The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt has been and still is marginalized in both Western and Israeli historiography on Palestine, and even progressive Western scholars have little to say about the anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian Arab rebels against the British Empire. According to Swedenberg's analysis, for instance, the Zionist version of Israeli history acknowledges only one authentic national movement: the struggle for Jewish self-determination that resulted in the Israeli Declaration of Independence in May 1948. Swedenberg writes that the Zionist narrative has no room for an anticolonial and anti-British Palestinian national revolt.  Zionists often describe the revolt as a series of "events" (Hebrew מאורעות תרצ"ו-תרצ"ט) "riots", or "happenings".The appropriate description was debated by Jewish Agency officials, who were keen not to give a negative impression of Palestine to prospective immigrants. In private, however, David Ben-Gurion was unequivocal: the Arabs, he said, were "fighting dispossession ... The fear is not of losing land, but of losing the homeland of the Arab people, which others want to turn into the homeland of the Jewish people."
As the inevitable war with Germany approached, British policy makers concluded that although they could rely on the support of the Jewish population in Palestine, who had no alternative but to support Britain, the support of Arab governments and populations in an area of great strategic importance for the British Empire was not assured. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain concluded "if we must offend one side, let us offend the Jews rather than the Arabs."In February 1939 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Malcolm MacDonald called together a conference of Arab and Zionist leaders on the future of Palestine at St. James's Palace in London but the discussions ended without agreement on 27 March. The government's new policy as published in White Paper of 17 May had been determined already and despite Jewish protests and Irgun attacks the British remained resolute.There was a growing feeling among British officials that there was nothing left for them to do in Palestine.Perhaps the ultimate achievement of the Arab Revolt was to make the British sick of Palestine. Major-General Bernard "Monty" Montgomery concluded, "the Jew murders the Arab and the Arab murders the Jew. This is what is going on in Palestine now. And it will go on for the next 50 years in all probability."
The revolt weakened the military strength of Palestinian Arabs in advance of their ultimate confrontation with the Jewish settlement in the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and was thus counterproductive. During the uprising, British authorities attempted to confiscate all weapons from the Arab population. This, and the destruction of the main Arab political leadership in the revolt, greatly hindered their military efforts in the 1948 Palestine war, where imbalances between the Jewish and Arab economic performance, social cohesion, political organisation and military capability became apparent.The Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his supporters directed a Jihad against any person who did not obey the Mufti. Their national struggle was a religious holy war, and the incarnation of both the Palestinian Arab nation and Islam was Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Anyone who rejected his leadership was a heretic and his life was forfeit. After the Peel report publication, the murders of Arabs leaders who opposed the Mufti were accelerated. Pressed by the assassination campaign pursued by the rebels at the behest of the Husseini leadership, the opposition had a security cooperation with the Jews. The flight of wealthy Arabs, which occurred during the revolt, was also replicated in 1947–49.Thousands of Palestinian houses were destroyed, and massive financial costs were incurred because of the general strike and the devastation of fields, crops and orchards. The economic boycott further damaged the fragile Palestinian Arab economy through loss of sales and goods and increased unemployment.Clearly, the revolt did not achieve its goals, although it is "credited with signifying the birth of the Arab Palestinian identity." It is generally credited with forcing the issuance of the White Paper of 1939 in which Britain retreated from the partition arrangements proposed by the Peel Commission in favour of the creation of a binational state within ten years, although The League of Nations commission held that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Mandate as put forth in the past. The White Paper of 1939 was regarded by many as incompatible with the commitment to a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as proclaimed in the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Al-Husseini rejected the new policy, although it seems that the ordinary Palestinian Arab accepted the White Paper of 1939. His biographer, Philip Mattar wrote that in that case, the Mufti preferred his personal interests and the ideology rather than the practical considerations.
1937年になると、JOBKも新しい曲をヒットさせた。新年早々に出した「月の出島」が好評で、これは佐藤惣之助の詩に内田元が曲を付けたものである。内田は続いて、「春の唄」を作曲した。3月1日から月村光子の歌で放送され、喜志邦三の詩もよかったので、多くの人々に愛唱されヒットした。JOAKでは、「牡蠣の殻」が評判がよかったが、やはり、「新鉄道唱歌」（土岐善麿作詞、堀内敬三作曲）が一番だった。鉄道唱歌といえば、明治に作られた「汽笛一声新橋を・・」を思い浮かべるが、いつまでも明治ではと、現代のモダンな鉄道を歌おうと作られたものである。5月3日から、加藤梅子（由利あけみ）と中野忠晴の歌で放送された。最初は、「新鉄道唱歌」として放送されたのだが、好評なので、続編を数々作った。曲は同じで詞が違うというものである。西條八十作詞の「東海道編」、佐佐木信綱作詞の「伊勢路」、「尾張、美濃、近江路」、与謝野晶子作詞の「近畿」、翌年には、杉山長谷夫が新しく曲を付け、「上野－仙台」、土井晩翠が「高崎－直江津」、相馬御風が「直江津－金沢」を作詞している。1937年7月7日に盧溝橋事件が起こると、歌の世界にもだんだん戦時色が濃くなって来た。そして、国民歌謡の本来の主旨とは違った方向へ曲げられつつあった。それは、国民歌謡が誕生してわずか1年のことであった。8月23日から放送した「千人針」もこうした一つである。この千人針は、作詞のサトウハチローがポリドール専属、作曲の乗松昭博がビクター専属と会社が違うためレコードは出来なかった。そこでポリドールは、長津義司が似たような曲を付け、関種子の歌でレコード発売した。ビクターは、佐伯孝夫が別の詩を付け、「街の千人針」と題し、江戸川蘭子の歌でレコード発売されている。同年、12月27日からは「愛国行進曲」が放送された。この曲は、JOBK、JOAKが作った曲ではなく、内閣情報部が選定し、放送されたものである。この曲は、各レコード会社から発売されている。戦時中とあれ、戦時歌謡ばかりという訳ではなく、10月18日からJOBKで放送した「愛国の花」（作詞福田正夫、作曲古関裕而）のように、渡辺はま子の歌で広く愛唱された曲もある。この年の国民歌謡は、午後0時23分から7分間に2曲聞かせる形の放送に変更していた。この時に放送されたのが、「海ゆかば」であった。