[2008] 14 S.C.R. 271

tr' ' RUKMINl NARVEKAR A v.

VIJAYA SATARDEKAR & ORS. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1576-1577 of 2008)

OCTOBER 3,. 2008

[MARKANDEY KAT JU AND ALTAMAS KABIR, JJ.]

----~

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973ss.227, 482 - Constitution of India, 1950 - ArticltJ 226 - Framing of charges - Evidence to be considered by the Court while framing of c charges and taking cognizance of offence - Per Katju, J: Held: Ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge - However, in very rare and exceptional cases when some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that prosecu- D

tion version was totally absurd or preposterous then the Court ..___,, can look into it - Per Kabir, J: There is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in support of his defence at the stage of framing of charge and only such material as are indicated in s.227 CrP.C. can be taken into consideration by E Magistrate at that stage - However, in a proceeding taken there-

~ from under s.482 CrP.C., Court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused - In the in- ,,. stant case, there is a/legation of fraud - By the Court: Prima r

,;, facie case is made out against accused no. 1 - Not a fit case for quashing proceedings - As against the accused no. 2, no F --1

material to show that she was involved in the fraud committed by accused no. 1- Hence prima facie case not made out against her - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 409, 420.

The complainant-appellant lodged an FIR under G ss.409 and 420 IPC, alleging that 'RS', the accused No.1 _... _, who was an advocate took signatures of complainant on a Power of Attorney falsely representing that it was meant for enabling him to appear in court case in respect of cer-

271 H

A tain properties. The Power of Attorney was used by ac-

("I

cused for selling the property to his wife, 'VS' the other accused. The said property belonged to the complainant.

Charge sheet was filed against both the accused. Thereafter, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the

B charge sheet and process was issued.

Accused-respondents filed revision which was dis- -~ missed. Against that order a writ petition was filed. High Court allowed the writ petition relying upon the evidence of one 'ON' in a Civil Suit. c

In the instant appeal, it was contended for the appellant that High Court ought not have relied on the evidence in the Civil Suit for quashing the criminal case; that at the time of framing of the charges only the material produced

D by the prosecution side could be looked into by the Court

and the material produced by the defence cannot be

Y.· looked into. \,-..--

Respondent contended that the said evidence could have been relied upon on the facts of the instant case for E quashing the criminal proceedings.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: Per Katju, J.: ..

1. The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct I' prima facie made out an offence against the respondent, ' t-- 'RS'. [Para 12] [279, C]

2. The evidence of 'ON' in the Civil Suit was a very detailed one and some contradictory statements ap-

G peared to have been given by him e.g. that the amount was paid by 'RS' as a loan, and this contradicted the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Sit, it was hld that undue influence could not. be , ruled out. In these circumstances it

H cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 273 ILlf

& ORS.

_, )> i criminal case were totally ma/a fide and with ulterior mo- A tive. [Para 14] [279, H; 280, A-B]

3. The pleas which the respondent 'RS' took before the High court could be taken by him at the time of the trial, and it would not be proper to pre-empt the criminal B proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations were made against him in the FIR. The rlation of a lawyer and his -._, client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it was alleged in the FIR that 'RS' deceived the complainant and her husband. These are matters which the trial court in the crimic nal case should look into. However, this was not a fit case for quashing of the criminal proceedings against 'RS' in exercise of the powers under s.482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution. [Para 15] [280, C-E]

Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and D

--..,; Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370; K. G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87; State of Haryana and Ors. v.

Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992)Supp. 1 SCC 335; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. (1998) 5 E SCC 7 49; Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors.

(2006) 4 SCC 359 and *State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi

(2005) 1 sec 568 - referred to.

4. It is well settled that a judgment of the Court has

,\_ not to be treated as a Euclid formula. The observations of F --!

Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's formula nor as provisions of the statute. Thus while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge in view of *Debendra Nath Padhi case, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases G where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or tak- H

A ing cognizance. However, in the instant case, it cannot f-"' be said that the evidence in the Civil Suit which was pro~ duced by the defence before the trial court established convincingly that the prosecution case is totally absurd or preposterous. This is a matter which has to be looked

B into by the trial Court. The judgment of the High Court in respect of 'RS' is set aside and the criminal proceedings

t-.~ [ against him would go on-in the trial Court. As regards the other criminal appeal in which Smt. 'VS', wife of 'RS', was the respondent, there was no material whatsoever either c mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that she was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband 'RS'. The only allegation against her was that the sale deed was in her favour. This would not prima facie make out any offence.

Therefore, the criminal proceeding against 'VS' was rightly D quashed by the High Court. [Paras 17-19, 21-22] (281, C-

E; 282, A-B; 282, E-G] ..

Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari.Devi Lal University, \..---'

Sirsa and Anr. JT (2008) 8 SC 621 ; Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N. R. Vairamani and Anr. AIR (2004) SC E 4778 - relied on.

Or. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U. P and Ors. (2008) 9 Scale 166 - referred to.

Per Kabir, J.: (Concurring with the interpretation of F the provisions of s.227 Cr.P.C. and expressing his own f. views in the matter)

'r- HELD: 1. There is no scope for the accused to produce any evidence in his support at the stage of framing of charge and only such material as are indicated in s.227 G Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration by the Magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under s.482 Cr.P.C. the Court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be main- H tained. This appears to be the intention of the legislature I'

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 275

& ORS. -. \ in wording ss. 227 and 228 the way in which they have A been worded and as explained in *Debendra Nath Padhi's case by the larger Bench to which the very same question had been referred. [Para 9] [286, E-G]

*State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC B 568; Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766;

- -) State Anti-Corruption Bureau v. P. Suryaprakasan (1999) SCC Crl. 373 - referred to.

2. The complaint made does make out a prima facie case against accused 'RS' and the cognizance taken by c the Magistrate cannot be faulted. However, even prima facie, none of the offences referred to in the charge-sheet can be made out against accused 'VS'. and she has been roped in only with the aid of s.1208 which is also not substantiated. [Para 10] [286, G-H; 287, A] D

... i

CASE LAW REFERENCE '--;

(2005) 4 sec 370 referred to Para 10

(2002) 8 sec a1 referred to Para 10

(1992) Supp. 1 sec 335 referred to Para 11 E

(1998) 5 sec 749 referred to Para 11

c2oos) 4 sec 359 referred to Para 11

c2005) 1 sec 568 referred to Para 16

..\.

JT (2008) 8 SC 621 referred to Para 17 F

AIR (2004) SC 4778 relied on Para 17

(2008) 9 Scale 166 referred to Para 20

(2005) 1 sec 568 referred to Para 3

(1996) 9 sec 766 referred to Para 3 G

, A-,,....!

(1999) sec Crl. 373 referred to Para 6

CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1576-1577 of 2008 H

A From the Judgment and final Order dated 3/8/2007 of the t- '4 High Court of Bombay, Bench at Goa in CriminalWrit Petition Nos. 7 and 8 2007

Mukul Rohatgi, Dhruv Mehta, Harshvardhan Jha, Yashraj

B Singh Deora and T.S. Sabarish (for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co.) for

~ the Appellant. i-

U.U. Lalit, P.V. Shetty, Davedatt Kamat, Rauf Rahim and ~- Amarjit Singh Bexi for the Respondents.

; c The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

MARKANDEY KAT JU, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been filed against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (at Goa) dated 3.8~2007 in Criminal Writ Petition Nos .. 7/2007 D and 8/2007.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the \__: record.

4. Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in both these appeals are hus- E band and wife, being Ranjit Satardekar and his wife Vijaya Satardekar. An FIR dated 25.2.2002 was filed against these respondents by one Rukmini Narvekar (the appellant herein) under various provisions of the IPC including Sections 409, 420, 423, etc. A true copy of this FIR is annexed as P6 in this appeal.

F The gist of this FIR is that the complainant is an illiterate person Iand so was her husband Raghunath Narvekar. It is alleged that rthe respondent Ranjit Satardekar, who is an advocate, fraudulentty and dishonestly induced the complainant and her deceased husband to place their signatures and thumb impres-

G sion on some papers in the office of the Executive Magistrate at Sawantwadi without explaining the contents thereof, and falsely misrepresenting. that the same was necessary to give ' f-...../'-.. him necessary authority to represent them in the court in Goa in Inventory Proceedings on the death of Andre Andrade which

H were going on pertaining to the estate left by him. It may be

RUKMINf NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 277

& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.] .. ' mentioned that Andre Andrade had several children including A one daughterwho was married to Raghunath Narvekar but their marriage was dissolved on 16.2.1973 and thereafter Raghunath Narvekar married the complainant. Under the Goa law, Raghunath Narvekar and the complainant inherited 10% share in the estate left by the deceased Andre Andrade and the re- B

\ maining 10% went to Vijaya Andrade who had been married to

- -< Raghunath Narvekar and was being represented by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate, in the Inventory Proceedings.

5. The allegation in the FIR was that Ranjit Satardekar had falsely misrepresented to.the complainant and her husband that c

the document which was being executed by them was for enabling Ranjit to represent them in the Inventory Proceedings in progress on the death of Andre Andrade, although what was actually executed by them was a Power of Attorney. This Power of Attorney was used by the accused for executing a sale deed D

.... i in favour of his wife Vijaya Satardekar and Sadiq Sheikh in the --r year 1991, but the said sale deed was presented for registration only in the year ~001. It is alleged that the complainant came to know only in August 2001 for the first time about the execution of the sale deed in 1991. Thus it is alleged that the property E of the complainant was purported to have been sold away by Ranjit Satardekar, advocate by deceit and misrepresentation for which he deserved to be punished under Sections 409, 420 and other provisions of the IPC.

~' F

6. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the police investi- ---.;

gated the case and filed a chargesheet against both Ranjit Satardekar and Smt.Vijaya Satardekar as well as two others.

Thereafter, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the chargesheet and process was issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji under Sections 468/471/420/120-B G

./,.--\ read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code .

7. Against the order taking cognizance and issuing process against the accused, they filed a Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge, Panaji, which was dismissed by his judg- H

A ment dated 19.6.2007. Against that order a writ petition was

t~ _.

filed which was allowed by the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 3.8.2007. Hence this appeal.

8. We .have heard detailed arguments on both sides and we are of the opinion that judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained so far as it has quashed the complaint and proceed- '-~--'"' ings against Ranjit Satardekar, but it has to be sustained so far

as it relates to Vijaya Satardekar.

c .

9. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the ap- \ pellant has submitted that in the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge of the High Court largely relied on the evidence

\ >- ....._ proceedings in Civil Suit (No.97 of 2004, New No.101 of 2004).

The complainant was the plaintiff No.1 in the said Civil Suit which

D has been decreed on 30.12.2006. Shri Rohatgi has submitted that the High Court should not have relied on the evidence in the Iaforesaid Civil Suit for the purpose of quashing the criminal case. y On the other hand Shri U. U. Lant, learned senior counsel for the respondent has submitted that the said evidence could have

E been relied upon on the facts of this case for quashing the criminal proceedings.

10. Before dealing with these submissions we may point out that while there were certain rulings of two-Judge Benches of this Court, which had held that the findings in a Civil Suit are

F binding in a criminal case on the same facts but not vice versa, this view appears to have been watered down somewhat in the ': subsequent decisions of the larger Benches of this Court e.g. the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr.

G 2005(4) SCC 370 (vide para 32) [JT 2005(3)SC 195] as well

as the decision of the three-Judge Bench in K. G Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. 2002(8) SCC 87 (vide para 30

1"--A... to 33).

11. The \aw as to when criminal proceedings can be

H quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 279

& ORS. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.] - ,. \ 482 Cr. P. C or Article 226 of the Constitution has been laid down A by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 (vide para 102 and 103) [JT 1990(4) SC 650]. This decision has been followed subsequently by a series of decisions e.g. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. vs.

Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1998(5) SCC 749 [JT B 1997 (8) SC 705], Minu Kumari and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. 2006(4) SCC 359 [JT 2006(4) SC 569], etc.

12. Shri Rohatgi submitted that on a perusal of the FIR in this case it cannot be said that treating the allegations therein to be correct no prima facie offence is made out against Ranjit c Satardekar. We have carefully perused the FIR and we agree with the submission of Shri Rohatgi. The allegations .in the FIR

if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against the respondent, Ranjit Sataredkar. Shri Lalit, learned counsel for Ranjit Satardekar, however, submitted that in Bhajan Lat's D ... case (supra) itself the seventh ground given therein in para 102

~. of the said decision applies to the facts of this case. The seventh ground which entitles the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings is stated in Bhanjan Lat's case (supra) as follows:

"Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with E

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge."

F '

13. Shri Lalit submitted that the proceedings against Ranjit -;

Satardekar were mala fide as is evident from the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit where he has stated that he has received some money from Ranjit Satardekar. According to Shri Lalit this proves that the sale deed of 1991 was in G the knowledge of the complainant throughout.

,, J.

14. We have perused the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit and we have also perused the judgment in the Civil Suit, against which we are informed an appeal is pending.

The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and H

i . ~-4, A some contradictory statements appear to have been be given 1 by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these cir- B cumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior motive.

15. It may be mentioned that the pleas which the respondent Ranjit Satardekar took before the High Court could be taken C by him at the time of thetrial, and it would not be proper to preempt the criminal proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations have been made against him in the FIR The relation of a lawyer and his client is like a fiduciary relationship; and the lawyer has to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the D FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her husband in the manner aforesaid. These are matters which the trial court in the criminal case should look into, and we are not expressing any opinion either way on this question. However,

w~ are of the opinion that this was not a fit case for quashing of E the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Constitution.

16. Shri Mukul Rohatgi submitted that at the time of the framing of the charges only the material protjuced by the pros- F ecution side can be looked into by the Court but the material produced by the defence cannot be looked into. He has placed reliance on several decisions of this Court in this connection e.g. State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi 2005(1) SCC

568.

17. We have carefully perused the decision of this Court in the State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). Though the observations in paragraph 16 of the said decision seems to support the view canvassed by by Shri Rohatgi, it may be also pointed ourthat in 'paragraph 29 of the same decision it

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 281

& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.] ;.. ·--y

has been observed that the width of the powers of the High Court A under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal's case B

- .. -l (supra). Thus we have to reconcile paragraphs 16 and 23 of the decision in State of"Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra).

We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judgment of the Court has not to be treated as a Euclid formula vide Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa c & Anr. JT 2008(8) SC 621. As observed by this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N. R. Vairamani & Anr AIR 2004 SC 4778, observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's formula nor as provisions of the statute. Thus in our opinion while it is true that ordinarily defence material D

~. cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge ~

in view of D.N. Padhi's case (supra), there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trjal court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in E such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance.

.!.. . 18. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an abso- F ! --; lute proposition that under no circumstances can the Court look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases, i.e. where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally G

_.;.... absurd or totally concocted. We agree with Shri Lal it that in some very rare cases the Court is justified in looking into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, if such material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.

19. However, in this case it cannot be said that the. eviy--"

dence in the Civil Suit which was produced by the defence before the trial court established convincingly that the prosecution case is totally absurd or preposterous. In our opinion this is a matter which has to be looked into by the trial Court.

20. In Dr. Monica Kumar & Anr. vs. State of UP & Ors. 2008(9) Scale 166 this Court referred to various decisions on the point of quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused. In this decision this Court quashed the criminal proceed- C ings against the accused, though on the allegations in the F.l.R.

prima facie an offence was made out. Thus quashing of the criminal case was done considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt, in this decision the Court has relied on Article 142 of the Constitution, but in our opinion the

0 result would have been the same irrespective of Article 142. ·

21. Thus we allow the criminal appeal in which Ranjit Satardekar is the respondent and we set aside the judgment of the High Court in respect of Ranjit Sataredkar and direct.that the criminal proceedings against him yvill go on in the trial Court ..

E However, the trial Court will not be influenced by any observations made in this judgment.

22. As regards the other criminal appeal in which Smt.

Vijaya Satardekar, wife of Ranjit Satardekar, is the respondent, F we are of the opinion that there is no material whatsoever either mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar.

The only allegation against her is that the sale deed was in her G favour. In our opinion this does not prima facie make out any offence. In our opinion, therefore; the criminal proceeding against Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court and the criminal appeal in which Vijaya Satardekar is respondent is dismissed.

H 23: There shall be no order as to costs.

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR

& ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] 283

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. I have carefully gone through the A draft judgment prepared by my learned Brother and though I agree with his interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C." and wish to express my own views in the matter. Section 227 Cr.P.C., which is in Chapter XVIII of the Code, which B deals with trials before a Court of Sessions, relates to the opening stages of a trial at the time of framing of charge against the accused which is done under Section 228. Section 227 which is relevant for our purpose provides as follows:

 "227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of C the case and the documents submitted therewith, and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." D

2. The aforesaid provision has fallen for consideration of this Court in several cases on the question as to whether at the stage of framing of charge, the Court in seisin session of the matter is required to consider any material, other than that ind.icated in the Section.

3. In the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State ofOrissa vs Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1SCC568], to which my learned Brother has also referred, it has been mentioned as \ to how the matter came to be referred to the larger Bench. Till F

:1 1996, the consistent view which had been taken by this Court is that at the time of framing of charge the trial court can consider only such material as are placed by the investigating agency having regard to the very language of Section 227. At that stage, the defence could only be heard but could not be given an op- G portunity to produce evidence for the consideration of the Court.

-""' ..J However, a different view was expressed by a two-Judge Bench

ofthis Court in Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration {(1996) 9

SCC 766. The learned Judges observed that if the accused were able to produce any reliable material at the stage of tak- H

A ing cognizance or framing of charge which might fatally affect

the very su$tainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material should be looked into by the Court at that stage. It was, therefore, held that the trial court would be within its power to consider even material which the accused may produce at

B the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code. It was be-

~ cause of a discordant note being struck to an otherwise estab- l lished principle in the Satish Mehra case (supra) that in r Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) an order was passed rer- ferring the said question to a larger Bench and the same was

.,-

c taken up for consideration in the said case itself by a three- Judge Bench.

4. While referring to Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. relating to Sessions triable cases, the three-Judge Bench also con- • sidered the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. relat- ,'-

D ing to trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, which are almost t

identical to Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. The decision ren- G dered in Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) makes it very clear that the dominant issue being dealt with in the case was with regard to the right enjoyed by an accused to produce evi- ! ..

E dence for the consideration of the Court at the stage of framing of charge.

5. Interpreting the expression "the record of the case" and the word "case" used in Section 227 of the Code, the learned Judges held that the said expressions clearly meant the records

' .~ F and the documents or articles produced with it, as indicated in -y- Section 227 Cr.P.C. It was observed that no provision in the t

Code gives the accused the right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The right is only granted at the stage of the trial.

6. The learned Judge then went on to examine the earlier ..__,.....,.,_ cases where the common view taken was that at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code all that the Court is required to see is whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the

H accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. The

) --i

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 285 & ORS. [Al TAMAS KABIR, J.]

learned Judge while considering the other decision also referred A to the decision of this Court in State Anti-Corruption Bureau vs.

P. Suryaprakasan {(1999) SCC(Cri)373], wherein it was explained that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is required to and can only consider the Police report referred to in Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. It B was emphasised that the only right available to the accused at that stage was that of being heard and nothing beyond that.

7. In order to identify the parameters of the questions referred to it, the larger Bench observed that in the case before it the question involved was not about the jurisdiction under Sec- C tion 482 of the Code where along with the petition the accused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis seek quashing, but it is about the right' claimed by the accused to produce material at the stage of framing charge.

The larger Bench was, therefore, fully conscious of the limits D within which it was required to confine its views and the judgment was rendered in that context. The same will be evident from the opening paragraph of the judgment. While deciding the questions referred to it, the larger Bench made a conscious distinction between a proceeding under Section 227 Cr.P.C.

E before the trial court and a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and made a reference to the Court's power to consider material other than those produced by the prosecution in a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is in that context that while holding that the decision rendered in Satish Mehra's case (supra) F was erroneous, the larger Bench held that if the submission that the accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of his innocence at the stage of framing of charge, was to be accepted, it would be unsettling a law well settled over a hundred years. It is in that light that the provisions of Sec- G tion 227 Cr.P.C. would have to be understood and that it only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the records of the case filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The larger Bench arrived ata definite conclusion that the expression "hearing the submissions of H

A the accused" cannot men an opportunity to file material to be (---

granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.

8. The larger Bench did not leave any scope for a different interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 as is now being made. Incidentally, the very same arguments which have been advanced by Mr. Lalit before us on behalf of the accused, were also advanced by learned counsel before the larger Bench and c the same were negated as far as Section 227 Cr.P.C. is concerned. However, in paragraphs 21 and 29 of the judgment the larger Bench did indicate that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interest of justice D the High Court could make such order as may be required to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process (_,'.:, of any court.

9. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused

E to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such material as are indicated in Section 227 Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration by the learned magistrate at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

F the Court is free to consider material that may be produced on ,... behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge \ l- \ t as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be ' the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228

r .. the way in Which they have been worded and as explained in Debendra Nath Padhrs case (supra) by the larger Bench to 'l

G which the very same question had been referred.

10. However, as indicated by my learned Brother, the com- "'-""' plaint made does make out a prima facie case against accused Ranjit Satardekar and the cognizance taken by the learned

H magistrate cannot be faulted and the appeal as far as he is

RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 287 & ORS. [Al TAMAS KABIR, J.)

concerned, must be allowed. However, even prima facie, none A of the offences referred to in the charge-sheet can be made out against accused Vijaya Satardekar and she has been roped in only with the aid of Section 1208 which is also not substantiated. The appeal as far as she is concerned, must be dismissed.

11. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

D.G.

Appeals disposed of.