The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The agreed statement of facts set out in the case is as follows:
“This is an action by S. Behrman, plaintiff, against Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, defendant, for the value of one bale of cotton, alleged to have been delivered by plaintiff to defendant at Monck’s Comer, S. C., on or about November 20, 1915, for shipment to Charleston, S. C., and not accounted for to plaintiff. The action was tried before Magistrate Altman at Monck’s Corner, January 25, 1917, and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff; whereupon the defendant appealed to the Circuit Court, Judge Ernest Moore presiding. Judge Moore . having affirmed the judgment of the Magistrate, notice of appeal to the Supreme Court was given, and the case now comes up on appeal on the following agreed statement of facts:
“At the trial in the Magistrate’s Court it was shown that the plaintiff was in the habit of buying cotton from the farmers, changing the marks and shipping en bloc. On the day in question this particular ■ bale of cotton was placed on defendant’s platform at Monck’s Comer by B. F. Murray, who notified plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Murray for the cotton and changed the mark, but did not notify defendant’s agent that the cotton was on the platform. During the day plaintiff bought other cotton—a total of 16 bales that day. Date in the afternoon plaintiff applied to defendant’s agent for a bill of lading for the 16 bales. The agent agreed to give him a bill of lading for. 15 bales, all that he could find on the platform, but said he knew nothing about the 16th bale, and declined to give a bill of lading for it. No trace of the missing bale has ever been found.
“It was shown on behalf of defendant that there had been a prior suit between the same parties for a missing bale of cotton, for which defendant had been required to pay. Defendant posted a notice at its depot, which plaintiff admits having seen, and to which he admits his attention was particularly directed at the former trial, to the effect that the railroad would not be liable for -goods or freight of any kind left on its platform until after the shipper-had received á bill of lading. Although this notice had been displayed for a long time, it was shown that plaintiff and one or two other shippers had been in the habit of placing cotton on the platform as it was purchased, and of getting a bill of lading for the full day’s purchases just before closing time.
“Defendant contended at the trial, and in the Circuit1 Court, that it could not be held responsible for cotton or other property placed on its platform unless it has issued a bill of lading, or at least had been notified and had accepted the property for shipment. Plaintiff claimed that, since the custom had been for merchants to leave cotton on the platform until the close of the business day, and then get a bill of lading for the entire amount, defendant was estopped from disclaiming responsibility for cotton placed on its platform, even though a bill of lading had not been issued, and the agent had not been notified.
“The case comes before this Court on the same questions that were raised in the Magistrate’s Court and in the Circuit Court.”
This case is very nearly the same as the case of Copeland v. Railway, 76 S. C., 476; 57 S. E., 535. The differences are fatal to the respondént’s view. The Copeland case was a “fire case,” but it was not tried on that theory but on the theory that the cotton had been delivered to the railway as a common carrier. In that case there was no notice limiting liability. The respondent claims that, although in this case there was a notice, it had been disregarded and it was a question of fact as to whether it had been waived or not. In this the respondent is in error. The notice did not forbid the placing of cotton on the platform, but limited, the liability to the time of the giving of the bill of lading. There was no evidence that this was disregarded. If the cotton had been burned the custom might have been construed as consent to the playing of the cotton on the right of way. The cotton was not burned, but stolen. The railway is liable for things burned on, but not for things stolen from the right of way. The difference is fatal to the respondent’s case. The judgment in the Copeland case was affirmed . on the scintilla doctrine. There is another difference, and that is that the unburned cotton was taken by the railway and sold for its own account. That was evidence- from which a ratification might have been inferred. There are no such facts in this case.
Making allowances for the differences in the two cases, the Copeland case is conclusive of this case, and the judgment appealed from is reversed.