' 0

DHANANJOY DAS

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE & ANR.

August 16, 1982

[V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.)

Constitution of India-Article 22(5)-Rights of detenu.

National Security ACt~ 1980-section 3(3)-Grounds of detention-Inclusion of paragraph in the nature of preamble or introduction-Validity •

National Security Act, 1980-Section 3(3)-0rder of detention-Proof of satisfaction of detaining authority-Extraneous evidence not admissible.

National Security Act, 1980-section 3(3)-Grounds of detention-Vague-

~1s-Determination of.

The apPellant was detained by' an ofder made under section 3 (3) of ihe Act.t The grounds of detention served on him consisted of 4 paragraphs. The first part of paragraph 1 was admittedly introductory. The latter part of para.:· graph 1 was in the followillg terms:

"Shri Das has been playing a leading part in -the current agitation on foreigners issue in collaboration with other active agitators who re leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangrarn Parishad, ,. by organising bundhs, noncooperation programme, inciting people to violate law from time to time. Such activities have isturbed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life: Or society".

Paragraphs 2 and 3 gave details as to the part played by the appellant in a programme relating to obstruction of road and rail traffic and "violation of curfew by thousands of people. The first sentence of paragraph 4 stated: "Such activities of Shri Dhananjoy Oas are prejudicial t""the interest of maintenance of public order."

The appellant challenged the order by a petition under Article 226 which was dismissed by the High Court. , In appeal, counsel for the appellant contended that paragraph 1 of the grounds was so vague that the order of detention must be quashed on that ground alone, that paragraphs 2 and 3 also sufferred from vageness for the

ffi\!9~ th~! !h•y did not meQtigq certain necessary facts and that the facta

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DHANANJOY V, DISTT. MAGISTRATE . 123

alteged in the grounds of detention only made out a case for maintenance of IaW ' and order and not of public order.

Counsel for the respondent submitted that paragraph 1 was only a prelude or introductory and it did not deal with the grounds on which the District Magistrate bad biS subjective satisfaction in passing the order.

Counsel for the app"ellant, on the other hand, relying on certain observations in Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, conlended that Arti(:te 22(5) provided for supplying of grounds and there could be no preamble or introduction to the grounds of detention. It was submitted that the District _ Magistrate h.imself had in his counter-affidavit treated paragraph 1 as constituting one of the grounds of detention although be had subsequently changed his position by filing a supplementary affidavit on the basiS of a note ma<le bf him earlier in his correspondence with the State Government. Counsel contended that the order of detention was conclusive as to the state of mind of the person who made it and no such extraneous evidence Was admissible.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed, as soon 2s may be, of the grounds on which the order of detentioh 'is made, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfactioh of the detaining authority;. and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportuity of making a representation against the order

. -c

of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to E make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.

The inclusion of an irrelevant o.r nonexistent ground, among other relevant grounds, is an infriDgement of the first of the fights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground aong other clear and definite gro.unds is an infrige meat of the second of the rights. It is by yirtue 'of the second right that the detaining authority has to supply the. material facts on the basis of which sub jectjve satisfaction was derived for passing th"e orde1 .of detention and this is F

...,... how th~ facts from which the inference is drawn also become a part and parcel 'i!i._,( of the grounds. (134 D-G]

;..·

(b) There is no bar, to have introductory paragraphs in the ground& of detention. 'he observations .in Mohd. Yousuf Rather's case do opt indicate that there can be no .preaffibJe or introductory paragraph; those observations onIY. mean that all allegations of facts which have led to the Passing of the order of

detetion will form part of the grounds of detcntio_n. [129 G]

. (c) Whether a particular paragraph in the grounds amouQts only to a preamble or introduction or contains the grounds on the basis of which the detaining authority bad the subjective satisfaction for passing the order is to. be determined on the facts and circumstances of C\\~ ~~~~ 1,1;~~ t i§ open to the court to come to its own conclusion. (130 A-BJ

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1983] 1 S.C.R,

(d) the grounds of detention must be i~ existence on the date of the order and the authority concerned has to be satisfied about them on the.date of the order. The satisfaction of the detaining authority .must be clear on the face of the order and no extraneous evidence is admissible to P, rove what actually weighed with the authority while passing the order. It is not what a patty chooses t~ put as a gloss on the grounds of detention but it is the document itself wich will be taken to be, the. proof of what weighed with the detaining authority while passing the order. [135.D-E-F]

Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State

eplalned.

of Jammu & Kashmir, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 370,

Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of West Bengal, [1960] l S.C.R. 411; Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] l S.C.R. 709 and State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] S.C.R. 167, referred to.

In the instant case the tenor of ihe document only indicates that the three organisations named therein have been taking part in the current agitation on foreigners issue in the manner stipulated in paragraph 1, in which the appellant has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs 2 il.nd 3 deal with the specific part attributed to the appellant on specific days and at specific places. That is why the first sentence o~ Paragraph 4 stipulates that such activities of the appellant are prejudicial to the interests of maintenance of public order and be was called upon to make a representation against the allegations made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the groundS. Significance must be attached to the difference in language 'used ill the last sentence of paragraph l and the first sentence o'f paragraph 4. Paragraph 1 only contemplates that the variOus organisations have been tking part in the current agitation on foreigQefs issue in the various modes enumerated therein. The document read as a who!~ indicates that paragraph 1. of the grounds of detention is only by way of in!roduction or preamble. The vagueness in paragraph 1 cannot be made a ground of attack on the impugned order. [131 C-F; 131 A; 133 C-D].

• ,_

2. The question whether a particular groun(I is vag.ue will deend on 'the ../ facts and. circumstances of each case because vagueness is a rela1ive term. What ).__' may be vague in one case inay not be so in similar circurustiii:tces of another case. If the basic facts have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of detention whi.::h •enable the dctenu to make an effective repr.esentation, merely because meticulous details of far; ts are abt given will not vitiate the order of detention. [142 E-G]

Chaju Ram v. State of Jammu & Kt; ishmir, (1970) 1 S.C.C. 536; Gopal Bauriv. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Ors., [1975] l S.C.C. 522; Dr. Ram i .j/ Krishan Bhardwajv. State of Delhi &-Ors., [1953] S.C.R. 708; Bhupen Deka v.

State of Assam, (1981) Cri. L:J. 1743; Kam/a Kanya/al Khusalani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (!981) 1 S.C.C. 748; Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of .West Bengal, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 411; Maood A/Qm etc.~· Union of India & Ofs,

• "

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OHANANJOY v. i>ISt'r. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) . . ' '

12S


In the instant case basic facts have been given in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention to enable the apellant to make an effective representation. [142 G] B

 3.

The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation On the issue / of foreigners has been going on for years and it has taken an ugl~ and serious turn, and the statement of facts made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the< grounds of detention, in the pryalent circumstances in Assam~ relate tv the maintenan~, of pub1ic order in view of the law laid down in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration & Or;. [143 H; 144 A] . , . .

Dr. 11am Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966] l S.C.R. 709 and Ashok Kumtir. v. D'e/hi Administration & Ors., A.LR. 1982 S.C. 1143, rCferred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 199 of 1982.

• From the Judgmel)t dated the 23rd February, 1982 of the High Court of Gauhati in Civil Rule No. 6 (HC) of 1982.

S; Rangarajan, Prabir Chowdliury, B.P. Maheshwari, Suresh E Sethi and Miss "Asha Rani Jain, for the Appellant.

A.M. Mazumdar, Advocate General of Assam and S.K. Nandy for the Respondents.

' ' The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MISRA, ]. Th, e present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Gauhati dated 23rd of February, 1982 dismissing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of detention of the appellant.

The District Magistrate, Darrang passed an order of detention on 3rd ofJanuary, 1982 against the appellant under s.-3 (3) of the National Security Act, 1980. The order of detention al11.ng with the grounds was supplied to the' appellant on the same day, that is, on 3rd of January, 1982. ·The appellant was also arrested on the same day. He made a representation on the 9th of January, 1982

116 SlJPRilMB COUltT RBPOilTS. { l 9S3] t • s.C.R.

through the Superintendent of Special Jail who forwarded the.same -to the Government on 10th of January,_1982. The State Government received the same on !Ith of January, 1982 and it was rejected on 13t.h of January, 1982.

The order of detention was challenged by the. appellant on two grounds : (1) that the grounds of' detention were vague, and

(2) that the facts narrated in the grounds related to law and order situation and not to public order. The High Court repelled both the grounds and dismissed the writ petition by its order dated 23rd _qf February, 1982. The High Court, however, granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court. ·

Before dealing with the contentions in •this case oJi behalf of the parties it will be appropriate at this stage to refer to the . grounds of detention which were served on the appellant :

'.'!. Sri Dhananjay Das, aged about 50 is the President of Purbancbalia Lok Parishad, Tezpur Unit. He is a contractor by profession. Sri Das has been playing a leading part in the current agitation on foreigners issue in collaboration with other active agitators who . are leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana

Sangram Parishad, by organising bundhs, non-cooperation programme, inciting people to violate law from: time to time. Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life of society.

In connection with the programme of Rasla Roko

CoJllmencing from 0/50 hrs. of 31.1,2.81 to 1700 hrs. of 1.1.82 Sri Das in collaboration with others like Nabab Shahjamal, Biren Baishya etc. mobilised thousands of people from Parbatia, and other neighbouring areas of the town to give obstructions to motor vehicles on 31.12.81 and railway traffic on 1.1.82. At the instigation of Sri Das the people came in large numbers violating prohibitory orders. On

l. I.82 the crowd was instigated by him and aforesaid associates to pelt stones, brickbats etc. on police personnel on duty. This led to greater violence in which railway slippers were burnt, and driver of firebllANANJOY v. nistT. MAGiSTRATE (Misra, i.) 127

brigade was shot at. Ultimately firing was resorted to and three persons died.of bullet injury.

On 2.1.~2, when the. whole Tezpur Town was under curfew, Sri Das along with his other associates mobilised people of Parbatia etc. and led a procession of thousands of people through curfew-bound areas raising slogans instigating people to violate curfew.

This crowd had to be dispersed by use of force.

Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial to the interest of maintenance of public order. It is essential therefore that . in order . to prevent him from induJging in such like. prejudiil acts, Sri Das is detained under National Se'curity Act."

 Shri Rangarajan, counsel for th, e appellant, seriously contended that the first paragraph of the grounds is so vague that 'the order of detention must be quashed on this ground alone.

Shri A.M. Majumdar, Advocate General of Assam, on. the other hand has contended that the I st paragraph of the grounds was on1y

a _prelude or introductory and does not deal with the gro/mds on which .the District Magistrate had his subjective _satisfaction for passing the order of detention.

There is no doubt th at If the first paragraph of the grounds constitute the grounds of detention,. it is vague and the order of detention must be quashed on the ground of vagueness with regard to the statements contained therein.

Threfore,.the main question for consideration in this case is whether the first paragraph of the grounds is merely introductory or a preamble or a prelude. Shri Rangarajan contends that there could be no prelude or preamble. to the grounds. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution provides for • supplying the grounds of detention. In support of his contention he placed reHance on Mohd. Yousuf Rather v. State of Jammu. & Kashmir & Ors.(l) In .that case Dr. Singh vi for the State strenuously submitted that the first paragraph of the grounds supplied to 'the petitioner was of an introductory nature, that paragraphs 2; 3, 4 and 5 referred to the events which furnished the

en [19791 4 sec no.'

Fl.

128 SiJPREME COURT REPORtS [1983] I s.c:R.

background and that the penultimate paragraph alone contained the grounds of uetention as such. He submitted that it was permissible to separate the introduction and the recital of events constituting the background from the grounds of detention and. if that was done it would be apparent that the order of detention suffered from no infirmity. He sought to draw support for his submission from the decision in Naresh'Chandra Ganguli v. State of West Bengal.(1) In that case sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 were the subject matter of consideration and this Court held that the two sections read together contemplate that the copy of the order passed by the detaining authority under s. 3 '

(2) of the Act to be served on. the detenu should contain, (I) a preamble reciting in terms one or more of the sub-clauses of els. (a) and (b) of s. 3 (1) .as its object or objects, (2) the grounds contemplated bys. 7, namely, the c6nclusions of fact, which. led to the passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as to why he was &tained, and (3) particulars, if and where necessary, but not those referred to in sub-ss. 3 and (4) of s. 3 of the Act. This case thus contemplated of a preamble or introductory part in the grounds of detention. ··

Shri Raugarajan for the. appellant, however, contended that, the view taken in N.C. Ganguli's case (supra) does not hold the field and he referred to the following observations made . by Chinnappa Reddy J. in Mohd. Yousuf Rather's case (supra) :

"It is impossible to agree with the submission of Dr. Singhvi. The annexure to the order of detention detailing the grounds of detention has been fully extracted by my learned brother Shinghal J. We are unable to see how factual allegations such as those contained in the paragraphs I to s of the grounds of detention can be said to be merely introductory. or as constituting the background. ll, n Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. State of W.B. what was read by the Supreme Court as the 'preamble' was the recital in terms of section 3 (1) clause (a) and (b) of the Preventive Detention Act, namely : that the detenu was being detained in pursuance of a dcten-

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.(1) [1%0] I SC.R. 411.

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DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 129

lion order made in exercise ofthe power conferred by section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act on . the gr., und that the detenu was acting in a .manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars. given :!hereafter. The particulars given in the subsequent paragraphs, the Court said, constituted the grounds. We do .not. understand "flfaresh Chandra Ganguli v. $tale of W.B.

as laying down that it is permissible to dissect or trisect the grounds of detention into introduction, . bckground and 'grounds' as such. There is no

warrat. for any such division.

The distinction made in Naiesh Chandra Ganguli case between the 'preamble', meaning thereby the recital in terms of the statutory provision and the 'grounds' meaning thereby the conclusions of fact which led to the' passing of the order of detention does not justify any disiinction being made between introductory facts, background facts, and 'grounds' as such.

All allegations of fact which have , led . to the passing of the -Order of detention are 'grounds' of detention. If such allegations are irrelevant or vague .the detenu is entitled to be releaSed.''

Shinghal J., with whom Sarkiiria J. concurred,' however, did not go to the extent. of saying that there cannot he a preamble or introduction to the grounds.

According to the counsel for the

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appellant _the observatfons made by Chinnappa Reddy J. would F be taken to be the observations made by the Full Court inasmuch as he agreed with the vie\v expressed by Sarkaria and Shinghal

JJ.'

Be !hat as it m_ay, the observations eferred to above do not indicate that there can be no preamble or introductory para in the G grounds of detention. . There is no bar to have introductory paragraphs in the grounds, The observations only mean all allegations of facts which have led to the pass.ing of the order of detention )Viii form part of the grounds of detention. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that there co_uld be no introductory para in.

 H . tlie grounds. '

' G

i3o SuPRJ!ME COURT REPORTS

11983) i s.c.R.

Wh.ether a particular paragraph in the grounds amounts only io a preamble or introduction is to be determined on the facts ana

circumstances of each case and it is open to the Court to come to its own conclusion whether that paragraph is only .an introductory para or contains the grounds on the basis of which tlie detaining authority had the subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention.

'Preamble' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean a preliminary statement in speech or writing; an introductory paragraph, sction, or clause; a preface, prologue, introduction.

It has further been defined there as "an introductory paragraph" or part in a statute, deed, or other document setting forth the ground and intention of it." The preamble thus betokens that which follows.

The first part of paragraph 1 of the order of detention in the instan4 case is admittedly introductory where it says :

I •

'.'Sri Dhaoanjoy Das, aged about 50 years ia the President of Purbanchalia Lok Paiishad, Tezpur Unit.

He is a contractor by professii>n."

The dispute is about the nature of the latter part of paragraph.

I. It says : •

"Sri bas has been playing a leading part in the current agitation on foreigners issue iri collaboration with other active agitators who are leaders of AASU, Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangram Parishad, by organising bundhs, non-cooperation programme, inciting people to violate law from time to time. Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life of society."

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention deal with specific instances of the activities of the appellant.

The penultimate paragraph 4 of the grounds says :

"Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial H to the lnteres( of maintenance of public order."

biiANANJOY v. i>1sri. MAGISTRATE (Misia, i.) i:H

Significance must be attached to the language used in the last sentence of the !st paragraph and the !st sentence of the last paragraph, the former says :

"Such activities have disturbed peaceful, tolerant and harmonious life of society."

While the latter i.e., the !st sentence .of the last paragraph 4 states that:

"Such activities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial to

the interest of maintenance of public order." C

The tenor of the document indicate that the appellant has been playing a leading part in the current agitti<in on foreigners issue in collaboration with other active agitators wbo are leaders of AASU,

Karmachari Parishad and Gana Sangram Parishad by organising bundhs, non-cooperation programm~. inciting. people to violaJe law from time to time. It only indicates that the three organisations have been taking part in the current agitation on foreigners issue in the manner stipulated in the first paragraph, in which the appellant has also been playing a leading part. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds deal with specific part attributed to the appellant on specific days and at specific places. That is why . the first sentence of the last paragraph 4 stipulates such acti•ities of Sri Dhananjoy Das are prejudicial to the interests of maintenance of public order and the appellant was called upon to make a representation against the allegations made against him in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds.

The first paragraph only contemplates that the various organisations have been taking part in the current agitation against the foreigners issue in the various modes enumerated therein.

Shri Rangarajan sought to derive support for his contention from averments made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit .filed by the District Magistrate on 24th of January, 1982.wherein it has been stated that ground No' I is Clear, specific' and eloquent which provided all the opportunities to the detenu to submit his representation. This averment was in reply to the allegation made in the writ petition that paragraph I of the grounds was vague and indefinite. ' Therefore, on the own showing of. the :Qistrict Magistrate, he treated paragraph I a_s _constituting one 'of the grounds of detention. Later on he sought permission of the Court to file a

SUPREME COURT RE!>ORTS (1983] I s.c.R.

supplementary affidavit, which was allowed.

In the supplementary affidavit he averred that paragraph I of the grounds constitute only a preamble or introd'uctory para and the grounds on which be had subjective satisfaction for passing 'the order of detention against the appellant were contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention. In support of the application for permission to file a supplem.entary affidavit by way of clarifica; ion he relied on. the parawise comments made by him which he had sent to the Government under his memo. • No. DCM. 49/8!/29 dat!d , I 5th. of January 1982 with a copy to the Senior Government Advocate~ While dealing with paragraphs 9 and IO of the petition the District Magistrate had commented • tbat paa 1 of the grounds of . detention 'is of the nature of introduction and para 4 is of the nature of conclusion. It was also submitted for the appellant that the District Magistrate having once admitted in the counter affidavit that para l of the grounds of detention constitufe grounds of detention he could not subsequently turn turtle and , say that i( was only by way of introduction or preamble and he could not have been allowed to change his position by filing a supple- 1; rientary affidavit. The order of detention, said the counsel, is conclusive as to the state of mind of !he person who made it and that no extraneous eyidence can be takenr into consideration to prove that state of mind and hence any additional evidence such as the note made by the District Magistrate was not admissible to prove that the rule has been complied with. Such evidence could not have been given by the District Magistrate in view of the earlier affidavit dated 24th of January, 1982. expressly saying that paragraph I is th; ground which is clear, specific nd eloquent. In . support of his contention he placed reliance on Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar.(1)

The Advocate General of Assam, on the other hand, has contended that the counter affidavit filed earlier by the District Magistrate was just in reply to the averments made in the .writ petition and therein it was stated that ground No. l of the grounds of detention was vague and indefinite and' in reply the.reto the District Magistrate denied the vagueness of that ground. The District Magistrate, however, has clarifie.d the position in his para-wise comments which he had sent to the Government by memo.


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. DHANANJOY V. DISTT. MAGISTRATB .(Mimi, J.) . 133

No. DCM. 49/81/29 dated 15th of January, 1982. He clarified the position fhat paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention was only a preamble or introduction. This was done by him long before the filing of the writ petition itself and, therefore, the supplementary . affidavit filed by him clarifying the posi, tion cannot be said to be an after-thought and the High court accepted the position that the , District Magistrate did not take into consideration the statement of

facts made in paragraph I of the grounds of detention.

The grounds of.detention read as a w"hole leave no room tor doubt that paragraph I of the grounds of detention was only by

way of introduction or as a peamble. In substance, it only indicates the modus operandi adopted by the various organisations to the current agitation on foreigners issue in Assam. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the grounds of d.etention allege a specific part played by the appellant in that agitation; On a perusal of. grounds of detention as a whole we are satisfied that the view aken by the High Cqurt that the !st paragraph of the grounds 'of detention was only a preamble, pre)ude, or introductory para is correct. If this. be the position then the vagueness in the I st paragraph cannot be ma.de a ground of al)ack on the impugned order.

The Advocate General feebly sought to contend that assuming that !st paragraph. of the grounds also constituted the. grounds for detention there was no vagueness in as much as the material facts . d.etailed in paragraphs 2 and 3 were sufficient to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. For example, bundh referred : to' in paragraph 1 has been detailed in the 2nd paragraph, non.cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 has also been clarified by necessary implication in para 2 in as much as Rasta Roko programme or creating obstacles in .the roads necessarily helped the non'cooperation by preventing people from attending their offices or performing theirstatutory duties.

In the view that we have taken that the Is( paragraph of the grounds is only introductory it is not necessary ·.to deal with this aspect of the m; tter at length .

This takes us to the vaiueness in paragaphs 2 and 3 of the ground~ of detention which specifically refer to the part played by the appellant in the agitation 9n specific dates.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) l S, C.R

In ground No. 2 it has not been mentioned that 'Nabab Shahjamal and Biren Baishya etc. were leaders or even connected with any ofthe organisations mentioned in ground No. I. It was not even stated that all the instances referred to took place in Tezpur town. It has also not been stated what were exactly the acts of instigation by the detenu: The place and the manner of inciting people who came in large numbers to violate prohibitory orders or to pelt stones has n_ot been mentioned.

In ground No. 3 no particulars were given about when the order of curfew was promulgated and by whom. It is only baldly

' stated that the detenu "with his other associates mobilised people of parbatia etc." The people assembled had come from other places.

These places were not mentioned. None of the details of the slogans by way of instigating people to violate the curfew had been mentioned and thus grounds Nos. 2 and 3 also suffer from vagueness and this was quite sufficient to vitiate the proceedings.

The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Art. 22 (5) ofthe Constitution : (I) to be informed, as soon . as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is made, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered ma)l obtain relief to him.

The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground, among other relevant grounds is an infringement 'or the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights.

Therefore in this view of the legal position if the grounds are vague and indefinite that would amount to an infringement of the second right of the appellant. It is by virtue of the second right that the detaining authority has to supply the material facts on the basis of which subjective satisfaction was derived for passing the order of detention and this is how tile facts from which the inference is 'drawn also become a part and par.eel of the grounds. Therefore, the important question is whether grounds Nos. 2 and :i are o vague as to infringe the second right of the appellant conferred by t\rt. 22 (5) of the Constitution,

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I ' DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 135

Shri Rangarajan referred to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. Str; te of Bihar and Ors.(') wherein the Constitution Bench held :

"If oil its face an order of detention is in terms of the rule, ordinarily, a court is bound to . stay its hands and uphold the order. When an order is on the face of it not in terms of the rule, a court cannot enter into an investigation whether the order of detention was in fact in terms of the rule. So the Stte cannot be heard/ to say or prove that an order1was in fact made to prevent acts prejudicial to public order though the orqer does not say so ... The ' order is conclusive as to the state of the mind of the person.

wh~ made it and no evidence is admissible to prove that state of mind. Extraneous evidence sucli as the note made by the District Magistrate was not admissibl.e to prove that the rule has been complied. with.'! ·

There is no .denying the fact that the ground of detention must be in existence on the date when the order was passed and the authority concerned has to be satisfied about the grounds of detention on the date of the order and the satisfaction of the detaining authority must be clear on the face of it from the grounds of detention and no extraneous evidence. is admissible to prove what actually weighed with the detaining authority while passing the order of detention.

It must, however, be kept in mind that it is not what a party choose to put a gloss on the grounds of detention but" it is th.e document itself which will be taken to be the proof of what weighed with the detaining authority while passing the order of detention and it is for the Court to decide whether certain paragraphs of the grounds of detention were only by way of introduction or. preamble or constitute the grounds of detention itself. As observed earlier, we have meticulously perused the grounds of detention and the tenor of the document read as a whole indicates that the !st paragraph of the grounds of detention is only by way of introduction or . preamble. •

Before dealing with this question of vagueness about paragraph

(I) [1966) l S.C, R:7Q9,


(1983J I S.C.R.

, No. 2 nil 3 of the grounds we would like to deal with certain

autborfries which have been cited on behalf of the appellant to indicate what constitutes the grounds of detention. In the State o/ Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') this Court held :

"Clause (5) of Art. 22 confers two. rights on the detenu, namely, first, a right to be informed of the grounds on which the ord<!r of detention bas bei; n made, ·

and secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order; and though these rights are linked together, they are two distinct rights. If grounds which have a rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 are supplied, the first condition is complied with .. But the right to make a representation implie~ . that ihe detemj should have information so as to enable him to make a representation, an, d if the grounds supplied are not sufficient to enable the detenu to make a repre- . . ' • sental!on, he can rely on the second right.

He may if he likes ask for further particulars which will enablo him to make a, representation. On an infringement of either of ' these two rights the detained person has a right to approach the oourt, and even if an infringement of the second right under Art. 22 (S) is alone established be is entitled to be , released.''

As observed earlier it is , on account of the second right that it becomes necessary to give facts on which the conclusion is based.

By now it is well settled that the grounds of detention co.nstitute the facts also on which the conclusion has been drawn .. ·

The learned counsel for the appellant cited . various cases by way of example in which in somewhat similar situation the grounds of detention were branded as vague.

In Chaju Ram v. State of ' ' Jammu and Kashmir(') the gronnds charged the detenu with having conspired with some leaders of Democratic , Conference and having incited landless people of R.S. .Pura Tehsil to forcibly occupy the land comprised in Nandpur Mechanised Farm and to have persuaded t, hem to resist violently any attempt . to evict them. _No details

(1) [1951) SCR 167,

(2) [197011 sec 536.

\. , i

~ . '

DHANANJOY v. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 137 '

of the leaders of the conference or of the persons incited or the dates on which he conspired or incited the squatters or the time when such conference took place, were mentioned. In the facts . and

circumstancs of the case it was held by this Court : ,

"It would be impossible for anybody to make a representation against such grounds. These grounds, on the authorities of this 'Court, too numerous to be cited here, must be held to be vague."

The next case cited was that of Gopa/ Bauri v. Distrlcr Magistrate Burdwan & Ors.(') The grounds which bad been furnished to the detenu in that case described the occurrences of two successive days, namely, March 20 and 21, 1973. Ground No. 1 charged the detenu with regard to the incid_ence of March 20, 1973 that he with other associates committed theft of ball bearings and wheels of the bucket carriages of the rope-way lines near Harisbpur village and the supply of sand to the collieries was suspended. Likewise, about the incidence of March 21, 1973 the second ground charged the detenu that he with ther associates committed theft of ball bearings and wheels of the bucket. carriages from the rope-way lines at Palashbon village causing suspension of supply of sand to the collieries.

The detenu was not communicatedthe names of the particular associates from whose possession recovery of the stoleri articles, the subject matter - of 'thefts disclosed in the two grounds, was made and on the facts and circumstances of that case it was found that the grounds of detention were vague.

In J)r. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. Sla/e of Delhi & Ors.(') one of the grounds df detention mentioned was. that :

"You have been organiing the movement (Praja Parishad Movement) by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao."

'.['his ground was held to be vague and efen though thej other grounds , were not vague, the detention was held to b~ not in

(tJ [19751 1 sec 522.

(2) [1953]'.SCR 708.

' -----


(1983) 1 S.C.R.

accordance with the procedure established by law and was therefore illegal.

In Bhupen Deka v. State of Assam(') only ground No. I was germane to the supplies and services essential to the community.

The other. grounds did not pertain to mainten.ance of supplies and services essential to the community. The Court on the facts held that

" ... there is nothing in the ground to show disclosure of any material fact as to when, where, how and in what manner the bundhs, picketings, satyagraha had taken place and how and in what manner they affected tbe supplies and services essential to the community. There is not a single specific date or time of the bundhs, picketings, satyagraha nor is there any indication as to bow the "supplies and services" essential to the community were affected."

fa the circumstances the ordeP of detention was declared invalid and void on the ground of vagueness.

Shri Rangarajan also referred to Kam/a Kanya/a/ Khushalani

v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(') io contend that this case has added new dimension to various features of and concept of liberty enshrined in Art. 21.

In the ab.ave case this Court observed :

"This Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of !Mia(') has widened the hqrizon of Article 21 and added new dimensions to various features of and concept of liberty enshrined in Article 21. In view of the decision in the aforesaid case, Article 22(5) of the oonstitution assumes a new complexion and has to be construed liberally and meaningfully so as to permit the legislature to impose the minium possible curbs on the precious tights of'a_ citizen, by virtue of preventive detenti6n. If a procedure under Article 21 has (o be reasonable, fair and just, then the words 'effec- live representation' appearing in Article 22(5) must be

(I) [198!] Cri. t.J. 1743.

12) (1981] 1 s.c.c. 748.

(3) [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621.

.~-, ' .

.. .._ '

DHANANJoY v. biS1T. MAGISTRATE (Mista, i.) 139

construed so as to provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his case i.o the detaining authority in his representation. If the words 'effective representation' are interpreted in an artificial or fanciful manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of Article 22 (5) but also of Article 21 of the Constitu- . tion.''

The Advocate General of Assam, however, on the other band cited cases in which in, simHar situations the grounds were not branded as vague.

He referred to Naresf! Ci.andra Ganguli v. State of Wes't Bengal (supra). In that case the argument was that the grounds contained in paragraph 4 were vague and indefinite and not enabling the. person. detained . to make his representation. It appeared from the said paragraph that the detenu in 1fhat case intended to proceed to Delhi on October 9, t 958 with a view to. instigate plans against the personal security of the Prime Minister: The place, date and purpose of the planned nefarious activities had all been stated as clearly as could be expected. The argument, however, was that it was necessary to state the details of the plans hatched in Delhi.

This Court dealing with the point observed :

"There are several answers to this contention. Paragraph 4 has reference to something which was apprehended but lay in the womb of the foture.

From the nature of the fact that it was not an eve11t which had already happended but what was apprehended to .be in the contemplation of the detenu and his associates, if any, no further details of the plan could possibly be disclosed."

Reliance was placed in that case on the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (supra) wherein it was held that vagueness is a relative term. It was obseved further :

"Its meaning must vary with the facts and circumstances of eac'.! case. What may be said to be vague in one case may not .be so in another, and it could not be asserted as a general rule that a ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of"the detained person can be to deny it. If .the . statement of facts is capable of being clearly understood.

140 StrPREMll C()iJRT RllPOllTS (1983] I s.C.R.

and is sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to make his representation, it cannot be said that it is vague'.

Further, it cannot be denied that particulars of what has taken place, can be more definitely stated than those of events which are yet in the offing.

In the very nature of things, the main object of the Act is to prevent persons from doing something which comes within the purview of any one of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3 (I) of the Act."

Next reliance was placed on Masood Alam etc. v. Union of India & Ors. ('). In this case also the order of detention ws challenged on the ground of vagueness of some of the grounds.

Reference was specially made to thr last two lines of ground No. I relating to the collection of Rs. 700 for Youth Majlis and to grounds Nos. 2 and.

3. In the facts and circumstances of the case this Court held :

"If, the last two lines are read, as they should be, along with the remaining contents of ground No. l it cannot be said that the petitioner was unable to tender his explanation with respect to the allegation con.tained therein.

Quite clearly, the exact point of time and the people from whom small amounts were collected could not possibly be stated with precision.

Grounds Nos. 2 and 3, as is clear, contain precise details in the various clau'ses enumerated therein. According to ground No. 2 the petitioner has extra-territorial loyalties and, therefore, he is a threat to security of India and this conclusion is arrived at on the basis of the instances stated in els. (a) to (CI) which are precise and definite.

Similarly, ground No. 3 says that the -, petitioner has been exciting communal feelings among the Muslims in India and contributing to communal disturbances in Aligarh city and this conclusion is based on

I instances stated in els. (a) to (d) which are precise and definite.

The instances under both these grounds are relevant and germane to the object which is sought to be achieved by s. 3 of the Act for the purpose of detaining persons who are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order."

(I) [1973] 3 SCR 268.

I • . (

l>l!ANAN!OY v .. DISTT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 141

State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (supra) was sought to be distinguished by the Advocate General and referred to, the following observations made by the Court :

"This however does not mean that' all facts leading to the conclusion mentioned in the grounds must be conveyed to the detained person at the same time the grounds are conveyed to him. The facts on which the conclusion mentioned in the grounds are based must be available to the Government, but there may be, cases where there is delay or difficulty, in collecting the exact date or it may not be convenient to set out all the facts in the first communication. If the second commupication contains no fnrther conclusion of fact from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the facts on which the first mentioned conclusion was founded it is obvious that no fresh ground for which the order of detention was made is being furnished

to the detained person by the second communication which follows sometime after the first co.mmunication."

Next reliance was placed on Bidya Deb Barma v. District

• I Magistrate, Tripura, Agartala.(\) In that case also the impugned order was challenged on the ground of vagueness inasmuch as the ground did not give any details since no particulars of time, place and circumstances had been mentioned and relevant and irrelevant matters had also been included. In the circumstances of the case this Court negatived the contention and bserved : ·

I "The grounds begin !>Y stating generally what the activities were. They' consisted of instigation of tribal people , to. practise jhumin'g and preventing the authorities from delivering paddy to Government uuder the procurement schemes. This instigation it is said was through mass and secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Government. Having said this the grounds then specify the places where and the dates on which the meetings were held and the date on which and place at which the resistance took place.

In our . judgment more detailed information was not necessary to give the detenns an opportunity to make their representations."

(I) [1969] l SCR 562.

\ D

14~ SUPRilMil COURT REPORTS [1983] l s.c.a

In Vakil Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(') this Court observed :

" 'Grounds' within the contemplation of s. 8 (l) of the Act means 'materials' on which the order of detention is primarily based.

Apart from conclusions of facts 'grounds' have a factual constituent, also.

They must . contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not. subsidiary facts or evidential details. This requir<ment as to the communication of all essential constituents of grbunds was complied with in the present case. The basic facts, as distinguished from factual details, were incorporated in the .material communicated to the detenu.

He was told the name of the notorious PAK agent 'and courier ... through whom he was supplying the information about the Indian Army. He was informed about the places in Pakistan which he was visiting. He was further told that in lieu of the supply of this information he had been receiving money from Pakistan. Nothing more was required to be intimated to enable'him to make an effective representation. The facts which were not disclosed were not basic facts and their non-disclosure did not affect the petitioner's right o~ making a representation."

After analysing the various cases cited on either side we are of the view that the question whether a particular ground is vague will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case because vagueness is a relative term. What may be vague in one case may not be so in similar circumstances of the other case. If the basic facts.have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of detention which enable the detenu to make1 an effective representation, merely because meticulous details of 'facts are not given will not vitiate the order of detention. We have meticulously examined paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention and we are satisfied that basic facts have given to enable. the appellant to make an effective repreenttion. Of course, it would have been better if other minute details had als9 b<en given. \

(1) A, l.R. 1974 $.C. 2337.

DHANANJOY v. Dl~TT. MAGISTRATE (Misra, J.) 143

Lastly we take up the plea raised on behalf of the appellant that the facts allegd in the groundsof detention only make out a case for maintenance of law and order and not of public order.

The difference between the' expressions 'law and order' and 'public order' has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court on various occasions.' In Dr . . Ram .Manohar Lohia. v. State. of Bihar

(supra) this Court observed : ·

"What was meant by the 'maintenance of public order' was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder which the authority thought was necessary to prevent in. view of the emergent situation created by external aggres sion; whereas the expression 'maintenance of law and order' may mean prevention of disorder of comparativly lesser gravity and of local sigificance only.''.

Again, the distinction was brought out in Ashok Kumarv. Delhi

Administration & Ors.,(') to which one of lis was a party. This Court observed:

"The true distinction between the areas of "pnblic order" and "law , and order" lies riOt in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society: The distinction between the two concepts of "'law and order" and "public order" is a fine one but tJ; tis

does not mean that there can be n9 overlapping.

Ats similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore fouch the problem of law and order while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.''

The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation on the issue of foreigners has been going on for years and it has faken an ugly and serious turn, and th.e statements of facts made in paragraphs

(I) A.J.R. 1982 S<;:. 114~ .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.R.

2 and 3 of the grounds of detention in the prevalent circumstaoces in Assam relate to the maintenance of public order lirl view of the law laid down in the above case .

For the foregoing dicussion the appeal must fail. It is accordingly dismissed.

H.L.C.

Appeal dismissed.

t •

I . . .,..