A.P.S.R.T.C. AND ORS.

v. (

G. SRINIV ASA REDDY AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 24, 2006

[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND R.Y. RAVEENDRAN, JJ.]

Contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970-Section 10(/)- ' Circular containing guidelines issued by State Corporation for absorption of 1-- c persons employed on casual basis--Writ petitwn filed before High Court by respondents seeking direction/or regularisation of services on the basis of the Circular---High Court giving directions to th~ Corporation to consider the case of the respondents in terms of the Circular-Corporation passed an order rejecting the absorption of the respondents on the ground that they are contract labour and that there is no employee-employer relationship-Writ D petition filed by respondents before High Court challenging the order-High Court allowing the Writ Petition holding that the work of the respondents was perennial in nature and hence there was direct employee-employer relationship-Correctness of-Held, the High Court, while exercising the power Iof judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot

E substitute its own decision and direct absorption of r.spondents by assuming that the contract labour system was only a camouflage and that there was a direct employer-employee relationship-On facts, tile respondents are not entitled to the relief of absorptionlregularizatwn on the basis of the Circular as it specifically excluded contract labour.

F Appellant-Corporation issued a Circular containing guidelines for absorption of persons employed on casual basis/consolidated pay/piecemeal rate/work charged establishment. The guiddines provided, inter alia, that .

it is not applicable to contract labour. Res1mndents, who were employed as scavengers by the appellant, filed a Writ Petition before High Court seeking direction for regularisation of th1:ir seryices. The High Court, G without examining the claim on merits, din!cted the appellant to consider their cases in term of the Circular and pass order. The appellant, by a letter, instructed its concerned officer to verify the claims of the respondents and send necessary information. Since no further action was ...

taken, the respondents filed a Writ Petition before High Court (second I'

H 494

. -

• --i

- -\

, .. --<I

A.P.S.R.T.C. v. G. SRINIVASA REDDY 495

round) for declaration that the appellant's failure to take action was illegal A and praying for a direction to the appellant to absorb them into its service.

The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the Corporation to consider the claim for absorption.

A Selection Committee of the appellant, after interviewing the third respondent, found him to be a contract labour. The appellant passed an B order holding that the third respondent was not entitled to claim absorption under the Circular. The respondents filed a Writ Petition before High Court (third round) for quashing the order of the appellant and seeking a direction to treat them as ex-casual employees and absorb them under the Circular. The High Court quashed the order of the c appellant directing the appellant to pass a fresh order on the representation of the respondents. The High Court held that the appellant could not reject the claim of the respondents being contract labour as such ground was not taken by the appellant in earlier rounds of litigation. The Writ Appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court holding that the work of the respondents was perennial in nature and not D seasonal and hence there was direct master - servant relationship between • the appellant and the respondents.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. There was no notification under section 10(1) of Contract E Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 prohibiting contract labour.

There was also neither a contention nor a finding that the contract with the contractor was sham and nominal and the contract labour working in the establishment were, in fact, employees of the principal employer himself. The High Court could not have directed absorption of respondents who were held to be contract labour by assuming that the contract labour F system was only a camouflage and that there was a direct relationship of employer and employee between the corporation and the respondents. If respondents want the relief of absorption, they will have to approach the Industrial Tribunal and establish that the contract labour system was only a camouflage to avoid labour law benefits to them. The High Court could G not, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 266 of the Constitution of India, direct absorption of respondents, on the ground that work for which respondents were engaged as contract labour, was perennial in nature.

(502-H; 503-A-B(

Steel Authority of India ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront H

A Workers and Ors .. 12001 I 7 SCC I CB, relied on.

Air India S1atu1ury Corporation v. Uniled Labour Union, 11971 9 SCC 377 and Secretary. Haryana Stale Electricity Board v. Suresh, I 19991 3 SCC 601, referred to.

1.2. The respondents are not entitl•!d to the relief of absorption/ regularization on the basis of the Circular as it specifically excluded contract labour. The High Court in the first and second rounds neither examined the status of the respondents nor recorded a finding that they were entitled to absorption. The High Court merely disposed of the writ petition with a direction to consider the representation/claim of the respondents for absorption. Therefore, if fae appellant, on considering the claims of respondents, found that they were not employed by the appellant but were contract labour, who were not entitiled to seek absorption under the Circular, the appellant was justified in rejecting their for absorption.

The only remedy of the respondents is to approach the Industrial Tribunal for declaring that the contract labour system under which they were employed was a camouflage and therefore, they were, in fact, direct employees of the appellant and (or consequential relief. [503-C-F[

2. t. When a Court directs an authority to 'consider', it requires the authority to apply its mind to the fact and circumstances of the case and then take a decision thereon in accordan1:e with law. Where an order or action of the State or an authority is found to be illegal or in contravention of prescribed procedure or in breach of the rules of natural justice or arbitrary/unreasonable/irrational or prompted by malajides or extraneous consideration or the result of abuse of power, such action is open to judicial review. When the High Court finds that the order or action requires interference and exercises the power of judicial review, thereby resulting in the action/order of the State or authority being quashed, the High Court will not proceed to substitute its own dedsion in the matter as that will amount to exercising appellate power but require the authority to 'consider' and decide the matter again. The power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution concentrates and lays emphasis on the decision making process rather than the decision itself. [504-A, DJ

2.2. Where an authority vested with the power to decide a matter, fails to do so in spite of a request, the person aggrieved approaches the High Court, which in exercise of powe1r of judicial review, directs the authority to 'consider' and decide the matter. In such cases, while

t ,.

lor-· •

A.P.S.R.T.C. v. G. SRINIVASA REDDY 497

1 exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court directs A 'consideration' without examining the facts or the legal question (s) involved and without recording and findings on the issues. 1504-E-FI

,;.

2.3. The High Court may also direct the authority to 'consider' afresh, where the authority had decided a matter without considering the relevant facts and circumstances, or by taking extraneous or irrelevant B matters into consideration. In such cases also, the High Court may not examine the validity or tenability of the claim on merits but require the authority to do so. 1504-F-GI

2.4. Where the High Court finds the decision-making process C erroneous and records its findings as to the manner in which the decision should be made, and then directs the authority to 'consider' the matter, the authority will have to consider and decide the matter in the light of its findings or observations of the court. But where the High Court without recording any findings or without expressing any view, merely directs the authority to 'consider' the matter, the authority will have to consider the D matter in accordance with law, with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, its power not being circumscribed by any observations or findings of the court. 1504-G; 505-A)

2.5. While disposing of writ petition with a direction to 'consider' there is a need for the High Court to make the direction clear and specific. E The order should clearly indicate whether the High Court is recording any finding about the entitlement of the petitioner to the relief or whether the petition is being disposed of without examining the claim on merit.

The court should also normally fix a time-frame for consideration and decision. If no time-frame is fixed and if the authority does not decide the F matter, the direction of the court becomes virtually infructuous as the aggrieved will have to come again to Court with a fresh writ petition or file an application for fixing time for deciding the matter.

[505-G-H; 506-A-BI

On facts, held: The High Court in the third round disposed of the G Writ Petition at the admission stage on an erroneous conclusion that the order of the appellant was contrary to the decision of the High Court in the secon.d round and directed the appellant to pass fresh orders on the representations made by the respondents. The High Court proceeded on the assumption, without basis, that its earlier order had held that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the Circular when in fact there H

SUPREME COURT REPOIUS

[2006[ 2 S.C.R.

A was no such finding or direction. Therefore, the direction of the High t Court to consider the cases of the respondents under the Circular cannot be sustained. Liberty is, however, reserved to the respondents to approach the Industrial Tribunal/Court for relief, if any, in accordance with law.

1506-H; 507-A-DI

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3424 of 2000.

From the Judgment and dated 30.9.1999 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1422 of 1999.

R. Santhan Krishnan, Praveen Kr. Pandey and Guntur Prabhakar for the C Appellant.

T.N. Rao for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D RAVEENDRAN, J. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, first appellant, (for short •the Corporation'), issued a Circular dated I. 9. I 988 containing the guidelines for absorption of persons employed 1on casual basis/consolidated pay/piecem<:al rate/work charged establishment, whose services had been ordered to b1: dispensed with, under an earlier Circular dated 2.7.1987. The said guidelines provided, inter alia, that such E absorption shall be only against sanctioned va, ancies, and that the benefit was to be extended only to those who had been engaged for more than one year. The Circular made it clear that benefit therof will not extend to persons engaged by its contractors at Bus Stations and certain other categories of persor.s detailed therein.

F 2.

The respondents herein filed W.P. t; o.14353/1991 claiming to be

scavengers employed by the Corporation. seeking a direction for regularisation.

That petition was disposed of by order 5.11.1991 with a direction to consider their cases in terms of the Circular dated 1 9.1988 and pass appropriate orders. The High Court did not examine the claim on merits.

3. To give effect to the said order, the Divisional Manager of the Adilabad Division of the Corporation sent a communication dated 14. 7 .1992 instrudng the Depot Manager, Mar.cherial to verify the claims of the respondents (as they had claimed that they were working in the said Depot) and to send him the necessary information in the prescribed proforma. Alleging H inaction thereafter, the respondents herein again approached the High Court

in W.P. No.3022011997 for a declaration that the Corporation's failure to A

"!' take action in pursuance of the said letter dated 14.7.1992 was illegal and praying for a direction to the Corporation to absorb them into its service.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court by order dated 17.3.1998 disposed of Writ Petition No.30220/1997 at the stage of preliminary hearing, without examining the matter on merits, by directing the Corporation to consider the claim for absorption in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Circular dated 14. 7 .1992. In the said order, the High Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the letter dated 14.7.1992 of the Divisional Manager was the Circular containing the guidelines relating to absori)tion.

In pursuance of it, the claim of one of the respondents - 8.

Madhuraiah (third respondent herein), was considered. He was required to appear before a Selection Committee on 21.4.1999. He appeared before the Committee and admitted that he had worked only under a contractor and not under the Corporation. The Regional Manager, Adilabad Division, therefore, passed an order dated 21.4.1999 holding that the third respondent was not D .' entitled to claim absorption. He held that the provisions of the Circular dated 1.9.1988 providing for absorption were inapplicable to the third Respondent, as he had not directly worked under the Corporation. He recorded a finding that third respondent was employed as a contract labour by a contractor, receiving payment through the contractor, and that there was no relationship E of employee and employer between him and the Corporation, either in regard to assignment of work, or performance of work, or payment of remuneration.

Feeling aggrieved, the respondents approached the High Court for the third time, by filing W.P. No.17678 of 1999 for quashing the said order dated 21.4.1999 and seeking a direction to the Corporation to treat them as F ex-casual employees and absorb them under the terms of the Circular dated

1.9.1988. A learned Single Judge by order dated 23.8.1999 disposed of the said petition at the admission stage, quashing the said order dated 21.4.1999 and directing the Corporation to pass a fresh order on the representation of the respondents herein. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the G respondents herein could not be denied relief on the ground that they were employed as contract labour, as such a contention was not taken by the Corporation in the earlier petition (W.P. No.30220/1997). The learned Single Judge held that when the direction in W.P. No.30220/1997 was to 'consider' the case for absorption in terms of the guiaelines contained in Circular dated H

A 14.7.1992, the Corporation could not reject the claim by taking a stand that respondents were employed as contract labour and the Circular dated 1.9.1988 was inapplicable.

The order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the Corporation in Writ Appeal No.1422 of 1999. The Corporation contended B that the Learned Single Judge committed an error ir. quashing the order dated 21.4.1999. It was pointed out that the respondents were employed as contract labour and the Circular dated 1.9. I 988 did 10t permit absorption of contract labour, but only permitted absorption of those directly employed by the Corporation on casual basis or for a contractual period, on daily wages or on C consolidated salary or piece rate basis or under work changed establishment.

The Division Bench dismissed the Corpo:ation's appeal vide order dated 30.9.1999. It accepted the contention of the Corporation that respondents were employed as "contr11ct labour". It also impliedly accepted the contention of the Corporation that the respondents were not entitled to absorption under D the Circular dated 1.9.1988. It, however, neld that the work for which the respondents were employed as contract labour, chat is to clean the buses and to sweep the bus stand premises, was perennial in nature and not seasonal.

Purporting to rely on the decisions of t1is Court in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, [1997] 9 SCC 377 and Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board v. Sures11, [1999] 3 SCC 601, it held that E there was direct relationship of master and servant between the principal employer (Corporation) and contract labour (Respondents) and, therefore, the respondents were entitled to absorption. It did not, consider whether in the absence of a notification under Section I 0( 1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short 'the CLRA Act') prohibiting p contract labour, there could be a direction for absorption, even if the Respondents were contract labour. Thus, the ground on which the Division Bench upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge was different from the ground on which the writ petition was disposed of by the Single Judge. The said order of the Division Bench is challenged by the Corporation in this G appeal by special leave.

8. In Air India (supra), this Court had held that though there is no express provision in the CLRA Act for absorption of contract labour, when engagement of contract labour stood prohibited on issuance of a notification under Section 10( I) of the CLRA Act, a. direct relationship was established H between the workers (contract labour) and the e:rstwhile principal employer,

...

and the principal employer is obliged to absorb the workers. It also held that A if the High Court finds that workmen were engaged in violation of the provisions of CLRA Act or were continued as contract labour, in spite of the prohibition notification issued under Section I 0(1) of the CLRA Act, the High Court can, in exercise of its power of judicial review, mould the relief properly and direct the principal employer to absorb the contract labour, B instead of leaving the workmen in the lurch, and it was not necessary for the workmen to seek a reference of the dispute relating to their absorption under section l 0 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7. In Haryana State Electricity Board (supra), this Court following Air India, had held that where the work for which contract labour is employed, was perennial in nature (as contrasted from seasonal), contract labour system should be abolished by issuing a C notification under section I 0 of CLRA Act, so as to render the contract labourers, the direct employees of the principal employer. On the facts of the case, it was also held that the contract system prevailing in the Electricity Board (appellant herein) was not genuine, but a mere camouflage (to deprive workers, of the benefits under various labour enactments) and therefore, the D court can pierce the veil and visualize the direct relationship between the Board and the contract labour. Consequently, this Court upheld the relief of reinstatement granted to Safai Karamcharis by the High Court.

9. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. [2001 (7) SCC l], a Constitution Bench of this Court overruled E the decision in Air India (supra) and held that where contract labour are engaged in connection with the work in an establis!iment and employn: nt of such contract labour is prohibited by issue of a notification under Section

10( 1) of the CLRA Act, there was no question of automatic absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment and the principal employer cannot F be required to absorb the contract labour. This Court also held that on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him by the principal employer, it does not culminate into a relationship of 'master and servant' between the principal employer and the contract labour.

This Court held that whether the contract labour system was genuine or a mere camouflage has to be adjudicated only by the Industrial Tribunal/court G and not by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We extract below the relevant portions of the principles summed up by this Court :

"(5). On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in H

regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunde' If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employee~ of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularize the st:rvices of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.

(6). If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section I 0( I) of the CLRA Act in re~•pect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriatt: Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where ·.11 such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, f othemise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than :echnical qualifications.

We have used the expression "industrial adjudicator" by design as determination of the questions afor!mentioned requires enquiry into disputed questions of facts which ':annot conveniently be made by High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction mder Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be the Industrial Tribunal/Court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review."

[Emphasis supplied)

10. In this case, there was no notification under section 10(1) ofCLRA Act, prohibiting contract labour. There was also neither a contention nor a

finding that the contract with the contractor was sham and nominal and the H contract labour working in the establishment were, in fact, employees of the principal employer himself. In view of the principles laid down in Steel

...

Authority, the High Court could not have directed absorption of respondents A who were held to be contract labour, by assuming that the contract labour system was only a camouflage and that there was a direct relationship of employer and employee between the corporation and the respondents. If respondents want the relief of absorption, they will have to approach the Industrial Tribunal/Court and establish that the contract labour system was B only a ruse/camouflage to avoid labour law benefits to them. The High Court could not, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, direct absorption of respondents, on the ground that work for which respondents were engaged as contract labour, was perennial in nature.

11. The respondents were not also entitled to the relief of absorption/ C regularization on the basis of the Circular dated 1.9.1988, as it specifically excluded contract labour. The order dated 5.11.1991 in the first round (WP No.14353/1991) and the order dated 17.3.1998 in the second round (W.P.

No.3022011997) did not examine the status of the respondents, nor recorded a finding that they were entitled to absorption. They merely disposed of the writ petitions with a direction to consider the representation/claim of the D

· respondents for absorption. Therefore, if the Corporation on considering the claims ofrespondents found that they were not employed by the Corporation, but were contract labour, who were not entitled to seek absorption under the . Circular dated 1.9.1988, the Corporation was justified in rejecting their claim

for absorption. The only remedy of respondents, as noticed above, is to E approach the Industrial Tribunal for declaring that the contract labour system under which they were employed was a camouflage and therefore, they were, in fact, direct employees of the Corporation and for consequential relief. The Corporation has stated in the Special Leave Petition that such a question was already raised by the Trade Unions and was pending in l.D.No.1/1996 on the file of the. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad.

 F

12. Learned counsel for the respondents made an alternative submission that the relief granted to respondents, may be sustained on the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge. He submitted that having regard to the order in W.P. No.30220/1997 which had attained finality, the Corporation had no choice but to consider the cases of Respondents for absorption by treating them as causal labour employed by the Corporation. This takes us to the effect of the orders dated 5.11.1991 and 17.3.1998 made in the earlier writ petitions, directing /he Corporation to "consider" the cases of the respondents.

13. We may, in this context, examine the significance and meaning of a direction given by the court to "consider" a case. When a court directs an authority to 'consider'. it requires the authority to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and then take a d1:cision thereon in accordance with law. There is a reason for a large number •Jf writ petitions filed in High B Courts being disposed of with a direction to "consider" the claim/case/ representation of the petitioner/s in the writ pt:titions.

(13.1) Where an order or action of the State or an authority is found to be illegal, or in contravention of prescribed procedure, or in breach of the rules of natural justice, or arbitrary/unreasonable/ irra1:ional, or prompted by C mala fides or extraneous consideration, or the result of abuse of power, such action is open to judicial review. When the High Court finds that the order or action requires interference and exercises •:he power of judicial review, thereby resulting in the action/order of the Star.e or authority being quashed, the High Court will not proceed to substitute its own decision in the matter, as that will amount to exercising appellate power, but require the authority D to 'consider' and decide the matter again. The power of judicial review under Article 226 concentrates and lays emphasis on the decision making process, rather than the decision itself.

(13.2) The High Courts also direct author' ties to 'consider', in a different. category of cases. Where an authority vested with the power to decide a E matter, fails to do so in spite of a request, the person aggrieved approaches the High Court, which in exercise of power of judicial review, directs the authority to 'consider' and decide the matter. [n such cases, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court directs 'consideration' without examining the facts or the legal question(s) involved and without recording F any findings on the issues. The High Court may also direct the authority to 'consider' afresh, where the authority had decided a matter without considering the relevant facts and circumstances, or by taking extraneous or irrelevant matters into consideration. In such cases also, High Court may not examine the validity or tenability of the claim on merits, but require the authority to do so.

G (13 .3) Where the High Court finds the decision-making process erroneous and records its findings as to the manner in which the decision should be made, and then directs the authonty to 'consider' the matter, the authority will have to consider and decide the matter in the light of its H findings or observations of the court. But where the High Court without

recording any findings, or without expressing any view, merely directs the A

__,,. authority to 'consider' the matter, the authority will have to consider the matter in accordance with law, with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, its power not being circumscribed by any observations or findings of the court.

(13.4) We may also note that sometimes the High Courts dispose of B matter merely with a direction to the authority to 'consider' the matter without examining the issue raised even though the facts necessary to decide the correctness of the order are available. Neither pressure of work nor the complexity of the issue can be a reason for the court, to avoid deciding the issue which requires to be decided, and disposing of the matter with a direction C to 'consider' the matter afresh. Be that as it may.

(13.5) There are also several instances where unscrupulous petitioners

,. with the connivance of 'pliable' authorities have misused the direction 'to consider' issued by court. We may illustrate by an example. A claim, which is stale, time-barred or untenable, is put forth in the form of a representation. D On the ground that the authority has not disposed of the representation within a reasonable time, the person making the representation approaches the High Court with an innocuous prayer to direct the authority to 'consider' and dispose of the representation. When the court disposes of the petition with a ' direction to 'consider', th•e authority grants the relief, taking shelter under the order of the court directing him to 'consider' the grant of relief. Instances are also not wanting where authorities, unfamiliar with the process and practice relating to writ proceedings and the nuances of judicial review, have interpreted or understood the order 'to consider' as directing grant f relief sought in the representation and consequently granting reliefs which otherwise could not have been granted. Thus, action of the authorities granting undeserving relief,

F in pursuance of orders to 'consider', may be on account of ignorance, or on account of bona fide belief that they should grant relief in view of court's direction to 'consider' the claim, or on account of collusion/connivance' between the person making the representation and the authority deciding it.

Representations of daily wagers seeking regularization/absorption into regular service is a species of cases, where there has been a large scale misuse of the G orders 'to consider'.

14. Therefore, while disposing of writ petitions with a direction to l 'consider', there is a need for the High Court to make the direction clear and specific. The order should clearly indicate whether the High Court is recording H

A any finding about the entitlement of the petitioner to the relief or whether the petition is being disposed of without examining the claim on merits. The court should also normally fix a time-frame for consideration and decision.

If no time-frame is fixed and if the authority does not decide the matter, the direction of the court becomes virtually infructuom as the aggrieved petitioner B will have to come again to court with a fresh writ ptition or file an application

for fixing time for deciding the matter.

15. In this case, the respondents approached the High Court seeking a direction for regularization/absorption in the year 1991. That petition (WP No.14353/1991) was disposed of, aµparently, at the admission stage by order C dated 5.11.1991, with a direction to 'rnnsidcr' the representations of Respondents without examining the question whether the petitioners in the writ petition were entitled to the reliefofregularization/absorption and without fixing any time frame for deciding the mattir. Though the Divisional Manager, Adilabad, by letter dated 14.7.1992 sought information and verification of claims by the concerned depots, with the intention of giving effect to the D order dated 5.11.1991, no further action was takn. This led to filing of the second petition (W.P. No.30220/1997) whrein the respondents herein sought a direction to the concerned authority to take a jecision on the question of absorption. The second petition was also disposed of at the preliminary hearing stage by order dated 17.3.1998, without examining the claim of respondents E on merits. The said order dated 17.3. :. 998 p'.oceeded on an erroneous assumption that the letter dated 14.7.1992 (by which the Divisional Manager, Adilabad, sought information from the concerned Depot Managers abou' the respondents herein) was the Circular containing the guidelines for absorption, and disposed of Writ Petition No. 30220/1997 by directing the authority Concerned to consider the cases of the n:spondents herein for absorption in F terms of the guidelines contained in the ktter dated 14.7.1992 and decide the matter within three months.

16. We find that at that stage, the authority considered the case of the third respondent and passed a reasoned .irder dated 21.4.1999 rejecting the c:laim on the ground that the third respondent was not a direct employee, but G was a contract labour, and was not therefore entitled to absorption under the Circular dated 1.9.1988. This led to the third round of litigation in W.P.

No.17678/1999 wherein the prayer was for quashing the said order or rejection dated 21.4.1999 and for direction to absorb then into service in terms of the Circular dated 1.9.1988 Again, the High Court at the admission stage, disposed H of the matter on an erroneous conclusion that the order dated 21.4.1999 was

....

).. '

.. ,.

,) . . -A.

contrary to the decision in the second round (Order dated 17.3.1998 in W.P. A No.30220/1997) and directed the Corporation to pass fresh orders on the representations made by the respondents. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the assumption, without basis, that the order dated 17.3.1998 in the earlier petition (WP No. 30220/1997) had held that Respondents were entitled to the benefit of the Circular dated 1.9.1988, when in fact there was no such finding or direction. Therefore, the direction of the learned Single Judge, as confirmed B by the Division Bench, to consider the cases of respondents under the Circular dated 1.9.1988 cannot be sustained. It is unfortunate that in this process, the Respondents have been in courts for nearly 15 years.

17. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the C order dated 30.9.1999 passed by the Division Bench of the A.P. High Court in Writ Appeal No.1422 of 1999 and dismiss Writ Petition No.17678/1999 filed by the respondents. Liberty is, however, reserved to the respondents to approach the Industrial Tribunal/Court for relief, if any, in accordance with law. Parties to bear their respective costs.

B.S.

Appeal allowed.