On "Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific" (2013)

This commentary in response to the article, Strategic Landpower in the by John R. Deni published in the Autumn 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 3). In his Parameters article entitled Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, Professor John R. Deni attempts to make the case that the United States significant strategic roles to play in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region which cannot be met alone by the United States Air Force and the Navy. (1) Among these roles, Deni avers that the provide ballistic missile defense (BMD) in addition to the Army's traditional role of providing defense and deterrence and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. (2) Most importantly, Deni believes that in the Pacific theater, the foster allied and bolster the strength of less-capable partner militaries better than its Navy and Air Force counterparts, because the US 'Army' to its allies. (3) The implication clear. In the sequestration era, the needs to justify its relevance in pursuit of America's geopolitical strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Although I agree to an extent with Deni's proposal for the Army's participation in what he refers to as and cooperation activities, the premises underlying his argument may be flawed for several reasons. First, by arguing that many allies view the United States' presence positively because it helps establish capabilities that support the rule of law, promotes security and stability domestically, Deni assumes that America still and must retain the mantle of global leadership even though its image abroad has weakened considerably. (4) According to the latest survey by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, while the United States retained its favorable image over China at 63 percent, many countries are nevertheless perplexed by America's unilateral actions on the world stage. (5) Furthermore, security cooperation activities involving America's Asian allies may potentially anger the Chinese in the same manner that the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept has led, and could lead to, greater tensions with China. (6) Second, by advocating that the also undertake an active role in BMD to assure our allies in the Pacific of our commitment as well as to deter [potential] aggressors, Deni deliberately overlooks the fact that the Air Force and the Navy are already performing missile defense and, for this reason, undertaking such missions would prove redundant. (7) This leads to the third point. Deni's argument that the better suited for fostering allied because it can speak Army trivializes the fact other services have proven equally adept at or outmatched the in fostering interoperability among our Asian allies. (8) One example that of the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises hosted by the Pacific Fleet. Fourth, he correctly argues that confidence- and security-building measures will be critical to reverse Chinese perception that it being encircled by America's pivot to Asia; however, such activities are not without risk, especially given China's growing cyber capabilities. (9) Indeed, as Larry M. Wortzel, the president of Asia Strategies and Risks, testified before Congress in July, China is using its advanced cyber capabilities to conduct large-scale cyber espionage [against the United States]. (10) For the to adapt better to fluid strategic dynamics in the Asia Pacific, it should speak jointness (rather than Army) because sharing ideas and resources with other services and Asian allies guarantees efficient warfighting. …