[2008] 12 S.C.R. 765 -

-..

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR.

A v.

STATE OF HARYANA (Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 2001)

AUGUST 26, 2008 8

[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM _d.

SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302, 201 and 498-A - Death of a woman within 7 years of marriage and also of her infant c daughter - Circumstantial evidence - Extra-judicial confessions of accused (husband and father-in-law) that they had done the deceased to death suspecting her fidelity - Complaint by father of the deceased that it was a dowry death

- Deceased last seen together with the accused - Prosecution D of husband u/ss. 302, 201 and 498A - Prosecution of father- ... in-Jaw and other relatives u/s 498-A - Courts below convicting I'

the husband and father-in ... Jaw and acquitting other relatives - On appeal; held: Conviction justified - Extra-judicial confession can be accepted and form the basis for conviction E if passes the test of credibility - Sentence of father-in-law reduced to the period already undergone in view of his age - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 30.

Criminal Trial - Extra-judicial Confession - Reliance on

- Held: Can be relied on if voluntary, true and made in fit state F of mind - Voluntariness thereof to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case - Evidence Act, .1872 - s. 24.

 Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Reliance on - Held: Conviction can be based on such evidence - Condition precedent for reliance before conviction, discussed.

1' ~) Appellant-accused (husband) was prosecuted u/s 302, 201 and 498-A IPC and appellan!-accused (father-in- Law) was prosecuted u/s 498-A IPC. According to

765 H

.. ··?6.6 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS


A prosecution appellant-husband was married to the ..f' .. deceased No. 1. A daughter (deceased No. 2) was born out of the wedlock. PW 3 (father of deceased No. 1) filed private complaint against seven accused including the appellant-husband and appellant (father-in-law), alleging B that the dispute which led to the death of the deceased was demand of dowry. The police presented challan i against the appellants-accused placing reliance on -the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant- (fatherin-law) to PWs. 5, s that they had done the deceased to I c death, because of infidelity of deceased No. 1. Appellant 'o- (father-in-law) made confession before PW-10 that his son

(appellant-husband) had done the deceased to death. The . ~- challans of the complainant as well as the police wre . amalgamated and all the seven accused were tried. Trial rcourt fo_und the appEfllant•husband guilty of offences _'U/s ' D 302, 201 and 498-A. Appellant (father-inlaw) was convicted

u/s 498-A. The rest of the accused were acquitted. High .. '\ Court confirmed the conviction relying on extra-judicial. " confession. Hence the present appear.

E Partly allowing the. app.eal; the Court i ~

HELD: 1. The conviction recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court doe~ not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, coosidering

F the age of Appellant (father-in law), his sentence is reduced to the period already undergon~ which is nearty one year. . [Para 19] [784-C".'D] \-

2.1 Where a case rests squarely .(.m circumstantla' evidence, the inference of guilt can. be justified only when

G all the incrimina!ing te1cts and ci_rcumstances .are found to be incompatible with the innoc; ence of the accused or the guilt of any other person .. There i~ no doubt -that -lconviction-can be based solely on circumstantial evidence

but it should be tested by the tcuch•stone of law relating

H -to circumstantial evidence. They are the circumstances

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 767

HARYANA

from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be A fully established. The circumstances c~:mcerned 'must' or

'should' and not 'may be' established; the facts so established should be consistent only with _the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused B ,( is guilty; the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature ........

and tendency; they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to Jeave any reasonable ground forthe conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and .. must show that in all human c.

probability the act must have been done by the accused. [Paras 5, 10 and 12] [776-C 778-D 779 C-F]

Hukam Singh v. Stateof Rajasthan AIR 1977 SC 1063;

1 Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SC 316; D Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka AIR 1983 SC 446; State

, j of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. Al~ 1985 SC 1224; Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1·987 SC 350; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. AIR 1989 SC 1890; Bhagat Ram

v. State of Punjilb AIR 1954 SC 621; C. Chenga Reddy and E Ors. v. State of A.P. 1996 (10) SCC 193; Padala Veera Reddy

v. State of A.P. and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 79; State of UP. v.

Ashok 'Kumar Sriva.stava 1992 Crl.LJ 1104; Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR

1952 SC 343; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v .. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622; State of Rajasthan v. Raja F

Ram-2003 (8) SCC 180; State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh and Anr. 2003 (11) SCC 261; Kusuma Ankama Rao v State of A.P. 2008 (10) SCR 89 - relied on.

t "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) by Sir G ~) Alfred Wills - referred to.

2.2 The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused ahd the deceased' were seen last alive and when the H

.,_, A deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the . crime becomes impossible. [Para 14] [780-A-13]

Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of A.P. 2006

(10) SCC 172; Jaswant Gir V. State of Punjab 2005(12) SCC 438; Kusuma AnkamaRao v State of A.P. 2008 (10) SCR 89

)...

- relied on.

~-.:.

3.1 An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true

~ and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the c . court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. It is not open tO any court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It. would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made

D and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. , A,, fter subjecting the evidence of the witness. t to a rigorous test on-the touchstone of credibility, the, i extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility: [Para 18] [783·0-F, H] E 3.2 As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise: (i) were. they made voluntarily? and (ii) are they true? A confession wpuld be voluntarv if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by F any inducement, threat or promise which has reference " to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be involuntary, if the inducement,

(a) does not' have reference to the chrge. against the accused person; or (b) it does not proceed from a person

G in authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opiniQn of the

curt to give the ciccused person grounds which would ~~ appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by making.

.... 1--

it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedin~ against

H him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would

,..

~·· . j

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF

HARYANA

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, A judged in the light of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

(Para 17] [781-8, D, E & F]

3.3 A confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary 8 and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible in evidence. [Para 17] [781-G & H; 782-A] C

3.4 'every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since the object of the rule is to exclude only tho.se confessions which are testimonially untrustw'orthy, the inducement, threat or promise must 0 be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession.

The absence or presence of an inducement, promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in wf:lat measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him E reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude

th~ confession. The words "appear to him" in the last part of the section refer to the !llentality of the accused.[Para 17] [783-A, B & CJ F

3.5 So far as the extra judicial confession of Appellantaccused (father-in-law) before PWs 5 and 6 is concerned that actually is not of much relevance in view of Section 30 of Evidence Act. He was not t_ried for an offence under G Section 302 IPC. Therefore, his confession if any is of no consequence. But the extra judicia.1 confession before PW- 10 which ha$ been relied upon by both the trial Court and the High Court cannot be lost sight of. [Para 18] [784-A-B]

R. v. Warickshal (1783) 1 Leach 263 - referred to.

~ A Woodroffe's Evidence, 9th Edn., p. 284 - referred to ..

Case Law Refrence

AIR 1977 SC 1063 Relied on.

Paras

AIR 1956 SC 316 Reliett on.

Para 5 B

AIR 1983 SC 446 Relied on.

Para 5 ~

AIR 1985 SC 1224 Relied on.

Para 5

AIR 1987 SC 350 Relied o.n.

Para 5.

AIR 1989 SC 1890 Relied on.

Para_.~-;.

AIR 1954 SC 621 Relied on.

Para 5

1996 "tO) sec 193 Relied on.· Para 6

AIR 1990 SC 79 .

Relied o.n.

Para1

D 1992 Crl.LJ 1104 Relied .on.

Par~~- t

AIR 1952 SC 343 Relied on.· Para 11

AIR 1984 SC 1622 Relied .on~

_, Pafa 1·2

'1(

. ";' .. . 2003 -(8) sec 180 Relied on •. Para 13

E 2003 (11) sec 2s1 Relied on.

Para 13

2008 (10) SCR 89 .

Relied on.: Para13

2005 (3) sec 114 Relied on Para-14

2oos (10) sc~~112- Relied on.

Para 15 F 2005(12) sec~ 438 Relied on. ·-Para'.16

_ (1783) 1 Leach 263 Referred to ...

Para 17 . ....

CRIMINALAPPELLATE JU.RISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 2001 G From the final Judgment and O~er dated 5.09.2000 o~

.)-

'~· the High .Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh .in Criminal Appeal No. ~99 DB of 1997

Sus.hi! Kumar, Ajai Bhalla, Shefali Jain, Abhinav Jain and H Abha R. Sharma for the AppellaRts.

' -CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 771

HARYANA

Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem' and' T.V. George for the A _Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1.Chailenge in this appeal is.to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana B.

High Court upholding the conviction of appellant No.1 chattar Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'A-1 ') for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was also convicted for offence punishable un.der Section 201 and Section 498A IPC. Different sentences were imposed for the c said offences. Appellant-Mange Ram (hereinafter referred to as 'A-2') was convicted for offnce punishable under Section 498A IPC and was sentenced to undergo RI for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. The conviction recorded by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, was confirmed by Division 0 Bench of the High Court as also the sentences for botti the • appellants. · ·

2. Background facts giving rise to the prosecution are as follows:

A young girl, namely, Guddi (hereinafter referred to as the E 'deceased') aged about 26 years, belonged to village Nimly in district Bhiwani in Haryana. Her marriage was performed with Chattar Singh, A-1, son of Mange Ram, A-2 of village Sahlawas, in district Rohtak, in the year 1990. Both the families are agriculturists. A daughter, namely, Poonam (decesd no.2) F was born from this wedlock. ·

Dead bodies of Guddi and that of the infant daughter.

Poonam in the posture that the latter was in the armpit of Guddi were found in a well of village Sahalwas on the morning of G tJ,

~- .\ 17.2.1993. Jeet Singh, father of the deceased mad_e an application Ex.PO on 16.2.1993, a day earlier that his daughter was missing, before SI Ashok Kumar, PW-12, the then Station

House Officer, Pplice Station, Sahlawas and on its basis formal FIR Ex.PN was recorded. On 17.2.1993 he inspected the spot H

772 SUPREME COURT Re:PORTS


A and prepared rot.Jgh site plan Ex.PCQ. He got the dead bodies of th~ deceased photographed by Va rin.'der Singh, Photographer, PW.14. Ex.PJJ/I to 8 are th~ photographs and Ex.PJJ/9 to 14 and Ex.PZ/7 and 8 are their negatives. ile Singh, PW.9, also took photographs ExPZ/7 to 12 ?ind the B negatives.are Ex.PZ/1 to 6. The Investigating Officer prepared inquest reports Ex.PB and PD. He also prepared tough ite plan of the place of recovery of dead odies Ex.POD. _The dead bodies were taken out from the well arid were despatched for post mortm. On 28.2.1993, Chattar Singh and Mage Ram 0 accused wre produced by Babu Lal, Sarpanch of the yillag~

before the Investigating officer who were arrested. On interrogafjon by the Investigating Officer on 1 ~3.1993,· Chattar Singh accused made a disclosure statement Ex.PFF and in pursuance thereof got rcovered Chuni ·(Sc;:arf) from the

0 specified place which were taen into possession vide m~_mo

Ex.PFF/1. He also prepared rough site plan Ex.Pf.F/2 of ttie place of recovery. However, the statement made by Jeet Singh, PW.3, the father of the deceased Gontained the allegation$ that Ch attar Singh (husband) and Mange Ram (fatherin-law) of the deceased as well as Rajesh and Vijay Singh along with their f; wives Simla and Bala respectively who were maltreating his daughter were.demanding Rs.50,000/- as a part of dowry and only qn fulfilment of that condition the daughter could remain in peace.· He allegedly borrowed a sum of Rs.50,000/~ from' one Sadan Singh, PW.8, and paid the amount to the. accused F persons. He also claimed that he.gave various other amounts, valuables and rticles on vrious occasions and it was, therefore, ·. that since 'this a.mount was given at least 25 days earlier tothe occ1, Jrrence, after the birth of the child when Guddi had stayed only for a short period prior to the occurrence at the place of her G 'in-laws. So, there was one version of the complinant, father of . the deceased, that the dispute which led fo the death of the

dceased was the demand of dowry. However, during further investigation of the case, it. transpired that extra judicial confession ws allegedly made by Chattar Singh and Mange H. Ram accused that they were suspecting illicit relation of the

; K

J ..

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 773

HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J

deceased Guddi with some person and that she had conceived A a child from that person and the child was delivered at her parents' place. Therefore, on account of that stigma being cast on the family of the accused, they did notthin.k that it was befitting their prestige that Guddi should be allowed to stay with them and they have done her and the infant child to death and asked B the Sarpanch Babu Lal to help them in the matter. A similar extra judicial confession was allegedly made before Dial Singh,

PW.5, Om Singh, PW.6 and Ms.Viney Bhardwaj, P.W.10, a Reader in the Department of History who was the Secretary of one Mahila Dakshita Samiti and the Samiti had approached c the accused persons in the village where Mange Ram made an extra judicial confession that his son Chattar Singh had done the deceased to death, because of infidelity of the deceased.

The post-mortem on the dead body of Guddi was performed by Or. Vijay Pal Khanagwal, PW.1, on 19.2.1993 at D 9.00A.M. and he found the following injuries on the dead body:

(1) There was a contusion present over the tip and alae of nose, 3 cm in diameter. On dissection the sub cutaneous and deeper structures showed acchymosed. ~

(2) There were multiple contusions present over both the lips and in an area of 3 to 4 ems around the lips.

Size varying from 1 x 0.5 to 2.5 x 1.5 cm. On dissection, the underlying tissues were ecchymosed.

(3) A contusion present over right side of face 1 cm from mid line, situated 2 cm above lower border of mendible measuring 3.2 cm placed transversely. On dissection, the deeper tissues showed ecchymosis.

In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in moderate stage of decomposition and that the cause of death was smothering.

On the same day at 11.00 AM. the aforesaid doctor H

A conducted-post mortem on the dead body of infant child Poonam and he found the following injuries on the dead body:

(1) There was a contusion over the nose along its tip and alae measuring 3 x 2 cm in size. On dissection the underlying tissues showed ecchymosis. .

 (2) There were multiple contusion present over the lips, chin and the area around It in an area of 4 x 5 ems size varying from 1 x 0.5 cm to,2x1 cm. On dissection the sub cutaneous and deeper structure were ecchymosed.

In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in moderate sta_geof decomposition and the cause of death was smothering.

Clothes of the deceased were sent to the Forensic Science

0 Laboratory and they were found to be stained with human blood as per report Ex.PQ/1.

Investigation was conducted by Inspector Sumer Singh Malik, PW.13 who recorded the statements of Raghbir Singh, Ramesh and. one more witness on 5.4.l993. As per order of E Shri R.S. Yadav, Additional Superintendent of Police, who supervised the investigation, he arrested Mange Ram, Chattar Singh and Bhalliyan, accused.On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed.

It is to be noted that Jeet Singh (PW-3), father of the F deceased had brought a private complaint in which he had named seven accused perspns. The police presented challan against two persons i.e. the present appellants and the names of rest of the accused persons were kept in column No. II.

However, the trial Court ordered challan of the complaint to be G amalgamatectand, therefore, all the seven persons were tried.

Butthe trial Court directed acquittal of five co-accused persons while finding the appellants guilty.

The trial Courtfound tht the prosecution case rested or('"·~··;.,,,, H circumstantial evidence. Two of the major circumstances were

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 775

HARYANA [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

..,. the alleged extra judicial confession and that the accused and A '"the 9eceased were last seen together. The trial Courtfound the prosecution version to be cogent and credible. It is to be noted that 14 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. The complainant was examined as PW-3. The present appellants pleaded-innocence though they admitted relationship B inter se with the deceased Guddi and the factum that she has delivered a child. Though a plea was taken that the deceased had accidentally fallen in the well or had committed suicide, the same was discarded. The trial Court primarily relied on the evidence of Dr. Vijay Pal Kangwal to rule out the death by drowning and that death had occurred earlier and dead bodies c

Were thrown in the well. According to him, death was caused by closing the nostrils and mouth of the deceasHd with hands or other means. Accordingly, the convictions were recorded and sentences were imposed.

3. The primary stand in appeal was that the circumstances

) do not present a complete chain. The High Court noted that the y trial Judge believed the evidence of extra judicial confession against appellant No.1 that he had smothered his wife and child and managed to throw the dead bodies in the well and E came to the conclusion that he alongwith father Mange Ram also maltreated and harassed the deceased with cruelty. The _ trial Judge had, therefore, rightly recorded conviction. It was also averred before the High Court that Guddi was missing from the house since morning of 16.2.1993 and on making F

_-{ report to that effect, her dead body alqngwith the dead body of child were found in the well. It was also submitted that it was not a case _of smothering and death was due to asphyxia as stated by PW-1, the doctor and the injury on the person of the deceased could be the result of the deceased having fallen in the well. The G version of the accused persons that the deceased left the house w, around 6.00 a.m. was also falsified by the fact that semi

- >

digested food was found in her intestine. It was also pleaded that one of. the witnesses to the alleged extra judicial confession supported the case of the defence and not the prosecution. The H

SUPREME COURTREPORTS

(2008] 12 S.C.R

A High Court noticed that the extra judicial confession before PW-10 was most relevant. She had no animus against anyone whatsoever. The evidence of PWs 5 and 6 was also believed so far as extra judicial confession is concerned. The High Court did not find any substance in the appeal and dismisse~ the B' same.

4. The stand taken before the High Court was re-iterated by !earned counsel for, the appellants and the State.

5. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that

0 where acase rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only wt1en all the incriminating facts and circi.Jhlstance$ are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accusedor the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State ofRajasthanAIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (Al R 1956 SC 316) ;· D Earabhadrappa v. Sfate'of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446);

State of UP V .Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Ba/winder Singh V. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The E' circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely c;:onnected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621 ), it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from F circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.

6. We may also. make a reference to a decision of this ..

G Court. in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P (1996) 10

SCC 193, Wherein ithas been observed thus:

. "In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled

law is'that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt .is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all

-1,.i

~ -~ ),

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 777

HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

the circumstances should be complete and there should A be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence .... ".

7. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P and Ors. (AIR 8

1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

"(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is c sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a .D

chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and nnne else; and

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain E conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." F

8. In State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 CrLLJ 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied or'l is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that G the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.

9. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' H

77a·-

SUPREME COURT REPORTS


A CircumstantiFtl Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following

rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial

evidenc~; ( 1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2)the burden of proof is always oh 1i' the party who asserts the' .existence o'f any fact, which infers

legal accountability; (3)' in all. cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced. which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference .Qfguilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible c with ft)e innocence of the accused and incapable ofexplariation, upon: any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted". - . . .

. 10 ... There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely D. on circumstantial evidence but itshould be tested by the touchstone of law relating to .circumstantial evidence laid down by · . the this Court as far back as in 1952.

11. In Hant.imant GovincJ Nargundkar and Ani. v. State of

"' Madhya Pradesh/ (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was obserVed E thus:

"It is well: to remember that in cases where the evidence is ofa circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and al, I. the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis 6f the guilt ofthe accused. Again, the circumstances shuld be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they shoLJld

be such as to exclude every hypothesisbut the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain' of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the .innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show

.fhat within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

..>

J _.

l:,.

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 779

. HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

12. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad A Birdhichand Sa rd a v. Sta, te of Maharashtra, (Al R 1984 SC 1622).

Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been

held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the 8 words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not c 'may be' established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other D hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and ·· E

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must F have been done by the accused.

13. These aspects were highlighted in State of Ra1asthan

v. Raja Ram (2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh and Anr. (2003 (11) SCC 261) and Kusuma Ankama Rao v State of A. P. (Criminal Appeal No.185/2005 disposed of .G on 7.7.2008)

14. So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is necessary to take note of two decisions of this court. In State of UP v. Satish [2005 (3) sec 114] it was noted as follows; H

A "22. The last seen theory comes into play where the timegap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the auth0r of the crime becomes

B impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused ·"+ when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the c deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs. 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW-2."

15. In Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of A.P. [2006 (1 O) sec 172] it was noted as follows: ' - ::_ "27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of :time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the E deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration".

F (See also Bodh Raj v. State of J&K (2002(8) SCC 45).)"

16. A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab [2005(12) SCC 438] and Kusuma Ankama Rao's case (supra).

17. Confessions may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which .. are made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or court.

H Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 781

HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

a party to or before a private individual which includes even a A judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Code') or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the

confession at a stage when Section 164 of the Code does not B apply. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise: (1) were they made voluntarily? and (ii) are they true? As the section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or c promise, ( 1) having reference to the charge against the accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing ,, that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil D of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against

-¥ him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise whrch has reference to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It E would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to the charge against the accused person; or (b) it does not proceed from a person in authority; or ( c) it is not sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing

~ that, by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any F evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short

~-J._), 'Evidence Act'). The law is clear that a confession cannot be G used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstancessurrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may H

' '

, I

., i

', '}.

A' refse to acl upon the confession, even if it is admissible in evidence. O, ne important question, in regard to which the court has to be satisfied With is, whether when the accused made the confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency B .mployed by them for the purpose of securing such a-confession. 1\f"he questiqn whether a confession .is voluntary or not is always a question of facLAll the factors and all the circumstances of

he-case, including the important factors of the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling of threat, c inducement or pro, mise, must be col"!sidered before deciding whether the co.urt ts ati.sfied that in its opinion the impression caused.by the inducement.threat orpromise, if any; has been fully.removed, Afree.and voluntary confession is deserving of ttie highest credit, beGause it Js presumed to' flow from the

0 highest .. sense of guilt. (See R. v. Warickshall) H is not to 'Qe . _conceived.that a man-would be induced to make a tree and . . . . . . voluntary confession o_f .guilt, so. contrary to 'the feelings and

r principle~ of h~11Jn nature, ifhe facts-coritessed were not true. ·

Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, . are among' the most effectual proofs in law. An involuntary

.. E. 'confesion is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. so where the statement is made as a result of \ harassmentand continuous interrogation for several hours after

th~ person , is treted as an offender and. accusd, such,.

.· statment;.must be regarded as .involuntary. Theinducement F ' may. take the form of a pomise or of a threat, and often the

inducemnt involves bot.h promise ar.id threat, a promise of forgiveness-if disclosur:~· is made and threat of prosecution if it is not. (See l(tloodroffe's.Evidence, 9th Ed_n., p. 284.)A promise is always attached, to the confession alternative while a threat G is always !:ittached to the si1ence alternative; thus, in one case

.. the prisoner. is measuring 'the net advantage of the promise,

minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against the.present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he .is measuring th_e net advantages of the present satisfactory H situation, minus the general undesirability of the confession

I... l' \.jj

_..,

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 783

HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT; J.]

against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that every A inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession.

Since the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or

"') promise must be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the court is to determine B

.) the absence or presence of an inducement, promise etc. or its

--iJ sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by c making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words "appear to him" in the last part of the section refer to the mentaltty of the accused. -

18. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The D ; r confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value

.; i;..- of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to wh9m it has been made. The ttalue of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not E open to any court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction F

-( can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession cqmes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the G -;/_;.

accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may milltate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, H

A the exra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

18. So far as the extra judicial confession of A-2 before PWs 5 and 6 is concerned that actually is not of much relevance in view of Section 30 of Evidence Act. The stress in the said 8 provision is on the joint trial for the same offence. In the instant case A-2 was not tried for Section 302 IPC. Therefore, his confession if any is of no consequence. But the extra judicial ,,..

confession before PW-10 which has been relied upon by both the trial Court and the High Court cannot be lost sight of.

19. In view of the evidence led, the inevitable conclusion is that the conviction recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, considering the age of A-2 the sentence

0 is reduced to the period already undergone which is nearly one year so far as A-2 is concerned. Except the modification of sentence so far as A-2 is concerned the appeal is dismissed.

The bail bonds executed so far as A-2 is concerned shall stand discharged. So far as A-1 is concerned he shall surrender to E custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.

K.K.T.

Appeal partly allowed.