STATE OP MAHARASHTRA

NARAYAN RAO SHAM RAO DESHMUKH & ORS~

March 19, 1985

[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA,~].]

Maharathtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings} Act, 1961, Sections 2( 11) 2(22) and 6-Scope o/.-Whether a female whiJ inherits a~ share in a joint family property by.rea:ion of the death of a .male member of~ the family automatically -ceases to a member of the joint family by virt_ue of the 1 proviso to Section 6 of the Land Ceiling Act read with explanation I thereto, entitling her to a sepa1ate unit-Featuresof Hindu Undivided Family and J coparcenary explained. :i

. Sham Rao Bhagwant Rao Deshmukh, his son Narayan Rao_ Sham Rao Deshmukh, his wife Suloc.hanabai and his mother Gangabai alias Tibai were 1 members of a joint Hindu Family governed by the Mitakshara School of Law.

The said .family owned extensive property which included agricultural lands · situated in fourteen viUages. Shafi Rao died on June 15, 1957 after the coming,,. into force: of the Hindu S:uccession Act, 1956, and on his death his interest in the coparcenary property devolved on his son, wife and mother in equal shares under .Section 6 of the Ceiling Act, such interest bein& the share that /

would have been allotted to him if a partition of the family property had takeri '

place immediately before his death irrespective of whether hewas entitled to claim partition or not.

According to the Jaw governing the above family which 1 was governed by the Bombay School under which the mother also was. entitled 'I a share at a partition between her husband and her son equal to that of her son one-third shire in the family property could have been allotted to the share of Shafi Rao immediately before his death had a partition taken place.

That one-third share devolved in equal shares On Narayan RaO, Siit0ch3.nab3J and Gangabai alias Taibai each inheriting one-ninth share ofthe fanlily pf<"J perty. They, however, continued to live together enjoying the family properties as before.

As required by the Maharashtra Agricultural Ceiling Act which came into effect on January 26, 1962, Narayan Rao filed a declaration on behalf of himself, his mother, and his grandmother before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Saoner stating that they held in all 305.49 acres of agricultural land and that under a family arrangeplent entered into on March 30, 1957 they wre~ holdil'lg the lands in distinct and separate shares, Narayan Rao holding'1 one-· half share and the other two holding one-fourth share each and that each of them was entitled to retain 96 acres which was the maximum extent of land which a person in that area could hold after the Ceiling Act came into force.

MAHARASHTRA v. N. R. S, RAO, 359

_The Sub•Divisional Officer after enquiry held (i) that the alleged family l; ettlemt was not true ; (ii) Narayan Rao, his mothe.r and his grand-mother were. joint in estate and constituted a family. within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(11) of the Ceiling Act; (iii) the family could not, there~ fore, hold agricultural land in excess of one unit of the Ceiling area ; (iv)- the

'fily was entitled to 96 acres of land only out of 304.57 acres held by it on the appointed day ; (v) as the family had alienated after August 4, 1959 about . 44 actes Of land in contravention of Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act, it could retain oi; IIY 51.16 acres ; and (vi) the remaining extent of land measuring in all 222;32 acres must be. declared as surPius land which had to be surrendered under the Ceiling Act. '

_ ' Aggrieved by the decision of the Sub Divisional Officer, Narayan Rao,

., hi~ mother.and grandmother filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue " Tribunal questioning the 'correctness of the said decision and that appeal was dismissed.

A.gainst the decion of the Tribunal they filed a petition before r the High Court of Bombay under Article 227 of the .. Constitution.

The High Cou.rt accepted th~ contention that since the one third interest in the family . -property which could have been allotted to theshare of Sham Rao had he demanded a partition immediately before 'his death had devolved in equal shares on his heirs that is his wife, mother and son, the surviving members of the : riuniiy ccitsed to' hold the family property as members of a family and, there

foe. each ofthem was entitled to be allowed to ret3.in one unit of the ceiling afeii Under the Ceiling Act, allowed : the writ petition and directed rhe Sub ·:piVisional Officer to pass fresh order in the light of its juOgment.

Hence the State appeal by special leave.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. .The Proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 caniiot .be construed as laying down that where\_'er a member of a faniily .• had his separate property he or she s.hould be regarded as not a member of a , f,, tnily. [370Ei.

1.2 A legal fiction should no doubt ordinarily, be. carried 'to it~ logical , end to carry out the purposes for which it is epacted but it cannot be carried

beyond that. [369q

It i"s no doubt true that the right. of a femal~· hili .tO the interest inlierited by her in the family property gets fixed on the death' of a male inember under

~, .s'ection 6 of the Hindu .Succession Act but. she cnnot. be treated as having G ceased to be a member of the family without.'he'r volition.as , otherwise it will

- .ICad to strange results which could not have beeO in the contemplation of Parliament when it enacted that provision and which might also not be in the interest of such female heirs.

Otherwise_ it may result in-the wife automatically . being separated from her huband when one of her sOns. dies leaving her behind

, as_his heir.. Such a result does not foIIOw from the language of the stat-Ute.

In such ari event she should have 'the option t~ sepafate herself or to continue H fll the fatnili •! l9n~ ".~ h~ wishe1 ~! l\~ l"l"br though 1\1~ h~ cquired ~TI

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 s.c.R.

A indefeasible interest in a specific share of the family propertY Which WoUtd. remain undiminished. whatever may be the subsequent changes in the composition of the membership of the family.

[369C-F]

In the instant case, the theory that there was a family settlement not being pressed and there being no action taken by either of the two females concerned in the case to become divided from the remaining members of the family, notwithstanding the death of Sham Rao the remaining members of the family continued to hold the family properties together though the individual interest of the female members thereof in the family properties had become fixed.

[369H ; 370A]

t.3 Since a "person" 3.s defined in Section 2(22) of the Act iii.eludes a ''family" as defined in Section 2(11) for purposes of the Ceiling Act, the members of a family cannot hold more than one unit of ceiling area.

In the . circumstances of the case, here, Narayana Rao, Sulochanabai and Gangabai alias Taibai were together entitled to retain only one unit of the ceiling area as held by the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was affirmed by the Tribunal. ·

[364E ; 371B]

2 1 The joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu Society.

An U!ldivided Hindu family is ordinarily joint not only in estate but in food and worship but it is not necessary that a joint family should own joint family property.

There can be a joint family without a joint family property.

[36SF]

2.2 A Hindu coparcenary is, however, a narrower body than .. the joint family. Only nales who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can.be ffiembers of the coparcenary or coparceners.

A male member of a joint family and his sons, grandsons and great grandsons constitµte coparcenary.

A coparcener acquires right in the coparcenary property 'by birth but his right can be definitely ascertained only when a partition t:ie8 place.

When the family is joint, the extent of the share of a coparcener c8.n" not be definitely predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating.

It incre" ases by the death Qf a COpl\l"cepr ~Pd dm~~.si OP th~ birth of a coparcenef.

. . .

[366D:E1

2.3 A joint family, however, may consist of female members.

It may cOnsisf of.a male member, his wife, his mother and his unmarried daughters. cThe property of a joint family does not cease to belong to the family !"•(Cly G because there is only a single male member in the family.

A joint family i".ay consist of a single male member and hiswife and daughters. It is not necess&ry that there should be two male members to constitute a joint family.

[366F:-O),;:

Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax Mysore, Bangalore ,, [1966] 3 S C.R. 224 ; Sitabai & Anr. v. Ram Chandra, [1970] 2 S.C.R l ; N.v:i H /•laren<franath v. Commi sioner of Wealth Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hydrabad., ' \1969j 3 s,<;:.R. sst referrd t9.

MAHARASHTRA v. N. R s. RAO (Venkataramiah, J.) 361

2.4 While under the Mitakshara Hindu law there is community of oWnership and unity of possession of joint family property with all the members or the coparcenary, in a coparcenary governed by the Dayabhaga law, there is no unity or ownership of coparcenary property with the members thereof. Every coparcener takes a defined share in the property and he is the owner of .tl"J, at share.

But there is, however, unity of possession.

The share does not fluctuate by births and deaths.

Thus it is seen that the recognition of the right to a definite share does not militate against the owners of the property being treated as belonging to a family in the Dayabhaga w. •

[366G-H ; 367A-B]

2.5 The decision of the Supreme Court in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum _ v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum &.Ors, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 761 has to be treated _ __,...., aS an authority for the proposition that when a female member who inherlts an interest in the joint family property under Section 6 of the Succession Act files C ....._, a Suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share Which would haVe been notionally allotted to her as stated in Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Succession Act, and not an authority for the proposition that she ceases to be a member of the family on the death of a male member of the family whose iriterest in the family property devolves on her without her volition to separate herself from the family.

[367C ; 369AD] IP


C1vn:. Al'l'ELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeal No. 1441 of 1971

Prom the Judgment & Order dated 26.4.1970 of the Bombay E High Court in Special Civil Applicatioµ No, 16,/1967,

f.~ . .psqf an~ Af.N. fihro/J for thl' Ap)lellant,

V~· Lql(t a.n\14.q, alnqpqrkhi for t4~ Jlspimde!l!~.

Th~ J11d~111ent of the oqrt was delivered by

VSNKATARAMIR, J.

Sha111 Rao !hagwant Rao Deshmukh and his son, Narayan Rao were members of a joint Hindu family gover ned by the Mitakshara School of law. His wife Sulochanabai and his mother Gangabai alias Tribal were also the members of that . family. The said family owned extensive properties which included agricultural lands situated in fourteen villages. Sham Rao died on June.15, 1957 after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the Act') and on his death his interest in the coparcenary property devolved on his son, wife and

JUOtnr i!' eua\ spare~ \IP\11'f sectio11 (i Qf tjl~ A~~. u9h., nteres\

' G

SUPREME COURT.REPORTS

11985] 3 S.C.R.

. being the share that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the family property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.

According to the law governing the above family which was governed by the Bombay School under which the mother also was entitled

to a share at a partition between her husband and her .son equal to that of her son one-third share in the family property could have been allotted to the share of Sham Rao immediately before his death had a partition taken place. That one-third share devolved in equal shares on Narayan Rao, Su!ochanabai and Gangabai alias Taibai each inheriting one-ninth share of the family property. They, however, continued to live together enjoying the family properties as~ before. On January 26, J 962 the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings)Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as 'the Ceiling Act') came into force. As required by the Ceiling Act, Narayan Rao filed a declaration on behalf of himself, his mother Sulochanabai and his grandmother Gangabai alias Taibai beforethe Sub-Divisional Officer, Saoner stating that they held in all 305.49 acre of agricultural land and that under a family arrangement entered into on March 30, 1957 they were holding the lands in distinct and separate shares, Narayan Rao holding one-half and the other two holding one-fourth sham each and that each of them was entitled to retain 96 acres which was the maximum extent of land which a person in that area could hold after the Ceiling A.ct came into force.

The SubDivisional Officer after enquiry held that the alleged family settlement was not true, Narayan Rao, his mother and his grandmother were joint in estate and constituted a' family within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2(11) of the Ceiling Act and the family could not hole! agricultural land in excess of one unit of the ceiling area.

The .Sub-Divisional Officer came to the conclusion that the total area ,.A held by the said family on the appointed day was 313.57 acres, and • as the said lands were situated in different villages and the ceiling area in all the villages except in Chanakpurvillage was 96 acres and in Chanakpur village the ceiling area was 108 acres, the total land held by the family was to be converted into 304.57 acres for purposes of the Ceiling Act. He further held that the family was entitled to 96 a, res of land out of the said 304.57 acres on the appointed 4ay . and as the family had alienated after August 4, 1959 about .44 acrea

cif land in contravention of Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act, it could retain only'5Li6 acres. The remaining extent of land measuring in all 222.:2 acres was declared as surplus land which bad. to be sur, rendered under the <;:eilin f Act. A ¥ieved by the decision of. :the

>-·

. MAHARASHTRA v .. N. R. s. RAO Wenkataramiah, J.) . :363

Sub-Divisional' Officer, Narayan Rao, his mother and grandmother filed an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal qµestioning the correctn.ess of the said decision and that appeal was dismissed.

Against the decision of the Trib.unal _they filed a petition before the High Court of Bum bay udef'Article ';!27 of the Constitution. Before the High Co.url the ca; e of family settlement. was not pressed but it was cbntended that sir.ce the'one-third interest in the family property which could have been allotted to the share of Sham Rao had he demanded a partition immediately before his death had devolved in equal shares .on his heirs i.e. his wife, mother and son, the surviving members of the family ceased to hold the family property as members of a family and, therefore, _each of them was entitled to be allowed to retain one unit of the ceiling area under the Ceiling Act.

Th(' High Court. upheld the above plea. It held, that since the oneninth share of Gangabai alias Taibai, the mother of Sham Rao did not exceed the ceiling area, she could retain all tbe land befonging to her .. It further held that Narayan Rao and Sulochanabai were each' entitled to 4/9th share of the property and each of them was entitled to retain ro; himself or herself, as the case may be one unit of ceiling area out of his or her 4/9th share in the family property and only the surplus was liable to be surrendered. The High Court , d_irected the Sub-Divisional Officer to pass fresh orders accordingly in . the light of its decision. The State Government has filed this appeal

, bY special leave against the decision of the High Court.

In. order to examine the correctness of the contentions urged in this appeal, it is necessary to refer briefly first to the relevant provisions of the Ceiling Act, as they stood on the appointed day, i.e. the date on which the said Act came into force.

The Ceiling Act came into force on January 26, 1962 as per notification issued by the State Government under Section l (3) thereof. The Ceiling Act as its long title indicates was enacted for the purpose of imposing a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land in the State

of Maharashtra to provide for the acquisition and distribution on land held in excess of rnch ceiling and for making provisions regarding matiers connected with the purposes aforesaid.

The imposition of ceiling on the holding of agricultural land was found to be necessary in the interests of the agrarian economy of the State. TM Ceiling Act ., also made provisions for the distribution of surplus land acquired

 from persons who were holding in excess.of the ceiling amongst the landless and other persons.

Sections 3 and 4 of the Ceiling Act provided s follows ! : · 1 •

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1985) 3 S.C.R.

"3. In order to provide for the more equitable distribution of agricultural land amongst the peasantry of the State of Maharashtra (and in particular, to provide tht landless persons are given land for personal cultivation), on the commencement of this Act there shall be imposed to the extent, and in the manner hereinafter provided, a maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land throughout the States.

4.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall hold land in excess of the ceiling area, as determined in the manner hereinafter provided.

Explanation. - A person may hold exempted land to any extent.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land held by D a person in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be surplus land, and shall be dealt with in the manner hereinafter provided for surplus land."

The ceiling areas was perscribed by Section 5 of the Ceiling Act. Section 2(22) of the Ceiling Act defined the expression 'person' E as including a family.

Section 2(11) of the Ceiling Act read as follows:

"2(11) "family" includes, a f!indu undivided family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which by custom or usage, are joint in estate or posessio11 or residence."

Section 2(20) of the Ceiling Act stated :

"2. (20) "member of a family" means a father, mother, spouse, brother, son, grandson, or dependent sister or daughter, and in the case of a Hindu undivided family a member thereof and also a divorced and dependent daugheer.

The Ceiling Act was applicable not only to Hindus governed by the Mitakshara Hindu Law which recognised an unvided Hindu family but to all other communities amongst whom the concept of an undivided family owning joint property in which the members of the µndivided family ba\I qnmiunity IJf ipterrst 'l"s \ll'~Pl''l"P

T~~

MAHARASHTRA v. N. R. s. RAo'(Venkataramiah, J.) 3/iS

Ceiling Act intended that even amongstisuch non-Hindu communities, a family.should not be permitted to hold agriunltural land in excess of the ceiling.· It is with this object a wider definition of the expression 'family' was given in section 2(1 l) of the Ceiling Act as including not only a Hindu undivided family but other families too whose members could belong to any of the classes mentioned i11 section 2 (20) of the Ceiling Act. In the case of families other than a Hindu undivided famly, a father, mother, spouse, brother, son, granson or dependent sister or dughter constituted a family and by virtue of section 2(21) were treated together as a person and in the case of a Hindu undivided family every member thereof was treated as a member of the family. A divorced and dependent daughter also could be a member oft.he family.

The contention urged before us is that by reason of the death of Sham Rao, the family became disrupted of divided and that Narayan Rao, his mother and his grandmother ceased to be members of a joint Hindu family. Elaborating the said contention the learned counsel for the respeondents herein argued that by virtue of the proviso to section 6 of the Act read with Explanation I thereto which , purposes of quantifying the interest in the joint family property that devolved on the heirs of a deceased male Hindu required that it should be assumed that a notional partition had taken place . in

the family immediately prior to the death of the deceased, the female heirs of such deceased Hindu become divided .or separated from the family on the death of the deceased.

In order to examine the validity of this submission it is necesary to refer to some of the relevant features of a Hindu undivided family and to consider the effect of the provisions f section 6 of the Act on such family,

As observed in Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage (1953 Edn.) the joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu society. An undivided Hindu family is ordinarily joint not only in estate but in food and worship but it is not necessary that a joint family should own joint family property. There can be a joint family without a joint family property. At para. 264 of the above treatise it -is observed thus:.

. . "26( It is evident that there can be no limit to the nuniber of persons of whom a Hindu joint family consists, or to the remoteness of their descent from the common ancestor,

. and consequently tp the <; lis(ance of.their relatfonship from

"JI

,, If


each other. But the Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body ........... , ........... For, covarcenary in the Mitakshara Law is not identical with coparcenary as understood in English law: when a mamber or a joint family dies, 'his right accrues to the other members by survivorship, but if a coparcener dies his or her right does not accrue to the other coparceners, but goes to his or her own heirs". When we speak ofca .Hindu joint family as constituting a coparcenary we refer not to the entire number of persons who can trace descent from a cOmmon ahcestor, and amongast whom no partition has ever taken place; we include only those person who, by virtue of relationship, have the right to enjoy and hold the joint propery, to restrain the acts of each other in respect of it, to burden it with their debts, and at their pleasure to enforce its partition. Outside this body, there is a fringe of persons pos<essing only inferior rights such as that of maintenance, which however tend to diminish as the result of reforms in Hindu law by legislation."

A Hindu coparcenary is, however, a narrower body than the joint family. Only males who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be meinbers of the coparcenary or coparceners. A male member of a joint family and his sons, grandsons and great grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener acquires right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be definitely ascertained only when a partition takes place. When the family is joint, the extent of the share of a coparcener cannot be definitely predicated since it is always capable of fluctuating. It increases by the dea01 of a coparcener and decreases on the birth of a coparcener. A joint family, however, may consist of female members. It may consist of a male member, his wife, his mother and his unmarried daughters.

The property. of a joint family does nOt cease to. b.elong to the family merely because there is only a single male member in the family. (See Gow Ii Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Uysore. Ban.galore(') and Sitabai & Anr. v Ram Chandra).(') A joint family may consist of a single male member and his wife and daughters. It is not necessary that there should be two male member to constitute a joint family. (See N.V. Narenderanath v. CommisSio• ------------

. (I)

(1966] 3 S, C.R. 224, m [t 97012:s.c.R. 1.

iJA!IAIUSHtRA v. N. R; s: IUO (Ve11kataramiah, i.) 36~.

11er of Weairh Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad).(1) While under the Mitakshara Hindu law there is community of ownership and unity. of possession . of joint family property with all the members of the coparcenary, in a coparcenary governed by the Dayabhag1 Jaw, there. is no .unity of ownership of coparcenary property with the members htereof. Every coparcener takes a defined share in .the property and the property and he is the owner of that share. But there is, however, unity of possession. Th.e share does not fiuctuale by births and deaths. Thus it is seen that' the recognition of the right to a definite share does not miiitate against the owners. of the property. being treated.as belonging to a family.in the Dayabhaga law.

We have earlier seen that females can be the members. of a Hindu joint family. The question now is whether females who .ii1herits a share in a joint family property by reason of the de.ath of a member of the family ceases to be a member of th.e family. It was very forcefully pressed upon us by the .learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the decision of this Court in Gurupad Khandapya Magdum . v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum & Ors. (2) that there was a disruption of the family in question on the death of Sham Rao as for the purpose of determining the interest inherited by Gangabai . alias Taibai and Sulochanabai it wa> necessary to assume .that a notional partition had taken place .immediately before the death of .Sham Rao and carried to its logical end as observed in the above decisison, Gangabai alias Taibai and Sulochanabai should be deemed to have ""\ become separated from the family.

The facts of the .. above said . ·~ case were these. One Khandappa died leaving behind his wife •' Hirabai, two sons a'nd three daughters after the coming into force of the Act. Hirabai filed a suit .for partition and separate possession of 7 /24th share in the joint family property on the basis of section 6 of the Act. She claimed that if a partitio.n had taken place between her husband and her two sons ill]med°iately before the death of her husband Khandappa, she, her husband .and. two sonswould have each been allotted a one-fourth sharein the family proporty and on the death of her husband the one, fourth share. which would have been allotted.in his favour had.devolved in. equal ; bares on her, her two sons, and three daughters.

Thus she claimed \;- the one-fourth share which had to be allotted in her favour. on the -------·------

(I) ]1969] 3 S.C.ll.'882. (2)

[1978! 3 S.C.R. 761. . ' .

notional partition and . l /24th share (which was one-sixth of the one-fourth share of her husband) i.e. in all 7/24th share. It was contended on behalf of the contesting defendant that she could net get the one-fourth share since actually no. partition had taken place. Chandrachud, CJ rejected the said contention with the following observations at p. 768 :

"In order tci ascertain the shre of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the c9parcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation I to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death.

What is therefore required to be'assumed is that a partition had iu fact taken place between the deceased and his caparceners inirnediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascer.tainingthe share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of heirs~ of the without . reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire pi ocess of ascertainm_ent of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle. All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place .during the life time of the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as

l.!AMARASHTRA v. k , jt, ii, RAO (tlenkatiramlah, 1.)

a share allotted to a coparcener in, an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of ' this position is that the heir will get bis or her share in the , interest which the deceased had in the coparccnary property ·

at the time of his death, in adilition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the • notional partition."

, We have carefully considered the above decision and we feel that this casehas to be ircated as an authority for the position that when a female member who inherits an interest in the joint family property under Section 6 of the Act files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share which have been notionally allotted to her, as stated in Explanation l to Section 6 of the Act. But it cannot be an authority for the proposition that she ceases to be a member of the family on the death of a male member of the family whose interest in the family property devolves on her without her volition to separate herself from the family.

A legal fiction should no doubt ordinarily be carried to its logical end to carry out the purposes for which it is enacted but it cannot be carried beyond that. It is no doubt true that the right of a female heir to the'interest inherited by her in the family property gets. fixed on the death of a male member under section 6 of the Act but she canQot be treated as having ceased to be a member. of the family without her volition as otherwise it will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of Paf!iament when it enacted that provision and which might also not be in the interest of such female heirs. To illustrate, if what is being asserted is accepted as correct it may result in the wife automatically being separated from her husband when one of her sons dies leaving her behind as his heir. Such a result does not follow the language of the statute. ln such an event she should have the option to scparte herself or to continue in the family as long as she wishes as its member though she has acquired an indefeasible interest in a spccifie share of the family property which would remain undiminished whatever may be the subsequent changes in the composiiion of the membership of the family.

As already observed the ownership of a definite share in the family property by a person need not be treated as a factor which would militate against his being a member of a family.

We have already 'noticed that in the case of a Dayabhaga family,

it9SSl s.c.lt.

which recognises unity of possession but not community of interest in the family properties amongst its memb, rs, the members'.thereof do constitute a family. That might also be the case of families of persons who are not Hindus. In the instant case the theory that there was a family settlement is not pressed 'before us.

There was no action taken by either of the two females concerned in the case to become divided from the remaining members of the family. It should, therefore, be held that notwithstanding the death of Sham Rao the remaining members of the family continued to hold the family properties together though the individual interest of the female members thereof in the family properties had become fixed.

We have alt:eady seen that a 'person' includes a ,'family' for purposes of the Ceiling Act and the members of a family cannot hold 'more than one unit of 'ceiling area. The respondents cannot derive any assistance from the proviso to section 6 of the Ceiling Act. Section 6 of the Ceiling Act provided that where a family consisted of members which exceeded five in number, the family would be entitled to hold land exceeding the ceiling area to the extent of one-sixth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, subject to the condition that the total holding did not exceed twice the ceiling area. The proviso to section 6 of the Ceiling Actprovided that for the purposes of increasing the. holding of the family. in excess of the ceiling area as stated above if any member thereof held any land separtely he would not be regarded as a member of the family for that purpose. This proviso was intended to qualify what was stated in Section 6 and was limited in its operation.

It was confined to the purpose of increasing the ceiling area as provided in section 6 of the Cei, ling 'Act.

It cannot be construed as laying down that wherever a member of a family bad his separate property )1e or she should be regarded as not a member of a family and that he or she would be entitled .to a separate unit of ceiling area.

The High Court having held that after the death of Sham Rao the joint family of Narayan Rao, Sulochanabai and Gangabai continued and that there was nothing to show that Narayan Rao,' Sulochanabai and Gangabai separated in residence after tbe death' of Sham Rao erred in holding that each of them was entitled to a

separat~ unit of ceiling area in the circumstances of tbis case.

Its . construction of the proviso to Section 6 of the Ceiling Act isalso erroneous. Its conclusion that "even though, therefore, ordinarily a peson fuay be a member of a Hindu joint family for the purpose

MAt!ARASllfRA v. N. R. S. RAO (Yenicataramlah, i.) 37i

of the Ceiling Act, he would ; not be hld to be. a member if he A holds land separately" for all purposes is agaill erroneous for the reasons already given above.

In the circumstances of the case, we are of. the view that Narayan Rao, Sulochanabai and Gangabai alias Taibai were toaether entitled to retain only one unit of ciling area .. In the result the judament of the Hiih Court is set aside and the order passed by tho Sub-Divisional Officer wh!ch . was affirmed by the Tribunal is rCitored.

For the foregoing reasons the appeal is accordingly allowed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

S. R.

Appeal a/lowed

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