evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
GURBAX SINGH v.

KARTAR SINGH AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 11, 2002

[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND

BISHESHWAR PRASAD SINGH, JJ.]

Registration Act, I 908

S.47-Sale deeds-Commencement of operation-Two sale deeds (Ext.

P-2 and Ext. D-1) executed the same day-Time of execution of P-2 shown as

10.00 A.M-Time of execution of D-1 not shown-Concurrent findings of courts below that Ext. P-2 executed earlier than Ext. D-2 and former prevails over latter-Held, a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration-Where two documents are executed on the same day, time of their execution would determine the priority irrespective of the time of their registration-The one which is executed earlier would prevail over the other executed subsequently- In view of concurrent findings of courts below, High Court rightly held that Ext. P-2 prevails over Ext.-D-1-There is no illegality in the order of High Court warranting interference under Article I 36 of the Constitution-Deeds and Documents-Commencements of operation-Constitution of India-Article 136.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1969 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.10.2001 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 4050 of 1999.

Vipin Gogia and Ms. Jaspreet Gogia for the Petitioner.

G The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. .

Jamail Singh, respondent No. 2 executed two documents of sale (Exs. P-2 and D-1) on November 25, 199 I. Having regard to the findings of the H Courts below that Ex. P-2 was executed earlier than Ex.D.1-land having

..-

GURBAX SINGH v. KART AR SINGH 941

noted Ex. P-2 in favour of the first respondent was executed at 10.00 a.m. A and it was not shown when Ex. D-1 was executed in favour of the petitioner, the High Court, vide its order dated October 25, 2001, in RSA No. 4050 of 1999 confirmed the concurrent finding of the courts below holding that Ex.

P-2 prevails over Ex. D-1 and thus dismissed the second appeal. It is against the said order that this Special Leave Petition is filed.

In view of the provisions of Section 4 7 of the Registration Act, 1908

it is well-settled that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration.

Where two documents are executed on the same day, the time of their execution would determine the priority irrespective of the time of their registration. The C one which is executed earlier in time will prevail over the other executed subsequently. In view of the concurrent findings, referred to above, the High Court has rightly held that Ex. P-2 prevails over Ex. D-1. We find no illegality in the order of the High Court warranting our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

D ..

Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

R.P.

Petition dismissed.
STATE OF U.P.

A v.

KAMARUJJAMA @ MALVA AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 25, 2002

[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3:

Appeal against acquittal-Rejected by High Court by a judgment bereft of reasons-Held, accused was acquitted of charges u/ss. 147, 148 and 3021 C

149 !PC by trial court-High Court should have considered the merits of the case and recorded reasons for its decision-Impugned judgment is bereft of reasons and falls short of the requirements of a speaking order. A confirming judgment need consider the contentions urged before the court and record reasons for agreeing with order under appeal-Judgment and Order of High D Court set aside. Case remitted to High Court for fresh disposal-Judgment- Confirming judgment-Requirements of-Indian Penal Code, 1860-Ss. 147, 148, 3021149.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 289 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29 .1 I. 99 of the Allahabad High Court in A. No. 361 of 1996.

Y.P. Singh, C. Siddharth and Ajay K. Agrawal for the Appellant.

U.R. Lalit, Ms. Safia Khan, Shakeel Ahmed and Ms. Sandhya Goswami for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave is granted.

The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 361/1996 dated November 29, 1999. The impugned Judgment reads as follows:-

"Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the impugned judgment. After H 29

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2002] 2 S.C.R.

A perusal of the judgment, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment challenged in this appeal. The leave sought is refused, the appeal is accordingly rejected.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment, we are of the view that as the accused was acquitted B charges under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 IPC by the trial court, the High Court in appeal should have considered the merits of the case and recorded the reasons for its decision. The judgment quoted above is bereft or reasons and falls short of the requirements of a speaking order: A confirming judgment need consider the contentions urged before the court C and record reasons for agreeing with the order under app!!al. We are therefore constrained to set aside the said judgment, restore the appeal to the file of the High Court and remit the case to the Higtr Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

D R.P.

Appeal allowed.
COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE, NAGPUR

MIS. W AINGANGA SAHKARI S. KARK.HANA LTD.

APRIL I 8, 2002

[S.P. BHARUCHA, CJ., N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]

Excise Laws:

Trusses, Columns and purlines-Making of-Whether amounts to manufacture-Held, Tribunql noted that it had been found as a fact by the Collector that assessee had undertaken fabrication work at site-Decision of Aruna Industries case applied to instant case-Tribunal's order cannot be D faulted

Aruna Industries Vishakhapatnam v. C.C.E. Guntur, (1986) 25 ELT 580, relied on.

Structurals and Machineries (Bokaro) Pvt. Ltd v. Collector of Central E Excise, (1984) (17) ELT_ 127 and Richardson and Cruddas, (1972) Ltd. v.

Collector of Central Excise, (1988) 38 ELT 176, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 496 of 1998.

F From the Judgment and Order dated 7.5.97 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in A. No. E/739/89-BL in F.O. No. E/866/97-B.

Mukul Rohatgi, Additional Solictior General, Jaideep Gupta and B.K.

Prasad for the Appellant.

V. Lakshmikumaran, M.P. Devnath and V. Balachandran for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered

._,

COMMR. CENTRAL EXCISE, NAGPUR 1'. WAIN GANGA SAHKARI S. KARKHANA LTD. 225

The Tribunal was concerned with whether making trusses, columns and A purlines amounted to manufacture. The Tribunal followed an earlier decision in the case of Aruna Industries, Vishakhapatnam v. C.C.E., Guntur {1986) 25 EL T 580. It did not follow another decision in the case of Structurals and Machineries (Bokaro) Pvt. ltd v. Collector a/Central Excise. (1984) 17

ELT 127.

It is submitted on behalf of the Revenue that there are conflicting views taken by the Tribunal and that such conflicting views have been taken even after the impugned order.

In one of these subsequent judgments, in the case of Richardson and Cruddas (1972) Ltd v. Collector a/Central Excise, (1988] 38 ELT 176, the C case of Aruna Industries (supra) has been considered and found to be applicable to a situations where the assessee was erecting the structures at the constructions site and fabricating materials on the spot; it was therefore found that this could not be considered to be fabrication in a factory. Now, in the instant case, the Tribunal noted that it had been found as a fact by the D Collector that the assessee had undertaken fabrication work at site. This was a case, therefore, to which the decision of Aruna Industries (supra) applied and the Tribunal's order cannot be faulted.

The appeal is dismissed.. No order as to costs.

R.P.

Appeal dismissed.
SUL TAN MOHJYUDDIN AND ORS.

A v.

BASHEER AHMED SHARIFF AND ORS.

MAY 3,2002

{R.C. LAHOTl AND BISHESHWAR PRASAD SINGH, JJ.j B

Karnataka Rent Act, 1999:

s. 2(3) (g) and 70(2)(c)-Abatement of proceedings-Non-residential premises-Proceedings for eviction initiated u/s. 2 I (l )(h} and (p) of Karnalaka C Rent Control Act, 1961-Area exceeds 14 square meters-Held, dimension of the premises, its being non-residential and applicability of relevant provisions of 1999 Act not disputed on behalf of landlord-appellant, the proceedings stand abated-Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961-ss. 21 (l) (h) ~~ D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3325 of2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31. 7.200 l of the Karnataka High Court in R.P. No. 562 of2000.

E Naresh Kaushik, N.K. Roy, Ms. Shilpa Chohan, Rajesh Singh and Lalita Kaushik for the Appellants.

Kh. Nobin Singh, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Ankur S. Kulkarni for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

The proceeding' for eviction were initiated under Section 21(l)(h) and

{p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, l 961. The landlord, having lost from G the High Court, has filed this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

During the pendency of these proceedings, Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 has come into force with effect from 31.12.200 I. According to the counter filed 795 H

SUPREME COURT. REPORTS

[2002] 3 S.C.R.

A in this Court by the tenant-respondent, the area of the suit premises let out for non-residential purpose exceeds 14 square metres and, therefore, the premises are exempt from the provisions of the 1999 Act. It is the plea of the tenant-respondent that Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 being not applicable to the suit premises by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 2(3)(g), the proceedings shall stand abated under Section 70(2)( c) of the 1999 Act. The B dimension of the premises, its being non-residential and the applicability of the relevant provisions of the 1999 Act referred to hereinabove is not disputed by the learned counsel for the landlord-appellant. The proceedings, therefore, stand abated. Nothing survives for adjudication on merits. The appeal be treated as disposed of. c RP.

Appeal disposed of.
NIRMA LTD.

A v.

MIS. LURGI LENTJES ENERGIETECHNIK GHBH AND ANR.

JANUARY 14, 2002

[R.C. LAHOTI AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] B

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 :

Ss. 37(2) and (3)-Appellate order-Revision against before High

Court~Maintainability of-Held, special leave petition would not be C entertained in as much as an efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner by way of filing a revision in the High Court under s. 115 of the Code a/Civil Procedure. Merely because a second appeal against an appellate order is barred by the provisions ofsub-s. (3) ofs. 37, the remedy of revision does not cease to be available to the petitioner, for the City Civil Court D deciding an appeal under sub.s. (2) of s. 37 remains a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning ofs. l/5 of the C.P.C.-Code a/Civil Procedure, 1908-S. 115-Constitution of India-Article 136.

Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. v. Union of India, ( 1996( 2 SCC 132, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22106 of2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.8.2001 of the City Civil Court at

• • Ahmedabad in C.M.A.No. 155 of2001.

Ashok Desai, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, D.A. Dave, P.S. Shroff, Sunil Dogra, Jayant Mehta for Suresh A. Shroff and Co. for the Petitioner.

P. Chidambaram, Robin Jaisinghani and Shyel Trehan for Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This is a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, seeking leave to file civil appeal against an appellate order of City Civil Court No. 11 911 H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2002] 3 S.C.R.

A Ahmedabad, 'passed under sub-Section (2) of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. We are not inclined to entertain this special leave petition inasmuch as, in our opinion, an efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner by way of filing a revision in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Merely because a second appeal against B an appellate order is barred by the provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 37, the remedy of revision does not cease to be available to the petitioner, for the City Civil Court deciding an appeal under sub-Section (2) of Section 37 remains a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the C.P.C. In taking this view, we find support from a decision of this Court in Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. v. Union of India, [1996] 2 C sec 132. ·

The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. The petitioner may file a revision before the High Court and in calculating the limitation, the petitioner shall be entitled to exclusion of time spent in this Court, i.e., between the date of filing of the special leave petition and today.

RP.

Petition dismissed.
BALLA RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

PHOOLA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 27, 2002

[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

S. J 00(3)-Second appeal-Dismissed by High Court without considering C whether any substantial question of law arose for consideration between the parties-Held, it is expected of the appellant to frame substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal-In order to consider and dispose of a second appeal, substantial question or questions of law should arise for consideration between the parties-Order of High Court does not indicate D whether any substantial question of law arose for consideration between the parties-Matter remitted to High Court to consider whether any substantial question or questions of law arise for consideration and then dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1356 of E 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated I 3 .5.1992 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 2112 of 1991.

M.N. Krishnamani, P.K. Jain, P.K. Goswami and S. Pani for the F Appellants.

Yashank Adhyaru, Kavin Gulati, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Ms. Aditi Choudhary and Mrs Manik Karanjawala for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered

Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The correctness and validity of the order passed in a second appeal by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh is questioned in this appeal.

Disposing of the second appeal, the High Court passed the following

BALLA RAM v. PHOOLA 365

order: A

"Heard. No merit.

Dismissed."

The High Court did not consider whether any substantial question or questions of law arose for consideration between the parties as required under B Section l 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court has taken the consistent view that in order to consider and dispose of a second appeal, substantial question or questions of law should arise for consideration between the parties.

The impugned order does not indicate whether any substantial question or questions of law arose for consideration between the parties. It is expected Cof the appellant to frame substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal. Sub-Section '(3) of Section 100 C.P.C. states that:

"In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal."

In this view, without stating anything more on merits, the impugned order is set aside.

The appeal is allowed accordingly. The matter is remitted to the High Court to consider whether any substantial q.uestion or questions of law arise E for consideration and then dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law.

Having regard to the fact that the suit is of the year 1982, we request the High Court to dispose of the second appeal within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order.

R.P.

Appeal allowed.
SUNDERBHAI AMBALAL DESAI A v.

STATE OF GUJARAT

NOVEMBER 18, 2002

[M.B. SHAH AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Ss. 451 and 452-Custody and disposal, during inquiry or trial, of property seized by police-Held, in view a/directions given on 111012002* no C further directions are required-However, in a case where accused disputes his involvement in the incident and no article was found from him then such endorsement be taken on the photograph-As regards vehicles, there may not be any necessity of producing the vehicle before the court and the seizure report may be sufficient.

*Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, AIR (2003) SC 638, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2745 of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.6.2002 of the Gujarat High Court in Crl. R.A. No. 241 of 2002.

WITH

S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2755 of 2002.

Ujwal Kumar Jha, Aslam Ahmed, Ranjan Kumar Jha, Nakul Dewan and Ejaz Maqbool, for tlie Petitioner.

S.K. Dholakia and Ms. Hemantika Wahi, for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

In our view, no further directions are required to be given in these

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A matters. However, it is made clear that in case where accused dispute that he is not involved in the alleged incident and no article was found from him then such endorsement be taken on the photograph. Further with regard to the vehicle also, it is made clear that there may not be any necessity of producing the vehicle before the Court and the Seizure Report may be B sufficient. The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of, accordingly.

R.P.

Petitions disposed of.

.,,