(2016] 1 S.C.R. 3 73

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

SALEENA

(Criminal Appeal No. 1251 OF 2015)

JANUARY 29, 2016

[DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974: s.3(1) - Order of detention - Writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the decision of competent authority was not communicated to the dete1111 - High Court held that the decision of the competent authority was not communicated to the detenu and the right of detenu u!Art.22(5) of the Constitution was violated - Whether non-commu11icatio11 of order of the competent authority or absence of effective communication would vitiate the order of detention - Held: It is incorrect to treat issue of communication of rejection of representation by competent authority or incorporation of order passed by competent authority in the order of communication as a constitutional safeguard - The duty of the Court in this regard is to see whether the representation submilled by the detenu was rejected in a mechanical manner without application of mind - Jn the instant case, the competent authority passed an order on the basis of the material produced before it - It cannot be said that there was no subjective satisfaction - When the material, the file, the representation and the comments on the representation were produced before the authority and he had mentioned in the order that he had gone through the representation and not found siif.ficient ground for exercising the power u!s.11 of the COFEPOSA Act. it cannot be said that there was no subjective satisfaction - The impugned order granting writ of habeas corpus and directing the detenu ta be set at liberty was totally vulnerable and is set aside - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art.22(5).

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. When there is allegation that there has been nonapplication of mind and the representation has been rejected in a laconic or mechanical manner by the competent authority, the Court can always call for the file and peruse the notes and the H 373

proceedings whether there has been application of mind by the competent authority or not. Liberty of an individual is sacred.

But such liberty can be controlled by taking recourse to law.

Preventive detention is constitutionally permissible. The Courts can interfere where such detention has taken place in violation of constitutional or statutory safeguards. Treating the issue of communication of rejection of the representation by the competent authority or incorporation of the order passed by the competent authority in the order of communication as a constitutional safeguard, would not be correct.

The duty of the Court in this regard is to see whether the representation submitted by the detenu has been rejected in a mechanical manner without application of mind. All the assertions made in the representation were commented by the Under Secretary and every aspect has been stated in detail. The order that has been communicated to hin. by the Under Secretary indicates that the representation submitted uy the detenu had been carefully considered by the competent authority. A scrutiny of the file showed that the entire file relating to the detention was produced before the competent authority alongwith detailed comments. The said authority has clearly stated that he has gone through the representation and docs not find any sufficient ground to exercise the jurisdiction under the COFEPOSA Act. This would tantamount to real and proper consideration, for the competent authority is not required to pass an adj ndicatory order. There bas heen subjective satisfaction on the basis of the materials placed before the competent authority along with the representation. [Paras 22,

23, 25, 26, 30) [393-E-H; 394-A, G; 395-A-F; 398-A)

2. If the order is communicated by another authority and eventually the order is affirmed by the Advisory Board and the same is challenged, the constitutional courts have ample power to call for the records and verify how the representation has been rejected. Jurisdiction of the court is only to see whether there has been any subjective satisfaction that the proper law had been applied at the time of detention of the detenu. There is no need on the part of the competent authority to pass a speaking order and to give reasons on any facet. The Government has to follow the safeguards provided under Article 22(5) and the provisions of the statute. It is because without a trial a person is deprived

of his liberty. Promptitude of action within the statutory scheme is imperative. In the case at hand, these aspects which have been raised before the High Court have been negatived, and rightly so. The competent authority of the appropriate government has passed an order on the basis of the material produced before it. It cannot be said that there is no subjective satisfaction. When the material, the file, the representation and the comments on the representation were produced before the authority and he .had mentioned in the order that he had gone through the representation and not found sufficient ground for exercising the power under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, it cannot be said that there has been no subjective satisfaction.

The impugned order granting the writ of habeas corpus and directing the detenu to be set at liberty is totally vulnerable and accordingly is set aside the same.

It is urged by the respondent that the detenu was detained on 25.2.2013 and released on 24.10.2013 and in this backdrop, the detenu should not be sent back to undergo the remaining period of detention, for there exists no proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated in the order for which the detcnu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained if the order is set aside. In the present case, the detenu was initially detained for one year. He remained in incarceration from 25.2.2013 to 24.10.2013. The High Court has quashed the order of detention and be bas been set at liberty. The appropriate course would be that the detaining authority should re-examine the matter keeping in view the principle stated in Simi/ F11/c/11111d Sli11/i and C/11111tlr11k(l11/ Bmltli within two months. (Paras 31, 36,

37, 41) [398-D-F; 401-E-H; 402-C-E; 404-E-GJ

Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India (2000) 3 SCC 409:2000 (1) SCR 945; State of Tamil Nadu v. Kethiyan Perumal (2004) 8 SCC 780: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 322;

Sate of Tamil Nadu v. A/agar (2006) 7 SCC 540: 2006

(3) Suppl.SCR 310; Chandrakant Baddi" ADM & Police Commr (2008) 17 SCC 290:2008 (7) SCR163; Haradhan Saha v. State of We.I'/ Bengal (1975) 3 SCC

198: 1975 (1) SCR 778; John Martin v. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 836: 1975 (3) SCR 211; Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others

(1975) 2 SCC 81: 1975 (2) SCR 832; State ofGzljarat

v. Adam Kasam Bhaya (1981) 4 SCC 216:1982 (1) SCR 7 40 - relied on.

Devji Val/abhbhai Tande! v. The Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu and Anr. AIR 1982 SC 1029: 1982 (3) SCR 553; Lekha Nandakumar v. Government of India 2004 (2) KLT 1094; A.C. Razia ic Government of Kera/a and others AIR 2004 SC 2504:2004 (I) SCR 437; Saliyal Beevi and others v. State of Kera/a und others 2011 (4) KHC 422; Babu v. State of Kera/a 2010 (1) KLT 23; Ashok Narain v. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 437; Gurdev Singh v. Union of India (2002) l SCC 545: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR105; Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab 1952 SCR 756; K.M Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India (1991) I SCC 476: 1991 (I) SCR I 02; Bhut Nath Mete v. State of West Bengal (1974) 1 SCC 645: 1974

(3) SCR 315; A. S01(•kath Ali v. Union of India (2000) 7 SCC 148: 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 48; Ahamed Nassar

v. State of T.N. (1999) 8SCC 473: 1999 (3) Suppl.

SCR 657; Sanjay Kumar Aggarll'al 1. Union of India

(1990) 3 SCC 309: 1990 (2) SCR 318; Ashadevi v. K Shivraj, Addi. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Gzljarat

(1979) 1 SCC 222: 1979 (2) SCR 215; Union of India

v. Arvind Shergi!I (2000) 7 SCC 601; Raj Ki shore Prasad 1: State of Bihar and others (1982) 3 SCC 10;

Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others 1982 (2) SCC 43: 1982 (3) SCR 522 - referred to.

Case Law Reference

1?82 (3) SCR 553 referred to.

Para6

2904 (2) KLT 1094 referred to.

Para6

2004 (1) SCR 437 referred to.

Para6

2011 (4) KHC 422 referred to.

Para6

2010 (1) KLT 23 referred to.

Para 7

1975 (1) SCR 778 relied on.

Para 7

(1982) 2 sec 437 referred to.

Para 7

2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 105 referred to.

Par\) 7 A

1952 SCR 756 referred to.

Para 7

1991 (1) SCR 102 referred to.

Paras

1974 (3) SCR315 referred to.

Para S

2000 (1) SCR 945 relied on.

Paras B

2004 (5) Suppl. SCR322 relied on.

Paras

2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 310 relied on.

Paras

200S (7) SCR 163 relied on.

Paras

2000 ( 2) Suppl. SCR 4S referred to.

Para 19 c

1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 657 referred to.

Para 19

1990 (2) SCR 31S referred to.

Para 19

1979 (2) SCR 215 referred to.

Para 19 D (2QOO) 1 sec 601 referred to.

Para 21

1975 (3) SCR 211 relied on.

Para 2S

1975 (2) SCR S32 relied on.

Para32

(19S2) 3 sec 10 referred to.

Para 34 E

19!:1:Z (3) SCR 522 referred to.

Para35

19S2 (1) SCR 740 relied on.

Para 37

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1251of2015

F From the Judgment and Order dated 24.10.2013 of the High Court ofKerala at Emakulam in W. P. (Cr!.) No. 406 of2013

N. K. Kaul, ASG, Ranjana Narain, Sadhana Sandhu, Bhuvan Mishra, B. Krishna Prasad for the Appellants.

R. Basant, K. P. Rajgopal, V. S. Lakshmi, A. Venayagam Balan G for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Calling in question the defensibility of the judgment and order dated 24.10.2013 passed by the High Court ofKerala H

by which the Division Bench has quashed the order of detention passed against Abdu Rahiman (detenu), the husband of the respondent, under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for brevity, 'the COFEPOSA Act'), the instant appeal, by special leave, has been preferred.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details. the facts which are essential to be stated for adjudication of this appeal are that an order of detention was issued on 08.02.2013 under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

The said order, as the facts would uncurtain, came into existence on the basis of proposal of the Sponsoring Authority (Directorate of Enforcement) and the Empowered Officer of the Central Government (the Detaining Authority). The grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu vi de communication dated 08.02.2013. By the said communication in compliance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, the detenu was informed of his right to make a representation against his detention to the Detaining Authority. Be it stated, pursuant to the order or detention, the detenu was detained on 25.02.2013 and lodged in the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram.

3. The detenu made a representation on 11.04.2013 which was received on 18.04.2013 by the Jail Superintendent which was forwarded to the competent authority and thereafter the Special Secretary-cum- Director General, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, rejected the representation on behalf of the Central Government on 26.04.2013 after due consideration. The order of rejection was communicated to the detenu vide memorandum dated 29.04.2013 by the Under Secretary, Government oflndia. Keeping in view the prescription enshrined under Section 8( I) of the COFEPOSA Act, reference was made to the Advisory Board and the detenu was heard by the Advisory Board on 04.05.2013, and thereafter vi de order dated 21.05.2013, he was informed that the Advisory Board was of the opinion that sufficient reasons existed for his detention. On the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Central Government confirmed the order of detention and directed that the detention of the detenu would remain in force for a period of one year commencing from the date of his detention.

4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the wife of the detenu filed Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 406of2013 before the High Court seeking

fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

a writ of habeas corpus. It was urged before the High Court that the decision of the competent authority was not communicated to the detenu; that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the order of detention; that the report submitted by the sponsoring authority was not served on the detenu; 'that there was delay in considering his representation; that the translated copy of the order of detention was not served on him; that he was not served the order rejecting his representation; and that the order of rejection passed by the competent authority indicating the reasons was not communicated to the detenu.

5. Counter affidavit was filed by the respondents putting forth the stand that before rejecting the representation of the detenu, the requisite process was adhered to, and in support of the same it was asserted that after receipt of the representation of the detenu from the Jail Superintendent by the Deputy Director, Calicut, the same was sent to the Ministry with para-wise comments on 25.4.2013. On 26.4.2013, after examining the issue raised in the representation, the Under Secretary put up the file before the Joint Secretary who is the Competent Authority under Section 3( I) of the COFEPOSAAct. The said Authority recorded its comments and submitted the file to the Special Secretary and Director General, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau for consideration, who vide order dated 26.4.2013 rejected the same.

6. The High Court noting the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties adverted to the decisions in Devji Vallahllblwi Tande/ v.

The Admi11istrator of Goa, Daman mu! Diu a11d A11r. 1, Lek fut Nandakumar v. Government of India', A.C. Razia v. Govemmenl of Kerala amt otfters3, Saliyal Beevi mu! otfters v. State of Keraf(I and otfter~~ and some other authorities and eventually came to hold as follows:-

" As we have already stated, a detenu, who makes a representation availing of his constitutional rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution oflndia is entitled to have proper consideration of his representation and that process of consideration is completed, only when a decision on his representation is also communicated to

1 AIR 1982 SC 1029

2 2004 (2) KLT I 094

' AIR 2004 SC 2504

' 2011 (4) KHC 422

him.That constitutional requirement will not be satisfied if an authority subordinate to the competent authority informs the detenu that his representation is rejected. Admittedly, in this case, the decision of the competent authority was not communicated to the detenu and on the other hand, the only communication that was issued to the detenu is that of the Under Secretary to the Government of India, where, it was laconically stated that his representation is rejected. In our view, this is a case where the right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution oflndia is violated and the issue canvassed by the petitioner is fully covered in her favour by the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Lekha Nandakumar's case (supra)."

Be it stated, all other grounds urged before the High Court did not find favour and were regarded as unacceptable. Thus, the only ground that impressed the High Court is the one that is mentioned in the aforequoted passage.

7. Criticizing the aforesaid analysis and the ultimate view expressed by the High Court, Mr. N.K. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the High Court has fallen into error by opining that in the obtaining factual matrix, Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been violated. It is urged by him that the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Leklia Na11dakumar (supra) had already been diluted in B11bu v. State of Kera/a', but the High Court by the impugned order placed reliance on the earlier view. It is his further submission that the dc:tenu has no vested right neither under Article 22(5) of the Constitution nor under Section 3( I) and (3) of the COFEPOSA Act to assert that unless the order rejecting the representation itself is communicated there is a procedural irregularity which invalidates the detention. It has been further canvassed by him that there has been no abuse of discretion but on the contrary a complete application of mind, for all relevant materials have been taken into consideration which is reflective from the file and in such a situation, the order of detention is not vulnerable in law. Elaborating further, it is put forth by him that once a subjective satisfaction has been arrived at on consideration of the relevant materials placed before the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority, the order is absolutely

20 I 0 (I) KLT 230

[DIPAK MISRA, J.l

legally sustainable and there was no warrant for any interference by the High Court. It is argued by him that the High Court has been wholly misguided by the aspect that the order rejecting the representation was not communicated by the detaining authority, for there is no requirement in law that it has to be communicated by the said authority. Emphasis has to be on the satisfaction of the competent authority which is dem.onstrable from the file and that would suffice the legal requirement.

To bolster the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Kaul has placed reliance on Haradlian Saha v. State of West Bengaf', Asl10k Narain v. Union of lndia7, Gurdev Si11f(li v. Unio11 (Jf lmlia' and Ujaf(ar Sillg/1 v. State of Punjab'.

8. Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, per contra, would contend that right to represent as provided under Article 22(5) includes the right to fair and proper consideration . and the said position in law has been settled by the Constitution Bench in K.M. Abdulla Kun/ii v. Union of lndia 10• It is urged by him that the right for proper consideration, has been taken a step forward by the High Court of Kerala in Lek/U1 NaiulakunUlr (supra) by holding that detenu has a right to be communicated the order rejecting his representation and the non-compliance explicitly shows nonapplication of mind. It is put forth by the learned senior counsel that when the order passed rejecting the representation is communicated, the detenu would have been apprised of the fact that there had been a consideration of his representation in a fair and impartial manner indicating application of mind, but when the communication, as the fact situation in the present case would show, is fundamentally a non-communication to sustain an order of such nature, would be contrary to high values relating to life, freedom and liberty, inasmuch as such procedural violation vitiates the order of detention. Learned senior counsel would argue with vehemence that the order must be self-evident that the representation has been considered in an impartial and dispassionate manner and, therefore, the communication of the order passed by the competent authority is

'(1975) 3 sec 198

'(1982)2SCC437

'(2002) 1 sec 545

' 1952 SCR 756

"'(1991) I SCC476

imperative, for it would clearly convey that there has been real and proper consideration. Lastly it is propounded by Mr. Basant that if this Coult would be inclined to set aside the judgment of the High Court, it may not send back the accused to undergo the remaining period of detentioi1 as there exists no pro xi mate temporal nexus between the period of detention and today. That apart, submits the learned senior counsel, nothing has been brought on record to indicate the desirability offurther or continued detention. In support of the orderofthe High Court, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on llaradlum Salta (supra), leklw Namlllkumllr (supra), K.M. Abdulla Kun/ti (supra) and B/1111 Nlltlt Mete v. Slllte o.f West Benf{al" and for the second limb of submission, he has drawn inspiration from Su11il Fu/cluuul Slwlt v. Union of Imlia".

Stale of Tamil Nadu v. Ketlt(Vl/11 Perttmlll". Stllte of Tamil Nadu v.

Alag,, r" and C/u1111/rakt111t Btu/di v. ADM & Police Commr';·

9.When the matter was taken up for hearing on 12.3.2015, Mr.

Basant, learned senior counsel appearing forthe respondent had pleaded for sustenance of the order impugned on the foundation of the principles stated in llllradlum Salta (supra) and leklw Nl/lu/akumar (supra).

His singular submission was that unless the order itself is communicated. there is a procedural illegality which invalidates the detention. When the matter was taken up on 26.3.2015, the following order came to be passed:-

"Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General commended us to the Division Bench decision of the Kera la High Court in Babu Vs. State of Kera la [(20 I 0) (I) KLT 230] wherein paragraph 13 it has been held thus:

"Of course a reading of the po1tions emphasized above in the passage might suggest that communication by another of the order passed by the authority may not be sufficient. The portions emphasized above might create confusion as to whether that is the law. But we find it d_ifficult to accept such understanding of the Jaw based on the above observations. The order passed by the authority may be extracted in extensor or completely by a

" ( 1974) 1 sec M5

" (2000J 3 sec 409

" (2004) s sec no

11 (2006) 7 sec 540

H " t2008J 11 sec 290

rDIPAK MISRA, J.l

subordinate officer and that may be communicated to the detenu.

In such a case it cannot possibly be contended that there is no communication for the reason that the order was not communicated by the authority which passed the order or that the order as such has not been communicated. The observations extracted above understood properly in the context, according to us, can only means and insist that the order must be communicated effectively and not that the order as such must be communicated or that the authority which passed the order must himself communicate the order."

Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel, explaining the aforesaid judgment, submitted that effective communication of the order would tantamount to substantial compliance and in the said case the order passed by the competent authority was extracted. Mr.

Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General, submitted that the order need not be a speaking one and what is to be seen is that there is recording of subjective satisfaction by the competent authority.

The communication by the lower authority putting the order in indirect speech would not affect the orderof detention. In addition, he would submit that the court can, for its own satisfaction, peruse the record to find out whether procedural safeguards have been taken care of or not."

I 0. The purpose ofreferring to the aforesaid order is that the sole contention raised in the case, whether non-communication of the order rejecting the representation in an effective manner would invalidate or vitiate the order of detention. To appreciate the said submission, we had permitted the learned Additional Solicitor General to produce the file for our perusal.

11. We have already stated about the date of detention, date of submission of representation and rejection of representation. There is no dispute that the order of rejecting the representation has been communicated by the Under Secretary on 29.4.2013. The said order reads as follows:-

"With reference to his representation dated 11.04.2013 (in regional language) received through the Jail Superintendent, Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram on 18.04.2013 in the Ministry, Shri Abdu Rahiman @ Atheeq, a COFEPOSA detenu is hereby informed that the aforesaid representation has been carefully considered

A by the Special Secretary & Director General, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi on behalf of the Central Government, but it is regretted that the same has been rejected."

12. The gravamen of the submission is whether non- B communication of the order by the competent authority or absence of an effective communication would vitiate the order of detention. To appreciate the controversy in proper perspective, we may refer to Article 22(5) of the Constitution which reads as follows:-

"When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order."

13. Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act reads as follows:-

"Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- ( l) The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank ofa Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of the State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered forthe purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from-

(i) smuggling goods, or

(ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or

(iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or

(iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in

transp011ing or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or

(v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting tlie smuggling of goods,

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. SALEENA 385 fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person A be detained:

Provided that no order of detention shall be made on any of the grounds specified in this sub-section on which an order of detention may be made under section 3 of the Prevention oflllicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 or under B section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 (J&K Ordinance I of 1988).

(2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order.

(3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which-the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing,_ not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention."

 14. We shall analyse what the Division Bench of the High Court ofKerala in Leklra Nmulakunwr (supra) has laid down in the backdrop of the constitutional mandate, the statutory command and the view expressed by this Court. In the said case the Division Bench stated that it was not considering the correctness ofapplication of mind pertaining to the satisfaction of the authority or merits of the case, but addressing to the aspect whether constitutional safeguards prescribed by law were complied with or not. It noted the four contentions raised by the petitioner therein. One of the contention was that the representation was not properly disposed of by the appropriate authority and it was not sent to him by the competent authority but the rejection orer was comrnunicated by another authority without stating any reason. The High Court referred to the nature ofallegations, the protection granted under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 11 of the COFEPOSAAct, the duty of the authority who deals with the representation, took note of the fact that the representation addressed to the Secretary was considered by the Joint Secretary and in that context proceeded to state as follows:-

'"Even though various contentions including non-supply of necessary documents etc. were mentioned in the representation, there is no application of mind hy the Secretary to Government.

The Secretary has just rejected the representation. It does not show that he has applied his mind. When the Authority disposes a representation, which is a constitutional right of the detenu, it cannot be disposed of like this in a casual manner. Further. the Secretary has not communicated his order to the detenu. but only the 1 lnder Secretary has communicated the order. It is true that even though making ofrepresentation is a constitutional right, there is no obligation for the Central Government to grant a hearing. It is also not necessary that an elaborate speaking order should be passed. But from the order it should appear that the authority has applied its mind while disposing of the representation. The order should be sent to the detenu. Here the order passed by the Secretary was not sent to the detenu, but only the factum of rejection of his representation was intimated by the Under Secretary keeping the detenu in dark regarding the way in which his representation was disposed of. There is nothing on record to show that the concerned authority has applied its mind. Even if the Under Secretary informed him that Secretary has disposed of his representation. this is not the way a constitutional obligation is to be discharged by the Government Secretary. Therefore, there is no proper disposal of the representation. We are of the view that on this ground alone the detention order will not stand as there is procedural violation." ·

[underlining is by us]

15. In Babu (supra), a subsequent Division Bench posed the question which reads as follows:-

"Does the con1n1unication by anyone other than the authority passing the order of the fate of the representation made by the detenu (and not the order as such) infringe such fundamental right of the detenu?:'

16. Dealing with the said issue, the Court opined that the order must be communicated effectively and not that the order as such must be communicated or that the authority which passed the order must himself communicate the order. Thereafter, the Division Bench proceeded

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. SALEENA rDIPAK MISRA, J.]

to lay down the principle relating to effective communication and in that regard came to hold as follows:-

...... The order passed by the authority may be extracted in extenso or completely by a subordinate officer and that may be communicated to the detenu. In such a case it cannot possibly be contended that there is no communication for the reason that the order was not communicated by the authority which passed the order or that the order as such has not been communicated. The observations extracted above und_erstood properly in the context, . according to us, can only mean and insist that the order must be communicated effectively and not that the order as such must be communicated or that the authority which passed the order must. himself communicate the order."

17. Thus, the decision in Lek/w Nmulakumar (supra) lays down ·. that there has to be a communication by the competent authority failing which the order of detention is invalid. The second Division Bench explains the first one and goes by the concept of "effective communication". It states that the order passed liy the competent authority should be properly extracted in the order of communication and it must indicate subjective satisfaction. The question is whether the principles stated in both the decisions are correct or to put it differently, whether non-communication of the order by the coinpetent autl1ority or for that matternon-extraction-ofthe order of the competent authority by the communicatirig authority would straightaway invalidate the order of detention. In .this regard, we may usefully refer to the authority in Haradlwn Saha (supra). In the said case, the Constitution Bench was . dealing with the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal

Security Act, 1971. While dealing with the consideration of representation, the larger Bench opined thus:-

"24. The representation of a detenu is to be considered. There is an obligation on the State to consider the representation. The Advisory Board has adequate power to examine the entire material.

The Board can also call for more materials. The Board may call the detenu at his request. The constitution of the Board slfows that it is to consist of Judges or persons qualified to be Judges of the High Court. The. constitution of the Board observes the fundainental of fair play and principles of natural justice. It is not the requirement of principles of na.tural justice that there must be

an oral hearing. Section 8 oft he Act \vhich casts an obligation on the State to consider the representation affords the detenu all the rights which are guaranteed by A1iicle 22(5). The Government considers the representation to ascertain essentially whether the order is in conformity with the power under the law. The Board. on the other hand_ considers \vhethr in the ligbt of the representation there is sufficient cause for detention.

x, xxx.x

26. The opinion of the Board as well as the order of the Government rejecting the representation of the detenu must be after proper c consideration. There need not be a speaking order. The1:£_is also no failure of justice by the order not being a w_eaking order. All that is necessary is that there should be real and proper consideration by the Government and the Advisory Board."

[Emphasis added]

D The Court elucidating the said aspect in the backdrop of natural

justice expressed thus:-

"30. Elaborate rules of natural justice arc excluded either expressly or by necessary implication where procedural provisions are made in the statute or where disclosure of relevant information to an interested party would be contra1y to the public interest. If a statutory provision excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the court docs not completely ignore the mandate of the legislature. The court notices the distinction between the duty to act fairly and a duty to act judicially in accordance with natural justice. The detaining authority is under a duty to give fair consideration to the representation made by the detenu but it is not under a duty to disclose to the detenu any evidence or information. The duty to act fairly is discharged even if there is not an oral hearing. Fairness denotes abstention from abuse of discrctio11.

3 I. Article 22 which provides for preventive detention Jays down substantive limitations as well as procedural safeguards. The principles of natural justice insofar as they are compatible with detention laws find place in Article 22 itself and also in the Act.

Even if Article I 9 be examined in regard to preventive detention, it does not increase the content of reasonableness required to be

rDIPAK MISRA, .I.I

observed in respect of orders of preventive detention. The procednre in the Act provides for fair considerntion to the representation. Whether in a particular case. a detenu has not been afforded an opportunity of making a representatioi1 or whether

the detaining authority is abusing the po, vers of detention can be brought before the court of la, v."

l Emphasis supplied]

18. From the aforesaid authority, it is clear as day that while rejecting the representation, a speaking order need not be passed and what is necessary is that there should be real and proper consideration by the Government and the Advisory l:loard. The Constitution Bench has limited the application of principles or natural justice to the sphere of deliberation. It has confined it to real and proper consideration: application of mind. Dealing with the concept of fairness. it has been observed that fairness denotes abstention fron1 abuse or discretion. Understanding the said principle correctly, it can be said that the use of discretion has to be based on fairness of approach. The authority concerned may not give reasons but there has to be application of mind. Mr. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General would submit that even if the order itself does not indicate application ofn1ind by the competent authority or it has been communicated by another authority not indicating the approach of the competent authority the Court has ample power to call for the file and satisfy itself. In this regard, he has drawn our attention to the view expressed by this Court in As/111k Narui11 (supra). In the said case, one Santosh Ku1nar Jain \Vas engaged in illegal foreign exchange operations and he apprehended by the Enforcement Directorate of the Ministry of Finance. On the basis of ce1tain 111atcrials, he was arrested under Section 35 of.the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and remanded to judicial custody and thereafter he was released on bail. After he was enlarged on bail, an order of detention was passed under COFEPOS/\ Act. The said detention was challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court, and it was contended before this Court that the failure to launch the prosecution, taken along with the circumstance, that a long time was allowed to lapse before the order of detention was made, was sufficient to expose the hollowness of the claim that the order was made with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange. To appreciate the said submission, the Court called fort he original file and upon perusal of the

file held thus:-

1-1

"In order to satisfy ourselves that there was no undue or unnecessary delay in making the order of detention, we sent for the original files and we have perused them. We are satisfied that the matter was examined thoroughly at various levels and the detaining authority applied his mind fully and satisfactorily to the question whether the petitioner should be detained under the COFEPOSA. The passage of time from the date of initial apprehension of the detenu and the making of the order of detention was not occasioned by any laxity on the part of the agencies concerned, but was the result of a full and detailed consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case by the various departments involved. We find from the file that the very question whether the passage of time had made it unnecessary to order the detention of the detenu was also considered by the detaining authority. We are unable to hold in the circumstances of this case that there was any tardiness on the part of any one or that the detention is in any manner illegal."

19. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision in G11rdev Singft (supra). In the said case, it was contended by the appellant

ther~ that. the order of detention was vitiated because of nonconsideration ofrelevant materials by the detaining authority. The Court referred to the decisions in A. Sowkat/1 Ali v. U11io11 of ltu/ia'°, A/tamed

Nassa~ v. State of T.N. 11,· S1111jay Kumar Aggarwal v. Ui1io11 of Imlit1 18

and As/1111/evi v:K. Sftivrttj, Addi. Cftief Secretary to tfte Govt. of Gujarat" and came to rule thus:-

"Testing the case at hand on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the decisions noted above, we find that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in the case is based on consideration of all the relevant materials placed before it by the sponsor.ing authority. It is not the case of the appellant that the sponsori1ig authority did_ not place before the detaining authority any material in its possession which is relevant and material for the purpose and such material, if considered.by the

"' (2000) 7 sec 148

"(1999) 8SCC 473

" ( 1990) 3 sec Jo9

H " ( 1979) 1 sec 222

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. SALEENA 391 rDIPAK MISRA, J.]

detaining authority, might have resulted in taking a different view A in the matter. All that is contended bn behalf of the detenu is that the detaining authority should have taken further steps before being satisfied that a case for detention u1ider the COFEPOSA Act has been made.out against the detenu. Whether the detention order suffers from non-application of mind hy the detaining authority is not a matter to be examined according to any straitjacket formula or set principles. It depends oi1 the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the activities alleged against the detenu, the materials collected in support of such allegations, the propensity and potentiality ofthe detenu in indulging in such activities etc.

The Act does not lay down any set parameters for arriving at the C subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority. Keeping in view the purpose for which the enactment is made and the purpose it_is

inteded to achieve, Parliam_ent in its wisdom, has not laid down any set standards for the detaining authority to decide whether an order of detention should be passed against a person. The matter is left to the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority."

20 .. Be it stated, Mr. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General, relying on the said passage has urged that where after communicating detailed grounds of the detention order and upon receipt of the representatio.n from the detenu, the same has been properly considered, mere non-supply of the original order of rejection of the detenu 's representation would not vitiate.the detention order itself and it can never be a ground for interference in the order of detention by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

21. Resisting the said submission, it is propounded by Mr. Basant that incorporation of.the extract of the order passed by the competent authority where another authority .communicates the order is a constitutional safeguard as envisaged under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. In B£1bu (supra), the Division Bench of the High Court, while dealing with the deprivation ofrightto life and liberty of the citizens, held that it is obligatory on the competent authority to make aware the

reasoing of the decision to the detenu and intimation in laconic style has to be avoided. That apart, the authority must not be prisoner of the notes submitted by the subordinate, for it is its duty to consider the representation in proper perspective. Emphasis has been laid on individual freedom and liberty especially in preventive detention where it gets vitiated only

\vhen thl:re is violation of procedural safeguards. 'l'o arrive at the said conclusion, heavy reliance has been placed on Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The said decision. as we notice, has engrafted the principle that unless the extract of the original order is communicated. the detention

is vitiated, as there is a violation of the constitutional safeguard. We may hasten to state that Bllbu (supra) clarifies the proposition of law laid down in Leklw Nw11/ltk1111111r (supra) but the base of both the decision3 is that unless the detenu is made aware of the order passed by the competent authority. the said order is bound to suffer from legal impropriety. It has been laid down in /laradlllm Slt/ill (supra) that there may not be a speaking order but application of mind. In Gurdev Siugli (supra). this Court had made it clear that whether the detention orders suffer from non-application of mind by the detaining authority is not a matter to be examined according to any straitjacket formula or set principles and it would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the stress is on the application of mind. Communication of grounds on which the order of detention has been made cannot be equated with communication of the order rejecting the representation.

There is a constitutional command to intimate the grounds on which the order of detention has bc<'n made. There is a statutory mandate that grounds of detention ha\c to be communicated within five days and delay upo fifteen days is allowed, if reason is given in writing. There can be no shadow of doubt that if reasons are not communicated within the said time, the order of detention would be vitiated. There can be no trace of doubt that in both the stages there has to be application of mind which would be in the realm of subjective satisfoction based on consideration of all the relevant materials placed before the competent authority. The satisfaction of the competent authority regarding

sufficieny of materials on which the satisfaction is recorded is subjective in nature. In this regard, it is seemly to reproduce the observations made by this Court in U11i1111 l!f l11tlill v. Arvintl Sliergi!P' :-

"The High Court has virtually decided the matter as if it was sitting in appeal on the order passed by the detaining authority.

The action by way of preventive detention is largely based on suspicion and the court is not an appropriate forum to investigate the question whether the circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person. The language of Section 3

'" (2000) 7 sec 601

[DIPAK MISRA, J.l

clearly indicates that the responsibility for making a detention order rests upon the detaining authority which alone is entrusted with the duty in that regard and it will be a serious derogation from that responsibility ifthe court substitutes its judgment forthe satisfaction of that authority on an investigation undertaken regarding sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction was grounded. The court can only examine the grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, that is, to prevent the detenu from engaging in smuggling activity. The said satisfaction is subjective in nature and such a satisfaction, if based on relevant grounds, cannot be stated to be invalid. The authorities concerned have to take note of the various facts including the fact that this was a solitary incident in the case of the detenu and that he had , been granted bail earlier in respect of which the application for cancellation of the same was made but was rejected by the Court.

In this case, there has been due application of mind by the authority concerned to that aspect of the matter as we have indicated in the course of narration of facts. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court in the circumstances of the case cannot be sustained."

22. This being the position of law, when there is allegation that there has been non-application of mind and the representation has been rejected in a laconic or mechanical manner by the competent authority, we are disposed to think, the Cou1t can always call for the file and peruse the notes and the proceedings whether there has been application of mind by the competent authority or not. Our said conclusion gets support from the decision in As/wk Narain (supra). In the said case, this Court on perusal of file has expressed its opinion that there had been no tardiness on behalf of any one and, therefore, the detention in no manner was illegal.

23. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of an individual is sacred. The individual liberty has to be given paramount importance.

But such liberty can be controlled by taking recourse to law. Preventive detention is constitutionally permissible. The Courts can interfere where such detention has taken place in violation of constitutional or statutory safeguards. Treating the issue of communication of rejection of the repre3entation by the competent authority or incorporation of the order passed by the competent authority in the order of communication as a

constitutional safeguard, would not be correct. The duty of the Court in this regard is to see whether the representation submitted by the detenu has been rejected in a mechanical manner without application of mind.

We are inclined to hold that for the said purpose, the relevant file can be called for and perused and, accordingly, keeping that in view, in the course of hearing, we had asked for production of the file and the same had been produced.

24. On a perusal of the file, we find that after receipt of the representation, the Under Secretary, COFEPOSA, had narrated the grounds of detention and the file pertaining to the detention was also placed on record. Parawise comments of the sponsoring authority, that is, the Directorate of Enforcement, Kochi has been obtained. Various contentions have been raised in the representation that the detenu had studied only upto IO" standard in the Malayalam medium school of his native place and though he can write and read certain English words, he does not have enough knowledge to understand the meaning of the English words and sentences. In the comment, it has been mentioned that free Malayalam translation of the grounds of detention and relied upon documents had been supplied to the detenu to make him aware of the grounds and reasons for his detention under the COFEPOSA Act and, therefore, the ground had no relevance. As indicated earlier, such a ground was raised before the High Court and not found favour. It was also urged in the representation that he was unable to understand the documents which were furnished to him in Malayalam as they were not legible. It has been commented that the relevant writings were very much legible and photocopies of the FIR and Search List werefurnished to the detenu. A further ground was urged that he was not supplied the reasons of his detention and the documents were not supplied within five days or maximum within fifteen days. As has been stated in the comment, he was supplied the documents in the language known to him, that is, Malayalam within the statutory period and acknowledgement was obtained from him. All the assertions made in the representation were commented by the Under Secretary and every aspect has been G stated in detail. The competent authority has passed the following order:-

"I have gone through the representation. I do not find sufficient ground for exercising powers under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA

Act. The representation is rejected."

fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

25. The order that has been communicated to him by the Under Secretary indicates that the representation submitted by the detenu had been carefully considered by the competent authority.

26. We have already referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Harm/flan Saha (supra) in the context of duty of the Government while considering the representation; and the power of the Advisory Board. It has been clearly stated that the Government considers the representation to ascertain whether the order has been made within power under the law and the Board, on the other hand, considers whether in the light of the representation, there is sufficient cause for detention.

The Court has expressed the view that the order of the Government rejecting the representation of the detenu should show real and proper consideration by the Government. The ratio of the said authority has to be appositely understood. The competent authority while considering the representation is not required to pass a speaking order but it must reflect that there has been real and proper consideration of the representation. It is, as has been held in Gurtlev Singh (supra), a subjective satisfaction. But the subjective satisfaction must show that the authority had the opportunity to peruse the material obtained against the detenu. To elucidate, the material documents are to be produced before the competent authority who has the competence to deal with the representation. On a scrutiny of the file, we find that the entire file relating to the detention was produced before the competent authority alongwith detailed comments. The said authority has clearly stated that he has gone through the representation and does not find any sufficient ground to exercise the jurisdiction under the COFEPOSA Act. In our considered opinion, this would tantamount to real and proper consideration, for the competent authority is not required to pass an adjudicatory order.

The High Court of Kerala in Leklia Nantlakumar (supra) lays down that the order passed by the competent-authority has to be communicated to the detenu and the decision in Babu (supra) clarifies that the order passed by the authority may be extracted in extenso or completely by a subordinate officer and that may be communicated to the detenu. Thus, in Babu (supra), the emphasis is on the effective communication.

: 27. Mr. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General, has submitted that the both the decisions have not laid down the correct principles of law and further the factual score in Babu (supra) is quite different.

28. At this juncture, it would be quite pertinent to refer to the authority in Joh11 Martin v, Stme o( We.I"/ Be11;:a/", wherein a three- Judge Bench dealt with the rejection ofrepresentation of the petitioner therein against the order of detention and in that context, opined that appropriate Government cannot reject the representation of the detenu

in a casual and 1nechanical 111anner and it n1ust bring to bear on the consideration of the representation an unbiased mind. The Court referred to llaradlum Saha (supra) wherein it has been stated that there has to be "a real and proper consideration" of the representation by the appropriate Government and thereafter proceeded to opine thus:-

"We cannot over-emphasise the need for the closest and most zealous scrutiny of the representation for the purpose of deciding whether the detention of the petitioner is justified:'

29. A contention was raised in the said case that the order passed by the State Government rejecting the representation of the detenu should be a reasoned order. The three-Judge Bench on consideration of the principles laid down in llar1ullu111 Saha (supra), quoted a passage therefrom and observed as follows:-

"These observations must give a quietus to the contention that the order of the State Government must be a reasoned order. It is true that in Blwt Nath Mete v. State()( WB." Krishna Iyer, J., speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of this Cou11 observed that: [SCC p. 659 para 23, SCC (CR!) p. 314]

"It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answers in the representation have been

impartially considered'',

but if we read the judgment as a whole there can be no doubt that these observations were not meant to lay down a legal requirement that the order of the State Government must be a speaking order but they were intended to convey an admonition to the State Government that it would be eminently desirable if the order disclosed that "the substance of the charge and the essential answers in the representation" had been impartially considered.

The learned Judge in fact started the discussion of this point by stating: [SCC p. 659 para 23, SCC (CR!) p. 314]

21 ( 19751 J sec 836

" ( 197411 sec 645

IDIPAK MISRA, .I. I

we are not persuaded that a speaking order should be passed by the Government or by the Advisory Board while approving or advising continuance of detention;'~

In any event, the decision in Haradhan Saha case being a decision rendered by a Bench of five judges must prevail with us. We, therefore, reject the present contention of the petitioner."

30. From the aforesaid analysis, it is quite limpid that whatever has been stated in Bl111t Natlt Mete (supra) has been explained in Joltn Martin (supra) and it has reiterated the principle that a speaking order need not be passed by the government or by the Advisory Board. It has also been explained that the observations made in Bltut Natlt Mele

(supra) were not meant to lay down a legal requirement that the order of the State Government must be a speaking order. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in Jlartull11m S11ft11 (supra) to lay down that Bl111t N1111t Mete (supra) is not a binding precedent. The said delineation makes it absolutely clear that the Court shou Id be guided by the principles stated in ll1mull11111 Salt11 (supra) and not by Bl1111 N11tlt Mete (supra). Thus the principle behind ''real and proper consideration" would only mean as has been stated in Joltn Martin (supra). the representation cannot be rejected in a casual and 111cchanical n1anncr.

Overemphasis cannot be placed on "real and proper consideration".

What has to be seen by the competent authority is that the materials are placed bdore him and such materials come within the purview of the statute and it must show that there has been subjective satisfaction.

The word "satisfaction'' need not be used while rejecting the representation. To elaborate, the consideration by the competent authority the government is to ascertain essentially whether the order is in consonance with the power conferred under the law and the allegations made against the detenu come within the purview of the said law. The real and proper consideration by the appropriate government means the order ofrejection should indicate that there has been subjective satisfaction by the competent authority to reject the representation. As has been held in Jolin Marlin (supra). there cannot be zealous scrutiny of the representation for the purpose of deciding whether the detention of the petitioner is justified. In the said case, analyzing the principle stated in /lar1111f11111 Saf111 (supra), it lms been reiterated that the order need not be a speaking order and non-speaking order does not amount to failure of justice. The said controversy, as has been observed by the three-

? .

Judge Bench, should be given a quietus. That being the legal position, on a careful perusal of the file, we find that there has been subjective satisfaction on the basis of the materials placed before the competent authority along with the representation . .It cannot be said that the subjective satisfact; on is not discernible from the order passed. In view of the analysis, the decision in Leklia Nantfakumar (supra) by the Division Bench of the High Court stating the principle that the order passed by the competent authority should be communicated failing which there will be a violation of the constitutional command engrafted under Article 22(5) is not correct. The Court can always call for the file and peruse whether there has been rejection of the representation as required under the law.

31. The decision in Babu (supra) while explaining the Lekha Ntmtfakumar (supra) states that if an order is communicated by the

Under Secretary do not meet the constitutional obligation, for the order passed by the authority would be extracted in extenso completely by a subordinate officer and that may be communicated to the detenu. Thus, the said decision introduces principle of effective communication iii a different way. This approach, in our view, is erroneous. If the order is communicated by another authority an, d eventually the order is affirmed by the Advisory Board and the same is challenged, the constitutional courts have ample power to call for the records and verify how the representation has been rejected. We are not adverting to the facts in Babu (supra) whether there had been real and proper consideration or not, but suffice it to say that jurisdiction of the court is only to see whether there has been any subjective satisfaction that the proper law had been applied at the time of detention of the detenu. There is no need on the part of the competent authority to pass a speaking order and to give reasons on any facet. Thus analysed, the extended proposition in Babu

(supra) is not legally correct.

32. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Kliutfirttm Das v. Tlie State of West Bengal tmtf others" G wherein explaining the observations made in B/111t Natli Mete (supra), the Court observed that:-

"It was, however, sought to be contended on behalfof the petitioner, relying on the observation of this Court in Bhut Nath Mete v.

"(1975J2SCC81

fDIPAK MISRA. J.l

State ofWB that the exercise of the power of detention ·•implies

a quasi-judicial approach'', that the power must be registered as a quasi-judicial power. But we do not think it would be right to read this observation in the manner contended on behalf of the petitioner.

This. observation was not meant to convey that the power of detention is a quasi-judicial power. The only thing which it intended to emphasise was that the deta.ining authority must exercise . .:Jue care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of detention .

. 33. ln the said case, while dealing with subjective satisfaction, the Court observed:-

"There are several grounds evolved by judicial decisions for saying that no subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as 'required under the statute. Th~ simplest case. is whether the authority has not applied its mind at all; in such a case the authority could nofpossibiy be satisfied as regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied. Emperor v. Shi/math Bmmeiji" is a case in point. Then there 111ay be a case \Vhere the power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose : such a case would also negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of the authority. The existence of "improper purpose", that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute, has been recognised as an independent ground of control in several decidedcases. The satisfaction, moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority iiself, and therefore, if, in exercising the power, the authority has acted under the dictation ofanother body as the CommissionerorPolice did in Co111111issio11er of Police v. Gordhandas_Bhanji-" and the officer of the Ministryof Labour and National Service did in Simms

Mo/or Jff, ils Lid. v. Minister of Labour and National Service" the exercise.of the power.would be bad and so also .would the exercise of the power be vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from aplying its mind to the facts of each individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner. The satisfaction sai<lto have been arrived at by .the authority would also be bad

".AIR 1943 FC 75 = 45 CriLJ 341

" 1952 SCR 135 =AIR 1952 SC 16 ·

"' (\946)2All ER201

'' "!

.J\,_

\Vhere it is based on the application of a \Vrong test or the misconstruction ofa slatulc. Where this happens. the satisfaction of the authority \Vould not be in respect of the thing in regard to \Vhich it is required to be satislicd. 'l'hcn again the satisl~1ction

lllllSt be grounded ''on 111atcrials \Vhich arc of rationally probative value". /\I"':hi11dar v. King' . The grounds on which the satisfi1ction is based nu1st be such as a rational hurnan being can consider connected wilh lhe fact in respect of which the satisfoction

is lo be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of tlv: inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. lflhe authority has taken into account. it may even be with the best of intention. as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or lhe manner or extent to which it should be exercised. the exercise of the power would be bad. l'rnlap Singh v. Stale oj"P1111iab''. If there arc to be found in the statute ex_pressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to. then. in exercising the po\vcr. the authority 111ust luivc regard tu those nu1tters."

34. We have referred to the aforesaid passage only to highlight that how the subjective satisfaction has been understood by this Court especially in tl1c context of preventive detention. l'he detaining authority on the basis of certain material passes an order of detention. The same has to be communicated al the earliest as mandated under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. A period has been determined. Non-communication within the said period would be an impediment for sustaining the order or detention. Similarly. if a representation is made and not considered with promptitude and there is inordinate delay that would make the detention order unsustainable. In Rai Kis/111re Pru.mil 1•. State of"Bil/l/r mu/ otlters'" while dealing with an orderofdetcntion passed the National Security Acl. 1980 the Court was dealing with the contention that as there was inordinate delay in considering the representation of the dctenu and the unexplained delay in considering the representation of the detenu could vitiate the order. The two-Judge Bench referred lo Section 3(2) of the 1980 Acl and in the backdrop of the statutory scheme proceeded

"AIR t950 Fl' 129 Cri LI 1-180

'"AIR t%1SC72 H .,, (I 982l.' sec to

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. SALEEN/\ 401 !DIPAK MISRA. J.l

to state that when there has been a long delay of28 days in disposing of /\ the representation, it would invalidate the order.

35. In Vii1U' K1111111r ''-State olJ1111111111 & K11.,/1111ir 1111d ot/iers3" while dealing with the order of detention passed under Section 8 of the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, look into consideration the delay in disposal ofrepresenlation and in that context opined:- B

"In Khudira111 Das v. State of"W.B.. (1975) 2 SCC 81. this Court held that one of the basic requirements of clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making the order of detention must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity ofn1aking a reprcsent11tion rigainst the order of detention and th is reqL1irc111ent wollld become i II L1sory unless there is a corresponding obligation on the detaining authority to consider the represe11tatio11 of the dete1111 as early as 11ossible. Thus. in the facts of this case we are not satisfied that the representation was dealt with as early as possible or as expeditiously as possible, and. therefore. there wollld be contravention of Section 13 of the Act which would result in the invalidation of the order.''

36. We have referred to the said authorities solely to emphasise the duty of the appropriate government to dispose of the representation at the earliest and what is understood by the concept of subjective satisfaction. The Government has to follow the safeguards provided under A1tic le 22( 5) and the provisions of the statute. It is because withllllt a trial a person is deprived of his liberty. Promptitude of action within the statutory scheme is imperative. In the case at hand. these aspects which have been raised before the High Court have been negatived, and rightly so. On a scrutiny of the file which has been produced before us. we find that the competent authority of the appropriate government has passed an order on the basis of the material produced before it. It cannot be said that there is no subjective satisfaction. We may ingcminatc that when the material, the tile, the representation and the comments on the representation were produced before the authority and he had mentioned in the order that he had gone through the representation and not found sufficient ground for exercising the power under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, it cannot be said that there has been no subjective satisfaction. The Constitution Bench in ll1mu/lu111 Sa/w (supra) has

'" 11982)2 sec 43

laid down that the order need not be a speaking one but there should be real and proper consi, leration. The principle stated by the Constitution Bench has to be properly understood. The said principle has been explained in Jo/111.Marti11 (supra) and Klrndiram Das (supra).

Succinctly put, it is to be seen by the said authority that the materials on record on the basis of which the order is passed are under appropriate statute; that the detaining authority has not travelled beyond the grounds that are within the framework of the statute; and that the grounds are not vague, etc., and al 1 these come within the scope and ambit of subjective satisfaction and need not be objectively pronounced by an order. There is no trace of doubt that "subjective satisfaction" is not insusceptible from judicial reviewability. Thus analysed, the impugned order granting the writ of habeas corpus and directing the detenu to be set at liberty is totally vulnerable and accordingly we set aside the same.

37. Now, we shall proceed to deal with the alternative submission of Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel for the respondent. It is urged by him that the detenu was detained on 25.2.2013 and released on 24.10.2013 and in this backdrop, the detenu should not be sent back to undergo the remaining period of detention, for there exists no proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated in the order for which the detenu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained ifthe order is set aside. Learned senior counsel would urge that there is a necessity on the pmt of the authorities to be satisfied whether it is desirable that the detenu should be further detained for the balance period of detention. Mr. Basant has commended us to certain authorities which we shall proceed to deal with it.

38. In S1111i[Fulchmul Sit alt (supra), the Constitution Bench was F dealing with the issue whether the period of detention under the

COFEPOSAAct is a fixed period running from the date specified in the detention order and ending with the expiry of that period or the period is automatically extended by any period of parole granted to the detenu.

While dealing with the said issue, the majority speaking through the learned G Chief Justice noted the observation made in State of Gujarat v. Adam Karnm Bltaya''. viz .. ·if he has served a part of the period of detention, he will have to serve out the balance" and adverted to various facets and eventually recorded the following conclusion in respect of the said issue:-

H '' (1981) 4 Sl"C 216

fDIPAK MISRA, J.l

"33.6. The quashing of an order of detootion by the High Court brings to an end such an order and if an appeal is allowed against the order of the High Court, the question whether or not the detenu should be made to surrender to undergo the remaining period of detention, would depend upon a variety of factors and in particu Jar on the question of lapse of time between the dale of detention, the order of the High Court, and the order of this Court, setting aside the order of the High Court.

A detenu qeed not be sent back to undergo the remaining period of detention, after a long lapse of time, when even the maximum prescribed period intended in the order of detention has expired, unless there still exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated in the order by which the detenu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the appellate order and the State is able to satisfy the court about the desirability of"further" or "continued" detention.

7. That where, however, a long time has not lapsed or the period of detention initially fixed in the order of detention has not expired, the detenu may be sent back to undergo the balance period of detention. It is open to the appellate court, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, to decide whether the period during which the detenu was free on the basis of an erroneous order should be excluded while computing the total period of detention as indicated in the order of detention though normally the period during which the detenu was free on the basis of such an erroneous order may not be given as a "set-off' against the total period of detention. The actual period ofincarceration cannot, however, be permitted to exceed the maximum period of detention, as fixed in the order, as per the prescription of the statute."

39. In Ket/1iyan Peruma/ (supra), a two-Judge Bench, after referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Sunil Fu/cliand Shall ·(supra), directed as follows:-

" ... it is for the appropriate State to consider whether the impact of the acts, which led to the order of detention, still survives and whether it would be desirable to send back the detenu for serving . the temainC!er period of detention. Necessary order in this regard

shal 1 be passed within two months by the appellant State. Passage of time in all cases cannot be a ground not to send the detenu to serve the remainder of the period of detention. It all depends on the facts of the act and the continuance or otherwise of the effect of the objectionable acts. The State shall consider whether there still exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated in the order by which the detenu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the appellate order.'"

40. In Alt1gt1r (supra), similar observations were made. In Cfumtfrakm1t Btu/di (supra), a two-Judge Bench referred to the earlier decisions and opined that:-

" A reading of the abovequoted paragraphs would reveal that when an order of a court quashing the detention is set aside, the remittance of the detenu to jail to serve out the balance period of detention does not automatically follow and it is open to the detaining authority to go into the various factors delineated in the judgments aforequoted so as to find out as to whether it would be appropriate to send the detenu back to serve out tlie balance period of detention .... "

41. In the present case, the detenu was initially detained for one year. He remained in incarceration from 25.2.2013 to 24.10.2013. The High Court has quashed the order of detention and he has been set at liberty. Submission of Mr. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General is that regard being had to the nature of grounds on which the detention order was passed, this Court may direct that the detenu should surrender to custody. Regard being had to the authorities cited by Mr. Basant, we are of the opinion that the appropriate course would be that the detaining authority should re-examine the matter keeping in view the principle stated in S1111il F11/cf1t111tf Sliufi (supra) and Cf1tt11tfraka11t Bt1tftfi (supra} within two months from today.

42. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in above terms.

Devika Gujral J\ppcal ullo\\Cd.