SRI MOHAN WAH!

~ ·~

COMMISSIONER, INCOME TAX, VARANASI AND ORS. ~

MARCH 30, 2001

[DR. A.S. ANAND, C.J., R.C. LAHOTI AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.]

Income Tax Act, 1961 :

Section 225(3)-lncome Tax-AYs 1967-68 to 1969-70-Tax recovery ce11ificate issued against assesseejirm-House property belonging to assessee attached and proclamationforsale issued-Auction-purchaser's bid accepted- In appeal, demand of income tax against assessee-firm stood wiped out and reduced to nil-But Tax Recove1y Officer confirmed the sale and issued sale certificate infavourof auction-purchaser-Validity of-Held: If the demand of tax is reduced to nil, Tax Recovery Officer is obliged not to confirm the sale- D R. 56 is neither a redundant nor afonnal provision-It casts an obligation on the Tax Recove1y Officer to confirm the sale consciously-If a subsequent event goes to the root of the matter, Tax Recovery Officer must refuse to confirm the sale-Hence, auction sale set aside-Income Tax Rules-Second Schedule, Rule 56.

E Rule 56 in Second Schedule--AYs 1967-68 to 1969-70-Notice of Demand--Se111ice o, f-Tax recove1y ce11ificate issued against assessee-finn-House proppry belonging to assessee attached and proclamation for sale issued- Auction-pwdwser's bid accepted-In appeal, demand of income tax againstassessee Jinn stood wiped out and reduced to nil-It was also held that the assessee ivas not served 1vith a d.emand notice-But Tax Recovery Officer confinned the sale and issued sale certificate infavourof auction-purchaser- Validity of-Held: Sen>ice of notice of demand on assessee is mandat01y- Non-sen, ice of notice of demand goes to the root of recovery proceedings-Sale .':. of prope11y without service of notice of demand is invalid and liable to "w mmulled.

Words and phrases :

"Reduced"-Meaning of-In the context of S. 225( 3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Appellant and his brother entered into a partnership and income tax H assessments of the partnership firm were finalised for the assessment years 912

SRI MOHAN WAH! v. C.I.T. 913

1967-68 to 1969-70. Recovery certificates were issued pursuant to which the house property belonging to the appellant and his brother was attached and a proclamation for the sale of the property was issued. Respondent No.J's bid was accepted. However, in appeal, the several demands of income tax against the assesseefirm stood wiped out and, therefore, reduced to nil. In the appeal it was also held that the assessee•firm was not served with the demand notice. But the Tax Recovery Officer confirmed the sale and issued a sale certificate in favour of respondent No. 3. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 3. Hence this appeal.

The following question arose before this Court :

(i) Whether the Tax Recovery Officer could have confirmed the sale when the demands on account of tax for the recovery of which tax recovery certificates were issued had admittedly ceased to exist?

(ii) What is the effect of a notice of demand under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 having not been served on the assessce on the sale D held for recovery of arrears of income tax'?

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The term "reduced" occurring in Section 225(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would also include a case where the demand consequent upon an appeal or any proceedings under the Income Tax Act has been reduced to nil. The Tax Recovery Officer is obliged to give effect to such reduction in demand and accordingly amend or cancel the certificate.

The scheme of Part III of Second Schedule indicates that the sale proceedings terminate on their becoming absolute where after all that remains to be done is the issuance of sale certificate. However, an order confirming the sale by the Tax Recovery Officer is a must. The efficacy of the sale by public auction in favour of the highest bidder has been made to depend on the order of confirmation by the Tax Recovery Officer by incorporating Rule 56 in the Schedule. It is true that ordinarily if there is no application filed for setting aside the sale under Rules 60, 61 or 62 of the Income Tax Rules and 30 days from the date of the sale have expired, the Tax Recovery Officer has to make an order confirming a sale. Nevertheless, an order shall have to be actually made. The combined effect of Section 225(3) of the Act and Rules 56 and 63 of the Second Schedule is that if before an order confirming the sale is actually passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, the

demand of tax consequent upon an order made in appeal or other pro ceedings under the Act has been reduced to nil, the Tax Recovery Officer is obliged to cancel the certificate and as soon as the certificate is cancelled, he shall have no power to make an order confirming the sale. The sale itself, being subject to confirmation by the Tax Recovery Officer, would fall to the ground for want of confirmation. [919-E-H]

2. The demand against the assessee admittedly stood reduced to nil.

This fact was in the notice of the Income Tax Officer as well as the Commissioner of Income Tax. In view of the facts within the knowledge of the department, the Tax Recovery Officer could not have confirmed the sale. Rule 56 in the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is neither a redundant nor a formal provision. It casts an obligation on the Tax Recovery Officer to pass an order confirming the sale consciously and with due application of mind to the relevant facts relating to sale by public auction which is to be confirmed. Under Rule 63, confirmation of sale is not automatic. An order confirming the sale is contemplated to make the sale absolute. Ordinarily, in the absence of an application under Rules 60, 61 or 62 having heen made, or having been rejected if made, on expiry of 30 days from the date of sale, the Tax Recovery Officer shall pass an order confirming the sale. However, between the date of sale and the actual passing of the order confirming the sale if an event happens or a fact comes to the notice of the Tax Recovery Officer which goes to the root of the matter, the Tax Recovery Officer may refuse to pass an order confirm ing the sale. The fact that the sale was being held for an assumed demand which is found to be fictitious or held to have not existed at all, in fact or in the eye of law, is one such event which would oblige the Tax Recovery Officer not to pa.s an order confirming the sale and rather annul the same. [920-D-H]

Janak Raj v. Guniial Singh, [1967] 2 SCR 77; SaniarGovindraoMahadik

v. Devi Sahai, Affi (1982) SC 989 and Padanathi/ Ruqmini Amma v. P.K.

Abdulla, JT (1996) 1 SC 381, referred to.

3. Service of notice of demand on the assessee under Section 156 of the Act is mandatory hefore taking steps for recovery under the Second Schedule. Non-service of notice of demand goes to the root of the validity of subsequent proceedings for recovery. A sale held in recovery proceed- H in!}• initiated without serving the notice of demand shall be invalid and

SRI MOHAN WAHi v. C.i.T. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 915

hence shall he liable to be annulled on being called in question. (925-B] A

Income Tax Officer, Kolar Circle v. Seglm Buchiah Setty, (1964) 52 ITR 538; Homely Industries v. Sales Tax Officer, (1976) 37 STC 483; Union of India v. Jardine Henderson Ltd., (1979) 118 ITR 112 and Surinder Nath Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR (1988) SC 1777, referred to.

Ram Swarup Gupta v. Behari Lal Baldeo Prasad, (1974) 95 ITR 339 (All.); Sunil Kumar Singh Dea v. Tax Recovery Officer, (1987) 166 ITR 882 (Ori.); Ghanshyamlal v. State of M.P, (1961) MPLJ SN 218 (MP); Manmohan Lal Shukla v. Board of Revenue, M.P., (1964) l'vlPLJ 32 (MP) and Premchand Ramchand v. Bomd of Revenue, (1964) MPLJ 337 (MP), approved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2488 of2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated ll.1.2000 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 640 of 1999.

M.L. Ve1ma, N.N. Goswami, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Ranbir Chandra, Ms.

D Smuchi Aggarwal, Rajiv Tyagi, B.V. Balram Das, Ms. Sushma Suri, Sushi!

Kumar Jain, Rajesh Kumar and Ms. Neera Gupta for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. The relevant facts are jejune and beyond any pale of controversy. Late Bhagwati Prasad owned a house property described as D-53/91-D, Luxa, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the house property). He had four sons - namely, P, S, R and K. Under his will of the year 1962, probated in the year 1965, the house property devolved upon his four sons.

The elder two sons - P and S, had entered into a partnership known as M/s United Provinces Commercial Cmporation, Luxa, Varanasi (UPCC, for short) dealing in import and sale of heavy machinery and road rollers. The labour troubles resulted in the firm's business collapsing in the year 1967. 'The partners left Varanasi and migrated elsewhere. In the year 1972, Incometax assessments of the firm UPCC were finalised for the assessment years 1967-1968 to 1969-1970. Recovery certificates were issued in 1973-1974 pursuant whereto the house property was attached. On 3.12.1979 a proclamation for sale of the property was issued setting out a demand of Rs.30,82,000 and upset p1ice at Rs.1,70,000. On 11.\.1980, at the public auction, respondent no. 3 made a bid proposing to purchase the property for Rs.1,70,000 (which was the upset price). The bid was accepted by the o!Iicer conducting H

A the sale. An amount of Rs. 42,500 being I/4th of the aGction money, was deposited by the auction-purchaser on l l.1.1980 simultaneously with the acceptance of the bid. The balance amount of Rs. 1,27,500 was deposited on 25.1.1980 within the prescribed period of 15 days.

R, the third brother had died. His widow, Padma, filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Varanasi submitting that the undivided property of the four brothers and in any case the share of the brothers, who were not the partners in the fom, could not have been attached and advertised for sale for recovery of dues against the finn. She also sought for an ad interim restraint on sale. On 9.1.1980, the Court of Civil Judge deemed it not proper to stay the auction sale but nevertheless felt a prima facie case having been made out to stay the confinnation of the auction sale. Accordingly, the Union of India and the authorities of the Income-tax depaitment were directed, through an ad-interim injunction, not to confinn the sale. Jn tl1e year 1984 the auctionpurchaser, respondent no.3 herein, was also impleaded as a party to the suit.

The ad-interim injunction continued to operate until tl1e suit itself came to he dismissed in default of appearance on 12.1.1998. On 13.1.1998 an application for restoration of the suit was filed. On 30. 7 .1999 the suit was restored to file.

The assessments made against the finn UPCC were all ex-pal1e and a E substantial pait of the demand raised against tl1e !inn consisted of penalty and interest. The film agitated the matter in tl1e hierarchy of Income-tax Department. The challenge to the orders of assessment failed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who dismissed tl1e appeals relevant to assessment years 1967-1968 to 1970-1971 as having been filed beyond the F prescribed period of limitation. Four appeals were filed before the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Bench Allahabad. By an order dated 11.12.1987 all the four appeals were allowed. The Tribunal fanned an opinion that there was sufficient cause which had prevented the assessee from filing the appeals before the CIT (A) in time and therefore the appeals were liable to be restored on the file of CIT (A) to be dealt with on merits. It was ordered accordingly.

G During the course of its order the Tribunal upheld a finding of fact recorded by the CIT (A) that "the assessee could not be said to have been served with the demand notice". On being so remanded, the appeals were heard on merits by the CIT (A). Most of the matters relating to demand on account of tax, penalty and interest were resolved at the stage of CIT (Appeals) while the H tax demand referable to 1967-1968 was resolved before the Tribunal. The fact

SRI MOHAN WhHI v. C.LT [R.C. LAHOTI, l.] 917

remains that on different dates in the year 1989 the several demands against A r the assessee finn had all stood wiped ont and therefore reduced to nil. On 26.3.1990 the Income-tax Officer, Ward II, Varanasi wrote to Commissioner of Income-tax, Allahabad that various demands raised against the assessee firm had stood reduced to nil. On 22.11.1996 the assessee firm, Mis UPCC wrote to the Income-tax Officer, Ward II, Varanasi that all demands of tax B and penalties having been cancelled/liquidated, refunds were due and the Tax Recovery Officer may be advised for cancellation of all the recovery certifi- ..... cates. Copy of the application was endorsed to the Tax Recovery Officer. On 16.1.1997 the advocate for the assessee firm wrote to the ITO, Ward-II, Varanasi that in view of all the demands against the firm having ceased to exist and instead refunds having become due to the firm, it may be confirmed c that all the recove1y certificates issued for demands against the firm had stood withdrawn/cancelled. A copy of communication dated 26.3.1990 from ITO, Ward II, Varanasi to the Commissioner of Income-tax was annexed with the

f letter.

In spite of the abovesaid communications, 011 25.3.1998 sale in favour D

of respondent no. 3 was confirmed by the Tax Recovery Officer though only as regard the interest of P and S in the honse property and a sale certificate was also issued to respondent No. 3. The order of L1e Tax Recovery Officer confirming the sale was put in issue before CIT, Varanasi by the firm UPCC .. and its pai1ners P and S, by filing a petition under Section 264 of the Act.

E Vide order dated 21.5.1999, the CIT dismissed the petition forming an opinion that whatever happened after the auction sale held on 11.1.1980 was immaterial and the Tax Recovery Officer had no other option except to con.fitm the sale. S, the petitioner before us then filed the present writ petition laying challenge to the order of Tax Recovery Officer confinning the sale and F issuing sale certificate to respondent No.3 also to the order of C.l.T. dated 21.5.1999. The fact that all the demands against the firm (and the partners) had ceased to exist by 1996 and 1997 is a fact positively asserted in para 5 of the writ petition filed before the High Com1 and not denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax. So also the fact that the demands against the firm UPCC had stood cancelled and this G

fact was communicated by the ITO, Ward II, Varanasi to the Conunissioner -

of Income-tax, Allahabad through his letter dated 26.3.1990 is also admitted

~ in the counter-affidavit. However, the petition has been dismissed by the High Comt. The aggrieved petitioner has filed this petition for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2001] 2 S.C.R.

A Leave granted.

• .

Two questions arise for decision in this appeal : -'\"

(i) Whether the Tax Recovery Officer could have con.tinned the sale on 25.3.1998 when the demands on account of tax for the recovery of which B tax recovery certificates were issued had admittedly ceased to exist; and

(ii) What is the effect of• notice of demand under Section 156 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 having not been served on the assessee on the sale held ..... for recove1y of arrears of income-tax? c Taking up first question the first, according to Section 222 where an assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making a payment of tax, the Tax Recovery Officer may issue a certificate specifying the amount of arrears due from assessee and shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount so specified by one or more of the modes which include

D attachment and sale of the assessee's inunovable properties. The Second Schedule sets out the procedure for recovery of tax. We will refer to some of the rules contained in the Second Schedule and relevant for our purpose.

Rules regarding attachment and sale of immovable property are contained in Part Ill of Second Schedule. Rule 56 provides that the sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder aud shall be subject to confirmation by the Tax E Recovery Officer. Several provisions contained in the rules which follow Rule

" 56 are in pari materia with the provisions dealing with attachment and sale of immovable property contained in Order 21 of the C.P.C. dealing with execution of decrees passed 1iy civil courts. However, in Order 21 of the C.P.C., a provision similar to Rule 56 of Second Schedule is not to be found.

F Rule 60 provides for an application to set aside sale of immovable property being made by defaulter or an interested person on his depositing the specified amount within 30 days from the date of sale. Rule 61 deals with application to set aside sale of immovable property on the ground of nonservice of notice on the defaulter under the Schedule or on the ground of

G material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. Under Rule 62 a sale may be set aside on an application by the purchaser on the ground that the defaulter had no saleable interest in the property sold. The prescribed time limit within which the application can be made under Rules 60, 61 or 62 is - 30 days from the date of sale. Where no application is made for setting aside ..... the sale or such an application having been made is disallowed, the Tax H Recovery Officer shall make an order confinning the sale and thereupon the

--.I

SRI MOHAN WAHi v. C.i.T. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 919

sale shall become absolute. On a sale or immovable property becoming A absolute, a sale certificate shall be issued under Rule 65.

Under Section 224, an assessee cannot dispute the co1Tectness of any certificate drawn up by the Tax Recovery Officer but it is lawful for the Tax Recovery Officer to cancel the certificate for any reason if he thinks it necessary to do so or to correct any clerical or any arithmetical e!Tor therein.

Sub-section(3) of Section 225 provides as nnder:-

225. Stay of proceedings in pursuance ofcertificate and amendment or cancellation thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

(3). Where a certificate has been drawn up and subsequently the amount of the outstanding demand is reduced as a result of an appeal or other proceeding under this Act,

the Tax Recovery Officer shall, when the order which was D the subject-matter of such appeal or other proceeding has become final and conclusive, amend the certificate, or cancel it, as the case may be.

The term 'reduced' in Sub-section(3) of Section 225 would include a case where the demand consequent upon an appeal or any proceedings under tl1e Income-tax Act has been reduced to nil also. The Tax Recovery Officer is obliged to give effect to such reduction in demand and accordingly amend or cancel the certificate. The scheme of Part Ill of Second Schedule indicates that the sale proceedings terminate on their becoming absolute whereafter all that remains to be done is the issuance of sale certificate. However, an order confirming the sale by the Tax Recovery O!licer is a must. The ellicacy of the sale by public auction in favour of the highest bidder has been made to depend on the order of confirmation by the Tax Recovery Officer by incorporating Rule 56 in the Schedule. It is true that ordinarily if tl1ere is no application filed for setting aside sale nnder Rules 60, 61 or 62 and 30 days from the date of the sale have expired, the Tax Recovery Officer has to make an order confirming a sale. Nevertheless, an order shall have to be actually made. The combined effect of Sub-section(3) of Section 225 of the Act and Rule 56 and Rule 63 of Second Schedule is that if before an order confirming the sale is actually passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, the demand of tax consequent upon an order made in appeal or other proceedings nnder the Act

has been reduced to nil, the Tax Recovery Officer is obliged to cancel the certificate and as soon as the certificate is cancelled, he shall have no power to make an order confirming the sale. The sale itself being subject to confrnnation by the Tax Recovery Officer, would fall to the ground for want of confirmation.

In the case at hand the sale was held on 11.1.1980. No application was filed for setting aside the sale either by the assessee or by the auction purchaser or by anyone interested in the property. On expiry of 30 days from the date of the sale the Tax Recovery Officer could have passed an order confirming the sale. However, the Tax Recovery Officer was injuncted by the writ of civil court from confi1ming the sale. The interim order issued by the civil court ceased to operate on 12.1.1998 whereatier an order of confrnnation was passed on 25.3.1998 by the Tax Recovery Officer ignoring, or unmindful of, the important event which had taken place in between. Before 25.3.1998, the demand against the assessee admittedly stood reduced to nil. This fact was in the notice of Income-tax Officer as well as the Commissioner of Income Tax. Attention of the Income-tax Officer as also the Tax Recovery Officer was also invited hy the fi1m Mis. UPCC tlu-ough its conununication dated 22.11.1996 (Annexure P- 6). On 16.1.1997, the counsel for the assessee had specifically called upon the income tax officer who had raised the demand against the assessee to confom ii" all the recovery certificates issued against E the assessee frnn had stood withdrawn or cancelled. In view of the facts within the knowledge of the department aad the communications so made, the Tax Recovery Otlicer could not have confirmed the sale on 25.3.1998.

Rule 56 in Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is neither a redundant nor a formal provision. It casts an obligation on the Tax Recovery F Otlicer to pass an order confi1ming the sale consciously and with due application of mind to the relevant facts relating to sale by public auction which is to be confi1med. Under Rule 63, confi1mation of sale is not automatic. An order confirming the sale is contemplated to make the sale absolute. Ordinarily, in the absence of an application under Rules 60, 61 or

62 having been made, or having been rejected if made, on expiry of 30 days from the date of sale the Tax Recovery Officer shall pass an order confrnning the sale. However, between the date of sale and the actual passing of the order confirming the sale if an event happens or a fact comes to the notice of the Tax Recovery Officer which goes to the root of the matter, the Tax Recovery Officer may refuse to pass an order confinning the sale. The fact that sale was being held for an assumed demand which is found to be fictitious or held --

SRI MOHAN WAH! v. C.I.T. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 921

to have not existed at all, in fact or in the eye of law, is one such event which A would oblige the Tax Recovery Officer not to pass an order confinning the sale and rather annul the same. The High Court in our opinion, clearly fell in enor in not allowing relief to the petitioner-appellant by setting aside the sale.

Shri S.K. Jain, learned counsel for the auction-purchaser, respondent No. 3, referred to Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Anr., (1967) 2 SCR 77 and Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and Anr. v. Devi Sahai and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 989 wherein it has been held that once a sale has taken place in execution of a decree, the sale has to be confirmed notwithstanding the fact that after the holding of the sale, the decree was set aside. In Janak Raj's case, sale was held in execntion of an ex-pane decree. Tue ex-pane decree was set aside subsequent to the date of the sale but before an order confirming the sale was passed. 11iis comt held that in the absence of an application for setting aside the sale having been moved on the grounds available under Rules 89 to 91 of Order 21 of C.P.C., the court could not have refused to confom the sale. However, in this case itself, this comt has observed (at page

80) that there may be cases in which apan from the provisions of Rules 89 to 91 the comt may refuse to confirm a sale, as, for instance, where a sale is held without giving notice to the judgment debtor, or where the comt is misled in fixing a reserved price or where there was no decree in existence at the time when the sale was held. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik's case, Janak Raj's case was refened. The court has drawn a distinction between a court a1'ction held in favour of a decree holder and where the auction purchaser is an outsider or a stranger. In fonner case on the decree ceasing to exist before the sale is confomed, the sale may be refused to be confinned but in tlie latter case, equity in favour of the stranger should be protected and the judgment debtor should be left to snffer for the default on his part for not obtaining stay of the execution of the decree from where it was under challenge. Though the learned counsel for the auction purchaser has relied heavily on these decisions, sutTice it to observe that these are the cases of auction sale held under Order 21 of the C.P.C. and, therefore, may not apply to the case of an auction sale held under Second Schedule of the Incometax Act in view of Rule 56 contained therein. Moreover, in these decisions also, the Supreme Court has contemplated situations where in spite of the auction sale having been held and no application for setting aside the sale having been moved, yet in exceptional situations the sale may be refused to be confirmed and may be set aside. Shri S.K. Jain also relied on Padanathil

A Ruqmini Amma v. P.K. Abdulla, IT (1996) 1 SC 381, wherein this coun has observed that unless the auction purchasers were protected, the properties which are sold in court auctions would not fetch a proper p1ice. It is true that sanctity of sale of property by public auction has to be protected but at the same time a citizen faced with proceedings for recovery of assnmed B arrears should not be deprived of his property in spite of judicial or quasijudicial pronouncement holding, before the sale was confomed, that there were no atTears. This observation applies a fortiori under the scheme of _,.._ Income-tax Act, the relevant provisions whereof have already been refetTd , to by us. ·

C We now take up the second question.

Section 156 of the Act provides as under:-

"56. Notice 4 demand. When any tax, interest, penally, fine or any other sum is payable in consequence of any order passed under this Act, the Assessing Ollicer shall serve upon the assessee a notice of demand in the presc1ibed fonn specifying the snm so payable."

If the amount specified in the notice of demand under Section 156 is E not paid within the time limited by sub-section (1) or extended under subsection(3) of Section 220, then the assessee shall be deemed to be in default under sub-section (4) of Section 220. Tax recovery certificate can be issued under Section 222 when an assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default.

Proceedings for recovery of tax under the Second Schedule can be initiated

F against a defaulter. Thus Section 156 provides for a vital step to be taken by the assessing officer without which the assessee cannot be te1med a def<hllter.

The use of the tenn 'shall' in Section 156 implies that ser\iice bf ilemand notice is mandatory before initiating recovery proceedings"and tonsiitutes •· foundation of subsequent recovery proceedings. " '

I- · . ,.

G We have already stated that the .finding of fact recorded by 0.1.T (Appeals) and the Tribunal was that notice of demand was not served 6n the., assessee. The very foundation for.initiating the recovery proceedings, thereJ '' fore, was non-existent and the assessee could neiihfrhave been deemed 'to'"' be in default nor any proceedings for recovery of tax could have been H , initiated against, him.

SRI MOHAN WAHi v. C.I.T. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 923 ; The provision corresponding with Section 156 of the Income-tax Ac~ 1961 contained in Section 29 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 came up for the consideration of this Court in Income-Tax Officer, Kolar Circle and An1: v.

Seghu Buchiah Setty, (1964) 52 I1R 538. Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held that it is after the demand is made, the tax penalty and interest become a debt due to the Government 'The notice of demand is a vital document in many respects'. Disobedience to it makes the assessee a de faulter. It is a condition preedent to the treatment of the tax as an arrear of land revenue. His Lordship emphasised that the service of notice of demand has a few vital impacts amongst others : (i) when the notice of demand is not complied with, the assessee can be treated as a person in default; (ii) on the failure of the assessee to pay after a notice of demand is issued, the recovery proceedings can be started and the amowll of tax can be treated as an arrear of land revenue .. However, in this case Hidayatullah, J. went on to hold that if an assessment made by the Income-lax O!Jicer is alle:ed reduced

or increased - by reason of any order urrder the Act, it is the duty of the Income-tax Ollicer to issue a fresh notice of demand in the prescribed fom1 D and serve upon the assessee. TI1is particular finding of Hidayatullah, J. created serious complications and resulted in nullifying several recovery proceedings, as also creating bottlenecks in the recoveries of outstanding demands. The Parliament, therefore, enacted Taxation Laws (Continuation and Validation of Recovery Proceedings) Act, 1964 which was given a retrospective effect.

Section 3 of this Act provides that in the event of govcnuncnt demand being reduced by an order in appeal or other proceedings it shall n'1t be necessary for the taxing authority to serve upon the assessec a fresh notice of demand,

it would suffice if taxation authority intimated of reduction to the assessee and the Tax Recovery Ofiicer to scale down the amount of recovery and the proceedings initiated on tl1e hasis of the previous notice of demand shall continue to be valid. To this extent tl1e decision of this Court in Segbu

....ir.

Buchiah Setty was superseded.

In Homely Industries v. Sales Tax Office1; Sector V, Kanpur, (1976) 37 STC 483 also the significance of service of demand notice came up for the consideration of tl1is Court and it was held that there can be no recovery G without service of a demand notice; if such notice was not served, the recovery proceedings are not maintainable in law and are invalid and the same along with the recovery certificates are liable to be quashed.

In Ram Swarup Gupta v. Behari Lal Baldeo Prasad & Ors., (1974) 95 11R 339, a Division Bench of Allahabad High Conrt refctTed to the effect H

A of Taxation Laws (CVRP) Act, 1964 on the law laid down by this court in Seghu Buchiah Setty's case and held :-

"The effect of these provisions is to dispense with the need of issuing a fresh uotice of demand and the recovery certific_ate and to aflow the original recovery proceedings to continue, but only for the amount found due after reduction in the appeal, and it is for this purpose that the taxing authority is required to send intimation of the fact of the reduction to the assessee and to the Tax Recovery Officer. "'- - As the proceedings for recovery can be continued only for the amount that finally remains due, and not for any amount in excess thereof, the requirement of sending intimation to the Tax Recovery Officer becomes an essential duty of the taxing authority and must be held to be a mandatory condition. Non-compliance of that condition will be an illegality in the procedure and will invalidate the proceedings.

A sale held in proceedings initiated and continued for the recovery of an amount in excess of the amount payable by the assessee, after its reduction in appeal, will be invalid. Such a sale is not validated by clause ( c) of Section 3 of the Act."

The Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Ram Swarup Gupta's case was cited with approval before this Court in Union of India v.

Janiine Henderson fol., (1979) 118 !TR 112 though it was distinguished for its applicability to the facts of the case before this Court. 1l1e Division Bench of Orissa High Court has held in Sunil Kumar Singh Deo v. Tax Recovery Officer & Anr., (1987) 166 !TR 882 that non-service of demand notice goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer initiating recove1y proceedings.

F We find ourselves in agreement with the view so taken. Incidentally, we may refer to three Division Bench decisions of the High Comt of Madhya Pradesh, viz., Ghanshyamlal v. State of M.P., (1961) MPLJ SN 218; Manmohan Lal Shukla v. Board of Revenue, M.P. & Ors., (1964) MPLJ 32 and Premchand Ramchandv. Buurd uf Revenue, M.P. & Ors., (1964) MPLJ 337. Section 146 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 provides that before issuing any process G for recovery of arrears of land revenue the Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar may cause a notice of demand to be served on any defaulter. Chief Justice P. V.

Dixit speaking for the Division Benches, in all the three cases, has held that the word 'may' has the imperative meaning of 'shall' and no proceedings for recovery can be initiated without service of notice of demand failing which H the proceedings would suffer from jurisdictional defect. For a long period of

->-

SRI MOHAN WAHI v. C.l.T. [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 925

time the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has been taking this view consistently.

We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that service of notice of demand on the assessee nnder Section 156 of the Act, is mandatory before taking steps for recovery under Second Schedule. Non-service of notie of demand goes to the root of the validity of subsequent proceedings for recovery. A sale held in recovery proceedings initiated without serving the notice of demand shall be invalid and hence shall be liable to be annulled on being called in question.

In Surinder Nath Kapoor v. Union of India & Or!,, AIR (1988) SC C 1777, property was attached and sold pursuant to a garnishee order which was fow1d to be non-existent on account of a nullity attaching thereto. The sale was set aside. This Court held :

"the garnishee order that was passed was a nullity and any sale held pursuant to such an order is also a nullity. It is quite immaterial that D the sale was conti1med. When a decree or order is iUegal, any sale held in execution of such a decree or order and conii1med cannot be set aside on the ground that it was illegal when the sale is in favour of a third party. But, when a decree or order is a nullity, it will be deemed to have no existence at all and any sale held in execution of E such a decree or order must also be held to be null and void."

In the present case, the plea as to non-service of demand notice having been raised before the High Court, in onr opinion the High Court should not have adopted too technical a approach by refusing to deal with the plea because it was not rnised in the manner in which the High Court thought it F _... should have been raised. The plea went to the root of the matter. The plea . was raised before the departmental autho1ities right from the ITO to the Tribunal and was not given up before the High Court also. It would not have been difficult for die High Court to ask the Income-tax Department to produce the record of the proceedings and to show if the demand notice was at all G served on the assessee. A little more sensitive approach is required to be adopted in the process of dispensing justice when it is found that valuable .._... property of a person was sought to be sold away for recovery of such arrears as did not exist at all.

Thus, on both the grounds, we hold tl1at the sale of suit property in H

favour of respondent No. 3 is liable to be set aside. The appeal is allowed.

The impugned judgment of the High Comt is set aside. The writ petition filed by the appellant shall stand allowed. All the proceedings for the sale of the disputed property as also the order of the Tax Recovery Officer confirming the sale are hereby quashed.

The sale having fallen to the ground, the purchase money deposited by the respondent No. 3 shall, obviously, be liable to be refunded to her. She also needs to be compensated by awarding suitable interest for the period for which she has been deprived of the use of her money for no fault of her.

In our opinion, it would meet the ends of justice if the amount of Rs. 1,70,000 deposited by her with the Tax Recovery Officer is directed to be refunded and she is also awarded interest @ 12% per annum. Who should bear the liability for payment of interest'! For the period for which the sale was not vitiated on account of the demand having not been adjudged to be nonexistent, in our opinion, the assessee should pay the interest. Once the demand ceased to exist and that fact was brought to the notice of the Tax Recovery Officer by the assessee, the former should have cancelled the recovery certificate and, therefore, with effect from that date till the date of refond, the interest should be paid by the Union of India, i.e., tl1e Income-tax department, represented by respondent nos. I and 2, which has also kept the money and made use of it. It is, therefore, directed that the amount of Rs. 1,70,000 shall be refonded to the respondent No.3 by the respondents No. 1 and 2 within a period of two months from the date of this judgment.

For the period commencing from 1 ).I .1980 on an amount of Rs. 42,500, and from 25.1.1980, on an amount of Rs. 1,27,500, calculating upto 22.11.1996 the appellant shall pay the interest @ 12% per annmn to the respondent No.3 which may, in default of payment, be recovered from the house property. With effect from 23.11.1996 upto the date of refund, the respondent No. 3 shall be entitled to recover interest at the same rate from respondents No. I and 2. The amount of interest shall also be calculated and paid within a period of two months from today. We make it clear that the interest is being awarded purely on equitable considerations, in the facts and circumstancs of this case, G and in doing so we are not laying down any principle of law to be followed as a precedent. The appeal stands allowed in these te1ms. No order as to the

costs.

v.s.s.

Appeal allowed.