evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
RAMARAVALUGAVADE v.

SATABA GAV ADU GAV ADE (DEAD)

THROUGH LRS. AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 18, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Limitation:

Appeal-Application for bringing legal representatives on record- C Dismissed as time barred-Meanwhile appeal abated-Held, Courts below

were not right in refusing to condone the delay-Delay caused due to lack of proper legal advice-Delay condoned-Abatement stands set aside- Appeal lo be decided on merits.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15085 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.12.94 of the Bomb.ay High Court in C.R.A. No. 632 of 1991.

E A.S. Bhasme for the Appellant.

V.B. Joshi, Alok Singh and Umesh Bhagwat for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered ;

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Cou11 ofBombay, made on December 8, 1994 dismissing the Civil Revision No. 632/91.

H The admitted position is that the uncle of the petitioner died pending

R.R. GAV ADE v. S.G. GAV ADE 741

Regular Civil Suit No. 51/65 in the Cou11 of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, A Chandgad. Since he died pending appeal, it was dismissed on August 4, 1967 as having abated. In Civil Revision No. 632/91 by order dated December 8. 1994. the High Court dismissed the same. The application was filed for bringing the Legal Representatives on record which was also dismissed as no proper explanation for condoning the delay was given.

Thus, this appeal by special leave.

In view of the fact that the appellant is an illiterate farmer, the appropriate steps should have been taken by the counsel for the appellant on proper advice. In view of the fact that the counsel has not properly advised the appellant to take necessary steps, delay had occasioned. The High Cou11, therefore, was not right in refusing to condone the delay. It is C brought to our notice that no application has been filed for setting aside the abatement and the appeal also stands abated. In view of the fact that the delay now stands condoned the abatement, also stands set aside.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal on merits within a period of six months from the D date of the receipt of the order. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal allowed.
NARAYAN DATTATRA YA RAMTEERTHAKHAR v.

ST A TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 20, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANA VA TI AND

K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

Service Law :

Removal from service-Government servant-Misconduct- Misappropriation of public money-Inquiry officer finding the employee C guilty-Disciplinary authority removed him from service-Tribunal upheld the removal order-Pleas of employee that he was forced to deposit the money and the preliminary inquiry was not properly conducted-Held not sustainable-There is no illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal warranting interference.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23872 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.95 of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Bombay in O.A. No. 558 of 1991.

Jasbir Singh, Malik and Ms. Kamakshi Singh Mehlwal for the Petitioner.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned.

The special leave petition arises from the order of Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench, made in OA No. 558 of 1991. G The finding recorded by all the authorities is that the petitioner has misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1440 deducted from the employees and had not deposited until asked to pay the same in 1985. Thereby, the authorities have concluded that the petitioner has committed misconduct. On that finding, the Enquiry Officer found him guilty. The disciplinary authority removed him from service. The Petitioner challenged the order in the H

940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1996] SUl'I'. 8 S.C.R.

A High Court. The High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to avail the alternative remedy. The Tribunal found that there is no proper explanation for the inordinate delay in assailing the disciplinary action. That apait, even on merits also, we do not think that there is any case made out for interference. The finding is that the petitioner has committed misappropriation of the public money and his removal B from service is an appropriate order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to contend that the petitioner has not committed any misappropriation and that he was forced to deposit the money. We cannot accept the contention in view of the fact that the petitioner himself had deposited the amount. It is then contended that the C preliminary enquiry was not properly conducted and, therefore, the enquiry is vitiated by principles ofnaturaljustice. We find no force in the contention.

The preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent.

After full-fledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its D importance.

Under these circumstances, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal warranting interference. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.

R.P.

Petition dismissed.
BALARPUR INDUSTRIES LTD.

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 22, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :

S. 4( 1 }-Acquisition of land--<:hallenged on the ground that as a result C of acquisition ingress and egress to the factory would be blocked-Held, on the undertaking given that ingress and egress to the factory would not be stopped, there is no need to inteifere with the acquisition.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15522 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.96 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA. No. 8179 of 1995.

Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Appellant.

E Y. Adhyaru, Ms. Neetu Singh and Ms. H. Wahl for the Respondent Nos. 1-3.

A.K. Gupta for the Respondent No. 4.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

F Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by by special leave arises from the order of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, dated April 15, 1996 made in Special Civil Application No. 8179 of 1995. Learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the validity of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the G Land Acquisition Act, 1894 acquiring the land on the ground that the lands were needed for public purpose and it blocked ingress and egress to their factory. In view of the admission made by the respondent in the counteraffidavit filed in the High Court, notice was issued to the respondents as indicated in our order dated 2.9.1996. In furtherance thereof, the acquiring H authority in the counteraffidavit has admitted the same. The beneficiary, 156

BALARPURINDS. LID. v. STATE 157

namely, Respondent No. 4 on whose behalf acquisition is sought to be A made in their counter-affidavit, has admitted thus :

"This respondent submits that it stands by its said commitment and assures this Hon'ble Court that it would close the existing road passing through the acquired land only after it has constructed a new road on the boundary of the acquired land and connected to B the existing road for necessary ingress and egress to the petitioner's factory."

In view of this admission and undertaking given by the 4th respondent to provide for necessary ingress and egress to the appellant's faciory, C there is no need to interfere with the acquisition as it is subject to the above undertaking. Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that telephone lines and electrical energy lines etc. to the appellant's factory also are required to be shifted from the existing road to the new road. We direct that this should also be done as part of the undertaking given by the respondent.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal disposed of.
SHIMLA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS A v.

SMT. SANTOSH SHARMA AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 22, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Land Acquisitio11-Compensatiolt-Deduction of development charges-Extent of-Compensation awarded by Land Acquisition Officer @ Rs. C

40,000 per bigha-Reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs.

1,00,00()-{)eduction of 40% towards developmelll charges-Held, valid.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15550 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.1.90 of the Shimla High Court in R.F.A. No. 11 of 1988.

H.K. Puri for Naresh Kr. Sharma for the Appellants.

The following order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

Notice was sent to the respondents as early as on July 25, 1991 but neither the unserved notice nor the acknowledgement cards have so far been received from the respondents. So notice must be deemed to have F been on them.

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 23.1.1986 acquiring land situated at Patti Rihana I and II and Kasumpti Junga of Tehsil & District Shimla. The Land Acquisition G Officer awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 40,000 per bigha. On reference, the District Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,00,000. • On aPPeal, the High Court after deducting 40% of the compensation awarded towards development charges, has confirmed the same in the impugned judgment. Shri H.K. Puri, learned counsel for appellants contended that in several judgments, this Court has confirmed deduction upto H 171

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A 40% of the compensation towards development charges and that, therefore, the same ratio would be maintained in all the cases. In some cases this Court has pointed out that depending upon the location of the land and development needed, deduction between 30% to 40% was proper and was approved. In this case the Division Bench has accepted this :

B I am of the view a deduction of the 40% would be reasonable."

We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has correctly applied the principle and we find no ground to interfere with it.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.
ADAVALA SATHAIAH AND ORS.

THE SPECIAL DY. COLLECTOR,

LAND ACQUISITION UNIT I AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 26, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :

La11d acquisition-Compensation-Detem1i11ation of-Land acqulSl- C tion for erection of National 1hennal Power Corporation-Award for compensation by Land Acquisition Officer @ Rs. 4000 and Rs. 4500 per acre for Group l and Group II respectively-Enhancement of compensatio11 by Reference Court to Rs. 10, 000 and Rs. 11, 500 for Group I and II respectivelr High Cowt remanded the matter to T1ial Court for reconsideration- Appeal-Held, all the la1tds were agricultural lands at the time of acquisition D and their prevaili11g market value varies betwee11 Rs. 6, 000 to Rs. 6,500 per acre-Held, just a11d proper compe11satio11 in the circumstances would be @ Rs. 6000 per acre unifom1ly for all the lands.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15487 of E 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.3.92 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. No. 2660 of 1985.

A. Subba Rao and Annam Q.N. Rao for the Appellants.

K.C. Dua and G. Prabhakar for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Respondent Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 11 to 14 and 18 have, left their respective G places without any instructions as per endorsement made by the Postal authorities. Under these circumstances, notice on them is not necessary.

Regarding respondent Nos. 4, 7 to 10, 15 to 17 and 19 to 20, it is stated that neither unserved envelops nor AD. Cards have been received back by the Registry. Under these circumstances, they must be deemed to have been served. Even though the petitioners succeed, these respondents can- H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A not get the same benefit because they did not challenge the award. They being pro forma respondents, notice on them is not necessary.

Leave granted.

' <<< Heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and decree of the A.P. High Court, made on March 3, 1992 in the Appeal NO. 2660/85.

A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on Dcember 8, 1979, acquiring 71 acres 12 cents of land for the public purpose, namely, erection of National Thermal Power Corporation.

C The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 4000 and Rs. 4500 per acre for Group I and Group II of the lands. On reference, the subordinate Judge enhanced the compensation tO Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 11,500 per acre for Group I and Group II respectively. On appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsidera- D tion. Thus this appeal by special leave.

It is seen that all the lands were agricultural lands at the time of acquisition and their prevailing market value varies between Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 6,500 per acre. Under these circumstances, it would be just and proper if the compensation is fixed at Rs. 6,000 per acre uniformly to all the lands.

E It is ordered accordingly.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal allowed.
TEHRI HYDRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION A v.

SH. S.P. SINGH AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 26, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 4( 1) and 23(1-A)

Land acquisition--Compensation-Interest on solarium and one additional amount awarded under section 23(1-A)-No specific mention in the C decree of High Court that claimants are entitled to said relief-Decree mentioned that claimants were entitled only to statutory benefite/d, in these circumstances claimants were not entitled to interest on solatium and on additional. amount awarded under Section 23( 1-A) of the Act.

Prem Nath Kapoor v. National Fe1ti/izer Corporation, [1996] 2 SCC D 71, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 15486 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.96 of the Allahabad High E Court in F.A. No. 129 of 1995.

Prem Prasad Juneja for the Appellants.

Niraj Sharma for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order of G the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, made on March 22, 1996 in the First Appeal No. 129/95. This appeal and also the First Appeal No. 123/95 before the High Court are commonly disposed of since the acquisition was common. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the 'Act') was published on September H 211

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A 11, 1982 for acquiring 192.82 acres. The award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on March 3, 1984 in Award No. 44 in respect of 137.52 acres of the land and another award dated September 21, 1986 in award No. 44/1 in respect of 33 acres of land. On appeal, the Additional District Judge by his another award dated December 3, 1994 awarded a

B sum of Rs. 1,35,000 per acre. On appeal, the High Court has reduced the compensation to Rs. 1,12,500 per acre. it has also awarded separate compensation for the building, factory and machinery. Thus this appeal by special leave.

In this appeal, Shri Juneja, learned counsel for the appellant, has C contended that in view of the judgment in the case of Prem Nath Kapoor

v. National Fertilizer Corporation, [1996] 2 SCC 71 wherein it was held that the claimants are not entitled to solatium on additional amount awarded under Section 23(1A) of the Act, they are also not entitled to interest on solatium. The learned counsel for the respondent, in fairness, has stated that as per the decree of the High Court, there was no specific mention D that the claimants are entitled to the above reliefs. It mentions only that the statutory benefits would be granted as per law. Under these circumstances, it is clarified that the claimants are not entitled to interest on solatium and on additional amount awarded under Section 23(1A) of the Act.

E The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent. No costs.

T.N.A Appeal allowed.
STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

SUKANTI DEBI

DECEMBER 2, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.)

Se1vice Law-Directio11 give11 by T1ibu11al for appointme11t against a funtre vaca11cy-Va/idity of-State of Orissa-M.E. Schools-Respo11dent appointed in a third post as Hi11di Teacher which was not a sanctioned C post-Need for such an appointment 11ot recognised by Managemem--Govemment i11stntctions dated May 1, 1992-Direction that Hi11di being a non-Examinable subject in M.E. Schools, there was no need to allow the existing Hi11di teachers in M.E. Schools to continue fwthe1'-fleld direction issued by Tribunal to appoim respondent against a future vacancy was not light.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 15712 of

1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.95 of the Central Administrative Tribunal at Cuttack, Orissa in O.A. No 1499 of 1993.

Ms. Kirti Mishra for the Appellants.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal at Cuttack, made on March 2, 1995 in OA No. 1499/93. Though the respondent was served on September 30, 1996, she G did not appear. Therefore, we adjourned the matter by pcoceecijngs dated

October 28, 1996 to see whether she appears or is represented through counsel. Even today, she has not appeared.

The only question is : whether the direction issued by the Tribunal to appoint him in future vacancy is valid in law? It is seen that the third H respondent came to be appointed in a third post as Hindi Teacher which 434

STATEv.SUKANTI DEBI 435

was not sanctioned post; nor was the need for such an appointment A recognised by the management. It is also stated that he was not qualified for the post. We need not go into the question of his qualification. Suffice it would be to state that the Government in their letter dated May 1, 1992 have stated as under :

ti on.

"I am directed to invite a reference to Go\t. Education Department Letter No. 13409, dated 17.3.1992 and to inform you that Hindi being a non-Examinable subject in M.E. Schools, there is no need to allow the existing Hindi teachers in M.E. Schoo], to continue further. Therefore, it was decided that the Hindi teachers who are

... in M.E. Schools will be adjusted against the third post of C teachers in M.E. Schools provided they possessed Matric C.T.

Qualification. In case any of them not ... C. T. Qualification he should be given chance tc acquire C.T. Qualification as in service candidate by summer vacation ... he will be allowed untrained scale of pay till then. In case any one is non-Matric he should be given the chance to acquire an equal C.T. Qualification. In case of D former, the qualification would be acquired within three years for issue of order and in case the of non-Matriculation qualification should be acquired within period of Five Years."

In view of the above, the Tribunal was not right in giving the direc- E

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal allowed.
M/S. INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL A; v.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAYl.

DECEMBER 5, 1996

[S.P. BHARUCHA AND S.C. SEN, JJ.] B

Central Excise Tariff :

Item 14-D-lnterpretation of-Expression 'used in any dyeing process'- Whether qualify synthetic organic dyestuffs and synthetic organic derivatives C or only synthetic organic derivatives-Held apply only to synthetic derivatives which are used in the dyeing process-Words being clear no assistance from external source is necessary for their interpretation.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1908 of D

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.5.87 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in A. No.

ED/SB/860/83-C.

B.V. Desai, P.J. Mehta and Ms. Shasbi Soharu for the Appellant.

KC. Diwan for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The short question here relates to the interpretation of Tariff Item F 14D of the Central Excise Tariff. It reads thus :

"Synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) and synthetic organic derivatives used in auy dyeing process.".

The question is, do the words 'used in any dyeing process' qualify synthetic G organic dyestuffs and synthetic organic derivatives or only synthetic organic derivatives.

Dyestuffs are used in the dyeing process and, therefore, the use of the words "used in any dyeing process" with reference to dyestuffs would be tautology. The words can, therefore, apply only to synthetic derivatives H 553

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A which are used in the dyeing process.

This is the view that was taken by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal in an earlier judgment, which has been followed by the Tribunal in the present case.

B The words being so clear, we do not think that assistance from any external source for their interpretation is called for.

TJie appeal is dismissed, with n<? order as to costs.

T.N.A.

Appeal dismissed.
DY. GENERAL MANAGER, REDESIGNATED AS DEPUTY

DIRECTOR, INTER STATE BUS TERMINAL ETC.

SMT. SUDERSHAN KUMAR! AND ORS. ETC.

DECEMBER~, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 199.

Filing of false ce1tificate and false affidavits in Court-Punishment for-Appeal prefened before Supreme Cowt by 1spondent-False certificate and false affidavit filed before Supreme Cowt-Respondent convicted under Section 199-Rigorous imprisonment for six months and fine of rupees 1, 000 imposed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7084-85 of 1996 ..

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.94 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 2483 of 1994.

E Pramod Dayal for the Appellants.

D. Goburdhan and V.B. Saharya for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

F This Court by order dated April 2, 1996 had observed that leave and licence to run a sales counter granted on compassionate grounds and other liberties given to them were being abused by such persons and that the High Court was not right in giving liberty to the respondent No. 1 to withdraw the writ petition and to file another writ petition on the same cause of action. Civil Appeal No. 7084/96 was accordingly allowed and the G appeal filed by Sudershan Kumari was dismissed with costs. A direction was issued to the Notary to show cause as to why he should not be prosecuted and punished for attesting false affidavit of impersonation and why his licence should not be cancelled and why he should not be prosecuted for t,'1ving such false certificates. A notice was sent to him on H the basis of the name furnished by the respondent and also in the oath. It 686

DY. GEN. MANAUER. RElJt.SlGNAlEA"i DY. DIRECTOR JSB.T. '" SUDERSHANKUMARJ 687

rs now reported by the Registry that no such person is available in Tis "A Hazari Court. Consequently by order dated October 23, 1996 Mr.

Goburdhan learned counsel appearing for the respondent, was directed tC\ give the name of the Oath Commissioner lest proceedings should be

initialed against the first respondent Sudershan Kumari who has filed the affidavit alleged to have been attested by the Oath Commissioner which is B found to be false. Accordingly time was given. It is stated by the learned counsel, Mr. Goburdhan, that in spite of the letter written by him, the respondent is not responding. Under these circumstances, we are left with no option but to convict the first respondent Mrs. Sudershan Kumari for producing false certificate and false affidavits. Accordingly, she is convicted under Section 199 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous im- C prisonment for a period of six months and is directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, in default to undergo a further sentence of six weeks. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. This order should be sent to the Sessions Judge, Delhi to enforce the sentence. It is accordingly ordered.

T.N.A.

Appeal disposed of. D