1. the Once and Future Problem of General Friction (1996)

Since end of U.S.-Soviet Cold War, there has been growing discussion of possibility that technological advances in means of combat would produce ftmdamental changes in how future wars will be fought. A number of observers have suggested that nature of itself would be transformed. Some proponents of this view have gone so far as to predict that these changes would include great reductions in, if not outright elimination of, various impediments to timely and effective action in for which Prussian theorist and soldier Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) introduced term Friction in war, of course, has a long historical lineage. It predates Clausewitz by centuries and has remained a stubbornly recurring factor in combat outcomes right down to 1991 Gulf War. In looking to future, a seminal question is whether Clausewitzian would succumb to changes in leading-edge warfare that may lie ahead, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of that technology can but marginally affect. It is this question that present essay will examine. Clausewitz's earliest known use of term to describe effect of reality on ideas and intentions in war occurred in a 29 September letter written to his future wife, Marie von Briihl, less than 3 weeks before France defeated Prussia at twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt on 14 October 1806. (1) By time Clausewitz died in 1831, his original insight regarding friction's debilitating effects on campaign of 1806 had grown into a central theme of unfinished manuscript that his widow published as Vom Kriege [On War]. (2) American military officers today most often refer to Clausewitz's unified concept of a general (Gesamtbegriff einer allgemeinen Friktion) as and friction of war. (3) The diverse difficulties and impediments to effective use of military force that those possessing military experience instinctively associate with this phrase are generally acknowledged to have played significant roles in most, if not all, of wars since Clausewitz's time. Even in a conflict as inundated with technically advanced weaponry as 1991 Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), there was no shortage of at any level, tactical, operational, strategic, or even political. Indeed, close examination of Desert Storm suggests that frictional impediments experienced by winning side were not appreciably different in scope or magnitude than they were for Germans during their lightning conquest of France and Low Countries in May 1940. The historical persistence of friction, despite vast changes in means of since Clausewitz's time, suggests that his concept may reflect far more than a transitory or contingent feature of land warfare during Napoleonic era. Yet, as we try to think about how may change over next couple decades in response to technological advances, nothing precludes us from wondering whether scope or overall magnitude of Clausewitzian may change. Some U.S. military officers who have grappled with how future wars may be fought have suggested that foreseeable advances in surveillance and information technologies will sufficiently lift the fog of war to enable future American commanders to see and understand everything on a battlefield. (4) Nor are visionary military officers alone in this speculation. In a 6-month assessment conducted by a Washington, DC, defense-policy institute on prospects for a Military Technical Revolution (MTR), participants concluded that what MTR promises, more than precision attacks or laser beams, is ... to imbue information loop with near-perfect clarity and accuracy, to reduce its operation to a matter of minutes or seconds, and, perhaps most important of all, to deny it in its entirety to enemy. (5) These forecasts concerning conflict in information age raise at least three first-order questions about Clausewitz's unified concept of a general friction. …