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67 A

. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA • v.

UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

December.16, 1983 B

Constiflltio11 of India.-Article 32 (1)-Mode of intirpreting Article 3Z.....- "Appropriate proceedings", 1neaning of-Letter addressed by a party on behalf of pers_ons belonging to socially and, economically weaker iRections co1n'p/aining violation ... • of their rights under variots social welfare legislations-Whether can be t'reated as a

writ petition._Maintiltability of-Public Interest Litigation-Nature and scope of.

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Constitution of India, Article 32 (2)-Appointmeftt of com1nissions _by ihe Supretn'! Court to enqui; e into the complaint made iii the writ petition anti rrlying upon the commisioners' re/, ort-Propiety of-Adver:; arial Procedure-How far binding on the Co.urt-Supreme Court Rules, 1966, O, xxxv, XLVI and XLVll, Rule 6-

Code of Civil Procedure,.O, XXVI.

 Mines Act, 1952-Sections 2 (j), (jj), (kk), .i (I) (b) proviso 18 Chapters V, VI &. Vil-Meaning of the word ''mine"--Whether stone quarries are 1n; ties-Whether workers of the stone quarries and crushers entitled to the benefits accruing under" the Act-Responsibility of the mine lessees, 1nine owners, Ceniral Governmint and the State Governments for ensuring the benefits accruing under the Act, explained-Mines Rules 1955, Rules 30-32-r'uniab Minor Minera~ Concession Rules, 1964.

Inter-State Migrat Work1nen (Regulation of .Employment and Conditions of Service) Act. 1979-ss.2 (/) (e), (b), (g), 4,§_)2 and Chapter V-InterState Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment aird Conditions of SerJ1ice) Central Rules, : 1980-Rules 23, 25-45-Definition of inter-state 1nigrant workinen-Rights and benefits of inter-state mlgrant workmen explalned~Thekedars or Jan1adars recruitlng workers for mine lessees/owners from outside the State are "contractOrs"-Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, J.970-:-ss. 2 (/)(a), (b), (c) (g), 16 to 21.

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Bonded IAbour Sys(em (Abolition) Act, 1976-ss.2 (f), (g), 4, 5, 10-15-Existene,!! of Forced Labour-Whether bonded.labour-Burden o} prooJ lies upon the employer that the labourer is not a bonded labourer-Court will be justified in pressuming thilt the labourer ls a bonded labourer unless the pfesumption is rebutted by . producing satisfactory mairial.

Minbnum Wciges Act, Worktnen's C0mpensation 1Act, 1983, Paynient of Wages Act, E1npl0Yees State Insurance Act, Emplqyees Provident Fund and MisCel/aneous Provisions Act, Maternity Benefits Act, 1957-Benefits accruing under these Acts- Whether available to mine workers. -

The petitioner, an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded . labourers in the country, addressed a Ieiter to Hon'ble Bbagwati, J. alleging : (1) H that there \Vere a large number of labourers from different parts ofthC: Country who wC:re work.1ng in some of the stone quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of . ' . '

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!982] 2 S.c.R.

Haryana under

0 inhuman and intolerable cohditions; (2) that a large number of them were bonded labollrcrs; (3) that the provisions of the Constitution and various social Weffare laws passed for the benefit of the aid workmen ere not be:- ing implemented in regard to these IabOurers .. Th~ petitioner also mentioned in the letter the names of the stone. quarries and particulars of labourers who were work~ ing a_s bonded labourers and prayed that a w.t; it be issued for Proper implementation of the yarious provisiOni .of . the.., soda! welfare legislations, s:4ch as,· Mins Act, 1952 Inter-State ~11grant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con.:. ditiofls of Service) Act, 1979, Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,

1970, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, Minimum Wages.Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, Payment of Wages Act, Employees State Insurance Act, Ma.tern'ity enefits Act et~. applicable t~ these'Iabourrs Wo.rking in the said , sto-ne quarries with a view to endiIJ,$ the misery, suffering, and helplessness of "these victims of te inost inhllinan exploitation." ·

The Coui't treated the letter as a writ petition and appointed a commissi;>n to inqui.re into the allegations made by the petitioner. The conunission while cori- , firming the allegatic;>ns of the petitioner, pointed out i~ its ref)ort that-(i) the v,.hole

atmosphere in the alleged stone quarries was fuil of dust and it was difficult for any one tci breathe; ai) some of.the workmen were riOt allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced lab6ur; {ii) there was no facility of providing pure water to•drink and the labourers wefe compelled to' drink dirty water from a nul/ah; (i11) the labourers were not having proper shelter but were living in jhuggies With stones piled one upon the other as walls and straw caverning the top which Was too low to stanP, and which did not afford any proteCtion ag<iinst sun and rain;

(v) some of ihe labourers were suffering from chronic diseases; (vi) no compensa- tion was being paid tO labourerswhq were injured due iO accidents arising in the Course of cmploymeiit; (vii) there were no f<icilities for medical treatment or

chooling. At the direction of the Court, a socio-legal investigation Was a.lso carried out and it suggested measures for improving the conditions of the rnne workers;

The respondnts Cotitep.ded: (1) Article 32 of the Constitution is not attracted to the instant case as no fundcimental right of the .petitio"ner or of the workrr1en referred to in the petition is iiifringed ; (2) A letter addressed bY a party to this

Collrt cannot be treated as a writ petition;· (3) In a prdceeding under Art. 32,_ this . Court is not empoered to appoint any commission or an investigating body to enquire into the allegations made Jn the writ petition; (4} Reports made.by such commissions are based only on ex-parte statements which have not been tested by 'cross-examination and theiefore they. have no 'evidentiary value; and (5) there

might be forced labourers in the stone quarries and stone crushers.in the S_tate of Haryana but tlieY were not bonded. labourers within the meaning of that ex.pres- , sion as Used in the Ponded Laour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. '

RejeCtini all the contentions aD.d allowing 'the writ petition on merits,· tbe Court ·

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HELD : The State GoVernment's objection as to the maintainability of .)..--· the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by the petitioners is repre: hen'sible.

If any citizeri brings before the Court a coniptaiqt that a large nuni.ber of peasants or .workers are boqded serfs or are bing subjected to exploitation by a few mine lessees or contractors or emplo.yers.?r are beng enied htJ.o_benefit~ of.

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BAND HUA MUKTI MORCHA 'v. UN~ON 69

social welfare laws, the State Government, Which is, under our constitutional sche!Jle, charged with the µiission of bringing about a new socio-ecomonic order \vhere there will be social alld economic justice for.every One equality of status and opportuniiy for all, would \-velcome an inquiry by-"the .court, so that if it is found

- that there are ill fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are-not bof_1ded in the strict sense of the. term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 but they are made to proVide forced labour or are consigned to aJife of utter deprivatioD. and degradation~ such a situation can be set right by the State

Govcrnmnt. Even if the State Goveriunent"iS on its own inquiry satisfied ihilt the workmri are not bOnded and are notcompelled to provide forced Jabour and are Jivjng and wOrking in decent conditions with all the basic neceSsities of iife ' provided to them, the State Government should not baulk an inquiry bY the court when a complaint is brought by a citizen, but it should be anxiolls to satisfy the court and through tlie court, the pOOple of the coUntr.Y, that it is discharging its constitutional obligation fairly and adequately and the workriten are being nsured_ social and eeonomic justice .. [IQ2A-D].

2 .. Moreover, When a complaint is made on behalf of workmen that they are held in bondage and are working and living in miserable cOndltions Without any proper or adequate. shelter over their heads, without any protection ainst

sun and rain, without two squaremeals per da:Y arid withonly dirty water from a nullah tO drink, it is diffic.ult how such a_ complaint can be thrown out on the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen. It is the fundamental right of every one in this.country, assure4. under the interpfetation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen's Case, to Jive with 'human dignity, free from exploitatiori. This right to live with human _dignitY enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from: the Directive Principles of State Poiicy and -particullrly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, , it mttst include protection Of the health. and strength of workers, men and women, and of.the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities 3nd"faci~ lities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in cond!tionS of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the ffiinimum.requirements which fllUSt exist in order to ertable a person to live with human dignity .and no State-neither thC Central Government nor ariy State Govefiiqient-has the right ta , take any aCtion which will deprive a person of the enjoymentof thesebasic essentials. Since th, e Directive Principles of State Policy contained .in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 arid- 42 arC

-"" not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the jLidicial_ process to make provision by statutory nactment 'or executive fiat fOr ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a Jife of human dignity but"where legislation is alteady enaGted by the State providing these ba-3ic require~

ments to the wOrkinen ·.and thus invsting their" right to Jive with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content,· the. State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inactiOn op. the partof the State fn securing implementation of such leg!slation would amount to denial of the right to live

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with human.dignity nshrined inArticie 21, more so in the context of Article 256_ which provides 1hat the exceutive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State. [103B-H-104A] ·

3. The State is Under a: cOnstituti.onaI obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental right of any person, particularly when lie clongs, to the

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1984] 2 S.C.R

. wa~r secti?ns of the conunity and ls unable to wage a legal battlC against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him.

The Central Government is therefore bound to ensU.re obserVancC of various social welfare and,13.bour laws enacted by Parliament for the purpose of securing tO the workmen a life of basic

uman dignity in compliance wifh the_ Directive Principles of Stte Policy. It niust also follow as a necessary corollary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries arc vested by reason of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act . 1973 and which is therefore the owner.of the mines cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, permit wqrkni.en to be denied the benefit of various social welfare and labour laws enacted with. a view to enabling them to live a life of humln dinity. The State of Haryana n1ust therefore ensure that the minele'ssees or contractors, to whom it is giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, observe various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen.

TJ:iis is a constitlltional obligaton which can be enforced against the Central Government and the State of Haryana by a writ petition under Article ' 32 of the Constitution. [1.04 AD]

4. While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that our approach •

1nut-be guided nOt by any verbal or formalistic canons ef construction but by the paramount object and purpose-for 'vhich this Ariicie has been .enacted 3.s a Fund.a mental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation 'must receive illu.mination from the tiinity of provisions-which permeate and energise the entire Constitution

amely, the Preamble, the Fundamenta! Rights and the Directive PrinciPles of ·, State Policy. ClauSe (I) of rticle.32 confers the righ~ to inove the_ Supreme c:otirt. for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;=> but it does not say as to who , shall have this right to move the Supreme Court -nor d0eS it say by what proceeding~ the Supreme Court may be so movd. There. is no limitation in the words

of Clause. (J) of Article 32-that the fundamental right which is sought to be enforced bY n1oving the Supreme Court should be o.ne belonging to the person who n1oves the Suprerne Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court shoU:ld be moved only by-a particular kind of proceeding.· It is clear on the plain language of clause' (l)' of Article 32 that wheriever there is ii violation of a fundamental right, any .One can move the Supreme Court for enforcement Of , such fundamental right."

Of course, the collrt would nbt, in exercise of its discfetion, intervene at the in stance of a meddlesome interloper or buSy body and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundain"ental fight is violative should

0be allowed_ to activise the court, but. there is no fetter upon the power of the court to entertain a proceeding initiated by ally person other than .the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would not ordinarily entertain such a proceeding, since the person whose fuiidamental right.is violated. can always approach the court-and if he docs not wisli to seek judical redress by moving the court, why should some one else be'.allowed to do so on his behalf~ This reasoning however breaks down in the case of~ person orciass of persons , vhose fundamental right is violated but who cannot have resort to "the court on acCount of their poverty or disability:or socially or economically disadvantaged position and in such a case, therefore, the court can and rriust allow any membf:r of the public ating bona fide to esPouse thC cause of such person or class of persons.

This does not violate, in the slightest measµro the Iallguage of the constitutional provision enacted in clause (1) of Article

32. [106 BH-107AJ • • ff s:~ Clause (1) of Articie. 32 s_ays that the Suprf.me Cotirt can_ be moved for cnforcenlent of a fundan1ental right by any 'appfopriate' proceeding. There

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 71

is no liinitation in regard to the_kind o_f proceeding envisaged in clause (1) of Article 32 except that the proceeding must be "appropriate" and this requirement of appr.opriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right. The Constitution makers deliberately did not Jay down any pariicular forn1 of proceeding for enforcement or a fundamental right nor di&, they stipulate that suCh proceeding should confonn to anY rigid pattern or straight jacket fonnula as, for example, in Erigland, becau5e theY knew that in a country like India where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and xploitation, any insistence on a rigid for mula of proceeding for enfotcement of a fundamental right would become elf~ defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental r, ights beyond the reach of the comiµo"n man and~ the entire remedy for enforcetnent of fundamental rig_hts which the Constitution makers regarded as so precious and invaluable that they elevatCd it to the status of a fundii.mentaI right, would become a mere rope of sand so far aS; the large masses of the people in this country are concerned.

The

Constittion makers therefore advisedly provided in clause (1) of Article .32 that the Supreme Court may be moved by any 'appropriate' proceeding, 'appropriate' not in terms of any particular form but •appropriate' with reference to the purpose of the p'oceeding. [107 A-F] ·

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Therefore where a member of the public acting bona fide mOves the Court for.enforcement of a fi.!-ndamenta1 right on beha_lf of, a person or lass of persons who on-account of poverty or disability or socially of economicallY disadvantaged D position canriot approach the court for relief, such member of the public may mOve the collrt even by just writing a letter,' because it woi.Ild not be right or fair to expect a person' acting pro bono Publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer aii.d prepar.ing a regular writ petitiofi for being filed in court for enforcement of the fundamental right of the poor and deprived sections of the community and in such a case, a letter addressed by him can legitimately be regarded as an."

"appropriate" proceeding. [107 F-H] E'

. 6.

Public Interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation.but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the goYernment and its officers to make basic human rights meanirigful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the comn1unity and to assure them 'social and economic justice whici:) i~ the signature tune of our Constitution. When the Court 'entertains public interest litigation, it does no.t do so in a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood or with a yiew to tilting at . executive authority or seeking to unsurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure obser-

Vance ar social and economic rescue progfamrhes, legislative as wen as eXecutive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against v; iolation of their basic hunian ;-ights, which is also thti eonstitutional obli

gation of the executive. The Court is thus merely assisting in the realisation of the constitutional. objectives. [102 D-E, G-H, 103 A-Bl

Clause (2) of Article 32 conferring power on the Supreme Court "to issue directions, or orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari" which ever may e appropriate, for enforcement of any of the fundamerital rights, is in the widest terms.. It is not con, fined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamust prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions - differing froin one writ to another. But it is i'.nuCh wider and includes within its

trix, Power to issue any directions, orders or WtitS Which may be appropriate ' .

SuPREME COURT RE}?ORTS

(1984] 2 S.C.R.

fot enforctment of the fudamental right in question and this is m3.de aniply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua warranto and certiorari. Therefore even if the Conditions' for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled," the Supreme court

wou.ld have power to issue any directjon, order or it including a Writ in the nature of any high Prerogative .writ.· This provision conferring on the .SuPreme .court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest poss1ble terms shows the anxiety of the constitution makers not to a1Iow anY proceduraJ. technicalities to stand in the way Or enforcement of fundamental rights. Th6 Constitution makers 'clearly intended .that .ihe Supreme Court should have the an1plest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ may be 'appropriate. in a given case for enforcement of a fundamental right: That is why the Constittioll is silent as to what procedurC sh<i.11 be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the power to issue such direction or Order or writ as in Article 32 and advisedly so, beca.Sue the constitution makers never_ intended to fetter the discretion of the Supreme Court to evo!ve a procedure appropriate in the circumstances of a given case• for the purpose of enabliiig it to exercise its .power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither claug; e (2) of Article 32 nor any other provision of"the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its power to issue an approrpriate direction, order or writ. The pprpose for which the power to issue "an appropriate direction, order or -writ isconferred on the Supreme 'Court is to secure enfotcement of a fundtimeri.tal .fight.and obviously therefore, \vhatever

pr0cedure is necessary for fu1filment of that purpose must be permissible .to the Supreme Court. [108 B-H, 109 A-BJ , ·

8,. It is notvat ail obtigatOrJ. that an <idversarial prot:edurc. where each party producJs his own evidence tested by cross-examination by the other side .and the judge sits like an umpire and decides the case only on the basis of such m8.terial as

may be produced before him by both parties, must be .followed ih a proceeding under Article 32 for enforcement of a fundamental right.

In _fact, there is no such constitUtional compulSion enacted in clause ·(2} of Article 32 or ifn any other part of the Constitution. There is D.othing sacrosanct abOui the adversarial , procedure with evidence led by either party and tested by cr_ossxmainatfon by the other party and the judge playing ; i. positi.ve role has become a part of our legal system beCause it is embodied in the Code of Civil pro_Cedure and the. Indian Evidence ACt. But these statutes obviously have no application where, a new jurisdiction is created in the Supreme Court for enforcement of a fWldamental right. Therefore it Is rtot justified to impose anj" restriction on the power of the Supreme Cour::t' adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in _exercise. of Its new jurisdication, by lngrafting adve.rsarial procedure on it, when the constitution makers have deliberately chosen not tO insist, on any such requirement and instead left it open to the SuprCme C9urt to foliow such procedure as it thinks appropriate for the purpose of securing the end for which the" power is conferred namely, enforcement of a funruin1eiita-1

right. [109 B-0) . . .

9. The strict adherence to the adversarial procedure can som~ times lead to injustice. Particularly when the parti~ are nOt evenly balanced Jn social or econo mic strength. Where one of the parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and depriVed section of thecOminnity.and do~ not possiss adeqate social and material resour ces, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and powerful opponent uri, der the adversary,.system of justice, becasue of his.difficulty iii.getting competent legal representation and more than an)'thing else, his inability to produce relevant

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BANVHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION. 73

evidence before ihe court.

Threfwe, when ihe. por come before the court'. particularJy for. enforcement of.their fun, daffiental .. rjghts, it is ecesry to dpart fom

.... the adversarial procedure and to evoivea ne":. pro_cedurc wh_1chw1ll_make It posSible

for tbe poor and the weak to bring the necessary Illt.erial before the court for te

purpose of securing enforcen1ent of their fundamental_ rights. If the adver.san~~ procedUre is truly followed in their case, they would never be able to enforce their fundamental rights and the" result ould be nothing but a mockry of the _-Constitution. Therefore the Courts should a:balldon the laissez faire approach in the judicial process particularly where it.involves a question of enforcement of funa

inental rights and forge new tools, devise new methods and adopt new strategi~

... for the purpose of making fundamental rits meaningful for the large maes of people. And this is clearly pcnnissibli: on the language of clause (2) of Article 32 because the Constitution makers while. enacting that clause haye deliberately and advisedIY not used 'and words restricting th.e .power of the court to adopt any procedure which it considers appropriate in the circumstances of a given case for enforcing a fundamental right. [1_10 BFl '

10. .it is. obvious that the .Poor and. the disadvantaged cannot possibly: produce relevant materia-1 before the Court in support Of their caso and equally where . . an action is brought on their behair by a citizenacting pr(J bono pub/ico. it would be almost impossible for him to gather the relevant !9.aterial and place it before the Court. lo such a case the Supreme Court would he faiiing in discharge of its con- 'tional duties of enfofcing a fundamental right if it refuses to intervene because th"e

stitupetitioner belonging to the underprivileged segment of society or a Public spirited citizen espousing his cause is unable to produce the relevant material before the court.

If the Supreml; l Court \vere to agopt a passive approach arid decline to 'intervene in such a case because relevani material has not been produced before it by the party Seeking its intervention, the fundamental tights would remain merely a teasing i11usion so far as the poor and disadvantad sections of the community are concerned. Therefore the SuPren1e Court has evolved the practice of appointing conunissions for the purpose of gthering facts and data in regard to a Complaint' of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf.of the weaker sections of the society. The Report" of 'the commisSioner would furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful to appoint a responsible person as commissioner to make an inquiry or investigation into the fats r~Jating to the complairit. Even in the past the Supreme Court has appoii:ted sometimes a district magistrate, sometimes a district Jue; some- . times a professOr of law,· sometimes a jciumalist, sometimes an officer of the court and soinetims an advocate practising in the court, for the purpose' of carrying out an enquiry of investigation and inaking report to the court because the commissioner appointe'd .by the Court .must be a-responsible person who enjoys the confiden~ of the court and who is expected to carry o-Ut his assignment objectivey and impartially without" any predilection or .prejudice. Once the report of the conimissioner is fived, copies of ii-would be supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants to 'dispute anyof the facts or date statedjn the Report, rnaY do so by filing au affidavit nd the court then eonsider the report of the co.mmissioner and thC affidavits which rilay have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon the issue "arising in the wdt" petition. It would. be entirely foi the Court io consider what wtiight to attach to the f<icts and data stated in the report of the commissioner and to what extent to act'upon such.facts and data. But it wOuld not be correct to say that the report of the commissioner hasno evidentiary value at al1, since the Statements

WPREME COURT REPORTS. [1984] 2 s.c.R.

m<lde :in it are not_ tested b~ cross-examinaioQJ., To accept this co'ntentio'n would be to introduce the adversarial_ procedure-in a pr.occeding where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. [111 B-H, 112, A-BJ

1.1. If is 'true that Order XL Vi of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 makes the provisions of Order xxvr of the Code of Civil Procedure, except rules 13, 14, 19, io, 21 and 22 applicable to the Supreme Court and lays down the procedure for an application, for issue of a Comm_ission, but Order XXVI is not exhaustive and does

Ilt" dtract from the-inherent power of th(l Supreme Court to appoint a conurllsion, if the. appointment of such Comthission is found necessary for the purpose of secur- .ing enforcement fa funda1nental tight inexercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 32. Order XLYI Of_ the Supreme Court Rules 1966 cannot in any way n1ilitate against the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in fact rule 6 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides that noth.ing in these Rules "shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent Powers of the couft to niakC such orders as may be nssry for the cndS of justice. [l 12 C-F]

In the instant case, thf:refore, the Court did not act'beyond its power in appointing the commissions for the purpose of making n inquiry into the conditions of_ workmen employed i°' the st<iJ.e quarries. The petitioner in the writ petition specifically alleged violation of the fundamental rights of the workmen employed in the stone quarries under Articles 4.1 and 23 and ii was therefore necessary for the court to' appoint these comn1issioners for th, e purpose of in{iuiring i11to the facts related to this complaint. The Reports of the Commissions were clearly docwnents . hri.ving cvidentiary value .ind. they fui-nished prima facie evidence 'of the facis and data stated in those Reports. Of course, it is f0r the' court to consider what ".'eight it Should attach to the facts and data contained in these Reports , in the light of the various ri.ffidavits filed in the proceedings.[l, l.2 F-H, 113 A-BJ.

• . 12.· The position pointed out as the power of_ the Supreme Couft to appoint

con1misionerS in the exercise of its jurisdictiOn under Article 32 1nust"apply equ3.lly in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 for th~ tatter Jurisdiction is also a ne\V constitutional ju(isdiction and it is conferred in the same wide ten, ns as the jurisdiction Under Article 32 and the san1e powers can and must therefore be exerCised by the High Court v.ihilc exercising jurisdic- 'tion under-Art.ide 226. In fact, ihe jurisdiction of th~ High Courts under Article 226 is much \Vider, because the High.COurts are required to exercise this jurisdictiOn not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal righ_t and there are many rights conferred on the poor and .. the disadvantaged which are the creation of statute and they need to be enforced, as urgently and vigo_tousl!' as fundan1ental rights .. [I I 3 B-D] •

3 : 1.

The Stne quarries in the instant case are "mines" within the meaning of the Section 2 (j) of the Milles Act, 1952 since they are excavations where operp.-

tions for the purpose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are eing carried on but they are not 'open Cas"t working' since admittedly e~Civations , in the case of' these Stone quarries extend below superjacent.ground.

Since the workings in these stone quarriciS extend below Superjacent ground t1-nd they are not 'open east \Vorkings' and 'moreover explosives are admittedly used in connection with

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 75 • the excavation, the conditions set out in the. proviso to see. 3 (i) (i) are not, fulfilled and hence the exclusion of the provisioris of the Minrs Act 1952 (other than the excepted sections) is not attracted and 'all the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 apply to these stone quarries. The" prOvJsions contailled in chapters V1 VI & VII of the Mines Act confer certain rights and benefits on thfl workIQen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and these rights <ind benefits intended to secure to the workman jus~ ar.d human conditions of .\\'ork ensuring a decent. standard of Iife with basic human dignity. Since th~ stone quarries are not being exploited by the State of Haryana though it is the o.wner of the st.one quanies, but are being given out on lease by auction, the rn, ine-lessees who are not only lessees but also occupiers of the stone quarries arc the owners of the stone quarries within the mean.:. ing of that expression as used in section 2 (1) 3.nd so also are the owners of stone crushers ill relation to their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners of. stone crushers are, therefore, liable under section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952 to carry out their operations in accordance with the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines Rules, 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made under that Act and to ensure that the rights and benefits conferred by these provisions are actually and . concretelY made available to the workmen. The Central Government is entrusted under the Mines Act 1952 with the rsponsibilit).' of securiilg compliance with the provisions of that Act and of the Mines Rules 1953 a.nd other Rules and Regulations made under that Act and it is the primary obligation of thci Central Government to ensure that .these provisions (\re complied with bY the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners.

The State of Haryana is.also under an obligation to take all necessary steps for the purpose of secµring compliance with these provisions by the mine-ICssee~ and owners of stone crushers. The Staie of Haryana is .therefore, in-any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions.of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines , g\lles 1955 and otherRules and RegulatiOns made under that Act for the berrefit of the workmen. [113 G-H, 114 A, li5 A1 E: G, li6 B-F, 117 GD]

13. The Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulatio-n of Employment and, . conditions of Service) Act, by sub-seCtion (4) of section (1) applies to every establishn1ent in which five or more inter-St; ite M-igrant workmen are employed or wereemployed on any day of the preceding twelve n1onths .and so also it appiies

o every contractoi who employs or employed five or mre inter~State migrant \Vorkmeil on any day of t_he preceding twelve m<:>ntJ:is.

Section (2) sub-section (1) Clause (b) of the Act defines contractor, in relation to an establishment, to me?.n "a person \vho undertakes (whether as an independent contractor, agent, employee or otherwise) to' produce a given res Ult for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods and articles of n1anufacture to such establishment, b)• the employment of workmen or to supply workmen to the establishment, and includes a subcontractor, khatedar, sardar, agent or any other person, by whatever name called, who recruits or employs workman." Clause (e} of s.Ub-section (1) of section (2) defines. "interstate Migrant Workmen" to .mean "any person who is recruited by or through a contractor in one State. under an a, greement or other arragement for employment in an establishment in anoiher State, whe'the1 with or without the knowledge of the principal employer in relation to Such establisbment." The expression "priipal en1ployer" is defined by claUse (g) of sub-tion (1) of section 2 tO inean "in relation to a mine, the owner or agent of the mine and where a person has been named as the nianager of the mine, .the person so named." Obviously, therefore, the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in the .present case would be principal en1ployers within the meaning of that expression as used in the Inter-

76 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS . . [1984] 2 s.c.R.

State WorknlCn Act. Section 16 Jays a duty on every contractor employing inter State migrant work1nen i_n connection with the work of an csta blishment to prov id~ various other facilities particulars of. which are to be found in Rules 36 to 45 of

he Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules. (These facilities include me'dical facilities, protective clothing, di-inking water, latrines;_ urinaIS and •washing facilities, rest rooms, cateens, crccbe and residential accomn1odation) .. The obligation to provide these f<icilities is in reltion to the-inter-State migrantwOrkmen employed in an estab1ishn1ent to which the Act applies. Rut this liability is not confined only to the contracti;>r1 , because Section 18 provides in so many terms that if any anowancc required tb be paid under-section 14 or 15 to an inter., State migrant workmari is not paid by the contractor or if any facility specified in Section 16 is not provided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the casf'. may be, . the fa.cility"s'1.a11 be provided by the principal employer within such tin1e as ma.Y be prescribed by the Rules and all the allowances paid by the priricipal employer or all the expenses incurred by him in thiS connection may be recovered by him from the

conractor either by deductiori froln the iamount payable to the contiactor or as a ·.debt payable by the contractor. [117 F-H, U9 E-A-120 A]

14. Th"ethekcd'ir or jamadar who is engaged by. the 1nine lessees or the stone-. crusher own'ers to recruit workrrien or e1nplOy them on behalf of the mine lessees or stone crush:r o"Yners Would clearly be a 'contractor' within the meaning of that term as'defined in Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (b) and the \YOrkmen recruited by or thtough hin1 from other States for crnployni.ent in the stone quarries and stone crushers in the State of Haryana w0:uld Undoubtedly -be interState migrant work meri.

Even when the thekedar or jamadnr recruits or employs workmen for the

sL:>n~ qL11rries and ston~ 'crUshrs by sen:lii1g word" through the "old hands", the workmen so rhCruited or "entployed would, h~ interState migl:at workmen, becausO the "old. hands" wo.uld be really acting as agents of the thekedar or janiadar fo'r the purpose 'of recruiting or employirig workmen crushers in the Sfiite of Haryana. (121-E]

l5. In addition tO the rights and beefits conferred upon hiin Under the Inter-State Migrant W0rkmen Act _and the" iriter-State Migrant \Vorkmen Rules~ an intcrState migrant -workman is also, by reasori of Section 21, entitled to the benefit of the Provisions contained in the workmen's Cotnpen, sation Act 1923, The Payment of Wages Act 1936, The EmploYees' State Insurance Act 1948, . The Employees'. Provident Fu rids afld Misc. Provisions Apt, 1952, and_ the Maternity Benefit Act 1961. ('122 B-C] •

The obligation to give effect to. the provisipns cOntaind in .these various laws is not only that of the jamadar or thekedar and the minelessees and stone crushers owners (provided of course there are 5 or more intC'rState Migrant Workmen em.ployed ln the establishment) but; also: that of the. Central Govenunent because tpe. Central Government being 'the "ppropriate Government" within the meaui~ of Sectio.n 2(l)(a) is under an obligation to take necessary steps for the purpose of securing compliance with these , provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stori.e .crushers. The State of Haryana is also bound to ensure that these provisions are observed by the thekedar or jamadar and. minelessees and owners of .stoi1e crushers. [122D:.F] ~

H 16.' If the Jan1adar or thekadar in a Stone quarry or stone ci; usheris a •con trac.tor• within te meaning of the definition of the tem1 in the Inter~State Migrant

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. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION 77

WOrkmen Act, he wollld a fortiorari be contractor' also for the purpose of Conti-act Labour Act and any workmen hired in or in cohncc.tio{i with the work of stone quarfy or stone crusher by or through thejarn.adar or thekedar \vou1d be work- . men entitled to the-benefit of the provisions of the Contract labour Act.- . Where . therefore the tl; tekedar for Jan1adar is a Contractor, 3.nd the workmen are. employed as 'coritract labour'within the rtlealling of these expressions as used in the Contr'act Labour Act the Contractor is well as the principal employer would be liable io omply with the Provisions of the Cotract Labor Act and the Contract Labour Rules nd to. provide to the contract labour rights and benefits collferred by these Provisions. The Central Government being the ''appropriate government'' witliin the meaning Of section 2 subsection.(l) clause (a) would be responsible for ensuring compliance \ith the provisions of the Contract Labour A.ct and the Contract Labour

Rules by the mine-lessees and Stone crus.hers 0¥.'ners apd the thekedar :or jamadar.

So also, for reasons discussed while dealing with the applicability of the Mines Act 1952 and the Inter State Migrant.'Norkmen Act, the State of Haryana Woqld be under an obligation to enfore the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Contract Labour Rules for the h:nefit.of the workm, en. [123 E-F, H .• 124 ACJ

17. There can be no doubt and indeed this was not .disputed On behii.lf of the respondents, tat the Miniffium Wag, es Act"1948 is applicable.to workmen employed irl the stone quarries and stone crushers. Therefore whatever be the mode of payment fclloWed by the mine lesSees and stone crusher owners, the V.'orkmen must . get nothing less than the minirrium .wage for .the joQ which is being carfied out by them and if they are required to carry out additionally any of the functions pertaining to another job or occllpation for which a separate minimum wage is prescribed, they must be paid a proportion.ate part of such minimum wage in addition . to the minimum wage payable to them for the work priffiarily carried out bY them. The system of payment which is-being followed in the stone quarries and stone cru~ shers, under which the expenses of the explosives and of drilling holes arc to be borne by the workmen out of their own Wages, should be changed and the explo- . sives required for carrYing out blasting should be supPlied by,_th~ mine lessees or the .jamadar or thekedar without any deductio.n being made out of the v.-ages of. the workmen and the Work of drilling holes and shot firing should be entrusted only

.' to those who have received the reqisiie training un.der the" Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966.

So far as the complaint of the petitionerthat the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone cru.shcrs are not beir, g . paid the mfnlmum wage due and payable for the work caified out by them is concerned,· jt is a matter which would have to be i!J.vestigated and detem1i, ncd. Ll24 C, 125 A-E]

The Bonded Labour system is intendc'i:l to strike against the system of bonded labour which has been a shameful scar on the Jndian Soda! Scene for

1decades and ,;,.hich has c6nti.nued to disfigre the life of ihe nation even after independence. The 'Act was brought into force thro.ugh out the length and breadth of the country with effect from 25th October 1975, which means that the Act has been in force now for .almost 8 years and if properly implemented, it sho.uld ha Ve by this time brought 8.bout cOmplete idehtification, freeing and rehabilitation of bonded labouf. Bllt as official, semi-official and non-offici?-1 reports show, we have yet to go a long way in wiping out this outrage against humrinity. [126 A-C]

18. It i.S clear bonded 1aboUr 1s a form of .forced labour and Section 1~ of the Bonded Labour Systein (Abolition) Act 1976 recognises this self-evident l prc_>position by Jajringa duty on every District Magistrate and e-Very officer specified

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS" [1984] 2 s.c.R.

by him to inquire whether any bonded Jabour SYS\em or ay other form_ of fod labour is being enforced by or on behalf of any , person and, if so, to take such action as inay be necessary to eradicate the enforcement of such forced Jabour.

The thrust of the Act is against. the continua-rice of any fornl of forced 1abur. It is of course true that, strictly speaking, a borided labourer mens a labourer who incurs or .has or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt and a bori.ded debt

mans an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded labourer under or in pursuance 9f the 11oried labour system and it wold therefore appeaf that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not only be forced to provide 13.bour to the employer -but he must have also received an. advance or other economic consideration from. the employer unless he is made to provide forced labour in pursuance of any custoni or.social obligation 3r by reason of his birth i_n ny p1rticular caste or community. -J30 A~D] ·

19.

The contention of the State of Haryana.that the burden of proof under the bonded labour System (Abolition)- Act, 1976 is upon the bonded labourers is misconceived. To insist that the bonded labourers n1ust first prove that they are. pzoviding forced lab_our in consideration of an adVance or othef .economic con~

sidration rec:ived Dy thm and then only they woU.ld be eligible_ for the benefits provided urlder the Act, is nothing but asking tlicm to do a t'ask which is extremely diffi.:::Ult, if iiot imposible. _ The labourers w6'.ild have no evidence :it all .to prove so and since employment of bonded labour is a penal Offence underthe Act, the e:nployer \Vould im:nediately without any hesitation disown ha-Ying given any advance or e:; onomic consideration to the bonded. labourers. The insistance of proof from two labo'urers by the State Government which is constitutiOllally mindated to bring :ibout Change in the life conditions of the poor aad downtrodden and to ensure social justice to. the1n is rePrehensiblC . (130 F-H, 131 AJ

• It would be cruel to insist that a bonded labour in order to derive the benefits of this i; ocial welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal. process of t_rial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence. That. would be a totally futile process. because it is obvious that a bonded labourers can never stand "up. to the regidity and formalism of the legal process due to his poverty, illiteracy atld social and economic backwardness and if such a procedure were required to be followed, the St.ate Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book. It is now statistically establ_ished that most of bonded labourers are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes and ordinary course of human affairs would show, indeed judicial notice can be takeri of it, that there would be nO occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation wher~ he is reqiiired to supply (arced labour for no wige or for nominal wage, unless he has received some advance of other economic consideration from the employer and under the consideration fron1 the employer and under the pretext of not. having returned such a1Vance or other economic consideration, he is required to render service to the employer br is .deprived of his freedcim of -employment or of the right to moVe freely whereever he wants. Therefore, whenever it is shown that a labourers is maae to provide forced labour, the Court would raise a, presumption that he is required to do so ln consideration of an advance o.r other economic consideration received bY him and he is therefore a bonded labourer. This presumptionmay ·

b~ rebutted by the .employer and also by the State Government if it so chooses but unless and until satisfactory m:lterial is produced for reubuting this presump- .tion, the Cotirt must proceed on the basis that-the lab.curer is a bonded labourer entitled to .the benefif of the provisions of the Act. The Stte Government _cannot

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BAND:~UA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 79

be permitted to repudiate its obligation to identify, release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers on the ple3. that though the concerned labollrers m:iy be providing forced labour, the State Government does not owe any obligation to them .. unl~Ss and until they , show in an appropriate legal proceeding .conducted

'accordif\g to the rules of adversary ystem of jllsti&,. that they are bonded labourers. [131 C-H, 132 A]

20 .. Thugh section 13 provides for constitution of a Vigilance Committee in each f:>istrict and each sub.-division of a 'District, 'the Government-of Haryana, for some reason or the other,· did not constitute any Vigilance Conrmittee until

ts attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by this Court. It may be that according to the Go'vernment of Haryapa there .were not at any time any bonded labourers v., ithin. its territories, .but everl so Vigilance COmmittees are required by Sectipn. 13 to be constltuted because the function of the Vigilance Committee is to identify bonded labourers, if there are any, and tO free and rehabilitate them and it would.not be right for the State Goyernment not to constitute vigilance Comn1itteeS on the assumption.that there ate no bonded labourers at

~11. In constituting Vigilance Committee in each District and .• sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action group~ operating at the grass root level; for it is only through such social actioti groups and voluntary agencies that the problems of identification of bonded labour can be effectively 'solved. [128 E-H, 129 AB]

_The magistq~.tes and jUdicial officers take. a very lenient view of _violations D o( labour laws enacted for the benefits of the workmen and Jet off the defaulting employers \\lith smaM fines. There have also. been occasions where the magistrate and judicial officers have scotched prosecutiOns and acquitted or discharged the defaulting employers on hypertechrlicalities. This happens largely because the magistrates and judicial officefs are not sufficiently sensitised to the importance of the-observance of labour laws .\vith the result that the labour I<iws are" allowed to be, ignored a'nd breached \vith utter callousness and indifference nd the workn1en

.E begin.to feel that the defaulting employers can, b)r vaying a fine which hardly touches "their pocket, escape from the arm of law and \he labour laws supposdely enacted fcir the'ir benefit are not meant to be observed but are 1nerely decorative appendages intended to assuage the conscience of the workmen. The Magistrates ahd Judicial .

Officers shou[d take a strict yiew of violation of labour,'Jaws and t~ impose ad.equate punishment on the erring en1ployers so that they may realise that it docs nt pay to commit a breach of such la\vs arid to deny the benefit of such la\VS to the F workmen. [145 A-DJ

21. :rhe Court issued several directiQns to the entral Government and the State Government and the variouS authorities for implen1enting the provisions enacted in various social welfare lavs for the benefit of the' orkmen employed in the stone qurries and stone. crushers in the state of Haryana. So that the poor workmen' who lead a miserable exlsteiicc-maY one day be able to realise that freedom is not Only the monopoly .. _of a few but belongs tO them all and that they are also equally entitled along With others to pa.rt.icipate in the fruits Cif freedoiri and development. [1.32 D, 145 D-F]

PER PATHAK, J CONCURRING

("l) Public Interest Litigation in its present form constitutes a new chapter in olir judicial system. It has acquired a significant degree of importancein the

jurisprudncc practised by our cot1rts~.and has evoked a iively, if Somewhat Conc .

80 •

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19B4] 2 s .. C.R.

. troversial, resPnse' in fogat circles, in the edia and among. the general public.

In our country, this new class of litigiition is justificed by its protagonists on the basis generally of vast areas in our population of illiteacy and. poverty, of sqcial and eoonomic backwardness, and of an insufficient awareness and appreciation •. of individual and collective rights. These handicaps have denied nlillions' of our collntrymen access to justice. Public intereSt litigation is aid to possess the potential or providing su'ch access in the nµlieu of a new ethoS; in which pa:rticipa ting sectors in the adininisttation of justice cOperate in the creation of a 'system which promises legeal relief without cu4bersme formaufy arid heavy expe1lditure.

In the resut, the-Jegal organisation has taken on a radically. new dimension, and correspondingly new per_spectives are opening up before judges and lawyers and

State Law agencies in th_e tasks before tQ.em.

A crusading z.ea.1 iS abro:ld, viewing the present as an opportunity to -waken the political and legalorder to the objectives of social justice projecte~ in our oristitutional. system.- New slogans -fill the air, and new phrases .µave entered the legal dictionary, and one hears of 'the "justicing system" being galvanised into supplying justice to the socio-cconomi~ disadvanta'ges. These urges are responsible for t!le "birth of ne\V judicial concepts and the expanding horizqn calpower. They c1aith to represent an increasing em phasis on social welfare and a progressive humanitarianism, To the mind trained in he certainty of the law, of defined P.rificiples." of binding. precedertt, andthe common IaW doctrine :or stare decisis, ihC. future is fraught with confusion and disorder in the legal world and severe strains in the constitutional system_. At

the lowest, thefe is an uneasy doubt about where we are going. If p-Ublic interest litigation is to command broad acceptance attention must be paid to certain . -releven~ considrations. The historY of human exPerience show~· that Whell a revolution in ideas. and ju action .enters the life of a nation, 'the nascent power so released possesses the potential of throwing. the prevailing social order into disarray. In.a changing society, wisdonl. dictates that reform sbOutd eme.rge in the existing polity as an ordered. change produce thrOugh its institution. , Moeover1 the pace of change needs to be handled'with care lest the institutions themselves be endangered. [152F-H; 153A~C; 153O;154 A-BJ

I :2 Like the Warren Court's affifmative act~On programmes for the benefit of minorities: and other sociaUy or econ.omically disasivantaged~ interests through the avenues of Public Law, the courts in India, are beginning fo apply a similar conCept of constitutional duty. The doctrine Of snditig has been enlarged in India to provide, Where reasonably possible, access tojustice to large sectors of people for whom so far it had been a matter of despair. It is tiine indeed 'for 'the law to do so. In larg'.e ril.e<isure, the traditional conception of adjudication represented th~ socio-ei; Onomic Vision prevailing at the turn of. thC century. In India,

as the consciousness of social justice-spread 'though our mUlti-Jayered social order, the constitutioll began to come under increasing pressure frOrri social action groups .. petitioning o~- behalf of the under privileged .and deprived sections of society for

the fulfilmet of .their aspirations. Despite -the varying fortunCs of the number of cases Or public interest litigation which have entefed the Sureme Court, '-Public InterCst, Litigation constitutes today_ a significant segment of -the court's , docket (154 D: )56 A-q

2:1. The Provisions of Article 32 do.not specifica11y. indicate \vho canmovC the Court. In the ab:; ence-of a C'.Jrifining provisiq~ in that respect, it is plaiiJ. that a petitioner m1y be anyone in wham the Law recognises a standing_ to maintain an action of such nature. (156 EJ '

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 BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCl; IA V. UNION 81

 2:2. As regards-the form of proceeding and its character, Article 12 speako generally o(

11appropriate proceedings." It should be a pr_oceeding which can appropriately lead to an adjudication of the claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental _right and can result in the grant of effective relief. Article 32 speaks Of ihe Court's power ''to issue direction or orders of writs'-', and the specific refCrenc:e to "writs in the nature of. habeas: corpus, man'damUs. prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari" is by way of illustration only. They do not exlmst the content of the Court's power under Article 32; [156 F-G]

3 :1.

A Practice has gown in the pubii.c of invoking the jurisdiCtion of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a legal injufy to the author or to some other person or group of persons, and the Court has treated such letter as a petition under Article 32 and entertained the proceeding "without anything more. It is only comparatively recently that the Court has begun to call fOr the filing of a regular petition on the ltter. There is~ grave danger. in-here.nt in a practce where a mere letter is entertained as a petition from a person whose antecedents and status 'are unknown. or so Unce-rtain that no sei:ise of responsibility can, without • anything more,. be attributed to the communication. There is go, od reason for the insistence on a document being set out in a form, or accompanied by evidence, indicating that the allegations made in it are made with a sense of responsibility by a person who has taken due care and caution to verify those a1legations before making them. A ptaiQt instituting a. sllit is required bY the Cocteof Civil Procedure to conclude with a clause verifying the pleadings contained in it: A petition or - application filed in court is required to be supported on , affidavit. TJ:ie.se safeguards are necessary because the document. a plaii1t Or petitiOn or application, commences a course of litigation invofVing the expenditure Of public time nd public money. besides in apprOpriate cases involving the issue of summons or notice to the defendant or respondent to appear and contest the proceeding. Men are busy conducting the aff<iirs of their daily lives, and nO orte occupied with the responsibilities and pressures of present day existence Welcomes b.eing summoned to a law court and involved in a litigation. A document making allegations without any proof whateVer of responsibility can conceivably constitute an abuse of the' process of Ia\V.

Therefore, iri special circumstances the document petitioning the coUrt for relief should be supported by satisfactory verification.

This requirement is all the grea.ter where petitions are received by the Court through the post. . It is never beyond the bound of posSibility that an unverified communi- 9ation received through the post by the court may in fact have been employed 1nala fide, as an instrument of coercion or blackmail or other oblique motiive against >a person named therein who holds a position of-honour and respect in society.

The Court must be ever vigilant against the abuse of its process. It cannot" do th.at better in this matter than insisting at the earliest stage, and before issuing riotice to the respondent,· that an appropriate verification of the allegations be supplied. The equirement , i$- iinperative in private law litigation. Having rg3.rd

to its nature and purpose, U is equally attracted to public interest litigation. While this Court has readily acted upon lc; tters and telegtams in the past, there is need to insist now on an appropriate 'verification of the petitioner other 9omunication.

bfore act_ing on it. It will always be a matter for the court to decide, on wha; t peti-' . ti<;>n will it require verification and when will it waive the rule. [157 B-H; 158 A-C]

3 :2. All communicatipns and petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court

mut' be addressed to the entire Court, that is t6 say, the €hief Justice and his companion judes, No such communication or petition can properly be addresse~

82 SUPREME COURT RBPoRTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

to a particular jdge. When the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked, it' i! the jurisdiction of the entire court. Which Judge or Judges will hear .the _Case 11 exclusively a matter concerning_ the interital regulation of the business o(the Court, interference with whi, eh by a litigant or member of the public constitutes the grossest jmpropriety. It iS Well established that when a division of the Court house and de'cides cases 'it is in law regarded as a he'\fing and ~-decision by the Court itself.

The judgffient pronounced :ind the decree or order made are aCts of the Court, and -accordingly !hcY are -respected, obeyed -and enforced throughout the land._ It 'is only right and proper that this should be known clearly to the lay public ..

Communications and Petitions addressed tO a particular Judge are inlpoper and : violate the institutional personality of thC Court; They also embarrass the judge to whom they "are personally a:ddr.!ssed. The fundamental Conception of the Court must be respected, that is a singfo indivisible institution, of united purpOse and existing solely for the high constitutional . functioris for which it has been. created. 'The conception ofthe Court as a Iooseaggregate of individual Juages, to one or more of whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its

very_existen~ arid endangers itsproper andeffective functioning. [158 E-H; 159 AJ

4::.1. In 'public interest litigation, the role held by Ute Court is more assertive than in traditional actions, Viewed from the Warrei; i Court's experience the role

f the Court is creative rather thari passive, and it assumes a more poSitive at.titude .

..... in determining facts. Not infrequentlY public interest litigation affects ihC rights .

of pefsOns not before the Court, and in shaping the relier the court must invari{l-bJy

tilke into account its impaCt on those interests. Moreover, when 1ts jurisdiction .is invoked on behalf of a group, it is as. well to remember. that differences may exist

in -eoritent and emphasis between the claims of different Sections of the grouP. For all these reasons the court must exercise the greatest caution and adopt procedures ensuring ufficient "Il.otici:: to all interests likely tO be affected. MOreover; the . nature of the litigation sometimes invoJyes the Continued intervention Of the Collrt over a period of time, and the organising of the litigation to a satisfiictory conclusion calls for judicial ~:tatemanship, a c(ose tlndeistanding Of collstitutionaJ and legal values in the context or' contemporary social forCes, and a judicious mix: of restraint and .activism determined bY the dictati; s of existing reaJities. Importantly, at the same. time, the Court must never fo_rge~ that its jurist.!ictipn extends no farther _than thelegitimate limits of itS constit\ltional powers, and avoid trespassing into political territory which under the Constitutior:i has been appropriated tb other organs of the State. [159 B; D-0]

4~2., The Procedures acJopd by the Court in cases. of public interest" litigation must of.-course be proced_ures designed and shaped by the Court with a view to resolving the problem presented before it on 'determining the nature and extent of relief <lccessible in the circumstances. Whatever the Procedure adopted by the cow\ it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and charateristic of a judicial proceeding. There are methods a:nd avues of procuring material available to e.._xecutive and legislative agencies and often employed by them .for the efficient and effective discharge of the tasks before them. Not .all those methods and avenues are available to the Court. The Court must ever remind itse'If that One of the indicia identifyillg it as a Court is the nature and character of the procedure adOpted by it in determining a controVersy. It is 'in that sense limited fn the evolution of procures pursued by it in the process of an adjudication, and -in th~ grant and etecgtion of the relief. Legal juriSprudenoo has in its historical

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BANDHUA MUKTI MDRCHA, V. UNION 83 ,

devciopment identified rtain fundamental _principles which. form the essential, Constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed in every:judidal proceedin& and constitute th'e basic .infrastructure along whose chamaCts HOws the power or the Co.urt in the process of adjudication. it59 H; 160 A-DJ

4:3. What should be. the conceivable fratne work of proure in public interest litigation does not admit of a clear cut aQSwer. It-is not poSsible to envisage a dCfinedfpattem of procedure applicii.ble to an cases. Of necessity the pattom whk:h the Court adopts will vary with the circuffistances of each case. But,

if there iS a statute prescribing a judici:i1 procedure governing the particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to th.e Court to bypass } the statute iind evolve' a different" procedure at variance with it. W, here, howevCr, the Procedure prescribed by statute is incomplete or insufficient; it will 'be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving iis own rules. Nonetheless, the sup-· plCmentary procedure must conform at all stages to the principles of natural justice. 'fhere can be no deviation from the principles of.natural jusiice and oiher, well accepted procedural nonns characteristic of a judicial proceeding. They constitute an entire Code of general principles of procedure, tried and pioven ii.nd hallowed by°the sanciity of common and c011sistent.acCeptance during long_years of the historlC(lJ develop.mt'nt of the law.

The general principles of law, to which i-eference is made here, command ihe confidence, not merely of thC , rUdge and the Iil.wyer and tlie' parties 'to the litigation, but supply that basic credible to the judicial proceeding which strengthens public faith in the Rule of Law~ Thy are rules rooted in reason and fairplay and. their goveman1...e guarantees a just ciispositipn of the case. The Court should be wary of suggestions favouring. nove1 procedures in cases where accepted procedural rules will suffice. 160 E~H; 161 AJ . . . . , s :I. Article 32 confers t_he widest amplitude of power of this Court in the matter of granting relief. ft has power to issue "directions or orders. of writs''.. and .. tJlere is no specic indiCat1on, no express language, limiting orcircumscriing that power. Yet, the power is limited by.1he very nature, that its judicial Power.

rt is powe_r which pertains to the judicial organ of 1be State, identified by the .very nature of the judicial institution .. There are certain fundamerital constitutional

concepts which, althoUB; h elemeptary, need to berecalled at times. The constitu-. tion envisages a broad division of the power of the State between the legislature, • the exCcutive and the judiciary. Alth0ugh the diviSion is not precisely demarcated, tP, ere is genera( acknowledgement of its limits. The limits can be gathered from the , Vritten text of the Constitution, from conventions and constitutional pfiictiee; and from an entire array of judicial decisions. The constitutional lawyer COncedes

a certain measure of overlapping in functional action among the .three organs-of .the State. But there is no warrant for a.Ssuming geometrical congruence. I, t is

conun9n place that while the legislature enacts the law the eXecutive implements ·it and the Court interpretS it and, iii doing so~ adjudicates on the Validity of execqtive.

acon and, under ovr Constitution, even ju.dges the validity of .the legislati9n itself;- And yet it is .We11 recognised ihat in a certain sphCre the JegisJature is pos~·

sessed of judicial power, the. executive possesses a measure of both legislative an& judicial functions, and thy cOurt, in i~ duty. of interpreting.the law, accomplished jQ its perfected action a marginal degree of Jegislative, exercise. NOnetheless, a tine and delicate balance is envisaged under our Constitution between-these primary institutions of the State. In every case the Court should deteine the tre limits of its jurisdiction and, havjng d.one so. it should take care to remain wiihin the

restra.ints of its jurisdiction. [161 B-H; 162 A]

84 SUPR!>Mi COURT REPOUS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

5:2. This aspect of Collrt action assumes especial significance in public interest litigation. It bears .upon the legitimacy of the judicial irntitution, and that legitimacy is affected as much .by the solution presented by the Court in resolvina a controversy as by the manner in .which the solutibn is reached. 1n' an area of judicial functioning where jlldiial actiism finds room for play, where coM"titutional adjudication 'can becoc an instrument of social policy forged by !he personal pohtical philoophy o{ tho Judie, !his ls an important comidoration 10 keep in mind. [162 BC]

. 5 :3. Whore Ibo Court embarks upon affirmative action in tho at":mpt fo remedy a consiitutional imbalance within the social order, few critics will ftc.d fault >11th it so Ions as it confines itself to the. soope of its legitimate authority. But there is always the possibility, In public interest.litigation, of succumbing to the temptation of crossing into te_rritofy which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the ExocYtive Government. For in mo!lt cases the jurisdiction of the Court is _Invoked when a default occurs, in executive administration, and sometimes where .a void _in community life remains unfilled by legislative action. Tho resulting public grieva'nce~ finds" eXpression through social action groups, which consider. the Couri an appropriate forilm fo! feµioving the deficiencies. Indeed, the citizen -e:eems to find it more convenient to apply to the Court fof the vindicit.tion of con ...

stitutional rights than appeal to the executive or legislative organs of the State ..

In the process of correcting executive error or' removing legislative omission the Court can so easily find itself involved in policy making pf a quality and to a degree characteristic, of political authority, and indeed run the risk of being mistaken for one.. An excessively political role identifiable with political govCrnance betrays the Court into functions alien to its fundarµental character, and tends to destrqy ., the delicate balance 'nvisaged in our constitutional system between its three basic institlltions. The Judge, conceived in the -true c1assical mould, is an impartial. arbiter, beyond and above Political bias and prejudice, functioning silently in ·&ccordan1re with the Constitution and his judicial conscience. Thus does h~ maintain tho legitimacy of the institution be selves and honour tho trust which his oftice _ bas reposed in him. (162 DHJ . ,_

Tho aftirmative schemes framed in public interest litigation by the C.Ourt sometimes' require detailed adJninistration under. constarit judicial supervision over proected periods. The lives of large sections of people some of whom have

T had no voice in the decisions, are shaped and ordered by mand<itory Court action

extending intq the f1,1ture. -Jn that context it is as wen to rerriember that public approval and public <:onsent assume material importance in fts successflll implementation. In contrast with policy making by legislation, where a large body bf legislators "debate on a proposed legislative enactment, no such visual impact can be perceiv'ed when judicial decrees are forged and fashioned by a, few judi_cial personages in 'the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of decision-making, 'is associated traditionally with cloistered secrecy and confidentiality and the end-result commonly issues as a final definitive act of the Court. It is a serious question whether in every case the siu; ne awesome respect and revercn~

_will en4ure during different Stages .of affirmative action seeking o regulaie the lives of large numbers of people, some ?f whom never participated in the judicial process. [16~ A-DJ H s :4. Treating with public interest litigation requires more than legal ota:rship and a knowledge or' iet book law. It is -of the utmost importance in such

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iiANDllUA MuKTI MORCHA V. UNION

cases th.ltwhen formulating a scheme of action, the Court must have duo regard to -the particular circllmstances of the case, to surrounding realities including the pOtentiat for successful implementation, and the likelihood a!ld degree of response from the agencies on whom the implementation will depend. In mo§t cases of public interest litigatiOn. there wilf .be neither precedent nor settled praCtice to add weight and force to the validity of the Court's action. The example of similar cases in other countries can afford little su"pport. The successful implementatjon of the orders of the Court will depend upon the particuiar social forces in tht? backdrop of loca1 history, the prevailirig economic 'pressures, the duration of thc!I stages involved in the implemeniation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and the acceptabilitY of the Court's acon at all times by tfiose involVed in or affected by it. [163 E-Q] . o :5. An activist Court spearheading the movement for the development and oxtension of the citiz.en's constitutional rights, for the protection of individual

liberty and for the strengthening of tho socio-economic fabric in compliance With dOclared constitutional objoctives, will need to move \Vith a degree of judicial cir .. curnspection. In the centre of a social order changing with dynamic pace,' tho Court needs to balance the authority of tho past with the urges of lhe future. . In that task the court muit ever be conscious of the constitutional truism that it possesses the"sanction of ncithetthe sword nor the pursue and that its strength lies bsically in public confidence anc.l_support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its acts and decisions must remain beyond alt dOubt. Therefore, whatever the case before it, whatever the context of facts ancl Jeagal rights, whatever the social and e-; onon1ic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the.

Judge, let it aot be forgotten that the essential identity of the institlltion, that it is a Court, must remain preserved sO that every action of the Court is infonnod by tho fund.a.mental norms of law, and by the principles embodied in tho Constitbtion and other sources of law. -1r its contribution to the Jurisprudent; ial ethos of society is to -advance our consUtutional objectives, it must function in accord

wth only those principles which enter into the coffii>osition of judicial action and ' give to it_s essential quality. [163 H; 164 AD]

.5 :6. There is a grea.t' merit in the Court proceeding .to decide an issue on the .basis of strict .legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that al One gi, ves thedecision Of the Court a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that especial permanance in legal jhrisprudence which makes it a base for the next step foard in the further progress of the law.

Indoed, both certainty of substarice and oortainty of direction are indispenaable requireiµents in the development of the law, and invest it with the credibility"whicft commands pubiic.confidenco In.its legitimacy. [165 AB]

This • warning is of especial significance. in these times, during a phase

- of judicial history whel) a few social action groups tend to sl!ow evidence of pro- G suming that in CverY case the court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided. [165 CJ ' '

As new area!· open before the Court with modem deyelopments in jurisw prudence,- in a World more seruitive to human rights as well as the imPact of t"echnological progresl'!, the Co_urt will become increasingly consioUa of its expand.in.a: jurisdiCtion. That is. inevitable. But its res"ponsibiJities are correspondinaJy .. llrO&t, aad perhaps never greater than now. [165 DJ H

86 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s.c.R.

It mrist 'be .remerµ'btrC<l that there is no higher" Court tocorrect ove-r the Supreme Co_urt its errors, and at its Judge wear the mantle of infaUibility only . because their decisions are final. That the Judg!!S sit at the apex Of the judicial adininistration and their word,. by constitutional mandate, is the: law of tbO land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a feeling Judges must guard against by constantly reminding themselves that every decision must be guided by reason Md by judicial principles. [165 E-F] ·

6:1. Persons in this countr.Y obliged to serve as bonded labour are entitled to invoke Article 23 of te Constitution .. The provisions erribodied in' that clause form a vital eonstitue!'lt of tho Fundamental Rights set forth in.Part III of the Constitution, and their violation attracts pfoperly_ the scope of Article 32 of tbC .

Constitution. [165 OJ

6':2 .. It is true that-the reports of the court appointed Commissions haV'e not been tested by cross examiBation, but then the record does not show whether any atten1pt was IDade by-the respondents tO call them for cross examination. Further, whether the appointment of the commissioners fa11s within the terin of order' XLV! of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is of technical significance only because •'there was inherent power in the court, in the prticufaf circumstances of this.case fo tak~ that action; However, the court Would do well io issue. notice tO the res

pondiits, before appointing any Corn.rnisSioner, in those cases where. ihere is little appreheruion of tho disappearance of eviden~. [166 B-q . .

6:3. . The present case is one of considerable iritportance to a section of Our people, who pressed by the twin misfortunes of poverty and-illiteracy. ate compelled to a condition of life hich long since should have passed into history. Tho con tifiued existence of such pockets of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by our ConstitutiO!J to its cizens. [166 D~E] E PER AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J: (Concurrmg with Pathak, l.)

• 1: l. Article 32 of the Constitution is clearly attracted to the facts of the case, as in the present case the violation of the fundamental right of liberty of e workmen who are said to be kept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged.

Forced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Article 23 of the Coostiiution. [168 D-E] ' ·

1:2. An'y person who .is wrongfully and illega1ly employed as -a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 is jn essence dePrived of his liberty. A bonded ' labourer truly becomes a slave and thO freedoin of a bondd .lab9urer in the nlatter of his_ employment and mOvemont is !Jlore or less completely taken away and forced laboUr is thrust upon him. When any bonded labourer approached this Col, lrt the real grievance that he makes is-that he.should.be freed from this bodage and he prays for being set at libertY and liberty is no doubt a fundamental right guaranteed to every person

Under the cOnstitution. There canpoi be any\manner of doubt that any person. who is wrongfully and illegally detained and is deprived of his libertY can pproach this Court under Article 32 of tlie Constitution for his freedom and wrongful and illegal detention, and for being set at' liberty. Whellever anY person is won8fully and. illegally deprived of his liberty, it is open to anybody who is interested in tho persop to Inove -this Co.urt unCler. Article -32 of the Coµstitution for his release. . It may not veri often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to

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BANDH\JA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION 87

approach this Court, as by virtue of such illegal and wrongful Q.etention. he may not be free an~ ill a position to)llove the Supfeme.O?urt. [Hi_? E-H] .

1 :3.

The Bonded labourers working in the f<ir away places are generally poc;>r an~ belong to the very weak_ section of the people. They are <j.lso not very literate and. they .1nay not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in b.ondage their freedom is also restricted and they may not be in a position. to approach this Court. Thqugh no fundamental right of. the petitioner may be saidto be infringed, yet th,!} petitioner who co.mplains of the violation of the funda.- niental tight of the workmen who. ave been wrongfully and illegally denied their freedorµ and deprived of their constitutional right must be held to be entitled to approach this Court on behalf of the bonded labourers for 'removing thein from , illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. [168 .B-C)

S.P. Gupta v: Union of India & Another, (1981] Suppl. S.C.C, 81, referred to.

i:I. Article 32 or for that matter any other article does nOt Jay down any procedure whfoh has to be followed to move this Court for relief against the vio.law tion of any fundamental riiht. Article 32 (1) only lays down that the right t~ n1ove this court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of .fundamental rghts is guaranteed. The Constitution very appropriately leaveS the question as to what \vill consµtute all approprfate prOceetng{or the purpose of enforcement of fundaw ment&l 5ights to be determined by th.e Court. This Court when sought to be mewed under Article 32 by any party for redressing his grievance against the violation of fundamental rights has to consider whether the procedufe foJloWed by e pii.rty is appropriate enough to entitle the couit to proceed to act on-the same. No doubt this Court has framed rules which ae contained in part IV, Order :XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules under the Caption "application for enforcement of fundamental rights" (''Article 32 of the Constitution") Generally speaking, any party who seeks to move this Court under Article -32 of the Constitution should conform to the rules prescribed. The rules lay dOwn the procedure hi ch is normally to .be followed in the matter of any application under Article 32 of .the eonstitution. These rules are rule_s relating to the proct:dri.re to be adopted and the rules ar~ inten.ded to serve aS maids to the Deity of Justice.

Procedural law which also forms a part of the law and has io .be observed, is, however, 'Subservient to substantive Jaw and the .law~ of procedure are preScribed for promoting nd furthering the ends of justice. There cannot be any doubt that this Court should usually follow the procedure laid do\vn in O.XXXV of the Rules of .this Court and should normally iist on a petition properly verified by an affidavit to be _filed to enable_ the Court to take necessary action on the same. 'Though this Cou.rt should normally iilsist on the rules of procedure being followed, it cannot be Said, taking into consideration the nature of right coferred under Article 32 to move this Court by an appropriate proceeding and the Very wide powers cohferre4 on this Court fat granting relief in the case of violation of fundamental rights, tha't - this Court will haVe no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which. may not be in conforfnity with procedure prescribed by the Rules of this _Court. e .

Rules .undoubtedly lay down the procedure which .is normaJly to be followed for making an application under Article 32 ofthe Constitution. They,_ howeVer, do not and cannot have the effeCt of limiting the jurisdiction of this Court of enter- . taining a proceeding under' Article 32 of the Constitution, if made, only in the manner pr"'cribcd by the rul ..

~ [169 F-H; 170 A-DJ ' .


[19~4] 2 S.C.R.

i:2. For effectively safeguarding the fundamerit3.1 rights. guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court in appropriate cases in the interests of justice wiU certainly be competent to treat a P, roceeding, though_ not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court,- as an appropriate proceeding under Article 32 &( the Constitution and -to entertain the same. Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Coiistitution are indeed t6o sacred to be' ignored or trifled , vith merely on tl:ie ground of technicality or afly n.ile of procedure. The rules framed by this Court do not also lay .down th1;1.t this Court can be moved under Article 32 of the Constitution only in accordance with the procedure pres- . cribed by the Rules and not otherwise. A merC technicality in the matter of form • or procedure Which may not in any way affect" the substance of. any proceeding should not stand in the way of the exercise of the 'very wide Jurisdiction and powers

confrred on this Court under Article 32 of the Constituticin for enforcement of fundamental iights guaranteed under the Constitution. Taking into considera ti on the substance of the matter-and the nature of allegations made, it will essentially be a matter foithe court 10 decide whether the procedure adopted can be considered to be an appropriate proceeding Within the ambit of Article 32 of the , Constitution. The Court if satisfied on the inaterials placed in the form of a letter or , other communication addressed to this Court, may take notice of the same in appropriate cases. Experience &hows that .in many cases it may not be possible for the party c9ncerned to file a regular writ petition in confonnity with procedure Ia:id down in the Rules -of this eourf. The Supreme Court for quite somt; years now has in rhany cases .propeeded to act on the basis of the letters addressed to it: A iong standing practice of the Court in ihe 1natter of procedure also acquired sanctity. Further in yarious cases the Court has refused to take any ntice of letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also the Court on being moved by a letter bas direCted a formal writ petition to be filed before it has decided to proceed further in the matter. [170 FH; 171 AD] . .

2:3. It is bowel/er eminently desirable that normally the procedure prescribed in the rules of th.is Court should be followed while entertaining a petition under Article 32 of the Constitlition, though in exceptional cases and particulady in the matter of general public interest, this Court may, taking info con_sidetation the peculiar facts and ciumstances of case, proceed tO .exercise its jurisdiction Under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights treating the letter or the comµiunication in any other form as an appropriate proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Further any party who addresses a letter oi' a6.y other communication to this cOurt seeking intervention of this Court on the basis of the said letter and communication should address this letter or Communication to this Cow1 and not to any individual Judge by name. Such communication should be addressed to -the Chief Justice 'of the Court and his companion Justices.

A private. communication by a party to any Learned Judge ..

OVer any matter is not propef and may create embarrassment for tho Court and the Judge concerned. 11710-H;172 A]

In the present case, the unfoftunate workers who are employed and bonded labourers at a distant place, could not pos.sibly in view Of their bondage, move this Court, following the procedure laid down-in the RulOI of this Court, The Petitioner which claims to be a social welfare Organization interested in . restorina liberty and dignity to these unfortunate bonded labourers should be considered competent to move this Cowt by a letter or 4il'e conununication addressed to

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA \'. UNION 89

this Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner is not moving this Court

. A for any personal or private benefit. . ' ' ·

. 3:1. Whenever, however, there is an_allegatioh of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes the responsibility and also the sacred 'duty of this Court to pro~ tect such fundamental rights guaianteed under the Constitution provided that this Court is satisfied that a case for interference by this Court" appears prima facie to have been .made out. Very often the violation of .fundamental rights is not admitted or .accepted. On a proper consideration of the materials the Court has to come to a conclllsion whether there has been any violation of fundamental rights to enable the court to grant appropriate reliefs in the matter.

In various cases, because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the Case the party approaching this Court.for enforcement of fundamental rights may not be in ii position to furnish all. relevant materials and necestary particulars. If, however, on a consideration of the materials placed, the Court is satisfied 'that' a propei.- probe into the matter is necessafy in the larger. interest of administration of justice and for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed, the Court, in vew of the Obligatiq, ns and duty cast upon it of preserving andprotec'ting fundamental rights, may require bettr aµd further materials to enable the Court to take appropriate action; and there cannot' b:e anything improper in the proper exercise of Court's jurisdiction under.

Article 32 of the Constitution to try to secure the necessary materials through appropriate agency. The conunission that the Court m3.Y appoint or the investi~

gation that the court n1ay direct -is essentially for the 'Court's satisfaction as to the correctness or otherwise of (be allegation of violation of fundamental rights to

~blc the Court to decide the Course to bC adopted .fol: doing proper justi~ to the parties in the matter of protection Of . their fund3.mental rights. It has to be . bome in mid that in this land of ours, there are persons without education, without means and without opportunities and they also are entitled to full protection of their rights or privileges which the Constitutions affords. Living in chilled penury without nssary resources and very often. not fully conscious of their rights guaranteed under the ConstitUtion, a very large section of the people comtnonly termecl. as the weaker section live in this land. When this Court is approached on behalf of this class of people .for enforcement of fundamental rights of which they have been denrived and which they are pqually entitled to enjoy, it becon1es the specl.al responsibility of the Court to sec that justice is not.denied to them a"nd the disadvantageous position in which they are placed, do not stand in the way of their getting justice from this Court. [172 D-H; 173 AB]

. 3 :3. ThC po, ver to appoint a commission or an investigatiqn body for making enquiries in terms of directions given by the Court must be considered to be implied and , irlherent in the power that the Court haS under Article 32 for enforcement, of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This is a powei;- which is indeed "incidental or anci11afy, to !he power which the Court is called upon to exeraise in a proceeding under' Ar.tiCle 32 of the Constitution.

G It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of any case, to consider whether any such power regarding investigation has to be exercised or not. The Commission that the Court appoints or the investigation that the Court directs white dealing with. a proceeding under Article 32 of the"

Constitution is not a commission or enquiry under the Code of Civ'il Procedure.

Such power must necessarily be held. io be implied within the very wide Powers H conferred on this Court under Article 32 fr enforcement of fuiidamental rights.


(1984] 2 S.C.R.

A Fr proper Cxercise of its powers under Article 32 of the Constitution and for due

discharge of .the obligation and duty cast upon thi~ Court iii the matter of pro.· . tectibn nd enforcement of fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees,

. this .Court has an inherent power to act in such a manI1er as will enable this Court to discharge its duties and .obligations under Article 32 of the Constitution properly and effectively in the larger" interest of administration of jU.sticc, and for proper protection of Constitution safeguards. [i73 C-G]

4. The , litigation of ihis type particularly in relation to bonded Jaburers is really not in nature an adversary litigation and it becomes' the duty of the Stat'e and also of the appropriate "authorities to offer its best cooperation to see that this cvifpractice which has been declared illegal is ended at_the earliest.- The existence .of bonded labour in the Court' is an unfortunate fact. Whenever there is an allegation of the existence of bonded labour_ in any particular_ State, the State instead of seeking to come Out with a case of denial of such existen~ on the basis of a feeling that the existenqe of bonde41abour in the State may cast a slur or stigma on its administratiVe machinery, should cause.cffective.enquiriesto be made into , the matter and if the matter is pending in this court, should coop_crate with this Court to seethat death-knell is sounded On this illegal system which constitutes ' a veritable social menace aD.d stands in the way of healthy development of the nation. [174 A-CJ

. D

PER CONTRA :.

5. The grievance of denial Of Ot.h:er just rights to the workmen and the reliefs claimed for _givillg the. workmen the benefits to .which they _may be entitled under various Icgislatons enacted for their Welfare are more of less in the nature of con-. sequential reliefs incidental to the main relief of freedom from bonded and forced labour to whiCh the workriien are rejected. In the facts and circumstances Of the

se, it appears that the prOvisions of inter-State Migrant WorkmcD. (Regulation of

E Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 arc not applicable and therefore cdo not fall for any adjudication. [174 F-G]

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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ .Petition No. 2135 of 1982.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Govind Mukhoty,. S.K. Bhattacharya and N.R., Chaudhary for the Petitioner.

M.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondent Nos. 4,5,7, 8. & 9; ·

K.B. Rhtagi and S.J. Dhingra for tl:le Respondent No. 13 ..

S.K. Verma for the Respondent No'. 6.

Abdul Khadar Sr . . Advocate and Miss. A. Su6hash11i for the respondent.

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA 'V. UNIO'I (Bhagwati. n 91

The following Judgments were delivered-

BHAGWAl'I, J. The petitioner is an organisation dedicated, to the cause of release of onded labou.rers in the country. The syst.em of bonded labour has been prevalent ill' .various parts of the country since long prior to the attainment of political freedom and it con

stitutes an ugly and shameful feature of our national life. This system based on exploitation by a few socially and economically powerful wrsons trading on the misery and suffering of large numbers .. of men arid holding them iri bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchical society which, hypocritically proclaims the divinity of men but treats . large masses of people belonging to the lower rungs of the social ladder or economically impoverished segments of society as dirt and . chattel. This system under which one person can be bonded 'to pro

 vide labour. to anothr fo.r years and years until an alleged debt'is supposed to. be wiped out which never seems to happen during the life time of the bonded labourer, is totally incompatible with the new . . egalitarian socio-economic order which we have promised to build and it is not only an affornt to basic human dignity but also con" stitutes gross and revolting violatio~ of constitutional values. The appalling conditions in which bonded labourers live, not as humans but as serfs; recall to. the mind the following lines from"Man with the Hoe" which' ~!most seem to have been written with reference to this neglected and forlorn species of Indian humanity : .

"Bowed by. the weight or' centuries Ire leans

.Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground . The emptiness of ages on his fac.e,

And_on his back the burden of the world,

They are non-beings, .exiles of civilization, Jiving a life worst. than ihat of animals, for the animals are at least free to roam about as they like and they can plunder or grnb food whenever they are hungry but these out castes of society are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom and'they are consigned to an existence where they have to live either in hovels or under the open sky and be satisfied

with whatever 'little unwholesome food they can manage to get, in- . adequate. though. it be to fill their hungry stomachs. Not having any ·

. choice, they are driven by poverty and hunger into a life of bondage a dark bottomless pit from which, in a cruel exploitative society, thdy cannot hope to be rescued. .

This pernicious practice of bonded labour existed in . maicy


(1984J 2 S.C.R.

States and obviously with the ushering in of independence it could not be allowed to continue to blight the national life any longer and hence, when we framed our Constitution, we enacted Article 23 of , the Constitution which prohibits "traffic in human beings and 'begar. and other similar forms of fcmied labour" practised by any one. The system of bonded labour therefore stood prohibited by Article '23 and there could have been no more solemn and effective prohibition than the one enacted in the Constitution in Article 23. But, it appears that though the Consti\ution was enacted as far back as 26th January, 1950 and many years passed since then, no serious.effort was made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp out the shocking practice of ·· to bondild labour. It was only in 1976 that Parliament enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 providing for th.e aboli~ tion ofbonded labour S)".Steni with a view to preventing the economic and physical exploitation 'of the weaker sections of the people.

But, unfortunately, as subsequent events have .shown and that is borne ont also by the Report made by the Centre for Rural Development Administration, I.ndian Institute of Public Administration to the Mini, stry of Labour Government of India on "Rehabilitation of Bonded fabour in Monghyr Dfstrict, Jlihar", the Report made by the Public Policy and Planning Division of the Indian Institute of Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India on "Evaluation Study of Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Scheme In Tehri Garhwal, U.P.", the Report'ofLaxmi Dhar Misra, the Director-General (Labour Welfare) of the Government of India based on On the Spot Studies Regarding Identification, Release of Bonded_ Labourers and Rehabilitation of Freed Labourers in Uttar Pradesh,

Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan, tamilnadu and .Kerala and the Report of the National " Seminar on "Indentification and Rehabilitationof Bonded Labour" l).eld from 7th to 9th February, 1983 that the pernidous practice of bonded labour has not yet been totally eradieated from the national scene and that 'it continus t6 disfigure the social and economic life of the country ai certain places.

There are still number of bonded labourers in various parts of the country and significantly, as pointed ot in the Report of the Natfoual Seminar on '.'ldentifi_catioµ and Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour" a large number of them belong . to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes account for the next largest number while the few who are not from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled. Tribes are generally landles's agricultural labourers.

It is absolutely essential we would unhesitatingly declare that it is a constitutional imperative-that the bonded labourers must be identified and released from the shackles of bondage Sb that they can assimilate

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. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNlvN (Bhagwati, J.) 93

themselves in the main stream of civilised human society and realise 'the dignity, beauty and wor.th of human existence.

The process of identification and release of bonded labourers is a process of disco- .very and transformat.lon. of non-beings into human-beings and what it involves is eloquently described in the beautiful lines of Rabindra Nath Tagore in "Kadi and Koma!" .

I 'Into the mouths of these . Dumb, pale and meal<; ,

We have to infuse the language o(the soul.

Into the hearts of these Weary and worn, dry and forlorn We have to minstrel the language 'of humanity.'

This Process of discovery and transformation poses a serious problem since the social and economic milieu in which it has to be accomplished is dominated by elements hositle to it. But this problem has 'to be solved if we want to emancipate those who are living in bonda&e and serfdom and make them equal participants in the fruits of freedom and liberty.

It is aproblem which needs urgent attention of the Government'oflndia and the State Governments and when the Directive Principles of State Policy have obligated the Central.and the State Governments'to'take steps and adopt measures for the purp3se of ensuring social justice to .the have-notes and the handicapped, it is not right on the part of the.concerned governments to shut their eyes to the inhuman exploitation to which the bonded labourers are subjected. It is not uncommon to find that the administration in some States is not willing to admit the existence of bonded labour, even though it exists in their territory and there is incontrovertible evidence that it does so exist . We fail to see why the administration should .feel shy in admitting the existence of bonded labour, bequseit is not the existence of bonded labour that is a slur on the administration but its failure to take note of it and to take all eces sary steps for the purpose of putting an end to the bonded labour system by quickly identifying, reloasing and permanently rehabilitating bonded, labourers.

What is needed is determination, dynamism and a sens; of social commitment of the part of the administration to free bonded labourers and rehabilitate them and wipe out this ugly inhuman practice which is a blot on our national life. . What happend recently in the Ranga Reddy District of Andrha Pradesh as a result , of the initiative taken by' this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1574 of 1982 and 54 of 1983 sbows clearly that if the political and administrative apparatus has a sense of commitment to the constitutional values


[1984] 2 S.C.R.

and is determined to take action for identifying, relasing and rebabi~ litating bonded labourers despite pres.sures and pulls from different quarters, much can be done for securing emancipation and rehabilitation of bonded labourers.' . The District .Administration of Ranga Reddy District could in less than six months release over 3000 bonded labourers from the 'clutches of contractors in stone quarries in Ranga Reddy District and send them back to their ho.mes. with tickets and pocket expenses. • It is therefore essent.ial thai whichever be the.

State Government it should, where there is bonded labour, admit the existence of such bonded labour and make; all possible efforts .to eradicate it-. By doing so, it will not only be performing a humanitarian function but also discharging a constitutional obligation .and strengthening the foundations of participatory democracy in the country . ·

We also find that in some cases the State Governments in order to shi'rk their obligation, take shelter under the plea that there may be some forced labour in their State but that is not bonded labour." We shall have occasion to deal with this plea a little later 'when we refer to the definition of 'bonded labour' given in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act; 1976 which it! first blush appears to be a narrow definition limited only to a situation where a debtor'is forced 10 provide labour to a creditor.

The state of Haryana has iil the present case tried to. quibble with this definition of 'bonded labour' and its .argument has been that these , labourers may be providing. forced

labur but they are not bonded labourers within the meaning of the Bonded Labour Systein (Abolition) Act, 1976 and they may therefore be freed by the Court if it so pleases but the State of Haryana cannot be compelled to .rehabilitate them.

We are cmi:strained to observe. that this agrument, quite apart from its .invalidity, ill-behoves a State Government which is committed to the cause of socialism.and claims to be striving to esure social justice to the vulnerable seciions of the community. But we. do not wish to anitcipate the discussion . in regard to this argument and at the present stage we content ourselves by mrely observing that it is unfortunate that any State Go.vernmerit shauld take up the plea that persons who are forced to proyided labour. miy .be forced. labourers but unless it is shown by them by proper evidence tested by CT<Jss-examination that they are forced to prqvide." . labour against a bonded debt, tbey cannot be said to be bondedlabourers and the State Government cannot beheld to be under any 'obliga~

ti01J.to rehabilitate them.

' The ptitioner made a survey or'some of the stbne qarries in

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BANDHUA MUJCTI MORCHA \'. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ' 95

FAridabad district near the city bf Deijii and found that there were a large number of labourers from Maharashtra, . Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder "inhuman and intolerable conditions'" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about. ten years, and the pe.titioner gave the names of 11 bonded laboqrers who were from village Asarha, Bariner distriCt of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers who were from village Bharol, district Jhansi of Madhya. Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.

The petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .".

The petitioner also annexed to its letter, tatemen.ts in eriginal bearing .the thumb marks or .signatures as the case may be of these bonded lab; mrers referred to in the letter. 'rbe petitioner pointed out in. the letter that the labourers~ working in these stone quarries were living under the most inhuman conditions. and their pitiable lot.was described .by the. petitioner in the. f?llowing words:

"Besides these cases of bonded labour, there. are innumerable cases of fatal and serious injuries caused due to

acidents while working in the mines, while dynamiting the tocks or while crushing the stones. The stone-dust pol)ution near the stone crushers. is s.o various that.many a valuable' lives are lost due to tuberoculosi~ while others are . reduced to mere.skeletons because ofT.B. and other diseases . . The ; vorkers are. not provided with any medical care, what to speak of compensating the poor worker for injury or for death. No cas, s a'.re registered against the mine 6wners or' the lessees for violation of safety rules unaer Mines Act.

We are enclosing herewith the statements of about 75 workers who have suffered or are suffering continuously due to non-implementation of the rules by the Central Government or by.Haryana Government or by the employers. . ·. . . '

Almost 99 % of the workers are' migrnt from drought prone areas of Rajasthan, Madhya.Pradesh; Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar. But if there is any on.e

• G

place where the Central legislation of Inter State -Migrant H W6rkmens Act 1979 is being most .flagrantly violated it is •

SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS

(1984] 2 S.C.R.

here in these mines, without any residential accommodation, with the name-not eve~ a thatched roof to fend against the icy 'Yinds and winter rain or against the scorching heat in mindsummer, with scanty clothing, with very impure and polluted drinking water accumulated during rainy season in the clitches, with absolutely no facilities for scliooling or· childcare, braving al! the hazards of nature and pollution "and ill treatment, theS<I thusands of sons and daughters of . . .

Mother India pitomise: the "Wretched of the Earth".

' On top of all these forms of exploitation is the totally illegal system of "Thekedars", middlemen who extract 30 %

of the poor miner's .wages as their ill gotten commission (Rs. 20 out of Rs. 60, wages for per truck load of stone ballast).

The trucks are invariably oversign"d in some cases thy doubt the prescribed size of 150 Sq. feet but payment remains the same .. The hills are dotted with liquor vends-legal and illegal.

Murders ana molestation of women is very common."

The petitioner also set out the various provisions of the Con- . stitution and the statutes which were not being implemented or observed . in regard to the labourers working in ihese stone quarries. .The petitioner in the end prayed that a writ be issued for proper imple- . mentation of these provisions of the Constitution and statutes with a E view to ending the misery, suffering and helplessess of "these vie-,

ti'!ls of most inhuman exploitation". ·

The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working. M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda were directed to.visit these stone quarries on 27th and 28th February 1982 'and to make a.report to this Court on or before 2nd March 1982.

Pursuant to. this order made by us, M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda visited. the stone quarries of S.L. Shrma in Godhokhor and Lakkarpur

~'and carried out the assignment entrusted to them and submitted a "'

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BANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA •· UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 97 • • report to this Court on 2nd March J 982.

The Report pointed oil! inter alia that i11 the stone quarries of S.L. Sharma at Godhakhpur, "m1ny stone'. crushing machines were operating with the result that . th' whole atmosphere was full of dust and it was difficult even to.

breathe".

The report then referred to the statements of various 'workers interviewed by Mis. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Pan.da a11d according t~ 'the statements given by some of. them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt. Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain. and which were so low that a person could hardly stand insrde them.

The statements of these workers showed that a few of them , vere suffering from tuberculosis and even when injuries were caused due to accidents arising in the course of employment, no compensation was being i1aid to them and there were no facilities for medical treatment or schdoling for children.

The Report proceeded to state' that M/s. 'Ashok Srivastava and Ashok' Panda then Visited_ 1nine_ no. 8 in Godhokhor Bione quarries-and here they found that the. condition of the jhuggies was much worse ina<much as the jhuggies were made only of straw and most of the people living in jhuggies had no clothes lo wearand were shivering from cold and even the small children were moving about without any proj)oer clothing.

M/s.• Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda found that none of the inmates of the jhuggies had any blanket or wollen clothes and they did not even have any mat on which they could sleep. The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not. allowed to. leave the stone quarries and one' of them, n, am, ly, Sallu was seriously injured on his leftJeg only a day before the visit of M/s. Ashok Sri\>astava and Ashol': Panda but be did not

hop_, to get ari'y co1nµensation "because here ilo one gets any co.n1rn1sation for any injury''. Most of the workers interviewed 'by

M/s. Ash0k Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated that they got very little by way of \Vages fro1n ti1e mi.ne lessees or owners of" stone crushers since they .had to purchase explosives with their own m011eys and they had to incur other epenses which, according to Dr. Patwardhan's repJrt to which we .shall refer :hereafter, inCluded 50 per cent of the expenses of drilling holes.· M/s .. Ashok Srivastava .and Ashok Panda also pointed out in the Report that the folJo, ving persons working

SUPREME.COURT REPORTS [19S4] 2 S.c.R.

in the Godhokhor tone quarries" claimetl tat they were tcn<lcd . labourers :

(!) Chand Bahadur. son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur sen of Umbar .Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal sol) of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur ·.son of Jeet. Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh

(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir

(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool. Baha<lur sen of

Ram Bahadur (10) Heera Bahadur son .of Balbahadur (JJ) Veer 'Bahadur son of Chhalvir. (12) Nain Singh son of Lal Baliadur (I 3) Lal Bahadur son of Gang Bahaciur (14). Ganesh son of Gang PahPdur . (15) Amber Bahadur son of Sadhu Ba.hadur (I 6) Hira ta! sen· of .: Atbahadur (17) l(amar Bahadur (18) agadh Bahadur sol) of Tep BQhadur (19) Gajender Bahadur son of Shyam ta! (20) Ganga Ram. son of Lal Bai1adur. (21) Nar .Bahadur .and (22) Sant. Bahadpr son of Bhag Bahadur .

. So .far as the workers working h1 La'kkarptir .stone quarnrs were concerned, .. the report of M/s. Ashok Sriyastava and Ashck • Panda stated that out of about 250 persons living in st:raw j!rngrirc . .. 100. persons hailed from Bilaspur while 150 persons telongcd to

.Allahbad and according to the rep.or!, 100. persons coming from . Bilas.pur stated that they were forcibly kept by the co11tractcr. a1'd

they were not allowed to move out ofthelr place and.tl1ey were bonded . labourers.

M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Asho.k Panda described iii the Report the pitiable condition in which these workers were livinc in . . straw jhuggies withot any protection against sun 8_rd min arc!. \~'ith

drinking water available only from the iiarsati nal!e/i. 'The Rrrc•rt

pointed out that while M/s. Ashk Sri_vastavri anci Asl1ok Pacda. were interiewing the .workers in the Lakkarpur stone quarry, ii started raining heavily and thereupon they t0ek shelter in me of tl•e

j_hugges ''.but.inside the jhuggi .it'wns not _safC, as \vater \vns p0urlnr

inside'.' amt they were compleiely drenched inside the jhugi. i k Report also stated that, according to.tJ1.ese workers. there wercno ; nodical facilities available and even where workers were inj1•rrd.

they did.not• get.any medical aid .. The Report ended hy cbmv; rf' . that the.so workmen "presented a picture of hclplessnes>. poverty rrci

?xtrcme exploitation at the hands of moneyed people" and ihry \\(re

found "leading a most.miserable life and perhapsheasts rnd ; n; n-c'c. could be leading niore comfortable life than these •iielplessiabourers".

H Thereafter, the writ petition came up for hc.aring on Sth March 1;'82 along with anot(ler wtit petition filed by the present pethiciner .

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IlANDJIUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 99

j for release of some other bonded. labourers and on this day the Court A m1-:le an order directing that the copies of the Repqtt of M/s. Ashok . Srinstava and Ashok Panda shouldbe supplied to all the mine- '

lc>sees and stono crushers who are respondents t_o. th_e writ petitions . 'so that they mly have an opportunity to file their reply to the focts

found in the Report. The Court also appointed nr. Patw.ardha'n f .

Indi•.tn _Institute of Technology to carry out a socioClegal lnvestiga-

. B ti.on in the following terms : ·

-1.·

"ft is neCe5'ary that a socio-legal investigation should be carried out for the purpose 9f determining what are the con- .. ditiohs prevailing in the various quar_ries in Faridabad District and. whether ther_e are any workmen in those qu.arries . againsi their will 'or without their conse1it and what are the -

 COi'!ditions i~ which they an living. and whether any of the provisions ofthe Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act and

Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment&· Conditions ofScrvice) Act is being violated.

We may make it clear that when , e are directiiig a socio-legal investigation

- of these matters it 'is . not in a Spirit to criticise the State . .

G wernment or any of its officers but-with a view to find. ou_t the correctness of the state of affairs so that the State Govern- . moot.and its officers could take i1cccssary steps for remedying

. tle situation if a state of affairs cxis'ts , v.hicli iS contrary .-tO

th.e provi.sions Of law and. the basic hunH1n .nornis. The Court can take actioi1 only after the scio-legal investigation is carried out by some respon; iblc person and a copy , ofthe 'report of the socio-legal investigation is made available io the

p1rties.

We would, therefore, request Dr. Patwardhan of T.f .T. to be good enough to carry out a socio-legal investigation into the aforesaid matters in the quarfies in Faridabad :bistriCt a list of which will .be supplied by Mr: Muklrnty on behalf of the P'titi011crs to. Dr. Patwardhan within ten d"ays from . today after giving a copy to Mr. K.d. Bhagat, learned C9ttn<el appearing for the State of Haryairn. Dr.Patwardhap i" rquested- _to ca, rry out soci~-lcgal investigation with .a view to putting forward a scheme for improving the living - COndi-tions for t.he worke.rs worki1Jg in t.hc. stonc-ql1arries and after. the scheme is submitted to. us we propose to hear the

prtics ,011 the scheme with a view to evolving a fial scheme with the assistance of the State of Haryana for the purpose of ccci1lon1ic regeneratiol}--.of tese workn1en. _

The Court permitted Dr. Patwardhan to tke th~ assistance of

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100'

SUPRBME COURT.REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c, R. •

any person other th.an the parties to the writ petition in order to help him in his task and at the suggestion of the Court, the State of Haryana agreed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1500 to meet the expenses of'Dr.

Patwardhan in carrying out the socio-legal investigation. The Court also .recorded in its order .that when it was pointed out in the Report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda that the workers in the stone .quarries did not have any pure driJJking water but. were using dirty water from the nallah for drinking purposes, Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned Actditionar Solicitor General appearing on , behalf of the State of Haryana fairly stated that "though it may not be strictly the obligation of the State Government, the State Gqvernment will take necessary measures fof providing. cfrinking facilities to the workmen in the stone quarries" .. The Court also directed that • the. workmen whose names were setout in the writ petition. and in the . Report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda and particularly

in regard to whom a. separate statement had been filed in Court on b; half of the petitioner, would be free to go wherever they liked and they should not be restrained from doing so by any 'one and "i.f they go to their respective villages, the district magistrates having jnris-

~· diction over those villages" shall "take steps or measures to the extent

p)ssible for rehabilitating them." .

Pursuant to this order made by the Court, the State of Haryana

dpoited a sum of Rs. 1500 in Court to.meet the expenses of the so; io-legal investigation and Dr. Patwardhan embarked upon his task with tlie asistance of Mr. Krishan Mahajan, the.legal corres- . p'.>ndent of the Hindustan Times.

It took some time for Dr. Patwardh1n to complete his assignment and prepare his report but having . regard to the lmmensity of.the task, the.time within which Dr. Patw1rdhan finished the inquiry and submitted his report was remarkably sbrt. . We shall have occasion to refer to .this Report a little latter

w'nn we deal with the arguments advanced .on behalf of the parties', bc1t we m1y point out at this stage that the report of Dr. Patwardhan is a comprehnsive, well documented socio-legal study of the conditions in which the workmen engaged in stone quarries and stone crushers live and work and it. has made various constructive suggestions. and recommendations fof'ihe purpqs{ of improving the living conditions of the<ie workmen.

We are indeed grateful td'Dr. Patw1rdhan for carrying out this massive assignment so efficiently an:i in.such a short time,-. Dr. Patwardhan has submitted a state- . m'nt of the expenses 'incurred by him .in carrying out this socio-legal investigation and this statement shows that .he has incurred a total . expense of Rs. 2078 which after withdrawal of the amount of Rs.

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' BANDHUA MfTKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)

IOI

1500 deposit; d by the State of Haryana, leaves a balance of Rs. 578 to 'be reimbursed to_ Dr. Patwardhan. We are of the view that Dr.

Patwardhan should also be paid a small honorarium of Rs. 1000.

Wi would therefore direct the State of Haryana to deposit a sum of Rs.

\' 578 with the Registry of this Court within_ 4 weeks from today with . liberty to Dr. Patwardhan to withdraw the same.

Though it was stated by Shri K.G. Bhagat on behalf of the State of Haryana that the State Government will take necessary

moasures for providing dr_inking facilities to the workmen •in the stone quarries referred to in the writ petition and in the report of M/s.

Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda, it appears that either no such

measures were taken on behalf of the State Oovernment or even . if

. C they wore taken, they were short lived.

The result was that the work- . men working in most of these stone quarries had to remain wit.hoot . • pure drinking water and they had to continue "to quench their thirst by d, j; inking dirty and filthy water". Whether it is the obligation of the State Government to provide pure drinking water and if so what measures should be directed to be taken by the State Government in D . that behalf are matters which. we shall presently consider.

These are matters of some importance because there can be no doubt \hat · pure drinking water is absolutelyessential to the health and .wellbeing of the workmen and some authority has to be resp.onsible for. providing it. '

Before we proceed to consider the merits of the controversy between the parties in all its various aspects it will be convenient at this stage to. dispose of a few preliminary oli)ections urged on behalf of tile respondents. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Harynana as also Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine lessees contended that even if what is allrned by the petitioner in his letter which has been treated as a writ petition, is true; it cannot support a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, becaus~ no fundamental right of the petitiouer or of the workmen on whose behalf the writ petition has been filed, can be said to have been infringed.

This contention is, in our opinion, futile and it is indeed surprising that the State Government should have raised. it in answer to the writ petition. We can appreciate tJ:te anxiety. of the mine lessees to resist the writ petition on any ground availa- ' ble to them, be it hyper-technical or even frivolous, bnt we find it imcomprehensible -that the State Government should urge such a ·

preliminary objection .with a view to stifling at the thresh-hold an inquiry by the Court a,• .lo whethr the 'workmen are living in bondage

SUpREME CoURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.

' . anct under inhuman conditions. We should have thoughtthat if any citizen b.rings bfore the Court.a complaint that a large number of 'peasants or workers are bonded se, rfs or are being subjected to .. ex:

ploitation by a few mine lessees 6r conli'ctors ·.or employers or are b'ing denied the benefits of social welfare laws, the.State Government,.

whic~ is, under. our conititutional scheme, charged with. the mission. of bringing abSut a new socio-economic order where there will be social and .econimb justice for every one and equality of status and opportunity for au, would wclconie an inquiry by the court, so that if it is. fow1d that there. are in fact bonded labourers or even if the .WJrkers.are not bonded in the strict' sense Of the term as defined in.the

Bonded. Lib:mr System (Abolition) Act 1976 but they are made to provide forced labciur pr are consigned to a life of utfer deprivation . and degradatiqn, such a situation can be set right by the State Govern- . ·

mont. Even if the State Government is on its own inquiry satisfied • that th~ workm, n are not .bonded and arc not co'mpelled to provide •. forced .lab.our and are living and worhng ii; decent conditions with all tho b1sic necssities or life provided to them, 'the State Goveni"ment should not b1u1k-an inquiry by the court when a complaint is brought

b/ a citize~,:but it.should be anxious to ; atisfy the court and thr6ugh . th~. court. the p'ople, of the country, that it is discharging its constitutional oblig1tbn fairly and adequately and the. workmen are being ensured ooi.al and economic justice: We have on more occasions thln on' said tl11t , public interest litigation is not' in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge and. an opportunity to the .. governm, nt and, its otli; ers to' nuke basic human rights meaningful to

tbe. depfive.:I and vulnerable sections of the community and to. assure them s:icial and ecJrromic justice whih is the signature tune of our GJnstitution. The Government and its. officers must welqome public · interest litig1[ion, bocause it would provide. them an occasion to exa:nine w:nth'r the pJar and the down-trodden are gettillg their 'sJoial ani e; JrrJmic ~:1titlemlnts or whether they are continuing to

ro.n1in victlm; of deception and explitafion at !he hands of strong . and pJwerful sections \)ftlie CJmmu1; ity and wliether social and economic justice has become a o:ieaning-fui reality for the1n ot it has remained

tcirely teasing illusion and a>pro1niseof unreality, so that in case . the complaintin the public interest litigation is found to be true,: . they can in discharge or;' their' constitutional obligation root out exploitation and. injustice andensure to the weaker. sections their rights . and entitlcmets. When the Court entertains public. interest litiga- iion, it does not do so.in.a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood ·or with a -view to tilting.at executive authority or seeking to usurp it bui its attempt,. is only to ensure observance of .sociai and economic

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwilti, J.) 103

rescue programmes: legislatiye as wir as executive, fra1ild for the A i . benefit of ti)e have-nots and the handica1iped and to protect them against vio-Jation of their basic human rights, which is also the con- . stitutional obligation of the executive.

The Court is. thus• merely assisting in the realisation of the constitutio1ial obj_ecti\•cs.

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Moreover, when a complaint i_s made on behalf of workmen that tlrey are held in bondage :and arc working and living in miserable conditions without any proper or adequate shelter over their heads, without any" protection againsi sun and rain, without two . square meals per day.and with only dirty water 'from a nullah to. drink, it is difficult to appreciate how such a c01hplaini can be thrown out o~ the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen ..

It is the fundamental riglit of every one in this country, a_ssurcd under the interpretatioi1 givn to Aticlc 21 b, y thisCourt in Fraizcis Mullen's case, to live with human dignity, free froiu exr.loitation.

This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Arti!le 21 derives its life breath from _the Directive Prindplcs of State Policy and parti- cularly clauses (e}nd (f) of Article 39 and Artie-les41 and-42. and at the. least, th<; refore, it must include protection of the. health and sfre- _ngth of workers men and wornen, and of the tcriuer age of children

against abus~, opportunities and facilities for child_ren to develop in a healthy man1\er and in conditioi1s of freedom and dignity; educational facilities, just and humane conditions of w6rk and inaternity

. relief.

These are the minimuln requirements which must exist_ in order to enable_ a person to live with human dignity and no State norther the Central Government nor any State Government-has the

fight to take any action which will deprive a _person 0°f ihe enjoyment of these basic essentials: Since the Direcrive Principles of State . P0liey contained.in clauscs(e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to > compel the State through the judicial process to make provision: by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these_ basic essen iials which go to make up a life of human dignity but .where legisla tion is alrea\ly enacted by the Stte providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to"1ive 'with basic human dignity, with concr-ete reality a11d content; the State can _certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation' for inaction on' the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation woulda1uunt. to denial of the right to live with human dignitY. enshrined in Article 21, more so in the_context of Article 256 which providGs that the. executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance ; yith the iaws made by. Parliament

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SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1'984] 2 s.c.R.

and any existing laws which. apply in that State, We have alrady po.inted out in Asiad Construction Worker<1l case that the State is under a constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation .. of the fundamecitaJ right of any. person, particularly when he belongs to the weaker sections of the; community and is unable .to wage a legal battle . against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him.

The ·• Central Government. is' therefore bound to ensure observance of various social ,;, e!fare and Jabour laws enacted by Parliaent for the purpose of securing to the \vorkmen a life of basic human dignity in compliance with the Directive Principles of State Policy. It must also follow. as a necessary coroilary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries are vested by reason cif Haryana Minerals (V'i.sting of Righ.ts) .Act 1973 and which is therefore the owner of the mines -cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, permit workmen to be denied the benefit of various social welfare and labour laws nacted with a view to enablihg them to live aJife of human digity. tthe State of Haryana must therefore .ensure that the mirre-less.f'.es or contractors, to who1n. it is giving .its mines for stone quarrying operations, observe various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen.

This is a constitutional Obligation which can be enforced against the Central Governinent and . the State of Haryai1a by a writ petition under Article 32 of the Con ·

stitution.

The. next preliminary objection. urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State ofHaryana and Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine:Jessees was that the court had no poer Jo appoint either Mr. Ashok Srivastava and Mr. Ashok Panda or Mr. Patwardhan as commissioners and the Reports made by them had no evidentiary value since what was stated in .the Reports'was based only on ex-parte staterrients which had not been tested by ctoss-examination. The leari1ed Additional Solicitor General as also Mr. Phadke

. relied on Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 which, as its heading shows, deals with commissions and contended that since the commissions issued by the court in the. present case did not fall within the terms of any of the provisfons of Order XLVI, they were outside the scope of the power of the court and the cour! was not entitled to place any reliance on their reports for the purpose of adjudicating the issues arising in the writ petition. This arguemnt, plausible though .it rnay seem at first sight, is in our opini911 not well founded and must be rejected. It .is based upon a total misconception of the

(I) [1983] I S.C.R. 456.

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BANDHU~ MUHi MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 105

true nature of a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution.

A ArtiCJe 32 is so frequently used by iawyers and judges for enforcement of fundamental rights without a1iy preliminary objection against its invocation being raised on behalf of the State, that we have rarely . any occasion to examine its language and consiucr how lar, e is the width and amplitude qf its dimens.ion and range.

We are rn much .accustomed to the.· concept~ of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which .

B require every legal. proceedin'g including a proceeding for a high prerogative writ to be cast in a rigid or definitive mould and insist on ob.seivance of certain ,,7en settled rules of procedure, that we irr.pli- Citly assume that the same sophisticated procedural rules must also govern a 'proceedillg under Article 32 and the S11prcJi1e Court camict permit itself to be freed from tl1e shackles of these rules even if that C. be necessary for enforce111ent of a fundamental right. It wa~ orr the basis of this impre, sion fostered by Jong association with the Anglo- Saxon system of administration of justice thaf for a number of y, ears this court had taken the view that it is only a person whose fundamental right is violated who can approach the Supreme Court for relie1 ui:der Article 32 or in other words, he mus, t have a. cause of actic1) fer D. euforcemellt of his fundamental right.

It was 01ily in the year 1981 in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case~' that thfs Ccurt for lhe llrst tiine took, the view that v,1here a pe:rson .or class of :i:; erscns to whom legal injury is caused by reason of violation of a fundamental right is unable to approach the court for judicial redress on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged E position, any member. of the public acting bona fide can move the court for relief uder Article 32 and a fortiofari, also under Article 226, so that the fundamental rights may become meaningful not only for the rich and the well:to-do who have the means to approach the court but also for the large masses of pe°'le who are living a life of want and destitution and who are by reason of Jack of awareness, assertive- F . ness and resources unable to seek judicial redress.

This "view whic.h we took in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case is clearly within ti1e terms of Article 32 if only we look at the language of this . Article uninfluenced and uninhibited by any pre-conceptions and prejudices or any pre-conceived notions. Article 32 in so far it is material is iii the following -terms : G

"Art. 32 (!) : The right to move the Supreme Court by , , appropriate proceedings for4the effforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

(!) [1982] (2).SCR 365.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·

[1984) 2 S.C.R .

(2) : The Supreme Court shall have power to . issue directions or orders or .writs, .in- • clucling writ in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and cer!lornri, whichever may be appropriate, . for the enforcemel)t of any of the rights

conferied by this Part. .

While intcrpre, ting Article 32, it must. be borne in mind that our'approach must be guided. not by any v.crbal or formalistic.cations of coristrudion but by the. par.amount object and purpose for which . thi;; Article has been. enacted as a Funadmental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation must receive illtnnination f10m the trinity of provisions ivhich permeate and energise the entire Constitutioil namely, the Preamale, the Ftmclarnerital Rights and the Difectiw Prlndples of State Policy. .Clause (1) of Article 32 c6nfc1:s the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, but it does not 'say as to who shall luive this right to . move the Supreme court not does it say by what proceedings the Supreme Court may be so moved.

There is no li; nitation in the words. of Clause (1) of Article 32 that the fundamental right which is . sought to be enforced by. moving the Supreine Cou.rt should be one belongini to the person who' moves the Supreme Court JlOI .docs il say that the Supreme Court should. be mved only by a particular kind of pr0ceoding; It is clear on the plain langu'lge of clause (I) of Article 32 that whenever there is a violation of a fundamental right; any one can move the Sqpreme Court for enforcement ofsuch funda.mental right. Of course, the Court wo.uld not, in exercise of . its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper

. or busy body, and ould ordina?ily insist that only a person whose

fundamental right is violated should be. allowed to activise the court, but there is no fetter upon the power of the <:ourt to entertain a pro: . ceeding initiated by any person other than the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would, not ordinaril} entertain such a proceoding, since the person whose fundamental righ(is violated can always apprdacJ:i the court and if lie. does not wish to seek judicial redress by moving the court, why should some one else be allowed to do so on his behalf.

This reasoning however breaks down. when we have the case of a"person or class of persons whose [uridmental right is violated but who cannot hiwe resort.to the cqurt on account of their pJverty or disability o.r soci'ally or economically disadvantaged position ani in suoh a case, therefore, the courf.canand must allow any member of the public acting boqa fid0 to espouse the cause of such

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNIGN (Bhagwati; J.) 107 . . person or class of persons and move .the court for j'udicial rnforccme!it A or the fundamental right of such person or class of persons.

This does nt violate, in the slightest m\'asure, the language @f the con- • stitutional provision enacted in clause (J) of A1ticlc 32"

The.n again clause(!) of Article 32 says that the Supreme Court . . . ' . can be moved for enforcement. of a fundamental right by any. 'a ppro-.

B priate' proeeedlng. T!ierc is no limitation. in regard to the kind of proceeding envisaged in clause (l) of Article _32 except that.theproceedi.ng must be: "appropriate" and this requirement of appropriateness must be judged in the'light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, narnely, enforcement of a fondamentai right: . Tl1e

Co11titutin makers .deliberately did not lay down ny particu]ar fo111i C of procec(iing for enforcement of a fu'ndamental right nor did they stipulate that such proceeding should conform. to any rigid pattem or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England,.· because they knew that in a country' like India where there is'so. much or p.Jverty, ignorance,. illiteracy, deprivati.on and exploitation, 'iny insistence on a rigid formulaof proceeding for enforcement of a fu1.id-

 . D a1mntal right would. become self-defeating .because it would. place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond the reach of the common

imn and the enti're remedy for 'enforcement of fundainen'tal rights

.- \1('.lich th~ C Jtistitution' ma tiers regarded as so precious nd invaluable

tint tiny elev1ted it to. the status of a fundamental right, would be- CJm' a 'll; re rope of snd so far as the large masses of the people in E this -c)untry ar0 ce>ilerned. The Constitution 1nakers therefore advis, dly provided in Clause (I) of Article 32-that the Supreme Court m1y b' in)v ;.j by a11y '.a;>prop'riatc' proceeding, .'appropriate' not .i1rterm1 of a11y piticular form but 'appropriate' with refrcnce to

the pucpJc o( the proceeding. That is the reason why it .was held by this Cnrt in the Judges Appoi1itment and Transfer Case (supra) F lint Wli)rC a m'mbor of the public acting bona_ fide moves Hie Court for enforcJ.mnt of a. funclamental right 011 behalf of a person or cla11 of pmoin who on acco.uu; of poverty or .disability cir s.ocially

Of .eJ.JllJ n 1c1\ly disidvantaged position cannot approach the Court far nlief, such member of the public may move the court even .by just wriiiag, a letter, because iwould not.be right or fair to expect a G . prson acting pro bona publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket

for going to.a. lawyer and preparing a regular writ petition for being filed in c6uit for cnfprcement. of the fundamentalright or'the poor and doprivod ; ectfons of the cominunify a11d in such a case, a Jetter addrossecd. by him can legitimately be regarded as ari "appropriate''. ii proceeding. ·

SUPREMI> COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R • !Jut the question then arises as to what is the power which may be exernis.ed bi the Supreme Court when it is moved b

0 y an "appro_priate" proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right. The only provision made by the Constitution maker~ in this behallis to be found in clause (2) of Article 32.which confers power on the Supreme Court "to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto" and cer- tlorari, which-ever may be apprapriate, for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. lt will be seen that the power conferred by clause

(2) of Article 32 is in the widest terms. . It is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas 'corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo quarrnnto, which are hedged in by strict conditions differing from one writto another and which to quote the words. spoken by Lord Atkin 'in Bnited Australia Liniited v. Barciays Ban le

Ltd. (ll in another context often "stand in the path of justiceClanking their mediavel cilains".

But it is much wider and includes witilin it't; matrix, power to issue, any directions, orders or .writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of the iuO:damental right in questin and this is made ampiy clear by tlie inclusive clause whicil refers to ;,, the 1iature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quowarranto ; ind certiorari.

It is not only the iligh prerogative writs of 111andan1us, habeas corpus, prohibition, quo \Varranto and. certiorari .which can bei ssuo:l by the Supreme Court but also writs in the nature cif .

thes~ higil pnrJg1tive writs and tl1erefore even if the cpnditions for issue of any of tl1oie high prerogative writs are not fulfilled; the

Suprem~ Court WJU\d n_o( be constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its inability to help the citizen who has come before it for

judieial redrss, bitt would have po.wer to issue any directio1i, order .or \Vrit including a. \Vrit in. the nature of any high prerOgatlve writ.

This provision conforring on the Supreme Court power t~ enforce the fonaamental rights. in tile widest possible terms shows the anJ<icty of the Constitution makers not to allow any prncedural techn!colities to. stand in the way of enforcement of fu.ndametal rights. The Constitution mlkers clearly intende.d that the Supreme Court should have the atnplest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ nny be appropriate in a given case for enforcement of a fundameutal

right. But what procedure shall be followed by the Supoome Court ; n exercising. tile power .tq issue such direction,. order or writ ? That is a 1u1tt~r on 1vi1ich the Constitution is silent and advisedly So, becau;~ the Con•titt1tion makers never intended to fetter tile discretio.n of . the Suprome Court to evolve a procedure appropriate in the circums-

• (l) [1941] AC l

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BHANDHlJA MUKTI MORC!IA V. UNION (Bhagwati, /) 109 • tances of a given case for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its power f enforcing a fundamental right.

Neither clause (2) of Article 32 nor any otiler provision of the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its powe, I to issue an, appropirate direction; order or writ.

The purpose for which the power to issue an ppropriate direction, order or writ is conferred on the Supreme co.urt is to secure enforcement of a fundamental right and obviously therefore, whatever procedure' is necessary for fulfilment. of tb, e purpose must be permissible to the Supreme Court. n is not at all obligatory that arr adversarial procedur, where each party produces his own evidence tested by cross examipation by the other side and the judge sits like an umpire and decides the case only on the basis of such m.aterial as may be produced before him by both parties, must lie followed in a proceeding under Article 32 for enforcement of a fundamenlal right. . Jn fact, there is no such constitutional. compulsion enacted in clause (2) of ArtiCle '.l2 or. in any other part of tbe Constituion. It is only because we have been following the adversarial procedure for over a century owing to the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence under the British Rule that it has bccom! a part of our conscious as . well as sub-conscious thinking that every judiGial 'proceeding must. be 'casf in the mould of adversarial procedure and that justice cannot be dqne unless the 'adversarial procedure is adopted. But it may be . noted .that there is riothing sacrosanct about the adversarial procedure and in fact it is not followed in many other countries where the civil system of law prevails.· The adversarial procedure with evidence led either party and tested by-cross-examinaticiri by the other. party and the judge playing a passive role has become a part ofour legal system because it isembodied in. the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. But these statutes ob.iously have no application where a •new juriSdicdon is created in the Suprcn1c Court for enforce1ncnf of a fundamental right. We do not think we would be justified in imposing any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in exercise of its new jurisdiction, by engrafting adversarial procedure on it. when the constitution makers

haVe delibe, rately cho?en not to insist on any such requirement and instead, left it opei~ to tl)e SuP, reme Court to foliow.such proceoureas it thinks appropriate for the purpose of securfng the end for which the power is conferred, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.

The adversarial proceQ_ure l)aS, in fact, come in for a lot of criticism

!Ven in the coU:ntry of its ofigin, and there is an increasing tendency even in that country to depart from its strict. norms. Lord' De Jin speaking of the.nglish judiial syS"te.m sai~ ''If our n1thcds \\Ere

, . . 110

.SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R ·

as antiq.uated as our legal methods, we hould be a bakrupl country". , And Foster Q:C . .Observed : . "I t!Jink tl1e whole EngJ.ish system is non-sense. I would go to the root of it-·the civil case between two private parties. is a mimic battle ........ conducted according to rules of ev.idcnce." .There's a consicferable body of juristic opinion in our country als0 which believes that strict adherence to the adversarial procedure can some times lead tq injustice, . particularly where the parties are not evenly balanced i.n social or economic st1ength. Where one of the parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and de?rived section of the community and does not possess adequate social and material. resources, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and p0werful opponent ui1de.r the adversary system of jusiice, because . o[ his diflb1lty ih getting competent legal representation and more that; anything else, his inability to produce relevant evidence before the court. ·Therefore, when the poor come before the coil;!, particularly for cnforcem, nt of their fondamntal rights, it is nescessary to de.part from'thi adversari'al procedure and to evolve a n'ew procedure which,

wi!I rmkc it pJsible for the poor and the weak to bring the necessary 1111tcrial before the court for the 'purpose of securing enforce111e11t of . . . . ·. th>'r funclamcntal rights. It must be remembered that the problems of th~ pJor. whic'.1 are now coming before the court.are qualitatively different from thJse which hnvo hither to occupied the attei1tion of

tho C'}urt and_they needa different kind of lawyering skill and a ' difforent kind of judicial approach.

If we blindly folio~ the ad versaria l prJcedure in their case; they would never be able to. enforce their

fu,1da1nenta,! rights and the result would be nothing but a mockery of the Constitution. We have therefore to abandon the laissez faire .approach in .the jH<l°iciai procss particularly where it .involves

a q'uestion of enforcement' of fundamental rights and forge new tcols, devise new methods and adopt new strategies for the purpose of making , fnndarmntal rights meanirtgful for the lar.geJmsses of people. Ali'd this is clearly permissible on the language of claus.e (2) -of Aricle 32 . bcatise the .Constitution 1nakers 'while enaCtingthat .claue have dC-

 librateljr' and advisedly not 11sed any words restricting ihe power of the court to adopt any procedure which it considers appropriate in

th~ circilmstanccs of a given case for_ enforcing a fundaental right.

It is true. that the 'adoption of this 1\oi{-traditionql approach is not 'likely to find easy. acceptance from the generality of lawyers because their n.; inds it re. conditioned by constant association with the existing system of'administration f justice which has become ingrained in them as a result of long years of familiarity and experience nd become part of their mental make up and habit and they would therefore aliv1ys hlve an unconseiqus N"dilection . for the prevailing .. systeni

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BANDHUA MUKTl MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati,.J.) Ii I

of administration o(iustice. ·. But if we want. the fundamental rights A to become a living .reality and the Supreme Court to become it real, sentinel on the quiviVe, we must free. outselves from the shackles of outdated and outmoded assumptions and bring to bear on the subject fresh outlook and original unconventional thirtking. ·

Now it is obviou; that the poor and the disadvantaged cannot B possibly produce relevant material before the court in support of their 'case and equally where an action is brought on their behalf by a' citizen . acting pro bon~ publico, it would be alcimost impossible for him to gather the relevant materia.1 and place it before the court.

What is the Supreme Court to do in such a case ? Would the SupremeCourt not be failing. iri discharge of its constitutional duty of enforcing a . c fundamental right •if it refuses to intervene becasue the petiti0i1cr b;!Onging to .the underprivileged segment of s6Ciety o} a publiC spirited

dtiin espousing his cause is. unable to 'produce the relevant material

b)fore the. court. If the Supreme Court were to adopt a pas.iive approach and decline to intervene in .s.uch a case becaues relevant 1mterial has not been produced before ft by the party seeking its Ii intervention, the fundamental rights would remain merely a teasing: illu ; ion so f'.tr as the poor and disadvantaged sectfons of the community are cJ'lcerned. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has evolv-· ed the practice of appointing commissionsfor the puqiose of gathering

facts and data in regard to a complaint of breach of fundamental right made on behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The Report

. E ' of the coinmissioner \vould fur1ish primil iaie evidene-.of the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and .that i's why the Supreme Court is camful to appoint a responsible. person as commissioner to make an inquiry or investigation into the facts rela.ting to the cort1plaint• It is interesting to note that in the pa1tthe Supreme Court has appoiMted sometimes .a district magistrate, sometimes a district F Ji1dge, soinetimes a professor of law, sometimes a jounalist,'scmetimes an officer of the court and sometimes an advocate practising in t!1c court, for the ptirp.ose of carrying out an inquiry qr investigation and m1king report. to the court because t)1e commi.ssioner appointed by t:ie C.ourt must be a responsible person who enjoys the confidence of tho court and who is ·.expected. to carry out his assignment objecti- G v0Jy and impartially. without any predilection or prejudice. .Once the r, eport of the Commissioner is received, copies.of .jt would be sup- . 'plied to the parties so that either party; if it wan.ts to dispute any cf ihe facts or data stated in the Report, may do so by filing an ,, ffidavit and the court then consider the report of the commissioner. and the .

H affi1avits which ll!aY have been filed and pro_ceed (o adjiidiciate upon ·

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 s.c, R.

the isuerising in the w1it petition. It would be entirely for the Court to consider whatweight to attach to the facts and data stated in the report of.the commissioner and to what extent to act upon such facts and data. But it would not be correct to say _that the report of the commissio.ner has Jio evidentiary Vaine at all, since the statements made in it are no't tested by cross-examination. To accept thiS contention would be to introduce the adversarial procedure in a proceed- ing where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. The learned A1ditional Solicitor General and Mr: Phadke relied on Order XXVl of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules ! 966 for the purpose ofeontending that a commission can be appointed by the Supt; eme Court only .ro'r .the purpose of exa- 1nining witnesses, niaking legal-investigations and exan1iningaecounts and the _Supre1m Court has no power to appoint t\ commission for miking an lnqtiiry: or in'1'esti'gatio1~ into facts relating to a Coin- platnt of violation of a fundamental t'ight in a proceeding under Article 32..

NJw it is true that Order XLV I of the. Supreme Court R"1JC5 1956 m:1kes the proyisions of Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Prciodure, except rules 13, 14, 19, 20, 21 and 22 applicable to .the

:Spre:m Court and lays down the procedure for an application fol

i"m of a com:nissiou, but O_rder XXVI is not exhaustive and does nJt detract from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to appoint a cJm nission .. if theapp:Jinmtent of such co1nn1ission is found neccsnry for th' purpose of securing enforcement of a fundan1ental right in exrcis~ of its c9·11stitutional jut:isdiction under Article . .32. Order: XLVI of .the Suprem' Court Rules 1966 cannot in m1y way miliiatc ag iinst the power of the Supreme Court under Article32 and in fact rulo 6 rif Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides t!11t n ithing in tlnso Rules "sha\J be deemed to limit or otherwise a!foot th' in1Drent powers of the court to make such orders ts may .

b~ n~::es>; ary for the ends of justice." We canot therefore accept th' coatention or the learned Addi. Solicitor General and Mr. Phadke that th' court acted beyond its power in appointing M/s. Ashok , Sriva-; tava a11d Ashok Pandci as Co1nmissiOnerS in the fist istBncc

and Dr. Pat\vardhan as co111n1issioner ata subsequent stage {or the ·· purp:Jse of making: an itiquiry into the conditions C!f \vorkn1en en1pl6yod in the stone quarries. The petitioner in the "'rit petitio1i speci- . froally alleged violation of' the fundamenial rights of the workmen

employed in the stone quarries under Articles 21 aTid 23 and it was therefore nec0ssary for the court to appoint these c"oiinnissioners for the pc1rpose of inquiring int~ the facts related io this omplaint.

The. Report of M/s .. Ashok srivastava and Ashok Panda as also the Report of Dr. Patwardhan were clearly documents having evidenf-·

x. '.

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. BANDHUA MUK1' MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 113.

tiary value.and they furnishedprimafacie evidence of the facts and

A.. data stated i.n those Reports. Of course, as we have stated above, it will be for us to consider what weight w~ should attach to the facts and data contained in these Report; i.n the light of the various af!idavi.ts filedin the _proceedings.

. . . - . . . . .

We may point out that what we have. said abc ve in regard 1o

B · the exercise of jurisdiction by the. Supreme Court under Articl.e 32 must apply equally , in relation to the .exercise of jurisdkticn by )lie.

High. Courts under Article 226, for the latter jurisdicticn js a'[o a new constitutlonal jurisdiction and it is conferred in the san:c wide terms as .the jurisdi'ction under Article ~2 and the same powers can and must therefore be. exercised b) the .High Co];!rts while ex.ercising C . jurisdiction under Article 226. In. fact, the jurisdiction of the High ·

Courts under Article 226 is much wider, because the. High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal right and there are man-yrights conferred on the poor and the disadva.ntagcd "· which are the creation of statute and they need. tp _be. enforced .as .• D urgently and vigorously its fundamental r1ghts,. ·.

thving disposed of these preliminary bjections, we shall now . proceed to consider the writ petition on merits. But,. before ive

forn to "examine. the facts of this case, we may'first cnsider which . are tile laws gover.ning the living a.nil working conditions of workmen' ·, employed in the stone quarries--:~The first statute to which' we. must refer ill' this connectilfi1 is the Mines Act, 1952. This Act extends to tM whole of India an, d therefore applies a fo•tiorari in the State . of B:aryana. Section 2(j) nes "mine" to mean ·ny excavaticin

where any operation for the. purpose of searching for of obtaining mi1wrals has been. or is being carried on and includes. in clause (iv)

"all open cast working". The word "minerals" has been. given a very broad meaning under section 2(jj) a; d it rr.eans ·"ail substances which cart be obtained from the earth. by mining, digging, drilling, dredging, hydraulicing. quarrying or by any other. operation" .. Section 2(kk) gives the definition of "opn cast workfog" an4 according to this ddiaition, it means "a quar; y, that is to say, anexcavation where any opertatfon for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals ''has been or is.being carried <in.'not being .. a shaft or an excavation which extends below superjacent ground". There can be no doubt. that according to. these definitions, the' stone quarries with whih we are concer_ned in this writ petition, constitute "mines" within the meanijlg of the d; finition of that te.rm in 'section 2(j). since Jhey qre

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114 SUPREME €0tJRT REPORT9'

(1984] 2 S.C.R. • ·

excavations where operations for the purp'ose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are being carried on but they are not" 'open cast working' since admittedly excavations in the case of these stone quarries extend below superjace11t ground, But the question still remains whether the provisions or' the Mines Act 1952 apply : to these stone quarries even if they are "mines"., Section '3(1) (b) . enacts that the provision~ of the Mines Act, 1952 except those contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46 shall not apply to any mine engaged in the extraction 'i11ter alia of kankar, 'murruni,' Jaterite. - boulders, gravel, shingle, building stone, road nietal and earth and therefore, if this statutory. provision stood alone without any qualifi' cation, it would appear that barring the excepted sections, the provisions of Mines Act 1952 would not apply to these stone. quarries.

But there is a proviso to section 3(1)(b) which is very material and it runs as follows :

"3(1) The provisipns of this Act, except those contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46, shall not apP.IY to'-'-

(b) any mine engaged in the exiraction of kank.ar, murrum, Iaterite, boulder, gravel, shingle, ordinary sand (excluding moulding sand, glss sand and other mineral sands), ordinary clay (excluding kaolin, china clay, white clay or fire clay), building.sto.ne, road metal earth, fullors earth and. lime stone : '

Provided -that-

(i) the workings do not extnd below superjacent ground; or

. . . ..

(ii) where' it is an open cast working- ·

(a) the depth q( , the excavation measured from its

highefit to its !west point nowhere exceeds six

metfes; • . . (b) the number of persons employed on any one day does not exceed fifty; ad

(c) explosives are not used in connection with ihe. ·

excavation."

Since . the workings in these stone quarries cxter.d belc w superjacent ground and they are not 'open cast workings' and more- , over explosives are admittedly sed in connection with t~ excavation,_

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BANDHUA MUKTI l>!ORCHA ~· UNION (Bhagwati, .!;) 115

the conditions set out in the proviso are not fulfilled and henc;'e the A. exclusion of the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 (other than the excepted sections) is not attracted and all the provisions o(the Mines Act' 1952 apply tothese stone quarries. It may also be noted that the definition of 'mine' in section 2(j) includes in Clause (x) any premises or part thereof in or adjacent and belonging to a mine on : which any process ancilliary to the getting, dressing or .preparation B for sale of minerals ........... , ... is being carried on.''. Now obviously stone crushing is a process apcilliary to the getting, dressing . or preparation for ale of stone quarried from. the stone quarries and therefore if th.e stone crushing activity is caj'Iied o~ in premises in or adjacent to a stone quarry and it belongs to the same owner as the sfone quarry,. it would be. subject to the discipline of the

. C provisions of the Mines. Act 1952 nd ail wqrkmen employed in connection with such stone crushers would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that Act. It will, thus, be seen that all the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 are. applicable to the \vorkmen employed in the stone quarries as also to the workmen employed in connection: with stone crushers, where. the stone crusher is si.tuate in or adjoining D to a stone quarry and belongs to the same owner as the stone quany.

Now the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 which are material are those set out in Chapters V; VI and VII, Chapter V deaiing wit.h. provisions as to halth and safety, Chapter.VI, with.hours and li1'nitation of employment and Chapter VII, wfrh leave with wages. The provisions contained in these three Chapters confer certain rights E' and benefits on the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and these rights and benefits are in)ended to secure .• to the workmen just and humane conditiqns of work ensuring a d<cen.t standard of life with basic human dignity. We shall have' cccasicn to eonsider some of these rights .and benefiis. when we deal with the SJ?ecific complaints made on behalf of. the petitioner, bnt we may F poillt out at this stage that the most important rights and benefits conferred onthe workmen are those relating to tmir heaHh and safety. which include provisions as to drinking water, conservancy and injuries arising out of accidents, in regard to which detailed requirements are laid down in Chapters V, VI and lX. of the Mine..s Rules,

1955. We may: also. point out. that the obligation of complying with G these provisions of the Mines Act, 195~ and.the Mines Rules, 1955 rests on the owner, agent and manager of every stone quarry a.nd stone crusher~ because section 18 declares that the owner, agent and manager of every ine shall be responsible that all operatio'ns carried on in connection threwith are cond'ucted in accordance with

H the provision~ of the Act and 'of the' regulations. rules and by•laws . ·•

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[1984) 2 S.C:R; ·

nd of any orders made imder the Act. The 'owner' is defined in sedtion 2(1) of t!ic Mines Act~ 1952 to mean "any pemn \\EC is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the n:inc or any rart

theof. '..:;· .... but' does -not incldc a erson who . me'iely :eceives a royalty, tent or fine from the mme or is merely the proprietor cf the.mine, subjct to any iease, gran(or licence fc'r _the working.thereof." Sil,;;, 'the stone quarries in the present case are not l:eing exploited by the State of Harvana though :it iS the owner of the stone quarries, . but are baing give~ out ni1 lease by auctio~.- the mine-lemes "to

are. not only lessees but also occupiers of the sfone quarr:es are tbc .owners of ihe stone•quarries within the meaning of that .expressicn as used in section 2(1) and so also arc' the owners of stcr.c ctusl:os . - . 4 - .· -.. in relation lo their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners . ot' stone crushers are, therefore .. Jiable under section I§ of the Mines Aot, 1952 to carry .out their operations in accordance with the pro.-

.. visions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines Rules, 1955 and,9ther

Rules and Regulations made \lnder. that Act and to ensure that the rights and benefits confrrecl by ti1ese proyisions are actually and . 'c .. :inoretdy made available to the workmen. The Central Government. is entrusted under .t:1e Mines Act 195.2 with the responsibility of 1eour.ing compliance with the proidsious of that.Act and of the Mines

R'ulci 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made .under that Act and .it is the primary obligation of the Central Government to ensure that thCS\1 provisions are c()mp!ied 1;'.ith by the mine-lessees and stone

-crtlshr .O\vners.

The State of. !-f-aryana is also, fer rei!cns wliiCh w~ .h1ve already disCussed, under an obli_g-aticn to take all ncces5ary steps for. the purpJsc of securing co1npliance '\'.Hh these prcviicns by .. the mine-lessees arid owners of stone crushers. The State of:

Ha, rya!1a has in fact aQlric; le.d tlie P-unjrb Minor Miner_al Conccss, i9n Rules !9M in their application to the State of Haryana by issuing the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession (Haryana First Amendment) Rules.1982 ori 6th December 1982 and substituted a new clause 16 in Form F .. ?- nw cla"hse 13 in Form Land a nc\v ylause 1Q in For; n1 N ·

providing that the lessee/lessees or .the cohtractor/contract.ors, s . tho case may be, . . . .

"shan abid.e by the, provision's ofMiries ACt, 1952 Inter • State Migian.t Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Se(vice) Ac( J979 ai1d the rules and regulatiom framed th6reundcr .and also the. provisions. of other fabour ' Jaws both Central and State as are applicable to the work;,, e11

e;1gag¢d in tbe mineS; and quarrit-.s: relating to the pto:isions of dr_inking \vatr, rest _sheltqrS, dwlling houses, la.trnes1 .·

--~ ,

BANirHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwat!; f) !17. ·• ' a11d. first aid end. meelical facilities in particular. and other. ·., safety .and welfare provisions in general, to"the s&tisfaction : • of the competent authorities under the aforesaid Acts, rules and regulations and also to the satisf; ction of-the District . . . . . .

Migistrate concerrn; d .. In the case of non-compliance. of any Of the provisions of the enactments as _aforesaid, the St.ate Government. or any officer authorised by it in thi_s

behalf. may terminate the .contract by giving one monws. nJtice with forfeiture of security depo_sited or _in the alten1ative the State L_abo.ur Department may remedy the breach/ ·. breaches by providing. the welfare and ·.safety measures as provided in_ the aforosaid enactments at the expense and cost of the contractor/contractors. The amount thu.s .spent . . . . - shall be recovered from the cont; actor/contractors by the Industries .. Department and reimbursed to Labour Depart- 1nent.'' , '\

The State of Haryana is therefore, in any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions of the "Mines Act J952 and the Mines Rules 1955 "and other "Rules and Regulations made .under that Act. for the :benefit of the workmen: · • We may then turn to the provisions of Inter-State Migrant . Warkmn (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)·

Act, 197~ (hereinafter referred lo as the Inter-State Migrnnt Workmen . A't) .. ' This Act was brought into force in the State of Haryana with

offe;; t frnnr 2nd OctQber 19.80 and the authorities under ihis Act were

notifjod oil 21st July 1982. We may, therefore, proteed on .the basis that the provisions of this Act becairie enforceable, if not from 2nd Ootobor 1980 at least from 21st July 19.82.

Now this Act by sub- ?' . section (4) df Section (I) applies to every establishment in which

: five or more .inter-State migrant )VOrkmen are employd or were

eniploy, od. on any day of the preceding twelve months .and so also . . it applies to every. coritraCtor who employs or employed five or more

. inter-State migrant workmen on any' day of. ihe preceding twdve

months. Section (Z) subsection (I) Clause (b) of the Act .defin<s contractor, in ; elation to an establishment, to mean •a pencn who undertakes (whether as.an independent ccintrcicr, agent, mp1c}'c or otherwise) to produce a given result for the establishment, .ether than a mere. supply "of good~ and ariicles of manufactnre to such 'establishment, .by the employment of workme.n or to supply workmen

to the establishment, and includes a sub-contractor, khatedar, sardsr, agent or any , other person, by whatever nam.e called, who recruits

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SUPREME COURT REP<{RTS [1984] 2.s.c.a.

or employs -workmen.'' c; Jause (e) of sub-section' (I) of Section (2) defines "inter-State migrant workmen" to means "any person who is recruited'by or through a contractor in one State under an agreell\ent or other arrangement for employment in an establishment in another State, whether with or without the knowledge of the principal employer in relation to' .such establishment." The expression "principalemployer" is defined by clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 2 to mean "in relation .to a mine, the owner or agent of the fuine and - ' ' where a person has been named as the manager of th.e mine, the " . rerson so named." Obviously, therefore,. t):ie mine-lessees and . owners .of stone crushers in the present case would be principal employers within the meaning of that expression as used in the lnter- State Migrant Workmen Act. Section 4 provides for registration of every principal employer of an establishment to 'which the Act applies and Section 6 enacts that no principal employer of an establishment to which this Act applies, shall employ inter-State migrant workmen in the. establishment unless a certificate of registration in . respect of such establishment is issued under the Act in force. Similarly, Section .8 sub-section (1) provides that with.effect from such date as the appropriate Government may be Notification in the Official Gazette appoint no contractor to. wl.tom the Act applies shall recruit any person in a State for the purpose of eftiploying hi1il in any establishment situated in another State, exept unper and in accordance. with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer appointed b/the Central Government who has jurisdietion in relation. to the area wherein the recruitment is made, nor shall be employ as workmen for the execution of any' work in any establishment in . any State, persons from another State excent under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer appointed by

/ I

the appropriate Government having jurisdiction in relation to the )( area wherein the_ establishment is situated. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 declares. that a licence under sub-section (1) may contain such" conditions including, in particular, the terms an~ conditions of the agreement or other arrangelljent under which the workmen will be recruited, the remuneration payable, hours of work, fixation of wages and other 'esseritial amenities in respect of the inter-State migrant workmen, as the appropriate Government may deem fit to impose in accordance with the Rules, if any, made under-Section 35. Section

12 imposes certain duties and obUgations on contractors which include inter cilia the duty to issue to every inter-State migrant wor!<man a . pass-book containing various particulars regarding recruitment and employment of the worKrn.an as also to pay to the workman the return fare from the place ofemployment to the place ofresidencc

....

' BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. u.Nl0N (Bhagwati, J,) 119 ' . in the home State when he ceases to be employed, .Rule 23 of the Inter-State .Migrant Workn:en (Regulation -0f Employment and Conditions of Service) Central Rule$ 1980 (hereinafter referred to as inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules) sets out certain additional . ' particulars which must be inchided in the .pass•book to be issued tb every inter-State migrant workmen. Section 13 then proceeds to lay down the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of an i9ter-State .migrant workman and provides inter alia that in no case shall a inter-State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948, and the wages shall be paid to.an.inter-State migrant workman in cash. The deiai!ed particulars in regard to wages payable to an inter-State migtnt workman are laid down in Rules 25 to 35 of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Riiles. The!) follows Section 14 which provides that there shall be paid by the contractor to every inter-State' migrant workman at the time of recruitment, a displacement allowance and ' the amount of displacement allowance shair not be refundable but shall be in addition to the wages or other amounts payable to 'bim.

There is also a provision made in Section 15 for payment to an interstate migrant workman of a journey allowance of a sum not .less

tha~ the fare from the.place of residence. in his State to the place of work in the other State, both for outward and return ]ourneys and this Section also enacts that the workman shall be entitled to. payruent of wages during the period of such journeys as if he was bn duty . . Section 16 lays a duty on .. every contractor employing inter-State migrant workmen in connection with the work of an establishment t; provide various other.facilities particulars of which are to be found . in Rules 36. to 45 ef the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules. These facilities inc)ude p:iedical facilities, protective clothing, drinking \vater, latrines, urinals and washing facilities, rest rooms, canteens,· creche and residential accommodation. The obligation to provide these facilities. is in relation to the . inter-State Migrant Wo.rkmen. employed in -an establishment to which the Act applies. But this liability is not confined. only to the co11tractor, because Section 18 provides in .so many terms that .if any allowance required to be paid

under-ection 14 or I 5 to an. inter-State migrant .W 0rkman is not . paid by lihe contractor or if any facility specified jn section 16 is not .

pro.vided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the case may .be, the facility shall be provided by the principal employer within such time as may be prescribed by the Rules and .all the allowances paid by the principal employer or all the expenses incurred )Jy him in this connection may be recovered l; iy him from tM contractor either by deduction from. tJie amount payable .to the

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.120


cemtractor or as debt payable by the contractor.. Section :Zs & 2~. make .it an offence for any o.ne. to contravene. any of th.e provisions of .the Inter-State Migrant Workmen. Act or Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules and Section JO gives over-ridiHg effect to the pr(i. visions of the Inter, State Migrant Workmen Act over any other law or any agreement or contract. of service or any standing orders. These are broadly the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter-State' Migrant Workmen Rules which may call for consideration. ·

But the question arises whether the Inter-State.- Migrant Workmen Act applies to the workmen employed in the stone quarries . . - . . and the stone crushers. Now it was not disputed on behalf of the State of.Haryana and indeed It was clear from the Report of Dr.

Patwardhan that inost of the workmen.employed in the stone quarries and stone crusheril come from Uttat Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh and there are only .a few' workmen from Haryana. It ls only if 5 or more out. of these workmen .coming from States either than Haryana ate inter-State .· inigrant workmen within the meaning -of that expression as defined in Section. 2 sub-section (1) clause (e) of the Inter-State Mig'rant Workmen Act that the establishment in which .they are employed · . would be covered by the lnter-State Migrant Workmen Act.

It would. therefore have. to be determined in .case of each stone quarry fod each stone crusher whether there are 5 or.more inter-State migrant

workmen employed iu the establishment ana if there are, the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Intet-State Migrant Workmen Rules would become applicable to ch establishment.

The U; ion. of India in a submission filed on its behalf by Miss Subhashini has taken up the stand that the wor)cmen en';.ployed in the stone . quarries and stone crushers .. a.re coming to joip. the service: in th; e

stone quarries. of their own volition and they are noi recruited by any agent for _being migrated from any State" and. "as such they do. not come under the definition of the term" inter-State migrant workman. We would av: ordinarily been incliiied to accept this statinerit ·

made on behalf of the Union of India; but we find that, according to the Report.of Dr. Patwardhan, the modus operandi that i~ followed for the purpose of rcruitment of workmen is "that the stone crusher owners or th.e lessees holders ask the thekedar or jamadar of the mine tb fetch people from various States to w()rk in the mines" and some times "the janiadar or thekedar COlljlIBUnicates. the nee.d fo~ workers.to old hands at the quai:ricsso that they could bring in pe.ople • on their return froin their villages or their respective States". Now

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. BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCHA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 121

if what h.as been reported by Dr .. Patwar<lhan is true, ithere can be nu doubt that the workmen employed in the stone quarries and. stone " . crushers. would be inter-State migrant workmen. The thekedar or

jamadar. who .is engaged by the mine lessees or the stone-crusher owners to recruit workmen or employ them on behal( of the inine lessees or stone crusher owners would. clearly be a 'contractor' within the meaning.of that (erm as defined .in Section 2 sub-section (1) Clause

(b) and the workmen recruited. by or through him from .other States for employment in the stone quarries and stone crushers 'iii the State of Haryana would undoubtedly be inter-State migrant workmep.

Even when the thekedar or jal)ladar 'recruits or employs workmen for the stone quarries and stone . crushers by sefiding word through the "old hands", the workmen so recruid 'or employed would be inter-State migrant workmen, because the "old hands", w.ould be really acting as agents of the thekedar or jamadar for the purpose of..recruiting or employing workmen. The Inter-State Migrant

Wrkmen Act being a piece of social welfare legislation intended . to effectuate the Directive Principles of State Policy and ensure decent living and working conditions for the workmen .when they come from other States and are in a. totally strange environlnent. whee by. reason of .theii: poverty, ignorance. and. illiteracy, they would be totally unorganised and helpless and would become easy victims .. of illlploitation, it must be given a broad and expansive interpretatiop so as to preverit the mischief.and adhnce they remedy.and therefore, even when the workmen are recruited cir .employed by the jamadat or thekedar by operatig through the "old hands';, they inu; t be regarded as inter-State _migrant workmen entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen 'Act and the IIiter-State Migrant Workmen RuleS'. The Report of Di. Patwardhan also poipts out one other aspect of the matter : according to him,_. there is 'invariably "an unc; lerstanding between the Jamadar or.thekedai and the owners of stone crushers holding leases of stone 'quarries as to the.rate of output of stone. to be fed through the crushers" and thus the 'jamadar or thekedar is clearly a "contractor' of the stone crusher owners and the woren recruited or employed by him on behalf of the owners of stone ctushel's are inter, Statewigrant workmen. We entireJY agree with this view put fowa:rd. by .Dr. Patwardhan. in his Report arid we hav~ no doubt. that if there iS any areement 'or understanding between the jamadar or thekedar on the one hand . . .. and the owners of tone crushers on•the other, that the Jamadar or ' thekedar will ensure a certain rate. of output of stone to be fed to the

stone crushers, the jamadar or thekedar would be a 'contractor' and . the .. workmen recruited or einploye.d by him on behalf of the stone .

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.

crnsher owners would be"inter-State migrant workmen. But whether inany particular stone quarry or stone crush.er the workmen employed are inter-State .migrant workmen on the application of ., this test laid down by us and if so, hciw many of them are such inter-State migrant workmen, is a matter which would have to be investigated and deter- . mined and that is what must be .done if we areto make the provisicns of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules meaningfui for these workmen who are. recruited from other States and who come to the stone quarries ad stcr.e crushers in the State of Haryana. We may point out that in additicn to the rights and benefits confer; ed upon him under the Inter-S.tatc

Migrant Workmen" Act and tl1e Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules, an 'inter-Siate migrant ',\lorkman .is. also, by r.eason of Section 21, entitled to, the benefit of the provisions contained in the Wcrkman's . Compensation Act 1923. The Payment of Wages Act 1936,. The Employees' State Insurance Act 1948,. The Employees' Provillcnt .. Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952, a11d the Maternity Benefit Act 1961. The obligation to give effect to the provisions contained in these varfous laws is .not only that of the jamadar or thekedar and the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners (provided of course there are 5 or more inter-State migrant workmen employei! in the establishment) but also that of the Central Government because the C'i1tral JJoveniment being the appropriate Government" :within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) is under an obligation to take necessary steps for •the purpose o( securing compliance with these provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers.

The State of Haryana is also for reasons already discussed above bound to ensure that' thes_e provisions are-observed by 'the thekedar' ' or' jamadar dnd. mil)e-lessees and owners of stone crushers.

We, then turri to consider the provisio'ns of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred t_o as the ' ' Contract Labour Act). This Act applies to every establishment in which' 20 or more workme1; are .employed or were employed on any day , of the. preceding twelve months as contract labour and to every contractor who employs or who employed on. any day of the . preceding twdve months 20 or more workmen. The expression "apprqpriate gqvernment" is defined in Section 2 sub-section (I) clanse (a) and so far as the stone quarries and stone crushers are con'cerne!. the Central Government is the 'appropriate 'Government'.

Section 2 s.ub-section (I) clause (b) states that a workman shall be deemed to be employed as "contract labour" in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is 'hired in or in connection

I --1

DANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) . 123

with such work by or through a contractor and "contractor".· is defined in clause (c) of that sub-section to mean, in relation to an establishment, "a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such. establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any 'work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor". The expression "principal employer''. is defined in clause (g) of subsectiori (i) of section 2 and for the purpose of a mine, it means the owner or agent of the mine and therefore, so far as the stone quarries 'and stone crushers ate concerned, the m; ne lessees and owners of stone crushers would be the principal employrs. Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act for registration of establisbmen! by every principal employer and for licencing of every contractor to whom the ; Act applies: 1lut more importantly, Sections 16 to 19 imposea duty on every contractor to~ provide canteens, rest rooms, nrst aid facilities and other facilities and Section 20 enacts that if any amenity required to be provided under section 16, 17, 18 or 19 for the benefit of the contract la hour e10ployed in an establishment is not provided . by the contractor, such amen; ty shall be urovided by _the principal em- . player and all expenses incurred by the principal employer in providing such amenity may be recovered by the principal employer from.the co.ntractor. Every contractor is made responsible under-section 21 for payment of wages to each worker employed_ by him as . contract • lbour .and such wages are to be disbursed in the presence of a representative duly authorised by the principal employer. Now if the jamadar or thekedar in a stone quarry or stone crustier is a . 'contractor' within the meaning Of the definition of that term in the • Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, be would a fortiorarl a 'contractor' also for the purpose of Contract Labour Act and any • workmen hired in or in connection with the work of a' stone quarry or stone crusher by or through the jamadar or thekedar would be . workmn entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the . Contract •Labour Act. There are. elaborate Rules made under the Contract Labour Act called the cantract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules -1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Contract Labour Rules) and these Rules not only dal with the procedure for appliea- tion and grant of registration to a principal employer and licence _to a. cOl)tractor, but also particularise the deiails of the various welfare . and other facil:t; es direcied to be provided to the contract labour by Section 16, 1 ?, 18 and. 19 of the Contract Labour Act. Where therefore the thekedar or jamadar is a 'contractor' and the workmen are employed as 'contract lilbour' within the meaning of these expres-

•F.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

 sio1is as used in the Contract Labour Ad, the contractor as well as the principal .employer wold be liable to comply. with the provisions . of contract Cabour .Act and the Contract Labour Rules and to pro.vide to the contract Jabour rights and benefits conforred by these provisions. The Central Government beiqg the "appropriate gove rnment" within the.meaning of Setiori 12 suiHeciion (I) clause (a) would. be responsible for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and .. the.Contract Labourilules by 1he . mine-lessees and stone crusher owners and the . thekedar or jamadar.

So also, for reasoiis which we have alredy discussed while dalig with th~ applicability of the Mines Act i952 .and, the Inter-State Migrani Workmen Act, the State of Haryana would be .under. an . obligation to enfor90 the provisions of the Coµtract Labour Act and the-Contract Lab0ur Rules for the benefit of the-workmen .

. Turning to. the provisions of the Minim1fm .Wages Act 1948; there can lit.no doubt a'!ld indeed this was not disputed on beh~Jf of ihc respondnts, that the Mimmum Wags Act 1948 is applicable to workmetl employed in the stone q11arries and stone cru.shers. The minimum wage fixed for iniriers by the Notification of the 'Central . Govermneritdafod 2nd Dec; mber 1981 is fu.. 9.7·5.per day for those;.

working abbve the grnund and Rs. J 1 .. 25 per day for thbse wc; rking below the ground. Moreover the Notification prescribes a separate minimum wage for the occ11pation 'of a shot firer, stone breaker,. stone carrier; 1nud ren1over and water carriei. ThCn~ is "a mjni'rrlu, m' • wage, prescribed iri the Notificationfor each of these _occupations.: • The question is whether -the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers are paid minimum wage for lhe work done by _them .. The_ Report of Dr. Patwardhan alleges that the mode, of

.payment. to the workmen employed .in .stone quarrying operations is such that rafter deduction of the amounts spent on , explosivesand drilling of hoies, which amount has to be borne by the workmen • out. of the.ii' wa.ges, what is left to the workmen is iess than.the minimum wage. It is also stated_ in. the Repo"rt of Dr. Patwardhan tht the workmen employed in he stone .qu&rries not only quarry the stone . . but also carry out the work of a shot firer' and a stone breaker, though . .. . .. ' ' - the work of. a shot firer. cannot be done by them without proper : training as provide.d in the Mines Vocational Training Rules. 1966. and for this work of a shot firer and a stne hreaker carti<d cut by ·. theni, they do not-get the minimum wage stipulated for the ctcupaticn of a 'shot firer o~. it. stone braker and moreover since they ar~ piece:

rated workers, .their output fallsbecause of the other jobs they . are required to carry out with 'th" result that they are deprived of the

' .

.~.

...

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNI~ (Bhagwati, J.) 125

minimum wage which they should otherwise receive, We are not . in a position at the preent stage to give "° definite fihiling tht what

.is statedin the. Report of Dr. Patwardhan is true, but there can.be no. doubt that whatever be the mode of pa)'inent followed by the mine lessees and stone crµsher owners, the workmen must get nothing less than the minimum. wage for the job which is being carried out by them and if they are required to cariY out additionally any of the functions pertaining to another job or occupation for which a soparate minimum wage is prescribed, they rriust be paid a proper'. tionatc part of such minimum wage in addition to the minimum wage p1yable to them for the work primarily carried out by them. We wou!d also suggest that the system of payment which is being followed in the stone quarries and stone crushers, under which •the expenses -of the explosives and of drilling h.oles are: to be borne by the workmen

011t of their <>wn wages, should be changed and the explosives required for carrying out b!nsting should be suppiied by the mine lessees or .

the jmadar or thekedar without any deduction being made out of. the. wages of the workmen and the work of -Ori11ing holes. and shot firing should be entrusted only to those who have received the requisite training ·.under the Mines Vocational Training .Rnles 1966. We . would direc.t the Central Government and the Staie of Haryana to take. necessary steps in this behalf. so rar as the complaint of the petitioner thqt the' workmen employed in the •tone quarries and ·. sthe crushers' are not boing paid the min1mum was due and payable , for .the work carried out 'by them is concerned, it is a matter .which would have to be investigated and' determined in the light of the law: laid down by us. •

Lastly, we must conside~ the provision~ of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) !ACt 1976. We. have already pointed out , that many ofthe States are not prepared to adinit the existence of'b0nded labour in theif territories and the State of Haryana is no xception.

But in order to determine whether there is any bonded labour in the stone quarries and >tone crushers in the Faridabad area of the State of l!aryana, it is _necessary to examine some of the relevant provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)· Act 1976: This Act was enacted with a view to giving effect to Article 23 of the Constitution which. prohibits traffic fu .h.man 'beings and begar and other similar forms of forced 1aboui: We bave had ecasion to. consid_er the true scope and dimension of this. Article of the Constituiion in, Ptople's • 'Union.for Democratic Rights v, [, Inion~( india11 l commonly known as

(I) [198JJ 1 s, c:R. 456.

126 SUPREMllliCOURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.C.R.

the Asiad workers' case and it is not necessary for us to say anything more about it in the present judgment .. Sufl\ce it to. state that this Act is intended to strike against the system of bonded labour which has. been a shameful sdllr on the Indian social sceue for decades and which has continued to disfigure the life of the nation even after independence. The 'Act was brought into force through out the length and breadth of the country with effect• from 25th Qctober 197 5, which means that the. Act has been in force now for alfilost 8 years and if properly implemented, it should have by this time brought about complete identification, freeing and rehabilitation of bonded Jabour. But as official, semi-official and non, official reports show, we hve yet to go a long way in wiping out this outtage · against humat.ity. Clause (d) of Section 2 defines '°bonded debt" to mea.n an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained, by .a bonded labourer, under or in pur_suance of, the bonded Jabour .system. The expression 'bended labourer' is .defined in clause (t)

to mean "a labourer who. incurs, Gr has, or is presumed to have incurred a bonded 'debt", Clause (g) defines "bonded labour system"

 D to mean

,!;

"the system of forced, or partly foreed, labour under which a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, entered, into an agreement with the creditor to the effect that,- ·

(i) in consideration of an advance optained by him or, by any of his lineal ascendants or descendants (whether or not .such advance is evidenced by any document) and . in.

consideratn of the interest, if any, due on such advance, or

(ii) in pursuance of any customary or social obligatin; ar . . .

(iii) for .any economic consideration received by him or by any of his lineal ascend.ants or descendants, or he would- ·

(1) render, by .himself or throughany member of his family, or any person dependent ori him, labour or service to the creditor, or for the benefit of: the creditor. for a specified period or for an unspecified period, either . without ·-, vages or for nominal 'wages, or ·

(2) forfeit the freedom of emplo /inent or other means of H. . , livel; hood for a specified period or for an un-specified period,

?'·

BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.). 127.

(3) forfeit the right to move freely throughout the territory of India; or

(4) fo1feit the right-to appropriate. or sell at market value -any. of his property or product of his labour. or the labour cf a member of hi> family or an; y persoi1 dependent on him."

The expression "nominal wages" is. defined in clause (i) of Section 2 to mean, in relation to an, labour, a wage which is less t]lan-·-

(a) the minimum wages fixed by the. Government, in-relation to the same or similar labour, under ariy law for the time being in force, and

(b) where no such wage has been fixed in relation to any form of labour, the .wages that are normally paid, for the same or similar labour, to the labo.urers working.in the same locality."

Section 4 is the material section which provides for abolition of bo.nded labour system and it rims as follows :

"4(1) On the commencement of this Act, the bonded labour system shall stand abolished and every bonded labourer.. shall, on such commencement, stand1 freed and discharged

- • E frnm any obligation to render. any bonded labour.

{2) after the.commencement of this Act, no personshall-

(a) make any advance nncter, or in pursuance of; t.he bonded labour system, or F

(b) .compel any person to render any bonded labour or othen fonii of forced labour. .

Section 5 invalidates any custom or 'tradition or any contract agreement or other instrument by virtue of which any person or any member of the family or dependent of such .person is required to do. any work or render any service as a bonded labourer. Section 6 provides inter a/ia that on. the commencement of the Act, every obligation of a bonded labourer to. repay any bonded debt or such part of any bonded debt as remains unsatisfied immediately before s\Jch commencemerit, shall be deemed to have been extingui£hed.

.128

S0PRE~1E COURT REPORTS [I 984] 2 s.qc

.There ate certain other consequential provisions m Section 7 to 9

b:ut it is not necessary to refer to them.

Sections IO to 12 impose a duty on.every District Magistrate and every officer to \vhom .power may be delegated by him, to inquire whether, after the commencement of the Act, any bonded Jabour system .or any other form or forced 'Jabour is., being enforced by or on behalf 9f, any person resident wit.hin the I.ocal limits of bis jurisdiction and if, as. a result of such inquir)', .any person is found to be enforcing tbe bonded labour system ot any other syst0m cf forced labour, he is required forthwith to take tho necessary action to eradicate the enforcement of such forced labour. 'Section 15 provides for Constifution of a Vigilance Committee in each District and each sub-division of a District and sets out what shallbo the composition of each Vigilance Commiitee. The functions Of the. Vigilance (; ommitiee are set out'in Sectio~ 14 ard among other things, that Section proviaes that. the Vigilance Comm ttee shall' be responsible biter a/ia to advise .tho District Mgistrate as to the offorts

made and action taken, to ensure that' the provisions of the Act or any Rule. made thereunder are properly impleiucnted, to provi.de for the economic and. soda! rehilbUitation of the freed bonded labourers'. . ·.and to keep an eye onthe number of offences of 'which cognizance has been \aken unde~ the Act. Then comes Section 15 which Jays down that whenever any debt is clajnied by any Jab9urer or a Vigilance Committee to be a bonded debt, .the burden of proof that such debt • • i~ not a bonded debt shall lie on the 1; reditor. These are some of . the material provisions of the B.onded Labonr System (Abolition) Act-1976 wbich need to l{e considered.

It is a .matter of.regret i)lat though Section 13 proides for . ·.constitution of a Vigilance Committee in each. District and each subd!vision of' a District; the Goveminent of Haryana, for some reason

or .the othe, r, did not constitute any Vigilance Committee until 'its attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by. this Court.

It may be that according. to the Government of Har}ana there were not at any timeany bonded labourers.within its territories, but even .. so Vigilance Committees are required by Section 13 to be constituted because the function of theVigilarice Committee is to identify bonded , labourers, if there arc any, and 'to free , and rehabilitate them and it would not be right for the State 'Government riot to constitute Vigilrtce Committees on .the assumption that there .are rio bonded Jaboure1s at all. But ·;.,~ .are glad to find that the Government of Il:aryana has now costituted a Vigilance Committee in each District. It does not appear froin the record whether a_ Vigilance. Committee: has been consthuted also in each sub-division of a District bu.t we

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati,· J.) 129

have no doubt that the Government pf Hacyana will without any delay and at any rate within six' weeks from tcday constitue a Vigilance Committe.e in each sub-division and thus comply with the requirement of Section 13 of the Act. We may point out that in constituting Vigilance Commitiee in each District and sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action groups operting at the grass root level, for it is only through such social action groups and voluntary agencies that the problem of identification of bonded labour can be effectively solved.

It was contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana that in the stone quarries and stone crushers. there might be forced labourers but they were not bonded labourers within the meaning of that expression as used in. the Act, since a labourer would be. a. bonded labourer only if be bas er is .:presumed to have inc'urred a bonded debt and there was nothipg

in the presont, cose to show that the workmen employed in the sione quarries and stone crushers had incurred or could be presumed to have incurred any bonded debt. It was not enough, contended thelearned Additionalff Solicitor General, for the petitioner merely to .show that the workme~ were providillg forced labour in. that they were not allowed .to leave the premises of the establishment, but it was further necessary to show that they were woking under the bonded, .labour system. The learned Additional' Solicitor General ' also subm; t!ed that. in any event, even if the workmen filed affidavits ..

to the effect that they had taj<en advances fro~ tbekedar or jamadar and or mine lesset:s and/or stone crusher owners and they were not allowe(to. leave the 'premises of the establishment. until the advances were paid of, that would not be noilgb evidence for the Court to . hold that they were bonded labourers, because the mine"lessee.s and

stone crusher owners had no opportunity to cross-examine the workmen making such affidavits. This contention was seriously pressed by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the. State of Haryana, but as we shall presently show, there is no substance in this contention. We may point out that in the course of the arguments we did suggest .to the learned Additional Solicitor General that even i( the workmen were not bonded labourers jn .the strict sense of the term but were merely forced to provide labour, should the State Government not accept liability for freeing and rehabilita; ting them, particularly in view of the Directive _Prif\ciples of State Policy. The State of Haryana was however not prepared to c0me forward with any proposal.in this behalf.

c • •

• •

' !30

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

Now it is clear that bonded labour is a form of forced Jabour and Section 12 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 recognises this self-evident proposition by laying a duty on every District Magistrate and every officer specified by him to inquire

whether any bonded Jaoour system or.any other form of forced labour is being enforced by or on behalf of any person and, if so, to take such action as may be necessary to eradicate the enforcement of such forced labour. The thrust of the Act is against the continuance of any foriu of forced Jabour. 'It is of course true that, strictly speak- ing, a bonded labourer means a labourer who incurs or has or 1s presumed io have incurred a bonded debt and a bonded debt means an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded labourer under or in pursuance of the bonded labour system and it . would therefore appear that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not .only be forced to provide Jabour to the employer but he. must have also received an advance or other economic consideration from the employer unless he is made to provide forced Jabour in pursuance of any custom or social obligation or by reason of his birth in any particular caste or community.

It was on the basis of this definitional requirement that the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana p~ forward the argument that even if the . workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone .crushrs were being compelled to provide .forced labour,. they were not bonded laboure1s, since it as not shown by them or by the petitioner that they were doing so in consideration of an advance or other economic consideration received from the mine-lessees 'and owners of stone crushers.. Now if this contetion of the learned Additional Solicitor General were well-founded, it Would become almost impossible to enforce the provisions of the Bonded Lbour System (Abolition) Act 1976 because in every case where bonded labourers. are sought to be identified for the purpose of release and rehi!bilitation under the provisions of the. Act, the ' State A.uthorities as alS() the employer would be entitled to insist

that the bonded labourers must first prove that they .are providing forced labour .in consideration of an advance or other. economjc consideration received by them and then only they would be eligible, of the benefits provided under the Act and this would make it extremely dffiicult, 'if not impossible, for th~ labourers to establish that they are bonded labourers because they would have no evidence at all to prove that any advance or economic consideration was provided 'to them by the employer and since ployment of bonded labouren

is a penal offence under the Act the employer would immediately, without any hesitation, disown having given any advance .or economic

!. -

k BANDHUA l&UUI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 131 . . consideration to the bonded labourers. It is indeed difficult to 1111derstand how the State Government which is constitutionally mandated to bring about change in the life conditions of the poor 11nd the down-trodden and to ensure social justice to them, could possibly take up the stand' that the labourers m:ust prove that they are made to provide forced labour in consideration of an advance. or <:>ther economic consideration received from the employer and are t\ierefore bonded lab9urers. It is indeed a matter of. regret that the State Government should have insisted on a formal, rigid and legalistic approach in the matter of a statute wich is one of the most important measures for ensuring human dignity to these unfortunate specimens of humanity who are exiles bf civilization and who are leading a life of abject misery and destitution. . It would be cruel to insist that a bonded labourer in order to derive the benefits of this social welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal process of trial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence.

That would be a totally futile process because it is obvious that a bonded lal:iourer can never stand up to the rigidity and formalism of the legal process due to his poverty,.illiteracy and social and economic backwardness and .if such a procedure were required to be folldwed, the State Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book. It is now statistically established that most •f bonded labourers are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes and ordinary course. of hunian affairs would show, indeed judicial notice can be taken of it, that there would be no occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation where he is required to supply forced la.hour for no wage or for.nomi- nal. wage, unless he has received some advance or othe~. economic , consideration from the employer and under the pretext of not having returned such advance or.other economic consideration, he is required to render service to the employer or is deprived of his freedom of employment or of the right to move fteely wherever he wants. Therefore, whenever it is shown that a labourer is. made to provide forced labour, the Court would raise a presumption that he is required to do so in consideration of an advance or other economic considera' tion received by him and he is therefore a _bonded labourer. This presumption may be rebutted .bY .the employer and also by the

State Government if it so chooses but unless and until satisfactory material i11 produced for rebutting this presumption, the Court must proceed on the basis that the labourer is a bonded labourer entitled to the benefit of ihe provisions of the Act. The State Government. cannot be permitted to repudiate its .obligation to identify, release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers on the plea that though the

• SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1984] 2 s.c.R.

concerned labourers may be poviding forced labour, the State Government does not owe any obligatiqn to them unless and until they ·

show in an appropriate legal proceeding conducted according to the rules of adversary system .of justice, that they are bonded labourers.

The first question that arises in regard to the implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976, is thatof identification of bonded labour. One major handicap which impedes the identification of bonded labour is the reluctance of the administration to admit the existence of bonded labour. even where it is prevalent.

It is therefore. necessary to impress upon the administration that it does not help to ostrich-like bury its head in the sand and ignore the prevalence of bonded labour, for it is not the existence of bonded

. labour that is a slur on the administration but its failure 'to eradicate it and moreover not taking the necessary steps for the purpose of wiping out this biot on the fair name of the State is a breach of its constitutional obligation. We would therefore direct the Government of Haryana and also suggest to the other State Qovernments,.tQ take st.eps to sensitise the officers .concerned with the implementation of the Act to this acute human problems and its. socio-economic parameters. Moreover it may be noted that the District . Magistrates have a central role to play under. the provisions of the Act and. the State Governments would therefore do weli to instruct the District Magistra.tes to tae up the work of identification of bonded labour • as one of their top priority task~. There are certain areas of concentration of bonded labour which can be easily identified on the basis _of various studies and reports made bi governmental authorities, .social action groups and social scientists from time to time. These areas of concentration of bonded labour are mostly to be found in

stonequarries, brick kilns and amongst agricultural landless labourers and such areas must be mapped out by each State Government and task forces should be assigned.for identification and release of bonded labour: Labour camp.s should be held periodicall~ in these areas with a view to educating the labourers and for this purpose, the assistance of the National 'Labour Institute may be taken, because the National Labour Institute has the requisite expertise and experience of holding such amps and it should be associated with. the organisation and conduct of such camps and in each such camp, individuals with organisational capability or potential shculd 1:e identified and given training in the work of identification and relea'e 'of bonded Jabour. More importantly non-political serial acticn groups and voluntary agencies and. particularly those with a record of honost and cJmp, tent service for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled . . . '

'BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v . . UNION (Bhagwati, J,) 133

Tribes, agricultural labourers and other unorganised workmen shouid be involved in the .task of.identification and release of bonded labourers, for it is primarily through such soda! action groups and voluntary agencies alone that it will be possible to eradicate the toaded la tour system, because social action groups and voluntary agencies comprising inen and women dedi£ated to the cause o.f emancipation of bonded labour will be able to penetrate through the secrecy under which very often bonded labourers are required tp work and discover

the. existe.nce of bonded labour and help to identify and release bonded labourers. We would therefore direct the Vigilance Committees

'. as also the District Magistrates to take the assistance of non-political social.action groups and voluntary agencies for the purpose of ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976. '

Th.e other question arising' ou~ of the.· implementation of th~ Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 is that of rehabilitation

of tlie released bonded labourers. and that is also a question of the greatest importance, because if the bonded labourers who are identi-

• 1 D fied and freed, arc not rehabilitated, their condition would be much . worse .than what it was before during the period of their serfdom and they would .become more exposed to exploitation and slide back once again into serf<lon even in the absence of any coercion. The

bonded labourer who is released wonld prefer slavery to hunger, a world of 'bondage and (illusory) security' as against a world'. of freedom and starvation. The State Governments must therefore concentrate on rehabilitation ofbonded lribour and evolve effective programmes fot. this purpose. Indeed they are under ari obligation to do so under the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Aboii- tion) Act 1976. It may be pointed out that the oncept ofrehabilitation has the following four main features as admirably set out in the letter dated 2nd September 1982 addressed by the Secretary.

Ministry of Lab?ur, Government of India to the various States Governments:

(i) Psychological rehabilitation must go side by side with

physical and economic rehabilitation; G

(ii) The physical and economic rehabilitatim:i has 15 major

component~ .namely \lllotment of house-sites and agricultural land, Jarid development, provision of'Jow cost dwelling units, agriculture, provision of credit, horticulture, ariimal , husbandry, training for acquiripg

i34

SUP\UlMB COURT RBPOR.TS

(1984) 2 S.C.R..

 new skills and developing existing skills, promoting traditional arts and crafts, provision of wage einpioyment and . enforcement of minimum wages, collection and processing of minor foret produce, health, medical care and sanifation, supply of essential commodities, education of children of bonded labourers and protection civil rights;

(iii) There is scope for brillging about an integration among the various central and centrally sponsored schemes and the on-going schemes of the 1!tate Governments for a more qualitative rehabilitation. The essence of such integration is to avoid duplication i.e. pooling resources from different sources for the same purpose.

It should be ensured that while funds aye not drawn from different sources for the same purpose drawn from different sectors for different components of the rehabilitation scheme are integrated. skillfully'. and ,

. .

(iv) While 'drawing up any scheme/programme of rehabilifation of freed bonded labour, the latter must necessarily be given the choice between the various alternatives for their rehabilitation and such programme should be finally selected for execution as .would need the total requirements of the families of freed bonded labourers . to enable them to cross the poverty line on the one hand and to prevent them from sliding back to debt bondage on the other.

We would therefore direct the Government of ..Haryana to draw up a scheme. on programme for "a better and .more meaningful rehabilitat'on of the freed bonded labourers" in the light of. tho above guidelines set out b¥ the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982. The other State Governments are not parties before us and hence we cannot giv~ any direction to them, but we hope and trust that they will also take suitable steps for the purpose of securing identification, reiease and rehabilitation of bonded labourers on the lines indicated by u.s in this Judgment. • H We are not at all satisfied that the stand taken on bhalf of

th~. State of Haryana.that there is no bonded labour at. all in the stono

.,.

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bharvati, J.).

J.35

i q11rries and stane crushers is correct. The Report of Mfs Ashok

Srivastava and Ashok Panda shows that, according to the statements given by some of the workers, they were not allowe<l to leave the" stone quarries and were providing forced labour and this Report also stated that severlil persons working in the Ghodholwr and Lakarpur stone quarries were forcibly kept by the contractors and they wre not allowed to move out of their places and were bonded labourers. The petitioner also filed the affidavits of a large number

y<. of workers on 24th August 1982, each of them stating that he is under heavy. debt of the thekedar who does not allow him to leave ..

 ~ the premises without settling the account. We cannpt ignore this material which has been placed before us and unquestioningly accept the statement made on behalf .of the State of Haryana that there is no bonded labour in the stone quarries and stone crushers. But. at the same time, we do not think that it would be right for us on

,.. the basis of this material to come to a definite finding that these workers whoie names. are give~ in the Report of Mfs Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda or who have filed affidavits are providing forced labour or are bonded labourers. It is necessary to direct a further inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any of.the labourers working in the stonequarries and stone crushers in Faridabad Distriet are bonded labourers fa the. light of the law laid down by us in this j judgment. We would . therefore direct Sb:1i Laxmi Dhar Misra,, Joint Secretary in the. Ministry. of Labour, Government of India, who has considerable experience of the work of identification, release t and . rehabilitation of bonded labourers, to visit the stone quarries

T and stone crushers in Faridabad District and ascertain by enquiring from the labourers in each stone quarry or stone crusher whether any of them are being forced to provide labour ; md are .bonded laboureres. While making this inquiry, Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra Y will take care to see that wl1en he interviews the labourers either individually or collectively, neither the mine-lessees or owners of stone crushers nor the thekedar 'of jamadar nor any one else is present.

Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will prepare in respect of each stone quarry or stone crusher a statement showing the names and particulars of

thoe who, according to the inquiry made by him, are bonded labou-·

rers a1!d he will also ascertaiii from them whether they want to continue to work in. the stone quarry or tone crusher or they want to

-<. go back to their homes and if they want to go back, the District Magistrate of Faridabad will on. receipt of the statement from Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and provide for .their trarlsportation back to their hromes and for thio purpose the State Government shall make the requisite funds

• •

. A.

.ff

. " 136

SUPREME,, COURT REPORTS

(1984] 2 S.C.R.

. available to the. District Magistrate. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra .will also enquire from the mine-lessees and owners of stne crushers as also from the thekedar or jamadar whether there are any advances made by them to the labourers working in the stone quarry or. stone crusher anci if so, whether there is any docnmen- _iary evidence in support of the same and he will also ascertain what, according to the mine-lessees and owners of tone crushers oi the jamadar or thekedar, are the amounts of loans still remaining outstanding against such labourers. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will submit his report to this Court on or before 28th February t984.

We may make it clear that the object and purpose of this inquiry by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra is not to fasten any liability on the minelessees and owners, of stone crushers and the iamadar or thekedar on the basis of the Report of Sbri Laxmi Dhar Misra but to secure the release !Ind repatriation •Of those labourers Who claim to be bonded labourers and who want to leave the employment and go some where else. We niay point out , that the problem of bonded labo11rers is a difficult problem because unless, on being freed from bondage, they are provided proper and adequate rehabilitation, it would not help 'to merely seure their release. Rather in: such cases it would be more in their interest to ensure proper working conditions . with 'run ejoyment of the benefits of social welfare and labom' 1aws

so that they can live a healthy decent life. Bnt of course

0 this would . only be the next best substitute for rel.,.; se and rehabilitation which

must· receive the highest priority. •

 So fa.r a's implementation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948.is concerned "".e would direct the Central yovernment and State of Haryana fo take necessary steps for the purpose of ensuring that minimum wages are paid to the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers in accordance with the principles laid down by us in this judgment. It may not be a matter of any consequence, as to which mode of payment is followci, whether the workmen are paid on truck basis 9r on any other basis, but what is essential is and that is what the Minimum Wages Act 1948 requires that the workmen must _not receive any wage less than the minimum wage: Even if payment of wages is made to the workmen on truck basis; a formula would have to be evolved by the Central Gowtnment and the State of Haryana t0 ensure that the WQrkmen 'receive no less than the minimum: wage and to facilitatC:this fqrrnula. if would have to be provided that the expenses on explosives and drilling holes shall be borne by the mine-lessees and or the :iamadar or thekedar and the work of drillini: holes and shot firing shall be entrusted only ,

' . l ., -

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BANDHuA MUKTl-MORCl!A v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 137

. to those who have received reqisite training uder the Milles Vocational Training Rules 1966. We would direct the Central Govern-

.'

. ment and the State of Haryana to take the necessary steps in this behalf so that within. the shortest poS6ible time adas far .as possible within six weeks from_ today the workqien start actually receiving in their hands a wage not less than the minimum wage. If payment of wages is continued to be maile on truck basis, it is necessary that the appropriate offieer of the Central Enfo; cement Machinery must . determine the measurement of each truck as to how many cubic feet of stone it can contain and print or inscribe such measurement on the truck, so that appropriate and adequate wage is received by the workmen for the work <)one by them and they are not cheated out of their legitimate wage. We would also direct the-. inspecting officers of Central Enforcement Machinery to carty .out surprise checks for the' purpose of ensuring that the trucks are not loaded beyond their - true measurement capacity. Such .surprise checks _shall be carried out by the inspecting officers of the central Enforcement Machinery ' at least once in a week and jf it is found that the trucks are loaded in excess of their true measurement capacity and the wor.kmen are thereby deprived of their .legitimate wages, the 'inspecting officers carrying ont snch checks will immediately bring this fact to the notice of the appropriate authorities for initiation of necessary. actio11 against the defaulting mine owners and/or thekedar or jamadar. We would also direct the Central Government and (he State of Haryana _to ensure that payment of wage is made directly to the workmen by the mine-lessees and stone-crusher owners or at any rate in the presence of a representative of the mine-lessees and stone crushers owners

and the.inspecting officers bf the Centra.l Government 'as also of the State of Haryana shall carry out periodic checks in order' to ensure that payment of the sppulated wage is made to the workmen. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will also, while holding an. inquiry _pursuant to this . order, ascertain, by carrying out sample check, whether the workmen employed in any particular stone quarry or stone crusher are actually .in receipt of wage not less than the Illinimum wage and. whether the directions given by us in this order are being implemented. by the authorities. _ '.· - .

G There are also two other matters in respect of which it is necessary for us to give directions. The first is that, apart from poverty and. helplessness, on~ additional reason why the work111en , employed in stone quarries and stone crushers are deprived of the rights and benefiis conferred upon them unde~ various social welfare.

H laws enacted for their benefit and are subjected to .deception and


(1984) 2 S.C.R.

exploitation, m that they are totally ignorant of their rights and entitlements. It is this ignorance ', Vhich _is to some extent responsible for the total denial of the rights and benefits conferred upon them .. It is therefore necessary to educate the workmen employed iri stone quarries and stone crushers so that. they become a ware as to what are the rights and benefits to w, hich they are entitled under the various social welfare laws. The knowledge of thir rights and entitlements will give them the strength to fight against their employers for securing their legitimate dues and it will go a long way towards reducing, if not eliminating, their exploitation. We have fortunately in.our country the Central Board of Workers Education which is entrusted with the function of educating workers in their rights and entitlements and we would therefore direct the Central Board of Workers Education to organise periodic camps near the sites of stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District for the purpose of creating awareness amongst the workmen about the rights and benefits conferred upon them by social welfare laws. This educational campaign shall be taken up by the Central Board of Workers Education as early as possible and the progress made shall be reported to this Court by the Central Board of Workers Education from time to time, at least once in three months. ·

The other matter in regard to which. we find it necessary to . give directions relates to the tremendous pollution oi' air . by dust

E .. thrown out as a result of operation of the stone. crushers. When the stone crushers are being operated, they coniinually throw out largequantities of dust which not only pollute the 11ir, but also. affect the visibility ahd constitute a serious health hazard to the workmen.

The entire air in the area where stone crushers are being operated is heavily laden with dust and it is this air which the-workmen breathe F dy in and day out and it is µo wonder that many of them contract tuberculosis. We. would. therefore direct. the central Government and the State of Haryana to immediately take steps for the purpose of ensuring that the stone. crushers 'owners do not continue to foul' the air and they adopt.either of two devices, namely, keeping a drum of water above the stone crushing machine with arrangement for G : continues spraying of water upon it or installation of dust sucking

machine. This direction shall be carried out by the Central Government and the State of Haryana in respect of each stone crusher in thir Faridabad .District and a compliance report shall be made to this Col!rt on or before 28th February, 1984. -. _

So far as the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the.

J '

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwafi, J..) 139

-f foter-State Migrant Workmen Act are concerned, we have already discussed those provisions and pointed out in what circumstances those provisions would be applicable in. relation to workmen employed in the stone quarries an.d stone crushers. It is not possible for us on the material on record .to come to a definite finding whether the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Inter-State Migrant

Wokmen Act are applicable in the case 9f any particular stone quarry or stone crusher, because it would be a matter for investigation and ·) determination, particularly since it has been disputed by the Central Government that there are any inter-St>lte migrant workmen at all . .t in. any. of the stone quarries or stone crushers. We would therefore direct Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra to conduct an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are any contract labrers or . inter-State migrant workmen in any of tlj, ese stone quarries or slone -'-· crushers, in the light of 'the interpretation laid down by us in this ' judgment, and, if so, what is the number of such contract labourers or inter, State migrant workmen in each stone quarry or stone crusher.

If Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra finds as a result of his inquiry that 'the Contract Labour Act and/or the Inter-State.· Migrant Workmen Act . is applicable, he will make a report. to that effect to the Court ou or before 15th February 1984. We may make it clear that this. inquiry

~ by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra is not directed for the purpose of fastehing

any liability on the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners or the . iamadars and thekedars propriO vigore on the basis of such report, '\ but merely for the purpose of considering whether a prima facie case

T eX1sts on the basis of which action can be initiated by the Central

Goverrunent; in which the mine-lessees and stone crusher .owners and/or the jamdars or thekedars would have. an opportunity of :.· contesting the allegation thl\t the Contract Labour Act. and/or the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act applies to their' stone l\jUarry or stone crusher and defending such action.

We may. now take up a few specific complaints urged on behalf of the workmen. The first complaint relates. to the failure to provide pure drinking water to the workmen in most of the stone quarries

and stone crushers. The Report of M/s Ashok Sr'vastava and Ashk G ., Panda as also the Report made by Dr. Patwardhan shows that pure

 drinking water is not made available to the workmen. rn Lakarpur mines the workmen are obliged to take water !'from a shallow rivulet covered with thick algae" and that too, "after a walk over a dangerously , steep incline''. The same situation also prevails in the mine H in the Gurukul area as also in the Anangpur mines and in these mines

140 SUPREME COURT REPOR:rs [l 9'84 J 2 s.c.R.

"quite -0ften the upstream and the further down-streani of the rivulet get blocked due to mining of stone and the water becomes stagnnt" and the workmen have .no other option but to use this water fo.r drink , king p11rposes. It is true that in the low.er reaches of Lakarpur near the road there is a tubewell from which the workmen get water but that is only when they are permitted to do so by the persons operting. it. The Report of Dr. Patwardhan also points out that it is the children or women of the workmen who are usually engaged in the . work of transporting wate.r from distant places like the . tubewell but they are not paid anything for this work which is being done by them. Ne'ther any m'ne-lessee or stone crusher owner nor any jamadar or thekedar regards it as his duty to make prov; sion for drink- ihg water for the workmen nor does any officer of the Central Government or of the State Government bother to enforce the provisions of law in regard to snpply of drinking water: It is clear that, quite apart from the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Interstate Migrant Workmen Act, there is a specific prescription in section 19 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 30 to 32 of the Mines Rules l955 D that the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners shall make effective

arrangement~ fot providing and maintaining at , suitable points conveniently situated a sufficient supply of cool and wholesome drinking wa, ter for all workmen employed in the .stone quarries. and stone

crushers. The quality of drinkin_g wate~ to be provided by them

has to be on a scale of at least. 2.1itres for every person employed at any one time and such drinking water has to be readily ayailable at conveniently accessible points during the whole of the working time. Rule 31 requires that if drinking water is not provided from taps connected with constant 'water supply system, it should .be kept cool in suitable vessels sheltered from weather and such vessels must be emptied, cleaned and refilled every day a; i.d steps have tobe taken to preserve the water, the storage vessels and the vessels used for drinking water in clean and hygienic condition.· The inspectors may also by order in writing require the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners to submit with the least possible delay a certificate from a competent health officer or analyst as to the fitness of the water for human consumption. This obligation has to be carried out by the mine-lessees and stone crushr owners and it is the responsibility of the Central Government as also of the State of Haryana to ensure that this o]:>ligation is immediately carfied out by the mine-lessees and stbne crusher owners. We would therefore direct the Central Government and the State of Haryana to ensure immediately that the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners start supplying pure drink- . ing water to the workmen on a seale of at least 2 .litres for every

.,. .

I I

.·~

BANDHUA _MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhcgwati, J.) 14! • • workman by keeping suitable vessels in a shaded place at conveniently access; ble points and appointing some one, preferably, amongst the women and/or children of the workmen to look after these vessels. The Central Government and. the State. of Haryana will also take steps for ensuring that the vessels in which drinking water is kept by the mine-Jes.sees and stone crusher owners are kept in clea and hygienic condition and are emptied, cleaned and refilled every day anc! they shall also ensure that minimum wage is paid to the women and/or children who look after the, vessels. The Chief Labour Commissioner, th.e Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner, the Assistant L1baur Commissioner arid the Labour Enforcement Officers of the Government of India as also the appropriate inspecting officers of the Government of Haryana shall supervise strict!} the enforcement of this obligation and initiate necessary actiori if there is any default.

The Central Government ' as also. the '.State of Haryana will also immediataly direct the mie-lessees and stone-crusher owners to start' obtaining drinking Water from any nnpolluted source .or sources . ofsupp:y and to transport it by tankers to the works site with sufficient frequency so as to be a\Jle to keep the vessels filled up for supply of clean drinking water to the workmen. The Chief Administrator, Faridabad Comnlex is directed to set" up the points from where the mine-lessees and st0ne crusher owners can, if necessary, cbtain supply . of potable watc.r for being catiied by tanker_s. These directions given by s shall be promptly , and immed!ately carried out by the appropr:ate authorWes and Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while conducting his inquiry, also ascertain whether ihese directicns have teen carried . out and pure drinking water has been made available to the workmen in accordance with these directions and submit a report in that behalf . to the Court on or before 28th February 1984. ·

The second complaint related to the failure to provide conservan-; y faciFties to the workmen in the stone quarries and stone crushern: Section 20 of the Mines Act 1'952 requires that there shall

be provided separately for males and females a sufficient number of latrines and urinals of prescribed types so situated -, is to be convenient and accessible to. persons employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and all such latrines ar.d urinals shall be adequatel)I lighted, ventilated and at all times maintain<d in a ckan and sanitary ·condition. What should be the number of. latrine~ and . urinals. to be povided in each stone quarry or stone crusher and .

what should. be the standard of construction .to be ccmplkd with iii erecting the la!rines are provided in Rules 33 to 35 of the Mines

Rules 1955 and Rule 36 provides that a sufficient. number of water

B '

SUPREME COURT REPORTS • • . taps conveniently accessible shall be. provided in or near such latrines ' +

and if piped water supply is not available; then a sufficient quantity

• of water shall be hept stored in suitable receptacles near such latrines The Report of Dr. l>atwardhan sli.ows that there is not a trace of 1uch conservancy facilities in any of the stone quarries and the • 'vat open mountain dug-up without a thought as to environment is used by men and women and children as one huge open latrine" where the ' ' only privacy is that provided by the "curtain drawn by the turned. down eyes of women and the turned away eyes of men';, This statement made in the Reportof Dr. P; itwardhan has nbt been denied.

.... in ar, iy of the affidavits in reply filed on behalfof the respondents.

We would therefore direct the Central Government as also the State Government td. ensure that conservancy facilities in the shape of latrines and. urinals in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Mines Act 1950 and Rules 33 to 36 of the Mines Rules

r-~

1955 are provided immediately. by mine lessees and owners of stone crushers. This direction shall be carried out at the earliest without. ). any delay and Shri.Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while making his inquiry, ascertain whether the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarrie, s and stone crush<rs visit<d by him have complied with this direction and a Report in that behalf shall be submitted by Shri Laxm; Dhar Misra on or before 28.th February, 1984. .

There was also' one other complaint mode on behalf of the

. ·workmen and that related to the absence of any medical or first aid ..,.

facilities. The Report of J)r. Patwardhan shows that no such facili- 7 . ties are provided to the workmen employed in the sfone quarries and 1. "" stone crushers and this finding was not sqiously disputed en behalf of the respondents. It is indeed regrettable that despite 1here being a mandatory provision for medical and first Aid facilities in Secticn 21 -:t of the Min.es Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955, no medical or. first aid. facilities . seem to. be provided in the stone quarries and stone crushers. We would therefore direct the Centra I Government as also the State Government to take steps t.o immediately ensure that proper and .adequate medical ayd first aid facilities as required by Section 21 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955. are provided by the minelessees and owners of o6tone quarries to the workmen. Rule 45 provides that every shot 'f firer and blaster in a mine shall hold first aid qualification specified in Rule 41 and shall carry, while on duty, a first aid outfit consisting of one large sterilized dressing and an amul of tincture of iodine or other suitable antiseptic. But we find that this requireme.nt is also

BAND!fUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) . . 143

not observed bythc mine-Jcssees and stone crusher owners and t4e workmen are" required to carry on blasting with explosives withont any first aid qualification or first aid outfit. We would therefore direct the Central Government as also the State of Haryana to ensure that every workman who is required to carry out blasting with explo- sives should not only be trained under the Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966 bur should also hold first aid qualification and he. should carry a first aid outfit, while on duty, as tequired by Rule 45 ... The Central Government and the State Government wil1 also take steps to secure that proper and adequate medical treatment is provided by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers to. the :workmen en"iployed by them as also to the members of their families and such medical assistance should be made vailable to the111 without , any cost of tanspoi'tat_ion. or otherwise a.nd the cost of medicines prescribed by the doctors must be reimbursed to them. Where the workmen or the members of their families meet with any' serious accident involving fracture or possibility of' disability or suffer from any serious illness,· the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers should be required by the Central Government as also the State

Government to make arrangements for hospitalisation cf such W()rkmen or members of their families.at the"cost of the mine-lessees and/ or owners of stone crushers. We would also direct the Central Government and the Siate of Haryana to ensure that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, the Maternity ilenifit (Mines and Circus) Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules, 1966, where applicable in any particular stone quarries or stone crushers, are given effect to by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers.

These directions given by us shall also be carr'ed out at the earliest without any undue delay and Shri Laxmi. Dhar Misra, while conducting his inquiry, will ascertin whether these directions have been complied with and the necessary medical and first aid facilities including hosnitalisation have been provided to the workmen and the meinbes of iheir families.

We may point out that the above directions in regard to provision of health and welfare facilities have been given by us . onlf with reference to the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines Rules . 1955 which are admittedly applicble in the case of stone quarries and stone crushers. We have not given any directions for enforcement. of the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act because it has yet to be determined whether these two statutes are app!icable in any particular stcne quarry or stone crusher. It.is also. necessary to point out that whenever any

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144.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

workman .suffers any injury or contraets any disease .in the course of employment, he is entitled to compensation under the Workmens' Compensation Act 1923, but unfortunately he is very often not in a position to approach the appropriate court or autho.rity for enforcing his claim to compensation and even if he files such a claim, it takes a long time before such claim is disposed of by the court or auth<irity.

We would therefore direct that as soon as any workman employed . iii a stone quarry or stone crusher receives injury or contracts disease

in the course of his employment, the concerned mine-lessee or stone crnsher owner shall immediately report this fact to the Chief Inspector or Inspecting Officers of the Central Government and/or. the State Government and such Inspecting Officers shall immediately provide. legal assi.stance to the worman with a view to enabling him, to file

a claim for compensation before the appropriate court or authority and they shall .also ensure that such claim is pursued vigorously and the amount of compensation awarded to the workman is secured to him. We would like to impress upon the Cotirt'or Athority before which a claim for compensation is filed by or on bebaif oflhe workman to dispose of such claim without any undue delay, since delay i~ the awarding of compensation to the workman would only and to his misery and helplessness and would be nothing sort of gross denial of justice to him. The Inspecting Officers of the C.entral Government as also of the State Government will visit each stone quarry or stone crusher at least once in a fortnight and ascertain whether there. is any 'workman who is injured or who is suffering from .any disease or illness, and if so, they will immediately take the necessary steps . for the purpose Of providing medical and legal assistance and if they fail to do so, the Central Government and the State Government,

as the. case may be, shall take necessary action against the defaulting .Inspecting :officer or Officers. ·

We have given these directions to the Central Government and th~ State of Haryana and we expect the Central Goyernment and the State of Haryana' to strictly comply with the.se directions . .. We need not state that if any of these directions is not properly carried out by the Central Government or the St.a.le of Haryana, we shall take a very serious view of the matter, because we firmly believe that it is no use having social weifare 1~'ws on the statute book if they are not going to be implemented.' We must not be content with the law in books but we must have law in action. If we want our democracy to be a participatory democracy, it is necessary that law must not only speak justice but mu.st also deliver justice.

Before parting with this case, we may point out, and this bas •

t' .

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCH A v'. UNION (Bhagwati' J.). 145 .

. ,.

com~ to our notice not only through the Report of Dr. Patwardhan btit also otherwise, thtt! the magistrates and judicial officers take a very lenient view of violations of Jabour'laws enacted f01; the benefits of the workmen and Jet ff the defaulting. employers with small fines ..

There have ; lso boen occasions. where (he n1agistrate and judicial .officers have scotched prosecutions aild acquitted or discharged the defaultin.g employers on hypertechriica\ities. This happens largely because the magistrates and judicial officers are not 'sufficiently sensitised to 'the importance of. observance of Jabour. Jaws with the result that the labour. laws are allowed to be ignored and breached. with utter callousness and indifference and theworkmen begin toJel that the defaulting employers can, by paying a fine which hardly touches their pocket, escape from the.arm of law and the labour laws sup'posedly enacted for their benefit are not meant 'to be observed bu!are merely decorative appendages intended .to assuage the co11scie.nce f the workmen. we would therefore, strongly impress upon the magistrates and judicial officers to take a strict view of viol.ation df Jabour laws and to. impose abcquate punishment on the erring employers so that they 1nay re.alise that it does not pay. to. commit a breach of' such laws and to deny the benefit of such laws to tlie workmen.

C.·

.We .accordingly. allow thiS writ petition and issue the above directions to the Central Govornment and the state of Haryana.and :: the. v.arious authorities mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of' E this judgment so. that these poor unfortunate workmen. who lead a miserable existencµ in' snialr hovels, exposed to .. the vagaries of \Veathef, drinking foul water, breathing' heavily dusl-laden polluted air and breaking and blasting stone all ihcir life. may one day be able fo realise that freedom is nt only the monopoly of a few bt belongs to them all and that they are. a.lso equally .entitlca along with \).thers F t? participate in the fruits of freedom and development. These directions_ 1Tiay. be .sum1narise~ as follows . . "'

(I) The Govern.men! of Haryana will, without any delay and

at any rate , withihn six weeks from today, constitute Vigilance Committee in each sub-division of a district in compliance. with. the reuqirements of section 13 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. 1976 keeping. iri v}ew the guidelines given by us in this judgtnfnt. ·

(2) The Government of Haryana wili instruct the district magistrates to take up the work of identification .o( bonded

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SUPREME COURT REPbRTS-

[1984] 2 S.C.R .

labour as one of their top priority tasks and to map out areas of concentration of bonded labour which_ are mostly to be found in stone .quarries ad brick kilns and assign task forces for identification and •relea; e of bonded labour and periodically hold labour camps in the_se areas -with a view to educating the labourers inter alia with the assistance of fhe National Labour Institute.

(3) The State Government as also the Vigilanoe Committees and the district magistrates will take the assistance of nonpolitical social action groups and voluntary agenc_ies for ... the purpose of ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. }- '

(4) The Governmel of Haryana ;,, ill draw up within a period of three months from today a scheme cir programme-for rchallilitation of the freed bonded labourers in the light of the guidelines set out by the Secretary to. the Government of India; "Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982 and implement'such scheme or programme to the extent found necessary. •

(5) The Central Government and the Government of Hpiyana

will take all necessary steps for the purpose of' ensuring 'that -minilt\Um wages are paid to the workmen employfd , l.._ .in the stOiie quarries and stone crushers in accordance

with the principles-- laid down in this jdgment and this direction shall be carried out within the shortest possible . j time so that.within six weeks from today, the workmen ..i start actually receiving i_n their hands a wage not less than the minimumwage.

(6) If payment 'or wages is made on truck basis, the Central Government will direct the appropriate officer of the Central j:lnforcement Machinery or any other appropriate • authority or officer to 'determine the measurement of each truck as to how many cubic ft._ of_ stone it can contain ai{c] print or inscribe such mrasuren1ent on 1he trui;,::k so that appropriate and adequate wage is received by the workmen for the work done by them and they arc not cheated out of (hejr legitimate wage.

(7) The Central Governinent will direct the inspecting officers

'" •

-j -f '

...

.· (8)

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA "' l'NlON (Bhag1rati, ].)_

; J.47

 of the Central Enforcernen! Macl1inery or any o!her apprcpriate inspecting officers to carry out surpfise checks at least once in a week for the purpose of. ensuring that, '(he trucks are not loaded bcyonfl their true measurement

capacity. and \f it is found that the trucks are leaded in . excess of the true n1easuren1Cnt apacity, .the inspcctirg officers carrying out such checks will immediately bring this t'act to the notice of the appropriate authorities and necessary action shall 'b~ initialed against the dcfaullirg mine owners at1d/or thekedars or jrin1adars.

,;· .

 The Centi-al Government and. the Government of Haryana ; viii ensure that pay~1eP.t of '}'fges is ade diictly to the \Vorkmen by the n1inc lessee$ and st_0ne cruher .oviners or at any rate in the presence of a rc.presentative of the tnine 1essescs or. stne crush-er owners and . the-. inspecting officers of the Central Government as also of ihe Government of Haryana shall carry out pericdic checks in crdcr to ensure that the payment of the , stipulated wage is inade to the workn1en.

(9) The Cenlrnl Board of Workers Education wili organise

pricdic can1ps nca1' the sites. of cne qUariics rind stcnc crushers 'in Faridabad' district for the purpose of educatirg the \Vorkn1en in the rights and benefits conferred upon thern by social welfare and labour laws and .!he progress

made shall be reported to this Cotirt by the Central Board of Workers EducatiOn at lcnt once in thtec n1cnths .

(10). The Central Government ard the Government of Haryana \vill im1nediat.ely take stps for the purpcse of ensuring that the stone cruShcr O\vners d9 not coiitinue to foul . the air and they adopt either of two . devices, namely,,

keeping a drum of \Yater abllve the stone crushing n1achiJ?.e with. arrangement for co11tinuous spraying cf water upon it or installation of dust suking n1achine and a con1pliance report in regard to this -(, irection shall be made to .this Court on or before 281'11 February, 1984. ·

( 11) The Central Governn1cnt and the Governn1cnt of Haryana ,

\ill imm, ediately ensur~ t~1t the

1 n1ine lessees and stoe cruShcr owi1ers start .supplyi-ng pu-re drinkin-g water to the Wurkmen on a scale Of at least 2 litres for every wcrk- -·

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SUPREME COURT REP0RTS .


. man 'by keeping sitable. vessels in a shadd place at conveniently accessible points and such vessels shall be kept in clean a.nd hygieniC condition and shali be emptied, deaned. and reflJled every day and the appropriate auth.o~ rities of the Centrl Government' and' (he Government of Haryana will supervise strictly the enforcement of. this direction and initiate necessary action if there is any default. ..

The Central Governmertt.•and the Government of Haryan~ will ensure that minimi1m wage is paid to the wmen and/or

childrn who look after the vessels in whicb pure drinking

~ . . ' ' water ts kept for the workmen. . .

(13) The Central Government and the Government of Haryana will immediately direct the mine. lessees and stone crusher owners 10 start obtaining drinking water from any iippolluted surce or sources of supply and to transport it by tankers to the work site with sufficient' frequency so as to be able to keep the vessels filled up for s'upply of clean 'drinking water to the workmen and the Chief Administrator; Faridabad Complex. will set up tlie points from' .where the min'e lessees and stone crusher owners can, if . necessary, obtain supply of potable water for being carried

by tankers.

04) The Central Government and the State Government will ensure that conservancy facilities in the shape of latrines and urinal, s in accordance with the provision~ .contained in ection.20 of the M; nes Act, 1950 and Rules 33 to 36 of the Mines Rules 1955 are provided at-the latest by 15th February 1984., ·

. (15) The Central Government and the State Government w, ill

take steps to immediately ensure that appropriate and adequaie medical and.first aid' facilities as required by section 21 <if the Miries Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines R\lles 1955 are provided to the workmen not later than 31st January 1984.

..• [16) The. Central Government and 'the Government of Haryana will ensure th11t every workmen who is required to carry 1, rnt blasting with explosives isnot only trained under the

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNIOW(Bhagwati, J.) . 149

Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966' but. also holds first aid qualification and carries' a first aid outfit while on dty as required by Rule 45 of the Mines Ru)es 1955. . •,

(i '() The Central Government and the State Government will

immediately take steps to ensure that properand. adequate . medical treatment. is pro, ided 'by the mine lessees and owners of stone er.ushers to the ·orken employed by .them

(18)

...

(19)

(20)

as also to the membe.rs of their families free of cost and such medical assistance s)lall be made available to them without any .cost of transpotation or otherwise a'nd the . ·.doctor's fees as' also the cost of medicines "prescribed by the doctors inducting. hospitalisation charges, if any;. shall ll, lso be reimbursed. to them.

The Central Government and. the State Government wili ensure that the provisins o.f the Maternity :Benefit Act 1961, the Maternity. Benefit (Mines and Circus) Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules 1966 where applicable :iii anY particular stone .. qu~1Ty qr stone crush.er. are given effect to by .the mine le.ssees aiid_ stone _crusher owners ..

As son as any workman .emp!Qyed in a stone quarry or

stoe crusher receives injury or" contracts disease in. the course of his employment, the concerned mine lessee or stone crusher owner shall immediately .·, report this fact to the Chief Inspector or Inspecting Ot)J.cers of the Central . . Governmt;11t and/or the State Government and such Inspec-. ·

. ting Officers shall immediately provide". legal assistance ·

to the workman with a view to enabling him to file a claim for compensation before the appropriate court or authority and they shall also ensure that s.uch claim is pursued . vigorously and the amount of compensation awarded to. the workman is secured to .him. . .

The Inspecting Officers. of the Central Government as also of the State Government will visit each stone quarry or stone crusher at least once in, .a fortnight and ascertain whether there is any workman ·.who is injured or who i! suffering from any disease 6r illness, and if so, they will immediately take the necessary steps for the -pqrpose of providing medical and legal assistance ..

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. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1984) 2S.C.R

.(21) _ lf the Central -Government and the Go_vernment of Haryana fail to ensure performance of any of. the obligations. set out in clauses 11, 13, 14 and 15 by the m?ne lessees and stone crusher owners within the period specified in those respective clauses, such obligation or obligations to the

~tent to which they are not performed shall be. carried out by the Central Governmet and the Government of Haryana. . ' . . · ' · • We. also appoint" Shri. Laxmi Dhar Misra, Joint Secretary w1 the Ministry of Labour, Government of India as a. (,; ommission"er for the _purpose f carrying out the following assignment .

(a) He will visit the stone ql\arries and stone crushers in. Faridabad district and ascertain by enquiring from the labourers in each stone quarry Or stone crusher. in the lnanner set Out by us whether any of them are being forced to provide laoour and are bonded Jabourers and he will prepare in respect of each stone quarry or stone crusher a statement showing the names and particulars of those who, according fo the inquiry made by him, are bonded labourers and he will also ascertain from them whether they want to continue . to wo; k in the stone quarry or storre crusher or they want to _go away and if he 'finds that they want to go away, he will furnish particulars in regard to them to. the District Magistrate, Fari_dabad and . the District Magistrate will, on receipt of the particulars from Shri Laxmi Dhar. Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and provide for their , transpora ti on back. t? their homes and

for this' purpose' the State Government will make the requisite funds available to the Dist1'ict Magistrate ..

. (b) He wilf also enquire from" the mine lessees. and owners of stone er.ushers as also from the thekedars and jamadars

whether there are any advances made by them to the labourers working in the' stone. quarries or' stone crushers and if so, whether there is any documentary evidence in support of the same anq he will also ascertain what, according to th.e mine lessees and owners of stone crushers .or the Jamadar or Thekedar, are the amounts of loans still: remaining outstanding against such labourers.

(c) He will also -ascertain by carrying ut sample check whether the worlcmen employed_ in any particular stone qu_arry

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION (Bhagwati, J,) 151

or stone crusher are actually in receipt of wage not less than the minin\um wage and whether the directions given in tl_iis order in. regard to computation and payment of minimum wage are being implemented by the authorities,

He will conduct. an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and stonecr.ushers in faridabad District for th_c purpose of ascertaining whether there are any contract labourers or inter-State migrant workmen in any of these stone. quarries or stone c; ushers and i( he finds as a result of his inquiry that the Contract Labour Act and/or the Jnter- Staie. Migrant .Workmen Act is applicable, he will make a repcirt to that effect to the Court.

He will ascertain whether lhe direcUons given by us in !his judgme;1t rgajding effective arrangement for supply of pure drinking water have been carried out by the mine , lessees and stone crusher owners and pure .drinking water has been made available to the workmen in accordance with those, directions.

He will also ascertain whether the m'ne lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarries and stone crushers visited by , him have.complied with the directions given by. us in. this Judgn1Cnt regarding provision of con-· servancy facilities .

. He will. also ascertain whetl)er the directio1is given by us in this judgment in regard to provision of first aid facilities and proper and adequate medical treatment including hospitalisation to the workmen and the members of their families are bein& carried out by the mine lessees and stone crusher ownocs and' the necessary first aid facilities and . proper and adequate medical services including hospitalisation are provided to the workmen and the members of their families.

He will also enquire whether the various other directions given by us in this judgment have been and are being carried out by the mine lessees and stoe crusher owners.

Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will carry out this assignment entrusted H • to him and niakc his report to the Court on or before 28th Fbruary

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152 SUPREME COURT REPORiS (1984] 2 s.c.R.

1984.

It w, ill be open to Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra to take.the assis-.. lance of such other. person or persons as .he thinks fit including officers . or employtes in the Ministry of Labour r in the Mini; try of Mines, who may be made available by. the higher authorities. If Shri Laxrrii Dhar Misra finds it necessary,· he may request the Court to extend the time for submitting his report by addfessing a letter to the Registry . of the Court.' The State of Ilaryana will deposit a sum of Rs. 5000

within two weeks from. today for the purpose 'of meetipg the costs and out. o( p9cket expenses ofShri Laxmi Dhar Misra .. .

We have no doubt that if these directions given by us are honestly and s.incerely' carried out, it wi)r be. possible to 'improve the life conuitions of these workmen and ensure social ustice t~ them so that

they may be able to brcathe.:th.e fresh air of sociaI and economic freedom. The Central Goveniment and the St.ate of:Haryana w; ll pay to the petitioner's advocate a sum of Rs .. 5000 by way of i::osts.

We are grateful to Mr.. Govind Mukhoty. for renderin'g valuable assistanc; e to -us jn this case.

PATBAK, J. I have. read the judgmei1ts prepared by my brothers Bhagwati and A.N. Sen, and while I agree with. the directions proposed by my brother Bhagwati I think it proper, bec::ause of the importance of the questions which arise in such matters, to set forth . . . •

Public interest litigation in its present fer; constitutes a new chapter in our judicial system.

It has acquired a significant degree of ilnportanc; e in the jurisprudence practised by our courts and has evoked a lively, if somewhat o.ntroversial, response 'in. legal circles, , in the media and among the general 'public.

Jn tlie United States, . it is the name "giyen to efforts to provjde legal representation .to ' .groups and interests that have been.unrepresented or tinder-represented •.. in the legal proces; .. These include not only \he poor a.nd the dis- . advantaged but>. ordinary citizens who, because' they cannot afford .

lawyers to represent them, have Jacked access to courts, admini.stra'tive agencies and other legal forums in which basic policy decisions affec ting tJ; leir itterests are inad~"~{l) __ ]n our owfl.c.ount:ry, this rtew C]?SS of litigation is justified by its protagonists on the basis generally of .vast areas in our population .. of illiteracy and poverty, of social arid

economic. backwardness, and of an insufficieni awareness andapprecia ,.

Mitcbell"RogoVin: Pub1iC Interest i.aw~ ·. .

The Next_ Horizon, Anierican r- Ass(;>ci?tion )ournal. )§77 p. 334: •

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BANDHUA MIJKTI MORCH,;. l'. UNION (Pathak, 1,) 153 . . - tion of individual and collective rights.

Thee . handkaps l1avc denied millions of our countrymen access to justice. Public interest litigation is said to possess the potential of providing such access in the n1ilieu . of a new ethos, in which participating sectors in the administration of justice l'O-operate in th.e creation of a system. which promises legal relief without cumberspmc formality nd havy expenditure. In the result, the legal organisation has taken on a radically new dimension and correspondingly new'. perspectives are opening up before judges' and.lawyers .and State Law agencies in the tasks before them. ,·• A crusding zeal is abroad; viewing the. present as an opportunity . to awaken the political and legal order to the objectives' of social justice projected in our constitutional system. New slogans fill the. air, and, new phrases have entered the legal dictionary, and we hear of the "justicing system" being galvanised into supplying'justcie . to the .sodo-economic disadvantaged. These urges re responsible for the birth of new judicial concepts and the expaning ho1izon of juridical power. They claim to :represent an increasing emphasis on social welfare and a, progressive humanitarian.ism, " ·

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011 the othet side, tbe attempts of the judge and the lawyer are 'watched with sceptical concern by th0se who see .interference . by the courts .in public interest litigation as a series of quixotic forays in a world of unyieldibg and harsh reality, whose suceess in the face' of. opposition bolstered by the inertia and aP.athy of C:enturies is bourid to be limited .in impact ~d , brief in. duration. They .see judicial endeavour frustrated by the immobility of public concern and a traditio.nal resistance to change, and believethat the temporary success gained is.doomedfo 'waste away as a mere ripple in the vastness of a . giant . slow-moving society. Even the optimistic sense danger to the credibility and legitimacy f the eidsting judicial system, a feeling' contributed no doubt by the apprehension that the region into which the judiciary has ventured appears barren; uncharted and unpredic- \able, with few guiding posts and direction finding principles, ancl they fear that a traditonally proen legeal structure may yield te> the anarchy of purely.emotional impulse, To Jhe mind trained in the · certainW of t, be law, of defined principles, of binding precedent, , and the common law doctrine of Stare decisis. the future is fraught with confusion and disord.er in the "legal world and severe strains in the constitutional system.·- Atthe lowest, there is an uneas:; doubt about where we are going. ·

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, Amidst' this welter of agitated controversy, I tj1in)<'it appropriate H • ts, yt .down a fe~ considerations which seem to me relevant if public

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.'

interest litigation is to cmmand bwad acceptance. The history of human experience shows that when a revolution in ideas and in action enters the life of a nation, the nascent power so released possesses the potential nf throwing the preva%1g social order int-0 disarray.

In a. changing .society •. wisdom dictates that reform should emerge in the existing polity as an ordered change rroduced through its . institutio.ns. Moreover, the pace of change .needs to be handled with care lest the i~1stitutions themselves be. endangered.

In his Law in the Modern State, Leon Duguit observed : "Any system of publ.ic law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction. to the following ruies :· First, the holders of power cannot . do certain things; second, there are certain things they must do.''''' Traditional .. legal remedies have been preoccupied largely with the '.first rule.

It is recently that the second has begun. substantially to engage !>lie functional attention of the judicial , administration.

In the UQited States, the Warren Court achieved a remarkable degree . of success in decreeing affirmative ac\ion programmes for the benefit of minorities and other socially or . economically disadvantaged interests through the avenues of public law .. In India, we are now

beginnfog to apply a similar concept of con.stitutional duty.

U util the arrival of public interesf litigiion; civil litigation was patterned exclusively on the traditional model. The traditional conception of adjudication beiieves a suit to be a n1eans for settling disputes between private parties concerning their private rights. In .the usual form, the suit is an organised proceeding between two

individual corltestants. .It deals with a definite framework of facts requiring identification through porincip!es codified by statute and oit the basis of which the right-obligation relations between the parties .are determined, culminating in the grant or denial of relief by the Court. It 'is a proceeding confined to the parties, on whose volition depends the fact mateiialbrought o~ the record, witli the judge sitting , over the coritest as a mere passive neutral umpire.

Judicial initiative has no significant role.

The rigid character of civil litigation conceived as a contests between two individual .parties representil)g .their personal interests has ben allowed to expand into a - representative. proceeding Where a person can, with the permission. of the Court, represent other; also having the same inierest although not named in the

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 155

suit.

And the disability, temporary or permanent, of a person whose legal right is violated, enables another to represent hi? interes.t in a judicial proceeding .. They are cases \Vhere 11ext friei1d.s. are .permitted by the Court to act for minors and persons of unsound mind, where a person may petition .. for. the release" .of an. illegally detained individual, and where a minority shareholder, complaining of an ultra vires tra:nsaction by the 111anagement of a company, cqnsue in the name of the company. Tntervenors are allowed to part1c1patc in a proceeding . involving the decision of legal question; affecting their interests.

A rate payer of local authority has been held entitled to challenge its• illegal action.

A person conferred by statute the right to participate in' the' decision-making process of a statutory authority is entitled to seek relief against such decision .. In S.P.

Gupta v. Union of India, ni this Court has laid down that it; jrisdiction ca"n be invoked by a third party in the case of violation of the constitutional rights of another person or determinate class of persons who, by reason of poverty, helplessness, disability or social or.economic disadvantage is unable to move the Court personally for relief.

The Court observed further that wl1ete the public injury was suffered by an indeterminate clas; of persons from the breach of a public duty or from the violation of a CQnstitutional provision of the law, any member of the public havig sufficient interest can maintain an actioll for judicial redress for such • public injury. The principle was qualified by the reservation that such petitioner should act bona fide a'nd not .for personal gain or private profit, nor be moved by political or other oblique motivation.

The doctrine of standing has thus been enlarged in this country to provide, where reasonably possible, access. to justice to large sections of people for whom so far it had been a matter of despair. ' . .

• It ii time indeed for the law to do so. In large measure: the traditional concepiion of adjudication represented the socio-economic vision prevailing at the turn of the century. The expansion of govermental activity into . the life of individuals through programmes of social welfare and. development had not yet been foreshadowed.

An environment permeated by the .. doctrine of laissez faire shaped the development of legal jurisprudence. But soon, progressive social ''and economic forces.began to grow stronger and influence the minds of people, and governments,· in response to the pressures of egalitarian and socialist-oriented urges, began to enter increasingly upon. socio-economic programmes. in which legislation and. the courts


156 '


constituted the prin9ipal instrumnts of change. The movement

acceleratd with the close .of the Second World War, and a character of human rights was written into the political consiilution~ adopted by most .nations emerging from colonial rule even as, on another plane, it altered our basic conception df international law. In India, as .the consciousness of social justice. spread though ou~ multi.-layered .social order, the courts began to co.me under increasing pressure . fro111 social action groups petitioning dn behalf of the underprivileged.

and deprived sections of society for the fuffilment of their aspiTat.ions.

It is not necessary to detail the number of cases. of public interest . litigation which• have entered this Court It is sufficient to point , out ihat, despite the varying fortune of those .case.s, public interest litigation constitutes today a significant segment ofthe Cowl's docket. ·. ~· ' .

.In the 'debate 'befor~ us, questions of substantial importance. Jiave been raised tiy learned counsel, questions which go to the pro:

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cedur.e adopted by the Court arid the: manner of the exercise of its .Y constitutional powers. "

' This 'petition invokes t.he jurisdiction of the Cort under Article . 32 ,, of the Constitution, which con.fers the guaranteed right to move this Gourt by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of funa,

merial.rights .. The right excrcisei is a right to.a.constitutional remedy and the jurisdiction invoked is a constitutional jurisdiction. Bearing this ii{ mind.' we mus~ also take into account that the provisions of Article 32 do not Jpecifically indicate who can move the .Court . . In the absence <if a confining provision in that respect. It is plain that a petitioner may be anyone in whom ihe law recognis.es a standing to maintain.an action of such nature.

As regards the. form of the proceeding and its charcter, Artide 32 speaks generally of'a "appropriate proceedings". It should be. a proceeding which can appropriately lead to an adjudication of the. claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental right and ca1i result i.n tlie grant of effectiv~ relief. Article 32 spea)<s of the Court's power ''to' iss.ue dircfi.ons ,(or orders. or' \vrits", and' the specific ..C'efere'nce

to "writs in the natµre of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari"' is by way of illustration only .. They do !lot exhaust the content of the Court's power under Article 32. . . Entering notinto a more contro\ersial area, it is. appropriate to. consider the nature of the procedure which the court may adopt under Article 32 of the Constitution. So far.as "1e traditional private

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v: UNfON (Paihak; J.) 157

_ faw. is concerned,. the proced;1re follows. the acept!'d pattern and A traditional forms associated with it. There can be little dispute there: D.oes public intrest litigation call .for somewhat different considerations ? Before dealing with this aspect, however, it is neciissary to touth on two fundam.ental matters.

First, as to the petition, A practie has grown in the .public B of iiivoking the jurisdiction of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a IegaL injury to the author or 'to some other person or group of persons, and the Court has treafed such letter as a petition

under Article 32 and ntertained the proceeding without anything more.· It is only comparatiy-ely recently. that the Court has begun • to call for the fl.ling of a regular petition on the letter. I see grave C danger inherent in a practice where a mere Jetter is-entertained as a petWon from a person. whose antecedents and status are unknown or so. ncertain that no sense of responsibility can, without anvthiag_ more; be_ attributed to the 'communication:, There is good reason for the insistence on a document being set out in a form, or accompanied by 6vidence, inflicating that the allegations made in. it 'are D . made with a'sense of , responsibility by a person who l1as taken'd.ue

care and caution to verify those .allegations before making them.

A plaint instituting a suit is required by the Code_ of Civil Procedure to conclude .with a clause. verifying the. pleadings contained in it.

A petition or application tiled in court is required to oe supported

on. affidavit. These safeguards are necessary becatise the document, E a plaint or petitio, n or application, commences a course of litigation . involving the expenditure of public time and public m'oney, besides in appropriate cases involving tlie issue of summons'or notice to the defendant or respondent to appear and contest the 'proceeding. Men -are busy conducting' the affairs of their daily lives, and no one occupied with the responsibilities nd. pressures o(prsent day existence we!- F comesbeing summoried to a law couri 'and involved in a Jigitation.

A document . making allegations , without any proof whatever of responsibility cari conceivably constitute "an abuse of the process of law. There is good reason, I think, for maintain_ing the rule that,~ except in special circumstances, the document petitioning the court for relief should be supported by satisfactory verifi.cation.

This G .requirement is all the greater .where petitions are received by the Court througl\ the post. It is never beyond the bound of posibility that an unverified commu.nication received thro.ugh the post by the court may in fact have been employed mala fide, as an instument . of coercion or blackmail or other oblique motive against a person , . H

ilamed therein , who holds .a posWon of honour and respect in society.

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SUPREME COURT REPORJS [19R4] 2 s.c.R.'

The Court _inust be ever .vigil.ant ag.ainst the abuse of it~ process. ]t cUnn, ot do tht better \n 'this matcr t1; an insisting at the earliest tage, and before issuing notice to , the respondent, that an appropriate verification of. the allegations be supplied. The requiren1ent is i1nperativc in private law litigation. Having reg_afd to_ its nature an .... d purpose, it is equally attracted ta public interest litigation. While this Court has readily acted upon lette\S and telegrams in the: past,

ther~ is ne_cd to insist no\V on an appropriateverificatinn of the petition or other comniunieation before acting on it As .r flf!Ve. observed earlier, there may be ex!eption:i\ circumstances which may .justify a W<1iver of the rule.

For example, when the habeas corpus juri, diction of the Court is invoked.

For in all .cases of illegal detention. there is no doubt that the Court musl. act with speeo ai1d readiness.

Or. when the a1ithorShip of the comrlluication is so inJpecable and unquestionable that the authority of its c011tcnts. may reasonably be accepted priina facie unil rebutted. lt \viil always be.a _1}1atter for the Court to decide, on what p':tition will. it require verification and when will it \Vaivc the ru1e.

. Besidps this, there is another matter which, alth•ough on tlie surface'.appears to .tie of merely technical significance, inerits more

tl1n passing attenti0n.

I think the time has .come to state clearly that. all communications and po\itions invoking_ the jurisdiction of the- Court ni.ust be addressed. to the entire Court, that js to ?ay, the .E Chief Justice and his con1panion Judges.

No such .con11nunication or petition can prop.eriy be addrcsSed to a particuJaT Judge.

When the jurisdiction of 'the Court is invoked, it is the .jurisdiction of the ci1tire co•1rt.

Which Judge or Judges will hear the case is exclusively a in1ttr conc0rnin_g th~ internal -regulati:.Jn of the bu; iness of the Court. interference with w]1ich by a litigant or member of the public

F . c0astitutes the grossest impropriety. Ii is well established that when a division of the Court hears and decides cases it is in law regarded as a hearing ru1d a deci:;; on by the 'Court itself. The judgment pronounced and the decree or ordc:r nlade are acts of the Court, and accordingly they are respected,. o!'i:yed and enforced thrcughout the Jan~ It is only right and prciper that this Should be kno\VTI G clearly to the lay public .. Communications ai1d petitions addressed to a particular Judge are improper and violate the institutional personality of the Court. They also embarrass the judge to whom they are prsonally a<ldrssed.. The fundamental conception of the Court !11Ust b~ rspecteJ, that it is a single indivisible instituticn, Of unit<d

H~ purpuse and cxiting solely for tl)c high col1stitutional functions fer • \Vhich it !1a'l b.~8t1 Created .. The conception of ... the Cort as a J-oose

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IlANDHUA MUKTI 1'{0RCHA v. UNION (PDt!wk, J.) 159

aggregate of individual Judges,. to one or more of whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its very existence and. endangers its proper and effective functioning .

I. shall now turn to the character and incidents of the procedure . open to t\le Court iii public interest litigation and the nature of the

power exercised by it during the proceeding. In public interest litigation, the .role held by the Court is more assertive than in tradi~ tional actions.

During the .regime of the Warran Court in the United · States, it proceeded to the point. where a.ffirmative programmes wer• .envisaged, 'and .the relationship between right and reniedy' was freed from the rigid intimacy which constitutes a fundamental feature of private law liti.gation.

While remedial prncedure. was fashioned according to the demands of the case and varied from stage to stage, in the shaping of relief the. court treated with the future and devised .a code of regulatory action. Viewed in that context, the role. of. the Court i_s creative rather .than passive and it asseums a more positive attitude in determining facts.. ·

 Not infrequently public interest litigatidn affect0 the rights of persons rrat before the court, and in shaping the relief the court must invariably take into.accouht its impact on those interests.

Moreover," when its jurisdiction is invoked on behalf of a group, ii is as well to re1nember that differences n1ay exisf in Content and emphasis between the claims of different sectipns of the group. For all .these reasons the co11rt must exercise the greatest caution and adopt pro-· Cedures ensudng Sufficient notice_ to all inrerests likely to be a.ffected.

Moreover, the nature or the litigation . sometimes involves , the continued, intervention of the court over a period of time, and the organising of the litigation to a .; atisfactory conclsion calls for judicial statesn1anship, ·.a close understanding of constitutiorial and legal values in .the context cf contempora'ry social forces, and a judi- J:ious mix of restraint. and p.ctivism determined by the dictates of existi1ig realities. •Importantly,. at the same .tini'e, the Court must never forget that its jurisdiction extends no fart]\n than ¥1e legitimate limits of its constitutional powers; and avoid trespassing into political'-' • territory which under 'the CO'nstitution has been appropriated to other organs of the State. This last aspect of the matter calls for more detailed con.sideration, which will he ~!tempted later. •

The procedures adopted by the Court in cases of public interest ·

litigation must of course be procedures designed and shaped, by_ the

 H Cou, rt with a. view to resolving the problem presented before it and

'. E


deterillining t!ie naiure and ext.cnt of rdief accessible in the circums- . tances. On the. cons;.derations to which I have adverted earli.er, the C.ourt enjoys a degree .of flexibility unknown to the frial of traditional private law' litigation. 'But I think it. necessary to .emphasise . that whatever the procedure adopted by the colirt it must be pro- .. cedure known to judicial tenets and characteristic of a judicial proceedirrg. There are .m.ethods and. avenues of procuring, material ·.a.vailabie to executive. arid legislative agencies, and often. empfoyed by tJiem for the efficient and effective disch.arge of the ta.sks before • them.· Not all those. methods-and avenues are available to the Court.

The Cotirt must ever remind itself that oi1e of the indicia: identifying it 'as. a Court. is. the nature and character of the procedure adopted by it fo determining a controversy. Xt is in that sense limited in the evolution of procedures pursued ])y it in. the pocess of an adjudication arid in the. grant. and execution of the relief. Legal jurisprudence

.. has in its historical.development identified certairi..fundamental prin•

ciples which form the essential constituents of judicial procedure . • Thev are emploved in 'every judicial proceeding; and constitute the .. basic infrastructure along whose channels flows the power of the <;:ourt iri the process of adjudication.

' What should be the conceivable framework of procedure in. public interest litigation? This questi.on does not admit of a clear cut answer. As I have obsernid earlier, it is not possible to envisage a de1i11ed pattern of procedure applicable to all cases .. or. necessity the pattern which the Court adbp1s will vry with the circumstances of.each case.

But it seems to me that one principle is clear. lfthere is a statute prescribing a judicial procedre'governing the part.icular; case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to the Court to bypass the statute arid evolve a different procedure at variance

with it Where, however, the proceoure J>fescribed by statute . is incomplete or insufficient, ii. will .be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving its own rules .. N; netheless, the supplementary pro- . cedure must. conform at all stages to the principles of natural justice.

Thee.can be no deviation from the pr; ricipks of naturaljustice and , .. >other well accepted procedural norms characteristic of a. judicial proceeding. Tiley onstitute an e.nti.re code of general principles" of. ; procedure, tried and proven and halllowed by the sanctity of common : . . . ' . a.nd. consistent acceptance during long years of the historical develop• ment of the. Jaw.

The. general principles of law. to which reference is made .here, conitnand.lhe confidence, not merely ofthe Ju'dge. and. the lawyer and the parties to the litigation; but supply that basic credib; lity t@ the judicial p1oceeding wh; ch strengthens public faith

., ..

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Bl\NDHUA Ml:JKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 161 •· in the Rule of Law. They are•iules rooted in reason and fairplay, arid their governance guarantees a just disposition of the case. The court . should be wary .of suggestions favouring novel procedures in cases where accepted procedural Jules will suffice.

Turning now to the nature and extent of. the relief which can be contemphte<l in public inte'est.litigaticin, we enter into an area at once delicate and. sensitive and frangbt with grav~ implications.

Article 32 confers the widest amplitude of power on this Courf in the matter of granting relief. It has power to issue "directions or orders or writs". and ther is no spcific indication, no express language, limiting or circumscribing that power. YeV the power is limited by its very nature, that it is judicial power, It is power which pertains to the judicial'organ ofthe State, identified by the very nature of the judicial institution. There are certain fundamental constituli.onal concepts which, although elementary, need to be recalfed at

L:11cs.

T:;:-: Constitulion envisages a broa<l division of the power of foe 3atc ~tween 'the legislature, the. executive and the judiciary.

Although the division .~ not-precisely demarcated. there is genernl ackno-..vicdgln.::rt of its limits. The lirnits ca:· L•' gatJ-i .·.c'. frr, m th.e .written text of Lhe ClnS 1 :t~1 tion, froril conv~::.·:.:, n::. ,,' tl _cn.., i.itutiun8] practice, a11d from a11 ellti1') array of i.:J'._i: .:·-~ d~' .. Jr(·< The coA-- . stitutional_ lawyr co-nr."c-j s a certai;1 incasUrC' ot oyer\:tpping in functional action lmong the three o,-gans of ihc S ate. Eut there is no. warrant for assuming a geometrical cpngruence.

It is common pl; tce that while the kgislature enacts the law, the executi\e ' implements it and the court interprets it and, in doing so, adjudicates on the validity ofeecutive action and, under ourConstitution, even judge's the validity of the legislation itself. And yet it is well recog- . , nised that in a certain sphere th'' legislature is possessed of.judicial power, the executive' possesses a measure of both , legislative an judicial functions, and the co, urt,. in its. duty of interpreting the law, accomplishes in itS perfected action a marginal degree of legislative

"xrcise. Nonetheless, a fine and delicte balance is envisaged under our Constitution betwe.en these primary institutions of. the State.

In similar Constitutions elsewhere the courts have been anxious to maintain and preserve . that balance. An example is provied by Marbury v. Madisanl" I do not mean to say that the Court shouldhesitate or falter or withdraw from the exercise of its jurisdic" tion. On the contracy, it must plainly do its duty under the Con- · stitution. But .r do say that in every case the Cour.t hould determine .

( l l. 5 U.S. [l Cranchj 137 [1803].

~SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1~84).2. S.C.R. ·

the true limits of its jurisdiction and,'having done so, it should take care. to remain within the restn\ints of its jurisdictio.n.

This aspect of- Coiirt action assumes especial significance in public interest litigation. It bears upon the legitimacy of the judicial •instituti9n, Md. that. legitimacy is affected as much by the solution presented by the Court in. resolving .a controversy as by the manner in which 'the so1ution is reached. In an area of judicial functioning where' judicial activism finds .room for play, where constitutional adjudication. can become. an instrument of social policy forged by the

prsollal political philosophy of the jUdge, this is .an important CO!)- . siderati(ln to keep in mind. .

. . . . . . . •Where the Court.embarks upon affirmative action in the attempi to. remedy a "constitutional imbalance within the social 'order, few · critics will find fault with it so Jong as it confines itself to the scope of its legitimate authority. But there is always the possibility, .in public interest litigation, of succumbing tp . the temptation or crossing into terri, tofy . which . prope'rly pertailis to the Legislature or to the Executive Government: 'For in. most cases the jurisdicticin of th~ 'Court is. invoked when a default occurs in executive administration;. and sometimes where a void .in community life remains unfilled by . .legislative action: The resulting public. grievace finds expression E through social action groups, which consider the Court an appropriate " forum for removing. the deficiencies. Indeed, the citizen. seems to . find it pre coniienient to apply to the Court for the. vindication

of constitutional i; ghts than appeal .to the executive or legislative

organs of the State. -

 In th~ process of correcting executive erro.r. or removing legisla, tive omission the. Court can so eaily find itself 'involved in pelic.y . 'making of fl quality and toa degree characteristic of political autho-."

. rity and inded run the risk of being mistaken for one. . An excessively political role identifiable with political governance betrays the Court into functions alien to. its fundamental character, and tends to destroy the <!elicate balance envisaged in our constitutional system . between its three b.asic institutions. The Judge, conceived in the true classicai mould, is an impartial arbiter,' beyond and abow political bias and prejudice; functioning silent!) in accordance with 1he Constitution ancl his judicial concience .. Thus does he maintain the legitimacy of the institution he serves and hopour the trust which· his office has reposed in him .. t- . . ..

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 163 .

The affirmative schemes framed in public interst litigation by the. Court sometimes require detailed administration under con~ · stant judicial snpervisfon over protracted periods, Tue lives of large ·. sections of people, some of whom have had no voice in the deci'sion, areshaped. and 'ordered by mandatory Court action extendini: i11to the future.: In that context, it is as well to remember that public approval and public consent assue material importance. in its. successful 'implemenfution. Jn contrast' with polity making by Jegisla.ticin, where a large. body of legislators. debate ori a proposed legislative enactment, no such visual impact cai1 be perceived when judicial decrees .are forged and fashioned by a few judicial p_ersonages

in the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of decision-making, is associated.traditionally .with cloistered secrecy and confidentiality and the end-result commonly issue• as a fin&l definitive act of the Court.: It is a serious question whether in every . ·.case .the same awesone respect and reverence will endure durini different stages .of affirmati'l'e action seeking to regµJate the' Jiyi,. of · large numbers of people, .some of. whom never partieipated in tl!e judicial process . . . .

There is good reason to suppose that treating with public interest litigation requires morethan legal schola"hip and. a~ la.towlcdie of textbook. Jaw. It is of the utmost importance in such cam that .; wheri formulating a scheme of.action, the Court must have due regard to the particular circumstan.ces of the case, to /surrounding realities including the potential for successful implementation, and the lilce- . lihood and degree of response from the agencies on whom the imple- ' mentation will depend. In 111os.t cases of public interst litigation;

there will be neither. precedent nor settled practice to &dd weight and force to' the vitality of the Court'; action. The example -of. similar cases in otl]er coun\_ries can afford little support. The success- . •. ful implementation Of the orde.rs of the Court wiU depend upon the particular social forces in the backdrop of local history, t!:te prev11iling . economic pressures, the duration o( the stages involved in the implementation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and acceptance of t_he Court's action .. at all times by those involved in or affected

it. •

. . . . . .

An activist Court,. spearheading the moement for the developni,-nt and exteqsion f the citizen's constil1ltional rights, for the pr-0tection' of individual -liberty and for the strengthening of th" soci.oeconomic fabric in compliance with declared constitutional objectives, will need to move with a degree of judicial circumspection. In the . . .

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS '[1984] 2 s.c.R.

centre of a social order changing with dynamic pace, the Coutt

needs to balance the authority of the pa•t with the urges of the future. As far back as 1939, Judge Learned Hand()' observed that a Judge

"must preserve his authority by cloakin.g himself in the majesty of an over-shadowing past; but he must discover some composition with the dominant n<; eds of his times". In thaHask the Court must ever be conscious of the , constitutonal truism that it possesses the sanction of neither the swo.rd nor the purse and that its st; ength lies basically in public confidence and support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its acts and decisions must remain beyo1d all doubt. Therefore, whatever the case before it, whatever the context of facts and legal ights; whatever the social' and economic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the Judge, let i.t not be forgotten that the essential identity of the institution, that it is a Ccurt, must remain preserved so that every action of the Court is informed . by the fundamental norms of Jaw, and by the principles embodied . ' - . . in the Constitution and other sources of law. If its contribution to the. jurisprudeniiai .ethos of society is to advance our constitutional objectiv.es, it must function in. accord with only those principles which. enter irito the composition of .judicial action and give to it its essential quality. In his perceptive Lectures entitled "The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform"''' Professor Archicald Cox .pointedly observes .: .

"Ability to rationalise a constitutional judgment in terms of principleneferable to accepted sources of Jaw is an essential, major element of constitutional a!ljudication. It is one of the ultimate sources of the power of the Courtincluding the power to gain aceeptance for the occasional great leaps forward which lack such justification., Constitutional government must operate by consent of the governed . . Court decrees: draw no authority from the parlicipat10n of the people.. Their power to command consent depends upon more than habit or .even the deserved prestige of the . . justices. It comes; to an important degree, from the continuing force of the rule of law-from the belief that the major influence in judicial decisions is not fiat but principles which bind thejudges as well as the litigants and which apply : consistently among all men today, and also yesterday . and

tomorrow".

I H (O 52 Harvard Law Review 361 [1939].

(2) Harvard University Press [1968], p. 21.

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCH!\ v, UNION (PRthak, J.) 165

There is great merit in the Court proceeding to decide an issue on the basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional irppeal. For that alone gives the decision of the Court. a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that particular permanence in. legal jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next step forward in the further progress of the law.

Indeed,. both certainty of substance and cetainty of direction are indispensable requirements in the development of the law, and invest it with the credibility which commands public confidence in it• legitimacy .. _

. .

This wrning is of especial si gnifiance in these times, during a phase of judicial history when a fow social action groups tend to show evidence of presuming that in every cas'e the court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way .t'.case should be decided.. ·

I have endeavoured by th_ese observations to indicate some of the areas in which the Court should move with caution and circumspection when addressing.itself to public interest litigatiqn., As new areas-open before .the. Court with modern developments in jurisprudence, in a world more sensitive to human rights as well as the impact of technological progress; the Court will become increasingly conscious of its expanding jurisdiction. That. is inevitable. But its responsibilities are correspondingly gre_at, and perhaps never greater than now. And we must remember that tliere is no higher Court to correct our errors, and that we wear the mantle of infallibility only because \- ciur decisions are final: That we sit at the apex of the judicial administration and our word, by constitutio1ml mandate, is thelaw of the land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a feeling we must guard against by constantly reminding om'selves that every decision . r must be guided by re,'.'son and by judi.;:ial principles.

My brothers have dealt with the preliminary objections raised by the respondents to the maintainability of this proceeding. On the considerations to which I have adverted earlier J have no hesita- 'tion in agreeing with them ihat the preliminary objections must be rejected. I have 90 doubt in my mind that persons in this country. obliged. to serve as bonded Jabour are. entitlted to invoke Article 23 of the Constitution. The provisions embodied in .that.clause form a vital constituent of the Fundamental Rights set forth in Part III of the Constitution, and their violation attracts properly the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. I also find difficulty in upholding th? objection by the respondents to the admissibility and relevance ,

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. . 166 .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s:c.R,

.C, f the material consisting of'the repo; t of the two advocates and of

Dr. P.atwardhan appointed as Commissioners. H is tnie that the reports of the said:Co'mmissioners have not been tested by cross- .examination,' but then the .record docs not show whether any .attempt .. was made by . the respondents to call them for cross-examination ..

The further question whether the appointment of the Comm.issioners falls withi,;.the terms of Order XLVI of the Suprem~ Court Rules . 1966 is of technical significance only, \)ecausc there was inherent power in the Court, i11 the particular circumstances of this case, to take that action. 1 have already set forth earlier my views.in rspect

of the nature and forms of procedure open to . the Co ti rt in pulllic interest litigation and I need not elaborate them here. ( may add,

howevr, that.the Court would do well to issue notice to. the respondents, bofore appointing any Commissioner, .. iii tl)ose cases where there Is little upprehen:iion of the disappearane of evidence:

. . . . ._ . . (ln the merits of.the case I find myself in agreement with my )Jrother Bhagwati, .both in regard to ·:the operation of the various

statuts as. well as the directions proposed by. him. The case. is one . . of considerable importance to a section of our people, .who .pressed by the twiit misfortunes of pov.erty and i1iileracy, are compelled to a condition of life which long since should have passed into history~ The continued . existence of such pockets. of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by 'm, ir Con- "' . . . . . .. . ' .. st1tut.Ion to 1ts citizens. . ·. , . . . . -

. AMARENDRA NATH 'SEN, J .. The' relevant facts .have .been fully. i set out in the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati; J. My learned : . brother has. also recorded in his judgment the. various contentions' which were urged before us in this writ petition. - \ ' ' .

'i A preliminary objection . was raised by Shri K. L. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General of India and also by Shri Phadke, learned counsel appe.aring on behalf of the respondents, as to the ma.intainability of the present petition.

TI1e objection to the maintainability of th~ present petition is taken mainly on the following three grounds:-,- .

Art. 32 of the Constitution is.' not attracted to the instant case as no fundamental right of the, petitioners or of the workmen referred to in. the petition ate infringed.

A letter addressed by a party to this Court cannot be treatrd as a writ petition and in th~ absence of any

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCjlA v. UNIOl:I (A.N. Sen, J.) . 167

verified petitiqn this Court cannot he moved to exercise its wrir jurisdiction. - In a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution ihis Court is nt cmp; wered tc. appoint any commission or an investigating body to enquire into the allegations . . . made and make a report to· this. Court on te basis of the enquiry to ¢nable this Court to exercise its power and jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution,

I Propose to consider the objection• in ihe order noted above.

I shall first deal with the first objection, namely, that Art . .32 of the Constitu.tion is not attracted as. there is no violation of any fundamental right of the petitioner or ofthe >Vorkri1en referred to in the .petition.

Tl; e substance of the grievance of the petitioners in this petition is that the workmen referred to in the communication addressed to thls Court. are bonded labourers .. In 1976, the Parliament enacted

D . the. Bonded Lab0ur System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and by virtue of the provisions of the said Act,. the bonded labour system has been declar.ed to be illegal inthis country. Any person who is wrongfully and illegal!i employed as a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Act, -is in essence deprived al. his liberty ... A bo"nded labourer truly becomes a slave and the freedom of a bonded labourer in the E matter of his employment and movement is mre or Jess completely taken. away .and forced iabour is thrust° upon him. When any bonded labourer appraaches this Court, the real grievance that he makes is that he sould be freed from this bondage and he prays for be; ng set a~ liberty and liberty is no doubt a fundamental righ(gura1tteed

to every person under the Constitution. There cannot be any-manner F of doubt that any person who is wrongfully ana illegally detained and is deprived of his liberty can approach this Co11rt under Art. 32 of the Constitution for his freedom from wrongfui and illegal detention,

and for being sef at liberty. Jn my opinion, whenever any person is wrongfully and illegally depdved of his libertv, it is open to, anybody ·

who is interested in the person to move' this Court under Art. 32 of : G the Constitution for his release. It may not very often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to approach. this Court, as by. virtue of such illegal and wrongful detentio~·; he may not be . free and in a position to' move this Court. The Petitlo.ner in the instant case claims to be an association interested in the welfare of " H society and particularly of the weaker section. The Petiticner furtl1cr


[1984] 2S.C.R.

states that the petifioner seeks to promote the welfare of the labourers and. for promoting the welfare of laboljr, the petitioner .seeks to niove this Court for relasing the bonded labourers from their. bondage and:for resloring to them their freedom and.othe.r legitimate 1ights.

The bonded labourers working in the far away places are generally po9r and belong to the very weak section of the people. They. are also ; JO! very .literate and they may not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in bondage their freedom is: also restricted and they may ndt be in a position to approach this Court. Though no fundamental right of the petitioner may be said to be infringed, yet the petititner who complains of the violatio1i of the fundamental right of the workmen who have .been wrongfully and illegally denied their freedom .and deprived of their constitntional right must be. held to be. entitled to approach this Com:t on behalf of.the bonded labourers for removing them from illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. The focus standi oLthe petitiouer to move this Court appear to be conclusively established by the decision of. this Court in the case of S.P. Guta v. Union of India. & Aiir.U 1 Farced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Art. 23 of the Constitution .• As in the present case the violation or the fundamental right of liberty of the workmen who" arc.said to be k.ept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged, Art. 32 of the Constitu!icn . to my mind, is clearly attracted; The ftrst ground raised on behalf

of the respondei:ts cannot, therefore, be sustained':

Before I proceed to deal with the second ground urged on behalf of the respol)dents, it will be convenient to set out the provisions. of Art .. 32 of the Constitution.

Art. 32 'read as follows :-

"(!) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for. the enforcement of the ri_ghts conferred by trus Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue. directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qup warrants and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate'; for the enforcement of any of' the rights conferred by this part. ·

(3). Without prejudice to the powers co.nferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower

(1) [19811 Suppl. S.C.C. 87.

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aANDHUA MUK.Ti MORCHA V. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.)

J69

any other court to exercise within t!ie .local limits of its jurisdiction all or aµy of the powers exercisable by tlie Supreme Court under clause (2).

( 4) The right guaranteed by this article sh.,!! not sus- . pended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution."

Art. 32(1) confers the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the fundamental rights. guaranteed under the Constitution.

Art. 32(2) makes provision. for the powers of this. Court in the matter of granting relief in any proceeding in - this Court_ for enforcement of the fundamental. rights . guaranteed by the ConstitutiOn. )\rt. 32(3) and 32(4) which I have also set out for the purpose of complete understanding of the provisions of Art. 32 for proper appreciation of its scope and effect; do not have any material bearing ori the question-involved in the prese_nt proceeding.

The seond grou.nd which raises the question whether tjie letter addressed by a party to this Court can be treated as a writ petition and in the absence of any verified_ petition this court can be moved to exercise its writ jurisdiction. is essentially an objection to the procedure to be adopted by. this Cou.rt in the matter of entertaining a proceeding under Art. 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights of

the parties. Art. 32(1) of the Constitutionwhich ha_s been earlier set out guarantees the right to move this Court by an appropriate .. proceeding for the enforcement Of the fundamental rights. A; t. 32(2) f:Onfers wide powers on this Court in the _matter. of granting relief against any violation ofthe fundamental rights. Art. 32 or for that matter any other article does not lay down any procedure which has to be followed to move this Court for relief against the violation of any fundamental right. Art. 32(1) only' lays down that _the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights is guaranteed. _ The Constitution very appropriately leaves the question as to what will constitute an approprite .proceeding for the ppose of enforcement of fundamental rights' to be determined by the Court. Tgis Court, when sought to be_ moved under Art. 32 by any party for redressing his .grievance against the violation of fundamental rights has to consider whether the procedure followed by the party is appropriate enough to entitle _ the court to procee.d to act on the same. No doubt this Court.has framed rules which are .contained in part IV, Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules under the Caption. "application for enforcement of fundamental

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] i S.C.R.

rights ("Art. 32 of the Constitution"). Generally speaking, any party who seeks to move this Con.rt under Act. 32 of the Constitution: should conform "to the rules prescribed .. The rules fay down the procedure which is normally to be fllowed in the matter of any application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. These rules are ruls relating to the procedure tci be adopted and the rules are intended · to serv.e as mafds to the. Deity of Justice. Pro.cedural Jaw which also . forms a part of the law and has t6 be. observed, is, however, subservient to substantive law and the Jaws of procedure are prescri'll!d for promoting and furthering the ends of justice. There cannot. be any :doubt that this. Court should usually follow .the procedure laid down in O.XXXV of the Rules of this Court and should .normally insist on a petitio'n properly verified by an affidavit to be filed te enable the Co.tut to take necessary action on the same. Though this Court should nrmally insist on the ruls of procedure being followed, it cannot be said, taking.into consideration the nature of right conferred under Art. 32 to move this Courthy an appropriate proeeeding and the very wide powers conferred on this Court for granting relief in the case of violation or' fundamental rights, that . this Co.urt will have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which may not be in conformity wit]\ procedure prescribed by the Rules of tilis COurt. The Rules undoubtedly lay down the procedure which is normally to be followed for. making an application 'under Art. 32 of the Constitution. They, however, do not and cannot have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction f this Court of entertaining a proceeC.!ing>under Art. 32 of t\le Constitut)on, if made', only in the manner prescribed by the rules. For effectively safeguarding the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court in appropriate cases in the. inte.rests of justice will certainly be- 'ompetent to. treat a proceeding, though not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court, as an appropriate proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution aud to entertain the same. Fundamental rights . •guaranteed under the'Constitutiqn are indeed too sacred to be ignored . or trifled with merely on the ground. of technicality or any rule of .. procedute. . It may further be notice'a that the rules framed by this Court do not also. fay down that this Court. can be moved under Art 32 .of t)le Constitution only in accordance with the. procedure prescribed by the .Rules. and not otherwise .. A mere technicality in. the matter of form Ol' procedure whic)l may not in any way affect the substance of any proceeing should .not. stand in the way of the exercise of the very wide jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitutjqn for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranted under the Constjtution.

Taking. into .

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BANDHUA , MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.) !'71

considera.tio;1 th~ substance f the matter and .the nature of allega- A tions ma:de, it .will essentialiy be a matter for the Court to decide whether the 'procedure adopted cnn be considertd to te ,; n anic- priate proceeding within the ambit' of Art. 32 of the Constitution.

The Court, if satisfied on the material; placed in the fem of a letter " or other communication addressed to this court,· may take notice . of the same in a.ppropriate cases. Experience shows that in many B . - ' . \ cases it may not be possible for the party conc., rned to file a regular writ petition in conformity with procedure laid .down in the Ruks

of this Court. It further appears that this Court; for quite some years now ha.s 1n many cases proceeded to act on the basis of the letters adressed to it. A long standfog practice of the. Court in the matter ofprocedure also acquires sancti'ty~. It may also be pointed C out that in various cases the Court has refused to take any notice of letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also. the court on being moved by a letter hasdireeied a formal writ petition to be filed before it has. decided to prcceed . further in the matter. It is, however, eminently desirable, in my ·

opinion, that nornially the. procedur~ prescribed in the ruies. of this D Court should he followed while entertaining a petiticn 'under Art. 32 . of the Constitution, though in exceptional cases and particularly in matter of general public interest, this Court may, taking into C0\1sideration the peculiar .facts and circumstances of the case, proceed to exerci.se its jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the constitution for enforcement of. fundamental rights treating t)le letter or ,.the communication

, E in any other form as an appropriate proceeding under Arte 32. of the Constitution, It is, however, eminently desir1ble mat any party who addresses a Jetter .or any other coinmunication to this Court seeking intervention of this Court on the basis of the said letter and. communication shOuld 'address this letter or communication to this . Court and nqt to any individual Judge by name. Such communica- F . tion should be addressed to, the Chief Justice. of the Court and .his companion Justices,· A private communication, by a party to any Learned Judge over any matter is not proper and niay create. embarrassment for the Court. and the Judge concerned.

lti the present <:ase,.the unfortunate , workers who are emploccd ·

G , as bonded labourers at a distant place, could not possibly in view of the.ir bondage, move this Court, following the procedure laid do\vn in the Rules of this Court. The.· Petitioner which claiins to be a Social Welfare Organisation interested jn restoring. liberty and digni, ty to these unfortunate bondedlabourers should be considered competent H to move this Court by a letter or like communication addressed to


[1984] 2 $.C.R.

this Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner. is not moving this Court for any personal or private benefit. . . .

I shall now consider. the third and the last: objection which relates to the powers of this Court to direct an enquiry into the allegations made and to call for a report in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution to enable this Court to exercise its power andjurisdiction under Art. 32 'bf the Constitution.

We have earlier noted that the funpamental rights are guarnteed by the Constitution arid for the enforcement of the fundamental rights very -wide powers have been conferred on this Court Before this Court proceeds to exercise itsp owers under Art.. 32 of the Con- stitution for enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed, this Court has to be satisfied that there has been a violati('ln of the fundamental rights. The fundamental rights may be alleged to have been violated

under various. circumstances. The facts and circumstances differ

I'" . from case to case.

Wh.enever, ho.wever, there is an allegation of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes the responsibility and also the sacred duty of this Court to protect such fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution provided 'that this Court is satisfie.d that a case for interference by this. Court appears prima facie to have been made out.. very often the violation. of fundamental rights is not admitted or accepted. On a proper consideration of the materials t.he Court has to come to a c0ncluson whether there has been any violation of fundamental rights to enable the Court to grant' appro' priate reliefs in the matter. rn various cases, because of the peculiar facts and circumstances. of the case the party approaching this Court for enforcement of fundamental rights may not be in " position to furnish all relevant materials an<l necessary partiuclars. If,' however, on a consideration of the materials placed, the Court is satisfied that a prope_r probe into the qatter is necessary in .the larger interest of administration of'justice and for enforcement of fundmental rights guaranteed, the Court, in view of the obligations and duty cast upon it of preserving and protecting fundamental rights, may require better and further materials to enable the. Court to take appropriate action; and there cannot be anything improper in the proper exercise of Court's jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the .Constitution to try to secure the necessary materials through appropriate agency. The Com- . rnission that. the Court may appoint or the investigation that the court may .direct is essentially for the Court's satisfaction as to the correctness or otherwise of the allegation of violation of fundamental rights tci . enable the Court to decide the coiirse to. be adopted for

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~ANDHUA MUKTI M, ORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J. 173

doing proper justice to the parties i.n the matter of protection of their A fundamental rights', We have to bear in mind that in this Jarid of outs,. there are persons without education, without means and without opportunities and they also are entitled to full protec.tion of their rights or privileges which the Constitution affords. Living .iP. chilled penury without necessary.resources and very often not fully conscious of their .rights guaranted under the , Constitution, a very large section

. B of the people commonly termed as the weaker section iive iri this land.

When this Court is approached on behalf of this cl.ass of people for enforcement of fundamental rights of which they have beeii deprived and which they are equally entitied to enjoy, it beco.mes the special responsibility of this Court to see that justice is not denied to them and the disadvantageous position in whiCh they' are placed, do not C stand in the way of theiigetting justice from this Court .. The power to appoint a commission or an.'investigating body for making enquiries in terms of directions given by the Court must be considered to be implied and inherent in the power that the Court has under Art. 32 for enforcement of the fundametal rights guaranteed under. the Constitution. This is .a power which is indeed incidental . or

.. D ancillary to the power 'which the Court is called upon to exercise in . a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending_ on the facts and circuinstpnces of any.case, to consider whether any such power regarding invest!gation has to be exercised or not. .. The Commission that the Court appoints or the investigation. that the Court .directs while deali.ng with a pro-

E . . ceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not a commission .or enquiry under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such power must necessarily be held to be implied within the very wide powers conferred on this Court under Art.. 32 fr enforcement of fundamental rights. I am, further of the opinion that for proper exercise of its powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution and for due discharge F of the obligation and duty. cast upon this Court in the matter of protection and enforcement of fundamental rights which the Constitution• guarantees, it must be held that this Ccurt has an inherent power to act in such a manner as will enable this Court to discharge its dutles and obligations under Art. 32 of the Constitution prorerly and effectively in the larger interest of administraticn of justice, G and for proper protection of ccinstitutionai safeguards. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this objection is. de, void of any .merit. ..

I may incidentally observe that as.a result of such acticn on the part of' the Court aitention of the appropriate authorities concerned H has in a number of cases. been po, intedly drawn to the existence of

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SUPREME COUU REPORTS [l Q84J 2 S.C.R.

bonded labourers in various parts of the country and to their misea- . rable plight and a iarge number of bonded labourers have been freed from their bondage. ··.To my mint!, the litigation. of tis type parti. cularly in. re)ation to bonded labourers is really not in nature in adver- sary litigation and it becomes thioduty of the State and also of the . appropriate authorities to offer its best co-operation to see thaHhi$ evil practice "'.hich has been declaie, d illegal is ended at the earliest.

The existence of.bonded labour in the country is ap unfortunate fact.

Whenever there is any allegation of the existence of bonded labour in any particular State, the.State instead.of seeking to come 'out with a case of denial of such existence o'n the basis of afeeling that the existence of bonde~ labour in 'the State may, cast a slur or stigma on its' administrative machinery,. should cause effective enquiries to bo mad'e into the matter and if the mtter is pending in this Court, should. co-operate with this Court to-see that death-knell is sounded on this illegal system which constitutes. a veritable, social menace and stands in the way of healthy development of the nation.

Foneasons aforesaid, I do not find any merit in the preliminary objections, raised and I agree with my learned brother that the preliminary objections must be over-ruled. ·

On the merits of the case my learned broth.er Bhagwati, J.

hs in.his judgment carefully and elaborately discussed all the aspects.

Apart from the principal grievance made-that the. workmen in the

~· . . .. . ' . instant case are bonded labourers, various grievances on behalf of the wrkmen have.been voiced !lnd deni.aI to the workmen of various other just rights has been alleged. The grievance of denial of.other

.· just rights to the. workmen and the reliefs claimed for giving the

workmen the benefits to which. they may be entitled 'under various legislat.ions enacted for their welfare are more or Jess in the nature of consequential reliefs incidental to the main relief of 'freedom from . bonded.and forced labour to which the workmen are subjected. 1

must frankly confess th3.t"in the facts .and circumstances of this case I have some. doubts as to the applicability of the provisions of Inter . . ·- . ..

State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment. and Conditions of Sryice). Act, 1919 . . The vie, vs expressed by my learned broter Bhagwati, J. in his judgment, to my mind, do not amount to any adjudication on the question nf appl\cabiliiy of the Inter Siate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) . Act, 1979. The 'observati()n.s niade by my leared brother Bhagwati,· J. and the directions given by him on. the various aspects witlnegard to th> m:rits of th' case after carefully considering the provisions of . . - . '

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BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen', J.) 175

all the relevant labour legislations enacted tor the benefit of labourers and. for improvement .and betterment of their Jot, are for furthering the interests of the .workmen and for proper protection and "preser'Va-. tion of their just rights and to enable the appropriate authorities to take. necessary action in tha matter. As I am 'in agreement wit.h the vie\Ys expressed bv my learned Brother .Bhagwati, J. I do not propose . to deal with these aspects at any Jength and l ccntent myself ]Jy

expressing my agreement . wiih the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. on these matters. ·

S. R.

Pttitions allowed and

. preliminary grmmds

. C . rejected.

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