Source: EURLEX
Language: en
Format: md

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| European flag | Official Journal  of the European Union | EN  C series |

---

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | C/2024/4187 | 2.8.2024 |

P9\_TA(2023)0468

EU-US relations

European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2023 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-US relations (2023/2126(INI))

(C/2024/4187)

The European Parliament,

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 on a new EU-US agenda for global change (JOIN(2020)0022), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on EU-US relations of 7 December 2020, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint statement by President von der Leyen and US President Biden of 10 March 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue of 17 June 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the NATO Vilnius summit that took place on 11 and 12 July 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Final Assessment Report of the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure of 29 June 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the US-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council, issued on 31 May 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Commission recommendation of 14 June 2023 for a Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations of an agreement with the United States of America on strengthening international supply chains of critical minerals (COM(2023)0327), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the 9th US-EU Energy Council joint statement issued on 7 February 2022 and the 10th US-EU Energy Council joint statement issued on 4 April 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2023)0160), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint statement between the European Commission and the United States on European Energy Security of 25 March 2022, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the fifth high-level meeting of the EU-US Dialogue on China and the fourth meeting of the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific on 22 June 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the third joint EU-NATO declaration signed on 10 January 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Administrative Arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the Department of Defense of the United States of America signed on 26 April 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/750 of 6 May 2021 on the participation of the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility [(1)](#ntr1-C_202404187EN.000101-E0001), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Joint Communication on an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence adopted on 10 March 2023, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence adopted in March 2022, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections [(2)](#ntr2-C_202404187EN.000101-E0002), its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership [(3)](#ntr3-C_202404187EN.000101-E0003), its resolution of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-US relations [(4)](#ntr4-C_202404187EN.000101-E0004) and its resolution of 6 October 2021 on the future of EU-US relations [(5)](#ntr5-C_202404187EN.000101-E0005), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2022 [(6)](#ntr6-C_202404187EN.000101-E0006), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2022 [(7)](#ntr7-C_202404187EN.000101-E0007), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0372/2023), |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| A. | whereas the US is the EU’s most important ally; whereas the transatlantic partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historic links and shared values such as freedom, democracy, the promotion of peace and stability, human dignity and the rule of law, and on common objectives such as prosperity, open and integrated economies, social progress and inclusion, sustainable development and the peaceful resolution of conflict; whereas a strong and dynamic transatlantic cooperation based on the principles of a partnership in leadership and responsibility is necessary in today’s changing and unpredictable geopolitical context to weather the storm of multiple crises including war, the fragile post-pandemic economic recovery, climate change, migration challenges, critical infrastructure protection, and raw materials becoming scarcer and generally negatively affecting global supply chains, as well as to defend democracy against rising authoritarianism around the world; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| B. | whereas the multilateral rule-based order is taking new shape and some of the former alliances are beginning to re-emerge, which calls for greater public diplomacy on both sides of the Atlantic; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| C. | whereas the transatlantic partnership and close cooperation in foreign and security affairs is instrumental in asserting and enhancing the principles of international law, the rules-based international order and multilateral cooperation in the face of the multiple threats and crises confronting both sides of the Atlantic, in particular Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the growing multi-dimensional threat posed by a more assertive stance from China, as well as in addressing shared global challenges such as economic stability and growth, the fight against climate change, the promotion of the digital transformation, global health and the fight against terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| D. | whereas the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has become the key vehicle for advancing transatlantic dialogue and provides an effective, high-level platform to coordinate approaches to key global trade, economic and technological issues, but also to the fight against disinformation and support for Ukraine; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| E. | whereas the US, with its bipartisan support for Ukraine, should continue showing true solidarity with Ukraine while continuing to work closely with the EU as we work together to protect peace, security and democracy on the European continent, as well as the principles of international law, the rules-based international order and the UN Charter; whereas we hope that the US’s strong support for Ukraine will continue, notwithstanding an internal political divide in the US; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| F. | whereas, while pursuing transatlantic cooperation in areas of shared interest, the EU should also foster its strategic sovereignty and, where necessary, autonomy in political, defence, economic and trade relations; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| G. | whereas standing together against the brutality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and helping Ukraine win this war, will be even more crucial in the months to come and must remain a joint transatlantic commitment regardless of upcoming political developments; whereas the EU and the US, together with NATO and our like-minded partners around the globe, will continue to support Ukraine and to address Ukraine’s needs for humanitarian assistance and military support, as well as for its economic and social recovery and reconstruction, and hold Russia accountable for its war crimes and crime of aggression; whereas all efforts should be made to utilise the European Defence Industry Reinforcement throughout common Procurement Act (DIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the European Peace Facility to ensure that a provision of supplies in support of Ukraine is maintained; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| H. | whereas security in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans is greatly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of this aggression spilling over; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| I. | whereas the EU-US summit in Washington DC on 20 October 2023 reiterated the partnership between the US and the EU; whereas both sides should continue to engage in delivering concrete results in our relationship; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| J. | whereas EU-US transatlantic dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy are indispensable in addressing the current multifaceted threats and the most pressing global challenges, such as climate change, the threat posed by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes globally, including in Europe and Asia, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the worrying situation in the Middle East, the fight against global criminal networks, making gender equality and anti-discrimination a reality and ensuring sustainable modernisation; whereas the EU-US transatlantic dialogue should continue to build bipartisan relations in order to further consolidate the transatlantic relationship, to address the increasing gaps between urban and rural areas and to pursue the digital and green transformation as a means of sustainable modernisation; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| K. | whereas regular consultations between Parliament and the US Congress on how to support the work of the EU-US TTC, with particular reference to policy convergence in the digital realm and how to foster joint efforts on digital innovation, regulation and joint standards, could prove valuable; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| L. | whereas the wide range of issues of common interest we cooperate on would benefit immensely from an even stronger parliamentary dimension between the US Congress, the European Parliament and national parliaments, especially on foreign affairs, trade and technology and regulations, covering, for example, artificial intelligence (AI) and innovations, which would enhance public awareness, democratic legitimacy, oversight and the ability to deliver on our joint endeavours; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| M. | whereas the Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, dedicates one of its main sections to the role of partnerships and calls for stronger tailored bilateral partnerships, in particular with the US and NATO; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| N. | whereas the fifth high-level meeting of the EU-US Dialogue on China and the fourth meeting of the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific were held on 22 June 2023; whereas the EU-US Dialogues remain important dimensions in strengthening cooperation against growing authoritarianism around the world and economic coercion, in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in addressing China’s grave human rights violations; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| O. | whereas NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its members and the guarantor of transatlantic security; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| P. | whereas the EU and the US conducted their first joint naval exercise on 23 and 24 March 2023; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Q. | whereas Latin America is a region which shares many values, interests, historical, cultural and human relationships and important economic links with the EU and the US; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| R. | whereas EU-US cooperation also remains relevant in Africa for not only security, counter-terrorism and combating organised crime, but also innovation, investment, infrastructure, energy, health and food security; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| S. | whereas the US’s European Deterrence Initiative helps boost the military readiness of European allies and deter Russian aggression; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| T. | whereas the US has invested over USD 35 billion since 2015 through the European Deterrence Initiative in supporting US troop deployments in Europe and assisting capability development and military readiness in Europe; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| U. | whereas China’s economic and military presence has increased in the Mediterranean and African countries; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| V. | whereas the threat of domestic and foreign terrorism stems primarily from groups such as ISIS and its affiliates, but also Hezbollah and Hamas, which receive support from Iran and Russia; |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| W. | whereas new technologies such as AI, space capabilities and quantum computing, which present new opportunities for mankind, also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus between the Member States and the US; |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. | Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (a) | work towards fostering an even stronger, mutually beneficial partnership in leadership and responsibility between the EU and the US, in order to defend multilateralism and tackle the global challenges and the new and dangerous geopolitical realities that affect our shared values, common interests, security and prosperity and that shape our societies, communities and institutions; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (b) | fully emphasise, in the context of the deteriorating global security situation, that transatlantic unity is now needed more than ever in order to respond to the challenges we face caused by the multiple global crises, ranging from Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and an increasingly tense and at times violent Middle East to an increasingly assertive China which is increasingly challenging European values around the globe; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (c) | foster closer ties, therefore, with the US, intensify cooperation within established mechanisms such as the EU-US TTC, and encourage the House of Representatives to establish a standing congressional delegation for the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) in line with the 1999 joint statement on the establishment of the TLD between the US Congress and the European Parliament, which would increase our capacity for policy dialogue and cooperation; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (d) | work towards enhancing transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy by strengthening the role of the TLD by working towards more frequent and regular exchanges between the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress and the European Parliament; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (e) | reiterate our common transatlantic friendship with Ukraine and Israel based on our joint and full condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, our joint condemnation of the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, our joint efforts to free all hostages taken by Hamas and our joint support of Israel’s right to defend itself in line with humanitarian and international law, and express deepest sorrow and full solidarity with the innocent victims on both sides; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (f) | work towards a transatlantic agenda that prioritises multilateral cooperation for a more equitable and healthier world, the fight against climate change, the promotion of peaceful resolution of conflicts, arms control, disarmament, the fight against racism, and reform of economic governance, by putting the fight against inequalities and ecological transformation at its centre and focusing on a sustainable and environmentally friendly transformation of the economy; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (g) | reassert the continued relevance of the strategic transatlantic relationship and its anchoring in our shared values for the rebuilding and reinvigoration of the multilateral rules-based international order, with the UN system and international law at its centre, the global strengthening of democracy and democratic values and the promotion of human rights, and for shaping the rules of the digital and technological future according to shared values, sustainable economic development and inclusive economic growth and jobs worldwide; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (h) | intensify cooperation with like-minded partners and other global partners in reforming and reinforcing inclusive multilateral governance, including the UN, its Security Council and Human Rights Council and its agencies, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and NATO; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (i) | strengthen the transatlantic partnership in order to support democracy, fundamental freedoms, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law, the rules-based international order and multilateralism, especially in the light of growing authoritarianism around the world; implement the recent commitment to increase its funding to the Erasmus+ programme and to double EU support to the Fulbright-Schuman program, and to foster exchanges between US and European students and researchers; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (j) | study the possibility of opening negotiations in sectoral areas, including economic or trade, given the absence of negotiations on a needed comprehensive trade, energy, investment and public procurement agreement between the EU and the US; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (k) | express regret about the fact that negotiations on a Mercosur-EU association agreement, which would be a good complement to a US-EU trade agreement, have not yet produced a satisfactory result; work towards the swift conclusion of this agreement; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (l) | jointly demonstrate with our partners in the US through concrete actions that democracy delivers results for individuals and societies across the globe and is capable of withstanding autocratic pressure and influence and other serious emerging threats to our viable systems; strive to reinforce the democratic structures that have secured prosperity and stability for decades on both sides of the Atlantic and also around the globe; develop effective solutions to global problems that are having an impact on our political, social and economic systems; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (m) | reinforce the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems, in particular in the run-up to the elections next year on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in the light of recent attempts to meddle in electoral processes, as well as enhance transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on policies supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law and combating corruption, disinformation and foreign interference from authoritarian regimes, including electoral interference, disinformation, and economic and political coercion, as well as our ability to advocate our values globally; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (n) | jointly condemn all forms of racism, hate and violence, as well as any discrimination based on gender, sex, race, class, caste, religion, disability, physical appearance or age, and take decisive steps to address systemic racism and entrenched inequalities; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (o) | work on improving gender equality and women’s rights while insisting that increased efforts are needed, including on equal representation at all levels of political, societal and economic life, and in terms of equal pay, labour force participation, and sexual and reproductive health and rights, among other matters; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (p) | foster the EU’s strategic autonomy not only as a means to pursue and safeguard the EU’s own legitimate interests, but also as a means to strengthen the transatlantic dialogue on shared interests and increase the joint leverage of the EU and the US to shape future international relations together with like-minded partners, including global partners; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (q) | acknowledge the conclusions of the EU-US summit held on 20 October 2023 on strengthening the EU’s position globally by boosting investments in new clean technologies and bolstering its industry production; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (r) | encourage the holding of an annual EU-US summit in order to better coordinate on the numerous emerging global crises and to coordinate transatlantic responses; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (s) | enhance production, equipment and related research and military capabilities and overall capacity building, thereby aiming for a stronger EU-US partnership and improved burden-sharing in defence, inter alia within NATO, while acknowledging that the US remains the EU’s most important partner for the security and defence of the European continent; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (t) | recognise the great contribution made by the US in the past and present for European security; ensure that the EU Member States respect their commitments on defence spending and significantly increase national investments in defence in order to achieve fairer burden-sharing with the US; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (u) | build upon the third joint EU-NATO declaration and further operationalise EU-NATO cooperation in areas such as resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, the fight against maritime piracy, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (v) | significantly strengthen consultation, cooperation and contingency planning for joint responses to geopolitical developments and escalating situations such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular by working together to strengthen the NATO Alliance’s eastern flank, in order to ensure the security and stability of the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions, to prepare for the reconstruction of Ukraine and to prevent any significant disruptions to the global free flow of goods; base this cooperation on unity and solidarity among the EU Member States, respect for their security arrangements, and adherence to the principles related to the current European security architecture and international law, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (w) | maximise the added value of transatlantic relations in security and defence by exploiting the opportunities for cooperation presented by the EU-US security and defence dialogue in order to improve the security situation in the Eastern Partnership region, whose stability is essential for the security of the whole European continent; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (x) | put arms control and disarmament high on the transatlantic and international agenda in international forums such as the UN, in particular its Peacebuilding Commission, in order to achieve strengthened coordination and conflict-prevention globally; push, jointly with transatlantic partners, for international negotiations on arms control agreements, in particular for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including new military technologies, such as AI, outer space weaponry, biotechnologies and hypersonic technologies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (y) | ensure complementarity between the EU Strategic Compass and similar relevant US documents, such as the national security strategy, as well as with the NATO Strategic Concept; deepen partnerships in the areas of cooperation envisaged by the NATO Strategic Concept, the EU Strategic Compass and similar US documents, particularly in the areas of military mobility, cyber security, defence research, dual-use infrastructure, resilience and inclusive joint exercises; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (z) | ensure better interoperability between the EU, its Member States, the United States and NATO in order to achieve shared security and defence goals; continue encouraging the EU Member States that are also members of NATO to meet NATO spending requirements in order to contribute to a more effective alliance and guarantee more equal burden-sharing; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (aa) | assess the perspectives of further defence cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the US by putting in practice the Administrative Arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the United States Department of Defense, and the US’s contribution to the PESCO project entitled ‘Military Mobility’, in view of its importance in the current geopolitical reality; recognise that civic defence is a developing area both in the EU and the US, and therefore work together towards cooperation in this emerging sector to reap mutual benefits; enhance their maritime security cooperation efforts and step up joint naval exercises in order to improve the interoperability and integration of their systems; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ab) | continue the ongoing coordination of the military support, which should match Ukraine’s military needs, provided to Ukraine within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in order to help deter and end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and re-establish Ukraine’s full control over its entire internationally recognised territory in the shortest possible time, in particular, through intelligence sharing, military assistance, humanitarian aid and political support and by bolstering the most exposed part of NATO’s eastern flank; urge the Member States to work with their transatlantic partners to provide adequate military support and security guarantees to Ukraine, to produce and provide ammunition to Ukraine’s armed forces and to ensure the provision of the resources and infrastructure necessary for Ukraine to service its military hardware; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ac) | work together to ensure that the resources provided to the Ukrainian Government have the maximum impact in the defence of Ukrainian territory, and put in place further mechanisms with a role in oversight for all of this expenditure; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ad) | make joint progress on key foreign policy files, including those on our respective relations with China, on Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood, on Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as on the Indo-Pacific; develop closer and more ambitious cooperation in the framework of the EU-US dialogue on security and defence and the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific; further advance strategic cooperation on areas of shared common past achievements, such as the Western Balkans, Sahel and the Arctic, and promote peace and stability, preventive diplomacy and better visibility in order to keep at bay all malign influences; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ae) | continue the full EU-US coordination on effective international sanctions on Russia, Belarus and all those who facilitate and support, directly or in a covert manner, Russia’s aggression, in order to undermine Russia’s ability to continue the war and other aggressions against its neighbours and to strongly increase efforts to prevent sanction circumvention and close loopholes, especially in the energy sector; offer various incentives to and enhance cooperation with partners around the world with the aim of consolidating the strongest opposition against the war of aggression initiated by Russia and securing ongoing global cooperation on sanctions on Russia and its few allies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (af) | coordinate sanctions lists under the US Magnitsky Act and the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and cooperate in encouraging other like-minded countries to adopt similar sanctions regimes for human rights abuses and corruption; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ag) | jointly mobilise international support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine while supporting the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ah) | continue with the comprehensive EU-US coordination of efforts, together with other G7 partners, to explore how any extraordinary revenues held by private entities stemming directly from immobilised Russian sovereign assets could be directed to support Ukraine and its recovery and reconstruction in compliance with the applicable laws; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ai) | continue vital EU-US cooperation, regardless of election results on both sides of the Atlantic, to support Ukraine’s reform process towards European integration, as well as commitments given related to NATO accession, and to develop a long-term reconstruction plan alongside the EU’s Ukraine Facility and under mechanisms that assure resilience, accountability and full transparency, in order to diminish as much as possible the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression and assure Ukraine’s swift recovery from the war; ensure that cooperation includes demining and the clearance of unexploded ordnance, which are prerequisites for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including its agricultural production, which is vital for the country’s economy and for global food security; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (aj) | strengthen bilateral cooperation between the EU and US in the context of regional and international organisations and forums such as the G7 and G20, as well as at UN General Assembly level, in order to isolate Russia, address the challenges presented by China and in general foster cooperation with like-minded countries genuinely interested in promoting multilateralism and defending the rules-based international order; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ak) | foster the establishment of a transatlantic political council, led by the foreign policy chiefs of the US and the EU, that would serve as a forum for regular and effective institutional dialogue on foreign and security policy between the EU and the US; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (al) | seek the convergence of transatlantic positions towards China and build on ‘de-risking’ and lessening strategic dependence, in accordance with the EU’s strategic autonomy priorities, and build resilient supply chains while, where feasible, looking for ways to engage in dialogue with China on certain global challenges; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (am) | explore ways to create synergies and opportunities for EU-US engagement with China in multilateral frameworks on common and global challenges, such as climate change, health-related risks and pandemic preparedness, humanitarian assistance, respect for human rights, including religious freedom, foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberspace, arms control, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, preventing risks from emerging disruptive technologies, freedom of navigation, and the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (an) | work with regional partners and the US to ensure freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China and East China Seas, which are of critical importance for regional and global commercial flows; enhance efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral actions, in particular when based on threats or use of force, which undermine cross-Strait peace and stability; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ao) | strengthen cooperation and coordination with the US, the G7 and other like-minded democratic allies to provide an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative and to ensure access to critical raw materials; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ap) | work together with like-minded partners such as the US to support steps towards allowing Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the meetings, mechanisms and activities of relevant international institutions such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (aq) | coordinate with the US and other like-minded partners on issues where China’s actions are contrary to Euro-Atlantic security interests, giving priority to challenges in the cyber, hybrid, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT), space, arms control and non-proliferation areas; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ar) | address the concern that in recent years, China has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional and nuclear capabilities, creating thousands of precision warheads tied to sophisticated command and control systems, and has shown reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral arms control instruments; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (as) | recognise that China’s acquisitions of intellectual property and technological advances by leading research centres are often used to propel its military aims and that the EU should therefore work to develop a long-term strategy to counter China’s military-civil fusion strategy in Europe; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (at) | undertake an internal audit of the procurement practices of the Member States to ensure that products integrated into their national networks and defence institutions are free of technologies coming from companies in China, in view of the close ties between the Chinese Communist Party and industry in China, particularly security companies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (au) | foster closer partnership and security and economic cooperation with the US and other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan, in order to contribute to regional stability and prosperity and counter challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity, in particular, any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan; acknowledge that China’s continued military provocations pose a threat not only to Taiwan, but to the wider Indo-Pacific and ultimately to the established global order; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (av) | continue the EU-US strategic partnership and cooperation in the Western Balkans to secure peace and stability in the region by supporting the countries on their path to European integration and NATO membership and to support them in addressing issues in the region, such as electoral and constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue; enhance efforts to strengthen the security framework for this region, as this would consolidate the stability of this area and further assist with the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of the Western Balkans; ensure that the EU and NATO provide more support to the countries of the Western Balkans in countering malicious foreign interference and hybrid threats from third countries; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (aw) | ensure an improved joint approach to the region, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ax) | oppose the strengthening of secessionist policies and political violence against journalists and agents of the Kosovo law enforcement authorities, including kidnappings and killings; strongly welcome the current cooperation and further upgrade our cooperation with the US and like-minded partners in the UN Security Council to secure the extension of EUFOR Althea’s mandate in order to maintain stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ay) | continue EU-US cooperation in support of democratic reforms in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia on their path to EU membership and bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to their NATO membership goal, as this is crucial for bringing about pro-democratic reforms and their societies’ security, stability and prosperity; couple this with effective mechanisms to bring about the end of the occupation of their territories by the Russian Federation; support the democratic aspirations of the people of Belarus; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (az) | cooperate jointly with global partners to reinforce our capacity and effectiveness to work in a genuine and transparent partnership and our commitment to democratic values, human rights, gender equality and a rules-based international order and to working on effective digital, ecological and economic development and connectivity; foster cooperation with the US to make sure that the EU’s Global Gateway initiative is well coordinated with the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ba) | reach out jointly to other global partners and look for new ways to re-engage emerging countries, such as Kazakhstan and Armenia, into cooperation in foreign affairs, security and defence, trade, infrastructure, investments and other areas, and offer them a way out of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bb) | establish joint EU-US cooperation with countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in all aspects already agreed upon; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bc) | recognise that the ever closer alignment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Russia and other actors, such as Iran or China, its proliferation of small- and medium-range missile technology and their trafficking in nuclear know-how to like-minded rogue regimes, while their nuclear weapons programme is frequently used to extort political and economic concessions from the international community, requires a renewed effort from the EU-US partnership to prevent further expansion of the DPRK’s hostile behaviour; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bd) | underline the urgent need to deepen EU-US cooperation in the Middle East while supporting the good bilateral engagements on our respective policies towards the Middle East Peace Process and the two-state solution, as well as to reinforce the coordination of our efforts to encourage positive developments, peace and stability in the wider region, including the Abraham Accords; welcome the US efforts to stabilise bilateral and multilateral relations in the region; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (be) | continue to support NATO’s Capacity Building Initiatives, which play an important role in contributing to Middle East stabilisation; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bf) | continue to condemn Iran for its malign and hostile influence in the Middle East, including its support for the recent, despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel; cooperate with the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency in ensuring that Iran abides by its international nuclear obligations, but take appropriate measures jointly if this is no longer the case; explore the closer aligning of sanctions against Iran for its, and its proxies’, in particular Hezbollah’s, violations of its international nuclear obligations and human rights; support the efforts of the US and other allies to counter Iranian hostility and to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bg) | coordinate closely in the face of the difficult and unstable situation that the Sahel is going through, particularly after the numerous coups d’état that several countries in the region have suffered in recent years; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bh) | jointly enhance economic, political and operational support along with regional organisations based in Africa such as the African Union, G5 Sahel and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bi) | strengthen transatlantic cooperation on situational awareness, diplomatic responses, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, capacity building and enhancing cyber resilience through the EU-US Cyber Dialogue; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bj) | build upon the EU’s Arctic strategy on all issues of common interest and form a comprehensive joint strategy for this region, in particular on matters concerning sustainability and scientific research, which would guarantee political stability and regional peace; jointly enhance awareness of the situation across the High North and the Arctic and create a new strategy focusing on deterrence and defence plans, including freedom of navigation and provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bk) | support international law, in particular as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law, including under UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bl) | step up cooperation to combat IUU fishing in a coordinated manner; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bm) | develop a common policy approach to address the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, persuade the Taliban de facto government to end gender apartheid against Afghan women and girls, and engage in dialogue with the Afghan people; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bn) | further operationalise closer transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on renewable energy sources in accordance with the EU Green Agenda for the future, given the importance for the EU and the US to be at the forefront of innovation, aiming towards synergic investment, subsidy systems that can foster seamless cooperation in transatlantic renewable energy, and technological and production space based on and aiming towards common technological standards; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bo) | work with the US and partners around the world to minimise risks arising from the proliferation of sensitive technologies, while preserving openness towards international cooperation; strengthen coordination in controlling the exports of critical technologies to authoritarian regimes posing a security threat to the transatlantic partnership; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bp) | encourage EU-US cooperation in regulating 5G implementation to comply with strict security standards that secure national and international information networks capable of encrypting communications; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bq) | deepen cooperation in forging democratic standards for the use of technology ,  especially AI, in order to defend our shared values, enhance our security and foster democracy-serving digital standards at home and worldwide; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (br) | consolidate coordination mechanisms and deepen synergies for securing joint supplies of critical raw materials and rebalancing supply chains of these materials in order to reduce strategic dependencies on non-democratic suppliers; ensure the swift agreement of the EU-US Critical Minerals Agreement in order to reduce the negative consequences of the Inflation Reduction Act on European manufacturers; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bs) | deepen joint transatlantic efforts to secure key transatlantic infrastructure and to advance secure and resilient connectivity infrastructure for information and communication technologies around the world with like-minded and trustworthy partners, in particular as concerns telecommunications cables and the need to ensure that these are fully protected against efforts by malign actors to disrupt transatlantic internet and data traffic; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bt) | ensure that the EU and the US, together with other relevant partners, create robust avenues for transatlantic data transfer and secure alternatives so that data flow can be maintained or quickly restored even in instances of attempts at disruption, bearing in mind the importance of ensuring the full protection of personal data; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bu) | consider establishing joint Parliament-US Congress delegations to the ministerial meetings of the TTC, with consultations between these joint delegations and participants in the ministerial meeting to be held in the margins of these TTC meetings in order to enable Parliament and Congress to contribute to reflections on the objectives and challenges of the TTC and how to support the implementation of the TTC agenda; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bv) | deepen cooperation and research with the US and promote the EU-US Space Dialogue structure as complementary to the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence; enhance cooperation based on current EU programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus; stress that EU-US cooperation on space could help to promote space safety standards and best practices across the international community; involve the European Union Satellite Centre in analysing the current state of EU and Member States’ satellite security and/or vulnerability and determine areas where cooperation with the US in this area could be established; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bw) | foster cooperation between the EU, the US and all other American and African countries in order to confront challenges and threats such as terrorism, security threats, trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs, organised crime and piracy; synergise efforts to combat terrorism and radicalisation by ensuring sufficient resources, improved intelligence sharing, improved situational awareness in key areas including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, hybrid tactics, joint training and education activities, shared counter-terrorism courses, exchange programmes for officers and tactical drills, as well as by ensuring that terrorism cases are adjudicated by appropriately trained judges and lawyers; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bx) | step up efforts in joint coordination and information-sharing regarding hybrid threats, especially regarding cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, and recognise the unique requirements that this will place on defence architectures and the need for a high-tech industrial base, which the EU-US relationship is well placed to address; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (by) | encourage further progress on the common set of proposals, particularly the ongoing interaction between the new EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Cell, on sharing situational awareness and analysis, tactical and operational cooperation between Operation Sea Guardian and Operation Irini and ongoing cooperation between the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team and the NATO Cyber Security Centre; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (bz) | continue and make progress on the excellent cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference and reinforce our joint readiness and resilience against the malign usage of technological advancement to harm our shared interests; ensure that EU-US cooperation on fighting disinformation and foreign interference takes into account the fact that some organisations focusing on social issues, such as women’s sexual and reproductive rights, and lobbying in the EU receive funding from outside the EU, including from US-based far-right groups, and try to influence core European values; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ca) | exchange information and jointly address the spread of Russian and Chinese influence and hybrid activities, including information manipulation, cyber-attacks, internal interference and economic and political coercion, in particular in the context of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and its impact on the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, Africa and Latin America; counter Russian and all other disruptive efforts by authoritarian regimes to undermine democracy worldwide and the functioning of market economies; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (cb) | closely coordinate and align efforts for democratic and global convergence on frontier technologies, in particular AI and machine learning, and nano and biotechnologies; closely coordinate EU-US efforts in the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Council of Europe, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and other multilateral forums that aim to establish governance frameworks for AI based on our common values and our shared commitment to upholding them; enhance EU-US cooperation in developing quantum computing capabilities; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (cc) | continue and enhance bilateral talks on technology with the aim of taking the lead in developing international standards for emerging technologies, including but not limited to AI, cyber security and emerging technologies; pursue transatlantic cooperation in streamlining procurement practices and the interoperability of technology and move forward with the establishment of a transatlantic trade and investment partnership; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (cd) | aim for an EU-US agreement on a common carbon footprint calculation methodology, which would aim for carbon neutrality by 2050, allow the development of a transatlantic market in low carbon goods, foster joint transatlantic efforts on climate innovation, further the capacity of the EU and the US to lead the global market for low carbon goods and promote global standards to this effect; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (ce) | ensure that the US remains an important partner for the EU’s energy security, as it has been, in particular, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine; |  |  |  | | --- | --- | | (cf) | welcome transatlantic energy cooperation through new instruments such as the Task Force on Energy Security established in 2022 and through the use of other forums for structured dialogue such as the EU-US Energy Council; | |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2. | Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as to the US Congress’s Foreign Relations Committees. |

---

---

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4187/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

---

[Top](#document1)