RAE BARELI KSHETRIY A GRAMIN BANK v.

BHOLA NATH SINGH AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 28, 1997

[K. RAMASWAMY AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]

Service Law :

Dismissal---<:ashier in Bank-Charged of misconduct for forgery of C signatures and for fradulent withdrawal of a, mounts-lnquiry Officer found the charges established-Disciplinary authority ordered dismissal-Order upheld in appeal-High Court in writ jurisdiction on re-appreciation of evidence quashed the order--Held, High Court e"ed in examining the evidence as a first appeal/ate court-Judicial review is not akin to adjudication D of case on merits as an appellate authority-High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority but exercises the power within the limits of judicial review to co"ect e"ors of law or procedural e"ors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice-In the present case no such e"ors were pointed out nor any E finding in that behalf was recorded by High Court-Order of High Court set aside; judicial Review : Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1826 of 1997.

F From the Judgment and Order dated 19.4.96 of the Allahabad High

Court in W.P. No. 10200 of 1990.

Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General and B. Parthasarathy for the appellant.

Yogcshwar Prasad, Mrs. Rachna Gupta and P.K. Bajaj for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

H Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. 588

RAE BARELI KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK v. BHOLA NA TH SINGH 589

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the single A Judge of the Allahabad High Court, made on April 19, 1996 in Writ Petition No. 10200/90.

The admitted position is that the respondent, while working as Cashier-cum-Clerk in the appellant-Bank, was charged with the allegation B that he had fraudulently withdrawn a sum of Rs. 28,500 on different dates from the saving accounts of different account-holders by forging the bank records and signatures of the saving bank account-holders. A charge sheet was served upon him to which the respondent gave his reply. An enquiry was conducted in which he did not participate. Proceedings were conducted ex-parte. Then, the enquiry officer, after detailed examination of the C evidence adduced, recorded findings that the respondent was guilty of misconduct for forgery of the signatures and for fraudulent withdrawal of the amounts. Accordingly, he submitted his report. The disciplinary authority on April 17, 1989 had given the respondent a show-cause notice as to why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed on him. The D respondent submitted his reply thereto on April 11, 1990. On consideration thereof, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of the dismissal from service. In appeal, the Board had considered the entire record and confirmed the order dismissing the respondent from service. The respondent, thereafter, filed the writ petition in the High Court. The learned Judge has gone into the merits of the matter and found that the charges E have not been proved. Utlimately, he quashed the punishment of dismissal from service. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, has contended that the procedure adopted by the learned Judge is not correct in F law. Even the writ petition was not maintainable because the alternative remedy of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act is available.

Therefore, the order of the learned single Judge is vitiated by error of law.

Shri Y ogeshwar Prasad, learned senior counsel for respondent, contends that all the steps taken by the enquiry officer in conducting enquiry were not in accordance with law. The Branch Manager has admitted in a letter G that he is responsible for the withdrawal of the amounts; the respondent was made a scapegoat;. the hand-writing expert was not exmined in the enquiry and, therefore, there is no admissible evidence to show that the respondent had forged the signatures of the account-holders and withdrawn the amount. His application to summon the witness and to H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1997] 2 S.C.R.

A cross-examine them was denied violating the principles of natural justice.

The High Court, therefore, was right in holding that the charges have not been proved against the respondent beyond doubt.

Having regard to the respective contentions, the only question that arises for consideration is: whether the conclusion reached by the High Court is correct in law? It is not in dispute that the procedural steps under the disciplinary rules, required by the appellant, have been followed. After the enquiry was concluded and report was submitted, the disciplinary authority had given him a show-cause notice to the proposed punishment and the respondent also submitted his explanation. After consideration of C the report and the reply, the punishment of dismissal was imposed by the disciplinary auth9rity against which an appeal was filed. At that stage, he made an application for summoning the witnesses afresh. That application was dismissed by the appellate authority. That order also was allowed to brcome final. The appeal was dismissed by the Board.

D Under these circumstances, the question arises : whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence as examined and to record a finding in that behalf?

The judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 E does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or voidation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact F recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority.

Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate court, is wholly illegai and cannot be sustained.

G Accordingly, we set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. Consequently, the order of dismissal stands upheld. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal allowed.