RAMCHANDRA MURA RI LAL BHA TI AD AND ORS.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

DECEMBER 5, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.]

Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, I974

Bids invited by Authority for development of Convention and Exhibition C Centre-A II bids in response thereto, including the highest, rejected by Authority, project rendered and granted to highest bidder therein-Correctness of -Held-Only because there was change in computation of total price under new tender, it could not be said to be invalid in law-It was a case where the highest offer was not rejected, but a new policy decision was taken- D The Authority in law could alter its policy in regard to disposal of its properties-It exercised its power in canceling tenders to have a re-look at entire project-Entire policy decision could not be said to be vitiated in law merely because Authority at one point of time took a stand in Court that it had thought of setting up Convention Centre of their own without any private participation-Reasons for rejecting bids were not required to be given as it E was a ca,.se of decision involving policy change.

Section 7-Executive Committee-Power of approval or rejection of tenders for projects and schemes of Authority-Scope of-Held-Jurisdiction of Committee was lif1Jited-It could not (i) cancel entire tender (ii) change F entire scheme or policy (iii) make alterations in methodology of tender (iv) go into working of project (v) go into question as to whether project would be financially v_iable if method of calculation was changed (vi) exercise any special power.

Power of Authority-Scope of-Held-Authority was a statutory G authority, consisting of politicians and other responsible officers-While exercising its power under the Act, it must necessarily take policy decisions- Though its power was larger and different from that of Executive Committee, it could not usurp functions of latter.

Statutory authority-Power to deal with contractual matter-Scope of- H IM

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA TI AD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA } 07

~ Held-It is distinct and different from its power in determining rights and A liabilities of parties-Whereas reasons are required to be assigned in a case where civil or evil consequences may ensue, same may not be necessary where it is contractual in nature, save and except in some cases.

Judicial review-Policy decision-Held-It may be changed from time to time-Only because a change is effected, decision cannot be termed as B illegal or otherwise vitiated in law-It is more so where ex facie, policy decision was not contrary to any statute or against a public policy, or Court was not called upon to exercise its equity jurisdiction.

MMRDA is an authority created under the Mumbai Metropolitan C .

Region Development Authority Act, 1974. Section 7 therefore provided for constitution and powers of Executive Committee, inter alia, for approval or rejection of tenders for projects and schemes of the Authority. The Authority invited bids for development of a Convention and Exhibition Centre.

Appellant was one of the several entitles who put in their bids in response.

Their bid wasfound to be the highest. The Authority, however rejected all the D bids, rtendered and granted contract to the highest bidder therein. Appellant filed a writ petition before High Court questioning the right and power of the Authority to reject at any stage all or any of the bids without assigning any reason. In response, the Authority conteuded that (i) its decision was in pursuance of power conferred by the terms of the contract (ii) in view of E sections 12(1)(b)(d) and (h) and the power to issue directions under S.14 of the Act, it could, at any stage, review any decision including the decision of the executive committee and direct either rejection of all bids or issuance of fresh bids ( c) it had decided to set up the convention Centre on its own without any private participation. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition holding that (i) under various provisions of the Act, the authority was entitled to F acquire, hold and dispose of the property, so it could not be said that its power in such matters did not include the power to reject a bid invited for projects and schemes framed by it (ii) the Executive Committee was not sole judge in matters of approval or rejection of tenders for projects and schemes of the authorities. Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed the present appeal.

Appellant contended that (i) the purported major shift in the policy by the Authority was impermissible in law (ii) the Executive Committee alone was the sole judge in relation to rejection of bids (iii) in rejecting their bid, as sufficient and valid reasons were not assigned, the impugned order was vitiated in law (iv) in accepting the bid of the highest bidder in rtender, their H

A offer to pay@ 21120/o per year from the annual turnover from the 21st year was not considered.

Successful bidder in re-tender, subsequently added as respondent, contended that (i) the Executive Committee could not have taken a decision in regard to the change of policy (ii) in re-tender, appellant did not take B part (iii) procedural lapses, if any, cannot be a ground for judicial review.

The Authority contended that (i) judicial review is not maintainable as appellant has not disclosed infringement of any constitutional or statutory right (ii) it was entitled to reject the tender on appreciation of C professional competence and capacity of appellant to run the centre •

profitably, as well as the fact that prices offered by them were competitively low, and (iii) the policy being in relation to a mega project and its judgment being objective, no interference by Court was called for.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD I.I. The Executive Committee is a statutory functionary. The powers and functions of the authority and the respective committees are governed by the provisions of the statute, but, then the jurisdiction of the Executive Committee is limited. It is confined to rejection or acceptance of the tender. The Authority exercise a larger power. For the said purpose one E would assume that the Authority had no incidental or a1_1cillary power, but there cannot be any doubt or dispute that the Executive Committee could not cancel the entire tender. It could not have caused any change in the entire scheme or policy. It could not make alterations in the methodology of tender.

It could not have gone into the working of the project It also could not have F gone into the question as to whether the project would be financially viable if the method of calculation is changed. 1123-F, G, HJ

Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, 11989] 3 SCC 132, referred to.

G 1.2. Further assumption has to be made that the power of the

Executive Committee and the Authority under the Act are diffrent and the latter for all intent and purport could not usurp the functions of the former.

But in this case, it has not been so done. 1124-BJ

t.3. Executive Committee does not exercise any special power.1125-GI

' ' I

RAMCHANDRA MURAR!LAL BHATT AD v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA 109

Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 A SCC 111, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & Ors., 11964) 4 SCR 485, held inapplicable.

Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426, 431, referred to.

1.4. The action on the part of the Authority was neither illigal nor without B jurisdiction. (124-CI

JK. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1961) 3 SCR 185, distinguished.

1.5. The Authority has not exercised any power forbidden by law. C The Authority has also not exercised its power in the manner which is not in accordance with law. (126-D)

2.1. The Authority is a statutory authority. It consists of not only politicians but also various other responsible officers. It, while exercising its power under the Act, must necessarily take policy decisions. (127-G) D

2.2. Where as under the 2002 tender the bidder had to quote the rate of premium in terms of rupees per square meter of FSI and the total premium separately for C&EC and the Real Estate component subject to the condition that the rate quoted for the Real Estate component should E be greater than that quoted for the C&EC, upon having come to know that the value of the land would be much more, the Authority in the 2005 tender decided that the bidders should be required to quote a fixed rate of 20,000 per sq.m. of built-up area for total built-up area 65,000 sq.m. for Convention & Exhibition Centre. Economic viability of the entire project component, taking into consideration two different compoenents for F C&EC and the Commearcial Complex, could have been taken differently. The premium amount was to be quoted higher than Rs. 350 crores for the Commercial Complex. (127-G, H; 128-A, B)

2.3. It cannot be said that only because a change has been effected in computation of total price under the new tender, the same was invalid G in law. (131-F)

3.1. The highest offer has not been rejected. A new policy decision has been taken. Question is not as to whether the offer of the appellants should

have been rejected but is as to whether the Authority in law could H

A have altered its policy in regard to disposal of its properties. (129-EJ

Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors., (199114 SCC 54, referred to.

3.2. The Executive Committee in rejecting the tender has not B exercised its power to reject bid. The power has been exercised by the Authority in cancelling the tenders so as to enable it to have a re-look of the entire project. (130-FI

Star Enterprises & Ors. v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990] 3 SCC 280, distinguished.

Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. D.C./. T. & Ors., (20061 11 SCALE 409, CommissiQner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhardas Bhanji, (19521 1 SCR 135 and Union of India & Ors. v. Dinesh Enginering Corporation & Anr. etc., 1200118sec491, referred to.

D 3.3. It may be true that the Authorities at one point of time, as was

disclosed in the Counter Affidavit, had thoght of setting up a Convention Centre of their own and without any private participation, but only because.there has been a deviation from the said stand would not render the entire policy decision vitiated in law. (131-A, Bl

4. t. A power to deal with a contractual matter and a power of a statutory authority to exercise its statutory power in determining the rights and liabilities of the perties are distinct and different. Whereas reasons are required to be assigned in a case where civil or evil consequenses may ensue, the same may not be necessary where it is contractual in nature, F save and except in some cases. (130-B, CJ

4.2. Some reasons may be required to be assigned for rejecting the bid, but in the instant case, no reason was required to be assigned as there has been a change in the policy decision. (130-GI

G 5.1. While exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review, the Court is required to decide the cases before it, keeping the well known principles therefor in mind and having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein.

No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. 1128-BI

Noble Resources Ltd v. State of Orissa and Anr., (200619 SCALE 181, H relied on.

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA TIAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 111

Star Enterprises & Ors. v. City and Industrial Development Corporation A of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 280, held inapplicable.

5.2. It is not a case where the Court is called upon to exercise its equity jurisdiction. It is also not a case where ex facie the policy decision can be held to be contrary to any statute or against a public policy. A policy decision may be subjected to change from time to time. Only because a B change is effected, the same by itself does not render a policy decision to be illegal or otherwise vitiated in law. (131-DJ

Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 247, distinguised.

New Horizons Ltd & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., {1995J 1SCC478, and Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and Ors.,(1985) 3 SCC 267, referred to.

6.1. Appellant stated before the Court that he is ready and willing to take a part of the contract, viz., construction of the C&EC and pay the same D amount as has been done by Reliance Industries Ltd. and in addition it would pay 2.5% of its annual turnover from the Convention Centre from the 21st year, as was initially offered. [132-C)

6.2. Appellant did not participate in the second bid. The tender E process is complete. Before the Court only a higher bid has been given.

Appellants could have submitted its bids pursuant to the new tender and new conditions, even without prejudice to its rights and contentions in this appeal. The stipulations made in 2002 tender could have been repeated by it so as to demonstrate before the experts comprising members of the Executive Committee that its bid was the highest. If, in view of the change F in the policy decision, the Authority does not intend to become a partner in the profit making and opt for having the entire bid amount at one go instead of waiting for 20 years, it cannot be faulted. (132-D, E, F)

6.3. It, however would not mean that the Authority or the Executive Committee would not be entitled to take note of the offer of Appellant. It G may do so. It would not further mean that if the terms of new tender are violative of the provisions of the master plan, the same would not besuitably dealt with. (134-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5610 of2006.

A From the final Judgment and Order dated 20.1.2004 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. No. 2942/2003.

R.F. Nariman, Dr. AM. Singhvi, P.N. Gupta, H. Devarajan and N.V.

Vimadalal for the Appellants.

B Shekhar Naphade, Harish N. Salve, Milind Sathe, A.S. Bhasme, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Atul S. Dayal, K.R. Sasiprabhu,_ Ashwin Dave, Meenakshi Grover and Chandarchud for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (for short, 'the Authority') was created under the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 ('the Act'). It conceptualized the idea of establishing a Convention and Exhibition Centre_ ('C&EC'). Pursuant thereto D and in furtherance thereof it called for "Expression of Interest for development of C&EC" in Sandra Kurla Complex. An advertisement was issued inviting 'Expression of Interest for development of C&EC. Appellant No. I, pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Mis. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (L&T) for setting up E such a complex.

It also conducted conference of investors therefor.

It submitted its tender on 7.4.2003, highlighting :

(a) Entire ground of75,000 sq.m. would be required for international standard C&EC.

(b) They have formed a consortium for bidding for the said project F and giving the names of the members of the consortium as including L&T and IMAG (Germany).

(c) Letters of acceptance from L&T was also annexed to show its participation.

( d) The Authority was offered equity participation to the extent of 5% of the total equity base.

Several other companies also submitted their tenders.

The tenders were to be considered at three stages and thus, three different covers were to be submitted along with tenders. The first cover contained

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA IT AD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 113

compliance with minimum eligibility criteria, the second cover contained A financial bid and the third one contained technical and business proposals.

The technical bid was opened on 7.5.2003. The financial bid was thereafter opened which was contained in second cover, on 8.5.2003. Appellant was the highest bidder having offered 91.514 crores. Mis. Reliance Capitals Ltd. was said to be the lowest bidder therein. The offer of the bidders thereof are as under :

Mis. Shapurji Pallonji & Co. Ltd.

Rs.50.005 Crores.

Mis. Reliance Capitals Ltd.

Mis: R.M. Bhuther & Co. Ltd. and its Associate companies in consor-

Rs.13.032 Crores.

tium with L&T Ltd.

Rs. 91.514 Crores.

3rd Cover thereof was opened thereafter and the Authority, on 26.6.2003 informed Appellants that it had decided to arrange a presentation on the business proposal by them on 3.7.2003.

Pursuant thereto they made a presentation on 4.7.2003.

Appellants, by a letter dated 29.8.2003, informed the Authority that :

(a) reputed concerns like L&T and IMAG were associated in the project.

(b) A presentation was made on 4th July, 2003, a copy whereof was

enclosed.

(c) Thereafter it did not receive any query from the Authority.

( d) List of business partners shown with details of Convention projects

of L&T and business of IMAG.

(e) Role of IMAG was also set out.

The Authority, however, took a decisio.n to reject all the bids on 1.9.2003, which was said to have been communicated to Appellants by a fax message on 22. 10.2003.

Allegedly, the news item appeared in the 'Economic Times' on 2.10.2003, wherein, inter alia, it was reported that :

(a) The Authority is close to finalizing the much talked about Convention centre in Bandra Kurla Complex.

(b) An official of the Authority had stated that they were trying to get private participation and three bidders had been finalized and in a few days the plans for the Centre would be finalized in an area of 5.5 hectares.

Appellant issued a letter to the Chairman of the Authority, in terms B whereof he was, inter alia, informed that the project would start getting yield only after 12 years from the date of commencement thereof. It was furthermore _,,/informed that its consortium members included L&T and IMAG. (/

It was contended :

(i) The company has offered highest bid price for the land at BKC for a reserved plot for C&EC since the company is interested in bringing up an international standard Exhibition Centre, a long over-due infrastructure asset for a city like Mumbai inspite of reserved plot (restricted utility) area with high gestation period and longest break even which is almost about 7 years. In all, the project starts getting yield only after 12 year5 from date of commencement of construction.

(ii) It has also been the contention of the company to relocate the asset base of the company on account of core competency of the company in the field for more than 50 years and intending to continue to command on industry.

(iii) As per the press release for a commercial block bidding invited by the Authority, it was awarded at Rs. 25,000/- per square metre in spite of having a total flexibility to exploit the commercial aspect visa-vis an offer given by the company for the reserved plot for convention centre at the rate of Rs.14,642/- per square metre.

(iv) Company also expressed that the projects of such type are always being given land at very concessional rate. Statistics indicates that world over such exhibition centres are either funded by way of concessional land price or absolute government contribution by way of land to make the project to early break even.

The expertise of L&T and IMAG in setting up Exhibition Centres was again highlighted by a letter dated 20.10.2002, therein it was alleged:

(a) The Authority had informed in the presence of other bidders that

RAMCHANDRA MURARilAL BHA IT ADv. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.J 115

the consortium led by the appellants were the successful bidders.

(b) Sorrie committee members informed that the matter had not been decided on 1.9.2003 and the matter was deferred till the next meeting to be held on 27.10.2003.

(c) The detailed history was set out including the fact that Reliance B Capital had quoted Rs.13.032 crores against Rs.91.514 crores quoted by Appellants.

(d) L&T and IMAG were the consortium members and the decision would have an international impact.

A writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court by Appellants, C inter a/ia, questioning :

(a) the validity of clause 2.4 of the Request for Proposal in which the Authority reserved the right to reject at any stage all or any of the bids without assigning any reason.

(b) the power of the Authority to cancel or reject the bids.

(c) the cancellation of the bid by the decision purported to have been made on 1.9.2003.

The contentions of Respondents before the High Court were : E

(a) the decision to reject all bids is in pursuance of the power was conferred by the terms of the contract.

(b) the authorities acted reasonably and fairly and have now reached a decision to set up the convention centre on their own without any F private participation.

(c) By virtue of section 12(l)(b)(d) and (h) and the power to issue directions under S.14 of the Act, it could, at any stage, review any decision including the decision of the executive committee and direct either rejection of all bids or issuance of fresh bids.

The writ petition filed by Appellants was dismissed by the High Court holding:

A. The Executive Committee is not the sole judge in matters of approval or rejection of tenders for projects and schemes of the H

A authorities.

B. In view of sections 12, 13, 14 and other provisions of the Chapter, the power of the Authority cannot be whittled down or restricted.

C. It being the authority entitled to acquire, hold and dispose of the property it cannot be said that its power in such mattes will not include the power to reject a tender or bid which is invited for projects and schemes framed by it.

D. In exercise of the powers under Article 226 it could not act as an Appellate Authority to review of supervise the functions of authorities C like the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority.

E. Considering the material on record it cannot be held that the Authority acted unreasonably unfairly or in an unjust manner.

F. The Authority consisting of people possessing expertise and skill in the field its decision to develop the property as a C&EC by itself cannot be faulted with.

G. It is not a case where Article 14 can be said to have been infringed.

H. Jt cannot be said the facts which are pleaded are not based on evidence or materials which are not annexed to the counter affidavit.

I. Reasons in such matters can. be gathered from files/records maintained by the authorities.

A review petition filed thereagainst was dismissed.

F Appellants filed the special leave petition on 29.10.2004 against the order dated 20.1.2004 as also against the order dated 11.10.2004 dismissing the review petition.

In its counter affidavit filed before this Court the Authority, inter a/ia, disclosed that the rate of premium for the commercial properties was increased G from Rs.25,000/- per square metre to Rs.42,500/- per square metre. It was further disclosed that the Authority called for fresh tenders for development of 5.5 hectares as C&EC and 2.0 hectares for a commercial complex, in terms whereof the bidders were required to quote separately for C&EC and Real Estate Components.

Whereas the rate for C&EC was fixed at 130 crores (Rs.20,000/- per square metre); for the Real Estate Component the H

RAMCHANDRAMURARILALBHATIADv. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[S.B. SINHA, J.] l l 7

bidder was required to quote higher than 350 crores (i.e. higher than Rs. 70,000/

- per square metre). It was further stipulated that the successful bidder was required to pay 50% of the compensation amount within one month of acceptance thereof and the rest 50% within three months thereof. The other terms and conditions and procedure for evaluating bids, however, remained the same.

A supplementary affidavit was filed by Respondents on 20th February, 2006, wherein it was brought to this Court's notice that in response to the tender floated in 2005, Reliance Industries Ltd. had bid Rs.974,00,00, 111/- for the commercial portion and the fixed price of Rs.130 crores for the C&EC. Reliance Industries Limited thereafter was directed to be impleaded as a party by an order dated 24.4.2006, wherein this Court

recorded : ~

"These matters pertain to the construction of a Convention-cum- Exhibition Centre and commercial complex at Bandra Kurla, Mumbai.

The petitioner before us is the unsuccessful bidder who has challenged the action of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) cancelling all the bids at an earlier stage. Despite the D application made by the petitioner, we declined to grant injunction in the matter. As a result, MMRDA re-tendered and we are informed that the highest bid was by Reliance Industries Limited, which is said to have been granted the contract and paid a sum of Rs.552 crores.

The petitioner desires to demonstrate to this Court (a) that the bid was cancelled by the MMRDA, which had no jurisdiction to do so under the Act; and (b) that there was ma/a fides in cancelling all the bids as it was intended to engineer the re-tendering process to favour the party who has now succeeded. To demonstrate his bonafides, the petitioner's counsel states that the petitioner would not only match the bid of the presently successful party only for the Convention Centre, but that he would also pay the amount at one go instead of paying it over a period of time.

We are informed that there is another party who is involved. Mr.

R.F. Nariman, the learned senior counsel, states that the petitioner would move an application to implead that other party (Reliance Industries Limited)."

The Reliance Industries Limited was impleaded as a party to this appeal thereafter.

A Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Appellantin support of this appeal would contend that-

(i) the purported major shift in the policy by the Authority was impermissible in law;

(ii) rejection of the bid offered by the Authority was wholly illegal as the Executive Committee alone was the sole judge in relation . thereto;

(iii) in accepting the bid of Reliance Industries Ltd., the offer of the appellants that they would pay @2 112% per year from the annual C turnover from the 21st year had not been considered;

(iv) in rejecting the tender of the appellant, the Executive Committee/ Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority was required to assign sufficient and valid reason; and the same having not been done, the order impugned in the writ petition was vitiated in law.

Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Reliance Industries Ltd., on the other hand, would submit that-

(i) th~ Executive Committee could not have taken a decision in regard to the change of policy;

(ii) when the second tender was floated, Appellant did not take part therein;

(iii) procedural lapses, if any, cannot be a ground for judicial review.

Contentions of Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel'appearing F on behalf of the Authority were-

(i) judicial review is not maintainable as Appellant has not disclosed infringement of any constitutional or statutory right;

(ii) the Authority was entitled to reject the tender on appreciation of G professional competence and capacity of Appellant to run the centre profitably, as well as the fact that prices offered by them were competitively low; and

(iii) the policy being in relation to a mega project and the judgment of the authority being objective criterion, no interference is called for

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHATT AD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.) 119

by this Court.

The Act was enacted for forming Brihan Mumbai and certain areas round about into a Mumbai Metropolitan Region. Section 4 thereof deals with the composition of the Authority. Section 4A provides for powers and functions, inter alia, of its Chairman and Metropolitan Commissioner. Section

7 provides for constitution and powers of Executive Committee. Clause (iii) B of Sub-Section (3) of Section 7 reads as under :

"7. (3)(iii) Approval or rejection of tenders for projects and schemes of the Authority;"

Section 12 of the Act provides for powers and functions of the Authority. C Clause (b) of Sub-Section (I) of Section 12 deals with the power ofreviewing any project or scheme for development which may be proposed or may be in the course of execution or may be completed in the Metropolitan Region.

Clause (d) thereofrefers to execution of projects and schemes and Clause (h) provides for co-ordination in execution of the project or schemes for the D development of the Metropolitan Region. Pursuant to or in furtherance of its regulation making power contained in Section 50 of the Act, regulations were framed by the Authority, known as the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (Disposal of Land) Regulations, 1977 (Regulations).

Regulations 7 and 9 of the Regulations are as under :

"7. Disposal of land by offers to Government, Local Authority or E

Public Sector Undertaking

Where the Authority determines to dispose of land by making .offers to the Government, Local Authority or Public Sector

Undertaking, the offers shall be made by the Metropolitan F Commissioner in such form as he may decide, incorporating the terms and conditions of offers determined by the Authority which shall include the condition that the offer shall remain open and valid for acceptance for a period of 30 days and shall lapse if it remains unaccepted by the expiry of this period; provided that it shall be lawful for the Metropolitan Commissioner to renew any lapsed offer G on an additional condition that the Government, Local Authority or Public Sector Undertaking, as the case may be, shall pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum over the premium specified in the lapsed offer with effect from the date on which the lapsed off er was made; provided further that nothing contained herein shall authorize the H

A Metropolitan Commissioner to renew any lapsed offer after three months of its lapse."

Regulation 9 provides for the mode and manner of payment of premium.

Sub-Regulation (ii) of Regulation 9 reads as under :

"9(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing Clause to contrary, if there shall a scheme fonnulated and sanctioned by the Authority to erect or to finance erection of a building or buildings on land agreed to be leased to the Government, a Local Authority or a Public Sector Undertaking to subserve the development of the Metropolitan Region or any part thereof and to grant in lease such building or buildings to th.e concerned government, Local Authority or Public Sector Undertaking it shall be lawful to agree with the concerned Government local authority or Public Sector Undertaking to recover the premium agreed to be paid in consideration of the lease of such building or buildings in yearly installments, not exceeding ten in number."

We may also notice some of the provisions of "Request for Proposal for Grant of Lease of Land for developing and operating a Convention and Exhibition Centre". Clause 3.15 defines "successful bidder" to mean the E bidder selected according to the evaluation criteria as detailed in Section 7 for grant of lease of land. The concept of Convention and Exhibition Centre is contained in Clause 4.3 thereof. Clause 5 provides for specification of C&EC. Clause 5.1 reads as under :

"5.1. The C&EC facility for Phase I is estimated to require approximately 35,750 sq.m. of built up area which will be reckoned as 44,525 sq.m. for computation of FSI after allowing for height in excess of 4.20 m. for exhibitions areas. In Phase II there is a provision of a further I 0,650 sq.m. of built up area (which will be reckoned as 15,975 sq.m. for computation of FSI for Exhibition areas having height in excess of 4.20 m) that is to be used for further expansion of exhibition areas having at least 2 additional exhibition halls having an area of 5000 sq.m. each."

The total built-up area comes to about 60,500 sq, m.

Provision of Convention Auditorium was made in Clause 5.3. Clause H 7 provides for submission and evaluation of bids stating that interested parties

- RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA IT AD v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] J 2 J

shall submit their bids in three separate sealed covers : (1) Cover 1 should A contain compliance in regard to minimum eligibility criteria. Evaluation of minimum eligibility criteria is contained in clause 7.15 in the following terms:

"7.15 The objective of the minimum eligibility criteria is to short list Bidders who have :

e The financial strengths necessary to contribute and/or arrange the funds required to execute the Project in the desired time frame.

e The technical skills necessary to design, construct, operate and maintain the Facility as per the Principles of Good Industry C Practice. e The commercial skills necessary to market the Facility and successfully develop business.

Clause 7 .17 provides for the eligibility criteria being :

e "Tangible Net worth not less than Rs. 750 Million as per the latest audited financial statement.

• Annual turnover not less than Rs.500 Million as per the latest audited financial statement.

• Net Profit not less than Rs. 50 Million as per the latest audited E financial statement or Average annual net profit of the last three financial years not less than Rs.50 Million."

Category "I", related to field of activity defined as Convention & Exhibition Centres, Hotels, Restaurants and Banquet Halls.

Clause 7.22 provides for Category "II" to include an indirectly related field of activity defined as shopping centers, commercial complexes, housing

or office complexes, retail stores, entertainment centres and amusement parks.

Clause 7.23 provides for the eligibility criteria to show that the bidding company must have developed during last five years at least one Project having Capital Cost not less than Rs.1,000 Million. Clauses 7.24 and 7.25 G thereof read as under :

"7.24 The turnover of the Bidding Company or the combined turnover of the Financially Significant Members of the Bidding Consortium from the directly related field of activities shall not be less than H

Rs.500 million.

725 Format for Cover I compliance to minimum eligibility criteria

Bidders are required to organize "Cover I Companies with Minimum Eligibility Criteria'' according to the following checklist:

Cover I Compliance to Minimum Eligibility Criteria

:::iect1on 1 ················

:::iect1on L. taJ ............

(b) .............

(c) Letters of Acceptance, as per the format specified in Exhibi1 4, from each of the Consortium Members in case of a Bidding Consortium.

Section 3

(a) ................

(b) Letters of Commitment as per the format specified in Exhibi1 3, from each of the entities which are Financially Significan1 Consortium Member, the strengths of which is to be considered for the purpose of evaluation.

Clause 7.26 reads as under :

"7 .26 MMRDA on demand will return unopened Financial Bids and Technical Bids (Covers 2 and 3) of the Bidders who do not comply with the minimum eligibility criteria."

Step 2 (Cover 2) provides for financial bid. Clause 7.30 provh.!es for methodology for evaluation of bids.

Clause 7.30 deals with the manner in which the bids would be dealt with.

Clause 7.34 provides for technical and business proposal evaluation criteria. Clauses 7.38 and 7.39 are as under :

"7.38 In evaluating the Business Proposal, MMRDA reserves the right to seek clarificatins from the Bidders. The Bidders shall be required to furnish such clarifications.

RAMCHANDRA MURARILALBHA TIAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 123

139 The Technical and Business Proposal of only the Rank I bidder A will be opened. He may also be requested to make a presentation at his own cost, for clarifications and additional information on bidder's capability, concept plan and the business proposal in this regard to the evaluation committee appointed by the Metropolitan Commissioner, MMRDA. The Committee may seek further clarifications and make suggestions in respect of the B proposal, within the permitted built-up area, which will not include any change in the premium or the manner in which it is to be paid. These suggestions will have to be incorporated by the bidder."

The Bidding Companies/Bidding Consortium of Appellants included :

Mis. R.M. Bhuther & Co. Ltd.

Mis. Larsen & Toubro Ltd.

Mis. R.M. Bhuther & Co.

Mis. M.B. Development Corporation

Mis. M.B. Constructions

Mis. Bhattad Bros.

Mis. Alusett System (India) Pvt. Ltd.

The principal question which arises for consideration is as to whether the Authority had any jurisdiction to cancel the bid.

The Executive Committee is a statutory functionary. The powers and functions of the authority and the respective committees concededly are F governed by the provisions of the statute, but, then the jurisdiction of the Executive Committee is limited. It was confined to rejection or acceptance of the tender. The Authority exercises a larger power. For the sai!i purpose we would assume that the Authority had no incidental or ancillary power, but there cannot be any doubt Cir dispute that the Executive Committee could not cancel the entire tender. It could not have caused any change in the entire G scheme or policy.

It could not make alterations in the methodology of tender. It could not have gone into the working of the project. It also could not have gone into the question as to whether the project would be financially viable if the method of calculation is changed.

A Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Nariman on Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, [1989) 3 SCC 132: AIR (1989) SC 1582 to contend that as therein the power of the Vice Chancellor and the Executive Council was different, the former's power could not have been exercised by the latter.

B We do not dispute the proposition of law laid down therein.

We would assume that the power of the Executive Committee and the Authority under the Act are different and the latter for all intent and purport could not usurp the functions of the fonner. But in this case, it has not been so done.

Jurisdiction of the Authority being larger, and the power to cancel the tender being not vested in the Executive Committee, the action on the part of the fonner was neither illegal nor without jurisdiction.

This Court rejected the contention that the power of the Vice Chancellor D to regulate work also included the power to initiate disciplinary action, stating:

"This takes us to the second contention urged for the appellants.

The contention relates to the legal effect of ratification done by the Executive Council in its meeting held on December 26/27, 1985. The decision taken by the Executive Council is in the fonn of a resolution and it reads as follows :

"Considering the issues, the Executive Council resolved as follows:

l. The Executive Council at its meeting held on 22-3-1979, had by a resolution given full authority to the Vice-Chancellor for taking further proceedings and decision in both the cases of the defaulting officers.

2. In exercise of above authority, the Vice-Chancellor appointed an Inquiry-Officer and as suggested by the Inquiry Officer issued show-cause notices, obtained replies from the officers and lastly issued orders for terminating their services;

* * *

It was further resolved that-

(i) There has been no inadequacy in the proceedings against both

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA IT AD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 125

the officers;

(ii) The punishment ordered against both the officers is commensurate with the defaults and allegations proved against both the officers; and

(iii) The Executive Council, therefore, wholly, endorses the actions B taken by the then Vice-Chancellor against both the officers."

By this resolution, we are told that the Executive Council has ratified the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor. Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. In Friedman's Law of Agency (5th edn.) Chapter 5 at p. C 73, the principle of ratification has been explained:

"What the 'agent' does on behalf of the 'principal' is done at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist: (hence the use in this sentence, but not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas). The agent, in fact, has no authority to do D what he does at the time he does it. Subsequently, however, the principal, on whose behalf, thugh without whose authority, the agent has acted, accepts the agent's act, and adopts it, just as if there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly what the agent has done."

As noticed hereinbefore, we have proceeded on the basis that the powers of the Executive Committee and the Authority are separate and distinct and we have pointed out that the powers vested in the Executive Committee being limited, the decision taken by the Authority cannot be said to be illegal.

It was furthermore contended that the Executive Committee had a special F power which would prevail over general power vested in the Authority. In J.K. Cotton Spinning & fVeaving Mills Co., Ltd v. The State of Uttar Pradesh

& Ors., [1961) 3 SCR 185, this Court applied the rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions, but, the said rule has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Executive G Committee does not exercise any special power. The jurisdictions of both the authorities are separate and distinct.

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Appellants in

the connected appeal relied upon Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd & Ors., [2003) 2 SCC 111, wherein it was held : H

"It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant."

We fail to understand as to how the principle laid down therein can be said to have been violated.

Reliance has also been placed on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara C Singh and Ors., AIR (1964) SC 358: [1964] 4 SCR 485, wherein this Court quoted with approval the decision in Taylor v. Taylor, [1875] I Ch. D. 426, 431] for the proposition that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. There is again no quarrel D over the aforementioned proposition of Jaw.

Here the Authority has not exercised any power forbidden by law. The Authority has also not exercised its power in the manner which is not in accordance with law.

On merit of the matter, Mr. Nariman has pointed out, the distinction between 2002 and 2005 tenders to show that such a policy decision as laid E down in the 2005 tender was not in pari materia with 2002 tender. The comparison of methodology for evaluation of bids is as under :

2005TENDER

METHODOLOGY

FOR F

EVALUATION OF BIDS

7.30 The bidder will have to quote separately for the Convention & Exhibition Centre and the Commercial Complex.

The built-up area (considered for

FSI computa-tion) of the Convention & Exhibition Centre shall be considered as 65,000 sq.m. irrespective of the reductio~

that may be possible on

2002 TENDER METHODOLOGY

FOR EVALUATION OF BIDS

7.30 The bidder will have to quote separately for the C&EC and the Real Estate component. The builtup area (considered for FSI computation) of C&EC shall be considered as 60,500 sq.m. (Phase

I and II) irrespective of the reduction that may be possible on finalization of detailed architectural designs. Similarly the floor space

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHA TIAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 127

finalization of detailed architectural designs.

Similarly the floor space considered for FSI computation for the commercial Complex will be 50,000 sq.m.

The bidder will have to quote a fixed rate of Rs.20,000 per sq.m. of built up area for total built-up area 65,000 sq.m. for Convention & Exhibition Centre. The amount will be Rs.130 crores. The bidder will also have to quote a rate of premium higher than Rs.70,000 per sq.m. of built-up area for 50,000 sq.m. of total built-up area for Commercial Complex.

The premium amount will be higher than Rs.350 crores.

The total minimum amount of lease premium to be quoted by the bidder will be higher than Rs.480 crores of the total amount of lease premium that will be payable to MMRDA 50% will have to be paid within one month and the balance will have to be paid within two months i.e. within three months from the time the bid is accepted. The lease period is of 80 years as is indicated in the MMRDA (Disposal of Land) Regulation 1977.

considered in FSI computation for the Real Estate component shall be

15,000 sq.m. The bidder has the option of bidding only for the C&EC without the Real Estate component.

The bidder has to quote a rate of premium in terms of Rs. per sq.m. of FSI and the total premium, separately for the C&EC and the Real Estate component subject to the condition that the rate quoted for the Real Estate component shall be greater than that quoted for the C&EC.

The Authority is a statutory authority. It consists ofnot only politicians G but also various other responsible officers. It, while exercising its power under the Act, must necessarily take policy decisions. Whereas under the 2002 tender the bidder had to quote the rate of premium in terms of rupees per square meter of FSl and the total premium separately for C&EC and the Real Estate component subject to the condition that the rate quoted for the Real Estate component should be greater than th.at quoted for the C&EC, H

A upon having come to know that the value of the land would be much more, the Authority in the 2005 tender decided that the bidders should be required to quote a fixed rate of 20,000 per sq.m. of built-up area for total built-up area 65,000 sq.m. for Convention & Exhibition Centre. Economic viability of the entire project component, taking into consideration two different B components for C&EC and the Commercial Complex, could have been taken differently. The premium amount was to be quoted higher than Rs. 350 crores for the Commercial Complex.

While exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review, the Court is required to decide the cases before it, keeping the well known principles therefor in mind and having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor.

C Recently, in Noble Resources Ltd v. State of Orissa and Anr., (2006) 9 SCALE 181 this Court has noticed the power of judicial review vis-a-vis contractual disputes, opining . :

"Although terms of the invitation to tender may not be open to judicial scrutiny, but the courts can scrutinize the award of contract D by the Government or its agencies in exercise of their power of judicial review to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. [See Directorate of Education and Ors. v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. and Ors., [2004] 4 SCC 19]. However, the court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, if it does not involve any public interest.

Although the scope of judicial review or the development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL International Ltd (supra), each case, however, must be decided on its own facts. Public interest as noticed hereinbefore, may be one of the factors to exercise power of judicial review. In a case where a public law element is involved, judicial review may be permissible."

Noticing some of the areas where judicial review would be permissible, this Court opined that ordinarily, this Court would not enforce specific performance of contract where damages would be adequate remedy. It was G also held that conduct pf the parties would also play an important role. The expansive role of Courts in exercising its power of judicial review is not in dispute. But as indicated hereinbefore, each case must be decided on its own facts.

Dr. Singhvi placed reliance upon Star Enterprises & Ors. v. City and H Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra & Ors., [1990] 3 SCC

RAMCHANDRAMURARILALBHATIADv.STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[S.B.SINHA, J.] 129

280, wherein Ranganath Misra, J., as His Lordship then was, opined : A

"In recent times, judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day. The traditional limitations have been vanishing and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded. State activity too is becoming fast pervasive. As the State has descended into the commercial field and giant public sector B undertakings have grown up, the stake of the public exchequer is also large justifying larger social audit, judicial control and review by opening of the public gaze; these necessitate recording of reasons for executive actions including cases of rejection of highest offers. That very often involves long stakes and availability of reasons for action C on the record assures credibility to the action; disciplines public conduct and improves the culture of accountability. Looking for reasons in support of such action provides an opportunity for an objective review in appropriate cases both by the administrative superior and by the judicial process. The submission of Mr. Dwivedi, therefore, commends itself to our acceptance, namely, that when D highest offers of the type in question are rejected reasons sufficient to indicate the stand of the appropriate authority should be made available and ordinarily the same should be communicated to the concerned parties unless there be any specific justification not to do so."

In this case, highest offer has not been rejected. A new policy decision has been taken. Question as noticed herein is not as to whether the offer of the Appellants should have been rejected but is as to whether the Authority

in law could have altered its policy in regard to disposal of its properties. 'Public Trust Doctrine' was also sought to be invoked by Mr. Nariman against F the Authority and in this behalf reliance has been placed on Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 54. This Court therein was dealing with a master plan in the light of justifiability of exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under the Town Planning Act. Having regard to the provisions contained in Sub-Section (4) of Section 19 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 as also the fact that the discretionary G jurisdiction had been arbitrarily exercised, this Court invoked the 'public trust doctrine' saying that although the State is required to keep a vigil on the local body, but, thereby the power thereunder cannot be stretched so as to entitle the Government to alter any scheme and convert any site or power specifically reserved in the statute in the Authority.

A By floating a tender in furtherance of a public project, the Authority was not truly concerned with the enforcement of its master plan. No such argument was advanced. before the High Court. Such an argument has been advanced for the first time before us. We would consider the efficacy of said contention a little later.

B The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether any reason was required to be assigned. A power to deal with a contractual matter and a power of a statutory authority to exercise its statutory power in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties are distinct and different.

Whereas reasons are required to be assigned in a case where civil or evil C consequences may ensue, the same may not be necessary where it is contractual in nature, save and except in some cases, e.g., Star Enterprises (supra).

Whether assignment of reasons forms third pillar of principle of natural justice, is not free from doubt. There is a diversity of opinion as has been noticed by this Court in Rajesh Kumar & .Ors. v. D.C./. T. & Ors., (2006) 11

D SCALE 409.

Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Nariman on Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhardas Bhanji, [1952] I SCR 135 and Union of India & Ors. v. Dinesh Enginering Corporation & Anr. etc., [2001] 8 SCC 491. In Commissioner of Police (supra) the Court was concerned with a situation E where a statutory authority had acted on dictation of an Appellate Authority, which was found to be illegal. In Dinesh Enginering (supra), this Court opined that the Railways have no arbitrary power to reject the bid offered by a party merely because it has that power, particularly, when the same can be exercised only on the existence of certain conditions which in the opinion of F the Railways are not in the interest of the Railways to accept the offer.

We have noticed hereinbefore that power has not been exercised by the Executive Committee in rejecting the tender. The power has been exercised by the Authority in canceling the tenders so as to enable it to have a re-look of the entire project.

Some reasons may be required to be assigned for rejecting the bid, but in the instant case, in our opinion, no reason was required to be assigned as there has been a change in the policy decision.

The news item appearing in the Economic Times is not of much H significance. No affidavit has been affirmed as regards the correctness or

RAMCHANDRAMURARILALSHATIADv.STATEOFMAHARASITTRA[S.RSINHA, J.J 131

otherwise of the said news item.

It may be true that the Authorities at one point of time, as was disclosed in the Counter Affidavit, had thought of setting up a Convention Centre of their own and without any private participation, but only because there has been a deviation from the said stand would not, in our considered opinion, render the entire policy decision vitiated in law.

It had set up its Evaluation Committee. The decision presumably has been reached by experts.

The reasons as regards purported unsatisfactory performance of Appellants, take a back seat once having a re-look to the entire situation was C thought of.

It is not a case where the Court is called upon to exercise its equity jurisdiction. It is also not a case where ex facie the policy decision can be held to be contrary to any statute or against a public policy.

A policy D decision may be subjected to change from time to time. Only because a change is effected, the same by itself does not render a policy decision to be illegal or otherwise vitiated in law.

In Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India & Ors., [1986] 3 SCC 247, whereupon Dr. Singhvi relied upon, the tender was arbitrarily rejected. E Therein the writ petition was dismissed in limine only on the premise that the question involved therein related to contractual obligations and the policy decision could not be tenned as unfair or arbitrary. It was opined that therein no question of policy decision arose and as such contract was to be given to the lowest bidder in tenns of the tender notice and the contract should have been awarded to the appellant therein, especially when he had been doing the F job for many years.

As to how the said decision is applicable to the facts of the present case, we fail to understand. For the self-same reasons we are unable to appreciate the contention that only because a change has been effected in computation of total price under the new tender, the same was invalid in law.

In New Horizons ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1995] I SCC 478, this Court opined that in the matter of grant of tender the State cannot

act as a private person having regard to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was categorically opined that departing from the narrow legalistic view the Courts have taken note of the realities of the situation which, by no H

A stretch of imagination, would mean that the Court would substitute itself in the place of a statutory authority. The Court in a case of this nature must exercise judicial restraint. It may be one thing to say that having regard to the public interest, the Court may itself invite bids so as to verify the justification of accepting a palpably lower bid as was done in Ram and B Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 267, but it is another thing to say the Court would under all circumstances not allow a play in joint in favour of the employer.

However, if the Court in a given situation is not in a position to allow a bid to take place before, it may not still venture to strike down an Act in C the name of public interest, although, no such public interest exists.

Appellant stated before us that he is ready and willing to take a part of the contract, viz., construction of the C&EC and pay the same amount as has been done by ReFance Industries Ltd. and in addition it would pay 2.5% of its annual turnover from the Convention Centre from the 21st year, as was D initially offered.

Appellant did not participate in the second bid. The tender process is complete. Before us only a higher bid has been given. We do not intend to enter into the intricacies of the question. Appellants could have submitted its bids pursuant to the new tender and new conditions, even without prejudice E to its rights and contentions in this appeal. The stipulations made in 2002

tender could have been repeated by it so as to demonstrate before the experts comprising members of the Executive Committee that its bid was the highest.

If, in view of the change in the policy decision, the Authority does not intend to become a partner in the profit making and opt for having the entire bid amount at one go instead of waiting for 20 years, we do not find any fault F therewith.

Before us comparative bids of the bidders have been placed on the second tender, which are as follows :

SR Name of the Bidder Bid Amount Rate per sq.

No.

Rs. m. .. (approx.) Rs .

Reliance Industries Ltd. l l ,04,00,00, l l l 96000

DLF 1050 crores 91304

RAMCHANDRA MURARILAL BHATT AD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 133

Reliance Communications & 1011.12 crores 87913 Infrastructure Ltd.

Gammon India 1011 crores 87913

EMAR 911.07 crores 79217

The comparative statistics reads as under

Rate offered by the Petitioners Rs.

Rs. 12,121 per sq. mtrs. 91.514 crores (divided by) 75,500 sq.mtrs.

Rate expected by MMRDA Rs. 25,000 per sq.mtrs.

Amount for 75,500 sq. mtrs Rs. 188.75 crores @ Rs.25,000/- per sq.mtrs. (This should have been the minimum bid in 2003)

Amount for 1,15,000 sq.mtrs Rs.287.50 crores @ Rs.25,000/- per sq.mtrs. (This would have been the reserve price at old rate in 2005)

Reserve Bid of MMRDA in 2005 Rs.480 crores (Minimum price revised as below)

Rate per sq. mtrs in the Reserve Rs.41, 739/- per sq. mtrs. bid Rs.480 crores (divided by)

1,15,000 sq.mtrs.

Bid by Reliance Industries Ltd.

Rs.1104,00,00, 111/-

Rate per sq.mtrs of RIL Bid Rs.96,000/- per sq. mtrs.

Rs.11,04,00.00.111/- (divided by) 1,15,000 sq. mtrs.

Appellant complains that whereas the bid of Sister concern of Reliance Industries Ltd. was very low; now it has offered a bid of Rs.1104,00,00, 111/

-. From the chart placed before us it would appear that there had been a stiff computation. The Reliance Industries Ltd. has become the highest bidder. Its competitors had taken part in the earlier contracts. No ma/a fide in accepting H

A the tender has been alleged nor do we find any.

We, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the subsequent events, are of the opinion that it is not a case where we should interfere with the judgment of the High Court.

B It, however, would not mean that the Authority or the Executive Committee would not be entitled to take note of the offer of Appellant. It. may do so. It would not further mean that if the terms of new tender are violative of the provisions of the master plan, the same would not be suitably dealt with. We merely place on record that we have not gone into the said C questions, although raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, simply on the ground that no such plea had been taken before the High Court. In the absence of any plea that the policy decision adopted by the Authority. would be violative of the provisions of the Act or any master plan, the same cannot be entertained. The question, however, is left open.

D For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

vs Appeals dismissed.