flwrlabs/fed-legal huggingface dataset:
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: equated to the making of a new contract. Rather, we give effect to the terms of the agreements themselves and conclude that they were executed once, in 1984, and that the original agreements continued to be in force until John Deere attempted to exercise its rights under the 120 notice provision in 2007. See 11 Williston on Cont of one party, John Deere, to terminate the contract without cause on 120 days notice. Applying the Act would effectively extend the dealer agreements indefinitely unless John Deere can meet the terms of the Act’s good cause provision. We conclude that this would substantially impair the contractual relationship between John Deere and Reliable Tractor and would violate the Contracts Clause. See Morgan v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 754 F.2d 145, 147-48 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001, Options: A. holding that the employer was not the insurers agent B. holding retroactive application C. holding that a retroactive application of a statute impairing an insurers contractual right to terminate an agent without cause violated the contract clause D. recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary E. holding no retroactive application

assistant: The best answer is C. holding that a retroactive application of a statute impairing an insurers contractual right to terminate an agent without cause violated the contract clause
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: terms thereof. See United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that “[t]he rules contain no provision for the district court to modify a [C-type] plea agreement”). Consequently, the court cannot vary the agreed-upon sentence unless the terms of the plea agreement explicitly authorize it to do so. See Peveler, 359 F.3d at 378-79. In the absence of such a provision, the court is bound to impose (and leave undisturbed) the agreed-upon sentence. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 281 n. 7; id. at 282-83 (Rendell, J., concurring); Peveler, 359 F.3d at 378-79. This result is consistent with the established view that plea agreements are for the most part governed by principles of contract law. In this case, no principle of contract law would have justified th 641, 648 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). This court has indicated that, in rare Options: A. holding that principle of mutual mistake does not apply to permit modification of plea agreement B. holding that where judgment and sentence for nonexistent crime had to be vacated upon remand the state shall have the option of withdrawing from the entire plea agreement since the plea agreement was based on a material mistake of law which works to the benefit of the defendant C. holding that mutual mistake as to essential element of plea agreement can invalidate entire agreement D. holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement E. holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established

assistant: The best answer is C. holding that mutual mistake as to essential element of plea agreement can invalidate entire agreement
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: of a crime need not be objected to or preserved for appeal in order to merit treatment by the appellate court, and may be ground for reversal. See Rule 12-216. {47} “In determining what is or is not an essential element of an offense, we begin with the language of the statute itself[.]” Osborne, 111 N.M. at 657, 808 P.2d at 627. The murder statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1 (1963) does not deal with the issue of more than one person contributing to the cause of death, and there is not the slightest suggestion that if there are multiple individuals responsible for the death that any of them is less guilty of the crime of murder. The additional, omitted instruction is therefore merely elaborative of the primary instruction. See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462, 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it expands, rather than contracts, Options: A. holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established B. holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element C. recognizing that trial courts failure to instruct jury on element of offense is harmless when existence of element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence D. holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial E. holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim

assistant: The best answer is B. holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: The capitalization of the Company is as set forth in Schedule 3.1(g) . The Company has not issued any capital stock since its most recently filed periodic report under the Exchange Act other than pursuant to the exercise of employee stock options under the Stock Option Plan, the issuance of shares of Common Stock to employees pursuant to the Stock Option Plan and pursuant to the conversion and/or exercise of Common Stock Equivalents outstanding as of the date of the most recently filed periodic report under the Exchange Act as set forth on Schedule 3.1(g) . No Person has any right of first refusal, preemptive right, right of participation, or any similar right to participate in the transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents. Except as disclosed on Schedule 3.1(g) , there are no outstanding options, employee or incentive stock option plans, warrants, scrip rights to subscribe to, calls or commitments of any character whatsoever relating to, or securities, rights or obligations convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for, or giving any Person any right to subscribe for or acquire any shares of Common Stock, or contracts, commitments, understandings or arrangements by which the Company or any Subsidiary is or may become bound to issue additional shares of Common Stock or Common Stock Equivalents. Except as set forth on Schedule 3.1(g) , the issuance and sale of the Securities will not obligate the Company to issue shares of Common Stock or other securities to any Person (other than the Purchasers) and will not result in a right of any holder of Company securities to adjust the exercise, conversion, exchange or reset price under any of such securities. All of the outstanding shares of capital stock of the Company are duly authorized, validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable, have been issued in material compliance with all federal and state securities laws, and none of such outstanding shares was issued in violation of any preemptive rights or similar rights to subscribe for or purchase securities. No further approval or authorization of any stockholder, the Board of Directors or others is required for the issuance and sale of the Securities. There are no stockholders agreements, voting agreements or other similar agreements with respect to the Company’s capital stock to which the Company is a party or, to the knowledge of the Company, between or among any of the Company’s stockholders.

assistant: Capitalization
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: speech was made by an employee of the government, and the government’s retaliation for that speech took the form of an adverse-employment action, such as termination of employment, decreased compensation, or refusal to consider for hiring or re-hiring. Id. Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government’s retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person’s speech. See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., Options: A. holding that first amendment principles preclude recovery under state law for damages caused by speech or other protected conduct B. holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation C. recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment D. recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge E. holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment

assistant: The best answer is E. holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any employment agreement, severance agreement or Change in Control agreement between the Company and the Employee, if a Change in Control of the Company occurs prior to the Maturity Date and while the Employee is in the employ of the Company, then the continued employment requirement for the Employee shall cease to apply and the Share Payout as a Percentage of Target Award for the PSUs shall be determined in accordance with Section 2 above adjusted pro rata to reflect partial fiscal year, if necessary; provided, however , that the achievement of the Profit Requirement shall be determined by reference to the Company’s achievement of the Profit Requirement as the close of the fiscal year quarter occurring on or immediately before the Change in Control and any Share Payout shall be made in a single payment of shares of Stock (subject to applicable tax withholding) no earlier than the date of the Change in Control and no later than ten (10) calendar days after the date of the Change in Control.

assistant: Change In Control
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: appellants would recover nothing by their action. This appeal followed. Appellants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mistrial following Crawford’s testimony that Rowell was not issued a citation fol lowing the accident. We agree. As the Fourth District has explained: Common sense (and experience as well) tells us that to the average juror the decision of the investigating police officer, i.e., whether to charge one driver or the other with a traffic violation based upon the result of his investigation, is very material to, if not wholly dispositive of, that juror’s determination of fault on the part of the respective drivers. Albertson v. Stark, 294 So.2d 698, 699-700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We similarly have explained that 466, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>); Lindos Rent A Car v. Standley, 590 So.2d Options: A. holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the appellees negative response to his attorneys question of whether he had been cited for a traffic violation following the parties accident and concluding that the question and answer were highly improper and prejudicial and that the harm was hot cured by the trial courts instruction to the jury B. holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question C. holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the investigating officers affirmative response to the appellees counsels question of whether any traffic citations had been issued as a result of the parties collision D. holding that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the admission of evidence that she received a traffic citation following the accidentand concluding that the trial court erred in denying the appellants motion in limine to preclude the appellee from questioning her and the investigating officer as to whether she received a citation E. holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial given the appellees testimony that we dont have no ticket for that accident notwithstanding the fact that the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment

assistant: The best answer is C. holding that the trial court reversibly erred in denying the appellants motion for mistrial following the investigating officers affirmative response to the appellees counsels question of whether any traffic citations had been issued as a result of the parties collision
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: that no such hard and fast benchmark exists, however. {See Oral Ruling on City’s Rule 52(c) Motion, Trial Tr., 1100-1104.) 16 . Ruiz v. City of Santa Mana, 160 F.3d 543, 553-54 (9th Cir.1998) (”[I]n a multi seat, mul-ti vote election, the ability of the minority to elect a non minority candidate is not as probative in a Gingles prong three analysis as the inability of the minority to elect a minority candidate.”); Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 988 n. 8 (1st Cir.1995) ("Although the VRA does not require for a successful section 2 showing that minority-preferred candidates be members of the minority group, elections in which minority candidates run are often especially probative on the issue of racial bloc voting.”); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 849 (5th Options: A. holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation B. holding that in a case involving misrepresentations in violation of securities and exchange commission rule 10b5 under the circumstances of this case involving primarily a failure to disclose positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery C. holding in dispute involving two insurers the federal action against only one insurer should be stayed in favor of state action involving both D. holding that elections involving only white candidates are generally less probative than those involving minority candidates E. holding that a crime involving the willful commission of a base or depraved act is a crime involving moral turpitude whether or not the statute requires proof of evil intent

assistant: The best answer is D. holding that elections involving only white candidates are generally less probative than those involving minority candidates
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: THIS AGREEMENT AND THE OTHER LOAN DOCUMENTS AND ANY CLAIMS, CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR CAUSE OF ACTION (WHETHER IN CONTRACT OR TORT OR OTHERWISE) BASED UPON, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OTHER LOAN DOCUMENT (EXCEPT, AS TO ANY OTHER LOAN DOCUMENT, AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH THEREIN) AND THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY AND THEREBY SHALL BE GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK WITHOUT REGARD TO PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS THEREOF (OTHER THAN SECTIONS 5-1401 AND 5-1402 OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK); PROVIDED THAT PERFECTION ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 9 OF THE UCC MAY GIVE EFFECT TO APPLICABLE CHOICE OR CONFLICT OF LAW RULES SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 9 OF THE UCC) OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

assistant: Governing Laws
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: No party will (a) use any other party’s proprietary indicia, trademarks, service marks, trade names, logos, symbols, or brand names, or (b) otherwise refer to or identify any other party in advertising, publicity releases, or promotional or marketing publications, or correspondence to third parties without, in each case, securing the prior written consent of such other party.

assistant: Publicity
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: The Releasor Parties agree not to file for themselves or on behalf of any other party, any claim, charge, complaint, action, or cause of action against the Released Persons and Entities related to or arising from the Released Claims, and further agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Released Persons and Entities from and against any and all losses, including, without limitation, the cost of defense and legal fees, occurring as a result of any claims, charges, complaints, actions, or causes of action made or brought by any Releasor Party or any third party against any of the Released Persons and Entities in violation of this Release. In the event that any party brings a suit against any of the Released Persons and Entities, in violation of this covenant, in relation to and/or arising from any actions or inactions and activities taken on behalf of any of the Releasor Parties, provided only that such actions and activities are not found to have been illegal, the Releasor Parties agree to pay any and all costs of the Released Persons and Entities, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the Released Persons and Entities in challenging such action. In the event that any Releasor Party brings a suit against any of the Released Persons and Entities in violation of this covenant, the Releasor Parties agree to pay any and all costs of the Released Persons and Entities, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the Released Persons and Entities in challenging such action.

assistant: Indemnifications
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: No waiver by either party of or failure to assert any provision or condition of this Agreement or right to be exercised hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of such or similar or dissimilar provisions, conditions or rights.

assistant: No Waivers
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: is nevertheless discern-able. At least three courts of appeals have held that a public meeting will not serve the public participation requirement unless it is “meaningful.” See Reg’l Airport Auth., 460 F.3d at 708; Union Pac., 215 F.3d at 835, 837-38; Pierson Sand, 1996 WL 338624, at *3-*4 (applying same concept but with different terminology). Although these courts did not specifically state where they derived this “meaningfulness” requirement, it is clear that their goal was to achieve the purposes of the public participation requirement. Cf. 55 Fed.Reg. at 8793 (explaining that “meaningful” public participation is necessary for achieving NCP’s purposes). Other courts have explicitly relied on the purposes of the requirement in reaching their decisions. See Bedford, 156 F.3d at 428 (<HOLDING>); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., Options: A. holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances B. holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice C. recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public D. holding that the ncp public participation requirement was fulfilled because the indiana department of environmental management gave public notice and received public comments before issuing an npdes permit for the cleanup even if it did not hold a public hearing E. holding that significant state involvement satisfies public participation requirement because it serves the identical purpose that the public notice provision seeks to effectuate

assistant: The best answer is E. holding that significant state involvement satisfies public participation requirement because it serves the identical purpose that the public notice provision seeks to effectuate
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: Landlord and Tenant each hereby represents and warrants to the other that it has had no dealings with any real estate broker or agent in connection with the negotiation of this Amendment, other than CBRE, Inc. (Jon Moeller and Payam Tabar) (“ Landlord’s Broker ”), representing Landlord, and CBRE, Inc. (Richard Friday) (“ Tenant’s Broker ,” and, together with Landlord’s Broker, collectively, the “ Brokers ”), representing Tenant, and that they know of no other real estate broker or agent who is entitled to a commission in connection with this Amendment. Landlord shall be solely responsible for paying any commission owed to the Brokers in connection with this Amendment pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in a separate written agreement. Each party agrees to indemnify and defend the other party against and hold the other party harmless from any and all claims, demands, losses, liabilities, lawsuits, judgments, and costs and expenses (including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees) with respect to any leasing commission or equivalent compensation alleged to be owing on account of any breach of the foregoing representation and warranty by the indemnifying party in connection with this Amendment. The provisions of this Section 9 shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of the Lease.

assistant: Brokers
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: GUARANTORS ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE, PURSUANT TO NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW SECTION 5-1401, THAT THIS GUARANTY AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF GUARANTORS HEREUNDER SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND INTERPRETED AND DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

assistant: Governing Laws
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: collection action was in privity with client-creditor). Finally, CCSI is in privity with Citibank SD because CCSI represents similar interests and legal rights to the underlying debt as its corporate affiliate Citibank SD. See FWB Bank v. Richman, 354 Md. 472, 731 A.2d, 916, 930 (1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“Privity in the res judicata sense generally involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.”). Third, whether claims are “identical” for res judicata purposes is determined by the transactional test: do they “arise[] out of the same transaction or series of transactions”? Laurel Sand & Gravel, 519 F.3d at 162; accord Long v. Burson, 182 Md.App. 1, 957 A.2d 173, 187 n. 16 (2008); Sheahy, 284 F.Supp.2d at 281 (<HOLDING>). In other words, even if a claim or defenses Options: A. holding that the situs of debt for purposes of the act of state doctrine was not in dubai when the terms of the relevant promissory note provided that the note was payable in united states dollars at the place of the holders designation B. holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met C. holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes D. holding that where a promissory note had never been made payable to plaintiff or to bearer nor had it ever been indorsed to plaintiff defendants established that plaintiff was not the owner or holder of the note E. holding that fraudulent collection on promissory note was reasonably related to breach of contract claim

assistant: The best answer is B. holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: facilities primarily used by children. As the United States argued during the sentencing hearing, Bergendahl would not be prohibited from working in a casino but would certainly be prohibited from working in its child-care facility. None of the examples Bergendahl cited would be prohibited by the condition’s current language. Further, numerous circuit courts have upheld similar language in the context of loitering restrictions. E.g., United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Nor did the district court commit reversible error in prohibiting Shultz from going near any place where children normally congregate or any business that caters to or targets child customers.” (internal brackets and ellipses omitted)); United States v. Malenya, 736 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Options: A. holding that wills should be construed by the law as it existed when the testator died thereby excluding adopted children as beneficiaries unless the will indicates an intent to include adopted children B. recognizing mutual duty of each parent to provide children with support and education suitable to the childrens circumstances C. recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children D. holding that a condition preventing the defendant from entering into any area where children frequently congregate cannot reasonably and should not be read to proscribe entering areas such as theaters or shopping malls unless those venues are for example a childrens theater or a mall catering specifically to children E. holding wife unreasonably exposed neighbors children to danger because she invited the children over in spite of knowing her husband had molested children in the past

assistant: The best answer is D. holding that a condition preventing the defendant from entering into any area where children frequently congregate cannot reasonably and should not be read to proscribe entering areas such as theaters or shopping malls unless those venues are for example a childrens theater or a mall catering specifically to children
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: (1994)); see also United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 983, 116 S.Ct. 492, 133 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The Seventh Circuit has also recognized an exception to Rooker-Feldman when a federal statute specifically authorizes federal review of a final state court decision. See Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir.1996); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(1999) (authorizing federal district courts to review state court decisions in habeas corpus proceedings). Debtor initially asserts that his situation falls within the Eleventh Circuit’s recognized exception to Rooker-Feldman because the contempt order was not the result of a full hearing and thus, he did not have a “reasonable opportunity” to raise his federal claim in the state court. See Wood, 715 F.2d at 1547 (<HOLDING>). However, Debtor clearly had the opportunity Options: A. holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action B. holding rooker bar only applies to issues plaintiff had reasonable opportunity to raise C. holding state is required to raise procedural bar as affirmative defense or it is waived D. holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action E. holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen

assistant: The best answer is B. holding rooker bar only applies to issues plaintiff had reasonable opportunity to raise
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the following Terms of Service clause and list all applicable unfairness categories. If none apply, answer with None. Clause: in agreeing to these terms , you also agree that the rights in the service and evernote software , including all intellectual property rights , such as trademarks , patents , designs and copyrights , are protected by one or more of copyright , trademark , patent , trade secret and other laws , regulations and treaties , in addition to these terms and any separate agreement .

assistant: None
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: the involved officers themselves. Gov’t Br. at 33. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. As we have noted above, “the prosecutor is responsible for ‘any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police,’ ” Strickler, - U.S. at - n. 12, 119 S.Ct. at 1945 n. 12 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555), and particularly including the MPD, see Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503. Accordingly, defense counsel was no more required to subpoena the officers to learn of their agreements, than she was to subpoena the prosecutor to learn of hers. The appropriate way for defense counsel to obtain such information was to make a Brady request of the prosecutor, just as she did. See United States v. Iverson, 648 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, at oral argument the government Options: A. holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia B. holding that the right of privacy does not attach to matters already within the public domain C. holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant D. holding that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain and the decision of the general assembly in that regard will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error E. holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government

assistant: The best answer is E. holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: There is no action, suit, inquiry, notice of violation, proceeding or investigation pending or, to the knowledge of the Company, threatened against or affecting the Company, any Subsidiary or any of their respective properties before or by any court, arbitrator, governmental or administrative agency or regulatory authority (federal, state, county, local or foreign) (collectively, an “ Action ”) which (i) adversely affects or challenges the legality, validity or enforceability of any of the Transaction Documents or the Securities or (ii) would, if there were an unfavorable decision, have or reasonably be expected to result in a Material Adverse Effect. Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary, nor any director or officer thereof, is or has been the subject of any Action involving a claim of violation of or liability under federal or state securities laws or a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. There has not been, and to the knowledge of the Company, there is not pending or contemplated, any investigation by the Commission involving the Company or any current or former director or officer of the Company. The Commission has not issued any stop order or other order suspending the effectiveness of any registration statement filed by the Company or any Subsidiary under the Exchange Act or the Securities Act.

assistant: Litigations
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir.1998). Clark now contends that the district court erred in not making adequate factual findings, but he never raised this objection below. He also argues that some of the victims may already have received refunds, even though he offered no evidence as to whether he had actually made any such payments. Despite the district court’s brief consideration of the amount, if any, by which the order of restitution should be offset, the court effectively resolved any potential detriment to Clark by ruling that Clark did not have to pay those victims to whom he had already provided restitution. See United States v. Wiant, 314 F.3d 826, 832 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). There was, therefore, no “plain error” on the Options: A. holding that the district courts cursory treatment of a factual matter related to victim payment was adequate under rule 32c1 because the defendant expressed very little interest in pursing his objection B. holding magistrates pretrial hearing sufficient under rule 44c and considering the district courts cursory questioning as well C. holding that the district court failed to comply with rule 32c1 because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from monuss offense was stated in general terms and did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendants specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the psr D. holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection E. holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully

assistant: The best answer is A. holding that the district courts cursory treatment of a factual matter related to victim payment was adequate under rule 32c1 because the defendant expressed very little interest in pursing his objection
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the following Terms of Service clause and list all applicable unfairness categories. If none apply, answer with None. Clause: please read these terms and conditions , carefully before ordering any products from the website or third party app stores ( e.g. the apple app store , the android play store , amazon , etc. ) .

assistant: None
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.’ ” (Citation omitted.)). The Teamsters court recognized that a particularized showing of bad faith is required to justify the use of the court’s inherent power, and stated that we have declined to uphold awards under the bad-faith exception absent both clear evidence that the challenged actions are entirely without color, and are taken for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes and a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of the lower courts. Id. (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir.1986) (citations, internal brackets, and internal quotations marks omitted)); see also Kukui Nuts, 6 Haw.App. at 436, 726 P.2d at 272 (<HOLDING>). Although it is well-settled that “[a]n Options: A. holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate B. holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees C. holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error D. holding that a necessary precedent to any sanction of attorneys fees under the courts inherent powers was the finding that the attorneys conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith citation omitted E. holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees

assistant: The best answer is D. holding that a necessary precedent to any sanction of attorneys fees under the courts inherent powers was the finding that the attorneys conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith citation omitted
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: Thompson have interpreted Thompson’s, three-part test. See Larson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa.Ct.App.1982) (evidence that employee’s supervisor knew of danger associated with post-hole digger machine’s unshielded “power take-off shaft,” that he was familiar with the reasons underlying subsequent Occupational Safely and Health Administration regulations requiring guards to shield the shafts, that he knew that his order requiring weight to be placed on post-hole digger arm required worker to work in close proximity to the unshielded shaft, and that injury was probable whenever working near unshielded moving parts sustained finding that supervisor was guilty of wanton neglect and thus could be held liable to injured worker); Taylor v. Peck, 382 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1986) (<HOLDING>); Justus v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 66 Options: A. holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees B. holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge C. holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered D. holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton neglect by coemployee toward claimant to impose liability on coemployee where there had been no previous accidents on particular punch press no safety inspections to alert employee of danger or malfunction concerning activation of machine and no evidence that coemployee knew that safety mechanism was partially dismantled and coemployee did not instruct claimant to put her hand into die to cheek loose pin E. holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed

assistant: The best answer is D. holding that there was insufficient evidence of wanton neglect by coemployee toward claimant to impose liability on coemployee where there had been no previous accidents on particular punch press no safety inspections to alert employee of danger or malfunction concerning activation of machine and no evidence that coemployee knew that safety mechanism was partially dismantled and coemployee did not instruct claimant to put her hand into die to cheek loose pin
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: that is required to exercise the right of rescission. The problem with this argument is that, in a significant number of instances, the remedial economy of the remedy would be jeopardized. See [Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 Bus. Law. 569, 577 (2006) ]. Specifically, it is self-evident that when a borrower who has provided notice to a creditor decides later — at some unknown, and perhaps distant, point in the future — to effectuate the rescission right through judicial process, the underlying circumstances in no small number . of cases are likely to have changed significantly. Just to provide one example: new actors may have come onto the field post-transaction and obtained some interest in the loan or the underlying property. Cf. Beach, 523 U.S. at 418-19, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (<HOLDING>). And, as a consequence of this reality, Options: A. holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose B. holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute C. holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought D. recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title E. holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose

assistant: The best answer is D. recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the case excerpt and choose the best holding from the options. Case excerpt: adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Id. at 1170 (quoting, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (original emphasis)). Based on the evidence before it, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to assert a classification based on sex and held that “the proper classification, if there was one at all, was the group of persons with whom [the defendant] had or sought to have a romantic affair.” Id. at 1172. Other courts have similarly rejected attempts to label sex-neutral harassment or discrimination as “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment” merely because it followed the break up of a consensual relationship between a man and a woman. See, e.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School, 715 F.Supp. 862, 869 (N.D.Ill.1989) (<HOLDING>). This court finds the rational of Succar, Options: A. recognizing that the duty arises not from the terms of the insurance contract but from an obligation imposed in law as a result of the special relationship B. holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in maryland allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship citations omitted C. holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship D. holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job E. holding that in a quid pro quo case when an employer penalizes an employee after the termination of a consensual relationship the employee has to show that the penalty was a result of the employees refusal to give in to demands for additional sexual relations and not simply the result of anger over the failure of the past relationship

assistant: The best answer is E. holding that in a quid pro quo case when an employer penalizes an employee after the termination of a consensual relationship the employee has to show that the penalty was a result of the employees refusal to give in to demands for additional sexual relations and not simply the result of anger over the failure of the past relationship
system: You are a legal assistant. Answer concisely and accurately. When legal text is provided, rely on it and do not invent facts.

user: Read the legal provision and list the applicable contract clause categories. Provision: The parties hereto agree that, on the Effective Date, the following transactions shall be deemed to occur automatically, without further action by any party hereto: (a) the Original Credit Agreement shall be deemed to be amended and restated in its entirety pursuant to this Agreement; (b) all Obligations (as defined in the Original Credit Agreement) under the Original Credit Agreement outstanding on the Effective Date shall in all respects be continuing and shall be deemed to Obligations outstanding hereunder; (c) the guaranties made by the Credit Parties pursuant to the Original Credit Agreement to the holders of the Obligations (as defined in the Original Credit Agreement) shall remain in full force and effect with respect to the Obligations and are hereby reaffirmed; (d) the Collateral Documents and the Liens created thereunder by the Credit Parties in favor of Regions Bank, as administrative agent and collateral agent for the benefit of the holders of the Obligations (as defined in the Original Credit Agreement) shall remain in full force and effect with respect to the Obligations and are hereby reaffirmed; and (e) all references in the other Credit Documents to the Original Credit Agreement shall be deemed to refer without further amendment to this Agreement.

assistant: Amendments