' .

SMT. BIMLA DEVI ETC.

v.'

' .

IST ADDITIONAL •DISTRICT JUDOE AJ'!"D OTHERS )OTC.

, B March 27, 1984

[S; MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAn AND RANGANATR

MISRA, JJ.J

Ulla.r Prad~"'' U1ban Buildings (Regu:atlon of Letting, Rent and Eviction) ...Act. 1972, Scope of-Words ad Phrases-lnport, inrerpreration ar:d nieaning

•. of the word''occup_;/ifJn" occurring in Exp!anarion {JV) to section 22(l}{bJ- The words used are not a rule pf evidence-A tenant ha1 no r-iCht to queltion

.he mode in which tire. Land.orcl 111ay choose to fi1•e in.

Jn both Civil Appeal No.41 or 1979 and Civil Appeal No. 319 of 1980, 1he &ppellants are the unsuccessful house-owners. to get an eviction --order againt their tenants from tl1c portions of their' respective houses from

th~ court's l-e!ow. In the first case, the question af-ose whether the .. porlion ·-Of the pi"emises sought to be vaCa1ed by the landlady was one single u:iit or two separate unitS. In t1'e sec_ond case, the point involved was whether. the

1 word "occupation":included actual residence of the landlord eVen though \; he maY not hJve'bcen'fesiding there .

AHowing tliO' appeals, by sp !cial leave, the Court,

HELD: (C.A. No. 41/1979)

In view of the Trial Court's finding basiDg its decision on the report

~"°f the Co_mmii::.sioner appointed for the purpose, that the en.tire building con ··; Stituted one single .unit, the appellant being 'in occupation of a portion of 'f.he same, she is entitled to get release of the other portion occupied by the

_ lienant. [32JF-G]

In C.A,. No. 379//980.

1: _I. The case of the a;'lpe:Ilant is clearly covered by-lhc provi:.ions of 'Explanation (iv) to section 21(\)(bl or the Ut•ar Pradesh U.rban Buildings •(Regulation or Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act 1972. [323C]

1:2; The policy-of the law was to give a facility. to the landlord so :as to securr the entire building where he 'is in occUpation of a part of the ""1me and wa11ts to occupy the whole ho.use. [32 lD]

SUPJ\EME COURT _RE)'ORTS.

(1984] 3 S.C.R-

1'3. lo Babu Singh.Chauhan v. Rajkumari Jain & Ors. [1982l3 S C.R •. 114, the Supreme C0urt;, whi16construing tbe word ·occup1tio1" oocurring.• . in section 21(l)(b) of the 1972 Act, uied the word ''po:i'iessio.1", treating. the word ·"possession" as synonym of "occuf)ation" a:Jd sioca the word ''possession" or'' occupati'oa" may take vari"0us forn1s held that even kep .. ing the house-hold effects by' the owner is an act of occupation. _. . ' [l 19H, 3200-GJ

Therefqre, even if a landlord iS serviflg Outside or living with his near relations bilt makes casu:il visits :to his hou'l.e and thus retains cOntrol or-·

ove~.the entire area~ or a.Portion 9f th.e-proPerty, he. Would. in law be deem~ ed to be in occupation of.the same1 To accept the co::iteotion th1t Explaaa· tion IV required actu1l physical occup1,1tion by tblj landlord of the portiol).. _ re.t8ip.ed by him. would destory the Very concept of constructive or actria• possession or occupation. [320H ;· 32 iA-B] • ·

2: 1. All the Rent Control Acts try o Qep.rive and curtail -the right of an. onwer of his property and hlve put 'coOstrJinis anJ restraints on hisi. right by giving suQstantial protectiO:i to the ten1nts io p:.iblk: interest, other- \Vise if Rent Acts_, wereto b3 nbolishi+t or wer~ not th.er7 the landl"ord could 'get a tenant eviCted only by a notic~ after expiry of the.tenancy in accor dance with the provisions of the Transfer ofPcopaty Act. [l21EF]. . . .

2:2:.The words "shall be conclusiveto prove" in Explanation (iv)' clearly indicte that it is a s11bstantive right which belongs to the Jand 1ordi and w; tiich has been affirmed and recogni.sed if a p-art of an accommodatiol}· is retainfd by the landlord. The words "concluivc to prove that the building is bona fide requ'ired_by the landlord" dos not con.stitute a rule of cvi~ . dence. [J2JF-G] · ·

2:-3. The right to j-ectment bavirig accri.led to tbe apDellant und-er E~~ p1anation (iv) was a vested right as an owaer and could not be affCcied hy the 1976 amendment unless it. was couched in a language which was either expressly Or by necessary intendm'ent 'ineant to b~ operative retrosoectively~ Explariation {iv) deals not merc.ly wit, h a particular procedure but \\-ith the-.• substaritive rights of the parties.

The Said E'xplan:it[on tias asserted f}nd~ affirmed tho substantive 'tight ora landlord to get portion of a buliding v.u1a.- ted where he is in occupation.· of a p'art of iJ.

Such a sub.itantive rigbt can--· not be taken away mere1y by a procedural amendment nof does the languagO''

of the amendment introdu::ed the 1976- .A:ot envisage or cotemplat~ Sl, lch a position. section .i 4 of. the 19 7 6 'ACt m'erely recites' tJJ.at Explanation (ii) and (iv) of s.21(1)(b) shafr be omitted. There is nothing to show that th<> legislature intended , to give, any. retrospective cffct to the delCtioil, of ExPll •· natioo (lv). [321H, 322A-D]

The .argument that merely because the 1andlor.d was living withi -his son or bis r~Jation after retirement and, therefore, was not ia occupatio[)

of the house cannot b~ accCpted because it was not for the tenant to dictate t~ the Jani;\lord.as to_ hOw he sbOuld use his own premises. A tenant to has got: . no right ilor an; y busi_ness

0 to interfere with .the .mode or manner .in which a. landlord may choose \o QS<; Ms property or live therein. {323 A-BJ ' - . ' .

aJMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DJSTI': JUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) 317

CIVIL {\PPELLATE JURI_smicnoN : Civil Appeal .

A No. 4\ of 1979. (From the Judgment and Order dated 23rd August, 1978 of Allahabad Hi•hCourt in Writ Petition No, 1483 of 78) . 0 . .

WITH Civil Appeal No. 379 of 1980. ,,· From the Judgment and order dated.28th March, 1979 of the < Allahabad High Court in civil Misc-Writ No. 1287 of 1.977- G.L. Sanghi, V.A. Bobde & H.K. Puri for the appellant in C.A.

No. 41/79.

R:K. Jaln for the appellant in C.A.No. 379/80 ..

K.P. Gupta for the respondents in C.A. No. 41/79.

Shanti Bhushan and R.B. Mehrotra for the respondent in C.A.

No. 379/80.

The Judgment of, the Court was dlivered by

' I> FAZAL Au J.

We would first take up Civil appeal No. 379 or 1980 which is .directed against an Order dated March 28, 1979 passed by the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and arises in the following circumstances.

The appellant owns a house bearing No. 113, Amroha Gate, Fruit Market, Morada bad, in a portion of which he had inducted. respondent No.3 (Vishwa Nath K1por) as a tenant white rtaining some portion for himself, when he (appellant) was servlng as a . Judi, i; ial Officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the year !968, the appellant retired as a District Judge as a result of which he had to vacate his official residence, which necessitated the present eviction proceedings against respond~.nt No.3. The application for eviction was tiled on 2.l.!973 under s.21(1) (b) of the Utar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the '1972 Act') in which the appellant prayed that the portion occupied by respondent No.3 i'uay be released on the ground of personal requirement as after retirement he wanted to occupy the entire house.· The appellant further claimed that due to shortage of accommodation he had to stay with bis son elsewhere-.. The eviction proceedings were contested by the respondent on the following grounds:-

(a) that since .the appellant was already living with .his spn there was no particular urgency or personal necessity fot him to occupy the rented portion also,

IA I

(b)

(c)

SU"Pll.EME COURT REPORTS'

[1984] 3 S.C.R.

that the appellant badin bis occupation a part of th~ house which was retained by him even after inducting him.

(respondent) as a tenant and which was sufficient tor his needs, and . . tha.t !be.appellant after keeping his household effects in the portion retained by him bad locked up the. same and was, therefore, .not ill actual occupation of the home as equired by Explnation (iv) to s. 21 (1) (b). ·

In the same token, it was submitted as a point of law that the essential ingredient ofExplanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) was that the building must have been in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes which alone would be a conclusive proof cif personal . necessity. It was also contended as a question of fact that• as the

appellant-landlord was not in actual occupation of the premises, Explanation (iv) would not be attracted in the instant case. To buttress this argu'.llent it was submitted that the landlord never occupi; d .or possessed the premises but had locked up the same and. was.re.siding e!sewhe.re. Thhplea of the respondent-tenant did not find favourwith the Prescribed Authority or the High Court ..

 . TI1e .domiriant question, therdore, turns upon the import and interpretation of Explanation (iv). to s.21(1) (b), particularly the nature and meaning of the word 'occupation' as used in Explanat\on (iv). The crux of the inatter, therefore, was as to whether or not the case of the appellant squarely fell within the four corners ofExplana-, tion (iv) and'whether the word 'occupation' included actual residence of the landlord even though he may not have b, een residing there.

We migl1t mention that while the eviction proceedings were pending

• I I , ' ' before.the Prescnbed Authority the 1972 Act was amended by U.P.

Act No.28 of 1976 (for short to be referred to as the ' 1976 Act') which came into force with effect fro~, 5th July 1976. and which '. deleted Explanation (iv).

The Prescribed Authority, relying on Explanation (iv), held that the need of the landlord was fully made .uut and accordingly passed an order -f .eviction against the tenant., partly re) easing some portion in appellanes favour.

The appellant tlien filed an appeal befoR.the District Judge which was heard by an Additional District Judge who accepted the offer of the tenant and modjfied the Order of the Prescribed Authority by further 'releasing some other portion In his favour.

The appellant then filed a writ

' '

. BIMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DJSTT. JUDGE (Fazal' An; J.) 319'

petition before the High Court which upheld the decision of the A Disttict Judge and dismissed the writ petition.

Before we approach the. question cif law raised before us it may be nec.essary to give a detailed picture of the position of the premises retained by_the landlord and hat rerited out to the tenant. The house in question is a double'storeyed one containing some rooms 0n the first floor and some on the_ ground floor which were retained by the landlord at the time.of th• lease and the rest of the portion. was let out to the tenant.

The learned counsel for the appellant coatended that in view of the requieme.nts of the landlord he had a real and tona fide need Cf9r o:cupying the entire house and. therefore, the entire portion occupied by the tenant should have been released' in favour of the appellant. This argument was countered by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, counsel for the respondellt, who put forward the following legal su bmissioo:

In the first place,. he con\ended that Explanat.ion (iv) woulc; l not in terms apply to the facts of the present case because on the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below it was not shown that the appellant was in actual '°ccupation of the portion retained by him, which js a prerequisite for the application of Explanation (iv) to s.21 (l} (b). In this connection, it was sµbmitted that the admitted position being that the application was previously employed as a.

District Judge and was living elsewhere, he could not be deemed to be in occupation of the portion retained by him. In order to appreciate this argument, it my be necessary to examine closely the language of Explanation (iv) which may be extracted thus:

"(iv) the factthat the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the iemining part thereof is.in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to . prove that the building is. bona fide required by the landlord."

The pivotal argument of the counsel for the respondent turns upon the interpretation of the word 'occupation'. This, however,. does not present any d1fficulty because in a recent decision in the case of Babu Singh Chauhan v. Ra1kumari Jain & Ors.(') this Co)lrt while

(I) [1982] 3 SCR 114. ·

• H:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1984) 3 s.c.R. ·

costruing a sim}lar term in the same Act obseed as follows : ·

"We have gone through the judgment .of .the High Court in the light of the arguments of the parties and we .are. inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court that

~ the mere fact . that the lady did not actually reside in the premises. which were locked and contained her household effects, it cannot be said that she was not in possession of the premises so as to make s. 17 (2J •inapplicable. Possession by. a landlord of his property "may assume various forms. A lanlllord may be se_rving outside while retaininii his possession over a property o( a part of the property by either leaving it in-charge of a servant or by putting his household effects or. things locked up in the premises; such an occupation also would be full and complete posses, Sion .in. the eye of law."

.• It is true that the court used the word, 'possession' but in • • Explanation.(iv) !O s.21(1) (b) the word used is 'occupation' and not 'possession' but this Court treated the word 'possession' as being a synonym of 'occupation'. In Webster's Third New Jl)tcrnational DictiOllary the word 'occupation' has been denned at page 1560 thus: ·• ·

"Occupationto take possession of, occupy, einploy"

, The Black's Law Dictonary (5th Edn.) defines 'occupation' at page 82 thus: ·

"occupation.::...possession; control; enure; use."

. F Jn Corpus Juris Secundum (vol.67) at pge 74 'occupation' hs

been .mentioned thus:

"The wor.d may be employed "as referri'ng to the. act or process 'of occupying, the state of being occupied, occupancy, or tenure.''

This, Court in the observations, extracted above, has clearly pointed out that 'possession' of 'ocoupatio_n' may take various forms and it was expressly held that even keeping the houtehold .effects by the own.er is an act of occupation.

It is, therefore, manifestly clear that even if a landlord is serving outside or , Jiving 'l(ith his near relations but makes cas\l!il

BIMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE (Fazal All, J;) 32l ' isits t.ohis house and thus retains control over the entire .or .a por •tion of th.e property, he would in law be deemed to be in occupation ·-Of the same.

Therefore, we are unable to accept the' argument of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the essential. ingredient of Explanation (iv) 11as not been made out, there being no actual physical occupation . 'by . the lanqlord of the portion retained, by him. Indeed, if the broa.d argument put forward by the counsel is.to be accepted then

hat would destroy the very concept of coqsructive or actual posses- ·sion or occupation. For, instance, even if a. house is not let out to any)Jody but is locked up, can it be said that the owner who is not 'living there but.has kept his household effects, would not be deemed tp be in occupation of the same? The answer must necessarily be in . the negative.

It seems to us that the policy of the law was to give a facilitf to the landiord so as to secure the entire building where he is in

1 -0ccupation of a part of the same and wants to occupy th~ whole .house.

Mr. Shanti Bhushan then argued that Explanation (iv) •does not confer any substantive right but merely raises a preump, •tion that if a landlord is in occupation of a part of the premises, his need would be deemed to be bona fide, We are, .however, unable to agree with this argument.

We must remember that all the Rent Control Acts try to deprive and. curtail the legal right of an owner to his property and have pnt constraints and restraints on his right by giving substantial protection to the tenant~ .in public interest; otherwise if'the Rent Acts were to be abolished or were not there, the landlord could get a tenant evicted only by a notice after expiry of the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The words "shall be condusive to prove" In Explanation (iv) clearly indicate that it is a substantive right which belongs to the landlord and which has been affirmed and recognised if a part of an accommodation is retained by the landlord. We are unable to agree with Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the words "conclusive to prove that the building is \Jona fide required by the landlord" constitute a rule of evidence.

In fact, this argument . was put forward before usbecause the learned counsel wanted to submit that in view of the 1976 Amendment Act, deleting Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) of the 1972 Act, it would be -deemed to be retrospective and therefore the relief given by Explanation (iv) wonld . -Oisappear. We cannot agre.e with this somewhat far-fetched submis-


[1984) 3 S.C.Rsion because Explanation (iv) deals not merely with a particular procedure but with the substantive rights of the parties. The said< Explanation has assserled and affirmed the substantive right of a . . landlord to get a portion of a building vacated where he is in occupa~

tion of a part of it. Such a substantive right cannot be teyken away merely by a procedural amendment nor. does the language of the amendment introduced by the .1976 Act envisage cir cntempfate such. a position .. Section 14 of the 1976 Act merely recites that Explanations (ii) and (iv) of s.21(1) (b) shall be omitted. There is nothing; to show that the legislature intended to give any retrospective effect to the deletion of Explanation (iv). ·

In these circumstances, therefore, the right to ejectment having: accrued to the appellant under Explanation (iv} was a vested right as an owner and could not 'be affected by t!Je 1976. amendment unless. it was couched in a language which was either exp.ressly or by necessary intendment meant to be operative retrospectively.

Lastly, it was argued by Mr .. Shanti Bhushan that the fact reinains that the appellant, even after retirement, was not in actual possession of the portion retained by him and was living with his. son or Qtber relati.ons most of the time excepting casual visits to the premises in dispute. A farther argument was raised in an additionat Note supplied by the counsel for the respondent that as the bathroom and the latrine were in occupation of the tenant, the landlord could not possibly have occupied the premises retained by hi!D' and could not have lived there in the' absence of these facilities. The High Court rightly rejected thes.e argumets by observing thus:

- \ ~· "The last argument was that the view ofthe Prescribed

~ ' ' ' .

Authority that since the petitioner did not occupy the por- . tion retained by him and lived with his son anrl, therefore. his need was not bona fide has nomerits inasmuchas the petitioner did not have .either a latrine._ or a bathroom• and that he could not possibly occupy the hoi1se in the. posit.lop; in which it bad been .retained: There may be some truth in. the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

But, as neither the Prescribed Authority nor the Appellate Authority based their judgment on this feature of the case an"d . th'ey examjned the merits of the. claii:n ofthe respective parties. it is not possible to interfere with the j, udgments of tlie courts; below."

. . '

I..._.

BIMLA DEV! v. ADDL. DISTT. JU;)Gb (F aza/ Ali, J,) 323

An attempt was made by the parties to come to a settlement but, unfortunately, the efforts failed. T}le argument.of Mr. Shanti' Bhushan .that merely because the landlord was living with his son or his relation a(ter :etirement and, therefore, was not in occupation of the' house cannot be accepted because it was not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how he should use his own premises.

A tenant has got no right nor any business to interfere with the mode or manner in which a landlord may choose to use his propecty or live !herein.

Jn these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the case

of the appellant is' clearly covered by the provisions of Explanation o

(iv) to s.21(1) (bl and a decree for release of the entire premises should have been passed by the District Judge against the respondent.

We, therefore, allo; v this appeal, set aside the judgments of all the courts below and grder release of the entire premises in possession of the respondent to the appellant. Time is granted to the respondent to vacate the premises on or.before 31st December 1984, subject D to the usual undertaking to be given and filed by him in the Court within four weeks frqm .today, failing which the.grant of time shall st1nd revoked without further reference to the Bench and the appellant would be entitled to be put in possession forthwith. . - .

Civil Appeal No. 41 of 19,79

This appeal was heard alongwith civil appeal No. 379 of 1980 which we have decided by our judgment.• The main point involved in , this appeal was as to whether theportion of the premises sought to be vacated by the landlady was one sjngle unit or two separate units. This Court remanded the, matter to. the trial court for examining this po int and the trial court has returned a finding, basing its decision on the report of the Commissioner appointed for the purpose, that the entire building cons1ituted one single , unit.

It is, therefore, manifest that if the entire building was one unit and the appellant being in occupation of a portion of the same, she is entitled to get release of the other portion also.

In view of our decision in civil appeal No. 379 of 1980, the appeal is allowed and we order release of the entire portion in favour of the appellant • . Time is grantd to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before

31st October 1984, subject to the nsuaf undertaking being given and fited within four weeks from today, failing which the .grant of time

. 324


[1984) 3 S.C.R •• . . . j shall stand revoked without f\)rther refaence to the Bench. There wiH be no order as io costs.

• Let a certified copy of this judgment be placed civil appeal No.41 ofl979.

S.lt. '

• • \.

on the file of

i4ppeals allowed.