Question: When did the peace treaty between Croatia and Serbia go into effect?

Dayton Agreement





The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton–Paris Agreement, (Bosnian: Dejtonski mirovni sporazum, Serbian: Dejtonski mirovni sporazum, Croatian: Daytonski sporazum) is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 1 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the ​31⁄2-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.
Negotiation and signature
Though basic elements of the Dayton Agreement were proposed in international talks as early as 1992,[2] these negotiations were initiated following the unsuccessful previous peace efforts and arrangements, the August 1995 Croatian military Operation Storm and its aftermath, the government military offensive against the Republika Srpska, conducted in parallel with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force. During September and October 1995, world powers (especially the United States and Russia), gathered in the Contact Group, applied intense pressure to the leaders of the three sides to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.
The conference took place from 1–21 November 1995. The main participants from the region were the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević (representing the Bosnian Serb interests due to the absence of Karadžić), President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović with his Foreign Minister Muhamed Šaćirbeg.
The peace conference was led by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and negotiator Richard Holbrooke with two Co-Chairmen in the form of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov. A key participant in the US delegation was General Wesley Clark (later to become NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 1997). The head of the UK's team was Pauline Neville-Jones, political director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The UK military representative was Col Arundell David Leakey (later to become Commander of EUFOR in 2005). Paul Williams, through the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) served as legal counsel to the Bosnian Government delegation during the negotiations.
The secure site was chosen in order to remove all the parties from their comfort zone, without which they would have little incentive to negotiate; to reduce their ability to negotiate through the media; and to securely house over 800 staff and attendants. Curbing the participants' ability to negotiate via the media was a particularly important consideration. Richard Holbrooke wanted to prevent posturing through early leaks to the press.

After having been initiated in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, the full and formal agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995[3]  and witnessed by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, French President Jacques Chirac, U.S. President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister John Major, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Content
The agreement's main purpose is to promote peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to endorse regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia (Article V, annex 1-B), thus in a regional perspective.[4]
The present political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its structure of government were agreed upon, as part the constitution that makes up Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement concluded at Dayton. A key component of this was the delineation of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line to which many of the tasks listed in the Annexes referred.
The State of Bosnia Herzegovina was set as of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complete state, as opposed to a confederation; no entity or entities could ever be separated from Bosnia and Herzegovina unless by due legal process. Although highly decentralised in its entities, it would still retain a central government, with a rotating State Presidency, a central bank and a constitutional court.[4]
The agreement mandated a wide range of international organizations to monitor, oversee and implement components of the agreement. The NATO-led IFOR (Implementation Force) was responsible for implementing military aspects of the agreement and deployed on 20 December 1995, taking over the forces of the UNPROFOR. The Office of the High Representative was charged with the task of civil implementation. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was charged with organising the first free elections in 1996.[4]
Constitutional Court decision
On 13 October 1997, the Croatian 1861 Law Party and the Bosnia-Herzegovina 1861 Law Party requested the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to annul several decisions and to confirm one decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, to review the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina since it was alleged that the agreement violated the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way that it undermined the integrity of the state and could cause the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court reached the conclusion that it is not competent to decide the dispute in regards to the mentioned decisions since the applicants were not subjects that were identified in Article VI.3 (a) of the Constitution on those who can refer disputes to the Court. The Court also rejected the other request:
(...) the Constitutional Court is not competent to evaluate the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement as the Constitutional Court has in fact been established under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to uphold this Constitution (...) The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as Annex IV to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and consequently there cannot be a conflict or a possibility for controversy between this Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[5]

It was one of the early cases in which the Court had to deal with the question of the legal nature of the Constitution. By making the remark in the manner of obiter dictum concerning the Annex IV (the Constitution) and the rest of the peace agreement, the Court actually "established the ground for legal unity"[6] of the entire peace agreement, which further implied that all of the annexes are in the hierarchical equality. In later decisions the Court confirmed that by using other annexes of the peace agreement as a direct base for the analysis, not only in the context of systematic interpretation of the Annex IV. However, since the Court rejected the presented request of the appellants, it did not go into details concerning the controversial questions of the legality of the process in which the new Constitution (Annex IV) came to power and replaced the former Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court used the same reasoning to dismiss the similar claim in a later case.[7]
Territorial changes


Before the agreement, Bosnian Serbs controlled about 46% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (23,687km2), Bosniaks 28% (14,505km2) and Bosnian Croats 25% (12,937km2).
Bosnian Serbs got large tracts of mountainous territories back (4% from Bosnian Croats and some small amounts from Bosniaks), but they had to surrender Sarajevo and some vital Eastern Bosnian/Herzegovian positions. Their percentage grew to 49% (48% by excluding the Brčko District, 24,526km2) from a little bit more than 46% prior to Dayton.
Bosniaks got most of Sarajevo and some important positions in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina while they lost only a few locations on Mount Ozren and in western Bosnia. Their percentage grew from 28%, prior to Dayton to 30%, and they greatly improved the quality of the land. Large tracts of prewar Bosniak (and Bosnian Croat) inhabited lands remained under Bosnian Serb control.
Bosnian Croats gave most (4% of BiH territories) back to the Bosnian Serbs (9% of today's RS) and also retreated from Una-Sana Donji Vakuf (in Central Bosnia) afterward. A small enlargement of Posavina (Odžak and parts of Domaljevac) have not changed the fact that after Dayton Bosnian Croats controlled just 21% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (10,640km2), especially when compared to more than 25% prior to Dayton. One of the most important Bosnian Croat territories (Posavina with Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Derventa) was left out of Bosnian Croat control.[4]
Control of Republika Srpska
About 89.5% (22,059km2) was under control of Bosnian Serbs
About 9% (2,117km2) of today's territories of Republika Srpska was controlled by Bosnian Croat forces; mainly in municipalities of Šipovo, Petrovac, Istočni Drvar, Jezero, Kupres (RS) and part of Banja Luka municipality
About 1.5% (350km2) of today's territories of Republika Srpska was controlled by Bosniak forces, mainly some villages in Ozren (Doboj and Petrovo), western Bosnia (Krupa na Uni and parts of Novi Grad and Oštra Luka).
Control of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
About 53% (13,955km2) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Bosniak control.
About 41% (10,720km2) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the control of Bosnian Croats.
About 6% (1,435km2) was under control of Bosnian Serbs.
Cantons

Canton 10:
was almost completely under control of Bosnian Croats (4,924km2)
Bosniaks controlled some points east of Kupres (10km2)
Una-Sana Canton:
was almost completely under control of Bosniaks (3,925km2)
Bosnian Croats controlled some mountain passes on the southern parts of Bosanski Petrovac and Bihać municipalities (200km2)
West Herzegovina Canton:
was completely under Bosnian Croat control (1,362km2)
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton:
was divided, more than half was under Bosnian Croat control (2,525km2)
northern and central parts were under Bosniak control (1,666km2)
eastern mountains were under Bosnian Serb control (210km2)
Central Bosnia Canton:
was divided, a bit more than a third was under Bosnian Croat control (1,099km2)
rest was under control of Bosniaks (2,090km2)
Zenica-Doboj Canton:
was largely under Bosniak control (2,843km2)
there were some small enclaves like Žepče, Usora under Bosnian Croat control (400km2)
eastern mountains were under Bosnian Serb control (100km2)
Tuzla Canton:
was largely under Bosniak control (2,544km2)
there were some villages in Gradačac municipality under Bosnian Croat control (5km2)
and some villages in Doboj and Gračanica municipalities under Bosnian Serb control (100km2)
Posavina Canton:
was mostly under Bosnian Croat control (205km2)
Bosnian Serbs controlled Odžak and parts of Domaljevac municipalities (120km2)
Bosnian Podrinje Canton:
was mostly under Bosniak control (405km2)
Bosnian Serbs controlled areas which linked it with Sarajevo (100km2)
Sarajevo Canton:
was mostly under Bosnian Serbs control (800km2)
while Bosniaks controlled some southern suburbs and most of the city itself (477km2)
Brčko District was divided;
Bosniaks controlled most of its southern parts (200km2)
Bosnian Serbs its northern parts (193km2)
While Bosnian Croats controlled the rest, part near Orašje municipality and two enclaves on southern parts of municipality (100km2)
Analysis
The immediate purpose of the agreement was to freeze the military confrontation and prevent it from resuming. It was thefore defined as a "construction of necessity".[8]
Still, the Dayton Agreement proved to be a highly flexible instrument, allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from an early post-conflict phase through reconstruction and consolidation, passing from a consociationalist approach to a more integrationist one.[4] Many scholars refer to it as "the most impressive example of conflict resolution".[9]
Wolfgang Petritsch, OHR, has argued that the Dayton framework has allowed the international community to move "from statebuilding via institutions and capacity-building to identity building", putting Bosnia and Herzegovina "on the road to Brussels".[10]
Criticism
The Dayton Agreement has come across much criticism since its inception, including:
A complicated government system -  As part of the Dayton agreement, Bosnia was divided into 2 entities and a government structure was created to appease all sides. However, by creating such a dissolved government, Bosnia has stalled in moving forward as every important issue is deadlocked within the central government as each party is championing opposing priorities that are based on ethnic policies and not shared ideals.[11]
Dependency and control of international actors -  Dayton was very much an international vision, led by the United States who supported an end to the war, but that didn't allow Bosnian leaders to negotiate an ending to the war, therefore leaving no incentive in the afterward peacebuilding process and no area for leaders to discuss the underlying root causes of the conflict. International actors also played an extensive role in shaping the postwar agenda in Bosnia, including enacting punishment over local political actors.[12] The influx of NGOs and international actors to kick start investment in the country post war also failed to kick start the economy, with Bosnia suffering from poor economic growth (2% in 2015). The lack of economic development has been attributed to poor coordination between international actors and lack of consideration for local capacity [13]
Ending the war but not promoting peace -  The primary aims of Dayton was to stop the war, but the agreement was only meant to be a temporary measure while a long term plan was developed. While Dayton has halted the conflict and there has not been an resurgence of violence, the stability in the conflict does not give an accurate assessment of peace. There is still currently a large military presence to mitigate any chance of violence and to enforce peace in the country.[14] Enforcing such peace can be seen as highlighting the still deep rooted tensions in the country, with Dayton covering the cracks of a fractured society that could be plunged back into conflict as soon as military forces left.
Disappearance of the original document
On 13 February 2008, the head of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina Željko Komšić said that the original Dayton Agreement was lost from the Presidency's archive. High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina Miroslav Lajčak said: "I don't know whether the news is sad or funny".[15] On 16 November 2009 the French Foreign Ministry delivered the certified copy of the Dayton agreement to the French embassy in Sarajevo. The copy was later transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[16] The original was found in 2017 in a private residence in Pale, resulting in arrest of one person.[17]
See also






Bosnia and Herzegovina
This article is part of a series on the
politics and government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Constitution
Dayton Agreement
Peace Implementation Council
High Representative: V. Inzko
Presidency
Bosniak member
Šefik Džaferović
Croat member
Željko Komšić
Serb member
Milorad Dodik (Chairman)
ParliamentExecutive
Parliament
House of Peoples
House of Representatives
Council of Ministers
Chairman: Denis Zvizdić
Recent elections
General: 201020142018
Political parties
Foreign relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister: Igor Crnadak

Diplomatic missions of / in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Nationality law
Passport
Visa requirements
Visa policy

EU accession
NATO accession
Political divisions
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
President (list): Marinko Čavara
Government
Prime Minister: Fadil Novalić
Parliament
House of Representatives
House of Peoples
Cantons
Assemblies
Republika Srpska
President (list): Željka Cvijanović
Government
Prime Minister: Radovan Višković
National Assembly
Speaker: Nedeljko Čubrilović
Brčko District
International Supervisor: B. Berton
(Suspended)
Mayor: Siniša Milić
 Bosnia and Herzegovinaportal 
Other countries
Atlas
vt
Washington Agreement
Peace plans offered before and during the Bosnian War
Proposed secession of Republika Srpska
Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina


Further reading

Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Caplan, R., 2000. Assessing the Dayton Accord: The structural weaknesses of the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11(2), pp.213–232.


Daalder, I.H., 2014. Getting to Dayton: the making of America's Bosnia policy. Brookings Institution Press.

Goodby, J.E., 1996. When war won out: Bosnian peace plans before Dayton. International Negotiation, 1(3), pp.501–523.

Parish, M., 2007. The Demise of the Dayton protectorate. Inside the Bosnian Crisis: Documents and Analysis. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1, pp.11–23.


Cite journal requires |journal= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)




, UN Peacemaker
, UN Peacemaker
, a Symposium at the European Journal of International Law
, Bosnian Institute, 12 May 2006
 U.S. Institute of Peace Event, November 2005 (Audio & transcripts)