Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| European flag | Official Journal  of the European Union | EN  Series C |

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|  | C/2023/1059 | 15.12.2023 |

P9\_TA(2023)0131

Critical technologies for security and defence

European Parliament resolution of 9 May 2023 on Critical technologies for security and defence: state of play and future challenges (2022/2079(INI))

(C/2023/1059)

The European Parliament,

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| — | having regard to the 2021-2027 European Defence Fund, with its dedicated budget for emerging disruptive technologies, |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘First progress report on the implementation of the Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (SWD(2022)0362), |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EEAS’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap [(1)](#ntr1-C_202301059EN.000101-E0001), |

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| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, |

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| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |

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| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0120/2023), |

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| A. | whereas a strong, sustainable, technologically advanced and competitive defence industry is crucial for Europe’s security and defence capabilities and therefore for its prosperity and for supporting its allies and friends; |

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| B. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shown that Europe urgently needs to invest in its defence and security technologies, including ammunition production, on a scale reflecting the needs of the modern battlefield, with joint coordination, procurement and investment in research and development, including cybersecurity, and in an efficient and collaborative manner; whereas the Member States have set a target of 35 % for collaborative defence investments, but have shown little, and even decreasing, political will to meet this target, achieving only 11 % in 2020 and a record low of 8 % in 2021; whereas some Member States have been much more engaged in supporting Ukraine than others, both in financial and military terms; |

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| C. | whereas there is an urgent need to establish a truly European defence equipment market, inter alia, by consolidating industrial capacities, reducing duplication and fragmentation and simultaneously adapting the market’s industrial basis, in particular its supply chains and skilled workforce, to the new security environment in Europe, which demands a rapid increase in production capacities; |

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| D. | whereas a steady, sustainable and stable supply of critical raw materials, technologies and components is vital for Europe’s defence sector; |

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| E. | whereas cutting-edge technologies and corresponding human capital, in particular fast-evolving digital technologies and skills, are increasingly important factors for sustaining and strengthening Europe’s security and defence industries; |

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| F. | whereas the defence sector is structured differently in each Member State; |

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| G. | whereas the fragmentation of Europe’s defence sector and duplication efforts in the European defence market lead to the inefficient use of economic resources and reduced defence capabilities and should be avoided; whereas this amounts to collective losses of EUR 25 to 100 billion, according to the Commission; |

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| H. | whereas some critical technologies which could be available for use in the defence sector originate in the civilian sector and could qualify for dual-use if obstacles were removed; |

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| I. | whereas open research and innovation involving academia, private enterprise and the public sector have the potential to accelerate the development of Europe’s cutting-edge technologies, which have the potential to address market fragmentation, provided that interoperability is ensured; |

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| J. | whereas the increased involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) enhances the competitiveness of the security and defence sector; |

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| K. | whereas the need for structured support for innovation and technological progress should take into account the fact that innovation essentially comes about through competition and the spirit of research, not through bureaucratic planning; |

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| L. | whereas from 2017 to 2020, the Member States participating in the European Defence Agency (EDA) dedicated more than EUR 25 billion towards defence-related research and development (R&D), of which only a small portion has been spent collaboratively; |

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| M. | whereas access to finance for the security and defence industries must not be restricted through EU regulations; |

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| N. | whereas data sharing is key to analysing strategic gaps and realising the potential of technological progress, but the protection of intellectual property and sensitive business data must be guaranteed; |

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| O. | whereas cooperation with strategic partners outside of the EU, especially NATO allies, but also associated and like-minded global partners, is key to enhancing innovation and technological progress; |

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|  | 1. | Welcomes the Commission’s roadmap for critical technologies for security and defence; emphasises the need for greater involvement of the EU in coordinating and facilitating the development of security- and defence-related technology, which should be, to the largest extent possible, compatible with the goals of the European Green Deal, without reducing operational effectiveness; underlines that the EU’s global technological competitiveness is highly dependent on R&D, innovation and the ability to transfer and deploy new technologies and train people rapidly; |

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|  | 2. | Recognises the urgent need, highlighted in the roadmap, to identify technologies critical for EU security and defence, while maintaining the necessary flexibility for the development and application of ground-breaking and disruptive technologies; stresses that the proposal for a coordinated EU-wide strategic approach on critical technologies for security and defence to be taken from the outset is the right way forward; |

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|  | 3. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to overcome the current division between civil, defence and security research, development and innovation; calls on the Commission to better connect EU civil, defence and security programmes and instruments with the relevant stakeholders, in particular in the field of innovation; calls for better targeted investment in common R&D; underlines that increased defence and security research and innovation should not come at the expense of civilian projects; |

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|  | 4. | Regrets the fact that the combined defence research and technology spending of the Member States in 2020 amounted to only 1,2 % of their total defence spending, which falls far below the 2 % benchmark agreed on under the EDA framework; |

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|  | 5. | Underlines that the worsening of the security situation in Europe, especially in countries with external EU borders, following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine demands a stronger and better coordinated effort by the EU and its Member States to invest in and, to the largest extent possible, procure critical security and defence technologies, including ammunition production, and to establish a European defence equipment market; is concerned that the growing global demand for conventional weapon systems, in the context of the war in Ukraine, may have a negative effect on investments in the development of new technologies; |

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|  | 6. | Welcomes the Commission’s establishment of an observatory of critical technologies; calls on the Commission to fully integrate the findings of the observatory into its classified report to the Member States on critical technologies and risks associated with strategic dependencies affecting security, space and defence; emphasises that the protection of intellectual property and sensitive business data must be guaranteed; stresses the need for the Commission, in cooperation with the EDA, to further coordinate, promote and facilitate cooperation and resource pooling among the Member States in order to address the existing and future gaps in technology, reduce the duplication of projects and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of spending; calls on the Commission to keep Parliament duly informed of the main outputs of this observatory; |

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|  | 7. | Calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to review all defence programmes and policy tools, following the approach of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), with a specific focus on critical technologies, to check if they are still fit for purpose and to summarise and share their findings with all other Member States where possible and relevant; calls for a thorough review of relevant defence initiatives, such as the capability development plan, in order to update them in the light of the provisions included in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence and the gap analysis developed by the EDA; suggests that the EDA is well placed to ensure the alignment of innovation activities among European actors in the defence sector; calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of its role in providing support, coordinating suggestions, including a strategic assessment of the findings, and presenting solutions to support common R&D and procurement projects; |

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|  | 8. | Calls on the EDA to include the concept of critical technologies in its annual CARD procedure; |

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|  | 9. | Notes that there is a risk of dependency for the supply of critical materials and of overstretched supply chains that may affect the EU’s ability to stay competitive in the field of critical technologies for security and defence; calls on the Commission to promote circularity and to assess how to increase research on new materials for critical technologies in the critical raw materials act, so as to minimise the EU’s dependency on non-EU countries; |

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|  | 10. | Notes the danger of overdependence on non-EU raw materials and recommends strengthening efforts to avoid this; |

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|  | 11. | Welcomes the creation of an EU defence innovation scheme and the ongoing work with various tools relating to defence and new and dual-use technologies in order to help innovative start-ups and SMEs overcome high technological, administrative, financial, regulatory and market entry hurdles; calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States, as the end users, to integrate cross-border innovation networks into their defence technology supply chains; underlines that these initiatives must aim to improve military capabilities and strive for a high level of EU technological independence; calls on the Commission to duly consider the specific sensitivities of security and defence when establishing initiatives under the EU defence innovation scheme; calls on the Commission to work closely together with the Hub for EU Defence Innovation established within the EDA; |

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|  | 12. | Calls on the Commission to examine EU procurement directives with regard to barriers for start-ups and small businesses, especially in the area of innovation, where the risk of project failure is higher, and to encourage the Member States to avoid such barriers in their implementation; |

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|  | 13. | Stresses the constant need for close coordination with associated and like-minded partners, such as the United States and NATO; welcomes the commitment by the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to exploring EU-US cooperation in the context of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council; welcomes the commitment of the Commission and the VP/HR to exploring mutually agreed upon and beneficial interactions between EU and NATO initiatives focused on new technologies; stresses, however, the need for the EU to build an open strategic autonomy with a special focus on investment in European technologies; |

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|  | 14. | Is concerned about the lack of investment in new, disruptive technologies in the defence and security industries despite the existence of the European Defence Fund Regulation [(2)](#ntr2-C_202301059EN.000101-E0002) (EDF); calls on the Commission to clarify strategic guidelines and regulations in order to foster investment in the defence industry and to establish the necessary cooperative tools and measures to encourage the defence and security industries to invest more in technological innovation in critical technologies for security and defence, in addition to producing existing weapon systems, in full compliance with and following the development of international law and the EU legislative framework; |

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|  | 15. | Stresses the important role of SMEs and start-ups in innovation and development and calls for them to be included in specific programmes and instruments as part of the future implementation of the roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence; |

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|  | 16. | Stresses the need for closer cooperation between the Member States on capability development to boost innovation in critical technologies for security and defence; calls on the relevant EU bodies to prioritise joint projects for EU-financed and co-financed innovation in critical technologies for security and defence and to act as catalysts and accelerators to strongly encourage the Member States to effectively coordinate their capability development programmes; calls further on the Commission and the Member States to consider establishing an EU mechanism to pool national resources for R&D in defence and security, with the sound involvement of Parliament, where appropriate, in its implementation; |

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|  | 17. | Emphasises that EU-financed and co-financed innovation and development in critical and disruptive defence technologies should lead to a higher degree of interoperability and common procurement of defence equipment by the Member States once the technologies developed have reached an appropriate technological readiness level; stresses the equal importance of preventing the duplication of projects at EU level and underlines the importance of minimising existing overlaps and duplications; asks that the appropriate technological readiness level be defined by the Commission in cooperation with the Member States in line with the modern security environment and modern battlefield demands; highlights the need to more closely align the various EU research and innovation programmes in order to foster the development of critical technologies in Europe, while bearing in mind the possibility of making dual-use of existing technologies; |

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|  | 18. | Notes the Commission’s efforts to support the joint procurement of security and defence technologies by the Member States, such as the proposal for a regulation establishing the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act; |

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|  | 19. | Highlights the need for close cooperation between the various stakeholders such as academia and the public and private sectors in order to utilise best practices in security and defence technologies; calls on the Commission to examine the potential of using ‘multiple helix’ models for innovation; |

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|  | 20. | Is concerned about the insufficient level of financing for defence and security from the EU funds and deplores the record low collaboration rate of the Member States on defence procurement; regrets the fact that the EDF’s budget was cut by approximately 40 % relative to the Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), and the fact that the military mobility programme’s budget was reduced by 75 %; stresses the fact that the current MFF will not be able to provide sufficient financial resources to boost EU defence collaboration to an appropriate level, as the current security situation demands a quantum leap; urges the Member States to consider pooling considerable parts of their rising national defence budgets at EU level to jointly replenish depleted ammunition stocks and to jointly purchase weapon systems, including the most complex and expensive ones, such as fighter jets, warships and main battle tanks; calls on the Commission to further develop existing funding schemes and alternatives to significantly increase funding for critical technologies for security and defence under the current MFF, taking into account real needs in terms of industrial investment; |

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|  | 21. | Emphasises that EU regulation, which may impact the European security and defence industries’ access to finance, must be consistent with the EU’s efforts to facilitate the European defence industry's sufficient access to public and private finance and investment; |

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|  | 22. | Emphasises the need for better dual-use of existing civilian technologies and for cross-fertilisation among civilian, military and dual-use innovation in the field of critical technologies for security and defence and highlights the corresponding potential of furthering cooperation among EU programmes; stresses the need for better knowledge-sharing networks for existing and new technologies to enable potential end users and investors to make better use of technologies already on the market or to invest in high potential emerging technologies; |

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|  | 23. | Encourages innovation based on increased resource efficiency, the development of new materials, the promotion of secondary raw materials and more sustainable joint public procurement and the use of environmentally sustainable technology solutions; calls on the Commission to explore, in cooperation with the EDA, the way forward on sustainable security and defence technologies and how the EU’s resilience and its security and defence industries could benefit in line with the EU’s climate change and defence roadmap and its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the very same topic, in particular by reducing the dependence of the EU’s security and defence industries on fossil fuels, and by assessing their vulnerability to climate change and the corresponding need to adapt to it; |

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|  | 24. | Underlines the need to increase investments in ‘green’ defence by dedicating a higher share of EU-financed R&D to carbon-neutral fuels and propulsion systems for military vehicles, in particular for future major weapon systems developed under the relevant EU frameworks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider energy, carbon and environmental footprints starting at the design phase when investing the relevant EU funds; recalls that the R&D actions under the EDF can improve efficiency, reduce carbon footprints and achieve sustainable best practices; calls for a mechanism to incentivise R&D for sustainable technologies in defence and security; welcomes the budget dedicated to energy resilience and environmental transition in the first annual work programme, but notes that this represents only 11 % of the overall annual EDF budget; |

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|  | 25. | Highlights that Russia’s war against Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of disruptive technologies that often come at relatively low cost, while having a powerful impact on the battlefield against large weapon systems and formations; calls on the Commission to conduct a study, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Government and NATO partners, on the lessons identified from the war in Ukraine with regard to critical technologies for security and defence; stresses the need for an open-minded approach when carrying out the technological assessment and highlights the grave necessity of drawing the right conclusions from the biggest war in Europe since World War II; |

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|  | 26. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |

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ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1059/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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