Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| CALL FOR EVIDENCE  FOR AN EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT RUN IN PARALLEL | |
| This document aims to inform the public and stakeholders about the Commission's work, so they can provide feedback and participate effectively in consultation activities. | |
| Title of the INITIATIVE | Fighting organised crime - new EU rules |
| Lead DG – responsible unit | DG HOME – D.5 |
| LIKELY TYPE OF INITIATIVE | Legislative initiative |
| Indicative timetable  (planned start date and completion date) | Planned start date: Q2 2025  Planned completion: Q4 2026 |
| Additional information | Internal security - European Commission (europa.eu) |
| This document is for information purposes only. It does not prejudge the final decision of the Commission on whether this initiative will be pursued or on its final content. All elements of the initiative described by the document, including its timing, are subject to change. | |
| A. Political context, evaluation, problem definition and subsidiarity check | |
| Political context | |
| Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA [1](#footnote3)  on the fight against organised crime (‘the Framework Decision’), entered into force on 11 November 2008, aiming to improve the joint capability of the EU and its Member States to combat cross-border serious organised crime by establishing a set of minimum rules. A study on the effectiveness of the Framework Decision was published in December 2022 [2](#footnote4) . This study highlights significant differences between Member States and concluded that the Framework Decision’s contribution to the fight against serious and organised crime has been sub-optimal and has not substantially improved cross-border cooperation. In October 2024, Europol published its first-ever report on the most threatening criminal networks in the EU [3](#footnote5) . The report identified a total of 821 criminal networks comprising over 25 000 individuals, posing a serious threat to the internal security of the European Union. Notably, 34% of these networks have been active for more than a decade.  The 2025 ProtectEU strategy [4](#footnote6)  on internal security highlighted the need to intensify the fight against high-risk criminal networks, ringleaders and enablers, and confirmed the intention, expressed by President Ursula von der Leyen in the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 [5](#footnote7)  and the mission letter to Commissioner Brunner, to revise the current rules on organised crime.   As indicated in the EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime [6](#footnote8)  such an assessment should look at the legal definition of a criminal organisation, and the offences and penalties concerning participation. The assessment should also explore additional investigative techniques, crown witnesses, organised crime strategies and specialised units.  This work contributes to the implementation of the ProtectEU strategy, one of the objectives of which is to tighten the net on serious and organised crime, and to the implementation of the initiatives and action plans that will derive from the strategy to fight crimes committed by criminal groups, from drugs to trafficking in human beings or firearms. It will also help strengthen the EU’s security capabilities, which the Commission aims to achieve by developing new tools for law enforcement, such as a revamped Europol, and better means of coordinating and ensuring the secure exchange of data and lawful access to data. | |
| Evaluation | |
| The objectives of the Framework Decision are to: (1) strengthen the capabilities to combat and prosecute organised crime in the EU through harmonised criminalisation; (2) ensure that Member States impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for those offences; and (3) facilitate police and judicial cooperation. The evaluation will run in parallel to an impact assessment looking at all aspects of the Framework Decision to determine whether it is still fit for purpose, 17 years after its adoption.  Building on studies published in 2015 [7](#footnote9)  and 2022 [8](#footnote10) , and a Commission report from 2016 [9](#footnote11) , the evaluation will assess the period from 2010 to 2025 with a focus on 2015 to 2025 (until the start of the evaluation procedure), and will cover all EU Member States.  In line with the European Commission’s Better Regulation guidelines, the evaluation will assess the extent to which the actions taken under the Framework Decision have achieved their objectives. It will also examine whether the resulting benefits - such as enhanced judicial cooperation, more effective investigations, and improvements in the prosecution of organised crime - justify the associated costs, including the administrative and operational burdens on Member States and EU agencies.  The evaluation will consider the continued relevance of the Framework Decision in addressing current and emerging challenges in organised crime, and its consistency with other EU legal instruments, such as instruments harmonising specific crimes or instruments promoting judicial cooperation and the mutual recognition of judicial decisions between Member States.  It will also assess the consistency of the Framework Decision with the relevant provisions of the Schengen body of rules and with international obligations, such as those arising from the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). The evaluation will also examine the added value of EU-level action, particularly in fostering cross-border cooperation and addressing gaps that cannot be tackled effectively by Member States acting alone. | |
| Problem the initiative aims to tackle | |
| The main problem the initiative aims to address is that competent authorities are not well equipped to tackle organised crime effectively, which in recent years has grown in power, violence and sophistication, becoming a major security threat for many Member States. This overarching problem can be broken down into five specific problems:    Problem 1: the discrepancies in how different Member States define criminal organisations, and the penalties for participating in such groups, undermine effective prosecution and cross-border cooperation.    Problem 2: the unequal capacity among Member States to develop a comprehensive intelligence picture of the most threatening criminal networks and actors hampers the ability of law enforcement to prioritise cross-border investigations effectively.    Problem 3: the differences between Member States as regards legal frameworks and the availability in practice of investigative tools for use by competent authorities hamper cooperation and the gathering of evidence in cross-border situations, and the diverging national rules on cooperating with (former) members of criminal groups hampers their protection across borders.    Problem 4: since the administrative approach [10](#footnote12)  is systematically applied in only a handful of Member States, administrative authorities are often unable to use their powers to counter criminal infiltration. Moreover, crime prevention is not well integrated into the security policies of most Member States.     Problem 5: the absence of adequate institutional frameworks or resources, the lack of clarity on the competences of the numerous authorities involved, or a lack of specialised skills and knowledge among the staff involved often impede effective action against organised criminal groups.    Considering the capacity of organised crime groups to adapt and their cross-border nature, the threat from organised crime is likely to increase in the absence of new action by the EU. Given that the cross-border nature of organised crime extends beyond Europe’s external borders, we will also be looking into challenges that impact the international dimension of the EU’s fight against organised crime. | |
| Basis for EU action | |
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| Legal Basis | |
| The legal basis for the revision of this Framework Decision is Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which gives the EU the power to enact Directives with common minimum rules for offences and sanctions in the area of particularly serious cross-border crimes. Other legal bases will be explored to the extent necessary, including Article 87 TFEU. | |
| Practical need for EU Action | |
| Action at EU level is necessary given the cross-border nature of criminal groups, which operate in multiple illicit markets throughout the EU and beyond. Moreover, such European action provides clear added value by ensuring the necessary multinational approach, a coherent strategy, and effective action by the competent authorities of all Member States, and by facilitating their cross-border cooperation. The current threat of transnational organised crime is one that simply cannot be tackled without such cooperation. | |
| B. Objectives and policy options | |
| The aim of this initiative is to reinforce the capacity of the competent authorities to tackle organised crime. To do so, the initiative will consider strengthening the penal response to organised crime, and investigate how to tackle the main operational obstacles to fighting organised crime. The impact assessment will consider the following options:  Baseline scenario (‘status quo’): Under this option, the current rules and the action taken by the EU will not change. Member States will continue with their current level of effort to prevent, prosecute and dismantle organised crime groups.  Option 1: Non-legislative measures and better enforcement: this option could encompass a range of practical measures, such as the exchange of best practices, and other soft measures intended to: (i) improve law enforcement and judicial efforts against organised crime and improve the strategic and institutional framework against organised crime; (ii) enhance the intelligence picture; and (iii) improve crime prevention policies and administrative action against criminal infiltration through the ‘administrative approach’.  Option 2: Legislative measures to improve the definition of offences and penalties for participating in a criminal organisation and to facilitate the use of special investigative techniques and the collaboration of crown witnesses, (i.e. (former) members of criminal organisations collaborating with authorities). Such legislative measures would be combined with non-legislative action to reinforce the institutional framework against organised crime, and improve the intelligence picture, crime prevention and the administrative approach.  Option 3: This option would regulate not only the offences, penalties and investigative techniques available for tackling organised crime groups, but also establish new legislative measures to: (i) promote a more strategic and institutional setting to tackle organised crime; (ii) enhance the capacity to develop the intelligence picture on criminal networks; (iii) reinforce crime prevention; and (iv) enhance the capacity of administrative authorities to prevent criminal organisations from infiltrating society and the economy.  The Commission will take into account the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, the regulatory burden imposed by the measures, the growing online dimension of organised crime, and the international aspects of the EU’s response, when it assesses the available options. | |
| C. Preliminary assessment of the expected impacts | |
| Likely impact on security: This initiative is expected to have a positive impact on the capacity of authorities in the EU to effectively prevent and counter organised crime.  Likely economic impact: Organised crime distorts competition, with companies infiltrated by organised crime getting contracts due to corruption and obtaining resources from public budgets through crimes such as VAT fraud. The measures will therefore have a significant positive impact on the European economy by tackling the distorting effect of organised crime and by increasing the attractiveness of the EU as a place for investment.  Likely social impact: With criminal organisations involved in activities such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and cybercrimes, this initiative is expected to have a strong positive social impact not only in terms of security, but also in terms of health, workers’ safety and online safety, etc.  Likely environmental impact: Organised crime groups are responsible for dumping large amounts of toxic waste into nature, and contaminating soil or water through activities such as synthetic drug production or illicit waste disposal. By improving the EU’s capacity to tackle organised crime, this initiative would benefit the EU’s environment.  Likely impact on fundamental rights and equality: Depending on the measures taken, this initiative may have an impact on fundamental rights (right to privacy and protection of personal data, right to property, etc.), which should be proportionate to the objective of increasing security for the EU and for everyone who lives there. Safeguards will be taken into account and all measures taken will respect the principle of proportionality. | |
| D. Better regulation instruments | |
| Impact assessment and evaluation | |
| An impact assessment and an evaluation will be prepared, in parallel, to support the preparation of this initiative. The sources of information to be used in preparing the evaluation and the impact assessment will be existing studies (2015 and 2022), public consultations, targeted consultations of particular stakeholders, the collection and analysis of information from European and international sources, and desk analysis. | |
| Consultation strategy | |
| To prepare this initiative, the Commission will carry out targeted consultations to collect views, including by collecting qualitative and quantitative data, from a wide range of relevant public and private stakeholders. This consultation strategy will include desk research, questionnaires, focus groups, interviews and workshops.  In addition, a public consultation will be published on the Commission’s ‘Have your say’ portal in the third quarter of 2025 in all 24 official EU languages. The public consultation will be open for 12 weeks and responses can be sent in any of the 24 official languages.   The evaluation and impact assessment will draw evidence from these consultations to collect all necessary views and experiences. A synopsis report of all the consultation activities will be annexed to the impact assessment. | |
| Why are we consulting? | |
| The consultation will aim to gather views on: (i) the implementation of the Framework Decision, in particular its effectiveness, efficiency, EU added value, relevance, coherence and impact on fundamental rights and freedoms; (ii) the scale of the threat from organised crime; (iii) ways of controlling that threat and non-legislative and legislative options; and (iv) the relevant EU tools and organisations and how they operate to counter that threat. | |
| Target audience | |
| The main stakeholders identified are:  -EU Agencies and bodies, notably the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the European Labour Authority (ELA), and any other EU services or agencies that are deemed relevant.  -The participants in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) operational action plans on: high-risk criminal networks, on criminal finances, on synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances, on cocaine, cannabis and heroin, and on trafficking of human beings.  -EU institutions, in particular the Council and its relevant working groups, and the European Parliament.  -Member States’ national authorities, law enforcement and judicial authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in the area of organised crime, including networks such as the @ON Network against Mafia- Style Criminal Organisations.   -International organisations, e.g. the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the Council of Europe.  -Civil society, academia and the private sector, including members of the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership. | |

:   [(1)](#footnoteref3)
     
    <EUR-Lex - 32008F0841 - EN - EUR-Lex>
:   [(2)](#footnoteref4)
     
    <Study strengthening the fight against organised crime - Publications Office of the EU>
:   [(3)](#footnoteref5)
     
    <Decoding the EU’s most threatening criminal networks | Europol>
:   [(4)](#footnoteref6)
     
    <EUR-Lex - 52025DC0148 - EN - EUR-Lex>
:   [(5)](#footnoteref7)
     
    <Political>
     [Guidelines 2024-2029 |]( Guidelines 2024-2029 | ) 
    <European>
     [Commission]( Commission)
:   [(6)](#footnoteref8)
     
    <EUR-Lex - 52023DC0641 - EN - EUR-Lex>
:   [(7)](#footnoteref9)
     
    <Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime - Publications Office of the EU>
:   [(8)](#footnoteref10)
     
    <Study strengthening the fight against organised crime - Publications Office of the EU>
:   [(9)](#footnoteref11)
     
    <COM_2016_0448_FIN.ENG.xhtml.1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.docx>
:   [(10)](#footnoteref12)
     
    <https://administrativeapproach.eu/administrative-approach/definition>

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