Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| 8.2.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 67/2 |

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P9\_TA(2021)0275

Competition policy — annual report 2020

European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2021 on competition policy — annual report 2020 (2020/2223(INI))

(2022/C 67/01)

The European Parliament,

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| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 101 to 109 thereof, |

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| — | having regard to the relevant Commission rules, guidelines, resolutions, public consultations, communications and papers on the subject of competition, |

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| — | having regard to the Commission report of 9 July 2020 on Competition Policy 2019 (COM(2020)0302) and to the Commission staff working document published as a supporting document on the same date, |

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy [(1)](#ntr1-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0001), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 on a New Industrial Strategy for Europe (COM(2020)0102), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communications of 19 March 2020, 4 April 2020, 13 May 2020, and 2 July 2020 on a Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, and subsequent amendments thereto [(2)](#ntr2-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0002), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 21 September 2020 on Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post 2021 (C(2020)6400), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission’s White Paper of 17 June 2020 on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies (COM(2020)0253), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission’s decision of 17 December 2020 to clear the acquisition of Fitbit by Google, subject to conditions, |

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| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) Special Report 24/2020 entitled ‘The Commission’s EU merger control and antitrust proceedings: a need to scale up market oversight’ [(3)](#ntr3-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0003), |

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| — | having regard to the State of the Union address by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of 16 September 2020, |

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| — | having regard to the written and oral replies given by then Commissioner-designate Margrethe Vestager at the hearing by the European Parliament on 8 October 2019, |

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| — | having regard to the joint statement by the European Competition Network (ECN) of 23 March 2020 on the application of competition law during the Corona crisis [(4)](#ntr4-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0004), |

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| — | having regard to the report of 4 April 2019 by high-level Commission experts entitled ‘Competition policy for the digital era’ [(5)](#ntr5-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0005), |

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| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 March 2019 on jobs, growth and competitiveness, |

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| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Special European Council meeting of 1 and 2 October 2020, |

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| — | having regard to the Commission notice to stakeholders of 2 December 2020 on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of competition, and that of 18 January 2021 on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of State aid, |

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| — | having regard to the study of December 2020 by the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the European Parliament entitled ‘Impact of state aid on competition and competitiveness during the COVID-19 pandemic: an early assessment’, |

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| — | having regard to the US House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee report of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘Investigation of Competition in the Digital Marketplace: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations’ [(6)](#ntr6-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0006), |

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| — | having regard to the UK Competition and Markets Authority’s research paper of 19 January 2021 entitled ‘Algorithms: How they can reduce competition and harm consumers’, |

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| — | having regard to the EU’s 2030 greenhouse gas emissions target, as endorsed by EU leaders in December 2020, |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 — Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380), |

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| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 on a new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe (COM(2020)0098), |

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| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |

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| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A9-0168/2021), |

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| A. | whereas consumers benefit from competitive markets, especially when they result in fair prices and wider choices of quality products; whereas EU competition policy is designed to maintain an open market economy with free, fair and effective competition favouring an efficient allocation of resources and promoting innovation, thereby paying particular attention to the needs of SMEs and the creation of a level of playing field, to the benefit of all EU citizens; whereas this fundamental objective remains relevant even in crisis conditions; |

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| B. | whereas the Commission responded to the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis promptly by adopting special temporary competition rules to remedy a serious disturbance to the European economy; |

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| C. | whereas exceptional and temporary measures to respond to the pandemic should not be applied in the form of anticompetitive behaviour, nor should they be exploited by financially unhealthy companies to receive additional aid without the necessary and effective restructuring plans; |

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| D. | whereas all State aid should be designed and granted in an economically, socially and environmentally responsible manner; whereas in the long run, competition policy should efficiently address social, digital and environmental challenges, and should be fully in line with the priorities outlined in the European Green Deal and the objectives of the Paris Agreement; |

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| E. | whereas smart reconciliation of the Union’s competition rules with its industrial, digital, environmental, social and international trade policies is essential for ensuring a level playing field in all sectors, strengthening resilient value chains and bolstering job creation and global competitiveness, thus contributing to an SME-friendly trade environment; |

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| F. | whereas unfair competition between Member States hinders the proper functioning of the internal market; |

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| G. | whereas the Commission is currently carrying out a general review of the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement, including antitrust regulations, a number of State aid rules and guidance, the evaluation of merger control rules and the review of the Market Definition Notice; |

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| H. | whereas economic boycotts against products from specific geographical areas in the EU constitute a serious violation of competition rules and should be addressed effectively; |

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| I. | whereas the increasing challenges of competing with a deeply subsidised major economy like that of China require measures to strengthen EU companies in the face of non-EU competitors; |

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| J. | whereas an open market architecture in trading and clearing allowing for genuine competition among market infrastructures is key for preserving and strengthening the resilience of EU capital markets, incentivising market-led innovations, and thus delivering better outcomes for pensioners, businesses and investors; whereas the need for an open market structure needs to be balanced against financial stability considerations; |

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| K. | whereas most consumers’ gateways to the Internet are restricted to a strikingly small number of digital ecosystems and large platforms; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the pace of digitalisation, posing new challenges to the effectiveness of competition policy, especially in the field of antitrust rules where, to date, ex ante interventions are not allowed; |

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| L. | whereas data scandals, investigations and evidence have shown how personal data is being collected and stored, often in an excessive manner, as well as being used and sold to third parties by platforms, and how dominant technology players and platforms have been systematically tracking consumers online; |

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| M. | whereas some undertakings, which benefit from a dual status as both platforms and suppliers, abuse their position to impose unfair terms and conditions on competitors; |

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| N. | whereas analysts predict [(7)](#ntr7-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0007) that Amazon, Facebook and Alphabet Inc. (Google) will collectively capture 61 % of all digital advertising in 2021, representing a doubling of their market share since 2015; whereas Facebook and Alphabet Inc. (Google) earn 98,53 % and 83,3 % of their respective revenues from digital advertising [(8)](#ntr8-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0008); |

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| O. | whereas fines issued by competition authorities have often failed to have a deterring effect for large technology companies as they are merely considered as costs of doing business; |

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| P. | whereas antitrust tools should be made adequate to face the new realities of rapidly changing digital and technology markets; |

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| Q. | whereas a level playing field between financial services firms and technology firms is needed to ensure competition on an equal footing, following the principle of ‘same risk, same activity, same regulation’; |

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| R. | whereas algorithms can greatly enhance efficiency and allow firms to deliver better products and services to consumers; whereas, however, intentional or unintentional misuse of algorithms can cause harm to consumers and competition; |

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| S. | whereas EU competition and State aid rules should be coherent with and could significantly contribute to the European Green Deal, the EU’s digital strategy, the European Pillar of Social Rights and the UN Sustainable Development Goals; whereas EU State aid cases hardly refer to such overall EU policy objectives; |

General considerations

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|  | 1. | Highlights that a competition policy aiming to ensure a level playing field in all sectors, drive innovation and give consumers more and higher quality choices, is crucial for guaranteeing the proper functioning of the single market; |

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|  | 2. | Expresses its concern regarding the increase in industry concentration in Europe; observes in this regard that between 2001 and 2012 the average industry across 10 European economies saw a 2-3 % increase in the share of sales of the largest 10 % of companies; warns that this increase is observed for both manufacturing and non-financial services and is not driven by digital-intensive sectors; notes that increases in industry concentrations lead to higher mark-ups associated with higher profits at the expense of European consumers; |

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|  | 3. | Believes that a strict and impartial enforcement of EU competition rules by independent competition authorities is crucial for European companies active in the internal market and at international level, especially for SMEs, and can make a significant contribution to key political priorities such as a deeper and fairer internal market, a connected digital single market, the Union’s global competitiveness, the fight against social inequalities and the climate crisis, as well as to European values regarding environmental standards, social affairs, climate policy and consumer protection; emphasises, however, the importance of well-dosed flexibility in crisis conditions; |

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|  | 4. | Welcomes the consultation on competition law and the European Green Deal as a step towards greater policy coherence; calls on the Commission to present a comprehensive and forward-looking action plan on how competition rules and State aid should be revised; |

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|  | 5. | Considers that ensuring a level playing field for undertakings in the single market and in global markets, which is key for especially SMEs and for the creation of decent and sustainable jobs within and outside the EU, also depends on decisively and effectively combating social, environmental and fiscal dumping; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to step up its efforts to establish a legal framework for a mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence instrument; |

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|  | 6. | Highlights that aggressive tax practices by multinationals, harmful tax practices and tax advantages targeted at large companies may stifle innovation and jeopardise the contestability of markets, especially for SMEs, which are the backbone of the European economy; |

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|  | 7. | Underlines the importance of the ECN in supporting cooperation between national competition authorities (NCAs) and the Commission with a view to promoting fair competition within the single market through strengthened enforcement and the sharing of best practices; |

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|  | 8. | Encourages the structured dialogues with the Executive Vice-President of the Commission for Competition and the efforts of the Commission to maintain close cooperation with the members of Parliament’s competent committee; considers the Commission’s annual report on competition policy to be an indispensable exercise in terms of democratic scrutiny; recalls that in recent years, Parliament has been involved through the ordinary legislative procedure in shaping the framework for competition rules; insists on Parliament’s co-decision powers to shape the framework for competition rules; |

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|  | 9. | Asks the Commission to use its advocacy powers to highlight the risks of price control measures implemented by governments, including those related to distorting price signals that may encourage production and undermine incentives for new entrants to address shortages; |

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|  | 10. | Notes with concern that some Member States have not effectively implemented the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts [(9)](#ntr9-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0009), based on the Commission’s assessment, with tremendous detrimental effects for consumers and fair competition; calls on the Commission to scrutinise the unfair clauses and practices employed, especially by the banking sector, in consumer contracts and to ensure the effective and swift implementation of this directive using all means available; |

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|  | 11. | Recognises that resources for the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) should be adequate to match its workload and range of tasks; considers the need to ensure specific expertise on digital issues and the practices of online platforms with behavioural economists, algorithms specialists, engineers and data scientist; calls on the Commission to inform Parliament of the allocation of resources between State aid control, merger control, and antitrust; |

Policy responses to COVID-19

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|  | 12. | Welcomes the adoption of a Temporary Framework for State aid measures, and amendments to prolong and expand it, established in response to unexpected developments related to the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis to enable Member States to support companies during the pandemic; supports the maintenance of exceptional measures for as long as justified by the epidemiological situation, but underlines that the Framework is a temporary tool; stresses that restoring effective competition in the medium to long term is key to ensuring that the recovery is rapid and consistent; stresses that support measures should become more targeted as the recovery progresses; notes substantial differences between Member States regarding their available fiscal space for the provision of State aid; |

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|  | 13. | Welcomes the Commission communication on a Temporary Framework for assessing antitrust issues related to business cooperation in response to situations of urgency stemming from the current COVID-19 outbreak; considers that guidance and support on antitrust rules facilitates the cooperation required to overcome the COVID-19 crisis, and thus benefits consumers; |

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|  | 14. | Notes that the Temporary Framework includes certain conditions for certain types of State aid measures such as recapitalisation; welcomes in this regard conditions such as a ban on dividend distribution, bonus payments and share buybacks; regrets, however, that such conditions were not imposed on other State aid measures; calls on the Commission to impose such conditions on all State aid measures in the Temporary Framework, including, in particular, recapitalisation measures, which should be considered only as a solution of last resort by Member States, due to the major distortive impact they can have on the internal market; |

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|  | 15. | Strongly supports effective measures to address the shortage of vaccines against COVID-19, especially in low- and middle-income countries, and therefore supports the Commission and the Member States in their efforts to push non-EU countries to lift existing export bans and to step up the donation of vaccines, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to further increase their efforts to support technology transfer and voluntary licencing for intellectual property rights to treat endemic or pandemic infectious diseases in the world population; |

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|  | 16. | Underlines that the actions of the Commission aimed at eliminating the conditions that lead to monopolies and dominant positions and at limiting public funding to companies which could lead to such conditions does not provide any solution to the issue of systemic and structural disadvantages that affects the competitiveness of businesses based in and operating from European insular territories and outermost regions; |

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|  | 17. | Highlights the importance of policy coherence and of any aid granted being issued only to companies enduring direct financial consequences of the pandemic; urges, furthermore, that companies using tax havens outside the EU for tax avoidance be banned from accessing State aid or financial support if they do not commit to changing their behaviour; |

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|  | 18. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to launch a post COVID-19 roadmap for better targeted State aid in order to promote competitiveness and safeguard jobs; suggests that such a roadmap could include measures to tackle market fragmentation and distortions due to an uneven playing field, an analysis of the impact of State aid on the internal market, and clear guidance on how best to use competition policy tools to foster the recovery; urges the Commission, furthermore, to mainstream industrial, digital and green strategies in setting the future conditions for State aid; |

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|  | 19. | Reiterates the priority of ensuring that State aid rules and European banking regulation are strictly and impartially enforced, including when dealing with future banking crises; calls on the Commission to examine swiftly the discrepancies between the rules on State aid in the area of liquidation aid and the resolution regime under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive [(10)](#ntr10-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0010) (BRR Directive), and to review its Banking Communication of 30 July 2013 [(11)](#ntr11-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0011) in the context of the review of the crisis management framework, including in the light of recent cases, taking into account the need to protect taxpayers and savers against the burden of bank rescues; |

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|  | 20. | Notes that EU competition and State aid rules should not be seen in isolation of monetary, trade and fiscal policies; calls for reflection on possible distortions of competition arising from the European Central Bank’s corporate bond purchases; emphasises in this regard the notion of selectivity in State aid and Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union which contains the so-called principle of loyalty; |

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|  | 21. | Calls on the Commission to ensure and monitor the proper use and distribution of the different EU funding measures in response to the COVID-19 crisis, including through Member States’ National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which should be in accordance with EU competition and State aid rules, must not lead to any distortions of competition, and must be applied equally to all companies, in particular in critical sectors such as telecommunications, energy and transport; urges the Commission to oversee any such potential distortions of competition; stresses that State aid should not be granted to companies that were inefficient and structurally loss-making before the COVID-19 crisis, nor encourage the formation of monopolistic structures; |

Global dimension

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|  | 22. | Emphasises the importance of an increasingly intense structured global dialogue and cooperation on competition policy enforcement and reform for a common approach towards fair competition; |

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|  | 23. | Supports an active participation of the Commission and the NCAs in the International Competition Network (ICN) and urges for closer involvement of Parliament in the activity of the relevant working parties and expert groups of the ICN and the OECD; |

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|  | 24. | Supports the Commission’s strategy to eliminate the negative effects caused by the unlawful extra-territorial application of unilateral sanctions by non-EU countries against EU operators; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication of 19 January 2021 entitled ‘European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience’ (COM(2021)0032); |

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|  | 25. | Stresses that dedicated cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in the area of competition policy can meaningfully contribute to the effectiveness of competition policy and invites the Commission to pursue more of such dedicated competition agreements in order to allow for a more effective exchange of information between competition authorities; recalls, furthermore, that the EU must ensure a level playing field and reciprocity with its international partners in terms of State aid, public procurement and investment policy; calls on the Commission to reinforce State aid chapters in future trade and investments agreements; |

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|  | 26. | Calls on the Commission to pay attention to the role of foreign-based state-owned enterprises that are supported and subsidised by their governments in ways that the EU single market rules prohibit for EU entities; expresses its concern about distortive state-funded competition caused by foreign undertakings acquiring European undertakings, especially those active in innovative or strategic sectors and technologies, those aligning with the European Green Deal, and those weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic; |

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|  | 27. | Welcomes as a preliminary step the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [(12)](#ntr12-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0012) as well as the Commission’s White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies; observes the continued foreign takeover pressure on European companies and warns that urgent action is needed; looks forward, therefore, to the Commission’s upcoming legislative proposal aimed at addressing the distortive effects of foreign subsidies on the internal market; |

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|  | 28. | Is of the view that EU undertakings should be able to compete in global markets on an equal footing; calls on the Commission, therefore, to adapt its competition and State aid policy in order to promote serious industrial development; highlights that a smart industrial policy can help to reallocate resources to certain key sectors without distorting competition, and thus lay the groundwork for a resilient and sustainable economy in the long term; is of the opinion that the Union and the Member States need to enhance synergies between targeted EU policies, investments and competition policy to foster jobs and resilient value chains in order to achieve EU autonomy in certain strategic industries while preserving an open economy; |

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|  | 29. | Calls for strong investment in research and development by European industry, with a view to ensuring a level playing field between producers inside and outside the EU, achieving the objectives of the European Green Deal, including the transition to low-carbon modes of production, and supporting the competitiveness of EU undertakings vis-à-vis non-EU competitors whose production processes are not subject to the same criteria as those determined at EU level; further calls on the Commission, in this regard, to consider increasing aid for research and innovation as well as for technologies generating positive externalities for the environment or for the overall energy system; |

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|  | 30. | Invites the Commission to identify strategic dependencies, particularly in sensitive industrial ecosystems, and to propose measures to reduce these, including by diversifying production and supply chains, fostering production and investment in Europe, and ensuring strategic stockpiling; highlights in this regard the importance of Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) for investments in disruptive technologies; calls on the Commission, with regard to the upcoming revision of the IPCEI communication, to further promote IPCEIs, to clarify selection rules for IPCEIs, to revise and simplify some implementation criteria and requirements, and to consider allowing for easier co-financing by the EU, in order to facilitate the participation of partners from smaller Member States and to ensure that smaller industrial research projects can more easily benefit from support; |

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|  | 31. | Supports the inclusion in EU competition rules of a thorough State aid check on undertakings from non-EU countries, while stressing that the Union should remain open to foreign direct investments complying with its legal framework, respecting European social and environmental standards and not distorting competition; reiterates in this regard its call on the Commission and the Member States, pending consideration of the proposal on the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), to adopt reinforced trade defence instruments to combat unfair trading practices and protect in particular the competitiveness of the industrial sectors; stresses at the same time that competition policy decisions should not be used as a protectionist measure and calls in this regard for a spill-over analysis of EU State aid rules on the competitiveness of low and middle-income countries; |

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|  | 32. | Notes with concern that compared to other trade agreements, such as the one with Switzerland, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is weaker; regrets in particular that the EU-UK TCA does not provide for a full level playing field as regards State aid and competition; calls for the EU and the UK to find common ground to continuously cooperate and strive towards fair competition and a level playing field; |

Competition policy in the digital age

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|  | 33. | Welcomes the Commission’s determination to address unfair terms and practices of platforms acting as gatekeepers, act decisively, and eliminate illegitimate obstacles to online competition in the European digital single market; regrets the slowness of antitrust investigations compared to fast-moving digital markets; underlines in this regard that 10 years after the opening of an investigation into Google search bias practices, the Commission has still not completed its investigation; considers that in the digital economy, the concentration of data in the hands of a small number of companies leads to market failures, excessive rent extraction and blocking of new entrants; |

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|  | 34. | Considers, while acknowledging efforts made, that problems linked to large technology undertakings’ excessive market dominance have so far been insufficiently addressed and need to be resolved urgently; |

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|  | 35. | Recognises the challenges ahead for competition policy-making and enforcement related to, inter alia, network effects, the concentration, aggregation and use of data in zero-priced markets, pricing algorithms, the structuring of big platforms and market intervention; |

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|  | 36. | Calls on the Commission to give due attention and careful consideration to structural competition problems relating to gatekeeping positions of incumbent payment networks, which have only grown during the COVID-19 pandemic; |

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|  | 37. | Welcomes the Commission’s appeal of the Apple ruling [(13)](#ntr13-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0013); is of the opinion that the Apple case shows once again the need for sound State aid rules, taking into account beneficial tax regimes; |

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|  | 38. | Notes that traditional instruments used by competition authorities such as investigations into the possible abuse of a dominant market position take a very long time, which has proven to be a problem in fast-moving digital markets; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s assessment regarding the need for new competition tools that might be needed to deal with structural competition problems across different markets which current rules cannot address in the most effective manner and calls for careful Commission surveillance of these markets so as to be able to quickly and efficiently detect and intervene on major issues and legal loopholes; notes that fines issued by competition authorities have often failed to have a deterring effect for large technology companies as these are merely considered costs of doing business; |

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|  | 39. | Welcomes the Commission proposal for a Digital Markets Act (DMA) to prohibit platforms from engaging in self-preferencing business practices (including mandatory bundling/pre-installation), or operating in lines of business that depend on or interoperate with the platform, as well as to require platforms to make their services compatible with competing networks to allow for interoperability, including of core services, data portability and multi-vendor integration; calls on the Commission to address cases where remedies offered have clearly been ineffective at restoring competition to the comparison-shopping market; |

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|  | 40. | Recalls that data-driven advantages linked to data sharing and data selling, but also services set as default settings, risk conferring on some companies the position of ‘gatekeeper’ in digital markets, and that this needs to be addressed effectively by the DMA; takes the view that the Commission should have the ability to force a gatekeeping platform to substitute certain default settings by an effective and objective consumer choice architecture; |

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|  | 41. | Considers that the structural unbundling of Big Tech monopolies may be desirable for restoring competition in digital markets given the limits of fines and the failure of past behavioural remedies in certain antitrust cases; stresses that targeted and effective behavioural remedies offer a time-efficient solution; suggests implementing a participative antitrust framework in order to foster continuous dialogue with all undertakings, increase legal certainty, transparency and consumer protection, and ensure effective remedies; |

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|  | 42. | Urges the Commission to speed up procedures, in particular with regard to antitrust and in rapidly growing digital markets; and asks for cooperation in this regard also from the companies under investigation; condemns the practice by some companies under investigation of artificially prolonging investigations by systematically requesting prolongations of deadlines and by replying to requests for information only with substantial delays or submitting ineffective proposals for commitments they would take; |

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|  | 43. | Notes, furthermore, that while it is important to ensure due process and the right of defence of undertakings under investigation, there is a need to make administrative procedures faster and more efficient; stresses the need to look into the possibility of making more systematic use of specific measures such as interim measures, as well as other structural and behavioural remedies, in order to prevent irreversible distortions of competition; recalls, in this regard, that in the annex of the ECN+ Directive [(14)](#ntr14-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0014), the Commission identified ‘interim measures’ as ‘a key tool for competition authorities to ensure that competition is not harmed while an investigation is on-going’; regrets and is concerned that interim measures have been used only once in 20 years; calls on the Commission to revise the Notice on Remedies [(15)](#ntr15-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0015) by taking into account the developments and evolution of the digital sector over recent years; |

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|  | 44. | Welcomes the fact that the Commission’s proposals for a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act take a distinct approach towards all digital services, very large digital services, and gatekeepers; notes in particular that the aim of the DMA proposal is to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market by promoting effective competition, a level playing field in digital markets and a fair and contestable online platform environment; regrets the absence of adequate measures against advertising intermediaries in the draft proposals; notes that the first enforcement action under the new DMA regulation will only be possible in five years; urges the Commission, therefore, to pursue its antitrust enforcement in new and pending cases involving gatekeepers in the digital environment; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 45. | Highlights the importance of an adequate enforcement framework in the future DMA; considers that the supervisory function of the Commission should be sufficiently resourced and that the supervisory process should allow the participation of all actors, including NCAs, national sectoral regulators, the European Data Protection Board, the European Data Protection Supervisor and consumer organisations; stresses that the design of remedies should not be left to the sole appreciation of the incriminated company, but should instead be subject to a strict compliance mechanism; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 46. | Considers that the DMA proposal is a complementary tool to competition rules that aims to ensure fair and contestable online markets; stresses that it should not jeopardise the proper enforcement of competition law already in force, including existing national laws, nor prevent the Commission from making full use of its existing tools in competition enforcement; refers in this regard to pending concerns related to the Android decision [(16)](#ntr16-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0016) and insufficient competition in online search; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 47. | Notes that the remedies proposed by Google have been rejected as insufficient by market players and consumer organisations across Europe; calls on the Commission to file antitrust charges against Google for abuse of dominance in other specialised search services, including local search; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 48. | Calls on the Commission to make full use of its competition policy instruments to guarantee a fair level playing field and to address potential gatekeeper effects with regard to access to key enabling technologies for artificial intelligence and data; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 49. | Considers that Parliament should play an active role in the political debate on competition policy, including through organising a public hearing with the CEOs of GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) on their corporate strategies in the field of competition and taxation practices; regrets that all four CEOs have declined invitations to such a hearing; regrets furthermore that Parliament does not have proper mechanisms in place to legally mandate such appearances and hopes that this may be resolved soon; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 50. | Underlines the importance of the transparency register to ensure public scrutiny of lobbying efforts with the aim of preventing distortion of competition; calls for an enhanced EU transparency register with information related to funding of companies or associations in order to prevent stakeholders from acting on behalf of other companies without specifying that they are doing so; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 51. | Stresses the importance of helping consumers and users to gain greater control over, and take responsibility for, their own data and identity, and calls for a high level of protection of personal data while increasing the levels of transparency and accountability of digital services; recalls that consumers have no other choice than giving their consent if they do not want to lose access to some services offered by online platforms; calls in this regard for a mandatory data sharing framework providing consumers with tools to rightfully take ownership of and manage their own data in a simpler and more effective manner; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 52. | Calls on the Commission to review its merger and acquisition rules when it comes to assessing personal data; calls on the Commission to fully consider and assess personal data assets in the same way as all other traditional physical assets when deciding on digital mergers and acquisitions; urges the Commission to take a broader view when evaluating digital mergers and to also assess the impact of data consolidation, including of advertising technology at the heart of big tech companies’ business models; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 53. | Notes that the acquisition of targets with specific data resources can bring about a concentration in control over valuable and non-replicable data resources and result in better data access for the merging parties than for their competitors; stresses that data consolidation via mergers may strengthen a dominant position or allow the acquiring entity to leverage market power, and sometimes raise foreclosure concerns; regrets, therefore, the Commission’s decision to approve Google’s takeover of the wearable fitness device company Fitbit; is worried about future processing of personal data from Fitbit users, including data concerning health, that may be used for the purposes of digital advertising; stipulates that data concerning health should be seen as a special category of personal data, as laid down in Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation [(17)](#ntr17-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0017) (GDPR); notes that the remedies proposed by Google and endorsed by the Commission are insufficient to ensure effective competition in wearables and digital health, which are becoming increasingly important in consumers’ lives; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 54. | Notes that in several specific markets for financial data, there are multiple vendors and, although none of them has a dominant market share, competition remains very low; notes also that some financial market data vendors positioned as data aggregators could act as gatekeepers and as such control access to data and restrict usage for customers; calls on the Commission to assess such situations where companies acquire the position of gatekeepers or oligopolies and to develop measures to restore competition, supporting price transparency and avoiding unfair and unreasonable commercial practices; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 55. | Regrets and expresses its concern at the acquisition in 2014 of WhatsApp by Facebook; recalls that the Commission was lied to by Facebook during the process of assessing the take-over about its technical capability to use WhatsApp data for the purposes of digital advertising; stipulates that Facebook started in 2016 to use metadata from WhatsApp conversations for the purposes of advertising; recalls that the Commission fined Facebook in 2017 for having lied during its assessment process; reiterates that Article 105 TFEU obliges the Commission to propose appropriate measures to bring an end to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate measures to bring an end to the use of WhatsApp users’ data for Facebook’s advertising purposes; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 56. | Calls for the Union’s infrastructure and operational resilience capacity in critical digital sectors to be enhanced, including by encouraging fair competition and promoting fair software licensing principles in European cloud markets; considers sustainable competition and the avoidance of monopolistic structures in markets vital for Europe’s digital transition, economic recovery and competitiveness; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 57. | Calls on the Commission to review and adapt the methodology used to assess an abuse of dominant position and ensure that the notion of ‘essential facilities’ remains fit for the purpose in the digital age; invites the Commission to consider complementing the concept of ‘dominance’ with concepts such as ‘dependency’ and ‘relative market power’; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 58. | Notes that some oligopolistic structures have developed in the area of financial services, and also that some large technology undertakings have become important players in the financial services market; calls on the Commission to monitor and investigate how the competitive advantages inherent to these operators may distort competition in the market and harm the interests of consumers and innovation; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 59. | Considers that the protection of privacy and personal data, the principle of non-discrimination, and the freedom of expression and information need to be ingrained in the core of a successful and durable EU policy on digital services; |

State aid control

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 60. | Notes that State aid policy is an integral part of competition policy and that State aid control reflects the need to maintain a level playing field for all undertakings carrying out activities in the single market; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 61. | Reiterates that Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) remain essential for the survival of a number of communities across Europe, especially in isolated, remote or peripheral regions in the Union; welcomes the Commission’s open consultation regarding government subsidies for essential services; welcomes the recently adopted new Guidelines on regional State aid; recalls the need for a road map for better targeted State aid, especially for the delivery of SGEI; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 62. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to launch a territorial assessment of the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 crisis in the context of the application of State aid rules and the relevant ongoing revision process; notes that, in this regard, special attention should be paid to analysing impacts on enterprises based in EU islands and outermost regions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 174 and 349 TFEU; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 63. | Calls on the Commission to give careful consideration to sectors which are the basis of many other industries, as well as the Union’s sustainable social and economic value chain; reiterates the need to promote technologies and production practices that lead to significantly reduced environmental impacts; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 64. | Calls for the alignment of all EU competition and State aid rules with long-term societal objectives, in particular the European Green Deal, taking into account the EU’s climate commitments; regrets that while the definition of the energy mix remains a national competence, most Member States do not make State aid conditional to such objectives; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 65. | Welcomes the consultation launched on how competition policy can support the European Green Deal and better take into account green and sustainable efficiencies when dealing with State aid, merger control and antitrust rules; calls on the Commission, as part of its upcoming revision of the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy and on horizontal cooperation agreements, to put in place concrete incentives and conditions to continue on the path of decarbonisation; calls in particular for guidance on repowering, hybrid projects and electricity storage and on investments in energy efficiency and building renovation; reiterates, moreover, that the transition to a climate-neutral economy requires measures to deal with structural change, including the identification of coal regions as assisted areas in accordance with Article 107(3) TFEU; |

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|  | 66. | Notes with concern that the recovery of illegal State aid remains a lengthy and cumbersome process; highlights, furthermore, that the transparency and traceability of the State aid cases evaluation process should be enhanced, taking into account a non-negligible risk of interconnectedness between cases; |

Merger control, antitrust and cartels

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|  | 67. | Urges the Commission to remain vigilant and strictly enforce Article 102 TFEU prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position as well as its merger control procedures, enshrined in the EC Merger Regulation [(18)](#ntr18-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0018); |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 68. | Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to review its 1997 Notice [(19)](#ntr19-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0019) on the definition of relevant market in the Commission’s merger and antitrust enforcement; encourages the Commission, on a case-by-case basis, to take into account a longer-term vision encompassing the global dimension and potential future competition in its competitive assessments; highlights that in the past, the Commission’s definition of the relevant market might have been too narrow to sufficiently take into account dynamic competition in global markets; calls on the Commission to adopt a more dynamic approach to market definition, making innovation criteria a core element of relevant market analysis when it comes to European merger control; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 69. | Calls on the Commission to revise mergers guidelines to take into account efficiency gains linked to mergers, including the challenge of EU industrial competitiveness; welcomes in this regard the fact that DG COMP’s Priorities and Strategic Coordination Unit is able to draw on the expertise of all the Commission’s Directorates-General with regard to DG COMP investigations; believes that the expertise behind the Commission’s industrial and sectoral strategy could be strengthened in support of DG COMP’s investigation teams in order to identify the feasibility and consequences of remedies with regard to the Commission’s priorities; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 70. | Reiterates its call on the Commission to carry out an evaluation of the Damages Directive [(20)](#ntr20-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0020), once sufficient experience from the application of the new rules has accumulated in all Member States in order to assess the potential need to make some changes for a more effective and harmonised enforcement of damages actions across the EU; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 71. | Welcomes the introduction of the ‘eLeniency tool’ by the Commission; recalls that with the swift development of digital markets, new challenges arise for the implementation of competition policy; recommends in this regard that the Commission look into the possibilities of ex ante intervention, especially in digital markets, and of providing EU and national competition and regulatory authorities with the necessary means to gather data anonymously so as to be able to better detect market failures in due time; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 72. | Points out that abuse of market power and related unjust behaviour, such as a degradation in quality or extortive practices, can take place even when products or services are supplied for free; stresses that EU consumers’ interests go beyond low prices and, in line with the principles of the TFEU, also include quality, innovation, productivity, sustainability, environmental protection and the proliferation of fair trading relations; considers that competition policy should better integrate the value of public goods and externalities associated with certain types of production; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 73. | Recalls that the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 101 TFEU takes into account the different aims of the Treaties; points in particular to the Wouters judgment [(21)](#ntr21-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0021) in which the general interest was predominant and therefore limitations of competition were considered to be justified; calls on the Commission to formulate a ‘theory of harm’, which should transcend price-centric approaches and account for broader considerations, while stressing the importance of the proportionality principle, meaning that limitations of competition cannot go beyond what is necessary for the general interest; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to issue guidance in this regard on the interpretation of ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ under the EC Merger Regulation; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 74. | Agrees with the ECA that, overall, the Commission makes good use of its enforcement powers in merger control and antitrust proceedings, although improvements are necessary in a number of areas; notes in particular that the turnover thresholds might not be suitable to detect all cases that should be reviewed by competition authorities; calls on the Commission, therefore, to consider revising the thresholds in order to include factors such as the number of consumers impacted and the value of the related transactions as part of its ongoing evaluation of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission, furthermore, to also assess higher levels of concentration due to horizontal ownership by large asset management companies in its ongoing evaluation of the EC Merger Regulation and to consider providing guidelines on the use of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in this respect; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 75. | Notes that while the ECA rightly points out that the amount of fines does not allow conclusions to be drawn on whether they are effective deterrents, the ECA also underlines that, in itself, the ceiling of possible fines can limit the deterrent effect in ‘serious cases’; points out in this regard that, while the level of fines imposed by the Commission is among the highest in the world, nearly two thirds of the fines imposed by the Commission in cartel cases since 2006 stayed below 0,99 % of global annual turnover, thus well below the allowed ceiling of 10 % of a company’s annual worldwide turnover [(22)](#ntr22-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0022); calls on the Commission to evaluate the deterrent effects of its fines and to consider imposing fines of up to 40 % of global annual turnover in serious cartel cases; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 76. | Recalls that cartels represent some of the most serious violations of competition law and that monopolies are the most concerning form of market concentration; stresses the importance of tracking down illegal cartel behaviour, as such infringements of competition law go against the interests of EU citizens, leading to significantly higher costs for consumers and a risk of stifling innovation and quality; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 77. | Highlights that in the face of a crisis, some firms may be tempted to reorganise the structure of an industry by entering into so-called ‘crisis cartels’, i.e. agreements among most or all competitors to restrict output and/or reduce capacity in order to increase profitability and prevent market exit in times of crisis; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 78. | Suggests looking into ‘killer acquisition’ practices that could jeopardise innovation and the flourishing of European start-ups and small enterprises; welcomes in this regard the initiative of the Commission to encourage greater use of the ‘Dutch clause’ of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation and to start accepting referrals from national competition authorities of mergers that are worth reviewing at EU level; calls on the Commission to review and issue guidelines on its referral practice based on the aforementioned Article, in parallel with the obligation to inform about concentrations provided for in the Digital Markets Act; |

Sectoral developments

|  |  |  |
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|  | 79. | Reiterates that it is deeply concerned about the far-reaching concentration in the European agricultural and food supply chain to the detriment of consumers, small-scale farmers, the environment and biodiversity alike; highlights that excessive processor or buyer power downstream in the supply chain leads to an unsustainable downward pressure on farm prices; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 80. | Welcomes in this regard the Directive on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain [(23)](#ntr23-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0023) as an important first step to ensure fairness between operators, combat dual standards in agri-food practices and address imbalances of bargaining power; calls on the Commission to monitor the progress of its transposition closely and to promote the sharing of best practices between Member States; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 81. | Calls further on the Commission to continue its in-depth analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability, in order to ensure that farmers receive fair conditions and prices for their products; regrets in this regard the fact that selling at a loss is not prohibited at EU level; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 82. | Draws attention to the growing number of farmers’ protests and notes that the cumulative impact of free trade agreements on the EU’s agri-food sector is one of their participants’ concerns; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to any anti-competitive practices by non-EU countries that risk penalising the EU’s agriculture sector and farmers, given differences in social, health, labour, environmental and animal welfare standards outside the EU; calls for the application of the principles of reciprocity and compliance for agricultural products in ongoing and future trade negotiations; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 83. | Notes that taxation is predominantly a national competence, dependent on the political views and actions of governments and parliaments, and is based on fiscal policies and political aspirations regarding public finances; welcomes the Commission’s vigilance in enforcing State aid rules in the area of taxation; reiterates that selective fiscal State aid can create an uneven playing field in the internal market and that aggressive tax planning does not solely harm fair competition but also undermines the proper functioning of social systems in general; highlights the importance of reforming the current taxation system in order to ensure that taxes are paid where value is created; calls on the Commission in this regard to review its State aid guidelines with a view to assessing which fiscal State aid measures distort competition; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 84. | Notes with concern the fragmentation and divergence in telecommunications and ultra-high-speed internet connections both across Member States and between urban and rural areas all over Europe; recalls that healthy competition is needed in order to close the gap; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 85. | Emphasises the critical moment for the Union’s hospitality industry which has been, from an economic and financial perspective, the hardest hit throughout the ongoing crisis; welcomes State aid directed towards the sector in this context; |

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 86. | Calls on the Commission, in its review of the Consumer Credit Directive [(24)](#ntr24-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0024), to ensure appropriate consumer protection in the field of consumer credit, including by promoting effective conditions of competition between operators, as well as ease of access; calls in this regard for consumers to be enabled to better compare offers through increased transparency, including by distinguishing direct costs related to the repayment of credit from indirect costs such as charges for third-party services and taxes, which are non-refundable; |

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|  | 87. | Is concerned about the purchase by a state-run oil company of a leading press group which owns 20 leading regional newspapers, 120 weekly magazines and 500 online portals [(25)](#ntr25-C_2022067EN.01000201-E0025) in the Member State concerned; repeats its call on the Commission to carry out a study into the concentration of media ownership in Europe, particularly in the context of multinational corporations buying out European media providers; |

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|  | 88. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the national parliaments of the Member States and the national, and where applicable, regional competition authorities of the Member States. |

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