LEGAL DOCUMENT

Case: Providence Steam-Engine Company vs. Providence and Stonington Steamship Company et als.
Citation: 12 R.I. 348
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1879-07-19
Docket Number: 
Pages: 348–372
Volume: 12
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports

Parties: Providence Steam-Engine Company vs. Providence and Stonington Steamship Company et als.

Providence Steam-Engine Company vs. Providence and Stonington Steamship Company et als.
A riparian owner platted his land into streets, lots, and a square, and made on the plat a declaration, sealed and acknowledged, that the square, streets, and gangways were equally appurtenant to each of the lots, and that the grantees of the lots were equally entitled to use and occupy the square, streets, and gangways. When platted one of the streets was below high-water mark. It was subsequently filled out and made, and af-terwards closed by B., who had purchased all the lots adjoining this street.
A., owning by purchase other lots on the plat, filed a bill in equity against B. to compel him to reopen the street. B. objected to the bill : 1. That the platted lay out of the street being over tide-water was invalid. 2. That owning all the adjoining lots he was entitled to close the street.
Held, that neither of these defences could avail.
Held, further, that B., holding under conveyances made with reference to the plat, was estopped from denying the validity of the lay out.
Held, further, that the street being appurtenant to the lots of the complainant, as well as to those of the respondent, and leading to tide-water, the respondent could not deny the the complainant’s interest in the street.
Rights of owners on the Fox Point Association Plat to the square, streets, and gangways defined.
Bill IN Equity praying for the removal of an obstruction in an alleged street, and for an injunction.
The pleadings and an agreed statement set forth the facts as stated in the opinion of the court. The answer contains three defences : 1. That the lay out of the street over public tide-waters, as made by the trustees of the Fox Point Association on tbeir plat, was invalid, 2. That the ownership by the respondents of all the adjacent lots entitled them to close the street as laid out, 3. That the respondents and their predecessors in title had enjoyed uninterrupted, peaceful, actual, and exclusive possession of the alleged street for more than twenty years. The respondents claimed the benefit of the first two defences as if by a demurrer to the bill, and demanded a jury trial of the issues of fact involved in the third. The case was heard on the validity of the first two defences under a stipulation signed by the solici-toi’s of the litigants, which reserved the third defence and the right to set up under it any title not derived from the trustees of the Fox Point Association. 'The position of the realty in question is shown on the plat annexed.
G-eorge S. Browne Charles H. JParhhurst, for complainant.
1. The Harbor Line Act of October, 1815, adopted and fixed certain lines which had been before agreed upon by the freeholders of the town of Providence in town meeting.
Since 1815, the State has never claimed the land between the former shore and the harbor line then established. The Harbor Line Act, if not in terms an absolute grant of the soil by the State to the riparian proprietors, was at least a license from the State to such proprietors to fill the tide-flowed lands from the shore or high-water mark to such harbor line. This right to fill was the subject of grant by the riparian proprietors. The trustees of the Fox Point Association assumed the right, the State not interfering, in 1816 to convey absolutely by deed the lots then covered by tide-water, including lots 13 to 22, inclusive, and many others, as delineated on the plat; and conveyed these lots, 13 to 22, inclusive, as they were marked out on said plat, by their respec tive numbers, and, as shown on the plat, they bound upon tbe street or way delineated upon tbe plat.
The grantees of the Fox Point Association, if they took nothing else by their deeds, certainly acquired by those deeds the right to fill the lots described in such deeds. The Pox Point Association would be estopped by their deeds from claiming the right to fill these lots themselves, or from asserting any title to such lots; and their grantees having purchased lots bounding on a street as shown on the plat, would equally be estopped to deny the existence of the way or street.
It is clear, therefore, that when the various grantees of the tide-flowed lots bounding on this street, as delineated upon the Fox Point Association Plat, filled these lots, and the way or street adjoining them, they filled under and pursuant to that plat; and that when they filled the street or way adjoining lots 13 to 22, they filled it for a street or way, and that such way did not become private property, but became precisely such a street or way as the other streets and ways marked out on said plat, and -yas within the terms of the declaration of dedication written upon the plat.
The trustees of the Fox Point Association were the riparian proprietors. The legislative assent to their appropriation of the land between high-water mark and the harbor line, had already been given ; and hence the doctrine that a private way or public highway cannot be laid out over tide-flowed land, has no application. Peck f Salsbury v. Prov. Steam-Fngine Co. 8 R. I. 353 ; Pngs v. Peckham, 11 R. I. 210 ; People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9 ; Jersey City v. Morris Canal Co. 12 N. J. Eq. 547; Henshaw v. Hunting, 1 Gray, 203; Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346 ; Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 ; Grerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384.
2. Supposing the street or way in controversy to have been lawfully established, has it become extinguished by reason of the exclusive ownership by the respondents of lots 13 to 22, inclusive ? The plain answer to the question is found in the declaration made by the trustees, and recorded with their plat, prior to making any sales of lots, as follows : “ All the square, streets, and gangways are equally appurtenant to each and every of said lots, and each and every of the grantees of the same are equally entitled to use and occupy said square, streets, and gangways as such at all times.” -So that no unity of title to less than the entire number of lots on said plat could give to the respondents the right to exclude the complainant, the owner of other lots on said plat, from the use of said street south of India Street, as all these streets were declared to be appurtenant, as well to the complainants’ lots as the respondents’.
Benjamin B. Thurston James M. Ripley, for the respondents.
1. The instrument executed by the trustees upon the face of the plat was wholly inoperative, and of no force or effect, to create the easement of a way, in dispute, (a.j The locus, at the time of the making of the plat and the execution of said instru.ment, and the conveyance, by said trustees, of said adjoining lots having been below high-water mark, the fee in the soil thereof was in the State. Bailey v. Burges, 11 It. I. 330; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367. (6.) The establishment of the harbor line in the year 1815 had no effect upon the title to the shore or flats, until reclaimed ; but simply conferred upon the said trustees, as riparian owners, the right to fill out to the line established. Until reclaimed, the title remained in the State. Bugs v. Beckham, 11 R. I. 210, 224 ; State v. Jersey Oity, 25 N. J. Law, 525; People v.' Ward $ Kelsey, 14 Ab. Pr. 372; Bast Haven v. Hemingway, 7 Conn. 186, 202; Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38, 40; Nichols v. Lewis, 15 Conn. 137, 143 ; Lockwood v. N. Y. $ N. H. B. R. Co. 37 Conn. 387, 391. (o.j The said trustees having no title to the soil over which the supposed way was laid on said plat, but the same being below high-water mark, and flowed by tide-water, their dedication of the same, by the instrument on the plat as a way for their grantees, was inoperative and void. Simmons v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 172, 184; Lnhabitants of Arundel v. McCul-loch, 10 Mass. 70 ; Lnhabitants of Charlestown v. County Commrs. of Middlesex, 3 Met. 202; Commomuealth v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180 ; Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492, 494; Richardson v. The City of Boston, 19 How. U. S. 263, 269.
2. But even if the river-bed over which the said most westerly street was laid out on said plat had been upland, and the said in_ strument on the plat therefore effectual to establish such supposed way, such easement would now, upon the facts submitted, have become extinguished, for the title to all of said lotsT3,14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, ■ 1, and 22, now having become vested in the respondent, the purpose for which such easement was created no longer exists, and the use and enjoyment thereof is no longer of any practical utility or avail. Washburn on Easements and Ser-vitudes, *532, *523, *529 ; Hancock v. Wentworth, 5 Met. 446 ; Massey v. Proprietors of Union Wharf., 41 Me. 34; Mott v. Mott, 8 Hun, 474.
3. Assuming, again, that the supposed way was lawfully created, then, even if the union of the title to all of said lots, 13 to 22, in the respondent, did not work an extinguishment of said way, the case made by the complainant is not such that a court of equity will interpose by injunction. An injunction against a private nuisance will be granted only where the plaintiff would otherwise suffer an irreparable injury, and upon a bill setting forth the facts from which such injury may be seen; and the same will not be granted where the property or rights interfered with are of slight use to the plaintiff. Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, *577; Clack v. White, 2 Swan, Tenn. 540; Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 Gill & J. 468; Roman v. Strauss, 10 Md. 89 ; Shipley v. Capíes, 17 Md. 179 ; Earl of Rip on v. Hobart, Coop. t. Brougham, 333 ; Wingfield v. Crenshaw, 4 Hen. & M. 474 ; Van Winkle v. Curtis, 3 N. J. Eq. 422, 426 ; Lexington City Nat. Bank v. Cuynn, 6 Bush, 486; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Oh. 315. The use of the way in question in this suit is in no way necessary, or even convenient, for any purpose connected with the use or enjoyment of the lots owned by the complainant on the plat.
4. The case of Peck Salsbury v. Providence Steam-Engine Company, in this court, reported in 8 R. I. 353, in which the effect of the Fox Point plat and the instrument upon it came in question, and the cases of Jersey City v. Morris Canal Co. 12 N. J. Eq. 547, and The People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, cited therein (p. 357), in no way conflict with the respondent’s position. In the two latter cases the streets in question had an actual existence upon upland before the filling out in front of the same, and the parties complaining had a vested right of way over the same to the water, while in this case the supposed most westerly street was, when laid out upon the plat, purely an imaginary one, located wholly upon land flowed by tide-water, the title to which land was then in the State, and so remained until the land was reclaimed, which was not until after the said trustees had parted with their title to the upland lots adjoining the shore back of the same, no part of the same ever being reclaimed by said trustees. The case of Jersey Qity v. Morris Qanal Co. arose under a still different state of facts from that in the present case or the two others last mentioned. The same case below, is reported in the same volume, 12 N. J. Eq. 252; and the material questions involved also received consideration, and were adjudicated in the same court, in the previous case of the Associates of the Jersey Company v. The Mayor, ¿•c. of Jersey City, reported in 8 N. J. Eq. 715. In both of these cases the court held that Hudson Street, delineated upon the plat of the Associates of the Jersey Company, the entire extent of which street was at the time of the making of the plat covered by the tide-water of the Hudson River, was effectually laid out and created a street by force and virtue of the plat. But this decision was based upon the fact that the Associates, &c., were, by virtue of a grant from the legislature, the owners of the platted land covered by tide-water, and were moreover expressly empowered by the act, which granted to them the land in question, to lay out the same into streets.
July 19, 1879.

Dureee, C. J.
This is a bill in equity to abate a nuisance or obstruction to an alleged street or right of way at India Point in the city of Providence. In 1811 the land on India Point belonged to the Fox Point Association, so called, being vested in trustees for the association. In 1815 the harbor line in front of it was established. In 1816 the trustees caused a plat to be made embracing the upland and the land below high-water mark out to the harbor line, and dividing the entire tract into lots, squares, streets, and gangways, designating the lots,' upward of one hundred and sixty in number, by letters A to K and by numbers 1 to 153. The trustees inscribed on the plat, under their hands, seals, and acknowledgment, the following declaration, to wit:
“ Know all men whom it may concern, that all and singular the within numbered lots are sold and conveyed by us, the undersigned, trustees of the Fox Point Association, in manner following, that is to say: All the squares, streets, and gangways are equally appurtenant to each and every of said lots, and each and every the grantees of the same are equally entitled to use and oc cupy said square, streets, and gangways as such at all times, excepting that the grantees of all and singular the water lots, their heirs and assigns forever, shall have the exclusive right to demand and receive wharfage for all the streets and gangways adjoining to their several lots respectively, and each and every the grantees of the wafer lots, on the west and south sides of said plat, beginning at lot number one and ending at lot number twenty-two, inclusively, their heirs and assigns forever, shall have the sole right to use and occupy the several pieces of land west of the street, adjoining their several lots respectively, for all purposes, excepting that they nor either of them shall not, at any time ever hereafter, have the right to erect any permanent building on said pieces of land or either of them, and the grantee of lot number twenty-two, his heirs and assigns forever, shall have the same right to use and occupy the land south of said lot adjoining said street, subjected to the same restriction as aforesaid.”
The plat was afterwards recorded, and all the lots designated on it were sold from time to time The lot designated as lot A, and a portion of the lot designated as lot 56, became the property of the complainant, which continues to own them. Lots 13 to 22, inclusive, became the property of the defendants, who continue to own them.
The bill does not expressly allege that the lots were conveyed under and by reference to the plat, nor does it anywhere appear that such was the fact. We infer, however, from the manner in which the case was submitted to us, that it was supposed we would take it for granted that the conveyances were so made, and accordingly we shall do so.
The alleged street or way here in controversy was among the streets or ways designated on the plat. It was, when platted, below high-water mark, and of course existed at that time only on paper. The land over which it was delineated has since then, and after conveyance, been reclaimed from tide-water by filling out the upland. It lies over or along the front of lots 13 to 22, conveyed to the defendants, said lots being situated at the extremity of India Point, on or near the side of the harbor. The defendants have erected a fence across it, thereby obstructing access to and travel over it. The complainant contends that this is an interruption of its right of way and has brought this suit to get the fence removed.
The defendants interpose among other defences the two following, to wit: first, that the street or way was never lawfully created, because at the time of its alleged creation the land over which it was laid was flowed by tide-water; and second, that if it was lawfully created, the part of it lying along or over lots from 13 to 22, inclusive, has become extinguished by unity of title or ownership of these lots. The only question now submitted to us is whether these two defences, or either of them, is valid.
We think the first defence, to wit, that the way or street was never lawfully created, cannot be maintained ; for though it may be true that the way or street had no actual existence when the conveyances under which it is claimed were made, we think it had nevertheless-what may be called a potential or prospective existence, which would become actual whenever the place for it should be filled and incorporated with the upland, and though the conveyances when executed may have been ineffectual to create the way or street, because the site of it was flowed by tide-water, yet we think they were binding by way of estoppel on parties and privies, so that in equity, at least, the said parties and privies could not refuse to allow the way or street as soon as the land designated for it became capable of supporting it. The ground of the estoppel is, that the easements and servitudes indicated by the plat constitute a part of the consideration for which all conveyances referring to the plat are made, and therefore no person, while claiming under the conveyances, can be permitted to repudiate them or to deny that they exist where they are capable of existing.
In coming to this conclusion we make little account of the Harbor Line Act. The ostensible purpose of that act is not to confer any new right, title, or interest on the riparian proprietor, but only to prevent his encroaching too far on the space required for the harbor. It amounts simply to a license to him to fill out to the harbor line, or to an implied declaration that in filling out to it he will commit no encroachment. To hold that it amounts to more would be doing violence to the act, especially in view of the rule that such acts are to be strictly construed, or are to be con strued most liberally in favor of tbe State. See tbe decision of the Supreme Court of tbe United States in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge et als. 11 Peters, 420.
Tbe second defence is, that tbe way, if ever lawfully created, has become extinct, tbe title to tbe several lots over which it is laid having become vested in tbe same owner. We do not think tbe defence can avail. Tbe way is appurtenant to other lots than those over which it is laid, and among them to the lots belonging to the complainant. The way over the lots belonging to the defendants connects with tide-water, and therefore it cannot be said that the complainant has no interest in the way because the lots over which it is laid all belong to the defendants; for the complainant may want to use it as a way to tide-water, which belongs to everybody.