Source: EURLEX
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# 52014DC0155

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard /\* COM/2014/0155 final \*/**

  

1.           Introduction

The
2014 edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard ('the Scoreboard') is presented in a context
where a number of Member States are engaged in a process of reform of their
justice systems to render them more effective for citizens and businesses. These
reforms are of direct relevance for the EU and are followed closely by European
institutions and stakeholders.

Quality,
independence and efficiency are the key components for an effective justice
system. Well-functioning justice systems are important structural condition on
which Member States base their sustainable growth and social stability policies.
For these reasons, since 2011, national judicial reforms have become an
integral part of the structural components in Member States subject to the
Economic Adjustment Programmes[1].
Since 2012[2],
the improvement of the quality, independence and efficiency of judicial systems
has also been a priority for the European Semester, the EU annual cycle of
economic policy coordination, as signalled in the Annual Growth Survey 2014[3].
The Scoreboard feeds the European Semester process by providing objective data
concerning the functioning of the national judicial systems. This contributes
to identifying issues that deserve particular attention to ensure implementation
of reforms.

Access
to an effective justice system is an essential right which is at the foundation
of European democracies and is recognised by the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States. For this reason, the right to an effective remedy
before a tribunal is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (Article 47). Whenever a national court applies EU legislation,
it acts as a ‘Union court’ and must provide effective judicial protection to
everyone, citizens and businesses, whose rights guaranteed in EU law were
violated. The effectiveness of justice systems is therefore crucial for the
implementation of EU law and for the strengthening of mutual trust.

What
is the EU Justice Scoreboard?

The
EU Justice Scoreboard is an information tool aiming to assist the EU and Member States to achieve more effective justice by providing objective, reliable and
comparable data on the quality, independence and efficiency of justice systems
in all Member States.

The
Scoreboard contributes to identifying potential shortcomings, improvements and
good practices and aims to present trends on the functioning of the national
justice systems over time. It does
not present an overall single ranking but an overview of the functioning of all
justice systems based on various indicators which are of common interest for
all Member States.

The
Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system. Whatever
the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is
anchored, timeliness, independence, affordability, and user-friendly access are
some of the essential parameters of what constitutes an effective justice
system.

The
2014 Scoreboard focuses on litigious civil and commercial cases as well as
administrative cases in order to assist Member States in their efforts to improve
business climate and to overcome the sovereign debt and financial crisis. The
Scoreboard is a tool which evolves in dialogue with Member States and the European Parliament, with the objective of identifying the essential parameters
of an effective justice system. The European Parliament has called on the
Commission to progressively broaden the scope of the Scoreboard.

How does the EU Justice
Scoreboard feed the European Semester?

Poor
performance revealed by the Scoreboard indicators always requires a deeper
analysis of the reasons behind the result. This country-specific assessment is
carried out in the context of the European Semester process through bilateral
dialogue with concerned authorities and stakeholders. This assessment takes
into account the particularities of the legal system and the context of the
concerned Member States. It may eventually lead the Commission to propose Council
country-specific recommendations on the need to improve justice systems[4].

What
is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard?

The
Scoreboard uses different sources of information. Most of the quantitative data
are currently provided by the Council of Europe Commission for the Evaluation
of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with which the Commission has concluded a
contract in order to carry out a specific study[5]. These data are
from 2012 and have been provided by Member States according to the CEPEJ
methodology[6].
The study also provides country fiches which give more context and should be
read together with the figures.

For
the 2014 Scoreboard, the Commission has also drawn upon additional sources of information,
namely, Eurostat, World Bank, World Economic Forum, and the European judicial
networks, in particular the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary
which provided replies to a questionnaire on judicial independence. Further data
has also been obtained through two pilot field studies on the functioning of
national courts for the application of consumer and competition law rules[7].

The
effectiveness
of national justice systems as a structural component for growth

High-quality
institutions, including effective national justice systems are a determinant
for economic performance. In times of sovereign debt, financial and economic
crisis they play a key role in restoring confidence and fostering the return to
growth. Predictable, timely and enforceable justice decisions are important
structural components of an attractive business environment. They contribute to
trust and stability throughout the entire business cycle by maintaining the
confidence for starting a business, enforcing a contract, attracting
investment, settling private debt or protecting property and other rights.

The
impact of national justice systems on the economy is underlined by the
International Monetary Fund[8],
the European Central Bank[9],
the OECD[10],
the World Economic Forum[11]
and the World Bank[12].
The effectiveness of the justice system incentivizes investment in a given
country[13].
Research shows that there is a positive correlation between firm size and
effective justice systems and weaker incentives to invest and to employ in the
presence of shortcomings in the functioning of justice[14].
Growth in more innovative sectors notably, those which often rely on intangible
assets like intellectual property rights, is dependent on a well-functioning
law enforcement system[15].
Effective justice systems also foster competition in the market. Where justice
systems guarantee a good enforcement of contracts, firms are dissuaded from
opportunistic behaviour in their economic relationships and transaction costs are
reduced. Finally, trust in well-functioning systems facilitates
entrepreneurship. Shortcomings in judicial systems lead to higher borrowing
costs[16].
Creditors are more likely to lend when they are confident that the
effectiveness of the justice system guarantees that they will be able to
collect their loans.

A
wide debate on the effectiveness of justice systems

The
presentation of the first edition of the Scoreboard contributed to a wide
exchange of views on the effectiveness of national justice systems in the EU. In
its Resolution of 4 February 2014 on
the EU Justice Scoreboard[17],
the European Parliament expressed its great interest for the Scoreboard and called
on the Commission to take this exercise forward. It highlighted the importance
of ensuring an efficient and independent justice system that can contribute to
economic growth in Europe and boost competitiveness and stressed that an effective
and trustworthy justice system gives businesses incentives to develop and
invest at national and cross-border level.

The
Council had an exchange of views on the justice-related aspects of the 2014
European Semester, including the 2013 Scoreboard, in the informal Justice and
Home Affairs Council meeting in December. In the Justice and Home Affairs
Council meeting of March 2014, the Commission presented the main
characteristics of the upcoming 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard. The Council and the
Member States adopted on 4 March Conclusion on the civil and commercial
justice systems of the Member States[18].

The
effectiveness of the national justice systems and the 2013 Scoreboard were also
discussed during the “Assises de la Justice”, a high-level conference
organised by the European Commission in Brussels on 21 and 22 November 2013 on
the shaping of justice policies in Europe for the years to come[19]. Representatives
of the judiciary (e.g. the Supreme Courts, the Councils for the judiciary and
judges) and of practitioners (e.g. lawyers and judicial officers) expressed
their interest and made suggestions for its future development. Certain Member
States contributed to the discussion and highlighted aspects of the methodology
that could be further improved. On this occasion, a Eurobarometer survey[20] on
"Justice in the European Union" was published which highlighted,
notably, that the level of trust in national justice systems varies
significantly between Member States.

The
Commission initiated a systematic dialogue with Member States experts to promote
the exchange of best practices on the effectiveness of justice systems and to
further develop the Scoreboard. Member States have been asked to designate two
contact persons, one from the Judiciary and one from the Ministry of Justice.
The first two meetings of the contact persons discussed the availability of
data on the functioning of justice systems and good practices on data
collection.

2.           Follow-up to the 2013 EU
Justice Scoreboard

The findings
of the 2013 Scoreboard helped, together with the specific assessment of the
situation in Member States, to define country-specific-recommendations in the
area of justice. Following a proposal from the Commission, the Council made recommendations
to ten Member States[21]
to improve, depending on the country concerned, the independence, quality and/or
efficiency of their justice system or to further strengthen the judiciary. Out
of these ten Member States, six Member States[22] were already
identified in 2012 as facing challenges relating to the functioning of their justice
system.

These
Member States are taking measures concerning the functioning of the judiciary. These
measures range from operational measures, such as the modernisation of the management
process in court, the use of new information technology, the development of alternative
dispute resolution; to more structural measures, such as restructuring the organisation
of courts or simplification of civil procedural rules that may lead to decreasing
the length of proceedings. The intensity and the state of the reforms vary
according to the Member States. Whilst in certain Member States measures have
already been adopted and are being implemented, in other Member States, the
measures are still at the early stages. The Scoreboard presents data from 2012 and
therefore cannot yet reflect the effects of on-going reforms, including for
Member States which have already adopted ambitious measures[23].

The
findings of the Scoreboard help to establish priorities for EU structural
funds. Previous experiences have shown that EU funds can be used to improve the
effectiveness of justice systems. For example, Estonia has used structural
funds to develop e-justice tools and is now one of the most advanced countries
in the use of ICT tools for the management of courts and for communication
between courts and parties.

The
Commission identified justice as a priority area for twelve Member States for
funding in the context of the multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020[24].
Member States are setting out their strategy on the deployment of EU funds to support
the EU 2020 strategy in the so-called "Partnership Agreements". These
agreements are an opportunity to ensure the adequate allocation of funds to fully
reflect the importance of rendering judicial systems more effective.

3.           Indicators of the 2014 EU
Justice Scoreboard

Efficiency of justice systems

The
2014 Scoreboard maintains the same indicators relating to the efficiency of
proceedings as were used in 2013: length of proceedings, clearance rate and
number of pending cases. In addition, the 2014 Scoreboard presents the outcome
of two pilot studies[25],
aimed at providing more fine-tuned data on the length of judicial proceedings relating
to competition law and consumer law, expressed in average days. The effectiveness
of judicial systems in these two areas is important for the economy. For
example, the negative consumer welfare impact of all the hard-core cartels,
expressed as a proportion of the EU’s gross domestic product, is estimated as
ranging from 0.20% to 0.55% of the EU’s GDP in 2011[26].
Similarly, the application of consumer law is equally important to the economy
as final household consumption represents 56% of GDP[27].

Quality
of justice systems

As
regards the quality of justice systems, the 2014 Scoreboard uses the same
indicators as in 2013. It focuses on certain factors that can help to improve
the quality of justice such as training, monitoring and evaluation of court
activities, budget, human resources, the availability of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) systems for courts (which facilitate in particular the
relation between the parties and the courts) and the availability of alternative
dispute resolution methods (ADR) which enable the parties to find other methods
for solving their disputes. In addition the 2014 Scoreboard provides more
refined data on training in EU law, the use of satisfaction surveys, budget for
courts and the number of judges.

Independence of
the judiciary

The
Scoreboard presents data on the perceived independence of the justice system as
provided by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its annual Global Competitiveness
Report.

While
the perceived independence is important, as it can influence investment
decisions, what is more important is that judicial independence is effectively protected
in a justice system through legal safeguards. As announced in the 2013
Scoreboard, the Commission has started cooperation on the structural
independence of the judiciary with the European judicial networks, particularly
the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary. The 2014 Scoreboard
presents, in an annex, a first general comparative overview on the legal safeguards
for the protection of the structural independence of the judiciary in the legal
systems of Member States.

4.           Key findings of the 2014
EU Justice Scoreboard

4.1 Efficiency of justice systems

Justice
delayed is justice denied. Timely decisions are essential for businesses and
investors. In their investment decisions, companies take into account the risk
of being involved in commercial disputes, labour or taxation disputes or
insolvencies. The efficiency with which a judicial system in a Member States
handles litigation is very important. For example, the legal enforcement of a
supply or services contract becomes very costly the longer the judicial dispute
takes, and even meaningless beyond a certain time, as the probability of retrieving
money from payments and penalties diminishes.

4.1.1
Length of proceedings

The length of proceedings
expresses the time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, that is the
time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance. The 'disposition
time' indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of
resolved cases at the end of a year multiplied by 365 days[28].

Except in figures 4, 11 and
12 all figures concern proceedings at first instance. Although different appeal
procedures can have a major impact on length of proceedings, the efficiency of
a judicial system should already be reflected at first instance, as the first
instance is an obligatory step for everyone going to court.

Figure 1: Time needed to resolve civil, commercial,
administrative and other cases\* (1st instance/in days) (source:
CEPEJ study[29])

\*According
to the CEPEJ methodology this figure includes all civil and commercial
litigious and non-litigious cases, enforcement cases, land-registry cases,
administrative law cases (litigious or non-litigious) and other non-criminal
cases.

Figure
2: Time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases\* (1st
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)

\*Litigious
civil (and commercial) cases concern disputes between parties, for example
disputes regarding contracts, following the CEPEJ methodology. By contrast,
non-litigious civil (and commercial) cases concern uncontested proceedings, for
example, uncontested payment orders. Commercial cases are addressed by special
commercial courts in some countries and handled by ordinary (civil) courts in
others.

Figure
3: Time needed to resolve administrative cases\* (1st
instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study)

\*Administrative law cases concern disputes
between citizens and local, regional or national authorities, following the CEPEJ
methodology. Administrative law cases are addressed by special administrative
courts in some countries and handled by ordinary (civil) courts in others.

Figure
4: Time needed to resolve insolvency\* (in years) (source: World Bank:
Doing Business)

\*Time
for creditors to recover their credit. The period of time is from the company’s
default until the payment of some or all of the money owed to the bank.
Potential delay tactics by the parties, such as the filing of dilatory appeals
or request for extension, are taken into consideration. The data are collected
from questionnaire responses by local insolvency practitioners and verified
through a study of laws and regulations as well as public information on
bankruptcy systems.

4.1.2
Clearance rate

The clearance rate is the
ratio of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases. It
measures whether a court is keeping up with its incoming caseload. The length
of proceedings is linked to the rate at which the courts can resolve cases, the
'clearance rate', and to the number of cases that are still waiting to be resolved,
'pending cases'. When the clearance rate is about 100% or higher it means the
judicial system is able to resolve at least as many cases as come in. When the
clearance rate is below 100%, it means that the courts are resolving fewer
cases than the number of incoming cases, and as a result, at the end of the
year, the number of unresolved cases adds up as pending cases. If this
situation persists over several years, this could be indicative of a more
systemic problem as backlogs build up which further aggravate the workload of
courts, and which cause the length of proceedings to rise further.

Figure
5: Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases (1st
instance/in % - values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved
than come in, while values below 100% indicate that fewer cases are resolved
than come in) (source: CEPEJ study)

Figure
6: Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases (1st
instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)

Figure 7: Rate of resolving administrative
cases (1st instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study)

4.1.3
Pending cases

The number of pending cases
expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the end of a
period. The number of pending cases influences the disposition time. Therefore,
in order to improve the length of proceedings measures to reduce the number of
pending cases are required.

Figure
8: Number of civil, commercial, administrative and other pending cases (1st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

Figure
9: Number of litigious civil and commercial pending cases (1st
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

Figure
10: Number of administrative pending cases (1st instance/per
100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

4.1.4.
Results of the pilot field studies

The results of the pilot field
studies concerning length of proceedings in the field of competition and
consumer law show the average number of days which it takes to have a decision
on the substance in cases pertaining to these two specific fields. The average duration
in days is provided for first, second and (if relevant) third instance cases
where such information is available. Given the divergences in the way data is
presented for these instances, Member States are ordered alphabetically in their
original languages.

The average length for
resolving judicial review cases in competition law indicated below appears to
be generally higher than the average length for civil, commercial,
administrative and other cases in Figure 1. This could be due to the complexity
involved in this type of specialized litigation. The figure below also shows
that in several Member States significant differences in length can be observed
between first, second (and where existing) third judicial review instances.

Figure
11: Average time needed to resolve judicial review cases against decisions
of national competition authorities applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU\* (in
days) (source: pilot field study[30])

\*The
calculation on the length has been carried out on the basis of a study that
sought to identify all cases of appeal of national competition authority
decisions applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union for which judicial decisions on the substance were issued between
2008 and 2013. The figures are provided for1st and 2nd instance
and, in those cases where it was relevant, for 3rd instance.

Figure
12: Average time needed to resolve consumer law cases\* (in days) (source:
pilot field study[31])

While the average length
appears to be higher than that of litigious civil and commercial cases
presented in Figure 2, account should be taken of the fact the length has been
calculated on the basis of consumer litigation published cases, which tend to
be more complex. The chart also confirms that a number of Member States present
significant differences in average length between first, second and third
instance for consumer litigation.

\*The
calculation on the length has been carried out on the basis of samples of cases
relating to the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Distance
Sales Directive, Consumer Sales and Guarantee Directive, Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive and their national implementing provisions where decisions
were issued between 2008 and 2013. As the sample size varied according to the
availability of published decisions, the figures provided should be approached
cautiously[32].

Ø Conclusions on the efficiency of justice systems · The Scoreboard shows that there are Member States which continue to face particular challenges with regard to the efficiency of their justice systems, i.e. lengthy first instance proceedings together with low clearance rates or a large number of pending cases. These Member States have already been identified in the 2013 European Semester and the Economic Adjustment programmes and are in the process of defining, adopting or implementing measures for improving the functioning of their justice systems. The figures confirm the importance of committing to all necessary reforms and of pursuing these efforts with determination. · For a few Member States the figures indicate an increase in the length of proceedings. The reasons behind this may differ. For example, for countries especially affected by the sovereign debt, financial and economic crisis, the increase of incoming cases has had an impact on the functioning of the justice system[33]. · The effects of ambitious reforms recently adopted in certain Member States cannot yet be reflected as the data are from 2012. Implementing and reaping the benefits of structural justice reforms, in particular for countries which are subject to the Economic Adjustment programmes[34], takes time. As the Scoreboard is a regular exercise, the outcome of these reforms could become visible in future Scoreboards.

4.2. Quality of justice systems

Effective
justice requires quality throughout the whole justice chain. A lack of quality
of justice decisions may increase business risks for large companies and SMEs
and affect consumer choices. Certain input indicators, such as training,
monitoring and evaluation of activities, availability of ICT systems and ADR
methods and budgetary and human resources can help to improve the quality of
justice systems.

4.2.1
Monitoring and evaluation help to shorten the length of proceedings

The
definition of quality policies and the evaluation of the activities of courts
are tools which increase the quality of justice in order to improve access to
justice, trust, predictability and timeliness of justice decisions. These tools
can consist in monitoring the day-to-day activity of the courts thanks to data
collection or the evaluation of the performance of court systems by using
indicators or by the introduction of quality systems in courts. The absence of
reliable monitoring and evaluation can make improving the functioning of a
justice system more difficult. An effective time management of court cases
requires that the courts, the judiciary and all justice end-users can be
informed on the functioning of courts through a regular monitoring system.

The
data for stacked charts on quality factors are from 2012, as they reflect
descriptive indicators which tend to remain stable. Divergences from previous
exercises for certain Member States are explained individually. Member States
on the right side of the charts without values are those for which data were
not available. When the indicators do not exist or are not possible in certain
Member States, this has been made explicit on the right side of the charts.

Figure
13: Availability of monitoring of courts' activities in 2012\* (source: CEPEJ
study)

\*Availability
of monitoring tools has been reported as increasing in CY, EL (annual activity
reports) and SI (other monitoring elements) and decreasing in SK (no annual
activity report, as individual courts are required to send statistical data to
the Ministry of Justice that publishes data for the whole judiciary).

Figure
14: Availability of evaluation of courts' activities in 2012\* (source: CEPEJ
Study)

\*Availability
of these tools has been reported to have increased in EE, HU and SI and decreased
in LV.

Figure
15: Surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals in 2012\* (source:
CEPEJ Study)

Surveys conducted amongst
professionals who work in courts and/or users of the courts can provide
relevant information on the quality of the justice system. An additional
indicator has been introduced to reflect the target groups and the extent to
which such surveys are used in Member States.

\*Surveys
aimed at persons who were in direct contact with a court (professionals, litigants
and other courts users, for example witnesses, experts, interpreters, etc.)
following the CEPEJ methodology.

4.2.2
Information and communication technology systems help to reduce the length of
proceedings and to facilitate access to justice

ICT
systems for the registration and management of cases are indispensable tools at
the disposal of courts for an effective time management of cases, as they help
to improve the rate at which the court can treat cases and thereby to reduce
the overall length of proceedings[35].

Figure
16: ICT Systems for the registration and management of cases (weighted
indicator-min=0, max=4)[36]
(source: CEPEJ study)

Figure
17: Electronic communication between courts and parties (weighted indicator
-min=0, max=4) (source: CEPEJ study)

ICT
systems for communication between courts and parties (e.g. electronic
submission of claims) can contribute to reducing delays and costs for citizens
and businesses by facilitating the access to justice. ICT systems also play an
increasing role in cross-border cooperation between judicial authorities and
thereby facilitate the implementation of EU legislation.

Figure
18: Electronic processing of small claims\* (0 = available in 0% of courts; 4 =
available in 100% of courts) (source: CEPEJ study)

\*The notion of
"small claims" indicates a civil case where the monetary value of the
claim is relatively low. This notion varies between the Member States and the
CEPEJ Study uses the national definition in each Member State.

Figure 19: Electronic processing of
undisputed debt recovery (0 = available in 0% of courts; 4 = available in 100%
of courts) (source: CEPEJ study)

Figure
20: Electronic submission of claims (0 = available in 0% of courts; 4 = available
in 100% of courts) (source: CEPEJ study)

4.2.3
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods help to reduce the workload of
courts

Effective
mediation and other alternative dispute resolution methods broaden the
possibilities for citizens and businesses to have disputes solved and contribute
to a culture of peaceful resolution of disputes. The interest in such methods
is confirmed by a Eurobarometer survey which shows that 89% of respondents
would seek an agreement out of court whilst 8% say they would go to court
anyway[37].
ADR also contributes to the better functioning of courts. By facilitating an
early settlement between parties on a voluntary basis, ADR reduces the number
of pending cases and can have a positive impact on the workload of courts, which
are then better able to keep reasonable timeframes.

Figure 21: Availability of alternative
dispute resolution methods in 2012\* (source: CEPEJ study)

\*Almost no
changes have been reported on the availability of ADR which appeared to
increase in CY and decrease in LV, that is in the early stage of establishing a
new legal basis for mediation and a mediation institute.

4.2.4 Promoting
training of judges can help to improve the effectiveness of justice

Training
of judges is an important element for the quality of judicial decisions. An
additional indicator has been introduced to provide information on the actual
percentage of judges participating in continuous training in EU law or in the
law of another Member State.

Figure 22: Compulsory training for judges
in 2012\* (source: CEPEJ study)

\*EL,
HU and LT have increased the number of compulsory training categories in
comparison to 2010, whereas in LU, SE and RO some categories that were
compulsory have become optional.

Figure 23: Judges participating in continuous
training activities in EU Law or in the law of another Member State (as a % of total number or judges )\* ( source: European Commission, European Judicial
Training, 2012[38])

\*In
a few cases reported by the Member States the ratio of participants to existing
members of a legal profession exceeds 100%, meaning that participants took part
in more than one training activity on EU law. Some of the exceptionally high
figures may suggest that, the data delivered concerns training in all subjects
and not just in EU law.

4.2.5 Resources

Figure
24: Budget for courts (in EUR per inhabitant)\* (source: CEPEJ study)

\*
Figure 24 indicates the annual approved budget allocated to the functioning of
all courts, whatever the source and level of this budget (national or regional).
It does not take into account Prosecution Services (except in BE, DE, EL, ES
(for 2010), FR, LU and AT) or legal aid (except in BE, ES (for 2010) and AT).[39]

Figure 25: General Government total
expenditure on "law courts"\* (in EUR per inhabitant) (source:
Eurostat)

This additional indicator on
resources draws upon Eurostat’s data on government expenditure. It presents the
budget actually spent, which complements the existing indicator on allocated
budget for courts. The comparison is made between 2010, 2011 and 2012.

\*Whereas
Figure 24 indicates the annual approved budget allocated to the functioning of
all courts, whatever the source and level of this budget (national or
regional), Figure 25 presents general government total (actual) expenditure on
courts (National Accounts Data, Classification of the Functions of Government,
group 03.3). Figure 25 also includes probation systems and legal aid.[40]

Figure 26: General
government expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP (source: Eurostat)[41]

Figure
27: Number of judges\* (per 100.000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

In
order to improve comparability and provide a more focused view, the indicator
has been revised in comparison to the 2013 Scoreboard. It no longer includes Rechtspfleger/court
clerks which exist only in some Member States. Exclusively full-time judges are
taken into account.

\*The
category consists of judges working full-time judges, following the CEPEJ
methodology. It does not include Rechtspfleger/court clerks who exist in some
Member States.

Figure 28: Number of lawyers \*(per
100.000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

\*A
lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead
and act on behalf of his or her clients, to engage in the practice of law, to
appear before the courts or advise and represent his or her clients in legal
matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer).

Ø Conclusions on the quality of justice systems · Monitoring and evaluation of court activities already exist in most Member States. Only a few countries have no evaluation systems in place. User surveys are conducted among court users or legal professionals in more than half of the Member States. · Alternative dispute resolutions methods are available in nearly all Member States. Updated data on the use of such methods are not available. · The availability of information and communication technology (ICT) tools for courts increased. They are largely available for the administration and management of courts and to a lesser extent for electronic communications between courts and parties. Electronic processing of small claims, undisputed debt recovery and electronic submission of claims is not possible in a significant number of Member States. · In nearly a third of Member States the participation rate of judges in continuous training activities on EU law is above 50%. For half of the Member States the participation of judges in EU law training represents less than 20%. · Training of judges and legal practitioners and ICT tools are crucial for the effective functioning of a European area of justice based on mutual trust. The findings of the Scoreboard confirm that training and ICT should be key components of the future EU Justice policy and will help to consolidate what has been achieved during the past 15 years in this area.

4.3 Independence

Judicial
independence is important for an attractive business environment. It assures
the predictability, certainty, fairness and stability of the legal system in
which businesses operate. For this reason, improving the
independence of national judicial systems, together with their quality and
efficiency, is an important element in the European Semester. The
independence of the judiciary is also a requirement stemming from the right to
an effective remedy enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Judicial
independence is also important for an effective fight against corruption, as highlighted
in the EU Anti-corruption Report[42].

In order to provide information on the
independence of the judiciary in Member States the 2013 Scoreboard used the
indicator of the perception of independence of the judicial system. The
perceived independence of the judiciary is indeed a growth-enhancing factor as a
perceived lack of independence can deter investments. As a general rule,
justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.

While
perceived independence is a relevant indicator, information on how judicial
independence is legally guaranteed and upheld is necessary. For this reason, the
2013 Scoreboard announced that the Commission, with the networks of judges and
judicial authorities, will examine how the quality and availability of
comparable data on structural independence could be improved.

In
cooperation with the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the
Commission has started to collect information on the legal protection of
judicial independence in Member States. The figures in the annex present a
first comparative overview on how justice systems are organised to
protect judicial independence in certain types of situations where their
independence can be at risk. Five indicators are used to cover the following
situations: (i) the safeguards regarding the transfer of judges without their
consent, (ii) the dismissal of judges, (iii) the allocation of
incoming cases within a court, (iv) the withdrawal and recusal of judges
and (v) the threat against the independence of a judge. For such
situations, the 2010 Council of Europe Recommendation on judges: independence,
efficiency and responsibilities ('the Recommendation') presents standards to
ensure that the independence of the judiciary is respected[43].

Figure 29: Perceived judicial independence
(perception – higher value means better perception) (source: World Economic
Forum[44])

Ø Conclusions on judicial independence · In several Member States the perception of independence has improved whilst in some Member States it has deteriorated. · 2014 Scoreboard also presents in the annex a first factual comparative overview of the legal safeguards aiming at protecting judicial independence in certain situations where independence could be at risk. The Commission will further examine with the networks of judicial authorities and judges, as well as the Member States, how the Scoreboard could further develop comparative data on the effectiveness of these legal safeguards and on other safeguards relating to the structural independence.

5.           Further steps

The findings of the
Scoreboard will be taken into account in preparing the forthcoming country
specific analysis of the 2014 European Semester. They will also be taken into
account  in the context of the Economic Adjustments Programmes.

The
2014 Scoreboard confirms that the gathering of objective, comparable and
reliable data on the effectiveness of justice systems covering all Member
States remains a challenge. This may be for different reasons: lack of
availability of data due to insufficient statistical capacity, lack of
comparability due to procedures or definitions which may vary significantly or
the unwillingness to cooperate fully with the CEPEJ.

The
Commission considers that it is important to make real progress in the ability
to gather and provide relevant data on the quality, efficiency and independence
of the justice systems. In view of the importance of well functioning national
justice systems in achieving the objectives of the Union, all Member States
should address, as a priority, the collection of sound, impartial, reliable,
objective and comparable data and make it available in support of this
exercise. There is a mutual interest for Member States and national judiciaries
to develop the collection of such data in order to better define justice
policies.

The
Commission intends to intensify the work of the expert group
on national justice systems to improve the availability, quality and
comparability of data relevant for the EU. In addition to cooperating with the CEPEJ,
the Commission is strengthening cooperation with the European networks
in the area of justice, in particular the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary,
the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Court of the European
Union, the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions,
and with the associations of legal practitioners, in particular the lawyers. The
possibility to collect data on the functioning of justice systems in other
focused areas relevant for growth, such as financial and economic crimes, will
be explored.

6.           Conclusions

The
EU Justice Scoreboard contributes towards identifying, in an open dialogue with
Member States, the good examples and possible shortcomings of national justice
systems. In line with the principle of equal treatment, it is important that
all Member States are covered by the Scoreboard and provide the necessary data.
This is a matter of common interest for the smooth functioning of a common European
area of justice based on mutual trust and more generally of the Union.

The
2014 EU Justice Scoreboard shows the importance of pursuing with determination
the efforts made to improve the effectiveness of justice systems in order to
enjoy the full benefits of these reforms. On the basis of this Scoreboard, the
Commission invites the Member States, the European Parliament and all
stakeholders to an open dialogue and constructive collaboration towards this
objective.

ANNEX:
STRUCTURAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

The
figures below present a first overview of the legal safeguards in certain types
of situations without making an assessment of their effectiveness[45]. The
figures are
based on the replies to a questionnaire elaborated by the Commission in close
association with the ENCJ[46].

Figure
I: The safeguards regarding the transfer of judges without their consent (irremovability of
judges)

The
figure examines the scenario of the transfers of judges without their consent
and shows whether such transfer is allowed and when it is allowed: (i) the
authorities that decide on such transfers, (ii) the reasons (e.g.
organisational, disciplinary) for which such a transfer is allowed and (iii)
whether an appeal against the decision is possible[47].

Figure II: The dismissal of 1st
and 2nd instance judges

This
figure presents the authorities that have the power to propose and decide on
the dismissal of judges of first and second instance in the different Member
States[48].
The upper part of the column indicates who takes the final decision[49] and
the lower part shows – where relevant- who proposes dismissal or who must be
consulted before a decision is taken.

Figure
III: The allocation of cases within a court

The
figure presents at what level the criteria for distributing cases within a
court are defined (e.g. law, well-established practice), how cases are
allocated (e.g. by court president, by court staff, random allocation,
pre-defined order) and which authority supervises the allocation[50].

Figure
IV: The withdrawal and recusal of a judge

The
figure presents whether judges can be subject to sanctions if they disrespect
the obligation to withdraw from adjudicating a case in which their impartiality
is in question or is compromised or where there is a reasonable perception of
bias. The figure also presents which authority[51]
decides on a recusal request by a party aimed at challenging a judge[52].

Figure
V: The procedures in case of threat against the independence of a judge

The
figure presents which authorities can act in specific procedures for protecting
judicial independence when judges consider that their independence is
threatened[53]. It
also presents the measures these authorities can adopt (e.g. issuing a formal
declaration, filing of complaints or sanctions against persons seeking to
influence judges in an improper manner). Action taken for the protection of judicial
independence comes from a public prosecution service or a court in case of
sanctions, or from the Council for the Judiciary in case of other measures.

[1]     In 2014, Economic Adjustment Programmes in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus include conditionality on justice reforms.

[2]     Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2013,
COM(2012) 750 final.

[3]     Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2014, COM(2013)
800 final.

[4]     The reasons for country-specific
recommendations are presented by the Commission in a Staff Working Document, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/index\_en.htm

[5]     Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index\_en.htm

[6]     Not all Member States have provided data to the CEPEJ.

[7]     Study on the functioning of national courts for the application
of competition law rules, carried out by ICF GHK, 2014; Study on the
functioning of national courts for the application of consumer law rules
carried out by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services LPP, 2014.
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index\_en.htm

[8]     IMF, "Fostering Growth in Europe Now" 18 June 2012.

[9]     Available at: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130516.en.html

[10]    See for example "What makes civil justice effective?”, OECD
Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18 June 2013 and "The Economics of
Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics", OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 1060.

[11]    World Economic Forum, "The Global Competitiveness Report;
2013-2014", available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_GlobalCompetitivenessReport\_2013-14.pdf

[12]    Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Chapters/DB14-Enforcing-contracts.pdf

[13]    See IMF Country Report No. 13/299.

[14]    See Bank of Spain Working Paper 1303; Bank of Italy Working
Paper 898; IMF Country Report 13/299 referred to above.

[15]    OECD Economics Department referred to above.

[16]    IMF Country Report No. 13/299.

[17]    Resolution "EU Justice Scoreboard- civil and administrative
justice in the Member States".

[18]    As regards the Committee of the Regions, the Chair of the
Commission in charge of Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External
Affairs (CIVEX) transmitted a series of remarks underlining the importance of
effective justice and growth at local and regional level.

[19]    Information on the conference, speeches and written
contributions available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/index\_en.htm

[20]    Flash Eurobarometer 385 Justice in the EU,
available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/public\_opinion/archives/flash\_arch\_390\_375\_en.htm#385

[21]    Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/03), of 9 July 2013, on the
National Reform Programme 2013 of Bulgaria and delivering a Council
opinion on the Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2012-2016 (see §5); Council
Recommendation (2013/C 217/20), of 9 July 2013,on the National Reform Programme
2013 of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability
Programme of Spain, 2012-2016 (see §9); Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/10),
of 9 July 2013, on the National Reform Programme 2013 of Hungary and
delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Hungary, 2012-2016
(see §5); Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/11), of 9 July 2013, on the
National Reform Programme 2013 of Italy and delivering a Council opinion
on the Stability Programme of Italy, 2012-2017 (see §2): Council Recommendation
(2013/C 217/12), of 9 July 2013, on the National Reform Programme 2013 of Latvia
and delivering a Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of Latvia,
2012-2016, of 9 July 2013 (see §7); Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/15), of
9 July 2013,  on the National Reform Programme 2013 of Malta and
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Malta, 2012-2016
(see §5); Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/16), of 9 July 2013, on the
National Reform Programme 2013 of Poland and delivering a Council
opinion on the Convergence Programme of Poland, 2012-2016 (see §7); Council
Recommendation (2013/C 217/17), of 9 July 2013, on the National Reform
Programme 2013 of Romania and delivering a Council opinion on the
Convergence Programme of Romania, 2012-2016 (see §7); Council Recommendation
(2013/C 217/19),of 9 July 2013, on the National Reform Programme 2013 for Slovenia
and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Slovenia,
2012-2016, (see §7); Council Recommendation (2013/C 217/18), of 9 July 2013, on
the National Reform Programme 2013 of Slovakia and delivering a Council
opinion on the Stability Programme of Slovakia, 2012-2016 (see §6). Available
at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:217:SOM:EN:HTML

[22]    BG, IT, LV, PL, SI, SK.

[23]    For example, following the signature of the Economic Adjustment
Programme in 2011, PT has taken measures to improve the effective and timely
enforcement of contracts, restructure the court system, and eliminate backlog
of court cases. Preliminary data for 2013 show positive developments for
instance as regards clearance rate of enforcement cases.

[24]    BG, CZ, EL, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, PL, RO, SI and SK. Positions of
the Commission Services on the development of Partnership Agreement and
programmes for these countries are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional\_policy/what/future/program/index\_en.cfm

[25]    Study on the functioning of national courts for the application
of competition law rules, carried out by ICF GHK, 2014; Study on the
functioning of national courts for the application of consumer law rules
carried out by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services LPP, 2014.

[26]    Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report,
Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 11
June 2013, SWD 2013 (203) (paragraph 65).

[27]    Commission Staff Working Paper Consumer Empowerment in the EU, 7
April 2011, SEC (2011) 469, (paragraph 2).

[28]    Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending
cases, are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ. Their definition and
interrelation is available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default\_en.asp

[29]    Report on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member
States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat for the Commission. All charts
compare, where available, data for 2010 with data for 2012. 2010 data includes
updates made by CEPEJ after the publication of their 2013 study as transmitted
to the Commission.

[30]    Study on the functioning of national courts for the application
of competition law rules, carried out by ICF GHK, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index\_en.htm.

[31]    Study on the functioning of national courts for the application
of consumer law rules carried out by Centre for Strategy & Evaluation
Services LLP, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index\_en.htm.

[32]    For some Member States (\*) only length in last instance is
indicated, as no sufficient data were available for other instances. For ES (\*\*),
the average length of proceedings at 3rd instance differs
significantly between 2008 and 2012: in 2008 it was over 2,600 days and has
been reduced to about 1,000 days in 2012. In the UK (\*\*\*), data refer to England and Wales and they provide the average length of county court proceedings at 1st
instance.

[33]    For example, in EL, the number of incoming civil and commercial litigious
cases increased by 42% between 2010 and 2012.

[34]    See note 23.

[35]    CY, IE and SI indicated to CEPEJ that they have interpreted some
questions on ICT differently than in 2010. This explains why the values for
certain ICT indicators are lower in 2012 than in 2010.

[36]    Figures 16 and 17 show composite indicators constructed from
several ICT indicators that each measures availability of these systems from 0
to 4 (0= available in 0% of courts; 4=available in 100% of courts).

[37]    Flash Eurobarometer 385, November 2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public\_opinion/flash/fl\_385\_en.pdf

[38] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/european\_judicial\_training\_annual\_report\_2012.pdf

[39]    In Figure 24, the significant decrease for ES reflects the fact
that data from the Autonomous Communities and from the Council for the
Judiciary have not been included in 2012 data.

[40]    The following values are provisional: BG, EL and HU for all
years, SE for 2012.

[41]    The following values are provisional: BG, EL and HU for all
years; for SE, values for 2012 are provisional.

[42]    COM (2014)38 final, 4.2.2014, available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr\_2014\_en.pdf
and http://ec.europa.eu/anti-corruption-report/

[43]    Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities.

[44]    The WEF indicator is based on survey answers to the question:
"To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from the
influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?" The survey was
replied to by a representative sample of firms in all countries representing
the main sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing industry, non-
manufacturing industry, and services). The administration of the survey took
different formats, including face-to-face interviews with business executives,
telephone interviews and mailings, with an online survey as an alternative.
Available at: http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014

[45]    This overview contains only basic information on how the justice
systems are organised and does not intend to reflect the complexity and details
of these systems. The objective of this section is to provide a first mapping
of safeguards for judicial independence and therefore the figures present the
Member States according to the alphabetical order of their geographical names
in the original language.

[46]    For those Member States where Councils for the Judiciary do not
exist, the replies to the questionnaire have been obtained in cooperation with
the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of the European Union.

[47]    § 52 of the Recommendation contains guarantees on the
irremovability of judges, in particular that a judge should not be moved to
another judicial office without consenting to it, except in cases of
disciplinary sanctions or reform of the organisation of the judicial system.

[48] § 46 and 47 of the Recommendation require that national systems
provide for safeguards regarding the dismissal of judges.

[49]  It can be one or two different bodies depending on the reason for
dismissal or the type of judge (e.g. president, etc.).

[50]    § 24 of the Recommendation requires that the systems for the
distribution of cases within a court follow objective pre-established criteria
in order to safeguard the right to an independent and impartial judge.

[51]    Sometimes more than one authority can take this decision, depending
on the level of the court where the recused judge sits.

[52]    § 59, 60 and 61 of the Recommendation provide that judges should
act independently and impartially in all cases and should withdraw from a case
or decline to act where there are valid reasons defined by law, and not
otherwise.

[53]    § 8, 13 and 14 of the Recommendation provide that where judges
consider that their independence is threatened, they should be able to have
recourse to effective means of remedy.

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