Power under Control (1997)

PERHAPS THE GREATEST challenge the military faces in conducting operations other than war (OOTW) today-by whatever terminology we choose to describe them-is setting realistic goals and identifying meaningful measurements of success.l US civilian policy makers and military leaders have been wrestling with the problem in one form or another for over two centuries. In fact, such operations have been more common than wars. Simply put, confusion stems from three principal sources: Military operations that rely heavily on show of force, presence or peace enforcement occur in an inherently ambiguous environment, especially in the area of rules of engagement. They offer few concrete objectives or sign posts that permit an intervening force to reliably determine the success of its efforts. The placement of combat forces in situations that put a much higher premium on restraint and adaptability than on warrior skills, which form the main focus of soldier training and indoctrination, creates an inescapable tension. Each of these sources of complexity is magnified several times over by virtue of the fact that OOTW typically entails working in a foreign cultural environment most soldiers can little understand. Indeed, Americans in general, whether working for military or civilian agencies, are not renowned for their cross-cultural awareness. Probably no recent case better illustrates the finely nuanced difficulty of such deployments than Operation Uphold Democracy. The US Army's deployment to Haiti reflects an attempt to learn from past mistakes. The operation was wildly popular with the native populace and, by most accounts, scored some notable successes. However, there is cause to question what we actually did accomplish in a strategic sense. The following discussion looks at what the US Army actually did and the situation we left behind. Rationale and Mission Notwithstanding the high level of approval that greeted the performance of American, multinational and UN forces in Haiti, Time correspondent Johanna McGreary issued a challenging mission appraisal in February 1996: When the post-Cold War book of rules for global intervention is written, the lesson of the Haiti chapter will be this: define your goals so minimally that it will be easy to meet them, declare victory and go home.3 McGreary went on to assert that the mission's most critical element was the timely departure of American soldiers, thereby ensuring that US engagement in Haiti would not become protracted, costly and politically unpopular. The assessment's most damning aspect was the conclusion that in the end, Haiti remains a basket case with bleak future prospects.4 Whatever the US mission accomplished, it produced little change to suggest that the beleaguered nation, born of history's only successful revolution engineered by slaves, is retreating from the abyss of social chaos and deepening human tragedy. In a separate but equally blunt 1996 critique by the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, Donald Schultz maintained that overall neither American politicians nor their Haitian counterparts were anxious to address the Caribbean republic's root problem: the existence of an embedded system of behavior and values that cripples the development of a stable, democratic polity, economic growth and a social infrastructure beneficial to the average, impoverished citizen. The reasons, Schultz maintains, are that Americans are disposed to seek a quick fix which will not require a commitment to nation building.5 On the other hand, most Haitian politicians and their co-nationals living abroad resent the notion that Haiti's problems are fundamental, reaching to the core of their political culture. They prefer to believe the predatory state that has dominated their country for so long owes its existence to a picked group of corrupt leaders and their paid henchmen.6 The implication is that good leaders, backed by international aid, can turn Haiti's fortunes around. …