evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
SA TISH KUMAR

THE JALANDHAR IMPROVEMENT TRUST,

JALANDHAR AND ANR.

JANUARY 29, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Art. 39(d) & 14-Equal pay for equal work-Applicable only when a person discharges same duties but not paid same pay-Unequals cannot be treated as equals for paying equal pay for equal work-Person appointed without the minimum basic qualificatiol!--Not entitled to equal pay 011 par with persons appointed with the minimum qualificatio11-Service Law-Equal pay for equal work.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) '

No. 0807 of 1996.

From the Jildgment and Order dated 5.9.95 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 691 of 1995.

Puneet Bali and M.T. George for the Petitioner.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Though the learned counsel has tried his best to persuade us to F disagree with the impugned order of the High Court, we think that the High Court is right in its conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to the equal pay as Pumpset Operator. The learned counsel sought to rely upon section 18 of the Punjab Town Improvement Trust Act, 1923 (for short the Act). Section 18 envisages power of the Trust to fix number M employees, their salaries etc. Section 17 envisages constitution of the trust G and subject to the constitution section 18 says that the Trust may from time to time employ such other servants on such terms and conditions as it may deem, necessary and proper for carrying out its functions under the Act.

Sub-section (2) gives controlling power of appointment, promotion, granting leave, suspension of the servants, reducing them into their hierarchy of H position reinoving them from service, dismissing them from service for

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SA TISH KUMAR v. JALANDHAR IMPROVEMENT TRUST 1021

misconduct for reasons other than misconduct Chairman also has power A under the Act.

It is stated that in exercising this power, the Chairman being the controlling authority had releaxed the service conditions of the petitioner and also appointed him as Pumpset Operator though he was not possessed of the minimum qualification prescribed under the Act. It is not in dispute B that for the said post Matriculation with LT.I. are qualifications which the petitioner admittedly has not possessed of. General power of supervision and control does not include the power to appoint any person of his choice without basic qualification. Therefore, the exercise of the power by the Chairman would obviously be illegal. Under those circumstances, the C doctrine of equal pay for equal work envisaged in Article 39 (a) of the Constitution has no application. It would apply only when a person is discharging the same duties but not being paid the same pay for the same work. In this case since the petitioner is not possessed of minimum basic qualification to the post to which he was appointed, unequals cannot be made equals for paying equal pay for equal work. Therefore, he is not D entitled to equal pay.

The Petition is accordingly dismissed.

G.N.

Petition dismissed.
MALKIAT SINGH

v. 4--

STATE OF PUN.TAB AND ORS. -

JANUARY 29, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) c -

Sen1ice Law : -.

Police constable-Discharge from se1vice-Absence from duty and ir- ' c regular in attending duty-Absence on three occasions---Held; Can not be considered to be regular absence so as to conclude that he had not proved his efficiency-On the third occasion, the absence not deliberate as his wife' delive1y had complications as revealed by the Medical Certificaw-One more opportunity to be given to the constable to prove his excellence-To be reinstated in se1vice--In case he absents for two consecutive days within one D year without p1ior pennission action be taken for dis111issing hint front se!Vice.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3506 of ,-

1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.4.94 of the Punjab & E Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 9775 of 1993.

K. R. Nagaraja for the Appellant.

Ranbir Yadav and G.K. Bansal for the Respondents.

F The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard the counsel on both sides.

G The appellant was appointed on April 20, 1990 and was discharged from service on July 22, 1992 on the ground that he remained absent from duty for more than 1 month 9 days. Another ground was that he was irregular in attending to the duty. So he could not prove himself to be an • efficient Constable. We had sent for the records which disclose that he was absent on three occasions. On the first occasion, when he was called upon ..• H to report for duty at 12 noon, he reported on September 10, 1990 and was

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MALKIAT SINGH v. STATE 1027

late by six hours. On the second occasion, he was absent, on June 30, 1991, A from night duty. The third occasion was on April 24, 1995. The explanation offered for the absence on third occasion was that since in his wife's delivery certain complication had arisen, he to attend to his wife and so he could not be present. The Medical Certificate in that behalf was produced.

In view of the Medical certificate, it cannot be said that he had deliberately B absented himself from duty. On the previous two occasions, the absence for one day and in another year for one night cannot be considered lo be regular absence so as to reach the conclusion that he had not proved his efficiency. It is true that discipline is required to be maintained. However, absence may sometimes be inevitable. In the facts and circumstances of this case, an opportunity may be given to the appellant to work efficiently to prove his excellence. The order of discharge is set aside. The respondents are directed to take the appellant into service forthwith. If the appellant absence himself again for two consecutive days within one year without prior permission. Appropriate action may be taken by dismissing him from . service. The appellant, however, is not entitled to backwages.

Appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
SESHAN AND ORS.

THE SPECIAL TEHSILDAR AND LAND ACOUISITION

OFFICER, SIPCOT, PUDUKKOTTAI

JANUARY 30, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, S.S. SAGHIR AHMAD

AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

La11d Acquisition Act, 1894 :

Sections 23(2), 34-Award made after the introduction cf Ame11dment Act 68 of 1984~Hence claimants entitled to i11£eresl @ 9% p.a. from the dale of taking possessio11 till date of awan}-A/so elllirled lo interest @I 5% p.a. on enhanced con1pensation after expily of one yea1; and on the enhanced con1pensation-Clain1ants are also entitled to Solatiunt @ 3Do/o on the D additional amo1111£.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2938 of 1996.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.89 of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 572 of 1985.

V. Balachandran for the Appellants.

A. Mariarputham and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard the learned counsel on both sides.

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 17th October, 1981. The possession of the land was taken in January 1982. The land Acquisition Officer in his award dated July 31, 1982 determined compensation @ Rs. 2,000 per acre. On reference, the civil Court by award and decree dated November 7, 1983 enhanced the H compensation to Rs. 4,000 per acre. On appeal, the High Court by judg-

SESHAN v. SPL. TEHSILDAR & LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER 1059

ment and decree dated August, 9, 1989 enhanced the compensation to A ·-...f Rs.6,000 per acre and awarded interest under the unamended Act as per the State amendment, thus this appeal by special leave.

In view of the fact that the Land Acquisition officer has made the award on July 31, 1982, i.e., after the introduction of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 on the floor of the Parliament, the claimants arc entitled to B interest under Section 34@ 9% per annum from the date of taking possession till date of payment or deposit in the Court. They are entitled to

- interest @ 15% on compensation not paid or deposited after the expiry of (' one year. Equally so on the enhanced compensation from the respective dates till the date of deposit in the Court. Equally, solatium @ 30% under C Section 23(2) is required to be deposited on the market value.

The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
GRAM PANCHAYAT VILLAGE SUFIPIND

STATE OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 1, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961 :

Sections 4(2). 42-Abadi land situated in a particular plol-Consolida- C tion proceedings completed in 1959-Jn 1979 application was made for realignment of the plot so as not to cause disturbance of respondent's enjoyment of his plot-Condoning the delay the autho1ity passed the order for realignment without notice to the Gram Panchayat which claimed that the land in question stood vested in it as a pathway-On appeal held, in view of the fact that the respondellt claims access to his prope1ty and realignment D . thereof, the realignment order passed earlier is set aside and the matter

remanded to the Consolidation Officer-After notice to pa1ties and personal inspection of the place, he should detem1ine the alignment in their presence according to law, within two nzonths.

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1808 of 1975.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.5.75 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W.P.No. 1887 of 1975.

Pawan Kumar Bahl and P. Narasimhan for the appellant.

Y.P. Dhingra and M.K. Garg for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises against the order dated 21st May, G 1975 of the High Court dismissing Writ Petition No. 1887n5 as usual in limine. The controversy is whether abadi plot No.71 is a pathway which stands vested in the Gram Panchayat, Sufipind or whether it passes through the passage to the respondent. Admittedly, the consolidation proceedill'gs were completed in 1959. An application came to be made in 1974 after H long lapse of time for realignment of the plot so as not to cause disturbance

GRAM PANCHAYATVILL.SUFIPINDv. STATE 1151

of his enjoyment of Plot No.71. The Gram Panchayat claimed that it is a A pathway and under the Punjab Village Common Land [Regulation] Act, 1961 and later it stands vested in the Gram Panchayat by operation of Section 4 [2] of that Act. Admittedly, notice was not issued to the Gram Panchayat. The authority had exercised the revisional jurisdiction under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act and condoned the delay and passed B the order for realignment. In view of the fact that the respondent is claiming access to his property and realignment thereof, the appropriate course would be to setaside the order and to remand the matter to the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer is directed to issue prior notice to the appellant as well as to the respondent. He should make a personal inspection to the place and then determine the alignment in their presence according to law. That would not only avoid needless wastage of time but the rights of the parties would also be settled in the presence of the parties by looking into the factual position as well as actual need in that behalf.

Under these circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The Consolidation D Officer is directed to do the exercise within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of this order. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
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UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A v.

SMT. DARSHNA DEVI

JANUARY 22, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Inherent power of Court :

Appeals disposed of-Review Petitions thereon dismissed-Application filed for clarification and modification of the order-Since remedy by way of C review under the Supreme Cowt Rules already availed inherent power cannot be invoked again for fwther clarification or modification-Otherwise it will be an abuse of the process of law without any responsibility.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : I.A. Nos. in Civil Appeal Nos. 3450-3520 of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.91 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 428,161-73, 362-65, 412-18, 429/85, 431, 434, 443-444/84, 445/85, 446/84, 16-23, 141/85, 143- 45/85, 147, 148-160/85, 116/84, 146/85, 174-80, 181/85, 141of1985.

N.N. Goswami, Ashok K. Srivastava, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Sushma Suri, S.M. Sarin and P.N. Puri for the Appellants.

H.N. Salve, N.D. Garg, CJ. Jain, Anil Gupta, Rajiv K. Rarg and A.D.N. Rao for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This Court by order dated March 2, 1995 disposed of the appeal in

the light of the earlier law laid down this Court. Review petitions in these appeals were filed and the same came to be dismissed on May 10, 1995.

Now these applications have been filed after changing the counsel, for G clarification and modification of the order.

IA. No. in CA No. 3450/95

When this Court asked the counsel as to under what provisions of law these applications are maintainable, the counsel found himself unable H 839

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1996] 1 S.C.R.

A to bring to our notice any provision under which this application could be entertained. The counsel state that the Court can do it under its inherent power. Inherent power is meant only to correct orders when other remedy is not available. Since the remedy by way of review under the rules of this Court has been provided for and has been availed of, the inherent power

B cannot be invoked again for further clarification or modification. It would be an obvious abuse of the process of law without any responsibility.

The I.A. is accordingly dismissed.

IA. Nos. in C4 Nos. 3451-3520/95

C If the decree is not drawn in accordance with the directions of this Court, then remedy would be open to the petitioners to have that decree corrected according to law. l.A.S. are accordingly disposed of.

G.N.

I.AS. disposed of.

I (
J. ASH OK KUMAR A v.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 23, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Se1vice Law :

A.P. Excise Se1vice Rules.

Selection to Group I Se1vice-Direct recmitment-Assistant Excise Supelintendent-Weightage of 5% marks to N. C. C. candidates-A candidate with NCC qualification not given the weightage-Tlibunal dismissing his C petition-Held, the candidate eligible and should have been given the weightage-However since the selection is already over and appointments made, relief not given to the petitioner.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 1492 of 1994.

From the judgment and Order dated 2.8.93 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, in O.A. No. 17698 of 1991.

L.N. Rao and R.P. Singh for the Petitioners.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : E

Mr. L.N. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends "that under G.O. Ms. No. 1136, dated September 13, 1986 rule 4 of the AP.

Excise Service Rules was amended given weightage of 5% of the marks for selection to an NCC candidate and that the petitioner had appeared for p the post of Assistant Excise Superintendent, Group I Service, by direct recruitment. He should have been given weightage of 5% marks and the Tribunal was unjustified in dismissing his petition. We find force in his contention. Any candidate appeared for the selection even for direct recruitment would be eligible to be considered for the weightage provided to candidate having NCC qualification. But since the selection has already G been over and candidates were selected and appointed, we cannot give the benefit to the petitioner.

The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.

G.N.

Petition dismissed. H 1035
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

A v.

CHHANGUR PRASAD SETH

FEBRUARY 5, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Service Law :

General Provident Fund-Death of Teacher--Claim by nominees-- Paid by State-Subsequently deceased's brother's son also making claim- C Produced Succession certificate-High Court directing payment to him-Held: State had discharged liability in temis of nomination by the deceased-Cannot be compelled to pay twice over on succession certificate being produced-Claim to be adjudicated only on the regular constituted f 01um in accordance with law.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3364 of 1996. •

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.93 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 13107 of 1992.

H.L. Aggarwal, B.B. Singh, for the Appellants.

AK. Pandey for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard the counsel for the parties. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Patna made on November 11, 1993 in CWJC No. 13107/92. Admittedly one G Shyama Devi was a teacher who died on August 17, 1988. She nominated certain persons to be entitled to received the G.P.F. etc. on her behalf. It would appear that three persons laid the claim which was accordingly made over. When the respondent claimed to be son of a brother of the deceased, he was asked for the succession certificate. By the time he produced the certificate, the amount had already been paid to the claimants. Therefore, H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1996] 2 S.C.R.

A the respondent filed a writ petition. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed to make the payment to him. Thus this appeal by special leave.

In view of the fact that the State had discharged the liability In terms of the nomination by the deceased teacher, the inter se claim,-if any, have B to be adjudicated only on the regular constituted forum and the State cannot be compelled to pay twice over on the succession certificate produced by the respondent. Under these circumstances, the direction issued by the High Court is clearly illegal.

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The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High court is C set aside. If any other claim is to be discharged, the same may be done in _.. accordance with law. This order does not preclude the respondent to take action according to law.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
THE VADAKKENCHARY CO. OPERATIVE SERVICE BANK A

LTD. ETC. ETC.

STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 7, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Appeal-Similar appeals dismissed earlier-Liberty to withdraw the present appeals granted-Appeals dismissed as withdrawn.

c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2274-78 of 1977 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.12.76 of the Kerala High Court in O.P. Nos. 3116, 3121, 3239, 3240 and 3372 of 1974.

V.B. Saharaya, for the appellants.

M.T. George for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

CA. Nos. 2274-78/77

Counsel states that he seeks liberty to have the appeals dismissed as withdrawn following similar orders passed by this Court in S.A. 2279 of 1977 and batch on December 6, 1982; and another order dated February

12, 1992 in C.A. No. 295 of 1978. The appeals are accordingly dismissed F as withdrawn. No costs.

C.A. Nos. 3436-47 of 1996 [@ SLP (C) No. 106-17/78]

Leave granted.

Appeals are dismissed as withdrawn. No costs.

G.N.

Appeals dismissed as withdrawn.
KOODALMANICKAM IN DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTEE A v.

THACHUDAYA KAIMAL@ MAN1CKAN KERALAN

(DEAD) BY LRS.

FEBRUARY 7, 1996

K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Right in personam-Enjoyment of Income or usu/met-Person dying pending appeal-Held: It is only a right in personam and on demise the right ceases to exist.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1057of1978.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.3.78 of the Kerala High Court in S.A. No. 1006 of 1976.

T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer and V.B. Saharya for the Appellant.

A.S. Nambiar, Shantha Vasudevan and P.K. Manohar for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special arises from the order dated March 31, 1978 of the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Second Appeal No. 1006/1976. The sole respondent instituted a suit against the appellant contending that the properties were a part of the residential premises given

to him in person in for his personal benefit under a decree of the British Resident for the State of Travancore and Cochin. Consequentially, he is F entitled to enjoy the income or the usufruct during his tenure. The trial Court and the appellate Court dismissed the suit; but in Second Appeal the learned single Judge allowed the appeal and held that he is entitled to the enjoyment of the income or usufruct. Pending appeal, the respondent died. We are informed that appellant-committee has taken over the property. Right to enjoy the property even assuming that the order is G correct, is a right only in personam and on demise the right cease to exist.

ConseqU; ently, nothing survives in this case for decision.

t. 'The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal disposed of. 251
...

RAJBIR SINGH, HFS-II

THESTATEOFHARYANAANDANR.

JANUARY 4, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY ANDG.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Service Law :

Inter-se seniority--Party whose seniority is challenged not impleaded- High Court dismissing the writ petition-Open to the party to approach the High Court to .file fresh Writ petition impleading the affected parties.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1530 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.6.92 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 7172 of 1992.

K. Madhav Reddy, R.K. Talwar, Goodwill Indeevar for the Appellant.

LS. Goyal, Ms. Indu Malhotra and Ravindra Bana for the State.

S. Balakrishnan and M.K.D. Narnboodri for the Impleading party.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Application for impleadment is dismissed as withdrawn.

Leave granted.

We decline to express any opinion on merits since M.P. Sharma, who was appointed to an additional pos_t as a general candidate pursuant to the direction issued by the High Coui; t in Writ Petition No. 13700/90, on July 8, 1990 while the appellant was regularly selected by the Public Service Commission and appointed earlier to him,. is not made a party to these proceedings. The main thrust of the argument is on in.terse seniority between

the appellant and M.P. Sharma. But in the abse_nce of M.P. Sharma being impleaded as a party respondent to these proceedings, we cannot go into the question. Under these circumstances, we do find that though the High Court G dismissed the writ petition in limine, it would be open to the appellant to approach the High Court, if so advised, to file a fresh writ petition impleading the affected parties and seek his remedy according to law.

The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.

GN.

Appeal dismissed.

H 157