Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik. Platon und Aristoteles (review) (1985)

422 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:3 JULY 1985 the ES, and the dramatic interaction between them (esp. 61-69). One does not have to accept everything that Rosen says about this matter to realize that Plato does portray Socrates as partly suspicious of the ES and as holding him at arm's length, and that there is ground therein for doubting that the ES is simply Plato's mouthpiece . The chief virtue of the book is that it forces us to confront the possibility that the ES's account of falsity is at best only a part of Plato's realist conception of falsity and truth. If one finds it implausible (as I do) that Plato gave that conception up in his later works,5 then this book is a useful stimulus to further thought about how the contents of the Sophist are related to it. NICHOLAS WHITE The University of Michigan Andreas Graeser. Die Philosophie der Antike 2: Sophistik und Sokratik. Platon und Aristoteles . Vol. 2, Geschichte der Phitosophie in zwOlf B~nden. Reihe Beck'sche Elementarb~cher. Edited by W. ROd. M0nchen: C. H. Beck, 1983. Pp. 345. DM 38,oo. Within a 12 volume history of philosophy, Graeser's book covers the "classical" period of Greek Philosophy; it treats, in four chapters, of (1) the Sophists, (2) Socrates and some of his followers, (3) Plato, and (4) Aristotle. Graeser's style is lively and, for the most part, makes for easy reading. When he discusses competing interpretations of a philosopher's teaching, he can quite frequently base this on his own research. In a general introduction to the volume, the author draws attention to the historical setting against which the philosophical movements of 5th and 4th century Greece have to be seen. "Sophistik": The particular virtue of the chapter on the sophists is the emphasis on their significance for the history of philosophy. Graeser takes these philosophers seriously , although, understandably, he shows more respect for their questions than for their answers. Protagoras, e.g., presents us with questions as up-to-date as the following : What is the relation between what seems to me to be true and what is true? What forms of relativism or subjectivism, if any, are tenable? Or take the section on Gorgias: What are the objects of perception and of thought? How can something mean something else? How can we talk about what is not? Can your sense-impressions be compared with mine? (This section, by the way, is a little laborious to read. The inadequacy of the sources seems to lead Graeser to somewhat shaky and hazy interpretations here.) The individual contours of each sophist emerge quite distinctly. At the same time, Graeser is aware that the sophists' topics and even their positions exhibit a considerable convergence, apparently owing to a shared misunderstanding of language : words, esp., predicates, and even sentences tend to be construed as names of 5 See my Plato on Knowledge and Reality. This is not to deny that Plato changed some features of the theory that embodied that conception. BOOK REVIEWS 423 things (See 48 f.). Recurring themes are: (1) The problem of understanding "is" in sentences like "The man is wise," i.e., either we should never use such a form of proposition or else we are saying what is false, viz., that man = wise. (2) Accounts of knowledge on the model of seeing. (3) The possibility of negation and of falsehood. There is, of course, another area of thought where the sophists easily get in touch with more recent philosophers: questions of unconditional norms of behavior and of the foundations and function of legislation. I found particularly illuminating the pages on Thrasymachus (77-8o). According to Graeser's analytical treatment, his position concerns not so much the nature of justice as its intrinsic relationship with "the anatomy of social reality" (79). The second chapter, "Sokratik," deals with Socrates, Euclid of Megara, Antisthenes and Aristippus. In comparing Socrates with Aristotle (94 f.), Graeser observes that Socrates is the more critical moral philosopher of the two in regard to accepted moral values. The larger part of the book is taken up by two extensive...