Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

3 September 2025 ([\*](#Footnote*))

( Access to documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Documents relating to State aid procedures – Advance tax agreements – Refusal of access – Exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a third party – Exception relating to the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits – General presumption of confidentiality – Not irrebuttable – Overriding public interest – Principle of sound administration – Obligation to state reasons )

In Case T‑225/24,

**Huhtamaki Holding Sàrl,** established in Senningerberg (Luxembourg), represented by M. Struys, F. Pili, H. de Cazotte and V. Ciudin, lawyers,

applicant,

v

**European** **Commission,** represented by M. Burón Pérez and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber),

composed of O. Porchia (Rapporteur), President, M. Jaeger and L. Madise, Judges,

Registrar: A. Marghelis, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the documents produced by the Commission on 7 May 2025 in response to the order of the Court of 14 April 2025 on the measure of inquiry,

further to the hearing on 20 May 2025,

gives the following

**Judgment**

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Huhtamaki Holding Sàrl, seeks annulment of Commission Decision C(2024) 1212 final of 19 February 2024 refusing it access to documents relating to State aid procedures (‘the contested decision’).

**Background to the dispute**

2        In 2009, Huhtamaki Sàrl, a subsidiary of the applicant, was engaged in refinancing activities, granting interest-bearing loans to the entities of the Huhtamäki group of which it is a part. Those activities were financed by an interest-free loan granted in 2009 by a sister company, based in Ireland, Huhtamäki Ireland Limited.

3        On 11 November 2009, the Luxembourg tax authorities granted Huhtamaki Sàrl an advance tax agreement (‘the ATA’), confirming that it would be considered as making an acceptable profit margin on its refinancing activities, which complies with its transfer pricing policy as well as the provisions of Luxembourg income tax law.

4        In 2012 and 2013, two ATAs were granted by the Luxembourg tax authorities to Huhtamaki Sàrl.

5        In 2013, the European Commission opened an investigation into the practice of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in relation to ATAs, pursuant to Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).

6        In the context of that investigation, and in particular of the State aid investigation procedures concerning ATAs granted to undertakings by the Luxembourg tax authorities (procedures SA.37267, ATA Luxembourg, and SA.41303, alleged aid in Luxleaks), the latter provided information concerning various recipients of ATAs on 22 December 2014 and 19 January 2018. As regards Huhtamaki Sàrl, those authorities provided the ATAs granted to it in 2009, 2012 and 2013.

7        In 2018, the Commission decided to examine the information concerning the ATAs issued by the Luxembourg tax authorities in favour of Huhtamaki Sàrl and, by decision of 7 March 2019, it opened a formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU in case SA.50400, concerning those ATAs (‘the decision to open the formal investigation procedure’). On 10 June 2019, Huhtamaki Sàrl, in its capacity as an interested party, submitted comments pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU.

8        On 3 October 2019, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), Huhtamaki Sàrl requested access to the non-confidential version of the document referred to in paragraph 4 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, containing the list of recipients of ATAs communicated by the Luxembourg authorities on 22 December 2014, as well as the non-confidential version of the ATAs issued by the Luxembourg tax administration and to which the Commission referred in paragraphs 4 and 7 of that opening decision.

9        By letter of 24 October 2019, the Commission refused access to the requested documents. On 13 November 2019, Huhtamaki Sàrl asked the Commission to reconsider its initial refusal. On 18 December 2019, the Commission adopted Decision C(2019) 9417 final, by which it rejected the confirmatory application.

10      Huhtamaki Sàrl brought an action challenging Decision C(2019) 9417 final before the General Court, which annulled it by judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission* (T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100).

11      Following that annulment, the Commission adopted a new decision on 21 October 2022, Decision C(2022) 7563 final, again refusing access to the requested documents. That decision was not challenged by Huhtamaki Sàrl.

12      On 13 July 2023, pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001, the applicant requested access to the non-confidential versions of (i) the document mentioned in paragraph 4 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure listing the recipients of the tax rulings issued by the Luxembourg authorities and submitted by them on 22 December 2014, (ii) the ATAs issued by the Luxembourg tax authorities to other comparable undertakings mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the opening decision, and (iii) any other ATAs issued by the Luxembourg tax authorities to other comparable tax payers regarding interest-free loan agreements, which are otherwise available to the Commission (together, ‘the requested documents’).

13      By letter of 11 August 2023, the Commission refused access to the requested documents, pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

14      In a confirmatory application submitted on 31 August 2023, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation No 1049/2001, the applicant asked the Commission to reconsider its initial refusal.

15      On 1 December 2023, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the implied decision rejecting its confirmatory application of 31 August 2023. The application was lodged at the Registry of the General Court under case number T‑1145/23.

16      On 19 February 2024, the Commission adopted the contested decision, in which it states that the requested documents are covered by a general presumption of confidentiality based on the exceptions provided for in the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and that, according to settled case-law, disclosure would, inter alia, undermine the purpose of procedures for reviewing State aid.

17      In Case T‑1145/23, the applicant withdrew its action, which was removed from the register by an order of 8 May 2024.

**Forms of order sought**

18      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

19      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

**Law**

20      In support of its action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law, the first alleging an error of law in that the general presumption of confidentiality is not applicable, the second, in the alternative, alleging an error of law in that that general presumption is rebutted because there is no risk of harm to the interests protected by the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, and, in any event, in that such an infringement is justified by an overriding public interest, and the third, also in the alternative, in two parts, the first alleging breach of the right to sound administration and the second alleging breach of the duty to state reasons.

***The first plea in law***

21      By its first plea, the applicant claims that the Commission erred in law by relying on a general presumption of confidentiality applicable to the requested documents.

22      The Commission replies that its refusal to disclose the requested documents is justified by a general presumption of confidentiality under the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

23      Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 provides:

‘The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of:

–        commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,

…

–        the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,

unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’

24      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Regulation No 1049/2001 seeks, as indicated in recital 4 and Article 1 thereof, to confer on the public the widest possible right of access to documents of the institutions. It is also clear from that regulation, particularly recital 11 and Article 4 thereof, the latter of which provides for a system of exceptions in that regard, that that right of access is nevertheless subject to certain limits based on reasons of public or private interest (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited; judgment of 5 October 2022, *Múka* v *Commission*, T‑214/21, not published, EU:T:2022:607, paragraph 39). Since such exceptions depart from the principle of the widest possible public access to documents, they must be interpreted and applied strictly (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

25      In order to justify refusal of access to a document for which disclosure has been requested, it is not sufficient, in principle, for that document to fall within the scope of an activity mentioned in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also explain how access to that document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article (see judgments of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited and of 5 October 2022, *Múka* v *Commission*, T‑214/21, not published, EU:T:2022:607, paragraph 41).

26      Nevertheless, it has already been recognised that it was open to the institution concerned to base its decisions, in that regard, on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of document, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to applications for disclosure which relate to documents of the same nature (see judgments of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited; of 5 October 2022, *Múka* v *Commission*, T‑214/21, not published, EU:T:2022:607, paragraph 42; and of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 41).

27      It should be borne in mind that, with the exception of the Member State responsible for granting the aid, the interested parties do not have the right to consult the documents in the Commission’s administrative file in the context of procedures for reviewing State aid. That factor must be taken into account for the purposes of interpreting the exception provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. If those interested parties were able to obtain access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

28      In that regard, the right to consult the administrative file in the context of a review procedure opened in accordance with Article 108 TFEU and the right of access to documents, under Regulation No 1049/2001, are legally distinct, but they nevertheless lead to a comparable situation from a functional point of view. Whatever the legal basis on which it is granted, access to the file enables the interested parties to obtain all the observations and documents submitted to the Commission, and, where appropriate, adopt a position on those matters in their own observations, which is likely to modify the nature of such a procedure (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

29      It has already been held that there is a general presumption that disclosure of the documents in the Commission’s administrative file in procedures for reviewing State aid would, in principle, undermine protection of the purpose of investigations (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

30      In the present case, the contested decision divides the requested documents into three categories. The applicant confirmed at the hearing that it had not disputed those categories as such.

31      It is common ground that the document in category 1 is the list of recipients of ATAs mentioned in paragraph 4 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure. According to the contested decision, that list forms part of case SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg).

32      With regard to the other documents in categories 2 and 3, the Commission stated in the contested decision that they all formed part of administrative files relating to State aid cases in which it had not adopted a final decision or in which the investigation procedure could not yet be considered closed.

33      In the first place, it should be noted that, as the Commission pointed out at the hearing, the applicant has not requested any evidence, either in the request for access of 13 July 2023 or in the confirmatory application of 31 August 2023, to prove that the requested documents form part of the administrative files referred to by the Commission. It was only during the proceedings before the General Court that it argued that the general presumption of confidentiality could not apply without that proof being duly established.

34      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, if the documents requested form part of the Commission’s administrative file relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid, that fact that they form part of the administrative file is sufficient to confer on them the benefit of the general presumption set out in paragraph 29 above (judgments of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 36, and of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 54).

35      In the present case, having regard to the request made by the applicant as referred to in paragraph 33 above, the Commission could, as it did in the contested decision, justify to the requisite legal standard the application of the general presumption of confidentiality by sorting the requested documents into three categories, which referred either to a particular case, as with the document in category 1, or to several cases, as with the documents in categories 2 and 3, given that all the cases concerned tax practices in Luxembourg.

36      Second, as regards the document in category 1, it is apparent from the documents provided by the Commission in response to the measure of inquiry that the list forms part of case SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg).

37      As regards the documents in categories 2 and 3, it should be noted that the applicant stated, in the request for access of 13 July 2023 and in the confirmatory application of 31 August 2023, that it wished to have access to the non-confidential version, first, of the ATAs referred to in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, which were granted to other comparable undertakings by the Luxembourg tax authorities between 2010 and 2012, which the Commission classified in category 2, and, second, of any other ATA issued by those authorities to comparable taxpayers concerning interest-free loans, which the Commission classified in category 3.

38      The applicant submits that, as regards the documents in category 2, only paragraph 4 of the decision to open the investigation procedure is relevant, in so far as paragraph 7 of that decision refers to documents already known to the applicant. As regards paragraph 4 of the decision, it merely describes certain procedural steps taken by the Commission to obtain information regarding Luxembourg’s general practice of ATAs, it being noted that, according to the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2016 C 262, p. 1), there is no general presumption of confidentiality attached to the granting of tax rulings. That reference alone does not mean that the documents in question form part of the investigation in case SA.50400 (Huhtamaki).

39      Furthermore, as regards the documents in categories 2 and 3, the applicant states that the Commission does not explain how or why those documents are inextricably linked to Cases SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg), SA.41303 (alleged aid in Luxleaks), SA.44888 (Engie) and SA.38375 (Fiat).

40      It is important to note that the request for access of 13 July 2023 and the confirmatory application of 31 August 2023 clearly seek to obtain ATAs which the Luxembourg authorities communicated to the Commission in the context of the examination procedures initiated by that institution concerning Luxembourg’s ATA practice.

41      That is the case for the category 2 ATAs, as is apparent from paragraphs 4 and 7 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, to which the applicant itself referred.

42      A reading of those paragraphs, placed in the context of the procedures initiated by the Commission with regard to Luxembourg’s practice of ATAs, shows that the Commission received the ATAs from the Luxembourg tax authorities in response to letters which it had sent to them in the context of those procedures.

43      That is also the case for ATAs in category 3, even though the applicant’s request does not refer to particular ATAs communicated in the context of a specific procedure to the Commission. Category 3 covers the non-confidential versions of ATAs which the applicant wishes to access, in order, as the applicant itself states, to be able to defend itself with regard to Luxembourg’s practice of ATAs which is liable to constitute State aid in its regard. The ATAs in question also clearly encompass ATAs communicated by the Luxembourg authorities in the context of the procedures initiated by the Commission concerning those practices.

44      In any event, it is apparent from the documents provided by the Commission in response to the measure of inquiry that ATAs in categories 2 and 3 form part of the files of cases initiated by the Commission.

45      In the second place, the applicant submits that the general presumption of confidentiality cannot apply in the present case since the Commission has not explained why disclosure of the requested documents would affect Cases SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg), SA.41303 (alleged aid in Luxleaks), SA.44888 (Engie) and SA.38375 (Fiat). Moreover, the first two cases cannot be found in the Commission’s State aid database (Transparency Award Module, TAM). Moreover, the latter two cases have given rise to two annulment judgments delivered by the Court of Justice, which does not necessarily mean that the formal investigation procedures remain open with a view to the adoption of new decisions. In any event, the disclosure of the documents requested in the present case would not be such as to jeopardise the investigations in those four cases, which do not relate to either interest-free loan agreements or notional interests.

46      The present case differs from those which gave rise to the judgments of 28 June 2012, *Commission* v *Éditions Odile Jacob* (C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393), and of 14 July 2016, *Sea Handling* v *Commission* (C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557), in so far as the documents requested in the present case cannot be treated in the same way as the documents at issue in those cases.

47      It should be noted, first of all, that, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above, if the requested documents form part of the Commission’s administrative file relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid, that fact is sufficient to confer on them the benefit of the general presumption of confidentiality.

48      Contrary to what the applicant claims, the Commission, in order to apply the general presumption of confidentiality, was not required to explain under what conditions disclosure of the requested documents would have been liable to affect or jeopardise the cases in question.

49      Next, as regards the argument that Cases SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg) and SA.41303 (alleged aid in Luxleaks) cannot be found, it should be noted that, in the request for access of 13 July 2023 and in the confirmatory application of 31 August 2023, the applicant had not disputed the existence of those cases. The Commission cannot therefore be criticised for failing to demonstrate the existence of such cases in the contested decision. Furthermore, such cases undoubtedly exist, particularly in the light of the documents provided by the Commission in response to the Court’s measure of inquiry.

50      Lastly, as regards the argument that case SA.38375 (Fiat) and case SA.4488 (Engie) were still pending, it is true that those cases gave rise, respectively, to the judgments of 8 November 2022, *Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe* v *Commission* (C‑885/19 P and C‑898/19 P, EU:C:2022:859), and of 5 December 2023, *Luxembourg and Others* v *Commission* (C‑451/21 P and C‑454/21 P, EU:C:2023:948). However, it should be noted that the annulment of the contested final decisions in the corresponding cases by those judgments does not indicate that the Commission’s procedures in those cases have been completed. Nor have the decisions to open the formal investigation procedure been annulled. Furthermore, in the context of case SA.38375, the Commission adopted a new final decision on 28 November 2024, which confirms that the procedure was still ongoing on the date of adoption of the contested decision.

51      It should be added that the fact that the Commission adopted a final decision in one of the ongoing cases after the contested decision cannot have any effect on the assessment of the application of the general presumption of confidentiality to the requested documents relating to that case.

52      It is important to note that the justification for applying one of the exceptions provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 must be assessed in the light of the facts existing on the date of adoption of the decision refusing to grant access to the documents on the basis of that exception. It is settled case-law that the legality of an EU act must be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law existing on the date on which the act was adopted (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

53      In those circumstances, the Commission was fully entitled to state, in the contested decision, that all the documents in categories 2 and 3 formed part of the administrative files relating to State aid cases in which no final decision had yet been adopted or in which the investigation procedure had not yet been finalised, in so far as the Commission’s decision could still be challenged before the Courts of the European Union.

54      The Commission was therefore also right to rely on a general presumption of confidentiality applicable to documents forming part of the administrative file of the procedure for reviewing State aid, with regard to the undermining of the protection of the objectives of investigation and audit activities referred to in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

55      It should be added that the applicant’s other arguments in the context of the first plea cannot invalidate that conclusion.

56      In the first place, as regards the fact that the application seeks the disclosure of specific and easily identifiable documents, it must be stated that, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above, the general presumption of confidentiality applies irrespective of whether the request for access has specifically identified the document or documents concerned (judgments of 14 July 2016, *Sea Handling* v *Commission*, C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:577, paragraph 51; of 13 March 2019, *AlzChem* v *Commission*, C‑666/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:196, paragraph 31; and of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 36).

57      In the second place, as regards the argument that the requested documents were drawn up by the Luxembourg authorities before the procedure for reviewing State aid was opened, it is apparent from the case-law that such documents need not be distinguished from the rest of the Commission’s administrative file and their pre-existing nature does not preclude them from being covered by the general presumption of confidentiality (judgments of 13 March 2019, *AlzChem* v *Commission*, C‑666/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:196, paragraphs 33 and 34, and of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraphs 37 and 38).

58      In the third place, as regards the argument that the Commission should have demonstrated, on the basis of an initial examination, that there were solid and convincing reasons to assume that disclosure of the requested documents would undermine the proper conduct of the procedure for the review of State aid or the commercial interests of third parties, it has already been held that, while it is necessary to ascertain whether the general presumption actually applies, that cannot deprive that presumption of its proper effect. That proper effect is to permit the Commission, when it receives a global request for access, to provide an equally global reply (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraphs 36 and 40, and of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraphs 55 and 56).

59      In the fourth place, as regards the argument that the Commission cannot merely rely on the general presumption of confidentiality and use a standardised statement of reasons without examining whether it is reasonable to apply that presumption, since to do so would undermine the purpose of the system of exceptions laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 and the requirements of the principle of proportionality, it has also already been held that, for the purposes of applying the general presumption of confidentiality, a prima facie examination of the documents concerned cannot oblige the Commission to carry out a concrete and individual examination of those documents, nor to ascertain whether there are other valid reasons for not disclosing any part of them (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

60      The requested documents, in so far as they are covered by the general presumption of confidentiality, escape a priori the obligation to disclose their content, in full or in part. Consequently, the contested decision cannot be regarded as having been taken in breach of the fundamental right of access to documents and the principle of proportionality (see judgment of 2 March 2022, *Huhtamaki* v *Commission*, T‑134/20, not published, EU:T:2022:100, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

61      Finally, since it is sufficient for them to form part of the administrative file in order for them to benefit from the general presumption of confidentiality, there is no need to examine whether the documents concerned are or were relevant for the purposes of the investigation or of the demonstration of the existence of State aid. It is sufficient to note that they were communicated to the Commission in the context of the corresponding cases, the reality of which is indisputable and which were ongoing at the time the contested decision was made.

62      It should be added that the exceptions provided for in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 are not cumulative and that it is sufficient for access to the file to fall within the scope of one of those exceptions for the Commission to be entitled to refuse disclosure. Therefore, having regard to the rejection of the first plea in so far as it alleges infringement of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that plea must be rejected as ineffective in so far as it alleges infringement of the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2021, *TUIfly* v *Commission*, T‑619/18, not published, EU:T:2021:627, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

63      It follows from all of the foregoing that the first plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

***The second plea in law***

64      By its second plea in law, raised in the alternative, the applicant submits that, assuming that the general presumption of confidentiality applies to the requested documents, the Commission wrongly considered that that presumption could not be rebutted.

65      The applicant divides its plea into two parts.

66      In the first part of that plea, it submits that that presumption can be rebutted by the absence of any risk of harm to the interests protected by the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

67      In the second part of the plea, the applicant relies on the fact that, in any event, the general presumption of confidentiality is rebutted for compelling reasons of public interest justifying the disclosure of the requested documents.

*First part of the second plea in law*

68      As regards the first part of the second plea, alleging the absence of any harm to the interests protected by the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, it should be borne in mind that, in the field of State aid, the Court of Justice has held that the general presumption that the disclosure of documents in an administrative file would, as a general rule, undermine the protection of the purposes of investigations is not irrebuttable and does not rule out the possibility that some of the specific documents contained in the Commission’s file relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid may be disclosed (see judgments of 13 March 2019, *AlzChem* v *Commission*, C‑666/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:196, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and of 28 May 2020, *Campbell* v *Commission*, T‑701/18, EU:T:2020:224, paragraph 43).

69      More generally, although the application of a general presumption of confidentiality permits the institution to dispense with carrying out an individual examination of each document, it cannot, however, exempt it from indicating to the applicant which documents it identified as being part of a file covered by that presumption and from providing him or her with the list of those documents (judgment of 28 May 2020, *Campbell* v *Commission*, T‑701/18, EU:T:2020:224, paragraph 44).

70      It must be held that it is only once the institution has identified which documents were covered by the request for access that it can classify them into categories according to their common characteristics, their same nature or their belonging to the same file and that it can then apply a general presumption of confidentiality to them (judgment of 28 May 2020, *Campbell* v *Commission*, T‑701/18, EU:T:2020:224, paragraph 45).

71      In that regard, as has already been stated in paragraphs 30 to 32 above, it is apparent from the contested decision that the documents requested by the applicant were divided into three categories. It should be recalled that category 1 includes the list of ATAs referred to in paragraph 4 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, which contains the names of the recipients of the ATAs for the 2010-2012 period, submitted by the Luxembourg authorities on 22 December 2014. That document forms part of the file in case SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg). Category 2 includes the ATAs referred to in paragraphs 4 and 7 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, granted to comparable recipients by the Luxembourg authorities. Category 3 includes any other ATAs granted by the Luxembourg authorities to comparable taxpayers regarding interest-free loans.

72      It should be observed that, as the Commission noted, the applicant, in the context of the first part of the second plea, has developed a very similar line of argument to that set out in support of its first plea. Although that line of argument may seek to challenge the application of a general presumption of confidentiality in the present case, it may also be understood as demonstrating that disclosing the requested documents would not undermine the interests protected by the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

73      It is from that perspective that, for the purposes of examining the first part of the second plea, the arguments put forward by the applicant will be examined below.

74      As has already been stated in paragraph 52 above, the justification for applying one of the exceptions provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 must be assessed in the light of the facts existing on the date of adoption of the decision refusing access to the documents on the basis of that exception.

75      It is necessary to examine whether the arguments put forward by the applicant are capable of rebutting the general presumption of confidentiality for the requested documents, whether taken together or on the basis of the category to which they belong, and thus of justifying the disclosure of those documents.

76      The applicant claims that disclosure of the requested documents would have no bearing on the interest protected by the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. In particular, the Commission’s assertion that the requested documents fall within the scope of investigations in State aid proceedings which are still ongoing is incorrect.

77      In any event, even if those proceedings were still ongoing, the Commission did not specify how the requested documents would be so inextricably linked to them that disclosure would affect the investigations. The disclosure of the list of recipients would not put pressure on the Commission’s services.

78      Access to the requested documents would allow the applicant to exercise its rights of defence as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). It also allows the Commission to carry out a more comprehensive assessment, with knowledge of further elements, enabling it to adopt a more balanced position on whether the selectivity requirement was met.

79      Disclosure of the requested documents would not jeopardise the willingness of Member States to cooperate with the Commission in procedures for reviewing State aid. Moreover, since the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has not sought to oppose the request for access, the Commission is trying to invoke interests which that Member State has not raised.

80      That argument also disregards the procedural rules applicable to State aid, in so far as the Member State concerned does not enjoy any discretion as to the amount of information it wishes to share with the Commission. The nature or content of the requested documents is what determines whether they are confidential.

81      Furthermore, disclosure of the requested documents would not have any impact on the interests protected under the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, namely the commercial interests of third parties. As regards the document in category 1, the applicant requested only a simple list of companies, which does not in itself provide any information on the taxable income and turnover of the companies concerned, or any other commercially sensitive information. Furthermore, the name of legal persons is generally not protected. In any event, even if the document in category 1 had contained sensitive information, the Commission should have granted partial access for the purposes of Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

82      Any alleged concerns with regard to the protection of the commercial interests of third parties could be addressed by redacting the alleged commercially sensitive information, since the applicant requested only non-confidential versions of the documents concerned. The Commission’s claim that the redactions create a ‘disproportionate administrative burden’ on its services is unfounded.

83      The fact that, according to the Commission, the redaction of commercially sensitive information renders the document illegible does not justify refusal of access to that document, since the Commission has no power to decide whether or not a redacted document is of interest to third parties.

84      As regards the other requested documents falling within categories 2 and 3, the applicant disputes the argument that the information contained in those documents refers to the core of the undertakings’ plans and lays down the overall corporate and tax strategy of those undertakings, with the result that disclosure is liable to harm their commercial position.

85      Lastly, the applicant adds that it did not request a concrete and individual examination of each document. Its request relates only to access to non-confidential versions of a limited number of ATAs.

86      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

87      In that connection, in so far as concerns the requested documents taken as a whole, it should be noted that the Court has already held that the disclosure of documents in an administrative file in procedures for reviewing State aid is liable to undermine the protection of investigations relating to a proceeding under Article 108 TFEU, even if closed, where a legal action against the decision on the merits is pending. Such a solution is explained by the fact that the Commission may, depending on the outcome of the legal proceedings, resume its activities with a view to the possible adoption of a new decision (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

88      That must a fortiori also be the situation in cases, such as those involving the requested documents, where the procedures for reviewing State aid are not closed, either because no final decision has yet been adopted or because, following the judgments of 8 November 2022, *Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe* v *Commission* (C‑885/19 P and C‑898/19 P, EU:C:2022:859), and of 5 December 2023, *Luxembourg and Others* v *Commission* (C‑451/21 P and C‑454/21 P, EU:C:2023:948), the Commission resumed proceedings in the corresponding cases with a view to adopting a new final decision.

89      It is important to note that it has already been held that if persons other than the Member State concerned by the procedure for reviewing State aid, which alone is authorised by the State aid rules to have access to the file of that procedure, were able to obtain access to documents on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, the system introduced by that legislation would be undermined (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

90      In its arguments for disclosure of the requested documents, even in their non-confidential version, the applicant itself acknowledged that access to those documents would enable it to submit observations during the review procedures in which it participates as an interested party. It has itself stated that its objective was, inter alia, to verify whether other taxpayers which are in a comparable situation have received the same tax treatment from the Luxembourg authorities, which may prompt it to take further action in the cases concerning it.

91      Furthermore, it should be added that, in State aid matters, the Commission relies on information communicated by the Member State concerned with sensitive data, which includes information relating to the economic activities of undertakings. In the present case, the Commission stated, in the contested decision, that the Luxembourg authorities had disclosed the documents concerned, emphasising their sensitive commercial nature and requesting that the information they contain be treated confidentially. That request for confidential treatment is apparent from the documents produced in response to the measure of inquiry. The applicant therefore errs in claiming that the Commission is relying on interests which the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has not raised.

92      In those circumstances, disclosure of the requested documents should, in principle, be refused, in line with the Commission’s approach in the contested decision.

93      In any event, as regards the requested documents, taken separately depending on the category to which they belong, whether in their confidential or non-confidential versions, first, it should be noted that, as regards the document in category 1, namely the list of recipients of ATAs for the 2010-2012 period submitted by the Luxembourg authorities on 22 December 2014 in response to a letter from the Commission of 19 June 2013, such a list is indeed included in the administrative file in case SA.37267 (ATA Luxembourg).

94      Contrary to what the applicant has claimed, the disclosure of such a list may enable it to identify the companies which may be subject to an investigation and it cannot therefore be ruled out that disclosure might enable the applicant to exert pressure on the Commission’s services. Not only is it common ground that that list includes the names of the undertakings which received the ATAs, but also that, even if that list were disclosed in its non-confidential version – and therefore without those names – there is nothing to prevent the undertakings concerned from being identified, since the list also contains information on the subject matter of the granted ATAs. Having knowledge of such a subject matter may provide insight into certain sectors of activity of the undertakings concerned. Furthermore, based on the responses provided during the hearing, it cannot be ruled out that identifying the business sectors of certain ATA recipients – even through the disclosure of a redacted list of recipients of ATAs – would not guarantee the confidentiality of all the relevant undertakings.

95      Second, as regards the documents in categories 2 and 3, namely the ATAs from which undertakings were able to benefit for the 2010-2012 period or after that period, those ATAs do appear in the administrative files of several cases which were all ongoing when the contested decision was adopted.

96      As the Commission has correctly stated, those ATAs contain information such as the names of the undertakings concerned, business organisation and strategies, tax strategies and their financial information, in particular.

97      There is no guarantee that disclosure of those ATAs in their non-confidential version could not undermine ongoing investigations.

98      First, taking into account the information contained in the ATAs, it cannot be ruled out that the non-confidential version of those documents would make it possible to determine the identity of their recipients, since ATAs can contain detailed information.

99      Next, ATAs contain a whole range of information which the Commission has rightly classified as trade secrets, since they reveal, in particular, methods of intra-group financing, organisational structures and strategies known only to the undertakings concerned.

100    The applicant claims that the information contained in the documents relating to categories 1 and 2, which is ‘historical’ in so far as it dates back to the 2010-2012 period and is therefore more than five years old, cannot be regarded as commercially sensitive information for the purposes of the second indent of point 14 of Commission communication C(2003) 4582 of 1 December 2003 on professional secrecy in State aid decisions (OJ 2003 C 297, p. 6). In addition, such documents are covered by the 10-year limitation period provided for in Article 17 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9) regarding the recovery of aid by the Commission.

101    With regard to the historical nature of the data, although information which was confidential and is at least five years old must, as a rule, on account of the passage of time, be considered historical and therefore as having lost its secret or confidential nature, the party relying on that nature may nevertheless show that, despite its age, that information must remain confidential (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2017, *Evonik Degussa* v *Commission*, C‑162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205, paragraph 64).

102    Accordingly, the Commission refused to disclose information which was more than five years old, relying on the fact that that information was included in documents forming part of ongoing case files, and that disclosure could undermine the conduct of proceedings. It should be noted in that regard that Article 4(7) of Regulation No 1049/2001 even allows the general presumption of confidentiality to be applied, where appropriate, under the exceptions set out in the paragraph 2 of that article, for a maximum period of 30 years.

103    As regards the argument based on the 10-year limitation period laid down in Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589, it is sufficient to note that it is ineffective in the present case. That period relates solely to the obligation to recover the aid and does not affect the issue of whether that aid was lawful. It is not intended to determine the period during which information may remain confidential.

104    Lastly, it should be borne in mind that it is only in exceptional cases and only where the administrative burden entailed by a concrete, individual examination of the documents proves to be particularly heavy, thereby exceeding the limits of what may reasonably be required, that a derogation from the obligation to examine a request for access may be permissible (judgments of 13 April 2005, *Verein für Konsumenteninformation* v *Commission*, T‑2/03, EU:T:2005:125, paragraph 112; of 14 December 2017, *Evropaïki Dynamiki* v *Parliament*, T‑136/15, EU:T:2017:915, paragraph 79; and of 15 March 2023, *Basaglia* v *Commission*, T‑597/21, not published, EU:T:2023:133, paragraph 53).

105    In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Commission justified its refusal to disclose the non-confidential version of the requested documents by relying, in essence, on the existence of the general presumption of confidentiality, on the voluminous nature of the requested documents and the confidential information contained therein, and on the fact that a non-confidential version of the requested documents would be of no use to the applicant.

106    It is important to note that the general exceptions of confidentiality set out in that provision are not irrebuttable if the person requesting access shows that one or more given documents are not covered by that presumption, or that there is a higher public interest justifying disclosure by virtue of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (judgments of 29 June 2010, *Commission* v *Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau*, C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraph 62, and of 13 March 2019, *AlzChem* v *Commission*, C‑666/17 P, not published, EU:C:2019:196, paragraph 37). It is not the responsibility of the institution to which the request for access is addressed to evaluate how useful the documents will be to the applicant.

107    In the present case, it is clear that the applicant has not put forward any argument to show that the requested documents are not in the administrative file of cases which are the subject of State aid proceedings before the Commission, or that even partial disclosure of those documents would undermine those procedures.

108    Moreover, as regards the list in category 1, it has already been found that a version without the names of the undertakings could not be disclosed for the reasons set out in paragraph 94 above. Furthermore, and in any event, the applicant made a request for the purposes of Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001, as noted in paragraph 81 above. That provision provides for partial access to information that is not covered by a general confidentiality exception. That cannot be the case as regards the category 1 list, all of which is subject to the exceptions relied on by the Commission, taking into account what has already been stated in paragraph 31 above.

109    As regards the other documents in the contested decision, namely the ATAs in categories 2 and 3, the Commission drew attention to the volume of documents requested and the significant amount of confidential information they contained.

110    In that regard, it is apparent that categories 2 and 3 cover a large number of ATAs and that those ATAs contain a large amount of confidential information. It is also sufficient to refer to the non-confidential version of the ATA provided by the applicant itself by way of example in order to find that carrying out a concrete and individual examination of the requested documents would require a significant amount of work to redact all the confidential information contained therein.

111    The Commission was therefore entitled to refuse full or partial access to the requested documents.

112    In those circumstances, the first part of the second plea, in so far as it alleges infringement of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, must be rejected as unfounded.

113    As has already been stated in paragraph 62 above, the exceptions provided for in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 are not cumulative and it is sufficient for one of those exceptions to cover access to the file for the Commission to be entitled to refuse disclosure. Therefore, having regard to the rejection of the first part of the second plea in so far as it alleges infringement of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that part must be rejected as ineffective in so far as it alleges infringement of the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.

*The second part of the second plea in law*

114    In the second part of the second plea in law, the applicant claims, in the alternative and in any event, that the application of the general presumption of confidentiality is rebutted for overriding reasons of public interest justifying disclosure of the requested documents. It relies, as a basis for such an interest, on the rights of the defence, as well as on the principles of transparency and proportionality.

115    As regards the rights of the defence and the alleged infringement of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, the Commission erred, in particular, in considering, in the contested decision, that the applicant had had the opportunity to comment following the decision to open the formal investigation procedure.

116    As regards the principles of transparency and proportionality, the Commission is bound by the first of those principles, which is enshrined in Article 15(3) TFEU and protected by Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. As a general principle of law, it constitutes an overriding public interest justifying the disclosure of documents allegedly covered by the general presumption of confidentiality. The principle of transparency therefore protects the need for undertakings to understand the type of data analysed by the Commission in the context of a State aid investigation. In the present case, granting access to the requested documents would contribute to the transparency of the Commission’s State aid policy, since those documents reflect the very elements of such a policy. The principle of transparency is therefore capable of rebutting the general presumption of confidentiality and, contrary to what is asserted by the Commission, it is not an individual interest.

117    Furthermore, in the light of the principle of proportionality, the Commission should, at the very least, have granted partial access for the purposes of Article 4(6) of Regulation No 1049/2001. Granting such access does not undermine the commercial interests of the undertakings which benefited from the ATAs, since allegedly sensitive information, such as the names of those undertakings and the financial amounts at stake, can be redacted. Since the requested documents were issued by a Member State, disclosure does not undermine the protection of the Commission’s decision-making process, since they do not reflect such a process or the Commission’s analysis of the State aid mechanism. The refusal to grant partial access to the requested documents is disproportionate.

118    The Commission contends that the applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that there was an overriding interest in the disclosure of the requested documents.

119    In that regard, concerning the potential existence of an overriding public interest that could justify the disclosure of the requested documents, it must be observed that, according to the case-law, it is for the person claiming the existence of an overriding public interest to rely on specific circumstances to justify the disclosure of the documents concerned (judgments of 7 September 2023, *Breyer* v *REA*, C‑135/22 P, EU:C:2023:640, paragraph 74, and of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 59).

120    As regards, first, the argument based on the rights of the defence, it is true that the existence of those rights is in itself of general interest. However, the fact that those rights are manifested in the present case by the applicant’s individual interest in defending itself in the context of proceedings implies that the interest which the applicants invoke is not a general, but rather a private, interest (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 July 2006, *Franchet and Byk* v *Commission*, T‑391/03 and T‑70/04, EU:T:2006:190, paragraph 138, and of 2 October 2024, *TotalEnergies Marketing Nederland* v *Commission*, T‑332/22, EU:T:2024:660, paragraph 44).

121    In that context, as regards the alleged infringement of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, it should be noted that the purpose of Regulation No 1049/2001 is to settle questions relating to public access to documents held by the EU institutions and not to determine whether interested parties have a right guaranteed by those articles of the Charter to have access to specific evidence submitted to the file of a procedure for reviewing State aid or whether such access would be useful to the Commission in the exercise of its investigative power.

122    In those circumstances, the argument based on the rights of the defence cannot be upheld.

123    As regards, second, the arguments based on the principles of transparency and proportionality, it has already been held that the overriding public interest capable of justifying the disclosure of a document need not necessarily be distinct from the principles which underlie Regulation No 1049/2001. However, a statement of purely general considerations is not sufficient to establish that an overriding public interest outweighs the reasons justifying a refusal to disclose the documents in question (judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 60).

124    That is the case for the arguments put forward by the applicant in its application and in the confirmatory application of 31 August 2022, which merely rely in general terms on an alleged breach of the principle of transparency.

125    As regards the applicant’s other arguments, they seek either to question whether Huhtamaki Sàrl was able to submit its observations in case SA.50400 (Huhtamaki) or to demonstrate once again the disproportionate nature of the refusal to disclose the non-confidential version of the requested documents.

126    The first argument overlaps with the arguments relating to the rights of the defence relied on in the context of the present part of the second plea, which was already examined in paragraphs 120 to 122 above.

127    The arguments relating to the principle of proportionality, set out in paragraph 117 above, have been addressed and have already been rejected in the context of the analysis of the first part of the second plea.

128    In those circumstances, the second part of the second plea must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the second plea must be rejected in its entirety.

***The third plea** **in law***

129    In the further alternative, the applicant relies on a third plea divided into two parts, alleging, first, a breach of the principle of sound administration and, second, infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

*First part of the third plea in law*

130    The applicant alleges a failure to observe the principle of sound administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter in that the Commission failed to comply with the time limits laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001, did not give reasons for the extension of the time limit for adopting its decision and even remained unjustifiably silent between 13 October 2023 and 19 February 2024, without informing the applicant of the delay. As a result of exceeding the time limit, the applicant had to bear unnecessary costs incurred as a result of taking action against the initial implied rejection decision. Consequently, such costs should in any event be borne by the Commission.

131    The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

132    In that regard, it should be borne in mind that Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001, relating to the processing of confirmatory applications, provides:

‘1.      A confirmatory application shall be handled promptly. Within 15 working days from registration of such an application, the institution shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal. In the event of a total or partial refusal, the institution shall inform the applicant of the remedies open to him or her, namely instituting court proceedings against the institution and/or making a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the conditions laid down in Articles 230 and 195 of the EC Treaty, respectively.

2.      In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the time limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given.

3.      Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall be considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty.’

133    It is apparent from the case-law that the mechanism of an implied refusal decision was established in Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001 in order to counter the risk of the institution potentially failing to respond to a request for access to documents addressed to it, so that, in the event of such an implied decision of refusal, an action may be brought before the courts against that decision on the basis of Article 263 TFEU. Accordingly, the contested decision cannot be annulled on the basis of a procedural irregularity consisting of the failure to comply with the time limits laid down in Article 8, in so far as that decision must be regarded as a negative decision (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 July 2016, *Sea Handling* v *Commission*, C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 84).

134    In addition, where an institution fails to comply with the time limits for replying laid down in Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001, that institution remains under an obligation to provide, even belatedly, a reasoned reply to the request of the person concerned (judgment of 14 July 2016, *Sea Handling* v *Commission*, C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 85).

135    In accordance with Article 8(1) and (3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the person concerned may have recourse to two types of procedure in order to challenge the failure to comply with the time limits laid down in Article 8.

136    He or she may, first, submit a complaint to the European Ombudsman in accordance with Article 228 TFEU or, second, bring an action for damages before the General Court under Article 340 TFEU in order to obtain compensation for any damage caused by the failure to comply with the time limits for replying (judgment of 14 July 2016, *Sea Handling* v *Commission*, C‑271/15 P, not published, EU:C:2016:557, paragraph 87).

137    In the present case, the action has been brought before the Court not as a result of the Commission’s inaction, but as a result of the Commission’s adoption of the contested decision and the Court is bound by the subject matter of the action as defined by the applicant. Similarly, the present action is brought as an action under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the contested decision, and not as an action for damages under Article 340 TFEU.

138    Accordingly, in the present case, the applicant cannot obtain annulment of the contested decision, either on the basis of an infringement of Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001 or on the basis of an infringement of the principle of sound administration, for the alleged financial loss it suffered as a result of the failure to comply with the time limits.

139    As regards the costs which the applicant claims to have incurred as a result of bringing an action against the implied rejection decision, before the present action was brought, it should be noted that it was open to the applicant to request, in Case T‑1145/23, corresponding to its action brought on 1 December 2023, that the costs be borne by the Commission.

140    In the light of the foregoing, the first part of the third plea must be rejected.

*The second part of the third plea in law*

141    The applicant alleges a failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons, in that the Commission provided a short, vague and standardised statement of reasons to rebut the arguments it had put forward in support of its request to access the requested documents. The applicant is not in a position to understand why, in the absence of any risk of undermining the interests protected by the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the general presumption is applicable to the requested documents, since the Commission devoted only two very short paragraphs to the factual basis justifying the application of that article.

142    The Commission provided insufficient reasons to support its view that the disclosure of the redacted parts of documents containing names and other confidential information, as requested by the applicant, would negatively affect the commercial interests of third parties. The fact that a document in its non-confidential version is, in the Commission’s view, illegible and devoid of any interest does not permit it to decide whether or not that document is of interest to third parties, nor is it sufficient as such to justify the refusal of access.

143    In order to meet the requirements of Article 296 TFEU, the Commission should have explained why the suggested redaction of the names of the companies in question and, where appropriate, of the financial information contained in the requested documents were not sufficient to assuage its concerns regarding the commercial interests of third parties. It cannot merely claim that redacting the documents would place an excessive administrative burden on its services.

144    The manifest lack of reasoning in the contested decision gives rise to a breach of the applicant’s right under Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter and Article 296 TFEU.

145    The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

146    It must be recalled that the obligation to state reasons is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and in Article 41(1) of the Charter, under which any legal act adopted by the EU institutions must state the reasons on which it is based. That obligation means that the EU institutions must disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author of the measure in such a way as to enable, on the one hand, interested parties to ascertain the reasons for the measure adopted in order to enable them to protect their rights, and, on the other hand, the court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

147    Accordingly, in the context of applying the provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001, it has been held that the purpose of the obligation for the institution to state the reasons for its decision refusing to grant access to a document is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to determine whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by an error which may permit its validity to be contested and, second, to enable the Courts of the European Union to review the lawfulness of the decision. The extent of that obligation depends on the nature of the measure at issue and the context in which it was adopted (see judgment of 2 October 2024, *Soares* v *Commission*, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

148    In the present case, it must be stated that, by relying primarily on the first plea relating to the erroneous application of the general presumption of confidentiality and, in the alternative, the rebuttal of that presumption, the applicant demonstrates that it was in a position to understand the meaning of the statement of reasons for the contested decision. That statement of reasons was also sufficient to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 December 2021, *JP* v *Commission*, T‑247/20, not published, EU:T:2021:871, paragraph 49).

149    The second part of the third plea must therefore be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

**Costs**

150    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Dismisses the action;**

2.      **Orders Huhtamaki Holding Sàrl to pay the costs.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Porchia | Jaeger | Madise |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 September 2025.

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| --- | --- | --- |
| V. Di Bucci |  | O. Porchia |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| Registrar |  | President |

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[\*](#Footref*)      Language of the case: English.

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