LEGAL DOCUMENT

Case: Charles KENNEDY v. CUMBERLAND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.
Citation: 471 A.2d 195
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1984-01-19
Docket Number: No. 82-95-Appeal
Pages: 195–206
Volume: 471
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series

Parties: Charles KENNEDY v. CUMBERLAND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.

Charles KENNEDY v. CUMBERLAND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.
No. 82-95-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Jan. 19, 1984.
Richard A. Boren, Ralph Stokes, Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler, Biener, Skolnik & Lip-sey, Providence, for plaintiff.
Mark S. Mandell, Mandell, Aisenberg, Goodman & Schwartz, Ltd. and Leonard Decof, John S. Foley, Decof & Grimm, Providence, amicus curiae.
Michael G. Sarli, Robert W. Lovegreen, Hinckley & Allen, Providence, for defendant.
Dennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., Faith A. LaSalle, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., intervenor.

OPINION
SHEA, Justice.
The plaintiff appeals from the order for summary judgment entered against him in the Superior Court. The appeal raises the issue of the validity of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-l-13(b), as amended by P.L. 1978, ch. 299, § 2, under the Federal and State Constitutions. We reverse the order for summary judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
The plaintiff, Charles Kennedy, filed a complaint in Superior Court on October 6, 1981, alleging that on or about October 16, 1978, three fingers on his right hand were amputated and a fourth finger fractured while he was using a machine manufactured by defendant, Cumberland Engineering. The machine was first sold for use by defendant in November 1969, and later was obtained by Service Color Corporation, plaintiff’s employer.
In 1978 the General Assembly amended § 9-1-13 to require that claims for recovery of damages involving injury-causing products must be commenced “within ten (10) years after the date the product was -first purchased for use or consumption.” Section 9-l-13(b) reads:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to real or personal property, including any action based upon implied warranties arising out of an alleged design, inspection, listing or manufacturing defect, or any other alleged defect of whatsoever kind or nature in a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to warn regarding a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to properly instruct in the use of a product, shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption.”
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit from Stanley T. Gotham, a vice president of Cumberland Engineering, claiming that § 9-l-13(b) barred the action because plaintiff’s complaint was filed more than ten years after the machine was first purchased. The Attorney General intervened in support of the motion for summary judgment because the constitutionality of a state statute was called into question by plaintiff in his objection to the motion. The trial judge granted the motion, and plaintiff appealed, alleging violations of the equal-protection and due-process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and access to the courts protected by art. I, sec. 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Two amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of plaintiff’s appeal.
I
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 5, OF THE RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTION
Article I, sec. 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution states:
“§ 5. Remedies for wrongs — Right to justice. — Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and without delay; eom-formably to the laws.”
The defendant claims that this section is limited to a prohibition of the purchase and sale of justice. This interpretation, however, is too narrow and ignores the clear command contained in the first sentence.
Many of the cases in which this court has addressed art. I, sec. 5, of our constitution have dealt solely with the provision concerning the “purchase” of justice. See Jones v. Aciz, 109 R.I. 612, 289 A.2d 44 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1094, 93 S.Ct. 704, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1972); Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324, 43 A. 542 (1899); Perce v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 363 (1881); Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 R.I. 244 (1879); Conley v. Woonsocket Institution for Savings, 11 R.I. 147 (1875); Hudson v. Geary, 4 R.I. 485 (1857); Littlefield v. Peckham, 1 R.I. 500 (1851). This does not, however, limit the application of art. I, see. 5, to the “purchase” issue only. In each of the cases, the second sentence of section 5 was the only portion of article I dealt with because the only issue involved related to the cost or fee applied to one of the litigants. None of these cases gives any indication that this was the sole purpose of this constitutional provision.
Other cases of this court that have dealt with art. I, sec. 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution clearly show an intent to give broader, independent meaning and application to the first sentence. In the recent case of Lemoine v. Martineau, 115 R.I. 233, 342 A.2d 616 (1975), this court held that a statute excusing legislators from all court appearances while the Legislature is in session “flies in the face of the constitutional command found in art. I, § 5.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 240, 342 A.2d at 621. Cf. Martin v. Hammond, 89 R.I. 98, 151 A.2d 114 (1959) (the court analyzed, under R.I. Const. art. I, sec. 5, the trial justice’s discretion in considering a motion for a continuance); Molloy v. Collins, 66 R.I. 251, 18 A.2d 639 (1941) (although rejecting the plaintiff’s contention, the court recognized the application of the section to personal injuries). These cases are factually different from the case before us. However, they clearly point to a less-restrictive reading of the section than that urged by defendant. To hold otherwise would require that we ignore the entire first sentence of art. I, sec. 5. A basic premise of constitutional interpretation is that every clause must be given its due force, meaning and effect and that no word or section must be assumed to have been unnecessarily used or needlessly added. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588, 58 S.Ct. 395, 397, 82 L.Ed. 439, 442 (1938); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572-73, 53 S.Ct. 751, 757, 77 L.Ed. 1372, 1380 (1933); Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570-71, 10 L.Ed. 579 (1840).
We therefore conclude that an analysis of the present issue under R.I. Const, art. I, sec. 5, is appropriate.
II
ANALYSIS
Clearly, art. I, sec. 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution should not be interpret ed to bar the Legislature from enacting any laws that may limit a party from bringing a claim in our courts. There are instances in which the Legislature permissibly placed reasonable limits or burdens on the parties’ right to have their claims adjudicated by the courts. Statutes of limitation have been upheld as reasonable legislative determination of when to cut off a plaintiff’s right to bring an existing claim. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1722, 44 L.Ed.2d 295, 303 (1975); Young v. Park, 116 R.I. 568, 573, 359 A.2d 697, 700 (1976). Reasonable filing fees also have been sustained as a permissible condition to a party’s seeking to have his or her existing claim adjudicated. Perce v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 363 (1881).
The total denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a claim even before it arises, however, most certainly “flies in the face of the constitutional command found in art. 1, § 5,” Lemoine v. Martineau, 115 R.I. at 240, 342 A.2d at 621, and to hold otherwise would be to render this constiiu-tional protectidh"~worthless, To prohibit court access absolutely for a generally recognized claim to a class of plaintiffs merely because they were injured by a product more than ten years old not only is irrational, in our opinion, but also flies in the face of even minimal constitutional protection mandated by art. I, sec. 5. As we stated in Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87, 93 (1983), in which we struck down a statute that treated medical-malpractice plaintiffs differently from tort plaintiffs as a whole, “The statute constitutes special class legislation enacted solely for the benefit of specially defined defendant(s) * * Even where this court has upheld reasonable limi tations, it has stopped short of allowing absolute bars to court access (e.g. Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 R.I. 244 (1879) (plaintiffs inability to furnish surety for costs because of poverty held not sufficient to bar his action in court)).
In Fournier v. Miriam Hospital, 98 R.I. 299, 175 A.2d 298 (1961), this court found that a statute granting immunity to charitable institutions did not violate art. 1, sec. 5. In so holding, this court noted the Legislature’s power to alter the substance of the common law. This case, however, is not applicable here. The immunity statute did not deprive the plaintiffs in Fournier of their day in court because agents, servants, and employees of a hospital remained liable for their torts. Rather, the statute prevented the plaintiffs from using the common-law theory of respondeat superior to reach the defendant hospital.
This statute, on the other hand, completely denies products-liability claimants of their day in court, notwithstanding the merits of their claims and the direct liability of the potential defendants. Products-liability claimants injured by products more than ten years old are left with no forum in which to bring their claims. If the constitutional guarantee of right of access to the courts is to have any meaning, this statute must be struck down.
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that he was injured on October 16, 1978, by a machine approximately nine years after it was first sold for use by defendant. The applicable statute of limitations (three years for personal injuries, § 9-1-14) gave defendant until October 16, 1981, to file his complaint, which he complied with by filing October 6, 1981. Yet, unknown to him, his right to bring the claim ceased in November 1979 (ten years after the purchase of the injury-causing machine), because of the provision of § 9-l-13(b).
The plaintiff was not even aware that his suit was barred until he filed suit and learned through answers to interrogatories and from affidavits the date of the sale of the injury-causing machine. Parties in the future who wish to ensure their right to redress for injuries would be forced to file suit the day of the injury, but even then they may be too late. They would be totally unaware of when the clock began to run or even if it had already run out.
This court has invalidated bars to claims until the injured party at least discovered, or should have discovered, his or her injury.
“It would, in our opinion, be manifestly unjust to bar the enforcement of injury claims brought by a plaintiff who was not, nor could not have known that he was, the victim of tortious conduct because the consequent harm was unknowable within two years of the negligent act.
* * * * * *
“[T]o preclude a person from obtaining a remedy simply because the wrong of which he was the victim did not manifest itself for at least two years from the time of the negligent conduct, is clearly inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice. To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust.” (Emphasis added.) Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 237-38, 243 A.2d 745, 752-53 (1968). See Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30 at 144 (4th ed. 1971).
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H.1983):
“The twelve-year limit is unreasonable because the mere purchase of pills produced by a drug manufacturer in California, or of a defective automobile made in Michigan, does not place the consumer on notice of a hidden defect injurious to his health or safety. When product defects lead to injury, our law has long provided for recovery without regard to when the substance or object was made or placed into the national or international stream of commerce. This is particularly important in cases where the injuries may not clearly manifest themselves until years later, such as the clear-cell adenocarcino-mas found in the daughters of mothers who twenty or more years previously took a female estrogen pill commonly known as DES (diethylstilbestrol). See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 577-78, 436 N.E.2d 182, 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (1982).”
Similarly, in the instant case Charles Kennedy’s right of access to the court is absolutely barred before the running of the applicable statute of limitation. The plaintiff was barred from bringing his action before he was able to discover the time frame that was applicable to his rights. It would be manifestly unjust and inconsistent with art. I, sec. 5, to bar plaintiff’s right to access to the courts absolutely.
The harshness of § 9-l-13(b) is further highlighted and intensified when one hypothesizes about its application in other similar situations. Plaintiffs may be absolutely barred from court through no'carelessness or fault of their own because they were injured by products that did not manifest their defects until after they were ten years old. Furthermore, plaintiffs would be barred from recovery because they were injured by products that continually injured people because of defective designs or construction when the manufacturers determine it more economical to allow the product to stay in the field of commerce until the ten-year bar applies than to correct the defect. Finally, as may be the case in this instance, a product with a life expectancy much greater than ten years can unfairly enjoy a total immunity from the effect of its defect for a great part of the product’s useful life. The application of this statute to this plaintiff is no less harsh and unjust.
States with similar constitutional provisions have also struck down this type of statute. The Alabama court stated in Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996, 1004 (Ala.1982) (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially):
“Statutes of repose * * * make an unreasonable distinction between similarly situated manufacturers, in that the makers of long-lived products may be insulated from liability, while makers of short-lived products are singled out for product liability.”
In Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980), the Supreme Court of Florida issued a per curiam opinion that invalidated a statute of repose in products-liability cases. The court did so “on the authority of Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979), and [held] that, as applied to [that] case, [Florida’s statute of repose] denies access to courts [in violation of] article 1, section 21 [of the] Florida Constitution.” Article 1, sec. 21 of the Florida Constitution provides:
“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”
In Overland Construction Co., supra, the Florida court considered a statute of repose which applied to professional engineers, registered architects, and licensed contractors that had prohibited suits brought more than twelve years after construction was completed. It found that the statute violated the constitutional right of access to the courts.
Most recently the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared the state’s products-liability statute of repose unconstitutional because it violated a state-constitutional provision similar to ours. The court in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H.1983), reasoned that because the right to recover was an important substantive right, the classification at issue in the statute of repose must be reasonable and substantially related to a legitimate legislative objective. The court held the statute unreasonable because it eliminates a plain tiff’s claim before the wrong can be reasonably discovered. Quoting Judge Frank’s dissent in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir.1952), the court “condemned the ‘Alice in Wonderland’ effect” of the results:
“ ‘Except in topsy-turvy land, you can’t die before you are conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of logical “axiom,” that a statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to a plaintiff.’” Heath, 464 A.2d at 295-96.
Although we recognize the Legislature’s wide scope of discretion to balance interests and enact laws accordingly, we believe that the Rhode Island Constitution forbids absolute bars to recovery for a recognized claim before the full tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff should have his day in court to show whether he is entitled to relief. The question of whether he will prevail must await a hearing on the merits in a court of proper jurisdiction.
Because we find that § 9-l-13(b) is inconsistent with art. I, sec. 5, of the Rhode Island Constitution, we need not address the remainder of the plaintiff’s contentions concerning the validity of the statute under the Federal Constitution.
The plaintiff’s appeal is sustained, and the papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
. Part 1, art. 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides:
“Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; con-formably to the laws.”