Original sentence: As Peter Hankins points out, "Dennett's broad range means he's said useful things on a broader range of topics than anyone else.Compounding this is the scope of the theory.In essence, he denies that consciousness requires something in addition to capacity for behavior, saying that philosophers such as Searle, "just can't imagine how understanding could be a property that emerges from lots of distributed quasi-understanding in a large system" (p439).The point of contention is whether Dennett's own definitions are indeed more accurate, whether what we think of when we speak of perceptions and consciousness can be understood in terms of effect on behavior
Edited sentence: He redefines qualia (Dennett(1988)) and consciousness (Dennett(1992)) to be consistent with his theory that consciousness can exist in information processors.In essence, he denies that consciousness requires something in addition to capacity for behavior, saying that philosophers such as Searle, "just can't imagine how understanding could be a property that emerges from lots of distributed quasi-understanding in a large system" (p439), although Dennett himself also offers no detailed explanation