[2014] 9 S.C.R. 221

SATTI PARADES! SAMADHI & PHILLIAR TEMPLE v.

M. SANKUNTALA (D) TR. LRS. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 5954 of 2014)

JULY 03; JULY

[DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ]

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:

0. 14, r. 2(2) - Court to prono1, mce judgment on all c issues - Disposal of suit on issue of limitation taking it as preliminary issue - Propriety of - Suit for declaration that settlement deeds executed by former trustee in favour of his daughters and grand daughter were null and void and for recovery of possession - Single Judge of High Court framing 0 issues and taking Issue No. 1 relating to limitation, as preliminary issue and dismissing the suit - Held: A plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law - The language employed in sub-r. (2) of r. 2 of 0. 14 makes it clear that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts, it can be stated with E certitude that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue - In the instant case, unless there is determination of the fact which would not protect the plaintiff u/s 10 of Limitation Act, the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation - It is not a case which F will come within the ambit and sweep of 0. 14, r. 2 which would enable the court to frame a preliminary issue for adjudication - Issue No. 1 was an issue that pertained to fact and law and,. as such, could not have been adjudicated as a preliminary. issue - Therefore, impugned judgments are set aside and the matter is remitted to single Judge of High Court to dispose G of the suit as expeditiously as possible - Limitation Act, 196:3 -s. 10.

The plaintiff-appellant filed, in the year 1997, a suit for

221 H

A declaration that three settlement deeds dated 27 .3.1978 executed by the former trustee in favour of his two daughters and a grand-daughter were null and void, and for recovery of possession of the land to the trust. The defendant filed written statement raising one of the B grounds that the suit was barred by limitation and, as such, did not desenie any adjudication. The single Judge of the High Court while framing the issues framed Issue No. 1 pertaining to limitation and taking it as a preliminary issue held that the defendants or• their legal c representatives had acquired right, title and interest by adverse possession and, therefore, the suit was not tenable being barred by limitation. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed appellant's appeal.

In the instant appeal, the question for consideration D before the Court was: whether an issue of limitation cold at all have been taken up as a preliminary issue.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

E HELD: 1.1. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and 1aw. On a plain consideration of the language employed in sub-r. (2) of r. 2 of 0.14, CPC (as insrted by amendment in 1976) it can be stated with certitude that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts it cannot be F tried as a preliminary issue. [para 18] [230-G]

Ramrameshwari Devi and others v. Nirma/a Devi and others 201.1 (8). SCR 992 = 2011 (8) SCC 249; Ramesh D.

Desai and others v. Bipin Vadi/a/ Mehta and others 2006 Suppl. (3) SCR.414 = 2006 (5) sec 638 - relied on.

Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon (1964) 4 SCR 409 =AIR 1964 SC 497 - referred to.

1.2. In the case at hand, unless there is determination of the fact which would not protect the plaintiff u/s 10 of H

SATTI PARADES! SAMADHI & PHILLIAR TEMPLE v. M. 223

SANKUNTALA (D) TR. LRS.

the Limitation Act the suit cannot be dismissed on the A ground of limitation. It is not a case which wilLcome within the ambit and sweep of 0. 14, r.2 wh.ich would enable the court to frame a preliminary issue for aBjudication. The single Judge has remained totally oblivious of th.e said facet and adjudicated th& issue as if it falls under O. 14, B r.2. On the scheme of s.10 of the Limitation Act, certain facts are to be established to throw the lis from the sphere of the said provision so that it would come within the concept of limitation. The Division Bench has fallen into the same error without appreciating the facts in c proper perspective. [para 19] [231-H; 232-A-C]

1.3. Besides, the Division Bench, by taking recourse of Arts. 92 to 96 of the Limitation Act, without appreciating the factum that it uses the words "transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration" in that event the D limitation would be twelve years but in the instant case the asseveration of the plaintiff is that the trustee had created three settlement deeds in favour of his two daughters and a granddaughter. The issue of consideration has not yet emerged. This settlement made by the father was whether for consideration or not has to be gone into and similarly whether the property belongs to the trust as tnrst is understood within the meaning of s.10 of the Limitation Act has also to be gone into. Ergo, there can be no shadow of doubt that issue No. 1 that was framed by the single Judge was an issue that pertained to fact and law and, therefore, coµld not have been adjudicated as a preliminary issue. Therefore, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable. [para 19]

[232-C-F]

2. The impugned judgments are set aside and the matter is remitted to the single Judge of the High Court to dispose of th~ suit as expeditiously as possible. [para

20-21] [232-G-H]

2011 (8) SCR 992

(1964) 4 SCR 409

Case Law Reference:

relied on para 14

referred to para 16

2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 414 relied on para 17

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5954 of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.11.2011 in OSA c No. 229 of 2006. of the High Court of Madras.

R. Basant, P.B. Suresh, Vipin Nair, U. Banerjee (For Temple Law Firm) for the Appellant.

Himanshu Munshi, Manish Garoni, Dinesh Rajpurohit, D Durga Dutt for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. In this appeal by special leave the plaintiff-appellant has called in question the legal sustainability of the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court <;>f Judicature at Madras in OSA No. 229 of 2006 whereby it has affirmed the judgment dated 24.07.2003 passed by the learned F single Judge in S.C. No. 673 of 1997 whereunder he, after framing of issues on the basis of prayer being made by the defendant, has dealt with the issue No. 1 as a preliminary issue and dismissed the suif.

3. The factual expose' which arise for disposal of the G present appeal are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for

declaration seeking that the three settlement deeds dated 27.3.1978 executed by the former trustee in favour of his two daughters and a granddaughter as null and void, and for the relief of recovery of possession of the land to the trust.

4. The defendant filed the written statement resisting the A claim of the plaintiff on many a ground and one of the grounds was that the suit was barred by limitation and, therefore, did not deserve any adjudication.

5. The learned single Judge framed the following issues 8 for consideration: -

"(1) Whether the suit for declaration that the three settlement deeds, all dated 27.3.1978 and registered as Document Nos. 248, 249 and 443 of 1978 with the Sub Registrar's Office, Royapuram, is barred by limitation of C time?

(2) Whether the suit properties had ever been in the possession of Sri S.S. Ramalingam in his individual capacity?

(3) Whether there existed a hereditary trust in the name of Satti P'aradesi Samadhi and Pillayar Temple Trust?

(4) Whether the plaintiff owns the schedule properties?

(5) Whether the defendants are the owners of the Schedule Properties and in possession and occupation from the date of settlement in the year 1978?

(6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits?

(7) To what relief the parties are entitled?"

6. The plaint presented by the plaintiff showed that the suit

for declaration of the settl13ment deeds by the defendant in favour of daughters and granddaughter which were executed G was done 19 years earlier, the defendant made a submission before the learned sjngle Judge that the suit was barred by limitation. Accepting the submission of the defendant, the learned single Judge thought it appropriate t6 take up the issue No. 1 as a preliminary issue.

7. Before the learned single Judge it was contended by the defendant that in view of the limitation provided under Articles 56 to 59 of the Limitation Act, the suit was enormously

barred by limitation and, therefore, deserved to be dismissed.

There was also a reference to Article 26 of the Limitation Act B and the learned single Judge referring to the same opined that even under the said Article the suit for recovery of possession was also barred by time. The learned single Judge also referred to Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and ruled that the defendants or their legal representatives had 'acquired right, title c and interest by adverse possession and, therefore, the suit was not tenable being barred by limitation.

8. On an appeal being preferred against the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench took note of Articles 92_and 96 and came to hold as follows: -

"22. Taking the property as a trust property, under Article 92, the suit for recovery of possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in the Trust out to have been filed within twelve years from the time when transfer becomes known to the plaintiff. Under Article 92, the plaintiff should have filed the suit within twelve years from 1978 when the settlement became known to the plaintiff.

23. In the plaint, at paragraph No. 4, the appellant/plaintiff has clearly alleged that !immediately after the death of settler, on 24.12.1978, the settlement were questioned by the appellant and the mother of the appellant and the defendants - Vijaya Saradambal, who was the earlier trustee, promised to settle the disputes recovering the scheduled properties to the plaintiff trust; but only the defendants influenced her and did not deliver the schedule properties to the plaintiff. By a reading of plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiff had known about the settlement deeds even in 1978. Having known about the settlement deeds, way back in 1978, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit to set aside the settlement deeds within twelve

years from the date of his knowledge. When plaintiff had . A chosen to file the suit only in the year 1977, the learned single Judge rightly held that the suit is barred by limitation.

24. The only grievance of the appellant is that after framing the issues, the learned single Judge had taken up the question of limitation as a preliminary issue and question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts and the appellant ought to have been given an opportunity to establish that the suit property is a trust property and also

the circumstances under which the plaintiff could not bring C the suit within the stipulated time and also to show as to how the suit is well within the time."

Being of this view, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal.

9. We have heard Mr. R. Basant learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Himanshu Munshi, learned counsel for the respondent.

10. Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, has drawn our attention to Section 10 of the E Limitation Act. It reads as follows: -

"10. Suits against trustees and their representatives

- Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions.of this Act, no suit against a person in whom F property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property G or proeeds, shall be barred by any length of time.

Explanation - For the purpose of this Section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property H

A vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof."

11. He has also drawn our attention to Articles 92 and 96 occurring in part VIII of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. He B has emphasized on both the Articles, namely, Articles 92 and,

96. The said Articles read as under: -

92 To recover Twelve When the transfer possession of years becomes known to immovable the plaintiff property conveyed or bequeathed in trust and after-wards transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration

96 By the manager of Twelve The date of death, a Hindu, Muslim or years resignation or Buddhist religious or removal of the charitable endowtransfer or the ment to recover date of possession of appointment of the movable qr plaintiff as manager immovea.ble _property of the endowment, comprised in the whichever is later endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration

12. Learned senior counsel has emphatically put forth that the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench has committed grave error by taking recourse to the principle of acquisition of knowledge by the plaintiff and other aspects. It H is absolutely limpid that if there is a transfer by previous

manager for a valuable consideration then only the limitation A of twelve years or any other article would come into the play.

As far as Article 59 is concerned, it is urged by him that the said Article is not applicable to the present case. Article 59 reads as follows: -

Description of Period of Time from which suit limitation period begins to run

59 To cancel or set Three When the facts entitling aside an years the plaintiff to have the instrument or - instrument or decree decree or for cancelled or set aside the rescission . or the contract of a contract rescinded first become known to him

13. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the plaintiff is not a trust as unperstood within the parameters of Section 10 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the learned single Judge has rihtly opined that Article 59 would be applicable. The learned counsel further submits that E assuming Article 59 is not attracted and any other Article contained in Chapter VIII would be applicable and suit would be barred by limitation inasmuch as it was filed after nineteen years.

14. The core question that emerges for consideration is F whether an issue of limitation could at all have been taken up as a preliminary issue.

15. In Ramrameshwari Devi and others v. Nirma/a Devi and others1, whi113 dealing with Order 14, Rule 2, observed that G sub-rule (2) of Order 14 refers to the discretion given to the court where the court may try an issue relating to the jurisdiction of

(2011) a sec 249.

A the court or the bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force as a preliminary issue.

16. The controversy pertaining to the provisions contained in Order 14 Rule 2 had come up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Di//on2 wherein it has B been ruled thus: -

"Under 0 .14, r 2 where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issue of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of Jaw and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all issues in a suit should be tried by the Court: not to do so, especially when the decision on issue$ even of law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit."

17. Be it stated, the aforesaid pronouncement was made before the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976.

18. In Ramesh D. Desai and others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and others3, while dealing with the issue of limitation, the Court F opined that a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law. divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. The Court further proceeded to state 1 that a plea of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. On G a plain consideration of the language employed in sub-rule (2) of Order 14 it can be stated with certitude that when an issue requires an inquiry into facts it cannot be tried jiS a preliminary issue. In the said judgment the Court opined as follows: -

AIR 1964 SC 497 : (1964) 4 SCR 409.

H 3.

(2006) s sec 638

"13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that A where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for B the time being in force. The provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna

v. Brig. F.J. Dillon and it was held as under: (SCR p. 421)

"Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law and of fact arise in the c same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed "of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of D law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as E preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided trial of the suit." F

Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but the principle enunciated in the abovequoted decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon G the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue."

19. In the case at hand, we find that unless there is H

A determination of the fact which would not protect the plaintiff under Section 10 of the Limitation Act the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation. It is not a case which will come within the ambit and sweep of Order 14, Rule 2 which would enable the court to frame a preliminary issue to adjudicate thereof. The

8 learned single Judge, as it appears, has remained totally oblivious of the said facet and adjudicated the issue as if it falls under Order 14, Rule 2. We repeat that on the scheme of Section 10 of the Limitation Act we find certain facts are to be established to throw the lis from the sphere of the said provision so that it would come within the concept of limitation. The Division C Bench has fallen into some error without appreciating the facts in proper perspective. That apart, the Division Bench, by taking recourse of Articles 92 to 96 without appreciating the factum that it uses the words "transferred by the trustee for a valuable consideration" in that event the limitation would be twelve years D but in the instant case the asseveration of the plaintiff is that the trustee had created three settlement deeds in favour of his two daughters and a granddaughter. The issue of consideration has not yet emerged. This settlement made by the father was whether for consideration or not has to be gone into nd similarly whether E the property belongs to the trust as trust is understood within the meaning of Sectin10 of the Limitation Act has also to be gone into. Ergo, there can be no shadow of doubt that the issue No. 1 that was framed by the learned single Judge was an issue that pertained to fact and law and hence, could not have been adjudicated as a preliminary issue. Therefore, the impugned

I F order is wholly unsustainable.

20. We have not expressed any opinion with regard to the issue of limitation except saying that the present issue could not have been taken up as a preliminary issue. As the suit is pending since 1997 we would request the learned single Judge of the G High Court of Madras to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as 1

possible.

21. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments are set aside without any order as to costs.

H Rajendra Prasad Appeal allowed.