KALUMIYA KARIMMIYA v.

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

January 14, 1977

[P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

. l:and Acquisition Act 1894-Secs. 4, SA, 6-Reasonable opportunity in znquzry under sec. SA-Whether collector bound to give copy of the report submuted to Government to the owner of land-Effect of not giving the copy- Delay between sec. 4 & 6 notifications-Effect of-What is unreasonable delay-Vagueness of s, 4 notification. ·

A notification was issued under section 4 ( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act ~894 n 7.6.1966 intending to acquire a total area of 13,900 sq. yds of land mc!.udmg 474. sq: yards of the appellant's land in Surat City. After considermg the obiecl!ons under s. SA a notification under section 6 was issued on

13.1.1~69. _The _appellat filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the said nolificalio~ which was summarily dismissed.

Th,\l High Court, however, grai:ited a rllficate ul'l:der Art. 133(1) (b) & (c) of the Constitution on the question of vzres of sect10ns 4, SA and 6 of the said Act.

Appellant contended :

( 1) In spite of the appellant's request for furnishing a copy of the report under s. SA the Collector did not give him a copy and, therefore, he did not have adequate and proper hearing under _s. SA.

(2) There was considerable delay between the notification under sections 4 and 6. ·

(3) Notification under s. 4 does not contain the public purpose as the requirement for "fire station". The notification merely mentions "station workshop and parking purpose."

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : (1) Ordinarily there should be no difficulty in furnishing a copy of the report under s. SA to an object.or when he asks for the same. However, it is not a correct proposition that hearing under s. Sb is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of the proceeding under the said Act.

[608 F-G]

(2) A second hearing by the State Government after the report is furnished by the Collector is not necessary.

[608-H]

Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [1968] (1) SCR S97, followed.

(3) Since other dags of land belonging to numerous persons were the subject matter of acquisition and individual objections had to be heard there was no inordinate delay in making the section 6 notification. Even the appellant has not submitted before the High Court a copy of his written objection. Nor has the same been produced in this Court with the result that one does not know how much delay was caused by the appellant himself. )"he delay in the present case is about 2t years and there is not even a clear statement of the appel\ant about delay to be attributable to the Government. [609 B-b]

( 4) Submission that s. 4 notification does not contain the public purpose is made on the basis of the copy of the notification anne; xed in. the pap_er book.

Even in the 5tatement of case the appellant has not raised this obiectton. On

the other hand it was conceded that the purpose was fire station, workshop A and parking place and the objection was that the appellant's l and was not suitable for construction of fire station. [609E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2731 of 1972.

(From the Judgment and Order dated 20-11-1970 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Appeal No. 1247 /70).

Vimal Dave and Miss Kailash Mehta, for the appellant.

D. V. Patel and M. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.

L. N. Sinha, Sol. Genl and Girish Chandra, for respondent No. 2.

K. C. Vakharia, P. H. Parekh and! Miss Manju Jetley, for respondent No. 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GoswAMI, J.-This appeal by certificate under Article 132 (1) (b) and ( c) of the Constitution is from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The certificate was granted on October 21, 1972, before coming into force of the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972.

Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the appellant, does not press before us the challenge to the validity of sections 4, SA and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

We will now state the facts as will appear from the statement of case filed on behalf of the appellant.

A notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly the Act) on June 7, 1966, intending to acquire a total area of 13900 sq. yds of land including 474 sq. yds. of the appellant's land in Ward No. 11 of Surat City included in City Survey Nos. 236S and 2366.

We are informed that only the appellant in raising objection to the acquisition and the plan has not yet been implemented on account of the pending litigation.

The appellant submitted his objections under section SA ( 1) of the Act to the Collector who gave him a hearing under sub-section (2) of section SA.

In. due course the Collector submitted his report to the State Government and after consideration of the same the Government issued a declaration under section 6 on January lS, 1969, that the land was required for the public purpose noted in the preliminary notification under section 4.

The apellnt in para 3 of the statement of case while referring to the not1ficat1on under section 4(1) of the Act averred as follows:-

"It was stated in the said notice that the suit lands wen: likely to be needed for fire station, workshop and parking purpose of the Surat Municipality as indicated in Govern~ ment Notification dated 7-6-1966;,.

In para 4 o~ the said statement it was averred ''that the appellant c?ntested the notice _by raising an. objection that the respondent No. 3-the Corporat10n-was not m need of the suit land for the purpose of the fire station, etc." After the declaration under scc- C , tion 6 of the Act, .as stated earlier, a notice under section 9 of the Act was served on the appellant but he did not submit any claims with regard to compensation under that section.

On Septemb.:r 22, l 970, the appellant filed an application under Article 226 or the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat challenging the aforesaid notifications under the Act. . The High Court by its order of November 30, 1970, rejected the petition.

The High Court, how- D ever, by its order of October 21, 1 972, granted certificate under Article 133(1) (bl and (c) of the Constitution on, the question of vires of sections 4, SA and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Mr. Dave confines his submissions before us only to the following points, which we will deal with seriatim :

First, that in spite of the appellant's reques~ for furnishing a copy of the report under section SA the Collector did not grant him a copy.

He complains that there was no proper and adequate hearing under section SA(2l of the Act.

According to the learned counsel a proper hearing would include furnishing of a copy of the report under section SA.

We are unable to accept this submission.

Although, ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in furnishing a copy of the report under section SA to an objector, when he asks for! the same, it is not a correct proposition that hearing under section SA is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of tlie hearing under the said section.

Unless there are weighty reasons, a report in public enquiry like this, should be available to the persons who take part in the enquiry.

But failure to furnish a copy of the report of such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is otherwise not open to any valid objection.

Apart from this solitary ground, our attention has not been drawn to any infirmity in the hearing under section SA.

We are, therefore unable to hold that the said enquiry under section SA was invalid. .

The matter would have been different if a second enquiry were essential under the law at the stage when the State Government was considering the report under section SA for issuing its declaration under section 6 of the Act.

We are, however, clearly of op1111on that there is no reason to hold that a second hearing by the State Government at that stage is necessary under section 6 of the A.Ct,

(See Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors.(') Since that is the position in law, failure to furnish a copy of the report under Syctjon 8A is innocuous.

The matter, again, may be different if there is a proper allegation of ma/a fide against the Collector or the State Government.

There is no such allegation in this case.

The first submission of the learned counsel is, therefore, devoid of substance.

The learned counsel next contends that there was considerable delay between the notification under section 4 which was issued on June 7, 1966, and the declaration under section 6 ma, de on January 13, 1969.

Since numerous dags of land belonging to a number of persons were the subject matter of acquisition and individual objections had to be heard, we do not think that there has been anv inordinate delay in making the notification.

Even, the appellant has not submitted before the High Court a copy of his written objection nor is the same produced before us to indicate when his objections were actually filed and whether he was not also responsible for some delay in the conclusion of the enquiry.

The delay in this case is only about 2t years and, as we have said, there is not even a clear statement of the responsibility for delay which may be attributable to the Government.

The second submission of the learned counsel is also of no avail.

Mr. Dave lastly submits that the notification under section 4 did not contain the public purpose as the requirement for "fire station".

The notification, says counsel, mentioned station, workshop and parking purpose.

He is able to make this submission from a copy E of the notification in the Paper Book° at page 20 (Ex. A). We are, however, unable to agree with counsel that the notification under sectiO'll 4 did not in fact contain the purpose as fire station.

Even in the statement of easer of the appellan~ whic~ we have set out earlier, no objection was ever taken against the so-called vague description Of the requirement in the notification.

On the other hand, it was conceded, therein, that the purpose was fire station, workshop and F parking purpose and the objection was that the appellant's land was not "suited for the construction of fire station".

There is, therefore, no substance in this submission.

This Court rather liberally grants prayers for dispensing with -statement of case when such requests are made by P!lrties. lndeed, the fonn in vogue, in which statements of case are submitted in this G Court, has perhaps outlived its practical utility in hearings before this Court. If anything, besides being expensive, it causes delay in making appeals ready for hearing.

We, however, feel, instead of the usual statements of case bv both the parties, a very succinct statement of case and a list of dates submitted by the appellant alone. with material facts necessary H for deciding the questions of law together with the findings of fact

(I) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 597.

A of the court below and pinpointing the only legal issues to be raised in this Court will be of advantage in expeditious disposal of appeals before this Court.

For once, on occasion, we are able to say that the statement of case in this appeal is of use to us in visiting the appellant with the forfeiture of his right to make his last submission with regard to the B vagueness or ambiguity of the purpose mentioned in the notification under section 4 of the Act.

All the submissions having failed, the appeal is dismissed. Having regard to the fact that there was a certificate by the High Court, we will make no order as to costs.

P.H.P.

Appeal dismissed.