.BALDBV SAHA! BANOIA

R.C. BHASIN

April 16, 1982

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-S. J4(J)(d)-Appllcotion for ejectment of tenant-Tenant ceasing to resid1 In premises. for ver six months-Whan maintainable.'

Words and phrase;,-'Members of faml/y'-Who are-S. T4(JJ(d) .of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

A landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises Jet for residential purpose under s. 14(l)(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, if he can show that neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application.

The appellant took the house in question on Jease in May, 1961 and E lived there with his parents, sisters and a brother. He went to Canada in 1971~ leaving behind in. the house, his mother nd brother, who continued to pay the rent.

The landlord filed an application for ejectment of tenant under s. 14(1)(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in September. 1972 contending that with the migration of the tenant to Canada, his mother 11nd brother i:ould not be treated as members of the ap'pellant's family. Tbe application was dismissed by the Rent ControJler who found that t.be mother, brother and sister of the appellant were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises along with the appellant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for ejectmentwas brought.

The landlord's appeal against the order of the Rent ControJJer was a11owcd by the Rent Control Tribunal which ordered eviction of the family members of the appellant from the tenanted house.

The appeal of the family members against the order of eviction was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that after the exit of the main tenant to Canada, neither the mother nor the brother or the sister could be legally termed as a member of the family of the appellant.

AJ1owin$ the appeal,

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B.S. BANGIA V. R.C. BHASIN 611

HELD : I. (a) The Act affords intrinsic evidence to show that the nonapplicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the misration of the main tenant' to Canada would make no difference. [674 HJ

(b) The term 'family' [has to be given not a restricted but a wider

maning. There are abundant authorities to show that the term 'family' should always ho liberally and broadly lccnstrued so as to include near relations of tho

head of the family. A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so B as to advance the object of tho Act. [676 F; 678 El

Price v. Gould and Ors., [1930].Vol. 143 Law Times 333; G. V. Shukla v.

Shri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass Ojha, [1963]' P.I.R. (Vol. LXV) 256; Govlnd . Dass and Ors. v. Ku/dip Singh, A.J.R.1971Delhi151 and Hira Lai and Ors. v.

Banarsi Dass, [1979] I R.L.R. 466 referred to.

(c) The Act has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment.

Tho definition of 'tenant' inserted in s~ 2(1) of the Act by the Amending Act 18 of 1976 expressly included 'parents' in sub-clause (iii) thereof and also indicated that .apart from the heirs 'of the tenant s., Ccificd therein, even those persons who had been ordinarily 1ivina: in the premises with the tenant would be treated as members of the family. [675 B; 677 H; 678 A]

2. (a) The legislature has advisedly provided that any member of the rami1y residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a tenant.

The stress is not so much on the actual presence o( the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises. Clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act is a special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession C\nly where the tenanted premises have been compltely vacated by the tenant. ·

[676 G-H; 677 A]

(b) The landlord bad failed to prove the essential ingredients of clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant. It could not be said that when the appellant migrated to Canada, he bad severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family. Such an interpretation is against our

national heritage and could never have been contemplated by the Act.

(680 B; 675 B]

.i.._:.

-~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1533 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 20th February, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in S.A.O. 149 of 1979.

SJ(. Meh, ta for the Appellant.

Yogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for

the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SUPREME COURT REPORTS .

FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated February 20, 1980 of the Delhi' High Court decreeing the landlord's suit for ejectment of the tenant.

The facts giving rise to the present litigation are summarised in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court and need not be .repeated.

Shorn of details, the positi9n seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs. 95/-. At the time when the tenancy started, the tenant was living in the tenanted house with his father, mother, two sisters and a brother. The tenant himself was at that time a bachelor but seems to have married subsequently.

One of his sisters was married in this very house.

As it happened, in 1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife and children. It is alleged that after having gone to Canada, the husband alongwith his wife took up some employment there. Admittedly, the tenant did not return to India after 1971.

While leaving for Canada the tenant had left his mother and brother in the house who were regularly paying rent to the landlord.

There is some controversy as to whether or not the mother and. brother, who were left behind, were being supported by the tenant or were living on their own earnings or by the income of the property left by the tenant in India. Such a controversy however, is of no consequence in deciding the question of law which arises for consideration in this case.

On September 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for

ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and - non-residence of the tenant under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section ~~ (!)of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter .._~ referred to as the 'Act'). The fundamental plea taken by the landlord was that with the exit of the tenant from the house it became vacant and his mother and brother who were left behind could not be treated as members of the family.

Hence, in the eye oflaw the tenanted premises must be deemed to have fallen vacant.

The suii was resisted by the mother, brother and sister of the tenant who averred that even if th"e tenant alongwith his wife and children had shifted to Canada, the non-applicants were continuing to live in the tem1nted premises an4 as they had been paying reQt

- B.S. BANGIA v. R.C. BHASIN (Fazal Ali, J.) 673

to the landlord regularly, who hd been accepting the question or the tenancy becoming vacant arose.

same, no •

• ThUi, .the entire case hinges.on the . interpretation of the word

! .. , II 'family' as also clausesJd) and (e) of s. 14(1) of the Act. So far as

- .!1if clause (e) js concrned, .both the courts below found as a fact that the landlord was not able to prove his bona fide necessity. Therefore, as far as ground (e) is concerned, the same no longer survives in view of.the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The only questionthatremains to be considered is whether the landlord - ,,.,.,,-- can bring.his case for evictfon within the ambit of clause'(d) of _..---- s. 14(1) which may J>e extracted thus:

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I '+

"14 (I) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law. or contract, no order or decree for the. recovery of possession of any premises 'shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the. landlord against a tenant: ·

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery iJf possessi.on of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :

xx xx xx

, (d) that the premises were. let .for use as a residence and neither thll' tenant nor any member or bis family bas been residing therein for a period of six months imqiediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof; ·

A close analysis of this provision would reveal that before the landlord can succeed, be must prove three essential ingredients- •

(l) that the premises were let out for use as a residence,

{2) that the tenant after having taken the premises has

teased to reside, and

(3) that apllrt from the tenant no member of his family also bas been residing for a period of six months immediately berOre the d3te Qf the filing of the

application for ejectment.

674 SUPREME COURT REPOllTB

(!982) 3 S.C.R.

It is manifest that unless the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the landlord cannot succeed in getting a decree for ejeetment. 19, the instant case, while it is the admitted case of the parties that the tenant had shifted to Canada alongwith bis wife and children, yet he had left Ws mother, brother and ister in the house, hence the

second essential condition of clause (d) continues to apply with full force.

The learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the mother, brother and sister were undoubtedly living with the tenant And so long as they continued to reside in the tenanted premises, there could be no question of the premises falling vacant.

To this, the counsel for the landlord coun iered that neither the mother, nor the brother nor the sister could in law be treated as . . members of the family of the tenant after be had himself shifted to a country outside India. Even though while be was I iving in Delhi, he was in Government service.

Thus, it was argued that in the eye of law, the )o-calledjfamily members would lose their status as members of the family of the tenant and would be pure trespassers or licensees or 'squatters . '

While the suit of the landlord .was dismissed by th-e Rent Controller, the Rent Control Tribunal allowed the appeal and directed eviction of the family members of the tenant under clause

(d) of s. 14(1) of the Act. The family members of the tenant then went up in appeal to the High Court which also affirmed the findings of the Tribunal and upheld the order of eviction passed by it.

The High Court was also of the view that after the exit of the main . tenant from India to Canada, neither the mother, nor the brother, nor the sister could be legally termed as a membe.r of the family of

the tenant.

- ,,,,->

• W.e have heard counsel for the parties and given our anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter and we feel that the High Court has taken a palpably wrong view of the law il)regard to the interpretation of the term 'member of Cthe family' as used in clause

(d) of s. 14(1) lof the Act.· In coming to its deci.sion, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the dominant purpose and the main object of the Act which affords several intrinsic and -

extrinsic evidence to show that tlie non-applicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the migration of the main tenant to.Canada, would make no· difference. The word 'family' has been defined in various lesaI 9iction.aries and several .

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B.S. BANGIA v. R.C. BHASIN (Fazal Ali, J.)

61S

authorities-of various courts and no court has ever held that mother or a brother or a sister who is living with the older member of the family would not constitute a family of the said member. Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination. that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Cafladit, he had severed all his connections with his -mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family.

Such an interpretation is aainst . our national heritage and, as we shall show, could never have been contemplated by the Act which has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment.

Coming now to [the definitions, we find that in Word~ and Phrases (permanent Edition-volume 16) at pp. 303-311 the word 'family' b.as been defined thus :

"The father, the mother, and the children ordinarily constitute a "family".

• A

"The word "family" embraces more than a huband

D and wife and includes _children."

"A "family" constitutes all who live in one house under one head."

"Father and mother of two illegitimate children; and children themselves, all living together under one roof, constituted a "family."

(pp. 303-304)

"The word "family" . fa . statute authorizing use of incQme for support of ward and "family" is not restricted to those individuals to .whom ward owes a legalduty of support, but is an expression of great flexibility and is liberally construed, and includes brothers and sisters in ·

poor financial circumstances for whom the insane ward, if

comptent, would make provision."

(p. 311)

"The general or ordinarily accepted meaning of the word "family", as used in Compensation Act, means a group, comprising immediate kindred, consisting of the parents llllQ !bir children,· whethr qtually living together or not:'

(p. 343) ·(Emphasis ours)

SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS

(1982) 3 s.c.R.

Similarly, in Webster's Third New International Dictfonary, the word 'family' is defined thus :

"Family-household including not only the servants but also the head of the hous, ehold and. all persom in it related to him by blood or marriage ...... a group of persons of common ancestry.'' (p. 821) (Emphasis supplied)

In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (New. Edition 1972), the word 'Family' has been de'fined thus.;

"family-the household, or all those who . live i.n one house (as parents, children, servants) : parents and their + children)"··

.In Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition), the same D definition appears to have been given of the word 'family" which may be extracted thus :

"family-Members of a household, parents, children, servants, etc. set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not; persons children. All descendants E of common ancestor."

A conspectus of the connotation of the term 'family' which emerges from a reference to the aforesaid dictionaries clearly shows that the word 'family' has to lie given not a restricted but a wider . meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all .•

embers or descendants from the common ancestors who are - actuallyliving with the same head. More particularly, in our country, blood relations do not evaporate merely because a member of the famiiy-the father, the brother or the son-leaves his household and goes out for some time. Furthermore, in our opinion, the legislal!lre has advisdly used the term that any mem_ber of the family residing therein for a period. of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a

tenant. The stress is not so much on the 11ctual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members" of the family actually live' and reside in the tenanted premises. In fact, it seems to us that clause (d) of s. 14(1) of the Act is a special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession only where the tenanted premises have

ii.§. liANGlA v. il.c. BHASJN (Paza/ Aii, J.) 67;

 been completely vacated by th( tenant if he/ceased to exercise any control over the property either through himself or through his blood relations.

In fact, a controversy arose as to what would happen to the members .of thtl' family of the tenant if while residing in the premises

1 be dies and in order to resolve this anomaly the legislature fl!!me-

' diately stepped in to amend certain provisions of. the Act and J defined the actual connotation of the term 'members of the family' .

. By virtue of Act I 8 of 1916 t])e definition of "Tenant" was inserted so as to include various categories of persons. S.ub-clause (iii) of clause (i) of section 2 of the Act actually mentions the persons who could be regarded as tenant even if main tenant dies. This subclause may be extracted thus :

"(I) "tenant" means any person . by wom or on whose accQunt or behalf the rent of any premises is, or •. but for a speciliI contract, wcluld be, payable and includes- . .

(i) a sub-tenant;

(ii) any person continuing in possession after the terminatibn of his tenancy; and·

(iii) in the event of the death of the person. continuing in . possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectiyely, in Explanation I and Explanation II to. this clause such of the aforesaid person's-.

(a) spouse, r ··~.

(b) son or daughter or, where there are' both son and ·

daughter, both of them,

(c) parents,

(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-

deceased son, G

as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of .his death, but does noHnclude, ......... "

. It would appear that parents were expressly included in sub~ clause (iii). It bas also been provided that apart from the heirs

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SbPilEMli C<ibit RB!'OllTS (198~11 s.c.k.

specified in clauses (a) to (d) (extracted above), ~Ven those persons who had been ordinarily Jiving in the premises with the tenant would be treated as members of the family. The statemen~. of objtcts arid reasons for this amendment may J>e extracted thus :

"There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to COD ferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by lan-dlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants. in case the landlord re quires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation.

Further, Government decided.on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who own$ his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December, 1975. Government .con sidered that in the circumstances, the Act required to be amended urgently." . ,

If this was the intention of the legislature then clause (d) of section 14( 1) of the Act could not be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat the very object of the Act. It is well setth:d that a bene ficial provision must 'be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act, and curing any lacuna or defect appearing in the same. There are abundant authorities to show that the term "Family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family.

In Hira Lal & Ors. v. Banarsi Dass(') even the learned Judge who decided that case had observed at page 472 that the term "members of the family" on the facts and circumstances of the case should not be given a narrow construction.

lnGobind Dass & Ors. vs. Ku/dip Singh(') a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H.R. Khanna,, C.J .. (as be then was) and Prakash Narain, J. while recognising , the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word "family" observed as follows :

"I hold that in the section now under consideration the word .. family" includes bf others and sister~ of the deceased

(I) 1979 (I) R.L.R. 46~. <1) AIR 1971 Delhi IS\.

11.S. llANGIA v. it:c. ill!AslN (Fozai Ali, J.) 619

living with her at the time of her death.

I think that that meaning is required by the ordinary acceptation of the word in this connection and that the legislature has used the wod "family" to introduce a flexible and wide term."

In Mr8. G. V. Shukla v. Shri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass -

• Ojha(1) Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed as follows: B

"Therefore, it must be held that" the word 'family' is . . -,.

capable of wider interpretation, but that interpretation must have relation to the existing facts and circumstances proved on the record in each case." c

liven as far back as 1930, Wright, J. in Price v. Gould & Ors(') (a King's Bench decision) had clearly held that the. word "family" included brothers and sisters and in this connection observed as follows :

"I find as a fact that the brothers and sisters were D residing with the deceased at the time of her death ..... ..

It has been laid down tb.at the primary meaning of the word "family" is children, hut that primary meaning is clearly susceptible of wider interpretation, because the cases decide that the exact scope of the word must depend on the context and the other provisions of the will or deed E

in view of the surrounding circumstances."

"Thus, in Snow v. Teed (1870, 23 L.T. Rep. 303; L. Rep. 9 Bq. 622) it was held that the word "family" could be extended beyond not merely children but even beyond the statutory next of kin."

Jn view, however, of the very clear 'and plain. language of + clause (d) of section 14(1) of the Act itself, we do not want to burden this judgment by multiplying authorities.

On a point of fact, we might mention that €he Rent Controller had given a clear finding that te mother, younger brother ·, (Davinder .. Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises alongwith the main

(1) 1963 P.L.R. (vol. LXV) 256.

(2) 1930 (vol. 143) Law Times 333.

F -

SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 198~1 j s.c.k

tenant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for ejectment was brought.

In these circumstances, we are satified that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and cannot be supported. The landlord has miserably failed to prove the essential ingredients of B clause (d) of section 14(1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant.

We therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and dismiss the plaintiff's ; action for ejectment and restore the judgment of the Rent Controller. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.

H.L.C .

Appeal allowed.

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