SURESH LOHIYA v.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.

AUGUST 23, 1996

(G.N. RAY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)

Indian Forest Act, 1927: Sectio11s 2( 4), ( 6) & (7).

'Forest-produce'-Bamboo mat-Held : did 11ot include bamboo C mat-A forest produce changed into commercially new and disti11ct product ceased to be forest produce--'Trees' in S. 2( 4)(b )(i) refe1Ted to natural growth or products of trees and did 11ot i11clude mticles produced with aid of huma11

labou~171e seco11d pmt of defi11itio11 of 'timber' i11 S. 2(6) did not refer to 'fashioned' bamboo.

D /11terpretatio11 of Statutes :

Judicial Legislatio11-Held: Not pennissible-Cowt could not read in the defi11ition of a provi ion somethi11g which was 1101 there.

I11temal aids-Definition-Held : Whe11 a word was defined in Act E Courl had to look to that defi11itio11 and not to ge11eral understanding of that word.

Words & Phrases :

"Forest-produce''-Mea11i11g of-ln the context of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.

The r•espondents confiscated bamboo mat belonging to the appellant.

However, t.he Additional Sessions Judge directed release of the bamboo mat. The revision petition filed by the respondents was allowed by the High G Court on the ground that the product confiscated was "forest-produce"

within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the second part of the definition "timber" in Section 2(6) of the Act did not include bamboo H mat; and that only natural growth or product like flowers and fruits was

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SURF.SH LOHIYAv. STATE 131

contemplated by the expression "produce of tree".

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that if bamboo mat was held to be not a "forest-produce" it would denude the country's forest wealth.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : Though bamboo as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of "forestproduce" leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an C article or thing which is totally different from forest-produce, having a distinct character. Therefore, were a product from bamboo is commercial Iy different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 despite it being D inclusive in nature. Bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world and, therefore, it is not a forest-produce in the eyes of law. [135-B-D]

Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1987) Guj 9, ap proved.

:E:

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, referred to.

2.1. Section 2(4)(b)(i) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 clearly indicates that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth or product like flowers and fruits. When the definition of "forest-produce" F is read in its entirety it would show that wherever the legislature wanted to include article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so specifically as would appear from Section 2(4)(b)(iv) of the Act, as it speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all products of mines or quarries".

The second part of the definition of timber in Section 2(6) of the Act does G not take within its fold fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be., [134-C-F]

2.2~ The legislature having defined "forest-produce", it is not permis sible to read in the definition something which is not there. While forest H

A wealth is required to be prestrved, it is not open to the Court to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to tlllke care of the same. [134-F -HJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 430 of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.12.92 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 57 of 1990.

S.K. Dholakia and S.M. Jadhav for the Appellant.

Madan Bhatia, Ms. Rakhi Verma and Ms. Bina Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D HANSARIA, J. Whether bamboo mat is a forest-produce as is this expression known to the Indian Forest Act? requires our determination in this appeal. This question would decide whether the order of confiscation of bamboo mat belonging to the appellant was in accordance with law. The Bombay High Court, having: been approached in revision by the State E against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge directing release of the bamboo mat, has reversed the order being of the view that the product confiscated was "forest-produce". The owner of the bamboo mat has approached this Court by filing this appeal.

2. ''Forest-produce" has been defined in The Indian Forest Act, 1927 F (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as below :

"2(4) "forest-produce" includes -

(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or :not, that is to say - timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, G :resin, natural varnish bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth and myrabolams, and

(b) the following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is to say -

(i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or

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SURF.SHLOHIYAv. STAIB[HANSARIA, J.] 133

produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees.

(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss), and all parts or produce of such planfs,

(iii) wild animals an skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey

and wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and B

(iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-stone, laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries)."

We must also note the definition of "timber" as given in sub-clause (6) and of "tree" in sub-clause (7) - the same being as below : C

"(6) "timber" includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not; and

(7) "tree" includes palms, bamboos, stumps, brush-wood and D canes."

3. The High Court's decision is principally based a conjoint reading of definition of "timber" and "tree". It has stated that as definition of "tree" includes bamboo, and as definition of "timber" includes tree, even a E fashioned bamboo would be a tree. It was then stated that "forest-produce" having been defined as any produce of tree in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of subsection (4), bamboo mat is forest-produce. In taking this view the High Court differed from what had been held by Gujarat High Court in Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1987) Gujarat 9.

4. Sh,_i Bhatia, appearing for the appellant, who was duly assisted by Ms. Verma, submitted that the High Court erred in holding that a product like bamboo mat would be forest-produce by relying on the definition of "timber" because that definition is in two parts and the second part which

speaks of "all wood ...... fashioned ........ or no" has no application so far trees G are conci;; rned, which have been dealt in the first part of the definition. It has also been urged that bamboo mat being a separate commercial product what was stated by the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case merits our acceptance.

5. Shri Dholakia, who was duly assisted by Shri Jadhav, however, H

A contends that if bamboo mat is held to be not a forest-produce, .the object of the Act would be frustrated inasmuch as it would debar the forest authorities to inquire about the removal of such goods from the forests, which would be used as a handle by unscrupulous dealers to denude the country of its forest wealth. To buttress his submission, reference has been

made to the definition of "produce" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which reads : "The expression 'produce of mines or minerals' does not necessarily mean produce in its native state; coke may be such produce, although by combustion its chemical nature is changed."

6. We have given our considered thought to the rival contentions. It appears to us that the High Court erred in taking the abovesaid view by referring to the definition of "timber" inasmuch as we agree with Shri Bhatia that the second part of the definition does not take within its fold fashioned bamboo as that part is relatable to wood, and not tree. We have said so because the definition of tree includes even canes, and a cane cannot be taken as a wood, even if a tree could be. But then, the High D Court has also referred to sub-clause (i) (supra) which speaks of produce of tree as well. As to this, submission of the appellant's counsel has been that whcn sub-clause (i) is read as a whole the same would clearly indicate that such produce of tree alone is contemplated which is a natural growth

or product like flowers and fruits. This submission has force when the definition of forest-produce: is read in its entirety which would show that the definition either include.s nature's gifts like charcoal, mahua flowers or minerals. Wild animals of which sub-clause (iii) speaks of is also a God's gift and not man-made. Wherever the legislature wanted to include article produced with the aid of human labour, it has said so specifically as would appear from sub-clause (iv), as it speaks, apart from minerals etc. of "all products of mines or quarries".

7. The legislature having defined "forest-produce'', it is not pem1issible to us to read in the definition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it G is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out creases; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same.

8. We may also state that according to us the view taken by the

SURESHLOHIYAv. STATE[HANSARIA, J.] 135

Gujarat High Court in Fatesang's case is correct, because though bamboo A as a whole is forest-produce, if a product, commercially new and distinct, known to the business community as totally different is brought into existence by human labour, such an article and product would cease to be a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves nothing to doubt that it would not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally B different from forest produce having a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look to that definition; the general understanding of it can not be determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds' Judicial Dictionary regarding a "produce" can not be decisive. Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially different from it and in common parlance C taken as a distinct product, the same would not be encompassed within the expression "forest-produce" as defined in section 2( 4) of the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. That bamboo mat is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial world, has not been disputed before us, and rightly.

9. In view of all the above, we hold that bamboo mat is not a forest-produce in the eye of the Act, and so, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and state that the order of confiscation passed by the Conservator of Forest was not in accordance with law.

V.S.S.

Appeal allowed.