Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

C 248/2 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE**

**COUNCIL**

**State of progress of the Galileo programme**

_(COM(2002) 518 final)_

(2002/C 248/02)

**Explanatory memorandum**

The Galileo satellite navigation programme is the first major
programme to bring the European Union and the European
Space Agency together. It aims to develop cutting-edge technology to enable a user equipped with a receiver to receive
signals from several satellites and thus determine his exact
position in time and space anywhere at any given moment.
Galileo is based on a constellation of 30 satellites placed in a
medium earth orbit (at an altitude of approximately
24 000 km) continuously covering the entire surface of the
earth. The final component is the ground stations which
manage the system.

Following the Council Decision of 26 March 2002, the Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking was formally
adopted on 21 May 2002 ( [1] ).

The purpose of the Galileo Joint Undertaking is to complete
the development phase of the programme (2002-2005).
Thereafter, in view of the many commercial spin-offs
associated with the growing satellite navigation service
markets in many areas, the programme will be managed
during the deployment phase (2006-2007) and the commercial
operation phase (after 2008) by a private entity. The Galileo
Joint Undertaking will therefore issue a call for tenders in order
to select the private consortium which will be awarded the
concession for the deployment and operation of the system.

Four months after the historic decision of 26 March 2002, it
seems appropriate to review the state of progress of the Galileo
programme. The following five aspects will be discussed in
turn:

— establishment of the Joint Undertaking,

— system security;

— definition of services and the frequency plan,

— reservation of frequencies,

— relations with third countries.

( [1] ) Council Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 of 21 May 2002 setting up
the Galileo Joint Undertaking (OJ L 138, 28.5.2002, p. 1).

1. **SETTING UP THE GALILEO JOINT UNDERTAKING**

There have been delays in setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking following problems within the European Space Agency
in finalising the respective contributions of the participating
States contained in the programme declaration relating to
Galileo. Some Member States are, mainly for political
reasons, claiming the status of the foremost contributor to
the programme, difficult situation to deal with in the
framework of the European Space Agency Convention. If no
solution is found in the short term, the matter will have to be
referred to the European Union. The Joint Undertaking must be
set up as quickly as possible so that the plan for the call for
tenders for the development phase can be approved. If no
decision is taken on this, the industrial operators involved
will have the greatest difficulties in keeping their teams of
engineers working on the project.

When these problems have been overcome, the **first meeting**
**of the Administrative Board** of the Joint Undertaking can be
held, preceded by the meeting of the Supervisory Board in
accordance with Article 3 of the Regulation. The Commission's
representative on the Administrative Board of the Joint Undertaking has been appointed ( [2] ). According to the statutes, the
Administrative Board must decide the following at its first
meeting:

— the rules of procedure of the Administrative Board,

— the Agreement between the Joint Undertaking and the
European Space Agency, defining the relationship
between the Agency and the Joint Undertaking, in
particular, the Joint Undertaking's authority to supervise
the execution of the programme by the European Space
Agency,

— the financial regulations of the Joint Undertaking,

— the 2002 budget of the Joint Undertaking, including in
particular the EU's 2002 contribution to the Joint Undertaking (EUR 70 million + EUR 170 million),

— the appointment of the Director of the Joint Undertaking,
based on a proposal from the Commission.

( [2] ) Mr Ravasio, Honorary Director-General at the European
Commission.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/3

One urgent task facing the Joint Undertaking will be to draw
up the terms of reference of the invitation to tender to be
issued in order to initiate the process of selecting the future
system operator, that is, the private entity which will manage
the deployment and operation phases of the Galileo
programme. The Commission will submit the results of the
invitation to tender to the Council to enable the latter to
have all the facts when deciding upon the concession holder.
It will be a very important decision as it will also determine the
EU budget allocations needed for the deployment and
operation phases. Indeed, one of the criteria for the selection
of the concession holder will be the financial contribution they
can make to the programme, which will determine the
respective contributions of the European Union and the
private sector.

In order to draw up this invitation to tender, contacts must be
stepped up with financial institutions of all kinds, such as the
European Investment Bank, institutional investors, investment
banks, insurance groups, etc., and with the major European
groups providing services or supplying equipment. Many
promotional events are planned for the next few months.
They will be launched at the beginning of 2003, holding a
major symposium on Galileo, bringing together the financial
sectors, service providers, the main users of navigation and the
manufacturers of space and ground station equipment,
including manufacturers of receiving equipment. A call for
expressions of interest in this event has already been
published in the _Official Journal of the European Communities_ ( [1] ).

2. **SYSTEM SECURITY**

Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 stipulates that a
Security Board shall be established in order to deal with
security matters regarding the Galileo system.

The Council did not set up this body at present. In the interests
of efficiency, and in order to begin work on the fundamental
questions at the earliest possible opportunity, the Commission
has wasted no time in convening an initial meeting with the
security experts of the Member States. It was an expert
committee meeting chaired by the Commission on 8 May
2002, which was followed by other meetings on 25 June
and 13 September 2002.

At the meetings, some Member States expressed the wish for
these meetings to be chaired by a Member State representative,
and even co-chaired by a Member State and the Commission,
with the Commission fulfilling the role of Secretary. The
Commission is of the opinion that, until the Security Board
is in place, these expert meetings should continue operating in
its present form.

The Commission considers that the missions of the Galileo
Security Board are as follows:

( [1] ) OJ C 173, 19.7.2002, p. 13.

— bring its expertise in the form of advice on technical
characteristics of the system with regard to security
(encryption, etc.),

— helping the Commission in its negotiations with third
countries by bringing its expertise, in particular on the
issue of sharing frequencies with the United States,

— helping to set up the future operational framework for
security, responsible for the relationship in the event of a
crisis to interrupt or restrict signal emissions, the definition
of users to be authorised to own encrypted receivers, supervision of the compliance with international commitments
on non-proliferation and export control, etc.

3. **DEFINING SERVICES AND THE FREQUENCY PLAN**

3.1. **Definition of services**

Work has been carried out for several years on defining the
services and the frequency plan. The first version of the
**technical document defining Galileo's mission** and, hence,
also the **range of associated services**, was produced at the
beginning of 2001. It has been widely distributed and
discussed, by both user groups and Member States, particularly
at a meeting of the Member State representatives held in the
European Space Agency in March 2001. The second version of
the document, widely circulated in April 2001, was the result
of this consultation.

Following the Council Decision of 26 March 2002, and developments in the technological concepts resulting from work
carried out during the definition phase, a new version was
produced (see summary in Annex 1) taking into account
fresh consultations of large user groups for whom a number
of forums were specifically organised in May and June 2002.
The consolidated version of the technical document has just
been forwarded to the Member States. It should help define:

— the list of services which Galileo should offer,

— service performance (quality),

— technical characteristics of services.

If the programme is to run smoothly, it is essential to make
final decisions on these aspects by the end of 2002 since they
will determine the technical specifications of the system
(satellite design, ground station architecture, frequency plan,
etc.) which must be identified before issuing the invitation to
tender for the whole of the development phase (2002-2005).
Making substantial amendments to these specifications would
significantly increase the costs of this phase of the programme.

C 248/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

In addition, the services must be defined before progress can be
made in international negotiations, particularly with regard to
aspects of interoperability with the American GPS and Russian
Glonass systems, and in order to define the specification for the
future operator of the Galileo system. The industrial and
financial groups interested in tendering for the operating
concession must have the information in order to draw up
their bid and their business plan. Lastly, European equipment
manufacturers have to start designing their products as of
today. Failing to define and make known the services will
compromise the design of the receivers (with the sale and
provision of associated services accounting for 85 % of the
market created by Galileo) and the development of the
satellite navigation applications market.

Galileo will offer several service levels, from open access to
restricted access of various levels:

— an open, free **basic service**, mainly involving applications
for the general public and services of general interest. This
services is comparable to that provided by civil GPS, which
is free of cost for these applications, but with improved
quality and reliability,

— a **commercial service** facilitating the development of
professional applications and offering enhanced
performance compared with the basic service, particularly
in terms of service guarantee,

— a **‘vital’** service (Safety of Life Service) of a very high
quality and integrity for safety-critical applications, such
as aviation and shipping,

— a **search and rescue service** that will greatly improve
existing relief and rescue services,

— a **public regulated service** (PRS), encrypted and resistant
to jamming and interference, reserved principally for the
public authorities responsible for civil protection, national
security and law enforcement which demand a high level of
continuity. It will enable secured applications to be
developed in the European Union, and could prove in
particular to be an important tool in improving the
instruments used by the European Union to combat
illegal exports and illegal immigration.

The real needs of future Galileo users need to be identified
before the characteristics of the package of services can be
decided. Studies have already been carried out in various standardisation institutes and international bodies, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International
Maritime Organisation, etc.

The range of Galileo services is designed to meet practical
objectives and expectations, from improving the coverage of
open-access services in urban environments (to cover 95 % of

urban districts compared with the 50 % currently covered by
GPS alone) which will benefit the 160 million private vehicles
in Europe, or enabling the use of satellite navigation
applications ‘indoors’, in buildings and even in tunnels, or
indeed mobile telephone services based on identifying the
caller's position.

The guarantees regarding the specific basic parameters of the
services provided (precision, availability, etc.) will be of benefit
not only to the insurance sector (tracking stolen vehicles,
premiums adjusted to the actual movements of the vehicles,
monitoring movements of goods, etc.), but also in high-tech
sectors such as oil prospecting, precision crop management,
freight management, etc.

The provision of an integrity message to determine the reliability of the satellite signal is also essential in the many sectors
where a legal guarantee is required (service industries) and in
cases where human life is at risk. For example, in some phases
of flight, civil aviation demands that there be a delay of no
more than six seconds between the detection of abnormal
operation and the user's receiving an appropriate warning
signal.

The existence of a very low speed communication channel (in
the order of 500 bits per second) can also be used to transmit
commercial information from service centres to users. The
detailed content of such information (distribution of encryption
decoding keys, traffic information, routing of different users,
etc.) may be determined by the future operator according to
their business plan.

All services are directly accessible worldwide. However, local
bodies may have to make some adaptations to specific
environments or user communities (tunnels, airports, ports,
etc.). In addition, the satellite infrastructure can be complemented by regional components, particularly for producing
the integrity message.

It is worth emphasising that the services offered by Galileo will
cover the whole planet, particularly areas at a geographical
disadvantage and the outermost regions of the European
Union.

3.2. **The need for a public regulated service (PRS)**

Satellite navigation enables a user to determine his position in
time and space to an unprecedented degree of precision at very
little cost, thus explaining why it is widely used in all sorts of
areas. However, open signals are extremely sensitive to interference or to deliberate — potentially hostile — manipulation.
The need for a PRS service is conditioned by the vulnerability
of satellite navigation signals, the special features of the service
and the very sensitive nature of the anticipated applications.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/5

(i) _The vulnerability of satellite navigation signals_

A report commissioned by the American authorities ( [1] )
highlights the vulnerability of the entire US transport infrastructure, which is increasingly dependent on the
American satellite radionavigation system, GPS, used
both as an aid to navigation and as a tool to determine
the precise position of vehicles within new improved
surveillance systems and as a synchronisation reference
for the majority of networks (energy, telecommunications,
etc.). It concludes: ‘The civil transportation sector, seeking
the increased efficiency made possible by GPS, is
developing a reliance on GPS that can lead to serious
consequences if the service is disrupted, and the
applications are not prepared with mitigating equipment
and operational procedures.’ In particular, the report
recommends using interference suppression technology
(special antennas and receivers). These recommendations
were accepted by the United States Ministry of Transport.

In five years' time, the European Union's dependence on
satellite radionavigation will be as far-reaching as in the
United States. Disrupting or jamming the Galileo signal by
the intelligent use of sources of interference in the hands
of economic terrorists, criminals, hostile agents could
prevent continuous signal reception over a wide
geographical area, seriously impairing the efficiency of
national security and police forces, or of economic
activities, and even leading to the complete shutdown of
services in some areas. This would seriously undermine
user confidence in the system.

(ii) _Special features of the Public Regulated Service_

With its specific interference suppression technology, the
PRS affords a degree of resistance to jamming not offered
by other Galileo services. The PRS signal will therefore be
transmitted on two frequencies, each occupying a wide
bandwidth, providing a signal structure that is resistant
to interference. In addition, the frequencies will be
distinct from those of the open access services, and one
of the PRS signals will be in a frequency band quite
different from those used by the GPS and Glonass
systems or other Galileo signals. These factors singularly
complicate the job of a terrorist attempting to cause interference on all the signals. In addition, PRS signal code and
data will be encrypted, ensuring protection against ‘intelligent’ interference. The use of encryption will enable the
introduction of encryption technology and the means to
control users since access will require a special key
available only to authorised users.

The special optimised PRS signal receivers and antennas,
and licences for their use, will be very strictly controlled.
The introduction of interference suppression technology
will give the European Union responsibility for controlling
access to the technology in order to prevent criminal or
hostile use against the interests of the Member States or

( [1] ) Final report of 29 August 2001: ‘Vulnerability assessment of the
transportation infrastructure relying on the global positioning
system’, prepared by John A. Volpe, National Transportation
Systems Center.

their allies. Access to the PRS service will be controlled by
means of encryption systems approved by the
governments of the Member States. Crisis management
plans to handle terrorist threats or the risks of conflict
will be drawn up between the Member States in the
context of the public supervision of Galileo and a
structure will be set up at European Union level.

(iii) _Planned applications_

The public regulated service is designed to reduce the risk
of government-authorised users losing access to a
continuous signal in space and time in the event of
threat or a crisis. There will be a limited number of authorised users. Application include, for example:

(a) Europe-wide:

— the European Police Office (Europol),

— the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF),

— civil protection services, safety services (Maritime
Safety Agency), and those emergency response
services (peacekeeping forces, humanitarian
response teams);

(b) in the Member States:

— law enforcement and security services,

— forces or services engaged in fighting crime,

— intelligence services responsible for national
security,

— services responsible for controlling and supervising
external borders.

By way of example, without the PRS service, the speedboat
of a drugs trafficker equipped with a jamming device
pursued by a customs vessel could, in poor weather
conditions, prevent his pursuer ascertaining his position
within a radius of more than 10 kilometres by means of
satellite navigation, and could thus evade arrest. With a
special PRS receiver and antenna, however, the customs
official could counter this threat and ascertain his
position in real time. If he were also equipped with a
jamming device, he could stop the trafficker using
satellite navigation positioning.

In conclusion, under European civilian control, the PRS
will be a robust and resistant controlled-access service
available to the EU Member States. It will enable them
to promote European policies which require great
confidence in the continued availability of the Galileo
signal.

C 248/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

3.3. **The problem of the overlay of signals**

A number of signals and frequency bands are associated with
the various services offered.

Considering the limited space in the frequency spectrum
allocated to satellite navigation, the overlay of frequency
bands used by GPS and Galileo is inevitable, particularly for
secured signals. Such overlay complies with international regulations provided that there is no harmful interference to either
of the two systems. However, the United States, who until now
enjoyed a de facto monopoly of satellite radionavigation, are
currently — for strategic reasons — opposed to overlay of one
of the two PRS signals and one of the two military (or code M)
GPS signals at a specific modulation in the high frequency
band.

The selection of frequencies for Galileo's PRS signal is perfectly
justifiable in technical terms, however, as this is the frequency
spectrum which offers the best performance in peacetime,
particularly in terms of resistance and robustness, the best
cost/benefit ratio, and the best guarantee of continuity and
integrity. These qualities are equally valuable in a crisis. The
arguments put forward by the European Community are as
follows:

— it has the know-how to operate a secured signal,

— it believes that the complementary operation of the GPS
and Galileo systems must depend on mutual trust, and

— it has a prior claim on the right to use the signals.

Accordingly, the total overlay of one of the two PRS signals on
one of the M code signals is not only possible but desirable,
especially as:

— overlay is authorised by international regulations,

— the possible alternatives are less efficient and have not been
technically validated.

In order to settle this difference of opinion with the United
States, the Commission has in particular proposed an exchange
of technical information to the American authorities. It has
also stressed that, to that end, the Galileo Security
Committee was a trustful interlocutor to discuss matters with
the corresponding American security body (see point 5.1 below
and Annex 2).

4. **RESERVATION OF FREQUENCIES**

The definition of services and the frequency plan presented
below presuppose that Galileo has access to the frequency

spectrum needed for the transmission of the corresponding
signals. The World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC),
under the aegis of the UN, is the international forum where
over 150 countries negotiate the allocation of the frequencies
available within a physically limited spectrum to different
services. It is vital that the next WRC in June and July 2003
confirms the frequency plan already allocated to Galileo, as
well as its characteristics. This conference will be prepared
pursuant to the provisions of the Radio Spectrum Decision
of the Council ( [1] ).

4.1. **Rights gained at WRC-2000 in Istanbul**

At the Istanbul World Radiocommunication Conference, a
further frequency spectrum was allocated to satellite radionavigation services. No frequency spectrum was, however, allocated
specifically to Galileo or to other radionavigation systems.

Following the Istanbul WRC, a number of countries applied to
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to be
allocated frequencies for different satellite navigation systems,
particularly Galileo. Given the limited frequency spectrum
available, the next WRC in 2003 must validate the coexistence
of different systems within that spectrum. What is more, a
large part of the frequency spectrum allocated to satellite radionavigation is already reserved as a priority to aeronautic radionavigation services (ARNS) ( [2] ). All new satellite navigation
systems, including Galileo, must therefore demonstrate that
they do not cause interference with these priority services.

4.2. **Objectives for the next WRC**

At WRC-2003 there will no longer be the need to seek access
to the frequency spectrum for Galileo, unlike the situation at
WRC-2000. What we must do, however, is ensure that the
frequency spectrum allocated to satellite navigation affords
the flexibility needed for Galileo to provide all the planned
services. We must therefore ensure that the WRC ratifies the
technical characteristics of the frequency spectrum to be used
for Galileo services and their compatibility with other systems
in terms of the acceptable level of interference.

The outcome of WRC-2003 will be crucial to the coordination
of the various satellite radionavigation systems (Galileo, GPS,
Glonass, the Chinese systems) within the allocated frequency
spectrum.

We must therefore prevent countries such as the United States
or the Russian Federation or organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) imposing excessive
restrictions on the frequency spectrum already allocated to
Galileo.

( [1] ) Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 1).
( [2] ) ARNS includes all the existing terrestrial navigation systems used
for civil aviation.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/7

Since all the issues of concern to Galileo at WRC-2003 are
related to the frequency spectrum allocated as a priority to civil
aviation, chiefly ground-based air navigation and radar
guidance systems, it is of prime importance to reach
agreement in advance with air navigation organisations,
particularly the ICAO.

4.3. **The strategy to be** **adopted** **to defend** **Galileo's**
**interests at WRC-2003**

Preparations for WRC-2003 should focus on the following four
priorities:

— final definition of the services and the frequency plan (see
section 3 below) in order to complete the technical specifications for Galileo,

— ensuring consistency between the various EU policies on
frequencies and between the various EU players,

— maintaining close relations with the main non-EU players
involved in preparing WRC-2003 (CEPT, ITU, Eurocontrol,
ICAO, etc.),

— enlisting the widest possible support for Galileo from third
countries and world regions at the WRC. The necessary
action should be taken on these priorities.

5. **RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES**

5.1. **The importance of international cooperation**

Galileo is a worldwide system. International cooperation is
essential if maximum advantage is to be gained from the
Galileo programme. It should also help increase European
know-how and reduce the technological and political risks of
the programme. As well as assisting technical standardisation
with existing systems, cooperation is essential for penetrating
markets and developing ground-based equipment. It therefore
also falls into line with the European Union's objectives in
terms of foreign policy, development cooperation, employment
and the environment.

Since the Council Decision to launch the Galileo programme, a
number of third countries have expressed a wish to be involved
in the programme in some way. Moreover, the Commission
regards the Galileo programme as being of world importance
and, as such, of interest to all third countries.

In practical terms, cooperation with third countries means
solving problems such as system supervision and security, tech

nology transfer, intellectual property and control of exports. In
opening up to third countries, the Community and its Member
States will in particular adhere to the international
commitments they have entered into on non-proliferation
and export control, especially with regard to dual-use goods.
In this context, consideration must be given to the differences
in the application of export controls noted between the
Community and some third countries that are members of
international systems, particularly with regard to arrangements
for monitoring intangible technology transfer, the extraterritorial aspects of some legislation, re-exporting conditions, etc.

(a) _United States_

The principal partner involved, the United States has
displayed renewed interest in signing an agreement with
the European Community. A successful initial negotiation
meeting was held in Brussels on 21 and 22 June 2002. The
next meeting is planned for October. The aim is to reach a
cooperation agreement with the United States by the end of
2003, outlining the principles of interoperability and
governing the commercial questions related to the use of
Galileo and GPS.

With regard to the commercial issues, the United States
have acknowledged that satellite radionavigation
(equipment and services) is covered by the multilateral
commercial rules issued by the World Trade Organisation.
It should however be examined whether some loopholes
(goods or services) would require introducing a special
clause in the future bilateral agreement presently under
negotiation.

A great step forward was also achieved in terms of interoperability. The United States were notified that the
European Community would be using its own standards,
often identical to the international standards, rather than
the GPS system standards, a choice dictated by the quality
of the services to be offered to users (signal continuity and
reliability, precision, low cost of receivers, etc.). Galileo is
also a commercial project, after all, and GPS is not the
international standard. Galileo will be a constellation that,
while complementary to GPS and interoperable for GPS
users, will be quite independent of the GPS system.

The European Community also presented the project's state
of progress and illustrated the suitability of the technical
solutions adopted (time, geodetic, frequency planning) in
terms of quality of service and interoperability with GPS
for the user. The best experts from the Member States were
brought in to participate in the meeting. They presented a
united front. The European and American experts will meet
before the next negotiations in October. Technical work on
the specific questions at issue should make it possible to
overcome the final obstacles to defining the principles
governing Galileo/GPS interoperability.

C 248/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

It has not, however, been possible to make progress on the
thorny issue of the overlay of one of the frequency bands
intended for Galileo's future public regulated service on one
of the future American military (code M) signals. The US
negotiators are not authorised to tackle this matter, given
its high political sensitivity. The United States regards
NATO as the only forum in which the matter may be
discussed.

On behalf of the European Community, the Commission
has made the following points:

— the Galileo programme is a civilian programme
supported by the European Union and the negotiating
mandate which the Council has given the Commission
covers all aspects connected with Galileo, including
frequencies. While the matter of frequencies may be
of interest to NATO, finding a solution to the
problem comes under relations between the European
Community and the United States,

— the planned overlay with the American military code,
which moreover complies with the decisions taken by
the International Telecommunication Union in 2000
regarding access to frequencies, is dictated by
technical and practical considerations, such as signal
robustness and acceptable levels of interference,

— the Commission wishes to initiate a purely technical
discussion of the matter with the American authorities
in order to understand their concerns. Awaiting for the
setting up of the Security Board, the task is entrusted to
the working group responsible for international issues
of the expert committee for Galileo security (whose
members are authorised to handle and exchange any
confidential information, even of military origin). A
political decision on the issue of possible overlay
cannot be made until technical information has been
exchanged and all the possible implications have been
reviewed.

Until now, in its negotiations with the Americans, the
Commission has put forward the scenario that the United
States will not be able to jam one of the planned PRS
signals because it will be overlaid on one of the future
military GPS signals and it is not possible to selectively
jam one of two signals overlaid on a single frequency
band with the same modulation. As explained in point
3.3 above, the modulation used for the overlay would
enable Galileo to transmit a much more ‘robust’ and
reliable signal. As a result, the United States would not
be able to selectively jam Galileo PRS users. A political
agreement on the cooperation necessary between the two
radionavigation systems is required in preparation for a
crisis or in the event of a crisis.

The Europe Community's political decision to equip itself
with its own satellite navigation system is based on the
supposition that it should retain genuine control of the
secured PRS signal and, therefore, runs counter to
accepting a situation of relative independence in which
the use of the ‘government’ signal would be subject to
certain conditions.

(b) _Russian Federation and China_

Contacts with Russia and China regarding Galileo cover
many areas of cooperation. Both countries have advanced
satellite radionavigation programmes and view cooperation
with the European Community as a strategic objective. One
major issue is the relationship between Glonass and Galileo
systems and standards. In tandem with its expressed wish to
participate in the Galileo programme, China is independently developing a regional system adapted to its
own needs and has applied to the International Telecommunication Union for access to frequencies dedicated to
satellite navigation.

_**Russian Federation:**_ The value of developing cooperation
on Galileo has been emphasised at every summit between
the European Union and Russia. In the past, formal
negotiations with Russia have focused on defining
scenarios for cooperation and joint industrial projects and
on the possibilities for collaboration on frequencies.
Following recent bilateral contacts between the Commission
and Russia, in particular at the summit of 29 May 2002,
both parties decided to re-examine the precise scope of
cooperation. They have a mutual interest in expanding
cooperation in terms of both developing technology and
financial investment.

Politically, the European Community and Russian should
attempt to combine forces (Galileo plus Glonass) in order
to create a worldwide satellite radionavigation system integrating the existing and planned systems. Coordinating
their respective positions within international organisations
with an interest in satellite radionavigation (ITU, ICAO,
IMO) should help attain this objective.

In practical terms, it is important to exploit the synergies
which the coexistence of the two systems, Galileo and
Glonass, can offer European users in terms of quality and
availability of services. The possible modernisation of
Glonass standards is also up for discussion since the
Russians have declared their interest in civilian and, more
especially, commercial radionavigation markets.

As well as promoting industrial and scientific links, it has
been agreed that negotiations will be resumed with a view
to concluding a cooperation agreement at the earliest
possible opportunity. The Commission will draw up a
draft agreement in the autumn.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/9

The Commission has organised a large roundtable meeting
with the representatives of the major Russian firms in order
to encourage cooperation on satellite navigation
applications and to inform them of the possibilities
available to them of participating directly in the Joint
Undertaking as future users.

_**People's Republic of China:**_ The demographic, economic
and political role of China and its satellite radionavigation
activities warrant the country a special place in the Galileo
programme. Following the Sino-European summit held in
June 2001, cooperation with China took the form of visits
by experts and two major conferences bringing together all
the Chinese scientific, technical and commercial operators.
The last such conference, held in Beijing on 3 and 4 June
2002, was organised with the help of the European Space
Agency.

When Vice-President de Palacio met Minister Xu Guanhua
on 17 June 2002, an announcement was made regarding
the future establishment in China of a Sino-European centre
for cooperation on satellite radionavigation. It is intended
to set up teams of European and Chinese researchers
working on Galileo and on radionavigation in general
with a view to promoting industrial partnerships to
research and exploit the applications of this technology.

The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, expressed his
country's interest in being fully involved in the Galileo
programme financially, technically and politically. The
Chinese Ministry for Research presented a list of areas of
cooperation which could be covered by formal agreements
between the European Community and China.

Considering both the state of progress of potential cooperation with China, the importance of the stakes of collaboration with this country in terms of markets, policies on
standardisation and frequencies, and the political objectives
of both parties in terms of sovereignty, technology transfer,
etc., the Commission will shortly present a proposal for a
directive on specific negotiations with China.

(c) _Other third countries_

_**Mediterranean countries:**_ The Fifth Euro-Mediterranean
Ministerial Conference on 22 and 23 April 2002,
marking the renewal of the Barcelona Process, adopted an
action plan for the development of the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership in association with the regional strategy
(2002-2006) for the Mediterranean region. Satellite radionavigation is a priority component of this action plan
which seeks to promote regional strategies of benefit to
multimodal transport systems in these countries.

The Mediterranean region has expressed great interest in
Galileo and in its precursor, Egnos. Because of their
geographic and economic proximity, the countries of the
Mediterranean are favoured sites for Egnos ground stations.
One of the planned MEDA Programme projects involves
setting up training and demonstration activities on
satellite radionavigation in the Mediterranean partner
countries. The chief objective is to inform and raise
awareness among decision-makers in these countries
regarding the possibilities afforded by the use of Galileo
and this technology.

_**Latin**_ _**America:**_ The support of the Latin American
countries is vital in order to protect the frequencies
allocated to Galileo. It is important to demonstrate
Galileo's potential and importance for Latin America.

Initial contacts with some Latin American countries,
including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay,
show that these countries are keen to counterbalance their
relations with the United States by forging strong links with
the European Union. The geographic, climatic and demographic situation of the region intensifies infrastructure and
transport safety problems there.

The European Union's approach in Latin America should
stress European know-how in the field of satellite radionavigation. A major regional cooperation project is
already under way. As in the Mediterranean region, it
involves setting up a cooperation centre responsible for
carrying out training and demonstrations on satellite radionavigation, using in particular the Egnos system, which
gives an idea of the future potential of Galileo. The
objective is to influence as many decision-makers and
future users in those countries as possible. In addition,
Galileo may play an important role in the regional civil
aviation plan developed for Latin America under the
auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

_**Canada:**_ In political terms, Canada has shown interest in
potentially participating in the Joint Undertaking via its
national space agency, with greater involvement in the
programme than simply as a European Space Agency
‘cooperating State’. The matter is currently under discussion
in Ottawa. In technical terms, Canada is still taking part in
the Galileo studies managed by the Commission and the
European Space Agency.

_**Australia:**_ Australia was initially reluctant to cooperate
with the European Community on the Galileo and Egnos
projects. This attitude has since changed, however, into a
wish for cooperation. This was shown by the Australian
transport authorities' visit to the Commission in April
2002. They expressed their interest in using Galileo
applications and in siting and managing Galileo ground
facilities in Australia. The Commission has therefore
started to draw up a list of possible areas for cooperation.

C 248/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

_**Japan:**_ Japan is an important country because of its many
political and economic links with the European Union. It is
also a country which has developed advanced satellite navigation technology, even if the Japanese authorities have yet
to choose between the various positioning systems, such as
the combined use of GPS and MSAS or Galileo and GPS.
Significantly, American industry, supported by the Federal
Aviation Authority, has established close links with the
Japanese authorities by exporting American technology in
order to develop the Japanese equivalent to Egnos, the
MSAS system. Moreover, Japan was opposed to allocating
frequencies to Galileo at WRC-2000 in Istanbul.
Negotiations with Japan must focus on this.

Satellite radionavigation was one of the seven priorities for
cooperation agreed by the Commission in its forthcoming
communication on establishing economic and commercial
partnership with Japan. The priority was confirmed at the
latest summit between the European Union and Japan on 8
July 2002. It reflects the interest of the Japanese
Government and industrial authorities in playing a more
important part in the Galileo programme.

_**Ukraine:**_ Ukraine has advanced aerospace capacity, having
in particular taken part in the development of the Russian
Glonass programme. At recent summit meetings between
the European Union and Ukraine, it was decided to step up
contacts between experts on the Galileo programme with a
view to possible cooperation. Ukraine, as a neighbour of
the European Union, is interested by the development of
Galileo applications in the transport sector. With Ukraine,
the Commission has always maintained the line that
exchanges should proceed as part of a cooperation and
partnership agreement.

_**India:**_ The Indian aviation and research authorities are
trying to set up a first-generation (Egnos or WAAS type)
satellite radionavigation system. European and American
industries are in competition over this. The aviation
sector is of critical importance in this project because of
the imperatives of air safety, with Indian airspace crossed
by a considerable number of international flights.

In this context, the European Community has initiated
cooperation with India to allow it to use Galileo's
precursor, the Egnos system. The aim is to ensure that
European technology forms the basis of any future navigation system developed by India, which claims to own its
own radionavigation system.

(d) _Candidate countries_

The problem explained above with regard to third
countries does not of course apply to the candidate

countries which are destined to become members of the
European Union. They have a key role in the Galileo
programme as future co-owners of the system. It is
moreover essential, as of now, to enlist their support for
Galileo in international forums, and to prepare them to
take on their future role as members of the European
Union and participants in the Galileo programme
structures.

Bilateral and multilateral contacts (UN) have shown the
capacity of these countries to use and develop satellite
navigation services for uses in transport, geodesy and
science in general. The conference currently being
prepared in Poland will significantly help to make these
countries aware of the value of the Galileo programme. An
initial planning meeting was held in Warsaw on 19 and 20
June 2002, as part of a conference on all space
applications organised jointly by the Commission and
the European Space Agency.

5.2. **Participation of third country members in the Joint**
**Undertaking**

On the subject of the possible forms of cooperation with third
countries, it should be noted that Article 5 of the Regulation
setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking specifically provides
for third country members to take part in the joint undertaking.

In addition to the negotiating directives issued by the Council
which, by definition, cover a wide range of subjects (scientific
and industrial cooperation, commercial matters, etc.), there is
the specific issue of third country participation in the activities
of the joint undertaking.

At present, a number of countries have expressed interest in
becoming involved in the Galileo programme in this way. This
means, however, that the countries concerned and the Joint
Undertaking will have to have discussions in order to work
out appropriate arrangements. In any case, final approval
must be given by the Council.

The founding members of the Joint Undertaking, applying their
own decision-making procedures, will have to assess the terms
of this participation, including, in particular, the amount of the
financial contribution to the joint undertaking, the approval —
by the country concerned — of the key elements of Galileo
strategy ( [1] ), protection of Galileo infrastructure, acceptance of
the EU principles regarding the transfer of technology and
intellectual property.

The Council still has to approve their participation, on the
basis of Commission proposals, and any conditions attached.

( [1] ) Support for Galileo standards in the IMO and ICAO, non-discrimination of Galileo services and equipment according to WTO rules,
non-discrimination of Galileo in the ITU.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/11

5.3. **Negotiating directives**

_**China:**_ The Commission is preparing a proposal for a
negotiating directive to be adopted in the near future by the
Council, with a view to reaching a formal agreement on cooperation with China after the pattern of the mandates obtained
for negotiations with the United States and Russia. The
negotiating mandate covers the range of subjects, from
scientific and industrial cooperation to political cooperation.

_**Other third countries:**_ In view of the large number of
applications and the need for a consistent approach, the
Commission is proposing that the Council in the near future
adopt a negotiating directive in the form of a **model**
**agreement** that can be used for all third countries rather
than taking each third country individually.

This directive would cover areas such as political cooperation,
technical (e.g. interoperability), industrial and financial cooperation, the management of Galileo, including the Joint Undertaking, scientific collaboration and research/training.

Cooperation with a view to promoting regional and local
services is an important element for the development of
Galileo, considering sovereignty issues.

The final content of the cooperation agreements will vary
according to the countries concerned. The wider the
anticipated cooperation ( [1] ), the more detailed the Commission
proposal to the Council will be.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The forthcoming deadlines are listed in Annex 3. Political
guidelines should be issued as quickly as possible on the
following points:

— the definition of Galileo services and the frequency plan
based on the most recent version of the technical
document produced by the Commission services,

— the overlay of PRS frequencies and the discussions to be
conducted on the subject between the European
Community and the United States,

— plans for negotiations with China and other third countries.

( [1] ) Potentially, e.g. Japan.

_ANNEX 1_

**GALILEO MISSION AND SERVICE DEFINITION**

**General introduction**

The main characteristics of the Galileo programme and the services and performances offered are presented in the
high-level definition document. It is used as the framework for the Galileo programme and is applicable to the mission
requirement document. The document prepared by the European Commission and the European Space Agency results
from a consultation process with users, Member States and prospective investors and takes into account the latest results
of technical definition studies performed so far.

The European objective of full autonomy in satellite navigation will be achieved in a two-step approach, starting with
the EGNOS system in 2004 and then with the Galileo system, which is aimed at full operational capability by 2008.
Galileo will be the first civil satellite positioning and navigation system, designed and operated under civil control.
Galileo will be interoperable with other systems to facilitate their combined use. For safety of life and commercial
applications, the navigation services will offer a guarantee, which is not only advantageous, but also an important
differentiation with respect to the current GNSS. Special attention has been given to security aspect of Galileo, to protect
its infrastructure and to avoid the potential misuse of its signals.

Four navigation services and one service to support search and rescue operations have been identified to cover the
widest range of users needs, including professional users, scientists, mass-market users, safety of life and public regulated
domains. The following Galileo satellite-only services will be provided worldwide and independently from other systems
by combining the Galileo's signals in space:

(i) _The Open Service (OS)_ results from a combination of open signals, free of user charge, provides position and timing
performances competitive with other GNSS systems.

C 248/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

(ii) _The Safety of Life Service (SoL)_ improves the open service performances providing timely warnings to the user when it
fails to meet certain margins of accuracy (integrity). It is envisaged that a service guarantee will be provided for this
service.

(iii) _The Commercial Service (CS)_ provides access to two additional signals, to allow for a higher data rate throughput and
to enable users to improve accuracy. It is envisaged that a service guarantee will be provided for this service. This
service also provides a limited broadcasting capacity for messages from service centres to users (in the order of 500
bits per second).

(iv) _The Public Regulated Service (PRS)_ provides position and timing to specific users requiring a high continuity of service,
with controlled access. Two PRS navigation signals with encrypted ranging codes and data will be available.

(v) _The Search and Rescue Service (SAR)_ broadcast globally the alert messages received from distress emitting beacons. It
will contribute to enhance the performances of the international Cospas-Sarsat search and rescue system.

The Galileo satellite-only services can be enhanced on a local basis through combination with local elements for
applications with more demanding requirements.

Galileo signals can also be combined with other GNSS system (Glonass, GPS) or non-GNSS systems (e.g. GSM and
UMTS) to allow enhanced services for specific applications.

A service-oriented approach has been used to design the Galileo architecture. The Galileo global component, comprising
the constellation of 27 active satellites + three spare satellites in medium earth orbit and its associated ground segment,
will broadcast the signal in space required to achieve the satellite-only services. The local service enhancements will be
facilitated, as the global component will be designed to easily interface with local elements. In the same way, the
interoperability between Galileo and external components will be a major driver of the Galileo design to allow the
development of applications combining Galileo services and external systems services (e.g. navigation or communication
systems).

OPEN SERVICE

_**Purpose**_

The Galileo Open Service provides positioning, velocity and timing information that can be accessed free of direct
charge. This service is suitable for mass-market applications, such as in-car navigation and hybridisation with mobile
telephones. The timing service is synchronised with UTC when used with receivers in fixed locations. This timing service
can be used for applications such as network synchronisation or scientific applications.

_**Performance and features**_

The performance objectives in terms of position accuracy and availability will be competitive with respect to existing
GNSS and further planned evolutions. In addition, the Open Service will also be interoperable with other GNSS, in order
to facilitate the provision of combined services.

_**Implementation**_

The Open Service signals are separated in frequency to permit the correction of errors induced by ionospheric effects by
differentiation of the ranging measurements made at each frequency. Each navigation frequency will include two ranging
code signals (in-phase and quadrature). Data are added to one of the ranging codes while the other ‘pilot’ ranging code is
data-less for more precise and robust navigation measurements.

COMMERCIAL SERVICE

_**Purpose**_

The Commercial Service will allow the development of professional applications, with increased navigation
performances and added value data, compared with the Open Service. The foreseen applications will be based on:

— dissemination of data with a rate of 500 bps, for added value services,

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/13

— broadcasting of two signals, separated in frequency from the Open Services signals to facilitate advanced
applications such as integration of Galileo positioning applications with wireless communications networks, high
accuracy positioning and indoor navigation.

_**Performances and features**_

The Galileo Operating Company (GOC) will determine the level of performance it can offer for each commercial service
together with ascertaining the demands of industry and the needs of the consumer. It is intended to provide a guarantee
for this service.

The Commercial Service will be a controlled access service operated by commercial service providers acting after a
licence agreement between them and the GOC.

Commercial service providers will make decisions on the offered services: e.g. integrity data, differential corrections for
local areas, etc., which will depend on the final characteristics of the other services offered by Galileo.

_**Implementation**_

The Commercial Service signals will be the Open Services signals, plus two encrypted signals (ranging codes and data),
on the E6 band.

SAFETY OF LIFE SERVICE

_**Purpose**_

The target markets of the Safety of Life Service are safety critical users, for example, maritime, aviation and trains, whose
applications or operations require stringent performance levels.

This service will provide high-level performance globally to satisfy the user community needs and to increase safety
especially in areas where services provided by traditional ground infrastructure are not available. A worldwide seamless
service will increase the efficiency of companies operating on a global basis, e.g. airlines, transoceanic maritime
companies.

_**Performance and features**_

With regard to Safety of Life Services, there are certain levels of service that are stipulated by law in various international transportation fields, for example, standards and recommended practices (SARPS) by ICAO. A very specific level
of service from Galileo will be needed to comply with legislation applicable for all considered domains of transport and
existing standards. It is intended to provide a guarantee for this service.

This service will be offered openly and the system will have the capability to authenticate the signal (e.g. by a digital
signature) to assure the users that the received signal is the actual Galileo signal. This system feature, which will be
activated if required by users, must be transparent and non-discriminatory to users and shall not introduce any
degradation in performance.

The provision of integrity ( [1] ) information at global level is the main characteristic of this service. Non-European regions
could also support the provision of this service on a regional basis by delivering regional integrity information through
the Galileo satellites.

The Safety of Life Service will be provided globally. Its specification include two levels to cover two conditions of risk
exposure and are applicable to many applications in different transport domains, for example air, land, maritime, rail:

— the critical level covers time critical operations for example, in the aviation domain approach operations with
vertical guidance,

— the non-critical level covers extended operations that are less time critical, such as open sea navigation in the
maritime domain.

( [1] ) Integrity is the ability of a system to provide timely warnings to the user when it fails to meet certain margins of accuracy.

C 248/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

The SoL Service signals are in the E5a + E5b and L1 bands. Galileo will offer a robust service to the Safety of Life
community providing also alternative levels of service for degraded modes of operation (e.g. where one or two
frequency would not be available due to interference).

_**Implementation**_

The Safety of Life Service signals are separated in frequency to permit correction of errors induced by ionospheric effects
by differentiation of the ranging measurements made at each frequency. Each navigation frequency will include two
ranging code signals (in-phase and quadrature). Data are added to one of the ranging codes while the other ‘pilot’
ranging code is data-less for more precise and robust navigation measurements. The integrity data will be broadcast in
the L1 and E5b bands.

PUBLIC REGULATED SERVICE

_**Purpose**_

The Public Regulated Service (PRS) will provide a higher level of protection against the threats to Galileo signals in space
than is available for the open services (OS, CS and SoL) through the use of appropriate interference mitigation technologies.

The need for the PRS results from the analysis of threats to the Galileo system and the identification of infrastructure
applications where disruption to the signal in space by economic terrorists, malcontents, subversives or hostile agencies
could result in damaging reductions in national security, law enforcement, safety or economic activity within a
significant geographic area.

The objective of the PRS is to improve the probability of continuous availability of the signal in space, in the presence
of interfering threats, to those users with such a need. Applications include the following:

(a) _Europe-wide:_

— the European Police Office (Europol),

— the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF),

— civil protection services, safety services (Maritime Safety Agency), and those emergency response services
(peacekeeping forces, humanitarian response teams);

(b) _in the Member States:_

— law enforcement and security services,

— forces or services engaged in fighting crime,

— intelligence services responsible for national security,

— services responsible for controlling and supervising external borders.

The introduction of interference mitigation technologies carries with it a responsibility to ensure that access to these
technologies is adequately controlled to prevent misuse of the technologies against the interests of Member States.
Access to the PRS will be controlled through key management systems approved by Member States' governments.

_**Performance and features**_

The Public Regulated Service access will be controlled by the authorities to be defined at European level, through the
encryption of the signals and the appropriate key distribution.

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/15

_**Implementation**_

The Public Regulated Service signals are permanently broadcast on separate frequencies with respect to open Galileo
satellite-only services, so as not to lose the PRS when the open service is denied locally. They are wide band signals so as
to be resistant to involuntary interference or malicious jamming and therefore offer a better continuity of service.

The use of PRS will be restricted to clearly identified categories of users authorised by EU and participating states.
Member States will authorise users through the implementation of appropriate controlled access techniques. Control of
distribution of receivers will be maintained by Member States.

SEARCH AND RESCUE SERVICE

_**Purpose**_

The Galileo support to the Search and Rescue service — herein called SAR/Galileo — represents the contribution of
Europe to the international Cospas-Sarsat cooperative effort on humanitarian search and rescue activities. SAR/Galileo
shall:

— fulfil the requirements and regulations of the International Maritime Organisation — via the detection of emergency
position indicating radio beacons of the Global Maritime Distress Security Service and of the International Civil
Aviation Organisation via the detection of emergency location terminals,

— be backward compatible with the Cospas-Sarsat system to efficiently contribute to this international search and
rescue effort.

_**Performances and features**_

SAR/Galileo will allow for important improvements of the existing Cospas-Sarsat system:

— near real-time reception of distress messages transmitted from anywhere on earth (the average waiting time is
currently one hour),

— precise location of alerts,

— multiple satellite detection to avoid terrain blockage in severe conditions,

— increased availability of the space segment (27 medium earth orbit satellites on top of the four low earth orbit
satellites and the three geostationary satellites in the current system).

In addition, SAR/Galileo will introduce a new SAR function namely, the return link from the SAR operator to the
distress emitting beacon, thereby facilitating the rescue operations and helping to identify and reject the false alerts.

_**Implementation**_

The search and rescue transponder on Galileo satellites detects the distress alert from any Cospas-Sarsat beacon emitting
an alert in the 406-406,1 MHz band, and broadcasts this information to dedicated ground stations in the ‘L6’ band.
Cospas-Sarsat Mission Control Centres (MCC) carry out the position determination of the distress alert emitting beacons,
once they have been detected by the dedicated ground segment.

C 248/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

_Appendix 1_

**Galileo services — main characteristics**

**Open Service (positioning)**

|Type of receiver|Carriers|Single frequency|Dual frequency|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Type of receiver**|Computes integrity|No|No|
|**Type of receiver**|Ionospheric correction|Based<br>on simple<br>model|Based on dual-frequency measurements|
|**Coverage**|**Coverage**|Global|Global|
|**Accuracy (95 %)**|**Accuracy (95 %)**|H: 15 m<br>V: 35 m|H: 4 m<br>V: 8 m|
|**Integrity**|**Alarm limit**|Not applicable|Not applicable|
|**Integrity**|**Time-to-alarm**|**Time-to-alarm**|**Time-to-alarm**|
|**Integrity**|**Integrity risk**|**Integrity risk**|**Integrity risk**|
|**Availability**|**Availability**|99,8 %|99,8 %|

**Open Service (timing)**

|Carriers|Three frequencies|
|---|---|
|**Coverage**|Global|
|**Timing accuracy wrt UTC/TAI**|30 nsec|
|**Availability**|99,8 %|

**Safety of Life Service**

|Type of receiver|Carriers|Three frequencies|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Type of receiver**|**Computes integrity**|Yes|Yes|
|**Type of receiver**|**Ionospheric correction**|Based on dual-frequency measurements|Based on dual-frequency measurements|
|**Coverage**|**Coverage**|Global|Global|
|||Critical level|Non-critical level|
|**Accuracy (95 %)**|**Accuracy (95 %)**|H: 4 m<br>V: 8 m|H: 220 m|
|**Integrity**|**Alarm limit**|H: 12 V 20 m|H: 556 m|
|**Integrity**|**Time-to-alarm**|6 seconds|10 seconds|
|**Integrity**|**Integrity risk**|3,5 × 10–7/150 s|10–7/hour|
|**Continuity risk**|**Continuity risk**|10–5/15 s|10–4/hour-10–8/hour|
|**Certification/liability**|**Certification/liability**|Yes|Yes|
|**Availability of integrity**|**Availability of integrity**|99,5 %|99,5 %|
|**Availability of accuracy**|**Availability of accuracy**|99,8 %|99,8 %|

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/17

**Public Regulated Service**

|Type of receiver|Carriers|Dual-frequency|
|---|---|---|
|**Type of receiver**|**Computes integrity**|Yes|
|**Type of receiver**|**Ionospheric**<br>**correction**|Based on dual-frequency measurements|
|**Coverage**|**Coverage**|Global|
|**Accuracy (95 %)**|**Accuracy (95 %)**|H: 6,5 m<br>V: 12 m|
|**Integrity**|**Alarm limit**|H:20-V:35<br>10 s<br>3,5 × 10–7/150 sec|
|**Integrity**|**Time-to-alarm**|**Time-to-alarm**|
|**Integrity**|**Integrity risk**|**Integrity risk**|
|**Continuity risk**|**Continuity risk**|10–5/15 s|
|**Timing accuracy wrt UTC/TAI**|**Timing accuracy wrt UTC/TAI**|100 nsec|
|**Availability**|**Availability**|99,5 %|

**Galileo support to search and rescue service (SAR/Galileo)**

|Capacity|Each satellite shall relay signals from up to 150 simultaneous<br>active beacons|
|---|---|
|**Forward system latency time**|The communication from beacons to SAR ground stations shall<br>allow for the detection and location of a distress transmission in<br>less than 10 minutes. The latency time goes from beacon first<br>activation to distress location determination|
|**Quality of service**|Bit error rate < 10–5 for communication link: beacon to SAR<br>ground station|
|**Acknowledgement data rate**|6 messages of 100 bits each, per minute|
|**Availability**|> 99,8 %|

|Type of local elements|Broadcast of differential<br>corrections|Broadcast of differential<br>corrections|Indoor assisted users|
|---|---|---|---|
|**Accuracy (95 %)**|< 1 m|< 10 cm|50 m (TBC)|
|**Integrity TTA**|Up to 1 second|TBD|TBD|
|**Integrity alarm limit**|TBD|TBD|TBD|
|**Availability**|99-99,95 (TBD)|99-99,9 (TBD)|99-99,9 (TBD)|
|**Communications**|Broadcast|Single-/bi-directional data|Single-/bi-directional data<br>and voice|

C 248/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

_Appendix 2_

**Galileo signals — main characteristics**

The following chart describes the Galileo navigation signal emissions:

— four signals are transmitted in the frequency range 1 164-1 215 MHz (E5a-E5b),

— three signals are transmitted in the frequency range 1 260-1 300 MHz (E6),

— three signals are transmitted in the frequency range 1 559-1 591 MHz (L1).

Both the ranging code and data carry the specific information needed for a specific service. Among the 10 navigation
signals:

— six are designed for OS and SoL (signals 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10),

— two are designed specifically for CS (signals 6, 7),

— two are designed specifically for PRS (signals 5, 8).

The table below summarises the characteristics of navigation signals and their service allocation:

|Col1|Col2|Navigation services|Col4|Col5|Col6|Signal characteristics|Col8|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Signal ID|Frequencies|OS|CS|SoL|PRS|Ranging code type|Data type|
|1, 2, 3,<br>4, 9<br>and 10|E5a<br>E5b<br>L1|×|×|×||Open access|Navigation data<br>Integrity data<br>SAR data, commercial data|
|6, 7|E6||×|||Commercial<br>encryption|Commercial data|
|5, 8|E6<br>L1||||×|Governmental<br>encryption|PRS data|

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/19

|Signal ID|Signals|Central<br>frequency|Modulation|Chip rate|Code encryption|Data rate|Data<br>encryption|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|data signal in E5A|1 176 MHz|BPSK (10)|10 Mcps|no|50 sps/25 bps|no|
|2|pilot signal in E5A|1 176 MHz|BPSK (10)|10 Mcps|no|no data|no data|
|3|data signal in E5B|1 207 MHz|BPSK (10)|10 Mcps|no|250 sps/<br>125 bps|no|
|4|pilot signal in E5B|1 207 MHz|BPSK (10)|10 Mcps|no|no data|no data|
|5|split-spectrum signal<br>in E6|1 278 MHz|BOC (10,5)|5 Mcps|Yes —<br>government<br>approved|250 sps/<br>125 bps|yes|
|6|commercial data<br>signal in E6|1 278 MHz|BPSK (5)|5 Mcps|Yes —<br>commercial|1 000 sps/<br>500 bps|yes|
|7|commercial pilot<br>signal in E6|1 278 MHz|BPSK (5)|5 Mcps|Yes —<br>commercial|no data|no data|
|8|split-spectrum signal<br>in L1|1 575 MHz|BOC (n,m)|m Mcps|Yes —<br>government<br>approved|250 sps/<br>125 bps|yes|
|9|data signal in L1|1 575 MHz|BOC (2,2)|2 Mcps|no|200 sps/<br>100 bps|no|
|10|pilot signal in L1|1 575 MHz|BOC (2,2)|2 Mcps|no|no data|no data|

_ANNEX 2_

**ISSUES RELATING TO GALILEO SIGNALS**

**Introduction**

The European Commission, European Space Agency (ESA), certain Member States ( [1] ) and the business world, notably
firms active in receiver design, have taken part in the work of the ‘Signal Task Force’ attached to the Galileo Steering
Committee. This Task Force began work in March 2001. One of its missions was to help define the signals to be
transmitted by Galileo. In this context, the best possible scenario in terms of the frequency and type of signals used was
devised to ensure that signals transmitted by Galileo would deliver optimum performance and thereby enable it to
penetrate the satellite navigation market. The experts appointed by the Member States reached a consensus on this
scenario.

Galileo will offer a range of services each using at least two frequency bands. Two of these services use unencrypted
signals. Two others rely on encrypted signals, one for commercial purposes and the other for critical and sensitive
applications under government control. This ‘governmental’ or Public Regulated Service has a high level of protection.

The American GPS system has two types of signals: civilian and military. The current GPS military signals are called P(Y)
and the future military ones are called code M.

The Signal Task Force has allowed for interoperability between GPS and Galileo. It works by overlaying the Galileo open
signals with two of the GPS frequencies, which will enable future open-signal satellite radionavigation receivers to use
GPS and Galileo signals together. It also allows for partial or total overlay of one of the encrypted PRS signals with one
of the forthcoming GPS code M signals. These overlays are possible from the technical and legal points of view.

For the moment the United States is opposed to the overlay of one of the Galileo PRS signals with one of the GPS code
M signals. It cites its defence policy priorities as its reason for wishing to retain the possibility of jamming the Galileo
PRS signal.

The analysis below first explains the issues raised by the United States and then goes on to set out the EU's position
regarding the choice of the Galileo PRS frequencies.

( [1] ) United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Finland.

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I. **OVERLAYING THE PRS AND CODE M SIGNALS**

1. **The Galileo PRS signal**

Of the various navigation services to be provided by Galileo, the PRS service is designed to ensure continuity of
service for certain sensitive applications (security, police, customs, fraud prevention), even in an emergency.

To ensure continuity of service and to prevent access to unauthorised users, the PRS signals are continuously
encrypted by a cipher or a government code and supervised by an appropriate European body.

PRS receivers will therefore be specific and very strictly controlled: users are identified by name, receivers are
traceable, stolen receivers are reported and disabled in accordance with a special procedure.

The PRS is composed of two signals: one in the medium-frequency band known as E6, the other in the highfrequency band known as L1. The signal located in the E6 band is defined without any overlay with GPS signals as it
has sufficient bandwidth. The GPS code M also uses the L1 band, however.

2. **Worldwide regulations (ITU)**

According to current international regulations laid down by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the
frequencies that can be used by satellite navigation systems do not belong to any particular country or system. If a
countries wishes to use a frequency band it must file an application with the ITU. The first country to file an
application for a frequency has a priority claim on its use. However, any country may use the same frequency for its
own navigation system provided that it does not cause excessive electromagnetic interference affecting other systems
in use, including those having a prior claim.

3. **Overlaying PRS and M code signals**

The GPS code M and Galileo PRS signals each use different frequency bands. At the World Radiocommunication
Conference (WRC) held in Istanbul in 2000, it did not prove possible to obtain sufficient bandwidth in the L1 band
for all the potential signals. The GPS M code therefore overlaps with the Galileo PRS signal.

Two years of studies on interference by the best European experts have led to the firm conclusion that the European
Union is capable of designing a PRS navigation service that will not interfere with the GPS M code, including in the
high L1 band.

Therefore, international regulations allow the Europe Community to use for its own Galileo system the frequencies
on which GPS operates, including the GPS military signals and in particular M code, provided that Galileo does not
cause interference harmful to the American system. There is no technical or legal obstacle standing in the way of
overlaying one of the two Galileo PRS signals with one of the GPS code M signals.

4. **The military, industrial and commercial stakes**

There are several reasons why the Americans oppose the overlay of the two signals.

(a) _Military reasons_

The United States considers that any civilian satellite navigation signal may be used for hostile or even terrorist
purposes against national or NATO interests. In order to counter that threat, the US and soon NATO plan to
develop an electronic warfare system called Navwar, that can locally jam civilian signals without interfering with
the GPS M code.

In accordance with that approach, the Americans also want to be able to jam the Galileo signal where circumstances dictate, since it is not a military signal. However, the use of a single frequency band with the same
modulation by one of the two PRS signals and one of the two GPS M code signals does not allow this jamming
system to be applied directly. It would indeed be technically difficult to jam one of the two signals selectively
without degrading the other.

The following political question therefore arises: does overlay create unacceptable risks for the EU and NATO and
how can any such risks be managed?

15.10.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 248/21

(b) _Industrial and commercial reasons_

It cannot be ruled out that, in 10 years' time, the GPS M code could be used not only for military purposes as it
is today, but also by other categories of users, such as coastguards, customs, etc., in many countries. Over 25
countries already use it. The potential market probably embraces hundreds of categories of users.

However, the Galileo PRS signal is also designed to meet the needs of all applications in the European Union
requiring secured signals (transport of nuclear materials, customs, police, etc.).

Even though Galileo is a civilian system, the European Union's PRS is an encrypted signal potentially as well
protected as the GPS military signal.

Since it is impossible to selectively jam a navigation signal using the same modulation and frequencies as another
signal without seriously degrading it, allowing a full overlay with the same modulation of one of the two Galileo
PRS signals with one of the two GPS M code signals means that the United States must reach an agreement with
the Europe Community to ensure that its policy on any exports of PRS receivers is coordinated and compatible
with theirs.

II. **ARGUMENTS FOR OVERLAY**

1. **Technical justification**

(a) _The need to overlay the GPS signal_

In order to attain metre precision and reject interference, the Galileo PRS signal must use two frequency bands
that are wide enough and spaced far enough apart. It was this frequency configuration, which was also adopted
for the most demanding signals of the American GPS and Russian Glonass systems, that led to the choice of the
Galileo signal scenario ( [1] ).

Taking account of international telecommunications regulations, the only available frequencies are in band L1
which is reserved for satellite navigation. This band is already used by GPS and Glonass for their top-level signals.
The frequency band used by the PRS signal must therefore be overlaid on either the GPS or the Glonass band.
The latter is ill advised for technical reasons since Glonass is based on a totally different design from GPS and
Galileo.

As stated earlier, the Galileo PRS signal in the L1 band is in any case overlaid by the GPS signals in the same
band, without leading to any degradation of performance according to ITU criteria, as is demonstrated by
interference calculations. Overlaying automatically requires reciprocity between GPS and Galileo, i.e. a good
level of interoperability between the two systems (a similar level of interference, for example).

(b) _Choice of signal type in band L1_

The specifications of the Galileo PRS signal are defined so that they are flexible. There are two main options for a
signal located in the L1 high band, one using a signal with ‘BOC (10,5)’ type modulation, the other a ‘BOC (14,2)’
type signal. BOC (10,5) modulation involves a full overlay with one of the two GPS code M signals, whereas a
BOC (14,2) type signal corresponds to a 75 % overlay (6 MHz of code M overlaps with the 8 MHz allocated at
the World Radionavigation Conference held in 2000 in Istanbul).

The choice remains open but BOC (10,5) is the preferred option for the following reasons:

— this type of signal costs the same but is more efficient than BOC (14,2) modulation. The two GPS code M
signals and the PRS signal in the E6 medium-frequency band are of the BOC (10,5) type. If the European
Union were to give up this type of signal for Galileo PRS in band L1, we would end up with a less efficient
and less competitive system,

— it has not been proven that a BOC (14,2) signal can provide certain technical functions essential to the
smooth operation of a PRS receiver,

— a BOC (14,2) signal could be unilaterally jammed by the United States, which in practice would mean giving
them the right to control Galileo PRS users. On the other hand, the Americans would have no technical
means of jamming a BOC (10,5) signal that was fully overlaid on the GPS M code in band L1. Control of the
users of this signal would be exercised by an appropriate European body using encryption techniques.

( [1] ) Scenario A.

C 248/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.10.2002

In order to respond to American concerns, the Commission suggested the choice of a generic signal, known as
BOC (n,m), in the high-frequency L1 band for one of the two PRS signals, leaving the modulation type flexible at
this stage of the project. However, of the available modulation types, BOC (10,5) is the most efficient.

2. **Political arguments**

(a) _The European Union has the essential security know-how_

Although a civilian signal, PRS will be restricted to certain strictly governmental applications and secured under
government control. The argument that the PRS signal should be jammed in the same way as the other Galileo
signals carried much less weight if that signal is appropriately secured (government encryption, users approved by
the European Union, service controlled by a European body).

Some EU Member States have the know-how to design and implement effective government encryption. The
resulting technology could be made available to the European authorities controlling the Galileo PRS signal.

(b) _The need for mutual trust_

Since October 1993, when the Memorandum of Understanding between the American Department of Defense
and the NATO member countries for access to the GPS encrypted navigation service was signed, a dozen
non-NATO countries and a few civilian administrations (American federal agencies and the Norwegian police,
for example) have had access to the service. However, the NATO member countries were never consulted on this
American policy of exporting a service which has become the main navigation system in the NATO Countries.
Similarly, the NATO member countries never worried about the possible consequences of that export policy for
NATO security because they knew that American and NATO interests were compatible and because they trust
the security mechanisms that the Americans have put in place for GPS.

Moreover, the choice of the GPS frequency band for the Galileo PRS signal was governed not only by technical
compatibility issues but also by a high level of trust in American security capabilities. This choice represents a
clear distinction between the secured signals (GPS M code and Galileo PRS) on the one hand and the unsecured
signals (all except M code and Galileo PRS) on the other. This split is compatible with the implementation of the
local jamming technology favoured by the United States and NATO.

The EU would like the US to show the same trust regarding its capability to implement a secure Galileo system.

**Conclusion**

The European Union acknowledges the wish of the United States to have a properly secured signal (M code) for military
and security reasons. The Commission's proposal takes account of both parties' security concerns, firstly by using
flexible modulation for the PRS code, which can be adapted as required, and by setting up a security structure to
monitor and control the use of the PRS code during the operational phase of Galileo. This security structure would be
an appropriate interlocutor for the American security bodies. The European Community is prepared to seek a political
agreement with the United States on the cooperation necessary between the two satellite navigation systems in
preparation for a crisis or in the event of a crisis.

_ANNEX 3_

**IMPORTANT FORTHCOMING MILESTONES IN THE GALILEO PROGRAMME**

— Autumn 2002: Galileo Joint Undertaking to start operation.

— End of 2002: Commission report to the Council on integrating Egnos into Galileo and the model for the concession.

— December 2002: Council to decide on the services to be offered by Galileo and the frequency plan for these.

— July 2003: World Radiocommunication Conference.

— Summer 2003: Commission proposal to the Council on creating the future security body.

— Autumn 2003: Commission report to the Council on the preselection of the future concession holder.

— End of 2004: launch of the first experimental satellite.