STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS. ETC.

L. KRlSHANAN AND ORS. ETC.

NOVEMBER 1, 1995

[K. RAMASWAMY, B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND

B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

Sections 4, 5-A, 6-Notification issued for acquiring lands for public C

pwpos~Preparation of final and effective scheme on the date of issuance of notification-Whether a preconditio11-Held--7he provisions of the Act does not require any scheme before issuance of notification-No objections in inquiry under section 5-A were filed-Effect of

Delay in passing the award--17ie person dep1ived of the land must be D given due compensation without avoidable delay-Obligation flows from the duty to exercise the sttutory power in a reasnnahle and fair manner.

Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act-Acquisition of /ands-Lands may be acquired both as part of housing or improvement scheme framed by it under E Chapter VII and also independent of siich schemublic pwpose defined in notification-Vagueness of--Jt is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.

The Appellants issued three notifications under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring the land for the implementation F of housing scheme and for increasing housing accommodation. The Respondents challenged t_he said notification in writ petitions which were allowed by the High Court holding that public purpose mentioned in the notification is vague and the date of issuance of notifications there did not exist any final and effective scheme prepared under the provisions of the G Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act; that there was undue delay in passing the award after the issuance of the declaration under section 6 and that there was non-compliance with the Land Acquisition Rules framed by the State

Government in the course of inquiry under section 5-A.

In appeal to this Court it was contended that it was not necessary H 663

A that there should be a final and effective scheme prepared under the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act before the lands are an1uired for the purpose of Housing Board and that the lands can be acquired by the Government even where there is no final and effective housing scheme on the date of the notification and that the respondents had neither filed objections in the inquiry held under section 5-A nor did they raise these grounds at any time B before issuance of declaration under section 6.

On behalf of the Respondent it was contended that unless a scheme is prepared under and in accordance with the Tamil nadu Housing Board Act, no notification under section 4 of the Laud Acquisition Act can be C issued. Unless the public purpose is spelt out clearly, the person interested would be handicapped in making an effective representation in the inquiry under section 5-A. Unless they know for what specific purpose the land is sought to be acquired, giving them an opportunity to file objection is an empty formality; further that where the land is acquired for the purpose D of the Housing Board, a final scheme prepared under the Housing Board Act is a condition precedent and that such a scheme is a precondition for a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Disposing of the matter, this Court

HELD : 1. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not state expressly or by necessary intendment that before a notification is published thereunder proposing to acquire land for the purpose of a body like Tamil Nadu Housing Board, a duly published final scheme prepared in accordance with the relevant Act should be in force. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act make it abundently clear that the duty of the Housing Board is not merely the execution of the housing or improvement schemes prepared and published by it under the Act but extends to executing other schemes made over to it or agreed to be undertaken by it.

Section 35 (2) speaks of transfer to the Board the execution of any housing or improvement scheme not provided for by this Act, it certainly cannot G mean a scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. Moreover while transferring the scheme to the Board, the Government is empowered to impose such conditions as they may think fit to impose. Such terms and conditions are not specified in the Act but lie within the discretion of the Government. Similarly sub H section (3) of section 35 speaks of a scheme undertaken by a local authority

STATEv. L.KRISHANAN 665

to be made over to the Housing Board for execution, it cannot again mean A a housing or improvement sche111e prepared in accordance with the Housing Board Act. Section 36 indeed discloses that what is entrusted to the Housing Board is the job of clearance or improvement of any slum area.

The (; overnment while directing the Hoard to undertake the clerance or improvement of a particular area can also direct the Board to frame and execute "SUCH housing or improven1ent scheme under this Act as the Govcnvncnt 111ay specify" and the Board is obliged to execute such schen1e as if such scheme is prepared by the Act [670-C, 674-D-G]

2. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that unless a final and efl'ective scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of Chapter C VII or the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act is in existence, the Government cannot issue a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land required for execution or the scheme by the Housing Board. [674-H, 675-A]

3. Merely because the Housing Board Act contemplates acquisition of land as part of' a housing or improvement scheme, it does not follow that no land needed for the purpose of the Housing Board can be acquired until and unle.ss a scheme is prepared and finalised by the Board and becomes effective under the provisions contained in Chapter VII. [680-E]

Amold Rod1icks & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 885 andAflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi & 01'., [1975] 1 SCR 802, relied on.

Babu Bmkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, [1961] 1 SCR 128; Pandit F lhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, [1961] 2 SCR 459 and State of Bombay v.

Bhanji Munji & Anr., [1955] I SCR 777, referred to.

4. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, bear out that the acquisition of land is not dependent upon the preparation and approval of a scheme under sections 37 to 56 and that the Government's power of acquisition extends to other purposes of the Board and the Housing Board Act referred to in sections 35 to 36. Moreover, under Tamil Nadu Housing Board too, there is no inhibition against acquisition of land for the purpose of the Board except in accordance with and as a part

of the scheme. [681-H, 682-A] H

State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v.A. Mohammed Yousef and Ors., (1991] 4 sec 224, distinguished

5. Where large extent of land is sought to be acquired for development or similar purposes, it would not be possible to specify how each owner's bit would be utilised and for what purpose. Whether the public purpose, defined in the notification is vague or not, is a question of fact which has to be decided in each case with regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. [684-H]

A mold Rodricks & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1966] 3 SCR C 885; Lila Ram Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc., [1976] 1 SCR 341 and Af/atoon & 01:1. v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi & On., [1975] 1 SCR 802, relied on.

6. The Respondents not only failed to file any objections in the in<tuiries held under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, they D also failed to act soon after the declaration was made in the year 1978.

They filed writ petition only sometime in the year 1982-83 when the award were about to be passed. Laches of this nature are fatal. [685-C]

Af/atoon & 01>-. v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802, relied on.

7. In view of section 48-A, the provision in Section 23(1-A) and the delay on the part of the Respondents in not reaching the Court within a reasonable time, the delay in passing the awards after publication of the declaration under section 6 cannot be held to be fatal. But it may not be F understood that land Acquisition proceedings can be delayed indefinitely and that the provision in section 23 (1 A) is an adequate recompense for such delay. No such proposition can be countenanced. These proceedings must be concluded with due expedition. The person who is deprived of the land must be given his due compensation without avoidable delay. This G obligation flows from the duty to exercise the statutory power in a reasonable and fair manner, more particularly where the subject matter is acquisition of land or property. Ram Chand and Othe1' v. Union of India & 01:1., [1994] 1 SCC 44, referred to. [687-E-H]

8. In the instant cases, the land acquisition proceedings were pend- H ing on 30th day of April, 1982 and if so the persons interested would be

STATEv. L. KRISHANAN [B.P.JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 667

entitled to additional amount provided by sub section (lA) of section 23 A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The declaration under section 6 was made some time in the year 1978 and the Respondents chose to approach the Court only in the year 1982-83. Had they raised this objection at the proper time and if it were found to be true and acceptable, opportunity could have been given to the Government to comply with the said require- B men(. (688-E-F)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1865-66, 1868-70 of 1992 Etc. Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.4.91 of the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos. 10474/82, 2758/83, 9561/83, 9654 and 9764 of 1986.

A.K. Sen, Sivasubaramaniam, R.K. Jain, R. Sundarvardan, Harish N.

Salve, A. Raghuvir, M.N. Krishnamani, K. Subaramanyam, Gopalaratanam, Y. Balaji, V. Krishnamurthy A.T.M. Sampath, Sudarsh Menon and Praveen Kumar Singh Advs. for the Appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Civil Appeal Nos. 1865-66, 1868-70 of 1992.

These appeals are preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu E Housing Board and others against the judgment of the Madras High Court allowing a batch of writ petitions and quashing three notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The three notifica lions concerned herein are the notifications dated May 8, 1975, August 29, 1975 and February 19, 1975. The writ petitions have been allowed relying mainly upon the earlier decision of that Court in State of Tamil Nadlt v. A.

F Mohammed Yollsef and Ors., (1992) 2 M.L.J. 149 which has since been affirmed by this Court in State of Tamil Nadlt & Anr. v. A. Mohammed Yousef & Ors., (1991] 4 SCC 224 and the decision of this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973] 1 SCR 973.

The first and the main ground assigned by the High Court for G quashing the said notifications is that the public purpose stated therein is vague and that on the date of issuance of the said notifications, there was not existing any final and effective scheme prepared under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act. Two other grounds assigned by the High Court in support of its decision are (i) tha"t there was an undue H

delay in passing the awards after the issuance of the declarations under Section 6 and (ii) non-compliance with clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 3 of the Land Acquisition Rules framed by the Stale Government in the course of enquiry under Section 5-A.

The public purpose stated in the three notifications is "for the implementation of housing schemes lo tncct the demands n1ade by various sectors of the population under 'Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Schen1e"', Ttfor the creation of a new neighbourhood known as Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Part II Scheme" and "for increasing housing accommodation for the development of South Madras neighbourhood" respectively. Enquiries under Section 5-A were held and on the basis of reports submitted in that behalf, declarations under section 6 were made sometime in the year 1978. Awards were passed in the year 1983. The writ petitions from which these appeals arise were filed in the year 1982 and in 1983 - one of them even later.

Sri Harish Salve, learned counsel for the appellants, disputed the correctness of the judgment under appeal on the following grounds : the impugned judgment of the High Court is contrary to more than one Constitution Bench judgment of this Court. The principle of the decision in Mohammed Yousef or, for that matter, of Mu11shi Si11gh has no application to the facts herein; it is not necessary that there should be a final and effective scheme prepared under the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act (Housing Board Act] before lands are acquired for the purpose of the Housing Board; lands can be acquired by the Government even where there is no final and effective housing scheme on the date of the notification; in these cases, the schen1cs were indeed initiated prior to the issuance of Section 4 notifications and were finalised after the issuance of the said notifications. The public purpose stated in the notifications is not vague.

Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents-writ petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the said grounds inasmuch as they neither filed objections in the enquiry held under Section 5-A, nor did they raise these grounds at any time before the isuance of declaration under section 6.

They did not make this grievance even after the issuance of section 6 declaration for a number of years. Only when the awards were about to be passed (and in some cases after the passing of the awards) were these writ petitions filed. On the ground of !aches and acquiscence alone, the writ petitions ought to have been dismissed. So far as the post-declaration delay

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY.].] 669

assigned by the High Court as one of the grounds for its decision is A concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the said delay, if any, is not fatal in vie\v of the counterMvai1ing/beneficial provision contained in Section 48-A, added by the Madras Legislature in the Land Acquisition Act.

Laches are pleaded with respect to this ground as well. With respect to the other ground given by the High Court, viz., non-compliance with clauses B

(b) and ( c) of Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules, Sri Salve submitted that the High Court ought not to have permitted the writ petitioners to raise this ground since they did not even file objections in the enquiry under Section 5-A nor did they complain of this aspect at the proper time. Only when the awards were about to be passed or after the passing of the awards, as the case may be, the petitioners have come forward with the present writ petitions. c

Sri Ashok Sen, learned counsel for the respondents writ petitioners, supported the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the High Court. He submitted that unless a scheme is prepared under and in accordance with D the Housing Board Act, no notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued. Unless the public purpose is spelt out clearly, the persons interested would be handicapped in making an effective representation in the enquiry under Section 5-A. Unless they know for what particular purpose their land is sought to be acquired, giving them an opportunity to file objections is an empty formality. A final and effective housing scheme prepared and published under the Housing Board Act, containing as it does the full particulars of development, alone would satisfy the requirement of particularisation of the public purpose. Where, therefore, the land is acquired for the purpose of the Housing Board, a final scheme prepared under the Housing Board Act is a condition precedent.

It is for this reason that this Court has held in Mohammed Yousef that such a scheme is a precondition for a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Sri Siva Subramaniam, learned counsel for some of the respondentswrit petitioners, supported the contentions of Sri Sen. He submitted further that even apart from the provisions of the Housing Board Act, there ought to be a scheme before the issuance of Section 4 notification not only to satisfy the requirement of public purpose but also to afford the persons

interested a reasonable and effective opportunity lo object.

The first question that arises in these appeals is whether a final and effective scheme prepared and published under the provisions of the Housing Board Act is a pre-condition to the issuance of notification under Section 4. This question has to be answered with reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as well as the Housing Board Act.

None of the three notifications, it may be noted, state that the land is being acquired for the purpose of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The fact, however, remains - and it is admitted before us - that the said lands were being acquired for the purpose of the Housing Board only.

C Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act does not state expressly or by necessary intendment that before a notification is issued/published thereunder proposing to acquire land for the purpose of a body like the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, a duly published final scheme prepared in accordance with the relevant Act should be in force. The respondents-writ petitioners, however, seek to deduce such a requirement from the D provisions of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act.

The Housing Board Act was enacted by the Tamil Nadu legislature "to provide for the execution of housing and improvement scheme, for the establishment of a State Housing Board and for certain other matters".

Section 2 defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. The expression "housing or improvement cheme" is defined in clause (9) to mean a scheme framed under the Act and includes any one of the types of schemes referred to in section 40. Chapter-II (Sections 3 to 11) provides for the constitution of the Board, appointment of its members and their disqualifications. Chapter-III (Sections 12 to 15) provides for transfer of the assets and liabilities of the City Improvement Trust to the Housing Board.

Section 12 dissolves the City Improvement Trust with effect from the date of the said enactment and vests all assets and liabilities thereof in the Board. Chapter-VI (Sections 16 to 22) deals with officers and members of the staff of the Board. Chapter-V (Sections 23 to 27) deals with the conduct G of business of the Board and its committees while chapter-VI (Sections 28 to 34) deals with powers of the Board and Chairman to incur expenditure on scheme and enter into contracts. Chapter-VII (Sections 35 to 69-A), which provides for housing or improvement schemes, is relevant for our purposes.

H Sub-section (1) of Section 35 provides that "subject to the provisions

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 671

of this Act, the Board may, from time to time, incur expenditure and A undertake works for the framing and execution of such housing or improvement schemes as it may consider necessary." Sub-section (2) is significant for our purposes. It says,

11The Government may, on such terms and conditions as they may think fit to impose, transfer to the Board the execution of any housing or improvement scheme not provided for by this B Act, and the Board shall thereupon undertake the execution of such scheme as if it had been provided for by this Act." Sub-section (3) empowers the Board to take over for execution any housing or improvement scheme undertaken by a local authority on such terms and conditions as may be agree upon. The Board shall execute such scheme as if it is provided by the Housing Board Act. Section 36 empowers the Government C to transfer to the Housing Board "any land in such area belonging to or vested in them or acquired under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1954'', on such terms as they may think fit to impose, for the purpose cif clearance or improvement of any slum area. The Government is also empowered to direct the Board to D undertake the clearance or improvement of that area and to frame and execute such housing or improvement scheme under the Act as the Government may specify. Thereupon, the Board is obligated to undertake the said scheme for execution as if it had been provided for by the Housing Board Act. We shall refer to the significance of these provisions after we refer to some more provisions in this Chapter.

Section 37 says that "a housing or improvement scheme may be framed by the Board on its own motion or at the instance of the Government or a local authority''. Section 38 empowers the Board either to execute or refuse to execute any scheme sought to be entrusted to it by any local F authority. Section 39 specifies the matters which must be provided for in a housing or improvement scheme. In short, all the particulars of the proposed scheme have to be stated therein. Section 40 specifies the several types of housing or improvement schemes. There are as many as eight types. Sections 41 to 48 deal separately with each type of scheme. We need G not refer to the contents of these sections for the purpose of these appeals.

Sections 49 to 56 deal with the procedure to be followed by the Board in preparing a housing or improvement scheme. Section 49(1) says that where any housing or improvement scheme has been framed, the Board shall prepare a notice to that effect and specify (a) the boundaries of the area comprising the scheme and (b) the place or places at which particulars of H

A the scheme, a map of the area and details of the land which it is proposed to acquire may be seen at reasonable hours. Sub-section (2) provides that the notice contemplated by sub-section (1) shall be published in the official gazette and two leading daily newspapers. A copy of the notice has also to be sent to the local authority concerned. Sub-section (3) empowers the B Chairman to deliver copies of all documents referred to in the notice to any applicant on payment of the appropriate fee. Section 50 says that the local authority to whom the notice under Section 49(2)(b) is sent shall forward any representation received by it to the Board within sixty days of the said notice. Section 51 deals with the notice regarding proposal to c recover betterment fee, which need not be noticed by us. Section 52 requires a local authority to furnish, on a request being made by the Chairman of the Board, a copy of or an extract from, the assessment list of the local authority. Section 53 provides that after considering the objections and representations, if any, received pursuant to the notice published under Sections 49(2), 50 and 51( 4) and after hearing such objectors, as may D desire to be heard, "the Board may either abandon or modify or sanction the scheme, or apply to the Govermuent for sanction with such modifications, if any, as the Board may consider necessary if the cost of the scheme exceeds ten lakhs of rupees". Sub-section (2) then says that the Government may sanction the scheme so forwarded either with or without modifications E

or may refuse to sanction or may return the same to the Board for reconsideration. Sub-section (3) of Section 53 says that where any modifications are effected to the scheme , it has to be re-published in accordance with Section 49. Section 54(1) provides for publication of sanctioned housing or improvement schemes. Sub-section (2) says that the publication of the notification or notice under sub-section (l) respect of any scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned. Sub-section (3) provides for an appeal against such scheme to the Government by any person aggrieved therewith to be preferred within thirty days of such publication. Sub-section ( 4) says that the scheme notified under Section 54(1) shall come into force and shall G have effect (a) where no appeal is preferred under sub-section (3) on and from the expiry of the thirty <lays referred to in that sub-section and (b) where such appeal is preferred on and from the date of the decision of the Government on such appeal. Section 55 says that as soon as may be after a housing or in1provement scheme has come into force as provided in H Section 54, the Board shall proceed to execute the same. Section 56

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.J 673

provides for alteration or cancellation of any scheme, even after it has come into force as provided in Section 54 but before it has been carried into execution. Clause (b) of Section 56 (which has been omitted by the Amendment Act 5 of 1992) provided that if any alteration in the scheme to be effected under Section 56 involves acquisition of any land, the procedure prescribed in the aforesaid sections in this Chart.er shall be followed as if the alteration were a separate scheme. Section 57 provides for transfer of any building, land or street situated within the limits of a local authority and vesting in it to the Board for execution of the scheme. Section 58 provides for a similar transfer of a private street or square and the procedure to be followed in that behalf. The remaining sections in this Chapter deal with the powers of the Board in the matter of executing the scheme prepared under Chapter.

Chapter-VIII provides for acquisition and disposal of lands required by the Board. Section 70 (which has since been substituted by Amendment

Act 5 of 1992) read as follows before its substitution; "70. Any land or any D interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894)." It is not necessary to refer to the remaining provisions of the Act.

Coming back to the provisions of Chapter-VII, it may be noticed that the said chapter provides for the types of the housing or improvement schemes and the procedure following which housing or improvement scheme have to be finalised and executed. But Sections 35 and 36 make it clear that the duty of the Housing Boring does not begin and end with executing the housing or in1provcmcnt scheme prepared by it under the Act. The Housing Board is under an obligation to carry out certain other schemes also as are provided in these sections. Sub-section (2) of Section

35 states that the Government may, on such te1111s and conditions as they may t/1i11k fit to impose, transfer lo the Board the execution of any housing

or improvement scheme not provided for by the Act. On such transfer, the Board is under an obligation to undertake the execution of such scheme G as if such scheme has been provided for by the Housing Board Act. Subsection (3) of Section 35 similarly provides that the Board may also

undertake to execute any housing or improvement scheme undertaken by a local authority on terms and conditions to be agreed upon between it and such local authority. If the Board agrees to execute the said scheme of the H

A local authority, it shall execute that scheme as if it had been provided for by the Housing Board Act. Section 36 then provides that if the Government thinks it expedient or necessary for the purpose of clearance or improvement of any slum, it can transfer any land in such area belonging to it or vested in it or acquired under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Slum

Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1954 to the Board on such terms and conditions as the Government may think fit to impose and direct the Board to undertakes the clearance or improvement of that area and to frame execute such housing or improvement scheme under this Act as the Government may specify. Section 36 further says that on such transfer and direction by the Government, the Board shall execute the said scheme as if it had been provided for by this Act.

These provisions make it abundantly clear that the duty of the Housing Board is not merely the execution of the housing or improvement schemes prepared and published by it under the Act but extends to D executing other scheme as well as are made over to it or agreed to be undertaken by it. Now, when Section 35(2) speaks of transfer to the Board the execution of any housing or improvement scheme not provided for by this Act, it certainly cannot mean a scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Housing Board Act. Moreover, while transferring the scheme to the Board, the Government is empowered to impose such E conditions as they may think fit to impose. Such terms and conditions are not specified in the Act but lie within the discretion of the Government.

Similarly, when sub-section (3) of Section 35 speaks of a scheme undertaken by a local authority to be made over to the Housing Board for execution, it cannot again mean a housing or improvement scheme F prepared in accordance with the Housing Board Act. Here again, the taking over the scheme by the Housing Board is subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by both. Section 36 indeed discloses that what is entrusted to the Housing Board is the job of clearance or improvement of any slum area. The Government while directing the Board to undertake the clearance or improvement of a particular area can also G direct the Board to frame and execute "such housing or improvement scheme under this Act as the Govemment may specify" and the Board is obliged to execute such scheme as if such scheme is prepared by the Act.

In such circumstances, it would not be right to contend that unless a H final and effective scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of

STATEv. L.KRISHANAN[B.P.JEEVANREDDY, J.] 675

Chapter-VII of the Housing Board Act is in existence, the Government cannot issue a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land required for execution of the schemes by the Housing Board. To repeat, the Housing Board is obliged to execute not only the housing or improvement schemes prepared under the said chapter but also certain other schemes referred to in Sections 35 and 36. For example, the Government may conceive of a particular scheme and ask the Housing Board to execute on such terms and conditions as the Government may specify. In such a situation, there is no question of preparing a housing or improvement scheme by the Housing Board in accordance with the provisions of the Housing Board over again. So far as the scheme framed by the Government is concerned, there is no enactment governing it. It can, therefore, be a scheme as ordinarily understood. Similar would be the case where the scheme undertaken by a local authority is made over to the Housing Board by mutual agreement.

In this connection, it is significant to notice that the Housing Board Act speaks of the acquisition of land both as a part of a housing or D improvement scheme framed by it under Chapter-VII and also independent of such a scheme. We may elaborate. Clause (a) of Section 39

(unamended) described one of the particulars to be stated in the draft scheme. Clause (a) of Section 39 read as follows :

"39. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a housing or improvement scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :

(a) the acquisition by purchase, exchange, or othe1wise of any property necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme.'' F

(emphasis added)

Similarly, Section 49(1) (unamended), which provides for publication of a final scheme, read :

"49 (1). When any housing or improvement scheme has been framed, the Board shall prepare a notice to that effect and specify-

(a) the boundaries of the area comprised in the scheme; and

(b) the place or places at which particulars of the scheme, a map H

of the area, and details of the land which it is proposed to acquire and of the land in regard lo which it is proposed lo recover a betterment fee, may be seen at reasonable hours."

(Emphasis added)

B Reference may also be made in this connection to clause (b) of the proviso to section 56. Section 56, as already noticed, provides for alteration or cancellation of a housing scheme even after it is sanctioned by the Board or the Government but before it is carried into execution. This power is, however, conditioned by matters provided in the proviso. Proviso (b ), C before it was deleted by the aforesaid Amendment Act, read thus :

"Provided that

(b) if any alteration involves the acquisition, otherwise than by agreement, of any 1and not previously proposed to be acquired in the original scheme, the procedure prescribed in the foregoing sections of the Chapter shall, so far as it may be applicable, be followed as if the alteration were a separate scheme."

(Emphasis added)

These arc the provisions which speak of acquisition of land as a part and parcel of a housing or improvement scheme framed under Chapter- VII. We may now refer to the provision which speaks of acquisition of land independent of a scheme framed under Chapter- VII.

Chapter-Vlll of the Act deals with acquisition and disposal of land.

Section 70, before it was substituted by the Amendment Act 5 of 1992, read thus :

"70. Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894)."

It is significant to notice the language of this section. This section enables the Government to acquire any land required by the Board "for any of the purposes of this Act" - and purposes of the Act are not confined H to execution of the schemes framed by the Board under Sections 37 to 56

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY. J.) 677

(in Chapter-VII) but extend lo the execution of the schemes transferred to A

it, or agreed to be undertaken by the Board, \Vhich schemes have to be executed by the Board as if they arc provided by the Housing Board Acl.

The execution of such schemes then becomes the purpose of the Board under the Act. It is open to the (i'uvcrnn1ent, for cxan1ple, to acquire a land and transfer it to the Housing Board for cxecuti: , the schc1nc devised by the Government and as directed by it. Similarly. any land required for executing a scheme devised by a local authority and the execution of which has been undertaken by the Board is also required for the purposes of the Act and can be acquired. In other words, Section 70 is an affirmation, a recognition, of the power of the Government to acquire any land required by the Housing Board for any of the purposes of the Act. It lakes in acquisition of land required for the execution of a housing or improvement scheme devised by the Housing Board under Sections 37 to 56 of the Act

as also acquisition of land for other purposes of the Act. As a matter of fact, we are not sure whether it would be right to curtail or restrict the plenary power under Section 4 with reference to the provisions of the D Housing Board Act merely because the land to be acquired is to be made over to Housing Board for the purposes of the Act. As mentioned hereinabove, the notifications themselves do not say that the land is being acquired for the purpose of a housing or improvement scheme framed by the Housing Board under the provisions of the Act, though it is true, it was undoubtedly meant for the Housing Board. Once it is held that the Housing Board can execute schemes other than those framed by it under Sections 37 lo 56, as explained above, there appears to be no warrant for qualifying

the plenary power under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act with reference to the said provisions of the Housing Board Act. As we shall point out, earlier decisions of this Court have taken precisely this view. But F before we refer to them, it would be appropriate lo deal with the decision of a two - Judge Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. A.

Mohammed Yousef and Ors., (1991] 4 SCC 224, affirming the decision of the Madras High Court, upon which strong reliance is placed by the respondents. Jn this decision, it has been held that a proceeding under Land Acquisition Act read with Section 70 of the Housing Board Act can G be commenced only after the framing of the scheme for which the land is required, but not before.

We may mention, at the outset, that these appeals have been referred to a three-Judge Bench by a Bench of two learned Judges because they H

doubted the correctness of the decision in Mohammed Yousef, vide Order

dated February 16, 1993.

The facts in Mohammed Yousef are these : the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued stating the public purpose as construction of houses by the Tamil Ndu Housing Board. Admittedly

not even a draft scheme was framed by the Housing Board by the date of the said notification. On the contrary, the contention of the State was that only after the acquisition proceedings are completed and possession of the land taken, would they frame a scheme. Alternately, it was contended by the State that framing of a scheme is not a pre-condition for issuance of a valid notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act proposing to acquire the land for construction of houses by the Housing Board. The High Court had struck down the notification on the ground that the public purpose mentioned therein was too vague in the absence of details relating to the scheme for which the acquisition was sought to be made. The High Court opined that in the absence of such a scheme with necessary particulars the land-owners cannot effectively avail of the opportunity given by Section 5-A. In this Court, however, the main contention of the respondents land-owners was that the framing of a scheme by the Housing Board under the provisions of the Housing Board Act is a pre-condition to a valid notification under Section 4 where the land is proposed to be acquired-for the purpose of the Housing Board. In view of the said contention, this Court examined the scheme of the Act and held that inasmuch as acquisition of the land is a part and parcel of the execution of a scheme framed by the Board under the Act, the acquisition must follow the scheme and cannot precede it. The Bench further observed that unless such a scheme with requisite particulars is duly published, it may not be possible for the land-owners to object lo the proposed acquisition on the ground that the land is not suitable for the scheme at all and/or that it does not serve the stated public purpose. The Bench observed that the power of the Board to frame a scheme is rcglate<l by the provisions of the Act which, inter G alia, provide a full opportunity to the affected persons to object to the scheme. Even after the final publication of the scheme and after its coming into force, it was pointed out, the scheme can yet be altered or cancelled as provided under Section 56 of the Act. For all these reasons, the Bench held that "a proceeding under Land Acquisition Act read with Section 70 H of the Madras Housing Board Act can be commenced only after framing

STATEv. L KRISHANAN[B.P.JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 679

the scheme for which the land is required."

Unfortunately, the provisions in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 35 and Section 36 were not brought to the notice of the Bench nor were the earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court brought to its notice, to which decisions \Ve may nO\\' turn. But one n1ore relevant aspect before we refer to them.

After, and in the light ot; the impugned judgment, the Tamil Nadu Legislature has amended the Housing Board Act with retrospective effect with a view to remove the basis of the said judgment and providing expressly that existence of a scheme framed by the Housing Board is not C a pre-condition for acquiring land for the purpose of the Board. The validity of the said Amendment Act has also been question in the connected matters but the necessity to go into that question will arise only if we agree with the reasoning and conclusiom in the decision under appeal.

Indeed, Sri Salve's argument was that the decision of the High Court is D unsustainable even without reference to the said Amendment Act it is on that basis that he made his submissions.

In Amold Rodiicks & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 885, the Constitution Bench dealt with the question whether the statement in the notification under Section 4 that the land was required for "development and utilisation of the said land as an industrial and residential areas" cannot be said to be a public purpose within the meaning of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court held, relying upon the decisions of this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, [1961] l SCR 128 at 137 and Pandit Jlzandu Lal v. The State of Punjab, [1961] 2 SCR 459 as well as the statement in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government - that the purpose stated in the notification is indeed

a public purpose. The Constitution Bench pointed out that in Babu Barkya Thakur, this Court had relied upon the decision in State of Bombay v.

Bhanji Munji &Anr., [1955] 1 SCR 777 to the effect that "providing housing G accommodation to the homeless is a public purpose (and that) where a larger section of the community is concerned, its welfare is a matter of public concerned". The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Government explained that the pressure of housing in Bombay is acute and that there was any amount of need for fresh housing. The Court (majority) observed,

"in our view, the welfare of a large proportion of persons living in Bombay H

680 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1995] SUPP. 4S.C.R.

is a matter of public concern and the notifications served to enhance the welfare of this section of the community and this is public purpose."

Another contention urged for the petitioners was that the Government had not prepared any scheme hefore issuing the notification under Section 4. This argument was also negatived in the following words :

"This is true that the Government has not uptil now prepared any scheme for the utilisation of the developed sites. But the notification itself shows that the sites would be used as residential and industrial sites. There is no law that requires a scheme to be C prepared before issuing a notification under s.4 or s.6 of the Act. We have, however, no doubt that the Government will, before disposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal. "

(Emphasis added)

We have held hereinbefore that merely because the Housing Board Act contemplates acquisition of land as part of a housing or improvement scheme, it does not follow that no land needed for the purpose of the Housing Board Act can be acquired until and unless a scheme is prepared and finalised by the Board and becomes effective under the provisions contained in Chapter-VII.

lnAflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802, another Constitution dealt with a similar contention, viz., that before publishing the notification under Section 4, the Government had not declared any area in Delhi as a development area under Section 12(1) of F the Delhi Development Act nor was there a Master Plan drawn up in accordance with Section 7 of that Act. The notification under Section 4 was attacked on that basis. It was argued that under Section 12(3) of the Delhi Development Act, no development of land can be undertaken or carried out except as provided in that sub- 0 -•ion. This argument was G negatived by the Constitution Bench holding lilat :

"The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of H Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN jB.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 681

ivas no inhibition in acquinng land for11lanncd develo]Jlnent of Delhi A under the Act before the Master Plan 1vas reac(r (see the decision in Patna bnprovcn1ent Tnt.rl v. Snit. Laksh111i Devi and 01:v., I I.963\ Suppl. 2 SCR, 812. Jn other words, the fact that actual development is pennissib/c in an area other than a developn1ent area with the approval or sanction of the local authmity did not preclude the Central Govenunent ji'01n acquin'ng the land for planned develop-

111e11t under the Act. Section 12 is concc111ed only with the planned develop111ent. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes developn1ent. For planned devc/op-

111ent in an area other than a develop111ent area it is only necessa1y

to obtain the sanction or approval of the local autho1ity as provided C

in s.12(3). T71e Central Govcnunent could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtai11i11g the approval of the local autho1ity . 11

(Emphasis added) D

It is significant to notice that Section 12 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 provided for declaration of any area as development area by the Central Government and it further provided that except as otherwise provided by the said Act, the Delhi Development Authority shall not undertake or carry out any development of land in any area which is not a E development area. Sub-section (3) of Section 12, however, provided that_ / after the commencement of the said Act, no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by anyone unless (i) where that area is a developmenl area, permission for such development has been ohtained in \Vriting from the Authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act F , and (ii) where the area is an area other than a development area, approval of the local authority or other concerned authority is obtained according to law. Section 15 of the said Act provided for acquisition of any land required for the purpose of development under the Act.

In our opinion, the observations quoted and emphasised G

< hereinabove, and the broad similarity between the provisions of the _.P<; Jhi Act and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, establish that the acquisition of the land is not dependent upon the preparation and approval of a

sceme under Sections 37 to 56 and that the Government's power of acquisition extends to other purposes or the Board and the Housing Board H

A Act referred to in Sections 35 and 36. Moreover, under Tamil Nadu Housing Board too 1 there is no inhibition against acquisition of land for the purpose of the Board except in accordance \Vith and as a part of the schen1e.

For all the above reasons, we find it difficult to read the holding in Mohammed Yousef as saying that in no event can the land be acquired for the purpose of the Act/Board unless a final and effective scheme is framed by lhc Housing Board under the provisions of Sections 37 to 56. The said limitation applies only where the land is sought lo be acquired avowedly for the purpose of execution of a housing or improvement scheme prepared by the Housing Board under Chapter-VII of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act. In other \Vords, unless the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act expressly states that land proposed to be acquired is required for executing a housing or improvement scheme (i.e., a final and effective scheme) framed by the Housing Board under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, the principle and ratio of

Jvfoha1111ned Yousef is not attracted.* Mere statcrnnt in the notification that land is required for the purpose of the Housing Board would not by itself attract the said principle and ratio. In the instant appeals, the notifications do not even state that the land proposed to be acquired is meant for the purpose of the Housing Board.

With respect to the other decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents, viz., Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authmity & Anr. v. Gangaram & Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 89, (to which one of us, K.

Ramaswamy, J. was a party), it may be said that it applies the ratio of F Mohammed Yousef in the light of the scheme and provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976. For the purpose

This is the position. it 1nay be reiterated, under the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act without reference to the Amendment Act 5 of 1992. If L11e Amending Act which has been given retrospective effect from April 22, 1961 is taken into account, it is obvious that even in a case where land is proposed to he acquired avowedly for executing a housing or improvement scheme framed by the Housing Board under Chapter-VII of the Act, it is not necessary that there should be a final and effective scheme in existence before issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Sub-section (2) of Section 70. added by the said Amendment Act. reads as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act. proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central ct I of 1894) may ; .. e taken for acquiring any land or any interest therein under sub-section (I) even before framing any housing or improvement scheme.

STAfE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 683

of these cases, it is not necessary lo say more about the said decision, particularly because we have had no occasion to examine the provisions and the scheme of the Maharashtra Act.

The Next question is whether the public purpose stated in the three notifications concerned is vague. It must be rcmcn1bered that what is vague is a question of fact to be decided in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of thatcase. By saying that the public purpose in the said notifications is vague what the respondents really mean is not that it is not a public purpose but that since the public purpose is expressed in vague terms and is not particularised \Vith sufficient specificity, they are not in a position to n1ake a effective representation against the proposed acquisition.

In Ajlatoon, the Constitution Bench dealt with the question whether the acquisition of a large extent of land for a public purpose, viz., "the planned development of Delhi" was vague. Mathew, J ., speaking for the Constitution Bench, stated that "according to the section .... it is only necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for a public purpose" and then added "the wording of Section 5-A would make it further clear that all that is necessary to be specified in a notification under s.4 is that the land is needed for public purpose. One reason for specification of the particular public P'"pose in the notification is to enable the person whose land is sought to be .cquired to file objection under s.5A.

Unless a person is told about the specific purpose of the acquisition, it may not be possible for him to file a meaningful objection against the acquisition under s.5A". The learned Judge then referred to the ratio of Munshi Singh and held "we think that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification under s.4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under s.5A would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case". The le, rned Judge also referred to the decision in Am old Rodlicks and held : "In the case of an acquisition of a large area of land complising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the pwpose can only be

with reference to the acquisition of Jhe whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be practically difficult to specify the G pa1ticular public piupose for which each and eve1y iteni of land con1prised in

the area is needed. ' 1

(Emphasis added)

In Lila Ram Etc. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc., [1976] 1 SCR 341, H

A another Constitution Bench held that the public purpose mentioned in the notificiltlon concerned therein, viz.,

11for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi 11 , is specific in the circun1stanccs and docs not suffer from any vagueness. The Court again pointed out that the notification does not pertain to a small plot but a huge area covering

thousands of acres an<l in such cases, it is difficult to insist upon greater precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered by the notification may have to be utilised for different purposes set out in the Interim General Plan. Of course, that was a case where the Interim General Plan was prepared and published by the Government after approval by the Cabinet as a policy decision for development of Delhi as an interim measure till the master plan could be made ready.

The above decisions, and particularly the decision in Aflatoon, to establish that whether the public purpose stated in the particular notification is vague or not is a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case and further that where a large extent of land is acquired, it would not be proper to insist upon the Government particularising the use to which each and every bit of the land so notified would be put to. The three notifications concerned herein, we are told, pertain to about 400 acres in all. The parties have not furnished copies of the notifications in their entirely. Only Sri Ashok Sen has supplied the full text of the notification dated February 19, 1975. It shows that a total extent of ninety seven acres one cent was proposed to be acquired, affecting the holdings of about twenty five persons, some of them holding such small extents of 0.26 or 0.25 acres.

So far as the decision in Munshi Singh (decided by the Bench comprising KS. Hedge, A.N. Grover and D.G. Palekar, JJ.) is concerned, it does contain certain observations supporting te petitioners' contentions but it must be remembered that this decision was referred to and explained in Ajlatoon. In Ajlatoon, it has stated that whether the public purpose G stated in a pa, rticu]ar notification is vague or not is a question of fact to be, decided in each case and cannot be treated as a question of law. It was also emphasised that where large extents are sought to be acquired for development or similar purposes, it would not be possible to specify how each owner's bit would be utilised and for what purpose. We are of the H respectful opinion that the decision in Munshi Singh should be read subject

STATE v. L KRISHANAN IB.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 685

to the explanation and the holding in Ajlatoon which is a decision of a Constitution Bench . As pointed out hercinbefore, in a subsequent decision in Lila Ram, another Constitution Bench has also emphasised the very same aspect. We are, therefore, of the opinion lhal Mwzshi Singh does not come to the rescue of the writ petitioners-respondents in these matters.

There is yet another and a very strong factor militating against the writ petitioners. Not only did they fail to file any objections in the enquiries held under Section 5-A, they also failed to acl soon after the declarations under Section 6 were made. As stated above, the declarations under Section 6 were made in the year 1978 and the present writ petitions were filed only sometime in the year 1982-83 when the awards were about to be passed. It has been appointed out in Ajlatoon that !aches of this nature are fatal. Having held that the public purpose specified in the notification concerned therein is not vague, Mathew, J. made the following observa- . tions:

"Assuming for the moment that the public purpose was not sufficiently specified in the notification, did the appellants make a grievance of it at the appropriate time? If the appellants had really been prejudiced by the non-specification of the public purpose for which the plots in which they were interested were needed, they should have taken steps to have the notification quashed on that ground within a reasonable time. They did not move in the matter even after the declaration under s.6 was published in 1966. They approached the High Court with their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under s.9 were issued to them .....

Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should F be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under s.6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 lo come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued G in 1959 of the ground that the particulars of the public purpose \Vere not specified. A valid notification under s.4 is a sine qua non

for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of properly. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under s.4 H

G86

SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ.9951SUPP.4 S.C.R.

an<l the declaration under s.6 were valid and Lhen to attack the notification on grounds ''"'hich \Vere available to then1 at the tin1e \Vhcn the notification was published would be putting a pren1ium on dilatory tactics. The \Vrit petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of I aches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Molichand and Ors. v. H.B. Muushi and Ano/her, {19691 2 SCR 824; and Rabindrana//z Bose and 01he1s v. Union of India & Ors., 119701 2 SCR 697.

From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is clear that the Government have allotted a large portion of the land after the acquisition proceedings were finalised to Cooperative housing societies. To quash the notification at this stage \voukl disturb the rights of third parties who are not before the Court."

The above observations speak for themselves - and are fatal to the writ petitioners.

We may next take up the other ground assigned by the High Court for quashing the notifications, viz., the delay in passing the award after the declaration under Section 6 were published. While we agree that there has certainly been delay in passing the award, but this circumstance must be \vcighed against the beneficial _couter-vailing provision contained in section 48-A, added by the Tamil Nadu Legislature in the Land Acquisition Act. Section 48-A reads :

"48-A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within two years. - (1) Where the Collector has not made an award under Section 11 in respect of any land \Vithin a perio<l of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 or of the issue of a notice under clause ( c) of sub-section (3) of Section 40 of the Madras City Improvement Trust Act, 1950, or of the publication of a notification under Section 53 of the Act as the case may be, the owner of the land shall, unless he has been responsible for the delay to a 111atcrial extent be entitled to receive con1pensation for the dan1age suffered by hin1 in consequence of the delay.

(2) The provision of Part Ill of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the <lctcrn1ination of the co111pcnsation payable under this section. 11

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN [B.P.JEEVAN REDDY. J.] 687

According to this provision~ if the a\vard is not n1aic \vithin l\VO years A of the declaration under Section 6, the O\Vncr of the land shall be entitled lo receive co111pcnsation for the dan1ages suffered by hi111 in consequence of the delay unless he is hin1sl'.lf responsible for the delay to a n1aterial

extent. Sub-sect.ion (2) further says that for determination or the con1pensation undc_r the said section, the provisions in Part-Ill of the Land B Acquisition Act shall apply. Even apart fron1 this provision, there is yet another circumstance \Vhich should be taken note of in these appeals. In these cases, the land acquisition proceedings wen.: pending on 30th day of April, 1982 and if so, lhe persons interested would be entitled lo lhe additional amount provided by sub-section (J.-A) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. According to the said sub-section, "ln addition to the C market value of the land ..... the Court shall in every ca-se a\vard an an1ount calculated al lhe rate of lwelve per centum per annum on such markclvalue for the period commencing on and from the dale of the publication of the notification under Section 4, SP 1_J-scction (1), in respect of such land lo lhe date of the award of the Co' ector or the dale of laking possession D of the land, \Vhichever is earlier." The provisions in this sub-section are designed to compensate the o\vners of the land for the rise in prices during the pcndency of the land acquisition procc(.; dings. It. is a n1easurc to off-set the effects of inflation and the continuous rise in the values of properties over the last few decades and appears to be more beneficial to 1 he claimants. In view of Section 48(A) (supra), lhc provision in section 23(1- E A) and the delay on the part of the writ pclilioncrs in not approaching the Court within a reasonable time, we are of the opinion lhat lhe delay in passing the awards after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 cannol he held lo he fatal.

F We n1ay append a note of caution. This holding of ours 1nay not be understood as saying that land acquisition proceedings can be delayed i1i<lefinitely and that the. provision in Section 23(1-A) is an adequate recompense for such delay. No such proposition can be countenanced.

These proceedings n1ust be concluded \Vith due expedition. It is this concern \vhich has led the Parliament to enact various tin1e lin1its for G making the declaration under Section 6 and for n1aking the a\vard by \Vay of Amendment Acl 68 of 1984. The person who is deprived of the land 1nust be given bis due compensation \Vithout avoidable delay. This obligation tlo\VS fron1 the duty t.o exercise the statutory po\vcr in a reasonable an<l fair n1anner, 1nore particularly \vhcrc the suhjcct-n1attcr is acquisition H

' A of land/property. I Sec Ram Chand and Other< v. Union of India and

Others, (1994] J S.C.C. 44.] It is only in the particular facts and circumstances of this casc 1 nlcntioned above, that \Ve arc disinclined to interfere.

There remains lhe last ground assigned by lhe High Court in support of its decision. The High Court has held lhat the non-compliance with sub-rule (b) and (c) of Rule 3 and Rules made by the Government of Tamil Nadu pursuant lo Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act vitiates the report made under Section 5-A and consequenlly the declarations made under Section 6. The said sub-rules provide thal on receipt of objections under Section 5-A, the Collector shall fix a date of hearing lo the objections and give notice of lhe same to the objector as well as to the department.

It is open to the department to file a statement by way of answer to the objections filed by the land-owners. The submission of the writ petitioners was that in a given case il may well happen lhat in the light of the objections submitted by the land-owners, the concerned department may decide to drop the acquisition. Since no such opportunity was given to the depart- D ment concerned herein, it could not file its statement by way of answer to their objections. This is said to be the prejudice. We do not think it necessary to go into the merits of this submission on account of the !aches on the part of the writ petitioners. As stated above, the declaration under

Section 6 were made some time in lhe year 1978 and the writ petitioners chose to approach the Court only in the years 1982-83. Had they raised this objection at the proper time and if it were found to be true and acceptable, opportunity could have been given to the Government to comply with the said requirement. Having kept quiet for a number of years, the petitioners cc1nnot raise this contention in writ petitions filed at a stage when the awards were about to be passed.

For the above reasons, the appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court under appeal herein is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents, from \Vhich these appeals arise, are dismissed. No costs.

G Civil Appeal Nos. 9822, 9814-18 and 9819, 9821 of 1995. [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 13725 of 1992, 7332-36 of 1992 and 6588-89 of 1992.J

Leave granted.

H These appeals are prefrrred against the judgment of the Madras

STATE v. L. KRISHANAN (B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 689

High Court qua., hing the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the A Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 1865-70 of 1992, these appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs. ·

Civil Appeal No. 9823-24 of 1995 [Arisi11g out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 1785-86 of 1995.] B Leave granted.

These appeals arise from the judgment of the Madras High Court dismissing the writ petitions in view of the Amendment Act 5 of 1992. The High Court has upheld the validity of the Amendment Act. The notification( s) under Section 4 concerned herein has not been placed before us. C No separate argument is addressed in these matters. Accordingly, following our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1865-70 of 1992, these appeals are also dismissed. No costs.

Civil Appeal No. 1740 of 1995 a11d Civil Appeal Nos. 9838-39, 9836-37 of 1995. [Arisi11g out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 14617-20 of 1994.J

Leave granted.

These appeals are preferred against the judgment of the Division E Bench of the Madras High Court upholding the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Amendment Act 5 of 1992. The purpose of acquisition stated in the notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is "a development of area by building houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board". In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 1865-70 of 1992, the notification must be deemed to be valid even without reference to the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 5 of 1992. These appeals are accordingly dismissed.

No costs.

P.C.

Appeal' dismissed .