Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 6.4.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 152/72 |

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions European Commission Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation’

[COM(2021) 262 final]

(2022/C 152/11)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Rapporteur: | Thierry LIBAERT |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Referral | European Commission, 1.7.2021 |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 18.11.2021 |
| Adopted at plenary | 9.12.2021 |
| Plenary session No | 565 |
| Outcome of vote  (for/against/abstentions) | 198/3/6 |

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recognises both the quality of the guidance on strengthening the European Code of Practice on Disinformation and the European Commission’s determination to constantly improve its action against disinformation. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.2. | The EESC recommends that the European Commission continuously ensure that the fight against disinformation cannot be used as a pretext for limiting public freedoms, in particular freedom of expression. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.3. | The EESC recommends that action to combat disinformation be given high priority, by focusing more on tackling the emergence of disinformation rather than on moderating its content. This would encourage a more preventive and proactive approach, which requires more resources, particularly for skills. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s emphasis on countering the monetisation of disinformation. It recommends that, in addition to voluntary commitments by online advertisers, the Commission should consider a range of more binding economic, legal or financial instruments. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.5. | The EESC recommends ongoing and determined discussions with digital platforms, specifically with a view to clarifying and advancing methodologies for processing information. Facebook is particularly relevant here, not least because 78 % of the EU population — more than 300 million Europeans — are users of it. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.6. | The EESC recommends that more resources be concentrated on small platforms that are less well-known to the general public and sometimes much less transparent as regards the flow of information. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.7. | The EESC recommends continuing efforts to coordinate the fight against disinformation. The topic has been disjointed for too long; only common action can tackle the issue. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.8. | The EESC supports the importance of a European media literacy plan, while noting that the subject of media content is the responsibility of the Member States. It is an essential precondition for our democracies that everyone, particularly our youngest citizens, is able to distinguish between true and false information. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.9. | The EESC recommends that the subject of fighting disinformation be opened up broadly to all stakeholders and those who could have a role in this fight. This is particularly the case for researchers and all civil society organisations. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.10. | The EESC recommends that measures to combat disinformation should not be too focused on English-speaking content, particularly for countries bordering Russia. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.11. | These actions should also ensure accessibility for and understanding of people with disabilities, especially sensory, psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, who are particularly vulnerable to false information. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.12. | The EESC recommends a more forward-looking and proactive approach in order to consider possible new ways to convey disinformation. The technological capacity to spread deep fakes has shown the extreme speed at which new risks emerge. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1.13. | More fundamentally, the EESC believes that disinformation is a threat to our democracies and to the European Union. However, the increase in disinformation is not only a consequence of the power of social media, but it is also a sign of mistrust of official messaging. The EESC recommends increasing opportunities for exchanges and dialogues between all stakeholders in order to better understand and combat the root causes of disinformation. |

2.   General comments

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.1. | The COVID-19 crisis has starkly illustrated the threats and challenges disinformation poses to our societies. The ‘infodemic’ — the rapid spread of false, inaccurate or misleading information about the pandemic — has posed substantial risks to personal health, public health systems, effective crisis management, the economy and social cohesion. The debates on the COVID-19 vaccination have illustrated the sometimes extreme consequences of disinformation in the area of health. Despite the considerable efforts made to date, there is an urgent need to step up efforts to fight disinformation [(1)](#ntr1-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0001). |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.2. | In 2018, the European Commission reported on an action plan on disinformation to strengthen the EU’s capacity and cooperation in the fight against disinformation. It also published a document titled Tackling online disinformation: a European approach [(2)](#ntr2-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0002), presenting a collection of tools to tackle the spread of disinformation and ensure the protection of EU values. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.3. | From its inception [(3)](#ntr3-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0003), the EU approach to countering disinformation has been based on two strands. First, the protection of freedom of expression and other rights and freedoms guaranteed under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In line with those rights and freedoms, the EU strategy aims to make the online environment and its actors more transparent and accountable, making content moderation practices more transparent, empowering citizens and fostering an open democratic debate [(4)](#ntr4-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0004). |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.4. | The second strand focuses on the threats, particularly external threats, that can undermine our democracies, especially in times of elections. The East StratCom Task Force set up in March 2015 reflects this growing aim of combatting organised and planned institutional disinformation operations. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.5. | The Code of Practice on Disinformation [(5)](#ntr5-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0005) is a text on self-regulation and a centrepiece of the EU’s efforts to work with private actors to reduce digital disinformation. It has been in force since October 2018 and its signatories now include the main online platforms operating in the EU, as well as the major trade associations representing the European advertising industry, among others. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.6. | The Code of Practice published in 2018 has led to several significant advances. One of the most useful encouraged online platforms at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic to make information from reliable sources more easily visible. It also raised issuers’ awareness of false information through specific warnings. The Commission Communication on tackling COVID-19 Disinformation also established a monitoring and reporting programme on the actions of platform signatories to tackle COVID-19 disinformation. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.7. | However, the Commission’s evaluation of the Code of Practice in 2020 [(6)](#ntr6-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0006) revealed significant shortcomings, including inconsistent and incomplete implementation of the Code across platforms and Member States, limitations intrinsic to the self-regulatory nature of the Code and gaps in the coverage of the Code’s commitments. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.8. | In 2020, the Commission presented a European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP), setting out additional measures to tackle disinformation, including those relating to the obligations and responsibilities of online platforms in the fight against disinformation. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.9. | It then implemented a COVID-19 monitoring and reporting programme, and after setting up (in June 2020) the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the Commission launched a call for projects to gain insight into the actors, tools, targets and methods at work in disinformation practices. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.10. | Stepping up the fight against disinformation, the Commission’s proposed legislation on digital services [(7)](#ntr7-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0007) sets out a co-regulatory framework through codes of conduct to address the systemic risks of disinformation. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.11. | On 3 June 2021, the European Court of Auditors [(8)](#ntr8-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0008) found the European Union’s strategy to be insufficient, although it did not take into account the more robust action plan of 26 May 2021. It considered that while the European Commission’s plan was well designed, it remains incomplete, particularly with regard to the rapid alert mechanism and the obligations incumbent on online platforms. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2.12. | On 29 July 2021, the European Commission and the digital platforms that are signatories to the European Code of Practice on Disinformation launched a joint call to encourage more actors to sign up to the Code. |

3.   Commission proposals

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.1. | The European Commission is constantly improving its strategy to combat disinformation. The new guidance on strengthening measures contains several reinforcement approaches, which are worth highlighting. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.2. | The guidance on strengthening action to tackle disinformation builds on the Commission’s experience to date in monitoring and evaluating the Code and on the Commission’s report on the 2019 elections. It also contributes to the Commission’s response to the December 2020 European Council conclusions. In order to gather input for the guidance, the Commission organised multi-stakeholder discussions and a workshop for Member States. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.3. | The guidance identifies the need to improve the quality and detail of reporting by EU Member States. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.4. | The guidance states that the fight against disinformation cannot work without measurement indicators. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.5. | The guidance recognises that fact-checking is not sufficiently shared between EU States. This means that information known to be false in one country can circulate in another. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.6. | The guidance notes that the fight against disinformation must be stepped up with regard to the monetisation of disinformation through the choice of advertising placements on the digital sphere, notably Google Ads. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3.7. | The Code reiterates the issue of political advertising. The identity of the issuer of political advertising is too often opaque and the transparency of the advertisements broadcast needs to be improved. This is in line with the proposals in the Digital Services legislation [(9)](#ntr9-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0009) (Article 30). New legislation for more transparency in political advertising will be proposed by the Commission. |

4.   Specific comments

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.1. | The EESC welcomes the quality of the European Commission’s work in the fight against disinformation, and in particular the gradual strengthening of its action. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.2. | The EESC notes that the fight against disinformation must always take into account the need to protect freedom of expression. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.3. | Discussions between all stakeholders are now being structured, in particular through a broad appeal to academics. The EESC recognises that the focus on the online advertising sector was a necessity that has now been taken into consideration. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.4. | The EESC’s main criticism of the guidance on strengthening the code on disinformation practices is that it focuses too much on content and its moderation and not enough on those who propagate it. The content is constantly changing and the platforms that are used evolve, but the main actors remain basically the same and the motives do not change. The approach must be one of prevention rather than cure, and the Commission’s work must focus on the causes rather than the consequences. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.5. | Behind the image of a few ideologues, sects or fanatics, there is a real and extremely profitable business of disinformation. Unwittingly, European companies spend more than EUR 400 million on disinformation sites [(10)](#ntr10-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0010). As it is recognised that the major sources of disinformation have financial objectives, notably through a referrals system that enables them to obtain large sums of money from online advertising, but also through specific statutes allowing them to claim public subsidies, the Commission should encourage an arsenal of economic and financial tools to fight disinformation at its source. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.6. | The EESC notes that many platforms do not publish enough about their methodology for dealing with disinformation and that this penalises all European players in their fight against disinformation practices. At the same time, the EESC is pleased to see that some platforms (YouTube) seem to have taken the problem seriously. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.7. | The power of the main platforms (Facebook and Twitter) should not hide the fact that the most effective disinformation is concentrated on tools that are less well known to the general public, such as VKontakte, Rumble, Odysee, Gab and Parler. These smaller platforms have smaller audiences but can more easily target specific groups by region, age or any other parameter. These platforms also lack the financial means to fight against the disinformation they propagate or do not consider important, hiding behind the banner of freedom of speech. Disinformation often originates on more confidential platforms before quickly reaching a wider audience [(11)](#ntr11-C_2022152EN.01007201-E0011). |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.8. | The EESC considers that European action is too compartmentalised and lacks coordination. The structures appear to be too separate, particularly where the two main bodies, the EDMO and European StratCom, are concerned. The creation of a permanent working group involving the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) should facilitate information-sharing. The EESC fears, however, that its resources for action are too limited, given the scale of the phenomena. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.9. | Better cooperation between the Member States is needed urgently. At the same time, the EU must take into account that media freedom, which is inseparable from freedom of expression, is currently at risk in several Member States. The same applies with regard to their legal systems. This will inevitably have a negative impact on the ability of these countries to cooperate successfully, for example in the field of fact-checking and in accordance with the values of the EU and more precisely the principles of the rule of law. Any effort to tackle disinformation can have very significant consequences for fundamental rights, which must be guaranteed and defended in all Member States. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.10. | The European Union must acquire more capabilities to be able to fight effectively against disinformation, which is systematically spread by hostile powers, often driven by governments of certain third countries, among which, most notably Russia, as well as China. To respond to this threat, it will not be enough to work on codes of conduct. National authorities need more support from intelligence services and it would make sense for governments to share their knowledge, while taking into account the problems in some Member States mentioned above. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.11. | These actions should also ensure accessibility for and understanding of people with disabilities, especially sensory, psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, who are particularly vulnerable to false information. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.12. | Civil society appears to be insufficiently involved. The main partners in dialogue cited by the Commission as being able to act are the platforms, the media, researchers and fact-checkers. Businesses in particular must be given a major role in the fight against disinformation, because they can lose a lot of money or their reputation as a result of disinformation practices, but also trade unions and associations. Civil society organisations have considerable legitimacy that can be harnessed to combat disinformation. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.13. | The EESC notes that the fight against disinformation mainly tackles English-language content. This is not least due to the fact that most platforms are of English-speaking origin. While some States appear to be heavily concerned (such as the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic States), it would like to see more action on content in languages other than English. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.14. | Overall, the EESC recommends more preventive and proactive action. Because new networks are emerging all the time (including Clubhouse), because disinformation uses increasingly sophisticated means (such as ‘deep fake’), and because some applications straddle the line between a platform and a private messaging service (such as Telegram), action must be taken as soon as a new type of risk is detected. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.15. | As the European Court of Auditors noted with some disappointment in its report of 3 June 2021, the EU still lacks a media literacy strategy enabling civil society to better decipher information, whether disseminated by traditional media or online. This plan, which falls under Member State competence, must be implemented from an early age, so that younger people are quickly able to distinguish the true information from the fake information that they receive. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4.16. | The EESC notes that, too often, many media outlets, in particular audiovisual media outlets, accept personalities on their platforms who claim to have scientific expertise in order to increase their credibility. In particular, it recommends more thorough verification of the academic credentials of those invited to speak as experts in the media. |

Brussels, 9 December 2021.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

---

[Top](#document1)