GAURI SHANKAR GAUR AND ORS. ETC.

A v.

STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

AUGUST 12, 1993

[K. RAMASWAMY AND R.M. SAHA!, JJ.] B

U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishdd Adhiniyam, 1963:

Sections 23, 32 and 5~Schedule-Acquisition of land for Housing Scheme-Notifications for-Limitation of period prescribed under first C proviso to S.6(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894--Applicability of

Land Acquisition Ac!, 1894:

First provis'a to s.6(1)-Applicability to Acquisitions Proceedings under Sections 28 and 32 of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965.

Constitution of India, 1950:

Articles 245, 254(2)-Provi., o-'-Seventh Schedule-State List-Entries 5, 6 and 66 Concu"ent List:-Entry 42-Repugnancy between State Law and Central Law-Unless State Law is fully inconsistent and absolutely irrecon- E cilable it would not be co"ect to co71clude that repugnancy renders the State Law void.

U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Pailshad Adhiniyam, 1965 co-exist independently without colliding with Land Acquisition Act, 1894--Section 55 and Schedule of the 1965 Adhiniyam held not void.

Doctrine of Occupied field-t.Applicability of Doctrine on Pith and Substance-Applicability of

Articles 32 and 136.

Special .Leave Petition-Grant of leave confined to one point-Writ Petition filed subsequent to grant of leave-Tagging of-Same point involved in writ and appeals-Additional points raised in Writ Petitions-Power an.1 duty of Court to decide.

Article 142 ( 1)

A Supreme Court-Power to mould and restrict relief to parties.

Interpretation of Statutes.

Legislative intent-Dury of Court to give effect to-No provision of statute should be rendered otiose.

Statute-Legislation by Incorporation and Legislation by Referenc~Distinction between and effect of

Judicial Propriety and Comity:

C Bench hearing Appeals-Duty to respect order of earlier Bench granting

leave.

The U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad published Notilications in the Gazette on September 8, 15 and 22 of 1973 under section 28(1) of the Avi.s Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 proposing to ac<1uire 14 Acres of Land for a housing schen1e. Notices inviting objections under section 29 were served on the appellants ou September 20, 1973 and the objections were filed on October 28, 1973. The Committee after hearing objections rejected the same and recommended to the Governn1ent to approve the scheme.

The Government approved the scheme only to the extent of 11 acres 27 E ents and a Notification under section 32(1) was published in the Gazette on. August 27, 1977. Appeal preferred under section 32(2) before the Government was rejected. Thereafter the Housing Board issued Notices on : February 1, 1979 under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to take possession of the lands on expiry of 15 days thereafter.

F The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the acquisition proceedings before the High Court. Against the decision of High Court Special Leave Petition was preferred to this Court and while granting leave this Court restricted the appeal to the question whether the Limitation period of three years prescribed under first Proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition G Act, 1894 would apply to Notilication under Sections 32(i) and 28 (i) of the

U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965. In the connected writ petitions and appeals which were filed subsequently similar question arose for consideration.

For the appellants it was contended (i) that the 1965 Act adapted the H Land Ac<1uisition Act by reference and that, therefore, the first proviso to

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. 669

Section 6 as amended by Act 13 of 1967 gets attracted. J)eclaration under A Section 6 vis-a-vis notification under Section 32(1) not having been published within three years from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 28(1) of the Act (Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act) the notifications under ss.28(1) and 32(1) became void ab initio and the authorities were devoid of jurisdiction to proceed further; (ii) Section 55 of the 1965 Act and the Schedule must be so read as to apply Section 6 as amended from time to time and shall be applicable to the proceedings taken under Sections 28 and 32 of the 1965 Act; and (iii) by operation of proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution, Section 55 and the Schedule of the 1965 Act became inconsistent with the first proviso to Section 6(1)

of the Land Acquisition Act; the Amendment Act of 1967 and 1984 brought C on statute the first and second provisos into section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Act being earlier, Section 55 and Schedule became void, the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act would be applied and the declarations made beyond three years became void and inoperative.

D Disposing of the cases, this Court

HELD: (BY THE COURT)

The Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions are dismissed. But the appellants and petitioners sball be paid compensation on the market rate E prevalent in the year the declarations analogous to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued.

(Per K. Ramaswamy,!.)

1. The limitation of three years prescribed under the first proviso to F Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not attracted in its application to the State of U.P. vis-avis the procedure prescribed in paragraph 2 of the schedule to the U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, read with Section 55 of the Adhiniyam. [702-A]

Kadim Hussain v. State of U.P, AIR (1973) All 132; Riazuddin v. State of U.P., AIR (1973) All. 240; Satish Kumar Agarwal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., Civil Misc. Writ No. 1966 of 1979 decided on 6.7.79 by Allahabad High Court; Gawi Shankar v. State of U.P., W.P No.1247/76 decided on 13.

2.81 by Allahabad High Court; Doctors' Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, AIR (1984) All. 234; Abdul Wahab & Ors. v. State of H

A U.P:, W.P. No. 37/87 decided. on 9.8.88 by Allahabad High Court and Bhaiinda Improvement Tntst v. Ba/want Singh & Ors., (1991] 4 SCC 368,

referred to.

,,.

2. Sections 28 and 32 of the U.P. Avas Evam, Vikas Parishad Ad hiniyam, 1965 operate in their own sphere within the time specified there- B under as separate and complete code, while Section 4(1) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, mandate to follow the procedure prescribed thereunder within the period of limitation provided therein as general law.

[684-EJ

3. In case of legislation by incorporation, incorporated provisions C would become part and parcel of the later fresh statute as if it is written by pen in ink or printed bodily therein as part of the later statute and became an integral scheme of that Act. The legislature while incorporating them did not intend to speculate that any subsequent amendment to previous Act or its repeal would alter the textufe of thr later Act unless D the previous Act is supplemental to the later Act or both are in pmi matoia

in which case it would render the later Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual or by necessary intendment applies it. [691-E-F]

4. In case of legislation by incorporation the former Act becomes an integral part and parcel of the later Act, as if it was written with ink and E printed in the later Act. Its validity including the provisions incorporated thereunder would be judged with reference to the power of the legislature enacting the later Act. It is not by reference. Logically when provisions in the former Act are repealed or amended, they do not, unless expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, be deemed to be incorporated in

F it. The later act is totally unaffected by any amendment or repeal. It would be subject to the enumerated exceptions. The statute being distinct and different each is to be judged with reference to its own source that emerges from its scheme, language employed and the purpose it seeks to achieve.

(696-A-C]

Clarke v. Brad/augh, (1881) 8 QBD 63; In re Wood's Estate, (1886) 31 G Ch.D 607; Secretmy of State v. Hindustan Coop. Insurance Society Ltd., 58 Indian Appeals 259 =AIR (1931) P.C. l49; Ram Swantp v. Munshi & Ors.,

(1963] 3 SCR 875; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, [1976] I SCR 6; State of Krala v. Mis. Attessee (AIT C01poration), AIR (1989) SC 222 andMahendra ,~ Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India &Anr.; (1979] 2 SCR H 1038, referred to.

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. 671

5. If a later Act merely makes a reference to the earlier Act or existing A law, it is only by way of reference and an amendments repeals, new 'I.aw subsequently made \\ill have efl'ect unJess its operation is saved by S!!ctioi1 8(1) of the General Clauses Act or is void under Article 254 ot' the

Constitution. [696-D]

Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathalia Sampathu Cheey & Anr., [1962] 3 SCR 786; New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & 01:1., [1971] 2 SCR 92; Rajaya v. Gopikabai & Anr., [1978] 2 SCC 542; UjagarP1ints& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 488; Dr. Pratap Singh & Oh. v. Director of Enforcement, FERA & Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 72; Westem Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Developmel!t Authority, Korba & Anr., [1982] 2 SCR 1; Klishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya

v. Union of India, [1988] 1 SCC 356, Rajnath Kedia v. State of Bihar, AIR

(1975) SC 1389 and Bangalore Jute Factory Co. v. Inspector of Central Etcise, [1992] 1 sec 401, referred to.

Kallfhimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kera/a & 01>·., [1989] 4 D SCC 650; P. Vajravelu Mudarliarv. Sp/. Dy. Co/lect01; Madras &Anr., [1965] 1 SCR 614 and Om Prakash v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCC 356, held inapplicable.

6. Section 55 of the U.P. Avas and Vikas parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 E read with the Schedule made an express inoperation of the provision ol' Section 4(1) and Section 6 as modified and incorporated in the Schedule.

The Schedule effected necessary structural amendments to Sections 4, 6, 17 and 23 incorporating therein the procedure and principles with neces sary modifications. Sections 28(2) and 32(1) prescribed procedure for publication of the notifications under Sections 28(1} and 32(1) of the Act F without prescribing any limitation. The Act of 1965 is a complete code in itself. The Act is not wholly unworkable or ineffectual though may be incompatible with provisos to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

The U.P. Legislature did not visualise that later amendment to Central Act 1/1984 i.e. Land Acc1uisition Act would be automatically extended. There- G fore, Section 55 and the schedule adopted only by incorporation of Sections 4(1) and 6(1) and the subsequent amendments to Section did not become part of the Act and they have no effect on the 01ieration of the provisions of the Act. [696EF]

7. There is no force in the contention that Section 55 and the H

A schedule must be so read as tu apply Section 6 as amended from time tu time and shall be applicable to the proceedings taken under Sections 28 and 32 of the Act. By Statutory interpretation the court has no power to add words or interpret the words "as amended from time to time".

[696-G, 697-F]

B Yuri Mam v. 77ie Woron, (1927) Appeal Cases 906, referred to.

8. It is fallacuous to contend that Section 2 of U.P. Amendment Act 28 of 1972 amended Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act retrospectively and validated the invalid declaration under first proviso to Section 6(1) of C the Land Acquisition Act and by necessary implication the U.P. Legislature extended the first proviso to Section 6(1) to the acquisition under the Act, otherwise the State Amendment Act would be rendered otiose. Therefore, the first proviso to Section 6(1) and Sub Section (2) as amended by the U.P. Legislature should be harmoniously interpreted to apply first proviso to all the acquisition under the Act. Different local Acts applied the D provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, with different language. In U.P.

Urban Land Planning and Development Act, 1973, Section 17 thereof adopted by reference the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the land under that Act. It adopted not by incorporation therein. The declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the period 3 years. So to validate E those acquisitions, Amendment Act came to be made. [697-H; 698-A]

9. Even it .the law be invalid law, its incorporation becomes valid provided the legislature has competence to made the Law. It is not in dispute that the U.P. Legislature has legislative competence to make the Act. Instead of enacting separately, a separate procedure with necessary F modifications under Section 55 and the schedule applied the procedure provided under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act with modifications enacted thereunder. Since the Act is not an Act to acquire the land, the question of inconsistency does not arise and the proviso to Article 254(2) is not attracted. [699-CD]

Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement T111st Board v. H.

Narayanaiah etc. etc., [1977] 1 SCR 178; Special Land Acquisition Officer

City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore v. P. Govindan, [1977] 1 SCR 549; Farid Ahamed Abdul Samnad & Anr. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., AIR (1976) SC 2095 and Boiani Ore. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1975] 2 SCR 138, referred to.

G.S. GAUR.v. STATE OF U.P. 673

10. The Parliament may not expressly repeal the State Law and may A by necessary implication the State Law Stands repealed to the extent of the repugnancy, as soon as the subsequent law of the Parliament creating repugnancy is made. Such repugnancy may also arise where both the laws are operating in the same field and they cannot possibly stand together.

(700-BJ B

11. The U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 was made under Entry 6, Entry 5 and Entry 66 of the State list and incidentally it took recourse to Entry 42 of the Concurrent List. Presumptive evidence furnishes that the State Legislature would be aware of the Central law and appreciated the local needs and the remedy is provided for and would C make the law. Every endeavour should be made to allow both the laws to operate in their respective field. Unless State Law is fully inconsistent and absolutely irreconcilable it would not be correct to condude the repugnancy renders the State Law void. Since the main purpose of the Act is not the acquisition of the property as the provisions do indicate in pith and substance they do not occupy the same field. It is not fully inconsistent and D is not absolutely irreconcilable. Both do co-exist in relation to the procedure prescribed under the Acts. The Act does co-exist independently without in any way colliding with the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, Section 55 and the Schedule did not become void. (701-E-G)

Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi, AIR (1958) SC 682; Zaverbhai Amaidas

v. 1he State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 799; M. Kanmanidhi v. Union of India, [1979) 3 SCR 254 and T. Barai v. Remy Ah Hee and Anr., [1983) 1 SCR 905, referred to.

12. It is settled law that the court would make every endeavour to F give effect to the legislative intent, allowing full play of its operation by harmonious construction and no part of the provision of the statute would be rendered surplus or otiose. In construing a statute equity will not relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statnte and it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the legislative G intent. (686-C; 687-D)

Brandling v. Barrington, (1927) 6 B & C 467, referred to.

Intel]Jretation of Statute, Maxwell 12th Edn. page 236 and Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. Page 101, referred to.

H ·

13. When the jurisdiction of the this court was invoked under Article 32, this court though would normally deal with the points which arose for decision but writ petitions were admitted after the leave was granted and tagged them to the main case. Generally, if not invariably, it is desirable to maintain uniformity at the hearing of the point on which leave was B granted and any other point would not be permitted to be canvassed unless the point touches the jurisdiction or constitutional validity of the offending provisions. Exceptions should not become the rule and permitting to reopen several points which this court did not consider lit to be canvassed, would create uncertainty and inconsistency and would become a gamble and exceptions become the rule. To maintain this concomitant comity and C certainty court declined to permit counsel for the appellants or writ petitioners to raise other points for adjudication. (681-F-G]

(Per Sahai, !.)-(partly dissenting)

1. Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by a competent Legislature to a latter Act is an accepted device of legislation. If the adopting Act refers to certain provisions in an earlier existing Act it is known as Legislation by reference. Whereas if the provisions of another act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the Act then it is known as legislation by incorporation. Legal meaning of these expressions, therefore, E is no different than the literal meaning. But the consequences o( their application are far reaching. When an earlier Act is referred in a later act then any subsequent amendment, addition or alteration in the earlier Act, automatically becomes a part of it even for purpose of the later Act. But in a legislation by incorporation since the entire provision either wholly or F partly stands bodily engrafted, therefore, it stands frozen on the date of incorporation and remains unaffected by any subsequent or future amendment. When an Act is wholly or partly referred in another Act it has to be applied or acted upon in the form it exists. The natural consequence that flows from it is that any amendment or alteration in the adopted Act becomes operative even in the statute in which it is referred. (702-D-F, G] G

2. A legislation by incorporation is to write sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with pen or printed in it. Repeal of the provision of the earlier Act adopted or any amendment or alteration in it can have no effect on its operation in the adopting Act as having H become part of the news statute it rmains untouched by what happens in

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OFU.P. 675

the parent Act. One of the reasons to resort to such method of legislation A is to ensure uniformity. When such method of legislation is resorted to the legislature prefers to accept the interpretation and understanding of such an expression as given by the courts in respect of it in the earlier Act.

Legislation by incorporation brings into effect a new and independent legislation which remains unaffected by any change, or alteration or B amendment in the earlier Act, because the legislature, which adopts by incorporation the existing provisions of another law, cannot be assumed to intend to bind itself to all future amendments or modifications which may be made in the earlier law. (703-D; 704-A-B]

Madendra.and Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR (1979) C SC 798; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, (1976] l SCR 6; Smt.

Ujjain Bai y. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 SCR 778; Boiani Ores Ltd. v.

State of 01issa, (1975] 2 SCR 138; Westem Coal-fields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authmity, Ko1i1a & Anr., (1982] 2 SCR 1; Secretaiy of State v.

fiindustan Coop. Insurance Society Ltd., AIR (1931) PC 149; Farid Ahmed D Abdul Samad & Anr. v. T7ie Municipal C01poration of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., AIR (1976) SC 2095; Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trnst Board, Mysore v. P. Govindan, [1977] 1 SCR 549; State of Kera/a

v. Mis. Attessee, [1989] Suppl. 1 SCC 733; Bajaya v. Gopikabai & A11r.

[1978] 2 SCC 542; M/s. Bangalore Jute Facto1y Co. & Ors. v. Inspector of Central Excise & 01>., (1992] 1 SCC 401; Bhatinda Improvement Trnst v. E Ba/want Singh & 01>., (1991] 4 SCC 368; Re Wood's Estate Ex. parte, Works and Buildings Commrs. , (1886) 31 Ch. D 607; Clarke v. Bradilaugh, [1881]

8. QBD 63 and Sutherland, Statut01y Constntction; Corpus Juris Secundum, referred to.

3. The determination whether a legislation was by way of incorporation or reference is more a matter of construction by the courts keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose of referring or incorporating provisions of an existing Act and the effect of it on the day to day working. Reason for it is the courts' prime duty to assume that any law made by the Legislature is enacted to serve public interest. (706-B] G

4. The language of Section 55 of the U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 indicates that the legislature intended to take proceedings for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act except to the extent it has been amended by the Schedule. The notices issued under the H

A Act under different sections mentioned in it shall be substituted in place of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is not bringing into ·· effect a new legislation nor transposing provisions of Land Acquisition Act to the Avas Vikas Act by applying the Land Acquisition Act as modified to proceedings under the Act. [706-G; 707-B]

5. Language of section 55, apart, the courts have a duty to construe the provisions of a statute to advance the cause of justice and facilitate the day to day working of the statute to serve the public interest and achieve the objective of social betterment. Motivated by such principles the rigour of legislation by incorporation has been mitigated by carving out excep- C !ions to it. One of such situations where legislation by incorporation has been excluded is if it would create difficulty in day to day working. In our constitutional set up it can be extended further and the courts should lean against a construction which may result in discrimination. Suppose adjoining lands are acquired one by the State Government for constructing

D a road or canal or bridge and other by the Avas Vikas Parishad for constructing a building in public interest. The acquisition proceedings in either case is taken under the Land Acquisition Act. In one it is Land Acquisition Act simplicitor whereas in other as modified to the extent indicated in the schedule or appendix '<!f the Act adopting it. Wltere it is under the Land Acc1uisition Act the proceedings ltave to be completed E within three years whereas under other it may go on for ten years. Such

consequence can be avoided by construing the statutory provision in such a manner that it does not operate unjustly. A legislature should not be deemed to have intended that the State Legislature while providing for acquisition of land under tlte Land Acquisition Act opted to exclude F availability of any beneficial amendments in it. At least not by construction. Faulty implementation of a legislative provision by the executive should not pursuade the court to impute intention t_o the legislature to have intended to act unfairly. [708-B-F]

6. Reason for adding the proviso to Sections 6 itself was public G interest. The proviso was added for reducing the gap between notification under section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of tlte Land Acquisition Act to three years. The object was to ensure that land acquisition proceedings do not linger on for unduly long time. It would be unjust to exclude operation of tlte beneficent provision added for general betterment in H social interest, by resorting to rule of construction. The courts are obliged

G.S. GAUR v. STATEOFU.P. 677

to adopt a constructive approach while construing such provisions. In A absence of express exclusion it is more in cons(Jnance 'vith justice to hold that the restriction of three years added by the proviso to Section 6 applied to the Act. Any effort to demonstrate impossibility of completing proceedings within three years cannot be countenanced. Legislative intention cannot be frustrated by executive inaction. The acc1uisition proceedings thus came to end after expiry of three years from the date of issuance of notification under the Act analogous to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. [708-H; 709-D-E]

7. Even though the law is in favour of petitioners equity stands in their way since in pursuance of these proceedings the Avas Vikas Parishad C entered into possession and constructed housing colonies as there was no interim order in favour of land owners during pendencY. of the writ petitioners in the High Court. Therefore, the indiidual interest of the land owners is faced with public interest of those larged number of middle class persons who must have. invested their life's savings in purchasing these D houses and the demolition of houses which are standing over the land and rendering its occupants homeless shall result in incalculable less and injury. Larger social interest therefore requires this Conrt to mould the relief in such manner thatjnstice may not suffer. No flaw bas been found in the notifications issued for acquisition of land under Section 4 or publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The infirmity has arisen due to procedural delay. It is well established that delay destroys the remedy but not the right. The Avas Vikas Parishad could have acquired the land by issuing fresh notification. Therefore the equities can be adjusted by directing that the compensation to the land owners shall be paid by assuming that fresh proceedings for aCtJnisition nere taken in the year in which the declaration was published. [709-F-H; 710-A]

8. Though publication of declarations under the Act were beyond the period of three years it is not in interest of justice to quash the proceedings but the appellants shall be paid compensation of the land acquired on market value prevalent 1n the year in which the declaration analogous to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published/issued by fictionally assuming that fresh notification under the Act analogous to Section 4 was issued in that year. [710-H; 711-A]

9. The order granting leave was confined to facts of that case. It may H

A legitimately be argued that the Bench hearing the appeals not bound by the order granting leave as even though other aspects shall be deemed to have been heard and decided yet in absence of any decision or adjudication on merits it has no binding effect. Whether it is so or not need not be gone into in these petitions except observing that the implied rejection of an B order does not amount to deciding on merits but in propriety and comity it is just and proper that except in very rare cases where injustice is manifest the Bench hearing the matter finally is expected to respect the earlier order passed by the Bench granting leave. But that does not apply to the writ petitions which were merely tagged with special leave petitions.

In absence of any specific order it would not be fair to shut out the C petitioner who invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this court merely because one of the questions, may be the main one, being common the petitions were directed to be connected either at the instance of the Bar or the Benc_h. Once the petitions were admitted the court has an obligation to hear them or to settle the question of law and permit the petitioners to D seek their remedy on other issues in appropriate forum. (710-D-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 965 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.2.1981 of the Allahabad E High Court io Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1247 of 1979.

WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 3325/84, 2185-87/80, 2381/80, S.L.P. (C) Nos. 12352-53/84, 10572-74/84, 5026/85, 6400/82, 484/89, 11697/84, 11698/84, F 11699/84, W.P (C) Nos. 861-64/82, 2136-37/82, 2316-19/82, 6452- 53/82, 6493-95/82, 5214-17/83, 3539-40/83, 3551-53/83, I.A. Nos. 1-6/91 in W.P.

Nos. 6493-95/82.

K.N. Bhat, Satish Chandra, O.P. Rana, A.B. Rohtagi, Yogeshwar Prasad, R.P. Bhatt , S.R. Bhatt, N.R. Nath, L.M. Bhat, Ms. Kiran Aneja, G K.C. Jain, H.K. Puri, Satish Chandra, Dileep Tandon, J.M. Knanna, Dr.

B.S. Chauhan, Ms. Rachna Gupta, Vishwajeet Singh, R.B. Misra, P.N.

Gupta, P. Kesava Pillai, Vijay Kumar Verma, Raju Ramachandran, R.P.

Singh, Aruneshwar Gupta, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Grover, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Mukul Mudgal, Mrs. Sheela Geol, P.N. Puri, Shrish Kumar Mishra, U.S. Prasad, Kan1leshwar Sahai_, P.K. Bajaj, E.C. Agarwala, Atul H Sh<(rma, Ms. P. Bhat Kak, A.V. Palli, A.K. Srivastava and S.C. Birla for the

' '

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 679

apprearing parties.

The Judgments of the court were delivered by

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Special leave granted.

These 41 appeals and writ petitions raise common question of law B for decision. Therefore, they are disposed of together. As the facts in C.A.

No. 965/81 are sufficient to consider the controversy raised, the need to reiterate the facts in each case became redundant.

U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow, the second respondent framed Bhumi Vikas Evam Grahastham Yojana No. 1 Scheme for Rampur c

city to relieve the acute housing problems of that city and published the impugned notification in the Gazette on September 8, 15 and 22 of 1973 under s.28(1) of the Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (Act l of

1966) amended as on that date, for short 'the Act' proposing to acquire 14 acres of land situated in civil area at an estimated cost of Rs. 25.21 lacs. D Local publications too were made. Notices under s.29 inviting objections were served on the appellants and others on Sept. 20, 1973. On October 28, 1973 objections were filed. On July 31, 1976 notice was given of hearing objections on August 28, 1976 The Committee constituted in that behalf after hearing the objections; consideration thereof and rejection by proceedings dated Nov. 1, 1976, recommended to the Govt. to approve the Scheme. The Govt. on June 25, 1977 approved it to the extent of 11 acres 27 cents and the notification was published on August 27, 1977 in the gazette as required under s.32(1). Appeal under s.32(2) filed before the Govt. too was rejected on July 14, 1978. On its receipt the Board issued notices on Feb. l, 1979 under s.9 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for short, 'L.A. Act' to take possession of the lands on expiry of 15 days thereafter. The appellant questioned its legality under Art. 226 in the High Court. Similar notifications at different places were also subject matters of

writ petitions raising reverse contentions. In Kadim Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR (1973) All. 132, a Diviswn ocncn held that the first proviso of the L.A. Act did not restrict the right to issue notification under s.32( 4) of the G Act, nor should it be done within a period of three years of the notification under s. 28(1) of the Act. In Riazuddin v. State of U.P., AIR (1973) All. 240, the notification under s.32 did not contain adequately the identity and the particulars of the land sought to be acquired as required in ss.4 and 6 of the L.A. Act., when its validity was questioned. The Division Bench held that Ss.4 and 6 of L.A. Act had no application. In Satish Kumar Aga1Wal H

A & Ors. v. State of U.P. & 01s., Civil Misc. Writ No. 1966 of 1979 dt. July 6, 1979, another Division Bench consisting of K.N. Singh, .T., as he then was, and B.D. Agrawal, J., as he then was, negatived the contention that notification under s.32 was to be issued within three years from the date of the notification under s.28(1) and the first proviso to s.6 of the L.A. Act had no application. Reliance was placed on Riazuddin's case. When similar B question was again raised in Gawi Shankar v. State of U.P., Writ Petition

No. 1247 of 1976 dated 13.2.1981, a division bench consisting of Salish Chandra, C.J. And AN. Verma, .I. upheld the validity of the notification under s.32(1) independently considered the provisions of the Act and also followed Kadim Hussain's case an reiterated the same view. Similar cases C were dismissed which are subject matter of these appeals. When Doctor'

Gdh Ninnan Samiti Ltd. v. Avas Evam Vikas Padshad, AIR (1984) Allahabad 234, came up for consideration before another division bench, on reference, the full bench considered the question in extenso and held that the first proviso to s.6 of the L.A. Act is inapplicable to the proceedings under s.28(1) or 32(1) of the Act. When an appeal was filed, this court in D S.L.P. Nos. 92-94 of 1984 dated Nov. 13, 1984 upheld the full bench judgment and dismissed the petition. In Abdul Wahab & Ors. v. State of

U.P., Writ Petition No. 37 of 1987 dt. August 9, 1988, another division bench bellowing the full bench ratio held that s. llA of L.A. Act had no application and award need not be made within one year as per 1984 amendment Act. In S.L.P. No. 11310 of 1989, etc. another three judges E bench confirmed the decision and dismissed the S.L.P. on November 6,

1989. It would thus be clear that in interpreting the Act and the L.A. Act as incorporated therein a consistent and unbroken judicial flora has been nurturing in the State of U.P. that ss.4 and 6 of L.A. Act have no application to the proceedings under the Act and the bar of three years F prescribed in first proviso to s.G too does not apply. In this case while granting leave, by order dated March 13, 1981 this Court restricted the appeal to the question whether the limitation of three years prescribed in first proviso to s.6 of the L.A. Act would apply to the notification under ss.32(i) and 28(i) of the Act. Other cases and Writ Petitions filed, thereafter, were tagged with it.

The counsel appearing for the appellants addressed the arguments exhaustively. They placed reliance on Bhatinda Improvement Tmst v. Ba/- want Singh & On., [1991] A SCC 368, and other decisions and contended that the Act adapted the L.A. Act by reference and that, therefore, the first proviso to s.6 as amended by Act 13of1967 gets attracted. Declaration

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 681

under s.6 vis-a-vis notification under s.32(1) not having been published A within three years from the date of the publication of the notification under s.28(1) of the Act [s.4(1) of the L.A. Act], the notifications under ss. 28(1) & 32(i) became void ab initio, and the authorities are devoid of jurisdiction to proceed further. The High Court had not adequately dealt with the point. The contention of the respondents is that by operation of s.55 and the schedule appended to the Act the legislature incorporated ss.4(i) and 6(i) L.A. Act \\ith modification existing as on the date the Act had come into force. The subsequent amendments to the L.A. Act are inapplicable.

The legislature did not intend that any subsequent amendments made to the L.A. Act would protanto protando be applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Their main plank is the full bench decision. The State sought to justify the delay on the plea of inconvenience or impossibility of compliance within three years' limitation prescribed in the proviso to s.6 of L.A. Act, due to the procedure the Act had prescribed and so departure from the rigorous test of compliance of time Schedule was salvaged.

Though counsel for the appellants sought to argue other points or new contentions, to maintain comity and concomitant consistence, we restricted our consideration to the point on which this court granted leave.

It would be obvious that this court applied its mind to the other questions canvassed by the counsel and did not consider them fit to be decided and limited to the general question of law of public importance as to the. E applicability of the first proviso to s.6 of L.A. Act to the proceedings under the Act in the State 0f U.P. to lay down the law authoritatively. When the jurisdiction of this court was invoked under Art. 32, this court would normally deal v, ith the points arose for decision but writ petitions were admitted after the leave was granted and tagged them to the main case.

Generally, if not invariably, it is desirable to maintain uniformity,' 'at the F hearing of the point on which leave was granted and any other poi;.t would not be permitted to be canvassed unless the point touches the jurisdiction or constitutional validity of the offending provisions. Exceptions should not become the rule and permitting to reopen several points which this court did not consider fit to be canvassed, would create uncertainty and incon- G sistences and would become a gamble and exceptions become the rule. To maintain this concomitant comity and certainty we declined to permit counsel for the appellants or writ petitioners to raise other points for adjudication.

Whether limitation of three years prescribed under the first proviso H

A to s.6 of the L.A. Act would apply to the acquisit1ons under ss.28 and 32 of the Act is the crucial question. The object of the Act is the establishment, incorporation and functioning of a Housing and Development Board in U.P. to develop the land, construct the houses, acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract and do all things necessary for the proposes of the Act. (Preamble and s.4) to relieve housing shortage in B urban areas due to increased influx of the migrant rural population to towns and cities to take out their livelihood or for their betterment and consequent rapid increase of urban population. The Housing Board or the Improvement Trust, Development Boards have been constituted under the Act and other allied Acts to frame and execute housing and improvement C schemes in other projects; to coordinate housing activities and expeditious and effective implementation thereof, etc. (s.15) and to construct new houses under the planned development of towns and cities and if need be to acquire land and to execute the housing improvement schemes and other projects regulating building operations, improvement and clearance of slums to provide roads, electricity, sanitation, waler supply and other civic D amenities in the area to be developed. Section 17 provides that, notwithstanding anything containing in any other law for the time being in force and without prejudice to the provisions in Chapter III , a housing to improvement scheme may provide for all or any of the enumerated powers, one of which is to acquire by purchase or exchange otherwise of any property necessary for or effected by the execution of the scheme, etc.

E Section 18 of the Act specifies diverse types of housing improvement schemes which the Housing Board was authorised to frame. The parameters were laid down in ss. 19 of 27. Section 28(1) envisages that when any housing or improvement schemes have been framed, the Board shall prepare a notice specifying (a) the boundaries of the area comprised F in the scheme; (b) the dates, hours and place or places at which the map of the area covering the scheme and the particulars mentioned in clause

(b) of sub-s.(1) of s.28 are available; and (c) the date by which the objection to the scheme shall be invited. The procedure was prescribed under Sub-s(2) of it publication in the state Gazette two daily newspapers, one of which shall be a Hindi newspaper, and publication on the notice board G of local authorities within whose jurisdiction the area comprised in the scheme lies, etc. It shall be complied with within six weeks from the date of the publication of s.28(1) notification. The Board is enjoined to serve the notice in the prescribed form on such person or classes of persons and jn such manner as may be prescribed, of the proposed acquisition and the H particulars of the land comprised therein. Within 30 days from the date of

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 683

service of the notice or within such extended time by the Board for A sufficient reasons, the O\vner or persons having interest may file objections in writing to the Board against the scheme or against the proposed acquisition or levy. Under s.31 the Board on receipt of the objections, after giving an opportunity of being heard by the objectors and consideration thereof, within six months from the date of the receipt of such objections, may either abandon the scheme or if the estimated cost of scheme does not B exceed Rs. 20.00 lacs, sanction it with or scheme exceeds Rs.20.00 lacs, the Board should submit it to the State Govt. with such modifications, if any, as it may suggest, for sanction. The State Govt. having been empowered under s.31(3), has to either accord or refuse or modify the sanction or return the proposed scheme for reconsideration. The other details of C sub-s.(3) are not relevant. Under sub-s.(1) of s.32 whenever the Board or the State Govt. sanctions a scheme or improvement scheme, it shall be notified in the gazette. Under sub-s.(2) thereof the sa; ne shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly approved and sanctioned. Any person or local authority which had objected under s.30(3) of the scheme, being an aggrieved person, has been given right to file an appeal within 30 D days from the date of s.32(1) notification to the State Govt. whose decision thereon shall be final. If the scheme is altered or cancelled as a result of the appeal under sub-s.(3) it shallbe notified under s.32(4) in the gazette.

Sub-section (5) envisages that the scheme shall come into force from the date of the notification under sub-s.(1) if it had to be sanctioned by the State Govt. and in case of sanction by the Board and where no appeal was preferred under sub-s.(3) of s.32, on expiry of 30 days from the date of the notification under sub-s.(1); Where an appeal was preferred and the scheme was maintained with or without alteration, on .the date of the decision of the appeal and where more than one appeal is preferred, on the date of the decision of the appeal last decided.

The purpose of s.4(1) of the L.A. Act is well-known. Whenever it appears to the appropriate Govt. that the Land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to the effect shall be published in the official gazette, etc. The Collector is also required to cause public notice of the substance of such G notification to be given at prominent places in the said locality, 'Flrereupon it shall be required for any officer either generally or specifically authorised in this behalf by such Govt. and for his servants or workmen to enter upon and survey and take-levels of any land in such locality, to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is H

A adapted for such purpose. It is also enjoined upon the officers to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken for the intended work, if any, proposed thereon. The officer is also enjoined lo make such levels, boundaries and line, by placing marks and cutting the trenches etc. Under sub-s.(1) of s.6 declaration shall be made that the lands are needed for the B public purpose or for a corppany duly signed by the Govt. and the officers.

Different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(4). The first proviso postulates that on declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under s.4, under sub-s.(1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition C (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) before the commencement of the land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984 shall be made after expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification. Further provisos and explanation, etc. are not material, hence omitted. The publication of the declaration in the official gazette has been D envisaged under sub-s.(2). Under sub-s.(3) the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be and the appropriate Govt. would acquire the land in the manner laid down thereafter.

It would, thus, be seen that ss.28 and 32 operate in their own sphere E within the time specified thereunder as separate and complete code, while s.4(1) and s.6 of the earlier Act mandate to follow the procedure prescribed thereunder within the period of limitation provided therein as general law.

F Section 55 of the Act manifests the intendment of the legislature thus:

"55. Ppwer to acquire land. -

(l) Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions G of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1984), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for this pwpose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act.

(emphasis supplied)

H In the Schedule it has been provided thus:

G.S.GAUR v.STJ\TEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY,.!.] 685

"Modifications in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended in A its application to Utrar Pradesh (hereinafter called "the said Act")

*** *** ***

2. Effect of notices under this Act. - (1) The first publication, in the official Gazette, of notice of any housing or improvement B scheme under s.28 or under clause (a) of sub-s.(3) of s.31 of the Act shall be substituted for and have, in relation to any land proposed to be acquired under the scheme, the same effect as publication in the Official Gazette, and in the locality, of a notification under sub-s. ( 1) of s.4 of the said Act, except where a notification under s.4 of a declaration under s.6 of the said Act has C previously been made and is still in force, and the provisions of s.5-A of the said Act shall he inapplicable in the case of such land.

(2) The issue of a notice under clause ( c) of sub-s.(3) of s.23 of this Act in the case of land acquired under Bhavi Sarak Yujana D and the publication of a notification under subs. ( 1) or as the case may be under sub-s.(4} of s.32 of this Act in the case of land acquired under any other housing or iniproventent schenze under this Act shall be substituted for and have the same effect as a declaration by the State Govt. under s.6 of the said Act, unless a declaration under the last mentioned section has previously been made and is still in E force.

(3) Jn as case to which sub-Paragraph ( 1) or subparagraph (2) Applies, a notification under sub-s.(2) of s.33 or under sub-s.(3) of s.49 of this Act involving alteration of the extent of the land proposed to be acqitired shall have the effect of COITespondingly modifying the notification under sub-s.( I) of s.4 and the declaration under s.6 of the said Act, so, howeve1~ that any such modification shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the original notification or declaration.

G (emphasis supplied)

Paragraphs Nos. 3 amends s.17 of the L.A. Act by, substituting sub-s.(1) for sub-ss.(1) and (l-A) and omitting sub-s.( 4); adds a Paragraph 4 substitutes new s.17-A in L.A. Act providing for transfer of land lo Board; Paragraph 5 amends s. 23 of the L.A. Act by substituting the Explanation H

A to clause 'firstly' payment of 15% solatium on the market value.

Service of notices have been prescribed in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Forms and Manner of Service of Notice Rules, 1967, the details of which are not material for t.he purpose of this case, hence omitted.

Before adverting to the main question it is well to keep in mind at the forefront that in Uttar Pradesh the legislature wherever finds necessary adapted the L.A. Act either by reference or by incorporation in different Acts to suit its local needs and to remedy the alarming malady. So it made the Act and provided its own procedure to achieve the object of the Act. C It is settled law that the court would make every endeavour to give effect to the legislative intent, allowing full play of its operation by harmonious construction and no part of the provision of the statute would be rendered surplus of otiose.

In Maxwell on The !11te1pretatio11 of Statute, 12th Edition, at page 236 D it is stated thus:

"By "equitable construction", the judges have sometimes meant nothing more than construction in accordance with the intention of the legislature. "Within the equity", said Byles J., "means the same thing as 'within the mischier of the statute. In this sense, equitable construction is unobjectionable and is still common: in application of mischief rule, for instance; in a "beneficial" or broadly liberal approach to problems of interpretation; and in the practice of construing a statute in such a way as to prevent evasion of its 'terms.n

At page 237 it is stated that 'equity in interpretation of statute would not be tolerated today and it may be now considered altogether discarded in the construction of modern statutcs ......... .It was at one time asserted that a statute contrary to natural equity or reason (such as one which made a man G Judge in his own cause), or contrary to Magna Cmta, was void, for, it was said, jura nature sunt immutabilia, they are leges legwn, and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong.

Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, at page 101 in Chapter VI 'Construction where the meaning is not plain' in Part 4 'Construction by H the Equity of the Statute', at page 102 it is stated that,

G.S. GAUR v. STATEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 687

"in Brantiling v. Banington, [1927] 6 B. & C. 467 at 475, "that there A is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of the statute, and that it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the legislature might possibly have provided for other cases had their attention been directed to them: ...... .

Although the expression "equity of the statute" has long been out of use in the courts, we find that a somewhat similar principle of construction is sometimes acted npon, and that if it is manifest that

the principles of justice require something to be done which is not expressly provided for in an Act of Parliament, a court of justice C will take into consideration the spirit and meaning of the Act apart from the words; in other words, there is still, as Jessel M.R. said, in Re Bethlem Hospital, "such a thing as construing an Act according to its intent, though not according to its words".

It would thus be clear that in construing a statute equity will not D relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statute and it is the duty of the court to give effect to the legislative intent. We have to advert, therefore, to the main question, whether the Act adapted ss.4 to 6 of the L.A. Act is by incorporation or by reference.

In Clarke v. Bradlaugh, [1881] 8 Q.B.D. 63.at p.69, Brett, L.J. laid the rule of incorporation thus:

11thre is a rule of construction that, where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute F by a third statute does not affect the second."

This was reiterated by Lord Esher, M.R., dealing with the legislation by incorporation, in In re Wood's Estate, (1886)31 Ch.D. 607 at 615, thus:

"If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the G clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has been held, is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written with pen, in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Mu~ H

A In Secretmy of State v. Hindustan Co-op. Insurance Society Ltd., 58 Indian Appeals 259 = AIR (1931) P.C. 1.49, the Judicial Committee was to consider whether Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911 which in express terms modified partly the body of the L.A. Act or partly in the schedule attached to it. Therein, s.26(2) of the Act empowered to con- B stitute a "Tribunal" in the place of the 'Court' under the L.A. Act consisting of a President with the judicial experience and two lay officers. The question was whether an appeal would lie lo the Privy Council against the decision of the Division Bench. It was contended that s.54 of the L.A. Act must be read into local Act and every award of the Tribunal must be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of the C.P.C. Dealing with that C question the Board, held that it is an accepted rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second. The independent existence of the two Acts, viz. Land Acquisition Act and Calcutta Improvement Act, is, therefore, recognised; despite the death of the parent Act, its D off spr.ing survives in the incorporating Act. Though no such saving clause appears in General Clauses Act, the principle involved is still applicable.

Where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it at all events if is is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually E without the addition. Accordingly it was held that an appeal would not lie to the Privy Council. This court approved and followed the above ratio in cantena of cases.

In Ram Swa1Up v. Munshi & Ors., [1963] 3 SCR 875, a Constitution Bench of this Court was lo consider whether the repeal of Punjab Alienation of land Act 1900 has only affect on the continued operation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. It was held that, "we are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that neither the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, nor the consequential removal of the fetters imposed by ss.14 and 23 have the effect of rendering the substantive provision contained in s.15 not G available to those who satisfy its terms" Sections 15 and 3(1) of the

Pre-emption Act incorporated "agricultural land" as defined in Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, as amended by Act 1of1907, without giving any right of mortgage, whether usufructury or not, in such a land. The

Punjab Alienation of Land Act was repealed later on. The contention raised was that the Punjab Alienation of Land Act was applied only by

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [RAMASWAMYJ.] 689

reference, and not by incorporation. The repeal of the Punjab Alienation A of Land Act of 11)00 had, therefore, effected the continued operation of the Pre-emption Acl. While negating the contention it was held that and the expression 'agricultural land' in the late Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it'' and it was by incorporation.

Jn Boiani Ores Ltd. v. State of Olissa, [1975] 2 SCR 138, Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 adapted the definition of 'Motor Vehicles' contained in Motor Vehicles Act, 1914. Subsequenlly it was amended in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Unamended definition of Motor Vehicles Act, 1914 remained

c in the Orissa Act The constitutionality of that Act was challenged contending that the Centrnl Act was applied by reference to Motor Vehicles registered under the Central Act for the purpose of State Ta'<ation Acts.

This court held that the intention of the Parliament for modifying the Motor Vehicles Act has no relevance in determining the intention of the state legislature in enacting a Taxation Act. ll is possible for both the Acts D to co-exist, even if the definition of Motor Vehicles Act has been amended in the Central Act. It is, therefore, clear that the definition of Motor Vehicles Act as existing prior to 1937 amendment would alone be applicable as having been incorporated in the Ti.xation Act. The constitutional validity of the said Act was accordingly upheld.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. 1\1. V. Narasimhan, [ 1976] 1 SCR 6, the question was whether the definition of 'public servant' in clause 12 of s.21 l.P.C. would be applicable to a public servant prosecuted under Prevention

of Corruption A.ct, 1947. The contention was that the definition not having been incorporated in the P.C. Act, the public servant under P.C. Act was p not liable to prosecution of corruption under P.C. Act. Dealing with the doctrine of incorporation by reference this Court considered the scope and reiterated the ratio in Hindustan Cop-op. Insurance Society's case holding thus:

"their Lordships of the Privy Council made it clear that this G principle would not apply where a subsequent Act is rendered unworkable or is not able to function effectively." On a consideration of the authorities laid down the following exceptions :

(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are sup- H

plemcntal to each other;

(b) where the two Acts are in pmi materia;

(cJ where.the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

( d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly of by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. It was held in that case that exception 'c' and 'd' would get attracted to the facts of that case and corporation employee was a. public servant and the l.P.C. amendment by implication supplement the definition of public servant in P.C. Act.

Otherwise P.C. Act becomes wholly unworkable and inefficient."

The same view was reiterated by this court in State of Kera/a v. Mis.

D Attessec (AIT Cmporation), AIR (1989) SC 222 at 226. In Fmid Ahmed Abdul Samnad & Anr. v. Municipal Cmporation of tlie City of Ahemdabad

& Anr. AIR (1976) SC 2095, the question was, whether s.5A of the Land Acquisition Act was incorporated and personal hearing was mandatory.

While considering the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation E Act, the scheme envisaged therein, this Court held thus:

"Section 284N referentially incorporated in the Bombay Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as detailed in Appendix I to the Bombay Act. Out of those provisions we are only concerned with part II (Acquisition) of the Land Acquisition Act containing ss.4 to 17 including s.5A. According to Appendix l all the sections in Part II of the Land Acquisition Act except subs.(1) of s.4, s.6 and sub-s. (2) of s.17 are bodily incorporated in the Bombay Act.

Those provisions are deemed to be part and parcel of the Bombay Act in terms of Appendix l"

In Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., [1979] 2 SCR 1038, the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 by s.55 thereof incorporated the grounds specified in s.100 of the C.P.C., 1907 as its part to file second appeal against the order made by the Commission.

It was contended that s.1.00 as amended in 1976 Amendment Act would H apply, as the Commission was empowered to amend or revoke at any time

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 691

in the manner in which it was made in s.13(2). The substantial question of A Law' envisaged was whether Amended s.100 C.P.C. would be applicable?

This court held that the three ground in unamended s.100 were before the legislature when that Act was made and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended B to restrict the right of appeal. The legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in s.100 without knowing what those grounds were.

The grounds specified in s.100 might be changed from time to time baving regard to legislative policy relating to second appeals and it is difficult to see any valid reason why the legislature should have though it necessary C that these changes should also be reflected in s.55 which deals with the right of appeal in a totally different context. We fail to appreciate what relevance the legislative policy in regard to second appeals has the right of appeal under s.55 so that s.55 should be inseparably linked or yoked to s.100 and whatever changes take place in s.100 must be automatically read into s.55".

It would thus be clear thal in case of legislation by incorporation; incorporated provisions would become part and parcel of the later fresh statute as if it is written by pen in ink or printed bodily therein as part of the later statute and became an integral scheme of that Act. The legislature while incorporating them did not intend to speculate that any subsequent amendment to the previous Act or its repeal would alter the texture of the later Act unless the Previous Act is supplemental to the later Act or both are in pwi mate1ia in which case it would render the later Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual or by necessary intendment applies it.

Let us then proceed to consider the cases on reference. In Collector

of Customs, Madras v. Nathe/la Sampathu Chcey & Anr., [1962] 3 SCR 786, s.23A of the Foreign Exchange 'Regulation Act as amended in 1952 provided that the restriction imposed in s.8 thereto shall be deemed to have been imposed under s.19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and all lhe G provisions of the Act shall have effect accordingly. A contention was raised that the Sea Customs Act was incorporated and that, therefore, the procedure therein alone would be followed. Their constitutional validity was also assailed. This court held that there is a "distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and H

A n1aking il part of another st) n1uch so the repeal of the former leaves q1e later wholly untouched. Considering the provisions of s.19 of Sea Customs Act, s.8 of General Clause Act and s.23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act this Court held that adaptation is only by way of reference and no! by incorporation and the repeal of the Sea Customs Act had no

eonseqµence. The order of confiscation and detention orders were upheld.

In New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v.Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad & 01'"., [1971.J 2 SCR 92, the appellant was a manufacturer of chemicals which included Amonia. The Asstl. Collector, Central Excise issued warrant to search and seize certain goods and document from the C appellant's premises on the pica that the appellant was evading excise duty

on Amonia. The jurisdiction of the officer under the offending action was questioned by way of writ petition on the ground that Sea Customs Act,

1875 having been repealed whether Central Gm1. by operation of s . .12 was empowered lo apply s.105 of Customs Act and the authority has power to take action. 11 was also contended that s.12 of the Central Excise and Salt D Act 1944 was void. In considering the questions, this court angulated the distinction between incorporation and reference of the Sea Customs Act into the later Act. Applying s.8(1) of the General Clauses Act, this court held that s.12 delegated limited power to Central Gov1. to draw upon the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and were not mean! to be incorporated E in the Act. They are only to be applicable to tbc extent modified by the

Central Govt. for the purpose of excise duty lcviable under s.3.

In Land Acquisition Office1; City Improvement Tmst Board v. H.

Narayanaialz, etc. etc., jl977J 1 SCR 178, s.27 of the city of Bangalore Improvement Act, .1945 .enables the officer to apply the procedure in the Land Acquisition Act to the acquisition therein except to the extent the Bangalore Act provided different procedure. It was contended that L.A.

Act was applicable by incorporation. Considering the scope and purpose of this Act, this court held it to he by reference and applied s.23 of the Land Acquisition Act to determine the market value. In Special Land Acquisition Officer City l111proven1ent Tnlst Board, Mysore v. P. Govindan, [1977) l SCR 549, a full Bench of the Mysore High Court held that the date of the determination of the compensation under s.23(1.) of the L.A.

Act was the date of the notification under s.18 of the local Act which corresponds to s.6 of the declaration of the Land Acquisition Act. This H court held that s.23 of the Mysore Act provided that compensation fpr f

G.S.GAUR v. STATEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY.J.) 693

acquisition shall be governed by the Land Acquisition Act as they exist on A the date of a particular acquisition proceedings "except to the extent to which a different procedure is expressly laid down in the Mysore Act". No such different procedure was provided therein. In the background it was held that the L.A. Act was applied only by reference and to determine the market value was the date of the notification under s.16 of the Mysore Act, corresponding to s.4(i) of L.A. Act. At this stage it is relevant to notice B

that this court laid emphasis that s.23 of the Mysore Act declared that "the general procedure provided in the Land Acquisition Act will apply except to the extent it was inapplicable. That would mean that "amendment of the procedure in the Acquisition Act will apply if it is capable of application".

The emphasis laid by the counsel was tha~ "the departure from the generally accepted procedure which regulates acquisition and compensation for it has to be something more explicit, express and substantial than mere date

of the enactment of the Mysore Act". The emphasis pointed out must be considered in the light of the language used in that Act. The U.P. Act expressly incorporated certain provisions in the Schedule, as seen earlier, D by operation of s.55 as integral scheme. Therefore, incorporation to that extent was specific, unambigious and explicit.

Bajaya V. Gopikabai & Am:, [1978] 2 sec 542, is also a case in which s.151 Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 provided applicability of the Hindu Persona] La\v

11for the ti1nc heing in forcc 11 and the interest of

Lhc tenure holder shall

11on his death passed on by inherencc, survivorship or bequest, as the case may be ''. Prior to the Hindu Succession Act 1956 came into force a Hindu female under \1itakshara law had only limited estate which right alone the female would get under personal law and the Hindu Succession Act 1956 \Vas inapplicable, \Vas the contention. This court negatived the contention and held that the code, applied

11personal lavi 1 by reference. Therefore, succession \Vas controlled by the law in operation as on the date of the death by which date the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force.

In Ujagar P1ints & Ors. v. Union of lndia & Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 488, the constitution bench of this Court held that the facts in that case fell in the exceptions carved out in Narsbnhun's case. The levy and excise duty on textiles was upheld. In Dr. Pratap Singh & On. v. Director of Enforcement, FERA & Ors. , [ 1985] 3 SCC 72, the question was whether the provisions

of s.165 of Crl. P.C., were made applicable to s.37 of the Foreign Exchange H

A Regulation Act, 1973 by reference or hy incorporation. Jt 'vas cuntendeJ that it \Vas not by reference an<l that there \Vas no po\vcr under the Act to search and seize the property. Accordingly the search and seizure were invalid. Repelling that contention this court reiterted that the language ''as far as practicable used in s.37" would indicate that it is only by reference

B and not by incorporation.

In Weste111 Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Dei'elopment Authmity, Korba & Anr., f 1982J 2 SCR l, the facts were that Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act empowered the Municipal Council to impose property tax. Similarly the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 also provided power to C levy property tax. Sections 127, 127A and 129 of the Municipalities Act and s.132 of the Municipal Corporation Act provide the power and procedure to impose property tax. In '1973, the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (23 of 1973) Act was made. Section 16 thereof conferred power on the Development Authorities to levy property tax. Subsequently, D it was amended in 1976 by Act 6 of 1976. Section 69( d) incorporated the provisions of Municipalities Act and Municipal Corporation Act in the 1973 Act to regulate the procedure to levy property tax. It was contended that the subsequent amendment of 1976 was. not applicable. In that behalf relying upon Hindustan Co-op. Insurance societies Ltd. 's case this court held that if an earlier legislation is incorporated into the later leb>islation, E the procedure of previous Act which are incorporated into the later Act, became a part and parcel of the latter Act. Therefore amendments made in the earlier law after the repeal of previous Act cannot by their own force be merged with the later law.

F ln Bangalore Jute Fact01y Co. v. Inspector of Central Excise, [1992] 1 SCC 401, this court considered the inter-play of rule 3 of the Jute Cess Ruic and amended rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules and exigibility of excise duty on jute yarn manufactured by the appellant. lt was held that rule 3 of the jute cess rule provided that the Central Excises Act and the rule, shall, so far as may be, applied in relation to levy and G collection of cess on jute manufactures under that Act. Therefore, it was held that it is only by reference. In Bhatinda lmprovemcnt Tmst's case s.59(b) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1992 provided that the Land Acquisition Act may be subject to further modification as indicated in the schedule to the said Act. Schedule II (Clause I) provided the procedure H for publication of the notification under s.36 as provided under sub-s.(1)

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [RAMASWAMY.J.] 695

of s.4 and suh-s.(l) of s:6 of L.A. Act except where a declaration under A sub-s.( 4) of s.6 of the said Act previously made and is in force. It was contended that it was by incorporation and not by reference. This court held that it was by way of reference and not by incorporation and the proviso to s.6 would apply and if the declaration was not made within three years from the date of s.36(4)(1) notification, the notification under s.36(4) B

(1) of the Land Improvement Trust Act shall stand lapsed. We are informed that the same bench directed these appeals to be heard later, though were posted together and obviously the bench was not inclined to apply the above ratio and intended to consider these appeals in the setting of the Act.

The ratio in Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [1989] 4 SCC 650, has no application. Both the Kcrala and the Central Act 68/1984 operate in the same field. Therefore, it was held that after I he amendment Act by operation of Act 254 the Kera la Land Aeq uisition Act would stand repealed. The ratio in P. Vajravdu Muda/iar v. SjJecial Dy, Collector, Madras & Anr., [1965] 1 SCR 614, has no application since the vires of the Act has not been questioned. The ratio in Om Prakash v. Union of India, [1988] 1 SCC 356, has no relevance. Therein the question was whether the Governor of Delhi is the Central Govt. for the purpose of s.15 of Delhi Development Act to acquire the land. Considering the definition

of the Central Govt. it was hekl that appropriate Govt. would mean the Lt.

Governor. [n Klis/ma Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India, [1988] I SCC 356, the contention was that the Bihar Mines and Minerals Rules, 1964 having been declared ultra vires in Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihm, AIR (1975) SC 1389, which Parliament validated it with retrospective effect, whether it was by reference and whether the validation Act was ultra vires as the vice was not cured. In that setting this court held that the parliament I cgislated for itself and statutorily adapted itself the second proviso to s.l 0 of the Bihar Act which was otherwise ultra vires of sub-rule G

(2) of rule 20. It was further contended that if the technique adopted by reference or incorporated legislation which was insufficient in la\V, cannot be validated. The court held that there is force in the submission. Taking a view of the circumstances of I he Validation Act the Parliament did more than simply validating an invalid law passed by the Bihar legislature, hut did re-enact \vith retrospective effect of its O\Vn right amending Central Act.

A It would thus be clear lhal in case of legislation by incorporation the former Acl becomes an integral part and parcel of the later Act, as if it was written with ink and printed in the later Act. Its validity including the provisions incorporated thereunder would be judged with reference to the power of the legislature enacting the later Act. It is not by reference.

B Logically when provisions in the former Act are repealed or amended, they do not, unless expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, be deemed to be incorporated in it. The later Act is totally unaffected by any amendment or repeal. It would be subject to the exceptions enumerated hereinbcfore. The statute being distinct and different each is to be judged with reference t-0 its O\Vn source that emerges from its scheme, language C employed and purpose it seeks to achieve.

If later Act merely makes a reference to the earlier Act or existing law, it is only by way of reference and all amendments, repeals, new law subsequently made will have effect unless its operation is saved by s.8(1) D of the General Clauses Act or-is void under Art.254 of the Constitution.

Section 55 of the Act read with the schedule made an express. incorporation of the provisions of s.4(1) and s.6 as modified and incorporated in the schedule. The schedule affected necessary structural amendments to ss.4, 6, 17 and 23 incorporating therein the procedure and E principles with necessary modifications. Sections 28(2) & 32(1) prescribed procedure for publication of the notifications under ss.28(1) and 32(2) of the Act without prescribing any limitation. It is a complete code in itself.

The Act is not wholly unworkable or ineffectual, though be incampatable with provisos to s.6(1) of L.A. Act. The U.P. Legislature did not visualise F that later amendment lo Central Act 1/1894 i.e. L.A. Act would be automatically extended. We have, therefore, no hesitation to conclude that s.55 and the schedule adapted only by incorporation ss.4(1) and 6(1) and the subsequent amendments to s.6 did not become part of the Act and they have no effect on the operation of the provisions of the Act.

G It is next contended that s.55 and the schedule must be so read as to aflply s.6 as amended from time to time and shall be applicable to the proceedings taken under ss.28 and 32 of the Act. We find no force in the contention. In Ywi Mam v. The Woron, 1927 Appeal Cases 906, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 limited the jurisdiction of the High H Court of England as Colonial. Admirality court established under the Act

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. [RAMASWAMY.J.j

"as if existed at the passing of the Acf'. When suil for damages againsl charter party \Va~ laid in the Exchaquer Court of ('.anada, vvhich was established under the Admiralty Act, 1906, it was contended that it had ceased having jurisdiction for the action for damages for breach of charter party; the defendant being domiciled in London and the cause of action not having been arisen within the limits of Exchequer Court of Canada, and the ship having been within the limits of the High Court of England it had jurisdiction as if the Act has been amended from time to time excluding the colonial jurisdiction of Canada Court. Therefore, the Exchequer court of Canada had no jurisdiction to try the case. The Privy Council negatived the contention and held that the High Court of England had jurisdiction only as available at the time when the Act was made. The appellant's claim that these words can be understood as applying to conditions which are to come into being upon and after passing of the Act and

they offer in effect to make the nwaning clear by reading into the sentence before the words

1'existing 1 \ the \\"ords

11 from time to time.

11 The judicial committee negatived the contention and held that," the admiralty jurisdic- D tion of the High Court of England as then existing would not apply in the following words:-

''On the whole, the true intent of the Act appears to theii; L0rdships to have been to define as a maximum of jurisdictional -aut)lority for the courts to be set up there under, the Admiralty jurisdiction E of the High Court in England as it existed at the time when the Act passed. What shall from time to time be added or excluded is left for independent legislative determination."

It is, therefore, clear that by statutory interpretation the court has no F power to add words or interpret the \\'ords

11as amended form time to time''.

Sri Salish Chandra then contended that s.2 of U.P. Amendment Act 28 of 1972 amended s.6 of the Land Acquisition Act retrospectively aod validated the invalid declaration under first proviso to s.6(1) of the L.A.

Ac; t. By necesSary implication the U.P. legislature extended the first proviso G to s.6(1) to the acquisition under the Act, otherwise the State Amendment Act would be rendered otiose. The first proviso to s.6(1) and subs.(2) as amended by the U.P. Legislature should be harmoniously interpreted to apply first proviso lo all the acquisition under the Act. P1imu facit the argument though attractive, by deeper porbe, we find it to be fallacious. It H

A is seen that different local Acts applied the provisions of the L.A. Act, with

different language. In TJ.P. Urban Land Planning and Development Act, 1973, s.17 thereof adopted by reference the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the Land under that Act. It adapted not by incorporation therein. The declaration under s.6 was made beyond the period of 3 years.

B So to validate those acquisitions. Amendment Act came to be made.

It is next contended that by operation of proviso lo Art. 254(2) of the Constitution s.55 and the schedule became inconsistent with the first proviso lo s.6(1) of the L.A. Act. The Act received the assent of the President. The Amendment Act of 1967 and 1984 brought on statute the C first and second provisos inlo s.6(1) of the L.A. Act. The Act being earlier s.55 and the schedule became void, the first proviso lo s.6(1) of L.A. Act would be applied and the declarations made beyond t!Hec years became void and inoperative. We find no force in the contention. ll is seen that the purpose of the Act is not acquisition simplicitor. It is only to constitute or D incorporate Housing Board or its branches to regulate planned dcvelopmenl of the Urban area. Power has been given lo the Board to frame the schemes and if necessary to acquire the land by agreement with the persons having interests in the land or by exchange or otherwise. Therefore, compulsory acquisition is only incidental to the main purpose. It is seen that in Narayanaiah and Govindan cases this court emphasised that the Improve- E ment Trust Act has provided a special procedure for improvement of the city of Bangalore and urban areas. There is no express incorporation in those Acts of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, by reference they were made applicable. In Ahmad's case this court in similar circumstances held that it is only by incorporation and purpose of the acquisition of land is F incidental. 111 Boiani Ores Ltd. 's case we have already seen that this Court held that the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was to regulate the motor vehicles and that the incorporation of Motor Vehicles defined under the Motor V chicles Acl, 1939 was as the part of the Taxation Act.

It,; constitutional validity was accordingly upheld.

G In Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi, AIR (1958) SC 682, the Constitution Bench of this court was to consider the constitutionality of the notification extending Bengal Finance Sales-tax Act, 1941 to Delhi State Part 'C'. Wh 0 n its constitutional validity under Art. 246 was challenged, the Constitution Bench held that the result of lhe notification issued under s.2 of Part 'C' H of State Laws Act enacted by Parliament was that provisions of the Jaw was

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 699

extended became incorporated by reference in the Act itself and, therefore, A a tax thereunder was imposed by the Parliament. Even if it is a invalid law, in paragraph 10, it was held that the impugned provisions by way of modification of the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, does not purport to modify the Bengal Act but merely extends the whole of it by way of mistaken notion that it is all valid. But that does not affect the position.

The notification intended that all the provisions of the Bengal Finance Sales-tax Act, 1941 should operate in the State of Delhi and if that may be effected by recourse being had to any of the powers of the legislature, that should be done and the legislation upheld as referable to that power Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Accordingly even if the law be invalid law,

c its incorporation becomes valid provided the legiolature has competence to make the law.)t is not in dispute that the U.P. Legislature has legislative competence to make the Act. Instead of enacting separately, a separate procedure with necessary modifications under s.55 and the schedule applied the procedure provided under ss.4 and 6 of the L.A. Act with modifications enacted thereunder. Since the Act is not an Act to acquire D the land, the question of inconsistency does not arise and the proviso to Art. 254(2) is not attracted.

There is no doubt or difficulty as to applicability of the law under Art. 254 of the Constitution. As to what would happen in a case of conflict between a Central and State Law, occupying the same field enumerated in E the concurrent list Article 254 was enacted to solve that conflict. Art. 254(1) envisages the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between the law made by the Union and the State Legislature in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter if the law relating to .the concurrent subject made by the State Legislature is repealed by Union Law, whether Union Law is prior or later in point of time, the Union Law will prevail F and the State Law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. An exception has been engrafted to this rule by Cl.2 thereof, namely, if the state law has been reserved for consideration and the President gives assent to a State Law, it will prevail, notwithstanding it repugnance to a earlier law made by the Union, though both laws are dealing with concurrent subject occupying the same field but operate in a collision course, The G assent obtained from the President of the State Act which is inconsistent with the Union Law prevails in that State and overrides the provisions of the Union Law in its application to that State only. However, if the Parliament, in exercising its power under proviso to Art. 254(2) makes a

A law adding, amending or repealing the union law, predominance secured by the Stale Law by the assent of the President is taken away and the repugnant Slate Law though it became valid by virtue of President's assent, would be void either directly of by its repugnance with respect to the same matter. The Parliament may not expressly repeal the State Law and may by necessary implication the State Law stands repealed to the extent of the B repugnancy, as soon as the subsequent law of the Parliament creating

repub'Ilaney is made. Such repugnancy may also arise where both the laws are operating in the same fie!<! and they cannot possibly stand together.

This is the consistent law laid by this Court. In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The Stale of Bombay, [ 1955] 1 SCR 799, the Bombay Act and Essential Supplies C (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 as amended in 45 and 49 void under proviso to Art. 254(2) of the Constitution occupied same field and State law imposes higher punishment for the same offence and so State Law is repugnant to the Central Act. It was, therefore, held that the Central Law will prevail over the State Law and State Law is void. Jn M. Kanmanidhi

v. Union of lndia [1979] 3 SCR 254, another Constitution Bench surveyed D the case Jaw when Tamilnadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act was challenged a.s being repugnant to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1.898, Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and laid down the lest thus: (1) where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely ineconcilable,, the Central Act will (emphasis supplied) prevail E and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy; (2) where, however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in F accordance with Cl. (2) of Art. 254; (3) Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the 'Concurrent List is inconsistent with or repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Art. 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail G in the State and over-rule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any tiipe make a law adding to, or amending, varying of repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Art.

254. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with or repugnant to a H

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF \J.P .. [RAMASWAMY, J.] 701

previous law made by the Parliament, then such a law can be protected by A obtaining the assent of the President under Art. 254(2) of the Constitution.

The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and over-rule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a State of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying of repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Art. 254; In that case it was held that part of the provisions were not repugnant in their application to the public men in Tamilnadu but are void to the extent of public servants. T. Barai v. Hemy Ah Hoe and Anr.,[1983] 1 SCR 905, is a case where s.16(l)(a) of the

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in the Concurrent List prescribes a punishment of six years and fine. The West Bengal State Legislature amended it by West Bengal Amendment Act, 1973 and prescribed a punishment of imprisonment for life for the self same offence under s.16(1) of the Act. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was amended by Parliamenl in 1976. The question arose whether by operation

of proviso lo Arl. 254(2) the Stale Law is void. Since the Central Amend- D rnent Act, 1976 occupies the same field imposing lesser punishment, the previous State Law imposing punishment of imprisonment for life, though received the assent of the President was held to be void.

It is seen that the Act was made under Entry 6, Entry 5 and Entry 66 of the State List and incidentally it took recourse to Entry 42 of the E Concurrent List. Presumptive evidence furnishes that the State Legislature would be aware of the Central law and appreciated the local needs and the remedy is provided for and would make the law. Every endeavour should be made to allow both the laws to operate in their respective field.

Unless State Law is fully in consistent and absolutely irreconcilable it p would not be correct conclude that repugnancy renders the State Law void.

Since the main purpose of the Act is not the acquisition of the property as the provisions do indicate in pith and substance that they do not occupy the same field. It is not fully inconsistent and are not absolutely irreconcilable. Both do co-exist in relation to the proce; lure prescribed under the Acts. The Act does co-exist independently without in any way colliding with G the L.A. Therefore, s.55 and the Schedule did not become void.

Thus considered, we hold that the view of the full bench is perfectly legal and already was upheld by this Court. The limitation of three years prescribed under the first proviso to s.6 of the L.A. Act is not attraded in H

A its application lo the State of U.P. vis-a-vis the procedure prescribed in paragraph 2 of the schedule to the Act read with s.55 of the Act. We would reiterate that the State bad undertaken, before the full bench, to properly compensate the land owners for the delayed period as it had occurred due to several supervening events beyond the State's control. The appeals and writ petitions arc dismissed, but without costs.

B R.M. SAHA!, J. Principal issue debated at length in these special leave petitions directed against Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court and writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, was if bar of three years on declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition C Act 1894 (Act l of 1894) (for brevity 'L.A. Act') added by way of proviso in 1967 applied to the housing or improvement scheme framed by the Board under Section 20 or sanctioned by State Government under Section 30 of the U.P. Avas and Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as the L.A. Act having been adopted by Section 55 of the Act all subsequent amendments in it applied automatically.

Adopting or applying an earlier or existing Act by a con1pctcnt Legislature to a later Act is an accepted device of legislation. If the adopting act refers to certain provisions in an earlier existing act it is kno\vn as Legislation by reference. Whereas if the provisions of another Act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the act then it is known as legislation by incorporation. Legal meaning of these expressions, therefore, is no different than the literal meaning. But the consequences of their application are far reaching. When an earlier act is referred in a later act then any subsequent amendment, addition or alteration in the earlier act, automatically, becomes a part of it even for purpose of the later act. But in a legislation by incorporation since the entire prvision either wholly or partly stands bodily engrafted, therefore, it stands frozen on the date of incorporation and remains unaffected by any subsequent or future amendment. Why it is so? What is the rationale for it? When an act is who!ly or partly referred in another act it has to be applied or acted upon in the form it exists. For instance if a statute provides that the proceedings under the act shall be conducted in accordance with the prbce- G dure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (in brief 'CPC'), then on the date the proceedings commence it is the CPC as existing, on that date which shall apply. The natural consequence that flows from it is that ny amendment or alteration in the adopted act becomes operative even in the statute in which it is referred. Sutherland in his book 'Statutmy Constl1lction' has iH explained it thus,

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OF U.P. [SAHA!, J.) 703

"A statute which refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the A law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference .statute was enacted

11 •

Same principle is discussed in Cmpus Jwis Secundwn as under :

" ............ Where the reference in the adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof, ............ the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied, with all the changes made from time to time, at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute."

On the other hand a legislation by incorporation 'is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been actually written in it with pen

or printed in it". Repeal of the provision of the earlier act adopted or any D arnendn1ent of alteration in it can have no effect on its operation in the adopting Act as having become part of the new statute it remains untouched by what happens in the parent Act. One of the reasons to resort to such method of legislation is to ensure uniformity. For instance if a statute provides a remedy by way of second appeal on the same grounds as is specified in Section 100 CPC then it may for sake of brevity and E uniformity incorporate those provisions as was the case in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR (1979) SC 798, which permitted a second appeal to be filed on, 'one or more of grounds of appeal specified in Section 100 of CPC'. Pravisions of Section 100 CPC stood transposed in Mouopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (in f brief M.R.T.P. Act'). The legislature instead of reproducing the same words opted for incorporation by reference as such device brings all the learning given to it by the courts of law. Effect of it was that the provision of Section 100 of CPC having become part and parcel of the M.R.T.P. Act it could be amended, altered or repealed by exercising such power under the act and not under CPC. State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, G [1976] 1 SCR 6; Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 SCR 778 and Boiani Ores. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1975] 2 SCR 138, were cases in which definitions of other acts which had withstood the test of interpretation were incorporated. In Narsin1han's case :ineanlng of the word ', public servant' used in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code having become well~ H

A known by interpretative process the Stale Legislature instead of repeating it adopted it by providing that, 'for purpose of this Act "public servant" means a public servant defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code'.

When such method of legislation is resorted to the legislature prefers to accept the intcrpreL.::1tion and understanding of :-; uch an expression as given B by the courts in respect of it in the earlier Act. Legislation by incorporation bring into effect a new and independent legislation which remains unaffected by any change, or alteration or amendment in the earlier Act, 'because the legislature, which adopts by incorporation the existing provisions of another law, cannot be assumed to intend to bind itself to all future amendments or modifications which. may be made in the earlier law.

C In other words, the incorporating Act does nothing more than borrow certain provisions of an existing Act an instead of setting out, verbatim, those provisions in its own creation, refers to them as a matter of convenience in the mode of drafting' [Westem Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Auth01ity, Korba & Anr., [ 1982] 2 SCR 1. Although the D decision of Privy Council in Secrctcuy of State v. Hindustan co-011crativc

Insurance Society Ltd., AIR (1931) PC 149 was concerned with the L.A.

Act adopted by the Calcutta Improvement Act the Court on consideration of the provisions held that the effecl of extensive modifications in the local act and schedule was, 'to enact for the purposes of the local Act a special law for the acquisitions of land'. Further the decision turned on the E principle that specific excludes general. The Court held that the State act while adopting L.A. Act constituted a tribunal and accorded it, by fiction, status of courts, 'except for the purposes of Section 54 of the Act'. Therefore, in view of this exclusion the subsequent amendment in Section 54 of L.A Act providing for second appeal could not be available in acquisition F proceedings under the Act. The language of Section 55 of the Avas Vikas Act permitting acquisition under the provisions of the L.A. Act 1894 (Act 1 of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, with modifications specified in the schedule, is widely different from the language used in Calcutta Improvement Trust Act. Apart from it this Court in Fmid Ahmed Abqul Samad & Anr. v. T71e Municipal Corporation of the City of G Ahmedabad & A11r., AIR (1976) SC 2095 held Section 284N of the Municipal Corporation Act was a referential legislation even though the Section ran as under :

"284N. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in this and the next H succeeding sections referred to as 'the Land Acquisition Act') shall

G.S. GAUR v. STATE OFU.P. [SAHA!, .I.[ 705

to the extent set forth in Appendix I regulate and apply to the acquisition of land under this Chaptcr1 other\vise than l?Y agreement, and shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this chapter in the same manner as if enacted in the body thereof, subject to the provisions of this Chapter and to the provisions following, namely :-........ "

It was held that the Corporation Act having adopted Chapter 11 of the L.A.

Act to the extent set forth in Appendix I of the Act which did not exclude Section 5A of the L.A. Act the right of hearing could not be denied. Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement T!1lst Board, Mysore v. P. Govindan, [1977) l SCR 549, was a case where this court applied subsequent amendment in L.A. Act, adopted by the City Improvement Act Mysore, as the provision relating to compensation was n1altcr of procedure and any law dealing with procedure is retrospective in operation. In WestCln Coalfields Ltd. v. Special area Development Authmity, Korba & Anr., [ 1.982) 2 SCR J., this Court construed section 69 of Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (23 of 1.973), which for purposes of t<Lxation conferred on the Special Area Development Authority same powers as were exercised under Municipal Corporation Act, 1.956 or the Madhya

Pradesh Municipal Act, 1.961 as legislation by reference therefore subsequent amendments in the Municipal Corporation Act enlarging the power of assessment applied to the Special Development Authority under Act 23 of 1973. State of Kera/a v. Mis Attessee, [1989) Suppl. 1. SCC 733. is yet another case where the State Legisleture provided that cotton fabric, silk fabric etc. as defined in First Schedule of Central Excise Act shall be exempt from payment of tax. The entry in Excise Act was subsequently amended. lt was held:

"! n the first place, we think it would be correct to say that the 1.963

Act brings in the definitions of the 1944 Act by way of incorporation. For, a reading of the Act shows that the Act. intended to confer exemption of a number of goods set out in the schedule. G Of these, since items 5 to 7 are defined in the 1944 Act, the Act refers to those definitions to ascertain the scope of these items.

There are no express words used by the statute which will justify an inference that the intention was to incorporate those definitions, as standing on that date, into the 1963 Act." H

A In Bajaya v. Copikahai & Anr., IJ978J 2 SCC 542 it was held that it was a case of legisbtion by reference.

Principles laid. down in these decisions indicate that the determination if a legislation was by \Vay of incorporation or reference is n1ore a matter of construction by the courts keeping in view the language employed by the Act, the purpose of referring or incorporating provisions of an existing Act. and the effect of it on the day to day working. Reason for it is the courts' prime <luty to serve ]a\v 1nade by the Legislature is enacted lo serve public interest. That is the rationale due to which the court constructed provisions in Westein Coalfields Ltd. (Supra) or Mis Attesee

(supra) or Mis Bangalm:e Jute Fact01y Co. & Others v. Inspector of Central Excise & others, [J.992J l SCC 401 as legislation by reference even though on litc1al and conservative test enunciated by English courts in Re Wood's Estate Ex parte, Works and Buildings Commers (1886) 31 Ch D 607 or Clarke v. Brad/augh, [J881J 8 QBD r,3 the provisions appears more to be illustrative of lc!{, islation by incorporation. San1e principle is discernible 0 from those cases where this Court applied amendments made subsequently in L.A. Act to proceedings for acquisition taken under the Act to which adopted the L.A. Act with modifications. It is necessary therefore to extract Section 55 of the Act to ascertain if the State Legislature intended to adopt the L.A. Act generally which would result in applying the amendments E made in Section 6 automatically or the L.A. as modified by the schedule stood bodily cngrafted:

"55. Power. to acquire land -

(1) Any /and or any interest therein required by the Board for of the purposes of this Act, 1nay be acquired under f!ic provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act l of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for this pu. pose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act."

The language indicates that the legislature intended lo take proceedings G for acquisition of land under the L.A. Act except to the extent it has been amended by the Schedule. A perusal of the schedule indicates that it amended Sections 3, 17, 23, and 49 of the L.A. Act added Section 17A to the L.A. Act and provided for effect of notices issued under Sections 23, 28, 31 and 32 of the Act. Notice published in the Official Gazette under H Section 28 and clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 31 have been given

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. [SAHAl, J.) 707

the same effect as a notification issued under Section 4 of the L.A. Acl. A Similarly notices issued under clause ( c) of sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act or publication of a notification under sub-section (1) or under sub-section ( 4) of Section 32 in the Act have been substituted for and have same effect as declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act. In other words the notices issued under the Act under different sections mentioned in it shall be substituted in place of Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A. Act. It is not bringing into effect a new legislation nor transposing provisions of L.A. Act to the Avas Yikas Act but applying the L.A. Act as modified to proceedings under the Act. In Bhatinda Improvement T111st v. Ba/want Singh & Ors., I 1991] 4 sec 368, this Court in more or less similar circumstances, where Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 provided that,

'publication of a notice of any improvement scheme under Section 36 of this Act shall be substituted for and have the same effect as publication in the Official Gazette and in the locality of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act, except D where a declaration under Section 4 or Section G of the said Act has previously been made and is still in force,'

held,

11111 the present case, however, we find lhat there is no question of incorporation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisitidn Act into the said Act at all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of the scheme conten1plated under the said Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in

the relevant sections of said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the said Act. In these circumstances, it G cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the said Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they stand at the relevant time, namely at the time of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention. There is nothing to indicate H

708 SUPREME \, QlJRT REPORTS 11993] SUPP. l S.C.R.

that there \Vas any such con! rary intention in the pres'ent case. Jn these circu1nstanccs, the notification under Section 42 should have been published within the period of three years of the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act." .

Language of the section, apart, the courts have a duty to construe the provisions of a statute lo advance the cause of justice and facilitate the day lo day working of the statute to serve the public interest and achieve the objective of social betterment. Motivated by such principles the Privy C Council mitigated the rigour of legislation by incorporation by carving out exceptions to it \vhich have been reitfrated by this Court in Narasin1han

(supra) and Mis Attessee (supra). One of such situati1.rns where legislation by incorporation has been excluded is if it wci11" I 1Teate difficulty in day to day working. In our constitutional set up it can be extended further and

f) lhe courts should lean against a construction \vhich n1ay result in discri1nination. Ho\v dlK:.s it arise? Lan<l OJ 'A' or 'B' O\Vncrs of adjoining land is acquired one by the State Govcrnn1cnt for constructing a road or canal or bridge and other by the Avas Vikas Parishad for constructing a building in public interest. The acquisition proceedings in either case in taken under the L.A. Act. In one it is L.A. Act simplicitor whereas in other as mpdified E to the extent indicated in the schedule or appendix of the act adopting it.

Where it is under L.A. Act the proceedings have to be completed within three years whereas under other it may go on for ten years. Such consequence can be avoided by construing the statutory provision in such a manner that it docs not operate unjustly. A legislature should not be deemed to have intended that the State Legislature while providing for acquisition of land under the L.A. Act opted to exclude availability of any benelicial amendments in it. At least not by construction. Faulty implementation of a legislative provision by the executive should not persuade the court to impute intention to the lcgi.slaturc to have intended to act unfairly.

Reason for adding the proviso to section itself was public interest. In the original act compensation for the land acquired was payable on the market value at the date of, 'declaration relating thereto under Section 6'.

It was substituted by (Amendment) Act 1923 (XXXVII of J 923) by the expression,

11notification under Section 4 11 • But the experience of \Vorking H of the Act indicated that declarations under Section 6 were issued Ion~

G.S.GAUR v. STATEOFU.P. [SAHAJ, J.] 709

after publication of notification under Section 4 even where urgency clause A was invoked resulting in grave injustice to the land owners. Consequently ttl mitigate such injustice the proviso was added to Section 6 reducing the gap between notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act to three years. The object and reasons for adding proviso to Section 6 \Vas,

11at the san1e time, care has been taken to ensure that land acquisition proceedings do not linger on for unduly long time. The aforesaid Ordinance, therefore, provides that no declaration under Section 6 of the Act should be issued in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) published after the commencement of the Ordinance, after the expiry of three years form the date of such publication". The Parliament in our Federal structure has the supremacy in legislative matters subject to the exclusive power of State on matters enumerated in list JI of the VI!th schedule. It would be unjust to exclude operation of the beneficient provision added for general betterment in social interest, by resorting to rule of construction. The courts are obliged

to adopt a constructive approach while construing such provisions. Jn D absence of express exclusion it is more in consonance with justice to hold that the restriction of three years added by the proviso to Section 6 applied to the Act. Any effort to demonstrate impossibility of completing proceedings within three years cannot be countenanced. Legislative intention cannot be frustrated by executive inaction. The acquisition proceedings thus came to end after expiry of three years from the date of issuance of notification under the act analogous to Section 4 of the L.A. Act.

But this is not the end. Even though the law is in favour of petitioners

but equity stands in their way since in pursuance of these proc.eedings the Avas Vikas Parishad entered into possession and constructed housing F colonies as there was no interim order in favour of land owners during pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court. Therefore the individual interest of the land owners is faced with public interest of those large number of middle class persons who must have invested their life's savings in purchasing theses houses and the demolition of houses which are standing over the land and rendering its occupants homeless shall result in G includible loss and injury. Larger social interest therefore requires this Court to mould the relief in such manner that justice may not suffer. No flaw has been found in the notifications issued for acquisition of land under Section 4 or publication of .declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The infirmity has arisen due to procedural delay. It is well established that delay H

710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11993] SUPP. lS.C.R.

A destroy the remedy but not the right. The Avas Vikas Parishad could have

quired the land by issuing fresh notification. Therefore the equities can be adjusted by directing that the compensation to the land owners shall be paid by assuming that fresh proceedings for acquisition were taken in the year in which the declaration was published.

B Before parting it is also necessary to mention of the petitioners who

approached this Court under Article 32 can be denied hearing on points other than limitation only because their petitions had been tagged with special leave petition in which following order was passed:

"Leave granted limited to the question as to whether the limitation provided in proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act introduced by the amending Act of 1967 is also applicable in the facts of this case in view of U.P. Avas & Vikas Adhiniyam."

From the order granting leave extracted above it is clear ihat the order was D confined to facts of that case. It may legitimately be argued that the Bench hearing the appeals is not bound by the order granting leave as even though other aspects shall be deemed to have been heard and decided yet in absence of any decision or adjudication on merits it has no binding effect. Whether it is so or not need not be gone into, in these petitions E except observing that the implied rejection of an order does not amount to deciding on merits but in propriety and comity it is just and proper that except in very rare cases where injustice is manifest the Bench hearing the matter finally is expected to respect the earlier order passed by the Bench granting leave. But that does not apply to the writ petitions which were merely tagged with special leave petitions. In absence of any specific order F it would not be fair to shut out the petitioners who invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court merely because one of the questions, may be the main one, being common the petitions were directed to be connected either at the instance of the bar or the Bench. Once the petitions were admitted the court has an obligation to hear them or to settle the question of law G and permit the petitioners to seek their remedy on other issues in appropriate forum.

For these reasons even though publication of declarations under the act were beyond the period of. three years it is not in interest of justice to quash the proceedings but the appellants shall be paid compensation of H the land acquired on market value prevalent in the year in which the

G.S.GAUR v.STATEOFU.P. [SAHAI, J.) 711

aeclaration analogous to Section 6 of the L.A. Act was published/issued by A fictionally assuming that fresh notifications under the Act analogous to Section 4 was issued in that year.

So far the writ petitions are concerned it shall be open to petitioners to seek their remedy in appropriate forum against any aspect other than the limitation. The special leave petitions and writ petitions are dismissed . B subject to observation made above.

T.N.A.

Petitions dismissed.