Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

8 October 2025 ([\*](#Footnote*))

( EU design – Invalidity proceedings – Registered EU design representing doors – Late filing of the statement setting out the grounds of appeal before the Board of Appeal – Calculation of time limits – Action inadmissible – Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 and Article 51(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2245/2002 – Restitutio in integrum – Failure to pay the fee – Article 67(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 )

In Case T‑586/24,

**Doors Bulgaria EOOD,** established in Sofia (Bulgaria), represented by M. Todorov, lawyer,

applicant,

v

**European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),** represented by R. Raponi, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being

**Top Ten EOOD,** established in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), represented by S. Sirakov, lawyer,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M.J. Costeira, President, U. Öberg and P. Zilgalvis (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

**Judgment**

1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Doors Bulgaria EOOD, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 16 September 2024 (Case R 470/2024-3) (‘the contested decision’).

**Background to the dispute**

2        On 23 June 2023, the intervener, Top Ten EOOD, filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU design registered, following an application filed on 10 May 2016, under No 3119601-0010 and intended to be applied to doors in Class 25.02 of the Locarno Agreement of 8 October 1968 Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs, as amended.

3        The grounds relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity were those set out in Article 25(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on European Union designs (OJ 2002 L 3, p. 1), in the version prior to the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2024/2822 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 (OJ L, 2024/2822), read in conjunction with Article 4(1) and with Article 5(1)(b) and Article 6(1)(b) of that regulation.

4        On 4 January 2024, the Invalidity Division declared the contested design invalid on account of its lack of novelty.

5        On 29 February 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Invalidity Division’s decision, indicating that the statement setting out the grounds of appeal would be filed at a later stage. On 4 March 2024, the Registry of the Boards of Appeal acknowledged receipt of the notice of appeal and reminded the applicant that, under Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002, there was a non-extendable four-month time limit from the date of notification of the Invalidity Division’s decision for the applicant to file its statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

6        On 27 May 2024, EUIPO received the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, in which the applicant requested that the Invalidity Division’s decision be annulled and that the application for a declaration of invalidity of the contested design be rejected.

7        On 30 May 2024, the Registry of the Boards of Appeal sent a deficiency letter to the applicant, indicating that the statement setting out the grounds of appeal had not been submitted in due time and that it should have been filed within four months from the date of notification of the Invalidity Division’s decision, that is on or before 10 May 2024. The applicant was invited to submit observations on the possible inadmissibility of the appeal.

8        On 25 June 2024, the applicant submitted its observations, arguing that it owned numerous industrial designs and that its lawyer, who usually handled the correspondence for most of those designs, was not listed as the representative in relation to the contested design; accordingly, the applicant had never received the Invalidity Division’s decision. It only became aware of the invalidity proceedings on 29 February 2024, when it filed the appeal against that decision. Therefore, the four-month time limit should have started to run from that date.

9        By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal as inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2245/2002 of 21 October 2002 implementing Regulation No 6/2002 (OJ 2002 L 341, p. 28), on the ground that the statement setting out the grounds of appeal had not been submitted within the statutory four-month time limit from the notification of the Invalidity Division’s decision, as provided for in the last sentence of Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002.

**Forms of order sought**

10      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision in so far as it declared the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision inadmissible and declare that that appeal was admissible and well founded and, consequently, annul the Invalidity Division’s decision;

–        in the alternative, annul the contested decision in so far as it declared the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision inadmissible and order EUIPO to rule on the merits of the appeal against that decision.

11      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.

12      The intervener contends that the Court should dismiss the action and uphold the contested decision.

**Law**

***The jurisdiction of the General Court***

13      EUIPO submits that the applicant’s claims put forward in the second head of claim, requesting, in essence, that the Court order EUIPO to decide on the merits of the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision, are inadmissible, given that, according to the case-law, it is not for the Court to issue directions to EUIPO, but for EUIPO to draw the appropriate inferences from the operative part and grounds of the judgments of the Courts of the European Union.

14      As regards the second part of the applicant’s second head of claim, by which it asks the Court to order EUIPO to decide on the merits of the Invalidity Division’s decision, it is sufficient to recall that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see order of 26 October 1995, *Pevasa and Inpesca* v *Commission*, C‑199/94 P and C‑200/94 P, EU:C:1995:360, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2018, *Sweden* v *Commission*, T‑260/16, EU:T:2018:597, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited). It follows that the second part of the second head of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

***Substance***

15      In support of its action, the applicant relies, in essence, on three pleas in law, alleging (i) infringement of Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002; (ii) infringement of Article 67 of that regulation; and (iii) incorrect assessment of the merits of the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision.

*The first plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002*

16      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s decision to dismiss as inadmissible the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision was unlawful on account of procedural irregularities, which limited its fundamental rights, including its right to a fair hearing and its rights of defence.

17      The applicant claims, inter alia, that Regulation No 6/2002 does not contain procedural rules, in particular as regards the manner in which documents and communications are to be notified to the parties to proceedings. In order to find that the Invalidity Division’s decision dated 4 January 2024 had to be deemed to have been notified to the applicant on 10 January 2024, the Board of Appeal relied on instructions from its Executive Director. However, that is an inter-departmental act of EUIPO which cannot bind the parties to the proceedings, let alone limit their rights of defence.

18      The applicant submits that, in its observations of 25 June 2024, it set out in detail its explanations and reasons for failing to comply with the time limit laid down in Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002, from which it is apparent that it first became aware of the intervener’s application for a declaration of invalidity on 29 February 2024. It also stated that the lack of additional notification via the official electronic address for correspondence with the company concerned should have been regarded as a lack of notification of the Invalidity Division’s decision. Therefore, according to the applicant, the deadline for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal was 29 June 2024; accordingly, the statement filed on 27 May 2024 had been filed within the time limit.

19      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

20      In the present case, the Board of Appeal noted, in paragraph 11 of the contested decision, that, in so far as the Invalidity Division’s decision was deemed to have been notified on 9 January 2024, the time limit for filing the written statement setting out the grounds of appeal had expired on 10 May 2024. It concluded, in paragraph 12 of the contested decision, that the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, received on 27 May 2024, had not been submitted within the prescribed time limit.

21      The Board of Appeal rejected, inter alia, the applicant’s argument that its representative did not appear on the list concerning the contested design and that it had only become aware of the Invalidity Division’s decision on 29 February 2024, the day on which it had filed the notice of appeal. In that regard, it stated in particular, in paragraph 13 of the contested decision, that the Invalidity Division’s decision included a notice about the availability of appeal proceedings under Articles 56 and 57 of Regulation No 6/2002 which clearly and unambiguously mentioned the four-month time limit for submitting a written statement of grounds. Moreover, in the acknowledgement of receipt of the notice of appeal issued on 4 March 2024, the Registry of the Boards of Appeal expressly and unequivocally recalled that the statement setting out the grounds had to be filed within the non-extendable four-month period counted from the date of notification of the contested decision.

22      Under Article 35(1) of Regulation No 2245/2002, if the appeal does not comply with Articles 55, 56 and 57 of Regulation No 6/2002 and Article 34(1)(c) and (2) of Regulation No 2245/2002, the Board of Appeal is to reject it as inadmissible, unless each deficiency has been remedied before the relevant time limit laid down in Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002 has expired.

23      According to Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at EUIPO within two months after the date of notification of the decision in question. The notice is to be deemed to have been filed only when the fee for appeal has been paid. Within four months after the date of notification of that decision, a written statement setting out the grounds of appeal must be filed.

24      In that regard, Article 51(2) of Regulation No 2245/2002 provides that details of notification by other technical means of communication are to be determined by the Executive Director of EUIPO.

25      Since Decision EX-23-13 of 15 December 2023 was adopted by the Executive Director of EUIPO and governs communication by electronic means (‘Decision EX-23-13’), that decision is applicable in the present case.

26      Under Article 4(5) of Decision EX-23-13, notification will be deemed to have taken place on the fifth calendar day following the day on which EUIPO placed the document in the user’s inbox.

27      It must also be recalled that, according to Article 58(1) of Regulation No 2245/2002, if a time limit expires on a day on which EUIPO is not open for receipt of documents or on which, for reasons other than those referred to in Article 58(2) of that regulation, ordinary mail is not delivered in the locality in which EUIPO is located, the time limit is to extend until the first day thereafter on which EUIPO is open for receipt of documents and on which ordinary mail is delivered.

28      Furthermore, as regards the notification of decisions of EUIPO, the case-law draws a distinction between, on the one hand, the transmission of a document to the addressee, which is required for due notification, and, on the other hand, actual knowledge of that document, which is not required for notification to be regarded as a due notification. According to the case-law, the validity of a notification to the addressee is in no way conditional on its having been actually brought to the notice of the person competent to deal with it under the internal rules of the entity addressed, due notification of a decision being effected once it has been communicated to the addressee and the addressee is in a position to take cognisance of it. Thus, in order to assess the validity of a notification, only its external aspect is taken into consideration, that is to say, due transmission to the addressee, rather than its internal aspect, which concerns the internal functioning of the entity addressed (see judgment of 13 June 2019, *Pet King Brands* v *EUIPO* – *Virbac (SUIMOX)*, T‑366/18, not published, EU:T:2019:410, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

29      In the present case, the Invalidity Division’s decision had been placed in the applicant’s inbox on 4 January 2024; therefore, in accordance with Article 4(5) of Decision EX-23-13, notification is deemed to have taken place on 9 January 2024, as was stated in paragraph 11 of the contested decision.

30      It follows that the Board of Appeal was right to find that, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 57 of Regulation No 6/2002, the time limit for filing the written statement setting out the grounds of appeal had expired on 10 May 2024 and, therefore, the statement filed by the applicant on 27 May 2024 had not been submitted within the prescribed time limit. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find that the appeal had become inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35(1) of Regulation No 2245/2002.

31      In that regard, it should be added, as EUIPO has done, that the clerical error of the Board of Appeal, which cited Article 4(5) of Decision EX-20-9 of the Executive Director of EUIPO of 3 November 2020 on communication by electronic means, instead of Article 4(5) of Decision EX-23-13, is irrelevant in the present case, given that the two provisions are worded identically.

32      Similarly, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal has done, that the circumstances relied on by the applicant – that it first became aware of the Invalidity Division’s decision on 29 February 2024 and that, consequently, the deadline for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal was 29 June 2024 – are not such as to call into question the finding that that statement had not been submitted within the prescribed time limit. In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above, in order to assess the validity of the notification of a measure, only its external aspect is taken into consideration, that is to say, due transmission to the addressee, rather than its internal aspect, which concerns the internal functioning of the entity addressed (see judgment of 13 June 2019, *SUIMOX*, T‑366/18, not published, EU:T:2019:410, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

33      In addition, while it is true that, as the applicant submits, Regulation No 6/2002 does not contain procedural rules as regards the manner in which documents and communications are to be notified to the parties to the proceedings, Article 51(2) of Regulation No 2245/2002 contains details relating to the adoption of such rules (see paragraph 24 above). In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Regulation No 2245/2002 concerns the implementation of Regulation No 6/2002.

34      In so far as the applicant’s line of argument should be regarded as containing a plea of illegality, it should be borne in mind that Article 51(2) of Regulation No 2245/2002 provides that details of notification by other technical means of communication are to be determined by the Executive Director of EUIPO. As has been stated, inter alia, in paragraph 26 above, the Executive Director has determined such details. In the absence of other arguments, the plea of illegality raised by the applicant must be rejected.

35      Lastly, in so far as the Board of Appeal correctly found that the statement setting out the grounds of appeal had been submitted out of time and that, consequently, the appeal brought against the Invalidity Division’s decision was inadmissible, the applicant’s wholly unsubstantiated claims, to the effect that the Board of Appeal infringed its fundamental rights and, in particular, its right to a fair hearing and its rights of defence, must also fail. In any event, it should be noted that the Registry of the Boards of Appeal had invited the applicant to submit observations on the possible inadmissibility of the appeal (see paragraph 7 above) and that the applicant submitted such observations (see paragraph 8 above).

36      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the present plea in law must be rejected.

*The second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 67 of Regulation No 6/2002*

37      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal accepted, in paragraph 14 of the contested decision, that the actions on the part of the applicant should be regarded as giving rise to *restitutio in integrum* under Article 67 of Regulation No 6/2002. However, instead of instructing the applicant to pay the relevant fee, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. According to the applicant, that is an ‘autonomous ground for declaring the [contested decision] unlawful’.

38      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

39      In the present case, the Board of Appeal stated, in paragraph 14 of the contested decision, that, where the holder of the design at issue, in spite of having taken all due care required by the circumstances, failed to comply with the prescribed time limit, which resulted in the loss of his or her right, the appropriate remedy is an application for *restitutio in integrum*. However, it added that, even if it were accepted that the arguments put forward by the applicant in its communications could have constituted such a request, such an application would have to be declared as deemed not filed in the absence of the payment of the relevant fee in accordance with the second sentence of Article 67(3) of Regulation No 6/2002.

40      Under the second sentence of Article 67(3) of Regulation No 6/2002, the application for *restitutio in integrum*  is not to be deemed to be filed until the fee for the re-establishment of rights has been paid.

41      In the present case, however, it is sufficient to note that the applicant did not pay such a fee. In those circumstances, the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to find that no application for *restitutio in integrum* had been submitted in the present case.

42      The applicant’s claim that the Board of Appeal should have instructed it to pay the fee for *restitutio in integrum*  must also fail. It is apparent from the case-law that there is no provision requiring EUIPO to inform a party of the procedures available to it under Article 67 of Regulation No 6/2002. Nor is it incumbent on it to advise that party to pursue any particular legal remedy (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 6 October 2021, *Dermavita Company* v *EUIPO* – *Allergan Holdings France (JUVÉDERM VYBRANCE)*, T‑635/20, not published, EU:T:2021:656, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

43      It follows that the second plea in law must be rejected.

*The third plea in law, concerning the merits of the appeal against the Invalidity Division’s decision*

44      The applicant submits that the Invalidity Division declared the contested design invalid on the ground that a similar design, disclosed via a website, existed before the filing date of the application for registration of the contested design. Evidence of disclosure of the earlier design was provided by means of a screenshot from the Wayback Machine. According to the applicant, that does not constitute genuine proof of disclosure and it is incapable of certifying the disclosure of the design as at the date indicated on the screenshot, namely 7 May 2016. In so far as the only evidence of disclosure of that design is inadmissible, the applicant claims that the Invalidity Division’s decision should be annulled and the application for a declaration of invalidity of the contested design rejected.

45      EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

46      It should be noted, as observed by EUIPO and the intervener, that, by the contested decision, the Board of Appeal confined itself to assessing the admissibility of the appeal brought before it by the applicant and did not deal with the substantive issues and, in particular, the issue of disclosure of the earlier design.

47      According to the case-law, pleas which do not seek to challenge the grounds on which the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal brought before it must be regarded as ineffective (see judgment of 27 April 2022, *Group Nivelles* v *EUIPO* – *Easy Sanitary Solutions (Shower drainage channel)*, T‑327/20, EU:T:2022:263, paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

48      Accordingly, the present plea in law must be rejected as ineffective.

49      Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

**Costs**

50      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

51      In the present case, although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that the parties are summoned to attend a hearing, and the intervener has not applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs. Since no such hearing was held in the present case, it is therefore appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      **Dismisses the action;**

2.      **Orders Doors Bulgaria EOOD, the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Top Ten EOOD each to bear their own costs.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Costeira | Öberg | Zilgalvis |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 8 October 2025.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| V. Di Bucci |  | S. Papasavvas |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Registrar |  | President |

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[\*](#Footref*)      Language of the case: English.

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