[2011] 9 S.C.R. 1

.-\

UNION OF !NOIA & ANR.

A .. v._ .·.: .. . . .

ARULMOZHI -INIARASlJ & ORS.· (Civil Appeal Nos. 4990-4991 of 2011)

JULY 06, 2011 B

[D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

Service Law - Recruitment - Part time contingent casual labourers - On purely temporary basis - Engaged as required on basis of need for which paid on hourly basis - Applications c -

invited for post of Sepoy in the Department prescribing certain age limit - Casual labourers not allowed to participate in the

j ' selection process - Application before the Tribunal - Direction issued by the Tribunal to the Department to consider the case of the labourers by relaxing the age limit prescribed - Said D order challenged - High Court modified the order of the Tribunal with regard to relaxation in the age limit with a condition that it would be applicable to the actual erstwhile employees of the Department - On appeal, held: Engagement of employees as casual labourers even for E considerable long duration did not confer any legal right on them for seeking a mandamus for relaxation of age limit - Also terms of letter of appointment in unambiguous terms stated that appointments were temporary and would not confer any right to claim any permanent post in the department - F Only because some similarly situated persons have been appointed/absorbed as Sepoys, same cannot be directed to be carried out - Thus, order of the High Court is set aside.

Constitution of India, 1950: . ./ G Article 141 - Precedent - Reliance on - Principles to be followed - Held: While applying precedents the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the fact situation of the case before it fits in with the fact 1 H

A situation of the decision on which reliance is placed - Observations of courts .are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context - These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated - Disposal B of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.

Article 226 - Writ of mandamus - Issuance of - Held: Writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when C there exists a legal right in the writ petitiorter and

corresponding legal obligation in the State - Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated - There cannot be equality in illegality - On facts, it cannot be said that the action of the D appellants is highly discriminatory in as much as some similarly situated persons have been appointed/absorbed as Sepoys.

Administrative law - Doctrine of legitimate expectation - E Applicability of - Plea of employees (part time contingent casual labourers) for permanent absorption/regularisation in the Department on account of their alleged uninterrupted engagement for long durations ranging between 8-14 years

- Held: Doctrine of legitimate expectation is not applicable - F Letter of appointment was to the effect that the appointments were temporary and would not confer any right to claim any permanent post in the department - Also no promise was made to the employees that they would be absorbed as regular employees of the Department.

G Respondents were engaged as part-time contingent casual labourers, purely on temporary basis in the Excise Department. They were engaged on basis of the need of the office for which they were paid on hourly basis. In the year 1999, most of the respondents were in continuous H employment for a period ranging from 8 to 14 years. In

' '

, l

the year 2005, the appellants dispensed with the services A of all such casual labourers. The respondents filed an application before the Tribunal seeking regularisation of their services. and the same was dismissed. The respondents filed a writ petition. The High Court directed the appellants to consider the matter afresh in light of the B circulars issued by the Department. The Excise Department found that the respondents were not eligible for regularization of their services as they did not satisfy the criteria laid down in the case of * Umadevi (3) and .

Office Memorandum. Thereafter, the Excise Department c invited applications for recruitment to the posts of Sepoy prescribing the age limit. The applications of the respondents were rejected as age barred. The respondents filed applications before the Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the appellants to consider the case of 0 the respondents for appointment by relaxing the age limit prescribed, if necessary, in view. of the long service rendered by them. The appellants challenged the order of the Tribunal. The High Court disposed of the writ . petition modifying of the order of Tribunal, holding that relaxation in the age limit could be up to 3 years for OBC E candidates and 5 years for SC/ST candidates, subject to the condition that it would be applicable to those candidates who were actually erstwhile employees of the department. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeals.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In the matter of applying precedents the Court should not place reliance on decisions without G discussing as to how the fact situation of the case before it fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These H

A observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. [Para 12) [12-C-E] B 1.2 The observation in **Nagendra Chandra's case cannot be said to be an exposition of general principle of law on the point that a long length of service, dehors the relevant recruitment rules for the post, is a relevant factor for waiver or relaxation of any eligibility criterion, C including age limit, for future regular selections for the post. The observation, general in nature, was made by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, cannot be treated as a binding precedent. It has to be confined to D the peculiar facts of that case. [Para 13) [13-E-G]

**Nagendra Chandra and Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand and0rs.(2008)1SCC 798: 2007 (12) SCR 608 - distinguished.

*Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 (3) SCR 953; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. vs. N.R. Vairamani and Anr.

(2004) 8 SCC 579: 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 923; Sarva Shramiks anghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra F and Ors. (2008) 1 SCC494: 2007 (12) SCR 645; Bhuwalka

Steel Industries Limited vs.Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board and Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 273: 2009 (16) SCR 618 - referred to.

G 2.1 In the instant case, indubitably, the respondents were engaged as part time contingent casual labourers In the office of the Commissioner of Central Excise for doing all types of work as may be assigned to them by the office. Their part time engagement was need based H for which they were to be paid on hourly basis. Though

their stand is that many a times they were required to A work day and night but it is nowhere stated that they were recruited or ever discharged the duties of a 'sepoy' for which recruitment process was initiated vide public

notice dated 14th January 2008 and the Tribunal as also the High Court directed the appellants to grant relaxation 8 in age limit over and above what is stipulated in the recruitment rules/advertisement. In view of the facts, the engagement of the respondents as casual labourers even for considerable long duration did not confer any legal right on them for seeking a mandamus for relaxation of C age limit. The impugned direction by the Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court based on the **Nagendra Chandra's case was clearly unwarranted. [Para 14] [14-A- E]

3.1 It is plain from the terms of the letter of D appointment that the respondents were told in unambiguous terms that their appointments were temporary and would not confer any right to claim any permanent post in the department. It is not the case of the respondents that at any point of time, during their E engagements with the appellants, a promise was held out to them by the apRellants that they would be absorbed as regular employees of the department. In fact, no such promise could be held out in view of the Government O.M. dated 7th June, 1988 banning the employment of persons F in regular posts. [Para 20] [17-B-C]

3.2 The doctrine of legitimate expectation, is not attracted in the instant case. The plea relating to the legitimate expectation of the respondents of being G permanently absorbed/regularised in the Excise Department on account of their alleged uninterrupted engagement for long durations ranging between 8-14 years is rejected. [Paras 15 and 22] [14-F; 18-A]

Sethi Auto Service Station and Anr. vs. Delhi H

A Development Authority and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 180: 2008 (14)

SCR 598 - relied on.

Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) - referred B to. .

4. The submission that the action of the appellants is highly discriminatory in as much as some similarly situated persons have been appointed/absorbed as Sepoys cannot be accepted. A writ of mandamus can be C issued by the High Court only when there exists a legal

right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated. There cannot be equality in illegality. [Para

D 23) (18-B-C]

Sushanta Tagore and Ors. .s. Union of India and Ors.

(2005) 3 sec

16: 2005 (2) SCR 502; UP. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. and E Anr. vs. Sant Raj Singh and Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 82: 2006 (2)

Suppl. SCR 636; State, CBI vs. Sashi Balasubramanian and Anr. (2006) 13 SCC 252: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 914; State of Orissa and Ors. vs. Prasana Kumar Sahoo (2007) 15 SCC 129: 2007 (5) SCR 697 - referred to.

5. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside. (Para 24] (18-E]

Case Law Reference:

2006 (3) SCR 953 Referred to Para 13, 14, 21

2007 (12) SCR 608 Distinguished Para 1, 14

2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 923 Referred to Para 12

2007 (12) SCR 645 Referred to Para 12

2009 (16) SCR 618 Referred to Para 12

{1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) Referred to Para 17

2008 (14) $CR 598 Relied on Para 18

2005 (2) SCR 502 Referred to Para 23

2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 636 Referred to Para 23

2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 914 Referred to Para 23

2007 (5) SCR 697 Referred to Para 23

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4990-4991 of 2011.

From the Judgment & Order dated 05.01.2010 of the High Court.of Judicature at Madras in W.P. Nos. 27605 & 27606 of2009.

B. Bhattacharya, Kiran Bhardadwaj, Rajiv Nanda, B.

Krishna Prasad for the Appellants.

P.B. Krishnan, B. Raghunath, Vijay Kumar, P.B.

Subramaniyan, R. Gopalakrishnan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D:K. JAIN, J.: 1. Leave granted.

2. These two appeals, by special leave, are directed against the judgment and final order dated 5th January, 2010 G delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, whereby the High Court, in slight modification of the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench (for short "the Tribunal"), has directed that the respondents shall be given a relaxation of five years and three years respectively to SC/

A ST and OBC candidates in age limit for being considered for

selection to the post of Sepoy in the Central Excise department, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. However, the High Court has directed that the said relaxation would be applicable to those candidates who were actually erstwhile employees of B the said department.

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts essential for adjudication of the present appeals may be stated as follows:

The respondents were engaged as part-time contingent C casual labourers-purely on temporary basis in the Office of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai Zone, in the year 1999. As per offer of appointment on record, they were required to work on the basis of the need of the office, for which they were to be paid @ Rs. 10/- per working hour with D no guarantee as regards minimum number of hours in a month.

In para 7 of the said letter, it was stated that the appointment letter would not confer any right to claim any permanent post in the department as also any automatic right to be considered for selection to any permanent post in the department. Most of E them.were in continuous employment for a period ranging from 8 to 14 years. It is common ground that none of the respondents fall within the purview of 1993 scheme, notified on 1 Oth September, 1993, for conferring temporary status and regularisation of casual workers, who were in employment on F 1st September, 1993, all of them having been engaged after the said date.

4. On 2nd May, 2005, in compliance with the directions issued by the Ministry of Finance, the appellants dispensed with the services of all such casual labourers and handed over G the work done by them to contractors. Aggrieved by the said action the respondents herein, approached the Tribunal by preferring an original application, (O.A.No.764 of 2005) seeking regularisation of their services. The said O.A. was dismissed by the Tribunal. Against the order of dismissal, the H

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v. ARULMOZHI INIARASU & 9

ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court. While A disposing of the writ petition, the High Court directed the appellants herein to consider the matter afresh in light of the circulars issued by the Department of Personnel in

O.M.No.49019/1/2006-Estt{C) dated 11th December, 2006 as also the circulars issued by the Ministry of Finance dated 7th B September, 2007 and 13th September, 2007. These circulars were issued pursuant to the order passed by this Court in the case of Secretary, State of Kamataka & Ors. Vs. Umadevi

(3) & Ors. 1, inter-alia directing the Union of India, State Governments and their instrumentalities to take steps to c regularise, as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed employees, who are duly qualified in terms ., of the statutory recruitment rules for the post and who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned post but not under cover of orders of Courts or Tribunals.

5. Upon a fresh .consideration in terms of the said direction, the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise found that the respondents were not eligible for regularization of their services as they did not satisfy the criteria laid down in the case of Umadevi(3) (supra) and Office Memorandum dated E ; 11th December, 2006, issued by Department of Personnel & Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances ahd Pensions.

6. On 14th January, 2008, the office of the Chief F Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai Zone, issued a notice inviting applications for recruitment to 40 (37 GC & 3 OBC) posts of Sepoy (General Central Service Group D Post).

As per the recruitment rules, the age limit prescribed for the

:< . post as on 1st January, 2008, was 27 years for general G candidate, 32 years for SC/ST candidates and 30 years for OBC because of relaxation of age limit by five years and three years in the cases of SC/ST candidates and OBC candidates '..:respectively. In the recruitment process, thus initiated, initially

1. c2oos) 4 sec 1.

A the respondents were permitted to participate but later on,

realising that the respondents (all SC/ST and OBC candidates) had crossed the prescribed age, they were not called to participate in the further selection process. Their applications were rejected as age barred.

7. Being aggrieved by the decision of the department in not granting relaxation in age, the respondents filed fresh Original Applications before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that the ratio of the decision of this Court in Nagendra Chandra & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. 2 was applicable C to the case of the respondents and therefore, they were entitled to the same relief as was granted in that case. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the appellants herein to consider the case of the respondents for appointment by relaxing the age limit prescribed, if necessary, in view of the long service rendered D bythem.

8. Aggrieved by the said direction, the appellants herein unsuccessfully questioned the validity of the order of the Tribunal before the High Court. The High Court disposed of both the E writ petitions with modification of the order of Tribunal to the effect that relaxation in the age limit could be up to 3 years for OBC candidates and 5 years for SC/ST candidates, subject to the condition that it would be applicable to those candidates who were actually erstwhile employees of the department.

F Hence, the present appeals.

9. Mr. B. Bhattacharya, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the appellants strenuously urged that the High Court has committed a manifest error in directing relaxation of age bar in the case of the respondents by treating G the decision in the case of Nagendra Chandra & Ors. (supra) as a binding precedent on the point, without appreciating that:

(i) the observation with regard to relaxation in age bar in the penultimate paragraph of Nagendra Chandra's case (supra)

H 2. c2008) 1 sec 798.

ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

 was made by this Court in exercise of power under Article A 142 of the Constitution of India, which is not possessed by either the High Court or the Tribunal and (ii) the fact-situation in the instant case was entirely different from the one obtaining in that case. It was asserted that unlike Nagendra Chandra's

~ case (supra), where there was irregularity in the appointment B of Constables against the sanctioned posts, the present case pertained to engagement of need based casual labourers without any recruitment rules or sanctioned posts. It was thus, argued that the High Court failed to notice distinction between the casual labourer and those whose appointment was irregular c because of non-compliance with some procedure in the selection process, which is not the case here when none of

~ the respondents had earlier participated in recruitment for the post of Sepoys.

10. Per contra, Mr. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel D appearing for the respondents, in his written submissions, has submitted that though the respondents were informed at the time of the appointment about the nature of their work, many a times they continued to work day and night and also on national holidays without any monetary benefits only with the E hope and expectation that they would be absorbed on regu1ar basis or at least conferred temporary status. It has been further pleaded that the action of the appellants in rejecting the request ., for age relaxation without taking into account considerable years of their casual service, was highly unjust and arbitrary.

F The learned counsel pleaded that by reason of the impugned directions the respondents have only been given a right to compete and not an appointment as such and therefore, this Court should be loathe to interfere with a just and equitable order by the authorities below, particularly when similarly placed G . labourers had been granted age relaxation.

11. Thus, in these appeals the first and the foremost question to be examined is whether in the matter of relaxation of age limit, prescribed as eligibility criteria for appointment H

A on a particular post, any principle of law has been laid down in the decision of this Court in Nagendra Chandra's case (supra)? If so, whether it could be applied to the facts of the present case for directing the afore-stated relaxation in age limit?

12. Before examining the first limb of the question, formulated above, it would be instructive to11ote, as a preface, the well settled principle of law in the matter of applying precedents that the Court should not place reliance on C decisions without discussing as to how the fact situation of the case before it fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been D stated. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. (Ref.: Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. N.R.

Vairamani & Anr.3; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai E Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 4 and Bhuwalka Steel

Industries Limited Vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board & Anr. 5.)

13. Bearing in mind the aforenoted principle of law, we F may now refer to the decision in Nagendra Chandra (supra).

It is plain from a bare reading of the said decision that the

.. -

question which fell for consideration before a bench of three • learned Judges of this Court was as to whether the appointments of the appellants in that case were illegal or G irregular. This Court opined that since the appointments made were not only in infraction of the recruitment rules but also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India,

(2004) s sec 579.

4. c2oos) 1 sec 494.

H 5. c2010) 2 sec 273.

ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

these were illegal. It was thus, held that the appellants would A not be entitled to get the benefit of the directions contained in Umadevi(3) case (supra), which are applicable only to those qualified employees who were appointed irregularly in a sanctioned post. Having come to the conclusion that the subject appointments being illegal, the competent authority was justified B in terminating the services of the employees concerned and the High Court was also justified in upholding the same, in our view, the relied upon observation in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment in Nagendra Chandra (supra) does not appear to be consistent with the ratio of the decision of the Constitution c Bench in Umadevi(3) case (supra). In the said decision it has clearly been held that the courts are not expected to issue any direction for absorption/regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wagers or ad-hoc employees merely. because such an employee is continued for a long time beyond the term of his appointment. D It has also been held that such an employee would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. Therefore, in our E opinion, the said observation cannot be said to be an exposition of general principle of law.on the point that a long length of service, dehors the relevant recruitment rules for the post, is a relevant factor for waiver or relaxation of any eligibility criterion, including age limit, for future regular selections for F the post. Obviously, the observation, general in nature, was made by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, cannot be treated . as a binding precedent. It has to be confined to the peculiar

facts of that case.

14. We may now advert to the second limb of the question in para 11 (supra). The issue need not detain us for long as in our view the factual position as obtaining in the present case does not fit in with the fact situation in the case of H

A Nagendra Chandra (supra). In the instant case. indubitably,

the respondents were engaged as part time contingent casual labourers in the office of the Commissioner of Central Excise for doing all types of work as may be assigned to them by the office. Their part time engagement was need based for which B they were to be paid on hourly basis. Though their stand is that many a times they were required to work day and night but it is 1 ; owhere stated that they were recruited or ever discharged the duties of a 'sepoy' for which recruitment process was initiated vide public notice dated 14th January 2008 and c the Tribunal as aiso the High Court has directed the appellants

to grant relaxation in age limit over and above what is stipulated in the recruitment rules/advertisement. In view of the stated factual scenario, in our opinion, the engagement of the respondents as casual labourers even for considerable long

0 duration did not confer any legal right on them for seeking a mandamus for relaxation of age limit. We have no hesitation in holding that Nagendra Chandra's case (supra) has no application on facts in hand and the impugned direction by the Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court based on the said E decision, was clearly unwarranted.

15. We may now consider the plea relating to the legitimate expectation of the respondents of being permanently absorbed/ regularised in the Excise Department on account of their alleged uninterrupted engagement for long durations ranging F between 8-14 years.

16. The doctrine of legitimate expectation and its impact in the administrative law has been considered by this Court in a catena of decisions. However, for the sake of brevity, we do G not propose to refer to all these cases. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the concept, we shall refer to a few decisions.

17. In Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for Civil Service6, a locus classicus on the subject, for the first

H 6. 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL).

ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

time an attempt was made by the House of Lords to give a A comprehensive definition to the principle of legitimate expectation. Enunciating the basic principles relating to

legitimate expectation, Lord Diplock observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of the administrative authority must affect such person either (a) by B altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law; or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either: (1) he has in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue c to do until some rational ground for withdrawing it has been communicated to him and he has been given an opportunity to comment thereon, or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without first giving him an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending D that they should be withdrawn.

18. Recently, in Sethi Auto Service Station & Anr. Vs.

Delhi Development Authority & Ors. 7, one of us (D.K. Jain, J.), referring to a large number of authorities on the point, summarised the nature and scope of the doctrine of legitimate E expectation as follows:

"32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows

.~ that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate F expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest G comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said

rpresentation and he denial of that expectation has

7. c2009) 1 sec 1 so.

A worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate s expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. n

19. Bearing in mind the afore-stated legal position, we 1 may now advert to the facts at hand. For the sake of ready \ reference, the relevant portions of offer of appointment issued C by Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai, to the respondents on 6th August 1999 are extracted below:

"The under mentioned candidates who have been applied

in response to the advertisement given by this department o in the "Daily Thanthi" & who are appeared in Interview conducted by this office on 10.04.99 are offered appointment provisionally in "part time contigent casual labourers" Purely on temporary basis on the basis of payment for the number of hours actually worked in a E month. They will be paid Rs. 10.00 for every working hour. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

3. The candidates should note that they will be asked to work on the basis of the need of the office and there is no F guarantee as regards minimum number in a month.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

6. The offer of appointment is purely on temporary basis only. In case the work and conduct of the candidates is not found to be satisfactory. Their services will be terminated without any intimation/notice.

7.This appointment letter does not confer any right to claim any permanent post in this department and does not also vest any automatic right to be considered for selection to

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v. ARULMOZHI INIARAsu & 17

ORS. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

any permanent post in the Department.

A xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

20. It is plain from the terms of the letter of appointment that the respondents were told in unambiguous terms that their B appointments were temporary and would not confer any right to claim any permanent post in the department. It is not the case of the respondents that at any point of time, during their engagements with the appellants, a promise was held out to them by the appellants that they would be absorbed as regular c employees of the department. In fact, no such promise could be held out in view of the Government O.M. dated 7th June, 1988 banning the employment of persons in regular posts.

21. At this juncture, it would be apposite to note that a similar plea was negatived by the Constitution Bench in D Umadevi(3) (supra) by observing thus:

"47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as E recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being

.j confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for F selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while G engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of

>. being made permanent in the post." H

22. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, in our opinion, the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as explained above, is not attracted in the instant case. The argument is rejected accordingly.

23. Lastly, as regards the submission that the action of the appellants is highly discriminatory in as much as some

similarly situated persons have been appointed/absorbed as Sepoys, the argument is stated to be rejected. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only c when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated. It is trite law that there cannot be equality in illegality. (Ref.: Sushanta Tagore & Ors. Vs. Union of India &

0 Ors. 8; U. P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sant Raj Singh & Ors. 9; State, CBI Vs. Sashi Balasubramanian & Anr. 10 and State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Prasana Kumar Sahoo11.)

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside and the appeals E are allowed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

N.J.

Appeals allowed.

(2005) 3 sec 16.

(2006) 9 sec 82.

10. (2006) 13 sec 252.

11. (2007) 15 sec 129.