Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 21.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 285/1 |

---

Wednesday 25 November 2009  
Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change

P7\_TA(2009)0089

European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2009 on the EU strategy for the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change (COP 15)

2010/C 285 E/01

The European Parliament,

having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,

having regard to the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/COP 13),

having regard to the forthcoming fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC and the fifth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 5) to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark, from 7 to 18 December 2009,

having regard to the climate and energy package adopted by Parliament on 17 December 2008, in particular Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community[(1)](#ntr1-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0001) and Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community's greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020[(2)](#ntr2-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0002),

having regard to Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community[(3)](#ntr3-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0003),

having regard to the Commission Communication of 10 September 2009 entitled ‘Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen deal’ (COM(2009)0475),

having regard to its previous resolutions relating to climate change, and in particular those of 4 February 2009 on ‘2050: The future begins today – recommendations for the EU's future integrated policy on climate change’[(4)](#ntr4-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0004) and of 11 March 2009 on ‘an EU strategy for a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen and the adequate provision of financing for climate change policy’[(5)](#ntr5-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0005),

having regard to the joint statement of 20 December 2005 by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’[(6)](#ntr6-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0006), and in particular points 22, 38, 75, 76 and 105 thereof,

having regard to the Conclusions of the European Council of 29-30 October 2009,

having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2008 entitled ‘Building a Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change’[(7)](#ntr7-CE2010285EN.01000101-E0007),

having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| A. | whereas negotiations on a comprehensive international post-2012 agreement on climate change are due to be concluded in Copenhagen in December 2009; whereas that agreement should be legally binding and consistent with the latest scientific evidence, which indicates that climate change is happening faster and more aggressively than previously estimated, and with the objective of limiting the overall global annual mean surface temperature increase to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (‘the 2 °C objective’), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| B. | whereas in order to meet the 2 °C objective it is necessary for developed countries to take the lead in significantly reducing their emissions, and for developing countries also to contribute to the attainment of that objective, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| C. | whereas developing countries have contributed least to climate change but are facing its severest consequences, and whereas climate change is placing 40 % of international poverty reduction investment at risk, thus threatening the efficacy and sustainability of development work; whereas there is a clear need for greater coordination, complementarity and coherence between climate change and development initiatives, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| D. | whereas climate change may exacerbate the potential for conflicts over natural resources owing to shrinking arable land, growing water scarcity or deforestation, or due to climate-induced migration; whereas the potential impact on public health should also be taken into account, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| E. | whereas deforestation accounts for some 20 % of global greenhouse gas emissions, is a major driver of biodiversity loss and constitutes a serious threat to development and, in particular, to the livelihoods of the poor, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| F. | whereas significantly increased financial resources are needed to enable the necessary mitigation and adaptation actions to be taken in developing countries, and therefore resources should be made available to tackle climate change with a commitment similar to the commitment that was needed to tackle the current financial crisis, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| G. | whereas most of the money promised for climate change comes from Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, thus diverting funds from development assistance and posing a serious threat to poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| H. | whereas a binding international framework leading to emission reductions on the necessary scale will also produce large, immediate co-benefits for global health, and whereas without such a framework progress towards meeting the MDGs is at risk and could be reversed, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I. | whereas the EU is the only regional entity in the world to have accepted binding objectives for the achievement of greenhouse gas emissions reductions by adopting the above-mentioned climate and energy package consisting of legislative measures to implement a unilateral 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2020, with the commitment to move to a 30 % reduction or more, in line with the latest developments in science, if a sufficiently ambitious and binding international agreement is reached in Copenhagen, which requires a similar effort from other developed countries and appropriate contributions from economically more advanced developing countries which are commensurate with their responsibility and abilities, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| J. | whereas a global transformation in technology and technological cooperation is necessary to accelerate the pace of innovation and increase the scale of demonstration and deployment so that all countries have access to affordable sustainable technologies, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| K. | whereas energy efficiency plays a crucial role in limiting CO2 emissions, in particular the recent initiatives on the energy performance of buildings and energy labelling rules, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| L. | whereas ambitious climate measures would contribute to solving the current economic crisis through job creation and increased economic activity, and whereas the International Energy Agency considers an ambitious agreement in Copenhagen to be necessary to channel investments delayed by the crisis to environmentally sustainable investments, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| M. | whereas a number of third countries have taken measures to combat climate change, such as emission reduction targets, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| N. | whereas a comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen is necessary in order to tackle carbon leakage and create a level playing field in the context of the move to a 30 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| O. | whereas an effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions requires a holistic approach which covers all emitting sectors of production and mobility and should be considered in the framework of the successful transition towards a sustainable economic model, which provides for environmental quality to go hand in hand with economic growth, wealth creation and technological advancement; |

Aim

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1. | Urges the EU to continue to develop an external climate policy and to speak with one voice to maintain its leading role in the negotiations at COP 15, and to maintain a high level of ambition in discussions with its international partners, in order to achieve an ambitious and legally binding international agreement in Copenhagen, in line with the latest developments in science and consistent with the 2 °C objective; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 2. | Emphasises that by the end of this year in Copenhagen, the Parties need to reach a legally binding agreement on industrialised-country mitigation targets and financing and to establish a formal process to achieve a legally binding comprehensive climate agreement in the first few months of 2010, coming into force on 1 January 2013; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 3. | Calls on the Heads of State or Government of all COP 15 members to give this matter the highest priority and to demonstrate political leadership and stresses the importance of those Heads of State or Government making themselves available to attend the high-level segment of COP 15 to avoid any possibility of an agreement involving significant and long-term national commitments failing to be secured because the negotiators present do not have the political mandate or authority required; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 4. | Stresses that, in order to secure continuing commitments after the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period expires, it is vital for the negotiations on a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen to be concluded, and points out that further delays in global action might lead to a situation whereby future generations will no longer be able to control climate change; |

Reduction commitments

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 5. | Stresses that the international agreement should be based on the principle of a ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, with the industrialised countries taking the lead in reducing their domestic emissions; takes the view, however, given their economic weight, that China, India and Brazil should commit themselves to targets similar to those of the industrialised countries, whereas other emerging countries should, in accordance with the Bali Action Plan, take nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner, by technology, financing and capacity-building from developed countries, having due regard, in technology transfers, to the protection of industrial property rights and to the special needs of the least developed countries; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 6. | Believes the Copenhagen agreement should bind the parties to mandatory reductions and provide for sanctions at international level for non-compliance, their form remaining to be defined; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 7. | Recalls that the international agreement should ensure collective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the developed countries at the high end of the 25-40 % range for 2020 compared to 1990 levels, as recommended by the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 4AR), and that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic; recalls that a long-term reduction target should be set for the EU and the other developed countries of at least 80 % by 2050 compared to 1990 levels; recalls that global greenhouse gas emissions should start falling by 2015 at the latest; emphasises the need for the reduction targets agreed in the international agreement to be in line with the 2 °C objective and with the latest developments in science; calls, therefore, for regular reviews in the agreement every five years to make sure that the reduction targets are ambitious enough to meet the 2 °C objective and that those targets continue to be in line with the latest developments in science; calls for the establishment of a global carbon accounting mechanism; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 8. | Invites the EU to clarify under which conditions it would increase its reduction commitment, taking into account the fact that the latest scientific recommendations call for a commitment to a 40 % reduction in emissions; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 9. | Calls for the inclusion of reporting requirements in the Copenhagen agreement under which Annex 1 Parties will have to establish action plans for achieving emission reductions in the period up to 2050 consistent with the 2 °C limit; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 10. | Recognises Japan's commitment to reduce its emissions by 25 % by 2020 and welcomes the positive signals from China; urges, in the light of these developments, the USA to make binding the goals set during the election campaign, thereby giving a strong signal of the resolve of the leading developed countries to take up the fight against climate change; stresses in this regard that it is also extremely important for India to make a contribution; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 11. | Welcomes the above-mentioned Commission Communication of 10 September 2009 as an important step in the discussion, and especially underlines the role of Parliament as a budgetary authority; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 12. | Recalls that the international agreement should also ensure that developing countries as a group limit the growth of their emissions to 15 to 30 % below ‘business as usual’ in order to ensure that the 2 °C objective is achieved; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 13. | Stresses that the Non-Annex-I countries cannot be treated as a block, because their capacities to invest in mitigation and adaptation of climate change, as well as their capacities to adjust to climate change, are not the same; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 14. | Calls on the EU to invite the members of the COP 15 to develop a common vision for the year 2050 and beyond; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 15. | Furthermore recalls its recommendation that certain principles adopted in the climate and energy package be used as a blueprint for the international agreement, in particular the binding linear pathway for developed country commitments, differentiation on the basis of verified emissions and gross domestic product (GDP), and a strengthened compliance regime with an annual abatement factor; |

Financing

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 16. | Emphasises that an agreement in Copenhagen could provide the necessary stimulus for a ‘Sustainable New Deal’ boosting sustainable social and economic growth, promoting environmentally sustainable technologies, renewable energy and energy efficiency, reducing energy consumption and securing new jobs and social cohesion in both developed and developing countries; notes also that due consideration needs to be given to the public health aspects of climate change; recalls the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, which demonstrates clear economic incentives for the international community to act as soon as possible to tackle climate change; recognises that upfront investments by the public sector in a sustainable energy infrastructure, and in complementary research and development, will reduce the social costs of climate change; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 17. | Emphasises that the active participation of all countries in tackling the climate challenge will only come about if developing countries and emerging economies can maintain sustainable economic growth; calls, therefore, for more truly integrated policy responses to development and climate challenges; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 18. | Notes that climate change is a challenge to which there is no single political solution, but that the combination of existing opportunities and a dramatic increase in efficiency in all areas of the economy and society in developed and developing countries would contribute to resolving the problem of resources and distribution and pave the way for a third industrial revolution; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 19. | Stresses that people in developing countries will be even worse affected by the consequences of climate change and that it is therefore also in the interests of those countries to contribute to the successful conclusion of a climate change convention; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 20. | Emphasises the responsibility of developed countries to provide sufficient, sustainable and predictable financial and technical support to the developing countries to allow them to commit themselves to the reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the consequences of climate change and to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, as well as to enhance capacity-building in order to comply with obligations under the future international agreement on climate change; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 21. | Insists that such commitments to provide for the required predictable financial support for climate change mitigation and adaptation in the context of the UNFCCC must be new and additional to ODA and independent from annual budgetary procedures in the Member States; recalls that the resources should be distributed not as concessional loans, but as grants; recalls the already-existing commitments, aimed at achieving ODA levels of 0,7 % of GDP by 2015; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 22. | Stresses the need for ‘fast-start’ international public support in order to reach an ambitious Copenhagen agreement, and calls upon the EU to commit at least to the Commission's estimate of overall financing of EUR 5-7 billion annually for the period 2010-2012; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 23. | Recalls that the collective contribution by the EU towards developing countries' mitigation efforts and adaptation needs should not be less than EUR 30 000 million per annum by 2020, a figure that may increase as new knowledge is acquired concerning the severity of climate change and the scale of its costs; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 24. | Invites the international community to increase significantly its financial support for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change for developing countries by exploring other innovative financial mechanisms (for example debt-for-nature swaps); |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 25. | Underlines that a substantial part of the revenues generated by the auctioning of certificates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), including auctioning for aviation and maritime transport, should be earmarked for enabling developing countries to fight and adapt to climate change; stresses, however, that more than 50 % of EU emissions are not covered by the EU ETS that started in 2005; recalls, therefore, that it is necessary to develop alternative strategies so that every part of the economy, not only industry, and especially all the Member States, bear the burden of reducing emissions and assume their responsibilities; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 26. | Emphasises that the upcoming EU budget review needs to focus on providing sufficient resources for measures for protection against, and adaptation to, climate change; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 27. | Recommends that the developed countries envisage earmarking a percentage of their GDP for the creation of a cooperation fund for the realisation of clean energy technologies, independently of existing development aid funds; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 28. | Supports Norway's proposal for Assigned Amount Units and the proposals from Denmark and Mexico; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 29. | Calls for the governing structures established in relation to climate financing under the Copenhagen agreement to ensure equal representation of developed and developing countries; stresses, furthermore, that, in order to guarantee that financial transfers are being used in a sustainable manner, experience from development policy and established principles such as ‘good governance’ should be applied; points out that donor countries need to invest in increasing the ‘absorptive capacity’ in developing countries, so that the latter are able to use the resources effectively; |

Cooperation with developing countries

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 30. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to strengthen their existing climate partnerships with developing countries, and to enter into new partnerships where they do not currently exist, providing significantly increased financial support for technology development and transfer, agreement on intellectual property rights and institutional capacity-building, including for National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) as important instruments for adaptation to climate change, promoting ownership; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 31. | Insists that the post-2012 international climate change agreement should take into account the existing development processes both at international and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to build the necessary links between climate change and the MDGs by incorporating adaptation to and mitigation of climate change into projects and programmes aimed at achieving the MDGs and into all poverty reduction strategies; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 32. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase substantially the budget for the GCCA and suggests that one source of funding could be obtained from the expected revenues from auctioning within the EU ETS; urges the Commission to ensure that the GCCA becomes a clearing house for adaptation funding in developing countries, thus avoiding the creation of new bilateral EU initiatives; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 33. | Considers that climate change causes displacement of people and therefore creates new forced migration which has to be adequately addressed by the international community; calls on the international community to identify and address the legal shortfalls that exist in respect of the protection of climate refugees, and to initiate a specific assistance and protection system; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 34. | Underlines the necessity for institutional accountability and trust to be ensured by establishing a fair representation of donor and recipient countries in the management body of adaptation funding institutions; |

Energy and energy efficiency

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 35. | Considers that the global transformation to an efficient sustainable economy is not only necessary to pre-empt dangerous climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but that it also has the potential to increase investment, employment, economic growth, competitiveness and to improve quality of life without compromising the objective of ensuring access to modern energy services for all; stresses, therefore, the urgent need to improve energy efficiency on a global scale and to increase the share of renewable energy resources; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 36. | Stresses that an international shift towards a low-carbon economy will consider nuclear energy as an important part of the energy mix in the medium term; points out, however, that the issue of safety and security of the nuclear fuel cycle must be addressed in an appropriate manner at international level in order to ensure the highest possible level of safety; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 37. | Urges all governments, including those of the EU's Member States, and the EU,to stimulate energy efficiency; urges EU Member States to step up their ambition on the energy efficiency package, notably on the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive recast which is currently being discussed (COM(2008)0780), to enable a dynamic and cohesive agreement with the Council to be reached, thereby sending a strong message as to the EU's commitment in view of the Copenhagen agreement and facilitating the move to a 30 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 38. | Stresses that the large-scale use of fossil fuels in power generation is a major source of CO2 emissions worldwide; acknowledges that in the medium term fossil fuels will continue to play an important role in energy supply; calls on the negotiating parties to attach high importance to the further development and use of sustainable, fuel-efficient and emission-reducing fossil fuel technologies for the production of electricity; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 39. | Considers that both emissions reduction targets and financing commitments need to be subject to a strengthened compliance regime, including an early warning mechanism and penalties, such as withdrawal of future Assigned Amount Units; |

Adaptation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 40. | Stresses the historical responsibility of developed countries for irreversible climate change and recalls the obligation to assist developing countries and least developed countries in adapting to these changes; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 41. | Calls, therefore, on the EU and its Member States to assist developing countries in capacity building in order to adapt to climate change and to provide sufficient technological support for those countries most affected by a changing environment; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 42. | Recognises the importance of proactive adaptation to unavoidable climate change, in particular in the most vulnerable regions and groups within societies, and stresses the importance of awareness-raising as a means of addressing adaptation to climate change in the most effective way; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 43. | Stresses that the EU and its Member States must also enhance action to support the urgent implementation of adaptation actions within the EU in order to save resources for future international action; |

Technological cooperation and research

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 44. | Believes that a new approach to technology cooperation is needed to achieve the necessary acceleration in the pace of innovation and the scale of deployment to allow all countries access to affordable climate-friendly technologies, while respecting intellectual property rights concerns; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 45. | Considers that the Copenhagen agreement should provide for Technology Action Programmes for key adaptation and mitigation technologies to provide support throughout the entire technology chain with objectives such as to considerably increase financing for mitigation and adaptation-related research, development and demonstration (RD&D); in this context supports the Commission assessment that, globally, energy-related RD&D should at least double by 2012 and be increased to four times its current level by 2020; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 46. | Urges developed countries to invest more in research on novel and advanced technologies for sustainable and energy-efficient production processes; considers it essential to improve funding for international cooperation on climate change within the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7); |

A global carbon market

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 47. | Emphasises that, although market solutions, including the development of a global carbon market, through ‘cap and trade’ mechanisms or taxation schemes in developed countries, are not the solution for developing countries in the near future, this must remain the long-term goal for all negotiations; calls on the EU and its partners in the world to find, in the immediate future, the most effective way of promoting links between the EU ETS and regional or federal trading schemes in the USA and elsewhere, which in turn would promise greater diversity of abatement options, improved market size and liquidity, and ultimately a more efficient allocation of resources; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 48. | Points out that a functioning global carbon market is essential for the EU economy in order to cope with the ambitious EU commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020; stresses the need for a comprehensive international post-2012 agreement stipulating comparable efforts to be made by other developed countries in order to overcome the risk of carbon leakage in particular, with a view to long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets; emphasises in this regard the key role of close cooperation between the emerging economies and the developed economies; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 49. | Welcomes the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a possible way to enable developing countries to participate in the carbon market and to provide them with modern and efficient technologies; underlines, however, that the use of offsets to meet emission reduction targets by developed countries cannot be counted as part of the responsibility of developing countries to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions in an international agreement on climate change, and is not a substitute for financial and technological support to developing countries for their mitigation action; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 50. | Insists, furthermore, that stringent project quality standards must be part of future offsetting mechanisms, in order to prevent developed countries taking away the low-cost reduction options from developing countries, and to guarantee the high standard of such projects, with reliable, verifiable and real additional emission reductions that also support sustainable development in such countries; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 51. | Takes the view that CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) should be reformed, taking into account those project quality standards; endorses, moreover, the Commission's view that sectoral mechanisms for economically more advanced developing countries should be agreed for the period beyond 2012, thereby making them an effective tool for climate protection and sustainable development in developing countries; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 52. | Insists that the EU and its Member States need to fulfil mitigation commitments primarily within the EU and reminds all parties that the use of flexible mechanisms should be kept to a minimum; |

Land use change, deforestation, forest and natural resources degradation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 53. | Considers that significant financial support, as well as technical and administrative assistance, must be provided to developing countries to halt gross tropical deforestation by 2020 at the latest, and that demonstration of commitment to this will be decisive in the international negotiations for a comprehensive global post-2012 climate agreement; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 54. | Emphasises that conserving natural carbon sinks constitutes the most efficient and effective means of climate change mitigation and entails no known negative side-effects; takes the view, moreover, that the development of a comprehensive forestation policy is invaluable in tackling climate change; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 55. | Calls upon the EU to commit to financing international efforts to halt deforestation and promote global non-commercial afforestation; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 56. | Emphasises that the protection of forests is essential for successful global climate protection and urges the EU and the Member States to recognise the need to preserve forests and to integrate this aspect into an international agreement; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 57. | Supports the Commission's view that public funding is the most realistic tool with which to provide incentives for combating deforestation over the period 2013 to 2020; calls, furthermore, on the EU and its Member States to provide funding for the period 2010-2012 for early action in developing countries and supports the Commission's proposal to create a Global Forest Carbon Mechanism (GFCM) under the UNFCCC framework, based on a permanent-financing scheme; calls on Member States to support their commitment to halting global deforestation and forest and land degradation, as well as desertification, by earmarking a significant part of the auctioning revenues from the EU ETS to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; calls on Member States to support the Commission's proposal to embrace the funding proposal made by Norway and to allocate part of future revenues from auctioning of Assigned Amount Units to the GFCM; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 58. | Stresses that the future GFCM must be linked to the decisions and contribute to the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and that impacts on biodiversity must be explicitly considered by activities, rules and modalities under the UN programme ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation’ (REDD); considers that the GFCM must first and foremost ensure that old-growth forests are protected; emphasises that industrial forestry activities which have low climate mitigation potential and may pose a threat to biodiversity must not be eligible for funding through the GFCM; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 59. | Emphasises that any future GFCM must respect the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, including their right to collective property and to autonomous indigenous territories, and provide for their full and effective participation and decision-making power at all levels, including in the development and implementation of national REDD plans, and allocation or distribution of financing; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 60. | Calls on the EU to promote strong social and environmental standards for REDD; calls on the EU to advocate REDD mechanisms that go beyond the current project approach of CDM and that address underlying causes of deforestation, such as poor governance, poverty, corruption and lack of law enforcement, by supporting policy and institutional reform at local, regional and national levels; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 61. | Calls for the environmental effectiveness of Annex I emissions reduction targets to be the guiding principle as regards the EU approach to international accounting rules for forest management andLULUCF in general; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 62. | Highlights that practices followed in several sectors, including water management, ecosystem preservation, agricultural production, soil conditions, land use change, health, food security and disaster risk, have led to the causation and aggravation of climate change, but at the same time that those sectors have also suffered severe consequences due to the negative effects of climate change; considers that both of those dimensions should be included in the Copenhagen agreement along with targeted measures in order to secure a high degree of those sectors' mitigation and adaptation to climate change; |

International aviation and maritime transport

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 63. | Recalls that aviation has a range of non-CO2 impacts which roughly double its global warming potential; calls on the EU to ensure those impacts are accounted for in the Copenhagen agreement; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 64. | Insists that – in the light of the failure of the negotiations involving the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) – international aviation and shipping be incorporated into an agreement under the UNFCCC; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 65. | Urges that international agreements in the aviation and maritime sectors set the same binding targets as for other industry sectors; urges further that in a global framework at least 50 % of the allowances in this area be auctioned; |

Civil society involvement

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 66. | Stresses the great importance of local citizens receiving comprehensive information and consultation and taking part in decision-making processes, and particularly encourages urban centres, regions and conurbations to launch their own information campaigns, with government support, which might be linked to specific reduction targets; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 67. | Recognises, given the fact that by 2030 two thirds of humanity will live in urban centres, that cities, local and regional authorities have a crucial role in implementing practical climate actions; welcomes the commitment demonstrated by the World Mayors and Local Governments Climate Protection Agreement, and calls for the EU to promote the engagement of cities, local and regional authorities in the development and implementation of national climate change strategies, including Mitigation Action Plans and Adaptation Programmes of Action; |

European Parliament Delegation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 68. | Believes that the EU delegation plays an important role in these negotiations on climate change, and therefore finds it unacceptable that the Members of the European Parliament that are part of that delegation were unable to attend the EU coordination meetings at the previous Conference of the Parties; expects the European Parliament participants to have access to such meetings in Copenhagen on the basis of observer status at least, with or without speaking rights; |

\*

\* \*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 69. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU contracting parties. |

---

[Top](#document1)