The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953 (2014)

Introduction General Omar Bradley, Chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1951 called America's deepening involvement in Korean conflict, the wrong war, at wrong place, at wrong time, and with wrong enemy. (1) He was concerned that U.S. had entered war without sufficient consideration of its consequences, and that widening commitments there might distract from more important military task of deterring possible Soviet attacks in Western Europe. For almost everyone involved, Korean War was indeed wrong war: something they did not want, that they participated in only reluctantly. Engaged in a bruising political fight over loss of Kuomintang regime on Chinese Mainland, Truman Administration felt compelled to resist communist aggression. The French and British went along in Korea in order for sake of infant Atlantic Alliance. The new Chinese leaders, having just won their revolution, hardly needed a major war, but could not countenance Western troops on their Yalu River border. Several times war drove two regimes on Korean peninsula to near-collapse. After three years of grinding destruction, both sides were forced to settle for essentially status quo ante bellum. The war was thus both profound tragedy and horrifying proxy for World War III. (2) For Soviet Union, Korean Conflict was definitely wrong war. Officially neutral, Soviets nonetheless were vilified by both sides. U.S. officials saw Stalin as puppet master for Communist side, while Chinese resented being water carrier for socialist camp and (along with their North Korean allies) grumbled about inadequate Soviet supply efforts. A newly minted superpower, Soviet Union was reduced to handwringing from sidelines, in constant fear of confrontation with America. Believing his junior ally, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), would have little trouble defeating U.S.-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in south, Soviet leader Josef Stalin apparently gave his consent to a DPRK attack. Miscalculating possible U.S. responses, he quickly distanced himself from war, while seeking a negotiated end to potentially threatening conflict. He nonetheless supported Chinese intervention in order to keep American forces away from Soviet border. (3) Since conflict ended, genesis of war has been viewed in scholarly literature from at least three different points of view. Until 1970s, prevailing view held that war was planned in Moscow and heavily supported by Beijing, and began with an unprovoked attack by North. Decisions were taken within realm of high politics, i.e., they were driven primarily by concerns for national interests and national security. Revisionists in 1980s, influenced by Vietnam War experience, asserted that conflict was part of an ongoing Korean civil war, and that North Koreans did not depend greatly on their Russian and Chinese allies in opening stages. Revisionist scholarship focused more on domestic factors than international relations in decision making. The release of Russian and Chinese documents in 1990s returned attention to centrality of high level decision making, as it added nuance and shading to earlier images of war. Stalin, Mao, and Kim indeed made most of key decisions that led to war, but recent literature on war, notably by Sergei Goncharov, et al. and Kathryn Weathersby, suggest that a more nuanced approach focused on key leaders provides best insights into how decisions were made. (4) How were key decisions that shaped war taken? Were nation-state, bureaucratic, or individual actors most important? This article indicates that, in Korean case, Stalin was key decision maker, and only he had power to determine whether war would be launched. Mao and Kim were secondary players, former through his endorsement of attack, and Kim through his constant urging of forceful reunification of Korea from 1949 onward. …