UMON OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

GAJENDRA SINGH, ETC., ETC.

March 1, 1972

[K. S. HEGDE AND K. K. MATHEW, JJ.]

('onstitution oJ India-Arts. 14, 16 and 311(2)-whether version amounted to reduction in rank to attract Art. 311(2)-J/ retention of

junior in officiating capacity was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the ('onstitution of India.

The facts of the apP'.als are similar -and the facts of C.A. No. 314 al c as follows : ·

The respondent was a permanent Kanungo who was promoted to offi. ciate as Naib Tehsildar under paragraph 37(ii) of the S!:lnding Order No. 12, passed by the second appellant. He was reverted from the officiating post for the ra:on that he did not pass the departmental examin'J. .. lion o! Naib Tehsildar within the period prescribed by the Standing Order.

The respondent contended in the writ petition that he was entitled to continue in the post of Naib Tehsildar until a qualified person became

av-ailable, that since he was promoted under para 37(ii) of the Standing Order, passing of departmental examination was not necessary to officiite in the post of Naib Tehsildar. that junior Kanungos were retained in the posts of Naib Tehsildar by which respondent had lost his seniority ih the subst'3ntive rank of Kanunt, v and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and retention of juniors h the post of Naib Tehsildaf' was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The Judicial COmmhsioner, decided the case ln favour of the 1espondent and held that the reversion of the respondent was attended with penal consequences and since he was not given a reasonable opPortunity of making representation agaist the order, the order W1lS bad and the order was accordingly quashed.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD : (i) Appointment t., a post on an officiating basis, is, ftom the nature of employment, its.elf of a transitory character and in the absence of any contract or spe6ific rule regarding the cc>ndition of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointment is that it is terminable at any time. 'fhe Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. But if the order entails or provides folr forfeiture of his pay or allowance etc. or stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance would indicate that in form the Government had purported to exercise its undoubted right to terminate 'the employment, but in , truth and reaUty, the termination was by way of penalty. f,863Dl

Parshotam fol Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, referred to.

Further, by the mere fact that some Of the juniors w.ire allowed to continue in the post. of N aib Tehsildar on an officiating basis, it could

UNION v. GAJENDRA SINGH (Mathew, ].) 661

A ' not be said that the respondent lost his seniority in his substantive l'3.D.t of Kanungo. [863 HJ

(ii) Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are also not violated in the present case because the junior persons were retained in their ciating capacities either because they had passed the departmental. ex~· nation or because they had been exempted from passing that exanunatlon.

B In any case, the respondent was not similarly situated with his juniors and therefore, there was no discrimination to attract the Articles. t864-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 314 to 320 of 1967.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated c July 23, 1966 of the Judicial Commissioner's Court at Simla in Writ-Petitions Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25 oi 1965.

R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in all the appeals).

Rameshwar Nath, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 314, 315 and 318 of 1967).

The Judgment of the court was delivered by

Mathew, J. These appeals, by special leave, by the Union of India and the Financial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, are from a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, E allowing Civil Writ petitions Nos. 18, 19,-20, 21, 23, 44 and 25 of 1965, filed by the respondents and quashing the orders passed by the financial Commissioner 2nd appellant reverting the respo.n.d'ents to the posts of Kanungos. As the facts in all the appeals are similar, we will deal with Civil Appeal No. 314.

The respondent was a permanent Kanungo in the Revenue F Department. He was promoted on March 26, 1962; to offici11_te as Naib Tehsildar und.er para 37(ii) of Standing Order No. 12, passed by the 2nd appellant. He was reverted from the officiating post to his substantive post on June 1, 1965, for the reason that he did not pass the departmental examination of Naib Tehsildar within the period prescribed in para 34 of the Standing Order.· 9 The respondent contended in the writ petition that he was en titled to continue in the post of Naib Tehsildar until a qualified person became available, that no qualified person was available when he was reverted, that since he was promoted! under para 37(ii) of the Standing Order, he could not have reverted for the reason that he did not pass the departmental examination as the H passing of the departmental examination was not necessary in the case. of Kanungos promoted under para 3 ?(ii) 11f the Standing Order to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar. He further con tended that Kanungos junior to him who were promoted to offi. 14-LIOJ!Sup.CI/72 -

662 SUPllBMB COURT REPORTS

(1972] 3 S.C.R.

ciate in the post of N aib Tehsildar were retained in the posts of A

Naib Tehsildar and that has resulted in the loss of his seniority in the substantive rank of Kanungo and hence the reversion amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 ( 2) of the Constitution.

So, according to the respondent, he should have been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the reversion and since such an opportunity was not given, B the order of reversion was bad. The respondent also contended that the retention of his .iuniors in the post of Naib Tehsildar was violative of his fundamental right under Articles 1.4 and 16 of the Constitution. ·

The learned Judicial Commissioner, by his order held that para 37(ii) of the Standing Order did not confer any rjght on the C respondent to continue to officiate in the post of Naib- Tehsildar until a qualified person became. available as that para only con~ mrred a power on the appropriate authority to. allow him to continue to officiate in thepost till a qualified'hahd Jiecame available.

The learned Judicial Comrtlissioner •then held that since the re&. pondent was promoted under i)ara 37 (ii) of the Standing Order, D he could not have been reverted on the score that he did_not pass the departmental examination, that since the juniors of the-respondent who were also prooted on an officiating basis, were allowed to continue in the post o.f Naib Tehsildar, the reversion had result;; eel in the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that the order of reversion wu attended 1 with penal consequen~ and that the respondent should hi!ve been given a reasonable oppgrtunity of making representation against the order, and quashed it.

Paragraphs 34 and 37 of the Standing Order passed by the Financial Commissioner read as under :..,-

"34(i) Ordinari_ly an A class candidate should pl!Ss F the Naib Tehsildar.'s examination within two years after. completing his revenue training as prescribed in paragraphs 25 and 27 and a B Class candidate should pass the Naib Tehsildar's examination within two y~ 'of his first selection. The Commissioner may extend this period for an.other year for special reason to be recorded in G writing .

. (ii) The Financial Commissioners may further ex tend the period in which a candidate must pass the - examination or exempt any candidate from passing the examination. in exceptional cases on the recommenda- . , tion of the Commissioner." H "37(i) Officiating appoiritments of Naib Tehsil~' are made by Commissioners in Divisions.

Preference .

UNION v. GAJBNDRA SINGH (Mathew, 1.) 66 3

should be given to direct tehsildar candidates who have .undergone revenue training for one year under paragraph 4(j) but not completed the requisite period of service as Nl!, ib Tehsildar under paragraph 4(i)(b).

(ii) If no such Tehsildar candidate and no qualified Naib Tehsildar candidate of his list is available for a vacant post of Naib Tehsildar, the Commissioner may appoint a Tehsildar candidate who has completed his two years service \f unemployed or an unqualified Naib Tehsildar candidate or a Kanungo to fill the vacancy until a qualified person becomes available."

We do not think that the Judicial Commissioner was justified in quashing the order of. reversion for the reason that in passing the order the 2nd appellant contravened the provisions of Article 311,(2).

Appointment to .a post on an officiating basis is, from the nature of employment,' itself of a transitory character and in the absence of any eontrai)t. or specific rule regulating the conditiQns of service to the contrary, the implied term of such an appointmeilt is that it is terminable at any time. The Government servant so appointed acquires no right to the post. But if the order entliila or provides for forfeiture of his pay or allowance or the loss of his seniority in the substantjve rank or the stoppage or potponement of hl!i future chances of promotion, then that circumstance .may jndicate that thoujh, . in form, the Government had purport¢ to exercise its undoubted right to terminate the employment, in truth and reality, the termination was by way of penalty (see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(').

We do not understand how the respondent lost his-Seniority in his substantive rank of Kanungo by the mere fact that some of his juniors were allowed to continue in the post of Naib Tehsifdar on an officiating basis. His juniors were not promoted on a regular basis. Like the respondent th.ey were also promoted to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar under para 37(ii). We do not see how .. their retention in the posts on an officiating basis would entail loss of seniority of the respodent in his substantive rank. No provision in the Standing Order or any other rule has been brought to our

nolice to show that by allowing the juniors of the respondent to continue to officiate in the posts of :N aib Tehsildar the respondent lost his seniority in his substantive. rank. We do not, therefore, think that the order of .r1<version w~ .attended with any penal consequences so as to attract the prov1s1ons of Article 311 (2).

(I) [1958] S.C.R. 828.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1972] 3 s.c.tt.

The respondent, no doubt, was appointed to officiate in the A post of Naib Tehsildar in pursuance of para 37(ii) of the Standing Order and that did not provide that he could be reverted for his not passing the departmental examination within any specified time but that would notin any way vitiate the order of reversion as the respondent had no right to hold the post and the 2nd appellant had the undoubted power to revert him.

The fact that the 8 2nd .appellant give a _wrong reason for reverting the respondent would not in any way affect the power which he undoubtedly possessed to revert him.

The contention of the respondent that the retention of his juniors to officiate in the post of Naib Tehsildar violated his fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has no C substance for his juniors were retained either because they had passed the deparl!mental examination or because they had been exempted from passing that examination. The respondent was not, therefore, similarly situate with his juniors and, therefore, there was no discrimination to attract the Articles.

We, therefore, set aside the order of the Judicial Commissioner and allow the appeal b11t, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. s.c.

I Appeals allowed.