evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
SH. VIJAY SINGH, SECRETARY HOME AND ANR. v.

MITTANLAL HJNDOLIYA

NOVEMBER I, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Service Law :

Date of birth-Correction of-Application by employee-Tribunal directing employer to consider representation of the emp/oyee- C Representation rejected-Held, representation was duly considered and rejected-Tribunal's order not deliberately disobeyed-Tribunal ought not have issued further directions to consider the case afresh.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14920 of

D 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.9.95 of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Indore in M.A.N0.99 of 1994.

Prashant Kumar and S.K. Agnihotri for the Appellants.

Dr. J.B. Gaur for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

F Delay condoned

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order in the contempt G proceedings dated August 1, 1995 made by the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Indore in Miscellaneous Application No. 99 of 1994.

The admitted position is that the respondent was appointed as a Sub- Inspector in the Police Department on January I, 1960 and his date of H birth in the High School Certificate was August 5, 1934. In 1992, he filed

VIJAY SINGH, SECY.HOMEv. MIITANLALHINDOLIYA 351

an application in the Tribunal for correction of his date of birth contending A that his date of birth was July 16, 1938. The Tribunal by order dated February 25, 1994 disposed of the application with a direction to consider the representation of the respondent. The representation was considered and rejected by proceedings dated May 23, 1994. Consequently, the respondent filed a contempt application contending that the appellants have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the orders of the Tribunal and B sought for initiation of the proceedings against the appellants under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In the impugned order, the Tribunal has held that the respondent has not deliberately disobeyed the orders of the court as direction was to consider the caseafresh on the finding that the Director General of Police had not applied his mind to the issue and, therefore, the impugned order came to be issued. The question is: whether C the Tribunal was right in its giving directions? It is seen that the Assistant Inspector General of Police who is the Administrative officer assists the Administrator, namely, the Director General of PoUce. He had put up the note on it and after consideration of it the Director General of Police had made a note 'inform the respondent'. Obviously, after consideration of the case he did not agree with the claim of the respondent and accepted the D report submitted by his subordinate, viz. Assistant Inspector General of Police. Thus, it would be a case where due consideration was given to the respondent's representation as per the .directions given by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal having held that the respondent has not deliberately dirnbeyed the order, there is no power to issue further directions:

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The directions are set aside, No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A v.

SITARAM SHIVHANDRAI GARODIA AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 4, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :

Land acquired for Railway purpose-Subsequently proposal given up-Eviction of erstwhile owners by the Government-Set aside by the C High Court in similar case-Respondents not impleaded-Open to Government to take steps to implead them-Respondents to take such defence as is available.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14781 of 1996. [)

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.94 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No . .2705 of 1986.

N.N. Goswamy, S.N. Sikka and D.S. Mehra for the Appellants.

F.S. Nariman, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam, Ms.

Monika Mehta and Aman V achhar for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division G Bench of the High Court of Bombay, dated August 11, 1994 made in W.P.No.2705 of 1986.

It is not necessary to dilate upon all the facts concerning the case.

Suffice it to state that the respondents have challenged the acquisition of part of the land in Survey No. 249 admeasuring 130 acres 19 Guntas H 389

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A which the respondent claims to have purchased. It would appear that in the affidavit filed by the Railway, they have .given up the proposal for the acquisition of the land for Railway purpose. Under those circumstdnces, there is no necessity to proceed further with the acquisition. It is then contended by Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, that in W.P. No. 1003 of 1Q82 titled Sitaram Shivchand B Garodia and Anr. v. S. V. Gokhale, the Assistant Salt Commissioner and Ors. the Division Bench of the High Court by order dated April 28, 1983 had allowed the writ petition setting aside the proceedings for summary eviction of them from the land in their occupation with liberty' for the Union of India. to file a suit to establish their title to the iand. When S.L.P.(C) Nos. 8706 of 1984 and 11507-08 of 1983, against the said C judgment were filed, by Order dated March 30, 1987, this Court refused

to grant leave. The appellant's attempt to have respondent evicted from the lands stands conclude4 subject to the division in the suit. We are informed that though the appellants have filed Suit No. 670/87 on the original side of the High Court, it is contended that as per the cause title, it would appear that the respondents have not been impleaded as party-defendants.

D We need not go into the correctness thereof, since the respondents though

exfcie are shown to be not parties to the suit; even then, it would be open to the Government to take steps as may be available under law for impleading them as defendants, if not already impleaded, and in such eventuality it would be open to the respondents, to take such defence as is available.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal disposed of.
SOWRASHTRA VIPRA SABHA.

A v.

THE NAMAKKAL MUNICIPALITY AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 4, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920.

S.339(2)-Pavadi land-Suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction on the ground that the property being an estate, plaintiff perfected C his title-Suit dismissed by all courts below-Notice served on plaintiff by affixure and possession of land taken-Held, the land vested in State after due ejectment of plaintiff-Not a fit case for interference by this Court.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 14779 of 1996. ])

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.9.995 of the Madras High CQurt in S.A. No. 2235 of 1983.

S. Sivasubramaniam, R. Nedumaran and V.G. Pragasam for the Appellant.

R. Mohan and T. Raja for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F Leave granted.

We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the learned G single Judge of the High Court of Madras, made on September l, 1996 in SA. No. 2235/83.

The appellant had filed a suit for declaration of title and for perpetual injunction. The contention raised by the appellant was that the property being an estate he has perfected his title thereto. The case of the respondents H 391

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A is that it is a Pavadi land and after the abolititon of the estate, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. All the courts below have concurrently found that the appellant has no title to the property but he was in possession of the property. Accordingly, a direction was given to have him ejected in accordance with law. After the judgment was rendered by the High Court, the notice was given to the appellant on September 1, B 1995 and they refused to receive the notice. As a result, on 2.9.1995, notice was served on the appellant by affixture and possession thereof was taken on 9.9.1995 under the provisions of Section 339(2) of the Tamil Nadu Municipal Act. Thus the land stood vested in the State after due ejectment by the appellant. It is stated that it is the part of the public bus stand at the site in question and that the public passenger buses enter through C it. A plan was filed in that behalf marking in red the portion which is part of the bus stand. Under these circumstances, we do not think that it is a case warranting interference.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

D R.P.

Appeal dismissed.
KUMUD LATA DAS A v.

INDU PRASAD

SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND, G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) B

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :

Order IX Rule 13-Application for setting aside. exparte decree-Property in possessio11 of daughter-i11-law-She could not live amicably with her C husband-Mother-in-law filing suit for possession on the basis of her alleged title-Appellant was set ex-parte-Applicatio11 for restoration of decree disposed of by the High Court by imposing condition of depositing mes11e profits for the execution of the exparte decree-Not justified-Matter remitted to High

Cowt for fresh consideration of the application for setting aside the decree on merits and i11 accorda11ce with law.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 12729 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.96 of the Delhi High Court in I.A. No. 8629/95 in Suit No. 3781 of 1990.

M.N: Krishnamani and S.B. Upadhyay for the Appellant.

AK. Ganguli, Manish Mishra for N.S. Bisht for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered : F

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order made on April 16, 1996 by the Delhi High Court in I.A. No. 8629/95 in Suit No. 3781/90. The suit was for possession of the property from the appellant. The plaintiff is G the mother-in-law of the appellant. The appellant and her husband are not able to live amicably in matrimonial tie. The proceedings for divorce are pending._The appellant is in possession of the property and, therefore, the respondent-mother-in-law filed a suit for possession on the basis of her alleged title. The appellant was set ex parte and the applicatio1i under H 521

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Order 9, Rule 13 CPC is now pending before the High Court. The application for restoration of the decree has been disposed of with directions to deposit and to continue to deposit mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per month from the date of ex-pa1te decree, Hence, this appeal by special leave.

B In view of the fact that the parties are closely related and the matter has been disposed of ex-parte, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to impose costs of depositing mesne profits from the date of ex-parte decree and to continue to deposit it as a condition to contest the application to set aside ex-parte decree. Moreover, such onerous condition is not valid, C though discretioary.

Under these circumstances, we think that the learned Single Judge was not right in imposing the condition of depositing the mesne profits as a condition precedent for execution of the ex-parte decree. The impugned order of the High court is accordingly set aside. There .shall be stay of D execution of the ex-parte decree. The matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the application for setting aside the decree on merits and in accordance with law.

The appeal is allowed. No costs.

E G.N.

Appeal allowed.
UNION OF INDIA A v.

SHRI UJAGAR LAL

OCTOBER 7, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.P. PAITANAIK, JJ.] B

Service Law :

Retiral Benefits-Death-cum-retirement gratuity-Delay in payment of-Claim for interest-Circular issued by Railway Board directing not to C make the payment till the retired employee surrenders possession of Railway . accommodation-Held, the delay in payment was not due to any administrative lapse-171e retired employee is not entitled to interest.

Raj Pal Wahi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., SLP (C) Nos. 7688-91/88 decided on 27.11.1989, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13220 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.90 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in O.A. No. 1383 of 1990.

P.P. Malhotra and B.K. Prasad for the Appellant.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Though notice was sent to the respondent on May 8, 1992, till date neither the acknowledgment card nor unserved notice has been received back. Under those circumstances, notice must be deemed to have served.

Leave granted.

The only question argued in this appeal is: whether the respondent G is entitled to the payment of interest for failure to released the death-cumretirement gratuity under the rules? The Tribunal in the impugned order made on 22.11.1990 in O.A. No. 1383/90 directed interest@ 7% per annum for the first twelve months and @10% per annum for the period thereafter.

The admitted position is that the respondent was unauthorisedly in occupation of the quarter allotted to him and, therefore, he was not paid death- H 227

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A cum-retirement gratuity since the respondent had remained in possession unauthorisedly for more than two years. This question was considered by this Court in Raj Pal Wahi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., SLP (C) Nos. 7688-91/88 decided on 27.11.1989 and held that in those circmstances, the Court unable to hold that the petitioners are entitled to get interest for the B delayed payment of death-cum-retirement gratuity as the delay in payment occurred due to the order passed on the basis of the said circular of Railway Board and not on account of administrative lapse. In this case, in view of the circular issued by the administration directing not to make payment of death-cum-retirement gratuity till the retired employee surrenders possession, the delay in payment was not due to any administrative C lapse but on account of the circular issued by the Board. Under these circumstances, the respondent is not entitled to the interest as directed by the Tribunal.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

D R.P.

Appeal allowed.
OM PRAKASH GARGI A v.

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

OCTOBER 7, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Service Law :

Medical expenses incwred by Government servant-Delay in reimbursement-Claim for interest-Held, the right of employee is to get reimburse- C ment and it does not follow that for the delay in payment he should be entitled to interest thereon--It would not be proper to direct payment of interest on delayed reimbursement.

Constitution of India:

Articles 136 and 141-Petition for special leave-Dismissed in D limine-Held, does not furnish any ratio decidendi.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19497 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.96 of the Punjab and E Haryana High Court in C.M. No. 933/96 in L.P.A. No. 60 of 1996.

J.D. Jain and B.S. Gupta for the Petitioner.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This special leave petition has been filed against the order of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana made on 29.5.1996 in C.M. No. 933/96 in LPA No. 60/96.

Admittedly, the petitioner had claimed reimbursement of medical expenses spent in private hospital for heart disease. Ultimately, the amount G came to be disbursed on August 28, 1991 but there was delay in payment thereof. The petitioner filed the writ petition. The High Court in LP A directed payment of the amount but disallowed interest at 12% as claimed by the petitioneL He filed a review petition and the same came to be dismissed. Thus this special leave petition.

H 229

SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996JSUPP. 7S.C.R.

A It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in several cases, the Division Bench had directed payment of interest, but in this case, they have departed from the above principle. When a special leave petition was filed by the State, this Court had dismissed the same in limine. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the payment of interest.

B We do not find any force in the contention. It is true that but for the benefit of reimbursement of the amount granted by the Government, the petitioner has no right to claim reimbursement. The question is: Whether on account of delay i11. reimbursing the amount incurred towards medical expenses, the State should be liable to pay also interest on the delayed C payment? We are of the view that it is inexpedient and not proper to direct the State to pay interest for delay in payment of the reimbursement amount. It requires verification of the amounts spent by the petitioner and similar person. His right only is to get reimbursement and it does not follow that for the delay in the payment of medical reimbursement, he should also be entitled to interest thereon. The order passed by this Court on an earlier D occasion was to the effect of dismissing the special leave petition in limine.

Therefore, it does not furnish any ratio decidendi for following the same.

Under these circumstances, we do not think that it would be proper to direct payment of interest on the delayed reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred by a Government servant.

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.

R.P.

Petition dismissed.
M. POORNACHANDRAN AND ANR. v.

STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 6, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, B.L. HANSARIA

AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Practice and Procedure :

Review petition-Filing of before the Supreme Court-Advocate on C Record filing the review petition-Not obtained "No Objection Certificate"

from the Advocate-on-Record in the appeal-He was neither a counsel of the petitioner when the appeal was heard nor was he present at that time- Grounds taken in the review petition do not confine to the scope of review- Held, it would be not in the interest of the profession to permit such practice.

D Advocate-on-Record-Filing review petition before the Supreme Court without obtaining "No objection Certificate"from the Advocate-on-Record in the app.eal-Held, filing of "No Objection Certificate" would be the basis for him to come on record-Otherwise the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court-Failure to obtain "No Objection Certificate" E from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the review petition.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Review Petition (C) No. 2070 of 1996.

Arising out of Civil Appeal No. 1867of1992

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.4.91 of the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos. 9269of1983.

Prabir Chowdhary for the Petitioner/Appellants.

The following of the Court was delivered :

H The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was the 542

M. POORNACHANDRAN v. ST ATE OF T.N. 543

Advocate-on-Record when the appeal was heard and decided on merits, A The Review Petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the Review Petition as if it is a re-hearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would be not in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That part, he has not B obtained "No Objection Certificate" from the Advocate-an-Record in the appeal, inspite the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for do'ng so. Filing of the "No Objection Certificate" would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate-an-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the "No Objection Certificate" from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the Review petition. C Even otherwise, the Review petition has no merits. It is an attempt to reargue the matter.

On these grounds, we dismiss the Review Petition.

R.P.

Petition dismissed. D
STATE OF HARYANA A v.

DHARAMPAL, WATER PUMP OPERATOR AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 7, 1996

[A.M. AHMADI, CJ. AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] B

Labour Law:

Casual workers-Claim for regularisation and parity in pay on the principle of equal pay for equal work-Held claim not sustainable C -In view of the judgment in the case of Jasmer Singh these appeals are allowed and the judgments and orders of the High Court are set aside.

State of Haryana and Ors. v. Jasmer Singh and Ors., [1996) 11 sec 77, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 14366- 69 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.95 of the Punjab and E Haryana High Court in CW.P. Nos.16819 and 12803/93 and 16821 of 1995.

Rao Ranjit for Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.

Ms. Naresh Bakshi for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Delay condoned.

G Leave granted.

For reasons set out in our judgment and order dated November 7, 1996 pronounced today in Civil Appeal No 14223of1996 (Arising out of S.L.P. (CJ NO. 27150 of 1995) etc. etc., these appeals are also allowed H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A and the judgments and orders of the High Court are set aside with no order as to costs.

R.P.

Appeals allowed.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A v.

THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 18, 1996

[J.S. VERMA AND B.N. KlRPAL, JJ.] B

Labour Law :

Workman-Removal from service-Order challenged-Pending proceedings before Industrial Tribunal, workman died- Tribunal found the C charges to have been proved but directed payment of wages from date of dismissal till date of death of workman-Held, in view ofjudgment of this Court in the case of R. Thiruvirkolam, the order of removal from service in this case operates from 12.12.1969 when it was made by the employer and not from any subsequent date.

R. Thiruvirkolam v, The Presiding Officer and Anr, (1997] l SCC 59, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8418 of 1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.4.94 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B.C.S. (Writ) No. 477 of 1992.

Harish N. Salve, Kai!ash Vasdev, K.K. Sharma, Ms. Meenakshi

Sakhardande and C.K. Sasi for the Appellants.

M.N. Krishnamani and Sudarsh Menon for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The point involved in this case is the same as in Civil Appeal No. 54 of I 993, R. Thiruvirko/am v. The Presiding Officer and Anr. For the reasons given by us in the judgment delivered today in R. Thiruvirkolam, it must be held that the order of removal from service in the present case operates from December 12, 1969 when it was made by the employer and not from

any subsequent date. The direction made in the impugned judgment for H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A payment of wages to the deceased workman from December 12, 1969 to December 7, 1987, the date of his death is, therefore, set aside. However, the amount of Rs. 50,000 paid to the heirs of the deceased workman under the interim order of the Court is not required to be refunded by them to the employer.

B Consequently, the appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal allowed.