Opinion.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary
(after stating the facts). We will consider first whether the act is constitutional.
The statute was intended to remedy an evil that not only exists in this State but is so extensive throughout the land as to necessitate action- on the part of the Federal government in the passage of an act entitled: “An act relating to liability of -common- carriers,” etc., approved 11th June, 1906, the third section of which is as follow-s: “That no contract of employment, insurance, relief, benefit or indemnity from) injury or -death entered into- by or -on- behalf of any employee, nor the acceptance of any such insurance, relief, benefit or indemnity by the person entitled thereto, shall constitute any bar or defense to any action brought to recover damages for -personal injuries to or death of such employee: provided, however, that upon the trial of such action against any common carrier, the defendant may set off therein any sum it has contributed toward- any s-uch- insurance, relief, benefit o-r indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee, or in case of his death, to- his personal representative.”
Although the statute last mlentioned has been declared unconstitutional, the third section thereof was not before the Court for construction.
The statute under consideration was enacted for the purpose of preventing! railroad- corporations (and other parties therein mentioned) from, inaugurating schemes, the ultimate aim and practical efféct of which, -are to enable the railroad company to bring such influence to, bear upon its employees as will force them toi surrender their claims for damages when they have sustained injury through the negligence of the company, against which it is not allowed by law to- contract
When the regulations of the Hospital and Relief Fund are analyzed, it will be seen that they contemplate the result just mlentioned
Not only do they provide that the employee who has paid his assessments, and thereby contributed to the creation and maintenance of said fund, shall be barred from recovering damages for negligence, if he accepts the benefit thereunder, but they likewise provide that his representatives shall not be allowed to bring an action for damages caused by the negligence of the corporation, if they -accept the benefit of said fund.
'Membership in the Hospital and Relief Fund creates the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, between the company and the employee, and, although the employee is assessed to maintain the fund, he is not allowed to- receive a dollar of the money collected for that purpose, unless he surrenders his claim for damages, when he has been injured through- the negligence of the corporation. The fiduciary relation established between- the company and the employee places him practically at the mercy of the corporation; for it is a well-known fact that the employees are not persons, generally, of large means, and frequently are dependent entirely upon their salary or wages for a support.
What is the condition, of the employee when he is injured through the negligence of the company? He realizes the fact, that he has a beneficial! interest in a, trust fund, and being in need of the money, he is anxious to get it. He is informed, however, that he must surrender 'all other claims against the corporation. At this time he, perhaps, is suffering. great mental and physical pain, his mind is not so clear as when in health, and the opportune time contemplated by the corporation has arrived, when he can be easily persuaded to relinquish bis claim for damages arising out of negligence.
Public policy demands that the corporation shall not have the opportunity of taking advantage of its employees, through the fiduciary relations established between them, with that end in view.
We only desire to say, in conclusion, that if the Hospital and Relief Fund is successfully operated, the practical result will be, that the railroad company will be enabled to liquidate claims for damages arising out of its negligence, with sum's of money contributed, in the main, by its employees — an indirect way of 'contracting against its negligence. We do not think, however, that the question as to the constitutionality of the statute is controlling in this case; but as it fairly arises upon the record, was also made a paramount issue in the Circuit Court, and is of vital importance, w'e have followed the practice in other cases and have considered it.
It is true the statute provides that the acceptance of benefits under the Hosptial Fund shall not operate to estop or in any manner bar the right of the employee from recovering damages for injury caused by the negligence of the corporation ; but it does not provide that a receipt or release given in satisfaction of a claim arising out of negligence shall be null and void, and that even after full compensation for negligent injury, the employee shall! still have the right to' recover his beneficial interest in the Hospital Fund although he had previously relinquished it.
The statute is 'therefore inapplicable to this case.
We proceed to consider the question whether the disability mentioned in the contract has reference to the work at which the plaintiff was engaged when he was injured. (The conclusion just announced, however, renders the question 'Speculative.)
In Rule 45 of the “Regulations- o-f the Reilief Department,” is the following provision: “'Whenever used in these Regulations, the -word ‘disability’ shall be held to- mean physical inability to work, by reason o-f sickness, or accidental injury, and the word ‘disabled’ shall apply to members thus physically unable to work.”
This provision has reference to physical inability to work whether caused by sickness or accidental injury.
There is scarcely a conceivable case where a person sustaining accidental injury is not able to do -some kind of work, even when deprived of both- arms or both legs.
If the construction of the said provision by his Honor, the presiding Judge, is correct, then a person accidentally losing both arms or both legs- would not be entitled to- the benefit of the fund the moment he was able to do- any kind of work. He would not even be -entitled to- any part of the fund whatever, if he could do work of any kind. We cannot accept a construction that would bring about such injustice.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
■Mr. Chief Justice Pope concurs.