evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
THE STATE OF GUJARAT A v.

RAJESH KUMAR CHIMANLAL BAROT AND ANR.

AUGUST 5, 1996

[S.P. BHARUCHA AND S.C. SEN, JJ.] B

Consumer Pmtection Act, 1986 :

Consumer Disputes Redressa/ Fontm-Jwisdiction-Adjudication of dispute by State Commission not falling within the pwview of the Fo11un-Ef- C feet of-Held, if a cowt does not have j1m'sdiction, it is the obligation of the appellate Court so to hold and set aside the order under appeat-Having regard lo the fact that the question of p1icing did not "legitimately fall within

the purview of adjudication by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Fo11uns'~ order under appeal is set aside and the claim made by the respondents before the State Commission is dismissed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10191 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.93 of the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, New Delhi in A. No. 160 of 1992.

Yashank Adhyaru and Ms. H. Wahi for the Appellants.

M. Barot and Ms. H. Khatun for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The order under appeal is passed by the national Consumer Disputes G Redressal Commi'5ion in first appeal against an order of the State Commission.

The order under appeal opens with these words :

'Although there is substantial force in the contention advanced by H 279

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

the learned Advocate General, Mr. Thakore, appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the question of pricing does not legitimately fall within the purview of adjudication by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums, regard being had to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case where only a very small period of about 10 months is involved and the party concerned is a Gram Panchayat, which is claiming benefit of subsidised rate of 25 paise per unit in respect of electricity consumed by it for the supply of drinking water to its residents from a bore-well, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the State Commission upholding the right of the panchayat to the benefit of the said subsidy."

We find this very difficult to appreciate. If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not have jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that one of the parties involved is a Gram Panchayat or the period involved is very short or the amount involved is very small. If a court does not have jurisdiction, it is the obligation of the appellate court so to hold and to set D aside the order under appeal.

Having regard to the fact that the dispute did not "legitimately fall within the purview of adjudication by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums", the appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and the claim made by the respondents before the Slate Commission is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

R.P.

Appeal allowed.
SRI RAM NIWAS TOD! AND ANR. v.

BIBI JABRUNNISSA AND ORS.

AUGUST 6, 1996

[M.M. PUNCHHI, AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

Mohammedan Law:

Gift-Oral gift-Plai11tiff-respo11de11t in possession of house property alo11gwith land appwte11ant theretO-Oral gift of the property by father-in-law of plai11tiff-Respondent i11 her [avow-There was also a written but not registered gift deed-Held, it could 1101 be said that in presence of written gift there was 110 oral gift-ft was followed by possession making the gift, complete as was rightly held by the three coiuts below-High Court was right in upholding the gift.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2276 of 1987.

From the Judgment and Or<lcr dated 24.9.86 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Decree Nos. 596 & 597 of 1979.

H.K. Puri for the Appellants.

Mohd. Kazim Sher for P.S. Jha, for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Before the Trial Court it was admitted that the suit land measuring 41.5 decimals was homestead land and several houses of phoos (thatch) and tiles were constructtd thereon, which were in occupation of the plaintiff-respondent since long, even prior to the gift Ex. 1 executed in her favour by her father-inlaw. Since the parties were Mohamedans, an oral G gift by a fatherin-law to his daughter-in-law was permissible but here was one which was written but not registered. It could not, in any event, be said that in presence thereof there was no oral gift. Significantly, it was followed by possession making the gift complete and that is the finding of all the three courts below.

H The debate before the High Court centered round the erroneous 314

R.N. TOD!. v. BIBIJABRUNNISSA 315

premise that the gifted rroperty was agricultural land to which the A provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 as also the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixing of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act got attracted ..

Even so, taking into account those provisions, the High Court came to the conclusion that the oral gift made by a Mohamedan would prevail over the provisions in the tenancy laws, which required occupancy rights to be B transferred by means of a registered deed. We think that it was unnecessary for the High Court entering into such controversy and putting the tenancy laws at a disadvantage over Muslim personal law. Once it stood established that the property in dispute was house-property, which included open spaces of land appurtenant and subservient thereto, to which the plaintiffrcspondcnt was put in possession after an oral gift in her favour, that per C se should have been enough to keep her suit decreed rejecting the pleas of the defendants-appellants that the gift as invalid, making the natural heirs of the deceased owner claim it by inheritance.

In this view of the matter we affirm the orders of the High Court to lhe extent to which we agree as to the validity of the gift on its own, D denuding its judgment of the discussion on the tenancy laws. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal dismissed.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR. ETC. v.

DEVRAJBHAl CHHAGANBHAl AND ORS. ETC.

AUGUST 8, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

S.JJ(2}-Compensatioll ill tenns of agreement-La/Id owners havillg agreed to payment of compensation at the rate of R,. 140 per guntha besides the additional compensation at the rate of 20% on accoum of development of land, solatiwn at the rate of 15% and interest prevailing 011 the date of agreement-Held, are not entitled to benefits available u!lder Amendment Act 68 of 1984.

State of Gujarat & o,,. v. Daya Shamji Bhai & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC D 746, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2754 of 1987 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.86 of the Gujarat High E Court in S.C.A. No. 5916 of 1983.

S. Hazarika, N. Mukherjee and H. Wahi for the Appellants.

Jatin .lhaveri and H.J. Jhaveri for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Leave granted in SLP.

The only question that arises in these cases is : whether the respondents, having agreed under Section 11(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 G (for short, the 'Act') to payment of the compensation in terms of the agreement @ Rs. 140 per guntha besides the additional compensation at the rate of 20% on account of development of the land and solatium @ 15% and interest prevailing as on that date, were entitled to claim the benefit under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984? This Court in State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Daya Shamji Bhai & Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 746 considered H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the question elaborately and held that the parties having ent.ered into the agreement under Section 11(2) were bound by the agreement: and thereby, they were not. entitled to any benefit other than what was agreed upon.

Therefore, the High Court was not right in the impugned order passed in the review petition , in allowing the enhancement under the Amendment

Act. It is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that under 16 of the agreement since there is no agreement as regards the rate of interest, the claimants are entitled to statutory rate of interest under Section 28 as amended in Act 68 of 1984. We do not appreciate the contention to be correct. Partieshaving agreed to the payment of interest on the date of the contract, the rate of interest admittedly payable being 4-1/2%, they are entitled to interest at 4-1/2% and nol to the enhanced rates under proviso to Section 28 of the Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984.

The appeals are allowed and order in the review petition stands dismissed Lut original order stands confirmed. No. costs.

R.P.

Appeals allowed.
RAM SINGH

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.

JULY 25, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK; JJ.]

U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960: Section 2(8).

Land holding-Grove land-Cut off date fixed for Ja11ua1y 24, C 1971-lnc/usion of fully grown trees except the excepted trees as on that date-Appellant cutting out the existing trees as on Janual)' 24, 1971 and planting new trees 011 that land after the rnt off date-Held such a la11d does 11ot co11stitllte grove la11d under the Act.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1765 of

D 1982.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.2.80 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W. No. 7091 of 1978.

Pramod Swamp for the Appellant.

R.C. Verma, A.K. Srivastava and M.N. Kura! for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by Special leave arises against the order of the High F Court of Allahabad made on February 22, 1980 in W.P. No. 6667 of 1978.

The finding, as a fact, recorded by both the Tribunals under the U.P.

Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act is that the appellant had cut out the existing trees as on January 24, 1971 and planted new trees. On that premise, the question arose; whether the trees planted by the appellant G would be a grove land wit!Jin the meaning of Section 23(8) of the Act which reads as under :

(8) "grove land" means any specific piece of land in a holding having trees not including (Guava, Papaya, banana or vine plants) planted thereon before January 24 1971, in such numbers that they H preclude, or when full grown will preclude, the land or any con- 44

- ...

RAM SINGH v.STATE 45

siderable portion thereof from being used primarily for any other A purpose, and the trees on such land constitute a grove".

A reading thereof clearly indicates that the Legislature has put a cut off date for existing trees as on January 24, 1971 except the Guava, Papaya, Banana or vine plants planted before that date. In other words, the Legislature has indicated that any grove existing as on that date with fully B grown trees would be the grove except the excepted trees and for the purpose of the Act. By necessary implication any tree planted after that date cannot be the grove land under the Act. Though the contention of Shri Pramod Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant that in place of fallen trees some new trees were grown, is plausible, we cannot give acceptance C to the contention since the Legislature has specifically put a date of the existing trees, viz., January 24, 1971. Under these circumstances, the view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be unwarranted.

The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.
SURAT SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS ETC •

. . ' v .• - . -,.,

UNION OF INDIA

 AUGUST 13, 1996 " B.

[K. RAMASWAMY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.) ·

Land Acquisition Ai:4 J894 :·ections 4(lf and 53. ···;,_ .. ,·. . :1 Land acquisition-Large extent o~Award of compensation byLand C Acquisition Officer-Enhancement by Reference Court and High Court-Appeal by dissatisfied claimants-Held sale instance relating to small pieces of land ca1mot be solely relied upon-Assuming that sale transactions were true

I/3rd of the value towards development charges have to be deducted °while . ' awarding compensation-in such a case Ian.downer would have got less than D thai awarded by High Court-Held in such circumstances no iiiteiference' was. called for. with the orde~ of High Court.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4028 f 1988 Etc.

E From the Judgmnt and Order dated 18.10.84 of the Delhi High Court in R.F.A. No. 575 of 1970. · ·

K. Priyadarshi, Ranbir Yadav and H.M. Singh for the Appellants.

Wasirn.A .Qadr~ B. Krishna Prasad for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This case relates to the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published on October 24, 1961. The Land Acquisition Officer in his award dated December 16, 1964 granted com- G pensation at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per bigha. on reference, the Additional District Judge by his award and decree dated May 20, 1970 enhanced the compensation varying between Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 per bigha in respect of ABC Blocks. The High Court in the impugned judgment dated September 11, 1984 enhanced the compensation to the uniform rate of Rs. 7,000 H per Bigha. DfssatiSfied therewith, the claimants have filed these appeals.

SURATSINGHv. U.0.1.

Though there is some force in the contention of learned senior A counsel for the appellants that there is a difference between the earlier cases and this case, since the notification in the earlier cases dated back to 1959 and this notification to 1961, the sale instances relating to the small pieces of land cannot be solely relied upon when lands of an extent of around 16000 and odd bighas is acquired. There is no proof of these' sale- B transactions. Moreover, even if they were true, 1/3rd of the value towards development charges has to be deducted. This exercise was not done. Even if it is done, the appellant will get less than what was awarded by the High Court. Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order made by the High Court since the State did not file

· any appeal.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed No costs .

T.NA. . Appeals dismissed.

'' ' '
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY

T.P. KUMARAN

AUGUST 16, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Section 11.

E:xplanation IV-Order 2, Rule 2.

Constructive res judicat<r-lncome Tax Officer-Dismissaf-Suit against-Suit decree and plaintiff reinstated in seivice--Writ for payment of aTTears-High Court order for payment of all arrears-Order attaining finality-Subsequently application claiming interest allowed by Tribunaf-Appeal-He/d Tribunal committed gross en-or of law in directing payment of D interest-Held claim was ban"ed by constructive res judicata-Even otherwise as no claim was made in the suit the petitioner was prohibited to seek remedy separately.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11399 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.8.94 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam, in O.A. No .. 2026 of 1993.

R.R. Misra, R. Salish and S.N. Terdol for the Appellant.

F E.M.S. Anam for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

G We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

This appeal by special leave arises against an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam made on 16.8.1994 in OA No. 2026/93.

The admitted position is that while the respondent was working as Incometax Officer, he was dismissed from service. He laid a suit against the order H of dismissal. The suit came to be decreed and he was consequently 732

C.l.T. v. T.P. KUMARAN 733

reinstated. Since the. arrears were not paid, he filed a writ petition in the A High Court. The High Court by drder dated August 16, 1982 directed the appellant to pay all the arrears. That order became final. Consequently, arrears came be paid. Then the respondent filed an OA claiming interest at 18% p.a. The Administrative Tribunal in the impugned order directed the payment of interest. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

The Tribunal has committed a gross error of law in directing the payment. The claim is barred by constructive res judicata under Section 11, Explanation IV, CPC which envisages that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit, shall

be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in a C subsequent suit. Hence when the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not seek so and, therefore, it operates as re judicata. Even otherwise, when he filed a suit and specifically did not claim the same, Order 2, Rule 2,' CPC prohibits the petitioner to seek the remedy separately. In either event, the OA is not sustainable.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal allowed.
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,.

SRIRANGAPATNAM v.

NAGEGOWOA·.

AUGUST 23, 1996

[K RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) ··

LandAcquisitionAc4 1894: Sections 4(1), 23(1-A),23(2), 28 and 54.

Land Acquisition-Compensation-l'rindple for detenninatiolt-Com- . C pensation. awarded by Land Acquisition Officer @ Rs. 4800 per acre-On reference Civil Judge enhancing compensation to Rs. 20,000 per acre-Reliance placed by Reference Cowt on award in another case-Other . case related to land with Coconut trees-Even the amount awarded in other case was subject matter of appeaHle/d in the circumstance award relied on was irrelevant for, detennination of compensation-Landowner held entitled D to compensation @ Rs. 10,000 per acre-Also held entitled to solatium, interest and additional amount

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11369 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 'i8.894 of the Karnataka High Court in M.F.A. No. 1311 of 1994. ·

KR. Nagaraja for the Appellant.

Shanta Kr. and KK Gupta for the Respondent.

The follo"1ng Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

 Notification under Section 4(1) of the .Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on December 26, 1985 acquiring land admeasuring 5 acres . 21 gunthas for the purpose of formation of Hemavathi left bank canal. ; rhe

Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation on February 23, 1988 @

Rs. 4,800 per acre: On refrence, the civil Judge relying upon Ex. P-3 H 191

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A awarded compensation @ Rs. 20,000 per acre. He categorically rejected the contention of the claimant that he was growing sugarcane, hybrid jowar and mulberry getting a full yield of Rs. 25,000 per acre. On appeal, the High Court by impugned judgment dated August 18, 1994 in FA No. 1311/94 confirmed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave.

B Having considered the facts and circumstances in this case, we think . that reasonable compensation would be Rs. 10,000 per acre. The judgment referring to Ex. A-3 has been placed before us and it indicates that it related to land with coconut trees. Even the amount awarded by the civil judge in that case is now subject matter in the appeal before the District C Judge filed under Section 54 of the Act. Under these circumstances, Ex.

A-3 is absolutely irrelevant for determination of the compensation. Accordingly, the respondent is entitled to enhanced compensation @ Rs. 10,000 per acre with solatium at 30% under Section 23(2), interest under Section 28 at 9% for one year from the taking of possession and at 15% thereafter on enhanced compensation till date of deposit into court and additional D amount under Section 23(1-A) at 13% per annum from the date of issue of Section 4(1) notification till date of the award.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal allowed.
I.T.C. LIMITED v.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY

AUGUST 26, 1996

[J.S. VERMA AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

Notification-Operativeness and enforceability-Publication in Official Gazette-Changes brought about by Notification also announced through radio-Press release also mad~-Appellant's claim that there was failure to C make the law knowit-Held not maintainable.

Mis. Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India and Ors., [1994) 5 SCC 198, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10379 of

D 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.4.96 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Wctst Regional Bench, Bombay in P.O. No. 1260196-WRB in Appeal No. E.D. (Bom)-298of1986.

E Joseph Vellopally, Ravincler Narain, Ashok Sagar, Ms. Punita Singh and Ms. Sonu Bhatnagar for JBD & Co. for the Appellants.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The points raised in this appeal are covered squarely against the F appellant by the decision of this Court in Mis. Pankaj Jain Agencies v.

Union of India and Others, [1994] 5 SCC 198, wherein it was emphatically stated as under :

'We, therefore, se(~ no substance in the contention that notwithstanding the publication in the Official Gazette there was yet G a failure to make the law known and that, therefore, the notification did not acquire the eiements of operativeness and enforceability.

This contention of Shri Ganesh is unacceptable."

(Para 18)

H We may also observe that rejection by the Tribunal of the appellant's 214

I.T.C. LID .. v. COLLECTOROFCEN1RALEXCISE 215

case. even on the admitted position that on the very date of issue of A notification there was a radio announcement about the changes brought about by these notifications; and also a press release is another ground to justify rejection of the appellant's claim. Accordingly, there is no ground to admit the appeal.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.