[2014] 6 S.C.R. 750

CHERUKURI MANI W/O NARENDRA CHOWDARI

THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF ANDH~A

PRADESH & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 1133 of 2014) B

MAY 08, 2014

[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

c Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabpers Act, 1986:

s.3 - Detention order passed by Government for a period of 12 mof1ths - Propriety of - Held: An order of detention D should in the first instance be in force for a period of three months - Government is, however, conferred with the power to extend the period beyond three months - Such extension .,

however, cannot be for period exceeding three months - In the instant case, the Government erred in directing detention

E of husband of the appellant for a period of 12 months in one stroke ignoring the legislative intention that even the order of extension of detention must not exceed three months at an}'- , one time.

F s. 3 - Detention order - Normally, a person who is detained under the provisions of the Act is facing trial which in other words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil rights - In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time - Detention, in the G instant case, for about seven months at a stretch without periodical review was, therefore, not sustainable - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 22.

Writ jurisdiction: Writ of habeas corpus - Duty of court to

H 750

CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 751

ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS

entertain - Technical lapse in framing writ petition - Held: A Even though the petition is not properly framed and appropriate relief is not sought, the Writ Court is expected to go into the issue and decide on merits - Normally, in such matters where liberty of a person is at stake, Courts would take a liberal approach in the procedural aspects.

Interpretation of statutes: Deviation from prescribed procedure - Held: Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions C of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure.

The husband of the appel, lant was alleged to have been involved in several cases of theft of Government and private properties as well as cases of destruction of public properties and his anti social ativities were D harmful to the society and general public and 11 cases were registered against him. The Collector issued a preventive detention under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 stating that the. husband of the appellant has got all the attributes to be called as a 'goonda' as envisaged under Section 2(g) of

the Act. While passing the detention order, the Collector made it clear that the detenu has a right to make a representation to the Government under Section 8(1) of the Act and the case will be referred to the Advisory Board for review and opinion under Section 10 of the Act and the detenu can be heard personally by the Advisory Board. The Collector also indicated that the Government, G on the basis of opinion of the Advisory Board, may confirm and continue the detention for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date of detention. After having served with a copy of the .detention order along with the grounds of detention, the husband of the

\ '

A appellant was taken into custody by Respondent No. 3 and from 5th October, 2013 he was detained in the Central Prison. On the basis of the recommendation of the Collector and after obtaining a report from the Advisory Board, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.0.Rt.

B No. 4803, dated 6th November, 2013 and directed detention of the detenu for a period of twelve monttis from the date on which he was detained i.e. 5th October,

2013. When the appellant challenged the detention of her . husband before the High Court in a habeas corpus Writ c Petition, the High Court dismissed the same with a cryptic order. The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the High Court .

. Allowing the appeal, the Court

D HELD: 1. When habeas corpus writ petition is filed, even though the petitioner has not properly framed the petition and not sought appropriate relief, it is expected from the Court to at least go into the issue and decide on merits. Normally, in such matters where liberty of a person E is at stake, the Courts would take a liberal approach in the procedural aspects. But unfortunately in the instant case, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition at the threshold itself. [Para 7] [756-G-H; 757-A-B]

2. Section 3 of the Act empowers the detention of F certain category of persons, as defined under the Act.

Apart from conferring of power, the section regulates the manner of passing the orders of detention as well as their duration. A reading of the provision makes it clear that the State Government, District Magistrate or G Commissioner of Police are the authorities, conferred with the power to pass orders of detention. The only difference is that the order of detention passed b, Y the Government would remain in force for a period of three months in the first instance, whereas similar orders H passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of

CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 753 .

ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS

Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days.

A The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon the appro.val to be accorded by the Government in this regard. Sub-section (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months.

Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention wofild in lhe first instance be in, force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend c the period, beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act for the maximum peri'd of 12 months, there must be an initial order of 0 detenlion for a period of three months, and at least, three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The expression "extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time" assumes significance in this regard. [Paras E 11, 12 and 13] [757-H; 758-A-F]

3. Restriction of initial period of detention to three months, is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the law prescribes a thing l:o be done in F a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated the authorities to pass an order of G detention at one time for a period not exceeding three months only, the Government Order in the instant case, directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of the prescribed manner and contrary to the provisions of H

A law. The Government cannot direct or extend the period of detention up to the maximuin period of twelve months, in one stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention that even the order of extension of detention must not exceed three months at any one time. One should not B ignore the underlying principles while passing orders of detention or extending the detention period from time to time. [Paras 14 and 15] [759-G, H; 760-D-G]

4. Normally, a person who is detained under the provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other C words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial

of civil rights. In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into consideration these factors, the Legislature Jlas D specifically provided the mechanism "Advisory Board" to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenu.

Hence, the impugned Government Order directing E detention for the maximum period of twelve months straightaway cannot be sustained in law. Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October, 2013 which means that he remained under detention for about seven months at a stretch without any periodical review as F envisaged by law. The detention order passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this case is in contravention to the provisions of law. On this ground alone, without going into other issues, we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention has G to be quashed. [Paras 16 and 17] [760-H; 761-A-E]

Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244: 2011

(4) SCR 740 Munagala Yadamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 386: 2012 (1) SCR 26 - referred to.

CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF

ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS

Case Law Reference :

2011 (4) SCR740

2012 (1) SCR 26

Referred to

Referred to

Para 8

Para 8

CRIMINAL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal B No.1133 of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2013 of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 30794 of 2013.

ATM Rangaramanujam, R.K. Adsure, AVS Raju, V.K.

Sidharthan, D. Mahesh Babu, Amit K. Naidu, Suchitra Harangkhawp, Amjit Maqbool, Aditya Jain, B. Ramkrishna Rao, T.V, Bhaskar Rao for the appearing Parties. \ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant, who is the wife of one Cherukuri Narendra Chowdari-detenu, filed a wr[t petition under Article 226 of th~ E Constitution before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh alleging that her husband has been unauthorisedly detained and the detention order passed was illegal and sought his release. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 28th October, 2013 stating that until and unless the competent Court of law decides the order of detention as illegal and invalid, it cannot be said that it is unauthorized detention.

Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

3. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this G appeal are that the Collector & District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh (Respondent No. 2) issued a preventive detention order on 30th September, 2013, under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral H

A Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 {for short "the

Act") stating that the husband of the appellant {detenu) has got all the attributes to be called as a 'goonda' as envisaged under Section 2{g) of the Act. It is also mentioned that he was involved in several cases of theft of Government and private properties B as well as cases of destruction of public properties and his

antisocial activities are harmful to the society and general public and referred 11 cases registered against him.

4. It is significant to note that while passing the detention C order, the Collector made it clear that the detenu has a right to make a representation to the Government under Section 8(1) of the Act and the case will be referred to the Advisory Board for review and opinion under Section 10 of the Act and the detenu can be heard personally by the Advisory Board. The Collector also indicated that the Government, on the basis of D opinion of the Advisory Board, may confirm and continue the detention for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date of detention.

5. After having served with a copy of the detention order E along with the grounds of detention, the husband of the

appellant was taken into custody by Respondent No. 3 and from 5th October, 2013 he was detained in the Central Prison, Rajahmundry till date.

6. It appears that on the basis of the recommendation of F the Collector and after obtaining a report from the Advisory Board, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.0.Rt. No. 4803, dated 6th November, 2013 and directed detention of the detenu for a period of twelve months from the date on which

G he was detained i.e. 5th October, 2013.

7. When the appellant challenged the detention of her husband before the High Court in a habeas corpus Writ Petition, the High Court dismissed the same with a cryptic order. In our considered view, when habeas corpus writ petition is filed, even H though the petitioner has not properly framed the petition and

not sought appropriate relief, it is expected from the Court to A at least go into the issue and decide on merits. Normally, in such matters where liberty of a person is at stake, the Courts would take a liberal approach in the procedural aspects. But unfortunately in the instant case, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition at the threshold itself.

8. Before us, learned counsel for the appellant mainly contended that as per the provisions of the Act, the period of detention in the first instance shall not exceed more than three months and a person cannot be put under detention without C facing trial for a long period. When the husband of the appellant-detenu is already facing charges under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code in around 11 cases, the invocation of detention laws against him and not permitting him to face the trial is bad in law and it is also contrarY to Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. He further D contended that the Government Order directing detention of the detenu for a period of 12 months is contrary to the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, and on this ground alone, the order of detention is liable to be set aside. To support his arguments, he strongly relied on decisions of this Court in E Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Na du (2011) 5 SCC 244 and Munaga/a Yadamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

(2012) 2 sec 386.

9. On behalf of the State, Mr. A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, F learned senior counsel supported the detention order and sought time till after summer vacation.

10. Now the issue for consideration before us is whether the State Government has the power to pass a detention order to detain a person at a stretch for a period of 12 months under G the provisions of the Act.

11. To answer the above issue, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act empowers the detention of certain category of persons, as H

A defined under the Act. Apart from conferring of power, the section regulates the manner of passing the orders of detention as well as their duration. It reads thus:

Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certail) persons : (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting inany manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during sucti period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as providl;!d in Sub-section (1 ), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section:

Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, ex6eed three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it isnecessary so to do, amend such order to extend suchperiod from time to time by any period not exceedingthree months at any one time.

(3) When any order is made under the section by an officer mentioned in Sub-section (2); he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in' his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government.

12. A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that A the State Government, District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police are the authorities, conferred with the power to pass orders of detention. The only difference is that the order of detention passed by the Government would remain in force for a period of three months in the first Instance, whereas similar B orders passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days.

The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon the approval to be accorded by the Government in this regard. Sub-section (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section c 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months.

13. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance D be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend the period, beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act E for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months, and at least, three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The expression "extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three F months at any one time" assumes significance in this regard.

14. The requirement to pass order of detention from time to time in the manner referred to above, has got its own significance. It must be remembered that restriction of initial G period of detention to three months, is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in

Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under: H

Clause 4 : No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless

(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the S(lid period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:

Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament Under Sub- . clause (b) of Clause (7); or

(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7).

15. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of 1§1.~,_witl:lout-\ E deviating from the prescribed procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated the authorities to pass an order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding three months only, the Government Order in the present case, directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period F of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of the prescribed manner and contrary to the provisions of law. The Government cannot direct or extend the period of detention up to the maximum period of twelve months, in one stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention that even the order of extension G of detention must not exceed three months at any one time. One

should not ignore the underlying principles while passing orders of detention or extending the detention period from time to time.

16. Normally, a person who is detained under the H provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other words

amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil rights.

A In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into consideration these factors, the Legislature,.

has specifically provided the mechanism "Advisory Board" to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for B a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper/ review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenu. Hence, the impugned Government Order directing detention for the maximum period of twelve months straightaway cannot be sustained in law.

17. Even though, learned senior counsel apparing for the C State sought for an adjournment beyond summer vacation, we are unable to accept his prayer for the simple reason that maximum part of the period of detention of the detenu is going to complete by the end of summer vacation. Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October, 2013 which means that D he remained under detention for about seven months at a stretch without any periodical review as envisaged by law. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention orq, r passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this cas~ 'is in contravention to the provisions of law. On this ground alone, E without going into other issues, we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention has to be quashed.

18. We accordingly allow the appeal quashing the detention order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and setting F aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.