Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan: Utility as a Strategic Counterinsurgency Tool (2011)

United States and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners have been engaging in counterinsurgency (COIN) in the area covered by Regional Command-East (RC-East) in Afghanistan for much of the last decade, with varying approaches, levels of resources, and results. One of the key players has been the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), civilian-military platforms designed to extend the reach of the government of Afghanistan and for other functions. While many are concerned about the Afghan government's capacity and negative trends in the counterinsurgency, RC-East has seen some notable successes. It forced insurgent groups to operate from outside of the area, and local government has taken root in many places.1 What role have PRTs played in the positive COIN trends in this part of Afghanistan, and what have they done that may be detrimental? How do they fit into the recently modified COIN strategy? How might we apply them to insurgencies outside of Afghanistan? This article has three sections and will focus primarily on the period from 2004 to 2008 (when I was there, with consideration of events since then). first section will look at the utility of PRTs, focusing on governance, diplomatic efforts, and civilian-military coordination, with some observations on the strategic significance of these efforts. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is a point of reference.2 second section examines the challenges the PRTs face in RC-East. third section includes an overall assessment of their success or failure, and makes some recommendations on how they can operate more effectively. Of course, PRTs are part of a larger coalition team. They operate in conjunction with battalions, brigades, and Special Forces units. While each of these units has its specific tasks, they often blend in with those of the PRTs, so that any assessment (and credit for success) applies to them as well. This article focuses on the political role of PRTs, rather than their military or development assistance efforts. Utility of PRTs This section examines the utility of PRTs from a political officer's perspective, particularly between 2004 and 2008, focusing on three main areas: * Assistance in developing local governance. * Reporting, analysis, and diplomacy. * As a hub for coordination within the U.S. government, the government of Afghanistan (GoA), and international organizations. Observations on the strategic value of these actions follow. Developing local governance. COIN manual notes, The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. How have PRTs contributed to this line of operation? While most international civilian efforts immediately after the 2001 defeat of the Taliban sought to establish a functioning central government in Kabul, by 2004 more effort was being put into establishing and developing provincial-level governance. There was a need not only to build up governance, but also to reestablish a functioning civil society whose fabric had been torn by a series of wars beginning in 1979. Provincial reconstruction teams were central to military, State Department, and to some extent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to improve governance.3 By 2007, more emphasis could be put on improving district-level government, along with some programs to build up municipal governments. Initially, PRTs in RC-East worked in a fluid environment, with uneven GoA presence and considerable influence by informal power brokers, including tribal leaders, militia leaders, mullahs, and landowners. insurgency was still in its nascent stages, allowing civilian and military coalition officers more opportunities to engage with Afghans. Many, perhaps most, Afghan civilians at this time were hopeful about the country's future and positive regarding coalition efforts. …