Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 16.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 345/32 |

---

P8\_TA(2018)0430

2018 UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland (COP24)

European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2018 on the 2018 UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland (COP24) (2018/2598(RSP))

(2020/C 345/07)

The European Parliament,

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC and to the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11), held in Paris, France from 30 November to 11 December 2015, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8), held in Doha, Qatar from 26 November to 8 December 2012, and to the adoption of an amendment to the Protocol establishing a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol starting on 1 January 2013 and ending on 31 December 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the opening for signature of the Paris Agreement at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York on 22 April 2016, and to the fact that it remained open until 21 April 2017, that 195 states have signed the Paris Agreement, and that 175 states have deposited instruments for its ratification, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23) to the UNFCCC, the 13th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP13), and the 2nd session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA2), held in Bonn, Germany, from 4 November to 16 November 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 July 2018 on EU climate diplomacy [(1)](#ntr1-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0001), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 4 October 2017 on the 2017 UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany (COP23) [(2)](#ntr2-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0002), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 20 July 2016 entitled ‘Accelerating Europe’s transition to a low-carbon economy’ (COM(2016)0500), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 February 2016, 30 September 2016, 23 June 2017 and 22 March 2018, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 October 2017, 26 February 2018 and 9 October 2018, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2017/1541 of 17 July 2017 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer [(3)](#ntr3-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0003), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the submission on 6 March 2015 by Latvia and the European Commission to the UNFCCC of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of the EU and its Member States (MS), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to its Synthesis Report and to the IPCC Special Report entitled ‘Global Warming of 1,5 oC’, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the eighth Synthesis Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) of November 2017, entitled ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2017’, as well as to its third Adaptation Gap Report for 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the International Energy Agency’s Global Energy and CO2 Status Report 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the ‘Statement on the state of the global climate in 2017’ by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) of March 2018 and to the 13th WMO ‘Greenhouse Gas Bulletin’ of 30 October 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Risks Report 2018’ [(4)](#ntr4-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0004), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the statement by the Green Growth Group of 5 March 2018, signed by 14 EU environment and climate ministers, on ‘Financing EU climate action — reinforcing climate spending and mainstreaming in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)’ [(5)](#ntr5-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0005), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the report published by the Commission Joint Research Centre in November 2017 entitled ‘CO2 — An operational anthropogenic CO2 emissions monitoring and verification support capacity’ [(6)](#ntr6-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0006), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Fairbanks Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arctic States at the 10th Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, held in Fairbanks, Alaska, 10-11 May 2017, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the first edition of the One Planet Summit held in Paris on 12 December 2017 and the 12 commitments adopted thereat, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si’, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Meseberg Declaration of 19 June 2018, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Rules 128(5) and 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| A. | whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016 with 181 of the 197 Parties to the Convention having deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the UN (as of 11 October 2018); |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| B. | whereas on 6 March 2015, the EU submitted the INDC of the EU and its Member States to the UNFCCC, thus committing itself to a binding target of at least a 40 % domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| C. | whereas the commitments made so far by the signatories to the Paris Agreement will not be sufficient to achieve the common goal; whereas the current Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) submitted by the EU and its Member States is also not in line with the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and needs therefore to be revised; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| D. | whereas essential elements of EU legislation contributing to fulfilling the EU NDC, in particular the Renewable Energy Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive, have been concluded with an increased level of ambition, bringing the EU to a GHG emissions reduction target of at least 45 % by 2030; whereas a 45 % reduction in the EU by 2030 does not yet make a sufficient contribution to attaining the goals of the Paris Agreement and the mid-century goal of net-zero emissions; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| E. | whereas transparency in measuring emissions is key to achieving significant progress in reducing GHG emissions globally in a just manner; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| F. | whereas, after three years in which the figures remained stationary, 2017 saw an increase in global and EU carbon emissions; whereas this increase is spread unevenly across the world; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| G. | whereas the high occurrence of extreme weather events and temperature records in 2017 increases the urgency of global climate action; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| H. | whereas an ambitious climate mitigation policy can create growth and jobs; whereas, however, some specific sectors are vulnerable to carbon leakage if the ambition is not comparable in other markets; whereas appropriate protection against carbon leakage is therefore necessary to protect jobs in these specific sectors; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I. | whereas climate change is a multiplier of a number of other threats that disproportionately affect developing countries; whereas droughts and other adverse weather events degrade and destroy resources on which poor people directly depend for their livelihoods and provoke increased competition for the remaining resources, contributing to humanitarian crises and to tension, forced displacement, radicalisation and conflicts; whereas there is evidence that climate change has played a role in unrest and the spread of violence in the Middle East, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, with repercussions far beyond; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| J. | whereas the IPCC’s 1,5 oC report further demonstrates that the impacts of such a temperature increase are likely to be significantly less severe than those of a 2 oC increase; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| K. | whereas the long-term success of climate change mitigation requires far stronger action, in particular by developed countries, to get out of the carbon economy and to foster climate-smart growth, including in developing countries; whereas continuous efforts must be made to strengthen financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| L. | whereas the failure of major emitters to reduce their GHG emissions in line with the action required to limit the global average temperature rise to 1,5 oC or 2 oC exacerbates the already enormous scale and costs of the necessary adaptation to climate change, with particularly serious consequences for least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS); whereas all initiatives by LDCs and SIDS to produce risk information and early warnings should be supported; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| M. | whereas the growing gap between adaptation needs and efforts must be reversed urgently through much stronger mitigation and adaptation measures; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| N. | whereas it is untenable to let adaptation costs lie where they fall and those bearing the main responsibility for GHG emissions must shoulder most of the global burden; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| O. | whereas Article 7 of the Paris Agreement sets a global goal for adaptation and this goal must now be operationalised without further delay; whereas national adaptation plans (NAPs) should play an important role; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| P. | whereas forests contribute substantially to climate change mitigation and adaptation; whereas deforestation accounts for nearly 20 % of global GHG emissions and is driven in particular by expanding industrial production of livestock, soy and palm oil, including for the EU market; whereas the EU should reduce its indirect contribution to deforestation (‘embodied deforestation’), for which it bears a responsibility; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Q. | whereas land is a scarce resource and its use for production of conventional and first-generation biofuel feedstock can aggravate food insecurity and destroy the livelihoods of poor people in developing countries, in particular through land grabs, forced displacement, pollution and violations of indigenous peoples’ rights; whereas carbon offsetting and reforestation schemes can also cause such damage if they are not properly designed and implemented; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. | Recalls that climate change, as a cause and multiplier of other risks, is one of the most pressing challenges facing humanity, and that all states and players worldwide need to do their utmost to fight it through strong individual action; underlines also that timely international cooperation, solidarity and consistent and persistent commitment to joint action constitute the only solution to fulfilling the collective responsibility of preserving the entire planet and its biodiversity for current and future generations; stresses that the EU is ready to continue its leading role in this global effort, while at the same time ensuring sustainable low-GHG economic development that provides for energy security, a competitive advantage for European industries and job creation; |

Scientific basis for climate action

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2. | Points out that the WMO has confirmed that 2015, 2016 and 2017 were the three warmest years on record, leading to a very pronounced Arctic warmth that will have long-lasting repercussions on overall sea levels and weather patterns worldwide; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 3. | Considers that the profound and most likely irreversible impacts of a 2 oC rise in global temperatures might be avoided if the more ambitious target of 1,5 oC is pursued, but this would require rising global GHG emissions to fall to net zero by 2050 at the latest; underlines that the technological solutions needed are available and are becoming increasingly cost-competitive, and that all EU policies should be closely aligned with the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals and regularly reviewed to keep them in line with these objectives; looks forward, therefore, to the findings of the 2018 IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1,5 oC above pre-industrial levels; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 4. | Underlines that, according to the WHO, climate change affects the social and environmental determinants of health — clean air, safe drinking water, sufficient food and secure shelter — and that between 2030 and 2050 250 000 additional deaths per year are expected from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress; notes that extremely high air temperatures are direct contributors to deaths from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, particularly among elderly people; recognises that climate change is a catalyst for conflicts; considers that full implementation of the Paris Agreement commitments would greatly contribute to enhancing European and international security and peace; |

Paris Agreement ratification and implementation of commitments

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 5. | Welcomes the unprecedented pace of ratification of the Paris Agreement, as well as the global mobilisation and the determination of both state and non-state actors to ensure its full and rapid implementation, as expressed in the commitments made at major global events such as the 2017 North American Climate Summit held in Chicago on 4-6 December 2017, the One Planet Summit held in Paris on 12 December 2017 and the Global Climate Action Summit held in San Francisco on 12-14 September 2018; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 6. | Stresses that current NDCs would only limit global warming to a temperature rise of about 3,2 oC [(7)](#ntr7-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0007) and would not even come close to 2 oC; calls on all Parties to contribute constructively to the process to be put in place towards 2020 when NDCs need to be updated and to ensure that their NDCs are in line with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement to keep the global temperature rise to well below 2 oC above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the increase even further to 1,5 oC; acknowledges that current pledges, including the one submitted by the Union and its Member States, are insufficient to achieve the goals of the Agreement; stresses, therefore, that global GHG emissions should reach their peak as soon as possible and that all parties, especially the EU and all G20 nations, must step up their efforts and update their NDCs by 2020, following the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue aimed at closing the remaining gap towards that goal; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 7. | Considers that, should other major economies fail to make commitments comparable with those of the EU on GHG emission reductions, it will be necessary to maintain carbon leakage provisions, particularly those aimed at sectors with a high carbon leakage risk, in order to ensure the global competitiveness of European industry; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 8. | Regrets that in most third countries which have made commitments under the Paris Agreement the debate on increasing their contributions is starting only very slowly; asks, therefore, that the Commission streamline the EU’s considerations on increasing its commitment, with stronger efforts to motivate other partners to do the same; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 9. | Stresses the importance of an ambitious climate policy for the EU to act as a credible and reliable partner globally, of maintaining the EU’s global climate leadership, and of adherence to the Paris Agreement; welcomes the agreement by the European Parliament and the Council to raise the targets for renewables and energy efficiency to 32 % and 32,5 % respectively by 2030, which will result in GHG emission reductions of over 45 % by 2030; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s comments on updating the EU’s NDC to take this higher ambition into account and increase its 2030 emissions reduction target; calls on the Commission to prepare, by the end of 2018, an ambitious mid-century zero emissions strategy for the EU, providing a cost-efficient pathway towards reaching the net-zero emissions goal adopted in the Paris Agreement and a net-zero carbon economy in the Union by 2050 at the latest, in line with a Union fair share of the remaining global carbon budget; supports an update of the Union’s NDC with an economy-wide target of 55 % domestic GHG emission reductions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 10. | Welcomes the announcement by the UN Secretary-General regarding the organisation of a Climate Summit in September 2019 on the sidelines of the 74th General Assembly, in order to accelerate climate action to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and in particular to promote raising the ambition of climate commitments; calls on the EU and its Member States to support this effort by showing engagement and political will to enhance their own commitments, and to advocate strong contributions by other Parties; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 11. | Regrets the announcement by US President Donald Trump of his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, and consider this a step backwards; expresses its satisfaction that all major Parties have confirmed their commitment to the Paris Agreement since President Trump’s announcement; strongly welcomes the continued mobilisation for climate action of major US states, cities, universities and other non-state actors under the ‘we are still in’ campaign; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 12. | Insists that, in particular after President Trump’s announcement, it is important to have appropriate provisions in place against carbon leakage and to ensure that the best performers get free allowances as agreed in the ETS Directive; asks the Commission to examine the effectiveness and legality of additional measures to protect industries at risk of carbon leakage, for example a carbon border tax adjustment and consumption charge, in particular in respect of products coming from countries that do not fulfil their commitments under the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 13. | Welcomes the entry into force of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on 1 January 2019, with 27 Parties having so far deposited their instruments of ratification, including seven Member States; calls upon all Parties to the Montreal Protocol, especially those Member States which have not yet submitted their instruments of ratification, to take all necessary steps towards its swift ratification as a necessary contribution to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and meeting the mid-term and long-term climate and energy targets; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 14. | Welcomes the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol by all the Member States and the deposition of the joint Union ratification on 21 December 2017; considers that this step will provide important negotiating leverage for the successful conclusion of the 2018 climate negotiations and, thanks to collaborative efforts, will effectively reduce greenhouse emissions; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 15. | Underlines that the pre-2020 implementation and ambition were a key point during the COP23 negotiations; welcomes the decision to hold two stocktaking exercises during the COPs in 2018 and 2019; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prepare contributions on emissions reductions up to 2020 to be presented at the pre-2020 stocktake at COP24; considers these as important steps towards the goal of increasing ambition for the post-2020 period by all Parties, and thus looks forward to the outcome of the first stocktaking exercise in Katowice, which should take the form of a COP Decision reconfirming the commitment to increase the ambition of the Parties’ 2030 NDCs by 2020 in order to align them with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 16. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to use communication strategies and activities to increase public and political support for climate action and to raise awareness of the co-benefits of fighting climate change, such as improved air quality and public health, the conservation of natural resources, economic growth and higher employment, increased energy security and reduced energy import costs, as well as advantages in international competition through innovation and technological development; underlines that attention should also be drawn to the interconnections between climate change and social injustice, migration, instabilities and poverty, and to the fact that global climate action can largely contribute to resolving these issues; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 17. | Emphasises the synergies that exist between the Paris Agreement, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (Finance for Development), as well as with other Rio Conventions, these representing important and interlinked steps forward in ensuring that poverty eradication and sustainable development can be tackled simultaneously; |

COP24 in Katowice

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 18. | Recognises the achievement of the COP22 and COP23 Presidencies in jointly preparing the design of the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue which was broadly approved by the Parties and launched in January 2018; looks forward to its first results during COP24 and the political conclusions thereafter to bring global collective ambition into line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement by 2020; appreciates that the Talanoa Dialogue is not limited to discussions among national governments, but allows a range of stakeholders, including regions and cities and their elected representatives, to bring key climate action issues to the attention of national and global policymakers; welcomes the Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues and is looking forward to further dialogues being held in Europe; looks forward to the input from non-state actors and calls on all Parties to submit their contributions in a timely manner in order to facilitate the political discussions in Katowice; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 19. | Recognises further that in spite of all the progress made on the Paris Action Work Programme (the Rulebook) during COP23, significant challenges lie ahead in order to complete it and reach concrete decisions at COP24; calls for all the necessary preparatory work to be carried out ahead of the summit in order to finalise the Rulebook, which is paramount to the timely implementation of the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 20. | Supports a Rulebook requiring a high level of transparency and robust binding rules for all Parties in order to accurately measure progress and build further trust among the Parties involved in the international process; is concerned that some Parties remain reluctant to work towards full transparency in measuring emissions; calls on all the major economies to take the lead in negotiations on the Rulebook and to promote binding requirements for monitoring and verification systems, including timely and reliable greenhouse gas emission data and estimates; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 21. | Stresses the importance of complementing the Rulebook with observation-based atmospheric data to increase the reliability and accuracy of reporting; calls on the Commission, the European Space Agency (ESA), the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), the Integrated Carbon Observation System (ICOS) European research infrastructure, the national inventory agencies and research centres and other key players to develop operational capacity that can produce anthropogenic emission information using satellite data and meeting the necessary requirements, including a constellation of satellites; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 22. | Underlines the importance of the EU speaking with a single and unified voice at COP24 in Katowice in order to ensure its political power and credibility; urges all Member States to support the EU mandate in the negotiations and in bilateral meetings with other actors; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 23. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to bring climate action on to the agenda of important international fora within the UN, and of bodies such as the G7 and G20, and to seek multilateral partnerships on specific issues concerning the implementation of the Paris Agreement and of the SDGs; |

Openness, inclusiveness and transparency

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 24. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain and strengthen strategic partnerships with developed countries and emerging economies so as to establish a group of climate leaders in the next few years, and to show greater solidarity towards vulnerable states; supports sustained and active EU engagement within the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) and with its member countries in order to give visibility to their determination to achieve meaningful implementation of the Paris Agreement through the conclusion of a robust Rulebook in 2018 and a successful Talanoa Dialogue at COP24; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 25. | Stresses that the effective participation of all parties is needed to pursue the objective of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to 1,5 oC, which in turn requires that the issue of vested or conflicting interests be addressed; reiterates, in this context, its support for the initiative taken by governments representing the majority of the world’s population to introduce a specific conflicts-of-interest policy within the UNFCCC; calls on the Commission and the Member States to engage constructively in that process without compromising the aims and objectives of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 26. | Underlines that 80 % of people displaced by climate change are women, who are in general more impacted by climate change than men yet bear a greater burden while not being as involved in key decision-making on climate action; stresses therefore that women’s empowerment, as well as their full and equal participation and leadership in international forums, such as the UNFCCC, and national, regional and local climate action, are vital for the success and effectiveness of such action; calls on the EU and the Member States to mainstream the gender perspective into climate policies, and to promote the participation of indigenous women and women’s rights defenders within the UNFCC framework; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 27. | Welcomes the COP23 decision for the Adaptation Fund to continue to serve the Paris Agreement; recognises the significance of the Fund for those communities most vulnerable to climate change, and therefore welcomes the new pledges of USD 93 million made by Member States to the Fund; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 28. | Recognises that the EU and its Member States are the largest provider of public climate finance; expresses concern that the actual pledges by developed countries fall far short of their collective goal of USD 100 billion per year; stresses the importance of all developed Parties meeting their contributions to this goal, as long-term financing is decisive in enabling developing countries to fulfil their adaptation and mitigation targets; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 29. | Stresses that the EU’s budget should be consistent with its international commitments on sustainable development and with its mid- and long-term climate and energy targets, and should not be counterproductive to these targets or hamper their implementation; notes with concern that the target of 20 % of total EU spending dedicated to climate action is likely to be missed and calls therefore for corrective action; underlines further that climate and energy targets should be at the heart of the political discussions on the post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from the outset in order to ensure that the resources required to achieve them will be in place; recalls its position to increase current climate-related spending from 20 % to 30 % as soon as possible and at the latest by 2027; considers that all remaining MFF spending should be Paris-compliant and not counterproductive to climate efforts; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 30. | Calls for the establishment of a dedicated and automatic EU public finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support towards delivering the EU’s fair share of the USD 100 billion international climate finance goal; |

Role of non-state actors

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 31. | Recalls that the Paris Agreement recognises the important role played by multilevel governance in climate policies and the need to engage with regions, cities and non-state actors; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 32. | Expresses its satisfaction with the growing global mobilisation of an ever-broader range of non-state actors committed to climate action with concrete and measurable deliverables; highlights the critical role of civil society, the private sector and sub-state governments in pressurising and driving public opinion and state action; calls on the EU, the Member States and all Parties to stimulate, facilitate and engage in completely transparent dialogue with non-state actors, who increasingly become frontrunners in the fight against climate change, as well as with sub-national actors, in particular where EU relations with national governments in the field of climate policy have deteriorated; praises, in this light, the pledge made during COP23 by 25 pioneering cities, representing 150 million citizens, to become net-zero emissions cities by 2050; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 33. | Calls on the Commission to further intensify its relations with local and regional authorities, to enhance thematic and sectoral cooperation between cities and regions both within and outside the EU, to develop adaptation and resilience initiatives, and to strengthen sustainable development models and emission reduction plans in key sectors such as energy, industry, technology, agriculture and transport in both urban and rural areas, e.g. through twinning programmes, through the International Urban Cooperation programme, through support for platforms such as the Covenant of Mayors and by building new fora for exchanging best practice; calls on the EU and the Member States to support efforts by regional and local actors to introduce regionally and locally determined contributions (similar to NDCs) where climate ambition can be increased through this process; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 34. | Encourages the Commission to lay down concrete greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 2050 for all sectors in its proposal for the EU long-term mid-century net-zero emission strategy, and to set out a clear path how to reach these targets, including concrete milestones for 2035, 2040 and 2045; calls on the Commission to include proposals on how to enhance removals by sinks in line with the Paris Agreement, so as to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions within the EU by 2050 at the latest, and to go into negative emissions soon thereafter; calls for this strategy to ensure a fair distribution of effort between sectors, to include a mechanism to incorporate the results of the five-yearly global stocktake, and to take into account the findings of the upcoming IPCC Special Report, the recommendations and positions of the European Parliament, and the views of non-state actors such as local and regional authorities, civil society and the private sector; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 35. | Underlines that the EU’s long-term strategy should be viewed as an opportunity to set out strategic future priorities for a modern, green EU economy that makes full use of the potential of technological progress, that maintains a high level of social security as well as high consumer standards, and that will be beneficial for industry and civil society, particularly in the long run; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 36. | Encourages the Commission and the Member States to develop strategies and programmes to address the transition within sectors caused by decarbonisation and by technological developments, and to enable the exchange of knowledge and good practices between affected regions, workers and businesses, as well as to provide support to regions and workers to help them prepare for structural changes, to actively seek new economic potential and to develop strategic location policies in order to ensure a just transition to a net-zero emission economy in Europe; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 37. | Considers that in order to ensure the consistency of NDCs with the economy-wide commitments required by the Paris Agreement, Parties should be encouraged to include emissions from international shipping and aviation and to agree and implement measures at international, regional and national level to address emissions from these sectors; |

Comprehensive efforts by all sectors

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 38. | Welcomes the continued development of emissions trading systems globally and specifically the launch in December 2017 of the initial phase of the Chinese nationwide carbon trading scheme covering the power sector; welcomes also the agreement on the linking of the EU ETS and the Swiss system signed at the end of 2017, and encourages the Commission to further explore such linkages and other forms of cooperation with the carbon markets of third states and regions, as well as to stimulate the setting-up of further carbon markets and other carbon pricing mechanisms that will contribute to reducing global emissions, bring extra efficiencies and cost savings, and reduce the risk of carbon leakage by creating a global level playing field; calls on the Commission to establish safeguards to ensure that any linkage with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the Union’s domestic greenhouse gas emission commitments; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 39. | Regrets that transport is the only sector in which emissions have grown since 1990; stresses that this is not compatible with long-term sustainable development, which instead requires reductions in emissions from all sectors of society at a greater and faster rate; recalls that the transport sector will need to be fully decarbonised by 2050; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 40. | Expresses its strong disappointment that the Commission’s proposal on post-2020 CO2 emissions standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles is not in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 41. | Expresses concern about the level of ambition of ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), given the ongoing work on the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) meant to implement the scheme from 2019; strongly opposes the efforts to impose CORSIA on flights within Europe, overriding EU laws and independence in decision-making; stresses that further dilution of the draft CORSIA SARPs is unacceptable; calls on the Commission and the Member States to do their utmost in strengthening CORSIA’s provisions and hence its future impact; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 42. | Recalls Regulation (EU) 2017/2392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2017 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to implement a global market-based measure from 2021 [(8)](#ntr8-C_2020345EN.01003201-E0008), and in particular its Article 1(7) which clearly states that, as co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council are the sole institutions to decide on any future amendment to the ETS Directive; calls on the Member States, in the spirit of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, to submit a formal reservation with respect to the CORSIA SARPs, stating that the implementation of CORSIA and participation in its voluntary phases require the prior agreement of the Council and the European Parliament; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 43. | Recalls that another extension of the derogation for extra-EEA flights to be exempt from the EU ETS was granted by the Union until 2024 in order to facilitate the ICAO process for a global solution to aviation emissions; stresses, however, that any further amendment of legislation should only be undertaken if it is consistent with the Union’s economy-wide greenhouse gas emission reduction commitment, which does not envisage the use of offset credits after 2020; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 44. | Welcomes the fact that, in aviation, the EU ETS has already delivered around 100 million tonnes of CO2 reductions/offsets; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 45. | Recalls that CO2 emissions from shipping are projected to increase by 50 % to 250 % in the period to 2050 and that technical means of substantially reducing emissions from ships already exist; welcomes the agreement on the initial IMO Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships during the 72nd session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee in April 2018, as a first step for the sector to contribute to the realisation of the temperature goal in the Paris Agreement; calls on the IMO to agree rapidly on the new mandatory emissions reduction measures necessary to deliver on the targets, and stresses the importance and urgency of implementing those before 2023; underlines that further measures and action are needed to address maritime emissions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to closely monitor the impact and implementation of the IMO agreement and to consider additional EU action to ensure that GHG emissions from ships are reduced in line with the temperature target in the Paris Agreement; urges the Commission to include international shipping in its forthcoming 2050 decarbonisation strategy to guide EU investment decisions into zero carbon fuels and propulsion technologies for shipping; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 46. | Notes that deforestation and forest degradation are responsible for 20 % of global GHG emissions; underlines the important role of forests and wetlands in climate mitigation as they provide a high carbon capture potential; points out that natural carbon sinks and reservoirs in the EU and globally should be conserved and enhanced over the long term, and that the overall size of global forests, as well as their adaptive capacities and resilience to climate change, need to be further increased in order to reach the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement; emphasises further the need for mitigation efforts focused on the tropical forest sector, starting with addressing the underlying causes of forest loss and climate change; |

Climate resilience through adaptation

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 47. | Calls on the Commission to revise the EU adaptation strategy, as adaptation action is an inevitable necessity for all countries if they are to minimise the negative effects of climate change and make full use of the opportunities for climate-resilient growth and sustainable development; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 48. | Views the operationalisation of the local communities and indigenous peoples platform as one of the successes of COP23 and as another important step in realising the Paris decisions; believes that the platform will facilitate the effective exchange of experiences and best practices in adaptation efforts and strategies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 49. | Stresses the need to develop public, transparent and user-friendly systems and tools to keep track of the progress and effectiveness of national adaptation plans and actions; |

Climate diplomacy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 50. | Strongly supports the continuation and further strengthening of the Union’s political outreach and climate diplomacy, which is essential for raising the profile of climate action in partner countries and global public opinion; calls for human and financial resources in the EEAS and the Commission to be allocated in a manner which better reflects the strong commitment to and increased engagement in climate diplomacy; insists on the need to develop a comprehensive strategy for EU climate diplomacy and to integrate climate into all fields of EU external action, including trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and security and defence; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 51. | Emphasises the deepening implications of climate change for international security and regional stability stemming from environmental degradation, loss of livelihood, climate-induced displacement of people and associated forms of unrest where climate change can often be regarded as a threat multiplier; urges the EU and the Member States, therefore, to work with their partners around the world to better understand, integrate, anticipate and manage the destabilising effects of climate change; stresses accordingly the importance of mainstreaming climate diplomacy in the EU’s conflict prevention policies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 52. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to launch high-ambition alliances to lead by example in the mainstreaming of climate action across different foreign policy issues, including trade, international migration, the reform of international financial institutions and peace and security; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 53. | Calls on the Commission to integrate the climate change dimension into international trade and investment agreements by making the ratification and implementation of the Paris Agreement a condition for future trade agreements; invites the Commission to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the consistency of the existing agreements with the Paris Agreement; |

Industry and competitiveness

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 54. | Emphasises that climate change is above all a societal challenge and that the fight against it should therefore remain one of the guiding principles of EU policies and actions, including in the field of industry, energy, research and digital technologies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 55. | Welcomes the efforts of, and the progress made so far by, European citizens, businesses and industry to meet the obligations of the Paris Agreement; encourages them to set higher ambitions and to take full advantage of the opportunities arising from the Paris Agreement, keeping pace with technological developments; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 56. | Stresses that a stable and predictable legal framework and clear policy signals at both EU and global level facilitate and enhance climate-related investment; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the legislative proposals under the ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ Package for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness, empowering citizens, and setting targets that are in line with EU commitments under the Paris Agreement and its five-year revision mechanism; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 57. | Welcomes the fact that several countries hosting major competitors of the EU’s energy-intensive industries have introduced carbon trading or other pricing mechanisms; encourages other countries to follow suit; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 58. | Stresses the importance of increasing the number of quality jobs and skilled workers in EU industry to drive its innovation and sustainable transition; calls for a holistic and inclusive process to develop a vision for an alternative business model in coal and carbon-intensive regions with a high share of workers in carbon-dependent sectors, so as to facilitate a sustainable transformation for thriving industries and services while recognising the patrimony and heritage and available workforce skills; underlines the important role of Member States in speeding up reforms that can lead to a just transition of the workforce in those regions; recalls that additional EU financial support plays an indispensable role in this regard; |

Energy policy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 59. | Recalls that investment in renewable energy in the EU is decreasing; stresses, therefore, the importance of renewable energy and energy efficiency for reducing emissions, as well as for energy security and preventing and alleviating energy poverty in order to protect and help vulnerable and poor households; calls for the global promotion of energy efficiency and energy-saving measures and the development of renewables and their effective deployment (e.g. by stimulating self-production and consumption of renewable energy sources); |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 60. | Recalls that prioritisation of energy efficiency, including through the energy efficiency first principle, and global leadership in renewables are two of the main goals of the EU’s Energy Union; stresses the importance of ambitious legislation under the Clean Energy Package for the achievement of those goals, as well as of the upcoming mid-century strategy for the effective implementation in EU policies of commitments under the Paris Agreement to contain the rise in average global temperatures to well below 2 oC, with the further aim of keeping it below 1,5 oC; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 61. | Underlines the importance of developing energy storage technologies, smart grids and demand response that will contribute to strengthening the effective deployment of renewable energy in power generation and the household heating and cooling sectors; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 62. | Calls on the EU to push the international community to adopt without delay concrete measures, including a timetable, for progressively phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies which distort competition, discourage international cooperation and hinder innovation; |

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 63. | Underlines the fact that continued and reinforced research and innovation in the areas of climate change mitigation, adaptation policies, resource efficiency, sustainable low-emission and zero-emission technologies, the sustainable use of secondary raw material (‘circular economy’) and data collection on climate change hold the key to fighting climate change in a cost-effective way and contribute to reducing dependence on fossil fuels; calls, therefore, for global commitments to boost and focus investment in these areas; stresses the need to prioritise funding for sustainable energy projects, under the new Horizon Europe programme, given the Union’s commitments within the Energy Union and under the Paris Agreement; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 64. | Stresses that the SDGs represent a radical change in international policies on development cooperation and that the EU has committed to implementing them in both its internal and external policies; emphasises, in line with the external dimension of the SDGs, the need to explore different methods to assist developing countries and emerging economies in their energy transition through, inter alia, capacity-building measures, help in reducing the capital costs of renewables and energy-efficiency projects, technology transfer and solutions for the development of smart cities and remote and rural communities, thus helping them deliver on their commitments under the Paris Agreement; welcomes, in this respect, the newly established European Fund for Sustainable Development; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 65. | Recalls that research, innovation and competitiveness are among the five pillars of the EU’s Energy Union strategy; notes that the EU is determined to remain a global leader in these fields, while at the same time developing close scientific cooperation with international partners; stresses the importance of building and maintaining a strong innovation capacity in both developed and emerging countries for the deployment of clean and sustainable energy technologies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 66. | Recalls the fundamental role of digital technologies in supporting the energy transition and, in particular, improving energy efficiency and savings; stresses the climate benefits that the digitalisation of European industry can bring through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of material intensity, and by enhancing the current workforce; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 67. | Strongly believes that the Union space programmes should be designed in such a way as to ensure that they contribute to the fight against climate change and to mitigation strategies; recalls in this context the particular role of the Copernicus system and the need to ensure that it includes a CO2 monitoring service; stresses the importance of maintaining the free, full and open data policy, since this is essential for the scientific community and underpins international cooperation in this field; |

Climate action in developing countries

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 68. | Insists on the need to keep open the possibility of limiting global warming to 1,5 oC and on the duty of major emitters, including the EU, to rapidly ramp up their mitigation efforts, which can generate significant sustainable development co-benefits, as well as to substantially increase their support for climate action in developing countries; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 69. | Underlines the importance of climate-informed decision-making and of supporting this through the improvement of climate services of special relevance to developing countries; calls for this to be made a significant objective of EU-funded research and for strong EU efforts to facilitate technology transfer to developing countries; calls for a WTO declaration on intellectual property rights and climate change, comparable to that on the TRIPS agreement and public health adopted in Doha in 2001; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 70. | Recalls the developed countries’ commitment to provide new and additional financing for climate action in developing countries reaching USD 100 billion per year by 2020; recognises the need for a continued increase in, and stricter accounting of, the financial effort, including through paying attention to the requirement that the financing be new and additional and through only including the grant equivalents of loans, calculated using the method agreed in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee; recommends that EU Member States follow the practices developed by the Commission for the use of the Rio markers for official development assistance with a climate objective; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 71. | Calls on the EU to comply with the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD), as enshrined in Article 208 of the TFEU, as it constitutes a fundamental aspect of the EU’s contribution to the Paris Agreement; calls, therefore, for the EU to ensure consistency between its development, trade, agriculture, energy and climate policies; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 72. | Recalls that climate change has both direct and indirect effects on agricultural productivity; reiterates its call for a transformative change in the way that we produce and consume food towards agro-ecological practices, in line with the conclusions of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) and the recommendations of the UN special rapporteur on the right to food; commends the initiatives taken by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to scale up agro-ecology in order to achieve the SDGs; urges the EU and its Member States to frame their development policy along these lines, including in the agriculture investment window of the EFSD; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 73. | Underlines that the ongoing increase in transport and trade-related CO2 emissions undermines the effectiveness of the EU’s climate change strategy; notes that promotion of export-led development, including through export-oriented industrial agriculture, is difficult to reconcile with the climate change mitigation imperative; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 74. | Believes that the EU should look into ways of introducing controls on European trade in and consumption of forest-risk commodities such as soy, palm oil, eucalyptus, beef, leather and cocoa, taking into account the lessons learned from the FLEGT Action Plan and the Timber Regulation and from the EU measures to regulate other supply chains in order to end or prevent serious harm; notes that the keys to the success of such efforts include enforcing traceability and mandatory due diligence requirements throughout the supply chain; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 75. | Calls on the European Investment Bank to put a rapid end to lending to fossil fuel projects and asks the EU Member States to end all export credit guarantees to fossil fuel projects; calls for specific public guarantees in favour of green investments, labels and fiscal advantages for green investment funds and for issuing green bonds; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 76. | Stresses the importance of operationalising the global goal on adaptation and of mobilising major new funds for adaptation in developing countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to commit to a significant increase in the adaptation finance they provide; recognises the need for progress also on the issue of loss and damage, for which additional resources should be raised through innovative sources of public finance using the Warsaw International Mechanism; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 77. | Emphasises the need for bottom-up, local-led projects that reach particularly vulnerable people and communities; notes that the current emphasis on blending operations and guarantees to facilitate private investment favours major-scale projects and calls for an appropriate balance in the use of assistance funds; |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 78. | Notes that the aviation industry relies heavily on carbon offsets and that forest offsets are difficult to measure and impossible to guarantee; stresses the need to ensure that the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and other projects in no way harm food security, land rights, indigenous peoples’ rights or biodiversity, and that the principle of free prior informed consent is respected; |

Role of the European Parliament

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 79. | Believes, since it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as co-legislator, that it needs to be well integrated into the EU delegation; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings in Katowice and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents from the moment negotiations begin; |

o

o o

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 80. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties. |

---

---

[Top](#document1)