The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Jones.
The petitioner applies to this Court for an injunction to restrain the authorities of the town council of Edgefield from issuing bonds in the sum of $15,000 for the purpose of erecting a school building within said town. The issue is made upon the facts stated in the petition and amended petition, which are not denied in the return and upon the facts stated in the return to which petitioner demurred. The petition as amended and the return thereto are officially reported herewith.
The petitioner is a citizen and taxpayer of the town of Edgefield and the respondents are the mayor and aldermen of said town, constituting its town council. The said town council have resolved to issue bonds of the said town in the sum of $15,000, payable thirty years after the date hereof, with interest at the rate of five per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, for the purpose of building a school house within the corporate limits of said town. The original charter of the town of Edgefield, renewed and amended by the act of December 24th, 1879, was surrendered and the town became incorporated under the act of March 5th, 1896, entitled “An act to provide for the incorporation of towns of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand inhabitants,” 22 St., 67, and thereby, on the 28th day of February, 1898, the town of Edgefield acquired the privileges, powers and immunities, and became subject to the limitations prescribed in said act. Under sec. 1999 of the Code of 1902, “The city councils and town councils of the cities and towns of the State shall, in addition to the power conferred by their respective charters, have power and authority to make, ordain and establish all such rules, bylaws, regulations and ordinances respecting the roads, streets, markets, police, health and order of said cities and towns, or respecting any subject as shall appear to them necessary and proper for the security, welfare and convenience of such cities and towns, or for preserving health, peace, order and good government within the same, &c.” The act of February 11, 1897, 22 Stat., 411, entitled “An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled an act to authorize special elections in any incorporated city or town of this State for the purpose of issuing bonds for corporate purposes, approved March 9, 1896, so as to specify certain corporate purposes (italics ours), and so as to validate certain bonds issued under the said act,” provides: Sec. 1. “That it shall be the duty of the municipal authorities of any incorporated city or town of this State, upon the petition of a majority of the freeholders of said city or town, as shown by its tax books, to order a special election in any such city or town for the purpose of issuing bonds for * * * erecting, repairing or altering school buildings * * * or any corporate purpose set forth in said petition, &c.,” with a proviso that the aggregate bonded indebtedness shall not exceed eight per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property therein; which need not be further noticed, as it is admitted by the demurrer to the return that the bonds proposed do not exceed such limit. The foregoing statute now appears as section 2021 of the Code of 1902. It also appears that all the requirements of law relating to the issue of said bonds were strictly complied with, as to petition by requisite number of freeholders, the notice of the election and its due publication, the requisite vote of the qualified electors in favor of the.issuance of the bonds, and the due declaration of the result of the election. The only issue in the case is one of law arising under the fourth allegation of the amended petition, in part as follows: “Fourth. Your petitioner alleges that the said mayor and aldermen constituting the said town council are without authority of law to issue bonds — for the reason that the purpose for which said bonds are to be issued is neither a public purpose nor a corporate purpose; that there is no authority of law for the said town council to enjoy or exercise any control over the schools in said town; and the said town council is without authority to incur the expenses incident to the erection of a school building which is to be managed and controlled without the interference, or co-operation, or supervision of the authorities of the said town.”
From the foregoing statement as to the chartered powers of the town of Edgefield, there is no room for doubt that the erection of a school building within the corporate limits is a corporate purpose. It is expressly declared to be a corporate purpose. That being the case, it is needless to inquire whether such is a public purpose, but a very slight consideration' of the purposes of a school building within a town, in the discipline and training of the youth of the community, in promoting an intelligent citizenship, in attracting to the town a desirable class of people, who build homes and enter into business in the town, in the tendency to create or enhance taxable property and other important public considerations, which readily occur to the mind as supporting the erection of a school building in convenient reach of the community, will demonstrate that such a purpose is a public one, and in a very high degree. But the petition states “that there is no authority of law for the said town council to enjoy or exercise any control over the schools in said town; and the said town council is without authority to incur the expenses incident to the erection of a school building which is to be managed and controlled without the interference, or co-operation, or supervision of the authorities of the said town.” These are but statements of legal conclusions which do not bind the respondents or the Court, even though they do not appear to have been specifically denied in the return. The Court judicially knows that such a building within a town would be subject to all proper police regulations of the town, and to that extent the building would be subj ect to the control and supervision of the municipal authorities just as other buildings in the town. It is doubtless true that the town council has no control over the schools in said town, for the very satisfactory reason that the Constitution of the State, in art. XI., devoted to the subject of education, and the statute laws of the State pursuant thereto, have placed jurisdiction over public schools in other officers, particularly selected for that purpose, and there is nowhere to be found any legislative attempt to confer power over schools in town-councils.
It has already been shown that the allegation- that the town council is without authority to incur the expenses 'incident to the erection of a school building, is in conflict with the express grant of such power to the town. But it is further argued that a municipal corporation has no power to issue bonds for the erection of a school building which is-to be managed and controlled without the interference, or co-operation, or supervision of the town authorities, and it is said that in order to carry out such a purpose, it would be necessary for the town authorities to divest themselves of their corporate powers, and delegate them to others, which would be unlawful. Attention must here be directed to the case as made by the petition and to the constitutional and statutory provisions on the subject of schools, to which reference has already been made. By these it is manifest that the town council of Edgefield never had any power or control over schools or school buildings beyond such as properly belong to them under their power of police. Therefore, the town council in issuing the bonds for the purpose named would not divest themselves of or delegate to others any power over schools, for the very simple reason that no power or control over schools was ever conferred on them. It has already been stated that the educational scheme of this State, as embodied m the Constitution and statutes, has wisely placed jurisdiction over schools elsewhere. The issuance of the bonds pursuant to the statute, whose terms and conditions have been complied with, would in no sense involve a delegation or divesting of corporate powers touching matters of police. It is perfectly competent for the legislature to prescribe what shall be a corporate purpose, unless some constitutional limitation or prohibition exists. The only corporate purpose prescribed in this connection is “erecting, repairing or altering school buildings,” and the legislature, even if it had the power, did not see fit to attach to this corporate purpose any such regulations as that the building, when erected, should be managed by the town authorities.
In the case of Copes v. City of Charleston, 10 Rich., 491, the Court held that the city of Charleston, under a general grant of power to make such regulations as “shall appear to them requisite and necessary for the security, welfare and convenience of said city, &c.,” had the power to subscribe to the stock of railroad companies within or without the State, and to tax the inhabitants of the city to pay such subscriptions. In the case of Brown v. C. & L. R. R. Co., 13 S. C., 290, the Court sustained as constitutional a'subscription by the county of York to the capital stock of a railroad company. Conceding fully that a corporate purpose must be some purpose germane to the general scope of the objects for which the corporation is created, it is difficult to see how subscriptions or donations to the building of a railroad could be germane to the general objects for which towns and counties are created, while the building of a school house within the town limits would not be germane to any corporate purpose of the town. Would not a school building within the town of Edgefield promote the convenience, welfare and order of its inhabitants ? Are traffic and transpor tation by a railroad more germane to municipal purpose than the moral and intellectual training of its citizens ?
The language used by the Court in Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S. C., 7, 8 S. E., 14, et seq., does not support a contrary view. That case had under consideration the validity of township bonds in aid of railroads, and the bonds were held invalid for the want of a township corporate purpose to be promoted by their issuance. The point of invalidity was found in the nondescript character of the township corporation, which had not been created for any purpose whatever except the issuance of the bonds. How different is the case before us! The. town of Edgefield is a full fledged municipal corporation, with general power and purpose to do that which shall appear .to them necessary and proper for the security, welfare and convenience of said town, or for preserving health, peace, order and good government within the same, and in addition to this, “the erecting, repairing or altering of school buildings,” specifically declared to' be a corporate purpose of said town, and it cannot be denied that such a specific corporate purpose is promotive of the general purposes of the town corporation.
Eor these reasons the petition should be dismissed, and the temporary restraining order heretofore granted herein should be revoked.
The judgment of this Court to this effect has already been rendered.