Case: HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees; HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees; HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees
Abbreviation: Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Agsalud
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1984-01-30
Docket Number: NO. 9209
Citation: 67 Haw. 39
Volume: 67
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Parties: HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees
Pages: 39–40

HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellant-Employer/Appellant, v. JOSHUA C. AGSALUD, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAII; LAVERNE AMAY; DAVID MENDOSA, individually and as representatives of claimants residing or last employed on Hawaii, Appellees/Appellees
(CIVIL NO. 7373)
(CIVIL NO. 7454)
(CIVIL NO. 7803)
NO. 9209
JANUARY 30, 1984
LUM, C.J., PADGETT AND HAYASHI, JJ„ INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUDGE WALTER M. HEEN, IN PLACE OF NAKAMURA, J„ DISQUALIFIED, AND INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS CHIEF JUDGE JAMES S. BURNS, IN PLACE OF WAKATSUKI, J„ DISQUALIFIED
RichardM. Rand {faredH.Jossem with him on the brief, Torkildson, Katz, Jossem & Fonseca of counsel) for appellant.
Herbert R. Takahashi for appellees Amay et al.

Per Curiam.
This is an appeal from three orders of the Third Circuit dismissing appeals from decisions of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations. Those decisions dismissed appeals by the appellant from decisions awarding benefits to appellant’s employees who were either residents of the County of Hawaii or whose last place of employment was the County of Hawaii because the appellant filed its notices of appeal with the Department’s office on Oahu rather than on Hawaii as required by HRS § 383-38. Appellant contends that the filing requirement is a matter of venue rather than a matter of jurisdiction. We do not agree. The first sentence of HRS § 383-38 states where and when a notice of appeal will be filed. The second sentence deals with where it is to be heard. As appellant concedes, the time provision in the first sentence is jurisdictional. We think the place requirement is likewise jurisdictional. Appellant’s other contentions we deem without substantial merit. Affirmed.