ASHARAM M. JAIN A v.

A. T. GUPTA AND OTHERS

August 25, 1983 8

[O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Conte1npt of Court-Strains and mortification of litigation cannot fle allowed ta lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of atlminis C tration of justice by vilification of judges.

In a petition for special leave to appeaJ file~- by him, the petitioner indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the Chief Justice of the High Court who had passed the order sought to be appealed from. In answer to the notice issued to him under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 he prayed for two weeks' time to file an affidavit (which was granted) and stated that he was not prepared to withdraw th, e allegations but desired to make amends. When the matter came up again'! his c.ounsel placed before the Court an affidavit said to contain the sincere and unconditional apology of the petitioner and pleaded that the Court should accept it and refrain from sending him to prison. Counci1, relying on Jn re : Shri S. Mulgaonkat:. [1978] 3 S.C.R.162 suggested that "a normative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction" was "not to be hypersensitive where distortions and criticism overstep the limts, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude''.

Rejecting the plea and sentencing the contemner to suffer simple imprisonmen.t for a .Pi:!iod of two months.

HELD : There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very nature of the judicial function makes ju9ges. sympathetic and responsive. Judges more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents and the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, as elsewhere, lines have to be drawn.

The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of judges. It is not that judges eed be protected; judges may well take care of themselves.

Jt is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected. The question has to be approached not from the point of view of the judge whose honour and dignity require to be vindicated, buffrom the point of view of the public who Jiave entrusted to judges the task of due administration of justice. A contumacious disregard of all decencies, such as that exhibited by the contemner in this case can only lead to a serious disturbance of the system of administration of justice. unless duly repaired at once by iaJlicting an apJ?ro_prlate punishrrient on thc.:i

SUPREME COl.JRT REPORTS t 19831 3 s.c.R •.

contemncr which must be to send ; tiJm tp ja_il to atone for his misconduct and thereafter to come out of prison a chasteried bllt a better citizen.

. [72i D-G; 723E-G]

Advocate General of Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries, (1980] 2 S.C.R. 1172, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JU1tJSD, ICf!Ol1 : ::; pecial Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6735 of 1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 14th April, 1983 of

.t.e Bo, i; nbay , f, lig\1 , Coµrt i, n N<Jtic~ of f\1otion No. ~59 of 1982 in J\.ppe11I N(): 295 of 1982.

R. K. Garg, U. R. La/it, R. V. Mehta and B. P. Maheshwari, with them for the fetip()ners.

Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, Raju Ramchandran and D. C. Singhania D for th~ Rspcindents.

H "

The Order of the Court was delivr.ed by

{3.HINNAPPA REDDY, J.

AsjJ.aram M. Jain sought special leave of h; s r; ourt µnder Art. 136 of the Cons!itution to appeal against the

or<!r of the J:ligh Court of Maharashtra in Notice of otion No. 859 of 19.82.

Th~ petition for special le.ave to appeal ran to 84 pages at the foot of the petition, it was stated "drawn and file.d by B. P. Maheshwari & Co., Advocates for the petitioner". Asharam M. Jain filed an affidavit along with the special leave petition affirming that the statement of facts in paragraphs I to 61 in the petition for special leave to appeal were true to his knowledge and belief and based .On the. record Of the lower CO)lrl. In Several paragraphs of the

pjal lave petitin, Ashara1fi M. Jain. indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the then Chief Justiye of the High Court of Maha rashtra. To illustrate the limits of the invective, we wish to refer to. but one paragraph of the petition. In paragraph 26 of the petition, it was statd by Asharam M. Jain : . . -., ' .,. ' . . . . "

"The petitioner says that having found that they would no longer be justified in continuing to hear the Notice of Motion an4 appeal for the several true facts set O\lt in t1ie Tr:; u;1sfr Appljation and the affidavits made by

th.~ petitioner aµd brief).y hreinabove set aboqt, the krl\ed

A.M. JAIN v. A.t. GUP~A ( Chimiappiz Reddy, J.) 72t

Chief Justice 'tried by tlie said Order to harm the petitioner as much as he could and made totally false and wrong observations quite unworthy of the head of the judiciilzy 'of the State •c)f Maharashtri, and His Lordship,

Mr. Justice'Pendse supported the learned Chief Justiee.

The said Order, it is clear, has been made with the sole and 'dishonest object of causing prejudice in the miilils of the Judges of the ne\v Bench against the petitioner and depriving the Judges of the new Bench of their right to indeperideu!ly jiidiCially decide the Notice of Motion on

merits, and which is proved by subsequent events."

When the special leave petition was heard cu April 27, 1983 by this C Court, the outrageous allegations made against . the Chief Justice and the Other learned JUdge of the High Court of Maharash1ra were noticed and two of us (A. P. Sen and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ) made the following order :

"The special leave petition is dismissed. Our attention is drawn to paragraphs 6, 10, l 1, 13, 16, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28

30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 42, 50, 57, 60, 62 and ground§ 5(v), Ix), 7 to 10, (z), (mm), (tt}, (uu) of the special leave petition. The learned Judges have also in the course of the order made reference to the conduct of the petitioner in casting aspersions on the former Chief Justice. Issue notice for contempt to the petitioner why he should not be committed. for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971".

Iti answer to the notice issued to before the court on July 25 •. 1983 made:·

Asharam M. Jilin, he appeared wlien the following 'order was

"Shri Garg, appears along with the coritemner. He prays for tWo weeks' time to file an affidavit and states on instruction that his client is not prepared to withdraw the allegations but wants to make amends. He is allowed two weeks' time to file an affidavit.

"Issue notice to the Attorney-General for India requesting him to appear ann assist the court in the case.

The Registry shall furnish a copy of the special leave

:E

722 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1'>83) 3 s.c.R.

petition and the show cause notice to the learned Attor ney-General.

"The matter be listed on August 22, 1983 .. The contemner shall remain present in the court on that date".

When the matter was taken up for hearing on August 22, 1982, Shri R. K. Garg• placed before us an affidavit, said to contain t~ sincere and unconditional apology of Asharam M. Jai11 and stated that the conte!llner was placing himself at the mercy of the court.

He submitted that the couri should be so gracious as to accept the unqualified apology tendered by the contemner and refrain from sending the contemner to prison. He invited our attention to In Re: Shri S. Mulgaonkar(') where Krishna Iyer, J. suggested that 'a normative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction' was "not to he hypersensitive where distortions and criticism overstep the limits, hut to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearfog, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude".

There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very nature of the judicial function makes judges sympathetic and responsive. Their very training blesses them with 'insensitivity', as opposed to hypersensitivity. Judges are always seeking good reasons to explain wrong conduct. They know there are always two sides to a coin.

They neither give nor take offence because they deal with persons and . situations impersonally, though. with understanding. Judges more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents and the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, a:s elsewhere, lines have to be drawn.

The strains and mortification of litigation can not be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of judges. It-is not that judges need be protected ; judge's may well take care of them selves' It is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to protected. We had occasion to point this out in Advocate General Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries,(') where we said:

"But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses

(1) [19781 3 S.C.R. 162. \2/. p980j 2 S.C, R. 1172.

__._,

A.M. JAIN v .. A.T. GUPTA (Chlnnappa Aeddy, l.) 723

and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the publlc in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a. viial stake in the effec tive and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of hll rights, and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to .commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the adminis tration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage.'' "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope."

So we approach the question not from the point of view of the judge

whose honour and dignity require to be vindicated, but from the point E of view of the public who have entrusted to us the task of due administration of justice. Having given our utmost consideration, we have come to the conclusion that it is not open to us to accept the easy and ready solution suggested by Mr. R. K. Garg of accept ing the apology and imposing a fine.

We think that a contumacious disregard of all decencies, such as, that exhibited by the contemner F in this case can only lead to a serious disturbance of the system of administration of justice, unless duly repaired atonce by inflicting an appropriate unishment on the contemner which must be to send him to jail to atone for his misconduct and thereafter to come out of prison a chastened but a better citiz<:n.

We accordingly sentence G him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months.

Before we part with the case, we must express our sense of shock at a sad-revelation made by Shri R. K. Garg during the course of the hearing. Wheri we expressed our surprise and disgust that the special leave petition should have been drawn and .settled by advocates of this Court, he told us that special leave petitions are

?24 SUPl\ME COURT REPORTS i1983l 3 s.c.ll.

often filed over the names of counsel, who receive the papers from counsel outside Delhi and file them fn the Registry of the Court as if drawn and settled by them, though they may have never even looked into the papers. This is harlily proper and surely discourteous to the Court. We hope this is not a common practice.

H.L.C.

Petition dismissed.