ghananlpcommunity/ghana-gov-speeches-sentences huggingface dataset:
I told him that the crime rate differs from region to region.
He then asked about our investigation into the affairs of the then Farmers Services Company (FASCOM) of the Upper Region.
I told him that our committee had spent 3 months thoroughly investigating that case and that we were not prepared to change anything.
In addition, one evening a major of the Ghana Army from the Kamina Barracks in Tamale came to intervene in our committee’s investigation into a case involving his nephew, and his colleague officer who was temporarily stationed at Bolgatanga, introduced him to me that evening.
I told him that we would attend to him the next morning.
The next morning, I had him called into our committee sitting room and had him sworn.
I then asked what was his mission.
He could not testify meaningfully.
I then addressed him that it was they the Army that launched the revolution to ensure justice prevailed so how could that be achieved if they tried to obstruct the due flow of Justice?
He became uneasy and was glad to be told to go his way.
He saluted us and left.
These are a few episodes.
I found myself appointed from the Bar to the Supreme Court on 30 th November 1995.
I soon noticed that public confidence in the Judiciary was of considerable concern in that there were perceptions of corruption and slanted Judicial positions especially constitutional cases.
There were frequent calls for the entire number of justices of the Supreme Court to be empanelled on constitutional cases.
I propose to try to unearth the causes for these perceptions which were built up over the years.
The perceptions were aroused by perceptions of political inclinations on the part of some judges.
There is a long history to it.
Sometimes the suspicion was anchored on the incidence of political influence.
This occurred in various ways to various degrees at various times.
Political confrontation On 20 th April 1970 the Court of Appeal coram Apaloo, Siriboe, Sowah, Anin and Archer JJ.A, gave judgement in Sallah v The Attorney General 2 G&G 739 (2d) 1319.
The Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration that his employment as a manager with the GNTC had been wrongly terminated by the Busia regime.
This decision meant that well over 350 other persons whose employments were similarly affected could also successfully sue the government.
Before the court could hear the case unsuccessful objections on the grounds of bias were raised against Apaloo, J.A (on the ground of close friendship with the plaintiff and Sowah J.A.
(on the ground that his brother-in-law’s wife had approached him to help her husband, Jonas, who was similarly affected as Sallah by the termination of his employment).
In the evening of that day (20/04/1970) of the delivery of the judgement, an incensed Dr.
Busia, the then Prime Minister of Ghana made a Radio Broadcast on this judgement, the full text of which is in 2 G&G 739 (2d) 1374.
Inter alia, he fumed as follows at 1378-1379 “if any others who were not reappointed in the recent implementation of the transitional provisions of the constitution wish to sue the government, they are at liberty to do so.
The government will not stop them.
But if they hope thereby to coerce the government to employ them, then they will be wasting their time and money.
My government will exercise its right to employ only those whom it wishes to employ.
No court can enforce any decision that seeks to compel the government to employ or re-employ anyone.
That would be a futile exercise.
I wish to make that perfectly clear.”
This outburst flew in the face of article 102 (3) of the 1969 constitution of Ghana, that ‘ in the exercise of the Judicial power of Ghana, the Judiciary in both its Judicial and administrative functions shall be subject only to this Constitution and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any other person or authority’.
Article 115 (1) and (2) of the said 1969 constitution of Ghana provided as follows: “The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the president, acting in consultation with the Council of State by warrant under his hand and the Presidential seal” ‘The other Judges of the Superior Court of Judicature shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and the Presidential Seal acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Council’ Consequent upon this judgement Justices, Azu Crabbe and Apaloo who after Ollennu J.A were the most senior justices of the Court of Appeal, see the list under the heading JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF GHANA contained in (1968) GLR, E.A.L Bannerman who had been a Senior Magistrate, the equivalent of a Circuit Court Judge was appointed the Chief Justice of Ghana and K.O.
Larbi a private Legal Practitioner and Siriboe J.A (the only judge who ruled in favour of the Busia Administration were made more senior judges over them on the Supreme Court.
What was more V.C.R A.C.
Crabbe who in 1968 was the 11 th most senior high court Judge out of a list of 12High court judges (see under Judges of the Superior Courts of Ghana (1968) GLR, was appointed from the High Court to the Supreme Court as a senior over and above Azu Crabbe and Apaloo JJ.A.
The appointments aroused public scrutiny as revealed in BADU v THE REPUBLIC (1974) 2 GLR 361.
Thereatthe facts of the case as summarized in the headnote are as follows; “the appellant, the editor of a newspaper.
The spokesman published a front page editorial commenting on the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court established under the suspended Constitution of 1969, which indicated that the appointments, including that of the first prosecution witness, were improper.
The editorial also imputed that the first prosecution witness who was at the material time a High Court Judge, was unfit to hold the post of a Supreme Court judge and that as Interim Electoral Commissioner, he had during the 1969 general elections, misconducted himself by showing bias in favor of the winning party.
The appellant was therefore charged with intentional libel arising from the publication, contrary to section 112 (2) of the Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29).”
Again, the plaintiff in TUFFUOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1980) GLR634 C.A sitting as the Supreme Court, successfully claimed that even though the 1979 constitution preserved existing offices at the time it came into force, President Limann purported to nominate Apaloo who was the sitting Chief Justice for parliamentary approval, to be Chief Justice anew.
Parliament rejected him on very tenuous grounds.
Otherwise Apaloo C.J.
would have been ousted and the Limann government would have had a free hand to pick the Chief Justice of his liking with its attendant implications.
President Limann also made a similar radio broadcast as Busia had done in 1969, when, as far as I can recollect, Colonel Frank George Barnasko rtd.
challenged his scheme of the distribution of essential commodities in court.
Also President Kuffuor in swearing in a Chief Justice of Ghana said that although the Judiciary is independent yet he could not ignore politics and that he must take politics into account.
When the Supreme Court ruled the Fast-Track court as unconstitutional President Kuffuor fumed from outside Ghana that he was dissatisfied with the decision and that he would do everything in his power to have it reversed.
Indeed, Justice Kwame Afreh was promoted to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal and was part of the reversing panel on the final decision on the Fast-Track court matter.
Such executive intimidations, not forgetting the unfortunate murder of 3 high Court Judges and a Retired Army Major in 1982, could demoralize the judiciary.
As noted in his book Ghana Bar Association Lectures in continuing legal education 1993-1994, the very distinguished late legal scholar, S.Y.
Bimpong-Buta, quoted pp.1-3 of the Weekly Spectator No.
1288,28 November 1992 frontpage, which referred to the fact that the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Peoples National Convention (PNC), the National Independent Party (NIP) and the Peoples Heritage Party (PHP)’s “decision not to contest the results of the presidential elections is based partly on “loss of confidence in the judiciary.
In the words of a leading member, of one of the four opposition parties: ‘it will be a waste of time and money to go to court, because the judiciary as at now is not independent: the judges have been so intimidated that there is no way they will rule in our favor against the government’.
In fact, the leader of the NPP was quoted as having said that the decision of the party not to challenge the results of the presidential elections at the Supreme court (was on the grounds, inter alia, that ‘the party had no confidence in the Chief Justice and the judges of the Supreme Court’.
At p.3 he stated thus: “And quite recently in an article appearing in the Ghanaian Chronicle, Professor Paul Ansah of the University of Ghana (now deceased) was able to assert that: ‘We know that with the kind of a de facto one party system that we have, Parliament may not be able to do much, and with an enfeebled, emasculated and compromised judiciary, the prospects don’t look too bright..” Though the author subsequently states that the said loss of confidence in the Judiciary was not justified, this is not entirely correct.
In Republic v. National Public Tribunals, Ex parte office of the Special Public Prosecutor (1993-94) 1 GLR 478 S.C, the special public prosecutor applied to the supreme court for directions to the National Public Tribunal concerning a review application before it.
At pp486-487 the very distinguished Adade JSC felt compelled to say thus “the proper party to apply in this case is the People or the Republic.
The office of the special public prosecutor is none of these.
If the special public prosecutor had mounted a full blown action under article 2 of the constitution 1992, that is enforcement of the constitution provision, perhaps different considerations might arise.
For the present, however, its locus standi is questionable.
Nonetheless, as this case raises constitutional issues of some importance, I propose to deal with it on the merits, and not dismiss it, justifiably, on the foregoing grounds, and risk being accused unjustifiably, of deciding it on so- called technicalities, even if those perceived technicalities are part of the laws which the courts are enjoined to interpret and enforce.”
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF EXECUTIVE INTRUSION OF THE JUDICIARY In (1980)12 R.G.L at pp.
2-3 Apaloo CJ in paying tribute to the late Akuffo -Addo C J and President of Ghana said “For a lawyer of his caliber, elevation to the bench was a matter of course.
To most lawyers, that is the culmination of a successful legal career.
It came in 1962 after he was in the law for 22 years, having been called to the bar in 1940.
Such honor was deserved much earlier.
That it did not come to him quicker, cannot be explained by want of merit but by the political alignment of the day.
But when it did arrive, its undue delay was acknowledged because he made history by being appointed together with lawyer R.S.
Blay, to the then highest court of the land namely, the Supreme Court, by-passing the High Court in the process.
He was not destined to remain long in that court because ironical as it seems, one of the treasured qualities of a judge which he possessed and exhibited, became his undoing.
He had the courage of his conviction and spoke his mind firmly in a judicial decision which displeased the then power in the land.
He was dismissed in February 1964, having been on the bench for less than two years.
But merit, like cork never remains submerged.
Just over two years afterwards, he was returned to the bench to fill its highest office Chief Justice.
He remained in that office till August 1970 when he was invited to occupy a still higher office- the Presidency of Ghana.
On the whole, he occupied high judicial office for just over 5 years and did so with great distinction’.
In New Patriotic Pary v Inspector General of Police (1993-94) 2 GLR 459 at 469 to 470, SC Amua-Sekyi JSC, commenting on the statutory reversal of an acquittal and retrial of certain leading personalities on a charge of treason, bluntly said: “Acquitted in proceedings intituled State v Otchere (1963)2 GLR 463, SC the verdicts were set aside by executive order: See Special Criminal Division Instrument, 1963 (EI 161).
Put back on trial before a more pliant bench, the executive had the satisfaction of seeing them convicted and sentenced to death.
Mercifully, the sentences were not carried out; but a grave precedent had been set.
The judges were not spared: Korsah CJ was removed from office, and a constitutional amendment cleared the way for the dismissal of Adumoa-Bossman J (as he then was) and other judges whose loyalty to the Absolutist State was now called in question.”
(The emphasis is ours).
Again, in Wuaku v Attorney-General (1993-94) 2 GLR 393 at 396, SC Amua-Sekyi JSC trenchantly stated as follows: “After the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime, the judiciary came in for much criticism for the role it had played while the previous government was in power.
It was said that it had departed from its traditional role as an independent arm of government and had become a willing tool of repression in the hands of the executive.
It was also said that some of the appointments to the bench had been politically motivated in that persons with known sympathies for the regime had been favoured over those who exhibited an independent frame of mind.
Worse still, it was said that some of the judges had become so depraved and demoralized that they habitually took bribes.
The answer of the new administration was the wholesale dismissal of judges – cleaning the Augean stables, as it were- and appointing new ones to take their place.
But it was soon realized that merely changing personnel would not be enough: what was required was a reappraisal of the role of the judge in the body-politic and the creation of the conditions necessary for the proper exercise of his functions.”
In Hasen v Ankrah (1987-88) GLR 639 at 667, SC Sowah JSC said: “Before I am done, I consider it ethically and judicially unacceptable the comments on the composition of the panel in this appeal.
If my brother Taylor JSC had reservations, he should have made them abundantly clear before hearing and not after opinions have been rendered which are contrary to his own.
And in any event the judges referred to are by all standards, including their knowledge of the law and integrity, competent to adorn the Supreme Court bench.
It is by sheer accident of past politics that they have not taken precedence over some members of the Supreme Court.”
This long-standing skepticism of the independence of the Judiciary and now the Supreme Court, in particular, led to the issuance of the following Practice Direction on empanelling of Justices of the Supreme Court reported in (2000) SCGLR 586 as follows: “ PRACTICE DIRECTION PRACTICE IN EMPANELLING JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 10 January 2001 Practice and procedure – Supreme Court- Constitutional cases – Empanelling of court by Chief Justice – Practice in – Chief Justice to empanel all available justices of the Supreme Court or at least seven justices in constitutional matters – Rationale for empanelling all available Justices of Supreme Court in such matters – Constitution, 1992 arts 125 (4) and 144 (6).
It is provided by the Constitution, 1992, arts 125 (4) and 144 (6) that: “125 (4) The Chief Justice shall, subject to this Constitution, be the Head of the Judiciary and shall be responsible for the administration and supervision of the Judiciary.”
“144 (6) Where the office of the Chief Justice is vacant, or where the Chief Justice is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office (a) until a person has been appointed to, and has assumed the functions of, that office; or (b) until the person, holding that office has resumed the functions of, that office; those functions shall be performed by the most senior of the Justices of the Supreme Court.”
( In exercising the functions of the office under articles 125 (4) and 144 (6) of the 1992 Constitution, His Lordship, the Ag.
Chief Justice, per his letter dated 10 January 2001 addressed to all the Justices of the Supreme Court and copied to the Judicial Secretary and the Registrar of the Supreme Court, directed as follows:) “ In order to minimize the mounting criticisms and the persistent public outcry against the Judiciary in our justice delivery and to restore public confidence, it is my desire that where practicable and especially in constitutional matters, all available Justices of the Supreme Court have a constitutional right to sit, or at least (7) justices of the court.
In view of the above and in the instant case (ie.
Republic v High Court, Bolgatanga and Hajia Fati Seidu; Ex parte Hawa Yakubu, Civil Motion No 2/2001), by virtue of the powers conferred on the Chief Justice by article 125 (4) and on me by article 144 (6), I have decided that Hon Justice Sophia Akuffo and myself, ie Hon Justice E K Wiredu, Ag Chief Justice, be added to the justices already panelled.
Hon MR.
Justice E K Wiredu Ag Chief Justice.
( Editorial Note: In pursuance of the above Directive, a panel of seven Justice of the Supreme Court, coram: Edward Wiredu Ag CJ, Adjabeng, Acquah, Atuguba, Sophia Akuffo, Lamptey and Adzoe JJSC in Republic v High Court, Bolgatanga, Ex parte Hawa Yakubu, CM No 2/2001, on 16 January 2001 unanimously granted (reserving the reasons), the application by Madam Hawa Yakubu for an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings and order of the High Court, Bolgatanga dated 6 January 2001, in an electoral petition resulting from the 7 th December 2000 Parliamentary Elections for Bawku Central Constituency.
In the respectful view of the Editor, the above Practice Direction, issued by His Lordship the Hon Ag Chief Justice, is to be most welcomed by all members of the Bench and Bar and the general public; and it may also be considered as very appropriate and long overdue.
The Practice Direction, in the form of a letter to all the Justices of the Supreme Court, makes the empanelling of the Supreme Court for the determination of the constitutional cases more transparent; and more importantly, the Direction is in line with the democratic aspirations of all Ghanaians and the sustenance of the Rule of Law in the country.
It has also the obvious merit of insulating and freeing the high Office of the Chief Justice from all imaginary and unproven but disturbing allegations of political bias in the empanelling of the Justices of the Supreme Court SYBB.”
This skepticism, as noted at pages 48-49 of Dr Date-Bah’s formidable book, Reflections on the Supreme Court of Ghana, Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing (2015), has persisted under the current Chief Justice.
He thereat states as follows: “ The Chief justice’s power to empanel judges confers on him or her, arguably, the opportunity or potential to influence the outcome of particular cases.
The Chief Justice’s knowledge of an individual judge’s track record on particular issues or his or her judicial inclinations on particular issues may give the Chief Justice this potential.
This, rightly or wrongly, has attracted unfavorable comment from people in political circles, in relation to politically controversial decisions.
It is in reaction to such comments that Chief Justice Georgina Wood decided that she would, during her tenure, empanel, as a matter of practice a bench of nine justices to hear all constitutional cases.
On this current practice, the Constitution Review Commission commented that it finds in regard to Ghana’s judicial practice that no law has ever prescribed the maximum number of Justices of the Supreme Court that should sit on a case brought before the Court, though it has been the practice to specify the quorum.
It has noted that this is a deliberate policy on the part of the law makers to allow the highest court a certain flexibility and freedom in deciding when to field a full complement of members depending on the gravity of the case and the need for a reconsideration of the law.
It acknowledges that this practice has helped ensure that in the adjudication of matters of importance, as many judicial minds as possible would be involved in settling the law and making a definitive pronouncement.
In this regard, the Commission commends the emerging practice by which 9 justices of the Supreme Court are empaneled to sit on constitutional cases.”
The legal colossus, Dr.
Date- Bah JSC (Retired), at page 201 of his said book has further observed as follows: ” A perception and conviction by the public of the Supreme Court’s impartiality between parties in its adjudication is vital to its fulfilment of its broader role.
Nevertheless, there has in recent years been a degree of controversy in the media as to the impartiality of the judiciary in general in disputes between the Government (by which is meant the Executive) and the individual.
This has been a challenge that the Supreme Court, along with other courts, has had to live with.
The challenge has arisen from the highly competitive nature of Ghanaian party politics in the last decade and the perceived tendency for a party in government to prosecute politicians belonging to opposition.
The court has been caught in the middle of this conflict and in their endeavour to do justice between parties before them have incurred the wrath of political party activists of the governing party who have alleged that the judiciary is biased against the government.
The best response to this challenge is for the conduct of the judiciary to manifest its indubitable impartiality.”
On the other hand, Dr Date-Bah JSC (Retired) in his aforementioned book states at 211-212 regarding this matter thus: “The mode of appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court is specified by article 144 of the 1992 Constitution.
It provides for their appointment by the President, acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with approval of Parliament.
Thus, both the executive and the legislature are involved in the process.
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, as confirmed by practice, appears to be that nominations should be made by the Judicial Council, although the appointment is by the President.
The names of nominees recommended by the Judicial Council are forwarded to the President who places them before the Council of State for their views.
If the views of the Council of State are not negative, the President then forwards the names to the Speaker of Parliament for Parliamentary vetting.
It should be noted, however, that Presidents in the Fourth Republic have not considered themselves bound by the advice of the Judicial Council in relation to nominations for appointment to the Supreme Court.
Presidents have on occasion refused to accept some nominees recommended by the Judicial Council.
-------- Under a Constitution on the Westminster model, such as that in force in Ghana between 1957 and 1960, the Governor-General was obliged to follow the advice given him on judicial appointments.
However, this convention and understanding have not survived into the Republican era.
Ordinarily, Presidents tend to accept the nominees of the Judicial Council as, it has to be remembered, the Attorney-General (the President’s principal legal adviser) and four nominees of the President serve on the Judicial Council.
The President thus has ample opportunity to influence the nominations by the Judicial Council.
--------Furthermore, because the constitutional provision requires parliament’s prior approval, Parliament has a veto power over the appointment of any Supreme Court Justice.
JUDICIAL COMPROMISE OF INDEPENDENCE Sometimes the judiciary gives the impression that it is giving an undue advantage to the executive.
In NATIONAL MEDIA COMMISSION v. ATTORNEY GENERAL (2000) SCGRL1 the national media commission complained to the attorney general that the president was usurping their clear authority under Article 168 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana “to appoint the chairmen and other members of the governing bodies of public corporations managing the state-owned media in consultation with the president.”