[2015) 3 S.C.R. 416

MD.ALl@GUDDU

STATE OF U.P.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2238 OF 2010)

MARCH 10, 2015

[DIPAK MISRA AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

Penal code, 1860-ss. 363, 366 and 376- Conviction under, by courts below- On appeal, held: The accused were convicted without proper appreciation of evidence - In view of the unexplained delay in lodging FIR, non-examination of D witness, the associated circumstances and the medical evidence, the testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be treated as so natural and truthful to inspire confidence - The accused were erroneously convicted.

E Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 - Criminal appeal by special leave - Scope of- Held: In such appeal, Supreme Court normally does not appreciate evidence and go into the question of credibility of witness, except where the conclusions recorded by High Court are manifestly F perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on record.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. In an appeal under Article 136 of the G Constitution, this Court does not normally appreciate the evidence by itself and go into the question of credibility of witness. The assessment of the evidence by the High Court is accepted as final, except where the conclusions recorded by the High Court are manifestly perverse and H unsupportable by the evidence on record. [Para 15] (427- 416

MD. ALl@GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 417

F-H; 428-A] A

Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Saqhanatha and Anr. 1979 (3) SCR 482: (1979) 2 SCC 297; State of U.P. v. Babu/ Nath 1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 598: (1994) 6 sec 29; Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar Ganga B Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211; Alamelu and Another v. State, represented by Inspector of Police 2011 (2) SCR 147: (2011) 2 SCC 385-relied on.

2. The conclusions arrived at by the High Court in the present case are totally unsupportable on the basis c

of the evidence on record. There is no proper appreciation of evidence by trial court and definitely the High Court has failed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction D in proper perspective as is expected from it in law. [Paras 16 and 17] [428-B]; [429-D-E]

Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat 2013

(9) SCR 257: (2013) 15 SCC 263; Padam Singh v.

State ofU.P. 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR59 =

(2000) 1 SCC 621; Rama v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 4 SCC 571; Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek v. State of Gujarat 2012

(8) SCR 1012 = (2012) 11SCC312; Padam Singh v.

State of U.P. 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 59: (2000) 1 SCC 621; Bani Singh v. State of U.P. 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 247 : (1996) 4 SCC 720; Majjal v. State of Haryana

(2013) 6 sec 798 - relied on.

3. FIR was lodged almost after expiry of eleven G days alleging the factum of kidnapping by the accused persons. In rape cases, the delay in filing the FIR by the prosecutrix or by the parents in all circumstance is not of significance such delay would depend upon facts of H

A each case, regard being had to the trauma suffered by the prosecutrix and various other factors. In the present case, the prosecutrix was missing from home. In such a situation, it was a normal expectation that either the mother (PW2) or the brother would have lodged a B missing report at the police station. The same was not done. This action of PW-2 really throws a great challenge to common sense. No explanation has been offered for such delay. In the absence of any explanation, it gives C rise to a sense of doubt. That apart, the factum that the

appellant informed the mother of the victim that he had left the prosecutirx at the door of her house also does not command acceptance. The recovery of the prosecutrix by the brother and her friends also creates D a cloud of suspicion. Therefore, the prosecution version that one 'A' had informed the brother of the prosecutirx that his sister was at his place but for reasons best known to the prosecution, 'A' has not been examined.

That apart, the persons who were accompanying the E brother have also not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the manner of recovery of the prosecutrix from the house of 'fJ( remains a mystery. [Paras 16 and 20) [428-B-C, F-G; 432-D-G]

F Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand 2013 (2) SCR

411 : (2013) 3 sec 791relied on.

4. On the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is unimpeachable and beyond reproach, G a conviction can be based. The grammar of law permits the testimony of a prosecutrix can be accepted without any corroboration without material particulars, for she has to be placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. But when a Court, on studied scrutiny of the H

MD. ALI @GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 419

evidence finds it difficult to accept the version of the A prosecutrix, because it is not unreproachable, there is requirement for search of such direct or circumstantial evidence which would lend assurani:e to her testimony.

The present case would show, that the testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, and the B circumstantial evidence remotely do not lend any support to the same. In the absence of both, the trial Judge has erroneously convicted the accusedappellants for the alleged offences and the High Court C has fallen into error, without re-appreciating the material on record, by giving the stamp of approval to the same.

It has been borne out from the material on record that she had travelled from place to place and she was ravished number of times. Under these circumstances, D the medical evidence gains significance, for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the non-examination ofthe witnesses, the testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the E medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to inspire confidence. The evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality which can be placed reliance upon. [Para 21] [432-H; 433-A-H; 434-A-B] F

Case Law Reference

1979 (3) SCR 482 relied on.

Para 12

1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 598 relied on.

Para 14 G

(2005) s sec 211 relied on.

Para 14

2011 (2) SCR 147 relied on.

Para 15 H

2013 (2) SCR 411 relied on.

Para 16

2013 (9) SCR 257 relied on.

Para 17

1999 (5) Suppl .• scR 59 relied on.

Para 17

(2002) 4 sec 571 relied on.

Para 18

2012 (8) SCR 1012 relied on.

Para 18

1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 59 relied on.

Para 18 c 1996 (3) Suppl. SC~ 247 relied on.

Para 18

(2013) 6 sec 79P relied on.

Para 18

CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal D Appeal No. 2238 of 2010.

From thr~ Judgment and Order dated 25.03.2009 of the High Couri at Allahabad in Cr. Appeal No. 602 of 2006.

WITH

Crl. A. Nos. 425 of 2015 and 636 of 2012

L.ajja Ram, Ashok Kumar Gupta II, for the Appellant.

F Ratnakar Dash, Abhisth Kumar, Archana Singh for the Resriondent. ·

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 9896 of 2011.

2. The present appeals are directed against the common judgment and order dated 25.03.2009 passed by H the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal

MD. ALI @GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 421

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

No. 602 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No. 863 of 2006 whereby A the learned Single Judge has given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order dated 30.01.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C., Hapur, District Ghaziabad whereunder he had convicted the appellants under Section 363, 366 and 3761.P.C. and sentenced each of them B to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under Section

363 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-with a default clause, five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/

- under Section 366 IPC and ten years rigorous imprisonment C and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/~ under Section 376 IPC with the default sequitur. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

3. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that 0 a written report was filed by the complainant, Smt. Aneesa, PW-2, on 3.12.1996 on the allegation that on 22.11.1996, around midnight, her daughter, Gulistan, PW-1, aged about 14 years, went out of her house to answer the call of nature but did not return for a considerable time. Being anxious, she E went in search of her and at that time Ali Waris, one of the appellants herein, informed her that he had left her daughter at his door. Thereafter, PW-2 and his son Abrar, PW-4, searched for her in the neighbourhood as well as amongst the relatives but as it turned out to be an exercise in futility, she sensed F some foul play and eventually informed the police thatAli Waris and Mohammad Ali @ Guddu had kidnapped her daughter.

After the criminal law was set in motion, the investigating agency commenced the search of the victim. As the factual matrix would uncurtain, Abrar had along with co-villagers, G namely, Arif s/o Md. Rafi, Zulfi, Papal, Shafiq and others had gone in search of his sister, they had reached village Loni and Arif s/o Azam Khan brought Gulistan from a house and handed over to him. All of them along with Gulistan went to the police H

A station on 18.1.1997 and PW-2 and Gulistan, PW-1, submitted an application at the police station Dhaulana .. The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The investigating agency sent the victim for medical examination, recorded the statements of seven 8 witnesses, prepared the site plan and after completing other formalities placed the chargesheet against eight accused persons, namely, Ali Waris, Md. Ali, Mehmood, Allahrakha, Sirajoo, Fazal, Shamshad and Sarfraz for the offences C punishable under Sections 363, 366, 368 and 376, IPC before the competent Court which in turn committed the matter to the Court of Session.

4. The accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded

0 false implication due to political rivalry relating to Gram Sabha Pradhan elections.

5. In course of trial, the prosecution, to bring home the charges, examined seven witnesses, namely, Gulistan, PW- 1, the prosecutrix, Anisha, PW-2, the informant and the mother E of the victim, LiyaqatAli, PW-3, Abrar, PW-4, the brother of the victim, Maqsood, PW-5, Mahavir Singh, PW-6 and Dr.

Rekha Singh, PW-7 who had examined the victim. Be it noted, PWs 3 and 5 have turned hostile.

6. The accused persons in their statements recorded under Section 313 of CrPC denied their involvement in the occurrence. Their plea was that they had supported Ali Waris in village Pradhan election and the rival party Arif, a relative of G PWs 1, 2 and 4 was defeated. The defence in order to establish

its plea examined one witness, namely, Jaggi Rana, DW-1.

7. The learned trial Judge on appreciation of evidence brought on record came to hold that the prosecution had been H able to establish the charges against four accused persons,

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 423

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

namely, Ali Waris, Mohd.Ali@Guddu, Mehmood and Fazal A for the offences under Sections 366, 368 and 376 of l.P.C., but had failed to bring home charges against other accused persons and on that basis convicted and imposed the sentence as has been stated hereinbefore.

8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, Fazal Mohd. Ali and Mehmood preferred Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 2006 and Ali Waris preferred an independent Appeal being Criminal Appeal

No. 863 of 2006. It is worthy to state here that the State had C not assailed the judgment of acquittal of the four accused persons. The High Court appreciated the evidence and by placing reliance on the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 4 had opined that the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge was D flawless. Being of the said view, it affirmed the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence.

8. We have heard Mr. Lajja Ram, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel for the State.

9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has absolutely gone wrong by coming to hold that the age of the victim was less than eighteen years on the date of F occurrence. It is his further submission that the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court and the High Court is totally perverse inasmuch as in the obtaining factual matrix, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could not have been G remotely given credence to. Learned counsel has seriously . criticized the delay in lodging of the FIR, regard being had to the unnatural facet, for PW-2 had lodged the FIR after 11 days whereas any reasonable person would have immediately informed the police about the missing of his/her daughter. It is H

A canvassed by him that the entire allegations of the prosecution are built on an unacceptable plinth and regard being had to the evidence brought on record which is completely sketchy, the conviction could not have been recorded. Mr. Lajja Ram has submitted that the medical evidence does not support the B prosecution version and the present case being not one where the evidence of the prosecutrix is so unmatchable that solely on the basis of her testimony and the conviction can be recorded, said medical evidences gains significance.

C Learned counsel would submit that the testimony of the victim, the conduct of the mother and the nature of allegations made against the accused persons lead to a definite conclusion that the entire story put forth by the prosecution is wholly incredible and the learned trial Judge has lent credence to the testimony o on assumed reasoning and the High Court has concurred with the same without proper appreciation of the evidence which is the obligation of the appellate Court hearing a criminal appeal.

9. Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State in his turn would contend there has been a concurring finding of facts with regard to the age and there is no justification or warrant to interfere with the same.

Learned senior counsel would submit that the prosecutrix was F under constant fear as has been stated by her and hence, under the obtaining circumstances there is no reason not to believe her testimony and unsettle the conviction. It is urged by him that findings recorded by the trial Court which have been concurred with by the High Court, by no stretch of imagination, G can be called perverse warranting interference by this Court.

10. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the bar, we have bestowed our anxious consideration to weigh and analyse the evidence brought on record for the purpose

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. '425

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

whether testimony of the victim deserves acceptance and A ultimately the prosecution case deserves acceptation. Though the learned counsel for the parties have urged the point with regard to the age of the prosecutrix, the same need not be adverted to. Suffice it to mention that PW-2, the mother of the victim, had alleged that her daughter was fourteen years of B age on 22.11.1996 when she was kidnapped. The ossification test has pointed out that she was approximately eighteen years of age. The learned trial Judge has opined that she was less than eighteen years and the High Court has accepted the C same. The said issue would gain prominence, if the story set forth by the prosec,:ution is accepted to be credible, for then only the question of consent by the prosecutrix for the offences would arise. If the entire prosecution story is discarded as being incredulous, then the said aspect would certainly melt D into insignificance.

11. Having stated so, we shall proceed to deal with the pertinent facts in this regard. Prior to that it is essential to address the issue of propriety and the conceptual parameters E or conceptions based on well accepted norms and paradigms to exercise the power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

12. In Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanatha andAnr.1 F it has been expressed thus:

"The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power. It is now the wellestablished practice of this Court to permitthe invocation of the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional

1 (1979) 2 sec 297

circumstances, as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the court. But, within the restrictions . imposed by itself, this Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings offact, making no distinction between judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted 'perversely or otherwise improperly'."

(emphasis supplied].

13. In State of U.P. v. Babu/ Nath2, a two Judge Bench has laid down thus:

"At the very outset we may mention that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court does not normally reappraise the evidence by itself and go into / the question of credibility of the witnesses and the assessment of the evidence by the High Court is accepted by the Supreme Court as final unless, of course, the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of the High _Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record."

14. In Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar the Court after referring to series of decisions on exercise of the power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution G culled out following principles:

"(i) The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

2 (1994) e sec 29 3 c2oosi e sec 211

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 427

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Constitution are very wide but in.criminal appeals this A Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances.

(ii) It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings of fact given by the High Court, ifthe High Court has acted B perversely or otherwise improperly.

(iii) It is open to this Court to invoke the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance c arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

(iv) When the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell -short of the test of reliability and acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon it. o

(v) Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions E of the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record."

15. In Alamelu and Another v. State, represented F By Inspector of Police", it has been stated that even though the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide, but in criminal appeals, this Court would not iriterfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in very exceptional cases. In an appeal under Article 136 of the G Constitution, this Court does not normally appreciate the evidence by itself and go into the question of credibility of witness. Elaborating further, the Court has opined that the

4 c2011i 2 sec 3ss H

A assessment of the evidence by the High Court is accepted as

final except where the conclusions recorded by the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on record.

16. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, we shall proceed to scrutinize the materials on record, for we are convinced that the conclusions arrived at by the High Court are totally unsupportable on the basis of the evidence on record.

For the aforesaid purpose, first we shall advert to the issue of C lodging of the First Information Report. As is demonstrated, the victim missed from the house on 22.11.1996 but the mother

lodged the FIR on 3.12.1996 almost after expiry of eleven days alleging the factum of kidnapping by the accused persons, D namely, Ali Waris and Md. Ali @ Guddu. It is interesting to note that the mother, had alleged that Ali Waris had left the girl at her door steps. In such a circumstance, if nothing else, the PW-2, the mother, who is expected to have necessitous concern, could have gone to the police station to lodge a E missing report which could have prompted the investigation officer to act. It baffles the commonsense that the mother after searching in the neighbourhood as well as amongst the relatives still, for some unfathomable reason that defeats the basic human prudence approached the police station quite F belatedly. It is apt to mention here that in rapes cases the

delay in filing the FIR by the prosecutrix or by the parents in all circumstance is not of significance. The authorities of this Court have granted adequate protection/allowance in that aspect regard being had to the trauma suffered, the agony G and anguish that creates the turbulence in the mind of the victim, to muster the courage to expose oneself in a conservative social milieu. Sometimes the fear of social stigma and on occasions the availability of medical treatment to gain normalcy H and above all the psychological inner strength to undertake

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 429

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

such a legal battle. But, a pregnant one, applying all these A allowances, in this context, it is apt to refer to the pronouncement in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand5 wherein in the facts and circumstances of the said delay of 11 days in lodging the FIR with the jurisdictional police was treated as fatal as the explanation offered was regarded as totally B

untenable. This Court did not accept the reasoning ascribed by the High Court in accepting the explanation as same was fundamentally erroneous.

17. Coming to the case at hand, after the mother lodged C the Fl R implicating Ali Waris and Md. Ali, the brother, PW-2, with his friends recovered the prosecutrix from village Loni and she was examined under Section 164, CrPC. As is evident, she had left home on 22.11.1996. As alleged, she was fourteen years of age. The trial court on the basis of radiological test D has opined that she was below eighteen years of age and the High Court has accepted the same. The factum of age only if the findings recorded by the trial court and High Court are accepted, for as we find, there is no proper appreciation of E evidence by trial court and definitely the High Court has failed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in proper perspective as is expected from it in law. In Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v.

State ofGujarat6dealing with the duty of the appellate court, this Court observed:- F

"At this juncture, we are obliged to state that though it may be difficult to state that the judgment suffers from sans reasons, yet it is not at all difficult to say that the reasons ascribed are really apology for reasons. If we allow ourselves to say so, one may ascribe certain reasons which seem to be reasons but the litmus test is

s c2013) 3 sec 1s1 s (2013) 1 s sec 263

to give seemly and condign reasons either to sustain or overturn the judgment. The filament of reasoning must logically flow from requisite analysis, but, unfortunately, the said exercise has not been carried out. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Padam Singh

v. State of U.P. 7, wherein a two-Judge Bench, while dealing with the duty of the appellate court, has expressed thus:

"2 . ... It is the duty of an appellate court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the appellate court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. It must be remembered that the appellate court, like the trial court, has to be satisfied affinnatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt as the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final Court of Appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court."

18. In Rama v. State of Rajasthan8 the Court has expressed about the duty of the appellate court thus:

"4 . ... It is well settled that in a criminal appeal, a duty is enjoined upon the appellate court to reappraise the evidence itself and it cannot proceed to dispose of the

H 1 (2000J 1 sec s21

s (2002) 4 sec s11

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P.

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

appeal upon appraisal of evidence by the trial court alone especially when the appeal has been already admitted and placed for final hearing. Upholding such a procedure would amount to negation of valuable right of appeal of an accused, which cannot be permitted under law."

Similar principles have been reiterated in Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek v. State of Gujarati, Padam Singh v. State of U.P. 10 and Bani Singh v. State of U.P. 11

19. A three-Judge Bench in Majjal v. State of Haryana12 has ruled thus:

"It was necessary for the High Court to consider whether the trial court's assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the conviction. The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record. The High Court's concurrence with the trial court's view would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence and important submissions which go to the root of the matter."

20. The obtaining factual matrix has to be appreciated G

9 (2012) 11 sec 312

10 (2000) 1 sec 621 11 (1996) 4 sec 120 12 (2013) 6 sec 798 H

A on the touchstone of the aforesaid parameters. Be it clearly stated here delay in lodging FIR in cases under Section 376 IPC would depend upon facts of each case and this Court has given immense allowance to such delay, regard being had to the trauma suffered by the prosecutrix and various other factors, B but a significant one, in the present case, it has to be appreciated from a different perspective. The prosecutrix was missing from home. In such a situation, it was a normal expectation that either the mother or the brother would have C lodged a missing report at the police station. The same was not done. This action of PW-2 really throws a great challenge, to common sense. No explanation has been offered for such delay. The learned trial Judge has adverted to this facet on an unacceptable backdrop by referring to the principle that o prosecutrix suffered from trauma and the constraint of the social

stigma. The prosecutrix at that time was nowhere on the scene. It is the mother who was required to inform the police about missing of her grown up daughter. In the absence of any explanation, it gives rise to a sense of doubt. That apart, E the factum that the appellant informed the mother of the victim that he had left the prosecutirx at the door of her house also does not command acceptance. The recovery of the prosecutrix by the brother and her friends also creates a cloud of suspicion. We are not inclined to believe the prosecution F version as has been projected that one Arif had informed the brother of the prosecutirx that his sister was at his place but for reasons best known to the prosecution, Arif has not been examined. That apart, the persons who were accompanying G the brother have also not been examined by the prosecution.

Thus, the manner of recovery of the J..; rosecutrix from the house of Arif remains a mystery.

21. Be it noted, there can be no iota of doubt that on H the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is

MD. ALI@ GUDDU v. STATE OF U. P. 433

[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

unimpeachable and beyond reproach, a conviction can be A based. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court have persuaded themselves away with this

principle without appreciating the acceptability and reliability of the testimony of the witness. In fact, it would not be inappropriate to say that whatever the analysis in the impugned B judgment, it would only indicate an impropriety of approach.

The prosecutrix has deposed that she was taken from one

place to the other and remained at various houses for almost two months. The only explanation given by her is that she was C . threatened by the accused persons. It is not in her testimony that she was confined to one place. In fact, it has been borne out from the material on record that she had travelled from place to place and she was ravished number of times. Under these circumstances, the medical evidence gains significance, o for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the nonexamination of the witnesses, the testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony of the prosecutrix as so E natural and truthful to inspire confidence. It can be stated with certitude that the evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality which can be placed reliance upon. True it is, the grammar of law permits the testimony of a prosecutrix can be accepted without any corroboration without material particulars, F for she has to be placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness, but, a pregnant one, when a Court, on studied scrutiny of the evidence finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix, because it is not unreproachable, there is G requirement for search of such direct or circumstantial evidence which would lend assurance to her testimony. As the present case would show, her testimony does not inspire_ confidence, and the circumstantial evidence remotely do not lend any support to the same. In the absence of both, we are H

A compelled to hold that the learned trial Judge has erroneously convicted the accused-appellants for the alleged offences and the High Court has fallen into error, without re-appreciating the material on record, by giving the stamp of approval to the same.

22. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed, judgment of

conviction and order of sentence are set aside and as the appellants are on bail, they be discharged of their bail bonds.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.

[2015) 3 S.C.R. 435

DEE PAK

STATE OF HARYANA

Criminal Appeal No. 65 of2012

MARCH 10, 2015

[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA AND

ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.] C

Penal Code, 1860 - s.376 - Punishment for rape - Rape of a young girl aged 16 years 3 months - Late disclosure of the incident by the prosecutrix to her mother since prosecutrix threatened with dire consequences by o accused - Conviction of accused for the offence punishable uls. 376 and sentenced to 7 years' RI with fine by the courts below- On appeal, held: Prosecutrix is a reliable and truthful witness - Her testimony suffers no infirmity or blemish whatsoever- Medical evidence supports the commission of E sexual violence on her - Even the accused did not dispute the factum of commission of offence by him on the prosecutrix because his only defence was that the prosecutrix had consented to the commission of the sexual act- Thus, the statutory presumption contemplated u/s. 114-A of the F Evidence Act invoked against the accused rendering him liable to suffer conviction uls. 376 for commission of offence of rape on the prosecutrix-Also late disclosure of the incident by the prosecutrix to her mother and consequently delay in G filing FIR was natural and satisfactorily explained - Lapses on the part of the investigating agency not fatal to the prosecution case - Thus, courts below rightly convicted the accused - As regards sentencing, lenient view cannot be taken since the accused was awarded minimum mandatory H 435

A sentence of 7 years- Evidence Act, 1872s. 114-A.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The FIR was lodged when the

8 prosecutrix disclosed to her mother of the incident first time as to what had happened with her hardly two weeks before the date of disclosure and the mother, in turn, immediately made a complaint to the police station and disclosed to the SI, who visited her place on coming to c know of the incident. The late disclosure of the offence by the prosecutrix was also well justified by her in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and also

in her evidence wherein she said that the appellant had taken her photographs and had also recorded her talks D with him on mobile. The accused was, as per her version, threatening her from raising any kind of alarm with the use of such evidence in his possession. The conduct of the prosecutrix, in this regard, therefore, appears to be most natural. She did not inform the incident immediately E to the parents and waited for two weeks to eventually

disclose to her mother. [Paras 17, 18] [448-E-H; 445-A- B]

1.2 The situation in which a young illiterate girl, F who had just crossed her 16th year and who was subjected to sexual violence against her will would

immediately react cannot be overlooked. If the Investigating Officer did not conduct the investigation G properly in not being able to seize the photographs and recorded conversation then it could not have been made a ground to discredit the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix, which was otherwise found to be trustworthy and consistent. No one can dispute that the H prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA 437

and nor the lapse on the part of the investigating agency A could in any manner affect the creditability of the statement of the prosecutrix. [Paras 20 and21] [445-D- G]

1.3 The courts below rightly placed reliance on the sworn B testimony of the prosecutrix on this issue and came to a just and proper conclusion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the explanation given by the prosecutrix, there was no delay in lodging the FIR by her mother and even if there was C some delay then the same was satisfactorily explained.

[Para 22] [445-G-H]; [446-A]

1.4 The prosecutrix, in her sworn testimony, in clear terms stated that she did not give her consent for D commission of the act to the appellant and that he committed the act of sexual violence on her against her will. The appellant was not able to give any satisfactory

explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 E of the Code nor was he able to adduce any defence evidence to rebut the presumption contained in Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 against him. So far as commission of sexual intercourse is concerned, it is proved with the medical evidence that it was performed F by the appellant with the prosecutrix. [Para 26][447-D-G]

1.5 In a case of rape, no selfrespecting woman would ever come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is G involved in the commission of rape on her. The testimony of the prosecutrix in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons, which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement or where there are

compelling reasons for rejecting of her testimony, there H

A is no justification on the part of the court to reject her testimony. [Para 27) [447-G-H]; [448-A]

1.6 In the instant case, on careful analysis of the statement of the prosecutrix created an impression on B the minds that she is a reliable and truthful witness and her testimony suffers from no infirmity or blemish whatsoever. That apart, even the medical evidence supports the commission of sexual violence on her.

Indeed, even the appellant did not dispute the factum of C commission of sexual intercourse by him on the prosecutrix because the appellant's only defence was that since the prosecutrix had consented to the commission of the sexual act, no offence of rape was

0 made out against him. Thus, there is no hesitation in invoking the statutory presumption contemplated under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act against the appellant rendering him liable to suffer the conviction under Section 376 of IPC for commission of offence of rape on E the prosecutrix. The finding of commission of rape by the appellant on the prosecutrix, which was rightly recorded by the two courts below, is upheld. [Para 28,

29, 30) [448-B-H]

F 1,7 The submission that looking to the young age of the appellant and further he being the first offender and lastly, the fact that he has already undergone 3 years 1 month in jail, this Court should take some lenient view in the matter of awarding of the sentence to him, cannot G be accepted since the appellant has been awarded minimum mandatory sentence of 7 years for the offence under Section 376 IPC, which may extend to imprisonment for life and the fine once the offence the offence under Section 376 IPC is proved. [Paras 31, 32) H

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA 439

[448-H]; [449-A-B] A

Uday vs. State of Karnataka 2003 (2) SCR 231:

(2003) 4 sec 46 - distinguished.

State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors.1996 (1) SCR 532: (1996) 2 sec 384 - referred to.

Case Law Reference

1996 (1) SCR 532 . .

Referred to.

Para 16

2003 (2) SCR 231 Distinguished.

Para 34

CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 2012

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2010 of the High D Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 2109-SB of2009

Vijay Panjwani (A.G.) for the Appellant.

Bhakti Vardhan Singh (for Kamal Mohan Gupta) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This criminal

appeal is filed by the accused against the final orderudgment dated 15.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.2109-SB of 2009 which arises out of judgment/order dated 18.08.2009/ G 20.08.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat in Misc. Sessions Case No. 31 of2007.

2. By impugned judgment/order, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant awarded by the H

A Sessions Court for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7. years and a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another six months.

3. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, few relevant facts need mention infra,

4. The prosecutrix (name withheld by us) was a young c girl aged around 16 years 3 months at the relevant time. She

had no educational background. She was the resident ofVidya Nand Colony, Panipat and was living with her parents and two younger sisters and three brothers. Her father, Abid was a labourer in one factory and her mother was running a small D grocery shop in their house. The appellant-accused, a young boy in his twenties was also residing with his family as their neighbour. He was also running his own grocery shop in his house.

5. On 02.04.2007, Sub Inspector (Sl)-Prithvi Raj of Police Station Chandni Bagh received information about the sexual assault on the prosecutrix, who was taken to the General Hospital, Panipat. After receipt of the information, SI rushed to the General Hospital, Panipat to find out the details. He F was told that the prosecutrix was not admitted to the hospital but was got examined by the doctors. He then collected parcel of slides, swab of the prosecutrix, samples of tests done on the prosecutrix and a copy of the MLR and then went to the G prosecutrix's residence and met her mother, Ruksana on

04.04.2007.

6. Ruksana-the mother of prosecutrix then gave her statement saying that she has three daughters - the eldest H being the prosecutrix aged around 14 years. Her husband

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 441

was working as labourer and she was running a small grocery A shop. She said that the appellant (accused), their neighbour, entered in their house a few days back in night and when she saw him, he slipped away. She had complained about this behavior of appellant to his parents but his parents did not pay any heed to her complaint. She then said that after some days, B in their absence, Sajida-wife of Salim, who was living as their tenant in the same house, came to their house and enticed the prosecutrix on the pretext that she should talk with the appellantaccused regarding her love otherwise he would end his life by C consuming poison. Ruksana further narrated that a fortnight back, on hearing the noise, she woke up and saw that her daughter was coming down from the staircase. On being asked, the prosecutrix did not give any response and avoided to give answer. However, later on, she told Ruksana (her D mother) that the appellant had raped her in the night forcefully without her consent and threatened her not to disclose this incident to her parents or to anyone else she will have to face the dire consequences.

7. This disclosu~ made by Ruksana led to registration of FIR No. 144 dated 04.04.2007 in the Police Station Chandni Bagh, Panipat against the appellant-accused and Sajida, who

as mentioned above, was living as tenant of the prosecutrix's father in the next room. The statement of the prosecutrix under F Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") was recorded. Her ossification test was also got done. The statements of other witnesses were recorded. The appellant and Sajida were arrested. The appellant was medically examined. After G completing the investigation and collecting the necessary evidence, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and Sajida under Sections 376/506/120-B of IPC.

8. On their appearance, the accused were supplied with all the documents relied on by the prosecution. The case was then committed to the Court of Sessions where the court framed the charges. So far as the appellant and Sajida were concerned, both were charged for the offence punishable under B Section 120-B IPC. So far as the appellant was concerned, he was also charged for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. Both the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

9. With a view to connect the appellant and Sajida with the crime, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses namely,

Ruksana, the Complainant(PW-1 ), the prosecutrix (PW-2), Dr.

Rahul Diwan (PW-3), Dr. Shashi Garg (PW-4), Dr. Nidhi Kharab (PW-5), Dr. Ashwani Kumar (PW-6), Ghansham Dass, ASI D (PW~7), Rajbir Singh, ASI (PW-8), Constable Jagbir Singh (PW-9), Head Constable Dharam P~I (PW-10), Constable Joginder (PW-11), Head Constable Dharampal (PW-12), Prithvi Raj, Inspector (PW-13) and ASI Rajbir Singh (PW-14) E whereas the defence examined four witnesses, namely, Hawa

Singh, Clerk, Death and Birth, Municipal Council, Panipat as DW-1, Ashok Kumar Bathla, Senior Supervisor, BSNL, Panipat as DW-2, Salim as DW-3 and Head Constable Kuleep as DW-4.

10. The Sessions Judge by judgmenUorder dated 18.08.2009/20.08.2009 held that no case of conspiracy was proved against the appellant and Sajida of any nature and since involvement of Sajida was not proved in this case, therefore, G both of them were acquitted of the charge of conspiracy. So

far as the appellant-accused (Deepak) was concerned, it was

held that the prosecution was able to prove the commission of offence of rape on the. prosecutrix by the appellant and accordingly he was convicted for the offence punishable under H

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.) 443

Section 376 IPC and was sentenced to undergo 7 years' RI A with a fine amount of Rs.5000/-and in default to undergo further RI for 6 months.

11. Feeling aggrieved by the said order/judgment, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. By impugned B judgmenUorder, the High Court dismissed the appeal and

upheld the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant by the Sessions Court. It is against this judgmenUorder, the accused-Deepak has filed this appeal by way of special leav_e.

12. Learned Counsel for the appellant mainly urged three submissions. In the first place, he urged that since there was inordinate delay in filing the FIR of the incident of alleged rape by the victim or/and her family members, the conviction

of the appellant becomes unsustainable in law and was, D therefore, liable to be set aside. Secondly, he made his submission based on the age of the prosecutrix. According to the learned counsel, since the age of the prosecutrix was above sixteen, it should have been held to be a yase of consent given E voluntarily by the prosecutrix rendering the appellant's conviction bad in law and lastly, the ingredients of rape were not proved against the appellant, no case of rape within the meaning of Section 376 of IPC was made out. It is essentially these three submissions, which were elaborated by the learned F counsel in his arguments by referring to the contents of the FIR and the evidence on record.

13. In contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State supported the reasoning and the conclusion of the courts below G and contended that the appeal being wholly devoid of merit, the same deserves dismissal.

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in H

A any of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant.

15. Coming to the first submission relating to the lodging of the FIR forthe commission of the offence is concerned, in our considered opinion, there was no delay in the lodging of B the FIR either and if at all there was some delay, the same has not only been properly explained by the prosecution but also considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it was natural. c

16. The Courts cannot overlook the fact that in sexual offences and, in. particular, the offence of rape and that too on a young illiterate girl, the delay in lodging the FIR can occur due to various reasons. One of the reasons is the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police D station and to make a complaint about the incident, which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of the entire family. In such cases, after giving very cool thought and considering all pros and cons arising out of an unfortunate incident, a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged E either by victim or by any member of her family. Indeed, this has been the consistent view of this Court as has been held in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors.[ (1996) 2 SCC 384)].

17. Keeping this well settled principle in mind, we find that the FIR in this case was lodged on 04.04.2007 when the prosecutrix disclosed to her mother of the incident first time as to what had happened with her hardly two weeks before G the date of disclosure and the mother, in tum, immediately made a complaintto the police station and disclosed to the SI, who visited her place on coming to know of the incident. The late disclosure of the offence by the prosecutrix was also well justified by her in her statement recorded under Section 164 H of the Code and also in her evidence wherein she said that

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 445

the appellant had taken her photographs and had also A recorded her talks with him on mobile. The accused was, as per her version, threatening her from raising any kind of alarm with the use of such evidence in his possession.

18. The conduct of the prosecutrix, in this regard, B therefore, appears to us to be most natural. She did not inform the incident immediately to the parents and waited for two weeks to eventually disclose to her mother. It was for the reason that the appellant was all along threatening the prosecutrix of the dire consequences with the use of the evidence, which he C was having with him against her.

19. We do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant when he contended that since no efforts were made by the prosecution to file the photographs D and the recorded conversation of the prosecutrix with the appellant and, therefore, the prosecutrix's version should not be relied on.

20. We cannot overlook the situation in which a young E illiterate girl, who had just crossed her 16th year and who was subjected to sexual violence against her will would immediately react.Again, in our considered view, ifthe Investigating Officer . did not conduct the investigation properly in not being able to seize the photographs and recorded conversation then it could F not have been made a ground to discredit the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix, which was otherwise found to be trustworthy and consistent.

21. No one can dispute that the prosecutrix had no G control over the investigating agency and nor the lapse on the part of the investigating agency could in any manner affect the. creditability of the statement of the prosecutrix.

22. In our considered opinion, the courts below, therefore, rightly placed reliance on the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix on this issue and came to a just and proper conclusion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the explanation given by the B prosecutrix, there was no delay in lodging the FIR by her mother and even if there was some delay then, in our considered view, the same was satisfactorily explained.

23. This takes us to the next two submissions of the C learned counsel for the appellant. The courts below have held

that the age of the prosecutrix on the date of commission of the offence was around 16 years and 3 months. Assuming this finding to be proper, we are of the considered opinion that

0 these st, Jbmissions have no merit in the light of the statutory presumption contained in Section 114-Aofthe Evidence Act, 1872 against the appellant, which in our opinion remain unrebutted at the instance of the appellant.

24. Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act was E brought on statute book with effect from 25.12.1983 by the

Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983. It reads as under:

"114-A. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape - In a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of sub-section

(2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),.where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent."

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 447

25. In order to enable the court to draw presumption as A contained in Section 114-Aagainstthe accused, it is necessary to first prove the commission of sexual intercourse by the accused on the prosecutrix and second, it should be proved that it was done without the consent of the prosecutrix. Once the prosecutrix states in her evidence that she did not consent B to act of sexual intercourse done by the accused on her which, as per her statement, was committed by the accused against her will and the accused failed to give any satisfactory explanation in his defence evidence on this issue, the court C will be entitled to draw the presumption under Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act against the accused holding that he committed the act of sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix against her will and without her consent. The question as to whether the sexual intercourse was done with or without o consent being a question of fact has to be proved by the evidence in every case before invoking the rigour of Section

114-Aofthe Indian Evidence Act.

26. Coming now to the case in hand, we find that the E prosecutrix, in her sworn testimony, in clear terms has said that she did not give her consent for commission of the act to the appellant and that he committed the act of sexual violence on her against her will. The appellant was not able to give any satisfactory explanation in his statement recorded under F Section 313 of the Code nor was he able to adduce any defence evidence to rebut the presumption contained in Section 114-Aofthe lndfan Evidence Act, 1872 against him.

So far as commission of sexual intercourse is concerned, it is proved with the medical evidence that it was performed by the G appellant with the prosecutrix.

27. We are alive to the law laid down by this Court wherein it is ruled that in a case of rape, no selfrespecting H

A woman would ever come forward in a court just to make a

humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. The testimony of the prosecutrix in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons, which necessitate looking for B corroboration of her statement or where there are compelling

reasons for rejecting of her testimony, there is no justification on the part of the court to reject her testimony.

28. In the instant case, our careful analysis of the C statement of the prosecutrix has.created an impression on our minds that she is a reliable and truthful witness and her testimony suffers no infirmity or blemish whatsoever. That apart, as observed supra, even the medical evidence supports the commission of sexual violence on her and we need not D elaborate on this issue any more in the light of concurrent finding of the courts below havirig been recorded against the appellant holding in clear terms that sign of commission of rape on her by the appellant stood proved by medical evidence E beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, even the appellant had not disputed the factum of commission of sexual intercourse by him on the prosecutrix because as taken note of, the appellant's only defence was that since the prosecutrix had consented to the commission of the sexual act, no offence of rape was made F out against him. This argument we have already rejected.

29. In the light of this, we have no hesitation in invoking the statutory presumption contemplated under Section 114-A of the Evidence Act against the appellant rendering him liable G to suffer the conviction under Section 376 of IPC .for commission of offence of rape on the prosecutrix.

30. In the light of foregoing discussion, we uphold the finding of commission of rape by the appellant on the H prosecutrix, which in our view, was rightly recorded by the two

DEEPAK v. STATE OF HARYANA

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] courts below.

31. The last submission of learned counsel for the appellant was that looking to the young age of the appellant and further he being the first offender and lastly, the fact that he has already undergone 3 years 1 month in jail, this Court should B take some lenient view in the matter of awarding of the sentence to him.

32. We find no merit in this submission for the simple reason that the appellant has been awarded minimum c mandatory sentence of 7 years. In other words, once the offence under Section 376 IPC is proved then the minimum sentence is 7 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life and the fine. Therefore, the appellant should feel fortunate that he was awarded only 7 years' sentence else it could have been D even more.

33. Since the State has not filed any appeal for enhancement of sentence, we need not go into this question except to reject the submissions urged by the learned counsel E for the appellant being totally devoid of substance.

34. Learned counsel for the appellant had placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Uday vs. State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 46] in support of his submissions.

F We have gone through the facts of this case and find that in the light of what we have held on appreciation of the evidence of this case, the decision relied upon may not help the appellant. In our opinion, it is distinguishable on facts.

35: In the light of foregoing discussion, we find no.merit in this appeal, which fails and is accordingly dismissed. Since the appellant is on bail by the order passed by this Court on 06.01.2012, his bail bonds stand cancelled and he is directed

to surrender forthwith t~ serve out the remaining period of his H sentence.

Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.