evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
M/S. RAAG RANG AND ANR. v.

THE GENERAL MANAGER, DELHI TELEPHONES

AND ORS.

APRIL 3, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P: WADHWA, JJ.]

Telegraph Act, 1885: Section 11-A.

Telephone--Payme11t due against-Disputed question off act whether payment has been made or not-Held cowt cannot satisfactorily decide the C dispute--Altemative arbitration under section 11-A of the Telegraphs Act is available for adjudication of the dispute-It is open to the appellants either to make payment of the bill or submit an application to the competent auth01ity to adjudicate the dispute and on such application being made appropriate decision would be taken.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3660 of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4.86 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 750of1986.

Mukul Mudgal for the Appellants.

Ms. Bharati Anand (NP) for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The appellants claim that they have paid a sum of Rs. 5,370.35 together with reconnection charges of Rs. 50, nonetheless, there is a thn; at of disconnection to the appellant. In the letter, Annexure-E at page 36 of the paper book, it is stated as under :

G "Please refer to this letter of even No. dated 8.11.85 regarding payment of telephone dues pertaining to telephone No. 386056.

You may please recall your visit to Sh. K.K. Trikha Area Manager (Central) on 28.8.85 in connection with payment of the dues against telephone No. 386056. During the discussion you have H 565

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1997] 3 S.C.R.

intimated that the payment of the said bills were made in the 1st week of May, 79. Investigations have been made by GMT office and records have been thoroughly checked. Payment of bills in question detailed below do not appear in the bonds of GMT office.

You are therefore again requested to arrange payment of the following bills and furnish payment particulars within 10 days from the date of issue of this letter;"

In view of this letter, the primary disputed question is of fact, viz., whether or not payment has been made. Under these circumstances, we C cannot satisfactorily decide the dispute. Alternative arbitration under Section 11-A of the Telegraphs Act is available for adjudication of the dispute.

It is open to the appellants either to make payment of the bill or submit an application to the competent authority to adjudicate the dispute and on such application being mode appropriate decision would be taken. Until then, the interim stay granted by this Court would continue. The appellants D shall make payment of an application, as the case may be, within 30 days from today, subject to such objections that may be raised.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal disposed of.
case*.

SRI NANDLAL TEJMAL KOTHARI

THE INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF

INCOME TAX AND ORS.

APRIL 3, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Appeal-Controversy in-Held covered by judgment in C.B. Gautam's

Income Tax Act, 1961-P. UD( l)-Compulso1y purchase.

*C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 1 SCC 78, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3624 of 1986.

From the Judgment nd Order dated 11/12.3.86 of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 11570 of 1985.

Mukul Mudgal for the ApI>ellant.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The controversy raised in this appeal is covered by the judgment of this Court in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 1 SCC 78 wherein it was held that :

"31. The recording of reasons which lead to the passing of the F order is basically intended to serve a two-fold purpose :

(1) that the "party aggrieved" in the proceeding before (sic the appropriate authority) acquires knowledge of the reasons and in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court G (Since there is no right of appeal or revision), it has an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to pass an order adverse to his interest were erroneous, irrational or irrelevant, and

(2) that the obligation to record reasons and convey the same to H 575

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1997] 3 S.C.R.

A the party concerned operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the quasi-judicial or the executive authority invested with judicial powers.

42. We realise that if order for compulsory purchase of the property is made hereafter the intending vendor will suffer to some extent B by reason of the fact that he will get the purchase amount several years after the time he would have got it had the impugned order been held to be valid. But on the other hand, however, he would have retained the possession of the property in question. Taking into account these factors and taking note of the fact that the C immovable properties in urban areas have gone up steeply in value during the last few years, we direct that in case an order for compulsory purchase is made the Central Government shall pay to the intending seller the amount of the apparent consideration plus interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date the impugned order was made.

50. We, accordingly, clarify by this supplemental direction to be read as part of the judgment that in respect of cases other than that of petitioner - C.B. Gautam, the period of two months referred to in Section 269-UD(l) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of disposal of each of such pending matters either before this Court or before the High Courts as the case may be. Where, however, the stay orders inhibiting the authorities from taking further proceedings are vacated, the period referred to in the said Section 269-UD(l) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of such vacating of the stay orders. This clarification and further direction shall be supplemental to and be treated a.s parts of the main judgment."

Following the above ratio, this appeal is disposed of. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal disposed of.
VENKAPPA GURAPPA HOSUR A v.

KASAWWA C/0. RANGAPPA KULGOD

APRIL 3, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Limitatio11 Ac~ 1963 : Article 54.

Suit-Dismissal for filing after expi1y of limitation period-Appellant's claim that he had entered into a sale agreement with respondent on August C 9, 1959-In the mea11while suit filed by respo11de11t for possession of the said properties-Suit decided in favour of respondent on November 9, 1971-0n August 22, 1972 appellant issued notice to respondent-Appellant filed suit on Novembe;· 5, 1972-Respo11dent denied execution of sale agreement-Held mere issuance of notice does not stop the mnning of limitation period--Once

the same l1as began to nm it mns its full course-Appellant having filed the D suit after the expily of three years from the date of knowledge of denial the suit was ban-ed by limitat'0n.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2837 of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.84 of the Karnataka High Court in R.S.A. No. 646 of 1976.

Manoj Kumar Mishra for A.S. Bhasme for the Appellant.

P.R. Ramasesh for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High court, made on July 30, 1984 in Second G Appeal No. 646 of 1976.

The appellant had filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement dated August 9, 1959 in respect of the land in Village Lingaur for a consideration of Rs. 10,200. It is the case of the appellant that he paid as part consideration a sum of Rs. 501 on the said date and a further sum H 579

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1997] 3 S.C.R.

A of Rs. 700 on March 4, 1960. In the meanwhile, the defendant filed suit No. 9/60 for possession of the said properties. The suit was decided in his favour on November 9, 1971. The appellant, therefore, issued notice for the first time on August 22, 1972. Thereon, the respondent denied execution of agreement. Then the appellant filed the suit on November 5, 1972.

B Thus, according to the plaintiff the suit was filed within limitation. The respondent has denied the execution of the agreement of sale, but the courts below have found that it is one of money transaction. It is, therefore, clear from Suit No. 9/60 itself that he had asserted to be the owner of the property and the property is unencumbered property. Therefore, no one has a right to interfere with his possession. Thus, it could be seen that the C suit document itself was denied as early as in 1960. As a consequence, mere issuance of notice dated August 22, 1972 does not stop the running of limitation period. Once the same has began to run, it runs its full course.

Therefore, the suit having been filed after the expiry of 3 years from the date of the knowledge of denial, by operation of Article 54 of the Schedule D to the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The High Court, therefore,. is right in dismissing the suit in the second appeal.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.
N.C. DAS A

M.A. MOHSIN AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 9, 1997

[S.P. BHARUCHA AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.] B

Contempt of Court-Petition before High Court for initiating contempt proceedings against opposite parties for alleged non-compliance of Court's

order~High Court holding that order had been complied and no further C action required-Appeal~Held in contempt proceedings, such as these, an appellate court will not interfere unless the order is totally pei; verse-;-There is no perversity in the order passed by the High Court-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 136.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) No. D 15812of1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated. 2.5.97 of tjie J;'atna High Court in M.J.C. No. 699of1996.

Deba Prasad Mukherjee, B. Kar Gupta and San jay Ghosh for the E Petitioner.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This is a Special Leave Petition against an order of the High Court at Patna declining to take proceedings in contempt against the respondents. F This is what the High Court said :

I have heard Mr. P. K. Sinha and Mr. Jai Narayan, Sr:Counsei appearing on behalf of the parties, and also perused the show cause filed by the O.Ps. Although the conduct of the O.Ps. does not appear to be very fair but in. the facts and circumstances of the case, I do G not think it fit and proper to pass any further orders. Since the judgment and order has been complied with by the. O.Ps., no further

action in this regard is needed. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel, submitted that although the petitioner has been given promotion but all the consequential benefits have not been paid to him. It goes H 25 .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

without saying that if the petitioner submits all the necessary documents and papers there should not be any reason for the opposite parties not to pass necessary orders for payment of all consequential benefits. This contempt application is disposed of accordingly.

At the commencement of the hearing, we told learned counsel that in contempt proceedings such as these, an Appellate Court will not interfere unless the order is totally perverse. The Special Leave Petition has, nonetheless, been argued at length. We are in no doubt at all that there is no perversity in the order that is challenged.

The contempt jurisdiction is not to be invoked or allowed to be invoked to enable that appellant to wreck personal vengeance against the alleged contemners.

The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

RP.

Petition dismissed.

...
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (M) A v.

BHARAT KUMAR AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 12, 1997

[J.S.VERMA CJ., B.N. KIRPAL AND V.N. KHARE, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 19 and 21.

Bandh-Cal/ing and enforcing 'Bandh' by political parties-Held unconstitutional by Kera/a High Court-Appeal before Supreme Court- C Held High Court was right in its conclusion that there cannot be any right to call or enforce a 'Bandh' which interferes with the exercise of fundamental freedoms of other citizens-Fundamental Rights of the people as _a whole cannot be subservient to the claim of Fundamental Right of an individual or only .a section of people-Distinction drawn by High Court between a 0

'Bandh' and a call for general strike or 'Hartal' is well made out-Held the impugned judgment does not call for any interference.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 7728-29 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.97 of the Kerala High Court in O.P. Nos. 3040/88, 12343/91 and 7827of1997.

Soli J. Sorabjee and Harish Salve, G. Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash and P.P. Vineeth for the Appellant.

Mathai M. Piakeday and P.I. Jose, (A. Raghunath) for Krishnamurthy Swami for the Respondent No. 1-9.

K.M.K. Nair and Bijan Ghosh for State of Kerala.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard Mr. Harish Salve and Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mathai M. Paideday, learned counsel for the respondents. 131

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A On a perusal of the impugned judgement of the High Court, referring to which learned counsel for the appellant pointed out certain portions, particularly in paras Band 18 including the operative part in support of their submissions, we find that the judgment does not call for any interference. We are satisfied that the distinction drawn by the High Court between a "Bandh" B and a call for general strike or "Hartal" is well made out with reference to the effect ofa "Bandh" on the fundamental rights of other citizens. There cannot be any doubt that the fundamental rights of the people as a whole cannot be subservient to the claim of fundamental right of an individual or only a section of the people. It is on the basis of this distinction that the High Court C has rightly concluded that there cannot be any right to ca11 or enforce a

"Bandh" which interferes with the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of other citizens, in addition to causing national loss in many ways. We may also add that the reasoning given by the High Court, particularly those in paragraphs 12, 13 and 17 for the ultimate conclusion and directions in paragraph D 18 is correct with which we are in agreement. We may also observe that the High Court has drawn a very appropriate distinction between a "Bandh" on the one hand and a call for general strike or "Hartal" on the other. We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

The appeals are dismissed accordingly. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeals dismissed.

....
BIR SINGH CHAUHAN

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

JULY 7, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Service Law:

Promotion-Non-consideration for-Employee, an Executive Engineer C was directed to carry out visual inspection of certain work and he accordingly submitted the report-Subsequently FIR registered against the contractor and the staff connected with the work-All staff including the Executive Engineer who had submitted the earlier report placed under suspension-After reinstatement the Executive Engineer not promoted though his juniors were promoted-High Cowt declined to interf ere---On appeal, held respondents D neither filed counter affidavit nor produced records-Hence, constrained to accept the case of the appellant-<Jovemment to consider his case for promotion on the basis of his service record within four months-While doing so it would exclude the material relating to his inspection report.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4614 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.9.95 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 7249 of 1994.

A.S. Pundir for the Appellant.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

The learned counsel for the respondent was directed to produce the G record and to file the counter; but neither counter has been filed nor the record has been produced. In these circumstances, we are constrained to proceed on the basis of the material on record.

The appellant, while he was working as Executive Engineer, was asked by the Superintending Engineer to carry out the visual inspection of H the work executed at Sonepat Drainage Division on April 30, 1989. He 460

B.S. CHAUHANv. STATE 461

carried on the same on May 2, 1989 and submitted the report. Sub- A sequently, a case was registered against the contractors and oher employees. On the basis of subsequent report submitted by Shri O.P. Vij, an FIR was registered on August 10, 1989 against the officers connected with the job. Thereafter, the entire staff comprising of 95 persons in Kamal Drainage Circle, was put under suspension in April 1990. On account B thereof, the appellant was also kept under suspension for giving the report of visual inspection vis-a-vis the execution of the work. After his reinstatement, he was due for promotion but the same was not given, while his juniors were promoted. Consequently, he challenged his non-consideration for promotion by way of writ petition which has been dismissed by the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

We wanted to examine the record to ascertain whether there is any substantial case against the appellant. The respondents have neither filed counter nor produced the record. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to accept the case of the appellant that he is entitled to be considered for promotion under the Rules. We direct the Government to D consider his case for promotion on the basis of his service record within four months from the receipt of this order. While doing so, the Government will exclude the material relating to his inspection report.

The appeal is accodingly allowed. No cost~.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
SHRI IRSHAD ALI AND ORS.

HAZI ABDUL SUKHUR MOZUMDAR AND ORS.

JULY 7, 1997

(K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Compensation---A ward of-Reference Court enhancing the compensa- C tion--High Court further enhancing the compensation-Application for review of the High Court's order dismissed-On appeal held, since the party had not challenged the award of the reference court and the award has become final it is not entitled to higher compensation.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4460 and D 4461 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.lQ.93/12.7.96 of the Assam High Court in R.A. No. 1/95 and FA. No. 8 of 1989.

Shakeel Ahmed Syed for the Appellants.

Vijay Hansaria, Smita Shankar and S.K. Jain for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties.

F This appeal arises against the judgment and order dated July 12, 1996 in Review Application No. 1 of 1995 and the main judgment dated October 8, 1993 in First Appeal No. 8 of 1989.

The admitted position is that the appellant is entitled to 1/3rd share G of the acquired land. The total extent of the land acquired is 10 Bighas, 15 Khatas, 2 c; hattaks and 5 gondas. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation against which the parties sought reference for re-determination of compensation etc. under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act.

The Reference Court by its award dated September 7, 1988 enhanced the compensation, and awarded compensation. To the extent of the claim of H the respondent No. 1, namely, 3 bighas, 16 kathas, 1 chatak, namely 1/3rd 472

...

IRSHAD ALI v. HAS. MOZUMDAR 473

of the entire land, he filed an appeal under Section 54 of the Land A Acquisition Act. The High Court enhanced the Compensation. Thereafter, the appellant filed his application under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC for review of the order. After reconsidering the matter and the main order, the High Court dismissed the same. Thus, this appeal by special leave. In view of the fact that the total extent of the land is 10 Bighas, 15 kathas, 2 chattaks, B 5 gondas, as referred earlier, in which admittedly respondent No. 1 is having 1/3rd share, the first respondent had waived his claim for higher compensation for the above extent of the land. Since the appellants had not challenged the award of the reference Court and the award has become final to the extent of their share, they are not entitled to any higher compensation for the extent of 1/3rd share.

The appeals are therefore, dismissed. No costs.

G.N.

Appeals dismissed.
SMT. RATAN KAUR

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

MAY 2, 1997

(K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.)

Lease:

Govemment land-Assig11ed for 30 years-On death of assig11ee his heir C tra11sf ened the land-{)11 demise of trans/ eree his heir applied for assig11ment-Applicatio11 rejected-Single Judge of High Court directed grant of assig11me11t, but Divisio11 Be11ch allowed writ appeal holding that applicant had no light for second re11ewal after expi1y of 30 years-Held, rejection of the application for rmewal of grant is clearly i11tra vires.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3639 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.7.95 of the Calcutta High Court in F.M.A.T. No. 2490 of 1993.

E . Om Prakash Dubey, R.D. Upadhyay and Subrata Das for the Appellant. .,.

M.S. Usgaocar, Additional Solicitor General, Dhruv Mehta and D.S. •

Mehra for the Respondents.

F The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

Originally the land of an extent of 68 acres, 7 kanal and 11 marlas G situated in Andaman & Nicobar Islands was assigned on May 1, 1922 to Khansahib Naban Ali for 30 years. After his demise in 1947, his widow Smt. ~.

Noorjahan Begum had transferred the land in the name of father-in-law of the appellant in the year 1949-50. Mutation was effected by an officer in the name of appellant after the demise of her father-in-law. She filed an H application for assignment. That was rejected. On a writ petition filed in 48

.v-;

R. KAUR v. U.0.1. 49

the High Court, the learned single Judgment directed grant of assignment. A In Writ Appeal No. 2490/93, by judgment and order dated July 25, 1995, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court allowed the writ appeal and held that she had no right for second renewal after the expiry of 30 years.

Since under the covenant, the predecessor-in-interest was entitled to only one renewal, after the first renewal, she had no right. Rejection of her B application for assignment is quite legal. The view taken by the High Court is correct. The lands absolutely belongt:d to the Government and they were assigned to Khansahib Naban Ali. The assignee has a right only for one renewal. Admittedly, the lease was made in May 1922. After the expiry of 30 years in 1952, further renewal for another 30 years having been rejected, she had no right for assignment. The rejection of the application for C renewal of grant is clearly intra vires.

It is stated that the appellant does not have any house to accommodate large family. In that viev:, we direct the respondents to consider grant of suitable land for construction of the house.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

R.P .

Appeal disposed of.