Rhodes, Justice:
This is an appeal by Jesse Floyd from a denial of a motion brought pursuant to Section 15-27-130, South Carolina Code (1976) to vacate a default judgment on the basis of excusable neglect, inadvertence, or surprise. We affirm.
Appellant was originally served with a summons and complaint on April 16, 1976 in which respondent James Stewart, as administrator, sought damages for the wrongful death of his daughter, allegedly caused by the negligence and wantonness of appellant, a practicing physician, in the medical treatment of his intestate. Upon receipt of these pleadings appellant immediately had them hand delivered to both his personal attorney and his malpractice insurer.
Respondent’s counsel subsequently discovered that the jurisdictional limits of the Richland County Court, where the action had been inadvertently instituted, had been grossly exceeded by the amount of damages prayed for in the complaint. He forthwith contacted both the appellant’s personal attorney and the attorney for appellant’s malpractice insurer, requesting that they consent to an alteration in the erroneous, caption by changing Richland County Court to Common Pleas Court and that the case be filed in the latter court. This request was denied. Respondent’s attorney then obtained an ex parte order from the Richland County Court on April 21, 1976 dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction. A copy of the order of dismissal was mailed to the attorney for appellant’s malpractice insurer on the same date.
A second summons and complaint, identical in every respect to the previous pleadings except the portion of the caption designating the trial forum, was served upon appellant on April 23, 1976, and filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County. When no answer, appearance, or other pleading was served within the statutory period, an affidavit of default was filed on June 4, 1976. The case was heard on September 7, 1977, without a jury, with judgment being rendered for $80,000 actual and $20,000 punitive damages against appellant.
Appellant first filed a motion on September 27, 1977 to vacate the default judgment on the ground of lack of service. After a hearing, at which appellant took the emphatic posi tion that he had never been served, the lower court denied the motion. No appeal was perfected from this ruling.
On November 15, 1977 appellant, again attempted to vacate the default judgment, proceeding under section 15-27-130 on the basis of excusable neglect, inadvertence, or surprise. The lower court denied his motion. This appeal followed.
The lower court’s determination of motions brought under section 15-27-130 will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Thermal Insulation Co., Inc. v. Town & Campus, Inc., 271 S. C. 478, 248 S. E. (2d) 310 (1978). An abuse of discretion arises in cases in which the judge issuing the order was controlled by some error of law or where the order, based upon factual, as distinguished from legal, conclusions, is without evidenitary support. Id. The party seeking relief under section 15-27-130 must show that the judgment was taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and that he had a meritorious defense. McInerny v. Toler, 260 S. C. 382, 196 S. E. (2d) 122 (1973).
Appellant contends that the two sets of summons and complaints were so similar that it constituted excusable neglect for him to conclude that the second summons and complaint had been taken care of by reason of the fact that he had placed the first set of pleadings in the hands of his attorneys. Appellant’s testimony concerning the reaction which he supposedly had when served with the second set of suit papers is necessarily diminished by his continued assertion that he has no personal recollection of ever having been served with such papers. His testimony on this vital issue is, therefore, hypothetical and speculative.
This court has passed upon several cases involving the attempt to vacate default judgments on the ground of a defendant’s failure to appreciate the importance of pleadings served upon him. In McInerny v. Toler, supra, .the court re fused to reopen a judgment where, after reading the complaint, the defendant thought the plaintiff was in error and had inadvertently brought the action against him, because he assumed he had no interest in the lease in question since he had assigned his interest to his children. In DeNault v. Holloway Builders, Inc., 271 S. C. 468, 248 S. E. (2d)265 (1978) the defendant asserted excusable neglect in failing to attend to a summons and complaint because he was served with two complaints within the same week and was confused as to the respective dates of service. This court affirmed the lower court’s refusal to vacate the judgment. In Thermal Insulation Co., Inc. v. Town & Campus, Inc., supra, this court declined to reopen a default judgment where two similar suits were served on the defendants and only one was delivered to the attorney for attention, it being “mistakenly assumed” that both had been delivered to the attorney. In none of the cases cited above was there evidence of any expectation that the lawsuits against the defendants would be served. In the instant case, both appellant’s personal attorney and the attorney for the malpractice insurer were alert to the fact that a second action would probably be forthcoming.
Moreover, unlike the recent case of Thompson v. Wilder, S. C., 253 S. E. (2d) 108 (1979), no affirmative action was undertaken by appellant to meet the statutorily specified time limit. Appellant did nothing in reference to the second set of pleadings to ascertain if he had a duty relating thereto. He made no communication of any nature to his attorneys concerning the second service.
Appellant relies heavily on the fact that the original suit was dismissed by the procurement of an ex parte order. While we have condemned the use of the ex parte order except in rare instances, Herring v. Credit Bureau of Columbia, 272 S. C. 368, 252 S. E. (2d) 123 (1979), we are unable to .discern any prejudice resulting to appellant by its use in this case. The attorneys for appellant were apparently aware of the order of dismissal at the time the second suit was filed on April 23, 1976 since a copy of the order was forwarded by respondent’s attorney through the mail to the attorney for the insurance carrier on April 21, 1976, who immediately called appellant’s personal attorney and informed him of its receipt. We are, then, unable to hold, under the circumstances here presented, that the ex parte order' was a proximate cause of appellant’s failure to give attention to the suit papers. There can be no serious contention that the order of dismissal should not have been granted, the jurisdictional defect appearing on the face of the complaint. The attorney for the malpractice insurer testified that he had in fact been prepared to make a special appearance to quash the service of. the summons and complaint for lack of jurisdiction if the ex parte order had not been obtained.
The evidence in this record is insufficient to support a finding of excusable neglect when viewed in the light of our prior decisions. Having found that appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of excusable neglect, we do not reach the issue of whether a meritorious defense exists.
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in denying the motion of appellant.
Affirmed.
Lewis, C. J., and Ness, J., concur.
Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., dissent.
The intestate initially consulted appellant concerning a pain which he diagnosed as being caused by pelvic inflammatory disease. She was admitted to Richland Memorial Hospital for the treatment of that condition and was discharged from the hospital two weeks later. Eighteen hours after such discharge, the intestate died at home.
Although appellant denies this service was made upon him, this issue has been conclusively resolved in a prior action adverse to his contention.
Counsel for the malpractice insurer testified that he called appellant’s personal counsel both after respondent’s attorney requested an amendment to the original suit and again after he had received a copy of the order of dismissal of the county court suit. On both occasions he advised appellant’s personal attorney that they might well expect suit to subsequenlty be brought in the court of common pleas.
Thompson v. Wilder, supra, may also be distinguished from the instant case by virtue of the fact that the confusion was caused in that case through the service of two summons (complaints not served). This court has noted previously that a summons (complaint not served) is a poor vehicle for alerting a layman to what is involved. Jolley v. Jolly, 265 S. C. 594, 220 S. E. (2d) 882 (1975).