Combat Decision Making in "Operations Other Than War" (1996)

Tis not hard, I think For men so old as we to keep the peace. -William Shakespeare1 RECENT ARMY DEPLOYMENTS have reaffirmed that the likelihood of US becoming involved in operations other than war (OOTW) will remain high in the near future. Likewise, contemporary US military strategy has embraced peace operations, along with warfighting and deterrence, as a prime means for advancing US national interests and pursuing national security objectives.2 Thus, brigade and battalion commanders find their units not only training for high-intensity combat operations, but also preparing to conduct peacekeeping (PK), humanitarian assistance (HA) or other complicated and potentially sensitive noncombat missions. The presence and role of the UN, other US government and international agencies, allied and nongovernmental organizations in OOTW add more complexity to the challenge of command and control. The varied interests of these entities are often incongruent, and the mission focus may shift in such a highly charged political environment. A recent example occurred in Somalia when US conducted concurrent HA, PK and peace enforcement operations under UN auspices.3 Therefore, command of US military in OOTW can be an intricate process. Decision making requires a pragmatic, flexible methodology due to OOTW's unique conditions. OOTW's multifaceted civil-military environment may give rise to openended mission statements or vague mission end states.4 In addition, the potential for periods of intense violence may exist, requiring precipitous force escalation followed by an equally rapid return to restraint. Finally, OOTW's nonlinear spatial nature often requires the commander to rely on decentralized execution of decisions and orders. Applying the Combat DecisionMaking Model to OOTW The concept, planning and/or preparation, execution and assessment (CPEA) methodology discussed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staffs, is one of three doctrinal methods of decision making in combat operations. However, CPEA's proactive focus on continuous planning for future events based on the outcome of current operations also makes it an ideal tool for decision making in OOTW, where several events may occur simultaneously or in quick succession.5 The CPEA methodology is particularly useful for brigade and battalion commanders when time constraints and staff limitations inhibit deliberate decision making. The OOTW process discussed in this article is much like the CPEA model designed for combat decision making. However, the OOTW process incorporates political, as well as military, environmental conditions that the commander must consider as he makes his running estimates. Accordingly, the methodology depicted in Figure 1 incorporates terminology and processes that are germane to both combat and noncombat operations. For example, what might otherwise be called enemy forces in PK operations are frequently termed former belligerents; intelligence collection becomes information gathering; and so on.6 At brigade level, the commander's initial concept focuses on at least one suitable method for employing allocated resources to accomplish missions within the intent and plans of the commander two levels higher. The commander must now consider essential specified and implied military tasks, as well as political tasks, in formulating a concept for the operation. In practice, political interests typically outweigh military necessity in OOTW's conduct, thus placing additional constraint on military forces. For example, PK operations are conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires the consent of the conflicting parties. This mutual consent compels UN to execute their mandate with absolute impartiality. Peacekeepers have no enforcement rights in the strictest sense and may legally employ force only as a last resort in self-defense? …