Subject:_ The organic foods market

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 43
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 44

**E-003190/12** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Turkey's potential economic contribution to the EU

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 45

**E-003191/12** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS II

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 46

**E-003193/12** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 46

**E-003194/12** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS III

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 46

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 3

**E-003195/12** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ Genetically modified insects

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 47
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 48

**E-003196/12** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ South Tyrol autonomous status — answer to Written Question E‐010703/2011

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 49
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 50

**E-003198/12** by Georgios Toussas to the Commission
_Subject:_ Safety of human life at sea

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 51
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 53

**E-003199/12** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Attracting foreign investment to Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 55
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 56

**E-003200/12** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ The economic crisis and increase in cases of depression

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 57
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 58

**E-003201/12** by Charalampos Angourakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Repression of the protest movement of Aysen inhabitants

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 59
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 60

**E-003202/12** by Robert Sturdy to the Commission
_Subject:_ Effects of the ETS on global trade

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 61

**E-003206/12** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Dramatic events of 7 February 2012 in the Maldives: security forces allegedly grab power in a
coup d'état, forcing President Mohamed Nasheed to resign

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 62

**E-003207/12** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which in ‘special circumstances’, and allegedly in the
interest of public morality, allows rapists to marry their underage victims

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 63

**E-003211/12** by Sonia Alfano to the Commission
_Subject:_ Biomass combustion plant in Menfi (province of Agrigento): opposition of the population and local
authorities and shortcomings in the authorisation process

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 64
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 65

**E-003212/12** by Janusz Wojciechowski to the Council
_Subject:_ Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for Member States to restrict or
prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 66
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 67

**E-003213/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Developments regarding the EU‐Mercosur Agreement

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 68
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 70

**E-003214/12** by Rareş-Lucian Niculescu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Dangerous actions in the clearing of agricultural land

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 72
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 73

C 124 E / 4 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**E-003215/12** by Rareş-Lucian Niculescu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Romania's isoglucose quota

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 74
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 75

**E-003216/12** by Rareş-Lucian Niculescu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Armed attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse (France)

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 76
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 77

**E-003218/12** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Wine imports: possible tax increase and imposition of quotas

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 78
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 80

**E-003219/12** by Santiago Fisas Ayxela to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Schools

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 81
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 82

**E-003220/12** by Ana Miranda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Electricity tariffs in Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 83
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 84

**E-003222/12** by Andreas Mölzer to the Council
_Subject:_ Planned early warning mechanism in the Schengen Area

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 85
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 87

**E-003223/12** by Georgios Papastamkos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cohesion policy — Regional categorisation

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 89
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 90

**E-003225/12** by Georgios Papastamkos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cohesion policy and macro-fiscal conditionality

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 91
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 92

**E-003226/12** by Georgios Papastamkos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Combination of cohesion policy with the Europe 2020 initiative

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 93
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 94

**E-003227/12** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Principles and substance of social dialogue

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 95
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 96

**E-003228/12** by Charalampos Angourakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Criminal nature of waste management in the Attica region

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 97
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 98

**E-003229/12** by Linda McAvan to the Commission
_Subject:_ Windows 8 and smartphones — concern that Microsoft is abusing its dominant market position

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 99

**E-003230/12** by Linda McAvan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Gao Zhisheng and human rights in China

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 100

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 5

**E-003231/12** by Pino Arlacchi, Andrea Cozzolino, Frieda Brepoels, Ivo Vajgl, Oreste Rossi, Sabine Lösing, Raül
Romeva i Rueda, Willy Meyer, Keith Taylor, Ana Gomes, Helmut Scholz, Rui Tavares, Mariya Nedelcheva and
Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — UK military exports to Bahrain

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 101
Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 103
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 105
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 107

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 109

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 111
Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 112
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 113

**E-003234/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europe-wide recognition of university qualifications

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 114
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 116

**E-003235/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Knowledge Alliances between higher education institutions and enterprises

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 118
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 120

**E-003236/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ ACP-OMR regional cooperation

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 121
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 123

**E-003237/12** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Transnational cooperation between ORs and neighbouring countries under the 2014-2020 cohesion
policy

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 125
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 127

**P-003240/12** by Esther de Lange to the Commission
_Subject:_ Polish road salt in food

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 128
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 129

**E-003242/12** by Marietta Giannakou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Measures to sustain small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Member States hit by recession

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 130
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 131

**E-003244/12** by Mario Mauro to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — India: Catholic man burnt by Hindus

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 132
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 133

**E-003245/12** by Daciana Octavia Sârbu to the Commission
_Subject:_ The state of agricultural cooperatives and organisations

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 134
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 135

**E-003246/12** by Petru Constantin Luhan to the Commission
_Subject:_ Promoting the use of the ‘silver economy’ concept

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 136
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 137

**P-003247/12** by Ivo Belet to the Commission
_Subject:_ Recommendation on the National Reform Programme of Belgium

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 138
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 139

C 124 E / 6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**E-003250/12** by Jens Rohde to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implementation of the cross-compliance principle

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 140
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 141

**E-003251/12** by Jens Rohde to the Commission
_Subject:_ Intercalibration of water courses

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 142
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 143

**E-003252/12** by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cooperation and cohesion between Commission services on the Greek crisis issue

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 144
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 146

**E-003253/12** by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Poverty and drastic pension cuts

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 147
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 149

**E-003255/12** by Kriton Arsenis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Icelandic whaling activities are incompatible with EU legislation and accession criteria

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 151
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 152

**E-003256/12** by Anna Rosbach to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fiscal status of agricultural cooperatives in the EU

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 153
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 154

**E-003257/12** by Roger Helmer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Production and wholesale of electricity in Germany

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 155

**E-003259/12** by David Martin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Repatriation of North Koreans by the Chinese authorities

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 156

**E-003261/12** by Elisabetta Gardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sorbitol crisis

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 157
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 158

**E-003262/12** by Sergio Berlato to the Commission
_Subject:_ Potentially carcinogenic colouring in beverages

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 159
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 160

**E-003263/12** by Sergio Berlato to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bogus universities and the award of sham degrees

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 161
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 162

**E-003268/12** by Ana Miranda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fires in Galicia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 163
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 164

**E-003269/12** by Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă to the Commission
_Subject:_ Convergence of direct payments

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 165
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 166

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 7

**E-003270/12** by Daciana Octavia Sârbu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Daily iodine intake

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 167
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 168

**E-003271/12** by Sabine Wils to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of the Indect scanner at the European Football Championships in Poland

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 169
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 170

**P-003272/12** by Patrick Le Hyaric to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Additional protocol to the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement on
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 171
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 172

**E-003273/12** by Sabine Wils to the Commission
_Subject:_ Assessment and management of environmental noise — drafting of a noise action plan

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 173
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 174

**E-003274/12** by Nicole Sinclaire to the Commission
_Subject:_ Public procurement contracts

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 175

**E-003275/12** by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Escalation of terror in Nigeria

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 176
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 177

**E-003276/12** by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Imprisonment of political opponents in Belarus

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 178
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 179

**E-003278/12** by Lambert van Nistelrooij and Iosif Matula to the Commission
_Subject:_ Urban development platform

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 180

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 181
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 182

**P-003279/12** by Eva Lichtenberger to the Commission
_Subject:_ Action 64 of the Digital Agenda for Europe

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 183
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 184

**E-003280/12** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ Hundreds of child deaths each year due to consumption of ‘halal meat’

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 185
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 187

**E-003281/12** by Antigoni Papadopoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Articles in the Turkish press on the opening-up the sealed-off town of Famagusta (Ammochostos)

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 189
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 190

C 124 E / 8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**E-003282/12** by Dominique Vlasto, Gaston Franco, Jean-Pierre Audy, Jan Březina, Pilar del Castillo Vera,
Françoise Grossetête, Jolanta Emilia Hibner, Herbert Reul, Michel Dantin, Christian Ehler, Jean Roatta, MarianJean Marinescu, Damien Abad, Vladimir Urutchev, Romana Jordan and Amalia Sartori to the Commission
_Subject:_ Funding of ITER from 2014 to 2020

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 191
Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 193
České znění ........................................................................................................................................................................ 195
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 197
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 199
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 201
Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 203
Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 205

Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 207
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 209

**E-003283/12** by Glenis Willmott and Brian Simpson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Enforcement of animal welfare directives

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 211

**E-003284/12** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Anti-dumping duties (ADD)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 212

**E-003285/12** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of red diesel as fuel for propelling private pleasure craft in UK and EU waters

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 213

**E-003286/12** by Graham Watson to the Commission
_Subject:_ VAT exemptions and air ambulances

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 214

**E-003287/12** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Intra-Community supplies

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 215

**E-003288/12** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Intra-Community supply

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 215

**E-003289/12** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Intra-Community supplies

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 216

**E-003293/12** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ The number of people seeking asylum in the EU has risen sharply

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 217
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 218

**E-003295/12** by Petru Constantin Luhan to the Commission
_Subject:_ Autism awareness and education

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 219
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 220

**E-003296/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Increased levels of pollen in the atmosphere

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 221
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 222

**E-003297/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Death penalty and European initiative for democracy and human rights

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 223
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 224

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 9

**E-003298/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Direct funding programmes — Palio dei Capatosta

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 225
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 226

**E-003299/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Crisis for fishing fleets

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 227
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 229

**E-003300/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Abolition of the death penalty

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 230
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 231

**E-003301/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ Venice and the risk of it disappearing

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 232
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 233

**E-003302/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Suicide attack in Pakistan

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 234
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 235

**E-003303/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ The new Hyst technology

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 236
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 238

**E-003304/12** by Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris to the Commission
_Subject:_ New research into water filter jugs

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 240
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 242

**E-003529/12** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Filter systems for domestic use: official position of the Italian Ministry of Health

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 240
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 242

**P-003305/12** by Jutta Steinruck to the Commission
_Subject:_ Working time arrangements for members of the voluntary fire service

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 244
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 245

**E-003306/12** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Border controls

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 246
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 247

**E-003307/12** by Antolín Sánchez Presedo to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 248
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 249

**E-003308/12** by Antolín Sánchez Presedo to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) inspections of European projects being carried out by the Orense
Provincial Government

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 250
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 251

**E-003310/12** by Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg to the Commission
_Subject:_ ACTA referral to the European Court of Justice

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 252
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 253

C 124 E / 10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**E-003311/12** by Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU foreign aid

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 254
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 255

**E-003312/12** by Struan Stevenson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Virunga National Park

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 256

**E-003313/12** by John Attard-Montalto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Treatment of EU GPs in Malta

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 257

**E-003314/12** by Fiorello Provera to the Commission
_Subject:_ Revision of Morocco's penal code

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 258
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 260

**E-003315/12** by Fiorello Provera to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Catholic nuns targeted in Egypt's Aswan Province

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 262
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 263

**E-003316/12** by Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — The case of Boghdan Danylyshyn

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 264

**E-003317/12** by Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — The repatriation by China of North Korean refugees

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 265

**E-003318/12** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Situation in Iran with regard to Pastor Nadarkhani

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 266

**E-003319/12** by David Martin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Pollution in Lake Koka (Ethiopia)

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 267

**E-003321/12** by Roberta Angelilli to the Commission
_Subject:_ Possible funding for constructing a service station in the vicinity of the industrial zone of Piedimonte San
Germano in the province of Frosinone

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 268
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 269

**E-003324/12** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ Taranis 2013 — international civil protection exercises: co-financing by the EU

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 270
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 271

**E-003325/12** by Franz Obermayr to the Commission
_Subject:_ SWIFT agreement leads to the disclosure of sensitive private bank data

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 272
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 273

**E-003327/12** by Åsa Westlund to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Integration of climate change issues into foreign policy

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 274
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 275

**E-003328/12** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ New NSRF guarantee fund in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 276
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 278

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 11

**E-003329/12** by Konstantinos Poupakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Greek bureaucracy as an obstacle to entrepreneurial activity

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 280
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 282

**E-003330/12** by Paweł Zalewski to the Commission
_Subject:_ The impact of the free trade agreement with South Korea on the economies of EU countries

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 284
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 285

**E-003331/12** by Paweł Zalewski to the Commission
_Subject:_ The impact of the free trade agreements with Central American countries, Mercosur, Peru and Colombia
on the economies of EU countries

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 286
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 287

**E-003334/12** by Rareş-Lucian Niculescu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Toxicity of fruit and vegetables produced in Turkey

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 288
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 289

**P-003337/12** by Horst Schnellhardt to the Commission
_Subject:_ Recognition of the qualifications of veterinary surgeons in Canada

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 290
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 291

**P-003338/12** by Marek Henryk Migalski to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Sergei Magnitsky case

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 292
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 293

**E-003339/12** by Bas Eickhout to the Commission
_Subject:_ Article 10c of the Emissions Trading Scheme Directive

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 294
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 296

**E-003340/12** by Horst Schnellhardt to the Commission
_Subject:_ Export of poultry meat to Africa

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 298
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 299

**E-003341/12** by Sabine Wils to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Commission encourages research into new monitoring systems

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 300
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 301

**E-003342/12** by Nikolaos Salavrakos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Provocative declarations by Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu in view of the Cypriot Presidency of the
EU

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 302
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 303

**E-003343/12** by Marek Henryk Migalski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sergei Magnitsky case

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 304
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 305

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 13

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003170/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Aumento delle persecuzioni di giornalisti a Cuba

Negli ultimi mesi, a Cuba, il numero di giornalisti, attivisti e blogger perseguitati e detenuti è aumentato
profondamente. Gli attivisti per i diritti umani e i giornalisti indipendenti sono trattenuti per periodi che variano dalle
poche ore ad alcuni giorni, nelle stazioni di polizia come nei centri di detenzione. In questi luoghi spesso subiscono
intimidazioni, minacce e azioni pubbliche di ripudio. In molti casi, le autorità non informano le famiglie sulle ragioni
dell'arresto o sul luogo di detenzione dei loro cari.

Le tattiche sono cambiate ma la repressione è forte come sempre, tanto che, dopo i rilasci di massa dei prigionieri di
coscienza nel 2011, le autorità hanno affilato la loro strategia per assicurarsi il silenzio dei giornalisti. Le autorità
cubane non tollerano alcuna critica alle politiche di stato al di fuori degli spazi internazionali che sono sotto il
controllo del governo e nessuna organizzazione politica o per i diritti umani può ottenere il riconoscimento legale.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, si interroga il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per sapere:

1. se è a conoscenza della situazione dei giornalisti a Cuba,

2. quali azioni ha intenzione di intraprendere per ridurre i casi riscontrati a Cuba e quali misure si intendono
adottare in futuro per garantire agli attivisti di svolgere il proprio lavoro senza timore di rappresaglie.

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(11 giugno 2012)_

1. L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è al corrente della situazione menzionata.

2. La delegazione dell'UE all'Avana, insieme ai capimissione dell'UE, segue attentamente la situazione dei diritti
umani a Cuba ed è in contatto con i rappresentanti dell'opposizione pacifica nel paese. I diritti umani e le libertà
fondamentali sono al centro delle relazioni dell'UE con i paesi terzi, tra cui Cuba. L'UE ha ribadito in più occasioni
l'importanza che le autorità cubane continuino a progredire verso il pieno rispetto di tutti i diritti civili e politici della
popolazione cubana, tra cui la libertà di espressione e di riunione.

C 124 E / 14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003170/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Increased persecution of journalists in Cuba

In Cuba in recent months, the number of journalists, activists and bloggers being persecuted and detained has risen
significantly. Human rights activists and freelance journalists are held for periods ranging from a few hours to several
days, both at police stations and detention centres. They often suffer intimidation, threats and public acts of
repudiation at these places. In many cases, the authorities do not inform the families as to why their loved ones have
been arrested or where they are being held.

The tactics have changed but the repression is as strong as ever so, after the mass release of prisoners of conscience in
2011, the authorities honed their strategy to ensure that journalists were gagged. The Cuban authorities do not
tolerate any criticism of state policies outside international areas under the government’s control, and no political or
human rights organisation can obtain legal recognition.

In light of the above, I would ask the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. whether she is aware of the situation of journalists in Cuba;

2. what action she intends to take to reduce the number of such cases in Cuba and what measures are planned for
the future to guarantee that activists can work without fear of reprisals?

**Answer given by High Representative /Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 June 2012)_

1. The HR/VP is aware of the situation mentionned.

2. The EU delegation in Havana, together with the EU Heads of Mission, monitors the human rights' situation in
Cuba and is in contact with representatives of the peaceful opposition in the country. Human rights and fundamental
freedoms are at the core of EU relations with third countries, including Cuba. The EU has reiterated on several
occasions the importance for the Cuban authorities to continue to make progress towards full respect of all political
and civil rights for the Cuban people, including freedom of expression and assembly.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 15

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003172/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Risposte alle interrogazioni parlamentari

Le interrogazioni parlamentari sono uno strumento importante per il controllo democratico delle istituzioni europee,
anche se rappresentano un notevole costo che la Commissione non ha mai rivelato. Il numero delle interrogazioni
parlamentari è aumentato negli ultimi anni. Se nella legislatura 2004-2009 si presentavano circa 6.000
interrogazioni all'anno, nella presente legislatura il numero è raddoppiato. Nel 2011 i deputati al Parlamento europeo
hanno presentato 12.094 interrogazioni.

Un quotidiano ha recentemente trattato l'argomento affermando che, se il costo di ogni interrogazione parlamentare
fosse pari a 600 euro (stima effettuata al ribasso), allora l'impegno economico della Commissione sarebbe di 7,3
milioni di euro l'anno. Se consideriamo la stima al rialzo, vale a dire 1.400 euro per ogni interrogazione presentata, la
Commissione spenderebbe circa 16,9 milioni di euro l'anno.

Considerato che le interrogazioni parlamentari permettono ai deputati europei di effettuare un controllo democratico
e di chiedere delucidazioni su determinati argomenti in tempi ben precisi, chiedo all'Alto Rappresentante di riferire
sul notevole ritardo con il quale risponde alle interrogazioni scritte, anche se prioritarie, con particolare riferimento
alla mia interrogazione P-009924/2011, che ha ottenuto risposta dopo 5 mesi dalla data di invio.

**Risposta data dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(21 maggio 2012)_

La Commissione concorda sul fatto che le interrogazioni parlamentari sono un importante strumento per il controllo
democratico delle istituzioni europee. Come l'onorevole parlamentare ci segnala, il numero delle interrogazioni
parlamentari ricevute annualmente è aumentato considerevolmente e i costi amministrativi sostenuti per rispondere a
tali interrogazioni sono elevati. Pertanto, benché la Commissione si adoperi per rispondere a tutte le interrogazioni
entro tempi ragionevoli, talvolta la limitatezza delle risorse può purtroppo determinare il verificarsi di ritardi.

C 124 E / 16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003172/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Answers to parliamentary questions

Parliamentary questions are an important means of exercising democratic scrutiny of the European institutions, even
though they generate significant costs, the volume of which the Commission has never revealed. The number of
parliamentary questions has increased in recent years. Whereas during the 2004-2009 parliamentary term
approximately 6000 questions were submitted each year, during the current term the number has doubled. In 2011,
Members of the European Parliament submitted 12 094 questions.

A daily newspaper recently examined this issue and argued that, if the cost of each parliamentary question were to be
put at EUR 600 (a conservative estimate), then the Commission would be spending EUR 7.3 million per year. If we
take a higher estimate, namely EUR 1 400 for every question submitted, the Commission would be spending
approximately EUR 16.9 million per year.

Given that parliamentary questions enable MEPs to exercise democratic scrutiny and to ask for clarifications on
specific issues by set deadlines, can the High Representative comment on the considerable delay with which she
answers written questions, even high-priority ones, with particular reference to my Question P‐009924/2011, which
was answered five months after the date on which it was sent?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

The Commission agrees that parliamentary questions are an important means of exercising democratic scrutiny of
the European institutions. As the Honourable Member notes, the number of parliamentary questions received
annually has increased substantially and the administrative cost associated with responding to these questions is high.
Consequently, while the Commission endeavours to respond to all questions within a reasonable timeframe, resource
constraints may unfortunately result in delays occurring from time to time.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 17

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003173/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Adozioni internazionali: le Agenzie regionali un modello per il futuro della risoluzione del 19 gennaio 2011

L'adozione internazionale costituisce un tassello importante nella cooperazione transfrontaliera tra i vari paesi; al
riguardo, il Parlamento europeo ha già chiesto alla Commissione di coordinare a livello europeo le strategie in materia
di adozione internazionale, conformemente alle convenzioni internazionali, al fine di migliorare l'assistenza nei
servizi di informazione, la preparazione per l'adozione internazionale, il trattamento delle procedure di candidatura
all’adozione internazionale e i servizi post-adozione.

In questa visione, il supporto concreto delle istituzioni europee all'attività degli enti locali autorizzati impegnati nei
diversi paesi, potrebbe arrivare non solo attraverso la stipulazione di convenzioni con le rappresentanze di ogni Stato
membro all'estero, ma anche attraverso la predisposizione di canali di finanziamento che consentano di promuovere
e sviluppare modelli organizzativi regionali (o locali) a supporto della loro sostenibilità economica per i servizi resi
dagli enti autorizzati che si occupano di seguire il percorso pre e post-adozione.

Considerando che in Italia sono ancora poche le Regioni (Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d'Aosta) che vi hanno fatto
ricorso, il modello organizzativo delle Agenzie territoriali o regionali potrebbe essere adottato anche in altre regioni
fra i vari Stati membri, in quanto consentirebbe di utilizzare l'esperienza e la professionalità di questi organismi
pubblici garantendo una maggiore trasparenza nelle procedure di adozione ed una diminuzione di parte dei costi a
carico delle coppie adottanti.

Alla luce della risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 19 gennaio del 2011, può la Commissione:

1. riferire sulle iniziative e sulle modalità di coordinamento che le istituzioni comunitarie intendono attuare per
garantire trasparenza e maggiore coordinamento nelle strategie relative all'adozione internazionale?

2. precisare se i modelli di cooperazione regionale, nonché l'istituzione di Agenzie regionali sviluppate in Italia
possa rappresentare una best practice da promuovere e finanziare?

**Risposta data da Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2012)_

L’adozione internazionale non è disciplinata a livello di Unione europea. Sul piano internazionale, la Commissione
sostiene la corretta attuazione della convenzione dell’Aia del 1993 sulla Protezione dei minori e cooperazione in
materia di adozione internazionale, partecipando regolarmente alle commissioni speciali organizzate nell’ambito
della Conferenza dell’Aia e incoraggiando i paesi terzi a ratificare la convenzione al fine di rafforzare la cooperazione
internazionale in questo settore.

Dal momento che la convenzione dell’Aia del 1993 si applica anche alle adozioni tra Stati membri, la Commissione
non prevede di proporre misure legislative specifiche.

Conformemente agli articoli 10 e 11 della convenzione, un organismo abilitato è solitamente un’agenzia privata per
l’adozione che ha portato a termine una procedura di abilitazione o di autorizzazione.

L’autorità centrale italiana istituita ai sensi della convenzione ha quasi integralmente delegato ad organismi abilitati la
responsabilità dell’intermediazione, delle relazioni con i paesi stranieri e delle attività all’estero per l’adozione da parte
di coppie italiane.

Solo gli Stati membri sono parti alla convenzione dell’Aia del 1993, per cui l’Italia è l’unica responsabile della
regolamentazione dei propri organismi abilitati.

Indicazioni utili sulle migliori pratiche in questo settore possono essere trovate nella guida n. 2 alla convenzione
dell’Aia del 1993: «Abilitazione e organismi abilitati per l'adozione: principi generali e guida alle buone prassi» che
sarà a breve pubblicata sul sito web della Conferenza dell'Aia: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?.

C 124 E / 18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003173/12**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ International adoptions. Regional agencies — a model for the future of Parliament's resolution of
19 January 2011

International adoption is an important element in cross-border cooperation between various countries; in view of
this, the European Parliament has already asked the Commission to coordinate international adoption strategies at
European level, in accordance with international conventions, in order to improve assistance in information services,
preparation for international adoption, the processing of applications for international adoption and post-adoption
services.

As part of this approach, the European institutions could provide specific support for the activities of the local
authorised bodies with responsibility for this area in the various countries. They could do so not only by concluding
agreements with the representations of each Member State abroad, but also by establishing funding channels to
promote and develop regional (or local) organisational models, in support of their economic sustainability, for the
services rendered by the authorised bodies that supervise the pre-and post-adoption process.

Since there are still few regions in Italy (Piedmont, Liguria and Valle d’Aosta) that have established such models, the
organisational model of the territorial or regional agencies could also be adopted in other regions in the various
Member States. This would make it possible to benefit from the experience and professionalism of these public
bodies, ensuring greater transparency in adoption procedures and a decrease in the costs to be borne by adoptive
couples.

In view of the European Parliament’s resolution of 19 January 2011:

1. Could the Commission comment on the initiatives and coordination methods that the EU institutions intend to
implement to ensure transparency and better coordination of international adoption strategies?

2. Could it also say whether the regional cooperation models, and the institution of regional agencies as
developed in Italy, could be considered a form of best practice that should be promoted and financed?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

International adoption is not regulated at EU level. At international level, the Commission supports the correct
implementation of the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption by participating on a regular basis to the Special Commissions organised in the context of the
Hague Conference and encourages third countries to become parties to the Convention with a view to strengthening
international cooperation in this matter.

As the 1993 Hague Convention applies also to adoptions between Member States, the Commission does not envisage
proposing specific legislative measures.

In accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, an accredited body is usually a private adoption agency
which has been through a process of accreditation or licensing.

The Italian Central Authority established under the Convention has almost totally delegated to the accredited bodies
the responsibility for intermediation and for relations with foreign countries and activities abroad for adoption by
Italian couples.

Only Member States are Party to the 1993 Hague Convention, therefore Italy has the sole responsibility for the
regulation of its accredited bodies.

Useful guidance on best practise in this field may be found in the Guide No 2 under the 1993 Hague Convention of
29 May 1993: ‘Accreditation and adoption accredited bodies: general principles and guide to good practice’ which
will be published shortly on the website of the Hague Conference: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 19

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003174/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Africa: tra green economy, scarsa regolamentazione e market failures

Nell'ambito delle politiche energetiche UE 2020, il controllo diretto delle coltivazioni di jatropha in Africa è una
scelta strategica, seguita dai più importanti produttori internazionali di energia pulita e sostenuta da un dato
fondamentale: il biodiesel rappresenterà in futuro il 71 % delle importazioni agro-energetiche UE.

Un esempio: la Tanzania «rischia» di diventare uno dei principali produttori di biocarburanti in Africa, con una
superficie coltivabile di 29,4 milioni di ettari (pari a un terzo del suo territorio). Il governo ha provveduto a firmare
concessioni per oltre 400 mila ettari, un terzo dei quali concentrati nelle mani di investitori europei dedicati alla
produzione della jatropha e canna da zucchero per il bioetanolo.

In Africa sono 15 i governi che hanno firmato il cosiddetto _Green Opec_, l'accordo che promuove la produzione e l'uso
locale dei biocarburanti per ridurre le importazioni di petrolio. L'obiettivo è raccogliere risparmi da reinvestire nel
rafforzamento dell'agricoltura locale e dell'autosufficienza alimentare. Tuttavia l'assenza di regolamentazione e di
linee guida nazionali coerenti con le politiche pubbliche rischia di vanificare tale obiettivo; non sono previsti obblighi
per gli investitori stranieri di riservare parte della produzione al mercato locale, né permessi per la costruzione di
raffinerie. Il caso, purtroppo non isolato, della Tanzania dimostra come la spinta all'export degli investitori e gli
obiettivi di sviluppo locale si trovino in collisione.

L'attuale procedura di espropriazione dei terreni di proprietà dei villaggi prevede che la terra collettiva, per essere
affittata ad un privato — in cambio di minime _royalties_ o di manodopera — debba prima essere trasferita al governo
centrale, unico proprietario e titolare dei diritti di concessione con gli investitori. Per di più, gli standard sociali
prescritti dal governo non hanno alcun valore legale. L'impatto dei fallimenti dei progetti d'investimento sui mezzi di
sussistenza delle comunità locali è uno dei maggiori rischi dell'espansione dell'agro-energia. La soluzione dovrebbe
essere un'altra: salvare la reputazione e contenere i rischi economici, puntando sui progetti locali.

Chiedo, pertanto, alla Commissione come intenda finanziare maggiormente i progetti su scala ridotta nell'ambito del
programma di sostegno energetico per l'Africa e se intenda definire standard obbligatori per garantire la sostenibilità
sociale, in modo da fornire adeguata disciplina e regolamentazione alla governance di tali progetti.

**Risposta data da Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione**

_(21 maggio 2012)_

La Commissione riconosce l’importanza di migliorare l’accesso a servizi energetici sostenibili al fine di ridurre la
povertà e contribuire al raggiungimento degli obiettivi di sviluppo del millennio. Ciò è stato recentemente ribadito in
occasione del vertice UE sull’iniziativa dell’ONU «Energia sostenibile per tutti» ( [1] ), il cui obiettivo è l’accesso universale
ai servizi energetici entro il 2030. In tal senso, l’utilizzo sostenibile delle risorse energetiche rinnovabili è
fondamentale. Tra queste risorse, i biocarburanti sono particolarmente indicati per le aree rurali se vengono prodotti
in maniera sostenibile e usati localmente.

Non sono tuttavia previsti programmi specifici dell’Unione europea che riguardino esclusivamente i biocarburanti,
dal momento che la cooperazione allo sviluppo si concentra essenzialmente sui bisogni delle singole popolazioni e
non sulle specifiche tecnologie. Attualmente, il principale strumento di finanziamento dell’Unione europea che
potrebbe essere utilizzato per elaborare progetti su scala ridotta per i biocarburanti in Africa è lo strumento ACP-UE
per l’energia, che si prefigge di migliorare l’accesso ai servizi energetici nelle aree rurali e periurbane con la prospettiva
di eliminare la povertà. I finanziamenti sono generalmente concessi in base a inviti a presentare proposte e sono
erogabili anche per i progetti riguardanti i biocarburanti, a condizione che rispettino alcuni requisiti minimi ( [2] ). In
particolare, i biocarburanti prodotti devono essere usati localmente per contribuire a migliorare l’accesso ai servizi
energetici. I progetti devono inoltre essere conformi a tutte le leggi applicabili nel paese in cui vengono attuati e
rispettare i diritti fondiari, umani, sociali e dei lavoratori. La produzione di biocarburanti non deve infine mettere a
repentaglio la sicurezza alimentare.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Si veda http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/documents/biofuels_position_paper_en.pdf

C 124 E / 20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Dal 2007 con questo strumento sono stati cofinanziati 16 progetti, tuttora in corso, sui biocarburanti a uso locale.
Sempre nel quadro dello strumento per l’energia, è previsto un nuovo invito a presentare proposte entro la fine del
2012 per progetti sull’accesso ai servizi energetici, tra cui anche quelli sui biocarburanti sostenibili a uso locale.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 21

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003174/12**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Africa: the green economy, lack of regulation and market failures

With regard to the EU 2020 energy policies, direct control of jatropha crops in Africa is a strategic choice that has
been adopted by the largest international clean energy producers and is backed up by a fundamental fact: in the
future, biodiesel will account for 71 % of EU agro-energy imports.

One example is Tanzania, which ‘risks’ becoming one of the main biofuel producers in Africa, with 29.4 million
hectares suitable for farming (equal to a third of its territory). The government has signed agreements for a further
400 000 hectares, a third of which are concentrated in the hands of European investors producing jatropha and
sugarcane for bioethanol.

In Africa, 15 governments have signed the ‘Green OPEC’ agreement, which promotes local production and use of
biofuels in order to reduce oil imports. The aim is to make savings that can be reinvested in boosting local agriculture
and self-sufficiency in food. However, the lack of regulation and national guidelines consistent with public policies is
likely to frustrate that objective; no obligations have been imposed on foreign investors to reserve a part of their
production for the local market and no provision has been made for refinery construction permits. The case of
Tanzania, which is unfortunately not an isolated example, demonstrates how investors’ focus on exports clashes with
local development objectives.

The current procedure of expropriating land that belongs to villages provides that in order for collective land to be
leased to a private entity — in exchange for minimal royalties or labour — it must first be transferred to central
government, which is the sole proprietor and holder of royalty agreements with investors. Moreover, the social
standards laid down by the government have no legal force. The impact of failures of investment projects on local
communities’ livelihoods is one of the main risks inherent in agro-energy expansion. The solution lies elsewhere —
reputations could be salvaged and economic risks contained by focusing on local projects.

Can the Commission therefore say how it intends to provide more finance to smaller-scale projects under the energy
support programme for Africa and whether it intends to lay down mandatory standards to guarantee social
sustainability, so as to provide adequate rules and regulations for the governance of these projects?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

The Commission recognises the importance of increasing access to sustainable energy services in order to reduce
poverty and contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. This has been recalled recently at
the occasion of the EU summit for the UN initiative ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ ( [1] ) whose objective is notably reaching
universal access to energy services by 2030. The utilization of renewable energy sources in a sustainable fashion is
pivotal. Among these sources, biofuels are particularly suited to rural areas if produced in a sustainable manner and
used locally.

However, no specific EU programme targeting exclusively biofuels is foreseen, since the focus of development
cooperation is on the needs of a given population and not on a specific technology. The current main EU financing
instrument that could be utilized to develop small-scale biofuel projects for local use in Africa is the ACP-EU Energy
Facility. Its objective is to increase access to energy services in rural and peri-urban areas in a perspective of poverty
eradication. Grants are mainly provided through Calls for Proposals, under which biofuel projects only are eligible as
far as they respect some minimum criteria ( [2] ). In particular, the biofuels produced should be used locally to contribute
to increase access to energy services. It should follow all applicable laws of the country in which they occur, should
respect land rights, human rights, social and labour rights. Biofuel production should not impair food security.

16 biofuel projects for local use were co-financed from 2007 in this framework and are still ongoing. It is intended to
have by the end of 2012 a new Call for proposals of the Energy Facility for energy access projects, including
sustainable biofuel projects for local use.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/documents/biofuels_position_paper_en.pdf

C 124 E / 22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003175/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Epatite nel programma Salute per la crescita 2014-2020

Il 9 novembre 2011 la Commissione ha adottato una proposta legislativa riguardante il terzo programma pluriennale
Salute per la crescita (2014-2020). Il nuovo programma intende affrontare le sfide economiche e demografiche che
interessano i sistemi sanitari degli Stati membri.

L'obiettivo è quello di garantire maggior benessere ai cittadini europei ed un invecchiamento attivo e di qualità. 446
milioni di euro finanzieranno molteplici tipologie di progetti dal 2014 al 2020.

L'Associazione europea a difesa dei pazienti malati di fegato (ELPA) denuncia con grande dispiacere la mancanza
dell'epatite virale B e C nella lista dei fattori di rischio come alcool, fumo, obesità ed HIV che la strategia europea
intende affrontare. Uno studio della suddetta associazione rivela che il 78 % dei malati di epatite ignorava del tutto
l'esistenza di questa malattia prima di contrarla. Inoltre, ELPA denuncia la poca informazione dello staff medico sul
virus dell'epatite e rivela che le persone affette da tumore al fegato nella maggior parte dei casi hanno sofferto in
precedenza di epatite B o C. Circa 600 000 persone affette dal virus dell'epatite B e circa 350 000 pazienti malati di
epatite C muoiono ogni anno a causa della patologia e delle sue conseguenze dirette.

L'epatite è una patologia che può essere curata con determinati approcci sanitari. Tuttavia, l'attenzione data alla
malattia varia moltissimo nei diversi Stati membri dell'Unione europea e differisce in termini di prevenzione, diagnosi
e accesso ai trattamenti.

Considerato che l'Europa auspica un maggior coordinamento comune in materia sanitaria per proteggere i cittadini,
ma che l'epatite non è considerata tra i rischi maggiori per la salute dell'uomo, può la Commissione precisare per
quale motivo non ha inserito tale patologia nella lista del nuovo programma pluriennale e se intende adottare una
strategia specifica per combatterla?

**Risposta data da John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

_(4 maggio 2012)_

Le epatiti A, B e C figurano sull'elenco di malattie coperte dal sistema di sorveglianza epidemiologica su scala
dell'Unione europea istituito con decisione 2119/98/CE ( [1] ).

Le azioni legate alla prevenzione e al controllo dell'epatite rientrano già pertanto nell'azione 4.4 della proposta della
Commissione relativa al programma Salute per la crescita che fa riferimento a «Azioni necessarie o utili al
raggiungimento degli obiettivi della legislazione di settore dell'UE in ambiti quali le malattie trasmissibili e altre
minacce sanitarie […]. Tale azione può includere attività volte a garantire l'attuazione, l'applicazione, il monitoraggio
e il riesame di tale legislazione».

La Commissione ha chiesto al Centro europeo per la prevenzione e il controllo delle malattie (ECDC) di realizzare una
serie di progetti e di studi in merito all'epatite B e C. Quale risposta, l'ECDC ha pubblicato una prima serie di
rapporti ( [2] ) e sono state identificate attività addizionali ora in corso di attuazione.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Decisione n. 2119/98/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 24 settembre 1998, che istituisce una rete di sorveglianza epidemiologica e

di controllo delle malattie trasmissibili nell'UE, GU L 268 del 03.10.1998, pag. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_C/Pages/index.aspx.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 23

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003175/12**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Hepatitis in the ‘Health for growth 2014-2020’ programme

On 9 November 2011, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal on the third multiannual ‘Health for growth’
programme (2014-2020). The new programme is designed to tackle the economic and demographic challenges
facing the Member States’ healthcare systems.

The objective is to ensure a higher level of well-being for European citizens and active, healthy ageing. The
programme’s budget of EUR 446 million will be used to fund many types of projects over the period from 2014 to
2020.

The European Liver Patients Association (ELPA) has strongly criticised the fact that viral hepatitis B and C have not
been included on the list of risk factors, such as alcohol consumption, smoking, obesity and HIV, which the European
strategy is designed to tackle. A study by the association has shown that 78 % of liver patients were totally unaware of
the existence of the disease before contracting it. In addition, ELPA condemns the low level of knowledge among
medical staff about the hepatitis virus and points out that a majority of patients with liver tumours previously suffered
from hepatitis B or C. Approximately 600 000 people with hepatitis B and approximately 350 000 with hepatitis C
die every year as a result of the disease and its immediate side effects.

Hepatitis is a disease for which there are specific treatments. However, the degree of attention paid to it varies hugely
from one Member State to another and there are differences in terms of prevention, diagnosis and access to treatment.

Europe is hoping to achieve closer coordination on healthcare matters, in order to protect its citizens, but hepatitis is
not being treated as a major public health risk. Can the Commission say why it has not included the disease in the list
of risk factors which forms part of the new multiannual programme, and whether it intends to adopt a specific
strategy to combat it?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

Hepatitis A, B and C are among the list of diseases covered by the European Union wide epidemiological surveillance
system of communicable diseases as set up by Decision 2119/98/EC ( [1] ).

Actions related to the prevention and control of hepatitis are therefore already covered by action 4.4 of the
Commission proposal for the Health for Growth programme which refers to ‘Actions required by or contributing to
the implementation of Union legislation in the fields of communicable diseases and other health threats. Such action
may include activities aimed at ensuring the implementation, application, monitoring and review of that legislation’.

The Commission requested the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) to perform a series of
projects and studies on Hepatitis B and C. In response, the ECDC published a first set of reports ( [2] ) and additional
activities have been identified which are currently being implemented.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Decision No 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 setting up a network for the epidemiological

surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community, OJ L 268/1, 3.10.1998, p. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_C/Pages/index.aspx.

( **|**

C 124 E / 24 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003176/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Farmaci «senza etichetta» e contraffatti

I farmaci dovrebbero essere uno dei prodotti più controllati al mondo. Rigide regolamentazioni permettono oggi ai
pazienti di ottenere le cure necessarie tramite medicine testate e immesse sul mercato dopo il rilascio di un'apposita
licenza.

Tuttavia, spesso vi sono casi di pazienti colpiti da gravi effetti collaterali a seguito della somministrazione di un
farmaco che non dispone di licenza. Purtroppo, un medicinale falso può causare danni molto più gravi di quanto si

possa pensare.

A gennaio 2011 è stato pubblicato uno studio che dimostra che il 45-60 % dei farmaci prescritti ai bambini sono
«senza etichetta» o non autorizzati. In Francia un medicinale contro l'obesità è stato utilizzato da moltissimi diabetici
prima di essere ritirato per aver causato circa 500 decessi.

Quanto detto dimostra che, nonostante i controlli e le regole imposte alle case farmaceutiche, ancora oggi circolano
sul mercato europeo numerosi farmaci contraffatti o non autorizzati che danneggiano la salute dei cittadini. Molto
spesso tali medicinali vengono preferiti ad altri farmaci regolarmente autorizzati in quanto sono molto più
economici. Tuttavia, il risparmio economico provoca gravi rischi per la salute di chi li assume.

Considerato che, sebbene la legislazione europea sull'argomento sia molto chiara, non sono rari i casi di
ospedalizzazione o di morte a seguito dell'assunzione di medicine non autorizzate, può la Commissione indicare
quali sono le strategie per proteggere i cittadini europei dai rischi di tali farmaci contraffatti o senza licenza?

**Risposta data da John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

_(2 maggio 2012)_

La direttiva 2011/62/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, che modifica la direttiva 2001/83/CE ( [1] ) recante un
codice comunitario relativo ai medicinali per uso umano al fine di prevenire l'ingresso di medicinali falsificati nella
catena di fornitura legale è stata adottata l'8 giugno 2011. Questo nuovo strumento legislativo introduce regole più
rigorose per migliorare la tutela della salute pubblica mediante nuove misure armonizzate su scala europea onde
assicurare che i medicinali siano sicuri e che il commercio di medicinali sia sottoposto a controlli rigorosi.

Per quanto concerne l'uso di medicinali «senza etichetta», la legislazione dell'UE non disciplina l'uso di medicinali per
indicazioni diverse da quelle descritte dall'autorizzazione alla commercializzazione. Tale uso rientra, nella maggior
parte degli Stati membri, nella responsabilità del medico che prescrive i medicinali a fini di trattamento in assenza di
un prodotto medicinale autorizzato per l'indicazione o il gruppo di età in questione. Gli Stati membri hanno la
responsabilità di vigilare sulla corretta applicazione di tali regole nazionali.

Conformemente alla nuova legislazione UE in tema di farmacovigilanza che si applicherà a decorrere dal luglio 2012,
tutte le reazioni avverse determinate da prodotti medicinali, sia nel contesto delle indicazioni autorizzate o al di fuori
dei termini di un'autorizzazione alla commercializzazione, devono essere denunciate alle autorità competenti e
potrebbero produrre un intervento normativo sull'autorizzazione alla commercializzazione. Ne potrebbe derivare
l'inclusione di controindicazioni o di avvertimenti per prevenire l'uso al di fuori dei termini dell'autorizzazione alla
commercializzazione laddove si disponga di prove che tale uso possa comportare un rischio per il paziente.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 174 dell'1.7.2011.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 25

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003176/12**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Medicines prescribed ‘off-label’ and counterfeit medicines

The market in medicines should be one of the most tightly controlled in the world. Today, strict regulations enable
patients to obtain the treatment they require in the form of medicines that have been tested and placed on the market
following the issuing of an appropriate licence.

However, there are frequent cases of patients suffering serious side effects after taking unauthorised medicines.
Unfortunately, a counterfeit medicine can cause much more serious damage than might be thought.

In January 2011 a study was published showing that 45-60 % of medicines taken by children are prescribed ‘off-label’
or are unauthorised. In France, a drug taken by large numbers of diabetics to counter weight gain linked to their
condition was withdrawn after causing some 500 deaths among otherwise healthy people prescribed it as an appetite
suppressant.

It is clear, therefore, that despite the controls and rules imposed on pharmaceuticals companies large numbers of
counterfeit or unauthorised drugs that are damaging to health are still available on the European market today. Very
often people choose these medicines over other, properly authorised drugs because they are much cheaper. However,
the financial savings must be set against the serious risks to the health of those that take them.

Given that, although European law is very clear on this issue, cases of hospitalisation or death following the use of
unauthorised medicines are common, could the Commission say what strategies have been drawn up to protect
European citizens against the risks posed by counterfeit or unauthorised drugs?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/83/EC ( [1] ) on the
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal
supply chain of falsified medicinal products was adopted on 8 June 2011. This new legislation introduces stricter
rules to improve the protection of public health with new harmonised, pan-European measures to ensure that
medicines are safe and that the trade in medicines is rigorously controlled.

Concerning the off-label use of medicines, EU legislation does not regulate the use of medicines for indications other
than the ones described by the marketing authorisation. Such use will, in most Member States, be the responsibility of
the physician who prescribes them as a means to provide treatment in the absence of an authorised medicinal product
for the indication or age group concerned. Member States are responsible to monitor the correct application of such
national rules.

In accordance with the new EU pharmacovigilance legislation which will apply from July 2012 onwards, all adverse
reactions of medicinal products, whether in the context of authorised indications or outside the terms of a marketing
authorisation, must be reported to the competent authorities and could lead to regulatory action on the marketing
authorisation. This may lead to the inclusion of contraindications or warnings to prevent the use outside the terms of
the marketing authorisation when there is evidence that such use may pose risk to the patient.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 174, 1.7.2011.

C 124 E / 26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003177/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Fiumi a secco

Secondo i dati raccolti da un'università olandese e da organizzazioni internazionali tra le quali vi è anche il WWF,
molti fiumi risentono dello sfruttamento delle loro acque da parte dell'uomo per scopi commerciali. In particolare, tra
il 1996 e il 2005, sono stati esaminati fiumi che, in totale, ricoprono il 66 % delle terre emerse. Il risultato di questa
indagine è preoccupante. Ben 201 fiumi intorno a cui gravita la vita di 2.67 miliardi di persone, sperimentano una
grave scarsità d'acqua per almeno un mese all'anno.

Gli studiosi hanno calcolato che, complessivamente, il volume medio di acqua prelevato dai fiumi ogni anno
ammonta a circa il 70 % dei deflussi naturali. Questa situazione ha come conseguenza la decimazione della
biodiversità e il prosciugamento di alcune zone umide perifluviali.

La causa principale dello sfruttamento delle acque fluviali è l'agricoltura. In Italia, ad esempio, il Po subisce un prelievo
di acqua notevole in estate per permettere l'irrigamento dei campi coltivati.

Considerato che lo sfruttamento indiscriminato dei bacini fluviali ha conseguenze negative per gli ecosistemi e, a
lungo andare, anche per l'uomo, può la Commissione indicare le prospettive di sviluppo sostenibile che tutelano le
risorse idriche naturali in vista della Conferenza di Rio+20?

**Risposta data da Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(30 maggio 2012)_

La direttiva quadro in materia di acque ( [1] ) fissa come obiettivo giuridicamente vincolante il conseguimento di un
buono stato in tutte le acque dell’UE entro il 2015. Il raggiungimento di tale obiettivo sarà possibile soltanto qualora
venga messa in atto una gestione sostenibile delle risorse idriche che ne integri gli aspetti qualitativi e quantitativi nei
piani di gestione dei bacini idrografici, come previsto dalla direttiva quadro. Nel corso del 2012, la Commissione
pubblicherà una relazione di valutazione dei piani di gestione dei bacini idrografici, nel quadro di un nuovo piano per
la salvaguardia delle risorse idriche europee previsto per il novembre di quest'anno. In tale piano verranno avanzate
proposte politiche volte a garantire la disponibilità di acqua di buona qualità per un uso sostenibile ed equo delle
risorse idriche, in linea con gli obiettivi della direttiva quadro. È attualmente in corso una consultazione online sulle
opzioni politiche per detto piano ( [2] ). Le opzioni previste riguardano la quantità e l'efficienza in materia di acqua, la
pressione esercitata dall’agricoltura, le perdite nella rete idrica, ecc.

Da qualche tempo, la Commissione sta promuovendo una gestione integrata delle risorse idriche in quanto strumento
per far fronte all'eccessiva estrazione di acqua a livello internazionale, ad esempio attraverso l’iniziativa UE per l'acqua
(EUWI) destinata ai paesi in via di sviluppo. Ciò è stato inoltre confermato dall’approvazione, da parte della
Commissione, della dichiarazione ministeriale adottata in occasione del Forum mondiale sull'acqua di Marsiglia del
marzo 2012. In vista della conferenza «Rio+20», la Commissione continuerà a perseguire tale obiettivo, ivi compresa
la promozione dell'efficienza nell'ambito di un'economia «verde», stabilendo obiettivi e traguardi concreti e ambiziosi.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 327 del 22.12.2012.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/blueprint_en.htm

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 27

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003177/12**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Dried-up rivers

According to data collected by a Dutch university and by international organisations, including the WWF, many
rivers are suffering from water depletion as a result of man using it for commercial ends. Specifically, between 1996
and 2005, there was a survey of rivers which, in total, cover 66 % of the planet’s landmass. The findings of this
research are worrying. As many as 201 rivers, around which the lives of 2.67 billion people revolve, experience
serious water shortages for at least one month per year.

Experts have calculated that, overall, the average volume of water removed from rivers every year amounts to
approximately 70 % of natural outflow. The result of this situation is the decimation of biodiversity and the drying
out of certain wetlands near rivers.

The main cause of river water depletion is agriculture. In Italy, for example, the River Po sees significant amounts of
water drained off in summer for the irrigation of cultivated fields.

Since the indiscriminate depletion of river basins has negative consequences for ecosystems and, in the long term, for
humans too, can the Commission give some indication of the prospects for sustainable development that will protect
natural water resources, with a view to the Rio+20 Conference?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 May 2012)_

The Water Framework Directive ( [1] ) (WFD) establishes the legally binding objective to achieve good status in all EU
waters by 2015. This can only happen if sustainable water management is put in place integrating qualitative and
quantitative aspects of water resources in river basin management plans as required by the WFD. In 2012, the
Commission will publish a report assessing the Member States river basin management plans in the framework of a
new Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources due by November 2012. The Blueprint will put forward policy
proposals aimed at ensuring the availability of good quality water for sustainable and equitable water use in line with
the WFD objective. An online consultation on policy options for the Blueprint is ongoing ( [2] ). It includes options
concerning water quantity and efficiency, pressures from agriculture, leakages, etc.

For some time, the Commission has been promoting integrated water resource management as a tool to address overabstraction of water at the international level e.g. by means of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI) aimed at developing
countries. This was also reflected in the Commission's endorsement of the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the
World Water Forum in Marseille in March 2012. With a view to the Rio + 20 Conference, the Commission will
continue to pursue this objective including promoting water efficiency in the framework of a green economy with
concrete aspirational goals and targets.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 327, 22.12.2012.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/blueprint_en.htm

C 124 E / 28 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003179/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(23 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Διαφάνεια τιμών στην αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού τροφίμων

Η Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, κατόπιν σχετικών προτάσεων της Επιτροπής Γεωργίας, έχει επανειλημμένως και
μετ' επιτάσεως αναδείξει την αναγκαιότητα ενίσχυσης της διαφάνειας στην αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού τροφίμων. Κρίνει εν
προκειμένω ως θετική τη συγκρότηση της ομάδος υψηλού επιπέδου για την καλύτερη λειτουργία της αλυσίδας εφοδιασμού
τροφίμων, καθώς και τη δημιουργία του ευρωπαϊκού εργαλείου παρακολούθησης των τιμών των τροφίμων (Food Price
Monitoring Tool), υπέρ του οποίου έχουν ήδη εγκριθεί ευρωπαϊκοί πόροι. Παράλληλα, όμως, ζητεί την υλοποίηση του
πιλοτικού προγράμματος για τη σύσταση ενός Ευρωπαϊκού Παρατηρητηρίου Τιμών και Περιθωρίων και εν πάση περιπτώσει
τη βελτίωση του ήδη εφαρμοζόμενου εργαλείου, λ.χ. ως προς την επέκταση του πεδίου κάλυψης και την ένταξη σε αυτό
περισσοτέρων προϊόντων, αλλά και του κόστους των εισροών (input prices) ( [1] ), καθώς και ως προς την κοινοποίηση των
στοιχείων. Η Επιτροπή, ωστόσο, κρίνει επαρκές το ευρωπαϊκό εργαλείο παρακολούθησης τιμών, το οποίο έχει θέσει σε
εφαρμογή για τη συλλογή πληροφοριών ως προς τις τιμές παραγωγού, μεταποιητή και λιανοπωλητή για ορισμένα προϊόντα,
και ότι, ως εκ τούτου, καθίσταται περιττή η σύσταση του ως άνω Ευρωπαϊκού Παρατηρητηρίου.

Βάσει των στοιχείων που συλλέγει στο πλαίσιο του εργαλείου παρακολούθησης των τιμών τροφίμων στα επιμέρους κράτη
μέλη, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Πώς αξιολογεί τις μεταβολές του δείκτη τιμών καταναλωτή, καθώς και τις ετήσιες ποσοστιαίες μεταβολές των τιμών
καταναλωτή στην Ελλάδα; Πού κυμαίνονται εν γένει οι τιμές παραγωγού/μεταποιητή/καταναλωτή στην Ελλάδα -στα υπό
παρακολούθηση προϊόντα- ως προς τον μέσο όρο της ΕΕ;

Ποια κράτη μέλη έχουν ήδη προβεί σε σύσταση Παρατηρητηρίου Τιμών σε εθνικό επίπεδο;

**Απάντηση του κ. Cioloș εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(26 Απριλίου 2012)_

Τα δεδομένα του Εναρμονισμένου Δείκτη Τιμών Καταναλωτή της Στατιστικής Υπηρεσίας δείχνουν ότι, κατά την περίοδο
2005-2011, οι τιμές καταναλωτή στην Ελλάδα ακολούθησαν σε γενικές γραμμές την ίδια πορεία με τον μέσο όρο της ΕΕ
(βλέπε πίνακα 1). Θα πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι, στη διάρκεια των τελευταίων ετών, οι τιμές καταναλωτή των τροφίμων στην
Ελλάδα ήταν ελαφρώς χαμηλότερες από τον μέσο όρο της ΕΕ. Οι τιμές των βασικών γεωργικών προϊόντων στην ΕΕ και την
Ελλάδα κορυφώθηκαν το 2007, μειώθηκαν το 2009 προτού ανακάμψουν το 2010 και 2011. Επιπρόσθετα, όσον αφορά τις
τιμές τροφίμων στην παραγωγή, καταγράφηκε παρόμοια εξελικτική τάση στην Ελλάδα και την ΕΕ των 27. Εξετάζοντας την
εξέλιξη των τιμών καταναλωτή των τροφίμων σε σύγκριση με το σύνολο των τιμών καταναλωτή (τροφίμων και άλλων ειδών),
οι αυξήσεις των τιμών καταναλωτή των τροφίμων στην ΕΕ από το 2007 και μετά ήταν μεγαλύτερες από τις αυξήσεις στο
συνολικό ποσοστό πληθωρισμού. Αντιθέτως, στην Ελλάδα, οι τιμές καταναλωτή των τροφίμων κυμάνθηκαν σε χαμηλότερα
επίπεδα από το σύνολο των τιμών καταναλωτή κατά τη διάρκεια των τελευταίων τριών ετών. Πλήρη στοιχεία για τα βασικά
γεωργικά προϊόντα και τις τιμές παραγωγού και καταναλωτή για 17 αλυσίδες εφοδιασμού τροφίμων καταγράφονται στο
Μέσο Παρακολούθησης των Ευρωπαϊκών Τιμών Τροφίμων της Στατιστικής Υπηρεσίας ( [2] ).

Απαντώντας στην τελευταία ερώτηση του Αξιότιμου Μέλους του Κοινοβουλίου, υπάρχουν παρατηρητήρια των τιμών
τροφίμων ή παρόμοιες πρωτοβουλίες σχετικά με τη διαφάνεια των τιμών σε πολλά κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, μεταξύ των οποίων και
η Ιταλία ( [3] ), η Ισπανία ( [4] ), η Γαλλία ( [5] ), η Δανία ( [6] ), η Γερμανία, η Πολωνία και η Ουγγαρία.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ψήφισμα του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου της 19ης Ιανουαρίου 2012 (2011/2114/INI).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/database.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://osservaprezzi.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.magrama.es/en/alimentacion/servicios/observatorio-de-precios-de-los-alimentos/default.aspx.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) https://observatoire-prixmarges.franceagrimer.fr/Pages/default.aspx.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/Publikationer/FOI_serier/~/media/Foi/docs/Publikationer/Udredninger/2012/FOI_udredning_2012_1.ashx.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 29

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003179/12**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Price transparency in the food supply chain

The European Parliament in plenary sitting has, following related proposals by the Committee on Agriculture,
repeatedly stressed the need to reinforce transparency in the food supply chain. On this matter, it has welcomed as a
positive development the creation of a High-Level Group to improve the functioning of the food supply chain and the
establishment of the EU Food Price Monitoring Tool, for which EU funding have already been agreed. At the same
time, however, it has called for the implementation of a pilot project establishing a European price and margins
observatory and for the improvement of the current mechanism i.e. by extending its scope and including more
products and also input prices ( [1] ), as well as the communication of data. However, the Commission considers that
the EU Food Price Monitoring Tool used to collect information on producer, processor and retail prices for certain
products is adequate and, therefore, that the establishment of the abovementioned European observatory is
superfluous.

Based on the data collected as part of the EU Food Price Monitoring Tool in individual Member States, will the
Commission say:

What is its assessment of the changes in the consumer price index as well as the annual percentage changes in
consumer prices in Greece? Where do producer/processer/consumer prices generally lie in Greece (for the monitored
products) in relation to the EU average?

Which Member States have already set up a price observatory at national level?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2012)_

The Eurostat Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices data shows that over the 2005-2011 period Greek consumer
prices followed in general the same pattern as the EU average (see Table 1). It should be noted that during the last
years, food consumer prices in Greece were slightly below the EU average. Prices for agricultural commodities in
the EU and Greece peaked in 2007, declined in 2009 before recovering in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, in the case of
food producer prices, a similar development trend was recorded for both Greece and the EU-27. Looking at the
development of consumer food prices compared to overall consumer prices (food and non-food), the rises in EU food
consumer prices from 2007 onwards were more pronounced than the increases in the overall rate of inflation. On the
contrary, in Greece, food consumer prices were situated below the overall consumer prices during the last three years.
Complete data on the agricultural commodity, producer and consumer prices for a number of 17 food supply chains
can be found in the Eurostat Food Price Monitoring Tool ( [2] ).

In reply to the Honourable Member's last question, food price observatories or similar initiatives on price
transparency are in place in a number of EU Member States, among which Italy ( [3] ), Spain ( [4] ), France ( [5] ), Denmark ( [6] ),
Germany, Poland and Hungary.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
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( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Parliament Resolution of 19 January 2012 (2011/2114/INI).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/hicp/data/database.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://osservaprezzi.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.magrama.es/en/alimentacion/servicios/observatorio-de-precios-de-los-alimentos/default.aspx.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) https://observatoire-prixmarges.franceagrimer.fr/Pages/default.aspx.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/Publikationer/FOI_serier/~/media/Foi/docs/Publikationer/Udredninger/2012/FOI_udredning_2012_1.ashx.

C 124 E / 30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003181/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(23 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Aγορές αγροτών και αγορές βιολογικών προϊόντων στην Ελλάδα

Στην Ελλάδα δεν υπάρχει νομοθετικό πλαίσιο που να επιτρέπει την λειτουργία αγορών αγροτών και αγορών βιολογικών
προϊόντων. Τα υπουργεία Οικονομικών και Ανάπτυξης εφαρμόζοντας την Υπουργική Απόφαση (ΥΑ ΠΟΛ 106572010)
αναγκάζουν τους παραγωγούς γης και τους αγρότες/παραγωγούς βιολογικών προϊόντων να πουλούν τα προϊόντα τους μόνο
μέσω των «λαϊκών αγορών» (μικτή αγορά εμπόρων και αγροτών υπό την οργάνωση του Οργανισμού Λαϊκών Αγορών). Έτσι,
αντιμετωπίζονται ως έμποροι με αποτέλεσμα να επιβάλλεται ΦΠΑ 13 % στα υπό πώληση προϊόντα και πρόστιμα στους ίδιους
επειδή δεν αποδέχονται να λειτουργούν ως παραγωγοί και έμποροι μαζί. Να πουλάνε δηλαδή τα προϊόντα που παράγουν
στους ίδιους τους εαυτούς (ως εμπόρους πια) και στη συνέχεια στους καταναλωτές.

Με βάση τα παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Η λειτουργία αγορών αγροτών και αγορών βιολογικών προϊόντων στα κράτη μέλη προβλέπεται από την ΚΑΠ;

2. Στα κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης οι αγρότες παραγωγοί και οι παραγωγοί βιολογικών προϊόντων πληρώνουν ΦΠΑ;
Αντιμετωπίζονται δηλαδή ταυτόχρονα σαν παραγωγοί και σαν έμποροι όπως στην Ελλάδα;

3. Αυτή η στάση του ελληνικού κράτους μπορεί να θεωρηθεί παρεμπόδιση της ελεύθερης λειτουργίας της αγοράς και
του ανταγωνισμού;

**Απάντηση του κ. Cioloș εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(29 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Όσον αφορά την ερώτηση του Αξιότιμου Μέλους του Κοινοβουλίου εάν η λειτουργία αγορών αγροτών και αγορών
βιολογικών προϊόντων στα κράτη μέλη προβλέπεται από την ΚΓΠ, δεν υπάρχουν ειδικοί κανόνες της ΕΕ για τον ορισμό ή τη
λειτουργία «αγορών αγροτών» ή «αγορών βιολογικών προϊόντων».

2. Τα άρθρα 295-305 της οδηγίας ΦΠΑ ( [1] ) εξουσιοδοτούν τα κράτη μέλη να θεσπίσουν ειδικούς κανόνες ΦΠΑ ώστε να
απαλλαγούν οι αγρότες από τις υποχρεώσεις άλλων υποκείμενων στον φόρο. Ωστόσο, τα κράτη μέλη μπορούν να εξαιρούν
ορισμένες κατηγορίες αγροτών, η επιβολή κανονικού φορολογικού καθεστώτος στους οποίους δεν ενδέχεται να προκαλέσει
διοικητικές δυσχέρειες. Επίσης, ένας αγρότης που καλύπτεται από το εν λόγω απλουστευμένο καθεστώς μπορεί ο ίδιος να
επιλέξει κανονικό φορολογικό καθεστώς.

Δεν υπάρχουν ειδικοί κανόνες για τους παραγωγούς βιολογικών προϊόντων, οι οποίοι κανονικά εμπίπτουν στο πεδίο
εφαρμογής του εν λόγω γενικού καθεστώτος για τους αγρότες.

3. Κατά την άποψη της Επιτροπής, η ελληνική υπουργική απόφαση (ελληνική υπουργική απόφαση αριθ. 1065 της
18.5.2010) καθώς και οι σχετικοί με αυτήν κανόνες φαίνεται να είναι γενικής εφαρμογής, όσον αφορά τις φορολογικές
διατάξεις για τις πωλήσεις οπωροκηπευτικών από αγρότες και τους καταναλωτές στην ελληνική επικράτεια, χωρίς καμία
διαφοροποίηση μεταξύ των παραδοσιακών, βιολογικών ή οργανικών προϊόντων και των παραγωγών.

Η απόφαση δεν παραβιάζει τις αρχές της ΕΕ για την εσωτερική αγορά και τον ανταγωνισμό και φαίνεται να συμφωνεί με την
πάγια νομολογία του Δικαστηρίου, «Keck και Mithouard» ( [2] ), σύμφωνα με την οποία δεν γίνεται λόγος παραβίασης της
νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ όταν _«οι διατάξεις εφαρμόζονται σε όλους τους επιχειρηματίες που ασκούν τη δραστηριότητά τους στο_
_εθνικό έδαφος και αρκεί να επηρεάζουν κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο, και νομικώς και πραγματικώς, την εμπορία των εγχωρίων_
_προϊόντων και των προϊόντων προελεύσεως άλλων κρατών μελών»._

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2006/112/ΕΚ του Συμβουλίου, της 28ης Νοεμβρίου 2006, σχετικά με το κοινό σύστημα φόρου προστιθέμενης αξίας (ΕΕ L 347 της

11.12.2006, σ. 1).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Απόφαση του Δικαστηρίου της 24ης Νοεμβρίου 1993, C-267/91 και C-268/91.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 31

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003181/12**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Farmers’ markets and organic food markets in Greece

There is no legal framework in Greece to allow the operation of farmers’ markets and organic food markets. Under
the ministerial decision (Greek Ministerial Order No 106572010) being implemented by the Greek Ministries of
Finance and Development, farmers and organic producers are required to sell their products solely in ‘people’s
markets’ (mixed trader and farmers’ markets organised by the Organisation of People’s Markets). As a result, they are
treated as traders, with VAT of 13 % being levied on the products for sale. Those refusing to acknowledge that they
are operating as both producers and traders face fines. This means that they are effectively selling their own products
to themselves (in their capacity as traders) and then on to consumers.

In view of this, will the Commission answer the following:

1. Is the operation of farmers’ markets and organic food markets in Member States provided for by the CAP?

2. Do farmers and organic producers pay VAT in other EU Member States? In other words, are they treated as
both producers and traders, as they are in Greece?

3. Can the Greek Government's stance be considered a hindrance to the free operation of the market and
competition?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2012)_

1. As concerns the question asked by the Honourable Member whether the operation of farmers' markets and
organic food markets in Member States is provided for by the CAP, there are no specific EU rules for the definition or
operation of ‘famers' markets’ or ‘organic food markets’.

2. Articles 295 to 305 of the VAT Directive ( [1] ) empower Member States to lay down special VAT rules for farmers
to relieve them of the obligation incumbent on other taxable persons. However, Member States may exclude certain
categories of farmers for whom the application of normal VAT arrangements is not likely to give raise to
administrative difficulties or a farmer covered by this simplified scheme may himself opt for normal VAT
arrangements.

There are no special rules for organic farmers, who would normally fall within these arrangements for farmers
generally.

3. According to the opinion of the Commission, the Greek Ministerial decree (Greek Ministerial Order No 1065 of
18.5.2010) as well as its related rules, seem to be of general application, referring to tax prescriptions for all fruit and
vegetables sales by farmers and shoppers in the Greek territory, without any differentiation between traditional and
biological nor organic products and producers.

The decree would not appear to infringe EU principles of internal market and competition and seems to be in line
with the consolidated jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, ‘Keck and Mithouard’ ( [2] ), according to which there is no
infringement of EC law when Member States ‘provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national
territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of
those from other Member States’.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 November 1993, C-267/91 and C-268/91.

C 124 E / 32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003182/12**

**to the Commission**
**Syed Kamall (ECR)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ UK Bangladesh Business Council (UKBBC)

I have been contacted by the UK Bangladesh Business Council (UKBBC), which is based in my constituency. The
UKBBC was established in 2009 to promote bilateral trade between the UK and Bangladesh by improving and
enhancing the perception of trade with, and investment in, Bangladesh.

The UKBBC tells me that, through exploration of business opportunities and successful delivery of its projects, it
promotes Bangladesh as a viable business destination for UK companies and vice versa.

More details can be found at: www.ukbbc.org.uk

1. Is there any advice or assistance that the Commission could offer the UKBBC with a view to promoting trade
between the UK and Bangladesh or between the EU and Bangladesh?

2. Is the Commission aware of any funding streams available to assist the UKBBC in promoting trade between the
UK and Bangladesh or between the EU and Bangladesh?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 April 2012)_

It is not part of the Commission's mission to give advice to private companies or entities and the Commission is not
aware of any funding streams available to assist UKBBC in promoting trade between the UK and Bangladesh or
between the EU and Bangladesh. With respect to trade with least developed countries, the Commission wishes to
draw the Honourable Member's attention to its Export Helpdesk, an online service, to facilitate market access in
particular for developing countries to the European Union. This free and user-friendly service provides relevant
information required by exporters from least developed countries interested in supplying the EU market
(http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/index_en.html).

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 33

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003183/12**
**adresată Comisiei (Vicepreședintelui/Înaltului Reprezentant)**

**Norica Nicolai (ALDE)**

_(23 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ VP/HR — Dreptul personalului militar european de a se adresa Ombudsmanului European

Având în vedere:

—
articolul 228 din TFUE care conferă oricărui cetățean al UE dreptul de a se adresa Ombudsmanului European în
legătură cu preocupările sale,

—
articolul 13 din TUE, prin care se desființează sistemul pilonilor, iar PSAC se încadrează acum în mandatul
Ombudsmanului,

—
articolele 15 și 18 din TUE, prin care se numește un Înalt Reprezentant responsabil cu PESC a UE,

aș dori să adresez următoarele întrebări VP/ÎR:

În cazul unei plângeri care a fost depusă de un membru militar al unei misiuni PSAC și care nu a fost rezolvată intern,
cine are mandatul și autoritatea de a rezolva problema?

Cum privește VP/ÎR cooperarea dintre SEAE și Biroul Ombudsmanului European cu privire la eventualele cazuri de
administrare defectuoasă din cadrul misiunilor militare ale UE? Ce structuri sau planuri există pentru abordarea unor
astfel de cazuri sensibile?

**Răspuns dat de dna Ashton în numele Comisiei**

_(14 iunie 2012)_

În cazul unei plângeri înaintate de către un membru militar al unei misiuni PSAC care nu a fost soluționată la nivelul
contingentului național desfășurat în teatrul de operațiuni sau care nu a fost soluționată de către comandantul
operațiunii, titularul plângerii va trebui să o înainteze autorităților ministeriale competente din statul care l-a detașat,
având în vedere că acesta rămâne sub autoritatea administrativă a statului care l-a detașat.

În calitate de cetățeni europeni, membrii personalului militar pot, de asemenea, înainta o plângere Ombudsmanului
European în conformitate cu articolul 228 din TFUE.

În temeiul obligației sale de a oferi sprijin și cooperare și celorlalte instituții și organisme ale Uniunii ( [1] ), SEAE, care
acordă asistență Înaltului Reprezentant/vicepreședintelui, a stabilit o strânsă cooperare cu Ombudsmanul European.
Înaltul Reprezentant/vicepreședintele tratează plângerile care i-au fost transmise de către Ombudsmanul European,
solicitând serviciilor competente să formuleze proiecte de răspuns și prezentând răspunsurile respective, împreună cu
orice informații și evaluări pe care le poate considera utile. Aceste plângeri sunt tratate în același mod ca orice alte
plângeri transmise de Ombudsman.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Decizia Consiliului privind organizarea și funcționarea SEAE, articolul 3 alineatul (4), JO L 201, 3.8.2010.

C 124 E / 34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003183/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Norica Nicolai (ALDE)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — The right of European military personnel to appeal to the EU Ombudsman

Bearing in mind:

—
Article 228 TFEU giving any citizen of the EU the right to address concerns to the EU Ombudsman,

—
Article 13 TEU abolishing the pillar system with the CSDP now falling within the Ombudsman’s mandate,

—
Articles 15 and 18 TEU appointing a High Representative in charge of the EU’s CFSP,

I wish to ask the VP/HR the following:

In the case of a complaint by a military member of a CSDP mission which has not been resolved internally, who has
the mandate and authority to deal with the issue?

How does the VP/HR view the cooperation between the EEAS and the EU Ombudsman’s office on potential
maladministration cases within EU military missions? What structures or plans exist to address such sensitive cases?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 June 2012)_

In the case of a complaint by a military member of a CSDP mission which has not been resolved at the level of the
national contingent deployed on the theatre or by the operation commander, this complaint will have to be addressed
by this military member to the competent ministerial authorities of his/her sending State, since he/she remains subject
to the administrative authority of this sending State.

As a European citizen they may also submit a complaint to the European Ombudsman in accordance with
Article 228 TFEU.

Pursuant to its obligation of extending support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union ( [1] ),
the EEAS, assisting the High Representative/Vice-President, has established close cooperation with the European
Ombudsman. The High Representative/Vice-President addresses the complaints forwarded by the European
Ombudsman, requesting the competent departments for draft replies and submitting the associated responses,
together with any information and assessments he may find helpful. These complaints are dealt with in the same
manner as any other complaints submitted by the Ombudsman.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, Article 3, paragraph 4, OJ L 201, 3.8.2010.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 35

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003184/12**

**do Komisji**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(23 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Uprawy monokulturowe w Unii Europejskiej

Czy Komisja dysponuje wiedzą o zasięgu upraw monokulturowych w rolnictwie unijnym?

Jeśli tak, to proszę o informację, jaką część ogólnej powierzchni upraw stanowią uprawy monokulturowe?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji**

_(15 maja 2012 r.)_

W odniesieniu do upraw monokulturowych nie są jeszcze dostępne żadne oficjalne dane przekazywane Komisji
(Eurostatowi) przez państwa członkowskie. Wynika to z tego, że rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady
(WE) nr 1166/2008 ( [1] ) z dnia 19 listopada 2008 r. w sprawie badań struktury gospodarstw rolnych i badania metod
produkcji rolnej obejmuje spis rolny w okresie 2009/2010 oraz badania reprezentacyjne gospodarstw rolnych
w latach 2013 i 2016.

Państwa członkowskie zgodziły się przeprowadzić, jednocześnie z rozpoczętym spisem rolnym za okres 2009/2010,
badania metod produkcji rolnej stosowanych w gospodarstwach rolnych. Jedno z pytań zawartych w tym badaniu
reprezentacyjnym dotyczącym metod produkcji, znajdujące się pod pozycją „Ochrona gleby”, odnosi się do części
gruntów ornych wyłączonych z planowanego płodozmianu, co umożliwia oszacowanie gruntów ornych
wykorzystywanych do upraw monokulturowych.

Dane te mają być przekazane Komisji (Eurostatowi) najpóźniej do dnia 31 grudnia 2012 r.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Dz.U. L 321 z 1.12.2008.

C 124 E / 36 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003184/12**

**to the Commission**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Monoculture farms in the European Union

Is the Commission aware of the extent of monoculture farms in EU agriculture?

If so, what share of the total farm area is accounted for by monoculture farms?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

No official data transmitted by Member States to the Commission (Eurostat) are as yet available on monoculture
crops because the regulation (EC) No 1166/2008 ( [1] ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 November 2008 concerning statistics on farm structure surveys and the survey on agricultural production
methods covers an agricultural census for 2009/2010 and farm sample surveys for 2013 and 2016.

In addition to the launched agricultural census 2009/2010, countries accepted to carry out a survey on agricultural
production methods used by agricultural holdings back to back to the agricultural census. In this sample survey on
production methods under the item ‘Soil conservation’ one of the questions refers to the share of arable area out of
the planned crop rotation which provides an estimate of arable land used for monoculture.

This data shall be transmitted to the Commission (Eurostat) by 31 December 2012 at the latest.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 321, 1.12.2008.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 37

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003185/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(23 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Pressão de Bruxelas para TGV «low cost»

Tendo em conta que:

—
Portugal se encontra a executar um forte programa de contenção da despesa e dos gastos públicos, a fim de
reequilibrar as finanças públicas e a dívida externa, tendo efetuado cortes em setores sociais, que foram
explicados aos cidadãos como medidas excecionais para ultrapassar a crise da dívida soberana;

—
Segundo o jornal _Diário Económico (_ [1] _)_, Bruxelas e Madrid estão a pressionar Portugal para avançar «com uma
versão reduzida do antigo TGV», aproveitando as verbas disponíveis do Fundo de Coesão, que tem ainda
disponível um montante de «733 milhões de euros por atribuir a este corredor Sul-Oeste» para a «construção da
linha de alta prestação de mercadorias e passageiros, que ligue os portos de Lisboa a Espanha»;

—
Portugal assumiu compromissos para a execução do projeto TGV, linhas Porto-Vigo, Lisboa-Madrid (ÉvoraMérida e terceira travessia do Tejo) e Lisboa-Porto, tendo as autoridades portuguesas assumido a paragem do
projeto Lisboa-Porto, da terceira travessia do Tejo e do lanço entre o Poceirão e o Caia, uma vez que não
constituem projetos prioritários, tal como sublinhado no Acordo assinado entre Portugal e a CE, FMI e BCE;

—
A ligação entre as capitais europeias por TGV é um dos objetivos da RTE-T e do novo instrumento «Connecting
Europe»,

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Se tem conhecimento destas informações, prestadas pelos meios de comunicação social em Portugal, e se tem
mantido conversações com as autoridades portuguesas sobre o desenvolvimento do TGV «low cost» em
Portugal?

2. Que entende pela execução de um TGV «low cost» e quais as medidas e supressões que a CE considera
importante fazer nos vários projetos prioritários do TGV apresentados por Portugal para se conseguir avançar
com o TGV, mas com uma redução dos custos?

3. Se pode dar informações quanto aos desenvolvimentos já realizados nas linhas de TGV Porto‐‐Vigo, LisboaMadrid e Lisboa-Porto? Em que situação se encontram estes projetos?

**Resposta dada por Siim Kallas em nome da Comissão**

_(3 de maio de 2012)_

1. A Comissão tem conhecimento de que as autoridades portuguesas estão a avaliar a viabilidade de executar um
projeto revisto do corredor de alta capacidade Sines-Lisboa-Madrid.

2. Na fase atual, a Comissão não pode formular observações sobre uma proposta referida pelo Senhor Deputado,
uma vez que não foi apresentada formalmente, mas preconiza uma utilização mais eficiente dos recursos públicos
nacionais e da União Europeia.

3. Até à data, em relação às linhas Porto-Vigo e Lisboa-Porto, para além dos estudos preliminares, a Comissão não
dispõe de elementos que atestem outras evoluções. Em contrapartida, no que respeita à linha Madrid-Lisboa, as obras
estão avançadas ou próximo da conclusão no troço Cáceres-Badajoz; o resto da nova linha em Espanha está
atualmente na fase de projeto.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) (http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/gaspar-trava-pressao-de-bruxelas-para-avancar-com-tgv-low-cost_140375.html#).

C 124 E / 38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003185/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Pressure from Brussels for ‘low-cost’ high-speed rail

Portugal is implementing a drastic programme to rein in public spending and costs, so as to rebalance its public
finances and foreign debt, and has scaled down social sectors, explaining the cuts to the public as exceptional
measures to overcome the sovereign debt crisis.

According to the newspaper _Diário Económico (_ [1] _)_ Brussels and Madrid are pressuring Portugal to go ahead with a
stripped-back version of the previous high-speed rail system, making use of resources available under the Cohesion
Fund, which still has a sum of EUR 733 million to allocate to this south-west corridor for the construction of the
high-performance freight and passenger line linking Lisbon’s ports with Spain.

Portugal has made commitments to implementing the high-speed rail project on the Porto-Vigo, Lisbon-Madrid
(Évora-Mérida and a third Tagus crossing) and Lisbon-Porto lines, and the Portuguese authorities have accepted that
the Lisbon-Porto project, the third Tagus crossing and the stretch between Poceirão and Caia should be halted, as they
do not constitute priority projects as laid down in the agreement concluded between Portugal and the Commission,
the IMF and the ECB.

High-speed rail links between all of Europe’s capitals are one of the objectives of the trans-European transport
network and the new ‘Connecting Europe’ Facility.

1. Is the Commission aware of these Portuguese media reports and has it held talks with the Portuguese authorities
on developing ‘low-cost’ high-speed rail in Portugal?

2. What does the Commission understand by the implementation of ‘low-cost’ high-speed rail, and what measures
and cuts does it consider necessary in the priority high-speed rail projects submitted by Portugal, in order to enable
high-speed rail to go ahead, but at a reduced cost?

3. Can it provide information about the development already completed on the Porto-Vigo, Lisbon-Madrid and
Lisbon-Porto high-speed rail lines? What stage have these projects reached?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2012)_

1. The Commission is aware that the Portuguese Authorities are assessing the possibility to implement a revised
project on the Sines/Lisboa-Madrid High Capacity Corridor.

2. The Commission cannot, at this stage, anticipate comments on a proposal quoted by the Honourable Member,
since this has not been submitted in any form, but it welcomes a more efficient use of Union and National public

resources.

3. So far the Commission does not dispose of evidence of any progress besides preliminary studies along the
Porto-Vigo and Lisboa-Porto lines, while for the Madrid-Lisboa line works are advanced or close to completion
between Caceres and Badajoz; the rest of the new line in Spain is currently in design phase.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/gaspar-trava-pressao-de-bruxelas-para-avancar-com-tgv-low-cost_140375.html#.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 39

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003186/12**

**à Comissão**
**Edite Estrela (S&D)**
_(23 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Financiamento do projeto de alta velocidade ferroviária em Portugal

Tendo em conta a pergunta E-3846/2009, sobre «o adiamento do projeto TGV em Portugal», apresentada em 29 de
julho de 2009, e respetiva resposta dada pelo Comissário Antonio Tajani em nome da Comissão Europeia;

Tendo em conta o quadro de referência estratégico nacional de Portugal (QREN) para o período 2007/2013, que
previa o financiamento da alta velocidade ferroviária em Portugal;

Tendo em conta que a Comissão afirmou que foi afetada uma verba de 383,38 milhões de euros ao cofinanciamento
deste projeto e que estas verbas são destinadas a projetos específicos, não podendo ser utilizadas para outras
finalidades;

Tendo em conta que o Governo português declarou que «o projeto do TGV será definitivamente abandonado»;

Considera a Comissão que a decisão do Governo português, de pôr termo ao projeto de alta velocidade ferroviária,
implicará a perda de fundos do orçamento da RTE-T e do Fundo de Coesão? Em caso afirmativo, em que montantes?

**Resposta dada por Siim Kallas em nome da Comissão**

_(4 de maio de 2012)_

No que respeita à rubrica orçamental da RTE‐T, se Portugal confirmar que o projeto de alta velocidade ferroviária não
está em curso e se se constatar a impossibilidade de utilizar a dotação de financiamento antes do prazo‐limite de
elegibilidade da despesa (ou seja, 31.12.2015), os montantes disponibilizados pelas decisões da Comissão para os
projetos em causa serão anulados e Portugal perde o direito aos fundos.

O montante referido pela Senhora Deputada corresponde à contribuição da RTE‐T para os estudos e obras dos três
projetos de alta velocidade cofinanciados pela referida rubrica e foi destinado a Portugal.

O montante anulado reverteria para o orçamento RTE‐T e seria reatribuído por concurso público, aberto a todos os
Estados-Membros.

No que respeita ao Fundo de Coesão, estão previstos 733 milhões de euros para o financiamento da infraestrutura
ferroviária RTE‐T em Portugal, para 2007/2013, incluindo a linha ferroviária de alta velocidade Lisboa-Madrid. Dada
a natureza plurianual do Fundo de Coesão, se o projeto em causa for cancelado, é possível utilizar os fundos
disponíveis para outras infraestruturas de transporte ou ambientais em Portugal. Em qualquer dos casos, os fundos
têm de ser utilizados até ao final de 2015.

C 124 E / 40 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003186/12**

**to the Commission**
**Edite Estrela (S&D)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Funding for the high-speed rail project in Portugal

Bearing in mind Question E-3846/2009 on ‘postponement of the high-speed rail project in Portugal’, tabled on
29 July 2009, and the answer given by Commissioner Antonio Tajani on behalf of the European Commission;

In view of Portugal’s national strategic reference framework for the 2007‐2013 period, which provides for funding
for high-speed rail in Portugal;

Given that the Commission has stated that a sum of EUR 383.38 million in co-financing has been allocated to this
project and that these funds are intended for specific projects and may not be used for other purposes;

In view of the Portuguese Government’s statement that the TGV project will be abandoned once and for all;

Does the Commission believe that the Portuguese Government’s decision to end the high-speed rail project will entail
the loss of funds from the trans-European transport network budget and the Cohesion Fund? If so, how much?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

With regards to the TEN‐T budget line, if Portugal confirms that no High Speed project is currently under way and if it
appears that there is no possibility to use the funding made available before its final date of eligibility of expenditure
(i.e. 31.12.2015), the amounts committed under the Commission decisions for these projects will be decommitted
and the funds lost for Portugal.

The amount quoted by the Honourable Member correctly refers to TEN‐T contribution for studies and works of the
three high speed projects for which TEN‐T co-financing has been awarded to Portugal.

The de-committed amount would be returned to the TEN‐T budget and would be reallocated through a future TEN‐T
open call, open for all EU Member States.

As regards the Cohesion Fund, there are currently EUR 733 million earmarked for the financing of TEN‐T railway
infrastructure in Portugal in the period 2007-2013, including the high-speed railway line Lisbon-Madrid. Due to the
multi-annual programming nature of the Cohesion Fund, should that project be cancelled, it is possible to use the
available funds for other transport or environment infrastructure in Portugal. In any case, the funds are to be used
until end of 2015.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 41

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003187/12**

**à Comissão**
**Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(23 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Condições de trabalho dos investigadores portugueses

As conclusões do Conselho Europeu do passado dia 1 e 2 de março referem a necessidade de intensificar os esforços
com vista a «melhorar as perspetivas de carreira dos investigadores». Em Portugal, uma grande parte, se não a maioria,
da produção científica é realizada por investigadores sem qualquer vínculo laboral, que apenas recebem uma «bolsa
de investigação». Os bolseiros de investigação vivem uma situação social e laboral precária, uma vez que não têm
acesso ao sistema geral de segurança social, aos subsídios de férias e de natal e ao subsídio de desemprego. São, muitas
vezes, os bolseiros de investigação que, sem nenhuma perspetiva de carreira científica, asseguram as necessidades
permanentes dos centros e laboratórios de investigação. Esta política contraria ainda os princípios consagrados na
«Carta Europeia do Investigador».

Em face do exposto, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que avaliação faz a Comissão da precária condição laboral em que muitos investigadores portugueses vivem e
desenvolvem o seu trabalho?

2. Que medidas irá tomar para dignificar e valorizar o trabalho científico e a vida destes investigadores,
nomeadamente dos bolseiros de investigação, face às conclusões decididas na última reunião do Conselho
Europeu?

**Resposta dada por Máire Geoghegan-Quinn em nome da Comissão**

_(3 de maio de 2012)_

A Carta Europeia do Investigador e o Código de Conduta para o Recrutamento de Investigadores são elementos
fundamentais da política da União Europeia destinada a fazer da investigação uma carreira atraente. Conjuntamente,
têm por objetivo a melhoria das condições de trabalho e emprego dos investigadores em toda a Europa. Contudo,
tanto a Carta como o Código são apenas uma recomendação não vinculativa da Comissão aos Estados-Membros.

Através do Grupo Diretor sobre Recursos Humanos e Mobilidade, a Comissão está a acompanhar a execução da
Parceria Europeia para os Investigadores ( [1] ), que abrange muitos dos princípios fundamentais da Carta e do Código. A
Comunicação «Iniciativa emblemática no quadro da estratégia Europa 2020 — União da Inovação» ( [2] ) identifica como
um compromisso essencial para os Estados-Membros o desenvolvimento de estratégias nacionais para a promoção de
condições de trabalho atraentes no domínio da investigação pública. Propõe também um quadro no âmbito do
Espaço Europeu da Investigação no qual a Comissão apresentará medidas concretas para tornar as carreiras europeias
de investigação mais atraentes e sustentáveis.

A fim de apoiar a aplicação da Carta e do Código a nível institucional, a Comissão lançou em 2008 a «Estratégia de
Recursos Humanos para os Investigadores» ( [3] ). Nela encoraja os empregadores e financiadores do setor da
investigação a demonstrar a compatibilidade das suas políticas e práticas com os princípios da Carta e do Código.
Contudo, das mais de 150 instituições atualmente envolvidas no grupo de trabalho específico estabelecido em 2009,
apenas uma é portuguesa.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/research_innovation/general_framework/ri0004_en.htm).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2010)546 de 6.10.2010.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) (http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/index.cfm/rights/strategy4Researcher).

C 124 E / 42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003187/12**

**to the Commission**
**Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Working conditions for Portuguese researchers

The conclusions of the European Council of 1 and 2 March 2012 highlighted the need to step up efforts to improve
the ‘career prospects of researchers’. Scientific production in Portugal is largely, if not mostly, carried out by
researchers who are not employed and receive only a ‘research grant’. These grant holders live in a precarious social
and employment situation, as they have no access to the general social security system, holiday pay, Christmas
bonuses, or unemployment benefit. In many cases they meet the permanent needs of research centres and
laboratories, even when they have no prospect of a scientific career themselves. This policy goes against the principles
enshrined in the European Charter for Researchers.

1. How does the Commission view the precarious employment conditions under which many Portuguese
researchers are living and working?

2. In the light of the conclusions adopted at the last European Council meeting, what measures will it take to
dignify, and increase the value of, scientific work and the lives of these researchers and research grant holders in
particular?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2012)_

The European Charter for Researchers and Code of Conduct for their Recruitment are key elements in the European
Union's policy to make research an attractive career. Together they aim to improve the employment and working
conditions for researchers across Europe. However, the Charter and Code are a non-binding recommendation from
the Commission to the Member States.

Through the Steering Group Human Resources and Mobility, the Commission is monitoring the implementation of
the European Partnership for Researchers ( [1] ), which encompasses many of the key Charter and Code principles. The
communication ‘Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative — Innovation Union’ ( [2] ) identifies the development of national
strategies for the promotion of attractive employment conditions in public research as a key commitment for
Member States. It also proposes a ‘European Research Area Framework’ in which the Commission will present
concrete measures to make European research careers more attractive and sustainable.

To support the implementation of the Charter and Code at institutional level, in 2008 the Commission launched the
‘Human Resources Strategy for Researchers’ ( [3] ). It encourages research employers and funders to demonstrate the
compatibility of their policies and practices with the Charter and Code principles. However, among more than 150
institutions currently involved in the dedicated working group set up in 2009, only one Portuguese institution can be
found.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/research_innovation/general_framework/ri0004_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 546, 6.10.2010.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/index.cfm/rights/strategy4Researcher.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 43

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-003188/12**

**til Kommissionen**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(23. marts 2012)_

_Om:_ Markedet for økologi

Mange forbrugere efterspørger økologiske varer af forskellig art, men hvor stort er det europæiske marked for
økologiske varer, og hvor stort er verdensmarkedet? Kan Kommissionen i den forbindelse svare på følgende:

—
Hvor stor en andel udgør økologiske varer af det samlede marked for fødevarer i de forskellige medlemslande,
samt i EU som et hele?

—
Hvordan har økologiske varers andel af markedet udviklet sig de seneste 5 år?

—
Hvor stort er verdensmarkedet for økologiske varer, og hvor stor en del af disse stammer fra EU?

—
Hvordan vurderer Kommissionen at markedet for økologiske varer i henholdsvis EU‐landene og på
verdensplan vil udvikle sig over de næste fem år?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Dacian Ciolos**

_(4. maj 2012)_

Markedsandelen for økologiske fødevarer varierer inden for EU. I 2009 ( [1] ) var andelen af det samlede nationale
fødevaremarked størst i Danmark med 7,2 %. Herefter fulgte Østrig (6 %), Sverige (4 %), Tyskland (3,4 %),
Luxembourg (3,3 %), Nederlandene (2,3 %), Frankrig 1,9 %) og Belgien (1,5 %). I lande som Tjekkiet, Finland, Ungarn,
Polen og Portugal var markedsandelen lavere. Det økologiske marked i EU havde i gennemsnit en vækst på 6 %
mellem 2009 og 2010. I adskillige lande, herunder Østrig, Belgien, Frankrig, Italien og Nederlandene, voksede
markedet med mere end 10 %, hvorimod man i Tyskland og Danmark kun forventede en vækst på 4 %. I samme
periode så man en nedgang i markederne i Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland.

Det globale salg af økologiske fødevarer nåede op på 44,6 mia. EUR i 2010, hvoraf Nordamerika og Europa tegnede
sig for henholdsvis 49 % og 47 %. Det økologiske marked i EU blev i 2010 anslået til 18,1 mia. EUR. De største
økologiske markeder i 2010 var følgende: Tyskland (6 mia. EUR), Frankrig (3,38 mia. EUR), Det Forenede Kongerige
(2 mia. EUR), Italien (1,55 mia. EUR), Østrig (986 mio. EUR), Spanien (905 mio. EUR), Sverige (804 mio. EUR),
Danmark (791 mio. EUR) og Nederlandene (657 mio. EUR).

I perioden 2005‐2008 voksede EU's økologiske marked med gennemsnitligt 10 % om året, hvorimod man i 2009‐
2010 oplevede en afmatning af markedet med en vækstrate på cirka 6 %. Tallene for 2011 foreligger endnu ikke, men
i mange lande, herunder Tyskland, Italien, Frankrig og Nederlandene, forventes der tilsvarende eller højere vækstrater
i forhold til 2009‐2010.

Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om det økologiske markeds udvikling i de kommende fem år, globalt set og i EU, er
Kommissionen på nuværende tidspunkt ikke i stand til at give noget konkret svar herpå.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Oplysningerne vedrørende det økologiske marked er hentet fra »The world of organic agriculture — statistics & emerging trends 2012« (FiBL og
IFOAM) og »The organic market in Europe« (SIPPO og FiBL, maj 2011). Der foreligger ikke oplysninger for alle medlemsstater.

C 124 E / 44 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003188/12**

**to the Commission**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The organic foods market

Many consumers ask for various types of organic produce, but how large is the European market for organic produce
and how large is the global market? In this connection:

—
How large a share does organic produce have of the total market for foodstuffs in the various Member States
and in the EU as a whole?

—
How has the market share of organic produce developed over the past five years?

—
How large is the global market for organic produce and how much of this originates in the EU?

—
How does the Commission see the market for organic produce developing globally and in the EU over the next
five years?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

The market share for organic food varies across the EU. The highest share in 2009 ( [1] ) was observed in Denmark with
7.2 % of the total food market, followed by Austria (6 %), Sweden (4 %), Germany (3.4 %), Luxembourg (3.3 %), the
Netherlands (2.3 %), France (1.9 %) and Belgium (1.5 %). In several other countries such as the Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary, Poland and Portugal the share was lower. The EU organic market grew by an average 6 % between
2009 and 2010. In several countries including Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the market grew
by more than 10 % whereas in Germany and in Denmark the growth between 2009 and 2010 was estimated at 4 %.
A decrease in the markets of the United Kingdom and of Ireland was observed during the same period.

Organic food global sales reached EUR 44.6 billion in 2010 with North America and Europe representing
respectively 49 % and 47 %. The EU organic market was estimated in 2010 at EUR 18.1 billion. The largest EU
organic markets in 2010 were: Germany (EUR 6 billion), France (EUR 3.38 billion), United Kingdom (EUR 2 billion),
Italy (EUR 1.55 billion), Austria (EUR 986 million), Spain (EUR 905 million), Sweden (EUR 804 million), Denmark
(EUR 791 million) and the Netherlands (EUR 657 million).

For 2005-2008 the EU organic market grew by an average 10 % whereas in 2009-2010 a slowdown was observed
with a growth of approximately 6 %. Data for 2011 are not yet available. Initial estimates show similar or higher to
2009-2010 growth rates in many countries such as Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands.

Regarding the development of the organic farming market for the next five years, globally and in the EU, the
Commission does not dispose at present of any tool which would allow providing a factual answer to this question.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Data on organic farming markets are extracted from ‘The world of organic agriculture — statistics and emerging trends 2012’ (FiBL and IFOAM)
and ‘The organic market in Europe’ (SIPPO and FiBL, May 2011). Data are not available for all EU Member States.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 45

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003190/12**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Turkey's potential economic contribution to the EU

In the light of Turkey’s free trade agreements with Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as its role in establishing
an approximation of an internal market with the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, can the Commission
comment on Turkey’s potential economic contribution to the EU given that nation’s tendency to establish
independent free trade agreements?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The EU‐Turkey Customs Union has contributed significantly to the increase of the EU‐Turkey trade as well as to
foreign direct investments mainly from the EU to Turkey. It has also facilitated the economic and business integration
of the EU and Turkish economies to the benefit of both parties.

According to Article 16 of Decision 1/95 of the EU‐Turkey Association Council establishing the EU‐Turkey Customs
Union, Turkey needs to align to the EU commercial policy. This includes the need for Turkey to conclude Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) with the EU's FTA partners.

C 124 E / 46 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003191/12**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS II

Can the Commission please detail when future plans to reduce the budget for the EEAS will be implemented?

**Question for written answer E-003193/12**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS

Can the Commission detail any future plans to reduce the budget of the European External Action Service, as there are
now projections of a future budget of EUR 3 billion per year (as opposed to Baroness Ashton’s assertion that the EEAS
would be a ‘budget-neutral’ diplomatic service)?

**Question for written answer E-003194/12**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(23 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Budget neutrality in the EEAS III

If there are no immediate plans to reduce the budget of the EEAS, can the Commission please explain why this is the
case, given the large amount of expenditure so far on the establishment of the EEAS?

**Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 June 2012)_

The European External Action Service (EEAS) began operations in January 2011. The 2011 EEAS budget had been
constituted by pro-rata transfers from the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council for a total amount,
approved by the Budgetary Authority, of EUR 464.1 million. In order to allow for economies of scale, notably
regarding administrative support activities, the EEAS entered into a series of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with the
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council. This made it possible to sensibly reduce costs for the new
service.

In addition, the EEAS is required to recruit staff from Member States' national diplomatic services, up to 1/3 of total
EEAS AD staff, which also has implications for the budget.

The EEAS' 2012 administrative budget is EUR 488.8 million. This takes into consideration the need to reach the level
of 1/3 staffing from Member States by 2013 and takes into account the saving policies implemented by the EEAS
since its creation (e.g. the reduction of mission expenses by 10 %, or the reduction of representation expenses by 5 %).

The EEAS will continue its work of developing a common European foreign policy while maintaining strict budget
discipline, constantly looking for potential savings and continuing its rigorous management of scarce resources in
order to ensure best value for taxpayers.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 47

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003195/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(26. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Transgene Insekten

In den USA, Malaysia und auf den Kaiman-Inseln ist es bereits zur Freisetzung transgener Insekten gekommen. Es ist
weder veröffentlicht worden, um welche Insektenarten es sich dabei handelt, noch zu welchem Zweck deren
Schaffung und Freisetzung erfolgten. Auch wurden gravierende Mängel bei der Qualität der Zulassungskriterien
festgestellt. Die positive Einschätzung in den USA etwa basierte auf zwei von insgesamt 170 angeführten
wissenschaftlichen Studien. Diese berücksichtigten wiederum nur eine der vier im Gutachten aufgeführten
Insektenarten.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es beunruhigend, dass derartige Freisetzungen auch in EU-Mitgliedsländern, konkret in
Frankreich und Großbritannien, geplant sind, zumal eine Rückholaktion im Falle auftretender Probleme nicht mehr
möglich sein wird.

1. Welche genetisch modifizierten Insektenarten sollen in Frankreich und Großbritannien freigesetzt werden?

2. Zu welchem Zweck soll diese Freisetzung erfolgen?

3. Welche Risikoabwägungen wurden diesbezüglich vorgenommen bzw. vorgelegt?

4. Welche nationale bzw. welche EU-Behörde wird über die Zulassung dieser Freisetzungen entscheiden?

5. Wird sich die Kommission dafür einsetzen, dass die Bewertungskriterien für diese Feldversuche — im Sinne des
Gesundheits‐ und Naturschutzes — aussagekräftig, das heißt vor allem auf Langzeituntersuchungen basierend, sein
werden?

6. Wird die Öffentlichkeit innerhalb der EU (nicht nur flugfähige Insekten breiten sich absehbar auch über
Landesgrenzen hinweg aus) zeitgerecht von eventuellen Freisetzungen informiert werden?

7. Wenn ja, in welcher Form wird diese Information erfolgen?

**Antwort von Herrn Dalli im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Mai 2012)_

Bei der absichtlichen Freisetzung genetisch veränderter Tiere in die Umwelt zu Forschungszwecken sind in der EU die
Anforderungen des Artikels 6 der Richtlinie 2001/18/EG ( [1] ) einzuhalten. Die Freisetzungen müssen bei den
Mitgliedstaaten angemeldet werden.

Weder Frankreich noch das Vereinigte Königreich haben nach eigenen Angaben bisher Anträge dieser Art erhalten,
und auch bei der Kommission ist kein Antrag bezüglich einer kommerziellen Freisetzung von GV-Insekten in der EU
eingereicht worden.

Um auf mögliche zukünftige Anträge vorbereitet zu sein, hat die Kommission die Europäische Behörde für
Lebensmittelsicherheit gebeten, u. a. Leitlinien zur Prüfung der Umweltverträglichkeit von GV-Tieren (einschließlich
GV-Insekten) auszuarbeiten, die 2012 vorliegen sollen.

Gemäß Artikel 9 der Richtlinie 2001/18/EG müssen die Mitgliedstaaten die Öffentlichkeit zu vorgeschlagenen
Freisetzungen von GVO (einschließlich GV-Insekten) zu Forschungszwecken anhören. Dabei legen die
Mitgliedstaaten Regelungen für diese Anhörung fest, einschließlich einer angemessenen Frist, um der Öffentlichkeit
oder Gruppen Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ABl. L 106 vom 17.4.2001.

C 124 E / 48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003195/12**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Genetically modified insects

In the US, Malaysia and the Cayman Islands, genetically modified insects have already been released. Neither the
species of insect involved nor the purpose of their creation and release has been revealed. Serious shortfalls have also
been discovered in the quality of the acceptance criteria. Positive evaluation in the US was based on two out of a total
of 170 scientific studies cited. These in turn only considered one of the four insect species listed in the report.

In the light of this, it is worrying that such releases are also planned in EU Member States, specifically France and the
United Kingdom, especially since no recall action will be possible if problems arise.

1. Which species of genetically modified insects are to be released in France and the United Kingdom?

2. What is the purpose of their release?

3. What risk assessments have been carried out and/or submitted in this regard?

4. What national and/or EU authorities will decide whether this release is to be permitted?

5. Will the Commission take action to ensure that the evaluation criteria for these field experiments (in terms of
the protection of health and nature conservation) will be meaningful, that is to say, most importantly, will be based
on long-term studies?

6. Given that it is not only flying insects that could spread beyond national borders, will the public within the EU
be informed in a timely manner of any possible releases?

7. If so, what form will this information take?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

In the EU, GM animals released deliberately into the environment for research purposes must meet the requirements
set out in Article 6 of Directive 2001/18/EC ( [1] ). Applications for such releases must be submitted to the Member
States.

France and the United Kingdom reported to the Commission that, to date, no application of this kind has been
submitted, neither has an application for commercial release of GM insects in the EU been submitted to the
Commission.

In order to prepare for possible future applications, the Commission requested the European Food Safety Authority to
develop guidance on inter-alia the environmental risk assessment of GM animals, including GM insects, for which
completion is foreseen in 2012.

According to Article 9 of Directive 2001/18/EC, Member States shall consult the public on proposed deliberate
releases of GMOs, including GM insects, for research purposes. In doing so, Member States shall lay down
arrangements for this consultation, including a reasonable time period, in order to give the public or groups the
opportunity to express an opinion.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 106, 17.4.2001.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 49

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003196/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(26. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Südtirol Autonomiestatus — Beantwortung der schriftlichen Anfrage E-010703/2011

Der Verfasser bezieht sich auf seine Anfrage E-010703/2011 und die Antwort der Kommission vom 9.1.2012.

Daraus resultieren folgende Zusatzfragen:

1. Besteht nach Meinung der Kommission durch das Ergebnis der am 14.12.2011 eingebrachten Klage nicht die
Gefahr, dass der Pariser Vertrag zum Schutz der deutschen und ladinischen Minderheiten in Italien unterminiert
und ausgehöhlt werden kann?

2. Wann glaubt die Kommission ist mit einer Behandlung der eingebrachten Klage zu rechnen?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Mai 2012)_

1. Die im Rahmen des Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens gegen Italien aufgeworfenen Fragen bezüglich des Zugangs
zur Beschäftigung im öffentlichen Sektor in Südtirol haben keinerlei Auswirkungen auf den Pariser Vertrag zum
Schutz der deutschen und ladinischen Minderheiten in Italien.

2. Die Kommission kann sich zum Fortschritt des Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens nicht äußern, da die
Angelegenheit an den Gerichtshof verwiesen wurde und dieser den Zeitplan für die Bearbeitung der ihm vorgelegten
Fälle selbst festlegt.

C 124 E / 50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003196/12**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ South Tyrol autonomous status — answer to Written Question E‐010703/2011

I refer to my Question E‐010703/2011 and the Commission’s answer of 9 January 2012.

The following supplementary questions now arise:

1. Does the Commission believe that, in view of the result of the complaint lodged on 14 December 2011, there is
a risk that the Paris Agreement on the protection of German and Ladin minorities in Italy could be
undermined?

2. When does the Commission believe we can expect the complaint to be addressed?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

1. The issues raised by the infringement procedure against Italy concerning access to employment in the public
sector in the South Tyrol Region have no impact on the Paris Agreement on the protection of German and Ladin
minorities in Italy.

2. The Commission is not in a position to comment on progress in the infringement procedure since the case has
been referred to the Court of Justice and it is for the Court to set the timetable for dealing with cases submitted.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 51

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003198/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Toussas (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Ασφάλεια της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα

Το τραγικό ναυάγιο του «Costa Concordia» στις 13.1.2012, στις ακτές της Τοσκάνης, με 3 200 επιβάτες και 1 068
ναυτεργάτες πλήρωμα, όπου έχασαν τη ζωή τους 30 επιβάτες ενώ αγνοούνται άλλοι 2, και η πυρκαγιά στις 27.2.2012 στο
«Costa Allegra», με 636 επιβάτες και 413 ναυτεργάτες πλήρωμα, της εταιρίας «Costa Cruises», θυγατρικής του
αμερικάνικου ομίλου «Carnival», είναι αποτέλεσμα της απληστίας της δράσης των μονοπωλιακών επιχειρηματικών ομίλων
στην κρουαζιέρα, για τη μεγιστοποίηση των κερδών τους, μέσα από την εκμετάλλευση επιβατών και ναυτεργατών. Tα
«ναυτικά ατυχήματα» αυτά δεν είναι μεμονωμένα: το ναυάγιο του κρουαζιερόπλοιου «Sea Diamond» συνεχίζει να ρυπαίνει τη
θαλάσσια περιοχή της Σαντορίνης. Με πρόσφατη δικαστική απόφαση επιβλήθηκε στην πλοιοκτήτρια εταιρεία του «Sea
Diamond» πρόστιμο 1,2 εκ. ευρώ για το ναυάγιο στην «Καλντέρα» της Σαντορίνης, στις 5.4.2007, και για τη ρύπανση από
τη διαφυγή πετρελαιοειδών ουσιών.

Οι διεθνείς κανόνες για την οργανική σύνθεση και τη ναυπήγηση των κρουαζιερόπλοιων είναι επικίνδυνοι για την ασφάλεια
της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα και το περιβάλλον. Το προσωπικό γενικών υπηρεσιών, οι ναυτεργάτες που δουλεύουν
στους τομείς ενδιαίτησης — τα ¾ του πληρώματος — δεν περιλαμβάνονται στην οργανική σύνθεση, διευκολύνοντας τους
εφοπλιστές να μην καταβάλλουν μισθούς με βάση τις ΣΣΕ της σημαίας του πλοίου, αλλά με βάση τους μισθούς της χώρας
προέλευσής τους ή αποκλειστικά από τα φιλοδωρήματα των επιβατών. Έτσι, γίνονται θύματα της πιο στυγνής εκμετάλλευσης
του διεθνούς δουλεμπορίου και των επιχειρηματικών ομίλων κρουαζιέρας. Η πολυεθνική σύνθεση επιβατών και εργατικού
δυναμικού — στο «Costa Concordia» επέβαιναν τουρίστες από 60 χώρες και ναυτεργάτες από 11 χώρες — θέτουν σε
κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια του πλοίου και της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα. Χιλιάδες επιβάτες και ναυτεργάτες διαμένουν σε
καμπίνες με μεγάλη πυκνότητα, σε επικίνδυνους χώρους ενδιαίτησης, κάτω και από την ίσαλο γραμμή των
κρουαζιερόπλοιων, για την αύξηση του πρωτόκολλου μεταφοράς επιβατών, χωρίς εναλλακτικούς διαδρόμους διαφυγής για
τους επιβάτες και τα πληρώματα σε κατάσταση έκτακτης ανάγκης.

Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι οι κανόνες που καθορίζουν τις οργανικές συνθέσεις και τη ναυπήγηση των κρουαζιερόπλοιων
διασφαλίζουν την ασφάλεια πληρώματος και επιβατών; Πώς τοποθετείται η Επιτροπή στην ανάγκη ένταξης του προσωπικού
γενικών υπηρεσιών ενδιαίτησης στις οργανικές συνθέσεις των κρουαζιερόπλοιων; Συμφωνεί με τις διεκδικήσεις των μαζικών
φορέων για άμεση ανέλκυση των κρουαζιερόπλοιων «Sea Diamond» και «Costa Concordia»;

**Απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Τα διεθνή πρότυπα σχετικά με την επάνδρωση των πλοίων, τα οποία θεσπίστηκαν υπό την αιγίδα του Διεθνούς
Ναυτιλιακού Οργανισμού και της Διεθνούς Οργάνωσης Εργασίας (ΔΟΕ), έχουν ενσωματωθεί στη νομοθεσία της Ευρωπαϊκής
Ένωσης. Επιπλέον, η οδηγία 1999/63/ΕΚ ( [1] ) περιλαμβάνει διατάξεις σχετικά με τη συμφωνία για την οργάνωση του χρόνου
εργασίας των ναυτικών, η οποία συνήφθη από την Ένωση Εφοπλιστών της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και την Ομοσπονδία των
Ενώσεων Εργαζομένων στις μεταφορές στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Σύμφωνα με τις εν λόγω διατάξεις, ο εφοπλιστής παρέχει
στον πλοίαρχο τους απαραίτητους πόρους για να εξασφαλίσει την εκπλήρωση των εκ του νόμου υποχρεώσεων σχετικά με τις
ώρες εργασίας και ανάπαυσης των ναυτικών, συμπεριλαμβανομένων εκείνων που έχουν σχέση με την κατάλληλη επάνδρωση
του πλοίου (ρήτρα 12).

Όσον αφορά τη ναυπήγηση, όλα τα επιβατηγά πλοία που εκτελούν διεθνείς μεταφορές έχουν ναυπηγηθεί σύμφωνα με τους
κανόνες ασφαλείας που έχουν θεσπιστεί από τον Διεθνή Ναυτιλιακό Οργανισμό στο πλαίσιο της Διεθνούς Σύμβασης για την
ασφάλεια της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα (SOLAS). Επιπλέον, ο κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 725/2004 ( [2] ) περιλαμβάνει
διατάξεις σχετικά με την ασφάλεια του πλοίου.

Η Επιτροπή επανεξετάζει επί του παρόντος το υφιστάμενο νομοθετικό πλαίσιο στην ΕΕ, το οποίο περιλαμβάνει τους κανόνες
ασφαλείας για τη ναυπήγηση, τον εξοπλισμό και την εξέταση των επιβατηγών πλοίων που εκτελούν εσωτερικά
δρομολόγια ( [3] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 1999/63/ΕΚ του Συμβουλίου, της 21ης Ιουνίου 1999, σχετικά με τη συμφωνία για την οργάνωση του χρόνου εργασίας των ναυτικών, που

σύναψαν η ένωση εφοπλιστών της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας (ECSA) και η ομοσπονδία των ενώσεων εργαζομένων στις μεταφορές, στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
(FST) — Παράρτημα: Ευρωπαϊκή συμφωνία για την οργάνωση του χρόνου εργασίας των ναυτικών: ΕΕ L 167 της 2.7.1999, σ. 33-37.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 725/2004 για τη βελτίωση της ασφάλειας στα πλοία και στις λιμενικές εγκαταστάσεις: ΕΕ L 129 της 29.4.2004, σ. 6.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2009/45/ΕΚ για τους κανόνες και τα πρότυπα ασφαλείας για τα επιβατηγά πλοία: ΕΕ L 163 της 25.6.2009, σ. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

C 124 E / 52 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

2. Όσον αφορά το θέμα του προσωπικού γενικών υπηρεσιών ενδιαίτησης, η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να τονίσει ότι, για τους
σκοπούς της οδηγίας 1999/63/ΕΚ του Συμβουλίου, ως ναυτικός νοείται _«κάθε άτομο το οποίο απασχολείται ή_
_προσλαμβάνεται με οποιαδήποτε ιδιότητα σε πλοίο»_ .

Γενικότερα, βάσει της οδηγίας 98/41/ΕΚ ( [4] ), η ναυτιλιακή εταιρεία υποχρεούται να καταγράφει όλους όσοι επιβαίνουν στο
πλοίο, ενώ η οδηγία 2010/65/EΚ ( [5] ) απαιτεί την κοινοποίηση από τα πλοία των καταστάσεων επιβατών και πληρώματος στον
λιμένα κατάπλου.

Όσον αφορά τις επιχειρήσεις διάσωσης, αυτές διοργανώνονται από τον πλοιοκτήτη, σύμφωνα με τους διεθνείς κανόνες
διάσωσης.

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 98/41/ΕΚ σχετικά με την καταγραφή των ατόμων που ταξιδεύουν με επιβατηγά πλοία που εκτελούν δρομολόγια προς ή από λιμένες των κρατών

μελών της Κοινότητας: ΕΕ L 188 της 2.7.1998, σ. 35.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2010/65/ΕΕ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 20ής Οκτωβρίου 2010, σχετικά με τις διατυπώσεις υποβολής δηλώσεων για

τα πλοία κατά τον κατάπλου ή/και απόπλου από λιμένες των κρατών μελών και για την κατάργηση της οδηγίας 2002/6/ΕΚ: ΕΕ L 283 της 29.10.2010,
σ. 1.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 53

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003198/12**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Toussas (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Safety of human life at sea

The tragic grounding of the _Costa Concordia_ on 13 January 2012 off the coast of Tuscany with 3 200 passengers and a
1 068‐member crew, where thirty passengers lost their lives and another two are still missing; the fire of Monday,
27 February 2012 on board the _Costa Allegra_, with 636 passengers and a crew of 413, both ships belonging to the
company Costa Cruises, an affiliate of the American Carnival group, are the outcome of an insatiable desire, on the
part of the cruise ship monopolies to maximise profits through the exploitation of passengers and maritime workers.
These maritime accidents are not isolated occurrences: the wreck of the _Sea Diamond_ cruise ship continues to pollute
the sea around Santorini. Through a recent court decision, a fine of EUR 1.2 million was imposed on the owners of
_Sea Diamond_ for its sinking on Thursday, 5 April 2007 in the Santorini caldera and for pollution from the leakage of
oil-derivatives.

International rules concerning the manning and construction of cruise ships present a danger to the safety of human
life at sea and the environment. The general services personnel, that is to say the crew members employed in
accommodation sectors — three-quarters of the crew — are not included on crew lists, making it easier for
shipowners not to pay salaries on the basis of the collective labour agreement of the ship’s flag state, but on the basis
of the wage levels of crew members’ country of origin, or to have crew members receiving remuneration exclusively
from passenger tips. The latter thus fall victim to the most brutal exploitation from the international slave trade and
the cruise ship tourism business groups. The multinational composition of passengers and crew — tourists from 60
countries and crew members from 11 countries on board the _Costa Concordia_ — poses a danger to the safety of ships
and to human life at sea. Thousands of passengers and crew members are accommodated in cabins, packed closely
together, in dangerous living quarters beneath the water line of the cruise ships, as a means of increasing the
passenger numbers, without providing alternative escape routes for passengers and crew in emergency situations.

In view of this:

Does the Commission believe that the rules concerning the manning and construction of cruise ships are sufficient to
safeguard the security of crew and passengers?

What is the Commission’s position on the necessity for inclusion of general accommodation services personnel on
the crew lists of cruise ships? Does it agree with the demands by public bodies for immediate salvaging of the _Sea_
_Diamond_ and _Costa Concordia_ cruise ships?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

1. The relevant international standards relating to the manning of vessels adopted under the auspices of
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) have been incorporated into
EC law. In addition, there are provisions in Directive 1999/63/EC ( [1] ) concerning the Agreement on the organisation
of working time of seafarers concluded by the European Community Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the
Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the European Union (FST) requiring the shipowner to provide the master
with the necessary resources to comply with the legal obligations related to the seafarers' hours of work and rest,
including the appropriate manning of the ship (Clause 12).

In terms of ship construction, all passenger ships which operate internationally are constructed in accordance with
the safety rules adopted by the IMO under the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) Convention. In addition there
is EU legislation regarding ship security set out in Regulation (EC) 725/2004 ( [2] ).

The Commission is currently reviewing the existing EU legislative framework, which includes safety rules on the
construction, outfitting and survey of domestic passenger ships ( [3] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the organisation of working time of seafarers concluded by the

European Community Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the Federation of Transport Workers' Unions in the European Union (FST) — Annex:
European Agreement on the organisation of working time of seafarers, OJ L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 33‐37.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security, OJ L 129, 29.4.2004, p. 6.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/45/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger ships, OJ L 163, 25.6.2009, p. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

C 124 E / 54 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

2. On the issue of the general accommodation services personnel, the Commission would underline that for the
purposes of Council Directive 1999/63/EC a seafarer is defined as ‘any person who is employed or engaged in any
capacity on board a ship’.

More generally, under Directive 98/41/EC ( [4] ) the shipping company is required to keep a record of all those on board,
while Directive 2010/65/EC ( [5] ) requires the notification by ships of passenger and crew lists to the port of arrival.

As regards salvage operations, this is for the shipowner to arrange in accordance with international rules on salvage.

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directive 98/41/EC on the registration of persons sailing on board passenger ships operating to or from ports of the Member States of the

Community, OJ L 188, 2.7.98, p. 35.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Directive 2010/65 on reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States and repealing

Directive 2002/6/EC, OJ L 283, 29.10.2010, p. 1.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 55

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003199/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Προσέλκυση ξένων επενδύσεων στην Ελλάδα

Η προσέλκυση ξένων επενδύσεων υψηλής προστιθέμενης αξίας για την ελληνική οικονομία είναι βασική προϋπόθεση για την
ανάκαμψή της. Τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια, στο πλαίσιο των Μνημονίων, η προσέλκυση ξένων επενδύσεων προσεγγίζεται χωρίς
αποτέλεσμα μέσω της συνεχούς υποτίμησης του μισθολογικού κόστους, την ώρα που οι διαρκείς μεταβολές και η
πολυπλοκότητα του φορολογικού συστήματος λειτουργούν αποτρεπτικά τόσο για κάθε σοβαρό επενδυτικό ενδιαφέρον όσο
και για την εγχώρια επιχειρηματικότητα. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Διαθέτει στοιχεία για τα κράτη μέλη που προσελκύουν το μεγαλύτερο όγκο ξένων επενδύσεων;

2. Αν ναι, ποια είναι τα επίπεδα μισθών και φορολογίας σε αυτά τα κράτη μέλη;

**Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Τα στοιχεία σχετικά με τις ξένες άμεσες επενδύσεις (FDI) για τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ διατίθενται σε συνολικό όγκο
(εκατομμύρια ευρώ) αλλά επίσης σε σχετικούς όρους λαμβάνοντας υπόψη το μέγεθος της οικονομίας της χώρας (ως
ποσοστό του ΑΕγχΠ). Μολονότι έχει εναρμονιστεί σε μεγάλο βαθμό η μεθοδολογία για τη συγκέντρωση των στατιστικών
στοιχείων σχετικά με τις ξένες άμεσες επενδύσεις, ορισμένες διαφορές περιορίζουν τη συγκρισιμότητα των στατιστικών για τις
ξένες άμεσες επενδύσεις ανάμεσα στις χώρες. Π.χ.: οι υπερβολικά υψηλές τιμές των ξένων άμεσων επενδύσεων για το
Λουξεμβούργο εξηγούνται κυρίως με την παρουσία οντοτήτων ειδικού σκοπού, οι οποίες αντιστοιχούν στο 85-90 % των
εισροών και εκροών ξένων άμεσων επενδύσεων. Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες σχετικά με τη μεθοδολογία βλέπε:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/bop_fdi_esms.htm

2. Τα στοιχεία των εθνικών λογαριασμών σχετικά με τους ακαθάριστους μισθούς και ημερομίσθια (συνολικά ή ανά κλάδο
παραγωγής) μπορεί να συσχετίζονται με τα στοιχεία σχετικά με την απασχόληση για καλύτερη συγκρισιμότητα, ενώ τα κύρια
φορολογικά μεγέθη των εθνικών λογαριασμών προσφέρουν αναλυτικά στοιχεία σχετικά με τα φορολογικά έσοδα και τα
έσοδα κοινωνικών εισφορών ανά κατηγορία φόρου και ανά υποτομέα της δημόσιας διοίκησης, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των
θεσμικών οργάνων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Συμπληρωματικοί δείκτες διατίθενται στην έκδοση του 2011 της έκθεσης με
τίτλο «Τάσεις φορολόγησης στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση» (Taxation trends in the European Union) (KS-DU-11-001-EN-C)
δηλαδή σχετικά με τους φόρους ανά οικονομική λειτουργία (βλέπε σ. 77 φορολόγηση κεφαλαίου), σχετικά με έμμεσους
φορολογικούς συντελεστές και με τους μέγιστους συντελεστές φορολογίας εισοδήματος εταιρειών (σ. 129) καθώς και με τα
χαρακτηριστικά κάθε κράτους μέλους (για την Ελλάδα σ. 194).

Επειδή τα στοιχεία διαφέρουν σημαντικά από έτος σε έτος, ο συνοπτικός πίνακας στο παράρτημα που απεστάλη στον κύριο
βουλευτή και στη Γραμματεία του Κοινοβουλίου παρουσιάζει επιλογή μέσων τιμών στοιχείων για την περίοδο 2005-2010,
στον οποίο επισημαίνονται με παχιά γράμματα οι πέντε υψηλότερες ή χαμηλότερες τιμές. Επίσης περιλαμβάνονται αναλυτικά
βασικά στατιστικά στοιχεία.

C 124 E / 56 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003199/12**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Attracting foreign investment to Greece

Attracting high added value foreign investments is vital for the recovery of the Greek economy. Over the last two
years, under the Greek Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies unsuccessful attempts have been made to
attract foreign investment by continuously cutting the wage bill. Constant changes to the tax system and the
complexity thereof, are at the same time deterring any serious investment interest as well as domestic
entrepreneurship.

In view of this:

1. Does the Commission have any information regarding those Member States which are attracting the largest
volume of foreign investments?

2. If so, what are the wage and tax rates in these Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

1. Data on foreign direct investment (FDI) for the EU Member States are available in total volume (million EUR) but
also in relative terms taking into account the size of the country's economy (as a percentage of the GDP). While the
methodology for the compilation of FDI statistics is largely harmonised, some differences restrict the comparability of
FDI statistics across countries. For example: the extremely high values of FDI for Luxembourg are mostly explained by
the presence of Special Purpose Entities which account for 85-90 % of FDI inflows and outflows. For details on
methodology see: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/bop_fdi_esms.htm

2. National accounts data on gross wages and salaries (total or by industries) can be related to employment data for
better comparability, while main national accounts tax aggregates offer detailed tax and social contribution receipts
by type and by sub-sector of general government including institutions of the European Union. Additional indicators
can be found in the 2011 edition of the report ‘Taxation trends in the European Union’ (KS-DU-11-001-EN-C) e.g. on
taxes by economic function (see pp.77 for taxation on capital), on implicit tax rates and on top statutory tax rates
(pp. 129) as well as Member State profiles (for Greece pp. 194).

As data vary significantly from year to year, the summary table in the annex sent to the Honourable Member and to
Parliament's Secretariat presents a selection of average data for the 2005-2010 period, where the five highest or
lowest values are indicated in bold. Underlying detailed statistics are also included.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 57

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003200/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Οικονομική κρίση και αύξηση των ποσοστών κατάθλιψης

Κοινή συνισταμένη του συνόλου των σχετικών διεθνών μελετών αποτελεί η έντονη διασύνδεση μεταξύ του χαμηλού
εισοδήματος και της αύξησης των πιθανοτήτων εμφάνισης καταθλιπτικών φαινομένων. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο οι οικονομικές
πιέσεις -η μείωση εισοδήματος, η ανεργία, η οικονομική δυσχέρεια -αλλά και άλλες παράμετροι όπως η εργασιακή
ανασφάλεια, ο φόβος και η αβεβαιότητα για το μέλλον συνιστούν βασικούς παράγοντες για την εκδήλωση συμπτωμάτων
κατάθλιψης. Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία της Ιατρικής Σχολής Αθηνών, το καταγεγραμμένο ποσοστό επικράτησης ενός μείζονος
καταθλιπτικού επεισοδίου αυξήθηκε στην Ελλάδα από το 3,3 % το 2008 σε 8,2 % το 2011. Ταυτόχρονα έχει αυξηθεί
σημαντικά ο κίνδυνος εμφάνισης καταθλιπτικών συμπτωμάτων σε νέους και έγγαμους, χωρίς αυτό να σημαίνει πως δεν έχουν
επηρεαστεί όλα τα στρώματα του ελληνικού πληθυσμού. Σε αυτήν την κατεύθυνση, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Διαθέτει στοιχεία για τη διακύμανση των ποσοστών κατάθλιψης στα κράτη μέλη κατά τηn τριετία 2008-2011και για
τις κοινωνικές ή ηλικιακές ομάδες που έχουν επηρεαστεί περισσότερο από την οικονομική κρίση;

2. Επεξεργάζεται ή πρόκειται να επεξεργαστεί ένα ενιαίο σχέδιο δράσης για την αντιμετώπιση των ψυχοκοινωνικών
επιπτώσεων της οικονομικής κρίσης στα κράτη μέλη;

3. Υπάρχουν διαθέσιμα κονδύλια από τα Ευρωπαϊκά Διαρθρωτικά Ταμεία που μπορούν να χρησιμοποιήσουν τα κράτη
μέλη για την περαιτέρω ενίσχυση της ψυχοκοινωνικής στήριξης των πολιτών τους; Αν ναι, ποια είναι τα διαθέσιμα
ποσά και τα ποσοστά απορροφητικότητας των κρατών μελών στα αντίστοιχα προγράμματα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Dalli εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση των στοιχείων σχετικά με τους ψυχοκοινωνικούς κινδύνους οι οποίοι προκύπτουν από την
οικονομική κρίση, ειδικότερα για τις κοινωνικές και ηλικιακές ομάδες που πλήττονται από αυτούς.

Ορισμένα στοιχεία σχετικά με τον αντίκτυπο της οικονομικής κρίσης στην ψυχική υγεία μπορούν να βρεθούν στην έρευνα
του Ευρωβαρομέτρου σχετικά με την ψυχική υγεία και την ευεξία, η οποία πραγματοποιήθηκε το 2010 ( [1] ). Η εν λόγω έρευνα
παρουσιάζει μια επιδείνωση της κατάστασης της ψυχικής υγείας ιδίως για τους εκείνους τους ανθρώπους που
αντιμετωπίζουν κοινωνικοοικονομικές δυσκολίες. Ωστόσο, η ιδία αντίληψη της κατάθλιψης προστέθηκε μόνο πρόσφατα στη
σειρά δεικτών της ευρωπαϊκής έρευνας ερωτηματολογίου για την υγεία και συνεπώς υπάρχει έλλειψη διαθέσιμων
διαχρονικών δεδομένων.

Η Επιτροπή συζητά τις ψυχοκοινωνικές επιπτώσεις της κρίσης και τα μέτρα που πρέπει να ληφθούν για την αντιμετώπισή
τους, στην ομάδα κυβερνητικών εμπειρογνωμόνων για την ψυχική υγεία και την ευεξία από τα κράτη μέλη. Οι ανταλλαγές
στην εν λόγω ομάδα έδειξαν ότι οι εξελίξεις στα κράτη μέλη διαφέρουν σημαντικά. Αυτό δεν συνηγορεί υπέρ της
προστιθέμενης αξίας της ανάπτυξης σχεδίου ενιαίας δράσης για το θέμα αυτό.

Η χρηματοδότηση από τα προγράμματα διαθρωτικών ταμείων της ΕΕ χρησιμοποιείται από τα κράτη μέλη για τη βελτίωση της
ψυχοκοινωνικής υποστήριξης των πολιτών. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο, ιδίως, μπορεί να παρέχει υποστήριξη σε
πρόσωπα μέσω της προώθησης του υγιούς τρόπου διαβίωσης και της αντιμετώπισης των παραγόντων κινδύνου ή μέσω της
παροχής υπηρεσιών αποκατάστασης και επανένταξης, βελτιώνοντας την απασχολησιμότητα καθώς και τα συστήματα και τις
δομές που εστιάζονται στην ψυχική υγεία. Για παράδειγμα το ελληνικό πρόγραμμα ΕΚΤ «ανάπτυξη του ανθρώπινου
δυναμικού 2007-2013» περιλαμβάνει ενέργειες σχετικά με την αναβάθμιση των υπηρεσιών ψυχικής υγείας, την ανάπτυξη
της πρωτοβάθμιας ιατρικής περίθαλψης και τον εκσυγχρονισμό των υπηρεσιών δημόσιας υγείας.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/mental_health/eurobarometers.

C 124 E / 58 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003200/12**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The economic crisis and increase in cases of depression

A common finding of all international studies on depression is the close link between low income and an increase in
the possibility of developing depression. In this context, financial pressures — income reduction, unemployment,
financial difficulties — as well as other criteria such as job insecurity, fear and uncertainty about the future are basic
factors that fuel the symptoms of depression. According to data collected by the Athens University Medical School,
the recorded prevalence of major depressive episodes rose from 3.3 % in 2008 to 8.2 % in 2011 in Greece. At the
same time, the danger of symptoms of depression manifesting among young people and married people rose
significantly. This does not mean that other levels of Greek society have not been affected.

In view of this:

1. Does the Commission have information on the variation in depression rates in Member States from 2008‐
2011 and on the social or age groups which have been most affected by the economic crisis?

2. Is it drawing up or does it intend to draw up a uniform action plan to combat the psycho-social effects of the
economic crisis in Member States?

3. Are any EU Structural Fund appropriations available for use by Member States to increase psycho-social
support for their citizens? If so, what amounts are available and what are the take-up rates of the Member States
for such programmes?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The Commission is well aware of evidence about the psychosocial risks which result from the economic crisis, in
particular for the social and age groups most affected by it.

Some data about the mental health impact of the economic crisis can be found in the Eurobarometer Survey on
Mental health and Well-being, which was carried out in 2010 ( [1] ). This survey shows a decline in mental health status
in particular among those people experiencing social-economic difficulties. However, self perceived depression was
only recently added to the set of indicators of the European Health Interview Survey and there is therefore lack of
available longitudinal data.

The Commission is discussing the psychosocial effects of the crisis, and the measures taken against them, in the
Group of Governmental experts on mental health and well-being from the Member States. The exchanges in this
group have shown that developments in Member States differ significantly, arguing against the added value of
developing a single action plan on this issue.

Funding from EU Structural Funds Programmes is being used by Member States to enhance psychosocial support for
citizens. The European Social Fund in particular can provide support to people through the promotion of healthy
lifestyles and tackling risk factors, or the provision of rehabilitation and reintegration services enhancing
employability as well as to systems and structures focusing on mental health. For instance the Greek ESF programme
‘Development of Human Resources 2007-2013’ includes actions on the upgrading of mental health services, the
development of primary healthcare and the modernisation of public health services.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/mental_health/eurobarometers.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 59

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003201/12**
**προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος)**

**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ VP/HR — Kαταστολή ενάντια στο κίνημα διαμαρτυρίας των κατοίκων της Aysen

Όπως αναφέρει ανακοίνωση του Κουμμουνιστικού Κόμματος Χιλής, η κυβέρνηση του Προέδρου Sebastián Piñera
προσπαθεί με νόμους της εποχής Pinochet για την «ασφάλεια του κράτους» να αντιμετωπίσει το ειρηνικό κίνημα
διαμαρτυρίας των κατοίκων της Aysen, στην Παταγονία, στο νότο της Χιλής

Όπως προειδοποιούν στελέχη του λαϊκού Μετώπου του Aysen, η καταστολή δεν πρόκειται να σταματήσει τον αγώνα. Το
κίνημα των κατοίκων απαιτεί λύσεις για τα λαϊκά προβλήματα, για την παιδεία, την υγεία, αξιοπρεπείς μισθούς, ενάντια στην
ακρίβεια, για υποδομές και οδική σύνδεση με την υπόλοιπη χώρα. Το κόστος ζωής είναι στην περιοχή, και λόγω των
κλιματολογικών συνθηκών, τεράστιο.

Λαϊκές οργανώσεις αναφέρουν δολοφονικές πρακτικές των σωμάτων των καραμπινιέρων και την ενεργοποίηση χουντικών
νόμων με τους οποίους διώκονται μέχρι στιγμής 22 συλληφθέντες.

Ερωτάται η Αντιπρόεδρος και Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος Catherine Ashton αν καταδικάζει τις απαράδεκτες τρομοκρατικές
ενέργειες της κυβέρνησης της Χιλής σε βάρος των κινητοποιήσεων και των δικαίων αιτημάτων του λαού της περιοχής της
Aysen.

**Απάντηση της Ύπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Ιουνίου 2012)_

Η Επιτροπή και η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος/Αντιπρόεδρος (ΥΕ/ΑΠ) παρακολούθησαν με προσοχή το κίνημα διαμαρτυρίας στην
περιφέρεια Aysén στο νότο της Χιλής, το οποίο συντονίστηκε από το κοινωνικό κίνημα για την περιφέρεια Aysén (MSPRA)
και άρχισε στις αρχές Φεβρουαρίου 2012. Μετά από διαβουλεύσεις μεταξύ των αρχών της Χιλής και του MSPRA, τα μέρη
υπέγραψαν συμφωνία στις 23 Μαρτίου 2012 που περιλάμβανε δεσμεύσεις σχετικά με την υγεία, την παιδεία, τη
συγκοινωνιακή σύνδεση, τις υποδομές και τις επιδοτήσεις υγρών καυσίμων και καυσόξυλων για τους κατοίκους της Aysén,
και έχει συμφωνηθεί χρονοδιάγραμμα για την εφαρμογή των δεσμεύσεων αυτών.

Η ΥΕ/ΑΠ σημειώνει ότι το εθνικό ινστιτούτο για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα (INDH) της Χιλής εξέδωσε εκθέσεις σχετικά με
δύο ανεξάρτητες αποστολές παρακολούθησης τις οποίες πραγματοποίησε στην Aysén μετά από αίτημα του MSPRA, στις
22-25 Φεβρουαρίου και στις 13-17 Μαρτίου αντίστοιχα, οι οποίες αναφέρουν ότι κάποιοι διαδηλωτές, άλλα μέλη του
κοινού και αστυνομικοί υπέστησαν σωματικές βλάβες κατά τη διάρκεια των διαδηλώσεων. Το INDH, τόνισε ότι η υποχρέωση
των κρατών να διατηρούν τη δημόσια τάξη δεν υπερτερεί της υποχρέωσης τους να σέβονται και να εξασφαλίζουν τα
ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, εξέφρασε την ανησυχία του σχετικά με τη συμπεριφορά των ειδικών δυνάμεων της
στρατιωτικοποιημένης αστυνομίας (Fuerzas Especiales de Carabineros), και έκανε σχετικές συστάσεις προς τις αρμόδιες
αρχές της Χιλής. Μετά από την παρέμβαση του INDH, το Υπουργείο Εσωτερικών απέσυρε τις κατηγορίες που είχε απαγγείλει
βάσει του νόμου περί εσωτερικής ασφάλειας εναντίον 22 διαδηλωτών, απόφαση που επιδοκιμάστηκε από το MSPRA. Καθότι
βρέθηκε λύση μέσω διαπραγματεύσεων και οι διαδηλώσεις σταμάτησαν, και έχοντας υπόψη τον αποτελεσματικό ρόλο του
εθνικού ινστιτούτου για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα στην διερεύνηση των εικαζόμενων παραβιάσεων των ανθρωπίνων
δικαιωμάτων και στην πραγματοποίηση των σχετικών διαβημάτων προς τις αρχές, η ΥΕ/ΑΠ θεωρεί ότι δεν απαιτείται καμία
περαιτέρω ενέργεια.

C 124 E / 60 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003201/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Repression of the protest movement of Aysen inhabitants

As reported in a _communiqué_ from the Communist Party of Chile, the government of President Sebastian Piñera is
trying, with the assistance of laws on ‘state security’ dating from the Pinochet era, to deal with the peaceful protest
movement of the inhabitants of Aysen in Patagonia, in southern Chile.

Leaders of the Socialist People’s Front of Aysen have warned that repression will not end the struggle. The protest
movement by local residents is seeking solutions to grassroots problems concerning education, health, decent wages
and an answer to inflation, together with infrastructure and a road link to the rest of the country. The cost of living in
the region is colossally high, partly owing to the climatic conditions.

Grassroots organisations refer to murderous practices by police units and the enforcement of laws passed by the
military _junta_, under which there have been prosecutions of 22 of those arrested so far.

In view of this:

Does the High Representative/Vice-President Baroness Ashton condemn the unacceptable terrorist practices adopted
by the Chilean Government in clamping down on these protest movements and on the just demands of the people of
the Aysen region?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 June 2012)_

The Commission and the HR/VP followed closely the protest movement in Chile’s southern Aysén region that was
coordinated by the Social Movement for the Aysén Region (MSPRA) and began in early February 2012. Following
talks between the Chilean authorities and the MSPRA, the parties signed an agreement on 23 March 2012 containing
commitments relating to health, education, employment, connectivity, infrastructure and fuel and firewood subsidies
for the inhabitants of Aysén; and a timetable was agreed for their implementation.

The HR/VP notes that Chile's National Institute for Human Rights (INDH) undertook two independent observation
missions in Aysén at the request of the MSPRA, from 22 to 25 February 2012 and 13 to 17 March 2012 respectively,
reporting that some protestors, other members of the public and police officers sustained injuries during the protests.
The INDH underlined that a state’s obligation to maintain public order does not outweigh its duty to respect and
guarantee human rights; expressed concern about the behaviour of the special forces of the militarised police (Fuerzas
Especiales de Carabineros); and made relevant recommendations to the respective Chilean authorities. Following the
intervention of the INDH, the Ministry of the Interior has dropped charges brought under the Law on State Security
against 22 protestors, a decision which was welcomed by the MSPRA. As a negotiated solution has been found and
the protests have ceased, and having regard to the effective role of the National Institute for Human Rights in
investigating alleged human rights abuses and making relevant interventions with the authorities, the HR/VP does not
consider any further action is required.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 61

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003202/12**

**to the Commission**
**Robert Sturdy (ECR)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Effects of the ETS on global trade

Four of the EU’s major trading partners, China, India, Russia and the US, have all warned of possible trade retaliation
over the highly restrictive and costly European Emissions Trading Scheme.

Chinese airlines have already cancelled GBP 8.8bn of orders for European aircraft following the introduction of the
charges, which came into effect on 1 January 2012.

— During the consultation phase of drafting the ETS regulation did the Commission receive any indications from our
trading partners, especially concerning possible reprisals against the EU?

— Has the Commission engaged in any high-level discussions bilaterally or at multilateral level with these countries
in the hope of finding a compromise solution in order to prevent a trade war?

— Has the Commission carried out any internal or external impact studies to weigh up the environmental benefits
versus the economic ramifications of the scheme in the light of these complaints? If so, can the Commission share the
details of its consultations and findings?

— Has the Commission carried out any assessment of the potential impact this regulation will have on transport
routes, European transfer hubs, and consumer choice and flight costs?

— Has the ETS been raised as a potential barrier to trade during the ongoing negotiations for a deep and
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the EU and India? If so, can the Commission offer details of these
discussions, and if and how negotiators plan to address these concerns?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 May 2012)_

1. The EU has sought to actively engage with third countries on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions from
aviation from an early stage. In 2004, States in ICAO endorsed emissions trading and unanimously agreed to pursue
its implementation through national or regional systems. EU policy is following precisely that approach.

2. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E‐011613/2011 by
Ms Lynne ( [1] ).

3 and 4. The Commission has carried out a full impact assessment on the extension of the EU ETS to aviation. The
information required by the Honourable Member is available on the Commission's website ( [2] ).

The Commission would further refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E‐006692/2011 by
Mr Kamall ( [3] ).

5. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E‐011613/2011 by
Ms Benova ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/aviation/docs/sec_2006_1684_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.

C 124 E / 62 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003206/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Dramatic events of 7 February 2012 in the Maldives: security forces allegedly grab power in a coup
d'état, forcing President Mohamed Nasheed to resign

What political support can the Commission offer to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations in
highlighting the dramatic events in the Maldives on 7 February 2012, when the security forces allegedly grabbed
power in a coup d’état, forcing President Mohamed Nasheed to resign?

The EEAS is asked to look into reports that:

1. the nascent democracy of the Maldives has been severely curtailed since the new government led by former
Vice-President Waheed seized power with the help of rogue police and military elements;

2. Members of Parliament have been severely beaten or stripped of their seats by the corrupt judiciary on dubious
charges, and the elected President, Mohamed Nasheed, has had an arrest warrant issued against him on charges
of alcohol possession, which will be used later to stop him from running for election again;

3. the continued extremist religious rhetoric of the new regime gives further cause for concern.

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2012)_

The EU has been supporting the democratic transition in the Maldives since before the 2008 elections and continues
to engage actively on democratic governance in the Maldives.

The EU Head of Delegation (HoD) in Sri Lanka, also accredited to the Maldives, together with the EU Missions and
other like-minded countries, is in contact with political forces and government authorities and continues to advocate
for calm and for the restoration of the democratic process, including early elections and an independent inquiry into
the transfer of power. This diplomatic approach includes missions to the Maldives and frequent meetings with
political actors on visits to Colombo.

In parallel, the European External Action Service (EEAS) Headquarter (HQ) is in contact with UN and Commonwealth
representatives in order to ensure a coordinated and effective approach, and is regularly in touch with the Maldives'
Ambassador to the EU in Brussels. In these contacts, EEAS and EU HoD are stressing the importance of respect for the
constitution, the rule of law and human rights, which are central to the process of democratic transition.

EU HoD and EEAS HQ are aware that religion and religious radicalization have been used, and continue to be used, as
a political tool in the Maldives.

The Honourable Member may refer to the High Representative/Vice-President's declaration released on behalf of
the EU calling on all parties to refrain from violence, inflammatory rhetoric and any provocative actions which could
threaten the future of democracy in the Maldives (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/index_en.htm; A 68/12 dated
21 February 2012).

The Honourable Member may also refer to HR/VP Ashton's recent declaration released on behalf of the EU on
20 March 2012 (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/index_en.htm).

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 63

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003207/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which in ‘special circumstances’, and allegedly in the
interest of public morality, allows rapists to marry their underage victims

Can the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Catherine
Ashton, say what pressure is being exerted on Prime Minister Benkirane to repeal Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal
Code, which in ‘special circumstances’, and allegedly in the interest of public morality, allows rapists to marry their
underage victims?

Would the EEAS agree that it is unacceptable and scandalous that:

1. many underage girls are pressured into marriage to protect their families from social stigma?

2. the rapist often puts physical and psychological pressure on his underage victim to consent to marriage so as to
avoid prosecution and imprisonment?

3. the victim giving consent to marriage absolves the crime of rape?

4. the burden of proof often remains on the underage victim, who can be prosecuted for immorality if she fails to
prove that she was attacked?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 June 2012)_

The Commission considers that Morocco is making general progress towards greater compliance with human rights
principles. In particular, the new Constitution includes significant measures with regard to human rights and
fundamental freedoms, such as the creation of the National Council for Human Rights. The Commission, however,
agrees that further improvements are needed, in particular in the area of gender equality and the fight against gender
discrimination.

As regards efforts to combat violence against women, this issue is explicitly covered in the new EU‐Morocco Action
Plan which is currently being negotiated in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In particular, it
includes among its priorities, the reform of the criminal code and the adoption of a law on marital abuse.

Furthermore, the Commission is launching a sector reform programme (covering 2012-2015) supporting the
Government’s Gender Equality Action Plan (Agenda Gouvernemental de l'Egalité), worth EUR 45 million. The
programme will support efforts to combat violence against women, strengthen gender equality in policy-making, and
provide capacity building, education and training for legal professionals and women generally on these issues.

Respect for human rights is at the heart of the dialogue with Morocco and consequently this issue is regularly
addressed in the meetings of the relevant joint bodies established under the EU Morocco Association Agreement.
Moreover, the Advanced Status, to which Morocco has acceded in its relations with the EU, implies that progress is
being made in this area and the EU is committed to ensuring close follow up in this regard. The High
Representative/Vice-President, in particular, expects Morocco to implement fully the principle of parity enshrined in
the new Constitution.

C 124 E / 64 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003211/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE)**

_(26 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Impianto di combustione a biomasse a Menfi (provincia di Agrigento): contrarietà di popolazione e autorità
locali e lacune dell'iter autorizzativo

L'11.1.2006 la ditta Tre Tigli s.r.l. ha presentato istanza all'Assessorato regionale per ottenere l'autorizzazione
integrata ambientale, ai sensi del decreto legislativo 59/2005, per la realizzazione di un impianto da 15 MW per la
produzione di energia elettrica tramite la combustione di biomasse nel territorio del comune di Menfi (contrada
Feudotto-Genovese), senza avere preventivamente informato la cittadinanza locale, come previsto dalle procedure
per la realizzazione di impianti industriali e dalla convenzione di Aarhus. Il 30.5.2007 l'Assessorato regionale
Territorio e Ambiente ha rilasciato l'autorizzazione integrata ambientale con 41 prescrizioni, tali da far ritenere
inopportuno il suddetto rilascio. Il 10.7.2007 la Commissione Provinciale per la Tutela Ambientale di Agrigento
(Regione Sicilia) ha inviato una nota alla ditta proponente il progetto, chiedendo delucidazioni riguardo al fatto che
l'impianto proposto, indicato come impianto a biomasse, presenta caratteristiche tecniche che, secondo le linee guida
regionali, sono simili a quelle di un inceneritore. Appare evidente, anche in questo caso, l'uso improprio del termine
«centrale a biomassa» in quanto si tratta di fatto di un inceneritore. Il 12 gennaio 2008 l'associazione «Menfi Vive», le
cantine Settesoli, il WWF Italia, l'Unione Agricoltori e diversi cittadini hanno presentato ricorso al TAR (Tribunale
amministrativo regionale) della Sicilia avverso il decreto dell'assessorato col quale è stata rilasciata l'autorizzazione. Il
ricorso risulta ad oggi pendente. Il 14.2.2008 il Sindaco di Menfi, dando seguito a diverse delibere del Consiglio
Comunale, ha presentato ricorso straordinario al Presidente della Regione Siciliana avverso l'autorizzazione integrata
ambientale, per violazione degli obblighi di annuncio pubblico del progetto ai fini della consultazione e della
partecipazione della popolazione e dei soggetti interessati all'iter autorizzativo. Il 6.3.2012 si è celebrato un ulteriore
Consiglio Comunale Aperto per ribadire la netta ed unanime contrarietà alla realizzazione del suddetto impianto a
biomasse; l’evento ha visto la partecipazione di numerosi cittadini singoli e di cinquanta associazioni variamente
rappresentative della maggioranza dei cittadini di Menfi, che hanno inviato una lettera alla Tre Tigli s.r.l. per invitarla
ad abbandonare definitivamente il progetto.

Si chiede pertanto alla Commissione se, alla luce dei fatti esposti, ritiene di intervenire presso le autorità competenti
per ottenere maggiori informazioni e per garantire la piena e corretta partecipazione della popolazione alle scelte che
riguardano il territorio, nel rispetto delle normative e delle convenzioni vigenti.

**Risposta data da Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(29 maggio 2012)_

Considerato che le informazioni comunicate dall'onorevole parlamentare non sono abbastanza particolareggiate e
dato che la capacità menzionata dell'impianto in questione può riferirsi sia al consumo, sia alla produzione, la
Commissione non è in grado di fornire una risposta esaustiva all'interrogazione.

Un impianto alimentato a biomasse con potenza termica nominale inferiore a 50 MW non rientrerebbe nell’ambito di
applicazione della direttiva 2008/1/CE sulla prevenzione e la riduzione integrale dell'inquinamento ( [1] ) né della
direttiva 2001/80/CE concernente la limitazione delle emissioni nell’atmosfera di taluni inquinanti originati dai
grandi impianti di combustione ( [2] ). Rientrerebbe tuttavia nell’allegato II della direttiva 2011/92/UE, concernente la
valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati ( [3] ) e spetterebbe quindi allo Stato
membro stabilire se tale valutazione debba esser eseguita.

Qualora l'impianto effettui l'incenerimento o il coincenerimento dei rifiuti può anche rientrare nell'ambito della
direttiva 2000/76/CE ( [4] ). È tuttavia opportuno osservare che, a norma dell'articolo 2, paragrafo 2, sono esclusi
dall'ambito di applicazione della direttiva in questione taluni rifiuti, come i rifiuti vegetali derivati dall'agricoltura e
dalla silvicoltura nonché alcuni tipi di rifiuti lignei.

Tenuto conto dei procedimenti giudiziari nazionali in corso nei confronti dell'impianto in questione, in questa fase la
Commissione non intende adottare ulteriori azioni.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 24 del 29.1.2008, pag. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) GU L 309 del 27.11.2001, pag. 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) GU L 26 del 28.1.2012, pag. 1.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) GU L 332 del 28.12.2000, pag. 91.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 65

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003211/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sonia Alfano (ALDE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Biomass combustion plant in Menfi (province of Agrigento): opposition of the population and local
authorities and shortcomings in the authorisation process

On 11 November 2006, the company Tre Tigli s.r.l. submitted an application to the regional planning office to obtain
an integrated environmental permit, pursuant to Legislative Decree No 59/2005, to construct a 15 MW electricity
generation plant powered by biomass combustion in the municipality of Menfi (Feudotto-Genovese district). This was
done without having given prior notification to the local population, as stipulated by the procedures for the
construction of industrial plants and by the Aarhus Convention. On 30 May 2007, the regional planning and
environment office issued the integrated environmental permit with 41 conditions, such as to make issuing the
permit seem inappropriate. On 10 July 2007, the Agrigento provincial environmental protection committee (region
of Sicily) sent a note to the company that proposed the project, asking for explanations regarding the fact that the
proposed plant, indicated as a biomass plant, had technical characteristics that, according to regional guidelines, were
similar to those of an incinerator. It seems clear, in this case, too, that the term ‘biomass plant’ has been used
inappropriately, since this is in fact an incinerator. On 12 January 2008, the Menfi Vive association, the Settesoli wine
growers’ association, WWF Italy, the farmers’ union and several citizens submitted an appeal to the regional
administrative court of Sicily against the regional office’s decree issuing the permit. The appeal is currently pending.
On 14 February 2008, the Mayor of Menfi, following on from several decisions of the municipal council, submitted a
special appeal to the President of the Region of Sicily against the integrated environmental permit, on account of
violation of the obligations to notify the public of the project for the purposes of consultation and participation of the
population and other interested parties in the authorisation process. Another open municipal council meeting was
held on 6 March 2012 to reiterate the clear and unanimous opposition to the construction of the aforementioned
biomass plant. Many individuals attended the event, as well as 50 associations representing various interests of the
majority of Menfi's citizens, who had sent a letter to Tre Tigli s.r.l. to call on it to abandon the project once and for all.

Can the Commission therefore say whether, in view of the above, it intends to call on the competent authorities to
obtain more information and to guarantee the full and proper participation of the population in choices regarding the
region, in compliance with the legislation and conventions in force?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2012)_

As the information provided by the Honourable Member does not provide sufficient detail, and given that the
mentioned capacity of the plant concerned may refer to either its input or output, the Commission cannot provide a
comprehensive answer to the question.

A biomass fuelled plant with a rated thermal input below 50 MW would not fall under the scope of
Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control ( [1] ) nor Directive 2001/80/EC on the
limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants ( [2] ). It would however fall under
Annex II of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment ( [3] ) and the Member State would, therefore, have to determine whether such an assessment should be
undertaken.

Should the installation actually incinerate or co-incinerate waste it may also fall under Directive 2000/76/EC on the
incineration of waste ( [4] ). However, it should be noted that there are certain wastes that are excluded under Article 2(2)
from the scope of this directive including vegetable waste from agriculture and forestry and certain types of wood

waste.

Given the ongoing national legal proceedings pending for the installation concerned the Commission does not intend
to take further action at this stage.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 24, 29.1.2008.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 309, 27.11.2001.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 332, 28.12.2000.

C 124 E / 66 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003212/12**

**do Rady**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(26 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Rozporządzenie zmieniające dyrektywę 2001/18/WE w zakresie umożliwienia państwom członkowskim
ograniczenia lub zakazania uprawy GMO na swoim terytorium

W dniu 5 lipca 2011 r. Parlament Europejski większością głosów przyjął rezolucję legislacyjną w sprawie wniosku
dotyczącego rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady zmieniającego dyrektywę 2001/18/WE w zakresie
umożliwienia państwom członkowskim ograniczenia lub zakazania uprawy organizmów zmodyfikowanych
genetycznie na swoim terytorium (COM(2010) 0375 – C7-0178/2010)

— Proszę o informację, kiedy można spodziewać się porozumienia w Radzie w sprawie przyjęcia wyżej
wymienionego rozporządzenia?

— Które państwa członkowskie popierają, a które sprzeciwiają się tej propozycji? Jakie jest stanowisko Rządu Polski
w tej sprawie?

**Odpowiedź**
_(6 czerwca 2012 r.)_

Odpowiadając na zadane pytanie, Rada może uaktualnić informacje, które przekazała Panu Posłowi w marcu 2012 r.
w związku z jego pytaniem wymagającym odpowiedzi na piśmie (E-001718/2012).

9 marca 2012 r. Rada podczas debaty jawnej przedyskutowała wniosek kompromisowy ( [1] ) przygotowany przez
prezydencję po ustaleniach technicznych, których dokonano w styczniu i lutym 2012 r. Kompromisowy tekst
prezydencji wynikał z ostatnio uzgodnionego ustawodawstwa UE w zakresie produktów biobójczych ( [2] ).

Propozycje prezydencji spotkały się z dużym poparciem, lecz w Radzie wciąż prowadzone są dyskusje zmierzające
do osiągnięcia porozumienia ogólnego.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 7153/12.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 17197/11.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 67

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003212/12**

**to the Council**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for Member States to restrict or prohibit
the cultivation of GMOs in their territory

On 5 July 2011 the European Parliament adopted by majority vote a legislative resolution on the proposal for a
regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for
Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms in their territory (COM(2010)
0375 — C7‐0178/2010).

— When can an agreement be expected in the Council on the adoption of the abovementioned regulation?

— Which Member States are in favour, and which oppose this proposal? What is the Polish Government’s position
on this matter?

**Reply**
_(6 June 2012)_

By way of response, the Council can provide an update to the information it provided to the Honourable Member in
March 2012 in response to Written Question (E‐001718/2012).

On 9 March 2012, the Council held a public debate focused on a compromise proposal ( [1] ) drawn up by the
Presidency in the light of technical discussions held in January and February 2012. The Presidency compromise text
was inspired by recently agreed EU legislation on biocidal products ( [2] ).

Whilst there was significant support for the Presidency's proposals, discussions are continuing within the Council
with the aim of reaching an overall agreement.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 7153/12.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 17197/11.

C 124 E / 68 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003213/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Desenvolvimentos do Acordo UE-Mercosul

Tendo em conta que:

—
As relações UE-Mercosul se baseiam no Acordo-Quadro Inter-Regional de Cooperação, em vigor desde julho
de 1999, e que desde então a UE pretende criar uma associação birregional, que a longo prazo conduzirá ao
estabelecimento de uma zona de comércio livre;

—
O Mercosul é o quarto bloco económico do mundo, onde aparecem economias emergentes com grande
potencial de crescimento, como o Brasil e a Argentina;

—
Apesar de a crise económica e financeira ter tido um impacto menor nesta região comparativamente com a
Europa, esta provocou um abrandamento do processo de integração regional;

—
As negociações com o Mercosul foram relançadas em 2010 pela Presidência Espanhola e que não está previsto
um prazo-limite para a respetiva conclusão, sendo este acordo um elemento essencial para a estabilidade e o
crescimento da América Latina;

—
Tem havido uma crescente polémica contra a finalização deste acordo, devido aos efeitos que supostamente
terá no setor agrícola europeu e à necessidade de aplicar medidas compensatórias para o mesmo,

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Se já pode avançar com informações relativas ao desenvolvimento das rondas negociais sobre os vários pontos
em debate, nomeadamente as regras de origem, a propriedade intelectual, os contratos públicos, a tecnologia e
os produtos agrícolas e alimentares, a liberalização dos serviços e a questão das migrações? Já se conhecem as
percentagens de liberalização no vários domínios?

2. Pensa a Comissão incluir um capítulo referente às cláusulas ambiental, em termos fitossanitários, e social?

3. Como pretende a Comissão demonstrar à opinião pública que este acordo trará benefícios à UE e,
consequentemente, aos cidadãos da União, nomeadamente para um setor que será diretamente afetado, o setor
agrícola?

4. Já existe um prazo para a conclusão da redação do Acordo?

**Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão**

_(11 de maio de 2012)_

Estão em curso negociações com o Mercosul. Foram realizados progressos satisfatórios no que se refere à parte
normativa do acordo. Em relação às regras de origem, a maior parte das regras horizontais foi acordada, estando
atualmente em curso trabalhos em matéria de regras específicas setoriais. Em matéria de propriedade intelectual,
incluindo as indicações geográficas, as discussões estão a avançar lentamente. Foram realizados progressos
satisfatórios em matéria de serviços e investimento e em matéria de contratos públicos. No que diz respeito aos
capítulos de cooperação política, está atualmente a ser debatido um artigo relativo à cooperação em matéria de
migração. Até agora, não se realizaram debates em matéria de acesso ao mercado para as mercadorias, pelo que, nesta
fase, não estão disponíveis dados sobre a percentagem de liberalização.

A clara intenção é que o acordo inclua um capítulo sobre medidas sanitárias e fitossanitárias e um capítulo sobre o
comércio e o desenvolvimento sustentável.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 69

A Comissão considera que este acordo poderia gerar vantagens económicas e políticas consideráveis tanto para a UE
como para o Mercosul. A este respeito, foi elaborada, em 2011, uma avaliação do impacto económico por
consultores independentes. Os resultados mostram que um Acordo UE-Mercosul acarretará um benefício líquido
global considerável para a economia da UE: o produto interno bruto (PIB) da UE deverá aumentar de 14,7 euros para
21,4 euros. Este benefício líquido no PIB da UE já tem em consideração o impacto previsto resultante da agricultura.
Em relação ao setor agrícola, uma avaliação de impacto específica mostra que o rendimento agrícola europeu sofrerá
uma redução de 0,4 %, passando para 1,2 %.

A Comissão está plenamente consciente da sensibilidade de determinados setores agrícolas e terá em conta esses
elementos ao negociar a oferta de acesso ao mercado.

Não há prazo para a conclusão do acordo, mas a UE espera que as negociações possam estar concluídas em breve.

C 124 E / 70 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003213/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Developments regarding the EU‐Mercosur Agreement

EU‐Mercosur relations are based on the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, in force since July 1999,
and the EU has been attempting since then to create a bi-regional partnership that will lead, in the long term, to a free
trade area.

Mercosur is the fourth largest economic bloc in the world and includes emerging economies with great potential for
growth, such as Brazil and Argentina.

Although the impact of the economic and financial crisis on this region has been smaller than in Europe, it has caused
the regional integration process to slow down.

Negotiations with Mercosur were relaunched in 2010 by the Spanish Presidency and no time limit has been
established for their conclusion; the projected agreement is an essential factor for stability and growth in Latin
America.

The finalisation of the agreement has become increasingly controversial, owing to the effects that it will supposedly
have on the European agricultural sector and the resulting need for compensation measures.

1. Can the Commission provide information at this stage about the progress of the negotiating rounds on the
various points being debated, particularly rules of origin, intellectual property, public procurement, technology,
agricultural and food products, the liberalisation of services and the migration issue? Are the individual liberalisation
percentages already known?

2. Is the Commission thinking of including chapters on environmental clauses — as regards plant health — and
social clauses?

3. How does the Commission intend to demonstrate to the public that this agreement will benefit the EU and,
consequently, Union citizens, particularly in one area that will be directly affected, namely agriculture?

4. Has a deadline been laid down for finalising the agreement?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 May 2012)_

Negotiations with Mercosur are ongoing. Good progress has been made on the normative part of the agreement. On
rules of origin, most of the horizontal rules have been agreed and work is now ongoing on sector specific rules. On
intellectual property, including Geographical Indications, discussions are moving slowly. Good progress has been
made on services and investment and on public procurement. An article concerning cooperation on migration is
currently being discussed in the political cooperation chapters. There have been no discussions on market access for
goods so far and no figures on the percentage of liberalisation are therefore available at this stage.

The clear intention is for the Agreement to include a chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and a chapter
on trade and sustainable development.

The Commission believes that this Agreement could generate considerable economic and political benefits for both
the EU and Mercosur. In this respect, an economic impact assessment was prepared by independent consultants in
2011. The results show that an EU‐Mercosur Agreement would deliver an overall sizeable net gain for the EU
economy: EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would increase from EUR 14.7 to EUR 21.4. This net gain in EU GDP
already takes into consideration the expected impact stemming from agriculture. For the agricultural sector, a specific
impact assessment shows that European agricultural income would be reduced by 0.4 % to 1.2 %.

The Commission is fully aware of the sensitiveness of certain agricultural sectors and will take these elements into
account when negotiating the market access offer.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 71

There is no deadline for the completion of the Agreement but the EU certainly hopes that negotiations could be
concluded soon.

C 124 E / 72 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003214/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Acțiuni periculoase de igienizare a terenurilor agricole

Peste 930 de incendii de vegetație uscată s-au înregistrat, la nivel național, în ultimele zile, în România, ca urmare a
acțiunilor de igienizare a terenurilor agricole, grădinilor și curților de vegetația uscată și resturi menajere.

Comisia este rugată sa precizeze dacă această practică poate fi considerată compatibilă cu bunele condiții agricole și
de mediu impuse de legislația europeană.

**Răspuns dat de dl Cioloș în numele Comisiei**

_(23 mai 2012)_

În temeiul articolului 6 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 73/2009 ( [1] ), statele membre trebuie să se asigure că terenurile
agricole sunt menținute în bune condiții agricole și de mediu (GAEC). În acest scop, trebuie definite standardele
enumerate în anexa III la acest regulament, care pot viza aspectul semnalat de distinsul membru.

În ceea ce privește controlul arderii vegetației uscate, autoritățile române au instituit o interdicție de ardere a miriștilor
și resturilor de vegetație ierboasă de pe terenurile agricole și o interdicție de ardere a vegetației de pe pășunile
permanente, în temeiul standardelor GAEC privind „gestionarea miriștilor” și „protejarea pășunilor permanente”.

Prin urmare, în acest cadru juridic, posibilitatea declanșării unor incendii de vegetație uscată ar trebui să fie limitată.

Cu toate acestea, în ceea ce privește aplicarea și controlul implementării GAEC, autorităților române le revine deplina
responsabilitate de a asigura verificarea efectivă a normelor de eco-condiționalitate.

Deficiențele în materie de implementare și de control al acestor norme fac obiectul unor audituri realizate de serviciile
Comisiei, care pot conduce la impunerea de corecții financiare statelor membre.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 73/2009 al Consiliului din 19 ianuarie 2009 de stabilire a unor norme comune pentru sistemele de ajutor direct pentru

agricultori în cadrul politicii agricole comune și de instituire a anumitor sisteme de ajutor pentru agricultori, de modificare a Regulamentelor (CE)
nr. 1290/2005, (CE) nr. 247/2006, (CE) nr. 378/2007 și de abrogare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1782/2003, JO L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16-99.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 73

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003214/12**

**to the Commission**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Dangerous actions in the clearing of agricultural land

More than 930 dry vegetation fires have recently been recorded throughout Romania as a result of farmland, gardens
and courtyards being cleared of dry vegetation and household waste.

Does the Commission consider this practice to be compatible with the good agricultural and environmental conduct
required under European legislation?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 ( [1] ), Member States shall ensure that agricultural land is
maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition (GAEC). For this purpose, different standards as listed
in Annex III of this same regulation have to be defined and can concern the issue raised by our honourable member.

As regards the control of the burning of dry vegetation, Romanian Authorities have set up a ban of burning of stubble
and plant remains on arable land as well as a ban of burning of vegetation on permanent pastures respectively under
GAEC ‘arable stubble management’ and GAEC ‘protection of permanent pasture’.

Therefore, in this legal framework, the possibility of dry vegetation fire should be limited.

Nevertheless, as regards the enforcement of GAEC and control in the field, the Romanian authorities have full
responsibility for assuring the effective verification of the rules under cross compliance.

Weaknesses in the implementation and control of such rules are subject to audits by Commission services and can
lead to financial corrections imposed on Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common

agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC)
No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 OJ L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16‐99.

C 124 E / 74 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003215/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Cota de izoglucoză a României

Comisia este rugată să ofere Parlamentului următoarele informații:

1. Care este cota de izoglucoză aprobată pentru România?

2. Care a fost solicitarea României în această privință la deschiderea negocierilor de aderare?

3. Care sunt cotele de izoglucoză aprobate pentru celelalte state membre?

4. Care este valoarea importurilor de produse și subproduse din această gamă, în UE, în perioada 2007-2011?

**Răspuns dat de dl Cioloș în numele Comisiei**

_(2 mai 2012)_

1. În cursul negocierilor de aderare, România a obținut o cotă de izoglucoză de 9 981 tone de substanță uscată,
după care a mai primit de trei ori cote suplimentare de 1 966 tone cu ocazia restructurării sectorului zahărului.
Ulterior, în 2009/10, România a renunțat în proporție de 100% la cotele sale de izoglucoză pentru care s-au primit
plăți. În consecință, cota actuală aprobată de izoglucoză pentru România se situează la zero și se regăsește în anexa VI
la Regulamentul 1234/2007 ( [1] ).

2. Autoritățile din România sunt singurele în măsură să ofere informații cu privire la strategia de negociere
anterioară aderării.

3. Vă rugăm să consultați anexa VI la Regulamentul 1234/2007.

4. Valoarea importurilor de izoglucoză în UE în cursul ultimilor patru ani de comercializare a fost cuprinsă între 6
și 7 milioane de euro.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 299, 16.11.2007.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 75

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003215/12**

**to the Commission**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Romania's isoglucose quota

The Commission is asked to provide Parliament with the following information:

1. What is the approved isoglucose quota for Romania?

2. What quota did Romania seek at the opening of the accession negotiations?

3. What are the approved isoglucose quotas for the other Member States?

4. What is the import value of this range of products and by-products in the EU for the period 2007‐2011?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

1. During the accession negotiations Romania obtained an isoglucose quota of 9 981 tonnes of dry matter. It
received three times additional quota of 1 966 tonnes during the restructuration of the sugar sector. Romania
subsequently renounced 100 % of its isoglucose quotas in 2009/10 for which a payment was received. As a result of
this the present approved isoglucose quota for Romania is zero and can be found in Annex VI of Regulation
1234/2007 ( [1] ).

2. The Romanian authorities only are in a position to provide information on their negotiating strategy prior to
accession.

3. Please See Annex VI of Regulation 1234/2007.

4. The import value of isoglucose into the EU during the last four marketing campaigns was between EUR 6 and
7 million.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 299, 16.11.2007.

C 124 E / 76 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003216/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Atacul armat de la colegiul evreiesc din Toulouse (Franța)

Recent, un atac armat în fața unui colegiu-liceu evreiesc din Toulouse (Franța), comis de o persoană necunoscută, s-a
soldat cu patru morți, dintre care trei copii. Comisia este rugată să comunice Parlamentului:

1. măsurile avute în vedere pentru combaterea fenomenului anti-semitismului în UE și

2. alocările de fonduri din bugetul UE, în actualul exercițiu financiar, pentru combaterea fenomenului antisemitismului în UE și

3. dacă este cazul, eficiența utilizării acestor fonduri.

**Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei**

_(15 mai 2012)_

Comisia Europeană a condamnat în repetate rânduri toate manifestările de antisemitism și se angajează să lupte
împotriva acestora cu toate mijloacele pe care le are la dispoziție în temeiul tratatelor. În ceea ce privește măsurile
concrete, Comisia ar dori să aducă în atenția distinsului deputat răspunsurile sale la întrebările cu solicitare de răspuns
scris E‐008195/2011, E‐006161/2011 și E‐000943/2011 ( [1] ).

Referitor la finanțarea UE în vederea combaterii antisemitismului, există mai multe programe de finanțare care pot
contribui la atingerea acestui scop ( [2] ). Programul „Drepturi fundamentale și cetățenie” are printre obiectivele sale
generale „lupta împotriva rasismului, xenofobiei și antisemitismului și promovarea unei mai bune înțelegeri
interconfesionale și interculturale și a unei toleranțe sporite pe întreg teritoriul Uniunii Europene”. Cererea curentă de
granturi pentru acțiuni, care tocmai a fost închisă, prevede un pachet financiar în valoare de 20 975 de milioane EUR,
care acoperă și această prioritate, pe lângă altele. În evaluarea intermediară a programului prezentată în anul 2011 s-a
concluzionat că în perioada 2007‐2009, 50 % din fondurile alocate au fost destinate proiectelor legate de acest
obiectiv.

În plus, acțiunea 4 „Memoria europeană activă” din cadrul programului „Europa pentru cetățeni”, care se referă la
comemorarea victimelor regimului nazist și stalinist, are ca obiectiv „promovarea acțiunilor, a dezbaterilor și a
reflecției în legătură cu cetățenia europeană și democrația, valorile comune, istoria și cultura comună” și „apropierea
Europei de cetățenii săi prin promovarea valorilor și a realizărilor Europei, conservând în același timp memoria
trecutului său”. Prin intermediul acțiunii 4 sunt finanțate în fiecare an aproximativ 50 de proiecte ( [3] ). În 2011, bugetul
pentru această acțiune a fost de 1,7 milioane EUR, iar bugetul pentru 2012 este de 2,4 milioane EUR.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Pentru mai multe informații despre diversele programe de finanțare, a se vedea, de exemplu, site-ul DG Justiție la adresa:

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/racism-xenophobia/index_en.htm

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Printre beneficiari se numără Comitetul Mauthausen din Austria, Mémorial de la Shoah din Franța, Terezin Initiative Institute, Roma Press Centre

Association, Comité International de Dachau, Lidice Memorial, Irish Holocaust Education Trust și Muzeul de Stat Auschwitz-Birkenau.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 77

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003216/12**

**to the Commission**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Armed attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse (France)

Recently, an armed attack in front of a Jewish school in Toulouse (France), committed by an unknown assailant
claimed the lives of four victimis, including three children.

Can the Commission indicate to the Parliament:

1. the measures envisaged for combating anti-Semitism in the EU;

2. the EU budget appropriations earmarked for combating anti-Semitism in the EU in the current financial year;

3. how efficiently any such funds are being deployed?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

The European Commission has repeatedly condemned all manifestations of anti-Semitism and is committed to
fighting against them with all means available to it under the Treaties. As for concrete measures, the Commission
would refer the Honourable Member to its replies to Written Questions E‐008195/2011, E‐006161/2011 and E‐
000943/2011 ( [1] ).

Concerning EU funding to combat anti-Semitism, there are several financing programmes that can contribute to this
end ( [2] ). The Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme has among its general objectives ‘to fight against racism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism and to promote a better interfaith and intercultural understanding and improved
tolerance throughout the European Union’. The current call for action grants, which has just closed, provides for an
envelope of EUR 20 975 million, covering this priority besides others. The interim evaluation of the programme
presented in 2011 concluded that in 2007-2009 50 % of the funds granted were dedicated to projects related to this
objective.

In addition, Action 4 ‘Active European Remembrance’ of the Europe for Citizens Programme, which deals with
commemorating the victims of Nazism and Stalinism, aims to foster ‘action, debate and reflection related to European
citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history and culture’ and to bring ‘Europe closer to its citizens by
promoting Europe’s values and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past’. Around 50 projects are
financed through Action 4 every year ( [3] ). In 2011, the budget for this Action was EUR 1.7 million; the budget for
2012 is EUR 2.4 million.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) For more information on different financing programmes, see for instance DG Justice website at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental
rights/racism-xenophobia/index_en.htm

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Beneficiaries include among others the Mauthausen Committee Austria, the Mémorial de la Shoah France, the Terezin Initiative Institute, the

Roma Press Centre Association, the Comité International de Dachau, the Lidice Memorial, the Irish Holocaust Education Trust, and the
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum.

( **|**

C 124 E / 78 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003218/12**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Potencial aumento dos impostos e adoção de quotas para vinhos importados

Notícias recentes dão conta de que, devido à pressão exercida por algumas associações de produtores nacionais, o
governo brasileiro — nomeadamente, a Secretaria de Comércio Exterior do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria
e Comércio Exterior — estuda neste momento a possibilidade de aumentar substancialmente, talvez mesmo duplicar,
a carga fiscal que incide sobre vinhos importados e de estabelecer quotas para os produtos de cada país exportador. A
ser adotada, esta medida penaliza gravemente os produtores e exportadores de vinhos europeus e implicará um
retrocesso nos esforços entretanto desenvolvidos, tendentes a uma maior liberalização das trocas comerciais entre o
Brasil e a União Europeia.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

—
Tem conhecimento deste potencial aumento dos impostos? Não considera que os vinhos europeus são já
sujeitos a uma carga fiscal muito considerável por parte do Brasil?

—
Confirma a tendência de crescimento do setor vitivinícola brasileiro e que esta tem convivido com a
importação de vinhos estrangeiros, entre os quais os europeus? Qual a percentagem de crescimento deste setor?
Crê ser justificada a possibilidade de adoção de «salvaguardas» por parte de um setor em expansão? Confirma
que mais de 70 % do vinho consumido no Brasil é produzido no país?

—
Como avalia o impacto potencial de semelhante medida na produção e nas exportações europeias?

—
Não considera que a imposição de medidas protecionistas, para além de afetar grandemente os produtores e
exportadores europeus, diminui o incentivo para a melhoria da qualidade do vinho brasileiro e apenas
contribuirá para reforçar a quota de mercado dos vinhos de alguns países sul-americanos que deverão ficar
isentos desse aumento de impostos e que constituem já a grande maioria das importações vínicas do Brasil?

—
Contactou as autoridades brasileiras a este propósito? Em caso afirmativo, que respostas obteve? Que medidas
tomou, ou prevê tomar, neste âmbito de molde a procurar evitar a adoção de semelhante medida ou a minorar
o seu impacto?

**Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloș em nome da Comissão**

_(4 de maio de 2012)_

Os serviços pertinentes da Comissão estão a par da situação, tendo já reagido a nível técnico e político. A Comissão
está a acompanhar todas as diligências legais do Brasil e prepara a contestação da motivação das medidas. Em ofício
do Comissário responsável pela Agricultura e o Desenvolvimento Rural, de 15 de março, evocam‐se os
compromissos assumidos pelas autoridades brasileiras nas reuniões do G20, nomeadamente no sentido de se
absterem de adotar medidas protecionistas do comércio.

As exportações de vinho para o Brasil são um mercado fundamental para os produtores europeus. O mercado
vitivinícola brasileiro está em franca expansão, com quase 250 milhões de litros vendidos em 2011, esperando‐se
novas grandes oportunidades em resultado das negociações ACL com o Mercosul. Assim sendo, a UE, na qualidade de
principal fornecedora das importações vínicas do Brasil, vai continuar a insistir no respeito dos compromissos do
G20. Não houve ainda resposta ao ofício enviado pelo Comissário da Agricultura e do Desenvolvimento Rural.

Os serviços pertinentes da Comissão operam estreitamente entre si sobre esta questão, tendo programado várias
reuniões de informação aos Estados-Membros e ao setor europeu sobre as medidas previstas.

O processo iniciou‐se oficialmente a 15 de março e a UE registou‐se oficialmente no sentido de ser parte interessada
no acordo e de poder contra‐argumentar. Esta argumentação deverá incluir uma análise exaustiva e todos os dados
pertinentes. Todavia, embora a UE partilhe inteiramente as preocupações do setor europeu e se proponha atuar em
conformidade, a legalidade da ação não pode ser contestada.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 79

Nesta fase, não foram adotadas medidas que possam afetar a produção ou as exportações europeias. A eventual
aplicação de medidas de salvaguarda afetaria as exportações vínicas dos produtores europeus para o mercado
brasileiro.

C 124 E / 80 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003218/12**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Wine imports: possible tax increase and imposition of quotas

It has recently been reported that, owing to pressure exerted by certain national producers’ associations, the Brazilian
Government — specifically, the Secretariat for Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign
Trade — is currently examining the possibility of substantially increasing, perhaps even doubling, the tax burden on
imported wines and of setting quotas for products from each exporting country. If adopted, this measure would
seriously penalise producers and exporters of European wines and will be a step backwards in the efforts made to date
to liberalise trade between Brazil and the European Union.

— Is the Commission aware of this potential tax increase? Does it not believe that European wines are already taxed
very heavily by Brazil?

— Can it confirm that the Brazilian wine-producing sector is growing and has been coexisting alongside imported
foreign wines, European wines included? What is the sector’s growth rate? Does the Commission consider it
legitimate for a growing sector to adopt ‘safeguards’? Can it confirm that more than 70 % of the wine consumed in
Brazil is home-produced?

— How in the Commission’s opinion are such measures likely to affect European production and exports?

— Does the Commission not believe that the imposition of protectionist measures, as well as having a major effect on
European producers and exporters, reduces the incentive for improving the quality of Brazilian wine and will serve
only to strengthen the market share of certain South American countries, which are apparently to be exempted from
the tax increase and which already account for by far the highest proportion of Brazil’s wine imports?

— Has it approached the Brazilian authorities in this matter? If so, what response has it received? What steps has it
taken or will it take in order to prevent the adoption of such measures or minimise their impact?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

The Commission services concerned are well aware of the situation and actions have already been taken, both at
technical and political level. The Commission is following all the legal steps of the procedure launched by Brazil by
preparing a submission to contest the grounds of this investigation. A letter sent by the Member of the Commission
responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development on 15th March recalled Brazilian authorities' commitments taken
in the G20 meetings, notably to refrain from taking trade protectionist measures.

Wine exports to Brazil are a key market for European producers. The Brazilian wine market is in clear expansion, with
almost 250 million litres sold in 2011, and further important opportunities expected to result from the FTA under
negotiation with Mercosur. The EU, as the main supplier for wine imports in Brazil, will therefore continue to insist
that these G20 commitments be upheld. No response has been received so far to the letter sent by the Member of the
Commission responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development.

Commission services concerned are working in close coordination in this issue and have scheduled several meetings
in order to inform Member States and European industry on the actions already envisaged.

The investigation was officially launched on 15 March and the EU officially registered to be an interested party in the
settlement and to present counter-arguments. Those counter arguments will include a full analysis and all relevant
data. Nevertheless, while the EU fully shares the concerns of European industry and will act accordingly, the legality of
launching this investigation cannot be contested.

At this stage no measure has been taken that could affect European production and exports. In the event that
safeguard measures are implemented, these would certainly affect the import of wines into the Brazilian market for
European producers.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 81

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003219/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(26 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Escuelas Europeas

Ante la inminente aprobación del presupuesto de las Escuelas Europeas para el año 2013, las asociaciones de padres
de las EE nos han comunicado su preocupación por el hecho de que los costes del actual sistema de escolarización
europeo deberían ser 12 millones más elevados que la cantidad contemplada en el proyecto presupuestario
presentado por el Consejo Superior para su aprobación los próximos días 18 a 20 de abril.

Esta posibilidad está generando preocupación entre madres, padres y profesores de los alumnos de las EE ya que,
teniendo en cuenta el aumento significativo de alumnos, las cantidades reflejadas en el proyecto de presupuesto
llevarían irremediablemente a recortes que podrían poner en peligro la calidad de la enseñanza.

Como ya ha reconocido el Parlamento Europeo en su resolución P7_TA(2011)0402 sobre el sistema de las Escuelas
Europeas, los recortes propuestos en los presupuestos de las EE constituyen una grave amenaza para la calidad de la
educación y el buen funcionamiento de las mismas y, por consiguiente, se opone a cualquier recorte presupuestario.

¿Ha tenido en cuenta la Comisión en la elaboración del presupuesto de las EE las recomendaciones contenidas en la
resolución aprobada por el PE? ¿Cómo justifica la Comisión esta mala planificación del presupuesto teniendo en
cuenta que el sistema cuenta con aproximadamente 1 000 alumnos más?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šefčovič en nombre de la Comisión**

_(4 de junio de 2012)_

La contribución financiera de la UE a las Escuelas Europeas (EE) para 2012 es de 165,4 millones EUR. El importe
previsto para 2013 en el proyecto de presupuesto para la contribución financiera de la UE a las EE es de
173,9 millones EUR, lo que representa un aumento del 5,14 % (8,5 millones EUR más) en comparación con 2012.

El presupuesto de las EE y la correspondiente contribución de la UE para 2013 se han analizado minuciosamente y se
ajustan a las necesidades de las 14 EE en 2013. Esta variación se justifica principalmente por un aumento superior al
esperado en la población de categoría 1 (850 alumnos más que en 2012), así como por un menor número de
profesores en comisión de servicios y una disminución de los salarios nacionales en algunos Estados miembros, lo
que repercute de manera directa en el aumento de la contribución financiera de la UE a las escuelas.

La dotación presupuestaria global de las escuelas, incluida la contribución financiera de la UE, fue aprobada por el
Consejo Superior de las Escuelas Europeas en su reunión de abril. Sin embargo, la contribución financiera de la UE a
las EE la aprobará de manera definitiva la autoridad presupuestaria de la UE a lo largo del año. La confirmación o
modificación de la contribución de la UE por parte del Parlamento y el Consejo, sólo se conoce, por tanto, justo antes
de que comience el ejercicio presupuestario en cuestión.

C 124 E / 82 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003219/12**

**to the Commission**
**Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ European Schools

Ahead of the imminent approval of the European Schools budget for 2013, the European Schools’ Parents
Associations have expressed disquiet because the cost figure for the current European Schools System should be
EUR 12 million higher than the amount provided for in the draft budget submitted by the Board of Governors, which
is to be approved on 18 to 20 April 2012.

This situation is causing concern among mothers, father and teachers of European Schools students, given that,
owing to the significantly higher student numbers, the amounts entered in the draft budget would lead to irreparable
cuts that could jeopardise teaching standards.

As Parliament has already recognised in its resolution P7_TA(2011)0402 on the European Schools System, the
proposed cuts in the European Schools budgets constitute a serious threat to the quality of education and the proper
functioning of the schools, and it is therefore totally opposed to budget cuts.

Did the Commission take into account the recommendations contained in the EP resolution when it drafted the
European Schools budget? How can it justify this poor budgetary planning, bearing in mind that the system has to
accommodate approximately 1 000 more students?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 June 2012)_

The EU financial contribution to the European schools (ES) for the current year 2012 is EUR 165.4 million. The
amount provided in the 2013 draft budget for the EU financial contribution to the ES is EUR 173.9 million,
representing an increase of 5.14 % (+ EUR 8.5 million) compared to 2012.

The ES budget and corresponding EU contribution for 2013 have been carefully analysed and correspond to the
needs of the 14 ES in 2013. This variation is mainly justified by a higher increase than expected in the Category c
population (+ 850 pupils compared with 2012). It is also due to less seconded teachers and to a decrease of national
salaries in some Members states, which have a direct impact on the increase of the EU financial contribution to the
schools.

The overall budget of the schools containing the EU financial contribution has been approved by the Board of
Governors of the European Schools in its April meeting. However, the EU financial contribution to the ES will only be
definitely approved later in the year by the EU budgetary authority. The confirmation or alteration by the Parliament
and Council, of the EU contribution is thus only known just before the budget year in question starts.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 83

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003220/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(26 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Tarifas de la electricidad en el Estado español

El Gobierno central español viene de anunciar que subirá el precio de la electricidad para los consumidores. El Estado
español es, según datos de Eurostat, el tercer Estado miembro (después de Malta y Chipre) donde es más cara la
energía eléctrica. Los Estados miembros con una renta por cápita superior (Alemania, Francia, Reino Unido o Italia)
tienen tarifas inferiores.

La denominación que se ha dado a esta situación se conoce como déficit tarifario. Este fenómeno se deriva de la
liberalización de las operadoras eléctricas que el Estado español realizó en base a la Ley 54/1997 de 27 de noviembre
del Sector Eléctrico como transposición de la Directiva 96/92/CE de 19 de diciembre de 1996 sobre normas
comunes para el mercado interior de la electricidad. El origen del déficit es la diferencia entre los costes de generación,
transporte y distribución reconocidos por el regulador y las tarifas minoristas que el gobierno fija para la mayor parte
de los consumidores.

Es necesario que la Comisión Europea promueva el desarrollo de una normativa que obligue a prever situaciones
como esta, así como también ofrecer soluciones mixtas que no hagan recaer este sobreprecio sobre el precio final que
pagan los consumidores. En el marco de una situación económica como la actual, las consecuencias sociales de un
aumento constante de las tarifas serían incalculables. Además, diversas organizaciones de consumidores del Estado
miembro han denunciado esta situación, que afecta a la ciudadanía en general.

¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de esta situación?

¿Establecerá la Comisión medidas para que, tal y como se recoge en el artículo 38 de la Carta de los Derechos
Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, se protejan los intereses de los consumidores?

**Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión**

_(10 de mayo de 2012)_

La Comisión está al corriente de la reciente decisión del Gobierno español de aumentar el precio de la electricidad en
un 6 %, en el marco de las reformas presupuestarias destinadas a mejorar la situación económica española. La
Comisión también ha tomado nota de la reciente aprobación en España de una ley por la que se incorpora al
ordenamiento jurídico nacional la legislación de la UE sobre el mercado interior de la electricidad (la denominada
Directiva sobre electricidad del tercer paquete energético) ( [1] ). Esta legislación sectorial de la UE reconoce que el
mercado de la energía necesita normas que garanticen la prestación de servicios públicos y protejan a los clientes
vulnerables (artículo 3 de la Directiva sobre electricidad).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 2009/72/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 13 de julio de 2009, sobre normas comunes para el mercado interior de la
electricidad y por la que se deroga la Directiva 2003/54/CE (DO L 211 de 14.8.2009).

C 124 E / 84 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003220/12**

**to the Commission**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Electricity tariffs in Spain

The Spanish central Government has recently announced its intention of increasing the price of electricity for
consumers. According to Eurostat figures, Spain is the Member State with the third highest electricity prices
(following Malta and Cyprus). Member States with a higher per capita income (Germany, France, the United Kingdom
or Italy) have lower tariffs.

This situation, known as a tariff deficit, is a result of the liberalisation of electricity providers carried out by the
Spanish Government under Law 54/1997 of 27 November on the Electricity Sector, transposing Directive 96/92/EC
of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. The deficit derives from the
difference between the production, transport and distribution costs recognised by the regulator and the retail prices
set by the government for most consumers.

The European Commission should promote legislation ensuring that situations such as this one are provided for and
offering a variety of solutions to prevent this surcharge on the final price paid by consumers. In the context of the
current economic situation, the social consequences of a constant increase in tariffs would be unthinkable.
Furthermore, various consumer organisations in the Member State have criticised this situation which affects the
population in general.

Is the Commission aware of this situation?

Will the Commission draw up measures to ensure that, in accordance with Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, the interests of consumers are protected?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 May 2012)_

The Commission is aware of the recent decision of the Spanish Government to increase the price of electricity by 6 %
as part of the state budget reforms aiming to improve Spain's fiscal situation. The Commission also took note of the
recent adoption of a law in Spain transposing European legislation on the internal electricity market (the so-called
Electricity Directive of the Third Package) ( [1] ). This sector-specific EU legislation recognises that the energy market
requires rules to ensure the provision of public services and to protect vulnerable customers (Article 3 of the
Electricity Directive).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 85

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003222/12**

**an den Rat**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(26. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Geplanter Frühwarnmechanismus im Schengen-Raum

Wegen der steigenden Anzahl illegaler Migranten in der EU steigt der Druck auf Griechenland. Sieben EU-Staaten
haben ein Forderungspaket mit sechs Punkten und 32 Einzelmaßnahmen beschlossen. Das teilten die Innenminister
Österreichs und Deutschlands — Johanna Mikl-Leitner und Hans-Peter Friedrich — vor Beginn des letzten EUMinisterrats in Brüssel mit. Zu den sieben Ländern gehören außerdem noch Frankreich, Belgien, Großbritannien, die
Niederlande und Schweden. Friedrich sprach sich für ein Rücknahmeabkommen zwischen der Türkei und der EU aus,
wandte sich aber gegen eine „generelle Visa-Erleichterung“ für Ankara. Die EU-Innenminister einigten sich bei dem
Treffen am Donnerstag auf eine Art Frühwarnmechanismus im Schengen-Raum. So soll, um Versäumnissen oder
problematischen Entwicklungen zeitgerecht vorbeugen zu können, halbjährlich eine Evaluation der Situation
erfolgen.

1. Seit wann sind dem Rat die Missstände bei der Kontrolle der griechischen Schengen-Außengrenze bekannt?

2. Worauf sind diese Missstände zurückzuführen?

3. Welche Konsequenzen zieht der Rat ansonsten aus den besagten Missständen?

4. Ist daran gedacht, Griechenland mit entsprechenden Maßnahmen dabei zu unterstützen, für eine angemessene
Kontrolle der Schengen-Außengrenze zu sorgen?

5. Wie konkret soll der erwähnte Frühwarnmechanismus funktionieren?

6. Ab wann wird dieser Frühwarnmechanismus in Kraft treten?

7. Ab wann wird es möglich sein, kurzfristige Grenzkontrollen gegenüber anderen Schengen-Ländern
durchzuführen?

8. Wie konkret soll ein „Rückübernahmeabkommen“ mit der Türkei aussehen?

9. Welche konkreten Schritte werden unternommen, um ein solches Abkommen mit der Türkei abzuschließen,
und wann werden diese Schritte unternommen?

10. Mit welchen anderen Ländern plant die Europäische Union ähnliche Rückübernahmeabkommen?

**Antwort**

_(6. Juni 2012)_

Entsprechend dem Beschluss des Exekutivausschusses vom 16. September 1998 bezüglich der Errichtung des
Ständigen Ausschusses Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen ( [1] ) bewertet der Rat regelmäßig die Einhaltung
des Schengen-Besitzstands durch die Schengen‐Staaten und gibt Emp‐fehlungen darüber ab, wie mit Mängeln
umzugehen ist, wo immer diese aufgedeckt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang haben Bewertungsausschüsse im
Jahre 2010 auch die ordnungsgemäße Um‐setzung des Schengen-Besitzstands an den Luft-, Land‐ und Seegrenzen
Griechenlands bewertet und aufgrund ihrer Ergebnisse Verbesserungsvorschläge formuliert. Der Rat hat infolge der
Bewer‐tung Empfehlungen angenommen; als Reaktion hierauf hat Griechenland im November 2010 einen
nationalen Aktionsplan „Griechenland — Schengen“ erstellt und seitdem den zuständigen Ratsgre‐mien regelmäßig
über die erzielten Fortschritte berichtet; diese Gremien überwachen die Umset‐zung zudem durch Missionen vor Ort.

Griechenland hat ferner einen nationalen Aktionsplan zur Asylreform und zur Migrationsbewälti‐gung ausgearbeitet,
den es derzeit umsetzt. Der Rat beobachtet kontinuierlich die Umsetzung so‐wohl des „Griechenland — Schengen“ —
als auch des weiteren nationalen Aktionsplans. Die im Rah‐men beider Pläne erzielten Fortschritte wurden vom Rat
(Justiz und Inneres) zuletzt auf seinen Tagungen vom 8. März ( [2] ) und vom 26./27. April 2012 ( [3] ) geprüft.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SCH/Com-ex(98)26 def., ABl. L 239 vom 22.9.2000, S. 138.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Dok. 7308/12.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Dok. 9179/12.

C 124 E / 86 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

In Bezug auf weitere noch zu ergreifende Maßnahmen möchte der Rat den Herrn Abgeordneten auf Nummer 22 der
Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates vom 23./24. Juni 2011 hinweisen, in denen dieser ( [4] ) die Einführung
eines Mechanismus forderte, „der — ohne das Prinzip des freien Per‐sonenverkehrs zu beeinträchtigen — unter
außergewöhnlichen Umständen greifen soll, in denen die Schengen-Zusammenarbeit insgesamt gefährdet ist; er sollte
eine Reihe von Maßnahmen umfassen, die schrittweise, differenziert und koordiniert angewandt werden, um einen
Mitgliedstaat zu unter‐stützen, dessen Außengrenzen einem hohen Druck ausgesetzt sind“, und „als allerletzte
Möglich‐keit“ könnte er „eine Schutzklausel (…)“ umfassen, „die es ermöglicht, ausnahmsweise eine Wie‐
dereinführung von Binnengrenzkontrollen in wahrhaft kritischen Situationen zuzulassen, in denen ein Mitgliedstaat
nicht mehr in der Lage ist, seine Verpflichtungen gemäß den Schengen-Vor‐schriften zu erfüllen“.

Der Rat und das Parlament prüfen derzeit zwei Gesetzgebungsvorschläge, die die Kommission am
16. September 2011 als Antwort auf dieses Ersuchen vorgelegt hat, d. h. einen geänderten Vorschlag für eine
Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Einführung eines Evaluie‐rungs‐ und
Überwachungsmechanismus für die Überprüfung der Anwendung des Schengen-Besitz‐stands ( [5] ) und einen
Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Änderung der Verordnung (EG)
Nr. 562/2006 zwecks Festlegung einer gemeinsamen Regelung für die vorübergehende Wiedereinführung von
Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen unter außergewöhn‐lichen Umständen ( [6] ).

Der Rat hat mehrfach betont, wie wichtig es ist, ein Rückübernahmeabkommen mit der Türkei abzuschließen ( [7] ). Die
Verhandlungen über ein derartiges Abkommen wurden von der Kommission 2011 zu Ende gebracht, das
Abkommen ist jedoch noch nicht von der EU und der Türkei unter‐zeich‐net worden. Das Europäische Parlament
wird im Anschluss an die Unterzeichnung des Abkom‐mens gemäß Artikel 218 AEUV um seine Zustimmung ersucht
werden. Der Rat hat den Sachstand in Bezug auf Rückübernahmeabkommen zwischen der EU und Drittländern mit
besonde‐rem Schwerpunkt auf der Türkei auf seiner Tagung vom 26./27. April 2012 erörtert. Der dänische Vorsitz
hat die Absicht, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt diesbezügliche Schlussfolgerungen des Rates zur Annahme
vorzulegen ( [8] ).

Der Rat hat Mandate angenommen, mit denen er die Kommission ermächtigt, Rückübernahme‐abkommen zwischen
der EU und Algerien ( [9] ), Armenien ( [10] ), Aserbaidschan ( [11] ), Belarus ( [12] ), Kap Verde ( [13] ), China ( [14] ) und Marokko ( [15] )
auszuhandeln.

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( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) EUCO 23/1/11 REV 1 Seite 9.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Dok. 14358/11.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Dok. 14359/11.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Siehe z. B. das Stockholmer Programm, das vom Europäischen Rat im Dezember 2009 verab‐schiedet wurde (ABl. C 115 vom 4.5.2010, S. 36),

oder die Schlussfolgerungen des JI-Rates vom März 2012 (Dok. 7308/12).

( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Dok. 9179/12.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) Dok. 14101/02.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) Dok. 17780/1/11 REV 1.
( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) Dok. 17781/1/11 REV 1.
( **|** ⋅12∙ **|** ) Dok. 6623/1/11.
( **|** ⋅13∙ **|** ) Dok. 10461/09.
( **|** ⋅14∙ **|** ) Dok. 14102/02.
( **|** ⋅15∙ **|** ) Dok. 11181/00.

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30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 87

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003222/12**

**to the Council**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Planned early warning mechanism in the Schengen Area

Pressure is mounting on Greece due to the increasing number of illegal migrants in the EU. Seven EU Member States
have agreed a six-point package of demands, containing 32 individual measures. This was announced by the Austrian
and German Ministers for the Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner and Hans-Peter Friedrich, before the opening of the last
meeting of the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels. The seven Member States also include France, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. Mr Friedrich spoke in favour of a readmission agreement between Turkey and
the EU, but was against a ‘general easing of visa requirements’ for Ankara. At Thursday’s meeting, the EU Ministers for
the Interior agreed to a kind of early warning mechanism in the Schengen Area. The plan was to evaluate the situation
on a six-monthly basis, so as to be able to take prompt action to prevent irregularities or problematic developments.

1. When did the Council first become aware of irregularities in relation to controls at the Schengen Area’s external
frontier in Greece?

2. What is the cause of these irregularities?

3. What other conclusions does the Council draw from these irregularities?

4. Are there plans to put appropriate measures in place to support Greece in ensuring appropriate controls at the
Schengen Area’s external frontiers?

5. How exactly is the early warning mechanism to work?

6. When is this early warning mechanism to come into force?

7. When will it be possible to implement rapid border checks on other Schengen countries?

8. What exactly will a ‘readmission agreement’ with Turkey entail?

9. What specific steps are being undertaken to conclude such an agreement with Turkey and when will these steps
be taken?

10. With which other countries is the European Union planning similar readmission agreements?

**Reply**
_(6 June 2012)_

The Council regularly evaluates Schengen Member States' compliance with the Schengen _acquis_ in accordance with
the decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation
and implementation of Schengen ( [1] ), and makes recommendations on how to deal with shortcomings wherever these
are detected. In this framework, evaluation committees also assessed in 2010 the proper implementation of the
Schengen _acquis_ at Greece's air, land and sea borders and made, based on their findings, recommendations for
improvements. In response to these recommendations adopted by the Council as a follow-up to the evaluation,
Greece drew up a National Action Plan ‘Greece — Schengen’ in November 2010 and has since then reported regularly
on the progress achieved to the competent bodies in the Council, which are also monitoring the implementation
through on-site missions.

Greece, in addition, has prepared and is implementing a National Action Plan on Asylum Reform and Migration
Management. The Council is keeping the implementation of both the ‘Greece — Schengen’ and the National Action
Plan under review. The progress being made under both plans was considered by the Justice and Home Affairs
Council most recently at its meetings on 8 March ( [2] ) and 26-27 April 2012 ( [3] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SCH/Com-ex (98) 26 def., OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, p. 138.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 7308/12.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) 9179/12.

C 124 E / 88 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

As regards further measures to be taken, the Council would like to draw the Honourable Member's attention to
point 22 of the European Council conclusions of 23‐24 June 2011 in which it ( [4] ) called for the introduction of a
mechanism ‘to respond to exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation at risk,
without jeopardising the principle of free movement of persons [which] should comprise a series of measures to be
applied in a gradual, differentiated and coordinated manner in order to assist a Member State facing heavy pressure at
the external borders’ and which ‘as a very last resort’ could include ‘a safeguard clause (…) to allow the exceptional
reintroduction of internal border controls in a truly critical situation where a Member State is no longer able to
comply with its obligations under the Schengen rules’.

The Council and the Parliament are currently examining two legislative proposals presented by the Commission on
16 September 2011 in response to this request, i.e. an amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the establishment of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the
Schengen acquis ( [5] ) and a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border
control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances ( [6] ).

The Council has on a number of occasions stressed the importance of concluding a readmission agreement with
Turkey ( [7] ). Negotiations on such an agreement were finalised by the Commission in 2011 but the agreement has yet
to be signed by the EU and the Turkish side. The European Parliament will be requested to give its consent following
signature of the agreement in accordance with Article 218 of the TFEU. The Council discussed the state of play of
readmission agreements between the EU and third countries with a particular focus on Turkey at its meeting on 26
and 27 April 2012. It is the intention of the Danish presidency to adopt Council conclusions on the matter at a later
stage ( [8] ).

The Council has adopted mandates for the purpose of authorising the Commission to negotiate readmission
agreements between the EU and Algeria ( [9] ), Armenia ( [10] ), Azerbaijan ( [11] ), Belarus ( [12] ), Cape Verde ( [13] ), China ( [14] ) and
Morocco ( [15] ).

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( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) 14358/11.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) 14359/11.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) See for example the Stockholm Programme adopted by the European Council in December 2009 (OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 36), JHA Council

conclusions of March 2012 (doc 7308/12).

( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) 9179/12.
( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) 14101/02.
( **|** ⋅10∙ **|** ) 17780/1/11 REV 1.
( **|** ⋅11∙ **|** ) 17781/1/11 REV 1.
( **|** ⋅12∙ **|** ) 6623/1/11.
( **|** ⋅13∙ **|** ) 10461/09.
( **|** ⋅14∙ **|** ) 14102/02.
( **|** ⋅15∙ **|** ) 11181/00.

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30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 89

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003223/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Πολιτική της συνοχής — κατηγοριοποίηση περιφερειών

Η πρόταση κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου (COM(2011)0615), η οποία περιλαμβάνει,
μεταξύ άλλων, γενικές διατάξεις σχετικά με την αποστολή και τους σκοπούς της πολιτικής για τη συνοχή, κατατάσσει τις
ευρωπαϊκές περιφέρειες σε τρεις κατηγορίες:

—
«τις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες», των οποίων το κατά κεφαλήν Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν (εφεξής ως
«ΑΕγχΠ») είναι κατώτερο από το 75 % του μέσου ΑΕγχΠ της ΕΕ,

—
«τις περιφέρειες μετάβασης», στις οποίες εντάσσονται όλες οι περιφέρειες με κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕγχΠ από 75 % έως 90 %
του μέσου όρου της ΕΕ-27,

—
«τις περισσότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες», οι οποίες διαθέτουν κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕγχΠ άνω του 90 % του μέσου
ΑΕγχΠ της ΕΕ-27.

Επ' αφορμή της ως άνω κατηγοριοποίησης ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Τεκμηριώνεται επιστημονικά η χρήση των προαναφερθέντων αριθμητικών ορίων του 75 % και 90 % του μέσου ΑΕγχΠ
της ΕΕ-27 ως κριτηρίου για την κατάταξη των περιφερειών στις ως άνω κατηγορίες;

2. Θεωρεί ότι είναι θεμιτή η μη περαιτέρω κατηγοριοποίηση των «περισσότερο αναπτυγμένων περιφερειών» ανάλογα με
το βαθμό υπέρβασης του ορίου 90 % του μέσου όρου της ΕΕ-27; Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, θα εξέταζε την υιοθέτηση της
προοδευτικής αύξησης των πόρων κατά κλίμακες στο εσωτερικό της κατηγορίας «περισσότερο αναπτυγμένες
περιφέρειες» π.χ. 90-100 %, 100-125 %, 125-150 %, > 150 %;

3. Θεωρεί ότι το ύψος του ΑΕγχΠ, το οποίο με βάση την παγιωθείσα πρακτική μετράται σε μέσο όρο τριετίας, αποτελεί
αντιπροσωπευτικό κριτήριο για την εκτίμηση της οικονομικής κατάστασης των περιφερειών των κρατών μελών,
δεδομένου ότι δεν περιλαμβάνει την τελευταία διετία (περίοδος 2009-2011), κατά την οποία σημαντικό μέρος των
περιφερειών, ιδίως του Ευρωπαϊκού Νότου, υφίσταται τις κοινωνικές επιπτώσεις της κρίσης; Συναφώς, θα εξέταζε τη
χρήση επικαιροποιημένων (περίοδος 2009-2011) στατιστικών στοιχείων για τη μέτρηση του ΑΕγχΠ των περιφερειών
των κρατών μελών;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(8 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Τα προβλεπόμενα κριτήρια για την ταξινόμηση των περιφερειών έχουν σκοπό να εξασφαλίσουν τη συνέχεια στην
εφαρμογή της πολιτικής συνοχής, με την επικέντρωση των προσπαθειών για την ενίσχυση των λιγότερο αναπτυγμένων
περιφερειών. Επιπλέον, πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι το όριο του 90 % για τις περιφέρειες σε μετάβαση καλύπτει τις περισσότερες
από τις πρώην περιφέρειες σύγκλισης. Συμπεριλαμβάνοντας τις περιφέρειες με παρόμοιο κατά κεφαλή ΑΕγχΠ σε σύγκριση με
τις περιφέρειες αυτές, η Επιτροπή προτείνει να εξασφαλιστεί ίση μεταχείριση και για τις δύο σειρές περιφερειών.

2. Στην κατηγορία των πιο ανεπτυγμένων περιφερειών, η Επιτροπή προτείνει ο βαθμός της ενίσχυσης να προσαρμόζεται
ανά περιφέρεια βάσει ορισμένων αντικειμενικών περιφερειακών δεικτών. Μεταξύ αυτών των δεικτών, η σχετική θέση της
περιφέρειας σε σχέση με το κατά κεφαλή ΑΕγχΠ λαμβάνεται επίσης υπόψη.

3. Η Επιτροπή προτείνει να ληφθεί υπόψη ο πιο πρόσφατος τριετής μέσος όρος του κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕγχΠ ως βάση για
τον καθορισμό της επιλεξιμότητας. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι μπορούν να ληφθούν υπόψη στοιχεία όσον αφορά το ΑΕγχΠ για τα
έτη 2007, 2008 και 2009, κάτι που θα αντικατοπτρίζει τις επιπτώσεις της κρίσης, στο μέτρο του δυνατού, σύμφωνα με τα
τρέχουσα στοιχεία που είναι διαθέσιμα.

C 124 E / 90 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003223/12**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Cohesion policy — Regional categorisation

The proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2011) 0615) that includes general
provisions on the purpose and scope of cohesion policy places European regions into three categories:

—
‘Less developed regions’ — regions whose gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is less than 75 % of the
average GDP of the EU-27,

—
‘Transition regions’ — regions with a GDP per capita between 75 % and 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27
and

—
‘More developed regions’ — regions whose GDP per capita is above 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27.

With regard to the above classifications, will the Commission say:

1. Does the use of the abovementioned limits of 75 % and 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27 as the criterion
for placing regions in these classifications have scientific backing?

2. Does it think that it is legitimate not to further break down the category of ‘more developed regions’, depending
on how far they exceed 90 % of the average GDP of the EU-27? With regard to this, would it consider gradually
scaling up resources within the category ‘more developed regions’, e.g. 90-100 %, 100-125 %, 125-150 %,
>150 %?

3. Does it think that GDP, which under established practice is measured as a three-year average, is a representative
criterion for the assessment of the economic situation of regions in the Member States, given that it does not
include the last two years (2009-2011), during which a significant number of regions, especially in southern
Europe, have been feeling the social effects of the crisis? Furthermore, would it consider using updated
statistical data (2009-2011) to measure the GDP of the regions of the Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2012)_

1. The criteria proposed for the classification of regions are intended to ensure continuity in the implementation of
cohesion policy, by concentrating the efforts on assistance of the less developed regions. In addition, it can be noted
that the limit of 90 % for transition regions covers most of the former Convergence regions. By including the regions
which have a similar GDP/head as those regions, the Commission proposes to ensure an equal treatment to both
series of regions.

2. Within the category of more developed regions, the Commission proposes to modulate the aid intensity per
region on the basis of a number of objective regional indicators. Amongst these indicators, the relative position of the
region in terms of GDP/head is also taken into account.

3. The Commission proposes to take into account the most recent three-year average of GDP/head as a basis for
determining eligibility. This means that GDP data for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 can be taken into account,
which will reflect the effects of the crisis as much as is possible with the current data availability.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 91

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003225/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Πολιτική της συνοχής και αιρεσιμότητα μακροοικονομικών όρων

Με το άρθρο 10 της πρότασης κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου (COM(2011)0615), η
οποία περιλαμβάνει, μεταξύ άλλων, γενικές διατάξεις σχετικά με την αποστολή και τους σκοπούς της πολιτικής για τη
συνοχή, προβλέπεται για πρώτη φορά η εξάρτηση της συνέχισης καταβολής των πόρων των Διαρθρωτικών Ταμείων από την
τήρηση των μακροοικονομικών όρων του Συμφώνου Σταθερότητας και Ανάπτυξης. Η εν λόγω ρύθμιση της αιρεσιμότητας
από μακροοικονομικούς όρους εισάγει ένα σύστημα ποινών σε βάρος των περιφερειών για λάθη και παραλείψεις των
αρμόδιων αρχών σε κεντρικό επίπεδο διακυβέρνησης.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Θεωρεί ότι είναι θεμιτό η μη τήρηση των μακροοικονομικών υποχρεώσεων να έχει επιπτώσεις στην εκταμίευση των πόρων
συνοχής, δεδομένου ότι σε μια χώρα που υφίσταται ήδη τις κοινωνικές συνέπειες της οικονομικής κρίσης τέτοιου είδους
κυρώσεις τροφοδοτούν περαιτέρω τον φαύλο κύκλο της ύφεσης; Επιπροσθέτως, δεν θεωρεί ότι οι αυστηρές κυρώσεις που
προβλέπονται στο πλαίσιο της οικονομικής διακυβέρνησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, σε περίπτωση μη τήρησης των
τεθειμένων μακροοικονομικών όρων, αποτελούν επαρκές μέτρο για το σκοπό αυτό; Ποιά είναι η σκοπιμότητα της εισαγωγής
επιπρόσθετων οικονομικών κυρώσεων και οι οποίες αφορούν αποκλειστικά στις χώρες της συνοχής;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(8 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η δημιουργία στενότερων δεσμών μεταξύ των ταμείων του κοινού στρατηγικού πλαισίου (ΚΠΣ) και της οικονομικής
διακυβέρνησης της Ένωσης θα εξασφαλίσει ότι η αποτελεσματικότητα των δαπανών στο πλαίσιο των ταμείων του ΚΠΣ
ερείζεται σε υγιείς οικονομικές πολιτικές. Συνεπάγεται επίσης ότι τα ταμεία του ΚΠΣ θα έχουν τη δυνατότητα, εάν χρειαστεί,
να επαναπροσανατολιστούν για να αντιμετωπιστούν τα οικονομικά προβλήματα μιας χώρας.

Ο μηχανισμός που προτείνεται βασίζεται στην ενισχυμένη συνεργασία και τον διάλογο μεταξύ της Επιτροπής και των κρατών
μελών, όταν προκύπτουν συγκεκριμένα οικονομικά προβλήματα. Είναι ισορροπημένος και έχει σταδιακό χαρακτήρα. Θα
δώσει αρκετό χρόνο στα κράτη μέλη να εφαρμόσουν τις απαραίτητες αλλαγές που συνδέονται άμεσα με τους τομείς
παρέμβασης της πολιτικής συνοχής και δεν θα υπάρξουν δημοσιονομικές επιπτώσεις σε περίπτωση συνεργασίας και
κατάλληλης δράσης από αυτά.

Σκοπός του είναι να εξασφαλίσει τη συμμετοχή των κρατών μελών σε μια διεξοδική εξέταση στρατηγικών και προγραμμάτων,
προκειμένου να εντοπίσουν τα σημεία συμφόρησης και να προβούν στις αναγκαίες προσαρμογές. Εάν πρέπει να γίνουν
αναστολές, αυτές θα είναι αναλογικές και θα λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις οικονομικές και κοινωνικές συνθήκες που επικρατούν σε
κάθε κράτος μέλος.

Οι χώρες που διέρχονται οικονομικές δυσκολίες, οι οποίες λαμβάνουν βοήθεια, μπορούν επίσης να ζητούν αύξηση του
ποσοστού συγχρηματοδότησης της ΕΕ (κατά 10 ποσοστιαίες μονάδες δηλ. έως 95 %), η οποία θα επιτρέψει επίσης την ταχεία
υλοποίηση των επενδύσεων που συμβάλλουν στην ανάπτυξη και των διαρθρωτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων.

C 124 E / 92 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003225/12**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Cohesion policy and macro-fiscal conditionality

The proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2011) 0615) includes general
provisions on the purpose and scope of the cohesion policy. Article 10 provides, for the first time, that the continued
release of Structural Funds’ resources shall be dependent on fulfilling the macro-fiscal terms of the Stability and
Growth Pact. The rules on macro-fiscal conditionality introduce a system of penalties for the regions for errors and
omissions by the competent authorities at the central level of government.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

Does it think that it is legitimate that the failure to comply with macro-fiscal obligations should have an impact on the
release of Cohesion Fund resources, given that, in a country already suffering from the social consequences of the
economic crisis, this kind of penalty will cause a further downturn? In addition, does it not think that the harsh
penalties provided for within the framework of the economic governance of the European Union for failure to adhere
to the macro-fiscal conditions imposed are an adequate measure to achieve this goal? What is the point of introducing
additional financial penalties which apply only to Cohesion Fund countries?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 May 2012)_

Establishing a closer link between the Common Strategic Framework (CSF) Funds and the economic governance of
the Union will ensure that the effectiveness of expenditure under the CSF Funds is underpinned by sound economic
policies. It also means that the CSF Funds can, if necessary, be redirected to address the economic problems a country
is facing.

The mechanism proposed is based on reinforced cooperation and dialogue between the Commission and Member
States when specific economic problems arise. It is balanced and gradual. It will allow sufficient time for the Member
State to implement necessary changes which are directly related to the areas of intervention of cohesion policy and
there will be no financial consequences in case of cooperation and adequate action by the Member State.

The intention is to engage with Member States in a thorough examination of strategies and programmes in order to
identify where bottlenecks lie and make the necessary adjustments. If suspensions are to be applied they shall be
proportionate and take into account the economic and social circumstances in the Member State.

Countries in economic difficulties, which are receiving assistance, may also request an increase of the EU co-financing
rate (by 10 percentage points i.e. up to 95 %) which would also allow more rapid implementation of growthenhancing investments and structural reforms.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 93

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003226/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Συνάρτηση της πολιτικής της συνοχής με την πρωτοβουλία «Ευρώπη 2020»

1. Δύναται να μου απαντήσει η Επιτροπή αν οι θεματικοί στόχοι των Ταμείων του Κοινού Στρατηγικού Πλαισίου (ΚΣΠ),
όπως απαριθμούνται στο άρθρο 9 της πρότασης κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου
(COM(2011)0615), υπηρετούν αμέσως το θεματικό πλαίσιο της πολιτικής της συνοχής που συνίσταται στην επίτευξη
εδαφικής, κοινωνικής και οικονομικής συνοχής, καθώς και στη σύγκλιση μεταξύ των φτωχότερων και πλουσιότερων
περιφερειών της Ευρώπης;

2. Ειδικότερα, εκτιμά ότι οι «λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες», των οποίων σημαντικό μέρος, ιδίως στα νέα κράτη
μέλη, δεν διαθέτει τις αναγκαίες υποδομές, θα είναι σε θέση να επωφεληθούν πλήρως και επί ίσοις όροις σε σχέση με τις
«περισσότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες» από τα κονδύλια που διατίθενται για την προώθηση της ανταγωνιστικότητας και της
καινοτομίας μέσω της αναπτυξιακής πρωτοβουλίας «Ευρώπη 2020»;

3. Συναφώς, η Επιτροπή δεν θεωρεί αναγκαία την εξειδίκευση των θεματικών στόχων των Ταμείων του ΚΣΠ ανά
περιφέρεια με παράλληλη συνεκτίμηση της ιδιαιτερότητας των γεωγραφικών δομών κάθε περιφέρειας, δεδομένου ότι, όπως
αναφέρθηκε ανωτέρω, τα κράτη μέλη εκκινούν από διαφορετική αφετηρία για την υλοποίηση των αναπτυξιακών στόχων της
«Ευρώπης 2020»;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Oι θεματικοί στόχοι των ταμείων του κοινού στρατηγικού πλαισίου, αφενός, συνδέονται άμεσα με τους στόχους της
στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020» για μια βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη χωρίς αποκλεισμούς που θα βασίζεται στη γνώση και αφετέρου,
ευθυγραμμίζονται πλήρως με τους στόχους της πολιτικής για τη συνοχή με σκοπό την επίτευξη κοινωνικής, οικονομικής και
εδαφικής συνοχής.

2. Οι αναπτυξιακές ανάγκες των λιγότερο αναπτυγμένων περιφερειών καλύπτουν μεγαλύτερο φάσμα από εκείνες των πιο
αναπτυγμένων περιφερειών που εκτείνεται από τις βασικές υποδομές έως την προώθηση της επιχειρηματικότητας και της
καινοτομίας. Για το λόγο αυτό, προτείνεται στην πρόταση της Επιτροπής για το επόμενο πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο
του Ιουνίου του 2011 ( [1] ), να χορηγηθεί το υψηλότερο ποσοστό χρηματοδότησης στις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες,
μεταξύ άλλων μέσω του ταμείου συνοχής, το οποίο υποστηρίζει το περιβάλλον και την υποδομή των διευρωπαϊκών δικτύων
μεταφορών.

3. Όλα τα κράτη μέλη και οι περιφέρειες πρέπει να επενδύσουν στην οικονομία της γνώσης και στην οικονομία με χαμηλές
εκπομπές άνθρακα. Οι λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες περιφέρειες, όπως υπογράμμισε ο κ. βουλευτής, χρειάζονται συνεχείς
επενδύσεις σε βασικές υποδομές. Αυτός είναι ο λόγος για τον οποίο διαφέρουν οι απαιτήσεις θεματικής συγκέντρωσης
μεταξύ των λιγότερο αναπτυγμένων και των περισσότερο αναπτυγμένων περιφερειών.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011)500 τελικό της 29ης Ιουνίου 2011.

C 124 E / 94 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003226/12**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papastamkos (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Combination of cohesion policy with the Europe 2020 initiative

1. Can the Commission say whether the thematic objectives of the Common Strategic Framework (CSF) Funds, as
listed in Article 9 of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2011) 0615),
directly relate to the thematic framework of the cohesion policy which consists in achieving territorial, social and
economic cohesion as well as convergence between Europe’s richest and poorest regions?

2. Does it think that the ‘less developed regions’, a significant number of which do not possess the required
infrastructure, especially in new Member States, will be in a position to benefit fully and on equal terms compared to
the ‘more developed regions’ from the funds made available to promote competitiveness and innovation through the
Europe 2020 growth initiative?

3. Furthermore, does it not consider it necessary to focus the thematic objectives of the CSF Funds according to
region, while taking into account the geographical characteristics of each region, given that, as mentioned above,
Member States have started from different points in implementing the Europe 2020's growth objectives?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

1. The thematic objectives for the Common Strategic Framework funds are directly linked to the Europe 2020
objectives of knowledge-based, sustainable and inclusive growth and are fully in line with the objectives of cohesion
policy to deliver social, economic and territorial cohesion.

2. Less developed regions have a broader range of development needs than more developed regions, from the
development of basic infrastructure to promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. This is reflected in the
Commission’s proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework of June 2011 ( [1] ), which proposes allocating the
highest share of funding to less developed regions, including through the Cohesion Fund, which supports
environment and TEN‐T infrastructure.

3. All Member States and regions need to invest in the knowledge-based and low-carbon economy. Less developed
regions, as the Honourable Member has underlined, need continued investments in basic infrastructure. This is the
reason why there is a differentiation in terms of the thematic concentration requirements for less developed and more
developed regions.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 500 final of 29 June 2011.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 95

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003227/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Αρχές και ουσία του κοινωνικού διαλόγου

Σε απάντησή του ο Επίτροπος κ. Rehn στην ερώτηση με αριθμό E-000889/2012 αναφορικά με την ενίσχυση της
ανταγωνιστικότητας και το μισθολογικό κόστος, σημειώνει μεταξύ άλλων: _«Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση προώθησε τον διάλογο_
_μεταξύ των κοινωνικών εταίρων, με στόχο την επίτευξη συμφωνίας για την στήριξη της ανταγωνιστικότητας, της_
_ανάπτυξης και της απασχόλησης. Η έκβαση του διαλόγου αυτού δεν ήταν ικανοποιητική όσον αφορά τη διαμόρφωση μιας_
_ελπιδοφόρας στρατηγικής, και κατόπιν τούτου, η κυβέρνηση συμφώνησε στην ανάληψη δράσης ώστε να συμβάλει στην_
_επίτευξη των συγκεκριμένων στόχων, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της θέσπισης νομοθεσίας σχετικά με τα επίπεδα των μισθών_
_που καθορίζονται στην ΕΓΣΣΕ· στη μεταρρύθμιση του συστήματος καθορισμού των μισθών και στην προώθηση της_
_επαναδιαπραγμάτευσης των συλλογικών συμβάσεων· στην αύξηση της δυναμικής των πρόσφατων μεταρρυθμίσεων στην_
_αγορά εργασίας· στην αντιμετώπιση θεμάτων κληρονομιάς σε πρώην κρατικές επιχειρήσεις· στη μείωση του μη_
_μισθολογικού κόστους εργασίας και στην καταπολέμηση της αδήλωτης εργασίας και εισφοροδιαφυγής»._ Πιστεύοντας ότι
τα αποτελέσματα ενός ελεύθερου κοινωνικού διαλόγου δεν μπορεί να χαρακτηρίζονται ικανοποιητικά ή μη εκτός και αν
υπάρχει σαφής επιθυμία για την έκβασή του, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Δεδομένου ότι υπήρξε απόλυτη συμφωνία μεταξύ των κοινωνικών εταίρων για ζητήματα που με βάση το νόμο στην
Ελλάδα καθορίζονται στο πλαίσιο του κοινωνικού διαλόγου μέσα από ελεύθερες συλλογικές διαπραγματεύσεις, πώς η
κατάσταση που περιγράφεται (ακύρωση κοινωνικής συμφωνίας και κυβερνητική παρέμβαση) συνάδει με τη διαφύλαξη
και προαγωγή του κοινωνικού διαλόγου — δέσμευση που έχει αναλάβει η Επιτροπή;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(23 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου στην απάντηση που έχει δώσει σε προηγούμενη πανομοιότυπη
ερώτηση με αριθμό E-001770/2012.

C 124 E / 96 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003227/12**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Principles and substance of social dialogue

In answer to Question E‐000889/2012 on wage costs and boosting competitiveness, Commissioner Rehn indicated:
‘The Greek Government promoted dialogue between social partners with a view to reaching an agreement to support
competitiveness, growth and employment. The outcome of that dialogue was not satisfactory in delivering a
promising strategy and the Government therefore agreed to take action to help achieve those objectives, including
legislating on the wage levels set in the NGCA; reforming the wage setting system and fostering renegotiation of
collective agreements; raising the potential of recent labour market reforms; tackling legacy issues in former stateowned enterprises; reducing non-wage labour costs and fighting undeclared work and social contribution evasion.’
Considering that the results of an open social dialogue are bound to be inadequate unless there is a clear appetite for
an outcome, will the Commission answer the following:

1. Given that there was full agreement between the social partners on issues which, under Greek law are decided
through social dialogue and open collective bargaining, how can the situation described (cancellation of the
social agreement and government intervention) as compatible with the Commission’s commitment to protect
and promote social dialogue?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member of Parliament to its answer to a previous identical Question
E-001770/2012.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 97

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003228/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Εγκληματική διαχείριση των αποβλήτων στην Περιφέρεια Αττικής

Εκατοντάδες εργαζόμενοι στους Οργανισμούς Τοπικής Αυτοδιοίκησης Αττικής κατέβηκαν αυτές τις μέρες σε απεργία
διαμαρτυρόμενοι για την παραχώρηση, μέσω σύμπραξης Δημοσίου και Ιδιωτικού Τομέα (ΣΔΙΤ), τεσσάρων μονάδων
επεξεργασίας απορριμμάτων κόστους κατασκευής 450 έως 500 εκατ. ευρώ και 3,5 δισ. ευρώ για την 25ετή λειτουργία τους.
Η όλη επένδυση θα χρηματοδοτηθεί από το πενιχρό εισόδημα της λαϊκής οικογένειας που συνεχώς συρρικνώνεται, σαν
συνέπεια της πολιτικής της συγκυβέρνησης ΠΑΣΟΚ-ΝΔ και των επιλογών της Τρόικας.

Με το έργο αυτό διαιωνίζεται η διοχέτευση του 85 %-90 % των απορριμμάτων της Αττικής για άλλα 30 χρόνια στο
βεβαρημένο Θριάσιο Πεδίο. Επιβάλλεται ένα μείγμα πανάκριβων τεχνολογιών, μαζί και αναποτελεσματικών, με κορμό τη
μεγιστοποίηση των σύμμεικτων απορριμμάτων (1 655 000 τόνοι τον χρόνο) και την επικίνδυνη για το περιβάλλον και την
υγεία αποτέφρωση των αποβλήτων.

Οι ανησυχίες ενισχύονται από τη μονοπώληση του κλάδου, όπως φαίνεται από τα στοιχεία της έκθεσης (2011/2038(ΙΝΙ)),
από τέσσερις εταιρίες: Onyx (Veolia), Sita (Σουέζ), Remondis και FCC, οι οποίες είναι παρούσες στα 2/3 των κρατών μελών
της ΕΕ και έχουν αναλάβει το 60 % της διαχείρισης των οικιακών αποβλήτων και το 75 % αυτών που παράγονται από
επιχειρήσεις.

Ποια είναι η τοποθέτηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής στα δίκαια αιτήματα των απεργών εργαζομένων στους ΟΤΑ Αττικής,
στην επιλογή ακατάλληλων τεχνολογιών επεξεργασίας απορριμμάτων υψηλού κόστους, με δυσβάστακτα ανταποδοτικά τέλη
και με σοβαρές απειλές για το περιβάλλον και τη δημόσια υγεία;

**Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(25 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η Ελλάδα είναι ένα από τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ στα οποία πρέπει επειγόντως να δημιουργηθούν υποδομές διαχείρισης των
αποβλήτων, ιδίως όσον αφορά τη διαχείριση των αστικών απορριμμάτων, προκειμένου να μειωθεί το ποσοστό υγειονομικής
ταφής και να αυξηθεί η ανάκτηση αποβλήτων και η ανακύκλωση. Το 2010, στην Ελλάδα, μόνο το 18 % των αστικών
απορριμμάτων ανακυκλώθηκε και λιπασματοποιήθηκε, ενώ το 82 % των αποβλήτων κατέληξε σε χώρους υγειονομικής
ταφής.

Το ζήτημα των ιδιωτικών ή δημόσιων συστημάτων διαχείρισης των αποβλήτων αποτελεί αρμοδιότητα των εθνικών αρχών και
δεν ρυθμίζεται σε επίπεδο ΕΕ. Η ιδιωτικοποίηση των υπηρεσιών στον τομέα της διαχείρισης των αποβλήτων δεν απαγορεύεται
από τη νομοθεσία της ΕΕ.

Όσον αφορά την προτεινόμενη τεχνολογία και τις σχετικές εγκαταστάσεις (π.χ. αποτεφρωτήρες για την Περιφέρεια Αττικής),
είναι σημαντικό να επισημανθεί ότι οι εγκαταστάσεις παραγωγής ενέργειας από απόβλητα κατατάσσονται σε υψηλότερη θέση
στην ιεράρχηση των αποβλήτων σε σύγκριση με τη διάθεση με υγειονομική ταφή, η οποία αποτελεί παραδοσιακά την
επικρατέστερη επιλογή στη συγκεκριμένη περιφέρεια. Οι εν λόγω εγκαταστάσεις πρέπει να τηρούν τις απαιτήσεις που
καθορίζονται στην οδηγία για την αποτέφρωση των αποβλήτων (2000/76/ΕΚ) ( [1] ), της οποίας ειδικός σκοπός είναι η
πρόληψη δυσμενών επιπτώσεων στην υγεία του ανθρώπου και στο περιβάλλον. Βάσει της οδηγίας-πλαισίου για τα απόβλητα
(2008/98/ΕΚ) ( [2] ), τα κράτη μέλη καλούνται να λάβουν μέτρα για να προωθήσουν τους τρόπους διαχείρισης των αποβλήτων
που θα έχουν τα καλύτερα συνολικά περιβαλλοντικά αποτελέσματα. Πρέπει να σημειωθεί ότι η πρόληψη της δημιουργίας
αποβλήτων, η επαναχρησιμοποίηση, η ανακύκλωση και η λιπασματοποίηση θεωρούνται όλες προτιμότερες από την
αποτέφρωση και την υγειονομική ταφή, σύμφωνα με την ιεράρχηση που καθορίζεται στην οδηγία. Απόκλιση από την
ιεράρχηση αυτή μπορεί να δικαιολογείται όσον αφορά συγκεκριμένες κατηγορίες αποβλήτων για λόγους τεχνικής
σκοπιμότητας, οικονομικής βιωσιμότητας και περιβαλλοντικής προστασίας.

Βάσει των πληροφοριών που διαβίβασε το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου, η Επιτροπή δεν είναι σε θέση να διαπιστώσει
παράβαση του ενωσιακού δικαίου.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 332 της 28.12.2000.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 312 της 22.11.2008.

C 124 E / 98 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003228/12**

**to the Commission**
**Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Criminal nature of waste management in the Attica region

Over the past few days, hundreds of Attica local government employees have been striking against the concession,
through a Public Private Partnership (PPP), of four waste-processing units, the construction cost of which will be
EUR 450 to EUR 500 million and EUR 3.5 billion over their 25‐year lives. The entire investment will be financed
from the meagre income of ordinary families, which is constantly shrinking as a result of the policies imposed by the
PASOK and New Democracy ruling coalition and the Troika’s decisions.

This project means that 85 %-90 % of Attica’s waste will continue to be disposed of in the already heavily polluted
Thriasian Plain for another 30 years. A combination of very expensive and inefficient technologies is proposed,
mainly for the maximisation of mixed waste (1 655 000 tonnes per year), plus waste incineration, which poses a
threat to the environment and human health.

.Such concerns are reinforced by the monopolisation of the industry, as shown by the report data (2011/2038(ΙΝΙ)) of
four companies: Onyx (Veolia), Sita (Suez), Remondis and FCC, which operate in two‐thirds of Member States and
handle 60 % of household waste and 75 % of commercial waste.

What is the Commission’s position regarding the fair demands by the striking Attica local government employees and
the choice of unsuitable, high-cost waste-processing technologies (with heavy reciprocal fees) — technologies that
seriously threaten the environment and public health?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

Greece is one of the EU Member States which urgently needs to build waste management infrastructure, particularly
for the management of municipal waste, in order to reduce the landfilling rate and increase waste recovery and
recycling. In 2010, Greece recycled and composted only 18 % of its municipal waste, while 82 % of the waste was
landfilled.

The question of private or public waste management systems is the responsibility of national authorities and is not
regulated at EU level. Privatisation of services in the field of waste management is not prohibited by EU legislation.

Regarding the proposed technology and installations (e.g. incinerators, for the region of Attica), it is relevant to point
out that waste-to-energy installations rank higher in the waste hierarchy than disposal through landfilling which has
been traditionally the predominant option in the Region. These installations have to respect the requirements laid
down in the Waste Incineration Directive (2000/76/EC) ( [1] ), which is specifically aimed at preventing detrimental
impacts on human health and the environment. Under the Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) ( [2] ) Member
States are required to take measures to encourage the waste management options that deliver the best overall
environmental outcome. It should be noted that waste prevention, re-use, recycling and composting are all
considered preferable to incineration and landfill according to the waste hierarchy established by the directive.
Departure from this hierarchy may be justified for specific waste streams due to technical feasibility, economic
viability and environmental protection.

Based on the information provided by the Honourable Member the Commission cannot establish any contravention
of the EC law.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 332, 28.12.2000.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 312, 22.11.2008.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 99

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003229/12**

**to the Commission**
**Linda McAvan (S&D)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Windows 8 and smartphones — concern that Microsoft is abusing its dominant market position

In response to previous written questions, the Commission has already commented on the concern expressed over
the exclusivity conditions that Microsoft is imposing on smartphones and other devices which run on ARM
processors, in return for certifying the devices as compatible with the Windows 8 operating system.

The Commission has said that it is difficult to assess whether or not there is a violation of EU competition rules before
any computers running on the Windows 8 operating system have been placed on the market.

Since then, Microsoft has finalised its official ‘Windows 8 Hardware Certification Requirements’ for manufacturers.
These terms and conditions explicitly disallow the disabling of the Secure Boot feature on devices which run on ARM
hardware. Is the Commission aware of these new requirements, which would prevent users from switching to a
different operating system?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 May 2012)_

In order to establish a violation of the EU competition rules (Article 102 of the Treaty), and separately from the
question of whether the behaviour at issue is abusive, it would need to be shown that Microsoft has a dominant
position in the relevant market. To date, according to the information available to the Commission, Microsoft
supports the ARM architecture mainly for its Windows mobile operating system. There are several mobile operating
systems on the market, including the widespread Android operating system, which provide similar functionalities to
Microsoft's. It therefore does not seem that Microsoft holds a dominant position on this market at this stage.

The Commission will continue to monitor Microsoft's business practices in order to ensure the full respect of EU
competition rules.

C 124 E / 100 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003230/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Linda McAvan (S&D)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Gao Zhisheng and human rights in China

Many of my constituents have raised their concern about the safety and whereabouts of human rights lawyer Gao
Zhisheng, who has reportedly been imprisoned in China after having been missing for two years.

Is the High Representative aware of the case, and will she ensure that it is raised in discussions with the Chinese
authorities?

Also, could the High Representative confirm whether a future round of the EU-China human rights dialogue has been
organised?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 June 2012)_

The HR/VP follows closely the situation of the lawyer Gao Zhisheng among other cases of human rights defenders of
concern in China.

She has issued a statement on 22 December 2011 to condemn his sentencing again to 3 years in prison after he had
been missing for 20 months. She called for Mr Gao’s immediate release and for information about his well-being and
location.

On 4 January 2012, the HR/VP spokesperson issued a statement on her behalf expressing the EU's concerns regarding
the situation of several human rights activists in China and mentioning the recent sentencing of human rights lawyer
Gao Zhisheng.

She has taken note that Mr Gao was allowed to meet with family in March 2012. Nevertheless, his situation has not
improved and remains of grave concern to the EU.

Most recently, the EU raised Mr Gao's situation at the EU‐China human rights dialogue which took place in Brussels
on 29 May 2012. The EU asked for information concerning the legal proceedings which had led to Mr Gao's reimprisonment. The EU urged China to allow Mr Gao to maintain contact with his family as well as with his lawyer
and friends while in prison, and to grant Mr Gao immediately the right to family reunification abroad should he
express such a wish. In reply, the Chinese authorities noted that while Mr Gao had been released on parole, ‘political
dissidents’ had smuggled his family out of China and he had started ‘fighting the Chinese government’. In the light of
these violations of his parole terms, his suspended sentence was withdrawn in accordance with Chinese law.

The European Union will continue to follow these cases attentively and to raise its concerns with the Chinese
authorities.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 101

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-003231/12**
**до Комисията (Зам.-председател/върховeн представител)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Мария Неделчева**

**(PPE) и Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 март 2012 г.)_

_Относно:_ VP/HR — Износ на военно оборудване от Обединеното кралство за Бахрейн

Наскоро оповестени официални данни разкриха, че, въпреки неотдавнашните жестоки репресии в Бахрейн, през
последните месеци британското правителство е одобрило продажбата на военно оборудване на тази страна.

През февруари 2011 г., след огласяването на съмнителни продажби на оръжие на Бахрейн, Либия и Египет,
британското правителство обяви, че ще преразгледа своята политика по лицензиране на износа на оръжие. В
съответствие с това, през март 2011 г. Обединеното кралство обяви, че е отменило 122 лицензии, включително 44 за
износ на военно оборудване за Бахрейн.

В случая с Бахрейн обаче Обединеното кралство бързо възобнови доставките си на оръжие. До юни 2011 г. търговията
е възстановена до обичайното ниво, пренебрегвайки продължаващото в страната насилие срещу цивилни граждани и

арестите на активисти.

Последните налични статистически данни, които обхващат третото тримесечие на 2011 г. и са публикувани на
уебсайта на Департамента за бизнес, иновации и умения на Обединеното кралство, показват, че Обединеното кралство
е издало лицензии за износ на военно оборудване за Бахрейн — включително заглушители, оптични мерници, пушки,
военноморски оръжия и артилерийска технология — на стойност 1,3 милиона лири стерлинги.

Критериите от общата позиция на ЕС относно износа на оръжие изискват държавите членки да отказват издаването на
лицензия „ако е налице явен риск предназначените за износ военни технологии или оборудване да бъдат използвани за
вътрешни репресии“.

Предвид горепосоченото:

1. Информиран ли е заместник-председателят/върховен представител за продажбите на военно оборудване от
Обединеното кралство за Бахрейн, които се осъществяват в противоречие с общата позиция на ЕС относно
износа на оръжие?

2. Какви мерки ще предприеме заместник-председателят/върховен представител, за да сложи край на това
положение и да насърчи по-стриктното прилагане от държавите членки на критериите от общата позиция на
ЕС?

**Отговор, даден от Заместник-председателs/Върховния представител г-жа Аштън от името на Комисията**

_(8 юни 2012 г.)_

ЕС изготвя годишни доклади относно износа на оръжие, които са публикувани в „Официален вестник“ на ЕС.
Последният, 13-и публикуван доклад, обхваща износа от държавите членки за 2010 г. Данните относно износа на
оръжие на държавите—членки на ЕС, през 2011 г. все още не са на разположение. Те ще бъдат събрани през
следващите месеци и публикувани в 14-иягодишен доклад до края на 2012 г.

Съгласно общата позиция (2008/944/ОВППС) за контрол на износа на военно оборудване решенията за това дали да

се разреши или откаже износът на оръжие, остават изключителна национална отговорност на държавите членки.
Лицензиите за износ на оръжия се разглеждат от държавите — членки на ЕС, трябва да бъдат оценени по отношение
на осем критерия, определени в общата позиция и държавите членки трябва да вземат под внимание забраните, които
евентуално са издадени от други държави членки за подобни сделки.

C 124 E / 102 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Въпросите, произтичащи от прилагането на общата позиция, се обсъждат на редовни срещи на работна група на Съвета
„Износ на конвенционално оръжие“ (COARM). В работната група COARM държавите членки обменят становища и
информация относно конкретни местоназначения с оглед постигане на по-голяма последователност на тяхната
политика за износ на оръжие към въпросните местоназначения. Местоназначенията в Близкия изток и Северна Африка
са били редовно обсъждани в работната група COARM след възникването на „Арабската пролет“.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 103

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003231/12**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta / Alta Representante)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) y Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Exportaciones de material militar del Reino Unido a Bahréin

Las cifras oficiales recientemente publicadas han revelado que, a pesar de la reciente campaña de represión violenta en
Bahréin, el Gobierno británico ha aprobado durante los últimos meses la venta de equipos militares a ese país.

En febrero de 2011, tras la denuncia de la cuestionable venta de armas a Bahréin, Libia y Egipto, el Gobierno británico
anunció una revisión de su política de concesión de licencias para la exportación de armas. En consecuencia, en
marzo de 2011 el Reino Unido declaró que había rechazado 122 licencias, incluidas 44 que cubrían exportaciones de
material militar para Bahréin.

Sin embargo, en el caso de Bahréin, el Reino Unido reanudó rápidamente la transferencia de armas y para junio
de 2011, las operaciones habían vuelto a la normalidad, ignorando la violencia continuada contra civiles y los
arrestos de los activistas en el país.

Las últimas estadísticas disponibles, que abarcan el tercer trimestre de 2011 y que se han publicado en el sitio web del
Departamento de Negocios, Innovación y Habilidades del Reino Unido, demuestran que el Reino Unido ha concedido
licencias para exportaciones de material militar a Bahréin (como silenciadores de pistolas, visores de armas, rifles,
artillería naval y tecnología para artillería) por valor de 1,3 millones de libras esterlinas.

Los criterios de la Posición Común de la UE respecto a las exportaciones de armas exigen a los Estados miembros que
se nieguen a otorgar licencias si existe un «riesgo manifiesto» de que «la tecnología o el equipo militar que se vaya a
exportar puedan utilizarse con fines de represión interna».

A la vista de lo anteriormente expuesto:

1. ¿Es consciente la Vicepresidenta y Alta Representante de las ventas de equipos militares del Reino Unido a
Bahréin, que son contrarias a la Posición Común de la UE sobre las exportaciones de armas?

2. ¿Qué medidas adoptará la Vicepresidenta y Alta Representante para poner fin a esta situación y promover una
aplicación más estricta por parte de los Estados miembros de los criterios establecidos en la Posición Común
de la UE?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(8 de junio de 2012)_

La UE redacta informes anuales sobre las exportaciones de armas, que se publican en el Diario Oficial de la UE. El
último hecho público, el decimotercero, se refiere a las exportaciones de los Estados miembros en 2010. Los datos
relativos a 2011 aún no están disponibles; serán recopilados a lo largo de los próximos meses y se publicarán en el
decimocuarto informe, a finales de 2012.

En virtud de la Posición Común 2008/944/PESC sobre el control de la exportación de equipo militar, las decisiones
sobre la conveniencia de autorizar o denegar las exportaciones de armas siguen siendo una responsabilidad
exclusivamente nacional de los Estados miembros. Las licencias de exportación de armas analizadas por los Estados
miembros de la UE han de evaluarse en relación con ocho criterios establecidos en la Posición Común, y los Estados
miembros deben tener en cuenta, en su caso, las denegaciones adoptadas por otros Estados miembros para
transacciones similares.

C 124 E / 104 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Las cuestiones planteadas por la aplicación de la Posición Común se debaten en reuniones regulares del Grupo de
Trabajo del Consejo sobre Exportación de Armas Convencionales (COARM), en donde los Estados miembros
intercambian opiniones e información sobre los destinos específicos, con vistas a dotar de mayor coherencia a su
política de exportación de armas a los destinos en cuestión. Los destinos en Oriente Medio y el norte de África han
sido debatidos periódicamente en el COARM desde el comienzo de la «Primavera Árabe».

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 105

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003231/12**
**an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin / Hohe Vertreterin)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) und Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ VP/HR — Ausfuhr von Militärgütern aus dem Vereinigten Königreich nach Bahrain

Neu veröffentlichte offizielle Zahlen haben gezeigt, dass die britische Regierung trotz der jüngsten gewaltsamen
Ereignisse in Bahrain in den vergangenen Monaten die Ausfuhr von Militärgütern in dieses Land genehmigt hat.

Im Februar 2011 kündigte die britische Regierung infolge der Aufdeckung fragwürdiger Waffenverkäufe nach
Bahrain, Libyen und Ägypten eine Überprüfung ihrer Genehmigungspolitik bei Waffenausfuhren an. Im März 2011
erklärte das Vereinigte Königreich dementsprechend, dass es 122 Genehmigungen widerrufen hat. 44 davon betrafen
Ausfuhren von Militärgütern nach Bahrain.

Im Falle von Bahrain nahm das Vereinigte Königreich seine Waffenlieferungen jedoch schnell wieder auf. Bereits im
Juni 2011 wurde wieder so vorgegangen wie vorher, und die anhaltende Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung und die
Inhaftierungen von Aktivisten im Land wurden ignoriert.

Die aktuellen Statistiken, die sich auf das dritte Quartal 2011 beziehen und auf der Website des britischen
Ministeriums für Unternehmen, Innovation und berufliche Weiterbildung veröffentlicht wurden, zeigen, dass das
Vereinigte Königreich die Ausfuhr von Militärgütern nach Bahrain — einschließlich Waffenschalldämpfern,
Waffensichtgeräten, Gewehren, Marinegeschützen und Artillerietechnik — im Wert von 1,3 Mio. GBP genehmigt hat.

Nach den Kriterien des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts der EU zu Waffenausfuhren müssen die Mitgliedstaaten eine
Genehmigung verweigern, „wenn eindeutig das Risiko besteht, dass die Militärtechnologie oder die Militärgüter, die
zur Ausfuhr bestimmt sind, zur internen Repression benutzt werden könnten“.

In Anbetracht der vorstehenden Ausführungen:

1. Ist der Vizepräsidentin/Hohen Vertreterin bekannt, dass das Vereinigte Königreich Militärgüter nach Bahrain
verkauft und damit gegen den Gemeinsamen Standpunkt der EU zu Waffenausfuhren verstößt?

2. Welche Maßnahmen wird die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin ergreifen, um diesen Zustand zu beenden und
eine strengere Umsetzung der Kriterien des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts der EU durch die Mitgliedstaaten zu
fördern?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(8. Juni 2012)_

Die EU legt Jahresberichte über Waffenausfuhren vor, die im EU‐Amtsblatt veröffentlicht werden. Der zuletzt
veröffentlichte 13. Bericht betrifft die Ausfuhren aus den EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Jahr 2010. Die Daten zu den
Waffenausfuhren der Mitgliedstaaten im Jahr 2011 liegen noch nicht vor. Sie werden in den nächsten Monaten
erhoben und Ende 2012 im 14. Jahresbericht veröffentlicht.

Nach dem Gemeinsamen Standpunkt 2008/944/GASP betreffend gemeinsame Regeln für die Kontrolle der Ausfuhr
von Militärtechnologie und Militärgütern liegt die Zuständigkeit für die Genehmigung oder Verweigerung von
Waffenausfuhren ausschließlich bei dem betreffenden Mitgliedstaat. Die Mitgliedstaaten müssen Lizenzen für die
Waffenausfuhr anhand der acht Kriterien überprüfen, die in dem Gemeinsamen Standpunkt festgelegt sind, und dabei
mögliche Verweigerungen berücksichtigen, die andere Mitgliedstaaten für gleichartige Transaktionen ausgesprochen
haben.

C 124 E / 106 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Fragen zur Umsetzung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts werden in regelmäßigen Sitzungen der Ratsgruppe „Ausfuhr
konventioneller Waffen“ (COARM) erörtert. Die Mitgliedstaaten tauschen innerhalb der COARM Meinungen und
Informationen über einzelne Bestimmungsländer aus, um eine größere Kohärenz ihrer Waffenausfuhrpolitik zu
erzielen. Bestimmungsländer in Nahost und Nordafrika sind seit dem Arabischen Frühling regelmäßig Thema in der
COARM.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 107

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003231/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) e Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Esportazioni di attrezzature militari del Regno Unito in Bahrein

Dati ufficiali resi noti ultimamente hanno rivelato che, nonostante i recenti episodi di repressione violenta in Bahrein,
nel corso degli ultimi mesi il governo britannico ha approvato la vendita di attrezzature militari a questo paese.

Nel febbraio 2011, in seguito alla rivelazione di discutibili operazioni di vendita di armi a Bahrein, Libia ed Egitto, il
governo britannico annunciò una revisione della sua politica in materia di rilascio delle licenze di esportazione di
armi. Nel marzo 2011, il Regno Unito dichiarò conseguentemente di aver revocato 122 licenze, di cui 44
riguardavano esportazioni di attrezzature militari in Bahrein.

Ciò nonostante, per quanto riguarda il Bahrein il Regno Unito riprese poco più tardi le sue esportazioni di armi. Nel
giugno 2011 era tornato alla situazione precedente, ignorando il perpetuarsi nel paese di violenze sui civili e arresti di
attivisti.

Secondo le più recenti statistiche disponibili, relative al terzo trimestre del 2011 e pubblicate sul sito web del
Dipartimento del Regno Unito per il commercio, l'innovazione e le competenze (Department for Business,
Innovation, and Skills), il Regno Unito ha concesso licenze per l'esportazione in Bahrein di attrezzature militari — tra
cui silenziatori per armi da fuoco, congegni di mira, fucili, cannoni navali e tecnologia per l'artiglieria — per un valore
di 1,3 milioni di sterline (GBP).

I criteri della posizione comune dell'UE sulle esportazioni di armi impongono agli Stati membri di rifiutare di
rilasciare licenze qualora esista un «rischio evidente» che «la tecnologia o le attrezzature militari da esportare possano
essere utilizzate a fini di repressione interna».

Considerato quanto sopra:

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza delle vendite di attrezzature militari del Regno Unito al
Bahrein, operazioni contrarie alla posizione comune dell'Unione sulle esportazioni di armi?

2. Quali misure intende adottare il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per porre fine a tale situazione e
promuovere un'applicazione più rigorosa da parte degli Stati membri dei criteri della posizione comune
dell'UE?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(8 giugno 2012)_

L’Unione europea pubblica nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’UE relazioni annuali sulle esportazioni di armi. L’ultima
relazione pubblicata — la tredicesima — tratta le esportazioni degli Stati membri nel 2010. I dati relativi alle
esportazioni di armi degli Stati membri nel 2011 non sono ancora disponibili: verranno raccolti nell’arco dei prossimi
mesi e saranno pubblicati nella quattordicesima relazione annuale entro la fine del 2012.

A norma della posizione comune (2008/944/PESC) sul controllo delle esportazioni di attrezzature militari, le
decisioni di autorizzare o di non autorizzare l’esportazione di armi rimangono di competenza esclusiva degli Stati
membri. Le domande di licenza di esportazione devono essere esaminate dagli Stati membri dell’UE basandosi sugli
otto criteri stabiliti dalla posizione comune e gli Stati membri devono tener conto delle eventuali licenze rifiutate da
altri Stati membri per operazioni analoghe.

C 124 E / 108 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Le problematiche sollevate dall’attuazione della posizione comune vengono discusse nelle periodiche riunioni del
gruppo di lavoro del Consiglio sull’esportazione di armi convenzionali (COARM). In tale sede gli Stati membri si
scambiano opinioni e informazioni su destinazioni specifiche al fine di rendere più coerenti le rispettive politiche di
esportazione di armi verso le destinazioni in questione. Le destinazioni medio-orientali e nordafricane vengono
periodicamente discusse in sede di COARM dall’inizio della «primavera araba».

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 109

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003231/12**
**aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter — Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) en Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ VP/HR — Export van militair materiaal naar Bahrein door het VK

Uit onlangs gepubliceerde officiële cijfers blijkt dat de Britse regering, ondanks recente gewelddadige confrontaties in
Bahrein, de voorbije maanden de verkoop van militaire uitrusting aan dat land goedgekeurd heeft.

Nadat in februari 2011 verdachte wapenleveringen aan Bahrein, Libië en Egypte aan het licht gekomen waren,
kondigde de Britse overheid aan haar wapenexportbeleid te zullen herzien. In maart 2011 verklaarde het VK
122 vergunningen te hebben ingetrokken, waaronder 44 voor de export van militair materiaal aan Bahrein.

Het land hervatte echter al zeer gauw zijn wapenleveringen aan Bahrein. Tegen juni 2011 ging alles weer zijn oude
gang, waarbij het aanhoudende geweld tegen burgers en de arrestaties van activisten in het land compleet genegeerd
werden.

Uit de laatste nieuwe statistieken voor het derde kwartaal van 2011 die op de website van het Britse Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills gepubliceerd werden, blijkt dat het VK aan Bahrein vergunningen verleend heeft voor
de export van militair materiaal — met inbegrip van geluiddempers, wapenvizieren, geweren, scheepsgeschut en
wapentechnologie — ter waarde van 1,3 miljoen GBP.

De criteria van het gemeenschappelijk standpunt van de Europese Unie inzake wapenuitvoer vereisen dat lidstaten
een vergunning weigeren indien er een „duidelijk risico bestaat dat uit te voeren militaire uitrusting of technologie
gebruikt worden voor binnenlandse onderdrukking”.

Rekening houdende met hetgeen voorafgaat:

1. Is de vicevoorzitter — hoge vertegenwoordiger op de hoogte van de verkoop van militaire uitrusting aan
Bahrein door het VK, hetgeen in strijd is met het gemeenschappelijk standpunt van de EU inzake wapenuitvoer?

2. Welke maatregelen zal de vicevoorzitter — hoge vertegenwoordiger nemen om een einde te maken aan deze
situatie en om strenger toe te zien op de toepassing van de criteria van het gemeenschappelijk standpunt van
de EU door lidstaten?

**Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie**

_(8 juni 2012)_

De EU publiceert jaarverslagen over wapenuitvoer in het Publicatieblad van de EU. In het meest recente gepubliceerde
13de jaarverslag zijn gegevens opgenomen over de wapenuitvoer uit de lidstaten in 2010. Gegevens met betrekking
tot de wapenuitvoer uit de EU-lidstaten in 2011 zijn nog niet beschikbaar. Zij zullen in de loop van de komende
maanden worden ingezameld en eind 2012 worden gepubliceerd in het 14de jaarverslag.

Krachtens Gemeenschappelijk Standpunt 2008/944/GBVB van de Raad met betrekking tot de controle op de uitvoer
van militaire goederen blijven besluiten om toestemming voor de uitvoer van wapens te verlenen dan wel die uitvoer
te weigeren een exclusieve nationale bevoegdheid van de lidstaten. De EU-lidstaten moeten de
wapenuitvoervergunningen toetsen aan acht criteria die in het Gemeenschappelijk Standpunt zijn vastgesteld.
Daarnaast moeten de lidstaten rekening houden met de eventuele weigeringen van andere lidstaten voor soortgelijke
transacties.

C 124 E / 110 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Kwesties die naar aanleiding van de tenuitvoerlegging van het Gemeenschappelijk Standpunt aan de orde zijn gesteld,
worden besproken in de regelmatige bijeenkomsten van de Groep Export van conventionele wapens (COARM). In het
kader van de COARM wisselen de lidstaten inzichten en informatie uit over specifieke bestemmingen om een grotere
samenhang tot stand te brengen in het wapenexportbeleid ten opzichte van de desbetreffende landen. Sinds het begin
van de Arabische lente zijn de uitvoerbestemmingen in het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika geregeld aan de orde
gekomen tijdens de besprekingen in de COARM.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 111

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003231/12**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente / Alta Representante)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) e Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Exportações de material militar do Reino Unido para o Barém

Os números oficiais recentemente divulgados revelaram que, apesar da repressão violenta verificada no Barém nos
últimos tempos, o governo britânico aprovou, ao longo dos últimos meses, a venda de equipamento militar a favor
deste país.

Em fevereiro de 2011, após a divulgação das vendas questionáveis de armamento ao Barém, à Líbia e ao Egito, o
governo britânico anunciou uma revisão da sua política de licenciamento de exportação de armas. Por conseguinte,
em março de 2011, o Reino Unido declarou ter revogado 122 licenças, das quais 44 abrangiam exportações militares
a favor do Barém.

Contudo, no caso do Barém, o Reino Unido retomou rapidamente as suas transferências de armas. Em junho de
2011, as negociações voltaram ao normal, ignorando a violência permanente contra civis e a detenção de ativistas em
todo o país.

As últimas estatísticas disponíveis, que abrangem o terceiro trimestre de 2011 e estão publicadas no sítio Web do
Ministério da Inovação Empresarial e da Qualificação Profissional do Reino Unido, revelam que o país concedeu
licenças de exportações militares a favor do Barém, incluindo silenciadores de armas, visores de armas, espingardas,
armamento naval e tecnologia para artilharia, no valor de 1,3 milhões de libras.

Os critérios da posição comum da UE sobre as exportações de armas exigem a recusa de emissão de licenças de
exportação por parte dos Estados-Membros caso haja «risco manifesto de a tecnologia ou o equipamento militar a
exportar serem suscetíveis de utilização para fins de repressão interna».

Tendo em conta o exposto:

1. Está a Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante ciente das vendas de equipamento militar do Reino Unido ao Barém,
o que contraria a posição comum da UE relativamente às exportações de armas?

2. Que medidas tomará a Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante para pôr termo a esta situação e promover uma
implementação mais rígida, por parte dos Estados-Membros, dos critérios da posição comum da UE?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(8 de junho de 2012)_

A UE publica relatórios anuais sobre as exportações de armas que são publicados no Jornal Oficial da UE. O último
relatório publicado abrange as exportações dos Estados-Membros em 2010. Ainda não estão disponíveis dados
relativos às exportações de armas dos Estados-Membros da União em 2011. Esses dados serão recolhidos durante os
próximos meses e publicados no décimo quarto relatório anual antes do final de 2012.

Nos termos da Posição Comum (2008/944/PESC) que define regras comuns aplicáveis ao controlo das exportações
de tecnologia e equipamento militares, as decisões de autorizar ou recusar exportações de armas são da exclusiva
responsabilidade dos Estados-Membros. Os Estados-Membros da UE avaliam as licenças de exportação de armas com
base em oito critérios fixados na Posição Comum; os Estados-Membros devem tomar em consideração as recusas de
licenças de exportação eventualmente emitidas por outros Estados-Membros relativamente a transações idênticas.

As questões que a implementação da Posição Comum suscita são debatidas nas reuniões periódicas do Grupo
«Exportações de armas convencionais» (COARM). No âmbito do COARM, os Estados-Membros trocam opiniões e
informações sobre destinos precisos, tendo em vista uma maior coerência das suas políticas de exportação de armas
para os destinos em causa. Destinos como o Médio Oriente e o Norte de África têm sido regularmente debatidos no
Grupo COARM desde o início da Primavera Árabe.

C 124 E / 112 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-003231/12**
**za Komisijo (podpredsednica/visoka predstavnica)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) in Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26. marec 2012)_

_Zadeva:_ VP/HR – vojaški izvoz Združenega kraljestva v Bahrajn

Nedavno objavljene uradne številke so razkrile, da je britanska vlada v zadnjih šestih mesecih kljub nedavnemu
nasilnemu zatrtju protestov v Bahrajnu odobrila prodajo vojaške opreme tej državi.

Britanska vlada je februarja 2011, po razkritju vprašljive prodaje orožja Bahrajnu, Libiji in Egiptu, naznanila presojo
svoje politike izvoznih dovoljenj za orožje. Združeno kraljestvo je tako marca 2011 naznanilo, da je razveljavilo 122
dovoljenj, vključno s 44, ki so zajemala vojaški izvoz v Bahrajn.

Vendar je v primeru Bahrajna Združeno kraljestvo hitro obnovilo promet z orožjem. Že junija 2011 je ponovno
začelo delati po starem in prezrlo nadaljnje nasilje nad civilisti in aretacije aktivistov v državi.

Zadnji razpoložljivi statistični podatki, ki zajemajo tretje četrtletje 2011 in so objavljeni na spletni strani Ministrstva
za podjetništvo, inovacije ter znanja in veščine Združenega kraljestva, kažejo, da je Združeno kraljestvo izdalo
dovoljenja za vojaški izvoz v Bahrajn – vključno z dušilniki za pištole in puške, vizirji za orožje, puškami, ladijskimi
topovi in tehnologijo za artilerijo – v vrednosti 1,3 milijona GBP.

Merila skupnega stališča EU o izvozu orožja zahtevajo od držav članic, da zavrnejo dovoljenja, če obstaja „očitno
tveganje“, da „bi vojaška tehnologija ali oprema za izvoz lahko bila uporabljena za notranjo represijo“.

Glede na navedeno:

1. Ali je podpredsednica/visoka predstavnica seznanjena s tem, da je Združeno kraljestvo prodalo vojaško
opremo Bahrajnu, kar je v nasprotju s skupnim stališčem EU o izvozu orožja?

2. Katere ukrepe bo podpredsednica/visoka predstavnica sprejela, da se to stanje odpravi in države članice
spodbudijo k strožjemu izvajanju meril skupnega stališča EU?

**Odgovor visoke predstavnice in podpredsednice Catherine Ashton v imenu Komisije**

_(8. junij 2012)_

Evropska unija objavlja letna poročila o izvozu orožja, ki se objavljajo v _Uradnem listu Evropske unije._ Nazadnje je bilo
objavljeno 13. poročilo, ki zajema izvoz iz držav članic v letu 2010. Podatki o izvozu orožja iz držav članic EU za leto
2011 še niso na voljo. Zbrani bodo v naslednjih mesecih in objavljeni v 14. letnem poročilu do konca leta 2012.

V skladu s Skupnim stališčem Sveta 2008/944/SZVP o nadzoru izvoza vojaške opreme ostajajo odločitve o njegovi
odobritvi ali zavrnitvi izključno v pristojnosti držav članic. Dovoljenja za izvoz orožja, ki jih pregledujejo države
članice EU, je treba oceniti na podlagi osmih kriterijev iz Skupnega stališča Sveta in države članice morajo upoštevati
zavrnitve, ki jih bodo morda izdale druge države članice za podobne sklenjene posle.

Vprašanja v zvezi z izvajanjem Skupnega stališča se obravnavajo na rednih sestankih Sveta za izvoz
konvencionalnega orožja (COARM). Države članice izmenjujejo mnenja in informacije o določenih namembnih
krajih na sestankih Sveta COARM z namenom, da se izboljša skladnost politike izvoza orožja v zvezi z
obravnavanimi namembnimi kraji. Od „arabske pomladi“ se Bližnji vzhod in namembni kraji v severni Afriki redno
obravnavajo na za Svet (only in the heading) COARM.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 113

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003231/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**
**Pino Arlacchi (S&D), Andrea Cozzolino (S&D), Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Oreste Rossi**

**(EFD), Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL), Keith Taylor**

**(Verts/ALE), Ana Gomes (S&D), Helmut Scholz (GUE/NGL), Rui Tavares (Verts/ALE), Mariya Nedelcheva**

**(PPE) and Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — UK military exports to Bahrain

Newly released official figures have disclosed that, despite the recent violent crackdown in Bahrain, the British
Government has approved, over the past months, the sale of military equipment to that country.

In February 2011, following the exposure of questionable arms sales to Bahrain, Libya and Egypt, the British
Government announced a review of its arms export licensing policy. In March 2011, accordingly, the UK declared
that it had revoked 122 licences, including 44 covering military exports to Bahrain.

However, in the case of Bahrain the UK quickly resumed its arms transfers. By June 2011 it was back to business as
usual, ignoring the continuing violence against civilians and arrests of activists in the country.

The latest statistics available, covering the third quarter of 2011 and published on the website of the UK’s Department
for Business, Innovation, and Skills, show that the UK has licensed military exports to Bahrain — including gun
silencers, weapon sights, rifles, naval guns and technology for artillery — to the value of GBP 1.3 million.

The criteria of the EU common position on arms exports require Member States to refuse a licence if there is a ‘clear
risk’ that ‘the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression’.

In view of the above:

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the UK’s sales of military equipment to Bahrain, which run
contrary to the EU common position on arms exports?

2. What measures will the Vice-President/High Representative take to put an end to this situation and promote
stricter implementation by Member States of the criteria of the EU common position?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 June 2012)_

The EU publishes annual reports on arms exports that are published in the EU official journal. The latest 13th report
published covers exports from member states in 2010. Data relating to EU member states’ arms exports in 2011 are
not yet available. They will be collected over the next months and published in the 14 [th] annual report by the end of
2012.

Under the Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) on the control of export of military equipment, decisions on whether
to authorise or deny arms exports remain a exclusively national responsibility of member states. Arms export licences
reviewed by EU member states have to be assessed against eight criteria laid down in the Common Position and
member states have to take into account denials possibly issued by other member states for similar transactions.

Issues raised by implementation of the Common Position are discussed in regular meetings of the Council Working
Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). The member states exchange views and information on specific
destinations in COARM with a view to achieving greater consistency of their arms export policy towards the
destinations in question. The Middle East and North African destinations have been regularly discussed in COARM
since the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’.

C 124 E / 114 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003234/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Reconhecimento de diplomas universitários a nível europeu

— A 23 de novembro de 2011, a Comissão Europeia apresentou o programa intitulado «Erasmus para Todos», que
tem como objetivo abranger cerca de 5 milhões de pessoas nas áreas da educação, formação, juventude e desporto;

— Com um orçamento global para o período 2014/2020 de 19 mil milhões de euros, a Comissão Europeia pretende
alocar 1,8 mil milhões de euros ao objetivo da promoção da dimensão internacional do ensino superior, por forma a
estimular as ações de mobilidade para fins de aprendizagem, bem como o diálogo político entre as autoridades,
instituições e organizações dos diversos Estados-Membros;

— Segundo Androulla Vassiliou, Comissária Europeia responsável pela Educação, Cultura, Multilinguismo e
Juventude, «o investimento na educação e na formação é o nosso melhor investimento para o futuro da Europa.
Estudar no estrangeiro potencia as competências das pessoas, o seu desenvolvimento pessoal e a sua adaptabilidade,
fazendo com que tenham mais possibilidades de emprego»;

— A Comissão Europeia está cada vez mais empenhada em aprofundar o espaço europeu de ensino superior,
estimulando a crescente participação dos jovens universitários nos programas Erasmus;

— Vários jovens europeus têm vindo a procurar uma oportunidade profissional fora do seu país de origem, mas
muitas vezes acabam por se deparar com enormes barreiras por parte das entidades públicas ao reconhecimento dos
cursos superiores que realizaram;

— Apesar de o Processo de Bolonha estar em vigor, continua a existir uma forte disparidade no reconhecimento das
qualificações académicas, sendo este caso ainda mais evidente entre os titulares de licenciaturas ou mestrados;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

—
Está a acompanhar o grave problema de reconhecimento das qualificações académicas que os jovens têm tido
nos diversos Estados-Membros, quando pretendem ingressar no mercado de trabalho?

—
Não considera que existe alguma incongruência no facto de a Comissão pretender estimular uma crescente
mobilidade de ensino superior e depois não existir o devido reconhecimento uniforme dos cursos ministrados
nas diversas Universidades ou Institutos Politécnicos?

—
Quais as atividades que a Comissão poderá realizar para uniformizar o reconhecimento de cursos superiores
em todo o espaço europeu?

**Resposta dada por Androulla Vassiliou em nome da Comissão**

_(15 de junho de 2012)_

A mobilidade na aprendizagem é uma prioridade da Agenda da Comissão para a Modernização do Ensino Superior e
o pilar central do programa Erasmus. O programa «Erasmus para Todos» proposto para 2014/2020 pela Comissão
aumentará substancialmente a mobilidade. No entanto, a Comissão reconhece que continuam a verificar-se
obstáculos ao reconhecimento de qualificações académicas; é necessário envidar novos esforços.

Por conseguinte, a Comissão apoia os Estados-Membros no desenvolvimento de sistemas de reconhecimento de
qualificações académicas, no âmbito da UE e do Processo de Bolonha. Promove ativamente boas práticas de
reconhecimento, através do apoio à rede NARIC ( [1] ), o financiamento de projetos transnacionais para melhorar os
procedimentos de reconhecimento académico, o incentivo de boas práticas em ECTS ( [2] ) e como líder conjunto de um
grupo de trabalho do Conselho da Europa relativo a quadros de qualificações e ao reconhecimento académico das
qualificações.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Centros nacionais de informação sobre reconhecimento académico.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Sistema europeu de transferência de créditos.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 115

No âmbito do Processo de Bolonha, os ministros responsáveis pelo ensino superior reunidos em Bucareste, em 26 e
27 de abril de 2012, consideraram o reconhecimento automático dos diplomas académicos comparáveis como um
objetivo de Bolonha a longo prazo. Um grupo precursor de países explorará várias formas que permitam alcançar o
referido objetivo. Além disso, foi estabelecido um compromisso para a revisão do sistema ECTS, de modo a promover
a utilização dos resultados da aprendizagem, a reformulação da legislação nacional com vista a torná-la conforme
com a Convenção de Lisboa sobre o reconhecimento de qualificações relativas ao ensino superior e para incentivar as
instituições de ensino superior a avaliar os procedimentos de reconhecimento académico em matéria de garantia de
qualidade. A Comissão apoia este processo e irá organizar com os Estados-Membros uma co-aprendizagem sobre o
reconhecimento no outono de 2012.

No que respeita ao acesso a profissões regulamentadas, nomeadamente no setor público, a Comissão propôs
recentemente uma modernização da diretiva relativa ao reconhecimento das qualificações profissionais, atualmente
em fase de negociação no Parlamento Europeu e no Conselho.

C 124 E / 116 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003234/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Europe-wide recognition of university qualifications

— On 23 November 2011, the Commission unveiled a programme called ‘Erasmus for All’, which is intended to
encompass around 5 million people in the areas of education, training, youth and sport.

— Out of the overall budget of EUR 19 000 million for the period from 2014 to 2020, it intends to allocate
EUR 1.8 billion to the objective of promoting the international dimension of higher education, so as to promote
mobility actions for learning purposes and encourage authorities, institutions and organisations in the Member States
to enter into policy dialogue.

— According to Androulla Vassiliou, Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, ‘Investing in
education and training is the best investment we can make for Europe’s future. Studying abroad boosts people’s skills,
personal development and adaptability, and makes them more employable’.

— The Commission is increasingly committed to consolidating the European higher education area by encouraging
the increased participation of young university students in the Erasmus programmes.

— Many young people have been seeking a professional opportunity outside their country of origin, but they often
end up encountering immense obstacles from public bodies when it comes to recognising the higher education
courses that they have completed.

— Although the Bologna Process is in force, there is still major disparity in terms of recognition of academic
qualifications, and this is even more evident amongst holders of bachelor’s and master’s degrees.

— Is the Commission aware that the recognition of academic qualifications has been posing a serious problem for
young people in the Member States attempting to enter the labour market?

— Does the Commission not consider it somewhat illogical that it should be seeking to promote increased mobility
in higher education when there is no system for the proper uniform recognition of university and polytechnic
courses?

— What can the Commission do to standardise the recognition of higher education courses throughout Europe?

**Answer given by Mrs Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 June 2012)_

Learning mobility is a priority of the Commission Agenda for Modernising Higher Education, and the central pillar of
the Erasmus programme. The ‘Erasmus for All’ proposal from the Commission for 2014-2020 will increase mobility
substantially. However, the Commission recognises that obstacles to recognising academic qualifications persist;
further efforts are required.

The Commission thus supports Member States in developing systems for recognising academic qualifications, in
the EU framework and in the Bologna process. It actively promotes good recognition practices by supporting the
NARIC ( [1] ) network, funding transnational projects to improve academic recognition procedures, encouraging good
practice in ECTS ( [2] ) and as joint leader of a Council of Europe working group on qualifications frameworks and the
academic recognition of qualifications.

Under the Bologna Process, Higher Education Ministers in Bucharest on 26-27 April 2012 adopted automatic
recognition of comparable academic degrees as a long-term Bologna goal. A pathfinder group of countries will
explore ways to achieve this. They also committed to review ECTS to promote the use of learning outcomes, national
reviews of legislation to comply with the Lisbon Recognition Convention, and to encourage higher education
institutions to assess academic recognition procedures in Quality Assurance. The Commission supports this process
and will organise peer learning on recognition with Member States in autumn 2012.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) National Academic Recognition Information Centres.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) European Credits Transfer System.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 117

With regard to access to regulated professions, including in the public sector, the Commission recently proposed a
modernisation of the directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications, currently being negotiated in the
European Parliament and in the Council.

C 124 E / 118 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003235/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Alianças de conhecimento entre empresas e instituições de ensino superior

— A Comissão Europeia apresentou o programa intitulado «Erasmus para Todos», que tem como objetivo abranger
cerca de 5 milhões de pessoas nas áreas da educação, formação, juventude e desporto;

— Segundo a alínea a) do ponto 1 do artigo 6°, o programa dará prossecução aos seus objetivos no domínio da
educação, formação e juventude, graças à realização de três tipos de ações, nomeadamente 1) mobilidade individual
para fins de aprendizagem; 2) cooperação para a inovação e boas práticas; e 3) apoio à reforma política;

— No que concerne à ação temática da cooperação para a inovação e boas práticas, pretende-se financiar as parcerias
transnacionais entre empresas e instituições de educação, nomeadamente as alianças de conhecimento entre
estabelecimentos de ensino superior e empresas, com vista a promover a criatividade, a inovação e o
empreendedorismo;

— A Comissão Europeia e os diversos Estados-Membros têm vindo a estimular a construção de incubadoras de
empresas como forma de diminuir o diferencial existente entre o conhecimento académico e o mercado empresarial,
fomentando-se a inovação e o espírito empreendedor dos cientistas;

— É entendimento de vários dirigentes políticos europeus que é fundamental apoiar a criação de empresas e o espírito
empreendedor dos jovens universitários, por forma a aumentar a competitividade da União Europeia face às restantes
economias globais;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

—
Que tipologia de despesas relacionadas com as incubadoras de empresas poderá o programa «Erasmus para
Todos» apoiar?

—
Que tipologias de despesas relacionadas com uma maior cooperação entre empresas e instituições de ensino
superior poderão ser financiadas no âmbito da ação temática «cooperação para a inovação e boas práticas»?

—
Que programas ou iniciativas pretende a Comissão dinamizar no próximo Quadro Financeiro Plurianual para
apoiar a criação ou desenvolvimento de incubadoras de empresas?

**Resposta dada por Androulla Vassiliou em nome da Comissão**

_(14 de junho de 2012)_

A proposta da Comissão relativa ao programa «Erasmus para Todos» incide em três tipos de ação: mobilidade
individual para fins de aprendizagem; cooperação para a inovação e boas práticas; reformas políticas nos EstadosMembros. Embora as incubadoras de empresas não sejam especificamente visadas, se as suas atividades
corresponderem aos objetivos do programa, podem candidatar-se a financiamento.

Ao abrigo da vertente «cooperação para a inovação e boas práticas», o programa «Erasmus para Todos» apoiará
práticas inovadoras para promover a empregabilidade, a criatividade e o espírito empresarial. As «Alianças do
Conhecimento» — iniciativas de cooperação entre as empresas e o ensino superior — incidirão em novos métodos de
ensino e aprendizagem, em competências e atitudes empresariais, e na mobilidade entre o ensino superior e as

empresas.

«Erasmus para Todos» prevê a criação de 200 Alianças do Conhecimento, envolvendo entre 1 500 e 2 000 parceiros.
Na sequência de uma proposta do Parlamento Europeu, foram lançados projetos-piloto de Alianças do
Conhecimento. Um primeiro convite à apresentação de candidaturas, lançado em 2011, suscitou mais de 90
candidaturas, estando em desenvolvimento três projetos selecionados. Está atualmente aberto um segundo convite à
[apresentação de candidaturas, cujo prazo termina a 28 de junho de 2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/education/calls/s0312_en.htm).](http://ec.europa.eu/education/calls/s0312_en.htm)

A política de coesão pode apoiar as incubadoras de empresas e a cooperação entre universidades e empresas. No
quadro da futura política de coesão, tais projetos serão apoiados no âmbito de estratégias de inovação para a
[especialização inteligente; cf. (http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guides).](http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guides)

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 119

O Instituto Europeu de Inovação e Tecnologia apoia as incubadoras de empresas em coerência com a missão das suas
Comunidades de Conhecimento e Inovação (CCI) de fomentar o espírito empresarial e a criação de novas empresas.
Após dois anos, as CCI já criaram cerca de 90 novas empresas deste tipo.

C 124 E / 120 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003235/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Knowledge Alliances between higher education institutions and enterprises

— The Commission has introduced a programme called ‘Erasmus for All’, which is intended to encompass around
5 million people in the areas of education, training, youth and sport.

— According to Article 6(1)(a), the programme will pursue its objectives in the field of education, training and youth
via three types of action, specifically 1) learning mobility of individuals, 2) cooperation for innovation and good
practices, and 3) support for policy reform.

— As regards action in the area of cooperation for innovation and good practices, the intention is to fund
transnational partnerships between companies and education institutions, specifically Knowledge Alliances between
higher education institutions and enterprises, promoting creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.

— The Commission and the Member States have been encouraging the construction of business incubators in order
to narrow the divide between academic knowledge and the labour market, thereby fostering innovation and
entrepreneurial spirit amongst scientists.

— A number of Europe’s political leaders consider it crucial to support enterprise creation and the entrepreneurial
spirit of young university students, so as to make the European Union more competitive compared to other global
economies.

— What type of spending related to business incubators will the ‘Erasmus for All’ programme be able to support?

— What type of spending on increased cooperation between businesses and higher education institutions will it be
possible to finance, as part of action in the area of ‘cooperation for innovation and good practices’?

— What programmes or initiatives does the Commission intend to promote in the next multiannual financial
framework to support the creation or development of business incubators?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 June 2012)_

The Commission's proposal for the ‘Erasmus for All’ programme focuses on three types of action: learning mobility
for individuals; cooperation for innovation and good practices; and policy reforms in Member States. While business
incubators are not specifically targeted, if their activities meet the programme's objectives, they could apply for
funding.

Under ‘cooperation for innovation and good practices’, ‘Erasmus for All’ will support innovative practices to promote
employability, creativity and entrepreneurship. Knowledge Alliances — cooperative ventures between businesses and
higher education — will address new learning and teaching methods, entrepreneurial skills and attitudes, and
mobility between higher education and business.

‘Erasmus for All’ foresees around 200 Knowledge Alliances, involving 1 500‐2 000 partners. On a proposal of the
European Parliament, Knowledge Alliance pilot projects have been launched. A first call for proposals in 2011
attracted more than 90 applications and three projects selected are in development. A second call with a deadline of
28 June 2012, is now open (http://ec.europa.eu/education/calls/s0312_en.htm).

Cohesion policy can support business incubators and university-business cooperation. Under the future cohesion
policy, such projects will be supported within innovation strategies for smart specialisation; see
http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guides

The European Institute of Innovation and Technology supports business incubators in line with the mission of its
Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) to foster entrepreneurship and create new businesses. After two
years, the KICs have already created around 90 such new ventures.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 121

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003236/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Cooperação Regional ACP-RUP

— A Comunicação da Comissão, de 26 de maio de 2004, intitulada «Uma parceria reforçada para as Regiões
Ultraperiféricas» (COM(2004)0343), defende a criação de uma estratégia tendo como base a melhoria das
acessibilidades e de outras limitações geográficas, reforçar a competitividade e a inserção regional;

— O memorando de entendimento das Regiões Ultraperiféricas, intitulado «Uma visão renovada da estratégia
europeia para a ultraperiferia», estimula a Comissão Europeia a «abordar de forma flexível e determinada as
dificuldades de inserção das RUP nas respetivas zonas geográficas, em especial as dificuldades na implementação da
cooperação territorial»;

— No âmbito da inserção regional das RUP, têm sido promovidos diversos encontros com autoridades regionais e
locais dos países África-Caraíbas-Pacífico (ACP), como é o caso do Fórum de Conectividade e Transportes realizado
com os países da África Atlântica Ocidental Subsariana, a I Reunião Económica Espaço Atlântico Euro-Africano ou o
Grupo de Trabalho ACP-RUP, que reúne Eurodeputados das RUP e membros dos Parlamentos nacionais dos países
ACP;

— Atualmente, assiste-se a um reforço da importância da África Subsariana, que deve ser acautelada na futura
comunicação da Comissão sobre a estratégia das RUP que irá ser conhecida em maio do presente ano;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que medidas irá adotar no intuito de dar seguimento às propostas realizadas nos respetivos fóruns de
cooperação ACP-RUP, especialmente no que diz respeito à proposta de criar um programa de cooperação nas
fronteiras exteriores que incluam as RUP e os países terceiros vizinhos, à semelhança do realizado em outras
fronteiras externas da União Europeia?

2. Que medidas irá adotar no programa de cooperação territorial na área da política de transportes para melhorar
as ligações aéreas e marítimas entre as RUP, os países terceiros vizinhos e a Europa continental?

3. Que mecanismos estão previstos para articular a cooperação ACP-RUP nos futuros instrumentos de ação
externa da União Europeia?

4. Qual a possibilidade de utilizar os fundos consagrados no artigo 28.° do Acordo de Cotonou para estabelecer
uma efetiva cooperação ACP-RUP?

**Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão**

_(24 de maio de 2012)_

1. As propostas legislativas da Comissão para a futura política de coesão facilitam a integração regional das regiões
ultraperiféricas, através da cooperação territorial europeia. O apoio a projetos comuns entre as regiões ultraperiféricas
e os países vizinhos é reforçado através de um aumento efetivo das respetivas dotações de cooperação e através de
uma maior percentagem de apoio do FEDER suscetível de ser utilizado para a execução de projetos em países
terceiros.

2. Os programas transnacionais podem apoiar o planeamento coerente das infraestruturas de transportes e os
programas transfronteiriços podem contribuir para enfrentar desafios relacionados com as ligações transfronteiriças
inexistentes, que constituem estrangulamentos para os fluxos de transporte. A resolução de desafios específicos é uma
questão a ser acordada entre os países e as regiões que participam num programa de cooperação.

C 124 E / 122 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

3. Nas suas propostas legislativas relativas à ação externa para o período de 2014/2020, a Comissão propõe que o
Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento ( [1] ) afete recursos à cooperação regional, com a eventual participação de regiões
ultraperiféricas; o Instrumento da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento ( [2] ) financia ações nos Estados-Membros, nos
países candidatos e nos potenciais candidatos e noutros países terceiros, incluindo os Estados ACP, ao passo que o
Instrumento de Parceria ( [3] ) apoia as estratégias de parceria de cooperação a nível bilateral, regional e inter-regional.

4. Em conformidade com o Acordo de Cotonu, o FED pode apoiar projetos de cooperação que envolvam Estados
ACP e territórios limítrofes não ACP (incluindo as regiões ultraperiféricas). Pode abranger uma gama de programas
comuns, consoante a capacidade das regiões ultraperiféricas e dos Estados ACP limítrofes em estabelecerem um
diálogo, identificarem interesses comuns e formularem programas conjuntos em conformidade.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 837 final de 7.12.2011 — «Preparação do quadro financeiro plurianual relativamente ao financiamento da cooperação da UE com os

Estados de África, das Caraíbas e do Pacífico e com os países e territórios ultramarinos para o período 2014-2020 (11.° Fundo Europeu de
Desenvolvimento)».

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 840 final de 7.12.2011 — «Proposta de regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que institui um Instrumento de

financiamento da Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento».

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 843 final de 7.12.2011 — «Proposta de regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que institui um Instrumento de Parceria

para a cooperação com países terceiros».

( **|**

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 123

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003236/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ ACP-OMR regional cooperation

— The Commission communication of 26 May 2004 entitled ‘A stronger partnership for the outermost regions’
(COM(2004)0343) advocates a strategy based on improving accessibility and remedying other geographical
limitations, and on enhancing competitiveness and regional integration.

— The memorandum of understanding for the outermost regions (OMRs), entitled ‘A renewed vision of the European
strategy for outermost regions’, urges the Commission to ‘approach with a broad mind and determination the
difficulties for the integration of OMRs in their respective geographic areas, particularly the anomalies and
disfunctions in the launching of territorial cooperation’.

— As regards regional integration of the OMRs, various meetings have been promoted with regional and local
authorities in countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), such as the Fórum de
Conectividade e Transportes [Forum on Connectivity and Transport] held with countries of Western Atlantic subSaharan Africa, the First Economic Meeting of the Euro-African Atlantic Area or the ACP-OMR Working Group,
which brings together Members of the European Parliament and members of the national parliaments of ACP
countries.

— The importance of sub-Saharan Africa is currently increasing, and that fact should be reflected in the future
Commission communication on OMR strategy, to be published in May of this year.

1. What measures will the Commission take to follow up the proposals made in the various forums for ACP-OMR
cooperation, particularly as regards the proposal to establish a programme for cooperation on the external borders
between OMRs and neighbouring non-EU countries, similar to the one carried out on the EU’s other external borders?

2. What measures will it adopt on the territorial cooperation programme in the area of transport policy to
improve air and sea links between the OMRs, neighbouring non-EU countries and mainland Europe?

3. Under what arrangements will ACP-OMR cooperation be dovetailed into future EU foreign policy measures?

4. What is the prospect for using the funds provided for in Article 28 of the Cotonou Agreement to establish
genuine ACP-OMR cooperation?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2012)_

1. The Commission's legislative proposals for future cohesion policy facilitate the regional integration of the
outermost regions through European Territorial Cooperation. Support for joint projects between the outermost
regions and neighbouring countries is strengthened through a guaranteed increase in their cooperation allocation and
through an increased percentage of ERDF support that can be used for project implementation in third countries.

2. Transnational programmes may support the coherent planning of transport infrastructure and cross-border
programmes may contribute to addressing challenges related to missing cross-border links that act as bottlenecks to
transport flows. Addressing specific challenges is a matter to be agreed between the countries and regions
participating in a cooperation programme.

3. In its legislative proposals for external action 2014-2020, the Commission proposes that the European
Development Fund ( [1] ) allocates resources to regional cooperation with the possible involvement of outermost
regions; the Instrument for Development Cooperation ( [2] ) finances actions in Member States, candidate countries and
potential candidates and other third countries including ACP States, and that the Partnership Instrument ( [3] ) supports
EU bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation partnership strategies.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 837 final of 7.12.2011 ‘Preparation of the multiannual financial framework regarding the financing of EU cooperation for African,

Caribbean and Pacific States and Overseas Countries and Territories for the 2014-202 period (11th European Development Fund)’.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 840 final of 7.12.2011 ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument

for development cooperation’.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 843 final of 7.12.2011 ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Partnership

Instrument for cooperation with third countries’.

( **|**

( **|**

C 124 E / 124 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

4. According to the Cotonou Agreement, the EDF can support cooperation projects involving ACP States and
neighbouring non-ACP territories (including outermost regions). This could cover a range of joint programmes,
depending on the capacity of the outermost regions and neighbouring ACP States to establish a dialogue, identify
common interests and formulate joint programmes accordingly.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 125

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-003237/12**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**
_(26 de março de 2012)_

_Assunto:_ Cooperação Transnacional entre RUP e países vizinhos no âmbito da Política de Coesão, 2014/2020

— Os artigos 355.° e 349.° do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia (TFUE), reconhecem um estatuto
particular às Regiões Ultraperiféricas e a alínea a) do n.° 3 do artigo 107.° estabelece um regime dos auxílios de Estado
nestas regiões, através de uma dotação específica adicional;

— Em outubro de 2011, a Comissão Europeia publicou a sua proposta para a vertente de Cooperação Territorial
Europeia no período 2014/2020, que tem como objetivos «reforçar a coesão territorial através da partilha de boas
práticas e experiências entre Regiões; dar um estímulo à elaboração de projetos comuns entre territórios da União
Europeia e criar redes entre Regiões que possuam recursos e estratégias comuns»;

— Ao contrário do anterior período de programação, a proposta para o período 2014/2020 consagra a possibilidade
de serem criados projetos de cooperação territorial entre regiões europeias e territórios vizinhos com interesses
similares;

— Na referida proposta, ressalva-se que cerca de 21 % do orçamento da cooperação territorial será destinado aos
projetos de cooperação transnacional (2 431 mil milhões de euros), sendo evidente o estímulo dado à criação de
maiores sinergias estratégicas entre regiões europeias e regiões vizinhas;

— Várias empresas europeias têm projetos que poderão desenvolver nas regiões africanas vizinhas, fomentando-se
uma crescente cooperação territorial e um aumento de competitividade do tecido empresarial europeu;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os instrumentos específicos atualmente em vigor para apoiar o espírito empresarial e empreendedor
entre as RUP e os países terceiros vizinhos?

2. Relativamente aos projetos de desenvolvimento criados pela Comissão, quais os instrumentos específicos de
apoio ainda disponíveis para apoiar as regiões africanas no fomento de projetos de eficiência energética e
sustentabilidade ambiental? Qual o valor ainda remanescente e como é que os governos africanos se podem
candidatar?

3. No âmbito dos projetos de Cooperação Territorial Europeia 2014/2020, qual a possibilidade de a Comissão
criar um novo programa de cooperação transnacional entre as RUP (Açores-Madeira-Canárias) e Cabo Verde,
por forma a afirmar estas áreas como plataformas estratégicas interligadas no espaço atlântico?

**Resposta dada por Sr. Hahn em nome da Comissão**

_(25 de maio de 2012)_

1. A integração das regiões ultraperiféricas no respetivo ambiente regional é um fator essencial para o seu
desenvolvimento. Consequentemente, as propostas legislativas relativas à política de coesão reforçam o papel das
regiões ultraperiféricas nos programas de cooperação territorial, que apoiam projetos comuns entre as regiões
ultraperiféricas e os seus países vizinhos. Os objetivos temáticos a prosseguir no âmbito destes programas decorrem
da estratégia Europa 2020 e também incluem o reforço da competitividade das PME, através da promoção do espírito
empresarial. A escolha de objetivos temáticos é, no entanto, feita pelos Estados-Membros e pelas regiões que
participam num programa de cooperação, que também tomam as decisões de financiamento dos diferentes projetos.

2. O 10.° Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento, o Instrumento de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento e a Aliança
Global contra as Alterações Climáticas, bem como os programas conexos que financiam, estão entre os instrumentos
que podem ser mobilizados pelas regiões africanas para promover a eficiência energética e projetos de
sustentabilidade ambiental. A UE também apoia instrumentos de investimento regional, que englobam tanto
investimentos públicos como privados em domínios estratégicos. Os dados em matéria de financiamento disponível e
de procedimentos de candidatura variam em função dos instrumentos. No que respeita a alguns programas,
atualmente podem estar limitadas novas oportunidades de financiamento devido à proximidade da data de

encerramento.

C 124 E / 126 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

3. Os programas de cooperação transnacional são elaborados pelos países e regiões participantes, e não pela
Comissão. A Comissão espera que a Madeira, os Açores e as Ilhas Canárias continuem a trabalhar em conjunto no
futuro, juntamente com participantes de Cabo Verde, que já participam em projetos no âmbito do programa atual.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 127

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003237/12**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Transnational cooperation between ORs and neighbouring countries under the 2014-2020 cohesion policy

— Articles 355 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) recognise the specific status
of the outermost regions and Article 107(3)(a) of the TFEU lays down state aid arrangements based on a specific
additional allocation.

— In October 2011, the Commission published its proposal for the direction of European territorial cooperation in
the years from 2014 to 2020. The aims are to enhance territorial cohesion by sharing best practices and experiences
among regions, encourage EU territories to enter into joint projects, and establish networks of regions with shared
resources and strategies.

— Unlike the previous programming period, the proposal for the 2014-2020 period provides for territorial
cooperation projects between neighbouring European regions and territories with similar interests.

— The proposal states that approximately 21 % of the territorial cooperation budget will be spent on transnational
cooperation projects (EUR 2.431 billion) and clearly encourages greater strategic synergies between European regions
and neighbouring regions.

— Several European companies have projects that they will be able to undertake in neighbouring African regions,
thereby fostering increased territorial cooperation and making European businesses more competitive.

1. What specific means are currently employed to support business and the entrepreneurial spirit in relations
between the outermost regions and neighbouring non-EU countries?

2. As regards development projects established by the Commission, what specific forms of aid instruments can
still be used to help African regions promote energy efficiency and environmental sustainability projects? How much
funding has yet to be tapped and how can African governments apply for it?

3. As regards European territorial cooperation from 2014 to 2020, could the Commission draw up a new
transnational cooperation programme encompassing the outermost regions of the Azores, Madeira and the Canary
Islands and Cape Verde in order to consolidate their role as interlinked strategic platforms in the Atlantic region?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

1. The integration of the outermost regions in their regional environment is a key factor for their development.
The legislative proposals for cohesion policy therefore strengthen the role of outermost regions in Territorial
Cooperation programmes that support joint projects between the outermost regions and their neighbouring
countries. The thematic objectives to be pursued in these programmes are derived from the Europe 2020 strategy and
also include enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs by promoting entrepreneurship. The choice of thematic
objectives is, however, made by the Member States and regions participating in a cooperation programme, who also
take the decisions on the funding of individual projects.

2. The 10th European Development Fund, the Instrument for Development Cooperation and the Global Climate
Change Alliance and the related programmes they finance are among the instruments that can be mobilised by
African regions to promote energy efficiency and envrionmental sustainability projects. The EU also supports
regional Investment Facilities which encompass both public and private investments in strategic areas. Figures on
available funding and application procedures vary between instruments. For some programmes, new funding
opportunities may currently be limited due to the up-coming closing date.

3. Transnational cooperation programmes are drawn up by the participating countries and regions, not by the
Commission. The Commission expects Madeira, the Azores and the Canary Islands to continue working together in
the future, along with participants from Cape Verde, who already participate in projects in the current programme.

C 124 E / 128 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-003240/12**

**aan de Commissie**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(26 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Pools strooizout in voedsel

Pools strooizout is door malafide bedrijven verpakt als consumptiezout en in zowel Polen als andere landen van de
Europese Unie verwerkt in voedsel. De Poolse autoriteiten willen de lijst met bedrijven die het zout gekocht en
mogelijk verwerkt hebben niet vrijgeven. De Poolse minister Sawicki riep op te zwijgen in het belang van de Poolse
export: „Wij helpen de concurrentie niet mee de Poolse voedselproductie te vernietigen”.

— Wat is de status van dit strooizoutprobleem in de Europese Unie, in welke hoeveelheden is het strooizout op de
Europese markt terecht gekomen, welke bedrijven zijn getroffen, wat is de samenstelling van het gebruikte zout en
wat voor effecten hebben (langdurige) consumptie op de gezondheid?

— Welke landen hebben bij de Commissie aangegeven extra maatregelen te nemen ten opzichte van het Poolse zout
of andere Poolse producten in dit kader?

— Welke maatregelen neemt de Commissie om de informatie uit Polen over de getroffen bedrijven en de
samenstelling van het strooizout met effecten voor de volksgezondheid te krijgen en te verspreiden?

— Is de Commissie ook van mening dat het gezondheidsbelang in de Europese Unie zwaarder weegt dan de
exportbelangen van één lidstaat?

**Antwoord van de heer Dalli namens de Commissie**

_(30 april 2012)_

Eén partij van 500 kg strooizout uit Polen is naar Nederland verkocht. Een reeks chemische parameters (met inbegrip
van mineralen, metalen, nitrieten, nitraten, dioxinen en pcb's) van dit zout is geanalyseerd en vergeleken met normaal
Nederlands keuken‐ en tafelzout. Uit de analyses bleek geen significant verschil tussen het Poolse strooizout en het
Nederlandse zout voor gebruik in levensmiddelen. Er waren geen andere leveringen van strooizout aan andere
lidstaten of derde landen. De Nederlandse autoriteiten hebben het restant van het strooizout uit Polen in beslag
genomen. Geen enkel ander land heeft aanvullende maatregelen genomen.

Het strooizout is in Polen onderzocht op de aanwezigheid van zware metalen, dioxinen en pcb's. Wat de metalen
(lood, cadmium, kwik en arseen) betreft, lagen alle geconstateerde gehaltes onder de maximumwaarden van de Codex
voor deze verontreinigende stoffen in keuken‐ en tafelzout. De gehaltes voor dioxinen en pcb's lagen in het bereik van
normale achtergrondverontreiniging.

Op basis van deze informatie lijkt er geen gezondheidsrisico voor de consument te bestaan. De Commissie heeft de
Poolse autoriteiten verzocht het systeem voor snelle waarschuwingen over levensmiddelen en diervoeders te
informeren als er nog andere gevallen van verzending van strooizout naar andere lidstaten of derde landen worden
geconstateerd, of eventueel gevallen van export van levensmiddelen bij de bereiding waarvan dergelijk strooizout is
gebruikt.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 129

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003240/12**

**to the Commission**
**Esther de Lange (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Polish road salt in food

Polish road salt has been packaged by disreputable companies as edible salt and is being used in food both in Poland
and in other European Union countries. The Polish authorities are refusing to release the list of companies which have
bought and possibly used the salt. The Polish Minister Marek Sawicki called for this to be kept quiet for the sake of
Polish exports: ‘We will not help the competition destroy Polish food production’.

— What is the status of this road salt problem in the European Union, what amount of road salt has entered the
European market, which companies are affected, what is the composition of the salt used and what kind of effects
does (long-term) consumption have on health?

— Which countries have indicated to the Commission that they are taking additional measures with regard to Polish
salt or other Polish products in this context?

— What measures is the Commission taking to obtain and disseminate the information from Poland about the
companies concerned, and about the composition of the road salt and its effects on public health?

— Does the Commission also share the view that the interests of health in the European Union outweigh the export
interests of one Member State?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2012)_

One batch of 500 kg of technical salt from Poland was sold to the Netherlands. An analysis of a whole range of
chemical parameters (including minerals, metals, nitrites, nitrates, dioxins and PCBs) was performed of the technical
salt and compared with regular Dutch food grade salt. The analyses showed no significant difference between the
Polish technical salt and the Dutch food grade salt. No other deliveries of technical salt to other Member States or
third countries took place. The Netherlands has seized the remaining part of the batch of technical salt from Poland.
No other countries have taken additional measures.

In Poland the technical salt was analysed on the presence of heavy metals and dioxins and PCBs. As regards the metals
(lead, cadmium, mercury and arsenic) all levels found were below the Codex maximum level of these contaminants
for food grade salt. The levels of dioxins and PCBs were in the range of a normal background contamination.

Based on this information, there does not seem to be a health risk for the consumer. The Commission has requested
the Polish authorities to inform the Rapid Alert System for Feed and Food in case there would be further findings of
distribution of technical salt to other Member States or third countries or in case there would be distribution of food
produced with such technical salt to other Member States and third countries.

C 124 E / 130 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003242/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**

_(26 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Πρωτοβουλίες για τη διατήρηση των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων στα κράτη μέλη με ύφεση

Σήμερα, λόγω της μεγάλης οικονομικής ύφεσης την οποία συντηρούν η αύξηση της φορολογίας, η μείωση των κατώτατων
μισθών, η μείωση του διαθεσίμου και της κατανάλωσης και η έλλειψη της ρευστότητας, πλήττεται άμεσα η λειτουργία και ο
σκοπός των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων. Για το λόγο αυτό, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ειδικά για τις μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις, για τη διετία 2012-2014 έχει εκπονήσει συγκεκριμένες προτάσεις και
προγράμματα για την ανάπτυξη της επιχειρηματικότητας στα κράτη μέλη και αν ναι, ποιά συγκεκριμένα είναι αυτά;

2. Θεωρεί ότι οι μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις θα πρέπει να έχουν διαφορετικό συντελεστή φορολόγησης για να συνεχίσουν
τη λειτουργία τους, και ποιές πρωτοβουλίες θα πρότεινε να αναλάβουν τα κράτη μέλη για να τις διατηρήσουν
ζωντανές;

**Απάντηση του κ. Tajani εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Ιουνίου 2012)_

Στο πλαίσιο της εφαρμογής της Νομοθετικής Πράξης για τις Μικρές Επιχειρήσεις (SBA), η Επιτροπή έχει αναλάβει διάφορες
ενέργειες για τη στήριξη των ΜΜΕ σε σημαντικούς τομείς: πρόσβαση στη χρηματοδότηση, πρόσβαση στις αγορές (μέσα στην
ενιαία αγορά και πέραν αυτής) και μείωση του διοικητικού φόρτου.

Οι συγκεκριμένες δραστηριότητες που έχουν ήδη αρχίσει να εφαρμόζονται ή προγραμματίζονται για την περίοδο 20122014 περιλαμβάνουν τα εξής:

—
Σχέδιο δράσης για τη βελτίωση της πρόσβασης των ΜΜΕ στη χρηματοδότηση (Δεκέμβριος 2011).

—
Ανακοίνωση για τη στήριξη των ΜΜΕ της ΕΕ στις αγορές τρίτων χωρών («Μικρή επιχείρηση, μεγάλος κόσμος»,
Νοέμβριος 2011).

—
Έκθεση για την «Ελαχιστοποίηση του κανονιστικού φόρτου για τις ΜΜΕ — Προσαρμογή της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ στις
ανάγκες των πολύ μικρών επιχειρήσεων» (εκδόθηκε από την Επιτροπή στις 23 Νοεμβρίου 2011).

—
Πρόγραμμα «Erasmus — Νεαροί επιχειρηματίες», το οποίο βοηθά επιχειρηματίες που ίδρυσαν πρόσφατα ή
σκοπεύουν να ιδρύσουν νέα επιχείρηση να καθοδηγούνται και να εκπαιδεύονται από πεπειραμένο επιχειρηματία άλλου
κράτους μέλους της ΕΕ. Για περισσότερες λεπτομέρειες σχετικά με το Erasmus, μπορείτε να συμβουλευθείτε την
απάντηση που δόθηκε στην ερώτηση Ε-7935/2011 της κυρίας Roberta Angelilli.

—
Ευρωπαϊκό δίκτυο πρεσβειρών γυναικείας επιχειρηματικότητας (320 επιτυχημένες γυναίκες επιχειρηματίες σε 22
ευρωπαϊκές χώρες, που λειτουργούν ως πρότυπα για έμπνευση και μίμηση) και

—
Ευρωπαϊκό δίκτυο καθοδήγησης για γυναίκες επιχειρηματίες (εγκαινιάστηκε τον Νοέμβριο), που θα προσφέρει
συμβουλές και υποστήριξη σε γυναίκες επιχειρηματίες κατά τα αρχικά στάδια της επιχειρηματικής δραστηριότητάς

τους.

Μερικά κράτη μέλη εφαρμόζουν ήδη μειωμένους φορολογικούς συντελεστές για τις ΜΜΕ. Τα εθνικά μέτρα αυτού του είδους
πρέπει να συνάδουν με τους κανόνες της ΕΕ περί κρατικών ενισχύσεων.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 131

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003242/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marietta Giannakou (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Measures to sustain small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Member States hit by recession

The major economic recession, fuelled by tax increases to rise, the reduction minimum wage levels, a fall in supply
and demand and a lack of liquidity, is directly threatening SMEs’ operations and objectives. In view of this:

1. Has the Commission drawn up specific proposals and programmes for 2012-2014 to develop
entrepreneurship in the Member States particularly with regard to SMEs and, if so, what exactly are they?

2. Does it think that SMEs should have a different tax rate in order to continue their operations and what
measures does it suggest that Member States take to keep them alive?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 June 2012)_

In the framework of the implementation of the Small Business Act (SBA) the Commission has launched a number of
actions to support SMEs in important areas: access to finance, to markets (within the single market and beyond) and
easing administrative burdens.

Concrete activities started or in the pipeline for 2012-2014 include:

—
Action Plan to improve access to finance for SMEs (Dec 2011);

—
Communication on supporting EU SMEs in third country markets (‘Small Business, Big World’, Nov 2011);

—
Report on ‘Minimising regulatory burden for SMEs — adapting EU regulation to the needs of micro-enterprises’
(adopted by the Commission 23 Nov 2011);

—
Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme, which helps entrepreneurs who have recently started a
company or intend to do so to be coached and trained by an experienced entrepreneur in another EU Member
State. For further details on Erasmus, please refer to the answer given to Question E‐7935/2011 by Sig.ra
Roberta Angelilli;

—
European Network of Female Entrepreneurship Ambassadors (320 successful female entrepreneurs in 22
European countries who serve as inspiring role models) and

—
European Network of Mentors for Women Entrepreneurs (inaugurated Nov), who will offer advice and support
to women entrepreneurs during the early phases of their businesses.

Some Member States already apply reduced corporate tax rates for SMEs. Such national measures must comply with
the EU State aid rules.

C 124 E / 132 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003244/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Mario Mauro (PPE)**

_(26 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — India, indù bruciano un cattolico

India orientale: un indiano di fede cattolica è stato assassinato e il suo corpo dato alle fiamme. Il motivo è l'accusa di
essere un praticante della stregoneria.

È accaduto nell'arcidiocesi di Cuttack-Bhubaneswar, in Orissa, regione dell'India orientale, lo scorso 3 marzo, quando
un uomo di 50 anni residente nel villaggio di Salimagocha aveva preso parte a una riunione o a una festa insieme a
sedici abitanti di un villaggio vicino al suo, tutti di religione indù. Sembra che tutti avessero bevuto non poco. Tutti
insieme poi stavano tornando verso le loro abitazioni quando i sedici indù lo hanno assalito e ucciso tagliandogli il
collo. Hanno poi dato alle fiamme il corpo lasciandolo nella foresta. Il cadavere è stato rinvenuto il giorno dopo.

I familiari dell'uomo ucciso hanno sporto denuncia alla polizia, che ha fermato i presunti assassini. Secondo le
indagini in corso, il movente dato per giustificare la morte dell'uomo è quello di aver praticato la stregoneria. La
moglie e i tre figli dell'uomo ovviamente negano l'accusa. Il vice parroco della chiesa di Sant'Antonio di Padova,
condannando l'uccisione, ha detto che l'uomo si era da poco convertito al cattolicesimo e che non si era mai occupato
di stregoneria. I probabili assassini sono tutta gente analfabeta, profondamente ignorante e che crede nelle
superstizioni.

Si chiede:

1. Il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è al corrente della situazione?

2. Sebbene questo caso possa non essere incluso fra gli episodi di fanatismo anticristiano, è pur vero che in molte
zone dell'India fanatici indù o islamici si sono macchiati di veri atti di persecuzione, incendiando chiese sia dei
cattolici che dei protestanti, e si sono anche resi protagonisti in taluni casi di atti di violenza. Quali politiche
intende attuare il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per garantire il diritto alla libertà religiosa in India?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(8 giugno 2012)_

L’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente, attraverso la delegazione dell’UE a New Delhi, si informa costantemente in
merito agli atti di intolleranza religiosa e di discriminazione nei confronti delle minoranze in India e segue con
estrema attenzione la situazione nello Stato di Orissa dal 2010, quando ha avuto luogo la missione dell’UE per
l’accertamento dei fatti a seguito degli episodi di violenza collettiva contro i cristiani avvenuti nel 2007 e nel 2008.

Al riguardo sono state espresse più volte preoccupazioni presso le autorità indiane, anche ai massimi livelli, e la
questione è sistematicamente discussa nell’ambito del dialogo annuale sui diritti umani UE-India.

La delegazione dell’UE e le ambasciate degli Stati membri a New Delhi intrattengono inoltre contatti regolari con
interlocutori locali e con le ONG europee in diversi Stati dell’India per monitorare la situazione delle minoranze,
compresa quella dei cristiani. L’UE segue inoltre da vicino il modo cui sono portate avanti la sensibilizzazione ai
diritti, la riforma della polizia e alcune normative, come l’imminente progetto di legge sulla prevenzione della
violenza collettiva, e discute questi temi con le autorità indiane.

L’elaborazione delle relazioni in vista del prossimo esame periodico universale dell’India nel giugno 2012 ha
costituito un’occasione per fare il punto della situazione sulla libertà di religione o di credo, un tema che sarà
ampiamente discusso nell’ambito dei lavori preparatori a tale evento. In questo contesto occorre riconoscere il ruolo
encomiabile della Commissione nazionale dell’India per le minoranze, che segue tali questioni ed è in regolare
contatto con la delegazione dell’UE.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 133

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003244/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Mario Mauro (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — India: Catholic man burnt by Hindus

In eastern India, an Indian Catholic was murdered and his body burned after having been accused of practising
witchcraft.

The incident occurred on 3 March 2012 in the Archdiocese of Cuttack-Bhubaneshwar in Orissa, a region in eastern
India, when a 50-year-old man living in the village of Salimagocha attended a meeting or party alongside 16
inhabitants of a nearby village, all of whom were Hindus. Apparently having all drunk more than just a little, they
were returning home when the 16 Hindus attacked and killed him by cutting his throat. They then set his body on fire
and left it in the forest, where it was found the following day.

The relatives of the murdered man reported the crime to the police, who then arrested the alleged murderers.
According to the ongoing investigations, the reason given for the man’s murder was that he had been practising
witchcraft. The man’s wife and three children obviously deny the charge. The deputy priest of the church of Saint
Anthony of Padua condemned the murder and stated that the man had only very recently converted to Catholicism
and had never practised witchcraft. The alleged murderers are all illiterate, extremely uneducated people who believe
in superstitions.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this situation?

2. Although this case cannot be included among the many acts of anti-Christian fanaticism, it is nevertheless true
that in many areas of India, Hindu or Islamic fanatics have committed true acts of persecution, burning both Catholic
and Protestant churches, and have also perpetrated several acts of violence. What policies does the VicePresident/High Representative intend to implement to guarantee the right to religious freedom in India?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 June 2012)_

The High Representative/Vice-President, with the EU Delegation in Delhi, closely monitors acts of religious
intolerance and discrimination against minorities in India, and has been following the situation in the state of Orissa
very closely since the EU fact-finding mission to the state in 2010 following the 2007 and 2008 communal violence
against Christians there.

Concerns in this regard have been raised repeatedly with the Indian authorities, including at the highest possible level,
and the subject is systematically discussed during the local annual EU‐India Human Rights Dialogue.

The EU Delegation and EU Member State’s Embassies in Delhi are furthermore in regular contact with local
interlocutors and with European NGOs in a number of Indian states in order to monitor the situation of minorities in
India, including the situation of Christians. The EU is also closely following developments on rights awareness, police
reform, and legislation such as the still-awaited Communal Violence Prevention Bill, and discusses these matters with
the authorities.

The preparation of reports for India's upcoming 2012 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in June has provided an
opportunity to take stock of the situation regarding freedom of religion or belief and will be broadly discussed in the
run-up to the UPR. In this context the commendable role of India's National Commission for Minorities, which
follows these issues and with which the EU Delegation is in regular contact, should be acknowledged.

C 124 E / 134 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003245/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(26 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Situaţia cooperativelor şi organizaţiilor agricole

Situaţia cooperativelor agricole în Uniunea Europeana este foarte diferită de la un stat membru la altul.

Având în vedere procesul de reformare a politicii agricole comune şi reformarea OCP, consideră Comisia oportună
publicarea unui raport referitor la situaţia cooperativelor şi a organizaţiilor agricole în Uniunea Europeana până la
sfârşitul anului 2012?

**Răspuns dat de dl Cioloș în numele Comisiei**

_(30 aprilie 2012)_

Ca urmare a solicitării Parlamentului European, Comisia a lansat proiectul-pilot „Sprijin pentru cooperative agricole”
în decembrie 2010.

Durata proiectului este de 23 de luni. În conformitate cu practica standard, Comisia intenționează să publice
rezultatele acestui proiect pilot după aprobarea raportului final, în 2013.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 135

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003245/12**

**to the Commission**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The state of agricultural cooperatives and organisations

The state of agricultural cooperatives in the European Union is very different from one Member State to another.

In view of the common agricultural policy and Common Market Organisation reform process, does the Commission
consider that a report on the state of agricultural cooperatives and organisations in the European Union should be
published by the end of 2012?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2012)_

Following a request of the European Parliament, the Commission launched a pilot project on ‘Support for farmers'
cooperatives’ in December 2010.

The duration of the project is 23 months. Following the standard practice, the Commission plans to publish the
results of this pilot project after the approval of the final report, in 2013.

C 124 E / 136 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003246/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)**

_(26 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Promovarea utilizării conceptului de „silver economy”

Conceptul de „silver economy”, acoperind întreaga gama de activități economice ce vizează produsele sau serviciile
din domenii variate, de la sănătate pana la turism, cultură, este considerat ca o posibilă soluție pentru ca regiunile să
reușească să gestioneze consecințele îmbătrânirii populației, așa cum apare și în studiul cActive ageing: local and
regional solutions” în anul 2011, elaborat pentru Comitetul Regiunilor.

— Există la nivelul Comisiei o analiză în acest sens?

— Există exemple de bună practică ce pot fi diseminate, astfel încât sa fie utilizate la nivel regional?

**Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei**

_(21 mai 2012)_

Comisia nu a realizat un studiu dedicat economiei vârstei a treia ca soluție posibilă pentru ca regiunile să poate face
față cu succes consecințelor îmbătrânirii populației. Totuși, Comisia a lansat inițiative în mai multe domenii cu scopul
stimulării economiei vârstei a treia, asigurând și finanțarea necesară acestora.

Fondul european de dezvoltare regională contribuie cu finanțare la dezvoltarea infrastructurii sociale și de sănătate,
precum și în alte domenii de investiții legate de schimbările demografice.

Inițiativa CALYPSO ( [1] ) privind schimburile transnaționale de turiști în extrasezon, lansată în 2009, este puternic
concentrată pe grupul-țintă reprezentat de persoanele în vârstă ( [2] ).

Comisia a lansat Parteneriatul european pentru inovare privind îmbătrânirea activă și în condiții bune de sănătate,
menit să încurajeze modernizarea sistemelor de asistență medicală și de îngrijire din Europa și să creeze noi
posibilități pentru întreprinderile din UE. Parteneriatul reunește actori-cheie din ciclul inovării și părți interesate
angajate în standardizare și reglementare. Scopul său principal este punerea în practică de soluții inovatoare și crearea
unui forum care să permită identificarea și depășirea barierelor potențiale din calea inovării, precum și atragerea de
cofinanțări în vederea investițiilor în inovare.

Pentru a contribui la economia vârstei a treia, în 2008, 20 de state membre ale UE și 3 țări asociate au lansat actualul
Program comun de asistență pentru autonomie la domiciliu („programul comun AAD”), cu un buget minim total de
600 milioane EUR, dintre care 150 milioane EUR din partea Uniunii Europene. Acest program vizează încurajarea
apariției de produse, servicii și sisteme inovatoare bazate pe TIC și dedicate îmbătrânirii în bune condiții, precum și
îmbunătățirea condițiilor pentru exploatarea economică a acestor produse, servicii și sisteme ( [3] ), în special de către
IMM-uri.

Programul Cultura sprijină, de asemenea, mai multe proiecte legate de îmbătrânirea activă ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Pentru informații suplimentare, a se vedea întrebările parlamentare anterioare E-4788/11, E-10453/11, H-32/11 și H235/11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) A se vedea http://www.aal-europe.eu/ pentru informații generale și respectiv http://www.aal-europe.eu/projects/AALCatalogueV3.pdf/view

pentru broșura pe 2011 conținând proiectele AAD.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Act your age („Arată-ți vârsta”). Grant UE: 200 000 EUR. http://www.nederlandsedansdagen.nl/p/344.html, TIME for TENSO 12 | 13: Innovation

and Musical Excellence in Choral Music („Inovație și excelență muzicală în muzica corală”). Grant UE: 197 630 EUR.
http://www.kulturrad.no/eus_kulturprogram/prosjektbanken/tverrfaglig/time-for-tenso-12-13/, POETRY REGENERATION („REGENERAREA
POEZEIEI”), Grant UE: 199 299 EUR http://www.sou-lj.si/novo/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=37, RACIF — Robots and Avatars —
Collaborative and Intergenerational Futures („RACIF — Roboți și avataruri — viitoruri în colaborare și intergeneraționale”). Grant UE: 199 054
EUR. http://www.robotsandavatars.net/tag/racif/, VIA VILLAS — Enrich Architectural Heritage Via Villas („Îmbogățirea patrimoniului arhitectural
cu vile”), grant UE: 196 100 EUR http://www.greatvillas.org/via-villas-project, Consortium — A European Network for Performance Practice
(„Consortium — o rețea europeană pentru practicarea artelor interpretative”), grant UE: 200 000 EUR.

( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 137

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003246/12**

**to the Commission**
**Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)**

_(26 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Promoting the use of the ‘silver economy’ concept

The ‘silver economy’ concept, covering the entire range of economic activities aimed at products or services in fields
including health, tourism and culture, is considered a possible solution for regions to successfully manage the
consequences of an ageing population, as is also shown in the study ‘Active ageing: local and regional solutions’,
prepared for the Committee of the Regions in 2011.

— Has an analysis of the situation been carried out at Commission level?

— Are there examples of best practice that can be disseminated for use at regional level?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

The Commission has not carried out a dedicated study on the silver economy as a possible solution for regions to
successfully manage the consequences of an ageing population. The Commission has however launched in several
areas initiatives with the aim to boost the silver economy and is also providing funding in this respect.

The European Regional Development Fund is contributing funding to developing social and health infrastructure and
to other investment areas related to demographic change.

The CALYPSO initiative ( [1] ) on low-season transnational tourist exchanges launched in 2009 has a strong focus on
seniors as a target group ( [2] ).

The Commission has launched the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing which aims to
foster modernisation of Europe's health and care systems and create opportunities for EU's businesses. The
Partnership brings together key stakeholders in the innovation cycle along with those engaged in standardisation and
regulation. It focuses on the implementation of innovative solutions, as well as provides a forum to identify and
overcome potential innovations barriers and to seek leverage financing for investments in innovation.

In order to contribute to the silver economy, the current Ambient Assistant Living Joint Programme (AAL JP) was
created by 20 EU Member States and 3 associated countries in 2008 with minimum total budget of EUR 600 million,
including EUR 150 million from the European Union. It aims at fostering the emergence of innovative ICT-based
products, services and systems for ageing well, and improving conditions for the industrial exploitation of those ( [3] ), in
particular for SMEs.

The Culture Programme supports a number of projects related to active ageing ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) For further information see earlier parliamentary Questions E‐4788/11, E‐10453/11, H‐32/11 and H-235/11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) See http://www.aal-europe.eu/ for general information and http://www.aal-europe.eu/projects/AALCatalogueV3.pdf/view for the 2011 brochure

of AAL projects.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Act your age. EU‐grant: 200.000 EUR, http://www.nederlandsedansdagen.nl/p/344.html, TIME for TENSO 12 | 13: Innovation and Musical

Excellence in Choral Music. EU‐grant: 197.630 EUR, http://www.kulturrad.no/eus_kulturprogram/prosjektbanken/tverrfaglig/time-for-tenso-1213/, POETRY REGENERATION, EU‐grant: 199.299 EUR, http://www.sou-lj.si/novo/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=37, RACIF —
Robots and Avatars — Collaborative and Intergenerational Futures. EU‐grant: 199.054 EUR, http://www.robotsandavatars.net/tag/racif/, VIA
VILLAS — Enrich Architectural Heritage Via Villas EU‐grant: 196.100 EUR, http://www.greatvillas.org/via-villas-project, Consortium — A
European Network for Performance Practice EU‐grant: 200.000 EUR.

( **|**

C 124 E / 138 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-003247/12**

**aan de Commissie**

**Ivo Belet (PPE)**
_(27 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Aanbeveling over het nationale hervormingsprogramma van België

De op 7 juni 2011 door de Europese Commissie geformuleerde en op 12 juli 2011 door de Raad aangenomen
aanbeveling over het nationale hervormingsprogramma 2011 van België spoort België aan om „in overleg met de
sociale partners en conform de nationale praktijken het systeem voor het voeren van loononderhandelingen en het
loonindexeringsysteem te hervormen, teneinde ervoor te zorgen dat de loonstijging beter aansluit bij de ontwikkeling
van de arbeidsproductiviteit en het concurrentievermogen”.

De Europese Unie (EU) is samen met de lidstaten verantwoordelijk voor een aantal aspecten van sociaal en
werkgelegenheidsbeleid. Het verdrag over de werking van de EU (VWEU), art. 153 (5) bepaalt echter dat de EU geen
bevoegdheid heeft aangaande het loonbeleid van de lidstaten. In die zin bepaalt, bijvoorbeeld, Verordening (EU) nr.
1176/2011 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de preventie en correctie van macro-economische
onevenwichtigheden expliciet dat bij toepassing van deze verordening artikel 152 VWEU ten volle in acht wordt
genomen, en dat de onder deze verordening vastgestelde aanbevelingen de nationale praktijken en de instellingen
voor loonvorming eerbiedigen. Verder stelt de tekst dat de verordening rekening houdt met artikel 28 van het
Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie en bijgevolg geen afbreuk doet aan het recht om over collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomsten te onderhandelen en deze te sluiten en naleving ervan af te dwingen, of om collectieve actie te
voeren overeenkomstig de nationale wetgeving en praktijken.

— Is de aanbeveling van de Commissie betreffende de hervorming van zowel het Belgisch systeem voor het voeren
van loononderhandelingen als het Belgisch loonindexeringsysteem in die optiek te verzoenen met het primaire recht
van de EU?

— Meent de Commissie dat deze aanbevelingen stroken met de bepalingen uit Verordening (EU) nr. 1176/2011?

**Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie**

_(26 april 2012)_

De beperking die is vervat in artikel 153, lid 5, van het VWEU betreft alleen de initiatieven in de tekst van het artikel
zelf, niet de aanbevelingen aan de Raad overeenkomstig artikel 121, lid 2, en artikel 148, lid 4, van het VWEU, die de
rechtsgrond verschaffen voor de aanbeveling aan België.

De aanbeveling is niet gebaseerd op Verordening (EU) nr. 1176/2011, die in werking is getreden op
13 december 2011.

Zoals bepaald in artikel 51 van het Handvest, moeten de Unie en de lidstaten de bepalingen van het Handvest naleven
wanneer zij het recht van de Unie ten uitvoer leggen. Deze bepaling betreft onder meer het recht op collectieve
onderhandelingen uit hoofde van artikel 28.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 139

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003247/12**

**to the Commission**

**Ivo Belet (PPE)**
_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Recommendation on the National Reform Programme of Belgium

The recommendation on Belgium’s 2011 National Reform Programme, drafted by the European Commission on
7 June 2011 and adopted by the Council on 12 July 2011, encourages Belgium ‘to reform, in consultation with the
social partners and in accordance with national practice, the system of wage bargaining and wage indexation, to
ensure that wage growth better reflects developments in labour productivity and competitiveness’.

The European Union, together with the Member States, is responsible for a number of social and employment policy
aspects. However, Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulates that
the EU does not have any jurisdiction regarding the wage policy of Member States. In this regard **,** for example,
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council on the prevention and correction of
macroeconomic imbalances, stipulates explicitly that the application of this regulation will fully observe Article 152
TFEU, and that the recommendations issued under this regulation will respect the national practices and institutions
for fixing wages. The text also states that the regulation takes into account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and, accordingly, is not detrimental to the right to negotiate, conclude or enforce
collective labour agreements, or to take collective action in accordance with the national law and practices.

— In this respect, is the Commission’s recommendation on the reform of the Belgian system for conducting wage
negotiations, as well as the Belgian wage indexation system, compatible with the primary law of the EU?

— Does the Commission believe that these recommendations are consistent with the provisions of Regulation (EU)
No 1176/2011?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 April 2012)_

The limitation included in Article 153(5) TFEU only pertains to the initiatives in the article itself not to the Council
recommendations under Articles 121(2) and 148(4) TFEU, which provide the legal basis for the recommendation to
Belgium.

The recommendation is not founded in Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, which came into force on
13 December 2011.

As laid down in Article 51 of the Charter, the Union and the Member States shall respect the provisions of the Charter
when they are implementing Union law and these provisions include the right to collective bargaining under
Article 28.

C 124 E / 140 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-003250/12**

**til Kommissionen**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27. marts 2012)_

_Om:_ Implementering af krydsoverensstemmelsesprincippet

Ifølge TV/MIDT-VEST mandag den 26. marts 2012 er en dansk landmand blevet trukket 3 % i sin landbrugsstøtte for
2011 af den danske Kulturarvsstyrelse for at have pløjet for tæt på en gravhøj på sin mark. Ifølge den danske
museumslovs § 29f må der ikke »foretages jordbehandling, gødes eller plantes på fortidsminder inden for en afstand
af 2 meter«.

Bøden er således idømt for en overtrædelse af en kulturarvsbestemmelse i en udelukkende national lov, som ikke
hviler på EU‐retten. De danske myndigheder henviser imidlertid til krydsoverensstemmelsesprincippet i EU's
forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009 om fælles regler for den fælles landbrugspolitiks ordninger, nærmere bestemt bilag III
om betingelser for god landbrugs‐ og miljømæssig stand som omhandlet i artikel 6. Denne artikel forpligter
medlemsstaterne til at sikre, at landbrugsjorden holdes i god landbrugs‐ og miljømæssig stand, ligesom den fastslår, at
medlemsstaterne ikke må fastsætte minimumskrav, der ikke er fastsat i forordningens rammer.

Mener Kommissionen — eftersom den danske museumslov på ingen måde vedrører landbrugsjordens stand, men
udelukkende har til formål at bevare den danske kulturarv — at der er hjemmel i EU's forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009 til
at anvende krydsoverensstemmelse til at sanktionere en landmand for en overtrædelse af denne lov? I fald
Kommissionen ikke mener, at der er hjemmel hertil, hvilke skridt agter den da at tage overfor Danmark?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Dacian Ciolos**

_(4. maj 2012)_

I henhold til artikel 6 i forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009 ( [1] ) påhviler det medlemsstaterne at sikre, at al landbrugsjord
holdes i god landbrugs‐ og miljømæssig stand (GLM). Medlemsstaterne fastsætter kravene herfor på grundlag af de
rammer, der er opstillet i bilag III til forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009.

Til dette formål skal der fastsættes en norm for »bevarelse af landskabstræk, herunder eventuelt hække, vandhuller,
grøfter og træer i rækker, i grupper eller enkeltstående og markbræmmer«.

Som angivet i artikel 6 i forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009 har medlemsstaterne dog et vist spillerum til at målrette de
minimumskrav eller elementer, som GLM skal tilgodese, » _idet der tages hensyn til de pågældende områders særlige_
_karakteristika, herunder jordbunds‐ og klimaforhold, eksisterende landbrugssystemer, arealanvendelse, vekseldrift,_
_landbrugspraksis og landbrugsstrukturer_ « _._

Reglerne, som det ærede medlem beskriver, er registreret af de danske myndigheder på baggrund af ovennævnte
juridiske bestemmelser med henblik på at opfylde kravet om bevarelse af landskabstræk.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009 af 19. januar 2009 om fælles regler for den fælles landbrugspolitiks ordninger for direkte støtte til landbrugere

og om fastlæggelse af visse støtteordninger for landbrugere, om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 1290/2005, (EF) nr. 247/2006, (EF)
nr. 378/2007 og om ophævelse af forordning (EF) nr. 1782/2003 (EUT L 30 af 31.1.2009, s. 16‐99).

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 141

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003250/12**

**to the Commission**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Implementation of the cross-compliance principle

According to TV/MIDT-VEST (a Danish regional TV channel), on Monday, 26 March 2012, a Danish farmer had 3 %
deducted from his 2011 agricultural aid by the Heritage Agency of Denmark for ploughing too close to a burial
mound on his field. According to Section 29f of the Danish Museum Act, ‘soil treatment, the application of fertiliser
and planting are prohibited on ancient relics or monuments and within a distance of 2 m from them’.

The fine has thus been levied for the infringement of a provision in exclusively national cultural legislation which is
not bound by EC law. The Danish authority, however, refers to the cross-compliance principle under Council
Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers
under the common agricultural policy, and in particular under Annex III on good agricultural and environmental
conditions referred to in Article 6. This article obliges Member States to ensure that all agricultural land is maintained
in good agricultural and environmental condition and also stipulates that Member States must not define minimum
requirements which are not foreseen in the framework of the regulation.

Does the Commission think — given that the Danish Museum Act does not in any way concern itself with
agricultural conditions, but is purely concerned with preserving Danish cultural heritage — that there are any
grounds under Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 to use cross-compliance to sanction a farmer for an
infringement of this Act? If the Commission believes that there are no grounds for this, what action does the
Commission intend to take with regard to Denmark?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

Pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 ( [1] ), Member States shall ensure that agricultural land is
maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition (GAEC). Member States define requirements based on
the standards in Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009.

For this purpose, one standard has to be determined concerning ‘retention of landscape features, including, where
appropriate, hedges, ponds, ditches, trees in line, in groups or isolated, and field margins’.

As foreseen by Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, Member States have nevertheless some flexibility for
targeting the minimum requirements or elements to be covered by GAEC, especially ‘taking into account the specific
characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic condition, existing farming systems, land use, crop
rotation, farming practices, and farm structures’.

It is based on this legal framework that the rules described by the honourable member have been registered by the
Danish authorities, in order to satisfy the requirement for a GAEC on retention of landscape features.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common

agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC)
No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 OJ L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16-99.

C 124 E / 142 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-003251/12**

**til Kommissionen**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27. marts 2012)_

_Om:_ Interkalibrering af vandløb

Vandrammedirektivet (2000/60/EF) forpligter EU's medlemsstater til at opstille metoder til at vurdere vandområders
økologiske tilstand.

For at sikre, at medlemsstaternes vurderingsmetoder giver ensartede resultater i forhold til at opfylde direktivets
miljømål om god tilstand, er medlemsstaterne forpligtet til at deltage i en interkalibrering af værdierne for
grænselinjerne mellem klasserne »høj og god« tilstand og mellem klasserne »god og moderat« tilstand.

Kommissionen forestår denne interkalibrering og offentliggør efterfølgende resultatet.

Ved en gennemgang af de indmeldte vandløbsklassificeringer nord og syd for den dansk-tyske grænse ses meget store
forskelle i antallet af udpegede vandløb, som skal opfylde målet om god økologisk tilstand. Således er der i
Nordtyskland 15‐20 % målsatte vandløb, mens der i Danmark er 70‐80 % målsatte vandløb på arealer, som
topografisk og hydrologisk er sammenlignelige med de nordtyske arealer.

Kan Kommissionen oplyse, hvorfor der forekommer en sådan variation i klassificeringen, når formålet med
interkalibreringen netop har været at give ensartede resultater i forhold til at opfylde direktivets målsætninger?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Janez Potočnik**

_(6. juni 2012)_

De danske vandområdeplaner, som er udarbejdet i overenstemmelse med Vandrammedirektivets artikel 13 ( [1] ), blev
vedtaget og indberettet til Kommissionen i december 2011.

Det fastsættes i direktivet, at medlemsstaterne foretager en interkalibrering med støtte fra Kommissionen for at sikre,
at resultatetne af medlemsstaternes vurderingsmetoder er sammenlignelige og i overensstemmelse med de
normgivende definitioner. Resultaterne af interkalibreringen blev offentliggjort ved Kommissionens
beslutning 2008/915/EF ( [2] ). Interkalibreringens anden fase afsluttes i 2012, og resultaterne vil blive offentliggjort
senere i 2012.

Kommissionen er ikke bekendt med den gennemgang, som det ærede medlem omtaler.

Kommissionen vurderer i øjeblikket de vandområdeplaner, som er indberettet af medlemsstaterne, og den vil
offentliggøre resultaterne i november 2012 som en del af strategien for beskyttelse af EU's vandressourcer.
Vurderingen omfatter bl.a. hvordan medlemsstaterne har opfyldt forpligtelsen til at overvåge og vurdere
vandområdernes økologiske tilstand, samt hvordan de har omsat resultaterne af interkalibreringen i deres
vurderingsmetoder.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 2000/60/EF, EFT L 327 af 22.12.2000.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) EUT L 332 af 10.12.2008.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 143

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003251/12**

**to the Commission**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Intercalibration of water courses

The Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) obliges Member States to establish methods for assessing the
ecological status of bodies of water.

In order to ensure that Member States’ assessment methods show uniform results in relation to meeting the
environmental objectives in the directive for good status, Member States are obliged to participate in intercalibration
of values for the borders between ‘high’ and ‘good’ status and between ‘good’ and ‘moderate’ status.

The Commission will undertake this intercalibration and will publish the subsequent result.

An inspection of the submitted water course classifications north and south of the Danish-German border shows very
great differences in the number of designated water courses that have to meet the objective of good ecological status.
Thus, in northern Germany, 15‐20 % of water courses are designated, while in Denmark, 70‐80 % of water courses
are designated in areas that are topographically and hydrologically comparable with the northern German areas.

Can the Commission explain why there is this variation in classification, when the intention of intercalibration was
specifically to achieve uniform results in order to fulfil the objectives of the directive?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 June 2012)_

The Danish River Basin Management Plans prepared according to Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive ( [1] )
were adopted and reported to the Commission in December 2011.

The directive foresees that Member States undertake an intercalibration exercise, facilitated by the Commission, to
ensure that the results of the assessment methods of the Member States are comparable and consistent with the
normative definitions. The results of the intercalibration exercise were published as Commission
Decision 2008/915/EC ( [2] ). A second phase of intercalibration is coming to an end in 2012 and the results will be
published later in 2012.

The Commission is not aware of the inspection mentioned by the Honourable Member.

The Commission is currently assessing the River Basin Management Plans reported by the Member States and will
publish its findings in November 2012 as part of the Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources. The
assessment covers, _inter alia_, how the Member States have implemented the obligations to monitor and assess the
ecological status of water bodies and how they have translated the results of the intercalibration exercise into their
assessment methods.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 2000/60/EC, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 332, 10.12.2008.

C 124 E / 144 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003252/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Συνεργασία και συνοχή μεταξύ των υπηρεσιών της Επιτροπής στο θέμα της ελληνικής κρίσης

Η προωθούμενη σήμερα πολιτική αντιμετώπισης της ελληνικής κρίσης αποτυγχάνει τόσο εξαιτίας διαρθρωτικών
προβλημάτων της ελληνικής οικονομίας κι αναποτελεσματικότητας του πολιτικού συστήματος και της διοίκησης, όσο όμως
και εξαιτίας της λανθασμένης πολιτικής που επιβάλλει η τρόικα, εμμένοντας σε μια σκληρή πολιτική μονόπλευρης λιτότητας
και περικοπών. Η μείωση των δαπανών του κράτους, κυρίως χάρη στη δραματική μείωση μισθών, συντάξεων και κοινωνικών
παροχών, σε πολύ μικρότερο βαθμό λόγω μεταρρυθμίσεων ή αντιμετώπισης της φοροδιαφυγής, υπερκαλύπτεται από την
αναγκαστική αύξηση δαπανών για ενίσχυση των ασφαλιστικών ταμείων -ιδιαίτερα του Ιδρύματος Κρατικών Ασφαλίσεων
(ΙΚΑ)- που κινδυνεύουν να καταρρεύσουν, λόγω μείωσης των εσόδων τους ως αποτέλεσμα της βαθιάς ύφεσης ( [1] ), της
αύξησης της ανεργίας ( [2] ) και της μείωσης των μισθών ( [3] ). Αυτή η αύξηση των δαπανών για το δίμηνο ΙανουαρίουΦεβρουαρίου 2012 ανέρχεται στο 1,5 %, ενώ προβλεπόταν μείωση κατά 8 %, εξαιτίας κυρίως της υπέρβασης των
πρωτογενών δαπανών κατά 774 εκ. για ασφάλιση, περίθαλψη και κοινωνική προστασία, καθώς και για επιχορήγηση στο ΙΚΑ
κατά 619 εκατ. ευρώ με σκοπό την αναπλήρωση της μείωσης των εσόδων από ασφαλιστικές εισφορές ( [4] ). Οι εν λόγω
αυξήσεις δαπανών υπερκάλυψαν τη σημαντική μείωση των υπολοίπων κατηγοριών των δαπανών κατά 568 εκατ. ευρώ σε
σχέση με την αντίστοιχη περίοδο του 2011, που προήλθε από μείωση δαπανών για μισθούς και λειτουργικά έξοδα στο
δημόσιο.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες Διευθύνσεις της Επιτροπής αποφασίζουν τις πολιτικές που προωθούνται μέσω της τρόικα στην περίπτωση της
ελληνικής κρίσης; Υπάρχει συνεργασία μεταξύ της Διεύθυνσης Οικονομικών και Χρηματοδοτικών Υποθέσεων και της
Διεύθυνσης Απασχόλησης, Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων και Κοινωνικής Ένταξης, ώστε η προωθούμενη πολιτική της
Επιτροπής να είναι συνεκτική;

2. Είναι διατεθειμένη η Επιτροπή να ξεκινήσει ένα ουσιαστικό διάλογο όχι μόνο μεταξύ των διαφόρων διευθύνσεών της,
αλλά και με το Ευρωκοινοβούλιο για να διορθωθούν οι προωθούμενες πολιτικές που οδηγούν σε έκρηξη της ανεργίας,
μείωση των εισφορών και απειλή πλήρους κατάρρευσης του ασφαλιστικού συστήματος στην Ελλάδα το αργότερο
μέχρι το 2017;

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0055:FIN:EL:PDF

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(7 Μαΐου 2012)_

Οι εκπρόσωποι της Επιτροπής στην τρόικα εργάζονται υπό την καθοδήγηση του Αντιπροέδρου της Επιτροπής που είναι
αρμόδιος για τις οικονομικές και νομισματικές υποθέσεις και το ευρώ. Πριν από τη λήψη οποιασδήποτε θέσης σχετικά με το
πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα, διεξάγονται οι αναγκαίες διαβουλεύσεις μεταξύ όλων των αρμοδίων
υπηρεσιών, κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο που διεξάγονται οι διαβουλεύσεις για όλες τις πράξεις της Επιτροπής. Η προσέγγιση αυτή
αντικατοπτρίζεται όχι μόνο στο Μνημόνιο Συνεννόησης αλλά και στην πρόσφατη ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής με τίτλο
«Ανάπτυξη στην Ελλάδα» ( [5] ).

Η Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει και προωθεί τη διαφάνεια και τον διάλογο στις εργασίες της και συνεργάζεται με όλα τα θεσμικά
όργανα της ΕΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του Κοινοβουλίου. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, ο Αντιπρόεδρος που είναι αρμόδιος για τις
οικονομικές και νομισματικές υποθέσεις και το ευρώ εμφανίστηκε πρόσφατα στην κοινή συνεδρίαση της Κοινοβουλευτικής
Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων και Απασχόλησης και Κοινωνικών Υποθέσεων, στο πλαίσιο ακρόασης
για την Ελλάδα.

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⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Εισηγητική Έκθεση Κρατικού Προϋπολογισμού 2012, Πίνακας 3.33.

http://www.minfin.gr/content-api/f/binaryChannel/minfin/datastore/d5/af/5e/d5af5e94ab4b082c523e8c0b34f750bf9892bf1b/application/pdf/EISHGHTIKH+2012.pdf.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-01032012-AP/EN/3-01032012-AP-EN.PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-15032012-BP/EN/3-15032012-BP-EN.PDF.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Όπως (1), Πίνακας 3.35.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/pdf/2012-04-18-greece-comm_en.pdf

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30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 145

Η Επιτροπή καταβάλλει επίσης προσπάθειες για την προώθηση της διαφάνειας και του διαλόγου με τη δημοσίευση
τριμηνιαίων εκθέσεων για την εφαρμογή του ελληνικού προγράμματος προσαρμογής (βλ.:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/op94_en.htm).

C 124 E / 146 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003252/12**

**to the Commission**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Cooperation and cohesion between Commission services on the Greek crisis issue

The policy currently being promoted to tackle the Greek crisis is failing both because of structural problems in the
Greek economy, the ineffectiveness of the political system and administration, and also because of the Troika’s
misguided policy of persisting with a harsh policy of one-sided austerity and cuts. The reduction in state expenditure,
mainly due to the dramatic reductions in wages, pensions and social benefits, and to a much smaller degree, due to
reforms and attempts to combat tax evasion, has been more than offset by the forced increase in expenditure to boost
insurance funds — especially the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) — which are in danger of collapsing due to a
reduction in their income as a result of the deep recession ( [1] ), the increase in unemployment ( [2] ) and the reduction in
wages ( [3] ). This increase in expenditure over the two-month period of January‐February 2012 amounts to 1.5 %,
where a reduction of 8 % had been forecast, mainly due to the fact that there was an overrun of EUR 774 million in
primary expenditure on insurance, healthcare and social protection, as well as the subsidy of EUR 619 million to IKA
to offset the reduction in income from insurance contributions ( [4] ). These increases in expenditure more than
outweigh the significant reduction in the remaining expenditure categories by EUR 568 million, compared to the
same period in 2011, achieved through cutting public sector wages and operating expenditure.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Which Commission Directorates-General decide on the policies promoted by the Troika to address the Greek
crisis? Is there cooperation between the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion to ensure that the Commission’s current
policy is coherent?

2. Does the Commission intend to begin a meaningful dialogue not only between its various Directorates but also
with Parliament, for the purpose of adjusting current policies, which are causing a sharp increase in
unemployment, reductions in income and the threat of a complete collapse of the Greek social insurance
system by 2017 at the latest?

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0055:FIN:EN:PDF

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2012)_

The representatives of the Commission in the Troika work under the direction of the Vice-President of the
Commission for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro. The necessary consultation takes place between all the
relevant services prior to any position being taken on the economic adjustment programme for Greece, in the same
way as consultation takes place for all the acts of the Commission. This approach is reflected not only in the MoU but
also in the Commission's recent Communication ‘Growth in Greece’ ( [5] ).

The Commission supports and promotes transparency and dialogue in its work and cooperates with all the EU
institutions, including the Parliament. In this context the Vice-President for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the
Euro has recently appeared at the joint meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
and on Employment and Social Affairs in a hearing on Greece.

The Commission has also promoted transparency and dialogue by publishing detailed quarterly reports on the
implementation of the Greek adjustment programme
(see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/op94_en.htm).

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Introductory report on the 2012 State budget, Table 3.33,

[http://www.minfin.gr/content-api/f/binaryChannel/minfin/datastore/d5/af/5e/d5af5e94ab4b082c523e8c0b34f750bf9892bf1b/application/pdf/EISHGHTIKH+2012.pdf](http://www.minfin.gr/content-)

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-01032012-AP/EN/3-01032012-AP-EN.PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-15032012-BP/EN/3-15032012-BP-EN.PDF
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) See footnote 1, Table 3.35.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/pdf/2012-04-18-greece-comm_en.pdf

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30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 147

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003253/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Φτώχεια και βίαιες περικοπές συντάξεων

Η μείωση των δαπανών του ελληνικού κράτους στο πλαίσιο της δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής ( [1] ) επιδιώκεται με πολύ βίαιη
περικοπή μισθών και συντάξεων, κάτι που συντελεί στην μείωση του διαθέσιμου εισοδήματος κάτω από το όριο της
αξιοπρεπούς διαβίωσης και στην αύξηση της φτώχειας μεγάλου τμήματος του πληθυσμού. Ταυτόχρονα ενισχύει τον φαύλο
κύκλο της ύφεσης στην οικονομία και αποδεικνύεται οικονομικά-δημοσιονομικά αναποτελεσματική. Αυτή η πολιτική
αντιστρατεύεται όμως και βασικές ευρωπαϊκές πολιτικές όπως: (α) την πολιτική για επαρκείς, ασφαλείς και βιώσιμες
συντάξεις ( [2] ), (β) την στρατηγική ΕΥΡΩΠΗ 2020, στο πλαίσιο της οποίας προβλέπεται μείωση της φτώχειας και μάλιστα,
στην ελληνική περίπτωση, μείωση των φτωχών κατά περίπου 450 000 μέχρι το 2020 ( [3] ).

Με δεδομένο ότι (α) η προωθούμενη πολιτική, με ευθύνη και της Επιτροπής, έχει αποτύχει να αντιμετωπίσει μέχρι τώρα τις
αιτίες της ελληνικής κρίσης εστιάζοντας μονομερώς σε μια πολιτική αυστηρής λιτότητας και σε μέτρα που έχουν μεγάλο
κοινωνικό — οικονομικό κόστος για τους έλληνες πολίτες και τους ευρωπαίους φορολογούμενους, και (β) οι συντάξεις στην
Ελλάδα (παρά τα όποια διαρθρωτικά προβλήματα υπήρχαν στο σύστημα) συμβάλλουν σημαντικά στη μείωση της φτώχειας
(κατά 19 %, σύμφωνα με τα τελευταία διαθέσιμα στοιχεία) ( [4] ), ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Δέχεται οι προτάσεις της, μέσω του εκπροσώπου της στην τρόικα, για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης να έρχονται σε
αντίθεση με βασικά στοιχεία της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής για την αντιμετώπιση της φτώχειας και αυτής για επαρκείς,
ασφαλείς και βιώσιμες συντάξεις;

2. Είναι έτοιμη να διερευνήσει, ή έχει τυχόν διερευνήσει ήδη εναλλακτικές, ως προς την μονομερή αυστηρή λιτότητα,
λύσεις για την ελληνική κρίση που συνδυάζουν αντιμετώπιση του δημοσιονομικού προβλήματος με κοινωνικά
ισορροπημένα και στοχευμένα μέτρα, που διασφαλίζουν, μεταξύ άλλων, την εφαρμογή των ευρωπαϊκών πολιτικών,
ιδιαίτερα σε σχέση με επαρκείς, ασφαλείς και βιώσιμες συντάξεις, καθώς και για μείωση των φτωχών κατά 450 000
μέχρι το 2020, σε σχέση με το 2009;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(22 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η μεταρρύθμιση του συνταξιοδοτικού συστήματος που εγκρίθηκε από το Eλληνικό Κοινοβούλιο τον Ιούλιο του 2010
απλοποίησε το έντονα κατακερματισμένο συνταξιοδοτικό σύστημα, ενίσχυσε τη διαφάνεια και τη δικαιοσύνη, αύξησε τα όρια
συνταξιοδότησης και μείωσε αισθητά τα επιδόματα.

Με τη μεταρρύθμιση καθιερώθηκε νέα βασική σύνταξη ύψους 360 ευρώ το μήνα. Για όσους έχουν εισφορές λιγότερες από
15 έτη και, συνεπώς, δεν δικαιούνται ανταποδοτική σύνταξη, η βασική σύνταξη χορηγείται με βάση τους πόρους διαβίωσης
του δικαιούχου και συνιστά ένα σημαντικό κοινωνικό δίχτυ ασφαλείας.

Οι στόχοι του νέου οικονομικού προγράμματος προσαρμογής, το οποίο αποτέλεσε αντικείμενο διαπραγμάτευσης μεταξύ της
Ελλάδας και της Επιτροπής ( [5] ), της ΕΚΤ και του ΔΝΤ, είναι να διασφαλισθεί η δημοσιονομική βιωσιμότητα, να αποκατασταθεί
η ανταγωνιστικότητα και να διασφαλισθεί η χρηματοπιστωτική σταθερότητα.

Δεδομένης της ανάγκης να συνεχιστεί η μείωση του δημοσιονομικού ελλείμματος, η Ελλάδα αποφάσισε να μειώσει τις
υψηλότερες συντάξεις και να αντιμετωπίσει την από φορολογική άποψη μη βιώσιμη κατάσταση των καθεστώτων επικουρικής
σύνταξης. Οι κύριες συντάξεις άνω των 1 300/μήνα μειώνονται κατά 12 %· οι επικουρικές συντάξεις 200-250 ευρώ
μειώνονται κατά 10 %, οι επικουρικές συντάξεις 250-300 ευρώ μειώνονται κατά 15 % και οι επικουρικές συντάξεις άνω των
300 ευρώ μειώνονται κατά 20 % ( [6] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Μνημόνιο ΙΙ και διαδικασία για τη μείωση του υπερβολικού ελλείμματος στην Ελλάδα (Απόφαση Συμβουλίου 2011/734/ΕΕ).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0055:FIN:EL:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0802/PressReleases/A0802_SFA10_DT_AN_00_2010_01_F_GR.pdf.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Εξ ονόματος των κρατών μελών της ευρωζώνης.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Βάσει του νόμου που ενέκρινε το ελληνικό Κοινοβούλιο στις 28 Φεβρουαρίου 2012.

C 124 E / 148 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Το συνταξιοδοτικό σύστημα πρέπει να εδράζεται σε μια βιώσιμη οικονομικά βάση προκειμένου να παρέχει στους
συνταξιούχους μακροπρόθεσμα επαρκείς και ασφαλείς συντάξεις. Ο αντίκτυπος της μεταρρύθμισης μετριάζεται σε κάποιο
βαθμό με την καθιέρωση της βασικής σύνταξης, η οποία αντιμετωπίζει αποτελεσματικά περιπτώσεις συνταξιούχων έσχατης
ένδειας. Επιπλέον, οι πρόσφατες περικοπές αφορούν τις υψηλότερες συντάξεις (κύρια και επικουρική) και, συνεπώς, δεν
επηρεάζουν όσους παίρνουν χαμηλές συντάξεις. Μετριάζεται επίσης ο αντίκτυπος των μεταρρυθμίσεων όσον αφορά τα
συνταξιοδοτικά επιδόματα. Η αύξηση των ορίων συνταξιοδότησης, υπό την προϋπόθεση βελτίωσης των δυνατοτήτων
απασχόλησης των εργαζομένων μεγαλύτερης ηλικίας, θα συμβάλει επίσης στη διασφάλιση της οικονομικής βιωσιμότητας
χωρίς να χρειαστεί να μειωθούν άλλο οι συντάξεις.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 149

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003253/12**

**to the Commission**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Poverty and drastic pension cuts

The Greek State is reducing its expenditure, as part of financial adjustment measures ( [1] ), by way of very drastic cuts in
wages and pensions, which is lowering available income below a decent subsistence level and consigning a large
proportion of the population to poverty. This intervention merely reinforces the vicious circle of recession in the
economy: it is economically and financially ineffectual. The policy also contradicts basic European policies, such as
(a) the policy on adequate, safe and sustainable pensions ( [2] ), and (b) the _Europe 2020_ strategy, which aims at reducing
poverty and, in the Greek context, seeks by the year 2020 to reduce by about 450 000 the number of people living in
poverty ( [3] ).

Given that (a) the current policy, for which the Commission bears responsibility, has so far failed to address the
reasons for the Greek crisis, focusing unilaterally on a policy of austerity and measures with a high socioeconomic
cost for Greek citizens and the European taxpayer, and that (b) pensions in Greece (despite whatever structural
problems affected the system) contribute significantly to reducing poverty (by 19 %, according to the latest data) ( [4] ),
will the Commission say:

1. Does it accept that its proposals, made through its representative in the Troika, for dealing with the Greek crisis
are at odds with basic elements of European policies on combating poverty and providing adequate, safe and
sustainable pensions?

2. Is it prepared to investigate, or has it already investigated, alternatives to harsh measures of unilateral austerity
— solutions to the Greek crisis that will combine remedies to the financial problem with socially balanced and
targeted measures for ensuring that, among other things, European policies are implemented, especially in
connection with adequate, safe and sustainable pensions, and with reducing the number of people living in
poverty by 2020 by 450 000, compared to 2009 figures?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 May 2012)_

The pension reform adopted by the Greek Parliament in July 2010 simplified the highly fragmented pension system;
enhanced transparency and fairness, postponed the retirement age and decreased the generosity of benefits.

The reform introduced a new basic pension of EUR 360/month. For those with less of 15 years of contributions, and
thus not eligible for the contributory pension, the basic pension is means-tested, and provides an important social
safety net.

The objectives of the new economic adjustment programme that has been negotiated between Greece, and the
Commission ( [5] ), the ECB and the IMF are to ensure fiscal sustainability, restore competitiveness and guarantee
financial stability.

Given the need to continue reducing the government deficit, Greece has decided to reduce the highest pensions, and
to address the fiscally unsustainable situation of the supplementary pension schemes. Main pensions above
EUR 1300/month will be cut by 12 %; supplementary pensions between EUR 200-250 by 10 %, supplementary
pensions between EUR 250-300 by 15 %, and above EUR 300 by 20 % ( [6] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Memorandum II and the procedure to reduce the excessive deficit in Greece (Council Decision 2011/734/EU).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0055:FIN:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0802/PressReleases/A0802_SFA10_DT_AN_00_2010_01_F_EN.pdf
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) On behalf of the euro area Member States.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Following the Law adopted by the Greek Parliament on 28 February 2012.

C 124 E / 150 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

The pension system has to stand on a financially sustainable footing in order to provide pensioners with adequate and
safe pensions over the long run. The impact of the reform is being mitigated to some extent by the introduction of the
basic pensions which effectively combats the most extreme poverty amongst pensioners. Furthermore, the recent cuts
are directed to the highest (main and supplementary) pensions and, therefore, do not impact on the less well-off
segment of pensioners. This also mitigates the impact of the reforms on the adequacy of pension benefits. Increasing
retirement age will, subject to an improvement in the employment opportunities for older workers, also help to
ensure financial sustainability without having to further weaken the adequacy of pensions.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 151

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003255/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Η συμβατότητα των δραστηριοτήτων φαλαινοθηρίας στην Ισλανδία με τη νομοθεσία της ΕΕ και με τα κριτήρια
προσχώρησης

Το 1982, η Διεθνής Επιτροπή Φαλαινοθηρίας (ΔΕΦ) υιοθέτησε ένα δικαιοστάσιο σχετικά με την φαλαινοθηρία για
εμπορικούς σκοπούς. Παρά το εν λόγω δικαιοστάσιο, η Νορβηγία, η Ισλανδία και η Ιαπωνία εξακολουθούν να αναπτύσσουν
φαλαινοθηρικές δραστηριότητες για εμπορικούς σκοπούς είτε προβάλλοντας αντιρρήσεις/επιφυλάξεις για το δικαιοστάσιο
είτε επικαλούμενες επιστημονικούς σκοπούς. Επιπλέον, στο παράρτημα IV της οδηγίας της ΕΕ για τους οικοτόπους
απαριθμούνται όλα τα κητοειδή για τα οποία προβλέπεται καθεστώς αυστηρής προστασίας που περιλαμβάνει, μεταξύ άλλων,
«την απαγόρευση της κατοχής, της μεταφοράς και της πώλησης/ανταλλαγής των δειγμάτων ειδών που έχουν συλληφθεί στο
φυσικό περιβάλλον». Η ΕΕ ακολουθεί μια ενιαία γραμμή υποστηρίζοντας με συνέπεια τη διατήρηση του δικαιοστασίου και
κατά τις ετήσιες συνόδους της ΔΕΦ έχει εκφράσει την αντίθεσή της για διάφορα νέα είδη φαλαινοθηρίας που περιλαμβάνουν
διεθνή εμπορική δραστηριότητα.

Σύμφωνα με την Δανική προεδρία, αν και με αργούς ρυθμούς, η διαδικασία προσχώρησης της Ισλανδίας στην ΕΕ σημειώνει
πρόοδο. Πιθανότατα τον Ιούνιο του 2012 θα ξεκινήσουν οι διαπραγματεύσεις για το περιβάλλον και τότε θα τεθούν επί
τάπητος οι δραστηριότητες φαλαινοθηρίας της Ισλανδίας. Σε αντίθεση με το ΗΒ, τις Κάτω Χώρες και την Νορβηγία, η
Ισλανδία δεν έχει μακρά ιστορία στις δραστηριότητες βιομηχανικής φαλαινοθηρίας. Η σύγχρονη θήρα μεγάλων φαλαινών
εισήχθη στην Ισλανδία από τη Νορβηγία το 1883. Η μεγάλης κλίμακας εμπορική φαλαινοθηρία ξεκίνησε μόλις το 1948 και
συνεχίζεται υποστηριζόμενη θερμά από την Ιαπωνία, χώρα εξαγωγής των προϊόντων. Μετά την απαγόρευση της
φαλαινοθηρίας το 1989, η Ισλανδία ξεκίνησε και πάλι να αναπτύσσει δραστηριότητες φαλαινοθηρίας το 2006, με
ποσόστωση 9 φαλαινοπτέρων και 40 ρυγχοφαλαινών.

1. Δεδομένου ότι η φαλαινοθηρία εισήχθη στην Ισλανδία από τη Νορβηγία, θα χαρακτηρίζαμε τη φαλαινοθηρία στην
Ισλανδία ως αυθεντική παραδοσιακή δραστηριότητα;

2. Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να επιβεβαιώσει ότι η ΕΕ θα επιμείνει στη θέση της όσον αφορά την προστασία των φαλαινών και ότι
στο πλαίσιο των διαπραγματεύσεων για την προσχώρηση της Ισλανδίας δεν θα επιτρέψει τη συνέχιση της εμπορικής
φαλαινοθηρίας;

3. Μπορεί η Επιτροπή να επιβεβαιώσει ότι δεν θα τροποποιήσει την οδηγία για τους οικοτόπους ώστε να συμπεριλάβει το
ζήτημα των ισλανδικών δραστηριοτήτων φαλαινοθηρίας στις διαπραγματεύσεις για την προσχώρηση;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η Επιτροπή γνωρίζει ότι η ισχύουσα νομοθεσία της Ισλανδίας επιτρέπει φαλαινοθηρικές επιχειρήσεις εμπορικής φύσης.

Η Επιτροπή επιβεβαιώνει την πλήρη δέσμευσή της για την προστασία όλων των κητοειδών (φάλαινες, δελφίνια και φώκαινες)
και, σ’ αυτό το πλαίσιο, παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος στην απάντηση της σε προηγούμενη γραπτή ερώτηση E006168/2011 από τον κ. Casa ( [1] ) στην οποία η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε την άποψη ότι οι φαλαινοθηρικές δραστηριότητες
εμπορικής φύσης από πλευράς της Ισλανδίας δεν είναι συμβατές με την νομοθεσία της ΕΕ και με τη θέση της ΕΕ στην Διεθνή
Επιτροπή Φαλαινοθηρίας. Κατά τη στιγμή της προσχώρησης, η Ισλανδία θα πρέπει να συμμορφώνεται με το κεκτημένο για
την προστασία της φύσης σχετικά με την προστασία της φάλαινας.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EL.

C 124 E / 152 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003255/12**

**to the Commission**

**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Icelandic whaling activities are incompatible with EU legislation and accession criteria

In 1982, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling. Despite this
moratorium, Norway, Iceland and Japan have continued whaling for commercial purposes, either under an
objection/reservation to the moratorium decision or under the guise of ‘scientific whaling’. Moreover, the EU Habitats
Directive lists all cetaceans in Annex IV, which affords them strict protection including ‘prohibiting the keeping,
transport and sale or exchange … of specimens taken from the wild’. The EU common position has consistently
supported the maintenance of the moratorium and has, during the annual meetings of the IWC, opposed any new
types of whaling that involve international trade.

According to the Danish Presidency, the accession of Iceland to the EU is progressing, albeit slowly. In June 2012, the
negotiation chapter on the environment will most probably be opened, at which time Icelandic whaling activities will
be discussed. Unlike the UK, Netherlands and Norway, Iceland does not have a long history of industrial whaling.
Modern whaling for large whales was introduced in Iceland from Norway in 1883. Large-scale commercial whaling
only began in 1948, and has continued with strong support from Japan, to which the products were exported. After
ceasing whaling in 1989, Iceland resumed commercial whaling in 2006, with a quota of 9 fin whales and 40 minke
whales.

1. Given that whaling was only introduced in Iceland from Norway, would you describe Icelandic whaling as a
genuine traditional activity?

2. Can the Commission confirm that it will maintain the EU position as regards protecting whales and, within the
framework of the Iceland accession negotiations, not allow the continuation of commercial whaling?

3. Can the Commission confirm that it will not amend the Habitats Directive to accommodate Icelandic whaling
within the negotiations for accession?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

The Commission is well aware of the fact that Iceland's current legislation allows commercial whaling operations.

The Commission reaffirms its full commitment to the protection of all cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises)
and in this context it refers the Honourable Member to the reply to previous Written Question E‐006168/2011 by
Mr Casa ( [1] ) in which the Commission expressed the view that commercial whaling operations carried out by Iceland
would not be compatible with EC law and with the position taken by the EU at the International Whaling
Commission. At the time of accession, Iceland will need to comply with the nature protection _acquis_ as regards
protection of whales.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 153

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-003256/12**

**til Kommissionen**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(27. marts 2012)_

_Om:_ Skattestatus for landbrugskooperativer i EU

Mit spørgsmål handler om, i hvilket omfang landbrugssektoren i EU har lige konkurrencevilkår. I Europa spiller
landbrugskooperativer en nøglerolle inden for distributionen af mad, hvor to modeller står over for hinanden:

—
På den ene side er der det, vi kunne kalde den »nordiske« model, der bruges i lande som Danmark,
Nederlandene, Tyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige, og som er en konkurrencemodel, hvor
konkurrencevilkårene generelt er lige, idet de skattemæssige vilkår for kooperativer og deres industrielle
modparter er lige.

—
På den anden side er der det, vi kunne kalde den »sydlige« model, der bruges i lande som Spanien, Frankrig og
Grækenland, hvor kooperativer er omfattet af væsentlige skattefritagelser, hvilket forårsager skattemæssige
uligheder og tab af industriel konkurrenceevne.

Det vurderes eksempelvis, at skattefritagelsen for franske kooperativer beløber sig til ca. 2 mia. EUR om året. Når man
sammenligner den »sydlige« og den »nordlige« model, står det klart, at en afhængighed af skattefritagelser resulterer i
et tab af konkurrenceevne, hvilket er i strid med det, som Europa p.t. er interesseret i.

1. I lyset af den aktuelle finanskrise og den franske regerings planer om økonomiske stramninger med henblik på
at mindske underskuddet, hvad er da Kommissionens holdning til, at der er skattefritagelser for
landbrugskooperativer?

2. Hvad er Kommissionens holdning til den forvridende effekt, skattefritagelser har på det indre marked, eftersom
visse af disse franske landbrugskooperativer hvert år, i medfør af skattefritagelser, får fordele til en værdi af millioner
af euro?

3. Kan Kommissionen bekræfte, at i henhold til Domstolens dom i sag C 78/08 og C 80/08 (2011/C 311/06) skal
»en mere fordelagtig skattemæssig behandling af kooperativer være i overensstemmelse med principperne om
konsekvens og proportionalitet«?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Joaquin Almunia**

_(21. maj 2012)_

Som skitseret i Kommissionens meddelelse af 23. februar 2004 om fremme af andelsselskaber, så spiller kooperativer
en meget vigtig rolle i Europas landbrugssektor ( [1] ).

Under henvisning til Den Europæiske Unions Domstols nyligt afsagte dom i sag C‐78/08-C‐80/08 om mulig
statsstøtte til produktions‐ og arbejdsandelsselskaber, har Domstolen mindet om, at det efter at have fastslået det
relevante referencesystem er nødvendigt at afgøre, om sådanne andelsselskaber står i en situation, der faktuelt og
juridisk er sammenlignelig med den, kommercielle virksomheder befinder sig i. Er dette tilfældet, skal det fastsættes,
om den skattemæssige begunstigelse af andelsselskaber er retfærdiggjort af skattesystemets logik. I henhold til
Domstolen er en sådan skattemæssig begunstigelse retfærdiggjort, hvis den for det første udgør en iboende del af den
pågældende medlemsstats skattesystems grundlæggende principper, og for det andet er i overensstemmelse med
principperne om konsekvens og proportionalitet. I den forbindelse understregede Domstolen, at de pågældende
medlemsstater skal implementere og gennemføre passende kontrol‐ og overvågningsprocedurer for at sikre, at
andelsselskabers specifikke skattemæssige fordele er konsekvente med logikken i skattesystemet, og for at forhindre
at erhvervsvirksomheder vælger netop denne selskabsform med det ene formål at udnytte de skattefordele, denne
type virksomheder nyder godt af. For at den skattemæssige begunstigelse er retfærdiggjort i overensstemmelse med
skattesystemet generelt eller dets natur, er det desuden også nødvendigt at sikre, at skattemæssige fritagelser er
konsekvente med proportionalitetsprincippet og ikke rækker længere end nødvendigt, idet det legitime formål ikke
kan opnås ved foranstaltninger af mindre omfang.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) KOM(2004)0018 endelig, punkt 4.

C 124 E / 154 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003256/12**

**to the Commission**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Fiscal status of agricultural cooperatives in the EU

My question refers to the extent to which the agricultural sector in the EU presents a level playing field. In Europe,
agricultural cooperatives play a key part in the distribution of food, with two models confronting each other:

—
On the one hand, there is what we could call the ‘northern’ model, followed in countries like Denmark,
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, being a competitive model where the playing field is generally
level, with equal fiscal terms for cooperatives and their industrial counterparts.

—
On the other hand, there is what we could call the ‘southern’ model, followed in countries like Spain, France
and Greece, where cooperatives benefit from substantial tax exemptions, causing fiscal inequalities and loss of
industrial competitiveness.

For example, the tax exemptions for French cooperatives amount to an estimated EUR 2 billion a year. When
comparing the ‘southern’ and ‘northern’ models, it becomes clear that a dependence on tax exemptions results in a
loss of competitiveness, quite the opposite of what Europe is currently looking for.

1. In light of the actual economic crisis and the economic austerity plans taken by the French Government to
diminish deficits, what is the Commission’s opinion on the existence of tax exemptions for agricultural cooperatives?

2. What is the Commission’s opinion on the distortive effects of tax exemptions on the internal market, given that
each year, as a result of tax exemptions, some of these French agricultural cooperatives receive benefits worth millions
of euros?

3. Can the Commission confirm that, in keeping with the ruling of the European Court of Justice in cases C 78/08
and C 80/08 (2011/C 311/06), ‘the more advantageous tax treatment enjoyed by cooperatives must comply with the
principles of consistency and proportionality’?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

As outlined in the Commission communication of 23 February 2004 on the promotion of cooperative societies,
cooperatives play a very important role in the agricultural sector in Europe ( [1] ).

With reference to the recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08, concerning the possible
existence of state aid to producers' and workers' cooperatives, the Court recalled that after having determined the
applicable reference system, it is necessary to determine if such cooperatives are in a comparable factual and legal
situation to that of commercial companies. If this is the case, it should then be established whether the preferential tax
treatment for cooperatives is justified by the logic of the tax system. According to the Court, such a preferential tax
treatment is justified if, first, it forms an inherent part of the essential principles of the tax system applicable in the
Member State concerned and, second, if it complies with the principles of consistency and proportionality. In this
respect, the Court underlined that the Member State concerned has to introduce and apply appropriate control and
monitoring procedures in order to ensure that specific tax measures enjoyed by cooperative societies are consistent
with the logic of the tax system and to prevent economic entities from choosing that particular legal form for the sole
purpose of taking advantage of the tax benefits provided for that kind of undertaking. Moreover, in order for tax
exemptions to be justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax system, it is also necessary to ensure that those
exemptions are consistent with the principle of proportionality and do not go beyond what is necessary, in that the
legitimate objective being pursued could not be attained by less far-reaching measures.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2004) 18 final, Section 4.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 155

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003257/12**

**to the Commission**
**Roger Helmer (EFD)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Production and wholesale of electricity in Germany

I was rather surprised by an implementing decision which appears to exempt Germany from the normal EU rules on
public procurement with regard to its electricity sector: this is the ‘Draft Commission Implementing Decision
exempting the production and wholesale of electricity produced from conventional sources in Germany from the
application of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating
the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sector’.

— What possible reason can there be for this separate treatment of a single Member State?

— Does this not cut across the whole principle of common rules in the single market?

— If Germany is entitled to this exemption, why should other Member States not benefit from it?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2004/17/EC ( [1] ), Member States or, where national legislation so allows,
contracting entities may request exemptions from the application of the rules of that directive for certain activities.
The Commission may also start procedures on its own initiative. The Commission may adopt a decision exempting
activities from the rules of the directive if two conditions are met, namely:

1. that access to the activity concerned is not restricted; and

2. that the activity is fully exposed to competition on the market in question.

The German application at the basis of the draft Decision is the 10th in the electricity sector so far. For the other nine
cases, five positive Decisions ( [2] ) were issued, two Decisions were negative ( [3] ) and one mixed (Italy), while in one other
case (Spain) the application was withdrawn by the applicant and therefore did not result in a decision. ( [4] )

The purpose of public procurement rules is to ensure that economic operators have a real possibility of exercising the
fundamental freedoms linked to the free movement of goods and services and the freedom of establishment. When
these objectives are ensured through a sufficient competitive pressure in a given sector and in a given Member State,
the Commission can consider, after careful examination of each individual case, that an exemption to public
procurement rules can be granted.

Each Decision adopted by the Commission must take into account the specific circumstances of the activities and
Member State concerned. It is therefore not possible to extend the application referred to by the Honourable Member
to other Member States. Other Member States may apply for a decision pursuant to Article 30 and may also be
granted exemptions if the Commission finds that the relevant conditions set-out in the directive are met.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,

energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Austria, Sweden, United Kindom — two Decisions, and Finland.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Poland and the Czech Republic.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/rules/exempt_markets/index_en.htm

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

C 124 E / 156 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003259/12**

**to the Commission**
**David Martin (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Repatriation of North Koreans by the Chinese authorities

Recent weeks have seen the repatriation by China of at least 41 North Korean refugees to the DPRK, where they are
likely to face execution along with their families, in accordance with statements issued by the North Korean regime.

In the light of this, what action will the Commission take to urge the Chinese government to live up to its
international obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and recognise all North
Koreans fleeing the DPRK as refugees _sur place_, considering the persecution they will face if repatriated?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

The EU has raised the issue of North Korean asylum‐seekers and refugees with China, in particular in the framework
of the EU‐China human rights dialogue. All countries should as a matter of principle fulfil their commitments under
the 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol by refraining from refouling people to
their country of origin where they might face the death penalty or other human rights abuses. The Chinese position
has remained unchanged until now. It does not recognise North Korean refugees and regards them as economic
migrants. The Commission will continue to follow closely the situation of North Korean refugees and to engage
China on this issue.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 157

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003261/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Emergenza sorbitolo

Una donna di 28 anni è morta a Barletta dopo aver ingerito una fiala di sorbitolo prima di sottoporsi a un test clinico
di gastroenterologia.

Il sorbitolo, un additivo alimentare, era stato acquistato on line dal medico che aveva in cura la ragazza.

Altre due donne, che hanno ingerito la stessa sostanza, sono state ricoverate in gravi condizioni e si trovano sotto
osservazione in ospedale.

E-Bay, il più grande sito di compravendite on line, dopo aver appreso la notizia ha deciso di sospendere la vendita in
rete del sorbitolo in tutto il mondo.

In Italia, i carabinieri del Nas (Nucleo antisofisticazione) hanno sequestrato, per esaminarli, migliaia di litri di questa

sostanza.

Premesso che, secondo l'Agenzia italiana del farmaco, delle oltre quarantamila farmacie aperte on line soltanto lo
0,6 % è legale, e un altro 2 % potenzialmente legale, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. è a conoscenza dell'emergenza sorbitolo? In che modo intende affrontarla?

2. Ritiene che le misure attualmente in vigore siano sufficienti per contrastare questo fenomeno?

3. Quali altri misure ritiene che si possano attuare per prevenire il verificarsi di episodi analoghi?

4. Come intende controllare il mercato dei farmaci on line?

**Risposta di John Dalli** **a nome della Commissione**

_(14 giugno 2012)_

La Commissione è al corrente del problema causato dal sorbitolo in Italia. Il sorbitolo è un additivo alimentare
(dolcificante). Esso appartiene al gruppo di additivi per i quali non è stata definita una dose giornaliera ammissibile.
Ciò significa che esso non rappresenta un rischio potenziale per la salute per raggiungere l'effetto tecnologico
desiderato. L'additivo può essere quindi usato in diverse categorie di alimenti quantum satis, vale a dire che non è
specificato un livello massimo e la sostanza deve essere usata conformemente a buone prassi di fabbricazione, a un
livello non superiore a quanto necessario per raggiungere l'obiettivo perseguito, a condizione che il consumatore non
venga tratto in inganno.

Informato dell'incidente il Regno Unito ha imposto un divieto di vendita o di distribuzione di tutte le sostanze
chimiche d'uso alimentare provenienti dalla società coinvolta nelle vendite via internet del prodotto. Informazioni
sulle vendite via internet/sugli acquirenti di tale impresa relativamente al «sorbitolo per uso alimentare» sono state
fornite e fatte circolare tramite il Sistema di allarme rapido per gli alimenti e i mangimi.

La direttiva 2011/62/UE ( [1] ) comprende disposizioni in merito alle vendite a distanza di medicinali, disposizioni che
diverranno applicabili un anno dopo la pubblicazione dell'atto di attuazione concernente la definizione di un logo
comune atto a consentire l'identificazione delle «farmacie online» che operano legalmente. La Commissione ha
iniziato i lavori preliminari su tale atto e prevede di pubblicare entro la fine del 2012 un documento di consultazione
per ricevere i commenti delle parti interessate.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2011/62/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio dell'8 giugno 2011 che modifica la direttiva 2001/83/CE, recante un codice

comunitario relativo ai medicinali per uso umano, al fine di impedire l'ingresso di medicinali falsificati nella catena di fornitura legale (GU L 174
dell'1.7.2011).

C 124 E / 158 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003261/12**

**to the Commission**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Sorbitol crisis

A 28-year-old woman has died in Barletta after ingesting an ampoule of sorbitol prior to undergoing a
gastroenterological clinical test.

The sorbitol, a food additive, had been purchased online by the doctor who was treating her.

Another two women, who had ingested the same substance, were admitted to hospital in a serious condition and are
being kept under observation.

After hearing the news, eBay, the biggest online shopping site, decided to suspend the online sale of sorbitol
throughout the world.

In Italy, the NAS Carabinieri (the unit responsible for the safety of food, drinks and medicines) seized thousands of
litres of this substance for testing.

In light of the fact that, according to the Italian Medicines Agency, only 0.6 % of the more than forty thousand online
pharmacies are legal, with a further 2 % being potentially legal, could the Commission please answer the following
questions:

1. Is it aware of the problem with sorbitol? How does it intend to deal with it?

2. Does it believe that the measures currently in force are sufficient to counter this problem?

3. What other measures does it believe can be taken to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents?

4. How does it intend to monitor the online medicines market?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 June 2012)_

The Commission is aware of the problem which occurred with Sorbitol in Italy. Sorbitol is a food additive
(sweetener). It belongs to the group of additives for which no acceptable daily intake has been specified. This implies
that it does not represent a hazard to health in order to achieve the desired technological effect. The additive can
therefore be used in several food categories at quantum satis, this means that no maximum level is specified and the
substance shall be used in accordance with good manufacturing practice, at the level not higher than is necessary to
achieve the intended purpose provided that the consumer is not misled.

Following the information on the incident, the United Kingdom imposed a ban on the sale or distribution of any food
grade chemicals from the company involved in the Internet sales. Information on the Internet sales/buyers from this
company of ‘sorbitol food grade’ was provided and circulated through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed.

Directive 2011/62/EU ( [1] ) includes provisions concerning the distance selling of medicines which will be applicable
one year after the date of publication of the implementing act concerning the establishment of a common logo
enabling the identification of legally operating ‘online pharmacies’. The Commission has initiated the preliminary
work on this act and a consultation paper is planned to be published for comments by the end of 2012.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2011/62/EU of Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to

medicinal products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal supply chain of falsified medicinal products, OJ L 174,
1.7.2011.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 159

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003262/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Colorante a rischio cancro contenuto nelle bibite

Il caratteristico colore scuro della Coca Cola, una delle bibite più conosciute consumate a livello mondiale,
sembrerebbe essere il risultato dell'utilizzo di chinotti e di un caramello altamente pericoloso, l'E150d, il quale,
insieme ad un altro colorante, l'E150c — entrambi contenenti ammoniaca — è stato accusato dall'associazione
americana _Center for Science in the Public Interest (Cspi)_ di produrre, durante la lavorazione, un residuo potenzialmente
cancerogeno che si ritrova in bibite e alimenti: il 4-MEI.

Si consideri che l'Agenzia internazionale di ricerca sul cancro dell'Oms (Iarc) ha già inserito il 4-MEI nella lista delle
sostanze potenzialmente cancerogene per la specie umana e che, dalle ultime analisi scientifiche, in una lattina di
Coca Cola si riscontra la presenza del 4-MEI in quantità 5 volte superiori rispetto ai limiti consentiti.

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. è a conoscenza degli effetti dell'utilizzo dei coloranti E150d e E150c e del loro residuo 4-MEI che
sembrerebbero essere altamente pericolosi per la salute umana?

2. Se fossero confermati questi sospetti, quali misure intende adottare per ridurre e/o limitare l'uso di questi
coloranti all'interno di alimenti e bibite?

**Risposta data da John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

_(2 maggio 2012)_

La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputato alla propria risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-002847/2012 ( [1] ):

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.

C 124 E / 160 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003262/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Potentially carcinogenic colouring in beverages

The characteristic dark colour of Coca-Cola, one of the most popular beverages consumed worldwide, appears to
result from the use of chinotto extract and a highly dangerous caramel, E150d. The US Center for Science in the
Public Interest has claimed that, when processed, the latter substance, along with another colouring, E150c — both of
which contain ammonia — produces a potentially carcinogenic residue found in beverages and food: 4-MEI.

The WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has already included 4-MEI on the list of potentially
carcinogenic substances for humans. According to the latest scientific analyses, a can of Coca-Cola contains 4-MEI in
quantities five times above the permitted limits.

In view of the above:

1. Is the Commission aware of the effects of using E150d and E150c colourings and of their 4-MEI residue, which
appear to be extremely dangerous to human health?

2. Assuming that the above suspicions were to be confirmed, what measures will it take to reduce and/or limit the
use of these colourings in food and drinks?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E‐002847/2012 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 161

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003263/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Atenei fantasma e rilascio di lauree fasulle

L'Università Giovanni Paolo I, il cui sito web è stato sequestrato dalla Procura della Repubblica italiana nei giorni
scorsi, rappresenta uno dei molti casi di falsi atenei che stanno nascendo non solo in Italia ma in tutta Europa.
Strutture didattiche e scientifiche, in realtà inesistenti, una vasta offerta formativa presente solo sulla carta e il
conferimento di lauree honoris causa a personaggi famosi e a politici per attirare iscrizioni, sono solo alcuni degli
strumenti utilizzati da queste organizzazioni e orchestrati da abili truffatori.

La presenza di atenei fasulli, diffusi su tutto il territorio europeo, rappresenta un grave ostacolo al diritto allo studio
dei cittadini e alla possibilità, soprattutto dei giovani, di ottenere un valido titolo di studio spendibile utilmente sul
mercato del lavoro. Il valore dei documenti rilasciati è totalmente nullo: essi non sono riconosciuti in alcun paese.

Considerato che queste università fasulle rappresentano un pericolo per i giovani europei che, raggirati da false
promesse, non solo vi investono tempo ed energie ma soprattutto risorse finanziarie, quali misure intende la
Commissione adottare per prevenire la proliferazione sul territorio europeo di atenei fantasma che rilasciano false
lauree, garantendo in tal modo ai cittadini europei il diritto allo studio e il connesso ottenimento di titoli legalmente
riconosciuti sul territorio dell'Unione?

**Risposta data da Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

_(4 maggio 2012)_

Conformemente all'articolo 165 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea (TFUE) gli Stati membri sono i
principali responsabili dell'organizzazione dei loro sistemi educativi. Di conseguenza, la Commissione non dispone di
nessuna base per intervenire sulla questione sollevata nel quesito dell'onorevole deputato né dispone di alcuna
conoscenza nel merito.

C 124 E / 162 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003263/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Berlato (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Bogus universities and the award of sham degrees

Giovanni Paolo I University, whose website was seized a few days ago by the Italian public prosecutor’s office, is one
of the many bogus universities that are emerging not just in Italy, but throughout Europe. Non-existent teaching and
scientific facilities, a wide range of courses existing on paper only and the award of honorary degrees to famous
people and politicians in order to attract potential students are just some of the ruses orchestrated by the clever cheats
who run bodies of this kind.

The fact that there are bogus universities spread all over Europe poses a serious obstacle to the right that citizens have
to study and also to the chance, for young people in particular, to obtain a valid qualification usable on the job
market. The documents issued are completely worthless: they are not recognised in any country.

Bearing in mind that they are a danger for young Europeans, who, lured by false promises, invest not only their time
and energy, but, above all, their money, what measures will the Commission take to prevent bogus universities
issuing similarly bogus degrees from proliferating in Europe and hence to ensure that European citizens can exercise
their right to study and obtain qualifications legally recognised within the EU?

**Answer given by Mrs Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

In accordance with Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States are
primarily responsible for the organisation of their education systems. Accordingly, there is no basis for the
Commission to intervene in the matter raised in the honourable member's question; nor does it have any knowledge
of this matter.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 163

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003268/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Incendios en Galicia

El entorno natural de Galicia cuenta con múltiples espacios protegidos y reconocidos por su valor ecológico. La Red
Natura 2000 reconoce el valor de diversos emplazamientos de Galicia, que deberían disponer de planes rectores de
protección y conservación. El problema de los incendios en Galicia no es nuevo. Entre 2001 y 2010 ardieron, en
promedio, 14 300 hectáreas anuales de zonas naturales gallegas. Muchos de esos incendios se produjeron en lugares
protegidos por la Red Natura 2000.

La Directiva 92/43/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 1992, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de
la fauna y flora silvestres, así como el Documento de trabajo de la Comisión sobre Natura 2000, de 27 de diciembre
de 2002, prevén la adopción de regímenes de gestión de esos espacios.

Además, en las últimas semanas se produjeron en Galicia diversos incendios, como el del valle de Lóuzara (Lugo), que
afectó, según la información recogida, a una ruta tradicional que enlaza los municipios de O Incio y O Courel, de gran
valor ecológico y supervisada por la Estación Científica del Courel (Lugo). El Gobierno de Galicia está dejando de
desempeñar las funciones de prevención y conservación, al suprimir los servicios de control de incendios de la
Empresa Pública de Servicios Agrarios Gallegos (SEAGA).

Solicitamos, pues, a la Comisión que exija la adopción de normas tendentes a la elaboración de planes de prevención
de incendios, a fin de evitar la destrucción de masa forestal y otras zonas de importante valor ecológico de este
territorio, de tanta relevancia para la biodiversidad de Europa.

¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de la situación en materia de incendios en Galicia?

¿Puede informar sobre los planes de prevención de incendios para lugares de interés comunitario (LIC) reconocidos
por la Red Natura 2000 en Galicia?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de mayo de 2012)_

La Comisión tiene conocimiento de esos incendios a través del Sistema Europeo de Información sobre Incendios
Forestales (EFFIS), que colabora con los servicios responsables de la protección de los bosques contra los incendios en
los países de la UE y facilita a los servicios de la Comisión y del Parlamento Europeo información actualizada y fiable
sobre los incendios forestales en Europa.

La Comisión no recibe información sobre los planes de prevención de incendios para lugares Natura 2000 en
aplicación de las disposiciones de la Directiva 92/43/CE ( [1] ) (Directiva de Hábitats).

No obstante, están previstas medidas forestales en el marco del Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural
(Feader) ( [2] ). Los Estados miembros pueden elegir diferentes medidas forestales con arreglo a los programas de
desarrollo rural correspondientes al período de programación 2007-2013, incluidas las acciones de prevención de
incendios forestales y de restauración, especialmente importantes en los países mediterráneos, y elaborar planes de
gestión y protección de lugares Natura 2000.

Mediante el fondo arriba mencionado, Galicia ya introdujo en 2010 medidas de prevención de incendios forestales en
más de 90 000 hectáreas.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 92/43/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 1992, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres,

DO L 206 de 22.7.1992.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Reglamento (CE) n° 1698/2005 del Consejo, de 20 de septiembre de 2005, relativo a la ayuda al desarrollo rural a través del Fondo Europeo

Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural (Feader), DO L 277 de 21.10.2005.

( **|**

C 124 E / 164 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003268/12**

**to the Commission**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Fires in Galicia

The natural surroundings of Galicia have many protected areas of recognised ecological value. The Natura 2000
network recognises the value of several sites in Galicia, for which there ought to be protection and conservation
master plans. The problem of fires in Galicia is not new. Between 2001 and 2010 an average of 14 300 hectares a
year of the Galician natural environment was destroyed. Many of the fires occurred on Natura 2000 protected sites.

Under Council Directive 92/43/CEE of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and
flora, and the Commission working document of 27 December 2002 on Natura 2000, management schemes have to
be laid down for these sites.

Furthermore, in recent weeks, there have been several fires in Galicia, such as the one in the Lóuzara valley (Lugo),
which, according to reports, damaged a traditional route of high ecological value linking the municipalities of O Incio
and O Courel, overseen by the O Courel (Lugo) scientific research station. The Galician Government is failing to
perform its prevention and conservation duties, as it is removing fire control services from the responsibility of the
Galician agricultural services public enterprise (SEAGA).

The Commission should therefore call for standards to be drawn up in order to provide a basis for fire prevention
plans to avoid the destruction of forest and other areas of ecological value in Galicia, given its high biodiversity value
to Europe as a whole.

Is the Commission aware of the fires in Galicia?

Could it give details of the fire prevention plans for Natura 2000 sites of Community interest (SCIs) in Galicia?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The Commission is aware of these fires through the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) which supports
the services in charge of the protection of forests against fires in EU countries and provides the European Commission
services and the European Parliament with updated and reliable information on wildland fires in Europe.

The Commission does not receive information about fire prevention plans for Natura 2000 sites through the
implementation of the provisions of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EC ( [1] ).

However, forestry measures are available under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) ( [2] ).
Through the rural development programmes for the programming period 2007-2013, different forestry measures
can be chosen by the Member States including active forest fire prevention and restoration actions which are
particularly important in Mediterranean countries and drawing-up of protection and management plans relating to
Natura 2000 sites.

Using the abovementioned fund, Galicia has already introduced prevention actions against forest fires on more than
90000 hectares by 2010.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 92/43/EC, of 21 May 1992, on the protection of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora. O.J. L 206, 22.07.1992.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural

Development (EAFRD), OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 165

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003269/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(27 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Convergența plăților directe

Având în vedere discrepanțele mari existente în distribuirea plăților directe între statele membre și, de asemenea,
realocarea insuficientă a unei treimi a diferenței dintre 90% din media europeană a plăților directe și nivelul actual al
plăților directe din statele unde nivelul acestora este situat sub media europeană (Comunicarea Comisiei privind
reforma bugetului UE), consider că o asemenea formulă de echilibrare a plăților va fi insuficientă pentru noile state
membre în contextul în care se preconizează impunerea unor condiții suplimentare pe componenta de ecologizare.
Astfel, se poate concluziona că suma efectivă a majorării va fi nesemnificativă.

— În aceste condiții, ce măsuri are în vedere Comisia în vederea clarificării sistemului de convergență dintre vechile și
noile state membre, având în vedere că reducerea plăților directe pentru statele membre situate peste media
europeană e la fel de nesemnificativă precum este creșterea pentru statele clasate sub media UE?

**Răspuns dat de dl Cioloș în numele Comisiei**

_(11 mai 2012)_

Traiectoria propusă spre un grad mai mare de convergență între statele membre ( [1] ) a avut la bază argumentul că o
modalitate pragmatică și fezabilă din punct de vedere economic și politic de redistribuire a plăților între statele
membre este aceea de a majora fondurile alocate statelor membre care beneficiază de plăți directe sub medie,
limitându-se în același timp pierderile statelor membre cu niveluri ale plăților care depășesc media.

Fără îndoială, chiar dacă diferențele în ceea ce privește nivelul de sprijin între statele membre și între agricultori sunt
din ce în ce mai greu de justificat, fiind bazate în principal pe date istorice referitoare la productivitate, există în
continuare diferențe substanțiale între statele membre în privința factorilor economici, iar o plată directă „forfetară”
comună nu ar fi răspuns în mod adecvat obiectivelor acestui instrument.

Pe lângă măsurile de convergență propuse, statele membre care se situează sub 90% din media UE pentru plățile
directe după redistribuire au posibilitatea de a transfera mai multe fonduri pentru plăți directe, prin trecerea de la
pilonul II la pilonul I, la un nivel de până la 5% din fondurile care le sunt alocate pentru dezvoltare rurală.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 500 final, COM(2011) 625 final/2, COM(2011) 626 final/2, COM(2011) 627 final/2, COM(2011) 628 final/2, COM(2011) 629
final, COM(2011) 630 final, COM(2011) 631 final.

C 124 E / 166 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003269/12**

**to the Commission**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Convergence of direct payments

Given the major inconsistencies existing with regard to the distribution of direct payments between Member States,
and also the insufficient reallocation of a third of the difference between 90 % of the European average direct
payments and the current level of direct payments in Member States where these levels are below the European
average (Commission Communication on EU budget reform), I believe that such a formula for balancing payments
will be insufficient for the new Member States, given the plan to impose further conditions in the recycling
component. Therefore, it can be concluded that the actual amount of the increase will be insignificant.

In view of this and taking into account the fact that the reduction of direct payments to Member States above the
European average is as insignificant as the increase for Member States classed as below the European average, what
measures does the Commission intend to take to clarify the system of convergence between the old and new Member
States?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 May 2012)_

The proposed path towards more convergence between Member States ( [1] ) has been guided by the consideration that a
pragmatic, economically and politically feasible manner of redistributing payments between Member States is to
increase the envelopes of Member States with below average direct payments while at the same time limiting the
losses of the Member States with above average payment levels.

Indeed, even if differences in level of support between Member States and farmers is increasingly difficult to justify as
based mainly on historical reference of productivity, substantial differences still exist between Member States in terms
of economic factors and a common ‘flat rate’ direct payment would not have responded appropriately to the
objectives of the instrument.

In addition to the proposed convergence, Member States that remain under 90 % of the EU average for direct
payments after the proposed redistribution are granted the possibility to transfer more funds into direct payments
through a shift from Pillar II to Pillar I at a level of up to 5 % of their rural development envelope.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 500 final, COM(2011) 625 final/2, COM(2011) 626 final/2, COM(2011) 627 final/2, COM(2011) 628 final/2, COM(2011) 629
final, COM(2011) 630 final, COM(2011) 631 final.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 167

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003270/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(27 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Consumul zilnic de iod

În unele state membre precum România, este obligatoriu ca sarea introdusă pe piață să conțină iod.

Reprezentanți ai societății civile din România și-au exprimat îngrijorările referitoare la consumul zilnic de iod și s-au
arătat preocupați de faptul că, în medie, un român consumă 11 grame de sare pe zi, adică dublu față de doza
recomandată de Organizația Mondială a Sănătății, și că această doză poate avea efecte adverse asupra sănătății.

În acest sens,

— Dispune Comisia de date privind efectele adverse ale consumului zilnic de iod?

— Poate oferi Comisia recomandări referitoare la folosirea zilnică a iodului din sare?

**Răspuns dat de dl Dalli în numele Comisiei**

_(2 mai 2012)_

Comisia invită distinsa membră să consulte răspunsul oferit de Comisie la întrebarea scrisă E‐002911/2012 [1] . Adaosul
obligatoriu de vitamine și minerale în produsele alimentare, care intervine atunci când statele membre solicită
producătorilor de produse alimentare să adauge anumite vitamine sau minerale în alimente, nu este armonizat la
nivelul UE. Statele membre care au introdus astfel de cerințe, cum ar fi România, dețin, prin urmare, competența
exclusivă de a decide cu privire la nivelul de vitamine sau minerale care urmează a fi adăugate în aceste cazuri
specifice.

Cu privire la efectele negative ale consumului zilnic de iod, Comisia dorește să aducă la cunoștința distinsei membre
că, la data de 26 septembrie 2002 ( [1] ), Comitetul științific pentru alimentație a emis un aviz privind limita superioară
de risc tolerabil pentru iod, ca urmare a unei solicitări din partea Comisiei.

Cu privire la recomandările referitoare la consumul zilnic de iod din sare, Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1925/2006 prevede
că o vitamină sau un mineral trebuie adăugat(ă) într-un produs alimentar în cel puțin o cantitate semnificativă, care
este definită ca fiind 15% din doza zilnică recomandată pentru vitamina sau mineralul în cauză la 100mg sau 100 ml
sau per recipient. Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1925/2006 prevede, de asemenea, stabilirea cantităților maxime de vitamină
sau mineral care pot fi adăugate în produsele alimentare. În absența armonizării acestor niveluri, anumite state
membre au adoptat norme naționale.

Informațiile referitoare la dispozițiile naționale privind adaosul obligatoriu de vitamine și minerale în produsele
alimentare pot fi găsite pe site-ul internet al Comisiei
[(http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/labellingnutrition/vitamins/comm_reg_en.pdf).](http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/labellingnutrition/vitamins/comm_reg_en.pdf)

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scf/out146_en.pdf

C 124 E / 168 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003270/12**

**to the Commission**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Daily iodine intake

In some Member States, such as Romania, it is mandatory for salt introduced into the market to contain iodine.

Representatives of civil society in Romania have expressed concerns about the daily intake of iodine and have raised
concerns that, on average, a Romanian consumes 11 grams of salt per day, which is double the dose recommended by
the World Health Organisation, and that this dose may have adverse health effects.

In view of this:

—
Does the Commission have any information regarding the adverse effects of daily iodine intake?

—
Can the Commission provide any recommendations regarding the daily intake of iodine in salt?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E‐002911/2012 [1] .
Mandatory addition of vitamins and minerals to foods, which occurs when individual Member States require food
manufacturers to add specified vitamins or minerals to foods, is not harmonised at EU level. Member States who have
introduced such requirements, such as Romania, have therefore the exclusive competence to decide on the level of
vitamins or minerals to be added in such specific cases.

With respect to adverse effects of daily iodine intake, the Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member
that the Scientific Committee on Food expressed its opinion on the Tolerable Upper Intake Level of Iodine on
26 September 2002 ( [1] ), following a request by the Commission.

With regard to recommendations on the daily intake of iodine in salt, Regulation (EC) No 1925/2006 lays down that
a vitamin or a mineral must be added to a food in at least a significant amount which is defined as 15 % of the
recommended daily allowance for the vitamin or mineral supplied by 100mg or 100ml or per package. Regulation
(EC) No 1925/2006 also provides for the setting of maximum amounts of a vitamin or a mineral that may be added
to foods. In the absence of these harmonised levels certain Member States have adopted national rules.

Information regarding national provisions on the mandatory addition of vitamins and minerals to foods may be
found on the Commission's website (http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/labellingnutrition/vitamins/comm_reg_en.pdf).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scf/out146_en.pdf

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 169

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003271/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Einsatz des Bevölkerungsscanners Indect bei der Fußball-EM in Polen

Laut deutschen Medienberichten soll das EU-Forschungsprojekt „ _Intelligent information system supporting observation,_
_searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment_ “ (Indect) bei der Fußball-EM 2012 getestet werden.
Polizeimaßnahmen würden demnach in einer „Operation Libero“ geprobt. Bei EM-Spielen in Polen würden mobile
Scanner eingesetzt, Stadionbesucher nach radioaktivem und pyrotechnischem Material abgesucht. Mittels eines
militärischen „Lasergeräts“ identifiziere die Polizei „kleinste Mengen bakteriologischer Verseuchung“.

Demgegenüber teilte die EU-Kommission am 24. November 2010 mit, dass Indect zwar in der _Baltic Arena_ in Polen
getestet würde (E-6912/2010), jedoch sollten keine Tests während der EM 2012 stattfinden. Vor Testläufen müssten
ohnehin Genehmigungen zur Verarbeitung persönlicher Daten eingeholt werden. Unterstrichen wurde, dass „nur
Einzelpersonen, die ihre schriftliche Einwilligung gegeben haben, an diesen Tests teilnehmen werden“.

Inwieweit finden Anwendungen des EU-Projekts Indect bei der Fußball-EM (auch testweise) Verwendung, und
inwieweit werden bei der Fußball-EM Anwendungen eingesetzt, die zwar nicht im Rahmen des Indect-Projekts
entwickelt wurden, jedoch über den polnischen Projektpartner AGH Krakau ( _Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza_ —
Akademie für Bergbau und Hüttenwesen) oder andere Entwicklungen des Projektleiters Andrej Dziech zu Indect
beigesteuert werden?

Wie wird bei etwaigen Tests oder Einsätzen von Hard‐ oder Software durch Sicherheitsbehörden sichergestellt, dass
alle erfassten Personen hierzu ihr Einverständnis gegeben haben?

Inwieweit sind Projekte, Maßnahmen oder Institutionen der EU in die Sicherheitszusammenarbeit anlässlich der
Fußball-EM in Polen und der Ukraine eingebunden, und inwieweit ist die EU an der „Operation Libero“ oder anderen
Tests zur Sicherheitszusammenarbeit bei der EM 2012 beteiligt?

Welche Entwicklungen oder Ergebnisse zeigen „Partnerschaften“ von Indect mit dem Polizeiüberwachungszentrum in
Warschau, anderen Behörden in Krakau, dem Flughafen Rębiechowo in Danzig, der _Baltic Arena_ oder „zahlreichen
anderen europäischen Städten“ hinsichtlich weiterer Tests von Indect (E-6912/2010)?

**Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission**

_(14. Mai 2012)_

Die Kommission teilt dem Herrn Abgeordneten mit, dass das Indect-Projekt nicht bei der FußballEuropameisterschaft 2012 in Polen und der Ukraine getestet wird. Dies wurde sowohl von der Indect-Projektleitung
[(http://www.indect-project.eu/events/global/to-euro-2012-and-indect) als auch von der Kommission](http://www.indect-project.eu/events/global/to-euro-2012-and-indect)
[(http://ec.europa.eu/deutschland/press/pr_releases/10555_de.htm) öffentlich bekanntgegeben.](http://ec.europa.eu/deutschland/press/pr_releases/10555_de.htm)

Sämtliche relevanten Informationen über das Indect-Projekt, ob über die Projektergebnisse oder über mögliche Tests,
[sind auf der Indect-Website (in polnischer und englischer Sprache) zu finden (http://www.indect-project.eu/).](http://www.indect-project.eu/)

Die Kommission ist an den von der polnischen Polizei bei der Fußball-Europameisterschaft 2012 geplanten
Sicherheitsmaßnahmen nicht beteiligt, auch nicht an der „Operation Libero“.

C 124 E / 170 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003271/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Use of the Indect scanner at the European Football Championships in Poland

According to reports in the German media, there are plans to test the EU research project ‘Intelligent information
system supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment’ (Indect) at the
European Football Championships in 2012. The report claims that policing measures would be put to the test in
‘Operation Libero’. It states that mobile scanners would be used at the European Football Championship games in
Poland to check stadium visitors for radioactive and pyrotechnical materials. Police would use a military ‘laser device’
to detect ‘even the smallest amount of bacteriological contamination’.

On the other hand, the European Commission stated on 24 November 2010 that although Indect would be tested in
the Baltic Arena in Poland (E‐6912/2010), there would be no testing during the 2012 Championships. In any case
approval for the processing of personal data would have to be sought before any trials. It was emphasised that only
‘individuals who had given their written permission would participate in these tests’.

To what extent are applications from the EU Indect project to be used at the European Football Championships (even
on a trial basis) and to what extent will applications be used at the European Football Championships that were not
developed within the framework of the Indect project, but through the Polish project partner AGH Krakow ( _Akademia_
_Górniczo-Hutnicza_ — University of Science and Technology) or other developments by project leader Andrej Dziech in
relation to Indect?

What measures will be taken to ensure that all the persons scanned during any test or deployment of hardware or
software by the security authorities have given their consent for this?

To what extent are EU projects, measures or institutions to be involved in security collaboration during the European
Football Championships in Poland and Ukraine, and to what extent is the EU involved in ‘Operation Libero’ or other
tests in relation to cooperation on security during the 2012 European Football Championships?

What developments or results have been yielded by ‘partnerships’ between Indect and the police surveillance centre in
Warsaw, other authorities in Krakow, Rębiechowo Airport in Gdansk, the Baltic Arena or ‘numerous other European
cities’ in relation to further testing of Indect (E‐6912/2010)?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2012)_

The Commission informs the Honourable Member that the INDECT project will not be tested during the UEFA
Football Championship 2012 in Poland and the Ukraine. This has been publicly stated by the INDECT project (see:
http://www.indect-project.eu/events/global/to-euro-2012-and-indect) as well as by the Commission (see:
http://ec.europa.eu/deutschland/press/pr_releases/10555_de.htm).

All relevant information on the INDECT project, be it on the results of the project or possible testing can be found on
the website of INDECT: http://www.indect-project.eu/

The Commission is not involved in the security measures planned by the Polish police during the UEFA Football
Championship 2012, nor is it participating to the ‘Operation Libero’.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 171

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-003272/12**
**à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

**Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)**

_(27 mars 2012)_

_Objet:_ VP/HR — Protocole additionnel ACAA de l'accord d'association UE/Israël

Ces derniers mois, trois rapports internes des chefs de mission de l'UE dans les territoires occupés ont décrit dans les
détails les violations des Droits de l'homme commises par Israël en Cisjordanie (Jérusalem-Est incluse) et en Israël
contre le peuple palestinien.

Le protocole additionnel ACAA, actuellement en discussion au Parlement européen, permettrait de renforcer les
relations UE-Israël en facilitant l'accès des produits industriels israéliens, dont une partie sont issus des territoires
occupés et produits par les colonies, au marché européen grâce à une seule et unique procédure de certification.

Or, Israël tente de faire passer des produits issus des colonies illégales dans les territoires occupés comme «produits
israéliens», ce qui contrevient clairement aux dispositions internationales.

Comme l'a déclaré la Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante dans sa communication conjointe au Parlement et au
Conseil des droits et de la démocratie, en décembre 2010, «l'agenda commercial et celui des Droits de l'homme de l'UE
doivent être cohérents, transparents, prévisibles, réalisables et efficaces».

La Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante compte-t-elle se prononcer et demander le rejet par le Conseil du protocole
additionnel ACAA?

Quelles sont les informations dont elle dispose concernant les produits issus des colonies qui arrivent en Europe?

**Réponse donnée par la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante Mme Ashton au nom de la Commission**

_(21 mai 2012)_

Le protocole ACAA a été signé par le Conseil au nom de l'Union européenne en mai 2010. La procédure législative
prévoit que le Conseil conclue l'accord après approbation du Parlement.

Les dispositions du protocole ACAA s'appliquent à tous les produits indépendamment de leur origine. Toute
marchandise, de toute origine, qu'elle soit d'Israël, de tout autre pays ou territoire voisin, ou de tout autre pays dans le
monde, peut bénéficier du protocole si le producteur choisit de faire certifier ses produits par des organismes de
certification de l'UE ou d'Israël. Par ailleurs, le protocole ACAA n'a aucune incidence sur la politique de l'UE, selon
laquelle les produits provenant des colonies ne peuvent pas bénéficier d'un traitement préférentiel au titre de l'accord
d'association EU-Israël, et l'arrangement technique existant entre l'EU et Israël fonctionne de manière satisfaisante.

Les statistiques israéliennes officielles n'établissent pas de distinction entre la situation avant, pendant et après les
frontières de 1967 de l'État d'Israël en matière d'exportations vers l'UE. C'est pourquoi il est impossible de fournir des
chiffres exacts à propos des produits provenant des colonies qui sont importés dans l'Union européenne.

C 124 E / 172 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003272/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE/NGL)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Additional protocol to the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement on Conformity
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products

In the last few months EU Heads of Mission in the occupied territories have issued three internal reports describing in
detail the human rights violations carried out by Israel in the West Bank (including in East Jerusalem) and in Israel
against the Palestinian people.

The additional protocol to the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement on Conformity Assessment and
Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), which is currently being debated in Parliament, could strengthen EUIsraeli relations and make it easier for Israeli industrial products, many of which come from the occupied territories
and are produced by the settlements, to reach the European market, thanks to a single and straightforward
certification procedure.

However, Israel is attempting to pass off products from illegal settlements in the occupied territories as ‘Israeli
products’, which is clearly in breach of international provisions.

As the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated in her joint communication on
rights and democracy in December 2010 to Parliament and the Council, the EU trade agenda and human rights
agenda need to be consistent, transparent, predictable, achievable and effective.

Does the High Representative intend to call on the Council to reject the additional protocol to the ACAA?

What information does she have on products from the settlements that are reaching Europe?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

The ACAA protocol was signed by the Council on behalf of the EU in May 2010. The legislative procedure envisages
that the Council concludes the agreement after obtaining the consent of the Parliament.

The provisions of the ACAA protocol apply to products irrespective of their origin. Any goods from any origin,
whether from Israel, from any other neighbouring country or territory, or from any other country in the world can
benefit from the protocol if the producer chooses that certification bodies in the EU or in Israel certify its products. At
the same time, the ACAA protocol does not affect the established EU policy that settlement products cannot benefit
from preferential treatment under the EU‐Israel Association Agreement, and the Technical Arrangement in place
between the EU and Israel is functioning in a satisfactory manner.

Official Israeli statistics do not distinguish between within and beyond pre-1967 borders of the State of Israel as
regards exports to the EU. Therefore, it is not possible to establish exact figures about settlement products imported
into the EU.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 173

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003273/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Bewertung und Bekämpfung von Umgebungslärm — Entwurf eines Lärmaktionsplans

In dem Grünbuch über die künftige Lärmschutzpolitik hat die Kommission den Umgebungslärm als eines der größten
Umweltprobleme in Europa bezeichnet. In der Stadt Dortmund wird nun über den Entwurf eines Lärmaktionsplans
gestritten. Eine wesentliche Frage dabei ist, wie die Vorgaben der Richtlinie 2002/49/EG vom 25. Juni 2002 über die
Bewertung und Bekämpfung von Umgebungslärm umgesetzt werden.

In Anhang I dieser Richtlinie betreffend Lärmindizes wird die Möglichkeit geschaffen, Umgebungslärm vielfältiger
und differenzierter zu betrachten und in entsprechende Lärmaktionspläne aufzunehmen. Nun hat die Stadt
Dortmund eingeräumt, dass Lärmgrenzwerte zwar überschritten werden, sie wird aber nicht tätig und beruft sich auf
deutsches Recht. Konkret werden von der Stadt Dortmund weder Fluglärm noch Gewerbelärm noch das
Zusammenwirken von Lärm aus verschiedenen Quellen betrachtet.

Kann sich die Stadt in Bezug auf die Richtlinie 2002/49/EG den Vorgaben und Zielen der Union, der Gewährleistung
eines hohen Gesundheits‐ und Umweltschutzniveaus als Teil der Gemeinschaftspolitik, wobei eines der Ziele im
Lärmschutz besteht, entziehen? Wenn ja, auf der Grundlage welcher Artikel der Richtlinie oder welcher nationalen
Gesetze?

Inwieweit und an welcher Stelle ist ein Rechtsanspruch auf Maßnahmen zur Lärmminderung einklagbar, wenn die
Stadt Dortmund auf die Tatsache, dass grenzwertüberschreitender Umgebungslärm die Gesundheit von Menschen
akut gefährdet, nicht reagiert, und wie kann die Ermittlung und Durchsetzung der erforderlichen Maßnahmen
gerichtlich erzwungen werden?

Die Stadt Dortmund hat erst jetzt, mit über vier Jahren Verspätung, angefangen, sich mit der Thematik in Form eines
Lärmaktionsplanes zu befassen. Dies geschieht auf der Grundlage veralteter Daten und ohne ausreichende
Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten der Bevölkerung. Ist dieser Umstand der Kommission bekannt, wie verfährt sie mit
Verspätungen solcher Art, und wie stellt die Kommission sicher, dass eine zeitgerechte und inhaltlich den EUAnforderungen entsprechende Umsetzung und Würdigung des Themas stattfindet?

**Antwort von Herrn Potočnik im Namen der Kommission**

_(4. Juni 2012)_

Mit der Richtlinie 2002/49/EG ( [1] ) über die Bewertung und Bekämpfung von Umgebungslärm wird Umgebungslärm
durch vier wesentliche Elemente bekämpft: 1) durch die Erstellung von Lärmkarten für Hauptverkehrsstraßen,
Ballungsräume, Eisenbahnstrecken und Flughäfen, 2) durch die Ausarbeitung von Aktionsplänen, 3) durch Berichte
über diese Lärmkarten und Aktionspläne an die Kommission und 4) durch die Unterrichtung der Öffentlichkeit. Die
Richtlinie ist für die Mitgliedstaaten hinsichtlich des zu erreichenden Ziels verbindlich, überlässt jedoch den
einzelstaatlichen Stellen die Wahl der Form und der Mittel.

Für die Durchsetzung der nationalen Rechtsvorschriften zum Umgebungslärm sind die Mitgliedstaaten selbst
verantwortlich ( [2] ).

Die deutschen Behörden haben eine Lärmkarte gemäß Richtlinie 2002/49/EG ( [3] ) für die Stadt Dortmund vorgelegt,
jedoch noch keinen entsprechenden Lärmaktionsplan. Aus öffentlich zugänglichen Informationen geht jedoch
hervor, dass die Stadt Dortmund nun mit der Erstellung eines Lärmaktionsplans ( [4] ) befasst ist. Der Entwurf eines
Lärmaktionsplans, zu dem die Öffentlichkeit allem Anschein nach befragt wurde und an dem sie sich beteiligen
konnte, beruht auf den Ergebnissen der entsprechenden Lärmkarte, wie in der Richtlinie verlangt (siehe Artikel 1
Absatz 1 Buchstabe c).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ABl. L 189 vom 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) [http://www.bmu.de/laermschutz/aktuell/1690.php](http://www.bmu.de/laermschutz/aktuell/1690.php)

http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/laermprobleme/stichwortsuche/index.html.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ABl. L 189 vom 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) https://www2.domap.de/wps/portal/laermaktionsplan/start/.

( **|**
( **|**

C 124 E / 174 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003273/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Assessment and management of environmental noise — drafting of a noise action plan

In the Green Paper on Future Noise Policy, the Commission identifies environmental noise as one of the most serious
environmental problems in Europe. In that connection, the City of Dortmund is now in the throes of a dispute
concerning the drafting of a noise action plan. One of the key points at issue is how to implement the provisions of
Directive 2002/49/EC of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise.

Annex I to that directive concerning noise indices makes it possible to analyse environmental noise in a more varied
and subtle way and to incorporate the results in corresponding noise action plans. The City of Dortmund has now
admitted that although noise limits are being exceeded, it does not intend to take action, invoking German law in
support of its position. The City of Dortmund does not address separately the issues of air traffic noise or industrial
noise, or the effect of noise from different sources.

Can the city choose to ignore the EU’s requirements and objectives as laid down in Directive 2002/49/EC, which aims
to ensure a high standard of health and environmental protection as part of Community policy, one of the objectives
being protection against noise? If so, on the basis of which article of the directive or which national laws can it do so?

What scope is there for bringing legal action, and before which court, to secure noise reduction measures if the City of
Dortmund fails to respond to the fact that environmental noise that exceeds the set limits represents an acute risk to
human health, and how can the identification and implementation of the required measures be enforced through the
courts?

Only now, after a delay of more than four years, has the City of Dortmund begun to deal with the issue in the form of
a noise action plan. This action plan is based on out-of-date information and does not make adequate provision for
public involvement. Is the Commission aware of this situation? How does it deal with delays of this kind? How does it
intend to ensure that this matter is addressed promptly and in accordance with the relevant EU requirements?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 June 2012)_

Directive 2002/49/EC ( [1] ) relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise addresses
environmental noise through four essential elements: (1) producing noise maps for major roads, agglomerations,
railways and airports, (2) preparing action plans, (3) reporting those noise maps and action plans to the Commission
and (4) informing the public thereof. The directive is binding on Member States, as to the result to be achieved, but
leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.

The enforcement of national environmental noise related law is the responsibility of each Member State ( [2] ).

As regards the city of Dortmund, Germany has reported a noise map pursuant to Directive 2002/49/EC ( [3] ) but has
not yet reported the relevant noise action plan. According to publicly available information it appears that the city of
Dortmund is however now in the process of establishing a noise action plan ( [4] ). The draft noise action plan on which
it appears that the public has been consulted and given an opportunity to participate in, is based on the result of the
relevant noise map, as required by the directive (see Article 1(1)c of the directive).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bmu.de/laermschutz/aktuell/1690.php

http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/laermprobleme/stichwortsuche/index.html.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) https://www2.domap.de/wps/portal/laermaktionsplan/start/.

( **|**
( **|**

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 175

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003274/12**

**to the Commission**
**Nicole Sinclaire (NI)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Public procurement contracts

The Commission has stated that the US government has made a total of EUR 178 billion in public contracts available
to foreign bidders.

However, the US government disputes this, citing a figure of ‘over USD 400 billion’ (EUR 302.77 billion).

Can the Commission explain this anomaly?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US) compared data for their respective procurement
markets during the re-negotiation of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Based on the
methodology agreed at this joint exercise, the figures for the respective procurement markets are as follows:

—
The EU offers to its GPA trading partners a potential market of EUR 317 billion out of its EUR 370 billion EU
(above threshold) procurement market (in 2007 figures) (i.e. 85 % of its procurement market). This means that
our GPA partners can compete for European procurement contracts, covered by the EU's GPA obligations, on
an equal footing as their European competitors. This amount is however subject to country specific derogations
if reciprocal opening could not be achieved with a given GPA Party;

—
The value of the US procurement offered to foreign bidders is estimated at approximately EUR 178 billion out
of EUR 556.25 billion (in 2007 figures). This represents 32 % of the US market;

—
Therefore, the EU maintains some reservations towards the US under the GPA. For example the US suppliers
and service providers are not entitled to enjoy the benefits of the Agreement for services and works contracts
tendered in the EU by sub-central level entities. The value of contracts offered by the EU under the GPA to
suppliers from the US amounts to EUR 175 billion, which is roughly equal to the amount offered by the US to
the EU suppliers, but it represents 54 % of the EU market.

We have no information on the US figures (EUR 302.77 billion) referred to by the Honourable Member.

C 124 E / 176 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003275/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Eskalation des Terrors in Nigeria

Die aktuelle Situation bezüglich Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Nigeria ist inakzeptabel und erfordert unverzügliche
Maßnahmen. Die anhaltenden Bedrohungen und terroristischen Angriffe durch Boko Haram in Verbindung mit
AQMI müssen zu einem Ende gebracht werden. Die Regierung Nigerias verweigert ihren Bürgern grundlegende
Menschenrechte.

1. Beobachtet die Kommission die Situation in Nigeria dauerhaft?

2. Ist sie sich der Schwierigkeiten bewusst, auf die EU-Bürger stoßen, die im Bereich humanitäre Unterstützung in
Nigeria arbeiten?

3. Welche Maßnahmen hat die Kommission getroffen, um die Entführung europäischer christlicher Missionare
durch muslimische Extremistengruppen in Nigeria zu verhindern?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(14. Juni 2012)_

Die Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin teilt das Interesse der Frau Abgeordneten an der Menschenrechtssituation in
Nigeria.

Am 14. März 2012 gab der dänische Außenminister Villy Søvndal im Namen der Hohen Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin
eine Erklärung zur Lage in Nigeria ab, in der auch die Menschenrechte thematisiert wurden. Im Anschluss daran hat
das Europäische Parlament eine umfassende Entschließung angenommen, in der insbesondere Menschenrechtsfragen
behandelt werden.

Die EU beobachtet fortlaufend die Menschenrechtssituation in Nigeria und führt zudem einen regelmäßigen
Menschenrechtsdialog mit den Behörden. Der jüngste Dialog fand am 3. Februar 2012 statt.

Der EU sind die Schwierigkeiten bekannt, mit denen Bürger der EU und anderer Staaten, die im Bereich der
humanitären Hilfe arbeiten, sowie ihre nigerianischen Kollegen konfrontiert sind. Sie würdigt deren Mitgefühl und
Einsatz. Wir arbeiten mit Nigeria zusammen, um diese Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden.

Der Hohen Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin ist nicht bekannt, dass in Nigeria vor kurzem europäische christliche
Missionare von muslimischen Extremistengruppen entführt worden sein sollen. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieser
Antwort betrifft der jüngste der äußerst besorgniserregenden Entführungsfälle einen Ingenieur mit EUStaatsangehörigkeit. Die EU bemüht sich gemeinsam mit anderen Mitgliedstaaten um eine Verbesserung der Fähigkeit
der Sicherheitskräfte, solche Entführungen vorauszusehen und in Zukunft zu verhindern.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 177

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003275/12**

**to the Commission**
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Escalation of terror in Nigeria

The current situation concerning human rights violations in Nigeria is inacceptable, and urgent measures have to be
taken. The continuous threats and terrorist attacks on the part of the Boko Aram sect in conjunction with AQMI must
be brought to an end. The Nigerian government is denying its citizens their basic human rights.

1. Is the Commission monitoring the situation in Nigeria on a permanent basis?

2. Is it aware of the difficulties being encountered by EU citizens working in the field of humanitarian assistance in
Nigeria?

3. What actions has the Commission taken to prevent the kidnapping of European Christian missionaries by
Muslim extremist groups in Nigeria?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 June 2012)_

The HR/VP shares the Honourable Member's interest in the human rights situation in Nigeria.

A statement on the situation in Nigeria covering this matter was delivered on 14 March 2012 by the Danish Foreign
Minister Villy Soevndal on behalf of the HR/VP, following which the European Parliament adopted a substantive
Resolution covering, in particular, human rights issues.

The EU permanently monitors the human rights situation in Nigeria, and also maintains a regular human rights
dialogue with the authorities. The most recent such dialogue took place on 3 February 2012.

The EU is aware of the difficulties faced by EU citizens and others, including their Nigerian counterparts working in
the field of humanitarian assistance. It salutes their compassion and dedication, and we work with Nigeria to
overcome such difficulties.

The HR/VP is not aware of any recent kidnappings of European Christian missionaries by Islamic extremist groups in
Nigeria. At the time of writing the most recent of these deeply distressing cases involves an engineer of EU nationality.
The EU is making efforts, along with some Member States, to improve the capacity of the security forces to anticipate
and prevent such kidnappings from happening in the future.

C 124 E / 178 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003276/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Inhaftierung politischer Gegner in Belarus

In der Republik Belarus werden politische Gegner oder Künstler, die die Regierung kritisieren, rechtswidrig inhaftiert.
Diese Maßnahmen widersprechen den Grundprinzipien und Grundwerten der Europäischen Union.

1. Welche Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission, um die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Belarus in Anbetracht
der zahlreichen Berichte und Untersuchungen, die die Verletzung der Grundrechte in Belarus belegen, zu verbessern?

2. Belarus ist als Nachbarland für die EU von entscheidender Bedeutung. Was unternimmt die Kommission vor
Ort, um die belarussische Regierung, lokale NRO und die Zivilgesellschaft bei ihren Bemühungen um die Einführung
von Reformen zu unterstützen, die zur Verbesserung der Lage der Demokratie und der Menschenrechte dringend
erforderlich sind?

**Antwort von Frau Catherine Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(27. Juni 2012)_

Die EU hat in verschiedenen internationalen Foren ihre Besorgnis über die Verschlechterung der Lage in Belarus seit
den Präsidentschaftswahlen vom 19. Dezember 2010 sehr deutlich zum Ausdruck gebracht. Neben zahlreichen
Erklärungen der Hohen Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin hat der Rat Auswärtige Angelegenheiten mehrfach
Schlussfolgerungen zu diesem Thema angenommen, zuletzt am 23. März 2012.

Der Rat hat restriktive Maßnahmen gegen Belarus angenommen und so die EU in die Lage versetzen, die Personen
oder Einrichtungen zu benennen, die für die Verletzung internationaler Wahlstandards bei den letzten
Präsidentschaftswahlen oder für die anschließende Repression verantwortlich waren. Auf seiner Tagung im Januar
beschloss der Rat Allgemeine Angelegenheiten die Anwendung restriktiver Maßnahmen gegen Personen, die für
schwerwiegende Menschenrechtsverletzungen oder die Unterdrückung der Zivilgesellschaft und der demokratischen
Opposition in Belarus verantwortlich waren, und gegen Personen oder Einrichtungen, die Nutzen aus dem Regime
ziehen oder es unterstützen.

Die EU verfolgt weiterhin eine Politik des kritischen Engagements u. a. durch Dialog und im Rahmen der Östlichen
Partnerschaft.

Der politische Dialog mit den Behörden ist sehr begrenzt. Die EU hat wiederholt ihre Bereitschaft signalisiert, Belarus
bei der Erfüllung seiner Verpflichtungen in Bezug auf die Achtung der Grundsätze der Demokratie, der
Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der Menschenrechte zu unterstützen. Unterdessen hat die EU im Rahmen des Europäischen
Dialogs über Modernisierung ihr Engagement gegenüber der Zivilgesellschaft und der politischen Opposition in
Belarus verstärkt. Dieser innovative Dialog, der Ende April von dem für die Erweiterung und die Europäische
Nachbarschaftspolitik zuständigen Kommissionsmitglied eingeleitet wurde und hauptsächlich in Minsk geführt wird,
trägt dazu bei, Wege aufzuzeigen, wie sich Belarus zu einem modernen, demokratischen Land entwickeln kann.

Schließlich hat die Europäische Kommission ihre Unterstützung für die Zivilgesellschaft und die Opfer der
Unterdrückung in Belarus mehr als vervierfacht.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 179

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003276/12**

**to the Commission**
**Angelika Werthmann (NI)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Imprisonment of political opponents in Belarus

The Republic of Belarus illegally detains opponents or artists who criticise the work of the government. This
behaviour does not comply with the fundamental principles and values of the European Union.

1. What actions are being taken by the Commission to improve EU/Belarus relations in the light of the numerous
reports and studies documenting the violation of fundamental rights in Belarus?

2. Belarus is of crucial importance for the EU as it is a neighbouring country. What is the Commission doing in the
country itself to support the Belarusian government, local NGOs and civil society in their efforts to introduce muchneeded reforms aimed at improving democracy and the human rights situation?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 June 2012)_

Against the background of the deterioration of the situation in Belarus since the 19 December 2010 Presidential
elections, the EU has been very vocal about its concerns in various international fora. HR/VP Ashton has made
numerous statements and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) has, on several occasions, adopted conclusions, the most
recent being on 23 March 2012.

The Council has adopted restrictive measures towards Belarus allowing the EU to designate persons or entities either
responsible for the violations of electoral standards in the last Presidential elections, or for the subsequent crackdown.
January's FAC decided to apply restrictive measures on persons responsible for serious violations of human rights or
the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus, and on persons or entities benefiting from or
supporting the regime.

The EU continues its policy of critical engagement, including through dialogue and the Eastern Partnership.

The political dialogue with the authorities is very limited. The EU has repeatedly made clear its willingness to assist
Belarus in meeting its obligations as regards the respect for the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights.
Meanwhile, the EU has strengthened its engagement with civil society and the political opposition through the
European Dialogue on Modernisation with Belarusian Society. Launched at the end of April by the Commissioner for
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy and mainly taking place in Minsk, it is an innovative exercise which will help
clarifying what a modern and democratic Belarus could look like and how to get there.

Finally, the European Commission has more than quadrupled its assistance to civil society and to victims of
repression in Belarus.

C 124 E / 180 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003278/12**

**aan de Commissie**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) en Iosif Matula (PPE)**

_(27 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Platform voor stedelijke ontwikkeling

Artikel 8 van het voorstel voor een verordening met betrekking tot het Europees Fonds voor Regionale Ontwikkeling
betreft de oprichting van een platform voor stedelijke ontwikkeling ter bevordering van een beleidsgeoriënteerde
dialoog over stedelijke ontwikkeling op het niveau van de EU. De Commissie regionale ontwikkeling (REGI) van het
Europees Parlement debatteert de komende weken en maanden over het voorstel voor een verordening van de
Commissie. Kan de Commissie, teneinde ons in de gelegenheid te stellen haar voorstel goed te kunnen beoordelen,
antwoord geven op de onderstaande vragen:

1. Op welke wijze zal het platform voor stedelijke ontwikkeling ten goede komen aan alle steden in de EU, en niet
alleen aan de metropolen? Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van het platform voor steden, gezien het feit dat er
reeds een plaats voor debat over stadsbeleid is en dat de verenigingen van plaatselijke overheden nu reeds een
platform voor debat en networking vormen?

2. Op basis van welke criteria zullen de 300 steden worden gekozen, en op welke wijze gaat de Commissie
waarborgen dat bij deze keuze de beginselen van transparantie, billijke behandeling en gelijke kansen worden
gewaarborgd?

3. Het is niet meer dan logisch dat steden die niet worden gekozen, teleurgesteld zullen zijn. Is de Commissie
bereid na te denken over wijzigingen die het mogelijk maken dat steden die aanzienlijke vooruitgang boeken
alsnog tot het platform kunnen toetreden en dat steden die niet goed genoeg presteren hun plaats moeten
afstaan?

**Antwoord van de heer Hahn namens de Commissie**

_(4 mei 2012)_

1. Het platform voor stedelijke ontwikkeling biedt de mogelijkheid tot rechtstreekse dialoog tussen de Commissie
en alle steden, ongeacht hun grootte of bevolkingsaantal, die actief deelnemen aan het beheer en de uitvoering van de
geïntegreerde territoriale investeringen en stedelijke innovatieve acties. Het platform zal gericht zijn op de nieuwe
instrumenten van het cohesiebeleid ter bevordering van de capaciteitsopbouw en de kwaliteit van met steun uit de
structuurfondsen gerealiseerde stadsprojecten.

2. De Commissie overweegt om de alle steden die geïntegreerde territoriale investeringen of stedelijke innovatieve
acties uitvoeren aan het platform te laten deelnemen. Daarom zou de selectie gebaseerd zijn op de beslissingen van de
lidstaten. Anders zal de selectieprocedure op basis van de criteria van de toekomstige verordeningen in een
uitvoeringsbesluit worden vastgesteld.

3. De deelname wordt niet gekoppeld aan de prestaties van een stad. Het zal echter geen statisch platform worden.
Steden die op een later tijdstip met de uitvoering van een stedelijke innovatieve actie beginnen, zullen automatisch tot
het platform kunnen toetreden.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 181

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003278/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) şi Iosif Matula (PPE)**

_(27 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Platforma de dezvoltare urbană

Articolul 8 din propunerea de regulament cu privire la FEDR propune crearea unei platforme de dezvoltare urbană în
vederea promovării unui dialog orientat pe politici cu privire la dezvoltarea urbană la nivelul UE. Comisia pentru
dezvoltare regională a Parlamentului European (REGI) va dezbate în săptămânile și lunile următoare propunerea de
regulament a Comisiei. Cu scopul de a obține o analiză autentică a propunerii Comisiei am dori clarificarea
următoarelor aspecte:

1. Cum vor beneficia orașele de dimensiuni diferite din UE, nu numai metropolele, de activitatea desfășurată în
cadrul platformei de dezvoltare urbană? Care va fi valoarea adăugată a platformei pentru orașe, având în vedere
faptul că există spațiul pentru dialog cu privire la politicile urbane și că multe asociații europene ale
administrației locale oferă deja o platformă de dezbatere și de creare de rețele între guvernele locale?

2. Ce criterii vor fi prezentate și cum va asigura Comisia existența transparenței în procesul decizional, a
tratamentului echitabil și a egalității de șanse în momentul alegerii celor 300 de orașe?

3. În mod evident, unele orașe se vor simți excluse dacă nu vor fi selectate pentru a face parte din platformă.
Dorește Comisia să accepte modificări suplimentare pentru a permite orașelor care demonstrează un progres
considerabil să devină parte a platformei și pentru a le exclude pe cele care nu au rezultate suficient de bune?

**Răspuns dat de dl Hahn în numele Comisiei**

_(4 mai 2012)_

1. Platforma de dezvoltare urbană va oferi posibilitatea unui dialog direct între Comisie și toate orașele, indiferent
de dimensiune și de populație, care sunt implicate activ în gestionarea și punerea în aplicare a investițiilor teritoriale
integrate (ITI) și a acțiunilor urbane inovatoare (AUI). Platforma se va concentra asupra noilor instrumente ale politicii
de coeziune, pentru a promova consolidarea capacităților și calitatea proiectelor urbane desfășurate cu sprijin din
partea fondurilor structurale.

2. Comisia ia în considerare ideea de a le oferi tuturor orașelor care pun în aplicare ITI și AUI posibilitatea de a
participa la această platformă. Prin urmare, procesul de selecție s-ar baza pe deciziile statele membre. Altminteri,
procedura de selecție va fi definită printr-un act de punere în aplicare, pe baza criteriilor stabilite în regulamentele
viitoare.

3. Participarea nu este legată de performanța unui oraș. Cu toate acestea, platforma nu va fi una statică. Orașele
care vor începe punerea în aplicare a unei AUI într-o etapă ulterioară vor deveni automat membre ale platformei.

C 124 E / 182 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003278/12**

**to the Commission**
**Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) and Iosif Matula (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Urban development platform

Article 8 of the proposal for a regulation on the ERDF proposes the establishment of an urban development platform
to promote a policy-oriented dialogue on urban development at the EU level. The European Parliament’s Committee
on Regional Development (REGI) will debate the Commission’s proposal for a regulation in the coming weeks and
months. With a view to obtaining a genuine analysis of the Commission proposal we would like to clarify the
following:

1. How will cities of all sizes in the EU and not only the metropolises benefit from the work carried out by the
urban development platform? What will be the platform’s added value for cities given that the space for
dialogue on urban policies exists and many European local government associations already provide a platform
for debate and networking among local governments?

2. What criteria will be put forward and how will the Commission ensure that transparency of decision-making,
fair treatment and equal opportunities are provided when the selection of the 300 cities is made?

3. Obviously some cities will feel excluded if not selected to be part of the platform. Is the Commission willing to
accept further changes to allow cities that demonstrate considerable progress to become part of the platform
and exclude the ones that do not perform well enough?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 May 2012)_

1. The urban development platform will provide the possibility for a direct dialogue between the Commission and
all the cities, regardless of their size and population, actively involved in the management and implementation
of Integrated Territorial Investments (ITI) and Urban Innovative Actions (UIA). The platform will focus on the new
instruments of cohesion policy to promote capacity building and the quality of urban projects carried out with
support from the Structural Funds.

2. The Commission considers opening the possibility for all cities implementing ITIs or UIAs to participate in the
platform. Therefore, the selection would be based on the decisions of the Member States. Otherwise, the selection
procedure will be defined in an implementing act based on the criteria set out in the future regulations.

3. Participation is not linked to the performance of a city. However it will not be a static platform. Cities which
start implementing an UIA at a later stage will automatically become part of the platform.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 183

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-003279/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Aktion 64 der Digitalen Agenda für Europa

Aktion 64 der Digitalen Agenda für Europa hat das Ziel, dass alle öffentlichen Webseiten und Webseiten, die den
Bürgern grundsätzliche Dienste anbieten, bis 2015 komplett zugänglich sind.

— Hat die Kommission ihre Folgenabschätzung zur Aktion 64 abgeschlossen?

— Kann die Kommission eine detaillierte Aufstellung bereitstellen, die Informationen darüber enthält, wie viele und
welche öffentlichen Stellen, welche Stellen aus dem Privatsektor und aus dem Freiwilligenbereich kontaktiert wurden?

**Antwort von Frau Kroes im Namen der Kommission**

_(25. April 2012)_

2010 wurde eine Folgenabschätzung zu den politischen Optionen für die Aktion 64 eingeleitet. In der
entsprechenden Lenkungsgruppe sind die Dienststellen und Abteilungen der Kommission umfassend vertreten. Als
Teil dieses Prozesses wurden mehrere öffentliche Konsultationen und Studien gemäß etablierten Standards und unter
Einbeziehung einer breiten Palette von Interessenträgern durchgeführt: Mitgliedstaaten (in den Arbeitgruppen zu „eInclusion“ ( [1] ) und „Inclusive Communications“ ( [2] )), Sachverständige des Bereichs IKT und/oder Behinderungen,
Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft, IKT-Unternehmen, die Produkte und Dienstleistungen zur Sicherung der
Barrierefreiheit im Internet anbieten, und Bürger/Nutzer. Darüber hinaus wurden direkte Konsultationen mit
wichtigen Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft (wie der Europäischen Blindenunion und dem Europäischen
Behindertenforum), großen Software-Unternehmen und europäischen Industrieverbänden geführt. Beispielsweise
wirkten über 150 Experten, Interessengruppen, im Internet barrierefrei zugängliche Organisationen und 30 auf den
Bereich der Barrierefreiheit im Internet spezialisierte Unternehmen an der Erhebung zur wirtschaftlichen Bewertung
der Verbesserung von Produkten und Dienstleistungen zur Sicherung der Barrierefreiheit elektronischer Medien
(„Economic Assessment for Improving e-Accessibility Services and Products“) mit. Auf die öffentliche Konsultation
über Barrierefreiheit im Internet und sonstige Aspekte der Barrierefreiheit elektronischer Medien gingen
161 Antworten aus 18 Mitgliedstaaten, Israel und den USA ein. Dabei meldeten sich 48 Experten des Bereichs
Behinderungen und/oder IKT, 25 Industrie/Unternehmensvertreter, 23 staatliche Stellen, 20 Nutzerorganisationen,
20 Personen mit und 19 Personen ohne Behinderungen zu Wort. 834 Personen gaben Antworten zu der öffentlichen
Online-Konsultation „Post-i2010“ ( [3] ) ab. Im Februar 2012 hat der Ausschuss für Folgenabschätzung seine
Stellungnahme zum Folgenabschätzungsbericht abgegeben. Derzeit wird der Vorschlag in Zusammenarbeit mit
verschiedenen Kommissionsdienststellen ausgearbeitet. Er dürfte im 2. Quartal 2012 der Kommission zur
Verabschiedung vorgelegt werden.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/einclusion/groups/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/public_documents_2010/cocom10-43_2011pdf/_EN_1.0_&a=i.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/documents/consultationresponses.pdf

C 124 E / 184 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003279/12**

**to the Commission**
**Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Action 64 of the Digital Agenda for Europe

Action 64 of the Digital Agenda for Europe aims to ensure that all public websites and websites offering basic services
for citizens will be fully accessible by 2015.

— Has the Commission carried out its impact assessment for Action 64?

— Can the Commission give a detailed breakdown providing information on how many and which particular offices
have been contacted from the public, private and volunteer sectors?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 April 2012)_

In 2010 an Impact Assessment process was initiated for policy options for Action 64, with an Impact Assessment
Steering Group comprising a wide representation of Commission services and departments. As part of this process, a
number of public consultations and studies were carried out according to established standards and with a wide range
of stakeholders: Member States (in working groups on ‘e-Inclusion’ ( [1] ) and ‘Inclusive communications’ ( [2] )), experts on
ICT and/or disabilities, civil society organisations, ICT companies providing web-accessibility products and services,
public authorities and citizens/users. In addition direct consultations have been held with major civil society
organisations (like the European Blind Union and the European Disability Forum), large software industries and
European industry associations. For example, over 150 experts, stakeholders, ‘web-accessible’ organisations, and 30
IT companies specialised in web-accessibility participated in the survey ‘Economic Assessment for Improving eAccessibility Services and Products’. The Public Consultation on web-accessibility and other e-accessibility issues had
161 respondents from 18 Member States, Israel and the USA, among which 48 experts on disability and/or ICT; 25
industry/enterprise representatives, 23 public authorities, 20 user organisations, 20 persons with and 19 people
without disabilities. Finally 834 people responded to the online public Post-i2010 consultation ( [3] ). In February 2012,
the impact assessment Board issued its opinion on the impact assessment Report. Currently, the proposal is being
prepared with different Commission services. Submission to Commission adoption is expected within the
second quarter of 2012.

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**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/einclusion/groups/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/cocom1/library?l=/public_documents_2010/cocom10-43_2011pdf/_EN_1.0_&a=i.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/documents/consultationresponses.pdf

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 185

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003280/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Jährlich Hunderte tote Kinder durch „Halal-Fleisch“

Die für die Schlachtung von Tieren geltenden europäischen Hygiene‐ und Tierschutzrichtlinien garantieren dem
Verbraucher große Hygiene‐ und Qualitätsstandards für Fleisch und verlangen für das Tier möglichst humane
Bedingungen bei der Tötung — sprich Betäubung. Ausgesetzt werden diese Standards bei religiösen Schlachtungen,
dem sogenannten Schächten. Medienberichten zufolge wird angenommen, dass in Frankreich jährlich Hunderte
Kinder an den Folgen des Konsums von Halal-Fleisch sterben.

„Halal“ ist eine arabische Bezeichnung für unter religiösen Gesichtspunkten zum Verzehr geeignete Lebensmittel, in
diesem Fall also Fleisch geschächteter Tiere. Erhebliche Gesundheitsgefahr entsteht vor allem dadurch, dass beim
Schächten effektiv die Speiseröhre des Tieres abgebunden werden kann. So gelangen kotige Flüssigkeiten, also
sterkorale Materialen in das Fleisch. Der Anstieg von mit Escherichia coli, also lebensgefährlichen Bakterien,
belastetem Fleisch im französischen Handel wird nicht zuletzt auf die steigende Produktion und den Konsum von
Schächtprodukten zurückgeführt. Für den Verbraucher werden Fleischprodukte religiöser Schlachtung nicht
ausreichend gekennzeichnet.

Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Sind der Kommission die Gefahren der Ausnahmeregelungen für religiöse Schlachtungen und der mangelnden
Kennzeichnung bewusst?

2. Hat die EFSA Kenntnis von diesem Problem in Frankreich?

3. Sind andere EU-Staaten vom gleichen Problem betroffen? Wenn ja, gibt es Erhebungen oder Schätzungen über
die Anzahl der Todesfälle bzw. Erkrankungen durch Schächtfleisch in diesen Staaten?

4. Gedenkt die Kommission Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um den Verbraucher durch Kennzeichnung von
Schächtfleisch ausreichend zu schützen?

5. Gedenkt die Kommission, auch bei religiösen Schlachtungen Hygiene‐ und Tierschutzstandards
durchzusetzen?

**Antwort von Herrn Dalli im Namen der Kommission**

_(2. Mai 2012)_

Nach den EU-Rechtsvorschriften ( [1] ) über die Lebensmittelhygiene dürfen Luft‐ und Speiseröhre beim Entbluten nicht
verletzt werden. Diese Bestimmung gilt nicht für die Schlachtung nach religiösen Gebräuchen. In den EURechtsvorschriften zum Tierschutz ( [2] ) ist außerdem eine Ausnahme für das Betäuben bei der Schlachtung nach
religiösen Gebräuchen vorgesehen. Auch wenn von der Ausnahme Gebrauch gemacht wird, muss das Entbluten
unverzüglich und auf eine Art und Weise erfolgen, dass das Fleisch nicht verunreinigt wird. Dementsprechend
müssen die Lebensmittelunternehmer, die die Ausnahmeregelung nutzen, dafür sorgen, dass eine Verunreinigung
vermieden wird.

Die zuständigen Behörden in den Mitgliedstaaten müssen durch amtliche Kontrollen sicherstellen, dass die
Lebensmittelunternehmer die Bestimmungen der EU-Rechtsvorschriften befolgen. Vor allem müssen sie überprüfen,
dass Hygienevorschriften und ‐verfahren stets eingehalten werden.

Die EFSA ( [3] ) erstellt anhand der von den Mitgliedstaaten erhobenen Daten jährliche zusammenfassende Berichte über
Zoonose-Infektionen und lebensmittelbedingte Ausbrüche zur Überwachung der Entwicklung der Lage in Europa ( [4] ).
Aus diesen Berichten geht nicht hervor, dass „Halal-Fleisch“ bei den lebensmittelbedingten Ausbrüchen eine
wesentliche Rolle spielt.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 853/2004 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 29. April 2004 mit spezifischen Hygienevorschriften für

Lebensmittel tierischen Ursprungs, ABl. L 139 vom 30.4.2004, S. 55.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 93/119/EG des Rates vom 22. Dezember 1993 über den Schutz von Tieren zum Zeitpunkt der Schlachtung oder Tötung, ABl. L 340

vom 31.12.1993, S. 21.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Europäische Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/de/zoonoses/zoonosesscdocs.htm

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

C 124 E / 186 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Die Rechtsvorschriften der EU über die Lebensmittelkennzeichnung ( [5] ) gelten für alle zur Abgabe an den
Endverbraucher bestimmten Lebensmittel, d. h. auch für „Halal-Fleisch“. Allerdings ist nicht vorgeschrieben, die
Methode anzugeben, nach der die zur Herstellung solcher Lebensmittel genutzten Tiere geschlachtet wurden. In der
vor kurzem erlassenen Verordnung betreffend die Information der Verbraucher über Lebensmittel ( [6] ) heißt es, dass im
Rahmen einer künftigen Strategie der Union für den Tierschutz und das Wohlergehen der Tiere die Durchführung
einer Studie in Betracht gezogen werden sollte, in der die Möglichkeiten geprüft werden, die Verbraucher über die
Betäubung der Tiere zu informieren.

Die Kommission hat inzwischen die erwähnte Strategie ( [7] ) beschlossen und plant eine solche Studie für 2013.

( **|**

⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 2000/13/EG zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über die Etikettierung und Aufmachung von Lebensmitteln

sowie die Werbung hierfür, ABl. L 109 vom 6.5.2000.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1169/2011 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 25. Oktober 2011 betreffend die Information der Verbraucher

über Lebensmittel und zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 1924/2006 und (EG) Nr. 1925/2006 des Europäischen Parlaments und des
Rates und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 87/250/EWG der Kommission, der Richtlinie 90/496/EWG des Rates, der Richtlinie 1999/10/EG der
Kommission, der Richtlinie 2000/13/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, der Richtlinien 2002/67/EG und 2008/5/EG der
Kommission und der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 608/2004 der Kommission, ABl. L 304 vom 22.11.2011, S. 18.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Mitteilung über die Strategie der EU für den Schutz und das Wohlergehen von Tieren 2012-2015, KOM(2012)6.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅7∙ **|** )

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 187

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003280/12**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Hundreds of child deaths each year due to consumption of ‘halal meat’

The European health and animal welfare directives governing the slaughter of livestock guarantee the consumer meat
which complies with stringent health and quality standards and stipulate that animals must be slaughtered using the
most humane method possible — in other words after they have first been stunned. These standards do not apply to
religious slaughtering practices, so-called halal butchering. According to media reports, it is generally assumed that
hundreds of children die in France each year after consuming halal meat.

‘Halal’ is an Arabic term for foods deemed suitable for consumption from a religious standpoint, in this case the meat
from appropriately slaughtered animals. Significant health risks arise in particular because an animal’s oesophagus
can effectively be closed off during this form of slaughter. This allows contaminated fluids, in other words stercoral
material, to enter the meat. One of the main reasons for the increase in the volume of meat contaminated with the
life-threatening bacteria _Escherichia coli_ appearing on the French market is the rise in the production and consumption
of meat products from animals slaughtered in accordance with religious practices. Meat products of this kind are not
adequately labelled for the consumer.

1. Is the Commission aware of the dangers posed by derogations for religious slaughtering practices and
inadequate labelling?

2. Is the European Food Safety Authority aware of this problem in France?

3. Are other EU Member States affected by the same problem? If so, are surveys or estimates available of the
number of fatalities or illnesses caused by meat produced in accordance with religious slaughtering practices in those
Member States?

4. Is the Commission considering taking steps to offer consumers adequate protection by ensuring that meat
produced in accordance with religious slaughtering practices is properly labelled?

5. Is the Commission considering enforcing health and animal welfare standards in connection with religious
slaughtering practices as well?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

EU food hygiene legislation ( [1] ) provides that the trachea and oesophagus must remain intact during bleeding. This
rule is not applicable when slaughter takes place according to religious custom. Also, EU legislation on animal
welfare ( [2] ) provides for an exception from stunning in the case of religious slaughter. However, even if the exception is
applied bleeding must always be carried out without undue delay and in a manner that avoids contaminating the
meat. It is the responsibility of food business operators using the derogation to ensure that contamination does not

occur.

It is the responsibility of the Competent Authorities in Member States to carry out official controls to ensure that food
business operators comply with EU legislation requirements. In particular they must verify that hygiene rules and
procedures are always respected.

Based on data collected by Member States, EFSA ( [3] ) prepares annual EU Summary Reports on zoonotic infections and
food-borne outbreaks monitoring the evolving situation in Europe ( [4] ). There is no indication in these reports that
halal meat has a significant role in food-borne outbreaks.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of

animal origin (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 55).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing (OJ L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 21).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The European Food Safety Authority.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/zoonoses/zoonosesscdocs.htm

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

C 124 E / 188 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

The EU legal framework for food labelling ( [5] ) covers all foods to be delivered as such to the final consumer, including
halal meats. However, there is no legal obligation to indicate the method of slaughter of animals used in the
production of such foods. The recently adopted Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers ( [6] )
indicates that a study on the opportunity to provide the consumer with information on the stunning of animals
should be considered in the context of a future Union strategy for the protection and welfare of animals.

The Commission has now adopted this strategy ( [7] ) and plans to carry out this study in 2013.

( **|**

⋅5∙ **|** )

⋅6∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs,

OJ L 109, 6.5.2000.

( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to

consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304,
22.11.2011, p.18.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Communication on the EU strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 2012-2015. COM(2012) 6.

( **|**

( **|**

⋅7∙ **|** )

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 189

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003281/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Δημοσίευμα στον τουρκικό τύπο για άνοιγμα της περίκλειστης πόλης της Αμμοχώστου

Η Τουρκική εφημερίδα Millyet σε δημοσίευμά της (26.3.2012), υπό τον τίτλο «Άνοιγμα της πόλης-φάντασμα», αναφέρει
πως η λεγόμενη «Τουρκική Δημοκρατία της Βόρειας Κύπρου, θα προχωρήσει την 1η Ιουλίου σε άνοιγμα της περίκλειστης
πόλης της Αμμοχώστου, όταν οι Ελληνοκύπριοι αναλάβουν την Προεδρία της ΕΕ». Στο συγκεκριμένο δημοσίευμα
αναφέρεται πως «θα ανοίξει τα Βαρώσια για εγκατάσταση και όλοι οι Ελληνοκύπριοι θα μπορούν να επιστρέψουν στα σπίτια
τους». Σύμφωνα με το δημοσίευμα της «Μιλιέτ», η τουρκική πλευρά θα επιτρέψει την εγκατάσταση σε όσους Ελληνοκυπρίους
έχουν περιουσία στην κλειστή περιοχή, υπό τον έλεγχο της τουρκοκυπριακής πλευράς. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, ερωτάται η
Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει ενημερωθεί από την Τουρκία, ως υπό ένταξη χώρα, για τους συγκεκριμένους σχεδιασμούς σχετικά με την κλειστή
περιοχή της Αμμοχώστου;

2. Προβληματίζεται για το γεγονός ότι η Τουρκία επιχειρεί να δημιουργήσει κλίμα έντασης και εντυπωσιασμού,
διασυνδέοντας χρονικά, τέτοιες προκλητικές κινήσεις με την έναρξη της ευρωπαϊκής Προεδρίας της Κυπριακής
Δημοκρατίας;

3. Ποια μέτρα έλαβε για να διασφαλίσει την ομαλότητα κατά την Προεδρία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας στην ΕΕ,
στηρίζοντας έμπρακτα μία χώρα μέλος της, από προκλητικές ενέργειες τρίτων;

4. Πώς τοποθετείται σε σχέση με τις εκτιμήσεις που έχουν εκφραστεί ότι πραγματικός στόχος της Τουρκίας είναι ο
εποικισμός της κλειστής περιοχής της Αμμοχώστου και ο πλήρης έλεγχος της «πόλης-φάντασμα» από την
τουρκοκυπριακή πλευρά, κατά παράβαση των ψηφισμάτων του ΟΗΕ και της πρόσφατης γραπτής δήλωσης για την
Αμμόχωστο που υπερψηφίστηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, στις 14.2.2012;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2012)_

Τα εικαζόμενα σχέδια στα οποία αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος δεν έχουν αναφερθεί ποτέ στην Επιτροπή, και η Επιτροπή δεν
σχολιάζει εικασίες εφημερίδων.

Η ΕΕ εξακολουθεί να ζητά από όλα τα μέρη να εργαστούν με στόχο τη συνολική διευθέτηση του Κυπριακού στο πλαίσιο του
Οργανισμού Ηνωμένων Εθνών (ΟΗΕ), σύμφωνα με τις σχετικές αποφάσεις του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ και τις
θεμελιώδεις αρχές που διέπουν την Ένωση.

C 124 E / 190 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003281/12**

**to the Commission**
**Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Articles in the Turkish press on the opening-up the sealed-off town of Famagusta (Ammochostos)

In an article entitled ‘Ghost-town opening’ on 26 March 2012, the Turkish newspaper, _Millyet_, states that the so-called
‘ _Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus_ is to open the sealed-off town of Famagusta on 1 July 2012, when the Greek
Cypriots assume the EU Presidency’. The article states that ‘Varosha (a district of Famagusta) will be opened for
settlement and all Greek Cypriots will be able to return to their homes’. According to the _Millyet_ article, the Turkish
side will allow any Greek Cypriots with property in the sealed-off area to return to their homes, under the control of
the Turkish Cypriots.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Has it been informed by Turkey, a candidate country for accession, of the specific plans regarding the sealed-off
area of Famagusta?

2. Is it concerned at this attempt by Turkey to create a climate of tension via a public relations coup, timing the
provocation to coincide with the start of the Cypriot Presidency of the EU?

3. What measures has it taken to safeguard public order during the Cypriot Presidency of the EU, providing
tangible support for one of its Member States in the face of acts of provocation by third parties?

4. What is its position on the assessments that have been put forward that Turkey's real objective is to colonise the
sealed-off area of Famagusta and secure complete control of the ‘ghost-town’ by the Turkish Cypriots,
breaching both UN resolutions and the recent written declaration on Famagusta adopted by the European
Parliament on 14 February 2012?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

The alleged plans referred to by the Honourable Member have never been brought to the attention of the
Commission, and the Commission does not comment on newspaper speculations.

The Commission continues to call on all parties to work towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem
within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in
line with the principles on which the Union is founded.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 191

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-003282/12**

**до Комисията**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**
**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Владимир Уручев**

**(PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) и Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 март 2012 г.)_

_Относно:_ Финансиране на проекта за „Международен термоядрен експериментален реактор“ (ITER) за периода 2014‐
2020 г.

Въпреки че досега ЕС беше сериозно ангажиран с проекта ITER, като постигна разполагане на обекта на своя територия
и финансиране на изграждането ѝ, което започна преди две години, понастоящем Комисията предлага да се изключи
използването на Многогодишната финансова рамка (МФР) за финансирането на тази научноизследователска програма
след 2014 г. (COM(2011) 0931).

Комисията мотивира това решение със своята загриженост, че бюджетът за ITER би нараснал рязко и би оказал
въздействие върху останалите бюджетни редове по МФР.

Въпреки това, благодарение на Европейския парламент, Съвета и Комисията, през последните месеци бяха положени
значителни усилия, за да се подобри управлението на проекта и да се сведат до минимум разходите за него. През юли
2010 г. Съветът предложи строго ограничаване на максималното равнище на разходите за фазата на изграждане на
ITER (2007‐2020 г.) до 6,6 милиарда евро, а Комисията призна на 20 юли 2010 г., че „въз основа на това може да се
гарантира жизнеспособността на дългосрочното финансиране за ITER“.

Поради това предложението на Комисията изпраща изненадващо послание на международните партньори на ITER и
на Европейската общност за термоядрен синтез, които са много ангажирани с успеха на проекта и не разбират това
предложение. Освен това, с такова предложение Европейският парламент (бюджетният орган) ще загуби контрол
върху финансирането на този проект.

Така възникват няколко въпроса относно допълнителната програма, предложена от Комисията:

1. Въпреки че европейските институции са се договорили за значително подобряване на проекта, защо Комисията
внезапно се отказва от финансирането на европейската част от ITER в рамките на бюджета на ЕС?

2. Дали Комисията счита, че предложената допълнителна програма, която никога не е била използвана за друго,
освен за експлоатацията на реактора с висока плътност на неутронния поток в Петен (с бюджет от 36 милиона
евро и с участието само на три държави членки), е подходяща за проект като ITER (с 2,5 милиарда евро, които да
бъдат управлявани през периода 2014‐2018 г., и 27 участващи държави)? Комисията, която постави под

съмнение този инструмент преди три години, счита ли, че с такава правна рамка може да се гарантира успехът на
ITER?

3. Комисията осъзнава ли, че с този инструмент Европейският парламент ще загуби контрол върху финансирането
на един от най-големите европейски и световни научни проекти?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Левандовски от името на Комисията**

_(25 май 2012 г.)_

Комисията остава ангажирана с проекта ITER и би желала да насочи вниманието на уважаемите членове към своя
отговор на писмен въпрос E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Комисията също така подчертава, че в своето предложение за Решение на
Съвета за приемане на Допълнителна научноизследователска програма по проекта „ITER“ (2014‐2018 г.) ( [2] ) тя
предлага финансиране изключително чрез вноски на държавите членки, внасяни в общия бюджет на ЕС и

предназначени за програмата.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 931 окончателен.

C 124 E / 192 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Важно предимство на това предложение е запазването на непрекъснатостта на проекта, по-специално по отношение на
нашите международни партньори, въпреки промяната в метода на финансиране. Съгласно предложението Комисията
и Съвместното европейско предприятие за ITER и за развитие на термоядрената енергетика („Ядрен синтез за енергия“)
ще продължат да отговарят за управлението на ITER, ще продължат да се прилагат настоящите финансови правила и
тези, свързани с персонала, а Комисията ще продължи да представлява Евратом в различните органи на ITER. Освен
това предложението не изисква предоговаряне с международните партньори на Споразумението за ITER.

Както е посочено в член 6 от предложението, финансирането на тази Допълнителна научноизследователска програма
ще подлежи на одит от страна на Европейската сметна палата и поради това ще влиза в обхвата на годишната
процедура по освобождаване от отговорност. Освен това, тъй като вноските на държавите членки ще се използват за
финансиране на годишните вноски за Съвместното европейско предприятие за ITER, Европейският парламент ще
продължи да упражнява своя контрол чрез отделната процедура по освобождаване от отговорност във връзка с
изпълнението на бюджета на съвместното предприятие, както е посочено в член 5, параграф 3 от Решение
2007/198/Евратом на Съвета ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OВ L 90, 30.3.2007 г., стр. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 193

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003282/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) y Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Financiación del proyecto ITER de 2014 a 2020

Aunque la Unión Europea ha estado hasta la fecha muy implicada en el proyecto ITER —ha conseguido que se fijase el
emplazamiento en su territorio y ha financiado su construcción, que se inició hace dos años—, la Comisión propone
ahora descartar la utilización del marco financiero plurianual (MFP) para financiar su programa de investigación
después de 2014 (COM(2011)0931).

La Comisión ha justificado esta decisión aduciendo que le preocupa que el presupuesto de ITER se dispare y afecte a
otras líneas presupuestarias del MFP.

No obstante, gracias al Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo y la Comisión, se ha realizado un esfuerzo significativo en los
últimos meses por mejorar la gobernanza del proyecto y minimizar sus costes. En julio de 2010, el Consejo propuso
limitar de manera rigurosa el nivel máximo de gasto para la fase de construcción de ITER (2007-2020) a
6 600 millones de euros y la Comisión reconoció el 20 de julio de 2010 que «la viabilidad de la financiación a largo
plazo del proyecto ITER puede garantizarse sobre esta base».

Por ello, la propuesta de la Comisión envía un mensaje sorprendente a los socios internacionales de ITER y de la
comunidad europea de fusión, que están muy involucrados en el éxito del proyecto y no comprenden esta propuesta.
Además, el Parlamento Europeo (la autoridad presupuestaria) perderá el control de la financiación de este proyecto
con una propuesta de este tipo.

Así pues, surgen varias preguntas en cuanto al programa adicional propuesto por la Comisión:

1. Dado que las instituciones europeas han acordado una mejora sustancial del proyecto, ¿por qué la Comisión
renuncia de repente a financiar la parte europea de ITER dentro del marco del presupuesto de la UE?

2. ¿Cree la Comisión que el programa adicional propuesto, que nunca se ha usado excepto por el accionamiento
del reactor de alto flujo en Petten (un presupuesto de 36 millones de euros y que solo afecta a tres Estados
miembros) es adecuado para un proyecto como ITER (2 500 millones de euros por gestionar en 2014-2018 y
27 países participantes)? ¿Cree la Comisión, que cuestionó este instrumento hace tres años, que el éxito de ITER
podría garantizarse con un marco jurídico de este tipo?

3. ¿Se da cuenta la Comisión de que con este instrumento el Parlamento Europeo perderá el control de la
financiación de uno de los proyectos científicos más grandes de Europa y del mundo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Lewandowski en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de mayo de 2012)_

La Comisión sigue comprometida con el proyecto ITER y remite a Sus Señorías a su respuesta a la pregunta escrita E00275/2012 ( [1] ). Asimismo, subraya que su Propuesta de Decisión del Consejo relativa a la adopción de un programa
de investigación complementario para el proyecto ITER (2014-2018) ( [2] ) propone una financiación formada
exclusivamente mediante contribuciones de los Estados miembros al presupuesto general de la UE y destinadas al

programa.

Esta propuesta tiene como importante ventaja la continuidad que da al proyecto, en particular de cara a nuestros
socios internacionales, pese al cambio de método de financiación. En virtud de esa propuesta, la Comisión y la
Empresa Común Europea para el ITER y el Desarrollo de la Energía de Fusión (Fusión para la Energía) seguirían
ocupándose de la gestión del ITER, las actuales normas sobre financiación y gestión del personal se mantendrían en
vigor y la Comisión seguiría representando a Euratom en los diferentes órganos del ITER. Asimismo, esa propuesta no
requeriría un proceso de renegociación internacional para modificar el Acuerdo ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 931 final.

C 124 E / 194 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Como se menciona en el artículo 6 de la propuesta, la financiación del programa de investigación complementario
estará sujeta a la auditoría del Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo y, por tanto, estará incluida en el ámbito de aplicación del
procedimiento anual de aprobación de la gestión. Además, dado que las contribuciones de los Estados miembros se
utilizarán para financiar la contribución anual a la Empresa Común Europea para el ITER, el Parlamento Europeo
seguirá ejerciendo su control mediante un procedimiento de aprobación de la gestión diferenciado en cuanto a la
ejecución del presupuesto de la Empresa Común tal como recoge el artículo 5, apartado 3, de la Decisión del Consejo
2007/198/Euratom ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) DO L 90 de 30.3.2007, p. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 195

_(České znění)_

**Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-003282/12**

**Komisi**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) a Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27. března 2012)_

_Předmět:_ Financování projektu ITER v letech 2014-2020

Přestože EU byla doposud do projektu ITER rozsáhle zapojena, zajistila pro něj na svém území lokalitu a financovala
jeho výstavbu, zahájenou před dvěma lety, Komise nyní navrhuje, aby tento výzkumný program přestal být po roce
2014 financován z prostředků víceletého finančního rámce (VFR) (COM(2011)0931).

Komise své rozhodnutí odůvodňuje obavami, že rozpočet projektu ITER by mohl neúměrně vzrůst a mít nepříznivý
dopad na ostatní rozpočtové linie.

Evropský parlament, Rada a Komise ovšem v posledních měsících vyvinuly značné úsilí o to, aby se řízení projektu
zlepšilo a minimalizovaly se jeho náklady. Rada v červenci 2010 navrhla striktní omezení maximálních nákladů na
fázi výstavby projektu ITER (2007‐2020) ve výši 6,6 miliardy EUR a Komise dne 20. července 2010 potvrdila, že „na
základě toho je možné zaručit životaschopnost dlouhodobého financování projektu ITER“.

Návrh Komise je tudíž z pohledu mezinárodních partnerů projektu ITER a evropského společenství pro výzkum
jaderné fúze, jimž na úspěchu projektu velice záleží, překvapivý a nepochopitelný. Kromě toho Evropský parlament
(rozpočtový orgán) tímto návrhem ztrácí kontrolu nad financováním projektu.

V souvislosti s doplňkovým programem navrhovaným Komisí tedy vyvstává řada otázek:

1. Jestliže se evropské orgány shodly na podstatném vylepšení projektu, proč se Komise náhle vzdává financování
evropského podílu na projektu ITER v rámci rozpočtu EU?

2. Je Komise skutečně přesvědčena, že navrhovaný doplňkový program, který byl doposud využit pouze
v případě reaktoru s vysokým tokem neutronů v Pettenu (s rozpočtem 36 milionů EUR a zapojením pouhých
tří členských států), vhodný pro takový projekt, jakým je ITER (s rozpočtem 2,5 miliardy EUR na období 2014‐
2018 a zapojením 27 zemí)? Domnívá se Komise, která tento nástroj před třemi lety sama zpochybnila, že
v takovém právním rámci lze zaručit úspěšnost projektu?

3. Uvědomuje si Komise, že tímto nástrojem přijde Evropský parlament o kontrolu nad financováním jednoho
z největších evropských i světových vědeckých projektů?

**Odpověď pana Lewandowského jménem Komise**

_(25. května 2012)_

Komise má o projekt ITER i nadále zájem a dovoluje si odkázat vážené poslankyně a poslance na svou odpověď na
písemnou otázku E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Chtěla by také zdůraznit, že ve svém návrhu rozhodnutí Rady o přijetí
doplňkového výzkumného programu pro projekt ITER (2014‐2018) ( [2] ) předkládá systém financování založený
výhradně na příspěvcích členských států do souhrnného rozpočtu EU a jejich vyčlenění na tento program.

Velkou výhodou tohoto návrhu je, že navzdory změně metody financování zaručuje kontinuitu projektu, zejména ve
vztahu k našim mezinárodním partnerům. Podle tohoto návrhu by projekt ITER i nadále řídila Komise a společný
evropský podnik pro ITER a rozvoj energie z jaderné syntézy („ _Fusion for Energy_ “), stále by se uplatňovala současná
finanční pravidla i pracovní řád a Komise by i nadále zastupovala Euratom v různých orgánech ITER. Navíc by tento
návrh nevyžadoval mezinárodní vyjednávání o změně dohody o ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2011) 931 v konečném znění.

C 124 E / 196 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Jak se uvádí v článku 6 návrhu, financování tohoto doplňkového výzkumného programu bude podléhat auditu
Evropského účetního dvora, a bude tudíž součástí každoročního procesu udělování absolutoria. Protože bude roční
příspěvek společnému evropskému podniku pro ITER hrazen z příspěvků členských států, bude navíc Evropský
parlament i nadále vykonávat dozor prostřednictvím zvláštního postupu udělování absolutoria za plnění rozpočtu
společného podniku, jak se uvádí v čl. 5 odst. 3 rozhodnutí Rady 2007/198/Euratom ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Úř. věst. L 90, 30.3.2007, s. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 197

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003282/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) und Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Finanzierung des ITER-Projekts im Zeitraum 2014 bis 2020

Obgleich die EU bisher in großem Ausmaß am ITER-Projekt beteiligt war — sie hatte die Einrichtung des Standorts
auf ihrem Territorium erwirkt und die vor zwei Jahren begonnenen Bauarbeiten finanziert — schlägt die Kommission
jetzt vor, die Verwendung des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens (MFR) für die Finanzierung dieses Forschungsprogramms
nach 2014 auszuschließen (KOM(2011)0931).

Die Kommission hat diese Entscheidung mit ihrer Besorgnis begründet, dass das Budget für das ITER-Projekt rapide
steigen und dass dies Auswirkungen auf die anderen Haushaltslinien des MFR haben könnte.

Dennoch wurden in den letzten Monaten dank des Europäischen Parlaments, des Rates und der Kommission
beachtliche Anstrengungen unternommen, um die Leitung des Projekts zu verbessern und seine Kosten zu
minimieren. Im Juli 2010 schlug der Rat vor, die Ausgaben für die Bauphase von ITER (2007-2020) strikt auf
maximal 6,6 Mrd. EUR zu begrenzen, und die Kommission erkannte am 20. Juli 2010 an, dass die langfristige
Finanzierung von ITER auf dieser Grundlage gewährleistet werden kann.

Daher kommt der Vorschlag der Kommission für die internationalen Partner des ITER-Projekts und die europäische
Fusionsgemeinschaft, die sich stark für den Erfolg des Projekts einsetzen und diesen Vorschlag nicht verstehen,
überraschend. Darüber hinaus wird das Europäische Parlament (die Haushaltsbehörde) durch einen derartigen
Vorschlag die Kontrolle über die Finanzierung dieses Projekts verlieren.

Daraus ergeben sich verschiedene Fragen bezüglich des von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen zusätzlichen
Programms:

1. Warum gibt die Kommission plötzlich die Finanzierung des europäischen Anteils an ITER im Rahmen des EUHaushalts auf, während sich die europäischen Institutionen auf eine deutliche Verbesserung des Projekts
geeinigt haben?

2. Glaubt die Kommission, dass das vorgeschlagene zusätzliche Programm, das mit Ausnahme des Betriebs des
Hochflussreaktors in Petten (mit einem Budget von 36 Mio. EUR und unter Beteiligung von nur drei
Mitgliedstaaten), nie verwendet wurde, für ein Projekt wie ITER geeignet ist (für das im Zeitraum 2014-2018
2,5 Mrd. EUR verwaltet werden müssen und an dem 27 Länder beteiligt sind)? Ist die Kommission der Ansicht,
dass der Erfolg von ITER mit einem solchen Rechtsrahmen gewährleistet werden kann, nachdem sie dieses
Instrument vor drei Jahren infrage gestellt hatte?

3. Ist sich die Kommission der Tatsache bewusst, dass das Europäische Parlament mit diesem Instrument die
Kontrolle über die Finanzierung eines der größten Wissenschaftsprojekte Europas und der Welt verlieren wird?

**Antwort von Herrn Lewandowski im Namen der Kommission**

_(25. Mai 2012)_

Die Kommission bleibt dem ITER-Projekt verpflichtet und verweist die Damen und Herren Abgeordneten auf ihre
Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Zu erwähnen ist, dass nach ihrem Vorschlag für einen
Beschluss des Rates über ein zusätzliches Forschungsprogramm für das ITER-Projekt (2014-2018) ( [2] ) die
Finanzierung ausschließlich über Beiträge der Mitgliedstaaten zum Gesamthaushaltsplan der EU erfolgt, die dem
Programm zugewiesen werden.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)931 endg.

C 124 E / 198 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Ein entscheidender Vorteil dieses Vorschlags besteht darin, dass die Kontinuität des Projekts — vor allem in Bezug auf
unsere internationalen Partner — gewahrt wird, auch wenn sich die Art der Finanzierung ändert. Dem Vorschlag
zufolge blieben die Kommission und das europäische gemeinsame Unternehmen für den ITER und die Entwicklung
der Fusionsenergie („Fusion for Energy“) für die ITER-Verwaltung zuständig, die derzeitigen Finanz‐ und
Personalvorschriften behielten ihre Gültigkeit und in den verschiedenen ITER-Gremien würde Euratom weiterhin von
der Kommission vertreten. Außerdem wäre keine internationale Neuverhandlung des ITER-Übereinkommens
erforderlich.

Nach Artikel 6 des Vorschlags unterliegt die Finanzierung dieses zusätzlichen Forschungsprogramms der Prüfung
durch den Europäischen Rechnungshof und wird somit in das jährliche Entlassungsverfahren einbezogen. Da die
Beiträge der Mitgliedstaaten zur Finanzierung des Jahresbeitrags zum europäischen gemeinsamen Unternehmen für
den ITER herangezogen werden sollen, wird das Europäische Parlament außerdem seine Kontrollbefugnis im Rahmen
des gesonderten Entlastungsverfahrens für die Ausführung des Haushaltsplans des gemeinsamen Unternehmens im
Sinne von Artikel 5 Absatz 3 der Entscheidung 2007/198/Euratom des Rates ( [3] ) wahrnehmen können.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ABl. L 90 vom 30.3.2007, S. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 199

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003282/12**

**à la Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) et Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 mars 2012)_

_Objet:_ Financement du projet ITER de 2014 à 2020

Bien que l'Union européenne ait été jusqu'à présent fortement impliquée dans le projet ITER, en obtenant
l'implantation du site sur son territoire et en finançant sa construction — qui a démarré il y a deux ans —, la
Commission propose aujourd'hui de ne plus recourir au cadre financier pluriannuel (CFP) pour financer ce
programme de recherche après 2014 [COM(2011)0931].

La Commission a motivé cette décision par le fait qu'elle est inquiète que le budget du projet ITER explose et qu'il ait
des répercussions sur les autres lignes budgétaires du CFP.

Néanmoins, grâce au Parlement européen, au Conseil et à la Commission, des efforts considérables ont été réalisés ces
derniers mois afin d'améliorer la gestion du projet et de minimiser les coûts. En juillet 2010, le Conseil a proposé de
limiter de manière stricte le niveau maximum de dépenses pour la phase de construction d'ITER (2007-2020) à
6,6 milliards d'euros et la Commission a reconnu le 20 juillet 2010 que «la viabilité du financement à long terme
d'ITER [pouvait] être garantie sur cette base».

Par conséquent, la proposition de la Commission constitue un message surprenant pour les partenaires
internationaux d'ITER et la communauté européenne de la fusion, qui sont très impliqués dans la réussite du projet et
ne comprennent pas cette proposition. En outre, cette proposition aura pour conséquence que le Parlement européen
(l'autorité budgétaire) perdra le contrôle du financement du projet.

Dès lors, plusieurs questions surgissent au sujet du programme complémentaire proposé par la Commission:

1. Alors que les institutions européennes ont accepté un développement substantiel du projet, pourquoi la
Commission renonce-t-elle soudainement à financer la part européenne d'ITER dans le cadre du budget de
l'Union européenne?

2. La Commission estime-t-elle que le programme complémentaire proposé, qui n'a jamais été utilisé si ce n'est
pour l'exploitation du réacteur à haut flux de Petten (un budget de 36 millions d'euros, seulement trois États
membres impliqués), est approprié pour un projet tel que l'ITER (2,5 milliards d'euros à gérer entre 2014 et
2018 et 27 pays impliqués)? La Commission, qui a émis des doutes sur cet instrument il y a trois ans, pense-telle que la réussite du projet ITER pourrait être garantie par un tel cadre juridique?

3. La Commission réalise-t-elle qu'avec cet instrument, le Parlement européen perdra le contrôle du financement
d'un des plus grands projets scientifiques en Europe et dans le monde?

**Réponse donnée par M. Lewandowski au nom de la Commission**

_(25 mai 2012)_

La Commission reste engagée dans le projet ITER et invite l'Honorable Parlementaire à se reporter à sa réponse à la
question écrite E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Elle souligne également que sa proposition de décision du Conseil sur l'adoption
d'un programme de recherche supplémentaire pour le projet ITER (2014-2018) ( [2] ) prévoit un financement sur la
seule base des contributions des États membres au budget général de l'UE qui sont affectées au programme.

Un grand avantage de cette proposition est la continuité qu'elle assure pour le projet, en particulier vis-à-vis de nos
partenaires internationaux, malgré le changement dans les modalités de financement. Dans cette proposition en effet,
la Commission et l'entreprise commune européenne pour l'ITER et le développement de l'énergie de fusion («fusion à
des fins énergétiques») conserve la responsabilité de la gestion de l'ITER, les règles actuelles en matière de finance et de
personnel restent applicables et la Commission continue de représenter Euratom au sein des différents organes de
l'ITER. En outre, cette proposition n'implique pas d'engager un processus international de renégociation en vue de la
modification de l'accord relatif à l'ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM,(2011) 931 final.

C 124 E / 200 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Comme indiqué à l'article 6 de la proposition, le financement du programme supplémentaire de recherche sera
soumis au contrôle de la Cour des comptes européenne et entrera donc dans le champ de la procédure de décharge
annuelle. En outre, les contributions des États membres devant servir à financer la contribution annuelle à l'entreprise
commune européenne pour l'ITER, le Parlement européen continuera d'exercer son contrôle dans le cadre de la
procédure de décharge séparée, en relation avec l'exécution du budget de l'entreprise commune, visée à l'article 5,
paragraphe 3, de la décision 2007/198/Euratom du Conseil ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) JO L 90 du 30.3.2007, p. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 201

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003282/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) e Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Finanziamento di ITER dal 2014 al 2020

Sebbene l'UE sia stata finora attivamente impegnata nel progetto ITER, ottenendo l'insediamento del sito sul proprio
territorio e il finanziamento della sua costruzione, iniziata due anni fa, la Commissione propone ora di escludere
l'impiego del quadro finanziario pluriennale (QFP) per finanziare questo programma di ricerca dopo il 2014
(COM(2011)0931).

La Commissione ha giustificato questa decisione in ragione del timore che il bilancio di ITER possa aumentare e
influire sulle altre linee di bilancio del QFP.

Tuttavia, grazie al Parlamento europeo, al Consiglio e alla Commissione, negli ultimi mesi sono stati compiuti
notevoli sforzi per migliorare la governance del progetto e ridurne al minimo i costi. Nel luglio 2010 il Consiglio ha
proposto di limitare rigorosamente il livello massimo di spesa per la fase di costruzione di ITER (2007-2020) a 6,6
miliardi di euro, e il 20 luglio 2010 la Commissione ha riconosciuto che «su tale base è possibile garantire la vitalità
economica a lungo termine di ITER».

Pertanto, la proposta della Commissione trasmette un messaggio sorprendente ai partner internazionali di ITER e alla
comunità europea della fusione, i quali partecipano attivamente al successo del progetto e non comprendono la
proposta. In aggiunta, tale proposta comporta per il Parlamento europeo (l'autorità di bilancio) la perdita del
controllo del finanziamento di tale progetto.

Emergono, di conseguenza, vari quesiti in relazione al programma supplementare proposto dalla Commissione:

1. Perché la Commissione ha deciso, improvvisamente, di rinunciare al finanziamento della quota europea di ITER
nel quadro del bilancio dell'UE nonostante le istituzioni europee abbiano concordato un sostanziale
miglioramento del progetto?

2. Ritiene la Commissione che il programma supplementare proposto, che non è mai stato utilizzato salvo per il
funzionamento del reattore ad alto flusso (High Flux Reactor — HFR) di Petten (con un bilancio di 36 milioni di
euro e la partecipazione di tre Stati membri soltanto), sia adeguato a un progetto come ITER (2,5 miliardi di
euro da gestire nel periodo 2014-2018, con il coinvolgimento di 27 paesi)? Ritiene la Commissione, la quale tre
anni fa aveva sollevato dei dubbi su questo strumento, che il successo di ITER possa essere garantito con un tale
quadro normativo?

3. È consapevole la Commissione che con questo strumento il Parlamento europeo perderà il controllo del
finanziamento di uno dei progetti scientifici più grandi a livello europeo e mondiale?

**Risposta data da Janusz Lewandowski a nome della Commissione**

_(25 maggio 2012)_

La Commissione rimane impegnata nel progetto ITER e rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alla propria risposta
all'interrogazione scritta E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Fa altresì presente che la sua proposta di decisione del Consiglio
sull’adozione di un programma di ricerca supplementare per il progetto ITER (2014-2018) ( [2] ) propone un
finanziamento unicamente mediante contributi degli Stati membri versati al bilancio generale dell'Unione europea e
destinati specificamente al programma.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)931 definitivo.

C 124 E / 202 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Un vantaggio importante di questa proposta è la continuità che assicura al progetto, in particolare nei confronti dei
nostri partner internazionali, nonostante il cambiamento della modalità di finanziamento. Secondo questa proposta,
la Commissione e l’impresa comune europea per ITER e lo sviluppo dell’energia da fusione («Fusion for Energy»)
continuerebbero a essere responsabili della gestione di ITER, le attuali norme finanziarie e in materia di personale
continuerebbero ad applicarsi e la Commissione continuerebbe a rappresentare l'Euratom all'interno dei differenti
organi di ITER. Inoltre, la proposta non richiederebbe un processo di rinegoziazione internazionale per modificare
l’accordo ITER.

Ai sensi dell'articolo 6 della proposta, il finanziamento del programma di ricerca supplementare sarà oggetto
dell'audit della Corte dei conti europea e rientrerà pertanto nella procedura annuale di discarico. Inoltre, poiché i
contributi degli Stati membri saranno utilizzati per finanziare il contributo annuale all’impresa comune europea per
ITER, il Parlamento europeo continuerà a esercitare attraverso la procedura di discarico separata il suo controllo
sull’esecuzione del bilancio dell’impresa comune a norma dell’articolo 5, paragrafo 3, della decisione
2007/198/Euratom del Consiglio ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) GU L 90 del 30.3.2007, pag. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 203

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003282/12**

**do Komisji**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) oraz Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Finansowanie ITER w latach 2014-2020

Mimo że UE była dotychczas silnie zaangażowana w projekt ITER – wyznaczyła bowiem lokalizację obiektu na
swoim terytorium i sfinansowała dwa lata temu jego konstrukcję – Komisja proponuje obecnie rezygnację
z wykorzystania wieloletnich ram finansowych do finansowania przedmiotowego programu badawczego po 2014 r.
(COM(2011) 0931).

Komisja uzasadniała tę decyzję obawami o zwiększenie budżetu ITER oraz o skutki dla innych pozycji w budżecie
uwzględnionych w wieloletnich ramach finansowych.

Niemniej jednak dzięki Parlamentowi Europejskiemu, Radzie i Komisji dokonano w ostatnich miesiącach znacznych
starań na rzecz usprawnienia zarządzania projektem i minimalizacji jego kosztów. W lipcu 2010 r. Rada
zaproponowała ścisłe ograniczenie maksymalnego poziomu wydatków w fazie budowy ITER (2007-2010) do 6,6
mld euro, a Komisja przyznała 20 lipca 2010 r., że „na tej podstawie można zagwarantować długoterminowe
finansowanie ITER”.

W związku z tym wniosek Komisji jest dużym zaskoczeniem dla przedstawicieli międzynarodowych partnerów ITER
i europejskich środowisk zajmujących się syntezą jądrową, którzy znacznie przyczynili się do sukcesu projektu;
stanowisko Komisji we wniosku jest dla nich niezrozumiałe. Ponadto po zatwierdzeniu przedmiotowego wniosku
Parlament Europejski (władza budżetowa) straci kontrolę nad finansowaniem przedmiotowego projektu.

Co za tym idzie, rodzi się kilka pytań w związku z dodatkowym programem zaproponowanym przez Komisję:

1. Skoro instytucje europejskie dostrzegły istotne usprawnienia w projekcie, dlaczego Komisja wycofuje się nagle
z finansowania europejskiego wkładu w ITER z budżetu UE?

2. Czy Komisja jest przekonana, że proponowany program dodatkowy, który nie był nigdy wykorzystywany do
celu innego niż funkcjonowanie reaktora wysokostrumieniowego w Petten (budżet w wysokości 36 milionów
euro z udziałem tylko trzech państw członkowskich), jest odpowiedni dla takiego projektu jak ITER (2,5
miliarda euro do rozdysponowania w latach 2014-2018 z udziałem 27 krajów)? Czy Komisja, która
zakwestionowała ten instrument trzy lata temu, uważa, że takie ramy prawne mogą być gwarancją sukcesu
ITER?

3. Czy Komisja zdaje sobie sprawę z tego, że w wyniku zastosowania tego instrumentu Parlament Europejski
straci kontrolę nad finansowaniem jednego z największych europejskich i światowych projektów naukowych?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janusza Lewandowskiego w imieniu Komisji**

_(25 maja 2012 r.)_

Komisja pozostaje zaangażowana w realizację projektu ITER i odsyła Szanownych Posłów do swojej odpowiedzi na
zapytanie pisemne E-00275/2012 r. ( [1] ). Podkreśla również, że we wniosku dotyczącym decyzji Rady w sprawie
przyjęcia dodatkowego programu badawczego na potrzeby projektu ITER (2014-2018) ( [2] ) zaproponowano
finansowanie wyłącznie poprzez wkłady państw członkowskich wnoszone do budżetu ogólnego UE i przeznaczone
na ten program.

Ważną korzyścią tego wniosku jest zapewnienie projektowi ciągłości, szczególnie w stosunku do naszych partnerów
międzynarodowych, pomimo zmiany metody finansowania. Wniosek przewiduje, że Komisja i Europejskie Wspólne
Przedsięwzięcie na rzecz Realizacji Projektu ITER i Rozwoju Energii Termojądrowej (zwane dalej „Fusion for Energy”)
nadal będą odpowiedzialne za zarządzanie ITER, obecne przepisy finansowe i kadrowe będą nadal obowiązywać,
a Komisja nadal będzie przedstawicielem Euratomu w różnych organach ITER. Ponadto wniosek ten nie będzie
wymagał międzynarodowego procesu renegocjacji w celu zmiany Porozumienia ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 931 wersja ostateczna.

C 124 E / 204 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Jak wspomniano w art. 6 wniosku, finansowanie tego dodatkowego programu badawczego będzie podlegało
audytowi przez Europejski Trybunał Obrachunkowy, a tym samym będzie objęte zakresem corocznej procedury
udzielania absolutorium. Ponadto wkłady państw członkowskich zostaną wykorzystane do finansowania wkładu
rocznego przeznaczonego dla Europejskiego Wspólnego Przedsięwzięcia na rzecz Realizacji Projektu ITER, dlatego
też Parlament Europejski będzie nadal sprawował kontrolę poprzez oddzielną procedurę udzielania absolutorium
w odniesieniu do wykonania budżetu wspólnego przedsięwzięcia, o którym mowa w art. 5 ust. 3 decyzji Rady
2007/198/Euratom ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Dz.U. L 90 z 30.3.2007, s. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 205

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003282/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) şi Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Finanțarea ITER în perioada 2014 — 2020

Deși UE a fost până în prezent implicată profund în proiectul ITER, obținând amplasarea locației pe teritoriul său și
finanțând construcția sa care a început în urmă cu doi ani, Comisia propune acum excluderea utilizării cadrului
financiar multianual (CFM) pentru finanțarea acestui program de cercetare după 2014 (COM(2011)0931).

Comisia a justificat această decizie pe motiv că este îngrijorată de faptul că bugetul ITER se va dezvolta și va avea
impact asupra liniilor bugetare din CFM.

Cu toate acestea, datorită Parlamentului European, Consiliului și Comisiei, s-au depus eforturi substanțiale în ultimele
luni în vederea îmbunătățirii guvernanței proiectului și a minimizării costurilor sale. În iulie 2010, Consiliul a propus
limitarea strictă a nivelului maxim al cheltuielilor pentru faza de construcție a proiectului ITER (2007-2020) la
6,6 miliarde de euro, iar Comisia a recunoscut la 20 iulie 2010 faptul că „poate fi garantată pe această bază viabilitatea
finanțării pe termen lung a proiectului ITER”.

Prin urmare, propunerea Comisiei transmite un mesaj surprinzător partenerilor internaționali ai ITER și comunității
europene din domeniul fuziunii care sunt profund implicate în succesul proiectului și nu înțeleg această propunere.
Pe lângă acestea, Parlamentul European (autoritatea bugetară) va pierde controlul asupra finanțării acestui proiect cu o
astfel de propunere.

Apar, astfel, mai multe întrebări cu privire la programul suplimentar propus de Comisie:

1. În vreme ce instituțiile europene au convenit asupra unei îmbunătățiri substanțiale a proiectului, de ce renunță
Comisia subit la finanțarea contribuției europene la ITER în cadrul bugetului UE?

2. Consideră Comisia că programul suplimentar propus, care nu a fost folosit niciodată decât pentru operarea
reactorului cu flux ridicat de la Petten (un buget de 36 de milioane de euro și care implică numai trei state
membre), este potrivit pentru un proiect precum ITER (în perioada 2014-2018 vor fi gestionate 2,5 miliarde de
euro și vor fi implicate 27 de țări)? Consideră Comisia, care a pus sub semnul întrebării acest instrument în
urmă cu trei ani, că succesul proiectului ITER ar putea fi garantat printr-un astfel de cadru juridic?

3. Realizează Comisia faptul că prin acest instrument Parlamentul European va pierde controlul asupra finanțării
unuia dintre cele mai mari proiecte științifice europene și mondiale?

**Răspuns dat de dl Lewandowski în numele Comisiei**

_(25 mai 2012)_

Comisia își menține angajamentul față de proiectul ITER și ar dori să reamintească distinșilor membri răspunsul său la
întrebarea scrisă E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). De asemenea, Comisia ar dori să sublinieze faptul că propunerea de decizie a
Consiliului privind adoptarea unui program suplimentar de cercetare pentru proiectul ITER (2014-2018) ( [2] ) propune
finanțarea exclusivă prin contribuțiile statelor membre la bugetul general al UE care sunt alocate programului.

Un avantaj important al acestei propuneri este continuitatea pe care o oferă proiectului, în special față de partenerii
noștri internaționali, în pofida modificării metodei de finanțare. În conformitate cu această propunere, Comisia și
întreprinderea comună europeană pentru ITER și pentru dezvoltarea energiei prin fuziune („Fuziune pentru energie”)
vor continua să fie responsabile de gestionarea ITER, normele actuale privind finanțarea și personalul vor continua să
se aplice, iar Comisia va continua să reprezinte Euratom în diferitele organisme ale ITER. În plus, propunerea nu va
necesita un proces de renegociere la nivel internațional în vederea modificării acordului ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM (2011) 931 final.

C 124 E / 206 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Astfel cum se menționează la articolul 6 din propunere, finanțarea acestui program suplimentar de cercetare va face
obiectul unui audit al Curții Europene de Conturi și, prin urmare, va fi inclusă în domeniul de aplicare al procedurii
anuale de descărcare de gestiune. În plus, deoarece contribuțiile statelor membre vor fi utilizate pentru a finanța
contribuția anuală pusă la dispoziția întreprinderii comune europene pentru ITER, Parlamentul European va continua
să își exercite funcția de control prin intermediul procedurii separate de descărcare de gestiune în ceea ce privește
execuția bugetului întreprinderii comune, astfel cum se menționează la articolul 5 alineatul (3) din Decizia
2007/198/Euratom a Consiliului ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) JO L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 207

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-003282/12**

**za Komisijo**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) in Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27. marec 2012)_

_Zadeva:_ Financiranje projekta ITER od leta 2014 do 2020

Čeprav se je EU doslej intenzivno ukvarjala s projektom ITER in je na svojem ozemlju pridobila lokacijo in financirala
gradnjo objekta, ki se je začela pred dvema letoma, Komisija zdaj predlaga izključitev uporabe večletnega finančnega
okvira za financiranje tega raziskovalnega programa po letu 2014 (COM(2011) 931).

Komisija je to odločitev utemeljila s skrbjo, da bo proračun projekta ITER skokovito narasel in vplival na druge
proračunske postavke večletnega finančnega okvira.

Kakor koli že, v zadnjih mesecih so bila s pomočjo Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije vložena velika
prizadevanja v izboljšanje upravljanja projekta in minimizacijo njegovih stroškov. Svet je julija 2010 predlagal strogo
omejitev zgornje meje izdatkov za fazo izgradnje projekta ITER (2007‐2020) na 6,6 milijarde EUR, Komisija pa je
20. julija 2010 priznala, da je na tej podlagi mogoče zagotoviti vzdržnost dolgoročnega financiranja projekta ITER.

Zato predlog Komisije preseneča mednarodne partnerje v projektu ITER in evropsko skupnost za jedrsko fuzijo, ki se
zelo zavzemajo za uspeh projekta in tega predloga ne razumejo. Poleg tega bo Evropski parlament (proračunski
organ) zaradi takega predloga izgubil nadzor nad financiranjem tega projekta.

S tem se zastavlja vrsta vprašanj v zvezi z dodatnim programom, ki ga predlaga Komisija:

1. Zakaj se je Komisija naenkrat odrekla financiranju evropskega deleža v projektu ITER v okviru proračuna EU,
čeprav so se evropske institucije dogovorile o znatnem izboljšanju projekta?

2. Ali Komisija meni, da je predlagani dodatni program, ki se razen za delovanje reaktorja z visokim pretokom v
Pettnu (proračun 36 milijonov EUR in le tri sodelujoče države članice) doslej še ni uporabljal, primeren za
projekt, kakršen je ITER (upravljanje 2,5 milijarde EUR v obdobju 2014‐2018 in 27 sodelujočih držav članic)?
Ali Komisija, ki je pred tremi leti dvomila v ta instrument, meni, da je s takim pravnim okvirom mogoče
zagotoviti uspeh projekta ITER?

3. Ali se Komisija zaveda, da bo s tem instrumentom Evropski parlament izgubil nadzor nad financiranjem enega
največjih evropskih in svetovnih znanstvenih projektov?

**Odgovor Janusza Lewandovskega v imenu Komisije**

_(25. maj 2012)_

Komisija je še naprej predana projektu ITER in želi spoštovane poslance opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje
E-00275/2012 ( [1] ). Prav tako želi poudariti, da je v njenem predlogu sklepa Sveta o sprejetju dopolnilnega
raziskovalnega programa za projekt ITER (2014‐2018) ( [2] ) predlagano, da se program financira izključno s prispevki
držav članic v splošni proračun EU, ki bi se šteli za namenske prejemke tega programa.

Pomembna prednost navedenega predloga je stalnost, ki jo predlog zagotavlja projektu, zlasti v razmerju do naših
mednarodnih partnerjev, ne glede na spremembo načina financiranja. V skladu z navedenim predlogom bi bila
Komisija ter Evropsko skupno podjetje za ITER in razvoj fuzijske energije („Fuzija za energijo“) še naprej odgovorna
za vodenje projekta ITER, veljavna finančna in kadrovska pravila bi veljala še naprej, Komisija pa bi še naprej
zastopala Euratom v različnih organih Organizacije ITER. Poleg tega zaradi navedenega predloga ne bi bila potrebna
ponovna mednarodna pogajanja za spremembo Sporazuma ITER.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 931 final.

C 124 E / 208 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Kot je navedeno v členu 6 predloga, je Računsko sodišče pristojno za revizijo financiranja tega dopolnilnega
raziskovalnega programa, ki je tako vključeno v letni postopek razrešnice. Poleg tega se bodo prispevki držav članic
porabili za financiranje letnega prispevka za Evropsko skupno podjetje za ITER, zato bo Evropski parlament lahko še
naprej izvajal nadzor v okviru ločenega postopka razrešnice za izvrševanje proračuna skupnega podjetja, kot je
navedeno v členu 5(3) Odločbe Sveta 2007/198/Euratom ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) UL L 90, 30.3.2007, str. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 209

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003282/12**

**to the Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jean-Pierre Audy (PPE), Jan Březina (PPE), Pilar del Castillo**
**Vera (PPE), Françoise Grossetête (PPE), Jolanta Emilia Hibner (PPE), Herbert Reul (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE),**

**Christian Ehler (PPE), Jean Roatta (PPE), Marian-Jean Marinescu (PPE), Damien Abad (PPE), Vladimir**

**Urutchev (PPE), Romana Jordan (PPE) and Amalia Sartori (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Funding of ITER from 2014 to 2020

Although the EU has so far been deeply involved in the ITER project, obtaining the establishment of the site on its
territory and funding its construction which started two years ago, the Commission now proposes ruling out the use
of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to fund this research programme after 2014 (COM(2011) 0931).

The Commission has justified this decision on the grounds that it is concerned that the ITER budget would soar and
impact on the other MFF budget lines.

Nevertheless, thanks to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, substantial efforts have been
made in recent months to improve governance of the project and minimise its costs. In July 2010, the Council
proposed to strictly limit the maximum level of expenditure for the construction phase of ITER (2007-2020) to
EUR 6.6 billion, and the Commission acknowledged on 20 July 2010 that ‘the viability of long-term financing of
ITER can be guaranteed on this basis’.

Therefore, the Commission’s proposal sends a surprising message to the international partners of ITER and the
European fusion community who are very involved in the project’s success and do not understand this proposal. On
top of that, the European Parliament (the budgetary authority) will lose control over the funding of this project with
such a proposal.

Thus, several questions arise regarding the additional programme proposed by the Commission:

1. While the European institutions have agreed on a substantial improvement of the project, why is the
Commission suddenly giving up on funding the European share of ITER in the framework of the EU budget?

2. Does the Commission believe that the proposed additional programme, which has never been used except for
the operation of the High Flux Reactor in Petten (a budget of EUR 36 million and involving only three Member
States), is suitable for a project such as ITER (EUR 2.5 billion to manage in 2014-2018, and 27 countries
involved)? Does the Commission, which questioned this instrument three years ago, think that the success of
ITER could be guaranteed with such a legal framework?

3. Does the Commission realise that with this instrument the European Parliament will lose control over the
funding of one of the largest European and world science projects?

**Answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The Commission remains committed to the ITER project and would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to
Written Question E‐00275/2012 ( [1] ). It would also stress that its proposal for a Council decision on the adoption of a
Supplementary Research Programme for the ITER project (2014-2018) [ (2)] proposes a financing exclusively through
Member States contributions made to the General Budget of the EU and assigned to the Programme.

An important advantage of this proposal is the continuity it provides for the project, in particular vis-à-vis our
international partners, in spite of the change in the financing method. Under this proposal, the Commission and the
European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (‘Fusion for Energy’) would continue to
be in charge of the management of ITER, the current financial and staff rules would continue to apply and the
Commission would continue to represent Euratom in the different ITER organs. Furthermore, this proposal would
not require an international re-negotiation process to modify the ITER Agreement.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E‐2012-000275+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 931 final.

C 124 E / 210 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

As mentioned in Article 6 of the proposal, the financing of this Supplementary Research Programme will be subject
to the audit of the European Court of Auditors and therefore included in the scope of the annual discharge procedure.
In addition, as the Member States’ contributions will be used to finance the annual contribution provided to the
European Joint Undertaking for ITER, the European Parliament will continue to exercise its scrutiny through the
separate discharge procedure in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Joint Undertaking as mentioned in
Article 5(3) of Council Decision 2007/198/Euratom ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 211

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003283/12**

**to the Commission**
**Glenis Willmott (S&D) and Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Enforcement of animal welfare directives

We have been contacted by constituents who are dismayed to hear that the ban on the rearing of hens in ‘battery’
cages, which was introduced by Council Directive 1999/74/EC and came into force on 1 January 2012, has been
ignored by 13 Member States.

As UK producers have complied with the directive on time, at a reported cost of over GBP 400 million to the industry,
our constituents are right to be concerned that eggs from illegally caged hens are still in production and on sale in the
UK and throughout Europe. Producers in our constituencies face unfair and illegal competition from producers who
have failed to make the necessary investments. At the same time, the directive is failing to improve the welfare of
European hens, with an estimated 50 million hens still in barren battery cages across the EU.

In the Commission’s opinion, what can those Member States who are in compliance with Directive 1999/74/EC
legally do to protect their domestic producers from this unfair and illegal competition?

Furthermore, Council Directive 2008/120/EC on the protection of pigs introduces a ban on individual sow stalls,
which will come into force on 1 January 2013. What is the Commission’s assessment of the likelihood that this ban
will be correctly enforced by that date in each Member State?

In the case of sow stalls and in future cases, what measures does the Commission intend to take in advance of the
deadline to prevent a situation of widespread non-compliance and unfair competition from arising?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2012)_

With regard to the ban on un-enriched cages for laying hens ( [1] ), the Commission refers to its answer to Written
Question E‐001113/2012 ( [2] ).

Regarding the enforcement of Council Directive 2008/120/EC on the protection of pigs ( [3] ), the Commission would
refer to its answer to Written Question E‐002588/20122.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens, OJ L 203, 3.8.1999, p. 53.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 47, 18.2.2009, p. 47.

C 124 E / 212 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003284/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Anti-dumping duties (ADD)

Can the Commission investigate whether there is a prospect of anti-dumping duties (ADD) being imposed on ceramic
tableware and kitchenware made in China and currently being imported into the EU? Does the Commission agree
that a large duty increase would have severe financial consequences for some of London’s small and medium-sized
enterprises should a proposed increase of 60-70 % (based on recent ADD increases for candles and tiles) go ahead?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 April 2012)_

On 16 February 2012, the Commission has, on the basis of a complaint by industry, initiated an anti-dumping
investigation on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People's Republic of China.

If any provisional measures were to be taken, they would have to be imposed by 15 November 2012 and definitive
measures, if any, by 15 May 2013. Given that this proceeding is currently ongoing and at an early stage, it is not
known yet whether any measures will be taken and at what level they would be set. Commission findings in antidumping investigation are the results of a proper and impartial investigation to which all interested parties can
contribute. No pre-determined decision could ever be envisaged in such proceedings.

For any measures to be imposed, a determination of dumping and resulting injury has to be made and it also has to be
established that it is in the Union interest to impose measures. The Honourable Member can be reassured that the
situation of small and medium-sized importers, wholesalers and retailers is part of the Union interest analysis.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 213

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003285/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Use of red diesel as fuel for propelling private pleasure craft in UK and EU waters

I have been contacted by one of my London constituents and am informed that from 1 April 2012 any UK citizen
purchasing red diesel for use as fuel for propelling private pleasure craft will be required to make a declaration that the
fuel will only be used within UK waters. I have been told that the reasoning behind this is that fellow EU Member
States object to the presence of UK-based red diesel within their territorial waters (even though it has been legally
bought and properly taxed in the UK).

Does the Commission agree that for an island nation this is a unworkable and restrictive plan, the main reasons being
the following:

1. the proposal effectively bans UK yachts from crossing the English Channel, as the only fuel one can presently
purchase at the quayside in the UK is red diesel, while even if one could purchase white diesel the practicalities
and environmental problems of flushing the tanks clean of red diesel would make such a short cross-channel
trip no longer worthwhile (even a small yacht can have up to 100 litres of diesel in its tanks);

2. a 1 % residue of red diesel in a vessel’s engine or fuel system will mean that the tank will be deemed illegal in a
fellow Member State. This would affect both UK leisure sailors and visiting EU yachts, with the latter being
reluctant to go home carrying UK red diesel for fear of sanctions on their return;

3. UK yachtsmen will no longer be able to visit British islands such as the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or
even Lyme Bay or the Land’s End area, in safety, as to do so would mean sailing through the waters of fellow
Member States where red diesel would be deemed illegal;

4. the proposal hinders EU citizens’ rights to free travel on the high seas?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2012)_

The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's reply to Question E‐000130/2012.

In addition, EU legislation clearly stipulates that a private pleasure craft cannot use marked fuel in its engine. It also
allows a Member State to impose fines when such use occurs in its territory ( [1] ). The Commission can only support the
efforts of Member States, and the United Kingdom in particular, to respect EC law.

It is for the UK authorities to find the best practical solution to allow for the purchase of non-marked fuel by private
pleasure craft owners and users when they call at UK ports for trips through the waters of other Member States.

As for the concerns for the limitations on the rights of EU citizens to travel on the high seas, the scope of the EU legal
acts referred to in the abovementioned reply are limited to the territorial waters of Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See Article 3 of Council Directive 95/60/EC of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene, OJ L 291, 6.12.1995.

C 124 E / 214 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003286/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VAT exemptions and air ambulances

The VAT Directive (Council Directive 2006/112/EC) recognises that certain activities such as hospital medical care
are of such critical importance that they are exempted from this tax.

Chapter 7, Article 148 (1) of the directive states that ‘Member States shall exempt the following transactions: (a) the
supply of goods for the fuelling and provisioning of vessels used for navigation on the high seas and carrying
passengers for reward or used for the purpose of commercial, industrial or fishing activities, or for rescue or
assistance at sea, or for inshore fishing, with the exception, in the case of vessels used for inshore fishing, of ships’
provisions’ This rightly eases the burden on lifeboats, which perform a magnificent service to seafarers.

Chapter 2, Article 132 of the directive states that ‘(1) Member States shall exempt the following transactions: …
(c) the provision of medical care in the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions as defined by the Member
State concerned’.

Can the Commission therefore confirm whether Article 132 extends to the medical and paramedical services offered
by air ambulances?

In particular, does Article 132 allow national authorities to exempt helicopter air ambulances which are operated by
charitable trusts for the public good?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 May 2012)_

Article 132(1)(c) of the VAT Directive ( [1] ) provides for a tax exemption for the provision of medical care in the exercise
of the medical and paramedical professions as defined by the Member State concerned. Medical care includes medical
interventions carried out for the purpose of diagnosing, treating and, in so far as possible, curing diseases or health
disorders ( [2] ). If those activities are carried out in the exercise of the professions mentioned in Article 132 (1) (c) of the
VAT Directive, they are tax exempt independent of whether they are performed in or using air ambulances.

Furthermore, air ambulance services could be covered by the tax exemption pursuant to Article 132(1)(p) of the VAT
Directive which concerns the supply of transport services for sick or injured persons in vehicles specially designed for
the purpose, by duly authorised bodies. The term ‘vehicle’ should be broad enough to also include (specially designed)
helicopters. Whether a ‘charitable trust for the public good’ is covered by the term ‘duly authorised body’ depends on
the national law of the respective Member State.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2006/112 EC of 28.11.2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) E.g. ECJ, judgment of 6.11.2003, C-45/01, _Dornier_, Recital 48.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 215

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003287/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Intra-Community supplies

In the Republic of Ireland, a UK supplier ships goods into Ireland exempt of VAT on behalf of a UK multinational in
the UK and the supplier sends the documents for these goods exempt of VAT to the UK Head Office of the
multinational. If the Head Office in turn issues a B2B or transfer invoice to its Irish operation that has exchange
charges and/or costs higher than the Central Bank rate on the date of dispatch, can the UK Revenue authorities accept
these invoices as intra-Community supply invoices, given that UK VAT was not paid and the UK multinational did
not warehouse or remove them from the State?

Can the UK Revenue authorities then accept these invoices as legitimate invoices for end-of-year account
reconciliation? If the UK supplier is so allowed to ship goods into Ireland on behalf of a UK multinational, and if the
UK multinational is so allowed to onward process the invoices in the manner described, are the UK supplier and the
UK multinational not being afforded a substantial Irish marketplace advantage over domestic Irish retailers, suppliers
and distributors, many of whom must buy their goods from the same supplier given that this supplier is the brand
owner or holds the European distributor rights to the brand?

Does this procedure not support the contention that UK suppliers and UK multinationals actively seek to enter into
this type of commercial arrangement as it garners substantial profits in their Irish stores that cannot be achieved by
their UK mainland business, while denying the Irish public of the same competitive pricing in these multi-stores in
Ireland as enjoyed by EU UK citizens in multinational stores on the UK mainland? Can the Irish and UK accounting
standard not be regarded as anti-competitive since the UK supplier and the UK multinational combined control a
substantial portion of the Irish marketplace?

**Question for written answer E-003288/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Intra-Community supply

Intra-Community supply relates to goods supplied by a business in one EU Member State to a business in another
which have been dispatched or transported from the territory of one Member State to another as a result of such
supply.

In the Republic of Ireland, if a UK supplier ships goods exempt from VAT into Ireland on behalf of a UK
multinational, they send the invoice for these goods to the UK head office of the multinational. If the head office in
turn issues a B2B or transfer invoice to its Irish operation that has exchange charges and/or costs greater than the
Central Bank rate on the date of dispatch, the multinational has the right not to disclose intra-group transactions. In
terms of cash flow, administration and insurance this is worth a 10 % cost saving to the multinational.

Since this gives a substantial marketplace advantage to UK multinationals over domestic Irish competitors in the field,
given that the multinational has been given by this process a cash flow advantage by not having to pay UK VAT but
can still add ‘profit’ on charges being levied to its Irish operation, does this constitute interference in the internal
market? Given that this procedure offers the UK multinational substantial profit before profit on intra-Community
supplies that is not afforded other competitors in the field, is there a lack of fair competition?

C 124 E / 216 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

**Question for written answer E-003289/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Intra-Community supplies

With respect to intra-Community supplied goods that have come into Ireland by way of a UK supplier shipping
goods into Ireland exempt of VAT on behalf of a UK multinational, where the documents have gone to the UK head
office of the multinational and where the onward processing of these goods is by way of B2B invoices or transfer
invoicing charged at a rate higher than the central bank rate on the date of dispatch from the original supplier, can the
Irish Revenue authorities allow these intra-Community supplies to then be accorded financial regulation 8 benefits? If
so, how is this not interference in the free market by the Irish State so as to confer a sizeable market place advantage
on external market competitors over domestic Irish competitors?

How can Ireland and the UK operate a standard accounting procedure that is not in the general public domain, since it
is not currently listed on either the Irish or UK revenue sites? How can this accounting standard be applied to intraCommunity supplies shipped into a Member State by a third party?

What monitoring procedures are compulsory for the UK and Ireland governments on direct invoicing of intraCommunity supplied goods, as laid down by the directive?

**Joint answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2012)_

The questions appear to deal with the same set of circumstances. One common feature involves intra-EU supplies of
goods where the vendor is UK established and a member of a group covered by Article 11 of the VAT Directive ( [1] ).
Both Ireland and UK use this provision which also allows them to adopt any measures needed to prevent any
associated tax evasion or avoidance. It restricts the territorial scope of a VAT grouping scheme to persons established
in the territory of the Member State concerned.

On the basis of the information provided, a UK established multinational company purchases goods from a UK
supplier who is instructed to deliver them to Ireland. The UK supplier raises an invoice to the UK establishment of the
multinational. This supply can be zero-rated (by the UK supplier) as long as the multinational is registered for VAT in
another Member State (in this case, Ireland) and there is evidence that the goods have been removed to another
Member State. The Irish establishment is obliged to account for acquisition tax on the supply. That is in accordance
with the VAT Directive.

The questions seem to reflect concerns about potential distortion around the issue of a B2B recharge invoice from the
UK establishment to the Irish establishment of a multinational. It is however difficult to identify any VAT-based
distortion on the basis of the facts supplied.

As far as standard accounting procedures are concerned, the question does not refer to precise standard accounting
procedures and does not contain any element showing conflicts with the VAT Directive.

Invoicing obligations in relation to intra-EU supplies are set out in Articles 220 to 237 of the VAT Directive. There is
nothing in the information provided that conflicts with these provisions.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 217

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003293/12**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Aantal asielzoekers naar EU flink gestegen

Uit de meest recente cijfers van Eurostat blijkt dat de EU-lidstaten in 2011 gezamenlijk maar liefst 301 000 verzoeken
van asielzoekers hebben ontvangen om tot de EU te worden toegelaten. In 2010 ging het nog om
259 000 asielzoekers: een flinke toename dus.

Van de 201 000 asielzoekers ontving Nederland er 14 600.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het bericht „Aantal asielzoekers naar Europese Unie stijgt fors” ( [1] ) en de daarin
aangehaalde cijfers van Eurostat ( [2] )?

2. Kan de Commissie per lidstaat aangeven wat de procentuele jaarlijkse groei van het aantal asielzoekers is?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven welke lidstaten relatief veel en welke relatief weinig asielaanvragen ontvangen, en
kan de Commissie dit verklaren? Kan de Commissie bevestigen of ontkennen dat de sociale voorzieningen voor
asielzoekers reden kunnen zijn om naar een bepaalde lidstaat te trekken?

4. Is het lidstaten toegestaan, naar eigen inzicht en belang, de sociale voorzieningen aan asielzoekers te
onthouden? Zo neen, waarom niet?

5. Wat is de Commissie voornemens te doen om het almaar toenemende aantal asielzoekers naar de EU drastisch

in te dammen?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie**

_(16 mei 2012)_

De Commissie volgt de stromen asielzoekers in de Unie nauwkeurig en is zich bewust van de in 2011 geregistreerde
piek op EU-niveau, hoewel dient te worden opgemerkt dat het aantal asielaanvragen voor Nederland in 2011 met
3,3 % gezakt is in vergelijking met 2010. Asielcijfers zijn niet stabiel van jaar tot jaar. Het aantal aanvragen bereikte in
2001 een piek van meer dan 424 000, maar daalde in 2006 naar minder dan 197 500. De sterke toename in 2011 is
voornamelijk aan de Arabische lente toe te schrijven. Gedetailleerde cijfers zijn publiekelijk beschikbaar in
de EUROSTAT-databank, die alle relevante informatie over asielzoekers op grond van Verordening (EG) nr.
862/2007 bevat.

De oprichting van een gemeenschappelijk Europees asielstelsel is erop gericht de praktijken tussen de lidstaten te
harmoniseren en te garanderen dat asielzoekers en personen die internationale bescherming genieten, in de hele EU
dezelfde behandeling krijgen. De Commissie bevordert beleid dat het asielzoekers mogelijk maakt bescherming in
hun regio van oorsprong en landen van doorreis te ontvangen (regionale beschermingsprogramma's). De Commissie
streeft er tevens naar iedereen die geen recht heeft op internationale bescherming, naar zijn land van oorsprong of
doorreis terug te sturen. Het verbod tot uitzetting of terugleiding, zoals vastgelegd in het Verdrag van Genève van
1951, wordt daarbij onverlet gelaten.

Wat sociale bijstand betreft, werden in het EU-acquis ( [3] ) minimumnormen vastgelegd voor het verlenen van sociale
bijstand aan asielzoekers en personen die internationale bescherming genieten. De lidstaten mogen deze normen
verhogen, maar kunnen ze niet verlagen zonder de gezamenlijk goedgekeurde EU-wetgeving te schenden.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Europese-Unie/334148/Aantal-asielzoekers-naar-Europese-Unie-stijgt-fors.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Richtlijnen 2003/9/EG en 2004/83/EG.

C 124 E / 218 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003293/12**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The number of people seeking asylum in the EU has risen sharply

It appears from the latest Eurostat figures that in 2011 EU Member States collectively received no less than 301 000
applications from refugees seeking asylum in the EU. This shows a sharp increase from 259 000 asylum‐seekers in
2010.

Of the 301 000 asylum‐seekers, the Netherlands received 14 600.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the report ‘The number of people seeking asylum in European Union rises
sharply’ ( [1] ) and the figures it quotes from Eurostat ( [2] )?

2. Can the Commission indicate, per Member State, what is the annual percentage of growth in the number of
asylum‐seekers?

3. Can the Commission indicate which Member States receive relatively many and which receive relatively few
asylum applications, and can the Commission explain this difference? Can the Commission confirm or deny that the
social provisions for asylum‐seekers may be a reason for travelling to a specific Member State?

4. Are Member States allowed, at their own discretion and in their own interest, to deny social provisions to
asylum‐seekers? If not, why not?

5. What does the Commission intend to do in order to drastically reduce the constantly increasing number of
people seeking asylum in the EU?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The Commission is carefully monitoring the flows of asylum‐seekers in the Union, and is aware of the peak registered
in 2011 at EU level, although it should be noted the number of asylum applications to the Netherlands fell in 2011 by
3.3 % compared with 2010. Asylum figures are not stable year-on-year. Applications peaked in 2001 with over
424 000 applications, but dropped to fewer than 197 500 in 2006. The sharp increase in applications in 2011 is due
predominantly to the Arab Spring. Detailed figures are publicly available on the Eurostat database containing all
relevant information on asylum‐seekers pursuant to Regulation 862/2007.

The establishment of the CEAS aims at harmonising practices among Member States and ensuring that asylum‐
seekers and beneficiaries of international protection can receive similar treatment across the EU. The Commission
promotes policies aimed at allowing asylum‐seekers to receive protection in their region of origin and countries of
transit (Regional Protection Programmes). The Commission is also committed to ensuring that those not entitled to
international protection are returned to their countries of origin or transit, without prejudice to the application of the
principle of non‐refoulment as enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention.

On social assistance, the EU acquis ( [3] ) sets minimum standards for the provision of social assistance to asylum‐seekers
and to beneficiaries of international protection. Member States may raise these standards, but they cannot lower them
without violating commonly agreed EC law.

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( **|**

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Europese-Unie/334148/Aantal-asielzoekers-naar-Europese-Unie-stijgt-fors.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2003/9/EC and Directive 2004/83/EC.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 219

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003295/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)**

_(27 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Conștientizarea autismului și educația

O serie de activități sunt organizate în fiecare an cu ocazia Zilei Internaționale de Conștientizare a Autismului care,
alături de evenimentele generate de Zilele Europene ale Autismului (luna octombrie), aduc în atenția tuturor
europenilor problemele pe care le au de înfruntat persoanele cu autism.

Educația copiilor și tinerilor cu autism implică atât o politică publică specifică, atent elaborată, cât și resurse financiare
mari pentru utilizarea celor mai eficiente tehnici și instrumente.

Există o preocupare la nivelul Comisiei de a încuraja în mod clar finanțarea proiectelor ce vizează educația
persoanelor cu autism, având în vedere că statele alocă resurse limitate?

**Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei**

_(25 mai 2012)_

Comisia este conștientă de importanța și de impactul social al diferitelor tulburări din spectrul autismului (TSA) și a
întreprins acțiuni care vizează o mai bună identificare și informare a publicului și a cadrelor medicale cu privire la
aceste afecțiuni, precum și detectarea timpurie a acestora. În contextul acestor eforturi, Comisia sprijină organizațiile
societății civile care reprezintă persoanele cu tulburări din spectrul autismului și familiile acestora. În cadrul
programului UE pentru ocuparea forței de muncă și solidaritate socială PROGRESS, Comisia a încheiat un acord de
parteneriat (2011-2013) cu organizația Autism Europe, prin care aceasta beneficiază de un grant operațional anual.

În privința eventualelor stimulente la nivelul UE pentru statele membre dispuse să finanțeze proiecte educaționale
destinate persoanelor care suferă de autism, nu există programe de finanțare specifice în acest domeniu, însă
proiectele de parteneriat școlar din cadrul programului Comenius, parte din programul UE de învățare pe tot
parcursul vieții, pot cuprinde o gamă largă de domenii, inclusiv educația destinată persoanelor cu nevoi speciale.

Pe lângă aceasta, la cererea Parlamentului European, Comisia gestionează patru proiecte-pilot privind ocuparea
persoanelor cu tulburări din spectrul autismului (VP/2010/017), al căror scop este să contribuie la dezvoltarea de
politici pentru angajarea și integrarea socială a acestora. Rezultatele obținute în cadrul acestor proiecte vor fi
prezentate înainte de sfârșitul anului 2012.

De asemenea, Comisia îl invită pe distinsul membru să consulte răspunsul la întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris
P-003674/2012 ( [1] ) în ceea ce privește două acțiuni finanțate de Comisie în cadrul programului său în domeniul
sănătății.

În cele din urmă, Comisia îl invită pe distinsul membru să consulte răspunsul la întrebarea P-005560/2010 ( [2] ) pentru
informații detaliate privind proiectele de cercetare destinate persoanelor care suferă de autism, finanțate în cadrul PC6
și PC7.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=RO&SELECT_TAB=qe_param.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=RO&SELECT_TAB=qe_param.

C 124 E / 220 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003295/12**

**to the Commission**
**Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Autism awareness and education

Every year, a range of activities is organised to mark World Autism Awareness Day, which in conjunction with other
events generated by the European Days of Autism (held in October), draw European attention to the difficulties that
people with autism have to face.

Education for children and young people with autism involves a specific and carefully drafted public policy, as well as
major financial resources to allow the use of the most efficient tools and techniques.

Given the limited resources earmarked by Member States for this purpose, is the Commission concerned to offer clear
incentives for the financing of educational projects intended for people with autism?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The Commission is aware of the importance and social impact of the different Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and
has been undertaking actions for better identification, early detection and information to public and professionals
about this group of disorders. As a part of this effort, the Commission supports civil society organisations
representing people with ASD and their families. Under the EU's employment and social solidarity programme
PROGRESS, the Commission has a partnership agreement (2011-2013) with Autism Europe under which this
organisation benefits from an annual operational grant.

As regards potential EU‐level incentives for Member States willing to finance educational projects intended for people
with autism, there are no specific funding programmes in this field but school partnership projects under the
Comenius part of the EU Lifelong Learning Programme may address a wide range of topics, including special needs
education.

Moreover, on request of the EP, the Commission manages four pilot projects on employment of persons with ASD
(VP/2010/017) that aim to help develop policies for employment and social integration. These projects will present
their results before the end of 2012.

The Commission would also refer the Honourable Member to its answer to the Written Question P‐003674/2012 ( [1] )
regarding two actions that it funds in the framework of its Health Programme.

Finally, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Question P‐005560/2010 ( [2] ) for
detailed information on research projects on ASD funded by the FP6 and FP7.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 221

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003296/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Aumento del polline nell'atmosfera

La quantità di pollini nell'atmosfera è in continuo aumento e le malattie allergiche sono diventate la prima causa di
malattia cronica per la fascia compresa tra 0-14 anni. Diversi sono gli studi e le ricerche effettuate per contrastare
questo fenomeno e per tenere sotto controllo la quantità di spore e polline.

Un passo importante concerne la previsione di spazi verdi ad hoc «anti allergia», una progettazione mirata del verde
urbano con l'utilizzo di piante non allergeniche che porterebbe ad una diminuzione significativa degli allergeni
nell'aria, e a una migliore qualità della vita del paziente allergico. Inoltre, con un'idonea gestione dei giardini pubblici e
privati, con potature che precedano la fioritura, si riuscirebbe ad ottenere lo stesso effetto di riduzione di pollini anche
per le piante spesso altamente allergizzanti.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. quali risultati sono stati raggiunti dal progetto ATOPICA da essa inserito nell'ambito del Settimo Programma
Quadro (2007-2013) al fine di identificare cloni di piante meno allergeniche, e se sono già previsti per il futuro
progetti simili in materia di ricerca allergenica;

2. se può fornire dati concernenti le percentuali di individui che soffrono di malattie allergiche nei vari Stati
membri?

**Risposta data da Máire Geoghegan-Quinn a nome della Commissione**

_(24 maggio 2012)_

Le attività del progetto di ricerca ATOPICA ( [1] ), finanziato nell’ambito del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e
sviluppo tecnologico (7° PQ, 2007-2013), sono iniziate nell’ottobre 2011. Il progetto esamina gli effetti dei
cambiamenti climatici e della qualità dell'aria sull'allergenicità del polline, segnatamente per quanto concerne le specie
invasive di Ambrosia artemisiifolia (ambrosia comune). Il progetto metterà a punto orientamenti strategici in materia
per combattere, a partire dalla seconda metà del 2014, l'invasione di ambrosia e le interazioni di inquinanti
atmosferici con aeroallergeni.

Secondo la rete di eccellenza GA2LEN ( [2] ), finanziata nell'ambito del Sesto programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo
tecnologico (6° PQ, 2002-2006), il maggior tasso di sensibilizzazione all’ambrosia si registra in Ungheria, seguita da
Paesi Bassi e Danimarca ( [3] ). Nei 13 Stati membri interessati dallo studio, si è rilevato che il 23,7 % dei pazienti sensibili
all’ambrosia presenta sintomi di asma. La _European Academy of allergy and clinical immunology_ (EAACI) stima che la
prevalenza dell’allergia e dell’asma atmosferiche in Europa colpisce tra il 15 % — e il 40 % della popolazione ( [4] ).

Nell’elenco degli indicatori sanitari della Comunità europea (ECHI) ( [5] ) figurano indicatori relativi allo stato di salute
anche per quanto riguarda la prevalenza dichiarata di asma e broncopneumopatia ostruttiva cronica. Questi due
indicatori sono alimentati con dati Eurostat provenienti dalla indagine europea sulla salute (IES) condotta tra il 2006 e
il 2009 da 17 Stati membri e 3 paesi terzi.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.atopica.eu/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.ga2len.net/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Heinzerling et al., Allergy, ottobre 2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://eaaci.net/.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/indicators/echi/list/index_en.htm

C 124 E / 222 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003296/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Increased levels of pollen in the atmosphere

Levels of pollen in the atmosphere are constantly rising and allergy-related illnesses have become the leading cause of
chronic diseases in the 0‐14‐year age group. Various studies and research projects have been carried out to counter
this phenomenon and to control the levels of spores and pollen.

One important step is the provision of ad hoc ‘anti-allergy’ green spaces, the targeted design of urban green spaces
using non-allergenic plants, which would lead to a significant reduction in airborne allergens and a better quality of
life for allergy sufferers. Furthermore, managing public and private gardens appropriately, pruning plants before they
flower, would make it possible to achieve the same pollen reduction effect even for plants that are often highly
allergenic.

1. Can the Commission provide information on the results achieved by the ATOPICA project, which it included in
the Seventh Framework Programme (2007‐2013) with the aim of identifying less allergenic plant clones, and are
similar projects on allergy research already planned for the future?

2. Can it provide data on the percentage of individuals who suffer from allergy-related illnesses in the various
Member States?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 May 2012)_

The research project ATOPICA ( [1] ), funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological
Development (FP7, 2007-2013), started its activities in October 2011. The project investigates the effects of climate
change and air quality on pollen allergenicity, focusing on the invasive species Ambrosia artemisiifolia (common
ragweed). The project will deliver policy-relevant guidance to combat Ambrosia invasion and air pollutants
interactions with aeroallergens as from the second half of 2014.

According to the Network of Excellence GA2LEN ( [2] ), funded under the Sixth Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development (FP6, 2002-2006), the highest sensitisation rate to Ambrosia is found in Hungary,
followed by the Netherlands and Denmark ( [3] ).Across the 13 Member States covered by the study, it was found that
23.7 % of ragweed-sensitive patients have symptoms of asthma. The European academy of allergy and clinical
immunology (EAACI) estimates that the prevalence of airborne allergy and asthma in Europe has reached 15 %-40 %
of the population ( [4] ).

The European Community Health Indicators (ECHI) ( [5] ) list contains indicators on health status, including on selfreported prevalence for asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Both indicators are fed with
Eurostat data from the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS), conducted between 2006 and 2009 by 17 Member
States and 3 other countries.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.atopica.eu.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.ga2len.net.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Heinzerling et al., Allergy, October 2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://eaaci.net.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/indicators/echi/list/index_en.htm

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 223

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003297/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Pena di morte e iniziativa europea per la democrazia e i diritti dell'uomo

I luoghi del mondo dove l'anno scorso vi sono state esecuzioni capitali, secondo il Rapporto annuale di Amnesty
International sulla pena di morte nel 2011, sono 20, oltre un terzo in meno rispetto a 10 anni fa. Per contro, l'anno
scorso il 90 % degli Stati membri delle Nazioni Unite non ha eseguito condanne a morte e, di questi, 141 paesi hanno
abolito la pena di morte per legge o perseguono una consolidata prassi abolizionista: il più recente, primo del 2012, è
stato la Lettonia.

In quel 10 % di mondo dove si decapita, si fucila, s'avvelena e s’impicca, nel 2011 il boia ha agito 676 volte, 149 in più
dell'anno precedente, a causa di un forte aumento delle esecuzioni in due paesi: Arabia Saudita e Iran. In quest'ultimo,
sono stati impiccati almeno tre minorenni.

Alla luce di quanto citato, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se è informata sull'ultimo rapporto di Amnesty International,

2. in che modo sono stati finora spesi i fondi dell'iniziativa europea per la democrazia e i diritti dell'uomo, mirante
all'abolizione della pena di morte nei paesi dove è ancora in vigore?

**Risposta data da Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione**

_(30 maggio 2012)_

1. La Commissione è pienamente informata sull'ultimo rapporto di Amnesty International e su altri rapporti sulla
pena di morte.

2. Dal 2007, lo Strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani (EIDHR) sostiene la lotta che si porta avanti
in tutto il mondo contro la pena di morte. Tale impegno si è tradotto in progetti del valore di 18 milioni di euro che
hanno dato risultati concreti. Tramite inviti internazionali e nazionali a presentare proposte sono stati selezionati,
sulla base dei criteri di valutazione qualitativa relativi alla pertinenza, all'efficienza, all'efficacia, alla sostenibilità,
all'impatto, al valore aggiunto e alla coerenza, 24 progetti per l'abolizione della pena capitale in tutto il mondo.
Alcuni di essi sono imperniati sulla prestazione di assistenza giuridica e di aiuto a persone a rischio o a detenuti in
attesa di esecuzione capitale, per garantire maggiormente il diritto a un processo equo; altri sul sostegno alla riforma
costituzionale e giuridica finalizzata a limitare il numero totale di reati per i quali è prevista la pena di morte ovvero a
escludere i malati di mente o a garantire il diritto all'appello; altri ancora sul monitoraggio delle attuali condizioni di
applicazione della pena capitale, comprese le condizioni dei detenuti in attesa di esecuzione, al fine di promuovere la
firma e la ratifica del secondo protocollo facoltativo al Patto internazionale sui diritti civili e politici.

C 124 E / 224 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003297/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Death penalty and European initiative for democracy and human rights

According to Amnesty International’s annual report on the death penalty in 2011, 20 countries carried out
executions last year, over a third fewer than 10 years ago. By contrast, last year 90 % of Member States of the United
Nations did not sentence people to death and, of these, 141 countries have abolished the death penalty by law or are
pursuing an established policy of abolition: the most recent, and the first of 2012, was Latvia.

In the 10 % of the world where beheading, shooting, poisoning and hanging do occur, in 2011 there were 676
executions, 149 more than in the previous year, owing to a sharp rise in executions in two countries: Saudi Arabia
and Iran. In the latter of these two countries, at least three minors were hanged.

In view of the above:

1. Can the Commission state whether it is aware of the latest report from Amnesty International?

2. How have funds from the European initiative for democracy and human rights been spent so far, with the aim
of abolishing the death penalty in countries where it is still practised?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 May 2012)_

1. The Commission is fully aware of the latest report from Amnesty International and other reports on the death
penalty.

2. Since 2007, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has supported the worldwide
fight against the death penalty. This has involved more than EUR 18 million worth of projects leading to concrete
results. There have been 24 projects promoting the abolition of the death penalty worldwide selected through global
and in-country call for proposals on the basis of the quality assessment criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness,
sustainability, impact, value added and coherence. Some projects are focused on providing legal assistance and aid to
persons at risk or prisoners awaiting execution in order to enhance the right to a fair trial; others on supporting legal
and constitutional reform aimed at restricting the total number of capital offences or at excluding the mentally ill or at
guaranteeing right of appeal; and others on monitoring current conditions of the use of the death penalty, including
the conditions of detention for people in prison awaiting execution, in order to promote the signature and the
ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 225

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003298/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Programmi per fondi diretti — Palio dei Capatosta

Nei giorni 8 e 13-14-15 luglio 2012 nella città di Mola di Bari (BA) avrà luogo la seconda edizione del Palio dei
Capatosta.

Il Palio dei «Capatosta» si richiama ad un avvenimento del 14 luglio1549, giorno in cui passò da Mola Isabella di
Capua, principessa di Molfetta, moglie di Ferrante Gonzaga.

Per emulare i festeggiamenti in onore della principessa Isabella di Capua, è stato istituito un Palio tra le sei contrade
(Terra, Stella, Fuoco, Drago, Giglio e Noria), in cui Mola è stata suddivisa. Ogni contrada possiede caratteristiche
peculiari che tengono conto della storia e della tradizione, dai colori ai simboli, dai santi protettori alle chiese e piazze
di riferimento. È un'occasione per la città di ritrovare un nuovo spirito di appartenenza, di orgoglio e di
partecipazione alla crescita culturale, turistica, economica e sociale del proprio territorio.

In merito a quanto sopraesposto, può la Commissione chiarire se esistono fondi europei per i quali il Palio dei
Capatosta può fare richiesta considerato l'interesse storico, culturale e folkloristico delle lodevoli iniziative messe in
atto dall'associazione organizzatrice?

**Risposta data da Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(16 maggio 2012)_

Il progetto cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato può essere ammissibile ad un sostegno finanziario dei Fondi
strutturali a patto che soddisfi tutte le condizioni del caso. Il programma per la Puglia, cofinanziato dal Fondo
europeo di sviluppo regionale, prevede lo stanziamento di 50 milioni di euro per la «Tutela, valorizzazione e gestione
del patrimonio culturale» nell'ambito della priorità «Valorizzazione delle risorse naturali e culturali per l'attrattività e
lo sviluppo». Tuttavia, in linea con il principio di gestione condivisa usato per l'amministrazione della politica di
coesione, la selezione di progetti e la loro attuazione competono alle autorità nazionali. La Commissione suggerisce
all'onorevole deputato di mettersi direttamente in contatto con l'autorità di gestione del programma Puglia:

Autorità di Gestione POR Puglia:
Viale Japigia, 145
70126 BARI
adgfesr@regione.puglia.it

C 124 E / 226 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003298/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Direct funding programmes — Palio dei Capatosta

On 8 and 13, 14 and 15 July 2012 the second Palio dei Capatosta will take place in the town of Mola di Bari, Province
of Bari.

The Palio dei Capatosta harks back to an event that took place on 14 July 1549, the day on which Isabella di Capua,
Princess of Molfetta, wife of Ferrante Gonzaga, passed through Mola.

To emulate the festivities in honour of Princess Isabella di Capua, a _palio_ (traditional horse race) was established
between the six districts (Terra, Stella, Fuoco, Drago, Giglio and Noria) into which Mola was divided. Each district has
its own particular characteristics which take account of its history and tradition, from colours to symbols, from
patron saints to churches and town squares. It is an opportunity for the town to rediscover a new spirit of belonging,
of pride and participation in its own local cultural, tourist, economic and social growth.

With regard to the above, can the Commission say whether there are any European funds for which the Palio dei
Capatosta can apply, given the historic, cultural and folkloric significance of the commendable work done by the
association organising the event?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The project referred to by the Honourable Member may be eligible for financial support from the Structural Funds,
provided that all applicable conditions are met. The programme for Puglia, which is co-financed by the European
Regional Development Fund, provides for an allocation of EUR 50 million for the ‘Protection and preservation of
cultural heritage’ under the priority ‘Natural and cultural resources for local development’. However, in line with the
shared management principle used for the administration of cohesion policy, project selection and implementation is
the responsibility of the national authorities. The Commission suggests that the Honourable Member contact directly
the managing authority of the Puglia programme:

Autorità di Gestione POR Puglia
Viale Japigia, 145
70126 BARI
adgfesr@regione.puglia.it

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 227

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003299/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Crisi delle marinerie pescherecce

Le marinerie pescherecce nazionali, ed in particolare quelle italiane, stanno versando in una situazione di profonda
crisi strutturale ed economica oramai da molti mesi. La situazione è stata ulteriormente aggravata dall'adozione di
alcune normative europee e nazionali, che hanno tenuto poco conto delle specificità delle tipologie di pesca e
d'imbarcazioni operanti a livello locale.

Il regolamento (CE) n. 1967/2006 prescrive, all'articolo 9, comma 3, riguardante la pesca da strascico, che a decorrere
dal 1 [o] luglio 2008 le reti debbano avere una maglia quadrata di 40mm. I pescatori di moltissime marinerie hanno
rilevato come il regolamento in questione appaia inattuabile per la pesca a strascico di fondo in considerazione delle
specie oggetto di cattura. Simile la situazione per quanto concerne il regolamento (CE) n. 1224/2009 che all'articolo
92, unitamente a gravosi sistemi tecnologici di rilevazione del pescato, prevede un sistema di sanzioni con
decurtazione di punti, dato un punteggio di partenza, fino al ritiro definitivo della licenza. Le disposizioni di cui alla
normativa citata appaiono estremamente complesse e non sembrano considerare le dinamiche e le condotte della vita
a bordo dei pescherecci. Il sistema di sanzioni previsto dal regolamento concorre inoltre in maniera decisiva ad
aggravare la situazione di una categoria produttiva storicamente fondamentale per la vita economica e sociale delle
comunità locali.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione chiarire se:

1. intende modificare i regolamenti (CE) n. 1967/2006 e (CE) n. 1224/2009 in modo da rivedere la normativa
tenendo conto delle realtà locali e della situazione economica costiera che basa la sua economia quasi
esclusivamente sulle attività di pesca?

2. intende modificare, nello specifico, il nuovo sistema di controlli previsto dal regolamento (CE) n. 1224/2009,
eliminando in caso di infrazioni non gravi la sospensione della licenza e l'arresto forzato del peschereccio, ma
lasciando intatti i provvedimenti nei confronti del comandante dell'imbarcazione?

3. sulla base della sua comunicazione COM(2008)0453, non giudichi utile intervenire in modo da allineare i
prezzi del gasolio a livello del prezzo medio applicato all'interno dei paesi pescherecci dell'UE?

**Risposta di Maria Damanaki a nome della Commissione**

_(5 giugno 2012)_

Benché consapevole delle difficoltà cui è confrontato il settore, la Commissione ritiene che un'adeguata applicazione
di pratiche di pesca sostenibili contribuirebbe a migliorare lo stato degli stock ittici, aumentando in tal modo la
redditività della flotta peschereccia.

Questa impostazione, alla base dei regolamenti (CE) del Consiglio n. 1967/2006 e n. 1224/2009, è stata confermata
dalla proposta della Commissione relativa alla riforma della politica comune della pesca (PCP). La priorità della
Commissione consiste nel garantire il rispetto delle norme della PCP e in questa fase non sono previste modifiche dei
regolamenti sopra citati.

C 124 E / 228 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

Con riguardo al terzo quesito, la Commissione non dispone di strumenti per intervenire nella direzione proposta al
fine di stabilire o fissare i prezzi del carburante. In ogni caso, adottare o favorire tale comportamento sarebbe in
contraddizione con le norme di concorrenza del trattato, in particolare con l'articolo 101 del medesimo. In proposito
occorre anche tener conto della relazione speciale n. 12 della Corte dei Conti europea ( [1] ), da cui emerge che il
regolamento sulla crisi del carburante adottato a seguito della comunicazione menzionata non ha ottenuto gli effetti
auspicati. Come ha indicato nella risposta alla suddetta relazione, la Commissione resta convinta del fatto che per
realizzare un profondo adeguamento della flotta dell'UE in termini di sostenibilità economica e ambientale occorra
affrontare le radici dei problemi strutturali del settore. A tal fine si potrebbero ad esempio adottare misure che
comportino una riduzione della sovraccapacità di pesca e della dipendenza dai carburanti (come la riconversione
verso tecniche e attrezzature di pesca caratterizzate da un minor consumo di carburante). Tali misure potrebbero
contribuire a migliorare la competitività del settore e la sua efficienza sotto il profilo energetico.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Corte dei conti europea, relazione speciale n. 12/2011: «Le misure dell'UE hanno contribuito ad adeguare la capacità delle flotte pescherecce alle
possibilità di pesca?».

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 229

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003299/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Crisis for fishing fleets

National fishing fleets, and in particular those from Italy, have been facing a profound structural and economic crisis
for many months now. The situation has recently been exacerbated by the adoption of several European and national
regulations, which have taken little account of the specific types of fishing and vessels operating at local level.

Article 9(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 stipulates, in relation to trawler fishing, that from 1 July 2008, nets
must have a square mesh size of 40 mm. Fishermen from a great number of fleets have pointed out how the
regulation in question appears impracticable for bottom trawling, considering the species they aim to catch. The
situation is similar as regards Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Article 92 of which, together with onerous
technological systems for the detection of fish, lays down a system of sanctions with points deducted from a starting
score, until the licence is withdrawn permanently. The provisions of the aforementioned regulation appear extremely
complex and do not seem to consider the dynamics and way of life on board fishing boats. The system of sanctions
set out in the regulation also contributes significantly to worsening the situation in an industrial sector that has
historically been fundamental to the economic and social life of local communities.

In view of the above:

1. Can the Commission clarify whether it intends to amend Regulations (EC) No 1967/2006 and (EC)
No 1224/2009 in order to revise the legislation to take account of local situations and the economic situation
of coastal areas, which base their economy almost exclusively on fishing?

2. Does it intend to specifically amend the new system of checks laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, by
eliminating the suspension of licences and the forced immobilisation of fishing boats in cases of minor
infringements, but retaining the provisions relating to the master of the vessel?

3. On the basis of its communication COM(2008) 0453, does it not think it might be useful to intervene in order
to bring diesel prices into line with the average price applied within the fishing countries of the EU?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 June 2012)_

The Commission is aware of the difficulties that the sector is facing. The Commission believes that a proper
implementation of sustainable fishing practices would help to improve the state of the fishing stocks, thus increasing
the profitability of the fishing fleet.

This approach, which was at the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 and of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1224/2009, has been confirmed by the Commission's proposal to reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP).
The Commission's priority is to ensure compliance with the CFP legislation and no modifications to these regulations
are envisaged at this stage.

Regarding the third question, the Commission does not have the tools to intervene in the direction proposed to set or
fix fuel prices. In any event doing so or fostering such a behaviour would be in contradiction with the competition
rules of the Treaty, in particular with Article 101 of the Treaty. In this respect it is also relevant to take note of the
Special Report No 12 ( [1] ) from the European Court of Auditors which indicates that it has found that the fuel crisis
regulation adopted following the communication referred to was not effective. As indicated in its response to that
report the Commission remains convinced that an in-depth adaptation of the EU fleet towards economic and
environmental sustainability should be addressed by tackling the roots of the structural problems of the sector. This
could for instance be achieved by measures leading to reduction of fishing overcapacity and fuel dependency (such as
reconversion towards fuel efficient fishing techniques and equipment). These measures could help the sector to
become more competitive and energy efficient.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Have EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing opportunities?, European Court of Auditors,
Special report No 12/2011.

C 124 E / 230 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003300/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Abolizione della pena di morte

Secondo il Rapporto annuale di Amnesty International sulla pena di morte nel 2011, sono venti i paesi che l'anno
scorso hanno eseguito pene capitali, oltre un terzo in meno rispetto a 10 anni fa. Visto dall'altra parte, l'anno scorso il
90 per cento degli Stati membri delle Nazioni Unite non ha eseguito condanne a morte e, di questi, 141 hanno abolito
la pena di morte per legge o perseguono una consolidata prassi abolizionista: più recentemente, e primo del 2012, è
stato la Lettonia.

In quel 10 per cento di mondo dove si decapita, si fucila, si avvelena e si impicca, nel 2011 il boia ha agito 676 volte,
149 in più dell'anno precedente, a causa di un notevole aumento delle esecuzioni in due paesi: Arabia Saudita e Iran.
In quest'ultimo paese, sono stati impiccati almeno tre minorenni.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può l'Alto Rappresentante far sapere:

1. se è informato sull'ultimo rapporto di Amnesty International?

2. in che modo intende fare pressioni, anche con accordi economici e diplomatici, sugli Stati che eseguono la pena
di morte per indurli ad abolirla?

**Risposta data dall'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(25 maggio 2012)_

L'Unione europea è informata sull'ultimo rapporto di Amnesty International, poiché tale ONG è un importante
interlocutore. Benché il 2011 sia stato un buon anno per la causa abolizionista si registra un aumento delle esecuzioni
capitali, a causa dell'incremento in taluni paesi che mantengono la pena di morte.

Tra gli interventi per fronteggiare la situazione si citano:

—
dichiarazioni: rilasciate tempestivamente per esprimere la posizione dell'UE sulla situazione generale o su
singoli casi;

—
iniziative a livello diplomatico: vengono compiuti passi diplomatici presso i paesi interessati per invitarli ad
abolire la pena capitale o almeno a decidere una moratoria. Di recente, ad esempio, in occasione dell'ultimo
incontro tra l'UE e il Consiglio di cooperazione del Golfo, l'Unione ha chiesto a tutti i paesi del Golfo di decidere
una moratoria sulla pena di morte;

—
dialoghi sui diritti umani: il tema della pena di morte figura costantemente all'ordine del giorno di 40 dialoghi
specifici sui diritti umani che l'UE intrattiene con svariati partner del mondo;

—
finanziamento di progetti: tramite lo Strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani l'UE continua a
finanziare progetti contro la pena di morte in svariati paesi, ad esempio negli Stati Uniti e in Cina;

—
azione in sede multilaterale: l'UE rimane il pioniere più attivo a livello mondiale nell'impegno per l'abolizione
della pena di morte, collaborando strettamente con tutti i competenti meccanismi e organismi ONU.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 231

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003300/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Abolition of the death penalty

According to Amnesty International’s annual report on the death penalty in 2011, 20 countries carried out death
sentences last year, over a third fewer than 10 years ago. From another perspective, last year 90 % of Member States of
the United Nations did not sentence people to death and, of these, 141 abolished the death penalty by law or are
pursuing an established policy of abolition: most recently, and the first of 2012, was Latvia.

In the 10 % of the world where beheading, shooting, poisoning and hanging do occur, in 2011 there were
676 executions, 149 more than in the previous year, owing to a notable rise in executions in two countries: Saudi
Arabia and Iran. In the latter of these two countries, at least three minors have been hanged.

In view of the above, can the High Representative state:

1. Whether she is aware of the latest report from Amnesty International?

2. How she intends to put pressure on countries that practise the death penalty, including with economic and
diplomatic agreements, to persuade them to abolish it?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The EU is aware of the Amnesty International report, since this organisation constitutes an important NGO
interlocutor. Although 2011 has been a good year for the abolitionist trend, there is an increase in number of
executions, due to a flux in certain retaining countries.

Measures to confront the situation include _inter alia_ :

—
Statements/Declarations: issued quickly to reflect the position of the EU, either of general nature or as a followup to individual cases.

—
Diplomatic level/demarches: countries concerned are approached at diplomatic level and invited to abolish
capital punishment or at least establish a moratorium. Recently, for example the EU asked all Gulf countries to
establish a moratorium on death penalty at the last EU and Gulf Cooperation Council meeting.

—
Human rights dialogues: the issue of death penalty constantly features in 40 dedicated human rights dialogues
that EU holds with diverse partners worldwide.

—
Project financing: through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the EU continues to
fund anti-death penalty projects in diverse countries, such as the US and China.

—
Action in multilateral forums: the EU remains the world's most active pioneer for the abolition of the death
penalty, working in close collaboration with all relevant UN mechanisms and bodies.

C 124 E / 232 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003301/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Venezia e il rischio che scompaia

Venezia rischia di sprofondare letteralmente nelle acque dei suoi famosi canali. Dai sempre più frequenti studi si è
appurato che il livello dell'acqua sta aumentando a ritmi più elevati di quelli riscontrati nelle precedenti rilevazioni,
andando ad interessare sempre più gli edifici della laguna. Secondo i ricercatori, l'aumento del livello delle acque, di
circa due millimetri l'anno, combinato a quello del livello del mare rispetto alla terra, porterebbe ad un «abbassamento
raddoppiato» di circa quattro millimetri all'anno.

La città è già sottoposta a regolari inondazioni. Sicuramente nessuno può azzardare previsioni sul futuro ma, se gli
attuali tassi di subsidenza e di innalzamento del livello del mare rimanessero stabili, è possibile che nei prossimi
vent'anni la città galleggiante scenda di otto centimetri rispetto al livello medio dell'acqua della laguna.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti, può la Commissione far sapere a quali fondi europei la città di Venezia può accedere
per la rigenerazione urbana e per finanziare nuovi progetti intesi a attenuare questo fenomeno?

**Risposta data da Johannes Hahn** **a nome della Commissione**

_(15 maggio 2012)_

L'articolo 5, paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 1080/2006 relativo al Fondo europeo di Sviluppo regionale (FESR)
prevede la possibilità di finanziare progetti volti a migliorare il patrimonio naturale e culturale delle regioni nonché
progetti volti alla prevenzione dei rischi ambientali.

Il programma per la regione Veneto, che delinea la strategia per l'assistenza del FESR nella regione nel periodo 20072013, prevede la possibilità di cofinanziare interventi di questo tipo nel quadro della priorità «Ambiente e
valorizzazione del territorio», a patto che siano soddisfatte le condizioni specifiche stabilite nel programma.

In linea con il principio della gestione condivisa usato per l'amministrazione della politica di coesione, la selezione dei
progetti e la loro attuazione compete alle autorità nazionali. Per ulteriori informazioni la Commissione suggerisce
pertanto all'onorevole deputato di mettersi direttamente in contatto con l'autorità di gestione del programma
operativo regionale:

Regione Veneto
Direzione Programmazione
Palazzo ex ULSS
Rio dei Tre Ponti — Dorsoduro, 3494/A
30123 Venezia

Tel. 041 2791469 — 1470-1472

Fax. 041 2791477
E-mail: programmazione@regione.veneto.it

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 233

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003301/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Venice and the risk of it disappearing

Venice is at risk of literally sinking into the waters of its famous canals. Ever more frequent studies have confirmed
that the water level is rising at a higher rate than found in previous surveys, and is increasingly affecting the buildings
on the lagoon. According to the researchers, the rise in the water level of around two millimetres a year, combined
with the global rise in sea level, could lead to a ‘doubled lowering’ of around four millimetres a year.

The city is already subject to regular flooding. Clearly nobody can predict the future but, if the current rates of
subsidence and increase in water level remain stable, it is possible that in the next 20 years the floating city will drop
by eight centimetres in relation to the average water level in the lagoon.

In view of the above facts, could the Commission state which European funds Venice can access for urban
regeneration and to finance new projects to mitigate this phenomenon?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn** **on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

Article 5.2 of the regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) provides for
the possibility to finance projects aimed at improving the natural and cultural heritage of regions as well as projects
aimed at countering environmental risks.

The programme for region Veneto which sets out the strategy for ERDF assistance in the region for 2007-2013,
envisages the possibility to co-finance interventions of this type within the framework of the priority ‘Environment
and enhancement of the territory’, provided that the specific conditions set out by the programme are met.

In line with the shared management principle used for the administration of cohesion policy, project selection and
implementation is the responsibility of the national authorities. For more information, the Commission therefore
suggests that the Honourable Member contact directly the Managing Authority of the regional operational

programme:

Regione Veneto
Direzione Programmazione
Palazzo ex ULSS
Rio dei Tre Ponti — Dorsoduro, 3494/A
30123 Venezia

Tel. 041 2791469 — 1470 — 1472

Fax. 041 2791477
E-mail: programmazione@regione.veneto.it

C 124 E / 234 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003302/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Attacco kamikaze in Pakistan

Almeno 13 persone sono state uccise in un attacco suicida nel distretto tribale di Khyber dominato da diversi gruppi
talebani, nel nord ovest del Pakistan. Lo riferisce Ary News. Da quanto ha detto il responsabile governativo Bakhtiar
Khan, un kamikaze si è fatto esplodere davanti a una moschea della regione di Bara affiliata al gruppo estremista
Lashkar-e-Islam (Li). L'attacco coincide con il «Pakistan Day», che celebra la decisione di creare la nazione del Pakistan
distinta dall'India. Continuano così a ripetersi gravi violazioni dei diritti umani.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può l'Alto Rappresentante far sapere:

1. se è informata sulla vicenda?

2. in che modo intende ridurre i casi di attacchi suicida in una zona sensibile come quella pakistana?

3. quali sono le attività antiterrorismo intraprese in precedenza dalla Comunità europea nella regione del
Pakistan?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(13 luglio 2012)_

L’AR/VP è a conoscenza dell’attacco suicida come da oggetto dell’interrogazione, perpetrato nel distretto tribale di
Khyber, e, più in generale, è preoccupata per le difficoltà con le quali la popolazione e le autorità pakistane si
confrontano quotidianamente a causa di attacchi terroristici. La situazione globale della sicurezza è critica,
soprattutto nelle aree del Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, del Balochistan e delle FATA. Il Pakistan è tuttora uno dei paesi più
instabili al mondo.

Pur non potendo intervenire direttamente negli affari interni di un paese partner, l’UE può esprimere le proprie
preoccupazioni per i danni che un clima di violenza e intimidazioni può causare allo sviluppo complessivo del paese e
può mettere a disposizione la sua esperienza nel risolvere problemi politici attraverso il dialogo e per rafforzare lo
Stato di diritto.

In questo contesto l’assistenza dell’UE si concentra sin dal 2007 nelle regioni di confine del Pakistan settentrionale e
occidentale. Sono stati avviati specifici progetti di assistenza per sostenere gli sforzi delle autorità pakistane nel
ripristinare la normalità in zone già assoggettate ad elementi estremisti, in particolare nella divisione di Malakand.

L’UE mantiene un costante dialogo politico con il Pakistan, anche in materia di sicurezza e di lotta al terrorismo.
Nell’ambito del piano d’impegno UE-Pakistan i contatti esistenti sono aumentati grazie all’accordo di tenere dialoghi
settoriali periodici sulla lotta al terrorismo.

Dal 2010 l’UE sostiene progetti in Pakistan finalizzati a migliorare la qualità dell’applicazione della legge nel paese e
l’accesso alla giustizia e contribuisce ad iniziative per il consolidamento della pace attraverso la mediazione. Dopo
che, il 25 giugno 2012, il Consiglio «Affari esteri» ha adottato la strategia dell’UE di lotta al terrorismo e di sicurezza
per il Pakistan, si prevede che si possa rafforzare il sostegno pratico alle misure di lotta al terrorismo nel paese.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 235

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003302/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Suicide attack in Pakistan

The Pakistani news channel Ary News has reported that at least 13 people were killed in a suicide attack in the tribal
district of Khyber in the north-west of Pakistan, an area which is dominated by various Taliban groups. According to
the statement made by government official Bakhtiar Khan, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of a mosque in
the Bara region which is affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) extremist group. The attack coincided with ‘Pakistan
Day’, which commemorates the decision to create a Pakistani nation separate from India. This attack is merely the
latest in a long line of serious human rights violations.

In the light of the above, could the High Representative state:

1. Whether she is aware of this incident?

2. What action she intends to take to reduce the number of suicide attacks in an area as sensitive as Pakistan?

3. What counter-terrorism activities the European Union has been involved in previously in the Pakistan region?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(13 July 2012)_

The HR/VP is aware of the specific suicide attack in the tribal district of Khyber, and more generally is concerned by
the difficult situation with which the Pakistani people and authorities are confronted on a daily basis as a result of
terrorist attacks. The overall security situation is challenging, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and
FATA. Pakistan is still among the most volatile countries in the world.

Although the EU cannot intervene directly in the internal affairs of a partner country, it can convey its concern at the
damage that a climate of violence and intimidation does to a country’s overall development, and offer to share its
experience in resolving political issues through dialogue and strengthening the rule of law.

In parallel the EU’s assistance since 2007 has been focused on the border regions in North and West Pakistan. Specific
assistance projects have been launched to support the Pakistani authorities’ efforts to restore normality to areas which
have been recovered from extremist elements, most notably in the Malakand Division.

The EU engages in regular political dialogue with Pakistan, including on security and counter-terrorism. Under the
EU‐Pakistan Engagement Plan, the existing dialogue has been enhanced by agreement to hold regular sector dialogues
on counter-terrorism.

Since 2010 the EU supports projects in Pakistan intended to improve the quality of law enforcement in Pakistan,
access to justice and contribute to peace-building initiatives through mediation. Following the adoption of the EU
Counter Terrorism/Security Strategy for Pakistan at the 25 June 2012 Foreign Affairs Council, it is expected that the
EU’s practical support for measures against terrorist acts in Pakistan can be reinforced.

C 124 E / 236 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003303/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ La nuova tecnologia Hyst

Oggi da sterpaglie, rami e scarti di potature non si produce solo energia pulita, ma anche alimenti. Si chiama Hyst la
tecnologia in grado di mutare i residui agricoli in mangimi per animali e in alimenti per l'essere umano. Semplice, a
basso costo e a impatto ambientale nullo, è un procedimento basato sulla disaggregazione fisica della materia
organica, indotta da un bombardamento provocato da aria ad alta pressione. In questo modo, si ottiene biogas di
seconda generazione. Ma la vera novità di questo procedimento consiste nell'aprire un orizzonte del tutto nuovo: la
generazione di cibo dagli scarti. Trattando in questo modo crusca di cereali e stocchi di mais, infatti, si ottengono
prodotti di elevata qualità nutrizionale, paragonabili a farine nobili e molto ricche di proteine, vitamine e
micronutrienti, di solito più rari nelle farine di uso comune.

Se realmente si rivelerà come le premesse la descrivono, è facile immaginare che impatto potrà avere questa nuova
tecnologia, soprattutto dal punto di vista dell'emergenza alimentare. Non è solo l'agricoltura a essere interessata alla
nuova tecnologia: l'altra fonte di materiale, infatti, viene dall'industria. E studi recenti su questa tecnologia, resi noti
nell'ambito del convegno tenutosi lo scorso 23 febbraio a Roma presso il Cnr (Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche),
hanno riportato che solo dai sottoprodotti dell'industria molitoria, ad esempio, è possibile recuperare fino al 40 per
cento di proteine e amidi a uso alimentare: il che significa dai trenta ai quaranta milioni di tonnellate l'anno di farina
per l'alimentazione umana.

Alla luce di quanto precede può dunque la Commissione far sapere:

1. se esiste uno studio della Commissione che prenda in considerazione le potenzialità delle biomasse alimentari
come nell'esperimento descritto;

2. quali normative europee regolano le biomasse per produzione di energia e quali quelle per la produzione di
alimenti;

3. se dispone di dati circa la produzione in Europa di biomassa che non derivi da scarti di produzione agricola, ma
da vere e proprie coltivazioni?

**Risposta data da Dacian Cioloș a nome della Commissione**

_(21 maggio 2012)_

1. Sebbene non esistano studi della Commissione sul potenziale della biomassa alimentare come nella tecnologia
Hyst, ve ne sono altri in settori correlati — ad esempio un'analisi scientifica dei diversi flussi di rifiuti e dei criteri volti
a stabilire quando un rifiuto cessa di essere tale — che comprendono i rifiuti biodegradabili, tra cui quelli alimentari.
Per ulteriori informazioni si veda il sito: http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC58206.pdf

2. L'uso dell'energia da biomassa per i biocarburanti è disciplinato dalla direttiva sull'energia da fonti rinnovabili
(2009/28/CE) e dalla direttiva sulla qualità dei combustibili (2009/30/CE). Spetta agli Stati membri provvedere
affinché i biocarburanti soddisfino i criteri di sostenibilità contenuti in tali direttive.

Per quanto riguarda la biomassa solida e gassosa per la produzione di energia elettrica e calore, la Commissione ha
pubblicato una relazione sulla sostenibilità che comprende un sistema non vincolante raccomandato agli Stati
membri; sta attualmente valutando se tali criteri sono sufficienti o se occorrono criteri vincolanti.

Per quanto riguarda la biomassa per la produzione di alimenti e mangimi da immettere sul mercato dell'UE, si
applicano i principi generali della legislazione alimentare dell'UE (regolamento 178/2002) e la legislazione specifica
derivata.

3. La coltivazione di biomassa agricola a fini energetici nell’Unione europea riguarda principalmente cereali per la
produzione di etanolo e colza per la produzione di biodiesel. L'uso dei cereali dell’UE per la produzione di etanolo è di
circa 9,1 milioni di tonnellate; circa 9,5 milioni di tonnellate di oli vegetali sono convertiti in biodiesel: una parte è
importata o triturata da importazioni di semi oleosi. Più dei due terzi del raccolto di colza dell'UE (19,3 milioni di
tonnellate nel 2011) è destinato al biodiesel. Inoltre, vi sono superfici coltivate a silomais per il biogas, a barbabietola
da zucchero per l'etanolo, a girasole per il biodiesel, a forestazione a ciclo breve e a erbe perenni.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 237

Poiché non esistono statistiche esplicite sulla produzione di biomassa a fini energetici, questi dati sono basati sulla
produzione di bioenergia. Nei prossimi anni la Commissione dovrebbe disporre di più dati sulla produzione di
biomassa per i biocarburanti. Per ulteriori informazioni: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy/tenders/index_en.htm

C 124 E / 238 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003303/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The new Hyst technology

Today, undergrowth, branches and cuttings can be used to produce not only clean energy but food as well. The
technology capable of turning agricultural waste into feed for animals and food for humans is called Hyst. Simple,
low-cost and with absolutely no environmental impact, it is a process based on physically breaking down organic
matter by bombarding it with air at high pressure. This produces second-generation biogas. However, the real novelty
of this process is how it has opened up a completely new horizon: producing food from waste. Processing cereal bran
and maize stalks in this way yields products of high nutritional value, comparable to premium flours that are very
high in protein, vitamins and micronutrients, often rarer in commonly-used flour.

If it actually lives up to the theory, it is easy to imagine the impact that this new technology could have, particularly in
terms of food emergencies. It is not just agriculture that is interested in this new technology: the other source of
material comes from industry. Recent studies into this technology, announced at the conference that took place on
23 February in Rome at the CNR (National Research Council), reported that it is possible to recover up to 40 % of the
protein and starch for use in food from by-products from the milling industry alone, for example. This amounts to 30
to 40 million tonnes of flour for human consumption per year.

In view of the above:

1. Can the Commission state whether there is a Commission study to consider the potential of food biomass as in
the experiment described?

2. Can the Commission state which European regulations govern the use of biomass for the production of energy
and the production of food?

3. Does the Commission have data on the production in Europe of biomass that comes from actual cultivation,
rather than from agricultural waste?

**Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

1. Although there are no Commission studies to consider the potential of food biomass as in Hyst technology,
there are some others in related fields, like a scientific analysis of different waste streams and end-of-waste criteria,
covering biodegradable waste, including food waste. Further info at: http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC58206.pdf

2. The use of biomass for biofuels is regulated by the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) and the Fuel
Quality Directive (2009/30/EC). Member States should ensure that biofuels meet the sustainability criteria contained
in those Directives.

For solid and gaseous biomass for electricity and heat, the Commission published a report on sustainability, including
a non-binding scheme recommended for Member States to use. The Commission is currently assessing if these criteria
are sufficient or if binding criteria would be needed.

For biomass for food and feed production purposes to be placed on the EU market, the requirements of the general
EU Food Law (Regulation 178/2002) and the specific legislation based thereon apply.

3. Cultivation of agricultural biomass for energy in the EU is mainly cereals for ethanol and rapeseed for biodiesel.
Use of EU cereals for ethanol is around 9.1 million tonnes. About 9.5 million tonnes of vegetable oils will be
converted into biodiesel. Part are imported or crushed from imported oilseeds. More than 2/3 of the EU rapeseed crop
(19.3 million tonnes in 2011) is for biodiesel. In addition, areas are cultivated with silage maize for biogas, sugar beet
for ethanol, sunflowers for biodiesel, short rotation forestry and perennial grasses.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 239

As there are no explicit statistics for biomass production for energy use, these figures are based on bioenergy
production. In the coming years the Commission should have more data on the production of biomass for biofuel
production. Further info at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy/tenders/index_en.htm

C 124 E / 240 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003304/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Nuova ricerca sulle caraffe filtranti

Vendute senza controllo e sulla base di vecchie disposizioni, le caraffe filtranti alimentano un mercato fiorente con
circa un milione di pezzi venduti.

A Torino una perizia commissionata dalla Procura della Republblica ha dimostrato che l'utilizzo delle caraffe filtranti
non migliora la qualità dell'acqua di rubinetto. Al contrario, la impoverisce di sali minerali quali calcio, magnesio e
potassio, necessari per l'organismo. C'è poi una nuova relazione tecnica, del ministro italiano della salute, che
evidenzia come questi apparecchi hanno l'unico scopo di alterare le proprietà organolettiche dell'acqua (sapore,
odore, colore) e la modificano indistintamente, senza tener conto della sua composizione specifica che può variare da
città a città.

Alla luce dei fatti sopraesposti e della risposta fornita l'11 luglio 2011 in merito ad un'interrogazione presentata nel
luglio dello stesso anno, si interroga la Commissione per sapere:

1. se si intende uniformare i metodi di analisi e arrivare a valutazioni armonizzate e, eventualmente, ad azioni
condivise;

2. qualora fossero accertati i risultati delle nuove analisi, quali provvedimenti si intendono adottare per tutelare la
salute dei consumatori.

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003529/12**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(2 aprile 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Sistemi di filtraggio ad uso domestico: posizione ufficiale del ministero della Salute italiano

In seguito alla precedente risposta all'interrogazione E-007670/2011, informiamo la Commissione che, circa i sistemi
filtranti, il ministero italiano della Salute ha preso posizione emanando il decreto n. 25, 7 febbraio 2012 (Gazzetta
ufficiale 22.3.2012).

Il ministero precisa che il regolamento emanato si applica solo ai sistemi per il trattamento dell'acqua destinata al
consumo umano e reputa che l'uso di tali filtri, a differenza di quanto pubblicizzato, non elimini le sostanze nocive
migliorando la qualità dell'acqua, ma si limiti ad avere un effetto sul sapore e il colore dell'acqua, modificandolo.

Inoltre, una scarsa manutenzione dell'apparecchiatura fa perdere all'acqua le caratteristiche stesse di potabilità.

— La Commissione è stata informata dalle autorità nazionali?

— La Commissione reputa necessario commissionare una valutazione scientifica indipendente che possa dare un
parere terzo oltre a quello dei produttori e delle indagini svolte dalle autorità italiane?

— La Commissione, in seguito alla posizione presa dal ministero italiano della Salute, reputa di muoversi a sua volta
nei confronti delle società produttrici delle apparecchiature in oggetto?

**Risposta congiunta data da John Dalli a nome della Commissione**

_(23 maggio 2012)_

Secondo le autorità italiane i dati disponibili confermano l'assenza di rischi per la salute nel breve e medio termine.
Esse però ritengono tali dati insufficienti per trarre conclusioni sugli eventuali rischi nel lungo termine presentati dalle
caraffe filtranti. Per tale motivo esse hanno avviato recentemente uno studio più ampio. Pertanto la Commissione non
vede la necessità di condurre uno studio indipendente.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 241

Considerato che non risultano esservi preoccupazioni immediate per la salute dei consumatori e che si dispone di dati
insufficienti per prendere decisioni ai fini della gestione del rischio, la Commissione non intende intervenire
ulteriormente. La Commissione seguirà però con attenzione le relazioni legate alla problematica al fine di riesaminare
la sua posizione se del caso.

C 124 E / 242 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003304/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sergio Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE)**

_(27 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ New research into water filter jugs

The market in water filter jugs, which are marketed without proper supervision and on the basis of outdated
provisions, is flourishing, with around a million units sold.

In Turin, an investigation ordered by the public prosecutor has shown that the use of filter jugs does not improve the
quality of tap water. On the contrary, it reduces the levels of mineral salts, such as calcium, magnesium and
potassium, which the body needs. A new technical report from the Italian Ministry of Health demonstrates how these
devices are designed solely to alter the organoleptic properties of water (taste, odour, colour) and that they do so
indiscriminately, without taking into account its specific composition, which can vary from place to place.

In view of the facts outlined above and the answer given on 11 July 2011 to a question asked in the same month,
could the Commission state:

1. Whether it intends to standardise testing methods and move towards harmonised product assessments and,
eventually, common measures to address the problem?

2. If the results of these new tests are confirmed, what measures does the Commission intend to take in order to
protect consumers’ health?

**Question for written answer E-003529/12**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(2 April 2012)_

_Subject:_ Filter systems for domestic use: official position of the Italian Ministry of Health

Further to the previous answer to Question E‐007670/2011 concerning filter systems, I should like to draw the
Commission’s attention to the fact that the Italian Ministry of Health has taken action by issuing Decree No 25,
7 February 2012 (Official Journal of 22 March 2012).

The ministry has pointed out that the rules brought into force by means of the decree apply only to systems for
treating water intended for human consumption and that, contrary to the advertised claims, the use of such filters
does not improve the quality of water by eliminating harmful substances, but instead merely alters its taste and
colour.

Moreover, if the appliances are not maintained properly any water treated becomes undrinkable.

Has the Commission been informed of the new rules by the competent national authorities?

Does the Commission agree that there is a need to commission an independent scientific study to provide a third
opinion balancing those held by the manufacturers and the outcome of the investigations conducted by the Italian
authorities?

In view of the standpoint adopted by the Italian Ministry of Health, does the Commission intend to take action vis-àvis the manufacturers of the appliances under discussion?

**Joint answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

In the view of the Italian authorities the available data confirm the absence of short‐ and medium-term health risks.
However, this data is considered by them insufficient to make conclusions on the possible long term health risks of
water filter jugs. Therefore they have recently launched a more comprehensive study. For this reason the Commission
does not see a need for an independent study.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 243

Given there appears no immediate concern to the health of consumers, and there is insufficient data for risk
management decisions, the Commission will take no further action. The Commission will however remain attentive
to any reports related to the matter, in order to review its position as appropriate.

C 124 E / 244 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-003305/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Arbeitszeitregelung für Angehörige der freiwilligen Feuerwehren

In der Mitteilung der Kommission (KOM(2010)0801) vom Dezember 2010, mit der die zweite Phase des Dialogs der
Sozialpartner zur Überarbeitung der Arbeitszeitrichtlinie eingeleitet wird, schreibt die Kommission, dass zu prüfen
ist, ob es rechtlich zulässig ist, die Angehörigen der freiwilligen Feuerwehren von der Arbeitszeitregelung
auszunehmen.

Sollte für das deutsche System der Zusammenarbeit von Berufsfeuerwehr und freiwilliger Feuerwehr eine Aufnahme
ehrenamtlich geleisteter Tätigkeit in die Arbeitszeitrichtlinie umgesetzt werden, hätte das weitreichende
Konsequenzen. Die Attraktivität der freiwilligen Feuerwehren nähme ab, weil dann für Freiwillige erhebliche
Nachteile für den Beruf zu erwarten sind.

1. Ist sich die Kommission der Tatsache bewusst, dass in Deutschland nur 102 Berufsfeuerwehren in großen
Städten existieren, die weit überwiegende Mehrzahl der Feuerwehren in der Fläche jedoch freiwillig und ehrenamtlich
organisiert ist. Ein Umbau dieses Systems ist in Deutschland gesellschaftlich nicht erwünscht und finanziell für die
Kommunen nicht tragbar.

2. Die sich logisch anschließende Frage betrifft die Bewertung anderer ehrenamtlicher Tätigkeiten (zum Beispiel
Trainer in Sportvereinen oder in Verbänden aktive Personen). Ehrenamt ist freiwillig geleistete Arbeit, die nicht unter
dem Begriff des Beschäftigungsverhältnisses eingeordnet werden kann. Ehrenamt stärkt den gesellschaftlichen
Zusammenhalt und darf nicht als Beschäftigungsverhältnis verstanden werden. Ist sich die Kommission der Folgen
einer Veränderung ehrenamtlicher Strukturen bewusst, und will die Kommission das in Kauf nehmen?

**Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission**

_(30. April 2012)_

Zur Beantwortung der ersten Frage verweist die Kommission die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antwort auf die
schriftliche Anfrage P-002225/2012 ( [1] ).

In Bezug auf die zweite Frage möchte die Kommission erneut betonen, dass die von der Frau Abgeordneten
angesprochene Art der ehrenamtlichen Betätigung höchst unterschiedliche Formen annehmen kann. Wie die
Kommission bereits ausgeführt hat ( [2] ), wäre es also sehr schwierig, eine allgemeingültige Regelung anzuwenden.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-2012-002225+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-2012-002225+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE)
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2010)801, Abschnitt 5.2 Ziffer v.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 245

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003305/12**

**to the Commission**
**Jutta Steinruck (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Working time arrangements for members of the voluntary fire service

In the communication from the Commission (COM(2010) 0801) of December 2010, marking the start of the second
phase of the dialogue between the social partners for the revision of the Working Time Directive, the Commission
writes that it is necessary to examine whether it is legally permissible to provide a derogation for members of the
voluntary fire service from working time arrangements.

There would be serious, far-reaching consequences for the German system of cooperation between the professional
and voluntary fire services if voluntary work were to be included in the Working Time Directive. The voluntary fire
service would become less attractive, because volunteers could expect serious disadvantages in relation to their paid
work.

1. Is the Commission aware of the fact that there are only 102 professional fire services in large cities in Germany,
while the vast majority of fire services in the rest of the country are staffed by volunteers? A reorganisation of this
system in Germany is undesirable for social reasons and financially unaffordable for the local authorities.

2. The logical next question relates to how other voluntary activities are to be evaluated (such as trainers in sports
clubs, or people who play an active role in other organisations). Voluntary work is carried out freely and willingly and
cannot be viewed in the same way as employment. Voluntary work strengthens social cohesion and should not be
understood as employment. Is the Commission aware of the implications of a change in voluntary structures and is
the Commission prepared to take this into account?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 April 2012)_

As regards the first point, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to Written Question P‐
002225/2012 ( [1] ) .

As regards the second point, the Commission would again underline that voluntary activities of the type mentioned
by the Honourable Member vary very widely in their nature. Thus, as the Commission already pointed out ( [2] ), it
would be difficult to apply generalised rules.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-2012-002225+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2010) 801, Section 5.2.(v). .

C 124 E / 246 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003306/12**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Grenstoezicht

Artikel 21 van Verordening (EG) nr. 562/2006 tot vaststelling van een communautaire code betreffende de
overschrijding van de grenzen door personen bepaalt dat afschaffing van het grenstoezicht aan de binnengrenzen
geen afbreuk doet aan de uitoefening van de politiebevoegdheid door de bevoegde instanties van de lidstaten
overeenkomstig de nationale wetgeving, voor zover de uitoefening van die bevoegdheid niet hetzelfde effect heeft als
grenscontroles en dat dit ook geldt in de grensgebieden. Voorts doet de afschaffing evenmin afbreuk aan de
mogelijkheid voor de lidstaten om personen wettelijk te verplichten in het bezit te zijn van bepaalde titels of
documenten en deze bij zich te dragen.

Volgens arrest van het Hof van Justitie in de gezamenlijke zaken C-188/10 en C-189/10 (Aziz Melki en Selim Abdeli)
verzet dit artikel zich tegen een nationale wettelijke regeling waarbij aan de politieautoriteiten van de betrokken
lidstaat de bevoegdheid wordt verleend om de identiteit van eenieder te controleren, ongeacht het gedrag van de
betrokkene en los van specifieke omstandigheden waarvan een risico op aantasting van de openbare orde uitgaat,
teneinde de naleving van de verplichtingen ter zake van het houden, het dragen en het tonen van titels en
documenten te verifiëren.

Volgens de informatie waarover ik beschik, hebben verschillende lidstaten verschillende nationale wetten die het
toezicht aan de binnengrenzen en de bevoegdheden van de politieautoriteiten op dat vlak regelen, wat tot
misverstanden en onzekerheid leidt in de nationale beleidsvorming.

1. Kan de Commissie informatie verstrekken over de bevoegdheid van politieautoriteiten in grensoverschrijdende
controles van elke lidstaat?

2. Kan de Commissie aangeven tot waar de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten reikt ten aanzien van de
overschrijding van binnengrenzen?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie**

_(7 mei 2012)_

De Commissie beschikt niet over een overzicht van de wetgeving van de lidstaten inzake de bevoegdheid van hun
politieautoriteiten om controles uit te voeren aan de binnengrenzen. De Commissie kan bijgevolg niet aangeven tot
waar de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten reikt ten aanzien van de overschrijding van binnengrenzen.

De Commissie zal per geval en in het licht van het arrest in zaak-Melki beoordelen of bepaalde politiemaatregelen aan
de binnengrenzen grenscontroles inhouden of hetzelfde effect hebben.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 247

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003306/12**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Border controls

Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, on establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders, provides that the abolition of border control at internal borders does not affect
the exercise of police powers by the competent authorities of the Member States under national law, in so far as the
exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks, and that this also applies in border areas.
Furthermore, this abolition does not affect the possibility for a Member State to provide by law for an obligation to
hold or carry papers and documents.

According to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 ( _Aziz Melki_ and _Selim_
_Abdeli_ ), the abovementioned article precludes national legislation which grants to the police authorities of the
Member States in question the power to check the identity of any person, irrespective of his behaviour and of specific
circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order, in order to ascertain whether the obligations laid down
by law to hold, carry and produce papers and document are fulfilled.

According to my information, several Member States have different national laws which regulate the controls on
internal borders and the competence of police authorities in this area, which leads to misunderstandings and
uncertainties in national law-making.

1. Can the Commission provide information about the competence of police authorities in cross-border checks of
each Member State?

2. Can the Commission state the limits of each Member State’s national legislation regarding the crossing of
internal borders?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(7 May 2012)_

The Commission does not possess a compilation of each Member State's legislation regarding the competence of their
police authorities to carry out checks in internal border areas. Hence, the Commission is not in a position to state the
limits of each Member State’s national legislation regarding the crossing of internal borders.

The Commission will continue to analyse, on a case by case basis and also in the light of the judgment in ‘Melki’ case,
whether police measures in Member States' internal border areas constitute border checks or have an effect equivalent
to border checks.

C 124 E / 248 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003307/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(28 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Fondo Europeo de Pesca (FEP) y Fondo Marítimo y de Pesca (FEMP)

Conforme a las informaciones públicas que facilita la Comisión Europea en su página web, el montante del Fondo
Europeo de Pesca (FEP) para el período 2007-2013 asciende, a precios corrientes, a un total de 4 300 millones de
euros (3 800 millones de euros presupuestados).

Según esas mismas fuentes, más de 1 000 millones de este fondo habrían sido asignados a España, para todo el
período 2007-2013, para los cinco ejes de financiación previstos: adaptación de la flota, acuicultura y
comercialización, medidas de interés público, desarrollo sostenible de las zonas pesqueras y asistencia técnica.

Por otra parte, a la vista de la nueva propuesta de la Comisión Europea sobre el Fondo Europeo y Marítimo de Pesca
(FEMP) para el período 2014-2020, presentada el pasado mes de diciembre, la cantidad presupuestada para el nuevo
fondo se estima cercana a los 6 600 millones de euros.

El pasado día 19 de marzo, durante el Consejo de Ministros de Pesca de la Unión Europea, trascendía a la opinión
pública que, conforme a la propuesta de la Comisión Europea, un tercio de los fondos pesqueros que recibe España
corría el riesgo de desaparecer.

¿Podría la Comisión detallar las cantidades del FEP comprometidas, pendientes de pago y pagadas para el período
2007-2013, desglosadas para cada año del período y para cada Estado miembro de la Unión? ¿Podría, asimismo, la
Comisión desglosar sus previsiones para el FEMP para el período 2014-2020, detalladas para cada año del período y
para cada Estado miembro de la Unión?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de mayo de 2012)_

La última versión de la asignación indicativa anual por Estado miembro correspondiente al periodo comprendido
entre el 1 de enero de 2007 y el 31 de diciembre de 2013 de los créditos de compromiso comunitarios del Fondo
Europeo de Pesca se recoge en la Decisión de la Comisión de 13 de agosto de 2008 ( [1] ). Los últimos datos disponibles
sobre los compromisos y pagos efectuados por la Comisión a los Estados miembros respecto a cada año se enviarán
directamente a Su Señoría y a la Secretaría General del Parlamento Europeo.

La Comisión, en su Comunicación sobre el Marco Financiero Plurianual, propone un presupuesto de
5 520 millones EUR para el Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca (FEMP) en el periodo 2014-2020. La asignación final
para el FEMP se fijará una vez se haya alcanzado un acuerdo sobre el Marco Financiero Plurianual. El método para
determinar la asignación indicativa por Estado miembro se establece en el artículo 17 de la propuesta de Reglamento
relativo al FEMP ( [2] ), y tiene en cuenta el nivel de empleo y de producción en los sectores de la pesca y de la acuicultura,
y la parte que representa la flota de pesca costera artesanal, además del historial de asignaciones en el marco del
Reglamento (CE) n° 1198/2006 del Consejo. La Comisión no podrá confirmar la dimensión del presupuesto del FEMP
y su asignación indicativa por Estado miembro hasta que se haya alcanzado un acuerdo general sobre el Marco
Financiero Plurianual.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) C(2008) 4358 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 804 final.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 249

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003307/12**

**to the Commission**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)

According to public information on the Commission’s website, at current prices the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) for
2007-2013 amounts to a total of EUR 4.3 billion (as opposed to a budgeted amount of EUR 3.8 billion).

According to the same source, more than EUR 1 billion of this fund has been earmarked to Spain over this period for
the five planned areas of funding: adaptation of the fleet, aquaculture and marketing, public interest measures,
sustainable development of fishing areas and technical assistance.

Moreover, the Commission’s new proposal for the EFF’s successor, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)
for the period 2014-2020, presented in December 2012, entailed an estimated budget of almost EUR 6.6 billion.

On 19 March 2012, during the European Council of Ministers for Fisheries, it was revealed that under the
Commission’s proposal, Spain could lose a third of the fisheries funds that it currently receives.

Can the Commission provide a breakdown of funding allocated under the EFF for 2007-2013, both pending payment
and already disbursed, for each year and for each Member State?

Can it also provide a breakdown of planned payments under the EMFF for 2014-2020 for each year and for each
Member State?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The latest version of annual indicative allocation by Member State for the period from 01 January 2007 to
31 December 2013 of the Community commitment appropriations from the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) are fixed
in the Commission decision of 13 August 2008 ( [1] ). The latest available data on the commitments and payments made
by the Commission to the Member States by each year will be sent directly to the Honourable Member and to the
Parliament's Secretariat.

The Commission, in its communication on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework, has proposed a budget of EUR 5
520 million for the European Maritime and Fisheries fund (EMFF) 2014-2020. The final financial allocation for the
EMFF will be fixed once an agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework is reached. The method for fixing the
indicative allocation by Member States is set out in Article 17 of the EMFF proposed regulation ( [2] ) and takes into
account the level of employment and production in fisheries and aquaculture, the share of small scale coastal fishing
fleet as well as the historical allocation under Council Regulation (EC)1198/2006. The Commission will only be able
to confirm the size of the EMFF budget and its indicative allocation by Member States once an overall agreement has
been reached on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) C(2008) 4358 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)804 final.

C 124 E / 250 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003308/12**

**a la Comisión**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(28 de marzo de 2012)_

_Asunto:_ Inspecciones de la OLAF a proyectos europeos de la Diputación de Ourense

En las últimas semanas, la prensa gallega se ha hecho eco de las inspecciones realizadas por técnicos de la Oficina
Europea de Lucha Contra el Fraude (OLAF) a distintos proyectos desarrollados por la Diputación de Ourense con
recursos provenientes de los Fondos de cohesión de la Unión Europea. Entre los proyectos investigados se citan el
Plan Daredo y el Plan Deputrans, destinados a la adquisición de depuradoras de aguas residuales domésticas para
diferentes ayuntamientos de esta Diputación.

Por otra parte, existe una polémica sobre la ejecución del Plan Estaciones, desarrollado al amparo de fondos
provenientes del Programa Interreg IIIA y destinado a la rehabilitación y puesta en marcha de un conjunto de seis
estaciones funiculares en Ourense y un funicular en Viana do Castelo, en Portugal —con un coste de más de
6 millones de euros—, toda vez que sufre de retrasos en su puesta en marcha, tanto en la apertura de los apeaderos
rehabilitados en museos como en los centros de recepción de turistas.

¿Podría la Comisión facilitar información sobre los proyectos visitados en la Diputación de Ourense y que han sido
objeto de inspección en los últimos meses? ¿Considera la Comisión que el Plan Estaciones está siendo ejecutado de
manera correcta? ¿Podría informar sobre la existencia de algún expediente de investigación en relación con alguno de
los proyectos visitados por la OLAF? ¿Cuándo se prevé la conclusión de aquellos expedientes que puedan estar
actualmente en curso? ¿Se ha producido algún tipo de denuncia o bien se trata de inspecciones rutinarias?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de mayo de 2012)_

La Comisión ha sido informada por la Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude (OLAF) de que se está llevando a
cabo una investigación sobre los proyectos del Plan Daredo y del Plan Deputrans, en la provincia de Ourense, España.
Dado que el caso está en curso, la OLAF no puede aportar información adicional sobre la cuestión.

Los proyectos enumerados han sido cofinanciados por Interreg III.A. España-Portugal 2000-2005. Se trataba de:

|Nombre del proyecto|Coste total|FEDER|
|---|---|---|
|DAREDO|13 577 713,66|10 183 285,27|
|DEPUTRANS|8 126 031,22|6 094 523,41|
|ESTACIONES|7 052 040,91|5 289 030,70|

Estos tres proyectos figuran en la lista de proyectos finalizados en el informe final sobre la ejecución del programa
presentado por la Autoridad de Gestión el 30 de septiembre de 2010. De acuerdo con el Ministerio de Economía y
Hacienda español, que es la Autoridad de Gestión de este programa, estos proyectos se han estado ejecutando desde el
30 de junio de 2010. Puede obtenerse más información técnica en la siguiente dirección:

A. Dirección:

Programa de Cooperación Transfronteriza España-Portugal 2000-2006
Autoridad de Gestión: Dirección General de Fondos Comunitarios del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda
Paseo de la Castellana, 162 — Planta 20, 28071 Madrid, España

B. Sitio web:

www.dgfc.sgpg.meh.es/sitios/dgfc/es-ES/ipr/fcpp0006/fe/f/i3/Paginas/EspanaPortugal.aspx

C. Correo electrónico:

fondoscomunitarios@sepg.minhap.es; ahuetos@sepg.minhap.es

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 251

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003308/12**

**to the Commission**
**Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) inspections of European projects being carried out by the Orense
Provincial Government

In recent weeks, the Galician press has reported that OLAF experts have been inspecting Orense Provincial
Government projects financed under the EU Cohesion Fund. Among the projects under investigation mentioned in
this connection are the Daredo Plan and the Deputrans Plan, in which domestic sewage treatment plants are to be
installed in several municipalities in Orense province.

Furthermore, the implementation of the Stations Plan — supported by Interreg IIIA programme funds — the object
of which is to renovate and operate a group of six funicular stations in Orense and a funicular station in Viana do
Castelo in Portugal, at a cost of over EUR 6 000 000, has given rise to a dispute on account of the delays affecting
both the opening of the restored stations as museums and the tourist reception centres.

Could the Commission provide information regarding the projects in Orense province which have been inspected in
recent months? Does it believe that the Stations Plan is being executed properly? Could it say whether there are any
inspection records relating to projects visited by OLAF? If any records are currently being compiled, when are they
expected to be completed? Have there been any complaints, or are the inspections concerned a matter of routine?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 May 2012)_

The Commission has been informed by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) that it has an ongoing investigation
into the projects of the Daredo Plan and the Deputrans Plan, in the province of Ourense, Spain. Given that the case is
ongoing OLAF can give no further information in the matter at this stage.

The listed projects were co-financed by the Interreg III.A. Spain-Portugal 2000-2005, namely:

|Project name|Total cost|Feder|
|---|---|---|
|DAREDO|13.577.713,66|10.183.285,27|
|DEPUTRANS|8.126.031,22|6.094.523,41|
|ESTACIONES|7.052.040,91|5.289.030,70|

These three projects are on the list of completed projects in the final report on programme implementation submitted
by the Managing Authority on 30 September 2010. According to the Spanish Ministry of Finance, which is the
Managing Authority for this programme, these projects have all been operational since 30 June 2010. Technical
information may be obtained from:

A. Address:

Programa de Cooperación Transfronteriza España-Portugal 2000-2006

Autoridad de Gestión: Dirección General de Fondos Comunitarios del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda

Paseo de la Castellana, 162 — Planta 20, 28071 Madrid, España

B. Website:

www.dgfc.sgpg.meh.es/sitios/dgfc/es-ES/ipr/fcpp0006/fe/f/i3/Paginas/EspanaPortugal.aspx

C. E-mail:

fondoscomunitarios@sepg.minhap.es; ahuetos@sepg.minhap.es

C 124 E / 252 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003310/12**

**do Komisji**
**Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Przekazanie ACTA do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej

Dnia 22 lutego 2012 r. komisarz Karel De Gucht stwierdził, że Umowa handlowa dotycząca zwalczania obrotu
towarami podrobionymi (ACTA) zostanie przekazana do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w celu
ustalenia, czy nie narusza w żaden sposób podstawowych praw i wolności UE, takich jak wolność wypowiedzi,
swoboda dostępu do informacji i ochrony danych oraz prawo własności w przypadku własności intelektualnej.

Kiedy dokładnie ACTA zostanie przekazana do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej i jak dokładnie będzie
sformułowane pytanie do trybunału dotyczące zgodności przedmiotowej umowy z prawem UE?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(14 maja 2012 r.)_

W dniu 4 kwietnia 2012 r. Komisja postanowiła zadać Trybunałowi następujące pytanie:

„Czy Umowa handlowa dotycząca zwalczania obrotu towarami podrobionymi (ACTA) jest zgodna z Traktatami,
w szczególności z Kartą praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej?”

Służba Prawna Komisji przygotowuje obecnie pisemny wniosek, który będzie zawierał to pytanie oraz analizę
prawną Komisji w tym przedmiocie. Wniosek ten zostanie przekazany do Trybunału w ciągu najbliższych tygodni.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 253

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003310/12**

**to the Commission**
**Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ ACTA referral to the European Court of Justice

On 22 February 2012 Commissioner Karel De Gucht stated that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
would be referred to the European Court of Justice to determine whether it is incompatible, in any way, with the EU’s
fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression, information or data protection and the right to
property in the case of intellectual property.

When exactly will ACTA be sent to the European Court of Justice and what will be the precise wording of the question
to the Court regarding its compliance with EC law?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 May 2012)_

The Commission decided on 4 April 2012 to submit the following question to the Court:

‘Is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) compatible with the Treaties, in particular with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union?’

The Commission Legal Service is currently preparing the written request that will contain this question and the legal
analysis of the Commission concerning the question. This request will be submitted to the Court within the coming
weeks.

C 124 E / 254 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003311/12**

**do Komisji**
**Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Pomoc zagraniczna UE

Komisja i państwa członkowskie są łącznie największym światowym donatorem pomocy zagranicznej, którego
zobowiązania przekraczają 50 miliardów euro rocznie.

Zaangażowanie UE jest z pewnością ważne, ale w naszym interesie leży również dopilnowanie tego, by pieniądze
podatników UE były właściwie i rozsądnie wykorzystywane do pomocy ludziom w przyjmujących państwach
i regionach w taki sposób, który jest zgodny z interesami i podstawowymi wartościami UE.

Niestety w wielu krajach i regionach – w tym w Afganistanie i w Palestynie – fundusze UE nie były wykorzystywane
skutecznie, a wyniki rozwojowe są niskie w porównaniu z hojnym wkładem UE.

Nie podważając znaczenia pomocy UE dla rozwijających się regionów, jestem przekonana, że w czasach kryzysu
finansowego powinniśmy przejąć większą odpowiedzialność w stosunku do naszych obywateli, ponieważ to ich
pieniądze są wykorzystywane do celów pomocy zagranicznej. W związku z tym:

—
Czy Komisja dokonała szczegółowej oceny skutków dotyczącej rezultatów przedsięwzięć finansowanych
przez UE (z uwzględnieniem budownictwa i infrastruktury) w państwach/regionach przyjmujących pomoc?

—
Czy Komisja dokonała oceny wpływu przedsięwzięć finansowanych przez UE na stabilność i zrównoważony
rozwój państwa/regionu przyjmującego pomoc i czy może dostarczyć wartości i dane dotyczące wyników
oceny?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Andrisa Piebalgsa w imieniu Komisji**

_(21 maja 2012 r.)_

Programy pomocy rozwojowej UE podlegają systematycznej ocenie zgodnie z następującymi kryteriami
uzgodnionymi na szczeblu międzynarodowym: znaczenie programu, skuteczność i efektywność programu,
dotychczasowe oddziaływanie programu i jego zrównoważony charakter. Oceny przeprowadzane są przez
niezależnych konsultantów, a sprawozdania z ocen są publikowane na stronie internetowej Komisji:
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/index_en.htm.](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/index_en.htm)

Streszczenie głównych ustaleń i wniosków z przeprowadzonych w 2010 r. ocen programów opublikowane zostało
w rozdziale 4 („Managing aid for results”) sprawozdania rocznego za 2011 r., które można znaleźć na stronie
internetowej:
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2011_en.htm.](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2011_en.htm)

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 255

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003311/12**

**to the Commission**
**Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ EU foreign aid

The Commission and the Member States combined constitute the world’s largest single donor of foreign aid, with
commitments exceeding EUR 50 billion per year.

While the EU’s contribution is certainly important, so is our interest in ensuring that EU taxpayers’ money is used
properly and constructively to assist people in the recipient countries or regions, in a way that also upholds the EU’s
interests and core values.

Unfortunately, in many regions and countries — including Afghanistan and Palestine — EU funds have not been used
effectively and development results are poor in comparison to the generous EU contribution.

Without undermining the importance or significance of EU aid to developing regions, in this time of financial crisis I
believe we should be more responsible with regard to our citizens, as it is their money that is being used for foreign
aid. With this in mind:

—
Has the Commission carried out detailed impact assessments on the outcomes of EU‐funded projects (including
building and infrastructure) in recipient countries/regions?

—
Has the Commission assessed the impact of EU‐funded projects on the stability and sustainable development of
the recipient country/region, and can it provide figures and data on the results of the assessment?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(21 May 2012)_

EU development aid programmes are systematically evaluated in accordance with internationally agreed criteria,
which are the relevance of the programme, its effectiveness, its efficiency, the impacts it has had, and its sustainability.
The evaluations are carried out by independent consultants and the reports are published on the Commission's
website at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/index_en.htm

A summary of the main findings and conclusions of evaluations completed in 2010 is published in Chapter 4
(‘Managing aid for results’) of the 2011 Annual Report, which can be found at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/publications/annual-reports/2011_en.htm

C 124 E / 256 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003312/12**

**to the Commission**

**Struan Stevenson (ECR)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Virunga National Park

Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — Africa’s oldest national park, a World Heritage
Area under the Unesco Convention and home to the last mountain gorillas — is under imminent threat. Ignoring the
Unesco World Heritage Convention and the country’s own state law, the DRC has issued UK-based oil company
SOCO International two permits to start oil exploration in Virunga National Park.

These latest development go against a commitment made by the government of the DRC to hold off any further
activities until the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) is fully completed and discussed between the
various stakeholders. The SEIA, commissioned and partly funded by the European Union, is due in late 2012.

Furthermore, under the 10th European Development Fund, the European Commission currently provides
EUR 10 million to support the DRC government through the ICCN (Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la
Nature) in conserving and managing the 7 800 km [2] park.

Is the Commission aware that current and past investments by the international community will largely go to waste
should oil exploration commence in the park, as 85 %of Virunga National Park has been included in the oil
concessions?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 August 2012)_

In line with its policies for environment and biodiversity preservation, the EU and key donors working in the field of
conservation in the DRC have intervened repeatedly since late 2010 to seek to prevent oil exploration in the Virunga
National Park which would be contrary to Congolese legislation and international agreements signed by the DRC in
relation to the preservation of Unesco World Heritage sites.

In early 2011 the EU agreed to fund a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of exploration and exploitation of
oil across the Albertine Rift including the Virunga National Park. This assessment is underway and the EU, jointly with
other donors, is following the process with a special attention given to Virunga. The assessment will take into
consideration the exceptional biological value and the special legal status of the Virunga National Park. A properly
conducted environmental assessment will be the best tool to inform Government decision-making and therefore the
best guarantee for the safeguarding of the Virunga Park.

Heads of Mission have discussed the problem of oil exploration and potential extraction in the Virunga Park with the
Congolese authorities who have confirmed publicly that if the strict conditions associated with the exploration permit
were not respected by the oil company, the exploration license would be withdrawn. The issue has been raised on
several occasions by the EU Head of Delegation with the new government in place since April 2012.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 257

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003313/12**

**to the Commission**
**John Attard-Montalto (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Treatment of EU GPs in Malta

I have a query which was presented to me by an EU general practitioner. In order to practise as a GP in Malta one must
pass two exams. The first can be taken in English in the UK. The second exam must be taken in Malta. The two
countries — the UK and Malta — have identical entry requirements and exam structures. The problem, however, is
that the college for GPs in Malta will only allow candidates to sit the exam in Maltese.

Malta has two official languages: English and Maltese. Maltese citizens have the option of taking university
examinations in either language.

Does the Commission consider the above case discriminatory?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The recognition of professional qualifications allows the beneficiary to gain access to the profession in the host
Member State and to pursue it under the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State.

Under Article 53 of of Directive 2005/36/EC ( [1] ) (Directive), persons benefiting from the recognition of their
qualifications shall have a knowledge necessary for practising the profession in the host Member State. This provision
should be implemented into national law, by respecting the principle of proportionality as the level of required
language knowledge cannot be set equally for all professions, nor for all professional activities within a single
profession. It does not allow competent authorities to check language knowledge when also checking the
professional qualifications. Accordingly, any necessary language knowledge could be checked by the employer after
the host Member State has recognised the qualification, but before the professional takes up a position.

On 19 December 2011 the Commission presented a legislative proposal for modernising the directive ( [2] ). This
proposal further clarifies the existing rules, notably that the language checking must be limited to one of the official
languages of the Member State concerned.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2005/36/EC of Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255,

30.9.2005.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/docs/policy_developments/modernising/COM 2011_883_en.pdf

( **|**

C 124 E / 258 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003314/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Revisione del codice penale del Marocco

Il 23 marzo, l'organizzazione _Human Rights Watch_ ha denunciato la necessità che il Marocco riveda e abroghi alcune
delle sue leggi in matereia di violenza domestica e stupro. Ciò alla luce del caso di Amina Filali, che il 10 marzo si è
suicidata ingerendo del veleno per topi. Filali era stata costretta a sposarsi con l’uomo che l'aveva stuprata. I genitori di
Filali avevano presentato una denuncia nel 2011 davanti al Procuratore di Tangeri nella quale dichiaravano che un
uomo che viveva nel vicino villaggio di Khemis Sahel aveva stuprato la loro figlia. A settembre, il padre della ragazza
ha presentato una petizione al giudice per permettere a Filiali di sposare l'uomo che l'aveva stuprata. La ragazza
confermava il suo desiderio di sposarlo, e su questa base il procuratore abbandonava le indagini sullo stupro. Secondo
le tendenze culturali tradizionali in Marocco, una ragazza o una donna non sposata che ha perso la verginità, anche se
per uno stupro, non è più nubile e ha disonorato la famiglia. Talune famiglie credono che sposare lo stupratore o il
partner sessuale risolva il problema. Il Marocco non ha leggi specifiche sulla violenza domestica. In molti casi, le
vittime di stupro devono affrontare ostacoli per sporgere denuncia in quanto la donna che presenta denuncia, rischia
di essere a sua volta perseguita penalmente se lo stupratore viene assolto, infatti il codice penale considera reato
persino il sesso consensuale fuori dal matrimonio.

Ad oggi, il governo del Partito islamico per la Giustizia e lo Sviluppo, che ha conseguito il successo elettorale nel
novembre 2011, non ha annunciato alcuna normativa generale sulla violenza contro le donne. Alcuni ministri del
governo del Marocco hanno chiesto una revisione e una possibile riforma dell'articolo 475 del codice penale, che
sancisce una pena detentiva da uno a cinque anni per una persona che «rapisce o inganna un minore di 18 anni, senza
violenza, minaccia o frode, o tenta di farlo». Tuttavia, il secondo comma dell'articolo specifica che quando la minore
sposa l'uomo, «egli non può più essere perseguito se non dalle persone abilitate a chiedere l'annullamento del
matrimonio e solo dopo la proclamazione dell'annullamento». La costituzione del Marocco del 2011, tuttavia,
obbliga il governo a riformare le leggi esistenti per armonizzarle con gli articoli che affermano i diritti delle donne.

1. Alla luce del caso di Amina Filali, la Commissione ha discusso la questione delle riforme del codice penale del
Marocco, in particolare l'articolo 475, con le autorità competenti?

2. La Commissione ha effettuato passi in passato relativamente alle discrepanze nel diritto del Marocco sulla
questione della violenza domestica e dello stupro? In caso affermativo, quali ne sono stati gli esiti?

3. La Commissione è disposta a dar sostegno ai programmi educativi che informano le donne marocchine sui loro
diritti legali? Siffatti programmi esistono già e stanno producendo risultati concreti?

**Risposta data da Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione**

_(23 maggio 2012)_

I diritti dell'uomo sono al centro del dialogo dell'UE con il Marocco e regolarmente anche delle riunioni degli
organismi misti istituiti nel quadro dell'accordo di associazione UE-Marocco. L'UE segue con attenzione il rispetto
degli impegni assunti dal paese in questo settore.

La Commissione ritiene che il Marocco stia compiendo passi avanti verso una maggiore conformità ai principi dei
diritti umani. In particolare, la nuova Costituzione prevede importanti misure in materia di diritti umani e libertà
fondamentali. Sono però necessari ulteriori miglioramenti nel settore della parità tra donne e uomini e della lotta
contro la discriminazione di genere. La Commissione si aspetta che il Marocco attui pienamente il principio di parità
contenuto nella nuova Costituzione.

In merito alle questioni sollevate:

1. Il problema della riforma del codice penale è stato affrontato nell’ambito del sottocomitato per i diritti umani,
la democrazia e il buon governo e più recentemente in occasione della riunione del Consiglio di associazione
del 23 aprile 2012. Non è stato fatto alcun riferimento specifico alla modifica dell'articolo 475 del codice
penale, ma l'UE seguirà attentamente la questione nel contesto delle azioni di cui al punto 2.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 259

2. L’impegno per combattere la violenza contro le donne è esplicitamente contemplato nel nuovo piano d’azione
UE-Marocco attualmente in fase di negoziato. Le priorità del piano sono la riforma del codice penale e
l'adozione di una legge sulla violenza coniugale.

Infine, per il 2012-2015 la Commissione ha varato un programma di riforma settoriale per un valore di 45 milioni di
euro a sostegno del piano d'azione del governo per la parità tra i sessi inteso a favorire gli sforzi per combattere la
violenza contro le donne, rafforzare la parità tra i sessi nella definizione delle politiche e assicurare il rafforzamento
delle capacità, istruzione e formazione per gli operatori del settore giuridico e per le donne in generale.

C 124 E / 260 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003314/12**

**to the Commission**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Revision of Morocco's penal code

On 23 March, the _Human Rights Watch_ organisation reported on the need for Morocco to revise and repeal some of its
laws related to domestic abuse and rape. This is in light of the case of Amina Filali, who committed suicide on
10 March by ingesting rat poison. Filali was forced into marriage with a man who had raped her. Filali’s parents had
filed a complaint in 2011 before the Tangiers Prosecutor which stated that a man living in the nearby village of
Khemis Sahel had raped their daughter. The girl’s father petitioned the judge in September to allow Filali to marry the
man who had raped her. She confirmed her wish to marry him, whereupon the prosecutor dropped the rape
investigation. Due to traditional cultural attitudes in Morocco, an unmarried girl or woman who has lost her virginity
— even through rape — is no longer marriageable and has dishonoured her family. Some families believe that
marrying the rapist or sexual partner addresses these problems. Morocco has no specific law on domestic violence. In
many cases, rape victims face obstacles when pressing charges, as a complainant risks prosecution herself if her
accused rapist is acquitted, since the penal code criminalises even consensual sex outside marriage.

To date, the government under the Islamist Justice and Development Party, which achieved election success in
November 2011, has made no announcements calling for more comprehensive legislation on violence against
women. A handful of Moroccan government ministers have called for a review and possible reform of Article 475 of
the penal code, which stipulates a prison term of one to five years for a person who ‘abducts or deceives a minor,
under 18 years of age, without violence, threat or fraud, or attempts to do so’. However, the second clause of the
article specifies that when the minor marries the man, ‘he can no longer be prosecuted except by persons empowered
to demand the annulment of the marriage and then only after the annulment has been proclaimed’. Morocco’s 2011
constitution, however, obliges the government to reform existing laws to harmonise them with articles affirming the
rights of women.

1. In light of the case of Ms Amina Filali, has the Commission discussed the issue of reforms to Morocco’s penal
code, in particular addressing Article 475, with the relevant authorities?

2. Has the Commission taken steps in the past to address discrepancies in the Moroccan legal system pertaining to
the issue of domestic violence and rape? If so, what were the outcomes?

3. Is the Commission prepared to support educational programmes to inform Moroccan women about their legal
rights? Do such programmes already exist, and are they producing concrete results?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

Human rights are at the heart of the EU's dialogue with Morocco and are regularly addressed in the meetings of the
joint bodies established under the EU Morocco Association Agreement. The EU is ensuring close follow up of the
commitments taken by Morocco in this domain.

The Commission considers that Morocco is making progress towards greater compliance with human rights
principles. In particular, the new Constitution includes significant measures with regard to human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Further improvements are needed however, in the area of gender equality and the fight
against gender discrimination. The Commission expects Morocco to implement fully the principle of parity enshrined
in the new Constitution.

With regard to the questions raised:

1. The issue of the penal code's reform has been addressed within the subcommittee for Human Rights,
Democracy and Governance, and most recently, during the meeting of Association Council held on
23 April 2012. No specific reference was made to the amendment of Article 475 of the penal code, but the EU
will closely follow this in the context of the actions mentioned under point 2 below.

2. The issue of efforts to combat violence against women is explicitly covered in the new EU‐Morocco Action Plan
which is currently being negotiated. In particular it includes among its priorities the reform of the criminal code
and the adoption of a law on marital abuse.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 261

Finally, the Commission is launching a sector reform programme worth EUR45 million for 2012-2015 supporting
the Government's Gender Equality Action Plan to support efforts to combat violence against women; strengthen
gender equality in policy-making; provide capacity building, education and training for legal professionals and
women in general.

C 124 E / 262 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003315/12**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Suore cattoliche prese di mira nella provincia egiziana di Assuan

Il 16 marzo 2012, l'agenzia di stampa Compass Direct News ha segnalato che agli inizi di marzo due suore del
villaggio di Abu al-Reesh nella provincia di Assuan, Egitto, sono state ricoverate in ospedale dopo che una folla di
musulmani del luogo le aveva tenute in ostaggio per otto ore all'interno di una foresteria. I musulmani conservatori
hanno accusato le suore di aver costruito nel villaggio una chiesa nel sito della scuola pubblica a conduzione privata.
Le due suore, entrambe insegnanti volontarie, si sono dovute barricare nella foresteria della scuola. Una folla ha
saccheggiato la scuola, rubando videocamere di sicurezza, attrezzature elettriche e una parabola satellitare dal tetto. Si
riferisce che i manifestanti erano muniti di coltelli e che alcuni abitanti del villaggio si sono serviti degli altoparlanti
delle moschee del luogo per richiamare altri abitanti alla foresteria. Le due suore sono state, infine, tratte in salvo dalle
autorità, ma entrambe hanno riportato tagli e contusioni e sono state anche oggetto di insulti verbali. Un'altra suora è
stata nascosta dai dipendenti della scuola in un edificio separato del campus. Due delle suore erano egiziane, mentre la
terza è in possesso di doppia cittadinanza, francese ed egiziana.

Da allora la frequenza della scuola è diminuita, conseguentemente, di più di un terzo. La Notre Dame Language
School, dove le suore lavorano, accoglie studenti musulmani e cristiani copti. Secondo l'agenzia di stampa, nessuno
dei musulmani coinvolti nell'attacco alla chiesa è stato incriminato.

1. L’Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è a conoscenza degli eventi sopra descritti?

2. Quali passi concreti ha effettuato la VP/HR per affrontare il crescente problema del sentimento anticristiano in
Egitto?

3. Quali passi stanno effettuando i funzionari dell'UE in Egitto per monitorare il problema della violenza settaria, e
quali sono le loro principali preoccupazioni?

4. La VP/HR è pronta a lavorare con altri organi regionali quali la Lega araba per effettuare passi urgenti a sostegno
di qualsivoglia iniziativa per eliminare la violenza settaria, e tra comunità, in Egitto?

**Risposta data dall’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(4 giugno 2012)_

L’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Ashton è a conoscenza dei ripetuti casi di violenza settaria in Egitto, che ha
fermamente condannato nelle sue dichiarazioni, e ha sollecitato a più riprese le autorità egiziane affinché fosse
garantita la libertà di religione o di credo nel paese. Nel corso delle rispettive visite in Egitto nel marzo e nel luglio
2011, l’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Ashton e il presidente Barroso hanno espresso direttamente al
maresciallo Tantawi le preoccupazioni dell’UE al riguardo. Nelle conclusioni del Consiglio «Affari esteri» del
27 febbraio 2012 viene sottolineata l’importanza del ruolo delle autorità provvisorie egiziane nel garantire la tutela
delle libertà fondamentali e nel far luce sulle violazioni commesse, anche nei confronti delle comunità religiose. La
delegazione UE sorveglia attentamente i casi di violenza settaria e ribadisce l’importanza di evitare discriminazioni per
motivi religiosi nei suoi contatti con le autorità egiziane. Per contribuire al miglioramento della libertà di religione o
di credo in Egitto, il Servizio europeo per l'azione esterna è pronto a collaborare con tutte le parti interessate del paese,
nonché con le organizzazioni regionali e internazionali che condividono i valori e gli obiettivi dell’Unione europea in
materia.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 263

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003315/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Catholic nuns targeted in Egypt's Aswan Province

On March 16 2012, the news organisation Compass Direct News reported that in early March, two nuns in the village
of Abu al-Reesh in Aswan Province, Egypt, were hospitalised after a mob of Muslim villagers trapped them inside a
guesthouse for eight hours. Conservative Muslims accused the nuns of building a church at the site, which is a
privately-run public school in the village. The two nuns, who were volunteer teachers, had to barricade themselves
into the school’s guesthouse. A mob ransacked the school, stealing security cameras, electrical equipment and a
satellite dish on top of the guesthouse. Reports allege that the protestors were carrying knives, and some villagers
used loudspeakers from local mosques to call for other villagers to go to the guesthouse. The two nuns were
eventually escorted to safety by the authorities, but both sustained cuts and bruises, and were also subject to verbal
taunts. Another nun was hidden by school workers in a separate building on campus. Two of the nuns were
Egyptians, while the third holds dual French and Egyptian citizenship.

As a result, school attendance has since dropped by more than a third. The Notre Dame Language School where the
nuns work enrols both Muslims and Coptic Christians. According to the news organisation, none of the Muslims
involved in attacking the church have been charged.

1. Is the High Representative/Vice-President aware of the events described above?

2. What concrete steps have been adopted by the HR/VP to address the growing problem of anti-Christian
sentiment within Egypt?

3. What steps are EU officials in Egypt taking to monitor the problem of sectarian violence, and what are their
chief concerns?

4. Is the HR/VP prepared to work with other regional bodies such as the Arab League to take urgent steps to
support all efforts to suppress sectarian and intercommunal violence in Egypt?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 June 2012)_

High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Ashton is aware of the recurrent cases of sectarian violence in Egypt,
which she has strongly condemned in her statements. She also called repeatedly on the Egyptian authorities to ensure
Freedom of religion or belief in the country. EU concerns over this matter were directly communicated to Marshal
Tantawi by HR/VP Ashton and by President Barroso during their visits to Egypt in March and July 2011 respectively.
The Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 27 February 2012 emphasised the importance of the Egyptian interim
authorities to ensure the protection of fundamental freedoms and to investigate violations, including against religious
communities. The EU Delegation is closely monitoring cases of sectarian violence and emphasises the importance of
avoiding discrimination on religious grounds in its contacts with Egyptian authorities. In order to support the
improvement of freedom of religion or belief in Egypt, the European External Action Service is keen to engage with all
the relevant stakeholders in the country as well as with the regional and international organisations sharing EU's
values and objectives in this respect.

C 124 E / 264 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003316/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — The case of Boghdan Danylyshyn

The case has recently been brought to my attention of the former economy minister of Ukraine, Boghdan
Danylyshyn. Interpol has issued a red notice for Mr Danylyshyn, who was given political asylum in the Czech
Republic after he was put on Ukraine’s wanted list in 2010. Interpol’s mandate is to prevent and fight crime through
enhanced international police cooperation, transcending domestic and international politics. Its engagement in
matters of a political, military, religious and racial character is strictly forbidden under Article 3 of its constitution,
which must be upheld in order to ensure the organisation’s independence and neutrality, as well as to reflect
international extradition law and to protect individuals from political persecution.

Can the High Representative make enquiries as to why President Yanukovich’s government is being permitted by
Interpol to post such international arrest warrants when an EU Member State has deemed the issue to be political
rather than criminal? Does the High Representative agree that something must be done to address the situation and, if
so, what action does she plan to take?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2012)_

The procedure for issuing an Interpol Red Notice comprises several steps:

First of all an Interpol Member State which wishes to enter a Red Notice in the police information system is required
to indicate the name of the person, the offence concerned and provide the judicial documentation (usually a national
arrest warrant). This information is sent to the General Secretariat in Lyon where Interpol's legal service scrutinises the
submitted data to make sure that the Red Notice is compliant with the Interpol rules.

These rules indicate _inter alia_ that it is ‘(…) strictly forbidden for the Organisation to undertake any intervention or
activities of a political, military, religious or racial character’. (Article 3 Interpol Constitution). Only after this scrutiny
Interpol circulates the Red Notice.

Subsequently to the circulation of the Red Notice, Interpol Member States are still free to assess the case and decide
discretionally the effect which the Red Notice should have in the national legal system.

The Czech authorities arrested Mr Danylyshyn in October 2010 on the basis of the Interpol Red Notice. After the
Czech judicial bodies assessed the case, it was decided not to extradite Mr Danylyshyn and he was released from
custody.

It is important to underline that the global police cooperation under the aegis of Interpol follow rules established by
Interpol which are different rules that the EU police cooperation. The European Commission does not have any
competence and is not involved in the establishment and functioning of the system of Interpol Notices.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 265

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003317/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — The repatriation by China of North Korean refugees

Recent weeks have seen at least 41 North Korean refugees repatriated to the DPRK by China, where, according to
statements from the North Korean regime, they are likely to face severe punishment, including the possibility of being
executed along with their families. This forced return contravenes the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, which China ratified in 1988. China, however, does not view the North Koreans as refugees, but rather as
‘economic migrants’, though it is almost certain that they are forced to leave North Korea as a result of the
government’s unfair food policy, which favours the army as opposed to the civilian population. Last December, Kim
Jong-un declared his intention to ‘annihilate’ up to three generations of the families of those who fled the country
during the mourning period for Kim Jong-il.

In light of this, what action will the High Representative take to urge the PRC Government to meet its international
obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and to recognise all North Koreans fleeing
the DPRK as refugees _sur place_, given the harsh persecution they will face if repatriated?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 June 2012)_

The EU has raised the issue of North Korean asylum‐seekers and refugees with China, in particular in the framework
of the EU‐China Human rights dialogue. All countries should fulfil their commitments under the 1951 Convention
related to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol by refraining from refouling people to their country of origin
where they might face the death penalty or other human rights abuses. However China does not recognise North
Korean refugees and regards them as economic migrants. The EU will continue to follow closely the situation of
North Korean refugees and to engage China on this issue.

C 124 E / 266 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003318/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Situation in Iran with regard to Pastor Nadarkhani

What action is the European Union taking in relation to the unlawful arrest of Pastor Nadarkhani in Iran in 2009?

He was arrested for questioning the Muslim monopoly of religious instruction for children in Iran. He has been in
prison since then and has been under pressure to renounce his faith in order to have his sentence lifted.

It is confirmed that his execution order has been signed. What action, if any, is the European Union and/or your office
taking on this matter?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 June 2012)_

High Representative/Vice-President has on several occasions addressed the situation of Iranian Pastor Youcef
Nadarkhani. EU representatives have also spoken directly with Iranian authorities in Brussels and Iran about his case.

The Islamic Republic of Iran must respect and live up to the international obligations on human rights that it has itself
signed up to, _inter alia_ on freedom of religion and belief.

The EU therefore expects Pastor Nadarkhani to be released immediately and without further ado.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 267

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003319/12**

**to the Commission**
**David Martin (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Pollution in Lake Koka (Ethiopia)

On 22 March 2012, organisations and individuals around the world marked United Nation’s World Water Day and
its emphasis upon ‘Water and Food Security’. But as the International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’ nears its end
in 2015, much still remains to be done.

Ethiopia’s man-made Lake Koka is the result of the country’s drive to maximise its agricultural and hydroelectric
potential, and initially provided local Oromo communities and others with a new and valuable water resource for
farming, fishing and recreation. However, the ongoing contamination of Lake Koka with effluent from commercial
operations lying upstream has left it poisoned.

Lake Koka represents a key natural resource upon which thousands of livelihoods rely, the contamination of which
has caused many to contract diseases. As the contamination has worsened, the Ethiopian authorities have appeared
unable or unwilling to address the causes of pollution and to rectify its effects.

Have the Commission and the European Union’s Delegation in Ethiopia raised the issue of Lake Koka and the need for
its rehabilitation with the Ethiopian authorities, and what initiatives are they undertaking or supporting to ensure that
Lake Koka can be restored as a useable water resource without delay?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

Following the construction of a dam in the Awash River, Lake Koka emerged as a man-made lake around 1960,
serving the communities close to it with water for human and livestock consumption and for irrigation. In the past
years, widespread concern has been expressed on the pollution of the lake and the effects of the pollution on human
and livestock health. Pollution is the result of the discharge of toxic waste from industries in the vicinity of lake Koka,
as well those located near Addis Ababa and Akaki (tanneries, but also textile, metal and chemical factories and flower
farms), releasing waste materials into the tributaries of the Awash river.

The situation has received repeated coverage by local and international media, including the Government-owned
Ethiopian Radio and television. The Government of Ethiopia is therefore well aware of the situation.

The political dialogue with Ethiopia has focused so far on human rights, civil society, resettlement, energy and
macroeconomic issues, and intense discussions have taken place on food security and the humanitarian situation.
Thus far the specific issue of Lake Koka has not been raised with the Ethiopian authorities. However, in the dialogue
with the Government of Ethiopia, due attention is given to general considerations of environmental sustainability of
the development plans, processes and interventions, including industrialisation. In the framework of the upcoming
EU joint programming exercise, the EU Delegation will pay attention to have environmental issues such as those of
Lake Koka properly addressed within the EU assistance constellation in Ethiopia.

C 124 E / 268 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003321/12**

**alla Commissione**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(28 marzo 2012)_

_Oggetto:_ Possibili finanziamenti per la realizzazione di un impianto di carburante nei pressi della zona industriale di
Piedimonte San Germano nella provincia di Frosinone

Nella zona industriale di Piedimonte San Germano, in provincia di Frosinone, è prevista la realizzazione di un
impianto di carburante cosiddetto senza bandiera, con annesso uno spazio bar-tavola calda di 190 mq ed un
autolavaggio, su un terreno di 4500 mq.

La struttura sorgerà su un terreno che è situato in un punto della strada provinciale aquinese che è passaggio
quotidiano di migliaia di operai, impiegati e autotrasportatori che prestano servizio presso lo stabilimento di
produzione di un’importante casa automobilistica italiana.

Inoltre, la zona in questione è un territorio in continuo sviluppo urbano e industriale e pertanto la realizzazione di un
progetto come questo creerà nuovi posti di lavoro, oltre che favorire uno sviluppo urbano sostenibile.

Ciò premesso, si chiede alla Commissione di rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Esistono finanziamenti per la realizzazione di progetti volti a favorire l'occupazione locale come quello
suesposto?

2. Può la Commissione fornire un quadro generale della situazione?

**Risposta data da Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(15 maggio 2012)_

Il programma del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale 2007-2013 per la regione Lazio comprende una priorità
«Ricerca, innovazione e rafforzamento della base produttiva». Questo capitolo fornisce un sostegno ai progetti
innovativi per le PMI in cui potrebbe rientrare il tipo di progetto menzionato dall'onorevole deputata se corrisponde
alle disposizioni specifiche del programma. Inoltre, il Fondo sociale europeo potrebbe essere disponibile per attività di
formazione destinate alle persone che potrebbero venire occupate o iniziare attività presso le imprese interessate.

Tuttavia, in linea con il principio della gestione condivisa usato per l'amministrazione della politica di coesione, la
selezione dei progetti e la loro attuazione competono alle autorità nazionali. Per ulteriori informazioni su
finanziamenti del FESR e del FSE la Commissione suggerisce all'onorevole deputata di mettersi direttamente in
contatto con l'autorità di gestione del programma Lazio.

Autorità di gestione POR Lazio
Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7

00145 Roma
adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it
elongo@regione.lazio.it

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 269

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003321/12**

**to the Commission**
**Roberta Angelilli (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Possible funding for constructing a service station in the vicinity of the industrial zone of Piedimonte San
Germano in the province of Frosinone

The construction of an independent service station, together with a 190 m [2] bar, cafeteria and carwash, is planned on a
4 500 m [2] site in the industrial zone of Piedimonte San Germano, province of Frosinone. The facility will be built on a
site located at a point on the Aquino provincial road that is used every day by thousands of labourers, office staff and
vehicle transporters who work at the factory of a major Italian automotive company.

In addition, the area in question is in a continuous state of urban and industrial development and therefore, a project
like this will create new jobs and impact positively on sustainable urban development.

Therefore, the Commission is asked to reply to the following questions:

1. Are there any funds available for projects aimed at promoting local employment such as the one described
above?

2. Can the Commission provide a general overview of the situation?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn** **on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

The 2007‐2013 European Regional Development Fund programme for region Lazio includes a priority for ‘Research,
innovation and strengthening of production’. This provides support for innovation projects for SMEs which might
include the type of project referred to by the Honourable Member, if it complies with the specific provisions of the
programme. In addition, the European Social Fund might be available for training activities for persons who may be
employed or start activities in the companies concerned.

However, in line with the shared management principle used for the administration of cohesion policy, project
selection and implementation is the responsibility of the national authorities. For more information on both ERDF
and ESF funding, the Commission suggests that the Honourable Member contacts directly the managing authority of
the Lazio programme:

Managing authority ROP Lazio
Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7

00145 Roma
adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it
elongo@regione.lazio.it

C 124 E / 270 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003324/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Taranis 2013 — internationale Katastrophenschutzübung: Kofinanzierung durch die EU

Im Bundesland Salzburg (Republik Österreich) findet im Sommer 2013 die internationale Katastrophenschutzübung
„EU Taranis 2013“ statt. Einsatzorganisationen spielen bei dieser Übung Krisen‐ und Katastrophenszenarien durch.
Überschwemmungen, Murenabgänge und andere Naturkatastrophen sind in Österreich und seinen Nachbarländern
keine Seltenheit. Im Rahmen der EU Taranis 2013 sollen verschiedene Katastrophenschutzübungen durchgeführt
und Know-how auf hohem Niveau ausgetauscht werden. Das Österreichische Rote Kreuz und der Landesverband
Salzburg haben sich gemeinsam mit nationalen und internationalen Partnern für die Ausrichtung dieser von der EU
kofinanzierten Katastrophenschutzübung beworben und wurden ausgewählt.

1. Wie viel kostet die Taranis 2013 insgesamt?

2. In welcher Höhe wird die Taranis 2013 aus EU-Töpfen kofinanziert?

3. Aus welchen EU-Töpfen stammen die Mittel?

4. Wer trägt den restlichen Anteil der Finanzierung? Der Staat Österreich? Das Land Salzburg? Das Rote Kreuz?
Wie hoch ist dieser jeweilige Anteil?

5. Die regionalen Rot-Kreuz-Dienststellen haben zurzeit mit gravierenden finanziellen Engpässen zu kämpfen.
Zum Teil gibt es nicht einmal Mittel für Sicherheitsschuhe und Einsatzjacken. Wären die eingesetzten Mittel der EU
nicht zweckmäßiger verwendet, wenn man zunächst die Grundausstattung für den freiwilligen Katastrophenschutz
fördern würde, anstatt groß angelegte Events zu finanzieren?

**Antwort von Frau Georgieva im Namen der Kommission**

_(29. Mai 2012)_

1. Die Gesamtkosten für Taranis werden auf 1 175 650 EUR geschätzt.

2. Die EU finanziert bis zu 82,88 % (974 324 EUR) der förderfähigen Kosten.

3. Die Mittel für diese Kofinanzierung stammen aus dem Finanzierungsinstrument für den Katastrophenschutz ( [1] ).

4. Der Rest der förderfähigen Kosten (17,12 %) wird von einer Partnerschaft getragen, die aus dem
koordinierenden Begünstigten (Österreichisches Rotes Kreuz — Landesverband Salzburg) und mehreren
Mitbegünstigten (Österreichisches Rotes Kreuz, Landesfeuerwehrverband Salzburg, Kroatien — Staatliches Amt für
Schutz und Rettung, Niederlande — Nationales Einsatzzentrum, Feuerwehr und Rettungsdienste von
Südböhmen/Tschechische Republik) besteht.

5. Das Ziel des Katastrophenschutzverfahrens der Europäischen Union, das mit dem oben genannten
Finanzierungsinstrument unterstützt wird, ist die Verstärkung der Zusammenarbeit im Katastrophenschutz zwischen
den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Norwegen, Island, Liechtenstein, Kroatien und der ehemaligen jugoslawischen Republik
Mazedonien. Jährlich werden spezifische Mittel für das Übungsprogramm zur Vorbereitung auf den Katastrophenfall,
ein Schlüsselbereich des Katastrophenschutzverfahrens, bereitgestellt. Jede öffentliche oder private Einrichtung kann
Vorschläge, die den Zielen und Regeln des Verfahrens entsprechen, einreichen. Alle Teilnehmer werden von den
jeweiligen nationalen Katastrophenschutzbehörden unterstützt, die auch in der Übung involviert sind.

Finanzierungen in diesem Bereich können nicht für den Kauf von Ausrüstung verwendet werden.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Eingerichtet durch die Entscheidung 2007/162/EG, Euratom des Rates vom 5. März 2007.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 271

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003324/12**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Taranis 2013 — international civil protection exercises: co-financing by the EU

The ‘EU Taranis 2013’ international civil protection exercises are to be held in the Federal State of Salzburg (Republic
of Austria) in summer 2013. During these exercises, emergency organisations will practise crisis and disaster
scenarios. Floods, avalanches and other natural disasters are not unknown in Austria and its neighbouring countries.
During EU Taranis 2013, various civil protection exercises are to be carried out and know-how is to be exchanged at a
high level. The Austrian Red Cross and the organisation’s Salzburg branch in conjunction with national and
international partners applied and have been selected to run these EU co‐financed civil protection exercises.

1. How much will Taranis 2013 cost in total?

2. To what extent are the Taranis 2013 exercises co-financed from EU resources?

3. From which EU budgets are funds drawn?

4. Where is the rest of the funding to come from? The Austrian State? The Federal State of Salzburg? The Red
Cross? How big is the share of each of these parties?

5. The regional Red Cross branches are currently faced with serious financial bottlenecks. In some cases, adequate
funding is not even available for safety boots and jackets. Would the EU resources not be put to better use by
primarily funding basic equipment for the voluntary civil protection forces, rather than financing ambitious events of
this kind?

**Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 May 2012)_

1. Taranis is estimated to cost EUR 1 175 650 in total.

2. The EU finances up to 82.88 % (EUR 974 324) of the eligible budget.

3. This co-financing is made from the Civil Protection Financial Instrument ( [1] ).

4. The rest of the eligible budget (17.12 %) is covered by a partnership consisting of one coordinating beneficiary
(Red Cross Austria Regional Branch of Salzburg) and several associated beneficiaries (Red Cross Austria, Association
of Fire Brigades of the Province of Salzburg, National Protection and Rescue Directorate of Croatia, National
Operations Centre of The Netherlands, Fire and Rescue Services of South Bohemia/Czech Republic).

5. The aim of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism, supported by the abovementioned Financial
Instrument, is to enhance cooperation in the field of Civil Protection between EU Member States, Norway, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Croatia and FYROM. A specific budget is allocated yearly to the Exercise Programme supporting
preparation to disasters, a key activity of the Mechanism. Any public or private entity is allowed to submit proposals
that comply with the aims and the rules of the Mechanism. Each participant is supported by the respective national
civil protection authority, also involved as players in the exercise.

Financing under this activity cannot be used for the purchase of equipment.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Established by Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5.3.2007.

C 124 E / 272 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003325/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Swift-Abkommen führt zur Preisgabe sensibler Bankdaten der Bürger

Das höchst umstrittene Swift-Abkommen, das es US-amerikanischen Behörden ermöglicht, Informationen zu
Bankdaten und ‐transaktionen von EU-Bürgern abzufragen, entpuppt sich jetzt Medienberichten zufolge als wahres
Datenleck. Die vorgesehenen Datenschutzmaßnahmen werden nicht oder nur unzureichend befolgt. Bislang wurde
von der europäischen Kontrollinstanz Europol jede Anfrage von US-Behörden beantwortet, obwohl vorausgesetzte
Angaben — wie etwa das Datenvolumen — von den USA nicht gemacht wurden. Daher zweifeln Kritiker die
geeignete Rolle von Europol als Kontrollinstanz an und werfen der EU völlig mangelhafte politische Kontrolle vor.
Kontrolleure legten diese Mängel bereits vor einem Jahr offen. Ein aktueller Prüfbericht verstärkt nun diese Kritik.

Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Wie viele Anfragen wurden bislang von US-Behörden gestellt?

2. Unter welchen Umständen konnte es passieren, dass US-Behörden durch ein Datenleck wochenlang Zugriff
auf Informationen des innereuropäischen Zahlungsverkehrs hatten?

3. Welche Maßnahmen gedenkt die Kommission zu ergreifen, um die EU-Bürger vor willkürlichem Zugriff auf
ihre Bankdaten durch US-Behörden zu schützen?

4. Gedenkt die Kommission, anstelle von Europol eine unabhängige Kontrollinstanz einzuführen?

5. Gibt es Pläne, eine Kontrollstelle der Kontrollinstanz einzusetzen? Wenn nicht, warum nicht?

6. Seit wann ist der Kommission bekannt, dass Bedingungen zur Informationsweitergabe von Europol nicht
befolgt wurden?

7. Warum wurden die Anfragerichtlinien nicht befolgt?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(11. Mai 2012)_

Der Kommission ist weder ein Datenleck noch eine widerrechtliche oder willkürliche Verarbeitung bzw.
Übermittlung von Daten im Rahmen des Abkommens zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika über die Verarbeitung von Zahlungsverkehrsdaten und deren Übermittlung aus der
Europäischen Union an die Vereinigten Staaten für die Zwecke des Programms zum Aufspüren der Finanzierung des
Terrorismus (TFTP-Abkommen) bekannt.

Das TFTP-Abkommen ist seit 1. August 2010 in Kraft. Sein Artikel 13 sieht vor, dass die im Abkommen enthaltenen
Garantien und Kontrollen regelmäßig gemeinsam überprüft werden. Die erste Überprüfung, die die Anwendung des
Abkommens in den ersten sechs Monaten erfasste, fand im Februar 2011 statt. Im Bericht der Kommission über diese
erste Überprüfung (SEC(2011)438 endg. vom 30. März 2011) wurden alle in Artikel 13 genannten Aspekte mitsamt
statistischen Informationen behandelt. Die zweite Überprüfung, die den Zeitraum seit März 2011 abdeckt, ist für
Oktober dieses Jahres geplant.

Was die Aufgabe von Europol anbelangt, so ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Behörde gemäß Artikel 4 des TFTPAbkommens zu überprüfen hat, ob die an bezeichnete Anbieter gerichteten Ersuchen der Vereinigten Staaten um in
der EU gespeicherte Daten, die zur Verhütung, Ermittlung, Aufdeckung oder Verfolgung von Terrorismus und
Terrorismusfinanzierung notwendig sind, mit dem Abkommen konform sind. Darüber hinaus inspiziert die externe
Datenschutzbehörde Europols, also die gemeinsame Kontrollinstanz, diese Tätigkeit von Europol. Die vertraulichen
Inspektionen durch die Kontrollinstanz sind jedoch nicht den umfassenden gemeinsamen Überprüfungen gemäß
Artikel 13 des TFTP-Abkommens gleichzusetzen, über die die Kommission dem Parlament und dem Rat förmlich
berichtet.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 273

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003325/12**

**to the Commission**
**Franz Obermayr (NI)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ SWIFT agreement leads to the disclosure of sensitive private bank data

According to reports in the media, the extremely contentious SWIFT agreement, which allows US authorities to check
the bank data and transactions of EU citizens, has now become a genuine data leak. The relevant data protection
measures are not being adhered to, or at least not in sufficient measure. So far the Joint Supervisory Body of Europol
has answered every inquiry from the US authorities, even though required information, such as data volume, was not
specified by the US. This leads critics to question the suitability of Europol as a supervisory body and to accuse the EU
of completely inadequate political control. Inspectors drew attention to this problem a year ago. A new inspection
report reinforces this criticism.

This gives rise to the following questions:

1. How many inquiries have been made by US bodies to date?

2. What circumstances allowed US authorities to have access to information about payment transactions within
Europe for several weeks due to a data leak?

3. What steps is the Commission considering taking to protect EU citizens from having their bank data arbitrarily
accessed by US authorities?

4. Is the Commission considering introducing an independent supervisory body instead of Europol?

5. Are there any plans to set up a watchdog to monitor the supervisory body? If not, why not?

6. When did the Commission first become aware that the conditions concerning the sharing of information have
not been adhered to by Europol?

7. Why were the inquiry guidelines not adhered to?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 May 2012)_

The Commission is not aware of any data leaks or other unlawful or arbitrary data processing or transfers under the
agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program (TFTP agreement).

The TFTP agreement is in force since 1 August 2010. To check the various safeguards and controls built into the
agreement, its Article 13 provides for joint reviews at regular intervals. The first such review took place in
February 2011 and covered the first six months of its application. The Commission's report on this first review
(SEC(2011) 438 final of 30 March 2011) focused on all the issues listed in Article 13, including statistical
information. The second joint review is planned for October this year and will examine the period since March 2011.

Specifically on Europol's role, it is worth recalling that, pursuant to Article 4 of the TFTP agreement, Europol is
responsible for verifying whether the US requests on the Designated Provider for obtaining EU stored data necessary
for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing are in
conformity with the agreement. Europol's external data protection supervisory authority, the Joint Supervisory Body
(JSB) also inspects this part of Europol's work. However, these confidential inspections by the JSB should be
distinguished from the comprehensive joint reviews pursuant to Article 13 of the TFTP agreement on which, each
time, the Commission officially reports to Parliament and Council.

C 124 E / 274 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-003327/12**
**till kommissionen (Vice-ordföranden / Höga representanten)**

**Åsa Westlund (S&D)**

_(28 mars 2012)_

_Angående:_ VP/HR – Integration av klimatfrågor i det utrikespolitiska arbetet

Enligt Lissabonfördragets artikel 191 ska unionens miljöpolitik bidra till att främja åtgärder på internationell nivå för
att lösa regionala eller globala miljöproblem, särskilt åtgärder för att bekämpa klimatförändringen. Kommissionen
genom Catherine Ashton och Europeiska utrikestjänsten har betonat vikten av att arbeta aktivt med klimatfrågor i
unionens utrikespolitiska arbete och att EU:s delegationer utomlands har en viktig roll när det gäller att sprida
kunskap kring klimatfrågor. EU-delegationerna har möjlighet att stärka relationerna och förbättra samarbetet med
tredje land när det gäller arbete med klimatfrågor.

— Hur arbetar Europeiska utrikestjänsten med att integrera arbetet med klimat i unionens utrikespolitiska arbete, vad
finns det för strategier på plats?

— Hur arbetar man med klimatfrågor inom de delegationer som representerar unionen?

— Hur vanligt är det att Catherine Ashton tar upp klimatfrågan på högnivåmöten?

**Svar från den höga representanten/vice ordförande Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar**

_(22 juni 2012)_

Klimatförändringen blir ett alltmer centralt ämne i den globala utrikespolitiken. För att EU ska kunna uppnå sina
internationella mål i denna fråga måste dess kompletterande verktyg mobiliseras. EU:s klimatdiplomati grundar sig på
utrikesrådets slutsatser från den 18 juli 2011 och det bakomliggande gemensamma diskussionsunderlag som
arbetades fram mellan kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjänsten (EEAS). I ett nära samarbete med kommissionen
och medlemsstaterna fördjupar den höga representanten/vice ordföranden sitt deltagande i klimatdiplomatin inom
samtliga tre åtgärdsområden som fastställts i utrikesrådets slutsatser. Nätverket för grön diplomati för samman EU:s
utrikespolitik med kommissionen och EEAS som agerar som nätverksnav. Nätverkets arbete utförs både vid
huvudkontoren och inom tredjeländer, och inkluderar vanliga formella diplomatiska demarscher och lokala
informella politiska dialoger. EEAS fortsätter också att hjälpa till med integreringen av klimatåtgärder i
programplaneringen för EU:s finansiella stöd, särskilt genom att tillhandahålla lämpliga riktlinjer och verktyg, liksom
personalutbildning vid huvudkontoren och vid delegationer. Målet med förslaget om att integrera klimatfrågan i
programplaneringen för nästa fleråriga budgetram (2014‐2020) är att se till att åtminstone 20 % av EU:s externa
finansiella instrument läggs på klimatåtgärder. Klimatfrågor är ständigt på dagordningen i den höga
representanten/vice ordförandens samtal med tredjeländer och samarbetspartner. Klimatförändringen är givetvis
också huvudämnet för kommissionären med ansvar för klimatfrågor.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 275

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003327/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Åsa Westlund (S&D)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Integration of climate change issues into foreign policy

According to Article 191 of the Treaty of Lisbon, Union policy on the environment shall contribute to promoting
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular
combating climate change. The Commission, through Catherine Ashton and the European External Action Service,
has emphasised the importance of working actively with climate change issues in the EU’s foreign policy work, and
that European Union Delegations abroad have an important role to play in disseminating knowledge about climate
change issues. The European Union Delegations have an opportunity to strengthen relations and progress
cooperation with third countries when it comes to work on climate issues.

— How is the European External Action Service working on integrating work to combat climate change into the
Union’s foreign policy work, and what strategic plans are in place?

— How is work with climate change issues being conducted within the Delegations that represent the Union?

— How common is it for Catherine Ashton to take up the issue of climate change at high-level meetings?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 June 2012)_

Climate change is increasingly moving to the core of the global foreign policy agenda. For the EU to achieve its
international objectives linked to climate change, all its complementary tools need to be mobilised. The EU’s climate
diplomacy is guided by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions of 18 July 2011 and the underlying Joint
Reflection Paper that was elaborated between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Commission services.
The High Representative/Vice-President, in close cooperation with the Commission as well as Member States, is
deepening its involvement in climate diplomacy in all three strands of action set out in the FAC conclusions. The
Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) brings together the EU foreign affairs community with the Commission and the
European External Action Service (EEAS) who acts as the network hub. The GDN work is conducted both at
headquarters and within third countries and includes regular formal diplomatic demarches and informal policy
dialogue locally. The EEAS also continues to help mainstream climate action within the programming of EU financial
assistance, notably through suitable programming guidelines and tools as well as training of staff at headquarters and
delegations. The proposed mainstreaming of climate into programming in the next MFF (2014-2020) will aim to
ensure that at least 20 % of the EU external finance instruments be spent on climate action. Climate change issues are
very regularly on the agenda of the High Representative/Vice-President’s talks with third countries and partners.
Climate Change is obviously also the main issue for action by the Commissioner for Climate Action.

C 124 E / 276 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003328/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(28 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Νέο Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων για το ΕΣΠΑ στην Ελλάδα

Στις 21 Μαρτίου 2012, ύστερα από διαπραγματεύσεις μεταξύ της Ελληνικής Κυβέρνησης, της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής και
της Ευρωπαϊκής Τράπεζας Επενδύσεων (ΕΤΕπ) υπογράφηκε η σύσταση του Ταμείου Εγγυήσεων για τις ελληνικές
Μικρομεσαίες Επιχειρήσεις. Το εν λόγω Ταμείο προβλέπεται να αποτελείται από πόρους του ΕΣΠΑ, συνολικού ύψους
500 εκατ. ευρώ, οι οποίοι με αντίστοιχη μόχλευση από την ΕΤΕπ, με σχέση 1:2, θα παρέχουν ρευστότητα στην ελληνική
αγορά τουλάχιστον 1 δισ. ευρώ μέχρι το τέλος του 2013. Στο ποσό αυτό θα προστεθούν συμπληρωματικά και 440 εκ. ευρώ
που έχουν συμφωνηθεί με την ΕΤΕπ υπό την εγγύηση του ελληνικού Δημοσίου. Συνολικά, στόχος είναι μέχρι το τέλος 2015
να διοχετευθούν στις ελληνικές μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις πόροι ύψους τουλάχιστον 1,44 δισ. ευρώ. Επιπλέον, αυτό το
χρηματοδοτικό προϊόν πρόκειται να συμπληρωθεί, από ελληνικής πλευράς, με ένα νέο εγγυοδοτικό προϊόν ύψους 150 εκατ.
ευρώ προς τις μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις από πόρους επίσης του ΕΣΠΑ, το οποίο θα δοθεί μέσω του ΕΤΕΑΝ. Μέχρι στιγμής,
διατίθενται ήδη αρκετοί πόροι μέσω άλλων ταμείων χαρτοφυλακίου του ΕΣΠΑ, όπως το Ταμείο Επιχειρηματικότητας
(ΕΤΕΑΝ), το «Εξοικονομώ κατ’ Οίκον», το JEREMIE και το ΕΝΑΛΙΟ, στα οποία έχουν τοποθετηθεί πάνω από 1 δισ. ευρώ ήδη,
ενώ αναλογικά ελάχιστη ρευστότητα έχει διοχετευθεί στις σχετικές αγορές. Σύμφωνα με τα παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Από ποια επιχειρησιακά προγράμματα προβλέπεται να προέλθουν οι πόροι για το Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων; Έχει στη διάθεσή
της η Επιτροπή τους πλέον επικαιροποιημένους χρηματοδοτικούς πίνακες τους ΕΣΠΑ και των προγραμμάτων του;

2. Για πόσο διάστημα προβλέπεται να παραμείνουν δεσμευμένοι στο Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων οι πόροι που θα εισφέρει το
ΕΣΠΑ; Θα απελευθερωθούν εγκαίρως ώστε να επαναξιοποιηθούν από τα Επιχειρησιακά Προγράμματα του ΕΣΠΑ, ή η
μόχλευση που θα δώσει η ΕΤΕπ ουσιαστικά θα υπερκαλύπτει τα ποσά ώστε το 2015 να ικανοποιείται η σχέση
μόχλευσης 1:2;

3. Πότε ακριβώς θα θεωρηθεί από την Επιτροπή πως οι πόροι που θα εισφέρει το ΕΣΠΑ στο Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων έχουν
απορροφηθεί πλήρως, έτσι ώστε να μην υπάρχει κίνδυνος απώλειας των πόρων αυτών στο τέλος της προγραμματικής
περιόδου; Έχει υπάρξει σχετική διευκρίνιση;

4. Τι μέτρα έχει λάβει η ελληνική πλευρά για την επίσπευση της πενιχρής, τα τελευταία δύο έτη, διοχέτευσης στην αγορά
των πόρων των έως τώρα συσταθέντων ταμείων χαρτοφυλακίου, ιδίως του ΕΤΕΑΝ, επίσης για τις μικρομεσαίες
επιχειρήσεις;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Οι πόροι του Ταμείου Εγγυήσεων θα προέρχονται από τα ακόλουθα προγράμματα της πολιτικής συνοχής:
Ανταγωνιστικότητα και επιχειρηματικότητα, Μακεδονία-Θράκη, Κρήτη και νησιά του Αιγαίου, Θεσσαλία-Κεντρική ΕλλάδαΉπειρος, Δυτική Ελλάδα-Πελοπόννησος-νησιά του Ιονίου, και Αττική. Οι λεπτομέρειες της χρηματοδότησης θα
αποφασιστούν από τις επιτροπές παρακολούθησης των αντίστοιχων προγραμμάτων.

2. Οι πόροι που διατίθενται στο Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων και χρησιμοποιούνται για την εγγύηση των δανείων θα παραμείνουν
δεσμευμένοι στο Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων έως ότου αποπληρωθούν πλήρως όλα τα εγγυημένα δάνεια. Εφόσον, μετά την
ημερομηνία αυτή, υπάρχουν διαθέσιμοι πόροι, η χρήση αυτών των πόρων θα καθοριστεί από την Επιτροπή σύμφωνα με τις
απαιτήσεις των μέσων χρηματοοικονομικής τεχνικής (ΜΧΤ) δυνάμει του άρθρου 44 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1083/2006
του Συμβουλίου ( [1] ).

3. Το Ταμείο Εγγυήσεων θα προχρηματοδοτηθεί σε τρεις δόσεις, όπου η κάθε δόση θα ενεργοποιείται μόνο όταν η
προηγούμενη έχει πλήρως απορροφηθεί. Η υλοποίηση του Ταμείου Εγγυήσεων θα επανεξεταστεί στο τέλος του 2013 και
στο τέλος του 2014, όταν η ΕΤΕ και οι ελληνικές αρχές θα έχουν την ευκαιρία να τροποποιήσουν το χρονοδιάγραμμα
χρηματοδότησης, ανάλογα με την αντίδραση των δυνητικών δικαιούχων (ΜΜΕ) στη δανειοδοτική προσφορά και με το
ποσοστό πραγματικών εκταμιεύσεων προς τις ΜΜΕ.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Κανονισμός (EK) αριθ. 1083/2006 του Συμβουλίου, της 11ης Ιουλίου 2006, περί καθορισμού γενικών διατάξεων για το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο

Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο και το Ταμείο Συνοχής και την κατάργηση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1260/1999, ΕΕ L
210/25 της 31.7.2006.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 277

4. Οι ελληνικές αρχές έχουν πάρει μέτρα για τη βελτίωση της αποτελεσματικότητας των ΜΧΤ. Τα μέτρα αυτά
περιλαμβάνουν την αναδιάρθρωση του σχεδιασμού και των κριτηρίων επιλογής προγραμμάτων επιδοτήσεων, ώστε να
παρέχεται μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια, και η θέσπιση νέας νομοθεσίας περί επενδύσεων. Επίσης, η νομοθεσία της ΕΕ έχει
τροποποιηθεί ώστε να επιτρέπεται η συγχρηματοδότηση του κεφαλαίου κίνησης από τα ΜΧΤ, επιτρέποντας έτσι την
εξυγίανση των ΜΜΕ. Η νομοθεσία αυτή πρέπει να εφαρμοστεί από την ελληνική διοίκηση.

C 124 E / 278 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003328/12**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ New NSRF guarantee fund in Greece

On 21 March 2012, following negotiations between the Greek Government, the European Commission and the
European Investment Bank (EIB), an agreement was signed on setting up the guarantee fund for Greek small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The plan is for the fund in question to draw on NSRF resources, a total amount of
EUR 500 million which, with corresponding leverage from the EIB at a ratio of 1:2, will provide the Greek market
with liquidity of at least EUR 1 billion until the end of 2013. To this amount, a supplementary sum of
EUR 440 million will be added, as agreed with the EIB, backed by a Greek public sector guarantee. The overall
objective is that, by the end of 2015, funding to the amount of at least EUR 1.44 billion will be channelled to Greek
SMEs. In addition, this financial product will be supplemented, from the Greek side, by a new loan guarantee product
to the amount of EUR 150 million for SMEs again from NSRF funding, which will be provided through the ETEAN
Entrepreneurship Fund. Considerable resources have so far been made available through other NSRF portfolio funds,
such as the ETEAN Entrepreneurship Fund, Housecheck, JEREMIE and the ‘ENALIO’ fund, in which more than
EUR 1 billion has already been deposited, with proportionately minimal amounts of liquidity having been channelled
into the relevant markets. In the light of the above, will the Commission answer the following:

1. From which operational programmes is it envisaged that the resources for the guarantee fund will be derived?
Does the Commission have at its disposal the most recently updated funding charts for the NSRF and its
programmes?

2. For how long is it expected that funds contributed by the NSRF will remain committed to the guarantee fund?
Will they be released in time to be reutilised by the NSRF’s operational programmes or will EIB leverage
effectively cause the amounts to be exceeded so that in 2015, the 1:2 leverage ratio can be adhered to?

3. When, precisely, will the Commission consider the resources made available by the NSRF to the guarantee fund
to have been fully utilised, so that there is no risk of these funds being lost at the end of the programming
period? Has there been any clarification on this matter?

4. What measures have been taken in the last two years by Greece to speed up the extremely meagre flow to the
market of the portfolio fund resources established to date, in particular ETEAN, for the benefit of SMEs?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

1. The resources for the guarantee fund will be obtained from the following cohesion policy programmes:
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship, Macedonia‐Thrace, Crete and Aegean Islands, Thessaly-Mainland Greece‐
Epirus, Western Greece‐Peloponnese‐ Ionian Islands, and Attica. The details of the financing will be decided by the
monitoring committees of the relevant programmes.

2. The funds allocated to this Guarantee Fund and used to guarantee loans will remain committed to the guarantee
fund until all guaranteed loans are fully reimbursed. If there are funds available after that date, the use of these funds
will be determined by the Commission in line with the requirements of financial engineering instruments (FEIs) under
Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 ( [1] ).

3. The Guarantee Fund will be pre-funded in three tranches, the next tranche only activated once the previous one
has been fully taken up. The implementation of the Guarantee Fund will be reviewed by end 2013 and end 2014, at
which time the EIB and Greek authorities will have the opportunity to modify the funding schedule, in accordance
with the response from the potential beneficiaries (SMEs) to the lending offer and with the rate of actual
disbursements to SMEs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, OJ L 210/25, 31.7.2006.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 279

4. The Greek authorities have taken steps to improve the effectiveness of FEIs. Such measures include the
restructuring of the design and selection criteria of grant programmes making them more transparent and the
introduction of the new investment law. In addition, the EU legislation has been modified to allow the co-financing of
working capital by FEIs, thus allowing the consolidation of the position of SMEs; this legislation has to be
implemented now by the Greek administration.

C 124 E / 280 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003329/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(28 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Η ελληνική γραφειοκρατία τροχοπέδη για την επιχειρηματική δραστηριότητα

Η γραφειοκρατία και η αναποτελεσματική δημόσια διοίκηση αποτελούν σήμερα το μεγαλύτερο εμπόδιο για την ανάπτυξη
ενός κράτους μέσω της υγιούς και ανταγωνιστικής επιχειρηματικότητας, της εξωστρέφειας και της διαφάνειας. Δυστυχώς,
στην Ελλάδα, παρά τη μικρή βελτίωση που έχει σημειωθεί το τελευταίο διάστημα, παρόλα αυτά, τα δεδομένα παραμένουν
αρνητικά, λειτουργώντας αποτρεπτικά τόσο σε επίπεδο δημιουργίας νέων επιχειρηματικών ευκαιριών και θέσεων εργασίας,
όσο και προσέλκυσης επενδύσεων αλλά και απορρόφησης των κοινοτικών κονδυλίων του ΕΣΠΑ. Σύμφωνα με την ετήσια
έκθεση της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας «Doing Business 2012», η Ελλάδα κατέχει την 135η θέση στο σύνολο 183 κρατών στην
κατάταξη «Starting a Business», ενώ σύμφωνα με την έκθεση προόδου για το 2011, στην Ελλάδα απαιτούνται 5 ημέρες στα
χαρτιά -μήνες στην πραγματικότητα- βάσει των δικαιολογητικών και των διοικητικών διαδικασιών που απαιτούνται, καθώς
και 910 ευρώ για την σύσταση μιας μικρής νέας επιχείρησης, ενώ αντίστοιχα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση απαιτούνται 7 ημέρες
και συνολικό κόστος 399 ευρώ. Δεδομένου ότι η ελληνική οικονομία εισέρχεται στο 5ο έτος ύφεσης και τα στοιχεία της
Εθνικής Συνομοσπονδίας Ελληνικού Εμπορίου δείχνουν ότι μόνο το 2011 έκλεισαν 68 000 μικρές επιχειρήσεις, ενώ για το
τρέχον έτος ήδη 63 000 επιχειρήσεις βρίσκονται στο «κόκκινο» και η δημιουργία του κατάλληλου εδάφους για την ανάπτυξη
της επιχειρηματικότητας είναι κάτι περισσότερο από κρίσιμη, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποια η πολιτική της ΕΕ στα κράτη μελή για τη μείωση του ετήσιου φόρτου των επιχειρήσεων από τις γραφειοκρατικές
διατυπώσεις που προέρχονται τόσο από την ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία όσο και από τις σχετικές εθνικές νομοθεσίες;

2. Σε τι ποσοστό επί του ΑΕΠ ανέρχεται το διοικητικό κόστος της γραφειοκρατίας σε κάθε κράτος μέλος ξεχωριστά;

3. Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με τον αριθμό νέων επιχειρήσεων που ιδρύθηκαν την τελευταία διετία συνολικά στην ΕΕ,
αλλά και ανά κράτος μέλος ξεχωριστά;

4. Αναφορικά με το πρόγραμμα δράσης για τη μείωση του διοικητικού φόρτου για τις επιχειρήσεις και τον στόχο που
ετέθη στο εαρινό Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο του 2007 για μείωση του διοικητικού φόρτου κατά 25 % μέχρι το 2012, σε
ποιο στάδιο βρισκόμαστε σήμερα; Υπάρχουν διαθέσιμα στοιχεία σχετικά με τα αποτελέσματα της συγκεκριμένης
διαδικασίας; Ποιοι ήταν οι εθνικοί στόχοι που είχαν θέσει τα κράτη μέλη, σε ποια από αυτά επιτεύχθηκε το επιθυμητό
αποτέλεσμα και με ποιο τρόπο;

**Απάντηση του κ. Barroso εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Μαΐου 2012)_

1. Το πρόγραμμα μείωσης του διοικητικού φόρτου έχει ως στόχο τη μείωση του διοικητικού φόρτου κατά 25 % έως το
τέλος του 2012. Η Επιτροπή θα συνεχίσει να έχει ως στόχο να εφαρμόζεται ο η χαμηλότερη εφικτή κανονιστική επιβάρυνση
μέσω μέτρων όπως οι αξιολογήσεις, οι διατομεακοί «έλεγχοι καταλληλότητας» και οι αξιολογήσεις αντικτύπου. Πέραν της
μεγαλύτερης περιόδου διαβούλευσης από 8 έως 12 εβδομάδες, η έκθεση σχετικά με την Ελαχιστοποίηση του κανονιστικού
φόρτου για τις ΜΜΕ ( [1] ) προβλέπει βελτιωμένη διαβούλευση με τις μικρές επιχειρήσεις σχετικά με τις απαλλαγές και τα
ηπιότερα καθεστώτα. Θα δημιουργηθεί πίνακας για την παρακολούθηση της προόδου μέσω των προτάσεων της Επιτροπής,
της έγκρισής τους από τον νομοθέτη της ΕΕ και της εφαρμογής τους από τα κράτη μέλη.

2. Η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει πληροφορίες σχετικά με αυτό το θέμα.

3. Ο αριθμός των νέων επιχειρήσεων που δημιουργήθηκαν το 2009 έφτασε τις 2 357 382 για 24 κράτη μέλη.
EUROSTAΤ, αριθμός ιδρυομένων επιχειρήσεων — Παράρτημα 1 (εξαιρούνται η Ελλάδα, η Δανία και η Μάλτα) που έχει
αποσταλεί απευθείας στο Αξιότιμο Μέλος και στη Γραμματεία του Κοινοβουλίου.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011)803 τελικό.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 281

4. Η Επιτροπή έχει υποβάλει προτάσεις για μείωση 33 %. Ο νομοθέτης τη ΕΕ έχει εφαρμόσει μέτρα για μείωση ύψους
περίπου 25 %. Έως τον Οκτώβριο του 2009 όλα τα κράτη μέλη είχαν θέσει τους εθνικούς στόχους που καθορίζονται στην
έκθεση της ομάδας υψηλού επιπέδου ανεξάρτητων ενδιαφερόμενων μερών για τη βέλτιστη πρακτική στα κράτη μέλη σχετικά
με την εφαρμογή της ευρωπαϊκής νομοθεσίας ( [2] ) (Παράρτημα 2 που έχει αποσταλεί απευθείας στο Αξιότιμο Μέλος και στη
Γραμματεία του Κοινοβουλίου). Η έκθεση προόδου της πολωνικής προεδρίας ( [3] ) δείχνει ότι ενδιάμεσες εκθέσεις έχουν
δημοσιευτεί από 12, και τελικές εκθέσεις έχουν δημοσιευτεί από τρία κράτη μέλη.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/admin_burden/best_practice_report/best_practice_report_en.htm.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st13/st13671.en08.pdf.

C 124 E / 282 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003329/12**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Greek bureaucracy as an obstacle to entrepreneurial activity

Bureaucracy and inefficient public administration today represent the greatest obstacle to building a State through
healthy and competitive entrepreneurship and a spirit of openness and transparency. Unfortunately in Greece, despite
the slight improvement recently, overall conditions remain negative and function as a disincentive both in terms of
creating new business opportunities and jobs and in terms of attracting investments and taking up Community funds
provided through the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). According to the World Bank’s annual report
‘Doing Business 2012’, Greece comes 135th out of a total of 183 States in the ranking for ‘Starting a Business’.
Moreover, according to the progress report for 2011, in Greece, five days are required on paper (months in reality)
due to the paperwork and administrative red tape required, as well as EUR 910, to start up a new small business,
whereas in the European Union as a whole, it takes seven days and costs a total of EUR 399. Given that the Greek
economy is entering its fifth year of recession and figures from the National Confederation of Hellenic Commerce
indicate that in 2011 alone, 68 000 small businesses closed down, while another 63 000 businesses find themselves
‘in the red’ this year and that the establishment of a favourable climate in which entrepreneurship can flourish is more
crucial than ever, will the Commission say:

1. What is the policy of the EU in Member States for reducing the annual burden on businesses from bureaucratic
formalities which stem from both European legislation and corresponding national legislation?

2. What proportion of GDP is accounted for by the administrative cost of bureaucracy in each individual Member
State?

3. Does it have any data on the total number of new businesses established in the last two years in the EU as a
whole, and also for each individual Member State?

4. As regards the action programme on reducing the administrative burden on businesses and the goal set at the
summer European Council summit of 2007 of a 25 % reduction in the administrative burden by 2012, what
stage are we at today? Is any data available on the results of the procedure in question? What are the national
goals set by Member States? In which of these has the desired outcome been achieved, and in what way?

**Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 May 2012)_

1. The Administrative Burden Reduction Programme aims to reduce administrative burdens by 25 % by the end of
2012. The Commission will continue to target that the least possible regulatory burden applies through such
measures as evaluations, sector-wide ‘fitness checks’ and impact assessments. In addition to the extended consultation
period from 8 to 12 weeks, the report on Minimising regulatory burden for SMEs ( [1] ) provides for improved
consultation with small companies on exemptions or lighter regimes. A scoreboard will be established to monitor
progress through Commission proposals, adoption by _the EU legislator and Member State implementation._

2. The Commission does not have information on this.

3. The number of new enterprises created in 2009 reached 2 357 382 for 24 Member States. (Eurostat, number of
births of enterprises — Annex A (excluding Greece, Denmark and Malta) sent directly to the Honourable Member and
to Parliament's Secretariat.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 803 final.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 283

4. The Commission has presented proposals worth a 33 % reduction. The EU legislator has adopted measures
worth close to the 25 % reduction. By October 2009 all Member States had set national targets indicated in the report
of t _he High Level Group of Independent Stakeholders on_ best practice in Member States to implement EU legislation ( [2] )
(Annex A sent directly to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat). The Polish Presidency Progress
Report ( [3] ) shows that intermediary reports have been published by 12 and final reports published by three Member
States.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/admin_burden/best_practice_report/best_practice_report_en.htm
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st14/st14328.en11.pdf

C 124 E / 284 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003330/12**

**do Komisji**
**Paweł Zalewski (PPE)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wpływ FTA z Koreą Południową na gospodarki krajów UE

Jednym z najważniejszych instrumentów realizacji polityki handlowej UE są umowy o wolnym handlu negocjowane
i zawierane z kluczowymi partnerami handlowymi na świecie. Mają one ogromny wpływ na gospodarkę całej UE
i z zasady swej mają służyć jej wzmocnieniu poprzez zniesienie dotychczasowych barier handlowych w wymianie
handlowej z krajami trzecimi. Podsumowując korzyści płynące dla UE z tych umów, należy niewątpliwie przyjrzeć
się analizie skutków umów o wolnym handlu, nie tylko dla UE jako całości, ale także dla gospodarek poszczególnych
państw członkowskich z rozbiciem na poszczególne gałęzie danej gospodarki: sektor przemysłowy, usługi oraz
rolnictwo.

W związku z powyższym proszę o udostępnienie analizy skutków wdrożenia w życie FTA z Koreą Południową
i wpływu tej umowy na gospodarki poszczególnych państw członkowskich z uwzględnieniem poszczególnych
sektorów danej gospodarki krajowej: sektor przemysłowy, usługi oraz rolnictwo.

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(2 maja 2012 r.)_

Komisja podziela opinię Pana Posła, że umowy o wolnym handlu są jednym z najważniejszych narzędzi realizacji
polityki handlowej UE. Umowy te mogą przynosić znaczące korzyści dla gospodarki UE, o ile są właściwie
wykonywane. Umowa o wolnym handlu z Koreą Południową jest pierwszą z nowej serii tego rodzaju umów. Jest ona
obecnie wdrażana, a Komisja zobowiązana jest do zapewnienia efektywności i skuteczności tego procesu.
Komisja pragnie poinformować Pana Posła, że potencjalne skutki umów o wolnym handlu między UE a państwami
trzecimi analizowane są jeszcze przed zawarciem takich umów, w odniesieniu do całej Unii Europejskiej.
W przypadku umowy o wolnym handlu z Koreą Południową przeprowadzono cztery takie analizy. Wszystkie z nich
są publicznie dostępne na stronie internetowej Dyrekcji Generalnej ds. Handlu poświęconej dwustronnym
stosunkom handlowym UE z Koreą Południową:
[http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/korea/.](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/korea/)

Komisja nie analizuje wpływu umów o wolnym handlu, w tym tej z Koreą Południową, na poszczególne państwa
członkowskie UE.

Komisja chciałaby również poinformować Pana Posła, że, zgodnie z rozporządzeniem Parlamentu Europejskiego
i Rady (UE) nr 511/2011 z dnia 11 maja 2011 r. w sprawie wprowadzenia w życie dwustronnej klauzuli ochronnej
zawartej w umowie o wolnym handlu między Unią Europejską i jej państwami członkowskimi a Republiką Korei ( [1] ),
Komisja zobowiązana jest do corocznego składania sprawozdań dotyczących różnych aspektów wykonywania
umowy. Sprawozdanie takie zostanie sporządzone w drugiej połowie 2012 r. (tj. po pierwszym pełnym roku
obowiązywania umowy) i będzie zawierać m.in. również analizy dotyczące niektórych sektorów gospodarki.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Dz.U. L 145 z 31.5.2011.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 285

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003330/12**

**to the Commission**
**Paweł Zalewski (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The impact of the free trade agreement with South Korea on the economies of EU countries

Free trade agreements negotiated and concluded with key trade partners around the world are one of the most
important instruments for implementing the EU’s trade policy. They have a great impact on the economy of the entire
EU and, essentially, are intended to strengthen it by removing existing trade barriers in trade with third countries. In
summing up the benefits of these agreements for the EU, we should certainly look at the analysis of the effects of free
trade agreements, not only for the EU as a whole, but also for the economies of individual Member States, including a
breakdown into individual sectors of the given economy: the industrial sector, services and agriculture.

In relation to the above, I hereby request that an analysis of the effects of implementing the free trade agreement with
South Korea and the impact of this agreement on the economies of individual Member States be made available,
taking into account the individual sectors of the given national economy: the industrial sector, services and
agriculture.

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 May 2012)_

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are one of the most
important instruments implementing the EU's trade policy. These agreements can bring considerable gains to the EU
economy provided that they are properly implemented. The FTA with South Korea is the first of a new generation of
FTAs that is now being implemented and the Commission is committed to ensuring that this is done efficiently and
effectively.

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that the analysis of the potential impact of Free Trade
Agreements between the EU and third countries is conducted even before they are concluded, on the whole of the
European Union. In particular in the case of the FTA with South Korea, four such studies have been conducted. They
are all public and available on Directorate-General Trade's website devoted to EU bilateral trade with South Korea:
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/korea/

The Commission does not analyse the impact of FTAs, including the one with South Korea, on individual EU Member
States.

Finally, the Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that, in line with Regulation No 511/2011 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 ( [1] ) implementing the bilateral safeguard clause of the
FTA between the EU and its Member States and the Republic of Korea, it has an obligation to report annually about
various aspects of the implementation of the agreement. Such a report will be prepared in the second half of 2012
(i.e. after first full year of operation of the Agreement) and will include, _inter alia_, also some sectoral analysis.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 145, 31.5.2011.

C 124 E / 286 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003331/12**

**do Komisji**
**Paweł Zalewski (PPE)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wpływ FTA z Krajami Ameryki Centralnej, Mercosurem oraz Peru i Kolumbią na gospodarki krajów UE

Jednym z najważniejszych instrumentów realizacji polityki handlowej UE są umowy o wolnym handlu negocjowane
i zawierane z kluczowymi partnerami handlowymi na świecie. Mają one ogromny wpływ na gospodarkę całej UE
i z zasady swej mają służyć jej wzmocnieniu poprzez zniesienie dotychczasowych barier handlowych w wymianie
handlowej z krajami trzecimi. Podsumowując korzyści płynące dla UE z tych umów, należy niewątpliwie przyjrzeć
się analizie skutków umów o wolnym handlu, nie tylko dla UE jako całości, ale także dla gospodarek poszczególnych
państw członkowskich z rozbiciem na poszczególne gałęzie danej gospodarki: sektor przemysłowy, usługi oraz
rolnictwo.

W związku z powyższym proszę o udostępnienie analizy przewidywanego wpływu FTA z Krajami Ameryki
Centralnej, Mercosurem oraz Peru i Kolumbią na gospodarki poszczególnych państw członkowskich
z uwzględnieniem poszczególnych sektorów danej gospodarki krajowej: sektor przemysłowy, usługi oraz rolnictwo.

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(11 maja 2012 r.)_

W odniesieniu do filaru handlowego układu o stowarzyszeniu UE-Mercosur przeprowadzono pełną ocenę skutków
w kontekście zrównoważonego rozwoju, która jest publicznie dostępna od marca 2009 r. ( [1] ). Ponadto w 2011 r.
przeprowadzono dwie zaktualizowane analizy skutków gospodarczych układu: jedna koncentrowała się na skutkach
ogólnych, a druga na szczegółowych skutkach w dziedzinie rolnictwa. Analizy te przekazano najpierw państwom
członkowskim i Parlamentowi, a obecnie są one publicznie dostępne ( [2] ). Jeśli chodzi Kolumbię, Peru oraz filar
handlowy układu o stowarzyszeniu z Ameryką Centralną, oceny skutków w kontekście zrównoważonego rozwoju
są publicznie dostępne na wspomnianej stronie internetowej. Dodatkowe analizy przeprowadzone po zawarciu tych
układów, dotyczące ich prawdopodobnych skutków gospodarczych, są obecnie finalizowane i zostaną przekazane
państwom członkowskim i Parlamentowi możliwie jak najszybciej.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/sustainability-impact-assessments/assessments/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 287

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003331/12**

**to the Commission**
**Paweł Zalewski (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The impact of the free trade agreements with Central American countries, Mercosur, Peru and Colombia on
the economies of EU countries

Free trade agreements negotiated and concluded with key trade partners around the world are one of the most
important instruments for implementing the EU’s trade policy. They have a great impact on the economy of the entire
EU and, essentially, are intended to strengthen it by removing existing trade barriers in trade with third countries. In
summing up the benefits of these agreements for the EU, we should certainly look at the analysis of the effects of free
trade agreements, not only for the EU as a whole, but also for the economies of individual Member States, including a
breakdown into individual sectors of the given economy: the industrial sector, services and agriculture.

In relation to the above, I hereby request that an analysis of the expected impact of the free trade agreements with
Central American countries, Mercosur, Peru and Colombia on the economies of individual Member States be made
available, taking into account the individual sectors of the given national economy: the industrial sector, services and
agriculture.

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 May 2012)_

A full Sustainable Impact Assessment (SIA) on the trade pillar of the EU‐Mercosur Association Agreement has been
conducted and is publicly available since March 2009 ( [1] ). In addition, two updated economic studies on the economic
impact of the agreement, one focusing on the general impact, the other one on the specific impact on agriculture,
were conducted in 2011. These studies were first shared with Member States and Parliament, and they are now
publicly available ( [2] ). Concerning Colombia, Peru as well as the trade pillar of the Association Agreement with Central
America, SIAs are publicly available on the website referred to. Additional post-conclusion studies covering the likely
economic impact of these agreements are currently being finalised and will be circulated to the Member States and
Parliament as soon as possible.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/sustainability-impact-assessments/assessments/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/.

C 124 E / 288 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-003334/12**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(28 martie 2012)_

_Subiect:_ Toxicitatea fructelor și legumelor produse în Turcia

Organizația Greenpeace a dat publicității un raport despre gradul de toxicitate al fructelor și legumelor produse în
Turcia. Potrivit raportului, în perioada 2009-2010 au fost studiate 76 de soiuri de fructe și legume provenite din
Turcia și importate în UE. Testele au descoperit prezența unor substanțe chimice depășind limitele normale admise,
iar în cazul a peste jumătate din produsele testate, pesticide peste limita normală admisă.

Printre cele mai toxice fructe și legume provenite din Turcia s-au situat ardeii, perele și strugurii. Turcia a fost
avertizată de autoritățile din Rusia, Olanda și Germania cu privire la pericolul prezentat de aceste produse. Comisia
este rugată să răspundă la următoarele întrebări:

1. Dacă cunoaște și a analizat acest raport.

2. Dacă consideră necesare noi măsuri de protejare a sănătății publice.

3. Dacă a abordat sau va aborda acest subiect în discuțiile cu Turcia.

**Răspuns dat de dl Dalli în numele Comisiei**

_(23 mai 2012)_

1. Comisia are cunoștință de raportul Greenpeace menționat.

2. Există un corpus legislativ cuprinzător pentru a se asigura că alimentele sunt sigure și sănătoase și că alimentele
importate în Uniune sunt în conformitate cu cerințele de siguranță din UE. Mai precis, Regulamentul (CE) nr.
178/2002 ( [1] ) și Regulamentul (CE) nr. 882/2004 ( [2] ) sunt principalele instrumente pentru atingerea acestui obiectiv.

În plus față de măsurile menționate anterior, o listă de produse alimentare și furaje care necesită un nivel crescut de
control înainte de introducerea în UE a fost instituită de Comisie [în anexa I la Regulamentul (CE) nr. 669/2009 ( [3] )] și
este revizuită în mod regulat pe baza unor date relevante, inclusiv înregistrări din sistemul de alertă rapidă pentru
produsele alimentare și alimentele pentru hrana animalelor (RASFF) și controale efectuate de către autoritățile
competente ale statelor membre. În prezent lista cuprinde, cu privire la Turcia, ardei grași și tomate (proaspete,
refrigerate sau congelate) din cauza prezenței posibile a unor anumite reziduuri de pesticide (frecvența de control la
frontieră de 10%). Nu există măsuri suplimentare luate în considerare în acest stadiu.

3. Comisia este în contact permanent cu Turcia privind anumite aspecte legate de siguranța alimentară.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 178/2002 al Parlamentului și al Consiliului din 28 ianuarie 2002 de stabilire a principiilor și a cerințelor generale ale

legislației alimentare, de instituire a Autorității Europene pentru Siguranța Alimentară și de stabilire a procedurilor în domeniul siguranței
produselor alimentare (JO L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 882/2004 al Parlamentului și al Consiliului din 29 aprilie 2004 privind controalele oficiale efectuate pentru a asigura

verificarea conformității cu legislația privind hrana pentru animale și produsele alimentare și cu normele de sănătate animală și de bunăstare a
animalelor (JO L 165, 30.4.2004).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 669/2009 al Comisiei din 24 iulie 2009 de punere în aplicare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 882/2004 al Parlamentului

European și al Consiliului în ceea ce privește controalele oficiale consolidate efectuate asupra importurilor de anumite produse de hrană pentru
animale și alimentare de origine neanimală și de modificare a Deciziei 2006/504/CE (JO L 194, 25.7.2009, p. 11).

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 289

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003334/12**

**to the Commission**
**Rareş-Lucian Niculescu (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Toxicity of fruit and vegetables produced in Turkey

The organisation Greenpeace has published a report regarding the level of toxicity in fruit and vegetables produced in
Turkey. According to the report, 76 different types of fruit and vegetables originating in Turkey and imported into
the EU were analysed between 2009 and 2010. Tests revealed the presence of certain chemical substances that were
above normal permitted limits, and in over half of the products tested, they found pesticides above normal permitted
limits.

Among the most toxic fruit and vegetables of Turkish origin were peppers, pears and grapes. The authorities in
Russia, the Netherlands and Germany have warned Turkey about the risk presented by these products. The
Commission is asked to answer the following questions:

1. Does the Commission have any knowledge of and has it studied this report?

2. Does the Commission consider it necessary to issue new public health protection measures?

3. Has the Commission broached this subject or does it plan to do so in its discussions with Turkey?

**Answer given by Mr Dalli on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

1. The Commission is aware of the mentioned Greenpeace report.

2. There is a comprehensive body of legislation to ensure that food is safe and wholesome, and that food imported
into the Union complies with EU safety standards. In particular, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 ( [1] ) and Regulation (EC)
No 882/2004 ( [2] ) are the two main tools in order to achieve this objective.

In addition to the above measures, a list of food and feed commodities which require an increased level of controls
prior to their introduction into the EU was established by the Commission in Annex I to Regulation (EC) 669/2009 ( [3] )
and is regularly reviewed on the basis of relevant data including records of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
Food (RASFF) and controls carried out by the Member States' competent authorities. At present the list features, with
respect to Turkey, sweet peppers and tomatoes (fresh, chilled or frozen) because of the possible presence of certain
pesticide residues (10 % control frequency at the borders). There are no additional measures considered at this stage.

3. The Commission is in regular contact with Turkey on food safety matters.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of

food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of

compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 of 24 July 2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the

Council as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin and amending
Decision 2006/504/EC (OJ L 194, 25.7.2009, p. 11).

( **|**

( **|**

C 124 E / 290 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-003337/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Anerkennung der Ausbildung von Veterinärmedizinern in Kanada

Das Übereinkommen über die Anerkennung von Qualifikationen im Hochschulbereich in der europäischen Region,
das 1997 von Europäischen Rat und mehreren Vertragspartnern, darunter Kanada, unterzeichnet wurde, soll die
Anerkennung von in Europa erworbenen höheren Studienabschlüssen in den unterzeichnenden Ländern
gewährleisten.

In der Überführung in nationale Regelungen hat sich Kanada für eine dezentrale Lösung mit Einschätzungsverfahren
in den Provinzen entschieden, wodurch von europäischen Veterinären die erneute Ablegung einer tiermedizinischen
Prüfung verlangt werden kann. Im Gegenzug werden Hochschulabschlüsse kanadischer Veterinäre in Europa, hier
Deutschland, anerkannt, solange die Gleichwertigkeit der Ausbildung anhand eines Kriterienkatalogs nachgewiesen
werden kann.

1. Befindet sich die Kommission in Verhandlungen mit Kanada, um die aktuelle Umsetzung der Regeln
anzupassen?

2. Welche Bemühungen bestehen seitens der Kommission, diese Ungleichbehandlung abzuschaffen?

**Antwort von Michel Barnier im Namen der Kommission**

_(23. Mai 2012)_

Die Kommission kennt die Inhalte des Übereinkommens über die Anerkennung von Qualifikationen im
Hochschulbereich in der europäischen Region von 1997, das vom Europarat und der Unesco gemeinsam
ausgearbeitet wurde.

Deutschland hat dieses Übereinkommen (das in Deutschland am 1. Oktober 2007 in Kraft getreten ist) ratifiziert,
Kanada hat es unterzeichnet (4. November 2007), aber noch nicht ratifiziert.

Allerdings sind in diesem Übereinkommen Fragen der Anerkennung im Hochschulbereich geregelt, nicht die
Anerkennung im Hinblick auf die Zulassung zu reglementierten Berufen wie beispielsweise dem des Tierarztes, um
die es in der Frage des Herrn Abgeordneten geht.

Da es bisher zwischen der Europäischen Union und Kanada kein Abkommen über die Anerkennung von
Berufsqualifikationen im Hinblick auf den Zugang zu einem reglementierten Beruf gibt, steht es beiden Seiten frei,
eigene Anerkennungsverfahren festzulegen.

Allerdings verhandelt die Europäische Union derzeit mit Kanada über ein umfassendes Wirtschafts‐ und
Handelsabkommen (CETA); dieses Abkommen enthält ein Kapitel, in dem die Verfahren für die Aufnahme und
Durchführung nachfolgender Verhandlungen über Abkommen über die gegenseitige Anerkennung bestimmter
Berufe vorgesehen sind. Nach Inkrafttreten des CETA können die Europäische Union und Kanada unter Einbeziehung
von Berufsverbänden und zuständigen Behörden solche Abkommen über die gegenseitige Anerkennung bestimmter
Berufe aushandeln.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 291

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003337/12**

**to the Commission**
**Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Recognition of the qualifications of veterinary surgeons in Canada

The Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region, signed
by the Council of Europe and a number of other parties, including Canada, in 1997, is intended to ensure that higher
education qualifications gained in Europe are recognised in the signatory countries.

As regards transposition into national law, Canada has chosen a decentralised approach involving an assessment
process in the provinces, on the basis of which European veterinary surgeons may be required to pass another
veterinary examination. Conversely, the university degrees of Canadian veterinary surgeons are recognised in the
European Union, in this case in Germany, provided that the equivalence of the qualification can be proven in
accordance with a given set of criteria.

1. Is the Commission involved in negotiations to persuade Canada to change the way it currently implements
these rules?

2. What steps is the Commission taking to remedy this form of unequal treatment?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

The Commission is aware of the 1997 Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education
in the European Region which was elaborated jointly by the Council of Europe and Unesco.

Germany has ratified the Convention (entry into force in Germany on 1st October 2007) while Canada has signed the
convention (4th November 2007) but has not ratified it yet.

The Convention however covers academic recognition issues and not recognition for the purposes of admission to
regulated professions, such as veterinaries, as raised in the question of the Honourable Member.

As there is currently no agreement between the European Union and Canada concerning recognition of professional
qualifications with a view of accessing a regulated profession, both parties remain free to adopt their own recognition
procedures.

However, the European Union is currently negotiating with Canada a Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) which contains a chapter setting up the procedural framework for the initiation and the conduct
of subsequent negotiations on profession-specific mutual recognition agreements. Once the CETA agreement enters
into force, the European Union and Canada may start the negotiations, with the involvement of professional bodies
and competent authorities, to adopt such profession-specific mutual recognition agreements.

C 124 E / 292 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-003338/12**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej / Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – sprawa Siergieja Magnickiego

Siergiej Magnicki, rosyjski prawnik, który pracował dla Hermitage Capital Management, został zatrzymany po
oskarżeniu przedstawicieli rosyjskich władz o oszustwo finansowe i zmarł w wyniku tortur i zaniedbania po
spędzeniu 358 dni w więzieniu. Parlament Europejski zwrócił uwagę na tę sprawę i wezwał do zastosowania sankcji
wizowych wobec rosyjskich urzędników, którzy bezpodstawnie aresztowali i torturowali Siergieja Magnickiego,
doprowadzili do jego śmierci, a następnie zataili zbrodnię, oraz do zamrożenia ich aktywów. Wygląda na to, że nie
ma żadnych postępów w tej sprawie.

— Jakie kroki poczyniła Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych (ESDZ) od czasu uchwalenia przez Parlament
Europejski rezolucji w sprawie Siergieja Magnickiego w grudniu 2011 r.?

— Czy ESDZ wezwała rosyjski rząd do przerwania pośmiertnych prześladowań Siergieja Magnickiego?

— Czy ESDZ wezwała rosyjski rząd do przerwania prześladowań matki Siergieja Magnickiego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel i Wiceprzewodniczącą Komisji Catherine Ashton**

**w imieniu Komisji**

_(8 czerwca 2012 r.)_

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca należycie uwzględniła rezolucje Parlamentu Europejskiego
w odniesieniu do sprawy Siergieja Magnickiego. ESDZ i Komisja uważnie śledzą tę sprawę i powracają do niej przy
każdej okazji kontaktów z władzami rosyjskimi, w tym na spotkaniach na najwyższym szczeblu. Ostatnią okazję do
omówienia tej kwestii stanowił szczyt UE-Rosja, który odbył się dnia 15 grudnia 2011 r. Również w październiku
2011 r. na szczeblu PPC w zakresie wymiaru sprawiedliwości i spraw wewnętrznych, komisarz Cecilia Malmström
poruszyła tę kwestię na spotkaniu z jej rosyjskim odpowiednikiem. UE stale i w sposób wyraźny podnosi tę kwestię
z Rosją podczas konsultacji w sprawie praw człowieka, w tym podczas ich ostatniej rundy w listopadzie 2011 r.

Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel i podległe jej służby uczestniczyły w licznych debatach w Parlamencie
Europejskim dotyczących tej kwestii, podkreślając wagę tej sprawy dla UE i jej dialogu z Rosją. UE podtrzymuje
stanowisko, że szczegółowe dochodzenie w sprawie śmierci Siergieja Magnickiego należy zakończyć w jak
najszybszym terminie, tak aby postawić wszystkich sprawców przed wymiarem sprawiedliwości. Ponadto
pośmiertne postępowanie karne w sprawie Siergieja Magnickiego powinno zostać zamknięte. Naciski wywierane na
matkę Siergieja Magnickiego i wdowę po nim są w tym kontekście nie do przyjęcia. Wysoka
Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca pragnie zapewnić Szanownego Pana Posła, że wraz z podległymi jej służbami
będzie ona nadal uważnie monitorować rozwój sytuacji w tej sprawie.

Przewodniczący Herman Van Rompuy poruszył niedawno przypadek Siergieja Magnickiego w piśmie do prezydenta
Dmitrija Miedwiediewa, ponownie wyrażając zaniepokojenie UE tą sprawą. Podkreślił on wagę przedstawienia
wiarygodnych i dokładnych wyników postępowania w tej symbolicznej sprawie.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 293

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-003338/12**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Sergei Magnitsky case

Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who worked for Hermitage Capital Management, was detained after accusing
Russian officials of fraud and died as a result of torture and neglect after 358 days in prison. The European Parliament
drew attention to this case, calling for visa sanctions and asset freezes on the Russian officials who falsely arrested,
tortured and killed Sergei Magnitsky and then covered up the crime. It seems that there is a lack of progress on this

matter.

— What steps has the European External Action Service (EEAS) taken since the European Parliament adopted its
resolution on Sergei Magnitsky in December 2011?

— Has the EEAS called on the Russian Government to stop the posthumous prosecution of Sergei Magnitsky?

— Has the EEAS called on the Russian Government to stop persecuting Sergei Magnitsky’s mother?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 June 2012)_

The HR/VP has taken full note of the European Parliament’s resolutions with regard to Mr Magnitsky’s case. The EEAS
and the Commission have been following this case very closely, raising it with the Russian authorities at every
opportunity, including at the highest level. The latest opportunity to discuss this issue was during the last EU‐Russia
Summit on 15 December 2011. Also, in October, 2011, at the Justice and Home Affairs PPC, Commissioner
Malmstrom raised our concerns with her Russian counterpart. The EU has been continuously and prominently
raising the case at its human rights consultations with Russia, including at the latest round in November, 2011.

The HR/VP and her services have participated in numeours debates on this issue in the European Parliament, stressing
the importance of this case to the EU and its dialogue with Russia. The EU’s position remains that the comprehensive
investigation into the death of Sergey Magnitsky has to be brought to conclusion as soon as possible, bringing all
perpetrators to justice. Furthermore, the posthumous prosecution of Sergey Magnitsky should be closed. The pressure
exerted on Sergey Magnitsky’s mother and widow in this context is unacceptable. HR/VP would like to assure the
Honourable Member that she and her services will continue monitoring the developments in this case very closely.

President Van Rompuy has recently raised the specific case of Sergey Magnitsky in a letter to President Medvedev,
reiterating EU concerns and underlining the importance of bringing the investigation of this emblematic case to a
credible and thorough conclusion.

C 124 E / 294 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-003339/12**

**aan de Commissie**
**Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 maart 2012)_

_Betreft:_ Artikel 10 quater van de richtlijn tot vaststelling van een regeling voor de handel in broeikasgasemissierechten

Krachtens artikel 10 quater van Richtlijn 2003/87/EG kunnen de lidstaten een voorlopige kosteloze toewijzing geven
aan installaties waarvoor het investeringsproces eind 2008 fysiek was geïnitieerd. De betrokken lidstaat legt de
Commissie een nationaal plan voor dat voorziet in investeringen in de aanpassing en modernisering van de
infrastructuur en schone technologieën. Het nationale plan voorziet ook in de diversificatie van de energiemix en de
bevoorradingsbronnen van de lidstaat, voor een bedrag dat in de mate van het mogelijke gelijk is aan de marktwaarde
van de kosteloze toewijzing. Acht lidstaten hebben een aanvraag tot deze afwijking ingediend, voor in het totaal bijna
700 miljoen kosteloze toewijzingen.

1. Kan de Commissie de aanvragen van de acht lidstaten openbaar maken?

2. Meer dan de helft van de Poolse investeringen in het nationale plan (ter waarde van bijna 4 miljard euro) zouden
leiden tot een aanhoudende afhankelijkheid van steenkool.

a) Op basis van welke criteria denkt de Commissie de diversificatie van energiebronnen waarnaar gestreefd wordt in
de nationale plannen te beoordelen?

b) Is de Commissie van mening dat meer steenkoolcentrales in Polen zullen leiden tot de modernisering en
diversificatie van de energiemix van dat land?

c) Zal de Commissie vereisen dat deze steenkoolcentrales geschikt worden gemaakt voor het afvangen en opslaan van
koolstof opdat de EU niet vast komt te zitten aan koolstofintensieve infrastructuur die niet strookt met onze
klimaatdoelstellingen op lange termijn?

3. De Poolse aanvraag bevat 14 niet-subsidiabele steenkoolcentrales die niet fysiek geïnitieerd waren aan het einde
van 2008. Is de Commissie daarvan op de hoogte en zal de Commissie aanvragen die niet in aanmerking komen voor
kosteloze toewijzingen verwerpen?

4. In de Poolse aanvraag worden de installaties waarvoor een aanvraag voor kosteloze toewijzingen werd
ingediend ook opgenomen in het nationale plan. Leidt dit niet tot „dubbeltelling”, aangezien de centrales die kosteloze
toewijzingen ontvangen tevens als „compenserende” investeringen zouden worden aangemerkt in het nationale plan?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie**

_(27 april 2012)_

1. Sommige lidstaten hebben hun aanvragen in het kader van artikel 10 quater van de richtlijn inzake de EUregeling voor de emissiehandel (EU ETS) ( [1] ) reeds bekendgemaakt. De Commissie pleegt momenteel overleg met de
overige lidstaten van de Europese Unie met het oog op de bekendmaking van hun aanvragen.

2(a). De Commissie onderzoekt de in de Poolse aanvraag voorgestelde investeringen volledig in overeenstemming
met het rechtskader. Artikel 10 quater vereist „investeringen in de aanpassing en modernisering van de infrastructuur
en schone technologieën” en „diversificatie van de energiemix en de bevoorradingsbronnen.”

2(b). De lidstaten zijn zeer goed in staat om te bepalen welke investeringen het best kunnen bijdragen aan de
modernisering van hun elektriciteitsproductiesector. De eis inzake de diversificatie van de energiemix wordt in de
richtlijn niet gekwantificeerd.

2(c). Zie antwoord 2(a). Het is geen wettelijk vereiste uit hoofde van artikel 10 quater dat alleen mag worden
geïnvesteerd in kolengestookte centrales die geschikt zijn voor het afvangen en opslaan van koolstof.

3. De Commissie beoordeelt momenteel de door de lidstaten ingediende aanvragen die in aanmerking komen voor
toepassing van artikel 10 quater van de EU-ETS-richtlijn. Zij kan niet op het resultaat van deze beoordelingen
vooruitlopen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) PB L 275 van 25.10.2003.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 295

4. De kosteloze emissierechten die beschikbaar komen in het kader van artikel 10 quater van de EU-ETS-richtlijn
vormen, zodra zij zijn uitgegeven, een verplichting om te investeren in de modernisering van de
elektriciteitsproductie. Dergelijke investeringen moeten bovenop de investeringen komen die het gevolg zijn van
gewone marktontwikkelingen. Zo niet, dan zou er geen overeenkomstige bijdrage worden geleverd aan de
verwezenlijking van de doelstelling van artikel 10 quater van de EU-ETS-richtlijn.

C 124 E / 296 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003339/12**

**to the Commission**
**Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Article 10c of the Emissions Trading Scheme Directive

Under Article 10c of Directive 2003/87/EC, certain Member States may give transitional free allocation to
installations for which the investment process was physically initiated by the end of 2008. These Member States ‘shall
submit to the Commission a national plan that provides for investments in retrofitting and upgrading of the
infrastructure and clean technologies. The national plan shall also provide for the diversification of their energy mix
and sources of supply’ for an equivalent amount to the market value of the free allocation. Eight Member States have
submitted applications for this derogation for a total of nearly 700 million free allowances.

1. Can the Commission make the applications by the eight Member States publicly available?

2. More than half of the Polish investments in the national plan (to the tune of almost EUR 4 billion) would lead to
a continued dependence on coal.

(a) On the basis of which criteria is the Commission planning to assess the diversification of energy sources aimed for
in the national plans?

(b) Is the Commission of the opinion that more coal power plants in Poland will lead to the modernisation and
diversification of its energy mix?

(c) Will the Commission require that these coal plants be carbon capture and storage-ready in order for the EU not to
lock itself into a high-carbon infrastructure that is incompatible with our long-term climate targets?

3. The Polish application contains 14 ineligible coal-fired power plants that were not physically initiated by the
end of 2008. Is the Commission aware of this and will the Commission reject applications that do not qualify for free
allocations?

4. In the Polish application the same installations that applied for free allocation are also listed in the national plan.
Would this not lead to ‘double counting’, since the same power plants that receive free allowances would also be
classified as ‘compensatory’ investments in the national plan?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 April 2012)_

1. Some Member States have already published their applications under Article 10c of the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) Directive ( [1] ). The Commission is currently discussing with remaining Member States with a view to
publishing their applications too.

2(a). The Commission is assessing the investments proposed in the Polish application strictly in line with the legal
framework. Article 10c requires ‘investments in retrofitting and upgrading of the infrastructure and clean
technologies’ as well as ‘diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply’.

2(b). Member States are well positioned to decide which investments would best contribute to the modernisation of
their electricity generation sector. The requirement concerning the diversification of the energy mix is not quantified
in the directive.

2(c). See answer 2(a). It is not a legal requirement under Article 10c to invest only in coal power plants that are ready
for carbon capture and storage.

3. The Commission is currently assessing the applications submitted by Member States eligible for application of
Article 10c of the EU ETS Directive. It cannot pre-empt the outcome of these assessments.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 275, 25.10.2003.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 297

4. The free allowances made available under Article 10c of the EU ETS Directive constitute, once issued, an
obligation to invest in modernisation of electricity generation. Such kind of investments must come in addition to
investments triggered by normal market developments. Otherwise, there would not be a corresponding contribution
to reaching the objective of Article 10c of the EU ETS Directive.

C 124 E / 298 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003340/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Export von Geflügelfleisch nach Afrika

Seit Jahren nimmt der Export tiefgefrorener Hühnerteile, die nicht den europäischen Ernährungsgewohnheiten
entsprechen, in verschiedene afrikanische Länder deutlich zu. Das billige Hühnerfleisch aus der EU setzt die
Geflügelzucht in Afrika stark unter Druck und zerstört die einzige Einnahmequelle vieler afrikanischer Kleinbauern.
Außerdem stellt das Tiefkühlfleisch aufgrund oftmals unterbrochener Kühlketten ein Risiko für die
Lebensmittelsicherheit dar.

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Kommission gebeten, die folgenden Fragen zu beantworten:

1. In welchem Umfang sind die Exporte von Hühnerfleisch aus der EU in afrikanische Länder in den letzten
Jahren gestiegen?

2. Wie gewährleistet die Kommission, dass eine Öffnung der Märkte nicht zu einer Einbahnstraße für europäische
Billignahrungsmittel wird, was zu einem Zusammenbruch der lokalen Märkte führt?

3. Mit welchen Maßnahmen versucht die Kommission zu gewährleisten, dass die in der EU geltenden
hygienerechtlichen Auflagen für den Transport von Geflügelfleisch auch auf den Export europäischer Produkte
angewendet werden, um eine Gefährdung der Konsumenten in Drittstaaten zu vermeiden?

4. Wie beurteilt die Kommission das Vorgehen des IWF und der Weltbank, die Nichtumsetzung von geplanten
Zollerhöhungen für Geflügelimporte zu einer Bedingung für die Vergabe neuer Kredite zu machen?

**Antwort von Herrn Cioloș im Namen der Kommission**

_(31. Mai 2012)_

1. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren waren die EU-Geflügelexporte in afrikanische Länder südlich der Sahara mit
200 000 bis 300 000 Tonnen relativ stabil, stiegen aber 2011 auf rund 440 000 Tonnen (Südafrika führte 2011
große Geflügelmengen ein). Doch nicht nur die EU liefert Geflügel nach Afrika: Die brasilianischen Geflügelexporte
liegen weit über den EU-Exporten von Geflügelfleisch (539 000 Tonnen im Jahr 2010), während die Geflügel‐exporte
der USA gegenwärtig mit denen der EU vergleichbar sind.

2. Für diese EU-Exporte bestehen keinerlei Vorzugszölle. Im Rahmen der Verhandlungen zum
Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (WPA) haben die AKP-Partnerländer die Möglichkeit, bestimmte Erzeugnisse
von der Liberalisierung auszunehmen, um sensible Erzeugnisse zu schützen; dies gilt auch für das regionale
westafrikanische WPA, das derzeit ausgehandelt wird.

3. Das gesamte von der EU exportierte Geflügelfleisch muss die EU-Vorschriften zur Tiergesundheit und
Lebensmittelsicherheit erfüllen. Sobald das Geflügelfleisch die EU-Außengrenzen passiert hat, geht die Verantwortung
für die Einhaltung der Gesundheits‐vorschriften, insbesondere für die unterbrechungsfreie Kühlkette, auf die
Transporteure/ Importeure über. Die zuständige Behörde des Einfuhrlands muss die dort für Importe geltenden
gesetzlichen Hygienevorschriften überwachen.

4. Die Kommission unterstützt grundsätzlich die regionale Integration im Bereich der AKP-Staaten, einschließlich
der Errichtung von Zollunionen (siehe Punkt 2), und respektiert die jeweilige von den internationalen Organisationen
in ihren Zuständigkeitsbereichen verfolgte Politik, auch wenn sie vielleicht selbst eine andere Politik verfolgt.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 299

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003340/12**

**to the Commission**
**Horst Schnellhardt (PPE)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Export of poultry meat to Africa

The export to various African countries of frozen chicken portions that are not part of the standard European diet has
been increasing for many years. Cheap chicken meat from the EU is placing enormous pressure on poultry producers
in Africa and destroying the only source of income for many African smallholders. In addition, the frozen meat can
pose a threat to food safety, because the refrigeration chain is often disrupted.

In view of this, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. To what extent has the export of chicken meat from the EU to African countries increased in recent years?

2. How does the Commission ensure that an opening in the market does not lead to a one-way street for cheap
European foodstuffs, causing the collapse of the local markets?

3. What measures is the Commission taking to try to ensure that the hygiene regulations that apply to the
transport of poultry meat within the EU are also applied to the export of European products, so as to avoid
endangering consumers in third countries?

4. How does the Commission assess the approach taken by the IMF and the World Bank in making the
abandonment of planned increases in customs duties on poultry imports a condition for the provision of new
loans?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 May 2012)_

1. Over the last decade, EU poultry exports to Sub-Saharan Africa were relatively stable between 200 000 and
300 000 tonnes but increased to about 440 000 tonnes in 2011 (South Africa imported large quantities of poultry in
2011). The EU is not the only supplier of poultry to Africa: Brazilian poultry exports exceed by far EU poultry exports
(539 000 tonnes in 2010) while US poultry exports are nowadays equalling EU exports.

2. These EU exports take place without any preferential tariff reduction. In the framework of the Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, the ACP partner countries have the possibility to exclude certain products
from liberalisation in order to protect sensitive products, which also applies to the regional West African EPA
currently under negotiation.

3. All poultry meat exported from the EU must meet the EU requirements on animal health and food safety. Once
poultrymeat has left the EU’s borders, the transporters/importers are responsible for the maintenance of good
sanitary standards, in particular the continuation of the cold chain. The importing country’s Competent Authority
must follow its own legal requirements on sanitary inspections at import.

4. As general principle, the Commission supports ACP regional integration, including the establishment of
customs unions (cf. 2), and respects relevant policies of international organisations in their respective areas of
competence, without necessarily following identical policies itself.

C 124 E / 300 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-003341/12**

**an die Kommission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(28. März 2012)_

_Betrifft:_ Kommission lässt Forschung zu neuen Überwachungssystemen betreiben

Die Europäische Kommission prämiert im Frühjahr 2012 zwei Forscherkonsortien und unterstützt diese mit jeweils
einer Milliarde Euro, verteilt auf zehn Jahre. Eines der Konsortien, die die letzte Runde erreicht haben, ist das
Trägerkonsortium des Projekts „Guardian Angels“.

„Guardian Angels“ forscht zu winzigen Hightech-Assistenten, die in allen Lebenssituationen helfend und schützend
zur Seite stehen sollen. Sie sollen dabei eigenständig und ohne externe Energiezufuhr funktionieren. Das Konsortium
wirbt mit Funktionen im Gesundheitsbereich, wie etwa damit, dass der Blutzuckerspiegel von Diabetikern oder
Vitalparameter von gefährdeten Personengruppen ständig überwacht werden. Laut dem Konsortium sind dem Einsatz
aber keine Grenzen gesetzt. Menschen sollen auch vor gefährlichen Verkehrssituationen oder Pollenwolken gewarnt
werden usw.

Aufgrund der geringen Größe dieser Hightech-Assistenten und der Energieunabhängigkeit sind sie für
Überwachungszwecke prädestiniert. Es ist offensichtlich, dass Militär und Sicherheitsbehörden die Möglichkeiten der
„Guardian Angels“ nutzen werden, sobald diese verfügbar sind. Sie ermöglichen eine umfassende Überwachung von
Personen, die Sorgen weckt, die weit über die aktuellen Befürchtungen hinsichtlich „gläserner Bürgerinnen und
Bürger“ hinausgehen. Das Projekt untergräbt auf fundamentale Art und Weise die Grund‐ und Bürgerrechte der
Menschen.

— Welche Funktionen weisen die „Guardian Angels“ auf, die für das Militär, für Sicherheitsbehörden und für
Geheimdienste von Bedeutung sein können?

— Wird es möglich sein oder wird im Rahmen des Projektes „Guardian Angels“ oder anderer Projekte daran
geforscht, solche Kleinstgeräte mit Überwachungsfunktionen in vivo, also unter die Haut oder anderswo im Körper
zu implantieren?

— Wie fortgeschritten sind die Forschungen bereits und sind nationale oder europäische Institutionen,
Sicherheitsorgane oder andere Behörden involviert? Welche und inwieweit?

**Antwort von Frau Kroes im Namen der Kommission**

_(23. Mai 2012)_

„Guardian Angels“ ist derzeit noch ein Projekt zur Koordinierung von Maßnahmen, in dessen Rahmen nicht
unmittelbar Forschung betrieben wird. Es gehört zu den sechs Kandidaten für eine Leitinitiative, die sich in einer
Ausschreibung um eine Finanzierung aus Mitteln des RP7 bewerben können; dabei sollen bis Ende 2012 zwei FETLeitinitiativen ausgewählt werden. Die Fragen zu technischen Einzelheiten lassen sich anhand eines vorläufigen
Konzepts für ein Forschungsprojekt, für das noch kein detaillierter Projektvorschlag vorgelegt wurde, nicht
beantworten (siehe: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/530).

Europa nimmt im FuE-Sektor eine anerkannte Führungsrolle im Bereich intelligenter Systeme für Anwendungen in
der Biomedizin, Kommunikation oder dem Fahrzeugbau ein, und eines der wichtigsten Ziele des GA-Konsortiums ist
die Entwicklung von Geräten wie nicht‐invasiven Biosensoren.

Bedenken hinsichtlich möglicher nachteiliger Auswirkungen, des Missbrauchs oder eines doppelten
Verwendungszwecks bestehen praktisch bei allen neuen Technologien, aber es ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass das GAKonzept ausschließlich auf zivile Anwendungen ausgerichtet ist. Im Zuge des Bewertungsverfahrens werden alle
Vorschläge eingehend geprüft, um sicherzustellen, dass sie solchen Bedenken Rechnung tragen.

Über die übliche Ethikprüfung hinaus wird ausdrücklich verlangt, dass die Vorschläge auch ethische und rechtliche
Auswirkungen berücksichtigen und die ordnungsgemäße Beteiligung von Behörden und Endnutzern vorsehen.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 301

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003341/12**

**to the Commission**
**Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ The Commission encourages research into new monitoring systems

In early 2012, the European Commission awarded two research consortia a funding of EUR 1 billion each, spread out
over 10 years. One of the consortia to have reached the final stage is the group behind the ‘Guardian Angels’ project.

‘Guardian Angels’ conducts research into tiny high-tech assistants that should provide help and protection in all
aspects of life. They are to operate independently and without an external energy supply. The consortium promises
functions in the health sector, such as continuously monitoring blood sugar levels in diabetics, or vital signs of people
at risk. According to the consortium, there are no limits to the applications of this technology. It should also be
possible to warn people about dangerous traffic situations or pollen clouds, etc.

Because these high-tech assistants are so small and have an independent energy source, they are perfect for
surveillance applications. It is obvious that military and security authorities will make use of these ‘Guardian Angels’
as soon as they become available. They will enable extensive surveillance of personnel, giving rise to concerns that go
far beyond current worries in relation to ‘transparency among our citizens’. The project undermines people’s basic
civil rights in a fundamental way.

— What functions do the ‘Guardian Angels’ offer that may be of significance for the military, for security authorities
and intelligence services?

— Will it be possible to implant such tiny devices _in vivo_, in other words under the skin or elsewhere on the body, for
surveillance purposes, or are such applications being researched as part of the ‘Guardian Angels’ project or other
projects?

— What stage of advancement has research already reached and are national or European institutions, security bodies
or other authorities involved? Which ones and to what extent?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 May 2012)_

‘Guardian Angels’ (GA) is currently a coordination action project that does not carry out research, but is one of six
flagship candidates that may compete for funding in an FP7 evaluation process foreseen to select two FET Flagship
Initiatives at the end of 2012. It is impossible to provide the technological details requested on the basis of a
preliminary concept of a research project for which no detailed project proposal has been submitted yet (see
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/530).

Europe is a recognised leader in R & D for smart systems, addressing sectors such as biomedicine, communication or
automotive, and the GA consortium has as one of its key goals to provide devices like non-invasive bio-sensors.

Concerns on potential adverse impact, misuse, or dual use will apply to almost any new technology, but it is
important to note that the GA concept targets solely civilian applications. During the evaluation process, all
proposals will be scrutinized to ensure they address such concerns.

In addition to the standard ethical screening, proposals will to be explicitly requested to address ethical and legal
implications, as well as to plan due engagement with authorities and end-users.

C 124 E / 302 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-003342/12**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(28 Μαρτίου 2012)_

_Θέμα:_ Προκλητικές δηλώσεις Νταβούτογλου ενόψει της Κυπριακής Προεδρίας της ΕΕ

Κατά τη διάρκεια πρόσφατης εκδήλωσης, του Κέντρου Ευρωπαϊκής Πολιτικής (European Policy Centre) στις 23 Μαρτίου
2012, ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας, Αχμέτ Νταβούτογλου, προέβη σε ανησυχητικές δηλώσεις σχετικά με το
Κυπριακό και την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Συγκεκριμένα ανέφερε:

«Από πρώτης Ιουλίου, μόλις αναλάβει την προεδρία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης η Κύπρος, θα διακόψουμε κάθε επικοινωνία,
επίσημη ή ανεπίσημη».

Επιπρόσθετα, δήλωσε «ότι αυτή η προεδρία είναι παράνομη», και για ακόμη μια φορά ότι «δεν αναγνωρίζουμε τους
Ελληνοκύπριους».

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη αυτές τις επαναλαμβανόμενες δηλώσεις και την ενταξιακή προοπτική της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ, ερωτάται η
Επιτροπή:

1. Πώς σκοπεύει να αντιδράσει στην περίπτωση που, την 1η Ιουλίου, η Τουρκία διακόψει κάθε επικοινωνία με την
προεδρία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης; Με ποιο τρόπο θα ενεργήσει η Επιτροπή ώστε να αποτρέψει αυτό το ενδεχόμενο;

2. Έχει λάβει δεόντως υπόψη ότι η Τουρκία, όντας χώρα υπό ένταξη στην ΕΕ, με τέτοιες συμπεριφορές, αμφισβητεί
έμμεσα και άμεσα την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση στο σύνολό της; Υπάρχει πρόβλεψη για κυρώσεις ή άλλα μέτρα
συμμόρφωσης για μια χώρα που, ενώ θέλει να απολαμβάνει τα οφέλη της ΕΕ, την ίδια ώρα απειλεί και αμφισβητεί τα
κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα ενός κράτους μέλους της;

**Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Μαΐου 2012)_

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος στην απάντηση της προς την κοινοβουλευτική ερώτηση E-002681/2012 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 303

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003342/12**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Provocative declarations by Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu in view of the Cypriot Presidency of the EU

During a function at the European Policy Centre on 23 March 2012, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet
Davutoğlu, made alarming declarations in relation to the Cyprus problem and the European Union. Specifically, he
said:

‘From the first of July, as soon as Cyprus takes over the presidency of the European Union, we will terminate all
communication, official and unofficial.’

Moreover, he declared that ‘this presidency is illegal’, once again emphasising that ‘we do not recognise the Greek
Cypriots’.

Taking into account these repeated declarations and Turkey’s prospect of joining the EU, will the Commission say:

1. How does it intend to react when, on 1 July, Turkey terminates all communication with the presidency of the
European Union? How will it act to avert such a possibility?

2. Has it given due thought to the fact that Turkey, a candidate country for EU membership, is directly and
indirectly calling into question the European Union as a whole through such behaviour? Is there any provision
for sanctions or other disciplinary measures against a country which, while seeking to benefit from EU
membership, is threatening and questioning the sovereign rights of one of its Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 May 2012)_

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its reply to parliamentary Question
E-002681/2012 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/home.jsp

C 124 E / 304 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2013

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003343/12**

**do Komisji**
**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(28 marca 2012 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Sprawa Siergieja Magnickiego

Siergiej Magnicki, rosyjski prawnik, który pracował dla Hermitage Capital Management, został zatrzymany po
oskarżeniu przedstawicieli rosyjskich władz o oszustwo finansowe i zmarł w wyniku tortur i zaniedbania po
spędzeniu 358 dni w więzieniu. Parlament Europejski zwrócił uwagę na tę sprawę i wezwał do zastosowania sankcji
wizowych wobec rosyjskich urzędników, którzy bezpodstawnie aresztowali i torturowali Siergieja Magnickiego,
doprowadzili do jego śmierci, a następnie zataili zbrodnię, oraz do zamrożenia ich aktywów. Wygląda na to, że nie
ma żadnych postępów w tej sprawie.

— Jakie kroki poczyniła Komisja od czasu uchwalenia przez Parlament Europejski rezolucji w sprawie Siergieja
Magnickiego w grudniu 2011 r.?

— Czy José Manuel Barroso zwrócił się w sprawie Siergieja Magnickiego do prezydenta Rosji?

— Czy Komisja wezwała rosyjski rząd do wszczęcia postępowania wobec rosyjskich urzędników odpowiedzialnych
za bezprawne aresztowanie, tortury i śmierć Siergieja Magnickiego?

— Czy Komisja wezwała rosyjski rząd do przerwania pośmiertnych prześladowań Siergieja Magnickiego?

— Czy Komisja wezwała rosyjski rząd do przerwania prześladowań matki Siergieja Magnickiego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(22 czerwca 2012 r.)_

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca należycie uwzględniła rezolucje Parlamentu w odniesieniu do sprawy
Siergieja Magnickiego. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca uważnie śledzi tę sprawę i powraca do niej przy
każdej okazji kontaktów z władzami rosyjskimi, w tym na spotkaniach na najwyższym szczeblu. Ostatnią okazją do
omówienia tej kwestii był szczyt UE-Rosja, który odbył się dnia 15 grudnia 2011 r. Również w październiku 2011 r.
na szczeblu Stałej Rady Partnerstwa w zakresie wymiaru sprawiedliwości i spraw wewnętrznych komisarz
odpowiedzialny za sprawy wewnętrzne poruszył tę kwestię na spotkaniu ze swoim rosyjskim odpowiednikiem. UE
stale i wyraźnie podnosi tę kwestię z Rosją podczas konsultacji w sprawie praw człowieka, w tym podczas ich
ostatniej rundy w listopadzie 2011 r.

Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel uczestniczyła w licznych debatach w Parlamencie poświęconych tej
kwestii, podkreślając wagę tej sprawy dla UE i jej dialogu z Rosją. UE podtrzymuje stanowisko, że szczegółowe
dochodzenie w sprawie śmierci Siergieja Magnickiego należy jak najszybciej zakończyć, tak aby postawić wszystkich
sprawców przed wymiarem sprawiedliwości. Ponadto pośmiertne postępowanie karne w sprawie Siergieja
Magnickiego, jak również prześladowania jego matki i wdowy są nie do zaakceptowania i powinny zostać zamknięte.
Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca pragnie zapewnić Szanownego Pana Posła, że wraz z podległymi jej
służbami będzie nadal uważnie monitorować rozwój sytuacji w tej sprawie.

Przewodniczący Herman Van Rompuy poruszył niedawno sprawę Siergieja Magnickiego w piśmie do prezydenta
Dmitrija Miedwiediewa, wyrażając zaniepokojenie UE tym przypadkiem. Podkreślił też istotne znaczenie
przedstawienia wiarygodnych i dokładnych wyników postępowania w tej symbolicznej sprawie.

30.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124 E / 305

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-003343/12**

**to the Commission**
**Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)**

_(28 March 2012)_

_Subject:_ Sergei Magnitsky case

Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who worked for Hermitage Capital Management, was detained after accusing
Russian officials of fraud and died as a result of torture and neglect after 358 days in prison. The European Parliament
drew attention to this case, calling for visa sanctions and asset freezes on the Russian officials who falsely arrested,
tortured and killed Sergei Magnitsky and then covered up the crime. It seems that there is a lack of progress on this

matter.

— What steps has the Commission taken since the European Parliament adopted its resolution on Sergei Magnitsky
in December 2011?

— Has Jose Manuel Barroso brought up the Magnitsky case with the Russian President?

— Has the Commission called on the Russian Government to prosecute the Russian officials involved in the false
arrest, torture and death of Sergei Magnitsky?

— Has the Commission called on the Russian Government to stop the posthumous prosecution of Sergei Magnitsky?

— Has the Commission called on the Russian Government to stop persecuting Sergei Magnitsky’s mother?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 June 2012)_

The HR/VP has taken full note of Parliament’s resolutions with regard to Mr Magnitsky’s case. The HR/VP has been
following this case very closely, raising it with the Russian authorities at every opportunity, including at the highest
level. The latest opportunity to discuss this issue was during the last EU‐Russia Summit on 15 December 2011. Also,
in October 2011, at the Justice and Home Affairs PPC, the Commissioner responsible for Home Affairs raised
concerns with her Russian counterpart. The EU has been continuously and prominently raising the case at its human
rights consultations with Russia, including at the latest round in November 2011.

The HR/VP has participated in numeours debates on this issue in Parliament, stressing the importance of this case to
the EU and its dialogue with Russia. The EU’s position remains that the comprehensive investigation into the death of
Sergey Magnitsky has to be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible, bringing all perpetrators to justice.
Furthermore, the posthumous prosecution of Sergey Magnitsky, as well as the persecution of Sergey Magnitsky’s
mother and widow, are unacceptable and should be closed. The HR/VP would like to assure the Honourable Member
that she and her services will continue monitoring the developments in this case very closely.

President Van Rompuy has recently raised the specific case of Sergey Magnitsky in a letter to President Medvedev,
expressing EU concerns and underlining the importance of bringing the investigation of this emblematic case to a
credible and thorough conclusion.

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