DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANR. v

VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR

DECEMBER 9, 1997

(S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]

Tenancy and Land Laws :

Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,

1963) : Section 9(2)(a) proviso (as amended by T.N. Act 27 of 1966) and 2( 13)(ii)(a) and 65(1).

 New inam estate-Private land as defined in S. 2( 13)(ii)(a)-Patta-Grant of~To temple as landholder-Land under per- D sonal cultivation of temple not proved-Held: Amended proviso to S. 9(2)(a) applied-Hence, temple exempted from proving personal cultivation for purpose of grant of patta-It makes no difference that exemption from proof of personal cultivation is introduced in S. 9(2) (a) and not in S. 2( 13)(ii)(a)-T71e presumption under S. 65( 1) regarding the land being 1yoti is rebuttable-This presumption gets rebutted because of the introduction of E the exemption to the temple-Cowt can refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Act to take notice of the evil which was sought to be remedied-Interpretation of Staflttes.

Th~ appellant, before the lnam Tribunal (Sub-Court), claimed ryotwari patta in a private laud ou the basis that he had cultivation rights over the said laud. The Tribunal held that the appellant was only a tenant and granted ryotwari patta to the respondent-temple as landowner under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963.

The Appellate Tribunal (Sub-Court) dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. The Appellate Tribunal relied on the amendment by the T.N.

Amending Act 27 of 1966 relating to exemption in favour of a temple from proving personal cultivation and granted the said exemption to the respondent-temple. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.

H Hence this appeal. 282

DEV ADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. v. VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR 283

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the proviso added A in Section 9(2)(a) of the 1963 Act by T.N. Amending Act 27/1966 applied only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not to Section 2(13)(ii)(b) of the 1963 Act and would not help the respondent-temple, that the legislative intention behind T.N. Act 27/1966 was not to grant any exemption in favour of religious institutions and the respondent had to prove personal cultivation B for 3 years within a continuous period of 12 years immediately before 1-4-1960, and that there was a presumption under Section 65(1) of the 1963 Act to the effect that land in an estate was ryoti land, unless it was proved to be a private land by the landholder.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court c

HELD : 1.1. With a view of avoiding hardship to temples in proving personal cultivation as required by Section 9(2)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, the Legisla ture introduced a new provision of exemption by which it sought to exclude D temples from the need to prove personal cultivation under the proviso to Section 9(2) (a) of the 1963 Act inserted by the Tamil Nadu Amending Act 27 of 1966. It is seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act that an exemption from personal cultivation became necessary in respect of temples for proving land as private land. It is, therefore, E permissible for the court to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons to take notice of "the evil which was smight to be remedied" by the Amending Act by removing the said hardship experienced by tmples.

[295-E-G]

Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain, [1985) 1 SCC 1 and F Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Eileen K Patlicia D' Rozmie, [1995) 1 SCC 164, relied on.

1.2. The plain reading of the proviso to Section 9(2)(a) of the 1963 Act after its insertion by the Amending Act 27 of 1966 is that the proof of personal cultivation even for 3 years within a continuous period of 12 years immediately before 1.4.1960 was not required for purposes of grant of ryotwari patta to the temple under Section 9(2)(a). [295-G-H; 296-A]

Shanmugham v. Thintvadutlmrai Adheenam Madam, (1997) 1 L.W.

287 (Mad.), approved.

2. It is true that Section 65(1) of the 1963 Act raises a mandatory presumption that until the contrary is proved, land is to be presumed to be ryoti land. But this presumption is a rebuttable one. The exemption carved out in the body of Section 9(2) (a) helps the temple to rebut the presumption in Section 65(1) of the 1963 Act. While the presumption under Section 65(1) might operate against other landholders claiming ryotwari patta under Section 9(2)(a), so far as the respondent-temple is concerned, proof of personal cult.ivation is statutorily dispensed with, even for the period of three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is how, the statutory presumption gets rebutted. It makes no difference that exemption from proof of personal cultivation has been introduced in Section 9(2)(a) and C not in Section 2(13)(ii)(a) which defines private land.

[296-G-H; 297-A-C; 298-A-B]

Pollisetti Pullamma v. Ka/lwi Kameshwaramma, AIR (1991) SC 604; Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santanaramaswami Odaym; [1968] 2 SCR 754; P.

Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddy, [1976] 3 SCC 665; Periannan v. Amman D Kail, AIR (1952) Mad. 323; Narayudu v. Venkta Ramanamwthi, (1949) 2

MW 623; Mallikmjuna Prasad v. Somaya's Case, ILR 42 Mad. 400 (PC); Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajakapati Somaya, ILR 39 Mad. 341; Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal, _ILR (1946) Mad. 687; Pmish P1iest v.

Thiagagaswam, Appeals Nos. 176 to 178; Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, [1970] 3 SCC 894 and S. 77lenappa Chettiar v. State of T.N., [1986] E 2 sec 275, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8581 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.l.97 of the Madras High F Court in S.T.A. No. 4 of 1993.

R Sundaravaradhan, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, Ms. Kalpana K.

Tripathy for the Appellants.

A.T.M. Sampht and V. Balaji for the Respondent.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Leave granted.

This appeal has been preferred by the legal representative of one Dr.

H Devadoss against the Judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. >·. VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR [ M. JAGANNADHA RAO. 1.]285

Court in Special Tribunal Appeal No. 4of1993 dated 21.1.1997, dismissing A the appeal of the said Dr. Devadoss a legal representative. That was an appeal preferred against the order of the Inam abolition Tribunal (Sub.Court) Thanjavur in CMA No. 23 of 1985, by which the said Tribunal had confirmed the order of the Asst. Settlement Officer (Asst. Law Tax Officer dated 4.5.1985 in T..8.5./EO/PKT 94 (on remand) granting ryotwari B patta to the respondent temple as a landholder under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 26/1963) hereinafter called the 1963 Act).

The dispute relates to the 0.84 cents in S. No. 10/2 and 0.79 cents in S. No. 75, Athaloor Village, Peravoorani Taluk, Thanjavur District.

1he decisioiz of the tribunals : • Before the primary tribunal, the respondent temple claimed patta under Section 9 as the landholder, Dr. Devadoss (hereinafter called the D appellant for convenience) claimed ryotwari patta on the basis that he was having the Kudikani or kudivaram rights. He examined himself as PW 1 and five other witnesses as PW 2 to 6. The temple examined its accountant as RW 1. The appellant claimed that he cultivated the land under orders of the Collector under the Grow More Food Scheme, spent Rs. 5,000 and brought the rocky and waste land under cultivation from 1944 onwards. In E his evidence, he stated that he did not know that the Second of Rights showed that the land belonged to the temple. He had not filed any document to show that he came into possession through proceedings of the Collector under the Grow More Food Campaign. Except to say he was cultivating the land. He admitted he had no document to prove Kudikani rights nor were there any muchilakas executed by the temple in his favour. F

He expressed ignorance of the fact that the Revenue Divisional Record described him as a 'tenant'. He denied the suggestion that the land belonged to the temple. He admitted that in a case filed by the temple against him, the temple claimed it had turvaram-rights. He admitted that Exs. 9 and 10 adangals for 1960, 1961 showed the temple as pattadar and G himself as tenant. PW 2 to 6 supported his case, PW 4, the village accountant from 1946 to 1980 admitted that column 8 of Record of Rights showed the temple as pattadar, the land was inam and that column 8 would record who has got kudikani rights. Column 9 of Record of Rights only indicates the mclwaram rights. RW 1, the present temple Accountant stated that in the Record of Rights, the temple's name was recorded in Column 8. In H

A column 9 - relating to melwaram right - nobody's name is mentioned. He stated that the appellant was only a cultivating tenant and it was so recorded in D.C.P. accounts of temple from 1959 to 1984, the rent being 10 kulams of paddy per year. From 1973, no rent was paid till date and demand notices were issued. The appellant even filed petitions for fixation

B of fair rent under the Tamil Nadu Fair Rent Act during 1965 and 1981 but he withdrew the same and suddenly started claiming kudikani rights. The appellant was not a cultivating tenant under the Grow More Food Campaign.

On this material, the primary authority held that it was clearly C established that the temple was having iruvaram rights and the appellant was only a tenant. It then referred to the exemption in favour of temple from proving self-cultivation in T.N. Act 27/1966 and said :

 "Under the Act 27/66, religious institutions have been exempted from proving personal cultivation. Enjoyment of the petitioner shows enjoyment and possession of the temple".

The primary authority finally held that the temple was entitled to patta under Section 9.

On appeal by the appellant, the appellate Tribunal (Sub-Court) dismissed the appeal. During the hearing, it allowed an application by the appellant for adducing additional evidence consisting of an order dated 1.7.72 in Petition No. 23/72 filed by the temple before the Record Officer, Pattugottai. In the counter thereto (a copy of which was placed before us by the appellants' counsel), the appellant admitted : "No doubt, the applicant (temple) was the landholder" but pleaded that once the Act 26/63 came into force, the land vested in the State and he therefore denied that the temple was the landlord on that the appellant was only a tenant. The application No. 23/72 of the temple above stated "was allowed" and it was held that the appellant was only a tenant. Thal order has become final. The other document produced as additional evidence was the tenancy Register G which again showed the appellant only as a tenant. The appellate Tribunal thus relied on the additional evidence produced by the appellant to hold against the appellant. Appellant relied upon the statut01y presumption in Section 65 of the 1963 Act to say that the land must be presumed to be ryoti. The appellate Tribunal said that in the present ca!.e, "it has been H proved clearly that the entire properties mentioned in the appeal are the

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LR.'i ' VEER.AMAKALI AMMAN KOILATHALURj M.JAGANNADHAR.AO.J.J287

private properties, belonging to the Respondent. Further, it has been A proved by the Respondent through documentary evidence, that the appellant has been cultivating the entire properties mentioned in the appeal, in the capacity as a tenant only. The appellate Tribunal also relied on the amendment by T.N. Act 27 of 1966 relating to exemption in favour of temple from provilling self-cultivation and observed : B

"We could grant exemption to the Respondent, being a Hindu temple, in respect of the lands for which patta is requested as per the Amendment act 27/66, even though the entire properties are not in the enjoyment of Respondent directly."

The decision of the High Cnwt :

The appellant appealed to the High Court, which again held that the appellant had no evidence to prove kudikani rights in himself or his predecessors-in-interest except the kist receipts, that on the other hand,

the records produced would belie the claim of the appellant and the so D called kudikani rights and that this was an indication that the appellant was only a cultivating tenant and not a ryot holding kudivaram interest in the lands in question. The High Court further held that the "very tenancy records produced and marked in the proceedings, militate against such a claim and it only would go to show that, if at all, possession of the lands by the appellant was only as a cultivating tenant and not as a holger of E kudivaram interest or as a ryot lawfully admitted into any ryoti land by conferring kudikani rights."

As regards the plea of the appellant that the temple had no personal cultivation, the High Court too referred to the exemption by T .N. Act 27 of 1966 as follows :

"The tribunal below has rightly placed reliance upon the provisions

of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 under which, the religious institutions recognised and as defined within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, are G exempted from proving personal cultivation as a condition precedent for getting patta in respect of irervaram pannai lands belonging to it."

The High Court, in that respect stated that it had elaborately considered this question in Shamnugham v. 171i1Uvavaduthurai Adheenam Madam H

A (since reported in 1997 (1) L.W. 287) and following the same, the High Court dismissed the appellant's apeal.

171e contentions in this Cowt :

In this appeal, learned Senior counsel for the appellant Shri R.

Sundaravaradan contended that the High Court had not noticed that the claim of the temple was not under Section 2(13)(ii)(a) but was one under Section 2(13)(ii)(b) and that the proviso added in Section 9(2)(a) of Act 26/63 byT.N. Act 27/66 applied only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not Section 2(13)(ii)(b) and would not help the temple. It was also contended that the C legislative intention behind Act 27 /66 was not to grant any exemption in favour of religious institutions and they had to prove personal cultivation for 3 years before 1.4.1960. It was also contended that the temple must prove self cultivation as required by the decisions of this Court in Pollisetti Pu/lamma v. Kallwi Kameswaramma, AIR (1991) SC 604, Chidambaram Chettiar v. Sallthanaramaswami Odayar & Others, (1968) 2 SCR 754 and P.

D Venkataswamy v. Dr. S. Rami Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 665. Counsel also relied upon the presumption in Section 65 of the Act 26/63 to the effect that land in an estate was ryoti land, unless the contrary was proved and also relied upon sub-clause (2) of Section 65 which states that certain expressions to the effect that a tenant had no occupancy right etc. in leases executed E before 19.4.49 would be inadmissible. Counsel, also referred to sub-clause

(3) of Section 65 to the effect that such expression in leases executed after 19.4.49 would not by themselves be sufficient to prove that the land was private land at the commencement of tenancy.

On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent Sri A.T.M. Sampath that, before the lower tribunal and the High Court, the respondent temple relied only upon Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not upon Section 2(13)(ii)(b) as contended by the appellant's counsel and hence T .N. Act 27 /66 squarely applied and on a proper interpretation of the said Act 27/1966 temples were "exempt" from proving self cultivation G even for the 3 year period and it was never intended otherwise. Even assuming that the presumption on Section 65 applied, the propositions 4, 5, 6 laid down by the Full Bench in Pe1iamza11 v. Amman Kail, AIR (1952) Mad. 323 (FB) were still applicable not only because of the exemption provided in T.N. Act 27 of 1966 but also because the decisions in H Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanaramaswami Odayar & Others, (1968] 2

' r

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. >. VEE RA MAKALI AMMAN KOJL A THAL UR [ M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 289

SCR 754, P. Venkataswamy V. Dr. B. Rami Reddy, (1976] 2 sec 665 and A Pollisetti Pullamma v. Kallwi Kameswaramma, AIR (i991) SC 604 imported a wrong test. The said decisions had applied the theory of lands attached to the manors of English nobleman into Indian law and this was not the intention of the legislature either in 1908 or thereafter as pointed out by Viswanatha Sastri, J. in Narayudu v. Venkatas Ramanamwthi, (1949) B 2 MU 6233 (approved by the majority in ReTiannan 's case), Viswanatha Sastri, J. had observed :

"It is all very well when talking of the de mesne lands of an English Duke or marquis to use the term as denoting land appurtenant to the mansion of the lord of the manor. The C menorial system was not prevalent in this country. Zamindar lived in cities and forts for reasons of security and their private lands were not confined to vacant spaces surrounding their palaces or residence."

It is also pointed out that Satyanarayana Rao, J. in the Full Bench stated (at p. 329) that in fact, these lands granted to the Zamindars were not granted near their houses nor at one place but "were distributed very often

to each village to make the supervision effective." Satyanarayana Rao, J. therefore held that the contention on behalf of the ryot that it was necessary for the landholder to prove that atleast at some time or other, the E lands were under actual personal cultivation of the landholder, could not be accepted. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent-temple that the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 applied to Zamindars etc. and even assuming that for proving land as private land they had to prove that the land was appurtenant to manors or castles, such F a principle of self cultivation of lands around manors could not be extended to landholders in whose favour grants of whole villages (which were brought under the definition of estate in 1936) were made nor to palts of main villages which now under Madras Act 26/1963 are to be treated as new inam estates. The legislature must have known that these small landholders had to manors. Nor could, it is argued for the respondent, a G deity in a temple be equated with an English hopleman having manors and land appurtenant thereto. It was also pointed out that the case decided by the Privy Council in Mallikmjune Prasad V. Soma)J'a's case (!LR 42 Mad. 400 (PC)) which affirmed the decision of the Madras High Court in Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajakapati Soma>J•a, (ILR 39 Mad. 341) and H

A which was relied upon by this Court in Clzidambaram Chettiar's case (1968] 2 SCR 754, was as case of conversion of ryoti land into private land for which actual cultivation had to be proved and it was not a case where Section 3(10) fell for interpretation. This aspect was pointed out by Satyanarayana Rao, J. in the Full Bench case (at p. 329). It was also

B contended that this Court in Chidambaram Chettiar's case adopted the law as stated in Jagadeesan pillai, v. Kuppammal, ILR (1946) Mad. 687 of the Madras High Court (though no express reference was made to that decision) and that that decision related to lands in a village which were in fact part of Tanjore Palace Estate and it might be that the manorial concept applied to the lands connected with the Tanjore Palace. It was pointed out C for the respondent that the other judgment of the Madras High Court in

Pmish P1iest v. Thiagagaswam (appeal No. 176 to 178) merely followed Jagadeesan Pillai's case relating to Tanjore Palace Estate, and that, even Chidambaram chettiar's case decided by this Court related to lands in Orathur Padugal in Tanjore Palace Estates to which perhaps the manorial D concept could apply. It was contended for the respondent further that the later decision of this Court in P. Venkataswami v. Dr. S. Rammi Reddy, AIR (1976) SC 1060 merely followed Chidambaram Chettiar's case and that Pollisttli's case which related to an inam estate also wrongly applied the manorial concept by following Chidambaram Chettiar's case and that it was

not the intention of the legislature to import these concepts into the Madras Estates Land Act in 1906 or thereafter.

Contention by respondent - landholder based on Pe1ianna11 's case need not be gone into :

In view of the alternative submission of the respondent based on T.N. Act 27, 1966, it is not necessary for us to go into the above contention that the decisions of this Court, ought not have applied the concept of lands appurtenant to the manors of English nobleman, to the case of private land of landholders under the Madras Estates Lands Act, 1908. Nor is it G necessary for us to deal with the contention based on Pe1ia11na11's case, we therefore do not propose to go into the said controversy. We are of the view that for the purpose of the case before us, it will be sufficient, as shown hereinafter, to rely upon the T.N. Act 27/1966. We shall therefore proceed to deal with this alternative submission made on behalf of the H learned counsel for the respondent -temple.

DEVADOSS (DEAD) RY LRS. " VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOILATHALUR f M. JAGANNADHA RAO. J.J 291

• Altemative contention of temple landholder based 011 exemption by T.N. Act, A 27/66 :

We shall start with T.N. Act 26 of 1963. The legislative history behind the abolition of existing inam estates and new inam estates specified in the T.N. Act 26/63 has been set out in detail in two decisions of this Court in B

Klza; amian Wakf Estates Etc. V. State of Madras and Anot/1e1; (1970] 3 sec 894 a11d in S. Tlzenappa Chettiar & Othe1~· v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1986] 2 SCC 275 where the vires of the Act and its amendment of 1969, respectively, were upheld. There is an elaborate discussion in these rulings about melvaram and kudivaram rights and rights of ryots in ryoti land under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, its amendment in 1936 and the C Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and about different types of inam estates and their abolition from time to time.

Existing and new inam estates :

Under the T .N. Act 26 of 1963, estates which were sought to be abolished and converted into ryotwari and for which ryotwari pattas were proposed to be granted related to existing inam estates and new inam estates. Section 2( 4) defined existing inam estates as an inam village which became an estate by viltue of the Madras Estates Land (Tl1ird Amendment) Act, 1936 while new inam estate was defined in Section 2(9) as 'part village inam estate or a pudukottai inam estate'. Section 2(11) defined pa1t village inam estate as a part of a village (including a part of a village in the merged territory of pudukottai) the grant of which part has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, such part had been partitioned among the grantees or the successor -in-title of the grant of grantees. (This definition was amended by T.N. Act 23/69 w.e.f. 15.2.65 in certain respects). Section 2(11) contains two Explanations. I and II .

'Private land' in new 'inam estates' :

We next come to the crucial definition of private land in respect of new inam estates in Section 2(13) of Act 26/1963 and to the proviso in Section 9(2) which deals with grant of ryotwari patta to landholders in respect of new inam estates.

. , __ A At the outset, we may make it clear that our reading of the judg- • ments of the tribunals below and of the High Court shows that the respondent-temple nowhere relied upon Section 2(13)(ii)(b) of the !963 Act as contended for by the appellant and that the parties on both sides proceeded on the basis that the case of the temple was based only on B Section 2(13)(ii)(a). We shall therefore examine the contentions of the respondent-temple with reference to Section 2(13)(ii)(a). We shall therefore refer to the definition of private land as applicable to new inam est<ites and to the rights of landholders for grant of ryotwari patta in new inam estates.

C So far as new inam estates are concerned Section 2(13)(ii) defines

p1ivate land as :

"(a) the domain or home farm land of the landholder by whatever designation known, such as Kambattam, Khas, Sir or Pannai; or

(b) Land which is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock for a continous period of twelve years immediately before the 1st day of April, 1980, provided that the landholder has retai11ed the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land or ........ "

It will be noticed that, we are here concerned with Section 2(13)(ii)(a) only.

Grant of 1yotwari patta to la11dholder i11 11ew i11am estates :

So far as grant fo ryotwari patta in respect of new inam estates to .

F the landholder is concerned, the same is provided in Section 9(2)(a). Before amendment by Act 27/66, Section 9(2) of the Act of 1963 provided that the landholder will be entitled to grant of ryotwari patta in respect of.

"(a) all land which immediately before the notified date belonged to him as private land; provided that in the case of private land specified in clause 13(ii)( a) of Section 2, such land is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by his own servants

or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, for a continuous period of three years within a period to twelve years immediately before the 1st day of April, 1960; ......... "

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS." VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR [ M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.)293

We are here concerned with the proviso in Section 9(2)(a) which, for the A purpose of proof of private land under Section 2(13)(ii)( a), permits proof of cultivation for 3 years out of 12 years before 1.4.1960, \

The next question is whether, by virtue of the Amending Act 27/66, even the requirement of 3 years cultivation was dispensed with, so far as B claims for ryotwari patta by temples under Section 9(2)(a)? We shall accordingly refer to the amendment brought out by the T, N, Amendment Act 27/66 which amended Act 23/63. Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3 of the amending Act 27 of 1966 brought into force the following amendments to Section 9(.!)(a) and Section 9(2)(a) of the Principle Act 26/63. Section 3 stated :

"In Section 9 of the Principal Act,

(i) In item (2) of the proviso to clause (a) of subsection (i) for

the words is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder D himself', the word "is, in the case of the landholder other than a religious institution, proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself' should be substituted.

(ii) In the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (2) for the expression "provided that in the case of private land specified in clause E l3(ii)(a) of Section 2, such land is proved", the expression "provided that in the case of a landholder other than a religious institution, the private land specified in clause (13)(ii)(a) is proved". shall be substituted."

F We are concerned here with the second para, extracted above which concerns the proviso in Section 9(2)(a) and to the Explanation added by sub-clause (iii) of Section 3 which states that for the purposes of the proviso in Section 9(2)(a) "religious institution" shall mean a religious institution as defined in clause ( 18) of Section 6 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 22 of 1959), G

In order to understand the background of the abovesaid Amending Act 27/1966 we shall refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which preceded T.N. Act 27/66. It is stated in para 6 of the said Statement as follows : H

"According to the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) and the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act, in the case of private land, in order that the landholder shall be entitled to ryotwari patta, the land must be proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself or by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of three years within a period

Of twelve years immediately before 1st April, 1960. This applies to religious institutions also."

It was explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as follows :

"So far as religious institutions governed by the Madras Hindu Religious and' Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 22 of 1959) are concerned, under the rules made under that Act, such religious institutions are prohibited from canying on pannai cultivation without obtaining the previous approval of the Deputy Commissioner of the division concerned. In view of this, the religious institutions have not been canying on pannai cultivation and consequently they will not be satisfying the requirement of the provisos refe1red to above, this causes undue hardship to such institutions and it is proposed not to insist on personal cultivation for three years for the purpose of grant of ryotwari patta in the case of private lands of religious institutions governed by the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, 1959.

The bill seeks to achieve the above objects."

F It is therefore seen from the said Statement of Objects and Reasons that an exemption from personal cultivation became necessary in respect of temples for proving land as private land, inasmuch as, temples were, under the Rules made under the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 prohibited from having pa11nai cultivation except with permission of competent G authority.

Whether Statement of Objects & Reasons of Act 27166 could be looked into :

Question arises naturally whether the Court can refer to the State- H ment of Objects and Reasons mentioned in a Bill when it is placed before

I I

DEV ADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. ,, VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOILAIBALUR [ M JAGANNADHA RAO, J.]295

the Legislature and even if it is permissible, to what extent the Court can A make use of the same. On this aspect, the law is well settled. In Narain Knamman v. Panduman Kumar Jain, [1985] 1 SCC 1 (B). It was stated that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative Bill could not be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it was pennissible to refer to the same B for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the sorrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. (See also Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Eileen K. Pat1icia D'Rozarie, [1995] 1 SCC 164.

In our view, the Legislature of Tamil Nadu was aware that in almost C every case where a temple landholder was contending that certain land was private land and not ryoti land. and where the landholder was claiming ryotwari patta under Section 9 of T.N. Act 26/1963, the tenants were invariably raising a plea that the temple must prove for purposes of Section 9(2)(a) that the land was before the notified date, being cultivated by the D landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired Labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, under Section 9(2)(a), proof of personal cultivation was required atleast for a continuous period of 3 years within a period of 12 years immediately before 1.4.1960.

The legislature, however, noticed that under the Rules made under E the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 temples were prohibited from pannai cultivation without obtaining the previous approval of the Deputy commissioner and that therefore it would be difficult for temples to prove personal cultivation as required by Section 9(2)(a), with a view to avoid hardship to temples in proving pannai cultivation, the legislature thefore thought of F introducing new provision of exemption by which it sought to exclude temples from the need to prove personal cultivation under tlie proviso to Section 9(2)(a).

It is therefore permissible for the Court to take notice of "the evil G which was sought to be remedied" by the Amending Act 27/1966 by removing the said hardship experienced by temples. In our view the plain meaning of the proviso, after the amendment of 1966 is that, so far as the temples covered by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 were concerned, the proof of personal cultivation even for 3 years within a continuous period of 12 years immediately before 1.4.1960 was not required, for purposes of H

A grant of cyotwari patta to the temple under Section 9(2)( a).

In our opinion, the tribunals below and the High Court were right in applying the Amending provisions of Act 27/1966 so far as the respondenttemple was concerned, we may add that the judgment of the Madras High Court in Shammugham's case (1997) 1 L.W. '2J37 in so far as it had taken B the same view mentioned by us in this judgment, to that extent, is correct.

The presumption under Section 65, if rebutted :

Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly relied on the statutory presumption in Section 65 of the T .N. Act 26/1963 to the effect that land C is to be presumed to be ryoti land unless it is proved to be private land by the landholder. Section 65 reads as follows :

"S. 65(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), when in any proceeding under this Act it becomes necessary to determine whether any land is a ryoti land or a priavate land, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such land is a ryoti land.

(2)(i) any expression in a lease, patta or the like executed or issued on or after the 1st day of July 1918 in the case of an existing inam estate and the 19th day of April 1949 in the case of a new inam estate to the effect or implying that a tenant has no right of occupancy or that his right of occupancy is limited or restricted in any manner shall not be admisible in evidence for the purpose of proving that the land concerned was private land at the commencement of the tenancy.

(ii) any such expression in a lease, patta or the like executed or issued before the 1st day of July 1918 in the case of an existing inam esate and the 19th day of April 1949 in the case of a new inam estate shall not by itself be sufficient for the purpose of proving that the land concerned was private land at the commencement of the tenancy."

Now, it is true that the Section 65(1) raises a mandatory presumption that until the contrary is proved, land is to be presumed to be ryoti land.

But this presumption is a rebuttable one. In the normal course, to prove H that the land is private land the landholder, so far as new inam estates are

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS." VEERAMAKALI AMMAN KO!LATHALUR[ M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.]297

concerned, could establish, under Section 2(13)(ii)(a), that the land was A domain land or home farm of the temple, by whatever designation known such as, kamipattam, khas, sir or pannai. But the question is as to what extent the exemption granted by Madras Act 27/66 helps in this behalf.

It is contended for the appellate that the respondent cannot rely B upon the exemption from self cultivation introduced in Secti0n 9(2)(a) inasmuch as the said exemption does not find a place in the definition of private land in Section 2(13)(ii)(a).

It is true that the exemption from proof a personal cultivation has been introduced by the legislature in the proviso to Section 9(2)(a) which C deals with grant of ryotwari patta to the landholder and not in Section 2(13)(ii)(a) which defines private land'. But, as pointed by the Madras High Court in Shanmugham 's case ( 1997) 1 L W 2B7 that makes no difference. In that case Raju, J. observed (at p. 295) :

D "The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants that the amendments introduced by the provisions contained in Section 9(2) without corresponding amendment of the definition of private land in section 2(13) will not enure to the benefit of the landholder Adheenam effectively, is a mere futile attempt to wriggle out, some how, of the inevitable consequences flowing out of E Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, enacted with a definite purpose and aim and the legislature in our view, achieved the same effectively by excepting the religious institutions from the necessity to prove personal cultivation for the required period unlike the other class or category of landholders and the efficacy of the amendments F introduced to Section 9 which relates to the grant of ryotwari patta in favour of a landholder religious institutions, does not in any way depend upon any further amendment being made to Section 2(13) of the Act. Irrespective of the definition clause in Section 2(13) and the criteria laid down therein, it is always open to the legislature, to carve out a distinct class in the operative provisions of the G Act by way of exception to meet out a special treatment."

and referred to the opening words in Section 2, "unless the context otherwise requires." In our view, the approach of the High Court in this behalf is perfectly justified.

A If therefore, we go by the exemption carved out in the body of Section 9(2)(a), then the said provision itself helps the temple so far as new inam estates with which we are concerned, to rebut the presumption in Section 65(1) of the Act 26/1963. In other words, while the presumption under Section 65(1) might operate against other land holders claiming B ryotwari patta under Section 9(2)(a), the position so far as temples governed by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 are concerned, proof of personal cultivation is statutorily dispersed with, even for the period of three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is now, the statutory presumption gets rebutted.

C For the above reasons, we uphold the conlusion arrived at by the Madras High Court which affirmed the grant of ryotwari patta to the respondents.

It is therefore held that the authorities were right in granting ryotwari patta to the respondent-temple and in treating the Dr. Devadoss only as D an ordinary cultivating tenant in the private land of the temple.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.

v.s.s.

Appeal dismissed.