Russia's Ulster: The Chechen War and Its Consequences (2001)

After capturing Groznyi in February 2000, Moscow claimed victory in war against Chechnya. Generals and officiaLs anticipated war's end by presidential election of 26 March 2000, and Moscow announced its final offensive to destroy Chechen forces by 26 February.(1) Nevertheless, Russian armed forces in Groznyi remain vulnerable to approximately rive hundred Chechens there. Because estimates of Chechen strength vary on a daily basis, Russian intelligence evidently knows neither number nor location of enemy forces it faces. By June 2000, Chechen terror attacks against Russians in and around Chechnya had already begun to seriously demoralize Russian troops, forcing General Staff to admit that it had underestimated size of Chechen forces. Thus, Russian and foreign observers increasingly admit that no end to war is in sight, although Russian troops will remain as long as it takes to destroy Chechen forces.(2) It is equally difficult to define what would constitute a Russian victory other than Chechnya's utter devastation. In this sense Chechnya, like Northern Ireland, appears to be an internal war that will last for years. And as with the troubles home government is (or was until Blair government took power in Great Britain) pledged to win to preserve state's unity. Chechnya's Strategic Implications The Chechen war's strategic implications are now appearing at home and abroad. Even local commanders have begun to grasp that only a political settlement with a recognized Chechen authority can extricate Moscow from Chechnya sooner rather than later. Because Moscow cannot sustain large numbers of regular troops in Chechnya--it has halved troop strength since February 2000--and therefore cannot win war soon, local commanders have urged a political settlement. They did so to force government's hand, but Moscow rejected their attempted dictation.(3) Thus apart from war's danger to Russia's political stability and territorial integrity, continued warfare could further undermine control over military. The long-standing public infighting between chief of staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, and Minister of Defense General Igor Sergeyev over fundamental issues of defense policy reflects Russia's precarious control over its armed forces. Chechnya's aggravation of this weakness highlights threats posed by this internal war--Russia's third since 1993--and confirms that however second Chechen war ends, it will determine not just Russia's territorial boundaries, but also what kind of Russia it will be.(4) Indeed, Russian political trends since war began are troubling. Those negative trends have appeared in Russia's foreign, domestic, and defense policies and oblige us to ponder consequences of either prolonged war or Russian victory. We must also define what victory would mean. Moscow neither knows how to conclude a political settlement to war nor has a viable concept of what it would entail. Nor will it negotiate with any truly authoritative figure who could end war and command internal support in Chechnya. Moscow's efforts to put Chechen clients in power and restore a political order either depend on Russian military support or have fallen apart. Therefore, this war could escape political definition or control, framework within which Clausewitz tells us that political violence must be bounded lest it become violence and war for their own sake. Then entire Russian Federation would become theater or theaters of war, as internal war became its own justification. Moscow itself is already war's center of gravity, from which all foci of Russian power emanate. So if Russia loses, repercussions will be felt there, not in Groznyi. And they will be profound. Yet it remains difficult, if not impossible, to define a Russian victory in terms other than Tacitus's phrase that Romans made a desert and called it peace. …