Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

ISSN 1725-2431
## C 42 E
# Official Journal
#### of the European Union

**Volume 57**
##### English edition Information and Notices 13 February 2014

_Notice to reader_

This publication contains written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers
given by a European Union institution.
For each question and answer, the original language version is presented before a possible translation.
In some cases, it is possible that the answer is given in a language other than the question. This depends
on the working language of the committee requested to provide the answer.
These questions and answers are published in accordance with Rules 117 and 118 of the Rules of
Procedure of the European Parliament.
All questions and answers can be accessed via the website of the European Parliament (Europarl) under
the heading ‘Parliamentary questions’:
_http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html_

_ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR POLITICAL GROUPS_
PPE Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the
European Parliament
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
NI Non-attached Members

### **EN**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 1

IV

_(Notices)_

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES

AND AGENCIES

###### EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

**WRITTEN QUESTIONS WITH ANSWER**

**Written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given**

**by a European Union institution**

(2014/C 42 E/01)

**Contents** **Page**

**E-005854/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Sport and cannabis — athletes' health undermined

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 23
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 24

**E-005855/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and India, and the threat to access to care in least developed
countries (LDCs)

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 25
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 27

**E-005856/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of dimethylamylamine (DMAA) in food supplements

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 29
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 31

**E-005857/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Follow-up to Written Question E-002798/2013

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 33
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 34

**E-005858/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Drop in lending and high borrowing costs for SMEs

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 35
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 37

**E-005859/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Lending to SMEs by Spain's nationalised banks

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 38
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 39

C 42 E / 2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-005860/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Science funding in Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 40
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 41

**P-005861/13** by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Evaluation of the implementation of a VAT exemption for small businesses in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 42
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 43

**P-005862/13** by Cecilia Wikström to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission proposal on mutual recognition of the effects of civil status documents

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 44
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 45

**E-005863/13** by Izaskun Bilbao Barandica to the Commission
_Subject:_ Delay in EU-funded priority corridor works

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 46
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 48

**E-005864/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Minimum guaranteed income

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 50
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 51

**E-005865/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Access to medicines

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 52
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 53

**E-005866/13** by Pablo Zalba Bidegain to the Commission
_Subject:_ Proliferation of protectionist measures in the steel trade

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 54
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 55

**E-005867/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Drugs online

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 56
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 57

**E-005868/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ Spread of the dangerous drug ‘shisha’

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 58
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 59

**E-005869/13** by Franziska Katharina Brantner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Additional financial support for Egypt: EUR 200 million top-up in the hope of a greater return on
investment

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 60
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 62

**E-005870/13** by Bastiaan Belder to the Commission
_Subject:_ Accidents in the chemical industry

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 63
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 64

**E-005871/13** by Silvia-Adriana Ţicău to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implementation and revision of the Urban Mobility Action Plan

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 65
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 66

**E-005872/13** by George Sabin Cutaş to the Commission
_Subject:_ Youth Guarantee

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 67
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 68

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 3

**E-005873/13** by Philippe Lamberts to the Commission
_Subject:_ Legal obligation for the Commission to disclose the methodologies, assumptions and relevant
parameters that underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 69
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 71

**E-005874/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Social Fund resources available to support young people

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 73
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 74

**E-005875/13** by Niccolò Rinaldi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Need for sufficient EU data on homelessness

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 75
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 77

**E-005876/13** by Niccolò Rinaldi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rights of European citizens who become homeless in another EU Member State while exercising their
right of free movement

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 79
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 81

**E-005877/13** by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Vaccine protection — improving coverage and raising awareness

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 83
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 85

**E-005878/13** by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Lobbying in schools

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 86
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 87

**E-005879/13** by Angelika Werthmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ Violation of human rights because of austerity measures

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 88
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 89

**E-005880/13** by Ivo Belet to the Commission
_Subject:_ Intelligent Speed Adaptation

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 90
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 91

**E-005881/13** by Ricardo Cortés Lastra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Dairy sector in Cantabria

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 92
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 93

**E-005882/13** by Isabelle Thomas and Eric Andrieu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rules of procedure of Regional Advisory Councils

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 94
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 95

**P-005883/13** by Niccolò Rinaldi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Roma Capitale budget deficit

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 96
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 97

**E-005886/13** by Jens Rohde to the Commission
_Subject:_ Deadlines for consultations

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 98
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 99

C 42 E / 4 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-005887/13** by Laurence J.A.J. Stassen to the Commission
_Subject:_ Detrimental impact of quotas for numbers of women on turnover and profits

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 100
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 101

**E-005888/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Threat by Fatah against friendly football matches

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 102
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 103

**E-005889/13** by Eider Gardiazábal Rubial to the Commission
_Subject:_ Financial instruments and release of savings for medium- and long-term projects

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 104
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 105

**E-005890/13** by Eider Gardiazábal Rubial to the Commission
_Subject:_ Financial instruments and the legal environment for the treatment of long-term investments

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 106
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 107

**E-005891/13** by Daciana Octavia Sârbu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Novel coronavirus — recommendations

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 108
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 109

**E-005892/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Arrears in the Spanish financial sector

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 110
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 111

**E-005893/13** by Martina Anderson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Irish Bank Resolution Corporation

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 112

**E-005894/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Comments by the European Central Bank on the financial transaction tax

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 113
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 114

**E-005895/13** by Anne Delvaux to the Commission
_Subject:_ Proposals on seed registration

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 115
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 116

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 5

**E-005896/13** by Mário David, Alexandra Thein, Burkhard Balz, Oldřich Vlasák, Filip Kaczmarek, Salvador Sedó
i Alabart, Nuno Teixeira, Roberta Metsola, Ivo Vajgl, Lara Comi, Inese Vaidere, Rolandas Paksas, Libor Rouček,
Paul Rübig, Niccolò Rinaldi, Marc Tarabella, Tunne Kelam, Antonio Cancian, Angelika Niebler, Ismail Ertug,
Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Krzysztof Lisek, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Paulo Rangel, Michael
Gahler, David Casa, Jacek Protasiewicz, Eduard Kukan, Elena Oana Antonescu, Diogo Feio, Cristian Dan Preda,
Antonio López-Istúriz White, Charles Tannock and Anne Delvaux to the Council
_Subject:_ Inclusion of the United Arab Emirates in the visa-free Schengen area

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 117
České znění ........................................................................................................................................................................ 118
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 119
Eestikeelne versioon ......................................................................................................................................................... 120
Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 121
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 123
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 125
Latviešu valodas versija .................................................................................................................................................... 127
Tekstas lietuvių kalba ....................................................................................................................................................... 128
Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 129
Verżjoni Maltija ................................................................................................................................................................. 130
Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 131
Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 132
Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 133

Slovenské znenie ............................................................................................................................................................... 134

Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 135
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 136

**E-005897/13** by Mário David, Alexandra Thein, Burkhard Balz, Oldřich Vlasák, Filip Kaczmarek, Salvador Sedó
i Alabart, Nuno Teixeira, Roberta Metsola, Ivo Vajgl, Lara Comi, Inese Vaidere, Rolandas Paksas, Libor Rouček,
Paul Rübig, Niccolò Rinaldi, Marc Tarabella, Tunne Kelam, Antonio Cancian, Angelika Niebler, Ismail Ertug,
Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Krzysztof Lisek, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Paulo Rangel, Michael
Gahler, David Casa, Jacek Protasiewicz, Eduard Kukan, Elena Oana Antonescu, Diogo Feio, Cristian Dan Preda,
Antonio López-Istúriz White, Charles Tannock and Anne Delvaux to the Commission
_Subject:_ Inclusion of the United Arab Emirates in the visa-free Schengen area

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 137
České znění ........................................................................................................................................................................ 139
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 141
Eestikeelne versioon ......................................................................................................................................................... 143
Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 145
Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 147
Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 149
Latviešu valodas versija .................................................................................................................................................... 151
Tekstas lietuvių kalba ....................................................................................................................................................... 153
Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 154
Verżjoni Maltija ................................................................................................................................................................. 156
Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 158
Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 160
Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 162

Slovenské znenie ............................................................................................................................................................... 164

Slovenska različica ............................................................................................................................................................ 166
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 168

**E-005898/13** by Ádám Kósa to the Commission
_Subject:_ UN Disability Convention and the problem of Treaty infringement proceedings

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 170
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 171

**E-005899/13** by Joachim Zeller to the Commission
_Subject:_ Aid for biogas plants in Greece

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 172
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 173

**E-005900/13** by Pier Antonio Panzeri to the Commission
_Subject:_ Nokia Siemens restructuring, with reference to a previous question on the same subject (E006739/2012)

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 174
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 175

C 42 E / 6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-005902/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Follow-up question concerning animal transport — number of animals inspected during transport in
Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 176
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 177

**E-005903/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Oceanogràfic in Valencia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 178
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 179

**E-005904/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Shale gas and energy dependency

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 180
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 182

**E-005905/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Rohingya in Burma

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 183
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 184

**E-005906/13** by Janusz Wojciechowski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Long-distance transport of unweaned calves

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 185
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 187

**E-005910/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Council
_Subject:_ Employment prospects for young people

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 188
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 190

**E-005911/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Employment prospects for young people

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 192
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 193

**E-005912/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Culling of geese near Amsterdam Airport

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 194
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 195

**E-005913/13** by Lorenzo Fontana to the Commission
_Subject:_ Forced evictions in Brazil

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 196
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 197

**E-005914/13** by Lorenzo Fontana to the Commission
_Subject:_ Convictions of activists in Vietnam

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 198
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 199

**E-005915/13** by Janusz Wojciechowski to the Commission
_Subject:_ Amount of beef produced in the EU and beef trade between the EU and non-EU countries

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 200
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 201

**E-005919/13** by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Handling of EU funds

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 202
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 203

**E-005920/13** by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Asylum abuse through visa-free travel

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 204
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 205

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 7

**E-005921/13** by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data protection in connection with cloud computing

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 206
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 207

**E-005922/13** by Andreas Mölzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU-wide asylum system

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 208
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 209

**E-005923/13** by Sabine Lösing to the Commission
_Subject:_ Content and results of the EU-US law enforcement conference

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 210
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 211

**E-005924/13** by Fiorello Provera to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Continued intimidation of Mozabite minority in Algeria

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 212
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 213

**E-005926/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Council
_Subject:_ Infringement of the directive on protected sites in Cós Nou

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 214
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 215

**E-005927/13** by Norbert Neuser and Knut Fleckenstein to the Commission
_Subject:_ European directive for unmanned aircraft — Euro Hawk drone

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 216
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 218

**E-005928/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Solar panel roads

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 219
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 220

**E-005929/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Food speculation

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 221
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 222

**E-005930/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Consequences for the EU of the attack in Woolwich

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 223
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 224

**E-005931/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Peace talks in Syria

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 225
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 226

**E-005932/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Call to arm Syrian rebel forces

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 227
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 228

**E-005933/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Seventh Pacific Alliance summit

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 229
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 230

**E-005934/13** by Diogo Feio to the Commission
_Subject:_ Radical Islamism — restricting access to websites

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 231
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 232

C 42 E / 8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**P-005935/13** by Isabella Lövin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Extent of ‘flag-hopping’ by EU vessels

Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 233
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 234

**P-005936/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU-flagged fishing vessels

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 235
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 236

**E-005937/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Council
_Subject:_ Access to culture for the visually impaired

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 237
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 238

**E-005938/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Access to culture for the visually impaired

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 239
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 240

**E-005939/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Failure to comply with entry prices and quotas for Moroccan tomatoes

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 241
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 242

**E-005940/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Concern over the rise in late payments

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 243
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 245

**E-005941/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tax evasion

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 247
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 248

**E-005942/13** by Izaskun Bilbao Barandica to the Commission
_Subject:_ Extension to the useful life of the Santa María de Garoña nuclear power plant

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 249
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 251

**E-005944/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Council
_Subject:_ Euroscepticism

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 253
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 254

**E-005945/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Euroscepticism

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 255
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 256

**E-005946/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Electricity prices in Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 257
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 258

**E-005947/13** by Eva Ortiz Vilella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Decision on retroactive anti-dumping measures against imports of mandarins from China

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 259
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 260

**E-005948/13** by Ole Christensen to the Commission
_Subject:_ Follow-up question to the Commission on the interpretation of driving licence rules for drivers with
epilepsy

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 261
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 262

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 9

**E-005949/13** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Need to recognise in practice the specific situation in Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 263
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 264

**E-005950/13** by Nikolaos Chountis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Real estate transfer tax on the sale of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE)

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 265
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 266

**E-005951/13** by Glenis Willmott to the Commission
_Subject:_ UK Enterprise and Regulatory Bill & EU health & safety law

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 267

**E-005952/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Restrictions on the free movement of capital in Cyprus (follow-up to Written Question E-003802/2013)

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 268
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 269

**E-005953/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Greece lays off 15 000 civil servants… in order to recruit in the same numbers at a later stage!

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 270
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 271

**E-005954/13** by Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rainwater recovery and recycling

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 272
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 273

**E-005955/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ EAFRD funds for irrigation projects

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 274
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 275

**E-005956/13** by Jürgen Creutzmann to the Commission
_Subject:_ VAT assessment of chain transactions in the EU internal market

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 276
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 277

**E-005957/13** by Nikos Chrysogelos to the Commission
_Subject:_ New developments concerning a real estate development scheme in a Natura 2000 site on Korinos beach
(Pieria)

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 278
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 280

**E-005959/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Schmallenberg virus spreading: livestock at risk

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 282
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 284

**E-005960/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ China: police halt a religious celebration in the village of Donglu

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 286
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 287

**E-005961/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Swedish model in crisis

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 288
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 289

**E-005962/13** by Mara Bizzotto to the Commission
_Subject:_ Economic situation in Croatia ahead of the country's accession on 1 July 2013

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 290
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 292

C 42 E / 10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**P-005963/13** by Metin Kazak to the Commission
_Subject:_ Longstanding problem of Bulgarian and Turkish hauliers in road transportation

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 294
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 295

**E-005964/13** by Catherine Bearder to the Commission
_Subject:_ Greek judiciary system

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 296

**E-005965/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Safety of journalists in Azerbaijan

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 297
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 298

**E-005966/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Use of landmines in Yemen

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 299
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 300

**E-005967/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Stationing and operations of Russian troops in Transnistria

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 301
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 302

**E-005968/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian attempts to fence off South Ossetia

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 303
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 304

**E-005969/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian policy towards Azerbaijan

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 305
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 306

**E-005970/13** by Adam Bielan to the Commission
_Subject:_ Attempts to restrict employment rights in the EU

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 307
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 308

**E-005971/13** by Claude Moraes, Jan Philipp Albrecht, Dimitrios Droutsas, Sophia in 't Veld and Brian Simpson
to the Commission
_Subject:_ International Air Transport Association and the new distribution capability

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 309
Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 310
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 311
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 312

**E-005972/13** by Claude Moraes and Glenis Willmott to the Council
_Subject:_ Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 313

**E-005973/13** by Claude Moraes and Glenis Willmott to the Commission
_Subject:_ Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 314

**E-005974/13** by Lorenzo Fontana to the Commission
_Subject:_ Syria: lifting of the arms embargo, use of chemical weapons and bioterrorism

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 315
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 316

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 11

**E-005975/13** by Lorenzo Fontana to the Commission
_Subject:_ Twenty killed in clashes between the army and Muslim rebels in the Philippines

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 317
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 318

**E-005976/13** by Christine De Veyrac to the Commission
_Subject:_ Action to combat social dumping in the road cabotage sector

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 319
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 321

**E-005977/13** by Christine De Veyrac to the Commission
_Subject:_ Biodiversity: endangered species in the European Union

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 323
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 325

**E-005980/13** by Sandrine Bélier and Michèle Rivasi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Impact of development projects on a French Natura 2000 site which is also covered by the Water
Framework Directive

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 326
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 327

**E-005985/13** by Raimon Obiols to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — The political conflict in Syria and its consequences for the Middle East

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 328
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 329

**E-005986/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU subsidies for bullfighting

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 330
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 331

**E-005987/13** by Konstantinos Poupakis and Georgios Koumoutsakos to the Commission
_Subject:_ More effective measures to prevent, treat and raise awareness of cystic fibrosis

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 332
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 334

**E-005988/13** by François Alfonsi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Funding for the Lyon-Turin high-speed rail link project

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 335
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 337

**E-005989/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Reliability of Spanish GDP

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 339
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 340

**E-005990/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Council
_Subject:_ Tax harmonisation

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 341
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 342

**E-005991/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Commission
_Subject:_ Tax harmonisation

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 343
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 344

**E-005993/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of cartridges loaded with buckshot

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 345
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 346

**E-005994/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Commission
_Subject:_ Copyright and cultural content on the Internet

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 347
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 348

C 42 E / 12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-005995/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fraud control

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 349
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 350

**E-005996/13** by Véronique Mathieu Houillon to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data roaming services — Cost of mobile networks abroad

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 351
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 352

**E-005997/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fuel prices: collusion and rigging

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 353
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 354

**E-005998/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ EIB contribution to measures necessary for the implementation of development cooperation policy

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 355
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 356

**E-005999/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Exclusion of the canned tuna sector from any trade agreement between the EU and Thailand

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 357
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 358

**E-006000/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Baixo Mondego: operations in zones irrigated by the lower part of the Mondego river

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 359
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 360

**E-006001/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ State of play in negotiations towards an EU-Gabon fisheries agreement

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 361
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 362

**E-006002/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Privatisation of EGF — Aguas de Portugal

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 363
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 364

**E-006003/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Integrated combined municipal waste water system in the Setubal peninsula — ETAR Barreiro/Moita (III)

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 365
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 366

**E-006005/13** by João Ferreira and Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ Redundancies recently announced by European multinationals

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 367
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 369

**E-006006/13** by João Ferreira and Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ International Day of Families — how families are being affected by the crisis

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 370
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 371

**E-006007/13** by João Ferreira and Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Closure of Guantánamo prison and release of detainees held without formal charges

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 372
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 373

**E-006008/13** by João Ferreira and Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ New record unemployment and the coverage and amount of unemployment benefit in Portugal

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 374
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 376

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 13

**E-006009/13** by João Ferreira and Inês Cristina Zuber to the Commission
_Subject:_ Wage share in national income

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 377
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 379

**E-006010/13** by Matteo Salvini and Giancarlo Scottà to the Commission
_Subject:_ Ineffective action to combat swine vesicular disease (SVD) in southern Italy and damage to the Italian
animal farming sector

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 381
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 382

**E-006011/13** by Alain Cadec to the Commission
_Subject:_ Composition of joint committees set up to negotiate fisheries agreements with third countries

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 383
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 384

**E-006012/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Digital levy in Spain

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 385
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 386

**E-006013/13** by Daniël van der Stoep to the Commission
_Subject:_ Greece repeatedly stocking up its gold reserves

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 387
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 388

**E-006014/13** by Chris Davies to the Commission
_Subject:_ Carbon capture and storage (CCS) pilot plant

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 389

**E-006015/13** by João Ferreira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission's blocking of a credit line for Portuguese SMEs

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 390
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 391

**E-006016/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Law on women's rights in Afghanistan

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 392
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 394

**E-006017/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ Need to combat illegal ivory trade which also allegedly funds terrorism and armed groups

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 395
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 396

**E-006018/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Construction of a nuclear research reactor in Iran

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 397
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 398

**E-006019/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Proposed restrictions on alcohol sales in Turkey

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 399
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 400

**E-006020/13** by Fiorello Provera and Charles Tannock to the Council
_Subject:_ Terror attack in Woolwich, London (UK)

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 401
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 402

**E-006021/13** by María Irigoyen Pérez to the Commission
_Subject:_ Spanish law on mortgagor protection measures, debt restructuring and social housing

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 403
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 404

C 42 E / 14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-006023/13** by Regina Bastos and Carlos Coelho to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of IP tracking by Internet sites

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 405
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 407

**E-006024/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Equens marketing reports

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 408
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 410

**E-006025/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ ‘Green energy’ versus ‘nuclear power’

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 412
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 413

**E-006026/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ Increase in trafficking in human beings

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 414
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 415

**E-006027/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ Standardising the criteria for, and the whole process of, qualifying as an auditor in the European Union

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 416
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 417

**P-006030/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Block on Brazilian meat entering the European Union

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 418
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 419

**E-006032/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Commission
_Subject:_ Unanswered question: Conflicting statements by Commissioner Füle and EU Special Representative León
on ‘more for more’ and Egypt

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 420
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 421

**E-006033/13** by Auke Zijlstra to the Commission
_Subject:_ Freedoms guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 422
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 423

**E-006034/13** by Brian Simpson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fraudulent use of EU funds

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 424

**E-006035/13** by Marina Yannakoudakis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Competition in the French ski tourism industry

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 425

**E-006036/13** by Mikael Gustafsson and Barbara Lochbihler to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriage and girls' education

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 426
Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 427
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 428

**E-006037/13** by Mikael Gustafsson and Barbara Lochbihler to the Commission
_Subject:_ Child marriage and girls' education

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 429
Svensk version ................................................................................................................................................................... 430
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 431

**E-006038/13** by Tiziano Motti to the Commission
_Subject:_ Use of European funding for reconstruction in Emilia-Romagna

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 432
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 433

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 15

**E-006039/13** by Tiziano Motti to the Commission
_Subject:_ Seizure of pets

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 434
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 435

**E-006041/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ Development finance institution in Portugal

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 436
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 437

**E-006042/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Energy Policy

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 438
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 439

**E-006043/13** by Nuno Teixeira to the Commission
_Subject:_ The EU and refugees from the civil war in Syria

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 440
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 441

**E-006044/13** by Hannu Takkula to the Commission
_Subject:_ Compensation for damage caused by large predators

Suomenkielinen versio ..................................................................................................................................................... 442
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 443

**P-006045/13** by Saïd El Khadraoui to the Commission
_Subject:_ Taxation

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 444
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 445

**E-006046/13** by Willy Meyer to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Involvement of civil society in the peace process in Colombia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 446
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 447

**E-006047/13** by Willy Meyer to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian and Turkish positions on attacks on Syria

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 448
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 449

**E-006048/13** by Willy Meyer to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Lifting of the arms embargo on Syria

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 450
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 451

**E-006049/13** by Willy Meyer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Worldwide protest against Monsanto

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 452
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 453

**E-006050/13** by Raül Romeva i Rueda, Ana Miranda and Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Platform for Catalonia

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 454
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 455

**E-006052/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells to the Commission
_Subject:_ Exorbitant bank fees

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 456
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 457

**E-006053/13** by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells and Raül Romeva i Rueda to the Council
_Subject:_ Consumer information

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 458
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 459

C 42 E / 16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-006055/13** by Jo Leinen to the Commission
_Subject:_ Dumping of nuclear waste at sea

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 460
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 461

**E-006056/13** by Anna Rosbach to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rules regarding gifts from companies in the pharmaceutical and medical devices sectors

Dansk udgave .................................................................................................................................................................... 462
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 463

**E-006057/13** by Jim Higgins to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU bathing water quality standards

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 464

**E-006058/13** by Patrice Tirolien to the Commission
_Subject:_ Food security in Europe

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 465
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 467

**E-006059/13** by Saïd El Khadraoui to the Commission
_Subject:_ Valuation

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 468
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 469

**E-006060/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ Regulation of charges applied by chain stores to Bulgarian producers

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 470
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 471

**E-006061/13** by Dimitar Stoyanov to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bulgaria's and Romania's entry to Schengen

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 472
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 473

**E-006062/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Protection of greyhounds

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 474
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 475

**E-006066/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ iPhone sales

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 476
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 477

**E-006067/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Greenhouse gas emissions

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 478
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 480

**E-006068/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Commission
_Subject:_ Microsoft's purchase of Skype

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 481
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 482

**P-006069/13** by Anne Delvaux to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bee health

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 483
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 484

**P-006071/13** by Paul Murphy to the Commission
_Subject:_ Local Community Development programmes

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 485

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 17

**E-006072/13** by Francisco Sosa Wagner to the Commission
_Subject:_ Promoting European industry and the environmental protection of the coast

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 486
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 487

**E-006073/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Recent EU-Russia talks regarding discrimination and violence

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 488

**E-006074/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ EU fight against piracy

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 489

**E-006075/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Europe Day 2013

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 490

**E-006077/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Adoption of the euro by Member States

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 491

**E-006078/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Emergency Response Centre

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 492

**E-006079/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Accession of Moldova to the European Union

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 493

**E-006080/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Chemical weapons use in Syria

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 494

**E-006081/13** by James Nicholson to the Commission
_Subject:_ Implications of reducing discards on defined fisheries

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 495

**E-006124/13** by Zigmantas Balčytis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Solar cell utilisation in the EU

Tekstas lietuvių kalba ....................................................................................................................................................... 496
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 497

**E-006128/13** by Ivailo Kalfin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission proposal to reduce red tape

българска версия ............................................................................................................................................................... 498
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 499

**E-006129/13** by Sławomir Nitras to the Commission
_Subject:_ Modernisation of state aid control

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 500
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 501

**E-006130/13** by Sławomir Nitras to the Commission
_Subject:_ Ship recycling

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 502
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 504

**E-006131/13** by Maria do Céu Patrão Neves to the Commission
_Subject:_ Public consultation on the POSEI agriculture programme (Regulation (EC) No 247/2006)

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 506
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 507

C 42 E / 18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-006132/13** by Dominique Vlasto, Alain Cadec, Gaston Franco and Françoise Grossetête to the Commission
_Subject:_ Gangui fishing

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 508
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 509

**E-006133/13** by Martin Häusling to the Commission
_Subject:_ Welfare of dairy cows

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 510
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 511

**E-006134/13** by Maria do Céu Patrão Neves to the Commission
_Subject:_ Public consultation on the POSEI fisheries programme (Regulation (EC) No 791/2007)

Versão portuguesa ............................................................................................................................................................ 512
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 513

**E-006135/13** by Lena Kolarska-Bobińska to the Commission
_Subject:_ Labelling of animal-based ‘E-numbers’ on foodstuffs

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 514
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 516

**E-006136/13** by Michael Cramer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Discrimination when purchasing railway tickets in the Netherlands

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 517
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 518

**E-006137/13** by Pino Arlacchi to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria arms embargo

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 519
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 520

**E-006138/13** by Lorenzo Fontana to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rape, religious persecution and humanitarian emergency in Syria

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 521
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 522

**P-006139/13** by Derk Jan Eppink to the Commission
_Subject:_ De Gucht — Code of Conduct for Commissioners

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 523
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 524

**P-006140/13** by Chris Davies to the Commission
_Subject:_ Marketing of illegal Mercedes vehicles by Daimler

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 525

**E-006142/13** by Werner Langen to the Commission
_Subject:_ Honorary appointments

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 526
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 527

**E-006143/13** by Josef Weidenholzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Google Glass: Compatible with EC law?

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 528
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 529

**E-006144/13** by Josef Weidenholzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Social networks and data protection

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 530
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 531

**E-006145/13** by Josef Weidenholzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Telecom tariffs and net neutrality

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 532
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 533

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 19

**E-006146/13** by Josef Weidenholzer to the Commission
_Subject:_ Data throttling and the effects on social participation and the internal market

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 534
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 536

**P-006148/13** by Georgios Koumoutsakos to the Commission
_Subject:_ Imposition of fiscal discipline on agricultural direct payments

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 538
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 539

**E-006150/13** by Daciana Octavia Sârbu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Endocrine disrupters

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 540
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 541

**E-006151/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — EEAS missions 2012

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 542

**E-006152/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — 2012 EEAS missions

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 543

**E-006153/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Council
_Subject:_ Cost of staff missions 2012

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 544

**E-006154/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Council
_Subject:_ Council staff missions 2012

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 545

**E-006155/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cost of staff missions 2012

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 546

**E-006156/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Commission staff missions 2012

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 547

**E-006157/13** by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth to the Commission
_Subject:_ Turkey's EU candidacy

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 548

**E-006158/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Council
_Subject:_ Unanswered written question on ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and the EU cyber security strategy’

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 549
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 550

**E-006159/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Commission
_Subject:_ Unanswered written question on ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and the EU cyber security strategy’

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 551
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 552

**E-006160/13** by Marietje Schaake to the Council
_Subject:_ Unanswered question: ‘Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations’

Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 553
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 554

**E-006161/13** by Christine De Veyrac to the Commission
_Subject:_ Research: developing European drones

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 555
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 556

C 42 E / 20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-006162/13** by Christine De Veyrac to the Commission
_Subject:_ VP/HR — European drones for the European security and defence policy

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 557
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 559

**E-006164/13** by Niccolò Rinaldi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Arsenic in the water in the provinces of Rome, Latina and Viterbo

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 560
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 561

**E-006165/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Anti-counterfeiting application

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 562
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 563

**E-006166/13** by Cristiana Muscardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Cybercrime on the rise

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 564
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 566

**E-006167/13** by Elena Băsescu to the Commission
_Subject:_ Beneš decrees

Versiunea în limba română .............................................................................................................................................. 568
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 569

**E-006168/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ European Alliance for Apprenticeships

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 570
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 571

**E-006169/13** by Georgios Papanikolaou to the Commission
_Subject:_ ‘Europeana’ and works from Greece

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 572
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 573

**E-006170/13** by Ana Miranda to the Commission
_Subject:_ Fines for delays in adopting river basin management plans

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 574
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 575

**E-006171/13** by Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska to the Commission
_Subject:_ Discrepancies in the level of duty between the EU and Eastern European countries

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 576
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 578

**E-006172/13** by Marc Tarabella to the Council
_Subject:_ 2014 elections: an elected President for the Commission

Version française ............................................................................................................................................................... 579
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 580

**P-006173/13** by Paul Rübig to the Commission
_Subject:_ Concession rules concerning direct lines for operators of small hydroelectric power plants

Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 581
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 582

**E-006174/13** by Csanád Szegedi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Union problems associated with tumorous diseases

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 583
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 585

**E-006175/13** by Csanád Szegedi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Access to cross-border healthcare

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 587
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 588

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 21

**E-006176/13** by Csanád Szegedi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Free movement of health sector employees

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 589
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 590

**E-006177/13** by Csanád Szegedi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Syrian conflict

Magyar változat ................................................................................................................................................................. 591
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 592

**E-006178/13** by Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa to the Commission
_Subject:_ GMOs, protection of intellectual property rights and economic relations in the context of the
negotiations on an EU-US free trade agreement

Wersja polska .................................................................................................................................................................... 593
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 594

**E-006179/13** by Sophia in 't Veld, Timothy Kirkhope, Birgit Sippel, Carmen Romero López and Axel Voss to the
Commission
_Subject:_ Russia and other third countries using passenger name record (PNR) systems

Versión española ............................................................................................................................................................... 595
Deutsche Fassung .............................................................................................................................................................. 596
Nederlandse versie ............................................................................................................................................................ 597
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 598

**P-006180/13** by Kriton Arsenis to the Commission
_Subject:_ Suspension of water supplies to the unemployed

Ελληνική έκδοση ................................................................................................................................................................. 599
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 600

**P-006181/13** by Emma McClarkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Falsified Medicines Directive

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 601

**P-006182/13** by Anna Záborská to the Commission
_Subject:_ Written Question E-007514/2012: confirmation of absence of a legal basis in the TFEU for use of the
term ‘gender’

Slovenské znenie ............................................................................................................................................................... 602
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 603

**E-006183/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Hepatitis A alert in the EU: frozen berries from third countries

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 604
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 606

**E-006184/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ After Iran, Bangladesh: the drinking-water emergency in developing countries

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 607
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 609

**E-006185/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Abuse of indigenous populations occurring in the context of Clean Development Mechanism projects

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 611
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 612

**E-006186/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Vitamin B as a cure for Alzheimer's disease

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 613
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 614

**E-006187/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Treatment for autism found: many Italian families are forced to seek treatment for their children outside
the EU

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 615
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 616

C 42 E / 22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

**E-006188/13** by Oreste Rossi to the Commission
_Subject:_ Rare earths: how to make Europe self-sufficient and to protect the peoples of underdeveloped countries

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 617
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 619

**E-006189/13** by Elisabetta Gardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Importation of construction machinery that does not comply with EU directives

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 621
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 622

**E-006190/13** by Elisabetta Gardini to the Commission
_Subject:_ Construction machinery register

Versione italiana ................................................................................................................................................................ 623
English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 625

**E-006191/13** by Marian Harkin to the Commission
_Subject:_ Bus routes in Ireland

English version .................................................................................................................................................................. 626

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 23

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005854/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Sport e cannabis: la salute degli sportivi è compromessa

Nonostante una prima risoluzione del Consiglio sulla cannabis, adottata nel 2004 (CORDROGUE 59), e la recente
raccomandazione del Consiglio (GU C 402 del 29 dicembre 2012, pag. 1), che prevede una Strategia dell'UE in
materia di droga (2013-2020), chiedano espressamente agli Stati membri di adottare misure per scoraggiare l'uso
personale di cannabis, nell'ambito del quadro giuridico internazionale delineato dalle Convenzioni ONU pertinenti la
WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency) ha di recente innalzato la soglia oltre la quale gli sportivi sono considerati
dopati. Il THC (principio attivo della cannabis) è stato innalzato da 15 a 150 nanogrammi per millilitro nelle urine, al
fine di colpire solo chi utilizza tale sostanza nelle ore precedenti la competizione e non per uso personale. I potenziali
effetti della cannabis sono noti: è considerata un potente calmante, rilassa e diminuisce lo stress; in particolare, tali
effetti potrebbero essere amplificati dalla pressione sociale e mediatica che accompagna le prestazioni a eventi
sportivi, incidendo sull'integrità fisica dell'atleta. Non vi è dubbio, infatti, che il senso di sollievo e tranquillità legato
all'assunzione di sostanze cannabinoidi crei nello sportivo che ne fa uso un senso di assuefazione fino alla dipendenza
e all'assunzione di sostanze sintetiche psicostimolanti (es. anfetamine). Inoltre vanno ricordati anche gli effetti
irreversibili a lungo termine che derivano dall'uso prolungato di cannabis, come ansia, panico, tachicardia,
allucinazioni, psicosi ossessive.

L’elenco delle sostanze proibite nelle competizioni (e il relativo punto S8) è stato approvato di recente dal Consiglio
europeo ed è entrato in vigore il 1 [o ] gennaio 2013; sono ormai noti gli effetti e i rischi per la salute che l'utilizzo di
cannabis provoca, anche sugli atleti, sia a livello fisico che psichico; il Consiglio ha adottato una Strategia dell'UE in
materia di droga (2013-2020) basata sulla cooperazione e sul coordinamento tra Stati membri e organizzazioni
internazionali.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione far sapere:

—
Quale posizione assume nei confronti della recente decisione della WADA di innalzare la soglia di THC per gli
atleti impegnati nelle competizioni sportive;

—
Se non ritenga un paradosso promuovere una decisa ed energica campagna contro il fumo di sigarette e, al
tempo stesso, appoggiare una deroga per l'uso di cannabinoidi nelle competizioni sportive;

—
Se intenda rivedere le linee guida per intraprendere la strada dell'armonizzazione dello status legale della
cannabis medicinale a uso sportivo?

**Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione**

_(26 luglio 2013)_

Poiché l’Agenzia mondiale antidoping è un’organizzazione non governativa, le sue politiche non prevalgono sulla
normativa o sulle politiche dell’Unione e degli Stati membri. Esse mirano soprattutto a prevenire l’utilizzo di sostanze
o metodi in grado di migliorare le prestazioni sportive. La Commissione prende posizione in merito alle politiche
dell'Agenzia mondiale antidoping unicamente nei casi in cui la normativa applicabile dell'Unione, i diritti
fondamentali o i principi giuridici fondamentali siano compromessi. Non sembra che ciò riguardi la disposizione
menzionata dall’onorevole parlamentare.

Per quanto riguarda la terza domanda, spetta agli Stati membri elaborare e attuare politiche relative al consumo di
droghe (in particolare riguardo alla prevenzione, alla terapia o alla riduzione del danno connesse all'uso di sostanze
stupefacenti) così da poterle adattare al meglio ai rispettivi contesti socio-economici e culturali. Spetta quindi agli Stati
membri attuare politiche in merito all’uso medico della cannabis.

C 42 E / 24 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005854/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Sport and cannabis — athletes' health undermined

Despite the fact that an initial Council resolution on cannabis, adopted in 2004 (CORDROGUE 59), and the recent
Council recommendation (OJ C 402, 29 December 2012, p.1) providing for an EU Drugs Strategy (2013 ‐2020)
expressly request Member States to take measures to discourage the personal use of cannabis, within the international
legal framework set out by the relevant UN Conventions, WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency) has recently raised the
threshold beyond which athletes are considered to be doped.

THC (the active ingredient in cannabis) has been increased from 15 to 150 nanogrammes per millilitre in urine, in
order to catch only those who use this substance just before the competition rather than for personal use. The
potential effects of cannabis are known: it is considered to be a powerful tranquilliser, relaxant and stress reducer.
These effects, in particular, could be amplified by the social and media pressure that accompanies athletes'
performance in sporting events, affecting their physical integrity. There is no doubt, in fact, that the sense of relief and
calm linked to the consumption of cannabinoids is habit-forming for the athletes that use them and can lead to
addiction and to the consumption of synthetic stimulants (e.g. amphetamines). In addition, it is worth pointing out
the long-term irreversible effects resulting from the prolonged use of cannabis, such as anxiety, panic attacks,
tachycardia, hallucinations and obsessive psychosis.

The list of substances that are prohibited in competition (and the relevant paragraph S8) was recently approved by the
European Council and entered into force on 1 January 2013. The effects of cannabis and the physical and mental
health risks it poses, even for athletes, are by now well known. The Council has adopted an EU Drugs Strategy (20132020) based on cooperation and coordination between Member States and international organisations.

In the light of the above, can the Commission say:

—
what its position is with regard to the recent decision by WADA to raise the threshold of THC for athletes
involved in sports competitions;

—
whether it does not consider it ironic to launch a strong and pro-active campaign against cigarette smoking
whilst at the same time supporting an exemption for the use of cannabinoids in sporting competitions;

—
whether it intends to revise its guidelines and embark upon the road towards harmonisation of the legal status
of cannabis for medicinal use in sports?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

As the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is an NGO, WADA policies do not overrule laws or policies of the EU
and its Member States. They are mainly aimed to prevent the use of substances or methods that have the potential to
enhance sport performance _._ The Commission does not take a position with regard to WADA's policies except when
enforceable EC law, fundamental rights or basic legal principles appear to be affected. This does not seem to be the
case with regard to the provision mentioned by the Honourable Member.

As to the third question, Member States are competent for developing and implementing policies regarding drug use
— in particular on drug prevention, treatment or harm reduction — that work best in their national socioeconomic
and cultural contexts. The medical use of cannabis is, therefore, a matter for the Member States.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 25

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005855/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Accordo di libero scambio tra l'Unione europea e l'India e minaccia per l'accesso alle cure nei paesi meno
sviluppati (PMS)

Ultimamente, vi sono indicazioni del fatto che l'Unione Europea e l'India potrebbero essere pronte a firmare l'accordo
di libero scambio (ALS), oggetto di discussione dal 2007. Mentre i negoziati si sono concentrati principalmente sulle
riduzioni dei dazi doganali per le automobili fabbricate nell'UE e sull'innalzamento del tetto per l'investimento diretto
estero (IDE) nel settore assicurativo dal 26 % al 49 %, un'importante questione pare essere stata tralasciata dalle parti
interessate, ossia l'accesso ai farmaci per i poveri. L'adozione dell'ALS comporterebbe, fra l'altro, l'estensione
dell'applicazione dell'accordo TRIPS (aspetti dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale attinenti al commercio) al settore della
salute, in particolare ai farmaci brevettati nei paesi sviluppati, nei quali i campi della ricerca e dello sviluppo di nuove
forme di assistenza medica sono più avanzati. Ciò garantirebbe la tutela degli interessi delle principali società
farmaceutiche multinazionali, compromettendo la sovranità e il diritto di accesso ai farmaci a basso costo dei PMS.

L'India è il principale produttore di farmaci generici, e quindi più economici, fornendo intorno all'80 % dei medicinali
utilizzati dagli enti benefici per combattere l'AIDS. Quasi metà della popolazione dei PMS non ha accesso ai farmaci di
cui ha bisogno. Un mercato parallelo per i farmaci generici stabile e affidabile potrebbe portare ad una riduzione
significativa dei prezzi. La Dichiarazione di Doha intende stabilire la priorità della sanità pubblica sui diritti di
proprietà intellettuale (PI) e specifica delle esenzioni, come il permesso per i paesi in via di sviluppo che sono privi di
capacità di produzione di importare farmaci brevettati, in caso di emergenza sanitaria nazionale. La spesa per i
farmaci nei PMS potrebbe rappresentare fino al 60 % della spesa sanitaria totale, indebolendo quindi gravemente il
reddito delle famiglie, vista l'assenza, in quasi tutti i PMS, di un sistema sanitario nazionale affidabile e di un quadro
normativo per i prezzi dei medicinali. Più del 96 % dei brevetti di medicinali è detenuto da società farmaceutiche dei
paesi sviluppati. La ricerca e lo sviluppo nel settore farmaceutico sono governati unicamente da criteri finanziari,
come il margine di profitto, e non dai bisogni reali della popolazione, in particolare quella dei PMS.

In considerazione di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

—
Quali garanzie sono poste in essere a tutela dei diritti di PI? In particolare, quale impatto avrà l'ALS sul settore
farmaceutico indiano?

—
È stata presa in considerazione una valutazione dell'impatto della produzione di farmaci a basso costo sui PMS?

—
Sono state valutate misure alternative per aiutare i PMS ad accedere ai farmaci di cui hanno bisogno (come
partenariati pubblico/privato per la produzione di medicinali)?

**Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione**

_(3 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione è al corrente dell'impiego dei farmaci generici per migliorare l'accesso ai medicinali e del ruolo svolto
dall'India a tale riguardo.

La Commissione desidera chiarire che la sua intenzione è che il capitolo riguardante i diritti di proprietà intellettuale
(PI) di un eventuale accordo di libero scambio (ALS) fra l'Unione europea e l'India si limiti a riflettere le legislazioni
delle due parti. Non è previsto che tale accordo introduca un'estensione della durata dei brevetti o l'esclusività dei dati,
per cui non avrà ripercussione alcuna sul settore farmaceutico indiano.

Per quanto riguarda la questione più ampia dell'accesso ai medicinali nei paesi in via di sviluppo, si osservi che:

—
quando negozia accordi commerciali bilaterali con paesi terzi, l'UE tiene debitamente conto del loro livello di
sviluppo;

—
l'UE ha recentemente dato il suo assenso all'OMC per prorogare ulteriormente l'esenzione di cui beneficiano i
paesi meno sviluppati per quanto riguarda l'attuazione dell'accordo TRIPS;

—
l'UE (con i suoi Stati membri) è il principale finanziatore del Fondo globale per la lotta contro l'AIDS, la
tubercolosi e la malaria e dell'alleanza GAVI per l'immunizzazione;

C 42 E / 26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

—
l'UE è uno dei principali finanziatori del partenariato CE/ACP ( [1] )/OMS ( [2] ) sulle politiche farmaceutiche, che mira
a sviluppare le politiche sanitarie nazionali e a migliorare l'accesso ai farmaci essenziali per i paesi ACP;

—
l'UE sostiene inoltre lo sviluppo di medicinali per le tre principali malattie legate alla povertà attraverso il
partenariato Europa-Paesi in via di sviluppo per gli studi clinici nell'Africa subsahariana e il Settimo programma
quadro di ricerca dell'UE;

—
l'UE ha contribuito all'aggiornamento della relazione 2013 dell'OMS sui medicinali prioritari per i cittadini
d'Europa e del mondo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ACP = gruppo degli Stati dell'Africa, dei Caraibi e del Pacifico.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OMS = Organizzazione mondiale della sanità.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 27

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005855/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and India, and the threat to access to care in least developed
countries (LDCs)

In recent days, there have been indications that the EU and India may be ready to sign the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
that has been on the table since 2007. While negotiations have mainly focused on duty cuts for EU-manufactured
automobiles and raising the cap for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the insurance sector from 26% to 49%, a big
issue appears to have been overlooked by the relevant parties, namely access to medicines for poor people. Adoption
of the FTA would involve, among other things, extending the application of the TRIPS Agreement (trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights) to the health sector, in particular to medicines patented in developed countries,
where research and development for new forms of care is more advanced. This would result in the interests of major
multinational pharmaceutical companies being protected, while undermining the sovereignty and the right to access
cheap medicines of LDCs.

India is the world’s primary supplier of generic, and therefore cheaper, medicines, supplying roughly 80% of the drugs
used by charity programmes to combat AIDS. Nearly half of the people living in LDCs do not have access to the
medicines they need. A stable and reliable parallel market for generic medicines could lead to a significant drop in
prices. The Doha Declaration sought to prioritise public health over Intellectual Property (IP) rights and specified
dispensations, such as allowing developing countries lacking production capacity the possibility to import patented
medicines in the case of a national health emergency. Spending on drugs in LDCs can constitute as much as 60% of
total health expenditure, thereby severely weakening the income of families, with almost all LDCs lacking a
trustworthy national health service and regulatory framework for medicine prices. More than 96% of drug patents are
held by companies in developed countries. Research and development in the pharmaceutical sector is driven only by
financial criteria, such as mark-up and not by real population needs, in particular those of LDCs.

In light of the above, could the Commission answer the following:

—
What safeguards are in place for the protection of IP rights? In particular, what impact will the FTA have on
India’s pharmaceutical sector?

—
Is an assessment of the impact on LDCs of the supply of cheap medicines being considered?

—
Are alternative measures to help LDCs access the medicines they need (such as private-public partnerships for
manufacturing drugs) being evaluated?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2013)_

The Commission is well aware of the use of generics in improving access to medicines, and of the role played by India
in this respect.

The Commission wishes to clarify that it is its intention that the intellectual property rights (IPR) chapter of any EUIndia FTA will merely reflect both parties' legislations. It is not intended that it will introduce patent term restoration
extension nor data exclusivity, so will thus have no impact whatsoever on India’s pharmaceutical sector.

Regarding the broader issue of access to medicines in developing countries, it may be noted that:

—
in negotiating bilateral trade agreements with third countries, the EU duly takes their level of development into

account;

—
the EU recently agreed to the WTO further extending the waiver enjoyed by LDCs regarding the
implementation of the TRIPS agreement;

—
the EU (with its Member States) is the biggest contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria and to the GAVI Alliance supporting immunisation for all;

C 42 E / 28 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

—
the EU is a major contributor to the EC/ACP ( [1] )/WHO ( [2] ) Partnership on Pharmaceutical Policies aiming to
develop national health policies and improve access to essential medicines for the ACP countries;

—
the EU is also supporting the development of medicines for the three main poverty-related diseases through the
Europe and Developing Countries Clinical Trial Partnership in sub-Saharan Africa and the EU 7th Research
Framework Programme;

—
The EU contributed to the update of the WHO's report on Priority Medicines for Europe and the World 2013.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) WHO = World Health Organisation.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 29

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005856/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Utilizzo della dimetilamilamina (DMAA) in integratori alimentari

La dimetilamilamina, o DMAA, è un composto, ottenuto con un processo di sintesi chimica, che si ritiene derivi
originariamente dalle radici di geranio. Questa sostanza è sovente contenuta in integratori alimentari prodotti con lo
scopo di far perdere peso e migliorare la forma fisica, in quanto possiede proprietà simili all'anfetamina, farmaco con
diverse caratteristiche e che agisce, tra le altre cose, sulla concentrazione di dopamina. Questo neurotrasmettitore
svolge diverse funzioni fondamentali nel corpo umano, dato che agisce sull'apparato motorio e sui muscoli, sulla
capacità di concentrazione e di attenzione, sugli stimoli di ricompensa cerebrali e sull'umore. Per i motivi esposti, la
DMAA può trovare un largo impiego tra gli sportivi, in particolar modo chi svolge attività a livello professionistico e
ad altissimi livelli, dove è continuamente necessario oltrepassare i propri limiti e migliorare le performance. L'Agenzia
Mondiale Anti-Doping (WADA) ha perciò bandito, nel 2009, l'uso della DMAA.

Nonostante diversi enti governativi di regolamentazione dei farmaci nel mondo abbiano trattato la questione e
abbiano richiesto il non utilizzo di tale composto alle aziende produttrici, su tutte la «Food and Drug Administration»
(FDA) statunitense, ad oggi esistono in commercio integratori che contengono la DMAA, la quale, oltre al comune
nome dimetilamilamina, può essere menzionata anche in altri modi come «estratto di radice di geranio»,
«metilexanamina» ed altri, generando confusione tra i consumatori.

Considerato che vi sono state segnalazioni da parte di Stati membri, quali la Spagna e la Svezia, sulla
commercializzazione e sull'utilizzo, in particolar modo tra gli sportivi, di integratori alimentari contenti DMAA; che
negli Stati Uniti la FDA ha ricevuto notizia di 86 casi di malattie o morti riconducibili al composto chimico in
questione; che un ulteriore motivo di preoccupazione deriva dall'eventuale associazione della DMAA con altre
sostanze, come ad esempio la caffeina, dato che in tali casi si possono generare gravi complicazioni cardiovascolari;
che gli integratori alimentari, per quanto concerne i test di sicurezza, non sono considerati alla stessa stregua dei
farmaci,

si chiede alla Commissione:

—
Non ritiene opportuno rivedere la normativa inerente la produzione e commercializzazione di integratori
alimentari?

—
In che modo intende controllare i canali di vendita alternativi, internet su tutti?

—
Intende promuovere una campagna informativa a favore dei consumatori?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(1_ _[o]_ _luglio 2013)_

Nell'UE gli integratori alimentari sono disciplinati dalla direttiva 2002/46/CE ( [1] ) che stabilisce regole armonizzate per
l'etichettatura degli integratori alimentari e introduce regole specifiche sulle vitamine e i minerali presenti negli
integratori alimentari. Tali regole sono adeguate e non hanno bisogno di revisione.

Le regole relative all'uso di sostanze diverse dalle vitamine e dai minerali usate negli integratori alimentari, come ad
esempio la dimetilamilamina, non sono armonizzate e sono pertanto disciplinate da regolamenti nazionali, fatte salve
le disposizioni del trattato. Nel 2008 la Commissione ha presentato al Consiglio e al Parlamento europeo una
relazione sull'uso delle sostanze diverse dalle vitamine e dai minerali negli integratori alimentari. La relazione
giungeva alla conclusione che la Commissione non riteneva opportuno stabilire regole specifiche per le sostanze
diverse dalle vitamine o dai minerali. Essa però non escludeva la possibilità di effettuare successivamente un'analisi
supplementare per esaminare le condizioni per l'aggiunta di tali sostanze agli alimenti in generale.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2002/46/CE 2003 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 10 giugno 2002, per il ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati
membri relative agli integratori alimentari, GU L 183 del 12.7.2002, pag. 51.

C 42 E / 30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Il regolamento (CE) 178/2002 ( [2] ) stabilisce che non si devono immettere sul mercato alimenti che non siano sicuri;
per alimenti non sicuri s'intendono quelli nocivi per la salute o non idonei al consumo umano. In forza dello stesso
regolamento gli operatori del settore alimentare hanno la responsabilità di assicurare la conformità degli alimenti ai
requisiti della legislazione alimentare generale nelle aziende di cui detengono il controllo. Gli Stati membri fanno
rispettare la normativa, assicurano il monitoraggio e verificano che le pertinenti disposizioni della legislazione
alimentare siano rispettate dagli operatori del settore alimentare. Ciò vale per l'intera filiera alimentare e comprende
tutti i canali di vendita. Analogamente, l'eventuale opportunità di avviare una campagna di sensibilizzazione
all'indirizzo dei consumatori rientra nel potere discrezionale degli Stati membri.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) 178/2002 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 28 gennaio 2002, che stabilisce i principi e i requisiti generali della

legislazione alimentare, e istituisce l'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare e fissa procedure nel campo della sicurezza alimentare, GU L 31
dell'1.2.2002, pag. 1.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 31

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005856/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Use of dimethylamylamine (DMAA) in food supplements

Dimethylamylamine, or DMAA, is a chemically synthesised compound which is believed to derive originally from
geranium roots. This substance is often contained in food supplements designed to enhance weight loss and improve
physical fitness, as it has properties that are similar to those of amphetamines — drugs with various characteristics
which act, among other things, on the concentration of dopamine. This neurotransmitter performs several important
functions in the human body, since it affects the body's system of movement and muscles, concentration and
attention span, brain reward stimuli and mood. For these reasons, DMAA can be widely used among athletes,
especially professional or high-level athletes, who constantly have to exceed their limits and improve their
performance. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) thus banned the use of DMAA in 2009.

Despite the fact that several government drug regulation bodies around the world — first and foremost the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) — have dealt with this issue and have asked producers not to use this compound, there
are still supplements on the market that contain DMAA which, in addition to its common name dimethylamylamine,
may also be referred to as geranium root extract, methylhexaneamine and other names, thus confusing consumers.

Given that some Member States, such as Spain and Sweden, have reported that food supplements containing DMAA
are being marketed and used, particularly among athletes; given that in the United States the FDA has received reports
of 86 cases of disease or death attributable to the chemical in question and that a further cause for concern is the
possible association of DMAA with other substances, such as caffeine; given also that such cases can lead to serious
cardiovascular complications and that food supplements, as far as safety tests are concerned, are not treated in the
same way as medicines,

can the Commission answer the following questions:

—
Does it not think that the rules concerning the production and marketing of food supplements should be
revised?

—
How does it intend to monitor alternative sales channels, first and foremost the Internet?

—
Will it launch an awareness-raising campaign for consumers?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 July 2013)_

In the EU food supplements are regulated by Directive 2002/46/EC ( [1] ) which establishes harmonised rules for the
labelling of food supplements and introduces specific rules on vitamins and minerals in food supplements. These
rules are adequate and they do not need to be revised.

Rules for the use of substances other than vitamins and minerals used in food supplements, e.g. dimethylamylamine,
are not harmonised and therefore are governed by national rules, without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty. In
2008, the Commission submitted to the Council and the European Parliament a report on the use of substances other
than vitamins and minerals in food supplements. The report concluded that the Commission does not consider it
opportune to lay down specific rules for substances other than vitamins or minerals. However, it does not rule out the
possibility of carrying out a supplementary analysis to this report, at a later stage, examining the conditions for the
addition of these substances to foodstuffs in general.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2002/46/EC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to food supplements.

C 42 E / 32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Regulation (EC) 178/2002 ( [2] ) stipulates that food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe; unsafe food is
defined as either injurious to health or unfit for human consumption. According to the same Regulation food
business operators are responsible for compliance of foods with the requirements of general food law within the
business under their control. Member States shall enforce food law, monitor and verify that the relevant requirements
of food law are fulfilled by food business operators. This applies along the whole food chain, and includes all sales
channels. Similarly, the necessity of launching an awareness-raising campaign for consumers should, therefore, also
be considered by Member States.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 33

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005857/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Pregunta complementaria a la pregunta E-002798/2013

Preguntada sobre la posible manipulación de los precios del petróleo, la Comisión declaraba que «a falta de indicios
claros de que las empresas petroleras ejerzan prácticas contrarias a la competencia, no tiene por ahora intención de
investigar este fenómeno, no dudará en actuar si se presentan nuevas pruebas concluyentes».

En su respuesta, la Comisión también reconocía que distintos órganos nacionales de competencia han investigado el
caso, aunque sin resultados tangibles.

Por otro lado, el caso presentado ( [1] ) se produjo en la temporada de otoño de 2012, después de dichas investigaciones.

— ¿No considera la Comisión que una nueva investigación merece ser abierta debido a estos últimos datos?

— En vista de que diversos órganos nacionales de competencia han decidido investigar este tipo de casos, y que, por
lo tanto, existe la sospecha generalizada de que existe un problema, ¿no cree la Comisión que debería iniciar una
investigación propia?

— ¿Es cierto, como afirma este artículo ( [2] ), que el Gobierno español solo ha cumplido dos o tres de las medidas
propuestas por la Comisión Nacional de la Competencia para aumentar la competencia en el sector?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(9 de julio de 2013)_

Tras su respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-2798/2013, la Comisión puso en marcha una investigación sobre el
comportamiento de las empresas activas o que prestan servicios en los sectores del petróleo crudo, los productos
derivados del petróleo y los biocombustibles ( [3] ). La Comisión ha llevado a cabo inspecciones sin previo aviso y ha
recabado información de un gran número de empresas en el EEE. No obstante, aún es demasiado pronto para sacar
conclusiones sobre los resultados de la investigación, porque la información todavía se está recogiendo, procesando y
analizando.

La Comisión sigue supervisando la situación competitiva global del sector de los carburantes en España y en otros
Estados miembros de la UE.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://expansionpro.orbyt.es/2013/04/23/economia_y_fiscalidad/1366746794.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-435_en.htm

C 42 E / 34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005857/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Follow-up to Written Question E-002798/2013

When asked about the possibility that oil prices might be being manipulated, the Commission replied that ‘while the
Commission, in the absence of clear indications of anticompetitive practices by fuel companies, does not currently
intend to investigate this phenomenon, it will not hesitate to act if presented with new, compelling evidence’.

In its reply, the Commission also acknowledged that various national competition authorities had analysed such
cases, but with no conclusive results.

However, the case in question ( [1] ) relates to autumn 2012, after these investigations had taken place.

— Does the Commission not think it would be worth conducting a fresh investigation in light of recent data?

— Given that various national competition authorities have decided to investigate such cases and given the
widespread suspicion that a problem exists, does the Commission not think it ought to start its own investigation?

— Is it true that, as has been reported ( [2] ), the Spanish Government has implemented only two or three of the
measures proposed by the National Competition Commission with the aim of increasing competition in the sector?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

After its reply to Written Question E-2798/2013, the Commission launched an investigation into the behaviour of
companies active in and providing services to the crude oil, refined oil products and biofuels sectors ( [3] ). The
Commission has carried out unannounced inspections and sent requests for information to numerous companies
within the EEA. It is, however, too early to draw conclusions about the findings of the investigation, as the
information is still being collected, processed and analysed.

The Commission continues to monitor the overall competitive situation of the fuel sector in Spain as well as in other
EU Member States.

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://expansionpro.orbyt.es/2013/04/23/economia_y_fiscalidad/1366746794.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-435_en.htm

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 35

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005858/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Caída y alto coste del crédito a PYME

La caída del crédito a empresas y familias ha sido del 10,6 % en 2012. Existen distintos motivos que explican este
hecho, pero uno de ellos es la gran bajada en la tasa de aceptación de crédito por parte de la banca nacionalizada.

Además, actualmente el crédito a las PYME tiene diferenciales muy altos, de hasta 8 o 9 puntos por encima del Euríbor
y del interés que tienen que pagar competidoras similares en otros puntos del mercado único ( [1] ). No son pocas las
PYME que ven en peligro su viabilidad debido a estas restricciones en el crédito, perjudicando así las posibilidades de
que el Estado español vuelva a crecer a corto plazo.

A la luz de lo anterior:

—
¿Cree la Comisión que el diferencial de crédito que tienen que pagar las PYME españolas respecto las PYME de
otros países de la Unión supone una fragmentación del mercado único?

—
¿Qué medidas piensa tomar la Comisión Europea para que las PYME españolas puedan recibir crédito a un
diferencial que les permita competir en el mercado único en igualdad de condiciones?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(31 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión reconoce la existencia de una fragmentación del mercado financiero; los desafíos planteados por ella
están en el centro de la creación de la unión bancaria ( [2] ). Las divergencias entre los tipos de interés impuestos a las
PYME españolas y los de otros países se deben sobre todo al riesgo soberano y a las perspectivas macroeconómicas.
Los signos actuales de recuperación y la menor presión sobre la deuda soberana española podrían traducirse en una
mejora de las condiciones de crédito para las PYME españolas.

Por lo general, la UE dispone de instrumentos para relajar las condiciones de crédito para las PYME. Las PYME
españolas pueden encontrar apoyo a través del programa «Créditos para PYME» ( [3] ) del BEI ( [4] ), que facilita créditos a las
PYME por medio de bancos comerciales locales. Desde 2010 hasta 2012, el BEI puso a disposición de las PYME
españolas 6 275 millones de euros, con un volumen total de crédito en 2012 superior en un 76 % al del año anterior.
Además, el BEI ha obtenido un aumento de capital de 10 000 millones de euros, que reforzará la capacidad de
préstamo del grupo del BEI en otros 60 000 millones de euros ( [5] ) para el periodo 2013-2015 ( [6] ).

La Comisión está poniendo en marcha también una serie de instrumentos financieros, por ejemplo los instrumentos
de capital y de garantías de préstamo del actual programa PIC ( [7] ) ( [8] ). Con respecto al periodo 2014-2020, la Comisión
ha presentado propuestas para la nueva generación de instrumentos financieros, sobre todo en el marco de los nuevos
programas Cosme ( [9] ) y Horizonte 2020.

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⋅6∙ **|** )
⋅7∙ **|** )
⋅8∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/05/04/credito-a-las-pymes-si-pero-al-10-120146/
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) En agosto, cuando discutió el programa OMT, el Presidente del Banco Central Europeo presentó también pruebas que señalan el debilitamiento de

la integración de los mercados financieros. Véase http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/sme/index.htm
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Banco Europeo de Inversiones.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) De esta cantidad, entre 10 000 y 15 000 millones de euros irán destinados a las PYME.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Esto desbloqueará hasta 180 000 millones de euros de inversiones adicionales.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Programa Marco para la Innovación y la Competitividad 2007-2013.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) El PIC está gestionado por el Fondo Europeo de Inversiones (FEI) en nombre de la Comisión Europea y está disponible para las PYME a través de

intermediarios financieros, como los bancos, las sociedades de garantía recíproca y los fondos de capital riesgo. En España, el FEI coopera con
CERSA, que ofrece contragarantías relacionadas con créditos, y la Caixa, que ofrece instrumentos de microcrédito y cuasicapital. Las garantías del
PIC se han facilitado a más de cincuenta mil PYME españolas, que son una cuarta parte del número total de PYME que participaron en el programa
en la EU. Con respecto al capital riesgo, el fondo español Fund Bullnet Capital Fund II está participando también en el programa.

( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) El nuevo programa Cosme, para el que se ha propuesto un presupuesto de 2 500 millones de euros, se basará en gran medida en la experiencia

adquirida con el actual PIC. La dotación presupuestaria prevista de 1 400 millones de euros para instrumentos financieros mejorará el acceso a la
financiación de las PYME con un instrumento de capital y un instrumento de garantía de préstamo. Estos dos instrumentos trabajarán junto con el
nuevo Programa Marco de Investigación denominado Horizonte 2020.

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C 42 E / 36 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Por último, la Comisión está cumpliendo su Plan de Acción de 2011 de acceso de las PYME a la financiación: se ha
aprobado la legislación sobre los fondos de capital riesgo y de emprendimiento social; las nuevas Directivas de
transparencia y contabilidad reducirán la carga para las PYME; el factor corrector de la Directiva sobre los requisitos
de capital (DCR IV) facilitará el crédito para las PYME; la Directiva relativa a los mercados de instrumentos financieros
(MiFID) creará una etiqueta PYME, y la publicación del Libro Verde sobre financiación a largo plazo con un capítulo
dedicado a las PYME ofrecerá orientaciones sobre posibles nuevas medidas.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 37

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005858/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Drop in lending and high borrowing costs for SMEs

Lending to households and businesses in Spain fell by 10.6% in 2012. One of the reasons for this was the sharp drop
in the number of loans approved by Spain’s nationalised banks.

What is more, interest rates are currently far higher for Spanish SMEs than elsewhere — up to eight or nine
percentage points above Euribor and the rates at which their competitors pay interest elsewhere in the single
market ( [1] ). As a result, the viability of many SMEs is at risk, which is damaging Spain’s short-term growth prospects.

— Does the Commission believe that the disparity between the interest rates imposed on Spanish SMEs and those
available to SMEs in other Member States implies a fragmentation of the single market?

— What steps does the Commission intend to take to ensure Spanish SMEs are able to borrow at a rate which enables
them to compete in the single market on equal terms?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

The Commission recognises the existence of financial market fragmentation; the challenges posed by it are at the
heart of the creation of the Banking Union ( [2] ). The disparity between the interest rates imposed on Spanish SMEs and
those in different countries is mainly due to sovereign risk and macroeconomic prospects. Current signs of recovery
and the reduced pressure on Spanish sovereign debt might translate in improved loan conditions for Spanish SMEs.

Generally, the EU has instruments to ease the lending conditions of SMEs. Spanish SMEs can find support through the
EIB ( [3] ) ‘Loans for SMEs’ programme ( [4] ) which provides loans to SMEs via local commercial banks. From 2010 to
2012, the EIB made 6 275 million EUR available to Spanish SMEs, with a total lending volume in 2012 which rose by
76% vs. the previous year. Further, the EIB has received a EUR 10 billion capital increase, which will strengthen the
EIB Group’s lending capacity by an additional EUR 60 billion ( [5] ) in the period 2013-2015 ( [6] ).

The Commission is also putting in place a variety of financial instruments, such as the equity and loan guarantee
facilities of the current CIP ( [7] ) programme ( [8] ). For the period 2014-2020 the Commission has put forward proposals
for the new generation of financial instruments, mainly under the new programmes COSME ( [9] ) and Horizon 2020.

Finally, the Commission is delivering on its SME access to finance Action Plan of 2011: venture capital and social
entrepreneurship fund legislation is approved; the new transparency and accounting directives will reduce the burden
for SMEs; CRD IV’s correcting factor should ease SME lending, MiFID will create a SME label, and the publication of a
Green Paper on long term financing with a chapter devoted to SMEs will give guidance on possible further action.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/05/04/credito-a-las-pymes-si-pero-al-10-120146/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Evidence pointing out to declining financial market integration was equally presented by the President of the ECB in August, upon discussing the

OMT program, see http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) European Investment Bank.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/sme/index.htm
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) of this EUR 10-15 billion will be for SMEs.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) This will unlock up to 180 billion of additional investment.
( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 2007-2013.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) CIP is managed by the European Investment Fund on behalf of the European Commission and available to SMEs through financial intermediaries,

such as banks, mutual guarantee societies and venture capital funds. In Spain, the EIF cooperates with CERSA, which provides counter-guarantees
relating to loans, and La Caixa, which provides micro-credit and quasi-equity instruments. CIP guarantees have been channelled to more than
50,000 Spanish SMEs, which is one quarter of the total number of SMEs who participated in the programme in the EU. On the risk capital side,
the Spanish Fund Bullnet Capital Fund II is also participating in the programme.

( **|** ⋅9∙ **|** ) The new COSME programme, with a proposed budget of 2.5 billion EUR, will largely build on the experience from the current CIP. The foreseen

budget envelope of EUR 1.4 billion for financial instruments will improve access to SME finance with an Equity and a Loan Guarantee Facility.
These two facilities will work in conjunction with the new Research Framework Programme called Horizon 2020.

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C 42 E / 38 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005859/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Créditos a las PYME por parte de la banca nacionalizada en el Estado español

La caída del crédito a empresas y familias ha sido del 10,6 % en 2012. Existen distintos motivos que explican este
hecho, pero uno de ellos es la gran bajada en la tasa de aceptación de créditos por parte de la banca nacionalizada.

Según el Banco de España, 8 de cada 10 créditos son rechazados. Eso representa una caída de más del 50 % del crédito
desde el año 2006, en que la tasa de aceptación de créditos era de 5 de cada 10 en las entidades ahora nacionalizadas.
Por otro lado, la financiación a las administraciones públicas ha aumentado de media un 14,5 % en 2012 en el sector
bancario ( [1] ).

En la segunda revisión del programa, varios puntos estaban dedicados a la discusión de aspectos relacionados con la
caída del crédito en el Estado español. Ahora bien, no se planteaban medidas para evitar esta situación, sumamente
perjudicial para el retorno al crecimiento.

A la luz de lo anterior:

—
¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de que en las entidades nacionalizadas se deniegan 8 de cada 10 créditos?

—
¿No cree la Comisión que aquellas entidades que han recibido ayudas del Estado deberían anteponer el crédito a
familias y empresas al crédito a las administraciones públicas?

—
¿Piensa la Comisión proponer como condición para el desembolso de la siguiente partida de la línea de crédito
del programa un aumento del crédito a empresas y familias?

**Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión**

_(1 de julio de 2013)_

Según las normas sobre ayudas estatales, el principal objetivo de los planes de reestructuración de los bancos
subvencionados consiste en garantizar la recuperación de la viabilidad y la sostenibilidad de la actividad de préstamo.
Alcanzar dicho objetivo implica reducir los riesgos de los balances de los bancos mediante la reformulación de sus
modelos empresariales en torno a las actividades y ámbitos en los que radique su fuerza competitiva.

En España, los bancos acogidos a ayudas estatales representan el 21 % del total del sistema bancario español desde el
punto de vista de los activos y el 28 % desde el punto de vista de los préstamos a los clientes. Los bancos de los
grupos 1 y 2 ( [2] ) representan, respectivamente, el 8 % y el 4 % de los préstamos a las empresas y las PYME y el 19 % y el
8 % de los créditos hipotecarios.

En consecuencia, la inmensa mayoría del sector bancario español no necesita ayudas públicas y está en buenas
condiciones de proporcionar préstamos sostenibles a la economía real. En particular, cuando un banco se retira de
una región no central por no ser viable, es muy probable que los bancos más fuertes asuman la demanda solvente de
crédito restante.

En los planes de reestructuración de los bancos subvencionados no se imponen restricciones significativas a los
préstamos de esos bancos a las PYME en sus regiones centrales, en reconocimiento de la importancia de este sector,
tanto para la economía española como para la recuperación de la viabilidad de los bancos. La mayor parte de la
reducción del crédito para el sector privado se centra en el sector inmobiliario y en la cartera de desarrollo. Como
España se está reequilibrando tras el estallido de la burbuja inmobiliaria y de activos, el desapalancamiento y el
saneamiento de los balances en esos sectores constituyen un elemento imprescindible del ajuste.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/05/07/la-banca-nacionalizada-deniega-8-de-cada-10-créditos-según-el-bde-120402/
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Los bancos del grupo 1 son BFA Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NovaGalicia Banco y el Banco de Valencia y los del grupo 2 son Liberbank, Banco CEISS,

Banco Mare Nostrum y Caja3.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 39

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005859/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Lending to SMEs by Spain's nationalised banks

Lending to businesses and households fell by 10.6% in 2012. Among the various explanations put forward is the
sharp drop in loan approvals by the nationalised banks.

According to the Bank of Spain, 80% of loan applications are rejected. That represents a more than 50% drop in the
level of lending since 2006, when approval was granted for half of all loans by the banks that are now nationalised.
On the other hand, bank lending to general government grew by 14.5% on average in 2012 ( [1] ).

In the second revision of the restructuring plans for the banks, a number of points focused on aspects relating to the
fall in lending in Spain. Despite this, no measures are being considered to avoid this situation, which is hugely
damaging to the economic recovery.

— Is the Commission aware that 80% of loan applications are being rejected by Spain’s nationalised banks?

— Does the Commission not believe that those banks that have received state aid should prioritise lending to
households and businesses over general government financing?

— Is the Commission considering proposing that an increase in lending to businesses and households should be a
condition for receiving the next tranche of the bailout fund?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 July 2013)_

Under state aid rules, the main goal of the restructuring plans for aided banks is to ensure their return to viability and
to sustainable lending. To achieve that goal involves de-risking the banks' balance sheets, by redesigning their
business models around the activities and areas where their competitive strength lies.

In Spain, State-aided banks account for 21% of the total Spanish banking system in terms of assets and 28% in terms
of lending to customers. Group 1 and 2 banks ( [2] ) account respectively for about 8% and 4% of lending to
corporations and SMEs and for 19% and 8% of lending to residential mortgages.

As a result, in Spain the large majority of the banking sector does not need public support and is well positioned to
provide sustainable lending to the real economy. In particular, when a bank is withdrawing from a non-core region
where it is not viable, stronger banks are very likely to pick up the remaining solvent demand for credit.

In the approved restructuring plans for aided banks, no significant restrictions are imposed on those banks' lending to
SMEs in their core regions, in recognition of the importance of that sector both for the Spanish economy and for the
return of the banks to viability. The bulk of the reduction in credit to the private sector is in the real estate and
development portfolio. As Spain is rebalancing following the burst of the housing and asset bubble, deleveraging and
balance sheet repair in those sectors are an unavoidable part of the adjustment.

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⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/05/07/la-banca-nacionalizada-deniega-8-de-cada-10-creditos-segun-el-bde-120402/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Group 1 banks include BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NovaGalicia Banco and Banco de Valencia and Group 2 banks include Liberbank, Banco

CEISS, Banco Mare Nostrum and Caja3.

C 42 E / 40 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005860/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Financiación de proyectos científicos en el Estado español

La situación de la ciencia y la investigación han empeorado en el Estado español con la llegada de la crisis. En 2012,
por ejemplo, el Gobierno español recortó en un 25 % la partida de I+D del presupuesto ( [1] ).

En estos momentos, además, el Gobierno español no paga unas becas predoctorales ya concedidas a investigadores
catalanes porque «Catalunya no ha cumplido con el objetivo de déficit».

Por otro lado, diversos proyectos de investigación no pueden seguir funcionando porque la financiación europea
depende de la cofinanciación por parte del Gobierno español ( [2] ).

A la luz de lo anterior,

— ¿En cuántos casos se ha perdido financiación europea para proyectos de investigación debido a que el Gobierno
español no los haya cofinanciado?

— ¿Qué medidas propone la Comisión para evitar que la financiación de la ciencia caiga en picado en aquellos
Estados miembros que atraviesan dificultades económicas y tienen problemas para participar en la cofinanciación?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Geoghegan-Quinn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión no sabe de ningún proyecto de investigación apoyado por el FEDER que haya perdido financiación
de la UE por falta de cofinanciación nacional. De hecho, hasta la fecha, España ha cumplido con sus compromisos
anuales de inversión en la prioridad temática de investigación e innovación y, por consiguiente, no ha perdido ningún
compromiso de los Fondos Estructurales de la UE. Hasta el momento, el nivel de los gastos certificados y del
presupuesto asignado a los proyectos españoles seleccionados en este ámbito se aproxima al promedio de la UE.

La Comisión concede gran importancia a que el saneamiento presupuestario sea compatible con el crecimiento,
incluido mediante la mejora de la calidad y la eficiencia del gasto público. Esta era una de las cinco prioridades puestas
de relieve en el Estudio Prospectivo Anual sobre el Crecimiento correspondiente a 2013, adoptado el 28 de
noviembre de 2012, y que se confirmó en el paquete «Sacar a Europa de la crisis», adoptado el 29 de mayo de 2013,
en el que la Comisión hizo hincapié en que debería considerarse prioritaria la inversión pública en investigación,
innovación y capital humano y mejorarse su rentabilidad ( [3] ).

La situación del gasto en I+D e innovación en España se ha analizado en el documento de trabajo de los servicios de la
Comisión en el marco del Semestre Europeo de 2013 ( [4] ). Tanto el gasto público como el privado en investigación e
innovación se han reducido en los últimos años. Al mismo tiempo, con todo, el aumento de este tipo de gasto a lo
largo del decenio de 2000 a 2009 no impulsó la innovación de forma significativa, lo que pone de manifiesto la
importancia de mejorar la eficiencia del gasto público y privado en I+D en España, en consonancia con la Estrategia
Española de Ciencia y Tecnología y de Innovación aprobada en febrero de 2013.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/04/10/actualidad/1334087140_227519.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/noticias/opinio/hola-europa-algu-2395151
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/2013eccomm_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_es.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 41

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005860/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(24 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Science funding in Spain

The situation for science and research has worsened in Spain since the onset of the crisis. In 2012, for example, the
Spanish Government cut the share of the budget allocated to R&D by 25% ( [1] ).

What is more, the Spanish Government is currently refusing to pay a number of predoctoral scholarships already
awarded to Catalan researchers because ‘Catalonia has not achieved its deficit target’.

A number of research projects have also ground to a halt because their EU funding is contingent on co-financing by
the Spanish Government ( [2] ).

— How many research projects have lost EU funding because they were not co-financed by the Spanish government?

— What steps does the Commission envisage to avoid deep cuts to science funding in those Member States facing
financial difficulties and struggling to co-finance projects?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of any research project supported by ERDF having lost EU funding because of a lack of
national co-funding. Indeed, until now, Spain has fulfilled its annual commitment with respect to investment into the
ERDF research and innovation thematic priority and, therefore, no EU Structural Funds commitments have been lost.
The level of certified expenditures and budget allocated to selected projects in Spain in this field remains until now
close to the EU average.

The Commission attaches great importance to ensuring the growth-friendliness of fiscal consolidation, including by
improving the quality and efficiency of public spending. This was one of the five priorities highlighted in the Annual
Growth Survey 2013 adopted on 28 November 2012, and repeated in the package ‘Moving Europe beyond the crisis’
adopted on 29 May 2013, where the Commission underscored that public investment in research, innovation and
human capital should be given priority, including through greater cost-efficiency ( [3] ).

The specific situation of R&D and innovation spending in Spain has been analysed in the Staff Working Document
under the 2013 European Semester ( [4] ). Indeed, both public and private spending on research and innovation have
decreased in recent years. However, at the same time, the increase in such spending over the decade 2000-2009 did
not boost innovation significantly. This highlights the importance of improving the efficiency of public and private
expenditure on R&D in Spain, in line with the national strategy for science, technology and innovation adopted in
February 2013.

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( **|**

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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/04/10/actualidad/1334087140_227519.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/noticias/opinio/hola-europa-algu-2395151
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/2013eccomm_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_en.pdf

C 42 E / 42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-005861/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αξιολόγηση της εφαρμογής για την εξαίρεση από τον ΦΠΑ μικρών επιχειρήσεων στην Ελλάδα

Σύμφωνα με την οδηγία 2006/112/EK της 28ης Νοεμβρίου 2006 ( [1] ) σχετικά με το κοινό σύστημα φόρου προστιθέμενης
αξίας και το άρθρο 3951«το Συμβούλιο, αποφασίζοντας ομόφωνα έπειτα από πρόταση της Επιτροπής, μπορεί να επιτρέπει
σε κάθε κράτος μέλος να θεσπίζει ειδικά μέτρα παρέκκλισης από τις διατάξεις της οδηγίας για λόγους απλούστευσης των
διαδικασιών επιβολής του φόρου ή πρόληψης ορισμένων τύπων φοροδιαφυγής ή φοροαποφυγής». Βάσει της παραπάνω
οδηγίας και, πιο συγκεκριμένα, του κεφαλαίου 1 για το ειδικό καθεστώς των μικρών επιχειρήσεων, το Συμβούλιο
εξουσιοδότησε ( [2] ) το Βέλγιο, κατόπιν αιτήματος του, με παρέκκλιση από το προβλεπόμενο όριο των 5 000 ευρώ, να
εφαρμόσει από το τρέχον έτος την εξαίρεση των μικρών επιχειρήσεων με κύκλο εργασιών έως 25 000 ευρώ από την χρέωση
και την απόδοση ΦΠΑ, προσβλέποντας σε οφέλη επί του προϋπολογισμού. Την ίδια στιγμή, στην Ελλάδα παρά τις
ικανοποιητικές δημοσιονομικές επιδόσεις, για το μήνα Απρίλιο τα έσοδα από τον ΦΠΑ όλων των κατηγοριών υστέρησαν
έναντι του σχετικού στόχου ( [3] ), ενώ, για τον ίδιο μήνα, ένας στους τέσσερις ελεύθερους επαγγελματίες και επιχειρηματίες δεν
υπέβαλε περιοδικές δηλώσεις ΦΠΑ ως όφειλε ( [4] ).

Δεδομένων των παραπάνω στρεβλώσεων ερωτάται η Eπιτροπή:

1. Πώς θα αντιμετώπιζε την εφαρμογή ενός τέτοιου μέτρου και στην ελληνική οικονομία; Θεωρεί πως οι ιδιαιτερότητες
των συνθηκών και τα σοβαρά προβλήματα της ελληνικής οικονομίας θα δικαιολογούσαν τη λήψη μίας τέτοιας
απόφασης;

2. Διαθέτει εκτιμήσεις για το αν η εφαρμογή ενός τέτοιου μέτρου θα ωφελούσε συνολικά την ελληνική οικονομία και την
απασχόληση στην κρίσιμη φάση στην οποία ευρίσκεται;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(4 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή συμφωνεί με το Αξιότιμο μέλος τους Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου ότι η βελτίωση του επιχειρηματικού
περιβάλλοντος στην Ελλάδα, συμπεριλαμβανομένου εκείνου για τις ΜΜΕ, αποτελεί καίρια προτεραιότητα. Το μνημόνιο
συμφωνίας για τους ειδικούς όρους οικονομικής πολιτικής στο πλαίσιο του 2ου προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής
της Ελλάδας περιέχει ήδη ευρύ φάσμα μέτρων προς την κατεύθυνση αυτή. Προϋπόθεση για την ανάκαμψη στην Ελλάδα
αποτελεί, ωστόσο, η αποκατάσταση του κλίματος εμπιστοσύνης μέσω της επιτυχούς διαδικασίας δημοσιονομικής
εξυγίανσης. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, οιαδήποτε μεταβολή πολιτικής στο θέμα του ΦΠΑ θα ενέπιπτε στην αρμοδιότητα των
ελληνικών αρχών, υπό τον όρο ότι υπάρχει επαρκές δημοσιονομικό περιθώριο και τηρείται η κοινοτική νομοθεσία.

Όσον αφορά τη χρήση προσωρινών παρεκκλίσεων δυνάμει του άρθρου 395 της οδηγίας για τον ΦΠΑ, υπενθυμίζεται ότι
εναπόκειται στο ενδιαφερόμενο κράτος μέλος να ζητήσει την παρέκκλιση αυτή και να τεκμηριώσει ότι πληρούνται οι όροι
σχετικά με την απλούστευση της είσπραξης του ΦΠΑ ή σχετικά με την πρόληψη της φοροδιαφυγής ή της φοροαποφυγής.

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⋅1∙ **|** )
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⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:EL:PDF
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0654:FIN:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.minfin.gr/portal/el/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/genericContentResourceObject,fileResourceObject,arrayOfFileResourceTy

peObject/topicNames/budgetExecutionBulletin/resourceRepresentationTemplate/contentObjectListAlternativeTemplate

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathremote_1_22/05/2013_500231

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 43

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005861/13**

**to the Commission**
**Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Evaluation of the implementation of a VAT exemption for small businesses in Greece

Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 ( [1] ) on the common system of value added tax provides, in
Article 395(1), that: ‘The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, may authorise any
Member State to introduce special measures for derogation from the provisions of this directive, in order to simplify
the procedure for collecting VAT or to prevent certain forms of tax evasion or avoidance.’ In the light of the above
Directive, and in particular Chapter 1 on the special scheme for small businesses, the Council authorised ( [2] ) Belgium,
at its request, by way of derogation from the stipulated limit of EUR 5 000, to apply from this year onwards an
exemption to small businesses having a turnover of up to EUR 25 000 from paying VAT, in expectation of budgetary
benefits. At the same time, in Greece, despite the satisfactory financial performance, in the month of April,7 VAT
revenue for all categories lagged behind the target amount ( [3] ), while in the same month, one in four self-employed
persons and entrepreneurs failed to submit their regular VAT returns, as they should have done ( [4] ).

Given the above distortions, will the Commission say:

1. How would it view the application of such a measure to the Greek economy? Does it consider that the special
conditions obtaining in Greece and the serious problems facing the Greek economy would justify such a
decision?

2. Does it have any estimates about whether the application of such a measure would be of overall benefit to the
Greek economy and employment in the present critical phase?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 July 2013)_

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that improving the business environment in Greece, including
for SMEs, is a key priority. The Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality in the
context of the 2nd economic adjustment programme for Greece already contains a wide range of measures in this
direction. A precondition for the recovery in Greece is, however, a return of confidence supported by successful fiscal
consolidation. In this context, any policy change in VAT would fall within the responsibility of the Greek authorities,
provided that there is enough fiscal space and Community law is respected.

Concerning the use of temporary derogations under Article 395 of the VAT Directive, it should be recalled that it is
for the Member State concerned to request such a derogation and to justify that the conditions, as regards the
simplification of the VAT collection or the prevention of tax evasion or avoidance, are fullfilled.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:EL:PDF.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0654:FIN:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.minfin.gr/portal/el/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/genericContentResourceObject,fileResourceObject,arrayOfFileResourceTy

peObject/topicNames/budgetExecutionBulletin/resourceRepresentationTemplate/contentObjectListAlternativeTemplate.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathremote_1_22/05/2013_500231.

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C 42 E / 44 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-005862/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)**

_(27 maj 2013)_

_Angående:_ Kommissionens förslag om ömsesidigt erkännande av civilståndshandlingars verkan

Stockholmsprogrammet inbegriper initiativ för att underlätta EU-medborgarnas fria rörlighet genom att möjliggöra
ömsesidigt erkännande av civilståndshandlingars verkan. Även i kommissionens arbetsprogram nämndes sådana
initiativ, för vilka en konsekvensbedömning nyligen genomförts. Parlamentet har också välkomnat detta initiativ i
flera av sina resolutioner, inbegripet de med anknytning till Stockholmsprogrammet. Kommissionen har vid flera
tillfällen försäkrat parlamentets ledamöter att den ska offentliggöra ett förslag före slutet av 2013.

Den 21 maj 2013 frågade jag kommissionsledamot Tonio Borg, under plenardebatten om utvärderingen av
Stockholmsprogrammet, om och när kommissionen skulle lägga fram ett sådant förslag, men tyvärr har jag inte fått
något svar på den frågan. Trots Stockholmsprogrammet, parlamentets återkommande stöd och den genomförda
konsekvensbedömningen finns det indikationer på att kommissionsledamoten med ansvar för rättsliga frågor,
grundläggande rättigheter och medborgarskap kan ha beslutat att inte offentliggöra förslaget.

Kan kommissionen lämna upplysningar om konsekvensbedömningen och den uppföljning som den har planerat?
Kan kommissionen tydliggöra om och när den kommer att offentliggöra förslaget i fråga?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar**

_(20 juni 2013)_

Kommissionen anser att medborgarnas ökade rörlighet i EU har lett till ett behov av förbättringar vad gäller både den
fria rörligheten för offentliga handlingar och ömsesidigt erkännande av civilstånd i gränsöverskridande situationer.
Den har därför tillkännagivit två initiativ i sin grönbok från 2010 ( [1] ). Som ett första steg antog kommissionen
den 24 april 2013 ett förslag för en förordning ( [2] ) som innehåller konkreta förenklingsåtgärder för godtagande av
offentliga handlingar i EU.

Kommissionen vill också göra det lättare för medborgare att utöva sin rätt att röra sig fritt i EU genom att minska
hindren för erkännande i en medlemsstat av verkningarna av civilståndshandlingar. I detta syfte vill kommissionen
informera parlamentsledamoten att den har inlett en konsekvensbedömning och resultaten av denna väntas före
slutet av året.

Kommissionen kommer då att överväga vilka steg som måste tas.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Europeiska kommissionen, Grönbok, Minskad byråkrati för medborgarna: att underlätta fri rörlighet i fråga om officiella handlingar och

erkännande av verkningarna av civilståndshandlingar [KOM(2010) 747 slutlig, 14.12.2010].

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Europeiska kommissionen, Förslag till en förordning om främjande av medborgares och företags fria rörlighet genom förenkling av godtagandet

av vissa officiella handlingar i Europeiska unionen [KOM(2013) 228 slutlig, 24.4.2013].

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 45

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005862/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Commission proposal on mutual recognition of the effects of civil status documents

The Stockholm Programme includes initiatives to facilitate EU citizens’ free movement by enabling the mutual
recognition of the effects of civil status documents. The Commission’s Work Programme also mentioned such
initiatives, for which an impact assessment was recently completed. Parliament has also welcomed this initiative in
several of its resolutions, including those relating to the Stockholm Programme. The Commission assured Members
on several occasions that it would publish a proposal by the end of 2013.

On 21 May 2013, I asked Commissioner Borg, during the debate in plenary on the evaluation of the Stockholm
Programme, whether and when the Commission would issue such a proposal, but unfortunately I have not received a
reply. There are indications that notwithstanding the Stockholm Programme, Parliament’s repeated support and the
completed impact assessment, the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship may have decided
not to publish the proposal.

Can the Commission provide details on the impact assessment and on the follow-up it has planned? Can it clarify
whether and when it will publish the proposal in question?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 June 2013)_

The Commission considers that increasing mobility of citizens within the EU has generated the need for improvement
of both free movement of public documents and mutual recognition of civil status in cross-border situations. It
announced therefore in its 2010 Green Paper ( [1] ) two initiatives. As a first step, the Commission adopted on
24 April 2013 a proposal for a regulation ( [2] ) containing concrete simplification measures for the acceptance of
certain public documents in the EU.

The Commission wishes also to make it easier for citizens to exercise their right to freedom of movement within
the EU by reducing obstacles to the recognition in one Member State of the effects of civil status records issued in
another Member State. To this end, the Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that it has
initiated an impact assessment study and is expecting the results of this before the end of the year.

The Commission will then consider the necessary appropriate steps to be taken.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Commission, Green Paper, Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of public documents and recognition of the effects

of civil status records, COM(2010) 747 final, 14.12.2010.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) European Commission, Proposal for a regulation on promoting the free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying the acceptance of

certain public documents in the European Union, COM(2013) 228 final, 24.04.2013.

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C 42 E / 46 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005863/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Retraso en las obras de corredores prioritarios que cuentan con financiación europea

Las inversiones destinadas por el Gobierno de España al tramo ferroviario de alta velocidad que une Francia con la
Península Ibérica incluido en el eje atlántico (Y vasca) se han reducido en los últimos meses un 40 % y acumulan ya un
preocupante retraso. La razón esgrimida para justificarlo son los recortes en el gasto público originados por la crisis.
El tramo afectado por estos retrasos cuenta con financiación europea, está integrado de pleno en el corredor Atlántico
y resuelve uno de los «cuellos de botella» del mismo. Cumple además los criterios señalados por la Comisión y el
Consejo Europeo para ser considerado de la máxima prioridad, pues mejora la conexión efectiva entre dos Estados
miembros, es intermodal, conecta el corredor con un puerto Core de la red básica y otros dos secundarios, aporta
alternativas al tráfico rodado y atiende al movimiento de varias plataformas logísticas y zonas industrializadas
fuertemente exportadoras. El Gobierno español se niega además a comprometer nuevos plazos para la finalización de
las obras.

Las limitaciones presupuestarias no parecen afectar, sin embargo, a otros tramos de alta velocidad en España que no
reúnen estas características. Tal es el caso de las obras bautizadas como «corredor noroeste» por ADIF, donde la
inversión ha caído solo un 11 %. El Ministerio de Obras Públicas español aventura que concluirá las obras para 2018.

A la vista de estos hechos:

¿Se están ejecutando en el tiempo y la forma previstos los trayectos de alta velocidad en España que cuentan con
financiación europea? ¿Dónde se producen los retrasos y por qué razones?

¿Considera la Comisión que hechos como el comentado y la señalada planificación respetan las prioridades
establecidas para optimizar las inversiones en infraestructuras y añadir valor europeo a las mismas?

Dada la existencia de inversiones europeas en el tramo, ¿tiene la Comisión la intención de revisar las inversiones y
animar al Gobierno español a ajustarlas a las prioridades establecidas?

**Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de julio de 2013)_

La realización de la red de alta velocidad en España se encuentra fragmentada dado que de ella forman parte
numerosas líneas. La ejecución de estas depende de la financiación nacional como fuente principal, apoyada por la
política de cohesión y por la financiación de la RTE-T.

Por lo que se refiere a los proyectos cofinanciados más importantes, hay que señalar lo siguiente:

—
tanto la línea de alta velocidad entre la frontera francesa y Barcelona-Tarragona, como las líneas a Valencia y
Alicante ya se han terminado; siguen realizándose, en cambio, las obras de transformación de la línea existente
en línea de alta velocidad con ancho UIC entre Tarragona y Valencia;

—
en cuanto a la Y vasca, las obras prosiguen en la mayoría de los tramos; para el cruce de las ciudades de Vitoria y
Bilbao, se está desarrollando una solución provisional; la línea podrá entrar en funcionamiento a finales
de 2017;

—
la línea Valladolid-Venta de Baños está ya casi terminada; hay obras en curso en todos los terrenos de León y
Burgos;

—
en Andalucía, la línea a Granada ha sufrido retrasos, pero su construcción quedará completada antes de que
finalice 2015.

El apoyo que presta la UE tiene dos objetivos principales, lo que ha permitido decidir el subconjunto de proyectos
cofinanciados. Tales objetivos son:

—
impulsar el desarrollo de la red transeuropea de transportes (RTE-T) y

—
contribuir al desarrollo regional.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 47

Es preciso recordar, asimismo, que, tratándose de la política de cohesión, son los Estados miembros los que se
encargan de la selección de los proyectos, mientras que, en el caso del presupuesto de la RTE-T, es a la Comisión a
quien corresponde seleccionar los mejores proyectos en el marco de convocatorias de propuestas competitivas. Es
probable que el conjunto de proyectos españoles que se está ejecutando actualmente absorba la contribución
disponible de la UE.

En cuanto a las prioridades, la Comisión ha propuesto que el próximo período presupuestario se caracterice por una
mayor concentración en una lista de proyectos previamente identificados. Se hace referencia aquí al anexo de la
propuesta de Reglamento por el que se crea el Mecanismo «Conectar Europa» ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665 final.

C 42 E / 48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005863/13**

**to the Commission**
**Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Delay in EU-funded priority corridor works

Spanish Government investments in the high-speed rail link connecting France and Spain, including along the
Atlantic route (Y Vasca), have been cut by 40% in recent months and are causing worrying delays to build up. The cuts
in public expenditure as a result of the crisis have been put forward as the reason justifying this. The section of the line
affected by these delays receives EU funding, is fully integrated into the Atlantic corridor and resolves one of the
bottlenecks on that corridor. It also meets the criteria stipulated by the Commission and the Council to be considered
a top priority, since it improves effective links between two Member States, is intermodal, connects the corridor to a
core port on the basic network and another two secondary ports, provides alternatives to road transport and serves
the transport needs of several logistics platforms and industrial zones that are major exporters. The Spanish
Government also refuses to commit to new timescales for completion of the works.

However, other high-speed sections in Spain, which do not have these features do not appear to be affected by budget
constraints. This is the case with the ‘north-west corridor’ works by the Spanish rail infrastructure manager (ADIF),
where investment has only been cut by 11%. The Spanish Ministry of Public Works expects works to be completed by
2018.

Are the EU-funded high-speed routes in Spain being built to schedule and as planned? Where are the delays occurring
and why?

Does the Commission think that situations such as that described above and the designated plan comply with the
established priorities to optimise investment in infrastructure and to add European value to it?

Given that the line receives EU investment, does the Commission intend to review the investments and urge the
Spanish Government to adapt them to the established priorities?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The implementation of the High speed network in Spain is fragmented since it involves many lines, the
implementation of which depends on national funding as a primary source, supported by Cohesion Policy and TEN-T
funding.

Concerning the most relevant co-funded projects:

The high-speed line from the French border to Barcelona-Tarragona has been completed, as well as the lines to
Valencia and Alicante; works to upgrade the existing line to high-speed in UIC gauge from Tarragona to Valencia are
ongoing.

On the Y Basque works are proceeding in most lots; for the crossing of Vitoria and Bilbao provisional solution are
being developed; the line could be operational by the end of 2017.

The line Valladolid-Venta de Baños is close to completion; works are ongoing in all the lots to Leon and Burgos.

In Andalucía, the line to Granada is being delayed but construction should be completed by 2015.

The EU support has two main objectives, which has led to identify the subset of co-financed projects:

—
enhance the development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T);

—
contribute to the Regional Development.

It has also to be recalled that for the Cohesion Policy, Member States are in charge of project selection, while for TENT budget, the Commission selects the best projects in competitive calls for proposals. The set of Spanish projects
actually being implemented is likely to absorb the available EU contribution.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 49

With regards to prioritisation, the Commission has proposed that the next budgetary period be characterised by a
stronger concentration on a list of pre-identified projects. Reference is made to the annex to its proposal for a
regulation establishing the Connecting Europe Facility ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 665 final.

C 42 E / 50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005864/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Renta garantizada de ciudadanía

Considerando el objetivo de España en el marco de la estrategia Europa 2020 de que haya solo 1 400 000-1 500 000
personas en riesgo de exclusión social para 2020 y dado que la lucha contra la exclusión social y la pobreza es un
elemento clave para la salida de la crisis de Europa.

Sabiendo que el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña, en su artículo 24, apartado 3, establece que las personas o
familias que se encuentren en situación de pobreza tienen derecho a acceder a una renta garantizada de ciudadanía
que les asegure los mínimos de una vida digna, de acuerdo con las condiciones que legalmente se establezcan. De
acuerdo con el artículo 37, apartado 3, del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña, este derecho del ámbito de los
servicios sociales debe ser regulado mediante una ley del Parlament de Catalunya, hecho que respeta
fundamentalmente el principio de subsidiariedad de la UE.

La crisis, con todos los efectos asociados como el incremento del paro sin precedentes, la creciente privación material
y la pérdida del hogar para muchas personas y los recortes en inversión social pública, está incrementando el
colectivo de personas y familias que viven por debajo del umbral de la pobreza en Cataluña. Representantes de
sindicatos, partidos políticos y entidades sin ánimo de lucro impulsan una Iniciativa Legislativa Popular (ILP) que tiene
por objeto regular la Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía para dar cumplimiento al mandato del artículo 24, apartado 3,
del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña, contribuir a los objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020 para España y
asegurar unos ingresos mínimos para una vida digna a las personas o familias que se encuentran en situación de
pobreza. La Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía se dibuja como un derecho universal, no condicionado a
disponibilidades presupuestarias y su cuantía máxima alcanzaría los 664 euros mensuales.

¿Qué opinión le merece la Iniciativa Legislativa Popular de la Renta Garantizada de Ciudadanía que se está
impulsando en Cataluña? ¿Considera que Cataluña podría acceder al Paquete de Inversión Social para cofinanciar con
la UE esta iniciativa? ¿Considerará recomendar al Estado español la evaluación de dichas iniciativas para que las
Comunidades Autónomas puedan aplicarlas, cumpliendo así con su lucha contra la pobreza y la exclusión social y sin
que esto conlleve una penalización por el incumplimiento de los objetivos de déficit?

**Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión**

_(22 de julio de 2013)_

La Recomendación n° 6, dirigida por el Consejo a España el 9 de julio de 2013 ( [1] ), solicita al Gobierno español que
adopte e implemente las medidas necesarias para reducir el número de personas en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión
social, reforzando las políticas activas del mercado de trabajo a fin de aumentar la empleabilidad de las personas más
alejadas del mismo, mejorando su focalización y reforzando la eficacia y la efectividad de las medidas de apoyo,
incluida la calidad de los servicios de ayuda a la familia. Las recomendaciones específicas por país no excluyen en
modo alguno otras medidas de apoyo, como los programas de renta mínima, siempre y cuando España no se aparte
de la senda para corregir su déficit excesivo.

El objetivo del Paquete de Inversión Social ( [2] ) es guiar a los países de la UE hacia una utilización más eficaz y efectiva
de sus presupuestos sociales a fin de garantizar una protección social adecuada y sostenible. Aboga por paquetes
integrados de prestaciones y servicios que ayuden a las personas a participar en la sociedad y en el mercado de trabajo,
priorizando la prevención antes que la curación, y reduciendo de este modo la necesidad de prestaciones. Tiene en
cuenta, asimismo, el papel de los programas de renta mínima como colchón para satisfacer las necesidades básicas.

La Recomendación a España en relación con el procedimiento de déficit excesivo (PDE), adoptada por el Consejo el
21 de junio de 2013, modula el esfuerzo requerido y garantiza el cumplimiento del plazo fijado para corregir el déficit
teniendo en cuenta todos los factores pertinentes, como lo demuestra la propuesta de ampliación de dicho plazo a
2016.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Documento 10656/1/13 Rev. 1 del Consejo, basado en la propuesta de la Comisión COM(2013) 359 final de 29.5.2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 083 final de 20.2.2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 51

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005864/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Minimum guaranteed income

One of Spain’s targets under the Europe 2020 strategy is to have only 1.4-1.5 million people at risk of social
exclusion by 2020, and combating social exclusion and poverty is key to overcoming the crisis in the EU.

Article 24(3) of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia lays down that individuals or families living in poverty are
entitled to a minimum guaranteed income that guarantees them the minimum necessary to live in dignity, in
accordance with legally established conditions. According to Article 37(3) of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia,
this entitlement from the social services should be regulated through an act of the Catalan Parliament, something
which is essentially in line with the EU’s subsidiarity principle.

The crisis, with all its related effects such as an unprecedented rise in unemployment, growing material deprivation
and homelessness for many people and the cuts in public social investment, is leading to more people and families
living below the breadline in Catalonia. Representatives from trade unions, political parties and non-profit
organisations are calling for a popular legislative initiative with the aim of regulating the minimum guaranteed
income in order to fulfil the mandate in Article 24(3) of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, to help achieve Spain’s
targets under the Europe 2020 strategy and to guarantee a minimum income for a decent standard of living for
people or families living in poverty. The minimum guaranteed income is designed as a universal right, not subject to
budgetary resources, and it would amount to a maximum of EUR 664 per month.

What is the Commission’s opinion of the popular legislative initiative on the minimum guaranteed income being
promoted in Catalonia? Does the Commission think that Catalonia could access the Social Investment Package to cofinance this initiative with the EU? Is it planning to recommend that Spain assess these initiatives so that the
Autonomous Communities can implement them, in line with the fight against poverty and social exclusion and
without this leading to a penalty for failure to meet deficit targets?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

Recommendation no. 6, addressed by the Council to Spain on 9 July 2013 ( [1] ), invites Spain to adopt and implement
the necessary measures to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion, by reinforcing
active labour market policies to improve employability of people further away from the labour market, and by
improving the targeting and increasing efficiency and effectiveness of support measures, including quality family
support services. The country-specific recommendations in no way exclude other support measures, such as
minimum income schemes, provided that Spain remains on track to ensure correction of its excessive deficit.

The Social Investment Package ( [2] ) is intended to guide EU countries in using their social budgets more efficiently and
effectively to ensure adequate and sustainable social protection. It advocates for integrated packages of benefits and
services that can help people to participate in society and the labour market, stressing prevention rather than cure,
and thus reducing the need for benefits. It takes into consideration the role of minimum income schemes in providing
essential safety nets.

The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) recommendation to Spain, adopted by the Council on 21 June 2013,
modulates the required effort and ensuing deadline for correction taking into account all the relevant factors, as
showed by the proposed extension of the deadline to correct the excessive deficit to 2016.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council document 10656/1/13 REV 1, based on the Commission's proposal COM(2013) 359 final, from 29.05.2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013)083 final, 20.02.2013.

C 42 E / 52 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005865/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Acceso a los medicamentos

En el contexto de la actual crisis económica, algunos países como Grecia y España están sufriendo un drama humano
en la medida en que las condiciones impuestas desde la troika están teniendo un profundo impacto en la capacidad de
los sistemas de salud pública para proveer adecuadamente muchos productos médicos necesarios para la ciudadanía.

Una de las posibilidades defendidas en multitud de foros, pero descartadas por la Comisión Europea, es la compra
conjunta de medicamentos entre diferentes Estados. En este sentido, ya desde noviembre de 2012, en el marco de
iniciativas dirigidas a países en vías de desarrollo se practicó esta política, como pueden ser el caso del Sarpam
(Southern African Regional Programme on Access to Medicines and Diagnostics) o el de SADC (Southern African
Development Community). Estas iniciativas han permitido una compra más eficiente y económica de los
medicamentos y sería igualmente aplicable a la Unión Europea. Se trata de priorizar el bienestar de las personas frente
al enorme beneficio privado del sector farmacéutico. Europa debe ser capaz de dar respuesta a esta problemática y
hacer valer los intereses de la ciudadanía facilitando el acceso a medicamentos en todos los Estados miembros.

¿Qué opina la Comisión sobre el hecho de que a millones de personas que viven en Europa se les niega el tratamiento,
cuando el coste marginal de muchos medicamentos es mínimo? ¿No considera que esta acción economicista deja de
lado los principios de seguridad sanitaria? ¿Ha considerado la compra de medicinas de manera conjunta por parte de
la UE para abaratar costes de los Estados miembros? ¿Fomentará la compra de medicamentos de forma coordinada
entre algunos Estados miembros?

**Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión**

_(25 de julio de 2013)_

Como dispone el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, la organización y la prestación de los servicios
sanitarios y de la asistencia médica son responsabilidad de los Estados miembros. La Comisión carece de indicios de
que la Troika haya impuesto a España condiciones que afecten a la capacidad del sistema de salud pública para ofrecer
un suministro adecuado de medicamentos.

La posición de la Comisión se expresa en el Estudio Prospectivo Anual sobre el Crecimiento 2013, en el que se pide
que se reformen los sistemas de asistencia sanitaria para garantizar su rentabilidad y sostenibilidad, con el doble
objetivo de un uso más eficiente de los recursos públicos y un acceso a una asistencia sanitaria de gran calidad.

La adquisición conjunta de contramedidas médicas para luchar contra amenazas transfronterizas graves para la salud
está prevista en el artículo 5 de la propuesta de Decisión del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre las amenazas
transfronterizas graves para la salud, que ambas instituciones están adoptando oficialmente tras el acuerdo sobre el
texto definitivo en primera lectura. Dicha disposición crea la posibilidad de que los Estados miembros, de forma
voluntaria, adquieran conjuntamente contramedidas médicas para atajar amenazas transfronterizas graves para la
salud derivadas de enfermedades transmisibles o de amenazas de origen químico, biológico o medioambiental.

La adquisición de medicamentos no incluida en el mecanismo de adquisición conjunta mencionado sigue siendo
competencia de los Estados miembros.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 53

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005865/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Access to medicines

Against the backdrop of the current economic crisis, some countries, such as Greece and Spain, are suffering a human
tragedy insofar as the conditions imposed by the Troika are severely affecting the capacity of public health systems to
provide adequate supplies of many medical products required by the public.

One possibility advocated in many quarters, but rejected by the Commission, is that of several Member States
purchasing medicines together. In this regard, such a policy has been implemented in developing countries since
November 2012 under initiatives such as the Southern African Regional Programme on Access to Medicines and
Diagnostics (SARPAM) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These initiatives have made it
possible to buy medicines more efficiently and economically and would work just as well in the EU. This involves
putting the welfare of people before the enormous private gain of the pharmaceutical sector. Europe must be able to
deal with this problem and defend the public interest by facilitating access to medicines in all Member States.

What does the Commission think about the fact that millions of people living in Europe are denied treatment, when
the marginal cost of many medicines is minimal? Does it not think that this frugal approach disregards the principles
of health security? Has it considered the possibility of joint procurement of medicines by the EU to lower the cost to
Member States? Will it encourage the coordinated procurement of medicines between several Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The responsibility for the organisation and the delivery of health services and medical care is the responsibility of the
Member States as stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission has no
evidence of conditions imposed by the Troika on Spain which are affecting the capacity of the public health system to
provide adequate supplies of medical products.

The position of the Commission is expressed in the Annual Growth Survey 2013, which calls for reforms of
healthcare systems to ensure cost-effectiveness and sustainability, with the twin aim of a more efficient use of public
resources and access to high quality healthcare.

The possibility of joint procurement of medical countermeasures against serious cross-border threats to health is
foreseen by Article 5 of the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and the Council on serious crossborder threats to health which is being formally adopted by both institutions following agreement on a final text in
first reading. It creates the possibility for Member States on a voluntary basis to procure medical countermeasures to
tackle serious cross-border threats to health deriving from communicable diseases, or from threats of chemical,
biological or environmental origin.

Procurement of medicines not addressed by the above joint procurement mechanism remains the competence of
Member States.

C 42 E / 54 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005866/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Incremento de medidas proteccionistas al comercio del acero

La crisis europea está teniendo un gran impacto en el consumo de los productos largos de acero, que ha descendido
más de un 35 % en algunos de los productos clave. A esto se une la débil expectativa de crecimiento de la demanda en
Europa en comparación con la mayor parte de las regiones del mundo. Como resultado de ello, los fabricantes de
productos largos de acero están forzados a exportar a terceros países.

Sin embargo, muchos terceros países están aplicando aranceles a la importación, así como barreras no arancelarias en
relación con los productos largos de acero. La reciente tendencia a intensificar las medidas aplicadas por terceros
países a bienes finales y a sus materias primas, como la chatarra, está empeorando la situación.

Para que la industria europea pueda seguir siendo competitiva, necesita medidas contundentes y urgentes para
cambiar esta situación. Por ello:

1. ¿Está la Comisión intensificando las acciones para eliminar las restricciones al acceso al mercado de los
productos largos del acero? ¿Qué medidas está adoptando para luchar contra el creciente proteccionismo?

2. En caso de que no fuera posible adoptar estas acciones y medidas a corto plazo, ¿está la Comisión estudiando
políticas comerciales alternativas?

3. ¿Tiene la Comisión intención de tratar esta situación en el Plan de Acción del Acero que está preparando?

**Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión dispone de una estrategia comercial integral, cuyo objetivo es mejorar las posibilidades de acceso de
todos los productores de la UE al mercado; este objetivo se persigue también en el sector siderúrgico.

La Comisión hace frente a las medidas proteccionistas de los terceros países con su estrategia de acceso al mercado.
También entabla consultas de carácter bilateral —grupos de contacto del acero— con los principales socios
comerciales de la UE. El reciente aplazamiento del sistema de certificación del acero indio es una buena muestra de la
eficacia de este enfoque. Cuando fallan todas las demás opciones, la Comisión puede recurrir al procedimiento de
resolución de diferencias.

Por otro lado, cuando así lo justifica la situación, la Comisión aplica sus instrumentos de defensa comercial (IDC). En
2012 se iniciaron once nuevas investigaciones sobre productos siderúrgicos. Además, la Comisión siempre se
mantiene vigilante frente a los instrumentos de defensa comercial de sus socios comerciales.

Las negociaciones bilaterales son un instrumento más para lograr unas condiciones de competencia equitativas para
las empresas de la UE tanto por lo que se refiere al acceso a los mercados, como al acceso a las materias primas.

La consecución de un ambicioso programa de liberalización comercial, la modernización de los instrumentos de
defensa comercial y la decidida aplicación de nuestra Estrategia de Acceso a los Mercados son medidas concretas y
eficaces que está llevando a cabo la Comisión con el fin de eliminar toda restricción comercial.

El Plan de Acción prevé que la Comisión, en el marco de su estrategia comercial integral, utilice medidas de política
comercial para que los productores europeos de acero tengan mayores posibilidades de acceder a los mercados de los
terceros países. Concretamente, el Plan fomenta las actuales consultas con los principales países productores de acero,
la continuación del programa de liberalización comercial y la modernización de los instrumentos de defensa
comercial.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 55

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005866/13**

**to the Commission**
**Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Proliferation of protectionist measures in the steel trade

The crisis in the EU is having a major impact on the consumption of long steel products; consumption of some key
products has fallen by more than 35%. On top of this comes low predicted growth in demand in Europe compared
with most other parts of the world. All of this means that manufacturers of long steel products are being forced to
export to third countries.

Many third countries, however, are applying import duties and non-tariff barriers to long steel products. The recent
trend of third countries stepping up the measures they apply to final goods and raw materials, such as scrap metal, is
making matters worse.

For the European industry to remain competitive, bold measures are urgently needed to turn this situation around.

1. Is the Commission stepping up action to do away with market access restrictions on long steel products? What
steps is it taking to combat increasing protectionism?

2. If it is not possible to take such action and measures in the short term, is the Commission looking into
alternative trade policies?

3. Does the Commission plan to tackle this situation in the Steel Action Plan that it is preparing?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The Commission has a comprehensive trade strategy targeted at improving market access opportunities for all EU
producers and notably in the steel sector.

The Commission fights against protectionist measures in third countries by implementing its market access strategy.
It engages also in bilateral consultations — Steel Contact Groups — with the EU’s main trading partners. The recent
postponement of the Indian steel certification scheme shows the effectiveness of the approach. When all other
options have failed, the Commission can resort to dispute settlement.

Also, and when justified, the Commission applies its Trade Defence Instruments (TDIs). In 2012 eleven new
investigations on iron and steel products were initiated. The Commission remains also vigilant to other partners' use
of TDIs.

Bilateral negotiations are another tool to achieve a level playing field for EU companies both in terms of access to
markets and access to raw materials.

The pursuit of an ambitious trade liberalisation agenda and the modernisation of our TDIs, and the forceful
implementation of our Market Access Strategy are effective and concrete actions that the Commission is undertaking
to do away with market restrictions.

The action plan foresees that the Commission will, within its comprehensive trade strategy, use the trade policy tools
to improve the European steel producers' access to third country markets. In particular it encourages the existing
practices of consultations with main steel producing countries, the pursuit of the trade liberalisation agenda and the
modernisation of the TDIs.

C 42 E / 56 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005867/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ναρκωτικά στο διαδίκτυο

Παρά τις σχετικές νομοθετικές πρωτοβουλίες σε κοινοτικό αλλά και σε εθνικό επίπεδο, η προμήθεια ναρκωτικών ουσιών από
το διαδίκτυο δεν έχει περιοριστεί. Αντίθετα, μια σύντομη περιήγηση αποδεικνύει πως μέσω συγκεκριμένων ιστοσελίδων
διεξάγεται ένα τεράστιο παραεμπόριο ναρκωτικών ουσιών σχετικώς εύκολα προσβάσιμο ακόμα και από ερασιτέχνη χρήστη
του διαδικτύου. Διαπιστώνεται δε, ότι οι συναλλαγές δεν πραγματοποιούνται μέσω τραπεζικών λογαριασμών αλλά με
bitcoins (ηλεκτρονικό νόμισμα) γεγονός που καθιστά ακόμα πιο δύσκολη την ανίχνευση των διαδρομών των παράνομων
αυτών δραστηριοτήτων.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες ενέργειες καταβάλλει ειδικά για τον περιορισμό αυτών των παράνομων δοσοληψιών με ηλεκτρονικά νομίσματα
μέσω διαδικτύου;

2. Ποια είναι τα στοιχεία που πιθανόν διαθέτει από την Europol για την έκταση του φαινομένου και τον όγκο των
παράνομων δοσοληψιών αναφορικά με ναρκωτικές ουσίες στο διαδίκτυο;

**Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(25 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η στρατηγική της ΕΕ για τα ναρκωτικά 2013-2020 αναγνωρίζει ότι οι νέες τεχνολογίες επικοινωνιών διαδραματίζουν
σημαντικό ρόλο στη διευκόλυνση της παραγωγής, της εμπορίας, της διακίνησης και της διανομής ναρκωτικών
(συμπεριλαμβανομένων των ελεγχόμενων νέων ψυχοτρόπων ουσιών). Κατά συνέπεια, το νέο σχέδιο δράσης της ΕΕ για τα
ναρκωτικά 2013-2016 ( [1] ), που καθορίζει συγκεκριμένες δράσεις για την εφαρμογή στρατηγικής για τα ναρκωτικά, καλεί το
Συμβούλιο, τα κράτη μέλη, την Επιτροπή και την Ευρωπόλ να χαράξουν στρατηγική σχετικά με το νέο ρόλο των τεχνολογιών
επικοινωνιών. Καλεί επίσης τα κράτη μέλη, την Cepol και την Ευρωπόλ να ενισχύσουν την κατάρτιση των υπαλλήλων
επιβολής του νόμου της CEPOL στον τομέα αυτό. Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί επίσης το εν λόγω θέμα.

Πρόκειται περί σοβαρού φαινομένου, αλλά δεν υπάρχει καμία μελέτη που να εκτιμά την έκταση της διακίνησης ναρκωτικών
μέσω του Διαδικτύου σε επίπεδο ΕΕ παρά το γεγονός ότι _η έκθεση για τις αγορές ναρκωτικών της ΕΕ: στρατηγική_
_ανάλυση (_ _[2]_ _)_ επισημαίνει τη σοβαρότητά του. Ωστόσο, στο πλαίσιο των νέων ενεργειών της ΕΕ για την καταπολέμηση του
σοβαρού και οργανωμένου εγκλήματος της περιόδου 2014-2017 το φαινόμενο πρέπει να αντιμετωπιστεί ως μία από τις
εννέα βασικές προτεραιότητες της επιχειρησιακής διασυνοριακής συνεργασίας στην ΕΕ. Το πρόσφατα ιδρυθέν κέντρο της
Ευρωπόλ για εγκλήματα στον κυβερνοχώρο (EC3) θα είναι σε θέση να υποστηρίξει τις δράσεις των κρατών μελών στον τομέα
αυτό.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/el/13/st09/st09963.el13.pdf που ενέκρινε το Συμβούλιο ΔΕΥ στις 6-7 Ιουνίου 2013, δεν έχει δημοσιευτεί

στην ΕΕ ακόμη.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_194336_EN_TD3112366ENC.pdf

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 57

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005867/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Drugs online

Legislative initiatives at EU and national level have been unable to curb online drugs trafficking. On the contrary, a
cursory survey shows that a massive illegal trade in drugs is being conducted though specific sites, a trade which is
relatively easily accessible even to the casual Internet user. It transpires that transactions are not conducted through
bank accounts, but with bitcoins (electronic currency), which makes it even more difficult to track these illegal
activities.

In view of the above, will Commission say:

1. What action is it taking specifically to restrict these illegal transactions using electronic currency online?

2. What evidence does it have, if any, from Europol about the scale of the phenomenon and the volume of illegal
transactions involving drugs online?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 acknowledges that new communication technologies have a significant role in
facilitating the production, marketing, trafficking and distribution of drugs, including controlled new psychoactive
substances. Consequently, the new EU Action Plan on Drugs 2013-2016 ( [1] ), which sets out concrete actions to
implement the Drugs Strategy, calls on Council, the Member States, the Commission and Europol to identify strategic
responses to address this new role of communication technologies. It also invites the Member States, CEPOL and
Europol to strengthen CEPOL's training for law enforcement officers in this area The Commission is also monitoring
this issue.

Given the nature of the phenomenon, there is no study assessing the scale of drug trafficking online at EU level even
though the EU _drug markets report: a strategic_ _analysis (_ [2] _)_ sheds light on the topic. However within the new EU Policy
Cycle against serious and organised crime 2014-2017, the phenomenon is to be tackled as one of nine key priorities
for operational cross-border cooperation in the EU. The recently established Europol Cybercrime Centre (EC3) will be
able to support Member States actions in this regard.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st09/st09963.en13.pdf adopted by the JHA Council on 6-7 June 2013, not published in the OJ yet.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_194336_EN_TD3112366ENC.pdf

C 42 E / 58 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005868/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Αύξηση της διάδοσης του επικίνδυνου ναρκωτικού «shisha»

Το τελευταίο διάστημα σε αρκετές ευρωπαϊκές χώρες και ιδίως σε εκείνες που πλήττονται από την κρίση, παρατηρείται
δραματική αύξηση στη χρήση της θανατηφόρας, αλλά εξαιρετικά φτηνής, ουσίας «shisha». Η «κοκαΐνη των φτωχών» και «το
ναρκωτικό της λιτότητας» όπως ονομάζεται είναι η απάντηση των εμπόρων στους τοξικομανείς που δεν έχουν πλέον χρήματα
να αγοράσουν κοκαΐνη ή ηρωίνη.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει περιέλθει στη γνώση της η νέα αυτή απειλή; Διαθέτει στοιχεία αναφορικά με την αύξηση του φαινομένου στην ΕΕ
και ιδίως σε κράτη μέλη που πλήττονται από την κρίση;

2. Καθώς η αντιμετώπιση της έξαρσης της χρήσης ναρκωτικών ουσιών απαιτεί ισχυρές δομές απεξάρτησης, πρόληψης και
θεραπείας και ενώ η κρίση στα κράτη μέλη περιορίζει τους διαθέσιμους πόρους, είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η
Επιτροπή αν προτίθεται να κινητοποιήσει περισσότερους πόρους — ιδίως από το ευρωπαϊκό κοινωνικό ταμείο — προς
αυτή την κατεύθυνση;

**Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(31 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση της αύξησης της χρήσης μιας παραλλαγής της μεθαμφεταμίνης, την κοινώς αποκαλούμενη
«shisha», σε πολλά κράτη μέλη, ιδίως στην Ελλάδα.

Το εν λόγω ναρκωτικό, κοινώς γνωστό ως «κοκαΐνη των φτωχών» δείχνει να είναι μείγμα συνθετικών ναρκωτικών με διάφορες
χημικές ουσίες (λάδι μπαταρίας, λάδι κινητήρα, μερικές φορές σαμπουάν). Προσλαμβάνεται με εισπνοή ή ενέσεις και συχνά
χρησιμοποιείται σε συνδυασμό με αλκοόλη. Δεν υπάρχουν στοιχεία σχετικά με την τοξικότητά του, αλλά από πληροφορίες
των ίδιων των χρηστών προκύπτει ότι μπορεί να έχει σοβαρές συνέπειες στην υγεία και την κοινωνία, συμπεριλαμβανομένης
της απώλειας συνείδησης και της βίαιης συμπεριφοράς. Οι κατασχέσεις της αστυνομίας επιβεβαιώνουν ότι είναι άμεσα
διαθέσιμο και εύκολο να παραχθεί σε κατ' οίκον εργαστήρια.

Ο περιορισμός της ζήτησης ναρκωτικών αποτελεί κατά κύριο λόγο αρμοδιότητα των κρατών μελών, τα οποία αναπτύσσουν
και εφαρμόζουν πολιτικές σχετικά με την πρόληψη της τοξικομανίας, τη θεραπεία και τον περιορισμό των επιπτώσεων, με
στόχο τη μείωση της χρήσης ψυχοτρόπων ουσιών και των επιπτώσεών τους στα άτομα και στην κοινωνία. Η Επιτροπή
συμπληρώνει τη δράση των κρατών μελών με την προώθηση της ανάπτυξης καινοτόμων προσεγγίσεων για την πρόληψη, τη
θεραπεία και τον περιορισμό των επιπτώσεων, υποστηρίζοντας την ανταλλαγή βέλτιστων πρακτικών και τη χρηματοδότηση
της έρευνας μέσω χρηματοδοτικών προγραμμάτων της ΕΕ.

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο χρηματοδοτεί πολυάριθμα έργα συνδρομής ατόμων που αντιμετωπίζουν δυσκολίες και
άλλων από μειονεκτούσες ομάδες, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των τοξικομανών, και βελτίωσης των δεξιοτήτων τους, με στόχο
την εξεύρεση εργασίας και τη δυνατότητα πρόσβασης σε ίσες ευκαιρίες με τον υπόλοιπο πληθυσμό.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 59

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005868/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Spread of the dangerous drug ‘shisha’

Recently a number of European countries, especially those most affected by the crisis, have seen a dramatic increase in
consumption of the deadly, but extremely cheap, substance ‘shisha’. The ‘poor man’s cocaine’ and the ‘austerity drug’,
as it is called, is drug dealers’ answer for drug addicts who can no longer find the money to buy cocaine or heroin.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Has it been apprised of this new threat? Does it have any data regarding the growth of this phenomenon in
the EU and in particular in those Member States most affected by the crisis?

2. Since well-endowed rehabilitation, prevention and treatment facilities are needed to address the dramatic
increase in drug use and since the crisis in Member States restricts the amount of resources available, can the
Commission say whether it intends to mobilise more resources — in particular from the European Social Fund
— for this purpose?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of a rise in the use of a variant of methamphetamine, commonly called ‘shisha’, in several
Member States, in particular in Greece.

This drug, known in the streets as ‘cocaine of the poor’ appears to be a mixture of a synthetic drug with various
chemicals (battery oil, engine oil, sometimes shampoo). It can be inhaled or injected and it is frequently used in
combination with alcohol. There is no information on its toxicity, but users self-reports suggest that it can cause
severe health and social harms, including loss of consciousness and violent behaviour. Police seizures confirm that it
is readily available and easy to produce in home laboratories.

Drug-demand reduction is primarily a competence of the Member States, which develop and implement policies on
drug prevention, treatment and harm reduction, to reduce the use of psychoactive substances and the harms that they
cause to individuals and society. The Commission complements Member States’ action by promoting the
development of innovative approaches for prevention, treatment and harm reduction, supporting the sharing of best
practices and funding research trough EU financial programmes.

The European Social Fund finances numerous projects to help people in difficulty and those from disadvantaged
groups, including drug users, improve their skills, to find jobs and have the same opportunities as others do.

C 42 E / 60 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005869/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Zusätzliche finanzielle Unterstützung für Ägypten: Mehrbetrag von 200 Mio. EUR (leistungsbezogener
Grundsatz — „mehr für mehr“)

In der gemeinsamen Mitteilung vom 25. Mai 2011 zur Neuausrichtung der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik
erklären die Kommission und die Hohe Vertreterin der Union für Außen‐ und Sicherheitspolitik, dass im Rahmen des
neuen EU-Konzepts eine verstärkte Unterstützung der EU für ihre Nachbarn an Bedingungen geknüpft sei. So
müssten die Partner Fortschritte bei Aufbau und Festigung von Demokratie und Rechtstaatlichkeit vorweisen ( [1] ).

In ihren Vorschlägen zum Europäischen Nachbarschaftsinstrument (2014‐2010) bestätigt die Kommmission den auf
Anreizen beruhenden Ansatz und erklärt, dass zusätzliche finanzielle Unterstützung nach dem leistungsbezogenen
Grundsatz („mehr für mehr“) aus den Rahmenprogrammen SPRING und EPICS auf der Grundlage von Fortschritten,
die bei Reformen zur Vertiefung der Demokratie sowie bei der Einhaltung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der
Menschenrechte erzielt werden, gewährt wird.

Laut der gemeinsamen Erklärung vom 25. Mai 2011 sind mehrere Elemente für den Aufbau einer vertieften
Demokratie unverzichtbar:

—
freie und faire Wahlen;

—
Vereinigungs-, Meinungs‐ und Versammlungsfreiheit und eine freie Presse und freie Medien;

—
Rechtspflege durch ein unabhängiges Gerichtswesen und Recht auf ein faires Verfahren;

—
Korruptionsbekämpfung sowie

—
Reform des Sicherheitssektors und der Strafverfolgung (einschließlich der Polizei) und Gewährleitung der
demokratischen Kontrolle des Militärs und der Sicherheitskräfte.

Im Mai 2013 teilte das für Erweiterung und Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik zuständige Mitglied der Kommission
Štefan Füle dem ägyptischen Präsidenten Mohamed Morsi schriftlich mit, dass für Ägypten zusätzliche 200 Mio. EUR
finanzielle Unterstützung aus dem Rahmenprogramm SPRING bereitgestellt werden.

Könnte die Kommission darlegen, auf welcher Grundlage die Kriterien, denen zufolge Ägypten 200 Mio. EUR an
zusätzlicher Unterstützung gewährt werden, ausgewählt worden sind?

**Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission**

_(25. Juli 2013)_

Der für Erweiterung und Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik zuständige EU-Kommissar Štefan Füle beantwortete am
8. Mai 2013 ein Schreiben des ägyptischen Finanzministers, das im Februar 2013 bei der Kommission eingegangen
ist. Die ägyptische Regierung beantragte in diesem Schreiben zusätzliche Unterstützung der EU in Höhe von
200 Mio. EUR für das nationale Programm für soziale und wirtschaftliche Reformen. Dieser EU-Beitrag ist Bestandteil
eines umfassenderen Maßnahmenpakets, das gemeinsam mit der Weltbank und der Afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank
konzipiert wurde.

Von diesen insgesamt 200 Mio. EUR sollten lediglich 90 Mio. EUR aus dem Programm SPRING bereitgestellt werden.
Diese Mittelzuweisung aus dem Programm SPRING für Ägypten in Höhe von 90 Mio. EUR war bereits im November
2012 angekündigt worden und sollte der Durchführung der Präsidentschaftswahlen 2012 unter zufriedenstellenden
Bedingungen, der Aufhebung des Ausnahmezustands und dem Übergang von einer Militärregierung zu einer zivilen
Regierung Rechnung tragen. Dem im März 2013 veröffentlichten ENP-Fortschrittsbericht zu Ägypten ( [2] ) sind weitere
Einzelheiten der Gründe für diese Entscheidung zu entnehmen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Siehe: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_de.pdf, Seite 3.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_progress_report_egypt_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 61

Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Unsicherheit in Bezug auf die politische Richtung, die Ägypten einschlagen wird,
wurde das gesamte Programm von EU, Weltbank und Afrikanischer Entwicklungsbank zur Unterstützung des
Reformprogramms zurückgestellt. Unklar ist auch, ob Ägypten weiterhin finanzielle Unterstützung des IWF in
Anspruch nehmen wird. Bislang wurden weder Mittelbindungen noch Zahlungen im Rahmen der EU-Unterstützung
in Höhe von 200 Mio. EUR vorgenommen, deren Bereitstellung aufgrund der Entwicklung der Lage in Ägypten
erneut geprüft werden muss.

C 42 E / 62 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005869/13**

**to the Commission**
**Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Additional financial support for Egypt: EUR 200 million top-up in the hope of a greater return on investment

In the Joint Communication of 25 May 2011 on the review of the European Neighbourhood, the Commission and
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy state that with the EU’s new approach, ‘increased EU
support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and
respect for the rule of law’ ( [1] ).

In its proposals for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (2014-2020), the Commission confirms the incentivebased approach and states that additional financial support, i.e. a greater return on investment from the SPRING and
EPICS umbrella programmes will be granted based on progress in reforms on deep democracy, and respect for the
rule of law and human rights.

According to the Joint Communication from 25 May 2011, the elements involved in building deep democracy are:

—
free and fair elections;

—
freedom of association, expression and assembly, and a free press and media;

—
administration of the rule of law by an independent judiciary and the right to a fair trial;

—
combating corruption;

—
reform of the security and law enforcement sector (including the police), and the establishment of democratic
control over armed and security forces.

In May 2013, Mr Štefan Füle, the Commissioner responsible for enlargement and European neighbourhood policy,
communicated in writing to the President of Egypt, Mr Mohamed Morsi, that an additional EUR 200 million in
financial support from the SPRING umbrella programme would be allocated to Egypt.

Could the Commission outline the basis on which the criteria for the granting of this EUR 200 million in additional
financial support to Egypt were selected?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

On 8 May 2013, Mr Štefan Füle, the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and for the European
Neighbourhood Policy, replied to a letter received from the Egyptian Minister of Finance in February 2013, in which
the Egyptian authorities requested EU support worth EUR 200 million for the implementation of the national
programme for social and economic reform. The EU contribution would be part of a more comprehensive package
designed jointly with the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

Of the EUR 200 million EU contribution, only EUR 90 million was due to come from the SPRING programme. This
EUR 90 million SPRING allocation to Egypt was announced in November 2012, in recognition of the satisfactory
holding of the Presidential elections in 2012, the end of the state of emergency and the transfer from military to
civilian rule. The ENP progress report on Egypt published in March 2013 gives more details on the facts that led to
this decision ( [2] ).

At the current juncture, given the current uncertainty about the political direction of Egypt, the entire programme
from the EU, the World Bank and the African Development Bank to support the national programme for social and
economic reform is currently on hold. It is also unclear if Egypt will continue to request IMF assistance. No financial
commitments, let alone payments, have been made so far on the EUR 200 million programme, the feasibility of
which will need to be reassessed in the light of the evolution of the situation in Egypt.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf, page 6.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_progress_report_egypt_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 63

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005870/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Bastiaan Belder (EFD)**

_(27 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Ongevallen in chemische industrie

Op 17 april ontplofte in West, Texas, USA een gedeelte van een kunstmestfabriek. Ten gevolge van de explosie
kwamen 15 mensen om het leven en raakten meer dan 160 personen gewond.

Het Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) van de EU lijkt een enorme afname te tonen van het aantal chemische
ongevallen in de EU naar 3 ongevallen in 2011 en 1 in 2012.

Bovenstaande brengt me tot enkele vragen:

1. Zijn in de EU vergelijkbare ongevallen bekend als in West, Texas?

2. Welke maatregelen zijn er genomen om dit te voorkomen?

3. Mogen we, met inachtneming van de gegevens uit de MARS databank, concluderen dat de chemische industrie
in de EU de laatste jaren veiliger is geworden?

4. Wat is de reden van de drastische afname van het aantal gerapporteerde ongevallen in de MARS database?

**Antwoord van de heer Potočnik namens de Commissie**

_(26 juli 2013)_

Uit een analyse van de databank eMARS ( [1] ), die de lidstaten op grond van de Seveso II‐richtlijn 96/82/EG betreffende
de beheersing van de gevaren van zware ongevallen waarbij gevaarlijke stoffen zijn betrokken ( [2] ) moeten gebruiken
om zware ongevallen te rapporteren, is gebleken dat het aantal ongevallen in de periode 2000-2010 relatief stabiel is
gebleven, met een gemiddelde van 27 per jaar. Rekening houdend met de stijging van het aantal locaties, de
economische groei en de uitbreiding in 2004 en 2007 wijst dit op een positieve trend. Anderzijds zal het lage aantal
online gepubliceerde ongevallen voor de jaren 2011 en 2012 naar verwachting nog stijgen, aangezien nog niet alle
ongevallenrapporten zijn gepubliceerd, door vertragingen vanwege gerechtelijke procedures en de tijd die nodig is
voor de formele goedkeuring van de rapporten.

Bij het ongeval in Toulouse (Frankrijk) in 2001 waren er 30 doden en meer dan 2 500 gewonden en bedroeg de
materiële schade tussen 1,5 en 2,3 miljard EUR. Dit ongeval is vergelijkbaar met dat van West, Texas, wat betreft de
daarbij betrokken stoffen en de omvang van de gevolgen. Bijgevolg werd de Seveso-richtlijn gewijzigd om de indeling
van mengsels van ammoniumnitraat te wijzigen, alsook de desbetreffende drempelwaarden ( [3] ).

De nieuwe Seveso III-richtlijn 2012/18/EU ( [4] ) verbetert het recht van het publiek om te worden voorgelicht en
geraadpleegd en bevat striktere bepalingen inzake inspecties en veiligheidsbeheer, waarbij de rol van het management
wordt versterkt. De chemische industrie in de EU zal hierdoor naar verwachting nog veiliger worden.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Systeem voor het rapporteren van zware ongevallen (Major Accident Reporting System), op: https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) PB L 10 van 14.1.1997.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) PB L 345 van 31.12.2003.
( ⋅4∙ ) PB L 197 van 24.7.2012.

C 42 E / 64 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005870/13**

**to the Commission**
**Bastiaan Belder (EFD)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Accidents in the chemical industry

On 17 April, part of an artificial fertiliser plant in West, Texas, USA, exploded, killing 15 people and injuring more
than 160.

The EU’s Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) seems to indicate an enormous fall in the number of chemical
accidents in the EU, to 3 accidents in 2011 and 1 in 2012.

1. Are any accidents known to have occurred in the EU which are comparable to that in West, Texas?

2. What measures have been taken to prevent them?

3. May we, on the basis of data from the MARS database, conclude that the chemical industry in the EU has
become safer in recent years?

4. What is the reason for the dramatic reduction in the number of reported accidents in the MARS database?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

An analysis of the eMARS database ( [1] ), to which Member States have to report major accidents under the Seveso II
Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances ( [2] ), shows that the
number of accidents remained relatively stable over the years 2000-2010, with an average of 27 per year.
Considering the increase in the number of sites, economic growth and the enlargement in 2004 and 2007, this
indicates a positive trend. However, the low number of accidents published online for the years 2011 and 2012 is
expected to rise, as not all accident reports have been published yet, due to delays caused by legal proceedings and the
time needed for formal approval of reports.

The Toulouse accident in France in 2001 caused 30 fatalities, over 2,500 injuries and material damage between
EUR 1.5 and 2.3 billion. It is comparable to that of West, Texas, in terms of substances involved and magnitude of
consequences. As a result, the Seveso Directive was amended to modify the classification of ammonium nitrate
mixtures and associated threshold quantities ( [3] ).

The new Seveso III Directive 2012/18/EU ( [4] ) improves the right of the public to be informed and consulted and
introduces stricter provisions on inspections and safety management, strengthening the role of management. It is
expected to further increase the safety of the EU chemical industry.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Major Accident Reporting System, at: https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 10 of 14 January 1997.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 345 of 31 December 2003.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ L 197 of 24 July 2012.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 65

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005871/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Silvia-Adriana Ţicău (S&D)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Implementarea și revizuirea Planului de acțiune privind mobilitatea urbană

Comisia a publicat în septembrie 2009 un Plan de acțiune privind mobilitatea urbană. Acțiunile prevăzute în Planul
de acțiune privind mobilitatea urbană trebuiau să fie implementate pe parcursul a trei ani din momentul adoptării
acestui plan.

Aș dori să întreb Comisia care este stadiul realizării acestui plan de acțiune, care sunt lecțiile învățate și când
intenționează Comisia să publice raportul aferent implementării acestui plan? De asemenea, aș dori să întreb Comisia
când intenționează să publice un plan de acțiune pentru mobilitatea urbană revizuit și care ar fi principalele noi
acțiuni pe care Comisia intenționează să le introducă?

**Răspuns dat de dl Kallas în numele Comisiei**

_(11 iulie 2013)_

Cele 20 de măsuri propuse în Planul de acțiune privind mobilitatea urbană ( [1] ) au fost puse în aplicare de către Comisie
în perioada 2009-2012. Până la sfârșitul anului 2013, Comisia intenționează să prezinte o inițiativă în materie de
mobilitate urbană. Lucrările referitoare la această inițiativă se află în prezent într-un stadiu avansat. De asemenea, vom
lua în considerare realizarea unei evaluări independente a implementării planului de acțiune.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2009)0490.

C 42 E / 66 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005871/13**

**to the Commission**
**Silvia-Adriana Ţicău (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Implementation and revision of the Urban Mobility Action Plan

The Commission published an Urban Mobility Action Plan in September 2009. The actions set out in the Urban
Mobility Action Plan were to be implemented during the three years following this plan’s adoption.

I would like to ask the Commission the following questions: At what stage is this action plan’s implementation? What
lessons are being learnt and when does the Commission intend to publish the report on this plan’s implementation? I
would also like to ask the Commission when it intends to publish a revised urban mobility action plan and what main
new actions it would intend to introduce.

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The 20 measures put forward in the action plan on Urban Mobility ( [1] ) were implemented by the Commission in the
period 2009-2012. The Commission plans to put forward an Urban Mobility initiative before the end of 2013. The
work on this initiative is currently at an advanced stage and an independent review of the implementation of the
action plan will be taken into consideration.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2009) 0490.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 67

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005872/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**George Sabin Cutaş (S&D)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Garanția pentru tineri

Tinerii au fost afectați în mod disproporționat de actuala criză economică. 5,7 milioane de tineri europeni sunt în
prezent șomeri, iar în anumite state membre una din două persoane cu vârste cuprinse între 15 și 24 de ani nu își
găsesc un loc de muncă. Salut, prin urmare, inițiativa Comisiei Europene și recentele angajamente ale Consiliului de
Miniștri privind „Garanția pentru tineri”.

Având în vedere că reușita acesteia va depinde în mare măsură de structura serviciilor publice de angajare din fiecare
stat membru, cum va interveni Comisia pentru a susține eforturile depuse de membrii UE? Ia executivul european în
calcul posibilitatea de a oferi asistență tehnică statelor membre și de a intra în parteneriate cu alte instituții
internaționale, precum Organizația Internațională a Muncii, pentru a se asigura de succesul „Garanției pentru tineri”?

**Răspuns dat de dl. Andor în numele Comisiei**

_(22 iulie 2013)_

Într-o comunicare din iunie 2013, intitulată „Apel la acțiune pentru combaterea șomajului în rândul tinerilor”,
Comisia a invitat statele membre cu regiuni care se confruntă cu rate ale șomajului în rândul tinerilor de peste 25 % să
elaboreze, până în octombrie 2013, planuri de punere în aplicare a „garanției pentru tineret”. Planurile ar trebui să se
ghideze după documentul de lucru al serviciilor Comisiei, care va fi în curând disponibil în 22 de limbi ale UE ( [1] ). La
cererea statelor membre, Comisia va coordona asistența tehnică, de exemplu programele de înfrățire între statele
membre. În același timp, Comisia cooperează cu OIM și încurajează statele membre să facă la fel.

În plus, Comisia propune concentrarea eforturilor la începutul perioadei de desfășurare a Inițiativei privind ocuparea
forței de muncă în rândul tinerilor (YEI), prin alocarea a 6 miliarde de euro în anii 2014-2015. Comisia propune, de
asemenea, relansarea, la cererea statelor membre, a echipelor de acțiune pentru încadrarea în muncă a tinerilor, în
sprijinul punerii în aplicare a „garanției pentru tineret” și al mobilizării Fondului social european și a YEI.

În ceea ce privește punerea în aplicare a „garanției pentru tineret”, Comisia este conștientă de rolul esențial al
serviciilor publice de ocupare a forței de muncă (SPOFM). De aceea, au fost lansate o serie de inițiative generale,
pentru a spori capacitatea SPOFM: un program specific de învățare reciprocă, dedicat SPOFM, „dialogul de la SPOFM
la SPOFM” și PARES (parteneriatul SPOFM), care include proiecte de cooperare. Mai mult, Comisia a adoptat o
propunere de decizie privind cooperarea consolidată între SPOFM ( [2] ), care prevede un sistem comun de evaluare
comparativă bazat pe date concrete, activități de învățare reciprocă, asistență reciprocă și acțiuni strategice de
modernizare a SPOFM.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1036&newsId=1731&furtherNews=yes
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 430 final, 17.6.2013.

C 42 E / 68 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005872/13**

**to the Commission**
**George Sabin Cutaş (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Youth Guarantee

Young people have been affected disproportionately by the current economic recession. There are 5.7 million
unemployed young people in Europe at the moment. Indeed, in some Member States one person in two aged between
15 and 24 is without a job. This is why I welcome the initiative from the Commission and the undertakings made
recently by the Council of Ministers on the Youth Guarantee.

Given that its success will largely depend on how public employment services are organised in each Member State,
what input will the Commission provide to support the efforts made by Member States? Is the European executive
considering the possibility of offering technical assistance to Member States and of entering into partnerships with
other international institutions, such as the International Labour Organisation, to ensure that the Youth Guarantee is
successful?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

The Commission’s June 2013 ‘Call to Action on Youth Unemployment’ calls upon Member States (MS) with regions
experiencing youth unemployment rates above 25% to develop Youth Guarantee Implementation Plans by
October 2013. The plans should be guided by the detailed Staff Working Document, soon available in 22 EU
languages ( [1] ). Upon MS request, the Commission will coordinate technical assistance, for example MS twinning. The
Commission is also cooperating, and encourages Member States to cooperate, with the ILO.

In addition, the Commission is proposing to frontload the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) by committing
EUR 6 billion in 2014-15, and to re-launch Youth Employment Action Teams on MS request, to assist with the
implementation of the Youth Guarantee scheme and the mobilisation of the European Social Fund and YEI.

The Commission is aware of the key role of Public Employment Services (PES) in the implementation of the Youth
Guarantee. General initiatives to enhance PES capacity include a specific PES mutual learning programme, ‘PES to PES
[Dialogue’ and PARES (Partnership of Employment Services), which includes cooperation projects. Moreover, the](http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=991&langId=en)
COM has adopted a proposal for a decision on enhanced cooperation between PES ( [2] ) involving a common evidencebased benchmarking system, mutual learning activities, mutual assistance and strategic actions for the modernisation
of PES.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1036&newsId=1731&furtherNews=yes
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 430 final of 17.6.2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 69

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005873/13**

**à la Commission**
**Philippe Lamberts (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Obligation légale pour la Commission de publier les méthodes, hypothèses et paramètres pertinents qui soustendent ses prévisions macroéconomiques et budgétaires

Conformément à l'article 4, paragraphe 2, de la directive 2011/85/UE du Conseil du 8 novembre 2011 sur les
exigences applicables aux cadres budgétaires des États membres, «la Commission publie les méthodes, hypothèses et
paramètres pertinents qui sous-tendent ses prévisions macroéconomiques et budgétaires ( [1] )».

Adopté récemment, le règlement (UE) n° 472/2013 relatif au renforcement de la surveillance économique et
budgétaire des États membres de la zone euro connaissant ou risquant de connaître de sérieuses difficultés du point de
vue de leur stabilité financière prévoit une évaluation de la soutenabilité de la dette publique de ces pays. En outre,
l'article 6 dispose que «la Commission rend public le scénario macroéconomique, y compris le scénario de croissance,
les paramètres pertinents qui sous-tendent l'évaluation de la soutenabilité de la dette publique de l'État membre
concerné et les estimations quant à l'incidence des mesures budgétaires au plan agrégé sur la croissance
économique ( [2] )».

Sur base des directive et règlement susmentionnés, je demande que:

1. toutes les informations qui sous-tendent les prévisions macroéconomiques, budgétaires et concernant la dette
pour l'Union en général, ainsi que tous les méthodes, hypothèses ou paramètres spécifiques pertinents pour les
prévisions par pays, soient fournis par la Commission;

2. en particulier, les données (modèles, hypothèses et paramètres) qui sous-tendent l'évaluation de la soutenabilité
de la dette des pays dits «bénéficiant d'un programme», à savoir Chypre, la Grèce, l'Irlande et le Portugal, soient
obtenues;

3. dans l'esprit du processus relatif au dialogue économique prévu dans le _six‐pack_ et dans le _two‐pack_, une
manifestation publique soit organisée en collaboration avec les institutions européennes et les partenaires
sociaux, ainsi que les ONG, le monde universitaire et les instituts de statistique nationaux, afin de procéder à un
échange de vues sur cette question, et d'ajuster cette dernière si cela s'avère nécessaire.

**Réponse donnée par M. Rehn au nom de la Commission**

_(8 juillet 2013)_

1. Les hypothèses et paramètres externes qui sous-tendent les prévisions de printemps 2013 de la Commission
sont expliqués dans le cadre I.5 ( [3] ).

Concernant la méthodologie utilisée pour ces prévisions, la préparation des prévisions économiques européennes
combine une approche géographiquement décentralisée, des orientations au niveau central et des contrôles de
cohérence. Les prévisions pour les États membres sont fournies par les unités géographiques. Les éléments gérés au
niveau central portent sur l'analyse des perspectives économiques au niveau de l'UE et de la zone euro ainsi que sur un
ensemble commun dit d'«hypothèses externes» pour le commerce et la croissance en dehors de l'UE, le prix des
matières premières, les taux de change et les taux d'intérêt. La cohérence des prévisions est ensuite assurée par un
processus itératif entre les unités géographiques et l'équipe chargée de la coordination des prévisions. Une analyse de
scénario est également réalisée au niveau central au moyen du modèle QUEST III de la Commission et étaye par
exemple l'évaluation des risques entourant les prévisions. En outre, les unités géographiques peuvent s'appuyer sur
l'expertise des spécialistes de la DG ECFIN dans le domaine de l'économie internationale, des marchés financiers, des
marchés du travail et des finances publiques.

Enfin, à l'automne, une information sur les méthodes, hypothèses et paramètres de ces prévisions sera fournie à
l'occasion de l'évaluation globale de la situation et des perspectives budgétaires de la zone euro, conformément aux
dispositions du règlement (UE) n° 473/2013 établissant des dispositions communes pour le suivi et l'évaluation des
projets de plans budgétaires et pour la correction des déficits excessifs dans les États membres de la zone euro.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Voir http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0041:0047:FR:PDF, p. 45.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Voir http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:140:FULL:FR:PDF, p. 6.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee2_en.pdf

C 42 E / 70 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

2. Les dernières données et paramètres qui sous-tendent l'évaluation de la soutenabilité de la dette des pays
bénéficiant d'un programme FESF/MESF/MES se trouvent à l'adresse dont le lien est donné en référence ( [4] ).

3. La Commission procède à un échange de vue régulier concernant les perspectives économiques avec d'autres
institutions internationales, autorités nationales, prévisionnistes du secteur privé, partenaires sociaux et universitaires,
à travers différents canaux et dans le cadre de divers forums.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp124_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op149_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp131_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp148_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 71

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005873/13**

**to the Commission**
**Philippe Lamberts (Verts/ALE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Legal obligation for the Commission to disclose the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters that
underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts

Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on the budgetary framework
requirements of Member States, ‘the Commission shall make public the methodologies, assumptions and relevant
parameters that underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts’ ( [1] ).

The recently adopted Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of
Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial
stability foresees an assessment of the sustainability of the government debt of these countries. Furthermore, Article 6
specifies that ‘the Commission shall make public the macroeconomic scenario, including the growth scenario, the
relevant parameters underpinning the assessment of the sustainability of the government debt of the Member State
concerned, and the estimated impact of the aggregate budgetary measures on economic growth’ ( [2] ).

Drawing on the abovementioned directive and regulation, I request that:

1. all the information underpinning the macroeconomic, budgetary and debt forecasts for the EU in general, as
well as any specific methodology, assumption or parameter relevant to country forecasts, be provided by the
Commission;

2. in particular the data (models, assumptions and parameters) underpinning the debt sustainability assessment of
the so-called ‘programme countries’, i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, be obtained;

3. in the spirit of the economic dialogue procedure foreseen in the six pack and the two pack, a public event with
the European institutions and social partners, and with NGOs, academics and national statistics bodies, be
organised so as to exchange views on this material, with a view to adjusting it where necessary.

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

1. The external assumptions and parameters underlying the Commission's Spring 2013 Forecasts are explained in
box I.5 ( [3] ).

In terms of forecast methodology, the preparation of European Economic Forecasts combines a geographically
decentralised approach with central guidance and consistency checks. Forecasts for Member States (MS) are provided
by country desks. Central elements consist of the analysis of the economic outlook at the EU and euro area level as
well as a common set of so-called ‘external assumptions’ for non-EU growth and trade, commodity prices, exchange
rates and interest rates. The mutual consistency of forecasts is then ensured in an iterative process between
geographical desks and the forecast coordination team. Also, scenario analysis with the Commission's QUEST III
model is carried out centrally and underpins e.g. the assessment of risks to the forecast. Moreover, country desks can
draw on the expertise of DG ECFIN specialists on the international economy, financial markets, labour markets and
public finances.

Finally, in the autumn information on the forecast methodologies, assumptions and parameters will be provided
together with the overall assessment of the budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area, in line with the
provisions of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 concerning the assessment of EU area MS draft budgetary plans.

2. The latest data and parameters underpinning the debt sustainability assessment of the countries benefitting
from EFSF/EFSM/ESM can be found under the links provided at the references ( [4] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0041:0047:EN:PDF, page 45.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:140:FULL:EN:PDF, page 6.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee2_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp124_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op149_en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp131_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp148_en.pdf

C 42 E / 72 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

3. The Commission is engaged in a regular exchange of views on the economic outlook with other international
institutions, national authorities, private forecasters, social partners and academia through various channels and in
various fora.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 73

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005874/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διαθέσιμα κεφάλαια από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο για την στήριξη των νέων

Με σχετική ομιλία του, τον Δεκέμβριο του 2011, αναφορικά με τους διαθέσιμους προς αξιοποίηση πόρους από το ΕΚΤ, ο
Πρόεδρος της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής τόνισε πως περίπου 30 δις ευρώ παραμένουν αναξιοποίητα από τα κράτη μέλη ενώ θα
μπορούσαν να διοχετευθούν στην προσπάθεια για την αντιμετώπιση της ανεργίας των νέων και την στήριξη της κατάρτισης.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

—
Καθώς έχουν έκτοτε ανακοινωθεί νέες πρωτοβουλίες, όπως «η εγγύηση για τους νέους» είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει
η Επιτροπή για το εάν παρατηρείται πλέον βελτίωση στην αξιοποίηση των σχετικών πόρων;

—
Δεδομένου ότι σε λίγους μήνες ολοκληρώνεται το τρέχον πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο, ποιο είναι σήμερα το ποσό
που συνεχίζει να είναι διαθέσιμο στο ΕΚΤ και να μην έχει αξιοποιηθεί από τα κράτη μέλη;

**Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(19 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή υπέβαλε έκθεση σχετικά με την τρέχουσα κατάσταση ανακατανομής και αναπρογραμματισμού των κεφαλαίων
της ΕΕ σε μέτρα απασχόλησης των νέων στο εαρινό Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο ( [1] ). Η έκθεση έδειξε ότι κινητοποιήθηκαν 16
δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ για ενέργειες για τους νέους και τις ΜΜΕ μέσω των εργασιών των ομάδων δράσης.

Ύστερα από την ανακατανομή στα κράτη μέλη, η Επιτροπή επί του παρόντος δεν αναμένει περαιτέρω σημαντικές αιτήσεις για
τροποποιήσεις προγραμμάτων από τα κράτη μέλη προς το τέλος της τρέχουσας περιόδου προγραμματισμού. Η Επιτροπή
έδωσε παραδείγματα των αποτελεσμάτων που επιτεύχθηκαν έως σήμερα μέσω του έργου των ομάδων δράσης για τους νέους
στην ανακοίνωσή της ( [2] ) στο Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο του Ιουνίου.

Η Επιτροπή αναμένει ότι τα κράτη μέλη θα διαθέσουν επαρκείς πόρους για την υποστήριξη της εφαρμογής της «Εγγύησης για
τους νέους» στα έγγραφα προγραμματισμού τους για την περίοδο 2014-2020 που επί του παρόντος βρίσκονται σε στάδιο
διαπραγμάτευσης. Στους πόρους αυτούς περιλαμβάνονται χρηματοδότηση βάσει της «Πρωτοβουλίας για την απασχόληση
των νέων» ύψους 6 δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ που ενσωματώνεται στον προγραμματισμό του ΕΚΤ για την περίοδο 2014-2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/barroso/report_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/06/pdf/3_en.pdf

C 42 E / 74 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005874/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Social Fund resources available to support young people

In an address given in December 2011 on the amount of ESF funds available, the Commission President stressed that
some EUR 30 billion remained unused by Member States and could be channelled into efforts to tackle youth
unemployment and support training.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

—
Since new initiatives, such as the ‘Youth Guarantee’ scheme, have been unveiled since then, will the
Commission say whether these funds are now being put to better use?

—
Since the current multiannual financial framework is due to expire in a few months’ time, what amount of ESF
funds is currently still available, having not been used by Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

The Commission reported on the state of play of the reallocation and reprogramming of EU Funds towards youth
employment measures to the Spring European Council ( [1] ). The report showed that EUR 16 billion have been
mobilised for youth actions and SMEs through the action teams work.

Following the reallocation exercise in Member States, the Commission currently does not expect further substantial
requests for programme modifications by the Member States towards the end of the current programming period.
The Commission provided examples of the results achieved so far through the work of the Youth Action Teams in its
communication ( [2] ) to the June European Council.

The Commission expects Member States to allocate sufficient resources to support the implementation of ‘Youth
Guarantee’ in their programming documents for 2014-2020 which are currently under negotiation. This includes
earmarking funding under the EUR 6 billion Youth Employment Initiative which is integrated into ESF programming
for 2014-2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/barroso/report_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/06/pdf/3_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 75

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005875/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ L'Unione europea possiede dati sufficienti sulla problematica dei senzatetto

La disponibilità di dati attendibili è fondamentale per lo sviluppo di ogni politica. La Commissione è stata già
interrogata sui dati a sua disposizione sulle persone senza fissa dimora e sull'utilizzo della formulazione «senza fissa
dimora» utilizzata nella «Classificazione europea sulla grave esclusione abitativa e la condizione di persona senza
dimora» (ETHOS). La Commissione ha reso noto come sia già cosciente della necessità di statistiche migliori
sull'esclusione abitativa: l'UE non dispone di nessuna statistica ufficiale sul fenomeno dei senzatetto. La mancanza di
dati sul fenomeno comporta l'impossibilità di stilare un profilo demografico delle persone senza fissa dimora e di
comprendere in che modo il loro numero è aumentato in seguito alla crisi economica. È opinione dell'interrogante
però che la mancanza di dati specifici sulle persone senza fissa dimora a livello europeo non sia dovuta a un'assenza di
metodologia, ma alla scarsa volontà politica che la Commissione (Eurostat, ISG) riserva all'applicazione di tali
metodologie.

Ciò premesso:

1. Le statistiche dell'Unione europea sul reddito e sulle condizioni di vita (EU-SILC) non coprono le situazioni di
estrema povertà, come quella delle persone senza fissa dimora. Di conseguenza, può la Commissione riferire
quando inizierà a prendere come riferimento un'altra categoria di indicatori (che si ispirino ad esempio alla
classificazione ETHOS)?

2. La EMCO (comitato per l'occupazione) e la SPC (comitato per la protezione sociale) hanno definito la
problematica delle persone senza fissa dimora come un'area specifica da monitorare attraverso il quadro di
valutazione comune. Può la Commissione indicare perché il quadro di valutazione comune si basa
esclusivamente sugli indicatori EU-SILC quando è stata largamente approvata l'inadeguatezza di questo
strumento nell'includere tutte le forme di povertà?

3. Il documento di lavoro dei servizi della Commissione sul fenomeno delle persone senza fissa dimora nel
«pacchetto sugli investimenti sociali» chiede agli Stati membri di impegnarsi in una cooperazione
transfrontaliera per migliorare il grado di conoscenza e scambiare le buone prassi nella raccolta di dati sul
fenomeno. Può la Commissione far sapere come pensa di sostenere la creazione di una tale rete?

4. Può la Commissione illustrare come i senzatetto saranno integrati nel monitoraggio dei risultati in materia di
protezione sociale?

5. Considerata la gravità crescente del fenomeno dei senzatetto in molti Stati membri, può la Commissione
riferire se intende integrare questa problematica fra quelle ricorrenti analizzate nella relazione sull'occupazione
e lo sviluppo sociale in Europa?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

_(24 luglio 2013)_

La popolazione di riferimento dello strumento EU-SILC consiste di tutti i nuclei domestici e dei loro attuali membri
residenti nel territorio ( [1] ). Per definizione i senzatetto non sono coperti da tale strumento di monitoraggio. La
Commissione ha tuttavia svolto un ruolo attivo nel migliorare la valutazione del fenomeno. Nel censimento del
2011 ( [2] ) si invitano gli Stati membri a fornire volontariamente informazioni sulle persone senza fissa dimora di tipo
primario e secondario, nonché su coloro che vivono in ricoveri non convenzionali.

Il quadro di valutazione comune si basa essenzialmente su strumenti armonizzati dell'UE (SILC, indagine sulle forze di
lavoro, ecc.), integrati all'occorrenza da altre banche dati comparative internazionali (ad esempio, dall'OCSE). Il
quadro di valutazione comune contempla attualmente indicatori riferiti all'insieme delle condizioni abitative (costo,
disagio abitativo e sovraffollamento) in base allo strumento EU-SILC. Nel contesto della revisione di EU-SILC Eurostat
ha proposto di sviluppare le variabili relative al costo degli alloggi e di svolgere ogni tre anni una rilevazione specifica
sulle realtà abitative.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 1177/2003.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (UE) n. 519/2010; i dati dovrebbero essere disponibili nel 2014.

C 42 E / 76 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Il pacchetto di investimenti sociali ( [3] ) incoraggia agli scambi transnazionali di dati e prassi ottimali tra Stati membri in
merito alla questione dei senzatetto. Nell'ambito del Comitato per la protezione sociale la Commissione collabora con
gli Stati membri riguardo agli scambi in materia di politica sociale ed all'elaborazione di dati ed offre idonee sedi di
discussione.

Il pacchetto di investimenti sociali avvalora l'impegno della Commissione inteso a migliorare l'integrazione delle
questioni di politica sociale nel semestre europeo e a formulare all'occorrenza raccomandazioni specifiche per paese.

La mancanza di dati sul fenomeno dei senzatetto a livello di UE limita il numero di settori passibili di analisi
approfondita. La Commissione ha tuttavia esaminato le modalità per ottimizzare le informazioni esistenti ed ha
sintetizzato le recenti tendenze relative alla situazione delle persone senza fissa dimora nell' _Employment and Social_
_Situation Quarterly Review_ (esame trimestrale su occupazione e situazione sociale) del giugno 2012.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Ulteriori informazioni sul pacchetto di investimenti sociali sono disponibili al seguente indirizzo:
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=it.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 77

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005875/13**

**to the Commission**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Need for sufficient EU data on homelessness

The availability of reliable data is fundamental for the development of all policy. The Commission has already been
questioned about the data at its disposal on homeless people and on the use of the term ‘homeless’ in the ‘European
Typology of Homelessness and Housing Exclusion’ (ETHOS). The Commission has indicated that it is already aware of
the need for better statistics on housing exclusion: the EU has no official statistics on the phenomenon of
homelessness. The lack of relevant data also makes it impossible to draw up a demographic profile of homeless
people or to understand how their numbers have grown as a result of the economic crisis. The author of this question
believes, however, that the absence of specific data on homeless people at European level is due not to a lack of
methodology, but to the fact that the Commission (Eurostat, the Indicators’ Sub-Group) lacks the political will to
apply it.

1. The European Union statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) do not cover situations of extreme
poverty, such as those experienced by the homeless. Can the Commission therefore state when it will start to use
another category of indicators (inspired, for example, by the ETHOS classification) as a reference?

2. The Employment Committee (EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) have identified the problem of
homeless people as a specific area to be monitored through the joint assessment framework. Can the Commission
indicate why the joint assessment framework is based solely on the EU-SILC indicators when this instrument has been
clearly proven to be inadequate when it comes to including all forms of poverty?

3. The Commission staff working document on the phenomenon of homeless people in the ‘Social Investment
Package’ calls on the Member States to engage in cross-border cooperation in order to increase knowledge and
exchange good practices in the collection of data on this phenomenon. Can the Commission state how it intends to
support the creation of such a network?

4. Can the Commission explain how homeless people will be included in the monitoring of social protection
outcomes?

5. Given the increasingly serious phenomenon of homelessness in many Member States, can the Commission say
whether it intends to include this problem among the cyclical issues analysed in the report on employment and social
development in Europe?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

The reference population of EU-SILC is all private households and their current members residing in the territory ( [1] ).
Homeless people are by definition not included in this monitoring tool. However, the Commission has been active in
improving the measurement of homelessness. The 2011 Census ( [2] ) asks Member States to provide voluntarily
information about primary and secondary homeless persons as well as persons living in non-conventional shelter.

The Joint Assessment Framework is primarily based on harmonised EU sources (SILC, LFS, etc.), complemented if
necessary by other international comparative databases (e.g. from OECD). The JAF currently includes indicators on
overall housing conditions (cost, housing deprivation and overcrowding) based EU-SILC. In the context of the
revision of EU-SILC, Eurostat proposed to reinforce the housing cost variables and to run a specific housing module
every 3 years.

The Social Investment Package ( [3] ) indeed encourages Member States for transnational exchanges on data and best
practices on homelessness. The Commission works together with Member States in the Social Protection Committee
on social policy exchanges and data development and it provides fora for discussion.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1177/2003.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 519/2010; data are foreseen to be available in 2014.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) For more information on the Social Investment Package, please visit http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en.

C 42 E / 78 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

The Social Investment Package reinforces the commitment of the Commission to further integrate social policy issues
in the European Semester and launch country-specific recommendations as appropriate.

The lack of data on homelessness at EU level limits the areas for in-depth analysis. However, the Commission has
investigated how to better use existing information and summarised recent trends in homeless in the June 2012 EU
Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 79

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005876/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Diritti dei cittadini europei che, esercitando il diritto di libera circolazione, diventano senza tetto in un altro
Stato membro dell'UE

Nelle precedenti interrogazioni parlamentari relative ai diritti dei senzatetto nell'UE, la Commissione aveva messo in
luce le seguenti questioni:

1. gli Stati membri non sono obbligati a fornire assistenza sociale al cittadino di un altro Stato che a) non lavori
durante i primi tre mesi e b) che si trovi nello Stato membro da più di tre mesi e non rispetti le condizioni di
residenza vigenti nello Stato ospitante;

2. i cittadini europei possono essere espulsi dal territorio se non rispettano le condizioni di residenza o se
rappresentano un onere ingente per il sistema di assistenza sociale del paese ospitante;

3. è necessario stabilire un test di proporzionalità per determinare in quali casi specifici l'accesso a sistemazioni di
emergenza sia da considerare come un onere ingente e se tale rifiuto sia in linea con la Carta europea dei diritti
fondamentali;

4. in merito alla compatibilità del rifiuto di fornire sistemazioni di emergenza con il diritto europeo, la
Commissione non può fornire un quadro di riferimento generale poiché l'accessibilità a tale servizio dipende
dalle circostanze fattuali e dal singolo caso;

5. la Commissione consacra alla problematica in questione i seguenti strumenti: la comunicazione «Agenda
europea per l’integrazione dei cittadini di paesi terzi», il progetto MPHASIS e lo studio del gennaio 2007
«Measurement of Homelessness at European Union Level» e supporta lo «Study on mobility, migration and
destitution in the European Union».

Considerando quanto enunciato, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. l'accesso alle sistemazioni di emergenza può essere considerato un diritto fondamentale;

2. è possibile stabilire un Fondo europeo che rafforzi la solidarietà fra gli Stati membri e permetta di dividere i
costi economici del sostegno ai cittadini indigenti che esercitano il proprio diritto di circolazione all'interno
dell'Europa;

3. è possibile stabilire un quadro di riferimento più chiaro, o almeno armonizzare la pratica nazionale, in merito
all'accesso all'assistenza sociale per quei cittadini dell'UE che esercitano il proprio diritto di circolazione e non
sono economicamente attivi nello Stato ospitante?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

_(25 luglio 2013)_

1. La risposta è si. Nella Carta dei diritti fondamentali ( [1] ) l'UE riconosce e rispetta il diritto all'assistenza sociale ed
abitativa in modo da garantire un'esistenza dignitosa a tutti coloro che non dispongano di risorse sufficienti, in
conformità a quanto stabilito dal diritto dell'Unione e dalle legislazioni e prassi nazionali. La Carta dispone inoltre che
tale principio sia applicato da istituzioni, organi, uffici ed agenzie dell'Unione e dagli Stati membri, per questi ultimi
esclusivamente nell'attuazione del diritto dell'Unione ( [2] ).

Gli Stati membri, cui primariamente compete l'attuazione di politiche abitative e di azioni a favore dei senzatetto,
hanno inoltre ratificato diversi accordi internazionali che contemplano disposizioni basate sui diritti intese a
promuovere l'accesso o il mantenimento dell'abitazione come presupposto per una vita dignitosa. Nel pacchetto di
investimenti sociali ( [3] ) la Commissione ha rilevato che, per prevenire ed affrontare più efficacemente la deprivazione
abitativa, sarebbe opportuno che gli Stati membri destinassero gli investimenti a migliorare l'accesso ad alloggi
economicamente sostenibili piuttosto che a fornire ricoveri d’emergenza.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Articolo 34, paragrafo 3.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Articolo 51, paragrafo 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Ulteriori informazioni sul pacchetto di investimenti sociali sono disponibili al seguente indirizzo:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en.

C 42 E / 80 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

2. Nell'ottobre 2012 la Commissione ha proposto l'istituzione di un Fondo di aiuti europei agli indigenti (FEAD). Il
compito di individuare i beneficiari del FEAD spetterà agli Stati membri, i quali sono nella condizione migliore per
valutare le esigenze locali.

3. Gli Stati membri hanno competenza esclusiva nel determinare le condizioni di accesso alle prestazioni
assistenziali. Nell’ambito del diritto dell’UE che disciplina la libera circolazione ed il soggiorno dei cittadini dell’UE ( [4] ) è
tuttavia previsto ( [5] ) che lo Stato membro ospitante possa decidere se concedere prestazioni assistenziali durante i
primi tre mesi di soggiorno, in modo da trovare il giusto equilibrio tra il diritto alla libera circolazione e l'esigenza di
non sovraccaricare i regimi assistenziali degli Stati membri.

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2004/38/CE relativa al diritto dei cittadini dell'Unione e dei loro familiari di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli

Stati membri.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Articolo 24, paragrafo 1, della direttiva 2004/38/CE.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 81

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005876/13**

**to the Commission**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rights of European citizens who become homeless in another EU Member State while exercising their right of
free movement

In the previous parliamentary questions concerning the rights of homeless people in the EU, the Commission had
highlighted the following issues:

1. Member States are not obliged to provide social assistance to citizens from another State who a) do not work
for the first three months and b) are in the Member State for over three months and fail to meet the residency
requirements in force in the host State;

2. European citizens may be expelled from the host State if they fail to meet its residency requirements or
constitute a heavy burden for its welfare system;

3. A proportionality test is needed to determine in which specific cases access to emergency accommodation
should be considered a heavy burden and whether a refusal to award such access is in line with the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights;

4. As regards the compatibility with EC law of a refusal to provide emergency accommodation, the Commission is
unable to provide a general framework of reference since access to this service depends on the actual
circumstances and each individual case;

5. The Commission is devoting the following instruments to tackling the issue in question: the communication
‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’, the MPHASIS project and the January 2007
study ‘Measurement of Homelessness at European Union Level’. It also supports the ‘Study on mobility,
migration and destitution in the European Union’.

In view of the above, can the Commission state whether:

1. access to emergency accommodation can be considered a fundamental right;

2. it is possible to set up a European fund to strengthen solidarity between the Member States and help split the
economic costs of supporting the most deprived citizens who are exercising their right of free movement
within the European Union;

3. it is possible to establish a clearer framework of reference, or at least harmonise national practice, as regards
access to social assistance for those EU citizens exercising their right of free movement who are not
economically active in the host State?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

1. Yes, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights ( [1] ), the EU recognises and respects the right to social and housing
assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules
laid down by Union law and national laws and practices. The Charter also stipulates that this principle has to be
applied by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and by the Member States, but only when they
are implementing Union law ( [2] ).

Member States — who have the main competence to implement housing and homelessness policies — also ratified a
number of international agreements which contain rights-based provisions to promote access to or retention of
housing as a precondition for a dignified life. The Commission pointed out in the Social Investment Package ( [3] ), that in
order to better prevent and tackle homelessness, Member States should shift the focus of investments from the
provision of emergency accommodation towards improving access to affordable housing.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 34(3).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Article 51 (1).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) For more information on the Social Investment Package, please visit .

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en.

C 42 E / 82 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

2. The Commission has proposed in October 2012 the establishment of a Fund for European Aid to the Most
Deprived (FEAD). The identification of the persons who may benefit from the FEAD would be the responsibility of the
Member States, as they are best placed to assess the local needs.

3. Each Member State is solely competent to determine the conditions for access to social assistance benefits.
However, in the framework of the EC law regulating free movement and residence of EU citizens ( [4] ), EC law ( [5] )
provides that the host Member State can decide whether it will grant social assistance during the first three months of
residence, thus striking the right balance between the right to free movement and the need not to overburden the
welfare system of Member States

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member

States.

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 83

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005877/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Impfschutz — Verbesserung und Aufklärung

Es häufen sich Berichte über ein Wiederaufflammen von Masern und Röteln in Europa; eine Immunisierung ist noch
nicht erreicht, und die Zielvorgabe für die Ausrottung von Masern wurde von der WHO von 2010 auf 2015
verschoben (auch dieses Zeitlimit wird wahrscheinlich nicht eingehalten werden können).

Diese Entwicklungen sind auf eine steigende Impfmüdigkeit und ‐skepsis der Bevölkerung zurückzuführen, die unter
anderem durch eine zu geringe Aufklärung über die (Neben‐)Wirkungen von Impfungen verursacht wurde.
Verschärft findet sich diese Problematik auch in den Entwicklungsländern, wobei hier, neben negativen
Falschmeldungen und Gerüchten, der Kostenfaktor eine tragende Rolle spielt. Neue Studien weisen auf die zentrale
Rolle der sozialen Medien im Bereich der Aufklärung und Information rund um Impfungen hin; dies kann in Zukunft
in wichtiges Mittel zur Bekämpfung von Impfmüdigkeit werden. Insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Gefahr von
Epidemien ist ein flächendeckender Impfschutz dringend notwendig.

1. Ist der Kommission die oben genannte Problematik, insbesondere in den Entwicklungsländern, bekannt?

2. Wenn ja, wird im Zuge der Entwicklungsförderung eine Aufklärungskampagne über Impfungen durch die
sozialen Medien angedacht und konkret gefördert?

3. Sind Kampagnen zur Bewusstseinsbildung durch die sozialen Medien generell auch in Ländern der EU
angedacht, und gibt es zu diesem Zweck eine europaweite Zusammenarbeit unter den EU-Mitgliedstaaten? Wie weit
sind derartige Programme (soweit vorhanden) gediehen?

4. Wird das Konzept der längerfristigen Kostenvermeidung (im Hinblick auf die Tatsache, dass die Impfung fast
immer billiger ist als die Behandlung einer bereits ausgebrochenen Krankheit) durch besondere finanzielle
Förderungen von Impfstoffen und niedrigschwelligen Angeboten in die Tat umgesetzt, um eine Steigerung von
Impfquoten zu erreichen?

5. Gibt es Pläne, um eine höhere Impfquote bei besonders jungen und alten Bürgerinnen und Bürgern zu
erreichen, beispielsweise durch die Koppelung von Sozialleistungen an Impfungen?

**Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission**

_(22. Juli 2013)_

Der Kommission ist die Lage bezüglich der Masernausbrüche in der Europäischen Union und die besonders
besorgniserregende Situation in den Entwicklungsländern, vor allem in Afrika, bekannt.

Im Zuge des Jahrzehnts der Impfung und des daraus folgenden Globalen Aktionsplans zur Impfung, der auf der
Weltgesundheitsversammlung vom Mai 2012 gebilligt wurde, hat die Kommission ihre Unterstützung für die
weltweite Allianz für Impfstoffe und Immunisierung ebenso wie für die weltweite Initiative zur Ausrottung der
Kinderlähmung bekräftigt, um allen Menschen gleichen Zugang zu vorhandenen Impfstoffen zu gewähren. Diese
Organisationen habe strategische Pläne erarbeitet, die auch Elemente von Bewusstseinsbildungskampagnen
umfassen.

Im Juni 2011 nahm der Rat der EU Schlussfolgerungen über die Impfung von Kindern an, um die Bemühungen zur
Verbesserung der Durchimpfung gegen Krankheiten zu verstärken, denen sich durch Impfung vorbeugen lässt. Dazu
gehören Masern, Mumps und Röteln. Die von der Kommission 2012 veranstaltete internationale Konferenz über die
Impfung von Kindern konzentrierte sich insbesondere auf die Impfung gegen Masern und Röteln sowie auf
Möglichkeiten zur Verstärkung der Kommunikation durch soziale Netzwerke ( [1] ). Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, hat das
Europäische Zentrum für die Prävention und die Kontrolle von Krankheiten Instrumente entwickelt, die die
Mitgliedstaaten bei der Kommunikation über soziale Medien unterstützen. Die jüngsten Instrumente zielen auf die
Verbesserung der Impfung schwer erreichbarer Bevölkerungsgruppen gegen Röteln ab ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/vaccination/events/ev_20121016_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/Forms/ECDC_DispForm.aspx?ID=1053

C 42 E / 84 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Zu den stärksten Argumenten für die Unterstützung von Impfkampagnen — nicht nur gegen Masern, sondern auch
gegen andere Erkrankungen, denen sich durch Impfung vorbeugen lässt — zählen die langfristigen
Kosteneinsparungen.

Impfmassnahmen fallen ebenso wie die Sozialversicherungsmaßnahmen auf nationaler Ebene in die Zuständigkeit
der nationalen Gesundheitsbehörden.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 85

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005877/13**

**to the Commission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Vaccine protection — improving coverage and raising awareness

Recently there have been more and more reports of a resurgence of measles and rubella in Europe. Immunisation has
not yet been achieved, and the WHO has extended the deadline for the eradication of measles from 2010 to 2015
(although this target will probably not be met either).

These developments are due to growing weariness and scepticism among the population about vaccinations, caused
in part by too little information about the (side) effects of immunisations. The situation is even worse in developing
countries where, on top of misinformation and rumours about the dangers of immunisation, the cost factor plays a
major role. New studies point to the central role of social media in disseminating information and raising awareness
about vaccinations and this can play an important role in future in combating people's reluctance to immunise.
Protection by immunising _everyone_ against the virus is urgently required, in particular in the light of the danger of
epidemics.

1. Is the Commission aware of the problem set out above, in particular the situation in developing countries?

2. If so, are there any plans to use development aid to implement and provide specific funding for an awareness‐
raising campaign about vaccinations using social media?

3. Are there any plans to raise awareness in EU countries using social media, and does any Europe‐wide
cooperation exist between Member States to this effect? If applicable, to what extent have such programmes been
successful?

4. Is the concept of longer‐term savings actually being put into practice with specific funding for vaccines and low‐
threshold services (given that it almost always costs less to vaccinate someone against a disease than to treat them
once it has broken out) in order to increase vaccination rates?

5. Are there any plans to increase the immunisation rate among young and old people in particular, by linking
social security benefits to vaccinations, for example?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the situation of measles outbreaks in the European Union and of the particularly
concerning situation in developing countries, especially in Africa.

In the wake of the Decade of Vaccine and the subsequent Global Vaccine Action Plan endorsed at the World Health
Assembly in May 2012, the Commission has reiterated its support to the Global Alliance for Vaccine and
Immunization and also to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative to improve more equitable access to existing
vaccines for people in all communities. These organisations have developed strategic plans that include elements of
awareness raising campaigns.

In June 2011, the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on childhood immunisation to strengthen the efforts to
improve immunisation coverage for vaccine preventable diseases, including measles, mumps and rubella (MMR). The
international conference organised by the Commission in 2012 on childhood immunisation focused in particular on
vaccination against measles and rubella, including how to strengthen communication through social networks ( [1] ). To
reach this objective, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has developed tools to support Member
States in communication through social media, the most recent tools targeted at improving MMR vaccination among
hard-to-reach population groups ( [2] ).

The longer‐term savings are one of strongest reasons to support vaccination campaigns, not only against measles but
also against other vaccine preventable diseases.

Vaccination, as well as social security measures at national level, are competences of the national public health
authorities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/vaccination/events/ev_20121016_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/Forms/ECDC_DispForm.aspx?ID=1053.

C 42 E / 86 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005878/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Lobbyismus an Schulen

Lobbyismus an Schulen wird zunehmend zu einer drängenden Problematik: Firmen und Lobbyverbände stellen
kostenlose Unterrichts‐ und Lernmaterialen, Projekttage, Schulungen und Ähnliches zur Verfügung. In dieser Form
werden einseitige, unrichtige und voreingenommene Inhalte im schulischen Rahmen vermittelt, oft ohne die Schüler
auf die subjektive Schilderung aufmerksam zu machen. Finanzielle Unterstützungen werden nicht offen gelegt und
Inhalte kritiklos übernommen. Eine derartige Einflussnahme auf die Schulbildung von Kindern und Jugendlichen ist
nicht tolerierbar, die Schule ist kein Raum für die Anwerbung potentieller/zukünftiger Verbraucher.

1. Sind der Kommission die oben genannten Tatsachen bekannt?

2. Wenn ja, gibt es bereits EU-weite Programme, die auf Aufklärung und Monitoring abzielen?

3. Wenn nicht, sind derartige Programme bzw. Informations‐ und Monitoringstellen geplant?

4. Gibt es bereits Pläne auf EU-Ebene, Datenbanken zur Bewertung von Unterrichtsmaterialen einzurichten?

**Antwort von Frau Vassiliou im Namen der Kommission**

_(17. Juli 2013)_

Wie der Frau Abgeordneten bekannt sein dürfte, tragen gemäß Artikel 165 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der
Europäischen Union allein die Mitgliedstaaten die Verantwortung für die Lehrinhalte und für die Gestaltung des
Bildungssystems. Die Kommission unterstützt die Politik der Mitgliedstaaten durch ihre Programme und indem sie
den politischen Austausch und das wechselseitige Lernen im Zusammenhang mit Fragen von beiderseitigem Interesse
fördert. Probleme mit der Qualität der Lehrmittel geben in der Tat EU-weit Anlass zur Sorge; das Thema Lobbyismus
bzw. Vermarktung von Waren und Dienstleistungen an Schulen wurde im europäischen Erfahrungsaustausch jedoch
noch nicht angesprochen. Entsprechend hat sich die Kommission noch nicht eingehend mit der Frage der
Lobbyarbeit an Schulen befasst.

Speziell auf diese Problematik ausgerichtete EU-Programme gibt es nicht. Die Kommission hat derzeit nicht die
Absicht, Programme dieser Art aufzulegen oder Datenbanken zur Bewertung von Lehrmaterial einzurichten.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 87

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005878/13**

**to the Commission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Lobbying in schools

Lobbying in schools is becoming an increasingly urgent problem: firms and lobby associations provide teaching and
educational materials, project days, training courses and similar benefits at no cost. One-sided, incorrect and biased
information is thus imparted in the school setting, often without the pupils being made aware of the subjective way in
which it is conveyed. Financial support is not disclosed and content is taken over uncritically. Exerting influence in
this way over the education of children and young people cannot be tolerated; schools are not the place to recruit
potential/future consumers.

1. Are the above facts known to the Commission?

2. If so, are there already EU-wide programmes in existence that aim to educate about lobbying and monitor it?

3. If not, are there any plans for programmes of this kind and/or for lobby information and monitoring bodies?

4. Are there already plans at EU level to set up databanks to assess teaching materials?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 July 2013)_

The Honourable Member will be aware that, in accordance with Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, the responsibility for the content and organisation of education and training systems rests entirely
with Member States. The Commission acts in support of Member States' policies through its programme actions and
by facilitating policy exchanges and peer learning on issues of mutual interest. While issues to do with the quality of
teaching materials are indeed a matter of concern across the EU, the specific issue of lobbying or marketing of
materials and services within schools has not been raised in these exchanges. Accordingly, the Commission has not
studied in detail the issue of lobbying in schools.

There are no EU programmes dealing specifically with this issue. The Commission has no plans to start programmes
of this kind, nor to set up databanks to assess teaching materials.

C 42 E / 88 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005879/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Verletzung der Menschenrechte aufgrund von Sparmaßnahmen

Es häufen sich Berichte über Sparmaßnahmen, die im Zuge der Finanz‐ und Wirtschaftskrise eingeführt wurden und
nun Grund‐ und Gleichheitsrechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger verletzen. Ein solches Verhalten ist zutiefst
fragwürdig, insbesondere in einer Union, die sich auf die Einhaltung von Menschenrechten gründet.

1. Gibt es konkrete Maßnahmen, die ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die Bürger‐ und Menschenrechte der von der
Krise betroffenen EU-Bürgerinnen und Bürger legen?

2. Gibt es bereits konkrete legislative Maßnahmen, die entsprechende Normen/Empfehlungen fokussieren,
insbesondere im Bereich der Kreditvergabe sowie des Eigentums‐ und Besitzrechtes?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(20. August 2013)_

Wie im Jahreswachstumsbericht 2013 erläutert, spricht sich die Kommission für eine differenzierte
wachstumsfreundliche Haushaltskonsolidierung aus. Dies bedeutet, dass die sozialen Auswirklungen berücksichtigt
werden und ein wirksamer Schutz der schwächsten Gruppen gewährleistet wird. Dieser Ansatz wurde bei Erstellung
der wirtschaftlichen Anpassungsprogramme verfolgt. Wenn die Mitgliedstaaten bindende Unionsbeschlüsse in
Zusammenhang mit diesen Programmen umsetzen, müssen sie die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen
Union ( [1] ) beachten. In dem kürzlich angenommenen Sozialinvestitionspaket ( [2] ) werden sozialpolitische Reformen in
den Mitgliedstaaten gefordert, um die Folgen der Krise und die demographischen Herausforderungen mit
Unterstützung der EU besser bewältigen zu können. Außerdem beabsichtigt die Kommission, im zweiten
Halbjahr 2013 ein Pilotprojekt zu dem Thema einzuleiten, wie das Recht auf Wohnung bei Zwangsräumungen
geschützt werden kann.

Im März 2011 hat die Kommission einen Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie über Kreditverträge für Wohnimmobilien
angenommen. Im Rahmen der politischen Einigung, die im vergangenen April bei den Trialogverhandlungen erzielt
wurde, ist ein Artikel „Zahlungsrückstände und Zwangsvollstreckung“ aufgenommen worden; darin werden
Kreditgeber aufgefordert, im Umgang mit Kreditnehmern, die in Zahlungsschwierigkeiten geraten sind, eine
angemessene Nachsicht walten zu lassen. Sobald die Richtlinie förmlich angenommen ist, findet sie auf neue
Kreditverträge Anwendung.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Die Charta enthält insbesondere Bestimmungen zur Nichtdiskiminierung, zu den Rechten des Kindes, älterer Menschen und Menschen mit

Behinderung sowie Bestimmungen über die Arbeitsbedingungen und die soziale Sicherheit.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Weitere Informationen zum Sozialinvestitionspaket sind abrufbar unter:

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 89

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005879/13**

**to the Commission**
**Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Violation of human rights because of austerity measures

Subject: Human rights violations resulting from austerity measures

There are increasing reports of austerity measures introduced during the financial and economic crisis now violating
the fundamental rights of citizens and their right to equal treatment. This is questionable in the extreme, particularly
in a Union based on respect for human rights.

1. Are there any specific measures which focus particularly on the civil and human rights of EU citizens hit by the
crisis?

2. Are there any specific legislative measures that seek to develop standards and/or recommendations in this area,
particularly as regards loans and property rights?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

The Commission has been calling for a differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, as explained in the Annual
Growth Survey of 2013. This means considering the social impacts and a more effective protection for the most
vulnerable. This approach was followed when designing economic adjustment programmes. When implementing
binding Union decisions relating to these economic adjustment programmes, Member States have to respect the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( [1] ). The recently adopted Social Investment Package ( [2] ) calls for
a set of social policy reforms in Member States to better tackle the consequences of the crisis and demographic
challenges with the support of the EU. The Commission also plans to launch a pilot project on the protection of the
right to housing in the context of evictions in the second half of 2013.

The Commission adopted in March 2011 a proposal for a directive on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential
Property. The political agreement reached in trilogue last April introduced an Article on ‘arrears and foreclosure’, to
encourage reasonable forbearance when dealing with borrowers in payment difficulties. The directive, once formally
adopted, will apply to new credit agreements.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The Charter includes in particular provisions on non-discrimination, the rights of the child, of the elderly and of persons with disabilities, as well

as provisions relating to working conditions and social security.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) For more information on the Social Investment Package, please visit http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en.

( **|**

C 42 E / 90 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005880/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(27 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ „Intelligent Speed Adaptation”

Studies, waaronder het PROSPER-project dat werd gefinancierd door de Europese Commissie, tonen aan dat het
gebruik van ISA (Intelligent Speed Adaptation, een techniek waarbij de bestuurder wordt ondersteund om de juiste
snelheid aan te houden) de verkeersveiligheid sterk verhoogt. De beschikbaarheid van en toegang tot
snelheidsinformatie zijn cruciaal voor de implementatie van deze systemen. Bovendien is samenwerking tussen de
lidstaten noodzakelijk om technische, wettelijke en beleidsmatige belemmeringen te verhinderen.

De ITS Richtlijn die werd aangenomen op 7 juli 2010 met als doel de ontwikkeling en implementatie van innovatieve
transport technologieën in heel Europa te versnellen, zorgt voor een wettelijk kader voor de ontwikkeling en
implementatie van Intelligent Transport System technologieën, waartoe ook het ISA systeem behoort.

— Heeft de Commissie, die uiterlijk op 17 augustus 2012 een overzicht van de lidstaten gekregen heeft, een zicht op
het aantal initiatieven die genomen werden door de lidstaten met betrekking tot de implementatie van ISA?

— Heeft de Commissie aan de lidstaten aanbevelingen gedaan naar aanleiding van deze rapporten?

— Op welke termijn voorziet de Commissie dat een systeem zoals ISA in heel Europa operationeel zou kunnen zijn?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(9 juli 2013)_

De lidstaten hebben in het kader van de richtlijn intelligente vervoerssystemen ( [1] ) verslag uitgebracht van hun
plannen; daaruit blijkt dat sommige lidstaten intelligente snelheidsaanpassing hebben ontwikkeld. België, Frankrijk,
Nederland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zweden noemen dit systeem expliciet.

De Europese Commissie heeft geen aanbevelingen aan de lidstaten gedaan op basis van deze verslagen omdat er
momenteel een onderzoek naar snelheidsbegrenzers wordt uitgevoerd.

De Commissie brengt binnenkort verslag uit aan het Europees Parlement en de Raad over de tenuitvoerlegging van de
verordening algemene veiligheid (Verordening 661/2009) ( [2] ), waaronder het snelheidsalarm.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) PB L 207 van 6.8.2010, blz 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Verordening (EG) nr. 661/2009 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 13 juli 2009 betreffende typegoedkeuringsvoorschriften voor de

algemene veiligheid van motorvoertuigen, aanhangwagens daarvan en daarvoor bestemde systemen, onderdelen en technische eenheden, PB L
200 van 31.7.2009.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 91

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005880/13**

**to the Commission**

**Ivo Belet (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Intelligent Speed Adaptation

Studies, including the PROSPER project funded by the European Commission, indicate that the use of ISA (Intelligent
Speed Adaptation, a technology which helps drivers to maintain the right speed) greatly improves road safety. The
availability of speed information, and access to it, are crucial for the implementation of these systems. Moreover,
cooperation between Member States is needed in order to prevent technical, legal and policy-based obstacles from
arising.

The ITS Directive adopted on 7 July 2010 with the aim of accelerating the development and implementation of
innovative transport technologies throughout Europe provides a legal framework for the development and
implementation of Intelligent Transport System technologies, which also include the ISA system.

— Does the Commission, which on 17 August 2012 at the latest received an overview from the Member States, know
how many initiatives have been taken by the Member States with regard to the implementation of ISA?

— Has the Commission made any recommendations to the Member States on the basis of these reports?

— How soon does the Commission anticipate that a system such as ISA could be operational throughout Europe?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

Member States have been reporting on their plans in the framework of the Intelligent Transport Systems Directive ( [1] )
and show that some have developed intelligent speed adaptation. Belgium, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and United
Kingdom mention it explicitely.

The European Commission has not made any recommendations to the Member States on the basis of these reports
since a study on speed limitation devices is currently being carried out.

The Commission will soon report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the General
Safety Regulation (Regulation 661/2009 ( [2] )) including Speed Alert.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 207, 6.8.2010.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 661/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning type-approval requirements for the

general safety of motor vehicles, their trailers and systems, components and separate technical units intended therefor, OJ L 200, 31.7.2009.

C 42 E / 92 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005881/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ricardo Cortés Lastra (S&D)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Sector lácteo en Cantabria

El sector más perjudicado del campo en España en 2012 fue el sector lácteo, según la Alianza por la Unidad del
Campo. En España se han llegado a firmar contratos en los que se pagaba 18 céntimos por litro de leche. Este ha sido
el primer año de la historia en el que el kilo de pienso costaba más que el litro de leche. Además, los agricultores
españoles denuncian que de media se paga 4 céntimos menos el litro de leche en España que en Francia.

Ante este problema, en Cantabria se ha intentado designar un mediador entre los ganaderos y la industria a la hora de
llegar a acuerdos de compraventa en el sector lácteo. Sin embargo, los ganaderos han señalado que esa figura es
inservible porque la industria sigue imponiendo sus precios. Hace un año, el Gobierno regional, del Partido Popular,
rechazó un plan estratégico propuesto por el PSOE y apoyado por el PRC para revitalizar el sector lácteo y poner en
marcha medidas urgentes para evitar que la leche se venda por debajo del coste de producción.

Como ya pregunté a la Comisión dos veces el pasado año, ¿a qué espera la Comisión para activar las ayudas al sector
ante la drástica bajada de los precios de la leche?

¿Piensa aplicar la Comisión otra clase de medidas para corregir los desequilibrios del mercado en este sector?

**Respuesta de M. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión**

_(10 de julio de 2013)_

De acuerdo con el Ministerio de Agricultura español, el precio mínimo mensual de la leche en 2012 en Cantabria fue
de 29,0 céntimos/litro ( [1] ). La misma fuente señala diferencias de precio de la leche entre regiones españolas superiores
a 5 céntimos/litro. Un cambio de orientación hacia productos de más valor añadido puede explicar las diferencias
entre los precios pagados a los agricultores en diferentes regiones o países.

El ajuste de los niveles de los precios de la leche registrados durante el primer semestre de 2012, tras una temporada
de elevada producción, ya ha finalizado. En efecto, los precios de la leche en la EU aumentaron un 10,7 % entre julio
de 2012 y enero de 2013 (el 11,6 % en España). Por otra parte, aunque durante este período los agentes económicos
podían recurrir a los mecanismos de mercado, su utilización fue bastante limitada (únicamente el 1,25 % de la
mantequilla ofrecida la temporada pasada en régimen de almacenamiento privado procedía de España).

Las medidas de emergencia y la cláusula de perturbación del mercado siguen estando disponibles en la OCM ( [2] ), si
bien no fueron activadas porque el sector lácteo de la UE no estaba en situación de crisis.

No obstante, la Comisión aprobó una propuesta de las autoridades españolas para asignar derechos de pago a los
productores de leche a través de la reserva nacional ( [3] ).

Aparte de lo ya previsto en las propuestas legislativas para la PAC después de 2013 en materia de apoyo al sector
lácteo, la Comisión está realizando en la actualidad un estudio prospectivo sobre la evolución más probable del sector
en un entorno sin contingentes, que incluye, entre otros temas, la capacidad del sector lácteo europeo para abordar
los desequilibrios del mercado. Los resultados de este y de otros estudios se debatirán con las partes interesadas, las
instituciones europeas y los Estados miembros en una conferencia que la Comisión tiene previsto organizar el 24 de
septiembre de 2013.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.magrama.gob.es/app/vocwai/documentos/Adjuntos_AreaPublica/Informe%20de%20precios_Abril_2013.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Artículos 186 y 191 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1234/2007 del Consejo, de 22 de octubre de 2007, por el que se crea una organización común de

mercados agrícolas y se establecen disposiciones específicas para determinados productos agrícolas.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) En virtud de las disposiciones del artículo 41, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) n° 73/2009 del Consejo, de 19 de enero de 2009, por el que se

establecen disposiciones comunes aplicables a los regímenes de ayuda directa a los agricultores en el marco de la política agrícola común y se
instauran determinados regímenes de ayuda a los agricultores y por el que se modifican los Reglamentos (CE) n° 1290/2005, (CE) n° 247/2006,
(CE) n° 378/2007 y se deroga el Reglamento (CE) n° 1782/2003 (DO L 30 de 31.1.2009, p. 16).

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 93

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005881/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ricardo Cortés Lastra (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Dairy sector in Cantabria

According to the Alianza por la Unidad del Campo (Countryside Unity Alliance), the Spanish farming sector that
suffered the most in 2012 was the dairy sector. Contracts were signed in Spain whereby farmers were paid 18 cents
for one litre of milk. This was the first year in which one kilo of feed cost more than one litre of milk. Moreover,
Spanish farmers claim that, on average, they are paid four cents less per litre of milk than farmers in France.

Faced with this problem, in Cantabria the initiative was taken to appoint a mediator between dairy farmers and the
industry when concluding purchase and sale agreements in the dairy sector. However, dairy farmers have said that the
mediator is useless because the industry is still dictating prices. A year ago, the People’s Party-led regional government
rejected a strategic plan proposed by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and supported by the Regionalist
Party of Cantabria (PRC) to revitalise the dairy sector and to take urgent measures to stop milk being sold for less than
the cost of production.

As I have already asked the Commission twice in the last year, why has it not yet mobilised aid for the sector in view
of the collapse in milk prices?

Is it planning to take other kinds of measures to rectify market imbalances in this sector?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 July 2013)_

According to the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, the minimum monthly milk price in Cantabria in 2012 was 29.0
cent/l ( [1] ). The same source shows differences in milk price between Spanish regions of more than 5 cent/l. A
difference of orientation towards more added-value products can explain differences in the price paid to farmers in
different regions/countries.

The adjustment in milk price levels observed in the first half of 2012, following a high production season, is already
over. Indeed, milk prices in the EU increased by 10.7% between July 2012 and January 2013 (11.6% increase in
Spain). Moreover, although market mechanisms were available for operators during this period, their use was rather
limited (only 1.25% of the butter offered last season under the private storage scheme was from Spain).

Emergency measures and the disturbance clause remain available in the CMO ( [2] ) but they were not mobilised, as
the EU dairy sector was not in a crisis situation.

However, the Commission approved a proposal made by the Spanish authorities to allocate payment entitlements to
dairy farmers from the National Reserve ( [3] ).

Apart from what has already been foreseen in the legal proposals for the CAP after 2013 in terms of support for the
milk sector, the Commission is currently running a prospective study on the most likely evolution of the milk sector
in a quota-free environment, comprising, among other subjects, the capacity of the European milk sector to address
market imbalances. The results of this and other studies will be discussed with the stakeholders, European institutions
and Member States in a conference that the Commission will organise on 24 September 2013.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.magrama.gob.es/app/vocwai/documentos/Adjuntos_AreaPublica/Informe%20de%20precios_Abril_2013.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Articles 186 and 191 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets

and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Under the provisions set in Article 41(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct

support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations
(EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (OJ L 30, 31.1.2009, p. 16).

( **|**

C 42 E / 94 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005882/13**

**à la Commission**
**Isabelle Thomas (S&D) et Eric Andrieu (S&D)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Règlement intérieur des conseils consultatifs régionaux

Le rôle des conseils consultatifs régionaux (CCR) est primordial pour permettre à différentes parties prenantes de
formuler des recommandations sur la politique de la pêche de l'Union européenne.

En vertu de la législation adoptée en 2004, des règles strictes ont été établies afin de régir la création et le
fonctionnement de ces CCR. Ainsi, les articles 4 et 5 de cette législation disposent qu'au moins deux États membres
doivent y être représentés. Les articles 1 et 5 explicitent que le «secteur de la pêche» comprend un éventail de
participants, parmi lesquels des organisations professionnelles ou associatives.

Dans le cadre du fonctionnement du CCR MED, certaines parties prenantes nous ont alertés à propos de radiations
d'organisations professionnelles ou associatives, ou de refus opposés à leur adhésion. De plus, au sein du secrétariat
général et de la présidence, ne sont représentées des parties prenantes que d'un seul et unique État.

Les questions suivantes cherchent à déterminer si la Commission envisage de faire appliquer la règlementation aux
conseils consultatifs régionaux qui s'en écarteraient:

1. La Commission a-t-elle effectué récemment un contrôle des différents règlements internes des CCR afin de
s'assurer, notamment, qu'ils ne favorisent pas les intérêts particuliers d'une des parties prenantes?

2. La Commission, institution neutre et garante de l'intérêt commun, est-elle présente en tant qu'observateur lors
de l'élection du président des CCR afin de s'assurer de la conformité de celle-ci et du respect de certaines règles
démocratiques fondamentales?

3. La Commission supervise-t-elle l'utilisation des fonds dans le cadre de la gestion des CCR afin de s'assurer que
les dépenses soient justifiées, d'une part, et utilisées à des fins utiles non-partisanes, d'autre part?

4. La Commission considère-t-elle qu'il est nécessaire de veiller à ce que les membres du Bureau soient
représentatifs de la composition des CCR?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Damanaki au nom de la Commission**

_(29 juillet 2013)_

La Commission surveille le fonctionnement des conseils consultatifs régionaux (CCR) pour s'assurer que les règles
procédurales et les règles de composition prévues par la décision 2004/585/CE ( [1] ) du Conseil sont respectées. Il
importe en effet de garantir que les intérêts de toutes les parties prenantes soient correctement représentés. Les règles
actuelles précisent qu'au sein de l'assemblée générale et du comité exécutif de tous les CCR, deux tiers des sièges
doivent être alloués aux représentants du secteur de la pêche et un tiers aux représentants des autres groupes d'intérêt
concernés par la politique commune de la pêche (PCP).

La politique commune réformée de la pêche contient une disposition destinée à rendre cette composition plus
équilibrée: 60 % des sièges seront alloués aux représentants du secteur de la pêche — comme la pêche artisanale, la
pêche industrielle, les activités de transformation, ainsi que d'autres acteurs — et 40 % des sièges devront être réservés
aux représentants des autres groupes d'intérêt.

Pour ce qui est du CCR pour la mer Méditerranée (CCR MED), la Commission examine actuellement les plaintes
reçues concernant le fonctionnement de ce conseil, afin de vérifier si la réglementation en vigueur concernant sa
composition est appliquée. La représentativité du CCR MED dans sa composition actuelle préoccupe également la
Commission: elle a mis en place une initiative visant à obtenir une composition plus équilibrée, grâce à l'élargissement
des procédures relatives à l'adhésion de nouveaux membres, afin d'assurer une bonne représentation géographique
ainsi que la présence de petits armateurs. À cet égard, la participation financière de l'Union européenne au budget du
CCR MED fait à présent l'objet d'un réexamen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Décision 2004/585/CE du Conseil du 19 juillet 2004 instituant des conseils consultatifs régionaux dans le cadre de la politique commune de la
pêche (JO L 256 du 3.8.2004), modifiée par la décision 2007/409/CE du Conseil du 11 juin 2007 (JO L 155 du 15.6.2007).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 95

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005882/13**

**to the Commission**
**Isabelle Thomas (S&D) and Eric Andrieu (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rules of procedure of Regional Advisory Councils

Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) play a vital role in the implementation of the common fisheries policy by
providing a forum through which stakeholders can submit their own recommendations.

A Council decision adopted in 2004 lays down strict rules governing the establishment and functioning of RACs.
Articles 4 and 5 of that decision stipulate that RACs must include stakeholders from at least two Member States.
Articles 1 and 5 define the ‘fisheries sector’ as comprising a range of participants, including professional organisations
and associations.

These rules are sometimes disregarded, however. In the case of the Regional Advisory Council for the Mediterranean
(RAC MED), some stakeholders have raised the issue of professional organisations or associations being denied
membership or having their membership cancelled. What is more, all the stakeholders represented in the secretariat
and the presidency come from one single Member State.

The following questions seek to determine whether the Commission plans to ensure that the rules governing RACs
are properly enforced:

1. Has the Commission recently scrutinised the way in which RACs apply their rules of procedure, in particular in
order to satisfy itself that they do not give undue weight to the specific interests of any one stakeholder?

2. Given that the Commission is an impartial institution whose role is to safeguard the common interest, is it
present as an observer when the RACs elect their chairs, so that it can be sure that the election process is fair
and consistent with fundamental democratic principles?

3. Does the Commission oversee the use of funds in the context of the management of the RACs in order to satisfy
itself that spending is justified and that funds are disbursed fairly?

4. Does the Commission see a need to ensure that the composition of the bureaux accurately reflects the makeup
of the RACs?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 July 2013)_

The Commission monitors the functioning of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) to ensure that the rules of
procedure and the composition rules provided for in the Council Decision 2004/585/EC ( [1] ) are respected. It is indeed
important to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are duly represented. The current rules specify that in the
general assembly and the executive committee of all the RACs, two thirds of the seats have to be allotted to the
representatives of the fishing sector and one third to the representatives of the other interest groups affected by the
common fisheries policy (CFP).

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy has a provision for a more balanced composition. 60% of the seats will be
allotted to the representatives of the fishing sector, such as the small scale fishing industry, large scale fishing industry,
processing industry and others. 40% will have to be allotted to the representatives of the other interest groups.

Referring to the Mediterranean RAC, the Commission is currently looking into the complaints received, concerning
the functioning of the MEDRAC to verify that the current composition rules are respected. The Commission also has
concerns about the representativity of the current Mediterranean RAC composition. The Commission is undertaking
an initiative towards a more balanced composition through the opening of the procedures for new admittances to
ensure geographical representation and the presence of small scale vessel owners. The contribution of European
funding to the MEDRAC budget is now re-examined in this respect.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Decision 2004/585/EC of 19 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the common fisheries policy, OJ L 256, 3.8.2004
as amended by Council Decision 2007/409/EC of 11 June 2007, OJ L155, 15.6.2007.

C 42 E / 96 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-005883/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Deficit di bilancio di Roma Capitale

In un articolo del quotidiano «La Repubblica» del 25 maggio si apprende che, secondo quanto riferito da «fonti
autorevoli di Bruxelles», Roma Capitale avrebbe un deficit di bilancio di «decine di miliardi di euro». Quest'ultimo è
definito come un rischio sistemico che la città di Roma pone all'intera eurozona trattandosi di un debito pari a quello
dell'Austria.

Può la Commissione riferire se:

—
sta monitorando l'esposizione finanziaria di Roma Capitale e se è a conoscenza dei fatti sopra riportati;

—
è in contatto con l'autorità di Roma Capitale;

—
può confermare che il deficit è pari a quello dell'Austria?

**Risposta di Olli Rehn a nome della Commissione**

_(24 giugno 2013)_

L’onorevole parlamentare si riferisce alla sorveglianza della situazione di bilancio di un’amministrazione locale
italiana, che rientra nella sfera di competenza nazionale.

Il disavanzo pubblico dell’Italia nel 2012 è stato pari a 47 633 milioni di euro (ossia il 3,0 % del PIL). Nello stesso
anno il disavanzo pubblico dell’Austria è stato di 7 684 milioni di euro (ossia il 2,5 % del PIL).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 97

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005883/13**

**to the Commission**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Roma Capitale budget deficit

An article published on 25 May in the _La Repubblica_ newspaper revealed that, according to what were termed ‘reliable
sources in Brussels’, Roma Capitale (i.e. the city of Rome) has a budget deficit amounting to ‘tens of billions of euros’
and to that extent is posing a systemic risk to the euro area as a whole, given that the debt in question is as high as
Austria’s.

— Is the Commission monitoring Rome’s financial exposure and is it aware of the facts mentioned above?

— Is it in touch with the Roma Capitale authorities?

— Is the deficit really as large as Austria’s?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 June 2013)_

The Honourable Member of the European Parliament refers to monitoring the budgetary situation of an Italian local
authority, which falls under national responsibility.

Italy's general government deficit in 2012 was EUR 47 633 million (i.e. 3.0% of GDP). In the same year, Austria's
general government deficit was EUR 7 684 million (i.e. 2.5% of GDP).

C 42 E / 98 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-005886/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27. maj 2013)_

_Om:_ Høringsfrister

Kommissionen svarer på spørgsmål E-001716/2013 følgende: _»I overensstemmelse med det relevante udvalgs_
_forretningsregler fremsendte Kommissionen udkastet til afgørelsen om interkalibrering til udvalgets medlemmer to uger før_
_afstemningen. Det er op til den enkelte medlemsstat at organisere dets interne høringsproces.« (_ [1] _)_

I Danmark blev udkastet til afgørelsen om interkalibrering sendt i høring hos danske aktører og virksomheder med
henblik på at styrke den demokratiske inddragelse. Det er en generel procedure, at udkast til afgørelser sendes i høring
i Danmark. Da de danske myndigheder først modtager sådanne udkast fra Kommissionen 14 dage før afstemningen i
ECOSTAT, resulterer det i meget korte høringsfrister for danske aktører og virksomheder.

Kommissionen bedes svare på, om forretningsreglerne i ECOSTAT, som omtalt i svar E-001716/2013, og som
medfører, at udvalgets medlemmer får tilsendt udkast til afgørelser to uger før afstemningerne i ECOSTAT, også gør
sig gældende i andre lignende komiteer?

Endvidere bedes Kommissionen oplyse, om den mener, at der sikres en tilstrækkelig grundig høringsperiode i
medlemsstaterne, når myndigheder i medlemsstaterne får tilsendt udkast til afgørelser 14 dage før forslagene skal til
afstemning i ECOSTAT?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Janez Potočnik**

_(12. juli 2013)_

I Kommissionens svar på skriftlig forespørgsel nr. E-001716/2013 nævnes det, at medlemsstaterne i forbindelse med
ECOSTAT's arbejde vedrørende afgørelsen om interkalibrering havde rigelig lejlighed til at involvere sig i
udarbejdelsen af udkastet. Det påpeges også, at ECOSTAT's arbejde vedrørende denne afgørelse begyndte længe inden
afstemningen om det endelige udkast til afgørelse.

Det var derfor op til den enkelte medlemsstat at høre og indsende bidrag fra de relevante aktører under ECOSTATprocessen. En periode på 14 dage ansås for tilstrækkeligt til høringen om det endelige udkast, som blev sat til
afstemning i udvalget den 28. januar 2013, da dette var i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne vedrørende det
tidsrum for fremsendelse af dokumenter til medlemsstaterne, som er fastsat i standardforretningsordenen for udvalg.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-001716&language=DA.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 99

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005886/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jens Rohde (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Deadlines for consultations

In its answer to my Written Question E-001716/2013, the Commission states that: ‘The Commission sent the draft
intercalibration decision to Committee members 2 weeks in advance of the vote as required by the rules of procedure
of the relevant Committee. It is up to Member States to organise their internal consultation process’ ( [1] ).

In Denmark the draft intercalibration decision was sent for consultation with Danish stakeholders and businesses
with a view to enhancing the democratic input. It is normal practice for draft decisions to be sent for consultation in
Denmark. Since the Danish authorities only receive such drafts from the Commission 14 days before the vote in
ECOSTAT, this results in very short deadlines for consultation with Danish stakeholders and businesses.

Can the Commission please state whether the rules of procedure of ECOSTAT, as referred to in the answer to Written
Question E-001716/2013, which mean that the committee’s members receive the draft decisions two weeks before
the vote in ECOSTAT, also apply to other similar committees?

Does the Commission consider that sufficient time is guaranteed for an in-depth consultation in the Member States
when the Member States’ authorities are sent draft decisions 14 days before the proposals have to be voted on by
ECOSTAT?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The Commission's answer to Written Question E-001716/2013 mentions that, in the context of work undertaken by
the ECOSTAT on the intercalibration decision, Member States had ample opportunity to be involved in the
development of its draft. It also highlights that ECOSTAT's work in relation to that decision commenced well before
the vote on the final draft version of that decision.

Therefore, it was up to Member States to consult and provide input from relevant stakeholders to the ECOSTAT
process. For the consultation on the final draft to be voted upon in the committee of 28 January 2013 a 14 day period
was considered sufficient as it respected the time period set in the standard committee rules of procedure for the
documentation to be sent to members.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-001716&language=EN

C 42 E / 100 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005887/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)**

_(27 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Vrouwenquotum heeft negatieve invloed op omzet‐ en winstpercentages

Uit diverse onderzoeken is gebleken dat een vrouwenquotum voor de raad van commissarissen van bedrijven een
negatieve invloed op de omzet‐ en winstpercentages heeft — zo stelt Christina Hoff Sommers, verbonden aan de
Amerikaanse denktank Amercian Enterprise Institute in Washington.

Een voorbeeld: in Noorwegen, waar in 2003 een verplicht quotum werd ingevoerd, hebben bedrijven een
waardedaling ondergaan — zo blijkt uit onderzoek van de Universiteit van Michigan.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de negatieve invloed van vrouwenquota op de omzet‐ en winstpercentages? Hoe
beoordeelt zij dit? Verandert dit de positieve houding van de Commissie ten opzichte van vrouwenquota? Zo neen,
waarom niet?

2. Hoe verklaart de Commissie de negatieve invloed van vrouwenquota op de omzet‐ en winstpercentages?

3. Is de Commissie ertoe bereid af te zien van de invoering van vrouwenquota? Of is zij wellicht voornemens de
bedrijven, die ten gevolge van vrouwenquota waardedaling ondergaan, te compenseren?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**

_(8 juli 2013)_

De Commissie heeft de invloed van meer gendergelijkheid in het bestuur van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen zeer
nauwkeurig geëvalueerd in haar effectbeoordeling bij het voorstel voor een richtlijn. Zij heeft nota genomen van al
het beschikbare onderzoek. De beschouwde onderzoeken en hun resultaten kunnen worden geraadpleegd in bijlage 3
bij de effectbeoordeling ( [1] ). De Noorse situatie wordt in detail beoordeeld in de effectenbeoordeling en bijlage 9
daarbij.

Niet op basis van een individueel onderzoek, maar na een diepgaande analyse van al het beschikbare feitenmateriaal is
de Commissie tot de algemene conclusie gekomen dat een overgrote meerderheid van de feiten ( [2] ) een positieve
correlatie aantoont tussen genderdiversiteit in het bestuur van bedrijven en hun winstgevendheid en de kwaliteit van
hun bestuur. Deze bevindingen benadrukken dat het nodig is om het genderevenwicht in het bestuur van
beursgenoteerde bedrijven te verbeteren, zoals in de door de Commissie voorstelde de richtlijn. Dit voorstel zou geen
vaste quota invoeren, maar een systeem dat ervoor zorgt dat de selectie van niet-uitvoerende bestuursleden
uitsluitend op basis van kwalificatie gebeurt, en dat tegelijkertijd de transparantie van het selectieproces verhoogt en
de toegang tot deze posities voor hooggekwalificeerde vrouwen verbetert.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2012:0348 %2851 %29:FIN:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Zie bijvoorbeeld: Catalyst, jaarlijkse verslagen vanaf 2002, Women in leadership; The Bottom Line; Women on Boards; Crédit Suisse, Gender

Diversity and Company Performance, 2012; Ernst & Young, Mixed leadership, 2012; Mc Kinsey & Co, Women Matter (serie) vanaf 2007;
Watson/Korbel/Evans, Women on boards = Peak performance, 2012.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 101

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005887/13**

**to the Commission**
**Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Detrimental impact of quotas for numbers of women on turnover and profits

Various surveys have shown that a quota for the number of women on businesses’ Board of Directors adversely
affects turnover and profits, according to Christina Hoff Sommers, of the US think-tank the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington.

To take one example, in Norway, where a compulsory quota was introduced in 2003, the value of businesses has
fallen, according to a survey by the University of Michigan.

1. Is the Commission aware of the adverse impact of quotas for numbers of women on turnover and profits? What
view does it take of this? Does this alter the Commission’s positive attitude towards quotas for numbers of women? If
not, why not?

2. How does the Commission explain the adverse impact of quotas for numbers of women on turnover and
profits?

3. Will the Commission refrain from introducing quotas for numbers of women? Or does it perhaps intend to
compensate businesses whose value falls because of quotas for numbers of women?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

The Commission has evaluated the impact of more gender equality on boards of listed companies very carefully in its
Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive. It has taken note of all important research available.
The studies taken into account and their results can be consulted in Annex 3 to the impact assessment ( [1] ). The
Norwegian situation is evaluated in detail in the impact assessment and its Annex 9.

Not relying on one individual study but after a thorough analysis of the entire evidence available, the Commission has
come to the overall conclusion that an overwhelming majority of the evidence ( [2] ) illustrates a positive correlation
between the gender diversity of company boards and their profitability and the quality of their governance. These
findings underscore the need to improve the gender balance on the boards of listed companies as in the directive
proposed by the Commission. This proposal would not introduce rigid quotas, but a system which would ensure the
selection of non-executive board members strictly on the basis of qualification while increasing the transparency of
the selection process and facilitating access to these positions for highly qualified women.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2012:0348%2851%29:FIN:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See for instance some of them: Catalyst, yearly reports from 2002 onwards, Women in leadership; The Bottom Line; Women on Boards; Crédit

Suisse, Gender Diversity and Company Performance, 2012; Ernst&Young, Mixed leadership, 2012; Mc Kinsey&Co, Women Matter (series) from
2007 onwards; Watson/Korbel/Evans, Women on boards = Peak performance, 2012.

C 42 E / 102 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005888/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Fatahdreiging bij vriendschappelijke voetbalwedstrijd

The Jerusalem Post meldt dat Fatah activisten Palestijnse jongeren bedreigen die meededen aan een vriendschappelijke
voetbalwedstrijd tussen een Israëlisch jongerenteam en een Palestijns jongerenteam. De wedstrijd werd georganiseerd
door Mifalot met financiële steun van de Europese Unie. De Fatah activisten veroordeelden de wedstrijd op grond van:
„het bevorderen van de normalisatie van de verhoudingen met Israël”. Fatah uitte daarop bedreigingen op internet aan
de deelnemende Palestijnse jongeren.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van deze bedreigingen van Palestijnse jongeren door Fatah?

2. Is de Commissie van plan bij Fatah protest aan te tekenen tegen het uiten van deze bedreigingen aan jonge
Palestijnse voetballers die, met financiële steun van de EU, een vriendschappelijke wedstrijd hebben gespeeld tegen
jonge Israëlische voetballers?

3. Is de Commissie bereid strenger toezicht te houden op de EU-geldstromen naar Fatah en op de verantwoording
van Fatah over de besteding ervan?

4. Kan de Commissie aangeven waar zijn ethisch‐morele grens ligt met betrekking tot het continueren van het
bieden van financiële steun door de EU aan Fatah?

**Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie**

_(14 augustus 2013)_

1. De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van bedreigingen door Fatah van deelnemers aan de voetbalwedstrijd zoals
het geachte Parlementslid noemt. Een aantal Palestijnse politieke actoren is tegen elke activiteit waaraan zowel
Palestijnen en Israëliërs deelnemen zonder dat het vraagstuk van de bezetting wordt erkend of besproken. De
Commissie weet dat leden van Fatah hun afkeuring over deze activiteit hebben kenbaar gemaakt aan de organisatoren
van de voetbalwedstrijd, maar is niet op de hoogte van druk die rechtstreeks op de deelnemers zou zijn uitgeoefend.

2. Aangezien de Commissie niet weet of de in de krant vermelde specifieke beschuldigingen terecht zijn, heeft zij
deze kwestie niet aangekaart bij de Palestijnse Autoriteit. De Commissie heeft daarentegen wel met verschillende
belanghebbenden gesproken over de bezwaren tegen normalisatie en verdedigde daarbij haar standpunt vóór dialoog
en gezamenlijke inspanningen voor vredesopbouw in de regio.

3-4.  De Commissie verstrekt geen financiering aan politieke partijen, en dus ook niet aan Fatah. De Commissie
financiert projecten die worden ingediend door niet-overheidsactoren naar aanleiding van een oproep tot het
indienen van voorstellen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 103

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005888/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Threat by Fatah against friendly football matches

The Jerusalem Post reports that Fatah activists are threatening young Palestinians who took part in a friendly football
match between a team of young Israelis and a team of young Palestinians. The match was organised by Mifalot with
financial support from the European Union. The Fatah activists condemned the match as ‘promoting normalisation of
relations with Israel’. Fatah responded by issuing threats to the young Palestinian participants over the Internet.

1. Is the Commission aware of these threats against young Palestinians by Fatah?

2. Will the Commission protest to Fatah about these threats to young Palestinian footballers who, with financial
support from the EU, played a friendly match against young Israeli footballers?

3. Will the Commission monitor more strictly EU funding of Fatah and the way in which Fatah accounts for its use
of that funding?

4. Can the Commission indicate where it draws the ethical/moral borderline to determine whether to continue to
provide EU financial assistance to Fatah?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 August 2013)_

1. The Commission is not aware of threats made by Fatah to participants in the football match referred to in the
Honourable Member's question. It is however worth noting that there is a discontent among a number of Palestinian
political actors with any activity that brings together Palestinians and Israelis without acknowledging or addressing
the issue of the occupation. The Commission is aware that Fatah members expressed their disapproval of this activity
to the organisers of the football match but is not aware of any pressure being applied directly to the participants.

2. Given that the Commission is not aware of the validity of the specific allegations contained in the press report,
the Commission did not raise this particular issue with the Palestinian Authority. However, the Commission has met
multiple stakeholders on the issue of ‘antinormalization’ and has defended its position in favour of dialogue and joint
efforts to build peace in the region.

3-4.  The Commission does not fund political parties, hence there are no EU funds allocated to Fatah. The
Commission funds projects submitted by non-state actors selected through competitive calls for proposals.

C 42 E / 104 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005889/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Instrumentos financieros y movilización del ahorro para proyectos a medio y largo plazo

En su Resolución ( [1] ) de 26 de octubre de 2012 sobre los Instrumentos financieros innovadores en el contexto del
próximo marco financiero plurianual, el Parlamento Europeo aprobó lo siguiente:

«50. Confía en que una mayor utilización de los instrumentos financieros tenga un efecto más que positivo en la
economía europea, pero teme que dicho efecto se limite en la práctica a proyectos rentables a corto y medio plazo;
teme asimismo que las inversiones en proyectos que sean igualmente necesarios para alcanzar los objetivos de la
estrategia de la Unión para un crecimiento inteligente, sostenible e integrador no puedan realizarse debido a su
excesivo nivel de riesgo para los inversores y a la falta de fondos públicos; pide en consecuencia a la Comisión que
presente lo antes posible propuestas dirigidas a facilitar la movilización del ahorro actualmente infrautilizado en favor
de proyectos a medio y largo plazo que generen un crecimiento sostenible dentro de la Unión;»

¿Puede decir la Comisión si está trabajando en alguna propuesta al respecto, sobre qué bases está trabajando y cuándo
estará lista dicha propuesta?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de julio de 2013)_

Una manera de liberar el ahorro es fomentar la financiación por los inversores institucionales de proyectos a largo
plazo, como la infraestructura económica y social, y no solo porque todas las partes interesadas salen beneficiadas si
esos inversores pueden ajustar mejor sus deudas a largo plazo a sus activos a largo plazo. Aparte de la fase piloto de la
Iniciativa de Obligaciones para la Financiación de Proyectos, la Comisión está analizando las posibles necesidades del
mercado en materia de financiación de las infraestructuras de la RTE-T y la RTE-E.

Por lo que se refiere a las PYME, la Comisión ha presentado dos propuestas para mejorar el acceso a la financiación a
medio y largo plazo. El Programa para la Competitividad de las Empresas y para las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas
(COSME), que cuenta con un presupuesto previsto de 1 400 millones de euros para instrumentos financieros,
facilitará a las PYME en general participaciones en el capital y apoyo a la financiación de la deuda. Horizonte 2020 (el
Programa Marco de Investigación e Innovación) hará lo mismo para las PYME con una dedicación reforzada a
la I+D+i . Un porcentaje importante de los 3 500 millones de euros asignados a los instrumentos financieros en el
marco de Horizonte 2020 se dedicará a la financiación de las PYME. Además, la financiación a las PYME mediante
instrumentos financieros al amparo de los fondos ESI se incrementará considerablemente en el próximo Marco
Financiero Plurianual.

Para abordar el problema de la financiación a largo plazo de manera más sistemática, la Comisión ha publicado el
Libro Verde sobre la financiación a largo plazo de la economía europea, el cual estudia las posibilidades de
financiación de proyectos a largo plazo y de las PYME. Se estudiarán medidas de seguimiento a partir de las respuestas
a las preguntas de la consulta. La Comisión también contribuye a grupos de trabajo internacionales en el G20 y la
OCDE para concienciar a los gobiernos a nivel internacional sobre la importancia de la financiación a largo plazo y el
papel cada vez más importante de los inversores institucionales.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0404.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 105

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005889/13**

**to the Commission**
**Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Financial instruments and release of savings for medium- and long-term projects

In its resolution ( [1] ) of 26 October 2012 on innovative financial instruments in the context of the next Multiannual
Financial Framework, Parliament adopted the following:

‘50. Is confident that the greater use of IFIs will have an extremely positive impact on the European economy, but
fears that, in practice, this will be limited to projects offering short‐ to medium-term returns; fears that investment in
projects equally fundamental to the achievement of the EU’s strategic objectives for intelligent, sustainable and
inclusive growth may not be realised because such projects are deemed too risky for investors, and because public
funds are lacking; calls, therefore, on the Commission to submit, as quickly as possible, proposals to facilitate the
release of savings, an underused resource at present, to support medium‐ and long-term projects which generate
sustainable growth in the Union;’

Can the Commission state whether it is working on any proposals in this regard, on what basis it is working and when
these proposals will be ready?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

One way to release savings is to promote institutional investors' financing of long-term projects such as economic
and social infrastructure, not least as all parties involved benefit if such investors can better match their long-term
liabilities with long-term assets. Apart from the pilot phase of the Project Bond Initiative, the Commission is analysing
potential further market needs in TEN-T and TEN-E infrastructure financing.

As regards SMEs, the Commission has tabled two proposals to enhance access to finance in the medium and long
term. The programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME), with
a foreseen budget for financial instruments of EUR 1.4bn will provide equity investments and support for debt
finance to SMEs generally. Horizon 2020 (The framework Programme for Research and Innovation) will do the same
for RDI intensive SMEs. A significant portion of the EUR 3.5 bn allocated to financial instruments under Horizon
2020 will be dedicated to SME financing. In addition, financing to SMEs through financial instruments under the ESIF
will signifcanly increase in the next MFF.

To tackle the problem of long-term financing more systematically, the Commission launched the Green Paper on the
long-term financing of the European economy that explores avenues of non-bank financing of long-term projects and
SMEs. Follow-up actions will be considered based on the answers to the consultation questions. The Commission is
also contributing to international task forces at the G20 and the OECD to raise government awareness internationally
on the importance of long-term financing and the growing role of institutional investors.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0404.

C 42 E / 106 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005890/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Instrumentos financieros y entorno jurídico del tratamiento de las inversiones a largo plazo

En su Resolución ( [1] ) de 26 de octubre de 2012 sobre los Instrumentos financieros innovadores en el contexto del
próximo marco financiero plurianual el Parlamento Europeo aprobó lo siguiente:

«49. Llama la atención sobre el hecho de que, independientemente del nivel de compleción de los instrumentos
financieros, no podrán desplegar todos sus efectos si el entorno jurídico y reglamentario general no es propicio a su
desarrollo, por ejemplo en lo que se refiere al tratamiento de las inversiones a largo plazo en el marco de las normas
prudenciales actualmente objeto de reforma (Basilea III, Solvency II, etc.);»

¿Puede decir la Comisión qué actuaciones ha realizado o piensa realizar en este campo?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de julio de 2013)_

La primera medida tomada por la Comisión para garantizar que el sistema financiero es capaz de canalizar fondos
para la inversión a largo plazo consiste en completar el programa de reformas. La estabilidad del sistema financiero es
necesaria para facilitar los incentivos adecuados para que los inversores se comprometan a largo plazo. A este
respecto, la adopción por la UE de normas cautelares en aplicación del Acuerdo de Basilea III son de vital importancia,
así como el trabajo de cara a una Unión bancaria.

Por otra parte, la Comisión ha puesto en marcha una amplia consulta pública sobre la base de su Libro Verde sobre la
financiación a largo plazo de la economía europea. La consulta finalizó el 26 de junio de 2013. La Comisión analizará
las respuestas recibidas y garantizará un seguimiento adecuado.

En lo que se refiere concretamente a las normas de supervisión prudencial aplicables a las entidades aseguradoras, la
aplicación de Solvencia II sigue siendo objeto de debates entre el Parlamento y el Consejo en relación con las
negociaciones sobre la llamada Directiva Ómnibus II. En ese contexto, la Autoridad Europea de Seguros y Pensiones
de Jubilación (AESPJ) ha presentado recientemente un informe sobre las garantías a largo plazo que debería permitir
que los legisladores alcancen un acuerdo definitivo sobre el texto.

Además, la Comisión ha pedido a la AESPJ que realice un análisis de la calibración prudencial de las inversiones en
infraestructuras, titulización y capital riesgo. La AESPJ ha llevado a cabo una consulta pública sobre la cuestión y está
previsto que presente un informe a la Comisión este verano.

Por último, la Comisión presentó el 26 de junio de 2013 una propuesta legislativa para la creación de fondos de
inversión a largo plazo, un producto de fondo de inversión diseñado para canalizar los fondos destinados a las
inversiones a largo plazo, por ejemplo, en infraestructuras.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0404.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 107

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005890/13**

**to the Commission**
**Eider Gardiazábal Rubial (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Financial instruments and the legal environment for the treatment of long-term investments

In its resolution ( [1] ) of 26 October 2012 on innovative financial instruments in the context of the next Multiannual
Financial Framework, Parliament adopted the following:

‘49. Draws attention to the fact that, irrespective of the degree to which IFIs fulfil their intended purpose, they will
generate their full impact only if the overall legal and regulatory environment is conducive to their development, as
reflected, for example, in the treatment of long-term investments under the prudential rules which are currently
undergoing revision (Basel III, Solvency II);’

Can the Commission say what action it has taken or is planning to take in this regard?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The first action taken by the Commission to ensure that the financial system is able to channel funds to long-term
investment is to complete the reform prpgramme. A stable financial system is necessary in order to provide the right
incentives for investors to engage in the long-term. In this context, the adoption at the EU level of prudential rules
implementing the Basel III agreement are of paramount importance, as well as the work on a Banking Union.

Moreover, the Commission has launched a wide public consultation on the basis of its Green Paper on Long-Term
Financing for the EU Economy. The consultation closed on 26 June 2013. The Commission will analyse the replies
received and will ensure an appropriate follow-up.

In particular as concerns the prudential rules for insurers, the implementation of Solvency II is still under discussion
between Parliament and Council in relation to the negotiations on the so-called Omnibus II Directive. In that context,
EIOPA has recently delivered a report on long-term guarantees that should allow legislators to reach a final
compromise on the text.

Furthermore, the Commission has asked EIOPA to carry out an analysis of the prudential calibration of investments
in infrastructure, securitisation and venture capital. EIOPA has carried out a public consultation on the issue and is
expected to deliver a report to the Commission during the summer.

Finally, the Commission put forward, on 26 June 2013, a legislative proposal for the establishment of Long-Term
Investment Funds, a fund product designed to channel funds to long-term investments, such as infrastructure.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0404.

C 42 E / 108 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005891/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Noul coronavirus — recomandări

Prevenirea bolilor, în special a flagelurilor majore, constituie o prioritate a acțiunii Uniunii care necesită o abordare
globală, coordonată, a statelor membre.

În Franța, noul coronavirus a făcut deja două victime.

La 9 mai 2013 au fost confirmate 33 de decese datorate SARS. Cazurile au fost înregistrate în Arabia Saudită, Qatar,
Iordania, Emiratele Arabe Unite și Marea Britanie.

— În acest sens, poate Comisia preciza dacă au existat recomandări speciale pentru europenii ce călătoresc în Arabia
Saudită, Qatar, Iordania și Emiratele Arabe Unite?

— Poate Comisia preciza dacă ar fi utile elaborarea unui ghid practic pentru cetățenii europeni ce plănuiesc să își
petreacă vacanțele în aceste țări?

**Răspuns dat de dl. Borg în numele Comisiei**

_(15 iulie 2013)_

Încă din septembrie 2012, când noul coronavirus (cunoscut în prezent sub numele de coronavirusul Sindromului
Respirator din Orientul Mijlociu sau MERS-CoV) a fost semnalat în Europa, Comisia monitorizează situația în strânsă
cooperare cu Centrul European de Prevenire și Control al Bolilor, Organizația Mondială a Sănătății și statele membre
ale UE.

Comisia a ținut statele membre la curent în legătură cu situația epidemiologică și a analizat, împreună cu Comitetul
pentru securitate sanitară, posibile măsuri de sănătate publică. În cadrul reuniunii sale din 12 iunie 2013, Comitetul a
convenit asupra unor declarații comune cu privire la informațiile sanitare pentru persoanele care călătoresc în țările
cu risc de îmbolnăvire și la recomandările furnizate personalului medical care se ocupă de cazurile confirmate sau
bănuite de infecție cu MERS-CoV.

În ceea ce privește sfaturile pentru călători, Comitetul pentru securitate sanitară s-a pronunțat în favoarea
recomandărilor de călătorie care nu impun restricții comerciale sau de călătorie legate de virusul MERS-CoV. Cu toate
acestea, persoanele care călătoresc în Orientul Mijlociu trebuie să fie conștiente de prezența MERS-CoV în această
zonă geografică și de riscul redus de infectare.

Deși sursa de infecție din Orientul Mijlociu este necunoscută, alți coronaviruși noi sunt zoonoze și provin de la
animale. Călătorii ar trebui, așadar, să respecte standardele de bune practici de igienă și să evite contactul cu animalele
sau cu deșeurile provenite de la acestea. În plus, Organizația Mondială a Sănătății a publicat recomandări pentru
călători în scopul de a reduce la minimum riscul de infecție ( [1] ). Recomandările UE vor fi actualizate în funcție de
evoluția situației.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.who.int/ith/updates/20130605/en/index.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 109

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005891/13**

**to the Commission**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Novel coronavirus — recommendations

The prevention of disease, in particular of major health scourges, is a priority action area for the EU, requiring a global
approach coordinated between Member States.

In France the novel coronavirus has already claimed two victims.

As of 9 May 2013, 33 deaths from SARS have been confirmed. Cases have been reported in Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and the UK.

— In this regard, can the Commission specify whether there were special recommendations for Europeans travelling
to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates?

— Can the Commission specify whether it would be helpful to produce a practical guide for European citizens
planning to spend their holidays in these countries?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

Since the first alert of the Novel Coronavirus, now named Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERSCoV), in Europe in September 2012, the Commission is monitoring the situation in close cooperation with the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the World Health Organisation and the EU Member States.

The Commission has kept Member States updated as regards the epidemiological situation and discussed possible
public health measures with the Health Security Committee. During its meeting on 12 June 2013, the Committee
agreed on common statements covering health information for persons travelling in countries at risk and advice to
healthcare workers caring for patients with confirmed or possible MERS-CoV infection.

Concerning health advice to travellers, the Health Security Committee supports travel advice which imposes no travel
or trade restrictions in relation to MERS-CoV. However, persons travelling to the Middle East need to be aware of the
presence of MERS-CoV in this geographical area and of the small risk of infection.

Although the reservoir of infection in the Middle East is unknown, other novel coronaviruses are zoonoses and have
come from animal sources. Travellers should therefore follow standard good hygiene practise and avoid contact with
animals or their waste products. In addition, the World Health Organisation has published health advice to travellers
in order to minimise the risk of infection ( [1] ). The EU advice will be updated as the situation evolves.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.who.int/ith/updates/20130605/en/index.html

C 42 E / 110 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005892/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Morosidad en el sector financiero español

La Inspección del Banco de España ha detectado que el sector financiero oculta parte de la morosidad real de sus
clientes con créditos hipotecarios mediante el sistema de refinanciarlos una y otra vez ( [1] ).

Según el documento confidencial fechado el pasado 15 de abril, los grandes bancos españoles y el sector en general
acepta primeras e incluso segundas refinanciaciones de clientes con hipotecas, sin reconocer en toda su crudeza las
pocas posibilidades de recuperar la deuda, según las conclusiones de los inspectores. El resultado es que la tasa de
mora media oficial sobre este tipo de créditos hipotecarios minoristas no es del 4,1 % como se dice oficialmente, sino
del 6,5 %, más de un 50 % por encima, de acuerdo con el informe.

La fórmula empleada por los bancos para contener su tasa oficial de mora es tardar en considerar sus créditos
refinanciados como de dudoso cobro. Entre BBVA, Santander y Banesto acumulan un volumen de hipotecas
minoristas de 132 000 millones, lo que supone un 20 % del sistema bancario español. El total alcanza los
677 732 millones, de los cuales se han refinanciado 99 760 millones. Los inspectores aplican a las cifras una
metodología que incluye, por ejemplo, considerar todas las segundas refinanciaciones como dudosas, salvo el cliente
lleve 12 meses seguidos al corriente de pago. Aplicándola, aunque oficialmente hay 27 819 millones de créditos
dudosos en todo el sector, la realidad son 44 053 millones. En total, los activos problemáticos, entre dudosos y
subestándar, deberían ser de 74 178 millones, en vez de los 45 036 millones oficiales. Por tanto, la provisión debería
ser 10 115 millones mayor para cubrir el déficit de colchón del sistema.

— ¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de estos datos?

— ¿Cree la Comisión que, en caso de confirmarse estos datos, será necesario utilizar una mayor parte de los fondos de
la línea de crédito de 100 000 millones concedida al Estado español?

— ¿Cree la Comisión que los préstamos refinanciados dos veces deberían incluirse como dudosos en el balance de los
bancos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(23 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión es consciente de la cuestión de los préstamos refinanciados y de la necesidad de contabilizarlos
adecuadamente en los balances de los bancos en España. La Comisión también tiene conocimiento de que el Banco de
España, autoridad supervisora de los bancos españoles, proporcionó en abril nuevas directrices a los bancos relativas
a la aplicación adecuada de las normas contables vigentes a los préstamos refinanciados.

Aún no está clara la magnitud exacta de los efectos de la revisión de la contabilidad de los préstamos refinanciados
sobre las necesidades de provisión y sobre la situación de capital de los bancos. También debe observarse que los
bancos concretos mencionados en la pregunta mostraron un excedente de capital en la prueba de resistencia externa
realizada en 2012. Por ello, estos bancos no tendrían necesariamente que obtener capital en caso de mayores
necesidades de provisión. Por esta razón, también es prematuro especular si se pedirían o exigirían nuevos
desembolsos en el marco del programa financiero en favor de los bancos españoles.

La cuestión de si debe considerarse que en el caso de los préstamos refinanciados se produce un deterioro de valor
depende de los hechos y circunstancias particulares de cada caso. Sin embargo, en diciembre de 2012, la Autoridad
Europea de Valores y Mercados (AEVM) publicó una declaración con el título de «Treatment of Forbearance Practices
in IFRS Financial Statements of Financial Institutions» (Consideración de las prácticas de tolerancia en los estados
financieros de las entidades financieras con arreglo a las NIIF). La AEVM subrayó la necesidad de transparencia y la
importancia de una aplicación adecuada y coherente de los criterios de reconocimiento, valoración y presentación
establecidos en las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://rsocial.elmundo.orbyt.es/epaper/xml_epaper/El%20Mundo/22_05_2013/pla_11014_Madrid/xml_arts/art_15202966.xml?

SHARE=6C23C0F29C6C4F158F7CA6264B486305BACC04B083C4C381F64456E713AD26276CEF929180B2E6137424D626706B3C9A5

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 111

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005892/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Arrears in the Spanish financial sector

Bank of Spain inspectors have found that the financial sector repeatedly refinances mortgages to conceal the true
extent of mortgage customers’ arrears ( [1] ).

According to the confidential document dated 15 April 2013, the inspectors found that major Spanish banks and the
sector as a whole approve first and even second refinancing deals for mortgage customers, without facing up to the
harsh reality that there is little chance of recovering the debt. This means that the official average arrears rate for this
kind of retail mortgage lending is not 4.1% as officially stated, but 6.5%, more than 50% higher, according to the
report.

The tactic used by the banks to keep their official arrears rate down is to put off counting refinanced loans as bad
debts. Between them, the banks BBVA, Santander and Banesto have lent EUR 132 billion in retail mortgages,
accounting for 20% of the Spanish banking system. The total is EUR 677.732 billion, of which EUR 99.760 billion
has been refinanced. The methodology applied to the figures by the inspectors includes, for example, considering all
second refinancing deals as bad debts, unless the client has paid on time for 12 consecutive months. While bad debts
total EUR 27.819 billion for the sector as a whole, according to official figures, applying this methodology shows that
the actual figure is EUR 44.053 billion. In total, problematic assets, including bad debts and substandard assets, really
amount to EUR 74.178 billion, rather than the 45.036 billion according to official figures. There should therefore be
EUR 10.115 billion more in cover to make up the shortfall in the system’s cushion.

— Is the Commission aware of these figures?

— Does the Commission think that, if these figures are confirmed, it will be necessary to use a larger portion of the
EUR 100 billion lent to Spain?

— Does the Commission think that loans refinanced twice should be counted as bad debts in banks’ accounts?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the issue of refinanced loans and their proper accounting in banks' balance sheets in
Spain. The Commission is also aware that the Banco de España, the competent supervisor of Spanish banks, gave in
April further guidance to banks on the appropriate application of the prevailing accounting rules on refinanced loans.

The exact numerical impact of having revisited the accounting of refinanced loans on provisioning needs and capital
position of banks is not yet clear. It should also be noted that the specific banks mentioned in the question revealed a
capital surplus in the external stress test conducted in 2012. Hence, these banks would not necessarily have to raise
capital in case of further provisioning needs. Also for this reason, it is premature to speculate whether any further
disbursement under the financial-sector programme in favour of Spanish banks would be requested or required.

Whether refinanced loans should be regarded as impaired is a question of the particular facts and circumstances in
each case. However, in December 2012, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) published a
statement on the ‘Treatment of Forbearance Practices in IFRS [International Financial Reporting Standards] Financial
Statements of Financial Institutions’. ESMA stressed the need for transparency and the importance of appropriate and
consistent application of the recognition, measurement and disclosure principles provided within IFRS.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://rsocial.elmundo.orbyt.es/epaper/xml_epaper/El%20Mundo/22_05_2013/pla_11014_Madrid/xml_arts/art_15202966.xml?

SHARE=6C23C0F29C6C4F158F7CA6264B486305BACC04B083C4C381F64456E713AD26276CEF929180B2E6137424D626706B3C9A5

17956D8358E20EE89D695F10B7334C81525EB2E774514268FB9D6C892575EDAFDC003CCD20C6B9C29E9577F7F883354.

C 42 E / 112 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005893/13**

**to the Commission**
**Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Irish Bank Resolution Corporation

With regard to the Commission decision of 29.6.2011 on the state aids Nos SA.32504 (2011/N) and C 11/2010 (ex
N 667/2009) implemented by Ireland for Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society (C(2011)4432), is
the Commission aware of the case of Paddy McKillen? Does it have an opinion on whether the Irish Bank Resolution
Corporation breached the terms of its Commitments Letter to the Commission by issuing a further EUR 5 million
loan to Mr McKillen in 2012 to pay legal costs, when his debt with the IBRC amounted to approximately
EUR 900 million in personal and corporate accounts at the time?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 July 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of the case of Paddy McKillen with respect to the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation
nor does it have information on the loan that IBRC apparently granted to Mr McKillen in 2012.

In the context of the state aid procedure on IBRC's restructuring, the Irish authorities made a commitment that IBRC
would not carry out new business during the wind-down period. However, some restricted lending activities, under
strict caps and conditions, were still possible to optimise the work-out of the legacy loan book. The Irish authorities
made a commitment that IBRC would manage the legacy assets in accordance with normal commercial practice and
fiduciary duties.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 113

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005894/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Uitspraken van de Europese Centrale Bank over de belasting op financiële transacties

Benoît Cœuré, lid van de directie van de ECB, heeft onlangs verklaard in de _Financial Times_ dat de ECB „samen met de
regeringen en de Europese Commissie er constructief op zal toezien dat de belasting geen negatieve gevolgen heeft
voor de financiële markten en de reële economie” ( [1] ).

In het licht van deze uitspraak wordt de Commissie verzocht de volgende vragen te beantwoorden:

1. Is de Commissie het eens met het voorbehoud dat de ECB maakt?

2. Zo ja, kan de Commissie duidelijk maken hoe de ECB betrokken kan worden bij de herformulering van het
voorstel? Is deze betrokkenheid verenigbaar met het in artikel 282, lid 3, VWEU vastgelegde
onafhankelijkheidsbeginsel?

3. Is de Commissie van mening dat een eventuele betrokkenheid van de ECB bij het voorstel verenigbaar is met
artikel 282, lid 5, VWEU ( [2] ), aangezien de ECB heeft verklaard niet te beschikken over een mandaat op dit
gebied?

4. Zo niet, neemt de Commissie afstand van de verklaringen van de heer Cœuré? Kan de Commissie expliciet
bevestigen dat de beoogde belasting overeenkomstig artikel 326, lid 1 VWEU ( [3] ) geen negatieve gevolgen zal
hebben voor de financiële markten en de reële economie? Zo niet, waarom heeft de Commissie haar voorstel
nog niet ingetrokken?

**Antwoord van de heer Šemeta namens de Commissie**

_(11 juli 2013)_

1. De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van een officieel standpunt van de ECB met betrekking tot haar voorstel voor
een richtlijn van de Raad betreffende de totstandbrenging van nauwere samenwerking op het gebied van een belasting
op financiële transacties.

2. en 3. De Commissie is niet voornemens zich opnieuw over haar voorstel te buigen.

4. In de desbetreffende effectbeoordelingen zijn de diensten van de Commissie tot de algemene conclusie gekomen
dat de gevolgen van de FTT, zoals die is voorgesteld, voor de reële economie niet aanzienlijk zouden zijn en dat er
geen bewijs van verstoring van de financiële markten is ten gevolge van de uitvoering van de voorgestelde FTT, maar
dat de belasting wel zou kunnen leiden tot een wijziging van de bedrijfsmodellen die in de financiële sector worden
gebruikt. Ten slotte hebben de Commissie en de Raad geoordeeld dat de nauwere samenwerking op het gebied van de
FTT in overeenstemming is met artikel 326 VWEU.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3121802-c480-11e2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html#axzz2UTdPPQpf.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Op de gebieden die onder haar bevoegdheid vallen, wordt de Europese Centrale Bank geraadpleegd over ieder ontwerp van een handeling van de

Unie, alsmede over ieder ontwerp van regelgeving op nationaal niveau, en kan zij advies uitbrengen.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) „Bij nauwere samenwerking worden de Verdragen en het recht van de Unie geëerbiedigd. Nauwere samenwerking mag geen afbreuk doen aan de

interne markt, noch aan de economische, sociale en territoriale samenhang. Zij mag geen belemmering of discriminatie in de handel tussen de
lidstaten vormen, en zij mag de mededinging tussen de lidstaten niet verstoren”.

( **|**

C 42 E / 114 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005894/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Comments by the European Central Bank on the financial transaction tax

Mr Benoît Cœuré, Executive Board Member of the ECB, very recently told the _Financial Times_ that the ECB would
‘engage constructively with governments and the European Commission to ensure that the tax has no negative
impact on financial markets and the real economy’ ( [1] ).

In the light of this:

1. Does the Commission agree with the ECB’s reservations?

2. If so, could the Commission clarify how the ECB might be engaged in reframing the proposal? Would this
involvement be compatible with the principle of independence, as established by Article 282(3) TFEU?

3. If the ECB was to be engaged, does the Commission think that this involvement would be compatible with
Article 282(5) TFEU ( [2] ), considering that the ECB has pointed out that it has no mandate in the field?

4. If not, will the Commission dismiss Mr Cœuré statements? Can the Commission explicitly confirm that the
planned tax will not have a negative impact on financial markets and the real economy, pursuant to
Article 326(1) TFEU ( [3] )? If it cannot, why has the Commission not yet withdrawn its proposal?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

1. The Commission is not aware of an official ECB opinion on its Proposal for a Council Directive implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax (COM(2013) 71 final).

2 and 3. The Commission has no intention to re-table its proposal.

4. In the relevant impact assessments the Commission services came to the general conclusion that the impact of
the FTT, as proposed, on the ‘real economy’ would not be significant and that there is no evidence of malfunction of
the financial markets as a consequence of the implementation of the proposed FTT, but that it might lead to a change
of certain business models currently used in the financial sector. Finally, both the Commission and the Council have
assessed that the enhanced cooperation in the area of FTT complies with Article 326 TFEU.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c3121802-c480-11e2-9ac0-00144feab7de.html#axzz2UTdPPQpf.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) ‘Within the areas falling within its responsibilities, the European Central Bank shall be consulted on all proposed Union acts, and all proposals for

regulation at national level, and may give an opinion’.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ‘Any enhanced cooperation shall comply with the Treaties and Union law. Such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or

economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor shall it distort
competition between them’.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 115

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005895/13**

**à la Commission**
**Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Enregistrement des semences

Le 6 mai 2013, la Commission européenne a présenté un ensemble de propositions relatives aux nouvelles règles
d'enregistrement des semences dont l'objectif est de simplifier les règles de commercialisation des graines afin de
garantir la productivité, l'adaptabilité et la diversité de la production végétale et forestière de l'Europe, et de faciliter les
échanges commerciaux en la matière.

Mais à quel prix? Il semblerait en effet que, sous couvert d'une volonté de simplification et de préservation de la
biodiversité, le texte vise davantage à réduire les droits des paysans et agriculteurs à ressemer leurs propres semences,
en durcissant les conditions de reconnaissance des variétés par des petits entrepreneurs indépendants, en limitant la
circulation et l'échange de graines entre associations et entre planteurs.

Je déplore également le fait qu'en obligeant à payer des coûts d'enregistrement ou de contrôle, immanquablement,
l'on en vienne à se tourner vers les semences de l'industrie agro-alimentaire, avec la dépendance que ces dernières
représentent et leur cortège de produits chimiques et phytosanitaires. Mais peut-être est-ce là l'objectif réellement
recherché?

J'aimerais rappeler ici combien la biodiversité végétale ne peut être maintenue qu'en créant les conditions d'un
véritable partenariat entre des réseaux de paysans et des agronomes qui ne considèrent pas les plantes comme de
simples réservoirs d'ADN mais comme des êtres vivants qui évoluent au fil des ans en s'adaptant aux nouvelles
conditions qu'elles rencontrent… La proposition de l'exécutif européen est loin du compte!

J'estime donc que le paquet législatif actuellement proposé est inquiétant à plus d'un titre. Et la FAO, l'Organisation
des Nations unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture, tire elle-même la sonnette d'alarme!

Que compte faire l'exécutif européen pour répondre à ces craintes (légitimes)? Et que répond la Commission à ceux
qui estiment que cette proposition laissera la porte grande ouverte à la commercialisation sans restriction de plantes
brevetées… dont certaines sont des OGM cachés?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(5 juillet 2013)_

La future législation ne porte pas sur la production de semences dans les exploitations pour compte propre. Elle
ne concerne que la production de semences destinées à la commercialisation avec pour but de garantir l'identité, la
santé et la qualité de ces semences à leurs utilisateurs. L'échange de semences en nature entre des non-professionnels
est exclu.

Un nombre relativement élevé de petits et moyens opérateurs sont actifs dans le secteur des semences dans l'UE.
Diverses mesures sont proposées pour favoriser la préservation de la biodiversité et les micro-entreprises.
L'enregistrement de variétés traditionnelles d'espèces répertoriées s'effectue selon un mécanisme administratif très
simple et peu contraignant. Les micro-entreprises sont exonérées du paiement de redevances d'enregistrement des
variétés et peuvent même commercialiser du matériel de reproduction des végétaux en se conformant simplement à
des règles de base en matière d'emballage et d'étiquetage.

Quant à une quelconque déclaration de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture
concernant la proposition législative de la Commission, cette dernière n'en a nullement connaissance.

La proposition ne contient pas de dispositions sur les droits de propriété intellectuelle.

C 42 E / 116 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005895/13**

**to the Commission**
**Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Proposals on seed registration

On 6 May 2013, the Commission put forward a package of proposals setting out new rules on seed registration. The
aim is to simplify the current rules on the marketing of seeds in order to safeguard productivity, adaptability and
diversity in the agricultural and forestry sectors in Europe and to facilitate trade in seeds.

This is likely to come at a cost, however, since the proposals would appear to use the goal of simplifying rules and
safeguarding biodiversity as a pretext to restrict the rights of farmers to replant their own seed. If introduced, the new
rules would make it more difficult for small, independent businesses to secure official approval for the varieties they
want to market and restrict the circulation and exchanges of seeds among professional organisations and individual

growers.

It is also unacceptable that farmers should be required to bear the cost of seed registration and checks, giving them no
choice but to use seeds produced by the agri-foodstuffs industry and leaving them dependent not only on the seeds
themselves, but also on the slew of chemicals and plant-health products that come with them. But then perhaps this is
the whole point of the exercise?

It is worth remembering that plant biodiversity can be safeguarded only by fostering a real partnership between
networks of farmers and agronomists who do not look at plants simply as reservoirs of DNA, but rather as living
things which evolve over time by adapting to the new conditions in which they find themselves. The Commission
proposals are therefore woefully inadequate.

The legislative package currently on the table is troubling for a number of reasons, as emphasised by the fact that even
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is sounding the alarm.

How does the Commission intend to address these (legitimate) concerns? What is its response to claims that these
proposals will throw open the door to the unrestricted marketing of patented plant varieties, some of which are
GMOs in disguise?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 July 2013)_

The future legislation does not cover the production of seed on farm for own use. It only covers the production of
seed intended for marketing with the objective to ensure the identity, health and quality of seed for its users. Exchange
of seed in kind between non-professionals is excluded.

A relatively high number of small and medium-size operators are active in the EU seed sector. A number of measures
are proposed to support preservation of biodiversity and micro-enterprises. Traditional varieties of listed species are
registered under a very light, low-burden administrative regime. Micro-enterprises are exempted from variety
registration fees and even can market non-registered plant reproductive material with basic rules on packaging and
labelling.

The Commission is not aware of any statements of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation in relation
to its legislative proposal.

The proposal does not address intellectual property rights.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 117

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005896/13**

**al Consejo**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) y Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en el listado de países exentos de la obligación de visado para entrar
en el espacio Schengen

Garantizar la entrada al espacio Schengen sin necesidad de visado a los ciudadanos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos es
la evolución natural de la relación excepcional existente entre la UE y este país, así como una de sus máximas
prioridades. Esto se puede conseguir incluyendo a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la propuesta en curso (de
noviembre de 2012) de la Comisión de una lista de países cuyos nacionales están exentos de la obligación de visado
para entrar en el espacio Schengen (anexo II al Reglamento (CE) n° 539/2001 del Consejo).

Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y la UE tienen intereses comunes importantes tanto políticos como en materia de
seguridad, mientras que se calcula que el monto del comercio y la inversión entre los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y los
países del espacio Schengen, tanto de la UE como de fuera de la UE, es de 50 000 millones de euros.

En 2012, 1 640 000 ciudadanos de la UE visitaron los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Se va a ampliar la lista actual de países
europeos a cuyos nacionales se les expide visado al llegar al país para que incluya a doce Estados miembros más de la
UE. Además, están a punto de culminar las negociaciones que permitirán que, a partir de finales de este año, los
ciudadanos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos estén exentos de la obligación de visado cuando visiten el Reino Unido.

Los argumentos a favor de la inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la susodicha lista del anexo II son sólidos,
objetivos e irrebatibles: no plantea problemas de inmigración o seguridad, dado que hay menos de un millón de
titulares del pasaporte de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (que cumple las normas técnicas requeridas), a ninguno de los
cuales se le ha denegado un visado Schengen o se le ha detenido por temas de inmigración o seguridad. Todos
sabemos que, cuando los ciudadanos de este país viajan al espacio Schengen, lo hacen principalmente por motivos de
negocios, ocio de alta calidad, atención médica (privada), o estudios y formación (completamente pagados y sin coste
alguno para la UE).

Solo hay otro país de la zona (Israel) que esté exento de la obligación de visado Schengen, y solo hay dos países
islámicos que figuren en la lista (Brunéi y Malasia). Si bien el caso de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos debiera examinarse
teniendo en cuenta solo sus méritos propios, el impacto político del mensaje de la UE sería tremendo. Es indudable
que tal medida recibirá un amplio apoyo por parte del Parlamento.

Dado que los Emiratos Árabes Unidos cumplen los criterios pertinentes y aplicables para ser incluidos en el anexo II,
creemos que ha llegado la hora de actuar. ¿Qué opina el Consejo de la inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la
actual revisión de la lista de países cuyos nacionales están exentos de la obligación de visado para entrar en el espacio
Schengen?

**Respuesta**
_(16 de septiembre de 2013)_

La propuesta de la Comisión a la que se refieren Sus Señorías fue emitida por la Comisión el 7 de noviembre de 2012
(COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)) y tiene por objeto modificar el Reglamento n° 539/2001 ( [1] )
transfiriendo determinados terceros países de la lista de visado obligatorio (Anexo I) a la lista de exención de visado
(Anexo II), y actualizar la lista de visado obligatorio. En esta propuesta, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos no se han incluido
en la lista de países transferidos a la lista de exención de visado.

La Comisión ha transmitido la propuesta al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo y en la actualidad estas Instituciones la
están examinando.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Reglamento (CE) n° 539/2001 por el que se establece la lista de terceros países cuyos nacionales están sometidos a la obligación de visado para
cruzar las fronteras exteriores de los Estados miembros y la lista de terceros países cuyos nacionales están exentos de esa obligación.

C 42 E / 118 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(České znění)_

**Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-005896/13**

**Radě**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) a Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. května 2013)_

_Předmět:_ Zahrnutí Spojených arabských emirátů do bezvízového schengenského prostoru

Zajištění bezvízového vstupu do schengenského prostoru pro občany Spojených arabských emirátů (SAE) je nejvyšší
prioritou a přirozeným vývojem v oblasti výjimečných vztahů mezi EU a Spojenými arabskými emiráty. Toho lze
dosáhnout v případě, že SAE budou zahrnuty do současného návrhu Komise (z listopadu 2012), kde je uveden
seznam zemí, jejichž státní příslušníci mohou vstoupit do schengenského prostoru bez víza (příloha II nařízení Rady
(ES) č. 539/2001).

SAE a EU mají významné společné politické a bezpečnostní zájmy a obchodní výměny a investice mezi SAE na jedné
straně a EU a zeměmi schengenského prostoru mimo EU na straně druhé jsou odhadovány na přibližně
50 miliard EUR.

V roce 2012 navštívil Spojené arabské emiráty 1 640 000 občanů EU. Aktuální seznam evropských zemí, jejimž
státním příslušníkům jsou vydávána víza po příjezdu do SAE, bude rozšířen o dalších 12 členských států EU. Mimoto
se přibližuje uzavření jednání, jež od konce letošního roku osvobodí občany SAE od vízové povinnosti při návštěvě
Spojeného království.

SAE předkládají pro zařazení na současný seznam v příloze II řadu věrohodných, pozitivních a objektivních
argumentů: neexistují žádné obavy spojené s přistěhovaleckou nebo bezpečnostní politikou, neboť držitelů
cestovních pasů SAE (které splňují požadované technické normy) je méně než 1 milion, žádnému z nich nebylo nikdy
odepřeno vydání víza do schengenského prostoru ani nebyl zadržen v důsledku obav souvisejících s otázkami
přistěhovalectví nebo bezpečnosti. Všichni víme, že občané SAE navštěvují schengenský prostor při cestách za
obchodními účely, dovolenými pro náročné, (soukromou) zdravotní péčí nebo studiem/vzděláváním (které je plně
financováno, a to nikoli na náklady EU).

Od vízové povinnosti v rámci schengenského prostoru je osvobozena pouze jedna země v regionu (Izrael) a na tomto
seznamu jsou uvedeny pouze dvě další islámské země (Brunej a Malajsie). I když by měl být případ SAE posuzován
podle skutečných zásluh, politický signál ze strany EU by měl obrovský dopad. Parlament jistě poskytne tomuto
opatření širokou podporu.

Vzhledem k tomu, že SAE splňují veškerá relevantní a platná kritéria pro udělení statusu podle přílohy II, jsme toho
názoru, že nastal čas jednat. Jak Rada pohlíží na zahrnutí SAE do probíhající revize seznamu zemí, jejichž státní
příslušníci mohou vstoupit do schengenského prostoru bez víza?

**Odpověď**
_(16. září 2013)_

Návrh Komise, k němuž vážené poslankyně a odkazují, byl Komisí vydán dne 7. listopadu 2012 (dokument
COM(2012) 650 final – 2012/0309(COD)) a jeho cílem je pozměnit nařízení č. 539/2001 ( [1] ) tím, že několik třetích
zemí bude převedeno ze seznamu zemí podléhajících vízové povinnosti (příloha I) na seznam zemí, jejichž státní
příslušníci jsou od vízové povinnosti osvobozeni (příloha II), a příslušný seznam aktualizovat. V tomto návrhu nebyly
Spojené arabské emiráty zařazeny na seznam zemí, které mají být převedeny mezi země, jejichž státní příslušníci jsou
od vízové povinnosti osvobozeni.

Komise návrh zaslala Evropskému parlamentu a Radě a v současné době je stále předmětem jednání.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Nařízení (ES) č. 539/2001, kterým se stanoví seznam třetích zemí, jejichž státní příslušníci musí mít při překračování vnějších hranic vízum,
jakož i seznam třetích zemí, jejichž státní příslušníci jsou od této povinnosti osvobozeni.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 119

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005896/13**

**an den Rat**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) und Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Aufnahme der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate in den visumfreien Schengen-Raum

Die Gewährung des visumfreien Zugangs zum Schengen-Raum für Bürger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE)
ist von oberster Priorität und entspricht einer natürlichen Entwicklung in den außergewöhnlichen Beziehungen
zwischen der EU und den VAE. Dafür müssen die VAE in den derzeitigen Vorschlag der Kommission (von
November 2012) für eine Liste der Länder, deren Staatsangehörige ohne Visum in den Schengen-Raum einreisen
dürfen (Anhang II der Verordnung des Rates (EG) Nr. 539/2001), aufgenommen werden.

Die VAE und die EU haben wichtige gemeinsame politische und sicherheitspolitische Interessen, und das Volumen
der Handels‐ und Investitionsströme zwischen den VAE einerseits und der EU und den nicht zur EU gehörigen
Schengen-Staaten andererseits wird auf 50 Mrd. EUR beziffert.

2012 besuchten 1 640 000 EU-Bürger die VAE. Die aktuelle Liste der europäischen Staaten, deren Bürgern bei der
Ankunft in den VAE ein Visum ausgestellt wird, wird um weitere zwölf Mitgliedstaaten erweitert. Darüber hinaus
stehen Verhandlungen über die Befreiung der Bürger der VAE von der Visumpflicht für das Vereinigte Königreich ab
Ende dieses Jahres kurz vor dem Abschluss.

Für eine Aufnahme der VAE in die derzeitige Liste in Anhang II sprechen eine Reihe tragfähiger, positiver und
objektiver Argumente: Es bestehen keine Einwanderungs‐ oder Sicherheitsbedenken, da weniger als eine Million
Menschen Reisepässe der VAE (die die geltenden technischen Normen erfüllen) besitzen; keinem von ihnen wurde
jemals ein Schengen-Visum verweigert, und keiner wurde jemals aus einwanderungsrechtlichen Erwägungen oder aus
Sicherheitsgründen inhaftiert. Wir wissen alle, dass Staatsangehörige der VAE den Schengen-Raum hauptsächlich aus
geschäftlichen Gründen, für Urlaubsreisen im Luxussegment, zur (privaten) Gesundheitsversorgung oder zu
Bildungszwecken (mit vollständiger eigener Finanzierung, die nicht zulasten der EU geht) besuchen.

Nur ein anderes Land dieser Weltregion (Israel) ist von den Visa-Vorschriften im Rahmen von Schengen befreit, und
nur zwei andere islamische Länder (Brunei und Malaysia) stehen auf der Liste. Selbst wenn der Fall der VAE für sich
genommen beurteilt würde, hätte die politische Botschaft der EU eine enorme Wirkung. Im Parlament fände diese
Maßnahme sicher breite Unterstützung.

Da die VAE alle relevanten geltenden Kriterien dafür erfüllen, den in Anhang II vorgesehenen Status zu erlangen,
halten wir die Zeit für gekommen. Wie steht der Rat zu der Einbeziehung der VAE in die laufende Überarbeitung der
Liste der Länder, deren Staatsangehörige ohne Visum in den Schengen-Raum einreisen dürfen?

**Antwort**

_(16. September 2013)_

Der Kommissionsvorschlag, auf den die Abgeordneten Bezug nehmen, wurde von der Kommission am 7. November
2012 vorgelegt (KOM(2012)650 endg. — 2012/0309(COD)); das Ziel dieses Vorschlags besteht darin, die
Verordnung Nr. 539/2001 ( [1] ) dahin gehend zu ändern, dass mehrere Drittländer von der Visumliste (Anhang I) in die
Liste der visumbefreiten Länder (Anhang II) aufgenommen werden, und die Visumliste zu aktualisieren. Nach diesem
Vorschlag gehören die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) nicht zu den Ländern, die in die Liste der visumbefreiten
Länder aufzunehmen sind.

Der Vorschlag ist von der Kommission dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat zugeleitet worden und wird derzeit
noch geprüft.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 539/2001 zur Aufstellung der Liste der Drittländer, deren Staatsangehörige beim Überschreiten der Außengrenzen der
Mitgliedstaaten im Besitz eines Visums sein müssen, sowie der Liste der Drittländer, deren Staatsangehörige von dieser Visumpflicht befreit sind.

C 42 E / 120 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Eestikeelne versioon)_

**Kirjalikult vastatav küsimus E-005896/13**

**nõukogule**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) ja Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. mai 2013)_

_Teema:_ Araabia Ühendemiraatide lisamine riikide nimekirja, mille kodanikud võivad siseneda Schengeni alale ilma
viisata

Araabia Ühendemiraatide (AÜE) kodanikele viisavaba sissepääsu kindlustamine Schengeni alale on esmatähtis
ülesanne ning ELi ja AÜE vaheliste eriliste suhete loomulik areng. See oleks saavutatav, kui AÜE lisatakse komisjoni
viimasesse 2012. aasta novembri ettepanekusse loetelu kohta riikidest, mille kodanikud võivad Schengeni alale
viisavabalt siseneda (nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 539/2001 II lisa).

AÜE ja EL jagavad tähtsaid poliitilisi ja julgeolekualaseid huve, lisaks hinnatakse AÜE ning ELi ja ELi mittekuuluvate
Schengeni ala riikide vaheliste kaubandustehingute ja investeeringute väärtuseks 50 miljardit eurot.

2012. aastal külastas Araabia Ühendemiraate 1 640 000 ELi kodanikku. Kehtivasse Euroopa riikide nimekirja,
mille kodanikele väljastatakse AÜE viisa riiki saabumisel, lisatakse veel 12 ELi liikmesriiki. Samuti on lõppemas
läbirääkimised AÜE kodanike vabastamiseks viisakohustusest Ühendkuningriigi külastamisel alates käesoleva aasta
lõpust.

AÜE lisamiseks määruse II lisas olevasse nimekirja on kindlad, positiivsed ja objektiivsed argumendid: sellega ei
kaasneks immigratsiooni- või julgeolekualaseid probleeme, sest siiani ei ole ühelegi AÜE passi omanikule keeldutud
Schengeni viisat andmast ning ühtegi neist ei ole kinni peetud immigratsiooni- või julgeolekuprobleemide tõttu (AÜE
pass vastab nõutavatele tehnilistele standarditele ning passiomanikke on kokku alla ühe miljoni). Üldiselt on teada, et
AÜE kodanikud külastavad Schengeni ala peamiselt ärilistel põhjustel, luksusliku meelelahutuse, (era-)
meditsiiniteenuste või õppimise/hariduse (täielikult rahastatud ja mitte ELi vahenditest) eesmärkidel.

Selles piirkonnas on ainult üks riik (Iisrael) Schengeni viisakohustusest vabastatud ja nimekirjas leidub vaid kaks teist
islamiriiki (Brunei ja Malaisia). Isegi kui AÜE üle hinnatakse tema enda saavutuste põhjal, võib ELi poliitiline sõnum
tohutut mõju avaldada. Euroopa Parlamendis leiab see meede kindlasti laia toetust.

Arvestades, et AÜE täidab kõiki II lisa staatuse saavutamiseks asjakohaseid ja kohaldatavaid kriteeriumeid, leiame me,
et on aeg tegutseda. Kuidas hindab nõukogu AÜE lisamist praegu läbivaadatavasse nimekirja riikidest, mille
kodanikud võivad sisenda Schengeni alale ilma viisata?

**Vastus**
_(16. september 2013)_

Ettepaneku, millele austatud parlamendiliikmed osutavad (COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)), andis
komisjon välja 7. novembril 2012 ja selle eesmärk on muuta määrust nr 539/2001 ( [1] ), paigutades mitu kolmandat
riiki I lisas esitatud viisanimekirjast ümber II lisas sisalduvasse viisakohustusest vabastatud riikide nimekirja, ning seda
viisanimekirja ajakohastada. Selles ettepanekus ei ole Araabia Ühendemiraadid (AÜE) kantud loetellu nendest
riikidest, mis tuleks ümber paigutada viisakohustusest vabastatud riikide nimekirja.

Komisjon on kõnealuse ettepaneku saatnud Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule ning see on praegu jätkuvalt
analüüsimisel.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Määrus (EÜ) nr 539/2001, milles loetletakse kolmandad riigid, kelle kodanikel peab liikmesriikide välispiiride ületamisel olema viisa, ja need
kolmandad riigid, kelle kodanikud on sellest nõudest vabastatud.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 121

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005896/13**

**προς το Συμβούλιο**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) και Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ένταξη των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων στον χώρο Σένγκεν ως προς την απαλλαγή από την υποχρέωση θεώρησης

Η εξασφάλιση της εισόδου στους πολίτες Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων (ΗΑΕ) στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση συνιστά
μείζονα προτεραιότητα και φυσική εξέλιξη λόγω των εξαιρετικών σχέσεων που υπάρχουν μεταξύ της ΕΕ και των ΗΑΕ. Τούτο
μπορεί να επιτευχθεί εφόσον τα ΗΑΕ περιληφθούν στην πρόταση της Επιτροπής (από τον Νοέμβριο 2012) σχετικά με την
κατάσταση των χωρών οι πολίτες των οποίων μπορούν να εισέλθουν στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση (Παράρτημα ΙΙ στον
Κανονισμό αριθ. (ΕΚ) 539/2001) του Συμβουλίου.

Τα ΗΑΕ και η ΕΕ έχουν μείζονα κοινά ενδιαφέροντα σε επίπεδο πολιτικής και ασφάλειας, ενώ οι συναλλαγές και οι επενδύσεις
μεταξύ των ΗΑΕ, αφενός, και της ΕΕ και των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ που δεν είναι μέλη του χώρου Σένγκεν, αφετέρου,
ανέρχονται σε 50 δις ευρώ.

Το 2012, 1 640 000 πολίτες της ΕΕ επισκέφθηκαν τα ΗΑΕ. Η ισχύουσα κατάσταση των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών για τους πολίτες
των οποίων εκδίδεται θεώρηση άμα τη αφίξει των στα ΗΑΕ θα διευρυνθεί ώστε να περιλάβει και τα 12 νέα κράτη μέλη. Εκτός
αυτού, σύντομα ολοκληρώνονται οι διαπραγματεύσεις ώστε από τα τέλη του τρέχοντος έτους οι πολίτες των ΗΑΕ που
μεταβαίνουν στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο να απαλλάσσονται από την έκδοση θεώρησης.

Τα ΗΑΕ παρουσιάζουν μια σειρά από ισχυρά, θετικά και αντικειμενικά επιχειρήματα προκειμένου να περιληφθούν στην
κατάσταση του ισχύοντος Παραρτήματος ΙΙ: Δεν υφίστανται κίνδυνοι σχετικοί με την μετανάστευση ή την ασφάλεια,
δεδομένου ότι διαθέτουν διαβατήριο ΗΑΕ ολιγότερα του ενός εκατομμυρίου άτομα (πράγμα που ανταποκρίνεται στις
ισχύουσες τεχνικές προϋποθέσεις), σε κανένα από τα οποία δεν απερρίφθη η αίτηση για χορήγηση θεωρήσεως Σένγκεν και
κανένα από τα οποία δεν τέθηκε υπό κράτηση δια λόγους μετανάστευσης ή ασφάλειας. Είναι γνωστόν τοις πάσι ότι όταν οι
πολίτες των ΗΑΕ επισκέπτονται τον χώρο Σένγκεν, ταξιδεύουν κυρίως δια λόγους επαγγελματικούς, τουρισμού (υψηλών
προδιαγραφών), (ιδιωτικής) ιατρικής περίθαλψης, ή σπουδών (πλήρως χρηματοδοτούμενων και όχι με δαπάνες της
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης).

Μία μόνον χώρα της περιοχής (το Ισραήλ) απαλλάσσεται από την υποχρέωση έκδοσης θεώρησης Σένγκεν και μόνον δύο
άλλες ισλαμικές χώρες περιλαμβάνονται στην κατάσταση (το Μπρουνέι και η Μαλαισία). Παρά το γεγονός ότι η περίπτωση
των ΗΑΕ θα έπρεπε να κριθεί αποκλειστικώς επί τη βάσει της αξίας της, το πολιτικό μήνυμα της ΕΕ θα έχει τεράστιο βάρος: Το
Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο θα παράσχει ευρεία υποστήριξη στο μέτρο αυτό.

Δεδομένου ότι τα ΗΑΕ πληρούν όλα απαιτούμενα και εφαρμοζόμενα κριτήρια προκειμένου να ενταχθούν στο καθεστώς του
Παραρτήματος ΙΙ, εκτιμούμε ότι είναι καιρός να προβούμε στις ενδεδειγμένες ενέργειες. Με ποιον τρόπο σκοπεύει το
Συμβούλιο να συμπεριλάβει τα ΗΑΕ στην εν εξελίξει αναθεώρηση της κατάστασης των χωρών οι πολίτες των οποίων μπορούν
να εισέρχονται στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση;

**Απάντηση**
_(16 Σεπτεμβρίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή εξέδωσε την πρόταση στην οποία αναφέρονται τα αξιότιμα μέλη στις 7 Νοεμβρίου 2012 (COM(2012)650
τελικό — 2012/0309(COD)), η οποία έχει ως στόχο την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού αριθ. 539/2001 ( [1] ) με τη μεταφορά
επιμέρους τρίτων χωρών από τον κατάλογο των χωρών οι υπήκοοι των οποίων υπόκεινται στην υποχρέωση θεώρησης
(Παράρτημα Ι) στον κατάλογο χωρών οι υπήκοοι των οποίων απαλλάσσονται από την υποχρέωση αυτή (Παράρτημα ΙΙ),
καθώς και την επικαιροποίηση του προαναφερόμενου καταλόγου για το υποχρεωτικό καθεστώς θεωρήσεων. Στη
συγκεκριμένη πρόταση, τα Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα (ΗΑΕ) δεν έχουν περιληφθεί στον κατάλογο των χωρών που πρέπει να
μεταφερθούν στον κατάλογο των χωρών οι υπήκοοι των οποίων απαλλάσσονται από την υποχρέωση θεώρησης.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 539/2001 περί του καταλόγου τρίτων χωρών οι υπήκοοι των οποίων υπόκεινται στην υποχρέωση θεώρησης για τη διέλευση των
εξωτερικών συνόρων των κρατών μελών, και του καταλόγου τρίτων χωρών οι υπήκοοι των οποίων απαλλάσσονται από την υποχρέωση αυτή.

C 42 E / 122 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Η πρόταση αυτή διαβιβάστηκε από την Επιτροπή στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο και τελεί επί του παρόντος
υπό εξέταση.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 123

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005896/13**

**au Conseil**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR),**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE),**
**Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D),**

**Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE),**
**Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D),**

**Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE),**

**Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz (PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE),**

**Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**
**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) et Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Inclusion des Émirats arabes unis (EAU) au programme d'exemption de visa de l'espace Schengen

Garantir un accès sans visa à l'espace Schengen aux citoyens des Émirats arabes unis constitue une priorité majeure et
la suite logique de l'évolution des relations particulières qu'entretiennent l'Union européenne et les EAU. Pour qu'il en
soit ainsi, il faut que les EAU figurent sur la liste, prévue dans la proposition de la Commission (de novembre 2012),
des pays pouvant accéder à l'espace Schengen sans visa (annexe II du règlement (CE) n° 539/2001 du Conseil).

Les EAU et l'Union européenne ont des intérêts communs majeurs en matière de politique et de sécurité; quant aux
échanges et aux investissements entre les EAU, d'une part, et l'Union européenne et les États membres de l'Union
européenne non membres de l'espace Schengen, d'autre part, ils sont de l'ordre de 50 milliards d'euros.

En 2012, 1 640 000 citoyens de l'Union européenne se sont rendus aux EAU. Douze nouveaux États membres
viendront compléter la liste actuelle des pays européens dont les ressortissants reçoivent un visa à leur arrivée aux
EAU. Par ailleurs, les négociations sur l'exemption de visas pour les citoyens des EAU se rendant au Royaume-Uni, qui
devrait être mise en place dès la fin de cette année, sont sur le point de s'achever.

Les EAU peuvent faire valoir une série d'arguments solides, positifs et objectifs, afin de motiver leur inclusion dans la
liste actuelle de l'annexe II: il n'y a aucun risque en matière d'immigration ou de sécurité, puisque moins d'un million
de citoyens des EAU possèdent un passeport (répondant aux normes techniques en vigueur) et qu'aucun d'entre eux
ne s'est vu refuser un visa Schengen ou n'a été placé en détention préventive pour des raisons de sécurité ou
d'immigration. Nous savons tous que, lorsque des citoyens des EAU se rendent dans l'espace Schengen, ils le font
principalement dans le cadre de leurs activités professionnelles, du tourisme haut de gamme, de soins médicaux
(privés) ou de leurs études (financées dans leur intégralité et non aux frais de l'Union européenne).

Un seul pays de la région (Israël) est exempté de visa Schengen et seuls deux autres pays musulmans figurent sur la
liste (le Brunei et la Malaisie). Même si le cas des EAU doit être considéré sur les seuls critères de mérite, le message
politique que l'Union ferait passer aurait dès lors une incidence considérable. Il ne fait aucun doute que le Parlement
européen soutiendra largement cette mesure.

Étant donné que les EAU répondent à tous les critères pertinents et applicables pour se voir conférer le statut défini à
l'annexe II, le moment est venu d'agir.

Quelle est la position du Conseil quant à l'intégration des EAU dans la liste actuellement à l'examen des pays pouvant
accéder à l'espace Schengen sans visa?

**Réponse**
_(16 septembre 2013)_

La proposition à laquelle l'Honorable Parlementaire fait référence a été publiée par la Commission le
7 novembre 2012 (COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)) et vise à modifier le règlement (CE) n° 539/2001 ( [1] )
en transférant plusieurs pays tiers de la liste prévoyant l'obligation de visa (annexe I) à la liste d'exemption de visa
(annexe II) et à mettre à jour la première liste. Dans cette proposition, les Émirats arabes unis (EAU) ne figurent pas
parmi les pays à transférer vers la liste d'exemption de visa.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 539/2001 fixant la liste des pays tiers dont les ressortissants sont soumis à l'obligation de visa pour franchir les frontières
extérieures des États membres et la liste de ceux dont les ressortissants sont exemptés de cette obligation.

C 42 E / 124 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

La proposition a été transmise par la Commission au Parlement européen et au Conseil et est encore en cours
d'examen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 125

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005896/13**

**al Consiglio**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) e Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Inclusione degli Emirati Arabi Uniti nell'esenzione dal visto per lo spazio Schengen

Garantire l'accesso senza visto allo spazio Schengen per i cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti (EAU) è una priorità
fondamentale e il naturale sviluppo delle relazioni particolari instauratesi tra l'UE e gli Emirati Arabi Uniti. A questo
scopo, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti dovrebbero essere inclusi nell'elenco dei paesi i cui cittadini possono entrare nello
spazio Schengen senza visto (allegato II del regolamento del Consiglio (CE) n. 539/2001) proposto dalla
Commissione a novembre 2012.

Gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e l'UE condividono importanti interessi politici e di sicurezza, e gli scambi commerciali e gli
investimenti tra gli Emirati Arabi Uniti, da una parte, e l'Unione europea e gli Stati membri dell'UE che non fanno
parte dello spazio Schengen, dall'altra, ammontano a 50 miliardi di euro.

Nel 2012, 1 640 000 cittadini dell'UE hanno visitato gli Emirati Arabi Uniti. Dodici nuovi Stati membri dell'UE
andranno ad aggiungersi all'elenco attuale dei paesi europei ai cui cittadini viene rilasciato un visto all'arrivo negli
Emirati Arabi Uniti. Si stanno inoltre concludendo negoziati in virtù dei quali, dalla fine di quest'anno, i cittadini degli
Emirati Arabi Uniti che intendono visitare il Regno Unito saranno esentati dal visto.

Gli Emirati Arabi Uniti vantano una serie di argomenti solidi, positivi e obiettivi ai fini dell'inclusione nell'attuale
elenco dell'allegato II: non sussistono problemi in materia di sicurezza o d'immigrazione, poiché meno di 1 milione di
cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti possiede un passaporto (rispondente alle norme tecniche in vigore), e nessuno di
essi si è mai visto negare un visto Schengen o è stato arrestato per problemi di immigrazione o di sicurezza. È
generalmente noto che quando i cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti visitano lo spazio Schengen, viaggiano
principalmente per lavoro, turismo di alta gamma, cure mediche (private), o per motivi di studio/formazione
(interamente finanziati e non a spese dell'UE).

Un solo altro paese della regione (Israele) è esentato dal visto per lo spazio Schengen, e solo due altri paesi islamici
(Brunei e Malesia) sono inclusi nell'elenco. Sebbene il caso degli Emirati Arabi Uniti vada valutato esclusivamente in
base al criterio del merito, il messaggio politico da parte dell'UE avrebbe comunque un impatto considerevole. Il
Parlamento darà senz'altro ampio sostegno a tale misura.

Dato che gli Emirati Arabi Uniti riuniscono tutti i criteri rilevanti e applicabili per ottenere lo status di cui all'allegato
II, si ritiene che sia giunto il momento di agire.Ciò premesso, qual è la posizione del Consiglio sull'inclusione degli
Emirati Arabi Uniti nell'ambito dell'attuale revisione dell'elenco dei paesi i cui cittadini possono accedere allo spazio
Schengen senza visto?

**Risposta**
_(16 settembre 2013)_

La proposta della Commissione, cui l'onorevole parlamentare fa riferimento, è stata presentata dalla Commissione il
7 novembre 2012 (COM(2012)650 def. — 2012/0309(COD)) ed è volta a modificare il regolamento n. 539/2001 ( [1] )
spostando diversi paesi terzi dall'elenco negativo (allegato I) all'elenco positivo (allegato II) e ad aggiornare tale elenco dei
visti. In tale proposta gli Emirati arabi uniti (UAE) non sono stati inclusi nell'elenco dei paesi da spostare nell'elenco
positivo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 539/2001 che adotta l’elenco dei paesi terzi i cui cittadini devono essere in possesso del visto all’atto dell’attraversamento
delle frontiere esterne e l’elenco dei paesi terzi i cui cittadini sono esenti da tale obbligo.

C 42 E / 126 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

La proposta è stata trasmessa dalla Commissione al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio ed è attualmente ancora
all'esame.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 127

_(Latviešu valodas versija)_

**Jautājums, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski, E-005896/13**

**Padomei**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) un Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013. gada 27. maijs)_

_Temats:_ Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu iekļaušana bezvīzu Šengenas zonā

Ņemot vērā īpašās ES un Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu (AAE) attiecības, ir ļoti svarīgi un loģiski nodrošināt AAE
pilsoņiem tiesības ieceļot Šengenas zonā bez vīzas. To var panākt, ja AAE tiek iekļauta Komisijas pašreizējā
priekšlikumā (iesniegts 2012. gada novembrī), kurā paredzēts to valstu saraksts, kuru valstspiederīgie var ieceļot
Šengenas zonā bez vīzas (Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 539/2001 II pielikums).

AAE un ES vieno svarīgas politiskās un drošības intereses, kamēr tiek lēsts, ka tirdzniecība un ieguldījumi, no vienas
puses, starp AAE, un, no otras puses, starp ES un tām Šengenas zonas valstīm, kuras nav ES dalībvalstis, sasniedz
EUR 50 miljardus.

AAE 2012. gadā apmeklēja 1 640 000 ES pilsoņu. Pašreizējais saraksts ar Eiropas valstīm, kuru valstspiederīgajiem
tiek izsniegta vīza, ierodoties AAE, tiks papildināts, iekļaujot vēl 12 citas ES dalībvalstis. Turklāt drīz tiks pabeigtas
sarunas, kuru rezultātā no šā gada beigām AAE pilsoņiem netiks pieprasīta vīza, apmeklējot Apvienoto Karalisti.

AAE piedāvā nopietnus, pozitīvus un objektīvus argumentus savai iekļaušanai pašreizējā II pielikuma sarakstā –
nepastāv imigrācijas vai drošības problēmas, jo AAE pasu (kas atbilst attiecīgajiem tehniskajiem standartiem) turētāju
skaits nesasniedz 1 miljonu, neviena no šīm personām nekad nav saņēmusi Šengenas vīzas atteikumu, ne arī ir
aizturēta imigrācijas vai drošības jautājumu dēļ. Visiem ir zināms, ka AAE pilsoņi apmeklē Šengenas zonu pamatā
uzņēmējdarbības, augstas klases atpūtas, (privātās) medicīniskās aprūpes vai studiju/izglītības (kas tiek pilnībā
finansēta un nav jāapmaksā ES) dēļ.

Šajā reģionā tikai vēl viena valsts – Izraēla – ir atbrīvota no vīzu prasības ieceļošanai Šengenas zonā, un sarakstā ir
iekļautas vēl divas citas islāma valstis, proti, Bruneja un Malaizija. Pat tad, ja AAE gadījums tiktu vērtēts tikai pēc šīs
valsts nopelniem, ES politiskās vēsts ietekme būtu milzīga. Parlaments noteikti šim pasākumam sniegs plašu atbalstu.

Tā kā AAE atbilst visiem attiecīgajiem un piemērojamiem kritērijiem, lai piešķirtu II pielikumā paredzēto statusu, mēs
uzskatām, ka ir pienācis laiks rīkoties. Kāds ir Padomes viedoklis par to, vai iekļaut AAE, pārskatot sarakstu ar valstīm,
kuru valstspiederīgie var ieceļot Šengenas zonā bez vīzas?

**Atbilde**
_(2013. gada 16. septembris)_

Komisijas priekšlikumu, uz kuru godātie deputāti atsaucas, Komisija iesniedza 2012. gada 7. novembrī
(COM(2012) 650 galīgā redakcija – 2012/0309(COD)), un tā mērķis ir grozīt Regulu Nr. 539/2001 ( [1] ), pārceļot
vairākas trešās valstis no vīzu saraksta (I pielikums) uz to valstu sarakstu, kurām piemēro bezvīzu režīmu
(II pielikums), un atjaunināt minēto vīzu sarakstu. Šajā priekšlikumā Apvienotie Arābu Emirāti (AAE) nav starp
valstīm, kas jāpārceļ uz to valstu uz sarakstu, kurām piemēro bezvīzu režīmu.

Komisija priekšlikumu nosūtīja Eiropas Parlamentam un Padomei, un tas vēl joprojām tiek izskatīts.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regula, ar kuru groza Regulu (EK) Nr. 539/2001, ar ko izveido to trešo valstu sarakstu, kuru pilsoņiem, šķērsojot dalībvalstu ārējās robežas, ir
jābūt vīzām, kā arī to trešo valstu sarakstu, uz kuru pilsoņiem šī prasība neattiecas.

C 42 E / 128 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)_

**Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-005896/13**

**Tarybai**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) ir Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013 m. gegužės 27 d.)_

_Tema:_ Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų įtraukimas į bevizę Šengeno erdvę

Galimybės be vizos atvykti į Šengeno erdvę Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų (JAE) piliečiams užtikrinimas yra išskirtinių ES ir
JAE santykių didžiausias prioritetas ir natūrali išdava. Tai galima pasiekti įtraukus JAE į dabartinį Komisijos pasiūlymą
(2012 m. lapkričio mėn.) dėl šalių, kurių piliečiai gali atvykti į Šengeno erdvę be vizų, sąrašo (Tarybos reglamento (EB)
Nr. 539/2001 II priedas).

JAE ir ES turi bendrų svarbių politinių ir saugumo interesų, o JAE ir ES bei ES nepriklausančių Šengeno erdvės šalių
tarpusavio prekybos ir investicijų vertė siekia 50 mlrd. EUR.

2012 m. 1 640 000 ES piliečių apsilankė JAE. Dabartinis Europos šalių, kurių piliečiams viza išduodama atvykus į
JAE, sąrašas bus papildytas dar 12 ES valstybių narių. Be to, greitai bus užbaigtos derybos, kuriose bus susitarta, jog
nuo šių metų pabaigos į Jungtinę Karalystę vykstantiems JAE piliečiams nebereikės vizų.

Siekdama būti įtraukta į dabartinį II priedo sąrašą JAE pateikia įvairių tvirtų, pozityvių ir objektyvių argumentų: jokių
imigracijos ar saugumo problemų, nes JAE pasus (atitinkančius būtinus techninius standartus) turi mažiau kaip
milijonas žmonių, kurių nė vienam nebuvo atsakyta išduoti Šengeno vizą ir kurių nė vienas nebuvo sulaikytas dėl
imigracijos ar saugumo problemų. Žinome, jog JAE piliečiai atvyksta į Šengeno erdvę daugiausia verslo reikalais,
aukštos klasės poilsio, (privačios) medicinos paslaugų ar studijuoti (visiškai finansuojami, o ne ES lėšomis).

Vienintelei to regiono šaliai (Izraeliui) netaikomas Šengeno vizos reikalavimas ir tik dvi kitos islamiškos šalys
(Brunėjus ir Malaizija) yra įtrauktos į sąrašą. Net jei JAE atvejis turėtų būti vertinamas atsižvelgiant į šalies pasiekimus,
ES politinis požiūris turėtų didžiulį poveikį. Parlamentas neabejotinai tvirtai paremtų šią priemonę.

Kadangi JAE atitinka visus susijusius taikomus kriterijus, kad jiems būtų suteiktas II priede numatytas statusas,
manome, jog atėjo metas imtis veiksmų. Ką Taryba mano dėl JAE įtraukimo į peržiūrimą šalių, kurių piliečiai gali
atvykti į Šengeno erdvę be vizų, sąrašą?

**Atsakymas**
_(2013 m. rugsėjo 16 d.)_

Komisijos pasiūlymą, apie kurį kalba gerbiami Parlamento nariai, Komisija paskelbė 2012 m. lapkričio 7 d.
(COM(2012) 650 galutinis – 2012/0309(COD); juo siekiama iš dalies pakeisti Reglamentą Nr. 539/2001 ( [1] ) ir kelias
trečiąsias šalis perkelti iš šalių, kurių piliečiams taikomas vizos reikalavimas, sąrašo (I priedas) į šalių, kurių piliečiams
vizos reikalavimas netaikomas, sąrašą (II priedas), taip pat atnaujinti tą sąrašą. Tame pasiūlyme Jungtiniai Arabų
Emyratai (JAE) nebuvo įtraukti į sąrašą šalių, kurios bus perkeltos į šalių, kurių piliečiams vizos reikalavimas
netaikomas, sąrašą.

Komisija nusiuntė šį pasiūlymą Europos Parlamentui bei Tarybai ir šiuo metu jis vis dar nagrinėjamas.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Reglamentas (EB) Nr. 539/2001, nustatantis trečiųjų šalių, kurių piliečiai, kirsdami išorines sienas, privalo turėti vizas, ir trečiųjų šalių, kurių
piliečiams toks reikalavimas netaikomas, sąrašus.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 129

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-005896/13**

**a Tanács számára**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) és Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013. május 27.)_

_Tárgy:_ Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek felvétele a vízummentes schengeni övezetbe

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek állampolgárai részére a schengeni övezetbe történő vízummentes beutazás biztosítása
kiemelt fontosságú cél, és az EU és az Egyesült Arab Emírségek közötti kivételes kapcsolat természetes
következménye. Ez megvalósítható azáltal, ha az Egyesült Arab Emírségek bekerül a Bizottság jelenlegi
(2012. novemberi), azon országok listájára irányuló javaslatába, amelyek állampolgárai vízum nélkül léphetnek be a
schengeni övezetbe (az 539/2001/EK tanácsi rendelet II. melléklete).

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek és az EU fontos közös politikai és biztonsági érdekekkel bír, miközben az egyrészről az
Egyesült Arab Emírségek, másrészről az EU és az EU-n kívüli, schengeni övezethez tartozó országok közötti
kereskedelem és beruházások értéke 50 milliárd euró.

2012-ben 1 640 000 uniós polgár utazott az Egyesült Arab Emírségekbe. További 12 uniós tagállammal kibővítésre
kerül majd azon európai országok jelenlegi listája, amelyek állampolgárai az Egyesült Arab Emírségekbe való
megérkezéskor kapnak vízumot. Ezenfelül lezárásukhoz közelednek azok a tárgyalások, amelyek ez év végétől
kezdődően mentesítik az Egyesült Arab Emírségek állampolgárait a vízumkötelezettség alól az Egyesült Királyságba
való belépéskor.

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek vonatkozásában számos szilárd, pozitív és tárgyilagos érvvel lehet alátámasztani a
II. mellékletben szereplő jelenlegi listára való felvételt: nincsenek bevándorlási vagy biztonsági aggályok, hiszen
kevesebb mint 1 millióan rendelkeznek az Egyesült Arab Emírségek útlevelével (amely megfelel a szükséges technikai
előírásoknak), akik közül még soha senkitől nem került megtagadásra a schengeni vízum, illetve nem kerültek
őrizetbe vételre bevándorlási vagy biztonsági aggályok miatt. Mindannyian tudjuk, hogy amikor az Egyesült Arab
Emírségek állampolgárai belépnek a schengeni térségbe, főleg üzleti, magas színvonalú szabadidős,
(magán)egészségügyi ellátási vagy tanulmányi/oktatási célból utaznak (amely teljes körűen finanszírozásra kerül, és
nem az EU költségére).

A térségben csak egy másik ország (Izrael) mentesül a schengeni vízumkötelezettség alól, illetve két egyéb iszlám
ország (Brunei és Malajzia) szerepel a listán. Még ha az Egyesült Arab Emírségek esete saját érdemei alapján kerülne is
megítélésre, az EU-tól érkező politikai üzenet ezért óriási hatással járna. A Parlament minden bizonnyal széles körűen
támogatni fogja ezt az intézkedést.

Mivel az Egyesült Arab Emírségek megfelel a II. melléklet szerinti státusz megadásához szükséges minden lényeges és
alkalmazandó feltételnek, úgy gondoljuk, hogy ideje cselekedni. Hogyan látja a Tanács az Egyesült Arab Emírségek
bevonását azon országok listájának folyamatban lévő felülvizsgálatába, amelyek állampolgárai vízum nélkül
léphetnek be a schengeni övezetbe?

**Válasz**
_(2013. szeptember 16.)_

A javaslat, amelyre a tisztelt képviselők hivatkoznak, a Bizottság 2012. november 7-i (COM(2012) 650 final –
2012/0309(COD)) javaslata ( [1] ), amelynek célja az 593/2001/EK rendelet módosítása, a vízumköteles államok listáján
(I. melléklet) szereplő több harmadik országnak a vízummentes államok listájára (II. melléklet) való áthelyezése révén,
valamint a vízumköteles államok jegyzékének naprakésszé tétele. A szóban forgó javaslatban az Egyesült Arab
Emírségek nem szerepelt a vízummentességet élvező államok listájára áthelyezendő országok között.

A Bizottság a javaslatot megküldte az Európai Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak, és jelenleg vizsgálat tárgyát képezi.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) A Tanács 539/2001/EK rendelete a külső határok átlépésekor vízumkötelezettség alá eső, illetve az e kötelezettség alól mentes harmadik
országbeli állampolgárok országainak felsorolásáról.

C 42 E / 130 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-005896/13**

**lill-Kunsill**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) u Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 ta' Mejju 2013)_

_Suġġett:_ L-inklużjoni tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża.

L-iżgurar ta’ aċċess mingħajr viża għaż-Żona Schengen għaċ-ċittadini tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda (EGħM) hu
priorità għolja u żvilupp naturali għar-relazzjonijiet eċċezzjonali bejn l-UE u l-EGħM. Dan jista’ jinkiseb jekk l-EGħM
ikunu inklużi fil-proposta ta’ bħalissa tal-Kummissjoni (minn Novembru 2012) għal elenku ta’ pajjiżi li n-nazzjonali
tagħhom jistgħu jidħlu fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża (Anness II għar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001).

L-EGħM u l-UE jikkondividu interessi importanti politiċi u ta’ sigurtà, filwaqt li l-kummerċ u l-investiment bejn lEGħM, mill-banda l-waħda, u l-UE u l-pajjiżi mhux membri tal-UE imma fix-Schengen, mill-banda l-oħra, għandu
valur ta’ EUR 50 biljun.

Fl-2012, 1 640 000 ċittadin tal-UE żaru l-EGħM. L-elenku kurrenti ta’ pajjiżi Ewropej li n-nazzjonali tagħhom
jingħataw viża meta jaslu fl-EGħM se jitwessa’ biex jinkorpora 12-il Stat Membru ieħor tal-UE. Inoltre, daqt se jiġu
konklużi n-negozjati li, mill-aħħar ta’ din is-sena, se jeżentaw liċ-ċittadini tal-EGħM mir-rekwiżiti tal-viża meta jżuru
r-Renju Unit.

L-EGħM jippreżentaw firxa ta’ argumenti solidi, pożittivi u oġġettiva għall-inklużjoni fl-elenku kurrenti tal-Anness II:
ma hemmx tħassib ta’ immigrazzjoni jew sigurtà, billi hemm anqas minn miljun detentur ta’ passaporti tal-EGħM (li
jissodisfaw l-istandards tekniċi rikjesti), u l-ebda wieħed minnhom qatt ma ġiet miċħuda lilu viża Schengen jew qatt
ma ġie detenut dwar kwestjonijiet marbutin mal-immigrazzjoni jew mas-sigurtà. Ilkoll nafu li meta ċ-ċittadini talEGħM jżuru ż-Żona Schengen, dawn ikunu qed jivvjaġġaw l-aktar għan-negozju, għall-pjaċir b'infiq għoli, għal kura
medika (privata), jew għal skopijiet ta' studju/edukazzjoni (kompletament iffinanzjati u mhux akariku tal-UE).

Hemm biss pajjiż wieħed ieħor fir-reġjun (Iżrael) li hu eżenti mir-rekwiżiti viża ta' Schengen, u żewġ pajjiżi Islamiċi
oħra biss (Brunej u l-Malażja) li huma elenkati. Ukoll kieku l-każ tal-EGħM ikun iġġudikat fuq il-merti tiegħu biss, ilmessaġġ politiku mill-UE għal dawn ir-raġunijiet ikollu impatt enormi. Il-Parlament m’hemmx dubju li se jappoġġja
bil-kbir din il-miżura.

Billi l-EGħM jottemperaw ruħhom mall-kriterji kollha relevanti u applikabbli għall-għoti ta’ Status Anness II, naħsbu
li wasal iż-żmien li wieħed jaġixxi. Kif jaraha l-Kunsill l-inklużjoni tal-EGħM fir-reviżjoni li għaddejja bħalissa talelenku tal-pajjiżi li n-nazzjonali tagħhom jistgħu jidħlu fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża?

**Tweġiba**
_(16 ta' Settembru 2013)_

Il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni li l-Membri Onorevoli jirreferu għaliha nħarġet mill-Kummissjoni fis-7 ta' Novembru
2012 (COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)) u għandha l-għan li temenda r-Regolament Nru 539/2001 ( [1] ) billi
tittrasferixxi diversi pajjiżi terzi mil-lista tal-viża (Anness I) għal-lista ta' mingħajr viża (Anness II) u li taġġorna dik illista tal-viża. F'dik il-proposta, l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda (EGħM) ma ġewx inklużi fil-lista tal-pajjiżi li għandhom
jiġu ttrasferiti għal-lista ta' mingħajr viża.

Il-proposta ntbagħtet mill-Kummissjoni lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill u bħalissa għadha qed tiġi eżaminata.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 539/2001 li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom irid ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri
esterni tal-Istati Membri u dawk li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżentati minn dik il-ħtieġa.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 131

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005896/13**

**do Rady**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) oraz Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Włączenie Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich do bezwizowej strefy Schengen

Zapewnienie obywatelom Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich (ZEA) bezwizowego dostępu do strefy Schengen to
nadrzędny priorytet, a zarazem naturalny postęp w kształtowaniu wyjątkowych stosunków między UE a ZEA. Będzie
to osiągalne, jeśli ZEA w ramach obecnego wniosku Komisji zostaną wpisane (od listopada 2012 r.) do wykazu
krajów, których obywatele mogą bez wizy przekraczać terytorium strefy Schengen (załącznik II do rozporządzenia
Rady (WE) nr 539/2001).

Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie i UE łączą ważne interesy polityczne i kwestie bezpieczeństwa, natomiast handel
i inwestycje między ZEA a UE i państwami spoza strefy Schengen wycenia się na 50 mld EUR.

W 2012 r. ZEA odwiedziło 1 640 000 obywateli UE. Obowiązujący wykaz państw europejskich, których obywatele
otrzymują wizę w momencie przyjazdu do ZEA, zostanie uzupełniony o kolejne 12 państw członkowskich UE.
Ponadto dobiegają końca negocjacje, dzięki którym wraz z upływem tego roku obywatele ZEA będą zwolnieni
z obowiązku wizowego podczas wizyty w Zjednoczonym Królestwie.

Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie przedstawiły rzetelne, pozytywne i obiektywne argumenty przemawiające za
wpisaniem ich do zawartego w załączniku II wykazu: nie istnieją żadne powody do obaw związanych z kwestią
bezpieczeństwa czy imigracji, ponieważ do posiadaczy paszportów ZEA zalicza się niespełna 1 mln osób (co spełnia
normy techniczne), z których żadnej nie odmówiono dotychczas wizy do strefy Schengen ani nie zatrzymano
z powodów imigracyjnych czy bezpieczeństwa. Powszechnie wiadomo, że obywatele ZEA przyjeżdżają do krajów
należących do strefy Schengen głównie w celach biznesowych, aby skorzystać z luksusowej oferty turystycznej,
z (prywatnej) opieki medycznej lub aby studiować/kształcić się (przy czym pełne koszty tej nauki nie są ponoszone
przez UE tylko przez samych zainteresowanych).

Jedynie jeden kraj z tego regionu (Izrael) jest zwolniony ze spełniania wymogów wizowych systemu Schengen,
natomiast w wykazie widnieją tylko dwa kraje islamskie (Brunei i Malezja). Nawet jeśli przypadek ZEA należy oceniać
wyłącznie w oparciu o ustalone kryteria, to sygnał polityczny UE będzie miał potężny wydźwięk. Parlament
z pewnością udzieli szerokiego poparcia w tej sprawie.

Biorąc pod uwagę, że ZEA spełniają wszelkie istotne i obowiązujące kryteria niezbędne do wpisania ich do wykazu
państw w ramach załącznika II, uważamy, że nadszedł czas na podjęcie działań. Jak Rada postrzega włączenie ZEA
do aktualizowanego obecnie wykazu państw, których obywatele mogą wjeżdżać do strefy Schengen bez wizy?

**Odpowiedź**
_(16 września 2013 r.)_

Wniosek Komisji, o którym wspominają szanowni posłowie, został wydany przez Komisję w dniu 7 listopada
2012 r. (COM(2012) 650 final – 2012/0309(COD)) i ma na celu zmianę rozporządzenia nr 539/2001 ( [1] ) przez
przeniesienie kilku państw trzecich z wykazu państw objętych obowiązkiem wizowym (załącznik I) do wykazu
państw nieobjętych tym obowiązkiem (załącznik II) oraz aktualizację tego ostatniego wykazu. We wniosku tym
Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie (ZEA) nie zostały włączone do wykazu państw, które mają zostać przeniesione do
wykazu państw nieobjętych obowiązkiem wizowym.

Komisja przesłała ten wniosek Parlamentowi Europejskiemu i Radzie; jest on nadal przedmiotem analizy.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) NR 539/2001 z dnia 15 marca 2001 r. wymieniające państwa trzecie, których obywatele muszą posiadać wizy
podczas przekraczania granic zewnętrznych, oraz te, których obywatele są zwolnieni z tego wymogu.

C 42 E / 132 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005896/13**

**ao Conselho**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) e Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Inclusão dos Emirados Árabes Unidos na lista de países isentos da obrigação de visto para entrar no espaço
Schengen

A garantia de acesso ao espaço Schengen com isenção de visto para os cidadãos dos Emirados Árabes Unidos (EAU) é
uma prioridade e uma evolução natural das relações excecionais entre a UE e os EAU. Tal pode ser conseguido se os
EAU forem incluídos na atual proposta da Comissão (de novembro de 2012) de uma lista de países cujos cidadãos
podem entrar no espaço Schengen sem visto (Anexo II do Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001).

Os EAU e a UE partilham importantes interesses políticos e de segurança; além disso, o comércio e o investimento
entre os EAU, por um lado, e a UE e os países do Espaço Schengen não pertencentes à UE, por outro lado, são
estimados em 50 mil milhões de euros.

Em 2012, 1 640 000 cidadãos da UE visitaram os EAU. A lista atual de países europeus a cujos cidadãos é emitido um
visto à chegada aos EAU será alargada no sentido de incluir mais 12 Estados‐Membros da UE. Além disso, estão
prestes a ser concluídas as negociações relativas a um acordo que, a partir do final deste ano, irá isentar de visto os
cidadãos dos EAU que visitam o Reino Unido.

Os EAU apresentam uma série de argumentos sólidos, concretos e objetivos para serem incluídos na atual lista do
Anexo II: não existem preocupações de imigração ou de segurança, já que há menos de 1 milhão de titulares de
passaportes dos EAU (que cumprem as normas técnicas exigidas), nenhum deles viu alguma vez recusado um visto
Schengen ou foi detido devido a preocupações de imigração ou de segurança. Todos sabemos que, quando visitam o
espaço Schengen, os cidadãos dos EAU viajam principalmente para negócios, lazer de qualidade, cuidados médicos
(privados) ou estudo/educação (totalmente financiados e não a expensas da UE).

Apenas um outro país da região (Israel) está isento da obrigação de visto Schengen e apenas dois outros países
islâmicos (Brunei e Malásia) constam da lista. Mesmo que o caso dos EAU seja avaliado em função dos seus próprios
méritos, a mensagem política da UE teria, por conseguinte, um enorme impacto. O Parlamento irá certamente dar um
grande apoio a esta medida.

Atendendo a que os EAU cumprem todos os critérios pertinentes e aplicáveis para a concessão do estatuto do anexo
II, pensamos que chegou o momento de agir. Como encara o Conselho a inclusão dos EAU na revisão em curso da
lista de países cujos cidadãos podem ter acesso ao espaço Schengen sem visto?

**Resposta**
_(16 de setembro de 2013)_

A proposta da Comissão a que o Senhor Deputado se refere foi apresentada pela Comissão em 7 de novembro
de 2012 (COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)) e destina‐se a alterar o Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001 ( [1] )
transferindo vários países terceiros da lista de obrigação de visto (Anexo I) para a lista de isenção de visto (Anexo II) e
a atualizar essa primeira lista. A proposta não inclui os Emiratos Árabes Unidos na lista de países a transferir para a
lista de isenção de vistos.

A proposta foi enviada pela Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu e ao Conselho e, presentemente, está ainda em análise.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001 que fixa a lista dos países terceiros cujos nacionais estão sujeitos à obrigação de visto para transporem as
fronteiras externas e a lista dos países terceiros cujos nacionais estão isentos dessa obrigação.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 133

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005896/13**

**adresată Consiliului**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) şi Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Includerea Emiratelor Arabe Unite printre statele cu acces fără viză în spațiul Schengen

Asigurarea accesului fără viză în spațiul Schengen pentru cetățenii Emiratelor Arabe Unite (EAU) reprezintă o
prioritate majoră și o evoluție normală ca urmare a relațiilor excepționale dintre UE și EAU. Acest obiectiv poate fi
atins dacă EAU sunt incluse în propunerea actuală a Comisiei (din noiembrie 2012) pentru o listă de țări ai căror
resortisanți pot intra în spațiul Schengen fără viză (anexa II la Regulamentul (CE) nr. 539/2001 al Consiliului).

EAU și UE au importante interese comune de natură politică și de securitate, în timp ce comerțul și investițiile între
EAU pe de o parte, și UE și țările terțe care fac parte din zona Schengen pe de alta, sunt evaluate la 50 de miliarde EUR.

În anul 2012, 1 640 000 de cetățeni ai UE au vizitat EAU. Lista actuală a statelor europene pentru ai căror resortisanți
sunt eliberate vize la sosirea în EAU va fi extinsă pentru a include alte 12 state membre ale UE. Mai mult decât atât, se
prevede sfârșitul negocierilor ce vor permite cetățenilor EAU să călătorească fără viză în Regatul Unit începând cu
sfârșitul acestui an.

EAU prezintă o serie de argumente solide, pozitive și obiective în ceea ce privește includerea în lista curentă din anexa
II: nu există aspecte problematice legate de imigrare sau securitate, întrucât numărul deținătorilor de pașaport EAU
(care respectă standardele tehnice necesare) este sub un milion, niciunuia dintre aceștia nefiindu-i vreodată refuzată
viza Schengen și nefiind nici reținut din cauza unor aspecte problematice legate de imigrare sau securitate. Știm cu
toții că atunci când cetățenii EAU vizitează spațiul Schengen, scopul călătoriei lor este în cea mai mare parte legat de
afaceri, activități recreative de înaltă calitate, servicii de asistență medicală (de natură privată) sau studii/educație
(finanțate în totalitate și nu pe cheltuiala UE).

Numai o singură țară din regiune (Israel) este exonerată de obligația de a deține viză și doar alte două state islamice
(Brunei și Malaysia) se mai află pe listă. Chiar dacă cazul EAU ar fi evaluat după meritele proprii, mesajul politic
transmis de UE ar avea, astfel, un impact enorm. Parlamentul va acorda un sprijin larg acestei măsuri.

Având în vedere că EAU îndeplinesc toate cerințele relevante și aplicabile pentru a le fi acordate statutul prevăzut la
anexa II, considerăm că este momentul să acționăm. Care este opinia Consiliului cu privire la includerea EAU în cadrul
revizuirii în curs a listei țărilor ai căror resortisanți pot intra în spațiul Schengen fără viză?

**Răspuns**
_(16 septembrie 2013)_

Propunerea Comisiei, la care se referă distinșii deputați, a fost emisă de Comisie la data de 7 noiembrie 2012

[COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)]. Ea urmărește să modifice Regulamentul nr. 539/2001 ( [1] ), transferând
mai multe țări terțe de pe lista vizelor (anexa I) pe lista fără vize (anexa II) și să actualizeze respectiva listă a vizelor. În
textul propunerii, Emiratele Arabe Unite (EAU) nu figurează în rândul țărilor care urmează să fie transferate pe lista
fără vize.

Comisia a transmis Parlamentului European și Consiliului propunerea, care este încă în proces de examinare.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulamentului (CE) nr. 539/2001 de stabilire a listei țărilor terțe ai căror resortisanți trebuie să dețină viză pentru trecerea frontierelor externe ale
statelor membre și a listei țărilor terțe ai căror resortisanți sunt exonerați de această obligație.

C 42 E / 134 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Slovenské znenie)_

**Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-005896/13**

**Rade**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) a Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. mája 2013)_

_Vec:_ Začlenenie Spojených arabských emirátov do bezvízového schengenského priestoru

Zabezpečenie bezvízového vstupu do schengenského priestoru pre občanov Spojených arabských emirátov (SAE) je
vrcholnou prioritou a prirodzeným vývojom výnimočných vzťahov medzi EÚ a Spojenými arabskými emirátmi.
Dalo by sa to dosiahnuť v prípade, že budú SAE začlenené do súčasného návrhu Komisie (z novembra 2012), kde je
uvedený zoznam krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci môžu vstúpiť do schengenského priestoru bez víz (príloha II
k nariadeniu Rady (ES) č. 539/2001).

SAE a EÚ majú významné spoločné politické a bezpečnostné záujmy a zároveň sa obchodné výmeny a investície
medzi Spojenými arabskými emirátmi na jednej strane a EÚ a krajinami nepatriacimi do schengenského priestoru na
strane druhej odhadujú na 50 miliárd EUR.

V roku 2012 navštívilo Spojené arabské emiráty 1 640 000 občanov EÚ. Súčasný zoznam európskych krajín,
ktorých štátnym príslušníkom sú vydané víza pri príchode do SAE, sa rozšíri o ďalších 12 členských štátov EÚ.
Okrem toho sa čoskoro uzavrú rokovania, na základe ktorých budú od konca tohto roku občania SAE pri návšteve
Spojeného kráľovstva oslobodení od vízovej povinnosti.

SAE predkladajú množstvo solídnych, pozitívnych a objektívnych argumentov na podporu svojho začlenenia do
súčasného zoznamu II: neexistujú žiadne obavy spojené s prisťahovaleckou či bezpečnostnou politikou, pretože
držiteľov cestovných pasov SAE (ktoré spĺňajú požadované technické normy) je menej než milión, pričom žiadnemu
z nich neboli zamietnuté schengenské víza ani nebol žiaden zadržaný z dôvodu obáv súvisiacich s otázkami
prisťahovalectva či bezpečnosti. Všetci vieme, že občania SAE navštevujú schengenský priestor väčšinou
z obchodných dôvodov, v rámci dovolenky pre náročných, na účely (súkromnej) lekárskej starostlivosti či
štúdia/vzdelávania (ktoré si financujú sami, nie na náklady EÚ).

V tomto regióne je od vízovej povinnosti pri vstupe do schengenského priestoru oslobodená iba jedna krajina (Izrael)
a v zozname sú uvedené iba dve iné islamské krajiny (Brunej a Malajzia). Aj keby sa prípad SAE posudzoval
samostatne, politický signál zo strany EÚ by mal obrovský dosah. Parlament určite tomuto opatreniu poskytne širokú
podporu.

Vzhľadom na to, že SAE spĺňajú všetky náležité a uplatniteľné kritéria na získanie štatútu podľa prílohy II, nazdávame
sa, že je načase konať. Aký má Rada názor na začlenenie SAE do prebiehajúcej revízie zoznamu krajín, ktorých štátni
príslušníci môžu vstupovať do schengenského priestoru bez víz?

**Odpoveď**
_(16. septembra 2013)_

Návrh Komisie, na ktorý sa vážené poslankyne a vážení poslanci odvolávajú, vydala Komisia 7. novembra 2012
(COM(2012) 650 final – 2012/0309(COD)) a jeho cieľom je zmeniť nariadenie č. 539/2001 ( [1] ) tak, že sa niekoľko
tretích krajín presunie zo zoznamu krajín s vízovým režimom (príloha I) do zoznamu krajín s bezvízovým režimom
(príloha II), pričom sa príslušný zoznam zaktualizuje. V tomto návrhu neboli Spojené arabské emiráty začlenené do
zoznamu krajín, ktoré sa majú presunúť do zoznamu krajín s bezvízovým režimom.

Komisia zaslala uvedený návrh Európskemu parlamentu a Rade a momentálne je predmetom skúmania.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Nariadenie (ES) č. 539/2001 uvádzajúce zoznam tretích krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci musia mať víza pri prekračovaní vonkajších hraníc
členských štátov, a krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci sú oslobodení od tejto povinnosti.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 135

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-005896/13**

**za Svet**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) in Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. maj 2013)_

_Zadeva:_ Vključitev Združenih arabskih emiratov v brezvizumsko schengensko območje

Odnosi med Evropsko unijo in Združenimi arabskimi emirati so odlični, zato je zagotavljanje brezvizumskega
dostopa v schengensko območje za državljane Združenih arabskih emiratov ena od največjih prednostih nalog in
logični razvoj dogodkov. To bi lahko naredili tako, da bi Združene arabske emirate vključili v sedanji predlog
Komisije (iz novembra 2012) za seznam držav, katerih državljani lahko vstopajo v schengensko območje brez
vizuma (Priloga II k Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 539/2001).Združeni arabski emirati in Evropska unija imajo pomembne
skupne politične in varnostne interese, vrednost trgovinske izmenjave in naložb med Združenimi arabskimi emirati
na eni strani in med EU in državami EU, ki niso članice schengenskega območja, po drugi, pa se ocenjuje na
50 milijard EUR.

Leta 2012 je Združene arabske emirate obiskalo 1 640 000 državljanov EU. Sedanji seznam evropskih držav, katerih
državljani ob prihodu v Združene arabske emirate dobijo vizo, se bo razširil na dodatnih 12 držav članic EU. Poleg
tega se bodo kmalu končala pogajanja, s katerimi bodo od konca letošnjega leta državljani Združenih arabskih
emiratov ob obisku Združenega kraljestva izključeni iz vizumske obveznosti.

Obstajajo številni trdni, pozitivni in objektivni argumenti, ki govorijo v prid vključiti Združenih arabskih emiratov v
sedanji seznam v Prilogi II: skrbi, povezanih z imigracijo ali varnostjo ni, saj ima potni list (ki izpolnjuje predpisane
tehnične standarde) Združenih arabskih emiratov manj kot milijon oseb, od katerih doslej še nobeni niso zavrnili
schengenske vize, prav tako pa še nihče ni bil pridržan zaradi pomislekov glede imigracije ali varnosti. Splošno je
znano, da državljani Združenih arabskih emiratov na schengensko območje potujejo večinoma iz poslovnih
razlogov, zaradi preživljanja prostega časa na visoki ravni, (zasebne) zdravstvene oskrbe ali študija oziroma
izobraževanja, ki ga v celoti financirajo sami, in ne na stroške EU.

Iz vizumske obveznosti za schengensko območje je izvzeta le še ena država iz tega območja, in sicer Izrael, na
seznamu pa sta le še dve drugi islamski državi, Brunej in Malazija. Čeprav bi si primer Združenih arabskih emiratov
sam po sebi zaslužil posebno obravnavo, bi politično sporočilo EU naletelo na izjemen odmev. V Parlamentu bo ta
ukrep gotovo deležen široke podpore.

Glede na to, da Združeni arabski emirati izpolnjujejo vsa potrebna in veljavna merila za vključitev v Prilogo II,
menimo, da je čas za ukrepanje. Kako Svet gleda na vključitev Združenih arabskih emiratov v tekoči ponovni pregled
seznama držav, katerih državljani lahko v schengensko območje vstopajo brez vizuma?

**Odgovor**
_(16. september 2013)_

Predlog, ki ga navajajo poslanke in poslanci, je Komisija objavila 7. novembra 2012 (COM(2012)0650 final –
2012/0309(COD)), njegov namen pa je spremeniti Uredbo št. 539/2001 ( [1] ), in sicer tako, da se več tretjih držav s
seznama držav, katerih državljani potrebujejo vizum (Priloga I), prenese na seznam držav, katerih državljani so
oproščeni vizumske obveznosti (Priloga II), ter posodobiti navedeni seznam iz Priloge I. V navedenem predlogu
Združeni arabski emirati niso bili vključeni med države, ki naj bi bile prenesene na seznam držav, katerih državljani
so oproščeni vizumske obveznosti.

V tem trenutku se predlog, ki ga je Komisija poslala Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu, še preučuje.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 539/2001 o seznamu tretjih držav, katerih državljani morajo pri prehodu zunanjih meja imeti vizume, in držav, katerih
državljani so oproščeni te zahteve.

C 42 E / 136 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005896/13**

**to the Council**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) and Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Inclusion of the United Arab Emirates in the visa-free Schengen area

Securing visa-free access to the Schengen area for United Arab Emirates (UAE) citizens is a top priority and a natural
development for the exceptional relations between the EU and the UAE. This can be achieved if the UAE is included in
the Commission’s current proposal (from November 2012) for a list of countries whose nationals can enter the
Schengen area without a visa (Annex II to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001).

The UAE and the EU share important political and security interests, while trade and investment between the UAE, on
the one hand, and the EU and the non-EU Schengen countries, on the other hand, is valued at EUR 50 billion.

In 2012, 1 640 000 EU citizens visited the UAE. The current list of European countries whose nationals are issued a
visa upon arrival in the UAE will be extended to include a further 12 EU Member States. Furthermore, negotiations
are about to be concluded which, from the end of this year, will exempt UAE citizens from visa requirements when
visiting the United Kingdom.

The UAE presents a range of solid, positive and objective arguments for being included in the current Annex II list:
there are no immigration or security concerns, as there are fewer than 1 million holders of UAE passports (which
meet the required technical standards), none of whom has ever been denied a Schengen visa or been detained over
immigration or security concerns. We all know that when UAE citizens visit the Schengen area, they travel mainly for
business, high-end leisure, (private) medical care, or study/education (fully financed and not at the EU’s expense).

Only one other country in the region (Israel) is exempted from the Schengen visa requirements, and only two other
Islamic countries (Brunei and Malaysia) are listed. Even if the UAE case were to be judged on its own merits, the
political message from the EU would therefore have a tremendous impact. Parliament will certainly give wide support
to this measure.

Given that the UAE complies with all relevant and applicable criteria for being granted Annex II status, we think it is
time to act. How does the Council view the inclusion of the UAE in the ongoing revision of the list of countries whose
nationals can access the Schengen area without a visa?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

The Commission proposal to which the Honourable Members refer was issued by the Commission on
7 November 2012 (COM(2012) 650 final — 2012/0309(COD)) and aims to amend Regulation No 539/2001 ( [1] ) by
transferring several third countries from the visa list (Annex I) to the visa-free list (Annex II) and to update that visa
list. In that proposal, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not been included in the list of countries to be transferred
to the visa-free list.

The proposal has been sent by the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council and is currently still
under examination.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of
Member States and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 137

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005897/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) y Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en el listado de países exentos de la obligación de visado para entrar
en el espacio Schengen

Garantizar la entrada al espacio Schengen sin necesidad de visado a los ciudadanos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos es
la evolución natural de la relación excepcional existente entre la UE y este país, así como una de sus máximas
prioridades. Esto se puede conseguir incluyendo a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la propuesta en curso (de
noviembre de 2012) de la Comisión de una lista de países cuyos nacionales están exentos de la obligación de visado
para entrar en el espacio Schengen (anexo II al Reglamento (CE) n° 539/2001 del Consejo).

Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y la UE tienen intereses comunes importantes tanto políticos como en materia de
seguridad, mientras que se calcula que el monto del comercio y la inversión entre los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y los
países del espacio Schengen, tanto de la UE como de fuera de la UE, es de 50 000 millones de euros.

En 2012, 1 640 000 ciudadanos de la UE visitaron los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Se va a ampliar la lista actual de países
europeos a cuyos nacionales se les expide visado al llegar al país para que incluya a doce Estados miembros más de la
UE. Además, están a punto de culminar las negociaciones que permitirán que, a partir de finales de este año, los
ciudadanos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos estén exentos de la obligación de visado cuando visiten el Reino Unido.

Los argumentos a favor de la inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la susodicha lista del anexo II son sólidos,
objetivos e irrebatibles: no plantea problemas de inmigración o seguridad, dado que hay menos de un millón de
titulares del pasaporte de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (que cumple las normas técnicas requeridas), a ninguno de los
cuales se le ha denegado un visado Schengen o se le ha detenido por temas de inmigración o seguridad. Todos
sabemos que, cuando los ciudadanos de este país viajan al espacio Schengen, lo hacen principalmente por motivos de
negocios, ocio de alta calidad, atención médica (privada), o estudios y formación (completamente pagados y sin coste
alguno para la UE).

Solo hay otro país de la zona (Israel) que esté exento de la obligación de visado Schengen, y solo hay dos países
islámicos que figuren en la lista (Brunéi y Malasia). Si bien el caso de los Emiratos Árabes debiera examinarse teniendo
en cuenta solo sus méritos propios, el impacto político del mensaje de la UE sería tremendo. Es indudable que tal
medida recibirá un amplio apoyo por parte del Parlamento.

Dado que los Emiratos Árabes Unidos cumplen los criterios pertinentes y aplicables para ser incluidos en el anexo II,
creemos que ha llegado la hora de actuar. ¿Qué opina la Comisión de la inclusión de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en la
actual revisión de la lista de países cuyos nacionales están exentos de la obligación de visado para entrar en el espacio
Schengen?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión es consciente de los beneficios económicos que la exención de la obligación de visado para los
ciudadanos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) podría aportar a la UE, así como de los riesgos limitados en el
ámbito de la seguridad y la inmigración para el espacio Schengen de una exención de este tipo. No obstante, existe
otro criterio importante, contemplado en los considerandos del Reglamento (CE) n° 539/2001, que se debe tener en
cuenta, a saber, las relaciones exteriores de la UE y las consideraciones de coherencia regional.

C 42 E / 138 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Durante los debates celebrados en el Consejo desde que la Comisión adoptó su propuesta en noviembre de 2012, se
ha puesto de manifiesto que ha aumentado entre los Estados miembros el apoyo de la inclusión de los EAU en la lista
de países sin requisito de visado. El otro colegislador, el Parlamento Europeo, aún no ha dado a conocer su posición
definitiva sobre este tema. El proyecto de informe del ponente no contenía indicación alguna a este respecto. En caso
de que los dos colegisladores se pongan de acuerdo para eximir a los ciudadanos de los EAU de la obligación de
visado, la Comisión podría prestar su apoyo, sin perder de vista por ello el contexto global de las relaciones entre los
EAU y la UE.

La Comisión tiene la intención de proponer, posiblemente en 2014, una revisión más ambiciosa de las listas de los
países cubiertos por el Reglamento sobre obligación de visado (539/2001), en la que se tendrán más en cuenta las
consideraciones económicas. Si los EAU no se incluyeran en la lista de países con exención de visado en el proceso
actual, esta próxima revisión brindará la ocasión de examinar de nuevo el caso de los EAU, así como de otros países
en una situación similar.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 139

_(České znění)_

**Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-005897/13**

**Komisi**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) a Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. května 2013)_

_Předmět:_ Zahrnutí Spojených arabských emirátů do bezvízového schengenského prostoru

Zajištění bezvízového vstupu do schengenského prostoru pro občany Spojených arabských emirátů (SAE) je nejvyšší
prioritou a přirozeným vývojem v oblasti výjimečných vztahů mezi EU a Spojenými arabskými emiráty. Toho lze
dosáhnout v případě, že SAE budou zahrnuty do současného návrhu Komise (z listopadu 2012), kde je uveden
seznam zemí, jejichž státní příslušníci mohou vstoupit do schengenského prostoru bez víza (příloha II nařízení Rady
(ES) č. 539/2001).

SAE a EU mají významné společné politické a bezpečnostní zájmy a obchodní výměny a investice mezi SAE na jedné
straně a EU a zeměmi schengenského prostoru mimo EU na straně druhé jsou odhadovány na přibližně
50 miliard EUR.

V roce 2012 navštívil Spojené arabské emiráty 1 640 000 občanů EU. Aktuální seznam evropských zemí, jejimž
státním příslušníkům jsou vydávána víza po příjezdu do SAE, bude rozšířen o dalších 12 členských států EU. Mimoto
se přibližuje uzavření jednání, jež od konce letošního roku osvobodí občany SAE od vízové povinnosti při návštěvě
Spojeného království.

SAE předkládají pro zařazení na současný seznam v příloze II řadu věrohodných, pozitivních a objektivních
argumentů: neexistují žádné obavy spojené s přistěhovaleckou nebo bezpečnostní politikou, neboť držitelů
cestovních pasů SAE (které splňují požadované technické normy) je méně než 1 milion, žádnému z nich nebylo nikdy
odepřeno vydání víza do schengenského prostoru ani nebyl zadržen v důsledku obav souvisejících s otázkami
přistěhovalectví nebo bezpečnosti. Všichni víme, že občané SAE navštěvují schengenský prostor při cestách za
obchodními účely, zájmovými činnostmi pro náročné, (soukromou) zdravotní péčí nebo studiem/vzděláváním (které
je plně financováno, a to nikoli na náklady EU).

Od vízové povinnosti v rámci schengenského prostoru je osvobozena pouze jedna země v regionu (Izrael) a na tomto
seznamu jsou uvedeny pouze dvě další islámské země (Brunej a Malajsie). I když by měl být případ SAE posuzován
podle skutečných zásluh, politický signál ze strany EU by měl obrovský dopad. Parlament jistě poskytne tomuto
opatření širokou podporu.

Vzhledem k tomu, že SAE splňují veškerá relevantní a platná kritéria pro udělení statusu podle přílohy II, jsme toho
názoru, že nastal čas jednat. Jak Komise pohlíží na zahrnutí SAE do probíhající revize seznamu zemí, jejichž státní
příslušníci mohou vstoupit do schengenského prostoru bez víza?

**Odpověď paní Malmströmové jménem Komise**

_(15. července 2013)_

Komise si je vědoma hospodářského prospěchu, který by mohlo osvobození občanů Spojených arabských emirátů
(SAE) od vízové povinnosti Evropské unii přinést, i toho, že v oblasti bezpečnosti a přistěhovalectví by toto
osvobození představovalo pro schengenský prostor pouze omezené riziko. Existuje však ještě jedno důležité
kritérium zahrnuté v bodech odůvodnění nařízení č. 539/2001, které by se mělo zohlednit, a to vnější vztahy
Evropské unie a důsledky regionální spojitosti.

Během projednávání v Radě poté, co Komise v listopadu 2012 přijala vlastní návrh, se ukázalo, že podpora členských
států ve prospěch přesunu SAE na seznam zemí s bezvízovým stykem vzrostla. Druhý spolutvůrce právních předpisů,
Evropský parlament, ještě k tomuto problému neoznámil své konečné stanovisko. Zpravodaj ve svém návrhu zprávy
v tomto směru nic nenaznačil. Pokud se uvedení dva spolutvůrci právních předpisů shodnou na osvobození občanů
SAE od vízové povinnosti, Komise tento návrh podpoří, ovšem s ohledem na celkový kontext vztahů mezi SAE a EU.

C 42 E / 140 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Komise plánuje podat pravděpodobně v roce 2014 návrh na výraznější revizi seznamů zemí, na které se vztahuje
nařízení o vízech (č. 539/2001), která by měla více zohlednit hospodářské aspekty. Pokud SAE nebudou přesunuty
na seznam zemí s bezvízovým stykem během stávajícího procesu, poskytne tato revize příležitost znovu zvážit
situaci SAE a dalších zemí v podobném postavení.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 141

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005897/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) und Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Aufnahme der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate in den visumfreien Schengen-Raum

Die Gewährung des visumfreien Zugangs zum Schengen-Raum für Bürger der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE)
ist von oberster Priorität und entspricht einer natürlichen Entwicklung in den außergewöhnlichen Beziehungen
zwischen der EU und den VAE. Dafür müssen die VAE in den derzeitigen Vorschlag der Kommission (von
November 2012) für eine Liste der Länder, deren Staatsangehörige ohne Visum in den Schengen-Raum einreisen
dürfen (Anhang II der Verordnung des Rates (EG) Nr. 539/2001), aufgenommen werden.

Die VAE und die EU haben wichtige gemeinsame politische und sicherheitspolitische Interessen, und das Volumen
der Handels‐ und Investitionsströme zwischen den VAE einerseits und der EU und den nicht zur EU gehörigen
Schengen-Staaten andererseits wird auf 50 Mrd. EUR beziffert.

2012 besuchten 1 640 000 EU-Bürger die VAE. Die aktuelle Liste der europäischen Staaten, deren Bürgern bei der
Ankunft in den VAE ein Visum ausgestellt wird, wird um weitere zwölf Mitgliedstaaten erweitert. Darüber hinaus
stehen Verhandlungen über die Befreiung der Bürger der VAE von der Visumpflicht für das Vereinigte Königreich ab
Ende dieses Jahres kurz vor dem Abschluss.

Für eine Aufnahme der VAE in die derzeitige Liste in Anhang II sprechen eine Reihe tragfähiger, positiver und
objektiver Argumente: Es bestehen keine Einwanderungs‐ oder Sicherheitsbedenken, da weniger als eine Million
Menschen Reisepässe der VAE (die die geltenden technischen Normen erfüllen) besitzen; keinem von ihnen wurde
jemals ein Schengen-Visum verweigert, und keiner wurde jemals aus einwanderungsrechtlichen Erwägungen oder aus
Sicherheitsgründen inhaftiert. Wir wissen alle, dass Staatsangehörige der VAE den Schengen-Raum hauptsächlich aus
geschäftlichen Gründen, für Urlaubsreisen im Luxussegment, zur (privaten) Gesundheitsversorgung oder zu
Bildungszwecken (mit vollständiger eigener Finanzierung, die nicht zulasten der EU geht) besuchen.

Nur ein anderes Land dieser Weltregion (Israel) ist von den Visa-Vorschriften im Rahmen von Schengen befreit, und
nur zwei andere islamische Länder (Brunei und Malaysia) stehen auf der Liste. Selbst wenn der Fall der VAE für sich
genommen beurteilt würde, hätte die politische Botschaft der EU eine enorme Wirkung. Im Parlament fände diese
Maßnahme sicher breite Unterstützung.

Da die VAE alle relevanten geltenden Kriterien dafür erfüllen, den in Anhang II vorgesehenen Status zu erlangen,
halten wir die Zeit für gekommen. Wie steht die Kommission zu der Einbeziehung der VAE in die laufende
Überarbeitung der Liste der Länder, deren Staatsangehörige ohne Visum in den Schengen-Raum einreisen dürfen?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Juli 2013)_

Der Kommission ist bewusst, dass die Aufhebung der Visumpflicht für Bürger der VAE wirtschaftliche Vorteile für die
EU mit sich bringen könnte und dass dadurch keine relevanten Einwanderungs‐ und Sicherheitsbedenken für den
Schengen-Raum entstehen würden. Zu beachten sind jedoch weitere Kriterien, wie zum Beispiel die
Außenbeziehungen der EU und die regionale Kohärenz, die in den Erwägungsgründen der Verordnung Nr. 539/2001
aufgeführt sind.

Seit der Annahme des Vorschlags durch die Kommission im November 2012 geht aus den Diskussionen im Rat
hervor, dass sich die Mitgliedstaaten verstärkt für die Aufnahme der VAE in die Liste der visumbefreiten Länder
aussprechen. Als Mitgesetzgeber hat das Europäische Parlament seinen endgültigen Standpunkt zu dieser Frage noch
nicht bekannt gegeben. Im Berichtsentwurf des Berichterstatters sind diesbezüglich keine Angaben enthalten. Sollten
sich die beiden Mitgesetzgeber darauf verständigen, Staatsangehörige der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate von der
Visumpflicht zu befreien, könnte die Kommission diese Entscheidung unterstützen, ohne jedoch den allgemeinen
Kontext der Beziehungen zwischen den VAE und der EU aus den Augen zu verlieren.

C 42 E / 142 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Möglicherweise wird die Kommission im Jahr 2014 eine eingehende Überprüfung der Liste der Länder, die unter die
Visum-Verordnung (EG) Nr. 539/2001 fallen, vorschlagen; dabei würden wirtschaftliche Überlegungen stärker
berücksichtigt werden. Sollten die VAE bei der laufenden Überarbeitung der Liste nicht zum Zuge kommen, könnte
dies bei der nächsten Überarbeitung geschehen. Diese Möglichkeit würde auch für andere Länder bestehen, die sich in
einer ähnlichen Lage befinden.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 143

_(Eestikeelne versioon)_

**Kirjalikult vastatav küsimus E-005897/13**

**komisjonile**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) ja Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. mai 2013)_

_Teema:_ Araabia Ühendemiraatide lisamine riikide nimekirja, mille kodanikud võivad siseneda Schengeni alale ilma
viisata

Araabia Ühendemiraatide (AÜE) kodanikele viisavaba sissepääsu kindlustamine Schengeni alale on esmatähtis
ülesanne ning ELi ja AÜE vaheliste eriliste suhete loomulik areng. See oleks saavutatav, kui AÜE lisatakse komisjoni
viimasesse 2012. aasta novembri ettepanekusse loetelu kohta riikidest, mille kodanikud võivad Schengeni alale
viisavabalt siseneda (nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 539/2001 II lisa).

AÜE ja EL jagavad tähtsaid poliitilisi ja julgeolekualaseid huve, lisaks hinnatakse AÜE ning ELi ja ELi mittekuuluvate
Schengeni ala riikide vaheliste kaubandustehingute ja investeeringute väärtuseks 50 miljardit eurot.

2012. aastal külastas Araabia Ühendemiraate 1 640 000 ELi kodanikku. Kehtivasse Euroopa riikide nimekirja,
mille kodanikele väljastatakse AÜE viisa riiki saabumisel, lisatakse veel 12 ELi liikmesriiki. Samuti on lõppemas
läbirääkimised AÜE kodanike vabastamiseks viisakohustusest Ühendkuningriigi külastamisel alates käesoleva aasta
lõpust.

AÜE lisamiseks määruse II lisas olevasse nimekirja on kindlad, positiivsed ja objektiivsed argumendid: sellega ei
kaasneks immigratsiooni— või julgeolekualaseid probleeme, sest siiani ei ole ühelegi AÜE passi omanikule keeldutud
Schengeni viisat andmast ning ühtegi neist ei ole kinni peetud immigratsiooni— või julgeolekuprobleemide tõttu
(AÜE pass vastab nõutavatele tehnilistele standarditele ning passiomanikke on kokku alla ühe miljoni). Üldiselt on
teada, et AÜE kodanikud külastavad Schengeni ala peamiselt ärilistel põhjustel, luksusliku meelelahutuse, (era-)
meditsiiniteenuste või õppimise/hariduse (täielikult rahastatud ja mitte ELi vahenditest) eesmärkidel.

Selles piirkonnas on ainult üks riik (Iisrael) Schengeni viisakohustusest vabastatud ja nimekirjas leidub vaid kaks teist
islamiriiki (Brunei ja Malaisia). Isegi kui AÜE üle hinnatakse tema enda saavutuste põhjal, võib ELi poliitiline sõnum
tohutut mõju avaldada. Euroopa Parlamendis leiab see meede kindlasti laia toetust.

Arvestades, et AÜE täidab kõiki II lisa staatuse saavutamiseks asjakohaseid ja kohaldatavaid kriteeriumeid, leiame me,
et on aeg tegutseda. Kuidas hindab komisjon AÜE lisamist praegu läbivaadatavasse nimekirja riikidest, mille
kodanikud võivad sisenda Schengeni alale ilma viisata?

**Komisjoni nimel vastanud Cecilia Malmström**

_(15. juuli 2013)_

Komisjon teab, et Araabia Ühendemiraatide kodanikele kehtestatud viisanõude kaotamine annab Euroopa Liidule
majanduslikku kasu, ning on teadlik ka sellest, et sellise erandi kehtestamine kätkeb endas teatavat ohtu Schengeni
alale julgeoleku ja sisserände valdkonnas. Lisaks tuleks arvesse võtta ka määruse (EÜ) nr 539/2001 põhjendustes
esitatud olulist kriteeriumi — ELi välissuheteid ja piirkondlikku ühtsust.

Pärast komisjon ettepaneku vastuvõtmist 2012. aasta novembris toimusid nõukogus arutelud, mille käigus selgus, et
üha rohkem liikmesriike toetab Araabia Ühendemiraatide kandmist viisanõudest vabastatud riikide nimekirja. Teine
kaasseadusandja — Euroopa Parlament — ei ole veel teatanud oma lõplikku seisukohta selles küsimuses. Raportööri
aruande projekt ei sisalda selle kohta mingit teavet. Kui mõlemad kaasseadusandjad jõuavad Araabia
Ühendemiraatide kodanike viisanõudest vabastamise küsimuses ühisele seisukohale, võib ka komisjon seda algatust
toetada, pidades siiski silmas kogu Araabia Ühendemiraatide ja Euroopa Liidu suhete konteksti.

C 42 E / 144 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Majanduslikest kaalutlustest lähtudes kavatseb komisjon tõenäoliselt 2014. aastal teha ettepaneku vaadata põhjalikult
läbi määruses 539/2001 (viisamäärus) esitatud riikide loetelud. Kui Araabia Ühendemiraate ei kanta loetellu praeguse
algatuse tulemusel, saab tema ja teiste samas olukorras olevate riikide küsimust uuesti kaaluda osutatud läbivaatamine
käigus.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 145

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005897/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) και Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ένταξη των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων στον χώρο Σένγκεν ως προς την απαλλαγή από την υποχρέωση θεώρησης

Η εξασφάλιση της εισόδου στους πολίτες Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση συνιστά μείζονα
προτεραιότητα και φυσική εξέλιξη λόγω των εξαιρετικών σχέσεων που υπάρχουν μεταξύ της ΕΕ και των ΗΑΕ. Τούτο μπορεί
να επιτευχθεί εφόσον τα ΗΑΕ περιληφθούν στην πρόταση της Επιτροπής (από τον Νοέμβριο 2012) σχετικά με την
κατάσταση των χωρών οι πολίτες των οποίων μπορούν να εισέλθουν στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση (Παράρτημα ΙΙ στον
Κανονισμό αριθ. (ΕΚ) 539/2001) του Συμβουλίου.

Τα ΗΑΕ και η ΕΕ έχουν μείζονα κοινά ενδιαφέροντα σε επίπεδο πολιτικής και ασφάλειας, ενώ οι συναλλαγές και οι επενδύσεις
μεταξύ των ΗΑΕ, αφενός, και της ΕΕ και των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ που δεν είναι μέλη του χώρου Σένγκεν, αφετέρου,
ανέρχονται σε 50 δις ευρώ.

Το 2012, 1 640 000 πολίτες της ΕΕ επισκέφθηκαν τα ΗΑΕ. Η ισχύουσα κατάσταση των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών για τους πολίτες
των οποίων εκδίδεται θεώρηση άμα τη αφίξει των στα ΗΑΕ θα διευρυνθεί ώστε να περιλάβει και τα 12 νέα κράτη μέλη. Εκτός
αυτού, σύντομα ολοκληρώνονται οι διαπραγματεύσεις ώστε από τα τέλη του τρέχοντος έτους οι πολίτες των ΗΑΕ που
μεταβαίνουν στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο να απαλλάσσονται από την έκδοση θεώρησης.

Τα ΗΑΕ παρουσιάζουν μια σειρά από ισχυρά, θετικά και αντικειμενικά επιχειρήματα προκειμένου να περιληφθούν στην
κατάσταση του ισχύοντος Παραρτήματος ΙΙ: Δεν υφίστανται κίνδυνοι σχετικοί με την μετανάστευση ή την ασφάλεια,
δεδομένου ότι διαθέτουν διαβατήριο ΗΑΕ ολιγότερα του ενός εκατομμυρίου άτομα (πράγμα που ανταποκρίνεται στις
ισχύουσες τεχνικές προϋποθέσεις), σε κανένα από τα οποία δεν απερρίφθη η αίτηση για χορήγηση θεωρήσεως Σένγκεν και
κανένα από τα οποία δεν τέθηκε υπό κράτηση δια λόγους μετανάστευσης ή ασφάλειας. Είναι γνωστόν τοις πάσι ότι όταν οι
πολίτες των ΗΑΕ επισκέπτονται τον χώρο Σένγκεν, ταξιδεύουν κυρίως δια λόγους επαγγελματικούς, τουρισμού (υψηλών
προδιαγραφών), (ιδιωτικής) ιατρικής περίθαλψης, ή σπουδών (πλήρως χρηματοδοτούμενων και όχι με δαπάνες της
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης).

Μία μόνον χώρα της περιοχής (το Ισραήλ) απαλλάσσεται από την υποχρέωση έκδοσης θεώρησης Σένγκεν και μόνον δύο
άλλες ισλαμικές χώρες περιλαμβάνονται στην κατάσταση (το Μπρουνέι και η Μαλαισία). Παρά το γεγονός ότι η περίπτωση
των ΗΑΕ θα έπρεπε να κριθεί αποκλειστικώς επί τη βάσει της αξίας της, το πολιτικό μήνυμα της ΕΕ θα έχει τεράστιο βάρος: Το
Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο θα παράσχει ευρεία υποστήριξη στο μέτρο αυτό.

Δεδομένου ότι τα ΗΑΕ πληρούν όλα απαιτούμενα και εφαρμοζόμενα κριτήρια προκειμένου να ενταχθούν στο καθεστώς του
Παραρτήματος ΙΙ, εκτιμούμε ότι είναι καιρός να προβούμε στις ενδεδειγμένες ενέργειες. Με ποιον τρόπο σκοπεύει η Επιτροπή
να συμπεριλάβει τα ΗΑΕ στην εν εξελίξει αναθεώρηση της κατάστασης των χωρών οι πολίτες των οποίων μπορούν να
εισέρχονται στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση;

**Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(15 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή γνωρίζει τα οικονομικά οφέλη που θα μπορούσε να αποφέρει στην ΕΕ η απαλλαγή των πολιτών των ΗΑΕ από την
υποχρέωση θεώρησης, καθώς και τους περιορισμένους κινδύνους που προκύπτουν από την εν λόγω απαλλαγή στον τομέα
της ασφάλειας και της μετανάστευσης στον χώρο Σένγκεν. Υπάρχει, ωστόσο, ένα άλλο σημαντικό κριτήριο, που
περιλαμβάνεται στις αιτιολογικές σκέψεις του κανονισμού 539/2001, το οποίο θα πρέπει να λαμβάνεται υπόψη, δηλαδή οι
εξωτερικές σχέσεις της ΕΕ και οι επιπτώσεις στην περιφερειακή συνοχή.

C 42 E / 146 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Κατά τη διάρκεια των συζητήσεων στο Συμβούλιο, αφότου η Επιτροπή υπέβαλε την πρότασή της τον Νοέμβριο του 2012,
κατέστη σαφές ότι όλο και περισσότερα κράτη μέλη τάσσονται υπέρ της συμπερίληψης των ΗΑΕ στην κατάσταση των χωρών
οι πολίτες των οποίων μπορούν να εισέλθουν στον χώρο Σένγκεν χωρίς θεώρηση. Ο άλλος συννομοθέτης, το Ευρωπαϊκό
Κοινοβούλιο, δεν έχει ακόμη γνωστοποιήσει την οριστική θέση του σχετικά με το θέμα αυτό. Το σχέδιο έκθεσης του εισηγητή
δεν περιείχε καμία ένδειξη ως προς το θέμα αυτό. Εάν οι δύο συννομοθέτες συμφωνήσουν σχετικά με την απαλλαγή των
πολιτών των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων από την υποχρέωση θεώρησης, η Επιτροπή θα προσφέρει τη στήριξή της χωρίς,
ωστόσο, να παραβλέπει το σφαιρικό πλαίσιο των σχέσεων μεταξύ των ΗΑΕ και της ΕΕ.

Η Επιτροπή προτίθεται να προτείνει — ενδεχομένως το 2014 — μια περισσότερο φιλόδοξη αναθεώρηση της κατάστασης
των χωρών οι πολίτες των οποίων καλύπτονται από τον νέο κανονισμό θεωρήσεων (539/2001), κατά την οποία θα αποδοθεί
μεγαλύτερη βαρύτητα στα οικονομικά ζητήματα. Εάν τα ΗΑΕ δεν συμπεριληφθούν κατά την παρούσα αναθεώρηση, κατά την
επόμενη αναθεώρηση θα δοθεί η ευκαιρία να εξετασθεί η περίπτωση των ΗΑΕ καθώς και άλλων χωρών σε παρόμοια θέση.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 147

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005897/13**

**à la Commission**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR),**
**Filip Kaczmarek (PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE),**
**Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D),**

**Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE),**
**Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D),**

**Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE),**

**Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz (PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE),**

**Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**
**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) et Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Inclusion des Émirats arabes unis (EAU) au programme d'exemption de visa de l'espace Schengen

Garantir un accès sans visa à l'espace Schengen aux citoyens des Émirats arabes unis constitue une priorité majeure et
la suite logique de l'évolution des relations particulières qu'entretiennent l'Union européenne et les EAU. Pour qu'il en
soit ainsi, il faut que les EAU figurent sur la liste, prévue dans la proposition de la Commission (de novembre 2012),
des pays pouvant accéder à l'espace Schengen sans visa (annexe II du règlement (CE) n° 539/2001 du Conseil).

Les EAU et l'Union européenne ont des intérêts communs majeurs en matière de politique et de sécurité; quant aux
échanges et aux investissements entre les EAU, d'une part, et l'Union européenne et les États membres de l'Union
européenne non membres de l'espace Schengen, d'autre part, ils sont de l'ordre de 50 milliards d'euros.

En 2012, 1 640 000 citoyens de l'Union européenne se sont rendus aux EAU. Douze nouveaux États membres
viendront compléter la liste actuelle des pays européens dont les ressortissants reçoivent un visa à leur arrivée aux
EAU. Par ailleurs, les négociations sur l'exemption de visas pour les citoyens des EAU se rendant au Royaume-Uni, qui
devrait être mise en place dès la fin de cette année, sont sur le point de s'achever.

Les EAU peuvent faire valoir une série d'arguments solides, positifs et objectifs, afin de motiver leur inclusion dans la
liste actuelle de l'annexe II: il n'y a aucun risque en matière d'immigration ou de sécurité, puisque moins d'un million
de citoyens des EAU possèdent un passeport (répondant aux normes techniques en vigueur) et qu'aucun d'entre eux
ne s'est vu refuser un visa Schengen ou n'a été placé en détention préventive pour des raisons de sécurité ou
d'immigration. Nous savons tous que, lorsque des citoyens des EAU se rendent dans l'espace Schengen, ils le font
principalement dans le cadre de leurs activités professionnelles, du tourisme haut de gamme, de soins médicaux
(privés) ou de leurs études (financées dans leur intégralité et non aux frais de l'Union européenne).

Un seul pays de la région (Israël) est exempté de visa Schengen et seuls deux autres pays musulmans figurent sur la
liste (le Brunei et la Malaisie). Même si le cas des EAU doit être considéré sur les seuls critères de mérite, le message
politique que l'Union ferait passer aurait dès lors une incidence considérable. Il ne fait aucun doute que le Parlement
européen soutiendra largement cette mesure.

Étant donné que les EAU répondent à tous les critères pertinents et applicables pour se voir conférer le statut défini à
l'annexe II, le moment est venu d'agir.

Quelle est la position de la Commission quant à l'intégration des EAU dans la liste actuellement à l'examen des pays
pouvant accéder à l'espace Schengen sans visa?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Malmström au nom de la Commission**

_(15 juillet 2013)_

La Commission est consciente des avantages économiques que l'exemption de l'obligation de visa pour les citoyens
des Émirats arabes unis (EAU) pourrait procurer à l'UE, ainsi que des risques limités en matière de sécurité et
d'immigration que cette exemption représenterait pour l'espace Schengen. Il y a toutefois lieu de prendre en
considération un autre critère important, mentionné dans les considérants du règlement (CE) n° 539/2001, à savoir
les relations extérieures de l'UE et les implications de la cohérence régionale.

C 42 E / 148 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Au cours des discussions qui se sont tenues au Conseil depuis que la Commission a adopté sa proposition en
novembre 2012, il est clairement apparu que les États membres étaient de plus en plus favorables au transfert des
EAU sur la liste des pays non soumis à une obligation de visa. L'autre colégislateur, le Parlement européen, n'a pas
encore fait connaître son avis définitif sur la question, et le projet de rapport du rapporteur ne contenait aucune
indication à cet égard. Si les deux colégislateurs venaient à s'accorder sur l'exemption de l'obligation de visa pour les
citoyens des Émirats arabes unis, la Commission pourrait également y être favorable, sans toutefois perdre de vue le
contexte global des relations entre les EAU et l'UE.

La Commission a l'intention de proposer, si possible en 2014, une révision plus ambitieuse des listes de pays couverts
par le règlement (CE) n° 539/2001 sur les visas, qui permettrait de mieux prendre en compte les préoccupations
économiques. Si les EAU ne sont pas transférés sur la liste des pays non soumis à une obligation de visa dans le cadre
du processus en cours, la révision que proposera la Commission sera l'occasion de réexaminer le cas des EAU, ainsi
que celui d'autres pays dans une situation similaire.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 149

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005897/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) e Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Inclusione degli Emirati Arabi Uniti nell'esenzione dal visto per lo spazio Schengen

Garantire l'accesso senza visto allo spazio Schengen per i cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti (EAU) è una priorità
fondamentale e il naturale sviluppo delle relazioni particolari instauratesi tra l'UE e gli Emirati Arabi Uniti. A questo
scopo, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti dovrebbero essere inclusi nell'elenco dei paesi i cui cittadini possono entrare nello
spazio Schengen senza visto (allegato II del regolamento del Consiglio (CE) n. 539/2001) proposto dalla
Commissione a novembre 2012.

Gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e l'UE condividono importanti interessi politici e di sicurezza, e gli scambi commerciali e gli
investimenti tra gli Emirati Arabi Uniti, da una parte, e l'Unione europea e gli Stati membri dell'UE che non fanno
parte dello spazio Schengen, dall'altra, ammontano a 50 miliardi di euro.

Nel 2012, 1 640 000 cittadini dell'UE hanno visitato gli Emirati Arabi Uniti. Dodici nuovi Stati membri dell'UE
andranno ad aggiungersi all'elenco attuale dei paesi europei ai cui cittadini viene rilasciato un visto all'arrivo negli
Emirati Arabi Uniti. Si stanno inoltre concludendo negoziati in virtù dei quali, dalla fine di quest'anno, i cittadini degli
Emirati Arabi Uniti che intendono visitare il Regno Unito saranno esentati dal visto.

Gli Emirati Arabi Uniti vantano una serie di argomenti solidi, positivi e obiettivi ai fini dell'inclusione nell'attuale
elenco dell'allegato II: non sussistono problemi in materia di sicurezza o d'immigrazione, poiché meno di 1 milione di
cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti possiede un passaporto (rispondente alle norme tecniche in vigore), e nessuno di
essi si è mai visto negare un visto Schengen o è stato arrestato per problemi di immigrazione o di sicurezza. È
generalmente noto che quando i cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti visitano lo spazio Schengen, viaggiano
principalmente per lavoro, turismo di alta gamma, cure mediche (private), o per motivi di studio/formazione
(interamente finanziati e non a spese dell'UE).

Un solo altro paese della regione (Israele) è esentato dal visto per lo spazio Schengen, e solo due altri paesi islamici
(Brunei e Malesia) sono inclusi nell'elenco. Sebbene il caso degli Emirati Arabi Uniti vada valutato esclusivamente in
base al criterio del merito, il messaggio politico da parte dell'UE avrebbe comunque un impatto considerevole. Il
Parlamento darà senz'altro ampio sostegno a tale misura.

Dato che gli Emirati Arabi Uniti riuniscono tutti i criteri rilevanti e applicabili per ottenere lo status di cui all'allegato
II, si ritiene che sia giunto il momento di agire. Ciò premesso, qual è la posizione della Commissione sull'inclusione
degli Emirati Arabi Uniti nell'ambito dell'attuale revisione dell'elenco dei paesi i cui cittadini possono accedere allo
spazio Schengen senza visto?

**Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione**

_(15 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione è consapevole dei benefici economici che l'esenzione dall'obbligo del visto per i cittadini degli EAU
apporterebbe all'UE, come pure dei rischi limitati nel settore della sicurezza e dell'immigrazione per lo spazio
Schengen derivanti da tale esenzione. Vi è tuttavia è un altro importante criterio inserito nei considerando del
regolamento (CE) n. 539/2001 da prendere in considerazione, e cioè quello delle relazioni esterne dell'UE e delle
implicazioni di coerenza regionale.

C 42 E / 150 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Successivamente all'adozione della proposta della Commissione nel novembre 2012, è risultato evidente nelle
discussioni in sede di Consiglio che tra gli Stati membri è cresciuto il sostegno a favore dell'inclusione degli EAU
nell'elenco dei paesi esonerati dall'obbligo di visto. L'altro colegislatore, il Parlamento europeo, non ha ancora reso
nota la propria posizione definitiva in proposito. Il progetto di relazione del relatore non conteneva alcuna
indicazione al riguardo. Qualora i due colegislatori concordassero nell'esentare i cittadini degli Emirati Arabi Uniti
dall'obbligo del visto, la Commissione potrebbe fornire il suo sostegno senza per questo perdere di vista il contesto
generale delle relazioni fra gli EAU e l'UE.

La Commissione intende proporre, eventualmente nel 2014, una revisione più ambiziosa degli elenchi di paesi
contemplati dal regolamento (CE) n. 539/2001 sui visti che tenga maggiormente conto di considerazioni di ordine
economico. Qualora gli EAU non fossero inclusi nell'elenco in questa occasione, tale prossima revisione offrirà
l'opportunità di valutare nuovamente il caso degli EAU, come anche quello di altri paesi in situazione analoga.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 151

_(Latviešu valodas versija)_

**Jautājums, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski, E-005897/13**

**Komisijai**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) un Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013. gada 27. maijs)_

_Temats:_ Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu iekļaušana bezvīzu Šengenas zonā

Ņemot vērā īpašās ES un Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu (AAE) attiecības, ir ļoti svarīgi un loģiski nodrošināt AAE
pilsoņiem tiesības ieceļot Šengenas zonā bez vīzas. To var panākt, ja AAE tiek iekļauta Komisijas pašreizējā
priekšlikumā (iesniegts 2012. gada novembrī), kurā paredzēts to valstu saraksts, kuru valstspiederīgie var ieceļot
Šengenas zonā bez vīzas (Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 539/2001 II pielikums).

AAE un ES vieno svarīgas politiskās un drošības intereses, kamēr tiek lēsts, ka tirdzniecība un ieguldījumi, no vienas
puses, starp AAE, un, no otras puses, starp ES un tām Šengenas zonas valstīm, kuras nav ES dalībvalstis, sasniedz
EUR 50 miljardus.

AAE 2012. gadā apmeklēja 1 640 000 ES pilsoņu. Pašreizējais saraksts ar Eiropas valstīm, kuru valstspiederīgajiem
tiek izsniegta vīza, ierodoties AAE, tiks papildināts, iekļaujot vēl 12 citas ES dalībvalstis. Turklāt drīz tiks pabeigtas
sarunas, kuru rezultātā no šā gada beigām AAE pilsoņiem netiks pieprasīta vīza, apmeklējot Apvienoto Karalisti.

AAE piedāvā nopietnus, pozitīvus un objektīvus argumentus savai iekļaušanai pašreizējā II pielikuma sarakstā –
nepastāv imigrācijas vai drošības problēmas, jo AAE pasu (kas atbilst attiecīgajiem tehniskajiem standartiem) turētāju
skaits nesasniedz 1 miljonu, neviena no šīm personām nekad nav saņēmusi Šengenas vīzas atteikumu, ne arī tikusi
aizturēta imigrācijas vai drošības jautājumu dēļ. Visiem ir zināms, ka AAE pilsoņi apmeklē Šengenas zonu pamatā
uzņēmējdarbības, augstas klases atpūtas, (privātās) medicīniskās aprūpes vai studiju/izglītības (kas tiek pilnībā
finansēta un nav jāapmaksā ES) dēļ.

Šajā reģionā tikai vēl viena valsts – Izraēla – ir atbrīvota no vīzu prasības ieceļošanai Šengenas zonā, un sarakstā ir
iekļautas vēl divas citas islāma valstis, proti, Bruneja un Malaizija. Pat tad, ja AAE gadījumu tiktu vērtēts tikai pēc šīs
valsts nopelniem, ES politiskās vēsts ietekme būtu milzīga. Parlaments noteikti šim pasākumam sniegs plašu atbalstu.

Tā kā AAE atbilst visiem attiecīgajiem un piemērojamiem kritērijiem, lai piešķirtu II pielikumā paredzēto statusu, mēs
uzskatām, ka ir pienācis laiks rīkoties. Kāds ir Komisijas viedoklis par to, vai iekļaut AAE, pārskatot sarakstu ar
valstīm, kuru valstspiederīgie var ieceļot Šengenas zonā bez vīzas?

**Atbildi Komisijas vārdā sniedza Sesīlija Malmstrēma**

_(2013. gada 15. jūlijs)_

Komisija apzinās ekonomiskās priekšrocības, ko ES varētu iegūt, ja AAE pilsoņi būtu atbrīvoti no pienākuma saņemt
vīzu, kā arī šāda atbrīvojuma radīto nelielo risku Šengenas zonai drošības un imigrācijas jomā. Tomēr ir vēl viens
svarīgs kritērijs, kas iekļauts Regulas 539/2001 apsvērumos un kas ir jāņem vērā, proti, ES ārējās attiecības un
reģionālās vienotības prasība.

Kopš brīža, kad Komisija pieņēma priekšlikumu 2012. gada novembrī, apspriedēs Padomē ir kļuvis skaidrs, ka ir
pieaudzis to dalībvalstu skaits, kas atbalsta AAE iekļaušanu to valstu sarakstā, uz kurām attiecas bezvīzu režīms. Otrs
likumdevējs – Eiropas Parlaments – vēl nav paudis noteiktu nostāju šajā jautājumā. Referenta ziņojuma projektā
netika ietvertas norādes par šo jautājumu. Ja abi likumdevēji vienosies par Apvienoto Arābu Emirātu pilsoņu
atbrīvošanu no pienākuma saņemt vīzu, Komisija varētu to atbalstīt, vienlaikus ņemot vērā AAE un ES attiecību
vispārējo kontekstu.

C 42 E / 152 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Komisija ir iecerējusi ierosināt – iespējams, 2014. gadā – vērienīgāku valstu sarakstu pārskatīšanu, uz ko attiecas vīzu
regula (539/2001), labāk ņemot vērā ekonomiskos apsvērumus. Ja AAE netiks iekļauti bezvīzu režīma valstu sarakstā
pašreizējā procesā, minētā nākamā pārskatīšana sniegs iespēju atkārtoti izvērtēt jautājumu saistībā ar AAE un citām
valstīm, kas ir līdzīgā situācijā.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 153

_(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)_

**Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-005897/13**

**Komisijai**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) ir Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013 m. gegužės 27 d.)_

_Tema:_ Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų įtraukimas į bevizę Šengeno erdvę

Galimybės be vizos atvykti į Šengeno erdvę Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų (JAE) piliečiams užtikrinimas yra išskirtinių ES ir
JAE santykių didžiausias prioritetas ir natūrali išdava. Tai galima pasiekti įtraukus JAE į dabartinį Komisijos pasiūlymą
(2012 m. lapkričio mėn.) dėl šalių, kurių piliečiai gali atvykti į Šengeno erdvę be vizų, sąrašo (Tarybos reglamento (EB)
Nr. 539/2001 II priedas).

JAE ir ES turi bendrų svarbių politinių ir saugumo interesų, o JAE ir ES bei ES nepriklausančių Šengeno erdvės šalių
tarpusavio prekybos ir investicijų vertė siekia 50 mlrd. EUR.

2012 m. 1 640 000 ES piliečių apsilankė JAE. Dabartinis Europos šalių, kurių piliečiams viza išduodama atvykus į
JAE, sąrašas bus papildytas dar 12 ES valstybių narių. Be to, greitai bus užbaigtos derybos, kuriose bus susitarta, jog
nuo šių metų pabaigos į Jungtinę Karalystę vykstantiems JAE piliečiams nebereikės vizų.

Siekdami būti įtraukti į dabartinį II priedo sąrašą JAE pateikia įvairių tvirtų, pozityvių ir objektyvių argumentų: jokių
imigracijos ar saugumo problemų, nes JAE pasus (atitinkančius būtinus techninius standartus) turi mažiau kaip
milijonas žmonių, kurių nė vienam nebuvo atsakyta išduoti Šengeno vizą ir kurių nė vienas nebuvo sulaikytas dėl
imigracijos ar saugumo problemų. Žinome, jog JAE piliečiai atvyksta į Šengeno erdvę daugiausia verslo reikalais,
aukštos klasės poilsio, (privačios) medicinos paslaugų ar studijuoti (visiškai finansuojami, o ne ES lėšomis).

Vienintelei to regiono šaliai (Izraeliui) netaikomas Šengeno vizos reikalavimas ir tik dvi kitos islamiškos šalys
(Brunėjus ir Malaizija) yra įtrauktos į sąrašą. Net jei JAE atvejis turėtų būti vertinamas atsižvelgiant į šalies pasiekimus,
ES politinis požiūris turėtų didžiulį poveikį. Parlamentas neabejotinai tvirtai paremtų šią priemonę.

Kadangi JAE atitinka visus susijusius taikomus kriterijus, kad jiems būtų suteiktas II priede numatytas statusas,
manome, jog atėjo metas imtis veiksmų. Ką Komisija mano dėl JAE įtraukimo į peržiūrimą šalių, kurių piliečiai gali
atvykti į Šengeno erdvę be vizų, sąrašą?

**C. Malmström atsakymas Komisijos vardu**

_(2013 m. liepos 15 d.)_

Komisija žino apie ekonominę naudą, kurią ES galėtų gauti, jeigu panaikintų vizų reikalavimą JAE piliečiams, ir apie
nedidelę saugumo bei imigracijos sričių riziką Šengeno erdvei, susijusią su tokiu panaikinimu. Tačiau yra kitas
svarbus į Reglamento Nr. 539/2001 konstatuojamąsias dalis įtrauktas kriterijus, į kurį būtina atsižvelgti, t. y. ES išorės
santykiai ir poveikis regioninei sąveikai.

Nuo to laiko, kai Komisija 2012 m. lapkričio mėn. priėmė pasiūlymą, per diskusijas Taryboje paaiškėjo, kad valstybės
narės palankiau žvelgia į JAE perkėlimą į bevizio režimo sąrašą. Kita teisėkūros institucija – Europos Parlamentas –
dar nepareiškė savo galutinės nuomonės dėl šio klausimo. Pranešėjo ataskaitos projekte šiuo atžvilgiu nieko
nepasakyta. Jeigu abi teisėkūros institucijos susitars panaikinti vizų reikalavimą Jungtinių Arabų Emyratų piliečiams,
Komisija galėtų šiam sprendimui pritarti, tačiau atsižvelgdama į bendrą JAE ir ES santykių kontekstą.

Komisija ketina siūlyti (tikriausiai 2014 m.) išsamesnę šalių, kurioms taikomas vizų reglamentas (539/2001), sąrašų
peržiūrą, per kurią bus labiau atsižvelgiama į ekonomines aplinkybes. Jeigu JAE, vykstant dabartiniam procesui, nebus
perkelti į kitą sąrašą, per ateinančią peržiūrą bus galima dar kartą apsvarstyti JAE atvejį ir taip pat išnagrinėti kitų šalių,
kurių padėtis yra panaši, atvejus.

C 42 E / 154 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-005897/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) és Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(2013. május 27.)_

_Tárgy:_ Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek felvétele a vízummentes schengeni övezetbe

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek állampolgárai részére a schengeni övezetbe történő vízummentes beutazás biztosítása
kiemelt fontosságú cél, és az EU és az Egyesült Arab Emírségek közötti kivételes kapcsolat természetes
következménye. Ez megvalósítható azáltal, ha az Egyesült Arab Emírségek bekerül a Bizottság jelenlegi (2012.
novemberi), azon országok listájára irányuló javaslatába, amelyek állampolgárai vízum nélkül léphetnek be a
schengeni övezetbe (az 539/2001/EK tanácsi rendelet II. melléklete).

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek és az EU fontos közös politikai és biztonsági érdekekkel bír, miközben az egyrészről az
Egyesült Arab Emírségek, másrészről az EU és az EU-n kívüli, schengeni övezethez tartozó országok közötti
kereskedelem és beruházások értéke 50 milliárd euró.

2012-ben 1 640 000 uniós polgár utazott az Egyesült Arab Emírségekbe. További 12 uniós tagállammal kibővítésre
kerül majd azon európai országok jelenlegi listája, amelyek állampolgárai az Egyesült Arab Emírségekbe való
megérkezéskor kapnak vízumot. Ezenfelül lezárásukhoz közelednek azok a tárgyalások, amelyek ez év végétől
kezdődően mentesítik az Egyesült Arab Emírségek állampolgárait a vízumkötelezettség alól az Egyesült Királyságba
való belépéskor.

Az Egyesült Arab Emírségek vonatkozásában számos szilárd, pozitív és tárgyilagos érvvel lehet alátámasztani a II.
mellékletben szereplő jelenlegi listára való felvételt: nincsenek bevándorlási vagy biztonsági aggályok, hiszen
kevesebb mint 1 millióan rendelkeznek az Egyesült Arab Emírségek útlevelével (amely megfelel a szükséges technikai
előírásoknak), akik közül még soha senkitől nem került megtagadásra a schengeni vízum, illetve nem kerültek
őrizetbe vételre bevándorlási vagy biztonsági aggályok miatt. Mindannyian tudjuk, hogy amikor az Egyesült Arab
Emírségek állampolgárai belépnek a schengeni térségbe, főleg üzleti, magas színvonalú szabadidős,
(magán-)egészségügyi ellátási vagy tanulmányi/oktatási célból utaznak (amely teljes körűen finanszírozásra kerül, és
nem az EU költségére).

A térségben csak egy másik ország (Izrael) mentesül a schengeni vízumkötelezettség alól, illetve két egyéb iszlám
ország (Brunei és Malajzia) szerepel a listán. Még ha az Egyesült Arab Emírségek esete saját érdemei alapján kerülne is
megítélésre, az EU-tól érkező politikai üzenet ezért óriási hatással járna. A Parlament minden bizonnyal széles körűen
támogatni fogja ezt az intézkedést.

Mivel az Egyesült Arab Emírségek megfelel a II. melléklet szerinti státusz megadásához szükséges minden lényeges és
alkalmazandó feltételnek, úgy gondoljuk, hogy ideje cselekedni. Hogyan látja a Bizottság az Egyesült Arab Emírségek
bevonását azon országok listájának folyamatban lévő felülvizsgálatába, amelyek állampolgárai vízum nélkül
léphetnek be a schengeni övezetbe?

**Cecilia Malmström válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. július 15.)_

A Bizottság tisztában van azzal, milyen gazdasági előnyöket biztosíthat az EU számára az Egyesült Arab Emírségek
állampolgárainak vízumkötelezettség alóli mentesítése, akárcsak azzal, hogy e mentesítés korlátozott biztonsági és
bevándorlási kockázattal jár a schengeni övezet tekintetében. Mindazonáltal figyelembe kell venni egy másik fontos
kritériumot is, amely az 539/2001/EK rendelet preambulumbekezdéseiben található, és az Európai Uniónak
harmadik országokkal fenntartott külkapcsolataival és a regionális összefüggésekkel kapcsolatos.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 155

A bizottsági javaslat 2012. novemberi elfogadását követően a Tanácsban folytatott megbeszélésekből egyértelművé
vált, hogy a tagállamok fokozott mértékben támogatják az Egyesült Arab Emírségeknek a vízummentes listára való
felvételét. A másik társjogalkotó, az Európai Parlament eddig még nem ismertette a kérdéssel kapcsolatos végleges
álláspontját. Az előadó jelentéstervezete erre vonatkozó utalást nem tartalmazott. Amennyiben a két társjogalkotó
megegyezésre jut az Egyesült Arab Emírségek állampolgárainak vízumkötelezettség alóli mentesítéséről, a Bizottság
támogathatja ezt a kezdeményezést, mindazonáltal szem előtt kell tartania az Egyesült Arab Emírségek és az EU
közötti kapcsolatok általános vonatkozásait is.

A Bizottság tervei szerint – valószínűleg 2014-ben – a vízumrendelet részét képező országlisták ambiciózusabb
felülvizsgálatára tesz javaslatot, amelyben jobban figyelembe veszi majd a gazdasági szempontokat. Ha az Egyesült
Arab Emírségek esetleg nem kerül át a megfelelő listára a jelenlegi eljárás keretében, a következő felülvizsgálat
lehetőséget biztosít – hasonló helyzetű egyéb országok mellett – az Egyesült Arab Emírségek esetének újbóli
mérlegelésére is.

C 42 E / 156 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Verżjoni Maltija)_

**Mistoqsija għal tweġiba bil-miktub E-005897/13**

**lill-Kummissjoni**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) u Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 ta' Mejju 2013)_

_Suġġett:_ L-inklużjoni tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża.

L-iżgurar ta’ aċċess mingħajr viża għaż-Żona Schengen għaċ-ċittadini tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda (UAE) hu priorità
għolja u żvilupp naturali għar-relazzjonijiet eċċezzjonali bejn l-UE u l-UAE. Dan jista’ jinkiseb jekk l-EGħM ikunu
inklużi fil-proposta ta’ bħalissa tal-Kummissjoni (minn Novembru 2012) għal elenku ta’ pajjiżi li n-nazzjonali
tagħhom jistgħu jidħlu fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża (Anness II għar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001).

L-EGħM u l-UE jikkondividu interessi importanti politiċi u ta’ sigurtà, filwaqt li l-kummerċ u l-investiment bejn lEGħM, mill-banda l-waħda, u l-UE u l-pajjiżi mhux membri tal-UE imma fix-Schengen, mill-banda l-oħra, għandu
valur ta’ EUR 50 biljun.

Fl-2012, 1, 640, 000 ċittadin tal-UE żaru l-EGħM. L-elenku kurrenti ta’ pajjiżi Ewropej li n-nazzjonali tagħhom
jingħataw viża meta jaslu fl-EGħM se jitwessa’ biex jinkorpora 12-il Stat Membru ieħor tal-UE. Inoltre, daqt se jiġu
konklużi n-negozjati li, mill-aħħar ta’ din is-sena, se jeżentaw liċ-ċittadini tal-EGħM mir-rekwiżiti tal-viża meta jżuru
r-Renju Unit.

L-EGħM jippreżentaw firxa ta’ argumenti solidi, pożittivi u oġġettiva għall-inklużjoni fl-elenku kurrenti tal-Anness II:
ma hemmx tħassib ta’ immigrazzjoni jew sigurtà, billi hemm anqas minn miljun detentur ta’ passaporti tal-EGħM (li
jissodisfaw l-istandards tekniċi rikjesti), u l-ebda wieħed minnhom qatt ma ġiet miċħuda lilu viża Schengen jew qatt
ma ġie detenut dwar kwestjonijiet marbutin mal-immigrazzjoni jew mas-sigurtà. Ilkoll nafu li meta ċ-ċittadini talEGħM jżuru ż-Żona Schengen, dawn ikunu qed jivvjaġġaw l-aktar għan-negozju, għall-pjaċir b'infiq għoli, għal kura
medika (privata), jew għal skopijiet ta' studju/edukazzjoni (kompletament iffinanzjati u mhux akariku tal-UE).

Hemm biss pajjiż wieħed ieħor fir-reġjun (Iżrael) li hu eżenti mir-rekwiżiti viża ta' Schengen, u żewġ pajjiżi Iżlamiċi
oħra biss (Brunej u l-Malażja) li huma elenkati. Ukoll kieku l-każ tal-EGħM ikun iġġudikat fuq il-merti tiegħu biss, ilmessaġġ politiku mill-UE għal dawn ir-raġunijiet ikollu impatt enormi. Il-Parlament m’hemmx dubju li se jappoġġja
bil-kbir din il-miżura.

Billi l-EGħM jottemperaw ruħhom mall-kriterji kollha relevanti u applikabbli għall-għoti ta’ Status Anness II, naħsbu
li wasal iż-żmien li wieħed jaġixxi. Kif taraha l-Kummissjoni l-inklużjoni tal-EGħM fir-reviżjoni li għaddejja bħalissa
tal-elenku tal-pajjiżi li n-nazzjonali tagħhom jistgħu jidħlu fiż-Żona Schengen mingħajr viża?

**Tweġiba mogħtija mis-Sinjura Malmström f'isem il-Kummissjoni**

_(15 ta' Lulju 2013)_

Il-Kummissjoni hija konxja mill-benefiċċji ekonomiċi li l-eżenzjoni mill-obbligu tal-viża għaċ-ċittadini tal-Emirati
Għarab Magħquda tista' tagħti lill-UE, kif ukoll mir-riskji limitati fil-qasam tas-sigurtà u l-immigrazzjoni għaż-żona
Schengen li jirriżultaw minn tali eżenzjoni. Hemm, madankollu, kriterju importanti ieħor, inkluż fil-premessi tarRegolament 539/2001, li għandu jitqies jiġifieri r-relazzjonijiet esterni tal-UE u l-implikazzjonijiet ta’ koerenza
reġjonali.

Matul id-diskussjonijiet fil-Kunsill minn meta l-Kummissjoni adottat il-proposta tagħha f’Novembru 2012, ħareġ biċċar li l-appoġġ fost l-Istati Membri għat-trasferiment tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda fil-lista ta' bla viża kiber. Ilkoleġiżlatur l-ieħor, il-Parlament Ewropew, għadu ma rrivelax il-pożizzjoni definittiva tiegħu dwar din il-kwistjoni. Labbozz tar-rapport tar-relatur ma kien fih l-ebda indikazzjoni f’dan ir-rigward. Jekk iż-żewġ koleġiżlaturi jaqblu fuq leżenzjoni taċ-ċittadini tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda mill-obbligu tal-viża, il-Kummissjoni tista’ tkun ta’ appoġġ,
mingħajr, ma tinsa madankollu il-kuntest globali tar-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda u l-UE.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 157

Il-Kummissjoni bi ħsiebha tipproponi — possibilment fl-2014 — reviżjoni aktar ambizzjuża tal-listi ta’ pajjiżi koperti
mir-regolament tal-viża (539/2001), li għandha tieħu kont aħjar tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ekonomiċi. Jekk l-Emirati
Għarab Magħquda ma jiġux trasferiti fil-proċess preżenti, ir-reviżjoni li jmiss se tipprovdi opportunità biex il-każ talEmirati Għarab Magħquda jiġi kkunsidrat mill-ġdid, flimkien ma' dak ta’ pajjiżi oħra f’pożizzjoni simili.

C 42 E / 158 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005897/13**

**do Komisji**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) oraz Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Włączenie Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich do bezwizowej strefy Schengen

Zapewnienie obywatelom Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich (ZEA) bezwizowego dostępu do strefy Schengen to
nadrzędny priorytet, a zarazem naturalny postęp w kształtowaniu wyjątkowych stosunków między UE a ZEA. Będzie
to osiągalne, jeśli ZEA w ramach obecnego wniosku Komisji zostaną wpisane (od listopada 2012 r.) do wykazu
krajów, których obywatele mogą bez wizy przekraczać terytorium strefy Schengen (załącznik II do rozporządzenia
Rady (WE) nr 539/2001).

Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie i UE łączą ważne interesy polityczne i kwestie bezpieczeństwa, natomiast handel
i inwestycje między ZEA a UE i państwami spoza strefy Schengen wycenia się na 50 mld EUR.

W 2012 r. ZEA odwiedziło 1 640 000 obywateli UE. Obowiązujący wykaz państw europejskich, których obywatele
otrzymują wizę w momencie przyjazdu do ZEA, zostanie uzupełniony o kolejne 12 państw członkowskich UE.
Ponadto dobiegają końca negocjacje, dzięki którym wraz z upływem tego roku, obywatele ZEA będą zwolnieni
z obowiązku wizowego podczas wizyty w Zjednoczonym Królestwie.

Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie przedstawiły rzetelne, pozytywne i obiektywne argumenty przemawiające za
wpisaniem ich do zawartego w załączniku II wykazu: nie istnieją żadne powody do obaw związanych z kwestią
bezpieczeństwa czy imigracji, ponieważ do posiadaczy paszportów ZEA zalicza się niespełna 1 mln osób (co spełnia
normy techniczne), z których żadnej nie odmówiono dotychczas wizy do strefy Schengen ani nie zatrzymano
z powodów imigracyjnych czy bezpieczeństwa. Powszechnie wiadomo, że obywatele ZEA przyjeżdżają do krajów
należących do strefy Schengen głównie w celach biznesowych, aby skorzystać z luksusowej oferty turystycznej,
z (prywatnej) opieki medycznej lub aby studiować/kształcić się (przy czym pełne koszty tej nauki nie są ponoszone
przez UE tylko przez samych zainteresowanych).

Jedynie jeden kraj z tego regionu (Izrael) jest zwolniony ze spełniania wymogów wizowych systemu Schengen,
natomiast w wykazie widnieją tylko dwa kraje islamskie (Brunei i Malezja). Nawet jeśli przypadek ZEA należy oceniać
wyłącznie w oparciu o ustalone kryteria, to sygnał polityczny UE będzie miał potężny wydźwięk. Parlament
z pewnością udzieli szerokiego poparcia w tej sprawie.

Biorąc pod uwagę, że ZEA spełniają wszelkie istotne i obowiązujące kryteria niezbędne do wpisania ich do wykazu
państw w ramach załącznika II, uważamy, że nadszedł czas na podjęcie działań. Jak Komisja postrzega włączenie
ZEA do aktualizowanego obecnie wykazu państw, których obywatele mogą wjeżdżać do strefy Schengen bez wizy?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Cecilię Malmström w imieniu Komisji**

_(15 lipca 2013 r.)_

Komisja zdaje sobie sprawę z potencjalnych korzyści gospodarczych dla UE wynikających ze zwolnienia
z obowiązku wizowego obywateli Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich, jak również z ograniczonego ryzyka
w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i imigracji z tym związanym dla strefy Schengen. Jest jednak inne ważne kryterium,
zawarte w motywach rozporządzenia (WE) nr 539/2001, które powinno zostać wzięte pod uwagę, mianowicie
stosunki zewnętrzne UE oraz konsekwencje dla spójności regionalnej.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 159

Podczas dyskusji w Radzie, które miały miejsce po przyjęciu wniosku przez Komisję w listopadzie 2012 r., stało się
jasne, że wzrosło poparcie państw członkowskich dla dodania ZEA do wykazu państw, których obywatele nie są
objęci wymogiem wizowym. Drugi współprawodawca, Parlament Europejski, nie przekazał jeszcze swojego
ostatecznego stanowiska w tej kwestii. Projekt sprawozdania sprawozdawcy nie zawierał jakichkolwiek wskazań
w tym zakresie. Jeżeli obaj współprawodawcy porozumieją się w sprawie zwolnienia z obowiązku wizowego
obywateli Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich, Komisja mogłaby poprzeć takie rozwiązanie, nie zapominając
jednak o ogólnym kontekście stosunków między ZEA a UE.

Komisja zamierza zaproponować – prawdopodobnie w 2014 r. – bardziej ambitny przegląd wykazu państw objętych
rozporządzeniem wizowym (nr 539/2001), który przyczyniłby się do lepszego uwzględnienia uwarunkowań
gospodarczych. Jeżeli status Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich nie zostanie zmieniony w bieżącym procesie,
kolejny przegląd będzie okazją do ponownego rozważenia przypadku ZEA oraz innych krajów znajdujących się
w podobnej sytuacji.

C 42 E / 160 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005897/13**

**à Comissão**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) e Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Inclusão dos Emirados Árabes Unidos na lista de países isentos da obrigação de visto para entrar no espaço
Schengen

A garantia de acesso ao espaço Schengen com isenção de visto para os cidadãos dos Emirados Árabes Unidos (EAU) é
uma prioridade e uma evolução natural das relações excecionais entre a UE e os EAU. Tal pode ser conseguido se os
EAU forem incluídos na atual proposta da Comissão (de novembro de 2012) de uma lista de países cujos cidadãos
podem entrar no espaço Schengen sem visto (Anexo II do Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001).

Os EAU e a UE partilham importantes interesses políticos e de segurança; além disso, o comércio e o investimento
entre os EAU, por um lado, e a UE e os países do Espaço Schengen não pertencentes à UE, por outro lado, são
estimados em 50 mil milhões de euros.

Em 2012, 1 640 000 cidadãos da UE visitaram os EAU. A lista atual de países europeus a cujos cidadãos é emitido um
visto à chegada aos EAU será alargada no sentido de incluir mais 12 Estados‐Membros da UE. Além disso, estão
prestes a ser concluídas as negociações relativas a um acordo que, a partir do final deste ano, irá isentar de visto os
cidadãos dos EAU que visitam o Reino Unido.

Os EAU apresentam uma série de argumentos sólidos, concretos e objetivos para serem incluídos na atual lista do
Anexo II: não existem preocupações de imigração ou de segurança, já que há menos de 1 milhão de titulares de
passaportes dos EAU (que cumprem as normas técnicas exigidas), nenhum deles viu alguma vez recusado um visto
Schengen ou foi detido devido a preocupações de imigração ou de segurança. Todos sabemos que, quando visitam o
espaço Schengen, os cidadãos dos EAU viajam principalmente para negócios, lazer de qualidade, cuidados médicos
(privados) ou estudo/educação (totalmente financiados e não a expensas da UE).

Apenas um outro país da região (Israel) está isento da obrigação de visto Schengen e apenas dois outros países
islâmicos (Brunei e Malásia) constam da lista. Mesmo que o caso dos EAU seja avaliado em função dos seus próprios
méritos, a mensagem política da UE teria, por conseguinte, um enorme impacto. O Parlamento irá certamente dar um
grande apoio a esta medida.

Atendendo a que os EAU cumprem todos os critérios pertinentes e aplicáveis para a concessão do estatuto do
anexo II, pensamos que chegou o momento de agir. Como encara a Comissão a inclusão dos EAU na revisão em curso
da lista de países cujos cidadãos podem ter acesso ao espaço Schengen sem visto?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

_(15 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão está consciente dos benefícios económicos que a isenção da obrigação de visto para os cidadãos dos
Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) poderá ter para a UE, bem como dos riscos limitados de uma decisão nesse sentido no
que se refere à segurança e à imigração para o espaço Schengen. Existem, no entanto, outros critérios importantes,
mencionados nos considerandos do Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001, a ter em conta, designadamente as relações
externas da UE e as implicações da coerência regional.

A proposta adotada pela Comissão em novembro de 2012 foi debatida no Conselho, tornando‐se claro que há um
maior apoio por parte dos Estados-Membros à inclusão dos EAU na lista dos países cujos cidadãos estão isentos da
obrigação de visto. O outro co-legislador, o Parlamento Europeu, ainda não se exprimiu de forma definitiva sobre esta
questão e o projeto de relatório do relator não contém qualquer indicação a este respeito. Caso os dois co‐legisladores
estejam de acordo quanto a isentar da obrigação de visto os cidadãos dos EAU, a Comissão não deverá, em princípio,
ter objeções, sem, contundo, perder de vista o contexto global das relações entre os EAU e a UE.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 161

A Comissão tenciona propor, eventualmente em 2014, uma revisão mais ambiciosa das listas dos países abrangidos
pelo Regulamento (CE) n.° 539/2001, que teria mais em conta as considerações de ordem económica. Caso, no atual
processo de revisão, os EAU não sejam incluídos na lista dos países cujos cidadãos podem ter acesso ao espaço
Schengen sem visto, a próxima revisão constituirá uma oportunidade para estudar o caso deste país, bem como o de
outros países numa posição semelhante.

C 42 E / 162 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005897/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) şi Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Includerea Emiratelor Arabe Unite printre statele cu acces fără viză în spațiul Schengen

Asigurarea accesului fără viză în spațiul Schengen pentru cetățenii Emiratelor Arabe Unite (EAU) reprezintă o
prioritate majoră și o evoluție normală ca urmare a relațiilor excepționale dintre UE și EAU. Acest obiectiv poate fi
atins dacă EAU sunt incluse în propunerea actuală a Comisiei (din noiembrie 2012) pentru o listă de țări ai căror
resortisanți pot intra în spațiul Schengen fără viză (anexa II la Regulamentul (CE) nr. 539/2001 al Consiliului).

EAU și UE au importante interese comune de natură politică și de securitate, în timp ce comerțul și investițiile între
EAU pe de o parte, și UE și țările terțe care fac parte din zona Schengen pe de alta, sunt evaluate la 50 de miliarde EUR.

În anul 2012, 1 640 000 de cetățeni ai UE au vizitat EAU. Lista actuală a statelor europene pentru ai căror resortisanți
sunt eliberate vize la sosirea în EAU va fi extinsă pentru a include alte 12 state membre ale UE. Mai mult decât atât, se
prevede sfârșitul negocierilor ce vor permite cetățenilor EAU să călătorească fără viză în Regatul Unit începând cu
sfârșitul acestui an.

EAU prezintă o serie de argumente solide, pozitive și obiective în ceea ce privește includerea în lista curentă din anexa
II: nu există aspecte problematice legate de imigrare sau securitate, întrucât numărul deținătorilor de pașaport EAU
(care respectă standardele tehnice necesare) este sub un milion, niciunuia dintre aceștia nefiindu-i vreodată refuzată
viza Schengen și nefiind nici reținut din cauza unor aspecte problematice legate de imigrare sau securitate. Știm cu
toții că atunci când cetățenii EAU vizitează spațiul Schengen, scopul călătoriei lor este în cea mai mare parte legat de
afaceri, activități recreative de înaltă calitate, servicii de asistență medicală (de natură privată) sau studii/educație
(finanțate în totalitate și nu pe cheltuiala UE).

Numai o singură țară din regiune (Israel) este exonerată de obligația de a deține viză și doar alte două state islamice
(Brunei și Malaysia) se mai află pe listă. Chiar dacă cazul EAU ar fi evaluat după meritele proprii, mesajul politic
transmis de UE ar avea, astfel, un impact enorm. Parlamentul va acorda un sprijin larg acestei măsuri.

Având în vedere că EAU îndeplinesc toate cerințele relevante și aplicabile pentru a le fi acordate statutul prevăzut la
anexa II, considerăm că este momentul să acționăm. Care este opinia Comisiei cu privire la includerea EAU în cadrul
revizuirii în curs a listei țărilor ai căror resortisanți pot intra în spațiul Schengen fără viză?

**Răspuns dat de dna Malmström în numele Comisiei**

_(15 iulie 2013)_

Comisia este conștientă de avantajele economice pe care scutirea cetățenilor EAU de obligația de a deține viză le-ar
putea oferi UE, precum și de riscurile limitate în domeniul securității și imigrației pentru spațiul Schengen care rezultă
în urma acestei scutiri. Există, cu toate acestea, un alt criteriu important, inclus în considerentele Regulamentului (CE)
nr. 539/2001, care ar trebui să fie luat în considerare, și anume relațiile externe ale UE și implicațiile coeziunii
regionale.

Pe parcursul discuțiilor care au avut loc în Consiliu din momentul în care Comisia a adoptat propunerea, în noiembrie
2012, a devenit clar că a crescut sprijinul statelor membre în vederea menționării EAU pe lista țărilor scutite de viză.
Cel de al doilea colegiuitor, Parlamentul European, nu și-a exprimat încă opinia definitivă cu privire la acest aspect.
Proiectul de raport al raportorului nu a conținut nicio indicație în acest sens. În cazul în care cei doi colegiuitori sunt
de acord cu privire la scutirea cetățenilor Emiratelor Arabe Unite de obligația de a deține viză, Comisia ar putea
sprijini această propunere, fără însă a pierde din vedere contextul general al relațiilor dintre EAU și UE.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 163

Comisia intenționează să propună — eventual în 2014 — o revizuire mai ambițioasă a listei de țări cărora li se aplică
Regulamentul privind vizele (539/2001), care să țină mai bine seama de considerentele economice. În cazul în care
EAU nu ar figura pe această listă în urma revizuirii actuale, noua revizuire va oferi ocazia de a analiza, din nou, cazul
EAU, precum și cel al altor țări aflate în situații similare.

C 42 E / 164 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Slovenské znenie)_

**Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-005897/13**

**Komisii**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) a Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. mája 2013)_

_Vec:_ Začlenenie Spojených arabských emirátov do bezvízového schengenského priestoru

Zabezpečenie bezvízového vstupu do schengenského priestoru pre občanov Spojených arabských emirátov (SAE) je
vrcholnou prioritou a prirodzeným vývojom výnimočných vzťahov medzi EÚ a Spojenými arabskými emirátmi.
Dalo by sa to dosiahnuť v prípade, že budú SAE začlenené do súčasného návrhu Komisie (z novembra 2012), kde je
uvedený zoznam krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci môžu vstúpiť do schengenského priestoru bez víz (príloha II
k nariadeniu Rady (ES) č. 539/2001).

SAE a EÚ majú významné spoločné politické a bezpečnostné záujmy a zároveň sa obchodné výmeny a investície
medzi Spojenými arabskými emirátmi na jednej strane a EÚ a krajinami nepatriacimi do schengenského priestoru na
strane druhej odhadujú na 50 miliárd EUR.

V roku 2012 navštívilo Spojené arabské emiráty 1 640 000 občanov EÚ. Súčasný zoznam európskych krajín,
ktorých štátnym príslušníkom sú vydané víza pri príchode do SAE, sa rozšíri o ďalších 12 členských štátov EÚ.
Okrem toho sa čoskoro uzavrú rokovania, na základe ktorých budú od konca tohto roku občania SAE pri návšteve
Spojeného kráľovstva oslobodení od vízovej povinnosti.

SAE predkladajú množstvo solídnych, pozitívnych a objektívnych argumentov na podporu svojho začlenenia do
súčasného zoznamu II: neexistujú žiadne obavy spojené s prisťahovaleckou či bezpečnostnou politikou, pretože
držiteľov cestovných pasov SAE (ktoré spĺňajú požadované technické normy) je menej než milión, pričom žiadnemu
z nich neboli zamietnuté schengenské víza ani nebol žiaden zadržaný z dôvodu obáv súvisiacich s otázkami
prisťahovalectva či bezpečnosti. Všetci vieme, že občania SAE navštevujú schengenský priestor väčšinou
z obchodných dôvodov, v rámci dovolenky pre náročných, na účely (súkromnej) lekárskej starostlivosti či
štúdia/vzdelávania (ktoré si financujú sami, nie na náklady EÚ).

V tomto regióne je od vízovej povinnosti pri vstupe do schengenského priestoru oslobodená iba jedna krajina (Izrael)
a v zozname sú uvedené iba dve iné islamské krajiny (Brunej a Malajzia). Aj keby sa prípad SAE posudzoval
samostatne, politický signál zo strany EÚ by mal obrovský dosah. Parlament určite tomuto opatreniu poskytne širokú
podporu.

Vzhľadom na to, že SAE spĺňajú všetky náležité a uplatniteľné kritéria na získanie štatútu podľa prílohy II, nazdávame
sa, že je načase konať. Aký má Komisia názor na začlenenie SAE do prebiehajúcej revízie zoznamu krajín, ktorých
štátni príslušníci môžu vstupovať do schengenského priestoru bez víz?

**Odpoveď pani Malmströmovej v mene Komisie**

_(15. júla 2013)_

Komisia si je vedomá, aké hospodárske prínosy by pre EÚ znamenalo oslobodenie občanov Spojených arabských
emirátov (ďalej len „SAE“) od vízovej povinnosti a že riziká v oblasti bezpečnosti a prisťahovalectva pre schengenský
priestor, ktoré by z takéhoto oslobodenia vyplynuli, sú obmedzené. Existuje však ďalšie dôležité kritérium zahrnuté
v odôvodneniach nariadenia č. 539/2009, ktoré by sa malo zohľadniť, a to vonkajšie vzťahy EÚ a aspekty regionálnej
spojitosti.

Z diskusií v Rade vyplynulo, že od prijatia návrhu Komisiou v novembri 2012 vzrástla podpora členských štátov
v prospech presunu SAE na zoznam krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci sú oslobodení od vízovej povinnosti. Druhý
spoluzákonodarca, Európsky parlament, ešte k tejto otázke neoznámil svoje konečné stanovisko. Spravodajca vo
svojom návrhu správy v tejto súvislosti nič nenaznačil. Ak by sa dvaja spoluzákonodarcovia dohodli na oslobodení
občanov Spojených arabských emirátov od vízovej povinnosti, Komisia tento návrh podporí, zohľadní však celkový
kontext vzťahov medzi SAE a EÚ.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 165

Komisia plánuje pravdepodobne v roku 2014 navrhnúť hlbšiu revíziu zoznamov krajín, na ktoré sa vzťahuje
nariadenie o vízovej povinnosti (č. 539/2001), pričom by sa viac zohľadnili hospodárske aspekty. V prípade, že počas
prebiehajúceho procesu SAE nebudú presunuté na zoznam krajín, ktorých štátni príslušníci sú oslobodení od vízovej
povinnosti, táto plánovaná revízia bude príležitosťou opäť preskúmať situáciu SAE, ako aj podobnú pozíciu ďalších
krajín.

C 42 E / 166 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Slovenska različica)_

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-005897/13**

**za Komisijo**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) in Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27. maj 2013)_

_Zadeva:_ Vključitev Združenih arabskih emiratov v brezvizumsko schengensko območje

Odnosi med Evropsko unijo in Združenimi arabskimi emirati so odlični, zato je zagotavljanje brezvizumskega
dostopa v schengensko območje za državljane Združenih arabskih emiratov ena od največjih prednostih nalog in
logični razvoj dogodkov. To bi lahko naredili tako, da bi Združene arabske emirate vključili v sedanji predlog
Komisije (iz novembra 2012) za seznam držav, katerih državljani lahko vstopajo v schengensko območje brez
vizuma (Priloga II k Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 539/2001).

Združeni arabski emirati in Evropska unija imajo pomembne skupne politične in varnostne interese, vrednost
trgovinske izmenjave in naložb med Združenimi arabskimi emirati na eni strani in med EU in državami EU, ki niso
članice schengenskega območja, po drugi, pa se ocenjuje na 50 milijard EUR.

Leta 2012 je Združene arabske emirate obiskalo 1 640 000 državljanov EU. Sedanji seznam evropskih držav, katerih
državljani ob prihodu v Združene arabske emirate dobijo vizo, se bo razširil na dodatnih 12 držav članic EU. Poleg
tega se bodo kmalu končala pogajanja, s katerimi bodo od konca letošnjega leta državljani Združenih arabskih
emiratov ob obisku Združenega kraljestva izključeni iz vizumske obveznosti.

Obstajajo številni trdni, pozitivni in objektivni argumenti, ki govorijo v prid vključiti Združenih arabskih emiratov v
sedanji seznam v Prilogi II: skrbi, povezanih z imigracijo ali varnostjo ni, saj ima potni list (ki izpolnjuje predpisane
tehnične standarde) Združenih arabskih emiratov manj kot milijon oseb, od katerih doslej še nobeni niso zavrnili
schengenske vize, prav tako pa še nihče ni bil pridržan zaradi pomislekov glede imigracije ali varnosti. Splošno je
znano, da državljani Združenih arabskih emiratov na schengensko območje potujejo večinoma iz poslovnih
razlogov, zaradi preživljanja prostega časa na visoki ravni, (zasebne) zdravstvene oskrbe ali študija oziroma
izobraževanja, ki ga v celoti financirajo sami, in ne na stroške EU.

Iz vizumske obveznosti za schengensko območje je izvzeta le še ena država iz tega območja, in sicer Izrael, na
seznamu pa sta le še dve drugi islamski državi, Brunej in Malezija. Čeprav bi si primer Združenih arabskih emiratov
sam po sebi zaslužil posebno obravnavo, bi politično sporočilo EU naletelo na izjemen odmev. V Parlamentu bo ta
ukrep gotovo deležen široke podpore.

Glede na to, da Združeni arabski emirati izpolnjujejo vsa potrebna in veljavna merila za vključitev v Prilogo II,
menimo, da je čas za ukrepanje. Kako Komisijo gleda na vključitev Združenih arabskih emiratov v tekoči ponovni
pregled seznama držav, katerih državljani lahko v schengensko območje vstopajo brez vizuma?

**Odgovor komisarke Malmström v imenu Komisije**

_(15. julij 2013)_

Komisija se zaveda gospodarskih koristi, ki bi jih izvzetje državljanov Združenih arabskih emiratov iz vizumske
obveznosti lahko prineslo EU, kot tudi nizke stopnje tveganja za schengensko območje z vidika varnosti in imigracije,
ki bi izhajala iz takšne odločitve. Vendar pa obstaja še eno pomembno merilo, navedeno v uvodnih izjavah
Uredbe 539/2001, ki bi ga bilo potrebno upoštevati, namreč zunanji odnosi EU in posledice za regionalno
povezanost.

Razprave, ki potekajo v Svetu od novembra 2012, ko je Komisija sprejela svoj predlog, kažejo, da države članice vse
bolj podpirajo vključitev Združenih arabskih emiratov na seznam držav, katerih državljani lahko vstopajo na
schengensko območje brez vizuma. Evropski parlament v vlogi drugega sozakonodajalca se še ni dokončno izrekel o
vprašanju. Tudi osnutek poročila poročevalca ni vseboval nobene navedbe v zvezi s tem. V primeru, da bi se
sozakonodajalca strinjala o izvzetju državljanov Združenih arabskih emiratov iz vizumske obveznosti, bi Komisija
predlog lahko podprla, vendar bi pri tem upoštevala splošni okvir odnosov med Združenimi arabskimi emirati in EU.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 167

Komisija namerava – po možnosti v letu 2014 – predlagati obsežnejši pregled seznama držav, zajetih v uredbo o
vizumih (539/2001), ki bi bolje upošteval gospodarske okoliščine. Če se Združeni arabski emirati na zadevni seznam
v trenutnem postopku ne bi uvrstili, bo omenjeni pregled priložnost za ponovno presojo primera Združenih arabskih
emiratov kot tudi drugih držav v podobnem položaju.

C 42 E / 168 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005897/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mário David (PPE), Alexandra Thein (ALDE), Burkhard Balz (PPE), Oldřich Vlasák (ECR), Filip Kaczmarek**

**(PPE), Salvador Sedó i Alabart (PPE), Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Roberta Metsola (PPE), Ivo Vajgl (ALDE), Lara**

**Comi (PPE), Inese Vaidere (PPE), Rolandas Paksas (EFD), Libor Rouček (S&D), Paul Rübig (PPE), Niccolò**
**Rinaldi (ALDE), Marc Tarabella (S&D), Tunne Kelam (PPE), Antonio Cancian (PPE), Angelika Niebler (PPE),**

**Ismail Ertug (S&D), Emilio Menéndez del Valle (S&D), Krzysztof Lisek (PPE), Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Rodi**
**Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE), Paulo Rangel (PPE), Michael Gahler (PPE), David Casa (PPE), Jacek Protasiewicz**

**(PPE), Eduard Kukan (PPE), Elena Oana Antonescu (PPE), Diogo Feio (PPE), Cristian Dan Preda (PPE),**

**Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE), Charles Tannock (ECR) and Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Inclusion of the United Arab Emirates in the visa-free Schengen area

Securing visa-free access to the Schengen area for United Arab Emirates (UAE) citizens is a top priority and a natural
development for the exceptional relations between the EU and the UAE. This can be achieved if the UAE is included in
the Commission’s current proposal (from November 2012) for a list of countries whose nationals can enter the
Schengen area without a visa (Annex II to Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001).

The UAE and the EU share important political and security interests, while trade and investment between the UAE, on
the one hand, and the EU and the non-EU Schengen countries, on the other hand, is valued at EUR 50 billion.

In 2012, 1 640 000 EU citizens visited the UAE. The current list of European countries whose nationals are issued a
visa upon arrival in the UAE will be extended to include a further 12 EU Member States. Furthermore, negotiations
are about to be concluded which, from the end of this year, will exempt UAE citizens from visa requirements when
visiting the United Kingdom.

The UAE presents a range of solid, positive and objective arguments for being included in the current Annex II list:
there are no immigration or security concerns, as there are fewer than 1 million holders of UAE passports (which
meet the required technical standards), none of whom has ever been denied a Schengen visa or been detained over
immigration or security concerns. We all know that when UAE citizens visit the Schengen area, they travel mainly for
business, high-end leisure, (private) medical care, or study/education (fully financed and not at the EU’s expense).

Only one other country in the region (Israel) is exempted from the Schengen visa requirements, and only two other
Islamic countries (Brunei and Malaysia) are listed. Even if the UAE case were to be judged on its own merits, the
political message from the EU would therefore have a tremendous impact. Parliament will certainly give wide support
to this measure.

Given that the UAE complies with all relevant and applicable criteria for being granted Annex II status, we think it is
time to act. How does the Commission view the inclusion of the UAE in the ongoing revision of the list of countries
whose nationals can access the Schengen area without a visa?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the economic benefits that the exemption from the visa obligation for UAE citizens
could bring to the EU, as well as of the limited risks in the field of security and immigration for the Schengen area
arising from such an exemption. There is, however, another important criterion, included in the recitals of Regulation
539/2001, which should be taken into account, namely the EU’s external relations and the implications of regional
coherence.

During the discussions in the Council since the Commission adopted its proposal in November 2012, it has become
clear that support among Member States for transferring the UAE to the visa-free list has grown. The other colegislator, the European Parliament, has not yet made known its definitive view on this issue. The rapporteur's draft
report did not contain any indication in this regard. Should the two co-legislators agree on exempting United Arab
Emirates citizens from the visa obligation, the Commission could be supportive, without, however, losing sight of the
overall context of relations between the UAE and the EU.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 169

The Commission intends to propose — possibly in 2014 — a more ambitious revision of the lists of countries
covered by the visa regulation (539/2001), which would take better account of economic considerations. Should the
UAE not be transferred in the present process, this next review will provide an opportunity to consider the UAE case
again, as well as that of other countries in a similar position.

C 42 E / 170 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-005898/13**

**a Bizottság számára**

**Kósa Ádám (PPE)**

_(2013. május 27.)_

_Tárgy:_ Az ENSZ-egyezmény és a kötelezettségszegési eljárás problematikája

Elmarasztalta Magyarországot az ENSZ fogyatékossággal élők jogaival foglalkozó bizottsága (CRPD) egy vak, magyar
állampolgárságú házaspárnak az OTP pénzfelvevő automatáival szembeni kifogásai alapján. Az elmarasztalás
alapjául szolgáló nemzetközi egyezményt és a hozzá kapcsolódó kiegészítő jegyzőkönyvet Magyarország 2007 elején
az elsők közt fogadta el a világon, és mint részes állam elsőként vetette alá magát az egyéni panaszok alapján indult
eljárások lehetőségének is. A beadványt még 2010-ben nyújtotta be a Magyar Helsinki Bizottság. Az Európai Unió
2010 decembere óta szintén részes állam, de csak az egyezmény vonatkozásában, így ellene egyéni panasz nem
nyújtható be, ami egyelőre várat magára, hiszen az EU nem ratifikálta a kiegészítő jegyzőkönyvet.

Kérdésem: amennyiben Magyarország önállóan (akár a kormányzati jogszabályalkotás, akár a Magyar Nemzeti Bank
útján) mihamarább – amit személy szerint is szorgalmazok – szabályozza a Magyarországon működő valamennyi
pénzintézet által használt pénzfelvételi automatákra vonatkozó egységes akadálymentesítési és infrastrukturális
feltételeket és szolgáltatásokat, az nem sérti-e az Európai Unióban működő bankok közti verseny semlegességét,
illetve nem tesz-e indokolatlan különbséget a Magyarországon működő bankok és pénzintézetek között egy újabb,
akár kötelezettségszegési eljárás megindításának a kockázatával? Továbbá tervezi-e a Bizottság, hogy az
akadálymentesítési jogszabálycsomagban erre is kitérjen – mivel az EU is részes állam –, de csak az egyezmény
vonatkozásában?

**Viviane Reding válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. augusztus 20.)_

A Bizottság az akadálymentesítéssel összefüggő munkája során azt is vizsgálja, hogy a különböző áruk és
szolgáltatások (így például a készpénzkiadó automaták) hozzáférhetőségével kapcsolatos, eltérő (létező és tervezett)
nemzeti szabályok miként akadályozhatják a belső piac megfelelő működését, valamint felméri, hogy milyen
lépésekre van szükség e téren. Ez a vizsgálat várhatóan 2013 végére zárul le.

Jelenleg nincs olyan uniós jogszabály, amely a pénzintézetek által használt készpénzkiadó automaták
akadálymentesítését szabályozná. Ebből következően nincsenek előzetesen meghatározott uniós követelmények az
ilyen típusú nemzeti szabályokra vonatkozóan, amelyekre számos tagállamban van példa. Amennyiben egy
magánszemély vagy társaság panasszal él a Bizottság felé azzal kapcsolatban, hogy egy konkrét nemzeti szabály
veszélyeztetheti az áruk és szolgáltatások szabad mozgását a belső piacon, vagy a verseny torzulásához vezethet, a
Bizottság kezdeményezheti az ilyen panaszok esetében szokásos vizsgálatát.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 171

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005898/13**

**to the Commission**

**Ádám Kósa (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ UN Disability Convention and the problem of Treaty infringement proceedings

The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has ruled against Hungary in response to a
petition from a blind Hungarian couple concerning OTP Bank’s cash machines. The international Convention and the
Optional Protocol thereto, on the basis of which the petition was submitted, is one which Hungary was among the
first countries in the world to sign at the beginning of 2007, and as a signatory state was also the first to allow the
possibility of proceedings on the basis of an individual petition. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee submitted the
petition in 2010. Since December 2010 the European Union has also been a signatory, but only to the Convention,
and so complaints may not be submitted against it: for the time being this option is not available, as the EU has not
ratified the optional protocol.

My question is this: if Hungary independently (either by legislation or via the Hungarian National Bank) adopts
regulations as soon as possible — which personally I would urge it to do — to the effect that all cash machines used
by banks operating in Hungary must comply with uniform accessibility and infrastructure conditions and rules on
service provision, does this not violate competition-neutrality between banks operating in the European Union, and
does it not make an unjustified distinction between banks and financial institutions operating in Hungary, thus
incurring a new risk, that of Treaty infringement proceedings? Does the Commission plan to extend the Accessibility
Legislative Package to cover this too, since the EU is also a signatory, though only to the Convention?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

In the context of its work on accessibility the Commission is also examining how diverging (existing and planned)
national rules on accessibility of various goods and services, including for example cash machines, can act as obstacles
in the internal market, and what should be done about it. This examination is expected to be completed by the end of
2013.

Currently there is no EU legislation regulating the accessibility of cash machines used by banks. This means that there
are no a priori EU requirements for national rules of this type that do exist in various Member States. If an individual
or a company complains to the Commission that a specific national rule would pose an obstacle to the free
movement of goods and services in the internal market or cause a distortion of competition, the Commission can
initiate its usual examination of such complaints.

C 42 E / 172 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005899/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Joachim Zeller (PPE)**

_(27. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Fördermittel Biogasanlagen Griechenland

Seit diesem Jahr werden Biogasanlagen in Griechenland nicht mehr finanziell gefördert. Angesichts der wirtschaftlich
prekären Situation in dem Land ist der Wegfall der Förderung gerade für zukunftsweisende Technologien schwer
nachvollziehbar.

Sind der Kommission die Gründe für den Wegfall der Förderung bekannt, und sind davon auch Projekte betroffen, für
die europäische Fördergelder vorgesehen waren/sind?

**Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Juli 2013)_

Biogasanlagen in Griechenland werden im Rahmen des nationalen Systems für Strom aus erneuerbaren
Energiequellen gefördert. Nach Kenntnis der Kommission wurden die Entgelthöhen und ‐kategorien in jüngster Zeit
nicht geändert, wenngleich einige andere gesetzgeberische Maßnahmen Auswirkungen auf diese Förderung hatten,
ohne diese jedoch abzuschaffen. Mit dem griechischen Gesetz 4093/2012 wurde für alle Anlagen, die Strom aus
erneuerbaren Energiequellen erzeugen, ein „besonderer Solidaritätsbeitrag“ eingeführt. Aufgrund des griechischen
Gesetzes 4152/2013 wurden Inhabern einer Erzeugungsgenehmigung jährliche Gebühren auferlegt, sofern die
Genehmigung für einen bestimmten, in besagtem Gesetz festgelegten Zeitraum erteilt und die Anlage noch nicht in
Betrieb genommen wurde.

Die von der EU finanzierten Projekte waren von diesen rechtlichen Entwicklungen bislang nicht betroffen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 173

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005899/13**

**to the Commission**
**Joachim Zeller (PPE)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Aid for biogas plants in Greece

From this year, biogas plants in Greece are no longer being granted financial aid. In view of the precarious economic
situation in this country, withdrawal of aid, in particular for technologies of the future, is difficult to comprehend.

Does the Commission know the reasons for the withdrawal of aid, and are projects for which European funding
was/is planned also affected?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

Biogas installations in Greece receive support from the national scheme for electricity from renewable sources. While
to the Commission's knowledge there have been no recent changes to the tariff levels and categories, some other
legislative measures have affected, but not abolished this support. Pursuant to Greek Law 4093/2012 a ‘Special
Solidarity Contribution’ was introduced for all installations producing electricity from renewable sources. Pursuant to
Greek Law 4152/2013 annual fees were imposed on owners of a production license, where this license has been
attained for a certain period as defined in the said law without the plant having started operations.

EU funded projects have so far not been affected by these legal developments.

C 42 E / 174 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005900/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D)**

_(27 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Ristrutturazione NOKIA SIEMENS — Con riferimento a una precedente interrogazione sul medesimo
argomento (E-006739/2012)

La joint venture Nokia Siemens Networks è una delle principali aziende di telecomunicazioni al mondo, con più sedi
in Europa e circa 70 000 dipendenti. La sua presenza in Italia riveste un'importanza strategica per l'occupazione
qualificata soprattutto nella provincia di Milano, dove sono allocate le diverse sedi di Cinisello Balsamo e Cassina de'
Pecchi, con oltre 3 000 dipendenti e un importante indotto di consulenti impegnati soprattutto nelle attività di
sviluppo e ricerca. Nel gennaio 2008 Nokia Siemens Networks, il governo italiano e le organizzazioni sindacali hanno
firmato un protocollo d'intesa per potenziare i siti di ricerca e sviluppo. Tuttavia, tale piano è andato completamente
disatteso, ad oggi è intervenuta una riduzione di dipendenti di circa il 70 %. A maggio 2012 l'azienda ha firmato un
accordo di cessione del ramo d'azienda Microwave alla canadese Dragonwave con conseguente esubero di 580
lavoratori italiani su 1 100. Anche questo piano è andato disatteso nelle sue parti essenziali, particolarmente per quel
che riguarda l'utilizzo degli ammortizzatori sociali e le informazioni ai lavoratori.

Nel tempo trascorso dalla data della precedente interrogazione, la situazione aziendale in genere e quella dei
lavoratori non hanno registrato nessun significativo miglioramento nemmeno sul piano della chiarezza di
informazioni.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione riferire se:

—
ritiene strategica la permanenza nel territorio dell'Unione europea di un asset di rilevanza mondiale nel campo
delle telecomunicazioni;

—
esiste un'interlocuzione con il management aziendale;

—
ritiene di verificare l'operato di Nokia Siemens Network, con particolare riferimento al rispetto delle normative
contenute nelle direttive in materia di impatto sociale delle ristrutturazioni industriali, tra cui la direttiva
98/59/CE sui licenziamenti collettivi, la direttiva 2001/23/CE sul trasferimento di imprese, e la direttiva
2002/14/CE sull'informazione e la consultazione dei lavoratori?

**Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione**

_(22 luglio 2013)_

1. La strategia di politica industriale dell’UE ( [1] ) mette in luce che una solida base industriale è essenziale per la
ricchezza e per il successo economico dell’Europa.

2. La Commissione tuttavia non ha la facoltà di interferire nelle discussioni tra dirigenti e rappresentanti dei
lavoratori o in decisioni aziendali specifiche, ma può esortare ad anticipare competenze ed esigenze di formazione
all’interno delle imprese e a gestire la ristrutturazione in modo socialmente responsabile. Secondo il Libro verde della
Commissione intitolato «Ristrutturare e anticipare i mutamenti: quali insegnamenti trarre dall’esperienza recente?» ( [2] )
e l’adozione da parte del Parlamento europeo in data 15 gennaio 2013 della risoluzione relativa a Informazione e
consultazione dei lavoratori, anticipazione e gestione delle ristrutturazioni ( [3] ), la Commissione sta attualmente
elaborando un quadro di riferimento per la qualità che definisca l'ambito della legislazione e delle iniziative dell’UE
attualmente in corso in tema di ristrutturazione nonché le pratiche ottimali.

3. La Commissione non è in grado di valutare i fatti o di stabilire se un’azienda privata abbia rispettato o no una
disposizione nazionale che attua una direttiva dell'UE.

Spetta alle autorità nazionali competenti, tribunali compresi, garantire che la legislazione nazionale che recepisce le
direttive UE cui l’onorevole parlamentare fa riferimento sia applicata in modo corretto ed efficace dal datore di lavoro
in questione, tenendo conto delle circostanze specifiche del caso.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)582 definitivo.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) V. le risposte e una sintesi accessibili dal link http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8908&langId=en.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//IT .

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 175

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005900/13**

**to the Commission**

**Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D)**

_(27 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Nokia Siemens restructuring, with reference to a previous question on the same subject (E-006739/2012)

The Nokia Siemens Networks joint venture is one of the leading telecommunications companies in the world, with
various establishments in Europe and some 70 000 employees. Its presence in Italy is of strategic importance for
skilled employment, especially in the Province of Milan, where the Cinisello Balsamo and Cassina de' Pecchi branches,
with over 3 000 employees and a large number of associated consultants engaged primarily in research and
development, are located. In January 2008 Nokia Siemens Networks, the Italian Government and trade union
organisations signed a memorandum of understanding to step up the work being done at the research and
development facilities. However, that plan was completely disregarded, and the number of employees has thus far
been reduced by approximately 70%. In May 2012 the company signed an agreement assigning the Microwave
branch of the company to the Canadian company Dragonwave, which resulted in 580 Italian employees out of 1 100
being made redundant. That plan was also fundamentally disregarded, especially the part concerning the use of ‘social
shock absorbers’ and information for the employees.

Since the date of the previous question, the corporate situation in general as well as that of the employees has seen no
noticeable improvement, not even as regards the clarity of information provided.

— Does the Commission believe it is strategically important for a world-class telecommunications company to
continue to operate within the European Union?

— Is there a dialogue open with the company’s management?

— Does the Commission intend to verify the actions of Nokia Siemens Network, with particular reference to
compliance with the legislation contained within the directives on the social impact of corporate restructuring,
including Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, Directive 2001/23/EC on transfers of undertakings, and
Directive 2002/14/EC on informing and consulting employees?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

1. The EU industrial policy strategy ( [1] ) makes it clear that a strong industrial base is essential for a wealthy and
economically successful Europe.

2. However, the Commission has no powers to interfere in discussions between management and workers'
representatives or in specific company's decisions but urges them to anticipate skills and training needs within
companies and manage restructuring in a socially responsible way. Following its Green Paper on ‘Restructuring and
anticipation of change: what lessons from recent experience?’ ( [2] ) and the adoption by the European Parliament on
15 January 2013 of the resolution on Information and consultation of workers, anticipation and management of
restructuring ( [3] ), the Commission is currently working on a Quality Framework that will frame the current EU
legislation and initiatives relevant to restructuring and will present the best practices.

3. The Commission is not in a position to assess the facts or state whether a private company has or has not
complied with any national provisions which serve to implement EU directives.

It is for the competent national authorities, including the courts, to ensure that the national legislation transposing
the EU Directives to which the Honourable Member refers is correctly and effectively applied by the employer
concerned, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)582 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See the replies and a summary under http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8908&langId=en .
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN .

C 42 E / 176 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005902/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Pregunta complementaria en relación con el transporte de animales — número de animales inspeccionados
durante el transporte en España

Hago referencia a la respuesta de la Comisión a mi pregunta escrita E-002374/2013.

En su informe al Parlamento y al Consejo sobre el impacto del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005 del Consejo relativo a la
protección de los animales durante el transporte, la Comisión declaró que su objetivo es lograr «un aumento del
número de inspecciones», a fin de mejorar el control del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005.

A la luz de este objetivo declarado, ¿cómo justifica la Comisión su afirmación, en su respuesta a la pregunta E002374/2013, de que «la Comisión no considera necesario por ahora adoptar medida alguna en relación con el
número de controles efectuados por las autoridades españolas durante el transporte de animales»?

**Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión**

_(11 de julio de 2013)_

En su informe relativo a la protección de los animales durante el transporte ( [1] ), que señaló problemas de mala
aplicación, la Comisión consideró una serie de medidas que podrían paliarlos, si bien no se comprometió a llevar a
cabo todas esas medidas.

Por lo que respecta a los controles que deben efectuar los Estados miembros para garantizar la correcta aplicación del
Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005, relativo a la protección de los animales durante el transporte ( [2] ), el artículo 27 de este
Reglamento ( [3] ) faculta a la Comisión para adoptar medidas de ejecución que establezcan la proporción de dichas
inspecciones. Un cambio en dicha proporción podría conducir a un aumento o una disminución del número de
controles oficiales realizados en relación con los transportes de animales.

Antes de que la Comisión considere la adopción de tales medidas de ejecución, debe disponer de datos mejores y más
comparables de los Estados miembros en relación con el número y los resultados de las inspecciones realizadas. Este
es uno de los principales objetivos de la Decisión de la Comisión sobre los informes anuales de los Estados miembros
en relación con los controles del transporte de animales ( [4] ), recientemente adoptada.

Cuando esté en posesión de dichos datos, la Comisión considerará si nuevas medidas, como la adopción de medidas
de ejecución relativas a la proporción de las inspecciones, contribuirían a una mejor ejecución del Reglamento (CE)
n° 1/2005.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Informe de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo sobre el impacto del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005 del Consejo, relativo a la protección

de los animales durante el transporte, COM(2011) 700 final.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005, relativo a la protección de los animales durante el transporte y las operaciones conexas, DO L 3 de 5.1.2005, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) El artículo 27 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005 dispone: «La autoridad competente comprobará el cumplimiento de los requisitos del presente

Reglamento procediendo a inspecciones no discriminatorias […]. La proporción de las inspecciones se incrementará si se comprueba que no se
han cumplido las disposiciones del presente Reglamento».

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Decisión de Ejecución 2013/188/UE de la Comisión, de 18 de abril de 2013, sobre los informes anuales de las inspecciones no discriminatorias

realizadas en virtud del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2005 del Consejo relativo a la protección de los animales durante el transporte, DO L 111
de 23.4.2013, p. 107.

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 177

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005902/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Follow-up question concerning animal transport — number of animals inspected during transport in Spain

I refer to the Commission’s reply to my Written Question E-002374/2013.

In its report to Parliament and the Council on the impact of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of
animals during transport, the Commission declared that its objective is to achieve ‘an increase in the number of
inspections’ in order to improve enforcement of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

Given this declared objective, how does the Commission justify its statement in its reply to Question E-002374/2013
that it ‘does not consider [it] necessary for the time being to take any measures in relation to the number of controls
carried out by the Spanish authorities during the transport of animals’?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

In its report on animal welfare during transport ( [1] ) which identified problems of poor enforcement the Commission
considered a number of actions that could correct them but did not however commit to carrying all of them out.

As regards the inspections to be carried out by Member States to ensure proper implementation of Regulation (EC)
No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport ( [2] ), Article 27 ( [3] ) mandates the Commission to adopt
implementing measures determining the proportion of these inspections. A change in those proportions could lead
to an increase or a decrease in the number of performed official controls of animal transports.

Before the Commission would consider adopting such implementing measures, it must have better and more
comparable data from the Member States regarding the number and outcome of performed inspections. This is one of
the main objectives of the recently adopted Commission Decision on Member States' annual reports on controls of
animal transports ( [4] ).

When the Commission is in possession of such data it will consider if further measures, including the adoption of
implementing measures on the proportion of inspections, would contribute to improved enforcement of Regulation
(EC) No 1/2005.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the impact of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection

of animals during transport. COM(2011) 700 final.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 27 of Regulation 1/2005 provides that ‘The competent authorities shall check that the requirements of this regulation have been complied

with, by carrying out non-discriminatory inspections […]. The proportion of inspections shall be increased where it is established that the
provisions of this regulation have been disregarded’.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Commission implementing Decision of 18 April 2013 on annual reports on non-discriminatory inspections carried out pursuant to Council

Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport, 2013/188/EU. OJ L 111, 23.4.2013, p. 107.

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C 42 E / 178 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005903/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Oceanogràfic de Valencia

El pasado mes de febrero la organización SOS Delfines tuvo acceso a los testimonios de dos extrabajadores del
zoológico Oceanogràfic de Valencia en los que ponen de manifiesto los malos tratos y las condiciones de dejadez que
sufren estos animales en cautiverio.

Algunas de las organizaciones que forman SOS Delfines se han dirigido tanto a la dirección del parque como a la
Generalitat Valenciana para informar acerca de estos casos de maltrato, recibiendo respuestas poco satisfactorias por
parte de la administración.

Uno de los casos fue el de una morsa que, debido al estrés que le producía el escaso acceso a la luz solar, murió a causa
de la ingesta de piedras. También se ha informado de que uno de los delfines murió por comer la pintura que se
desprende de las paredes de la piscina. A su vez, se ha informado de que a los delfines se les realizan periódicamente
dolorosas endoscopias para sacarles del estómago toda clase de objetos, o incluso se tiene constancia de la excesiva
cantidad de animales en una misma piscina y el reducido espacio con el que cuentan.

Todas estas prácticas contravienen la Directiva 2010/63/UE por la que se establecen las medidas de protección de
animales con fines científicos o educativos, así como la Directiva 1999/22/CE relativa al mantenimiento de animales
salvajes en parques zoológicos. Así pues, se debe dejar constancia del nulo papel educativo o conservacionista que
tiene este tipo de parques.

Por ello, ¿tiene conocimiento la Comisión de lo que realmente ocurre en estos centros? ¿Qué medidas de protección
piensa tomar al respecto? ¿Es posible que se pueda imponer algún tipo de sanción a la dirección del parque?
¿Funciona dicho parque con la subvención de fondos europeos?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(15 de julio de 2013)_

Las cuestiones planteadas por Su Señoría (bienestar de los animales salvajes en cautividad) son competencia de los
Estados miembros. La Directiva 1999/22/CE ( [1] ) fue incorporada por España al ordenamiento jurídico español
mediante la Ley 31/2003 ( [2] ), que tipifica las infracciones y sanciones por incumplimiento de sus prescripciones, y
corresponde a España velar por la aplicación de esa legislación.

El Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional no ha cofinanciado el zoológico Oceanogràfic.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 1999/22/CE, de 29 de marzo de 1999, relativa al mantenimiento de animales salvajes en parques zoológicos (DO L 94

de 9.4.1999, p. 24).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2003-19800

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 179

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005903/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Oceanogràfic in Valencia

In February 2013, the organisation SOS Delfines (SOS Dolphins) came into possession of statements by former
employees of Ocenaogràfic zoo in Valencia, which described the ill-treatment and neglect inflicted on these animals
in captivity.

Some of the organisations belonging to SOS Delfines have contacted both the park’s management and the Valencian
Regional Government to inform them of these cases of ill-treatment, only to receive unsatisfactory responses from
the authorities.

One of the cases involved a walrus which, due to stress caused by limited access to sunlight, died because it had
ingested stones. It has also been reported that one of the dolphins died from eating the paint that was peeling off the
walls of the pool. At the same time, it has been reported that the dolphins are periodically given painful endoscopies
to remove all kinds of objects from their stomachs, and there have also been reports of overcrowding of animals in
the same pool and the limited space they are given.

All of these practices run counter to Directive 2010/63/EU, which establishes measures for the protection of animals
used for scientific or educational purposes, and Directive 1999/22/EC relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos.
It should therefore be pointed out that such parks play absolutely no part in education or conservation.

On that basis, is the Commission aware of what really happens in these centres? What protective measures does it
intend to take in this regard? Is it possible that some kind of sanction could be applied to the park’s management?
Does this park receive subsidies from European funds?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The matters raised by the Honourable Member (welfare of wild animals held in captivity) are a competence of the
Member States. Directive 1999/22/EC ( [1] ) was transposed in Spain through the Law 31/2003 ( [2] ), which sets a range of
possible infractions and sanctions in case of non‐compliance with its provisions and it is for Spain to ensure
application of this legislation.

The European Regional Development Fund did not co-finance the park Oceanographic zoo.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 1999/22/EC, of 29 March 1999 relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos, OJ L 094.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2003-19800.

C 42 E / 180 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005904/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Gas de esquisto y dependencia energética

En el informe 2011/2308 (INI) del Parlamento Europeo sobre las repercusiones medioambientales de la extracción de
gas y petróleo de esquisto se reconoce que no existe una normativa detallada, exhaustiva y accesible relativa a la
extracción del gas de esquisto y la necesidad de que ésta se desarrolle. El informe recomienda revisar la Directiva
Marco del Agua y los posibles impactos que podría tener el fracking, considerando la prohibición del uso de químicos
tóxicos o, al menos, que la composición exacta de los mismos sea revelada.

En la respuesta E-007627/2011, la Comisión afirmaba que «los proyectos de prospección y explotación de gas de
esquisto están regulados por la Directiva de Impacto Ambiental (EIA), que impone a los Estados miembros la
responsabilidad de someter ese tipo de proyectos (sean públicos o privados) a evaluación antes de autorizar su
ejecución, aplicando, si resulta necesario, el principio de cautela».

España ha concedido permisos de fracking sin realizar ningún estudio de impacto medioambiental y bajo la falsa
afirmación de que permitirá un cambio radical en el sector energético. El fracking utiliza grandes cantidades de agua
(10 000-20 000 m [3] ), pero en España la escasez de agua es un problema estructural. Así se vulneraría
automáticamente la Directiva Marco del Agua. A su vez, algunas prospecciones se realizarán en lugares protegidos
por la Red Natura 2000, violando los objetivos de protección de la biodiversidad.

¿Cree la Comisión que el fracking es una tecnología totalmente desarrollada? ¿Está comprobada su fiabilidad por
organismos independientes? ¿Se ha comprobado que no existe riesgo para los habitantes de las regiones donde se
practique? ¿Y para el medioambiente? ¿Es el gas de esquisto una buena fuente de energía para Europa?

La extracción del gas de esquisto comporta la colisión y pérdida de otros recursos naturales y valores sociales de
Europa, como los recursos hídricos o la protección de los espacios naturales. ¿Cómo piensa lidiar la Comisión con
ello? ¿Cree que la rentabilidad económica pasa por encima del derecho a una naturaleza sana? ¿Planea la Comisión dar
más impulso a las energías renovables que respetan el medioambiente? ¿Cree la Comisión que el gas de esquisto va a
solucionar la dependencia energética de Europa?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(19 de julio de 2013)_

Los Estados miembros son responsables de tomar las decisiones oportunas sobre su combinación energética, en
particular la prospección, la exploración y/o la producción de gas de esquisto. Corresponde a los Estados miembros
garantizar —con evaluaciones, regímenes de permisos y actividades de seguimiento adecuados— que todas las
actividades de exploración o explotación de fuentes de energía, entre las que figuran las que utilizan la fracturación
hidráulica, cumplan los requisitos del marco jurídico vigente en la EU. Dicho marco incluye, entre otras cosas,
disposiciones sobre las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental y la participación pública ( [1] ), la protección de las aguas
superficiales y subterráneas ( [2] ), la gestión de los residuos ( [3] ) y la conservación de los hábitats naturales ( [4] ). La Comisión
se puso en contacto con las autoridades españolas, quienes le informaron de que los proyectos de sondeo
exploratorio estarán sujetos a la legislación en materia de EIA.

En su programa de trabajo de 2013, la Comisión incluye un marco de evaluación medioambiental, climática y
energética que permita una extracción segura y protegida de hidrocarburos no convencionales ( [5] ). Este proceso se
entiende sin perjuicio del objetivo de la UE de lograr que de aquí a 2020 el 20 % de su energía proceda de fuentes de
energía renovables.

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⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 2011/92/UE, relativa a la evaluación de las repercusiones de determinados proyectos públicos y privados sobre el medio ambiente

(DO L 26 de 28.1.2012, p. 1).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directiva 2000/60/CE, por la que se establece un marco comunitario de actuación en el ámbito de la política de aguas (DO L 327

de 22.12.2000, p. 1) y Directiva 2006/118/CE, relativa a la protección de las aguas subterráneas contra la contaminación y el deterioro (DO L 372
de 27.12.2006, p. 19).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directiva 2006/21/CE, sobre la gestión de los residuos de industrias extractivas y por la que se modifica la Directiva 2004/35/CE (DO L 102

de 11.4.2006, p. 15).

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directiva 92/43/CE, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres (DO L 206 de 22.7.1992, p. 7).
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2013_annex_es.pdf

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 181

Aunque sigue habiendo incertidumbre sobre los recursos recuperables del gas de esquisto en la EU, la modelización
del sistema energético de posibles hipótesis de evolución del gas de esquisto, realizada por el Centro Común de
Investigación, indica que el aprovechamiento de este gas en la EU puede compensar el descenso de la producción de
gas convencional y evitar así el aumento del nivel actual de dependencia de las importaciones.

C 42 E / 182 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005904/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Shale gas and energy dependency

Parliament’s report 2011/2308(INI) on the environmental impacts of shale gas and shale oil extraction activities
acknowledges that there is no detailed, exhaustive and accessible legislation on the extraction of shale gas and that
such legislation needs to be drawn up. The report recommends a review of the Water Framework Directive and the
possible impacts that fracking could have, considering a ban on the use of toxic chemicals or, at least, that the exact
composition of those chemicals should be disclosed.

In its answer to Question E-007627/2011, the Commission stated that ‘shale gas exploration and exploitation
projects should be covered by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, under which Member States are
responsible for assessing private and public projects before granting development consent, taking into account the
precautionary principle, as necessary.’

Spain has granted fracking permits without carrying out any environmental impact assessments and under the false
claim that it will pave the way for radical change in the energy sector. Fracking uses large quantities of water (10 00020 000 m [3] ), but in Spain, water scarcity is a structural problem. This would therefore automatically be in breach of
the Water Framework Directive. In turn, some exploration will take place in areas protected by the Natura 2000
network, in breach of biodiversity protection objectives.

Does the Commission believe that fracking is a technology which has been fully developed? Has it been shown to be
reliable by independent bodies? Has it been established that there is no risk to people living in the regions where it is
carried out? What about risks to the environment? Is shale gas a good source of energy for Europe?

The extraction of shale gas involves the loss of other natural resources, such as water resources, and clashes with
European social values, such as the protection of natural areas. How does the Commission plan to deal with it? Does it
think that profitability takes precedence over the right to a healthy natural environment? Does the Commission plan
to place a greater emphasis on environmentally friendly renewable energies? Does the Commission believe that shale
gas will solve Europe’s energy dependency?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

Member States are responsible for the decisions on their energy mix, including prospecting, exploration and/or
production of shale gas. It is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure — via appropriate assessments,
permitting regimes and monitoring activities — that any exploration or exploitation of energy sources, including
those using hydraulic fracturing, complies with the requirements of the existing legal framework in the EU. This
includes, _inter alia_, provisions on environmental impact assessments and public participation ( [1] ), the protection of
surface and groundwater ( [2] ), on waste management ( [3] ) and on the conservation of natural habitats ( [4] ). The
Commission contacted the Spanish authorities and was informed that projects involving exploratory drilling will be
subject to EIA legislation.

The Commission included in its 2013 Work Programme an ‘Environmental, Climate and Energy Assessment
Framework to Enable Safe and Secure Unconventional Hydrocarbon Extraction’. ( [5] ) This process is without prejudice
to the EU objective to get 20% of its energy from renewable sources by 2020.

While there are still uncertainties about recoverable resources of shale gas in the EU, energy system modelling of
possible shale gas development scenarios done by the Joint Research Centre indicate that shale gas development in
the EU may compensate for the decline of conventional gas production and thus prevent the current level of import
dependency from rising.

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⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on environment (OJ L 26/1, 28.1.2012).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1) and

Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration (OJ L 372/19, 27.12.2006).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending Directive 2004/35/EC (OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 15).
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Directive 92/43/EC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7).
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2013_annex_en.pdf

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13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 183

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005905/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Los rohingyas en Myanmar/Birmania

¿Ha mantenido el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior algún debate con miembros de la Organización de
Cooperación Islámica, o les ha formulado a estos últimos alguna observación, en relación con su propuesta de una
comisión de investigación de las Naciones Unidas para evaluar los abusos perpetrados contra los rohingyas en
Myanmar/Birmania?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Sra. Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(5 de agosto de 2013)_

En sus esfuerzos para hacer frente a la propagación de la violencia antimusulmana y la situación de Rohingya en
particular en Myanamr/Birmania, la AR/VP plantea sus preocupaciones en todas las oportunidades, tanto a nivel
bilateral como internacional. Esto incluye un compromiso con la OCI y con el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo;
directamente con estas organizaciones y también en el contexto de las Naciones Unidas.

Recientemente, el 14 de junio, el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU adoptó una declaración consensual de la
Presidencia «sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Myanmar por lo que se refiere a los musulmanes de
Rohingya en el Estado de Rakhine y otros musulmanes» (presentada por Pakistán en nombre de la OCI y
Myanmar/Birmania). La UE participó activamente en las negociaciones con la OCI y Myanmar sobre el texto. Esta
declaración presidencial hace específicamente un llamamiento al Gobierno de Myanmar/Birmania para que «tome
todas las medidas necesarias para asegurar la asunción de responsabilidades y poner fin a la impunidad de las
violaciones de los derechos humanos que tienen lugar, incluida la violencia basada en la religión, en particular contra
los musulmanes, iniciando una investigación independiente, transparente y completa sobre las denuncias de todas las
violaciones del Derecho internacional en materia de derechos humanos y del Derecho internacional humanitario».

C 42 E / 184 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005905/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Rohingya in Burma

Has the European External Action Service had any discussions with, or made any representations to, any members of
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation regarding its proposal for a UN Commission of Inquiry on abuses against the
Rohingya in Burma?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 August 2013)_

In its efforts to address the spread of anti-Muslim violence and situation of Rohingya in particular in Myanamr/Burma
the HR/VP raises its concerns at every opportunity, both bilaterally and at international level. This includes
engagement also with the OIC and the Gulf Cooperation Council; directly with these organisations, but also in the UN

context.

Most recently, on 14 June the UN Human Rights Council adopted a consensual Presidential Statement ‘on the human
rights situation in Myanmar as regards Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State and other Muslims’ (tabled by Pakistan on
behalf of the OIC and Myanmar/Burma). The EU was actively engaged in the negotiations with the OIC and Myanmar
on the text. This Presidential Statement specifically calls upon the Government of Myanmar/Burma ‘to take all
necessary measures to ensure accountability and to end impunity for all violations of human rights that take place,
including violence based on religion, including against Muslims, by undertaking a full, transparent and independent
investigation into reports of all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law’.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 185

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005906/13**

**do Komisji**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(28 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Przewożenie na duże odległości cieląt nieodstawionych od matki

Na posiedzeniu intergrupy PE w dniu 17 stycznia 2013 r. dotyczącym dobrostanu zwierząt w Polsce Andrzej
Elżanowski z Polskiej Akademii Nauk oświadczył, że sporo ponad 100 000 cieląt nieodstawionych od matki jest co
roku przewożonych z Polski do Włoch (średni czas trwania podróży to w tym przypadku 25 godzin), Holandii
i Hiszpanii, oraz stwierdził, że po wielu latach polskie władze weterynaryjne przyznały, że nie są w stanie zapewnić
podstawowych standardów dobrostanu w trakcie przewozu cieląt na duże odległości, zgodnych z rozporządzeniem
(WE) nr 1/2005, w szczególności w zakresie zagwarantowania odpowiedniego żywienia.

W swoim sprawozdaniu z wizyty w Polsce Biuro ds. Żywności i Weterynarii Komisji (FVO) stwierdziło, że nawet
przedstawiciele właściwych polskich organów centralnych zgodzili się, że „w praktyce nie jest możliwe zapewnienie
odpowiedniego żywienia zwierząt nieodstawionych od matki podczas przewozu pojazdami” ( [1] ).

Projekt opracowujący wytyczne dotyczące oceny ryzyka zagrażającego dobrostanowi zwierząt podczas przewozu, tj.
sprawozdanie techniczne przedstawione Europejskiemu Urzędowi ds. Bezpieczeństwa Żywności (EFSA) w roku
2009, pokazał podstawy naukowe tego problemu, stwierdzając, że „podczas przewozu żywienie cieląt w pojeździe
mlekiem lub preparatem mlekozastępczym jest technicznie niemożliwe” ( [2] ).

1. Czy Komisja zamierza podjąć działania powstrzymujące polskie władze od udzielania zezwoleń na
przewożenie na duże odległości cieląt nieodstawionych od matki, dopóki nie będą one zdolne do zagwarantowania
minimalnych standardów dobrostanu zgodnie z rozporządzeniem (WE) nr 1/2005, w szczególności w zakresie
zagwarantowania odpowiedniego żywienia?

2. Czy odnośnie do kwestii zagwarantowania dobrostanu zwierząt nieodstawionych od matki Komisja widzi
jakiekolwiek inne możliwości, poza ograniczeniem przewozu takich zwierząt, dzięki którym nie byłoby konieczne
zapewnienie zwierzętom wody lub paszy podczas przewozu, takie jak np. ograniczenie długości trwania przewozu
do dziewięciu godzin?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonia Borga w imieniu Komisji**

_(12 lipca 2013 r.)_

1. Państwa członkowskie są odpowiedzialne za należyte egzekwowanie przepisów UE, a w tym konkretnie
przypadku powinny zapewnić, by podczas wydawania zezwoleń na przewożenie na duże odległości cieląt
nieodstawionych od matki przestrzegano przepisów w zakresie dobrostanu zwierząt zgodnie z rozporządzeniem
(WE) nr 1/2005.

W przypadku posiadania wystarczających dowodów świadczących o systematycznym i powszechnym
niezapewnianiu przez państwo członkowskie należytego egzekwowania przepisów UE w sprawie transportu
zwierząt nieodstawionych od matki Komisja może rozpocząć postępowanie w sprawie uchybienia zobowiązaniom
państwa członkowskiego, aby zlikwidować wszelkie niezgodności, a w razie konieczności może skierować sprawę do
Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE.

W przypadku Polski kwestia długości trwania przewozu oraz pojenia i karmienia zwierząt nieodstawionych od matki
była już poruszana w sprawozdaniu z kontroli, o którym mowa w zapytaniu ( [3] ). W sprawozdaniu tym stwierdza się,
że niedociągnięcia są głównie konsekwencją „nieodpowiednich kontroli w miejscu wyjazdu”. _W_ sprawozdaniu
zalecono zatem ( [4] ), by „centralny właściwy organ zapewniał przeprowadzanie odpowiednich kontroli dzienników
podróży zgodnie z wymogami art. 14 rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1/2005 ( [5] ) oraz zapisów przemieszczania się środków
transportu drogowego otrzymanych z systemu nawigacyjnego zgodnie z art. 15 ust. 4 rozporządzenia (WE)
nr 1/2005”.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DG (SANCO)2010-8387-MR FINAL (specjalna kontrola przeprowadzona w Polsce w dniach 23 lutego–4 marca 2010 r.), s. 19.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) S. 30 sprawozdania technicznego.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Sprawozdanie końcowe ze szczegółowej kontroli przeprowadzonej w Polsce w dniach od 23 lutego do 4 marca 2010 r. w celu oceny

przeprowadzania kontroli w zakresie dobrostanu zwierząt w gospodarstwach rolnych i podczas transportu w kontekście audytu ogólnego.
DG(SANCO) 2010-8387 – MR FINAL, http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_id=2498

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Zalecenie nr 6 sprawozdania z kontroli.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Rozporządzenie Rady (WE) nr 1/2005 z dnia 22 grudnia 2004 r. w sprawie ochrony zwierząt podczas transportu i związanych z tym działań,

Dz.U. L 3 z 5.1.2005, s. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 186 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Komisja będzie w dalszym ciągu ściśle monitorować sytuację, a w przypadku uporczywego niespełniania wymogów,
rozważy podjęcie w miarę potrzeby dalszych działań.

2. Komisja nie uważa, by zmiana długości trwania przewozu określonej w rozporządzeniu 1/2005 była
konieczna w celu zapewnienia zadowalającego poziomu ochrony zwierząt, których dotyczy zapytanie. Komisja jest
zdania, że powinna się skupiać na właściwym egzekwowaniu istniejącego prawodawstwa przez państwa
członkowskie.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 187

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005906/13**

**to the Commission**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Long-distance transport of unweaned calves

At the Parliament intergroup meeting of 17 January 2013 on animal welfare in Poland, Andrzej Elżanowski of the
Polish Academy of Sciences said that well over 100 000 unweaned calves per year had been exported from Poland to
Italy (with an average journey time of 25 hours), the Netherlands and Spain, and that, after many years, the Polish
veterinary authorities had admitted to failing to secure minimum welfare standards for the long-distance transport of
calves in order to comply with Regulation (EC) No 1/2005, especially with regard to ensuring appropriate feeding.

In its report on a mission to Poland, the Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) states that even
representatives of the competent central authorities in Poland agree that ‘in practice it is not possible to ensure the
adequate feeding of unweaned animals on board vehicles’ ( [1] ).

The ‘Project to Develop Animal Welfare Risk Assessment Guidelines on Transport’, a technical report submitted to
the European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2009, provides the scientific basis for this in stating that ‘during
transport it is technically impossible to feed calves on board a vehicle with milk or milk replacer’ ( [2] ).

1. Does the Commission intend to take action to stop the Polish authorities authorising the long-distance
transport of unweaned calves until such time as they are able to ensure minimum welfare standards, as laid down in
Regulation (EC) No 1/2005, especially with regard to ensuring appropriate feeding?

2. With regard to guaranteeing the welfare of unweaned animals, does the Commission see any other possibilities
aside from the reduction of transport times for unweaned animals, so that it would not be necessary to provide them
with water or food during transit, e.g. limiting transport times to nine hours?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

1. Member States are responsible for the adequate enforcement of EU provisions and, in this particular case, they
shall ensure that, when authorising long distance transport of unweaned calves, welfare standards as included in
Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 are respected.

The Commission may, in case of sufficient evidence of a systematic and general failure by a Member State to ensure
the proper enforcement of EU legislation on transport of unweaned animals, start infringement proceedings to bring
any incompliance to an end and, where necessary, may refer the case to the European Court of Justice.

In the case of Poland, the issue of travelling times and watering and feeding for unweaned animals was addressed in
the audit report referred to in the question ( [3] ). The report concludes that this is mainly a consequence of inadequate
checks at departure. The report therefore recommends ( [4] ) that ‘the central competent authority should ensure that
appropriate checks are performed on journey logs as required by Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 ( [5] ) and on
the records of movements of the means of transport obtained from navigation system as required by Article 15(4) of
Regulation (EC) No 1/2005’.

The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation and, in case of persistent non-compliance, will
consider further actions as necessary.

2. The Commission does not see that a change in the journey times as set out in Regulation 1/2005 would be
necessary to ensure a satisfactory level of protection for the animals concerned. Instead, the Commission considers
that it should focus on the proper enforcement of the existing legislation by Member States.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DG (SANCO)2010-8387-MR FINAL (special audit carried out in Poland from 23 February to 4 March 2010), page 19.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Page 30 of the technical report.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Final report of a specific audit carried out in Poland from 23 February to 4 March 2010 in order to evaluate the implementation of controls for

animal welfare on farms and during transport in the context of a general audit. DG(SANCO) 2010-8387 — MR FINAL,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_id=2498

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Recommendation number 6 of the audit report.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations, OJ L 3, 5.1.2005,

p. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 188 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005910/13**

**au Conseil**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(28 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Perspectives d'avenir pour l'emploi des jeunes

Avec près d'un jeune Européen sur quatre au chômage, l'emploi devrait être une des grandes priorités de l'Union
européenne.

Le taux de chômage chez les Grecs de moins de 25 ans est supérieur à 50 % depuis des mois. La situation est tout aussi
dramatique en Espagne, au Portugal et en Italie. Selon Eurostat, l'Office statistique de l'Union européenne, le taux de
chômage chez les jeunes adultes au sein de l'Union a augmenté, au point d'atteindre 23,5 %. Une génération perdue
est en train de prendre forme en Europe.

En février, le Conseil européen a décidé d'allouer 6 000 000 000 d'euros supplémentaires à la lutte contre le chômage
des jeunes d'ici à 2020, une mesure accompagnée d'un engagement extrêmement symbolique: la garantie d'un
emploi. Toutefois, comme les États membres débattent encore de la façon de dépenser cet argent, le programme ne
pourra débuter avant 2014.

1. Le Conseil peut il confirmer que l'Allemagne souhaite prêter main forte aux pays les plus en crise en
«incorporant des éléments associant la formation et l'enseignement professionnel dans leurs systèmes respectifs»? Le
gouvernement entendrait créer un nouveau «Bureau central pour la coopération internationale en matière
d'éducation» dans le cadre de l'Institut fédéral pour l'enseignement professionnel et la formation (BIBB), qui pourrait
envoyer des conseillers dans les pays en crise si besoin.

2. Quels sont les résultats escomptés?

3. Quels sont les autres plans à l'embauche pour les jeunes prévus par le Conseil?

**Réponse**
_(11 septembre 2013)_

Le Conseil n'est pas en mesure d'exprimer un avis sur les projets ou les initiatives des États membres.

L'emploi étant une matière qui relève de la compétence des États membres, le traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union
européenne précise que _«l'Union contribue à la réalisation d'un niveau d'emploi élevé en encourageant la coopération entre les_
_États membres et en soutenant et, au besoin, en complétant leur action» (_ **[1]** ). À cet égard, le Conseil européen a invité les États
membres à présenter, dans leurs programmes nationaux de réforme, les mesures concrètes qu'ils prendraient pour
préserver les emplois existants et en créer de nouveaux («plans nationaux pour l'emploi») et il a décidé que la mise en
œuvre de ces mesures ferait l'objet d'un suivi renforcé, dans le cadre du semestre européen ( **[2]** ).

Le Conseil a reconnu en de nombreuses occasions ( [3] ) l'importance capitale que revêt la lutte contre le chômage des
jeunes en Europe, en dernier lieu en dégageant rapidement un accord qui a conduit à l'adoption de la
recommandation du Conseil du 22 avril 2013 sur l'établissement d'une garantie pour la jeunesse ( [4] ).

Par ailleurs, dans le cadre de la procédure législative ordinaire, le Conseil est engagé dans des négociations avec le
Parlement européen en vue de l'adoption d'un ensemble de mesures législatives relatives à la politique de cohésion
pour la période 2014-2020, au cours desquelles sont examinées les modalités pratiques de mise en œuvre de
l'initiative pour l'emploi des jeunes que le Conseil européen a approuvée les 7 et 8 février 2013.

L'attention de l'Honorable Parlementaire est également attirée sur le fait que, dans le cadre du semestre européen
2013, la Commission a soumis, le 29 mai 2013, des propositions de recommandations par pays ( **[5]** ), dont certaines
portent sur la jeunesse. Ces recommandations par pays ont été approuvées dans l'ensemble par le Conseil européen
les 27 et 28 juin 2013 ( **[6]** ) et adoptées par le Conseil le 9 juillet 2013.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 147, paragraphe 1, du TFUE.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Déclaration des membres du Conseil européen du 30 janvier 2012 (doc. SN 5/1/12).
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Notamment doc. 11838/11, 17590/11 et 14426/12.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) JO C 120 du 26.4.2013, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Doc. 10345/13.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Doc. EUCO 104/2/13.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 189

Le thème du chômage des jeunes a également fait l'objet d'un débat d'orientation au sein du Conseil lors de sa session
du 20 juin 2013 ( **[7]** ) et il a été abordé aussi lors de la réunion du Conseil européen des 27 et 28 juin 2013 ( **[8]** ). Le Conseil
européen s'est mis d'accord sur une approche globale pour lutter contre le chômage des jeunes, fondée sur les mesures
concrètes suivantes: accélération de l'Initiative pour l'emploi des jeunes, avec une concentration des efforts en début
de période; accélération de la mise en œuvre de la garantie pour la jeunesse et renforcement de la mobilité des jeunes
et de la participation des partenaires sociaux ( **[9]** ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) Doc. 10375/13.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) Doc. EUCO 104/2/13.
( ⋅9∙ ) Idem.

C 42 E / 190 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005910/13**

**to the Council**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Employment prospects for young people

With nearly one in four young people out of work, jobs should be one of the EU’s top priorities.

The unemployment rate for under 25-year-olds in Greece has been above 50% for months. The situation is no less
dire in Spain, Portugal and Italy. According to Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union, the
unemployment rate among young adults in Europe now stands at 23.5%. In other words, a lost generation is
emerging in Europe.

In February, the European Council decided to set aside an additional EUR 6 billion over the period to 2020 to tackle
the problem of youth unemployment, and backed this up by making a commitment of great symbolic power: the
guarantee of a job for every young person. However, since Member States are still debating how to spend this money,
the scheme will not be up and running before 2014.

1. Can the Council confirm that Germany has offered to lend its support to those countries hardest hit by the crisis
by helping them to incorporate elements of its model, which combines vocational education and training, into their
national education systems? According to reports, the German Government plans to set up a new Central Office for
International Educational Cooperation at the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training, which could
send advisers to the crisis-stricken countries if needed.

2. What does the Council expect this initiative to achieve?

3. What other initiatives does the Council have in the pipeline to help young people find jobs?

**Reply**
_(11 September 2013)_

The Council is not in a position to give an opinion on plans or initiatives taken by Member States.

Employment being a Member States' competence, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that
‘the European Union shall contribute to a high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member
States and by supporting and, if necessary, complementing their action’ ( **[1]** ). In this context, the European Council
called upon Member States to set out, within their National Reform Programmes, concrete measures to keep people
in work and create jobs (‘National Job Plans’); and decided that implementation thereof would be subject to enhanced
monitoring in the framework of the European Semester ( **[2]** ).

The critical importance of tackling the youth unemployment situation in Europe has been recognised by the Council
on numerous occasions ( [3] ), and most recently by the rapid agreement leading to the adoption of the Council
Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee ( [4] ).

Furthermore, the Council is engaged in negotiations with the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative
procedure, with a view to the adoption of the Cohesion Policy legislative package for 2014-2020, in which the
practical terms and conditions of the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) as agreed upon by the European Council on
7-8 February 2013, are being discussed.

The Honourable Member's attention is also drawn to the fact that, in the context of the 2013 European Semester
process, the Commission on 29 May 2013 submitted proposals for Country‐Specific Recommendations (CSR) ( [5] )
which include youth-related recommendations. On 27‐28 June 2013, the European Council generally endorsed the
CSRs ( [6] ), and the Council adopted them on 9 July 2013.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 147(1) TFEU.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Statement of the Members of the European Council, 30 January 2012, SN 5/1/12.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) 11838/11, 17590/11, 14426/12, inter alia.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) OJ C 120, 26.4.2013, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) 10345/13.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) EUCO 104/2/13.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 191

Youth unemployment was also the subject of a policy debate within the Council at its session on 20 June 2013 ( [7] ),
and this issue was also discussed at the European Council meeting of 27‐28 June 2013 ( [8] ). The European Council
agreed on a comprehensive approach to combat youth unemployment, building on the following concrete measures:
speeding up and frontloading of the Youth Employment Initiative; speeding up implementation of the Youth
Guarantee; and increased youth mobility and involvement of the social partners ( [9] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) 10375/13.
( **|** ⋅8∙ **|** ) EUCO 104/2/13.
( ⋅9∙ ) idem.

C 42 E / 192 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005911/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(28 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Perspectives d'avenir pour l'emploi des jeunes

Avec près d'un jeune Européen sur quatre au chômage, l'emploi devrait être une des grandes priorités de l'Union
européenne.

Le taux de chômage chez les Grecs de moins de 25 ans est supérieur à 50 % depuis des mois. La situation est tout aussi
dramatique en Espagne, au Portugal et en Italie. Selon Eurostat, l'Office statistique de l'Union européenne, le taux de
chômage chez les jeunes adultes au sein de l'UE a augmenté au point d'atteindre 23,5 %. Une génération perdue est en
train de prendre forme en Europe.

En février, le Conseil européen a décidé d'allouer six milliards d'euros supplémentaires à la lutte contre le chômage des
jeunes d'ici à 2020; cette mesure s'est accompagnée d'un engagement extrêmement symbolique: la garantie d'un
emploi. Toutefois, comme les États membres débattent encore de la façon de dépenser cet argent, le programme ne
pourra pas débuter avant 2014.

1. La Commission peut-elle confirmer que l'Allemagne souhaite prêter main forte aux pays les plus en crise en
«incorporant des éléments associant la formation et l'enseignement professionnel dans leurs systèmes respectifs»? Le
gouvernement entendrait créer un nouveau «Bureau central pour la coopération internationale en matière
d'éducation» dans le cadre de l'Institut fédéral pour l'enseignement professionnel et la formation (BIBB), qui pourrait
envoyer des conseillers dans les pays en crise si besoin.

2. Quels sont les résultats escomptés?

3. Quels sont les autres plans à l'embauche pour les jeunes prévus par la Commission?

**Réponse donnée par M. Andor au nom de la Commission**

_(22 juillet 2013)_

1. La Commission peut confirmer que six États membres de l'UE — l'Espagne, la Grèce, le Portugal, l'Italie, la
Slovaquie et la Lettonie — ont signé un protocole avec l'Allemagne à Berlin le 11 décembre 2012 afin de collaborer
étroitement avec cette dernière pour réformer leurs systèmes de formation professionnelle et d'éducation ( [1] ). La
Commission a soutenu cette initiative, qui constitue une contribution essentielle à la création et au développement de
l'alliance européenne pour l'apprentissage. Elle a lancé cette alliance officiellement le 2 juillet 2013, en regroupant
sous un même chapeau l'initiative susnommée ainsi que d'autres initiatives bilatérales et en associant à la démarche
d'autres États membres et un éventail plus large d'acteurs pour les amener à apprendre les uns des autres et à
promouvoir des partenariats solides à l'échelle nationale en faveur de la formation en alternance.

2. En ce qui concerne les résultats escomptés des coopérations bilatérales en cours, la Commission invite
l'Honorable Parlementaire à s'adresser aux gouvernements qui ont signé le protocole.

3. Dans la continuation du paquet «emploi des jeunes» du 5 décembre 2012 et de l'adoption, le 22 avril 2013, de la
recommandation du Conseil sur l'établissement d'une garantie pour la jeunesse, la Commission a publié, le 19 juin
2013, la communication «Œuvrer ensemble pour les jeunes Européens — Un appel à l'action contre le chômage des
jeunes», en guise de contribution aux travaux du Conseil européen des 27 et 28 juin ( [2] ). Elle préconise des mesures
d'urgence, notamment la mise en œuvre de l'initiative Garantie pour la jeunesse, l'utilisation du Fonds social
européen, une mise en œuvre accélérée de l'initiative pour l'emploi des jeunes, un soutien à la mobilité de la maind'œuvre à l'intérieur de l'UE avec le concours d'EURES, des mesures visant à faciliter le passage des études à la vie
active grâce aux apprentissages et aux stages, une ouverture des possibilités d'éducation et de formation
transfrontières via le programme «Erasmus +» et un soutien aux PME.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bmbf.de/de/17127.php
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013)447 final.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 193

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005911/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Employment prospects for young people

With nearly one in four young people out of work, jobs should be one of the EU’s top priorities.

The unemployment rate for under 25-year-olds in Greece has been above 50% for months. The situation is no less
dire in Spain, Portugal and Italy. According to Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union, the
unemployment rate among young adults in Europe now stands at 23.5%. In other words, a lost generation is
emerging in Europe.

In February, the European Council decided to set aside an additional EUR 6 billion over the period to 2020 to tackle
the problem of youth unemployment, and backed this up by making a commitment of great symbolic power: the
guarantee of a job for every young person. However, since Member States are still debating how to spend this money,
the scheme will not be up and running before 2014.

1. Can the Commission confirm that Germany has offered to lend its support to those countries hardest hit by the
crisis by helping them to incorporate elements of its model, which combines vocational education and training, into
their national education systems? According to reports, the German Government plans to set up a new Central Office
for International Educational Cooperation at the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training, which could
send advisers to the crisis-stricken countries if needed.

2. What does the Commission expect this initiative to achieve?

3. What other initiatives does the Commission have in the pipeline to help young people find jobs?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

1. The Commission can confirm that six EU Member States — Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Slovakia and Latvia
— signed a memorandum with Germany in Berlin on 11 December 2012 in order to closely work with Germany to
reform their systems of vocational training and education ( [1] ). The Commission supported this initiative as an essential
contribution to the establishment and implementation of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships. The
Commission officially launched this Alliance on 2 July 2013, pooling this and other ongoing bilateral initiatives
under a common umbrella, bringing in more Member States and a wider range of stakeholders to learn from each
other and promote strong partnerships at national level for dual learning.

2. With regard to the expected outcomes of ongoing bilateral cooperations, the Commission invites the
honourable Member of Parliament to refer to the governments that signed the memorandum.

3. Building on the Youth Employment Package of 5 December 2012, and the adoption of the Council
Recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee on 22 April 2013, the Commission issued a communication
‘Working together for Europe's young people. A call to action on youth unemployment’ on 19 June 2013 as input to
the 27-28 June European Council ( [2] ). It calls for urgent action including the implementation of the Youth Guarantee;
the use of the European Social Fund; the front-loading of the Youth Employment Initiative; support to intra-EU
labour mobility through EURES; measures to ease the transition from education to work through apprenticeships and
traineeships; opening up cross-border education and training opportunities through ‘Erasmus +’ and support for
SMEs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.bmbf.de/en/17127.php
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 447 final.

C 42 E / 194 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005912/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Strage di oche nei pressi dell'aeroporto di Amsterdam

Dopo una feroce battaglia giudiziaria sollevata da un gruppo animalista olandese, un tribunale dei Paesi Bassi ha
autorizzato l'Autorità aeroportuale di Amsterdam a sterminare con gas tossici delle oche, oltre 10 000, che dimorano
nei pressi dell'aeroporto di Schipol. Già l'estate scorsa le autorità avevano sterminato 5 000 oche, con il risultato di
diminuire del 90 % le collisioni tra uccelli ed aerei; tuttavia, l'uccisione di 15 000 animali in totale potrebbe portare a
gravi scompensi nella fauna e nella flora dei Paesi Bassi, oltre a rappresentare una vera e propria barbarie ed una
violazione della tutela degli animali.

Si chiede alla Commissione:

1. Non ritiene che lo sterminio di 10 000 animali vada contro le norme europee sulla tutela della fauna?

2. Non ritiene perciò che l'aeroporto di Schipol debba dotarsi di moderne tecnologie, come avviene in numerosi
altri aeroporti internazionali, come sistemi radar appositi che rilevino la presenza di stormi di uccelli o
strumenti sonori che allontanino i volatili, oppure che si debba prevedere la modifica delle colture intorno allo
scalo, che farebbe migrare pacificamente gli uccelli, come avvenuto nel caso dell'aeroporto londinese di
Heathrow?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(12 luglio 2013)_

1.   La Commissione è al corrente della decisione di un tribunale dei Paesi Bassi ( [1] ) che consente l'abbattimento di
oche in un raggio fino a 20 km intorno alla zona aeroportuale di Schiphol. A norma della direttiva Uccelli ( [2] ) nei Paesi
Bassi quattro specie di oche ( _Anse anser_, _A. albifrons_, _A. flavirostris_ e _Branta Canadensis)_ possono essere oggetto di atti di
caccia. In deroga alle disposizioni generali in materia di caccia (articolo 7) ed al divieto di utilizzare metodi di
uccisione non selettiva (articolo 8), l'articolo 9, paragrafo 1, lettera a), consente in circostanze ben precise la cattura e
l'uccisione di uccelli nell’interesse della sicurezza aerea.

2.   Esistono diverse tecniche per scoraggiare gli uccelli del posarsi in prossimità di aree aeroportuali, ma è
primariamente compito delle autorità (giudiziarie) nazionali verificare se sussistano o meno le condizioni per
l'applicazione dell'articolo 9 della direttiva Uccelli, compresa l'assenza di altre soluzioni soddisfacenti. La
Commissione non vede alcun motivo per non condividere le conclusioni raggiunte dal tribunale dei Paesi Bassi in
merito all'assenza di misure alternative che potessero, nel breve termine, condurre all'auspicata riduzione del numero
di volatili.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Sentenza (provvedimenti provvisori) del 31/5/2013 nei casi AWB 13/2457 e 13/2473.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Direttiva 2009/147/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 30 novembre 2009, concernente la conservazione degli uccelli selvatici.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 195

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005912/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Culling of geese near Amsterdam Airport

Following a bitter legal battle instigated by a Dutch animal rights group, a court in the Netherlands has authorised the
Amsterdam Airport authority to exterminate over 10 000 geese living near Schiphol Airport with poison gas. In the
summer of 2012 the authorities already exterminated 5 000 geese, thus reducing the collisions between birds and
aircraft by 90%; nevertheless, culling 15 000 animals in total could cause a serious imbalance in the flora and fauna of
the Netherlands, as well as being a truly savage act and a violation of animal protection.

1. Does the Commission not believe that exterminating 10 000 animals breaches European legislation on the
protection of fauna?

2. Does it not believe, therefore, that Schiphol Airport should follow the lead of many other international airports
and employ modern technologies, such as radar systems designed to detect the presence of flocks of birds or sound
instruments to deter them, or that it should change the crops around the airport so as to make the birds migrate
peacefully, a tactic used at Heathrow Airport in London?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

1. The Commission is aware of the decision by the Dutch Court ( [1] ) allowing the killing of geese up to 20 km
around the Schiphol Airport area. Under the Birds Directive ( [2] ) four species of Geese ( _Anse anser_, _A. albifrons_, _A._
_flavirostris_ and _Branta Canadensis)_ can be hunted in the Netherlands _._ Article 9 (1)(a) does allow under strict
circumstances the capture and killing of birds in the interest of air safety by derogating from the general provision on
hunting (Article 7) and from the prohibition to use non-selective methods of killing (Article 8).

2. Different techniques for discouraging birds landing in airport areas exist, but it is primarily for the national
(judicial) authorities to verify whether the conditions for applying Article 9 of the Birds directive, including in the
absence of other satisfactory solutions, have been met or not. The Commission does not see a reason for disagreeing
with the conclusion reached by the Dutch court on this point, that no alternative measures effectively leading to the
desired reduction of numbers in the short term existed.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Judgment (interim relief) of 31/5/2013 in cases AWB 13/2457 +13/2473.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds.

C 42 E / 196 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005913/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Sgomberi forzati in Brasile

Nel suo rapporto annuale, Amnesty International ha evidenziato i frequenti sgomberi forzati attuati in Brasile,
soprattutto nella metropoli di Rio de Janeiro. Di questi trasferimenti, necessari per far spazio alle grandi infrastrutture
previste per la Coppa del Mondo 2014 e per le Olimpiadi del 2016, non sono state informate le comunità residenti,
composte per la maggior parte da indios. Di conseguenza, gli indigeni sono esposti a sgomberi improvvisi e perdono
la loro casa senza essere a conoscenza delle alternative proposte dal governo.

Considerando l'articolo 25 della Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti dell'Uomo, che cita tra i diritti corollario della
dignità umana anche il diritto all'abitazione; osservando altresì l'articolo 11 del Patto internazionale sui diritti
economici, sociali e culturali, che riprende la dicitura della Dichiarazione riconoscendo il diritto all'abitazione quale
diritto indispensabile per ottenere un «miglioramento continuo delle proprie condizioni di vita»; considerando infine
l'articolo 17 della Carta CEDU, posto a tutela del diritto di proprietà, secondo il quale «(…) Nessuno può essere
privato della proprietà se non per causa di pubblico interesse, nei casi e nei modi previsti dalla legge e contro il
pagamento in tempo utile di una giusta indennità per la perdita della stessa»,

si chiede alla Commissione:

1. Sono attualmente in corso indagini per approfondire la conoscenza del fenomeno in questione?

2. Quali misure intende intraprendere nell'ambito della politica estera per fare pressione sul governo brasiliano
affinché ponga fine alle vessazioni?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(16 agosto 2013)_

1. L'UE segue con la massima attenzione la questione degli sfratti, indipendentemente dal fatto che siano legati a
grandi progetti infrastrutturali. Al riguardo sono state intentate diverse azioni giudiziarie dinanzi ai giudici brasiliani.
Fatta eccezione per il «Museu do Indio» di Rio de Janeiro, gli sfratti non sembrano colpire nessun gruppo etnico in
particolare.

2. L'UE mantiene un dialogo costante con il Brasile e le sue autorità in materia di diritti umani e sviluppo sociale.
L'agenda del dialogo sui diritti umani viene definita con l'attiva partecipazione delle organizzazioni della società civile.
Il prossimo dialogo si svolgerà in Brasile, probabilmente a ottobre 2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 197

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005913/13**

**to the Commission**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Forced evictions in Brazil

In its annual report, Amnesty International has highlighted the frequent forced evictions carried out in Brazil,
especially in Rio de Janeiro. The communities of residents, comprised mainly of Indios, are not informed of these
evictions, which are necessary to make space for the major infrastructure planned for the 2014 World Cup and the
2016 Olympic Games. Consequently, the indigenous peoples are evicted without warning and lose their homes
without being aware of the alternatives offered by the government.

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists the right to housing among the rights relating to human
dignity; Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights echoes the wording of the
Declaration, recognising the right to housing as indispensable for obtaining a ‘continuous improvement of living
conditions’; and lastly, Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which safeguards the right to
property, stipulates that: ‘(…) No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in
the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their
loss.’

1. Are investigations currently under way to gain a better understanding of the situation in question?

2. What foreign policy measures will the Commission take in order to put pressure on the Brazilian Government
to stop this oppression?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 August 2013)_

1. The subject of evictions, whether or not in connection to major infrastructure projects, is closely followed by
the EU. A number of related legal actions have been presented to the Brazilian Courts. Apart from the ‘Museu do
Indio’ in Rio de Janeiro, evictions do not seem to target any ethnic groups in particular.

2. The EU has a continued dialogue with Brazil and its authorities on matters of human rights and social
development. The Human Rights dialogue agenda is organised with the active involvement of Civil Society
Organisations. The next dialogue will take place in Brazil, most probably in October 2013.

C 42 E / 198 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005914/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Condanna di alcuni attivisti in Vietnam

Dopo che, lo scorso gennaio, il Tribunale di Vinh li aveva condannati a 13 anni di detenzione con l'accusa di
sovversione, oggi solo quattro dei 14 attivisti cattolici colpevoli di utilizzare Internet hanno ottenuto una
diminuzione della pena. Tra questi, il blogger Paulus Le Van Son, che sconterà quattro anni in un carcere di Stato.

Sottolineando come l'articolo 19 della Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti dell'Uomo affermi che «Ogni individuo ha
il diritto alla libertà di opinione e di espressione, incluso il diritto di non essere molestato per la propria opinione e
quello di cercare, ricevere e diffondere informazioni e idee attraverso ogni mezzo e senza riguardo alle frontiere»;
considerando poi l'articolo 10, paragrafo 1, della Carta CEDU, che ribadisce il principio della libertà di espressione
imponendo alle autorità pubbliche di astenersi dall'attuare ingerenze di sorta; evidenziando infine la risoluzione del
Parlamento europeo sulla libertà di espressione su Internet (P6_TA(2006)0324), con la quale si ribadiva l'impegno a
costruire una società dell'informazione basata sui diritti umani e sulle libertà fondamentali,

si chiede alla Commissione:

1. Quali strumenti di pressione intende adottare per indurre gli Stati terzi a rispettare la libertà di espressione su
Internet?

2. Di quali dati dispone attualmente con riferimento alla violazione della libertà di pensiero sui nuovi mezzi di
informazione?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(12 agosto 2013)_

Il 24 maggio scorso l'UE ha espresso al governo del Vietnam la sua preoccupazione per il peggioramento della
situazione dei diritti umani, con particolare riguardo alle sentenze cui si riferisce l'onorevole deputato. In un
messaggio pubblicato il 31 maggio sul sito web della delegazione, il capo della delegazione dell'UE ha espresso
preoccupazione in merito alla libertà di espressione e alle dure condanne pronunciate contro i blogger.

Il quadro strategico 2013 dell'UE su diritti umani e democrazia afferma inoltre che l'UE continuerà a promuovere la
libertà di espressione online e offline, perché la democrazia non può esistere senza tali diritti. A titolo di esempio, in
occasione del varo della strategia per la sicurezza informatica, nel gennaio 2013, l'Alta Rappresentante dell'Unione
per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza/Vicepresidente della Commissione ha dichiarato: «Affinché il ciberspazio
resti aperto e libero, occorre che alle transazioni su internet si applichino regole, principi e valori promossi dall'UE al
di fuori di tale ambito.».

Gli interventi sono realizzati nell'ambito di più ampi strumenti UE per i diritti umani quali lo strumento europeo per
la democrazia e i diritti umani, che dal 2012 eroga finanziamenti specifici per progetti relativi alla censura sulla rete,
volti a evitare violazioni dei diritti umani per mezzo delle tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione, o
attraverso l'elaborazione di orientamenti sulla libertà di espressione online e offline, compresa la protezione di
blogger e giornalisti.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 199

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005914/13**

**to the Commission**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Convictions of activists in Vietnam

In January 2013, the Court of Vinh sentenced 14 Catholic activists to 13 years’ imprisonment for using the Internet
for subversive purposes. As of today, only four of the 14 activists have had their sentences reduced, including the
blogger Paulus Le Van Son, who will spend four years in a state prison.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers’; Article 10(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights reaffirms the principle of freedom of expression, requiring the public authorities not to interfere in any
way; and lastly, the European Parliament resolution on freedom of expression on the Internet (P6_TA(2006)0324)
stresses the need to build an information society on the basis of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

1. What pressure will the Commission bring to bear on third countries in order to ensure that they respect
freedom of expression on the Internet?

2. What data does it currently possess with regard to violations of freedom of thought on new media?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 August 2013)_

The EU most recently (24 May) carried out a demarche conveying its concerns to the Government of Vietnam about
regressive developments of the human rights situation in general and these sentences in particular. On 31 May the
Head of the EU Delegation in a message published on the Delegation's website expressed concern regarding freedom
of expression and the harsh sentencing of bloggers.

Moreover, the 2012 EU strategic framework on Human rights and Democracy states that the EU will continue to
promote freedom of expression, both online and offline as democracy cannot exist without these rights. As an
example during the launch of the cyber security strategy in January 2013 the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission said: ‘For cyberspace to remain open and free,
the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline, should also apply online.’

Actions are channelled through a number of broader EU Human Rights instruments such as the European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights that since 2012 provides specific funding for cyber-censorship projects to address
violations of human rights using ICT; or through the development of EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression online
and offline, including the protection of bloggers and journalists.

C 42 E / 200 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005915/13**

**do Komisji**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(28 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wielkość produkcji wołowiny w UE oraz obrót wołowiną pomiędzy UE a krajami trzecimi

Jaki jest import wołowiny do krajów Unii Europejskiej z krajów trzecich oraz jaki jest eksport wołowiny z UE,
w okresie ostatnich trzech lat, ze wskazaniem głównych krajów eksportujących i importujących wołowinę do UE
i z UE?

Jaka była produkcja wołowiny w UE w okresie ostatnich trzech lat, z uwzględnieniem poszczególnych państw
członkowskich?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Daciana Cioloșa w imieniu Komisji**

_(5 lipca 2013 r.)_

W porównaniu z 2010 r., w 2011 r. eksport produktów z wołowiny z UE odnotował solidny wzrost, a w 2012 r.
zmniejszył się, utrzymując się jednak na wyższym poziomie niż w 2010 r. Główną przyczyną wzrostu eksportu był
wyższy popyt na żywe zwierzęta w Turcji, która w latach 2011-2012 stała się głównym rynkiem eksportowym dla
UE.

W tym samym trzyletnim okresie import do UE nieznacznie spadł, przede wszystkim w wyniku zmniejszenia się
dostaw z krajów należących do Mercosur, takich jak Brazylia i Argentyna.

W załączniku I znajduje się zestawienie szczegółowych danych dotyczących unijnego handlu produktami
z wołowiny.

Produkcja wołowiny w UE spadła z 7,917 tys. ton (masa tusz) w 2010 r. do 7,537 tys. ton w 2012 r. Do
największych producentów należą: Francja, Niemcy, Włochy, Zjednoczone Królestwo, Hiszpania i Irlandia. Spadek
produkcji wynika ze zmniejszania się stad bydła, jak również z gwałtownego zwiększenia się eksportu żywych
zwierząt.

W załączniku II przedstawiono ogólne zestawienie danych dotyczących produkcji mięsa wołowego w UE.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 201

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005915/13**

**to the Commission**
**Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Amount of beef produced in the EU and beef trade between the EU and non-EU countries

How much beef has been imported to the Member States from non-EU countries and how much has been exported
from the EU over the past three years, broken down in terms of the main exporters and importers of beef to and from
the EU?

How much beef did the EU produce in the past three years, and what are the figures for the individual Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 July 2013)_

Compared to 2010 EU exports of Beef products increased firmly in 2011 and went down again in 2012, although
remaining above 2010 figures. This increase in exports is mainly due to a higher demand for live animals from
Turkey, which became our first export market in 2011 and 2012.

EU imports decreased slightly during this 3-year period mainly caused by lower shipments from Mercosur suppliers
such as Brazil and Argentina.

In Annex I a detailed overview of the EU trade in Beef products is provided.

EU beef production came down from 7.917 thousand tonnes carcass weight in 2010 to 7.537 thousand tonnes in
2012. Main producing Member States are France, Germany, Italy, UK, Spain and Ireland. The decrease in production
figures is due to a declining cattle herd as well as a surge in exports of life animals.

In Annex II an overview of the EU beef meat production is to be found.

C 42 E / 202 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005919/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Umgang mit EU-Geldern

Die EU-Kommission kam Anfang des Monats zu dem Schluss, dass Rumänien hinsichtlich der Projektvorschläge für
EU-Förderungen in der Finanzierungsperiode 2014-2020 die minimalen Qualitäts‐ und Glaubwürdigkeitsvorgaben
nicht erfüllt. Dabei scheint das Problem hauptsächlich in zahlreichen Regelverstößen öffentlicher Ausschreibungen
zu liegen.

1. Welche Fortschritte konnte Rumänien hinsichtlich der Projektvorschläge erzielen?

2. Gibt es ähnliche Probleme auch mit anderen förderwürdigen Staaten, wie z. B. Bulgarien?

3. In welchem Ausmaß erwartet die Kommission nach der Umstellung der EU-Fonds-Nutzung in Richtung
Regionalisierung eine Besserung im Umgang mit EU-Geldern?

**Antwort von Herrn Hahn im Namen der Kommission**

_(23. Juli 2013)_

1. Die Kommentare der Kommission von Februar 2013 bezogen sich nicht auf einen möglichen Verstoß gegen
die Vorschriften für die Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge, sondern auf die Vorbereitungen für den nächsten
Programmplanungszeitraum durch die rumänischen Behörden betreffend solide und gut aufeinander abgestimmte
Prioritäten auf der Grundlage tragfähiger Strategien. Probleme bei der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge, die im laufenden
Planungszeitraum festgestellt wurden, konnten durch eine gezielte Initiative behoben werden, die mit der
Vorbereitung des kommenden Planungszeitraums in keinerlei Zusammenhang steht.

2. Was die Vorbereitungen für den nächsten Planungszeitraum angeht, so arbeiten die Mitgliedstaaten derzeit
sämtlich die Entwürfe ihrer Programmplanungsdokumente aus. Bulgarien hat als erstes Land den Entwurf einer
Partnerschaftsvereinbarung vorgelegt. Was mögliche Mängel bei der Verwaltung öffentlicher Ausschreibungen in
einem Mitgliedstaat anbelangt, so wird die Ordnungsmäßigkeit der aus EU-Mitteln bestrittenen Ausgaben mit den
nationalen Verwaltungs‐ und Kontrollsystemen unter Aufsicht der Kommission überprüft, die bei Bedarf eigene
Audits durchführt und geeignete Maßnahmen zur Absicherung des EU‐Haushalts ergreift.

3. Die rumänischen Behörden haben der Kommission mitgeteilt, dass sie einen erheblichen Betrag an Mitteln aus
dem Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung für künftige Regionalprogramme aufzuwenden beabsichtigen.
Die Kommission hat festgestellt, dass die Dezentralisierung auf geeignete Weise ausgestaltet und auf eine gründliche
Analyse (Subsidiarität) und Vorbereitung (Kompetenztransfer, Finanzierungsmechanismen) gestützt werden muss,
damit sie nachhaltig und wirksam ist. Ein allein die dezentrale Verwaltung von EU-Mitteln anstrebender Prozess
würde nicht automatisch zu dem erwünschten Ergebnis einer effizienteren Verwaltung der EU-Mittel führen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 203

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005919/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Handling of EU funds

At the beginning of the month, the Commission concluded that, with regard to the project proposals for EU funding
during the 2014-2020 funding period, Romania had not met the minimum quality and credibility conditions. The
main problem seems to lie in numerous violations of rules relating to public invitations to tender.

1. What progress has Romania been able to make with regard to the project proposals?

2. Are there any similar problems with other Member States that are eligible for aid, such as Bulgaria, for example?

3. Following the shift in the use of EU funds towards regionalisation, to what extent does the Commission expect
an improvement in the handling of EU funds?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

1. The comments made by the Commission in February 2013 did not refer to a possible violation of public
procurement rules but to the preparation by Romanian authorities of the next programming period, regarding sound
and well coordinated priorities, built on solid strategies. Difficulties encountered in the management of public
procurement in the current period have been handled through a dedicated initiative, independent of the preparation
of the next period.

2. Regarding the preparation of the next period, all Member States are currently preparing draft programming
documents. Bulgaria was the first to submit a draft partnership agreement. With respect to possible shortcomings
regarding the management of tendering procedures in any Member State, the regularity of EU funded expenditure is
verified by the national management and control systems, under the supervision of the Commission, carrying out its
own audits whenever necessary and taking appropriate measures to protect the EU budget.

3. The Romanian authorities have informed the Commission about their intention to allocate a significant amount
of European Regional Development funding for future regional programmes. The Commission has noted the need for
an appropriate design of the decentralisation reform, which needs to be justified by a solid analysis (subsidiarity) and
preparation (transfer of competences, financing mechanisms), as a condition for sustainability and effectiveness. A
process driven solely by the desire to decentralise the management of EU funds would not necessarily deliver the
desired outcome of handling EU funds more efficiently.

C 42 E / 204 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005920/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Asylmissbrauch durch Visafreiheit

Wie einem Artikel der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“ vom 18. Mai 2013 zu entnehmen ist, steigt die Zahl der
Asylbewerber in Deutschland drastisch an. Vor allem der Anteil von Russen steigt zunehmend an. Die Asylbewerber
beantragen in Polen Asyl, reisen dann aber nach Deutschland weiter, wo die Sozialleistungen deutlich höher und
besser als in Polen sind.

Auch die Zahl der Asylsuchenden aus Serbien ist wieder angestiegen. Nach Lockerung der Visabestimmungen reisen
diese als Touristen ein und beantragen dann im Land Asyl. Allgemein wird diese Vorgehensweise als Missbrauch der
Visafreiheit gewertet. Zudem werden seither Asylanträge von Personen aus dem Kosovo, Serbien und Mazedonien
schneller bearbeitet. Die Idee dahinter: Die Kosten für die Schleuser, die die Flüchtlinge zu begleichen haben, sind so
deutlich höher als die Sozialleistungen, die in den kurzen Zeiträumen in Anspruch genommen werden können. Eine
Einreise zahlt sich also nur mehr bedingt aus.

1. Wie will die EU in Zukunft mit dem Missbrauch der Visafreiheit umgehen?

2. Ist eine erneute Verschärfung der Visa-Abkommen geplant?

3. Wie bewertet die EU die Situation russischer Asylwerber, die ursprünglich in Polen Asyl beantragt haben und
dann weiter reisen?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(16. Juli 2013)_

Die Kommission ist sich darüber im Klaren, dass der Missbrauch der Reisefreiheit durch eine Minderheit von
Reisenden aus den westlichen Balkanstaaten eine Gefahr für die Regelung für visumfreies Reisen darstellt, die diesen
Ländern zugestanden wird. Sie überwacht die Lage fortlaufend mittels regelmäßiger Berichte ( [1] ) und steht in engem
Kontakt mit den Behörden der betroffenen Länder, um zu prüfen, ob die vereinbarten Maßnahmen zur Wahrung der
Integrität der Regelung eingehalten werden.

Im Mai 2011 hat die Kommission eine Änderung ( [2] ) der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 539/2001 ( [3] ) vorgeschlagen, um u. a.
eine Visumschutzklausel einzuführen, damit unter außergewöhnlichen Umständen die Visumfreiheit für Drittländer
vorübergehend aufgehoben werden kann. Diese Schutzklausel würde nur befristet angewandt und könnte nur in
einer Notlage geltend gemacht werden, z. B. wenn ein Mitgliedstaat einen erheblichen und plötzlichen Anstieg der
Zahl irregulärer Einwanderer oder unbegründeter oder missbräuchlicher Asylgesuche verzeichnet. Der Vorschlag
steht im Europäischen Parlament und im Rat noch immer zur Beratung an. Die Kommission hofft auf eine baldige
förmliche Annahme.

Die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 343/2003 ( [4] ) legt die Regeln zur Bestimmung des Mitgliedstaats fest, der für die Prüfung
eines in einem der Mitgliedstaaten gestellten Asylantrags zuständig ist. Mit der Verordnung soll u. a. der Missbrauch
des Asylrechts durch die Einreichung von Mehrfachanträgen in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten verhindert werden.
Grundsätzlich sollte nur ein Mitgliedstaat für die Prüfung eines Asylantrags zuständig sein; dabei soll es sich um den
Staat handeln, dem eine maßgebliche Rolle bei der Einreise der Person in die EU oder deren Aufenthalt im Gebiet der
EU zukommt.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Bisher wurden drei Berichte über die Überwachung für die Zeit nach der Visaliberalisierung für die westlichen Balkanstaaten veröffentlicht. Siehe

SEK(2011)695, SEK(2011)1570 und KOM(2012)472. Ein vierter Bericht ist für Mitte 2013 geplant.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)290 endg. vom 24.5.2011.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 539/2001 des Rates vom 15. März 2001 zur Aufstellung der Liste der Drittländer, deren Staatsangehörige beim

Überschreiten der Außengrenzen im Besitz eines Visums sein müssen, sowie der Liste der Drittländer, deren Staatsangehörige von dieser
Visumpflicht befreit sind, ABl. L 81 vom 21.3.2001, S. 1.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 343/2003 des Rates vom 18. Februar 2003 zur Festlegung der Kriterien und Verfahren zur Bestimmung des Mitgliedstaats,

der für die Prüfung eines von einem Drittstaatsangehörigen in einem Mitgliedstaat gestellten Asylantrags zuständig ist, ABl. L 50 vom 25.2.2003,
S. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 205

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005920/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Asylum abuse through visa-free travel

According to an article in the German newspaper _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_ of 18 May 2013, the number of
asylum-seekers in Germany is rising dramatically. The proportion of Russians in particular is continuing to increase.
The asylum-seekers apply for asylum in Poland, but then travel on to Germany, where the social benefits are
significantly higher and better than they are in Poland.

The number of asylum-seekers from Serbia has also increased again. Following the relaxation of visa requirements,
these people enter the country as tourists and, once there, apply for asylum. This behaviour is generally regarded as
abuse of the arrangements for visa-free travel. In addition, asylum applications from people from Kosovo, Serbia and
Macedonia are now being processed faster. The idea behind this is to ensure that the facilitator costs that the refugees
have to pay are significantly higher than the social benefits that can be obtained in these short periods. The financial
rewards to be gained from entering the country are therefore more limited.

1. How does the EU intend to deal with the abuse of visa-free travel arrangements in the future?

2. Are there any plans to tighten up the visa agreements?

3. What is the EU’s view of cases in which Russian asylum-seekers, who originally applied for asylum in Poland,
move on elsewhere?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the threats to the integrity of the visa-free travel regime with the Western Balkan
countries arising from the abuse of this regime by a minority of travellers coming from those countries. It constantly
monitors the situation through its regular reporting ( [1] ) and it is in direct contact with the authorities of the countries
concerned to assess their compliance with the agreed measures to ensure the integrity of the visa-free travel regime.

In May 2011 the Commission proposed ( [2] ) to amend Regulation 539/2001 ( [3] ) in order to, _inter alia_, create a visa
suspension mechanism for temporarily suspending the third countries' visa-free status under exceptional
circumstances. This mechanism would be applied only as a temporary measure and could be triggered only in case of
an emergency situation, namely when a Member State experiences a substantial and sudden increase in the number of
irregular immigrants or asylum claims considered to be unfounded or abusive. The European Parliament and the
Council are still considering this proposal. The Commission hopes to see it formally adopted as soon as possible.

Regulation 343/2003 ( [4] ) sets the rules for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States. One of its purposes is to prevent abuse of asylum procedures in the
form of multiple asylum applications in various Member States. The underlying principle is that only one Member
State should be responsible for an asylum application, and that is the State which played a major role in the entry or
stay of the person on EU territory.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Three reports on the post-visa liberalisation monitoring for the Western Balkan countries have been issued to date. See documents SEC(2011)

695, SEC(2011) 1570 and COM(2012) 472. A fourth report is planned for mid-2013.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 290 final of 24.5.2011.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Council regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2011 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing

the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81, 21.3.2001, p. 1.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for

examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ L 50, 25.2.2003, p. 1.

( **|**
( **|**

( **|**

C 42 E / 206 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005921/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Datenschutz bei Cloud Computing

Anwendungen wie Youtube, Ebay, Amazon, diverse E-Mail-Clients, aber auch diverse Smart-Phone-Funktionen
basieren mittlerweile auf Cloud Computing. Privatleute nutzen Cloud Computing vorwiegend für die Speicherung
von Fotos, Musik oder elektronischen Büchern. Im Firmenbereich wird es zunehmend als Alternative zum
Outsourcing verwendet.

Beim Hochladen in Fotodatenbanken ist es möglich, dass die Reche an den Inhalten abgetreten werden. Bei
Streitfragen ist der Server-Standort ausschlaggebend. Dabei kann sich der Nutzer derzeit bedauerlicherweise auch
nicht auf Sicherheitszertifikate verlassen. Die in Clouds ausgelagerten Daten sind in der Regel auf viele Server verteilt,
so dass der Nutzer oft nicht weiß, wo der jeweilige Server steht und welche Datenschutzregeln gelten. Auch ist nicht
gesetzlich geregelt, wer die Daten durchforsten darf.

1. Ist sich die Kommission der Datenschutzprobleme bei Cloud Computing bewusst?

2. Gibt es auf EU-Ebene Pläne, einheitliche Sicherheitszertifikate einzuführen, auf die sich der Nutzer verlassen
kann?

3. Ist eine rechtliche Regelung geplant, wer auf Servern, die sich auf dem Gebiet der EU befinden, Daten
durchforsten darf?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(6. August 2013)_

Die Cloud-Computing-Dienste, die personenbezogene Daten verarbeiten, müssen bereits jetzt die nationalen
Bestimmungen zur Umsetzung der Datenschutzrichtlinie ( [1] ) einhalten, wenn der Dienstleister eine Niederlassung
innerhalb der Union besitzt oder wenn er auf Mittel zur Datenverarbeitung innerhalb der Union zurückgreift (siehe
Artikel 4 der Richtlinie).

In der von der Kommission am 25. Januar 2012 ( [2] ) vorgelegten Reform des Europäischen Rechtsrahmens zum
Datenschutz werden Fragen der Dematerialisierung des Austauschs personenbezogener Daten sowie die Entwicklung
des Cloud-Computing berücksichtigt. In der Reform werden die Pflichten der Auftragsverarbeiter geklärt, und sie gilt
für alle Unternehmen mit Sitz in der Union sowie für Verarbeitungstätigkeiten, die dem Zweck dienen,
Einzelpersonen in Europa Güter und Dienstleistungen anzubieten. Es wird zudem das Recht auf Vergessenwerden
und das Recht auf Portabilität eingeführt — dies ist im Zusammenhang mit Cloud-Computing besonders wichtig.

Die Kommission hat zusätzlich im September 2012 eine Strategie für Cloud-Computing ( [3] ) vorgeschlagen. Unter
anderem unterstützt sie die Entwicklung eines europäischen Verhaltenskodex für den Datenschutz im Rahmen des
Cloud-Computing durch die Industrie, der der mit Artikel 29 eingesetzten Gruppe ( [4] ) vorgelegt werden könnte.

Im Bezug auf die Sicherheitszertifikate hat die Kommission mit Unterstützung der ENISA und anderer kompetenter
Organisationen begonnen, im Bereich des Cloud-Computing an der Entwicklung von freiwilligen
Zertifizierungssystemen auf europäischer Ebene zu arbeiten.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlinie 95/46/EG, ABl. L 281 vom 23.11.1995, S. 31.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2012)11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) KOM(2012)529.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Die mit Artikel 29 eingesetzte Gruppe umfasst die nationalen Stellen für den europäischen Datenschutz und wird mit Artikel 29 der

Richtlinie 95/46/EG eingesetzt.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 207

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005921/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Data protection in connection with cloud computing

Applications such as YouTube, eBay, Amazon and various email clients, as well as various smartphone functions, are
now based on cloud computing. Private individuals use cloud computing primarily for storing photographs, music or
electronic books. In the commercial sector, it is used increasingly as an alternative to outsourcing.

When uploading to photo databases it is possible for rights to the content to be transferred. In the event of a dispute,
the location of the server is the important factor. In this regard, regrettably, users cannot currently even rely on
security certificates. The data stored in the cloud are usually distributed over many different servers, so that the user
often does not know where the relevant server is located and what data protection rules apply. There is also no
legislation governing who is permitted to search this data.

1. Is the Commission aware of the data protection problems associated with cloud computing?

2. Are there any plans at EU level to introduce uniform security certificates on which users can rely?

3. Are there any plans for legislation governing who is permitted to search data on servers located within the EU?

_(Version française)_

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Reding au nom de la Commission**

_(6 août 2013)_

Les services d'informatique dans les nuages traitant des données personnelles doivent d'ores et déjà respecter les
mesures nationales transposant la Directive protection des données ( [1] ) dans la mesure ou le fournisseur du service a
un établissement dans l'union, ou bien fait usage de moyens de traitement dans l'union ( _cf_ . article 4 de la Directive).

La réforme du cadre européen relatif à la protection des données présentée par la Commission le 25 janvier 2012 ( [2] )
tient compte de la dématérialisation des échanges de données personnelles et du développement de l'informatique
dans les nuages. La réforme clarifie les obligations des sous-traitants et est applicable à toutes les entreprises établies
dans l'Union et aux activités de traitement visant à offrir des biens et des services aux individus en Europe. La réforme
introduit le droit à l'oubli et le droit à la portabilité, qui sont particulièrement importants dans le contexte du
cloud computing.

La Commission a de plus proposé en septembre 2012 une stratégie sur l'informatique dans les nuages ( [3] ). La
Commission soutient entre autres le développement par l'industrie d'un code de conduite européen pour la
protection des données dans le cadre de l'informatique dans les nuages, qui pourrait être soumis au groupe de
l'article 29 ( [4] ).

En ce qui concerne les certifications de sécurité, la Commission a commencé à travailler avec le soutien de l'ENISA et
d'autres organismes compétents afin d'aider au développement de systèmes de certification volontaires à l'échelle
européenne dans le domaine de l'informatique en nuage.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 95/46/CE, JO n° L 281 du 23/11/1995, p. 31.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012)11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012)529.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Le groupe de l'article 29 rassemble les autorités nationales de protection des données européennes, et est établi par l'article 29 de la

Directive 95/46/CE.

C 42 E / 208 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005922/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ EU-weites Asylsystem

Der Europäische Rat hat vor zwei Jahren den Auftrag erteilt, bis Ende 2012 ein gemeinsames europäisches
Asylsystem zu verwirklichen. Um europaweit asylrechtliche Mindeststandards und Zuständigkeiten zu regeln,
wurden mehrere Rechtsakte überarbeitet. Nur zehn Mitgliedstaaten bearbeiten 90 % aller Asylanträge. „Österreich
liegt mit 14 426 Asylanträgen dabei auf Platz sieben und auf Platz fünf bei der Pro-Kopf-Belastung“, so
Innenministerin Mikl-Leitner. Andere EU-Mitgliedstaaten wie Tschechien und die Slowakei hätten im selben Zeitraum
knapp 500 Asylanträge bearbeitet.

1. Wie weit ist ein europäisches Asylsystem bereits gediehen?

2. Wann ist mit der Einführung des europäischen Asylsystems zu rechnen?

3. Wie wird die EU auf die gravierenden Unterschiede bei den Zahlen der bearbeiteten Asylanträge reagieren?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(11. Juli 2013)_

Der letzte Bestandteil des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) wurde am Weltflüchtlingstag
(20. Juni 2013) angenommen. Das Gemeinsame Europäische Asylsystem umfasst die Richtlinien über die
Anerkennung, Asylverfahren, Aufnahmebedingungen und vorübergehenden Schutz sowie die Dublin‐ und die
EURODAC-Verordnung. Die einschlägigen Informationen hierzu finden Sie auf der Europa-Website ( [1] ). Da für jedes
Instrument unterschiedliche Umsetzungsfristen gelten, wird es noch einige Jahre dauern, bis alle neuen
Bestimmungen vollständig Anwendung finden.

Nach Ansicht der Kommission wird das Gemeinsame Europäische Asylsystem zu einheitlicheren Asylentscheidungen
führen. Mit den von der Kommission vorgeschlagenen Rechtsvorschriften, die dem GEAS zugrunde liegen, soll die
Wahrscheinlichkeit verringert werden, dass Personen, die internationalen Schutz beantragen, z. B. wegen
unterschiedlicher Aufnahmebedingungen oder ‐chancen einen Mitgliedstaat dem anderen vorziehen.

Zudem helfen Solidaritätsmaßnahmen der Kommission denjenigen Mitgliedstaaten, deren Asylsystem besonders
stark belastet ist. Als ersten Schritt plant die Kommission ein jährliches Forum zum Thema der Umsiedlung („annual
relocation forum“), auf dem sich die Mitgliedstaaten darüber austauschen können, ob Personen mit internationalem
Schutzstatus aus besonders stark belasteten Mitgliedstaaten umgesiedelt werden sollten. Darüber hinaus werden die
Mitgliedstaaten durch das Europäische Unterstützungsbüro für Asylfragen unterstützt.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 209

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005922/13**

**to the Commission**
**Andreas Mölzer (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU-wide asylum system

Two years ago, the Council issued instructions for a common European asylum system to be in place by the end of
2012. In order to regulate minimum standards and responsibilities under asylum law throughout Europe, several
legal instruments were revised. Ninety per cent of all asylum applications are processed by only 10 Member States.
According to Austria’s Minister for the Interior, Ms Mikl-Leitner, ‘Austria comes seventh with 14 426 asylum
applications, and on a per capita basis it is fifth’. Other EU Member States such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia
processed just under 500 asylum applications during the same period, according to Ms Mikl-Leitner.

1. How much progress has already been made with regard to establishing a European asylum system?

2. When can we expect the European asylum system to be introduced?

3. How will the EU respond to the considerable differences in terms of the numbers of asylum applications
processed?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The final instrument of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was adopted on World Refugee Day
(20 June 2013). The CEAS comprises the Qualification, Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions and Temporary
Protection Directives, plus the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations. Information about these EU instruments can be
found on the Europa website ( [1] ). Each instrument has a different implementation deadline therefore it will still take a
few years before all of the new provisions are applied in full.

The Commission believes that the CEAS will lead to a greater similarity of outcomes for asylum applications. The
legislation underpinning the Common European Asylum System was proposed by the Commission with a view to
decreasing the likelihood that applicants for international protection would choose one Member State over another
because of the quality of provisions such as reception conditions or of differences in the probability of being granted
international protection.

The Commission has also put in place solidarity measures to assist Member States facing particular pressures on their
asylum systems. The Commission intends to commence with an annual Relocation Forum to help Member States
determine whether it would be appropriate to relocate beneficiaries of international protection from another Member
State facing a pressurised situation. In addition, the European Asylum Support Office is providing assistance to
Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

C 42 E / 210 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005923/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Inhalte und Ergebnisse des EU-US Law-enforcement Meeting

Am 15./16. April 2013 reiste Europol-Direktor Wainwright nach Washington, um dort an einem
„EU-US Law-enforcement“ Meeting teilzunehmen. Mitreisende waren der Generaldirektor für Außenbeziehungen
Almeida und der Terrorismus-Koordinator de Kerchove. Themenschwerpunkte des Treffens waren u. a. Cyber Crime,
Urheberschutzrechte und Terrorismus. Diese Themen werden von der europäischen Öffentlichkeit kritisch
beobachtet, da neue Regelungen zur Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und/oder Cyberkriminalität beträchtliche
Auswirkungen auf die Menschenrechte und auch die Freiheit des Internet haben können.

1. Welchen Inhalt hatte das „EU-US Law-enforcement Meeting“ und welche Personen nahmen daran teil?

2. Welche Themen wurden erörtert und wer hatte diese jeweils vorgeschlagen bzw. vorbereitet?

3. Mit welchen Themen hat sich der Terrorismus-Koordinator de Kerchove in das Treffen eingebracht?

4. Welche Ergebnisse bzw. welcher Zwischenstand folgten aus den Beratungen und Diskussionen?

5. Inwiefern und mit welchem Inhalt drehten sich die Gespräche auch um die Themen: „Gescheiterte und geplante
Handelsabkommen und Interessen der Strafverfolgung“, „Gegenseitiger polizeilicher Zugriff auf Daten in der Cloud“,
„Teilnahme der USA an Europols Arbeitsdateien für Analysezwecke“, „Ausgestaltung des strategischen
Zusammenarbeitsabkommens bzw. Ergänzungsabkommens zwischen Europol und US-Behörden“?

6. Welche eigenen Anstrengungen unternimmt die Kommission, um den gegenseitigen polizeilichen Zugriff auf
Daten in der Cloud zwischen Behörden der EU und der USA zu erleichtern oder überhaupt zu regeln?

7. Welche Defizite sieht die Kommission in der Zusammenarbeit von Europol mit US-Behörden, und welche
Maßnahmen hält sie für geeignet, diesen zu begegnen?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(24. Juli 2013)_

Die EU-US-Konferenz über Strafverfolgung war Teil einer Reihe öffentlicher Veranstaltungen unter dem Titel
„EU rendez-vous“, die vom EU-Botschafter bei den Vereinigten Staaten veranstaltet wurde. Thema war die
Zusammenarbeit zwischen EU und USA bei der Strafverfolgung. An der Veranstaltung nahmen rund 150 Personen
mit sehr unterschiedlichem Hintergrund teil. Auch das Europol-Verbindungsbüro in Washington war vertreten.

Die Themen — Terrorismus, Diebstahl geistigen Eigentums und Cyberkriminalität — wurden von Europol und der
EU-Delegation in Washington in enger Zusammenarbeit mit der amerikanischen Regierung ausgewählt.

Ziel der Veranstaltung war es, Gedanken zu den gemeinsamen Sicherheitsproblemen im Zusammenhang mit den
genannten Themen auszutauschen und im Hinblick auf eine Lösung dieser Probleme die Zusammenarbeit zwischen
EU und USA zu intensivieren.

Während der Konferenz wurde keines der in der Anfrage genannten Themen speziell erörtert — die Veranstaltung
wäre nicht das geeignete Forum hierfür gewesen, und eine solche Erörterung hätte nicht ihrem Ziel entsprochen.

Der EU-Koordinator für die Terrorismusbekämpfung beteiligte sich an der Podiumsdiskussion zu Themen, die derzeit
im Bereich Terrorismus anstehen. Die Veranstaltung fand am Tag nach dem Bombenanschlag von Boston statt. Daher
nahmen Einzeltäter, ausländische Kämpfer und Radikalisierung in der Diskussion großen Raum ein.

Die Kommission und die Vereinigten Staaten sprechen regelmäßig über den Zugang von Strafverfolgungsbehörden
zu Daten in der Cloud. Europol und die amerikanischen Behörden erörtern regelmäßig ihre Zusammenarbeit,
bewerten die Ergebnisse und gehen Sicherheitsprobleme an.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 211

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005923/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Content and results of the EU-US law enforcement conference

On 15/16 April 2013, the Director of Europol, Mr Wainwright, travelled to Washington to participate in an EU-US
law enforcement conference. Also travelling to Washington were the Director-General for External Relations, Mr Vale
de Almeida, and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Mr de Kerchove. The main themes of the conference
included cybercrime, intellectual property rights and terrorism. People in Europe are keeping a critical eye on these
issues, as new regulations for combating terrorism and/or cybercrime could have a significant impact on human
rights and also on the freedom of the Internet.

1. What was the content of the EU-US law enforcement conference and who took part?

2. What topics were discussed and who proposed or prepared each of these topics?

3. What topics did the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Mr de Kerchove, contribute to the meeting?

4. What results or intermediate status came out of the deliberations and discussions?

5. To what extent did the talks also concern the following topics and what was their content: ‘failed and planned
trade agreements and the interests of law enforcement’, ‘reciprocal police access to data in the cloud’, ‘US access to
Europol’s work files for analysis purposes’, ‘structure of the strategic cooperation agreement or supplementary
agreement between Europol and the US authorities’?

6. What efforts is the Commission itself making to facilitate reciprocal police access to data in the cloud between
the authorities in the EU and the US, or to regulate this in general?

7. What shortcomings does the Commission see in Europol’s cooperation with the US authorities and what
measures does it consider appropriate for dealing with these shortcomings?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

The EU-US law enforcement conference was part of a series of public events entitled ‘EU rendez-vous’ organised by
the EU Ambassador to the U.S. The theme was EU-U.S. law enforcement cooperation. Around 150 participants took
part in this public event, coming from a wide range of background. The Europol Liaison Office in Washington was
also represented.

The topics were selected by Europol and the EU Delegation in Washington in close cooperation with the US
Administration. They were: terrorism, intellectual property thefts and cybercrime.

The aim of this event was to exchange views on common security challenges related to the above topics and to
promote EU-US law enforcement cooperation to address these challenges.

None of the topics mentioned in the question were discussed specifically during this event as it was neither the
appropriate forum nor the aim of the event.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator contributed to the terrorism discussion panel which covered topical issues
currently debated in the field of terrorism. The event took place the day after the Boston bombing, therefore a large
part of the debate was devoted to lone actors, foreign fighters and radicalisation.

The Commission and the US regularly discuss the issue of access by law enforcement authorities to data held ‘in the
cloud’. Europol and the US regularly discuss their cooperation to assess results achieved and to address security
challenges.

C 42 E / 212 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005924/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Protrarsi delle intimidazioni nei confronti della minoranza mozabita in Algeria

Il 7 maggio 2013 ha visto la ripresa delle violenze tra la minoranza mozabita (parte della popolazione berbera) e le
più vaste comunità arabe a Ghardaia, in Algeria. Uffici e negozi della città sono stati presi d'assalto e lasciati in rovina.
Gli scontri sono iniziati il 23 marzo 2013 durante un sit-in e uno sciopero organizzati da persone in cerca di lavoro,
per lo più mozabiti.

Con una popolazione di circa 300.000 persone, i mozabiti rappresentano meno dell'1 % degli oltre 37 milioni di
algerini. Poiché costituiscono una minoranza etnica e religiosa, l'inazione delle autorità dinanzi agli atti di violenza è
inevitabilmente percepita dalla comunità locale come «intimidazione etnica» politicamente motivata.

Una delle strutture vandalizzate, sede della sezione di Ghardaia della Lega algerina per la difesa dei diritti umani ( _Ligue_
_algérienne pour la défense des droits de l'Homme_ ), riferisce di essere stata presa d'assalto proprio durante l'incontro
settimanale. La sede di Ghardaia è stata saccheggiata e i suoi militanti sono stati aggrediti da individui definiti
«baltaguia» (delinquenti) al servizio delle autorità locali.

1. Il gabinetto del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è a conoscenza delle tensioni continue e crescenti tra
comunità in Algeria?

2. Ha la Commissione sollevato la problematica relativa a questo tipo di violenza nelle sue relazioni con le autorità
algerine?

3. È la delegazione dell'UE a conoscenza di altre minoranze etniche o religiose in Algeria vittime di atteggiamenti
analoghi da parte delle autorità algerine?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(25 luglio 2013)_

L'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è al corrente delle tensioni tra le diverse comunità etniche in Algeria e in
particolare degli episodi di violenza di cui la comunità mozabita è stata vittima negli ultimi mesi.

Nell'ambito del dialogo politico con le autorità algerine, l'UE sottolinea regolarmente l'importanza di garantire le
libertà fondamentali, de jure e de facto, compreso il rispetto delle minoranze e dei loro diritti. Tali questioni sono state
affrontate di recente durante il sottocomitato dialogo politico, diritti umani e sicurezza, tenutosi a Bruxelles il
16 maggio scorso.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 213

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005924/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Continued intimidation of Mozabite minority in Algeria

On 7 May 2013 there was a resurgence of violence between the Mozabite minority (part of the Berber population)
and the wider Arab communities in Ghardaïa, Algeria. Offices and shops in the city were targeted and left in ruins.
This follows clashes which began at a sit-in and strike held by jobseekers, mostly Mozabites, on 23 March 2013.

The Mozabites, who number roughly 300 000, represent less than 1% of the Algerian population of over 37 million.
Given that the Mozabites are an ethnic and religious minority, the complacency the authorities are displaying towards
the violence is inevitably perceived by the local community as politically motivated ‘ethnic intimidation’.

Among the facilities vandalised were the offices of the Ghardaïa branch of the Algerian Human Rights Defence
League. Representatives of the League have reported that they were specifically targeted during their weekly meeting.
The League’s headquarters in Ghardaïa were ransacked and activists belonging to the League were attacked by people
they have identified as _‘baltaguia’_ (thugs) working for the local authorities.

1. Has the Vice-President/High Representative been made aware of the continuous and increasing tension that
exists between Algeria’s communities?

2. Has the Commission raised the issue of this type of violence in its relations with the Algerian authorities?

3. Is the EU Delegation aware of other ethnic or religious minorities in Algeria that are subject to the same
complacent attitude towards intimidation on the part of the Algerian authorities?

_(Version française)_

**Réponse donnée par la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante Ashton au nom de la Commission**

_(25 juillet 2013)_

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a connaissance des tensions existantes entre les différentes communautés
ethniques en Algérie, notamment des épisodes de violence dont la communauté mozabite a été victime au cours des
derniers mois.

Dans le dialogue politique avec les autorités algériennes, l'UE souligne de manière régulière l'importance de garantir
de jure et de facto les libertés fondamentales, y compris le respect des minorités et de leurs droits. Récemment, ces
questions ont été abordées lors du Sous-comité Dialogue politique, droits de l'Homme et sécurité, qui a eu lieu à
Bruxelles le 16 mai dernier.

C 42 E / 214 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005926/13**

**al Consejo**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Vulneración de la Directiva de espacios protegidos en el caso Cós Nou

La Autoridad Portuaria de Menorca ha expuesto al público el vial que pretende hacer entre Cós Nou y la carretera de
Sa Mesquida. El problema radica en que se pretende hacer pasar dicho vial por la única zona protegida de Cós Nou,
aun disponiendo de espacios suficientes para llevarla a cabo.

Así pues, el trazado de esta vía afecta muy significativamente a la colina situada dentro de la base naval y que se
encuentra considerada como Área Natural de Interés Territorial (ANIT), y tiene calificación de Red Natura 2000 y en
ella está terminantemente prohibido abrir nuevas carreteras. Por ello resulta incomprensible el empeño por parte de la
Autoridad Portuaria, cuando la misma es propietaria de todos los terrenos que hay entre la central térmica y la base
naval, los cuales no se encuentran protegidos.

A su vez, la realización de este proyecto es contraproducente, ya que en ciertos tramos va a ser inviable la circulación
de grandes camiones con remolque los cuales son comunes por las zonas de carga y descarga, por lo que no va a
cumplir con una de sus funciones principales, que es la disminución del tráfico. Además está el coste desorbitado que
la realización de dicha obra va a conllevar, ya que se ha calculado que costará alrededor de 3 155 174,21 euros, es
decir, más de un millón de euros cada 100 metros del nuevo vial.

Por lo tanto, la realización de esta obra vulnera la Directiva 92/43/CEE sobre los espacios protegidos. ¿Qué medidas
piensa tomar la Comisión al respecto? ¿Cómo piensa evitar la construcción? ¿Cuál es el especial interés por parte de la
Autoridad Portuaria de llevar a cabo la obra en dicho espacio?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(26 de julio de 2013)_

El artículo 6, aparatado 3, de la Directiva de hábitats ( [1] ) prevé que cualquier plan o proyecto que pueda afectar de
forma apreciable a un lugar Natura 2000 se someterá a una adecuada evaluación teniendo en cuenta los objetivos de
conservación del lugar. Las autoridades nacionales solo se declararán de acuerdo con el proyecto tras haberse
asegurado de que no causará perjuicio a la integridad del lugar de que se trate. La responsabilidad de garantizar el
cumplimiento de la Directiva de hábitats recae en primer lugar en las autoridades nacionales.

El proyecto de nuevo acceso a Cos Nóu desde la carretera de La Mola y su evaluación de impacto ambiental han sido
objeto de una consulta pública reciente ( [2] ). Según la información disponible, todavía no ha finalizado el proceso de
evaluación de impacto ambiental y las autoridades competentes no han tomado una decisión definitiva al respecto.
Por tanto, no se puede apreciar infracción alguna de la Directiva de hábitats, y la Comisión no ve motivos para
adoptar medidas en estos momentos.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directiva 92/43/CEE del Consejo, de 21 de mayo de 1992, relativa a la conservación de los hábitats naturales y de la fauna y flora silvestres

(DO L 206 de 22.7.1992).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.caib.es/eboibfront/es/2013/8131/515611/departament-d-ordenacion-del-territorio-informacio

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 215

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005926/13**

**to the Council**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Infringement of the directive on protected sites in Cós Nou

The Menorca Port Authority has unveiled the road it plans to build between Cós Nou and the Sa Mesquida road. The
problem is that it is planned for this road to pass through the only protected area of Cós Nou, despite there being
plenty of other sites on which to build it.

The route of this road therefore very seriously impinges on the hillside which is located inside the naval base and
which is considered a natural area of territorial interest (ANIT). The hillside is also part of the Natura 2000 network,
so building new roads on the site is strictly prohibited. The Port Authority’s insistence is therefore very difficult to
understand when it owns all the land between the power plant and the naval base, which is not protected.

Building this road is also counterproductive, since large articulated lorries, which are common in the area because of
the loading and unloading facilities, will not be able to drive along certain stretches of it, meaning that the road will
not fulfil one of its main functions, namely traffic reduction. Moreover, there is the exorbitant cost that constructing
this road will involve, given that, according to calculations, it will cost around EUR 3 155 174.21, which is over
EUR 1 million per 100 metres of new road.

Construction of this road therefore infringes Directive 92/43/EEC on protected sites. What is the Commission
planning to do about it? How does it plan to stop the road being built? What special interest does the Port Authority
have in building the road on this site?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

Article 6.3 of the Habitats Directive ( [1] ) provides that any plan or project likely to have a significant effect on a
Natura 2000 site must be subject to an appropriate assessment in view of the sites' conservation objectives. The
national authorities shall agree to the project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity
of the site. The responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Habitats Directive lies primarily with the national
authorities.

The project for a road to access Cos Nóu from the road of La Mola and its Environmental Impact Assessment have
recently been subject to public consultation ( [2] ). According to the available information, it appears that the process for
the environmental impact assessment of the project has not yet been concluded, and that the competent authorities
have not undertaken a final decision on this matter. Therefore, it is not possible to identify any breach of the Habitats
Directive and the Commission has no cause to take action at this stage.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 92/43/EEC, of 21 May 1992, on the protection of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora. OJ L 206 of 22.07.1992.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.caib.es/eboibfront/es/2013/8131/515611/departament-d-ordenacion-del-territorio-informacio.

C 42 E / 216 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005927/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Norbert Neuser (S&D) und Knut Fleckenstein (S&D)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Europäische Richtlinie für unbemannte Flugzeuge — Drohne Euro Hawk

Das deutsche Bundesverteidigungsministerium hat wegen unzureichender Genehmigungsverfahren den Verzicht auf
die Euro Hawk-Drohne bekannt gegeben.

Unter anderem begründet das Bundesverteidigungsministerium den Verzicht auf das unbemannte
Aufklärungsflugzeug mit den nicht vorhandenen europäischen Richtlinien zum Betrieb ferngesteuerter Flugzeuge im
zivilen Luftraum über Europa.

Kann die Kommission vor diesem Hintergrund folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Wie ist der derzeitige Sachstand der Kommission bei der Erarbeitung von europaweit geltenden Richtlinien für
unbemannte Flugzeuge?

2. Wann ist voraussichtlich mit der Verabschiedung von Richtlinien durch die EU für unbemannte Flugzeuge zu
rechnen?

3. Wie operieren derzeit Drohnen im Luftraum über Europa, obwohl es bisher keine einheitlichen Richtlinien
gibt?

4. Angeblich können Drohnen mit Sondergenehmigungen in dafür eigens gesperrten Lufträumen operieren. Ist
die Kommission oder sind europäische Behörden in die Erteilung von Sondergenehmigungen einbezogen?

5. Wenn ja, dürfen Sondergenehmigungen auch für den Einsatz über dicht besiedelten Gebieten in Europa erteilt
werden?

6. Welches Gefahrenpotential durch Drohnen sieht die Kommission im Hinblick auf die zivile Luftfahrt in
Europa?

7. War das deutsche Bundesverteidigungsministerium bei Fragen der Beschaffung und Genehmigung der Drohne
Euro Hawk in Kontakt mit der Kommission und den entsprechenden europäischen Behörden?

8. Wurden seitens der Kommission bzw. der entsprechenden europäischen Behörden Genehmigungen für die
Drohne Euro Hawk erteilt oder in Aussicht gestellt?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Juli 2013)_

1. Die Kommission erwägt derzeit, einen unterstützenden politischen Rahmen für ferngesteuerte Luftfahrtsysteme
(Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, RPAS) zu erarbeiten. Dem vorausgegangen sind unlängst eine Konsultation der
europäischen Generaldirektoren für die Zivilluftfahrt und die Verabschiedung eines Fahrplans für die Integration von
RPAS in das europäische Luftverkehrssystem durch Interessenträger, die in der europäischen RPAS-Lenkungsgruppe
vertreten sind (Mai 2013). Soweit die Europäische Agentur für Flugsicherheit (EASA) bereits dafür zuständig ist, zivile
Lufttüchtigkeitszeugnisse für RPAS mit einer Betriebsmasse von mehr als 150 kg auszustellen, wird dieser Rahmen
auf der Grundlage bestehender Bescheinigungsvorschriften ausgearbeitet.

2. Der Erarbeitung europäischer Rechtsvorschriften gehen Konsultationen und Folgenabschätzungen voraus.
Diese Vorbereitungen dürften ein Jahr dauern.

3. ohnen dürfen auf der Grundlage individueller Genehmigungen, die die nationalen Behörden gemäß nationalen
Vorschriften erteilen, betrieben werden. Es gibt bisher keine gemeinsamen Vorschriften.

4./5. Die Kommission ist an der Erteilung individueller Genehmigungen nicht beteiligt. Dafür sind vielmehr die
nationalen Behörden zuständig, die in ihren Genehmigungen besondere, von den RPAS-Betreibern einzuhaltende
Bedingungen vorsehen können.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 217

6. Der RPAS-Betrieb sollte das hohe Sicherheits‐ und Datenschutzniveau, das derzeit in Europa besteht, nicht
beeinträchtigen.

7. Das deutsche Verteidigungsministerium stand hinsichtlich des Erwerbs und der Genehmigung des Euro Hawk
weder mit Eurocontrol noch mit der Europäischen Agentur für Flugsicherheit in Verbindung.

8. Weder die Kommission noch die EASA haben eine Genehmigung erteilt oder in Aussicht gestellt.

C 42 E / 218 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005927/13**

**to the Commission**
**Norbert Neuser (S&D) and Knut Fleckenstein (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ European directive for unmanned aircraft — Euro Hawk drone

The German Federal Ministry of Defence has announced that it is dispensing with the Euro Hawk drone on account of
an inadequate approval procedure.

Among the reasons cited by the Federal Ministry of Defence for dispensing with the unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft was the absence of European directives on the operation of remote-controlled aircraft in civil airspace over
Europe.

1. What stage has the Commission reached in drawing up Europe-wide directives for unmanned aircraft?

2. When can we expect the EU to adopt directives for unmanned aircraft?

3. How do drones currently operate in the airspace above Europe, even though there are as yet no uniform
directives?

4. Drones can supposedly operate with special approvals in airspace that is restricted specifically for this purpose.
Is the Commission or are European authorities involved in issuing special approvals?

5. If so, can special approvals also be issued for deployment above densely populated areas in Europe?

6. What potential risks posed by drones does the Commission see with regard to civil aviation in Europe?

7. Was the German Federal Ministry of Defence in contact with the Commission and the relevant European
authorities in connection with the acquisition and approval of the Euro Hawk drone?

8. Have approvals for the Euro Hawk drone been issued or promised by the Commission or the relevant European
authorities?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

1. The Commission is currently considering the preparation of a supportive and enabling policy framework for
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). This follows a recent consultation of the European Directors-General for
Civil Aviation and the adoption of a Roadmap for the integration of RPAS into the European Aviation System by a
group of stakeholders gathered in the European RPAS Steering Group (in May 2013). This framework will be built on
and elaborated from existing certification rules, where the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) already has the
competence to issue civil airworthiness certifications to RPAS of more than 150 Kg operating mass.

2. The preparation of European legislation requires the necessary consultation and impact assessment process.
This preparatory process is expected to last one year.

3. Drones are allowed to operate on basis of individual authorisations of national authorities given on basis of
national regulations. There are not yet common rules.

4.&5. The Commission is not involved in giving individual approvals. This is the competence of national authorities,
which in their approval impose specific modalities which RPAS operators have to respect.

6. RPAS operations should not affect the high levels of safety, security and privacy that our citizens currently
enjoy.

7. The German Federal Ministry of Defence has neither been in contact with Eurocontrol nor with the European
Aviation Safety Agency in connection with the acquisition and approval of the Euro Hawk.

8. The Commission nor EASA have never issued an approval or have never promised to do so.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 219

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005928/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Estradas painéis solares

Notícias recentes dão conta que se encontra em estudo, no Idaho, nos Estados Unidos da América, a possibilidade de
substituir o asfalto que pavimenta as estradas por painéis solares. Estes gerariam eletricidade que poderia alimentar as
redes elétricas, bem como os veículos movidos a eletricidade que circulassem nas estradas.

Trata-se ainda de um projeto numa fase preliminar, sendo reconhecido que o custo envolvido presentemente na
produção de estradas deste novo tipo implicaria o triplo do custo das estradas atuais.

Não obstante, a ideia de uma estrada que não apenas potencie o consumo de energia mas permita a sua geração
poderá produzir bons resultados no futuro, merecendo ser vista com detalhe.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Dispõe de dados acerca deste projeto?

2. Face às informações de que dispõe, considera-o interessante ao ponto de a sua evolução merecer ser
acompanhada pela Comissão?

**Resposta dada por Siim Kallas em nome da Comissão**

_(17 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão tem conhecimento do projeto-piloto lançado nos EUA que visa demonstrar a viabilidade técnica e
económica do conceito de utilização dos pavimentos rodoviários para produzir energia solar e acompanha o
desenrolar do processo. As ações de demonstração com elementos da construção baseados na energia solar
fotovoltaica foram tema de dois convites à apresentação de propostas publicados no âmbito do 7.° Programa-Quadro
de Investigação da UE (7.° PQ 2006-2013). A Comissão tencionar incluir os temas ligados à investigação no domínio
das tecnologias de captação de energia gerada por infraestruturas de transportes no primeiro convite à apresentação
de propostas no âmbito do Programa-Quadro Horizonte 2020.

C 42 E / 220 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005928/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Solar panel roads

According to recent reports, the possibility of paving roads with solar panels instead of asphalt is currently being
investigated in the US state of Idaho. These panels would generate electricity that could be used to supply electricity
grids, as well as to power electric vehicles on the roads.

The project is still in the early stages and it is acknowledged that at present it would cost three times as much to lay
this new kind of road as current roads.

Nonetheless, the idea of a road that does not just increase energy consumption but actually generates power could be
very useful in the future and deserves careful consideration.

1. Does the Commission have any information about this project?

2. In view of the information it has, does the Commission think it is worth watching the development of this
project?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the pilot project started in the USA to demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility
of the concept of using road surfaces to generate solar power and is following its progress. The demonstration of
building elements based on solar photovoltaics has been the topic of two calls published under the 7th Framework
Programme for Research of the EU (FP7, 2006-2013). The Commission envisages to include in the first call for
proposals under Horizon 2020 topics regarding research in technologies to recover energy from transport
infrastructure.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 221

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005929/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Especulação alimentar

Notícias recentes dão conta que o grupo financeiro alemão DZ Bank Group e sua subsidiária Union Investment
optaram por retirar-se completamente da especulação sobre géneros alimentícios. Não obstante, neste momento não
parecem existir ainda provas concludentes de uma relação causal entre a especulação sobre alimentos e a fome e
escassez, sabendo-se que existem alguns estudos em curso sobre este assunto. O DZ Bank Group defendeu mais
controlo e restrições para este tipo de mercado.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que apreciação faz da tomada de posição por parte de DZ Bank Group?

2. Dispõe de dados que confirmem ou infirmem a relação causal entre a especulação financeira em torno do
mercado de alimentos e casos de fome e de escassez alimentar?

**Resposta dada por Michel Barnier em nome da Comissão**

_(12 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão considera prioritária a necessidade de analisar a questão da excessiva volatilidade dos preços nos
mercados dos produtos de base a nível mundial. Na sua comunicação de fevereiro de 2011 ( [1] ), a Comissão apelou à
adoção de novas medidas para melhorar a integridade e a transparência nestes mercados. A Comissão manifestou a
sua preocupação relativamente à «financeirização» dos mercados de instrumentos derivados sobre produtos de base e
observou que a falta de transparência dificulta a obtenção de provas conclusivas de um nexo de causalidade entre a
especulação e os preços excessivos dos géneros alimentícios.

A Comissão concorda que é necessário reforçar os controlos e as restrições nesses mercados. Em consonância com os
compromissos do G20, a Comissão lançou uma série de iniciativas regulamentares para aumentar a integridade e a
transparência dos mercados de instrumentos derivados sobre produtos de base. Entre estas incluem-se propostas
legislativas para clarificar os tipos de transações nos mercados dos produtos de base que constituem abuso de
mercado ( [2] ), bem como propostas legislativas que preveem que os instrumentos derivados sobre produtos de base
sejam comercializados exclusivamente em plataformas de negociação regulamentadas e que essas atividades sejam
transparentes e objeto de uma supervisão mais abrangente das posições em derivados, incluindo a imposição de
limites máximos à tomada de posições pelos intervenientes no mercado ( [3] ). Estas propostas estão neste momento em
negociação no Parlamento Europeu e no Conselho.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Fazer face aos desafios nos mercados dos produtos de base e das matérias-primas, fevereiro de 2011, COM(2011) 25 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulamento relativo ao abuso de informação privilegiada e à manipulação de mercado (abuso de mercado), COM(2011) 651 final, e a Diretiva

relativa às sanções penais aplicáveis ao abuso de informação privilegiada e à manipulação de mercado (abuso de mercado) (COM(2011) 654 final,
20.10.2011.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposta de Diretiva relativa aos mercados de instrumentos financeiros, que revoga a Diretiva 2004/39/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho

(reformulação) COM(2011) 656 final, e um regulamento relativo aos mercados de instrumentos financeiros, que altera o Regulamento [EMIR]
relativo aos derivados OTC, às contrapartes centrais e aos repositórios de transações, COM(2011) 652 final, 20.10.2011.

( **|**

⋅3∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 222 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005929/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Food speculation

According to recent reports, the German financial group DZ Bank Group and its subsidiary, Union Investment, have
chosen to withdraw completely from speculation on foodstuffs. However, at present there is no conclusive proof of a
causal link between food speculation and people going hungry and food shortages; several studies on this issue are
currently under way. DZ Bank Group has called for tighter controls and restrictions on this kind of market.

1. What is the Commission’s view of the stance adopted by DZ Bank Group?

2. Does it have any data to prove or disprove a causal link between financial speculation on the food market and
instances of people going hungry and food shortages?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The Commission considers the need to address the excessive price volatility on the world’s commodity markets a high
priority. In its communication of February 2011 ( [1] ), the Commission called for further action to improve integrity
and transparency on these markets. The Commission expressed its concerns about the financialisation of commodity
derivatives markets, and noted that the lack of transparency makes it difficult to find conclusive evidence for a causal
link between speculation and excessive food prices.

The Commission agrees that tighter controls and restrictions are needed in these markets. In line with G20
commitments, the Commission has launched a number of regulatory initiatives to increase the integrity and
transparency of commodity derivatives markets. This includes legislative proposals to clarify the types of trading in
commodity markets that constitute market abuse ( [2] ), as well as legislative proposals to require that commodity
derivative products are traded exclusively on regulated trading venues, that these trading activities are transparent and
a comprehensive oversight of commodity derivative positions, including the imposition of position limits by market
participants ( [3] ). These proposals are currently under negotiation in the European Parliament and the Council.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on raw Materials, February 2011, COM(2011) 25 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), COM(2011) 651 final, and Directive on criminal sanctions for insider

dealing and market manipulation, COM(2011) 654 final, 20.10.2011.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposal for a directive on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Recast) COM(2011) 656 final, and a regulation on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central
counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2011) 652 final, 20.10.2011.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 223

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005930/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Atentado de Woolwich — consequências para a UE

O terrível atentado de Woolwich, que vitimou um soldado britânico, tornou patente a existência de movimentos
islâmicos radicais que coordenam ou, no mínimo, doutrinam os seus seguidores e os instigam a realizar ações contra
pessoas e instituições numa lógica de «guerra santa» contra o Ocidente.

Esta circunstância é sentida em vários países da União e faz temer pela segurança dos cidadãos, devendo ser tratada
como uma ameaça séria merecedora de acompanhamento rigoroso.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que ilações retira do atentado de Woolwich?

2. Considera existirem motivos sérios de preocupação por parte dos Estados e dos cidadãos quanto ao
funcionamento no seu seio de redes e movimentos como os descritos?

3. Como deve agir a União Europeia, em conjunção com os Estados‐Membros, de modo a minorar as
probabilidades de verificação de novos ataques?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

_(16 de julho de 2013)_

O brutal assassínio de Lee Rigby em Woolwich voltou a trazer para a ribalta a questão do terrorismo interno. O
ataque e os eventos subsequentes levantam um conjunto de questões sobre o caráter evolutivo do terrorismo e a
radicalização, as informações, o extremismo de direita e a agenda da UE sobre a prevenção do extremismo violento.
Este ataque veio de novo provar que as ameaças à segurança são multifacetadas e difusas e que a Europa tem de
continuar a adaptar os seus instrumentos para detetar os sinais de radicalização violenta.

O desafio colocado pelos indivíduos endoutrinados por ideologias extremistas violentas, nomeadamente através da
Internet, sublinha igualmente a necessidade de uma abordagem societal mais ampla em termos de prevenção. É
necessária uma abordagem que congregue os múltiplos intervenientes e serviços para fazer face a uma ameaça cuja
natureza e expressão é tão diversificada. A Comissão continua a trabalhar sobre as formas de ajudar os Estados‐
Membros a prevenir o extremismo violento, independentemente da sua motivação e métodos, como uma das
prioridades da segurança interna. A Rede de Sensibilização para a Radicalização (RAN), lançada pela Comissão em
2011, colabora com um vasto leque de intervenientes, a fim de trocar informações sobre a melhor forma de atenuar
os riscos do extremismo. As conclusões da RAN confirmam que, embora a estratégia de combate à radicalização e ao
recrutamento para o terrorismo da UE, lançada em 2005 e revista em 2008, continue a ser válida no seu contexto, é
necessário garantir que é dada a devida atenção a um conjunto de fatores significativos.

A Comissão está atualmente a trabalhar na elaboração de um programa da UE para o extremismo violento, que define
medidas específicas e inovadoras para combater o extremismo violento com base na experiência da RAN e dos
Estados-Membros.

C 42 E / 224 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005930/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Consequences for the EU of the attack in Woolwich

The horrific attack in Woolwich, in which a British soldier died, has shown that there are radical Islamic movements
that direct or, at least, indoctrinate their followers and encourage them to carry out attacks against people and
institutions as part of a ‘holy war’ against the West.

This is a situation seen in several EU countries and leads to fears over public safety; it has to be treated as a serious
threat that needs close monitoring.

1. What conclusions does the Commission draw from the attack in Woolwich?

2. Does the Commission think that there are good grounds for the Member States and the public to be concerned
about such networks and movements operating in the EU?

3. What should the European Union do, together with the Member States, to make further attacks less likely?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The brutal murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich has once again put the spotlight on the challenge of domestic terrorism.
The attack and subsequent events raise a series of questions about the evolving nature of terrorism and radicalisation,
intelligence, right-wing extremism and the EU agenda on preventing violent extremism. This attack proved once
more that threats to security are multifaceted and diffuse and that Europe needs to continue to adapt its tools in order
to detect signs of violent radicalisation.

The challenge of individuals indoctrinated by violent extremist ideologies, notably via material on the Internet, also
highlights the need for a broader societal approach in terms of prevention. A multi-actor and multi-agency approach
is needed to address a threat so diverse in its nature and expression. The Commission continues to work on ways to
assist Member States in preventing violent extremism, regardless of motivation and methods, as one of the internal
security priorities. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) launched by the Commission in 2011, works with a
wide range of practitioners to exchange information on how best mitigating the risk of extremism. The findings of the
RAN confirm that while the 2005 EU Strategy as revised in 2008 for combating radicalisation and recruitment to
terrorism is still valid in its scope, there is a need to ensure that due consideration is given to a number of significant
factors.

The Commission is currently working on an EU programme on violent extremism outlining specific innovative
measures to counter violent extremism based on experience from the RAN and the Member States.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 225

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005931/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Síria — negociações de paz

Notícias recentes dão conta que ambos os lados do conflito sírio terão mostrado disponibilidade para participarem
em negociações visando pôr fim ao conflito que lavra no país.

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. Que apreciação faz desta aparente manifestação de vontades?

2. Que credibilidade lhe merecem?

3. Tem mantido canais de contacto com as autoridades governamentais sírias?

4. Acredita ser possível evitar a degradação ainda maior das condições e da segurança e estabilidade das
populações num cenário pós-Assad? Em que medida poderá a União Europeia contribuir para que assim seja?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(25 de julho de 2013)_

A organização da Segunda Conferência de Genebra sobre a Síria é da máxima prioridade. A Alta Representante/VicePresidente congratula-se com o apoio continuado e inequívoco prestado na Cimeira do G8 pelos EUA e pela Rússia à
convocação da Conferência de Genebra sobre a Síria; tanto mais, dadas as diferenças de pontos de vista sobre outras
linhas de ação para acelerar o final do conflito.

A AR/VP espera que a Coligação Nacional das Forças da Revolução e Oposição Sírias alargada (SOC) após a
assembleia geral da SOC em maio, em Istambul, seja um interlocutor eficaz e que lidere a delegação da oposição na
conferência.

A AR/VP prossegue com os seus trabalhos preparatórios sobre possíveis respostas da UE, abordando as necessidades
a curto prazo e os esforços de reconstrução a longo prazo, em função dos diferentes cenários que se podem
desenvolver no terreno na Síria; estes trabalhos estão em constante atualização. O princípio orientador desses
trabalhos preparatórios foi o comprovado valor acrescentado da UE em comparação com as respostas dadas no
âmbito da cooperação bilateral pelos Estados-Membros da UE.

Ver igualmente a comunicação conjunta da UE: «Para uma abordagem global da crise síria pela UE» ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/PT/foraff/137583.pdf

C 42 E / 226 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005931/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Peace talks in Syria

According to recent reports, both sides in the Syrian conflict have shown they are prepared to take part in
negotiations to put an end to the conflict in the country.

1. What does the Vice-President/High Representative think about this apparent show of willingness?

2. How credible does she think it is?

3. Has she remained in contact with the Syrian Government?

4. Does she believe it is possible to prevent the safety and stability of the population deteriorating even further in a
post-Assad scenario? To what extent could the European Union help achieve this?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

Organisation of the Geneva II conference on Syria is of utmost priority. The HR/VP welcomes continued and
unequivocal support given at the G8 meeting by the US and Russia to the convening of the Geneva conference on
Syria; all the more so given differences of views on other courses of action to hasten the end of the conflict.

The HR/VP hopes that the expanded Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) after the SOC General Assembly meeting that
met in May in Istanbul will be an effective interlocutor and lead the opposition delegation to the conference.

The HR/VP continues its preparatory work on possible EU responses, addressing the short term needs and the longterm reconstruction efforts, depending on the various scenarios that may develop on the ground in Syria; updating of
this work is constant. The guiding principle of that preparatory work was EU's demonstrable value-added as
compared to bilateral cooperation responses by the EU Member States.

Please refer also to the EU joint communication: ‘Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis’ ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137583.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 227

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005932/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Síria — apelo ao armamento das forças rebeldes

Alguns países europeus têm apelado à comunidade internacional para que levante os entraves ao armamento das
forças rebeldes e passe a apoiá-lo como forma de permitir um desenlace mais célere do conflito na Síria.

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. Que apreciação faz desta posição?

2. Crê que as forças rebeldes já dispõem de unidade operacional e estrutura de comando que permita ver de modo
mais favorável um apoio internacional mais empenhado, ou acredita que se mantêm as dúvidas quanto aos
mesmos?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(15 de julho de 2013)_

No que diz respeito às medidas em matéria de armamento, é de referir que o embargo chegou ao fim em 31 de maio,
tendo-se os Estados-Membros comprometido a respeitar no âmbito das suas políticas nacionais os princípios
estabelecidos na Declaração do Conselho adotada em 27 de maio. Assim, nesta fase, os Estados-Membros não farão
qualquer entrega de equipamento militar e o Conselho deverá rever a sua posição antes de 1 de agosto de 2013, com
base num relatório da Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente, após consulta do Secretário-Geral da ONU, sobre a
evolução da iniciativa dos EUA e da Rússia e sobre o empenhamento das partes sírias.

A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente reconhece os esforços envidados pela coligação da oposição síria e pelos seus
parceiros, como o Conselho Militar Supremo do General Salim Idris na Síria no sentido de proteger mais eficazmente
a população civil das consequências da violência indiscriminada perpetrada pelo regime do Presidente Assad.

A UE continua empenhada em colaborar com todas as partes interessadas a nível internacional, a fim de promover
um processo político na Síria. A Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente considera que apesar da situação atual no terreno
é necessário explorar todas as possibilidades de obter uma solução política com base no compromisso assumido em
30 de junho de 2012 pelo denominado Grupo de Ação que assinou o comunicado de Genebra. Neste contexto, a Alta
Representante/Vice-Presidente apoia plenamente e tenciona facilitar a preparação de uma conferência internacional
na qual participem representantes do Governo sírio, bem como da oposição, tal como previsto pelos Estados Unidos
e pela Rússia.

C 42 E / 228 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005932/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Call to arm Syrian rebel forces

Several EU countries have called on the international community to lift restrictions on arming the rebel forces and to
support arming them in order to bring about a swifter resolution to the conflict in Syria.

1. What is the Vice-President/High Representative’s view of this call?

2. Does she think that the rebels are sufficiently united operationally and have the command structure to make her
look more favourably on firmer international support, or does she believe that doubts remain over them?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

With regard to the measures on arms, the embargo expired on 31 May, and Member States committed to proceed in
their national policies in accordance with the principles set out in the Council Declaration adopted on 27 May.
Member States will not proceed at this stage with the delivery of military equipment and that the Council will review
its position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the HR/VP, after having consulted the UN Secretary
General, on the developments related to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties.

The HR/VP recognises all efforts by the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and its partners such as the Supreme
Military Council (SMC) of Gen. Salim Idris in Syria to improve their capacity to better protect civilians from the
consequences of indiscriminate violence inflicted upon them by the Assad regime.

The EU remains committed to working with all international stakeholders to promote a political process in Syria. The
HR/VP believes that notwithstanding the current situation on the ground there is a need to explore all possibilities to
reach a political solution based on the commitment made on 30 June 2012 by the so-called Action Group that signed
the Geneva Communique. In this context HR/VP fully supports and intends to facilitate the preparation of an
international conference attended by representatives of the Syrian government as well as the opposition, as envisaged
by the United States and Russia.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 229

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005933/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — VII Cimeira da Aliança do Pacífico

Os Presidentes do México, do Chile, do Peru e da Colômbia defenderam o livre comércio como instrumento para
gerar desenvolvimento económico sustentável e combater a pobreza e a desigualdade dos seus países, no começo da
VII Cimeira da Aliança do Pacífico em Cali, na Colômbia.

Assim, pergunto à Alta Representante:

1. A União Europeia fez-se representar na Cimeira?

2. Considera que a União Europeia deve estabelecer canais de comunicação permanentes com a Aliança do
Pacífico? Estes já existem?

3. Por que formas poderá a União Europeia estreitar o seu relacionamento político e comercial com os países
integrantes da Aliança do Pacífico?

4. Crê que a sua predisposição para a liberalização do comércio poderá contribuir para propiciar as trocas com os
seus parceiros externos, nomeadamente a União Europeia?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(25 de julho de 2013)_

Os países membros da Aliança do Pacífico representam, em conjunto, uma população de mais de 200 milhões de
habitantes, quase um terço do PIB da América Latina e cerca de 55 % das exportações da região. A UE mantém
relações bilaterais amistosas com os quatro países membros e tem acordos de associação ou de comércio livre com
cada um deles. Por este motivo, e tendo em conta o dinamismo do processo, a UE está a acompanhar o seu
desenvolvimento com grande interesse.

Nos termos do Acordo-Quadro assinado em junho de 2012, os objetivos da Aliança do Pacífico são a integração
regional, que deverá culminar na livre circulação de bens, serviços, capitais e pessoas, e a promoção do crescimento,
do desenvolvimento e da competitividade, tendo em vista alcançar a inclusão social. No âmbito do Acordo-Quadro
foram obtidos alguns resultados concretos, nomeadamente a nível da liberalização do comércio e da livre circulação
de pessoas.

O Acordo-Quadro salienta também o empenhamento dos países membros na democracia, no Estado de direito e nos
direitos humanos.

A UE foi convidada pela Presidência _pro tempore_ a participar, na qualidade de convidada especial, na recente Cimeira
da Aliança do Pacífico realizada em Cali, na Colômbia, em 23 de maio de 2013, onde foi representada a nível de
embaixadores. No futuro, a UE acolherá com agrado uma participação similar na qualidade de convidada especial nas
reuniões da Aliança do Pacífico, caso seja convidada a participar. À margem destes acontecimentos, afigura‐se
oportuno prosseguir os debates com os membros da Aliança do Pacífico sobre assuntos de interesse mútuo, como o
comércio, as questões relativas ao mercado interno ou outros aspetos da integração económica.

A nível político, a UE continuará a debater os processos de integração na região com os membros da Aliança do
Pacífico e com outros parceiros da América Latina e das Caraíbas.

C 42 E / 230 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005933/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Seventh Pacific Alliance summit

As the seventh Pacific Alliance summit got under way in Cali, Colombia, the Presidents of Mexico, Chile, Peru and
Colombia hailed free trade as a way of creating sustainable economic development and of combating poverty and
inequality in their countries.

1. Was the European Union represented at the summit?

2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative think that the European Union should open permanent channels
of communication with the Pacific Alliance? Have any such channels already been established?

3. How could the European Union develop closer political and trade relations with the member countries of the
Pacific Alliance?

4. Does the Vice-President/High Representative think that the Alliance’s penchant for liberalisation of trade could
help encourage trade with its external partners, particularly the European Union?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The member countries of the Pacific Alliance together account for a population of more than 200 million, nearly a
third of the GDP of Latin America, and some 55% of the region's exports. The EU enjoys friendly bilateral relations
with all four member countries, and has Association or Free Trade Agreements with each of them. For this reason,
and in view of the dynamism of the process, the EU is following its development with considerable interest.

According to the framework Agreement signed in June 2012, the objectives of the Pacific Alliance are regional
integration, culminating in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons; and the promotion of growth,
development and competitiveness with a view to achieving social inclusion. It has achieved a number of concrete
results, particularly in trade liberalisation and free movement of people.

The framework Agreement also underlines the commitment of member countries to democracy, the rule of law and
human rights.

The EU was invited by the _pro tempore_ Presidency to participate as a special guest at the recent Pacific Alliance summit
held in Cali, Colombia, on 23 May 2013, and was represented at ambassador level. For the future, similar
participation as special guest in meetings of the Pacific Alliance will be positively considered if the EU is invited to
attend. In the margins of such events, there would be merit in pursuing discussions with the Pacific Alliance members
on issues of mutual interest such as trade, internal market matters or other aspects of economic integration.

At political level, the EU will continue to discuss integration processes in the region with the members of the Pacific
Alliance and with other Latin American and Caribbean partners.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 231

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005934/13**

**à Comissão**
**Diogo Feio (PPE)**
_(28 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Islamismo radical — restrição do acesso a sítios da internet

A ministra do Interior do Reino Unido defendeu recentemente um aumento dos poderes para poder travar a difusão
de mensagens radicais islâmicas, nomeadamente mediante a restrição ou proibição do acesso a sítios da internet que
apelem à «jihad» e não condenem atos terroristas.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Que apreciação faz da posição britânica?

2. Crê que os Estados-Membros devem ponderar a adoção de medidas semelhantes?

**Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão**

_(17 de julho de 2013)_

A legislação da UE em vigor relativa ao combate ao terrorismo (Decisão-Quadro do Conselho 2008/919/JAI, de 28 de
novembro de 2008, que altera a Decisão-Quadro 2002/475/JAI) garante que o incitamento público à prática de
infrações terroristas é criminalizado em todos os Estados‐Membros. Esta infração pode ser cometida através da
divulgação ou distribuição pública de tais mensagens, incluindo na Internet.

Em conformidade com o artigo 14.° da Diretiva 2000/31/CE («Diretiva sobre o comércio eletrónico») para que os
prestadores de «serviços de armazenagem Web» beneficiem de uma isenção de responsabilidade no que respeita a
atividades ilegais ou informações armazenadas têm que atuar com diligência a partir do momento em que tenham
conhecimento do conteúdo ilegal.

A legislação da UE em vigor não exige que os prestadores destes serviços retirem ou impossibilitem o acesso a
determinados conteúdos em linha, exceto se se tratar de pornografia infantil. A Comissão não tenciona propor nova
legislação da UE que exija aos prestadores destes serviços que retirem ou impossibilitem o acesso a conteúdos em
linha.

C 42 E / 232 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005934/13**

**to the Commission**

**Diogo Feio (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Radical Islamism — restricting access to websites

The UK Home Secretary recently called for tougher powers to make it possible to block the distribution of radical
Islamic material, particularly by restricting or blocking access to websites that incite ‘jihad’ and do not condemn
terrorism.

1. What is the Commission’s view of the UK’s position?

2. Does it think that the Member States should consider taking similar steps?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(17 July 2013)_

Existing EU legislation on combating terrorism (Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA) ensures it is a criminal offence in all Member States publicly to incite
the commission of a terrorist offence. This offence can be committed through the public dissemination or
distribution of such messages, including on the Internet.

According to Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (‘E-commerce Directive’) providers of ‘hosting services’, in order to
benefit from a liability exemption for illegal activity or information that they host, should act expeditiously once they
obtain knowledge or awareness of such illegal content.

The issue of requiring hosting providers to remove or disable access to given online content is, with the exception of
child sexual exploitation material, not covered by existing EU legislation. The Commission is not planning to propose
new EU legislation requiring hosting providers to remove or disable access to online content.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 233

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-005935/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 maj 2013)_

_Angående:_ Utbredningen av ”flagghoppning” hos EU-fartyg

Fartyg som seglar under EU-flagg kan dra nytta av bilaterala fiskeriavtal med tredjeländer som EU förhandlat fram.
Vissa av dessa fartyg kan säsongsmässigt utnyttja även andra fiskemöjligheter inom EU:s farvatten eller på öppet hav
så länge de finns upptagna i ett EU-register. Andra kan lockas att lämna EU-registret under en begränsad period för att
utnyttja andra fiskemöjligheter medan de seglar under ett tredjelands flagg. Därefter återgår de till EU-registret för att
fiska inom ramen för ett bilateralt avtal igen.

Känner kommissionen till exempel på när ett fartyg har seglat under EU-flagg inom ramen för ett bilateralt avtal,
sedan lämnat EU-registret under en period bara för att återgå till registret för att kunna fiska inom ramen för ett
bilateralt avtal igen? Kommissionen bör kunna få information om sådana eventuella fall genom att titta på EU:s
fartygsregister och den förteckning över fartyg som har fått tillstånd enligt bilaterala avtal.

Kan kommissionen i så fall tillhandahålla uppgifter om antalet inblandade fartyg, det EU-lands och tredjelands flagg
under vilket fartyget har seglat, inom ramen för vilka fiskeriavtal de har fiskat samt antalet år och fångster det har
handlat om?

**Svar från Maria Damanaki på kommissionens vägnar**

_(11 juli 2013)_

Även om information som gjorts tillgänglig i registret över EU:s fiskeflotta inte helt avser fisketillstånd som beviljats
EU-fartyg inom ramen för partnerskapsavtalen om fiske, kan Europeiska kommissionen spåra EU-fiskefartygs historia
och kontrollera om vissa av dem temporärt har exporterats till ett land utanför EU. Dock skulle en riktig bedömning
av omflaggningsstrategier kräva ett närmare samarbete mellan Europeiska kommissionen, medlemsstaternas
förvaltningar och tredjeländer.

Från en första översyn av de registreringar som gjorts tillgängliga i registret över EU:s fiskeflotta förefaller det att
fiskestrategier som grundas på tillfälliga omflaggningar oftast är begränsade till de blandade partnerskapsavtalen om
fiske och i synnerhet rör de delar i EU:s industriella flotta av trålare som fiskar efter små pelagiska arter. Detta är
mycket ovanligare (eller till och med obefintligt) inom andra segment i den externa EU-flottan såsom ringnotsfartyg
för tonfiskfiske, fartyg för långrevsfiske och bottentrålare.

Kommissionen förespråkar starkt mer öppenhet i denna fråga och stödjer förbättringar av förvaltningsåtgärder,
särskilt när det gäller regler för tillträde och kapacitetsförvaltning i fiske som omfattas av partnerskapsavtalen om
fiske. Detta är ett av målen med en eventuell översyn av fisketillståndsförordningen, om vilken ett offentligt samråd
nyligen har inlett arbetet. I ett sådant sammanhang kan Europeiska kommissionen undersöka ytterligare
bedömningar av omflaggningsregler med anledning av det förestående ikraftträdandet av den reformerade
gemensamma fiskeripolitiken, och använda denna bedömning när den utarbetar sitt kommande förslag till en
översyn av fisketillståndsförordningen.

C 42 E / 234 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005935/13**

**to the Commission**
**Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Extent of ‘flag-hopping’ by EU vessels

Vessels flying an EU flag may benefit from EU-negotiated bilateral fisheries agreements with third countries. Some of
these vessels may also avail themselves, seasonally, of other fishing opportunities within EU waters or on the high
seas while remaining on an EU register. Others may be tempted to leave the EU register for a limited time in order to
exploit other fishing opportunities while flying the flag of a third country, then return to the EU register to fish under
a bilateral agreement again.

Does the Commission know of instances in which a vessel has operated under an EU flag in the context of a bilateral
agreement, then left the EU register for a period of time, only to return to it in order to fish under a bilateral agreement
again? The Commission should be able to obtain information on such eventualities by looking at the EU vessel
register and the list of vessels that have been given authorisations under bilateral agreements.

If such instances have occurred, could the Commission provide data on the number of vessels involved, the EU and
third-country flags under which the vessels have operated, the fisheries agreement(s) under which they have fished,
and the years and catches involved?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

Although information made available in the EU Fleet Register does not fully relate to fishing authorisations granted to
EU vessels in the context of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs), the European Commission is able to track the
history of EU fishing vessels and check if some of them were temporarily exported in a non-EU State. However,
carrying out a proper assessment of reflagging strategies would require a deeper collaboration between the European
Commission, the Member State administrations, and third countries.

From a first review of the track records made available in the EU fleet register, it appears that fishing strategies based
on temporary reflagging are mostly restricted to the mixed Fisheries Partnership Agreements and relate in particular
to the section of the EU industrial fleet of trawlers targeting small pelagic species. This is much less prevalent (or even
non-existent) in other segments of the EU external fleet such as the tuna purse-seiners and long-liners, or the demersal
trawlers.

The Commission strongly favours more transparency on this issue and supports improvements of management
measures, particularly those related to access rules and capacity management in fisheries covered by FPAs. This is one
of the aims of a possible revision of the Fishing Authorisation Regulation, on which a public consultation has been
recently launched. In such a context, the European Commission will look into further assessment of rules on
reflagging in view of the forthcoming entering into force of the reformed CFP and will use this assessment when
preparing its forthcoming proposal to revise the regulation on fishing authorisations.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 235

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-005936/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Buques pesqueros con bandera de la UE

¿Tiene constancia la Comisión de que buques pesqueros que enarbolen el pabellón de un Estado miembro hayan
faenado en aguas de un país tercero con el que la UE no tenga un acuerdo bilateral de pesca en vigor?

Esto implicaría que tales situaciones son un acuerdo privado con el gobierno de un país tercero o una empresa
conjunta de algún tipo. En virtud del artículo 3 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1006/2008 del Consejo, un buque bajo
bandera de la UE precisa de una autorización de pesca para faenar fuera de las aguas de la UE, luego la Comisión
debería disponer de dicha información.

El artículo 11,2, del Reglamento exige que los Estados miembros recaben información acerca de los acuerdos entre
sus nacionales y un tercer país sobre las actividades en aguas de un tercer país. ¿Ha recibido la Comisión información
de este tipo de algún Estado miembro?

De ser el caso, ¿de qué Estados miembros se trataba? ¿A cuántos buques afectaba? ¿En aguas de qué tercer país se
realizaron las actividades?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión**

_(9 de julio de 2013)_

El artículo 11, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) n° 1006/2008 del Consejo establece que los Estados miembros deben
esforzarse por recabar información sobre los acuerdos entre sus nacionales y un tercer país que autoricen actividades
pesqueras a los buques de más de 24 metros de eslora total.

Dicho artículo también establece que es competencia de los Estados miembros informar a la Comisión sobre
cualquier acuerdo de esta naturaleza. La Comisión recibe de forma esporádica dicha información de los Estados
miembros. Por ejemplo, Francia comunicó recientemente que nueve atuneros cerqueros de jareta habían sido
autorizados a faenar en aguas de la República de Guinea entre octubre y diciembre de 2013. En 2012, Portugal
comunicó que un buque había recibido autorización para faenar en aguas de Angola y previamente, en 2010, había
informado a la Comisión de que un buque había sido autorizado a faenar en Liberia.

Sin embargo, esta información es demasiado incompleta para llevar a cabo una evaluación global de las actividades de
los buques de la Unión que faenan en aguas de terceros países con los que no existe acuerdo de asociación en el sector
pesquero o en aguas internacionales donde no se aplican las medidas de gestión de las organizaciones regionales de
ordenación pesquera. La falta de información completa refleja las dificultades a las que se enfrentan los Estados
miembros a la hora de recopilar los datos pertinentes y comunicarlos a la Comisión.

La Comisión está totalmente a favor de una mayor transparencia en esta materia. Esta cuestión será analizada en el
contexto de una posible revisión del Reglamento relativo a la autorización de las actividades pesqueras para lo cual
recientemente se ha puesto en marcha una consulta pública.

C 42 E / 236 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005936/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU-flagged fishing vessels

Is the Commission aware of fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State that have operated in the waters of a third
country with which the EU does not have an active bilateral fisheries agreement?

This would involve such situations as a private agreement with a third-country government or a joint venture of some
kind. Under the terms of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008, an EU-flagged vessel requires a fishing
authorisation to fish outside EU waters, so such information should be available to the Commission.

Article 11(2) of the regulation requires Member States to seek information on arrangements between their nationals
and a third country concerning activities in third-country waters. Has the Commission received information of this
kind from any Member State?

If so, which Member State(s) were they, how many vessels were involved, and in which third‐country waters did the
activities take place?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

Article 11.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008, states that Member States shall endeavour to obtain
information on any arrangements between their nationals and a third country which allow fishing activities of vessels
exceeding 24 metres in length overall.

The article further states that it is incumbent on Member States to inform the Commission of any arrangements of
this nature. The Commission does sporadically receive such information from Member States. For instance, France
recently informed that nine tuna purse-seiners had been entitled to fish in waters of the Republic of Guinea, from
October to December 2013. In 2012 Portugal provided information that one vessel had received authorisation to fish
in waters of Angola having previously, in 2010, notified the Commission that one vessel was authorised to fish in
Liberia.

However, this information is too incomplete to allow a comprehensive assessment of activities of Union vessels
fishing either in third country waters where no FPA is in place or in international waters where no RFMO
management measures apply. The lack of complete information reflects the difficulties faced by Member States when
collecting the relevant data and communicating them back to the Commission.

The Commission is strongly in favour of greater transparency on this issue. This will be considered in the context of a
possible revision of the Fishing Authorisation Regulation for which a public consultation has recently been launched.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 237

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005937/13**

**al Consejo**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Acceso a la cultura de las personas con discapacidad visual

En la Conferencia Diplomática de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual que se celebrará en Marrakech
el próximo 17 de junio tendremos una oportunidad histórica para intentar reparar una gran injusticia: la falta de
acceso a la cultura de las personas con una discapacidad visual. Según la Unión Europea de Ciegos, de la que forma
parte la Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE), las propuestas negociadoras muy restrictivas y
complejas de la Unión Europea han dificultado un acuerdo global sobre el Tratado.

Este diputado lamenta no estar informado del mandato negociador establecido por el Consejo en cumplimiento del
artículo 218, apartado 10, del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, que establece que «se informará
cumplida e inmediatamente al Parlamento Europeo en todas las fases del procedimiento».

1. ¿Tiene intención el Consejo de reconsiderar su muy criticada actuación negociadora ante la Conferencia
Diplomática que se avecina?

2. ¿Tiene intención el Consejo de informar al Parlamento Europeo sobre el mandato y el curso de las negociaciones
en obligado cumplimiento de lo establecido en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea?

**Respuesta**
_(23 de septiembre de 2013)_

El Consejo llama la atención de Su Señoría sobre el hecho de que es a la Comisión a la que se ha encomendado
negociar, en nombre de la Unión Europea y en la medida en que el asunto en cuestión es competencia exclusiva de la
Unión, un Tratado de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual que facilite el acceso a las obras publicadas
a las personas con discapacidad visual y a las personas con discapacidad visual respecto del texto impreso. A tal
efecto, el Consejo ha dirigido a la Comisión un conjunto de directrices de negociación.

El Parlamento Europeo ha sido debidamente informado del mandato de negociación y de las directrices de
negociación.

El Consejo advierte que en la Conferencia Diplomática de Marrakech ya se ha alcanzado un acuerdo entre las partes
negociadoras sobre el texto del citado Tratado. Dicho texto tiene que ser ahora examinado por la Unión Europea de
conformidad con las disposiciones pertinentes de los Tratados.

C 42 E / 238 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005937/13**

**to the Council**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Access to culture for the visually impaired

At the Diplomatic Conference of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in Marrakesh on 17 June 2013
there will be an historic opportunity to try to put right a great injustice: the lack of access to culture for visually
impaired people. According to the European Blind Union, of which ONCE — Spain’s national organisation for the
blind — is a member, the European Union’s very restrictive and complex negotiating proposals have made finding a
global agreement on the treaty very difficult.

I deplore the fact that I have not been informed about the negotiating mandate established by the Council, in
accordance with Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which states that,
‘The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’.

1. Will the Council reconsider at the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference the highly criticised stance it has taken
in negotiations?

2. Will the Council keep Parliament informed about the mandate and the negotiations as stipulated by the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union?

**Reply**
_(23 September 2013)_

The Council draws the Honourable Member's attention to the fact that it is the Commission that has been entrusted
with the task of negotiating on behalf of the European Union, to the extent that the subject matter falls within the
Union's exclusive competence, a WIPO Treaty to facilitate access to published works by visually impaired persons and
persons with print disabilities. To that effect, the Council has addressed to the Commission a set of negotiating
directives.

The European Parliament has been kept duly informed of the negotiating mandate and of the negotiating directives.

The Council notes that the Marrakesh Diplomatic Conference has resulted in an agreement between the negotiating
parties on the text of the said Treaty. This text will now have to be scrutinised by the European Union in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Treaties.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 239

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005938/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Acceso a la cultura de las personas con discapacidad visual

En la Conferencia Diplomática de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual que se celebrará en Marrakech
el próximo 17 de junio tendremos una oportunidad histórica para intentar reparar una gran injusticia: la falta de
acceso a la cultura de las personas con una discapacidad visual. Según la Unión Europea de Ciegos, de la que forma
parte la Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE), las propuestas negociadoras muy restrictivas y
complejas de la Unión Europea han dificultado un acuerdo global sobre el Tratado.

Este diputado lamenta no estar informado del mandato negociador establecido por el Consejo en cumplimiento del
artículo 218, apartado 10, del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, que establece que «se informará
cumplida e inmediatamente al Parlamento Europeo en todas las fases del procedimiento».

1. ¿Tiene intención la Comisión de reconsiderar su muy criticada actuación negociadora ante la Conferencia
Diplomática que se avecina?

2. ¿Tiene intención la Comisión de informar al Parlamento Europeo sobre el mandato y el curso de las
negociaciones en obligado cumplimiento de lo establecido en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(2 de septiembre de 2013)_

1. La Conferencia Diplomática de Marrakech (del 17 al 28 de junio de 2013) adoptó un Tratado para facilitar el
acceso a las obras publicadas a las personas ciegas, con discapacidad visual o con otras dificultades para acceder al
texto impreso.

A lo largo de las negociaciones, inclusive en la Conferencia Diplomática, la Comisión representó a la Unión Europea y
los Estados miembros, de conformidad con las orientaciones establecidas por el Consejo en las directrices de
negociación adoptadas en otoño de 2012.

La Comisión es muy consciente de las obligaciones de la UE al ser parte en la Convención de las NU sobre los
derechos de las personas con discapacidad y está plenamente comprometida con su aplicación en los ámbitos de
competencia de la UE.

2. La Comisión ha mantenido informado regularmente al Parlamento Europeo e informó después de cada ronda
de negociaciones, la última vez con ocasión de un debate del Pleno el 21 de mayo de 2013. La Comisión ofreció
también al Parlamento Europeo la posibilidad de incluir a miembros del Parlamento Europeo como observadores en
la Delegación de la UE en la Conferencia Diplomática.

La Comisión seguirá manteniendo informado al Parlamento en el futuro. Sin embargo, las directrices de negociación
son un documento restringido elaborado por el Consejo y, por tanto, solo el Consejo podría dar acceso a los
miembros del Parlamento Europeo a dicho documento. La Comisión no ha sido autorizada a hacerlo público.

C 42 E / 240 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005938/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Access to culture for the visually impaired

At the Diplomatic Conference of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in Marrakesh on 17 June 2013
there will be an historic opportunity to try to put right a great injustice: the lack of access to culture for visually
impaired people. According to the European Blind Union, of which ONCE — Spain’s national organisation for the
blind — is a member, the European Union’s very restrictive and complex negotiating proposals have made finding a
global agreement on the treaty very difficult.

I deplore the fact that I have not been informed about the negotiating mandate established by the Council, in
accordance with Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which states that,
‘The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’.

1. Will the Commission reconsider at the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference the highly criticised stance it has
taken in negotiations?

2. Will the Commission keep Parliament informed about the mandate and the negotiations as stipulated by the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 September 2013)_

1. The Marrakesh Diplomatic Conference (17-28 June 2013) successfully adopted a Treaty to Facilitate Access to
Books for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or otherwise Print Disabled.

Throughout the negotiations, including at the Diplomatic Conference, the Commission represented the European
Union and its Member States along the lines determined by the Council in the negotiating directives adopted in
autumn 2012.

The Commission is well aware of the EU obligations being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and is fully committed to its implementation in areas falling under EU competences.

2. The Commission has kept the European Parliament regularly informed and reported back after each round of
the negotiations, last time being at the occasion of a plenary debate on 21 May 2013. The Commission also offered
the European Parliament the possibility to include Members of the European Parliament as observers in the EU
delegation at the Diplomatic Conference.

The Commission will continue to keep the Parliament informed in the future. However, the negotiating directives is a
restricted document issued by the Council, hence only the Council could give Members of the European Parliament
access to this document. The Commission has not been authorised to disclose it.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 241

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005939/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Incumplimiento en relación con los precios de entrada y el contingente del tomate marroquí

Son reiteradas las ocasiones en las que el sector hortofrutícola ha manifestado el persistente fracaso en los sistemas de
control que se aplican a la entrada del tomate marroquí en el mercado de la Unión.

El pasado año una alianza de productores de España, Francia e Italia reclamó a la Comisión un mayor control en las
aduanas debido al hundimiento del mercado de la Unión como consecuencia de las exportaciones de tomate
marroquí por debajo del precio establecido en el Acuerdo de Asociación.

Asimismo, un reciente informe de seguimiento realizado por la Consejería de Agricultura, Pesca y Medio Ambiente de
la Comunidad de Andalucía —del 8 al 14 de abril de 2013— señala que el tomate procedente del Reino alauita se
vendió a un precio que oscila entre 0,50 y 0,60 euros por kilogramo, de nuevo por debajo del precio que fija el
Acuerdo.

Por todo ello, ¿qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión para garantizar el correcto funcionamiento de los controles
de precios de entrada y de contingente?

**Respuesta del Sr. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión**

_(8 de julio de 2013)_

Los servicios de la Comisión controlan rigurosamente la cantidad de tomates importados de Marruecos, con un
sistema de doble control basado en la declaración de las cantidades exportadas a la UE por parte de los operadores
marroquíes y en el registro diario de las importaciones por parte de los servicios aduaneros de los Estados miembros
(con publicación diaria en la página web de la Dirección General de Fiscalidad y Unión Aduanera). Para ayudar a las
autoridades aduaneras a reforzar el control de las importaciones de productos sujetos a precio de entrada, el
Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 701/2012 de la Comisión ( [1] ) introdujo un sistema de trazabilidad.

Sobre la base de las notificaciones de los Estados miembros, los servicios de la Comisión calculan el valor de
importación a tanto alzado (con arreglo al artículo 140 _bis_ del Reglamento (CE) n° 1234/2007 del Consejo). Ese
indicador de los precios del tomate importado de Marruecos puede fluctuar por encima y por debajo del precio de
entrada acordado, siempre y cuando se paguen los derechos correspondientes.

La última campaña de importación de tomates de Marruecos (de octubre de 2012 a mayo de 2013) se desarrolló
satisfactoriamente en términos de precios y cantidades importadas. En todo momento se respetó el contingente de
importación asignado a los tomates marroquíes.

En la segunda semana de abril, el valor de importación a tanto alzado de los tomates marroquíes osciló entre
60 y 71 euros/100 kg, rebasando por tanto el precio de entrada acordado, de 46,1 euros/100 kg.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) DO L 203 de 31.7.2012.

C 42 E / 242 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005939/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Failure to comply with entry prices and quotas for Moroccan tomatoes

The fruit and vegetable sector has repeatedly pointed to persistent failings in the systems controlling the entry of
Moroccan tomatoes onto the EU market.

Last year, with the EU’s market collapsing as a result of Moroccan tomatoes being exported at prices below those set
in the Association Agreement, producers from Spain, France and Italy joined together to demand that the
Commission tighten up customs controls.

Similarly, a recent report on monitoring conducted from 8 to 14 April 2013 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and the Environment of the Autonomous Community of Andalucía showed that tomatoes from Morocco were being
sold at a price that varied between EUR 0.50 and EUR 0.60 per kilo, which is once again below the price set in the
Agreement.

What measures is the Commission planning to take to ensure that controls on entry prices and quotas are properly
implemented?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

The Commission services closely monitor the amount of tomatoes imported from Morocco, with a double-checking
system which is based on the declaration of the quantities exported to the EU by the Moroccan operators as well as
the daily registration of imports by the national Customs Services of the Member States (published daily on the
webpage of Directorate General of Taxation and Customs Union). To help customs authorities to reinforce the
control of imports of products subject to the Entry Price, a traceability system was put in place through Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 701/2012 ( [1] ).

Based on the notifications of the Member States, the Commission services calculate the Standard Import Value
(pursuant to Article 140a Council Regulation 1234/2007). This proxy of tomato prices imported from Morocco can
fluctuate above and below the agreed entry price, to the extent that the corresponding duties are paid.

The last import season (October 2012 to May 2013) of tomatoes from Morocco took place in good conditions in
terms of prices and quantities imported. The tomato import quota allocated to Morocco has always been respected.

During the second week of April, the Standard Import Value of tomatoes from Morocco was between EUR 60 and
EUR 71/ 100 kg, therefore above the agreed entry price of EUR 46.1/100 kg.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 203, 31.7.2012.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 243

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005940/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Preocupación por el incremento de la morosidad

A mediados del pasado mes de marzo expiró el plazo para incorporar a los ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados
miembros las previsiones contenidas en la Directiva 2011/7/UE, de 16 de febrero de 2011, que establece medidas
para luchar contra la morosidad en los contratos mercantiles. Es sabido que algunos países europeos no han
culminado este proceso. Pero más preocupa que, como están publicando diversos institutos, fundaciones y
federaciones de empresarios de distintos países que sí han asumido la nueva regulación, haya sectores en los que se
esté ampliando la demora de los pagos. Tal es el caso, por ejemplo en España, de las deudas contractuales que
mantienen las Administraciones autonómicas y locales en Andalucía, Cataluña y Valencia.

Igualmente, resulta inquietante que los Derechos nacionales no estén estableciendo ninguna previsión transitoria para
los contratos suscritos con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor del nuevo régimen jurídico. Es cierto que lo permite el
texto de la directriz (artículo 12, apartado 4). Sin embargo, hay que saber que esa «desarmonización europea»
representa un obstáculo en el mercado común interior, además de incrementar la desprotección de esos empresarios
que están soportando el lastre de importantes impagos.

Por ello, pregunto a la Comisión:

1. Además de los consabidos requerimientos para exigir el cumplimiento del Derecho comunitario, ¿qué análisis
está realizando de los primeros pasos de la aplicación de la Directiva europea?

2. Ante la crítica situación que padecen muchos empresarios por los retrasos de los pagos de las Administraciones
públicas, en especial aquellos cuyos contratos ya estaban ultimados antes del pasado mes de marzo, ¿no ha
considerado la Comisión la aprobación de un plan de ayudas especiales para facilitar cierta liquidez a esas
empresas y no seguir incrementando la deuda pública?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(31 de julio de 2013)_

1. A día de hoy, 24 Estados miembros han notificado a la Comisión que han finalizado las medidas de
transposición de la Directiva 2011/7/UE. Tres Estados miembros (Alemania, la República Checa y Bélgica) aún no han
notificado oficialmente la transposición completa de la Directiva. El 29 de mayo de 2013, la Comisión remitió a los
Estados miembros sendos escritos de requerimiento por no haber notificado sus medidas de transposición.

La Comisión está realizando actualmente un análisis jurídico de las medidas nacionales notificadas, a fin de
comprobar si las medidas son coherentes con la Directiva. En caso de que la evaluación jurídica revele que se han
incumplido los requisitos de la Directiva, la Comisión no dudará en tomar las medidas necesarias, incluyendo, en su
caso, procedimientos de infracción.

Dada la importancia de la correcta implementación y del cumplimiento de la Directiva, la Comisión ha organizado
una campaña de información sobre la morosidad en los pagos ( [1] ). Además, en septiembre de 2013 se celebrará una
tercera reunión del grupo de expertos sobre morosidad ( [2] ).

2. En 2011 la Comisión adoptó un plan de acción en el que se enumeran una serie de medidas destinadas a
mejorar el acceso de las PYME a la financiación. Con un presupuesto de 1 100 millones de euros, el Programa Marco
para la Innovación y la Competitividad ha contribuido a movilizar más de 13 000 millones de euros de préstamos y
2 300 millones de euros de capital de riesgo para casi 220 000 PYME en toda Europa. En 2012, el apoyo del Grupo
del BEI a las PYME ascendió a 13 000 millones de euros. La Comisión también ha puesto en marcha un nuevo portal
único en línea sobre la financiación de la UE para ayudar a las PYME a acceder a instrumentos financieros en el marco
de los programas de la UE.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) La campaña de información sobre la morosidad en los pagos se inició en octubre de 2012 y se llevará a cabo en todos los Estados miembros de la

UE. El objetivo es, entre otras cosas, incrementar la sensibilización entre las partes interesadas europeas sobre los nuevos derechos que les confiere
la Directiva.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) El principal objetivo de la reunión es recibir información actualizada sobre la situación de la transposición y la implementación de la Directiva, así

como toda la información relativa a las medidas nacionales correspondientes que han sido recientemente adoptadas para resolver la cuestión de
las deudas pendientes.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 244 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Para el futuro período de programación 2014-2020 la Comisión tiene previsto incrementar el uso de instrumentos
financieros ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) El programa COSME apoyará a las PYME con mecanismos de capital y deuda apoyándose en el éxito del programa marco de competitividad e

innovación. Los instrumentos del programa COSME se complementarán con financiación para empresas basadas en la investigación y la
innovación en el marco del programa Horizonte 2020.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 245

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005940/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Concern over the rise in late payments

Directive 2011/7/EU of 16 February 2011 sets out measures to combat late payment in business contracts. The
deadline for incorporating its provisions into Member States’ legal systems expired in the middle of March 2013 and
it is well known that some EU countries have not yet completed transposition. But what is even more worrying are
reports from various business institutes, foundations and federations in different countries that even where the new
rules have been transposed, there are sectors in which late payment is becoming more widespread than ever. This is
the case, for example, in Spain with the contractual debts held by the regional governments and local authorities in
the autonomous communities of Andalucía, Catalonia and Valencia.

It is also worrying that national laws do not include any transitional provisions for contracts signed before the entry
into force of the new laws. The directive does make provision for this in Article 12(4). It should nevertheless be noted
that this ‘lack of harmonisation in the EU’ places an obstacle in the way of the common internal market, as well as
increasing the vulnerability of those small businesses bearing the burden of having significant sums of money owed
to them.

1. What analysis of the first stages of implementing this EU Directive is the Commission conducting, in addition to
its normal requests that EC law be complied with?

2. With many small businesses in a critical situation owing to late payment by public authorities, in particular
those businesses whose contracts were finalised before March 2013, has the Commission considered approving a
special aid plan to provide these businesses with some liquidity and prevent further public debt?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

1. As of today, 24 Member States have notified the Commission regarding the completion of the transposing
measures of Directive 2011/7/EU. Three Member States, namely Germany, the Czech Republic and Belgium, have not
yet officially notified complete transposition of the directive. On 29 May 2013, the Commission sent letters of formal
notice for non-communication to the Member States that until that date had failed to notify their transposing

measures.

The Commission is currently undertaking a legal analysis of the notified national measures to verify whether the
measures are consistent with the directive. Should the legal assessment reveal non‐compliance with the requirements
of the directive, the Commission will not hesitate to take the necessary action including, where appropriate,
infringement procedures.

Given the importance of correct implementation and enforcement of the directive, the Commission is organising a
Late Payment Information Campaign ( [1] ). In addition, a third Late Payment Expert Group meeting will take place in
September 2013 ( [2] ).

2. The Commission adopted an Action Plan in 2011 which lists a series of measures aimed at improving access to
finance for SMEs. With a budget of EUR 1.1 billion, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme has
helped to mobilise over EUR 13 billion of loans and EUR 2.3 billion of venture capital for almost 220,000 SMEs
across Europe. The EIB Group's support for SMEs reached EUR 13 billion in 2012. The Commission has also
launched a new single online portal on EU finance helping SMEs to access financial instruments under the EU

programmes.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The Late Payment Information campaign started in October 2012 and will take place in all EU Member States. The aim is, amongst others, to

increase the awareness among European stakeholders about the new rights conferred by the directive.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The main objective of the meeting is to receive up to date information on the state of play of the transposition and implementation of the directive

as well as all information regarding relevant national measures that have been recently adopted to solve outstanding debts.

( **|**

C 42 E / 246 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

For the forthcoming programming period 2014‐2020, the Commission is aiming to increase the use of financial
instruments ( [3] ).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The COSME Programme will support SMEs with debt and equity instruments building on the success of the Competitiveness and Innovation

Framework Programme. The COSME instruments will be complemented by financing for research and innovation driven enterprises under the
Horizon Programme 2020.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 247

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005941/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Evasión fiscal

Los servicios de prensa de la Comisión europea han insistido en la voluntad de esta institución para tratar de acabar
con el abuso de resquicios legales por parte de multinacionales para eludir el pago de impuestos, así como el anuncio
de que antes de finales de año se presentará una propuesta de revisión de la Directiva sobre sociedades matrices y
filiales. Me ha alegrado conocer estas declaraciones, pues han sido varias las ocasiones en las que he tratado de llevar al
ánimo de esa Comisión la necesidad de una profunda reforma, ante las graves consecuencias que genera la falta de
armonización en Europa del impuesto de sociedades, así como el diferente cálculo de las bases imponibles o el
peculiar régimen jurídico de los traslados de beneficios (por ejemplo, mis preguntas E-007799/2012 o E010066/2012).

Espero con atención la propuesta de la Comisión y, para este periodo de estudio y elaboración de la reforma, me
permito recomendar a esa institución que utilice y analice un «juego» muy difundido de evasión fiscal: Taxodus.net.

En todo caso, sí me gustaría conocer:

¿Qué opinión le merece la amplia difusión de un «juego» que incrementa las habilidades de evasión fiscal?

**Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión**

_(19 de julio de 2013)_

La evasión fiscal consiste en recurrir a medios ilegales para eludir el pago de impuestos, por ejemplo, no declarar la
renta imponible a las autoridades fiscales. La Comisión considera esta práctica ilegal un problema grave y ha
adoptado medidas constructivas para luchar contra la evasión fiscal, conforme a su Plan de acción contra el fraude
fiscal y la evasión fiscal ( [1] ), de 6 de diciembre de 2012. La práctica de la elusión fiscal o planificación fiscal abusiva
empleada por las multinacionales consiste en la reducción de su carga fiscal global mediante la planificación de su
fiscalidad, acto que, aunque lícito, contradice el espíritu de la ley. Esto se lleva a cabo aprovechando las lagunas de los
sistemas tributarios nacionales y las deficiencias de las normas fiscales internacionales, explotando al mismo tiempo
los desfases existentes en la interacción entre regímenes fiscales nacionales. Esta práctica no supone por tanto una
evasión fiscal, en sentido estricto, pero resulta igualmente inaceptable y perjudicial.

En sus recomendaciones de 6 de diciembre de 2012 ( [2] ), la Comisión instó a los Estados miembros a tomar medidas
para frenar este tipo de prácticas. Por otra parte, la Comisión también contribuye y apoya activamente los esfuerzos
que realiza la OCDE para actualizar las normas internacionales y resolver los desfases existentes a escala mundial. En
cuanto a la opinión que le merece a la Comisión el juego en línea «taxodus.net» al que se refiere Su Señoría, cabe decir
que se trata de una manera creativa pero simplista de explicar las prácticas de planificación fiscal agresiva que
presentan a menudo una gran complejidad.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 722 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) C(2012) 8805 final y C(2012) 8806 final.

C 42 E / 248 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005941/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tax evasion

The Commission’s press service has insisted on the fact that the Commission wants to try to stop multinationals
abusing legal loopholes in order to avoid paying taxes and has announced that the Commission will present a
proposal on reviewing the directive on parent companies and subsidiaries before the end of the year. I was pleased to
hear this as I have tried on various occasions to make the Commission aware of the need for far-reaching reform, in
view of the serious consequences arising from the lack of harmonisation of corporation tax in the European Union, as
well as from tax bases being calculated differently and the very particular legal system applying to profit shifting (see
for instance, Written Questions E-007799/2012 or E-010066/2012).

I await the Commission’s proposal with interest and take the liberty of recommending that the Commission uses and
analyses, while it is examining and developing this reform, a very popular tax evasion ‘game’: Taxodus.net

How does the Commission view the wide distribution of a ‘game’ which helps improve tax evasion skills?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

Tax evasion is using illegal means to avoid paying taxes due, for example by not declaring taxable income to the tax
authorities. The Commission considers this illegal practice a serious issue. It has taken constructive measures to tackle
tax evasion as laid down in its Action Plan of 6 December 2012 against tax fraud and tax evasion ( [1] ). The practice of
tax avoidance or aggressive tax planning by multinationals concerns the reduction of their global tax bill by arranging
their tax affairs which although being legal contradict the spirit of the law. They do this by using loopholes in
domestic tax systems, taking advantage of deficiencies in international tax standards, and exploiting mismatches in
the interaction of national tax systems. This is therefore different from tax evasion, but is also damaging and
unacceptable.

In its recommendations of 6 December 2012 ( [2] ), the Commission has urged Member States to take measures to curb
such practices. Moreover, the Commission also actively contributes to and supports efforts at OECD level to update
international standards and tackle mismatches at a global level. The online game ‘taxodus.net’ to which the
Honourable Member refers is a creative but simplistic way to explain aggressive tax planning arrangements which are
often highly complex.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 722 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) C(2012) 8805 final, and C(2012) 8806 final.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 249

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005942/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Prolongación de la vida útil de la central nuclear de Santa María de Garoña

El Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) español acaba de prorrogar por un año la licencia de operación de la central
nuclear de Santa María de Garoña. Tras las pruebas europeas de estrés de todas las instalaciones nucleares después del
accidente de Fukushima, se demostró que esta central no resiste terremotos de la intensidad que exige el regulador,
que presenta un riesgo de inundación muy alto en caso de rotura de las presas cercanas y que tiene deficiencias en la
custodia y protección del combustible gastado en caso de pérdida de los sistemas de refrigeración. También faltan
medidas para reducir las concentraciones de hidrógeno, con riesgo de explosión en la contención del reactor.
Finalmente, se detectaron deficiencias en los planes de emergencia ante una catástrofe nuclear en la zona ( [1] ). Estas
circunstancias, junto con la longevidad de una central diseñada para operar durante 25 años y con 41 de actividad, y
la existencia en su perímetro cercano de significativos núcleos de población, como la localidad burgalesa de Miranda
de Ebro y la capital del País Vasco, Vitoria-Gasteiz, aconsejaron que se concluyese el ciclo de vida útil de la central el
próximo mes de julio.

Pocas semanas antes de cumplirse el plazo, un CSN dividido ha acordado dar un año más de plazo a los propietarios
de la central para mantenerla en activo. En su decisión se reconoce que Garoña no ha realizado aún todas las reformas
necesarias para adaptarla a las nuevas exigencias pos‐Fukushima, por lo que prolongan la licencia a cambio de que no
se introduzca más combustible en el reactor hasta que la central cumpla con las nuevas exigencias. Cabe recordar que,
dado el carácter estructural de las mismas, no parece sencillo que esta central pueda acomodarse a los nuevos
requisitos. Todas estas razones han concitado un rechazo masivo de la población residente en la zona de influencia de
la central al mantenimiento en actividad de la misma.

1. ¿Conoce la Comisión la situación de la central nuclear de Garoña y la decisión adoptada por el CSN español para
prorrogar su actividad?

2. ¿Dispone la Comisión de informes sobre los trabajos realizados o por realizar en esta central para acomodarla a
las exigencias de Fukushima?

3. ¿Considera la Comisión un buen precedente la controversia vivida en el CSN para aceptar la prórroga de
explotación de la central?

4. ¿Conoce la Comisión las razones que han animado a las autoridades españolas a mantener en marcha esta
central nuclear?

**Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión**

_(4 de julio de 2013)_

1. y 4. Según la información disponible, el Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear español (CSN) examinó el 16 de mayo
de 2013, a petición del Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo de España, una serie de opciones técnicas para
poder prorrogar la actual licencia de explotación de la central nuclear de Garoña, cuya validez finaliza en 2013. El
CSN consideró que era posible ampliar la vida útil de la central por un período de un año, siempre que se cumplieran
determinadas condiciones.

La central no se encuentra actualmente en funcionamiento y no hay combustible nuclear en el reactor ( [2] ). El CSN
anunció que, si se volviera a introducir combustible en el reactor, exigiría que se efectuaran las modificaciones de
diseño previstas en la Orden Ministerial relativa a la explotación de la central nuclear de Garoña actualmente vigente y
que se prosiguiera la aplicación del programa de mejoras técnicas posterior a Fukushima.

La prórroga de la explotación de la central requeriría la modificación de la Orden Ministerial correspondiente ( [3] ),
decisión que debe adoptar el Gobierno español.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.greenpeace.org/espana/Global/espana/report/nuclear/gp_dossierGaronya_marzo2012.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) El titular de la licencia no puede introducir combustible en el reactor sin la aprobación previa del CSN.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) IET/1453/2012.

C 42 E / 250 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

2. En respuesta a las conclusiones de las pruebas de resistencia y a las recomendaciones de la revisión _inter pares_ de
dichas conclusiones, el CSN publicó en 2012 un plan de acción nacional ( [4] ) que expone las mejoras posteriores a
Fukushima que se están analizando, se hallan en curso o deberán introducirse en todas las centrales nucleares
españolas, incluida la de Garoña. El plan también resume el contenido de las instrucciones vinculantes que se
impartirán a todos los titulares de licencias para que las sigan en distintos períodos de aquí a 2016.

3. El CSN adoptó las citadas conclusiones técnicas por mayoría en su reunión plenaria. La Comisión no tiene
competencia alguna para opinar sobre los procedimientos internos del CSN.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Plan de acción europeo posterior a Fukushima, Plan de acción nacional de España, diciembre de 2012 (CSN), www.ensreg.eu

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 251

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005942/13**

**to the Commission**
**Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Extension to the useful life of the Santa María de Garoña nuclear power plant

Spain's Nuclear Safety Council (the CSN) has just extended the operating licence of the Santa María de Garoña nuclear
power plant for a further year. The European stress tests carried out on all nuclear power plants in the wake of the
accident at Fukushima showed that this plant could not withstand an earthquake of the intensity stipulated by the
Regulator, that the risk of flooding in the event of the nearby dams bursting is very high and that there are deficiencies
in the storage and protection of the spent fuel in the event of refrigeration systems being lost. There are also no
measures in place to reduce hydrogen concentrations, with a risk of an explosion in the reactor containment. Finally,
deficiencies were found in the emergency plans for a nuclear disaster in the area ( [1] ). These circumstances, together
with the plant’s age — it was designed for a working life of 25 years and has now been in operation for 41 years —
and the fact that there are major population centres in the surrounding area, such as the town of Miranda de Ebro in
Burgos province and the Basque Country’s capital, Vitoria-Gasteiz, would all recommend that the plant’s useful
working life be brought to an end in July 2013.

Just a few weeks before the plant was due to close, a divided CSN agreed that its owners could keep the plant in
operation for a further year. The CSN acknowledged in its decision that some of the improvements needed to bring
the Garoña plant up to post‐Fukushima requirements had not yet been carried out. The CSN therefore extended the
operating licence in return for no further fuel being brought into the reactor until the plant complies with the new
requirements. It should be remembered that these requirements are of a structural nature and hence it will not be easy
for this plant to meet them. All these factors have caused the population living in the plant’s catchment area to object
overwhelmingly to it being kept in operation.

1. Is the Commission aware of the situation concerning the Garoña nuclear power plant and the decision taken by
Spain’s CSN to extend its working life?

2. Does the Commission have information on the work that has been or will be carried out at the Garoña nuclear
power plant to upgrade it to post-Fukushima requirements?

3. Does the Commission feel that the controversy at the CSN over the extension of the plant’s operating life sets a
good precedent?

4. Does the Commission know the reasons why the Spanish authorities decided to kept this nuclear power plant in
operation?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 July 2013)_

1 and 4. According to the available information, Spain's Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) has examined on
16 May 2013, upon request of the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, technical options for the
possibility of an extension of the current operating licence of the Garoña nuclear power plant (NPP) beyond its expiry
date in 2013. CSN found that the extension of the operating life of the plant, for 1 year, would be possible subject to
conditions.

The plant is currently not in operation and there is no nuclear fuel in the reactor ( [2] ). Should fuel be introduced again
into the reactor, CSN announced that it will require design modifications provided for in the Ministerial Order in
force relating to the operation of the Garoña NPP and continue the post-Fukushima programme for technical
improvements.

Extension of the operation of the plant would require the modification of the relevant Ministerial Order ( [3] ), which is a
decision to be taken by the Spanish Government.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.greenpeace.org/espana/Globalhttp://www.greenpeace.org/espana/Global/espana/report/nuclear/GP_Garonya_pricewemustnotpay_

March2012.pdf

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The licensee cannot introduce fuel into the reactor without the prior approval of CSN.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) IET/1453/2012.

( **|**
( **|**

C 42 E / 252 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

2. Responding to the findings of the stress tests and the recommendations of the peer review of these findings,
CSN issued a national Action Plan in 2012 ( [4] ) detailing the post-Fukushima improvements which are currently being
analysed, or underway, or due to be carried out at all Spanish NPPs including the Garoña NPP. It also summarises the
content of the binding instructions issued to each licensee for implementation in various time periods up to 2016.

3. CSN adopted the abovementioned technical findings by majority in its plenary. The Commission has no
competence to opine on the internal procedures of CSN.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Post-Fukuishima European Action Plan, Spain-National Action Plan, December 2012 (CSN), www.ensreg.eu.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 253

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005944/13**

**al Consejo**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Euroescepticismo

Según numerosas encuestas realizadas, en toda la UE están creciendo, en número y en tamaño, las fuerzas políticas
que se declaran euroescépticas o, directamente, eurófobas.

A las tradicionales posturas de aquellos quienes quieren que sus países abandonen la EU hay que añadir ahora muchos
miles de personas más que se declaran decepcionadas o frustradas con el proyecto europeo. Estas personas basan su
eurofrustración en la existencia de un déficit democrático notable y en que la toma de decisiones europeas se hace de
forma poco o nada transparente, sin prácticamente ningún control ciudadano, generando así una clara sensación de
desamparo político y ciudadano.

Teniendo en cuenta que en 2014 se celebrarán elecciones al Parlamento Europeo ¿qué análisis hace el Consejo de esta
situación? ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar para invertir esta tendencia y lograr que todas estas personas recuperen la
confianza en el proyecto europeo ( [1] )?

**Respuesta**
_(5 de noviembre de 2013)_

En respuesta a una pregunta tan generalizadora, el Consejo reconoce que efectivamente existen pocas dudas de que las
actuales dificultades económicas y financieras y el nivel inaceptablemente alto de desempleo están teniendo un
impacto negativo en la imagen de la UE. La tarea primordial de todos los interesados, ya sean los gobiernos y los
parlamentos nacionales o las instituciones de la UE, es hacer todo lo humanamente posible para relanzar el
crecimiento, garantizando al mismo tiempo que las condiciones subyacentes sean propicias para que dicho
crecimiento sea sostenible. Mucho se ha hecho en realidad en los últimos años y meses, también a nivel europeo, y la
perspectiva de un retorno a un crecimiento sano es ahora mejor de lo que ha sido desde hace algún tiempo. Sin
embargo, se trata de asuntos que llevan tiempo y que requieren un esfuerzo prolongado, junto con numerosas
explicaciones de por qué se toman determinadas medidas. En términos más generales, la reputación de la UE
dependerá de los resultados concretos obtenidos en los distintos ámbitos que afectan a los ciudadanos. En este
sentido, en lo que afecta a las competencias de la UE, el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo, en el marco del proceso de
codecisión, deben rendir y hacerlo de manera visible, y ello requiere buena voluntad y cooperación por parte de todas
las partes involucradas.

El Consejo no comparte la evaluación negativa de Su Señoría. El proceso de integración europea se caracteriza por la
superposición de legitimidades, que de hecho, a veces parecen confundir a los ciudadanos. Debería explicarse más
claramente quién es responsable de qué y qué puede y no puede hacer la UE. Y existe una necesidad evidente de
reflexionar sobre las formas de asociar mejor a los ciudadanos a la toma de decisiones a nivel nacional y comunitario,
y esto es en gran medida una responsabilidad compartida entre las instituciones de la UE y las autoridades nacionales.
Las próximas elecciones directas al Parlamento Europeo ofrecerán sin duda una oportunidad única para hacerlo y
para proponer ideas sobre el valor añadido que la UE puede aportar en muchas áreas de interés para los ciudadanos.
También es una buena oportunidad para recordar a los ciudadanos la inmensa contribución que el proceso de
integración europea ha prestado en las últimas décadas a la paz y la estabilidad en Europa y explicar las razones por
las que necesitamos una UE más fuerte que nunca. Por otra parte, también hay que tener en cuenta el papel de los
parlamentos nacionales y el deseo de fomentar una mayor participación de los mismos en las actividades de la Unión
Europea. Desde la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa, el papel de los parlamentos nacionales se ha fortalecido, de
conformidad con el artículo 12 del TUE y con los Protocolos 1 y 2 anejos a los Tratados. El Consejo está activamente
comprometido en garantizar la plena aplicación de estas nuevas disposiciones para que los parlamentos nacionales
puedan contribuir activamente al buen funcionamiento de la Unión, según lo dispuesto por el artículo 12 del TUE.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euroefe.efe.com/1311_noticias/2056731_la-ue-pierde-el-apoyo-de-los-ciudadanos-y-se-enfrenta-al-auge-euroesceptico.html

C 42 E / 254 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005944/13**

**to the Council**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Euroscepticism

According to the results of a number of surveys Eurosceptic and even openly anti-European political parties are
growing in size and number throughout the EU.

Whilst the Union has always had its opponents, now many more people are voicing their disappointment and
frustration with the European integration process. They object to the glaring democratic deficit in Europe, on the
grounds that there is little or no transparency in EU decision‐making and that members of the public feel that they
have practically no say in what the EU does, creating a feeling of political powerlessness.

What view does the Council take on this situation, bearing in mind that there will be European Parliament elections in
2014? What steps does it plan to take in order to reverse the trend towards Euroscepticism and to restore people's
confidence in the European project ( [1] )?

**Reply**
_(5 November 2013)_

In reply to such a general and sweeping question, the Council recognises that there is indeed little doubt that the
ongoing economic and financial difficulties and the unacceptably high level of unemployment are having a negative
impact on the image of the EU. The primary task of all concerned, be they national governments and parliaments or
EU institutions, is to do everything humanly possible to restart growth while ensuring that the underlying conditions
are conducive to this growth being sustainable. A lot has actually been done over the past years and months,
including at the European level, and the perspective for a return to healthy growth is now better than it has been for
some time. However, these things take time and require a prolonged effort, together with a lot of explaining about
why certain measures are being taken. More generally, the EU's reputation will depend on the concrete results
achieved in the various fields of interest to citizens. In this respect, as far as EU competences are involved, the
European Parliament and the Council, within the framework of the codecision process, must deliver and be seen to
deliver, and this requires good will and cooperation on the part of all involved.

The Council does not share the Honourable Member's negative assessment. The European integration process is
characterised by overlapping legitimacies, which do indeed at times appear confusing to citizens. There should be
more explanation on who is responsible for what and what the EU can and cannot do. And there is a glaring need to
reflect on ways to better associate citizens with decision-making at the national and the EU levels, and this is very
much a responsibility shared between EU institutions and national authorities. The upcoming direct elections to the
EP certainly provide a unique opportunity to do so and to put forward ideas about the added value the EU can provide
in many areas of concern to its citizens. It is also a good opportunity to remind citizens of the immense contribution
the European integration process has brought over the past decades to peace and stability in Europe and to explain
the reasons why we need a strong EU more than ever. On the other hand, we should also be aware of the role of
national parliaments and the desire to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the
European Union. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the role of national parliaments has been
strengthened, in compliance with Article 12 TEU and Protocols (No 1) and (No 2) annexed to the Treaties. The
Council is actively engaged in ensuring full implementation of these new provisions so that the national parliaments
can contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union, as provided for by Article 12 TEU.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euroefe.efe.com/1311_noticias/2056731_la-ue-pierde-el-apoyo-de-los-ciudadanos-y-se-enfrenta-al-auge-euroesceptico.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 255

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005945/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Euroescepticismo

Según numerosas encuestas realizadas, en toda la UE están creciendo, en número y en tamaño, las fuerzas políticas
que se declaran euroescépticas o, directamente, eurófobas.

A las tradicionales posturas de aquellos quienes quieren que sus países abandonen la EU hay que añadir ahora muchos
miles de personas más que se declaran decepcionadas o frustradas con el proyecto europeo. Estas personas basan su
eurofrustración en la existencia de un déficit democrático notable y en que la toma de decisiones europeas se hace de
forma poco o nada transparente, sin prácticamente ningún control ciudadano, generando así una clara sensación de
desamparo político y ciudadano.

Teniendo en cuenta que en 2014 se elebrarán elecciones al Parlamento Europeo ¿qué análisis hace la Comisión de esta
situación? ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar para invertir esta tendencia y lograr que todas estas personas recuperen la
confianza en el proyecto europeo ( [1] )?

**Respuesta del Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(10 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión remite a Su Señoría a las respuestas a las preguntas escritas E-5507/13 y E-5480/13 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euroefe.efe.com/1311_noticias/2056731_la-ue-pierde-el-apoyo-de-los-ciudadanos-y-se-enfrenta-al-auge-euroesceptico.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 42 E / 256 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005945/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Euroscepticism

According to the results of a number of surveys Eurosceptic and even openly anti-European political parties are
growing in size and number throughout the EU.

Whilst the Union has always had its opponents, now many more people are voicing their disappointment and
frustration with the European integration process. They object to the glaring democratic deficit in Europe, on the
grounds that there is little or no transparency in EU decision‐making and that members of the public feel that they
have practically no say in what the EU does, creating a feeling of political powerlessness.

What view does the Commission take on this situation, bearing in mind that there will be European Parliament
elections in 2014? What steps does it plan to take in order to reverse the trend towards Euroscepticism and to restore
people's confidence in the European project ( [1] )?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 July 2013)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to the written questions E-5507/13 and
E-5480/13 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.euroefe.efe.com/1311_noticias/2056731_la-ue-pierde-el-apoyo-de-los-ciudadanos-y-se-enfrenta-al-auge-euroesceptico.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 257

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005946/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Precios de la electricidad en el Reino de España

La última actualización de los datos de Eurostat, que recoge cifras del primer semestre de este año y, por lo tanto, la
fuerte subida ocurrida en el Reino de España en enero, sitúa a este país entre los que tienen la electricidad más cara en
Europa. Solo le superan Chipre y Malta. Los datos de Eurostat se refieren a los precios medios que pagaría por la luz,
sin impuestos, un hogar tipo en España con un consumo de entre 2 500 y 5 000 kilovatios hora ( [1] ).

Lo cierto es que los precios de la electricidad en el Reino de España han subido fuertemente desde el año 2004.
En concreto, según las estadísticas de Eurostat, los precios de la electricidad, sin impuestos, han subido entre 2004
y 2011 un 80 %. Así, un hogar tipo pagaba 0,0872 euros por kilovatio hora antes de 2004, y ahora estaría pagando
0,1597 euros.

La media de la zona del euro es de 0,1276 euros por kilovatio hora.

¿Qué opinión tiene la Comisión sobre esta diferencia tan grande de precios dentro de la propia UE?

¿Cree la Comisión que se debe poner un precio máximo o dejará que suba indefinidamente?

El hecho que países como Chipre, Malta o el Reino de España tengan el precio de la electricidad tan elevado no
solamente afecta a las familias sino a la competitividad de las empresas ubicadas en estos países, ¿qué medidas
recomienda la Comisión a estos países para que bajen los precios de esta energía básica?

**Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión**

_(18 de julio de 2013)_

Los precios de la electricidad difieren según los Estados miembros debido a factores que determinan la oferta y la
demanda. Las discrepancias se explican también debido a que los precios de la electricidad están reglamentados a nivel
nacional en algunos Estados miembros. Cuando los precios se fijan por debajo de los costes de producción aparece el
denominado déficit tarifario, que no es sostenible a largo plazo. Los Estados miembros en que se produce esta
situación tienen que hacer frente finalmente a la necesidad de aumentar considerablemente los precios de la
electricidad en un período relativamente corto de tiempo. En el informe de país sobre España ( [2] ), la Comisión
identificó el déficit tarifario como uno de los principales problemas del sector de la energía ( [3] ).

La Comisión opina que los precios de la energía deberían formarse siguiendo los principios del mercado y regirse por
las presiones de la competencia en un mercado interior de la energía a escala de la UE en vez de por una imposición de
límites máximos u otras medidas administrativas. Paralelamente, los Estados miembros también deben velar por que
se preste apoyo a los consumidores vulnerables a través de medidas que no restrinjan la competencia en los mercados.

El Consejo Europeo del día 22 de mayo de 2013 puso de relieve la necesidad de impulsar la competitividad de la UE y
de responder al desafío de los elevados precios de la energía. En sus conclusiones confirmaba la importancia de la
realización de un mercado interconectado y que funcione plenamente, para facilitar las inversiones en
infraestructuras energéticas, para diversificar las fuentes de abastecimiento y para consolidar la eficiencia energética y
la respuesta de la demanda. Es con este tipo de medidas como los Estados miembros pueden garantizar de la manera
más eficaz y sostenible los precios de la energía más bajos posible.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.expansion.com/2011/11/21/empresas/energia/1321897927.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121217_energy_market_2011_lr_en.pdf; que acompaña a la Comunicación «Velar por la buena

marcha del mercado interior de la energía» (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0663:FIN:Es:PDF).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) En dicho informe, la Comisión instaba a España a revisar la eficacia y la necesidad de los mecanismos de apoyo que provocan el déficit tarifario y a

proseguir las reformas dirigidas a la apertura de los mercados.

( **|**

C 42 E / 258 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005946/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Electricity prices in Spain

According to the latest Eurostat figures, which cover the first half of 2013, electricity prices in Spain rose steeply in
January and are among the most expensive in Europe. Only in Cyprus and Malta do people pay more. The Eurostat
figures show what a typical Spanish household consuming between 2 500 and 5 000 kWh of electricity would pay
(excluding tax) ( [1] ).

Electricity prices have increased sharply in Spain since 2004. According to Eurostat electricity cost 80% more in 2011
than it did in 2004 (excluding tax). A typical household is thus now paying EUR 0.1597 per kWh, as opposed to the
EUR 0.0872 it was paying prior to 2004.

The average price per kWh in the eurozone is EUR 0.1276.

What view does the Commission take on this major price disparity within the EU?

Does it think that there should be a ceiling price or that prices should be allowed to increase indefinitely?

High electricity prices in Cyprus, Malta and Spain have an impact not only on local families but also on the
competitiveness of companies based in these countries. What measures should these Member States take in order to
reduce the cost of this basic energy source?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

Electricity prices across Member States differ due to factors determining supply and demand. Discrepancies are also
explained due to nationally regulated electricity prices in some Member States. Where prices are set below production
costs so called tariff deficits emerge. These are not sustainable in the long term. Such Member States eventually face
the necessity to substantially increase electricity prices over a relatively short period of time. In the country report on
Spain ( [2] ), the Commission identified the tariff deficit as one of the biggest problems of the energy sector ( [3] ).

The Commission's position is that energy prices should be formed by market principles and be kept in check by
competitive pressures in an EU-wide internal energy market rather than by an imposition of ceilings or other
administrative measures. In parallel, Member States should also ensure the support to vulnerable customers via
measures that do not restrict competition in the markets.

The European Council of 22 May 2013 highlighted the need to foster EU competitiveness and to respond to the
challenge of high energy prices. Its conclusions confirm the importance of the completion of a fully functioning and
interconnected market, to facilitate investments in energy infrastructure, to diversify sources of supply and to
strengthen energy efficiency and demand response. It is through such measures that Member States can most
effectively and sustainably ensure lowest possible energy prices.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.expansion.com/2011/11/21/empresas/energia/1321897927.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121217_energy_market_2011_lr_en.pdf; accompanying the communication ‘Making the

internal energy market work’ (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012DC0663:EN:NOT).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) In that report, the Commission encouraged Spain to review the effectiveness and necessity of support mechanisms causing the tariff deficit and to

continue the reforms towards market opening.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 259

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005947/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Eva Ortiz Vilella (PPE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Decisión sobre la retroactividad de medidas antidumping frente a importaciones de mandarinas chinas

En su respuesta a la pregunta P-004675/2013, la Comisión Europea informa de que ya ha recibido las estadísticas de
las importaciones de los productos afectados por las importaciones de determinados cítricos preparados o
conservados (principalmente mandarinas) procedentes de China.

¿Cuándo espera tomar la Comisión una decisión sobre la aplicación de la retroactividad en este asunto de acuerdo con
el considerando 161 del Reglamento de Ejecución por el que se reestablece un derecho antidumping definitivo sobre
este tipo de importaciones (Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 158/2013)?

**Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión**

_(23 de julio de 2013)_

Como se indicó en la respuesta a la pregunta escrita anterior, P-004675/2013 ( [1] ), en el considerando 161 del
Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 158/2013, de 18 de febrero de 2013, el Consejo observó que la posibilidad de
cobrar derechos con carácter retroactivo se decidiría posteriormente, cuando se dispusiera de datos estadísticos
completos.

La Comisión ha recibido las estadísticas de las importaciones del producto afectado procedentes de la República
Popular China y acaba de evaluar los datos de que dispone de conformidad con las normas aplicables. Sobre esta base,
la Comisión ha llegado a la conclusión de que no se cumplen las condiciones para cobrar derechos con carácter
retroactivo. Se ha informado a las partes interesadas al respecto. Por tanto, la Comisión considera cerrado este asunto.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm

C 42 E / 260 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005947/13**

**to the Commission**
**Eva Ortiz Vilella (PPE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Decision on retroactive anti-dumping measures against imports of mandarins from China

In its answer to Question P-004675/2013 the Commission states that it has now received statistical data on imports
from China of certain prepared or preserved citrus fruits (mainly mandarins).

When does the Commission plan to take a decision on collecting retroactive duties as provided for in Recital 161 of
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 158/2013 reimposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of the
abovementioned products?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

As stated in the answer to previous Written Question P-004675/2013 ( [1] ), in Recital 161 of Council Implementing
Regulation (EU) No 158/2013 of 18 February 2013, the Council noted that the possibility of collecting retroactive
duties would be decided upon at a later stage, once full statistical data were available.

The Commission has received the statistics of imports of the product concerned from the People’s Republic of China
and has now evaluated the data at its disposal pursuant to the applicable rules. On these grounds, the Commission has
found that the conditions to collect duties retroactively are not met. Interested parties have been informed of this
situation. The Commission considers therefore this matter as closed.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 261

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-005948/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Ole Christensen (S&D)**

_(28. maj 2013)_

_Om:_ Opfølgende spørgsmål til Kommissionen om tolkning af kørekortsregler for chauffører med epilepsi

Den 17. april 2013 fremsatte jeg en forespørgsel til Kommissionen vedrørende den danske tolkning af EU-regler om
kørekort (E-004407/2013). Jeg modtog svar fra Kommissionen den 23. maj 2013. Af Kommissionens svar fremgår
blot, at »kravene er i overensstemmelse med EU-reglerne«.

Dette svar besvarer ikke direkte mit spørgsmål om, hvorvidt det danske Justitsministerium har lavet en korrekt
indarbejdning af EU-reglerne i overensstemmelse med lovgivers hensigt, som var mit første spørgsmål i ovennævnte
forespørgsel af 17. april.

Dertil kommer, at Kommissionen ikke svarer på forespørgslens andet spørgsmål, som kan siges at være kernen i
forespørgslen, dvs. om chauffører, der allerede har kunnet få kørekort med anfaldsforebyggende medicin, kan være
undtaget de nye regler.

Derfor tillader jeg mit at gentage begge mine spørgsmål i håb om, at Kommissionen denne gang vil give mig et
fyldestgørende svar. Vil Kommissionen med henvisning til min forespørgsel af 17. april:

‐– foretage en vurdering af, om det danske Justitsministerium har lavet en korrekt indarbejdning af EU-reglerne i
overensstemmelse med lovgivers hensigt?

— tage stilling til, om det er i overensstemmelse med direktiv 2006/126/EF, at chauffører, der har fået deres kørekort
fornyet hvert andet år og er i behandling for epilepsi, har lov til at være undtaget fra de nye regler om, at man skal
have haft en anfaldsfri periode på mindst 10 år uden forebyggende medicin, da det nye direktiv ikke skal berøre en
eksisterende førerret, og således at chaufførerne også i fremtiden kan få udstedt kørekort?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Siim Kallas**

_(22. juli 2013)_

Kravet til professionelle chauffører om at have haft en anfaldsfri periode på mindst 10 år er i overensstemmelse med
kravene i lovgivningen. Alle disse bestemmelser udgør minimumskravene, og medlemsstaterne har ret til at indføre
strengere krav, hvis de finder det hensigtsmæssigt.

De erhvervede rettigheder henviser til førerret til visse køretøjer og ikke til kravene med hensyn til egnethed til at føre
motorkøretøj. Derfor skal alle lastbilschauffører overholde sidstnævnte krav for at få deres kørekort fornyet.

C 42 E / 262 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005948/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ole Christensen (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Follow-up question to the Commission on the interpretation of driving licence rules for drivers with epilepsy

On 17 April 2013, I submitted a question to the Commission about Denmark’s interpretation of EU rules concerning
driving licences (E-004407/2013). I received an answer from the Commission on 23 May 2013 which consists
simply of the statement that ‘the requirements are in line with the EU rules’.

This answer does not give a direct reply to my first question as to whether the Danish Ministry of Justice has correctly
incorporated the EU rules as intended by the legislator.

Nor does the Commission answer the second question, which can be considered to lie at the heart of my inquiry,
i.e. whether drivers who have already been able to obtain a driving license by using medicine to prevent seizures may
be exempted from the new rules.

I therefore take the liberty to repeat both my questions in the hope that the Commission will give me a complete
answer this time. With reference to my Written Question of 17 April, will the Commission:

—
Assess whether the Danish Ministry of Justice has correctly incorporated the EU rules as intended by the
legislator?

—
Say whether it is in accordance with Directive 2006/126/EC for drivers who have renewed their driving licence
every two years and are receiving treatment for epilepsy to be entitled to be exempt from the new rules
requiring a seizure-free period of at least 10 years without preventative medicine, as the new directive should
not prejudice existing entitlements to drive, so the drivers can continue to obtain a driving licence in future?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

The requirements for professional drivers to be seizure-free for at least 10 years is in line with the requirements
stipulated by the legislation. All of these provisions constitute minimum requirements and Member States are allowed
to introduce stricter ones if they deem it appropriate.

Acquired rights refer to the entitlements to drive certain vehicles and not to the requirements concerning the fitness
to drive. Therefore, all lorry drivers have to comply with the latter to get their driving licence renewed.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 263

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005949/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ανάγκη έμπρακτης αναγνώρισης της ιδιαίτερης κατάστασης της Ελλάδας

Σε πρόσφατη ερώτησή μου (Ε-000866/2013), η Επιτροπή μου είχε απαντήσει μεταξύ άλλων ότι «κάθε ποσό που
καταβλήθηκε στο πλαίσιο της περιόδου προγραμματισμού 2000-2006 για τα έργα-γέφυρες, θα πρέπει να επιστραφεί στην
Επιτροπή, σε περίπτωση που ολόκληρο το έργο δεν ολοκληρωθεί εντός της περιόδου προγραμματισμού 2007-2013».

Όπως είναι γνωστό, οι ρυθμοί απορρόφησης των κονδυλίων συγχρηματοδότησης είναι ιδιαίτερα χαμηλοί. Με δεδομένους
τους τρέχοντες ρυθμούς υλοποίησης των έργων, είναι σχεδόν βέβαιο ότι κάποια από αυτά δεν θα έχουν ολοκληρωθεί εντός
της περιόδου προγραμματισμού 2007-2013.

Δεδομένου ότι στην ίδια απάντηση «η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει την ιδιαίτερη κατάσταση της Ελλάδας»,

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει, δεδομένης της «ιδιαίτερης κατάστασης της Ελλάδας», ώστε να ολοκληρωθούν τα έργα χωρίς
παράλληλα να υπάρχει ο κίνδυνος απώλειας της χρηματοδοτικής ενίσχυσης της ΕΕ;

**Απάντηση του κ. Hahn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(22 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Κατά το κλείσιμο της περιόδου 2000-2006, οι ελληνικές αρχές προσδιόρισαν τα λεγόμενα «έργα-γέφυρες», τα ημιτελή έργα,
τα οποία, προκειμένου να ολοκληρωθούν και να λειτουργήσουν, θα συγχρηματοδοτούνταν από τα κοινοτικά Ταμεία κατά
την επόμενη περίοδο,

Οι κατευθυντήριες γραμμές ( [1] ) για το κλείσιμο των προγραμμάτων της περιόδου 2007-2013 δεν προβλέπουν περαιτέρω
εκτέλεση κατά φάσεις των έργων-γεφυρών, όπως ήδη αναφέρθηκε στην απάντηση της Επιτροπής στη γραπτή ερώτηση
Ε-866/2013. Ως εκ τούτου, τα κράτη μέλη πρέπει να διασφαλίσουν ότι όλα τα έργα-γέφυρες έχουν ολοκληρωθεί και
χρησιμοποιούνται.

Σύμφωνα με τον κανονισμό του Συμβουλίου αριθ. 1083 ( [2] ), η τελική ημερομηνία για την επιλεξιμότητα των δαπανών που
αφορούν τα προγράμματα τα οποία έχουν εγκριθεί για συνδρομή από τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία για την περίοδο 2007-2013
είναι η 31η Δεκεμβρίου 2015. Για την πληρωμή του τελικού υπολοίπου, τα κράτη μέλη πρέπει να υποβάλουν αίτηση
πληρωμής έως τις 31 Μαρτίου 2017 ( [3] ).

Ωστόσο, το κράτος μέλος μπορεί να αποφασίσει, κατ' εξαίρεση και κατά περίπτωση, εφόσον παρέχεται η απαιτούμενη
αιτιολόγηση και πληρούνται συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις, να συμπεριλάβει μη λειτουργούντα έργα στην εν λόγω αίτηση
πληρωμής. Με αυτόν τον τρόπο, ένα κράτος μέλος αναλαμβάνει τη δέσμευση να ολοκληρώσει με δικά του έξοδα όλα τα
δηλωμένα ως μη λειτουργούντα έργα το αργότερο δύο χρόνια μετά την εκπνοή της προθεσμίας για την υποβολή των
εγγράφων κλεισίματος και να επιστρέψει τη συγχρηματοδότηση της Ένωσης, που διατίθεται σε περίπτωση μη ολοκλήρωσης
των εν λόγω έργων, εντός της διετούς προθεσμίας, δηλαδή έως την 31η Μαρτίου 2019.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Απόφαση της Επιτροπής C (2013) αριθ. 1573 της 20ής Μαρτίου 2013 για την έγκριση κατευθυντήριων γραμμών για το κλείσιμο των επιχειρησιακών

προγραμμάτων 2007-2013.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Άρθρο 56 (1) του κανονισμού του Συμβουλίου (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1083/2006 της 11ης Ιουλίου 2009.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Άρθρο 89 (1) του γενικού κανονισμού.

( **|**
( **|**

C 42 E / 264 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005949/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Need to recognise in practice the specific situation in Greece

In reply to my recent question (E-000866/2013), the Commission indicated that ‘any amount paid under the 20002006 programming period for bridge projects will have to be reimbursed to the Commission in case the entire project
is not completed within the 2007-2013 programming period’.

It is no secret that funding take-up is particularly low. Furthermore, in the light of current completion rates, it is
almost inevitable that a number of projects will not have been finished within the 2007-2013 programming period.

Given that the Commission also indicates in its answer that it ‘recognises the specific situation in Greece’, what
measures will it take accordingly to ensure project completion and avoid any risk of forfeiting EU funding?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

At closure of the 2000-2006 period, the Greek authorities identified the so-called ‘bridge projects’, the unfinished
projects which in order to be completed and operational, would be co-financed by Community funds under the next
period,

The guidelines ( [1] ) on closure of 2007-2013 programmes do not envisage further phasing of bridge projects, as
already indicated in the Commission's answer to Written Question E-866/2013. Therefore Member States have to
ensure that all bridge projects are completed and in use.

In accordance with the Council Regulation No 1083 ( [2] ), the final date for eligibility of expenditure relating to the
programmes approved for assistance from the Structural Funds for the 2007-2013 period is 31 December 2015. For
the payment of the final balance, Member States must submit an application for payment by 31 March 2017 ( [3] ).

However, the Member State may decide, exceptionally and on a case-by-case basis, provided that adequate
justification exists and specific conditions are met, to include non-functioning projects in the aforementioned
application for payment. By doing so, a Member State commits, at its own expenses, to complete all declared nonfunctioning projects not later than two years after the deadline for submission of the closure documents and to
reimburse the Union co-financing allocated in case of non-completion of such projects by the two year deadline,
namely 31 March 2019.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Commission Decision C (2013) No 1573 of 20 March 2013 on the approval of guidelines on closure of operational programmes 2007-2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Article 56(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2009.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 89(1) of the General Regulation.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 265

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005950/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Φόροι Μεταβίβασης Ακινήτων στην πώληση της Αγροτικής Τράπεζας της Ελλάδας

Σε συνέχεια της απάντησής σας στην ερώτησή μου Ε-002405/2013, σας ενημερώνω ότι την 5.4.2013 ψηφίστηκε από το
ελληνικό κοινοβούλιο ο Νόμος 4141/2013 «Επενδυτικά εργαλεία ανάπτυξης, παροχή πιστώσεων και άλλες διατάξεις».

Στο Νομοσχέδιο υπήρχε το άρθρο 22, «Διαδικασία ανάκτησης κρατικών ενισχύσεων», στο οποίο οριζόταν ότι «Κατά
παρέκκλιση από κάθε αντίθετη διάταξη, η σύμβαση μεταβίβασης που καταρτίζεται με ιδιωτικό έγγραφο αποτελεί τον τίτλο
κτήσης από το προς η μεταβίβαση πιστωτικό ίδρυμα των μεταβιβαζόμενων σε αυτό περιουσιακών στοιχείων, χωρίς την
τήρηση οποιασδήποτε άλλης διατύπωσης».

Η ρύθμιση αυτή θα τροποποιούσε το άρθρο 63 του Ν.3601/2007, αναφορικά με το ισχύον καθεστώς μεταβίβασης
περιουσιακών στοιχείων και, ουσιαστικά, θα απάλλασσε αναδρομικά την Τράπεζα Πειραιώς από την καταβολή φόρου
μεταβίβασης για την ακίνητη περιουσία που απέκτησε από την Αγροτική Τράπεζα της Ελλάδας (ΑΤΕ).

Κατόπιν έντονων αντιδράσεων από βουλευτές της αντιπολίτευσης, η ρύθμιση αυτή αποσύρθηκε!

Η προσπάθεια ψήφισης αυτής της ρύθμισης αποδεικνύει ότι η Τράπεζα Πειραιώς όχι μόνο δεν έχει καταβάλει τους φόρους
μεταβίβασης ακίνητης περιουσίας στο ελληνικό Δημόσιο, αλλά και ότι επιχειρείται η απαλλαγή της από την υποχρέωση αυτή.

Είναι σαφές ότι, αν ήταν γνωστό στους υποψήφιους αγοραστές της ΑΤΕ ότι θα απαλλάσσονταν από το φόρο μεταβίβασης
των περιουσιακών στοιχείων, το πλήθος των ενδιαφερομένων θα ήταν πολύ μεγαλύτερο, ενώ το τίμημα της πώλησης θα
ξεπερνούσε κατά πολύ τα 95 εκατομμύρια ευρώ, που τελικά πουλήθηκε η Τράπεζα. Καταστρατηγείται δηλαδή η παράγραφος
1 του άρθρου 107 της ΣΛΕΕ, αφού «νοθεύεται ο ανταγωνισμός δια της ευνοϊκής μεταχειρίσεως» της Τράπεζας Πειραιώς
έναντι των υπόλοιπων δυνητικών της ανταγωνιστών, κατά την διαδικασία πώλησης της ΑΤΕ.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Γνωρίζει εάν καταβλήθηκε ο συγκεκριμένος φόρος ακίνητης περιουσίας στο ελληνικό δημόσιο;

Με βάση πλέον τα ανωτέρω δεδομένα, τι προτίθεται να πράξει η Επιτροπή;

**Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(16 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου στην απάντησή της στη γραπτή ερώτηση P-011701/2012 ( [1] ).
Η φορολογική μεταχείριση των μεταβιβάσεων ακινήτων σε περίπτωση εκκαθάρισης εμπίπτει στην αρμοδιότητα των ελληνικών
φορολογικών αρχών. Το Αξιότιμο Μέλος μπορεί να απευθύνει ερώτημα άμεσα στις ελληνικές φορολογικές αρχές.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/el/parliamentary-questions.html

C 42 E / 266 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005950/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Real estate transfer tax on the sale of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE)

Further to the Commission’s answer to my Question E-002405/2013, I wish to inform it that on 5 April 2013 the
Hellenic Parliament adopted Law 4141/2013 on ‘Investment tools to promote growth, the granting of credit and
other provisions.’ Article 22 of the bill ‘Procedure for the recovery of state aid’ provides that: ‘Notwithstanding any
provision to the contrary, a transfer agreement established by private document constitutes the purchase deed of a
credit institute to which real estate is transferred, without the need for any other formalities.’

These rules would have amended Article 63 of Law 3601/2007, the current arrangements governing the transfer of
real estate, and, in effect, would have retrospectively exempted Piraeus Bank from paying a transfer tax on the real
estate acquired from the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE). Following vigorous protests by opposition MPs, these
rules have now been withdrawn! The attempt to have these rules adopted shows not only that Piraeus Bank has failed
to pay real estate transfer tax to the Greek State, but that an attempt is being made to exempt it from that obligation.

Clearly, if the prospective buyers of ATE had known that the real estate in question would be exempted from transfer
tax, the number of parties interested would have been much larger, and the sales price would have far exceeded the
EUR 95 million, for which the ATE was eventually sold. In other words, paragraph 1 of Article 107 TFEU has been
circumvented since ‘competition [has been distorted] by favouring’ Piraeus Bank over other prospective competitors
in the procedure governing the sale of the ATE. In view of the above, will the Commission say:

Does it know whether the property tax in question was paid to the Greek State?

Given the above information, what does it intend to do?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question P-011701/2012 ( [1] ). Tax
treatment of real estate transfers under resolution scenarios falls under the responsibility of Hellenic tax authorities.
The Honourable Member may address a query directly to the Hellenic tax authorities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 267

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005951/13**

**to the Commission**
**Glenis Willmott (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ UK Enterprise and Regulatory Bill & EU health & safety law

The Commission may be aware of the UK Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ERR) Bill, which is currently going
through the British Parliament.

On 6 March 2013, the House of Lords voted to remove Clause 62 of the Bill. The Bill will now return to the House of
Commons, where the UK Government is likely to try to reinstate Clause 62 in its original form. If passed into law,
Clause 62 will amend the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, removing a worker’s right to claim compensation
for an employer’s breach of health and safety regulations.

Could the Commission confirm whether Clause 62 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill would undermine
the implementation of EU health and safety law?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

In accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, which is the central legislative act
in the field of health and safety at work in EC law, the employer shall have a duty to ensure the safety and health of
workers in every aspect related to the work.

Further to Article 4 in this directive, Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that employers, workers
and workers' representatives are subject to the legal provisions necessary for the implementation of the mentioned
Directive and in particular, they shall ensure adequate controls and supervision.

In accordance with Article 288 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a directive shall be binding,
as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods. In addition, it results from the case law from the Court of Justice that the
Member States shall ensure the full effectiveness of Directives.

The Commission has just become aware of the UK Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ERR) Bill and is therefore not
able, at this stage, to pronounce itself regarding the conformity with EC law of clause 62 of the draft legislation.
However, it will closely follow the developments in this field in the UK and, in accordance with its competences
conferred in the treaties, oversee the correct application of EC law.

C 42 E / 268 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005952/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Beperkingen van het vrije verkeer van kapitaal in Cyprus (vervolg op schriftelijke vraag E-003802/2013)

Op 25 maart 2013 kondigde de Eurogroep aan dat de kapitaalcontroles in Cyprus van tijdelijke aard zouden zijn en
dat de duur van deze maatregelen zorgvuldig bewaakt zou worden. Eurocommissaris Barnier voegde hier later aan toe
dat kapitaalrestricties slechts bij wijze van uitzondering zou worden ingevoerd en bovendien tijdelijk zou zijn. Op
26 april 2013 heeft een Cypriotisch regeringsadviseur echter verkondigd dat Cyprus de kapitaalcontroles tijdens het
toeristisch zomerseizoen zal voortzetten ( [1] ).

Momenteel zijn er nog steeds beperkingen op het kapitaalverkeer van kracht.

Gezien bovenstaande:

1. Kan de Commissie duidelijk aangeven of het van kracht blijven van deze beperkingen op het kapitaalverkeer
verenigbaar is met het Verdrag ( [2] )?

2. Kan de Commissie, gelet op de bepalingen van het Verdrag, een definitie geven van het begrip „tijdelijk”?

3. Als de beperkingen niet verenigbaar zijn met het Verdrag, wat is de Commissie dan van plan te ondernemen
om het vrij verkeer van kapitaal in Cyprus volledig te herstellen?

4. Als de beperkingen niet verenigbaar zijn met het Verdrag, is de Commissie dan van oordeel dat zij zich naar
behoren van haar taak als hoedster van de Verdragen heeft gekweten?

5. Als de beperkingen wel verenigbaar zijn met het Verdrag, van welke andere fundamentele beginselen kan er
dan nog meer worden afgeweken?

**Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie**

_(23 juli 2013)_

Zoals vermeld in het vorige antwoord (E-3802/2013) zijn op alle fundamentele vrijheden uit hoofde van het Verdrag
bepaalde uitzonderingen van toepassing. Overeenkomstig artikel 65 VWEU mogen lidstaten onder bepaalde
voorwaarden dergelijke beperkingen opleggen, zolang deze proportioneel, niet-discriminerend en tijdelijk zijn. In
deze context wordt het algemene begrip „tijdelijk” niet gedefinieerd.

Wat betreft de acties die ondernomen worden om het vrij verkeer van kapitaal in Cyprus volledig te herstellen, volgt
de Commissie de situatie op de voet en wordt zij door de Cypriotische autoriteiten geraadpleegd over de geplande
maatregelen in verband met kapitaalcontroles. Als hoedster van het Verdrag zal de Commissie erop aandringen dat
deze maatregelen niet langer van kracht blijven dan strikt noodzakelijk is. Tegelijkertijd moet worden benadrukt dat
de maatregelen geleidelijk versoepeld en opgeheven moeten worden om de algemene financiële stabiliteit niet in
gevaar te brengen.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13e9728e-ae60-11e2-8316-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UZjQIF64.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Met name artikel 26, lid 2, VWEU dat luidt: „De interne markt omvat een ruimte zonder binnengrenzen waarin het vrije verkeer van goederen,

personen, diensten en kapitaal is gewaarborgd volgens de bepalingen van de Verdragen.”.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 269

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005952/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Restrictions on the free movement of capital in Cyprus (follow-up to Written Question E-003802/2013)

On 25 March 2013, the Eurogroup announced that capital controls in Cyprus would be temporary, as well as strictly
monitored in terms of duration. Commissioner Barnier later added that any capital restrictions would only be enacted
exceptionally and temporarily. However, on 26 April 2013 a Cypriot Government adviser said that Cyprus ‘will keep
capital controls in place throughout the summer tourist season’ ( [1] ).

Capital restrictions are still in place at present.

In the light of this:

1. Can the Commission clearly state whether or not the continuing enforcement of capital controls is compatible
with the Treaty ( [2] )?

2. Can the Commission provide a definition of ‘temporary’, in the light of the Treaty?

3. If such restrictions are not compatible with the Treaty, what action does the Commission intend to take in
order to fully restore the free movement of capital in Cyprus?

4. If such restrictions are not compatible with the Treaty, does the Commission consider that it has properly
fulfilled its role as guardian of the Treaty?

5. If such restrictions are compatible with the Treaty, what other fundamental principles can be similarly
restricted and/or derogated?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

As explained in the previous reply (E-3802/2013), all fundamental freedoms are subject to certain exceptions under
the Treaty. Under Article 65 TFEU, Member States are allowed to impose such restrictions under certain conditions
and as long as they are proportionate, non-discriminatory and temporary. In this context, there is no definition of the
general term ‘temporary’.

As regards the actions in order to fully restore the free movement of capital in Cyprus, the Commission is closely
monitoring the situation in Cyprus and is consulted by the Cypriot authorities about the planned measures on capital
controls. As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission will insist that these measures last no longer than strictly
necessary. At the same time, it should be stressed that the measures must be relaxed and lifted gradually in order not
to endanger the overall financial stability.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13e9728e-ae60-11e2-8316-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UZjQIF64
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Specifically, Article 26(2) TFEU: ‘The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,

persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’.

C 42 E / 270 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005953/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ In Griekenland worden 15 000 ambtenaren ontslagen… en later wordt hetzelfde aantal ambtenaren
aangeworven!

Op 15 april 2013 bevestigde de Griekse premier Antonis Samaras dat er voor het einde van 2014 in totaal
15 000 ambtenaren, waarvan 4 000 dit jaar, zullen worden ontslagen. Hij benadrukte daarbij evenwel dat elk ontslag
gepaard zal gaan met een nieuwe aanwerving ( [1] ).

In het licht van het bovengenoemde:

1. is de Commissie op de hoogte van de plannen die de Griekse regering in dit verband heeft?

2. Zo ja, kan de Commissie aangeven of de geplande aanwerving van ambtenaren in overeenstemming is met de
toezeggingen die in het kader van de reddingsoperatie in Griekenland zijn gedaan?

**Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie**

_(16 augustus 2013)_

Griekenland heeft reeds aanzienlijke vorderingen gemaakt bij het afslanken van zijn overheidsapparaat. De regel
waarbij slechts 1 van de 5 ambtenaren die de ambtenarij verlaten mag worden vervangen, zal het naar verwachting
mogelijk maken de beoogde personeelsinkrimping met ten minste 150 000 eenheden tegen eind 2015 te
verwezenlijken. Deze regel wordt nog steeds toegepast.

De uitkering van de subtranche van maart 2013 ter grootte van 2,8 miljard EUR heeft pas plaatsgevonden nadat
Griekenland zijn personeelsplannen volledig had uitgevoerd, waarbij overbodige posten waren opgespoord en
driemaandelijkse doelstellingen voor verplichte ontslagen waren vastgesteld. Er werd bijzondere aandacht besteed aan
de wijze waarop de overeengekomen 15 000 verplichte ontslagen zouden worden gerealiseerd. Griekenland
specificeerde dat de ontslagen het gevolg zullen zijn van: i) tuchtprocedures, ii) samenvoegingen en afschaffingen van
entiteiten, iii) evaluaties van het personeel dat van de mobiliteitsregeling gebruikmaakt, iv) vrijwillige uittredingen uit
de mobiliteitsregeling, en v) het aflopen van een twaalfmaandsperiode in de mobiliteitsregeling.

Griekenland mag enkel van de afslankingsregel van 1 indienstneming voor 5 ontslagen afwijken zolang het land op
schema blijft om zijn totale doelstelling te halen, namelijk de inkrimping van het overheidspersoneel met
150 000 ambtenaren tegen eind 2015. Griekenland moet op een aantal prioritaire terreinen, zoals belastingcontrole,
gekwalificeerd personeel in dienst nemen. Wegens bijzondere kwalificatievereisten kan niet altijd door middel van
interne overplaatsingen aan de personeelsbehoefte worden voldaan. De budgettaire ruimte voor deze prioritaire
indienstnemingen zal afkomstig zijn van de overeengekomen ontslagen. De voor deze ontslagen geldende 1-op-1regel zou de inspanningen tot hervorming van het overheidsapparaat moeten versterken, mits de autoriteiten in een
solide evaluatiekader voorzien.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_15/04/2013_493934.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 271

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005953/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Greece lays off 15 000 civil servants… in order to recruit in the same numbers at a later stage!

On 15 April 2013 Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras confirmed that a total of 15 000 civil servants would be
dismissed before the end of 2014, with 4 000 to go this year, but stressed that each departure would be replaced by a
new recruit ( [1] ).

In the light of this:

1. Is the Commission aware of the intentions of the Greek Government in this regard?

2. If so, can the Commission state whether or not the planned recruitment of civil servants is in line with the
country’s bailout commitments?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 August 2013)_

Greece has already made substantial progress in downsizing its public administration. The rule which allows
replacing only 1 in 5 employees exiting the public sector is expected to bring about the targeted reduction of at least
150,000 by the end of 2015. The rule continues to be applied.

The disbursement of the EUR 2.8b sub-tranche of March 2013 was made only after Greece completed staffing plans,
identifying redundant positions and after setting quarterly targets for mandatory exits. Particular focus was placed
identifying how the 15,000 mandatory exists agreed would be achieved. Greece specified that the exits will come
from i) disciplinary cases, ii) mergers and abolishment of entities iii) evaluation of the personnel using the mobility
scheme, iv) voluntary exits from the mobility scheme and v) the elapse of a 12‐ month period in the mobility scheme.

The derogation of the 1:5 attrition rule for these exits will only be applied as long as Greece remains on track for its
overall target of reduction of public sector employees of 150,000 by end-2015. Greece needs to recruit qualified staff
in a number of priority areas such as tax auditing. The staffing needs cannot always be met through internal transfers
due to special qualification requirements. The fiscal space for this priority hiring will come from the exits agreed. The
1:1 attrition rule for these exits should reinforce public administration reform efforts and the authorities should put
in place a robust appraisal framework.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_15/04/2013_493934

C 42 E / 272 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-005954/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(28 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Recuperarea și reutilizarea apei de ploaie

Ploile abundente din ultima perioadă au dus la identificarea a noi probleme pentru administrațiile locale din statele
membre. Nu este vorba doar de inundațiile cauzate de cantitățile mari de apă înregistrate în diferite zone, ci și de așazisa poluare cauzată de apa de ploaie.

Este vorba de faptul că, prin inundarea rețelelor de canalizare sau de ape uzate din diverse instalații industriale, ploile
determină revărsarea acestora în spații publice — străzi, parcuri etc., provocând poluarea mediului natural.

Ce soluții are Comisia în vedere pentru a sprijini aplicarea unor soluții inovatoare, care să permită colectarea separată
a apei de ploaie la nivelul administrațiilor publice în vederea utilizării ei în scopuri industriale sau casnice?

**Răspuns dat de dl. Potočnik în numele Comisiei**

_(9 iulie 2013)_

În noiembrie 2012, Comisia a adoptat un plan de salvgardare a resurselor de apă ale Europei ( [1] ). În urma consultării
părților interesate care a condus la acest plan de salvgardare a reieșit faptul că UE trebui să acorde atenție reutilizării
apei pentru irigații sau în scopuri industriale. Astfel cum s-a anunțat în planul de salvgardare, Comisia intenționează
ca, până în 2015, să lucreze la un instrument la nivelul UE, care urmează să facă obiectul unei evaluări a impactului,
pentru a maximiza reutilizarea apei, asigurând în același timp menținerea unui nivel înalt de protecție a sănătății
publice și a mediului în UE.

Proiectul a evidențiat, de asemenea, colectarea apelor pluviale ca alternativă la resursele de apă convenționale, dar
evaluarea impactului a arătat că viitoarea sa punere în aplicare nu necesită o intervenție la nivelul UE.

De asemenea, una dintre prioritățile Parteneriatului european pentru inovare în domeniul apei ( [2] ) este refolosirea și
reciclarea apei. Comisia consideră că Parteneriatului european pentru inovare în domeniul apei va facilita dezvoltarea,
implementarea și adoptarea de către piață a tehnologiilor inovatoare privind reutilizarea și reciclarea apei, inclusiv
colectarea apelor pluviale.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 673 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 216 final.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 273

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005954/13**

**to the Commission**
**Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rainwater recovery and recycling

Heavy rainfalls have recently been creating new problems for certain local authorities in the Member States, causing
not only flooding but also pollution.

The fact is that heavy rainfall causes sewers and industrial effluent outlets to overflow into roads, parks and other
public spaces, thereby polluting the natural environment.

What measures are being accordingly envisaged by the Commission to encourage the implementation of innovatory
solutions for the separate collection of rainwater by the authorities for the purposes of industrial or domestic
recycling?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

In November 2012, the Commission adopted a Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources ( [1] ). In the
stakeholder consultations leading to this Blueprint, water re-use for irrigation or industrial purposes emerged as an
issue requiring EU attention. As announced in the Blueprint, the Commission intends by 2015 to work on a suitable
EU-level instrument, subject to an impact assessment, to maximise water re-use while ensuring the maintenance of a
high level of public health and environmental protection in the EU.

The Blueprint also highlighted rainwater harvesting as an alternative to conventional water resources, but the impact
assessment showed that its further implementation did not require intervention at EU level.

Furthermore, one of the priorities of the European Innovation Partnership on Water ( [2] ) is water reuse and recycling.
The Commission believes that the EIP on water will facilitate the development, deployment and market uptake of
innovative technologies on water reuse and recycling, including rainwater harvesting.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 673 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 216 final.

C 42 E / 274 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005955/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Fondos Feader para regadíos

El Estado español ha realizado una inversión de 1 800 millones de euros, a partir de fondos Feader y fondos propios
de la Administración, para modernizar una serie de regadíos del Estado, contemplados en el Real Decreto 287/2006,
por el que se regulan las obras urgentes de mejora y consolidación de regadíos. A pesar de la cuantía de la inversión, el
Estado ha afirmado desconocer si estas modernizaciones han supuesto un ahorro de agua, aduciendo que la
Administración hidráulica no tiene la obligación de realizar evaluaciones posteriores a la ejecución de estas mejoras
en las infraestructuras de regadío.

¿Coincide la Comisión en que no es necesario realizar evaluaciones ex post de las obras de modernización de regadíos
para verificar si, efectivamente, se produce un ahorro de agua?

¿Qué opinión tiene la Comisión sobre el uso de fondos europeos para llevar a cabo obras en regadíos si no se sabe,
efectivamente, si se produce un ahorro en el uso del agua ni se conoce el destino de dicho ahorro?

**Respuesta del Sr. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión**

_(5 de julio de 2013)_

Las intervenciones comunitarias en favor de las infraestructuras de gestión del agua en España en el marco de la
programación de desarrollo rural 2007-2013, cofinanciadas por el Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural
(Feader), están sujetas a las condiciones establecidas en el marco nacional aprobado por la Comisión.

Uno de los principales objetivos de estas intervenciones es reducir la demanda de agua de riego que se obtendría por el
aumento de la eficiencia en la utilización del agua gracias a la modernización de los sistemas de riego existentes.

Numerosos programas regionales de desarrollo rural en España contienen la submedida «Gestión de los recursos
hídricos» destinada a mejorar los sistemas de riego en las comunidades autónomas en cuestión.

Los programas regionales de desarrollo rural prevén objetivos cuantificados en términos de reducción del consumo
de agua de riego para el período 2007-2013. Los informes anuales de ejecución de los mismos muestran los
resultados obtenidos en este ámbito.

La consecución de los objetivos de la submedida «Gestión de los recursos hídricos» y, en particular, la reducción del
consumo de agua de riego ha sido objeto de la evaluación posterior de los programas regionales de desarrollo rural
correspondientes.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 275

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005955/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EAFRD funds for irrigation projects

Spain has recently invested EUR 1.8 billion of government and EAFRD monies to modernise a number of public
irrigation systems. The investment was made on the basis of Royal Decree No 287/2006, which regulates urgent
irrigation-system improvement and consolidation projects. Despite the considerable sums of money involved, Spain
claims not to know whether the investment has led to water savings, and says that the public water authority is not
required to carry out _ex post_ assessments of projects designed to improve irrigation infrastructure.

Does the Commission share the Spanish Government’s view that it is not necessary to carry out _ex post_ assessments of
irrigation modernisation projects in order to verify whether water savings have actually been made?

Does it think it is right that European funds are being used to finance irrigation projects, even though it is unclear
whether the projects have actually reduced water consumption and, if so, how exactly the water that has been saved is
being used?

_(Version française)_

**Réponse donnée par M. Cioloş au nom de la Commission**

_(5 juillet 2013)_

Les interventions communautaires en faveur des infrastructures relatives à la gestion de l'eau en Espagne dans le cadre
de la programmation en faveur du développement rural 2007-2013, cofinancées par le Fonds européen agricole de
développement rural (Feader), sont soumises aux conditions établies dans le Cadre national approuvé par la
Commission.

Un des principaux objectifs de ces interventions consiste en la réduction de la demande d'eau d'irrigation qui serait
atteint par l'augmentation de l'efficience dans l'utilisation de l'eau grâce à la modernisation des systèmes d'irrigation
existants.

De nombreux Programmes régionaux de développement rural (PDRs) en Espagne contiennent la sous-mesure
«Gestion des ressources hydriques» visant à améliorer les systèmes d'irrigation dans les Communautés autonomes
concernées.

Les PDRs prévoient des objectifs chiffrés en termes de réduction de la consommation d'eau d'irrigation pour la
période 2007-2013. Les rapports annuels d'exécution des PDRs montrent les résultats atteints dans ce domaine.

La réalisation des objectifs de la sous-mesure «Gestion des ressources hydriques» et, en particulier, la réduction de la
consommation d'eau d'irrigation fait l'objet de l'évaluation ex post des PDRs concernés.

C 42 E / 276 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005956/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Jürgen Creutzmann (ALDE)**

_(28. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Umsatzsteuerliche Beurteilung von Reihengeschäften im EU-Binnenmarkt

Nach vorliegenden Beschwerden von betroffenen Unternehmern ist das aktuelle System der umsatzsteuerlichen
Beurteilung von Reihengeschäften äußerst kompliziert und führt vielfach zu Fehlern in der Handhabung. Eine
Steuerbefreiung für Ausfuhrlieferungen oder innergemeinschaftliche Lieferungen im Rahmen der
grenzüberschreitenden Warenbewegung ist nur für sogenannte Beförderungs‐ oder Versendungslieferungen
vorgesehen. Für alle anderen Lieferungen, die im Rahmen der Lieferkette stattfinden (die sogenannten ruhenden
Lieferungen), kommt die Steuerbefreiung nicht in Betracht. Die umsatzsteuerliche Beurteilung der Reihengeschäfte
hängt maßgeblich von der genauen Zuordnung der Beförderung einer der Lieferungen in der Lieferkette ab. Diese
komplizierten Vorschriften führen in der Praxis sehr oft zu Unsicherheit und Zeitverlust für die beteiligten
Unternehmen, insbesondere für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen.

1. Welchen Beitrag wird die bevorstehende Reform des Mehrwertsteuersystems konkret zur Vereinfachung der
umsatzsteuerlichen Beurteilung von Reihengeschäften leisten?

2. Wann sieht die Kommission vor, Berichte über die seit 2012 im Zuge des Reformprozesses erzielten
Fortschritte zu veröffentlichen?

3. In welchem Zeitraum plant die Kommission die Reform des Mehrwertsteuersystems durchzuführen?

**Antwort von Herrn Šemeta im Namen der Kommission**

_(3. Juli 2013)_

1. Wie in ihrer Mitteilung zur Zukunft der Mehrwertsteuer — Wege zu einem einfacheren, robusteren und
effizienteren MwSt-System, das auf den Binnenmarkt zugeschnitten ist ( [1] ), angekündigt, hat die Kommission eine
umfassende technische Prüfung und einen breit angelegten Dialog mit den Mitgliedstaaten und anderen Betroffenen
eingeleitet, um die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten der Anwendung des „Bestimmungslandprinzips“ in Bezug auf
Lieferungen innerhalb der EU im Einzelnen zu untersuchen.

Die Frage der Komplexität der mehrwertsteuerlichen Behandlung sogenannter „Reihengeschäfte“ wurde in diesem
Kontext in der Tat aufgeworfen. Die Diskussionen zu einer Reihe möglicher Optionen, jede mit anderen Merkmalen,
um unter anderem diesem Problem abzuhelfen, sind allerdings noch nicht abgeschlossen. Es lässt sich daher noch
nicht sagen, wie die Reform im Einzelnen zur Vereinfachung der Angabe solcher Geschäfte beitragen wird.

2. Die Kommission hat nicht die Absicht, Fortschrittsberichte zu veröffentlichen. Die zuständigen
Kommissionsdienstsellen aktualisieren jedoch regelmäßig ihre Website ( [2] ), um die breite Öffentlichkeit über die
Entwicklung der in der Mitteilung beschriebenen Schlüsselmaßnahmen zu unterrichten.

3. Der Zeitplan, auch für die Vorlage neuer Rechtsvorschriften durch die Kommission, ist in der Mitteilung
enthalten.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) KOM(2011)851 vom 6.12.2011.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/future_vat/index_de.htm

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 277

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005956/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jürgen Creutzmann (ALDE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VAT assessment of chain transactions in the EU internal market

According to complaints lodged by companies affected, the current system for assessing VAT in chain transactions is
extremely complicated and frequently leads to errors in practice. VAT exemption for supplies of goods for export, or
where the supply involves cross-border movement of goods within the EU, applies only to the supplies actually
dispatched or transported (‘moving’ supplies). There is no VAT exemption for any other supplies within the delivery
chain (‘static’ supplies). The assessment of chain transactions for VAT depends crucially on precisely how one of the
supplies in the delivery chain is classified. These complicated regulations very often lead in practice to uncertainty and
time lost for the companies involved, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises.

1. What precisely will the forthcoming reform of the VAT system contribute to simplifying the assessment of
chain transactions for turnover tax purposes?

2. When does the Commission plan to publish reports on the progress made since 2012 in the reform process?

3. What is the Commission’s timescale for implementing the reform of the VAT system?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2013)_

1. As mentioned in the communication on the future of VAT — Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient
VAT system tailored to the single market ( [1] ), the Commission has launched in-depth technical work and a broad
based dialogue with Member States and other stakeholders to examine in detail the different possible ways to
implement the ‘destination principle’ as regards intra-EU supplies.

The issue of the complexity of the VAT treatment of the so-called ‘chain transactions’ has been indeed raised in this
context. However, the discussions on a series of possible options, each with different features, to address, among
others, this shortcoming are still ongoing. Therefore, it is too early to say how the reform will precisely contribute to
simplifying the reporting of such transactions.

2. The Commission does not plan to publish reports on the progress made. However, the responsible Commission
services regularly update their website ( [2] ) to inform the general public on the follow-up to the key actions featured in
the communication.

3. The timetable, including when the Commission envisages presenting new legislation, is included in the
communication.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 851, 6.12.2011.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/future_vat/index_en.htm

C 42 E / 278 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005957/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Νέες εξελίξεις σχετικά με την οικοπεδοποίηση περιοχής του Δικτύου Natura 2000 στην παραλία Κορινού Πιερίας

«Πρότυπος» παραθεριστικός οικισμός επιχειρήθηκε να κατασκευαστεί στον Κορινό Πιερίας, μέσα στα όρια του Καταφυγίου
Άγριας Ζωής (ΚΑΖ) Αλυκής Κίτρους (ΦΕΚ 177/τ.B'/31.3.1988), όπου σύμφωνα με τον Ν. 2637/98 (ΦΕΚ 200/Α/27-81998) απαγορεύεται η ένταξή του σε πολεοδομικό ή ρυμοτομικό σχεδιασμό. Η Επιτροπή, απαντώντας σε σχετική
ερώτηση ( [1] ), είχε δηλώσει ότι θα επικοινωνήσει με τις ελληνικές αρχές προκειμένου να πληροφορηθεί σχετικά με τη
συμμόρφωση με την νομοθεσία ΕΕ για τη φύση. Από τότε σταμάτησε οποιαδήποτε εργασία στην συγκεκριμένη περιοχή του
Δικτύου Natura 2000 (GR1220010). Πρόσφατα, όμως, υπήρξαν κινήσεις για αλλαγή του καθεστώτος προστασίας,
ιδιαίτερα για περιορισμό των ορίων του ΚΑΖ Αλυκής Κίτρους **.** Η Διεύθυνση Δασών Πιερίας εξέδωσε το Δεκέμβριο 2012
θετική εισήγηση για την τροποποίηση των ορίων ( [2] ), χωρίς τα συμπληρωματικά στοιχεία που είχε ζητήσει η Διεύθυνση
Συντονισμού και Επιθεώρησης Δασών της Αποκεντρωμένης Διοίκησης Μακεδονίας-Θράκης ( [3] ). Με έγγραφό της η Διεύθυνση
Συντονισμού απέφευγε να πάρει θέση και ζητούσε η νέα έκθεση να αποσταλεί κατευθείαν στο Υπουργείο Περιβάλλοντος. Για
την περιοχή, όμως, υπάρχει πρόσφατη έκθεση καταγραφής της ορνιθοπανίδας που εκπόνησε ο Φορέας Διαχείρισης Δέλτα
Αξιού-Λουδία-Αλιάκμονα ( [4] ), η οποία έρχεται σε αντίθεση με την έκθεση της Διεύθυνσης Δασών, καθώς τεκμηριώνει την
ύπαρξη σημαντικών ειδών που πληρούν τα κριτήρια χαρακτηρισμού της περιοχής ως Ζώνης Ειδικής Προστασίας, σύμφωνα
με την οδηγία 2009/147/EΚ.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Είχε ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές το 2011 αλλά και για πρόσφατες εξελίξεις; Συμφωνεί ότι οποιαδήποτε
αλλαγή του καθεστώτος προστασίας παραβιάζει την ελληνική και ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία, όπως την οδηγία
2009/147/EΚ, ιδιαίτερα την οδηγία 92/43/ΕΟΚ (άρθρο 6), καθώς θα επιτρέψει την καταστροφή ευαίσθητων
οικολογικά περιοχών διεθνούς σημασίας;

2. Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει ώστε να μην καταστραφούν περαιτέρω οι συγκεκριμένες περιοχές και να αποκατασταθούν
οι βλάβες που προκλήθηκαν το 2011;

3. Υπάρχει η δυνατότητα αντισταθμιστικών μέτρων για τις βεβαιωμένες ιδιοκτησίες εντός της συγκεκριμένης περιοχής,
ως επιλέξιμες δράσεις στο πλαίσιο των νέων ευρωπαϊκών διαρθρωτικών και επενδυτικών ταμείων ή από άλλες πηγές
ευρωπαϊκής χρηματοδότησης με στόχο να αποκατασταθεί και διατηρηθεί το οικοσύστημα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(9 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Σε απάντηση στο αίτημά της, η Επιτροπή ενημερώθηκε από τις ελληνικές αρχές ότι η περιβαλλοντική άδεια για
προπαρασκευαστικά έργα υποδομής για την οικοπεδοποίηση στην οποία αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος είχε ανακληθεί και
τα έργα είχαν σταματήσει, δεδομένου ότι προκάλεσαν σημαντική φθορά των ενδιαιτημάτων και λοιπών υδροβιότοπων εντός
της ζώνης ειδικής προστασίας (ΖΕΠ) GR1220010 «Αξιός-Λουδίας-Δέλτα Αλιάκμονα-Αλυκή Κίτρους». Οι ελληνικές αρχές
ενημέρωσαν επίσης ότι έχουν ζητήσει από τον κύριο του έργου να υποβάλει αίτηση για αναθεώρηση της άδειας που θα
λαμβάνει πλήρως υπόψη τα ορνιθολογικά στοιχεία που συλλέγονται από τον φορέα διαχείρισης του εθνικού πάρκου ΑξιόςΛουδίας-Δέλτα Αλιάκμονα και θα προβλέπει ρητώς την αποκατάσταση των πληγέντων ενδιαιτημάτων των πτηνών για τα
οποία έχει οριστεί η Ζώνη Ειδικής Προστασίας.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Σχετική ερώτηση προς την Επιτροπή E-009839/2011

(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-009839&language=EL).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Έγγραφο με αριθ. πρωτ. 12615/3-12-2012.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Έγγραφο με αριθ. πρωτ. 85715/15-11-2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Έκθεση καταγραφής της ορνιθοπανίδας στο χώρο των παρεμβάσεων οδοποιίας εντός της Ζώνης Ειδικής Προστασίας (ΖΕΠ) GR1220010 και του

καταφυγίου άγριας ζωής (ΦΕΚ 177/τ.B'/31.3.1988) ΚΑΖ στην περιοχή του Κορινού Νομού Πιερίας. Περίοδος καταγραφών: Ιανουάριος-Μάϊος 2013.
Φορέας Διαχείρισης Δέλτα Αξιού-Λουδία-Αλιάκμονα. http://www.axiosdelta.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=922&language=el-GR

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 279

Η Επιτροπή δεν είναι ενήμερη σχετικά με προτάσεις για την αλλαγή των ορίων του ΚΑΖ Αλυκής Κίτρους, η οποία αποτελεί
θέμα εθνικής αρμοδιότητας. Ωστόσο, οποιαδήποτε σχετική απόφαση δεν θα πρέπει να υπονομεύει την προστασία της ΖΕΠ, η
οποία πρέπει να βασίζεται σε έγκυρα ορνιθολογικά στοιχεία και να συμμορφώνεται με τις απαιτήσεις του άρθρου 4 της
οδηγίας 2009/147/ΕΟΚ ( [5] ) περί πτηνών και του άρθρου 6 της οδηγίας 92/43/ΕΟΚ ( [6] ) περί ενδιαιτημάτων. Η Επιτροπή θα
ερευνήσει περαιτέρω με τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με το θέμα αυτό και σχετικά με τα μέτρα που λαμβάνονται για την
αποκατάσταση της περιοχής.

Δυνατότητες χρηματοδότησης σε περιοχές του Δικτύου Natura 2000 στο πλαίσιο των υφιστάμενων ενωσιακών Ταμείων
(2007-2013) καθορίζονται στο σχετικό εγχειρίδιο οδηγιών που εκδίδεται από την Επιτροπή ( [7] ). Οι αποζημιώσεις στους
ιδιοκτήτες γης αποτελούν επίσης θέμα το οποίο θίγεται στο αίτημα της Επιτροπής. Οι διατάξεις για τα νέα Ταμεία της ΕΕ δεν
έχουν εκδοθεί ακόμη.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

⋅7∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2009/147/EΚ (κωδικοποιημένη έκδοση που αντικαθιστά την οδηγία 79/409/EΟΚ), ΕΕ L 20 της 26.1.2010, σ. 7.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 92/43/ΕΟΚ του Συμβουλίου της 21ης Μαΐου 1992 για τη διατήρηση των φυσικών ενδιαιτημάτων και της άγριας πανίδας και χλωρίδας. ΕΕ L 206

της 22.7.1992.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/financing/docs/financing_natura2000_el.pdf

( **|**

C 42 E / 280 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005957/13**

**to the Commission**
**Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ New developments concerning a real estate development scheme in a Natura 2000 site on Korinos beach
(Pieria)

A plan had been launched to build a ‘model’ holiday village in Korinos (Pieria) within the boundaries of the Aliki
Kitrous wildlife sanctuary (Greek Official Gazette 177/t.B/31.3.1988), despite the fact that Law 2367/98 (Greek
Official Gazette 200/A/27.8. 1998) prohibits the inclusion of this site in any urban development plan. In its answer
to a question on this subject ( [1] ), the Commission had stated that it would ask the Greek authorities whether this
scheme complied with EU legislation on nature. Since then, all work in this particular Natura 2000 network site
(GR1220010) has ceased. However, recently there have been moves to change its protection status, in particular to
reduce the boundaries of the Aliki Kitrous wildlife sanctuary. In December 2012, Pieria Forest Department issued a
positive recommendation to alter the boundaries ( [2] ), without providing the additional data that had been requested by
the Forestry Coordination and Inspection Directorate of the Decentralised Administration of Macedonia — Thrace ( [3] ).
In a letter, the Coordination Directorate avoided taking a position and requested that the new report be sent directly
to the Ministry for the Environment. For the particular site in question, however, there exists a recent report recording
birdlife drawn up by the Axios-Loudias-Aliakmons Delta Management Body ( [4] ), which contradicts the findings of the
Forestry Department report, and documents the existence of significant species meeting the criteria for the
designation of the area as a Special Protection Area in accordance with Directive 2009/147/EC.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Was it informed by the Greek authorities in 2011 and has it been informed about recent developments? Does it
agree that any change in the protection status would be in breach of Greek and European law, such as
Directive 2009/147/EC, in particular Directive 92/43/EEC (Article 6), as it would allow the destruction of
ecologically vulnerable areas of international importance?

2. What steps will it take to prevent the further destruction of the specific areas and to restore the damage caused
in 2011?

3. Is there any possibility of compensatory measures for the attested properties within that area, as eligible for the
new European structural and investment funds or other sources of European funding, with a view to restoring
and preserving the ecosystem?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

Further to its request the Commission was informed by the Greek authorities that the environmental permit for the
preparatory infrastructure works for the housing development referred to by the Honourable Member had been
withdrawn and works had ceased, as they had caused significant deterioration of bird and other wetland habitats
within the Special Protection Area (SPA) GR1220010 ‘Axios-Loudias-Aliakmon Delta — Alyki Kitrous’. The Greek
authorities also informed that they have requested the developer to submit an application for the revision of the
permit that would take fully into account the ornithological data collected by the management body of the AxiosLoudias-Aliakmon Delta national park and would explicitly provide for the restoration of the damaged habitats of the
bird species for which the SPA has been designated.

The Commission is not aware of proposals to change the boundaries of the Alyki Kitrous wildlife sanctuary, which is
a matter of national competence. However, any related decision should not compromise the protection status of the
SPA which should be based on sound ornithological data and comply with the requirements of Art. 4 of the Birds
Directive 2009/147/EEC ( [5] ) and Art. 6 of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC ( [6] ). The Commission will further inquire
with the Greek authorities about this and measures taken for the restoration of the area.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Question to the Commission E-009839/2011

(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2011-009839&language=EN).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Doc No 12615/3-12-2012.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Doc No 85715/15-11-2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Report recording birdlife at a road construction site within Special Protection Area (SPA) GR1220010 and the wildlife sanctuary (Greek Official

Gazette 177/t.B/31.3.1988) in the Korinos (Pieria) area. Recording period: January‐ May 2013. Axios-Loudias-Aliakmons Delta Management
Body. http://www.axiosdelta.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=922&language=el-GR

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/147/EC (codified version replacing Directive 79/409/EEC), OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7.
( **|** ⋅6∙ **|** ) Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

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⋅5∙ **|** )
⋅6∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 281

Financing opportunities for Natura 2000 sites under the current EU funds (2007-2013) are set out in the relevant
guidance handbook issued by the Commission ( [7] ). Compensation to landowners is also addressed. The provisions for
the new EU funds have not been adopted yet.

( **|** ⋅7∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/financing/docs/financing_natura2000_en.pdf

C 42 E / 282 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005959/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Diffusione del virus Schmallenberg: allevamenti a rischio

L'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare (Efsa) lancia un allarme: il virus Schmallenberg (SBV), che colpisce
bovini, ovini e caprini domestici di grande e piccola taglia si sta diffondendo negli allevamenti europei. Ad aprile
2013 è stata riscontrata la presenza del virus in alcune stalle della Scozia e della Scandinavia, mentre alcuni focolai
hanno già raggiunto Norvegia, Finlandia e Svezia.

Efsa comunica che da settembre 2011 i casi accertati sono progressivamente aumentati con gravi conseguenze per gli
allevatori in termini di minore produzione, fertilità ridotta, casi di malformazioni e alta mortalità dei capi alla nascita.

Il virus ha colpito anche l'Italia dove, dopo il caso registrato a febbraio 2012 in un'azienda del Veneto, l'Istituto
Zooprofilatico di Teramo ha confermato la presenza in Sardegna di due nuovi focolai che, da novembre 2012 a
marzo 2013, hanno interessato 85 aziende. Anche in Piemonte, in provincia di Cuneo, sono stati individuati in aprile
4 nuovi focolai.

Può la Commissione riferire:

1. se è a conoscenza dei fatti;

2. se può rendere noti i dati ricevuti in seguito alla richiesta di aggiornamenti inoltrata all'Efsa per il periodo
30 agosto 2012-30 aprile 2013;

3. considerato l'avvicinarsi del periodo estivo che favorisce la circolazione dell'insetto vettore, come valuta il
pericolo di una eventuale diffusione del virus su larga scala all'interno dell'Unione;

4. se ritiene opportuno aggiornare i servizi veterinari sulla diffusione del virus ed eventualmente predisporre
piattaforme di collaborazione tra gli allevatori;

5. se ritiene che l'introduzione un vaccino adeguato possa rappresentare una soluzione al problema;

6. come valuta l'impatto della diffusione del virus dal punto di vista commerciale e politico sul piano delle
relazioni internazionali, alla luce anche delle dichiarazioni di Stati Uniti, Russia, Messico, Algeria e Tunisia
sull'intenzione di introdurre misure restrittive per il commercio di carne e bestiame proveniente dall'Unione
europea?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(11 luglio 2013)_

1. La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alla risposta all'interrogazione P-000044/2013 ( [1] ).

2. Su richiesta della Commissione l'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare (EFSA) ha pubblicato cinque
relazioni sul virus di Schmallenberg. La Commissione fornisce un link per accedere a tali relazioni da un'apposita
pagina web ( [2] ).

3. Secondo le analisi dell'EFSA è probabile che l'infezione da virus di Schmallenberg continui a diffondersi nelle
regioni non ancora colpite o in quelle a bassa prevalenza di tale virus mediante la trasmissione ad opera di insetti
vettori; tale metodo di trasmissione si è dimostrato estremamente efficiente ( [3] ). Inoltre, gli strumenti di controllo
attualmente disponibili sembrano decisamente insufficienti e inadeguati a fermare la diffusione dell'infezione.

4. La Commissione continua ad affrontare il tema in varie sedi, con le autorità veterinarie degli Stati membri e altre
parti interessate. Da tale dibattito non è emersa la necessità di prendere, a livello di Unione, ulteriori iniziative
armonizzate intese a contenere il virus.

( **|**
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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/sbv
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/2768.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 283

5. Il virus di Schmallenberg si è già diffuso nella maggior parte del territorio dell'UE ed è stato individuato anche in
alcuni paesi confinanti. I dati a disposizione indicano che in molte regioni dell'UE la percentuale di animali
naturalmente immuni al virus è molto elevata. Si dovrebbero quindi valutare i benefici dell'effettuazione della
vaccinazione in tali aree. Prima di effettuare le eventuali vaccinazioni, inoltre andrebbe considerato il fatto che tale
virus ha un impatto limitato.

6. In base ai principi e alle norme dell'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio e dell'Organizzazione mondiale
per la salute animale, la Commissione ritiene che per il virus di Schmallenberg non siano giustificate restrizioni
commerciali internazionali. Tuttavia, la Commissione partecipa attivamente a negoziati bilaterali e multilaterali
relativi alla problematica in questione.

C 42 E / 284 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005959/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Schmallenberg virus spreading: livestock at risk

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has issued an alert: the Schmallenberg (SBV) virus, which affects both
young and adult cattle, sheep and goats, is spreading among European livestock. In April 2013, the virus was detected
in Scottish cattle sheds, and there have been isolated outbreaks in Norway, Finland and Sweden.

The EFSA has reported that since September 2011 the number of confirmed cases has been steadily increasing, with
serious ramifications for livestock farmers in terms of lower production, reduced fertility, incidences of deformities
and a high rate of stillbirth.

Italian livestock farms have also been affected by the virus. Following a case recorded in the Veneto region in
February 2012, the Istituto Zooprofilatico di Teramo (Teramo Animal Disease Prevention Institute) confirmed two
new outbreaks in Sardinia, which affected 85 farms between November 2012 and March 2013. In April, four new
outbreaks were also identified in the provinces of Piedmont and Cuneo.

1. Is the Commission aware of the situation?

2. Will it publish the data received following the EFSA’s update request for the period 30 August 201230 April 2013?

3. How likely is it that the virus will spread to other parts of the EU now that summer, when the insect which
carries the virus is more active, is approaching?

4. Is it time to update veterinary services about the spread of the virus and to set up collaborative platforms among
livestock farmers?

5. Could an effective vaccine solve the problem?

6. What international commercial and political impact will the spread of the virus have, given the statements made
by the United States, Russia, Mexico, Algeria and Tunisia announcing their intention to impose restrictions on
imports of meat and cattle from the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

1. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question P‐000044/2013 ( [1] ).

2. Following Commission's requests, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published five reports on
Schmallenberg virus (SBV). The Commission provides a link to these reports on a dedicated webpage ( [2] ).

3. EFSA analysis suggest that in regions unaffected by SBV or regions with lower SBV prevalence, the infection is
likely to continue to spread due to transmission by insect vectors, that has proven to be extremely efficient ( [3] ). At the
same time, currently available control tools appear to be largely insufficient and ineffective to stop such spread.

4. The Commission continues to discuss SBV with the Member States veterinary authorities and other
stakeholders in several ‘fora’. From this debate, no need has emerged of further EU harmonised actions aimed at
containing this virus.

5. SBV has already spread to the majority of the EU territory and it is also being detected in some bordering
countries. Data available indicates that in many areas of the EU the proportion of animals naturally immunised
against the virus is very high. The benefits of performing vaccination in such areas would therefore need to be
assessed. In addition, the limited impact of this virus would also need to be considered before implementing any
vaccination.

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/food/sbv
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/2768.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 285

6. The Commission considers that international trade restrictions in relation to SBV are unjustified according to
the principles and standards of the World Trade Organisation and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).
However, the Commission is engaged in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on this issue.

C 42 E / 286 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005960/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Cina: la polizia impedisce una celebrazione religiosa nel villaggio di Donglu

Il 26 maggio scorso la polizia cinese ha predisposto dei posti di blocco sulle vie di accesso a Donglu, una delle
roccaforti della comunità cristiana in Cina, per impedire ai pellegrini provenienti dalle altre regioni di partecipare alla
cerimonia che ogni anno si tiene in onore della Vergine Maria. Nonostante dal 1995, anno in cui prese avvio la
tradizione, il regime di Pechino osteggi la celebrazione blindando il villaggio, gli abitanti, per il 90 % cattolici,
difendono il loro diritto alla libertà religiosa.

Può la Commissione precisare:

1. se è al corrente dei fatti;

2. se ritiene necessario richiamare l'attenzione della comunità internazionale sulla questione;

3. quali misure considera opportuno adottare a salvaguardia della libertà religiosa delle comunità cristiane nel
paese?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(5 agosto 2013)_

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente esprime preoccupazioni circa le limitazioni imposte alla libertà religiosa in
Cina, comprese quelle applicate ai cristiani. L'UE ha affrontato il tema della libertà di religione — e in particolare le
restrizioni imposte al culto cristiano — in occasione dell'ultima sessione del dialogo UE-Cina sui diritti umani,
tenutasi il 25 giugno a Guiyang, nella provincia cinese del Guizhou, e continuerà a sollevare la questione in tutte le
sedi opportune.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 287

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005960/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ China: police halt a religious celebration in the village of Donglu

On 26 May 2013, Chinese police set up roadblocks on the main routes into the village of Donglu, one of the
strongholds of the Christian community in China, to stop pilgrims from other parts of the country attending the
ceremony held there every year in honour of the Virgin Mary. Despite the fact that the Beijing regime has done
everything it can, including blocking off the village, to thwart the celebrations, which were first held in 1995, the
inhabitants, 90% of whom are Catholic, are continuing to defend their right to religious freedom.

1. Is the Commission aware of the situation?

2. Does it feel that it should be brought to the attention of the international community?

3. What measures does it feel should be taken to safeguard the religious freedom of Christian communities in
China?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 August 2013)_

The HR/VP is concerned at limitations on the exercise of religious freedom in China, including restrictions on
Christians. The EU raised violations of freedom of religion — and in particular restrictions on Christian worship — at
the last session of the EU-China human rights dialogue which took place on 25 June in Guiyang, Guizhou Province,
China and will continue to raise the issue at all appropriate opportunities.

C 42 E / 288 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005961/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Crisi del modello svedese

Il sistema di welfare svedese, punto di riferimento per gli Stati membri in materia sociale, è in crisi. Tale modello, che
prevede un elevato livello di protezione sociale per tutti i cittadini anche immigrati, aveva permesso al paese, la cui
popolazione è per il 15 % straniera, di risolvere i problemi sociali legati ai flussi migratori. Il sistema, apparentemente
sostenibile, ha mostrato recentemente la propria debolezza. Dal 19 maggio, infatti, a Stoccolma gruppi di immigrati
provenienti da Turchia, Libano, Siria e Somalia manifestano contro il governo attaccando con pietre, bastoni e
bottiglie incendiarie edifici pubblici, scuole e stazioni di polizia fino a coinvolgere 15 quartieri della periferia. Dietro
l'episodio scatenante — l'uccisione il 13 maggio scorso da parte della polizia di un immigrato di 69 anni che si
aggirava per le strade armato di coltello — si nascondono tensioni legate alle diverse condizioni sociali tra cittadini
immigrati e nativi. Accanto al divario nel tasso di disoccupazione tra immigrati e nativi, maggiore di dieci punti
percentuali per i primi, cresce l'ostilità dell'opinione pubblica nei confronti dell'immigrazione.

Può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. è al corrente dell'accaduto;

2. qual è la sua posizione sulla questione;

3. intende intervenire adottando misure che aiutino il governo svedese ad affrontare la situazione;

4. in seguito alle affermazioni del 4 febbraio scorso da parte del Ministro svedese dell'Immigrazione, Tobias
Billstroem, sulla necessità di rafforzare le leggi al fine di ridurre il numero di persone che arrivano nel paese,
ritiene che la politica di integrazione svedese necessiti di essere rivista?

**Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione**

_(11 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione è a conoscenza dei recenti eventi verificatisi in Svezia. Quanto accaduto evidenzia l'importanza di
politiche proattive in materia di integrazione, soprattutto per i giovani, e la necessità di affrontare i problemi delle
aree urbane particolarmente svantaggiate. La Commissione assiste gli Stati membri per promuovere l'integrazione dei
cittadini di paesi terzi con azioni e strumenti diversi a livello dell'UE.

La legislazione dell'UE in materia di immigrazione stabilisce le condizioni di ingresso e di residenza nel quadro di una
politica comune che intende assicurare, in tutte le fasi, la gestione efficiente dei flussi migratori e il trattamento equo
dei cittadini di paesi terzi che risiedono legalmente negli Stati membri. Spetta agli Stati membri determinare il numero
di ammissioni di cittadini di paesi extra-UE nel loro territorio alla ricerca di lavoro, dipendente o autonomo.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 289

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005961/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Swedish model in crisis

Sweden’s welfare system, seen by Member States as a model when it comes to social matters, is currently in crisis.
Over the years the system, which provides for a high level of social protection for immigrants (who make up 15% of
the population) and for Swedish citizens alike, has enabled the country to deal with the social problems linked to
immigration. People had thought that the system was sustainable, but recently its shortcomings have become
apparent. On 19 May 2013 groups of Turkish, Libyan, Syrian and Somali immigrants began demonstrating in
Stockholm against the government, hurling stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails at public buildings, schools and
police stations in 15 different suburbs of the capital. The demonstrations were triggered by the killing by the police on
13 May of a 69‐ year‐old immigrant who had been brandishing a knife in public. The incident rekindled underlying
tensions linked to the widening social disparities between immigrant communities and Swedish citizens. Against the
backdrop of higher unemployment among immigrants than among Swedish nationals (a difference of 10%), public
hostility towards immigration is growing.

1. Is the Commission aware of what has been happening in Sweden?

2. What view does it take of these events?

3. Does it plan to take steps to help the Swedish Government deal with the situation?

4. On 4 February 2013 the Swedish Immigration Minister Tobias Billstroem called for Swedish law to be amended
in order to reduce the number of immigrants entering the country. In the light of those comments, does the
Commission think that Sweden needs to revise its integration policy?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of recent events in Sweden. The events highlight among other aspects the importance of
proactive integration policies, in particular for young persons, and the need to address the challenges of especially
disadvantaged urban areas. The Commission supports Member States in promoting integration of third-country
nationals through a number of different actions and tools at EU level.

EU migration legislation determines conditions of entry and residence in a common immigration policy aimed at
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows and fair treatment of on third-country nationals
residing legally in Member States. It is the competence of the Member States to determine the volumes of admission
of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or
self-employed.

C 42 E / 290 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005962/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Situazione economica della Croazia in vista dell'adesione il 1 [o] luglio 2013

Nonostante che i criteri stabiliti dal Consiglio di Copenaghen del 1993 richiedano a ciascun paese candidato
all'Unione di garantire un'economia di mercato funzionante e capace di far fronte alla concorrenza interna, negli
ultimi mesi la situazione economica della Croazia in vista dell'adesione il 1 [o] luglio 2013 ha visto dei peggioramenti
che ne minano la stabilità.

Il rapporto pubblicato lo scorso novembre dal Fondo monetario internazionale (FMI) mostra che nel primo semestre
2012 non solo il Pil è sceso di 1,7 punti percentuali a causa di una brusca diminuzione dei consumi e della spesa per
gli investimenti, ma l'inflazione è aumentata tra il 3,4 e il 4 %. Nella seconda metà dello scorso anno il tasso di
disoccupazione ha raggiunto il 14 %, cifra al di sopra della media dell'Unione che in ottobre 2012 si assestava intorno
all'11,7 %, e le previsioni per l'anno corrente indicano una crescita, determinata dall'intervento statale, limitata allo
0,75 %.

1. Può la Commissione riferire quanti fondi sono stati ricevuti dalla Croazia nella fase di pre-adesione;

2. come garantisce che tali risorse siano state allocate correttamente e non siano state impiegate per favorire la
delocalizzazione;

3. se ritiene che gli impegni stabiliti nell'Accordo di stabilizzazione e associazione firmato dalla Croazia il
29 ottobre 2001 siano stati rispettati;

4. come valuta la situazione economica del paese;

5. in che modo intende affrontare l'integrazione comunitaria di un'economia in difficoltà quale si presenta oggi
quella croata;

6. data l'attuale situazione economica, come intende rispettare gli impegni presi nella relazione speciale sulla
capacità dell'Unione europea di accogliere nuovi Stati membri contenuta nella comunicazione della Commissione al
Parlamento europeo dell'8 novembre 2006 «Strategia di allargamento e sfide principali per il periodo 2006-2007»
che prevede la capacità dell'Unione di assorbire nuovi membri senza che vengano compromessi gli obiettivi politici e
strategici?

**Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione**

_(23 luglio 2013)_

Nell'ambito dello strumento di assistenza preadesione la Croazia ha ricevuto sostegno dall'UE per un totale di
998 milioni di EUR durante il periodo 2007-2013 (per i dettagli, cfr. l'ultima relazione sull'assistenza finanziaria
annuale IPA ( [1] )).

I fondi di preadesione dell'UE preparano i paesi beneficiari ai diritti e agli obblighi derivanti dall'adesione, tra cui
l'allineamento alle norme e alla legislazione dell'UE. Nel fornire assistenza preadesione, la Commissione controlla
attentamente l'utilizzo dei fondi e garantisce il rispetto delle norme dell'UE in materia di appalti e aiuti di Stato.
L'assistenza dell'UE alla Croazia è stata esaminata nella relazione speciale 2011/14 della Corte dei conti europea.

In linea di massima, la Croazia ha rispettato gli impegni assunti nell'ambito dell'accordo di stabilizzazione e di
associazione, sotto la supervisione del Consiglio di stabilizzazione e di associazione, e ciò le ha permesso di prepararsi
adeguatamente in vista dell'adesione all'UE.

La Commissione ha pubblicato un'analisi dettagliata della situazione economica croata nel documento di lavoro sul
programma economico della Croazia per il 2013 (SDW(2013)61 del 29.5.2013), nell'ambito del semestre europeo.
Si rinvia inoltre alla risposta all'interrogazione E-003683/2013.

L'economia croata è già fortemente integrata nell'Unione europea e le sfide attuali possono essere affrontate meglio
nel quadro dell'adesione all'UE.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/2011_ipa_annual_report_with_annex_new_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 291

Il processo di adesione della Croazia all'Unione europea è stato rigoroso e basato su criteri rigidi di apertura e chiusura
dei capitoli di negoziato, il che ha portato ad una trasformazione politica ed economica duratura. La Croazia è entrata
nell'UE ben preparata ad adempiere ai suoi obblighi e a contribuire allo sviluppo delle politiche dell'Unione.

C 42 E / 292 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005962/13**

**to the Commission**

**Mara Bizzotto (EFD)**

_(28 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Economic situation in Croatia ahead of the country's accession on 1 July 2013

Under the stability criteria agreed at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, all applicant countries are required
to have a functioning market economy strong enough to withstand competition from other Member States. In the
last few months, however, the economic situation in Croatia, which is due to join the Union on 1 July 2013, has
deteriorated, undermining the country’s stability.

According to a report by the International Monetary Fund published in November 2012, in the first half of that year a
sudden drop in consumer and investment‐related spending led to a 1.7% contraction in the country's GDP and
inflation increased to between 3.4 and 4%. In the second half of 2012 Croatia had an unemployment rate of 14%,
higher than the EU’s October 2012 average of 11.7%. Forecasts for the current year point to a further increase in
unemployment (albeit one of only 0.75% as a result of government measures).

1. Can the Commission say how much financial support Croatia has received during the pre-accession stage?

2. How can it be sure that these resources have been allocated appropriately and have not been used to encourage
companies to relocate production to Croatia?

3. Does it think that Croatia has fulfilled the commitments it made under the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement of 29 October 2001?

4. How would it assess the economic situation in Croatia?

5. How does it plan to integrate into the Union a country which is struggling economically, as is the case with
Croatia?

6. In the light of the current economic situation, how does it intend to ensure that the commitments made in the
special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members ( [1] ) can be met without jeopardising political and policy
objectives?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

Under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Croatia has been provided with a total of EUR 998 million EU
support during the period 2007 to 2013 (for details, see latest IPA Annual Financial Assistance Report ( [2] )).

EU pre‐accession funds prepare beneficiary countries for the rights and obligations that come with EU membership,
including alignment with EU standards and legislation. When providing pre-accession assistance, the Commission
closely monitors the use of funds and ensures that EU procurement and state aid rules are respected. EU assistance to
Croatia was reviewed by the European Court of Auditor's Special Report 2011/14.

Croatia generally fulfilled its commitments under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, as monitored by the
Stabilisation and Association Council, which contributed to Croatia's successful preparations for EU membership.

The Commission published a detailed review of the economic situation in the Staff Working Document on Croatia's
Economic Programme 2013 (SDW (2013)361, 29/05/2013), as part of the European Semester. Reference is also
made to answer E-003683/2013.

The Croatian economy is already highly integrated into the EU; present challenges are best addressed in the
framework of EU membership.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Annexed to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 8 November 2006 on ‘Enlargement

Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007’.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/2011_ipa_annual_report_with_annex_new_en.pdf

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 293

Croatia's EU accession process has been rigorous and based on strict benchmarks for opening and closing of
negotiations chapters, leading to a lasting political and economic transformation. Croatia entered the EU well
prepared to fulfil its EU obligations and contribute to the development of EU policies.

C 42 E / 294 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор P-005963/13**

**до Комисията**
**Metin Kazak (ALDE)**

_(29 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Дългогодишен проблем на българските и турските превозвачи в пътните превози

Българските и турските автомобилните превозвачи от дълго време са изправени пред проблема със системата от квоти
в пътния превоз, както и с административни и бюрократични пречки, които оказват отрицателно въздействие не само
върху двустранната търговия между ЕС и Турция, но и върху международната търговия между ЕС и съседните на
Турция страни.

Като се има предвид, че принципът на свободното движение на стоки се прилага по отношение на двустранната
търговия между ЕС и Турция в рамките на Митническия съюз ЕС—Турция, може ли Комисията да отговори на

следните въпроси:

—
Защо все още не са премахнати квотите за пътните превози, като се има предвид, че те възпрепятстват свободното
движение на стоки между държавите, които са страни по това споразумение?

—
Какви действия предприема Комисията, за да прекрати отрицателното въздействие на квотите за пътни превози и
нетарифните бариери върху двустранната търговия?

—
Какви действия възнамерява да предприеме Комисията в рамките на Съвместния комитет на Митническия съюз,
за да се намери взаимно изгодно решение на проблема със съществуващите нетарифни бариери между Турция и
държавите членки на ЕС?

—
Като се има предвид, че принципът на свободно транзитно преминаване е установен с член 5 от Общото
споразумение за митата и търговията (ГАТТ), по което са страни и държавите — членки на ЕС, и Турция, какви
мерки предприема Комисията, за да гарантира прилагането на този принцип от съответните страни?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Каласон от името на Комисията**

_(10 юли 2013 г.)_

Законодателството на ЕС предвижда, че между ЕС и третите държави следва да се сключат споразумения, които
уреждат въпросите на международния автомобилен превоз на товари от една държава членка до трета държава или
обратно ( [1] ). Понастоящем ЕС няма такова споразумение с Турция, а митническият съюз между ЕС и Турция не включва
въпросите на транспорта, който е част от сектора на услугите. Освен това в споразумението за асоцииране между ЕС и
Турция движението на стоки се третира отделно от предоставянето на транспортни услуги. При липсата на
споразумение за транспортните услуги между ЕС и Турция държавите членки продължават да прилагат своите

двустранни споразумения.

В тази връзка Комисията би искала да уточни, че либерализирането на транспортните услуги в рамките на ЕС бе
предшествано от транспонирането и прилагането от държавите членки на съответните достижения на правото на ЕС,
които целят, наред с друго, подобряване на безопасността по пътищата, защита на трудовите права в сектора и
създаване на условия за лоялна конкуренция. Доколкото е известно на Комисията, Турция не е приела, нито прилага
достиженията на правото на ЕС в тези области.

Комисията редовно уведомява държавите членки относно опасенията на Турция по тези въпроси. Комисията следи
въпроса отблизо и възнамерява да проучи по-подробно ситуацията, като за целта смята да поиска от Турция да
предостави конкретна информация в подкрепа на твърденията на страната, че начинът, по който държавите членки
разпределят пътните квоти, ограничава търговията. Резултатът от това проучване ще определи следващите стъпки,
които трябва да бъдат предприети.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) лен 1, параграф 2 от Регламент (ЕО) № 1072/2009 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 21 октомври 2009 година относно общите правила за
достъп до пазара на международни автомобилни превози на товари, ОВ L 300, 14.11.2009 г.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 295

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-005963/13**

**to the Commission**
**Metin Kazak (ALDE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Longstanding problem of Bulgarian and Turkish hauliers in road transportation

Bulgarian and Turkish road hauliers have long been faced with the problem of the road transportation quota system,
as well as administrative and bureaucratic obstacles which negatively affect not only bilateral trade between the EU
and Turkey, but also foreign trade between the EU and Turkey’s neighbours.

Considering that the principle of the free movement of goods applies to bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey
under the EU-Turkey Customs Union, could the Commission answer the following:

—
Why have road transportation quotas not yet been removed, considering that they impede the free movement
of goods between the States party to the agreement?

—
What action is the Commission taking to put an end to the negative effect of road transportation quotas and
non-tariff barriers on bilateral trade?

—
What action does the Commission intend to take within the Customs Union Joint Committee to find a
mutually beneficial solution to the problem of existing non-tariff barriers between Turkey and EU Member
States?

—
Considering that the principle of freedom of transit was established by Article 5 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which both the EU Member States and Turkey are party, what measures are being
taken by the Commission to ensure the application of this principle by the parties concerned?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 July 2013)_

With respect to international carriage of goods by road from a Member State to a third country or vice versa, the EU
legislation provides that necessary agreements between the EU and third countries should be concluded ( [1] ). Currently
the EU does not have such agreement with Turkey and the EU-Turkey Customs Union does not cover transport which
belongs to the sector of services. Besides, in the EU-Turkey Association Agreement the movement of goods is treated
separately from the provision of transport services. In the absence of an EU road transport agreement with Turkey,
Member States continue to apply their bilateral agreements.

In this respect, the Commission would like to clarify that the liberalisation of transport services within the EU was
preceded by the transposition and implementation by Member States of the related _acquis_ aiming, _inter alia_, at
promoting road safety, protecting labour and creating conditions for fair competition. As far as the Commission is
aware, Turkey has neither adopted nor implemented the EU _acquis_ in these fields.

The Commission systematically informs Member States of Turkey's concerns in this area. The Commission is
following the subject matter closely and intends to study the situation in more detail. To this end, the Commission
envisages asking Turkey for specific information to substantiate Turkey's claim that the current manner of road
quotas allocation by Member States restricts trade. The outcome of this study will determine the following steps to be
taken.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 1, paragraph 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 on common rules
for access to the international road haulage market, OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

C 42 E / 296 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005964/13**

**to the Commission**
**Catherine Bearder (ALDE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Greek judiciary system

I have a constituent in the UK who is having terrible trouble with the Greek justice system with regard to a case of
child abduction. He tells me that he made a Hague Application to the Greek Ministry of Justice in December 2011 but
did not receive notification of a custody hearing until 25 May 2012. We consider this to be an undue delay in such a
sensitive case.

Furthermore, some statements submitted to the court were never given to the prosecutor, to the claimant or to his
legal representative. The judge in the case is also reported to have ignored factual independent evidence.

It seems therefore that there have been significant breaches of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. This has been brought to the attention of the Greek Government.

In light of this, what action is the Commission intending to take to ascertain whether the Greek Government is
adhering to its own rules? Would the Commission consider asking the Greek Government why there has been such
undue delay in this case, which might create a precedent in actions regarding child custody?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

In cases of intra-EU cross-border parental child abduction, Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 ( [1] ) (‘the Brussels IIa
regulation’) supplements the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The
Brussels IIa regulation makes an expeditious uniform procedure available to a left-behind parent to obtain the return
of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained.

The Commission would inform the Honourable Member that as far as the present case of child abduction and the
reaction of the Greek authorities is concerned, it does not have sufficient information to enable it to answer the
questions. However, the Commission stands ready to examine the case. To this end, it would need details of the
principal decisions and other relevant extracts from the case file. On receipt and examination of these documents, the
Commission expects to be in a position to advise the Honourable Member on whether it is necessary to take action in
the case in question.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 297

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005965/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – bezpieczeństwo dziennikarzy w Azerbejdżanie

Liczne organizacje takie jak Radio Wolna Europa, BBC i Human Rights Watch donosiły ostatnio o kilku przypadkach
domniemanego zastraszania i prześladowania dziennikarzy w Azerbejdżanie. W ciągu ostatnich trzech miesięcy
aresztowano czterech dziennikarzy pod zarzutem posiadania narkotyków na podstawie wątpliwych dowodów.
Dziennikarze byli przesłuchiwani przez policję bez obecności prawników, a niektórzy twierdzili również, że podczas
zatrzymania policja używała wobec nich przemocy. Po jednym z takich incydentów jeden z dziennikarzy nie mógł
poruszać niektórymi palcami.

1. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel może potwierdzić prawdziwość tych oskarżeń?

2. Czy ochrona dziennikarzy była przedmiotem dyskusji między dyplomatami UE a rządem Azerbejdżanu?

3. Czy istnieją jakiekolwiek plany zajęcia się sprawą domniemanych represji dziennikarzy w Azerbejdżanie? Jeśli
tak, to jakie?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(25 lipca 2013 r.)_

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca jest poinformowana o wspomnianych oskarżeniach, w szczególności
w związku z czterema sprawami dotyczącymi Raszada Ramazanowa, Daszkina Melikowa, Taleha Magirzada
i Mahamada Azizowa. UE wyraziła obawy w związku z sytuacją w zakresie wolności słowa w Azerbejdżanie, w tym
dotyczące ograniczeń niezależnych mediów i dziennikarzy.

W ramach ostatniego dialogu na temat praw człowieka pomiędzy UE a Azerbejdżanem poruszono kwestie wolności
mediów i ogólnie wolności słowa, a także konkretne sprawy dotyczące niektórych dziennikarzy. Delegatura UE
skierowała kilka pism do rzeczniczki praw człowieka w Azerbejdżanie, w których wyraziła swoje obawy związane
z konkretnymi sprawami.

W dniu 8 lutego 2013 r. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wydała także wraz z komisarzem Štefanem
Füle wspólne oświadczenie, w którym poruszone zostały sprawy Tofika Yakublu i Ilgara Mammedowa – aktywnego
blogera i dziennikarza Internetowego, jak również sprawa Hilala Mammedowa. Kolejne oświadczenie dotyczące
wolności Internetu i zniesławienia zostało wydane w czerwcu.

Delegatura UE, wspólnie z OBWE i państwami członkowskimi, ściśle monitoruje wszystkie wymienione powyżej
przypadki oraz inne sprawy.

C 42 E / 298 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005965/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Safety of journalists in Azerbaijan

Recently, numerous organisations such as Radio Free Europe, the BBC and Human Rights Watch have reported on
several allegations of intimidation and persecution of journalists in Azerbaijan. In the last three months, four
journalists have been arrested on drugs charges on the basis of questionable evidence. The journalists were questioned
by the police without lawyers present, and several also alleged that they had been assaulted by the police while in
custody. One man was unable to move several of his fingers after one such instance.

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative confirm the veracity of these claims?

2. Have there been any discussions between EU diplomats and the Azerbaijani Government about the protection
of journalists?

3. What, if any, plans are there to address the alleged repression of journalists in Azerbaijan?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The High Representative/Vice-President is aware of these claims, and in particular in relation to four cases concerning
Rashad Ramazanov, Dashqin Melikov, Taleh Bagirzade and Mahamad Azizov. The EU has expressed concern at the
situation of freedom of expression in Azerbaijan, including restrictions on independent media outlets and journalists.

The last EU-Azerbaijan Human Rights Dialogue addressed media freedom and freedom of expression in general, and
the cases of some journalists in particular. The EU Delegation has sent several letters to the Azerbaijani
Ombudswoman raising concern about specific cases.

The HR/VP and Commissioner Füle also issued a joint statement on 8 February 2013 also particularly raising the
cases of Tofiq Yaqublu and Ilgar Mammedov, who is also an active blogger and online journalist, as well as Hilal
Mammedov. Another statement was issued in June on Internet Freedom and defamation.

The EU Delegation closely monitors all mentioned cases and others together with the OSCE and EU Member States.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 299

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005966/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Stosowanie min przeciwpiechotnych w Jemenie

Od 2011 r. pojawia się wiele doniesień z Jemenu, według których w trakcie ostatnich zamieszek żołnierze Gwardii
Republikańskiej mieli stosować miny przeciwpiechotne. W 1997 r. Jemen podpisał konwencję ottawską zakazującą
stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych. Gdyby te zarzuty zostały potwierdzone, byłby to pierwszy przypadek złamania
zakazu stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych przez państwo, które podpisało konwencję ottawską.

1. Czy dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej zamierza przeprowadzić działania w reakcji na te doniesienia z Jemenu,
a jeśli tak, to jakie to będą działania?

2. Jak UE może wzmocnić środki egzekwowania konwencji ottawskiej, jeżeli zajdzie taka konieczność?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(20 sierpnia 2013 r.)_

Raporty wskazują, że członkowie jemeńskiej Gwardii Republikańskiej stosowali miny przeciwpiechotne podczas
zamieszek w 2011 r. Niedawno organizacja Human Rights Watch zwróciła uwagę rządu Jemenu na tę kwestię
i zwróciła się z prośbą o zbadanie sprawy w świetle konwencji o zakazie stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych (której
Jemen jest stroną).

Chociaż UE nie jest stroną konwencji o zakazie stosowania min przeciwpiechotnych, Komisja przywiązuje dużą
wagę do jej poszanowania przez wszystkie strony. Domniemane naruszenie jej postanowień przez Jemen musi
jeszcze zostać udowodnione i udokumentowane.

Strony konwencji mogą poruszyć tę kwestię za pośrednictwem Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ składając wniosek
o wyjaśnienie, na który państwo, które go otrzymało, jest zobowiązane odpowiedzieć w terminie dwudziestu ośmiu
dni. Wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE są stroną konwencji i mogą zastosować tę procedurę.

C 42 E / 300 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005966/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Use of landmines in Yemen

Since 2011, many reports have emerged from Yemen that members of the Republican Guard were involved in
deploying landmines during the recent unrest. Yet in 1997, Yemen signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of
landmines. If proven, these allegations would represent the first time that a country has broken the Mine Ban Treaty,
to which all Member States are signatories.

1. What, if any, action do EU diplomats intend to take in response to these new revelations in Yemen?

2. How, if necessary, might the EU strengthen enforcement of the Ottawa Treaty?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

Reports suggest that members of the Yemeni Republican Guard were involved in deploying landmines during the
2011 unrest. Recently Human Rights Watch has drawn the Government of Yemen's attention to this and requested to
investigate the issue in the light of the Mine Ban Treaty (of which Yemen is a Contracting Party).

Although the EU is not a Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, it attaches great importance to the respect of the Mine Ban
Treaty by all its Contracting Parties. An alleged violation of the rules by Yemen still has to be proven and documented
at this point.

States party to the Treaty can raise the issue through the Secretary General of the UN with a request for clarification to
which the State that receives the request has to respond within 28 days. All EU Member States are Party to the Treaty
and can thus set this procedure in motion.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 301

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005967/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – W sprawie stacjonowania i działań wojsk rosyjskich
w Naddniestrzu

W minionym tygodniu rosyjska agencja informacyjna ITAR-TASS podała informację o rzekomym zatrzymaniu (pod
zarzutem szpiegostwa), przez stacjonujących na terenie Naddniestrza rosyjskich żołnierzy, oficerów z Polski
i Wielkiej Brytanii pracujących w ramach misji OBWE. Niepotwierdzona wiadomość została ostatecznie oficjalnie
zdementowana przez MSZ Rosji. Republika Naddniestrzańska nie jest uznawana przez żadne państwo na świecie
i stanowi integralną część Mołdawii.

W obliczu akcesyjnych aspiracji Republiki Mołdawii oraz z uwagi na zaangażowanie Unii Europejskiej w ramach
Partnerstwa Wschodniego, którego Mołdawia jest członkiem, zwracam się z prośbą o ustosunkowanie się do
następujących problemów:

1. Jakie stanowisko zajmuje europejska dyplomacja w kwestii stacjonowania rosyjskich wojsk na terytorium
Mołdawii? Czy podejmuje się, bądź planuje podjąć negocjacje prowadzące do ich wycofania?

2. Czy sprawa rzekomego zatrzymania oficerów z krajów członkowskich Unii przez rosyjski patrol na terytorium
niezależnego państwa trzeciego może nosić znamiona prowokacji wymierzonej w interesy polityczne
Wspólnoty na Wschodzie?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(16 sierpnia 2013 r.)_

Polityczne rozwiązanie konfliktu będzie musiało uwzględniać jako integralną część wszelkie kwestie związane
z bezpieczeństwem, w tym utrzymanie pokoju. Informacje na ten temat są wymieniane z władzami Republiki
Mołdawii, a Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca jest poinformowana o wspomnianym rzekomym
zatrzymaniu.

UE pozostaje wierna zasadzie zgody państwa przyjmującego, co oznacza, że wojska rosyjskie musiałyby być
wycofane, jeżeli państwo przyjmujące, tj. Republika Mołdawii, wyraziłoby wolę wycofania zagranicznych wojsk.
Ponadto UE przypomina o zobowiązaniu podjętym przez Rosję na szczycie Organizacji Bezpieczeństwa
i Współpracy w Europie (OBWE) w Stambule w 1999 r. dotyczącym wycofania swoich wojsk we właściwym czasie.
Jednocześnie UE przyznaje, że obecność rosyjskich sił pokojowych wynika z porozumienia o zawieszeniu broni
z 1992 r., które przewiduje obecność sił pokojowych oraz Wspólnej Komisji Kontroli, składającej się
z przedstawicieli zarówno Republiki Mołdawii, jak i Federacji Rosyjskiej, i mającej na celu omawianie konkretnych
kwestii związanych z bezpieczeństwem do czasu ostatecznego rozwiązania konfliktu naddniestrzańskiego.

UE podkreśla, że ostateczne rozwiązanie konfliktu naddniestrzańskiego powinno zostać omówione podczas rozmów
5+2 oraz wzywa wszystkich uczestników tych rozmów do niezwłocznego rozpoczęcia dyskusji na temat
ostatecznego rozwiązania konfliktu i związanych z nim kwestii bezpieczeństwa w celu stworzenia warunków
umożliwiających wycofanie wszystkich zagranicznych wojsk we właściwym czasie. Równocześnie Wspólna Komisja
Kontroli pozostanie odpowiednim forum do dyskusji na temat konkretnych kwestii bezpieczeństwa oraz
incydentów.

C 42 E / 302 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005967/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Stationing and operations of Russian troops in Transnistria

Last week the Russian press agency ITAR‐TASS reported that Russian soldiers stationed in Transnistria had allegedly
detained Polish and British officers working as part of the OSCE mission on suspicion of spying. This unconfirmed
report was later officially denied by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Transnistria is not recognised by any
country, and it forms an integral part of Moldovan territory.

Given Moldova’s aspirations to join the EU and the EU’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership, of which Moldova is
a member, I should like to put the following questions:

1. What position does the EEAS take on the stationing of Russian troops on Moldovan territory? Is it engaged —
or does it plan to engage — in negotiations aimed at securing their withdrawal?

2. Could the alleged detention of officers from EU Member States by Russian troops on theterritory of an
independent third country be seen as a provocation aimed at underminingthe EU’s political interests in the
East?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 August 2013)_

All issues related to security, including the peacekeeping, will have to be an integral part of the political settlement of
the conflict. Information is exchanged on these issues with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, and the HR/VP
is aware of the above=mentioned alleged detention.

The EU adheres to the principle of host nation consent, meaning that Russian troops would have to be withdrawn if
the host nation, i.e. the Republic of Moldova, indicates its wish for foreign troops to be withdrawn. The EU
furthermore recalls the commitment made by Russia at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) summit in Istanbul in 1999 to withdraw its troops in due course. At the same time, the EU recognises that the
presence of Russian peacekeepers is based on the ceasefire agreement of 1992, which provides for the presence of a
peacekeeping force as well as Joint Control Commission in which both the Republic of Moldova as Russian
Federation are represented to discuss concrete security issues pending a final settlement of the Transnistria conflict.

The EU underlines that the final settlement of the Transnistria conflict should be discussed in the 5+2-talks, and calls
on all participants of the 5+2-talks to open discussions on the final settlement and security issues without delay with a
view to creating circumstances allowing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in due course, while the Joint Control
Commission is the appropriate forum to discuss specific security issues and incidents.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 303

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005968/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Rosyjskie próby odgrodzenia Osetii Południowej

Z informacji nadchodzących z Gruzji wynika, że okupujące Osetię Południową rosyjskie wojska przystąpiły do
odgradzania zajętych terytoriów na granicy administracyjnej pomiędzy Osetią a pozostałą częścią gruzińskiego
państwa. Ustawianie ogrodzenia spowodowało – według doniesień – przesunięcie o kilkaset metrów granicy w głąb
terytorium kontrolowanego przez władze w Tbilisi, czyli de facto rozszerzenie okupacji. Oznacza to również
problemy dla okolicznych mieszkańców i rolników.

Działania takie mogą prowadzić do pogwałcenia rosyjsko-gruzińskiego porozumienia o zawieszeniu broni.
Z pewnością natomiast nie służą normalizacji wzajemnych stosunków. Stosowny protest w tej sprawie
zapowiedziało gruzińskie MSZ.

Proszę o informacje, jakie czynności podjęte zostaną za pośrednictwem Europejskiej Służby Działań Zewnętrznych
w przypadku potwierdzenia się, bądź również możliwej eskalacji, tych niepokojących rosyjskich działań wobec
Gruzji.

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(16 lipca 2013 r.)_

Począwszy od 2010 r. Służby Graniczne Federacji Rosyjskiej w Abchazji i Osetii Południowej wznoszą fizyczne
przeszkody (w postaci ogrodzeń, rowów, wyposażenia nadzorującego) oraz tworzą posterunki straży granicznej
wzdłuż granic administracyjnych.

Kwestia ta była już wcześniej omawiana na posiedzeniach poświęconych mechanizmowi zapobiegania incydentom
i reagowania na nie (IPRM) oraz podczas międzynarodowych rozmów genewskich.

Tego typu działania na granicach uległy intensyfikacji i stały się bardziej widoczne począwszy od jesieni 2012 r., co
obejmuje przypadki takiego postępowania na terenach kontrolowanych przez Tbilisi, takie jak sytuacja, która miała
miejsce w maju w pobliżu miejscowości Ditsi. Sytuacja ta skłoniła rząd gruziński do poszukiwania wsparcia
dyplomatycznego na arenie międzynarodowej.

Wznoszenie tego rodzaju konstrukcji na granicach wywiera bezpośredni negatywny wpływ na codzienne życie ludzi
zamieszkujących po obydwu stronach granicy administracyjnej. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca
poruszyła sprawę granicy oraz wyraziła żywione przez UE obawy podczas ostatniego szczytu UE‐Rosja. Odniosła się
również do powtarzających się przypadków niestosowania się przez Federację Rosyjską do sześciopunktowego
porozumienia. Kwestię tę poruszano także podczas czerwcowej rundy międzynarodowych rozmów genewskich,
w ramach których Specjalny Przedstawiciel Unii Europejskiej (SPUE) w Regionie Południowego Kaukazu i ds. kryzysu
w Gruzji będzie nadal podejmował działania na rzecz promowania dialogu i budowania zaufania między wszystkimi
stronami, przy czym oczekuje się, że temat ten zostanie ponownie omówiony w kolejnej rundzie rozmów
w październiku.

Misja Obserwacyjna Unii Europejskiej w Gruzji w dalszym ciągu ściśle monitoruje tę kwestię i odgrywa kluczową rolę
w zapobieganiu lokalnym incydentom i łagodzeniu istniejących napięć poprzez ułatwianie kontaktów między
stronami za pomocą komunikacji poprzez „punkty kontaktowe” oraz posiedzeń IPRM.

C 42 E / 304 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005968/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian attempts to fence off South Ossetia

According to reports from Georgia, Russian forces occupying South Ossetia have set about constructing a fence along
the administrative border separating the occupied territory of South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia. The
construction of the fence has reportedly led to the border being shifted several hundred metres into Georgian‐
controlled territory, which constitutes a _de facto_ expansion of the occupation. This state of affairs is also causing
problems for local residents and farmers.

These actions could violate the Russian‐Georgian ceasefire agreement, and they are certainly not helping to normalise
relations between the two countries. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lodged an appropriate protest in
this matter.

What steps will the EEAS take if it is proven that Russian has taken these troubling actions against Georgia, or in the
event of any escalation?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Russian Federation (RF) Border Service in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been erecting physical obstacles
(fences, ditches, surveillance equipment) and border guards bases along the administrative boundary lines (ABLs)
since 2010.

The issue has previously been addressed in meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) and
in the Geneva International Discussions.

‘Borderisation’ activities have intensified and become more visible since Autumn 2012, including on occasion on
Tbilisi-administered territory, such as in May near the village of Ditsi, which has led the Georgian government to seek
international diplomatic support.

These ‘borderisation’ activities have a direct, negative impact on the daily lives of the people living on either side of the
ABL. The HR/VP raised ‘borderisation’ and the concerns of the EU at the latest EU-Russia Summit, as well as the
continued non-compliance of the RF with the Six Point Agreement. The issue was also raised in the June round of the
Geneva International Discussions in which the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia will continue
supporting dialogue and confidence building between all parties, and it is expected to be revisited also in the next
round of the talks in October.

EUMM Georgia continues to monitor the issue closely and plays a key role in averting local incidents and deescalating tension by facilitating contacts between the parties, through ‘hotline’ communications and IPRM meetings.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 305

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005969/13**
**do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Polityka Rosji względem Azerbejdżanu

W ostatnim czasie zaobserwować można wzrost aktywności Moskwy w krajach Kaukazu Południowego,
w szczególności względem Azerbejdżanu. Może to mieć związek ze zbliżającymi się wyborami prezydenckimi w tym
państwie, a celem władz rosyjskich jest najprawdopodobniej doprowadzenie do zmiany obozu rządzącego w Baku.
W tym kontekście niepokój budzi wypowiedzenie (5 maja 2013 r.) przez Rosję porozumienia o tranzycie
azerbejdżańskiej ropy przez rosyjski ropociąg Baku‐Noworosyjsk, co zostało odebrane jako godzące we współpracę
Azerbejdżanu z Turcją i UE. Istnieje również obawa wspierania, także finansowego, przez Kreml prorosyjskiej
opozycji.

Proszę o informacje:

1. Jakie jest stanowisko ESDZ w sprawie ww. wypowiedzenia umowy o tranzycie ropy?

2. Czy – w opinii Wysokiej Przedstawiciel – rosyjska polityka wobec Baku może być również wymierzona
w interesy Wspólnoty w zakresie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego, poprzez torpedowanie współpracy i dialogu
UE-Azerbejdżan (w tym realizacji projektu Południowego Korytarza Gazowego)?

3. Czy z uwagi na członkostwo Azerbejdżanu w Partnerstwie Wschodnim, UE będzie bacznie monitorować
przebieg kampanii wyborczej i wyborów w tym kraju?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu**

**Komisji**
_(16 lipca 2013 r.)_

Rosja wypowiedziała w dniu 14 maja 2013 r. umowę o tranzycie ropy, podpisaną z Azerbejdżanem w styczniu
1996 r. Wypowiedzenie staje się skuteczne z dniem 1 stycznia 2014 r. Rosyjski operator ropociągu Transnieft
utrzymuje, że umowę wypowiedziano z powodów czysto handlowych. Zdolność przesyłowa ropociągu Baku‐
Noworosyjsk wynosi 5 mln ton ropy rocznie, z czego w ciągu ostatnich dwóch lat zaledwie około 2 mln ton zostało
wykorzystanych przez SOCAR, azerbejdżańskie państwowe przedsiębiorstwo paliwowe. Nowa umowa o tranzycie
może zostać wynegocjowana. Wypowiedzenie ma bardzo ograniczone skutki dla zdolności wywozowych
Azerbejdżanu, ponieważ istnieją inne drogi wywozu ropy, a transport wymienionym ropociągiem stanowił jedynie
5 % całkowitego wywozu w ostatnich kilku latach.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca ściśle monitoruje wydarzenia związane z ropociągiem Baku‐
Noworosyjsk, zwłaszcza aspekt bezpieczeństwa dostaw.

Wizyta prezydenta Alijewa w Brukseli potwierdziła znaczenie projektu Południowego Korytarza Gazowego dla
dywersyfikacji dostaw energii dla UE oraz zaangażowanie obu stron na rzecz powodzenia tego przedsięwzięcia.
Dywersyfikacja źródeł energii jest kluczowym elementem unijnej polityki energetycznej. UE podkreślała ten fakt
w ramach dwustronnych kontaktów z Rosją na najwyższym szczeblu, w tym na ostatnim szczycie UE-Rosja, jaki
odbył się w dniach 3-4 czerwca w Jekaterynburgu. Rosja była i pozostaje ważnym partnerem UE w dziedzinie energii,
jednak UE przyjęła strategię dywersyfikacji dostaw i poprosiła swoich partnerów o uszanowanie jej decyzji w tym
względzie.

Wolne, uczciwe i przejrzyste wybory są niezwykle ważne dla wszystkich krajów Partnerstwa Wschodniego i UE
będzie ściśle monitorować nie tylko kampanię wyborczą, ale również ogólne warunki demokracji, w tym
poszanowanie podstawowych wolności, takich jak wolność wypowiedzi oraz wolność zgromadzeń, które są
niezbędnym elementem głębokiej demokracji.

C 42 E / 306 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005969/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian policy towards Azerbaijan

Moscow has recently been pursuing an increasingly active policy in the countries of the Southern Caucasus, and this
has been particularly evident in Azerbaijan. This could be linked to the upcoming presidential elections in that
country, and it is likely that the Russian Government’s objective is to bring about a change in government in Baku. In
this context, Russia’s decision — taken on 5 May 2013 — to terminate an agreement to transport Azerbaijani oil
through the Russian Baku‐Novorossiysk pipeline is worrying, as it is viewed as an attack on Azerbaijan's cooperation
with Turkey and the EU. There are also concerns that the Kremlin is providing support, including financial support, to
the pro‐Russian opposition.

1. What position does the EEAS take on the termination of the oil transit agreement?

2. Does the High Representative take the view that Russia’s policy towards Baku could also aim to undermine the
EU’s energy security interests by torpedoing dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan, notably with
regard to the execution of the Southern Gas Corridor project?

3. Given that Azerbaijan is a member of the Eastern Partnership, will the EU be closely monitoring the election
campaign in that country?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

Russia terminated the oil transit agreement, signed with Azerbaijan in January 1996, on 14 May 2013. The
termination takes effect as of 1 January 2014. The Russian pipeline operator Transneft claims purely commercial
reasons for its termination. The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline has an annual capacity of 5 million tons of oil out of
which SOCAR, Azerbaijan's state oil company, used only approximately 2 million tons during the last two years. A
new transit agreement could still be negotiated. This has only very limited implications for Azerbaijan's oil export
capacity as other export routes exist, and this pipeline represented only 5% of total exports in the last few years.

The HR/VP is closely monitoring developments as regards the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, especially security of
supply.

The visit of President Aliyev to Brussels underlines the importance of the Southern Gas Corridor project to diversify
energy supplies to the EU and the commitment of both Parties to its success. Supply diversification is a crucial
element of EU energy policy. The EU has conveyed this message to Russia in its bi-lateral contacts on the highest level,
including at the last EU-Russia summit on 3-4 June in Yekaterinburg. While Russia has been and remains an
important partner in the field of energy, the EU follows its strategy of supply diversification and asked its partners to
respect such choices.

Free, fair and transparent elections are of a paramount importance for all Eastern Partnership countries, and the EU
will be closely monitoring not only the election campaign, but also the overall democratic environment including
respect for fuindamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly which are integral
elements of deep democracy.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 307

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-005970/13**

**do Komisji**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Próby ograniczenia praw pracowniczych w UE

Prawo wyboru kraju zamieszkania oraz związane z tym prawo do pracy i uzyskiwania świadczeń socjalnych jest
jednym z fundamentalnych praw nabytych przez obywateli Wspólnoty. Nie powinno ono podlegać dodatkowym
ograniczeniom w żadnym państwie członkowskim Unii Europejskiej. Z zaniepokojeniem odbieram podejmowane
w ostatnim czasie próby podważenia tych zasad przez rządy niektórych państw członkowskich. Jednocześnie
ubolewam nad brakiem reakcji ze strony państw, których obywatele są niekiedy bezpodstawnie oskarżani.

Z nadzieją przyjmuję zatem inicjatywę komisarzy ds. sprawiedliwości, spraw wewnętrznych oraz zatrudnienia
i spraw społecznych, która ma na celu przeciwdziałanie wyżej wspomnianym próbom podejmowanym przez Wielką
Brytanię, Niemcy, Holandię i Austrię.

W celu uzyskania dalszych informacji proszę o odpowiedź na następujące pytania:

1. Czy Komisja zwracała się oficjalnie, bądź planuje zwrócić o wsparcie do krajów, których obywatele są celem tej
niefortunnej inicjatywy?

2. Czy Komisja rozważa przedstawienie jednoznacznego i rozstrzygającego stanowiska wobec wszystkich
państw członkowskich w celu obrony praw wspólnotowych obywateli Unii?

3. W piśmie do Komisji cztery wyżej wymienione kraje oskarżają cudzoziemskich pracowników m.in. o łamanie
prawa. Czy Komisja dysponuje wiarygodnymi danymi statystycznymi na temat takich przypadków i czy
w ocenie Komisji mogą one stanowić uzasadnione źródło niepokoju, czy też pozostają zjawiskiem
marginalnym?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji Europejskiej**

_(23 lipca 2013 r.)_

Swobodny przepływ osób jest jedną z najważniejszych i najcenniejszych zasad UE zapisanych w traktatach. Komisja
realizuje zatem politykę ścisłego egzekwowania praw obywateli i stale wzywa państwa członkowskie do
przestrzegania odnośnych przepisów UE.

W piśmie, do którego nawiązuje Szanowny Poseł, czterech ministrów spraw wewnętrznych Niemiec, Holandii,
Wielkiej Brytanii i Austrii odnosi się do obaw związanych z przepisami UE w zakresie swobodnego przepływu, które
dotyczą „obciążeń i dodatkowych kosztów nakładanych na niektóre gminy w związku ze świadczeniem lokalnych
usług takich jak nauka szkolna, opieka zdrowotna i odpowiednie zakwaterowanie” oraz „uzyskiwania pomocy
socjalnej bez faktycznych uprawnień”, „systematycznych nadużyć” oraz fałszowania dokumentów, a także
obciążenia systemów opieki społecznej. W odpowiedzi na te obawy Komisja przypomniała na czerwcowym
posiedzeniu Rady ds. Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości i Spraw Wewnętrznych, że istniejące przepisy UE dopuszczają
zapobieganie nadużyciom i zażądała, aby wyżej wymienione cztery państwa członkowskie, które podniosły te
kwestie, wyjaśniły swoje zarzuty i przedstawiły odpowiednie dowody, ponieważ Komisja nie dysponuje danymi
statystycznymi na temat tych spraw. Komisja nie posiada również danych dotyczących pracowników UE, którzy
rzekomo łamią przepisy prawa.

Rada przyjęła do wiadomości te obawy i zwróciła się do wspomnianych czterech państw członkowskich
o przedłożenie danych, w tym danych statystycznych, na temat charakteru i zakresu podniesionych kwestii, tak by
Komisja, na forum grupy ekspertów zajmujących się prawem do swobodnego przepływu osób (FREEMO), mogła
dogłębniej zbadać tę sprawę. Komisja przygotuje sprawozdanie dla Rady ds. Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości i Spraw
Wewnętrznych, z ewentualnym udziałem Rady ds. Zatrudnienia, Polityki Społecznej, Zdrowia i Ochrony
Konsumentów.

C 42 E / 308 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005970/13**

**to the Commission**
**Adam Bielan (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Attempts to restrict employment rights in the EU

The right to choose one's country of residence and the related right to work and claim social benefits is one of the
fundamental rights held by EU citizens. This right should not be restricted in any Member State. Thus it is with
concern that I note the recent attempts made by some Member States to undermine these principles. I am also
disappointed by the lack of a reaction from the Member States whose citizens are often the target of groundless
accusations.

I therefore welcome the initiative of the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, the
Commissioner for Home Affairs and the Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, which aims to
counter the attempts made by the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria to impose restrictions.

1. Has the Commission officially requested support from the countries whose citizens arethe subject of this
initiative? If not, does it plan to do so?

2. Is the Commission considering adopting an unequivocal and resolute position with regardto all Member States
in order to defend the rights of EU citizens?

3. In a letter to the Commission, the four aforementioned Member States level a variety ofaccusations against
foreign workers, including accusations that they have broken laws.Does the Commission have credible statistical data
on such cases? Does the Commissionbelieve that such cases are a legitimate cause for concern, or are they a
marginalphenomenon?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

Free movement is one of the most important and most cherished EU principles laid down in the Treaties. The
Commission therefore pursues a rigorous policy of enforcement of citizen's rights and continues to call on Member
States to ensure compliance with the relevant EU rules.

In the letter to which the Honourable Member refers, the four Interior Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK
and Austria refer to concerns with EC law on free movement that range from ‘strains and additional costs on certain
municipalities for providing local services such as schooling, healthcare and adequate accommodation’ to ‘receipt of
social assistance without a genuine entitlement’, ‘systematic abuse’ and document forgery, and pressure on social
welfare systems. In response to these concerns the Commission recalled at the June Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Council that existing EU rules allow for the prevention of abuses and requested the four Member States raising the
issues to clarify their allegations and to provide relevant evidence as the Commission does not have statistical data on
these cases. The Commission does also not have data on EU workers allegedly breaking laws.

Council took note of the concerns and invited the four Member States to submit data and statistics about the nature
and the scope of the issues raised so that the Commission, in the context of the Experts Group on the right to free
movement of persons (FREEMO), could examine this further. The Commission will prepare a report for the JHA
Council, with the possible involvement of the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 309

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-005971/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)**

**und Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(29. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Internationale Flug-Transport-Vereinigung/Neues System zur Erstellung von Flugpreisangeboten (NDC)

Am 18. Oktober 2012 nahm die Internationale Flug-Transport-Vereinigung (International Air Transport Association
— IATA), die 240 Fluggesellschaften in der ganzen Welt vertritt, die Resolution 787 an. Darin sind die Vorschriften
für die Entwicklung eines Modells festgelegt, anhand dessen die IATA-Mitglieder die Ticketpreise für ihre Kunden
künftig auf neue Weise festlegen können (New Distribution Capability — NDC).

Die Anwendung der NDC würde eine Abkehr von dem System bedeuten, das derzeit für den Erwerb von Flugtickets
angewandt wird. Dabei erhalten die Kunden alle Informationen, die sie für die Beurteilung des Ticketpreises
benötigen, ohne im Voraus persönliche Daten angeben zu müssen. Tritt das neue System in Kraft, so bedeutet dies für
die Kunden, dass sie persönliche und sensible Daten, einschließlich des Nationalität, des Alters, des Familienstandes,
bisheriger Reisen, Teilnahme an Vielfliegerprogrammen und Art der Reise (geschäftlich oder privat) angeben müssen.
Diese Angaben würden von den Fluggesellschaften gesammelt und verarbeitet, um den Kunden einen auf sie
zugeschnittenen Preis anbieten zu können.

Im Februar 2013 unterzeichneten fünf Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments gemeinsam ein Schreiben an die
EU-Kommissarin Viviane Reding, in dem sie feststellten, dass das NDC-Vorhaben eine massive Verletzung der
Persönlichkeitsrechte der Bürger der Europäischen Union darstellen werde, wenn es nicht gestoppt würde, und
forderten, dass die Kommission der IATA mitteilt, dass das NDC-Vorhaben in seiner jetzigen Form einen Verstoß
gegen die Persönlichkeits‐ und Datenschutzrechte der EU-Bürger darstelle.

Am 23. April 2013 veröffentlichte die Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe ein Schreiben an die IATA, in dem sie darlegte,
dass das NDC-Vorhaben eine Reihe von Bedenken hinsichtlich Persönlichkeits‐ und Menschenrechten aufwerfe,
insbesondere was die Nutzerprofile von Einzelpersonen angeht. Sie wies außerdem darauf hin, dass die
Datenschutzbehörden alle potenziellen Auswirkungen dieses Systems untersuchten, und betonte, dass IATA die
Datenschutzbehörden in jedem einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaat konsultieren müsse, bevor sie ein NDC-Pilotprojekt auf
diesen Märkten starte.

Kann die Kommission angesichts der potenziellen Verletzungen der Persönlichkeits‐ und Datenschutzrechte der
EU-Bürger Angaben zu den Schritten machen, die sie plant, um möglichen Verstößen gegen das EU-Recht
vorzubeugen?

Hat sich die Kommission mit IATA in Verbindung gesetzt, um ihr diese Bedenken mitzuteilen und sie aufzufordern,
eine Bewertung der möglichen Auswirkungen des Systems vorzunehmen?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

_(19. Juli 2013)_

Die Kommissionsdienststellen haben den Internationalen Luftverkehrsverband (IATA) schriftlich auf den geltenden
EU-Rechtsrahmen in den Bereichen Wettbewerbsrecht, Datenschutzrecht und Luftfahrtrecht hingewiesen.

Am 3. Juni 2013 verabschiedete der Internationale Luftverkehrsverband auf seiner 69. Jahresgeneralversammlung
eine neue Entschließung zum neuen Modell für die Festlegung der Ticketpreise (New Distribution Capability — NDC).
Die Kommission prüft diese Entschließung zurzeit mit Blick auf die Art und die Auswirkungen des NDC-Vorhabens.

C 42 E / 310 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005971/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)**

**και Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(29 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διεθνής Ένωση Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών και η νέα ικανότητα κατανομής

Στις 18 Οκτωβρίου 2012, η Διεθνής Ένωση Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (IATA) η οποία εκπροσωπεί 240 αεροπορικές
εταιρείες παγκοσμίως υιοθέτησε το Ψήφισμα 787, το οποίο περιλαμβάνει διατάξεις για την ανάπτυξη μιας νέας ικανότητας
κατανομής (NDC) η οποία αλλάζει τον τρόπο με τον οποίο οι συμμετέχουσες αεροπορικές εταιρείες τιμολογούν τα εισιτήριά
τους για τους πελάτες.

Το πρόγραμμα NDC περιλαμβάνει την απομάκρυνση από το τρέχον μοντέλο που χρησιμοποιείται για την αγορά
αεροπορικών εισιτηρίων, όπου οι πελάτες λαμβάνουν όλες τις πληροφορίες που χρειάζονται σχετικά με τους αεροπορικούς
φόρους χωρίς να παρέχουν οποιαδήποτε προσωπικά δεδομένα εκ των προτέρων. Το πρόγραμμα NDC καθιστά απαραίτητη
την παροχή προσωπικών, ευαίσθητων δεδομένων, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της εθνικότητας, της ηλικίας, της οικογενειακής
κατάστασης, του ιστορικού προηγούμενων μετακινήσεων, της συμμετοχής τακτικών πελατών καθώς και του εάν το ταξίδι
προορίζεται για σκοπούς επαγγελματικούς ή αναψυχής. Τα δεδομένα αυτά θα συγκεντρώνονται και θα τυγχάνουν
επεξεργασίας από αεροπορικές εταιρείες προκειμένου να προσφέρουν στον πελάτη μια εξατομικευμένη τιμή.

Τον Φεβρουάριο του 2013, πέντε μέλη του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου συνυπέγραψαν μια επιστολή προς την Επίτροπο
κ. Reding δηλώνοντας ότι το νέο πρόγραμμα NDC «ενέχει τον κίνδυνο για μια τεράστια παραβίαση των δικαιωμάτων
προσωπικού απορρήτου των πολιτών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εκτός εάν τερματιστεί», και ζήτησαν η Επιτροπή να ειδοποιήσει
την IATA ότι στην παρούσα μορφή του, το πρόγραμμα NDC θα παραβίαζε τα δικαιώματα προστασίας της ιδιωτικής ζωής
και ιδιωτικών δεδομένων των πολιτών της ΕΕ.

Στις 23 Απριλίου η ομάδα εργασίας του άρθρου 29 για την προστασία των δεδομένων εξέδωσε επιστολή προς την IATA
δηλώνοντας ότι «το πρόγραμμα NDC θίγει ορισμένα θέματα περί δικαιωμάτων ιδιωτικότητας και ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων,
ιδιαίτερα όσα είναι σχετικά με την ανάλυση των χαρακτηριστικών των ατόμων». Επίσης εξέφρασαν την ανάγκη για «τις αρχές
προστασίας δεδομένων να εξετάσουν όλες τις ενδεχόμενες επιπτώσεις του εν λόγω συστήματος» και υπογράμμισαν ότι η
«IATA θα πρέπει να συμβουλεύεται τις αρχές προστασίας δεδομένων» σε κάθε επιμέρους κράτος μέλος της ΕΕ πριν την
έναρξη οποιωνδήποτε δοκιμαστικών προγραμμάτων NDC σε αυτές τις αγορές.

Δεδομένων των ενδεχόμενων παραβιάσεων των δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα και προστασίας δεδομένων για τους
Ευρωπαίους πολίτες, θα μπορούσε η Επιτροπή να παράσχει πληροφορίες ως προς τα μέτρα που σχεδιάζει να λάβει
προκειμένου να εμποδίσει οποιεσδήποτε ενδεχόμενες παραβιάσεις του δικαίου της ΕΕ;

Έχει επικοινωνήσει η Επιτροπή με την IATA προκειμένου να θίξει αυτά τα θέματα και να ζητήσει μια αξιολόγηση όλων των
ενδεχόμενων επιπτώσεων αυτού του νέου συστήματος;

**Απάντηση του κ. Kallas εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(19 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής επικοινώνησαν εγγράφως με τη Διεθνή Ένωση Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (ΙΑΤΑ) για να της
υπενθυμίσουν το ισχύον νομικό πλαίσιο της ΕΕ βάσει του δικαίου περί ανταγωνισμού, του δικαίου περί προστασίας των
δεδομένων και του αεροπορικού δικαίου.

Στις 3 Ιουνίου 2013, κατά την 69η ετήσια γενική συνέλευση, η Διεθνής Ένωση Αεροπορικών Μεταφορών (IATA) ενέκρινε
νέο ψήφισμα σχετικά με τη νέα ικανότητα κατανομής (NDC). Η Επιτροπή αναλύει επί του παρόντος το παρόν ψήφισμα
προκειμένου να κατανοήσει τη φύση και τις επιπτώσεις της NDC.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 311

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-005971/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)**

**en Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(29 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Internationale Luchtvaartassociatie en nieuwe distributiecapaciteit

Op 18 oktober 2012 hechtte de Internationale Luchtvaartassociatie (International Air Transport Association, IATA),
vertegenwoordiger van 240 luchtvaartmaatschappijen in de hele wereld, haar goedkeuring aan resolutie nr. 787,
waarin is voorzien in de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe distributiecapaciteit, waarmee de maatschappijen die lid zijn,
op een andere manier de prijzen zullen kunnen vaststellen van hun tickets voor klanten.

Het project inzake een nieuwe distributiecapaciteit houdt in dat wordt afgestapt van het bestaande model voor de
aankoop van vliegtickets, waarbij de klanten alle benodigde informatie over de vluchttarieven krijgen zonder vooraf
persoonsgegevens te verstrekken. Met het project inzake een nieuwe distributiecapaciteit zouden klanten worden
verplicht persoonlijke, gevoelige gegevens te verstrekken, inclusief nationaliteit, leeftijd, burgerlijke staat, eerdere
reizen, deelname aan frequent flyer-programma’s en of het gaat om een werkgerelateerde dan wel een plezierreis.
Deze gegevens zouden door luchtvaartmaatschappijen worden verzameld en verwerkt om de klant een
gepersonaliseerde prijs aan te bieden.

In februari 2013 ondertekenden vijf leden van het Europees Parlement een brief aan Commissielid Reding waarin zij
stellen dat het onlangs gestarte project inzake een nieuwe distributiecapaciteit, als het niet wordt stopgezet, de rechten
van de burgers van de Europese Unie met betrekking tot de persoonlijke levenssfeer ernstig dreigt te schenden en
waarin zij de Commissie verzoeken de IATA in kennis te stellen van het feit dat het project in zijn huidige vorm
schending van de rechten van de EU-burgers met betrekking tot de persoonlijke levenssfeer en tot
gegevensbescherming inhoudt.

Op 23 april 2013 stuurde de Groep gegevensbescherming artikel 29 een brief naar de IATA waarin hij meedeelt dat
het project inzake een nieuwe distributiecapaciteit op een aantal punten zorgwekkend is met betrekking tot de
persoonlijke levenssfeer en de mensenrechten, met name doordat er sprake is van het opstellen van
persoonsprofielen. De Groep verklaarde ook dat de autoriteiten op het gebied van gegevensbescherming alle
potentiële gevolgen van dit systeem moeten onderzoeken en benadrukte het feit dat de IATA overleg moet plegen
met de gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten in elke EU-lidstaat alvorens op de markten in kwestie proefprojecten in het
kader van de nieuwe distributiecapaciteit te starten.

Kan de Commissie, gelet op de mogelijke schending van de rechten van de EU-burgers met betrekking tot de
persoonlijke levenssfeer en tot gegevensbescherming, informatie verstrekken over de stappen die zij voornemens is te
ondernemen om schending van het EU-recht te voorkomen?

Heeft de Commissie met de IATA contact opgenomen om uiting aan haar bezorgdheid met betrekking tot
bovenstaande kwesties te geven en om te vragen dat een beoordeling van alle potentiële gevolgen van het nieuwe
systeem wordt uitgevoerd?

**Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie**

_(19 juli 2013)_

De diensten van de Commissie hebben de Internationale Luchtvaartassociatie (IATA) aangeschreven om haar te
herinneren aan het geldende rechtskader van de EU voor mededinging, gegevenbescherming en luchtvaart.

Op haar 69e jaarlijkse algemene vergadering op 3 juni 2013 heeft de Internationale Luchtvaartassociatie (IATA) een
nieuwe resolutie met betrekking tot een nieuwe distributiestandaard ( _New Distribution Capability_ — NDC)
aangenomen. De Commissie bestudeert momenteel deze resolutie om inzicht te krijgen in de aard en de gevolgen van
de nieuwe distributiestandaard.

C 42 E / 312 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005971/13**

**to the Commission**
**Claude Moraes (S&D), Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE), Dimitrios Droutsas (S&D), Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)**

**and Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ International Air Transport Association and the new distribution capability

On 18 October 2012, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which represents 240 airlines worldwide,
adopted Resolution 787, which includes provisions to develop a new distribution capability (NDC) allowing for a
change in the way member airlines would price their tickets for customers.

The NDC project would involve moving away from the current model used for the purchase of airline tickets,
whereby customers obtain all the information they need regarding air fares without providing any personal data in
advance. With the NDC project, it would be necessary for customers to provide personal, sensitive data, including
nationality, age, marital status, travel history, frequent flyer participation and whether the trip is intended for business
or leisure. This data would be collected and processed by airline companies in order to offer the customer a
personalised price.

In February 2013, five Members of the European Parliament co-signed a letter to Commissioner Reding stating that
the new NDC project ‘will threaten a massive violation of the privacy rights of the citizens of the European Union
unless it is stopped’, and they asked that the Commission notify IATA that, in its present draft, the NDC project would
infringe on the privacy and data protection rights of EU citizens.

On 23 April 2013, the article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued a letter to IATA stating that ‘the NDC project
raises a number of privacy and human rights concerns, in particular those related to the profiling of individuals’. They
also expressed the need for ‘data protection authorities to look at all potential impacts of this system’ and stressed that
‘IATA would have to consult data protection authorities’ within each individual EU Member State before starting any
pilot NDC schemes in these markets.

Given the potential infringements on the personal and data protection rights of EU citizens, could the Commission
provide information on the steps it plans to take to prevent any potential violations of EC law?

Has the Commission contacted IATA to express these concerns and ask for an assessment of all the potential impacts
of this new system?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

The Commission services have written to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to recall the EU
applicable legal framework under competition law, data protection law and aviation law.

On 3 June 2013, at its 69th Annual General Meeting, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) adopted a
new resolution on the New Distribution Capability (NDC). The Commission is currently analysing this resolution to
understand the nature and implications of the NDC.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 313

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005972/13**

**to the Council**
**Claude Moraes (S&D) and Glenis Willmott (S&D)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse

On 25 October 2007, during the 28th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in Lanzarote (Spain), the
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse was opened for signature.

One of the main problems in the fight against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children by travelling sex
offenders is the lack of international cooperation, particularly in the timely sharing of information and on, and
evidence against, offenders and in the investigation and prosecution of offenders.

The Convention sets out measures to foster greater international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in
investigating and prosecuting sex offenders, particularly with countries that are not members of the Council of
Europe. The Convention also reinforces the need for states to undertake prosecutions of their own nationals under
extra-territorial legislation for child sexual offences committed abroad.

Despite the significance of this Convention in the fight against child sexual abuse, and in protecting the most
vulnerable children in the world, there are still several countries that have not ratified the agreement.

The United Kingdom is an example of one country that has not yet ratified the agreement into national law. The
authors of this question have already co-signed a letter to the UK Government asking for the immediate ratification
and implementation of the Convention to reinforce the UK’s commitment to tackling child sexual abuse.

Could the Council provide any information on whether more countries intend to ratify and implement the
Convention and whether any timetable is envisaged?

Could the Council inform us of any intention to put the ratification of this Convention on the political agenda,
allowing for discussion as to why individual countries have not ratified the Convention, and to reiterate the
importance of the Convention in the fight against sexual exploitation of children?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual
abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography ( [1] ) is the main EU legislative instrument concerning
the active protection of children and fighting child sexual abuse. This directive shall be transposed by Member States
by 18 December 2013. In Recital 5 of its preamble, the directive makes explicit reference to the 2007 Council of
Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (the Lanzarote
Convention) as a crucial step in the process of enhancing international cooperation in this field.

It is entirely up to Member States whether or not they sign and ratify Council of Europe conventions. The EU does not
sign Council of Europe conventions on a systematic basis. A signature would require a proposal from the
Commission and a mandate from the Council.

The Honourable Members' attention is also drawn to the fact that Directive 2011/92/EU reproduces to a great extent
the content of the Lanzarote Convention, and furthermore it introduces strengthened rules in a number of areas.

It could be also recalled that fighting the sexual abuse of children has been addressed in a number of other acts and
initiatives, as a follow-up to the invitations of the Stockholm Programme, in particular its Section 4.3.3, giving a clear
priority to combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1.

C 42 E / 314 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005973/13**

**to the Commission**
**Claude Moraes (S&D) and Glenis Willmott (S&D)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse

On 25 October 2007, during the 28th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in Lanzarote (Spain), the
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse was opened for signature.

One of the main problems in the fight against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children by travelling sex
offenders is the lack of international cooperation, particularly in the timely sharing of information on, and evidence
against, offenders and in the investigation and prosecution of offenders.

The Convention sets out measures to foster greater international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in
investigating and prosecuting sex offenders, particularly with countries that are not members of the Council of
Europe. The Convention also reinforces the need for states to undertake prosecutions of their own nationals under
extra-territorial legislation for child sexual offences committed abroad.

Despite the significance of this Convention in the fight against child sexual abuse, and in protecting the most
vulnerable children in the world, there are still several countries that have not ratified the agreement.

The United Kingdom is an example of one country that has not yet ratified the agreement into national law. The
authors of this question have already co-signed a letter to the UK Government asking for the immediate ratification
and implementation of the Convention to reinforce the UK’s commitment to tackling child sexual abuse.

— Could the Commission provide any information on whether more countries intend to ratify and implement the
Convention and whether any timetable is envisaged?

— Could the Commission inform us of any intention to put the ratification of this Convention on the political
agenda, allowing for discussion as to why individual countries have not ratified the Convention, and to reiterate the
importance of the Convention in the fight against sexual exploitation of children?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

The Commission is committed to combating child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation.
In 2011, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. The
importance of the Council of Europe Lanzarote Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse (the ‘Lanzarote Convention’) is highlighted in the directive, which in Recital 5 emphasises the crucial
role of the Lanzarote Convention in the process of enhancing international cooperation in this field.

Furthermore, the provisions of the Lanzarote Convention are to a large extent reflected in the directive. For instance,
to address the example cited in the question, Member States under the directive have to establish jurisdiction over
nationals of a Member State for child sexual abuse and exploitation committed abroad. The deadline for transposition
is December 2013;

while the Commission is not aware of Member States’ schedules for accession to the Lanzarote Convention, Member
States’ law in any case should be compliant with the provisions of the Lanzarote Convention by December as a side
effect of their transposition of the directive. The Commission notes that the Convention has entered into force in a
large number of Member States in the past three years; given the transposition deadline for the directive, it is likely
that that number will increase further in the near future.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 315

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005974/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Siria: fine dell'embargo sulla vendita delle armi, utilizzo di armi chimiche e bioterrorismo

Dopo la notizia della fine dell'embargo europeo sulla vendita di armi all'opposizione siriana, torna in primo piano il
delicato tema dell'utilizzo di armi chimiche da parte dell'esercito di Assad.

Due reporter francesi del quotidiano Le Monde hanno denunciato recenti episodi di utilizzo di gas ben più potenti dei
lacrimogeni in alcune zone strategiche per la lotta agli insorti, tra le quali la città di Jobar lo scorso aprile. A causa delle
sostanze impiegate dalle milizie, gli inviati affermano di essersi sentiti male per giorni.

Considerando la necessità di raccogliere informazioni quanto più oggettive al riguardo e ricordando che l'obiettivoguida dell'Unione nella sua azione deve sempre essere quello garantire di la pace (fine per il quale l'UE è stata anche
insignita del Premio Nobel per la pace 2012).

Osservando inoltre che il presidente siriano Bashar Al Assad nega l'impiego di queste armi da parte delle sue milizie e,
anzi, ritiene tale affermazione un pretesto per l'intervento armato sull'altrui territorio sovrano.

Sottolineando che, per ora, non si danno report aggiornati in riferimento alle armi in possesso del regime, perché la
guerra civile crea disordini tali da rendere difficile il monitoraggio da parte delle organizzazioni internazionali.

Evidenziando, infine, che l'utilizzo di armi chimiche crea un terreno favorevole alle minacce di «bioterrorismo» e che
la decisione del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio COM(2011)0866 relativa alle gravi minacce per la salute a
carattere transfrontaliero cerca di rafforzare le strutture dell'UE capaci di rispondere a questa possibilità.

Si chiede alla Commissione:

—
di quali dati è in possesso con riguardo ai fenomeni di bioterrorismo, anche transfrontaliero, dall'inizio della
guerra in Siria?

—
quali misure intende adottare per aumentare il grado di protezione dei propri cittadini e contribuire a far sì che
l'UE onori il proposito di perseguire sempre la pace?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(20 agosto 2013)_

La Commissione non è al corrente di atti di bioterrorismo in Siria dall'inizio della crisi. Tuttavia, l'Alta Rappresentante
ha ricevuto segnalazioni da parte di alcuni Stati membri e degli USA circa l'uso di sostanze chimiche contro la
popolazione civile in Siria. Il portavoce dell'Alta Rappresentante ha rilasciato una dichiarazione ( [1] ) in proposito in cui
afferma che «queste informazioni, congiuntamente con le altre che sono circolate, rende ancora più pressanti i nostri
ripetuti inviti a trovare un accordo per inviare immediatamente una missione di verifica dell'ONU per valutare queste
accuse sul campo». D'altra parte, senza una missione di verifica dell'ONU, è difficile confermare l'uso di armi
chimiche, da parte degli uni o degli altri. L'UE continuerà a insistere affinché la Siria aderisca con urgenza alla
convenzione sulle armi chimiche e ratifichi la convenzione sulle armi biologiche.

Infine, l'Alta Rappresentante ribadisce l'invito alle autorità siriane ad accogliere immediatamente una missione di
verifica dell'ONU.

Per quanto riguarda le azioni dell'UE finalizzate a migliorare la protezione dei suoi cittadini, occorre ricordare che
questo compito spetta agli Stati membri. D'altra parte, l'UE appoggia fortemente gli sforzi compiuti dagli Stati
membri in tal senso.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137474.pdf

C 42 E / 316 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005974/13**

**to the Commission**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Syria: lifting of the arms embargo, use of chemical weapons and bioterrorism

Following the news that the EU embargo on the sale of arms to the Syrian opposition has been lifted, the spotlight is
once again on the sensitive issue of the use of chemical weapons by President Assad’s army.

Two French reporters from _Le Monde_ newspaper have revealed that gases much stronger than tear gas were recently
used in certain areas of strategic importance to the fight against the rebels, including the city of Jobar in April 2013.
The reporters claim that they felt ill for days because of the substances used by the army.

The information to be gathered on this issue must be as objective as possible.

The EU’s action must always be guided by the objective of guaranteeing peace (the EU was also awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize 2012 because of that objective).

Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad denies that his army uses chemical weapons and, in fact, believes that this claim is a
pretext for armed intervention in another sovereign state.

No up-to-date reports have yet been received about what weapons the regime has, because the turmoil created by the
civil war is making it difficult for international organisations to monitor the situation.

The use of chemical weapons paves the way for ‘bioterrorism’ threats. The decision of the European Parliament and of
the Council on serious cross-border threats to health (COM(2011)0866) is aimed at strengthening EU bodies capable
of responding to such threats.

— What information has the Commission obtained on bioterrorism, including cross-border bioterrorism, since the
start of the war in Syria?

— What action will it take to increase the level of protection of its citizens and to help ensure that the EU meets the
objective of always seeking peace?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of any reports regarding bioterrorism in Syria since the crisis started. However, the
HR/VP is aware of reports from some Member States and the US on the use of chemical agents against civilians in
Syria. The HR/VP Spokesperson has released a statement ( [1] ) on that matter, which stated that ‘this assessment,
combined with others that have been circulated, makes even more urgent our repeated calls for an agreement to
immediately deploy a UN verification mission to investigate these allegations on the ground’. At this time, without a
successful deployment of a UN verification mission, it is difficult to confirm the use of chemical weapons by either
side. The EU will continue to urge Syria to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to ratify the Biological
Weapons Convention as a matter of urgency.

Lastly, the HR/VP reiterates its call on the Syrian authorities for an agreement to immediately host the UN verification
mission.

With regard to EU actions aiming at enhancing the level of protection of its citizens, it is important to keep in mind
that the latter is under the responsibility of the relevant Member States. On the other hand the EU, clearly, is strongly
supporting Member States in these efforts.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137474.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 317

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005975/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Venti morti negli scontri tra esercito e ribelli islamici nelle Filippine

È notizia di ieri la morte di almeno 20 persone negli scontri a fuoco tra i soldati filippini ed i ribelli musulmani di Abu
Sayaf nella città di Mindamao. Il dato preoccupante è l'aumento degli episodi terroristici attuati da cellule vicine ad Al
Qaeda. Tra le più forti nell'arcipelago, si ricordano il Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Milf) e il Bansamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters (Biff). I conflitti tra soldati e miliziani fanno vittime anche tra i civili, ma di questa situazione i
cittadini europei sono spesso ignari, pur trovandosi a viaggiare nelle Filippine per turismo o affari.

Considerando la comunicazione della Commissione COM(2010)0386 dal titolo «La politica antiterrorismo dell'UE:
principali risultati e sfide future», in particolare la parte in cui si afferma la volontà di rafforzare il coordinamento e la
cooperazione indispensabili alla tutela consolare e che: «Occorrerà sviluppare ulteriormente il ruolo dell'UE nella
gestione delle crisi e delle catastrofi, in particolare elaborando una capacità di risposta rapida basata sugli strumenti
esistenti per gli aiuti umanitari e la protezione civile».

Osservando inoltre che nelle Filippine i ribelli hanno già attuato un rapimento ai danni di Jenifer Casilda Villarasa,
moglie di un ex generale del corpo dei Marines, e che la raccomandazione 2007/562/CE del Consiglio sullo scambio
di informazioni relative ai sequestri di persona a sfondo terroristico tratta la tematica a livello di Stati membri, ma non
approfondisce il profilo dello scambio con i paesi terzi.

Si chiede alla Commissione:

—
è a conoscenza degli scontri armati nell'arcipelago filippino?

—
quali azioni intende intraprendere per tutelare maggiormente i propri cittadini in viaggio all'estero e per
ottenere informazioni preziose riguardo alla lotta al terrorismo?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(26 luglio 2013)_

L’AR/VP non solo è a conoscenza dei conflitti armati nelle Filippine, ma si adopera attivamente per sostenere
un’importante iniziativa di pace nel paese.

I gruppi scissionisti del Fronte islamico di liberazione Moro (MILF) o del Fronte di liberazione nazionale Moro (MNLF)
hanno commesso una serie di attentati provocando decessi, lesioni e danni materiali. Si sono inoltre verificati
rapimenti di stranieri, tra cui numerosi cittadini europei, ad opera di terroristi.

Per questo motivo le operazioni antinsurrezionali condotte dalle forze di sicurezza filippine in collaborazione con i
partner internazionali hanno riguardato un certo numero di questi gruppi terroristici, tra cui Jema’ah Islamiyah. Gli
scontri a fuoco tra l’esercito filippino e i ribelli musulmani dal gruppo Abu Sayyaf a cui si riferisce l’onorevole
deputato non hanno avuto luogo sull’isola di Mindanao ma più a ovest, nell’arcipelago di Sulu.

Il MILF sta completando l’accordo quadro di pace firmato con il governo delle Filippine alla fine dello scorso anno. La
comunità internazionale, compresa l’UE, fornisce sostegno e assistenza a lungo termine a questo processo di pace.
L’UE eroga 9 milioni di euro per sostenere una serie di iniziative, tra cui la mediazione con chi potrebbe boicottare il
processo di pace.

L’UE segue la situazione a Mindanao e riferisce in merito, anche attraverso la sua delegazione a Manila, mentre i
singoli Stati membri aggiornano regolarmente le loro rubriche informative per chi si reca nelle Filippine al fine di
migliorare la protezione dei cittadini.

C 42 E / 318 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005975/13**

**to the Commission**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Twenty killed in clashes between the army and Muslim rebels in the Philippines

At least 20 people were yesterday reported to have died in gun battles between the Philippine army and Muslim rebels
from the Abu Sayyaf group in the city of Mindanao. The worrying news is that terrorist attacks carried out by AlQaida-linked cells are on the increase. The most powerful cells in the archipelago include the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Civilians are also victims of the conflicts between
the army and the militia, but Europeans are often unaware of this situation even if they travel to the Philippines on
holiday or on business.

Commission Communication COM(2010)0386 entitled ‘The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and
future challenges’ specifically includes a section confirming the intention to reinforce coordination and cooperation
to facilitate consular protection. It also states that: ‘The EU’s role in crisis and disaster management will need to be
further developed, in particular, by developing the EU rapid response capacity based on existing instruments for
humanitarian aid and civil protection.’

In the Philippines the rebels have already kidnapped the wife of a former Marine Corps general, Jenifer Casilda
Villarasa. Moreover, while Council Recommendation 2007/562/EC concerning sharing of information on terrorist
kidnappings addresses this issue at Member State level, it fails to explore information sharing with third countries.

— Is the Commission aware of the armed conflicts in the Philippine archipelago?

— What action will it take to better protect its citizens who travel abroad and to obtain valuable counter-terrorism
information?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

The HR/VP is not only aware of the armed conflicts in the Philippines but is actively involved in supporting a major
peace initiative in that country.

The groups that have broken away from the more mainstream Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) have carried out a number of bombings resulting in deaths, injuries, and damage to
property. In addition, foreigners including several European citizens have also been victims of terrorist kidnappings.

Therefore, the counter-insurgency activites conducted by the Philippine security forces in cooperation with the
international partners have been directed against a number of these terrorist groups, including Abu Sayyaf Group and
Jema’ah Islamiyah. The particular gun battles referred to, between the Philippine army and Muslim rebels from the
Abu Sayyaf group, did not take place on the island of Mindanao but further west in the Sulu Archipelago.

The MILF is currently engaged in fleshing out a framework peace agreement signed with the Philippine Government
late last year. The international community, including the EU, is providing long-term support and assistance to this
peace process. The EU contributes EUR 9 million to support a number of initiatives including mediation with possible
peace process spoilers.

The EU, including the Delegation in Manila, monitors and reports on the situation in Mindanao, while individual EU
Member States regularly update their travel advisory for the Philippines in order to better protect their citizens.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 319

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005976/13**

**à la Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Lutter contre le dumping social dans le secteur du cabotage routier

D'après le règlement (CEE) 3118/93 fixant les conditions de l'admission de transporteurs non‐résidents aux
transports nationaux de marchandises par route, le cabotage routier est défini comme un «transport public routier de
marchandises effectué par une entreprise d'un État membre à titre temporaire, dans un autre État membre sans y
disposer d'un siège ou d'un établissement». Ces transporteurs sont néanmoins soumis, dans un certain nombre de
domaines, aux dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives en vigueur dans l'État membre d'accueil.

En 2009, le paquet «transports routiers» a entraîné l'adoption du règlement (CE) 1072/09 établissant des règles
communes pour l'accès au marché du transport international de marchandises par route. Il prévoit notamment
d'autoriser trois opérations de cabotage dans un délai de sept jours, à la suite d'un trajet international, ainsi que
d'ajouter des dispositions soulignant le caractère temporaire des opérations de cabotage. Ce texte permet surtout
d'encadrer la pratique du cabotage en introduisant certaines dispositions de sauvegarde autorisant les États membres à
introduire des mesures de protection en cas de perturbation grave du marché des transports nationaux.

Depuis plusieurs mois, la Commission européenne envisage de libéraliser le cabotage routier à partir du 1 [er] janvier
2014. En effet, en mettant fin à l'encadrement prévu par l'accord de 2009 sur le transport routier, il est question
d'approfondir le marché unique européen. Toutefois, cette libéralisation entrainerait une concurrence déloyale entre
les transporteurs des États membres, du fait du manque d'harmonisation sociale. C'est ici le problème des minimas
sociaux qui se pose. Les écarts sociaux entre les différents États membres de l'Union européenne, concernant les
salaires, les conditions de travail et autres, subsistent et sont à l'origine d'un fort dumping social.

Néanmoins, le commissaire chargé des transports a récemment remis en cause la volonté européenne de libéraliser le
cabotage routier et a finalement préconisé une meilleure application et une simplification des règles actuelles en
faveur des entreprises de transport routier qui subissent une concurrence déloyale.

1. Quelle direction la Commission envisage-t-elle de prendre? La Commission compte‐t‐elle prendre les mesures
nécessaires à une libéralisation du cabotage routier ou prévoit‐elle une simple clarification et amélioration de
l'application de la législation actuelle en la matière?

2. Si le cabotage routier devait être libéralisé, la Commission entendrait-elle harmoniser les statuts sociaux au sein
de l'Union européenne, de manière à éviter toute forme de dumping social qui pourrait constituer une conséquence
négative d'une libéralisation de ce secteur?

**Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission**

_(9 juillet 2013)_

Conformément à la mission que lui a confiée le législateur en vertu du règlement (CE) n° 1072/2009, la Commission
prépare actuellement un rapport sur la situation du marché des transports routiers dans l'UE. Il ressort de ces travaux
préparatoires, ainsi que du rapport du groupe de haut niveau sur le développement du marché européen des
transports de marchandises par route présenté en juin 2012 et de l'étude commandée par le Parlement ( [1] ), qu'il est
difficile de faire respecter les dispositions actuelles sur l'accès au marché du transport de marchandises par route et
que celles-ci constituent un obstacle pour les transporteurs routiers exerçant leurs activités en dehors de leur État
membre d'immatriculation. Conformément à la mission confiée à la Commission en vertu de l'article 17,
paragraphe 3, du règlement, la simplification de ces règles et la garantie de leur mise en œuvre uniforme dans
l'ensemble de l'UE seront donc une priorité dans l'éventualité où il serait proposé de poursuivre l'intégration du
marché du transport de marchandises par route.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Development and Implementation of EU Road Cabotage, Parlement européen, 2013.

C 42 E / 320 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Par ailleurs, le fait de clarifier les règles d'accès au marché, en particulier les cas dans lesquels la prestation de services
est considérée soit comme temporaire, soit comme permanente, permettrait également de mieux définir les cas dans
lesquels la législation en matière d'emploi, telle que la directive 96/71/CE ( [2] ) ou le règlement (CE) n° 593/2008 ( [3] ),
devrait s'appliquer. Outre les dispositions sociales propres au secteur du transport routier de marchandises [règlement
(CE) n° 561/2006 sur les temps de conduite et les périodes de repos, directive 2002/15/CE relative à l'aménagement
du temps de travail des personnes exécutant des activités mobiles de transport routier, règlement (CEE) n° 3821/85
concernant l'appareil de contrôle dans le domaine des transports par route], il existe un vaste cadre pour assurer la
protection des travailleurs dans le secteur du transport routier de marchandises. La Commission continuera donc à
travailler en étroite collaboration avec les États membres afin de veiller à ce que ce cadre soit appliqué correctement.
Les États membres conservent la responsabilité de la mise en place de leurs systèmes de protection sociale, en
particulier en ce qui concerne le financement de leur régime de sécurité sociale.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 96/71/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 1996 concernant le détachement de travailleurs effectué dans le cadre

d'une prestation de services, JO L 18 du 21.1.1997.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n° 593/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 17 juin 2008 sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles (Rome I)

(JO L 177 du 4.7.2008, p. 6).

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 321

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005976/13**

**to the Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Action to combat social dumping in the road cabotage sector

Under Regulation (EEC) 3118/93, which lays down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate
national road haulage services within a Member State, cabotage transport operations are defined as road passenger
transport services operated temporarily by a carrier established in one Member State in another Member State
without having a registered office or other establishment in that State. The carriers in question are, however, subject
in a number of respects to the legislation, rules and administrative provisions in force in the host Member State.

The ‘road transport package’ adopted in 2009 included Regulation (EC) 1072/09 on common rules for access to the
international road haulage market. This regulation allows hauliers to carry out up to three cabotage operations within
seven days following international carriage of goods from another Member State, subject to various additional
provisions emphasising the temporary nature of cabotage operations. The regulation serves to tighten up the rules on
cabotage on the basis of various provisions which enable the Member States to introduce ‘safeguard measures’ in the
event of ‘serious disturbance’ of their national transport market.

The Commission has been planning for several months to liberalise the cabotage system as of 1 January 2014. The
aim is, in fact, to deepen the single European market by replacing the system introduced by the 2009 agreement on
road transport. However, this liberalisation would lead to unfair competition between the Member States’ hauliers
due to the fact that social policy is not harmonised in the EU. This raises the issue of statutory minimum welfare
provision. Differences between EU Member States in terms of salaries, working conditions etc continue to exist and
give rise to widespread social dumping.

The Transport Commissioner, however, has recently called Europe’s determination to liberalise the cabotage system
into question and, finally, advocated better implementation and simplification of the existing rules to help road
transport operators which are suffering the effects of unfair competition.

1. What approach does the Commission plan to adopt? Does it intend to take the necessary measures to liberalise
road cabotage operations, or will it simply clarify and improve the implementation of the existing legislation on the
subject?

2. If road cabotage is liberalised, does the Commission intend to harmonise social welfare provision within the EU
so as to avoid the social dumping which could be the unwelcome result of deregulating this sector?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

As requested by the legislator under Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009, the Commission is preparing a report on the
state of the EU road transport market. This preparatory work, as well as the report of the High Level Group on the
Development of the EU Road Haulage Market presented in June 2012 and the study commissioned by the
Parliament ( [1] ), show that the current provisions on access to the road haulage market are difficult to enforce and
constitute a barrier for hauliers operating outside of their Member State of registration. Simplifying these rules and
ensuring that they can be implemented uniformly throughout the EU will therefore be a priority in the case a proposal
is made to further integrate the road haulage market, as requested from the Commission under Art. 17(3) of the
regulation.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Development and Implementation of EU Road Cabotage, European Parliament, 2013.

C 42 E / 322 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Furthermore, clarifying the market access rules, in particular in which cases a provision of services is considered to be
temporary or permanent, would also help to better define the cases in which labour-related legislation such as
Directive 96/71/EC ( [2] ) or Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 ( [3] ) should apply. In combination with the application of
social provisions specific to the road haulage sector (Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 on driving time and rest periods,
Directive 2002/15/EC on working time of mobile workers, Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on the digital tachograph),
a wide-reaching framework exists to ensure the protection of workers in the road haulage sector. The Commission
will therefore continue to work closely with Member States to ensure that this framework is correctly applied.
Member States remain responsible for the set-up of their social welfare systems and in particular for the funding of
their social security systems.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of

the provision of services OJ L 18, 21.1.1997.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations

(Rome I) OJ L 177, 4.7.2008.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 323

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005977/13**

**à la Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Biodiversité: des espèces menacées d'extinction au sein de l'Union européenne

Dans sa Communication de 2011 intitulée «La biodiversité, notre assurance-vie et notre capital naturel — stratégie de
l'UE à l'horizon 2020», la Commission adopte une stratégie pour protéger et améliorer l'état de la biodiversité en
Europe d'ici à 2020. Cette stratégie passe par la définition de six objectifs qui sont de conserver et de régénérer la
nature, de préserver et d'améliorer les écosystèmes et leurs services, d'assurer la durabilité de l'agriculture et de la
foresterie, de garantir une utilisation durable des ressources de pêche, de lutter contre les espèces allogènes
envahissantes ainsi que de gérer la crise de la biodiversité au niveau mondial.

Le 2 mai 2013, l'Union internationale pour la conservation de la nature a publié une analyse composée de fiches
d'informations par pays, visant à donner un aperçu détaillé des espèces menacées sur les territoires des pays membres
de l'Union européenne. Selon cette analyse, les États membres de l'Union européenne devraient intensifier leurs
efforts pour prévenir l'extinction de plusieurs espèces et ainsi mettre en œuvre dans son intégralité la stratégie sur la
biodiversité de l'Union européenne. Il semblerait qu'une action efficace de protection des espèces menacées soit
particulièrement urgente dans les régions situées autour de la Méditerranée.

1. Compte tenu de cette analyse publiée par l'Union internationale pour la conservation de la nature, la
Commission envisage-t-elle de prendre les mesures nécessaires à la mise en œuvre totale et efficace de la stratégie sur
la biodiversité de l'Union européenne adoptée en 2011?

2. Afin de lutter contre l'extinction de certaines espèces menacées, des travaux de conservation des habitats et de
l'environnement de ces espèces sont nécessaires, mais ne peuvent exister sans de solides recherches dans ce domaine.
La Commission a-t-elle l'intention de prendre les mesures nécessaires au financement, à l'organisation ainsi qu'à
l'utilisation des recherches et des innovations relatives à la protection des espèces menacées?

3. Bien que la Commission mette déjà en œuvre des mesures incitatives envers les acteurs compétents pour la
protection de l'environnement et de la biodiversité, prévoit-elle d'adopter des mesures plus contraignantes en faveur
de la protection de ces espèces?

**Réponse donnée par M. Potočnik au nom de la Commission**

_(19 juillet 2013)_

1. Afin de garantir la mise en œuvre de la stratégie de l'Union en faveur de la biodiversité à l'horizon 2020 au
niveau national et à l'échelle de l'Union, la Commission a élaboré en étroite coopération avec les États membres un
cadre commun de mise en œuvre. Des groupes de travail thématiques, auxquels les États membres et les parties
concernées participent, soutiennent la mise en œuvre des actions définies dans la stratégie. Les progrès accomplis
dans la mise en œuvre de ces actions et dans la réalisation des objectifs feront l'objet d'un rapport lors de l'examen à
mi-parcours de la stratégie qui sera entrepris par l'Union en 2015.

2. La Commission a financé les travaux de l'Union internationale pour la conservation de la nature (UICN) en vue
de procéder à des évaluations des populations de mammifères, de reptiles, d'amphibiens, de poissons d'eau douce, de
papillons, de libellules, de groupes sélectionnés de coléoptères, de mollusques et des plantes vasculaires, qui
constituent les «listes rouges de l'Union européenne». Des évaluations des poissons d'eau de mer, des pollinisateurs,
des plantes médicales et des habitats sont en cours. La Commission, les États membres et les parties concernées ont
aussi conjointement recensé les priorités en matière de recherche ( [1] ) afin de soutenir la mise en œuvre de la stratégie
de l'Union en faveur de la biodiversité à l'horizon 2020, qui devrait faire l'objet d'un soutien au titre du programme
«Horizon 2020» ( [2] ). La Commission et l'Agence européenne pour l'environnement ont mis au point un système
européen d'information sur la biodiversité (BISE) qui devrait faciliter l'accès aux connaissances et leur transfert afin
d'appuyer l'élaboration des politiques.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://share.bebif.be/data/EPBRS/EPBRSIE/EPBRS-IE2013-EUBD2020targets_Final.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011)808 final.

C 42 E / 324 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

3. Bon nombre des espèces figurant sur les listes rouges sont protégées par les directives «Habitats» (JO L 206, du
22.7.1992) et «Oiseaux» (JO L 20, du 26.1.2010, p. 7), qui définissent des mesures de protection juridiquement
contraignantes. Le bon état sanitaire des écosystèmes est également un objectif fondamental de la directive-cadre sur
l'eau et de la directive-cadre «stratégie pour le milieu marin», qui a récemment fait l'objet de propositions présentées
par la Commission, à savoir le plan d'action pour l'eau ainsi que la planification de l'espace maritime et la gestion
intégrée des zones côtières.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 325

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005977/13**

**to the Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Biodiversity: endangered species in the European Union

In a 2011 Communication entitled ‘Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020’, the
Commission adopted a strategy aimed at halting or reversing biodiversity loss in Europe by 2020. This strategy
involves identifying six objectives, namely conserving and restoring Nature; maintaining and enhancing ecosystems
and their services, ensuring the sustainability of agriculture and forestry; ensuring the sustainable use of fisheries
resources; combating invasive alien species and addressing the global biodiversity crisis.

On 2 May 2013, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) published an analysis comprising a
number of country-by-country fact sheets and presenting a detailed overview of endangered species in the Member
States of the European Union. According to that analysis, the EU countries should step up their efforts to prevent
species from becoming extinct and fully implement the EU biodiversity strategy. It appears that there is a particularly
urgent need for effective action to protect endangered species in the Mediterranean region.

1. In view of the analysis published by the International Union for Conservation of Nature, does the Commission
intend to take the necessary action to ensure the EU biodiversity strategy adopted in 2011 is fully and effectively
implemented?

2. To tackle the threat of certain endangered species becoming extinct, work needs to be carried out with a view to
conserving their habitats and environment, which in turn requires solid research in this field. Does the Commission
intend to take the necessary measures to ensure that research and innovations relating to the protection of
endangered species are funded, organised and utilised?

3. Although the Commission is already implementing incentive measures to encourage the relevant stakeholders
in the field of environmental protection and biodiversity, does it envisage adopting measures of a more coercive
nature to help protect the species in question?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

1. In order to ensure the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 is implemented at EU and national levels, the
Commission has developed in close cooperation with Member States a common implementation framework.
Dedicated working groups in which Member States — and stakeholders — are involved are supporting the delivery of
actions set out in the strategy. Progress in implementing the actions of the strategy and in reaching the targets will be
reported in the EU Mid-Term Review of the strategy in 2015.

2. The Commission has funded work by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to carry out
assessments of mammals, reptiles, amphibians, freshwater fishes, butterflies, dragonflies, selected groups of beetles,
molluscs, and vascular plants — the ‘EU Red Lists’. Assessments of marine fishes, pollinators, medicinal plants and
habitats are in development. The Commission together with Member States and stakeholders has also identified
research priorities ( [1] ) to support the implementation of the EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy, which should be
supported under the Horizon 2020 programme ( [2] ). The Commission and the European Environment Agency have
established a Biodiversity Information System for Europe (BISE) that should facilitate the access and transfer of
knowledge to support policy-making.

3. Many of the red listed species are protected by the Habitats (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992) and Birds (OJ L 20/7,
26.1.2010) Directives that set out legally binding protective measures. The objective of healthy ecosystems is also at
the core of the Water Framework Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, for which the Commission
has recently put forward proposals — the Water Blueprint and the Marine Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal
Zone Management.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://share.bebif.be/data/EPBRS/EPBRSIE/EPBRS-IE2013-EUBD2020targets_Final.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 808 final.

C 42 E / 326 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005980/13**

**à la Commission**
**Sandrine Bélier (Verts/ALE) et Michèle Rivasi (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Incidences sur un site français: directive-cadre sur l'eau et réseau Natura 2000 par des projets d'aménagement

La basse vallée du Var est un site du réseau Natura 2000 depuis 2006 qui a une importance écologique majeure aussi
bien pour sa biodiversité floristique et faunistique et sa forte valeur patrimoniale que pour sa fonction de pièce
maîtresse de la trame bleue et verte. Le fleuve Var fait l'objet d'un PPRI basse vallée du Var suivi d'un PAPI I et II qui se
doivent de respecter les retranscriptions des directives‐cadres européennes sur l'eau de 2000 et 2008. Cette zone
naturelle est visée par des dossiers d'aménagement séparés regroupés en OIN sur un périmètre de 10 000 hectares, à
savoir des plans locaux d'urbanisme (PLU) des communes de Saint‐Laurent‐du‐Var, La Gaude, Carros et Levens, le
déplacement du marché d'intérêt national (MIN) de Nice à La Baronne (commune de La Gaude) et d'autres projets. Ces
projets relèvent de l'établissement public d'aménagement (EPA) de la plaine du Var qui doit amener le territoire à être
exemplaire en matière de développement durable et en faire une véritable «éco‐vallée».

Cependant, l'EPA a avancé projet par projet, ce qui — selon l'autorité environnementale saisie sur les projets — ne
permet pas d'avoir une vision globale des effets environnementaux cumulés, notamment des incidences sur la zone
Natura 2000 du fleuve et les fonctionnalités écologiques et géologiques de ces espaces. Quelques effets attendus
incluent l'augmentation du risque d'inondation du fait de l'endiguement, le risque de pollution des eaux souterraines,
la consommation de 25 hectares de terres nourricières et des effets très forts en matière de destruction d'habitats, de
dérangement et de surmortalité de la faune. En effet, la non‐élaboration du SAGE 2010‐2015 empêche le PAPI II
d'entrer en conformité avec la retranscription en droit français de la dernière directive‐cadre européenne sur l'eau.
Pour ces raisons entre autres, l'autorité environnementale a recommandé de «revoir certaines dispositions du PLU de
La Gaude et d'intégrer et de compléter les mesures d'évitement ou de réduction des impacts sur les sites du réseau
Natura 2000».

La Commission peut‐elle répondre aux questions suivantes:

1. A‐t‐elle connaissance de mesures d'évitement et de réduction de ces incidences sur la zone Natura 2000?

2. A‐t‐elle connaissance du respect de la retranscription des directives européennes sur l'eau?

3. Qu'envisage‐t‐elle pour assurer que les projets d'aménagement respectent la législation européenne?

**Réponse donnée par M. Potočnik au nom de la Commission**

_(10 juillet 2013)_

La Commission n'a pas connaissance de mesures visant à atténuer les incidences mentionnées sur la zone de
protection spéciale «basse vallée du Var» (FR9312025) qui pourraient être intégrées dans un plan local d'urbanisme
révisé. Toutefois, conformément à l'article 6, paragraphe 3 de la directive «Habitats» (92/43/CEE ( [1] )), les États
membres sont tenus d'évaluer les incidences de tout projet susceptible d'affecter le site de manière significative,
individuellement ou en conjugaison avec d'autres projets.

La France a adopté et communiqué des plans de gestion des bassins hydrographiques en vertu de la directive-cadre sur
l'eau (DCE, 2000/60/CE ( [2] )). En 2012, la Commission a publié l'évaluation de ces plans dans le cadre d'un rapport de
mise en œuvre, composé d'une vue d'ensemble de la situation en UE et d'un rapport d'évaluation spécifique pour la
France ( [3] ), qui formule des recommandations visant à améliorer la mise en œuvre.

Tout projet susceptible de détériorer l'état des masses d'eau ne peut être mis en œuvre que s'il respecte les conditions
énoncées à l'article 4, paragraphe 7, de la DCE. Il incombe aux autorités françaises de veiller au respect des
dispositions de la législation de l'Union.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 206 du 22.07.1992, p. 7.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) JO L 327 du 22.12.2000, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Voir http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/participation/map_mc/map.htm et les rapports COM,(2012) 670 et SWD (2012) 379 volumes 1, 2

et 14, accessibles depuis cette page.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 327

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005980/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sandrine Bélier (Verts/ALE) and Michèle Rivasi (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Impact of development projects on a French Natura 2000 site which is also covered by the Water Framework
Directive

The Lower Var Valley has been a Natura 2000 site since 2006 and is of major environmental importance by virtue of
the diversity of its flora and fauna, its huge heritage value and its role as a key component of France’s ‘Green and Blue
Framework’. The River Var is covered by the Flood Risk Prevention Plan (PPRI) for the Lower Var Valley and by Flood
Prevention Action Programmes (PAPI) I and II, which must be consistent with the French laws transposing the EU
Water Framework Directives of 2000 and 2008. This unspoilt area is included in several development plans that
come under the umbrella of an Operation of National Interest (OIN) covering an area of 10 000 hectares. These
include local development plans (PLUs) for the municipalities of Saint Laurent du Var, La Gaude, Carros and Levens,
and the relocation of a Market of National Interest (MIN) from Nice to La Baronne (La Gaude municipality). These
projects fall within the remit of the Public Development Establishment (EPA) for the Var Plain, which is tasked with
turning the area into a model of sustainable development and with creating an authentic ‘eco‐valley’.

According to the environmental authority consulted on these projects, however, the EPA has been proceeding on a
project‐by‐project basis. This approach makes it impossible to develop an overview of the cumulative impact on the
environment, including on the River Var Natura 2000 site and on the site’s environmental and geological features.
The anticipated consequences include an increased risk of flooding caused by the diking of the river, possible
groundwater pollution, the utilisation of 25 hectares of feeding grounds, and significant habitat destruction and
disruption and higher animal death rates. The failure to draft a local water management plan (SAGE) for the 2010‐
2015 period means that PAPI II is not consistent with the law transposing the most recent EU Water Framework
Directive into French law. For these reasons and others, the environmental authority has recommended that some of
the provisions of the PLU for La Gaude be revised to incorporate more detailed preventive and impact‐mitigation
measures for the Natura 2000 sites.

1. Does the Commission know what preventive and impact‐mitigation measures are being taken at the
Natura 2000 site?

2. Does it know whether the EU Water Framework Directives are being complied with?

3. What steps does it plan to take in order to ensure that the development projects are consistent with EC law?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 July 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of mitigation measures on the Special Protection Area ‘Basse vallée du Var’
(FR9312025) that could be incorporated in a revised ‘Plan Local d'Urbanisme’. However under Article 6.3 of the
Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC ( [1] )) Member States are required to assess the impact of any project likely to have a
significant impact on the site, either individually or in combination with other projects.

France has adopted and reported river basin management plans according to the Water Framework Directive (WFD,
2000/60/EC ( [2] )). The Commission has published the assessment of the contents of the plans as part of an
implementation report in 2012. This includes an EU overview and a specific assessment report for France ( [3] ),
including recommendations to improve implementation.

Any project that is liable to cause deterioration of status of water bodies can only be implemented if the conditions set
out in Article 4.7 of the WFD are fulfilled. It is for the French authorities to ensure that the provisions of EU legislation
are respected.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/participation/map_mc/map.htm, including links to reports COM(2012)670, SWD(2012)379

volumes 1, 2 and 14.

C 42 E / 328 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005985/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Raimon Obiols (S&D)**

_(29 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — El conflicto político en Siria y sus consecuencias en Oriente Próximo

Pasados más de dos años, el conflicto político en Siria mantiene al país dividido y sumido en la violencia, además de
ser un factor desestabilizador en la región de Oriente Próximo. Hace un par de semanas se produjeron dos atentados
bomba en la localidad suroriental turca de Reyhanli, fronteriza con Siria, que agravó la crisis entre el Gobierno turco y
el sirio. El conflicto sirio afecta también a otros países de la región como el Líbano o Israel.

En la reunión del Consejo Europeo de Asuntos Exteriores de ayer se decidió que la UE, además de renovar las
sanciones al régimen sirio, levantaba el embargo de armas al país.

Ante esta compleja situación:

—
¿Cómo valora la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante la decisión del Consejo Europeo sobre el embargo de
armas? ¿Cree que es una solución adecuada a un conflicto que ya se ha cobrado más de 70 000 víctimas? ¿Qué
control va existir para asegurar que las armas no llegan a radicales o grupos violentos?

—
¿Cree la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante que a día de hoy existe margen para buscar una salida política al
conflicto sirio, a través, por ejemplo, de la propuesta de EE.UU. y Rusia de realizar una conferencia
internacional de paz?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(26 de agosto de 2013)_

En relación con las medidas sobre las armas, el embargo expiró el 31 de mayo de 2013 y los Estados miembros se han
comprometido a proceder en sus políticas nacionales de conformidad con los principios establecidos en la
Declaración del Consejo adoptada el 27 de mayo de 2013. Los Estados miembros no procederán por el momento a la
entrega de equipo militar. El Consejo examinará su posición antes del 1 de agosto de 2013 teniendo en cuenta el
informe de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta, previa consulta con el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas,
sobre la evolución de la situación relativa a la iniciativa de los Estados Unidos y Rusia, así como el compromiso de las
partes sirias.

La UE sigue comprometida a trabajar con todos los interlocutores internacionales para promover un proceso político
en Siria. La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta considera que, a pesar de la situación actual sobre el terreno, es
necesario estudiar todas las posibilidades de llegar a una solución pacífica basada en el compromiso contraído el
30 de junio de 2012 por el llamado grupo de acción que firmó la Declaración de Ginebra ( [1] ). A este respecto, la Alta
Representante y Vicepresidenta apoya plenamente y se propone facilitar la preparación de una conferencia
internacional con la asistencia tanto de representantes del Gobierno sirio como de la oposición, según lo previsto por
los Estados Unidos y Rusia.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 329

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005985/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Raimon Obiols (S&D)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — The political conflict in Syria and its consequences for the Middle East

More than two years on, the political conflict in Syria is keeping the country divided and plagued by violence; it is also
having a destabilising effect in the Middle East. Two weeks ago, two bombings took place in Reyhanlı, a town in
south-east Turkey, on the border with Syria, which made the crisis between the Turkish Government and the Syrian
Government worse. The Syrian conflict is also affecting other countries in the region, such as Lebanon and Israel.

At yesterday’s EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting, it was decided that the EU, as well as renewing sanctions against
the Syrian regime, would lift the arms embargo on the country.

In view of this complex situation:

—
What does the Vice-President/High Representative think of the Council’s decision regarding the arms embargo?
Does she believe that it is an appropriate solution to a conflict that has claimed the lives of over 70 000 people?
What controls will there be to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radicals or violent groups?

—
Does the Vice-President/High Representative think there is now scope to seek a political resolution to the
conflict in Syria, through the proposal of the United States and Russia to hold an international peace
conference, for example?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 August 2013)_

With regard to the measures on arms, the embargo expired on 31 May 2013, and Member States committed to
proceed in their national policies in accordance with the principles set out in the Council Declaration adopted on
27 May 2013. Member States will not proceed at this stage with the delivery of military equipment. The Council will
review its position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the HR/VP, after having consulted the UN
Secretary General, on the developments related to the United States-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the
Syrian parties.

The EU remains committed to working with all international stakeholders to promote a political process in Syria. The
HR/VP believes that notwithstanding the current situation on the ground there is a need to explore all possibilities to
reach a political solution based on the commitment made on 30 June 2012 by the so-called Action Group that signed
the Geneva Communiqué ( [1] ). In this context, the HR/VP fully supports and intends to facilitate the preparation of an
international conference attended by representatives of the Syrian Government as well as the opposition, as envisaged
by the United States and Russia.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf

C 42 E / 330 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005986/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Subvenciones de la UE a la tauromaquia

Es un hecho indiscutible, puesto que así lo reconocen públicamente los mismos ganaderos, eurodiputados y los
Gobiernos de los Estados miembros afectados _(véase la respuesta del Gobierno de España de 10/5/2012 a la solicitud de_
_datos «subvenciones de ganadería de lidia proveniente de la UE» de 17/4/2012 a instancia del diputado Joan Josep Nuet),_ que la
tauromaquia recibe subvenciones procedentes de la Política Agrícola Común (PAC). La PAC no excluye ninguna raza
de vacuno para ser receptor de estas ayudas y, por este motivo, los productores de ganado de lidia se benefician de las
mismas ayudas que otros ganaderos. Según las respuestas recibidas por la Comisión a anteriores preguntas, la UE no
ha actuado amparándose en los siguientes motivos: la PAC no contempla ninguna ayuda específica de la UE destinada
a apoyar la cría de toros de lidia; el trato que se da a los animales no interfiere en la ejecución de políticas de la UE ni
viola ninguna normativa europea y en aplicación del artículo 13 del TFUE; la UE no tiene competencias al ser una
cuestión que afecta a una tradición cultural del Estado miembro.

La concesión de subvenciones destinadas a los ganaderos que crían toros para corridas de toros incumple la PAC, ya
que los beneficiarios no pueden cumplir los requisitos de bienestar animal. El propio Reglamento (CE) n° 1782/2003,
en virtud del cual se concedieron millones de euros destinados a la tauromaquia, establecía que a los agricultores que
no respetasen las exigencias en materia de bienestar animal serían excluidos del beneficio de la misma. El actual
Reglamento (CE) n° 73/2009 también establece que todo agricultor que reciba pagos directos deberá cumplir los
requisitos de bienestar de los animales. La normativa sobre bienestar animal excluye a los animales destinados a
participar en actividades culturales, ya que es imposible cumplir con estos requisitos, debido al maltrato explícito al
que son sometidos los toros en dichas actividades. Si no se pueden cumplir los requisitos de bienestar animal, la
consecuencia inmediata es que tampoco pueden ser beneficiarios de estos programas de ayudas y, si la UE no puede
intervenir al tratarse de una tradición cultural de un Estado miembro, tampoco puede dar soporte económico a esta
tradición cultural.

¿Ha pensado la Comisión en proponer la modificación de la regulación de la PAC para incluir de forma expresa a los
toros de lidia como ganado que no puede beneficiarse de las ayudas o tomar las medidas necesarias para que las
actividades taurinas estén excluidas de las ayudas de la PAC?

**Respuesta del Sr. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión**

_(30 de julio de 2013)_

La legislación en materia de bienestar animal para la protección de los animales en las explotaciones ganaderas ( [1] )
excluye de su ámbito de aplicación a los animales destinados a participar en competiciones, exposiciones o actos o
actividades culturales o deportivos. Por lo tanto, la cría de animales destinados a estas actividades no está sujeta a los
requisitos de condicionalidad con la legislación de la UE en materia de bienestar animal.

Por otra parte, la posición final del Parlamento Europeo sobre la propuesta de la Comisión sobre pagos directos a raíz
de la reforma de la PAC no incluye ninguna modificación en la dirección propugnada en la pregunta.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Artículo 1, apartado 2, letra b), de la Directiva 98/58/CE, relativa a la protección de los animales en las explotaciones ganaderas (DO L 221 de
8.8.1998, p. 23).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 331

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005986/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU subsidies for bullfighting

It is an indisputable fact, since livestock farmers themselves, MEPs and the governments of the Member States
concerned publicly admit it to be the case (see the response of the Spanish Government of 10 May 2012 to the
request for information on ‘EU subsidies for livestock for bullfighting’ of 17 April 2012 submitted by Spanish
Member of Parliament Joan Josep Nuet i Pujals), that bullfighting receives subsidies under the common agricultural
policy (CAP). The CAP does not exclude any breed of cattle from receiving such aid and farmers who breed livestock
for bullfighting therefore receive the same aid as other livestock farmers. According to answers given by the
Commission to previous questions, the EU has taken no action for the following reasons: the PAC does not provide
for any specific EU support for the breeding of fighting bulls; the treatment meted out to the animals has no bearing
on the implementation of EU policies and does not breach any European legislation, including in implementation of
Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the EU has no jurisdiction as this is an
issue concerning a cultural tradition of the Member State.

Awarding subsidies to livestock farmers who breed fighting bulls does not comply with the CAP, as the beneficiaries
cannot comply with the animal welfare requirements. Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, under which millions of euros
have been granted to bullfighting, laid down that farmers who did not comply with animal welfare requirements
would not be eligible to be beneficiaries under the CAP. The current Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 also lays down that
any farmers who receive direct payments must comply with animal welfare requirements. Animal welfare legislation
does not cover animals intended to participate in cultural activities, since it is impossible to comply with the welfare
requirements due to the blatant ill-treatment to which bulls are subjected in such activities. If it is not possible to
comply with animal welfare requirements, the immediate consequence is that farmers cannot be beneficiaries under
these aid programmes and the EU cannot give financial support to this cultural tradition, if it cannot intervene as it is
a Member State’s cultural tradition.

Has the Commission considered proposing amending the CAP reform expressly to include fighting bulls as livestock
which cannot receive aid, or taking the necessary steps to make bullfighting ineligible for CAP aid?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 July 2013)_

The animal welfare legislation for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes ( [1] ) excludes from its scope
animals intended for use in competitions, shows, cultural or sporting events or activities. Therefore rearing animals
for those activities is not subject to cross-compliance requirements with the EU animal welfare legislation.

Moreover, the final position of the European Parliament on the Commission proposal on Direct Payments in the light
of the CAP reform does not include any modification in the direction advocated in the question.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Article 1(2b) of Directive 98/58/EC concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 23).

C 42 E / 332 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-005987/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE) και Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE)**

_(29 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Πρόληψη, ενίσχυση της αντιμετώπισης και ευαισθητοποίηση για την Κυστική Ινώδη Νόσο (Κυστική Ίνωση)

Η Κυστική Ίνωση (CF) αποτελεί το πιο διαδεδομένο κληρονομικό νόσημα της λευκής φυλής από το οποίο υπολογίζεται ότι
πάσχουν περισσότεροι από 40 000 άνθρωποι σε όλη την Ευρώπη ενώ περίπου 1 στους 25 Ευρωπαίους είναι φορείς του
παθολογικού γονιδίου που την προκαλεί. Πρόκειται για μια ιδιαίτερα σοβαρή και απειλητική για τη ζωή ασθένεια, όπου παρά
τις πρόσφατες εξελίξεις στην ιατρική αντιμετώπισή της, ο μέσος όρος ζωής των ατόμων με κυστική ίνωση παραμένει
σημαντικά περιορισμένος. Αξίζει, μάλιστα, να σημειωθεί ότι οι ασθενείς της νόσου απαιτείται να βρίσκονται υπό συνεχή
ιατρική παρακολούθηση και να υποβάλλονται σε επώδυνες και ταυτόχρονα πολυδάπανες θεραπείες. Γίνεται, λοιπόν,
αντιληπτό ότι τόσο η πρόληψη μέσα από τη γενίκευση του ειδικού προγεννητικού ελέγχου, όσο και η εξειδικευμένη
ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη στους πάσχοντες οφείλουν να καταστούν δύο βασικές κατευθύνσεις για την αντιμετώπιση της
νόσου, καθώς, όπως προκύπτει από σχετικές έρευνες, ο μέσος όρος ζωής των ανθρώπων με ινοκυστική νόσο εξαρτάται
ευθέως από την ύπαρξη εξειδικευμένων γιατρών και οργανωμένων ειδικών κέντρων κυστικής ίνωσης. Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

—
Προτίθεται να προχωρήσει σε ειδικές συστάσεις προς τα κράτη μέλη, ώστε η εξέταση για την κυστική ίνωση να ενταχθεί
ως υποχρεωτική στον προγεννητικό έλεγχο και να καλύπτεται από τα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία;

—
Διαθέτει στοιχεία αναφορικά με τη θέσπιση της ειδικής αυτής εξέτασης ως υποχρεωτικής στα κράτη μέλη;

—
Γνωρίζει σε ποια κράτη μέλη λειτουργούν οργανωμένα ειδικά κέντρα κυστικής ίνωσης και ποιο είναι το ποσοστό
συμμετοχής των ασφαλιστικών ταμείων στη νοσηλεία;

—
Επεξεργάζεται την έκδοση κατευθυντήριων γραμμών στα κράτη μέλη για τη σύσταση, στελέχωση και λειτουργία των
ειδικών αυτών κέντρων, όπου δεν υπάρχουν;

—
Σκοπεύει να προωθήσει την ανταλλαγή βέλτιστων πρακτικών μεταξύ των κρατών-μελών προκειμένου να αναδειχθούν
οι πλέον ενδεδειγμένες και αποτελεσματικές δράσεις περαιτέρω ευαισθητοποίησης και ενημέρωσης της κοινής γνώμης
πάνω σε αυτό το ιδιαίτερα σοβαρό ζήτημα;

**Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(19 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 168 της συνθήκης της Λισαβόνας, ο καθορισμός της πολιτικής στον τομέα της υγείας όπως και η
οργάνωση και παροχή υπηρεσιών υγείας και ιατρικής περίθαλψης — συμπεριλαμβανομένου του προσυμπτωματικού ελέγχου
για τα βρέφη — αποτελεί αρμοδιότητα των κρατών μελών. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή δεν προτίθεται να εκδώσει συστάσεις
προς τα κράτη μέλη με τις οποίες να ζητά την κάλυψη από τα ταμεία ασθένειας του υποχρεωτικού προγεννητικού ελέγχου
για κυστική ίνωση.

Για να συγκεντρώσει πληροφορίες σχετικά με την υφιστάμενη πρακτική που ακολουθείται ως προς τον προσυμπτωματικό
έλεγχο, η Επιτροπή χρηματοδότησε την εκπόνηση έκθεσης σχετικά με την «Αξιολόγηση των πρακτικών προσυμπτωματικού
ελέγχου του πληθυσμού για τις σπάνιες παθήσεις στα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης» ( [1] ). Σύμφωνα με την εν λόγω
έκθεση, έλεγχοι για κυστική ίνωση πραγματοποιούνται σε 8 κράτη μέλη.

Για να διευκολύνονται η συλλογή και η διάδοση πληροφοριών σχετικά με τις σπάνιες νόσους, η Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει τη
διαδικτυακή πύλη Orphanet ( [2] ), μια διεθνή βάση δεδομένων με πληροφορίες σχετικά με σπάνιες ασθένειες
συμπεριλαμβανομένης της κυστικής ίνωσης.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/news/news104.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/index.php

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 333

Το άρθρο 12 της οδηγίας 2011/24/ΕΕ ( [3] ) του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 9ης Μαρτίου 2011,
σχετικά με την άσκηση των δικαιωμάτων των ασθενών στη διασυνοριακή υγειονομική περίθαλψη, απαιτεί την υποστήριξη της
ανάπτυξης ευρωπαϊκών δικτύων αναφοράς από την Επιτροπή. Η καθιέρωση των εν λόγω δικτύων θα συμβάλλει στην παροχή
προσιτής, υψηλής ποιότητας και οικονομικά αποδοτικής υγειονομικής περίθαλψης σε ασθενείς που πάσχουν από
πολύπλοκες και χαμηλού επιπολασμού παθήσεις, οι οποίες απαιτούν επιπλέον συγκέντρωση πόρων και ειδικές γνώσεις. Τα
δίκτυα θα μπορούσαν επίσης να χρησιμεύσουν ως εστιακά σημεία για την ιατρική επιμόρφωση και την έρευνα, τη διάδοση και
την αξιολόγηση των πληροφοριών.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 88 της 4.4.2011.

C 42 E / 334 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005987/13**

**to the Commission**
**Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE) and Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ More effective measures to prevent, treat and raise awareness of cystic fibrosis

Cystic fibrosis (CF) is one of the most widespread hereditary diseases among Caucasians. It is estimated that there are
over 40 000 sufferers in Europe and that around one in 25 Europeans is a CF gene carrier. It is a particularly serious
and potentially fatal illness, the average life expectancy of CF sufferers being considerably reduced, despite recent
medical advances in the field. Furthermore, CF sufferers require constant medical observation, as well as painful and
frequently expensive treatments. Hence, prevention by means of general prenatal screening and specialised medical
care for sufferers are clearly two basic conditions which must be met in combating the disease, given that research has
shown that the average life expectancy of CF sufferers greatly depends on the availability of specialist practitioners
and treatment centres. In view of this:

—
Will the Commission make specific recommendations to the Member States calling for compulsory prenatal
screening for cystic fibrosis to be reimbursed by sickness insurance funds?

—
Does it have any information concerning the extent to which such specialist screening is compulsory in the
Member States?

—
Does it know in which Member States specialist CF treatment centres are in operation and to what extent
treatment is covered by sickness insurance funds?

—
Are guidelines being considered regarding the creation, staffing and operation of specialist centres in those
Member States where they do not yet exist?

—
Will it encourage exchanges of best practice between Member States in order to establish the most effective
means of raising awareness and informing the public regarding this particularly serious disease?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

According to Article 168 of the Lisbon Treaty, the definition of health policy and the organisation and delivery of
health services and medical care — including new-born screening — is a responsibility of the Member States.
Therefore, the Commission is not planning to issue recommendations to the Member States calling for compulsory
prenatal screening for cystic fibrosis to be reimbursed by sickness insurance funds.

In order to obtain information regarding existing practice on new-born screening, the Commission funded a report
on the ‘Evaluation of population new-born screening practices for rare disorders in Member States of the European
Union’ ( [1] ). According to this report, Cystic fibrosis is screened for in 8 Member States.

To facilitate collection and dissemination of information about rare diseases, the Commission is supporting the
Orphanet ( [2] ) portal, which is a global database on information related to rare diseases including cystic fibrosis.

Article 12 of the Directive 2011/24/EU ( [3] ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the
application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare requires the Commission to support the development of
European Reference Networks. Establishing such Networks will help to provide affordable, high-quality and costeffective healthcare to patients who have complex and low prevalence conditions requiring a particular concentration
of resources or expertise. The Networks could also be focal points for medical training and research, information
dissemination and evaluation.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/eahc/news/news104.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.orpha.net/consor/cgi-bin/index.php
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 88, 4.4.2011.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 335

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005988/13**

**à la Commission**
**François Alfonsi (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Financement du projet de la LGV Lyon-Turin

Dans la proposition législative 2011/0302 établissant «le mécanisme pour l'interconnexion en Europe» (MIE), vous
estimiez que l'achèvement des réseaux transeuropéens de transport nécessiterait environ 500 milliards d'euros d'ici
à 2020, dont 250 milliards d'euros seraient requis pour finaliser les liaisons manquantes et éliminer les goulets
d'étranglement sur le réseau central. Parmi les projets retenus en 2011, figurent 37,69 milliards pour le corridor
méditerranéen qui couvre la LGV Lyon‐Turin.

Le 8 février dernier, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement, à l'unanimité, ont décidé de réduire drastiquement, et pour la
première fois dans l'histoire de l'Union européenne, le budget communautaire et en particulier les fonds dédiés aux
transports au sein du mécanisme pour l'interconnexion en Europe (– 39,37 %). La proposition initiale de la
Commission (21,694 milliards) est ramenée à seulement 13,174 milliards, hors Fonds de cohésion, ce qui ne
permettra pas de financer tous les projets retenus par la Commission en 2011, et le taux indicatif de 40 % prévu pour
les pays autres que ceux du Fonds de cohésion ne pourra qu'être revu à la baisse si on veut financer un nombre
significatif d'infrastructures nouvelles.

Parmi les projets pré-retenus, il y a celui de Lyon‐Turin qui prévoit notamment le creusement d'un tunnel de base de
57 km et d'autres tunnels situés en amont et en aval, solution qui a été jusque‐là préférée à la rénovation des lignes
ferroviaires existantes. L'investissement a été estimé à 12 milliards d'euros en 2002, puis réévalué à 26 milliards
d'euros par la Cour des comptes française (valeur janvier 2010), soit plus du double. Des études datant des années 90
et 2000 et portant sur des estimations d'accroissement du trafic routier et de croissance économique à 30 ans dans les
Alpes se sont toutes révélées fausses, si bien que l'aménagement de la voie existante apparaît beaucoup plus réaliste et
tout aussi efficace.

23 millions de tonnes sont transportées sur cet axe dont 3,4 millions de tonnes sur la voie ferroviaire alors que celle‐ci
dispose d'une capacité de 20 millions de tonnes, et donc d'une marge de progression considérable.

1. La Commission a‐t‐elle pris en compte le coût croissant du projet Lyon‐Turin pour la faiblesse du tonnage
transporté en baisse permanente depuis 1998, alors que le budget du MIE‐Transport est en drastique réduction?

2. La Commission ne considère‐t‐elle pas que le projet Lyon-Turin et ses coûts grandissants risquent de limiter les
financements d'autres projets de transports européens financés par le budget du MIE-Transport qui sont beaucoup
plus pertinents compte tenu de la croissance du trafic poids lourds, notamment sur les axes Nord‐Sud?

**Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission**

_(19 juillet 2013)_

La nouvelle liaison ferroviaire Lyon-Turin est un chaînon manquant essentiel du réseau transeuropéen de transport. Il
complétera un corridor de transport européen Est-Ouest de première importance qui relie la péninsule Ibérique à
l'Europe centrale. Ce projet a été une priorité absolue pour l'Italie et la France, et il a reçu le soutien constant de la
Commission.

L'analyse coûts-avantages approfondie de 2012 indique qu'en ce qui concerne le transport de fret, la nouvelle liaison
ferroviaire permettra non seulement d'absorber le volume des marchandises transportées à l'heure actuelle au moyen
de la ligne existante, mais aussi, et de manière plus importante, d'attirer les marchandises actuellement acheminées
par voie routière (par l'autoroute de Fréjus qui est parallèle à la nouvelle ligne, par la route côtière de Vintimille et par
d'autres routes alpines). Il en résultera un transfert modal considérable pour le transport des marchandises dans la
partie occidentale de la région alpine, ce qui contribuera de manière importante à l'amélioration de l'environnement.
Quant au transport des voyageurs, la nouvelle ligne raccourcira la durée des trajets entre Lyon et Turin de plus de la
moitié. D'ici 2035, cette ligne devrait accueillir 40 millions de passagers par an, dont 17 millions de passagers qui
auront délaissé la route et 19 millions le transport aérien.

Le coût total de la section transfrontalière, y compris les 57 km de tunnel de base et les raccordements à la ligne
existante, s'élève à 8,2 milliards EUR. Compte tenu du taux de cofinancement maximal de 40 %, ce projet pourrait
bénéficier d'une aide de l'Union européenne d'un montant maximum de 3,3 milliards EUR.

C 42 E / 336 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Dans quelle mesure la nouvelle liaison ferroviaire Lyon-Turin et des projets analogues pourront être cofinancés est
une question que la Commission devra déterminer, en conformité avec les orientations de l'Union pour le
développement du réseau transeuropéen de transport (RTE-T).

La réduction de la dotation budgétaire du mécanisme pour l'interconnexion en Europe ne contrecarre pas l'ambition
de la Commission de parvenir à réaliser un véritable réseau européen de transport.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 337

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005988/13**

**to the Commission**
**François Alfonsi (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Funding for the Lyon-Turin high-speed rail link project

In legislative proposal 2011/0302 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the Commission estimated that
approximately EUR 500 billion would be needed in order to complete the trans‐European transport networks by
2020, of which EUR 250 billion would have to be spent on completing missing sections and eliminating bottlenecks
in the core network. Among the projects selected in 2011, EUR 37.69 billion was allocated to the Lyon‐Turin high‐
speed rail link, which forms part of the Mediterranean corridor.

On 8 February 2013, the Heads of State and Government decided unanimously to impose drastic cuts — for the first
time in EU history — on the EU budget, and in particular on funding for transport under the CEF (-39.37%). The
Commission's original proposal of EUR 21 694 billion was thus reduced to EUR 13 174 billion, excluding any
support from the Cohesion Fund. This means that not all of the projects selected by the Commission in 2011 can be
funded, and that the indicative rate of 40% for non‐Cohesion‐Fund countries will have to be revised downwards if a
meaningful number of new infrastructure projects are to be financed.

The Lyon‐Turin project was one of the pre‐selected projects. It would entail boring a base tunnel 57 km long and
several other tunnels at various points along the track. This had previously been considered preferable to upgrading
existing railway lines. The investment required was put at EUR 12 billion in 2002; however, that figure was
subsequently revised upwards to EUR 26 billion — or more than double the original sum — by the French Court of
Auditors in January 2010. A number of studies from the 1990s and 2000s setting out 30‐year forecasts of increases
in road traffic and economic growth in Alpine regions of Europe have all proven to be inaccurate. Upgrading existing
railway lines would therefore seem to be a much more realistic approach to this problem, and just as effective.

A total of 23 million tonnes of freight are transported along this route, of which 3.4 million tonnes go by rail. The
railway line, meanwhile, has a capacity of 20 million tonnes, so there is considerable scope for expanding rail freight
services.

1. Has the Commission set the growing cost of the Lyon‐Turin project against the low volume of freight
transported by rail — a figure that has been falling consistently since 1998 — and the drastic cuts imposed on the CEF
budget?

2. Does the Commission not feel that the spiralling cost of the Lyon‐Turin project are jeopardising funding for
other European transport projects financed through the CEF Transport budget — projects that are much more
relevant in view of the increases in heavy goods traffic, particularly along north‐south routes?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

The new railway link Lyon-Turin is a key missing link of the trans-European transport network. It will complete a
major European East-West transport corridor linking the Iberian Peninsula to central Europe. This project has been a
top priority for Italy and France and has received the continuous support of the Commission.

The extensive 2012 cost-benefit analysis shows that as regards freight transport the new railway link will not only
absorb the current freight volumes carried on the existing line but more importantly will attract freight traffic
currently carried out by road on the parallel Fréjus motorway, the coastal passage at Ventimiglia and other Alpine
passages. This will help to achieve a considerable modal shift in freight transport in the Western part of the Alpine
region and thus contribute significantly to a better environment. As regards passenger services the new line will
shorten travel times between Lyon and Turin by more than half. By 2035 the line is expected to accommodate
40 million passengers a year, 17 million of which will have switched from the road and 19 million from travelling by
airplane.

The total cost of the cross-border section, including the 57 km base tunnel and the connections to the existing line,
amounts to EUR 8.2 billion. Given the maximum co-financing rate of 40% the project would be eligible for a possible
EU contribution of EUR 3.3 billion at maximum.

C 42 E / 338 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

To what extent the Lyon-Turin new railway link and similar projects will be co-financed remains to be assessed by the
Commission in accordance with the Union guidelines for the development of the TEN-T network.

The reduction of the Connecting Europe Facility's budgetary allocation does not thwart the Commission's ambition of
achieving a truly European transport network.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 339

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-005989/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(29 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Fiabilidad del PIB español

A pesar de que el paro ha llegado hasta el nivel récord del 27 % en el Estado español, la caída acumulada del PIB
español ha sido de solo el 3,6 % entre 2007 y 2011. En cambio, otros países con niveles de paro similares, como por
ejemplo Grecia, han registrado una caída del 20,1 % del PIB.

Si se analizan indicadores sectoriales, en cambio, los resultados son distintos. En el caso de la construcción y la
industria existe trimestralmente una diferencia de 8 000 millones de euros entre los índices de actividad reales y los
oficiales. En el caso de los servicios de mercado, en cambio, la caída es del 42 %. Cabe destacar que, en los tres
sectores, los datos tenían una excelente correlación con los datos utilizados por las instituciones oficiales ( [1] ).

A la luz de lo anterior, ¿conoce la Comisión estos datos?

¿Por qué cree la Comisión que existe esta divergencia entre los datos oficiales del PIB y los datos de los indicadores de
actividad sectorial antes mencionados?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(23 de julio de 2013)_

Las estadísticas relativas a la contabilidad nacional de España las elabora el Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)
aplicando las normas de la UE. El _blog_ mencionado en la pregunta no aporta datos que permitan dudar de la validez de
estas estadísticas. Por ejemplo, el hecho de que el empleo haya disminuido más que el PIB en el periodo 2007-2012
puede deberse a la distribución sectorial del empleo y a la rigidez y dualidad del mercado de trabajo español, en el que
la mayor parte del ajuste se ha realizado mediante despidos (mientras que los salarios han seguido disfrutando de un
buen ritmo de aumento durante la recesión). También debe observarse que los argumentos en que se basa la alegación
de que la recesión es más profunda implicarían que la expansión anterior fue mayor. Debe observarse que los
indicadores del valor añadido pueden razonablemente presentar una evolución diferente de la reflejada en las
estadísticas de producción. Por último, las estimaciones oficiales del PIB requieren la compatibilidad de los datos de la
demanda y de la oferta, mientras que la pregunta formulada parece motivada únicamente por un análisis de la oferta.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/economia/grafico-de-la-semana/2013/05/24/mas-dudas-sobre-la-fiabilidad-del-pib-espanol-11338

C 42 E / 340 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005989/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Reliability of Spanish GDP

Despite unemployment in Spain reaching a record high of 27%, Spanish GDP fell by a total of only 3.6% between
2007 and 2011. Conversely, other countries with similar levels of unemployment, like Greece for example, have seen
GDP fall by 20.1%.

Examining sector indicators, however, yields different results. In construction and industry there is a quarterly
difference of EUR 8 billion between the actual activity indicators and official indicators. Market services, by contrast,
have fallen by 42%. It should be noted that, in all three sectors, the figures used to correspond closely to the figures
used by official institutions ( [1] ).

Is the Commission aware of these figures?

Why does the Commission think that official GDP figures and the figures yielded by the sector activity indicators
mentioned above do not tally?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

Spain's national accounts statistics are produced by the national statistical institute INE on the basis of EU rules. The
blog reported in the question does not offer evidence to doubt these statistics. For instance, the larger fall of
employment relative to the fall in GDP in the period 2007-2012 can be related to the sectorial distribution of
employment and the rigidity and duality of the Spanish labour market, where most of the adjustment has taken place
via dismissals (while wages kept increasing well into the recession). It can be also noted that the arguments
underpinning the claim that the recession is deeper would imply that the previous expansion was stronger. It should
be noted that indicators of value added can reasonably evolve differently from statistics of production. Finally, official
estimates of GDP require the compatibility of the demand and supply sides, whereas the question seems motivated
only by an analysis of the supply side.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/economia/grafico-de-la-semana/2013/05/24/mas-dudas-sobre-la-fiabilidad-del-pib-espanol-11338.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 341

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005990/13**

**au Conseil**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Harmonisation de la taxation

La différence de taxation sur certains produits entraîne des différences de prix importantes qui encouragent
naturellement les citoyens à s'approvisionner dans un autre État membre pour économiser de l'argent. Cette situation
a des conséquences très négatives pour certains secteurs comme les buralistes, qui tendent à disparaître dans certaines
zones rurales à cause des différences de prix entre États membres.

Les États membres pourraient-ils s'accorder sur une harmonisation des taxes appliquées sur certains produits,
notamment ceux que l'on transporte facilement comme les paquets de cigarettes?

**Réponse**
_(16 septembre 2013)_

La législation de l'UE concernant la structure et les taux des accises applicables aux tabacs manufacturés ( [1] ) et, par
conséquent, aux cigarettes, fixe des niveaux minimaux de taxation applicables dans l'UE.

Pour le moment, la Commission n'a transmis aucune proposition spécifique modifiant les règles en vigueur.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2011/64/UE du 21 juin 2011 concernant la structure et les taux des accises applicables aux tabacs manufacturés (codification).

C 42 E / 342 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005990/13**

**to the Council**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tax harmonisation

Differences in the taxation of certain products can lead to significant price differences, which naturally encourage
people to try to save money by purchasing such products in Member States other than their own. This situation has a
very serious impact on operators in certain sectors, such as tobacconists, which are disappearing from some rural
areas because of price disparities between Member States.

Could the Member States reach agreement on harmonising the taxes imposed on certain products, and in particular
those which can be transported easily, such as packets of cigarettes?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

EU legislation on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco ( [1] ) and thus to cigarettes
provides for minimum levels of taxation applicable in the EU.

For the time being no specific Commission proposal modifying the current rules has been transmitted.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco (codification).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 343

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005991/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Harmonisation de la taxation

La différence de taxation sur certains produits entraîne des différences de prix importantes qui encouragent
naturellement les citoyens à s'approvisionner dans un autre État membre pour économiser de l'argent. Cette situation
a des conséquences très négatives pour certains secteurs comme les buralistes, qui tendent à disparaître dans certaines
zones rurales à cause des différences de prix entre États membres.

La Commission travaille-t-elle sur des propositions pour l'harmonisation de la taxation sur certains produits comme
le tabac?

**Réponse donnée par M. Šemeta au nom de la Commission**

_(16 juillet 2013)_

Les services de la Commission ont entrepris, dans la perspective d'une éventuelle initiative législative à moyen terme,
une évaluation détaillée des règles en vigueur en matière de taxation des produits du tabac pour lesquelles il existe déjà
un certain degré d'harmonisation. Il serait prématuré de se prononcer sur la mesure dans laquelle cette initiative
inclura une harmonisation plus poussée des taux de taxation.

C 42 E / 344 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005991/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Tax harmonisation

Differences in the taxation of certain products can lead to significant price differences, which naturally encourage
people to try to save money by purchasing such products in Member States other than their own. This situation has a
very serious impact on operators in certain sectors, such as tobacconists, which are disappearing from some rural
areas because of price disparities between Member States.

Is the Commission working on proposals to harmonise tax on certain products such as tobacco?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Commission services have started a comprehensive evaluation of the current tobacco taxation rules which
already include a certain degree of harmonisation with a view to possible legislative initiative in the mid-term. It is too
early to say to which extent further harmonisation of rate levels will be addressed therein.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 345

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005993/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Utilisation de cartouches chargées de chevrotines

La Commission pourrait-elle indiquer quels sont les États membres qui autorisent les cartouches de chevrotines et
quelle en est l'utilité?

**Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission**

_(12 juillet 2013)_

L'utilisation de cartouches de chevrotines n'est pas spécifiquement réglementée au niveau de l'Union européenne.
Partant, la Commission n'a, dans ce domaine, qu'une vision partielle des législations nationales, lesquelles, dans
certains cas, relèvent de la compétence des autorités régionales. L'utilisation de chevrotines pour la chasse a nettement
diminué et certains États membres l'ont interdite, mais d'autres, comme la France, l'autorisent encore dans certaines
régions. L'argument invoqué pour restreindre l'emploi de ce type de cartouches est qu'elles contiennent du plomb.

C 42 E / 346 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005993/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Use of cartridges loaded with buckshot

Would the Commission state which Member States authorise buckshot cartridges and what purpose they serve?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The use of buckshot cartridges is not specifically regulated at EU level. Therefore the Commission has only a partial
overview of national legislation in this domain, which in some cases is subject to regional competence. The use of
buckshot for hunting has significantly diminished and there are Member States that have banned it. However, some
Member States, such as France, still allow the use of buckshot in certain regions. The rationale for restricting the use of
this type of cartridges is linked to the fact that they contain lead.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 347

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005994/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Droit d'auteur et contenus culturels sur Internet

La licence globale est une autorisation donnée aux internautes pour accéder à des contenus culturels (musique,
images, films, textes) sur Internet et les échanger entre eux à des fins non commerciales en contrepartie d'une
rémunération versée aux artistes proportionnellement à la densité de téléchargement que leurs œuvres ont suscitée.

La Commission envisage-t-elle la licence globale comme une solution d'avenir pour la rémunération des droits
d'auteur au niveau européen?

**Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission**

_(23 juillet 2013)_

La Commission s'emploie à garantir que le cadre européen relatif aux droits d'auteur assure une rémunération
appropriée des titulaires de droits dans le cas de l'exploitation en ligne de leurs œuvres et autres objets protégés. La
législation européenne sur les droits d'auteur doit favoriser le plus largement possible l'accès aux œuvres protégées
par des droits d'auteur ainsi que leur diffusion tout en maintenant des incitations appropriées pour encourager la
création et les investissements susceptibles d'étayer l'ensemble du processus de création.

En ce qui concerne la question spécifique relative à la «licence globale», les informations fournies par l'Honorable
Parlementaire ne permettent pas à la Commission de déterminer, parmi les différents modèles de rémunération des
titulaires de droits liés à cette notion, à quel modèle il est fait allusion.

Comme annoncé dans sa communication du 18 décembre 2012 relative au contenu sur le marché unique numérique,
la Commission a entamé un processus d'évaluation du système de droits d'auteur de l'Union européenne, afin de
s'assurer qu'il est toujours adapté aux besoins, et cherche à favoriser des pratiques de marché innovantes, notamment
pour garantir une reconnaissance et une rémunération effectives des droits d'auteur, ainsi que des incitations durables
à la créativité, à la diversité culturelle et à l'innovation. Dans ce contexte, plusieurs modèles de rémunération des
titulaires de droits pour l'exploitation en ligne de leurs œuvres et autres objets protégés sont et seront examinés, à
condition qu'ils respectent les exigences de base découlant du droit européen ainsi que les conventions internationales
auxquelles l'Union européenne et les États membres sont parties.

C 42 E / 348 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005994/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Copyright and cultural content on the Internet

Global licensing is a system whereby Internet users are authorised to access and share online cultural content (music,
images, film, text) for non-commercial purposes while artists are remunerated according to the extent and frequency
with which their work is downloaded.

Does the Commission regard global licensing as a possible future approach to the remuneration of intellectual
property rights at European level?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

The Commission is committed to ensure that the European copyright framework provides for the appropriate
remuneration of rightholders in the context of the online exploitation of their works and other protected subjectmatter. European copyright law must encourage the widest-possible dissemination and accessibility of copyrightprotected works whilst maintaining the right incentives to encourage creation and the investments that may underpin
the whole creative process.

As to the specific issue of the ‘licence globale’ (‘global licensing’), the Commission is not able, on the basis of the
information provided by the Honourable Member, to identify which of the various possible models of remuneration
of rightholders revolving around this notion is referred to.

As announced in the communication of 18 December 2012 on content in the Digital Single Market, the Commission
is currently carrying a process of assessment of the EU copyright system in order to ensure that it remains fit for
purpose and seeks to foster innovative market practices _inter alia_ in order to guarantee effective recognition and
remuneration of rightholders, sustainable incentives for creativity, cultural diversity and innovation. In this context,
various models of remuneration for rightholders for online exploitation of their works and other protected subjectmatter are and will be looked into, provided that they respect the essential requirements stemming from EC law as
well as the international conventions to which the EU and its Member States are party.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 349

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005995/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Contrôle de la fraude

Quel est le ratio entre le budget alloué pour le contrôle de la régularité des dépenses européennes et le montant perdu
par l'Union européenne en raison de la fraude au budget communautaire?

**Réponse donnée par M. Šemeta au nom de la Commission**

_(29 juillet 2013)_

La Commission tient à souligner que les deux points évoqués par l'Honorable Parlementaire ne sont pas directement
liés.

Le budget alloué pour le contrôle de la régularité des dépenses européennes recouvre un grand nombre de tâches et
procédures opérationnelles et administratives ( [1] ) [.] . Par ailleurs, plus de 80 % du budget de l'UE est géré, dépensé et
vérifié en premier lieu par les autorités nationales. Les coûts totaux de ces contrôles pour 2011 et 2012 n'ont pas été
évalués.

Conformément à l'exigence établie à l'article 66, paragraphe 9, du nouveau règlement financier, la Commission fera
en sorte qu'à partir de 2013, ses services communiquent dans leurs rapports annuels d'activité davantage
d'informations sur les coûts des systèmes de contrôle.

Les montants des pertes financières dues à la fraude relèvent du domaine des enquêtes pénales. Par définition, ces
chiffres ne sont pas connus, étant donné que les informations disponibles se rapportent aux cas de (présomptions de)
fraude détectés et signalés à la Commission ( [2] ). Toutefois, en moyenne, les États membres signalent des fraudes
présumées d'une valeur de 500 millions d'euros environ chaque année (dépenses et recettes). Le montant réel de la
fraude est vraisemblablement bien plus élevé ( [3] ).

En ce qui concerne les résultats de la lutte antifraude au niveau des institutions de l'Union européenne, en 2012,
l'OLAF, qui dispose d'un budget de 57,4 millions d'euros, a recommandé aux services nationaux et/ou à la
Commission de récupérer un montant de 284 millions d'euros ( [4] ), grâce à ses activités d'enquête. Une partie
seulement de ce montant correspond aux cas pour lesquels l'OLAF, sur la base de ses conclusions, a recommandé
qu'une action pénale soit également engagée au niveau national en ce qui concerne les bénéficiaires des fonds.
En 2012, l'OLAF a été informé par les services compétents qu'à la suite des recommandations formulées les années
précédentes, un montant de 94,5 millions d'euros avait été recouvré ( [5] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ces tâches diverses et nombreuses vont des contrôles administratifs et de gestion ex ante aux vérifications et audits ex post, réalisés tant en interne

par les services de la Commission que par des entreprises extérieures.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) C'est-à-dire les cas pour lesquels une procédure pénale a été engagée à l'encontre des acteurs suspectés et le recouvrement des montants indûment

versés est en cours (et, par conséquent, les montants ne seront peut-être pas perdus).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Voir le document de travail des services de la Commission du 17 juillet 2013 intitulé «Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a

Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office» (analyse d'impact accompagnant la proposition de règlement
du Conseil portant création du Parquet européen) » [SWD (2013) 0274], p. 7: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/swd_2013_274_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Sur ce montant, 118,2 millions d'euros concernaient des dépenses et 165,8 millions d'euros le secteur des douanes (c'est-à-dire des recettes).
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Sur ce montant, 60,6 millions d'euros concernent les dépenses et 33,9 millions d'euros le secteur des douanes (c'est-à-dire des recettes). Pour de

plus amples informations, se reporter au rapport de l'OLAF sur ses activités en 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reportsolaf/2012/olaf_report_2012_en.pdf

( **|**

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 350 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005995/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fraud control

What is the ratio between the budget allocated for controlling the regularity of European expenditure and the amount
that the European Union loses due to fraud within the EU budget?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 July 2013)_

The Commission would stress that the two issues mentioned by the Honourable Member are not directly linked.

The budget allocated for controlling the regularity of European expenditure includes a high number of operational
and administrative tasks and procedures ( [1] ). Furthermore, more than 80% of the EU budget is managed, spent and
verified, in the first place, by national authorities. The total costs of these controls for 2011 and 2012 have not been
assessed.

Following the requirement of Art. 66(9) of the new Financial Regulation, it is the intention of the Commission that
from 2013 its services will disclose more information on the costs of control systems in their Annual Activity
Reports.

The amount lost to fraud is linked to the domain of criminal investigations. By definition, this is an unknown figure as
the available information relates to cases of (suspected) fraud detected and reported to the Commission ( [2] ). However,
Member States report an average of about EUR 500 million of suspected fraud each year (expenditure and revenue).
The real amount of fraud is likely to be significantly higher ( [3] ).

Looking at the anti-fraud results at the level of EU institutions, in 2012, on the basis of its investigative activities,
OLAF, with a budget of EUR 57.4 million, recommended to national and/or Commission services to recover
EUR 284 million ( [4] ). Only a part of this amount is linked to cases for which OLAF, on the basis of its findings, has
recommended that also criminal action is taken at national level in relation to the beneficiaries of the funds. In 2012,
OLAF was informed by the competent services that following recommendations issued in previous years,
EUR 94.5 million were recovered ( [5] ).

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) These varied and numerous tasks range from _ex ante_ administrative and management checks to _ex-post_ verifications and audits, performed both

internally by Commission staff and external companies.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) i.e. cases for which criminal proceedings have been initiated in relation to the suspected actors and recoveries of unduly paid amounts are ongoing

(and, consequently, the amounts will potentially not be lost).

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) See Commission Staff Working Document of 17 July 2013 entitled ‘Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Council Regulation on

the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office’ (SWD (2013)0274), p. 7:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/swd_2013_274_en.pdf

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Of these, EUR 118.2 million related to the expenditure areas, and EUR 165.8 million were linked to the area of customs — i.e. revenues.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Of these, EUR 60.6 million relate to the expenditure areas and EUR 33.9 million were recovered in relation to the area of customs — i.e. revenues.

For more information, see the OLAF Report covering its activities in 2012:
http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/2012/olaf_report_2012_en.pdf

( **|**

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )
⋅5∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 351

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-005996/13**

**à la Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Service de données en itinérance — Coût du réseau mobile à l'étranger

Bien que le coût du service de données en itinérance ait finalement récemment diminué, les prix appliqués ne sont
toujours pas justifiables.

En effet, les opérateurs locaux sont en mesure de savoir quand, où, pendant quelle durée et en quelle quantité des
données ont été téléchargées sur un réseau étranger. Ils connaissent également le prix de l'octet dans l'État membre
en question.

Ainsi, afin de favoriser la transparence et un juste prix pour le consommateur, la Commission pourrait-elle mettre en
place un système pour que les consommateurs connaissent le coût moyen du service de données en itinérance
à l'étranger?

Serait-il envisageable que le consommateur puisse régler un service de données en itinérance en fonction de sa
consommation et non, comme c'est le cas à présent, en fonction de la durée ou en fonction de la quantité?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Kroes au nom de la Commission**

_(11 juillet 2013)_

Le nouveau règlement sur l'itinérance contient déjà des mécanismes de transparence et de sauvegarde pour les services
de données en itinérance. Il oblige les fournisseurs de services d'itinérance à informer adéquatement leurs clients en
itinérance des tarifs applicables à l'utilisation de services de données en itinérance réglementés. Chaque fournisseur de
services d'itinérance doit accorder à ses clients en itinérance la possibilité d'opter gratuitement pour une fonction qui
fournit des informations sur la consommation cumulée, exprimée en volume ou dans la devise dans laquelle la facture
de l'abonné est établie, et qui garantit que, sans le consentement explicite de l'abonné, les dépenses cumulées pour les
services de données en itinérance réglementés n'excèdent pas un plafond financier déterminé.

Le coût moyen des services de données en itinérance dépend pour beaucoup du mode de consommation individuel et
des services utilisés, dans la mesure où certains de ces services peuvent être très gourmands en données (par exemple
les vidéos en haute définition) tandis que d'autres (tels que les courriers électroniques) nécessitent des volumes de
données moins importants. Le règlement a introduit l'obligation dite «de découplage», en vertu de laquelle, à partir
du 1 [er] juillet 2014, les abonnés pourront acheter des services d'itinérance dissociés des autres prestations. Pour les
données en itinérance, en particulier, le client pourra opter, s'ils sont proposés, pour des services de données fournis
directement sur un réseau visité. La Commission envisage également de mettre en œuvre d'autres mesures pour que
les citoyens puissent consommer des services de communication électronique dans toute l'Union comme ils le
feraient chez eux, sans devoir payer de frais d'itinérance internationale.

C 42 E / 352 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005996/13**

**to the Commission**
**Véronique Mathieu Houillon (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Data roaming services — Cost of mobile networks abroad

Although the cost of data roaming services has finally decreased in recent times, the prices applied still cannot be
justified.

Local operators are able to find out how much data has been downloaded on a foreign network, when and where it
was downloaded, and for how long. They also know the price per byte in the Member State concerned.

Therefore, in order to promote transparency and fair prices for consumers, could the Commission put in place a
system informing consumers of the average cost of data roaming services abroad?

Would it be possible for consumers to choose a data roaming service based on usage and not on how much data they
use or for how long they use it, as is currently the case?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The new Roaming Regulation already contains transparency and safeguard mechanisms for data roaming services.
The regulation obliges roaming providers to keep their roaming customers adequately informed of the charges which
apply to their use of regulated data roaming services. Each roaming provider shall grant its roaming customers the
opportunity to opt free of charge for a facility which provides information on the accumulated consumption
expressed either in volume or in the currency in which the roaming customer is billed and which guarantees that,
without the customer’s explicit consent, the accumulated expenditure for regulated data roaming services does not
exceed a specified financial limit.

Average cost of data roaming services depends very much on one's consumption pattern and services used, as some
data services might be very data intensive (HD video) while other (e-mail) are less data intensive. The regulation
introduced the so called decoupling obligation, according to which as of 1 July 2014, customer will be allowed to
purchase roaming as a separate service. Specifically for data roaming, customer will be able to opt, whenever offered,
data services offered directly on a visited network. The Commission is also envisaging further steps to ensure that
citizens can consume electronic communication services in other parts of the Union as they do at home without
international roaming charges.

.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 353

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005997/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Colusão e conluio na fixação dos preços dos combustíveis

No passado dia 14 de maio, a Comissão Europeia divulgou um comunicado de imprensa sobre a intervenção de
agentes da Comissão Europeia junto de Empresas Petrolíferas e da Agência de Divulgação dos Índices Platts (McGraw
Hill/Standard & Poor`s), por suspeita de colusão na fixação dos índices que servem de referência aos preços dos
combustíveis em toda a Europa.

Sucede que, em resposta à pergunta escrita E-6115/2009 de Ilda Figueiredo, sobre a fiabilidade e razoabilidade desse
processo de fixação de preços dos combustíveis, a Comissão Europeia não identificou qualquer problema com o
sistema vigente de fixação dos preços.

Solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Quais as conclusões das diligências efetuadas?

2. Verificada a prática de colusão e conluio, dispõe a Comissão de informação sobre quantos milhões de milhões
de euros os consumidores europeus poderão ter pago a mais pelo preço da gasolina e gasóleo? Quando
pretende divulgar publicamente essa informação?

**Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão**

_(5 de agosto de 2013)_

A Comissão pode confirmar que realizou, em maio de 2013, inspeções nas instalações de diversas empresas que
operam e são prestadoras de serviços nos setores do petróleo bruto, dos produtos petrolíferos refinados e dos
biocombustíveis. A Comissão receia que as empresas possam ter-se concertado para comunicar uma distorção dos
preços a uma agência de comunicação de preços, no intuito de manipular os preços publicados relativos a uma série
de produtos petrolíferos e biocombustíveis. Além disso, a Comissão receia que essas empresas possam ter impedido
outras de participar no processo de avaliação de preços com o objetivo de distorcer os preços publicados.

As informações obtidas pela Comissão ainda terão de ser analisadas pelo que é extemporâneo querer extrair
conclusões sobre o resultado da investigação. Como a duração do inquérito depende de vários fatores, a Comissão
não pode ainda indicar quando deverá estar concluído. A Comissão procurará concluir o inquérito o mais
rapidamente possível. É demasiado cedo para avaliar se, e em que medida, os consumidores podem ter sido afetados
pela alegada infração.

C 42 E / 354 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005997/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fuel prices: collusion and rigging

In a press release issued on 14 May 2013 the Commission revealed that its officials had carried out unannounced
inspections on the premises of several oil companies and the Platts price reporting agency (McGraw Hill/Standard &
Poor’s), which were suspected of rigging the assessments serving as the benchmark for fuel prices throughout Europe.

On the other hand, when it replied to Ilda Figueiredo’s Question E-6115/2009, which expressed doubts about the
soundness and accuracy of fuel pricing, the Commission said nothing at that time about problems with the existing
system.

1. What has been the outcome of the Commission’s inquiries?

2. Assuming that collusion and rigging have in fact occurred, can the Commission say howmany billions of euros
too much European consumers might have been paying for petrolanddiesel oil? When does it propose to divulge that
information?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 August 2013)_

The Commission can confirm that, in May 2013, it carried out inspections at the premises of several companies active
in and providing services to the crude oil, refined oil products and biofuels sectors. The Commission has concerns
that the companies may have colluded in reporting distorted prices to a Price Reporting Agency to manipulate the
published prices for a number of oil and biofuel products. Furthermore, the Commission has concerns that the
companies may have prevented others from participating in the price assessment process, with a view to distorting
published prices.

The information obtained by the Commission will now need to be analysed and it is too early to draw conclusions
about the outcome of the investigation. As the duration of the investigation depends on a number of factors, the
Commission cannot indicate at this stage when it will be completed. The Commission will seek to finalise the
investigation as quickly as possible. It is too early to assess whether and to what extent consumers may have been
affected by the alleged infringement.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 355

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005998/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Contributo do BEI para a aplicação das medidas necessárias à execução da política de cooperação

De acordo com o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, o Banco Europeu de Investimento contribuirá
para a aplicação das medidas necessárias à execução da política de cooperação para o desenvolvimento, que podem
dizer respeito a programas plurianuais de cooperação com países em desenvolvimento ou a programas com uma
abordagem temática.

Solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Qual o contributo do BEI para a aplicação das medidas necessárias à execução da política de cooperação para o
desenvolvimento no triénio 2010-2012? Concretamente, qual o montante global de financiamento atribuído a
programas ou projetos em países em desenvolvimento?

2. Qual o contributo previsto para o triénio 2013-2015? Concretamente, qual o montante global de
financiamento a atribuir a programas ou projetos em países em desenvolvimento?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(2 de agosto de 2013)_

As atividades do BEI a nível mundial apoiam os objetivos de política externa da UE, nomeadamente em matéria de
desenvolvimento. As atividades do BEI contribuem para o desenvolvimento económico, social e ambiental
sustentável dos países nos quais atua. Os principais objetivos das operações do BEI são os seguintes:

—
Desenvolvimento do setor privado local, incluindo apoio às PME;

—
Desenvolvimento das infraestruturas sociais, ambientais e económicas;

—
Atenuação das alterações climáticas e adaptação às mesmas.

Ao abrigo da Decisão n.° 1080/2011/UE, de 25 de outubro de 2011, a UE presta uma garantia orçamental às
operações de financiamento pelo BEI nos países em pré‐adesão e nas regiões vizinhas, bem como na Ásia, na América
Latina e na África do Sul. O BEI concede apoio aos países da África, Caraíbas e Pacífico no âmbito do Acordo de
Parceria ACP-UE, bem como aos países e territórios ultramarinos, no âmbito da Decisão de Associação Ultramarina.
O Banco concede também empréstimos fora da UE por sua conta e risco.

Neste contexto, o BEI atua presentemente em mais de 80 países fora da UE, a maioria dos quais são considerados
países em desenvolvimento em conformidade com o Relatório sobre as Perspetivas Económicas Mundiais do FMI.
Entre 2010 e 2012, o BEI aprovou a concessão de empréstimos da ordem de 23 mil milhões de EUR fora da UE. O
relatório _Report on results of EIB operations outside the EU_, de 2012, publicado no sítio Web do BEI, apresenta mais
informações e exemplos concretos do impacto dos projetos do BEI fora da UE.

Em 2013, o montante dos empréstimos do BEI fora da UE deverá ascender a cerca 6 mil milhões de EUR. Em 20142015, o referido montante dependerá essencialmente da decisão do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho sobre a
garantia orçamental da UE para o período 2014-2020, com base na proposta da Comissão apresentada em 23 de
maio de 2013 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 293.

C 42 E / 356 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005998/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EIB contribution to measures necessary for the implementation of development cooperation policy

As laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Investment Bank is required to
contribute to measures necessary for the implementation of development cooperation policy, which may relate to
multiannual cooperation programmes with developing countries or programmes with a thematic approach.

1. What contribution did the EIB make for the purposes of measures necessary for theimplementation of
development cooperation policy in the years 2010 to 2012?Specifically, what was the aggregate amount of funding
allocated to programmes orprojects in developing countries?

2. What contribution will be provided for the years 2013 to 2015? Specifically, how muchfunding in all will be
allocated to programmes or projects in developing countries?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 August 2013)_

The EIB’s activities around the world underpin EU’s external policy goals, including its development objectives. EIB
activities contribute to the sustainable economic, social or environmental development of the countries in which it
operates. The primary objectives of EIB operations are:

—
Local private sector development, including support for SMEs;

—
Development of social, environmental and economic infrastructure;

—
Climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Under Decision No 1080/2011/EU of 25 October 2011, the EU provides a budget guarantee to EIB financing
operations in the Pre-accession and Neighbourhood regions, Asia, Latin America and South Africa. Under the ACPEU Partnership Agreement, the EIB provides support to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and to Overseas
Countries and Territories under the Overseas Association Decision. The Bank also provides lending outside the EU at
its own risk.

Under these frameworks, the EIB currently operates in over 80 countries outside the EU, the majority of which are
considered developing countries according to the IMF World Economic Outlook Report. Between 2010 and 2012, it
has signed around EUR 23 billion of loans outside the EU. For concrete examples of the impact of EIB projects outside
the EU, more information can be found in the EIB’s ‘Report on results of EIB operations outside the EU, 2012’
published on the EIB website.

The volume of EIB lending outside the EU in 2013 is expected to be in the order of EUR 6 billion. The volume of EIB
lending in 2014-2015 will mostly depend on the decision of the European Parliament and Council regarding the EU
budget guarantee for the period 2014-2020 following the Commission proposal issued on 23 May 2013 ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 293.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 357

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-005999/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Exclusão do setor das conservas de atum de qualquer acordo comercial UE-Tailândia

Os industriais de conservas de peixe portugueses e espanhóis têm vindo a manifestar a sua preocupação face às
consequências do acordo de livre comércio que a UE está a negociar com a Tailândia e defendem a exclusão das
conservas deste acordo, sob pena de extinção do setor de conservas de atum na Península Ibérica. Mesmo com a atual
taxa de 24 %, de direitos, aplicada à entrada sobre as conservas tailandesas, a Tailândia é já o maior exportador para a
UE. Caso esta taxa deixasse de existir, o efeito prático seria o inundar do mercado europeu com conservas tailandesas
e o desaparecimento das fábricas em Portugal e Espanha, alertam os industriais. Também em França e em Itália as
consequências poderão ser profundamente negativas.

Segundo dados da Associação Nacional dos Industriais das Conservas de Peixe, em Portugal, as conservas de atum são
responsáveis, no mínimo, por 1 500 dos 3 500 empregos do setor conserveiro.

Em face do exposto, solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Qual o ponto da situação das negociações entre a UE e a Tailândia?

2. Considera a necessidade de excluir as conservas de atum de qualquer acordo com a Tailândia que vise a
liberalização e desregulação do comércio entre este país e a UE?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(2 de agosto de 2013)_

Em setembro de 2013, a União Europeia e a Tailândia realizarão a segunda ronda de negociações para a celebração de
um acordo de comércio livre.

A Comissão Europeia está consciente da importância e comunicou a vulnerabilidade da indústria de conservas de
atum da UE, em particular no contexto do comércio bilateral com um importante operador no setor das conservas de
atum, tal como a Tailândia.

C 42 E / 358 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-005999/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Exclusion of the canned tuna sector from any trade agreement between the EU and Thailand

The Portuguese and Spanish canned fish industries have been expressing concern about the consequences of the free
trade agreement that the EU is negotiating with Thailand, and are calling for canned products to be excluded from the
agreement; if it is not excluded, the canned tuna industry on the Iberian Peninsula is in danger of disappearing. Even
with the current 24% import duty applied to Thai canned products, Thailand is already the largest exporter to the EU.
According to warnings from the industry, if this rate ceased to apply, in practice the European market would be
flooded with Thai canned products and factories would disappear from Portugal and Spain. It could also have very
serious effects in France and Italy.

According to figures from the Portuguese National Canned Fish Industry Association, canned tuna accounts for at
least 1 500 of the 3 500 jobs in the canning industry.

1. What is the current state of play of negotiations between the EU and Thailand?

2. Does the Commission think that canned tuna should be excluded from any agreement with Thailand seeking to
liberalise and deregulate trade between that country and the EU?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 August 2013)_

The European Union and Thailand will hold the second round of negotiations for the conclusions of a Free Trade
Agreement in September 2013.

The European Commission is aware of the importance and reported vulnerability of the EU tuna canning industry, in
particular in the context of bilateral trade with a large player in the canned tuna sector such as Thailand.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 359

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006000/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Intervenções no perímetro de rega do Baixo Mondego

A Associação Portuguesa dos Orizicultores e a Associação Distrital dos Agricultores de Coimbra chamaram
recentemente a atenção para a necessidade de realização de uma reestruturação fundiária e de obras de
aproveitamento hidroagrícola no Vale do Pranto e no Vale do Arunca, uma região orizícola com perto de
4 000 hectares, que integra o perímetro de rega do Baixo Mondego, de indiscutível importância na economia da
região.

O Vale do Ega, uma zona de produção de milho, carece igualmente de uma intervenção.

Por fim, os campos de Maiorca, outra importante zona de produção agrícola, aguardam o desbloqueamento de verbas
necessárias para a finalização das obras hidroagrícolas.

Solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Dispõe de informação relativa à inclusão ou não das intervenções supramencionadas no Proder e ao respetivo
prazo de conclusão?

2. Que programas e verbas comunitárias (do atual QFP) podem apoiar a concretização dos investimentos acima
mencionados? Quais as respetivas taxas de cofinanciamento da UE?

**Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloș em nome da Comissão**

_(9 de julho de 2013)_

1. Como é do conhecimento do Senhor Deputado, a gestão do programa incumbe à autoridade de gestão (AG) e o
comité de acompanhamento é o organismo competente em matéria de execução ou para as questões relacionadas
com o programa de desenvolvimento rural. Convidamos, por conseguinte, o Senhor Deputado a contactar estes
organismos para quaisquer informações sobre projetos objeto de financiamento e respetivas operações.

2. No que diz respeito ao eventual financiamento dos projetos a que o Senhor Deputado faz referência, o Proder
inclui uma medida específica (1.6) dedicada ao regadio e a outras infraestruturas coletivas. Beneficia de uma dotação
global do Feader no montante de 412 872 800 euros, distribuídos do seguinte modo:

1.6.1 — Desenvolvimento do regadio: 95 650 000 euros
1.6.2 — Regadio do Alqueva: 237 150 000 euros
1.6.3 — Sustentabilidade dos regadios públicos: 34 154 000 euros
1.6.4 — Modernização dos regadios coletivos tradicionais 6 929 550 euros
1.6.5 — Projetos estruturantes: 28 988 350 euros

Estes apoios podem ascender a 100 % do investimento elegível. No entanto, para as questões relacionadas com
projetos específicos, convidamos o Senhor Deputado a consultar a autoridade de gestão ou o sítio Internet do Proder,
para mais informações.

Maria Gabriela Ventura, Gestora do Proder
Rua Padre António Vieira, 1 — 8.° andar
1099-073 Lisboa

Linha Verde: 800 500 064
Tel.: 00 351 21 381 9318/19/20
[Correio eletrónico: st.proder@gpp.pt](mailto:st.proder@gpp.pt)
[Sítio Internet: http://www.proder.pt](http://www.proder.pt/)

C 42 E / 360 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006000/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Baixo Mondego: operations in zones irrigated by the lower part of the Mondego river

The Portuguese Association of Rice Growers and the Coimbra District Farmers’ Association have recently drawn
attention to the need for land reorganisation and agriculture-related water management operations in the Pranto and
Arunca valleys, a rice-growing zone covering nearly 4 000 hectares, irrigated by the lower part of the Mondego river,
and unquestionably vital for the regional economy.

An operation is likewise required in the Ega valley, a maize-producing zone.

Lastly, as regards the Maiorca fields, a major agricultural production zone, the water management operations cannot
be completed until the necessary funds have been released.

1. Does the Commission know whether the above operations have been included under the Proder programme?
What are the scheduled completion dates?

2. Which EU programmes and sources of funding (within the present MAFF) could be used to implement the
investment projects mentioned above? What are the EU co-financing rates?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

1. The Commission would like to recall the Honourable Member that the management of the programme is a
competence of the Managing Authority (MA) and the Monitoring Committee is the relevant body following the
execution or any issue related to the RDP. The Honourable Member should consult such bodies for any details on
funded projects and respective operations.

2. As regards the possible funding for the projects mentioned, Proder has a specific measure (1.6) dedicated to
irrigation and other collective infrastructures with a total EARDF contribution of EUR 412 872 800 distributed as
follow:

1.6.1 — Development of irrigation EUR 95 650 000
1.6.2 — Alqueva irrigation EUR 237 150 000
1.6.3 — Sustainability of public irrigation EUR 34 154 000
1.6.4 — Modernisation of collective traditional irrigation systems EUR 6 929 550
1.6.5 — Structuring projects EUR 28 988 350

Aids can go as high as 100% of eligible investment however for specific project questions the Honourable Member
should consult the Managing Authority or the Proder website for details.

Maria Gabriela Ventura, Gestora do Proder
Rua Padre António Vieira, 1 — 8° andar

1099-073 LISBOA

Green line: 800 500 064
Tel.: 00 351 21 381 9318/19/20
Email: st.proder@gpp.pt
Website: http://www.proder.pt

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 361

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006001/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Ponto da situação nas negociações do Acordo de Pescas UE-Gabão

Após o retomar das negociações entre a União Europeia e o Gabão, tendo em vista a celebração de um Acordo de
Pescas, solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre qual o ponto da situação nestas negociações:

—
Foi alcançado já algum acordo?

—
Quando é expectável que isso venha a suceder?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(22 de julho de 2013)_

Após a retoma das negociações com o Gabão, tiveram lugar mais duas rondas de negociações em abril de 2013.

As duas Partes chegaram a um acordo sobre o texto do novo protocolo ao Acordo de Parceria no domínio das Pescas.
O referido texto foi rubricado em 24 de abril de 2013. Os documentos pertinentes e a ata das negociações foram
enviados à Comissão das Pescas do Parlamento Europeu em 25 de abril de 2013.

O novo protocolo dá a 27 cercadores e oito navios de pesca com canas da UE a possibilidade pescar atum e outras
espécies de grandes migradores com base numa tonelagem de referência de 20 000 toneladas. Em contrapartida, a UE
pagará ao Gabão uma compensação anual de 1 350 000 euros, 450 000 euros dos quais se destinam a apoiar a
política da pesca do Gabão. Os proprietários de navios europeus pagarão taxas acrescidas para poder pescar nas águas
do Gabão.

O procedimento para a assinatura e a aplicação provisória e para a conclusão do novo protocolo está em curso, tendo
a Comissão adotado as propostas relevantes em 27 de junho de 2013.

O debate no Conselho deverá ter lugar em julho de 2013, a fim de que o novo protocolo possa ser assinado e
provisoriamente aplicado o mais rapidamente possível.

C 42 E / 362 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006001/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ State of play in negotiations towards an EU-Gabon fisheries agreement

Following the resumption of negotiations between the EU and Gabon with a view to conclusion of a fisheries
agreement, could the Commission provide information on the state of play in these negotiations?

Has any agreement been reached yet?

When is an agreement likely to be reached?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

After the resumption of the negotiation with Gabon, two more rounds of negotiation took place in April 2013.

The two Parties reached an agreement on the text of the new protocol to the Fishery Partnership Agreement. This text
was initialled on 24 April 2013. The relevant documents and the minutes of the negotiation were sent to the Fisheries
Committee of the European Parliament on 25 April 2013.

The new Protocol provides the EU with fishing opportunities for tuna and other highly migratory species for 27 purse
seiners and 8 pole and line vessels, based on a reference tonnage of 20 000 tonnes. In return, the EU will pay Gabon
an annual compensation of EUR 1 350 000, out of which EUR 450 000 is earmarked to support the fisheries policy
of Gabon. European vessel owners will pay increased fees to fish in Gabonese waters.

The procedure for the signature and provisional application and for the conclusion of the new Protocol is ongoing:
the Commission adopted the relevant proposals on the 27 June 2013.

Discussions in Council are scheduled to take place during July 2013 with the objective to have the new protocol
signed and provisionally applied as soon as possible.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 363

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006002/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Privatização da EGF — Águas de Portugal

Em Portugal, populações e sindicatos têm vindo a desenvolver várias ações contra a privatização do setor dos
resíduos, em particular contra a privatização da Empresa Geral do Fomento (EGF), chamando a atenção para a
importância da gestão dos resíduos continuar no setor público.

Integrado na _holding_ pública Águas de Portugal, o Grupo EGF, com 11 empresas, é responsável pela gestão dos
resíduos em 174 municípios, que abrangem 58 por cento da população. Tem mais de dois mil trabalhadores, dispõe
de modernas tecnologias e infraestruturas, à custa de vultuosos investimentos públicos, e movimenta anualmente
cerca de 150 milhões de euros. Em 2011, este grupo gerou lucros de 6,4 milhões de euros.

Em face do exposto, e tendo em conta as pressões da Comissão Europeia para que esta privatização se concretize,
solicito que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Como justifica estas pressões, à luz do disposto no Tratado, onde se garante a «neutralidade» da UE
relativamente à propriedade — pública ou privada — de empresas como a EGF e outras?

2. Como pode justificar as pressões para que o Estado português abdique no futuro de uma fonte de receitas como
a que o grupo EGF representa, indo parar a privados o que hoje constitui receita para os cofres do Estado,
sobretudo depois dos vultuosos investimentos públicos realizados?

3. Tem presente os resultados das experiências de privatização em vários países, que se revelaram negócios
ruinosos para o Estado, com prejuízos muito grandes para as populações e os trabalhadores, tendo em conta a
degradação dos serviços prestados, o aumento da precariedade laboral e a diminuição dos salários? Que
avaliação faz dessas experiências?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(3 de julho de 2013)_

Tendo em conta a necessidade de colocar o rácio da dívida pública portuguesa numa trajetória descendente, a venda
de ativos lucrativos como é o caso da EGF constitui uma fonte possível de financiamento. Por outro lado, o Governo
português já ultrapassou os objetivos de privatização incluídos no programa de ajustamento económico. Cabe por
conseguinte ao Governo decidir se deve ou não privatizar esta empresa, não tendo a Comissão exercido qualquer
pressão sobre Portugal no sentido da privatização da EGF.

Tendo em conta a experiência de outros Estados-Membros, o programa de ajustamento incide especialmente sobre a
revisão do quadro regulamentar, para garantir uma maior eficiência e um maior grau de concorrência entre os
operadores no setor da gestão dos resíduos e dos recursos hídricos. Conseguir-se-á assim melhorar os serviços
prestados aos clientes, assegurar uma utilização mais eficiente dos recursos e proteger os interesses dos utilizadores.
Uma maior participação do setor privado num mercado melhor regulamentado pode contribuir para atenuar os
potenciais riscos que podem emergir com o novo ambiente empresarial, mais concorrencial, nos setores em causa.

C 42 E / 364 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006002/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Privatisation of EGF — Aguas de Portugal

Local communities and trade unions in Portugal are carrying out a variety of actions to protest against the
privatisation of the waste sector, particularly that of the General Works Company (EGF — Empresa Geral do
Fomento), drawing attention to the importance of keeping waste management in the public sector.

The EGF Group forms part of the Aguas de Portugal public holding and is made up of 11 enterprises. it is responsible
for waste management in 174 municipalities, providing services to 58% of the country’s population. EGF has over
2 000 employees, is endowed with modern technology and infrastructure as a result of substantial public investment
and has an annual turnover of around EUR 150 million. In 2011, the group made a profit of EUR 6.4 million.

In light of the above, and bearing in mind the pressure being exerted by the Commission to ensure that this
privatisation goes ahead, could the Commission answer the following:

1. How does it justify exerting such pressure, when the terms of the Treaty guarantee the EU’s ‘neutrality’
concerning the ownership — whether public or private — of enterprises such as EGF?

2. How can it justify exerting pressure on the Portuguese state to give up all future claim to a source of public
revenue such as the EGF Group and hand it over to private control, particularly after large amounts of public
money have been invested in it?

3. Is it taking into consideration the experience of privatisation in other countries, where it has been a disastrous
business deal for the state and has had an extremely negative impact on local communities and workers,
resulting in a decline in services, increased job instability and lower wages? What is the Commission's
assessment of these experiences?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2013)_

In view of the need to bring the public debt ratio in Portugal on a declining path, the sale of profitable assets like the
General Works Company (EGF) is a possible source of financing. On the other hand, the Portuguese governement has
already overachieved on the privatisation targets included in the Economic Adjustment Programme. It is therfore for
the government to decide whether or not to privatise this company and the Commisison has not exerted any pressure
on Portugal to privatise EGF.

Taking into account the experiences of other Member States, the Adjustment Programme focuses on the redesign of
the regulatory framework to ensure greater efficiency and competition between operators in the waste management
and water sector. This will improve client service, ensure a more efficient use of resources and protect the interests of
users. A greater participation of the private sector in a better regulated market can help mitigate risks that can arise
from the new and more competitive business environment in these sectors.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 365

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006003/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Sistema Integrado Multimunicipal de Águas Residuais da Península de Setúbal — ETAR Barreiro/Moita (III)

Em pergunta anteriormente formulada sobre este mesmo assunto (P-012653/2011), na qual era feita referência a um
pedido de modificação da Decisão de 9 de dezembro de 2005, relativa ao projeto 2005 PT 16 C PE 002 (ETAR
Barreiro/Moita), apresentado pelas autoridades portuguesas, questionei a Comissão sobre se poderia equacionar uma
alteração ou adenda ao texto da cláusula restritiva da decisão em vigor (cláusula restritiva n.° 13, secção 3.1, da
Decisão, envolvendo ações que ultrapassam a área de intervenção do executor).

Em resposta a esta pergunta, (em 10.2.2012), a Comissão afirmou que o pedido de alteração da Decisão estava a ser
tratado e que a _«secção 13.1 obriga as autoridades nacionais a garantirem o pré-tratamento das águas residuais provenientes de_
_explorações de suinicultura, antes de serem submetidas a tratamento no sistema Simarsul»_ .

Mais afirmava que se tratava « _de uma obrigação já prevista na Decisão de 2005 que concede o apoio do Fundo de Coesão ao_
_projeto e que reflete o compromisso formal assumido pelas autoridades nacionais no sentido de adotarem uma solução global, que_
_responda simultaneamente ao problema das águas residuais urbanas e de tratamento das águas residuais provenientes de cerca de_
_130 explorações de suinicultura na zona_, _que, caso não seja tratado, tornar-se-á num importante risco para o ambiente»._

Entretanto, tive conhecimento de que o Instituto Financeiro para o Desenvolvimento Regional, IFDR, remeteu um
ofício à Comissão Europeia, anexando carta da Ministra da Agricultura, do Mar, do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do
Território, datada de 18 de junho de 2012 _, «com informação sobre as soluções adotadas na área abrangida pelo projeto, que_
_visa demonstrar que o Estado-Membro assegura um adequado tratamento, disponibilizando informação que permite rever os_
_termos do diagnóstico efetuado em 2005 aquando da adoção desta condicionante»_ e que em seu « _entendimento encontram-se_
_agora reunidas as condições para ultrapassar a referida condicionante»._

Em face do exposto, solicita-se à Comissão que informe sobre o seguinte:

Considera que os elementos remetidos pelas das autoridades portuguesas são suficientes para, finalmente, modificar e
ultrapassar a referida Decisão (secção 3.1), libertando o saldo, de modo a não penalizar a Região de Setúbal e o
beneficiário da ajuda, a Simarsul, por ações pelas quais não pode ser responsabilizado?

**Resposta dada por Johannes Hahn em nome da Comissão**

_(18 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão confirma a receção do ofício de 18 de junho de 2012, enviado pelas autoridades portuguesas sobre o
projeto mencionado pelo Senhor Deputado relativamente à obrigação assumida pelas autoridades nacionais de
garantirem o pré-tratamento de águas poluídas provenientes de explorações de suinicultura, antes de serem
submetidas a tratamento no sistema Simarsul.

A Comissão encontra-se atualmente a analisar este ofício e, por conseguinte, responderá ao Senhor Deputado sobre a
posição adotada em tempo útil.

C 42 E / 366 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006003/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Integrated combined municipal waste water system in the Setubal peninsula — ETAR Barreiro/Moita (III)

In a previously formulated question on this same subject (P-012653/2011), in which reference was made to a request
for the modification of the decision of 9 December 2005, relating to project 2005 PT 16 C PE 002 (ETAR Barreiro
Moita), presented by the Portuguese authorities, I asked the Commission whether it could make an alteration or
addendum to the text of the restrictive clause of the decision in force (restrictive clause no. 13 of the decision,
involving actions that exceed the area of intervention of the executor).

In response to this question (on 10 February 2011) the Commission said that the request for a decision modification
was being processed and that ‘Section 13.1 refers to the obligation of the national authorities regarding the pretreatment of polluted water from the pig farms before undergoing further treatment in the Simarsul system’.

It also stated that ‘this obligation was already included in the 2005 decision granting the Cohesion Fund support to
this project and reflects the formal commitment taken by the national authorities in order to implement a
comprehensive solution which would deal both with urban waste water and ensure the treatment of the waste water
from the roughly 130 pig farms in the area, which, if untreated, becomes an important environmental hazard’.

In the meantime, I have learned that the Financial Institute for Regional Development (FIRD) has written to the
Commission, forwarding a letter of 18 June 2012 from the Portuguese Minister for Agriculture, the Sea, Environment
and Territorial Planning ‘containing information on solutions agreed to in the area covered by the project, showing
that the Member State guarantees proper waste treatment, and providing information enabling the terms of the 2005
decision — when the restrictive clause was adopted — to be revised’ and expressing the ‘understanding that the
conditions for lifting the restriction have now been met’.

In light of the above, can the Commission say:

Whether it considers that the information provided by the Portuguese authorities is sufficient to finally amend the
said Decision (Section 3.1) and release the remaining amount, so that the Setubal region and the beneficiary of the aid
(Simarsul) are not penalised for actions in respect of which they cannot be held responsible?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

The Commission confirms reception of the letter of 18 June 2012, sent by the Portuguese authorities about the
project mentioned by the Honourable Member related to the obligation taken on by the national authorities of pretreating polluted water from pig farms before undergoing further treatment in the Simarsul system.

The Commission is currently analysing this letter and will therefore reply to the Honourable Member on the position
taken in due time.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 367

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006005/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Despedimentos anunciados recentemente por multinacionais europeias

O grupo industrial alemão ThyssenKrupp, líder em aço na Alemanha, anunciou recentemente a intenção de despedir
três mil trabalhadores em todo o mundo depois de ter registado perdas líquidas de 89 milhões de euros entre janeiro e

março.

O banco HSBC pretende eliminar mais 14 mil postos de trabalho nos próximos três anos, segundo revelou a
administração da instituição. Desde 2011, o HSBC já extinguiu 46 mil empregos.

O ABN AMRO, o maior banco holandês, anunciou, também recentemente, que vai despedir 400 trabalhadores,
depois ter registado uma quebra nos lucros de 17 % no primeiro trimestre deste ano.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Dispõe de informações sobre o impacto destes despedimentos em cada um dos 27 Estados‐Membros?

2. Que acompanhamento está a ser feito destas três situações?

3. Tomou ou vai tomar alguma medida para impedir estes despedimentos?

4. Que medidas pensa tomar caso os mesmos se concretizem?

5. Alguma destas multinacionais recebeu alguma vez financiamento da UE?

**Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão**

_(23 de julho de 2013)_

Perguntas 1 e 2

O Observatório Europeu da Reestruturação (European Restructuring Monitor — ERM) monitoriza o impacto a nível
do emprego dos processos de reestruturação em grande escala na UE. Os dados podem ser extraídos por país, setor,
etc. O ERM dispõe igualmente de uma base de dados sobre instrumentos de apoio público a nível nacional para a
reestruturação. O ERM delineia ainda trimestralmente as grandes tendências europeias no que diz respeito a
reestruturação ( [1] ). Além disso, a Comissão publica regularmente relatórios sobre a situação global do emprego na UE.

Perguntas 3 e 4

A Comissão não tem competência para intervir em decisões específicas das empresas. Insta, porém, as empresas a
observarem boas práticas para a antecipação das suas eventuais necessidades a nível de competências e de formação e
a adotarem uma gestão socialmente responsável da reestruturação. Na sequência do seu Livro Verde de janeiro de
2012 ( [2] ) e da aprovação do «relatório Cercas» pelo Parlamento Europeu em 15 de janeiro de 2013, a Comissão
proporá uma comunicação que institui um quadro jurídico em matéria de qualidade, que enquadrará a legislação e as
iniciativas da UE relevantes para a reestruturação, bem como apresentará as melhores práticas a serem implementadas
por todas as partes interessadas.

Além disso, a Comissão recorda que, em caso de encerramento de empresas, a entidade patronal tem de respeitar as
suas obrigações em matéria de informação e consulta dos trabalhadores, em conformidade com a legislação da UE ( [3] ).
A Comissão salienta que os trabalhadores suscetíveis de serem afetados pela reestruturação se podem candidatar ao
apoio do Fundo Social Europeu (FSE) e, se reunirem as condições necessárias para tal, ao apoio do Fundo Europeu de
Ajustamento à Globalização.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ver: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/index.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Ver as respostas e um resumo em: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8908&langId=en
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Em especial, a Diretiva 2002/14/CE que estabelece um quadro geral relativo à informação e à consulta dos trabalhadores na Comunidade

Europeia, JO L 80 de 23.3.2002, p. 29; a Diretiva 98/59/CE do Conselho relativa à aproximação das legislações dos Estados-Membros respeitantes
aos despedimentos coletivos (JO L 225 de 12.8.1998, p. 16); e a Diretiva 2009/38/CE relativa à instituição de um Conselho de Empresa Europeu
ou de um procedimento de informação e consulta dos trabalhadores nas empresas ou grupos de empresas de dimensão comunitária, JO L 122 de
16.5.2009.

C 42 E / 368 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Pergunta 5

No tocante ao apoio financeiro do FSE e do FEDER, a lista de beneficiários, os nomes das operações e o montante do
financiamento atribuído às operações podem ser consultados em cada Estado-Membro, a fim de verificar se tais
empresas receberam efetivamente apoio financeiro proveniente destes fundos ( [4] ).

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Em conformidade com o Regulamento (CE) n.° 1828/2006 da Comissão que estabelece a obrigação de manter e publicar, em formato eletrónico
ou outro, a lista de beneficiários, a designação das ações e os montantes das subvenções públicas a estas atribuídas.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 369

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006005/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Redundancies recently announced by European multinationals

The German industrial group ThyssenKrupp, the leading German steelmaker, recently announced that it intended to
dismiss 3 000 workers across the world after recording net losses of EUR 89 million between January and March.

The management of HSBC bank has announced that it is cutting a further 14 000 jobs over the next three years. A
total of 46 000 jobs have already been lost in HSBC since 2011.

The largest Dutch bank, ABN AMRO, also recently announced 400 redundancies after profits fell by 17% in the first
quarter of 2013.

1. Does the Commission have any information on the impact of these job losses in each of the 27 Member States?

2. What action is being taken to monitor these three cases?

3. Has the Commission taken or will it take any action to prevent these job losses?

4. What action will it take if these redundancies go ahead?

5. Has any of these multinationals ever received EU funding?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

1 and 2.

The European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) monitors the employment impact of large-scale restructuring events in
the EU. Data can be extracted by country, sector, etc. The ERM also provides a database on national public support
instruments for restructuring. The ERM quarterly outlines major European trends in restructuring. ( [1] ) Moreover, the
Commission publishes regular reports on the overall employment situation in the EU.

3 and 4.

The Commission has no powers to interfere in specific company's decisions. It urges them, however, to follow good
practices for anticipation of skills and training needs within companies and socially responsible management of
restructuring. Following its January 2012 Green Paper ( [2] ) and the adoption by the European Parliament on
15 January 2013 of the Cercas report, the Commission will propose a communication establishing a Quality
Framework that will frame the EU legislation and initiatives relevant to restructuring and will present the best
practices to be implemented by all stakeholders.

In addition, the Commission reminds that, in case of closure of undertakings, the employer has to respect his/her
obligations relating to information and consultation of workers in accordance with EC law ( [3] ). The Commission
would also point out that workers affected by restructuring may qualify for support from the European Social Fund
(ESF) and, provided that the necessary conditions are met, from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

5.

Concerning the financial support by the ESF and the ERDF, a list of beneficiaries, the names of the operations and the
amount of funding allocated to operations can be consulted in each Member State in order to verify if these
companies received any funding support from these Funds. ( [4] )

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/index.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See the replies and a summary under http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8908&langId=en
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) In particular, Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community,

OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29; Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies,
OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 16; Directive 2009/38/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale
undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 122 of 16.5.2009.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) According to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 that establishes the obligation to maintain and publish, electronically or otherwise a

list of beneficiaries, the names of the operations and the amount of funding allocated to operations.

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 370 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006006/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Dia Internacional das Famílias — Efeitos da crise nas famílias

Na sua mensagem no Dia Internacional das Famílias, o secretário-geral das Nações Unidas considerou que esta é uma
oportunidade para refletir sobre a forma como as famílias são afetadas pela crise económica e social, e sobre o que
pode ser feito para fortalecer as famílias em resposta a esta crise.

O desemprego obriga muitos jovens, que desejam ser independentes, a continuar a depender dos seus pais mais
tempo do que o esperado. A falta de creches e infantários acessíveis está a complicar os esforços dos pais, em famílias
em que os dois cônjuges trabalham, para combinar as obrigações familiares com o trabalho. Os mais idosos
continuam a carecer de uma rede apropriada de cuidados sociais e a serem vítimas de pensões baixas.

Em Portugal, as políticas implementadas ao abrigo do programa UE-FMI, como por exemplo os cortes nos apoios
sociais (subsídio de desemprego, abono de família, rendimento social de inserção, complemento solidário para
idosos) afetam, sobremaneira, as famílias.

Na sua mensagem, o secretário-geral da ONU afirma que é preciso fortalecer as políticas de apoio às famílias e exorta
os responsáveis políticos a terem estas preocupações em conta na sua ação.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que avaliação faz da forma como as famílias estão a ser afetadas pela crise? Em particular, que avaliação faz da
forma como, em Portugal, as famílias estão a ser afetadas pela implementação do programa UE-FMI e, em
especial, sobre os cortes nos apoios sociais supramencionados?

2. De que forma pensa acolher o apelo do secretário-geral da ONU para se fortalecerem as políticas de apoio às
famílias?

3. Considera a necessidade de inverter as políticas que tem vindo a defender, nomeadamente através dos
programas UE-FMI, tendo em conta o seu efeito profundamente negativo nas famílias?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(9 de julho de 2013)_

1. A Comissão está ciente do impacto dramático do aumento do desemprego em muitas famílias portuguesas. Por
este motivo, as medidas do Programa de Ajustamento Económico foram concebidas de forma a proteger os grupos
mais vulneráveis da sociedade. Em 2011e 2012, a despesa pública relativa a prestações sociais manteve-se estável em
cerca de 37 mil milhões de EUR, a um nível semelhante ao de 2010 e superior aos níveis anteriores à crise, em 2007 e
2008. Estes números são comparáveis, por exemplo, com reduções significativas noutras áreas, tais como o
investimento público ou o nível total de remunerações pago no setor público.

2. As políticas familiares como as mencionadas não são da competência da União Europeia. Por conseguinte, a
Comissão não pode apoiar diretamente o apelo do Secretário-Geral da ONU para se fortalecerem as políticas de apoio
às famílias. No entanto, é-lhes dada a devida atenção no contexto da avaliação e do controlo da proteção social. Em
especial, o Pacote de Investimento Social (PIS) ( [1] ) identificou as alterações demográficas como um importante motor
da mudança no sentido de tornar as despesas sociais mais eficazes. Além disso, no âmbito do Semestre Europeu, a
Comissão tem emitido recomendações específicas por país incluindo algumas em matéria da conciliação entre a vida
profissional e a vida privada.

3. A Comissão considera que a execução das medidas necessárias para assegurar a sustentabilidade da dívida,
aliada a uma agenda de reformas estruturais, constitui a estratégia adequada para tornar Portugal num país mais
competitivo, capaz de retomar um crescimento económico sustentável e inclusivo, bem como de criar emprego, ao
mesmo tempo que a despesa com a proteção social e as redes de segurança adequadas continuam a desempenhar um
papel crucial na preservação da coesão social e a evitar que aumente o número de pessoas em risco de pobreza.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Ver COM(2013) 83.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 371

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006006/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ International Day of Families — how families are being affected by the crisis

In his message for the International Day of Families, the Secretary-General of the United Nations said that this is an
opportunity to reflect on how families are affected by the economic and social crisis, and what can be done to
strengthen families in response to this crisis.

Unemployment is forcing many young people who would like to be independent to continue to rely on their parents
for longer than expected. The lack of affordable crèches and nurseries is complicating parents' efforts to combine
family responsibilities with work in families where both partners are employed. Elderly people still have no
appropriate network of social care and have to live on low pensions.

In Portugal, families are being especially hard hit by the policies implemented under the EU-IMF programme, such as
cuts to social security benefits (unemployment benefit, family allowance, income support and the solidarity
supplement for the elderly).

In his message, the UN Secretary-General said that policies to support families need to be strengthened and urged
policy-makers to take these concerns into account when taking decisions.

1. What is the Commission's assessment of the way in which families are being affected by the crisis? In particular,
what is its assessment of the way in which families are being affected by the implementation of the EU-IMF
programme in Portugal, and in particular the cuts to the social security benefits mentioned above?

2. How will it respond to the UN Secretary-General's appeal to strengthen policies to support families?

3. Does it see a need to reverse the policies that it has been advocating, in particular through the EU-IMF
programmes, bearing in mind their profoundly negative effect on families?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

1. The Commission is aware of the dramatic impact of the increase in unemployment on many Portuguese
families. For this reason, the measures of the Economic Adjustment Programme have been devised so as to protect the
most vulnerable in the society. Public expenditure in social benefits has been stable at around EUR 37 billion both in
2011 and 2012, which is the same level as in 2010 and higher than in pre-crisis levels in 2007 and 2008. These
figures compare for instance with significant reductions in other areas such as public investment or the total level
paid as remunerations in the public sector.

2. Family policies as such are not a competence of the European Union. It is therefore not possible for the
Commission to directly support the UN Secretary-General's appeal to strengthen policies to support families.
Nevertheless due attention is given to them in the context of social protection assessment and monitoring. In
particular, the Social Investment Package (SIP) ( [1] ) identified demographic change as a major engine of change towards
making social spending more effective. Moreover, within the European Semester the Commission has been issuing
country-specific recommendations, including some concerning work-life reconciliation.

3. The Commission considers that carrying out the necessary measures to ensure debt sustainability coupled with
an ambitious agenda of structural reforms is the right strategy to make Portugal a more competitive country capable
of resuming sustainable, and inclusive economic growth and creating employment, while expenditure in social
protection and adequate safety nets continue to play a crucial role in preserving social cohesion and avoiding
increases in the number of people at risk of poverty.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See COM(2013) 83.

C 42 E / 372 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006007/13**

**à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ VP/HR — Encerramento da prisão de Guantânamo e libertação dos detidos sobre os quais não pende
qualquer acusação formal

Cento e cinquenta mil pessoas exigiram ao Presidente dos EUA, num abaixo-assinado, o encerramento da prisão de
Guantânamo e a libertação dos detidos sobre os quais não pende qualquer acusação formal (95 % do total). Este
abaixo-assinado foi divulgado quando 130 dos 166 presos realizam uma greve de fome contra as torturas, as
condições de encarceramento e pela sua libertação. Alguns dos reclusos estão a ser alimentados por sondas, o que,
aliás, motivou já o protesto do Grupo de Trabalho da ONU para a Detenção Arbitrária e de três relatores especiais das
Nações Unidas, que consideram grave a situação e instam os EUA a encerrar definitivamente este campo de
concentração na Base Naval.

Em face do exposto, perguntamos:

1. Que posição assumiu recentemente a UE sobre este assunto?

2. Não considera necessária uma condenação pública formal das torturas e das condições de encarceramento em
Guantânamo e a exigência do seu encerramento imediato, com a libertação dos detidos sobre os quais não
pende qualquer acusação formal?

3. Que implicações retira da persistência desta situação para as relações entre a UE e os EUA?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(20 de agosto de 2013)_

A UE tem apelado repetidamente ao encerramento da prisão de Guantânamo. Este apelo foi renovado publicamente
em 18 de abril de 2013, numa declaração da Comissão, no âmbito de uma sessão plenária do Parlamento Europeu
sobre a greve de fome atualmente em curso em Guantânamo.

Além disso, a UE e os seus Estados-Membros questionaram as autoridades dos EUA sobre as disposições em matéria
de luta contra o terrorismo previstas nas leis de autorização da defesa nacional (NDAA) para os anos fiscais de 2012 e
2013, bem como sobre a lei de 2001 que permite o uso de força militar (AUMF), que constituem o quadro jurídico
que autoriza o sistema de detenção de Guantánamo ao abrigo da legislação dos EUA e que impede o seu

encerramento.

No passado, vários Estados-Membros da UE aceitaram acolher mais de 20 antigos detidos com vista à sua reinstalação
— um gesto importante, dado que, até à data, só um dos detidos de Guantânamo foi transferido para o território dos
Estados Unidos.

Em 30 de abril de 2013, durante uma conferência de imprensa, o Presidente Obama comprometeu-se a dar um novo
impulso ao encerramento da prisão de Guantânamo. Este impulso foi renovado em 23 de maio, durante um
importante discurso sobre a política norte‐americana de luta contra o terrorismo proferido na Universidade de Defesa
Nacional (Fort Mc Nair, Washington DC).

Na reunião ministerial sobre Justiça e Assuntos Internos, realizada em 14 de junho de 2013, a UE recordou a sua
posição sobre o encerramento da prisão de Guantânamo e congratulou-se com este compromisso renovado dos
Estados Unidos, tendo-se disposto a apoiar, na medida do possível, os esforços deste país para encerrar a prisão.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 373

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006007/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Closure of Guantánamo prison and release of detainees held without formal charges

A petition calling on the US President to close Guantánamo prison and release those detainees who are not facing any
formal charges (95% of all those being held) has now been signed by 150 000 people. The petition was published at a
time when 130 of the 166 prisoners are on hunger strike to protest against torture and prison conditions and appeal
for their release. Some detainees are being force-fed, which has sparked protests from the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention and three UN special rapporteurs, who have described the situation as serious and are urging
the US to close this naval base concentration camp once and for all.

1. What recent stance has the EU taken on this issue?

2. Is there not a need to issue a formal public condemnation of torture and prison conditions in Guantánamo,
demanding its immediate closure and the release of detainees against whom no formal charges have been made?

3. What implications does this ongoing situation have for relations between the EU and the US?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

The EU has consistently called for the closure of the Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility. This call was publicly
renewed on 18 April 2013 in a statement by the Commission, in the context of a European Parliament plenary debate
on the current hunger strike in Guantánamo.

Furthermore, the EU and its Member States have engaged the US authorities on the counter-terrorism provisions of
the National Defence Authorisation Acts (NDAA) for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 as well as on the Authorisation for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2001, which provide the legal framework that authorises the Guantánamo
detention system under US law and prevents the closure of the facility.

In the past, a number of EU Member States have accepted over 20 ex-detainees for resettlement — an important
gesture given that only one Guantánamo detainee has been transferred to US soil so far.

On 30 April 2013, during a press conference, President Obama pledged a new push to close the Guantánamo Bay
detention facility. This push was renewed on 23 May, during a major speech on US Counterterrorism policy at the
National Defense University (Fort McNair, Washington DC).

At the Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meeting, on 14 June 2013, the EU recalled its position on the closure of
the Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility and commended this renewed US commitment and offered to support, to the
extent possible, the US efforts to close the facility.

C 42 E / 374 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006008/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Novo máximo no desemprego e cobertura e valor do subsídio de desemprego em Portugal

Em Portugal, o desemprego atingiu um novo máximo. A taxa de desemprego subiu para os 17,7 % no primeiro
trimestre, face aos 16,9 % no trimestre anterior, com o número de desempregados a ultrapassar os 950 mil, segundo
dados divulgados pelo Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE).

Entre os jovens, a taxa atingiu, no mesmo período, os 42,1 %, ou seja, um universo de 165,9 mil pessoas entre os 15 e
os 24 anos. No primeiro trimestre de 2012, a taxa de desemprego nesta faixa etária era de 36,2 % e no quarto
trimestre era de 40 %.

O desemprego de longa duração (há 12 meses ou mais) continuou também a subir, chegando aos 10,4 % face aos
7,6 % no trimestre homólogo e aos 9,5 % no quarto trimestre de 2012.

Por outro lado, os últimos dados da Segurança Social, relativos a abril, indicam que apenas 43,9 % dos
desempregados recebem subsídio de desemprego (ou seja, 418 153 beneficiários).

Embora superior em 55 605 pessoas, face ao mesmo mês de 2012, este número está longe de corresponder aos
952,2 mil desempregados (mais 132,9 mil pessoas), contabilizados pelo INE. Os dados da Segurança Social incluem o
subsídio de desemprego, o subsídio social de desemprego inicial, o subsídio social de desemprego subsequente e o
prolongamento do subsídio social de desemprego. Verifica-se ainda que o valor médio das prestações diminuiu de
501,13 euros, em abril de 2012, para 487,67 euros, no mês passado.

Em face do exposto, perguntamos à Comissão:

1. Tendo em conta que estes números traduzem os efeitos destrutivos da aplicação do programa UE-FMI, e tendo
em conta que os números reais do desemprego superam sempre as previsões da troika e do governo português,
considera a necessidade de inverter as políticas contidas no referido programa?

2. Que medidas pensa tomar perante a catástrofe económica e social que estes dados evidenciam?

3. Não considera que estão em causa os direitos e a dignidade dos desempregados, quando menos de metade deles
recebe subsídio de desemprego (a que têm direito porque para ele descontaram enquanto trabalharam) e
quando o valor médio do subsídio de desemprego é de 487,67 euros? Pensa tomar alguma medida para
remediar esta situação?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(9 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão entende que a aplicação das medidas necessárias para assegurar a solvência da dívida e restabelecer de
forma sustentável o crescimento constitui a estratégia adequada para garantir a saída de Portugal da atual crise
económica e da dívida.

Os desempregados são um dos grupos mais vulneráveis da sociedade, sendo fundamental, na conjuntura atual,
garantir redes de segurança social adequadas para atenuar o impacte social da crise. Olhando para o futuro, o objetivo
deve continuar a ser o de fomentar o crescimento e o emprego, para reduzir o número de desempregados.

A política de emprego releva, sobretudo, da competência nacional. Portugal está a aplicar um conjunto de medidas
que deverão contribuir para o combate ao desemprego. Citem‐se, a título de exemplo, um conjunto abrangente de
políticas ativas do mercado de trabalho, a aplicação de um amplo programa de reformas estruturais e incentivos ao
investimento.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 375

Ao nível da UE, a Comissão apresentou várias iniciativas conducentes à criação de emprego e à melhoria das políticas
sociais. As medidas correspondentes encontram‐se delineadas, designadamente, no Pacto para o Crescimento e o
Emprego, na Análise Anual do Crescimento, de 2013, no Pacote relativo ao Emprego dos Jovens e no Pacote de
Investimento Social. A partir de 2014, estarão disponíveis suplementares da UE para financiar iniciativas de combate
ao desemprego dos jovens.

C 42 E / 376 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006008/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ New record unemployment and the coverage and amount of unemployment benefit in Portugal

Unemployment has reached a new record high in Portugal. The unemployment rate rose to 17.7% in the first quarter,
against 16.9% in the previous quarter, and the number of unemployed rose above 950 000, according to figures
published by the National Institute for Statistics (INE).

The unemployment rate for young people stood at 42.1% for the same period, equivalent to 165 900 people between
15 and 24. The unemployment rate for this age group stood at 36.2% in the first quarter of 2012 and 40% in the last
quarter.

Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) also continued to rise, reaching 10.4% against 7.6% in the
corresponding quarter of 2012, and 9.5% in the last quarter.

The latest social security figures, for April, showed that only 43.9% of unemployed people receive unemployment
benefits (i.e. 418 153 beneficiaries).

Even though this is 55 605 people more than in the same month in 2012, this figure is still a long way from the
952 200 people (a further 132 900) recorded as unemployed by the INE. The social security figures include
unemployment benefit, initial social unemployment benefit, subsequent social unemployment benefit and extended
social unemployment benefit. The average value of benefits fell from EUR 501.13 in April 2012 to EUR 487.67 last
month.

1. Bearing in mind that these figures reflect the destructive impact of the implementation of the EU-IMF
programme, and that the actual unemployment figures are always higher than the troika and Portuguese Government
forecasts, should the policies contained in this programme be reversed?

2. What action will the Commission take in response to the economic and social disaster that these figures reveal?

3. Does the Commission not believe that the rights and dignity of unemployed people are in jeopardy, given that
fewer than half of them receive unemployment benefit (to which they are entitled, since they contributed to it when
they were working) and the average value of unemployment benefit stands at EUR 487.67? Will it take any steps to
remedy this situation?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 July 2013)_

The Commission considers that carrying out the necessary measures to ensure debt solvency and restore growth on a
sustainable basis is the right strategy to ensure that Portugal can exit successfully the present debt and economic crisis.

The unemployed are among the most vulnerable groups in the society and ensuring adequate social safety nets is key
at the current juncture to alleviate the social impact of the crisis. Looking forward, the objective should continue to be
that of fostering growth and employment, to reduce the number of jobless persons.

Employment policy is mostly a matter of national competency. Portugal is implementing a set of measures that
should help fighting unemployment. Examples of these policies include a comprehensive set of Active Labour Market
Policies, the implementation of a broad structural reform programme and incentives for investment.

At the EU level the Commission has presented various initiatives conducive to employment creation and to improve
social policies. These measures are outlined, inter-alia, in the Compact for Growth and Jobs, the 2013 Annual Growth
Survey, the Youth Employment Package and the Social investment package. Additional EU funds will be available
starting from 2014 to finance initiatives to fight youth unemployment.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 377

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006009/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) e Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Peso dos salários no rendimento nacional

Em Portugal, o peso dos salários na distribuição do rendimento nacional atingiu o valor historicamente baixo de
38 %, sem contar com o efeito das várias políticas delineadas para o corrente ano, ao abrigo do programa UE-FMI, que
preveem ainda mais cortes nos salários. Este número mostra que, a par da profunda recessão que afeta o país, com
uma muito significativa quebra na produção de riqueza, se procedeu e procede a uma operação de redistribuição da
riqueza nacional em favor do capital e em desfavor do trabalho, agravando assim as injustiças que já existiam e que
colocavam Portugal, segundo dados do Eurostat, em 2011, entre os países com maiores desequilíbrios na distribuição
dos rendimentos.

Em face do exposto, solicitamos à Comissão que nos informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Tem avaliado a Comissão a evolução deste indicador — peso dos salários no rendimento nacional — nos 27
Estados-Membros? Que avaliação faz desta evolução?

2. Não considera que a diminuição do peso dos salários a que se assiste em Portugal compromete a possibilidade
de um desenvolvimento justo e inclusivo (objetivos que a UE afirma defender)?

3. Pensa adotar alguma medida que contribua para elevar o peso dos salários no rendimento nacional, ou seja,
para que uma parte maior da riqueza criada remunere aqueles que efetivamente a criam, contribuindo assim
para uma maior justiça social?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(4 de julho de 2013)_

De acordo com a base de dados macroeconómicos dos serviços da Comissão (AMECO), em Portugal, o peso relativo
ajustado dos salários aumentou de 55 %, em 1990, para um pouco mais de 59 %, no início da década de 2000, tendo,
a partir de então, começado a diminuir de novo para 58,2 %, em 2010 e ainda para 55,6 %, em 2012. Assim sendo, o
peso relativo da massa salarial continua a ser superior ao registado no início da década de 1990. Comparada com
outros países da UE, o peso relativo da massa salarial em Portugal situa-se algures no segmento intermédio.

O peso relativo da massa salarial traduz, essencialmente, a parte correspondente à remuneração dos trabalhadores no
valor acrescentado. Os países que se encontram em vias de recuperar a competitividade em termos de custos durante
o reajustamento, como é o caso de Portugal, registaram recentemente uma redução no peso relativo da massa salarial.
Uma evolução salarial moderada em países em crise resulta, em grande parte, de uma redução acentuada da procura
de mão-de-obra, sendo tal ajustamento salarial necessário para reabsorver o desemprego fortemente agravado.
Olhando para o futuro, as medidas do programa de ajustamento português destinadas a reduzir margens
injustificadas através da abertura dos mercados e do aumento da concorrência no setor empresarial, não só
permitirão reforçar a competitividade da economia, mas também contribuirão para limitar, se não mesmo inverter, a
diminuição do peso relativo da massa salarial.

C 42 E / 378 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

|Peso relativo da massa salarial em alguns países da UE (1990-2012)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1990|2000|2010|2011|2012|
|BE|61,4|61,3|61,1|61,5|62,4|
|DK|59,3|56,4|59,2|58,9|58,4|
|DE|NA|60,6|57,2|57,5|58,4|
|IE|59,4|48,2|53,3|51,4|50,6|
|EL|62,4|55,6|55|53,4|50,5|
|ES|60,7|58,9|56,4|55,1|53,1|
|FR|59,3|57,2|58,7|58,7|59|
|IT|61,9|53,2|55,4|55,3|55,5|
|LU|51,6|49,9|50,2|49,4|49,1|
|MT|52|49,2|51|50,7|51,5|
|NL|61,7|58,8|59,2|59,2|59,9|
|AT|61,8|59|57,5|56,8|57,4|
|PT|55|59,2|58,4|57,7|55,6|
|RO|78,4|72,1|55,1|53,4|54,2|
|FI|63,5|53,8|58,5|57,8|58,2|
|SE|61,7|58,6|56,4|55,4|56,6|
|UK|65|62,5|63,4|62,8|64,1|
|EA-17|NA|58,1|58,2|57,4|57,2|

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 379

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006009/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL) and Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Wage share in national income

The wage share in the distribution of national income in Portugal has reached a historic low of 38%, on top of the
impact of the various policies outlined for 2013 under the EU-IMF programme, which provide for yet more wage
cuts. This figure shows that, alongside the deep recession that is affecting the country, with a significant drop in
wealth production, national wealth has been and is still being redistributed away from labour and towards capital,
thereby worsening the injustices that were already in existence and which placed Portugal among the countries with
the greatest inequalities in income distribution in 2011, according to Eurostat figures.

1. Has the Commission assessed the way in which this indicator — wage share in national income — has
developed in the 27 Member States? What is its assessment of this development?

2. Does the Commission not believe that the decline in the wage share recorded in Portugal is undermining the
prospects for fair and inclusive development (objectives which the EU claims to support)?

3. Will the Commission take any steps to help increase the wage share in national income, i.e. to ensure that a
greater share of the wealth created benefits those who actually created it, thereby helping to bring about greater social
justice?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 July 2013)_

According to the Commission services' macroeconomic database (AMECO), the adjusted wage share in Portugal has
increased from 55% in 1990 to somewhat above 59% in the early 2000s from where it started to decline again, to
58.2% in 2010 and further to 55.6% by 2012. As such, the wage share remains higher than in the early 1990s.
Compared with other EU countries, the wage share in Portugal is situated somewhere in the medium range.

The wage share reflects essentially the share of employee compensations in value added. Countries in the process of
regaining cost competitiveness during rebalancing like Portugal have recently witnessed a reduction in the wage
share. Subdued wage developments in crisis countries are mostly the result of a major drop in labour demand, and
such wage adjustment is needed to re-absorb the much increased unemployment. Looking forward, the measures of
the Portuguese adjustment programme aimed at reducing unjustified mark-ups by opening up markets and
introducing more competition in the business sector would not only help further raising the competitiveness of the
economy but also work in the direction of limiting, if not reversing, the fall in the wage share.

C 42 E / 380 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

|Wage share in selected EU countries (1990-2012)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1990|2000|2010|2011|2012|
|BE|61.4|61.3|61.1|61.5|62.4|
|DK|59.3|56.4|59.2|58.9|58.4|
|DE|NA|60.6|57.2|57.5|58.4|
|IE|59.4|48.2|53.3|51.4|50.6|
|EL|62.4|55.6|55|53.4|50.5|
|ES|60.7|58.9|56.4|55.1|53.1|
|FR|59.3|57.2|58.7|58.7|59|
|IT|61.9|53.2|55.4|55.3|55.5|
|LU|51.6|49.9|50.2|49.4|49.1|
|MT|52|49.2|51|50.7|51.5|
|NL|61.7|58.8|59.2|59.2|59.9|
|AT|61.8|59|57.5|56.8|57.4|
|PT|55|59.2|58.4|57.7|55.6|
|RO|78.4|72.1|55.1|53.4|54.2|
|FI|63.5|53.8|58.5|57.8|58.2|
|SE|61.7|58.6|56.4|55.4|56.6|
|UK|65|62.5|63.4|62.8|64.1|
|EA-17|NA|58.1|58.2|57.4|57.2|

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 381

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006010/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD) e Giancarlo Scottà (EFD)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Inefficacia delle azioni di contrasto alla malattia vescicolare del suino (MVS) nel sud Italia e danni al comparto
zooagricolo nazionale

In diverse regioni italiane del centro-sud la malattia vescicolare del suino è ormai presente da decenni e, nonostante gli
aiuti statali ed europei ricevuti dagli allevatori per far fronte a tale malattia, essa non è stata ancora debellata. Vi sono
ragioni per sospettare una scarsa diligenza nell'opera di contrasto di tale patologia, alla luce del fatto che le regioni del
nord hanno eradicato il morbo.

È opportuno ricordare che la MVS è soggetta a obbligo di denuncia nazionale e internazionale e che la presenza di
focolai di MVS costituisce un serio ostacolo alla possibilità di commercio ed esportazione dei derivati del suino
prodotti nell'area interessata, in ragione dei divieti imposti dalle autorità per arginare la diffusione del morbo. Le
mancate esportazioni per il settore, legate ai divieti di importazione dall'Italia di carni suine e di determinati tipi di
salumi imposti da molti paesi per ridurre il rischio di contagio, sono quantificabili in 250 milioni di euro l'anno.

Va tuttavia rilevato che l'APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service), agenzia del governo USA che vigila
sulla sicurezza di piante, animali e derivati importati negli Stati Uniti, ha riconosciuto Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna,
Veneto e Piemonte (nonché le Province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano) come indenni dalla MVS, rimuovendo
pertanto il divieto di importazione dei salumi a breve stagionatura prodotti in tali regioni (nonché in Friuli Venezia
Giulia, Liguria, Marche e Valle d'Aosta, riconosciute indenni fin dal 2003).

Chiediamo pertanto alla Commissione se intende verificare gli aiuti, erogati dalle regioni del sud Italia che si sono
dimostrate poco attive nella lotta alla MVS, inerenti ai Piani di sviluppo rurali previsti dalla PAC attraverso le autorità
di gestione, soprattutto per quanto concerne le misure riguardanti il benessere degli animali; chiediamo inoltre alla
Commissione di considerare l'opportunità di riconoscere ufficialmente la macroregione del nord individuata
dall'APHIS, immune dalla MVS, al fine di valorizzarne le peculiarità e il potenziale di sviluppo nei confronti dei paesi
terzi in occasione di tutti i futuri accordi commerciali.

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(11 luglio 2013)_

1. I programmi di sviluppo rurale approvati dalla Commissione sulla base dei regolamenti per lo sviluppo rurale
1698/2005 e 1974/2006 non prevedono misure/azioni relative alla protezione della salute degli animali. La
questione non rientra nel mandato della politica di sviluppo rurale che non comprende nessuna base giuridica la
quale consenta di correlare il finanziamento dei programmi di sviluppo rurale con la messa in atto di misure di
controllo delle malattie degli animali.

2. Nell'UE le regioni settentrionali dell'Italia sono riconosciute esenti dalla malattia vescicolare dei suini a partire
dal 2005, anno in cui la Commissione ha adottato la decisione 2005/779/CE, dell'8 novembre 2005, relativa a talune
misure sanitarie di protezione contro la malattia vescicolare dei suini in Italia ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) GU L 293 del 9.11.2005, pagg. 28‐32.

C 42 E / 382 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006010/13**

**to the Commission**
**Matteo Salvini (EFD) and Giancarlo Scottà (EFD)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Ineffective action to combat swine vesicular disease (SVD) in southern Italy and damage to the Italian animal
farming sector

Swine vesicular disease (SVD) has existed in various regions of central-southern Italy for decades, and despite the EU
and state aid granted to the farmers to tackle the disease, it has not yet been eradicated. There are grounds for
suspecting that little effort is being made to combat this disease, given that the northern regions have eradicated it.

It should be remembered that there is an obligation to report SVD nationally and internationally, and that SVD
outbreaks are a major obstacle to the sale and export of pork products produced in the affected area because of the
prohibitions imposed by the authorities to limit the spread of the disease. The sector loses EUR 250 million in export
revenue each year due to the prohibitions on imports from Italy of pigmeat and certain kinds of prepared meat
products, which many countries impose in order to reduce the risk of infection.

It should be noted, however, that the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the US Government agency
responsible for ensuring the safety of plants, animals and derived products imported into the United States, has
acknowledged that Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Piedmont (as well as the autonomous provinces of
Trento and Bolzano) are free of SVD, and has accordingly lifted the ban on imports of prepared meat products with a
short maturation period produced in those regions (as well as in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Marche and Valle
d’Aosta, which have been declared disease-free since 2003).

Can the Commission therefore say whether it intends to verify the aid granted by the southern Italian regions, which
have been lax in combating SVD, under the rural development plans provided for by the common agricultural policy
(CAP) via the managing authorities, especially as regards animal welfare measures? Will the Commission also consider
officially recognising the northern macro-region, which APHIS has identified as being SVD-free, in order to enhance
its specific features and development potential in all future trade agreements with third countries?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

1. The Rural Development Programmes approved by the Commission on the basis of the rural development
regulations 1698/2005 and 1974/2006 do not foresee any measure/actions concerning animal health protection.
This issue is not under the remit of rural development policy, that does not include any legal bases to link the
financing of rural development programs with the implementation of animal disease control measures

2. In the EU, the northern Regions of Italy are recognised as free from swine vesicular disease since 2005, when the
Commission adopted Decision 2005/779/EC of 8 November 2005 concerning animal health protection measures
against swine vesicular disease in Italy ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 293, 9.11.2005, p. 28‐32. .

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 383

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006011/13**

**à la Commission**
**Alain Cadec (PPE)**

_(29 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Composition des commissions mixtes dans le cadre de la négociation d'accords de pêche avec des pays tiers

En vertu de l'article 17, paragraphe 1, du traité sur l'Union européenne, la Commission européenne assure la
représentation extérieure de l'Union européenne. Cette compétence recouvre donc la représentation de l'Union dans
les commissions mixtes mises en place dans les processus de négociation d'accords de pêche avec des pays tiers.

La présence de professionnels dans ces commissions mixtes au moment des négociations n'est donc pas obligatoire,
mais elle me semble primordiale pour parvenir à des accords équilibrés: la prise en compte de leur avis permet en effet
de mieux comprendre la réalité en mer dans le cadre de ces accords.

Or, dans la pratique, on constate que les délégations de l'Union européenne sont très souvent composées de
fonctionnaires de la DG MARE, ainsi que de représentants des administrations des États membres concernés.

Aussi, aucune base légale contraignante n'existant à ce jour selon les services de la DG MARE quant à la composition
desdites commissions mixtes du côté de l'Union européenne, la Commission peut-elle nous expliquer comment elle
compte remédier à ce flou juridique et accroître la représentation des professionnels dans ces instances?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me ]** **Damanaki au nom de la Commission**

_(2 août 2013)_

Les commissions mixtes se réunissent durant la mise en œuvre de protocoles d'accords de partenariat dans le domaine
de la pêche (APP) afin de veiller à la bonne exécution desdits protocoles. Elles sont constituées de représentants de
l'Union européenne et du pays partenaire.

Le secteur de la pêche de l'Union européenne est toujours consulté avant la réunion, au cours d'une réunion technique
préliminaire. Quand le calendrier le permet, la Commission organise une réunion de clôture avec le secteur de la
pêche à l'issue des réunions officielles. La Commission prend toujours bonne note des exigences formulées afin de les
examiner avec le pays partenaire. La contribution du secteur de la pêche aux discussions est essentielle et très
appréciée.

Les États membres peuvent participer aux réunions des commissions mixtes en tant qu'observateurs. Bien qu'ils
n'aient pas le droit d'intervenir au cours de la réunion, ils sont présents pour relayer les opinions de leurs parties
prenantes. La Commission consulte les États membres au cours de réunions de coordination, qui sont assurées en
marge des réunions des commissions mixtes.

Ce cadre s'applique également aux négociations en vue d'un APP.

Les professionnels du secteur de la pêche ainsi que d'autres parties prenantes peuvent exprimer et échanger leurs
points de vue concernant les APP au sein du conseil consultatif régional pour la pêche lointaine. La Commission a le
statut d'observateur au conseil consultatif régional pour la pêche lointaine.

C 42 E / 384 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006011/13**

**to the Commission**

**Alain Cadec (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Composition of joint committees set up to negotiate fisheries agreements with third countries

Under Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission is tasked with representing the European
Union in its dealings with other countries. Its remit includes representing the EU on joint committees set up to
negotiate agreements with countries outside the EU.

Although it is not mandatory, it is vital, therefore, that fishing industry professionals should sit on these joint
committees, in order to ensure that the agreements ultimately concluded are balanced. The advice these professionals
give can help the committees to understand the practical implications for fishermen.

In reality, however, EU delegations more often than not comprise officials from DG MARE and civil servants
representing the Member States concerned.

What is more, according to DG MARE no binding legal rules have yet been laid down governing the make-up of EU
delegations to joint committees. Can the Commission explain how it intends to address this legal grey area and
increase the number of industry professionals on these committees?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 August 2013)_

Joint Committees meet during the implementation of a protocol to Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) to
monitor the execution of this protocol. They are composed of representatives of the European Union and of the
partner country.

The EU fishing industry is always consulted before the meeting occurs during a preliminary technical meeting. A
debriefing meeting with the fishing industry is organised by the Commission at the end of the official meetings
whenever possible depending on time availability. The Commission always takes good note of the expressed
requirements in order to discuss the issues with the partner country. The input of the fishing industry to the
discussions is vital and much appreciated.

Member States can attend Joint Committee meetings as observers. Though they may not intervene during the
meeting, they are present on the spot to relay the views of their stakeholders. The Commission consults Member
States during coordination meetings which are assured in the margins of the Joint Committee meetings.

This framework also applies to FPA negotiations.

Fishing industries professionals and other stakeholders can express and discuss their views regarding FPAs within the
Long Distance Regional Advisory Council (LDRAC). The Commission is LDRAC observer.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 385

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006012/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Canon digital en España

Tras la sentencia del caso «Padawan», el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea (TJUE) declaró el canon digital en
España ilegal, considerando que se refería a los aparatos electrónicos que podían ser susceptibles de ser usados para
copiar elementos cubiertos por la protección de la propiedad intelectual.

Pese a la sentencia del TJUE, el Gobierno español optó por continuar ejecutando sentencias del Tribunal Supremo
español que van en sentido contrario. Esta situación ha motivado varias denuncias de los agentes sociales contra el
Estado por no reclamar a las entidades de gestión de la propiedad intelectual las cantidades indebidamente cobradas
(más de 500 millones de euros), en detrimento de los pequeños negocios, la ciudadanía y el propio Estado. Esto
constituye una financiación de las entidades de gestión contraria a las directivas europeas, vulnerando la disciplina de
mercado y la política de fondos comunitarios que el Estado español debe respetar.

Al mismo tiempo, el próximo 30 de mayo se presenta en el Parlamento Europeo un acto cuya intención es que se
reintroduzca el canon digital en España gracias a la presión de lobbies como la Entidad de Gestión de Derechos de los
Productores Audiovisuales (EGEDA), una de las entidades de gestión más implicadas en la cuestión.

— ¿Qué opina la Comisión del incumplimiento por parte del Estado español de las decisiones del Tribunal de Justicia
de la UE?

— ¿Qué acciones piensa emprender la Comisión al respecto?

— ¿Qué opina la Comisión de que se plantee nuevamente el debate sobre un canon claramente ilegal?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(23 de julio de 2013)_

En su sentencia en el asunto C-467/08 (Padawan/SGAE), el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE sostuvo que, en el asunto en
cuestión, la aplicación indiscriminada del canon por copia privada, en particular en relación con equipos, aparatos y
soportes de reproducción digital que no se hayan puesto a disposición de usuarios privados y que estén
manifiestamente reservados a usos distintos a la realización de copias privadas, no resulta conforme con la Directiva
2001/29. Posteriormente, España introdujo algunas modificaciones significativas en su sistema de copia privada.

1. Sobre la base de la información proporcionada, parece que la cuestión específica de la recuperación de los pagos
que describe Su señoría es un asunto de la legislación nacional.

2. Si la Comisión llega a tener conocimiento de cualesquiera acciones u omisiones de las autoridades españolas que
constituyan un incumplimiento de la legislación de la UE, no dudará en tomar las medidas apropiadas.

3. La Comisión está al corriente del debate en torno a la cuestión de la copia privada en España y sigue de cerca los
cambios legislativos introducidos recientemente.

C 42 E / 386 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006012/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Digital levy in Spain

Under its the ruling in the ‘Padawan’ case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) declared the digital levy
in Spain illegal on the grounds that it related to electronic devices that could be used to copy material covered by the
protection of intellectual property.

Despite the CJEU ruling, the Spanish Government decided to continue enforcing contrary judgments handed down by
the Spanish Supreme Court, prompting protests by the social partners at its failure to recover undue payments (over
EUR 500 million) from intellectual property managers, effectively subsidising them at the expense of small
businesses, the general public and the Government itself, thereby infringing EU directives and undermining market
discipline and EU funding policy with which the Spanish Government is expected to comply.

At the same time, on 30 May 2013, as a result of lobbying by bodies such as the Audiovisual Producers Rights
Management Organisation (EGEDA), one of those most closely involved, an act was tabled in the European
Parliament seeking the reintroduction of the digital levy in Spain

— What view does the Commission take of non-compliance by the Spanish Government with the judgments of
the EU Court of Justice?

— What action will it take in response to this?

— What view does it take of the renewed debate surrounding an obviously illegal levy?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

In its judgment in Case C-467/08 (Padawan vs SGAE) the Court of Justice of the EU held that, in the case at stake, the
indiscriminate application of the private copying levy, in particular with respect to digital reproduction equipment,
devices and media not made available to private users and clearly reserved for uses other than private copying, was
incompatible with Directive 2001/29. Subsequently, Spain introduced some significant amendments to its system of
private copying.

1. Based on the information provided, it seems that the specific question of the recovery of payments described by
the Honourable Member, is a matter of national law.

2. Should the Commission become aware of any actions or omissions by the Spanish authorities which would not
be in compliance with EC law, it will not hesitate to take appropriate steps.

3. The Commission is aware of the debate surrounding the issue of private copying in Spain and it follows closely
the legislative changes recently introduced.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 387

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006013/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Daniël van der Stoep (NI)**

_(29 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Griekenland verhoogt telkens goudreserves

De afgelopen maanden wordt in de media telkens melding gemaakt van de aankoop van goud door de Griekse
centrale bank ( [1] ).

Gezien het feit dat Griekenland enorme schulden heeft opgebouwd bij de lidstaten van de Europese Unie, leiden deze
berichten bij mij tot grote verbazing.

Wanneer men zijn rekeningen niet meer kan betalen, valt eerder te verwachten dat er wordt ingeteerd op eigen
tegoeden, alvorens anderen om geld te vragen. Hier is het tegenovergestelde gaande: Griekenland vergroot zijn
goudvoorraden! Daarom stel ik de Commissie graag de volgende vragen:

1. Kan de Commissie mij uitleggen hoe Griekenland het zich lijkt te kunnen permitteren om goudreserves op te
bouwen? Zo nee, waarom niet?

2. Kan de Commissie mij verklaren waarom Griekenland deze reserves niet te gelde maakt om zijn schuldenlast te
verlichten? Zo nee, waarom niet?

3. Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat hier sprake van opbouw van goudreserves met het oog op een terugkeer naar
de Drachme, i.e. het verlaten van de euro? Zo nee, waarom niet?

**Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie**

_(16 juli 2013)_

De Commissie geeft geen commentaar op speculaties in de media. Monetair goud maakt deel uit van de balansen van
centrale banken en beslissingen in dit verband moeten als een onderdeel van hun algemene activa‐ en reservebeheer
worden beschouwd. De Commissie herinnert eraan dat centrale banken volledig onafhankelijk handelen binnen het
kader dat in het Verdrag is gesteld.

Griekenland in de eurozone houden is steeds een hoofddoelstelling van het economisch aanpassingsprogramma
geweest. Deze doelstelling is bereikt en de integriteit van de eurozone staat buiten twijfel.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.beurs.com/2011/07/01/griekenland-vertikt-het-om-goudreserves-te-verkopen/5065;

http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article13453841/Griechenland-hortet-vier-Millionen-Unzen-Gold.html;
http://www.beurs.com/2013/05/28/griekenland-verhoogt-voor-de-4e-maand-op-rij-zijn-goudreserves/23787;
http://silverdoctors.com/russia-greece-turkey-other-central-banks-buy-gold-chinas-pboc-buying/.

C 42 E / 388 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006013/13**

**to the Commission**
**Daniël van der Stoep (NI)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Greece repeatedly stocking up its gold reserves

In recent months there have been frequent reports in the media of gold purchases by the Greek Central Bank ( [1] ).

Given that Greece has run up enormous debts with the Member States of the European Union, I am greatly surprised
by these reports.

If you can’t pay your bills any more, you are more likely to use up your own assets before you ask other people for
money. But here it is the other way around: Greece is increasing its gold reserves! So I should like to ask:

1. Can the Commission explain to me how Greece can apparently permit itself to build up gold reserves? If not,
why not?

2. Can the Commission explain to me why Greece is not liquidating these reserves to pay off its debt burden? If
not, why not?

3. Can the Commission confirm that these gold reserves are being built up with a view to returning to the
drachma, i.e. leaving the euro? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

It is not the Commission policy to comment on media speculations. Monetary gold is part of central banks' balance
sheets, and their decisions in this regard are to be seen as part of their overall asset and reserve management. The
Commission recalls that central banks act in full independence, within the framework set out by the Treaty.

Ensuring that Greece remained in the Euro Area has been from the start a key objective of the economic adjustment
programme for. This objective has been achieved and the integrity of the Euro Area is unquestionable.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.beurs.com/2011/07/01/griekenland-vertikt-het-om-goudreserves-te-verkopen/5065

http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article13453841/Griechenland-hortet-vier-Millionen-Unzen-Gold.html
http://www.beurs.com/2013/05/28/griekenland-verhoogt-voor-de-4e-maand-op-rij-zijn-goudreserves/23787
http://silverdoctors.com/russia-greece-turkey-other-central-banks-buy-gold-chinas-pboc-buying/

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 389

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006014/13**

**to the Commission**
**Chris Davies (ALDE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Carbon capture and storage (CCS) pilot plant

Can the Commission provide full details of the funding provided by the EU for the Ciuden carbon capture and storage
plant at Ponferrada in Spain?

What was the total cost of the project, for what specific purpose was it approved, and what bodies provided the
additional finance required?

How will the Commission evaluate the success or otherwise of the project?

How does the Commission intend to build on its investment and ensure that the Ponferrada plant is put to effective
use in developing and demonstrating CCS technology in order to increase its efficiency and reduce its costs for the
benefit of EU industry?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

The CO 2 Capture Technological Development Plant (TDP) and the CO 2 Transport TDP at Ponferrada, as well as the
CO 2 Storage TDP located in Hontomín (Burgos) have been developed by CIUDEN since 2007 and will be completed
in October 2013.

Most of the work in developing the CO 2 TDPs is carried out during ‘Phase I — Technology Development’ of the
Compostilla OXYCFB300 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) project co-funded under the European Energy
Programme for Recovery (EEPR).

The total budget earmarked for the CO 2 Capture, Transport and Storage TDPs is EUR 147.48m. The EEPR grant
covers EUR 92.92m and CUIDEN the remaining EUR 54.56m.

The Commission regularly assesses, including on-the-spot checks, the progress of the Compostilla project against the
objectives defined in the EEPR grant agreement.

Phase I of the Compostilla project will provide very useful test facilities regarding the full CCS value chain. The
project, as a recipient of the EEPR grant, is obliged to disseminate knowledge obtained while implementing the
project to the wider industry, and does this mainly via the European CCS Demonstration Project Network ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) https://www.ccsnetwork.eu/.

C 42 E / 390 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006015/13**

**à Comissão**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Bloqueio da Comissão à mobilização de uma linha de crédito para as PME portuguesas

O presidente do Banco Europeu de Investimento (BEI) acusou ontem a Comissão Europeia de travar a mobilização de
uma linha de crédito de mil milhões de euros às PME portuguesas, alegadamente por questões de concorrência. Em
declarações a órgãos de comunicação social portugueses, o presidente do BEI afirmou que este dinheiro, que resulta
de um contrato assinado no ano passado, poderia ser libertado de um dia para o outro, «se a Comissão Europeia
concordasse».

Por sua vez, segundo os mesmos órgãos, a Comissão Europeia afirma que este atraso — inaceitável e incompreensível
— resulta de exigências mais elevadas por parte do BEI no que respeita aos colaterais.

Em face do exposto, solicito à Comissão que me informe sobre o seguinte:

1. Como justifica este bloqueio à mobilização de uma linha de crédito às PME portuguesas? Quais são as «questões
de concorrência» referidas?

2. Decorre este bloqueio das garantias estatais concedidas pelo Estado português aos bancos, ao abrigo do
programa UE-FMI? Em caso afirmativo, em concreto, quais as garantias, os montantes e os bancos em causa?

3. Para quando perspetiva a resolução desta questão? De que depende a pronta resolução deste problema?

4. Considera a possibilidade de propor o estabelecimento de derrogações às regras da concorrência para países,
como Portugal, em maiores dificuldades financeiras? Em caso afirmativo, qual seria o seu âmbito?

**Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão**

_(23 de julho de 2013)_

Os atrasos na concessão de novos empréstimos do BEI a Portugal resultam da decisão do BEI de não conceder novos
empréstimos até que os empréstimos existentes aumentem as garantias. O Estado português decidiu conceder
garantias estatais a fim de satisfazer os requisitos do BEI. Tais garantias podem constituir auxílios estatais, que a
Comissão é obrigada a proceder a investigar.

Além disso, o atraso na aprovação dessas garantias não está ligado de modo algum às garantias estatais que Portugal
concedeu aos bancos ao abrigo do programa da UE — FMI, já que são garantias diferentes.

Em 27 de junho de 2013, foi aprovado pela Comissão um regime de garantia para os empréstimos do BEI a Portugal.
O regime estabelece que, entre outras, quaisquer vantagens resultantes de garantias oferecidas pelo Estado revertem
para o Estado e para os mutuários finais que, através do regime, poderão manter em vigor os empréstimos do BEI e
aceder a um aumento de cedência de liquidez fixado pelo BEI em Portugal, na sequência da aprovação do regime.
Uma vez que o regime garante que os bancos participantes não beneficiem de qualquer vantagem indevida da garantia
do Estado, este mecanismo está em conformidade com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais da UE.

Por último, durante a crise financeira, a Comissão já adotou regras específicas no contexto da crise que garantem um
nível adequado de flexibilidade na negociação com os bancos que necessitam de auxílio estatal.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 391

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006015/13**

**to the Commission**
**João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Commission's blocking of a credit line for Portuguese SMEs

The President of the European Investment Bank (EIB) has accused the Commission of preventing Portuguese SMEs
from drawing on a credit line amounting to a billion euros; the Commission’s obstructive attitude is said to be due to
competition grounds. Addressing the Portuguese media, the EIB President maintained that the money in question,
stemming from a contract signed last year, could be released ‘at the drop of a hat’ if the Commission were to agree.

The Commission, for its part, is quoted in the media as saying that the delay — which is unacceptable and
incomprehensible — is being caused by the tighter requirements that the EIB is laying down as regards collateral.

In the light of the foregoing:

1. Can the Commission say why it is blocking a credit line for Portuguese SMEs? What ismeant by ‘competition
grounds’?

2. Is the standstill in any way connected with the state guarantees which Portugal has granted to banks under the
EU-IMF programme? If so, what are the specific terms of theguarantees, what amounts do they cover, and
which banks are involved?

3. How soon does the Commission expect to resolve this problem? What is needed for anearly solution?

4. Does the Commission think that the rules on competition could be partially waived forPortugal and other
countries in more serious financial difficulties? If so, what would bethe extent of such exceptions?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

Delays in providing new EIB loans to Portugal stem from the EIB's decision not to provide any new loans until the
existing ones are equipped with higher collateral. The Portuguese State decided to provide state guarantees in order to
meet the EIB requirements. Such guarantees may constitute state aid which the Commission is under an obligation to
investigate.

Furthermore, the delay in approving those guarantees is in no way connected with the State guarantees which
Portugal has granted to banks under the EU-IMF programme, as they are different guarantees.

On 27 June 2013 a Guarantee Scheme for EIB lending in Portugal was approved by the Commission. The Scheme
establishes that, _inter alia_, any advantages derived from the guarantees offered by the State revert back to the State and
to the final borrowers that, through the Scheme, will be able to maintain their existing EIB loans and access an
increased lending facility set out by the EIB in Portugal, following the approval of the Scheme. Since the Scheme
ensures that participating banks do not retain any undue advantage from the State guarantee, it is in line with EU State
aid rules.

Finally, during the financial crisis, the Commission has already adopted crisis-specific rules ensuring an appropriate
level of flexibility when dealing with banks requiring state aid.

C 42 E / 392 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006016/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Legge sui diritti delle donne in Afganistan

Secondo un articolo pubblicato il 18 maggio 2013 sul quotidiano anglosassone _Times_, in seguito a una discussione in
seno al Parlamento afgano relativamente a una legge che abbozza i diritti delle donne, numerosi legislatori hanno
chiesto di accantonare la legge stessa.

Nel 2009, il presidente Hamid Karzai ha annunciato che avrebbe introdotto una legge per rendere penalmente
perseguibile la violenza contro le donne attraverso un decreto presidenziale. Quest’ultimo include l’abuso domestico,
i matrimoni precoci e quelli forzati e vieta, inoltre, la pratica della compravendita delle donne per risolvere le dispute.
Ne consegue che centinaia di persone si trovano in carcere sotto accusa per tali fatti. La legge è chiamata «Legge
sull’eliminazione della violenza contro le donne».

All’epoca questa legge non aveva ottenuto l’approvazione del Parlamento e si era deciso di indire un dibattito per
tentare di assicurarsi il sostegno del Parlamento. Tuttavia, alcuni parlamentari tradizionalisti hanno bloccato il
dibattito e hanno richiesto l’accantonamento della legge, poiché viola i precetti islamici e hanno, inoltre, accusato
Karzai di agire contro la sharia islamica (legge coranica) per aver proposto in prima istanza un ammodernamento
della legislazione.

I parlamentari progressisti, tra cui Fawzia Koofi, dichiarano che se non si ottiene l’approvazione del Parlamento, la
legge sarà comunque passibile di colpi di mano da parte dei futuri presidenti che potranno adattarla alle esigenze dei
partiti politici più conservatori dal punto di vista religioso. Al contrario, un parlamentare tradizionalista, Khalil
Ahmad Shaheedzada, ha sentenziato: «Tutto quello che è contro la legge islamica non deve nemmeno essere
discusso».

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Alla luce della mancata approvazione del decreto presidenziale del 2009 che aveva come obiettivo quello di far
fronte alla violenza contro le donne, quali azioni intende il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante intraprendere
per sostenere i legislatori afgani, i leader della società civile e tutti coloro i quali stanno lavorando affinché il
Parlamento approvi questa legge così tanto necessaria?

2. Di quali iniziative si sta occupando l’UE per sensibilizzare sia gli uomini che le donne dell’Afganistan
sull’importanza dei diritti delle donne?

**Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(25 luglio 2013)_

Il progresso in materia di diritti costituzionali e giuridici delle donne è uno degli sviluppi più importanti in
Afghanistan dalla caduta del regime talebano nel 2001. Uno dei settori focali dell’assistenza allo sviluppo dell’UE è il
sostegno al rafforzamento della polizia e dello Stato di diritto (compresa una più ampia riforma del settore
giudiziario), elementi fondamentali per la tutela dei diritti delle donne. L’UE continua ad essere in prima linea a livello
internazionale nella tutela di questi sviluppi e nella promozione della piena attuazione delle normative esistenti,
compresa la legge per l’eliminazione della violenza contro le donne (EVAW).

L’UE sostiene un’ampia gamma di progetti e attività di sensibilizzazione per garantire i diritti delle donne afghane. Tra
questi rientrano l'assistenza, consulenza e mediazione legale per donne e ragazze vittime di violenza in ambito
familiare; la promozione dei diritti delle donne attraverso strutture locali della società civile; attività di sviluppo delle
competenze e di sensibilizzazione destinate al personale giudiziario e agli operatori locali; il sostegno alle
organizzazioni della società civile e alle comunità locali a livello provinciale nell'attuazione della legge EWAV e della
risoluzione 1325 del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite; il finanziamento di attività di comunicazione in 15
province.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 393

La missione di polizia dell’UE (EUPOL Afghanistan) ha appoggiato l'unità di supporto familiare del Ministero
dell’interno, l'unità di violenza contro le donne dell’Ufficio del procuratore generale e altri enti interessati, attraverso
corsi di formazione in tecniche di indagine penale, tecniche per interrogare le vittime e di esame medico forense della
violenza di genere. EUPOL dispensa inoltre programmi di formazione specializzata sulla legge EVAW per forze di
polizia e procuratori e ha portato a termine una campagna di sensibilizzazione ad alta visibilità in collaborazione con
il Ministero dell’Interno, l’Ufficio del procuratore generale e UNFPA.

C 42 E / 394 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006016/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Law on women's rights in Afghanistan

On 18 May 2013, _The Times_ newspaper in the UK reported that a debate in Afghanistan’s parliament on a law
outlining women’s rights caused many lawmakers to call for the law to be scrapped.

In 2009, President Hamid Karzai announced that he would pass a law by presidential decree — the ‘Law on
Elimination of Violence Against Women’ — criminalising violence against women. This includes domestic abuse,
child marriages and forced marriages. It also bans the practice of buying and selling women to settle disputes. As a
result, hundreds of people have been imprisoned on such charges.

At the time, the law did not garner parliamentary approval and it was decided that a debate should be held in an
attempt to secure parliamentary support. However, some traditionalist Members of Parliament blocked the debate
and called for the law to be scrapped on the grounds that it violates Islamic principles. They accused President Karzai
of acting against Islamic sharia law by proposing the modernising legislation in the first place.

Progressive parliamentarians such as Fawzia Koofi say that unless this law obtains the approval of the parliament, it
will be easy for future presidents to overturn it in order to satisfy the demands of more religiously conservative
political parties. One traditionalist MP, Khalil Ahmad Shaheedzada, announced that, ‘Whatever is against Islamic law,
we don’t even need to speak about it.’

1. In light of the failure of the Afghan Parliament to vote on the 2009 presidential decree to tackle violence against
women, what steps is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to take in order to support Afghan lawmakers,
civil society leaders and relevant individuals who are working to gain parliamentary approval for this much-needed
legislation?

2. What initiatives is the EU pursuing in Afghanistan to educate both men and women about the importance of
women’s rights?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The advance in the constitutional and legal rights of women is one of the most important improvements in
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Supporting the strengthening of policing and the rule of law,
including wider judicial reform, which are critical for protecting the rights of women, is one of the focal sectors for EU
development assistance. The EU continues to be at the forefront of international efforts to safeguard these
improvements and promote the full implementation of existing statutory provisions, including the Eliminating
Violence Against Women Law (EVAW).

The EU supports a wide range of projects and awareness raising actities to support the rights of Afghan women.
Examples include the provision of legal support, counselling and mediation for women and girls affected by family
violence; the promotion of women's rights through local civil society structures; capacity building and awareness
raising activities for justice personnel and community stakeholders; enabling civil society organisations and local
communities at provincial level to follow up on the EVAW Law and UNSCR 1325; and the funding of media activities
in the field in 15 provinces.

The EU police mission, EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, has supported the Ministry of the Interior's Family Response Units,
the Attorney General’s Office Violence against Women Unit and other relevant actors through training in criminal
investigation techniques, victim sensitive interviewing and medical forensic examination on gender based violence.
EUPOL is also providing specialized training for police and prosecutors on EVAW and has completed a high profile
awareness-raising campaign together with the Ministry of Interior, the Attorney General's Office and UNFPA.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 395

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006017/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Necessità di combattere il commercio illecito di avorio che finanzierebbe anche il terrorismo e i gruppi
armati

Le Nazioni Unite hanno recentemente pubblicato una relazione nella quale si afferma che il commercio illecito di
avorio proveniente dalla caccia di frodo funge da fonte di finanziamento vitale per i gruppi militanti armati, fra cui
l'Esercito di Resistenza del Signore in Africa centrale, il cui leader è ricercato come criminale di guerra. Il Segretario
generale dell'ONU Ban Ki Moon ha affermato che: «La caccia di frodo e i suoi potenziali collegamenti con altre attività
criminali, se non terroristiche, costituisce una grave minaccia alla pace e alla sicurezza durature in Africa centrale».
Egli ha inoltre affermato che la caccia di frodo dovrebbe essere considerata una grande preoccupazione a livello
regionale, per cui è necessario uno sforzo internazionale concertato per combatterla efficacemente.

Nel Gabon nordorientale, sono stati sterminati tra il 2004 e il 2013 11.000 elefanti. Dopo la caduta di Gheddafi in
Libia, sono state distribuite armi fino all'Africa centrale, e quindi gli elefanti in Camerun, Ciad, Gabon e Repubblica
Centrafricana sono esposti ad un crescente rischio da parte dei cacciatori di frodo. L'ONU riferisce che vi è una
crescente domanda di avorio in Asia.

Alla fine di novembre 2012, i co-presidenti dell'Assemblea parlamentare paritetica ACP-UE hanno rilasciato una
dichiarazione riguardo alla caccia di frodo agli elefanti. Attualmente gli elefanti sono protetti dalla Convenzione ONU
sul commercio internazionale di specie minacciate della fauna e della flora selvatiche (CITES). Nel 2010 è stato
lanciato il «Piano di azione per l'elefante africano» e, dal 2007 al 2012, l'Unione europea ha stanziato10 milioni di
euro per questo programma e vari altri programmi di conservazione. Nel novembre 2012, i co-presidenti hanno
ancora una volta chiesto ai paesi di rafforzare le leggi e le politiche per combattere la caccia di frodo e il commercio
illegale di avorio.

1. Alla luce di questa nuova relazione ONU sull'incremento della caccia di frodo nell'Africa centrale e occidentale,
quali nuovi passi è disposta a compiere l'UE per rafforzare gli attuali programmi contro la caccia di frodo?

2. Negli scorsi cinque anni, quale effetto ha avuto il finanziamento UE sul piano di azione per l'elefante e analoghe
iniziative di conservazione?

3. La Commissione è disposta a incontrare i capi di stato e di governo dei paesi africani interessati dalla caccia di
frodo al fine di concordare la migliore procedura per salvaguardare le minacciate e declinanti popolazioni di elefanti?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(25 luglio 2013)_

1. e 2. Pur non finanziando specificamente il piano d’azione per gli elefanti africani, l’UE è uno dei principali
donatori che sostengono la conservazione e la tutela della flora e della fauna selvatiche nell’Africa centrale e
occidentale. Da un lato, essa contribuisce a varie iniziative regionali o mondiali come il programma della CITES
relativo al monitoraggio dell’uccisione illegale di elefanti (MIKE), che finanzia sin dall’inizio, e l’ICCWC (consorzio
internazionale per la lotta ai reati contro la fauna selvatica). Dall’altro, l’Unione europea è il principale donatore a
favore della conservazione delle aree protette nell’Africa centrale dalla fine degli anni Ottanta e uno dei più importanti
donatori nell’Africa occidentale, con oltre 500 milioni di euro impegnati e spesi nelle due regioni. Nella comunità
ambientalista è generalmente riconosciuto che i siti che beneficiano di aiuti dell’UE sono in una situazione migliore
rispetto agli altri. In considerazione di ciò e del fatto che la caccia di frodo e i reati contro la fauna selvatica sono in
aumento in tutta l’Africa, i servizi della Commissione stanno elaborando una nuova strategia per la conservazione
delle specie faunistiche africane al fine di coordinare meglio i vari strumenti e programmi, dalla protezione nei siti
stessi alle iniziative a livello africano e mondiale. In particolare, sono in corso colloqui con il Segretario generale della
CITES per definire il seguito del programma MIKE.

3. L’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è pronta a cogliere tutte le opportunità di sollevare la questione per
garantire che questo problema sia affrontato efficacemente.

C 42 E / 396 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006017/13**

**to the Commission**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Need to combat illegal ivory trade which also allegedly funds terrorism and armed groups

The United Nations recently issued a report which says that the illegal trade in poached ivory acts as a source of vital
funding for armed militant groups, including the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, whose leader is wanted as
a war criminal. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that: ‘Poaching and its potential linkages to other criminal,
even terrorist activities constitutes a grave menace to sustained peace and security in central Africa’. He went on to say
that poaching should be considered a major and regional concern, which requires concerted international effort to
effectively combat it.

In north-east Gabon, 11 000 elephants were slaughtered between 2004 and 2013. Since the fall of Gaddafi in Libya,
weapons have been distributed as far as Central Africa, and elephants in Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and the Central
African Republic are consequently at an increased risk from poachers. The UN reports that there is a growing demand
for ivory in Asia.

In late November 2012, the co-presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly made a declaration on the
issue of elephant poaching. At present, elephants are protected under the UN Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). In 2010, the ‘African Elephant Action Plan’ was launched, and
between 2007 and 2012 the European Union earmarked EUR 10 million for this and various other conservation
programmes. In November 2012, the co-presidents once again asked for countries to strengthen laws and policies to
combat poaching and the illegal trade in ivory.

1. In light of this new UN report on the acceleration of poaching across Central and West Africa, what new steps is
the EU prepared to adopt to bolster existing anti-poaching programmes?

2. Over the past five years, what effect has EU funding had on the elephant action plan and similar conservation
initiatives?

3. Is the Commission prepared to talk with the heads of state and government of African countries affected by
poaching to agree on the best way forward to preserve the dwindling and endangered elephant populations?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

1 and 2. While not funding the African Elephant Action Plan as such, the EU is a major donor for wildlife
conservation and protection in Central and West Africa. On the one hand it has been supporting various regional or
global initiatives like the CITES-operated MIKE programme (Monitoring of Illegal Killing of Elephants) since its
inception and the ICCWC (International Consortium to combat Wildlife Crime). On the other hand, the EU has been
the major donor in Protected Areas conservation in Central Africa since the end of the eighties and one of the most
important in West Africa, with more than EUR 500 million committed and spent in the two regions. It is generally
admitted among the conservation community that the sites which benefit from EU aid are in a better shape than those
which do not. Considering this and the fact that poaching and wildlife crime is increasing all over Africa, the
Commission’s departments are currently designing a new strategy for African Wildlife Conservation, with a view to
better coordinating the various instruments and programmes, from protection at the site level to initiatives at African
and global level. In particular, discussions are taking place at this moment with the Secretary-general of CITES to
define a follow-up to the MIKE programme.

3. The High Representative/Vice-President stands ready to seize all relevant opportunities to raise this issue to
ensure that this problem is tackled efficiently.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 397

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006018/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Costruzione di una reattore nucleare di ricerca in Iran

Il 23 maggio 2013 diverse agenzie di stampa hanno diffuso la notizia che la Repubblica islamica dell'Iran stava
procedendo alla realizzazione del progetto di costruire un reattore nucleare di ricerca nei pressi della città di Arak.
Secondo una relazione delle Nazioni Unite, una volta costruito, il reattore potrebbe potenzialmente produrre
plutonio con caratteristiche idonee a produrre una bomba atomica all'anno. Il governo iraniano ha in programma
l'avvio dei lavori dell'impianto nei primi mesi del 2014.

Nella relazione dell'Agenzia internazionale per l'energia atomica si precisa che le autorità iraniane hanno installato
centinaia di altre centrifughe nell'impianto di arricchimento di Natanz. Secondo l'AIEA, sarebbero state installate 700
centrifughe ad alta tecnologia nel contesto dell'aggiornamento dell'attuale programma. Le nuove centrifughe IR-2M
sono considerate capaci di un arricchimento ad una velocità da due a cinque volte maggiore rispetto ai dispositivi
precedenti più lenti.

In seguito al rifiuto degli iraniani di dare seguito agli appelli della comunità internazionale a rallentare le loro attività
di arricchimento di materiale nucleare, il 9 maggio diversi senatori degli USA hanno annunciato piani per impedire
all'Iran di accedere a 60-90 miliardi di dollari di riserve valutarie. Il quotidiano britannico _Daily Telegraph_ ha riferito
che i senatori hanno invitato l'UE a chiudere «una scappatoia rilevante» che consente all'Iran di accedere alle riserve in
euro. Con l'imposizione di queste ultime misure alle istituzioni finanziarie si trasmette il messaggio che devono
bloccare tutti i trasferimenti di valuta estera a nome di una serie di banche che figurano in una lista nera. Questo
intervento inciderebbe anche sulle possibilità per l'Iran di convertire le riserve valutarie in valuta locale in banche
straniere.

1. Vista la controversa decisione del governo iraniano di procedere con la costruzione del reattore di ricerca di
Arak, è il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a raccomandare che l'UE imponga ulteriori sanzioni per
impedire all'Iran di accedere alle riserve valutarie straniere?

2. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a mettersi in contatto con il governo degli USA per definire
una politica efficace onde affrontare la questione dell'accesso degli istituti bancari iraniani alle riserve valutarie estere?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(31 luglio 2013)_

L’Unione europea conferma il suo impegno a proseguire la sua duplice impostazione basata su diplomazia e pressione
in risposta all'espansione delle attività nucleari dell’Iran, in particolare nei settori dell'arricchimento e dei progetti
connessi all’acqua pesante. Tali attività svolte dall'Iran, in palese violazione di una serie di risoluzioni del Consiglio di
sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e in spregio delle risoluzioni del Consiglio dei governatori dell’AIEA, rappresentano un
motivo di grave preoccupazione.

L’Unione europea lavora a stretto contatto con gli Stati Uniti su tutte le questioni relative alle sanzioni, anche per
impedire all’Iran di ottenere e detenere valute estere, in particolare attraverso le procedure di compensazione e
regolamento relative a tali valute. La legislazione vigente dell’UE vieta già la messa a disposizione di fondi a tutte le
persone e entità iraniane indicate dall’UE, comprese le istituzioni finanziarie iraniane designate. Questa disposizione
mira a impedire a tali persone ed entità di ottenere tali valute estere attraverso operazioni che coinvolgano le
istituzioni dell’UE. Analogamente, i progetti di legge presentati di recente nel congresso degli Stati Uniti per eliminare
le lacune nelle sanzioni riguardano in particolare le operazioni di compensazione e liquidazione per le valute estere in
cui sono coinvolte persone ed entità iraniane designate e altre attività illecite. Sono in corso contatti per ottenere la
massima coerenza tra i due quadri giuridici.

C 42 E / 398 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006018/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Construction of a nuclear research reactor in Iran

On 23 May 2013, a number of news agencies reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran was moving ahead with a
plan to construct a nuclear research reactor close to the city of Arak. Once it is set up, according to a United Nations
report, it could potentially produce enough weapons grade plutonium for one bomb a year. The Iranian Government
plans to commission the plant in the first few months of 2014.

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report has shown that the Iranian authorities have installed hundreds
more centrifuges at the enrichment facility at Natanz. The IAEA believes they have installed 700 high-tech centrifuges
in an upgrade of the current programme. The new IR-2M centrifuges are believed to be able to enrich up to two to five
times faster than older slower machines.

In response to the failure of the Iranians to heed calls by the international community to curb their nuclear
enrichment activities, on 9 May 2013, a number of US Senators announced plans to prevent Iran from accessing
USD 60-100 billion in foreign exchange reserves. The UK’s _Daily Telegraph_ newspaper reported that the Senators
called for the EU to close a ‘significant loophole’ that was allowing Iran to gain access to euro reserves. With the
imposition of these latest measures, financial institutions would be told that they must halt all foreign-currency
transfers on behalf of blacklisted banks. This would also affect Iran’s ability to convert its overseas foreign-exchange
reserves into local currency in foreign banks.

1. In light of the Iranian Government’s controversial decision to push through with the construction of the Arak
research reactor, is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to recommend that the EU impose further
sanctions to prevent Iran from accessing foreign-exchange reserves?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to liaise with the US Government with a view to outlining an
effective policy to tackle the issue of Iranian banking institutions obtaining foreign-exchange reserves?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

The EU remains committed to pursue its dual track approach consisting of diplomacy and pressure as a response to
the ongoing expansion of Iran's nuclear activities, notably in the areas of enrichment and heavy water related projects.
These Iranian activities are in clear violation of several UNSC Resolutions and in defiance of IAEA Board of
Governor's resolutions and represent a matter of serious concern.

The EU is in close contact with the US on all issues relating to Iran sanctions, including the matter of preventing Iran
from obtaining and holding foreign currencies through, in particular, clearance and settlement procedures involving
such currencies. Existing EU legislation in effect already prohibits the making available of funds to all EU-designated
Iranian persons and entities, including designated Iranian financial institutions. This provision aims to prevent these
persons and entities from obtaining these foreign currencies through operations involving EU institutions. Equally,
recent draft legislation introduced in the US Congress on the elimination of sanctions loopholes targets in particular
clearance and settlement transactions for foreign currencies involving Iranian designated persons and entities and
other illicit activities. Contacts are ongoing to work for maximum consistency between the two legal frameworks.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 399

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006019/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Restrizioni proposte circa la vendita di alcolici in Turchia

Il 24 maggio 2013, il Parlamento turco ha approvato una normativa volta a stabilire la messa al bando totale delle
pubblicità di alcolici e il divieto di vendita di alcolici dalle dieci di sera alle sei del mattino. La normativa proibirebbe
inoltre la vendita di alcolici a meno di cento metri da moschee o centri educativi. Le aziende produttrici di bevande
non possono più promuovere i propri marchi e quando gli alcolici vengono mostrati in televisione, devono apparire
sfocati. Le bottiglie di alcolici saranno ora dotate di etichette di avvertenza riguardo ai rischi derivanti dal consumo di
alcol.

La legge deve ancora ottenere l'approvazione del Presidente turco, ma i sostenitori del disegno di legge ritengono che
esso protegga i giovani turchi dai danni fisici e mentali provocati dall'alcol. Tuttavia, i laici lo reputano un esempio di
come il Partito per la giustizia e lo sviluppo (AKP) stia tentando di imporre un programma di matrice islamica.Il Primo
ministro Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan è stato chiaro riguardo alla sua intenzione di contenere il consumo di alcolici.Da
quando il suo partito ha assunto il potere, sono state applicate imposte più elevate sulle bevande alcoliche.

Può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Quali passi ha intrapreso il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante in passato per discutere con
il Primo ministro Erdoğan riguardo a leggi considerate come una violazione del principio di scelta personale dai
legislatori laici in Turchia?

2. Quali effetti avrebbe il recente testo legislativo sui negoziati per l'accesso della Turchia nell'UE? Il suddetto testo
legislativo viola i requisiti del mercato unico dell'UE o dell'appartenenza all'unione doganale dell'UE?

3. Qual è il parere dei funzionari dell'UE ad Ankara in merito alle affermazioni secondo lequali tali iniziative
dimostrano che l'AKP sta lavorando per imporre un programma dimatrice islamica?

**Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione**

_(2 agosto 2013)_

In base a un primo esame della legge cui fanno riferimento gli onorevoli deputati, la Commissione ha concluso che le
sue disposizioni non sono in contraddizione con l'acquis dell'UE. Le restrizioni relative agli alcolici sono di esclusiva
competenza delle autorità nazionali e le prassi variano da uno Stato membro all'altro. Anche alcuni Stati membri
applicano restrizioni molto rigorose in materia, ma si tratta di risposte mirate a un grave problema di salute pubblica
legato al consumo di alcolici in ciascuno di questi paesi.

Inoltre, le misure si applicheranno sia alle bevande alcoliche importate che a quelle di produzione nazionale, e
pertanto non contravvengono all'unione doganale UE-Turchia.

Per quanto riguarda le procedure, la Turchia non ha consultato la Commissione prima di adottare il disegno di legge,
come avrebbe dovuto fare a norma dell'articolo 57 della decisione 1/95 del Consiglio di associazione UE-Turchia ( [1] )
che istituisce l'unione doganale, né ha notificato il disegno di legge a norma dell'accordo dell'Organizzazione
mondiale del commercio (OMC) sugli ostacoli tecnici agli scambi. I servizi della Commissione, pertanto,
monitoreranno con attenzione il rispetto degli obblighi internazionali della Turchia e, se del caso, solleveranno la
questione nelle opportune sedi bilaterali.

La Commissione ritiene inoltre che questioni così importanti e delicate per la società nel suo insieme dovrebbe essere
oggetto di un'ampia consultazione e che la legislazione dovrebbe essere discussa in modo approfondito prima
dell'adozione. In linea generale, qualsiasi misura adottata deve rispettare i diritti fondamentali, compreso il diritto al
rispetto della vita privata.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Decisione 95/1/CE, Euratom, CECA del Consiglio dell'Unione europea, del 1° gennaio 1995, recante adattamento degli Atti relativi all'adesione di
nuovi Stati membri all'Unione europea, GU L 1 dell'1.1.1995.

C 42 E / 400 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006019/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Proposed restrictions on alcohol sales in Turkey

On 24 May 2013, Turkey’s parliament passed legislation which would entail banning all advertising of alcohol and
prevent the sale of alcohol from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.. It would also prohibit alcohol sales within 100 metres of a mosque
or educational centre. Drinks companies can no longer promote their brands, and when alcohol is shown on
television it must appear blurred. Bottles of alcohol will now carry warning labels about the dangers of drinking.

The law still needs to receive approval from the Turkish President, but those in favour of the bill say that it protects
Turkey’s youth from the physical and mental harm caused by alcohol. However, secularists believe that it is
illustrative of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party trying to impose an Islamist agenda. Prime Minister
Reccep Tayyip Erdoğan has been open about his desire to curb alcohol consumption. Since his party came to power,
higher taxes have been imposed on alcoholic drinks.

1. What steps has the Vice-President/High Representative taken in the past to talk to Prime Minister Erdoğan about
laws which have been characterised by secular lawmakers in Turkey as infringing on personal choice?

2. What effect would this latest piece of legislation have on the negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU, and
does it in any way violate EU single market requirements or membership of the EU customs union?

3. What is the opinion of EU officials in Ankara concerning the allegation that such moves show that the AK Party
is working to impose an Islamist agenda?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 August 2013)_

From a first review of the law referred to by the Honourable Members, the Commission concluded that its provisions
are not in contradiction with the EU _acquis._ Limitations on alcohol fall under the exclusive competence of national
authorities, and practices vary from one Member States to another. Some Member States apply very strict restrictions
as well. However, these restrictions are targeted responses to the magnitude of a specific public health problem linked
to alcohol consumption in each of these countries.

In addition, the measures will apply equally to imported and domestically produced alcoholic beverages, thus
rendering it, from this point of view, not incompliant with the EU-Turkey Customs Union.

With regard to procedures, Turkey has not consulted the Commission of the draft law in advance of its adoption, as it
should have done in accordance with the provisions of Article 57 of the EU-Turkey Association Council
Decision 1/95 ( [1] ) establishing the Customs Union, nor did Turkey notify the draft law under the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) agreement on technical barriers to trade. Therefore, the Commission services will closely follows
Turkey's international obligations and, if warranted, will raise the issue in the appropriate bilateral fora.

The Commission would like to add that on such sensitive issues for society at large, a broad consultation should take
place and legislation should be debated thoroughly before adoption. On a general basis, any measure adopted needs
to respect fundamental rights, including the right to respect for private life.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC: Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of
new Member States to the European Union, OJ L 1, 1.1.1995.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 401

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006020/13**

**al Consiglio**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Attacco terroristico a Woolwich, Londra (Regno Unito)

Il 22 maggio 2013 il quotidiano «Daily Telegraph» ha riferito della brutale uccisione di un soldato a colpi di fendenti
da parte di due terroristi islamici, avvenuta nel quartiere di Woolwich, a Londra. Uno dei due uomini gridava:
«Giuriamo in nome di Allah onnipotente che non smetteremo mai di combattere contro di voi» e «Dobbiamo
combattere contro di loro come loro combattono contro di noi. Occhio per occhio, dente per dente».

I due uomini responsabili dell'attacco sono britannici di nascita e nigeriani di origine, e si presume siano entrambi
legati al gruppo islamico radicale con base nel Regno Unito Al Muhajiroun, dichiarato illegale. Uno dei due uomini,
Michael Adebolajo, a volte predicava per le strade di Woolwich e disponeva di uno spazio per distribuire materiale
con cui condannava l'intervento dei soldati britannici in Iraq e in Afghanistan. Sembra che le autorità kenyote gli
avessero impedito di recarsi in Somalia e lo avessero detenuto in quanto sospettato di terrorismo, ma che lo abbiano
poi deportato nel Regno Unito anziché presentare un'accusa.

Il primo ministro britannico, David Cameron, ha dichiarato: «Non ci piegheremo mai davanti al terrore o al
terrorismo, in qualunque sua forma». Egli ha inoltre affermato: «Questo non è stato solo un attacco contro la Gran
Bretagna e il suo stile di vita, è stato anche un tradimento nei confronti dell'Islam e delle comunità mussulmane che
danno così tanto al nostro paese. Non c'è nulla nell'Islam che giustifichi un atto tanto raccapricciante».

— Quali meccanismi ha posto in essere il Consiglio per monitorare l'ascesa e prevenire la diffusione dell'estremismo
jihadista islamico all'interno dell'Unione europea, del quale l'atroce crimine di Londra costituisce un esempio?

— Quali strumenti sono in atto per diffondere in tutta l'Unione le informazioni raccolte in merito a questo caso dalle
autorità kenyote, che sospettavano che Adebolajo intendesse portare a termine violenti atti terroristici in un altro
paese (la Somalia)?

**Risposta**
_(16 settembre 2013)_

Il Consiglio è preoccupato per la continua minaccia terroristica nell'UE e in particolare per i rischi che pongono la
radicalizzazione e il reclutamento di terroristi. Tali questioni sono state affrontate attuando la strategia antiterrorismo
e la rete per la sensibilizzazione in materia di radicalizzazione dell'UE. La questione della lotta alla radicalizzazione e
al reclutamento di terroristi è stata discussa da ultimo nella sessione del Consiglio del 6 e 7 giugno 2013. I risultati
delle discussioni figurano nelle conclusioni del Consiglio disponibili sul suo sito web.

C 42 E / 402 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006020/13**

**to the Council**
**Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Terror attack in Woolwich, London (UK)

On 22 May 2013, the _Daily Telegraph_ newspaper reported that two Islamist terrorists had brutally hacked to death a
soldier in Woolwich, London. One of the men shouted: ‘We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you,’
and ‘We must fight them as they fight us. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’

The men responsible for the attack are both British-born and of Nigerian descent, and both are alleged to have joined
the now banned radical UK-based Islamist group, Al Muhajiroun. One of the men, Michael Adebolajo, sometimes
preached on the streets of Woolwich and had a stall which distributed material condemning the involvement of
British soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is alleged he was prevented from travelling to Somalia by the Kenyan
authorities and detained as a terrorist suspect but deported to the UK rather than charged.

Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, said: ‘We will never give in to terror or terrorism in any of its forms.’
Furthermore, he said: ‘This was not just an attack on Britain and on the British way of life, it was also a betrayal of
Islam and of the Muslim communities who give so much to our country. There is nothing in Islam that justifies this
truly dreadful act.’

— What mechanisms has the Council put in place to monitor the rise, and prevent the growth, of Islamist jihadi
extremism in the European Union, as exemplified by this heinous crime in London?

— What facilities are in place to share across the EU the information gathered in this case by the Kenyans, which
suggested that Adebolajo was suspected of intending to carry out violent terrorist actions in another country
(Somalia)?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

The Council is concerned by the continuing threat of terrorism within the EU and in particular by the risks posed by
radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. These issues are being addressed by the implementation of the EU CounterTerrorism Strategy and the Radicalisation Awareness Network. The issue of combating radicalisation and recruitment
to terrorism was discussed most recently by the Council as its meeting of 6-7 June 2013. The outcome of the
discussions is set out in the Council conclusions which are available on the Council website.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 403

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006021/13**

**a la Comisión**
**María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)**

_(29 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Ley española de medidas para reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda y
alquiler social

Según los datos del Banco de España, en 2012 los bancos se quedaron con 39 167 viviendas por impago de la
hipoteca, de las que 18 195 fueron entregas judiciales.

La nueva Ley española de medidas para reforzar la protección a los deudores hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda
y alquiler social (Ley 1/2013), aprobada con el rechazo de toda la oposición y de la Plataforma de Afectados por la
Hipoteca, no ha cumplido con las expectativas previstas ni ha incluido algunos aspectos como la dación en pago
universal y retroactiva, la protección de los avalistas, el sobreendeudamiento de las familias, etc.

Asimismo, numerosas voces discrepantes con la nueva Ley (entre ellas numerosos jueces) han criticado que la nueva
ley se queda corta y han reclamado que, frente al drama social que viven decenas de miles de ciudadanos en España, es
urgente y necesario reformar la Ley Hipotecaria y la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.

A estas opiniones se suma la del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), que señaló, la pasada semana, en su Dictamen sobre el
proyecto de ley, que «la ejecución hipotecaria debe considerarse el último recurso» y que «debería adoptarse un
conjunto de medidas más amplio que aborde las causas subyacentes de las dificultades relacionadas con las hipotecas
y que trate de evitar, en la medida de lo posible, las ejecuciones hipotecarias».

Además, el BCE subrayó que es necesaria una estrategia de resolución más amplia para hacer frente a los retos que
plantean los cambios en las circunstancias económicas de los prestatarios, los cambios sustanciales en el valor de los
inmuebles y el posible resultado de hipotecas inviables, manteniendo al mismo tiempo incentivos apropiados tanto
para deudores como para acreedores y reduciendo al mínimo el posible riesgo moral.

— ¿Qué opinión le merece a la Comisión el dictamen del BCE?

— ¿Comparte la Comisión su opinión sobre la necesidad de una estrategia de resolución más amplia?

— ¿No cree la Comisión que sería oportuno que, en su calidad de institución garante del interés común, estudiara la
cuestión en profundidad?

**Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión**

_(8 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión considera que resultan necesarios unos marcos jurídicos e institucionales correctos que sean capaces de
tratar de forma efectiva a los prestatarios privados en dificultades, tanto en el sector de la vivienda como en el de las
empresas, especialmente de cara al saneamiento de una crisis económica profunda como la de España. Esos marcos
deben elaborarse de manera que faciliten una resolución rápida y eficaz, manteniendo los incentivos correctos para
los prestatarios y sin poner en peligro la calidad de los activos del sector bancario y la estabilidad financiera en
general.

En principio, tal marco debe ser global y abarcar los diversos sectores y las posibles situaciones de penuria económica,
además de basarse en las mejores prácticas internacionales. Sin embargo, dado que la elaboración y la aplicación de
un marco global de este tipo son tareas complejas y que exigen tiempo, la Comisión se congratula de las iniciativas del
Gobierno español para conceder ayudas temporales a los hogares más vulnerables en peligro actual de expulsión de
su vivienda y para reforzar globalmente los mercados hipotecarios y la protección de los consumidores, manteniendo
al mismo tiempo los incentivos adecuados de acuerdo con el interés de primer orden de mantener y fomentar la
estabilidad financiera en España.

C 42 E / 404 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006021/13**

**to the Commission**
**María Irigoyen Pérez (S&D)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Spanish law on mortgagor protection measures, debt restructuring and social housing

According to information from the Bank of Spain, 39 167 homes were repossessed by banks in 2012 as a result of
owners being unable to pay their mortgage, of which 18 195 were the result of legal action.

The new Spanish law concerning mortgagor protection measures, debt restructuring and social housing (Law
1/2013), which was enacted despite being rejected by both the opposition and the Platform for sufferers of mortgage
distress (Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca), has not met expectations and does not cover certain aspects such
as universal and retroactive payment in kind, protection for guarantors, over‐indebtedness of families etc.

Furthermore, many of the new law’s detractors (including many judges) have criticised the fact that it does not go far
enough and have stated that, in view of the hardship suffered by tens of thousands of people in Spain, reforms of the
Mortgages Act and of the Code of Civil Procedure are urgently required.

The European Central Bank (ECB) agrees, stating last week in its opinion on the draft law that ‘foreclosure should be
regarded as a last resort’ and that ‘a more comprehensive set of measures that addresses the underlying causes of
mortgage distress and attempts to avoid, insofar as possible, foreclosure proceedings should be pursued’.

The ECB also underlined that a more comprehensive resolution strategy is required to address the challenges that arise
in the face of changed economic circumstances of borrowers, significant changes in property values and the potential
for resultant unviable mortgages, whilst maintaining appropriate incentives for both the debtor and creditor, and
minimising the potential for moral hazard.

— What is the Commission’s view of the ECB opinion?

— Does the Commission share the ECB’s view that a more comprehensive resolution strategy is required?

— Does the Commission not believe that, given its role as guarantor of the collective interest, it should study the issue
in detail?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

The Commission considers appropriate proper legal and institutional frameworks that are able to effectively deal with
distressed private borrowers, both in the household and in the enterprise sector, are necessary in particular in the
work-out of a deep economic crisis such as in Spain. Such frameworks should be construed to be able to deliver
effective and fast resolution while maintaining proper incentives to borrowers and not endangering the asset quality
of the banking sector and financial stability at large.

In principle, such a framework should be comprehensive across different sectors and various possible situations of
financial distress, based on best international practices. However, given that establishing and implementing such a
comprehensive framework is complex and time-consuming, the Commission welcomes the initiatives by the Spanish
Government to give temporary relief to the most vulnerable households currently threatened by evictions and to
overall strengthening mortgage markets and consumer protection, while preserving proper incentives in the
imperative interest of maintaining and fostering financial stability in Spain.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 405

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006023/13**

**à Comissão**
**Regina Bastos (PPE) e Carlos Coelho (PPE)**

_(29 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Rastreamento de IP por parte de sítios Internet

Recentemente foi tornado público, pelos consumidores, que alguns sítios da Internet responsáveis pela venda de
viagens estão a praticar «rastreamento de IP», ou seja, a proceder à recolha de dados dos consumidores moldando o
preço oferecido em função do seu comportamento de navegação e em particular das suas simulações de anteriores

compras.

A confidencialidade dos dados pessoais e das comunicações constitui um direito fundamental garantido pelo artigo
16.° do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia (TFUE) e pelos artigos 7.° e 8.° da Carta dos Direitos
Fundamentais da UE. A confidencialidade é ainda protegida pelo direito derivado da UE, nomeadamente o artigo 5.°
da diretiva 2009/136/CE, relativa à privacidade no setor das comunicações eletrónicas, assim como pela Diretiva
95/46/CE.

Sem prejuízo das competências dos Estados-Membros, a Comissão Europeia, no exercício das suas competências,
pode, e deve, impor sanções aos cidadãos e às empresas por violação do Direito da União.

Neste sentido, solicitamos à Comissão os seguintes esclarecimentos:

1. Tem a Comissão conhecimento destas práticas?

2. Tenciona a Comissão, no exercício das suas competências, desencadear uma investigação a nível europeu sobre
estas práticas e verificar se as mesmas estão em conformidade com a legislação europeia?

3. Está a Comissão a pensar solicitar ao Organismo de Reguladores Europeus das Comunicações Eletrónicas
(ORECE) parecer sobre esta situação?

**Resposta dada por Neelie Kroes em nome da Comissão**

_(23 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão tem conhecimento de relatórios segundo os quais alguns sítios Internet obtêm dados sobre o
comportamento de navegação dos consumidores, utilizando endereços IP e testemunhos de conexão ( _cookies_ ) com
vista a adaptar os preços em função do comportamento de navegação anterior dos utilizadores.

Um endereço IP é um número único de identificação indispensável em qualquer dispositivo de acesso à Internet. É
possível identificar os utilizadores da Internet através dos endereços IP que, por conseguinte, são considerados dados
pessoais ( [1] ) na aceção da diretiva relativa à proteção de dados ( [2] ). Por conseguinte, qualquer tratamento de endereços
IP para seguir o comportamento de navegação dos utilizadores deve estar em conformidade com a legislação nacional
que dá cumprimento à referida diretiva, nomeadamente a disposição nos termos da qual o tratamento dos dados
pessoais deve ser justificado por motivos legítimos, ter uma finalidade específica e ser proporcional ao objetivo
pretendido. Os utilizadores da Internet devem ser informadas do tratamento dos seus dados.

Além disso, quando são utilizados testemunhos de conexão para seguir o comportamento de navegação dos
utilizadores, é aplicável o n.° 3 do artigo 5.° da diretiva relativa à privacidade no setor das comunicações
eletrónicas ( [3] ). Nos termos da referida disposição, só é permitido armazenar informações ou obter acesso a
informações armazenadas no equipamento terminal dos utilizadores, tais como testemunhos de conexão, se as
pessoas em causa tiverem dado o seu consentimento informado.

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( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Acórdão do TJUE, Processo C-70/10 Scarlet/SABAM, 24.11. 2011.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Diretiva 1995/46/CE, JO L 281 de 23.11.1995.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Diretiva 2009/136/CE, JO L 337 de 18.12.2009.

C 42 E / 406 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Sem prejuízo das competências da Comissão na qualidade de guardiã dos Tratados, as autoridades nacionais em
matéria de proteção de dados são as entidades competentes para supervisionar a aplicação das medidas nacionais de
execução da diretiva relativa à proteção de dados, embora os Estados-Membros tenham a liberdade de nomear a
autoridade nacional responsável pela supervisão da aplicação da diretiva relativa à privacidade no setor das
comunicações eletrónicas. A Comissão não tenciona lançar nenhuma investigação a nível europeu sobre estas
práticas, nem solicitar o parecer do ORECE. A Comissão apoia, contudo, a atividade dos Estados-Membros neste
domínio, principalmente no âmbito do Grupo de Trabalho do artigo 29.°.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 407

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006023/13**

**to the Commission**
**Regina Bastos (PPE) and Carlos Coelho (PPE)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Use of IP tracking by Internet sites

Consumers have recently reported that some Internet sites selling travel tickets are using IP tracking to collect data
from consumers and adjust the price according to their online behaviour, in particular previous purchases.

The confidentiality of personal data and communications is a fundamental right that is guaranteed by Article 16 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU. Confidentiality is also protected by the EU's secondary legislation, namely Article 5 of
Directive 2009/136/EC on privacy in the electronic communications sector, and Directive 95/46/EC.

Without prejudice to the powers of the Member States, the Commission can and should use its powers to impose
sanctions on citizens and undertakings acting in violation of Union law.

1. Is the Commission aware of these practices?

2. Will the Commission use its powers to launch a European-level investigation into these practices and ascertain
whether they comply with European legislation?

3. Is the Commission considering asking the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications
(BEREC) for its opinion on this matter?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of reports that websites track users, using IP addresses and cookies, to adjust prices in the
light of prior online behaviour.

An IP address is a unique numeric identifier that is needed by every device connecting to the Internet. They can
identify Internet users and are therefore considered personal data ( [1] ) in the sense of the Data Protection Directive ( [2] ).
Accordingly, any processing of IP addresses to track users must be in line with the national laws implementing this
directive; _inter alia_ personal data must be processed on legitimate grounds, for a specific purpose and must be
proportionate to the aim pursued. Internet users must be informed about the processing.

In addition, when cookies are used to track users, Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive ( [3] ) applies. This provision
allows the storing of information or the gaining of access to information already stored, such as cookies, on a user's
terminal equipment only if the user has given informed consent.

Without prejudice to the Commission's powers as guardian of the Treaty, national data protection authorities are the
competent bodies to monitor the application of the national measures implementing the Data Protection Directive,
while Member States are free to appoint the national authority to supervise the ePrivacy Directive. The Commission
has no plans to launch a European investigation into these practices, nor to ask BEREC for an opinion. However, the
Commission supports Member States' work on these issues, mainly through Article 29 Working Party.

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( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) ECJ Judgment Case 70/10 Scarlet v. SABAM, 24.11. 2011.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 1995/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Directive 2009/136/EC, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009.

C 42 E / 408 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006024/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(29 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Equens marketingrapporten

Op 23 mei jl. heeft Equens, een Europese payment processor, aangegeven de privégegevens te willen verkopen van
het koopgedrag van gebruikers van zijn pin-systeem. Equens schendt daarmee de gebruikersvoorwaarden van de bij
Equens aangesloten banken die geheimhouding over de transacties beloven. Ter oriëntatie, het gaat hierbij om
10,5 miljard transacties per jaar. Nadat er in Nederland ophef is ontstaan over dit voornemen heeft Equens zijn
voornemen voorlopig teruggetrokken.

1. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat de bescherming van persoonsgegevens een fundamenteel recht is?

2. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat Equens een monopoliepositie inneemt bij pinbetalingen in Nederland en
dat een klant geen keus heeft als hij bij pinbetalingen zijn privégegevens aan deze monopolist kenbaar maakt?

3. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat met de verkoop van privégegevens van gebruikers door Equens, de
gebruiksvoorwaarden van de bij Equens aangesloten banken wordt geschonden?

4. Vindt de Commissie dat pinbetalingen in de Europese betaalzone SEPA moet worden bevorderd?

5. Vindt de Commissie dat het voornemen van Equens schadelijk voor de acceptatie door het publiek van
pinbetalingen?

6. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat de verkoop van privégegevens door Equens niet verenigbaar is met
„purpose limitation”, wat een kernprincipe is van databescherming?

7. Vindt de Commissie dat op het principe van „purpose limitation” geen uitzonderingsposities moeten worden
gemaakt in de artikelen 6 en 7 van de nieuwe databeschermingsrichtlijn?

8. Is de Commissie van mening dat er een limitatieve lijst van gevallen moet worden opgesteld voor de invulling
van het begrip „legitimate interests” in de richtlijn (artikelen 6 en 9)?

9. Is de Commissie van mening dat met name de verkoop van privégegevens van gebruikers, door organisaties die
het maken van marketingrapporten niet als kernactiviteit hebben, buiten de werking van „legitimate interest” valt en
moet worden tegengegaan op grond van de nieuwe databeschermingsrichtlijn?

10. Hoe zal de Commissie, aan de hand van de nieuwe richtlijn, optreden bij de verkoop, door Equens, van de
privégegevens van gebruikers van de diensten van die payment processor?

11. Zal het optreden van de Commissie zich dan ook richten op de banken die eigenaar zijn van Equens?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**

_(30 september 2013)_

De meeste Nederlandse banken werken met Equens voor de verwerking van de creditcardbetalingen van hun klanten.
De banken van consumenten en detailhandelaren hebben overeenkomsten met ondernemingen die de
transactiegegevens verwerken. Dat is een overeenkomst tussen de bank en de dienstverlener: consumenten en
detailhandelaren zijn geen partij bij deze overeenkomst en hebben geen zeggenschap over de keuze van de
gegevensverwerkende onderneming.

De Commissie erkent dat Equens via deze overeenkomsten wellicht toegang heeft tot persoonsgegevens van
consumenten. De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van de voorwaarden die banken de gegevensverwerkers opleggen
met betrekking tot het verzamelen, opslaan of gebruiken van persoonsgegevens.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 409

De Commissie heeft bepaalde bevoegdheden als hoedster van de Verdragen, maar de
gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten moeten erop toezien dat de voor de verwerking verantwoordelijken de
gegevensbeschermingsregels naleven, ook die op het gebied van doelbinding (art. 6, lid 1, onder b), van
Richtlijn 95/46/EG ( [1] )).

Bescherming van persoonsgegevens is een grondrecht (artikel 8 van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de
Europese Unie). Het voorstel voor een algemene gegevensbeschermingsverordening ( [2] ) bevat geen uitzonderingen op
het doelbindingsbeginsel ( [3] ). Wanneer het doel van verdere verwerking niet verenigbaar is met het doel waarvoor de
persoonsgegevens zijn verzameld, moet de verwerking zijn gebaseerd op een andere rechtsgrondslag ( [4] ). De
Commissie is niet van mening dat een limitatieve lijst moet worden opgesteld van gevallen waarin „gerechtvaardigde
belangen” op het spel staan.

De Commissie is van oordeel dat transacties met kaarten met een chip en een pincode veiliger zijn dan transacties met
kaarten met een magnetische strip. Zij vindt de algemene toepassing van de EMV-norm in Europa een goede zaak.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) PB L 281 van 23.11.1995, blz. 31.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Zie artikel 5, onder b), van COM(2012)11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Het voorstel voor een herziene richtlijn betalingsdiensten, dat op 24 juli 2013 is gepubliceerd (COM(2013)247 final), bepaalt ook dat elke vorm

van gegevensverwerking in het kader van de richtlijn in overeenstemming moet zijn met Richtlijn 95/46/EG, de nationale voorschriften tot
omzetting van die richtlijn, en Verordening (EG) nr. 45/2001 (art. 84 en overweging 71). Daarnaast bepaalt artikel 5, onder g) en j) van de
voorgestelde richtlijn dat entiteiten die betalingsinstelling willen worden, bij hun vergunningsaanvraag een beschrijving moeten indienen van de
procedures voor het monitoren, traceren en beperken van de toegang tot gevoelige betalingsgegevens, alsook van de maatregelen op het gebied
van beveiliging en risicobeperking die worden genomen om de gebruikers van de betalingsdiensten afdoende te beschermen tegen de vastgestelde
risico’s, waaronder illegaal gebruik van gevoelige gegevens en persoonsgegevens.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Zie artikel 6, lid 4, van het voorstel.

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⋅4∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 410 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006024/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Equens marketing reports

On 23 May 2013, Equens, a European payment processor, indicated that it was willing to sell personal data revealing
the purchasing patterns of consumers using its PIN facilities, thereby breaching confidentiality guarantee given by
stakeholder banks in respect of the relevant transactions numbering around 10.5 billion annually. In response to
angry protests in the Netherlands, Equens has provisionally withdrawn its offer.

1. Does the Commission agree that personal data protection is a fundamental right?

2. Does the Commission agree that Equens enjoys a monopoly in the provision of PIN facilities in the Netherlands
and that consumer disclosing personal data to Equens through their PIN payments effectively have no choice in the
matter?

3. Does the Commission agree that the sale by Equens of consumers’ personal data constitutes a breach of the
terms and conditions offered by stakeholder banks?

4. Does the Commission consider that measures must be taken to encourage PIN payments in the Single Euro
Payments Area (SEPA)?

5. Does the Commission consider that this latest move by Equens will undermine public confidence in PIN
payments?

6. Does the Commission agree that the sale by Equens of personal data is incompatible with ‘purpose limitation’, a
fundamental principle of data protection?

7. Does the Commission agree that Articles 6 and 7 of the new data protection directive must contain no
exceptions to the ‘purpose limitation’ principle?

8. Does the Commission agree that a restrictive list of cases in which the ‘legitimate interests’ referred to an
Article 6 and 9 of the directive are at stake should be established?

9. Does the Commission agree that the sale of consumers’ personal data by organisations not principally engaged
in drawing up marketing reports does not constitute a ‘legitimate interest’ and must accordingly be opposed under the
new data protection directive?

10. What action will the Commission take under the new directive with regard to the sale by the Equens payment
processor of the personal data of consumers using its services?

11. Will such action also be directed at banks holding ownership stakes in Equens?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 September 2013)_

Most Dutch banks have chosen Equens as processor of their consumer credit card payments. Banks of consumers and
retailers have contracts with processing companies for the processing of card transactions. The contract governing
this relationship is between relevant banks and the processing service provider: consumers and retailers are not
parties to this contract and have no influence on the choice of processor.

The Commission acknowledges that through these contracts, Equens may have access to the personal data of
consumers. The Commission is not aware of the conditions imposed by the banks on their processors in terms of
how or whether they can gather, store or use any personal data they receive.

Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the responsibility for the compliance
of controllers with data protection provisions is with the data protection authorities, including on the compatibility
with the purpose limitation principle (Art. 6 (1) (b) of Directive 95/46/EC ( [1] )).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 411

The protection of personal data is a fundamental right (Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union). The proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation ( [2] ) provides no exceptions to the purpose
limitation principle ( [3] ). Where the purpose for processing is not compatible with the initial one, the controller must
base the processing on another legitimate ground for lawful processing ( [4] ). The Commission does not consider that a
restrictive list of cases of endangering ‘legitimate interest’ should be established.

The Commission considers that card transactions based on chip and PIN provide more security than such based on
magnetic stripes. It welcomes the full implementation of the EMV standard in Europe.

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⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) See Article 5 (b) of COM(2012)11.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) The proposal for a revised Directive on Payment Services published on 24 July 2013 (COM(2013) 547 final) also provides that any processing of

personal data for the purposes of the directive shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, national implementation legislation of
this directive and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (Art 82 and Recital 71). In addition, for entities that want to become a payment institution,
Articles 5 (g) and (j) of the draft Directive prescribe that as part of the application for a licence they have to submit a description of the process in
place to monitor, track and restrict access to sensitive payment data and documentation detailing control and mitigation measures to protect
payment services users against risks concerning _inter alia_ the illegal use of sensitive and personal data.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) See Article 6 (4) of the proposal.

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⋅4∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 412 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006025/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ „Зелена енергия“ или „ядрена енергия“

През последните месеци в България започна дебат по прилагането на една от главните директиви на ЕС — тази за
електроенергията, произведена от възобновяеми енергийни източници. Обект на коментари са ползите от тяхната
експлоатация и най-вече тяхната цена. Както в България, така и във всички останали европейски държави
изграждането и поддържането на ВЕИ в изправност е скъпо начинание, което е свързано най-вече с поскъпване на
цената на услугата, която се поема главно от крайния потребител и от държавата. Различните видове „зелена енергия“

са известни и с това, че нямат капацитета да покрият нуждите за електричество на една цяла държава, както и да
подсигурят стабилност, сигурност и качество на предоставяната услуга, което от своя страна води до много опасности.
За това свидетелства и фактът, че не съществува консенсус между водещите европейски икономики относно решаването
на „проблема“ за извеждане от експлоатация на атомните електроцентрали. Страни като Германия, Швеция и
Нидерландия планират да преустановят употребата им до 2050 г., докато страни като Франция и Финландия в
момента са в процес на изграждане на нови ядрени реактори. Други страни, които смятат да създадат нови ядрени
мощности и/или да удължат ресурса им, са Словения и Великобритания. Тези действия са оправдани от факта, че
атомните електроцентрали са сигурен източник за производство на електроенергия, който е напълно независим от
външни фактори като например метеорологичните условия, което позволява да се произвежда по чист начин евтино
електричество, което спомага за намаляването на вредните емисии в атмосферата. В България затварянето на АЕЦ
Козлодуй без заместител за нея има опасност да внесе хаос в енергийната политика на страната, тъй като 40% от
електрическата й енергия се осигурява от тази атомна електроцентрала, а досега не е ясно колко от общо
произвежданото количество електроенергия е от ВЕИ и дали ще може да се запази балансът и сигурността в
енергийната система на страната при спиране на някоя от големите мощности.

1. В България ВЕИ са обекти на спекулации и политически игри. В изказванията на различни политически лица
посочените цифри на инсталирани мощности варират от няколкостотин мегавата до десетки хиляди. Има ли
Комисията данни за точното количество инсталирани мощности от ВЕИ в България?

2. Счита ли Комисията, че за развиващите се страни от Източна Европа е по-удачно да се насърчи затварянето на
централите от тип ТЕЦ (където те са най-разпространени), отколкото тези от тип АЕЦ, с цел намаляване на вредните
емисии?

3. В тази връзка смята ли Комисията, че е възможно да се субсидира изграждането на нови ядрени реактори
в развиващите се страни от тази част на Европа, като по този начин се помогне за по-чистото производство на качествен
и достъпен ток, и също така се подсигури благоприятен инвестиционен климат за развитие на „зелените енергии“?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Oettinger от името на Комисията**

_(22 юли 2013 г.)_

1.   Общата инсталирана мощност на двата действащи реактора (блокове 5 и 6) на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ е около 1900
мегавата (електрически). Блокове 1‐4 на същия обект са спрени и подлежат на извеждане от експлоатация.

2.   Държавите членки имат правото да определят микса на енергийните източници, използвани на тяхна територия.
Държавите членки имат също свободата да избират дали да изграждат или затварят атомни електроцентрали. Тези

решения се вземат на национално равнище.

3.   ЕС не предоставя субсидии за изграждане на атомни електроцентрали. Освен това всички национални схеми за
финансиране, включващи държавна помощ, трябва да бъдат съвместими с правилата на ЕС за държавните помощи и

правилата на вътрешния пазар.

Комисията би искала да насочи вниманието на уважаемия член на ЕП към отговора, даден от нея на писмен въпрос E005501/2013 на г-н Michał Tomasz Kamiński.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 413

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006025/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ ‘Green energy’ versus ‘nuclear power’

A debate has opened in Bulgaria in recent months on the implementation of one of the most important EU directives
— that on electricity produced from renewable energy sources. The topics being discussed are the benefits of using
renewable energy sources and, in particular, their price. In Bulgaria, as in all the other European countries, the
construction and maintenance of renewable energy facilities is costly, and is generally associated with an increase in
the cost of the energy supplied, which is borne mainly by the end user and the state. It is also known that the various
types of ‘green energy’ are unable to satisfy the electricity needs of a whole country or to guarantee the stability,
security or quality of the service provided, which can lead to dangerous situations arising. This is also shown by the
fact that there is no consensus among the major European economies on how to resolve the issue of the
decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Countries like Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands are planning to
discontinue their use until 2050, while countries such as France and Finland are currently in the process of building
new nuclear reactors. Slovenia and the UK are two other countries that intend to establish new nuclear facilities
and/or extend their operational lives. Such an approach is based on the justification that nuclear power plants are a
reliable source of electricity completely independent of external factors such as weather conditions, which makes it
possible to produce clean and cheap electricity and therefore contributes to reducing harmful emissions . In Bulgaria,
the fact that Kozloduy nuclear power station is being close and will not be replaced is likely to wreak havoc with the
country’s energy policy, as 40% of its electrical energy comes from that power station and it is still not clear how
much of the total electricity produced comes from renewable energy sources and if balance and security can be
maintained in the country’s energy system once it loses one of its major sources of generating potential.

1. In Bulgaria, nuclear power stations are the subject of speculation and political manoeuvring. Statements issued
by various politicians have indicated installed capacities ranging from a few hundred to several thousand megawatts.
Does the Commission have any statistics on precise installed capacities for nuclear power facilities in Bulgaria?

2. Does the Commission consider that, in the case of the developing countries of Eastern Europe, it would be more
appropriate to encourage the closure of thermal power stations (where these are the commonest type) rather than the
closure of nuclear power stations, in order to reduce harmful emissions?

3. In this connection, does the Commission feel it would be possible to subsidise the construction of new nuclear
reactors in the developing countries of this part of Europe, thereby helping to ensure cleaner generation of high‐
quality and affordable energy, and also to create a propitious climate for investment in the development of green
energies?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

1. The total installed capacity of the two operating reactors (units 5 and 6) at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant is
circa 1900 megawatts (electrical). Units 1-4 at the same site are shut down and subject to decommissioning.

2. Member States have the right to determine the mix of energy sources used in their territory. Member States are
also free to opt either for the construction or the closure of nuclear power plants. These are decisions taken at
national level.

3. The EU does not subsidise the construction of nuclear power plants. Moreover, any national financing scheme
which involves state aid would need to be compatible with EU state aid rules and internal market rules.

The Commission would also like to refer the Honourable Member to its reply to Written Question E-005501/2013
by Mr Michał Tomasz Kamiński.

C 42 E / 414 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006026/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Разрешаване на проблема с трафика на хора

В периода 2008—2010 г. жертвите на трафика на хора в ЕС са 23 632 души. В този двугодишен период има ръст
от 18 % на трафика на хора, а 13 % по-малко трафиканти биват осъдени. Това е сериозен проблем особено за страни
като Румъния и България. Рискова група при трафик на хора са социално слабите граждани, както момичетата и
жените. Те се най-честите жертви на това престъпление. Съществен проблем е, че макар и в Директивата да има ясно
определена наказателна отговорност за престъплението трафик на хора, данните показват, че до този момент малко
заподозрени биват реално осъдени и влизат в затвора, защото няма точни критерии, на които да отговаря дадено лице,
за да бъде осъдено като трафикант. Малко внимание се отделя и на самия процес на трафик, който се изразява
в прехвърлянето на едно или повече лица от една държава членка в друга или от трети страни към Съюза и обратно.

1. Кога се очаква всички държави членки да транспонират Директивата на ЕС за борба с трафика на хора, крайният
срок за което беше до 6 април 2013 г., и как ще бъдат накарани те да извършат този процес по-бързо?

2. Какви мерки възнамерява да вземе Комисията по отношение на превенцията на трафика на хора, свързана
с рисковите групи, с цел да се подобри тяхното положение и да има по-голяма публичност и гласност на проблема?

3. Как възнамерява Комисията да реши проблема, че няма ясна законова регламентация, която да позволява вината
на заподозрените в трафик на хора да бъде доказана и те да бъдат осъдени и да влязат в затвора?

4. Как възнамерява Комисията да засили контрола по границите и контрола по време на пътуванията като цяло, да
засили трансграничното сътрудничество, с което да допринесе за затрудняване на процеса на трафик на хора, без тези
мерки да възпрепятстват свободното движение на хора?

**Отговор, даден от г-жа Малмстрьом от името на Комисията**

_(11 юли 2013 г.)_

В светлината на тенденциите и данните, представени в първия европейски статистически доклад за трафика на хора,
Комисията обръща особено внимание на транспонирането на Директива 2011/36/ЕС.

До момента девет държави членки (Чешката република, Естония, Латвия, Литва, Унгария, Полша, Румъния,
Финландия, Швеция) са уведомили за пълно транспониране и четири (Белгия, България, Словения, Обединеното
кралство) за частично транспониране. Комисията ще вземе всички необходими мерки, за да се гарантира правилното
прилагане на правото на ЕС, включително откриване на процедура за нарушение, ако е необходимо.

Официални уведомителни писма (член 258) бяха изпратени до тринадесет държави членки на 29 май 2013 г.
[Списъкът е достъпен онлайн: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20130603.htm.](http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20130603.htm)

Понастоящем Комисията започна да анализира информацията, изпратена от държавите членки. Всички разпоредби на
директивата ще бъдат разгледани, включително наказателноправните разпоредби.

Ако директивата бъде транспонирана и приложена изцяло, тя може да окаже реално и конкретно въздействие върху
живота на жертвите и да доведе до подобряване на трансграничното сътрудничество между държавите членки.

В стратегията на ЕС за премахване на трафика на хора се изтъква, че с цел по-ефективно разследване и наказателно
преследване на трафикантите, засилване на трансграничното сътрудничество и централизиране на данните за трафика
на хора държавите членки следва да създадат национални мултидисциплинарни правоприлагащи звена за борба с
трафика на хора. В рамките на тази стратегия Комисията насърчава националните органи и агенции на ЕС да създават,

когато е уместно, съвместни екипи за разследване.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 415

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006026/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Increase in trafficking in human beings

In the period 2008-2010, there were 23,632 the victims of human trafficking in the EU. That two‐year period saw
an18% increase in human trafficking, while13% fewer traffickers were convicted. This is a serious problem, especially
in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria. The risk group in the case of human trafficking are socially disadvantaged
citizens, women and girls. They are the most common victims of this crime. One crucial problem is that even if the
directive clearly defines human trafficking as a criminal offence, statistics show that so far few suspects have actually
been convicted and sent to jail because there are no precise criteria for sentencing someone for the crime of
trafficking. Little attention has been paid either to the process of trafficking itself, which has taken the form of passing
one or more persons from one Member State to another, or from third countries to the EU and vice‐versa.

1. When can one expect all the Member States to have transposed the EU directive on combating human
trafficking, the deadline for which was April 6, 2013, and how will they be encouraged to accelerate this process?

2. What steps does the Commission intend to take as regards the prevention of human trafficking in the case of
risk groups, in order to improve their situation and bring more openness and visibility to this issue?

3. How does the Commission intend to solve the problem of there being no clear legal regulations allowing
persons suspected of human trafficking to be found guilty of this and then sentenced to jail?

4. How does the Commission intend to strengthen border controls and travel checks as a whole and to strengthen
cross-border cooperation in order to make trafficking more difficult, without these measures impeding the free
movement of people?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

In the light of the trends and data presented in the First EU Statistical Report on Trafficking in Human Beings, the
Commission is paying particular attention to the transposition of the directive 2011/36/EU.

To date nine Member States (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Finland, Sweden)
have notified full transposition and four (Belgium, Bulgaria, Slovenia, UK) partial transposition. The Commission will
take all necessary measures to ensure the correct application of EC law, including the launching of an infringement
procedure if it appears to be necessary.

Letters of formal notice (Article 258) were sent to thirteen Member States on 29 May 2013. The list is available
[online: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20130603.htm.](http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20130603.htm)

The Commission have now started to analyse the information transmitted by the Member States. All the provisions of
the directive will be examined, including criminal law provisions.

If fully transposed and implemented, the directive has the potential to have a real and concrete impact on the lives of
the victims and will increase cross border cooperation among Member States.

The EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings sets out that, to better investigate and
prosecute traffickers and further increase cross-border cooperation and centralise knowledge on trafficking in human
beings, Member States should establish national multidisciplinary law-enforcement units on human trafficking. In the
same Strategy, the Commission encourages national authorities and EU agencies to create, where relevant, joint
investigation teams.

C 42 E / 416 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006027/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Изравняване на критериите и на цялостния процес на придобиване на правоспосбност за одитор
в Европейски съюз

Международните стандарти за финансови отчети са приети за официална база за изготвяне на финансови отчети
в България. Всички МСФО са приети с Регламент (ЕО) № 1126/2008 на Комисията от 3 ноември 2008 г. за приемане
на някои международни счетоводни стандарти в съответствие с Регламент (ЕО) № 1606/2002 на Европейския
парламент и на Съвета, публикуван в Официален вестник на ЕС от 29.11.2008 г. Последващите изменения
в стандартите са приети с допълнителни регламенти, публикувани в Официален вестник на ЕС, след като са одобрени
от Европейската комисия. След приемането на България в Европейския съюз на 1 януари 2007 г. одиторската дейност
се регулира от европейското законодателство. В българското законодателство действа Законът за независимия
финансов одит, който урежда Института на дипломираните експерт-счетоводители като независима национална
професионална организация. Институтът организира курсове за обучение и провежда изпитите за придобиване на
правоспособност. Но поради автономията, която има институтът, одиторската гилдия е приела изключително
рестриктивни условия, които силно ограничават конкуренцията и това поражда съмнения за злоупотреби в тази
област, като изкуствено се създава ситуация, при която само привилигеровани и поставени хора могат да практикуват
тази професия. Това хвърля сянка върху честността на професията и процеса за придобиване на квалификация.

Може ли Европейската комисия да инициира законодателни промени на нивото Европейския съюз във връзка
с прилагането на Международните стандарти за финансови отчети с цел да бъдат приети еднакви критерии, по които
да се организират изпитите за придобиване на правоспособност и на които да отговарят всички кандидати, желаещи да
практикуват тази професия, и в тази връзка да бъдат изготвени еднакви изпитни варианти за всички държави членки и
всички граждани на Съюза?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Barnier от името на Комисията**

_(12 юли 2013 г.)_

Директивата за задължителния одит (Директива 2006/43/EО) въвежда минимално ниво на хармонизация, наред
с друго, относно правилата за одобряването, продължаващото обучение, взаимното признаване и регистрирането на

одиторите и одиторските дружества, които могат да извършват задължителен одит.

Компетентните органи на държавите членки могат да одобряват за одитори, имащи право да извършват задължителен
одит, само физически лица, които отговарят на определени условия, установени в директивата. Органите могат да
предоставят одобрение само на физически лица или дружества с добра репутация. За да получи одобрение,
съответното лице трябва също така да притежава необходимите познания в области като дружественото, данъчното и
социалното право. Физическо лице може да бъде одобрено да извършва задължителен одит, само след като е
постъпило в университет или образователна институция с равностойно равнище, след което е завършило курс на
теоретична подготовка, преминало е през практическо обучение и е издържало изпит за придобиване на
професионална компетентност на университетско равнище или еквивалентна степен, организиран или признат от
съответната държава членка. Тази проверка на теоретичните познания следва да включва различни теми, в частност
обща счетоводна теория и принципи; нормативни изисквания и стандарти, свързани с подготовката на годишните и

консолидираните счетоводни отчети; международните счетоводни стандарти и т.н.

Целта на директивата, обаче, е да се постигне висока степен, а не цялостна хармонизация на изискванията за

одиторите, извършващи задължителен одит, поради което материята на изпитите все още не е стандартизирана.
Подобна евентуална стандартизация би означавала, че дружественото право, данъчното право и другите области,
обхванати от задължителния одит, са напълно хармонизирани на равнището на ЕС, което не е факт.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 417

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006027/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(29 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Standardising the criteria for, and the whole process of, qualifying as an auditor in the European Union

The international accounting standards (IAS) have been adopted as the official basis for the preparation of accounts in
Bulgaria. All the relevant standards are provided for in Commission Regulation No 1126/2008 of 3 November 2008,
adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, published in the Official Journal of 29 November 2008. Subsequent
amendments to the standards are set out in complementary regulations published in the Official Journal and
approved by the Commission. Since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU on 1 January 2007, auditing there has been
governed by EC law. The relevant national legislation is the Independent Auditing Act, providing for an Institute of
Chartered Accountants as an independent national body for the profession. The Institute organises courses and
conducts examinations. However, by virtue of the autonomy that the Institute enjoys, the Guild of Auditors has
adopted extremely restrictive criteria that severely limit competition. Doubts have thus arisen as to possible abuses,
and a situation has been artificially created whereby only privileged people with the right connections can practise as
auditors. This casts a shadow on the integrity of the profession and the process of qualifying for it.

Can the Commission initiate changes in EC law in relation to the application of the IAS so as to ensure that uniform
criteria are adopted for the conduct of examinations leading to qualification, and for the conditions to be met by
persons wishing to work as auditors, and that the content of the examinations is standardised for all the Member
States and all citizens of the Union?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The Statutory Audit Directive (Directive 2006/43/EC) establishes a minimum level of harmonisation concerning,
_inter alia_, rules on the approval, continuing education, mutual recognition and registration of statutory auditors and
audit firms.

The competent authorities of the Member States may approve as statutory auditors only natural persons who satisfy
certain conditions laid down in the directive. The competent authorities of a Member State may grant approval only
to natural persons or firms of good repute. Being approved as a statutory auditor also requires adequate knowledge of
matters such as company law, fiscal law and social law. A natural person may be approved to carry out a statutory
audit only after having attained university entrance or equivalent level, then completed a course of theoretical
instruction, undergone practical training and passed an examination of professional competence of university final or
equivalent examination level, organised or recognised by the Member State concerned. This test of theoretical
knowledge should include various subjects in particular — general accounting theory and principles; legal
requirements and standards relating to the preparation of annual and consolidated accounts; international accounting
standards etc.

However this directive aims at high-level — though not full — harmonisation of statutory audit requirements and
thus, the content of the examinations is not yet standardised. Such potential standardisation would imply that
company law, fiscal law and other areas, covered by the statutory audit, are fully harmonised at EU level, which is not
the current situation.

C 42 E / 418 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-006030/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Bloqueio de carne brasileira à entrada na União Europeia

A União Europeia e o Mercosul têm vindo a negociar um acordo de livre comércio, cujo relançamento das
negociações em 2010 resultou num novo alento e na aproximação das partes. Grande parte da carne bovina
importada pela União Europeia é oriunda dos países membros do Mercosul; porém, um dos pontos mais sensíveis das
referidas negociações respeita à importação de carne oriunda desses países, nomeadamente no que releva das
barreiras técnicas existentes.

A 26 de abril de 2013, dois carregamentos de carne brasileira de 35 toneladas foram bloqueados à chegada ao porto
de Roterdão, Holanda, depois se detetar a presença da bactéria E. coli, por se tratar de uma questão de segurança
alimentar.

A União Europeia deve, nos termos do artigo 169.° do TFUE, contribuir para a proteção da saúde, da segurança e dos
interesses económicos dos consumidores, contando com medidas complementares dos Estados-membros; ao mesmo
tempo, a UE prossegue no plano exterior uma política comercial comum, de sua competência exclusiva.

1. Que medidas tomou a Comissão, de forma a prevenir futuras tentativas de entrada na UE de carnes
contaminadas que possam pôr em questão a segurança alimentar e a defesa dos consumidores?

2. Que procedimentos de certificação e de segurança devem ser incluídos no futuro acordo de livre comércio, de
forma a controlar e evitar futuras situações?

3. Qual o impacto que este recente acontecimento pode ter no desenrolar das negociações do acordo de livre
comércio entre a UE e o Mercosul?

**Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão**

_(2 de julho de 2013)_

1. É precisamente devido à ocorrência de tais incidentes é necessário dispor de uma série suficiente de
salvaguardas. A legislação atualmente em vigor na da UE dispõe de todos os instrumentos necessários para impedir
que os produtos que apresentem um risco sanitário para os consumidores da UE sejam colocados no mercado. O
novo pacote de medidas relativas aos controlos sobre animais ou plantas estabelece uma abordagem modernizada e
simplificada em matéria de proteção da saúde, com uma maior ênfase nos riscos, e proporciona ferramentas de
controlo mais eficientes para assegurar a aplicação efetiva das normas que regem o funcionamento da cadeia
alimentar.

As rejeições deste tipo e as mensagens do Sistema de Alerta Rápido para os Géneros Alimentícios e Alimentos para
Animais (RASFF) são tidas em conta na seleção dos controlos do SAV.

2. O nível de proteção sanitária e fitossanitária da UE, que impõe normas de grande exigência relacionadas com a
segurança dos alimentos, não é objeto de negociações com países terceiros. Consequentemente, o capítulo SPS do
acordo em negociação com os países do Mercosul dispõe que os produtos comercializados entre as partes devem
cumprir plenamente as condições sanitárias da parte importadora.

3. Este incidente não deverá afetar as negociações em curso com o Mercosul.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 419

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006030/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Block on Brazilian meat entering the European Union

The European Union and Mercosur have been negotiating a free trade agreement. The relaunching of negotiations in
2010 gave fresh impetus to the process and brought the two parties closer. A large proportion of the beef imported
by the European Union comes from Mercosur member countries, and one of the most sensitive issues discussed in the
negotiations concerns meat imports from these countries, in particular the technical barriers that are currently in
place.

On 26 April 2013, two 35-tonne shipments of Brazilian meat were blocked on arrival at the port of Rotterdam in the
Netherlands on food safety grounds, after tests showed the presence of E. coli bacteria.

In accordance with Article 169 TFEU, the European Union must contribute to protecting the health, safety and
economic interests of consumers with measures that supplement the action taken by the Member States; at the same
time, in its relations with the rest of the world, the EU pursues a common commercial policy for which it has
exclusive competence.

1. What steps has the Commission taken to prevent future attempts to bring contaminated meat into the EU
which could pose a threat to food safety and consumer protection?

2. What certification and safety procedures should be included in the future free trade agreement in order to
monitor and prevent such incidents in the future?

3. What impact could this recent incident have on the ongoing negotiations on the free trade agreement between
the EU and Mercosur?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 July 2013)_

1. It is precisely because such incidents do happen that it is necessary to have in place a sufficient array of
safeguards. The current EU legislation has in place all the instruments needed to prevent such products presenting a
sanitary risk for the EU consumers by being placed on the market. The new package of measures on animal, plants
and controls will provide a modernised and simplified, more risked-based approach, to the protection of health and
more efficient control tools to ensure the effective application of the rules guiding the operation of the food chain.

Rejections of this type and Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) messages are taken into account in the
targeting of FVO audits.

2. The EU level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, including high standards related to food safety, are not
subject to negotiations with third countries. Consequently, the SPS Chapter of the Agreement under negotiation with
Mercosur provides that the products traded between the Parties shall fully meet the sanitary conditions of the
importing Party.

3. This incident should not affect the ongoing negotiation with Mercosur.

C 42 E / 420 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006032/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(30 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onbeantwoorde vraag: tegenstrijdige verklaringen van commissaris Füle en speciale EU-vertegenwoordiger
Léon over het „meer voor meer”-beginsel en Egypte

Op 10 april heb ik een vraag aan de Commissie gesteld over de tegenstrijdige verklaringen van commissaris Füle en
speciale EU-vertegenwoordiger Léon over het „meer voor meer”-beginsel en Egypte (E-003419/2013).

De termijn voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag is verstreken op 22 mei 2013.

Waarom heeft de Commissie zich niet gehouden aan de bepalingen van het Reglement?

**Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie**

_(8 juli 2013)_

Het antwoord op vraag E-3419/13 van het geachte Parlementslid is op 14 juni 2013 door de Commissie
toegezonden.

De Commissie wenst andermaal te beklemtonen dat zij groot belang hecht aan het beantwoorden van de
parlementaire vragen, een belangrijk element voor de democratische controle door het Parlement. Zij probeert alle
vragen zo compleet en zorgvuldig mogelijk en binnen korte tijd te beantwoorden. Daarom betreurt zij allereerst de
vertraging die bij het beantwoorden van bovengenoemde vraag is opgelopen.

Het aantal schriftelijke vragen is de afgelopen jaren echter aanzienlijk toegenomen. In 2012 heeft de Commissie bijna
12 000 schriftelijke vragen van leden van het Parlement beantwoord. Bovendien bevatten veel van deze vragen
meerdere subvragen. Het toegenomen aantal vragen heeft onvermijdelijk geleid tot een toename van de werkdruk in
een periode van nulgroei op het gebied van personeel.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 421

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006032/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Unanswered question: Conflicting statements by Commissioner Füle and EU Special Representative León on
‘more for more’ and Egypt

On 10 April I submitted a question to the Commission about the conflicting statements by Commissioner Füle and
EU Special Representative León on ‘more for more’ and Egypt (E‐ 003419/2013).

The deadline for answering this question lapsed on 22 May 2013.

Why has the Commission failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

The reply to the Honourable Member's Question E-3419/13 was transmitted by the Commission on 14 June 2013.

The Commission wishes to reiterate that it attaches great importance to answering parliamentary questions, an
important element of the democratic scrutiny exercised by Parliament. It seeks to answer all questions as completely
and as accurately as possible within a short period of time and therefore first of all very much regrets the delay that
has occurred in replying to the abovementioned question.

However, the number of written questions has increased considerably during recent years. In 2012, the Commission
responded to almost 12 000 written questions by Members of Parliament. Moreover, many of these questions include
several sub questions. The increased number of questions has inevitably lead to an increased workload during a
period of zero growth in human resources.

C 42 E / 422 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006033/13**

**aan de Commissie**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(30 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Door het Handvest van de grondrechten van de EU gegarandeerde vrijheden

De lidstaten van de Europese Unie hebben zich verplicht tot eerbiediging van de grondrechten en de fundamentele
vrijheden zoals die worden gegarandeerd door het Handvest van de grondrechten van de EU, dat volgens artikel 6
VEU dezelfde juridische status heeft als de Verdragen zelf. Om de desbetreffende bepalingen na te leven, is het van het
grootste belang om de correcte interpretatie van deze rechten en vrijheden te kennen.

Kan de Commissie, gelet op het voorgaande, de volgende vragen beantwoorden:

1. Kan de Commissie als hoedster van de Verdragen gedetailleerde informatie verstrekken over de toepassing van
bepaalde artikelen van het Handvest?

2. Kan de Commissie mij haar interpretatie uiteenzetten van artikel 10 (Vrijheid van gedachte, geweten en
godsdienst) en artikel 11 (Vrijheid van meningsuiting en van informatie) van het Handvest van de
grondrechten?

3. Onder welke omstandigheden worden de in artikel 10 genoemde vrijheden beïnvloed door iemands leeftijd?
Hebben kinderen de vrijheid om hun eigen godsdienst te kiezen? Is de vrijheid om van godsdienst of
overtuiging te veranderen gekoppeld aan iemands leeftijd?

4. Welke beperkingen gelden er voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting en van informatie,uitgaande van de leeftijd
van de betrokkene?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie**

_(25 juli 2013)_

1. Het derde jaarverslag over de toepassing van het EU‐Handvest van de grondrechten is op 8 mei 2013 ( [1] )
gepubliceerd. In het verslag wordt beschreven hoe de EU‐instellingen en de lidstaten het Handvest bij de
tenuitvoerlegging van EU‐wetgeving toepassen. Het verslag bestrijkt de bepalingen van het Handvest en geeft
informatie over situaties waarin burgers een beroep kunnen doen op het Handvest en over de rol van de Europese
Unie op het gebied van de grondrechten.

2. De vrijheid van gedachte, geweten en godsdienst en de vrijheid van meningsuiting zijn twee essentiële
fundamenten van democratische samenlevingen, zoals is vastgelegd in de artikelen 10 en 11 van het Handvest van de
grondrechten van de EU. Overeenkomstig artikel 51 van het Handvest zijn de bepalingen van het Handvest gericht tot
de lidstaten, uitsluitend wanneer zij het recht van de Unie ten uitvoer brengen. Over de interpretatie van de betrokken
artikelen kan uitsluitend worden beslist door de bevoegde rechtbanken, wanneer er een verband is met de EU‐
wetgeving. Voor informatie over de interpretatie van de artikelen verwijst de Europese Commissie het geachte
Parlementslid naar het jaarverslag en naar de toelichting bij het Handvest van de grondrechten ( [2] ).

3. De Commissie hecht groot belang aan de vrijheid van godsdienst. Dat recht omvat tevens de vrijheid om van
godsdienst en overtuiging te veranderen en het recht op agnosticisme. De Commissie bevindt zich echter niet in de
positie om algemene opmerkingen te geven over de interpretatie van de rechten, in het bijzonder wanneer er geen
verband lijkt te zijn met de EU‐wetgeving.

4. Het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting en van informatie is vastgelegd in het Handvest en kan, zoals
noodzakelijk is in een democratische samenleving, worden begrensd. De Commissie verwijst naar haar antwoord
onder punt 2 en herinnert het geachte Parlementslid eraan dat zij zich niet in de positie bevindt om verdere
opmerkingen te geven over deze kwestie.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 271 final. Beschikbaar op: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/nl/com/2013/com [2] 013_0271nl01.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) 2007/C 303/02.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 423

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006033/13**

**to the Commission**

**Auke Zijlstra (NI)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Freedoms guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Member States of the European Union have committed themselves to respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, under Article 6 TEU, has the same legal status as the
Treaties themselves. In order to comply with these provisions, it is extremely important to be aware of the proper
interpretation of these rights and freedoms.

In light of the above:

1. Is the Commission, as the defender of the Treaties, able to provide detailed information on the application of
particular articles of the Charter?

2. Could the Commission share with me its interpretation of Article 10 (Freedom of thought, conscience and
religion) and Article 11 (Freedom of expression and information) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

3. Under what kind of circumstances are the freedoms under Article 10 influenced by a person’s age? Are children
free in choosing their own religion? Is the freedom to change one’s religion or belief connected to a person’s
age?

4. What are the limitations on the freedom of expression and information with respect to the age of the person
concerned?

**Answer given by Ms Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

1. The third Annual Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was published on the
8th May 2013 ( [1] ). This report provides an overview of the implementation of the Charter by EU institutions and
Member States, when implementing EC law. It covers broadly the Charter provisions and informs the public on
situations in which they can rely on the Charter and on the role of the European Union in the field of fundamental
rights.

2. Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion and Freedom of Expression constitute two of the essential
foundations of democratic societies, as enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the EU. According to Article 51 of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only
when they are implementing EC law. The interpretation of such Articles can only be adjudicated by the competent
courts in question when there is a link to EC law. The European Commission directs the Honourable Member to
consult the Annual Report on how these Articles have been interpreted as well as the explanations relating to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights ( [2] ).

3. The Commission attaches great importance to the freedom of religion. This includes the freedom to change a
religion or belief and the right to be agnostic. However, the Commission is not in a position to make general
comments on interpretation and in particular, where there does not appear to be a link with EC law.

4. Freedom of expression and information is a right enshrined in the Charter and, as necessary in a democratic
society, may be qualified. With reference to the Commission's answer in [2] above, the Commission reminds the
Honourable Member that it is not in a position to comment further on this question.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 271 final. Available at:. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/charter_report_2012_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) (2007/C 303/02).

C 42 E / 424 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006034/13**

**to the Commission**
**Brian Simpson (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fraudulent use of EU funds

Could the Commission state the total figure for fraud in the use of EU funds in the most recent year for which figures
are available, the proportion of that figure which relates to EU programmes, projects and other activities administered
directly by the Commission, and the proportion which relates to EU programmes and projects administered by the
authorities of the Member States (which are therefore responsible for any fraud arising)?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 July 2013)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its annual report to the European Parliament and the
Council on the ‘Protection of the European Union's financial interests — fight against fraud’. Publication of this report
for 2012 is foreseen by the end of July 2013. The Honourable Member may also consult reports on the protection of
the EU's financial interests from the previous years on the OLAF website ( [1] ) and is kindly referred to the Commission's
reply to the Parliamentary Question E-5995/13 ( [2] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/reports/communities-reports/index_en.htm
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 425

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006035/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marina Yannakoudakis (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Competition in the French ski tourism industry

I have been alerted by a constituent that a court in Albertville (France), in a ruling on 18 February 2013, has
determined that social ski hosting by UK tour operators is in contravention of local law. The case was brought before
the court by the École du ski français, which until 1976 had a monopoly on social ski hosting in France.

Can the Commission comment on the resumption of the de facto monopoly on social ski hosting in the French alps
for the École du ski français? Can it look further into this issue to ensure that there is competition the French ski
tourism industry?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

As indicated in its response to P-002459/2013, the Commission is currently inquiring on this issue with the French
authorities. Once the requested information will have been received and analysed, the Commission will directly
inform the Honourable Member about its conclusions.

C 42 E / 426 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006036/13**
**an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) und Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ VP/HR — Kinderheirat und Bildung für Mädchen

Der EU-Aktionsplan für Menschenrechte und Demokratie zur Umsetzung des Strategischen Rahmens der EU für
Menschenrechte und Demokratie sieht folgende Ergebnisse vor:

—
Förderung und Schutz der Rechte des Kindes (Ergebnis 19), u. a. durch „a) Durchführung einer gezielten
Kampagne über die Rechte des Kindes mit Schwerpunkt Gewalt gegen Kinder“;

—
Schutz der Rechte von Frauen und Schutz vor geschlechtsspezifischer Gewalt (Ergebnis 20), u. a. durch
b) Unterstützung einschlägiger Initiativen gegen schädliche traditionelle Praktiken […], c) Förderung der
Prävention von Früh‐ und Zwangsehen, von denen Kinder betroffen sind, d) Umsetzung der neun Einzelziele
des EU-Aktionsplans für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter und die Machtgleichstellung der Frauen in der
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 2010-2015, und e) Unterstützung von Initiativen, einschließlich der
Zivilgesellschaft, gegen geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt und Frauenmord.

1. Welche Maßnahmen ergreift der EAD bzw. wird er ergreifen angesichts dieser Zusagen sowie angesichts der
Tatsache, dass Kinderheirat eine Form von Gewalt ist und angesichts der geschlechtsspezifischen Gewalt, die auch
eine schädliche traditionelle Praxis ist, um die oben genannten Ergebnisse zu verwirklichen, damit Kinderheirat
weltweit unterbunden wird und um die schädlichen Auswirkungen abzumildern, indem er denen, die von dieser
Praxis betroffen sind, Unterstützung anbietet? Wie sehen insbesondere der Zeitplan und die konkrete Planung zur
Umsetzung der Aktion 20c aus?

Sekundarschulbildung (mindestens neun Schuljahre) für Mädchen ist nicht nur ein Menschenrecht, sondern auch ein
zentraler Faktor für die Entwicklung. Kinderheirat und geschlechtsbezogene Gewalt in und in der Umgebung von
Schulen sind zwei der größten Hindernisse für Mädchen, was den Zugang zu einer solchen Bildung und den
Bildungsabschluss betrifft. Mit ihrem Europäischen Konsens über die Entwicklungspolitik hat die EU sich verpflichtet,
der Förderung der Bildung und der Sicherheit von Mädchen an den Schulen besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen.

2. Welche Anstrengungen unternimmt der EAD bzw. wird er unternehmen im Rahmen seiner politischen Dialoge
mit Drittländern, um die Themen hochwertige Bildung für Mädchen, Kinderheirat und geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt
in und in der Umgebung von Schulen zur Sprache zu bringen?

**Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission**

_(5. August 2013)_

Die Bekämpfung aller Formen von Gewalt gegen Frauen und Mädchen gehört weiterhin zu den Prioritäten der
Außenpolitik der EU. Nach dem Aktionsplan für Menschenrechte und Demokratie wird Aktion 20 c) bis Ende 2014
umgesetzt. Der EAD hat bereits mit der Ausarbeitung der Leistungsbeschreibung für die Kampagne zur Förderung der
Prävention von Früh‐ und Zwangsehen, von denen Kinder betroffen sind, begonnen. Dies geschieht in enger
Zusammenarbeit mit Belgien als beteiligtem Mitgliedstaat und in enger Abstimmung mit Unicef.

Darüber hinaus beginnt der EAD gerade mit der Vorbereitung der Kampagne zur Gewalt gegen Kinder, die sich mit
allgemeineren Aspekten der Gewalt gegen Mädchen und Jungen beschäftigt. Die Kampagne wird vor Ende 2013
anlaufen.

Die EU finanziert außerdem von der Zivilgesellschaft getragene Projekte in den ärmsten Ländern. Beispielsweise hat
ein innovatives Projekt von EU und Unicef durch Aufklärung und Sensibilisierung Tausender Familien zum
Umdenken und zur Beendigung von Genitalverstümmelungen bei Frauen in Ägypten, Eritrea, Äthiopien, Senegal und
Sudan beigetragen.

Bildung ist ein universelles Menschenrecht. Sie ist ein Katalysator für positive gesellschaftliche Veränderungen. Für
den Bildungsbereich eingesetzte Mittel sind eine langfristige Investition für die Stabilität und Demokratisierung
verschiedener Länder.

Geschlechts‐ und kinderspezifische Themen werden regelmäßig in den Menschenrechtsdialogen mit Drittländern
angesprochenen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 427

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-006036/13**
**till kommissionen (Vice-ordföranden / Höga representanten)**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) och Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 maj 2013)_

_Angående:_ VP/HR – Barnäktenskap och flickors utbildning

EU:s handlingsplan för mänskliga rättigheter och demokrati, som utgör en konkretisering av EU:s strategiska ram för
mänskliga rättigheter och demokrati, förväntas uppnå följande resultat:

—
Främjande och skydd av barns rättigheter (resultat 19), vilket ska genomföras bland annat genom ”a) […] en
riktad kampanj om barnets rättigheter med särskild inriktning på våld mot barn”.

—
Skydd av kvinnors rättigheter och skydd mot könsrelaterat våld (resultat 20), vilket ska genomföras bland
annat genom åtgärder för att ”b) [s]tödja relevanta initiativ mot skadliga traditionella sedvänjor […]”, ”c)

[f]rämja förebyggande av äktenskap för minderåriga och tvångsäktenskap som drabbar barn”, ”d) [g]enomföra
de nio särskilda målen i EU:s handlingsplan för jämställdhet och kvinnors egenmakt i utvecklingssamarbetet
2010–2015” samt ”e) [s]tödja initiativ, bland annat från det civila samhället, mot könsrelaterat våld och
kvinnomord”.

1. Barnäktenskap utgör en form av våld mot barn och könsrelaterat våld, liksom en skadlig traditionell sedvänja.
Vilka åtgärder vidtar Europeiska utrikestjänsten, och vilka kommer den att vidta, med tanke på detta och mot
bakgrund av de ovannämnda åtagandena? Vad gör utrikestjänsten för att uppnå dessa resultat i syfte att förebygga
barnäktenskap på global nivå och begränsa dess skadliga följder genom att erbjuda stöd till dem som drabbas av
sedvänjan? Vilka är tidsramarna och den konkreta planen för att genomföra i synnerhet åtgärd 20 c?

Sekundärutbildning (minst nio års skolgång) för flickor är inte bara en mänsklig rättighet, utan också en av de främsta
drivkrafterna bakom utveckling. Barnäktenskap och könsrelaterat våld i och omkring skolor är två av de främsta
hindren för att flickor ska få tillgång till sådan utbildning och möjlighet att slutföra den. Genom det europeiska
samförståndet om utveckling har EU åtagit sig att ägna särskild uppmärksamhet åt främjandet av flickors utbildning
och trygghet i skolan.

2. Vad gör utrikestjänsten, och vad kommer den att göra, inom ramen för sina politiska dialoger med tredjeländer,
för att ta upp frågorna om utbildning av god kvalitet för flickor, barnäktenskap samt könsrelaterat våld i och omkring
skolor?

**Svar från den höga representanten/vice ordföranden Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar**

_(5 augusti 2013)_

Kampen mot alla former av våld mot kvinnor och flickor kommer även i fortsättningen att vara en av prioriteringarna
i EU:s utrikespolitik. Enligt handlingsplanen för mänskliga rättigheter och demokrati kommer åtgärd 20.c att
genomföras före utgången av 2014. Utrikestjänsten har redan börjat förbereda mandatet för kampanjen för att främja
förebyggande av äktenskap för minderåriga och tvångsäktenskap som drabbar barn. Detta görs i nära samarbete med
Belgien, en medlemsstat som bär en del av bördan, och i nära samråd med Unicef.

Utrikestjänsten har dessutom börjat förbereda kampanjen om våld mot barn, som kommer att ta upp våld mot både
flickor och pojkar mer generellt. Kampanjen kommer att inledas före utgången av 2013.

EU finansierar även projekt i de fattigaste länderna, som drivs av civilsamhället. Ett innovativt EU‐ och Unicef-projekt
har till exempel bidragit till att genom utbildning och information hjälpa tusentals familjer att ändra attityd och
upphöra med kvinnlig könsstympning i Egypten, Eritrea, Etiopien, Senegal och Sudan.

Utbildning är en mänsklig rättighet för alla. Det är en katalysator för positiva förändringar i samhället. Resurser för
utbildning är en långsiktig investering för stabilitet i och demokratisering av länder.

Könsrelaterade frågor och frågor som gäller barn tas regelbundet upp i dialoger om mänskliga rättigheter med
tredjeländer.

C 42 E / 428 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006036/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) and Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Child marriage and girls' education

The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy implementing the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights
and Democracy foresees the following outcomes.

— Promotion and protection of children’s rights (Outcome 19), implemented _inter alia_ through ‘(a) […] a targeted
campaign on the rights of the child with a specific focus on violence against children’;

— Protection of the rights of women, and protection against gender-based violence (Outcome 20), implemented _inter_
_alia_ through actions to ‘(b) support relevant initiatives against harmful traditional practices […], (c) promote the
prevention of early and forced marriages affecting children, (d) implement the nine specific objectives of the EU plan
of action for gender equality and women’s empowerment in development 2010-15’, and ‘(e) support initiatives,
including of civil society, against gender based violence and feminicide’.

1. In light of these commitments, and in light of child marriage being a form of violence against children and
gender-based violence as well as a harmful traditional practice, what actions are being and will be taken by the EEAS
to fulfil the aforementioned outcomes in order to prevent child marriage on a global level, and to mitigate its harmful
consequences by offering support to those affected by the practice? In particular, what is the timeframe and concrete
planning for implementing action 20c?

Secondary education (minimum of nine years of schooling) for girls is not only a human right, it is also one of the key
drivers of development. Child marriage, and gender-based violence in and around schools, are two of the key barriers
to girls accessing and completing such education. With its European Consensus on Development, the EU has made a
commitment to pay particular attention to promoting girls’ education and safety at school.

2. What efforts are being and will be made by the EEAS in its policy dialogues with third countries to raise the
issues of quality education for girls, child marriage and gender-based violence in and around schools?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 August 2013)_

The fight against all forms of violence against women and girls will remain among the priorities of the EU external
policy. According to the action plan on Human Rights and Democracy, action 20 c) will be implemented by the end of
2014. EEAS has already started the preparation of the Terms of Reference for the campaign to promote the prevention of
early and forced marriages affecting children. This is done in close cooperation with Belgium as a burden sharing
Member State and in close consultation with Unicef.

In addition, the EEAS is beginning to prepare the campaign on violence against children which will cover more
general issues of violence against both girls and boys. The campaign will be launched before the end of 2013.

The EU also funds civil society-driven projects in the poorest countries. For instance, an innovative EU and Unicef
project has helped through education and awareness raising thousands of families to change attitudes and end female
genital mutilation in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal and Sudan.

Education is a universal human right. It is a catalyst for positive societal change. Resources devoted to education area
are a long-term investment for the stability and democratization of countries.

Gender and children-related issues are regularly raised in the Human Rights Dialogues with third countries.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 429

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006037/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) und Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Kinderheirat und Bildung für Mädchen

Sekundarschulbildung (mindestens neun Schuljahre) für Mädchen ist nicht nur ein Menschenrecht, sondern auch ein
zentraler Faktor für die Entwicklung. Kinderheirat und geschlechtsbezogene Gewalt in und in der Umgebung von
Schulen sind zwei der größten Hindernisse für Mädchen, was den Zugang zu einer solchen Bildung und den
Bildungsabschluss betrifft. Mit ihrem Europäischen Konsens über die Entwicklungspolitik hat die EU sich verpflichtet,
der Förderung der Bildung und der Sicherheit von Mädchen an den Schulen besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen.

1. Welche Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission vor diesem Hintergrund bzw. wird sie ergreifen, um zu
gewährleisten, dass Bildung für Mädchen in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der EU einen zentralen Platz
einnimmt? Welche Maßnahmen werden insbesondere gegen Kinderheirat und geschlechtsbezogene Gewalt in und in
der Umgebung von Schulen getroffen? Welche Maßnahmen werden zur Bekämpfung der schädigenden
geschlechtsspezifischen Normen ergriffen, die eine der Ursachen für Kinderheirat und geschlechtsbezogene Gewalt
sind?

Unter den im Bereich der Entwicklung tätigen Akteuren herrscht ein starkes Einvernehmen darüber, dass die
internationale Konzentration auf den Zugang zu Bildung ausgeweitet werden und die Vollendung der Studien sowie
die Qualität der erhaltenen Bildung miteinbezogen werden sollte. Hochwertige Bildung für Mädchen bedeutet
Bildung, die: (i) ihren Bedürfnissen, Rechten und Bestrebungen Rechnung trägt; (ii) in einem Lernumfeld stattfindet,
das sicher und mädchenfreundlich ist; und (iii) durch Unterrichtsmethoden und Lehrpläne umgesetzt und durch eine
Schulverwaltung ergänzt wird, die frei von geschlechtsspezifischen Vorurteilen ist und die die Gleichstellung der
Geschlechter fördert.

2. Welche Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission bzw. wird sie ergreifen, um zu gewährleisten, dass eine
hochwertige, mindestens neunjährige Schulausbildung (Grundschule und Unterstufe der Sekundarschule), die diese
Kriterien erfüllt, Mädchen zur Verfügung steht, sie Zugang dazu haben und sie diese Schulausbildung abschließen
können?

**Antwort von Herrn Piebalgs im Namen der Kommission**

_(15. Juli 2013)_

Während die Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Grundschulbildung beinahe erreicht ist (pro 100 Jungen besuchen
97 Mädchen die Grundschule — gegenüber 86 im Jahr 1990), besuchen noch immer 61 Millionen Kinder —
mehrheitlich Mädchen — die Grundschule gar nicht und auch im Sekundarbereich fällt das Ergebnis bei Mädchen
nicht positiv aus.

Im Arbeitsdokument der Dienststellen der Kommission „More and Better Education in Developing Countries“ ( [1] ) wird
der Förderung der Grundbildung — mindestens 9-10 Jahre hochwertige Bildung — als Fundament für weiteres
Lernen und Kompetenzentwicklung Vorrang eingeräumt. Die EU-Politik legt großes Gewicht auf den
gleichberechtigten Zugang zur Bildung und die Verbesserung ihrer Qualität. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt in
Länderprogrammen dem Zugang aller Mädchen zu Grund‐ und Sekundarschulbildung: In Indien beispielsweise stellt
die EU einen Beitrag in Höhe von 80 Mio. EUR für die Programme für den allgemeinen Zugang, auch von Mädchen,
zu hochwertiger Grund‐ und Sekundarschulbildung für den Zeitraum 2011-2013 bereit.

Die Kommission wird sich weiterhin darum bemühen, zu gewährleisten, dass Frauen und Männer in Bezug auf ihre
Rechte, die Kontrolle über und den Zugang zu Ressourcen sowie den Zugang zu Justiz, Bildung und Gesundheit
gleichgestellt sind. Dabei hat die Verweigerung der Rechte von Mädchen und Frauen auf der Grundlage von
schädlichen traditionellen Praktiken (wie Frühehen) und Gewohnheitsrecht keinen Platz.

Das Engagement der Kommission für Bildung kam kürzlich auf der hochrangigen EU-Konferenz über Bildung und
Entwicklung in Brüssel am 23. Mai zum Ausdruck, auf der politische Zusagen zur Verwirklichung des
gleichberechtigten Zugangs zu einem hochwertigen Lernangebot für alle Kinder gemacht wurden. Die Kommission
beabsichtigt, im Zeitraum 2014-2020 Bildungsmaßnahmen in mehr als 20 Ländern mit 2,5 Mrd. EUR zu
unterstützen.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SEK(2010)121 endg.

C 42 E / 430 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Svensk version)_

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-006037/13**

**till kommissionen**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) och Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 maj 2013)_

_Angående:_ Barnäktenskap och flickors utbildning

Sekundärutbildning (minst nio års skolgång) för flickor är inte bara en mänsklig rättighet, utan också en av de främsta
drivkrafterna bakom utveckling. Barnäktenskap och könsrelaterat våld i och i närheten av skolor är två av de främsta
hindren för att flickor ska få tillgång till sådan utbildning och möjlighet att slutföra den. Genom det europeiska
samförståndet om utveckling har EU åtagit sig att ägna särskild uppmärksamhet åt främjandet av flickors utbildning
och trygghet i skolan.

1. Vilka åtgärder vidtar kommissionen med tanke på detta, och vilka kommer den att vidta, för att se till att flickors
utbildning får en central plats i EU:s utvecklingssamarbete? Vilka specifika åtgärder vidtas och kommer att vidtas för
att sätta stopp för barnäktenskap och könsrelaterat våld i och omkring skolor? Vilka åtgärder vidtas och kommer att
vidtas för att ta itu med de skadliga könsroller som är en av de bakomliggande orsakerna till barnäktenskap och
könsrelaterat våld?

Det råder stark enighet bland utvecklingsaktörer om att den internationella uppmärksamheten på tillgång till
utbildning bör breddas, så att den innefattar slutförande av studier och kvaliteten på den erbjudna utbildningen.
Kvalitetsutbildning för flickor skulle innebära att utbildningen i) är relevant för deras behov, rättigheter och
ambitioner, ii) ges i en undervisningsmiljö som är säker, trygg och anpassad efter flickornas situation, samt iii) utförs
med hjälp av undervisningsmetoder och läroplaner som kompletteras av skolledningen och som är fria från
könsdiskriminering och främjar jämställdhet mellan könen.

2. Vilka åtgärder vidtar kommissionen, och vilka kommer den att vidta, för att se till att flickor får tillgång till och
kan slutföra minst nio års kvalitetsutbildning (på grundskolenivå) som uppfyller dessa kriterier?

**Svar från Andris Piebalgs på kommissionens vägnar**

_(15 juli 2013)_

Målet för jämställdhet mellan könen i skolan är nära att uppnås (97 flickor per 100 pojkar är inskrivna i grundskolan,
en ökning från 86 flickor år 1990), men 61 miljoner barn har ännu inte nått grundskolan, varav en majoritet är
flickor och resultaten för flickors gymnasieutbildning är inte positiva heller.

Kommissionens arbetsdokument _More and Better Education in Developing Countries (_ [1] _)_ prioriterar stöd till
grundläggande utbildning – minst 9–10-årig utbildning av god kvalitet – som är grunden för vidare lärande och
kompetensutveckling. EU:s politik understryker vikten av lika tillgång till utbildning för alla och förbättring av dess
kvalitet. I nationella program ägnas särskild uppmärksamhet till att garantera tillträde till grundskola och gymnasium
för alla flickor; exempelvis i Indien bidrog EU med 80 miljoner euro till programmen för allmän tillgång till grund‐
och gymnasieskola, även för flickor, av god kvalitet för perioden 2011–2013.

Kommissionen kommer att fortsätta arbeta för att se till att kvinnor och män har lika rättigheter, kontroll över och
tillgång till resurser, tillgång till rättvisa, till utbildning och hälso‐ och sjukvård med noll utrymme för förkastande av
flickors och kvinnors rättigheter på grund av traditionella skadliga sedvänjor (t.ex. tidiga äktenskap) och sedvanerätt.

Kommissionens engagemang för utbildning har nyligen uttryckts i EU:s högnivåkonferens om utbildning och
utveckling i Bryssel den 23 maj, vilket sammankallade politiskt engagemang för att göra en rättvis tillgång till
kvalitativt lärande verklighet för alla barn. Kommissionen avser att stödja utbildning i över 20 länder genom att
tilldela så mycket som 2,5 miljarder euro för utbildningssektorn för åren 2014–2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SEK(2010)121, slutgiltig version.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 431

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006037/13**

**to the Commission**
**Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL) and Barbara Lochbihler (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Child marriage and girls' education

Secondary education (minimum of nine years of schooling) for girls is not only a human right, it is also one of the key
drivers of development. Child marriage, and gender-based violence in and around schools, are two of the key barriers
to girls accessing and completing such education. With its European Consensus on Development, the EU has made a
commitment to pay particular attention to promoting girls’ education and safety at school.

1. In this light, what actions are being and will be taken by the Commission to ensure that girls’ education has a
central place in EU development cooperation? Specifically, what actions are being and will be taken to end child
marriage and gender-based violence in and around schools? What actions are being and will be taken to address the
harmful gender norms that are one of the causes underlying child marriage and gender-based violence?

There is strong agreement among development actors that international focus on access to education should be
broadened to include completion of studies and the quality of the education received. Quality education for girls
would mean education that is: (i) relevant to their needs, rights and aspirations; (ii) delivered in a learning
environment that is safe, secure and girl-friendly; and (iii) implemented through teaching methods and curricula, and
complemented by school governance, that is free from gender bias and that promotes gender equality.

2. What actions are being and will be taken by the Commission to ensure the availability of, access to and
completion by girls of a minimum of nine years of quality education (primary and lower secondary) that meet these
criteria?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

While gender parity in primary education is close to being achieved (97 girls per 100 boys are enrolled in primary
education, up from 86 in 1990), 61 million children are still out of primary school, the majority being girls and the
results for girls’ secondary education are not positive either.

The Commission Staff Working Document ‘More and Better Education in Developing Countries’ ( [1] ) prioritises
support to basic education — at least 9-10 years of quality education — as the foundation for further learning and
skills development. EU policy underlines the importance of equity of access to education, and improving its quality.
Special attention is given in country programmes to ensure access for all girls to primary and secondary education: in
India, for instance, the EU is contributing EUR 80 million to the programmes for universal access, including for girls,
to quality primary and secondary education for the period 2011-2013.

The Commission will continue to work to ensure that women and men have equal rights, control over and access to
resources, access to justice, to education and health with no space for the denial of girls’ and women’s rights on the
basis of traditional harmful practices (like early marriage) and customary laws.

The Commission’s commitment to education was recently expressed at EU high level conference on Education and
Development in Brussels on May 23, which mobilised political commitment to make equitable access to quality
learning a reality for all children. The Commission intends to support education in more than 20 countries,
mobilising as much as EUR 2.5 billion for the education sector for 2014-2020.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SEC(2010)121 final.

C 42 E / 432 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006038/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Tiziano Motti (PPE)**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Impiego dei finanziamenti europei per la ricostruzione in Emilia Romagna

Tra i mesi di maggio e giugno dello scorso anno, diverse scosse di terremoto squarciarono il territorio di alcune
province dell'Emilia Romagna.

Nella risposta data all'interrogazione E-006011/2012, il Commissario europeo allo sviluppo regionale spiegò che il
Fondo europeo di solidarietà «può contribuire unicamente al finanziamento o rifinanziamento degli interventi di
emergenza effettuati dalle autorità pubbliche, quali l'assistenza alla popolazione e il ripristino di infrastrutture vitali».

È notizia dei giorni scorsi che la famiglia di un ragazzo, deceduto sotto le macerie di una fabbrica di ceramica, è stata
risarcita con 1.600 euro. La Commissione destinò infatti 670 milioni di euro alla Regione Emilia Romagna quale
dotazione del Fondo di solidarietà.

È la Commissione al corrente in che misura tale dotazione è stata impiegata per le opere di ricostruzione?

Può dire a partire da quando sarà disponibile una relazione sull'impiego dei fondi di ricostruzione?

**Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione**

_(15 luglio 2013)_

In data 19 dicembre 2012 la Commissione ha versato all'Italia l'intero importo, pari a 670,2 milioni di euro, del
contributo finanziario del Fondo di solidarietà. Le autorità italiane sono autorizzate ad impiegare il suddetto
contributo per interventi d'urgenza conformemente all'accordo di attuazione concluso fra l'Italia e la Commissione,
entro un anno a decorrere da tale data, vale a dire fino al dicembre 2013. Sulla scorta delle informazioni inviate alla
Commissione in occasione di una recente visita di monitoraggio in Emilia Romagna, 550 milioni di euro del
contributo vengono utilizzati sotto la responsabilità dell'amministrazione regionale dell'Emilia Romagna. Il 46 % di
questo importo viene impiegato per la creazione di alloggi provvisori mentre il 51 % per il ripristino delle
infrastrutture di base. I progetti sono in corso. Le indennità alle famiglie delle vittime non sono ammissibili a titolo del
Fondo di solidarietà.

L'utilizzo definitivo del contributo sarà reso noto sei mesi dopo la fine del periodo di attuazione di un anno, vale a dire
entro il mese di giugno 2014, quando le autorità italiane sono tenute a presentare alla Commissione un rapporto di
attuazione dettagliato, che comprenda una dichiarazione relativa alla legittimità e alla regolarità della spesa da
determinare a cura di un organismo di audit indipendente.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 433

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006038/13**

**to the Commission**

**Tiziano Motti (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Use of European funding for reconstruction in Emilia-Romagna

Between May and June 2012, a number of earthquakes tore through several provinces in the Italian region of EmiliaRomagna.

In answer to Question E-006011/2012, the Commissioner for Regional Development explained that the EU
Solidarity Fund ‘is limited to help (re)finance emergency operations undertaken by the public authorities such as
assistance to the population and repair of vital infrastructure.’

According to recent reports, the family of a man who was found dead in the rubble of a ceramics factory has received
EUR 1 600 in compensation. The Commission earmarked EUR 670 million for the Emilia-Romagna region as an
allocation from the Solidarity Fund.

Does the Commission know how much of this allocation has been used for reconstruction works?

Can it say when a report on the use of reconstruction funds will be available?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The Commission paid out the full amount of Solidarity Fund financial aid to Italy of EUR 670.2 million on
19 December 2012. The Italian authorities have one year from that date, until December 2013, to use the aid for
emergency operations in accordance with the implementation agreement concluded between Italy and the
Commission. According to the information the Commission received on the occasion of a recent monitoring visit to
Emilia Romagna, EUR 550 million of the aid is being implemented under the responsibility of the Regional
Government of Emilia Romagna. 46% of this amount is being used for temporary accommodation and 51% for the
restoration of essential infrastructure. The projects are ongoing. Compensation payments to families of victims are
not eligible under the Solidarity Fund.

The definitive use of the aid will be known six months after the end of the one-year implementation period, i.e. by
June 2014, when the Italian authorities have to present a detailed implementation report to the Commission,
including a statement on the legality and regularity of the spending to be established by an independent audit body.

C 42 E / 434 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006039/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Tiziano Motti (PPE)**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Pignorabilità degli animali domestici

In un periodo di crisi economica acuta come quello attuale, la riscossione dei crediti da parte di agenzie specializzate è
diventata l'ossessione di molti cittadini, spesso in condizioni economiche disastrate. Il passo verso il pignoramento
dei beni è spesso breve e rappresenta una situazione psicologica molto forte per il debitore e i suoi famigliari.

Per l'ordinamento italiano, il pignoramento deve essere eseguito sulle cose che l'ufficiale giudiziario ritiene di più
pronta e facile liquidazione, nel limite del presumibile valore di realizzo pari all'importo del credito oggetto del
precetto, aumentato della metà. In ogni caso l'ufficiale giudiziario deve preferire, nell'ordine: il denaro contante, gli
oggetti preziosi, i titoli di credito e ogni altro bene che appaia di sicura realizzazione. Bisogna altresì dire che la legge
stessa pone numerosi limiti alla pignorabilità di determinati beni, ad esempio le cose sacre che servono all'esercizio
del culto oppure oggetti ad alto tasso di valore affettivo come l'anello nuziale, ma non vi è alcuna norma che vieta
specificatamente il pignoramento degli animali da compagnia, nonostante l'alto tasso affettivo che possono
rappresentare, quando non anche il rimedio a determinate situazioni di disagio infantile (pet teraphy).

Alcuni ordinamenti, come quello tedesco, inseriscono tra i beni impignorabili «gli animali domestici non tenuti a
scopo patrimoniale o lucrativo» (art. 811 del codice procedura civile tedesco «Zivilprozessordnung»). Nel perdurare di
tale vuoto di legge, da un lato vi sono stati casi di cronaca riguardo a animali domestici pignorati perché di razza e
quindi con un proprio valore economico; dall'altro la giurisprudenza e la legislazione italiana ed europea, consapevoli
del valore intrinseco del proprio animale da compagnia e intenzionate a conferire sempre maggiori diritti e tutele al
rapporto che lega il padrone al proprio animale, si stanno orientando a garantire principi e diritti a questi ultimi.

L'introduzione di reati per maltrattamento e uccisione degli animali e per traffico illecito di animali da compagnia,
l'inasprimento delle pene per chi abbandona animali domestici o le decisioni sul loro affidamento all'uno o all'altro
coniuge in caso di separazione o divorzio sono tutti indicatori della considerazione che il legislatore sta sempre più
attribuendo agli animali domestici da compagnia.

Può la Commissione riferire se esiste una direttiva europea o, in caso negativo, se abbia intenzione di proporla al fine
di dichiarare impignorabili gli animali domestici da compagnia?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 luglio 2013)_

Non esiste normativa UE in merito ad animali da compagnia passibili di sequestro da parte dei creditori. Al momento
la Commissione europea non intende presentare iniziative al riguardo _._

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 435

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006039/13**

**to the Commission**

**Tiziano Motti (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Seizure of pets

In the current severe economic crisis, many people, often in dire financial circumstances, worry about debts being
collected by debt collection agencies. It is often a short step towards possessions being seized and it is a situation that
is psychologically very difficult to deal with for the debtor and their family.

Under Italian law, the bailiff must seize the items he thinks can most readily and easily be turned into cash up to the
expected realisation value, which is equal to the value of the debt being collected, plus half. In any case, the bailiff
must seize the following in order of preference: cash, valuables, credit instruments and any other goods that have an
excellent chance of being turned into cash. The law also imposes a number of restrictions on certain items that cannot
be seized, such as sacred items used in worship or items of great sentimental value like wedding rings, but there is no
rule that specifically prohibits the seizure of pets, despite the great emotional attachment people can have to them,
and even when they ease certain childhood anxieties (pet therapy).

In some legal systems, like that of Germany for example, pets not kept as assets or for profit cannot be seized
(Article 811 of the German Code of Civil Procedure).In this continuing legislative vacuum, on the one hand there have
been news reports of pets seized because of their pedigree, so with real financial value; on the other, conscious of the
intrinsic value of pets and with the intention of giving more rights and safeguards to the relationship between owners
and their pets, there is a tendency in Italian and EU case-law and legislation towards guaranteeing pets principles and
rights.

The ill-treatment and killing of animals and illegal trafficking of pets being made specific offences, stricter penalties
for people who abandon pets or deciding which spouse is given custody of pets in the event of separation or divorce
are all indicative of the increasing consideration given to pets by legislators.

Can the Commission say whether there is already an EU directive establishing that pets cannot be seized and, if not,
whether it intends to propose one that does?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

There is no EU legislation on pets that can be seized by creditors. The European Commission does currently not
intend to come forward with an initiative in this regard.

C 42 E / 436 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006041/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Instituição financeira de desenvolvimento em Portugal

Considerando o seguinte:

Foi noticiado a 23 de maio de 2013, na imprensa portuguesa, que o banco de fomento alemão KfW está disposto a
criar linhas de crédito para as empresas portuguesas ou participar indiretamente no capital de PME, o que daria um
maior apoio técnico à criação de uma nova instituição financeira de desenvolvimento para investir em crescimento
sustentável e na criação de emprego em Portugal;

A nova instituição financeira deveria ceder crédito não só através de linhas de crédito intermédias, mas também
através da partilha de risco sobre as carteiras de financiamento de instituições de crédito e garantias e ainda através da
atribuição de financiamento direto, a título excecional;

A união bancária europeia pode beneficiar os Estados‐Membros que são atualmente objeto de programas de
ajustamento e medidas de austeridade, bem como outras iniciativas para lidar com os custos excessivos do
financiamento bancário e melhorar o acesso das empresas ao crédito;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como vê a criação de uma nova instituição financeira de desenvolvimento para criação de emprego e de
crescimento económico em Portugal?

2. Como lhe parece que deve tal instituição financeira de desenvolvimento ser estruturada e em que termos
deveria esta funcionar, tendo em conta o contexto atual?

3. Tem conhecimento desta intenção do banco de fomento alemão de participar ativamente nesta estrutura de
apoio?

**Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão**

_(11 de julho de 2013)_

O Governo está a trabalhar na instituição financeira de desenvolvimento para financiar a economia. Esta instituição
será encarregada de gerir os atuais e futuros quadros nacionais para a distribuição dos fundos estruturais da UE. De
acordo com as autoridades nacionais, esta instituição colocaria sob um balanço comum os diferentes instrumentos
financeiros baseados nos fundos estruturais que se encontram repartidos entre diferentes instituições que utilizam um
regime rotativo. A instituição é um elemento fundamental da estratégia para o crescimento, o emprego e o
desenvolvimento industrial 2013-2020 ( [1] ). O KfW alemão prestará assistência técnica na criação da instituição e
poderá igualmente fornecer apoio financeiro. O « _Banque Publique d'Investissment_ » francês também deverá prestar
assistência técnica.

A Comissão tomou uma atitude positiva e cuidadosa em relação a esta iniciativa. Na difícil situação atual, é
importante encontrar fontes alternativas de financiamento do setor empresarial, e o projeto implica riscos
orçamentais significativos dado que, em última instância, o Estado português será o garante dos empréstimos
concedidos pela instituição. A médio e longo prazo, a instituição será outra fonte geradora de efeito de alavanca para
as finanças públicas e a economia, um efeito que é contrário aos objetivos do programa. Além disso, de acordo com
os planos atuais, a instituição não contará entre as suas prioridades com o objetivo do financiamento da inovação, um
domínio em que o mercado é reconhecidamente deficiente.

A instituição deveria, portanto, assentar nas estruturas e mecanismos existentes que desempenham funções similares,
com vista a melhorar o seu funcionamento e governação, evitando simultaneamente uma eventual sobreposição. Tal
seria coerente com os objetivos de melhoria da eficiência da administração pública e de minimização dos riscos para
as finanças públicas previstos no Memorando de Entendimento.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Apresentado pelo Governo em abril, estando previsto o segundo trimestre de 2014 como o prazo para a criação da Instituição.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 437

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006041/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Development finance institution in Portugal

According to reports that appeared in the Portuguese press on 23 May 2013, the German development bank KfW
was prepared to set up credit lines for Portuguese companies or to participate indirectly in the capital of SMEs,
thereby giving greater technical support to the creation of a new development finance institution to invest in
sustainable growth and job creation in Portugal.

The new finance institution should grant credit not only through intermediate credit lines but also by sharing the risk
related to the funding portfolios of credit institutions and guarantees, as well as by allocating direct funding in
exceptional cases.

Member States that are currently undergoing adjustment programmes and austerity measures could benefit from
European banking union and from other initiatives intended to tackle the excessive costs of bank financing and to
improve companies’ access to credit.

1. What view does the Commission take of the creation of a new development finance institution for creating jobs
and economic growth in Portugal?

2. In view of the current situation, how should such an institution be structured and on what terms should it
operate?

3. It the Commission aware of the German development bank’s intention to participate actively in this support
structure?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The government is working Development Financial Institution to finance the economy. It will be tasked to manage
the existing and future national frameworks to distribute EU structural funds. According to the national authorities
this institution would bring under a common balance sheet the different structural funds-based financial instruments
spread across different institutions which use a revolving scheme. The institution is a key element of the strategy for
Growth, Employment and Industrial Development 2013-2020. ( [1] ) Germany's KfW is providing technical support to
the setup of the institution and may also provide financial support. The French ‘Banque Publique d'Investissment’
would also provide technical assistance.

The Commission has taken a cautiously positive stance towards the initiative. In the current difficult circumstances it
is important to find alternative sources of financing the corporate sector, the project entails non-negligible fiscal risks
since the Portuguese state will be the ultimate guarantor of the loans provided by this institution. In the medium to
long term the institution will be another source of leverage for public finances and for the economy, which is an effect
that goes against to the objectives of the programme. Also, under current plans the institution does not have among
its priorities the goal of financing innovation, an area of well-acknowledged market failure.

The institution should therefore build on existing structures and facilities that perform similar roles with a view to
improving their operation and governance, while avoiding any duplication. This would be consistent with the MoU
goals of improving the efficiency of the public administration and minimising risks for public finance.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Presented by the government in April with the second quarter of 2014 being set as the deadline for the set-up of the institution.

C 42 E / 438 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006042/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Política Energética Europeia

Considerando que:

No Conselho Europeu de 22 de maio de 2013, os representantes dos Estados-Membros acordaram atribuir uma
importância primordial à política energética europeia no futuro e que este é um dos principais desafios atuais da
sociedade europeia face à sua dependência e segurança em termos de abastecimento, à sustentabilidade dos recursos e
à importância do setor em termos de competitividade;

Uma política europeia da energia obriga a uma verdadeira mudança no que respeita aos modos de produção e de
transporte, bem como aos hábitos de consumo de energia na União Europeia, sendo, porém, uma prioridade política
e económica no horizonte futuro;

Embora existam algumas iniciativas no domínio energético na União Europeia, estas são, frequentemente, de caráter
fragmentando, pelo que é necessária uma definição de regras comuns ao nível europeu que vão para além de meras
cooperações entre os Estados-Membros e que contribuam para uma autêntica integração europeia neste domínio.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais as contribuições da Comissão até ao momento para uma verdadeira política energética europeia?

2. Quais as propostas de caráter legislativo que tenciona apresentar neste domínio? E qual o calendário previsto
para a sua apresentação?

3. Em que princípios basilares assentará uma política energética europeia uniforme?

**Resposta dada por Günther Oettinger em nome da Comissão**

_(12 de julho de 2013)_

1.-2.  Desde meados da década de 1990, as instituições europeias acordaram em estabelecer, por fases sucessivas, um
quadro regulamentar que define um mercado interno da energia aberto, interligado e competitivo, através de
legislação específica relativa aos mercados da eletricidade e do gás, à segurança do aprovisionamento de gás e petróleo
e ao desenvolvimento de infraestruturas. O Conselho Europeu solicitou à Comissão que assegurasse que o mercado
interno da energia esteja completo até 2014 e que nenhuma região da UE fique isolada das redes de energia da UE até
2015. Além disso, em 2008/2009, foi adotado o pacote relativo ao clima e à energia para 2020, que fixou os
objetivos «20-20-20» para a redução das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa, o aumento da quota de fontes de
energia renováveis no cabaz energético e os ganhos a nível da poupança de energia. Além disso, a Comissão definiu
uma estratégia global para as relações externas da UE no domínio da energia. A Comissão tem vindo a trabalhar
constantemente para melhorar a segurança no domínio da energia, por exemplo, no que respeita à energia nuclear ou
às plataformas _offshore_ . São elementos importantes para uma política europeia da energia. Estão previstas novas
medidas em todas estas áreas, como descrito no programa de trabalho da Comissão ( [1] ).

3. Os princípios de base da política energética europeia uniforme estão previstos no Tratado de Lisboa
(artigo 194.° do TFUE). Os princípios de base da política energética europeia são: assegurar o funcionamento do
mercado da energia, assegurar a segurança do aprovisionamento energético da União, promover a eficácia energética,
promover a poupança de energia, promover o desenvolvimento de energias novas e renováveis e promover a
interconexão das redes de energia. Temos de ter presentes as diferenças entre os Estados-Membros em termos de
cabazes energéticos, mas não podemos deixar que as medidas nacionais criem distorções nos mercados e na
concorrência. O funcionamento do mercado europeu da energia exige cooperação entre os Estados-Membros.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2013_pt.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 439

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006042/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Energy Policy

At the European Council of 22 May 2013, the representatives of the Member States agreed that European energy
policy should be a priority in the future and that this was one of the main challenges facing European society in view
of its energy dependency and security, the sustainability of resources and the importance of the sector in terms of
competitiveness.

A European energy policy requires real changes to be made to modes of production and transportation, as well as to
energy consumption habits in the European Union; it is therefore a political and economic priority for the future.

Although there are some energy-related initiatives in the EU, their often fragmentary nature means that common
rules need to be defined at EU level which go beyond mere cooperation between Member States and help to bring
about real European integration in this area.

1. What steps has the Commission taken so far towards a genuine European energy policy?

2. What legislative proposals does it intend to make in this area and when will these proposals be presented?

3. On what basic principles will a uniform European energy policy be based?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

1 and 2. Since the mid-1990s, the European institutions have agreed on successive steps to establish a regulatory
framework defining an open, interconnected and competitive single internal energy market (IEM), through dedicated
legislation on electricity and gas markets, security of gas and oil supply and infrastructure development. The
European Council has asked the Commission to ensure that the IEM is completed by 2014 and that no region of
the EU remain isolated from the EU energy networks by 2015. Furthermore, in 2008/2009, the 2020 climate and
energy package was adopted, setting the 20-20-20 targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase the share of
renewable energy sources in the energy mix and increase energy savings. The Commission also set out a
comprehensive strategy for the EU's external relations in energy. It constantly works to improve security in the field of
energy, for example in the field of nuclear energy or on offshore platforms. All these are important elements of a
European Energy Policy. Further steps in all these areas are expected, as described in the Commission's work
programme ( [1] ).

3. The basic principles for a uniform European energy policy are laid down in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 194 TFUE).
The basic principles of Europe's energy policy are to: ensure the functioning of the energy market; ensure security of
energy supply in the Union; promote energy efficiency; promote energy saving; promote the development of new and
renewable forms of energy; and to promote the interconnection of energy networks. We must acknowledge
differences between Member States' energy mixes but not let national measures distort markets and competition. The
functioning of the European energy market requires cooperation among Member States.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2013_en.pdf

C 42 E / 440 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006043/13**

**à Comissão**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ União Europeia e refugiados da guerra civil na Síria

No âmbito das suas relações da política europeia de vizinhança, a União Europeia tem, em paralelo com mais
11 países, uma relação privilegiada com a Síria. Este parceiro da União assistiu nos últimos tempos ao grave deflagrar
de uma guerra civil.

No passado dia 16 de maio, o primeiro-ministro da Turquia, Recep Erdogan, admitiu pela primeira vez que não
consegue suportar os gastos com os 400 mil refugiados sírios que estão no seu país, tendo informado que irá pedir
ajuda económica e também que irá solicitar à América e à Europa que recebam parte das pessoas que fogem à guerra
civil.

A guerra civil na Síria tem resultado na fuga de oito mil pessoas por dia, segundo dados das Nações Unidas, e a União
Europeia tem, nos termos do artigo 214.° TFUE, competência em matéria de ajuda humanitária com ações para
«prestar assistência, socorro e proteção às populações dos países terceiros vítimas de catástrofes naturais ou de origem
humana».

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como vê estas declarações do primeiro-ministro da Turquia?

2. Quais as ações que tenciona encetar neste contexto?

3. Como pode a União Europeia receber os refugiados da guerra civil na Síria? Em que termos?

**Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão**

_(6 de agosto de 2013)_

A Turquia está a assumir uma responsabilidade acrescida, ao proporcionar abrigo de alta qualidade e assistência
humanitária a mais de 200 000 sírios em 20 campos, sendo que há ainda cerca de 300 000 outros refugiados que
vivem fora dos campos. A Turquia declara ter desembolsado mais de 800 milhões de USD unicamente nos campos,
elevando‐se o montante gasto a mais de 1 500 milhões de USD se for tida em conta a totalidade dos custos. A UE
comprometeu-se, por conseguinte, a contribuir com um pacote global de 27 milhões de EUR, que estão atualmente a
ser utilizados. A UE está disposta a continuar a partilhar este encargo com a Turquia, com especial destaque para os
refugiados urbanos provenientes da Síria.

No que diz respeito aos refugiados e requerentes de asilo, o afluxo de requerentes de asilo sírios à UE mantém-se,
sendo a Alemanha e a Suécia os Estados-Membros mais afetados. Devido à crise, o Alto Comissariado para os
Refugiados, numa carta dirigida à Comissão e aos Estados‐Membros, apelou à admissão humanitária de
10 000 refugiados sírios provenientes de países do Médio Oriente e do Norte de África, assim como à reinstalação de
mais 2 000 cidadãos sírios, sobretudo refugiados particularmente vulneráveis, incluindo casos de pessoas com
necessidades de cuidados médicos importantes e com deficiências. A Comissão instou os Estados-Membros a
responderem positivamente a esse convite oferecendo‐se para aceitar a reinstalação ou admissão humanitária destas
pessoas. A Comissão convida ainda os Estados‐Membros a adotarem uma atitude generosa em relação à concessão de
vistos humanitários às pessoas deslocadas por força da crise síria que tenham familiares na UE, bem como a
admitirem qualquer cidadão sírio que se apresente nas fronteiras externas da União. Esta questão faz parte dos
assuntos abordados na Comunicação Conjunta da Alta Representante/Comissão sobre a Síria, de 24 de junho de
2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 441

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006043/13**

**to the Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ The EU and refugees from the civil war in Syria

In the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU has a special relationship with Syria and 11 other
countries. Syria recently witnessed the outbreak of a civil war.

On 16 May 2013, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdoğan, admitted for the first time that his country could not
afford the costs associated with the 400 000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. He also stated that he would request
economic aid and ask the United States and Europe to take in some of the people fleeing from the civil war.

According to United Nations figures, 8 000 people are fleeing the civil war every day and the EU has, under
Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a duty to provide humanitarian aid through
actions intended to ‘to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are
victims of natural or man-made disasters’.

1. What is the Commission’s view of the Turkish Prime Minister’s statements?

2. What steps does it intend to take in this respect?

3. How can the EU take in refugees from the civil war in Syria? On what terms?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(6 August 2013)_

Turkey is assuming an increased burden, providing high-quality shelter and humanitarian assistance to over 200 000
Syrians in 20 camps, with up to 300 000 more refugees living outside the camps. Turkey reports to have spent over
USD 800 million on camps alone, over USD 1.5 billion with all costs reflected. The EU has therefore pledged an
overall package of EUR 27 million, currently being spent. The EU is willing to further share the burden with Turkey
with special focus on the urban refugees from Syria.

Regarding refugees and asylum-seekers, the inflow of Syrian asylum-seekers into the EU is continuing, with Germany
and Sweden being the most affected Member States. Due to the crisis, the High Commissioner for Refugees called, in a
letter addressed to the Commission and the Member States, for the humanitarian admission of 10 000 Syrian refugees
from countries in the Middle East and North Africa and for the resettlement of an additional 2 000 Syrian nationals,
mainly particularly vulnerable refugees, including serious medical cases and disabled persons. The Commission called
on Member States to respond positively to this call by making resettlement or humanitarian admission places
available to these people. In addition, the Commission calls on Member States to adopt a generous attitude towards
the granting of humanitarian visas to persons displaced by the Syrian crisis who have family members present in
the EU, and also to admit any Syrians arriving at the external borders of the Union. This issue is one of those
addressed in the Joint High Representative/Commission Communication on Syria of 24 June 2013.

C 42 E / 442 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Suomenkielinen versio)_

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-006044/13**

**komissiolle**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(30. toukokuuta 2013)_

_Aihe:_ Petovahinkojen korvaukset

Suomessa suurpetojen suojelusta aiheutuu taloudellisia menetyksiä erityisesti poronhoitoalueella, jossa pedot
raatelevat merkittävän määrän poroja. Petovahinkojen määrä saattaa nousta jopa niin suureksi, että poronhoitajat
joutuvat lopettamaan toimintansa, koska vahingonkorvaukset eivät aina toteudu täysimääräisinä.

Suomessa petovahinkoja korvataan lain edellyttämällä tavalla, kuitenkin vain valtion siihen edeltä osoittamien
varojen puitteissa. Koska osoitetut määrärahat eivät ole aina riittäneet, ovat monet petovahinkoja kokeneet
poronhoitajat jääneet vaille korvausta.

Neuvoston direktiivi 92/43/ETY velvoittaa Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltiot suojelemaan luontotyyppejä sekä
luonnonvaraista eläimistöä ja kasveja. Suojeluvelvoite koskee myös suurpetoja. Niiden aiheuttamien taloudellisten
menetysten korvaaminen on kuitenkin jäänyt vain niiden maiden hallitusten vastuulle, joissa näitä eläimiä esiintyy ja
joissa niiden lukumäärän on direktiivin mukaisesti annettava kasvaa. Muilla mailla ei tällaista velvoitetta ole, ja
direktiivin soveltamisohjeessa jotkut jäsenmaat on jopa nimeltä mainiten vapautettu vastuusta päästää alueelleen
suurpetoja.

Eikö EU:n asettaman suojeluvelvoitteen tulisi johtaa myös EU:n vastuuseen velvoitteen aiheuttamien kustannusten
korvaamisesta? Millä tavalla EU:n vastuu käytännössä toteutuu sen asettaman suojeluvelvoitteen aiheuttamien
vahinkojen korvaamisessa?

**Janez Potočnikin komission puolesta antama vastaus**

_(15. heinäkuuta 2013)_

Arvoisan parlamentin jäsenen kannattaa tutustua vastauksiin, jotka komissio on antanut kirjallisiin kysymyksiin
E-6576/2012 ( [1] ), E-256/2013 ( [2] ), E-550/2013 ( [3] ) ja E-4417/2013 ( [4] ).

Vaikka direktiivin 1992/43/ETY ( [5] ) (luontotyyppidirektiivi) täytäntöönpano on jäsenvaltioiden vastuulla, on olemassa
erityisiä EU:n rahoitusjärjestelyitä, joilla voidaan auttaa jäsenvaltioita suurpetolajien suojelun ja ihmisten toiminnan
yhteensovittamisessa.

Kyseisessä direktiivissä myös vahvistetaan eriytetty järjestelmä suurpetokantojen suojelemiseksi jäsenvaltioiden eri
alueilla. Esimerkiksi Pohjois-Suomen poronhoitoalueella susi mainitaan liitteen V luettelossa, mikä sallii sen kestävän
hyödyntämisen, eikä liitteen IV tiukempaa suojelua edellyttävässä luettelossa, joka on voimassa muualla Suomessa.
Sen sisällyttäminen liitteeseen V ei kuitenkaan vapauta jäsenvaltiota suojelutoimenpiteistä, erityisesti suotuisan
suojelun tason säilyttämiseksi.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) EYVL L 206, 22.7.1992.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 443

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006044/13**

**to the Commission**
**Hannu Takkula (ALDE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Compensation for damage caused by large predators

In Finland, the protection of large predators is causing financial losses, particularly in the reindeer preserve, where
predators are killing substantial numbers of reindeer. Indeed, the number of cases in which such losses occur is likely
to grow so large that reindeer farmers will be forced to abandon their businesses because damage is not always fully
compensated.

In Finland, damage caused by predators is compensated in the manner laid down by law, but only within the limits of
the funds earmarked for this by the State. As the appropriations earmarked have not always been sufficient, many
reindeer farmers who have suffered damage from predators have not received compensation.

Council Directive 92/43/EEC requires European Union Member States to protect natural habitats and wild fauna and
flora. The duty of conservation also extends to large predators. However, payment of compensation for the financial
damage they cause is a responsibility which has devolved solely upon the governments of those countries where these
animals live and where the directive requires authorities to allow their numbers to grow. In other countries, there is
no such obligation, and in the circular on the application of the directive some Member States were even explicitly
named as being exempt from the requirement to allow large predators to enter their territory.

Ought not the duty of conservation imposed by the EU to be linked to an obligation for the EU to pay compensation
for the damage caused by that duty? How in practice is the EU’s responsibility acted upon for the purpose of paying
compensation for damage arising from the duty of conservation which it imposes?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its replies to Written Questions E-6576/2012 ( [1] ), E256/2013 ( [2] ), E-550/2013 ( [3] ) and E-4417/2013 ( [4] ).

Whereas implementation of Directive 1992/43/EEC ( [5] ) (‘Habitats Directive’) is the responsibility of the Member States
there are specific EU funding provisions which can assist them in reconciling the conservation of large carnivore
species with human activities.

The directive also establishes a differentiated system of protection for the large carnivore populations in different
territories of Member States. For example, in the Reindeer Herding Area in northern Finland the wolf is listed in
Annex V, which allows for its sustainable exploitation, and not under the stricter protection of Annex IV which
applies elsewhere in Finland. Nevertheless its inclusion in Annex V does not exempt the Member State from
protection measures, in particular in order to maintain favourable conservation status.

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

C 42 E / 444 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-006045/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(30 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Belastingen

Richtlijn 2011/16/EU van de Raad van 15 februari 2011 betreffende de administratieve samenwerking op het gebied
van de belastingen en tot intrekking van Richtlijn 77/799/EEG legt de voorschriften en procedures vast voor de
onderlinge samenwerking van de lidstaten met het oog op de uitwisseling van inlichtingen die naar verwachting van
belang zijn voor de administratie en de handhaving van de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten met betrekking tot de
in artikel 2 bedoelde belastingen. Artikel 16 van de richtlijn bepaalt dat „de inlichtingen die de lidstaten elkaar
krachtens deze richtlijn in enigerlei vorm verstrekken (…) kunnen worden gebruikt voor de administratie en de
handhaving van de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten met betrekking tot de in artikel 2 bedoelde belastingen”.

Houdt dit in dat de inlichtingen die de lidstaten elkaar krachtens de bovengenoemde richtlijn in enigerlei vorm
verstrekken kunnen worden gebruikt tijdens alle fasen van het belastingproces, met inbegrip van aanslag, onderzoek,
inning, terugvordering en handhaving van de in artikel 2 bedoelde belastingen?

**Antwoord van de heer Šemeta namens de Commissie**

_(27 juni 2013)_

De Commissie is van mening dat de inlichtingen die de lidstaten elkaar krachtens Richtlijn 2011/16/EU van de Raad
van 15 februari 2011 in enigerlei vorm verstrekken, gebruikt kunnen worden tijdens alle fasen van het
belastingproces, met inbegrip van aanslag, onderzoek, inning, terugvordering en handhaving van de in artikel 2 van
die richtlijn bedoelde belastingen. De formele uitlegging van het EU-recht is echter de taak van het Hof van Justitie van
de Europese Unie, en niet van de Commissie.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 445

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006045/13**

**to the Commission**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Taxation

Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and
repealing Directive 77/799/EEC lays down the rules and procedures under which the Member States must cooperate
with each other with a view to exchanging information that is foreseeable relevant to the administration and
enforcement of the domestic laws of the Member States concerning the taxes referred to in Article 2 of the directive.
Article 16 of the directive states that ‘Information communicated between Member States in any form pursuant to
this directive (…) may be used for the administration and enforcement of the domestic laws of the Member States
concerning the taxes referred to in Article 2’.

Does this mean that information communicated between Member States in any form pursuant to the aforementioned
directive may be used in all the various stages of the process of taxation, including assessment, examination,
collection, recovery and enforcement of the taxes referred to in Article 2?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 June 2013)_

The Commission is of the opinion that information exchanged between Member States in any form pursuant to
Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 may be used in all stages of the taxation process, including
assessment, examination, collection, recovery and enforcement of the taxes referred to in Article 2. However, it is the
role of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and not of the Commission, to formally interpret EC law.

C 42 E / 446 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006046/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Participación de la sociedad civil en el proceso de paz en Colombia

El proceso de paz que se está llevando a cabo entre el Gobierno de Colombia y las FARC está produciendo
significativos avances, tal como el reciente acuerdo alcanzado relativo a tierras. Pese a estos importantísimos avances,
consideramos que se deben dar más pasos para avanzar hacia la consolidación de un verdadero proceso de paz.

Para la realización de un proceso de paz efectivo no basta con negociar tan solo con uno de los grupos armados
involucrados, sino que se debe intentar afrontar desde una perspectiva aún más amplia. Establecer un juego entre
Gobierno y FARC se ha traducido en un incremento de las luchas por mantener las posiciones para ganar peso en las
negociaciones por parte de ambos. Según la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos,
en su último informe anual sobre Colombia (enero 2013), se ha producido un incremento de los desplazamientos
internos en el país.

Considerando muy importantes los avances realizados hasta ahora, debemos señalar que es fundamental incluir a
todos los actores involucrados y afectados por el conflicto. No es posible construir una paz estable y duradera si solo
se incluye a una parte de los actores del conflicto; es necesaria la presión internacional para incluir a todos los sectores
tanto armados como civiles. Este proceso de paz a dos partes debe dar un paso, como sostienen las resoluciones de la
ONU, para permitir la participación de la sociedad civil a través de la inclusión de sectores invisibilizados como
grupos de mujeres, pueblos indígenas, comunidades de descendientes de africanos y víctimas.

¿Considera la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante que el proceso de paz que se está desarrollando en Colombia será
completamente efectivo si no se incluye a todos los grupos involucrados de la sociedad civil?

¿Está instando al Gobierno colombiano para que se incluya en las negociaciones a los diferentes sectores civiles
citados? ¿En qué forma?

¿Considera que los demás grandes grupos armados involucrados en el conflicto deben participar en las negociaciones
del proceso de paz? ¿Ha presionado al Gobierno colombiano para que los incluya?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de agosto de 2013)_

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta coincide en que una paz duradera solo puede basarse en una solución
negociada que cuente con el apoyo lo más amplio posible de la sociedad colombiana. Si bien hay que respetar la
decisión del Gobierno colombiano, basada en las enseñanzas de procesos de paz anteriores, de limitar las
negociaciones en La Habana a las dos partes implicadas en el conflicto, hay que señalar que el Congreso colombiano
está celebrando una serie de mesas redondas integradoras con toda una serie de interlocutores sociales, entre los que
se cuentan representantes de distintas partes de la sociedad civil, incluidos los grupos a los que se refiere su Señoría.
Las conclusiones de estas reuniones se transmiten a las partes en la mesa de negociación de La Habana. La UE, a través
de su Delegación en Bogotá, ha participado en algunas de estas reuniones en calidad de observadora, y, de hecho, ha
subvencionado algunas de ellas. Hay que señalar también que el Gobierno colombiano tiene la intención de presentar
a los ciudadanos, para su aprobación, los resultados de las negociaciones, una vez concluidas.

Además, la Alta Representante y Vicepresidentas espera que el Gobierno colombiano entable conversaciones
exploratorias con el ELN, la segunda mayor organización guerrillera del país, cuando considere que se dan las
condiciones para las mismas, y se congratularía del inicio de las negociaciones de paz también con ese grupo.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 447

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006046/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Involvement of civil society in the peace process in Colombia

There have been significant steps forward in the ongoing peace process between the Colombian Government and
FARC, such as the recent agreement reached on land. However notwithstanding these highly significant steps
forward, further steps should be taken for progress to be made towards consolidating a genuine peace process.

Achieving an effective peace process requires more than just negotiating with one of the armed groups concerned.
Efforts must be made to tackle the problem from a wider perspective. The interaction established between the
government and FARC has led, in practice, to both sides increasingly striving to maintain their positions in order to
gain more weight in the negotiations. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her most recent
Annual Report on Colombia (January 2013), the number of people internally displaced in the country has risen.

While the progress made to date is important, it is essential that all the parties concerned and affected by the conflict
are included. It will not be possible to build a stable and lasting peace if only some of the parties involved in the
conflict are included in talks. International pressure needs to be brought to bear for all sectors, both armed and civil,
to be included. This two-sided peace process must take a further step forward, as the UN resolutions maintain, and
allow civil society to take part through the inclusion of sectors that have been kept off the scene, namely women’s
groups, indigenous peoples groups, communities of African descent and victims.

Does the Vice-President/High Representative believe that the ongoing peace process in Colombia will ever be fully
effective if all the civil society groups concerned are not included?

Is she urging the Colombian Government to include the aforementioned different sectors of civil society in the
negotiations? What form would this involvement take?

Does she believe that the other large armed groups involved in the conflict should take part in the peace process
negotiations? Has she brought pressure to bear on the Colombian Government to include them?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 August 2013)_

The HR/VP agrees that a durable peace can only be built on a negotiated solution that is supported by as large a part of
Colombian society as possible. While the decision of the Colombian government, based on experience from past
peace processes, to limit the negotiations in Havana to the two actors in the conflict should be respected, it is noted
that the Colombian Congress is carrying out a series of inclusive round table meetings involving a whole host of
societal actors, amongst them representatives of different parts of civil society, including the groups referred to by the
Honourable Member. The conclusions of these meetings are transmitted to the parties at the Havana negotiating
table. The EU, through its Delegation in Bogotá, has participated in some of these meetings as observer, and, indeed,
provided financing for some of them. It is also noted that government intends to submit the results of the
negotiations, once concluded, to the Colombian people for its endorsement.

The HR/VP moreover hopes that the government undertakes exploratory talks with the ELN, the country’s second
guerrilla organisation, when he feels the conditions for such a step are in place. She would welcome the launch of
formal peace negotiations also with this group.

C 42 E / 448 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006047/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Posición rusa y turca frente a los ataques a Siria

El 31 de enero de 2013, el ejército de Israel atacó posiciones dentro de Siria, ante ello presentamos la pregunta E001124/2013, que recibió una respuesta manifiestamente incompleta en la que la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante
eludía aportar información sobre la valoración de la posición de Rusia frente a dichos ataques.

Desde aquella pregunta hemos contemplado cómo se producía una escalada de violencia en la región, de la cual Israel
es responsable con sus bombardeos esporádicos sobre posiciones sirias. La crisis de Siria es una de las mayores
preocupaciones de la comunidad internacional, donde el ejército de Bashar al Assad está enfrentado a milicias
pertenecientes a Al Qaeda. La participación de Israel ha supuesto un nuevo paso de la desestabilización y un
incremento de la tensión de las relaciones de dicho país con Rusia.

Pero con el anuncio de los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Europea de levantar el embargo de armas,
Rusia ha dado un paso al frente y ha afirmado que armará al régimen sirio. El impacto que la intervención en Siria
puede tener sobre las relaciones internacionales entre las grandes potencias supondrá una mayor desestabilización
mundial. Rusia está manteniendo una posición en favor del Gobierno de Bashar al Assad que pretende evitar el
conflicto, debido a que, pese a que el Gobierno de Bashar al Assad está empleando la violencia en el interior de sus
fronteras, la intervención extranjera que supone la venta de armas sin duda desestabilizará aun más la región,
extendiendo el conflicto y la violencia más allá de sus fronteras, tal y como ha sucedido en Libia. Consideramos que el
armamento de grupos sirios también tendrá efectos en Turquía, que al compartir una larga frontera militarizará aún
más la zona.

¿Cómo valora la posición mantenida por Rusia para buscar una salida al conflicto que no implique una intervención
militar extranjera?

¿Qué impacto considera que tendría el levantamiento del embargo armamentístico en las relaciones de la UE con
Rusia? ¿Y en las relaciones con Turquía?

¿Cómo pretende garantizar la UE que una potencial exportación de armas a grupos opositores sirios no lleve a un
incremento del tráfico hacia diferentes grupos armados de la región?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(31 de julio de 2013)_

La Unión Europea apoya plenamente la iniciativa promovida por EE.UU. y Rusia de convocar una conferencia de paz
que reúna a representantes del régimen y la oposición siria para negociar y buscar una solución pacífica al conflicto.
Dicha convocatoria también se dio a conocer en la Comisión Conjunta — Comunicación sobre Siria de la Alta
Representante y Vicepresidenta, de 24 de junio de 2013.

La UE continúa instando a Rusia a que se abstenga de entregar armas al régimen sirio. Estas entregas contribuyen a
reforzar la voluntad del régimen de proseguir su violenta represión de la población siria, al tiempo que frenan e
impiden una solución política del conflicto y contradicen los esfuerzos por celebrar una conferencia de paz.

Al expirar el embargo de armas de la UE (el pasado 31 de mayo), los Estados miembros se comprometieron a no
proceder a la entrega de material de defensa y, antes del 1 de agosto de 2013, reconsiderarán su posición sobre la base
de un informe de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta relativo a la evolución de la iniciativa de EE.UU. y Rusia y al
compromiso de las partes sirias. Los Estados miembros se han comprometido asimismo a exigir las garantías
oportunas contra el uso indebido de las autorizaciones de exportación concedidas, en concreto información relativa
al usuario final y al destino final de la entrega, así como a evaluar cada solicitud de licencia de exportación por
separado, teniendo presentes en todo momento los criterios establecidos en la Posición Común 2008/944/PESC del
Consejo, de 8 de diciembre de 2008.

Turquía apoya el levantamiento del embargo armamentístico y sigue siendo un socio clave en la búsqueda de una
solución política a la guerra en Siria.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 449

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006047/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Russian and Turkish positions on attacks on Syria

On 31 January 2013, the Israeli army attacked positions within Syria, in regard to which Written Question E001124/2013 was tabled. The Vice-President/High Representative’s answer to this was clearly incomplete as she
avoided saying how she would assess Russia’s position on these attacks.

Since tabling that question, violence in the region has escalated, for which Israel is responsible with its sporadic
bombing of Syrian positions. The Syrian crisis is one of the international community’s major concerns, with Bashar
al-Assad’s army confronting militias belonging to Al‐Qaeda. Israel’s involvement brought about another stage in
destablisation as well as increasing Israel’s tense relations with Russia.

But with the announcement by the EU Foreign Ministers that the arms embargo is to be lifted, Russia has stepped
forward and said that it will arm the Syrian regime. Intervention in Syria could further destabilise international
relations at global level between the major powers. Russia is holding firm to its position in support of the government
of Bashar al‐Assad, claiming that this will prevent conflict as — notwithstanding the violence deployed by Bashar al‐
Assad’s government within its own borders — foreign intervention in the form of arms sales will undoubtably
destabilise the region even more, taking the conflict and its violence beyond Syria’s borders, as happened in Libya. It
seems likely that arming Syrian groups will also impact Turkey which, since it shares a long border with Syria, will
further step up military presence in the area.

How does the Commission assess Russia’s position in looking for a way out of the conflict that does not entail foreign
military intervention?

What impact will lifting the arms embargo have on EU relations with Russia? And on relations with Turkey?

How can the EU guarantee that the potential export of weapons to Syrian opposition groups will not lead to more
arms being traded to the various armed groups in the region?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

The EU fully supports the US-Russia initiative of convening a peace conference to bring together representatives of
the regime and the opposition in order to conduct negoatiations and identify a peaceful solution to the conflict. This
call was also set out in the Joint Commission — HR/VP Communication on Syria of 24 June 2013.

The EU continues to call on Russia to refrain from delivering arms to the Syrian regime. Such deliveries contribute to
strengthening the regime's resolve to continue its violent repression of the Syrian people, while moving away from a
political settlement of the conflict. They are also inconsistent with the effort at a peace conference.

Upon the expiry of the EU arms embargo (31/5), Member States committed not to proceed at this stage with the
delivery of military equipment. They will review their position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the
HR/VP on the developments related to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties. They
have also committed to require adequate safeguards against misuse of export authorisations granted, in particular
relevant information concerning the end-user and final destination of the delivery; and to assess the export licence
applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position
2008/944/CFSP of 8 December.

Turkey supported the lifting of the arms embargo and remains a key partner in the search for a political solution to
the war in Syria.

C 42 E / 450 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006048/13**

**a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ VP/HR — Levantamiento del embargo de armas a Siria

El pasado 26 junio los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Europea decidieron tomar partido en la crisis siria
y levantar el embargo sobre el comercio de armas que pesa sobre Siria. Este embargo, que ya había sido reducido para
permitir exportar petróleo a los rebeldes, permitirá a partir del próximo 1 de agosto que los Estados miembros
procedan a armar a dichas milicias opositoras.

El actual embargo expiraba el 1 de julio, pero los Estados miembros acordaron esperar hasta agosto para comenzar a
vender armas a la oposición siria. Los Estados miembros han insistido en que solo armarán a la oposición moderada y
no a los grupos extremistas. Sin embargo, el desembarco de armas en el país deja clara la incapacidad de control de
destino, si bien se puede controlar al importador, es evidente que, una vez dentro de una zona de conflicto, el frente
rebelde armará a quien luche junto a ellos, lo cual incluye sin algún género de duda al frente Al Nursa, miembro de Al
Qaeda.

El anuncio del levantamiento del embargo sobre Siria ha despertado las alarmas de la comunidad internacional,
encabezada por la reacción de Rusia, que ha decidido armar al ejército del régimen sirio con misiles. El levantamiento
de este embargo supone una intervención internacional en una región muy inestable, que armará al régimen sirio para
intentar estabilizar la zona. Levantar el embargo de armas solo conducirá al incremento de la violencia y de la
inestabilidad en la zona, como lo ocurrido en Libia. La llegada de armas a la región, ha desestabilizado a los países
vecinos, originando nuevos conflictos. En Oriente Próximo, una de las regiones más militarizadas e inestables del
mundo, las consecuencias del desembarco masivo de armamento, pese al control que pueda existir de los
importadores, originará un incremento sin precedentes de la inestabilidad de la zona.

¿Considera posible un control efectivo de los destinatarios finales de las armas que se distribuyan entre los rebeldes
sirios? ¿Qué garantías puede tener de que la oposición moderada no arme a otras milicias?

¿Cómo pretende controlar que los destinatarios y usuarios finales de las armas importadas no sean milicias terroristas
como Al Nursa? ¿Qué controles se realizarán más allá de los realizados a los importadores?

¿Piensa que puede existir un control efectivo del código de conducta y las salvaguardas impuestas a la oposición
moderada sobre la importación de armas sin controlar en el terreno su distribución y uso final?

**Respuesta de la Alta Representante y vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión**

_(14 de agosto de 2013)_

Desde el 31 de mayo de 2013, la UE ha dejado de aplicar el embargo de armas a Siria. La posible exportación de armas
a Siria incumbe ahora a las políticas nacionales de los Estados miembros.

Hay que señalar a este respecto que, en una Declaración del Consejo sobre Siria realizada el 27 de mayo de 2013, los
Estados miembros afirmaron que procederían en sus políticas nacionales de acuerdo con criterios estrictos, de
conformidad con el código de conducta existente para el control de las exportaciones de armas, las cuales se limitarán
a la coalición de la oposición siria y al objeto de proteger a los civiles, con garantías sobre sus usuarios finales. Los
Estados miembros acordaron también que no llevarían a cabo ninguna exportación en esta fase a fin de evaluar los
avances del proceso político. Se observa asimismo que algunos Estados miembros han declarado bilateralmente que
seguirían sin suministrar armas a Siria.

No obstante, en caso de que los Estados miembros no excluyan la posibilidad de proporcionar armas en un momento
determinado, corresponde a ellos mismos cerciorarse de que se cumplen los criterios acordados en el marco de la
Declaración del Consejo de 27 de mayo de 2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 451

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006048/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Lifting of the arms embargo on Syria

On 26 May 2013 the EU’s Foreign Ministers decided to take sides in the Syrian crisis and lift the embargo on the arms
trade imposed on Syria. This embargo had already been eased to allow oil to be exported to the rebels and now, as
from 1 August 2013, Member States will be allowed to arm Syrian opposition militias.

The embargo expires on 1 June, but the Member States agreed to wait until August before starting to sell arms to the
Syrian opposition. The Member States have insisted that they will not arm extremist groups but only the moderate
opposition forces. However, there is clearly no way to control what will happen to the weapons after they arrive in
the country; while the actual importer can be monitored, it is obvious that once in the conflict zone, the rebel front
will arm whoever fights with them, including without any doubt whatsoever, the Al-Nursa front which is a member
of Al-Qaeda.

The announcement that the Syrian embargo is to be lifted has alarmed the international community, led by Russia
which has reacted by deciding to supply the Syrian regime’s army with missiles. The lifting of this embargo entails
international intervention in a region that is very unstable and which will arm the Syrian regime in an attempt to
stabilise the area. Lifting the arms embargo will only lead to more violence and instability in the area, as happened in
Libya. The arrival of weapons in the region destabilised neighbouring countries, causing new conflicts. The
repercussions of a huge influx of weapons into the Middle East, one of the most militarised and unstable regions in
the world, despite whatever control those importing them may have, will be an unprecedented rise in the area’s
instability.

Will it be possible to impose effective controls on who are the final recipients of the weapons distributed to the Syrian
rebels? What guarantees can there be that the moderate opposition will not arm other militia?

How is it possible to ensure that the final recipients and end users of the imported arms will not be terrorist militas
such as Al Nursa? What checks will be carried out in addition to those on the actual importers of the weapons?

Is it possible to monitor effectively the code of conduct and safeguards imposed on the moderate opposition for arms
imports without monitoring their distribution and final use on the ground?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 August 2013)_

Since 31 May 2013 the EU has no longer applied an arms embargo against Syria. The possible export of arms to Syria
is now a matter of Member States' national policies.

It is noted in this respect that Member States on 27 May 2013 in a Council Declaration on Syria have declared that
they will proceed in their national policies on the basis of strict criteria, in accordance with the existing Code of
Conduct for control of arms exports, only for the Syrian Opposition Coalition and for the protection of civilians and
with guarantees about who the end-users will be. Member States also agreed that they would not actually carry out
any exports at that stage, in order to assess the progress of the political process. It is noted as well that a number of
Member States have bilaterally declared that they would continue not to deliver arms to Syria.

However, where Member States do not exclude the possibility of arms deliveries at a certain stage, it is for those
Member States to ensure that the criteria agreed in the framework of the 27 May 2013 Council Declaration are
implemented.

C 42 E / 452 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006049/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Manifestación mundial contra Monsanto

El pasado 25 de mayo se realizaron más de 500 manifestaciones en todo el mundo para mostrar el rechazo a una
multinacional específica, Monsanto. Esta empresa multinacional se ha convertido en un símbolo de la privatización
de las semillas y el desarrollo de los cultivos transgénicos en todo el mundo.

Se trata de una empresa implicada en numerosos escándalos de suicidios de agricultores, expropiación del patrimonio
biológico a comunidades y un perfecto ejemplo de cómo la avaricia capitalista no tiene ningún límite, más aún
cuando se trata de algo tan absurdo como tratar de privatizar la biodiversidad. Esta empresa es una insignia de las
semillas transgénicas y ha conseguido unir a todo el planeta para protestar contra ella y sus prácticas de depredación
del patrimonio genético de la humanidad, que son las semillas.

En su respuesta a mi pasada pregunta E-003989/2012, la Comisión sostenía que existen las estructuras legales para
declarar «zonas libres de transgénicos». Pese a ello, se están autorizando numerosas explotaciones con semillas
transgénicas, especialmente en España, que continúan contaminando diferentes productos agrícolas. Existen
numerosos estudios para sostener que declarar Europa «zona libre de transgénicos» podría suponer un impacto
económico positivo para su agricultura, además de reducir riesgos potenciales y supondría escasas pérdidas para
multinacionales, principalmente Monsanto, que son las principales cultivadoras de estas semillas en España.

Pese a los riesgos potenciales de contaminación de otros productos agrícolas, con el pernicioso impacto que esto tiene
para mantener y garantizar la calidad de los productos agrícolas, la EFSA autoriza numerosas plantaciones de
transgénicos, a pesar de los escándalos de «puertas giratorias» pendientes entre el personal de la EFSA y las compañías
de investigación de transgénicos que anulan por completo la legitimidad de dicha agencia.

¿Piensa prohibir la Comisión a nivel comunitario las plantaciones de cultivos transgénicos a escala comercial y a cielo
abierto, y declarar la Unión Europea territorio libre de transgénicos, como forma de potenciar el buen nombre y la
calidad de la agricultura europea? ¿Considera necesario hacer que Monsanto cumpla la responsabilidad social
corporativa (RSC)? ¿Considera del mismo interés para la Unión mejorar los ingresos de los agricultores, o los de una
multinacional como Monsanto, que no cumple ningún tipo de RSC y solo produce riesgos para la agricultura
europea?

**Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión**

_(16 de julio de 2013)_

1. La Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su respuesta a la pregunta parlamentaria E‐003989/2012 ( [1] ).

2. La Comisión apoya activamente la aplicación de las directrices y los principios sobre responsabilidad social de
las empresas acordados a nivel internacional, así como la concienciación al respecto; entre esos principios y
directrices cabe citar las directrices de la OCDE dirigidas a las empresas multinacionales, la declaración de principios
de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo sobre las empresas multinacionales y la política social, la norma
ISO 26000, el Pacto Mundial de las Naciones Unidas y los principios rectores de las Naciones Unidas sobre las
empresas y los derechos humanos.

3. Los objetivos de la PAC son una producción viable de alimentos, una gestión sostenible de los recursos naturales
y un desarrollo territorial equilibrado en la EU. Estos objetivos se consiguen dando a los productores agrícolas un
complemento de renta, acentuando la orientación de la agricultura al mercado, mejorando la integración de los
requisitos medioambientales y reforzando el apoyo al desarrollo de las zonas rurales.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 453

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006049/13**

**to the Commission**
**Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Worldwide protest against Monsanto

On 25 May 2013, over 500 demonstrations were held across the world in protest against a specific multinational,
Monsanto. This multinational company has become a symbol for the privatisation of seeds and the development of
GM crops worldwide.

Monsanto has been involved in numerous scandals involving farmers’ suicides and the expropriation of the biological
heritage from local communities, and is a perfect example of how capitalist greed has no limits, especially when it
comes to something as absurd as trying to privatise biodiversity. It is an emblem for GM seeds and has managed to
unite the entire planet in protest against it and its predatory practices on mankind’s genetic heritage in the form of
seeds.

In its answer to my previous Question E-003989/2012, the Commission claimed that there are legal structures for
declaring ‘GMO-free areas’. Despite this, authorisation is being given to a large number of farms using genetically
modified seeds, especially in Spain, which continue to contaminate various agricultural products. There are numerous
studies which argue that declaring Europe a ‘GMO-free area’ could have a positive economic impact for European
agriculture, and would also reduce potential risks, and would not entail major losses for multinationals, mainly
Monsanto, which are the main cultivators of these seeds in Spain.

Despite the potential risks of contamination of other agricultural products, and the pernicious effect this has on
maintaining and ensuring the quality of agricultural products, EFSA is authorising large numbers of GMO
plantations, even though the ongoing ‘revolving doors’ scandals involving EFSA staff and GM research companies
totally nullify the legitimacy of this agency.

Does the Commission plan to introduce a Community-wide ban on the planting of transgenic crops on a commercial
scale and in the open air, and to declare the European Union a transgenic-free territory as a way to enhance the
reputation and quality of European agriculture? Does it consider it necessary to make Monsanto comply with its
corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations? Does it consider it to be of equal interest for the Union to improve
farmers’ incomes and those of multinationals like Monsanto that practise no form of CSR and only endanger
European agriculture?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

1. The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answer to Parliamentary Question E-003989/2012 ( [1] ).

2. The Commission actively supports awareness-raising and implementation of internationally agreed Corporate
Social Responsibility guidelines and principles like the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the
International Labour Organisation Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the ISO 26000
standard, the UN Global Compact, and the UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights.

3. The CAP pursues the following objectives: ensuring viable food production, the sustainable management of
natural resources, and the balanced territorial development in the EU. These objectives are met through the provision
of income support to agricultural producers, enhanced market orientation for agriculture, improved integration of
environmental requirements and reinforced support for the development of rural areas.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 42 E / 454 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006050/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE) y Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Plataforma por Catalunya

El 16 de mayo se celebró un acto de homenaje a los combatientes españoles en el ejército nazi en Catalunya donde se
entregó un diploma a la «Hermandad de Combatientes de la División Azul». Entre los participantes estaba Carlos
Oliva, dirigente de las juventudes de Plataforma por Catalunya (PxC) y Joan Garriga, exmilitante del PP y ahora de PxC
y el concejal de PxC en Olot, Nacho Mulleras. Plataforma por Catalunya es un partido de extrema derecha, racista,
fascista y xenófobo que forma parte de los partidos identitarios europeos, como el FPÖ, de Austria.

Los partidos europeos con estas características fueron excluidos de las subvenciones europeas para partidos y
fundaciones políticas por las nuevas reglas introducidas por la Comisión y la normativa comunitaria (artículo 3 del
Reglamento (CE) n° 2004/2003).

La UE se ha comprometido en varias ocasiones contra el fascismo y el nazismo. Así lo refleja el artículo 3 de la
Decisión 1904/2006/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo que establece el programa «Memoria histórica activa
de Europa» para evitar que se repitieran los crímenes del nazismo y del estalinismo. También la Comisaria Malmström
puso en funcionamiento en 2011 un programa de la UE para la «Sensibilización frente a la Radicalización» (RSR),
donde se incluyen propuestas como formar a la policía local para detectar signos de radicalización hacia el
extremismo violento y facilitar programas de desradicalización y desvinculación de los miembros de grupos
extremistas.

¿Considera que la celebración de actos oficiales como la «Hermandad de Combatientes de la División Azul» se ajusta a
los principios de democracia y al posicionamiento del Parlamento y el Consejo nombrado en la Decisión
1904/2006/CE? ¿Qué medidas dentro del programa RSR promoverá para reducir estas actuaciones?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión**

_(12 de septiembre de 2013)_

De acuerdo con la Decisión Marco 2008/913/JAI, corresponde a las autoridades nacionales investigar todo caso de
incitación al odio o negación del Holocausto y perseguir a sus autores.

Con ánimo preventivo, el principal objetivo de la Red para la Sensibilización frente a la Radicalización (RSR) es
ayudar a los primeros interventores a detectar y atajar toda radicalización hacia el terrorismo y el extremismo
violento. La Red se propone aunar experiencias, conocimientos y enseñanzas extraídas para equipar a los
profesionales que se hallan en contacto directo con estas situaciones en su labor cotidiana con los individuos y los
grupos de riesgo. La RSR está organizada por grupos temáticos, uno de los cuales se dedica específicamente a tareas
de desradicalización y desmovilización y otro a la prevención de determinadas iniciativas dirigidas sobre todo a las
nuevas generaciones. Ambos grupos pueden beneficiarse de la actividad de otros grupos, como el que se centra en
Internet y los medios sociales o el que se ocupa de las víctimas del terrorismo. La labor de la red alimentará el
contenido de un Programa europeo de prevención de la radicalización hacia el terrorismo y el extremismo violento,
actualmente en fase de preparación.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 455

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006050/13**

**to the Commission**
**Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE) and Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Platform for Catalonia

On 16 May 2013, a ceremony was held in Catalonia to honour Spaniards who fought in the Nazi Army, at which a
diploma was awarded to the ‘Brotherhood of Combatants in the Blue Division’. Among those taking part was Carlos
Oliva, leader of the youth division of ‘Plataforma por Catalunya’ (Platform for Catalonia or PxC), Joan Garriga, a
former PP activist and now a PxC activist, and the PxC’s town councillor in Olot, Nacho Mulleras. Platform for
Catalonia is an extreme right-wing, racist, fascist and xenophobic party; like Austria’s FPÖ, it is one of Europe’s
nationalist parties.

New rules introduced by the Commission through EU legislation (Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003)
prevent European political parties of this kind from receiving EU grants for political parties and foundations.

The EU has on various occasions committed itself to fighting fascism and nazism. This is reflected in Article 3 of
Decision 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council which established the ‘Active European
Remembrance’ programme to ensure the crimes of nazism and stalinism are never repeated. Commissioner
Malmström also set up in 2011 the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), an EU programme whose proposals
include training local police to spot signs of radicalisation towards violent extremism and facilitating de-radicalisation
programmes and exit strategies for members of extremist groups.

Does it believe that official ceremonies like the one held for the Brotherhood of Blue Division Combattants are in
keeping with the principles of democracy and with Parliament’s and the Council’s position as set out in
Decision 1904/2006/EC? Which of the measures in the RAN programme will it promote in order that actions of this
kind become less frequent?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 September 2013)_

It is for national authorities to investigate any instances of hate speech or Holocaust denial and to prosecute the
perpetrators of such offences, according to Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA.

On the prevention side, the RAN’s main objective is to help first liners identify and fight radicalisation towards
terrorism and violent extremism. The Network aims to pool experiences, knowledge and lessons learned to better
equip first-line practitioners in their daily work with at risk individuals and groups _._ The RAN is organised in thematic
groups, among which one of them is specifically dedicated to deradicalisation and disengagement and another to
preventive initiatives, notably towards youth generations. Both groups may benefit from the work of other groups,
such as the group on Internet and social media or the group of the victims of terrorism. The work of the network will
feed into a European Programme on preventing radicalisation into terrorism and violent extremism currently in
preparation.

C 42 E / 456 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006052/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Comisiones bancarias excesivas

Cada cliente de un banco del Estado español paga de media 145,82 euros en comisiones, según un estudio de
FACUA ( [1] ), por comisiones de mantenimiento, administración, transferencias y descubiertos que aplican doce
entidades bancarias en sus cuentas.

Estas cuentas no obligan a tener una nómina domiciliada, pero en aquellos casos en que un usuario contrata
productos del banco o domicilia su pensión o su nomina, estos cargos no son cobrados.

¿Tiene la Comisión conocimiento de estos datos?

¿No cree la Comisión que el cobro de estas comisiones supone un abuso de mercado contra aquellos ciudadanos que
simplemente tienen una cuenta bancaria?

**Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión**

_(19 de julio de 2013)_

La Comisión no interviene directamente en la política comercial y tarifaria de los bancos. No obstante, con el fin de
dotar de mayor transparencia a las comisiones bancarias, la Comisión adoptó el pasado 8 de mayo de 2013 una
propuesta de directiva sobre la comparabilidad de las comisiones asociadas a las cuentas de pago, el traslado de
cuentas de pago y el acceso a cuentas de pago básicas.

Como ponen claramente de manifiesto los resultados arrojados por una consulta pública y varios estudios realizados,
son muchos los consumidores europeos que se quejan de la complejidad y opacidad que rodea a las comisiones
bancarias. Conforme a lo establecido en esta nueva directiva, los bancos deberán proporcionar información clara
sobre la naturaleza y las tarifas de los servicios bancarios que ofrecen, con una terminología estandarizada y una serie
de glosarios.

El consumidor recibirá dicha información de forma previa a su elección de banco, para así poder comparar las
diferentes ofertas disponibles en el mercado y seleccionar aquella que mejor se ajuste a sus necesidades. Cuando ya sea
cliente, recibirá extractos de su cuenta, una vez al año como mínimo, de forma que pueda hacer un seguimiento de las
comisiones cobradas por el banco. Por último, la directiva prevé que en cada Estado miembro exista al menos un
comparador de tarifas bancarias que facilite la comparación entre las distintas ofertas existentes en el mercado y que
fomente, por consiguiente, la movilidad bancaria y la competencia entre los bancos.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ara.cat/economia/espanyols-cobren-anuals-mitjana-comissions_0_915508635.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 457

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006052/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Exorbitant bank fees

In Spain, customers of state-owned banks are each paying EUR 145.82 on average in fees, according to a study by the
consumer association FACUA ( [1] ). Twelve banks charge customers maintenance fees, administration fees and fees for
money transfers and overdrafts.

Customers are not required to pay their salary into bank accounts of this kind, but when a customer does agree to buy
the bank’s products, or pays his or her pension or salary into the account, no fees are charged for this.

Is the Commission aware of these facts?

Would the Commission not agree that charging fees like these amounts to a case of market abuse practised on
members of the public simply for having a bank account?

_(Version française)_

**Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission**

_(19 juillet 2013)_

La Commission n'intervient pas directement dans la politique commerciale et tarifaire des banques. Cependant, afin
d'améliorer la transparence des frais bancaires, la Commission a adopté le 8 mai 2013 une proposition de directive
sur la comparabilité des frais liés aux comptes de paiement, le changement de compte de paiement et l'accès à un
compte de paiement assorti de prestations de base.

En effet, une consultation publique ainsi que plusieurs études ont montré que de nombreux consommateurs
européens se plaignent de la complexité et de l'opacité des frais bancaires. Avec cette nouvelle directive, les banques
devront fournir des informations claires sur la nature et les tarifs des services bancaires proposés avec l'introduction
d'une terminologie standardisée et de glossaires.

Ces informations seront fournies au consommateur avant de choisir une banque, et il pourra ainsi comparer les
différentes offres disponibles sur le marché et sélectionner l'offre la mieux adaptée à ses besoins. Une fois client, des
relevés de frais lui seront fournis au moins annuellement afin de suivre les frais facturés par la banque. Enfin, la
directive prévoit qu'il existera au moins un comparateur de tarifs bancaires dans chaque Etat-Membre afin de faciliter
la comparaison des offres sur le marché, et, en conséquence, de stimuler la mobilité bancaire et donc la compétition
entre banques.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ara.cat/economia/espanyols-cobren-anuals-mitjana-comissions_0_915508635.html

C 42 E / 458 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006053/13**

**al Consejo**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE) y Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Información al consumidor

En el pasado Consejo de Ministros de Pesca se acordó una propuesta en la cual no se da respuesta a la necesidad y
voluntad de la ciudadanía y del sector pesquero de bajura de obligar a incluir la información necesaria para identificar
los productos de proximidad en el etiquetado del pescado. Los ministros acordaron que la fecha de pesca debería ser
una información de carácter voluntario. Esto puede suponer un fuerte contratiempo para la pesca europea
mediterránea, que basa su negocio en el producto fresco del día y para el consumidor, quien, de ser aprobado tal y
como los ministros acordaron, no estará bien informado. Otras alternativas propuestas en su momento por el
Consejo fueron las de obligar a informar de la fecha de desembarque.

Si no se obliga a poner en el etiquetado la fecha de pesca, se producirá una clara desinformación para el consumidor.
No obligando a etiquetar, tal y como propone el Consejo, el consumidor puede pensar que está comprando un
pescado del día y verse inducido a comprar algo que tal vez no querría comprar.

A la luz de lo anterior y ante la importancia de ofrecer una información lo más rigurosa posible,

1. ¿Cree el Consejo que la información sobre la fecha de pesca no es relevante respecto a la información al
consumidor?

2. ¿Cree el Consejo que es lo mismo, en términos de información en el etiquetado para el consumidor y de rigor
informativo, decir que un pez ha sido pescado hace dos semanas o hace unas horas?

3. ¿Cree el Consejo que lo aprobado en el último Consejo de Ministros favorece los intereses de los pescadores de
la flota mediterránea?

**Respuesta**
_(17 de septiembre de 2013)_

En mayo de 2013, el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo llegaron a un acuerdo sobre la propuesta de Reglamento del
mercado común de los productos de la pesca y de la acuicultura.

En cuanto a la indicación de las fechas de captura, el Consejo, de acuerdo con la posición del Parlamento Europeo, no
estuvo a favor de la indicación obligatoria de fechas de captura, como había propuesto inicialmente la Comisión. El
Consejo consideró que la información obligatoria sobre las fechas de captura podría interpretarse erróneamente
como equivalente a la información sobre la calidad del producto. Ello podría tener un efecto engañoso, debido a que
la calidad del pescado en términos de frescura depende de una variedad de factores, siendo el más importante la forma
en que ha sido manipulado y almacenado después de la captura.

La solución transaccional alcanzada sobre la propuesta de Reglamento del mercado común de la pesca y de la
acuicultura sirve tanto a los intereses de las flotas pesqueras del Mediterráneo y otras flotas de la Unión, en particular
mediante la mejora de su organización interna para satisfacer las demandas del mercado y la sostenibilidad, como a
los de los consumidores.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 459

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006053/13**

**to the Council**
**Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE) and Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Consumer information

The proposal agreed at the most recent meeting of the Council of Fisheries Ministers fails to make compulsory
labelling information to facilitate the identification of local fishery products, a necessary measure being sought by the
general public and the inshore fisheries sector, and accepts that catch date indications should be voluntary. This is a
major setback for the European Mediterranean fisheries sector, which is basically concerned with the freshness of its
products and placing fish caught the same day in the hands of consumers, who, if the proposal agreed by the
Ministers is adopted, will not be properly informed. Alternatives considered by the Council included compulsory
landing date indications.

If, under the Council proposal, catch date indications on labelling are not compulsory, this could obviously result in
consumers being misinformed and possibly misled into purchasing fish they would not otherwise want, being under
the impression that it was caught the same day.

In view of this and given the importance of ensuring that the relevant information is as accurate as possible:

1. Does the Council consider catch dates irrelevant for consumer information purposes?

2. Does the Council consider it immaterial whether fish were caught two weeks ago or a few hours ago for the
purposes of accurate consumer information on labelling?

3. Does the Council consider the proposal agreed at the most recent meeting of the Council of Ministers to be in
the interests of Mediterranean fishing fleets?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

In May 2013, the European Parliament and the Council reached agreement on the proposal for a common market
Regulation for fisheries and aquaculture products.

With regard to the indication of catch dates, the Council, in line with the European Parliament's position, was not in
favour of mandatory indication of catch dates, as initially proposed by the Commission. The Council considered that
mandatory information on catch dates could be misinterpreted as being equivalent to informing about the quality of
the product. This could have a misleading effect, because the quality of the fish in terms of freshness depends on a
variety of factors, most importantly how it has been handled and stored after being caught.

The compromise reached on the proposal for a common market Regulation for fisheries and aquaculture products
serves both the interests of Mediterranean and other Union fishing fleets, in particular by improving their internal
organisation to meet market and sustainability demands, and those of the consumer.

C 42 E / 460 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006055/13**

**an die Kommission**

**Jo Leinen (S&D)**

_(30. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Verklappung von Atommüll

Mehr als 100 000 Tonnen radioaktiver Abfälle liegen auf dem Meeresgrund vor Europa. Durch Schäden an den
Fässern gelangen radioaktive Stoffe in die Meere. Die Verklappung von Atommüll hat sich zu einer enormen
Umweltbedrohung entwickelt, deren Auswirkungen die nationale Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten übersteigen.

Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Plant die Kommission europäische Maßnahmen bezüglich der Verklappung von Atommüll?

2. Inwiefern sollen die Verursacher zur Bergung der Abfälle verpflichtet werden?

**Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission**

_(19. Juli 2013)_

Die Kommission verweist den Herrn Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-004528/13 von
Frau Sabine Wils.

Die Kommission hat die Strahlengefährdung der Europäischen Union durch Radioaktivität in nordeuropäischen
Meeren in einer Studie untersucht ( [1] ). Außerdem beteiligt sie sich an den Arbeiten des OSPAR ( [2] )-Ausschusses für
radioaktive Stoffe und verfolgt sie die damit zusammenhängenden Arbeiten im Rahmen anderer regionaler
Meeresschutzkonventionen und der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) MARINA II, 2003. Aktualisierung des MARINA-Projekts über die Strahlengefährdung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften durch Radioaktivität in

nordeuropäischen Meeren; Europäische Kommission, Strahlenschutz, Veröffentlichungen, Nr. 132, 2003:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/radprot

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Das Übereinkommen zum Schutz der Meeresumwelt des Nordostatlantiks oder OSPAR-Übereinkommen ist der Rechtsakt, mit dem derzeit die

internationale Zusammenarbeit für den Umweltschutz im Nordostatlantik geregelt wird. Das OSPAR-Übereinkommen trat am 25. März 1998 in
Kraft.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 461

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006055/13**

**to the Commission**

**Jo Leinen (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Dumping of nuclear waste at sea

Over 100 000 tonnes of radioactive waste are lying on the seabed off Europe’s coasts. Radioactive substances are
leaking into the sea as a result of damage to the drums in which the waste is stored. The ocean dumping of nuclear
waste now constitutes an enormous threat to the environment which individual Member States are not in a position
to tackle at national level.

1. Does the Commission intend to take action at European level with regard to the dumpingof nuclear waste at
sea?

2. To what extent should the polluters be required to recover the waste they have dumped?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its reply to Written Question E-004528/13 by
Sabine Wils.

The Commission has carried out a study on the radiological exposure of the European Union from radioactivity in
North European marine waters ( [1] ). It also participates in the work of the OSPAR ( [2] ) Radioactive Substances
Committee and follows related work under other regional marine conventions and the International Atomic Energy
Agency.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) MARINA II, 2003. Update of the MARINA Project on the radiological exposure of the European Community from radioactivity in North

European marine waters; .
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/radprot, European Commission, Radiation Protection 132, 2003.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, or OSPAR Convention, is the current legislative

instrument regulating international cooperation on environmental protection in the North-East Atlantic. The OSPAR Convention entered into
force on March 25, 1998.

( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 462 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Dansk udgave)_

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-006056/13**

**til Kommissionen**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(30. maj 2013)_

_Om:_ Regler vedrørende gaver fra virksomheder, der leverer lægemidler og medicinsk udstyr

Der er givet udtryk for bekymring over forskellene i reglerne for, hvad sundhedspersonale må modtage (i form af
gaver, frokoster, invitationer osv.) fra selskaber, der leverer lægemidler, medicinsk udstyr mv.

Kommissionen bedes i denne forbindelse besvare følgende spørgsmål:

1. Hvilke regler, om nogen, eksisterer der på EU-plan for, hvilke gaver, invitationer osv. sundhedspersonale må
modtage fra selskaber, der leverer lægemidler og medicinsk udstyr?

2. Er der forskelle i reglerne for, hvad der må modtages fra virksomheder, der leverer lægemidler, og
virksomheder, der leverer medicinsk udstyr? I bekræftende fald hvilke?

3. Hvilke medlemsstater har regler på dette område, og hvilke har ikke?

4. Hvad er reglerne i de enkelte medlemsstater?

5. Har Kommissionen planer om at behandle dette spørgsmål?

**Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg**

_(24. juli 2013)_

I henhold til EU-lovgivningen betragtes enhver form for holdningspåvirkning fra en lægemiddelvirksomhed, der tager
sigte på at fremme ordinering, udlevering, salg eller forbrug af lægemidler, som reklame og er underlagt strenge regler
(artikel 86-100 i direktiv 2001/83/EF) ( [1] ).

Præmier, pekuniære fordele eller fordele i form af naturalier i forbindelse med fremme af salg af lægemidler er
omfattet af artikel 94 og 95 i nævnte direktiv. Lægemiddelvirksomheder må kun tilbyde eller love disse incitamenter
til sundhedspersoner, hvis de er af ubetydelig værdi og relevante for udøvelsen af læge‐ eller apotekergerningen.
Endvidere bør repræsentation i forbindelse med salgsfremme og videnskabelige arrangementer altid begrænses til
selve arrangementet og ikke udvides til at omfatte andre end sundhedspersoner.

Disse bestemmelser skulle gennemføres af medlemsstaterne. Det er de nationale myndigheders pligt at overvåge
overholdelsen.

Desuden fremmede Kommissionen inden for rammerne af CSR-processen på lægemiddelområdet arbejdet i
platformen for etik og gennemsigtighed i lægemiddelsektoren (Platform on Ethics and Transparency in the
pharmaceutical sector). Platformen var baseret på frivillig deltagelse af og samarbejde mellem interesserede parter, der
repræsenterer offentlige myndigheder, betalere, sundhedspersonale, patienter og industri. I efteråret 2012 nåede de til
enighed om en »List of Guiding Principles Promoting Good Governance in the Pharmaceutical Sector« (liste over
retningslinjer for god forvaltningspraksis i lægemiddelsektoren), som ganske vist ikke er juridisk bindende, men
omhandler en række spørgsmål ud over bilaterale forbindelser mellem berørte parter ( [2] ).

Endelig er det sådan, at den sektorspecifikke lovgivning om medicinsk udstyr ikke indeholder særlige regler om
reklamer. I stedet finder generelle regler anvendelse, såsom direktiv 2005/29/EF ( [3] ) om virksomheders urimelige
handelspraksis over for forbrugerne.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) EFT L 311 af 28.11.2001, s. 67.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/outcomes_et_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) L 149 af 11.6.2005, s. 22.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 463

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006056/13**

**to the Commission**
**Anna Rosbach (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rules regarding gifts from companies in the pharmaceutical and medical devices sectors

Concerns have been raised about the differences in rules regarding what healthcare practitioners may receive (in the
form of gifts, lunches, invitations, etc.) from companies providing pharmaceuticals, medical devices and so on.

In this regard, could the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What rules, if any, exist at EU level regarding the types of gifts, invitations, etc. which healthcare practitioners
may receive from companies supplying pharmaceuticals and medical devices?

2. Are there differences in the rules regarding what may be received from companies supplying pharmaceuticals
and companies supplying medical devices? If so, what are they?

3. Which Member States have rules on this issue and which do not?

4. What are the rules in each of the Member States?

5. Is the Commission planning to address this issue?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

Under EU legislation, any inducement by a pharmaceutical company designed to promote the prescription, supply,
sale or consumption of medicinal product is considered as advertising and subject to strict rules (Articles 86-100 of
Directive 2001/83/EC) ( [1] ).

Gifts, pecuniary advantages or benefits in the context of the promotion of medicinal products are covered by
Articles 94 and 95 of that directive. Pharmaceutical companies can only offer or promise these incentives to
healthcare professionals if they are inexpensive and relevant to the practice of medicine or pharmacy. Besides,
hospitality offered at sales promotion and scientific events should always be limited to the purpose of the event and
not be extended to non-healthcare professionals.

These provisions had to be implemented by Member States. It is the obligation of national authorities to monitor
compliance.

Moreover, in the framework of the Process on Corporate Responsibility in the field of Pharmaceuticals, the
Commission facilitated the work of the Platform on Ethics and Transparency in the pharmaceutical sector. The
Platform was based on volunteer participation and cooperation of interested stakeholders representing public
authorities, payers, health professionals, patients and industry. In autumn 2012, they reached an agreement on a list
of ‘Guiding Principles promoting good governance in the pharmaceutical sector’ which, although not legally binding,
address various issues beyond bilateral relationships between stakeholders ( [2] ).

Finally, the sector legislation on medical devices does not contain specific rules on advertising. Instead, general rules
apply, such as Directive 2005/29/EC ( [3] ) concerning unfair business to consumer commercial practices.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 311/67 28.11.2001.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/outcomes_et_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 149/22 11.6.2005.

C 42 E / 464 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006057/13**

**to the Commission**

**Jim Higgins (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU bathing water quality standards

New and stricter EU bathing water quality standards have been introduced which, I understand, have led to the loss of
the Blue Flags at the Lahinch and White Strand beaches in County Clare, Ireland. An Taisce, the National Trust for
Ireland, has admitted that the two beaches have wrongly been stripped of their Blue Flag status, but says that the
decision cannot be reversed at state level and that a change at EU level is required. It is believed that a ‘mathematical
anomaly’ in the new evaluation method has caused the two beaches to lose their Blue Flag status. The loss of the flags
is of real concern to the tourism industry in County Clare.

Does the Commission plan to review the methods used to determine Blue Flag status, having learned that the Lahinch
and White Strand beaches fail to meet the new, strict criteria despite their excellent water quality?

What advice does the Commission offer to operators of beaches that have wrongly been stripped of their Blue Flag
status?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

According to the assessment recently published by the European Environment Agency ( [1] ), in 2012 the quality of the
bathing water at the sites mentioned by the Honorable MEP was excellent. Member States and the Commission
cooperate to ensure that the assessment takes place as prescribed by the directive concerning the management of
bathing water quality ( [2] ).

The ‘Blue Flag’ scheme is not an EU scheme. ‘Blue Flags’ are awarded by a private organisation to bathing water
operators, as part of a voluntary scheme to which Ireland adheres. The Commission does not see any need to regulate
a process which essentially relies on a private agreement.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/status-and-monitoring/state-of-bathing-water/bathing-water-data-viewer
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2006/7, OJ L 64/37, 4.3.2006.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 465

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006058/13**

**à la Commission**
**Patrice Tirolien (S&D)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Sécurité alimentaire en Europe

Le Sénat français a adopté le 21 mai dernier une proposition de loi «visant à garantir la qualité de l'offre alimentaire en
Outre-mer», mettant fin à des décennies de pratiques alimentaires discriminantes pour les départements d'outre-mer
français. Elles permettaient en effet la commercialisation de produits à plus forte teneur en sucre ainsi qu'une date
limite de péremption plus allongée en Outre-mer qu'en métropole. Par exemple, un soda à l'orange vendu à La
Réunion peut contenir jusqu'à 47 % en plus de sucre par rapport au même soda vendu en métropole.

Ces pratiques ont évidemment des incidences directes sur la santé. Des études soulignent la fréquence du surpoids, de
l'obésité et du diabète chez les populations ultramarines avec une prévalence de l'obésité de 22 % en Martinique et de
23 % en Guadeloupe, contre 14,5 % en métropole, touchant en particulier les femmes et les enfants (9 % des enfants
seraient obèses en Guadeloupe et en Martinique, contre 3,5 % dans l'Hexagone).

En outre, selon V. Lurel, ministre de l'Outre-mer, plus de 300 produits frais font l'objet d'une date limite de
consommation (DCL) différenciée. Il prend l'exemple des yaourts, dont certains ont une DLC de 30 jours à Paris et de
cinquante jours outre-mer, ou d'un sachet de gruyère râpé avec une DLC de quarante jours en métropole et cent
quatre-vingts jours en outre-mer.

À ces pratiques discriminantes, aucune justification objective n'est donnée par les industriels, qui évoquent le «goût»
des ultramarins pour le sucre.

À l'échelle de l'Union européenne, il est commun pour les industriels d'adapter leurs recettes en fonction de
prétendues «préférences locales». Aucune législation alimentaire commune n'assure une harmonie dans la
composition des produits transformés industrialisés au niveau européen.

Dès lors, la Commission entend-elle mener des études sur la composition des produits alimentaires industriels en
fonction de leur destination?

Quelle initiative la Commission entend-elle introduire afin d'harmoniser et assurer les meilleurs standards qualitatifs
des produits alimentaires industriels vendus en Europe?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(23 juillet 2013)_

Aucune législation réglementant la composition des aliments en établissant des normes qualitatives n'est en place
dans l'Union européenne, à part pour certains aliments destinés à une alimentation particulière et certains produits
agricoles. Le règlement «OCM unique» ( [1] ) prévoit, entre autres, des instruments juridiques pour réglementer la mise
sur le marché et la dénomination du lait et des produits laitiers dans le but de protéger le consommateur et d'établir
des conditions de concurrence loyale entre les produits laitiers et les produits concurrents. En ce qui concerne les
matières grasses tartinables, les normes de commercialisation établissent une classification claire et distincte sur la
base des exigences en matière de composition.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Règlement (CE) n [o] 1234/2007 du Conseil du 22 octobre 2007 portant organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur agricole et dispositions
spécifiques en ce qui concerne certains produits de ce secteur (règlement «OCM unique»).

C 42 E / 466 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Pour l'instant, la Commission n'entend pas réaliser d'études sur la composition des produits alimentaires industriels
du point de vue de leur qualité en fonction de leur destination. Dès lors que les produits sont sûrs, ce qui est une
exigence légale fondamentale, elle estime que le consommateur devrait avoir la possibilité de choisir entre différents
produits alimentaires pouvant avoir des compositions différentes. La Commission considère toutefois que les
citoyens devraient disposer d'informations relatives à la composition en nutriments des aliments, afin qu'ils puissent
faire un choix en connaissance de cause. Le règlement (UE) 1169/2011 ( [2] ) introduira un étiquetage nutritionnel
obligatoire, qui contiendra des informations sur la teneur en sucre des aliments.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Règlement (UE) n [o] 1169/2011 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 25 octobre 2011 concernant l'information des consommateurs sur les

denrées alimentaires, modifiant les règlements (CE) n [o] 1924/2006 et (CE) n [o] 1925/2006 du Parlement européen et du Conseil et abrogeant la
directive 87/250/CEE de la Commission, la directive 90/496/CEE du Conseil, la directive 1999/10/CE de la Commission, la directive 2000/13/CE
du Parlement européen et du Conseil, les directives 2002/67/CE et 2008/5/CE de la Commission et le règlement (CE) n [o] 608/2004 de la
Commission, JO L 304 du 22.11.2011, p. 18. Le nouveau règlement entrera en vigueur le 13 décembre 2014.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 467

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006058/13**

**to the Commission**
**Patrice Tirolien (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Food security in Europe

On 21 May, the French Senate adopted a bill ‘seeking to ensure the quality of the food supply in the overseas
territories’, putting an end to decades of discriminatory practices for the French overseas departments. These practices
allowed the sale of products with a higher level of sugar as well as a longer expiry date in the overseas territories
compared with mainland France. For example, a fizzy orange drink sold in Réunion may contain up to 47% more
sugar than the same fizzy drink sold in mainland France.

These practices clearly have a direct effect on health. Studies underline the frequency of excess weight, obesity and
diabetes in the overseas populations, with a prevalence of obesity of 22% in Martinique and 23% in Guadeloupe,
compared with 14.5% in mainland France. Women and children are particularly affected (9% of children in
Guadeloupe and in Martinique are thought to be obese, compared with 3.5% in metropolitan France).

Furthermore, according to Victorin Lurel, the French Minister for Overseas Territories, over 300 fresh products have a
differentiated use-by date. He gives yoghurts as an example, some of which have a use-by date of 30 days in Paris and
50 days in the overseas territories, or packets of grated Gruyère cheese, with a use-by date of 40 days on the mainland
and 180 days overseas.

Producers do not provide any objective justification for these discriminatory practices, mentioning overseas
territories citizens’ ‘liking’ for sugar.

At EU level, it is common practice for manufacturers to adapt their recipes to supposed ‘local preferences’. No
common food legislation ensures the harmonised composition of industrial processed products at EU level.

Will the Commission therefore carry out studies into the composition of industrial foodstuffs according to their
destination?

What action will the Commission take to harmonise and guarantee the highest qualitative standards for industrial
foodstuffs sold in Europe?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

In the EU, there is no legislation in place to regulate the composition of foods concerning qualitative standards, apart
from the case of certain foods for particular nutritional uses and a number of agricultural products. The Single CMO
Regulation ( [1] ) provides, among others, for legal instruments to regulate the marketing and designation of milk and
milk products with a view to protect the consumer and establish conditions of fair competition between milk
products and competing products. With regard to spreadable fats, marketing standards are laid down with a clear and
distinct classification based on compositional requirements.

For the time being, the Commission does not intend to carry out studies into the composition of industrial foodstuffs
concerning their quality according to their destination. Provided that the food is safe, which is a basic legal
requirement, the Commission believes that the consumer should be able to choose between different food products
which may have different compositions. However, the Commission believes that citizens should be provided with
relevant information on nutrient composition of foods so that they can make informed choices. Regulation (EU)
1169/2011 ( [2] ) will introduce mandatory nutrition labelling, including information about the sugar content of foods.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific

provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to

consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council. Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304,
22.11.2011, p. 18. The new regulation will enter into application on 13 December 2014.

( **|**

C 42 E / 468 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006059/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(30 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Taxatie

De onderhandelingen rond de EU-spaarrichtlijn zitten in een belangrijke fase. De uitwisseling van informatie rond in
het buitenland verkregen inkomsten tussen belastingsautoriteiten is een cruciaal instrument in een effectieve aanpak
van fiscale fraude. Mag de informatie, ontvangen in het kader van de spaarrichtlijn, uitsluitend gebruikt worden met
het oog op de effectieve belasting van rente-inkomsten of ook ruimer (zoals de informatie op basis van de wederzijdse
bijstandsrichtlijn)? Indien de informatie uitsluitend gebruikt mag worden met het oog op de effectieve belasting van
rente-inkomsten, is het dan niet aangewezen de spaarrichtlijn te integreren in het gewijzigde voorstel op de
wederzijdse bijstandsrichtlijn waaraan de Commissie nu werkt?

**Antwoord van de heer Šemeta namens de Commissie**

_(25 juli 2013)_

Inlichtingen die op grond van de EU‐spaarrichtlijn ( [1] ) worden uitgewisseld, kunnen in dezelfde mate worden gebruikt
door de belastingdiensten als inlichtingen die op grond van Richtlijn 2011/16/EU van de Raad betreffende de
administratieve samenwerking op het gebied van de belastingen ( [2] ) worden uitgewisseld. Dit blijkt zowel uit de
overwegingen als de bewoordingen van artikel 9 van de EU‐spaarrichtlijn ( [3] ).

Toen de EU‐spaarrichtlijn werd vastgesteld, betekende dit een aanzienlijke innovatie in alle aspecten van de
inlichtingenuitwisseling. Wat de onder haar toepassingsgebied vallende inkomsten betreft, zijn de beperkingen
opgeheven die op grond van artikel 8 van Richtlijn 77/799/EEG golden. Bovendien is de uitwisseling van inlichtingen
voor deze inkomsten voor het eerst _verplicht_ gesteld.

De vervanging van Richtlijn 77/799/EEG door de richtlijn betreffende de administratieve samenwerking heeft
essentiële verbeteringen met zich meegebracht, met name wat het bankgeheim en het opheffen van de begrenzingen
aan de uitwisseling betreft. Het door de Commissie op 12 juni vastgestelde voorstel tot wijziging van de richtlijn
betreffende de administratieve samenwerking houdt een uitbreiding van de automatische uitwisseling van
inlichtingen in naar bijkomende inkomstencategorieën, maar het stelt geen geharmoniseerde procedures vast voor de
verzameling van de uit te wisselen inlichtingen. Dit is een fundamenteel verschil tussen de richtlijn betreffende de
administratieve samenwerking en de EU‐spaarrichtlijn.

Omdat de lidstaten bovendien al grotendeels overeenstemming hebben bereikt over de technische wijzigingen om
de EU‐spaarrichtlijn te verbeteren terwijl de gesprekken op het niveau van de Raad over het voorstel tot wijziging van
de richtlijn betreffende de administratieve samenwerking nog maar net begonnen zijn, is elke poging om de twee
wetteksten te combineren onpraktisch. Het gevolg zou goed mogelijk kunnen zijn dat de vaststelling van deze twee
instrumenten, die beide even noodzakelijk zijn in de strijd tegen belastingfraude en ‐ontduiking, wordt vertraagd.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Richtlijn 2003/48/EG van de Raad van 3 juni 2003 betreffende belastingheffing op inkomsten uit spaargelden in de vorm van rentebetaling.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Richtlijn 2011/16/EU van de Raad van 15 februari 2011 betreffende de administratieve samenwerking op het gebied van de belastingen en tot

intrekking van Richtlijn 77/799/EEG.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Overeenkomstig artikel 28 van de richtlijn betreffende de administratieve samenwerking, gelden alle verwijzingen in de tekst van de EU‐

spaarrichtlijn naar de ingetrokken Richtlijn 77/799/EEG als verwijzingen naar de richtlijn betreffende de administratieve samenwerking.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 469

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006059/13**

**to the Commission**
**Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Valuation

The negotiations on the EU Savings Directive are in an important phase. The exchange of information about income
earned abroad between tax authorities is a key instrument in an effective approach to tax fraud. Does information
received in the framework of the Savings Directive have to be used exclusively for the purpose of effective taxation of
interest income or can it be used more broadly (such as information on the basis of the Mutual Assistance Directive)?
If information may only be used for the purpose of effective taxation of interest income, would it not be appropriate
to integrate the Savings Directive in the amended proposal for the Mutual Assistance Directive on which the
Commission is currently working?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

Information exchanged under the Savings Directive (EUSD ( [1] )) can be used by tax administrations to the same extent
as information exchanged under Council Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation in the field of
taxation (DAC ( [2] )). That stems from both the recitals and the wording of Article 9 of the EUSD ( [3] ).

At the time of its adoption, the EUSD constituted a major innovation in all aspects of information exchange,
eliminating, with regards to income covered by its scope, the limitations to the exchange of information that were
established under Article 8 of Directive 77/799/EEC and, for the first time, making exchange of information
_mandatory_ for that income.

The replacement of Directive 77/799/EEC by the DAC brought key improvements, notably in relation to banking
secrecy and the elimination of the limitations on exchange. The proposal for amendment of the DAC adopted by the
Commission on 12 June, extends automatic exchange of information to additional categories of income but does not
establish harmonised procedures under which the collection of the information to be exchanged must take place. This
is a fundamental difference between the DAC and the EUSD.

Also, because the technical amendments to enhance the EUSD have already been substantially agreed by Member
States, while discussions at Council level on the proposal to amend the DAC are just starting, any attempt to combine
the two legal texts would be impractical and have the likely result of delaying the adoption of both instruments which
are equally necessary for the fight against tax fraud and evasion.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) As per Article 28 of the DAC, all references made in the text of the EUSD to the repealed Directive 77/799/EEC shall be considered as made to the

DAC.

C 42 E / 470 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006060/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(30 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Контрол на таксите, налагани от търговските вериги спрямо българските производители

Политиката за насърчаване на единен вътрешен пазар обхваща както границите на Европейския съюз в цялост, така и
икономическото пространство във всяка отделна държава членка. От тази гледна точка отношенията между

чуждестранните търговски мрежи и националните производители следва да подлежи на регламентация с цел защита
на конкуренцията. Въпреки че България е обвързана от правилата на конкуренцията на Съюза чрез своя национален
орган — Комисия за защита на конкуренцията, от 2011 г. насам в държавата ни се водят дела по обвинения за
картелни споразумения между пет от големите хранителни вериги. За да бъде представена българска стока в тези

търговски вериги, от производителите се иска заплащане на множество и високи такси, което ограничава достъпа на
малкия и среден бизнес до търговския обмен.

Следва ли да бъдат взети мерки за контрол спрямо произвола на монополните хранителни вериги за налагане на
различни такси и тарифи спрямо българските производители?

**Отговор, даден от г-н Aлмуния от името на Комисията**

_(5 август 2013 г.)_

Съгласно Регламент 1/2003 на Съвета Комисията и националните органи за защита на конкуренцията (НОК)
разполагат с паралелни правомощия и прилагат правилата за конкуренция на ЕС в тясно сътрудничество, а именно в
рамките на Европейската мрежа по конкуренция. В рамките на тази мрежа както НОК, така и Комисията, работят
в правилната посока, за да осигурят последователно и съгласувано прилагане на правото на ЕС.

Както подчертава уважаемият член на Парламента, българският орган за защита на конкуренцията вече разследва
предполагаем картел на българския пазар за хранителни стоки на дребно. Доколкото българските власти прилагат
член 101 или член 102 от Договора, Комисията има правомощието да следи случая отблизо.

Що се отнася до въпроса на уважаемия член на Парламента относно действия на Комисията с цел уреждане на въпроса,
свързан с „произвола на монополните хранителни вериги за налагане на различни такси и тарифи спрямо българските
производители“, Комисията предприе различни инициативи за оценяване на последствията от прилагането на
правилата относно нелоялните търговски практики в различни държави членки, включително и в България.

В този контекст Комисията прие Зелена книга относно нелоялните търговски практики ( [1] ) по веригата за доставки на
хранителни и нехранителни стоки, за да събере информация относно проблема, неговото отражение и възможните
решения. Въз основа на Зелената книга започна обществена консултация. В допълнение към това службите на
Комисията започнаха работа по извършването на анализ на въздействието с цел да се определи най-удачният начин за
справяне с нелоялните търговски практики. В тази оценка на въздействието внимателно ще бъде разгледано
отражението на тези практики върху различните участници във веригата на за доставки на хранителни стоки в Европа.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Вж. СОМ(2013) 37 „Зелена книга относно нелоялните търговски практики по веригата за доставки на хранителни и нехранителни стоки между
стопански обекти в Европа“.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 471

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006060/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Regulation of charges applied by chain stores to Bulgarian producers

The policy on a single internal market covers both the area within the borders of the European Union as a whole and
the economic space within each individual Member State. From that standpoint, the relationship between
international trading networks and national producers should be subject to regulation in the interests of protecting
competition. Although Bulgaria is subject to EU competition rules through the offices of its Commission for the
Protection of Competition, legal proceedings have been in progress there since 2011 over alleged cartel agreements
between five major food chains. In order for Bulgarian goods to be marketed through these retail chains, producers
are being asked to make multiple payments of high charges, which limits SMEs’ ability to participate in this trade.

Should action not be taken to regulate the arbitrary application by monopolistic food chains of various charges and
tariffs to Bulgarian producers?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 August 2013)_

Pursuant to Council Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the National Competition Authorities (‘NCAs’) have
parallel competences and apply EU competition rules in close cooperation, namely in the framework of the European
Competition Network. Within this network, both the NCAs and the Commission make appropriate efforts to ensure
the consistent and coherent application of EC law.

As the Honourable Member points out, the Bulgarian Competition Authority is already investigating an alleged cartel
on the Bulgarian food retail market. To the extent the Bulgarian authorities are applying Articles 101 or 102 of the
Treaty, the Commission is empowered to monitor the case closely.

As to the Honourable Member's question on Commission actions to regulate ‘the arbitrary application by
monopolistic food chains of various charges and tariffs to Bulgarian producers’ the Commission has taken various
initiatives to assess the implication of rules on unfair trading practices in various Member States including Bulgaria.

In this context the Commission has adopted a Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices ( [1] ) in the food and non-food
supply chain, in order to gather evidence on the problem, its effects and possible resolutions. A public consultation
has been launched on the basis of the Green Paper. In addition, the Commission services has also started to work on
an impact analysis assessing how the question of unfair trading practices could be best dealt with. This Impact
Assessment will carefully consider the effects of such practices on various players in the food-supply chain in Europe.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Cf. COM(2013) 37 ‘Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food Supply Chain In Europe’.

C 42 E / 472 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006061/13**

**до Комисията**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(30 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Влизане на България и Румъния в Шенген

От самото начало на преговорите за присъединяване към Европейския съюз, започнали през декември 1999 г., за
България и Румъния се говори като за страни, които вървят в „пакет“. Когато става въпрос за приемането на държавите в
Шенген, отново се говори за страните като за неразривно цяло. Планирано бе разширяването на Шенгенската зона да
се разгледа на срещата на вътрешните министри на ЕС на 7 март 2013 г. Решението беше отложено за края на годината.
Съмнения за готовността на България и Румъния, които се отнасят до подозрения за силна корупция и слаба съдебна
система, са изразили вътрешните министри на Германия, Финландия, Австрия и Холандия. След тези събития
в „Юрактив“ бяха тиражирани мненията на двама немски евродепутати, Манфред Вебер и Маркус Фербер, че
румънското правителство бави своето и членството на България в Шенгенското пространство. Според Вебер Румъния
не е била продуктивна в изпълнение на нормите и така блокирала България. В Брюксел Вебер казва още, че България и
Румъния винаги вървят „ръка за ръка“.

Целесъобразно ли е двете държави членки да вървят в пакет, като се вземе предвид различното им състояние
в икономически и политически план?

**Отговор, даден от г-жа Малмстрьом от името на Комисията**

_(18 юли 2013 г.)_

България и Румъния не са правно обвързани една с друга по отношение на пълноправното им присъединяване към
Шенгенското пространство. Всяка от държавите се оценява въз основа на постигнатите от нея резултати.

И все пак съществуват значителни предимства от присъединяването на съседни държави към Шенгенското
пространство по едно и също време, тъй като така се избягват загуби, свързани с инвестиции на общата им граница,
която след присъединяването става вътрешна граница. Ако България се присъедини преди Румъния, тя ще трябва да
контролира надхвърлящата 500 km граница с Румъния по продължението на река Дунав в съответствие с Шенгенските
изисквания. Този контрол ще бъде проверяван чрез извършването на оценка по Шенген.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 473

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006061/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Bulgaria's and Romania's entry to Schengen

Right from the outset, in December 1999, of the negotiations about Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the
European Union, the two countries have been deemed to ‘come as a package’. When the question of their joining the
Schengen Area arose, they were once again lumped together as an entity. The expansion of the Schengen Area was
discussed at the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council on 7 March 2013 but the Ministers postponed their decision
until the end of the year. The German, Finnish, Austrian and the Dutch Ministers expressed doubts — centring on
suspicions of corruption and on judicial system deficiencies — about Bulgaria’s and Romania’s readiness.
Subsequently the EurActiv website published the views of two German MEPs, Manfred Weber and Markus Ferber, to
the effect that the Romanian Government was holding up Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen. According
to Weber, Romania had failed to make progress on meeting the requisite standards and was thus blocking the way for
Bulgaria. Speaking in Brussels, Weber also said that Bulgaria and Romania always ‘come as a package’.

Is it advisable for the two Member States to be paired in this way, given that their economic and political situations are
different?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

Bulgaria and Romania are not legally tied to each other as regards their full accession to Schengen. Each country is
evaluated on its own merits.

There are, however, considerable advantages if neighbouring countries join the Schengen area at the same time, in
order to avoid investment losses at their common border, which would become an internal border after accession. If
Bulgaria were to join before Romania, Bulgaria would need to control its more than 500 km long border with
Romania along the Danube River in line with the Schengen requirements, which would need to be verified through a
Schengen evaluation.

C 42 E / 474 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006062/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Protection des lévriers

Depuis l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, l'article 13 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne
prévoit que tous les animaux sont considérés comme des êtres sensibles: nous devons apporter une entière attention à
leurs besoins et à leur bien-être et ceci doit être accompli par tous les moyens appropriés et disponibles.

En ce qui concerne les lévriers, il existe des réglementations nationales et une autorégulation par l'industrie. Malgré
tout, des milliers de lévriers subissent encore un sort terrible. Beaucoup sont élevés puis cruellement éliminés
lorsqu'ils ne sont plus jugés utiles.

1. Lorsque ces réglementations sont inexistantes, faibles ou inefficaces, comme c'est souvent le cas, que comptent
faire les autorités européennes pour mettre fin à cette barbarie?

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(5 juillet 2013)_

La Commission souhaite inviter l'Honorable Parlementaire à se reporter à sa réponse à la question E-006543/2011 ( [1] )
concernant également l'article 13 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, et rappeler ainsi qu'elle n'est
pas habilitée à prendre des dispositions réglementaires concernant le bien-être des animaux utilisés dans les activités
de sport ou de divertissement.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html .

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 475

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006062/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Protection of greyhounds

Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union specifies that all animals shall be considered as sentient beings: we must pay full regard to their needs and
welfare using all appropriate and available means.

National rules and self-regulation by the industry apply to the case of greyhounds. Nevertheless, thousands of
greyhounds still suffer a terrible fate. Many of them are bred then cruelly disposed of when they are no longer
considered useful.

1. Where these rules do not exist, are weak or ineffective, as is often the case, what do the EU authorities intend to
do to stop this barbarity?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 July 2013)_

The Commission would like to refer to its reply to Question E-006543/2011 ( [1] ) also concerning Article 13 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and thus reiterate that it has no competence to regulate the welfare
of animals used in sports or entertainment activities.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 42 E / 476 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006066/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Ventes d'iPhones

Plusieurs plaintes ont été déposées à propos de pratiques imputées à Apple, qui écarterait toute concurrence.

1. Selon la Commission, Apple jouit-il d'une position dominante sur le marché européen des téléphones
intelligents, malgré la popularité des modèles Galaxy de Samsung?

2. La Commission estime-t-elle, comme le laissent entendre les plaintes déposées, qu'Apple a recours à des
pratiques non concurrentielles afin de favoriser les ventes de son iPhone sur le marché européen des téléphones
intelligents?

**Réponse donnée par M. Almunia au nom de la Commission**

_(23 juillet 2013)_

La Commission mène actuellement une enquête afin d'examiner si les pratiques de distribution d'Apple sont
susceptibles de conduire à l'éviction d'autres fabricants de téléphones mobiles du marché des téléphones intelligents,
en empêchant les opérateurs télécoms de promouvoir des téléphones concurrents.

L'enquête de la Commission a été déclenchée par des informations au sujet du comportement d'Apple provenant des
marchés. La Commission n'a reçu aucune plainte officielle.

À ce stade préliminaire de l'enquête, il est trop tôt pour tirer des conclusions sur l'existence d'une éventuelle position
dominante d'Apple, ou d'une possible violation des articles 101 ou 102 du TFUE par Apple.

De manière plus générale, la Commission suit de près l'évolution du marché des téléphones intelligents et interviendra
en cas d'indications de comportements anticoncurrentiels portant atteinte aux consommateurs.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 477

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006066/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ iPhone sales

Several complaints have been made about allegedly anti-competitive practices by Apple.

1. Does the Commission think that Apple occupies a dominant position in the European smartphone market,
despite the popularity of Samsung’s Galaxy smartphones?

2. Does the Commission think that Apple indulges in anti-competitive practices in order to boost sales of its
iPhone on the European smartphone market, as the complaints would suggest?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

The Commission is currently carrying out a fact-finding exercise to examine whether Apple's distribution practices
may be leading to the foreclosure of other handset manufacturers from the smartphones market, by preventing
telecoms operators from promoting competing handsets.

The Commission's fact-finding was triggered by market information regarding Apple's behaviour. The Commission
has not received any formal complaints.

At this preliminary stage of the investigation, it is too early to draw any conclusions on the existence of a possible
dominant position of Apple, or on whether Apple may be breaching Articles 101 or 102 TFEU.

More generally, the Commission is actively monitoring market developments regarding smartphones and will
intervene if there are indications of anti-competitive behaviour to the detriment of consumers.

C 42 E / 478 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006067/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Émissions de gaz à effet de serre

Les émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES) ont baissé de 3,3 % dans l'Union européenne en 2011. Avec une baisse de
18,4 % de ses émissions de GES en 2011 par rapport à 1990 (année de référence choisie par la communauté
internationale), l'UE est donc en passe d'atteindre très aisément ses objectifs de réduction de 20 % à l'horizon 2020. La
baisse des émissions de gaz à effet de serre en 2011 est une bonne nouvelle. Cependant, elle est largement imputable à
un hiver plus doux, et donc à moins d'énergie consommée pour se chauffer.

1. La consommation de combustibles fossiles a diminué de 5 % dans l'UE en 2011. Ce bon chiffre masque
cependant une augmentation de la consommation (+ 2 %) de charbon et de lignite, les plus gros émetteurs de CO 2,
ainsi qu'une baisse de la consommation de gaz de 11 %. Sur la même période, le PIB a crû de 1,6 %. Qu'inspirent ces
chiffres à la Commission?

2. Que compte-t-elle faire pour lutter contre l'augmentation de la consommation de charbon et de lignite?

3. La Commission partage-t-elle l'avis que si l'Europe veut réussir une transition vers une société faiblement
carbonée, il lui faudra réaliser des investissements soutenus dans la technologie et l'innovation? Quelles sont les pistes
de la Commission dans ce domaine?

4. Par ailleurs, les rejets de GES liés au transport ont continué à baisser (- 1,2 %) pour la quatrième année
consécutive. En 2011, les deux plus gros pollueurs d'Europe sont l'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni, qui émettent à eux
deux un tiers des GES. La Commission compte-t-elle prendre des mesures à ce sujet?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Hedegaard au nom de la Commission**

_(19 juillet 2013)_

1. La réorientation de la consommation de gaz vers celle du charbon découle principalement de trois causes: 1) le
prix du gaz naturel n'a pas baissé dans l'Union européenne; 2) le prix des émissions de carbone est resté peu élevé en
raison de la crise économique et de dispositions réglementaires relatives au passage à la phase 3 du système d'échange
de quotas d'émission de l'UE (SEQE); 3) le prix du charbon a baissé dans la plupart des pays de l'UE, du fait des
importations de charbon à des prix concurrentiels.

2. Afin d'inciter davantage à la réalisation d'investissements sobres en carbone, la Commission s'est engagée
en 2012 à renforcer le système d'échange de quotas d'émission par une approche à deux volets: comme mesure à
court terme, elle a proposé un gel des quotas (c'est-à-dire de reporter une partie des mises aux enchères), et, comme
solution durable ( [1] ), elle a proposé une réforme structurelle; par ailleurs, la technologie du captage et du stockage du
carbone est essentielle pour obtenir une décarbonisation à moyen et à long terme.

3. La Commission a proposé que 35 % du budget du programme Horizon 2020 soit consacré à la recherche sur le
climat. Le programme NER300 en cours apporte des financements à des projets de démonstration à grande échelle
des technologies à faible intensité de carbone. À l'issue du premier appel à propositions, plus de 1,2 milliard d'euros a
été attribué à 23 projets, et le deuxième appel est actuellement en cours de réalisation. Le livre vert sur les politiques
en matière de climat et d'énergie à l'horizon 2030 ( [2] ) relève l'importance du soutien à l'innovation pour faire face au
changement climatique. De plus, la nécessité de réduire les coûts et d'accélérer l'innovation dans le domaine des
technologies à faible intensité de carbone a été soulignée dans une récente communication de la Commission sur les
technologies et l'innovation énergétiques ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012)416 et COM(2012)652.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013)169.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013)253.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 479

4. En 2011, le Royaume-Uni et l'Allemagne ont été à l'origine de moins de 30 % des émissions de gaz à effet de
serre (GES) du secteur des transports de l'UE; dans ces deux pays les émissions du secteur des transports
enregistrées en 2011 ont été inférieures à celles de 1990. Outre les politiques déjà mises en œuvre ou proposées en
vue de réduire les émissions ( [4] ), la Commission va continuer sa politique de poursuite de la décarbonisation des
transports, conformément aux objectifs exposés dans son livre blanc sur les transports ( [5] ).

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Comme l'inclusion du secteur de l'aviation dans le système d'échange de quotas, la fixation d'un objectif pour l'intensité de GES des combustibles

et pour l'efficacité des véhicules neufs, et une proposition récente concernant les émissions dues au transport maritime [COM(2013)480].

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) COM(2011)144.

( **|**

C 42 E / 480 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006067/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Greenhouse gas emissions

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions fell by 3.3% in the EU in 2011, making an aggregate decrease of 18.4% by
comparison with 1990, the base year chosen by the international community. The EU is therefore well on track to
achieve its objective of a 20% reduction by 2020. The 2011 fall in GHG emissions comes as welcome news, even
though it was due in large part to a mild winter, during which less energy was used for heating.

1. The EU’s consumption of fossil fuels fell by 5% in 2011. However, this encouraging figure masks a 2% rise in the
consumption of coal and lignite, which release more CO 2 than other types of fuel, and an 11% fall in gas
consumption. Over the same period GDP grew by 1.6%. What is the Commission’s response to these figures?

2. How does the Commission intend to tackle rising coal and lignite consumption?

3. Does it agree that Europe must invest substantially in technology and innovation if it is to make a successful
transition to a low‐carbon society? What measures is the Commission planning in this area?

4. Greenhouse gas emissions from transport have fallen (-1.2%) for the fourth consecutive year. Europe’s two
largest polluters in 2011 were Germany and the United Kingdom, which together account for two‐thirds of GHG
emissions. Does the Commission intend to take measures to address this state of affairs?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

1. The operational shift from gas to coal is mainly because: 1) natural gas prices remained high in the EU; 2)
carbon prices remained low due to the economic crisis and regulatory provisions related to the transition to phase 3
of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS); 3) coal prices decreased in most EU countries due to competitive coal
imports.

2. In order to better incentivise low-carbon investments, in 2012 the Commission undertook to strengthen the
ETS through a two-pronged approach. It proposed back-loading part of auctioning for the short term and structural
reform as a lasting solution ( [1] ). Furthermore, Carbon Capture and Storage is a key technology to contribute to
decarbonisation in the medium and long term.

3. The Commission proposed that 35% of the Horizon 2020 budget be spent on climate related research. The
current NER300 programme gives funding for large-scale demonstration of low carbon technologies. After the first
call for proposals, over EUR 1.2 billion was awarded to 23 projects and the second call is currently ongoing. The
2030 Green Paper on climate and energy policies ( [2] ) notes the importance of supporting innovation to tackle climate
change. Furthermore, the need to reduce costs and accelerate innovation in low carbon technologies is noted in a
recent Commission Communication on Energy Technologies and Innovation ( [3] ).

4. The UK and Germany contributed less than 30% of EU transport GHG emissions in 2011, and both countries’
transport emissions in 2011 were lower than in 1990. In addition to already implemented or proposed policies to
lower emissions ( [4] ), the Commission will pursue its policy on further decarbonising transport in line with the
objectives outlined in its Transport White Paper Transport ( [5] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

⋅5∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 416 and COM(2012) 652.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 169.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 253.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Such as the inclusion of aviation in the ETS, setting a target for GHG intensity of fuels and efficiency of new vehicles and a recent proposal on

shipping emissions (COM(2013) 480).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 144.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 481

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006068/13**

**à la Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Rachat de Skype par Microsoft

En mai 2011, Microsoft avait annoncé son intention de racheter Skype pour 8,5 milliards de dollars avec pour projet
d'intégrer la technologie au sein de ses divers services.

Depuis, Skype a remplacé Windows Live Messenger et s'est immiscé au sein d'Outlook, de Windows Phone ou de
la Xbox.

1. La Commission estime-t-elle que cette fusion pourrait faire craindre des effets anti-concurrentiels horizontaux
sur les marchés unifiés des télécommunications résidentielles?

2. Quels sont les arguments de la Commission?

3. Si l'on ne comptabilise que les utilisateurs de Windows, cette fusion conduit à la détention de parts de marché
cumulées de plus de 80 %. Cela ne va-t-il pas à l'encontre des textes européens?

**Réponse donnée par M. Almunia au nom de la Commission**

_(1_ _[er]_ _août 2013)_

La Commission a exposé sa position sur l'acquisition de Skype par Microsoft dans sa décision du 7 octobre 2011
autorisant l'opération de concentration dans l'affaire COMP/M.6281 Microsoft/Skype ( [1] ). Cette décision fait
actuellement l'objet d'un recours en annulation devant le Tribunal (affaire T-79/12, Cisco Systems et
Messagenet/Commission).

Dans le domaine des communications grand public/résidentielles, la Commission a constaté que les activités des
parties se chevauchent essentiellement sur le segment des communications vidéo, sur lequel Microsoft était déjà
présente avant la concentration, via Windows Live Messenger. Toutefois, la Commission estime qu'il n'existe pas de
problèmes de concurrence sur ce marché émergent, en pleine croissance, qui compte nombre d'acteurs de premier
plan, dont Google et Facebook. Microsoft/Skype détiendrait une part de marché de 80-90 % sur le marché
extrêmement étroit des services de communications vidéo grand public sur des PC tournant sous Windows. Il ne s'agit
qu'une partie des communications grand public/résidentielles, qui incluent également la messagerie instantanée, et du
segment, à croissance rapide, des services de communication vidéo grand public sur téléphones portables et tablettes.
Même sur le marché restreint des communications vidéo grand public sur les PC tournant sous Windows
uniquement, la Commission a estimé que la grande part de marché cumulée des parties ne permettait pas de conclure
à un pouvoir de marché compte tenu des spécificités du marché en question, qui se caractérise par un haut niveau
d'innovation, la relative faiblesse des barrières à l'entrée, un grand nombre de nouveaux entrants, des produits gratuits
et facilement téléchargeables par les consommateurs.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO C 341 du 22.11.2011, p. 2.

C 42 E / 482 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006068/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Microsoft's purchase of Skype

In May 2011, Microsoft announced that it planned to purchase the company Skype in a deal worth USD 8.5 billion
with the goal of integrating Skype technology into its services.

Since then, Skype has replaced Windows Live Messenger and the technology has insinuated its way into Outlook, the
Windows Phone and the Xbox.

1. Does the Commission believe that this horizontal merger could fuel concerns about a lack of competition on
unified home telecommunications markets?

2. What is the Commission’s position?

3. Following this merger Microsoft has a combined market share of more than 80%, taking only Windows users
into account. Is this not at odds with EC law?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 August 2013)_

The Commission has set out its position on the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft in its merger clearance decision of
7 October 2011 in the case No COMP/M.6281 Microsoft/Skype ( [1] ). This decision is currently the subject of an
application for annulment before the General Court (Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems and Messagenet v Commission).

In the area of consumer/home communications, the Commission found that the parties' activities mainly overlap for
video communications, where Microsoft was active pre-merger through Windows Live Messenger. However, the
Commission considers that there are no competition concerns in this nascent, growing market with numerous strong
players, including Google and Facebook. Microsoft/Skype would hold a market share of 80-90% in the narrowest
possible market for consumer video communications on Windows-based PCs. This is only a part of consumer/home
communications which also include instant messaging, and the fast growing consumer video communication on
mobile phones and tablets. Even on the narrow market of consumer video communications on Windows-based PCs
only, the Commission found that the parties' high combined market share was not indicative of market power given
the particular characteristics of the market in question, which is marked by a high level of innovation, relatively low
barriers to entry, a large number of entrants, products which are free and which are easily downloadable by

consumers.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ C 341, 22.11.2011, p. 2.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 483

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-006069/13**

**à la Commission**
**Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Santé des abeilles

Si je me réjouis de l'interdiction temporaire des trois pesticides néonicotinoïdes — la clothianidine, l'imidaclopride et
le thiaméthoxame —, reconnus comme étant les plus nocifs pour les abeilles mellifères d'Europe, qui a été décidée le
24 mai 2013 par la Commission européenne et qui entrera en vigueur le 1 [er] décembre prochain, j'estime toutefois que
la saga des «pesticides tueurs d'abeilles» n'est pas définitivement close. Certes, ce moratoire temporaire sur l'utilisation
de ces trois pesticides néonicotinoïdes est un premier pas décisif dans la bonne direction et l'exécutif européen a pris
une décision responsable en application du principe de précaution… mais c'est vers une interdiction permanente et
totale qu'il faut aller! Car seule une interdiction totale mettra fin à l'exposition des insectes non ciblés à ces composés
systémiques qui restent dans le sol et parviennent dans le nectar et le pollen au fil des ans. Qui plus est, la vigilance
reste de mise étant donné que la Commission a annoncé qu'elle réviserait ces restrictions au plus tard dans deux ans
pour prendre en compte les développements scientifiques et techniques «pertinents»…

Mais aujourd'hui, que compte faire l'exécutif européen par rapport à tous les autres insecticides épinglés?

Le 27 mai dernier, l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (AESA) a publié son avis sur les risques posés par le
fipronil (un pesticide commercialisé par BASF sous le nom de Régent et que la France a déjà interdit en enrobage de
semences dès 2005) pour les abeilles. L'avis de l'AESA sur le fipronil fait état de grandes lacunes dans la connaissance
sur les effets potentiels de cette molécule sur Apis mellifera… spécifiant qu'eu égard aux risques liés à l'exposition des
butineuses au nectar et au pollen des cultures traitées, les «études disponibles — en champ et semi-champ — ont des
faiblesses et sont ainsi insuffisantes pour établir le niveau de risque». Cet avis de l'AESA souligne donc en creux que les
tests réglementaires d'évaluation des risques des nouvelles générations d'insecticides utilisés (tel le fipronil) sont
incapables de déceler les effets potentiels de ces molécules sur les abeilles. Dès lors, que compte faire la Commission?

Appliquer une nouvelle fois le principe de précaution me paraîtrait très sage et s'inscrirait indéniablement dans la
stratégie globale adoptée par la Commission en 2010 pour lutter contre le déclin de la population des abeilles
d'Europe.

**Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission**

_(27 juin 2013)_

Le réexamen de l'approbation par l'Union européenne des pesticides néonicotinoïdes et du fipronil a été engagé sur la
base de nouvelles preuves scientifiques qui ont mis en évidence divers éléments préoccupants, lesquels ont incité les
États membres à prendre des mesures de protection.

En outre, il convient de rappeler que tous les pesticides sont périodiquement réévalués en fonction de nouveaux
critères et de nouvelles exigences en matière de données. Il y a peu, la Commission a adopté, précisément, des
exigences supplémentaires, dont le recours à de nouvelles méthodes d'essai sur les abeilles; ces exigences
s'appliqueront à compter du 1 [er] janvier 2014 ( [1] ).

Le processus décisionnel relatif au fipronil est en cours et il est prématuré, à ce stade, d'indiquer quelles mesures la
Commission pourrait prendre.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 93 du 3.4.2013.

C 42 E / 484 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006069/13**

**to the Commission**
**Anne Delvaux (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Bee health

While welcoming the temporary ban, adopted by the Commission on 24 May 2013 and coming into force on
1 December 2013, on the three neonicotinoids — clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiametoxam — acknowledged to
be the most harmful to honeybees in Europe, I believe that the long-running issue of ‘bee-killing pesticides’ has not
been resolved once and for all. The moratorium on using these three nicotonoids is certainly a decisive first step in the
right direction, and the Commission has taken a responsible decision based on the precautionary principle; but we
must move towards a permanent blanket ban. The fact is that only a blanket ban will end the exposure of non-target
insects to what are systemic compounds which remain in the soil and are taken up into nectar and pollen over the
years. We must continue to keep a very close eye on this, furthermore, given the Commission's announcement of a
review of the restrictions, within two years at the latest, in order to take account of ‘relevant’ scientific and technical
developments.

What, however, does the Commission propose doing, now, in connection with all the other pesticides which have
come in for scathing criticism?

On 27 May 2013 the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published its opinion on the risks posed to bees by
fipronil (a pesticide marketed by BASF under the trade name ‘Régent’ and banned by France for seed coating as long
ago as 2005). The EFSA opinion on fipronil reports major deficiencies in what is known about the substance’s
potential effects on honeybees, pointing out, with regard to the risks to foraging bees from exposure to nectar and
pollen in treated plants, that ‘the available studies — field and semi-field — had weaknesses and thus were insufficient
to establish the level of risk …’. The EFSA opinion infers therefore that the regulatory tests to assess the risks of new
generations of pesticides, such as fipronil, are unable to determine their potential effects on bees. What, accordingly,
does the Commission propose to do?

Applying the precautionary principle again would be most sensible, to my mind, and unquestionably would be in
keeping with the Commission's overall strategy, adopted in 2010, to combat the decline in Europe's bee populations.

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 June 2013)_

The review of the EU approval of neonicotinoid insecticides and of fipronil was initiated following new scientific
evidence identifying some concerns, which also triggered interim protective measures taken at Member State level.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that all pesticides are periodically re-evaluated against new criteria and new
data requirements. The Commission recently adopted new data requirements including new test methods on bees,
which will apply from 1 January 2014 ( [1] ).

As regards fipronil, the decision making process is still ongoing and at this stage it is premature to indicate which
actions may be taken by the Commission.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 93, 3.4.2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 485

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006071/13**

**to the Commission**
**Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Local Community Development programmes

Is the Commission aware of the process of ‘alignment’ of Local Community Development programmes and local
authorities? Does the Commission have an opinion about this process?

Is there a danger that the alignment process, by bringing the Local Community Development programmes close to
local authorities, which are state bodies, will mean that some European funding could be endangered?

Is the Commission aware that this process is proceeding without the engagement of civic society (for example,
workers’ representatives are not included in the implementation group)?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the process of local government reform in Ireland and of the proposals to include —
within the short to medium term — the provision of business support services for micro-enterprise as a local
government responsibility. The shared management principle applies to such processes. Accordingly these matters
fall within the competence of the Member State.

The scope of prospective support for community-led local development initiatives during the 2014-2020 period will
become clearer as and when the Irish authorities submit programming documentation following adoption of the
enabling regulatory framework for the European Structural and Investment Funds.

The Commission understands that, as part of the Irish government's strategy for promoting employment and growth,
the 35 County/City Enterprise Boards will be dissolved and their functions taken over by Local Enterprise Offices
established in local authority premises. Such Local Enterprise Offices will therefore become a ‘one-stop shop’ for state
support for micro-enterprise. The national authorities have stated that the new proposed model will ensure the
continuation of a business support service benefiting from local knowledge and expertise and operating within a
national micro-enterprise policy framework.

C 42 E / 486 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006072/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(30 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ A favor de la industria europea y la protección ambiental de las costas

El Comité Económico y Social Europeo ha publicado un ilustrativo informe titulado: «Industrias náuticas: una
transformación acelerada por la crisis» (DO C de 9.5.2013, serie C 133/1). Es conocido que este sector sufre una grave
crisis por el gran descenso de su producción en más del 40 %, con pérdidas de más de 40 000 puestos de trabajo y una
contracción en la facturación de más de 3 000 millones de euros. Muchas son las consideraciones de interés que
recoge el citado informe que critica el «fragmentado mercado único europeo» con muy diferentes regulaciones en
cada país, las dificultades y cargas que tienen los empresarios europeos para instalarse en otros mercados o el
incremento de importaciones y ventas de embarcaciones procedentes de China, Turquía u otros países
iberoamericanos que no cumplen con los mínimos parámetros de la legislación europea en materia de emisiones
contaminantes y ruidos (en concreto, los previstos en la Directiva 1994/25, de 16 de junio de 1994, sobre
embarcaciones de recreo que, como es sabido, ha sido objeto de varias modificaciones)

Sin duda, la Comisión tomará nota de las conclusiones de este informe y es probable que abunde en nuevos estudios o
libros verdes para facilitar un auténtico mercado europeo y una necesaria armonización fiscal. Pero junto a estas
razonables actuaciones, me permito insistir en la necesidad de actuar ya con controles ambientales para evitar que se
frustren las normas europeas de lucha contra las emisiones contaminantes, incluido el ruido que sólo parcialmente
parece controlarse en algún Estado miembro como muestra la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión
Europea (sentencias de 4 de junio de 2009 o de 15 de abril de 2010).

¿Qué información tiene esa Comisión sobre la importación de embarcaciones de recreo que no cumplen la normativa
de protección ambiental de las costas y, en concreto, sobre el cumplimiento del Reglamento (CE) n° 765/2008, de
9 de julio de 2008, que establece los requisitos de acreditación y vigilancia del mercado relativos a la comercialización
de productos con relación a las embarcaciones de recreo importadas?

**Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión**

_(31 de julio de 2013)_

La protección medioambiental en el sector de las embarcaciones de recreo ya se aborda en la Directiva 94/25/CE de
embarcaciones de recreo modificada por la Directiva 2003/44/CE, que establece los límites de las emisiones de escape
y sonoras que deben respetarse cuando la embarcación se comercializa en el mercado de la UE/EEE. El cumplimiento
de estos requisitos se demuestra con el marcado CE y la emisión de la declaración de conformidad. Se aplican las
mismas normas a las embarcaciones fabricadas en la EU y a las embarcaciones importadas. La Comisión ha propuesto
recientemente límites de escape más estrictos en la Directiva revisada que se encuentra en su fase final de aprobación.

Al mismo tiempo, la Directiva revisada definirá precisamente las funciones y las obligaciones de los agentes
económicos y reforzará los derechos de las autoridades nacionales de tomar medidas contra los productos no
conformes y retirar del mercado los productos que representen un grave riesgo para la salud, la seguridad o el medio
ambiente. Las disposiciones del Nuevo Marco Legislativo, incluidas las del Reglamento (CE) n° 765/2008, se tienen
plenamente en cuenta en la Directiva revisada.

La Comisión no dispone de estadísticas de la UE sobre la proporción de embarcaciones de recreo no conformes de
terceros países importadas en la EU. Sin embargo, apoya activamente las reuniones de cooperación administrativa de
las autoridades de vigilancia del mercado de los Estados miembros de la UE para compartir las mejores prácticas de
vigilancia del mercado y coordinar las medidas contra los productos no conformes, independientemente de su origen.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 487

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006072/13**

**to the Commission**
**Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Promoting European industry and the environmental protection of the coast

The European Economic and Social Committee has published an informative report entitled ‘Nautical industries:
restructuring accelerated by the crisis’ (OJ C No 133/1 of 9.5.2013). It is a well-known fact that this sector is suffering
a serious crisis due to a large fall in production of more than 40%, with more than 40 000 job losses and drop in
turnover of over EUR 3 billion. The abovementioned report pulls together many points of interest. It criticises the
‘fragmented European single market’ with very different regulations in each country, the difficulties and workload
faced by European employers seeking to establish themselves in other markets and the increasing number of imports
and sales of boats from China, Turkey or Latin American countries which do not meet the minimum criteria of
European legislation in terms of exhaust and noise emissions (in particular, those set out in Directive 1994/25, of
16 June 1994, on recreational craft which, as is well-known, has been subject to various amendments).

Undoubtedly, the Commission will take note of the conclusions of this report and it is likely that new studies or green
papers will abound to facilitate a genuine European market and the tax harmonisation required. However, alongside
these reasonable courses of action, allow me to emphasise the need to act now on environmental controls to prevent
European standards tackling exhaust emissions from being thwarted, including those on noise, which only appears to
be partially controlled in any Member State as shown by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(judgments of 4 June 2009 and 15 April 2010).

What information does the Commission have regarding imports of recreational craft that do not comply with
legislation on the environmental protection of the coast and, in particular, with Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, of
9 July 2008, setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of
products with regard to imported recreational craft?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

Environmental protection in the recreational craft sector is already addressed in the Recreational Craft
Directive 94/25/EC amended by 2003/44/EC which sets out the exhaust and noise emission limits to be respected
when the craft is placed on the EU/EEA market. The compliance to these requirements is demonstrated by CE
marking and issuing of Declaration of Conformity. The same rules apply to the EU-manufactured as well as to the
imported craft. The Commission has recently proposed stricter exhaust emission limits in the revised directive which
is in its final stage of approval.

At the same time the revised directive will precisely define the roles and obligations of economic operators as well as
will reinforce the rights of national enforcement authorities to take action on non-compliant products or to withdraw
from the market those products presenting serious risk to health, safety or environment. The provisions of the New
Legislative Framework, including those of Regulation 765/2008 are fully taken into account in the revised directive.

The Commission does not dispose of any EU statistics on the share of non-compliant recreational craft imported to
the EU from the third countries. However, it actively supports administrative-cooperation meetings of EU Member
State market surveillance authorities to share the best practices of market surveillance and to coordinate the actions
against non-compliant products, irrespective of their origin.

C 42 E / 488 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006073/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Recent EU-Russia talks regarding discrimination and violence

Recent talks between the European Union and the Russian Federation have sought to highlight issues of
discrimination and violence against women in Russia. Will the Commission detail the measures agreed between
the EU and Russia with a view to eradicating discrimination and violence? Will it also outline how it hopes to
successfully combat these issues, given that Russia is a sovereign state outside of the EU?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 July 2013)_

The bilateral Human Rights consultations held on 17 May 2013 gave an opportunity to discuss how to step up of
cooperation at the bilateral or multilateral levels on issues such as gender, notably violence against women, but the
meeting did not focus on issues of discrimination and violence against women in Russia. The EU presented its
priorities on gender issues in international cooperation, in particular the work undertaken in the G8 framework on
preventing sexual violence in conflict, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and the
activities implemented by the EU in the framework of CSDP missions and operations on sexual and gender-based
violence. Both delegations considered that gender was a topic of common interest which would deserve further
consideration during future rounds of Human Rights consultations: violence against women was a challenge both for
the EU and for Russia.

The Moscow Document agreed in the OSCE/CSCE context clearly states that ‘commitments undertaken in the field of
the human dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not
belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned’ . In that regard, the EU believes that human rights
issues in other OSCE participating states, including issues related to women's rights, are issues for which it is
legitimate for the EU to seek avenues of cooperation or to express concerns.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 489

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006074/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ EU fight against piracy

Since 2008, the EU has been considerably active off the coast of East Africa in its efforts to stem piracy. With the
recent announcement that the EU is to spend EUR 37 million to support the ongoing fight against piracy in the
region, will the Commission outline the progress the programme has made thus far? Also, does the Commission
intend to increase EU commitments in the region, should the situation continue to deteriorate?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 August 2013)_

Somali piracy can only be overcome by combining military and legal action with political and diplomatic efforts, as
well as development assistance and strong international coordination. The EU has tools in all of these policy areas at
its disposal and addresses that challenge through a ‘comprehensive approach’, tackling both current symptoms and
root causes of the problem on land. The regional programme on maritime capacities (MASE) was only launched this
year but other EU actions are ongoing since 2008. EUNAVFOR — Atalanta mission is probably the most visible of
them.

Some progress has clearly been made: No ship was hi-jacked since May 2012 and currently there are 54 hostages and
two ships left in control of pirate groups in Somalia (down from over 700 hostages at one time during 2011).

But this is not the moment for complacency. Pirate groups remain active and attacks continue. At the same time, we
all agree that naval forces can only address the symptoms, but not tackle on its own the threat at its root causes. The
EU is convinced that only the establishment of the rule of law and economic development will undermine the
breeding ground for organised crime in Somalia. The EU is committed to a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis,
covering its political, security, development and humanitarian aspects.

The EU will therefore play a lead role to establish a ‘Transition Compact’ of international donors and the Somali
government. This ‘new deal’ will involve mutual commitments and increased development aid by partners. A large
event in September 2013 in Brussels will be co-chaired by the HR/VP and the Somali President and outline further
steps towards the stabilisation of Somalia.

C 42 E / 490 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006075/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Europe Day 2013

Will the Commission detail how much it has cost to mark Europe Day across Member States this year? Will the
Commission also break the figure down, based on spending by area, and also detail how much it cost to mark Europe
Day in 2012, as a means of comparison?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

The European Council, in Milan in 1985, established 9 May as ‘Europe Day’, to commemorate the declaration made
by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. Every year the institutions and committees, as well as the Commission
Representations and the European Parliament Information Offices (EPIOs) in the Member States, organise events to
inform citizens about the European Union and how Europe contributes to improving their lives.

In 2013 the 27 Representations and 9 Regional Offices spent about EUR 1 090 000 on Europe Day. The
corresponding figure for 2012 was EUR 1 250 000.

The Representations finance events through the specific budget line for local actions. The wide range of activities
makes it difficult to regroup all costs under a single budget line, as often the cooperation with national or local
authorities (Partnerships) leads to the use of different sources of funding. Events co-organised by the Commission and
the European Parliament may be funded from Commission funds, from European Parliament funds or on a shared
basis, and in some cases with the co-financing of the Member States' authorities.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 491

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006077/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Adoption of the euro by Member States

With Latvia scheduled to adopt the euro on 1 January 2014, recent polls suggest that only 36% of the population
favour joining the common currency, whilst a staggering 62% oppose doing so. Opposition to the euro is a common
theme in many Member States, all of whom — with the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark — are
committed under the Treaties to joining the euro at some point in the future.

Will the Commission acknowledge public opinion polls and introduce measures to allow Member States either to
leave the euro or to opt out of joining it?

Further, does the Commission have any measures to propose that are aimed at boosting public confidence in the
euro?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 July 2013)_

Changing over to a new currency affects many aspects of a citizen's daily life. Timely and effective communication is
therefore an essential task for any Member State planning to introduce the euro. This will be important to ensure that
Latvian citizens will be adequately informed about the impact and practical aspects related to the changeover from
lats to euro. In this respect, the Commission would recall the experience of the two previous euro enlargements, in
Slovakia and in Estonia, where the level support for the euro increased sizeably following the actual introduction.

The Commission works closely with other stakeholders, including the Parliament, to further strengthen the
governance of EMU. Ongoing efforts at both European and Member State level to overcome the crisis and put our
economies on a sound footing for the future are key planks for strengthening confidence.

C 42 E / 492 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006078/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Emergency Response Centre

Will the Commission outline the powers and responsibilities of the recently opened Emergency Response Centre, as
well as the estimated yearly cost of running the centre? In addition, which Directorate-General will be responsible for
the centre and what emergencies does the Commission envisage the new centre responding to?

**Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The Emergency Response Centre will provide a more efficient and rapid response to emergencies.

It will have three main responsibilities: (1) to ensure that the Commission’s activities in humanitarian and and civil
protection are fully coordinated, efficient and coherent; (2) to facilitate coordination between Participating Countries
within the European Civil Protection Mechanism; (3) to serve as the default entry point for activations under the
Solidarity Clause.

The estimated annual running costs of the ERC will be in the order of EUR 700 000. The Directorate-General for
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection will be responsible for the centre. Its main focus will be natural and man-made
disasters, both inside and outside the Union.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 493

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006079/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Accession of Moldova to the European Union

Recently, Štefan Füle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, declared that ‘Moldova belongs
to Europe’. With this in mind, will the Commission outline the action it is taking to achieve the accession of Moldova
to the EU?

**Answer given by Commissioner Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

The Commission is putting in place the necessary technical and financial assistance to help the Republic of Moldova
build up a successful track record of implementation of its current and projected Agreements with the European
Union, as evidenced by the ENPI Annual Action Programmes 2012 and 2013, where important funds have been
earmarked to that effect. In addition, the Commission supports both politically and financially the challenging
reforms of the justice and law enforcement sectors that lie at the heart of Moldova's commitments to the European
Union under the existing ENP Action Plan. Implementation of these commitments and Agreements is the priority for
both the EU and Moldova at the present stage of their relationship.

C 42 E / 494 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006080/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Chemical weapons use in Syria

The civil war in Syria has been raging since March 2011. Given recent reports that chemical weapons have been used
by the Assad regime on the Syrian population, will the Commission outline any action it is taking to ensure that such
weapons are not used again in the region? Will the Commission outline any steps it is taking to defuse the Syrian
crisis?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The EU welcomed the announcement of the UN mission aiming to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in
Syria. It is of utmost importance that the UN mission starts its activities as soon as possible. It must be granted all
access needed to perform its investigation on the ground and collect the evidence needed. The EU reiterates that any
use of chemical weapons under any conditions is unacceptable.

The HR/VP reacted to the recent US intelligence assessment on the use of chemical weapons by the regime. EU will
examine closely the situation linked to the alleged chemical attacks and look into possible next steps with a view to
speeding up the convening of the Geneva conference.

The EU is responding to this extremely worrying development by preparing training and equipment for first
responders and medical services in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon (EUR 6.5 million in projects).

Please refer also to the EU joint communication: ‘Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis’ ( [1] ).

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137583.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 495

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006081/13**

**to the Commission**
**James Nicholson (ECR)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Implications of reducing discards on defined fisheries

Measures to reduce fishing discards have attracted intense media attention in recent weeks. Introducing such
measures will benefit our fishermen and fleets. With this in mind, will the Commission outline the analysis it has
undertaken to assess the practical impact of eradicating discards on defined fisheries?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

Political agreement has been reached by the European Parliament and Council on the reform of the common fisheries
policy (CFP). The Basic Regulation for the CFP includes the introduction of an obligation to land all catches in EU
fisheries from 1 January 2015 onwards.

As part of the impact assessment to support the CFP reform, the impact of discard eliminating policies was
comprehensively assessed ( [1] ). This assessment had two phases. The first phase comprised a series of desk studies on
the extent of discarding practices in the EU Member States as well as other countries, and described the anti-discard
policies in a number of non-EU countries (e.g. Iceland, Norway, and the USA) as well as pilot studies carried out in the
UK and Denmark. The level of discards in EU fisheries was also analysed during this phase with a special emphasis on
discarding in Mediterranean fisheries. The second analytical phase of the study assessed the impacts of a range of antidiscard policy options in EU fisheries including the effects of changes in fishing gear selectivity and the introduction
of new technical measures such as real-time closures. This analysis showed that phasing out discarding based on more
effective technical measures and the removal of ineffective technical measures that induce discarding would result in
short-term economic losses but medium to long-term additional gains, primarily in environmental and economic

terms.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/index_en.htmf.

C 42 E / 496 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)_

**Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-006124/13**

**Komisijai**
**Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D)**

_(2013 m. gegužės 30 d.)_

_Tema:_ Saulės elementų utilizavimas ES

Europos branduolinių tyrimų organizacijos mokslininkai (CERN) yra nustatę, kad, nors saulės energija yra įvardijama
kaip labai perspektyvi energijos rūšis užtikrinant ilgalaikį apsirūpinimą elektros energija, tačiau siekiant gauti realią
naudą reikia smarkiai didinti jos gamybos apimtis bei investuoti dideles lėšas į papildomų energijos valdymo sistemų
kūrimą.

ES energetikos strategijoje taip pat numatytas didelis atsinaujinančių energijos šaltinių vaidmuo bendrame ES
energetikos rūšių derinyje, nustačius įpareigojimą iki 2020 m. padidinti atsinaujinančiųjų energijos išteklių dalį iki 20
proc., kad būtų pasiekti aplinkosauginiai tikslai ir užtikrintas tvarus apsirūpinimas elektros energija.

Minėtos organizacijos mokslininkai taip pat nustatė, jog saulės baterijų gamybos ir panaudotų baterijų utilizavimo
procesai yra taršūs.

Žiniasklaidoje taip pat pasirodė informacija, jog Kinijoje dėl didelės saulės baterijų gamybos apimties jau susiduriama
su panaudotų baterijų utilizavimo problema ir užteršiamos ištisos teritorijos.

—
Kinija yra viena didžiausių pasaulyje saulės baterijų eksportuotojų. Todėl norėčiau sužinoti, koks yra saulės
baterijų gamybos mastas ES ir kiek saulės baterijų importuojama į ES iš Kinijos?

—
Norėčiau paklausti, ar ES yra reglamentuojama saulės baterijų gamyba, jų importas iš trečiųjų šalių ir jų
utilizavimas?

—
Ar Komisija yra įvertinusi saulės baterijų gamybos proceso taršą ir ar ateityje neiškils būtinybė skirti papildomų
dotacijų iš ES biudžeto, kad būtų remiama aplinkosauginius standartus ir ES įsipareigojimus šioje srityje atitinkanti
saulės baterijų gamyba ES?

**G. Oettingerio atsakymas Komisijos vardu**

_(2013 m. liepos 26 d.)_

— Iš konteksto sprendžiame, kad terminu „saulės baterijos“ įvardijami fotovoltiniai moduliai. 2012 m. prie Europos
energetikos tinklo prijungta apie 17,2 GW bendros galios saulės energijos įrenginių, palyginti su 22,4 GW 2011 m.
Europos pramonės tiekiama dalis sudarė apie 24 % ES rinkos, likusi dalis buvo importuojama daugiausia iš Kinijos ir
kitų Azijos šalių ( [1] ).

— 2013 m. birželio 4 d. Komisijos reglamentu (ES) Nr. 513/2013 įvestas laikinasis antidempingo muitas
importuojamiems Kinijos gamybos silicio kristalų fotovoltiniams moduliams ir pagrindinėms sudėtinėms dalims ( [2] ).
Šiuo metu nėra jokių kitų nuostatų dėl importo iš kitų trečiųjų šalių.

— Fotovoltinės plokštės patenka į **Direktyvos 2012/19/ES (** **[3]** **) dėl elektros ir elektroninės įrangos atliekų**
**taikymo sritį nuo jos įsigaliojimo** 2012 m. rugpjūčio 13 d. Valstybės narės ne vėliau kaip iki 2014 m. vasario 14 d.
turės iš dalies pakeisti galiojančius teisės aktus dėl elektros ir elektroninės įrangos atliekų ir suderinti juos su naująja
direktyva ir naujais tikslais.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) 2013‐2017 m. pasaulinės fotoelektros rinkos perspektyva („Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaic“), EPIA.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OL L 152/5, 2013 7 5.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OL L 197/38, 2012 7 24.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 497

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006124/13**

**to the Commission**
**Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Solar cell utilisation in the EU

Scientists from the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) have established that while solar energy is
identified as a very promising type of energy for ensuring long-term electricity security, in order to obtain real
benefits, we need to significantly increase production and invest large sums in the establishment of additional energy
management systems.

The EU energy strategy also provides for a greater role for renewable energy sources in the overall EU energy mix,
laying down the obligation to increase renewable energy resources by 20% by 2020 in order to achieve
environmental targets and guarantee a sustainable supply of electricity.

Scientists from the above organisation have also established that the processes of producing solar batteries and
utilising used batteries cause pollution.

Information has also appeared in the media that in China, due to the scale of solar battery production, the utilisation
of used batteries is already a problem and whole territories are being polluted.

—
China is one of the world’s largest exporters of solar batteries. However, I would like to know the scale of solar
battery production in the EU and the number of batteries imported into the EU from China.

—
I would like to ask whether solar battery production, their import from third countries and utilisation are
regulated in the EU?

—
Has the Commission evaluated the pollution caused by the solar battery production process and will there not
be a need, in future, to allocate additional funds from the EU budget in order to support environmental standards and
solar battery production in the EU that meets EU obligations in this field?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

— It is assumed from the context that the term ‘solar batteries’ refers to solar photovoltaic modules. About 17,2 GW
of solar photovoltaic capacity was connected to the grid in Europe in 2012, compared to 22,4 GW in 2011. The
European industry represented about 24% of the EU market. The rest was imported mainly from China and other
Asian countries ( [1] ).

— Commission Regulation (EU) No 513/2013 of 4 June 2013 imposes a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports
of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components originating from China ( [2] ). No other provision is
currently in place for imports from other third countries.

— Photovoltaic panels are within the scope of the directive **2012/19/EU (** **[3]** **) on waste electrical and electronic**
**equipment (WEEE)** as of its entry into force date of 13 August 2012. Member States will have to amend their
existing legislation on WEEE and align it with the new Directive and the new targets by 14 February 2014, at the
latest.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaics 2013-2017, EPIA.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 152/5 of 5.7.2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) OJ L 197/38 of 24.7.2012,.

C 42 E / 498 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(българска версия)_

**Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-006128/13**

**до Комисията**
**Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)**

_(30 май 2013 г.)_

_Относно:_ Предложението на Европейската комисия за намаляване на административните формалности

На 24 април 2013 г. Европейската комисия предложи мерки за намаляване на административните формалности за
гражданите и предприятията чрез премахване на бюрократичните процедури по подпечатване (апостили), изисквани
понастоящем, за да може публични актове да бъдат признати за автентични в друга държава — членка на ЕС.

Като поздравявам Европейската комисия за инициативата, искам да запитам дали Комисията смята, че е уместно в този
списък от документи да се включат и преводите на дипломи за завършена образователна степен, издавани от легитимни
учебни заведения, регистрирани в страните — членки на ЕС. Изискването за заверяване на преводите на дипломите
затруднява и оскъпява младежката мобилност, която е една от приоритетните политики на ЕС.

**Отговор, даден от г-жа Reding от името на Комисията**

_(19 август 2013 г.)_

Както знае уважаемият член на Парламента, предложението на Комисията относно опростяване приемането на някои
публични документи в ЕС не обхваща издаването на незаверени преводи на дипломи. Съществува широка гама видове
дипломи и не всички от тях са публични документи. Същевременно обаче това е въпрос, на който са посветени други
мерки на ЕС.

Достъпът до регламентираните професии е уреден чрез Директива 2005/36/ЕО относно взаимното признаване на
професионалните квалификации, съгласно която съответните органи могат да проверяват автентичността на дипломите
посредством Информационната система за вътрешния пазар. В доброволен кодекс за поведение се определят найдобрите практики за исканията за преводи. Правилата за прилагането на изменената директива също така ще изяснят
видовете документи, необходими за кандидатстване за европейска професионална карта.

Относно признаването на академични сертификати за допускане до продължаване на образованието, Комисията
насърчава държавите членки да опростят процедурите, включително преводите на дипломи. В рамките на процеса от
Болоня Комисията улеснява работата на специална група от държави, проучващи начини за постигане на автоматично
признаване на дипломи за висше образование, включително използването на инструмента Приложение към диплома.
Това е стандартизирано описание на естеството, степента, контекста, съдържанието и статута на завършеното обучение,
част е от рамката Европас и e безплатно предоставенo от висшите учебни заведения на широко разпространен
европейски език.

Вследствие на това, Комисията счете, че предложението не следва да включва публични документи, свързани
с областите на образованието или признаването на професионалните квалификации.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 499

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006128/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Commission proposal to reduce red tape

On 24 April 2013, the Commission proposed measures to reduce the burden of red tape on individuals and
companies by doing away with the bureaucratic authentication procedures (the so-called ‘Apostille’ certificate)
currently required for the recognition of official documents in other EU Member States.

While congratulating the Commission on its initiative, I would like to ask whether it considers that the list of
documents concerned should include translations of certificates for completion of the various levels of education,
issued by legitimate educational establishments registered in Member States. The requirement to have translations of
diplomas certified makes youth mobility — one of the EU’s policy priorities — more complicated and costly.

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 August 2013)_

As the Honourable Member is aware, the Commission proposal on simplifying the acceptance of certain public
documents in the EU does not cover the issue of non-certified translations of diplomas. A wide range of types of
diplomas exist and not all of them are public documents. However, this issue is dealt with by other EU measures.

The access to regulated professions is covered by Directive 2005/36/EC on the mutual recognition of professional
qualifications, under which the authorities may verify the authenticity of diplomas via the internal market
Information System. A voluntary Code of Conduct sets best practices for requests of translations. The rules
implementing the amended Directive will also clarify the types of documents required to apply for the European
Professional Card.

Concerning the recognition of academic certificates for admission to further study, the Commission encourages
Member States to simplify the procedures, including translations of diplomas. In the framework of the Bologna
process, the Commission facilitates the work of a pathfinder group of countries exploring ways to achieve automatic
recognition of academic degrees, including the use of the instrument of the Diploma Supplement. This is a
standardised description of the nature, level, context, content and status of the studies completed, is part of the
Europass framework and made available by higher education institutions free of charge and in a widely spoken
European language.

Consequently, the Commission considered that the proposal should not include public documents relating to the
policy areas of education or recognition of professional qualifications.

C 42 E / 500 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006129/13**

**do Komisji**
**Sławomir Nitras (PPE)**

_(30 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Modernizacja kontroli pomocy państwa

W dniu 8. maja 2012r. Komisja Europejska wydała Komunikat w sprawie unowocześnienia unijnej polityki
w dziedzinie pomocy państwa. Dokument ten zawiera następujący zapis: _„(…) Solidna kontrola pomocy państwa idzie_
_zazwyczaj w parze ze skutecznym wdrażaniem unijnych przepisów w dziedzinie rynku wewnętrznego i ma szczególne znaczenie na_
_rynkach, które są otwarte dopiero od niedawna i na których istotną rolę nadal odgrywają duże podmioty zasiedziałe korzystające_
_z pomocy państwa. Do takich rynków zalicza się transport, usługi pocztowe i, choć w bardziej ograniczonych przypadkach, rynek_
_energii (…)”._

Ponieważ niektóre z propozycji zawartych w ww. Komunikacie mogą mieć potencjalny negatywny wpływ na
sytuację społeczno-gospodarczą w województwie zachodniopomorskim, proszę Komisję o odpowiedź na
następujące pytania:

1. Czy dotacje dla przedsiębiorstw miejskich, w tym dla spółek transportu miejskiego, będą podlegały unijnym
zasadom udzielania pomocy państwa? Jeśli tak, to jak Komisja uzasadni właściwość swojej decyzji wobec faktu,
że takie dotacje będą wówczas podlegały wydłużonym procedurom biurokratycznym, a w związku z tym
staną się dużo mniej efektywne?

2. Czy Komisja planuje objąć przedsiębiorstwa miejskie kategorią „wyłączeń blokowych”? Jeśli tak, to w jaki
sposób Komisja chce monitorować zgodność udzielanych dotacji z regułami pomocy państwa?

3. Jak Komisja planuje doprecyzować pojęcie „pomocy państwa” oraz zapewnić, że będzie ono należycie
rozpowszechnione i zrozumiałe dla przedsiębiorców?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Joaquína Almunię w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 lipca 2013 r.)_

Zasady pomocy państwa mają zastosowanie do wszystkich przedsiębiorstw. Pojęcie przedsiębiorstwa stosowane
w prawie konkurencji, zdefiniowane w orzecznictwie Trybunału, obejmuje „każdą jednostkę wykonującą działalność
gospodarczą, niezależnie od jej formy prawnej i sposobu finansowania” – czyli każdy podmiot „oferujący towary
i usługi na danym rynku” ( [1] ). Nie ma przy tym znaczenia, jaką dany podmiot ma formę prawną według prawa
krajowego ani to, czy stanowi on własność prywatną czy publiczną. Ponieważ „pomoc państwa” jest pojęciem
obiektywnym, które jest zawarte w art. 107 ust. 1 TFUE i którego wykładnię zapewnia Trybunał Sprawiedliwości,
inicjatywa Komisji związana z unowocześnieniem polityki pomocy państwa nie wprowadza żadnych zmian w tym
względzie.

Przedsiębiorstwa miejskie mogą korzystać z pomocy objętej wyłączeniem grupowym na takich samych warunkach,
jak inne przedsiębiorstwa. W przypadku tego rodzaju pomocy szczegółowe warunki określone w rozporządzeniu
stanowiącym o wyłączeniu zapewniają zgodność pomocy z rynkiem wewnętrznym. Komisja monitoruje ponadto
pomoc podlegającą wyłączeniu grupowemu i planuje zwiększyć skuteczność tych działań. Prowadzi się je na dwóch
poziomach: na poziomie programu pomocy oraz na poziomie próbki beneficjentów.

W ramach inicjatywy związanej z unowocześnieniem polityki pomocy państwa Komisja pracuje nad komunikatem,
w którym wyjaśni pojęcie pomocy państwa zdefiniowane w art. 107 ust. 1. Komunikat zostanie oczywiście
opublikowany w Dzienniku Urzędowym oraz na stronie Internetowej Komisji. Komisja zwróci się także do państw
członkowskich o przekazanie wszystkim zainteresowanym informacji o nowym komunikacie.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Wyrok z 2006 r. w sprawie C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze i inni, Zb.Orz. s. I-289, pkt 107 i 108.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 501

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006129/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sławomir Nitras (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Modernisation of state aid control

On 8 May 2012, the Commission issued the communication ‘EU State Aid Modernisation’. This document includes
the following statement: ‘… robust state aid control goes hand in hand with the effective implementation of EU
internal market rules and is of particular relevance in markets that have only recently been opened and where large
incumbents aided by the State still play a major role, such as transport, postal services or, in more limited cases,
energy’.

Since some of the proposals contained in this communication could potentially have a negative impact on the social
and economic situation in the Voivodeship of Western Pomerania, I should like to ask the Commission the following
questions:

1. Are subsidies for municipal enterprises, including municipal transport firms, going to be brought under EU
rules for the provision of state aid? If they are, how does the Commission justify the appropriateness of its
decision in view of the fact that these subsidies will then be subject to protracted bureaucratic procedures and
will therefore become much less effective?

2. Is the Commission planning to include municipal enterprises in the ‘block exemption’ category? If so, how does
the Commission intend to monitor whether subsidies provided are compatible with the rules on state aid?

3. How does the Commission plan to clarify the concept of ‘State aid’ and ensure that this information is properly
communicated and made understandable to businesses?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

State aid rules apply to all undertakings. The concept of an undertaking, in the field of competition law has been
defined in the Court's case-law as encompassing ‘every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal
status and the way in which it is financed’: i.e. any entity ‘offering goods or services on a given market’ ( [1] ). The status
of the entity under national law or whether an entity is privately or publicly owned is not relevant. Since the notion of
state aid is an objective notion enshrined in Article 107(1) TFEU and interpreted by the Court of Justice, the state aid
modernization initiative of the Commission does not lead to any changes in this respect.

Municipal undertakings can benefit from the block exempted aid under the same conditions as any other
undertakings. For such aid, the detailed conditions set out in the exemption Regulation ensure the compatibility of
the aid with the internal market. Furthermore, block exempted aid is subject to monitoring by the Commission,
which plans to reinforce its monitoring actions. The monitoring is carried out at two levels: at the level of the aid
scheme, and at the level of a sample of individual beneficiaries.

As part of the state aid modernization initiative, the Commission is working on a communication to explain the
notion of state aid as defined in Article 107(1) TFEU. This communication will of course be published in the Official
Journal and on the Commission's website. The Commission will also invite Member States to draw the new
Communication to the attention of all concerned.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Case C-222/04 _Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others_ [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 107 and 108.

C 42 E / 502 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006130/13**

**do Komisji**
**Sławomir Nitras (PPE)**

_(30 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Złomowanie statków

W dniu 23.3.2012 r. Komisja Europejska wystosowała wniosek o rozporządzenie w sprawie recyklingu statków.
W myśl tego rozporządzenia, statki pływające pod banderą państw członkowskich UE można byłoby poddawać
recyklingowi wyłącznie w zakładach spełniających wspólne wymogi minimalne w zakresie ochrony środowiska
naturalnego w odniesieniu do stoczni złomowych. Parlament Europejski w swoich poprawkach do sprawozdania
posła Schlytera opowiedział się następnie za europejskim funduszem na rzecz recyklingu statków. Ponadto, statki
mają posiadać obowiązek przygotowania zestawienia znajdujących się na ich pokładzie materiałów niebezpiecznych;
a w razie przewożenia ilości większej niż dozwolona – podlegać karom.

W związku z powyższym projektem, proszę Komisję o odpowiedź na następujące pytania:

1. Jak Komisja zapewni, że w rezultacie rozporządzenia COM(2012)0118 final z 23.3.2012 nie zmaleje
konkurencyjność europejskich portów?

2. Jak Komisja ocenia ryzyko wzrostu niepotrzebnej biurokracji w rezultacie konieczności pobierania opłat od
statków korzystających z unijnych portów, i co zamierza zrobić, aby takie ryzyko wyeliminować?

3. Kto i w jaki sposób będzie zajmować się nadzorem materiałów przewożonych przez statki, a w razie
stwierdzenia większej niż dozwolona ilości materiałów niebiezpiecznych, również egzekwował kary? O jakich
karach mowa?

4. Jak Komisja zamierza zagwarantować, że pracownicy ośrodków recyklingu statków będą mieli odpowiednie
warunki pod względem zarówno bezpieczeństwa pracy, jak i wykształcenia zawodowego?

5. Jak Komisja zapatruje się na prawdopodobieństwo obniżenia poziomu życia robotników pracujących przy
recyklingu statków w Bangladeszu i innych azjatyckich krajach, oraz jakie środki zamierza podjąć, aby
zniwelować ten negatywny efekt swojego rozporządzenia?

6. Jaka istnieje szansa na to, aby regionalne stocznie krajów członkowskich mogły zostać ośrodkami recyklingu
statków? Czy Komisja planuje przeznaczyć środki finansowe na ew. przekształcenie stoczni produkcyjnych
i remontowych w stocznie złomowe?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 sierpnia 2013 r.)_

Niedawno uzgodnione rozporządzenie w sprawie recyklingu statków poprzedza ratyfikację Międzynarodowej
konwencji z Hongkongu z 2009 r. o bezpiecznym i ekologicznym recyklingu statków i z tego powodu przewiduje
pewne koszty administracyjne związane z inspekcjami i kontrolą tych statków. Ocena skutków opracowana przez
Komisję nie wykazała znaczącego wpływu wniosku na konkurencyjność europejskich portów.

W rozporządzeniu nie jest wymieniona opłata, która miałaby być pobierana od statków korzystających z unijnych
portów.

Egzekwowanie przestrzegania rozporządzenia, w tym przeprowadzanie inspekcji i szkoleń oraz nakładanie
grzywien, jest obowiązkiem państw członkowskich. Wykaz materiałów niebezpiecznych, który musi zostać
przygotowany dla statków z uwzględnieniem odpowiednich wytycznych IMO, nie wprowadza nowych limitów
ilościowych dotyczących materiałów niebezpiecznych.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 503

Według oceny skutków opracowanej przez Komisję stocznie złomowe w Bangladeszu i innych azjatyckich krajach
dopuszczają się demontażu statków w sposób niebezpieczny i szkodliwy dla środowiska. Wniosek ma na celu
zachęcenie tych stoczni do poprawy warunków działalności, tak aby pracownicy przez nie zatrudniani mogli
kontynuować pracę bez obecnych zagrożeń. W ramach programów realizowanych przez Sekretariat Konwencji
bazylejskiej ( [1] ), wspieranych finansowo przez Unię Europejską ( [2] ), możliwe jest wsparcie krajów rozwijających się
w modernizacji ich stoczni. Projekty finansowane bezpośrednio ze środków unijnych muszą być rozwijane w ramach
pomocy rozwojowej UE ( [3] ).

Państwa członkowskie mogą przekształcać swoje stocznie w stocznie złomowe. Komisja nie planuje wspierać
w sposób szczególny przekształcania stoczni produkcyjnych i remontowych w stocznie złomowe.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/1275/Default.aspx
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/FinanceBudget/tabid/1279/Default.aspx
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Wsparcie to obejmowałoby egzekwowanie przestrzegania zasad dotyczących zatrudnienia, norm bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy (BHP),

wydajności inspekcji pracy i odpowiedzialności społecznej przedsiębiorstw.

C 42 E / 504 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006130/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sławomir Nitras (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Ship recycling

On 23 March 2012, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on ship recycling. According to this
regulation, ships flying the flag of EU Member States would only be allowed to be recycled in facilities meeting ship
recycling environmental requirements. This was followed by the amendments adopted in the Schlyter report, in
which Parliament advocated a European Recycling Fund. Furthermore, ships are to be required to draw up an
inventory of hazardous materials found on board, and if they carry a greater amount than permitted, they will be
subject to fines.

In relation to this proposed legislation, I should like to ask the Commission the following questions:

1. How will the Commission ensure that regulation COM(2012) 118 final of 23 March 2012 does not reduce the
competitiveness of European ports?

2. What is the Commission’s assessment of the risk of an increase in unnecessary bureaucracy as a result of having
to collect a levy from ships calling at EU ports, and what does it intend to do to eliminate this risk?

3. Who is going to supervise the materials carried by ships, how is this going to be done and, if more than the
permitted amount of hazardous materials is found, who is going to enforce the fines? What kind of fines are
envisaged?

4. How does the Commission intend to guarantee that the people employed in ship recycling facilities will have
the appropriate conditions in terms of both work and training associated with this work?

5. How does the Commission view the likelihood of a reduction in the living standards of workers at ship
recycling facilities in Bangladesh and other countries in Asia, and what steps does it intend to take to mitigate
this negative effect of its regulation?

6. What is the possibility that regional shipyards in Member States could become ship recycling facilities? Is the
Commission planning to provide funding for the possible conversion of shipyards and ship repair yards to ship
recycling facilities?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 August 2013)_

The recently agreed Ship Recycling Regulation anticipates the ratification of the 2009 Hong Kong Convention for the
Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, and as such implies certain administrative costs related to ship
inspections and controls. The Commission's Impact Assessment did not demonstrate significant impacts of the
proposal on the competitiveness of European ports.

The regulation does not include a levy to be collected from ships calling at EU ports.

The enforcement of the regulation, including inspections, fines and training, is the responsibility of Member States.
An inventory of hazardous materials which must be established for ships taking into account the relevant IMO
Guidelines does not introduce new quantitative limits for hazardous materials.

According to the Commission's Impact Assessment, ship recycling facilities in Bangladesh and other countries in Asia
practice unsafe and environmentally damaging ship dismantling. The proposal aims to encourage those facilities to
upgrade their operating conditions, so that the workers they employ continue their activities without the present
hazards. Programmes operated by the secretariat of the Basel Convention ( [1] ), financially supported by the European
Union ( [2] ), can offer support for developing countries to upgrade their facilities. Projects involving direct EU funding
need to be developed within the framework of EU development aid ( [3] ).

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/1275/Default.aspx
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/FinanceBudget/tabid/1279/Default.aspx
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) This support would include employment regulation enforcement, occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, labour inspection capacities

and corporate social responsibility (CSR).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 505

Member States can convert their shipyards into ship recycling facilities. The Commission has no plans to provide
specific support for the conversion of shipyards and ship repair yards into ship recycling facilities.

C 42 E / 506 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006131/13**

**à Comissão**
**Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Consulta pública sobre o POSEI Agricultura (Regulamento (CE) n.° 246/2006)

Numa reunião, no passado dia 7 de maio, do Comissário Europeu da Agricultura e do Desenvolvimento Rural com os
Presidentes dos Governos e os Eurodeputados das Regiões Ultraperiféricas, estes foram informados de que a
Comissão Europeia tenciona proceder a uma consulta pública sobre o designado programa POSEI Agricultura
(Regulamento (CE) n.° 246/2006, que estabelece medidas específicas no domínio da agricultura a favor das regiões
ultraperiféricas).

O facto de o POSEI Agricultura ser um programa dirigido específica e exclusivamente às regiões ultraperiféricas e,
como tal, aplicável a apenas 3 (Portugal, Espanha e França) dos 27 (e proximamente 28) Estados-Membros da União
Europeia, impõe uma ponderação acrescida acerca do formato desta eventual futura consulta pública.

Considerando que todas as consultas públicas são prerrogativa da Comissão, pergunto:

—
Confirma a Comissão o propósito de proceder a uma consulta pública? Em caso afirmativo, qual o fundamento
desta opção? E quando decorrerá?

—
Quais os objetivos desta consulta pública? Quais as questões que serão sujeitas a consulta pública? Será excluída
a opção de integração do programa POSEI Agricultura na PAC, com a supressão total do primeiro, já
formalmente rejeitada pelos Presidentes dos Governos e pelos Eurodeputados das Regiões Ultraperiféricas?

—
Qual será o peso a atribuir aos contributos provenientes dos Estados‐Membros com RUP e qual será o peso que
será atribuído aos contributos em geral para a proposta legislativa que se segue?

**Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloș em nome da Comissão**

_(11 de julho de 2013)_

A Comissão pode confirmar que será realizada uma consulta pública no quadro da revisão do POSEI prevista no
artigo 35.° do Regulamento (UE) n.° 228/2013 ( [1] ) do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho.

O objetivo consiste em garantir o mais elevado nível de transparência neste exercício, dando a possibilidade a todos
os abrangidos por este regime específico de expressarem as suas opiniões.

O processo de consulta será lançado em breve e durante um período de doze semanas todas as partes interessadas
podem apresentar os seus contributos aos serviços da Comissão que, pouco tempo após o encerramento da consulta,
publicarão um resumo dos seus resultados.

O objetivo da consulta é recolher opiniões sobre o funcionamento do regime POSEI, sobre a forma de torná-lo mais
eficiente para benefício das comunidades rurais e dos produtores agrícolas nas regiões ultraperiféricas.

Todos os pareceres apresentados à Comissão serão tidos em conta no processo de elaboração de políticas. As partes
interessadas diretamente envolvidas na aplicação do regime devem apresentar os seus pontos de vista.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 78 de 20.3.2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 507

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006131/13**

**to the Commission**
**Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Public consultation on the POSEI agriculture programme (Regulation (EC) No 247/2006)

At a meeting on 7 May 2013 attended by the Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner, the Heads of
Government of the outermost regions, and the MEPs representing those regions, the Commission announced its
intention of holding a public consultation on the POSEI agriculture programme (Regulation (EC) No 247/2006 laying
down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions).

Because the POSEI agriculture programme is intended specifically and solely for the outermost regions and therefore
applies to only 3 (Portugal, France, and Spain) out of the 27 (and very soon 28) Member States, the arrangements for
the public consultation — assuming that it goes ahead — require particularly careful thought.

Bearing in mind that public consultations as a whole are a matter for the Commission:

—
Can the Commission confirm that a public consultation will indeed take place? If so, why is it choosing to go
down that road? When will the consultation be held?

—
What will be the purpose of the public consultation? What points will be covered? Is it the case that there will
be no consultation on the option whereby the POSEI agriculture programme would be absorbed into the CAP
and cease to exist as such, something which has already been categorically rejected by the Heads of
Government and MEPs from the outermost regions?

—
What weight will be given to contributions from Member States with ORs and to general contributions to the
future legislative proposal?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The Commission can confirm that a public consultation will take place in the framework of the POSEI review
provided for by Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 228/2013 ( [1] ) of the European Parliament and the Council.

This is to ensure the highest level of transparency in this exercise by giving the possibility to all those concerned by
this specific scheme to express their views.

The consultation will be launched shortly and during a 12-week period all interested stakeholders may submit their
contribution to the Commission services who, shortly after the closure of the consultation, will publish a summary of
its results.

The purpose of the consultation is to gather opinions on the functioning of the POSEI scheme, how to make it more
efficient for the benefit of rural communities and agricultural producers in the outermost regions.

All opinions submitted to the Commission will feed into the policy development process. The stakeholders who are
directly involved in the application of the scheme should provide their points of view.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 78, 20.3.2013.

C 42 E / 508 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006132/13**

**à la Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Alain Cadec (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE) et Françoise Grossetête (PPE)**

_(30 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Pêche aux ganguis

La pêche aux ganguis est une pêche traditionnelle du littoral provençal. Au-delà de sa participation à la richesse
gastronomique régionale, cette forme de pêche contribue au développement de nombreux emplois directs et indirects
(mareyeurs, conserverie, restauration) et à l'attractivité touristique de ce territoire.

Cette pêche traditionnelle, dont les prises n'excèdent pourtant pas plus de 1 000 tonnes de poissons prélevés par an,
est aujourd'hui strictement encadrée par l'Union européenne, notamment par le biais du règlement (CE)
n° 1967/2006.

Ainsi, la taille des navires de pêche ne doit pas excéder 12 mètres, leur puissance ne peut pas dépasser 85 kW et
l'activité est réglementée par un plan local de gestion durable des ressources.

Depuis 2010, le règlement (CE) n° 1967/2006 impose une nouvelle norme: le filet utilisé doit désormais disposer d'un
maillage minimal carré de 40 mm, alors que le maillage utilisé initialement était de 22 mm et en forme de losange.

Mais, alors que l'objectif affiché du changement de maillage est de réduire la capture de juvéniles, une étude de
l'Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer révèle que le passage à une maille carrée de 40 mm ne
permet pas d'atteindre cet objectif et menace la viabilité de cette activité économique.

L'étude conclut que si un tel changement de maille peut réduire de 29 % les captures juvéniles, celles-ci correspondent
majoritairement à des espèces non concernées par une taille minimale légale.

Par ailleurs, une telle maille entraînerait une baisse de 60 % des rendements horaires en poids capturés et conduirait à
réaliser de multiples traits journaliers pour tenter de maintenir la valeur initiale de débarquement, au risque de
détériorer l'environnement.

1. La Commission a-t-elle connaissance de cette étude? Au regard de ces éléments, quelles mesures ont été prises
pour permettre à cette pêche traditionnelle de rester économiquement viable?

2. La Commission envisage-t-elle de prolonger l'autorisation d'utilisation d'un filet à maillage losange de 22 mm,
en vue de pérenniser ce type de pêche traditionnelle et les emplois locaux?

**Réponse donnée par Mme Damanaki au nom de la Commission**

_(24 juillet 2013)_

La Commission a connaissance de l'étude à laquelle les Honorables Parlementaires font référence. Celle-ci révèle que
l'utilisation d'un maillage conforme aux dispositions du règlement (CE) n° 1967/2006 ( [1] ) (ci-après règlement
«Méditerranée») entraîne une réduction considérable du nombre de juvéniles capturés et rejetés. Cette étude montre
également qu'un grand nombre de poissons entrant dans la préparation de la bouillabaisse sont capturés avec le
maillage prescrit par le règlement «Méditerranée». Le respect des dispositions de ce règlement relatives à la taille du
maillage ne devrait donc pas avoir d'impact menaçant la viabilité économique de la pêche au gangui.

La Commission n'a pas l'intention de proposer aux colégislateurs une modification du règlement «Méditerranée» en
vue de prolonger la période transitoire prévue pour l'application des règles relatives à la taille du maillage. Cette
période transitoire a pris fin le 31 mai 2010 et les États membres avaient déjà disposé de plusieurs années de
préparation depuis l'adoption du règlement «Méditerranée» en 2006 et son entrée en vigueur en janvier 2007. La
Commission est en contact suivi avec l'administration française afin de définir les meilleures conditions de mise en
œuvre du règlement «Méditerranée» par le secteur de la petite pêche artisanale de la côte méditerranéenne française, et
constate qu'aucun plan de gestion n'a encore été proposé par la France pour la pêche au gangui.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO L 409 du 30.12.2006.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 509

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006132/13**

**to the Commission**
**Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Alain Cadec (PPE), Gaston Franco (PPE) and Françoise Grossetête (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Gangui fishing

Gangui fishing is a traditional fishing method used off the coast of Provence. As well as adding to the richness of the
local cuisine, this type of fishing also contributes to the development of many direct and indirect jobs (fish
wholesalers, canning, catering) and to the area’s appeal to tourists.

This traditional fishing method is now strictly regulated by the European Union, specifically through Regulation (EC)
No 1967/2006, yet catches from this method do not exceed 1 000 tonnes of fish harvested per year.

As a result, the size of the fishing vessels must not exceed 12 metres, their engine power must not exceed 85 kW and
their activity is regulated by a local plan for the sustainable management of resources.

Since 2010, a new rule has been imposed under Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006: the nets used must now have a
square mesh of at least 40 mm, while the netting used initially was 22 mm and diamond-shaped.

However, although the supposed objective of the change in the mesh is to reduce catches of juveniles, a study by the
French Research Institute for the Exploitation of the Sea shows that using a 40 mm mesh does not enable this
objective to be reached and threatens the viability of this economic activity.

The study concludes that although such a change to the netting could reduce catches of juveniles by 29%, this would
mainly correspond to species which are not affected by a minimum legal size.

Furthermore, these meshes would lead to a 60% reduction in hourly outputs in terms of the weight of catches and
would cause fishermen to make multiple daily trips to try to maintain the initial landing value, at the risk of having a
detrimental impact on the environment.

1. Is the Commission aware of this study? In view of this, what measures have been taken to ensure that this
traditional method of fishing remains economically viable?

2. Does the Commission intend to extend the authorisation to use nets with 22 mm diamond-shaped mesh so as
to ensure the continuity of this type of traditional fishing and local jobs?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the study referred to by the Honourable Members. The study reveals indeed that the
number of juveniles captured and discarded is significantly reduced when using a mesh size in line with the provisions
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 ( [1] ) (the ‘Mediterranean Regulation’). This same study also shows that a
larger number of fish used to prepare the ‘Bouillabaisse’ is captured when using the mesh size prescribed by
the Mediterranean Regulation. Alignment to the Mediterranean Regulation rules on mesh size should therefore not
have a major impact on the economic viability of the ‘gangui’ fishery.

The Commission has no intention to propose to the co-legislators a modification of the Mediterranean Regulation in
view of extending the transitional period foreseen to adapt to the mesh size rules. Such transitional period elapsed
already on 31 May 2010 and Member States have had several years to prepare since the Mediterranean Regulation
was adopted in 2006 and entered into force in January 2007. The Commission is in close contact with the French
administration to define the best conditions for the implementation of the Mediterranean Regulation by the small
scale artisanal fisheries in the Mediterranean coast of France, and notes that until now no proposal for a management
plan of the gangue fishery has been proposed by France.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 409, 30.12.2006.

C 42 E / 510 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006133/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Martin Häusling (Verts/ALE)**

_(30. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Artgerechte Haltung von Milchkühen

Nach Paragraph 5 des Anhangs B der Empfehlung für das Halten von Rindern, die von dem im Rahmen des
Europäischen Übereinkommens zum Schutz von Tieren in landwirtschaftlichen Tierhaltungen eingesetzten
Ständigen Ausschusses ausgesprochen wurde, sollten Tiere „im Sommer die Gelegenheit haben, sich so oft wie
möglich — vorzugsweise täglich — im Freien aufzuhalten“. Die Bedeutung dieser Vorschrift wird durch die
Feststellung der EFSA ersichtlich, dass bei Milchkühen, die nicht über einen gewissen Zeitraum im Jahr auf der Weide
gehalten werden, ein erhöhtes Risiko für mehrere schwerwiegende Krankheiten besteht. Empfehlungen, die im
Rahmen des Übereinkommens angenommen wurden, sind Teil der EU-Rechtsvorschriften. In Paragraph 5 wird die
Verbform „sollten“ an Stelle von „sollen“ verwendet.

Dennoch hat die EU das Übereinkommen durch den Beschluss 78/923/EWG genehmigt, vermutlich um zu erreichen,
dass die Empfehlungen in dem Übereinkommen nach Treu und Glauben umgesetzt werden, auch wenn „sollten“ an
Stelle von „sollen“ genutzt wird.

Welche Schritte plant die Kommission, um die Mitgliedstaaten und die Milchproduzenten dazu zu bewegen, den
Paragraphen 5 des Anhangs B der Empfehlung für das Halten von Rindern des im Rahmen des Übereinkommens
eingesetzten Ständigen Ausschusses umzusetzen?

**Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission**

_(11. Juli 2013)_

Die Kommission kontrolliert, in welcher Weise die allgemeinen Tierschutzanforderungen der Empfehlung des
Europarates zur Haltung von Rindern ( [1] ) in den Mitgliedstaaten angewandt werden. Zu diesem Zweck hat das
Lebensmittel‐ und Veterinäramt, der Auditdienst der Generaldirektion Gesundheit und Verbraucher, im Jahr 2012
bereits drei Vor-Ort-Inspektionen durchgeführt und für 2013 sind drei weitere geplant. Derzeit sind keine weiteren
besonderen Maßnahmen hinsichtlich der Weidehaltung von Milchkühen geplant.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/biological_safety_and_use_of_animals/farming/Rec%20cattle%20E.asp#TopOfPage

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 511

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006133/13**

**to the Commission**
**Martin Häusling (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Welfare of dairy cows

Paragraph 5 of Appendix B to the recommendation concerning cattle of the Standing Committee of the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes states that ‘animals should be given the
opportunity to go outside whenever possible and in summertime preferably every day’. The importance of this
provision can be seen from the fact that EFSA has concluded that if dairy cows are not kept on pasture for parts of the
year there is an increased risk of a range of serious health problems. Recommendations adopted under the
Convention are part of EC law. Paragraph 5 uses ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’.

Nonetheless, the Community approved the Convention through Decision 78/923/EEC, and in so doing presumably
intended, as a matter of good faith, to respect the recommendations made under the Convention even where they use
‘should’ rather than ‘shall’.

What steps is the Commission taking to encourage Member States and dairy producers to respect paragraph 5 of
Appendix B to the recommendation concerning cattle of the Standing Committee of the Convention?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The Commission checks how the general welfare requirements of the recommendation of the Council of Europe
concerning cattle ( [1] ) are applied within Member States. For this purpose, the Food and Veterinary Office, audit service
of the Commission's Health and Consumers Directorate General, already completed 3 on-the-spot inspections in
2012 and 3 more are planned for 2013. No other special measures are currently foreseen for dairy cows with regard
to access to pasture.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/biological_safety_and_use_of_animals/farming/Rec%20cattle%20E.asp#TopOfPage.

C 42 E / 512 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versão portuguesa)_

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-006134/13**

**à Comissão**
**Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (PPE)**

_(30 de maio de 2013)_

_Assunto:_ Consulta pública sobre o programa POSEI Pescas (Regulamento (CE) n.° 791/2007)

Numa reunião, no passado dia 8 de maio, da Comissária Europeia dos Assuntos Marítimos e das Pescas com os
Eurodeputados das Regiões Ultraperiféricas, estes foram informados de que a Comissão Europeia tenciona proceder a
uma consulta pública sobre o denominado programa POSEI Pescas (Regulamento (CE) n.° 791/2007, que institui um
regime de compensação dos custos suplementares para o escoamento dos produtos da pesca das regiões
ultraperiféricas), presentemente integrado na proposta da CE relativa ao Fundo Europeu dos Assuntos Marítimos e da
Pesca/FEAMP.

O facto de o POSEI Pescas ser um programa dirigido específica e exclusivamente às regiões ultraperiféricas e, como
tal, aplicável a apenas 3 (Portugal, Espanha e França) dos 27 (e proximamente 28) Estados-Membros da União
Europeia, impõe uma ponderação acrescida acerca do formato desta eventual futura consulta pública.

Considerando que todas as consultas públicas são prerrogativa da Comissão, pergunto:

—
Confirma a Comissão a intenção de proceder a uma consulta pública? Em caso afirmativo, qual o fundamento
desta opção? E quando decorrerá?

—
Quais os objetivos desta consulta pública? Quais as questões que serão sujeitas a consulta pública? Será excluída
a opção de integração do programa POSEI Pescas na proposta de regulamento do FEAMP já formalmente
rejeitada pelos Presidentes dos Governos e pelos Eurodeputados das Regiões Ultraperiféricas?

—
Qual será o peso a atribuir aos contributos provenientes dos Estados‐‐Membros com RUP e qual será o peso
que será atribuído aos contributos em geral para a proposta legislativa que se segue?

**Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão**

_(4 de setembro de 2013)_

A Comissão está empenhada em manter a compensação dos custos suplementares suportados pelos operadores dos
setores das pescas e da aquicultura nas regiões ultraperiféricas (RUP), razão pela qual propôs a integração do regime
de compensação na proposta de criação de um Fundo Europeu dos Assuntos Marítimos e das Pescas (FEAMP) ( [1] ). Em
termos de financiamento, após uma iniciativa dos serviços da Comissão, a dotação proposta será aumentada de 50 %
para o período de 2014-2020, conforme indicado na recente abordagem geral do Conselho.

A integração do regime de compensação no FEAMP, além de permitir harmonizar a execução da programação e
acompanhar as ações decorrentes da integração, oferece a vantagem específica de o Parlamento Europeu ser
plenamente associado enquanto colegislador no que se refere a este regime.

Na reunião de 8 de maio de 2013, a que a Senhora Deputada faz referência, a Comissão mencionou a realização
futura de uma consulta pública sobre o programa POSEI para a agricultura ( [2] ). Atendendo a que o regime de
compensação dos custos suplementares gerados pela ultraperifericidade em relação ao escoamento de determinados
produtos da pesca das RUP ( [3] ) não é propriamente um programa POSEI, a Comissão não tenciona lançar uma
consulta pública a este respeito, não podendo, portanto, responder às perguntas da Senhora Deputada do Parlamento
Europeu quanto ao alcance e eventuais resultados dessa consulta.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 804.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulamento (UE) n.° 228/2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulamento (CE) n.° 791/2007.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 513

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006134/13**

**to the Commission**
**Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Public consultation on the POSEI fisheries programme (Regulation (EC) No 791/2007)

At a meeting on 8 May 2013 between the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Commissioner and MEPs from the
outermost regions, the Commission announced its intention of holding a public consultation on the POSEI fisheries
programme (Regulation (EC) No 791/2007 introducing a scheme to compensate for the additional costs incurred in
the marketing of certain fishery products from the outermost regions), which is now in the process of being absorbed
into the Commission proposal on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).

Because the POSEI fisheries programme is intended specifically and solely for the outermost regions and therefore
applies to only 3 (Portugal, France, and Spain) out of the 27 (and very soon 28) Member States, the arrangements for
the forthcoming public consultation — assuming that it goes ahead — require particularly careful thought.

Bearing in mind that public consultations as a whole are a matter for the Commission:

—
Can the Commission confirm that a public consultation will indeed take place? If so, why is it choosing to go
down that road? When will the consultation be held?

—
What will be the purpose of the public consultation? What points will be covered? Is it the case that there will
be no consultation on the option of incorporating the POSEI fisheries programme into the proposed EMFF
regulation, something which has already been categorically rejected by the Heads of Government and MEPs
from the outermost regions?

—
What weight will be given to contributions from Member States with ORs and, more generally, to
contributions to the future legislative proposal?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission**

_(4 September 2013)_

The Commission is committed to the continuation of the compensation of additional costs incurred by operators of
the fisheries and aquaculture sectors in the outermost regions (OR) which is the reason behind the Commission's
proposal to integrate the compensation scheme (CS) in the proposal for a European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
(EMFF) ( [1] ). In terms of funding, and following an initiative from the Commission services, the proposed envelope will
be increased by 50% for the period 2014-2020, as set-out in the recent Council’s general approach.

Beyond the streamlining of the programming, implementation and monitoring of actions entailed by this integration,
one specific advantage of encompassing the CS in the EMFF is that the European Parliament is fully involved as colegislator for this scheme.

During the meeting of 8 May 2013, to which the honourable Member refers in her question, the Commission referred
to a public consultation that will take place on the programme POSEI for Agriculture ( [2] ). As the scheme to
compensate for the additional costs incurred in the marketing of certain fishery products from the OR ( [3] ) is not stricly
speaking a POSEI, the Commission does not have the intention to launch a public consultation and therefore cannot
answer the questions raised by the Honourable Member of the European Parliament regarding the scope and possible
outcome of such a consultation.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 804.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU)228/2013.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC)791/2007.

C 42 E / 514 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006135/13**

**do Komisji**
**Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)**

_(30 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Oznaczanie na etykietach produktów żywnościowych tzw. numerów E dotyczących dodatków
pochodzenia zwierzęcego

Pod kodami substancji chemicznych, których można używać jako dodatki do żywności (widniejące na etykietach
jako numery E), kryje się szereg substancji otrzymywanych lub często otrzymywanych z produktów zwierzęcych.

Najczęściej występującą taką substancją jest koszenila (E 120), czerwony barwnik żywności otrzymywany z owadów,
oraz żelatyna (E 441), otrzymywana z kości zwierzęcych. Jednak istnieje jeszcze wiele innych numerów E, które
mogą mieć pochodzenie zwierzęce lub roślinne.

Nie wiedząc, co dokładnie oznaczają numery E, konsumenci mogą kupować produkty w błędnym przekonaniu, że
dany produkt jest wegetariański lub wegański.

Uwzględniając fakt, że UE propaguje dietę obejmującą jeden dzień bezmięsny w tygodniu oraz że w Europie
przestrzega się zasady różnorodności religijnej/etycznej, niejasne oznakowanie produktów zwierzęcych stanowi dla
naszych obywateli problem.

— Czy Komisja mogłaby poinformować Parlament, jakie zamierza podjąć działania w celu zachęcenia producentów
do wyraźniejszego oznakowania dodatków do żywności pochodzenia zwierzęcego?

— Czy można skłonić poszczególne przedsiębiorstwa do oznakowania składników pochodzenia zwierzęcego za
pomocą pełnego opisu obok odnośnych numerów E?

— Czy Komisja mogłaby rozważyć podjęcie prac prowadzących do ogólnounijnej normalizacji terminów
„laktowegetariański”, „wegetariański” i „wegański” na opakowaniach oraz do wprowadzenia symbolu dla tych
rodzajów produktów?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonia Borga w imieniu Komisji Europejskiej**

_(11 lipca 2013 r.)_

Dodatki do żywności to ściśle określone substancje a ich funkcja technologiczna jest bezpośrednio związana z ich
właściwościami. Ta sama substancja spełnia tę samą funkcję technologiczną, niezależnie od tego, czy została
wytworzona w drodze syntezy chemicznej, czy też pozyskana w wyniku ekstrakcji lub oczyszczania różnych
naturalnych składników. Zgodnie z obowiązującymi przepisami ( [1] ) nazwa dodatków do żywności odwołuje się do
nazwy chemicznej, do danej substancji, do nazwy w Kodeksie Żywnościowym, lub nawet do źródła lub procesu
wytwarzania dodatku. Ze względu na obróbkę, jakiej dodatki do żywności zostały poddane przed ich
wprowadzeniem do obrotu w Unii, nie mogą one być uważane za żywność zwykle spożywaną lub za
charakterystyczny składnik żywności (np. dodatki do żywności pochodzenia zwierzęcego). Dlatego też pochodzenie
nie jest uważane za czynnik decydujący dla charakterystyki dodatków do żywności. W związku z powyższym
Komisja nie zamierza w chwili obecnej proponować wprowadzenia dodatkowych przepisów dotyczących
oznaczania dodatków do żywności.

Dotatki do żywności należące do jednej z kategorii wymienionych w załączniku II do dyrektywy 2000/13/WE ( [2] )
muszą być oznaczone nazwą tej kategorii z dodaniem nazwy szczegółowej lub numeru WE ( [3] ). Zabronione jest
podawanie jakichkolwiek innych danych szczegółowych dla oznaczenia dodatków do żywności w wykazie
składników na oznakowaniu środków spożywczych.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 1333/2008 z dnia 16 grudnia 2008 r. w sprawie dodatków do żywności (Dz.U. L 354

z 31.12.2008, s. 16).

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Dyrektywa 2000/13/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 20 marca 2000 r. w sprawie zbliżenia ustawodawstw państw członkowskich

w zakresie etykietowania, prezentacji i reklamy środków spożywczych, Dz.U. L 109 z 6.5.2000, s. 29.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Art. 6 dyrektywy 2000/13/WE.

( **|**

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 515

Na mocy nowego rozporządzenia (UE) nr 1169/2011 ( [4] ) w sprawie przekazywania konsumentom informacji na
temat żywności Komisja jest upoważniona do przyjęcia aktu wykonawczego dotyczącego dobrowolnych informacji
o tym, czy dana żywność jest odpowiednia dla wegetarianów lub wegan. Na obecnym etapie Komisja nie może
zobowiązać się do przyjęcia takiego aktu w określonym terminie.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1169/2011 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 25 października 2011 r. w sprawie przekazywania konsumentom

informacji o żywności, zmieniające rozporządzenia (WE) nr 1924/2006 i (WE) nr 1925/2006 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady oraz uchylające
dyrektywę Komisji 87/250/EWG, dyrektywę Rady 90/496/EWG, dyrektywę Komisji 1999/10/WE, dyrektywę 2000/13/WE Parlamentu
Europejskiego i Rady, dyrektywy Komisji 2002/67/WE i 2008/5/WE, jak również rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 608/2004 (Dz.U. L 304
z 22.11.2011, s. 18). Nowe rozporządzenie wejdzie w życie z dniem 13 grudnia 2014 r., uchylając i zastępując dyrektywę 2000/13/WE.

C 42 E / 516 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006135/13**

**to the Commission**
**Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Labelling of animal-based ‘E-numbers’ on foodstuffs

Under the code for chemicals that can be used as food additives (shown as ‘E-numbers’ on food labels), are a number
of chemicals derived from, or often derived from, animal products.

The most common of these are cochineal (E-120), a red food dye derived from insects, and gelatine (E441), which is
derived from animal bones. However, in addition to these, there are numerous other E-numbers that could be of
animal or plant origin.

Without knowledge of what exact E-numbers mean, consumers might be buying products in the false belief that a
product is vegetarian or vegan.

When taken into consideration with the EU’s promotion of a diet that includes one day a week without meat and the
religious/ethical diversity in Europe, the unclear labelling of animal products is problematic for our citizens.

— Could the Commission inform Parliament of what it intends to do to encourage clearer labelling of animal-based
food additives?

— Could individual companies be encouraged to label animal-based ingredients with a full description beside the
relevant E-numbers?

— Would the Commission consider working on EU-wide standardisation of the terms ‘Lacto-Vegetarian’, ‘Vegetarian’
and ‘Vegan’ on packaging and a symbol for these product types?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The food additives are defined substances and their technological purpose is directly linked with their properties. The
same substance fulfils the same technological purpose, regardless if it is chemically produced or obtained through
extraction or purification of different natural sources. Under existing rules ( [1] ), the designation of food additives refers
to the chemical name or to the substance concerned or the ‘Codex Alimentarius’ designation or even to the source or
manufacturing process thereof. Because of the process that food additives have undergone prior to their placing on
the Union market, they cannot be considered as foods normally consumed or as a characteristic ingredient of a food
(e.g. food additives of animal origin). Therefore, the origin is not considered a determining factor for the
characterisation of food additives. In light of the above considerations, the Commission does not intend to propose
additional rules on the designation of food additives for the time being.

Food additives belonging to one of the categories listed in Annex II to Directive 2000/13/EC ( [2] ) must be designated by
the name of their category followed by their specific name or EC number ( [3] ). No other labelling particulars concerning
the designation of food additives in the list of ingredients are allowed to be mentioned on the labelling of foodstuffs.

Under the new Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ( [4] ) on the provision of food information to consumers, the
Commission is empowered to adopt an implementing act concerning the voluntary information related to suitability
of a food for vegetarians or vegans. The Commission cannot commit at this stage to a specific date for its adoption.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives, OJ L 354, 31.12.2008,

p. 16.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States

relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Article 6 of Directive 2000/13/EC.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to

consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304,
22.11.2011, p. 18. The new Regulation will enter into application on 13 December 2014 and it will repeal and replace Directive 2000/13/EC.

( **|**

( **|**
( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 517

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006136/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)**

_(30. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Diskriminierung beim Kauf von Eisenbahntickets in den Niederlanden

Das Gebot der Nichtdiskriminierung von Unionsbürgern aufgrund deren Nationalität oder Wohnort gehört zu den
Grundpfeilern der Europäischen Union. Dies ist besonders im Bereich der Mobilität von großer Bedeutung.

Zahlreiche Bürger haben mir in letzter Zeit berichtet, dass dieses Prinzip beim Kauf von Eisenbahntickets in den
Niederlanden verletzt wird. So sei der der Erwerb der Reduktionskarte „Voordeel Abonnement“ oder von im Internet
erhältlichen Sonderangeboten nur dann möglich, wenn der Kunde eine persönliche „OV-Chipkaart“ vorweisen kann.
Diese Chipkarte kann er jedoch nur dann erwerben, wenn er ein niederländisches Bankkonto hat, für dessen
Eröffnung wiederum die Vorlage einer niederländischen Steuer‐ und Sozialversicherungsnummer erforderlich ist.

Es ist damit in der Praxis für nicht in den Niederlanden ansässige Unionsbürger unmöglich, diese Angebote der
niederländischen Eisenbahnen zu nutzen. Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Ist der Ausschluss von Kunden mit einem Wohnsitz außerhalb der Niederlande mit den Regeln des
europäischen Binnenmarkts vereinbar? Wenn ja, warum? Wenn nein, warum nicht?

2. In welcher Form müssen die niederländischen Eisenbahnen ihr Angebot anpassen, um einen
diskriminierungsfreien Zugang zu Vorteilskarten und Tickets zu ermöglichen?

3. Was wird die Kommission unternehmen, um eine Diskriminierung von nicht in den Niederlanden ansässigen
Unionsbürgern zu unterbinden?

**Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission**

_(12. August 2013)_

Die Kommissionsdienststellen haben die niederländische Regierung um Informationen über die persönliche
OV-Chipkarte sowie über die Voraussetzungen für ihren Erhalt ersucht, um festzustellen, ob die Praxis mit Artikel 18
und Artikel 21 Absatz 1 AEUV vereinbar ist.

Die niederländische Regierung hat erklärt, dass seit Dezember 2011 nicht nur in den Niederlanden, sondern auch in
Belgien, Luxemburg und Deutschland wohnende Personen eine persönliche OV-Chipkarte erhalten können, entweder
online oder durch einen Antrag in Papierform, der bei den Servicezentren der öffentlichen Verkehrsbetriebe erhältlich
ist.

Durch die persönliche OV-Chipkarte haben Antragsteller aus den genannten Mitgliedstaaten Anspruch auf die
Ermäßigungen, die in den Niederlanden wohnenden Personen gewährt werden, und sie können damit Zeitkarten
erwerben. In Belgien, Deutschland oder Luxemburg wohnende Personen können die persönliche OV-Chipkarte auch
mit PayPal oder Kreditkarte bezahlen und benötigen hierzu weder ein niederländisches Bankkonto noch eine
niederländische Steuer‐ und Sozialversicherungsnummer.

Die Fahrkarten, die mittels der persönlichen Chipkarte erworben werden können, sind vor allem für in den
Niederlanden oder den benachbarten Mitgliedstaaten (Belgien, Deutschland und Luxemburg) wohnende Pendler von
großem Interesse. Die Kommission wird jedoch ihre Gespräche mit den niederländischen Behörden fortsetzen, um zu
erreichen, dass auch in den übrigen Mitgliedstaaten wohnende Personen OV-Chipkarten erhalten können.

C 42 E / 518 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006136/13**

**to the Commission**
**Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Discrimination when purchasing railway tickets in the Netherlands

The principle of non-discrimination of the Union’s citizens on grounds of their nationality or place of residence is one
of the cornerstones of the European Union. This is of particularly great importance when it comes to mobility.

Many people have told me lately that this principle was violated when they purchased railway tickets in the
Netherlands. It appears that it is only possible to purchase a reduced-rate ticket, a _voordeel abonnement_, or special offers
available on the Internet if the customer is able to show his/her personal _OV-chipkaart_ . However, the customer can
only purchase this chip card if he/she has a Dutch bank account and, in order to open one, he/she is required to state
his/her Dutch tax and social security numbers.

This, in practice, means that it is impossible for European citizens not based in the Netherlands, to benefit from these
deals provided by the Dutch railways. Can the Commission answer the following questions in this respect?

1. Is the exclusion of customers resident outside the Netherlands consistent with the rules of the European internal
market? If so, why? If not, why not?

2. How should the Dutch railways change their offers in order to enable non-discriminatory access to discount
cards and tickets?

3. What action will the Commission take in order to prevent discrimination of Union citizens not resident in the
Netherlands?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(12 August 2013)_

The Commission services have requested the Dutch Government for information about the nature and eligibility
conditions of the personal OV-chipcard so as to assess whether the practice complies with Articles 18 and 21(1)
TFEU.

The Dutch Government explained that as of December 2011, in addition to residents of the Netherlands, those from
Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany can also obtain a personal OV-chipcard either online or through a paper
application form obtained from the public transport operator service centres.

A personalised OV-chipcard entitles applicants from these other Member States to the discounts available to Dutch
residents and provides them with access to season tickets. Residents of Belgium, Germany or Luxembourg can also
pay for the personalised OV-chipcard with PayPal or creditcard and do not need to possess a Dutch bank account or
to indicate their Dutch tax and social security numbers.

The tickets accessible via the personal OV-chipcard are of primary interest to frequent commuters residing mostly in
the Netherlands or in the neighbouring Member States (Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg). However the
Commission will continue its discussions with the Dutch authorities with the aim of enlarging the benefit of the OVchipcard to residents of all Member States.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 519

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006137/13**

**alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ VP/HR — Embargo sulle armi in Siria

La decisione del Consiglio europeo di porre fine all'embargo sulle armi nei confronti delle forze di opposizione siriane
potrebbe avere conseguenze devastanti. Non esistono soluzioni semplici per fermare lo spargimento di sangue in
Siria, ma di certo non lo è l'invio di ulteriori armi e munizioni. Il trasferimento di una maggiore quantità di armi in
Siria non può far altro che aumentare il numero di morti fra i civili.

Nel febbraio 2012 la commissione di inchiesta delle Nazioni Unite sulla Siria ha riferito che i ribelli avevano
commesso «crimini di guerra, compresi omicidi, esecuzioni extragiudiziali e torture» ( [1] ).

La risoluzione 2083 (2012) del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite afferma che tutti gli Stati devono adottare
misure per impedire la fornitura diretta o indiretta di armi e di relativi materiali ad Al-Qaeda e ad altri individui ed
entità ad essa associati. Uno dei gruppi armati più potenti, Jabhat al-Nusra, è legato ad Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Nell'aprile 2013 l'Assemblea generale dell'ONU ha adottato il trattato sul commercio di armi, che vieta agli Stati di
esportare armi convenzionali che potrebbero essere utilizzate per atti di genocidio, crimini contro l'umanità, crimini
di guerra o terrorismo.

Inoltre, la posizione comune dell'UE afferma che gli Stati membri devono respingere le domande di licenza
d'esportazione qualora sussista il rischio evidente che l'attrezzatura possa essere utilizzata per commettere violazioni
del diritto umanitario internazionale o dei diritti umani.

Alla luce di quanto sopra:

1. Può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante chiarire come è possibile che durante la riunione del Consiglio sulla
Siria sia stata infine adottata la posizione minoritaria del Regno Unito e della Francia, che contraddice l'ultima
risoluzione del Parlamento sulla Siria?

2. Non ritiene il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante che tale decisione porterà a un peggioramento della
situazione della popolazione civile e a forti reazioni da parte dei sostenitori di Assad, come già dimostrato dalla
reazione della Russia?

**Risposta dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione**

_(29 agosto 2013)_

Il 27 maggio il Consiglio ha deciso di adottare misure restrittive in tutti i settori oggetto delle sanzioni in vigore al
momento, ad esclusione del divieto di esportazioni di armi e materiali che possono essere utilizzati a fini di
repressione interna. La decisione è stata adottata conformemente alle procedure di cui agli articoli 29 e 31 del trattato
sull’Unione europea, che stabiliscono, fra l’altro, che in questi casi il Consiglio delibera all’unanimità.

Tutti gli Stati membri concordano che occorre dare la priorità ad azioni diplomatiche e alla messa a disposizione di
assistenza umanitaria ancora più efficace. L’UE ribadisce che urge trovare una soluzione politica al conflitto e ha
accolto con favore l’iniziativa congiunta USA-Russia di organizzare una conferenza di pace sulla Siria per
promuovere un processo politico fondato sui principi del comunicato di Ginevra del 30 giugno 2012. L’UE farà il
possibile per aiutare a creare le condizioni favorevoli per garantire il successo della conferenza.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Si veda http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42687.

C 42 E / 520 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006137/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**Pino Arlacchi (S&D)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — Syria arms embargo

The European Council decision to bring the arms embargo on the Syrian opposition forces to an end could have
devastating consequences. There are no easy solutions in putting an end to the bloodshed in Syria, but sending more
arms and ammunition is clearly not one of them. Transferring more weapons to Syria can only increase the number
of civilian deaths.

In February 2012, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported that the rebels had committed ‘war
crimes, including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture’ ( [1] ).

UN Security Council Resolution 2083 (2012) says that all states shall take measures to prevent the direct or indirect
supply of arms and related materials to al-Qaida and other individuals and entities associated with it. One of the most
powerful armed groups, Jabhat al‐Nusra, is linked to al-Qaida in Iraq.

In April 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty, which prohibits states from exporting
conventional weapons that would be used for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or terrorism.

Moreover, the EU Common Position says that Member States must deny an export licence application if there is a
clear risk that the equipment may be used to commit violations of international humanitarian law or human rights.

In light of the above:

1. Could the Vice-President/High Representative clarify how is it possible that during the Council meeting on
Syria, the minority position of UK and France, which contradicts the last Parliament Resolution on Syria, was in
the end adopted?

2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative not believe that this action will worsen the civilian situation and
cause a strong reaction by supporters of Assad, as already shown by Russia’s reaction?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 August 2013)_

On 27 May the Council agreed to adopt restrictive measures in all areas covered by the sanctions in force at that time,
except the prohibition on the export of arms and equipment that may be used for internal repression. This decision
was taken in accordance with procedures laid down in Artcile 29 and Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union,
which determine _inter alia_ that the Council acts unanimously when adopting such decisions.

All Member States strongly agreed that the priority now is to focus on diplomatic actions and delivery of even more
effective humanitarian assistance. The EU reiterates the urgent need for a political solution of the conflict and has
welcomed the joint US-Russian call for a peace conference on Syria to promote a political process based on the
principles included in the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012. The EU will spare no efforts in helping to create the
appropiate conditions for a succesful convening of this conference.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42687.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 521

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006138/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(30 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Rapimenti, persecuzioni religiose ed emergenza umanitaria in Siria

Dalla Siria arrivano numerose le segnalazioni di rapimenti e persecuzioni religiose ai danni dei cristiani. In particolare,
si conterebbero centinaia di sequestri che vedono vittime i rappresentanti della chiesa cattolica e ortodossa. Di
recente, ad Aleppo sono stati catturati i vescovi Mar Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim e Boulos al-Yazigi. La comunità
cattolica francescana e vari monasteri hanno diramato un'urgente richiesta di aiuto, perché si trovano a fronteggiare
un'emergenza senza precedenti e non hanno mezzi economici a sufficienza per far fronte ai bisogni dei rifugiati.

Considerando la dichiarazione comune del 30 gennaio 2008, in particolare l'articolo 1, secondo il quale «l'aiuto
umanitario è espressione fondamentale del valore universale della solidarietà tra i popoli e un imperativo morale»;

considerando altresì l'articolo 5, paragrafo 1, della CEDU, secondo il quale «ogni persona ha diritto alla libertà e alla
sicurezza. Nessuno può essere privato della libertà, salvo che (…) nei modi prescritti dalla legge»;

osservando inoltre la comunicazione della Commissione COM(2001)0231 dal titolo «Sviluppare un partenariato
efficace con le Nazioni Unite nei settori dello sviluppo e delle questioni umanitarie», soprattutto il riferimento alla
cooperazione tra ONU e UE sotto il profilo operativo, oltre che politico;

evidenziando infine la comunicazione della Commissione COM(2010)0126, secondo la quale le istituzioni
comunitarie «(…) garantiranno che, nei limiti del possibile, il fabbisogno di assistenza alimentare umanitaria sia
soddisfatto senza creare un'eccessiva dipendenza dal sistema di soccorso e senza perturbare il funzionamento dei
mercati»;

si chiede alla Commissione:

—
se sia al corrente degli ultimi sviluppi dell'emergenza umanitaria in Siria;

—
con quali strumenti intenda intervenire per porvi rimedio.

**Risposta di Kristalina Georgieva a nome della Commissione**

_(20 agosto 2013)_

La Commissione è al corrente degli ultimi sviluppi della crisi umanitaria in Siria, da cui risulta un numero allarmante
di denunce di stupri e di altri atti di violenza basati sul genere.

Oltre ai 437,8 milioni di euro di aiuti umanitari forniti dagli Stati membri, dalla fine del 2011 il bilancio dell'UE ha
stanziato circa 840 milioni di euro (aiuti umanitari: 515 milioni di euro, assistenza economica, allo sviluppo e alla
stabilizzazione: 325 milioni di euro) per attività all'interno e all'esterno della Siria. Il 5 % circa dell'assistenza
umanitaria della Commissione è investito in attività specifiche riguardanti direttamente le violenze basate sul genere e
la protezione dei bambini. Inoltre, la Commissione integra questo aspetto nella maggior parte delle sue attività. Per
tale motivo il 28 giugno 2013 si è tenuta una tavola rotonda di alto livello sulla violenza basata sul genere in
collaborazione con la presidenza irlandese e il Comitato internazionale di soccorso: la situazione in Siria era all'ordine
del giorno.

I finanziamenti umanitari dell'UE sono distribuiti esclusivamente attraverso partner umanitari accreditati. Per essere
accreditati, i partner devono essere neutrali e indipendenti nella fornitura di assistenza umanitaria: devono quindi
aiutare chiunque, senza distinzioni sulla base di religione, affiliazione politica, genere o razza, senza discriminazione
fra le popolazioni interessate o all'interno delle varie popolazioni.

C 42 E / 522 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006138/13**

**to the Commission**

**Lorenzo Fontana (EFD)**

_(30 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rape, religious persecution and humanitarian emergency in Syria

Many reports of rape and religious persecution against Christians are emerging from Syria. In particular, it appears
that hundreds of representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox churches have been kidnapped. The bishops Mar
Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim and Boulos al-Yazigii were captured recently in Aleppo. The Franciscan Catholic
community and various monasteries have made urgent appeals for help, because they find themselves facing an
unprecedented emergency and do not have enough financial resources to cope with the refugees’ needs.

Having regard to the joint declaration of 30 January 2008, particularly Article 1, according to which ‘Humanitarian
aid is a fundamental expression of the universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative’;

Having regard also to Article 5, paragraph 1, of the ECHR, according to which ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save (…) in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’;

Having regard also to a communication from the Commission COM(2001)0231 entitled ‘Building an effective
partnership with the United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs’, particularly the
reference to operational and political cooperation between the UN and the EU;

Having regard, finally, to Commission communication COM(2010)0126, according to which the EU and its Member
States ‘(…) will ensure that, as far as possible, humanitarian food needs are met in ways that do not create undue
dependency on the relief system, nor disrupt the functioning of markets’;

Can the Commission answer the following:

—
Is it aware of the latest developments in the humanitarian emergency in Syria?

—
What measures does it intend to take to remedy the situation?

**Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission**

_(20 August 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the latest developments in the humanitarian emergency in Syria, which includes the
alarming number of reports of rape and other forms of gender-based violence (GBV).

In addition to EUR 437.8 million of humanitarian assistance provided by Member States, the EU budget has, since the
end of 2011 and in direct response to the crises, mobilised approximately EUR 840 million (humanitarian aid:
EUR 515 million, economic, development and stabilisation assistance: EUR 325 million) of total support for activities
inside and outside Syria. Approximately 5% of the Commission's humanitarian assistance goes to specific activities
directly related to GBV and child protection. Moreover, the Commission mainstreams this dimension in most of its
activities. For this reason a High-Level Roundtable on GBV was organised in cooperation with the Irish Presidency
and the International Rescue Committee on 28 June 2013, during which Syria was on the agenda.

EU Humanitarian funding is channelled exclusively through accredited humanitarian partners. Accreditation requires
that partners are neutral and independent in the provision of humanitarian assistance, i.e. they must serve all people
with no distinction to religion, political affiliation, gender or race, without discrimination between or within the
affected populations.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 523

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-006139/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Derk Jan Eppink (ECR)**

_(31 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ De Gucht — Gedragscode voor commissarissen

Op woensdag 29 mei 2013 verscheen in de Vlaamse krant De Standaard een opinieartikel van Europees commissaris
voor Handel Karel De Gucht met als titel „De kromme ethiek van De Wever”. In dit verband heb ik de volgende vragen
aan de Commissie:

1. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat een dermate persoonlijke en directe betrokkenheid in de partijpolitiek,
zoals commissaris De Gucht ten toon spreidde op 29 mei 2013, op gespannen voet staat met de gedragscode
voor Europese commissarissen?

2. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat het taalgebruik van commissaris De Gucht in het genoemde opinie artikel
(hij omschrijft het beleid van het Antwerpse stadsbestuur o.m. als „grof”, „onethisch”, „rauw” en „platvloers”)
niet in overeenstemming is met de waardigheid van het ambt van Europees commissaris?

3. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat een commissaris met een dergelijk taalgebruik de sociale intelligentie mist
voor succesvolle onderhandelingen met China en de VS?

4. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat een dergelijke directe bemoeienis op persoonlijke titel in de Antwerpse
politiek de objectiviteit en de onafhankelijkheid van een commissaris en bijgevolg de Commissie in gevaar
brengt?

5. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat een dergelijke directe bemoeienis op persoonlijke titel in de Antwerpse
politiek nadelig is voor de beschikbaarheid van een commissaris voor werkzaamheden ten dienste van de
Commissie?

**Antwoord van de heer Šefčovič namens de Commissie**

_(22 juli 2013)_

1. 2. 4. 5.   De leden van de Commissie moeten bij de uitoefening van hun taken volledig onafhankelijk zijn en het
algemeen belang van de Unie bevorderen. Overeenkomstig het beginsel van collegiale verantwoordelijkheid mogen
zij de besluiten van de Commissie niet ter discussie stellen.

De leden van de Commissie mogen echter wel onder eigen verantwoordelijkheid hun persoonlijke mening uiten over
kwesties die niet tot de bevoegdheid van de Commissie behoren. In het in de vraag vermelde artikel heeft commissaris
De Gucht slechts op persoonlijke titel zijn eigen mening geuit. Het uiten van een persoonlijke mening in een krant
doet geen afbreuk aan het vermogen van een lid van de Commissie om zijn taken uit te voeren.

3. De Commissie ziet geen reden om aan te nemen dat de uitspraken van commissaris De Gucht gevolgen hebben
voor de onderhandelingen met China en de VS.

C 42 E / 524 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006139/13**

**to the Commission**
**Derk Jan Eppink (ECR)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ De Gucht — Code of Conduct for Commissioners

On Wednesday, 29 May 2013, the Flemish newspaper _De Standaard_ published an op-ed article by European Trade
Commissioner Karel De Gucht headed ‘The dubious ethics of De Wever’.

1. Does the Commission agree that such personal and direct involvement in party politics as was displayed by
Commissioner De Gucht on 29 May 2013 is difficult to reconcile with the Code of Conduct for European
Commissioners?

2. Does the Commission agree that the language used by Commissioner De Gucht in that article (he describes the
policy of Antwerp city council, _inter alia_, as ‘coarse’, ‘unethical’, ‘crude’ and ‘vulgar’) fails to live up to the dignity
expected of the office of a European Commissioner?

3. Does the Commission agree that, by using such language, a Commissioner shows that he lacks the social
intelligence required for successful negotiations with China and the USA?

4. Does the Commission agree that such direct involvement in the politics of Antwerp in a personal capacity
jeopardises the objectivity and independence of a Commissioner and hence of the Commission?

5. Does the Commission agree that such direct involvement in the politics of Antwerp in a personal capacity is
detrimental to a Commissioner’s availability to perform duties on behalf of the Commission?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

1, 2, 4, 5.   In carrying out their responsibilities, the Members of the Commission shall be completely independent
and shall promote the general interest of the Union. In accordance with the principle of collective responsibility, they
may not call into question a decision taken by the Commission.

However, the Members of the Commission may express personal opinions under their own responsibility on matters
which are not an issue of Commission competence. In the article referred to in the question, Commissioner De Gucht
limited himself to express a personal opinion in his personal capacity. Expressing a personal opinion in a newspaper
does not compromise the ability of a Member of the Commission to perform his duties.

3. The Commission sees no reason to consider that his statement could have any impact on negotiation with
China and the USA.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 525

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006140/13**

**to the Commission**
**Chris Davies (ALDE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Marketing of illegal Mercedes vehicles by Daimler

1. Is the Commission aware of any car manufacturer other than the German manufacturer Daimler, which places
new model cars on the European market that do not comply with the requirements of Directive 2006/40/EC, with
regard to air conditioning systems?

2. Is the Commission aware of any models other than the Mercedes A-class, B-class and SLK that do not comply
with the legislation?

3. Have the German authorities responded to the letter sent by the Commission in February 2013 and referred to
in the answer given to my question on 30 April 2013 (P‐003680/2013)? If so, what arguments did they make?

4. Is the Commission of the opinion that Germany is failing to ensure the correct implementation of
Directive 2006/40/EC?

5. Are other Member States that permit the sale of vehicles that do not comply with the legislation failing to ensure
the correct implementation of Directive 2006/40/EC? If so, does the Commission expect them to take appropriate
enforcement action?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2013)_

The information currently at the disposal of the Commission points to a situation where several models produced by
Daimler have been put on the European market not complying with their type-approval in what regards the
obligations deriving from the entry into force of the MAC Directive. There has been a similar case with another
manufacturer, but which has been voluntarily corrected by that manufacturer, in coordination with the relevant
national authorities and according to the framework Directive 2007/46/EC.

The German authorities have replied to the letter sent by the Commission restating the arguments previously debated
with the Commission and Member States. The letter was received in May 2013. Given this situation, the Commission
launched an investigation on 10 June 2013 with the German authorities requesting specific information on this
situation. Should the investigation reveal non-compliance with the requirements of the directive, the Commission, in
its role as Guardian of the Treaty, may take the necessary action, including where appropriate infringement
procedures.

C 42 E / 526 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006142/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Werner Langen (PPE)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Ehrenamt

Artikel 19 VAEU, der mit seinen Vorläufern bereits zu mehreren Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
geführt hat, verpflichtet die Regierung zur Beseitigung diskriminierender Maßnahmen und ist aufgrund der
Richtlinie 2000/78/EG, die eine Umsetzung des Altersdiskriminierungsverbots in nationales Recht vorschreibt,
2006 auch deutsches Recht geworden.

Die Europäische Antidiskriminierungsrichtlinie und das umgesetzte allgemeine Gleichstellungsgesetz schließen in § 1
Benachteiligungen wegen des Alters aus und lassen unterschiedliche Behandlungen grundsätzlich nach Artikel 8
Absatz 1 nur bei bestimmten beruflichen Anforderungen, die bei Ehrenämtern nicht vorliegen, zu.

Für Ehrenämter ist deshalb der Artikel 10 ohne nennenswerten Belang, da es lediglich um Fragen konkreter
gewerblicher Beschäftigungsverhältnisse geht.

Kann die Kommission in diesem Zusammenhang folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Ist unter diesen Gesichtspunkten aus europäischer Sicht die Berufung zu einem ehrenamtlichen Schöffen nach
§ 33 GVG vereinbar, wonach Personen, die das 70. Lebensjahr vollendet haben oder es bis zum Beginn der
Amtsperiode vollenden würden, nicht zum Schöffen berufen werden dürfen?

2. Wie ist die entsprechende Regelung in den übrigen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union hinsichtlich
ehrenamtlicher Tätigkeit unter dem Gesichtspunkt der europäischen Antidiskriminierungsrichtlinie?

3. Wie könnte eine Lösung für ehrenamtliche Tätigkeiten in Europa, gegebenenfalls auch in Deutschland, nach
Ansicht der Kommission aussehen?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(30. August 2013)_

Die Richtlinie 2000/78/EG zur Festlegung eines allgemeinen Rahmens für die Verwirklichung der Gleichbehandlung,
die Diskriminierung aus Altersgründen untersagt, bezieht sich ausschließlich auf Beschäftigung und Beruf.
Ehrenamtliche Richter und Schöffen „sollen“ nach den deutschen Vorschriften nicht älter als 70 Jahre sein (§ 33
Ziffer 2 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz). Die Tätigkeit eines ehrenamtlichen Richters oder Schöffen kann jedoch kaum als
Beschäftigung oder Beruf gelten, da es sich um eine ehrenamtliche Tätigkeit und Bürgerpflicht handelt, die nicht
vergütet wird.

Ferner bestimmt Artikel 6 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG, dass im Bereich der Beschäftigung Ungleichbehandlungen
wegen des Alters keine Diskriminierung darstellen, sofern sie objektiv und angemessen, im Rahmen des nationalen
Rechts durch ein legitimes Ziel gerechtfertigt und die Mittel zur Erreichung dieses Ziels angemessen und erforderlich
sind. In jüngster Zeit hat der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union einige Urteile zu den Bedingungen eines
obligatorischen Renteneintrittsalters für bestimmte Berufe gefällt, darunter auch Urteile, in denen ein obligatorisches
Renteneintrittsalter von unter 70 Jahren für Rechtsberufe wie Staatsanwälte für zulässig erachtet wird (siehe
beispielsweise Rechtssache C-159/10 Fuchs sowie C-160/10 Köhler).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 527

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006142/13**

**to the Commission**
**Werner Langen (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Honorary appointments

Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which, together with its precursors, has led
to several decisions of the European Court of Justice, requires governments to eliminate discriminatory measures. In
2006, it was also transposed into German law under Directive 2000/78/EC, which provides for the transposition of
the ban on age discrimination into national law.

In Section 1, the European Anti-discrimination Directive and the transposed German General Equality Act exclude
discrimination on grounds of age and allow different treatments, in principle, under Article 8(1) only for specific
occupational requirements that are not applicable to honorary appointments.

Therefore, Article 10 is of no significant relevance for honorary appointments because it only concerns specific
employment and industry relations.

Can the Commission answer the following questions in this context?

1. Is, in this respect and from a European perspective, the appointment of lay judges compatible with Section 33 of
the German General Equality Act, according to which anyone who has reached the age of 70 or will have done so by
the time his/her period of office begins may not be called to jury?

2. What regulations do the other Member States of the European Union have in place with regard to honorary
appointments from the perspective of the European Anti-Discrimination Directive?

3. What, in the Commission’s opinion, is a possible solution for honorary appointments in Europe and, where
appropriate, in Germany, too?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 August 2013)_

Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment which prohibits age discrimination only
applies to employment or occupation. Lay judges (Ehrenamtliche Richter, Schöffen) according to German provisions
‘should’ not be older than 70 years of age (§33 no 2 Gerichtsverfassungsesetz). The position as a lay judge however is
unlikely to be considered employment or occupation taking into consideration that it is an honorary activity and civic
duty and there is no remuneration.

Furthermore, Article 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC specifies that in matters of employment and occupation differences
in treatment on grounds of age are not considered age discrimination, if they are objectively and reasonably justified
by a legitimate aim and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. In the recent past, the Court
of Justice of the European Union has issued a number of rulings on the conditions of mandatory retirement ages for
particular professions including judgments considering mandatory retirement ages of less than 70 years admissible
for legal professions such as public prosecutors (see for instance Case C-159/10, Fuchs and Case C-160/10, Köhler).

C 42 E / 528 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006143/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Google Glass: Mit EU-Recht vereinbar

Google hat angekündigt, Ende dieses Jahres die sogenannte „Google-Brille“ (Google Glass) auf den Markt zu bringen.
Die Brille soll laut dem Hersteller in der Lage sein, permanent zu filmen und das Gesehene sofort ins Netz zu
streamen. Da es sich um eine Brille handelt, ist es für den Gefilmten kaum noch möglich, zu erkennen, dass gefilmt
wird. Darüber hinaus ist es möglich, die Brille mit zusätzlichen Diensten im Bereich von „augmented reality“ zur
Erkennung von Personen zu benutzen.

Die Google-Brille ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie uns die neuen technologischen Entwicklungen immer neue Möglichkeiten
eröffnen; auf der anderen Seite bergen sie aber auch massive Gefahren hinsichtlich des Schutzes von persönlichen
Daten und Privatsphäre. Der „Privacy by Design“-Ansatz geht davon aus, dass bereits bei der Entwicklung neuer
Technologien auf Datenschutz zu achten ist.

1. Welchen Standpunkt vertritt die Kommission zu der geplanten Google-Brille, vor allem unter dem
Gesichtspunkt datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen? Wäre das Produkt nach Einschätzung der Kommission mit
den jetzigen und geplanten europäischen Datenschutzbestimmungen vereinbar?

2. Welchen Standpunkt vertritt die Kommission zu dem Vorschlag, dass die Produkthersteller schon bei der
Entwicklung den Datenschutz beachten sollen und durch Voreinstellungen, Design und Technik die Einhaltung der
herrschenden Datenschutzbestimmungen garantieren müssen (Privacy by Design)?

3. Welche Gefahren sieht die Kommission durch die Verknüpfung dieser Technologie mit
„augmented-reality“-Anwendungen, die beispielsweise die Erkennung von Personen ermöglichen? Existieren solche
Anwendungen nach Kenntnis der Kommission bereits?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(23. Juli 2013)_

Bei Google Glass handelt es sich um ein Produkt, das sich in der Testphase befindet und noch nicht im Handel
erhältlich ist; Google Glass besteht aus einer integrierten Kamera, einem Mikrofon und einem GPS und besitzt
Internetanbindung. Als Betriebssystem wird Android verwendet, und zurzeit werden Drittanwendungen für Google
Glass entwickelt. Für die Benutzung von Google Glass wird ein Google-Konto benötigt.

Die Kommission stimmt mit dem Herrn Abgeordneten darin überein, dass Google Glass erhebliche
datenschutzrechtliche Bedenken aufwerfen könnte; dies gilt u. a. für die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten von
Personen, die mit der integrierten Kamera fotografiert bzw. gefilmt und identifiziert werden. In einem gemeinsamen
Schreiben mit Behörden aus Drittländern haben die Datenschutzbehörden der EU gegenüber Google ihre
diesbezügliche Besorgnis zum Ausdruck gebracht ( [1] ).

In dem Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Datenschutz-Grundverordnung ( [2] ) werden sowohl der Grundsatz der
Datenminimierung als auch die Pflicht der für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen, den Anforderungen des
Datenschutzes durch Technik und datenschutzfreundliche Voreinstellungen nachzukommen, ausdrücklich festgelegt.

Der Kommission ist nicht bekannt, welche Anwendungen über Google Glass verfügbar sind und ob eine
Identifizierung von Personen dadurch möglich ist.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2013/nr-c_130618_e.asp
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) KOM(2012)11.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 529

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006143/13**

**to the Commission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Google Glass: Compatible with EC law?

Google has announced that it will bring Google Glass, as it is known, on the market later this year. According to the
manufacturer, Google Glass is able to film permanently and stream immediately on the Internet what the wearer has
seen. Since this concerns a pair of glasses, it is virtually impossible for the person being filmed to be aware of the fact
that he/she is being filmed. In addition, it is possible to use the additional augmented reality feature of the glasses for
human recognition.

Google Glass is an example of how new technological developments always bring new possibilities to us. On the
other hand, they also pose massive risks concerning the protection of personal data and privacy. The Privacy by
Design approach presupposes that privacy needs to be taken into account as early as the development stage.

1. What is the Commission’s position on the proposed Google Glass, especially from the perspective of data
protection regulations? Does the Commission estimate that this product will be compatible with current and
proposed European data protection rules?

2. What is the Commission’s position on the proposal that product manufacturers should observe data protection
as early as the development stage and ensure compliance with current data protection regulations (Privacy by Design)
through default settings, design and technology?

3. What dangers does the Commission see in this technology being combined with augmented reality
applications, that enable, for example, human recognition? Does the Commission know if such applications already
exist?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

Google Glass is a product in testing not yet available to the general public which includes an embedded camera,
microphone and GPS, with access to the Internet. The Android Operating System powers Google Glass, and thirdparty applications are currently being built for Glass. To access Glass, a user needs a Google account.

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that Google glass could raise significant data protection
questions, amongst others related to the processing of personal data related to individuals captured and identified
through the embedded camera. EU data protection authorities expressed their concerns in a joint letter with
authorities from third countries to Google. ( [1] )

The Commission’s proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation ( [2] ) explicitly spells out the principle of data
minimisation, and an obligation for controllers to implement the principles of data protection by design and by
default.

The Commission is not aware of the applications available on Glass and on whether identification of individuals is
possible though those applications.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2013/nr-c_130618_e.asp.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) COM(2012)11.

C 42 E / 530 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006144/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Soziale Netzwerke und Datenschutz

In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland warnen Datenschutzorganisationen, dass Jobcenter oder andere Behörden soziale
Netzwerke gezielt nutzen könnten, um sensible Informationen über Leistungsbezieher zu erhalten, obwohl
anzunehmen ist, dass die Informationen, die in sozialen Netzwerken eingestellt werden, in vielen Fällen, nicht nur,
aber auch bei sozial schlecht gestellten Personen zur positiven Selbstdarstellung geschönt sind.

1. Sind der Kommission Fälle aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten bekannt, bei denen Behörden in sozialen Netzwerken
auf diese Weise recherchiert haben?

2. Sind die bestehenden Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen im Rahmen der europäischen Datenschutz-Gesetzgebung
ausreichend, um einen derartigen Missbrauch von Internet-Daten zu verhindern?

**Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission**

_(31. Juli 2013)_

Der Kommission liegen keine Anhaltspunkte dafür vor, dass Mitarbeiter der Jobcenter im Rahmen ihrer beruflichen
Tätigkeit soziale Netzwerke nutzen. Nach Auskunft der deutschen Arbeitsagentur findet eine solche Verarbeitung
personenbezogener Daten nicht statt ( [1] ). Auch ist der Kommission nicht bekannt, dass dies in anderen
EU-Mitgliedstaaten geschieht.

Unbeschadet der Befugnisse der Kommission ist es Aufgabe der deutschen Datenschutzbehörden, die Maßnahmen
zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 95/46/EG zu überwachen und durchzuführen. Die Bundesbehörde hat klargestellt, dass
die Nutzung von Facebook zur Beurteilung der Ansprüche arbeitsloser Personen in Deutschland rechtswidrig ist ( [2] ).

Der Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Datenschutz-Grundverordnung ( [3] ), der zurzeit von den Mitgesetzgebern
geprüft wird, baut auf den Grundprinzipien der Richtlinie 95/46/EG auf. So werden die Befugnisse der nationalen
Datenschutzbehörden gestärkt, die u. a. Verwaltungsmaßnahmen ergreifen können, wenn personenbezogene Daten
beispielsweise ohne jede bzw. ohne ausreichende Rechtsgrundlage verarbeitet werden.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_27044/zentraler-Content/Pressemeldungen/2013/Presse-13-028.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/datenschutzvorschriften/facebook-jagd-auf-hartz-iv-betrueger-30521178.bild.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) KOM(2012)11.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 531

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006144/13**

**to the Commission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Social networks and data protection

In the Federal Republic of Germany, privacy organisations are warning that job centres or other authorities could use
social networks for the specific purpose of obtaining sensitive information about benefit claimants, although it can be
assumed that information uploaded on social networks about socially vulnerable individuals, but not only them, is in
many cases embellished for image-boosting reasons.

1. Is the Commission aware of cases in other Member States where authorities have investigated social networks in
this way?

2. Are existing enforcement measures under the European data protection legislation sufficient to prevent such
abuse of Internet data?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of any evidence that job-centre employees use social networks in the context of their
professional activities. The German employment agency has denied conducting such processing of personal data ( [1] ).
The Commission is not aware of such processing of personal data in other EU Member States.

Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission, the German data protection authorities are responsible for
monitoring and enforcement of the measures implementing Directive 95/46/EC. The federal authority clearly stated
that it is unlawful to use Facebook in the context of the assessment of the rights of German unemployed persons ( [2] ).

The Commission’s proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ( [3] ) under examination of the colegislators builds on the principles of Directive 95/46/EC, and reinforces the power of the national data protection
authorities, e.g. by giving them the possibility to impose administrative sanctions, _inter alia_ when personal data are
processed without any or with no sufficient legal basis.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/nn_27044/zentraler-Content/Pressemeldungen/2013/Presse-13-028.html
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/datenschutzvorschriften/facebook-jagd-auf-hartz-iv-betrueger-30521178.bild.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 11.

C 42 E / 532 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006145/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Telekom-Tarife und Netzneutralität

Die Deutsche Telekom hat angekündigt, ihre Tarife umzustellen und dabei eine starke Drosselung vorzunehmen,
wenn ein bestimmter Datenverbrauch erreicht wurde. Beim günstigsten Tarif soll diese Drosselung ab einer Nutzung
von 75 GB liegen. Wirksam werden soll dies ab dem Jahr 2016.

Bedenklich ist dabei vor allem auch, dass eigene Dienste der Telekom sowie Dienste von dafür zahlenden
Vertragspartnern von der Volumenberechnung ausgenommen werden sollen, wodurch andere Dienste diskriminiert
werden.

1. Sieht die Kommission hierin einen Verstoß gegen das Prinzip der Netzneutralität?

2. Welche wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen erwartet die Kommission, wenn sich solche Modelle durchsetzen?

3. Ist zu erwarten, dass heute schon existierende marktbeherrschende Inhalte-Anbieter hierdurch einen
Wettbewerbsvorteil gegenüber neuen Diensten erhalten, da sie es sich im Gegensatz zu diesen eher leisten können,
kostspielige Verträge mit den Providern zu schließen?

4. Sieht es die Kommission unter diesen Aspekten als problematisch an, wenn Service-Provider selbst
Unterhaltungs‐ und Informationsdienste anbieten? Wenn ja, sind Maßnahmen vonseiten der Kommission hierzu
geplant?

**Antwort von Frau Kroes im Namen der Kommission**

_(5. Juli 2013)_

Der Kommission ist bekannt, dass die Deutsche Telekom Pläne zur Begrenzung des Datenvolumens in ihrem
Dienstleistungsangebot angekündigt hat. Der Ankündigung zufolge würde das Datenvolumen der eigenen Dienste
des Unternehmens (und der Dienste ihrer Partner) im Gegensatz zu den Diensten Dritter von der
Volumenberechnung ausgenommen.

Die Kommission vertritt die Auffassung, dass die Festsetzung von Höchstgrenzen für den Datenverbrauch
insbesondere bei starker Zunahme des Datenverkehrs Teil der unternehmerischen Freiheit von
Internetdienstanbietern ist und eine volumenabhängige Preisgestaltung den tatsächlichen Kosten besser Rechnung
trägt. Ebenso steht es den Internetdienstanbietern frei, Inhaltsdienste — etwa für Unterhaltung oder Information —
anzubieten. Eine Differenzierung aufgrund des Inhalts, insbesondere wenn Internetdienstanbieter konkurrierende
Dritte zugunsten eigener Dienste oder der Dienste von Partnern diskriminieren, wirft jedoch ernsthafte Probleme auf.

Die Kommission arbeitet zurzeit an Vorschlägen zur Netzneutralität, die für das Funktionieren des digitalen
Binnenmarkts erforderlich sind; hierbei prüft sie u. a. die Möglichkeit von Maßnahmen zur Sicherstellung einer
verantwortungsvollen Nutzung von Instrumenten zur Steuerung des Datenverkehrs. Eine diskriminierende Sperrung
oder Drosselung wäre nicht zulässig. Die Unternehmen hätten die Möglichkeit, ihre Angebote zu differenzieren und
durch bessere Dienstleistungen gegeneinander in Wettbewerb zu treten, sofern dies auf nichtdiskriminierende Weise
erfolgt; hierdurch würde neuen europäischen Internetunternehmen der Markzugang eröffnet.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 533

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006145/13**

**to the Commission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Telecom tariffs and net neutrality

Deutsche Telekom has announced that it will change its tariffs and impose a severe ‘throttling’ when a certain data
usage volume is reached. At the cheapest rate, this throttle is to apply to usage from 75GB. This will take effect in
2016.

What is particularly worrying in this respect is the fact that Telekom’s own services and volume calculation services
for contractors who are paying for them are to be excluded, which discriminates against other services.

1. Does the Commission see here a breach of the principle of net neutrality?

2. What economic consequences does the Commission expect should such models gain acceptance?

3. Is to be expected that this will enable existing content providers with a dominant market position to obtain a
competitive advantage over new services as the former, unlike the latter, are able to afford to conclude costly
contracts with providers?

4. Considering this situation, does the Commission have an issue with service providers offering entertainment
and information services themselves? If so, is the Commission planning any action to tackle this?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(5 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of Deutsche Telekom's announcement of plans to set data caps on its offers. According to
the announcement the data volumes used for some of the company's own services (and those of partners) would not
be deducted from the data allowance, unlike those of third party services which would be.

The Commission considers that setting data caps is part of ISPs' freedom to conduct their business, particularly when
there is a huge growth in data traffic, and volume-based pricing more accurately reflects the underlying costs. Equally,
ISPs are free to provide content services to end-users, such as entertainment or information. However, differentation
based on content, particularly where ISPs discriminate in favour of their own services or those of partners against
those of competing third parties, clearly raises serious problems.

The Commission is currently preparing proposals as regards net neutrality which are necessary for the functioning of
the Digital Single Market; it is examining the possibility for the measures to ensure, amongst other things, the
responsible use of traffic management tools. No discriminatory blocking and throttling would be allowed. Companies
would be allowed to differentiate their offers and compete on enhanced quality of service, provided that this is done
in a non-discriminatory manner so to ensure market access for European Internet start-up companies.

C 42 E / 534 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006146/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Drosselung und Auswirkungen auf soziale Teilhabe und Binnenmarkt

Die Deutsche Telekom hat angekündigt, ihre Tarife umzustellen und dabei eine starke Drosselung vorzunehmen,
wenn ein bestimmter Datenverbrauch erreicht wurde. Beim günstigsten Tarif soll diese Drosselung ab einer Nutzung
von 75GB liegen. Wirksam werden soll dies ab dem Jahr 2016. Neben dem gesondert zu betrachtenden Problem der
angekündigten Verletzung der Netzneutralität hat auch diese Drosselung selbst bereits zu großem Ärger unter
BürgerInnen beigetragen, der sich beispielsweise in einer Petition auf der Plattform change.org ( [1] ) niederschlug, die
derzeit von fast 200 000 Menschen unterzeichnet wurde ( [2] ).

1. Liegen der Kommission Zahlen zum heutigen und Prognosen zum zukünftigen Durchschnitts-Traffic von
Nutzern von Breitbandanschlüssen in den Mitgliedstaaten vor? Wenn ja, wie lauten diese?

2. Hält die Kommission einen möglichst unbeschränkten Zugriff auf das Internet, gerade auch für sozial
schwächer gestellte Personen, für eine Bedingung für möglichst vollständige gesellschaftliche Teilhabe? Wenn ja,
würde diese gesellschaftliche Teilhabe durch die Durchsetzung solcher Tarif-Modelle und die anfallenden Mehrkosten
bei Überschreiten der Volumengrenze nach Auffassung der Kommission beeinträchtigt?

3. Vertritt die Kommission einen Standpunkt bzw. verfügt die Kommission über belastbare Zahlen zum
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Effekt, der eintreten würde, wenn solche Drosselungs-Modelle sich europaweit durchsetzen?
Wenn ja, welche?

4. Wie würde sich dies nach Auffassung der Kommission auf junge europäische Unternehmen im Bereich von
Cloud-Diensten auswirken?

5. Zeitungsberichten zufolge will die Kommission noch in diesem Jahr eine rechtliche Empfehlung vorlegen, die
den uneingeschränkten Zugang der Verbraucher zu allen Internet-Inhalten schützen soll. Wann wird die Empfehlung
veröffentlicht?

6. Welche Maßnahmen plant die Kommission, um allen Bürgern Zugang zum offenen Internet zu verschaffen
und die Netzneutralität gesetzlich zu verankern?

**Antwort von Frau Kroes im Namen der Kommission**

_(11. Juli 2013)_

Der Kommission sind die Pläne der Deutschen Telekom (DT) zur Einführung von Beschränkungen bei
Internet-Flatrates im Festnetz bekannt. Nach Angaben von DT soll bei Erreichen eines vereinbarten Verbrauchs die
Geschwindigkeit auf 2 Mbit/s und nicht auf 384 kbit/s (wie ursprünglich angekündigt) gedrosselt werden.

Der Kommission liegen keine Daten zur durchschnittlichen Internetnutzung vor, laut Cisco wird jedoch 2017 der
IP-Verkehr pro Kopf in Westeuropa 38 GB erreichen (2012: 18 GB). In Mittel‐ und Osteuropa rechnet Cisco bis 2017
mit einem Verkehrsaufkommen von 18 GB je Nutzer (2012: 7 GB) ( [3] ). Nach Angaben der DT liegt bei ihren Kunden
die durchschnittliche Nutzung bei 15-20 GB ( [4] ). Zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt verfügt die Kommission nicht über
zuverlässige Daten zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der derzeit diskutierten Tarifmodelle.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.change.org/
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.change.org/de/Petitionen/deutsche-telekom-ag-drosselung-der-surfgeschwindigkeit-stoppen
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Der IP-Verkehr umfasst auch den Mobilfunkverkehr. Quelle: Cisco Visual Networking Index Global IP Traffic Forecast, 2012-2017, abrufbar

unter:
http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/sp/vni/vni_forecast_highlights/index.html

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.telecompaper.com/news/deutsche-telekom-confirms-new-broadband-data-limits--938900

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 535

Die Kommission setzt sich uneingeschränkt dafür ein, dass die Endnutzer freien Zugang zu Informationen haben und
diese verbreiten können und Anwendungen und Dienste ihrer Wahl nutzen können. Sie erwägt derzeit die Vorlage
von Vorschlägen zur Netzneutralität, die auch Maßnahmen umfassen könnten, durch die eine größere Transparenz,
ein einfacherer Anbieterwechsel und der verantwortliche Einsatz von Verkehrsmanagement-Instrumenten
sichergestellt wird. Das Blockieren und Drosseln konkurrierender Dienste wäre verboten, d. h. es gäbe keine
Diskriminierung bei der bestmöglichen Abwicklung des Internetverkehrs (Best Effort), abgesehen von den
Maßnahmen, die für ein reibungsloses Funktionieren der Netze (Engpassmanagement, Sicherheitsbedrohungen u. Ä.)
unerlässlich sind. Allen Nutzern sollte ungeachtet ihrer sozialen Situation ein solcher unbeschränkter Internetzugang
garantiert werden. Gleichzeitig sollten die Unternehmen ihre Angebote weiterhin differenzieren und z. B. bezüglich
Datenvolumen und Dienstleistungsqualität miteinander konkurrieren können. Mit den geplanten Vorschlägen soll
auch jungen europäischen Unternehmen der Zugang zu digitalen Märkten erleichtert werden, so dass sie wachsen
und innovieren können.

C 42 E / 536 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006146/13**

**to the Commission**
**Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Data throttling and the effects on social participation and the internal market

Deutsche Telekom has announced plans to change its tariffs and impose severe ‘throttling’ when a certain data usage
is reached. At the cheapest rate, this throttle is to apply to usage from 75GB. This will take effect in 2016. Besides the
issue of the announced breach of net neutrality that needs to be considered separately, the throttling itself has already
led to a great deal of anger among citizens that was reflected, for example, in a petition on the change.org ( [1] ) platform,
which has so far been signed by nearly 200 000 people ( [2] ).

1. Does the Commission have any figures on the current and future forecasted average usage by broadband users
in Member States? If so, what are they?

2. Does the Commission consider the most unrestricted Internet access possible, especially for socially
disadvantaged people, a condition for participating in society as fully as possible? If so, would, in the Commission’s
opinion, such social participation not be affected by the enforcement of such tariff models and the additional costs
arising from the volume limit being exceeded?

3. Does the Commission take the view or, rather, does the Commission have any reliable figures on the
macroeconomic effect that would occur if such throttling models were to gain acceptance across Europe? If yes, what
are they?

4. How, in the Commission’s opinion, would this affect young European companies operating in the cloud
services market?

5. According to newspaper reports, the Commission intends to put forward, as early as this year, a legal
recommendation designed to protect unlimited access to all Internet content for consumers. When will that
recommendation be published?

6. What measures is the Commission planning in order to ensure access to the open Internet for all citizens and to
enshrine net neutrality in law?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of Deutsche Telekom's (DT) plans to introduce restrictions on Internet flat rates in fixed
networks. DT has indicated that upon reaching an agreed volume, speed will be throttled to 2 Mbps and not 384 kbps
as originally announced.

The Commission does not have figures on average Internet usage, but Cisco reports that IP traffic per capita in
Western Europe will reach 38 GB in 2017, up from 18 GB in 2012. In Central and Eastern Europe, Cisco forecasts 18
GB per capita in 2017 up from 7 GB in 2012 ( [3] ). DT reports the average use of its customers is 15-20 GB ( [4] ). At this
stage, the Commission does not have reliable figures on the macroeconomic effect of the currently discussed tariff
models.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.change.org/.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.change.org/de/Petitionen/deutsche-telekom-ag-drosselung-der-surfgeschwindigkeit-stoppen.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) IP traffic includes also mobile traffic. _Source:_ Cisco Visual Networking Index Global IP Traffic Forecast, 2012-2017 available at

http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/sp/vni/vni_forecast_highlights/index.html

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://www.telecompaper.com/news/deutsche-telekom-confirms-new-broadband-data-limits--938900

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 537

The Commission is fully committed to ensuring end users' ability to access and distribute information or run
applications and services of their choice. The Commission is currently considering proposals as regards net neutrality,
including the possibility of measures to ensure enhanced transparency, easier switching and the responsible use of
traffic management tools. No blocking and throttling of competing services would be allowed, i.e. no discrimination
of best effort Internet traffic, except what is strictly necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the networks
(i.e. managing network congestion, security threats, etc.). This unrestricted Internet access should be guaranteed to all
end-users regardless of their social situation. At the same time, companies should remain free to differentiate their
offers and compete on, for example, volume or enhanced quality of service. The upcoming proposals also aim at
promoting access to digital markets by young European companies to ensure that they can grow and innovate.

C 42 E / 538 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-006148/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE)**

_(31 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Επιβολή δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας στις γεωργικές άμεσες ενισχύσεις

Στις 25 Μαρτίου 2013 η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δημοσιοποίησε τη νομοθετική της πρόταση σχετικά με τον «καθορισμό του
ποσοστού αναπροσαρμογής των άμεσων ενισχύσεων που προβλέπεται στον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009 του Συμβουλίου
όσον αφορά το ημερολογιακό έτος 2013» (COM(2013)0159 τελικό).

Η προτεινόμενη από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή μείωση του επιπέδου των αμέσων ενισχύσεων (κατά 4,981759%) στηρίζεται
στα συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου (7/8 Φεβρουαρίου 2013) σχετικά με το ΠΔΠ 2014-2020 (επιμέρους
ανώτατο όριο για τις δαπάνες που συνδέονται με την αγορά και τις άμεσες ενισχύσεις στο πλαίσιο του τομέα 2 για το
οικονομικό έτος 2014). Επιπροσθέτως, βασίζεται στην πρόταση του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου ως προς τη συμπερίληψη του
«αποθεματικού διαχείρισης κρίσεων» υπό τον τομέα 2 του προϋπολογισμού και τη χρηματοδότησή του μέσω της επιβολής
δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας (μείωση των αμέσων ενισχύσεων στην αρχή κάθε έτους).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Πώς αιτιολογεί τη στήριξη της πρότασής της περί επιβολής δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας στη συμφωνία που επετεύχθη στο
Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο (7/8 Φεβρουαρίου 2013), παρά το γεγονός ότι βρίσκεται εν εξελίξει η διοργανική διαπραγμάτευση
για την υιοθέτηση του ΠΔΠ 2014-2020; Πώς αιτιολογεί την υπαναχώρησή της από την αρχική της πρόταση σχετικά με το
ΠΔΠ 2014-2020 (COM(2012)0388), παραβλέποντας τη σχετική διαπραγματευτική εντολή που έχει υιοθετήσει η
Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου (13.3.2013);

**Απάντηση του κ. Cioloş εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(3 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η πρόταση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με την επιβολή δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας ( [1] ) βασίζεται, ως προληπτικό μέτρο, στα
συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου (7/8 Φεβρουαρίου 2013) για το πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο (ΠΔΠ) ( [2] ).
Αν ο υπολογισμός της δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας από μέρους της Επιτροπής βασιζόταν στην πρότασή της σχετικά με το
ΠΔΠ ( [3] ) 2014-2020, τότε η Επιτροπή θα υποτιμούσε το ποσοστό δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας και θα αγνοούσε την ανάγκη
δημιουργίας αποθεματικού κρίσεων, σε περίπτωση που επιτευχθεί συμφωνία με βάση τα συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού
Συμβουλίου.

Θα πρέπει να υπογραμμιστεί ότι το νομικό πλαίσιο προβλέπει τη δυνατότητα προσαρμογής του ποσοστού δημοσιονομικής
πειθαρχίας το φθινόπωρο, κατά την κατάρτιση από την Επιτροπή της διορθωτικής επιστολής στο σχέδιο προϋπολογισμού,
βάσει των επικαιροποιημένων διαθέσιμων στοιχείων. Επομένως, η Επιτροπή θα είναι σε θέση να προτείνει προσαρμογή του
ποσοστού δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας λαμβάνοντας υπόψη την πρόοδο των διοργανικών διαπραγματεύσεων, ιδίως όσον
αφορά το ΠΔΠ.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013)159 σχετικά με τον καθορισμό του ποσοστού αναπροσαρμογής των άμεσων ενισχύσεων που προβλέπεται στον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 73/2009

του Συμβουλίου όσον αφορά το ημερολογιακό έτος 2013.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Έγγραφο EUCO 37/13.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012)388.

( **|**
( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 539

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006148/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Koumoutsakos (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Imposition of fiscal discipline on agricultural direct payments

On 25 March 2013 the Commission published its legislative proposal on ‘fixing an adjustment rate to direct
payments provided for in Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 in respect of calendar year 2013’ (COM(2013) 0159 final).

The reduction in the level of direct payments (by 4.981759%) proposed by the Commission is based on the
Conclusions of the European Council (7/8 February, 2013) on the MFF 2014-2020 (the sub-ceiling for market related
expenditure and direct payment under Heading 2 for financial year 2014). It is also based on the European Council’s
proposal to include the ‘crisis management reserve’ under Heading 2 of the budget and to finance it by imposing fiscal
discipline (reduction of direct payments at the beginning of each year).

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

How does it justify the support for its proposal to impose fiscal discipline in respect of the agreement reached at the
European Council (7/8 February 2013), despite the fact that interinstitutional negotiations on the adoption of the
2014-2020 MFF are ongoing? How does it justify its retraction of its original proposal on the MFF 2014-2020
(COM(2012) 0388), ignoring the negotiating mandate adopted by the plenary of the European Parliament
(13.03.2013)?

**Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission**

_(3 July 2013)_

The Commission proposal on financial discipline ( [1] ) is based, as a precautionary measure, on the conclusions of the
European Council (7/8 February 2013) on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) ( [2] ). By basing the financial
discipline calculation on the Commission proposal on the MFF ( [3] ) for 2014-2020, the Commission would
underestimate the rate of financial discipline and ignore the need to establish a crises reserve, in case an agreement is
reached on the European Council conclusions.

It should be underlined that the legal framework foresees the possibility to adapt the financial discipline rate in the
autumn, when the Commission prepares the Amending Letter to the Draft Budget, on the basis of the new
information available. Therefore the Commission will be able to propose an adaptation of the financial discipline rate
taking into account the progress of the interinstitutional negotiations, in particular on the MFF.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2013) 159 on fixing an adjustment rate to direct payments provided for in Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 in respect of calendar year 2013.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) EUCO 37/13.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2012) 388.

C 42 E / 540 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-006150/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(31 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Perturbatorii endocrini

Declarația Berlaymont, recent publicată, privind perturbatorii endocrini prezintă numeroase preocupări grave în
legătură cu aceste substanțe chimice și cu posibilele lor efecte dăunătoare asupra mediului și sănătății umane.

Expunerea la perturbatori endocrini a fost asociată cu o varietate de maladii grave și uneori ireversibile – precum și cu
incidența tot mai ridicată a acestora – cum ar fi cancerul la sân și alte forme de cancer hormonal, precum și obezitatea
și efectele sale de comorbiditate, cum ar fi diabetul de tip 2.

Declarația Berlaymont recunoaște că aceste tendințe au factori cauzali multipli, dar avertizează asupra faptului că
„incertitudinea științifică nu ar trebui să întârzie măsurile de reglementare, iar interesele comerciale nu ar trebui să
predomine asupra preocupărilor legate de riscurile asociate cu perturbatorii endocrini”. Pe lângă aceasta, textul afirmă
că reglementarea UE în acest domeniu este inadecvată, că există o lipsă serioasă de activitate de cercetare
corespunzătoare și că prevalența în creștere a bolilor endocrine este „în mare măsură ignorată de legislatorii din statele
membre ale UE”.

Având în vedere cele menționate anterior:

1. Va răspunde Comisia în mod pozitiv apelului din declarație ca UE să desfășoare un program de cercetare
specific destinat perturbatorilor endocrini ca parte a inițiativei Orizont 2020?

2. Intenționează Comisia să coopereze cu decidenții politici din statele membre pentru a asigura faptul că se
acordă atenția cuvenită aspectelor evidențiate în declarație?

3. Intenționează Comisia să propună măsuri de reglementare în acest domeniu?

**Răspuns dat de dl Potočnik în numele Comisiei**

_(9 august 2013)_

1. Propunerea Comisiei privind Orizont 2020 ( [1] ) prevede acordarea unui sprijin suplimentar pentru studierea
impactului substanțelor chimice asupra sănătății umane ( [2] ).

2. Comisia intenționează să implice factorii de decizie politică din statele membre în activitatea descrisă la punctul
3 de mai jos. Chestiunile ridicate în declarație vor fi abordate în cadrul acestor discuții.

3. Comisia analizează în prezent o serie de criterii științifice pentru identificarea perturbatorilor endocrini.
Comisia trebuie să elaboreze criteriile specificate în Regulamentul privind produsele fitosanitare ( [3] ) și în Regulamentul
privind produsele biocide ( [4] ). În plus, în Regulamentul privind produsele cosmetice ( [5] ) se prevede obligația Comisiei
de a revizui dispozițiile acestuia în ceea ce privește perturbatorii endocrini atunci când sunt disponibile criterii pentru
identificarea perturbatorilor endocrini sau până în ianuarie 2015 cel mai târziu.

În plus, Comisia revede în prezent cele două modalități de autorizare (control adecvat și factori socioeconomici)
pentru a stabili care dintre acestea ar trebui să se aplice în cazul autorizării unui perturbator endocrin în temeiul
REACH.

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( **|**
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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Programul-cadru pentru cercetare și inovare (2014-2020).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0811:FIN:ro:PDF
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1107/2009 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 21 octombrie 2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (UE) nr. 528/2012 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 22 mai 2012.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Regulamentul (CE) Nr. 1223/2009 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 30 noiembrie 2009 privind produsele cosmetice.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 541

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006150/13**

**to the Commission**
**Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Endocrine disrupters

The recently published Berlaymont Declaration on Endocrine Disrupters outlines many serious concerns about these
chemicals and their potentially damaging effects on the environment and human health.

Exposure to endocrine disrupters has been linked to a variety of serious and sometimes irreversible conditions — and
their rising incidence — such as breast cancer and other hormonal cancers, and obesity and its comorbidity factors
such as type 2 diabetes.

The Declaration recognises that these trends have multiple causal factors, but warns that ‘scientific uncertainty should
not delay regulatory action, and commercial interests must not take precedent over concerns about risks associated
with endocrine disrupters’. Furthermore, according to the text, EU regulation is inadequate, proper research is
seriously lacking, and increased prevalence of endocrine-related disease is ‘largely ignored by policy-makers in EU
Member States’.

In light of the above:

1. Will the Commission respond positively to the Declaration’s call for the EU to pursue a targeted endocrine
disrupter research programme as part of Horizon 2020?

2. Will the Commission engage with policy-makers in Member States in order to focus attention on the concerns
raised by the Declaration?

3. Does the Commission intend to propose regulatory action?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 August 2013)_

1. The Commission proposal for Horizon 2020 ( [1] ), envisages further support for studying impact of chemicals on
human health ( [2] ),

2. The Commission intends to engage policy-makers in Member States in the work described at point 3 below. The
points raised in the Declaration will form input to these discussions.

3. The Commission is examining scientific criteria for the identification of endocrine disruptors. The Commission
is required to develop the criteria under the regulation for Plant Protection Products ( [3] ) and under the regulation for
Biocidal Products ( [4] ). Furthermore, the Cosmetic Products Regulation ( [5] ) requires the Commission to review this
regulation with regard to endocrine disruptors when criteria for identifying endocrine disruptors are available, or at
the latest by January 2015.

Furthermore, the Commission is working on a review on which of the two authorisation routes (adequate control or
socioeconomic) should be applicable to endocrine disruptors to gain an authorisation under REACH.

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**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
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**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0811:FIN:en:PDF.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012.
( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products.

C 42 E / 542 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006151/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — EEAS missions 2012

What was the cost of missions for EEAS staff members in 2012?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(29 July 2013)_

The cost of missions implemented by the staff belonging to the European External Action Service from the 2012
budget amounted to about EUR 14.1 million (about EUR 7.3 million for EEAS staff in Headquarters and about
EUR 6.8 million for EEAS staff in delegations).

The EEAS appropriations for missions' expenditure were cut by 10% from 2011 to 2012 and were frozen in nominal
terms in 2013. For 2014, the EEAS is proposing to keep such appropriations frozen at the headquarters and to cut
them again by 5% in delegations.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 543

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006152/13**
**to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — 2012 EEAS missions

How many missions did the EEAS staff undertake in 2012?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

During the year 2012 the EEAS staff performed about 10 000 missions (of which about 4 300 by the EEAS personnel
in Headquarters and about 5 700 by the EEAS personnel in delegations).

The EEAS cut it appropriations for mission expenditure, both at headquarters and in delegations, by 10% from 2011
to 2012 and froze them in nominal terms in 2013. For 2014, the EEAS is proposing to keep such appropriations
frozen at headquarters and to cut them again by 5% in delegations.

C 42 E / 544 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006153/13**

**to the Council**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cost of staff missions 2012

What was the cost of missions for Council staff in 2012?

**Reply**
_(11 September 2013)_

The cost of missions for Council staff in 2012 was 3.180.757 EUR .

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 545

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006154/13**

**to the Council**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Council staff missions 2012

How many missions did Council staff undertake in 2012?

**Reply**
_(11 September 2013)_

In 2012 Council staff undertook 3 991 missions.

C 42 E / 546 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006155/13**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cost of staff missions 2012

What was the cost of missions for Commission staff in 2012?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 August 2013)_

The total cost of missions for Commission staff in 2012 is indicated in the annual accounts of the EU, in the
corresponding budget line, which is submitted for the EP.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 547

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006156/13**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Commission staff missions 2012

How many missions did Commission staff undertake in 2012?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 August 2013)_

Commission staff carried out 101.106 missions during 2012.

C 42 E / 548 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006157/13**

**to the Commission**
**William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Turkey's EU candidacy

At the close of an International Bar Association conference in Istanbul last month (April 2013), the President of the
Turkish Bar stunned the audience by announcing that he and nine other lawyers were facing criminal charges because
they had made a public declaration in support of the right to a free trial. Their trial will take place in Istanbul on
10 October.

1. Is the Commission aware of the above events?

2. As a candidate country which is negotiating EU membership, Turkey should ensure that it respects the
fundamental rights of all its citizens and that it complies with the provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, as the Commission has pointed out several times in
its answers to my questions on the matter. Does the Commission not agree, however, that these facts clearly highlight
Turkey’s complete disregard for integration and alignment with the _acquis_ ?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

The Commission monitors closely developments related to the case mentioned by the Honourable Member and the
trial which started on 17 May at an Istanbul Serious Crime Court.

The Commission has to date recognised the progress Turkey has made to improve its judicial system but, also, called
for further continuous efforts for legislative alignment and progress on the ground.

It is the Commission's view that the EU needs to engage further with Turkey. This will ensure that EU standards
remain the reference in the country.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 549

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006158/13**

**aan de Raad**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onbeantwoorde vraag over het handboek van de NAVO over cyberoorlogvoering en de
cyberveiligheidsstrategie van de Europese Unie

Op 25 maart 2013 heb ik een schriftelijke vraag aan de Raad ingediend over het handboek van de NAVO over
cyberoorlogvoering en de cyberveiligheidsstrategie van de Europese Unie (E-003334/2013).

De termijn voor de beantwoording van deze vraag is verstreken op 21 mei 2013.

Waarom heeft de Raad het Reglement niet nageleefd?

**Antwoord**
_(16 september 2013)_

Het antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-003334/13 is op 10 juli 2013 naar het EP gezonden na voltooiing van de
vereiste procedurele stappen binnen de Raad. Dit kan meer tijd in beslag nemen dan de termijn die is voorzien in het
eigen reglement van het EP dat, er zij aan herinnerd, de Raad niet bindt.

C 42 E / 550 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006158/13**

**to the Council**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Unanswered written question on ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and the EU cyber security strategy’

On 25 March 2013 I submitted a written question to the Council on the ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and the EU
cyber security strategy’ (E-003334/2013).

The deadline for answering this question lapsed on 21 May 2013.

Why has the Council failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

The reply to Written Question E-003334/13 was sent to the EP on 10 July 2013, upon completion of the required
procedural steps within the Council. This may take longer than the deadline provided for in the EP's own rules of
procedure which, it will be recalled, do not bind the Council.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 551

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006159/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onbeantwoorde vraag over „het NAVO-handboek cyberoorlog en de EU-strategie cyberveiligheid”

Ik heb op 25 maart 2013 een vraag voor schriftelijke beantwoording aan de Commissie gesteld over „het NAVOhandboek cyberoorlog en de EU-strategie cyberveiligheid” (E-003335/2013).

De uiterste termijn voor beantwoording van deze vraag is op 21 mei 2013 verstreken.

Waarom houdt de Commissie zich niet aan het Reglement?

**Antwoord van de heer Šefčovič namens de Commissie**

_(1 juli 2013)_

Het antwoord op vraag E-3335/13 van het geachte Parlementslid is op 11 juni 2013 door de Commissie
toegezonden.

De Commissie wenst andermaal te beklemtonen dat zij groot belang hecht aan het beantwoorden van de
parlementaire vragen, een belangrijk element voor de democratische controle door het Parlement. Zij probeert alle
vragen zo compleet en zorgvuldig mogelijk en binnen korte tijd te beantwoorden. Daarom betreurt zij allereerst de
vertraging die bij het beantwoorden van bovengenoemde vraag is opgelopen.

Het aantal schriftelijke vragen is de afgelopen jaren echter aanzienlijk toegenomen. In 2012 heeft de Commissie bijna
12 000 schriftelijke vragen van leden van het Parlement beantwoord. Bovendien bevatten veel van deze vragen
meerdere subvragen. Het toegenomen aantal vragen heeft onvermijdelijk geleid tot een toename van de werkdruk in
een periode van nulgroei op het gebied van personeel.

C 42 E / 552 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006159/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Unanswered written question on ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and the EU cyber security strategy’

On 25 March 2013 I submitted a written question to the Commission on the ‘NATO cyber warfare manual and
the EU cyber security strategy’ (E-003335/2013).

The deadline for answering this question lapsed on 21 May 2013.

Why has the Commission failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 July 2013)_

The reply to the Honourable Member's Question E-3335/13 was transmitted by the Commission on 11 June 2013.

The Commission wishes to reiterate that it attaches great importance to answering parliamentary questions, an
important element of the democratic scrutiny exercised by Parliament. It seeks to answer all questions as completely
and as accurately as possible within a short period of time and therefore first of all very much regrets the delay that
has occurred in replying to the abovementioned question.

However, the number of written questions has increased considerably during recent years. In 2012, the Commission
responded to almost 12 000 written questions by Members of Parliament. Moreover, many of these questions include
several sub questions. The increased number of questions has inevitably lead to an increased workload during a
period of zero growth in human resources.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 553

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006160/13**

**aan de Raad**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Onbeantwoorde vraag over de opneming van Hezbollah in de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties

Op 12 maart 2013 heb ik een schriftelijke vraag aan de Raad ingediend over over de opneming van Hezbollah in
de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties(E-002868/2013).

De termijn voor de beantwoording van deze vraag is verstreken op 9 mei 2013.

Waarom heeft de Raad het Reglement niet nageleefd?

**Antwoord**
_(16 september 2013)_

Het antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-002868/13 is op 19 juni 2013 naar het EP gezonden na voltooiing van de
vereiste procedurele stappen binnen de Raad. Dit kan meer tijd in beslag nemen dan de termijn die is voorzien in het
eigen reglement van het EP dat, er zij aan herinnerd, de Raad niet bindt.

C 42 E / 554 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006160/13**

**to the Council**
**Marietje Schaake (ALDE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Unanswered question: ‘Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations’

On 12 March I submitted a question to the Council about placing ‘Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations’
(E-002868/2013).

The deadline for answering this question lapsed on 9 May 2013.

Why has the Council failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure?

**Reply**
_(16 September 2013)_

The reply to Written Question E-002868/13 was sent to the EP on 19 June 2013, upon completion of the required
procedural steps within the Council. This may take longer than the deadline provided for in the EP's own rules of
procedure which, it will be recalled, do not bind the Council.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 555

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006161/13**

**à la Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(31 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Recherche: développer des drones européens

La France, à la suite d'autres États membres de l'Union, envisage l'achat de drones, à des fins militaires, à l'étranger.
Cette annonce révèle, par contraste, l'absence criante de lancement d'un réel programme visant le développement des
technologies associées aux drones en Europe, dont les applications sont tant civiles que militaires.

Actuellement, les États-Unis et Israël sont les deux pays les plus avancés en matière de maîtrise des technologies
associées aux drones. Pour autant, l'industrie européenne possède également le savoir-faire et les compétences
nécessaires au développement de ces technologies. L'Europe devrait en effet pouvoir développer ses propres drones
afin de préserver son indépendance sur la scène internationale, mais également afin de préparer l'émergence du
marché des drones civils, au cours de la prochaine décennie, dont la Commission reconnaît par ailleurs l'importance
cruciale dans son document de travail en faveur d'une stratégie européenne pour le développement des applications
civiles des drones.

Afin de permettre à l'Europe de maintenir son avantage technologique et de donner à l'industrie aéronautique
européenne l'occasion de renforcer sa compétitivité, la Commission européenne devrait mettre en œuvre les moyens
et les outils nécessaires à la réalisation de cette ambition.

Il relève en effet des compétences de la Commission européenne de définir en premier lieu le cadre réglementaire
permettant l'insertion des drones dans le trafic aérien et dans l'espace aérien civil non-ségrégué dans le cadre de
l'Agence européenne de la sécurité aérienne (AESA). La Commission européenne devrait également, à travers sa
politique de recherche et de développement, allouer les moyens nécessaires au développement des technologies en
matière de drones. Ces projets de R&D pourraient notamment être mis en œuvre au travers de l'entreprise commune
SESAR, qui assure la coordination des projets de recherche dans le cadre du programme SESAR, le pilier
technologique du Ciel unique européen.

1. Afin de permettre l'émergence du marché européen des drones civils, quels moyens la Commission envisage-telle de consacrer au cadre réglementaire permettant l'insertion des drones dans le trafic aérien et dans l'espace aérien
civil non-ségrégué dans le cadre de l'AESA?

2. Quels moyens la Commission envisage-t-elle de consacrer au développement des technologies en matière de
drones, en relation avec l'entreprise commune SESAR et le cadre financier pluriannuel 2014-2020?

**Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission**

_(8 juillet 2013)_

1. La Commission envisage actuellement l'élaboration d'un cadre stratégique propice aux systèmes d'aéronefs
télépilotés. Ce cadre stratégique comprendrait des règles de sécurité, sur lesquelles l'Agence européenne de la sécurité
aérienne (AESA), chargée de les élaborer, a déjà commencé ses travaux. Il porterait également sur d'autres thèmes
importants, comme la sûreté, la protection de la vie privée et la protection des données. Globalement, ce cadre
stratégique devrait trouver un juste milieu entre promouvoir de nouvelles technologies nécessaires à l'essor de ce
secteur prometteur et assurer à nos citoyens le plus haut niveau de sûreté, de sécurité et de protection de la vie privée.

2. La Commission entend employer, en temps utile, le budget disponible au titre du programme SESAR pour
intégrer les systèmes d'aéronefs télépilotés dans le futur système de gestion du trafic aérien. Le budget exact sera
disponible une fois que le cadre financier pluriannuel aura été arrêté. Le programme SESAR sera axé sur les recherches
nécessaires en matière de guidage et de surveillance. L'intérêt accru que suscitent les systèmes d'aéronefs télépilotés
devrait également se traduire dans la gouvernance renouvelée de l'entreprise commune SESAR.

C 42 E / 556 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006161/13**

**to the Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Research: developing European drones

Following the example of other EU Member States, France is planning to purchase drones for military purposes
abroad. This announcement shows, by contrast, the glaring absence of a real programme aimed at developing dronerelated technology in Europe, which can be used for both civil and military applications.

Currently, the United States and Israel are the two most advanced countries in terms of developing drone-related
technology. However, European industry also has the necessary knowledge and skills to develop this technology.
Europe should be able to develop its own drones in order to preserve its independence in the international arena, but
also in order to prepare for the emergence of a civil drone market over the course of the next 10 years. Moreover, the
Commission recognises the critical importance of this in its working document in favour of a European strategy for
the development of civil applications of drones.

In order to enable Europe to maintain its technological advantage and to give the European aviation industry the
opportunity to boost its competitiveness, the Commission should put in place the necessary means and tools to
realise this ambition.

It falls within the Commission’s powers firstly to define the regulatory framework allowing for the insertion of drones
into air traffic and non-segregated civil airspace within the framework of the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA). The Commission should also allocate the necessary means for the development of drone technology through
its research and development policy. These R&D projects could be implemented in particular via the SESAR Joint
Undertaking, which ensures the coordination of research projects within the framework of the SESAR programme,
the technological pillar of the Single European Sky.

1. In order to enable the emergence of the European civil drone market, what means does the Commission intend
to provide for the regulatory framework allowing for the insertion of drones into air traffic and non-segregated civil
airspace within the framework of the EASA?

2. What means does the Commission intend to provide for the development of drone technology with regard to
the SESAR Joint Undertaking and the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission**

_(8 July 2013)_

1. The Commission is currently considering the preparation of a supportive and enabling policy framework for
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). The policy framework would include safety regulation to be developed by
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), on which work has already started by the Agency, and other relevant
topics like security, privacy and data protection. In all, the framework should strike a delicate balance between
promoting new technologies to let this promising industry take off and ensuring our citizens with the highest levels
of safety,-security-and privacy protection.

2. The Commission intends to use, at the appropriate time, the budget available under the SESAR programme to
integrate RPAS in the future Air Traffic Management system. The exact budget will become available once the
Multiannual Financial Framework will be decided. The SESAR programme will focus on the required guidance and
surveillance research. The renewed governance of the SESAR Joint Undertaking should also reflect the increased
interest for RPAS.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 557

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006162/13**

**à la Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(31 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ VP/HR — Des drones européens au service de la défense et de la sécurité européenne

La France, après d'autres États membres de l'Union européenne, envisage l'achat de drones, à des fins militaires, à
l'étranger. Cette annonce révèle, par contraste, l'absence criante de lancement de réel programme visant à développer
des technologies associées aux drones en Europe, dont les applications sont tant civiles que militaires.

Actuellement, les États-Unis et Israël sont les deux pays les plus avancés en matière de maîtrise des technologies
associées aux drones. Pour autant, l'industrie européenne possède également le savoir-faire et les compétences
nécessaires au développement de ces technologies. L'Europe devrait en effet pouvoir développer ses propres drones
afin de préserver son indépendance sur la scène internationale, mais également pour préparer l'émergence du marché
des drones civils au cours de la prochaine décennie.

L'Agence européenne de défense est déjà active en matière de recherche sur les technologies appliquées aux drones,
notamment à travers le projet MIDCAS _(Mid-Air Collision Avoidance System)_ et DeSIRE _(Demonstration of Satellites_
_Enabling the Insertion of RPAS in Europe)_ qui visent à permettre l'intégration des drones dans l'espace aérien civil nonségrégué.

L'Agence européenne de défense a relevé que le renseignement et l'observation issus des drones constituaient une
lacune capacitaire critique à l'issue des opérations militaires menées par la France et le Royaume-Uni en Libye.
L'Agence européenne de défense a pour vocation de faire converger et fédérer les besoins capacitaires des États
membres dans le cadre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) de l'Union européenne.

1. En ce qui concerne la recherche et la technologie, la haute représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et
la politique de sécurité envisage-t-elle de demander à l'Agence européenne de défense de coopérer avec la
Commission européenne et l'Agence spatiale européenne (ESA) en matière de développement de technologies duales
appliquées aux drones?

2. La haute représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité peut-elle demander à
l'Agence européenne de défense de développer des technologies spécifiques à la défense en complément des
technologies duales évoquées à la question précédente?

**Réponse donnée par M** **[me]** **Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission**

_(14 août 2013)_

Mme Ashton, en sa qualité de directrice de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED), préside les réunions du comité
directeur ministériel de l'EAD.

Lors de la dernière réunion du comité directeur ministériel du 23 avril, les ministres ont exprimé leur soutien à une
approche coopérative des systèmes d'aéronefs télépilotés (RPAS), approuvé la proposition de lancer un projet
expérimental de RPAS et chargé l'EAD de mettre en œuvre un certain nombre d'actions, y compris l'élaboration d'une
norme commune pour les RPAS Moyenne Altitude Longue Endurance et une mutualisation de la demande en RPAS
de petite taille.

Les RPAS appuient des activités militaires et civiles. Ils offrent la possibilité d'adopter une approche européenne
globale, en concertation avec la Commission. L'EAD a été très active dans le domaine des technologies d'intégration
dans le trafic aérien: des démonstrations sont prévues en 2013 avec le Midcas (MIDair Collision Avoidance System),
ce système doté de technologies de détection et d'évitement devant permettre aux RPAS d'éviter les collisions; une
démonstration (DeSIRE) menée conjointement avec l'ESA portera également sur la mise au point de concepts
opérationnels et de normes de sécurité garantissant une transmission sûre des données par satellite.

Un programme d'investissement conjoint, visant à soutenir le développement des technologies nécessaires à une
intégration dans le trafic aérien, est en cours d'élaboration. Il se concentrera sur des priorités telles que la détection et
l'évitement, la fonction de taxi, le décollage et l'atterrissage automatiques, les interfaces de gestion du trafic aérien, le
contrôle automatique sécurisé et l'architecture décisionnelle. Ces priorités viendront compléter les activités de la
Commission dans le même domaine.

C 42 E / 558 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Le plan stratégique pour la recherche et le développement inclus dans la feuille de route pour l'intégration des RPAS
civils dans le système aéronautique européen favorisera une coordination étroite entre ces activités. La feuille de route
a été élaborée par le groupe directeur européen chargé des RPAS (réunissant les principales parties prenantes, dont
l'EAD) et présentée à la Commission le 20 juin 2013.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 559

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006162/13**

**to the Commission**
**Christine De Veyrac (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ VP/HR — European drones for the European security and defence policy

Following the example of other EU Member States, France is planning to purchase drones for military purposes
abroad. This announcement shows, by contrast, the glaring absence of a real programme aimed at developing dronerelated technology in Europe, which can be used for both civil and military applications.

Currently, the United States and Israel are the two most advanced countries in terms of developing drone-related
technology. However, European industry also has the necessary knowledge and skills to develop this technology.
Europe should be able to develop its own drones in order to preserve its independence in the international arena, but
also in order to prepare for the emergence of a civil drone market over the course of the next 10 years.

The European Defence Agency is already actively involved in research on the technology used in drones, particularly
through the MIDCAS (Mid-Air Collision Avoidance System) project and DeSIRE (Demonstration of Satellites
Enabling the Insertion of RPAS in Europe), which are aimed at enabling the insertion of drones into non-segregated
civil airspace.

The European Defence Agency has stated that the information and observation provided by drones represented a
gaping hole in the military operations led by France and the United Kingdom in Libya. The European Defence Agency
aims to align and integrate the needs of the Member States within the framework of the EU’s common security and
defence policy (CSDP).

1. With regard to research and technology, does the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy intend to ask the European Defence Agency to cooperate with the Commission and the European
Space Agency (ESA) in the development of dual technology used in drones?

2. Can the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ask the European Defence
Agency to develop specific defence technology in addition to the dual technology mentioned in the previous
question?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 August 2013)_

The HR/VP in her capacity as Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) chairs meetings of the EDA Ministerial
Steering Board.

At the last Ministerial Steering Board on 23 April, Ministers: supported a cooperative approach on Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems (RPAS); endorsed the proposal to launch an RPAS Pioneer Project; and tasked EDA to implement a
number of actions, including the development of a common requirement for Medium Altitude Long Endurance
RPAS, and pooling demand of small RPAS.

RPAS support military and civil activities. They offer the potential for a comprehensive European approach, in
coordination with the Commission _._ EDA has done significant work in air traffic insertion technologies: MIDair
Collision Avoidance System (MIDCAS) will lead to demonstrations in 2013, equipped with sense-and-avoid
technologies, enabling RPAS to avoid collision; and a joint demonstration (DeSIRE) with ESA for the development of
operational concepts and safety requirements for secure satellite data-links.

A Joint Investment Programme to support the development of technology necessary for air traffic insertion is under
preparation. It will focus on priorities such as sense-and-avoid, taxi, automatic take-off and landing, air traffic
management interfaces, safe automated monitoring, and decision architecture. These will complement the activities
of the Commission in the same area.

The Strategic R&D Plan included in the Roadmap for civil RPAS integration into the European Aviation System will
facilitate close coordination between these activities. The Roadmap was elaborated by the European RPAS Steering
Group (gathering main stakeholders, including EDA) and presented to the Commission on 20 June 2013.

C 42 E / 560 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006164/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(31 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Arsenico nelle acque delle province di Roma, Latina e Viterbo

Il D. L. 31 del 2001 ha recepito la direttiva della Comunità europea del 1998 relativa alla qualità dell'acqua destinata
al consumo umano ed ha disposto l'obbligo di conformità ai valori di parametro riportati nel decreto a partire dal
25 dicembre 2003. Per l'arsenico il V.M.A è di10 μg/l.

La decisione (C82011)2014 del 22.3.2011 della Commissione ha accolto la richiesta di deroga formulata dall'Italia
per il parametro arsenico per valori di 20 μg/l per il triennio 2010-2012. In seguito alla scadenza di questa deroga
(31.12.2012), il Commissario europeo all'Ambiente, Janez Potocnick, ha reso noto nella sua dichiarazione
dell'8.1.2013 che le autorità italiane sono tenute a presentare una relazione entro la fine di febbraio 2013 per
illustrare i progressi nei loro interventi di bonifica e il presente livello di conformità. La Regione Lazio (Direzione
regionale ambiente) ha elaborato una Relazione sull'attività svolta per il rientro dei parametri arsenico e fluoro, sulle
misure correttive adottate e sui progressi raggiunti nelle province di Roma, Latina e Viterbo. Si apprende in ultimo che
è in atto una «Partnership Implementation Agreements» (PIA).

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. quali sono le sue valutazioni sulle misure correttive adottate in virtù dell'utilizzazione dello strumento PIA;

2. se sono state notate irregolarità nell'implementazione del patto;

3. se, quando uno Stato membro e la Commissione stabiliscono il patto PIA, le autorità regionali o sub-nazionali
possono essere coinvolte attraverso l'utilizzo di un «dossier team» per garantire che i livelli locali siano
pienamente operativi nell'implementazione dei compiti a loro affidati e è stato creato un dossier team nella
regione Lazio;

4. se è stato creato un altro elemento previsto dalla PIA, lo strumento tripartito, (che coinvolgerebbe la
Commissione, lo Stato membro e l'autorità sub-nazionale)?

5. se le modalità d'informazione della popolazione sono state efficaci?

**Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione**

_(30 luglio 2013)_

Gli accordi di partenariato per l’applicazione della normativa (Partnership Implementation Agreements, PIA) sono
stati individuati all’interno della comunicazione di attuazione della Commissione ( [1] ) come strumento utile per far
fronte ai nuovi problemi di attuazione, garantendo l’impegno degli Stati membri ad attuare le misure necessarie. Tali
misure vanno formalizzate e rese pubbliche. I PIA sono inoltre stati inseriti nella proposta per un programma
generale dell’Unione in materia di ambiente come mezzo per raggiungere l’obiettivo prioritario 4: «sfruttare al
massimo i vantaggi della legislazione dell’UE in materia di ambiente».

Il dibattito interistituzionale sul nuovo programma si è concluso da poco ( [2] ). In attesa del completamento del
programma, la Commissione sta esplorando (a livello di progetto pilota) le modalità di attuazione pratica degli
accordi PIA.

In tale contesto, le autorità italiane hanno chiesto alla Commissione di considerare la possibilità di sottoscrivere un
accordo PIA per risolvere le questioni ancora in sospeso derivanti dalle sue decisioni in materia di deroghe sull’acqua
potabile. La Commissione non si è ancora pronunciata in merito all’attuabilità di un tale accordo.

Per quanto riguarda l’informazione della popolazione, le autorità italiane hanno messo a disposizione i seguenti link:
http://www.asl.vt.it/Cittadino/arsenico/base.php e
[http://www.regione.lazio.it/rl_ambiente/?vw=contenutiDettaglio&cat=1&id=336.](http://www.regione.lazio.it/rl_ambiente/?vw=contenutiDettaglio&cat=1&id=336)

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Comunicazione dal titolo: «Trarre il massimo beneficio dalle misure ambientali dell’UE: instaurare la fiducia migliorando le conoscenze e

rafforzando la capacità di risposta.».

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/proposal.htm

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 561

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006164/13**

**to the Commission**
**Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Arsenic in the water in the provinces of Rome, Latina and Viterbo

Legislative Decree No 31 of 2001 transposed the 1998 EU directive on the quality of water intended for human
consumption and laid down the obligation to comply, from 25 December 2003, with the parametric values set out in
the decree. The maximum permissible value for arsenic is 10 μg/l.

Commission Decision C(2011) 2014 of 22 March 2011 accepted the derogation requested by Italy for a parametric
value of 20 μl for arsenic for the period 2010-2012. After this derogation expired on 31 December 2012, the
Commissioner for the Environment, Janez Potočnick, said in a statement dated 8 January 2013 that the Italian
authorities had to submit a report by the end of February 2013 to show what progress had been made in their
decontamination works and the present level of conformity. The Regional Government of Lazio (Regional directorate
for the environment) drafted a report on the actions taken to comply with the parameters for arsenic and fluoride, on
the corrective measures taken and on the progress made in the provinces of Rome, Latina and Viterbo. Finally, it has
come to light that a Partnership Implementation Agreement (PIA) is in place.

1. What is the Commission’s assessment of the corrective measures taken under the PIA instrument?

2. Have any irregularities come to light in the implementation of the agreement?

3. When a Member State and the Commission establish a PIA, can regional or sub-national authorities be involved
through the use of a ‘dossier team’ to ensure that local levels are fully engaged in the implementation of tasks assigned
to them and has a dossier team been established in the Lazio region?

4. Has another element provided for by the PIA, the tripartite instrument, been created (which would involve the
Commission, the Member State and the sub-national authorities)?

5. Have the methods of informing the public have been effective?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(30 July 2013)_

Partnership Implementation Agreement (PIA) were identified within the Commission's Implementation
Communication ( [1] ) as a means to address emerging implementation problems by ensuring that Member States
commit to put in place the necessary measures. These measures should be formalised and made publicly available.
Furthermore, PIA have been taken up in the proposed General Union Environment Action Programme, as a means
for attaining priority objective 4 ‘To maximise the benefits of EU environmental legislation’.

The interinstitutional discussions on the new Programme have been recently concluded ( [2] ). While awaiting the
finalisation of the Programme, the Commission is exploring (at pilot project level) ways in which PIAs could be
implemented in practice.

In this context, the Italian authorities requested the Commission to explore the possibility of a PIA in relation to the
outstanding issues stemming from the Commission Decisions on drinking water derogations. The Commission has
not yet decided on its feasibility.

In terms of informing the public, the Italian authorities have provided the following links:
[http://www.asl.vt.it/Cittadino/arsenico/base.php](http://www.asl.vt.it/Cittadino/arsenico/base.php)
[and http://www.regione.lazio.it/rl_ambiente/?vw=contenutiDettaglio&cat=1&id=336.](http://www.regione.lazio.it/rl_ambiente/?vw=contenutiDettaglio&cat=1&id=336)

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Communication on Improving the delivery of benefits from EU environment measures: building confidence through better knowledge and

responsiveness.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/proposal.htm

( **|**

C 42 E / 562 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006165/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(31 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ App anticontraffazione

Come non sempre è noto, la contraffazione è uno dei mali che affliggono il commercio in misura sempre più pesante.
Secondo l'OCSE, il mercato dei prodotti falsi vale oggi 460 miliardi di dollari ed è in costante crescita. Questo male
colpisce non solo chi produce gli originali, molto spesso di alta qualità, ma anche chi compra un prodotto truffaldino
e chi non può occupare un posto di lavoro legale. Essendo la contraffazione per sua natura clandestina, lo Stato perde
gli introiti fiscali tanto per la produzione quanto per il lavoro «in nero» che rimane sommerso. Ora però esiste
un'arma informatica che permette di riconosce se un prodotto è autentico o falso. Si tratta di una app scaricabile dal
web, accessibile da cellulari, tablet e PC. Tale programma è un sistema di autenticazione creato in Italia, disponibile in
otto lingue e usato in più di 100 paesi da oltre 30 grandi marchi. Funziona attraverso un codice sempre diverso di 12
caratteri cucito su un'etichetta o stampato su un certificato o su un pacco d'imballaggio. Lo si digita on line, si
forniscono le altre informazioni richieste (negozio o sito di vendita) e si può sapere in tempo reale se l'acquisto è
autentico oppure no.

1. Conosce la Commissione questo sistema?

2. Non potrebbe tenerne conto nella definizione delle misure da decidere per combattere la contraffazione, che è
un vero cancro dell'attività commerciale?

3. Non potrebbe suggerire alle dogane, se non l'avessero ancora fatto, di dotare i loro computer di questa nuova
app anticontraffazione?

4. Non potrebbe invitare i marchi che ancora non l'avessero fatto a usare questo sistema di autenticazione?

**Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione**

_(27 agosto 2013)_

I servizi della Commissione sono consapevoli che le tecnologie di autenticazione e tracciabilità costituiscono un
mercato in espansione, che può contribuire a proteggere le catene di approvvigionamento dalle merci contraffatte. La
Commissione, in cooperazione con l’Osservatorio europeo sulle violazioni dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale, si
prefigge di contribuire alla diffusione di informazioni sulle tecnologie disponibili, affinché i titolari di diritti di
proprietà intellettuale possano adottare le strategie anticontraffazione più adatte alla loro particolare attività. Tuttavia,
l’onorevole deputato comprenderà che la Commissione non può né intende intervenire nelle decisioni commerciali
delle imprese, quali la scelta del sistema da acquistare per rispondere alle esigenze in questo ambito.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 563

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006165/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Anti-counterfeiting application

People do not always realise that counterfeiting is a blight on business that is having an increasingly serious effect.
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the counterfeit goods market is
today worth USD 460 billion and is constantly growing. This blight not only affects producers of original goods,
which are very often of high quality, but also those who buy fake products and those who cannot find a legal job.
Since counterfeiting is, by its very nature, an underground activity, the state loses tax revenue both from production
and from undeclared work which remains hidden. However, there is now an IT tool that can recognise whether a
product is genuine or fake, in the form of an application that can be downloaded from the Internet and accessed by
mobile phones, tablets and PCs. The program is an authentication system created in Italy and is available in eight
languages and used in over 100 countries by more than 30 major brands. It works by using a unique 12-character
code sewn on to a label or printed on a certificate or on packaging. The consumer enters the code online, provides the
necessary additional information (the shop or website the product was bought from) and can then find out in real
time whether what they have bought is genuine or not.

1. Is the Commission aware of this system?

2. Could it not take it into account when deciding what measures to take to combat counterfeiting, which is real
blight on business?

3. Could it not suggest that customs install this new anti-counterfeiting application on their computer systems, if
they have not already done so?

4. Could it not call on brands that have not already done so to use this authentication system?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission**

_(27 August 2013)_

The Commission’s services are aware that there is a growing commercial market for track and trace technologies that
can help secure supply chains from the infiltration of counterfeits. The Commission together with the European
Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights seeks to contribute to the dissemination of information
on available technologies so that IP owners can adopt the most opportune anti-counterfeiting strategies for their
particular businesses. However, the Honourable Member will understand that the Commission neither can nor will
intervene in commercial decisions as to which system companies should decide to purchase to meet their needs in
this field.

C 42 E / 564 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006166/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(31 maggio 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Cybercriminalità in aumento

Nel 2012 gli attacchi hacker a siti privati e istituzionali sono aumentati del 42 per cento rispetto al 2011.
Emblematico per le sue conseguenze dolose e dannose, l'attacco effettuato il 23 aprile scorso all'account Twitter della
Associated Press dal «Syrian Eletronic Army», un gruppo di hacker pro Assad che dal network dell'AP ha diffuso la
notizia su un attentato alla Casa Bianca e sul ferimento di Obama. In pochi minuti l'indice Dow Jones alla Borsa di
New York è crollato (da 14,708 alle ore 13.07 a 14,550 alle ore 13.10) di quasi un punto percentuale, con volumi di
vendita balzati all'insù per poi rimbalzare e superare il crollo (14,720 alle ore 13.30), quando 20 minuti dopo la
notizia è stata smentita. L'account Twitter dell'AP ha 1,9 milioni di follower e ciò spiega l'ampiezza della reazione di
borsa. La sicurezza informatica è sempre sotto attacco. L'Italia è al settimo posto nel mondo per la quantità d'attività
di disturbo svolte da hacker e Roma è la quarta città al mondo per numero di «bot» (computer infettati, potenziali
veicoli per attività in grado di provocare danni). Tra l’altro, in rete sono facilmente reperibili a prezzi stracciati dei Kit
«fai da te» per diventare pirati. Con pochi clic si comprano anche programmi in grado di infettare altri computer,
rubare i dati memorizzati al loro interno o mettere fuori uso una pagina web. E ancor più facile è assoldare un «pirata»
che per pochi euro viola mail e social network. Gli antivirus e strumenti analoghi aiutano certamente a difendersi, ma
— come afferma uno degli hacker più famosi in «Ghost in the wires» — «Nessuno sarà mai protetto al 100 per cento.
Potrai ridurre i rischi a un livello accettabile, però non potrai rimuoverli del tutto». E mentre la criminalità cibernetica
aumenta, non si sa cosa facciano i governi per bloccarla.

Può la Commissione che certamente conosce la situazione riferire

1. come intende farvi fronte per evitare danni maggiori di quelli patiti fino ad ora;

2. se ritiene utile un'ulteriore riflessione sull'opportunità di impedire che la rete divenga sempre più un veicolo
d'illegalità e di reati;

3. se è in grado di individuare, con l'aiuto delle polizie postali nazionali coordinate da Europol, gli autori di questi
crimini ed i provider che li veicolano;

4. se crede che, senza interventi specifici, la rete diventerà sempre di più uno strumento di veicolazione
dell'illecito?

**Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione**

_(16 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione è ben consapevole della gravità del problema descritto dall'onorevole parlamentare e della crescita
allarmante del fenomeno. Esattamente per queste ragioni la lotta contro la criminalità informatica figura da diversi
anni ai primi posti tra le attività da seguire e costituisce una priorità per la Commissione e per l'UE. L'UE ha
recentemente adottato una serie di importanti provvedimenti, in particolare:

—
è stato varato a gennaio all'interno di Europol il Centro europeo per la lotta alla criminalità informatica ( [1] ) al
fine di migliorare, mediante gli indispensabili strumenti operativi e capacità di intelligence, i mezzi disponibili
ai tutori dell'ordine per contrastare le minacce informatiche;

—
è stata adottata a febbraio dell'anno in corso la strategia dell'UE in fatto di sicurezza informatica ( [2] ), con
l'obiettivo di promuovere un approccio coordinato di tutti gli interessati, tanto a livello di UE quanto su scala
nazionale, nonché di garantire un coordinamento tra comunità diverse;

—
è imminente l'adozione da parte del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio di una proposta di direttiva relativa
agli attacchi contro i sistemi di informazione ( [3] ) che trasforma in reati diverse infrazioni nel campo informatico,
comprese diverse tipologie di hacking e l'uso di reti di «bot»;

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) «Lotta alla criminalità nell'era digitale: istituzione di un Centro europeo per la lotta alla criminalità informatica», Bruxelles, 28.3.2012,

COM(2012)140 def.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) «Strategia dell'Unione europea per la cibersicurezza: un ciberspazio aperto e sicuro», Bruxelles, 7.2.2013, JOIN(2013)1 def.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) «Proposta di direttiva relativa agli attacchi contro i sistemi di informazione, e che abroga la decisione quadro 2005/222/GAI del Consiglio»,

Bruxelles, 30.9.2010, COM(2010)517 definitivo.

( **|**
( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 565

—
è stata avanzata una proposta di direttiva relativa alle reti e alla sicurezza dell'informazione ( [4] ) al fine di
aumentare la resistenza infrastrutturale dei settori vitali e di innalzare il grado di preparazione degli Stati
membri in caso di incidenti importanti.

Si tratta di una minaccia in costante evoluzione e risulta di conseguenza indispensabile dotarsi dei corretti strumenti
operativi, dei contesti normativi e delle capacità per farvi fronte. Appare quindi evidente la necessità che tutti
(istituzioni dell'UE, governi, imprese e privati) collaborino e condividano la responsabilità di rendere Internet sicura e
protetta.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) «Proposta di direttiva recante misure volte a garantire un elevato livello di sicurezza delle reti e dell’informazione nell'Unione», Bruxelles, 7.2.2013,
COM(2013)48 def.

C 42 E / 566 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006166/13**

**to the Commission**
**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Cybercrime on the rise

In 2012, there were 42% more hacker attacks on private and institutional websites than in 2011. One attack that
stood out because of the malicious and damaging consequences it had was that carried out by the Syrian Electronic
Army, a pro-Assad hacker group, on the Associated Press’s Twitter account on 23 April 2013. In the attack, the group
used AP’s network to spread news that the White House was under attack and that President Obama had been hurt. In
just a few minutes, the Dow Jones index on the New York stock exchange fell by almost one percentage point (from
14.708 at 13.07 to 14.550 at 13.10), with a sharp rise in the number of sales, then bounced back to a higher level
than before (14.720 at 13.30), when the news was confirmed to be fake 20 minutes later. AP’s Twitter account has
1.9 million followers, which explains the extent of the reaction on the stock exchange. Computer security is under
constant attack. Italy ranks seventh in the world in terms of the number of attacks carried out by hackers and Rome
has the fourth highest number of ‘bots’ (infected computers that can be used for potentially damaging attacks) of any
city in the world. Moreover, ‘DIY’ hacker kits are readily available at knock-down prices. With just a few clicks it is
even possible to buy programmes that can infect other computers, steal data stored inside them or take web pages
offline. It is even easier to hire a hacker who, for a few euros, will break into email and social network accounts.
Antivirus software and similar tools certainly help people to protect themselves but, as one of the most famous
hackers put it in the book _Ghost in the Wires_, no one can be 100% protected. People can reduce the risks to an
acceptable level, but they cannot eliminate them completely. While cybercrime is on the rise, it is not known what
governments are doing to stop it.

The Commission must surely be aware of this situation.

1. How does it plan to tackle cybercrime to prevent more serious damage than that done up to now?

2. Does it think it should give further consideration to the desirability of stopping the Internet from increasingly
becoming a tool for illegality and crime?

3. Can it identify, in cooperation with national cybercrime police forces coordinated by Europol, those responsible
for these crimes and the service providers that enable them to carry them out?

4. Does it believe that, without specific intervention, the Internet will increasingly become a tool for crime?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Commission is well aware of the scale of the problem described by the Honourable Member and of its alarming
growth. This is why the fight against cybercrime has been at the forefront of the political agenda for a number of years
now and is a priority for the Commission and for the EU. The EU has recently taken a number of important measures,
notably:

—
the European Cybercrime Centre ( [1] ) was launched in January within Europol, to improve the law enforcement
response to cyber threats, by equipping them with the necessary operational tools and intelligence;

—
an EU Cybersecurity Strategy ( [2] ) was adopted in February this year, to promote a coordinated approach of all
actors involved, both at EU and national level and ensuring cross-community coordination;

—
a draft Directive on Attacks against Information Systems ( [3] ), which criminalizes a number of cyber offences,
including various types of hacking as well as the use of botnets is about to be adopted by the European
Parliament and the Council;

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, Brussels, 28.3.2012, COM(2012) 140 final.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN(2013)1 final.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Proposal for a directive on attacks against information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision.

2005/222/JHA, Brussels, 30.9.2010, COM(2010) 517 final.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 567

—
a draft Directive on Networks and Information Security ( [4] ) was put forward to enhance the infrastructure
resilience of key sectors and improve the preparedness of Member States in the event of major incident.

This is a threat in constant evolution and therefore we need the right operational tools, legal frameworks and
capabilities to tackle it. There is a need for everyone — EU institutions, governments, businesses and individuals — to
work together and share the responsibility of making Internet safe and secure.

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Proposal for a directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union, Brussels,
7.2.2013, COM(2013) 48 final.

C 42 E / 568 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versiunea în limba română)_

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-006167/13**

**adresată Comisiei**
**Elena Băsescu (PPE)**

_(31 mai 2013)_

_Subiect:_ Decretele Beneš

Majoritatea petițiilor depuse la Parlamentul European în ultimii ani intră în categoria „drepturi fundamentale”. Unele
dintre acestea reclamă încălcări ale libertăților fundamentale garantate de Tratate, iar altele se referă la posibile
încălcări ale Cartei Drepturilor Fundamentale a Uniunii Europene.

În acest sens au fost primite mai multe petiții care ridică semne de întrebare asupra legalității și compatibilității așanumitelor „Decrete Beneš” cu prevederile Cartei.

Mai mult, în cadrul Comisiei competente din cadrul Parlamentului European, aceste petiții au generat numeroase
discuții, în special în ceea ce privește admisibilitatea lor și soluționarea acestora.

De asemenea, recurența acestor petiții arată faptul că deși Comisia a declarat că aceste decrete nu pot face obiectul
unei anchete retroactive, întrucât au fost adoptate înainte de aderarea Cehiei și Slovaciei la Uniunea Europeană,
problema este încă una de actualitate și continuă să îngrijoreze numeroși petiționari, mai ales că majoritatea invocă
faptul că decretele produc în continuare efecte.

În acest context, consideră Comisia că astfel de probleme intră în sfera de competențe a Uniunii Europene? Și, dacă da,
în ce măsură sunt aceste decrete compatibile cu legislația europeană?

**Răspuns dat de dna Reding în numele Comisiei**

_(1 august 2013)_

Așa-numitele „Decrete Beneš”, după cum s-a indicat în răspunsurile anterioare ale Comisiei, P-8383/2012, E-5310/11
E-1925/11, E-6938/08, E-4307/08, E-4776/07 și E-2238/04 ( [1] ), fiind acte normative istorice adoptate de autoritățile
din fosta Cehoslovacie înainte de aderare și nedând naștere unor efecte juridice noi care ar putea fi contrare dreptului
Uniunii, nu pot face obiectul unui control retroactiv.

În conformitate cu articolul 51 alineatul (1), dispozițiile Cartei drepturilor fundamentale a Uniunii Europene se aplică
statelor membre doar atunci când acestea pun în aplicare dreptul Uniunii. Pe baza informațiilor furnizate de către
distinsul membrul, problema menționată nu pare să aibă legătură cu punerea în aplicare a dreptului UE. Prin urmare,
este de competența exclusivă a statelor membre să asigure respectarea obligațiilor care le revin cu privire la drepturile
fundamentale, astfel cum rezultă din legislația națională a acestora și din acordurile internaționale.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 569

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006167/13**

**to the Commission**
**Elena Băsescu (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Beneš decrees

In recent years, most petitions to the European Parliament have been concerned with ‘fundamental rights’ involving
alleged infringements of either fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Treaties or the provisions of the
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.

A number of these petitions express concern regarding the legality of the ‘Beneš decrees’ and their compliance with
the Charter.

Their admissibility and possible ways of resolving the problems arising have prompted numerous debates in the
European Parliament committee responsible.

These petitions are still being tabled since, although the Commission has indicated that no retroactive inquiry can be
launched, the decrees having been adopted prior to Czech and Slovak accession, many people continue to be affected
by them.

In view of this, does the Commission consider such matters to fall within the sphere of activities of the European
Union and, if so, to what extent are the decrees compatible with EC law?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(1 August 2013)_

The so-called Benes decrees, as noted in the Commission's previous replies P-8383/2012, E-5310/11, E-1925/11, E6938/08, E-4307/08, E-4776/07 and E-2238/04 ( [1] ), are historical acts, undertaken by the authorities of the former
Czechoslovakia prior to accession and not giving rise to new legal effects which would be contrary to Union law,
cannot be subject to retroactive scrutiny.

According to its Article 51(1), the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are
addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. On the basis of the information
provided by the Honourable Member, it does not appear that the matter referred to is related to the implementation
of EC law. In that matter it is thus for Member States alone to ensure that their obligations regarding fundamental
rights — as resulting from international agreements and from their internal legislation — are respected.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

C 42 E / 570 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-006168/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(31 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Ευρωπαϊκή Συμμαχία για την Μαθητεία

Είναι γεγονός πως η αποτελεσματική πρακτική εκπαίδευση και η κατάρτιση, διευκολύνουν την πρόσβαση των νέων στην
αγορά εργασίας. Σε αυτό επιχειρεί να συμβάλει και η νέα πρωτοβουλία Ευρωπαϊκή Συμμαχία για την Μαθητεία (European
Alliance for Apprenticeships).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

—
Ποιο είναι το χρονοδιάγραμμα εφαρμογής της πρωτοβουλίας και ποιο το κόστος για τον κοινοτικό προϋπολογισμό;

—
Καθώς η συγκεκριμένη πρωτοβουλία εμπλέκει κρατικούς, επιχειρησιακούς και κοινωνικούς παράγοντες, ποιες είναι οι
προβλέψεις προκειμένου να ωφεληθούν και νέοι που δεν είναι ενταγμένοι σε κάποια οργάνωση, αλλά επιθυμούν να
κάνουν χρήση του προγράμματος σε ατομικό επίπεδο;

**Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(22 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Συμμαχία για Θέσεις Μαθητείας προκηρύχθηκε στις 2 Ιουλίου 2013.

Προς το παρόν δεν υπάρχουν άμεσες δαπάνες της Συμμαχίας από τον προϋπολογισμό της ΕΕ. Ωστόσο, η Συμμαχία προωθεί
ενέργειες που μπορούν να υποστηριχθούν από τα κονδύλια της ΕΕ, ιδίως του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινωνικού Ταμείου (πάνω από 10
δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ ετησίως), την πρωτοβουλία για την απασχόληση των νέων και το μελλοντικό πρόγραμμα Erasmus
Plus.

Ένας από τους στόχους της Συμμαχίας είναι η προαγωγή της αξιοποίησης των διαθέσιμων κεφαλαίων της ΕΕ για τη
δημιουργία περισσότερων και καλύτερων θέσεων μαθητείας, γεγονός που θα ωφελήσει τους νέους στην αναζήτηση
μαθητείας. Στόχος είναι να έχουν την ευρύτερη δυνατή ενημέρωση, τόσο μέσω της επένδυσης σε διαρθρωτικές
μεταρρυθμίσεις όσο και της άμεσης ατομικής υποστήριξης. Τα κριτήρια επιλεξιμότητας για χρηματοδότηση από την ΕΕ
ορίζονται στο αντίστοιχο κανονιστικό πλαίσιο.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 571

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006168/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ European Alliance for Apprenticeships

Effective practical education and training undoubtedly facilitate employment market access for young people, an
objective which the new European Alliance for Apprenticeships is also seeking to achieve:

In view of this:

—
Can the Commission indicate the timetable and cost to the EU budget of implementing this initiative?

—
Given that this initiative involves government, business and social factors, what provisions are being made to
extend benefits on an individual basis to young applicants not belonging to an organisation?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

The European Alliance for Apprenticeships was launched on 2 July 2013.

For the time being there are no direct costs of the Alliance to the EU budget. However, the Alliance promotes actions
which can be supported from EU resources, in particular the European Social Fund (more than EUR 10 billion per
year), the Youth Employment Initiative and the future Erasmus Plus Programme.

One aim of the Alliance is to promote the utilisation of the available EU funds to set up more and better
apprenticeship positions, which will benefit young people seeking an apprenticeship. The objective is to have the
widest possible outreach, both by investing in structural reforms and directly supporting individuals. Eligibility
criteria related to EU funding are set out in the respective regulatory framework.

C 42 E / 572 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-006169/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(31 Μαΐου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Europeana και έργα από την Ελλάδα.

Η Europeana αποτελεί μοναδικό και πρωτότυπο εργαλείο προβολής της πολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς στο Διαδίκτυο
προσφέροντας σε όλους τους πολίτες της Ευρώπης τη δυνατότητα αναζήτησης ποιοτικού υλικού πολιτιστικής και ιστορικής
σημασίας.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με το ποσοστό συμμετοχής της Ελλάδας στο πρόγραμμα Europeana;

2. Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή επαρκές το ενδιαφέρον και την συμμετοχή των κρατών μελών στην Europeana;

**Απάντηση της κ. Kroes εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(10 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Μέχρι και τον Ιούνιο του 2013, η συμβολή της Ελλάδας στο περιεχόμενο της Europeana ανερχόταν σε 247 633
αντικείμενα ( [1] ). Το ποσοστό αυτό αντιπροσωπεύει το 0,9% του συνολικού αριθμού αντικειμένων που είναι σήμερα
προσβάσιμα μέσω της Europeana. Στο παράρτημα II της Σύστασης της Επιτροπής, της 27ης Οκτωβρίου 2011, για την
ψηφιοποίηση και την επιγραμμική προσβασιμότητα πολιτιστικού υλικού και για την ψηφιακή διαφύλαξη ( [2] ) (εφεξής «η
Σύσταση») τίθεται ως συνολικός στόχος τα 30 εκατομμύρια αντικείμενα έως το 2015, εκ των οποίων τα 618 000 ορίζονται
ως ενδεικτικός στόχος ελάχιστης συμβολής σε περιεχόμενο για την Ελλάδα.

Με τον αριθμό των προσβάσιμων αντικειμένων μέσω της Europeana να φθάνει τα 27,4 εκατομμύρια, έχει επιτευχθεί το 91%
του συνολικού στόχου των 30 εκατομμυρίων ( [3] ). Καθώς απομένει ενάμισι έτος έως το 2015, η Επιτροπή κρίνει ότι το
συνολικό αποτέλεσμα είναι ικανοποιητικό. Ωστόσο, τα ποσοστά επίτευξης των επιμέρους στόχων διαφέρουν από το ένα
κράτος μέλος στο άλλο, π.χ. είναι 7% για τη Ρουμανία και 194% για την Εσθονία. Το ελληνικό περιεχόμενο στην Europeana
καλύπτει σήμερα το 40% του επιδιωκόμενου στόχου.

Όπως αναφέρθηκε στα διάφορα φόρουμ και δίκτυα που συντονίζει η Europeana, τα πολιτιστικά ιδρύματα των κρατών μελών
αναγνωρίζουν τον πρωτοποριακό ρόλο της Europeana, καθώς αυτή στηρίζει και επισπεύδει την καινοτομία στα ευρωπαϊκά
πολιτιστικά ιδρύματα. Το Rijksmuseum (https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/), παραδείγματος χάρη, έχει καταστήσει διαθέσιμες
όλες τις συλλογές του, σύμφωνα με την πρωτοβουλία της Europeana να γίνουν όλα τα μεταδεδομένα διαθέσιμα στο πλαίσιο
ανοικτών αδειών.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Η ενημέρωση για τον αριθμό των αντικειμένων που είναι προσβάσιμα ανά χώρα είναι δυνατή μέσω της ιστοσελίδας www.europeana.eu, κάνοντας

αναζήτηση πληκτρολογώντας τους τρεις χαρακτήρες *:* στο πεδίο αναζήτησης, και πατώντας την επιλογή «Κατά χώρα προέλευσης».

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) ΕΕ L 283 της 29.10.2011, σ. 39.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Στον αριθμό αυτό συμπεριλαμβάνονται αντικείμενα από χώρες εκτός ΕΕ.

( **|**
( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 573

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006169/13**

**to the Commission**
**Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ ‘Europeana’ and works from Greece

‘Europeana’ is a unique and innovatory Internet portal for promotion of the cultural heritage, offering the general
public in Europe access to high quality works of artistic and historical significance.

In view of this:

1. Does the Commission have information regarding the level of participation by Greece in the ‘Europeana’
programme?

2. Does the Commission consider that Member States are showing sufficient interest in ‘Europeana’ and is it
satisfied with their levels of participation?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission**

_(10 July 2013)_

As per June 2013, the number of objects contributed from Greece amounts to 247 633 ( [1] ). This represents 0.9% of
the total number of the objects currently accessible through Europeana. Annex II to the Commission
recommendation of 27 October 2011 on the digitisation and online accessibility of cultural material and digital
preservation ( [2] ) (‘the recommendation’) sets an overall target of 30 million objects by 2015, of which 618,000 are set
as the indicative target for minimum content contribution from Greece.

With currently 27.4 million objects accessible through Europeana, 91% of the overall target of 30 million have been
reached ( [3] ). With one and a half years to go until 2015, the Commission considers the overall result satisfactory. The
percentages of meeting individual targets, however, vary between Member States from 7% (Romania) to 194%
(Estonia). Greek content on Europeana currently represents 40% of its target.

As expressed in the various fora and networks coordinated by Europeana, the cultural institutions in the Member
States value Europeana as a frontrunner, supporting and accelerating innovation in Europe's cultural institutions. The
[Rijksmuseum (https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/), for instance, has made all its collections openly available in line with](https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/)
Europeana's initiative to make all metadata available under open licenses.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) The number of objects accessible per country can be consulted by accessing www.europeana.eu, by conducting a search with the three characters

*:* in the search box, and clicking on the ‘by providing country’ tab.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 283, 29.10.2011, p. 39.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) This includes also objects from non-EU countries.

( **|**
( **|**

C 42 E / 574 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006170/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(31 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Multas por retrasos en la aprobación de los planes de cuenca

El pasado 1 de mayo, los medios de comunicación publicaban que el presidente de la Confederación Hidrográfica del
río Segura informó, en el marco del Consejo del Agua de la demarcación hidrográfica del río Segura, que el retraso en
la aprobación de los planes hidrológicos de cuenca tenía un coste de 200 000 euros diarios de multa. En la misma
información se afirmaba que a esta cantidad se tendría que sumar la sanción de 100 millones de euros que ya ha
impuesto la Unión Europea al Gobierno español por no cumplir los plazos de aprobación de los planes de cuenca ( [1] ).

— ¿Qué sanciones económicas ha impuesto la Comisión al Reino de España por el incumplimiento de la Directiva
2000/60/CE sobre política de aguas, dado que no ha presentado los planes de cuenca dentro de los plazos
establecidos?

— ¿Puede informar la Comisión de la cuantía total de las sanciones al Estado español por retrasos en la aprobación y
presentación de planes de cuenca?

— ¿Tiene información la Comisión sobre la fecha de aprobación que estima el Gobierno de España para los planes de
cuenca que restan por aprobar?

**Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión**

_(9 de septiembre de 2013)_

El 25 de marzo de 2013, la Comisión pidió a España que adoptara las medidas necesarias para la ejecución de la
sentencia ( [2] ) del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. La Comisión está evaluando actualmente la información
más reciente presentada por las autoridades nacionales en respuesta a la carta de emplazamiento, de conformidad con
el artículo 260 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.

Según las autoridades españolas, a finales de 2013, casi todos los planes hidrológicos de cuenca estarán aprobados o
en la fase de aprobación final.

Según el artículo 260 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, si la Comisión estima que el Estado
miembro no ha adoptado las medidas necesarias para la ejecución de la sentencia del Tribunal, puede someter el
asunto al Tribunal, después de haber ofrecido a dicho Estado la posibilidad de presentar sus observaciones. La
Comisión indicará el importe de la suma a tanto alzado o de la multa coercitiva que deba ser pagada por el Estado
miembro y que considere adaptado a las circunstancias. Si el Tribunal considera que el Estado miembro afectado ha
incumplido su sentencia, puede imponerle el pago de una suma a tanto alzado o de una multa coercitiva.

Mientras no haya concluido la evaluación actualmente en curso, la Comisión no está en condiciones de calcular el
importe de la suma a tanto alzado o de la multa coercitiva que va a proponer en caso de que someta el asunto al
Tribunal.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.iagua.es/noticias/planificacion/13/05/02/el-retraso-en-la-aprobacion-de-los-planes-hidrologicos-le-cuesta-espana-6-millones-de
euros-al-m

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Sentencia del Tribunal de 4 de octubre de 2012 en el asunto C-403/11.

( **|**

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 575

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006170/13**

**to the Commission**
**Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Fines for delays in adopting river basin management plans

On 1 May 2013, the media reported that the head of the Segura River Water Management Board had stated, within
the framework of the Segura River District Water Council, that the delay in approving the river basin management
plans was costing EUR 200 000 daily in fines. At the same time, he asserted that this amount was in addition to the
penalty of EUR 100 million already imposed by the European Union on the Spanish Government for failure to meet
the deadlines for adopting the river basin management plans ( [1] ).

— What financial sanctions has the Commission imposed on Spain for failure to comply with Directive 2000/60/EC
on water policy, since it has not submitted the river basin management plans within the deadlines set?

— Can the Commission state the total amount of sanctions imposed on the Spanish State for its delay in adopting and
submitting river basin management plans?

— Does the Commission have any information on the date when the Spanish Government estimates it will adopt the
river basin management plans still outstanding?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 September 2013)_

On 25 March 2013, the Commission required Spain to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment ( [2] )
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Commission is now assessing the latest information submitted by
the national authorities in reply to the letter of formal notice under Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.

The authorities consider that, at the end of 2013, Spain will have almost all of their river basin management plans
approved or at the final stages of the adoption procedure.

According to Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if the Commission considers that
the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court, it may
bring the case before the Court after giving that State the opportunity to submit its observations. It shall specify the
amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers
appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with
its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it.

As long as the current assessment is not completed, the Commission is not in a position to calculate the amount of
the lump sum or penalty payment that it will propose in the case where the Commission would refer the matter to the
Court.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.iagua.es/noticias/planificacion/13/05/02/el-retraso-en-la-aprobacion-de-los-planes-hidrologicos-le-cuesta-espana-6-millones-de
euros-al-m

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Judgment of the Court of 4 October 2012 in Case C-403/11.

( **|**

C 42 E / 576 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006171/13**

**do Komisji**
**Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE)**

_(31 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Różnice w poziomie akcyzy pomiędzy UE a krajami Europy Wschodniej

W 2009 r. ministrowie finansów państw członkowskich UE uzgodnili poziom minimalnych stawek podatku
akcyzowego na wyroby tytoniowe pochodzące z państw, które przystąpiły do UE w 2004 i 2007 r. Ma to na celu
zlikwidowanie znacznych różnic wewnątrz UE, a wprowadzanie nowych przepisów zakończy się najpóźniej
w 2018 r.

Decyzja ta nie dotyczy jednak państw objętych Europejską Polityką Sąsiedztwa, w tym wschodnich sąsiadów UE.
W związku z tym różnice pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi UE a krajami Europy Wschodniej (Białorusią, Rosją
i Ukrainą) wciąż są bardzo wysokie.

Obecna sytuacja powoduje szereg niekorzystnych zjawisk gospodarczych i społecznych, w tym przede wszystkim
wysoką opłacalność przemytu wyrobów tytoniowych (nawet w ich dozwolonych ilościach) oraz tym samym
znaczne utrudnienia w przekraczaniu wschodniej granicy UE.

Wypracowanie wspólnego podejścia ze strony UE i jej wschodnich sąsiadów przyczyniłoby się do likwidacji lub
przynajmniej zmniejszenia przemytu, znacznego udrożnienia granic oraz ożywienia współpracy gospodarczej
i turystycznej pomiędzy wszystkimi partnerami.

W związku z tym zwracam się do Komisji z następującymi pytaniami:

—
Czy Komisja podejmuje działania mające na celu harmonizację stawek podatku akcyzowego na wyroby
tytoniowe pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi UE a krajami Europy Wschodniej?

—
Jak Komisja wspiera państwa członkowskie UE w ich staraniach udrożnienia wschodniej granicy UE oraz walki
na niej z przemytem?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji**

_(23 lipca 2013 r.)_

Komisja, w odniesieniu do stawek podatku akcyzowego pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi UE i sąsiadującymi
z nimi krajami Europy Wschodniej, nie może podejmować żadnych bezpośrednich działań mających na celu
harmonizację tych stawek, bowiem uzgodnienie ich wysokości stanowi suwerenne prawo każdego kraju. Jednakże
Komisja, podobnie jak wszystkie państwa członkowskie, jest stroną ramowej konwencji Światowej Organizacji
Zdrowia o ograniczeniu użycia tytoniu. W kontekście tej Konwencji UE i jej państwa członkowskie opowiadają się za
dalszym zbliżaniem stawek podatku akcyzowego na poziomie regionalnym, w szczególności między krajami
sąsiadującymi. Dodatkowo, stopniowa harmonizacja struktury i stawek podatku akcyzowego – z uwzględnieniem
specyfiki każdego z państw członkowskich, jak również kontekstu regionalnego – jest przedmiotem zawartych lub
będących na etapie negocjacji umów stowarzyszeniowych z Ukrainą, Armenią, Azerbejdżanem, Gruzją i Mołdawią.

Komisja wspiera służby celne państw członkowskich w aktywnym udziale w trwających obecnie negocjacjach
w ramach WRF na lata 2014-2020 dotyczących finansowania środków przeznaczonych na politykę spójności oraz
Europejskie Instrumenty Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa w celu pozyskania funduszy na rzecz modernizacji infrastruktury
celnej, wyposażenia (skanery), systemów informatycznych oraz rozwijania potencjału instytucjonalnego lub
administracyjnego.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 577

Przemytowi przez wschodnie granice poświęcono uwagę w strategii Komisji w zakresie zwalczania nadużyć
finansowych: w przyjętym w dniu 24 czerwca 2011 r. planie działania na rzecz zwalczania przemytu papierosów
i alkoholu przez wschodnią granicę UE ( [1] ). W tym zakresie Komisja odsyła Szanowną Panią Poseł do swojej
odpowiedzi na zapytanie E-1887/2012 Pani Beňová ( [2] ). Ponadto, w dniu 6 czerwca 2013 r. został opublikowany
komunikat w sprawie intensyfikacji walki z przemytem papierosów i innymi formami nielegalnego handlu
wyrobami tytoniowymi – kompleksowa strategia UE ( [3] ) oraz plan działania ( [4] ).

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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SEC(2011)791.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/pl/parliamentary-questions.html
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/2013-cigarette-communication/communication_pl.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/2013-cigarette-communication/action_plan_en.pdf

C 42 E / 578 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006171/13**

**to the Commission**
**Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Discrepancies in the level of duty between the EU and Eastern European countries

In 2009 the finance ministers of the Member States reached agreement on minimum rates of excise duties for tobacco
products from countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. This was aimed at eliminating the considerable
discrepancies within the EU, with new regulations to be introduced by 2018 at the latest.

However, the decision does not cover the countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy, among
these the EU’s eastern neighbours. As a result, there are still considerable discrepancies between the Member States
and the countries of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Russia and Ukraine).

The situation is giving rise to a series of adverse economic and social phenomena including, first and foremost,
making the smuggling of tobacco products — even in the quantities permitted — highly profitable and making it
extremely difficult to cross the EU’s eastern borders.

Attempts by the EU and its eastern neighbours to find a common approach would eliminate (or at least reduce)
smuggling, considerably ease the situation at the border and reinvigorate cooperation in the economic and tourism
fields between all those concerned.

_—_ Does the Commission intend to take any action aimed at harmonising rates of excise duties for tobacco products
between the Member States and Eastern European countries?

_—_ What support will the Commission give to Member States in their efforts to ease the border situation and fight
smuggling at the borders?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission**

_(23 July 2013)_

As regards the excise duty rates between the EU Member States and its Eastern neighbour countries, the Commission
cannot take any direct action aimed at harmonising these rates as the determination of levels falls under the sovereign
right of each country. However, the Commission as well as all Member States is Party to the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. In the context of this Convention, the EU and its Member States advocate for a
further approximation of excise duty rates on regional levels and in particular between neighbouring countries. In
addition, progressive harmonisation of excise duty structure and rates, taking into account the specificities of each
country as well as the regional context are covered in the Association Agreements concluded or under negotiation
with Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova.

The Commission supports Member States’ Customs services to actively engage with the current funding negotiations
of MFF 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy and European Neighbourhood Instruments, to obtain funding for modernisation
of customs infrastructure, equipment (ie. scanners), systems (ie. IT) and institutional/administrational capacity
building.

Smuggling through the Eastern borders is addressed in the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: ‘Action Plan to fight
against smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol along the EU Eastern Border’, adopted on 24.6.2011 ( [1] ). In this regard, the
Commission refers the Honourable Member to its reply to Question E-1887/2012 by Ms Beňová ( [2] ). Furthermore, a
communication on ‘Stepping up the fight against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in tobacco
products — A comprehensive EU strategy’ ( [3] ) and Action Plan ( [4] ) was published on 6.6.2013.

( **|**
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( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) SEC(2011)791.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/home.do?language=EN
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/2013-cigarette-communication/communication_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/2013-cigarette-communication/action_plan_en.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 579

_(Version française)_

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-006172/13**

**au Conseil**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(31 mai 2013)_

_Objet:_ Élections 2014: Président de la Commission élu par les citoyens

Le Parlement européen vient de présenter de nouvelles règles quant aux futures élections européennes. Selon cette
résolution, qui sera soumise au vote en juillet et qui rencontre déjà un vif succès au sein du Parlement européen, le
président de la Commission européenne serait élu par le peuple.

Chaque parti politique européen désignera un chef de file, qui serait ensuite candidat à la présidence de la Commission
européenne! En clair, le futur président de la Commission européenne sera choisi par les électeurs européens,
contrairement à la situation actuelle. Les candidats seraient donc dorénavant élus de manière transparente et
démocratique, en se présentant dans l'ensemble des États membres. Par ailleurs, les partis politiques européens seront
encouragés à organiser une série de débats publics entre les candidats désignés afin de faire écho aux enjeux
européens, trop souvent occultés par les enjeux purement nationaux.

1. Que pense le Conseil de cette proposition?

2. Appuie-t-il la demande du Parlement pour ce type de désignation au poste de Président de la Commission
européenne?

**Réponse**
_(11 septembre 2013)_

Le Conseil n'a pas débattu de la proposition mentionnée par l'Honorable Parlementaire.

Cependant, il attire l'attention de l'Honorable Parlementaire sur le fait que la procédure relative à l'élection du
président de la Commission est énoncée à l'article 17, paragraphe 7, premier alinéa, du traité sur l'Union européenne,
libellé comme suit:

_«En tenant compte des élections au Parlement européen, et après avoir procédé aux consultations appropriées, le Conseil européen,_
_statuant à la majorité qualifiée, propose au Parlement européen un candidat à la fonction de président de la Commission. Ce_
_candidat est élu par le Parlement européen à la majorité des membres qui le composent. Si ce candidat ne recueille pas la majorité,_
_le Conseil européen, statuant à la majorité qualifiée, propose, dans un délai d'un mois, un nouveau candidat, qui est élu par le_
_Parlement européen selon la même procédure_ » _._

En outre, la déclaration ad article 17, paragraphes 6 et 7, du traité sur l'Union européenne prévoit que ( [1] ):

«La Conférence considère que, en vertu des dispositions des traités, le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen ont
une responsabilité commune dans le bon déroulement du processus conduisant à l'élection du président de la
Commission européenne. En conséquence, des représentants du Parlement européen et du Conseil européen
procéderont, préalablement à la décision du Conseil européen, aux consultations nécessaires dans le cadre jugé le plus
approprié. Ces consultations porteront sur le profil des candidats aux fonctions de président de la Commission en
tenant compte des élections au Parlement européen, conformément à l'article 17, paragraphe 7, premier alinéa. Les
modalités de ces consultations pourront être précisées, en temps utile, d'un commun accord entre le Parlement
européen et le Conseil européen».

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) JO C 326 du 26 octobre 2012, p. 344.

C 42 E / 580 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006172/13**

**to the Council**
**Marc Tarabella (S&D)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ 2014 elections: an elected President for the Commission

The European Parliament has recently proposed new rules for future European elections. According to its resolution,
which will be put to the vote in July 2013 and has already been widely welcomed within the European Parliament, the
President of the European Commission would be elected by the people.

Each European political party would put forward a leading figure who would then be its candidate for President of the
Commission. In other words, contrary to the present system, the future Commission President would be chosen by
European electors. Candidates would thus in future would elected in a transparent and democratic manner, by
standing for election in all Member States. European political parties will also be encouraged to hold a series of public
debates between the designated candidate in order to reflect European issues, which are often obscured by purely
national issues.

1. What does the Council think of this proposal?

2. Does the Council support Parliament’s call for the President of the Commission to be elected in this way?

**Reply**
_(11 September 2013)_

The Council has not discussed the proposal to which the Honourable Member refers.

However, the Honourable Member's attention is drawn to the fact that the procedure for the election of the President
of the Commission is laid down in Article 17(7), first subparagraph of the Treaty on European Union, which reads as
follows:

‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the
European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President
of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component
members. If he does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall
within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same
procedure.’

Furthermore, the Declaration on Article 17(6) and (7) of the Treaty on European Union ( **[1]** ) indicates that:

‘The Conference considers that, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the
European Council are jointly responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election of the
President of the European Commission. Prior to the decision of the European Council, representatives of the
European Parliament and of the European Council will thus conduct the necessary consultations in the framework
deemed the most appropriate. These consultations will focus on the backgrounds of the candidates for President of
the Commission, taking account of the elections to the European Parliament, in accordance with the first
subparagraph of Article 17(7). The arrangements for such consultations may be determined, in due course, by
common accord between the European Parliament and the European Council.’

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ 26.10.2012, C 326/344.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 581

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-006173/13**

**an die Kommission**

**Paul Rübig (PPE)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Konzessionsregeln für Direktleitungen bei Kleinwasserkraftbetreibern

Eine Frage, die im Kontext mit Kleinwasserkraftbetreibern immer wieder aufkommt, ist der Direktverkauf von Strom
an einen benachbarten Kunden. Der Unionsgesetzgeber sieht dafür einen Rechtsanspruch auf die Errichtung und den
Betrieb von Direktleitungen vor; in der Praxis zeigt sich jedoch, dass die Versorgung eines Kunden über eine
Direktleitung für einen Kraftwerksbetreiber in der Praxis nicht möglich ist, da hier oftmals ein Widerspruch zum
Konzessionswesen für Verteilernetze gesehen wird.

Ist es Erzeugern bzw. Elektrizitätserzeugern im Sinne der RL 2009/72/EG gestattet, Direktleitungen zu errichten und
damit jeden zugelassenen Kunden zu versorgen?

Ist es hier von Bedeutung, ob zwischen dem Erzeuger und dem versorgten Kunden ein unternehmerischer
Zusammenhang besteht — muss es sich also um eine eigene Betriebsstätte oder ein Tochterunternehmen handeln?

Was könnte einer solchen Möglichkeit aus unionsrechtlicher Sicht entgegenstehen?

Wie ist diese Fragestellung im Zusammenhang mit dem Konzessionswesen für Verteilnetze zu bewerten; liegen hier
unionsrechtliche Widersprüche vor?

Steht eine bestehende Konzession in einem Versorgungsgebiet dem Recht auf Betrieb einer Direktleitung und
Versorgung eines zugelassenen Kunden entgegen?

Ist es einem Kraftwerksbetreiber gestattet, nicht nur eine, sondern eventuell auch mehrere Direktleitungen zum
Zweck der Versorgung von Kunden zu errichten und zu betreiben, sofern die Stromflüsse zum ebenfalls vorliegenden
Anschluss an das öffentliche Netz klar abgegrenzt sind?

Ist es für einen Erzeuger möglich, über eine einzige Direktleitung mehrere Kunden zu versorgen, wenn also nicht
jeweils eine eigene Leitung zu jedem einzelnen Kunden führt, sondern mehrere Kunden an einer Direktleitung
hängen?

**Antwort von Herrn Oettinger im Namen der Kommission**

_(2. Juli 2013)_

Gemäß Artikel 34 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG treffen die Mitgliedstaaten die erforderlichen Maßnahmen,
damit alle Elektrizitätserzeuger und alle Elektrizitätsversorgungsunternehmen ihre eigenen Betriebsstätten und
zugelassene Kunden über eine Direktleitung versorgen können. Zwischen Erzeugern und Kunden muss kein
unternehmerischer Zusammenhang bestehen. Weder die Anzahl der zugelassenen Kunden, die ein
Versorgungsunternehmen über eine Direktleitung mit Strom versorgen kann, noch die Anzahl der Direktleitungen,
die ein Kraftwerksbetreiber betreiben kann, werden durch die Richtlinie eingeschränkt.

Allerdings können die Mitgliedstaaten nach Artikel 34 Absatz 4 die Genehmigung zur Errichtung einer Direktleitung
von der Verweigerung des Zugangs Dritter zum bestehenden Übertragungs‐ oder Verteilernetz abhängig machen.
Dies bedeutet, dass Elektrizitätserzeugern und Elektrizitätsversorgungsunternehmen vorgeschrieben werden kann,
das lokale oder nationale Netz des benannten Netzbetreibers in ihrem Versorgungsgebiet für den Transport von
Strom an ihre Kunden zu verwenden, sofern der Betreiber dieses Netzes die erforderliche Kapazität zur Verfügung
stellt.

C 42 E / 582 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006173/13**

**to the Commission**

**Paul Rübig (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Concession rules concerning direct lines for operators of small hydroelectric power plants

Questions are regularly asked about small hydroelectric power plants’ entitlement to sell electricity directly to nearby
customers. EU legislation provides for a legal entitlement to install and operate direct lines. In practice, however, it is
not possible for a power plant operator to supply a customer via a direct line, as this is often seen to be in
contravention of concession rules on electricity grids.

Under Directive 2009/72/EC, are electricity producers allowed to install direct lines in order to supply all eligible
customers?

Does it matter whether the producer and the customer in receipt of the electricity are allied businesses? In other
words, does the customer have to be either a subsidiary or an establishment operated by the producer?

Does Union legislation stand in the way of this at all?

How does the Commission assess this issue with regard to concessions for electricity grids? Are there any
inconsistencies in Union legislation?

Is there anything preventing an existing concession in a service area from operating a direct line and supplying
electricity to an eligible customer?

Is the operator of a power plant entitled to install and operate more than one direct line for the purposes of supplying
customers if the electricity flows to them are clearly separated from a connection to the public grid which likewise
exists?

Is it possible for a producer to supply a number of customers using a single direct line, that is to say, if a number of
customers are connected to a single line rather than each customer having their own individual direct line?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission**

_(2 July 2013)_

Pursuant to Article 34(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC, Member States shall take measures to enable all electricity
producers and electricity supply undertakings to supply their own premises and eligible customers by direct lines. It is
not a requirement for producers and customers to be allied businesses. The directive does not limit the number of
eligible customers to whom a supplier may provide electricity via a direct line (or a number of direct lines operated by
a single power plant operator).

However, Article 34(4) of the directive also sets out that Member States may make authorisation to construct a direct
line subject to the refusal of third party access to the existing transmission or distribution system. This means that it is
possible for electricity producers and suppliers to be required to use the local or national network of the designated
system operator in their service area to transport electricity to their customers, provided that the operator of that
network makes the necessary capacity available.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 583

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-006174/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Szegedi Csanád (NI)**

_(2013. május 31.)_

_Tárgy:_ Daganatos betegségekkel kapcsolatos uniós problémák

Az Európai Unió tagországaiban kivétel nélkül a daganatos megbetegedések jelentik az egyik fő halálokot, aminek
immár népegészségügyi jelentősége van. A fejlett országok ezt a problémát elsősorban a daganatok megelőzésével, a
diagnózis korai megállapításával és a modern, bevált terápiás lehetőségeikkel orvosolják. A tumoros megbetegedések
száma Európa-szerte drámai méreteket öltött, és előfordulásuk az elmúlt évek során ijesztő mértékben emelkedett. A
szív‐ és érrendszeri betegségek után a második halálokot képezik. A másodlagos prevenciók (szűrések) hatására
bizonyos tumor típusok száma megtorpant, mint a méhnyakrák, emlőrák, de az egyelőre számos tumoros betegségre
ki nem terjedő szűrések miatt még így is magas haláloki tényezőt jelentenek, pedig sok esetben megelőzhetőek
lennének. Az adatok tükrében megállapítható, hogy a daganatos megbetegedések következtében (mortalitás +
morbiditás) évente nagyszámú polgári lakos kerül ki a munkaerőpiac világából, illetve nagy lelki terhet jelent a
családja és a társadalom számára.

Az egészségügy helyzete döntő fontosságú nemcsak a lakosságra nézve, hanem komoly hatást gyakorol a tagállamok
gazdaságaira is. A gazdasági növekedés nagymértékben függ a humán tőkétől és az egészségtől. Az egészséges
populáció magasabb termelékenységgel, munkaerő-kínálattal, képzettséggel rendelkezik, és lakossági megtakarítás
révén hozzájárul a „növekedéshez”. A jó egészségi állapot által több a munkanapban eltöltött idő, jobb minőségűvé
válik a munkavégzés, magasabb lesz a várható élettartam (termelékenységi növekedés), és magasabb az iskolai
végzettség. Az egészségesebb populáció kevesebbet veszi igénybe az egészségügyi szolgáltatásokat (megtakarítás), és
növekszik a pénzköltési hajlandósága (gazdaságélénkítés, adóbevételek).

A WHO makrogazdasági és egészségügyi bizottságának jelentése alapján (2001) a születéskor várható élettartam
10%-os növekedése legalább 0,3–0,4 százalékponttal növeli az éves GDP‐t, illetve a lakosság élettartamának 1 évvel
való meghosszabbítása 4%-os GDP-növekedést eredményez. Így az egészségüggyel kapcsolatos gazdasági
tevékenységek nagymértékben hozzájárulnak az ország bevételeihez is (húzóágazat). A felmerült probléma egyik
megoldása lehetne, hogy fokozzuk az Unió tevékenységét a daganatos betegségekkel kapcsolatos cselekvési tervek
megvalósítása érdekében.

— Az adatok tükrében az EU milyen eszközökkel próbál fellépni a daganatos betegségek növekedése ellen a jelenlegi
helyzetben?

— Milyen a tagországokat is átfogó népegészségügyi programokat, eljárásokat, ajánlásokat tervez a jövőben
(szűrővizsgálatok stb.) a rákos betegségek megelőzése érdekében?

— Érdemes lenne-e egy különbizottság felállítása, amely ebben a témakörben fejtené ki tevékenységét?

**Tonio Borg válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. július 16.)_

A Bizottság 2009-ben elfogadta a „Fellépés a rák ellen: európai partnerség” című közleményt ( [1] ). A partnerségnek
köszönhetően a tagállamok az egészségügyi program keretében közösen lépnek fel az Európai Bizottsággal. A rák
elleni közös fellépés a következő területekre terjed ki: rákmegelőzés (a szűrést is beleértve), a bevált gyógyászati
módszerek azonosítása, az összehasonlítható információk elemzése és a kutatás koordinációja.

A partnerség minden tagállamban elő kívánja mozdítani a nemzeti rákellenes tervek elfogadását abból a célból, hogy
a jövőben valamennyi tagállam rendelkezzen integrált rákellenes tervvel. Az ilyen tervek vélhetően hozzájárulnak
majd ahhoz, hogy az EU-ban csökkenjenek a rák okozta terhek; a cél az, hogy a rákos megbetegedések előfordulása
2020-ra 15%-kal mérséklődjön.

Az EU egészségügyi programja támogatja az Európai Rákellenes Kódex ( [2] ) felülvizsgálatát. A kódex új változata
várhatóan 2014-ben lesz elérhető.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_information/dissemination/diseases/docs/com_2009_291_hu.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_information/dissemination/diseases/docs/cancercode_hu.pdf

C 42 E / 584 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

A Tanács 2003-ban elfogadta a rákszűrésről szóló ajánlást ( [3] ), amely megállapítja a rákos megbetegedések korai
felismerése tekintetében bevált módszerek elveit. A Tanács minden tagállamot felszólít az emlő-, a méhnyak-,
valamint a vastag‐ és végbélrák diagnosztizálását célzó lakossági szűrőprogramok végrehajtására, valamint arra, hogy
minden szinten gondoskodjanak megfelelő minőségbiztosításról. Az ajánlás végrehajtásáról szóló első
jelentésében ( [4] ) a Bizottság 2008-ban arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy nagy előrelépés történt az emlő-, a
méhnyak-, valamint a vastag‐ és végbélrákra vonatkozó szűrési módszerek magas színvonalának biztosítására.

A Bizottság a tagállamokkal együttműködésben most készíti elő az EU egészségügyi programjából finanszírozandó új
közös fellépést (2014–2016), amelynek célja az átfogó rákellenes stratégiára vonatkozó európai iránymutatások
kialakítása. A közös fellépés nyomán az EU-ban folytatódhatnak a rákellenes politikákról folyó megbeszélések.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:327:0034:0038:EN:PDF
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/genetics/documents/cancer_screening.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 585

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006174/13**

**to the Commission**
**Csanád Szegedi (NI)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Union problems associated with tumorous diseases

In every Member State without exception, tumorous diseases are one of the main causes of death which are currently
of public health significance. Developed countries primarily tackle this problem by preventing tumours and by means
of early diagnosis and modern, tried and tested therapies. The number of cases of tumorous diseases has reached
dramatic proportions throughout Europe, their prevalence having increased alarmingly in recent years. They are the
second most common cause of death after cardiovascular disease. Thanks to secondary prevention (screening),
tumours of certain types have become far rarer, for example cervical cancer and breast cancer, but because screening
does not extend to tumorous diseases which remain prevalent, the death rate for them is still high, although in many
cases they could be prevented. In view of the statistics, it is clear that many people leave the labour market every year
on account of tumorous diseases (mortality + morbidity), and that this takes a severe psychological toll on their
families and society.

The health situation is not only extremely important to the general public but has a serious impact on Member States’
economies. Economic growth is very dependent on human capital and health. A healthy population possesses higher
productivity and a bigger reservoir of labour and skills, and contributes to ‘growth’ through household savings. A
good state of health means that more time is spent on the working day, the work done is of better quality, life
expectancy is longer (productivity growth), and the level of school qualifications attained is higher. A healthier
population makes less use of health services (a saving) and has greater propensity to spend (revitalising the economy
and generating tax revenue).

According to a report of 2001 by the WHO’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, a 10% rise in life
expectancy at birth increases annual GDP by at least 0.3-0.4 percentage points, and a one-year increase in the life
expectancy of the population adds 4% to GDP. Thus economic activity associated with health makes a large
contribution to a country’s income (key sectors). One solution to the problem which has arisen might be to increase
the Union’s activity to implement tumorous disease action plans.

— In view of the statistics, by means of what instruments is the EU seeking to control the rise in the prevalence of
tumorous diseases in the current situation?

— What public health programmes, procedures and recommendations (on screening, etc.) covering all the Member
States is it planning for the future in order to prevent cancerous diseases?

— Would it be worthwhile to set up a special committee to study this field?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(16 July 2013)_

The Commission adopted in 2009 the communication on the European Partnership for Action Against Cancer
(EPAAC) ( [1] ) . The Partnership brings together Member States into a ‘Joint Action’ with the European Commission
under the Health Programme. This Joint action on Cancer addresses cancer prevention, including screening;
identification of best practice in care; analysis of comparable information and coordination on research.

The Partnership promotes the adoption of National Cancer Plans in all the Member States with the aim that all
Member States will have integrated cancer plans. Such plans should contribute to reducing the cancer burden in
the EU, the target being a 15% incidence reduction by 2020.

The EU Health Programme supports the revision of the European Code Against Cancer ( [2] ). The new version should be
available in 2014.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_information/dissemination/diseases/docs/com_2009_291_en.pdf
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_information/dissemination/diseases/docs/cancercode_en.pdf

C 42 E / 586 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

In 2003, the Council adopted a recommendation on cancer screening ( [3] ), which sets out principles of best practice in
the early detection of cancer, and invites all Member States to implement population-based screening programmes for
breast, cervical and colorectal cancer, with appropriate quality assurance at all levels. In 2008, the Commission's first
report on the implementation of the recommendation ( [4] ) concluded that much has been done to attain high standards
of screening practices for breast, cervical and colorectal cancer across the EU.

The Commission is preparing, together with the Member States, a new Joint Action (2014-2016) funded by the EU
Health Programme aimed at shaping European guidelines for comprehensive cancer control. The Joint Action will
allow the continuation of discussions on cancer policies in the EU.

( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:327:0034:0038:EN:PDF.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/genetics/documents/cancer_screening.pdf

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 587

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-006175/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Szegedi Csanád (NI)**

_(2013. május 31.)_

_Tárgy:_ A határokon átnyúló egészségügyi ellátás igénybevétele

Az új uniós szabályozásnak köszönhetően hamarosan az uniós polgárok számára lehetőség nyílik a határokon
átnyúló egészségügyi ellátás igénybevételére. Az Európai Bíróság döntése nyomán, a szolgáltatások szabad áramlása
elvének megfelelően az egészségügyi szolgáltatás is igénybe vehető, tehát azt a költséget kell utólag kifizetnie a
betegnek (biztosítónak), amennyibe az otthon elvégzett beavatkozás került volna, így a külföldi szolgáltatók nem
kerülnek versenyhátrányba. Azonban komoly árkülönbségek vannak az egyes tagállamokbeli szolgáltatások között
(gyógyturizmus). Számos (pl. daganatos) betegség kezelése a többi orvosi tevékenységhez mérten is kiemelkedő
költségvonzattal jár, a kezelések költségei pedig az új hatóanyagok és modern eljárások következtében rendkívüli
erőforrást igényelnek, amelynek előteremtése komoly problémát jelent az adott tagállam számára.

Az Európai Uniónak nincs közvetlen szabályozó szerepe az unió tagállamainak egészségügyi rendszerére (nemzeti
hatáskör). Erre nincs is nagy lehetősége, hiszen az egyes uniós országok egészségügyi biztosítási rendszerei igen nagy
diverzifikációt mutatnak. A szolgáltatások igénybevételének terén azonban az az anomália is előfordulhat a jövőben,
hogy a magasabban kvalifikált államokból (pl. központi költségvetésből finanszírozott egészségügyi szolgáltatás
hosszú várólistákkal) az uniós polgárok tömegével vehetik igénybe a szegényebb országok egészségügyi
szolgáltatásait, és ennek következtében előfordulhat, hogy az adott tagállam polgárai kiszorulhatnak a hazájukban
nyújtott egészségügyi szolgáltatásból.

— A Bizottság milyen módon tudja biztosítani a tagállamok polgárainak az egészségügyi szolgáltatásokhoz való
egyenlő hozzáférés elvének érvényesülését?

— A fent említett helyzet előállása esetén milyen szabályozás bevezetését tervezi a Bizottság?

**Tonio Borg válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. július 22.)_

A személyek szabad mozgásának elvével összhangban az uniós polgárok határokon átnyúló egészségügyi ellátást is
igénybe vehetnek. A szociális biztonsági rendszerek koordinálásáról szóló 883/2004/EK rendelet ( [1] ) az egyenlő
bánásmód elvével összhangban szabályokat tartalmaz a tervezett és nem tervezett egészségügyi ellátás költségeinek
fedezésére vonatkozóan.

A határon átnyúló egészségügyi ellátásra vonatkozó betegjogok érvényesítéséről szóló 2011/24/EU irányelv ( [2] ),
amelyet a tagállamoknak 2013. október 25-ig kell átültetniük, a Bíróság ítélkezési gyakorlatára figyelemmel
egyértelműbbé teszi a betegek másik tagállambeli egészségügyi ellátáshoz való jogát és az ellátás költségeinek
megtérítését. Az irányelv értelmében a betegek az országuk egészségügyi rendszerében alkalmazott szintig jogosultak
költségeik visszatérítésére, azonban csak olyan egészségügyi ellátás esetében, amelyek igénybevételére saját
tagállamukban is jogosultak.

Ami a más tagállamokból származó betegek hatását illeti, az irányelv 4. cikkének (3) bekezdése megjegyzi, hogy az
ilyen betegekre az állampolgárság alapján történő megkülönböztetés elve nem alkalmazandó. Kifejti továbbá, hogy a
tagállam „a területén az egészségügyi ellátáshoz való megfelelő és állandó hozzáférés biztosításával kapcsolatos
alapvető feladata teljesítése érdekében intézkedéseket fogadhat el”, feltéve, hogy ezeket az intézkedéseket a
közérdeken alapuló olyan kényszerítő okok indokolják, mint például „az adott tagállamban a magas színvonalú és
kiegyensúlyozottan sokrétű ellátáshoz való elégséges és állandó hozzáférés biztosításának célja vagy a költségek
ellenőrzésére és a pénzügyi, technikai és humán erőforrások bármiféle pazarlásának megelőzésére irányuló
törekvéssel kapcsolatos tervezési követelmények”.

Az ilyen intézkedéseket bevezető tagállamoknak gondoskodniuk kell arról, hogy az intézkedések ne lépjék túl a cél
érdekében szükséges és azzal arányos mértéket, és ne váljanak önkényes megkülönböztetés eszközévé. Továbbá
előzetesen nyilvánosan hozzáférhetővé kell tenniük őket.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) HL L 166., 2004.4.30.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) HL L 88., 2011.4.4.

C 42 E / 588 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006175/13**

**to the Commission**
**Csanád Szegedi (NI)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Access to cross-border healthcare

As a result of new EU legislation, EU citizens will soon have access to cross-border healthcare. On the basis of a
decision by the European Court of Justice and in accordance with the principle of the free movement of services,
healthcare will also be obtainable: patients (insurers) will subsequently have to pay the amount which the medical
intervention would have cost in their own Member State, thus ensuring that service providers abroad are not placed at
a competitive disadvantage. However, there are large differences in the price of healthcare services between individual
Member States (health tourism). Treating many (e.g. tumorous) illnesses costs far more than other medical activities,
and the new active ingredients and modern procedures means that paying for treatments requires huge financial
resources, the provision of which is a serious problem for the Member State concerned.

The EU has no direct legislative role in the healthcare systems of the Member States (national competence). This
would in any case be unlikely to happen, as there are considerable discrepancies between the healthcare insurance
systems of the Member States. An anomalous situation may arise in this area in the future whereby large numbers of
EU citizens from more highly-qualified countries (e.g. ones with long waiting lists for healthcare financed from the
national budget) make use of the healthcare services of poorer countries, with the result that citizens of the ‘receiving’
country are excluded from the services of their own country.

— How will the Commission be able to ensure that EU citizens can benefit from the principle of equal access to
healthcare?

— In the event of the above situation arising, what legislation does the Commission intend to adopt?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

EU citizens have access to cross-border healthcare in line with the principle of free movement of persons. Regulation
(EC) No 883/2004 ( [1] ) on the coordination of social security systems contains rules on coverage of costs of planned
and unplanned healthcare in line with the equal treatment principle.

Directive 2011/24/EU ( [2] ) on patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, to be transposed by Member States by
25 October 2013, clarifies patients’ rights to seek cross-border healthcare and be reimbursed for it, by codifying
European Court of Justice jurisprudence. Under this directive, patients will be entitled to reimbursement, up to the
level applied in their healthcare system, only for healthcare they are entitled to in their home Member State.

Regarding the impact of ‘incoming’ patients, Article 4(3) of the directive notes that no nationality discriminatory
measures shall be applied. It further states that a Member State has the possibility ‘to adopt measures regarding access
to treatment aimed at fulfilling its fundamental responsibility to ensure sufficient and permanent access to healthcare
within its territory’, provided that these measures are justified by overriding reasons of general interest such as
‘planning requirements relating to the aim of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of highquality treatment’ or ‘the wish to control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of financial, technical and
human resources.’

Member States introducing such measures must ensure that they are limited to what is necessary and proportionate,
and are not discriminatory. They must also be made publicly available in advance.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ L 166, 30.4.2004.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 88, 04.4.2011.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 589

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-006176/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Szegedi Csanád (NI)**

_(2013. május 31.)_

_Tárgy:_ Az egészségügyi munkaerő szabad áramlása

Az elmúlt évek során köztudottan jelentős mennyiségű, egészségügyi tevékenységet folytató munkavállaló áramlott a
volt keleti blokk országaiból Nyugat-Európa felé. Különösen Németországba és Angliába érkezett sok orvos, ápoló és
más egészségügyi személyzet. A folyamatos tendencia következtében egyre nagyobb munkaerőhiány alakult ki a
keleti tagállamokban, illetve a tagállam számára elveszett dolgozók oktatási költségei nagy veszteséget jelentenek az
érintett tagállamok számára. Ugyanakkor a fogadó tagállamok szinte ingyen jutnak a magasan kvalifikált
egészségügyi dolgozó foglalkoztatásához.

— A Bizottság milyen intézkedéseket foganatosít a fentiek miatt jelentkező orvos‐ és nővérhiány ellensúlyozására,
illetve az orvosok elvándorlásának megállítására?

— A Bizottságnak van-e valamilyen elképzelése a fentiek miatt felmerülő költségtényezőkről?

**Tonio Borg válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. július 24.)_

Az egészségügyi dolgozók mobilitása az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződés 45. cikke szerinti alapvető
szabadság, melynek gyakorlását a szakmai képesítések elismeréséről szóló 2005/36/EK irányelv ( [1] ) segíti elő.

Az egészségügyi munkaerő fenntarthatóságát nemzeti, regionális és helyi szintű kezdeményezésekkel kell biztosítani.
Hogy támogassa a tagállamokat a politikai megoldások kidolgozásában, a Bizottság az EU 2008–2013-as
egészségügyi programja ( [2] ) keretében tanulmányt készít a munkaerő-felvétel és ‐megtartás innovatív és hatékony
stratégiáiról, valamint társfinanszírozást biztosít az egészségügyi dolgozók oktatási és képzési kapacitásairól készülő
OECD-tanulmányhoz.

A Bizottságnak nincsenek adatai az egészségügyi dolgozók mobilitásához kapcsolódó költségekről. Az uniós
egészségügyi dolgozók érdekében kidolgozott cselekvési terv ( [3] ) részeként a Bizottság 6 millió EUR társfinanszírozást
biztosít az egészségügyi munkaerő-szükséglet előrejelzésére és tervezésére irányuló közös fellépéshez ( [4] ). A 28
európai ország és 17 szervezet összefogásával megvalósuló fellépés lehetőséget nyújt a bevált módszerek
megosztására az egészségügyi dolgozókra vonatkozó adatok minőségének javítása érdekében, ideértve a mobilitással
kapcsolatos adatokat is.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=homepage
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) A Bizottság 2012. november 28-i végrehajtási határozata, HL C 378., 2012.12.8., 19. o.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Az Európai Unió egészségügyi dolgozóira vonatkozó cselekvési terv, COM(2012) 93 final, 2012. április 18.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) A Bizottság 2011. december 2-i végrehajtási határozata, HL C 353., 2011.12.3., 3. o.

C 42 E / 590 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006176/13**

**to the Commission**
**Csanád Szegedi (NI)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Free movement of health sector employees

The last few years have seen a well-documented exodus of a large number of health sector employees from the former
Eastern Bloc countries to Western Europe. A large number of doctors, nurses and other health sector workers have
gone to Germany and England in particular. As a result of this continuing trend, there is an increasing lack of
employees in the sector in the eastern Member States. In addition, the cost of training the workers lost to the Member
States concerned represents a considerable loss on their part. At the same time, the receiving Member States obtain,
virtually for free, highly-qualified workers for their health services.

— What steps is the Commission taking to offset this significant shortage of doctors and nurses and/or to stop the
migration of doctors?

— Does the Commission have any idea of the cost factors which this situation gives rise to?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(24 July 2013)_

The mobility of health professionals is a fundamental freedom under Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union and is facilitated by Directive 2005/36/EC on the mutual recognition of professional
qualifications ( [1] ).

To ensure a sustainable health workforce, initiatives at the national, regional and local level are required. To assist
Member States to develop policy responses, the Commission will carry out, under the EU Health Programme (20082013) ( [2] ), a study on innovative and effective recruitment and retention strategies and it will co-fund an OECD study
on education and training capacities of health professionals.

The Commission has no information on the costs resulting from the mobility of health professionals. As part of its
Action Plan for the EU health workforce ( [3] ), the Commission is co-funding with EUR 6 million a Joint Action ( [4] ) on
health workforce forecasting and planning. This action brings together 28 European countries and 17 organisations
to share best practice to improve the data on health professionals, including data on the mobility of health
professionals.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=homepage.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Implementing Decision of 28 November, C 378/19 of 8 December 2012.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) Action Plan for the EU health workforce, COM(2012) 93 final of 18 April 2012.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Commission Implementing Decision of 2 December 2011, C 353/3 of 3 December 2012.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 591

_(Magyar változat)_

**Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-006177/13**

**a Bizottság számára**
**Szegedi Csanád (NI)**

_(2013. május 31.)_

_Tárgy:_ A szíriai konfliktus

Ahogy a Bizottság is tudja, a szíriaiak a mai napig segítséget kapnak a Vöröskereszttől. Fontos hangsúlyozni, hogy a
szíriai demokrácia számára mekkora jelentősége van annak, hogy se a kormány, se a Hezbollah, se egyéb
terrorszervezet ne kapjon fegyvereket. Véleményem szerint az EU-nak is támogatnia kell az emberi jogokat Szíriában.

Mit tesz az EU annak megakadályozására, hogy a szíriai kormány most és a jövőben fegyverekhez jusson?

**Catherine Ashton főképviselő/alelnök válasza a Bizottság nevében**

_(2013. július 31.)_

Ez év május 31-e óta az EU már nem alkalmaz fegyverembargót Szíriával szemben, a Szíriába történő esetleges
fegyverkivitel kérdése immár a tagállamok nemzeti szakpolitikáinak körébe tartozik.

E tekintetben meg kell jegyezni, hogy a tagállamok 2013. május 27-én a Tanács Szíriáról szóló nyilatkozatában
kijelentették, hogy nemzeti szakpolitikáikban fegyverkivitelt szigorú kritériumok alapján, a fegyverkivitel
ellenőrzéséről szóló meglévő magatartási kódexszel összhangban, kizárólag a szíriai ellenzéki koalíció számára és a
polgári személyek védelme érdekében, a végfelhasználók kilétére vonatkozó garanciával folytatnak. Továbbá a
tagállamok nem szállítanak katonai felszerelést az ellenzéknek ebben a szakaszban, miközben folynak a Szíriával
foglalkozó nemzetközi békekonferencia (Genf II.) előkészületei. Emlékeztetünk arra is, hogy számos tagállam
kétoldalú nyilatkozatban jelezte, hogy továbbra sem szállít fegyvereket Szíriába.

Mindazonáltal amennyiben a tagállamok nem zárják ki annak lehetőségét, hogy egy későbbi szakaszban fegyvert
szállítanak Szíriába, e tagállamoknak kell biztosítaniuk, hogy a 2013. május 27-i tanácsi nyilatkozat keretében
elfogadott kritériumok teljesülnek.

C 42 E / 592 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006177/13**

**to the Commission**
**Csanád Szegedi (NI)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Syrian conflict

As the Commission knows, the Syrians have today received help from the Red Cross. It is important to stress how
important it is for democracy in Syria that neither the government nor Hezbollah nor any other terrorist organisation
should receive any weapons. In my opinion, the EU should also support human rights in Syria.

What is the EU doing to prevent the Syrian Government from getting weapons now and in the future?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission**

_(31 July 2013)_

Since 31 May the EU no longer applies an arms embargo against Syria, the matter of possible export of arms to Syria
is now a matter of Member States' national policies.

It is noted in this respect that Member States on 27 May 2013 in a Council Declaration on Syria have declared that
they will proceed in their national policies on the basis of strict criteria, in accordance with the existing Code of
Conduct for control of arms exports, only for the Syrian Opposition Coalition and for the protection of civilians and
with guarantees about who the end-users will be. Moreover, Member States will not deliver military equipment to the
opposition at this stage, while preparations for the international peace conference on Syria (Geneva II) are ongoing. It
is noted as well that a number of Member States have bilaterally declared that they would continue not to deliver arms
to Syria.

However, where Member States do not exclude the possibility of arms deliveries at a certain stage, it is for those
Member States to ensure that the criteria agreed in the framework of the 27 May 2013 Council Declaration are
implemented.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 593

_(Wersja polska)_

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-006178/13**

**do Komisji**
**Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa (PPE)**

_(31 maja 2013 r.)_

_Przedmiot:_ Kwestia GMO, ochrony praw własności intelektualnej oraz stosunków ekonomicznych w odniesieniu do
negocjacji dotyczących umowy o wolnym handlu między UE a USA

Podpisanie umowy o wolnym handlu między Unią Europejską a Stanami Zjednoczonymi z pewnością przyniesie
wiele korzyści ekonomicznych obu stronom. Dzięki usunięciu niektórych barier handlowych dojdzie do
intensyfikacji wymiany handlowej, a w konsekwencji do obopólnego wzrostu gospodarczego. Jednak pomimo
wszelkich pozytywnych aspektów płynących z podpisania tejże umowy istnieje kilka kwestii, które będą stanowiły
przedmiot do dyskusji.

Stany Zjednoczone są światowym liderem pod względem powierzchni rolnej przeznaczonej pod uprawę roślin
GMO. Dzięki podpisaniu umowy o wolnym handlu, będą poszukiwać nowego rynku zbytu dla tych produktów.
Tymczasem oficjalne stanowisko Polski w sposób negatywny odnosi się do wprowadzenia żywności modyfikowanej
genetycznie na rynek wspólnotowy. W związku z tym proszę o udzielenie informacji czy Komisja przewiduje
odstąpienie od negocjacji w tej kwestii i nie zezwoli na wprowadzenie tego typu produktów na wspólny rynek?

Drugą kwestią, którą chciałbym poruszyć jest problem ochrony praw własności intelektualnej. Jest on ściśle
powiązany z tzw. umową ACTA, zainicjowaną między innymi przez Stany Zjednoczone, a której próba ratyfikacji
spowodowała liczne protesty internautów w całej Europie. Czy Komisja uważa, że podczas rund negocjacyjnych,
będzie możliwość uniknięcia podobnych zapisów do tych, które zostały zawarte w wymienionej przeze mnie
umowie?

Chciałbym również zapytać jak umowa o wolnym handlu między UE a USA wpłynie na istniejące już umowy
bilateralne? Czy stracą one swoją ważność, a wszelkie regulacje będą zawarte tylko w jednej umowie? Czy wpłynie
ona na relacje handlowe z krajami spoza strefy wolnego handlu?

Proszę także o udzielenie informacji czy Komisja przeprowadziła analizy korzyści ekonomicznych wynikających
z podpisania umowy dla poszczególnych krajów członkowskich?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji**

_(15 lipca 2013 r.)_

UE i USA dążą do zawarcia kompleksowej i ambitnej umowy o handlu i inwestycjach. Komisja przeprowadziła
szczegółową analizę wpływu potencjalnej umowy na różne sektory gospodarki oraz na całą gospodarkę unijną.
Przedmiotowa analiza została podana do wiadomości publicznej ( [1] ). Chociaż Komisja Europejska pozostaje
w bliskim kontakcie z państwami członkowskimi i zainteresowanymi stronami w związku z uwzględnieniem ich
interesów i wrażliwych kwestii podczas negocjacji, przeprowadzenie szczegółowych analiz wpływu umowy
o transatlantyckim partnerstwie handlowym i inwestycyjnym (TTIP) na poszczególne państwa członkowskie leży
w gestii tych państw. Jeżeli chodzi o własność intelektualną, celem negocjacji nie będzie dostosowanie systemów
własności intelektualnej, lecz identyfikacja szeregu konkretnych zagadnień, w ramach których występują pewne
rozbieżności. Zarówno USA, jak i UE egzekwują prawa własności intelektualnej w zadowalającym stopniu, zatem
Komisja nie zamierza wprowadzać do umowy o wolnym handlu między UE a USA przepisów dotyczących Internetu,
które przypominałyby przepisy zawarte w umowie ACTA. Jeżeli chodzi o GMO, negocjacje nie będą prowadzić do
zaprzedania zdrowia konsumentów dla korzyści finansowych. Podstawowe uregulowania, takie jak te odnoszące się
do GMO, nie będą przedmiotem negocjacji. W odniesieniu do istniejących umów dwustronnych Komisja pragnie
podkreślić, że umowa o transatlantyckim partnerstwie handlowym i inwestycyjnym nie będzie wpływać a _priori_ na te
umowy. Na obecnym wczesnym etapie negocjacji nie jest również jasne, czy niektórych umów dwustronnych nie
będzie można uaktualnić za pośrednictwem umowy o transatlantyckim partnerstwie handlowym i inwestycyjnym.
Dwustronne umowy inwestycyjne między poszczególnymi państwami członkowskimi i USA zostaną jednak
zastąpione umową o transatlantyckim partnerstwie handlowym i inwestycyjnym.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/#sia

C 42 E / 594 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006178/13**

**to the Commission**
**Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ GMOs, protection of intellectual property rights and economic relations in the context of the negotiations on
an EU-US free trade agreement

The signing of a free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States will undoubtedly bring
many economic benefits to both sides. The removal of certain trade barriers will enhance trade and consequently
boost economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic. However, despite all the benefits the signing of this agreement
will bring, there are a number of questions which will be the subject of discussion.

The US is the world leader in terms of agricultural area dedicated to the cultivation of GMO crops. With the signing of
the free trade agreement the US will seek new markets for these products. At the same time, Poland’s official position
is against introducing genetically modified food into the EU market. In this connection, could the Commission
indicate whether it plans to withdraw from the negotiations on this issue and not permit the introduction of such
products into the single market?

The other question I would like to raise is the issue of protection of intellectual property rights. This is closely linked
to the ACTA agreement initiated, among others, by the United States, which provoked numerous protests from
Internet users across Europe when attempts were made to ratify it. Does the Commission believe that in the
negotiation it will be possible to avoid similar provisions to those contained in that agreement?

I would also like to ask how the free trade agreement between the EU and the US will affect existing bilateral
agreements. Will they lose their validity, with all regulations being included in a single agreement? Will it affect trade
relations with countries outside the free trade area?

Could the Commission also state whether it has carried out an analysis of the economic benefits of signing the
agreement for individual Member States?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission**

_(15 July 2013)_

The EU and the US aim at a comprehensive and ambitious trade and investment agreement. The Commission
undertook a detailed analysis of the impact of the potential agreement on various economic sectors and the EU
economy as a whole. This analysis is publicly available ( [1] ). While the Commission remains in close contact with
Member States and stakeholders regarding their interests and sensitivities in the negotiations, conducting detailed
studies of the impact of the TTIP on individual Member States remains in the hand of the Member States themselves.
As regards intellectual property, the objective will not be to align intellectual property regimes, but to identify a
number of specific issues where divergences will be addressed. Both the US and the EU have a good level of IPR
enforcement and the Commission does not intend to include ACTA-like Internet provisions in the EU-US FTA. As
regards GMOs, these negotiations will not compromise the health of our consumers for commercial gains. Basic
legislation, like that relating to GMOs, will not be part of the negotiations. As regards existing bilateral agreements,
the COM would like to specify that, a priori, existing bilateral agreements will not necessarily be affected by the TTIP.
At this early stage of the negotiations, it is also not clear whether certain bilateral agreements might be updated
through the TTIP. However, the Bilateral Investment Treaties between individual Member States and the US will be
replaced by the TTIP.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/#sia

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 595

_(Versión española)_

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-006179/13**

**a la Comisión**
**Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Carmen Romero López (S&D) y**

**Axel Voss (PPE)**
_(31 de mayo de 2013)_

_Asunto:_ Rusia y países terceros que aplican sistemas de registro de nombres de pasajeros

Los países terceros muestran cada vez más interés en poner en marcha un sistema de registro de nombres de pasajeros
(PNR). Se espera que a partir del 1 de julio de 2013 entre en vigor en Rusia un decreto que obligue a los transportistas
de pasajeros europeos que vuelan a Rusia o sobre territorio ruso, a transferir datos PNR a las autoridades rusas.

¿Puede proporcionar la Comisión los detalles de dicho decreto ruso que ordena que las autoridades rusas recopilen
datos PNR a partir del 1 de julio de este año?

¿Puede aclarar la Comisión cuál será el fundamento jurídico para la transferencia de datos y qué garantías jurídicas se
han puesto en marcha para defender los derechos de los ciudadanos?

¿Puede indicar la Comisión qué otros terceros países recopilan y procesan datos PNR o tienen la intención de
recopilar y procesar datos PNR?

¿Puede aclarar la Comisión cómo y cuándo ha sido informada de la intención del Gobierno ruso?

¿Reconoce la Comisión que varios diputados habían advertido de la posibilidad de un PNR ruso desde hace tiempo?
¿Por qué no ha actuado la Comisión antes?

Para consultas futuras, ¿puede informar la Comisión al Parlamento tan pronto como sepa que un tercer país introduce
o piensa introducir un sistema PNR?

**Respuesta de la Sra. Malmström en nombre de la Comisión**

_(9 de agosto de 2013)_

La Comisión está de acuerdo en que aumenta el número de terceros países que muestra interés por los sistemas PNR,
como por ejemplo Qatar, México, Brasil, Argentina, Omán, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Arabia Saudí, Japón y Corea del
Sur. No obstante, no tiene constancia de que las compañías aéreas transmitan datos del PNR a otros terceros países
que no sean Estados Unidos, Canadá o Australia, con los que ha concluido acuerdos PNR bilaterales. Si la UE no ha
firmado un acuerdo de intercambio de datos con un tercer país, se puede consultar a las autoridades nacionales
independientes de protección de datos de los Estados miembros sobre la posibilidad de llevar a cabo transferencias de
datos internacionales.

Por lo que se refiere al decreto ruso que obliga a los operadores de transporte de pasajeros europeos a transferir datos
a las autoridades rusas, fue un Estado miembro el que informó a la Comisión en octubre de 2012 sobre estos nuevos
requisitos. La Comisión se puso en contacto con las autoridades de este país para aclarar los términos de tales
requisitos. A tal fin, y tal y como se acordó en la cumbre UE-Rusia de los días 3 y 4 de junio de 2013, la Comisión se
reunió con representantes del Ministerio de Transportes ruso en Moscú el 21 de junio. Son varios los requisitos que
suscitan inquietud y, en concreto, los relativos a los vuelos sobre territorio ruso, ya que no existe base jurídica en el
Derecho de la UE para la transferencia de tales datos a Rusia. Así pues, la Comisión ha insistido en que las autoridades
rusas deberán confirmar por escrito que el tráfico procedente y con destino a la UE queda exento de la aplicación del
Decreto hasta que se encuentre una solución que permita salvaguardar los derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos
de la UE. De lo contrario, este asunto podría afectar a las negociaciones sobre temas relacionados. El 1 de julio
de 2013, el ministro de Transportes ruso decidió aplazar la aplicación del Decreto hasta el 1 de diciembre de 2013.

La Comisión seguirá manteniendo informado al Parlamento en virtud del acuerdo marco entre ambas instituciones.

C 42 E / 596 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Deutsche Fassung)_

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-006179/13**

**an die Kommission**
**Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Carmen Romero López (S&D) und**

**Axel Voss (PPE)**

_(31. Mai 2013)_

_Betrifft:_ Russland und andere Drittstaaten, die Systeme für Fluggastdatensätze (PNR) verwenden

Drittstaaten sind zunehmend an der Einführung von Systemen für Fluggastdatensätze (PNR) interessiert. In Russland
soll eine Verordnung in Kraft treten, gemäß der europäische Fluggesellschaften, die über russisches Hoheitsgebiet
fliegen, den russischen Behörden ab dem 1. Juli 2013 PNR-Daten übermitteln müssen.

Kann die Kommission nähere Informationen zu dieser russischen Verordnung über die verbindliche Übermittlung
von PNR-Daten an russische Behörden ab dem 1. Juli 2013 zur Verfügung stellen?

Kann die Kommission die Rechtsgrundlage für diese Datenübermittlung darlegen und erklären, welche rechtlichen
Garantien zum Schutz der Rechte der Bürger eingeführt wurden?

Kann die Kommission mitteilen, welche anderen Drittstaaten PNR-Daten erfassen und verarbeiten oder dies planen?

Kann die Kommission darlegen, wann und wie sie über die entsprechende Absicht der russischen Regierung in
Kenntnis gesetzt wurde?

Ist der Kommission bewusst, dass einige Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments bereits vor langer Zeit auf die
Möglichkeit eines russischen PNR-Systems hingewiesen haben? Warum hat die Kommission nicht eher reagiert?

Kann die Kommission das Parlament in Zukunft unterrichten, sobald sie feststellt, dass ein Drittstaat ein PNR-System
einführt oder einzuführen plant?

**Antwort von Frau Malmström im Namen der Kommission**

_(9. August 2013)_

Die Kommission räumt ein, dass eine zunehmende Zahl von Drittstaaten Interesse an Systemen für
Fluggastdatensätze (PNR) zeigt, insbesondere Katar, Mexico, Brasilien, Argentinien, Oman, VAE, Saudi-Arabien, Japan
und Südkorea. Nach Wissen der Kommission übermitteln die Fluggesellschaften jedoch keine PNR-Daten an andere
Drittstaaten als die USA, Kanada und Australien, mit denen die EU bilaterale PNR-Abkommen geschlossen hat. In den
Fällen, in denen die EU kein Abkommen über den Austausch von Daten mit einem Drittland geschlossen hat, können
die unabhängigen einzelstaatlichen Datenschutzbehörden der Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Möglichkeit
internationaler Datentransfers konsultiert werden.

Was die russische Verordnung betrifft, nach der Fluggesellschaften den russischen Behörden Fluggastdaten
übermitteln müssen, so hat ein Mitgliedstaat die Kommission im Oktober 2012 über die neuen russischen
Anforderungen informiert. Die Kommission hat sich daraufhin zur Klarstellung dieser Anforderungen mit den
russischen Behörden in Verbindung gesetzt. Zu diesem Zweck traf die Kommission wie auf dem EU-Russland-Gipfel
vom 3.-4. Juni 2013 vereinbart am 21. Juni mit Vertretern des russischen Verkehrsministeriums zusammen. Mehrere
Anforderungen geben Anlass zur Besorgnis, insbesondere diejenigen, die Flüge über russisches Hoheitsgebiet
betreffen, da nach EU-Recht keine Grundlage für eine Übermittlung derartiger Daten an Russland besteht. Die
Kommission besteht daher darauf, dass die russischen Behörden schriftlich bestätigen, dass der Verkehr in die und aus
der EU von der Verordnung ausgenommen ist, bis eine Lösung gefunden wird, die die Grundrechte der Bürgerinnen
und Bürger der EU wahrt. Diese Frage könnte ansonsten Auswirkungen auf die Gespräche über damit verbundene
Themen haben. Am 1. Juli 2013 hat das russische Verkehrsministerium beschlossen, die Umsetzung der Verordnung
bis zum 1. Dezember 2013 zu verschieben.

Die Kommission wird das Parlament gemäß der Rahmenvereinbarung zwischen den zwei Organen weiterhin auf dem
Laufenden halten.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 597

_(Nederlandse versie)_

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-006179/13**

**aan de Commissie**
**Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Carmen Romero López (S&D) en**

**Axel Voss (PPE)**

_(31 mei 2013)_

_Betreft:_ Gebruik van systemen voor persoonsgegevens van passagiers (PNR-gegevens) door Rusland en derde landen

Derde landen tonen steeds meer belangstelling om gebruik te maken van systemen voor PNR-gegevens. In Rusland
wordt wellicht binnenkort een decreet van kracht dat Europese luchtvaartmaatschappijen die over Russisch
grondgebied vliegen, verplicht om vanaf 1 juli 2013 PNR-gegevens door te geven aan de Russische autoriteiten.

Kan de Commissie gedetailleerde informatie geven over het hoger genoemde Russische decreet dat de overdracht van
PNR-gegevens aan de Russische autoriteiten vanaf 1 juli 2013 verplicht maakt?

Kan de Commissie de rechtsgrond voor deze gegevensoverdracht toelichten en zeggen welke juridische waarborgen
gecreëerd zijn om de rechten van de burgers te beschermen?

Kan de Commissie zeggen welke andere derde landen PNR-gegevens verzamelen en verwerken, of van plan zijn dit te
doen?

Kan de Commissie toelichten hoe en wanneer zij op de hoogte is gebracht van de plannen van de Russische regering
in dit verband?

Erkent de Commissie dat een aantal EP-leden al veel eerder heeft gewezen op de mogelijkheid van een Russisch PNRsysteem? Waarom heeft de Commissie niet eerder stappen ondernomen?

Wat de toekomst betreft, kan de Commissie het Parlement op de hoogte stellen zodra zij vaststelt dat een derde land
een PNR-systeem invoert of plannen heeft in die richting?

**Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie**

_(9 augustus 2013)_

De Commissie ziet inderdaad ook dat steeds meer derde landen belangstelling tonen voor PNR-systemen, waaronder
Qatar, Mexico, Brazilië, Argentinië, Oman, de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten, Saudi-Arabië, Japan en Zuid-Korea.
Voor zover zij weet, geven luchtvaartmaatschappijen geen PNR-gegevens door aan andere derde landen dan de VS,
Canada en Australië (waarmee de EU bilaterale PNR-overeenkomsten heeft gesloten). Als de EU met een derde land
geen overeenkomst over uitwisseling van gegevens heeft gesloten, kunnen de nationale onafhankelijke
gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten van de lidstaten worden geraadpleegd over de vraag of internationale
gegevensdoorgiften mogen plaatsvinden.

Een lidstaat heeft de Commissie in oktober 2012 ingelicht over het nieuwe Russische decreet dat
vervoersondernemingen ertoe verplicht PNR-gegevens aan de Russische autoriteiten door te geven. De Commissie
heeft toen contact opgenomen met de Russische autoriteiten om meer duidelijkheid te verkrijgen. Zoals ook
afgesproken op de top EU-Rusland van 3 en 4 juni 2013, heeft de Commissie op 21 juni in Moskou met
vertegenwoordigers van het Russische ministerie van Vervoer gesproken. Er zijn enkele voorschriften die tot
bezorgdheid aanleiding geven, met name waar het vluchten door het Russische luchtruim betreft, aangezien voor de
doorgifte van dergelijke gegevens in het EU-recht geen basis bestaat. De Commissie dringt er daarom bij de Russische
autoriteiten op aan dat zij schriftelijk bevestigen dat het decreet niet geldt voor het verkeer van en naar de EU, totdat
een oplossing wordt gevonden die de grondrechten van EU-burgers beschermt. Deze kwestie zou anders de
besprekingen over aanverwante onderwerpen kunnen beïnvloeden. Op 1 juli 2013 heeft het Russische ministerie van
Vervoer besloten om de uitvoering van het decreet uit te stellen tot 1 december 2013.

De Commissie zal het Parlement op de hoogte houden, zoals afgesproken in het kaderakkoord tussen de twee
instellingen.

C 42 E / 598 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006179/13**

**to the Commission**
**Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Carmen Romero López (S&D) and**

**Axel Voss (PPE)**

_(31 May 2013)_

_Subject:_ Russia and other third countries using passenger name record (PNR) systems

Third countries are showing an increasing interest in implementing passenger name record (PNR) systems. In Russia,
a decree is expected to enter into force that will oblige European passenger carriers flying into or over Russian
territory to transfer PNR data to Russian authorities as of 1 July 2013.

Can the Commission provide details of the aforementioned Russian decree ordering the transfer of PNR data to
Russian authorities from 1 July 2013?

Can the Commission clarify the legal basis for such a transfer of data, and say what legal safeguards have been put in
place to protect citizens’ rights?

Can the Commission indicate which other third countries collect and process PNR data, or intend to do so?

Can the Commission clarify how and when it was informed of the Russian Government’s intention in this regard?

Does the Commission acknowledge that MEPs flagged up the possibility of a Russian PNR scheme a long time ago?
Why did the Commission not act sooner?

For future reference, can the Commission report to Parliament as soon as it becomes aware that a third country is
introducing, or planning to introduce, a PNR system?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 August 2013)_

The Commission agrees that increasing number of third countries show an interest in PNR systems, notably Qatar,
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Japan and South Korea. However, to its knowledge, airlines do
not transfer PNR data to third countries other than to US, Canada or Australia with whom the EU has concluded
bilateral PNR agreements. Where the EU has not signed an agreement on exchange of data with a third country, the
independent national data protection authorities of the Member States can be consulted regarding the possibility of
international data transfers.

Regarding the Russian Decree obliging transport operators to transfer passenger data to the Russian authorities, a
Member State informed the Commission in October 2012 about the new Russian requirements. The Commission
then contacted the Russian authorities to have these requirements clarified. To that end, and as agreed in the EURussia summit of 3-4 June 2013, the Commission met representatives of the Russian ministry of transport in
Moscow on 21 June. Several requirements cause concern, in particular those on flights over Russian territory as there
is no basis in EC law for transfer of such data to Russia. The Commission therefore insists that the Russian authorities
should confirm in writing that traffic to and from the EU is exempted from the Decree until a solution has been found
that safeguards fundamental rights of EU citizens. This issue could otherwise affect discussions on related topics. On
1 July 2013 the Russian ministry of transport decided to postpone the implementation of the Decree to
1 December 2013.

The Commission will continue to keep Parliament informed in line with the framework agreement between the two
institutions.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 599

_(Ελληνική έκδοση)_

**Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-006180/13**

**προς την Επιτροπή**
**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(3 Ιουνίου 2013)_

_Θέμα:_ Διακοπή παροχής νερού σε ανέργους

Στην Ελλάδα το τελευταίο διάστημα έχουν καταγγελθεί πολλά περιστατικά διακοπής υδροδότησης σε μακροχρόνια
ανέργους που αδυνατούν να πληρώσουν τους λογαριασμούς τους σύμφωνα με ανακοινώσεις εργατικών συνδικάτων του
Πειραιά.

Επιπλέον, σύμφωνα με δημοσιεύματα η εταιρεία ύδρευσης της Αθήνας πρόσφατα κίνησε διαδικασίες κατάσχεσης του σπιτιού
άνεργου μεταλλεργάτη για οφειλή 831 ευρώ. Παρά τα αυξανόμενα περιστατικά διακοπής της υδροδότησης για οφειλές
πολιτών που αδυνατούν να πληρώσουν, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση προωθεί σθεναρά τις διαδικασίες ιδιωτικοποίησης του νερού.

Στην αιτιολογική σκέψη 15 της οδηγίας πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (2000/60/EK) ορίζεται ότι «η ύδρευση συνιστά υπηρεσία
κοινής ωφέλειας». Σύμφωνα με την Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής (EE C 281 της 26.9.1996) για τις υπηρεσίες κοινής ωφέλειας
επιβάλλονται ειδικές υποχρεώσεις παροχής στους πολίτες, και ειδικότερα όλοι οι πολίτες πρέπει να έχουν πρόσβαση στις
υπηρεσίες αυτές. H πρόσβαση όλων των πολιτών σε καθαρό νερό ορίζεται επίσης ως υποχρέωση για τις εταιρείες παροχής
νερού από το σημείο 37 της πρόσφατης έκθεσης του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου της 6ης Ιουνίου 2012 σχετικά με την
εφαρμογή της ευρωπαϊκής οδηγίας για το νερό. Επιπλέον, η ίδια έκθεση αναγνωρίζει ότι το νερό αποτελεί κοινό πόρο της
ανθρωπότητας και δημόσιο αγαθό και ότι η πρόσβαση σε αυτό πρέπει να συνιστά θεμελιώδες και καθολικό δικαίωμα.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τα ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Είναι σύμφωνη με το άρθρο 9 της οδηγίας πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (2000/60/ΕΚ), στο οποίο υπάρχει ειδική αναφορά για τα
κοινωνικά αποτελέσματα των λογαριασμών νερού, όπως είναι η διακοπή της πρόσβασης σε υπηρεσίες νερού σε άνεργους
πολίτες που λόγω της δυσχερούς οικονομικής τους κατάστασης δεν μπoρούν να πληρώσουν τους λογαριασμούς του νερού;

**Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής**

_(11 Ιουλίου 2013)_

Το άρθρο 9 της οδηγίας πλαισίου για τα ύδατα ( [1] ) (ΟΠΥ) προβλέπει ότι τα κράτη μέλη, όταν καθορίζουν τα τιμολόγια για το
νερό, μπορούν να λαμβάνουν υπόψη τις κοινωνικές, περιβαλλοντικές και οικονομικές επιπτώσεις του κόστους ανάκτησης,
καθώς και τις γεωγραφικές και κλιματολογικές συνθήκες της οικείας περιοχής ή των οικείων περιοχών. Η διάταξη αυτή
εφαρμόζεται ανεξάρτητα από το εάν ο πάροχος υπηρεσιών είναι δημόσια ή ιδιωτική επιχείρηση ή σύμπραξη δημόσιας και
ιδιωτικής επιχείρησης. Σε ορισμένα κράτη μέλη, προκειμένου να προστατευθούν οι χρήστες ύδατος που βρίσκονται σε
δυσχερή οικονομική κατάσταση, ισχύουν κλιμακωτά τιμολόγια, σύμφωνα με τα οποία οι χρήστες πληρώνουν ανάλογα με το
πόσο καταναλώνουν. Τα τιμολόγια αυτά προβλέπουν μια ελάχιστη ποσότητα νερού για την ικανοποίηση των βασικών
αναγκών, για την οποία η χρέωση είναι ελάχιστη ή μηδενική.

Το θέμα της διακοπής της υδροδότησης, όταν οι λογαριασμοί νερού δεν εξοφλούνται, δεν καλύπτεται από την οδηγία
πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα και, ως εκ τούτου, αποτελεί ζήτημα πολιτικής των κρατών μελών.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Οδηγία 2000/60/ΕΚ, ΕΕ L 327 της 22.12.2000.

C 42 E / 600 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006180/13**

**to the Commission**

**Kriton Arsenis (S&D)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Suspension of water supplies to the unemployed

According to labour unions in Piraeus, there have recently been many complaints in Greece about incidents in which
the water supply has been cut off for persons who are long-term unemployed and are unable to pay their bills.

Moreover, it is reported that the Athens water company recently initiated foreclosure proceedings on the home of an
unemployed metalworker for a debt of EUR 831. Despite the increasing instances of the water supply being cut off
for citizens who are unable to pay their debts, the Greek Government is vigorously promoting the privatisation of

water.

Recital 15 of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) states that: ‘The supply of water is a service of general
interest.’ According to the Commission Communication (OJ C 281, 26.9.1996), services of general interest have
special supply obligations towards citizens, in particular all citizens should have access to these services. Access of all
citizens to clean water is also defined as an obligation for water supply companies in Paragraph 37 of the recent
European Parliament report of 6 June 2012 on the implementation of European water legislation. The same report
recognises that water is a shared resource of humankind and a public good and that access to water should constitute
a fundamental and universal right.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

Are incidents such as the cutting off of access to water services for unemployed citizens who are unable to pay their
water bills due to their difficult economic situation compatible with Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive
(2000/60/EC), which refers specifically to the social effects of water bills?

**Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

Art 9 of the Water Framework Directive ( [1] ) (WFD) stipulates that Member States, in setting up water tariffs, may have
regard to the social, environmental and economic effects of the cost recovery as well as the geographic and climatic
conditions of the region or regions affected. This provision applies irrespective of whether the service provider is
public, private or a public/private partnership. In some Member States, in order to protect water users in difficult
economic situation, progressive block tariffs' schemes are in place, under which users pay different amounts for
different consumption levels. In such cases the first block tariff, assigned to meet basic water use needs, is low or free
of charge.

The issue of supply cuts when water bills are not paid is not covered by the WFD and hence is a matter of Member
States' policy.

⋅1∙
( **|** **|** ) Directive 2000/60/EC _,_ OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 601

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006181/13**

**to the Commission**
**Emma McClarkin (ECR)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Falsified Medicines Directive

Can the Commission clarify the revisions that are being made to its good distribution practice as a consequence of the
Falsified Medicines Directive? Businesses in the East Midlands are struggling with the implementation of the directive
and it is hindering their ability to carry out their business transactions in an efficient and cost-effective manner. If the
Commission could advise on how this process might be made easier for constituents in my region, I would be able to
write to them about any amendments that are due in order to simplify the procedure of complying with the directive.

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 June 2013)_

The revised Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of Medicinal Products for Human Use ( [1] ) were adopted on
7 March 2013 and will become applicable on 8 October 2013. Current guidelines date back to 1994. The revision
was driven by the need to take into account modern practices for the storage and distribution of medicines and the
requirements for wholesale distributors and brokers introduced by the Falsified Medicines Directive to prevent
falsified medicines from entering the legal supply chain ( [2] ).

The revised guidelines were prepared together with Member State experts and the European Medicines Agency. A
draft was published for public consultation in July 2011 and later considerably amended to take into account the
comments of numerous stakeholders, including of course businesses. Particular care was taken to avoid
overregulation and unnecessary burden.

The Commission is of course happy to answer any specific questions from constituents of the Honourable Member, if
there are any.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) OJ C 68, 8.3.2013, p. 1.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) OJ L 311, 28.11.2011, p. 67.

C 42 E / 602 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Slovenské znenie)_

**Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie P-006182/13**

**Komisii**
**Anna Záborská (PPE)**

_(3. júna 2013)_

_Vec:_ Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-007514/2012: potvrdenie neexistencie právneho základu v ZFEÚ pre
používanie pojmu „rod“

Komisii bola predložená táto otázka na písomné zodpovedanie E-007514/2012: Aký je právny základ v ZFEÚ pre
používanie pojmu „rod“ v oficiálnych publikáciách EÚ? Podpredsedníčka Reding vo svojej odpovedi neuviedla žiaden
konkrétny právny základ, no odpovedala takto: „Pojmy ‚rod‘ a ‚rodová rovnosť‘ sa používajú už dlho (…), a teda
používanie tejto terminológie nepredstavuje nový vývoj.“

Je si Komisia vedomá toho, že jej podpredsedníčka sa svojou odpoveďou na uvedenú otázku, ktorá sa týka právneho
základu ZFEÚ pre používanie pojmu „rod“, vyhla konkrétnej odpovedi?

Mohla by Komisia láskavo takúto odpoveď poskytnúť alebo – ak v právnych predpisoch EÚ, ktoré by odôvodňovali
použitie pojmu „rod“, konkrétny právny základ neexistuje vôbec – formálne potvrdiť túto skutočnosť?

**Odpoveď pani Redingovej v mene Komisie**

_(11. júla 2013)_

Pojem „rod“ sa v ZFEÚ nevyskytuje. Zvyčajne používaným výrazom na vyjadrenie nediskriminácie medzi ženami
a mužmi je „rovnosť žien a mužov“ alebo „rovnosť medzi ženami a mužmi“. Ustanovenia Zmluvy však nebránia
používaniu pojmu „rod“ alebo „rodová rovnosť“ v oficiálnych publikáciách EÚ. Súdny dvor pri odkazovaní na zákaz
diskriminácie medzi mužmi a ženami rovnako používa výraz „diskriminácia na základe pohlavia“ v niektorých
svojich rozsudkoch (pozri napríklad nedávnu vec C-401/11, Soukupová, bod 27).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 603

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer P-006182/13**

**to the Commission**
**Anna Záborská (PPE)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Written Question E-007514/2012: confirmation of absence of a legal basis in the TFEU for use of the term
‘gender’

In Written Question E-007514/2012, the Commission was asked: ‘What is the legal basis in the TFEU for the use of
the term “gender” in official EU publications?’ In her answer, Vice‐President Reding did not provide any concrete
indication of the legal basis, but replied: ‘The terms “gender” and “gender equality” have long been used (…) so the use
of this terminology does not constitute a new development.’

Is the Commission aware that in her answer to the above question which specifically concerned the legal basis in the
TFEU for the use of the term ‘gender’, its Vice-President avoided giving a concrete answer?

Could the Commission kindly provide such an answer or, if there is no concrete legal basis at all in EC law justifying
the use of the term ‘gender’, formally confirm this fact?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission**

_(11 July 2013)_

The word ‘gender’ does not appear in the TFEU. The words used to refer to non-discrimination between women and
men are usually ‘equality between men and women’. However, the Treaty provisions are not an impediment to the use
of the word ‘gender’ or ‘gender equality’ in EU official publications. The Court of justice also uses the expression
‘discrimination on grounds of gender’ in some of its rulings to refer to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds
of sex (see, for a recent illustration, Case C-401/11, Soukupova, para. 27)

C 42 E / 604 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006183/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Allerta epatite A nell'UE: frutti di bosco congelati provenienti da Paesi terzi

È allerta epatite A in Italia e in Europa dopo che lo scorso aprile sono stati registrati due focolai legati al consumo di
frutti di bosco congelati importati da Paesi terzi. La prima epidemia si è verificata nei paesi del Nord Europa ed una
seconda ha coinvolto turisti italiani di rientro dall'Egitto. In Italia il ministero della Salute ha pubblicato e diffuso, in
data 23 maggio 2013, una circolare che segnala come, nel solo mese di maggio, vi sia stato un incremento dei casi
confermati di epatite A pari al 70 % su 16 Regioni italiane rispetto allo scorso periodo del 2012.

In Europa i primi casi di epatite A si sono verificati in Danimarca, Finlandia, Norvegia e Svezia, dove è stata bloccata
una partita di frutti di bosco scongelati provenienti dalla Cina perché positiva al norovirus (collegato all'epatite A),
mentre i casi successivi segnalati erano legati al consumo di tali prodotti importati da Bulgaria, Polonia, Serbia e
Canada.

Considerato che il regolamento (CE) n. 882/2004 del 29 aprile 2013, al capo V, disciplina i controlli ufficiali
sull'introduzione di mangimi ed alimenti provenienti da paesi terzi; che vi è stato un incremento allarmante del 70 %
dei casi di epatite A nel solo periodo marzo-maggio 2013 rispetto allo stesso periodo dell'anno precedente; che
l'epatite A è prevista nella lista delle malattie trasmissibili da inserire progressivamente nella rete comunitaria in forza
della decisione 2119/98/CE; che è stato accertato dalle autorità competenti che la causa della diffusione dell'epatite A
è legata al consumo di frutti di bosco congelati e provenienti da Paesi extra UE, messi in commercio in Europa,

si chiede alla Commissione:

—
Il sistema di allerta rapida europeo ha informato tempestivamente gli Stati membri della causa di questi casi di
epatite A?

—
Può riferire sulla situazione epidemiologica segnalata?

—
Può verificare se, nel caso di specie, vi siano state irregolarità nel sistema di controlli destinato all'importazione
di alimenti extra UE?

—
Quali azioni intende intraprendere per migliorare i controlli sugli alimenti provenienti da Paesi terzi?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(18 luglio 2013)_

1.   Sono state comunicate informazioni reciproche e misure volte a tutelare la salute pubblica tramite il sistema di
allarme rapido e di reazione (SARR), la rete istituita dalla decisione n. 2119/98/CE.

2.   Sulla homepage del Centro europeo per la prevenzione e il controllo delle malattie (ECDC) è stata pubblicata una
valutazione congiunta dell'ECDC e dell'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare (EFSA) su ciascuno di tali focolai,
rispettivamente il 16 aprile e il 29 maggio 2013. Tali valutazioni, disponibili sul sito web dell'ECDC ( [1] ), contengono
informazioni sui dettagli della situazione epidemiologica. Le valutazioni sono inoltre state comunicate mediante il
sistema SARR.

3.   Le autorità competenti del paese terzo d'origine devono controllare i requisiti di igiene negli stabilimenti che
esportano generi alimentari nell'UE. Tali requisiti devono essere almeno equivalenti a quelli dell'UE. I controlli sono
regolarmente sottoposti a verifica nel corso delle visite dell'Ufficio alimentare e veterinario della Commissione
europea. Non sono state riscontrate di recente gravi irregolarità. Per quanto riguarda il focolaio al quale l'onorevole
deputato fa riferimento, va osservato che vari pazienti sono stati infettati nel paese terzo in questione.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_A/Pages/index.aspx.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 605

4.   La Commissione ha già introdotto un livello accresciuto di controlli all'importazione specifici per epatite A e
Norovirus sulle partite di fragole dalla Cina ( [2] ). Quando fosse confermata una contaminazione di questo tipo nei
prodotti importati da altri paesi, sarà considerato un approccio analogo.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Regolamento (CE) n. 669/2009 della Commissione, del 24 luglio 2009, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 882/2004 del

Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo al livello accresciuto di controlli ufficiali sulle importazioni di alcuni mangimi e alimenti di origine
non animale e che modifica la decisione 2006/504/CE della Commissione (GU L 194 del 25.7.2009, pag. 11).

C 42 E / 606 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006183/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Hepatitis A alert in the EU: frozen berries from third countries

There is a hepatitis A alert in Europe following two outbreaks in April 2013 linked to the eating of frozen berries
imported from third countries. The first epidemic affected northern European countries, while the second involved
Italian tourists recently returned from Egypt. On 23 May 2013, Italy’s health minister published and distributed a
circular reporting that in May alone, 16 Italian regions had seen a 70% increase in confirmed cases of hepatitis
compared with the same period in 2012.

In Europe, the first cases of hepatitis A were found in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, where a consignment
of frozen berries from China was seized after testing positive for norovirus (linked to hepatitis A), while the
subsequent reported cases were linked to the consumption of similar products imported from Bulgaria, Poland,
Serbia and Canada.

Title V of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of 29 April 2013 governs official controls on the introduction of feed and
food from third countries. In the period between March and May 2013 alone, there was an alarming 70% increase in
cases of hepatitis A compared with the same period of the previous year. Hepatitis A is included in the list of
communicable diseases to be progressively covered by the Community network in accordance with Decision
No 2119/98/EC. The relevant authorities have determined that the spread of hepatitis A is linked to the consumption
of frozen berries imported from non-EU countries and put on sale in Europe.

Can the Commission answer the following:

—
Did the European early warning system give the Member States timely information about the cause of these
cases of hepatitis A?

—
Can it provide details of the epidemiological situation?

—
Can it verify whether, in this case, there have been any irregularities in the system of controls intended to be
applied to imports of food from outside the EU?

—
What actions does it intend to take to improve controls on food imported from third countries?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(18 July 2013)_

1. Mutual information and measures to protect public health have been exchanged via the Early Warning and
Response System (EWRS), the network established by Decision 2119/98/EC.

2. A joint European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) assessment was published on ECDC's homepage on each of these two outbreaks, respectively on 16 April and
on 29 May 2013. These can be found on the ECDC website ( [1] ) and contain information about the details of the
epidemiological situation. These assessments have also been exchanged through EWRS.

3. Competent authorities in the third country of origin must control the hygiene requirements in establishments
exporting food towards the EU. These requirements must be at least equivalent to the EU ones. These controls are
regularly audited during visits of the European Commission's Food and Veterinary Office. No major irregularities
were recently observed. It should be noted that in the outbreak to which you refer, several patients were infected in
the third country itself.

4. The Commission has already introduced an enhanced import control specifically for hepatitis A and norovirus
in consignments of strawberries from China ( [2] ). When similar contamination is confirmed in imported products from
other countries, a similar approach will be considered.

( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/hepatitis_A/Pages/index.aspx
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 of 24 July 2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the

Council as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin and amending
Decision 2006/504/EC (OJ L 194, 25.7.2009, p. 11).

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 607

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006184/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Dopo l'Iran il Bangladesh: l'emergenza acqua potabile nei Paesi in via di sviluppo

L'acqua potabile sta diventando, soprattutto a causa dell'anomala distribuzione delle precipitazioni dovuta ai
cambiamenti climatici, un bene sempre più prezioso. Di recente la problematica in questione è tornata ad essere
trattata dagli organi di informazione in seguito alla mancanza che sta colpendo il Bangladesh, un Paese che detiene il
primato della densità di popolazione per chilometro quadrato e dove quasi 30 milioni di persone vivono in zone
remote, paludose o inaccessibili e soggette a calamità naturali. Precedentemente, anche la situazione dell'Iran, Paese
molto arido dato che soltanto il 10 % della sua superficie riceve sufficienti precipitazioni, aveva avuto risalto.

Tenuto conto del fatto che alcune popolazioni dei PVS devono scavare pozzi anche di centinaia di metri per attingere
acqua potabile; che l'abbassamento del livello delle falde, fenomeno sempre più diffuso, può inoltre avere
ripercussioni sulla stabilità geologica causando rischi di cedimenti per i terreni e gli edifici soprastanti; che nelle zone
costiere, quali sono molte regioni del Bangladesh, vi è un'altra criticità, dovuta all'innalzamento del livello dei mari,
che rende le acque di fiumi e falde troppo salmastre; che nei Paesi avanzati una buona percentuale dell'acqua potabile
disponibile viene sprecata, come in Italia dove quasi la metà del volume di risorse idriche potrebbe essere recuperato,
mentre in zone come l'Africa sub-sahariana più del 40 % della popolazione non ha accesso a fonti idriche sicure e
quasi un terzo del tempo è speso per l'approvvigionamento di acqua; che milioni di morti, soprattutto bambini, sono
dovuti alle scarse condizioni igieniche imputabili soprattutto alla salubrità dell'acqua e che l'incidenza di alcune
malattie come la diarrea, che è la prima causa di morte in Africa e che nel 90 % dei casi è dovuta proprio alla
mancanza di acqua pulita, potrebbe notevolmente diminuire; che il controllo dei bacini idrici può divenire causa di
tensioni e conflitti armati, come dimostrano, ad esempio, una statistica secondo la quale in Afghanistan il 43 % degli
scontri nelle comunità si scatena per l'acqua e le tensioni tra India e Cina, per le dighe che quest'ultima vuole costruire
sul fiume Brahmaputra, e Afghanistan, Iran e Pakistan, per timori di deviazioni delle portate dei fiumi che scorrono
tra i Paesi,

si chiede alla Commissione:

—
Quali misure ha adottato o intende adottare per migliorare l'accesso all'acqua potabile nei PVS?

—
Intende promuovere trattati internazionali sull'uso comune di risorse idriche?

**Risposta di Andris Piebalgs a nome della Commissione**

_(25 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione riconosce quanto sia fondamentale l’accesso a risorse idriche salubri e ai servizi igienico-sanitari per
la lotta contro la povertà. Nel complesso, per il periodo 2007-2013, la Commissione ha impegnato più di 2 miliardi
di euro per l’acqua e per i servizi igienico-sanitari. Dal 2004 gli aiuti dell'Unione europea hanno permesso di fornire
acqua potabile a oltre 68 milioni di persone e migliori strutture igienico-sanitarie a 24 milioni di persone.

Per il prossimo periodo di programmazione (2014-2020) si affronterà la questione di un migliore accesso all’acqua
potabile e ai servizi igienico-sanitari principalmente nei paesi in cui le risorse idriche sono state individuate come
settore prioritario.

In Bangladesh il contributo dell’UE è pari a 15 milioni di euro per un programma di preparazione alle catastrofi e a
730 000 euro per garantire risorse idriche e strutture igienico-sanitarie al fine di ridurre il rischio di catastrofi.

Nel contesto del programma di cambiamento ( [1] ), la cooperazione transfrontaliera in materia di acqua, di energia e di
sicurezza è un punto centrale per lo sviluppo e l’integrazione regionali.

Nel quadro di una nuova iniziativa della Commissione e dell’Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente riguardante il
coordinamento in materia di risorse idriche transfrontaliere, l’UE intende promuovere accordi di collaborazione per la
gestione sostenibile delle risorse dei bacini fluviali e di acqua dolce condivisi e favorisce la cooperazione regionale e
internazionale nell'ambito di politiche e di programmi concordati.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011)637 definitivo .

C 42 E / 608 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Per quanto riguarda la gestione delle acque dell’Unione, la Commissione non intende proporre un trattato
internazionale sulle risorse idriche condivise. Essa ha riconosciuto che la carenza idrica e la siccità costituiscono un
problema di notevole portata nella sua comunicazione COM(2007)414.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 609

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006184/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ After Iran, Bangladesh: the drinking-water emergency in developing countries

Drinking water is becoming an increasingly precious asset, largely due to the anomalous rainfall distribution caused
by climate change. This issue has recently been highlighted by the media because of the drought affecting Bangladesh,
which has the highest population density in the world and where almost 30 million people live in remote, marshy or
inaccessible areas prone to natural disasters. We had also seen Iran’s situation previously; it is an extremely arid
country where only 10% of its surface area receives sufficient rainfall.

Some of the populations of developing countries have to dig wells hundreds of metres deep to reach drinking water,
and falling water tables — an increasingly widespread problem — can impact geological stability, causing risks of
subsidence for land and buildings. In coastal regions, of which Bangladesh has many, there is another critical issue
caused by rising sea levels, which are making rivers and water tables excessively salty. In developed countries, a large
percentage of the available drinking water is wasted. This is the case in Italy, where almost half of the water resources
could be recovered, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 40% of the population has no access to safe water sources
and people spend almost a third of their time obtaining supplies of water. Millions of deaths — particularly of
children — are caused by inadequate hygiene conditions attributable mainly to poor water quality, and the incidence
of some diseases such as diarrhoea, which is the leading cause of death in Africa and in 90% of cases is caused by lack
of clean water, could be substantially reduced. The question of control of water basins can lead to tensions and armed
conflict, as demonstrated by a statistic showing that in Afghanistan 43% of community disputes break out over water,
and by the tensions between India and China — over the dams that China wants to build on the Brahmaputra river —
and between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan due to fears of diversion of the course of the rivers that run between
those countries.

Can the Commission answer the following:

—
What measures has it taken, or what measures does it intend to take, to improve access to drinking water in
developing countries?

—
Does it intend to promote any international treaties on the shared use of water resources?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission**

_(25 July 2013)_

The Commission recognises access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene as a critical element of the fight against
poverty. Overall, from 2007-2013, the Commission has committed more than EUR 2 billion to Water and
Sanitation. EU support since 2004 has resulted in more than 68 million persons getting access to safe drinking water
and 24 million benefiting from improved sanitation facilities.

Regarding the next programming period from 2014-2020, the issue of improving access to safe drinking water and
sanitation will be addressed mainly in countries where the water sector has been chosen as a focal sector.

In Bangladesh, the EU is contributing EUR 15 million to a disaster preparedness programme and EUR 730 000 to
help ensuring Water & Sanitation Facilities towards Disaster Risk Reduction.

In the context of the Agenda for Change ( [1] ), cross-border cooperation on water, energy and security is a focus in the
context of regional development and integration.

In the context of a new Commission/High Representative-Vice-President Initiative concerning coordination on transboundary water issues, the EU intends to promote collaborative and sustainable water management arrangements in
shared river and fresh water basins and encourages regional and international cooperation in the context of agreed
policies and programmes.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) COM(2011) 637 final.

C 42 E / 610 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Concerning the management of EU waters, the Commission does not intend to propose an international treaty on
shared water resources. The major challenge represented by water scarcity and droughts on the EU territory was
recognised by the Commission in its communication COM(2007) 414.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 611

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006185/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Abusi sulle popolazioni indigene compiuti in attuazione di progetti rientranti nell'ambito del Clean
Development Mechanism

Il Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) o Meccanismo di Sviluppo Pulito è stato istituito nell'ambito del Protocollo
di Kyoto, con l'intento di favorire una riduzione delle emissioni di CO 2 . Viene, infatti, previsto che la messa in opera di
progetti tesi a ridurre la quantità di gas clima-alteranti nell'atmosfera dia la possibilità di ricevere dei crediti di
emissione (Certified Emission Reductions, CER) che possono poi essere accumulati e portati in deduzione
dell'ammontare di quote di tonnellate di CO 2 da detenere, qualora l'operatore titolare del progetto svolga un'attività
inquinante, o rivenduti sul mercato. Alcune condizioni necessarie affinché il progetto possa essere ritenuto meritevole
dell'assegnazione di CER sono: che il Paese ospitante abbia ratificato il Protocollo di Kyoto e non sia compreso
nell'Allegato 1 della Convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici; che la riduzione dei gas
presenti nell'atmosfera sia addizionale rispetto al caso in cui il progetto non sia attuato e che sia possibile quantificare
analiticamente la riduzione delle emissioni.

La possibilità di negoziare liberamente i crediti ottenuti in attuazione di un dato progetto ha suscitato l'interesse di
diversi soggetti nel mondo e in Europa. Sembra che si stia, infatti, diffondendo una modalità di azione che prevede il
raggiro delle popolazioni dei paesi in via di sviluppo (PVS), su tutti quelle del continente africano in Stati come il
Kenya, la Tanzania, il Camerun, l'Uganda, il Mozambico, promettendo alle stesse la costruzione di scuole, ospedali ed
opere pubbliche in genere e la creazione di posti di lavoro a fronte della vendita dei terreni occupati.

Considerato che: l'apparato legislativo e giudiziario nei PVS ha molte lacune e che gli operatori interessati ai CER
sfruttano a loro vantaggio tale contesto; la libera compravendita dei crediti ha innescato fenomeni speculativi sul
mercato le cui conseguenze negative vengono sopportate dalle popolazioni indigene private dei loro terreni con false
promesse e scappatoie legali non identificabili dai diretti interessati; molto spesso la situazione sfocia in gravi atti di
ribellione quale, ad esempio, l'appiccare il fuoco ad una piantagione creata per assorbire carbonio dall'atmosfera,
generando danni economici per gli operatori titolari dei progetti, oltre che ambientali e sociali,

può la Commissione riferire se è al corrente di tali pratiche e se intende valutare l'adozione di misure volte ad evitare
atti speculativi e fraudolenti nell'ambito del CDM.

**Risposta di Connie Hedegaard a nome della Commissione**

_(19 luglio 2013)_

L’approvazione dei progetti CDM e il rilascio dei crediti sono di competenza del Comitato esecutivo del CDM, organo
governato da regole sotto l’autorità della Conferenza delle parti (COP) del protocollo di Kyoto. La Commissione, in
collaborazione con tutte le parti del protocollo, partecipa attivamente alle decisioni riguardanti le norme che il
Comitato deve rispettare in sede di valutazione dei progetti. Finora tali norme non prevedono una valutazione della
conformità dell’attività di progetto e della sua effettiva applicazione rispetto al trattamento delle popolazioni locali.
Ciò spetta ai paesi ospitanti in conformità con il principio contenuto nelle modalità e procedure secondo cui la
valutazione dello sviluppo sostenibile è di competenza esclusiva della parte ospitante.

Le modalità e procedure prevedono comunque che si organizzi una consultazione delle parti interessate a livello
locale e globale prima della registrazione di un progetto. Lo scopo è individuare i potenziali problemi nella fase
iniziale ed adattare il progetto di conseguenza. Tuttavia, una tale consultazione non sarà ripetuta durante la fase di
attuazione del progetto. Anche le linee guida relative alla consultazione delle parti interessate non vanno al di là di
quanto previsto dalla legge nei paesi di accoglienza. Nel corso della COP, la Commissione è ripetutamente intervenuta
a favore di un ulteriore rafforzamento delle norme che disciplinano le consultazioni con le parti interessate a livello
locale e globale, compresi i requisiti minimi in termini di portata, tempistica e forma dei progetti. Nel 2011 la
Commissione ha anche portato la questione all’attenzione della seduta plenaria della COP, dove però è stata respinta.
La Commissione continuerà a chiedere un rafforzamento delle linee guida relative alla consultazione delle parti
interessate nell’ambito del dibattito sul riesame delle modalità e procedure del CDM alla prossima Conferenza delle
parti nel novembre 2013 a Varsavia.

C 42 E / 612 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006185/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Abuse of indigenous populations occurring in the context of Clean Development Mechanism projects

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established under the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of helping reduce
CO 2 emissions. It provides for the possibility to receive emission credits (Certified Emission Reductions (CERs))
following the implementation of projects to reduce the quantity of climate-altering gases in the atmosphere. These
credits can then be amassed and offset against the amount of CO 2 tonne allowances to be held should the project
operator carry out a polluting activity, or they can be sold on the market. In order to consider assigning CERs to the
project, requirements include: that the host country must have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and is not included in
Annex 1 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; that the reduction of atmospheric gases is
additional to what would be the case if the project were not implemented, and that it is possible to analytically
quantify the reduction of emissions.

The possibility of freely trading credits obtained by implementing a given project has sparked the interest of various
parties throughout the world and in Europe. It appears that a means of operating is gaining ground, whereby the
populations of developing countries, including all the populations in African States such as Kenya, Tanzania,
Cameroon, Uganda and Mozambique, are tricked with promises of the construction of schools, hospitals and public
works in general and the creation of jobs following the sale of occupied land.

Given that: the legislative and judicial apparatus in developing countries has many deficiencies and operators
interested in CERs exploit this situation to their advantage; free trade in credits has triggered speculation on the
market, the negative consequences of which are borne by the indigenous populations deprived of their land thanks to
false promises and legal loopholes whereby those directly affected do not realise what is happening; the situation
frequently results in serious acts of rebellion, such as setting fire to a plantation created to absorb carbon from the
atmosphere, causing financial damage to the project operators, as well as environmental and social damage,

can the Commission state whether it is aware of these practices and whether it intends to evaluate the adoption of
measures to prevent speculation and fraud within the context of the CDM?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission**

_(19 July 2013)_

The approval of CDM projects and issuance of credits is the responsibility of the CDM Executive Board, a rule-based
body under the authority of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol. The Commission, together with all
Parties to the Protocol, actively participates in decisions setting the rules to be observed by the Board when assessing
projects. So far these rules do not foresee in an assessment of the conformity of the project activity and its actual
implementation regarding the treatment of local populations. This is left to the host countries in accordance with the
principle in the modalities and procedures that the assessment of sustainable development is the sole responsibility of
the host Party.

The modalities and procedures do foresee that a local and global stakeholder consultation is conducted prior to
registration of a project. This serves to identify potential problems early on and adapt the project accordingly.
However, such a consultation is not repeated during the implementation phase of a project. Stakeholder consultation
guidelines also do not go beyond what is required by the law in the host countries. At the COP the Commission has
consistently intervened in favour of further strengthening the rules governing local and global stakeholder
consultations, including minimum criteria for scope, timing and form. In 2011 the Commission even brought this
issue to the attention of the COP plenary where it was overruled. The Commission will continue to demand
reinforced stakeholder consultation guidelines when discussing the review of the modalities and procedures of the
CDM at the next COP in November 2013 in Warsaw.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 613

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006186/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Vitamina B rimedio contro l'Alzheimer

Recenti studi clinici condotti presso l'università di Oxford hanno dimostrato che, somministrando alte dosi di
vitamine del gruppo B: B12, acido folico e B6 a soggetti over 70 con lieve deficit cognitivo, si osserva un forte
rallentamento della perdita e riduzione di materia grigia fino a 7 volte in regioni specificamente colpite dal processo
neurodegenerativo dell'Alzheimer. Come noto, l'Alzheimer è una malattia degenerativa che interessa le persone di età
superiore ai 65 anni e colpisce la memoria e le funzioni mentali fino a distruggere lentamente e progressivamente le
cellule del cervello. L'assunzione di vitamine del gruppo B, che proteggono il cervello dalla demenza e dalla perdita di
memoria, si è rilevata efficacie, proprio nel rallentamento del declino cognitivo e, quindi, nello sviluppo
dell'Alzheimer.

Considerato che l'Alzheimer è un processo degenerativo che distrugge lentamente e progressivamente le cellule del
cervello, che la vitamina B porta una riduzione di omocisteina, che a sua volta riduce la perdita di materia grigia e
rallenta il declino cognitivo e che l'assunzione delle vitamine del gruppo B riduce del 90 % il restringimento del
cervello, per cui la ricerca in materia andrebbe approfondita ulteriormente, può la Commissione riferire:

—
quali progressi scientifici nel campo della ricerca medica siano stati fatti al fine di incentivare la
sperimentazione clinica per combattere l'Alzheimer;

—
se ritiene necessario inserire nella programmazione finanziaria 2014-2020 del programma Salute per la
crescita studi simili a quelli citati sulle vitamine del gruppo B con l'obiettivo di migliorare non solo la qualità
della vita alle persone anziane affette da Alzheimer, ma anche quella dei loro familiari;

—
se intende predisporre azioni mirate alla condivisione di risorse e competenze fra gli Stati membri per
affrontare tutte le problematiche legate all'Alzheimer?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 luglio 2013)_

Dal 2007 la Commissione ha investito 202 milioni di euro nella ricerca sul morbo di Alzheimer per il tramite del suo
Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo. Il progetto inteso a creare un profilo della varietà nota come
LOAD ( [1] ), ad esempio, esamina il ruolo della vitamina B12 nei mutamenti epigenetici rispetto alla metilazione dei
geni Alzheimer-rilevanti.

La Commissione sostiene inoltre l'attuazione dell'iniziativa di programmazione congiunta sulle malattie
neurodegenerative e in particolare sul morbo di Alzheimer ( [2] ), un'iniziativa portata avanti dagli Stati membri e che
intende accrescere l'impatto della ricerca europea in quest'ambito coordinando gli sforzi tra i paesi.

La condivisione di risorse e conoscenze tra gli Stati membri è un obiettivo chiave dell'iniziativa europea sulla malattia
di Alzheimer e le altre forme di demenza, avviata mediante una comunicazione nel 2009 ( [3] ). Per affrontare il morbo
di Alzheimer la Commissione ha sostenuto l'azione comune ALCOVE attraverso il programma unionale sulla
Salute ( [4] ). Il programma comune ha permesso la collaborazione di 19 Stati membri tra il 2011 e il marzo 2013.

Una decisione sulle eventuali ulteriori attività in materia di demenza nell'ambito del futuro programma 2014-2020
verrà presa una volta che il programma sarà stato adottato e una volta che saranno stati analizzati i risultati
dell'implementazione delle iniziative europee condotte sinora.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Sviluppo di un profilo del morbo di Alzheimer tardivo (Late-onset Alzheimer disease, LOAD) per la diagnosi accurata e l'identificazione dei

potenziali approcci terapeutici.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.neurodegenerationresearch.eu/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2009)380 definitivo, 22.7.2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) ALzheimer COoperative Valuation in Europe, all'indirizzo:.

http://www.alcove-project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28&Itemid=141.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

C 42 E / 614 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006186/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Vitamin B as a cure for Alzheimer's disease

Recent clinical studies conducted at the University of Oxford have shown that administering high doses of B vitamins
(B12, folic acid and B6) to subjects over the age of 70 with mild cognitive deficit slows the loss and reduction of grey
matter by a factor of up to 7 in regions specifically affected by the neurodegenerative process seen in Alzheimer’s
disease. As is well known, Alzheimer’s is a degenerative disease that hits people over the age of 65 and affects memory
and mental function, slowly and progressively destroying the cells of the brain. Taking B vitamins, which protect the
brain against dementia and memory loss, has been shown to be effective in slowing cognitive decline and therefore
the development of Alzheimer’s disease.

Given that Alzheimer’s disease is a degenerative process that slowly and progressively destroys the cells of the brain;
that vitamin B reduces homocysteine levels, thereby reducing the loss of grey matter and slowing cognitive decline;
that taking B vitamins reduces brain shrinkage by 90%, and that further research is needed on this subject;

Can the Commission answer the following:

— What scientific advances have been made in the field of medical research in order to incentivise clinical studies
for combating Alzheimer’s disease?

—
Does it consider it necessary to include studies similar to those mentioned above concerning B vitamins in the
2014-2020 financial planning for the Health Programme, with a view to improving not only the quality of life
of older people affected by Alzheimer’s disease, but also that of their families?

—
Does it intend to take any actions to encourage the sharing of resources and knowledge between the Member
States in order to tackle all the issues associated with Alzheimer’s disease?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

Since 2007, the Commission has invested EUR 202 million in research on Alzheimer's disease through its Seventh
Framework Programme for Research and Development. The project LOAD PROFILE ( [1] ), for instance, investigates the
role of vitamin B12 in epigenetic changes in methylation of Alzheimer's disease-relevant genes.

The Commission also supports the implementation of the Joint Programming Initiative on Neurodegenerative
Diseases and in particular Alzheimer's Disease ( [2] ), a Member State-led initiative which aims at increasing the impact of
European research in this area by coordinating efforts across countries.

Sharing resources and knowledge between Member States is a key objective of the European initiative on Alzheimer’s
disease and other dementia, launched through a communication in 2009 ( [3] ). To address Alzheimer’s disease, the
Commission supported the Joint Action ALCOVE through the EU-Health Programme ( [4] ). The Joint Action brought
together 19 Member States from 2011 to March 2013.

The decision about any further activities on dementia under the future Health Programme 2014-2020 will be made
after the adoption of the Programme and on the basis of the analysis of the outcomes of the implementation of
European initiatives so far.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Development of a late-onset-Alzheimer’s disease (LOAD) profile for accurate diagnosis and identification of potential therapeutic approaches.
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.neurodegenerationresearch.eu/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) COM(2009) 380 final22.7.2009.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Alzheimer COoperative Valuation in Europe, http://www.alcove-project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28&Itemid=141.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 615

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006187/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Trovata cura per l'autismo: molte famiglie italiane costrette a curare i propri figli oltre continente

Recenti studi e ricerche condotti negli USA mostrano come, interventi biomedici e terapie comportamentali precoci e
aggressive (in numero di ore) a bambini affetti da autismo, portino a miglioramenti eccezionali, fino a sviluppare
abilità sociali (i bambini giocano, parlano, studiano, ecc). Il nuovo approccio curativo considera l'autismo un
problema medico e tratta quindi ogni singolo sintomo per venire a conoscenza di tutte le molteplici problematiche,
coinvolgendo vari specialisti: dall'allergologo, all'immunologo, all'esperto in avvelenamento da metalli pesanti, ecc. La
maggioranza dei medici italiani è restia nei confronti della nuova cura, che sta invece rapidamente convincendo
ricercatori e studiosi, e continua a considerare l'autismo come un problema psichiatrico, obbligando così molte
famiglie italiane a rivolgersi a strutture più preparate e all'avanguardia oltre continente e a sostenere costi elevati per
garantire ai propri figli le cure migliori e una vita dignitosa.

Trattando ogni singolo sintomo, ogni errore nel sistema metabolico, ricostruendo il sistema immunitario e
ripristinando un corretto metabolismo dei metalli è possibile un cambio graduale e un miglioramento delle
condizioni di salute e del comportamento. Tali cure fondamentali per migliorare le condizioni di autismo sono state
adottate negli Stati Uniti. Oltre a essere una malattia, l'autismo è un problema sociale: in Italia oltre 400.000 famiglie
hanno a che fare con soggetti autistici e spesso sono lasciate a se stesse. Il diritto alla cura deve essere garantito a livello

europeo.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione far sapere:

—
se è a conoscenza degli studi sull'autismo e del nuovo sistema di cure in atto negli USA;

—
se intende fornire linee guida comuni per una specifica formazione degli operatori sanitari e del personale
medico europeo per il trattamento all'autismo;

—
se intende inserire il menzionato approccio curativo nel quadro dell'azione pilota «Protocollo europeo sulla
prevalenza dell'autismo per la diagnosi precoce dello spettro autistico in Europa» 2013?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione**

_(22 luglio 2013)_

La Commissione è a conoscenza del nuovo approccio terapeutico elaborato negli Stati Uniti nonché delle ricerche su
cui esso è basato ( [1] ). Prove recenti hanno effettivamente dimostrato che i disturbi dello spettro autistico possono
essere associati ad una serie di sintomi che è possibile curare in modo efficace con interventi biomedici ad hoc.

La Commissione sostiene la ricerca sui disturbi dello spettro autistico dal 2007 mediante il Settimo programma
quadro UE di ricerca e sviluppo, nel cui ambito sono stati erogati più di 65 milioni di EUR. Nello specifico il progetto
EU-AIMS ( [2] ), sostenuto dall'Impresa comune per l'attuazione dell'iniziativa tecnologica congiunta sui medicinali
innovativi ( [3] ), si prefigge lo scopo di approfondire le conoscenze sui disturbi dello spettro autistico e di sviluppare
approcci terapeutici su misura per soddisfare i bisogni dei singoli pazienti.

La Commissione indirà prossimamente una gara d’appalto per attuare il progetto pilota «Protocollo europeo sulla
prevalenza dell'autismo per la diagnosi precoce dello spettro autistico in Europa» e le iniziative ad esso correlate.
Poiché il bando non è ancora stato pubblicato la Commissione non è al momento in grado di fornire alcuna
precisazione in merito al progetto in questione.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Frye et al. Transl Psychiatry. 2013 June; 3(6): e273.

Ruskin et al. PLoS One. 2013 Jun 5; 8(6): e65021.
Rossignol and Frye, MoL Psychiatry. 2012 Apr;17(4):389-401.
Haas, Dev Disabil Res Rev. 2010 Jun;16(2):144-53.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.eu-aims.eu/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) L'IMI è una partnership pubblico-privata tra l'UE e la Federazione europea delle associazioni delle industrie farmaceutiche

(http://www.imi.europa.eu/).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

C 42 E / 616 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006187/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Treatment for autism found: many Italian families are forced to seek treatment for their children outside the
EU

Recent studies and research carried out in the United States show how biomedical intervention and early, aggressive
(in terms of hours) behavioural therapy can lead to exceptional improvements in autistic children, to the point of
developing social skills (the children play, talk, study etc.). The new curative approach considers autism to be a
medical problem and therefore treats each individual symptom in order to discover the whole range of issues present,
and involves different specialists: allergists, immunologists, experts in heavy metals, etc. The majority of Italian
doctors have reservations about the new treatment, which is, however, rapidly winning over researchers and
scientists. The doctors continue to view autism as a psychiatric problem, thereby forcing many Italian families to turn
to more competent and state-of-the-art facilities outside Europe and to bear high costs to provide their children with
the best treatment and a dignified life.

By treating each individual symptom, each error in the metabolic system, and by rebuilding the immune system and
restoring the correct metabolism of metals, it is possible to see a gradual change and an improvement in a child’s
health and behaviour. This treatment, fundamental to improving autism, has been adopted in the United States. In
addition to being an illness, autism is a social problem: in Italy, over 400 000 families have a family member with
autism, and often receive no support. The right to receive treatment must be guaranteed at European level.

In light of the above, can the Commission state:

—
whether it is aware of the autism studies and the new curative system in place in the United States;

—
whether it plans to provide common guidelines for the specific training of health professionals and EU medical
personnel in the treatment of autism;

—
whether it intends to include the above curative approach in the 2013 pilot project ‘European Prevalence
Protocol for early detection of Autistic Spectrum Disorders in Europe’?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission**

_(22 July 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the new curative approach in place in the US as well as of the research findings
underpinning it ( [1] ). Recent evidence has indeed shown that autism spectrum disorders may be associated with a
number of symptoms that can be effectively tackled with appropriate biomedical interventions.

In addition, through the EU Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development the Commission has
supported research on autism spectrum disorders with over EUR 65 million since 2007. In particular, the project EUAIMS ( [2] ), supported by the Innovative Medicines Initiative Joint Undertaking ( [3] ), aims to deliver a deeper insight into
autism spectrum disorders and to develop therapeutic approaches tailored to the individual patient's needs.

The Commission is currently finalising a call for tenders to implement the pilot project ‘European Prevalence Protocol
for early detection of Autistic Spectrum Disorders in Europe’ and the related specifications. As the call for tenders has
not yet been published, the Commission is not able, at this stage, to give any indications as regards the specific aspects
which will be included.

( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Frye et al. Transl Psychiatry. 2013 June; 3(6): e273.

Ruskin et al. PLoS One. 2013 Jun 5;8(6):e65021.
Rossignol and Frye, Mol Psychiatry. 2012 Apr;17(4):389-401.
Haas, Dev Disabil Res Rev. 2010 Jun;16(2):144-53.

( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) http://www.eu-aims.eu/.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) IMI is a public-private partnership between the EU and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations

(http://www.imi.europa.eu/).

( **|**
( **|**

⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 617

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006188/13**

**alla Commissione**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Terre rare: quali misure per rendere l'Europa autosufficiente e salvaguardare le popolazioni dei paesi
sottosviluppati

Le terre rare sono dei minerali con svariate e particolari proprietà che ad oggi vengono impiegati in una vasta gamma
di processi produttivi, dagli apparecchi elettronici quali televisori, smartphone, computer alle batterie per automobili
elettriche, dalle turbine eoliche alle celle fotovoltaiche. Dato questo ampio campo di utilizzo, la fornitura delle terre
rare assume un significato rilevante per il settore manifatturiero. Inoltre, essendo questi minerali incastonati nelle
rocce che formano la crosta terrestre, il processo di estrazione e raffinazione richiede tecnologie molto avanzate e una
grande quantità di acqua e di energia elettrica. Infine, dato che le terre rare si accompagnano sempre a elementi
radioattivi come il torio e l'uranio, nelle fasi di lavorazione vengono prodotti rifiuti altamente tossici.

L'Europa dipende totalmente dalle importazioni di queste materie prime, particolarmente dalla Cina che produce
all'incirca il 90 % di terre rare utilizzate nel mondo, ed è quindi estremamente assoggettata all'andamento dei prezzi e
al livello dell'offerta stabilito dai paesi esportatori. Il mercato delle terre rare è in crescita e si presuppone che continui
con un trend al rialzo dell'ordine del 10 % annuale. Riciclare le terre rare presenti nei più svariati manufatti è possibile
ma, a causa delle incerte aspettative di profitto e delle basse concentrazioni, ad oggi soltanto l'1 % circa delle terre rare
viene re-immesso nel ciclo produttivo. I paesi in via di sviluppo sono la meta preferita sia per lo stabilimento di
impianti di lavorazione dei minerali, che producono rifiuti tossici, sia come destinazione verso la quale spedire le
apparecchiature in disuso contenenti terre rare, che poi vengono smaltite dalla popolazione locale in modi
rudimentali e in assenza di sicurezza, dato che le norme sul rispetto dell'ambiente in tali paesi sono solitamente più
permissive. Le due situazioni precedentemente descritte causano un notevole aumento del tasso di incidenza di gravi
patologie, quali leucemia, tumori, malformazioni congenite, come verificatosi in località quali Bukit Merah, in
Malaysia, Guiyu, in Cina, e nella zona di Baotou, in Mongolia.

Alla luce di quanto sopra può la Commissione far sapere:

—
Quali misure ha adottato o intende adottare per favorire il riutilizzo delle terre rare;

—
se intende incentivare la ricerca e lo sviluppo di materiali alternativi;

—
se intende intervenire per quanto concerne lo stoccaggio di rifiuti tossici ottenuti dalla lavorazione delle terre
rare e lo smaltimento di apparecchiature elettroniche, anche con riferimento al quadro della situazione
internazionale?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione**

_(14 agosto 2013)_

Le terre rare sono un gruppo di metalli speciali utilizzati in prodotti ad alta tecnologia. L'UE è fortemente dipendente
dalle importazioni di terre rare e si adopera pertanto per garantire la sicurezza dell'approvvigionamento.

La Commissione, tramite affidamenti in subappalto, sta istituendo una Rete europea di competenze in materia di terre
rare ( [1] ) che riunirà esperti dal mondo istituzionale ed accademico, come pure dal mondo dell'industria, e cercherà di
considerare come affrontare la questione della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti. All'interno di ERECON saranno
organizzati tre diversi gruppi di lavoro, ciascuno responsabile di una determinata questione in materia di terre rare:
opportunità ed ostacoli all'approvvigionamento primario di terre rare in Europa; efficienza e riciclaggio delle risorse
in Europa; industrie utilizzatrici finali europee e tendenze e sfide nell'approvvigionamento di terre rare.

Inoltre, nell'ambito del 7 [o] programma quadro di ricerca, è stato istituito un progetto in materia di terre rare ( [2] ). Tale
progetto si ripropone di individuare e valutare le risorse di terre rare in Europa, sviluppare, ottimizzare e dimostrare le
tecnologie innovative per la prospezione efficiente delle risorse di terre rare, creare una massa critica di ricercatori e
ingegneri a sostegno del settore e sviluppare un sistema integrato di gestione delle conoscenze ( [3] ) per le risorse di terre
rare dell'UE.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

**|** )
**|** )
**|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Rete europea di competenze in materia di terre rare (ERECON).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) EURARE.
( ⋅3∙ ) IKMS.

C 42 E / 618 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Nel contesto del partenariato europeo per l'innovazione concernente le materie prime ( [4] ), il piano strategico di
attuazione prevede azioni finalizzate alla messa a punto di materiali alternativi alle terre rare nell'ambito delle
applicazioni nei beni ad alta tecnologia.

Inoltre, molte tecnologie a basse emissioni di carbonio si basano su materie prime rare, come i metalli delle terre rare,
che in Europa sono perlopiù importati. Per questo motivo è stata redatta una tabella di marcia per le tecnologie a
basse emissioni di carbonio ( [5] ).

( **|**

⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Comunicazione della Commissione al Parlamento europeo, al Consiglio, al Comitato economico e sociale europeo e al Comitato delle regioni

«Garantire l'accesso alle materie prime per il futuro benessere dell'Europa. Proposta di partenariato europeo per l'innovazione concernente le
materie prime» COM(2012)82 final. .

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Materials Roadmap Enabling Low Carbon Energy Technologies (Materiali per tecnologie energetiche a bassa emissione di CO 2 : una tabella di

marcia), documento di lavoro dei servizi della Commissione SEC(2011)1609 definitivo.

( **|**

⋅5∙ **|** )

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 619

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006188/13**

**to the Commission**

**Oreste Rossi (EFD)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Rare earths: how to make Europe self-sufficient and to protect the peoples of underdeveloped countries

Rare earths are minerals with a number of special properties that are currently used in a wide range of manufacturing
processes, from electronic appliances such as televisions, smartphones and computers to batteries for electric cars,
from wind turbines to photovoltaic cells. In view of their many uses, the supply of rare earths is crucial for the
manufacturing sector. Moreover, as these minerals are contained in the rocks that form the earth’s crust, the process
for extracting and refining them requires very advanced technologies and large amounts of water and electricity.
Finally, given that rare earths are always found with radioactive elements, such as thorium and uranium, highly toxic
waste is produced when they are processed.

Europe is entirely dependent on imports of these raw materials, particularly from China, which produces around 90%
of the rare earths used worldwide, and is therefore extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations and the level of supply
set by exporting countries. The rare earths market is growing and it is assumed that it will continue to grow by 10%
per year. It is possible to recycle the rare earths contained in a very wide range of products but, because of uncertain
profit expectations and low rare earth content, today only around 1% of rare earths are put back into the production
cycle. Developing countries are the preferred destination both for setting up mineral processing plants, which
produce toxic waste, and for shipping used equipment containing rare earths to. This equipment is then disposed of
by the local population in rudimentary and unsafe conditions, given that environmental protection rules are usually
less strict in such countries. Both of the above situations bring about a significant rise in the number of cases of
serious diseases, such as leukaemia, tumours and congenital abnormalities, as has been seen in places such as Bukit
Merah in Malaysia, Guiyu in China, and in the Baotou area in Mongolia.

— What steps has the Commission taken or does it plan to take to promote the reuse of rare earths?

— Does it plan to encourage research and development of alternative materials?

— Does it plan to take action on the storage of toxic waste resulting from the processing of rare earths and the
disposal of electronic equipment, including with regard to the international situation?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(14 August 2013)_

Rare earth elements are a group of speciality metals used in high-tech products. The EU is highly dependent on
imports of rare earths, thus trying to ensure supply security.

The Commission, through sub-contractual work, is setting up a Network for rare earths ( [1] ) which will bring together
experts from areas of government, academia as well as industry and will look at ways of addressing the issue of supply
security. ERECON will have three different working groups, each tackling a different topic related to rare earths:
opportunities and road blocks for primary supply of rare earths in Europe; resource efficiency and recycling in
Europe; European end-user industries and rare earth supply trends and challenges.

Besides, in the framework of the FP7 research programme, a project concerning rare earths has been set up ( [2] ). Its aim
will be to map and evaluate rare earth elements resources in Europe, develop, optimise and demonstrate innovative
technologies for the efficient exploration or rare earth resources, establish a critical mass of scientists and engineers to
support the sector, develop an integrated knowledge management system ( [3] ) for EU rare earth resources.

In the context of the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials ( [4] ) the strategic implementation plan foresees
actions aimed at development of alternative materials to rare earths, when it comes to applications in high tech goods.

( **|**
( **|**
( **|**
( **|**

⋅1∙ **|** )
⋅2∙ **|** )
⋅3∙ **|** )
⋅4∙ **|** )

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) European Rare Earth Competency Network (ERECON).
( **|** ⋅2∙ **|** ) EURARE.
( **|** ⋅3∙ **|** ) IKMS.
( **|** ⋅4∙ **|** ) Communication from the Commission to the EP, the Council, The EESC and the CoR ‘Making raw materials available for Europe’s future well
being. Proposal for a European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials’ COM(2012) 82 final. .

C 42 E / 620 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Moreover, many low carbon energy technologies rely on rare raw materials, such as rare-earth metals, which are by
and large imported in Europe. For this reason, a materials roadmap for low carbon energy technologies has been
developed ( [5] ).

( **|** ⋅5∙ **|** ) Materials Roadmap Enabling Low Carbon Energy Technologies, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 1609 final.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 621

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006189/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ Importazione macchine per costruzioni non conformi alle direttive dell'UE

Il mercato dell'Unione europea è soggetto al fenomeno di importazione di mezzi per costruzioni non conformi alle
direttive dell'UE.

In alcuni casi si tratta di macchine rubate e rivendute, in altri invece sono veicoli che varcano i confini europei senza le
autorizzazioni necessarie.

Questo fenomeno crea un grave danno per le aziende europee del settore provocando uno squilibrio per quanto
riguarda la concorrenza.

I produttori di macchine per costruzioni dell'Unione europea, nonostante gli ingenti investimenti in ricerca e sviluppo
effettuati per realizzare prodotti conformi, si vedono penalizzati da chi non rispetta le regole.

È necessario poi ricordare quali conseguenze questa situazione abbia sui volumi occupazionali, sugli operatori che
utilizzano nei cantieri macchine che possono avere sistemi di sicurezza inferiori alla norma, e sull'ambiente (una
macchina non conforme può non rispettare le normative in materia di emissioni gassose e di rumore).

Alla luce dei recenti piani di lavoro della Commissione riguardo alla sorveglianza di mercato, può la Commissione
rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. È a conoscenza di questo fenomeno?

2. Come intende intervenire per consentire alle autorità pubbliche una sorveglianza di mercato efficiente e alle
forze dell'ordine il contrasto dei furti?

3. Che tipologie di azioni intende attuare per difendere il mercato europeo, compatibilmente con misure di
protezione dell'ambiente?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione**

_(26 agosto 2013)_

La Commissione è consapevole dei problemi posti dall'importazione di macchine per costruzioni non conformi. La
responsabilità per la vigilanza del mercato dei macchinari e per i controlli alle frontiere esterne dell'UE incombe in
primo luogo alle autorità doganali e di vigilanza del mercato nazionale che operano nel quadro del regolamento (CE)
n. 765/2008. La Commissione ha adottato diverse iniziative per migliorare e coordinare le attività di queste autorità
in collaborazione con l'industria europea di produzione delle macchine per costruzioni. Sono stati forniti in
particolare alle autorità doganali nazionali documenti orientativi per facilitare i controlli di conformità delle
macchine per costruzioni con la normativa UE sulla sicurezza e la tutela dell'ambiente.

Il nuovo «pacchetto sicurezza dei prodotti e vigilanza del mercato», proposto dalla Commissione il 13 febbraio 2013,
comprende diverse misure legislative e non legislative il cui scopo è facilitare lo scambio d'informazioni tra gli Stati
membri e rafforzare la cooperazione e il coordinamento in questo settore.

C 42 E / 622 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006189/13**

**to the Commission**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Importation of construction machinery that does not comply with EU directives

Construction equipment that does not comply with EU directives is imported on to the EU market.

In some cases, the machinery has been stolen and sold on; other cases involve vehicles crossing European borders
without the necessary permits.

This phenomenon is very damaging to European construction machinery companies, as it causes an imbalance in
terms of competition.

Despite the huge investments in research and development to make their products compliant, EU construction
machinery manufacturers are being penalised by those who do not play by the rules.

This situation also has consequences for jobs, for operators on building sites using machinery that may have
substandard safety systems, and for the environment (a non-compliant machine may not respect rules on exhaust and
noise emissions).

In view of the Commission’s recent work plans on market surveillance:

1. Is the Commission aware of this issue?

2. What does it plan to do to enable the public authorities to monitor the market efficiently and law enforcement
agencies to combat theft?

3. What kind of action does it plan to take to protect the European market, in a way that is compatible with
environmental protection?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 August 2013)_

The Commission is aware of the problems posed by the import of non-complying construction machinery. The
responsibility for market surveillance of machinery and controls at the external borders of the EU lies primarily with
the national market surveillance and customs authorities who carry out their duties in the framework of Regulation
(EC) No 765/2008. The Commission has taken several initiatives to improve and coordinate the work of these
authorities in cooperation with the European construction machinery industry. In particular, guidance documents
have been provided to the national customs authorities to facilitate checks on the conformity of construction
machinery with both the EU safety and environmental protection legislation.

The new Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package, proposed by the Commission on 13 February 2013,
includes several legislative and non-legislative measures intended to facilitate the exchange of information between
the Member States and to reinforce cooperation and coordination in this area.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 623

_(Versione italiana)_

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-006190/13**

**alla Commissione**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(3 giugno 2013)_

_Oggetto:_ ANAGRAFE macchine per costruzioni

Nel 2012 in Europa sono state acquistate circa 250 000 macchine per costruzioni (escavatori, pale, rulli,
vibrofinitrici, caricatori per la rottamazione, perforatrici).

Di questi mezzi, una volta che vengono venduti, non si sa praticamente più nulla: dove, come e per quanti anni
vengono utilizzati? Qual è il loro grado di usura? Rispondono alle norme dell'Unione europea?

Sia a livello nazionale che europeo non c'è infatti un'anagrafe unica di questi mezzi, esistono solo alcuni registri
nazionali parziali per alcune tipologie di prodotto (per i mezzi utilizzati su strada è prevista per esempio
l'immatricolazione mentre le attrezzature per il sollevamento sono registrate in maniera tale da poterle sottoporre a
verifiche periodiche).

Si tratta dunque di registrazioni che non tengono conto della stragrande maggioranza delle macchine per costruzioni
presenti in Europa, mezzi che vengono impegnati esclusivamente all'interno dei cantieri.

Non è quindi una sorpresa che in caso di calamità naturali le autorità preposte all'intervento abbiano difficoltà in
alcuni paesi a localizzare in tempi brevi i macchinari adeguati disponibili sul territorio.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. È a conoscenza del fatto che manca uno strumento adeguato per permettere d'individuare posizione,
caratteristiche, proprietà e tasso di obsolescenza delle macchine per costruzioni in tutto il ciclo di vita?

2. Pensa di realizzare anagrafi uniche a livello dei singoli Stati, armonizzate mediante regole dell'UE?

3. Pensa di istituire un'anagrafe unica obbligatoria delle macchine per le costruzioni a livello dell'UE?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione**

_(9 agosto 2013)_

Per quanto riguarda la registrazione delle attrezzature da costruzione, la Commissione richiama l'attenzione dell'on.
deputato su due possibilità:

—
regimi di registrazione volontaria aventi lo scopo di facilitare la prevenzione dei furti;

—
registrazione da parte del datore di lavoro dei risultati delle ispezioni di alcune categorie di attrezzature
considerate «attrezzature di lavoro» ai sensi della direttiva 2009/104/CE ( [1] ). Oltre ai requisiti minimi stabiliti
dall'art. 5 di tale direttiva, questi risultati saranno mantenuti a disposizione delle autorità nazionali competenti
interessate negli Stati membri. L'attuazione pratica può variare da uno Stato membro all'altro.

Nessuno di questi regimi di registrazione, laddove esistano, fornisce informazioni utili per organizzare la reazione alle
calamità naturali, dal momento che essi non indicano la disponibilità delle attrezzature in un momento determinato.
Considerando la complessità dell'utilizzazione delle attrezzature da costruzione (varietà dei tipi di attrezzature,
subappalti, locazioni, trasferimento delle attrezzature da una regione all'altra) la Commissione ritiene che la creazione
di un registro dell'UE per questa categoria di attrezzature sarebbe molto onerosa e potrebbe non produrre i risultati
desiderati.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Direttiva relativa ai requisiti minimi di sicurezza e di salute per l'uso delle attrezzature di lavoro da parte dei lavoratori durante il lavoro.

C 42 E / 624 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

Una soluzione potrebbe consistere probabilmente nella elaborazione di piani di predisposizione operativa da attivare
in caso di calamità naturali, comprendenti un elenco dei potenziali fornitori delle necessarie attrezzature nelle regioni
interessate come, ad esempio, i principali utilizzatori pubblici e privati di attrezzature da costruzione e le principali
società di locazione delle attrezzature. Queste iniziative, configurate su base nazionale e regionale, hanno maggiori
probabilità di essere efficaci ed efficienti quando sono adottate a livello del territorio di riferimento, in linea con il
principio di sussidiarietà.

13.2.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 42 E / 625

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006190/13**

**to the Commission**
**Elisabetta Gardini (PPE)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Construction machinery register

Around 250 000 construction machines (excavators, loaders, steamrollers, paver-finishers, scrap loaders, pneumatic
drills) were bought in Europe in 2012.

Practically nothing is known about this equipment after it has been sold: where, how and for how many years is it
used? What condition is it in? Does it comply with EU standards?

There is no single national or European register for this equipment; there are only partial national registers for certain
types of equipment (for example, equipment used on roads is registered, while lifting equipment is recorded so that it
can be regularly inspected).

These registers therefore do not cover the overwhelming majority of construction machines in Europe, namely
equipment that is used exclusively on building sites.

It therefore comes as no surprise that, in some countries, when natural disasters occur, the authorities responsible for
dealing with them have difficulty finding suitable machinery that is locally available at short notice.

1. Is the Commission aware of the fact that there is no suitable tool for identifying the location, features, properties
and degree of obsolescence of construction machines throughout their life cycle?

2. Is it planning to establish individual registers at Member State level, which are harmonised by means of EU
rules?

3. Is it planning to introduce a compulsory single EU register for construction machinery?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission**

_(9 August 2013)_

As far as the registration of construction equipment is concerned, the Commission would draw the attention of the
Honorable Member to two possibilities:

—
voluntary registration schemes intended to facilitate the prevention of theft

—
recording by the employer of the results of the inspection of certain categories of equipment qualifying as work
equipment under Directive 2009/104/EC ( [1] ). Further to the minimum requirements laid down in Article 5 of
this directive, these results shall be kept at the disposal of the competent national authorities concerned in the
Member States. The practical implementation can vary from one Member State to another.

Neither of these records, where they exist, provides information useful for response to natural disasters since they do
not indicate the availability of the equipment at a given time. Given the complexity of the use of construction
equipment (variety of types of equipment, sub-contracting, rental, transfer of equipment from one region to another)
the Commission considers that the setting up of an EU Register for this purpose would be very burdensome and
might not achieve the desired result.

A solution would probably consist in natural disaster preparedness plans including a survey of potential suppliers of
the necessary equipment in the regions concerned such as, for example, major public and private users of
construction equipment and major equipment rental companies. Taking into account their national or regional basis,
such initiatives are likely to be more effective and more efficient when taken at national or regional levels, in line with
the subsidiarity principle.

( **|** ⋅1∙ **|** ) Directive concerning the minimum safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work.

C 42 E / 626 EN Official Journal of the European Union 13.2.2014

_(English version)_

**Question for written answer E-006191/13**

**to the Commission**
**Marian Harkin (ALDE)**

_(3 June 2013)_

_Subject:_ Bus routes in Ireland

A situation has arisen in Ireland whereby a very significant number of bus operators — both private and partially
state-owned — receive government funding to allow citizens carrying a free, government-issued travel pass to access
their services.

The total cost to the Irish exchequer in 2012 was EUR 75.6 million, whereof EUR 7.411 million was given to private
operators.

Since 2011 the Irish government has frozen the scheme at 2010 expenditure levels.

At issue is the fact that they have also not considered any new applications for routes since 2010, and this now means
that private operators running services established since 2012 cannot avail themselves of this scheme.

We therefore have a situation in which some transport operators can access funding to allow certain persons to travel
free while others — sometimes even on the same route — cannot.

Is this circumstance in breach of any competition law of or any other EU legislation?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission**

_(26 July 2013)_

The Commission is not aware of any closure of the Free Travel Scheme to new applicants.

The Commission will request information on this subject from the Irish authorities and answer more fully once that
information has been received.

This information will be sent to the Honourable Member by the Commission service directly when available.

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