DHANANJOY CHATIERJEE @ DHANA v.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JANUARY 11, 1994

[DR. AS. ANAND AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Ss. 302, 376 and 38o--Rape and murder of young gi, rl by a Security guard in the Apartment-Theft of a Watch-Conviction based on circumstantial evidence-Recovery of chain and shirt button of accused from place of occu"ence-Also circumstances of motive, accused's visit C to victim's flat and accused absconding after the occu"ence of the crime-- Recovery of stolen watch and shirt and pant of accused on the basis of disclosure statement-Chain of circumstantial evidence complete leading to guilt of accused-Conviction and sentence of death upheld.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Ss. 154-FIR-Vague and indefinite D telephone message making the police rush to the scene of occu"ence-Held does not constitute FIR.

Criminal Trial: Witnesses-Hostile witness-Testimony of-Not to be ignored completely-To be carefully examined-That part of the testimony which receives co"oboration from other evidence on record could be ac- E cepted.

Evidence Act, 1872 : Sections 25, 26 and 27-Disclosure statement made under Police Custody-Admissibility of that part of the Statement which distinctly relates to discovery of articles pursuant to disclosure statement.

Sections 11 and 106-Alibi-plea of-To be proved by cogent and satisfactory evidence-Possibility of accr-'sed's presence at the scene of occu"ence at the relevant time-To be completely excluded by adducing necessary evidence.

Penology: Measure of punishment-Factors to be considered-Retributive aspect of punishment-Need fo,._..punishment to depend upon atrocity of crime-Appropriate punishment to be gi, ven keeping in view not only the rights of accused, but also rights of victims and society.

Words and Phrases : "Facts discovered''-Meaning_pf-ln the context of H

A S. 27 of Evidence Act; 1872.

The appellant was one of the security guards posted in an apartment.

Be was teasing a girl living with her parents in one of the Oats there. Be once invited her to a cinma hall for seeing a movie. The girl complained B to her mother. Both the parents lodged a written complaint to the

propretor of the Security Agency which employed the appellant, and the proprietor immediately transferred the appellant to another building and posted another security guard in the said apartment, with immediate effect. However, the appellant did not report for duty at his new place of posting and continued to remain in the building. On that very day, the girl C returned from her school and was alone in her Oat since her father and brother had gone to look after their business and the mother had gone to temple. On the pretext of making a telephone call to his employer the appellant went to her flat. After some time his Supervisor visited the said Apartment to find out why the appellant had not complied with the D transfer order. Be was told that the appellant had gone to the girl's Oat

for making a telephone call. Since there was no response or the intercom phone one guard went and called out the appellant, who rushed out of the flat '.and met the Supervisor and told him that he would obey the transfer orders and join duty in the new place next day since due to some personal

difficulty he could not go there the same day. The appellant thereafter left the place. After sometime, the mother of the girl returned from the temple and since there was no response to the call-bell, the lock was broken. The girl was lying in her cot with blood stains. A doctor was summoned and after examination he pronounced that she was dead. Later it came to light that the girl had been raped and murdered.

The appellant abandoned his job and was not traceable. After a few days, he was arrested from his uncle's house. After investigation, he was challaned and tried for rape and murder of the girl and for committing theft of a wrist watch from her flat. He was convicted and sentenced to death for committing murder, life imprisonment for rape and 5 years rigorous imprisonment for theft. High Court confirmed the sentence of death after dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant. Hence this appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that there was no eye witness and the chain of circumstantial evidence did not lead to the guilt H of the appellant. ·

DHANANJOY v. STATE OFW.B. 39

Dismissing the appeal, this Court A

HELD : 1. It is settled law that in a case such as the present one based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have not only to be fully established but also that all the circumstances so established should be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Those circumstan- B ces should not be capable of being explained by any other hypothesis, except the guilt of the accused and the chain of the evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the belief consistent with the innocence of the accused. Legally established circumstances and not merely indignition of the court can form the basis of conviction and the more C serious the crime, the greater should be the care taken to scrutinise the evidence lest suspicion takes the place of proof. [ 49-E-F]

2. The cryptic telephone message received at the Police Station from PW4 father of the deceased, had only made the police agency to rush to the place of occurrence and record the statement of PW3 the mother of the D deceased, and thereafter commence the investigation as was admitted by the investigating officer in his testimony which testimony was not challenged during the cross-examination of the investigating officer. The Hif)l Court failed to notice that the vague and indefinite inf onnation given on the telephone which made the investigating agency only to rush to the scene of E occurrence could not be treated as a first information report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. The unchallenged statement of the investigating officer that he commenced the investigation only after recording the statement of PW3 unimistakably shows that it was that statement which alone could be treated as the first information report. The High Court fell in error in observing that the statement of PW3 was recorded "after the investigation F bad already commenced." (50-D-F]

3. The transfer of the appellant on grounds of bis improper behaviour with the deceased was an aspersion on his character and that appears to have provided him the immediate motive for committing the G crime in retaliation and even may be to remove the evidence of committing rape on the deceased. The prosecution has successfully established the existence of motive on the part of the appellant to commit the crime. (53-E]

4. Though PW8 the lift operator who took the appellant to the third ftoor (where the flat of the deceased was located) by the lift, turned hostile H

A at the trial, he did not go back on the entire version as earlier given by him. The testimony of PW8 need not, therefore, be ignored totally and the court can scrutinise his testimony and accept that portion of the same which receives corroboration from other evidence on record. The testimony of a hostile witness is not liable to be rejected without even scrutipising it

B although great care and caution is required to analyse the same before accepting any part 'there of if it is otherwise found reliable and consistent with the prosecution case. (54-E-F]

5. PW8 does afford corroboration regarding the presence of the appellant at the time of visit of PW6 e Supervisor to the Apartment and C his coming down the stairs from the third floor on being called by PW7,

the security guard on duty. On the return of PW3 from the temple, PW8 the liftman told her that the appellant had gone to. her Oat to make a telephone call. Despite lengthy cross-examination, the testimony of PW6 and PW7 on this aspect of the case has remained unshattered. Their D credibility has not been impeached at all. The appellant could not have

gone to the third floor unnoticed. Even if it be assumed that PW7 was not aware of the transfer order, the appellant's duty was already over and without giving some explanation to PW7 the guard on duty, he could not have gone to the Oat of the deceased. There was, therefore, nothing improbable for the appellant to have told the guard on duty that he was going E to that particular Oat and to have coined a false excuse that he was going there with a view to contact the office on telephone. (54-F-H, 55-A, CJ

6. The behaviour of the appellant on coming down from the third Door was not normal because when PW6 the supervisor wanted to talk to F the appellant, he side-tracked him and hurriedly went out of the main gate of the apartment asking the supervisor to come outside to take to him.

This behaviour, to say the least is not normal because a supervisor would not normally be treated in this manner by a subordinate security guard.

The testimony of PW6 and PW7 on this aspect of the case has again not been discredited in any way and both of them are independent witnesses, G who bed no reason to falsely depose against the appellant and so it is safe to rely upon their testimony. The prosecution bas, thus, conclusively establishea that at the crucial time, the appellant bad gone to flat 3-A, where the deceased was all alone, her mother PW3 having left the Oat for the temple earlier and that the deceased was found raped and murdered H shortly thereafter. (55-E-G]

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DHANANJOY v. STATEOFW.B. 41

7.1. From the prosecution evidence it stands established that during A the investigation of the case, when the police searched the room where the dead body of the deceased was lying, they recovered a broken chain and a shirt button of cream colour with four holes from the bed room besides the panty of the deceased from the living room which was tom and had blood stains. [56A, BJ

7.2. From the testimony of the senior Scientific Officer, it transpires that the cream colour button, recovered from the place of occurrence was from the shirt which had been recovered at the instance of the appellant from his house after his arrest. He deposed that all the buttons stitched

on the shirt, except the third button from the top of the front verticle plate, C were of light cream colour and stitched in the similar pattern with off white thread of three ply and z type twist, whereas the third button was of white colour and stiched in a different pattern with milky white thread of two ply and x type twist. The appellant appears to have stiched the third button in lieu of the one which had fallen off probably during scume, at D the site of occurrence. From the unchallenged testimony of PW27, it is crystal clear that the third button stitched on the shirt examined by him was different, distinct and separate from the other three buttons found on the shirt and that the third button had been replaced and stitched in a different manner. His examination also established that the button, recovered from the place of occurrence and sent to him for examination E tallied with and was identical to the remaining three buttons on the shirt of the appellant. The evidence of the expert witness, therefore, clearly points out to the conclusion that the button found from the place of occurrence was the third button of the shirt of the appellant, which bad failed off and was found on the scene of crime. This piece of circumstantial p evidence is quite specific and is of a crucial nature and undoubtedly connects the appellant with the crime. [56-H, 57-AE]

8. The discovery of the broken chain from the place of occurrence also connects the appellant with the crime. From the testimony of P.W.11 it appears that the broken chain recovered from the place of occurrence, G bad been given by the witness to the appellant about a month prior to the date of the incident. There was no cross-examination of this witness to challenge this part of his testimony. Of course, the defence did suggest during the cross-examination that such like chains are available in the market but that suggestion cannot detract from the reliability of the H

A prosecution evidence. The prosecution has successfully established that PWll had given the neck chain, recovered from the place of occurrence on 5.3.1990 to the appellant about a month before the occurrence. This piece of evidence establishes the presence of the appellant in the Oat of the deceased on 5.3.1990. [57-EfGJ

9. The circumstance f absconding was put to the appellant in his statement under Section 3i3 Cr.P.C. but instead of giving a satisfactory explanation, he came forwad with a plea of alibi. He statd that he left - the Apartment to see a picture in a cinema hall after 2 p.m. and then returned to Manorma Schol and after collecting his belongings and purchasing some fruits left fr his native place to participate in the sacred thread ceremony of his brothr. No evidence was produced by the appellant 'in support of the belated pl~ of alibi. There is no material on the record to show that he went to any :cinema or participated in any sacred thread ceremony of his brother or that even such a ceremony at all took place at D his native village. Though it s not necessary for an accused to render an explanation to prove his inno.cence and even if he renders a false explanation, it cannot be used to support the prosecution case against him and that the entire case must be p, roved by the prosecution itself but it is well settled that a plea of alibi, if rised by an accused, is required to be proved

by him by cogent and satisfactory evidence so as to complet.ely exclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. The belated and vague plea of alibi of which there is no whisper during the cross-exa111ination of any of the prosecution witnesses, and which has not .been sought to be established by leading any evidence, is only an after thought and '.a plea of despair. The abscondence of the appellant is thus a material conclusively established by the prosecution against him. [58-G-H, 59-A-D]

10. The recovery of the wrist watch has been established by the prosecution through the evidence of PW29, PW24 and PW19. They have given a consistent version and have deposed that after the arrest of the G appellant, he made a disclosure statement during interrogation, which led to the recovery of a ladies 'Richo' Wrist watch, with a golden metal band from a rack in his house. The said watch, was seized by the police in the presence of witnesses who have testified to the seizure and the sealing of the wrist watch after its recovery at the spot. The prosecution has led evidence H to show that the recovered watch had been sold to PW3 by HM W:itch

DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. 43

Company on 21.2.1990 for Rs.350. The non-seizure of the cash memo by the A investigating agency cannot discredit the testimony of PW18 or PW3 and nothing has been brought on recol'd from which any doubt can be cast on the testimony of PW18 regarding the sale of the watch to PW3. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses relating to the disclosure statement of the appellant and the seizure of the wrist watch pursuant thereto from his house coupled with the testimony of PW18 and the identification of the watch by its owner PW3 conclusively connects the appellant with the theft of the watch on the date of occurrence from the flat where the ghastly occurrence took place. The absence of any explanation for possession of the writ watch belonging to PW3 by the appellant is yet another circumstance which

I goes against the appellant. [59-F-H, 60-A-E]

11. All the circumstances which have been conclusively established

are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and are totally inconsistent with his innocence. Not only in the cross-examination of various prosecution witnesses, but even during the arguments nothing has D been pointed out as to why any of the witness for the prosecution should have falsely implicated the appellant in such a heinous crime. None of the witnesses had any motive to falsely implicate him. None had any enmity with him. The witnesses produced by the prosecution have withstood the test of cross-examination well and their cdit-worthiness and reliability has not been demolished in any manner. All the circumstances established E by the prosecution, as discuss =d above are conclusive in nature and specific in details. They are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and totally inconsistent with his innocence. [60-G-ll, 61-A]

12. In recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent crime p against women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts a subject of concern. Today there are admitted disparities. Some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for a essentially equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go unpunished, thereby encouraging the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility. Of course, it is not possible to lay G down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the objed of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the society has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In imposing sentences, in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety of factors and after considering H

A all those factors and taking an over-all view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into consideration. [61-G-H, 62-A-B]

13. The measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the condu":t of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment fitting to the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime.' The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment. [62-C-D]

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 Crl. Law Journal 636, referred to.

14. In the instant case the savage nature of the crime has shocked our judicial conscience. There are no extinuating or mitigating circumstances whats over in the case. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life is required to be kept in mind by the courts while considering the E confirmation of the sentence of death but a cold blooded pre-planned brutal murder, without any provocation, after committing rape on an innocent and defenceless young girl of 18 years, by the security guard certainly makes this case a "rare of the rareet" cases which calls for no punishment other than the capital punishment. Accordingly the sentence of death imposed

F upon the appellant for the offence under Section 302IPC is confirmed. The order of sentence imposed on appellant by the courts below for offences under Sections 376 and 380 IPC are also confirmed alongwith the directions relating thereto as in the event of the execution of the appellant, those sentences would only remain of academic interest. [62-G-H, 63-A-B]

G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 584of1992.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.1992 of the Calcutta High Court in Death Reference No. 3 of 1991.

H AK. Ganguli, S.C. Ghosh and AD. Sikri for the Appellant.

DHANANJOY v. STATEOFW.B. [DR.ANAND, J.) 45

~ D.N. Mukherjee, Dilip Sinha and J.R. Das for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

1. DR. ANAND, J. Hetal Parekh a young 18 years old school-going girl was raped and murdered on 5.3.1990 between 5.30 and 5.45 p.m. in her flat No. 3-A, on the third floor of 'Anand Apartment'. The appellant was B .. challanged and tried for rape and murder and also for an offence under -Section 380 IPC, for committing theft of a wrist watch fr:om the saic! flat.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge found him guilty and convicted the appellant, (i) for an offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to deatch, (ii) for an offence under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to c imprisonment for life, and (iii) for the offence undeer Section 380 IPC, he

ws sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The substantive sentences under Sections 376 and 380 IPC were ordered to run concurrently but were to cease to have any effect, in case the sentence of death for conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC was confirmed by the High Court and the appellant was executed. Reference for confir- D }- mation of the death sentence was accordingly made to the High Court. The appellant also preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence in the I:Iigh Court. The criminal appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed and the sentence of death was confirmed by the High Court. On special leave being granted, the appellant, Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana, has filed this appeal.

2. According to the prosecution case, the appellant Dhananjoy was one of the security guards deputed to guard the building 'Anand Apartment' by MIS Security and Investigating Bureau of which Mr. Shyam Karmakar PW21 was the proprietor. On 2.3.1990, Hetal deceased com- F plained to her mother Yashmoti Parekh PW3 that the appellant had been teasing her on her way to and back from the school and had proposed to her on that day to accompany him to a cinema hall to watch a_ movie. She had made complaints about the teasing by the appellant to her mother previously also. Yashmoti PW3 told her husband Nagardas Parekh PW4 on 3.3.1990 about the behaviour of the appellant towards their daughter, G who in turn complained to Shyam Karmakar PW21 and requested him to

~ replace the appellant. At the asking of Shyam Karmakar PW21, who came to meet Nagardas PW4 in his flat in that connection, PW4 gave a written complaint also and the appellant was transferred and a transfer order posting.' the appellant at 'Paras Apartment' was issued by PW21. Bijoy Thapa, :a security guard at Paras Apartment was posted in his place, at H

A Anand Apartment. The transfer was to take effect from 5.3.1990.

3. As per their normal routine, Nagardas Parekh PW4 and his son Bhawesh Parekh PW5, father and brother of the deceased respectively, left for their place of business and college in the morning on 5.3.1990. Bhawesh B PW5 returned to the flat at about 11.30 a.m. and after taking his meals, left for his father's place of business as was his routine. The deceased returned to her flat after taking her examination at about 1 p.m. Yashmoti PW3, the mother of the deceased used to visit Laxmi Narayan Mandir between 5 and 5.30 p.m. daily. As usual, on the date of the occurrence also she left for the Temple at about 5.20 p.m. Hetal, deceased was all alone in the flat at C that time. The appellant, inspite of the order of transfer, did not report at Paras Apartment'and instead performed his duties, as a security guard, at Anand Apartment between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. on 5.3.1990. Shortly after Yashmoti PW3, the mother of the deceased left for the Temple, the appellant met Dasarath Murmu PW7, another security guard who was at D that time on duty at the building and told him that he was going to flat 3-A for contacting his office over the telephone. The appellant used the lift to go to the sCJid flat. At about 5.45 p.m., Pratap Chandra Pali PW6, supervisor of the Scurity and Investigating Bureau, visited Anand Apartment and enquired from PW7 whether Bijoy Thapa had performed his duty in place of the appellant in the morning but was told by Dasarath PW7, that Bijoy E Thapa had not come to that building and that the duties had been performed by the appellant between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. on that day. On enquiry by the supervisor as to where the appellant was, PW7 told the supervisor that at that particular time, the appellant had gone to flat No. 3-A with a view to contact his office over the telephone. The supervisor Pratap F Chandra PW6 as.ked Dasarath PW7 to call th appellant and since, he was not able to contact him through the intercom, there being no response from flat No. 3-A, he called out the name of the appellant, who appeared at the balcony of flt No. 3~A and on being told that 'PW6, the supervisor had come and wanted to see him, told him. that he would come down. The appellant after a little while came down by the stairs and even though. the G supervisor PW6 and Dasarath PW7 were waiting for him, he hurriedly went passed them and on being asked,:by ; f>W6 that he wanted to talk to him, told him to come outside the gate, and speak to him. The appellant on inquiry by PW6 as to why he had not obeyed the transfer order told him that due to some personal difficulty he could not report for duty at Paras H Apartment. He was advised tO take charge at Paras Apartment without fail

.,....,

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DHANANJOY v. STATEOFW.B. [DR.ANAND, J.) 47

the next day. The appellant thereafter left.

4. At about 6.05 p.m. Yashmoti PW3 returned from the Temple.

While going to her falt in the lift, she was told by Ramdhan Yadav PW8, the lift operator, that the appellant had gone to her flat in her absence to make a telephone call to his office. She was annoyed on getting this B information because of the complaint which the deceased had made to her earlier. On reaching her flat, she rang the bell repeatedly but there was no response and no body opened the door. She raised alarm which attracted several of her neighbours. They also rang the bell and knocked at the door but there was no response. Eventually, the lock of the door was broken open by the neighbours, their servant and the liftman, and as she entered C the flat along with some of her neighbours, she found the door of her bed room open. Hetal deceased was lying on the floor. Her skirt and blouse had been pulled up and her private parts and breasts were visible. There were patches of blood near her head as well as on the floor. There were blood stains on her hands and vagina also. Her wearing apparel was blood D stained. There were some marks of violence and blood was found on her face as well. There were blood marks on the 'Jhoola' lying in the room.

Her torn panty was found lying near the entrance of the door and the deceased appeared to be unconscious at that time. Her mother, PW3, lifted the deceased in her arms and rushed down through the lift with a view to take her to the doctor. In the meantime, a doctor had been summoned by E the neighbours who arrived and on examining the deceased in the lift itself, where she was lying in the lap of her mother, pronounced her dead.

Information of the occurrence, was sent to the father of the deceased and at about 7 p.m. Bhawesh PW5 returned. In the meantime, another doctor, who had also been called, arrived and after examining the deceased cer- F tified her as dead. The dead body of Hetal was taken back to the flat and laid on her bed in her room and was covered by a sheet. At about 8.30 p.m. father of the deceased, Nagardas PW4 returned to the flat and on being told of the murder of Hetal, he informed Bhawanipore Police Station . at about 9 .15 p.m. on the telephone. On receipt of the telephonic message, G sub-inspector Gurupada Som PW28, the acting duty officer, rushed to the place of occurrence along with some other police personnel and recorded the FIR on the statement of Yashmoti Parekh PW3, the mother of the deceased and commenced investigation. During the search of the room where the deceased had been allegedly raped and murdered, blood stained earth, a broken chain, a cream colour button, the torn panty of the H

A deceased and some other articles were seized and sealed into a parcel aftet preparing seizure memos. Statements of some witnesses were also recorded.

5. Search was made for the appellant by the police at different places during the night intervening 5th and 6th March 1990 but in vain. The appellant did not even visit his employers to collect his wages for the past 5 days. He did not report at 'Paras Apartment' either. Though he was also doing night duty at another place, he did not report for duty there and did not collect his wages for four days service rendered with the other employer either. He was not traceable. Some raids were conducted in the C village of the appellant at Kuludihi, within the jurisdiction of Chatna Police

Station on different dates but ultimately it was only on 12.5.1990 that the appellant came to be arrested. Pursuant to a disclosure statement made by him under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a 'Richo' wrist watch was recovered. Appellant also led to the recovery of his' shirt and trouser

wrapped in a newspaper from his house pursuant to a disclosure statement.

At the trial the appellant pleaded innocence and alleged false implication 'due to quarrel with PW4 over his transfer'. In his statement made at the trial under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant stated that after his duty hours as the security guard at Anand Apartment on the date of the occurrence he had gone to a cinema and then purchsed some fruits in connection with the sacred thread .ceremony of his younger brother and left for his native place with the fruits to participate in the said ceremony.

He denied the recoveries allegedly made from him. He, however, led no defence evidence.

6. There is no eye-witness of this occurrence. The entire case rests

OIJ. circumstantial evidence. Hetal Parekh, the unfortunate young schoolgoing girl of about 18 years of age,, had been subjected to rape before her death and that the death was homicidal in nature stands amply established by the testimony of Dr. Dipankar Guba PW20, who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body. As many as 21 injuries were noticed G by Dr. Dipankar Guha on the deceased and since both the trial court and the High Court have reproduced the injuries in extenso, we need not repeat the same. The medical witness found that the hymen of the deceased showed fresh tear at 4, 5, and 7 O'clock position with evidence of fresh blood in the margins. He also found presence of blood stains on the vagina H and matted pubic hair of the deceased. Blood was also noticed at nostril

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DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. [DR. ANAND, J:] 49

and face of the deceased. The hair from the scalp were also found ma, tted A with blood. There was "fracture and dislocation of hyoid bone on its greater cornu of left side" (Injury No. 21). In the opinion of the doctor, the deceased had been subjected to rape before murder and that the death was due to the fact of smoothering with strangulation and injuries were anti-mortem and homicidal. Injury No. 21, as noticed above, was found B sufficient to cause the death of the victim in the ordinary course of nature.

According to the report of the Senior Scientific Officer-cum-Assistant Chemical Examiner, Forensic Science Laboratory, Government of West Bengal, Ex. 36 semen was detected on the panty (under garment) and the pubic hair of the deceased. The presence of blood stains, marks of violence on the face of the deceased and the state of her clothes indicated that the C victim had offered resistence but was helpless. There thus, remains no doubt that the deceased had been subjected to rape before her murder.

Medical evidence is clear and cogent and Mr. Ganguli, the learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant, did not questio, i the same either.

We therefore, have to address ourselves to determine whether or not the D

,~ appellant was the assailant who had raped and murdered the defenceless young girl.

7. It is settled law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have not only to be fully established but also that all the circumstances so E established but also that the circumstances so established should be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Those circumstances should not be capable of being explained by any other hypothesis, except the guilt of the accused and the chain of the evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground F for the belief consistent with the innocence of the accused. It needs no reminder that legally established circumstances and not merely indignition of the court can form the basis of conviction and the more serious the crime, the greater should be the care taken to scrutinise the evidence lest suspicion takes the place of proof. Since, the instant case is based on circumstantial evidence and the sentence awarded by the trial court and G confirmed by the High Court is that of death, we have to consider the circumstances carefully bearing the principles noticed above in mind.

8. Before, we proceed to consider various circumstances, we would like to deal with one finding of the High Court relating to the first H

A information report. The High Court found that after the telephonic message had been sent to the Police Station, and the investigating officer after making an entry in the G.D. rushed to the scene of occurrence to record the statement of Y ashmoti PW3, that statement of PW3 could not be treated as a first information report and that the "telephonic message as B recorded in the G.D." was the first information report and the statement. of PW3 was only a statement recorded during the investigation of the case and not the FIR. In the words of the High Court :

"We are therefore, of the opinion that the statement of PW3 recorded by the Police after the investigation had already commenced could not be treated as the first information report."

9. We are unable to agree with the opinion of the High Court. The

CI) ptic telephonic message received at the Police Station from Nagardas D PW4 had only made the police agency to rush to the place of occurrence . and record the statement of Y ashmoti PW3 and thereafter commence the

investigation as was admitted by the investigating officer in his testimony which testimony was not challenged during the cross-examination of the investigating officer. The High Court failed to notice that the vague and indefinite information given on the telephone which made the investigating E agency only to rush to the scene of occurrence could not be treated as a first information report under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. The unchallenged. statement of the investigating officer that he commenced the investigation only after recording the statement of PW3 Yashmoti unmistakably shows that it was that statement which !ilone could be treated as the first infor- .

F mation report. The High Court fell in error in observing that the statement of PW3 Y ashmoti was recorded "after the investigation had already commenced". There is no material on the record for the above opinion of the .

High Court. The cryptic telephonic message given to the police by Nagardas PW4 was only with the object of informing the police so that it could reach the spot. The investigation in the case only started after the statement G of PW3 Yashmoti was recorded. Though initially Mr. Ganguli did try to support the finding of the High Court but in the face. of the evidence on the record and more particlllarly in the absence_ of any challenge to the testimony of the investigating officer, in fairness:to. Mr. Ganguli, we must record that he rightly did not pursue that ai'.gatnent any further. We, H therefore, find ourselves unable t~ ~e with the opinion of the High

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DHANANJOY v.STAIBOFW.B.[DR.ANAND, J.) 51

Court and hold that the statement of Y ashm.oti PW3, recorded by the A investigating officer PW28, was rightly treated as FIR in this case by the prosecution and the trial court.

10. We shall now deal with and consider various circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.which have.been accepted as conclusively established both by the trial court and the High Court to connect the appellant B with the crime.

11. Motive : In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the existence of motive assumes significance though the absence of motive docs not necessarily discredit the prosecution case, if the case stands otherwise C established by other conclusive cireumstanees and the chain~ circumstantial evidence is so complete f1d is consistent only with the h)ipothesis of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with the hypothesis of his innocence. In this case, there is ample evidence on the record to show that the appellant had a motive to commit the alleged crime and we are unable D to agree with Mr. Ganguli that the motive for the appellant to commit the murder of the deceased has not been established.

llA. The deceased was being teased by the appellant when she used to go to or caine back from the schooi. She had brought it to the notice of her mother PW3 on a number of occasions, the latest in the series being E on 2.3.199(). Yashm.oti PW3 informed her husband Nagardas PW4 about the complaints. From the testimony of Nagardas PW4, it transpires that after he came to know about the misbehaviour of the appellant from his wife PW3 on 2.3.1990, he called some other dwellers of the Apartment to apprise them of the same. Mahendra Chauhatia PW13 and Barish Vakharia PW14 have deposed that they had been called by Nagardas PW4 who F reported to them'that the appellant had been teasing his daughter and that PW4 had suggested that the appellant should be replaced by another security guard. They (PW13 and PW14) both agreed. The testimony of

PW13 and PW14 has remained totally unchallenged in cross-examination.

After consulting PW13 and PW14, Nagardas PW4 asked Shyamal Kar- G makar PW21, the employer of the appellant, to meet him and according to the statement of PW21 Karmakar he came to the flat of Nagardas PW4 on 3.3.1990, where he Was informed about the teasing of the daughter of PW4 by the appellant. PW21 deposed that Nagardas PW4 told him to replace the appellant by antother security guard and even handed over a written complaint Ex.4 to him. The defence has not challenged this part of the H

A testimony of PW21 during his cross-examination at all. PW21 after receiving the complaint Ex.4 against the appellant from PW4, made an order of transfer of the appellant from 'Anand Apartment' to 'Paras Apartment' and deputed Bijoy Thapa another security guard in place of the appellantwith effect from 5.3.1990. The order of transfer was handed over to Riazul Haq PW9, who delivered it to the appellant. The copy of the transfer order B . Ex.23 was handed over by Riazul Haq PW9 to the appellant on 4.3.1990

while the appellant was on. duty at the 'Anand Apartment'. This part of the testimony of PW9 has not been assailed during his cross-examination. From the prosecution evidence, the teasing of the deceased by the appellant, his invitation to her to accompany him to watch a movie on 2.3.1990 and the C order or his transfer from 'Anand Apartment' made by PW21 on the complaint of the deceased, through her father PW 4, stand amply established on the record. It is pertinent to note that there has been no challenge worth the name to this part of the case of the prosecution during the cross-examination of various witnesses produced by the prosecution in its support. Mr. Ganguli however, submitted before us that the delay in the D seizure of complaint Ex. 4 and the transfer order, on 29.6.1990 were indicative of the fact that both the .documents had come into existence subsequently as an after thought. We do not find any force in this submission. PW 4 who gave a written complaint to PW21 and PW9 who delivered the transfer order issued by PW21 to the appellant were not challenged in E the cross-examination about the same. Even the investigating officer was not asked for an explanation as to why the documents had been seized so late. In any event the seizure of the. documents on 29.6.1990, after the appellant had been arrested only a couple of weeks earlier, would not go to show that the documents were either fabricated or were an after thought.

In this connection, it is also relevant to notice that a positive suggestion F was made by the defence to PW 4 during his cross-examination that the appellant had quarelled with him 'over his transfer from Aqand Apartment' and on account of that quarrel, the appellant had been "falsely implicated".

Of course, PW4 denied the suggestion but defence suggestion does not militate against the prosecution case regarding the annoyance of the ap- G pellant on that score. We also find corroboration available from the statement of Pratap Chandra Pali PW6, the supervisor of Security and Investigating Bureau, who had visited 'Anand Apartment' at about 5.45 p.m. on 5.3.1990 and enquired from the guard on duty as to how the appellant had reported for duty at Anand Apartment, when he stood transferred to Par~~· Apartment. Moreover, when PW6 demanded an ex- H plaatiqn from<the.appellant on 5.3.1990 as to why he had not reported for

• ' -·

DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. (DR. ANAND, J.] 53

duty at Paras Apartment, the appellant is alleged to have told him that it A was on account of 'certain personal inconvenience' that he could not so join on that date. PW6 was not challenged with regard to his testimony as regards the transfer of the appellant. We also fuid no substance in the submission of Mr. Ganguli that in a private organisation, written transfer orders are not given and that the written transfer order in this case is a created piece of evidence. There is no hard and fast rule regading giving B of oral or written transfer orders in private organisations and in any event neither PW21 nor PW9 or PW6 were questioned on this aspect. Once service of the transfer order by PW9 is not assailed during the cross-examination of the witness, the above argument of Mr. Ganguli hardly deserves any serious consideration. The evidence on the record has, thus, C clearly and cogently established the improper attitude of the appellant towards the young girl. Hetal, and his teasing her often and seeking her company to go to a movie. The appellant, therefore, had certainly improper designs so far as the deceased is concerned. His transfer from 'Anand Apartment' on the allegation that he had teased the deceased, therefore, provided sufficient motive for him not only to satisfy his lust and teach a D lesson to the deceased girl for spunning his offer but also as a measure of retaliation for being reported to his employer and being transferred from Anand Apartment to Paras Apartment on the basis of the said complaint.

The transfer of the appellant on grounds of his improper behaviour with the deceased was an aspersion0"?n his character and that appears to have provided him the immediate mOtive for committing the crime in retaliation E and even may be to remove the evidence of committing rape on the deceased. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution has successfully established the existence of motive on the part of the appellant to commit the crime.

12. Evidence relating to the appellant's visit to Flat 3-A: According to the prosecution case PW3 Y ashmoti, the mother of the unfortunate deceased, left for the Temple on 5.3.1990 at about 5.20 p.m. This was her daily routine and the appellant, who was a security guard at the apartment must be deemed to be aware of this routine practice of the mother and since the deceased had returned to her flat at about 1.00 p.m. after taking G the examination, when the appellant on his own admission, besides the testimony of PW7, was on duty, he knew that after the departure of PW3, the deceased would be alone in her flat, her father and brother having left earlier. He therefore utilised that opportunity to go to Flat No. 3-A, during the absence of PW3 to commit the crime. The liftman Ramdhan Y adav H

A PW8 and Dasarath PW7, the other security guard on duty have testified about Y ashmoti PW3 leaving the apartment at about 5.20 p.m. on 5.3.1990 for the Temple. Further according to the testimony of PW7, after the departure _of PW3, the appellant -went to Flat No. 3-A and had told Dasarath PW7 that he was going to the said flat for contacting his office B over the telephone and thereafter the appellant went upstairs by the lift.

At about 5.45 p.m., PW6 the supervisor on reaching 'Anand Apartment' was told by PW7, on his enquiry that the appellant had gone to Flat No. 3-A to contact the office over the telephone and that he had not obeyed the transfer order. At the direction of PW6, the guard on duty PW7 tried C to contact the appellant through the intercom but since there was no response from Flat 3-A, he called out the name of the appellant, who appeared at the balcony in front of Flat 3-A and on being informed that PW6 wanted to meet him, told PW7 that he was coming down. He then c<l!De down through the stairs. On reaching the ground floor he attemped to side track both PW6 and PW7 and hurriedly went past them. When D PW6, the supervisor, demanded an explanation from the appellant as to why he had not joined duty at Paras Apartment and why he was still at Anand Apartment, the appellant told him that on account of some personal inconvenience he had not been able to comply with the transfer order.

Though, Ramdhan PW8 who took the appellant to the third floor by the E lift, tilrned hostile at the trial, we find that he did not go back-on the entire version as earlier given by him. The testimony of PW8 need not, therefore, be ignored totally and the court can scrutinise his testimony and accept that portion of the same which receives corroboration from other evidence on record. The testimony of a hostile witness is not liable to be rejected

F without even scrutinising it, although great care and caution is required to analyse the same before accepting any part of it as is othei-wise found reliable and consistent with the prosecution case. We have carefully considered the statement of PW8 and fmd that he does afford corroboration regarding the presence of the appellant at the time of visit of PW6 to Anand Apartment and his coming down the stairs from the third floor on G being called by PW7, the security guard on duty. On the return of Y ashmoti

PW3, from the Temple, PW8 the liftman told her that the appellant had gone to her flat to make a telephone call. Despite lengthy crossexamination, the testimony of PW6 the supervisor and PW7 on this aspect of the case has remained unshattered. Their credibility has not been impeached H at all. The submission of Mr. Ganguli that there was no need for the

DHANANJOY v. STATE OFW.B. [DR. ANAND, J.) 55

appellant to have disclosed to PW7 that he was going to flat 3-A, if the A appellant was going to commit a crime, has not impressed us because in the face of the order of tansfer of the appellant from Anand Apartment to Paras Apartment, he had to give some explanation to the guard on duty for going to the third floor of the building. He could not have gone to the third floor unnoticed. Even if it be assumed that PW7 was not aware of the transfer order, the appellant's duty was already over and without giving B some explanation to PW7, the. guard on duty, he could not have gone to flat 3-A of Anand Apartment. There was, therefore, nothing improbable

~ for the appellant to have told the guard on duty that he was going to flat 3-A and to have coined a false excuse that he was going to do so with a view to contact the office on telephone. Moreover, we cannot lose sight of C the fact that human conduct varies from person to person and different people may react to a situation differently. Mr. Ganguli also argued that since there were no visible sign of preturbedness on the appellant when he came down from the third floor and met PW6, it would show that in all probabilities the appellant had nothing to do with the crime. The argument D is a mere surmise. Not only no question was asked of any witness as to what was the state of mind or facial expression or behaviour of the appellant when he came down from the third floor, the appellant would have in any case taken pains to conceal his real expressions, lest any suspicion should arise that the appellant ha<l done something wrong, because none at that point of time, had the knowledge about the commis- E sion of crime. The behaviour of the appellant on coming down from the third floor was not normal because when PW6, the supeor wanted to talk to the appellant, he side-tracked him and hurriedly went out of the main gate of the apartment asking the supervisor to come outside to talk to him. This behaviour, to say the least is not normal because a supervisor F would not nonn.ally be treated in this manner by a subordinate security guard. The testimony of PW6 and PW7 on this aspect of the case has again not been discredited in any way and both of them are independent witnesses, who had no reason to falsely depose against the appellant and we find it safe to rely upon their testimony. The prosecution has, thus, conclusively established that at the crucial time, the appellant had gone to flat G 3-A, where the deceased was all alone, her mother PW3 having left the flat --<. for the Temple earlier and that the deceased was found raped and murdered shortly thereafter.

13. Recovery of a cream colour button and chain from flat 3-A on H

A 5.3.1990 and shirt and pant of the appellant from his house on 12.5.1990:

From the prosecution evidence it stands established that durmg the investigation of the case, when the police searched the room where the dead body of Hetal was lying, they recovered a broken chain and a shirt button of cream colour with four holes from the bed room of PW3 and .PW4 besides the panty of the deceased from the living room which was tom and had blood stains. PW28, the investigation officer besides Bhawesh Parekh PW5 and Rajiv Bokharia PWlO have deposed to the seizure of these articles from the place of occurrence on 5.3.1990. All the articles were secured in a parcel and sealed. According to PW7, the appellant was wearing a cream coloured shirt and grey trousers when he went to flat No.3-A on the date of occurrence. The appellant, as already noticed, was arrested on 12.5.1990. Pursuant to a disclosure statement made by him, he brought out a packet, wrapped in a newspaper, containing one shirt and a pant which were seized vide seizure list Ex. 16. The recovery of the wearing apparel on the disclosure statement of the appellant has been established D by the testimony of Pranab Chatterjee and Debulal Mukherjee, who have corroborated the evidence of the investigating officer fully. Though, the entire statement made by the appellant before the police is inadmissible in evidence being hit hy sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act but that part of his statement which led to the discovery of the shirt and the pant is clearly admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We disregard the E inadmissible part of the statement and take note only of that part of his statement which distinctly relates to the discovery of the articles pursuant to the disclos.ure statement made by the appellant as it is only so much of the statement made by a person accused of an offence while in custody of a police officer. Whether it is confessional or not, as relates distinctly to F the fact discovered which is capable of being proved and admitted into evidence. The discovery of the fact in this connection includes the discovery of an object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence.

13.A The cream colour button recovered from the place of occur- G rence along with the shirt seized on the disclosure statement of .the appeliant and seized from his house on 12.5.1990 alongwith the other seized articles were sent by the investigating agency to the Forensic Science Laboratory. From the testimony of Pratha Sinha PW27, the senior Scientific Officer, attached to the Physics Division of the Forensic Science H

DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. [DR. ANAND, J.) 57

Laboratory, Government of West Bengal, it transpires that the cream A colour button, recovered from the place of occurrence, was from the shirt which had been recovered at the instance of the appellant from his house after his arrest. PW27 deposed that all the buttons stitched on the shirt, except the third button from the top of the front verticle plate, were of light cream colour and stitched in the similar pattern with off - white thread B of three ply and Z type twist, whereas the third button was of white colour and stitched in a different pattern with milky white thread of two ply and X type twist. The appellant appears to have stitched the third button in lieu of the one which had fallen off probably during scuffle, at the site of occurrence. From the unchallenged testimony of PW27, it is crystal clear C that the third button stitched on the shirt eumined by him was different, distinct and separate from the other three buttons found on the shirt and that the third button had been replaced and stitched in a different manner.

His examination also established that the button, recovered from the place of occurrence and sent to him for examination, tallied with and was identical to the remaining, three buttons on the shirt of the appellant. The D evidence of the expert witness, therefore, clearly points out to the conclusion that the button found from the place of occurrence was the third button of the shirt of the appellant, which had fallen off and was found on the scene of crime. This piece of circumstantial evidence is quite specific and is of a crucial nature and undoubtedly connects the appellant with the E crime.

13B. The discovery of the broken chain from the place of occurrence also connects the appellant with the crime. From the testimony of Gauranga Chandra PWll, it appears that the broken chain recovered from the place of occurrence, had been given by the witness to the appellant about a month prior to the date of the incident. There was no cross-examination F

of this witness to challenge this part of his testimony. Of course, the defence did suggest during the cross-examination that such like chains are available in the market but that suggestion cannot detract from the reliability of the prosecution evidence. We agree with the finding of the G High Court that the prosecution has successfully established that Gauranga PWll had given the neck chain, recovered from the place of occurrence on 5.3.1990, to the appellant about a month before the occurrence. This piece of evidence establishes the presence of the appellant in flat 3-A on H

A 5.3.1990.

14. Abscondig: We are conscious of the fact that abscondence by itseH is not a circumstance .which may lead to the only conclusion consi.>tent with the guilt of the accussed because it is not unknown that innocent B . persons, on being f alsel~ implicated, may abscond to save themselves but abscondence of an accused after the occurrence is certainly a circumstance which warrants consideration and careful scrutiny. The evidence of PW6, the supervisor, and of the security guard PW7 establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had left Anand Apartment at about 6 C p.m. and was not seen t, hereafter. The evidence on the record shows (see the evidence of PWs 3, 4, 6 and 7) that the appellant used to live in the generator room at 'Anand Apartment'. In the transfer order he had been asked to remove his belongings from the generator room. The investigating . officer PW28, has clearly deposed that he searched for the appellant but could not trace him during the night of 5.3.1990 and 6.3.1990. From the D testimony of PW21, the employer of the appellant it transpires that the appellant did not report for duty at 'Paras Apartment' or at 'Anand . Apartment' after he left the 'Anand Apartment' at about 6 p.m. on

5.3.1990. The appellant did not apply for any leave nor did he send .any letter of resignation. AniI Kumar sub-inspector PW25, had made search E for the appellant under orders of the Assistant Commissioner of the Detective Department but could not trace him. Raids were even made in the village of the appellant to apprehend the appellant but in vain till 12.5.1990. The evidence of PW25, PW28 and PW29 has not been aailed during the cross-examination. Their testimony is corroborated by F documentary evidence including Ex. 29 and we have no hesitation in relying upon their restimony the appellant absconded soon after the occurence.

No body had admittedly by named him as an accused at 6 p.m. on 5.3.1990, because even the FIR came to be recorded much .later at about 9.15 p.m.

Why did the appellant disappear? The appellant has offered no explana- tion. No challenge has been made. to the testimony of the investigating G officers either when they testified that they unsuccessfully searched for the. appellant from 5th to 8th March 1990 at different places or conducted raids at his village to apprehend him. The circumstance of absconding was put to the appellant~ •. his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. but instead of giving a satisfactory explanation, he came forward with a plea of alibi. He H stated that he left Anand Apartment to see a picture in a cinema hall after 2 p.m. and then returned to Manorma School and after collecting his

DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. [DR. ANAND, J.) 59

belongings and purchasing some fruits left for his native place to par- A ticipate in the sacred thread ceremony of his brother. No evidence was produced by the appellant in support of this belated plea of alibi. There is no material on the record to show that he went to any cinema or participated in any sacred thread ceremony of his brother or that even such a ceremony at all took place at his native village. Though it is not necessary B for an accused to render an explanation to prove his innocence and even if he renders a false explanation, it cannot be used to support the prosecution case against him and that the entire case must be proved by the prosecution itself but it is well settled that a plea of alib~ if raised, by an accused is required to be proved by him by cogent and satisfactory evidence so as to completely exclude th~ possibility of the presence of the C accused at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. The belated and vague plea of alibi of which we find no whisper during the cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses, and which has not been sought to be established by leading any evidence either is only an after thought and a plea of despair. The abscondence of the appellant is thus a material D circumstance which has been satisfactorily and conclusively established by the prosecution against the appellant.

15. Recovery of the wrist watch Ex. 18 from the house of the appellant: According to the prosecution case, the appellant led to the recovery of a 'Richo' wrist watch pursuant to a disclosure statement made by him under E Section 27 of the Evidence Act soon after he was arrested on 12.5.1990

during his interrogation in presence of the witnesses. Wrist watch recovered from the house of the appellant pursuant. to his disclosure statement, according to the prosecution, had been stolen from flat 3-A on the date of the occurrence and belonged to PW3, the mother of the F deceased. The recovery of the wrist watch has been established by the prosecution, through the evidence of PW29, PW24 and PW19. They have given a consistent version and have deposed that after the appellant was found hiding behind a stock of straw in his uncle's house and was arrested, he made a disclosure statement, during interrogation, and led to the recovery of a ladies 'Richo' wrist watch, with a golden metal band from a G rack in his house. The said watch, marked material Ex. 18, was seized by the police vide seizure memo Ex. 16 in presence of the witnesses who have testified to the seizure and the sealing of the wrist watch after its recovery at the spot. The prosecution has led evidence to show that the recovered watch Ex. 18 had been sold to PW3 by HM Watch Company on 21.2.1990 H

A for Rs. 350. Mohd. Fakruddin PW18, the sales man of the watch company proved the guarantee card Ex. 15 relating to the said wrist watch and stated r that the wrist watch Ex. 18 had been sold from their shop. The factum of the theft of the watch from the almiraha had come to the notice of PW3 during search on 6.3.1990 after the occurrence and the police was imme-

B diately apprised of the 1>ame in writing. Even though the communication to the police may be inadmissible in evidence, being hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C., there was no challenge to the testimony of PW3 that her 'Richo' wrist watch had been stolen on the date of the occurrence and that material object Ex. 18 was the same stolen wrist watch which had been recovered 1 at the instance of the appellant from his house. We do not find any c substance in the criticism levelled by Mr. Ganguli, to the effect that the absence of a cash memo or the cash register rendered the evidence of Fakruddin PW18 or PW3 doubtful. We have carefully perused the testimony of PW18 and do not find any blemish in the same. The non-seizure of the cash memo by the investigating agency cannot discredit the testimony

D of PW18 or PW3 and nothing has been brought to our notice from which any doubt can be cast on the testimony of PW18 regarding the sale of the watch to PW3. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses relating to the -\ disclosure statement of the appellant and the seizure of the wrist watch pursuant thereto from his house coupled with the testimony of PW18

0 Faruddin and the identification of the watch by PW3 conclusively connects 4,.~" E the appellant with the theft of the watch on the date of occurrence from the flat where the ghastly occurrence took place. The absence of any explanation, for possession of the wrist watch belongig to PW3, by the appellant is the circumstance which goes against the appeHant.

16. All the circumstances referred to above and relied upon by the ·~ prosecution have been conclusively established by the prosecution. They are specific and of a clinching nature and all of them irresistibly lead to conclusion that the appellant alone was guilty of committing rape of Hetal and s11bsequently murdering her. All the circumstances which have been

G conclusively established are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and are totally inconsistent with. his innocence. Not only in the cross-examination of various prosecution witnesses, but even during the arguments, nothing has been pointed. out as to why any of the witness ?- for the prosecution should have falsely implicated the appellant in such a heinous crime. None of the witnesses had any motive to falsely implicate H 'him. None had any enmity with him. The witnesses produced by the

DHANANJOY v. STATE OFW.B. (DR. ANAND, J.) 61

prosecution have withstood the test of cross-examination well and their A creditworthiness and reliability has not been demolished in any manner.

All the circumstances established by the prosecution, as discussed above, are conclusive. in nature and specific in details. They' are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant and totally inconsistent with his innocence. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the trial B court and the High Court that the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt and we, therefore, uphold his conviction for the offences under Sections 302. 376 and 380 IPC.

17. This now brings us to the question of sentence. The trial court awarded the sentence of death and the High Court confirmed the imposi- C tion of capital punishment for the offence under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Hetal Parekh. Learned counsel submitted that appellant was a married man of 27 years of age and there were no special reasons to award the sentence of death on him. Learned counsel submitted that keeping in view the legislative policy discernable from Section 235 (2) read with D Section 354(3) Cr.P.C., the Court may make the choice of not imposing the extreme penalty of death on the appellant and give him a chance to bec0me a reformed member of the society in keeping with the concern for the dignity of human life. Learned counsel for the State has on the other hand canvassed for confirmation of the sentence of death so that it serves as a deterrent to similar depraved minds. According to the learned State coun- E sel there were no mitigating circumstances, and the case was undoubtedly 'rarest of the rare' cases where the sentence of death alone would meet the ends of justice.

18. We have given our anxious consideration to the question of F sentence, keeping in view the changed legislative policy which is patent from Section 334(3) Cr.P.C. We have also considered the observations of this Court in Bachan Singh's case. 1980 Crl. Law Journal 636.

19. In recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts a subject of G concern. Today there are admitted disparities. Some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go unpunished, thereby encouraging the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility. Of course, it is not possible to lay H

A down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the society has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In imposing sentences, in the absence of specific legislation. Judges must consider variety of factors and after con-

B sidering all those factors and talcing an over-all view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be talcen into consideration.

20. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must C depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against .the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment fitting to the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence D of the crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.

21. The sordid episode of the security guard, whose sacred duty was to ensure the protection and welfare of the inhabitants of the flats in the apartments, should have subjected the deceased a resident of one of the flats, to gratify his lust and murder her in retaliation for his transfer on her complaint, malces the crime even more heinous. Keeping in view the medical evidence and the state in which the body of the deceased was found, it is obvious that a most heinous type or barbaric type and murder was committed on a helpless and defenceless school-going girl of 18 years.

If the security guards behave in this manner, who will guard the guards?

The faith of the society by such a barbaric act of the guard, gets totally shaken and its cry for justice becomes loud and clear. The offence was not only inhuman, and barbaric but it was a totally ruthless crime of rape followed by cold blooded murder and an affront to the human dignity of G the society. The savage nature of the crime has shocked our judicial conscience. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances whatsoever in the case. We agree that a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life is required to be kept in mind by the courts while considering the confirmation of the sentence of death but a cold blooded pre-planned H brutal murder, without any provocation, after committing rape on an

--c

DHANANJOY v. STATE OF W.B. [DR. ANAND, J.] 63

innocent and defenceless young girl of 18 years, by the security guard A certainly makes this case a "rare of the rarest" cases which calls for no punishment other then the capital punishment and we accordingly confirm the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The order of sentence imposed on the appellant by the courts below for offences under Sections 376 and 380 JPC are also confirmed alongwith the directions relating thereto as in the event of the execution of the appellant, those sentences would only remain of academic interest. This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

G.N.

Appeal failed.