341 A

NAGESH BISTO DESAI ETC. ETC.

KHANDO TIRMAL . DESAI ETC. ETC.

March 2, 1982

[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL !SLAM, JJ.)

Bombay P0rgana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act 1950-Section 4(1} and Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act 1955-Section 7-Scope Of-Wotan properties if impartible-Members of joint family-If entitled to a share in the wata11 projUfties. ·

The plaintiff's father was the last holder of the office of Desai. After bis Cleath the plaintiff, whb W!J.S his eldest son, was recognised as the watandar. In

1904 service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted.by the imposition D of 'judi' or quit-rent. Under s. 4 (l) of the Bomay Pargana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 ands. 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscel- Janeous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 all the watan lands were re-granted to the plaintiff and he was deemed to be the occupant thereof Within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

The plaintiff (appellant) filed a suit against respondents wlio were members of a joint Hindu family holding properties described as Kundgol Deshg8t Estate claiming a declaration that the estate formed.an impartible estate governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture. The plaintiff claimed that as the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to remain in full and exclusive J)ossession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that other members of the family bad no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence and in the alternative for partition and separation of 1/6 share therein.

Denying all the plaintiff's claims the respondents pleaded that the entire properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were therefore liable to be partitioned.

Rejecting all the claims of the appellant the Trial Court held that the pro- G perties belonged to the joint Hindu Family and were therefore partible.

On appeal the High Court, subject to a modification, upheld the decree of the court of first instance.

The question at issue in the appeal to this Court was whether, (I) oven assuming that the estate was impartible and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture by custom as pleaded, the igi~!lts of imartiiitr M well M t~~ ~.I~ ~(

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982) 3 s.c.R. ·

lineal primogeniture being nothing more than an incident of the watan, stood abrogated bys. 3(4) of the 19SO Act ands. 4 of the 19S5 Act and as such it was not open tO the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom,

(2) with the resumption of the watan and the re-grant of the watan lands to him, the suit properties lost their character as being joint family property and had become, under the provisions of the 1950 and 1955 Acts, the plaintiff's exclusive property by reason of his status as watandar and as such wefc not capable of being partitioned.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : It is well settled that property though impartible may bo the ances- tral property of the Joint Hindu Family. The impartibility of the estate doe5 not per se destfoy its nature as joint family _property or render it the separate property of the last holder, so as to destroy the right of survivorship; hence, the estate retains its character of joint fami1y property and its devolution is governed by the rule of survivorship. To establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which ther~ is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or implie.d, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their succession to the estate. [3S4 C-D]

Marland Rao v. Malhar Rao; [!928] SS IA 4S: AIR 1928 PC 10: 107 IC 7: Adrishappa v. Gurushidappa, (1880) 7 IA 162: !LR (1880) 4 Bom. 494: 7 Cal. LR 1 (PC); Vinayak Waman Joshi Rayarlkar v. Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar, [1903] 30 IA 77: !LR (1903) 27 Born. 3S3: 7 Cal. WN 409; Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumarl Debi, (1932) S9 IA 331: AIR 1932 PC 216: 138 IC 861; Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal, (1934) 61 IA 286: AIR 1934 PC 157: CIT v.

Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore, (1941) 68 IA lSS: AIR 1941 PC 120; Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil, (1943) 70 IA 232: AIR 1943 PC 196 and Chlnnathayl v. Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker, [19S2] SCR 241; AIR 19S2 SC 29, relied on.

Mirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur

v. Shri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapalhi Raj, [1964] 2 SCR 403: AIR 1964 SC 118 and Rajah Ve/ugoti Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu v. Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna.

Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu, (1969) 3 SCC 281: [1970) 3 SCR 88: AIR 1970 SC 1795, distinguished.

Neelklslo Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor, (1867-69) 12 MIA 523; Rani Sarlaj Kuari v. Rani Deoraj Kuari (1888) 15 IA Si: !LR (1888) 10 All 272 (PC); Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. Court of Wards, (1899) 26 IA 83: !LR (1899) 22 Mad. 383 (PC); Raja Ram Rao v. Raja of Pillapur, (1918) 4S IA 148: AIR 1918 PC 81; Baifnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh, (1921) 48 IA 19S: AIR 1921 PC 62 and Bhaiya Ramanuj Pralap Deo v. Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo (1981) 4 SCC 613, referred to.

2. The plaintiff's contention runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay jlereditar1 ()flie j\ct, 1874, ~114 io aoainst settled legal principles. The plain-

NAosslI v. KHANOO riRMAL (Sen, J.)

tiff's rights to such watan properties, whatever they were, were subject to the rights of the other members of tho family. [359 C-D]

In the former Bombay Presidency, a Desghat watan had always been treated to be the joint family property and the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan property tho exclusive property of the person who

was the watandar for tho time being.

3. The definition of the term Hwatandar" as contained in s. 4 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act is in two parts: the first sets out what "watandar"

means and the other states what is included in it, that is, the entire definition of watandar must be looked upon as one, the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in first part. Thus, a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to such office was also a ''watandar" within the meaning of the Watan Act. There can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to prcServe to pre-existing rights of the members of a joint Hindu family. The expression ''wataD.dar Of the same watan'' would include members of the fainily other than thewatandar, who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan prOperty.

[359 G-H 361 F]

Vijaysingrao Balasaheb Shinde Desai v. Janardanrao Narayanrao Shind~ Defai, 51 Bom. LR 556: AIR 1949 Bom. 314; Kadappo Bapurao Desaiv. Krishtappa Bachappa Desai, 37 Bom. LR 599: AIR 1935 Bom. 380 and Laxmibai Sa4a shi• Dal• v. Gan•sh Shankar Date, (1977) 79 Born. LR 234: AIR 1977 Bom. 350, approved.

Tarabai Sriniwa• Naik Gutta/ v. Murtacharya Anantacharya, 41 Born., LR 924: AIR 1939 Bom. 414, overruled.

4. The commutation Of service under •. 15(3) of the Watan Act by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of 'judi' or quit-rent chargedupon the watan land unless where it was otherwise provided for, had not the effect of con~ verting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of the alionability, but to leave thorn attached to tho hereditary offices, which although free from tho performance of services, remain in tact. Dospile commutation of service, the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liabi~ lity to perform service, and on that account the character of the watan lands still remained attached to the grant. [364 D-F]

Co/let:tor of South Satara v. Laxman Mahadev D'3hpand•, [1964] 2 SCR 48: AIR 1964 SC 326, relied on.

Appafl Bapufl v. K'4hav.Slumlrav, ILR (1891) 15 Bom. 13, referred to.

Bachhararn Datta Patil v. Vishwanath Pundalik Patil, [1956] SCR 675: AIR 1957 SC 34: 1956 SCJ 721, referred to.

344 SUPREME COUkT RllPORTS [19821 3 s.c.R.

5. The irnpartibility of the watan lands of the applicability or the rule of lineal primogeniture regarding succession to the estate, by the alleged custom as plead ed, being nothing more than an incident of the watan, stood extinguished by s.3(4) of the 1950 Act and s.4 of the 1955 Act. The effect of these Acts was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan lands but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under the personal law. That being so, the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the . watan land along with the watandar for the time being and therefore the re-

8:rant of the lands to the watandar under s. 4(1) of the 1950 Act and under s. 3 of the 1955 Act must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family.

(365 C, E; 367 E]

6. Section 4(2) of the 1950 Act ands. 7(3) of the 1955 Act do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a. partition once the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. [370 BJ

, Laxmibai Sadashiv Datt v. Ganesh Shankar Date, (1977) 79 Born. LR 234: AIR 1977 Born. 350 and Dhondi Vithoba Kofi v. Mahadeo Dagdu Kofi, (1973) 75 Born. LR 290: AIR 1973 Born. 323, approved.

Kalgonda Babgonda Patil v. Balgonda Ka/gonda Patil, (1975) 78 Born. LR 720, overruled.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 'civil Appeals Nos. 615-617/ 73, 618-20/73 and 1850 to 1852 of 1972.

From the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd June, 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No. 157/56 E Regular Appeal (Bl No. 16/57 & RA (B) 6 of 1958.

U.R. La/it, S.S. Javali D.P. Singh & Ravi Parkash, for the Appellants in CA. 1850-52/72, R-5 in CA. 615/73, R-2 i.n CA. 616/73, R-6 in CA. 617/73 and R-3 in CA. Nos. 618-20/73.

B.D. Bal, R.B. Datar & Miss Madhu Moolchandani, for the Appellant in C.A. Nos. 615-617/73, R-5 in CA. Nos. 1850-52/72 & for R-1 in CA. Nos. 618-620/73.

S.T. Desai, K. N. Bhat & Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA. 618-620/73, RR 2 and 3 in CA. 1850 to 1851/72, RR. 2,3, 17 & 18 in CA. 1852/72, RR 2, 3 in CA. 615/73, RR 10 & 11 in CA. 616/73 & for RR l, 2, 4,5 in CA. 617/73.

S.B. Bhasame, K.A. Naik, & M.R.K. Pillai for R-1 in CA.

Nos. 1850-52/72, CA 615-16/73, Rl4 in CA. 617173 and R-2 in CA. 618-620/'13.

H K.R. Nagaraja & Alok Bhatacharya for R-12 in CA. Nos. 1850-52/72, CA. 615/73, R-9 in CA. 617/73, R-13 in.CA. 617/73 and R!O in CA, 618-620 of 1973.

._ '*

NAOESH v. ltHANDo TIRMAL (Sen, i.)

P.R. Ramasesh, for RR 13, 15 (a) to (c) in CA. 1852/72, RR 15 & 17 in CA. 617/73 and RR 11, 14 (a) (c) and (d) in CA. 6l8/73.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SEN, J. These nine consolidated appeals on certificate are directed from a common judgment and decree of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore dated June 22; 1962 which affirmed, subject to a modification, the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Senior

Division, Dharwar, dated July 5, 1956, substantially dismissing the plaintiff's claim for declaratioµ of title to, and possession of, certain watan properties and decreeing instead his alternative claim for partition and separate possession of his one-sixth share therein.

Theprincipal question in controversy in these appeals is whether ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950 (for short 'Act No. 60 of 1950') and ss. 4 and 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 (for short 'Act No. 22 of 1955'), which provided for abolition of watans and alienations in the merged territories, resumption of watan land and its re-grant, to the holder for the time being, which brought about a change in the tenure or the character of holding as watan land, affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law.

The suit out of which these appeals arise, was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai, as plaintiff, claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisio Desai defendants Nos.2 & 3, mother Smt. Akkavva alias Parvathibai, defendant No. 4, brother Bhimaji Marland Desai, defendant No.5 who had gone in.adoption to Marland, member of a junior branch and father's brother's son Khando Tirmal Desai, defendant No. I, a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint, called the I)undgol Deshgat Estate, situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka, formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right, title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence, for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol

known as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos. 2 to 5, for exclusive possession of insignia of honour described in Schedule E and one-third share in the family movables described

'A

346 SUPlllME couat Rl!Mats

(1982) 3 s.c.l.

in Schedule D. Alternatively, in the event of the Court holding that the properties des.cribed in Schedule B, C and D, were properties belonging to the joint Hindu family, the plaintiff claimed partition and separate possession of his one-sixth share therein.

It will be convenient, in 'the first place, to refer briefly to the history of the estate, to set out the pedigree showing the descent from a common ancestor and to show how the present case arose.

The plaintiff's suit is brought on the allegation that the Deshgat family of Kundgol Paragana of which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are members is a very ancient and respectable one in the State of Jamkhandi which later merged in the then Province of . Bombay and is now in the State of K.arnataka. The lands and cash allowances described in Schedule B para (i) and (iii) are the emoluments of the district hereditary office of Desai. Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family. This amount, together with the cash allowance and the service lands appurtenant to the office of Desai and the houses and open sites form the impartible estate called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate, which was partly located within the territory of former fendatory State of Jhamkhandi and party in the territories of the then British India.

The first inam was granted at the time of Thimappa in 1575. All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rulers of Bijapur during the period from 1575 A.O. to 1694 A.O. with a couple of other grants received from the Chief of Jamkhandi during the period from 1120 A.D. to 1826 A.D. The watan has remained with the family which held the hereditary office of Desai for over four centuries. In 1904, service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted by the imposition of a "judi" or quit-rent.

Properties described in Schedules F ad G have been in possession of the two junior branches descended frooi Gundopant and Lingappa from 1825 A.O. and 1854 A.O. respectively and are being enjoyed by them even now.

The plaintiff's father, Bistappa, the last holder of the office of Desai died on July 27, 1931 leaving behind him his widow Smt.

Akkavva and four sons, Nagesh, Bhimrao, Ganesh and Gopal. Out

of them, Bhimarao had gone in adoption to Marland. member of a junior branch.

Upon, his father's. death the plaintiff Nagesh Bisio Desai was recognised to be the watandar. The plaintiff's cousin is Khandappa.

The subjoined genealogical' table gives the relationship of the parties belonging to the senior branch descended from Thimappa.

l Nagesh (plaintiff)

GENEALOGICAL TABLE

I Rama pp a

I . Bistappa (adopted)

I I Ramappa (died 1924)

Bistappa (died 193 J) =Smt. Akkevva (Deft 4)

I I Bhimrao (went in adoption to Marland)

I Khanderao

I Thimappa

I I Nagappa

I Pantoji

I .

I Gundopant

I Nilkant !

Mallappa

I Marland

I Bistappa (went in adoption) I lmnagappa

I Tirmallappa

I Khandappa (Deft. 1)

Ganesh=Smt. Indirabai (Deft. 2) (Deft. 9)

Bhimrao (Adopted Deft. 5)

Gopal=Smt. Kashibai (Deft. 3) (Deft. 10)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.a.

A It appears that after the death of the plaintiff's father in 1931, in the mutation proceedings that followed, the plaintiff first made a claim that the watan being impartible according to the custom of the family, he became the exclusive owner of the entire watan properties.

Although his brothers Ganesh Bisio Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai, B defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that osition and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff's uncle Tirmal, father of Khando. In consequence of this, the plaintiff accepted before the revenue authori ties that the properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and refrai- C ned from making any claim on the footing of the properties being impartible. In 1945, the plaintiff's brother Bhimarao defendant No. 5 who .had gone inadoption to Marland, started asserting a claim to 7.

Mars of land and right of residence in the family Wada and this bad the support of the plaintiff's mother Smt. Akkavva. The defendant D . No. 5 Bhimarao in assertion of his claim brought Special Suit No. 51

of 1949, in the Civil Court at Kundgol on the basis of the properties being impartible. In June 1946, the plaintiff leased out some home farm lands to defendants 6, 7 and 8, and this gave rise to proceedings uner s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Sub-Divilsional Magistrate Kundgol passed an order restraining defendants 2, 3 and \5 from disturbing the possession of defendants

6, 7 and 8 and this \>rder was kept in. force by the former State of ·- Jamkhandi till merger in the former State of Bombay in August,

I 948. The State Government revoked the order with effect from December 15, 1948, as a result of which the defendents 6, 7 and 8 brought suits for injunction. Due to discord in the family, the plaintiff left the ancestral residential house at Kundgol and started residing in his bungalow. The plaintiff has admittedly been regranted all the watan land under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of G 1950 ands. 7 of Act No. 22 of 1955 as if it were an unalienated

land, being the bolder of the watan to which it appertained, and he is deemed to be an occupant thereof within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.

The defendants filed separate written statements and repudiated the plaintiff's claim of imPartibility. They denied that the suit

NAGBSH v. KHANDO 'IIRMAL (Sen, i.\ 349

properties formed an impartible estate and that succession to the estate was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.

The defendant No. I asserted that there had been at least three partitions in the family. According to him, the allotment of the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa represented allotment of shares 'on partition. He pleaded that all the properties described in Schedules B C D and E were joint family properties and claimed one-half share therein. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3, in their written statement, also asserted that the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were shares allotted to them on partition.

The defendant No. 4 supported the case pleaded by her sons defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The defendant No. 5, however, pleaded that there had never been a p:.rtition in the family and that the entire properties, that is to say, the properties described in the plaint Schedules B to G continued to be joint family properties wherein he claimed one-fourth share. The remaining defendants also denied that the suit properties were impartible.

The learned trial Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim that he 'E was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the aforementioned properties being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate and that other members had no right, title or interest therein except as to maintenance as junior members and held instead that properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were, therefore, partible. He further held that the properties described in Schedules F and G in possession of the junior branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were not allotted to them as their share on partition and therefore had to be put into th.e hotchpot. He accordingly passed a preliminary decree for partition, declaring the plaintiff's share to be one-twentyfourth of the entire estate and to other minor reliefs. On appeal, the High C!>urt upheld the judgment of the trial Judge, holding that the suit properties were not

impartible and were therefore liable to partition, but it set asido

35() (1~82) j S.C.R.

the direction with regard to Schedules F and G properties on the finding that the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa had separated from the jt>int family. It accordingly modified the decree of the learned trial Judge and held that the plaintiff was entitled to one-sixth share in the properties described in Schedules B to E.

Arguments in these appeals have been confined to the question as to whether, as a matter of law, even if it were assumed that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was an impartible estate, and. that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture,· the incident of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand extinguished by Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955, and it is no longer open to the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom of impartibility or the rule of lineal primogeniture.

The questions that fall for determination in these appeals are, firstly, whether the impartibility of the tenure of a paragana watan appertaining to the office of a Hereditary District (Paragana) Officer in respect of which a commutation settlement has been effected, regulating succession to the property, by reason of family custom or a local custom being the incidents of such watan stands abolished by virtue of s. 3 of Act No. 60 of 1950 ors. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955, and, secondly, whether the watan lands lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan under s. 3 of Act No. 60 of 1950 or s.4 of Act No. 22 of 1955 and re-grants thereof were exclusive to the plaintiff under s. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955, by reason of his status as the watandar and therefore, they belonged to the plaintiff and were not capable of partition. There is no merit in any of these submissions.

It is argued that impartibility of the tenure was not an inci- G dent of the grant but the watan was impartible by custom and succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.

Our attention is drawn to the averment contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint:

H "The Kundgol Deshgat Estate, along with the estates of two other District Hereditary Offices of Nadgir and

, .....

NAGESH v. ttHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 351

Deshpande of Kundgol is impartible by custom and succession to it is governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.

This custom is ancient, invariable, definite and reasonable.

It is both a family custom and also a local custom prevailing in the families of Paragana Watandar of Kundgol

It is urged that in case of an impartible estate, the right to partition and the right of joint enjoyment arc from the very nature of the property incapable of existence and therefore, the courts below were in

- error dismissing the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that being the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. It is further urged that even assuming that impartibility of the estate or the rule of primogeniture regulating succession were an incident of the watan the suit properties lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan and the re-grants of the suit lands were exclusively to the plaintiff under sub-s. (I) of s 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and sub-s. (I) of s. 7 of Act No. 22 of 1955, by reason of his status as the watandar and, therefore, they exclusively belonged to the plaintiff and they were not capable of being partitioned.

There is no merit in the submission.

The decision of these appeals must turn on the question whether the impartibility of the estate and the rule of lineal primogeniture by which succession to it was governed makes the suit properties the self acquired or exclusive properties of the plaintiff and, therefore, cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds between the members of the joint family .. In Marland Rao v. Malhar Rao,(') the Privy Council ruled as follows :

"If an impartible estate existed as such from before the advent of British Rule, any settlement or regrant thereof by the British Governmnt must, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and unless inconsistent with the express terms of the new settlement, be presumed to continue the estate with its previous incide1113 of impartibility and succession by special custom.''

It also held in that case :

(I) L.R. [1928] SS I.A. 4~,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] 3 s.C.R.

"When there is a dispute with respect to an estate being impartible or otherwise the onus lies on the party who alleges the existence of a custom different from the ordinary law of inheritance, according to which custom the estate is to be held by a single member, and as such, not liable to partition. In order to establish that any estate is impartible, it must be proved that it is from its nature impartible and descendible to a single person, or that it is impartible and descendible by virtue of a special custom."

"Any such special custom modifying the ordinary law of succession must be ancient and invariable and must be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence."

The courts below in their well considered judgments have considered minutely and elaborately the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, led by both the parties on the question of custom, and have come to a definitive finding that the evidence is of little or no assistance to establish the alleged custom pleaded by the plaintiff as to the impartibility of the estate or the rule of lineal primogeniture. They have held in favour of the defendants on this basic issue and substantially dismissed the plaintiff's suit claiming full and exclusive title.

That part of the judgment has rightly not been assailed before us, and the argument has proceeded on the footing that even if the Kundgol Dcshgat Estate were an impartible estate, and that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture the incidents of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand exting.uished by Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955.

It bas always been the accepted view that the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan properties the exclusive property of the person who is the watandar for the time being.

In order to understand the arguments on this point, it is necessary to deal with the incidents of a Deshgat watan.

In the Bombay Presidency, it has always been treated to be the joint (amily property. It may be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Adrishappa v. Gurshindappa,(1) the headnote of which is that :

(!) i,, R. (1880) 7 J, A. 162.

i NAGESH v. ICBANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.)

."Deshgat watan or property held as appertaining to the office of Desai is not to be assumed prima facie to be impartible. The burde_n of proving the impartibility lies upon the Desai, and on his failing to prove a special tenure or a family or district or local custom to that effect, the ordinary law of succession applies."

In a suit for partition of property forming part of a Deshgat estate brought by the younger brothers against their eldest brother who held the hereditary district office of Desai, partly within the State of Jamkhandi and partly within the territory of British India, the defence was that the watan was held by him as an impartible estate and that he was entitled being the watandar to be in full and exclusive possession thereof, subject to a right by custom, that a brother should receive maintenance out of the income derived from it. The Court of first instance having found that there was no invariable rule against the partition of a Deshgat watan, the High Court refused to allow effect to be given to what had not been proved to be "the established governing rule of the family, class or district" sufficient to establish. the impartibility of the estate and held that the watan in question was subject to the general Hindu law, including the presumption as to the right to partition belongin~ to the members of the family to which it had descended. The Judicial Committee upheld the decision of the High Court holding that there was no general presumption in favour of the impartibility of an estate of this kind as to shift the burden of proof; the burden of proof was upon the Desai, who seeks to show that the property devolved upon him alone, in contra\'.ention of the ordinary rule or succession according to the Hindu law, and that no sufficient evidenee had been given by the watandar either of family custom, or of district custom, to prevent the operation of the ordinary rule of law whereby the property would be partibJe.

In Vinayak Woman Joshi Rayarikar v. Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar & Ors.,(1) th.e Court of first instance held that by custom a Deshgat Inam had become impartible and hence dismissed the suit for pai:tition. On appeal, the High Court reversed upon the view that the mere fact that the management remained in the hands of th~ ~*IQst ranch was not sufflcieot to

~1) L.R. (1903) 30 I.A. 77,

354 (1982} 3 s.c.R.

establish the plea that the estate was impartible. While affirming. the decision of the Higlt Court, the Privy Council followed its earlier decision in Adrishappa 13 caJe (supra), and aereed with the conclusion arrived at by the Hlah Court that :

"Neither by the terms of the original grant nor of the subsequent orders of the ruling power, nor by family custom, nor by adverse possession (if such there could be in a case like this, the eldest branch of the family acquired a right to perpetual management of the villaae or in conse- . quence to resist its partitio~}."

It is a trite proposition that property though impartible may be the ancestral property of the joint Hindu family. The impartibility of property does not per se destroy its nature as joint family property or rener it the separate property of the last holder, so as to destroy the right of survivorship; hence the estate retains its character of joint f amity property and devolves by the general law upon that person who being in fact and in law joint in respect of the estate is also the senior member in the senior line.

As observed by Sir Dinsbaw Mulla in his celebrated judgment in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kummi Debi & Ors.' (1)

"The keynote of the whole position, in their Lordships view, is to be found in the following passage in the judgment in the Tipperah case :(2)

''Where a custom is proved to exist, it supersedes the general'' law, which, however, still regulates an beyond the custom"

"Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom. In the case of ordinary joint family property, the members of the family have (I) the right of partition, (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity, (3) the right of maintenance and

(4) the right of survivorship. The first of these rights cannot exist in the case of an impartible estate, though.

ancestral, from the very nature of the estate. The secon<f

(1) L.R. (1931-32) 59 I.A. 331 1

(f) 12 M.l.A. 5~.

~ ,,._

~ (

' )

NAGESH v. ICHANDO TIRltAL (Sen, J.) 355

is incompatible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Kuari' s(1) case and the first Pittapur cl1se;(') and so al.so the third as held in the second Pittapur case.(') To this extent the general law of the Mitakshara has been superseded by custom, and the impartible.estate though ancestral is clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. But the right of survivorship is not inconsistent with the custom 'of impartibility. This right; therefore, Still remaiDS, and this is What was. held in Baijnath's case:(') To this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property, and its devolution is governed by the general Mitaksh11ra law applicable to such property. Though the other rights which a coparcene:r acquires by birth in joint family property no longer exist, the birth-right of the sei; iior member to take by survivorship still remains. Nor is this right a mere spes succession is similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband's estate. It is a right which is capable of being renounced and surrendred. Such being their Lordships' view, it .follows that in order to establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which there is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or

implied, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate."

Since the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh' s case (supra), it is well-settled that an estate is impartible does not make it the separate and exclusive property .o( the holder : where the property is ancestral and the holder has succeeded to it, it will be part of the joint estate of the undivided family .

The incidents of impartible estate laid down by the Privy G Council in Shiba Prasad Singh' s caie, supra, and the law as there stated, have been reaffirmed in the subsequent decision& qf I.he Privy

(I) L.R. (1888) 15 I.A. 51.

(2) L.R. (1899) 26 I.A. 83.

(3) L.R. (1918) 45 I.A. 148.

(4) L.R. 48 I.A. 195.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1982) 3 S.C.R.

Council and of this Court : Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mn/ & Ors'!(1) Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab. v. Krishna Kishore(') Anant Bhikappa Patil v. Shankar Ramchandra.Patil (8) Chinnathavi Alias Veeralakshmi v. Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker & Anr('). Mirza Raja Shrl Pushavathi Vizlaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur & Ors. v. Shri Pushavathi Viseswar Gajapathl Raj & Ors.(') Rajah Velugotl Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu & Ors. v.

Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu & Ors.(1) and Bhaiya Ramanuf Pratap Deo v. Lalu. Maheshanuf Pratap Deo & Ors.(')

In Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal's case, supra, it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuarl's case and the First Pittapur's case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamiadari could be in any sense joint family property, this view apparently implied in these ca1es was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnarh Prasad Singh's case. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab v. Krishna Kishore's case dealing with an impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904, it was held that the right of junior members of the family for maintenance was governed by custom and was not based on any joint right or interest in the property as co-owners. In Anant Bhlkappa Patil's case supra, it was observed that an impartible estate is not held in coparcenary though it may be joint family property. It may develove as joint family property or as separate property of the last male bolder. In the former case, it goes by survivorship to that individual, among those male members who in fact and in law are undivided in respect of the estate, who is singled out by the special custom e.g. lineal male primogeniture. In the latter case, jointness and survivorship are not as such in point the estate devolves by inheritance by the last male holder in the order prescribed by the special custom or according to the ordinary law of inheritance as modified by the custom.

(!) L.R. (1934) 61 I:A. 286.

(2) LR. (1941) 68 I.A. 155. (3l L.R. (1942-43) 70 I.A. zn.

(4) (1952] S.C.R. 241.

(5) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 403.


(7) [1982] I S.C.R. 417.

NAOBSH v. KHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 357

In Chinnathavi's case. supra, it was observed that the dictum of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh case, supra, that to etab lish that an impartible estate has ceased to be joint family property for purposes of succession, it is necessary to prove an intention, express or implied, on the part of the junior members of the family to give up their chance of succeeding to the estate. The test to be applied is whether the facts show a clear intention to renounce or surrender any interest in the impartible estate or a relinquishment of the right of succession and an intention to impress upon the zamindari the character of separate property.

In Mirza Raja Gajapathl' s case, supra, it was observed that an ancestral impartible estate to which the •bolder has succeeded by the custom of primogeniture is part of the joint estate of the undivided Hindu family.

Though the other rights enjoyed by the members of a joint Hindu family are inconsistent in the case of an impartible estate, the right survivorship still remains. In Rajah Velugoti Kumara KrlJhna's case, supra, it was observed that the only vestige of the incidents of joint family property, which still attaches to the joint family property is the right of survivorship which, of course, is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility.

In Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo's case, supra, the principles laid down by_ the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh'.< case were reiterated.

In the course of argument, great reliance was placed on the two decisions of this Court in Mirza Raja Ganapathl's case, supra and Raja Velugotl Kumara Krishna's case, supra, for the proposition that the junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no right of partition having regard to the very character of -the estate that it is impartible. To our mind, the contention cannot be accepted. Both the decisions in Mirza Raja Ganapathi's case, supra, and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna's case, supra, turned on the provision of the Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904. There are express provisions made in ss. 45 to 47 of the Abolition Act for the apportionment of compensation to the junior members of zamindari estates and subs (2) of s. 45 there of provides for payment of the capitalised value of the compensation amount to them on the basis of extinction of the estate. Thi: scheme of the Abolition Act therefore contemplates the continued existence of the rights of the holder of an impaftibl~ est11te vis-a-W~ th~ junior


( 1982) 3 S.C.R •

A members of such an estate. The facts involved in those cases were also entirely different.

In Mirza Raja Ganapathi' s case, supra it was a suit for partition for Vizianagrlim Estate, an ancient impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Aet 1904. The claim of the junior members regarding buildings which had been incorporated in the impartible estate as also their claim with regard to jewels treated as state regalia and therefore impressed with the family custom of impartibility was negatived. Ii was held that despite the fact that Vizinagram Estate had been notified to be an estate within the meaning of s.3 of the Madras Estate(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) ct, 1948, the extin- ·~ , guishment of the proprietary right, title and interest of the zamindar did not affect his right or title to the impartible properties outside the purview of that Act and governed by the Madras Impartible Esl!ltes ).

Act, 1904, but as regards other . properties falling within the zamindari including lands were held to be partible. With regard to the buildings, it was held that the buildings in question were not partible by virtue of sub-s. (4) of s. 18 of the Act as the buildings falling within the section vested in "the person who owned them immediately before the vesting". The expression "the person who owned" in subs. (4) of s. 18 of the Act was held to refer to the land-holder and not to any other person. Further, the buildings were outside the E limits of the zamindari estate and therefore not covered by s. 3 of the Abolition Act. The claim with regard to jewels failed because they were part of the impartible estate.

In Raja Velugoli Kumara Krishna's case, supra, it was a suit F for partition by the junior members of Vankatgiri Estate, an ancient inipartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904. The suit was principally confined to the claim for a share to the Schedule B properties.

The contention was that the impartibility was continued under that Act but ceased when the estate vested in the State Government under s. 3 of the Madras G Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and this had the effect of changing character of the properties in the B Schedule and making them partible. It was said that the junior members had l\ present right in the impartible estate and were entitled to share in the properties once it lost its character of impar• H tibility. The Court haci to consider the effect of the Abolition Act on the rihts and oblijlations of the members of the fainily and held ..

NAGESiI v. KHANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 359

that the Abolition Act has Jio application to properties which are outside the territorial limit of the Venkatgiri Estate. The claim that faifed was in relation to properties which did not form part of a 'zamindari estate' within the meaning of s. 1 (16) and therefore did not come within the purview af s. 3 of the Abolition Act but continued to be governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act,

1904.

The contention that the plaintiff holding the District Heredi _,...._ ··~" taty Office of Desai and being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof to the exclusion of the other members of the joint Hindu family, runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (for short 'the Watan Act'), and is against settled legal principles. The plaintiff's rights to such watan

properties whatever they were, subject to the rights of the other members of the family.

The terms 'Watandar' is defined ins. 4 of the Watan Act.

It readt:

Watandar means a person having a hereditary interest in the Watan. It includes a person holding watan property acquired by him before the introduction of British Govern ment into the locality of the watan, or legally acquired subsequent to such introduction, and a person holding such

po[>erty from him by inheritance. It includes a person adopted by an owner of a watan or part of a watan subject to the conditions speci lied in sections 33 to 35".

If the. words used in the definition are strictly and literally construed, it would mean that before a person can be said to .be a watandar, he must have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and iii the hereditary office, because it is these two that constitute the watan. There is no basis whatever for such a strict construction.

The aefinition is undoubtedly in two parts : the first sets out what "watandar''"means and the other states what is included in it and the question arises whether the primary definition i.e. the meaning portion of it should be regarded as primary and the inclusive part as illustrative or both the parts should be regarded as constituting one whole definition, the inclusive part being supplementary to the former.

The controversy arising from the rival constructions

360 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS [!9821 3 s .. c.a.

placed on the definition of "watandar" in s. 4 of the Watan Act was set at rest by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vijayasingrao Bala Saheb Shinde Desai v. Janardanrao Narayanrao Shinde Desai.(') Prior to that decision, two contlicting constructions on the definition had been placed by two DivisioR Benches of the Bombay High Court. In Kadappa v. Krlshtappa,(') an alienation of watan land by a watandar to his bhaubandh for maintenance was challenged and Rangnekar and Divatia, JJ. held that the alienation was valid beyond the life time of the watandar inasmuch as it was to a watandar of the same watan, in other words, the alienee who was a bhaubandb to whom a watan land had been transferred for maintenance regarded as a watandar though he had no interest in . the hereditary office and the rights and privileges attached to it. It would, therefore, appear that in Kndappa' s case, supra; the entire definition of watandar in s. 4 was looked upon as one, the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in the first part. In Smt. Tarabai v. Murtarharya.(') Sir John Beaumont C.J. and Wadia, J. however, struck a discordant note. It was that a person who merely acquired a watan property withont acquiring the office and without being under any obligation to perform services attached to the office was not a watandar within the meaning of the aforesaid definition; in other words, it held that the first part of the definition was exclusive an\i exhaustive, the latter part being merely illustrative and the illustrations given in the latter part should fall within the ambit of the exclusive definition given in the first part, that is to say, the primary definition of a "watandar" in s.4 was that be was a person having a hereditary interest in a watan, i.e. the office and a property if any, and the subsequent words were merely explanatory of the primary definition and did not curtail it.

In view of this .conflict, the &pecific question referred to the Full Bench in Vijayaslngrao' s case, &upra, was "Whether the term 'watandar' as defined in s. 4 of the Watan Act necessarily and always meant a person who had a hereditary interest not only in the watan property but also in the hereditary office".

And, on a conside.ration of the scheme and the relevant sections of the Watan Act and the two earlier decisions, the Full Bench preferred the construction

(I) 51 Born L.R. 556.

(2) 37 Born. L.R. 559.

(3) 41 Born. L.R. 924. '

' '>

NAotsil \>. KHANOO Till.MAL (Sen, J.)

placed on the term 'watandar' in Kadappa's case, supra, and conclu

ded that a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to each office was also a "watandar' within the meaning of the Watan Act.

There can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to preserve the pre-existing rights of the members of joint Hindu family.

The word 'family' is defined in s. 4 of the Watan Act to include 'each of the branches of the family descended from an original watandar' and the expression 'head of a family' is defined therein to include 'the chief representative of each branch of a family'. 'Representative watandar' defined in s. 4 meant 'a watandar registered by the Collector under section 25 as having a right to perform the duties of a hereditary office'. Section 5 of the Watan Act prohibited alienations of watan and watan rights. Clause (a) of sub-s.

(I) of s. 5. thereof, referred to a watander in general and provided D that it won.Id not be competent to such a watandar to mortgage, charge, alienate or lease, for a period beyond the term of his natural life, any watan, or any part thereof, or interest therein, to or for the benefit of any person who is not a watandar of the same watan, without the requisite sanction. The expression 'watandar of the same watan' occurs in many sections of the Act. As already indicated E the term 'watandar' as defined in s. 4 includes the members of a joint Hindu family. It must (ollow as a necessary corollary tht the expression 'watandar of the same watan' would include members of the family Qther than the watandar, who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan property • • It is necessary to emphasize that commutation of service had not the effect of changing the nature of the tenure. The effect of the Gordon Settlement came up for consideration in The Collector of South Satara & Anr. v. Laxman Mahadev Deshpande & Ors.(') when the Court referred to the decision in Appaji Bapuji v. Kesha; Shamrav.(2) and quoted the following passage from the judgment of

Sargent, C.J., with approval :

"What is termed a Gordon Settlement was an Arrangement-entered. into in 1864 by a Committee, of which Mr.

(I) (1964) 2 S.C.R. 48, •

(2) (1890) l.L.R. IS Bom. 13.

362 A

stli>RBMil oouitt IU!PORTS (!982] 3 S.C.k.

Gordon, as Collector, was Chairman, acting on behalf of Government-with the watandars in the Southern Maratha Country, by which the Government relieved certain watandars in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of a 'judi' or quit rent charged upon the watanlands ................ the reports of Mr. Gordon's Committee on the Satara and Poona Districts and their correspondence with Government can, we think, leave no doubt that th.e settlements ma(le by that committee, unless it was otherwise, specially provided by any particular settlement, were not !intended by either party to these settlements, to convert the watan lands into the private property of the vatandars with the necessary incident of alienabili ty, but to leave.them attached to the hereditary offices, which aithough freed from the perfor mance of service remain.ed intact."

D T)J.e Court continued :

"But the Commutation settlement does not confer an indefeasible title to the grantee, for the right affirmed by the 11ettlement under s. 15(2) of the Watan Act is liable to be determined by lapse, confiscation or [resumption (s. 22 of the Watan Act). The State having created the watan, is entitled to put an end to the watan i.e. to cancel the watan and to resume the grant (I) : Bachharam Datta Patilv. Vishwanath Pundalik Patil.(') Therefore if there be mere commutation of service, the watan office ordinarily survives without liability to perform service, and on that account the character of watan property.still remains attached to the grant. But the State Government may abolish the office and release the property from its character as watan property."

The Court then dealt with the scheme of the Act No. 60 of 11)50.and observed. that in the light of the incidents of the watan and the property granted for remuneration of the watandar, that the relevant provisions of the Act had to be considered in regard to the right of the watandar to regrai; it of the watan lands. It was observed that. on a c01llbined• operation of sub-s. (3) of s. 3 ands. 4 of the Act, the holder of the watan land is entitled to regrant of the land in occupancy rights as an unalienated land. As to the effect of the •

(!) [1956] S.C.R 675.

--_< __ :_,__. ~:~------~ ~· --'. -

. ~AGESB ' KBANDO niMAL (Sen, J.). : 363 ..-·( -·~ -

legislation, it was observed that S. 3 in terms proVides for abolition.

of the watan, extinction of the officeand modification.of the right . in which the land is held. The abolition, extinction . and modification arise by operation of s. 3 of the Act, and no.t from the exercise of the exceutive power of confiscation or resumpti n by the State, and it was then said :

'.'Undoubtedly the power of resumpiion. of a watari may be exercised under s.' 22 of the Watan Actand such a resumption niay destroy the right of the hold r both to; the .. office and the watan land, and in' the absence of any provi- : sion in that behalf no right to compensation inay arise; But .. where the .abolition of the watan is not by executive. -- action, but' by legislative -deeree, its consequences must . be songht in the 'statute which effectuates that abolition;''

~.•-,•'- :..<!'",'' __ ...... :·-!_ .... ; ... , • ' \' ' - . . -·. . ' -. - As to the effect of the resumption of the'watan lands nnder. sub-s. (3) of s. 3 and their regrant under sub-s. (I} of s. 4 of the Act it was .observed : . • · ·• -_, .-_- •' •i ·-. ' ' ' ' ' . "It mu8t be rcmemberd that 'the' pwer .which the. ' .State Government always possessed by the clearest implica- ·~· . . tion of s. 22 of the Bomba}''iiereditary 'offices Aci. 1874, of' . resumption is . statutorily enforced by s. 3 iri respect of the. :

.~ Para&ana i111d Kulkarni WataiiS:' The State Government . . ' having. the power to abolish a watan office; and to resiiine ": . . land granted as remueration for performance of the duties .-·· , .- .,·-:- - 1 1· \o -,·•. - ' -. • ' . . attached. to the . office was not obliged to compensate the .. '. watanda~ for eii:'tfuctlbn of his. rights. : . Bt the Legislature '

0 as, as a matter.of grace, presuniablybCcatise of settlement .• beteen tne holders and the Government under the Gordon

Settlement, provided by' s. 6 that cash' compensation he . awarded for loss' of the right to'i:ash allowance or ieinis- .. . sion of land 'revenue and has by s: 4 conferred upon the ..

holder -of the watan land,'i'or loss of his right, a right to: .•. re grant of the land as occupant and free from the obliga- .. : ·" . lion .iniposed by itS orlginal tenure as 'Yaian land. :. ....• : •..

By the operation· of s. '. 3 -au Paraganas. ancL Kulkarni . .. •, -.'\•,··~•-- - -.

'•'.I

•-'J•' .- ,..-; watans fallmg withm . the Act are abolished, the right to . hofd 'office is extinguished, and the lnd 'g'rante'd'as' renirine~

,. -·. '' ,.' •• ·.d ...... -· ~- ' ...

- ...... ~· -· ... --1 ' • ration for performance of service. is resumed. . The holder . -'' . ·.·• ... ... ,, ....... ' :

- .. -.. ,. ' of the land is thereafter liable . to pay land revenue, and is

SUPREilil tOUllT RBi'ollT~ (1982! 3 s.c.a.

entitled, on payment of the occupancy price at the preseribed rate, to be regranted "occupancy rights as if it is unalienated land. The right so conferred is, though not a right to cash compensation, a valuable right of occupancy in the land. By the resumption of watan land and regrant thereof in occupancy right, all the restrictions placed upon the bolder of watan land are by the provisions of the Watan Act, and the terms of the grant, statutorily abolished. But the right of occupancy granted by s. 4 adequately compensates the holder for loss of the precarious interest of a watandar, because the land regranted after abolition of the watan, is held subject only to the restrictions imposed by sub-s. (2) of s. 4, and is freed from the incidents of watan tenure, such as restriction on alienation beyond the lifetime of the holder, devolution according to the special rule of succession, and the liability to consideration or resumption!'

It most therefore be observed that the commutation of serviee under subs. (l) s. 15 of the watan lands by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity froin liability to' perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of 'judi' or quit-rent charged upon the watan land, unless where it was otherwise provided for, had not the effect of converting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of alienability but to leave them attached to the hereditary offices which, although freed from the performance of services, remained intact. Despite commutation of service, the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liability to perform service, and on that account the character of tlie watan lands still remained attached to the grant. By the end of the first half of the 19th century, the watandars had lost much of their raison d" etre. The British thought it expedient to dispense with their services and the watandars were given an offer to convert their watans into private property by the annual payment of a Nazrana but they were opposed to this.

At their own request, the Government agreed to continue their watans as unalienable after the service commutation settlements, subject to payment of 'judi' or quit-rent. After the service commutation settlements and the appointment of Mamlatdars, the watandars had practically no function to perform but the watans were not discontinued till the Government decided upon their abolition.

liAGEsti v. KSANDO TiRMAL (Sen, J.)

36S

It is said that although co-ownership of the joint family may exist in impartible property, a distinction must be drawn between present rights and future rights of the members of a family. This is because of the peculiar character of the property. Thus, while the junior members have future or contingent rights such as right of survivorship, they have, apart from custom or relationship, no present rights, as for instance, a right to restrain alienation or to claim maintenance. It is upon this basis that the submission is that the courts below manifestly erred in passing a decree for partition of the watan property described in Schedules B and <!appended to the plaint. We are afraid, these submissions based upon the alleged impartibility of the watan properties or the applicability of the rule of lineal primogeniture regulating succession to the estate cannot prevail, as these being nothing more than incidents of the watan, stand abrogated by sub-s. (4) of s. 3 Act No. 60 of 1950 and s. 4 of Act No. 22 of 1955.

It seems plain to us that the effect of Act No. 60 of 1950 and Act No. 22 of 1955 was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan land but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law.

It will be convenient to deal first with the provisions of Act No. 60 of 1950. Section 3 of the Act lays down that, with effect from, and on, the appointed day, notwi, thstanding anything contained in any law, usage, settlement, grant, sanad or order, all watans shall be deemed to have been abolished and all rights to hold office and any liability to render service appertaining to the said watana shall stand extinguished. It further lays down that subject to the provisions of s. 4, "all viatan land is hereby resumed" and "shall be deemed to be subject to the payment of land revenue under the pr<>visions of the Code and the rules made thereunder as if it were an unalienated land". The term 'Code' as defined in s. 2 (b) means "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879". All incidents pertaining to the said watans stand extinguished from the appointed day.

Sub-s. (!) of s. 4 of the Act, insofar as material, provides :

. "4 (1). A watan land resumed under the provisions of this Act shall .......... be regranted to the holder of the 'watan to which it appertained, on payment of the occupancy price ............ and the holder shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code in respect of

G .

.>..--

E.

366 (1982} 3 s.e.R.

SUPREME COtJkt REPORTS

• • . '} , •

I.-

such land and shall primarily he liable to pay. land revenue to the State Government 'in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereuiider;"all the provisions or"the "Code and rules .relating to'unalienated land. sliall, subject to tlie provisions of this Act, appiy to the.· said 1and :" · · · ""' · • ' •· · - ! '•

:· a~'use c2> of Exp1anaiton t~ 8., 4 reads :

, ,. .'.: .- ' . . _ . ' . . . .', .- --

. ~.

 "Explanation-For the purposes. of this• section the. • ·· ·

;.....

/ expssio? :·~~Ider" shll indde- ' . • ·· - " , _>

. . . _•- .. _,. .. - - . ·.. r·· "(i) all . persons who on . the appointed day_ are the ·

'ivatalldars of the same. watan to which the tand' . appeitamed; and . ' ' . .•; '

~?.. ·J}.-' J.'• .. -' •,_:;-c••"•-,;:• "' '. xx xx xx

.- . The provisions of Act No. 22 . of 1955 are more or less similar. '.Likewise; . s~ •(of th'e. Act provides .°that; notwlthstandini anything

.,.~,,.~, ~

~·I•' '• ~ '• • - .o. ~' . contained in any usage, settlement grant etc., with effect from the

~~-> .•. .• l ... ·.~ - ' •.. ' ..... ,, ... - -·· . , ., .. ,, > .. appointed day, all alienationuhall be deemed to have been abolish- -ed and an rights JCgally. subsisiing on ih~ sald date. in cspect of-such .• 8.lienations "and all other incidents of suchalienation shall be deemed

to liavi:"i, een extinguihed. ·. Seciion '( oL th~ Aci piovides that ~;~II

.· ianci'heid Under a watan is hereby resumed" 'and "shaiJ be rgraied -to ihe holder in aceordance, with th~ provisions contin-ed i~ sob- - . ections. (i) to. (3) therein.-' Cluse (I) .. of Explanation to ~- 7 ."ftads:·-. . ,.c -- ·. . ."_ ... -:,· - : ·. --.~ ·,·~

... ' .. . ..:!; -- .. ,__ • , t -·- ., -.-;-. -~-- ;"Exp_l_anation-Fot , the purpose .of .this. section, the ' . ' - expression -"holder" shall include-:-

-~.I. ; • ; : .• -- _;.

-· ·· (I) an alience holding land under a watan, and. ·

.(2) xx. xx xx xx

-'·· Upon: a plain reading of sub-s. (1)-0f s. 4 or Act No. 60 of 1950 and of s;.7 of Act No. 22 of 1955, It is clear.that watan lands resun:ied under the provisions thereof, . have:' to '.be regranted . to the . bolder; or the .. watan,. ani:I: be.·hall .be "deemed•; to•. be. an . occupant . within the meaning .of the Code in respeci of such land.:

,., I '.

NAG ESH v. ltH:'NDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 367.

The expression 'holder'. as defined in cl. (i) Explanation to s. 4 of the former Act includes '.'all persons who, on the appointed day, are the watandars of the same watan'' and cl. (I) of Explanation to

s. 7 of the latter Act defines it to include ·•an a Jienee holding land under a watan". The term "an alienee" is defined in s. 2 (!}(iii) to mean "the holder of an alienation and includes bis co-sharer".

The Watan Act contemplated two classes of persons. One is a larger class of persons belonging to the watan families having a • hereditary interest in the watan property as such and: th'e other a ' smaller class of persons who were appointed as representative watandars and who were liable for the performance of duties con-· C nected with the office of such watandars.

As already indicated, it would not be correct to limit 'the word "watandar" only to this

. ..A narrow class of persons who could claim to have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and in the hereditary office. Watan property had al ways been treated as property belonging to the family and all persons belonging to the watan family who bad a hereditary interest in such watan property were entitled to be called "watandars of the same watan° within the Watan Act. That being so, the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the w11tan land along with the watandar for the time being, and therefore the regrant of the lands to the wataildar under sub-s. (l) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and under s. 3 of Act No. 22 of 1955 must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family.

It appears that the same view has been taken iµ a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Laxrnibai Sadashiv Date v.

Ganesh Shankar Date('). .

A controversy had arisen as to the purport and effect of the non-obstante clause contained in s. 4 of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act, 1959. Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba v.

Mahadeo Dagdu(') held that the effect of sub-s. (3) of s. 4 read with s. 5 of the Act was to bring about a change in the tenure or character of holding as Watan land, but it did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law. The learned Judge therefore held that even though the watan was abolished and the incidents thereof were extinguis bed an<l the land resumed under

(I) (1977) 79 Born. L.R. 234.

(l) (1972) 75 Dom. L.R.29Q,


[1982) 3 S.C.R.

s. 4, the Act maintained the continuity of the interest in the lands of persons before and after the coming into frce of the Act provided, of course, the holder pay1 occupancy price in respect of the land. In other words, the property continues to jbe the joint family property or the property held by the tenants-in-common, as the case may be.

In Kalgonda Babgonda v. Balgonda,(') a Divi1ion Bench of the High Court took a view to the contrary and observed :

"The words "all incidents appertaining to the said watans shall be and are hereby extinguished", must include every kind of incident, including the so-called incident of a right to partition as cl.aimed by the plaintiff in this case, even if such right existed. Further, the lands were resumed by the Government on that date in law and vested in the Government till the lands were re-granted under s. 5 or 6, or 9 of that Act."

xx xx xx xx

"It is not possible for us . to consider it reasonable to held that although the lands were resumed by the Government and the holder himself had lost all his rights till the lands were re-granted to him except the right of asking, for re-grant, the incidents of the property under personal law appertaining to irnpartible property would survive the extinguishrnent of the tenure and resumption of the land by the State."

It was obviously wrong in reaching the couclusion that it did.

In Laxmibai Sadashiv Date's case, supra, the Full Bench reversed ihe decision of the Division Bench and upheld the"view taken by Malvankar, J. in Dhondi Vithoba's case, supra, observed:

"It is undoubtedly true that s. 4 starts with a nonobstante clause, but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to non-obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute. The non-obstanle clause is contained at the inception of s. 4 and the sole object of s. 4 is to abolish alienation and rights and incidents in respect thereof. The right of a member of joint Hindu family to ask for partition of a joint family

(!) (1975) 78 Bom. l,.ll. 720.

II!

- I

NAGESH v, r::HANDO TIRMAL (Sen, J.) 369

property cannot be regarded as a right relating to grant or , land as service inam or as an incident in respect thereof.

xx xx xx

The object of s. 4 was not to affect in any manner rights created under the personal Jaw relating to the parties and if the property belonged to joint Hindu family, then the normal rights of the members of the family to ask for partition were not in any way affected by reason of the .

non-obstante clause contained in a. 4."

These observations, in our opinion, are clearly in consonance with the true meaning and effect of the non-obstanate clause.

It still remains to ascertain the impact of subs (2) of s. 4 of Act No. 60 of 1950 and sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of /\ct No. 22 of 1955, and the question is whether the occupancy of the land regranted under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the former Act and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the latter Act is still impressed with the character of being impartible property.

All that these provisions Jay down is that the occupancy of the land regranted under sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the former Act shall not be transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the previous sanction of the Collector and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may, by general or special order, determine.

It is quite plain upon the terms of these provisions that they impose restrictions in the matter of making alienations. On regrant of the land, the holder is deemed to be an occupant and therefore the holding changes its intrinsic character and becomes Ryotwari and is like any other property which is capable of being transferred or partitioned by metes and bounds subject, of course, to the sanction of the Collector and on payment of the requisite amount.

It is the policy of the law to prevent the land-working classes being driven into the state of landless proletariates so far as may be, and accordingly it is provided by these provisions that alienations of such hold)ngs or partition thereof shall be ineffective unless the sanction of the Collector has first been obtained. It is of the utmost , importance that this important safeguard should be maintained in full,

force and effect so that the parties must exactly know what. they ban bargained for. The condition for the grant of sanction by the

Collector as a pre-requisite , for a valid transfer of a holding or the

37(} s!JPRBlll 'COUllT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.a.

making of a partition by mete.s an!! bounds, is. to ensure that the actual tiller of the soil is not aeprived of hill fand except for valid consideration, or that the partition effected between the members of a family is not unfair or unequal. These provisions therefore do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a partition once the conditions. mentioned therein are fulfilled.

In the result, the appeals! mlHt fail and are dismissed. There -t shall however be no order as to costs.

P.B.R.

Appeals dlslftisjed.

• A