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# 52013SC0054

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a space surveillance and tracking support programme /\* SWD/2013/054 final \*/**

  

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Accompanying the document

Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council

establishing a space surveillance
and tracking support programme

1.           Introduction

In the last few years, the development of a
European Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) service has been the subject of
political debate among EU Ministers responsible for space. The outcome of those
debates, reflected in several Council conclusions, reveal that there is a
consensus among Member States, satellite operators and other stakeholders on
the need to protect space infrastructure, that the establishment of a European
SST service to protect such infrastructure should be done under the leadership
of the EU (with the technical R&D support of the European Space Agency) and
should build on existing capacities to be complemented by new assets. Moreover,
public opinion is aware of and supports the need to protect space
infrastructure (two consultations of the broad public have been carried out
over the past three years).

2.           Problem definition

2.1.        Security
of critical European space infrastructures is not ensured

Space-based systems enable a wide spectrum
of applications which play a fundamental role in everyday reality (TV,
Internet, GPS etc). They have also become critical for the implementation of EU
policies. With Galileo and EGNOS, the EU itself will soon become one of the
largest satellite operators in Europe. However, space infrastructures are increasingly
threatened by the risk of collision between spacecraft and, more importantly,
between spacecraft and space debris. Space debris has become the most serious
threat to the sustainability of space activities.

In order to mitigate the risk of collision
it is necessary to identify and monitor satellites and space debris so that
satellite operators can be alerted to move their satellites. This activity,
which is highly sensitive with regard to national security, is known as space surveillance
and tracking (SST). SST is also a dual use activity that can serve both civil
and military users. A SST service comprises three basic functions:

–
Sensor function: radars and telescopes to
identify and track spacecraft and debris;

–
Processing function: to determine the
probability of collision or to determine the re-entry path of space objects;

–
Front desk function: to handle the dissemination
of SST information (e. g. collision risk alerts, re-entry warnings) to
satellite operators and relevant authorities.

Europe has today no SST service: the
exisiting sencor capacity is insufficient and disconnected, the processing
capacity is very limited and there is no front desk function at all.
Furthermore, there is no suitable alternative at international level, including
the system of the United States, which is not accurate enough, or other systems
which are not open to international cooperation.

2.2.        Increased
collision risks due to space debris

During the last half century, objects have
been launched in space regularly. This material,
orbiting the Earth at very high speed and in an uncontrolled manner, poses an
ever increasing potential risk for the launch of spacecrafts and of their
exploitation due to collision with other debris or other spacecrafts in orbit.

According to latest estimates, there are 16
000 objects orbiting Earth larger than 10 cm, which are catalogued and between 300
000 and 600 000 objects larger than 1 cm, not catalogued. According to ESA, the
population of objects larger than 1 cm will continue to grow, and will reach a
total of approximately 1 million debris in 2020. Furthermore, it is estimated
that there are more than 300 million objects larger than 1 mm. The vast
majority of these space objects are in the commercially most exploitable areas
of the outer space region. According to the most conservative estimates (based
in partially traceable objects), there is at present a risk of 1 collision
every three years.

2.3.        Collision avoidance
manoeuvre shorten the lifetime of satellites

As collision risks for potentially
traceable or untraceable debris is difficult to predict, satellite operators
tend to carry out avoidance manoeuvres on the basis of alerts of close
approaches of space debris.

Each avoidance manoeuvre requires fuel, which
shortens the active life of satellites, or requires additional fuel to be
carried into orbit thus increasing the cost of launch. Furthermore, due to the
inaccuracy of data related to the position of the objects in question, it can
be assumed that a good number of manoeuvres may not be indispensible but have
to be made as a precaution generating extra costs.

2.4.        Re-entry of debris or uncontrolled
spacecraft to Earth threaten the security of EU citizens

Re-entries of spacecraft and debris to
Earth form an increasing hazard for the security and health of the Earth
population. Whilst active spacecraft re-entries into the atmosphere are
controlled (e.g. the US Space Shuttle, the Russian Soyuz, and the European
Automated Transfer Vehicle), inactive satellites and debris regularly re-enter
the atmosphere in an uncontrolled manner.

The ability to predict the trajectory of an
object (which is highly dependant on the survey and tracking capability of a
space surveillance system) is essential to mitigate risks related to
re-entries. With an increasing population of satellites in orbit, the number of
uncontrolled re-entry events can be assumed to increase over the coming years.

2.5.        Overview of estimated
annualised losses due to hazards from space debris

On the basis of
available data and the estimates on market growth, the annualised quantifiable
estimated loss due to collision and collision avoidance manoeuvres (e.g. due to
loss of satellites, satellite lifetime shortening, loss of revenues generated
by the satellite) was estimated at a total of 140 M€. As the number of active
satellites in orbit is expected to grow by 50 % in the next 10 years,
annualised estimated losses can be expected to increase to 210 M€ in the next
decade

These costs are almost certainly just a
small fraction of possible non-quantified costs and, to some extent, the
non-quantifiable consequences that may result from the absence of a European space
surveillance and tracking capability. For example, the loss of a satellite may
result in the loss of critical satellite communication capacity in an emergency
situation resulting in loss of life.

3.           The
EU's Right to Act and Analysis of subsidiarity

Article 189 TFEU introduces a right for the
EU to act in drawing up a European Space Policy, while building on past
achievements at the level of the European Space Agency and Member States, and
gives the European Commission a clear mandate to exercise its right of
initiative. Space policy is defined as a shared competence between the EU and
its Member States.

From discussions with stakeholders over the
past years, it became clear that the setting up of operational European SST
services will require the intervention of the EU. This stems from a consensus
among EU and ESA Ministers responsible for space. In this regard, a European SST
service will have a security dimension with which the EU, unlike ESA (a R&D
agency), has competence to deal with.

The EU does not seek to replace initiatives
taken by Member States individually or in the framework of ESA. It seeks to
complement actions taken at their level (in particular in the framework of the
ESA SSA preparatory programme) and reinforce coordination where such
coordination is necessary to achieve common objectives.

The EU involvement would be necessary to
aggregate the investment required to fund certain space projects, set in place
governance arrangements, define a data policy and ensure that existing and
future capacities are broguht to work in a coordianted and efficient manner
ensuring a robust and interoperable system benefiting all relevant European
stakeholders.

Furthermore,
the proposed EU action does not seek to replace or duplicate existing
mitigation measures at international or multi-lateral level, since these
measures will not solve the problem at hand, but will only reduce the growth of
space debris in the long-term.

4.           Objectives

The general objective of the proposed
initiative is to safeguard the long-term availability and security of European
and national space infrastructures and services essential for the smooth
running of Europe’s economies and societies and for European citizens’
security.

Specific Objectives || Operational Objectives

(a) Reduce the risks related to the launch of European spacecrafts; (b) Assess and reduce the risks to in-orbit operations of European spacecrafts in terms of collisions, and to enable spacecraft operators to more efficiently plan and carry out mitigation measures (e.g. more accurate collision avoidance manoeuvres; avoidance of unnecessary manoeuvres which are risky in itself and reduce a satellite’s lifetime); (c) Survey uncontrolled re-entries of spacecraft or their debris into the Earth’s atmosphere and provide more accurate and efficient early warnings to national security and civil protection/disaster management administrations with the aim to reduce the potential risks to the security and health of European citizens and mitigate potential damage to critical terrestrial infrastructure. || (a) set up an operational space surveillance and tracking capability at European level building on existing European + national assets and capable of integrating future new assets; (b) implement an appropriate governance structure; (c) define and implement data policy principles for the handling of SST information through the European SST capability; (d) define and deliver the SST services open to all European and national public and private/ commercial actors; (e) ensure the necessary quality of SST services and their efficient and sustainable operational provision; (f) supervise the implementation and efficient functioning of the proposed operational SST capability and the operational SST services and by ensuring a sustainable EU funding contribution.

5.           Policy
options

5.1.        Option 1: Baseline: No EU
financial involvement in SST

Under the baseline scenario the EU would
not engage in any action or provide any support (legal or financial) to the
setting up and operational provision of European SST services

Due to lack of an organisational framework,
the development of a broader cooperation between Member States with a view to
providing a veritable European SST capability and operational European SST
services is unlikely.

In addition, taking into account the fact
that Member States do not see the development of a European SST service as a
mission to be entrusted to ESA, the setting up of operational SST services at
European level under the baseline scenario cannot be expected.

Cooperation between EU Member States and
third countries is expected to remain at its current status.

There are debris mitigation initiatives at
international level which seek to prevent the exponential growth of debris.
These initiatives may only be effective in the long-term, although these
actions cannot replace short-term mitigation measures such as collision
avoidance manoeuvres.

5.2.        Option
2: Partnership approach – EU Funding for the
European SST front desk function

This option
would seek a reduction of the collition risk by a factor of 3 to 5 and
therefore a reduction of economic loss due to satellite failure or destructions
by the same factor. There is convergence among experts that in order to achieve
such reduction the sensor function must be developped linking and operating as
a netwok existing assets and adding to this network 1 tracking radar, 1
surveillance radar, 8 telescopes and a data center. These assets should be
linked by secure lines. The processing function must be set up to determine the
probability of collision or to determine the re-entry path of space objects. A
front desk must also be set up to deliver alerts and handle request from SST
users.

This would
require an overall investement, coming from EU and Member States, of some 60 M€
per annum (for details see annex V on the calculation method). According to the
most conservative estimate the current anualised estimated loss of 140 M€ would
be reduced to between 28 to 46 M€.

In this option, operational European SST
services would be set up in partnership with EU Member States owning relevant
assets. The EU would define the legal framework for the setting up and
operations of European SST services (on the basis of existing sensors and
capacities as well as those Member States may decide to develop), inlcuding the
data policy.

A consortium of Member States would be
responsible for the sensor function and the processing function of the European
SST capability. The front desk function would be entrusted to an existing
operational entity/agency with proven security credentials to handle SST
information (for example the EU Satellite Centre). The European Commission
would not engage in any day to day operational activity, but would ensure the
overall coordination of the SST functional elements.

The overall costs of the setting up and
operation of the European SST capability would be co-funded by the Member
States constituting the consortium and the EU. While the consortium would fund
all capital investsments related to the sensor (including the development of
the new assets) and the processing functions (estimated at 58 M€ per anuum),
the EU would provide funding for the setting up and operation of the front desk
function (an estimated total of 2 M€ per annum). The introduction of service fees
could be examined in the context of the evaluation of the initative's
implemementation.

5.3.        Option
3: Partnership approach – EU Funding for the networking and operation of
sensor, processing and front desk function

This option is identical to option 2 in all
respects except as regards the distribution of funding provided by the
consortium of Member States and the EU. Under this option, Member States
participating in the consortium would again fund all capital investments
related to the sensor (including the development of new assets: 1 surveillance
radar and 1 tracking radar, 8 telescopes and a data center) and the processing
functions. However, in addition to what it is in charge of in accordance with
option 2, the EU would fund the maintenance and operational costs of the
sensors and processing functions necessary for the Europan SST service.

As in option 2, the acquisition of new
assets by Member States necessary to guarantee the target collision risk
reduction factor of 3 to 5 is estimated at 50 M€ per annum. The EU funding
contribution would amount to 10 M€ per annum. As in option 2, the introduction
of service fees could be examined.

5.4.        Option 4: EU-led SST
development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 3 to 5)

Under this option, the risk reduction
factor would be identical to that under options 2 & 3 but there would be
potentially some differences in terms of governance and funding because the EU
would be the system owner and would fund the totality of the costs.The EU
defines the related legal framework (including data policy), and takes the
responsibility for the development of the structures needed to federate
existing national and European sensors and capacities and to ensure the
provision of SST services.

The Commission would become owner of new
SST infrastructure elements. This option also assumes the development of 1
surveillance radar and 1 tracking radar, 8 telescopes and a data center and the
required equipment to network existing assets. The total contribution from the
EU would amount to some 60 M€ per annum.

5.5.        Option 5: EU-led SST
development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 10)

Option 5 follows the same logic as option
4, but seeks to reduce the risk of collision by a factor of 10 and consequently
of the estimated losses above a factor of 10. This option requires the
acquisition of 2 surveillance radars, 2 tracking radars and 14 telescopes and a
data centre, thereby improving the quality and accuracy of the services provided
to the various user groups and would also leverage on existing sensors in
Europe.

Funding would follow the same logic as in
option 4 but with double the number of new assets as described above. EU
funding can be estimated at some 120 M€ per annum for the period 2014-2020.

5.6.        Summary of stakeholder
views on the options

Both the manufacturing industry and the
satellite operators are strongly in favour of the setting up of a European SST
capability. While the manufacturing industry is clearly in favour of the option
that guarantees the highest investment and therefore industrial return,
operators are concerned with the performance of the system and that high
performance would not result in any additional costs imposed on them. The industry
has not expressed a particular view on governance or data policy.

As regards Member States, they all agree on
the need of a SST system and that the system should build on existing assets.
All Member States agree on the governance model in options 2 to 5. One of them
has indicated on a number of occasions that it would prefer a European entity to
be set up to deal with the sensor and processing functions, although it accepts
the proposed governance scheme on the condition that it ensures the
participation of all Member States willing to be part of the consortium.
Furthermore, they all agree on the proposed data policy and are open to the
idea of a European entity acting as a Front Desk. Member States owning SST
sensors and capacities under military control highlighted the importance for
the data policy and governance to take account of national security concerns.
All options respect these concerns.

As regards performance, Member States are
in favour of an improved performance of the order suggested in options 2 to 4.
When it comes to funding, some Member States are concerned that if the EU
completely funded the system, geographical return of investments in the way ESA
guarantees it would be affected. Notwithstanding the above, Member States
understand budgetary constraints and while potentially open to any of the
options proposed, their most favoured options are 3 and 4.

6.           Assessment
of impacts

6.1.        Impacts of option 1:
baseline scenario

6.1.1.     Strategic impact

Under the baseline scenario, the EU would
not invest in the setting up and operations of SST services at European level. This
would not affect the implementation of the EU flagship programmes Galileo and Copernicus
(new name for GMES), but their long-term security and sustainable exploitation
could be affected.

6.1.2.     Economic impact

The problems identified would not be
addressed and are likely to aggravate over the coming years. With increasing
space activity and increasing space debris, economic losses due to launch
failures, satellite loss or damage, and service outages are expected to
increase. Industrial activity in SST in Europe would stay at current limited
level.

6.1.3.     Social
impact

In absence of EU action and the fact that
Member States do not seem to be ready to engage in major SST development
activities in the framework of ESA, the impact on job creation of this option
is negligible. Security threats from uncontrolled re-entries of space debris
into the Earth's atmosphere as explained in the problem definition section
would not be addressed or mitigated. With increasing space activity, the risks
to the security of European citizens or critical ground-based infrastructure
risks to increase.

6.1.4.     Environmental impact

All estimates agree on the constant and
significant growth of the debris population in the future (in fact each
collision between space objects leads to an exponential growth of the debris
population) and the need for action to preserve the space environment. In the
absence of EU intervention none of these premises will be affected.

6.2.        Impacts
of option 2, 3 and 4:

6.2.1.     Strategic impact

The proposed governance and data policy
schemes will allow Member States to actively contribute and safeguard their
national security interests. These options would build on existing international
cooperation with the US. In general terms, the setting up of a European SST
capability would allow the EU to collaborate with and influence developments in
the US as an equal partner with a view to mutually enhancing SST performance.
Furthermore, these options would strengthen Europe's independent access to
space and its capacity to make independent decisions concerning the safety of
spacecraft operations. Finally, these options offer a pragmatic framework for
European cooperation in SST which can be extended to plug in further sensors
should it be needed in the future.

6.2.2.     Economic impact

The proposed
initiative would improve the European SST's ability to detect hazardous
situations and provide more accurate SST information for the launch and
in-orbit operation of satellites. It would imply a reduction of the risk of
satellite losses and the number of collision avoidance manoeuvres leading to a
reduction of economic losses. The current anualised estimated loss of 140 M€
would be reduced by a factor of 3 to 5 to between 28 to 46 M€. These options
would build on existing SST sensors and human expertise and foresee the
development of new SST sensors. The development of new sensors as suggested in
these options is likely to have a multiplier effect in terms of industrial
activity of 2.3. Considering only that the investment in new assets would
amount to roughly 50 M€ per annum, i.e. 350 M€ over the seven year period
2014-2020, the total industrial return can be estimated at 805 M€.

6.2.3.     Social impact

The proposed action would generate a
minimum of 50 permanent staff positions.

Moreover, it will lead to an improvement of
Europe's ability to predict the trajectory of space objects, and will as a
consequence improve its capacity to control re-entries of space debris into the
Earth’s atmosphere. Due to lack of any quantitative data and studies on
material damage caused by un-controlled re-entries it is not possible at this
point of time to quantify this positive impact.

6.2.4.     Environmental impact

These options would increase Europe's
capacity to monitor uncontrolled re-entries of space debris and to put in place
a coherent and clear procedure to issue meaningful and timely warnings to
national security authorities.

6.3.        Impacts
of option 5: EU-led SST development and exploitation (risk reduction factor of 10)

6.3.1.     Strategic and governance
impact

In addition to the strategic impacts
outlined for the previous options, option 5 could clearly increase the EU's
strategic potential to strengthen and intensify cooperation in SST with other
space-faring nations (notably the US) through established political channels.
In this option, the EU would have the full control over the setting up of the
European SST capability, and would ensure that the initiative is open to all EU
Member States that wish to participate.

6.3.2.     Economic impact

The EU SST programme proposed in this
option implies the development/procurement of new SST assets for the amount of
810 M€ during the period 2014-2020. Investments are likely to have a multiplier
effect in terms of industrial activity of 2.3. This would result in a direct
and indirect industrial turnover of 1.863 billion €. Applying the same approach
to estimate the reduction of economic losses likely to be brought about by
option 3, it could be estimated that option 5 could reduce the risks identified
in the problem definition by a factor of 10 or above. This would imply a
possible reduction of estimated annual losses due to collisions to 14 M€ from
the current estimate annualised economic loss of 140 M€.

6.3.3.     Social impact

In accordance with this option, the
potential for the creation of permanent jobs in the engineering and data
analyst domain would be around 100 new jobs across Europe. As option 2, 3 and
4, this option would lead to an improvement of Europe's ability to predict
re-entries of space debris into the Earth’s atmosphere. Option 5 provides a
potential to reduce risks to the security of European citizens and critical
terrestrial infrastructure even further.

6.3.4.     Environmental impact

As in option 2 to 4, this option would
strengthen Europe's capacity to monitor the debris population, avoid
collisions, and thus to mitigate the risk of further space debris creation.
Option 5 would allow the detection of debris up to 3 to 5 cm which are today
not catalogued. This would significantly increase Europe's capacity the risk of
debris clouds and their long-term proliferation in Low Earth Orbit.

Comparing the
options and conclusions:

|| Strengths || Weakness

Option 1: Baseline || A limited service is provided by the US at no cost. Public funds may be diverted to other priorities. || The risk of collision remains and will get worse. EU unable to protect critical space infrastructure. Negative strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It does not meet either Member States or industry expectations.

Option 2 || A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. Several Member States have given indications of their willingness to develop additional SST assets in the framework of an EU-led SST initiative. This option comforts Member States' perception that developing their own assets guarantees that their investment benefits national industry. || This option requires significant funding from both the EU and from Member States willing to develop new assets. Although there is evidence that some Member States are indeed supportive of this idea and willing to develop new assets, the EU does not have full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. The EU investment does not cover an important part of the costs directly linked with the setting up of a European SST; i.e. the operations of the sensor and processing function. It does not meet Member States' expectations that as a minimum the EU would cover the operational costs of the European SST service and therefore may not provide sufficient incentive for Member States to invest.

Option 3 || As in option 2, a collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. Several Member States have given indications of their willingness to develop additional SST assets in the framework of an EU-led SST initiative. This option comforts Member States' perception that developing their own assets guarantees that their investment benefits national industry. This option meets Member States expectation that as a minimum the EU would cover the operational costs of the European SST service. || As in option 2, this option requires significant funding from both the EU and from Member States willing to develop new assets. Although there is evidence that some Member States are indeed supportive of this idea and willing to develop new assets, the EU does not have full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service.

Option 4 || A collision risk reduction of 3 to 5 is targeted. Positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It gives the EU practically full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. Some Member States would welcome higher funding from the EU as this guarantees the setting up of an EU SST service and would give tem the choice of either invest further in SST or in other space projects. || As sole contributor, the EU has a higher responsibility for the overall system and in particular it has to supervise the acquisition of new assets. As the EU funding for SST is to be redeployed from other sources, the amount required under this option would impose a non-negligible burden on those sources.

Option 5 || A collision risk reduction of 10 is targeted. This option provides the most positive strategic, economic, social and environmental impacts. It gives the EU practically full control over the funding required to set up a European SST service. Some Member States would welcome higher funding from the EU as this guarantees the setting up of an EU SST service and would give tem the choice of either invest further in SST or in other space projects. || As sole contributor, the EU has a higher responsibility for the overall system and in particular it has to supervise the acquisition of new assets. As the EU funding for SST is to be redeployed from other sources, the amount required under this option can only be made available through very significant cuts in other programmes and would require very difficult trade offs.

A further comparison on the effectiveness,
efficiency and coherence of the different options is provided in the IA report.

7.           Monitoring and evaluation

A mid-term and ex-post evaluation will be
carried out. As far as monitoring is concerned, the Commission will ensure that
grant agreements or contracts under the framework of the proposed initiative
provide for supervision and financial control by the Commission, if necessary
by means of on-the-spot checks, sample checks, and audits by the Court of
Auditors.

In addition to the financial supervision,
the Commission will put in place mechanisms to ensure the continuous quality of
the SST services provided. This will be realised by measuring users'
satisfaction on one side and by technical audits on the other side. The IA
report presents a table with objectives and their corresponding indicators. As
regards anti-fraud, the EU funding contribution is proposed to be provided
through grant agreements which will allow for appropriate financial control
through the Commission.

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