evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. v.

SHRI RISAL SINGH

APRIL 29, 1997

(K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND

G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :

Compensation-Enhanced by reference court-High Court disposed of C all appeals by a common judgment-Appeal by Union of India to Supreme Court in one matter to reduce compensation-Held, appeals having been allowed to become final, question of reducing the compensation need not be gone into-Appeal dismissed with liberty to file review if it is pointed out that appeals have been filed against rest of the matters.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3572 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.91 of the Delhi High Court in R.F.A. No. 203 of 1991.

K. Lahiri, Y.P. Mahajan and S.N. Terdol for the Appellants.

A.B. Rohtagi, A. Mariarputham, Vinode Yadav and Aruna Mathur for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of Delhi High G Court, made on October 30, 1991 in RFA No. 203/91.

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short, the 'Act') was published on 27.7.1984 for acquiring the lands for development of the Delhi city. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 17,000 and Rs. 14,000 per Bigha. On H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1997) 3 S.C.R.

A reference, the Civil Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 25,000 per Bigha. On appea~ by a common judgment, the High Court had disposed of as many as 161 appeals. We are informed that against one of the judgment from that batch, Appeal No. 871/95 was filed and this Court has dismissed the SLP on the ground of delay as well as on merits.

When we asked the learned counsel for the appellants to give the number B of cases, though the case was adjourned from time to time, they have not been able to give any number to be tagged with this appeal for disposal.

In that view of the matter, as many as 161, which we take it for the time being as 159 appeals, against the judgment, appeals have been allowed to become final; as one appeal has been dismissed by this Court solitarily, we C decline to go into and examine the merits in the matter for reducing the compensation. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal. In case the appellants are able to point out at a later date that the appeals have been filed against the rest of 159 appeals, liberty is given to them to file an application for review in this appeal and it should be D considered accordingly.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the above directions. No costs. ·

R.P.

Appeal dismissed.
-'--{___

C.S. JOSHI

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, KANPUR

AND ANR.

MARCH 21, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND KT. THOMAS, JJ.)

Labour Law :

UP. Industlial Disputes Act, 1947:

S. 4-K-Removal from service-Reference to Labour Courr-Labour Court making the award reinstating the workman with 50% 7'Jf back wages-High Court passing a discretional)' order that 25% of back wages would meet the ends of justice-Held, order of High Court being a discretionwy one, no useful purpose would be se1ved by funher remittance-Appeal D dismissed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2553 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.3.96 of the Allahabad High E Court in C.M.W.P. No. 8196 of 1986.

Mrs. S. Janani for the Appellant.

Nikhil Nayyar for T.V.S.N. Chari for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, made on March 29, 1996 in Civil G Misc. Writ Petition No. 8106/86.

The appellant, while working as Lower Division Clerk, is said to have fabricated the record and misappropriated the funds of the respondent Institution. As a result show cause notice was issued and he was removed from service. Subsequently, on a reference under Section 4-K of the U.P. H 333

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1997] 3 S.C.R.

A Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court had in the award directed reinstatement of the appellant with 50% of the back-wages. Thereon, the respondent filed the writ petition. Similarly, the appellant also filed the writ petition. Both the writ petitions came to have been decided on different dates. The writ petition filed by the respondent-institution had come up in

B the first instance where the learned single judge, while maintaining the order of reinstatement, ordered reducing the back-wages to 25%. When the writ petition of the appellant had come up, the learned Judge directed payment of 100% back-wages. The matter was carried in appeal to his Court. This Court set side both the orders and remitted the matter for reconsideration. After remand, the learned single judge considered the C matter and restored the order passed by him on the writ petition filed by the respondent-Management and dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

The learned Judge felt it, in his discretion, to be expedient that 25% of the back-wages would meet the ends of justice. It being a discretionary D order, we think that no useful purpose would be served for further remittance.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

R.P.

E Appeal dismissed.
HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI AND ORS.

STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS~

MARCH 26, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Industrial Diputes Act, 1947 :

S.25-F-Retrenchment-Cooperative Trai11ing Institute in State of C Bihm~Daily wage e111ployee~Te11ni11ation of service~Held, eve1y depa1tme11t of Govemme11t cannot be treated to be "industry''-Wlien appointments are regulated by statutory 1Ules, concept of "industry" to that extent stands excluded'-Disengagement of daily wage employees from service cannot be const1ued to be retrenchment under the Act-Concept of "retrenchment" cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employee~Since they D are only daily wage employee and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrmy.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7957 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.7.96 of the Patna High Court in L.P.A. No. 1231 of 1995.

Ranjan Mukherjee for the Petitioners.

The following Order of the Court was delivtred :

Delay condoned.

This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court, made on 1.7.1996 in LPA No. 1213/95 G confirming the order of the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 2311/95.

The admitted position is that the petitioner No. 1 came to be appointed as Assistant, Petitioner No. 2 as Driver and Petitioner Nos. 3 to 5 as Peons on different dates, viz., on August 1, 1988, November 10, 1989, May 31, 1987 and April 22, 1992. They were appointed in the Co-operative H Training Institute, Deoghar by its Principal. They are admittedly daily wage 368

HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTIII v. STATE 369

employees. Their services came to be terminated by the Principal. Calling A that termination in question, they filed a writ petition in the High Court.

The main grievance of the petitioners before us is that termination of their services is in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The question for consideration, therefore, is : whether the petitioners can be said to have been 'retrenched' within the meaning of Section 25-F of B the Industrial Disputes Act? Every department of the Government cannot be treated to be "industry". When the appointments are regulated by the statutory rules, the concept of "industry" to that extent stands excluded.

Admittedly, they were not appointed to the posts in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the basis of need of the work. They are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, C their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. The concept of "retrenchment", therefore, cannot be stretched to such an e>.1:ent as to cover these employees. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks to contend that in the High Court, the petitioners did not contend that it is a case of D retrenchment but termination of their services is arbitrary. Since they are only daily-wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary.

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.

R.P.

Petition dismissed.
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION,

ALIGARH

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

MARCH 27, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Sections 4(1), 18 and 23.

Land acquisition-Compensation award by Collector--Enhancement C C'f compensation by Reference Cowt-Appeal dismissed by High Co wt on the ground of limitation-Appeal before Supreme Court-field two sale deeds had been filed in support of the claim higher compensation but neither the vendor nor the vendee has been examined to substantiate those documents which is not the evidence legally admissible nor to be considered-17ie approach adopted by the High Cowt as well as the reference Cowt is not D con-ect i11 law-171e award a11d decree of the reference Court and that of the Divisio11 Bench of the High Cowt is set aside-Matter remitted to High Court for fresh disposal i11 accordance with law.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4980-86 E of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.94 of the Allahabad High Court in F.A. No. 271, 270, 273, 274, 268, 272 and 269 of 1994.

Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.

S.K. Verma, Chandra Sekhar, J.M. Khan and M.A. Khan for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

G These appeals by special leave arise from the orders of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, made on October 17, 1994 in F.A.

No. 271/1994 and batch.

The Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act") was published on June 3, 1979 acquiring a total H 389

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1997) 3 S.C.R.

A extent of 24.9 acres of land for public purpose, namely, for establishment of road transport depot. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 11.25 per sq. yard. On reference under Section 18 of Act, the Additional District Judge by his award and decree enhanced the compensation to Rs. 25 per sq. yard. On appeal, the Division Bench of

B the High Court has dismissed the appeals on the ground of limitation.

Thus, these appeals.

On our direction the learned counsel for the parties have placed on record the adduced evidence. It is now admitted position that two sale deeds has been filed in support of the claim of higher compensation but C neither the vendor nor the vendee has been examined to substantiate those documents which is not the evidence legally admissible nor to be considered. The reference Court also did not properly consider the claims in the legal perspective. Thus, we find that the approach adopted by the High Court as well as the reference Court is not correct in law. However, we are not expressing any opinion on merits. We set aside the award and decree D of the reference Court and that of the Division Bench of the High Court.

The matter is remitted to the reference Court with a direction to give opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence afresh, consider the Sf1111e in the light of the law laid down by this Court and then decide the, compensation accordingly within six months from the receipt of this, nrder.

The appeals are, accordingly, allowed but, in the circumstances without costs.

T.N.A.

Appeals allowed.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR, v.

OAMODAR. NA YAK AND ANR.

MARCH 31, 1997'

(K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Se,:.., ice Law-Grant-in-aid Scheml~Entiilen; e,; t to salary 'under tiie

Scl1emespq11de11t appoi11ted as. Lectureuestion 'whether he wds entitled to receive lf'ant-i11-aid for payment of salary from ilie date of his acquire i1ig qualification 01' froli1 the date of i11itial 'ajJpointmeiit-Held admittedly, since the first respo11de11t 011 the date of his appointnlei; t ws not pm:sessing the reqitisite qualification and acquired the sa1i1e only 011 March :21; l989, he will be eligible to the be1tefit of the grant-inaid ~.e.f April 1, 1989 ai1d'oi1- . ·. ·, ' wardS.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2666 of 1997. . .. ' .

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.96 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 3548 of 1996.

E P.N. Misra for the Appellants.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The report of the Registry indicates that the service is complete.

However, the respondents are not appearing either in person or through F counsel.

Leave granted.

The question limited to the notice is : whether the respondent would be entitled to payment of salary under the Grant-in-Aid Scheme from the G date of initial appointment till he improved his qualification or from the date of his acquiring the qualification? The admitted position is that respondent No. 1 came to be appointed as a lecturer in 1976. The Government issued clarification on January 5, 1987 that unqualified lectures having minimum second class, i.e., 48% or above and below 54% of marks in P.G.

H examination and appointed on or after 1.8.1977 in recognised non-Govern- 456

STATE v. DAMODAR NAY AK 457 I

ment Colleges would be eligible to receive grant-in-aid. The Resolution A dated September 13, 1983 issued by the Government prescribes the qualification for recruitment of .L'ecturers of affiliated Colleges which indicates that "candidate not holding an M. Phil degree should possess a high second Class Master's degree, i.e., 54% marks and a second class Honours/Pass in the B.A./B. , Cpm./B:S~. examinafion.", Respondent No. 1 B secured 53.9% marks, hich is almost equivaleiit of 54% niarks, on March 21, 1989. Therefore, the. question arises : whether the second respoµdent is entitled tO receive grantin-aid

0 for payirient of salary to the first respondent from the date of his acquiririg qualification or from the date of initial appointment? Admittedly, slce the first respondent on the date of his appointment was not possessing the requisite qualification anci acquired c. the\ame only oh March 21, 1989 he will be eligible to th~ benefit of the. grant-in-aid w'.e.f. Apr1il, 1989 dnd onwards. . ·. . . . . . . .

The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court passed on April 23, 1996 in OJC No. 3548/96, to that extent stands modified. No costs. · O

T.N.A.

Appeal aJ.lowed.

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RANDHIR SINGH AND ORS.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION

AND ORS.

APRIL 1, 1997

(K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954: Section 3(5).

C 'Land'-Definition of-Buildings occupying the land and used for commercial pzuposes held not covered by Act.

U.P. Zamindari Abolition a11d La11d Refomzs Act, 1950:

Appellallls and respondents holding haats-Question whether such D lands vest in the State on abolition of the estates etc.-Questio11 left opm

since the State is not a party to these proceedings.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1097 and 1098 of 1979.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.77 of the Allahabad High Court in S.A. Nos. 1047-48 of 1970.

T.N. Singh, B.M. Sharma and S.N. Singh for the Appellants.

The following order of the Court was delivered :

F These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, made on 30.11.1977 in Special Appeal Nos. 1047 & 1048 of 1970.

It is not necessary to dilate upon the three-tier history of the litigation. Suffice it to state that pursuant to the remand order made by the High G Court in the last instance, the Deputy Director has gone into the question whether the Settlement Officer under the Consolidation Act has jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Section 3(5) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act defines "land" to mean the land held or occupied for the purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry H which includes pissiculture and poultry form and also the site, being part 488

RANDHIR SINGH v. DY. DIREC'TOR OF CONSOLIDATION 489

of a holding, of a house of other similar structures.

In view of the above definition under Section 3(5) of the Consolidation Act, the buildings occupying the land and used for commercial purposes are not covered by the Act. Therefore, the High Court had lef<. the dispute open for a decision by the appropriate Court.

It is an admitted position that the appellants and the respondents are holding haats in those areas. Under the U.P. Land Reforms Act, 1950 the question whether such lands vest in the State on abolition of the estates

etc. is also a matter left open since the State is not a party to these proceedings. It may be open to the appellants to have their right adjudicated as ordered by the High Court in an appropriate proceeding accord- C ing to law.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeals dismissed.
SEWA RAM AND ORS.

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

APRIL 1, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Enemy Property Act, 1968:

M migrated to Pakistan before 1947 and became citizen of Pakis- C tan-His mother remained in India-After death of his mother he came to India a11d obtai11ed Bhumidari rights-La11d sold to appellants--Respo11dents initiated proceedi11gs i11 respect of property-Appella11ts unsuccessfully filed a suit for inju11ctio11 to restrain the respo11dents from taking possessio11 of the praperty-Revision dismissed by High Court-AppeaHfeld in the circumstance M had no right title or i11terest in property-Accordingly appellant D could not acquire a11y title from M.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2746 of 1980

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.7.79 of the Allahabad High E Court in C.R. No. 84 of 1978.

AB. Rohtagi and Ambrish Kumar for the Appellants.

AK. Srivastava (NP) for the Respondent

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises from the order dated 31.7.1979 of the High Court of Allahabad made in Civil Revision No. 84 of 1978.

The admitted position is that one Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui had G migrated to Pakistan prior to August 14, 1947 and became a citizen of

Pakistan. His mother Kabool Fatima who remained in India died on August 7, 1965. Subsequently, he came to India and appears to have obtained the Bhumidari rights of his mother and sold the property to the appellants. The respondents had initiated proceedings against the property H on the ground that Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui was an enemy and therefore,

SEWARAMv. U.O.I. 491

the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (Act No. 34 of 1968) was applicable. The A appellants claimed title to the property. Subsequent thereto, the appellants filed a suit for injunction to restrain the respondents from taking possession of the property. Ultimately they came to be unsuccessful in the revision before the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

The only question is whether the appellants have acquired any valid B title to the property from Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui, a citizen of Pakistan?

On his acquiring citizenship of Pakistan, M.M. Siddiqui ceased to be a citizen of India and thereby after the demise of his mother, he had no right, title or interest in the land to obtain bhumidari right. The proceedings and ~~~- c

Under these circumstances, since the purchaser cannot have a better title than the seller himself had,. the appellants could not acquire any title by virtue of sale effected by Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

SHRI RAMANA TH PA TNAIK

APRIL 2, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, J.J.]

Se1vice Law-Employee-Date of bi1th-Con-ection of-Date of bilth recorded on the basis of school ceitificate-Superannuation-Suit filed subsequently for declaration of conect date of birih-Dis111issal of suit by Tlial C Cowt-Suit decreed by Fiw Appellate Cowt-Second appeal prefe1red by State dismissed by High Cowt-Appea/ before Supreme Cowt-Held no attempt was made by e111p/oyee to have the record cmrected while he was in service-Any amoulll of evidence produced subsequently would be of no

avai~The High Cowt, therefore, has co111mitted manifest en-or of law in D refusing to ente1tai11 the second appeal.

State of Tamil Nadu v. T. V Vcnugopalan, (1994] 6 SCC 302, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2673 of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.2.86 of the Orissa High Court in S.A. No. 295 of 1985.

P.N. Misra for the Appellants.

N.R. Choudhary for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises from the Judgment of the learned G single Judge of the Orissa High Court, made on February 21, 1986 in Second Appeal No. 767/81, dismissing the second appeal in li111i11e.

Admittedly, the respondent joined the State service as a Clerk on 21.3.1944. According to the Matriculation Certificate produced at the time of the entry into the service, 'his date of birth is January 1, 1921. On H attaining the superannuation, he retired from service on 31.12.1976. He 528

STATEv. RAMANATH PATNAIK 529

filed a suit in the year 1981. on the basis of the rejection of his repre- A sentation for declaration that his correct date of birth is January l, 1925 and not January l, 1921. The trial Court dismissed the suit, but on appeal, the Additional District Judge, Bhubaneshwar decreed the suit. As stated earlier, the second appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

The controversy is no longer res integra. This Court has considered the entire case law on this point in State of Tamil Nadu v. T. V.

Venugo}Jllftm._ ! 1994] 6 SCC 302. Therein, this Court, has held thus :

''It is well known thafthe service record would be opened after the C government servant enters the service record would be countersigned by the government servant. The date of birth as entered in the school record is the source of material for making entry in the service record."

When entry was made in the service record and when he was in D service, he did not make any attempt to have the service record corrected.

Therefore, any amount of evidence produced subsequently would be of no avail. The High Court, therefore, has committed manifest error of law in refusing to entertain the second appeal.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court E stands set aside. The judgment and decree of the appellate Court stands reversed and that of the trial Court stands confirmed. No Costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal allowed.