Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

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| 29.11.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 349/38 |

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Tuesday 3 July 2012  
Trade aspects of the Eastern partnership

P7\_TA(2012)0276

European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2012 on the trade aspects of the Eastern Partnership (2011/2306(INI))

2013/C 349 E/05

The European Parliament,

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| — | having regard to the ongoing negotiations on the EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldova, EU-Georgia, EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan Association Agreements, which will include substantial trade elements, |

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| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 22 January 2007 which adopted the negotiating directives for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement comprising a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, |

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| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 10 May 2010 which adopted the negotiating directives for the EU-Armenia and EU-Georgia Association Agreements, each comprising a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, |

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| — | having regard to the Council Conclusions of 15 June 2009 which adopted the negotiating directives for the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and to the additional detailed negotiating directives on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, adopted by the Council on 20 June 2011, |

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| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2010 which adopted the negotiating directives for the EU-Azerbaijan Association Agreement, |

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| — | having regard to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement concluded by the European Community with the then Soviet Union in 1989 and subsequently endorsed by Belarus, |

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| — | having regard to the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 May 2011 on A new response to a changing Neighbourhood (COM(2011)0303), |

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| — | having regard to the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since 2004, and in particular to the Commission’s progress reports on its implementation, |

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| — | having regard to its recommendations for the negotiation of Association Agreements with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, |

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| — | having regard to the Action Plans adopted jointly with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova and to the Association Agenda with Ukraine, |

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| — | having regard to the Joint Declarations of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit of 7 May 2009 and of the Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit of 29-30 September 2011, |

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| — | having regard to the creation of the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly by its Constituent Act of 3 May 2011, |

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| — | having regard to Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |

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| — | having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure, |

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| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A7-0183/2012), |

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| A. | whereas the conclusion and implementation of Association Agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) is a priority aim and ambition of the reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy regarding the Eastern Partners; |

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| B. | whereas four out of the six countries of the Eastern Partnership are already members of the WTO, with the Governments of Azerbaijan and Belarus having only observer status; |

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| C. | whereas, following the revolutionary movements which took place in 2011 in the EU Southern neighbourhood, now known as the Arab Spring, EU interest has been focused on the southern neighbours; whereas the countries belonging to the Eastern Partnership and EU trade relations with them deserve the attention of the EU; |

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| D. | whereas China’s economic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries is continuing to grow; |

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| E. | whereas the DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine were completed in October 2011; whereas the DCFTA will only enter into force after the conclusion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which is currently blocked due to the EU’s discontent with Ukraine’s internal political developments and the functioning of its judicial system; |

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| F. | whereas the DCFTA negotiations with Georgia and Moldova were endorsed by the Council in December 2011 and the first rounds of negotiations should take place in the spring of 2012; |

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| G. | whereas in 2011 Armenia made significant progress towards fulfilling the key recommendations, and DCFTA negotiations between the EU and Armenia were launched in February 2012 and started on 6 March 2012; |

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| H. | whereas the WTO accession of Azerbaijan has been under way since 1997 but progress has been limited, which is one of the key obstacles to launching DCFTA negotiations with the EU; |

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| I. | whereas Belarus has so far participated only in a limited way in the different platforms of the Eastern Partnership; whereas this jeopardises the fulfilment of the ultimate goal of the Eastern Partnership, which is strengthened democracy, progress, stability and prosperity in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood; notes the economic dynamics of the new economic space consisting of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and encourages its members to carry out their trade activities in compliance with internationally accepted trade rules and standards, namely those stemming from the WTO; |

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| J. | whereas all EU Eastern Partners, being the ex-USSR states, share the same historical and institutional background and have faced similar challenges in their political and socio-economic transition over the past two decades; |

General considerations

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| 1. | Stresses that the prospect of creating DCFTAs with the EU is one of the key incentives for the partner countries to pursue their reform efforts; considers the creation of DCFTAs to be one of the most ambitious tools of EU bilateral trade policy for achieving a stable, transparent and predictable economic environment which respects democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law, providing not only for greater economic integration by a gradual dismantling of trade barriers but also for regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade in goods and services, in particular by strengthening investment protection, streamlining customs and border procedures, reducing technical and other non-tariff barriers to trade, strengthening sanitary and phytosanitary rules, improving animal welfare, enhancing the legal frameworks for competition and public procurement and ensuring sustainable development; takes the view that concluding DCFTAs is fundamental in fighting tendencies towards protectionism at global level; |

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| 2. | Recognises that DCFTAs provide the EU with a vital trade instrument for building up long-term economic relationships with third countries; acknowledges the impact of DCFTAs on the entire functioning of the EU’s trade partner countries that reaches far beyond purely trade issues, also influencing the state of democracy, the rule of law and other common standards; |

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| 3. | Stresses that the decision-making process to assess the preparedness of potential EU partners to enter into trade negotiations should be free from political prejudgements and should, to a larger extent, depend on the real capacity of the trade partner to effectively implement DCFTA conditions; |

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| 4. | Acknowledges the fact that DCFTAs might be a core component of a wider political agreement (association agreement); stresses, however, that in cases where it is not possible or advisable to conclude an AA with a particular country other strategies shall be considered in order to efficiently pursue the Union’s economic and trade goals with the country concerned; |

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| 5. | Emphasises the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programme, Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX) and twinning programmes in helping the Eastern Partners to fulfil the key recommendations as well as in enhancing their implementation capacity; |

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| 6. | Recognises that greater trade integration, with the profound changes in economic structures it requires, calls for significant short-term and medium-term efforts by our Eastern Partners, is convinced, however, that in the long run, the benefits of such integration will compensate for those efforts; emphasises that the support and involvement of local civil society and international NGOs in promoting the long-term benefits is key for the success of their reform processes; |

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| 7. | Is in favour of strengthening cooperation between the EU and its Eastern Partners in a number of sectors, in particular industry, SMEs, research, development and innovation, ICT and tourism; |

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| 8. | Considers that differentiation accompanied by application of the ‘more for more’ principle as outlined in the above-mentioned Joint Communication on A new response to a changing neighbourhood is a step in the right direction in trade relations with the Eastern Partners, acknowledging the efforts of those who make the most progress and motivating others to step up their efforts; considers that trade should be a facilitator of change and stresses the importance of conditionality clauses and their subsequent enforcement; |

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| 9. | Is convinced that the economic integration of the Eastern Partners with the EU cannot be efficiently carried out without political and social reforms, participation of civil society in the decision-making process and economic integration among the Eastern Partners themselves; emphasises that economic integration among these countries should be open, so as to capitalise on its benefits; regrets in this regard that regional frozen conflicts have for many years harmed the effectiveness and development of cross-border trade and continue to cause enormous economic losses to some of the Eastern Partners and to lead to their economic isolation; |

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| 10. | Considers it important that the EU offer to all DCFTA partners the flexibilities which they are entitled to under WTO rules; |

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| 11. | Highlights the importance of conflict prevention through economic and social cohesion; |

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| 12. | Calls on the Commission to grant, in particular, flexibilities which promote the build-up of infant industries in the DCFTA partner countries; |

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| 13. | Welcomes the Commission proposal on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, which proposes a 40 % rise in funding for the European Neighbourhood Policy; emphasises its view that the Eastern Partners cannot carry alone the burden of costs of legal approximation and the necessary institutional and structural reforms, and that EU financial support, which should complement their own reform efforts, is also instrumental for the success; calls in this regard on the Council to maintain the funding proposed by the Commission; |

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| 14. | Stresses the role of the national parliaments of the EU’s Eastern Partners in approximation of trade legislation with the EU acquis, which is a prerequisite for conclusion and proper implementation of the future DCFTAs; calls in this regard on the EU and its Member States to provide them with greater technical assistance and invites especially the new EU Member States to share with them the expertise and best practices they have acquired in their own process of alignment of national legislation with the trade-related acquis communautaire; |

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| 15. | Welcomes the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, in view of its potentially vital role in terms of ensuring the achievement of the EU’s energy security objectives and contributing to security for those countries; |

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| 16. | Welcomes all efforts towards strengthening of the Eastern Partnership, especially the Commission’s flagship initiatives on SMEs, including the EaP SME facility, and on regional energy markets and energy efficiency; |

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| 17. | Calls on the Commission to further develop the EU Black Sea Strategy, as it represents an important component of the EU’s external energy strategy, given its geostrategic role, which offers a significant potential for energy security and supply diversification; |

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| 18. | Recognises the importance of the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly (PA), particularly its Committee on Economic Integration, Legal Approximation and Convergence with EU policies and its Committee on Energy Security, in discussions on trade issues between Members of the European Parliament and national parliamentarians of the EU’s Eastern Partners; expresses its hope that the conditions for the members of the Belarusian Parliament to join the EURONEST PA will be met in the foreseeable future; |

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| 19. | Stresses that a DCFTA is not assistance given to the Eastern Partners, but is a trade deal bringing about reciprocal advantages and obligations for both parties; regrets that the ENP review still does not elaborate on how developing such a trade policy could present a boost for EU economic interests by bringing substantial benefits to EU consumers, companies and workers; stresses that DCFTAs would not only bring economic benefits for the Eastern Partners but can also accelerate institutional reforms, modernisation and development; |

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| 20. | Takes note of the creation on 18 October 2011 of a free-trade zone among the majority of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which include the EU Eastern Partners with the exception of Georgia and, for the time being, Azerbaijan; believes that the conclusion of FTAs with other countries should not harm the DCFTAs that the Eastern Partnership countries conclude with the EU, emphasises in this regard that it is important for the EU to provide the Eastern Partners with an attractive and viable alternative; |

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| 21. | Insists that the EU’s strategy towards Russia should take due account of the Russian influence on the Eastern Partners; notes that Russia has concluded a customs union with Kazakhstan and with one Eastern Partner, Belarus; regrets that Russia may have undermined the trade negotiations between the EU and several Eastern Partners, in particular Ukraine, by offering them an alternative path, based on short-term solutions, such as lower gas prices; reckons that these alternatives will prove counterproductive in the long run for the Eastern Partners; |

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| 22. | Insists that the success of DCFTAs will to a great extent depend on institution building and proper implementation of commitments, which can only be assured in an open, transparent and corruption-free business environment, which is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of DCFTAs; |

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| 23. | Notes that prosperity and stability in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood are in the EU’s utmost interest and moreover that stable and predictable relations between the EU and its Eastern Partners will undoubtedly raise trade volumes in both directions; |

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| 24. | Notes at the same time that the EU is the main export partner of most of the Eastern Partnership countries; |

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| 25. | Points out that, despite making sufficient progress in fulfilling the key recommendations, as conditions for allowing the launch of the DCFTA negotiations, Georgia and Moldova still need to ensure that their commitment to the reform process is of a long-term nature and that they engage in a durable reform process throughout the negotiations; emphasises that both countries still need to make significant progress in regulatory reform concerning in particular technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, intellectual property rights and competition law; |

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| 26. | Expresses concern over the institutional capacity of the Eastern Partners concerned with regard to the actual implementation of a DCFTA; stresses that the conclusion of a DCFTA does not in itself guarantee success unless it is effectively implemented and accompanied by effective measures on competition and against corruption; |

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| 27. | Notes that internationally approved labour standards must be adhered to when concluding DCFTAs; notes that observance of fundamental labour rights approved by the International Labour Organisation is a key element of respect for human rights; |

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| 28. | Calls for an ambitious approach to integrating the economies of the EU and of the Eastern Partnership countries through DCFTAs by including other aspects related to free and fair trade; recommends that all DCFTAs include a binding sustainable development chapter, with provisions on environmental protection and international labour rights; |

Armenia

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| 29. | Applauds the Armenian Government for stepping up its efforts to fulfil the key recommendations in 2011, which led to the launch of the DCFTA negotiations in February 2012; |

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| 30. | Welcomes the launch of DCFTA negotiations between Armenia and the EU in February 2012 and their start on 6 March 2012; encourages Armenia to use the DCFTA potential to boost its economy, export opportunities and access to the EU market, to speed up necessary reforms and generally upgrade Armenia’s standards to a European level; stresses that closer economic integration with the EU must contribute to the strengthening of political stability and security in the region; hopes for a swift conclusion of the EU/Armenia DCFTA negotiations; |

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| 31. | Welcomes the launch of the DCFTA negotiations, which will provide opportunities to strengthen economic relations between the two sides; considers it necessary to sustain reforms to create a stable and transparent economic environment which will attract foreign investments, boost growth and create jobs; |

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| 32. | Believes that the conclusion of a DCFTA will stimulate Armenia’s economy by, among other things, boosting competition; |

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| 33. | Regrets that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still resonates in the closed borders of Armenia with Azerbaijan and Turkey, keeping the country economically isolated due to the lack of access routes; stresses that opening of the borders is, inter alia, an important condition for attracting foreign investment; |

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| 34. | Is concerned about the indications of the ongoing close links between political and business circles and significant impediments for businesses, including the untransparent tax system and low investment protection; recognises the need for a strong institutional framework for public procurement and competition policy in order to include an effective enforcement mechanism; |

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| 35. | Welcomes Armenia’s decision to rejoin the WTO Plurilateral Agreements on Public Procurement in December 2011; is convinced that this step is beneficial for Armenia’s image as a reliable trading partner; |

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| 36. | Stresses that the DCFTA should include a deep commitment on the part of Armenia to reform its regulations in the direction of EU standards, accompanied by effective anticorruption measures; |

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| 37. | Recommends also that the DCFTA should include measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of competition law, thus enabling foreign investors and companies to participate, in particular, in Armenia’s construction and energy industries; |

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| 38. | Urges Armenia to accelerate the process of complying with EU sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which would enable diversification of Armenia’s exports to include agricultural products; |

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| 39. | Believes that the weakening of Armenia’s dependence on Russian commercial and governmental support as a result of Armenia opening its borders and strengthening international cooperation promotes its economic growth; believes that the conclusion of a DCFTA with the EU would be particularly beneficial in this regard; |

Azerbaijan

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| 40. | Acknowledges the efforts and achievements of Azerbaijan towards approximation with the EU acquis; welcomes in this regard the recent adoption of the new Customs Code and Construction Code; |

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| 41. | Emphasises that the accession of Azerbaijan to the WTO is the key prerequisite for opening the DCFTA negotiations and thus bringing EU-Azerbaijan trade relations to a higher level; notes that the structure of the Azerbaijani economy does not give its government a strong motivation to seek WTO membership and a DCFTA with the EU; stresses however that the benefits of a DCFTA are not purely economic but that it could also develop the local economy beyond its overreliance on energy exports; urges the Azerbaijani Government therefore to step up its efforts towards WTO membership; in this regard calls on the EU to provide Azerbaijan with the necessary assistance; |

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| 42. | Commends the remarkable economic growth experienced by Azerbaijan in past years; points out, however, that the oil sector provides 5 0 % of Azerbaijan’s GDP, 95 % of its exports and 60 % of its budget revenues, which makes the Azerbaijani economy vulnerable to oil price volatility and all changes in global demand; calls in this regard on the Azerbaijani Government to consider adopting effective and consistent measures to diversify the country’s economy; |

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| 43. | Recalls Azerbaijan’s potential for development of competitive agricultural production, and recommends that the Azerbaijani Government take into account this area as a potentially important step towards the diversification of its economy and its exports to the EU, subject to compliance with EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, and to other countries; |

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| 44. | Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to genuinely engage in fighting corruption and social inequalities that can lead to social unrest, improve access to financing for businesses, thereby making the country’s economy more competitive and attractive for foreign investment; |

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| 45. | Strongly supports the upgrading of the trade component of the future EU-Azerbaijan Association Agreement to a DCFTA once all the conditions are met; |

Belarus

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| 46. | Regrets that Belarus, despite its unquestionable potential, is drifting further and further from the EU in terms of its overall political and economic standards, as well as its economic model; |

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| 47. | Stresses the importance of Belarus’s strategic position as a country of transit for energy, particularly supplies of natural gas for the EU; calls on Belarus, therefore, to promptly ratify and duly implement the Energy Charter; |

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| 48. | Recalls that the EU is Belarus’s second biggest trading partner after Russia; |

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| 49. | Stresses the need for more EU assistance in order to improve the performance of administrative structures, in particular the need to fight corruption; |

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| 50. | Points out the difficulties in assessing the real economic situation in Belarus, due to the official statistics which, according to independent observers, conceal the reality in which reportedly 20 % of Belarusians live below the breadline; |

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| 51. | Notes that 80 % of companies are publicly owned and the development of the private sector is hampered by discriminatory and arbitrary measures, changes to legislation and heavy taxation, which forces the private sector to operate partly in the unofficial economy; |

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| 52. | Recalls that, due to the negative political and economic climate in Belarus, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank froze their credits to Belarus in 1996 and the EU did the same in 1997; points out that all this dissuaded and continues to dissuade foreign investors, with foreign direct investment which now accounts for only 1 % of the country’s GDP; |

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| 53. | Believes that the EU should help to strengthen Belarusian civil society by reorienting EU funds in this direction; |

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| 54. | Is convinced that deep institutional and structural reforms need to be carried out in order to start building a functioning, transparent and open market economy; |

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| 55. | Points out that the country’s WTO accession is a condition for starting negotiations on any kind of free trade agreement with the EU; in this regard, calls on Belarus to genuinely engage in the WTO accession process; points out that Belarus, being a member of the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, could draw from Russia’s experience with the WTO accession process; |

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| 56. | Is convinced that the EU should make every effort to engage Belarus in real political and economic dialogue and provide incentives for reforms which are indispensable and of extreme importance for Belarusian citizens; notes, in this regard, the current EU targeted restrictive economic measures against Belarus; takes the view that the EU should continue its targeted individual restrictive measures while continuing to support civil society and entrepreneurs with the aim not only of improving economic conditions but also of enhancing the rule of law, transparency and the fight against corruption; |

Georgia

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| 57. | Points out that, according to the evaluation of the World Bank, Georgia is one of the world’s fastest reforming economies and that it is ranked by the World Bank as the world’s 16th best place to do business; |

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| 58. | Acknowledges Georgia’s reconstruction work following the war of 2008 and its opening of new markets; |

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| 59. | Recognises that the Georgian Government is trying to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights, points out however that Georgia still has the highest alleged prevalence of pirated software of any country; calls in this regard on the Georgian Government to develop laws for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, taking due account, however, of human rights and proportionality; |

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| 60. | Takes into consideration that Georgia has demonstrated notable economic growth and investment rates and emphasises that the DCFTA would be an additional factor for supporting broad-based growth and attracting foreign investments; |

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| 61. | Encourages Georgia to perfect its legislation, improve the efficiency of its institutions and ensure high quality-control standards for its products in order to comply with the requirements set out by the European Commission; |

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| 62. | Welcomes Georgia’s new procurement system, enabling e-auctions for all types of contracts, irrespective of their size or nature; points out that Georgia should also serve as an example for the EU Member States in this area; |

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| 63. | Calls on Georgia to ensure that, after the conclusion of the DCFTA negotiations, only products originating from regions formally recognising their adhesion to the Georgian state are eligible for trade preferences; |

Moldova

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| 64. | Recognises with satisfaction that Moldova, despite the fragility of its economy, has in recent years undergone a remarkable reform process and greatly improved its economic performance; highlights in this regard the vital importance of the financial assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund and the macrofinancial assistance provided by the EU; |

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| 65. | Is of the opinion that the future DCFTA should apply to the whole territory of Moldova that formally acknowledges its adhesion to the Molovan state; |

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| 66. | Notes that, for the time being, most Moldovan exports originate from agriculture and thus face fierce competition and strict requirements in the EU market; takes the view that a DCFTA should help diversify Moldovan exports and make the country more competitive and would enable Moldova to attract foreign investments in order to end its dependence on remittances and make the transition to an export-competitive market economy; |

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| 67. | Stresses the importance of continuing Moldova’s alignment to the EU of its infrastructure and systems for technical regulation, standardisation, conformity assessment, testing, market surveillance and metrology; |

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| 68. | Points out that considerable progress is still needed in the area of services and investment protection; |

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| 69. | Calls on the EU authorities to be more involved in finding a peaceful solution for the problems of territorial reintegration of Moldova; |

Ukraine

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| 70. | Welcomes the conclusion of the DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine, as the first ever free trade agreement between the EU and an Eastern Partner; considers that this ground-breaking agreement and the experience gained during its negotiation will undoubtedly serve as a useful example in future DCFTA negotiations; |

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| 71. | Points out that Ukraine is the EU’s largest Eastern Partner and that the DCFTA opens a new market of 46 million consumers for the EU; considers that for the EU the biggest benefits from implementing the DCFTA will come from a more stable and predictable trade and investment regime in Ukraine; |

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| 72. | Welcomes the Ukrainian authorities’ efforts to focus on overcoming social and geographic inequalities, in particular between the capital and the regions; |

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| 73. | Regrets the delays in signing the Association Agreement, which is the condition for entry into force of the DCTFA; expresses the hope that the obstacles to the signature will soon be overcome; |

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| 74. | Takes note of the fact that the Commission excluded the possibility of provisional application of the DCFTA before the conclusion of the Association Agreement and its consent by the European Parliament; points out that the application of both the Association Agreement and the DCFTA will bring about structural and political reforms and therefore wishes a swift implementation of both; |

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| 75. | Recognises that, regarding integration into European structures, Ukraine has made some advances and has started to adapt its legal system to the EU and to international standards and has also made great progress in the adoption of OECD standards and norms; notes nevertheless that the business climate in Ukraine is still ranked 152nd by the World Bank’s Doing Business, with a worsening of cross-border trading problems; |

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| 76. | Emphasises that successful implementation of the DCFTA will very much depend on the political will and administrative capacity to implement all its provisions in a timely and accurate manner; considers that this is a serious challenge for Ukraine, which has a mixed record on reforming its economy and state and which is still struggling to fulfil all its commitment under the WTO accession process, as well as commitments vis-à-vis the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; |

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| 77. | Reiterates that fundamental economic, political and institutional reforms, including a broad and permanent participation of civil society organisations and networks, must be accelerated and conducted in a more comprehensive and consistent way, in order to ensure proper implementation of the DCFTA and the gains coming from it; calls, in particular, for continuation of economic reforms in the areas of agriculture, energy and transport sectors; |

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| 78. | Is concerned about the negative indications regarding Ukraine’s business and investment climate resulting from various institutional and systemic deficiencies such as barriers to market entry, administrative permits, the excessive number of administrative inspections, untransparent tax and customs systems and poor administration, the unstable and untransparent legal system and its poor functioning, weak and corrupt public administration and judiciary, weak contract enforcement and insufficient property rights protection, underdevelopment and monopolisation of infrastructure; urges the Ukrainian Government to accelerate the reform process in order to eliminate the above obstacles to free and fair business and trade; |

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| 79. | Calls on the Ukrainian Government to address the concerns of the business sector more effectively, in particular with regard to access to credit and land, mortgages, preferential credits for developing small agricultural enterprises; a simplified and more transparent tax collection system, refunding value-added tax to exporters, customs clearance and approval procedures for imports, promotion of the SME sector, improvement of law enforcement in the area of protection of material assets and intellectual property; as all these factors have an immediate and direct impact on the quantity and quality of trade relations with the EU and its foreign direct investment inflow in Ukraine; |

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| 80. | Calls on Ukraine to adapt its internal legislation in order to facilitate free and uninterrupted transit of gas to the EU Member States; notes that this process should include a restructuring of the gas sector and the establishment of fair regulation of energy infrastructure with a view to placing foreign suppliers, foreign customers and local energy demand on an equal footing; calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the energy sector, for integration of the Ukrainian energy sector into the European energy sphere and for the initiation of joint modernisation and development projects in the energy infrastructure sphere; calls on the government to implement the third energy package; |

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| 81. | Expresses its hope that Ukraine will find enough political will and courage to create political and regulatory conditions for full and timely implementation of the DCFTA, which would be of great benefit to its population; |

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| 82. | Calls on the EU authorities to give more support to improving the performance of Ukrainian administrative structures and to promoting EU standards in the field of governance; |

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| 83. | Calls on the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service to take the above considerations and recommendations duly into account in negotiation and implementation of the trade parts of Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as well as in developing the EU’s trade relations with Belarus; |

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| 84. | Calls on the Commission to regularly and fully report to the European Parliament on the progress of the negotiations and, after its entry into force, on the progress in implementation of each DCFTA; |

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| --- | --- |
| 85. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the countries belonging to the Eastern Partnership. |

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