evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
LOKSHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL AND ANR.

RAJENDRA KUMAR AJABRAO MAHALLE AND ORS.

MAY 5, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Alticle 226-Writ petition-Stay of impugned orde,-..Education Depmtment of State of Maharashtra-Appointment given for one academic session C specifically mentioning in the letter of appointment that at the end of the session, services would stand tenninated without notice-Inf ollowing year no appointments made-Appellant approaching Tlibunal for continuation of service-Tribunal held tennination illegal-Wlit petition by State-High Coult

vacated the order of sttIJHeld, the finding recorded by the Tribunal is clearly unwan-anted-The case was clearly for the stay of order of the Tribunal D pending disposal of writ petition-Order of High Coult set aside-Writ petition to be di; posed of expeditiously-:-Service Law-Appointment for fixed period.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civii Appeal No. 3619 of 1997.

From the .Judgment and Order dated 19.2.97 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 3520 of 1995.

A.K. Sanghi for the Appellants.

V.A. Mohta, Pramit Saxena and S.V. Deshpande for the Respon- F dents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted. We have heard counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the interim order passed by the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, made on February 19, 1997 in Writ Petition No. 3520/95.

The respondent was appointed on July 9, 1992 for a period of one

year. The appointment order read as under : H 89

SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997]SUPP.1S.C.R.

"Your appointment is purely temporary for a period of one year from 9.7.92 to end of Session, in the leave/deputation/vacancy.

After expiry of the above period your services shall stand terminated without any notice."

Subsequently, no appointment was given to the respondent as indicated in the order of the Division Deputy Director of Education (Genl.), dated May 19, 1994 sent on May 21, 1995 which reads as under :

"That due to refusal of sanction and provisions from the State Government for the year 1993-94, no sanction was granted for any class on grant-in-aid basis.· Information to all Heads of Schools should be sent through Deputy Director of Education, Education Officer (Secondary) and Education Inspectors, Bombay."

Thus, it could be seen that for the year 1993-94, no appointment came to be made. The respondent filed an appeal in the Tribunal for D directions. The Tribunal held that he had been appointed against a permanent vacancy and the Head Master had no authority to pass an order of termination. In the face of the appointment order, such finding recorded by the Tribunal is clearly unwarranted. When a writ petition was filed seeking suspension of the order, the High Court vacated the order of stay made in the impugned order. In the aforestated facts, the case was clearly E for the stay of Tribunal order pending disposal of the writ petition.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court stands set aside. The High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible. No costs.

F R.P.

Appeal allowed.

>..
R. V ARADARAJAN

THIRUMANGAI NAIDU AND ORS.

MAY 5, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Article 136-Appellant, by suppressing the facts, got notice is- C sued--Notice withdrawn-Appeal dismissed with cost quantified at Rs. 5,000 payable by appellant to Supreme Cowt Legal Services Committee-Rent and Eviction.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3640 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.1.96 of the Madras High Court in S.A. No. 1673 of 1982.

M.N. Padmanabhan, Puja Anand and Revathy Raghavan for the Appellant.

Harish Salve and A. V. Rangam for the Respondents.

The follo'Ying Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

Notice on the limited question of compensation to the respondents in respect of the building in question, was issued on August 6, 1996, on the premise that the appellant himself was in possession of the building. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that the appellant has G let out the building to one Jasmirie Electricals on a monthly rent of Rs.

1000 and that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the premises.

In the rejoinder, it is admitted by the appellant in paragraph 8 which reads as under:

"It is true that 1 had let out to one Jasmine Electricals, but that is H only from 1993 and not earlier. It is totally incorrect to state that 94

R.VARADARAJAN v. T.NAIDU 95

I have been realising the rental income from the property since A 1968."

The admission thereby that he has let out the premises gets proved.

One Mohd. Rafeeq filed O.S. No. 6/97 in the Court of the District Munsif of Cuddalore for injunction against the owner. Therein, he stated that he entered into an agreement of lease on March 11, 1987. Further fresh deed B was executed on _April 30, 1990. He claimed injunction on the basis of the directions issued by this Court. Thus it could be seen that the appellant has suppressed thes'e material facts before getting the notice issued. Notice is accordingly withdrawn.

The appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000 payable by the appellant to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within 30 days from today. In case he does not pay the costs, the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee is at liberty to have this order executed as a decree.

R.P .

Appeal dismissed.
AJIT PRASAD GUPTA

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

JULY 10, 1997

[DR. A.S. ANAND AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]

Co11stitutio11 of India, 1950 : Article 32

Writ petition-Abuse of process of Cowt--lmposition of costs f01~Ter- C 111inatio11 of se1vices of petiti01w~Wlit petition challenging the orde1~Dis

missal of writ by High Court-Thereafter petitioner filed petition after petition questioning the tennination orde1~Dismissal of SLP by Supreme Cowt--1-Viit filed thereafter-Practice of filing petition after petition co11demned-Held 110

litigant has light to unlimited drought on Court time-Finality of judicial proceedings must be accepted at some state-Writ petition dismissed with D costs.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No ....... (D. 21228/96).

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

De basis Misra for the Petitioner. (NP)

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This case has been called even after the list is revised, but nobody F appears.

A perusal of the writ petition shows that filing of this petition is a total abuse of the process of this Court. The petitioner, whose services were terminated on 5.1.1972, questioned the order of termination through writ petition No. 9484/74, which was dismissed by the High Court on 23.8.1974.

G He allowed that order to acquire finality and later on filed a representation against termination of his services to the State which was also dismissed on 16.9.1975. Undeterred, he once again questioned the order of termination by filing a petition before the U .P. Public Service Tribunal. That petition came to be dismissed on 4.4.1979. The petitioner filed yet another writ H petition No. 4536/79, for the same cause which was dismissed by the High 258

AP. GUPTA v. STATE 259

Court on 16.8.1979. A review petition against that order was dismissed on A 16.1.1980 and an application under Article 133 of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court on 26.3.1980. The petitioner filed special leave petition No. 536/81 which came to be dismissed by this Court on 13.2.1981.

The petitioner has now filed yet another writ petition putting the same B termination order in issue. We take a serious view of the matter and condemn this practice of filing petition after petition. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on court time and public money in order to get the affair settled in the manner he wishes. Finality of judicial proceedings must .be accepted at some stage. We cannot allow the process of the court to be abused in the manner it has been done by the petitioner in this case. We C dismiss this writ petition with Rs. 5,000 as costs. The costs shall be deposited with the Registry, within eight weeks, in the account of Supreme Court Legal Services Authority.

T.N.A Petition dismissed.
MIS SUNDARAM SPINNING MILLS A v.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS

JULY 9, 1997

[S.C. AGRAWAL AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.) B

Income Tax Act, 1961 :

Extra shift allowance-Claimed by assessee--Entitlement of-c!nrespect of the machinery added on the basis of double and tJiple shifts worked by the C entire concem-Held, entitled.

Appeal filed by the assessee before the High Court on the question of entitlement of extra shift allowance in respect of the machinery added during the previous year on the basis of double and triple shifts worked by the entire concern was answered in the negative. Hence this appeal by the D assessee.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: In view of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 3179- 81182 on July 9, 1997, and for the reasoning given therein, question referred E to is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. [88-D-EJ

Mis South India Viscose Ltd. v. Commissioner of fllcome Tax, [1996) SCR [1997) Vol. 6 SCC 393, relied on.

Mis South India Viscose Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 135 ITR F 206, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 376 of 1985. .

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.4.84 of the Madras High G Court in T.C. No. 68 of 1980.

Ms. Janki Ramachandran for the Appellant.

Dr. V. Gaurishankar, B. Krishna Prasad and S. Rajappa for the Respondent.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. This appeal by the assesscc is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated April 25, 1984 whereby the following question was answered in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue :

"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee is entitled to extra shift allowance in respect of the machineries added during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1970-71 on the basis of double and triple shifts worked by the entire concern?"

The High Court has placed reliance on its earlier judgment dated April 24, 1984 in T.C. No. 1053-54 of 1979, Commissioner of Income Tax

v. Mis South India Viscose Ltd., which was based on the judgment in Mis South India Viscose Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 135 ITR 206. Civil D Appeal Nos. 3179-81/82 filed against the said judgment of the High Court reported in 135 ITR 206 have been allowed by our judgment pronounced , today and a similar question has been answered in the affirmative. For the reasons given in the said judgment of this Court the question referred must be answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assssee and against the Revenue. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment E of the High Court is set aside and the question referred is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.

R.K.S.

Appeal allowed.
KANHAIYA LAL SETHIA AND ANR.

A v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

AUGUST 4, 1997

[DR: AS. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Article 32, VIII Schedule-Writ petition seeking a direction to Union of India to introduce a Bill in Parliament to include Rajasthani language in the C VIII Schedule-c--Held, petitioner is not vested with any fundamental right to compel the Union of India to bring forth a particular legislation-Writ petition dismissed-The Challenge "in the alternative" to 71st Amendment Act of 1992 is without any merit.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 356 of D 1997.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Vijay Hansaria and Sunil K. Jain for M/s. Jain Hansaria & Co. for the Petitioners.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

In this Writ Petition, filed by way of 'Public Interest Litigation', the petitioners have prayed as follows :- .

(a) direct respondent No. 1 (Union of India) to introduce an Official Bill in the Parliament to include Rajasthani language in . the Vlllth Schedule to the Constitution; or to sponsor a Private Member's Bill to be introduced on this subject;

Or, in the alternative :

strike down the Constitutional (71st Amendment) Act of 1992 by which Manipuri, Konkani and Nepali found their places in the VIIIth Schedule, to the constitution being violative of one of the basic structures of the Constitution, viz. equality' 245

SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1997] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

AND

(b) pass such order/orders or give such direction/directions as your Lordships may deem fit and proper.

To include or not to include a particular language in the VIIIth Schedule is a policy matter of the Union. Generally speaking; the Courts do not, in exercise of their power of judicial review, interfere in poliy matters of the State, unless the policy so formulated either violates the mandate of the constitution or any statutory provision or is otherwise actuated by ma/a fides. No such infirmity is present in the instant case.

The petitioner is not vested with any fundamental right to compel the Union of India to bring forth a particular legislation or to exercise its discretion in the Parliament in a particular manner. It is, thus, not open to the petitioner to seek a direction to the Union of India "to sponsor a Private Member's Bill to be introduced on this subject".

Insofar as the challenge to the constitutional validity of the 71st Amendment Act of 1992 by which Manipuri, Konkani and Nepali were included in the VIIIth Schedule is concerned, we fail to see how the inclusion of those languages violates any "basic structure of the Constitution" as alleged by the petitioners. The challenge, "in the alternative", is E without any merits.

This writ petition und;:r Article 32 is misconceived and it is, accordingly, dismissed.

R.P.

Petition dismissed.
r~J '{

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

STATE OF NAGALAND AND ORS.

DECEMBER 17, 1997

[SUHAS C. SEN AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 : A1ticle 136

Appeal by Special Leave-Appeal against interim orddr--Jn the meanwhile writ petition also heard at lengt.h-Held, since the judgment was likely to be pronounced shortly inte1fere11ce with interim order was not called for at this stage.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8858-61 of 1997 Etc.

D From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.97 of the Gauhati High Court in C.R. No. 4986 of 1997.

Ashok H. Desai, Attorney General of India, A.K. Goel, Adv.

General, Kavin Gulati, Pradeep Misra, R.B. Misra and Kamlendra Misra for the Appellant.

Shanti Bhushan, P.K. Goswami, Dr. AM. Singhvi, C.K. Sasi, Kailash Vasdev, Pradeep Agarwal, N.B. Khatwada, Ms. Pratibha Jain and Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Leave granted. Although elaborate arguments have been advanced by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India and Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behalf of the State of Nagaland. We will not go into the merits of the case at all. We have been informed that the writ petition even al the G admission stage has been heard at length. The judgment is awaited. This is only an appeal from an interim order. Since the judgment is going to be pronounced shortly we are disinclined to interfere with the interim order passed at this stage. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The Court hearing this matter will be H 593

SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997}SUPP.6S.C.R.

A entirely free to decide the case in accordance with law. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

T.P. Nos. 418-421/97

In view of the above decision in SLP (C) Nos. 21304 07/97, no order B is passed on the Transfer petitions at this stage. The Transfer Petitions are also disposed of accordingly.

T.N.A.

Appeal and T.P. disposed of.