The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.
"On May 28, 1920, the defendant made to one R. E-Thompson his note for $182.75, payable October 1, 1920. Thompson at once discounted this note with the plaintiff. The defendant borrowed from the plaintiff $126.17 on September 20, 1920, and executed his note and chattel mortgage to secure this indebtedness payable on September 25, 1920, the mortgage covering ‘one pair of mules.’ The mortgage signed by the defendant contained a blanket. The provision making it secure all other debts of defendant to plaintiff, no matter how arising, then owing or thereafter owing. When defendant paid the note executed at the time of the execution of the mortgage he demanded his note and mortgage, and the bank stamped his note ‘Paid’ and delivered it, but .refused to deliver the mortgage, claiming that it secured other indebtedness then due to it by the defendant. That dispute originated this action, which is claim and delivery for the mules. The plaintiff gave bond and demanded inmmediate possession. The defendant made reply bond and maintained possession. The defendant answered, denying that the mortgage sucured any other indebtedness than the note for $126.17, and set up a counterclaim for damages for the refusal of the plaintiff to deliver his security upon the same being paid, and for the unlawful seizure of his property. It was not denied that the defendant owed the plaintiff the Thompson note, but it was denied that he knew anything about the bank owing the Thompson note at the time of the execution of the $126.17 note and the chattel mortgage securing it, or at the time of its payment. The cause came on for trial before Judge John S. Wilson and the jury at the summer term; 1922, of the Court of common pleas for Clarendon County, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount demanded, or for the possession of two mules, described in the verdict. This appeal questions the rulings of his Honor in the trial of the case.”
The exceptions are 17 in number; at the hearing exception 7 was abandoned.
Exception 1 is overruled. A juror’s indebtedness to a bank does not disqualify him for service in a case that the bank is interested in per se.
The Court is willing at all times to give a litigant a fair and impartial trial before an impartial jury, and, if, upon the examination of a juror under oath, the trial Judge is satisfied that he is not an impartial juror, he can excuse him in the cause. The excusing must, in the fitness of things, be left in the exercise of the Judge’s discretion, and ordinarily that discretion will not be interfered with.
The exceptions raise the question, under the pleadings, testimony, written and oral, and the verdict in the case: Is the chattel mortgage relied on void for want of certainty in the description of the property covered therein?
The mortgáge is of “one pair of mules”; the Sheriff, under claim and delivery, seizes “one pair of mules,” and the defendant replevies a pair of mules seized by the, Sheriff, and the jury found the mules seized by the Sheriff the mules covered by the mortgage. The plaintiff had the right to show what mules the defendant had at the time the mortgage was taken. The evidence, of Thompson and Plowden was competent, and supplied testimony as to the identity of the mules, and in no way attempted to vary the contents of the mortgage. 'It elucidated on this point the mules intended to be covered by the mortgage, and was competent to go to the jury for their determination. Jones, Chat. Mortg. (2d Ed.), § 53.
These exceptions are overruled.
The exceptions raise the question: “Does the chattel mortgage, although the debt primarily secured thereby has been paid, cover any other indebtedness owing by the maker to the bank, whether specifically mentioned at the execution of the mortgage or not, and can the recitals be disputed or destroyed by parol?”
These exceptions are overruled under the plain provisions in the mortgage which was the contract between the parties and the recent decision of this Court, in Lipscomb v. Bank of Tatum, 117 S. E., —, and the admitted competent testimony as to the mules as clarified by evidence as to the mules described in mortgage and verdict of jury is sufficient. ■
The exceptions asking for reversible error as a charge on facts are overruled, as we fail to see any such error as complained of, and his Honor in his charge left the matter to the jury for their determination, without violating the Constitution preventing a charge on facts.
The other exceptions are overruled. After the jury found for the _ plaintiff, his Honor had the right •either himself to write out form of verdict, or have some one else write it out, and submit it to the jury, and let them retire and consider it, and determine whether that was what they meant to find. 'In this case that is what was done, and we see no -error.
The refusal by his Honor to charge the request asked for by the defendant does 'not appear to be prejudicial.
All exceptions are overruled, and judgment affirmed.
Mr. ChiEE Justice Gary concurs.