A violent impediment: the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003–07 (2008)

Abstract Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan. Keywords: TalibanAfghanistanOperation Enduring Freedom, International Security Assistance ForceKandaharsuicide bombing Notes 1. See for example CitationJohnson, 'On the Edge of the Big Muddy'. 2. This study is based on the author's annual participation in coalition operations in Kandahar Province, which started in 2003. In the main it is derived from personal observations and discussions with local people as well as with counterinsurgency practitioners. The paucity of documentation derived from what is actually occurring on the ground is the primary motive for the production of this paper. 3. BBC, 28 March 2003, Rahimullah Yusufzai, 'Taleban aims to regain power.' 4. The external academic reviewer of this article snidely referred to this depiction of the situation as 'naive' and implied in his review that federal government legitimacy isn't relevant in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. That is a gross generalization not borne out during my travels in Kandahar province. The reality is that any international effort in stabilizing Afghanistan has to be seen by domestic audiences in Western countries to be supporting a legitimate government. International aid money on the scale necessary to rehabilitate Afghanistan will not flow without a legitimate government. The legitimacy of the federal and the provincial governments is indeed important to people in Kandahar province and the perceived lack of legitimacy in 2005–06 was deliberately exploited by the Taliban for their purposes. 5. RFE/RL 6 July 2004 'Afghan Voter-Registration Site Attacked'; 27 June 2004, 'Taliban Targeting Would-be Afghan Voters.' 6. Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan, 3 November 2005, 'An Assessment of the 18 September Election Results.' 7. For example, HiG deployed specialist personnel to assist Taliban efforts in Kandahar's Zharey district, while Chechyns affiliated with Al Qaeda acted as a close protection party to a Taliban leader moving operating in western Kandahar province. 8. A summation, 'Desperate Taliban,' is available at www.longwarjournal.org written by Bill Roggio. 9. Jonathan Landay, ' A New Taliban has Re-Emerged in Afghanistan,' Knight Ridder news agency, 19 August 2005. 10. 30 January 2006, 'Militants begin targeting Afghan schools parallel to soldiers,' www.AfghaNews.net 11. For these evolutions, see RFE/RL 22 April 2005, 'Taliban Says US Forces Won't Find Radio Station'; 9 May 2005, 'Afghanistan: Taliban Radio Back on the Air.' 12. See CitationGrau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 72. 13. Suicide attacks had taken place elsewhere in Afghanistan, particularly in Kabul in 2003–04, but there doesn't appear to have been this type of activity in Kandahar province until 2005. 14. CitationFoxley, 'The Taliban's Propaganda Activities'. This paper is worth reading, though there are some problems with its discussion of the tactical aspects of Taliban information operations when it comes to the local rural populations. 15. One such 'fixer', who 'assisted' one of Canada's major television networks and several prominent print journalists, was arrested in 2007 by American forces, declared an enemy combatant, and placed in American custody at Bagram Air Field. Back in 2006, this individual allegedly filmed a lethal suicide attack that took place against a convoy I was traveling in, demonstrating that he knew in advance about the attack. That television network insisted publicly that the Americans were 'mistaken' and 'wrong' to apprehend this fixer – and refused to publicly entertain the idea that the fixer was working for the Taliban and that they had been bamboozled by him. 16. The suicide car bomber that attacked and destroyed my vehicle was a Pakistani, for example. 17. As discussed at www.mypetjawa.mu.nu, 'For those who say the Internet Jihad is No Big Deal….' 16 October 2007. 18. I am indebted to Padre (Capt.) Suleyman Demiray for his insights into religious operations in Kandahar province. 19. CitationYousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap, 103.