LEGAL DOCUMENT

Case: Pearce, Larkin & Company vs. Joseph Curran et als.
Citation: 15 R.I. 298
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1886-03-31
Docket Number: 
Pages: 298–299
Volume: 15
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports

Parties: Pearce, Larkin & Company vs. Joseph Curran et als.

PROVIDENCE COUNTY.
Pearce, Larkin & Company vs. Joseph Curran et als.
Two breaches were made of a bail bond. The creditor plaintiff brought an action of debt, alleging the second breach.
Held, that the statute of limitations agajnstan action on the bond began to run at the time of the first breach, whether the creditor did or did not know of such breach, there being no fraud nor concealment to prevent the creditor obtaining knowledge of the breach.
Exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas.
March 31, 1886.

Per Curiam.
This is an action of debt upon a bond given for the liberty of the jail-yard. Tbe defendants plead in bar the special' statute of limitation, Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 225, § 9, which provides that no action shall be maintained for tbe breach of any such bond unless brought within one year after tbe breach shall have been committed, alleging in their plea that tbe debtor committed an escape in not making an assignment, or rendering himself to the jailer, within thirty days after the date of tbe bond, and that tbe action was not commenced within a year after the escape. The plaintiffs replied that they did not know of the escape alleged, and that tbey found tbeir action on another escape committed by the debtor by going off the limits into tbe State of Massachusetts, which latter escape was committed within one year before tbe commencement of the action. The defendants demurred to the replication. The question is whether the statute began to run, so as to bar the action, when tbe first escape was committed.
We are of the opinion that it did. The case of Brown v. Houdlette et al. 10 Me. 399, is precisely in point. It was there held that when a bond is given for. tbe liberty of tbe jail-yard, of which there are two breaches at different times, tbe statute begins to run at the time of the first breach, the amount recoverable for the first being the same as for both breaches. We do not see bow there can be any question about the correctness of this decision. We do not see bow tbe mere fact that tbe plaintiffs did not know of the first breach can prevent the running of the statute, inasmuch as they could readily have known it by inquiry at the jail. The case does not fall within the class of cases in which the running of the statute has sometimes been held to be avoided by the fraud or concealment of the debtor. Exceptions overruled.
Edwin E. Me Guinness, for plaintiffs.
John P. Gregory, for defendants.