Winning the Nationbuilding War (2004)

WHILE I WAS in Samac, Bosnia, an Assistant Secretary of Defense visited my unit--A Troop, 1st Squadron, 104th Cavalry, Pennsylvania Army National Guard. One of the things he said was, We have gotten pretty good at killing people. In retrospect, this was an understatement. As Saddam Hussein found out, the United States can reach almost any corner of the world with real power. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be quite as efficient at nationbuilding. Construction is more difficult than destruction, and nationbuilding operations can be long, complex, and expensive. America's mission in Bosnia has lasted several years, and no U.S. official has yet mentioned terminating operations. U.S. forces also are still in Afghanistan, and U.S. forces in Iraq have suffered more casualties since the end of major military operations than during initial operations. As a Vietnam-era veteran, 1 doubt the United States has the financial capability or the political will to occupy large segments of the world semipermanently. Yet, the potential costs of not engaging in nationbuilding might be horrific. How can we shorten the commitment and reduce the cost of nationbuilding? How can the U.S. military be as efficient at nationbuilding as it is at killing people? The answer is to have the right tools, the right people, and the fight processes for the job at hand. The Right Process Before World War 11, the Germans reorganized their army in a new way and, in doing so, changed the nature of war. The blitzkrieg was highly efficient and effective. Today, little doubt exists that the U.S. Army has the structure and processes in place for victory in any conventional conflict, but when the contest has less to do with destructive power than with winning hearts and minds, is the Army organized and manned in the most efficient, effective manner to win? The assessment made by many of those critical of the numerous peacekeeping operations throughout the globe is that it is not. The military's role in peacekeeping is to maintain a safe, secure environment. Little else is asked. Nationbuilding is seen as a separate, distinct diplomatic enterprise. Given the current structure and manning of the military force, this seems like a rational division of responsibility. Unfortunately, as former U.S. Congressman Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill once said, 'All politics is local! Most human interactions during nationbuilding occur between members of the Armed Forces and the local community. Few Iraqis have encountered Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremmer, but many have had interactions with U.S. soldiers. The millions of interactions Iraqis have with the Armed Forces create lasting impressions about Americans, and the impressions either support or diminish U.S. efforts. The ultimate goal of nationbuilding is to establish a self-sustaining country friendly to the United States. To do so, the U.S. military must use all its assets effectively. The United States should structure, man, and employ forces to ensure the peace and optimize nationbuilding through quality interactions with civilian populations. Soldiers must go beyond being peacekeepers and become nationbuilders. Up, not down. Ford's assembly line and the Army's rigid top-down command structure are good examples of the top-down approach to management that dominated the latter half of the 19th century and all of the 20th century. All organizational actions, down to the most elemental movements of the workforce, were controlled from the top. In combat operations, this type of management philosophy has proven highly effective. Unfortunately, the top-down system has been less successful in nationbuilding. Top-down management encourages exaggerating good news and minimizing bad news. Run that tendency through several layers of command and the chance is slim of higher headquarters understanding what is important in any exchange between a nationbuilder and a civilian. …