evolawyer/inlegalbert-sc-ner-silver huggingface dataset:
DR. G.N. KHAJURIA AND ORS.

D.D.A. AND ORS.

MARCH 18, 1996

fK. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Delhi Development Autholity-Development Plan-Area eannarked for pwk-Allotment to sclwoi-Cliallenge by residents-Supreme Court's direction for dismantling and vacation of school-Person responsible for deviation C and illegal a//otment-Fi.xatio11 of respo11sibility--{; onduct of enqui1y- Report-Co11duct of superficial enquiry deprecated-Person responsible ma11aging and camouflaging the auth01ity-After getti11g the plan approved i11troducing the allotment of site to school-Plan ultimately approved by Lt.

Govc11101--In such circunistances directions issued to close the reporl.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. No. 2.

Civil Appeal No. 7933 of 1995.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 8.3.94 of the Delhi High Court

in C.W.P. No. 3812 of 1992.

G.K. Bansal for the Appellants .

. T.D. Jain for the Respondents.

Gopal Subramaniam and Ms. lndu Malhotra for the D.D.A.

D.V. Sehgal, Pradeep Kr., Ms. Naina Kijriwal and Ms. Anil Kaliyar for the Respondent No. 2.

G The Order of the Court was delivered :

Time for vacating the school and dismantling the same as per the judgment of this Court, as prayed for, is extended till 30th April, 1996.

Though Shri D.S. Meshram, Chief Planner, Town and Country Plan- H ning Organisation, Government of India, Ministry of Urban Affairs and 522

11 ! I

DR. G.N. KHAJURIA v. D.D.A 523

Employment has submitted the report dated November 17, 1995. Unfor- A lunately, he has not adverted to the impact of the order of this Court nor he brought to bear up the subject in that perspective. He has conducted only superficial enquiry and stated only what is apparent and nothing more.

He should have subjected the enquiry to in depth scrutiny but failed to do that. His report is like that of a clerk putting up the note and nothing more. B However, we have carefully gone through the record annexed to the report.

From the record, it is clear that originally the area was earmarked for the park and there was no indication that it was intended !<' be allotted to any third agency in the land earmarked for the park. In fact, the Vice-Chairman also had pointed out time and again in that behalf. He had also issued notice to have the school vacated and the park preserved. Though notice C pursuant thereto was given, no follow up action was, persued. Resultantly, the residents had to take up tlie matter and ultimately succeeded in getting the order from this Court.

We tried to scan the person responsible for deviation and illegal allotment but it is difficult in the circumstances to pin point the actual D .,. person responsible in that behalf. He had skillfully managed and had camouflaged to have the authority after getting the plan approved introducing the allotment of the site to the school. Since the plan was approved ultimately by the Lt. Governor, it went under the carpet of official action.

He has escaped from the clutches of law. Therefore, nothing can be done in the circumstances Report is accordingly closed.

T.N.A.
STANDARD GAMES ETC. v.

STATE OF UP. AND ORS. ETC.

APRIL 10, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, S.P. BHARUCHAAND

K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.]

U.P. Entertainments and Betting Act, 1979 :

C S.2(a), 3-Entertainment tru.-Video game-Held, is exigible to enterta innient tax.

Geeta Entreprises & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 812, relied on.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3323 of 1984 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4-.3.82 of the Allahabad High Court in C. Misc. W.P. No. 390/81. ..,.,

E Ashok Grover, Ms. Lalitha Kohli and Manoj Swarup for the Appellants.

R.B. Misra, K.S. Chauhan for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted in SLP (C} No. 5560/84.

The admitted facts are that the appellant had installed the video game consisting of a machine with a display screen which is activated only by inserting a coin in the slot made in the machine. Immediately thereon, G the screen is lit up and the game commences. The question is : whether it is an entertainment within the meaning of_ Section 2{a) of U.P. Entertainment and Betting Act, 1979 (for short, the 'Act') ? The appellant's own case is that the operator gets nothing in return other than the pleasure he derives or enjoys from exercising or building up his skill in operating the machine. The Act defines "admission" under Section 2(a). Section 2 (g) H defines "entertainment". Section 2(1)(iii), (iv) and (v) in particular defines 172

STANDARD GAMES v. STATE 173

"payment for admission" with wide language. Notification dated .July 24, A 1981 was issued by the State exercising the power under Sections 3(1) and 4(1) of the Act prescribing the rates of admission.

Admittedly, since there is no enumeration in this regard for the video game, clause (v) of the said notification imposes 30% of the admission fee as entertainment tax. The controversy raised in this case is squarely covered B by the decision of this Court in Geeta Ellterp1ises & 010-. v. State of UP. & Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 812. This Court has considered the above provisions and had held that charge of inserting the coin was realised only from those who wanted to operate the video game at the rate of 50 paise, for a slot lasting upto 30 seconds and it amounts to entertainment within the meaning C of Section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, video games is exigible to entertain tax. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is liable to pay the entertainment tax. We do not find any illegality in the view taken by the High Court warranting interference.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

R..P.

Appeals dismissed.
BHARAT BUILDERS (PVT.) LTD. AND ORS.

PARIJAT FLAT OWNERS CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING

SOCIETY LTD. AND ORSI.

APRIL 4, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATT/l.NAIK, .JJ.J

Constitution of India, 1950 :

C A1tic/es 226, 227-Wiit petition-Listing of for a(imission-Matter to be

placed before the Division Bench of the High Cowt a/ongivith the appeal

wising out of the decree passed in suit for specific pe1fonnance.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7032 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.3.95 of the Bombay High Court in LP.A. No 16/94 in W.P. No. 3092 of 1992. I

B.N. Naik, B.N. Vaishava, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Nee/am Sharma, Ajay Sharma and T.C. Sharma for the Appellants.

Arri! B. Diwan, Y.R. Naik, R.K. Sharma and KR. Choudhary for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

While we are hearing the matter on the procedural part of listing for admission of the writ petitions filed under Articles n6, 227 of the Constitution of India in Bombay High Court, Mr. Anil B. Diwan, learned senior counsel for the respondents, has stated that a direction may be given to G place this matter before the Division Bench for disposal. We think that the appropriate course would be that the matter may be placed before the Division Bench. The learned Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to place the matter before the Division Bench presided over by him or . some other Bench for final disposal. We are informed that against the suit H for specific performance decreed by the Civil Judge, City Civil Court, P.A. 24

til

BHARAT BUILDERS (PVf.) Lm. v. P. FLAT OWNER CO-OP. HSG. SOCIETY LTD. 25

No. 869/92 has been filed and the Cdurl has directed that the appeal also A may be tagged along with the writ petition. We are informed that the matter has already been lagged with the writ petition. In that view of the matter, it would be expedient that both the matters may be disposed of together by the Division Bench. We are informed that the respondents are also anxious to have the matter disposed of. Under these circumstances, we request the High Court have the matters disposed of as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.

R.P.

Appeal disposed of.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

MARUTI LAXMAN

APRIL 15, 1996

B [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAlK, .JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Sections 23(2), 28 and 23(1-Aj-Award of enhanced benefits under the provisions of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984---Held, award made long before C the date of Introduction of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984--Hence claimants not entitled to the enhanced benefits-Since claimants did not file appeal for further enhancement, High Cowt had no jurisdiction to award the same.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No. 7490 of

D 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.86 of the Bombay High Court in F.A. No. 647 of 1977.

D.M. Nargolkar for the Appellants.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Though notice was served on the respondent, on one appears on behalf of him.

Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.

Notification nnder Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the 'Act') was published on July 31, 1969. The Land Acquisition officer made his award on October 12, 1972 awarding compensation 0) Rs. 1,000 per acre. On reference, the civil Court enhanced the compensation G to Rs. 2,000 per acre by award and decree dated February 18, 1977. The High Court while dismissing the State appeal on July 16, 1986 has awarded the enhanced benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Thus this appeal by special leave.

This appeal is only in respect of awarding of enhanced benefits under H Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1-A) of the Act. In view of the settled legal 324

STATE v. MARUTI LAXMAN 325

position that the award of the civil Court was made long before the date A of the introduction of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the claimant is not entitled to the enhanced benefits. That apart, it is also settled legal position that the High Court, while dismissing the appellant's appeal, had no jurisdiction to award the additional benefits since the claimants did not file any appeal for further enhancement. Therefore, in the absence of any additional compensation being awarded, the High Court has no jurisdiction to award the benefits under the provisions of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court awarding solatium, interest and additional amount under Section 23(2), 28 C and 23 (1-A) stands set aside. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
DHANNARAM

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

APRIL 18, 1996

B [K. RAJvlASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, J.J.J

Seivice Law :

Selection and appointment as Goods Clerks and Coaching C/e1*s from

~ c/ass-fV employee.1--Ceitain posts resc1ved for Scheduled Castes-Some SC ..... candidates selected on the general standard 1vhilc so111e others selected in the remred quota with relaxed standards-Appellant selected on relaxed standards-However, the conununication to hi111 14•rongly n1e11tioncd that he was selected on general standards-Subsequently the nJistake •vas conected and he 1vas put in the order of 1ne1it under rese11•ed quota-Could not be ap- D pointed as no vacancy e:xisted under the rese1ved quota-Hence direction

crmnot be given for his appointment-List e>.pired by efflux of time-Directions sought for O]Jpointnient in future vacancies-CG1111ot be given-Re.\e1vation for SC/ST in appointment promotion.

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7536 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.95 of the Central Administration Tribunal, Chandigarh in 0.A. No. 308-HR of 1994.

F Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.

P.P. Rao, Raj Kumar Gupta, Rajesh, H.P. Sharma, A. Bhasme and K. Swami for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted. Heard learned counsel on both sides.

This appeal by special leave arises from the Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal at Chandigarh made in 0.A. No. 308 of 1994 on March 21,1995. Though the Tribunal has dismissed the 0.A. on the ground H of delay, we have examined the matter on merits. It is now clear from the 564

DHANNARAMv. U.0.1. 565

record placed by the respondents that as a result of selection, list was A prepared on April 4, 1990 for appointment as Goods Clerks and Coaching Clerks from among the class IV employees in the order of merit from the quota reserved for class IV employees. Out of them they also made reservation to the members of the Scheduled Castes. The appellant belongs to the Scheduled Castes. Candidates at item Nos. 17 and 32 of the list also belong to the Scheduled Castes and were superior in the order of merit; they were selected on the general standard to the roster point as against those who were selected in the reserved quota with relaxed staudards. The appellant stands at No. 2 while one Sarvan Kumar stands at No. 1 of the list of reserved quota. It is true that in the communication sent to the appellant it was mentioned that he was selected on general standards. It would appear that subsequently, they realised the mistake and corrected the same and put him in the order of merit as a candidate for the reserved quota. Since there was no vacancy exi, ting for reserved quota, he could not

be appointed. Under those circumstances, we cannot give any direction for making his appointment. Since the list has already expired by efflux of D time, the directions sought for appointment in the future vacancies cannot be given. But this order does not preclude him from consideration for future promotion in any of the vacancies that would arise subsequent to the earlier selection.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

G .N.

Appeal dismissed.
FALIJA SINGH

JASPAL KAUR

APRIL 22, 1996

IDR. A.S. ANAND AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.f.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :

Section 60(ccc)-Plea of 11011-attacliability of residential house.1-Execllli11g Cowt as well as High Cowt not dealing with the question-Held, High

Coiat oug/lt to have assigned reasons for disniissing the civil revision petition-Obligation to give reasons introduces clarity and n1ini111ises chances of arbitrariness and the higher fonun can test the correctness of those reasons-Matter ren1anded lo High Corut for disposal in accordance vith law after hewing pmties-No opinion expressed on the nwits of the case.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7559 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.91 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 2064 of 1991.

Mahabir Singh for the Appellants.

R.K. Kapoor, S.K. Srivastava, P. Verma and Anis Ahmed Khan for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was deHvered :

Leave. granted.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.

The appellant had raised a specific plea in the executing court regarding the non-attachability of his residential house in view of the provisions of Section 60(ccc) C.P.C. The executing court has not dealt with the issue and the High Court, also did not deal with that question and H dismissed the civil revision petition by one word "dismissed''. In our 616

FAUJA SINGH v. JASP AL KAUR 617

opinion, since the parties were present before the High Court in the civil A revision, on the plainest consideration of justice, it should have assigned reasons for dismissing the civil revision petition against the order of the executing court. The absence of reasons has deprived this court to know the circumstances which weighed. with the High Court to dismiss the revision petition in limine. We say it with respect, that it was an unsatisfactory method of disposal of the revision petition. The necessity to provide reasons, howsoever, brief in support of its conclusion is too obvious to be reiterated. Obligation to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes, or at any rate minimises the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness of those reasons. The order of the High Court dismissing the civil revision petition, in-limine, thus, cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, accept this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and rmand the civil revision petition No. 2064/91 to the High Court for its disposal in accordance with law, after hearing the parties. We, however, clarify that we .are expressing no opinion on the merits of the civil revision petition.

The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above terms. No costs.

G.N.

Appeal allowed.
C.V. RAJA RAO AND ANR. v.

MIRZA BASHEER BAIG AND ORS

APRIL 30, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

Sections 145, 146-1njunction orders in favour of petitioners-Police C not giving aid-High Court quashing initiation of proceedings-However it directed that some high official of the Survey Department be deputed to inspect the site, localise the suit land-Magistrate to complete the enquiry under S. 146 and pass final order within three months-Held, High Court's directions to be complied with.

D CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.

662 OF 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.91 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cr!. P. No. 334 of 1991.

E A. Raghuvir and T.V. Ratnam for the Appellants.

K. Madhava Reddy, D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Ms. D. Bharathi Reddy and G. Prabhakar for the Respondents. .

F The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court dated April 2, 1991 made in Criminal Application No. 334/91. It is not necessary to narrate in elaboration all the proceedings that have taken G place between the parties. Suffice it to state that in respect of the lands bearing Survey No. 202 situated in Lallaguda in Secunderabad of Andhra Pradesh which is now part of the city of Hyderabad, an extent of 4922 sq. yds. is in dispute. Several proceedings have taken place between the parties narration of which is not material. The High Court in quashed H proceedings of the initiation of the action under sections 145 and 146 of

C.V.RAJARAO v. M.B.BAJG 115

the Cr. P.C. gave the following directions : A

"Since there are some allegations that the police were not giving aid to the petitioners even though there are injunction orders in their favour. I feel it is desirable that some high official of the Survey Department like the Assistant Director of Survey may be directed to inspect the suit land and localise the suit land with the B assistance of a Inspector of Survey with reference to the survey records. The learned Magistrate then under Section 146 Cr. P.C. may complete the enquiry expeditiously and pass final orders.

Since the parties are fighting out the matter since a long time, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is directed to dispose of the C matter expeditiously and pass final orders, preferably within a period of three months from today."

In view of the above d.irections, it would be necessary that the Survey Department should demarcate the land, localise the same \vith the assistance of the Inspector of the Survey and Land Record as directed by the D High Court and the Magistrate would take action pursuant to the report thereof according to law. In view of the facts in this case, we think that it is not a case warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

We are not expressing any opinion on merit since proceedings are pending af different stages in different courts. Whatever proceedings have been taken place, will be subject to the appropriate orders.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

G.N.

Appeal dismissed.
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA

RA VIND RA AND ORS.

MAY 7, 1996

B jK. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND G.B. PAITANAIK, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :

S.34-Expression "the principal sum adjudged" occuning in-lnterpreta- C lion of-Matter referred to Constitution Bench.

Corporation Bank v. D.S. Gouda & Ors., [1994] 5 SCC 213 and Bank of Baroda v. Jagannath, C.A. No. 2785/87 decided on September 21, 1994, referred to.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2421 of 1993.

From the Judgment & Order dated 15.7.92 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 227/90.

WITH

Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3954/94, 9082 and 9088/1995

AND

Civil Appeal Nos. 3964, 3967 of 1992.

M.K. Banerjee, AG. D.A. Dave and V.C. Mahajan, O.C. Mathur, Ms.

Meera Mathur, U.S. Prasad, Janendra Lal, B.R. Narang, Deepak Dewan, Balraj Dewan, A Subba Rao, Ranjit Kumar, K.M.K. Nair, R.C. Verma, Ms. Nina Gupta, Neeraj Sharma, Ms. Kiran, Vineet Kr., R.K. Kapoor, P.

G Varma, Anis Ahmed Khan, S.K. Srivastava and Ms. Sushma Manchanda for the appearing parties.

The following Order of the Conrt was delivered :

After hearing learned Attorney General and amicus curaie S/Shri A H Subba Rao, Ranjit Kumar and K.M.K. Nair on (the interpretation of the

CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA v. RA VIND RA 521

provisions of Section 34, CPC on "the principal sum adjudged" the matter A is required to be considered by a Constitution Bench. The learned Attorney General has drawn our attention to the judgments of this Court in Corporation Bank v. D.S. Gouda & Ors., [1994] 5 SCC 213 and Bank of Baroda v. Jagannath, C.A. No. 2785/87 decided on September 21, J.994 wherein he sought to draw the deduction that the principal sum adjudged and the principal sum mentioned later would be the same. He seeks to take support from the word "such" in support of his contention. Preceding Amendment Act 66 of 1956, the words were "aggregate sum so adjudged" and after Amendment, were substituted with the words "the principal sum adjudged", from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such "principal sum" for any period prior to the institution of the suit (with further interest on such date as the court deems reasonable on the "principal sum"). The distinction, therefore, was

not drawn to the attention of this Court in the aforesaid two judgments in particular later one. As a fact no argument in this behalf appears to have been canvassed. Interpretation of the liability of the borrower to pay D interest on the principal sum to include interest that became merged with the principal sum adjudged or principal sum as lent, is required to be authoritatively laid down by a Bench of five Judges.

The Registry is directed to place the matter before Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting the Constitution Bench.

R.P.