OPINION.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary,
after the foregoing statement of facts. On the former hearing before this Court, the respondent interposed a demurrer to the petition which was ovemued. One of the grounds of demurrer was: “In that the order of the Railroad Commission is not the result of a judicially determined fact, and the defendant not having had its day in Court on the merits of said order, the enforcement of the order of Railroad Commission deprives the defendant of its property without due process, &c.”
The Court, in disposing of this ground of demurrer, said:
“The facts were determined by a tribunal well recognized and adopted throughout the land. The defendant was notified, appeared and contested the facts upon the merits.” •
- As the facts were judicially determined by a tribunal," empowered, by statute to make such adjudication, they'are not subject to review by this Court, in the absence of allegations charging fraud or other grounds for setting aside the adjudication. . '
Therefore, the question to be determined is, whether the order of the Commissioners, requiring the railroad company to stop at Latta (if flagged) its two fast mail trains engaged in carrying interstate passengers, is a burden1 upon interstate commerce, when the accommodations are otherwise inadequate. The mere fact that théyare fast mail trains engaged in carrying interstate passengers,' does not exempt them from regulations under the statutes of' the State.
In the case of Lake Shore Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S., 285, the Court had under consideration a statute of Ohio providing that “each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city or village, • containing over 3,000 inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers.” At the time when it was contended1 that the statute was violated, the railroad company caused only one of its trains to stop as required by the statute,1 although it was then operating three or more trains, both-' ways, over its road; all of which, except the one that stopped at the station, were fast mail trains transporting interstate'' passengers. On the assumption that the statute was iiot! unreasonable, the Court held that the statute was constitutional, and used the following language, at page 300: “The power of the State, by appropriate legislation, to provide' for the public convenience, stands upon' the same ground precisely as its power'by appropriate legislation to protect1 the public health, the public'.morals, or the public safety.' Whether legislation of either kind is inconsistent with any 'power granted to the general government is determined by the same rules. * * * The statute does not stand in the ivay of the railroad company running as many trains as it may choose between Chicago and Buffalo, without stopping at intermediate points, or only at very large cities on the route, if, in the contingency named in the statute, the required number of trains stop at each place containing 3,000 inhabitants long enough to> receive and let off passengers. It seems from the evidence that the average time required to átop a train and receive and let off passengers is only three minutes. Certainly the State of Ohio did not endow the plaintiff in error with the rights of a corporation for the purpose simply of subserving the convenience of passengers traveling through the State between points outside of its territory.' * * * It was for the State to take into consideration all the circumstances affecting passenger travel within its limits, and, as far as practicable, make such regulations as were just to all who' might pass over the road in question. It was entitled, of course, to1 provide for the convenience of persons desiring to travel from one point to another in the State on domestic trains. But it was not bound to ignore the convenience of those who desired to travel from places in the State to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those outside of the State who wished to come into it. Its statute is in aid of interstate commerce of that character. It was not compelled to look only to1 the convenience of those who desired to pass through the State without stopping. Any other view of the relations between the State and the corporation created by it would mean that the directors of .the corporation could manage its affairs solely with reference to' the interests of the stockholders, and without taking into consideration the interests of the general public. It would mean, not only that such directors were exclusive judges of the manner in which the corporation should discharge the duties imposed upon it in the interest of the public, but that the corporation could so regulate the running of its interstate trains as to build up cities and towns at the ends of its line or at favored points, and by that means destroy or retard the growth and prosperity of those at intervening points. It would mean also that, beyond the power of the State to prevent it, the defendant railway company could run all its trains through the State without stopping at any city within its limits, however numerous its population, and could prevent the people along its road within the State who desired to go beyond its limits from using its interstate trains at all, or only at such points as the con> pany chose to designate. A principle that in its application admits of such results cannot be sanctioned.”
The statute of Illinois is as follows: “Every railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop upon its (their) arrival at each station advertised by such corporation as a place of receiving and discharging passengers upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of time to receive and let off such passengers with safety: Provided, All regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad stations of county seats, to receive and let off passengers with safety.” This statute was held to be un-. constitutional in the case of Cleveland &c. v. Illinois &c., 177 U. S., 514. The Court used the following language: “The question broadly presented in this case is this : Whether a State statute is valid which requires every passenger train, regardless of the number of such trains passing each way daily, and of the character of the traffic carried by them, to stop at every county seat through which such trains may pass by day or night, and regardless also of the fact whether another train designated especially for local traffic may stop at the same station within a few minutes before or after the arrival of the train in question. * * * While, as we. held in the Lake Shore case, railways are bound to provide primarily and adequately for the accommodation of those to whom they are directly tributar}7, and who not only have granted to them their franchise, but who may have contrib-: uted largely to the construction of the road, they are bound to do no- more than this, and may then provide special facilities for the. accommodation of through traffic. * * * With no disposition whatever to- .vary or qualify the cases above cited, neither the conclusions of the Court nor the tenor of the opinions are opposed to- the principles we hold-to-in this case, that, after all local conditions have been adequately met, railways have the legal right to'adopt special provisions for through traffic and legislative interference therewith is unreasonable and the infringement upon that provision of the Constitution which we have held requires that commerce between the States shall be free and unobstructed.” In commenting on the case of Cleveland &c. v. Illinois &c., 173 U. S., 285, the Court says: “This case is readily distinguishable from the one under consideration in the fact that the statute of Ohio required only that three regular passenger trains should stop at every station containing 3,000 inhabitants, leaving the company at liberty to run as many through passenger trains exceeding three per day as it chose, without restriction as to stoppage at particular stations. In other words, it left open the loophole which the statute of Illinois has effectually closed.”
, The Court recognized the principle that it is the duty of the railroad company to provide, primarily, sufficient accommodations for those to whom it is directly tributary. From' this doctrine, it follows as a necessary corollary, that it is only “after all local conditions have been adequately met, railways have the legal right to adopt special provisions for through traffic.” The facts judicially determined by the Commissioners show that the accommodations are inadequate, and that the citizens of Latta are entitled to relief. In seeking to give relief the Commissioners have ordered trains Nos. 32 and. 35 to stop when flagged.
This Court has reached the conclusion that the writ of mandamus should be issued; but in order that the respondent may. have the opportunity of discharging its primary duty in the premises, without stopping trains Nos. 32 and 35 on flag, the writ will be so framed as to confer upon the railroad--'company the alternative right to provide facilities substantially the same as those which would be afforded the citizens of Latta by stopping trains Nos. 32 and 35 on flag.
V;It is'the judgment of this Court, that the writ of mandamus be issued in accordance with the conclusions herein announced.
April 9, 1906.
Per Curiam.'
After consideration of the petition for rehearing in this case, the Court is satisfled that no material principle of law or fact has been overlooked or disregarded.
It is,-therefore, ordered, that the petition for rehearing be dismissed and the order heretofore granted staying'the remittitur be revoked. .
This case is now in Supreme Court of United States on writ of error.