RAJ NARAIN

v •.

SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR •.

March 15, 1972

(K. S. HEGDE, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND K. K. MATHEW; JJ.J

Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section

86(5)-SCOP<- Pleadings relming to corru.'1t .Dractice-Better particulars of charges ma\' he introduced by amendment of pladings. ·

Election Petition-Interrogatories-Code of Civil Procedure 1908- 0rder XI r, 1-lnterroga:pries 1nust have reasonable close connecti'on with "any n1atters in question."

While 3 corrupt practice has got to be strictly proved it does not follow that a pleading in an election petition should receive a strict construction. The object of section 86(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is to see that a person acused of a corrupt practice must know p!'OCisely what he is accused of so that hemay have the opportunity to meet the allegations JM.de against him. If the accusation made is nebulous and is capable of being made use of for establishin~ more than one charge or if it does not make out a corrupt plractice at all then the charge fails at the threshold.

So Jong as the charge levelled is beyond doubt, s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement; they either pertain to the region of particulars or evidence.

Under s. 86(5), if corrupt practice is alleged in the p~Otion, the particulars of such corrupt practice may b~ amended or amplified for ensui'ing a fair and effec

tive trial that is, more and better particulars of the charge may be given later, even after the period ef limitation; but if a corrupt practice is not previously "lleged in the petition, an am!ndment which will have the effect of introducing particulars of such. a corrupt practi<', o will not be permitted, after the period of Jimimtion. because, it would tantamount to making a fresh petition. [847 GJ ·

The appellant, in his election petition, challenging the validity of tbe election of respondent No. I, alleged that the respondent obtained the assistance of K when he was still a Gazetted Officer in the Go""ruwmt

of India for tbe furtherance <if the prospects of her election. and that K organised the electioneering work for her during the entire period even before the filing of the nomination paper. The petition did not

sct out specifically that when the respondent obtained tlr> a5si0 tancie of K, she was a "candidate", nor did it state the date on which X was entrusted with the electioneering work.

The respondent filed an application under 0. XI, Code of Civil Procedure, for sitting aside the interrogatories served on her by th! appellant. The trial court set aside some of the interrogatories and struck out the isaue& relating to cor\"uot oractice on the basis that the facts stated in the petition did not discli>oe the corrupt practice which were the subject matter of the issues. Thi! Court also dismissed the "poellant's application for amending the election petition, on the ground that the appellant was seeking to add material facts and hence they could not be accepted after the period of limitation for filing the election. petition. ·

HELD : ( i) that the trial court was not juslified in strikin~ out the issues relating to corrupt practice. The allegations in the petition bring

out al! th.: ingredients ot the corrupt practic; e alleged though they are A lacking in better particulars such as the date on which the respondent hc.:-can1e a candidate and the date on which K w:is entrusted with the

r<?ponsibility of organising the clcction:!cring 'W'Ork of the respondent.

Theabsence of these particulars does not per se invalidate the charge.

IS49 Gj

Harish Chandra Bajpui v. Triluki Singh, ~1957] S.C.R. 370; Sa111ar1t .\J. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernaridcz and ors. etc. [11969] 3 S.C.R.

D 60.l and Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh. [1972] S.C.C. 214, referred to.

l ii) that the question as to when K's resign"J.tion bcca.nc effective

h1.1~ to be examined \Vith rr.:ferencc to his c'onditions of service <ind this

h~1\ing not been done the conclusion of the trial judge in this regard had to he ignored. 1852 D-E]

R11j K111ne1r v. Union of India, [19681 3 S.C.R. 857. referred 1o.

Quaere : \Vhcth.::!r a government servant's resignation can he acceptd \'1.-ith effect from '3.n earlier date and whether such an acceptance has an,· 1alidity in con•idering a corrupt practice under s. 123(7).

(iii) that the amendments asked for should have been allowed. ek:ccion petition is not liahlc to be disn1isscd in limine because full partic

ClJiafs of c'orrupt practice alleged arc not set out.

If an objection wa~ D taken and the tribunal was of the view that the full particulars have nol hecn set out, the petitioner has to be given an opportunity to amend or ;.1mplify the purticulars. f,853 Bl ,

Shri Balwan Singh v. Shri Lalo:h111i Narain and or:.· .. [19601 3 S.C.R. 91, referred to.

(iv) that the, trial courl was right in striking out the interrogatorie!I..

Th~ intcrrog:itorics ~.crvd must have reasonable close connection with --any nlattcrs in question." Questions that n1ay be f'levant during Cros:-. cx:1mination are not necessarily relevant as interrogatories. [853 H]

Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 108 a.nd I 09 o.f 1972.

Appeals biY special leave from the. orders dated November 27. 1971 and December 22, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Applications Nos. A-112 and A-141 in Election Petition No. 5 of l 971 respectively.

S. V. Gupte, J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C. Srivastava, S. S. Khanduja and R. A. Gupta, for the appellant (in both the appeals).

C. K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yageshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga nod S. Bagga, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hegde, J.

Theso appeals by special leave arise from the eleciion petiti.on filed by .he appellant challenging the validity of the election of respondent No. I (who will hereinafr be referred to

as the respondell1) to the Lok Sabha, from Rae Bareilly coastituency, in the General Election to the Lok Sabha held in March,

I 971.

Aftr the pleadings of the parties were completed and the issues framed, 'the appellant applied to" the court under Order XI of the Civil Procedure <; ode for leave to deliver interrogatories, in writing for th.e examination of the respondent.

The respondnt objected to the same on the ground that the provisions of 0. XI,

C.P.C. cannot be applied to electi9n petitions. In her objectionstatement, the respondell't reserved her right to ob_ject to tire interrogatories sought to be s.erved at a later stage.

The application filed by the appellant for !·ave to serve interrogatories on the respondenl was heard by Broome J.

The_ learned Judge by his order dated September 14, 1971 overruled the objections of the respondent and directed as follows :

"Accordmgly i allow the application A-29 and grant leave to the petitioner to deliver !he accompanying interrogatoris for the examination of respondent No. 1.

The affidavit in reply shall be filed by 4-10-1971."

The resoondent appealed against that order to this Court after obtaiiiing special leave.

That appeal was withdrawn during the cours.c of the bearing.

During the pendency of that appeal, the respondent filed an app!ic3'lion before the High Coun undr rule 7, Order XI.

C.P.C. praying that the interrogatories served on her may be se.t

aside as thy were "unreasonable, vexatious, oppressive, unneo.:ssary and irrelevant".

As many as 31 interrngatories had been served on the respondent.

All these interrogatories related to f lssues 1 to 3. The appellant objected to each one of them. At the hearing of that petition, it appears it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the allega'tions in the election petition did not afford any basis for Issues 1 to 3.

Consequently th~ interrogatories served were irrelevant as well as unnecessary.

Th~ entire argument before 'the trial judge proceeded on th~ basis

G that the facts stated in. the petition did no! disclose the corrupt praC'tices which were th~ subject-matter of fasues I to 3. The Ieamect. judge accepted that contention and set aside some of the

interrog; itories srved on 1he respondent. Proceeding further, h~ struck out Issues 1 'to 3. Thereafter the appellant applied to that court for amendment of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the election Jl'ti

tion by giving better particulars.

The learned judge rejected H that application on the sole ground that by the a.mendmenl in queition, the appellant was seeking to add to material facts and hence they cannot be accepted after the period of limitation for

fili!J~ the electicm petition.

Civil Appeal No. 1 08 of 1972 is

directed against the order setting aside the interrogatories served A and the striking out of Issues 1 to 3 and Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1972 ar!§es from the order rejecting the application seeking permission to amend the e~ction petition.

Issue No. 2 had not been pressed before <the trial court nor was it pressed before us. Therefore we nerd not consider whether B that issue should be restored.

Issue No. 3 is largely consequential to Issue No. 2 though a portion of that issue bears on Issue No. 1. Hence at present we are only concerned with Issue No.· 1 and that portion of ili~ third issue which has a bearing on Issue No. 1. Both those aspects will be covered if issue No. 1 is recast thus : c

"Whether respondent No. 1 obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospec'ts of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of India. If so, from what date ?"

We can now leaw out of consideration Issue No.· 3.

The main question to be decided in these appeals is whether the allegtions made in the election petition can be said to disclose the corrupt practice which is the subject matter of Issue No. 1.

Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (to be hereinafor referred to as the 'Act') begins by saying that '"The followin~ shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act". ·

Sub-s. (7) of s. 123 to the extent material for our present F purpose reads :

"The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, _any assistance (other than the giving of vote) for 'tire furtherance of the prospects of that G candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following class_es, namely :

(a) gazetted officers; ..

The appellant's contention is that the respondent after she be- . came a candidate in lhe election in question obtained the services.

A of Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazetted officer in the Government of. India for the furtherance of the propects of her election. In order to establish that plea, he must plead and prove :

(1) That the respondent obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur when he was a gazetted officer;

(2) That the assistance obtained by her was for the furtherance of the prospects of her election and

' ( 3) Jhat she obtained that assistance after she became a candidate. c A candidate is defined ins. 79(b) of the Act. That section

says :

" 'candidate' means, a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at

any election and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began to hold himself' out as a prospective candidate."

The respondent became a candidate within the first part of s. 79 (b) when she was nominated on February 1, 1971. But if she had held herself out as a prospective candidate with the election in prospect before her nomination, she must be deemed to have become a candidate from the date she so held out.

In order to estabijsh his plea, the appellant has ito establish that the assistance of Yashpal Kapur was obtained when he still was a government servant and at the itime such an assistance was

obtained, the respondent had become a "candidate."

Now let us turn to the averments in the' election. petition which alone is relevant for finding out whether the corrupt practice referred to in Issue No. 1 is made out. Relevant averments are said to be in pa_ragraphs 2, 5 and 6. They read as follows :

"2 .. That the respondent No. 1 Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaifa Nand we1e also candidates in the said election from the 22-Rae Bareili Parliamentary constituency for the Lok Sabha.

5, That the said Shri Yashpal Kapur was Gazetted Officer in the Government of India, holding the post of an officer on Special Duty.

The respondent No. i..,.

Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi obtained and procured

tflc assistance of the said Shri Yashpal Kapur for the furtherance of the prospects of her election from the 8-Lt06!Sup.Cl/73

crnstituency aforesaid inasmuch as the said Shri Yahpal i<apur was a gazetted officer in the service of the Government of India when his assistance was obtained and procured (a corrupt practice under section 123 ( 7) of the R.P. Act, 195 l was committed by the respondent No. I Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi.

The said Shri Yashpal Kapur on the directions of Shrim<rd Indira Nehru Gandhi organised the electione.ring work for her in 1he constituency as her elction agent during the entire period from even before the filing of the nomination paper 1he filing ('I) the counting and the declaration of the result of the election. The eleciion of •the

respondent No. I is liable to be declared void on the 1?round of the commission of this corrupt practice under section l 00 ( I ) ( b) of lhe Representation of Peoples

Act, J 951.

6. That as the petitioll!r's candidature was being supported not only by Samyukta Socialist Party to which !he pelitioner belonged but also by the Jan Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization), Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and since the candidature of respondent No.

I. Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi was being supported by the Muslim Majlis, Muslim !Jague and the Communist Party of India (it was apprehended by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur •that an overwhelming majority of Hindu voters miht cast 1fieir votes for the petitioner against ShdrMtl Indira Nehru Gandhi.

It was accordingly de¢lded by them to induce the respondent No. 2 Swami

Advaita Nand to also stand as a candidate in the elec- 1ion. The said Shri Yashpal Kapur, the election agent of Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi offered and paid a sum of Rs. 50,000Ito the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaitanand as a gift with the object of directly including him to stand as a candidate at •the said dection. The offer and payment of the amount of Rs. 50,000Iwas made

by the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaita Nrtnd on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Bareili.

A corrupt practice of 'bribery under section 123(1) (A) (a) was thus committed by Shri Yashpal Kapur, election agent of Sm. Indira Nehru Gadhi and her election is therefore liable to be declared void under <ection 100(1) of thi R.P. Act." ...

It is true tha'. 'the election petition nowhere specifically say; .as to when the appellant became a "candidate".

But it is clear

...

RAJ NARAIN v. IND!Jl.A. GANDHI (Hegde, J.) 847

:rwr; a readinil of paragraphs 5 and 6 that according to the appell11nt, the respondent became a "candidate" even before she was nominated on February 1, 1971. The petition proceeds on thJt basis.

It is not clear from the petition that how long before her nomination 'the respondent held herself out as a prospective candidate.

But all the sam~, it is obvious from those avermcnts that the respondent is alleged to hav.~ obtained the assistance ot Y ashpal Kapur when he con•tinued to be a gazetted officer for crganizing her electioneering work. The expression "electionc.r in.e" is explained in Universal English Dictionary as "aci of canvassing for votes, speaking in public and otherwise promoting the election of a particular candidate for Parliament".

Reference. to Yashpal Kapur as an election agent on a date prior to rthe date when he was appointed as such-his nomination as an eleetion agent could not have been done before February 1.

1971-is clearly a misnomer but that is irrelevant. The men; ion in paragraph 5 of the election pdtion that Y ashpal Kapur ur- _ganised th~ electioneering work in the constituency at the direction of the respondent even before her nomination and again the reference to her candidature in January in paragraph 6 shows that according •to the petitioner •the rspondent was a ''candidate" even before her nomination and further that she obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazeHed officer.

There is no gainsaying the fact •that the election petition was not ar<istically drawn up.

That unfortunately is the case with most of our pleadings. But if the petition is read reasonably, as it should b~. it is clear that the allegation of the petitioner is that the servic.~ of Yashpal Kapur were obtained by the respondent when she had already become a candidate and when she so obtaine:t his assistance, Yashpal Kapur was still a gazetted officer.'

It is true chat one of the ingredients of tho~ corrupt practice alleged i.e. that when •the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur, she was a candidate is not specifically set out in the petition but from 'lhe allegations made; it flows as a necessary implication.

While a corrupt practice has got to b~ strictly proved but from that it does not follow that a pleading in an election proceeding should receive a s'lrict construction.

This Court has held that even a defetive charge does not vitiate a criminal trial unle5' it is proved that the same has prejudiced the accused. If a plading Ol'l a reasonable construction could sustain the action, the court should accept that cons'truction.

The courts are reluctant to t frustrate an action on technical grounds. The charge of corrupt oractice in an elction is a very serious charge. Purity of election is the very essence of real democracy.

The charge in question .J has heen denied by the respondent. It has yet to be proved.

It ·-' may or may not be proved. The alle_galions made by the appellant may ultimately be proved to be wholly devoid of truth. But . . '

the question is whether the appellant should be refused an opportunity to prove his allegations ? Should the court refnse to enquire into those allegations merely because 1the appellant or someone who prepared his brief did not know the language of the law.

We have no hesitation in answering those questions in the negative. The implications of the rule of law are manifold.

' It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the relevant proYisions of the Act precluded the appellant from proving his allegations.

Therefore let us look at those provisions in the Act i.e. Clauses (a) and (b) of s. 83(1) and cl. (5) of s. 86 for finding out whether the charge has to be rejected in limine.

Section 83 (1 )(a) and (b) read :

"(1 ) An election petition-

( a) shall contain a concise statement of the materia 1

facts on which the petitioner relies;

( b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as fnll a statement as possible of the names of 'the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice.

Sub-s. ( 5) of s. 86 prescribes :

"The High Court may upon such terms as to costs and otllerwise as it may deem fit. allow the particulars of ny corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of •the petition but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing 'particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition."

From thse two provisions, it follows that if the allegations made regardin~ a corrupt practice do not disclose the constituent pans of the corrupt practioe alleged, the same will not bo allowed to be proved and further th9se allegations cannot be amended after the period of limitation for filing an election petition: but the court may allow particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified.

The 1 scope of these provisions has been considered in several deci- \\ sions of this Court. The leading decision on this point is Barish Chandra Bajpai v. Tri/ok Singh( 1).

It is not necessary to go to that decision as the ratio of •that decisions has been elaborately

ill [1957] S.C.R. 370,

RAJ NARAIN V, JNDIRA GANDHI (Hegde, !.) 849

explained by this Court in Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and ors. etc.( 1). Dealing with !be scope of ss. 83 and 86(5), 'this Court observed thiit s. 83 requires that the petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and the fullest possible particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. 'Material facts' and 'particulars' may overlap but the word 'material' shows that the ground of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be s•tated.

The function of !be particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet Under s. 86(5), if cqrrupt practice is alleged in the petition, !be particulars of such corrupt practice may be amended or amplified for ensuring a fair and effective trial, that is, more and better pani culars of the charg>~ may be given later, even after the period 01 limitation; but if a corrupt practice is not previously alleged in the petition, an amendment which will have the effect of intro ducinJ? particulars of such a corrupt practice will not be permit ed, after the period of limitation, because, it would tantamount to making a fresh petition. The same view was iaken by this Court in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh('). From these dci sions. ir follows that facts stated in rthe petition relating to a1ly corrupt practice must be sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Jn other words the facts must bring out all the ingredients of th~ corrupt practice allged. If the facts stated fail to satisfy foat requirement then they do not give rise to a triable issue. Such a defect cannot be cured by anv amendment after the period of limitation for filinJ? the election petition.

But even if all the material facts are stated in the election petiition.

For a proper trial better particulars may still be required. If !base particulars are not set out in the election petition, Ibey may be incorporaled into the election petition wilb the permission of the court even after the period of limitation. The controversy in 'this case is whether the election petition discloses a cause of action for trying Issue No. 1. We think it does. The allegations made in paragraphs 2, .5 and 6 of the petition, if read together do show that the alle gation against the respondent is that she obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur, a gazetted officer, to support her candidature by organising her electioneering work.

These allegations bring out all the igredients of te corrupt practice alleged though they are lacking m better par!lculars such as the date on which the respondent became a candidate and the date on which Yashpal Kapur was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing the electioneering work of the respondent.

The absence of thoje particulars does not per se invalidate the charge. They can be supplied even now wi'th the permission of the Court. In this con-

(I)

[19691 3 S.C.R. 603.

(2) [1972] s.c.c.: 14,

nection ii is necessary to mention that the respondent in her written statement did not say 'that the allegations in questiton did not raise a triable issue. No such objection appears to have been taken at the time of 'the framing of the issues or in any of her pleadings. It seems that the objection was taken up for the first time when the pe:tition to set aside the interrogatories was hard ..

We are sying all these only 1o show as to how the parties umlerstood the allep,,!!tions at the eatlier stages, of the proceedings.

Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision.

An action at law should not be equated to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulas to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking, there lies a juristic principle.

It is the duty of the court to ascertain that principle and implement it.

What

tbn is •the principle underlying s. 86(5)? In our opinion the.aim of •that section is to see that a person accused of a corrupt prac.- tice must know precisely what he is accused of so that he may have the opportunity to meet the allegations made against him.

If the, accusation made is nebulous and is capable of ting made use of for e_stablishing more than one charge or if it does not make out a corrupt practice at all then the charge fails at the very threshold.

So Jong as the charge levelled is beyo!ld doubt. s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement. They either pertain to the reion of particulars or evidence.

That section is not designed to interdict a mere clumsy pleading like the petition before us.

The purpose of that section is to see that every charge of corrupt practice should be brought before the court before the prescribed period of limitation and none thereafter so tllat the trial of the case may not be converted into a persecution by adding more and more charges or by convertinii, one charge into another as the trial proceeds. The best illustra1ion of the prob !em thats. 86(5) tries to meet is found in Hardwari Lal's case (supra). The allegations made in paragraph 16 Of the .petition therein wer.e as follows :

"That the respondent committed the corrupt practice of obtaining and procuring or attempting to obtain and procure the assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from the following. persons who are in the service of the Government and belongfog to the prohibited classes within the meaning of section 123'

r7) of tho~ Act-

1. Shri Chand Ram Rathi, Lecturer in Political' Science, Government College, Gurgaon.

2. Shri Gulab Singh, B.A., B.Ed., Govt. High Sclioo[

Jharsa ( Gurgaon).

3. Pt. Bltim Singh, Asstt.

Sub-Inspector, Police- Securitv Lines, Lytton Road, w Delll.i.

4. Ch. Chhatar Singh, M.A., B.T., Toaoher, V.& P.O.

Bharai via Bahadurgarh, District Roh.tak.

5. Ch. Mukhtiar Singh, Inspector of Police, Delhi.

6. Ch. Ra11; hbir Singh, M.A., B.T., Bahadurgarh.

The respondent has writ\en letters under his own signatures to the above Government servants soliciting

their help and assistance in furtherance of the prospects of his election."

These were all the material facts s'tated in the pe1ition. From those a.verments, it was net possible to make out from whom among the government servants mentioned, the returned candidate alleged to have obtained or procured assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election; and who are thoso from whom he is alleged to have attempted to obtain and procure the assistance for the said purpose. That petition was also silent as re11; ards the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempted to be ob.ained or procured. In that case, it was necessary

to state. the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempled to be obtained or procured because a candidate can take the assistance of 11, overnment servants in certain respects. The allegations made in the petition were so elastic that it could have been used for establishing multitude of charges, leaving it free to the petitioner to pick and choose the charge he is in a position to establish. That was an intolerable position for his opponent.

In substance, 'the petitioner therein had merely quoted the relevant provision of law; he had failed to state the material facts to

bring out the charge sought to be Levelled. He had Clll!t a wide net. This is not so in the case before us. Herein all the ingredients of the corrupt practice viz. ( 1) that the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur; ( 2) Kapur was a goterDment serva.nt and ( 3) his services were obtained in suppon of the c~1dature of .the reSpondent .by organising her election compa1gn, are mentioned in the petition. The question whn the respondent became a candidate is merely a matter of evidence

For the reasons mentioned above, we think that the learned 1ud11; e was not iostified in striking out Issire No. 1. -On the other hand, he sh.ould .have reframed that issue, as mentioned earlier refore 4e:?icthi$ question, it is necessary to mention one othe;

tct. Iii a~ I . ap~~ appears to have tendered his resignation to ofe 3ie ce tifiw~.boli!m2 on !anuary 13, 1971. The certified copy . . no . ca on produced shows that the President accepted..,..( his res12natK"1 on the 25th of January '71 and the same was

...

gazetted on February 6, 1971. The order of the President shows that he accepted Yashpal Kapur's resignation with effect from January 14, 1971. The learned trial judge without examining the true effect of the President's order has abruptly come to the conclusion that Yashpal Kapur's resignation became effective as from January 14, 1971. This conclusion, in our opinion, requires reexamination.

H is necessary to examine whether a government servant's resignation can be accepted with effect from an earlier date.

At any rate whether such an acceptance has any validity in considering a corrupt practice under s. 123 (7). If such a course is permissible, it might enable the government to defeat 1the mandate of s. 123(7). The question as to wlPn a government servant's resignation becomes effective came up for consideration by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India(!).

Therein this Court ruled that when a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation the determination of his employment, his service normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and, in the absence of any law or statutory rule governing the conditions of his service, to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Hence the question as to when Yashpal Kapur';

resignation became effective will have to be examined with reference to his ci:mditions of service. This examination having not been done. the conclusion of the learned trial judge that it .became effective on January 14, 1971, has to be ignored.

For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the trial judge striking out Issue No. l and the last part of Issue No. 3 and restore Issue No. I as amended by us.

Now coming to the appeal against the order on the amendment application, the foamed trial judge disallowed the amendments sought on t!J.~ sole 1ground that if <those amendments are allowed, it will amount to amending the statement of material facts and 1the same is not permissible in view of s. 86(5). We have already found that that conclusion of the learned trial judge is not correct. The amendment application was moved even before the trial of the case commenced. It is not shown how the amendments sought in respect of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the petition can prejudice the case of the respondent. They are merely clarifica- 1 tory in charater. !his Court uled in Shri B_alwan .ingh v.

Shri Lakshmi Narain and ors.(·) that an electton petition was

. not liable to be dismissed in limine because full particulars of corrupt practice alleged were not set out.

It further observed '- that if an objection was taken and the tribunal was of the view . ~that the full particulars have not been set out, the petitioner had

-Ol-[l96iJ 3 S.ER. 857. ----

(2) [1960] J s.c.R. 91.

to be .R)ven an opportunity 'to amend or amplify the particulars.

It was only in the event of non-compliance with the order to supply the pal'liculars that the charge which remained vague could be struck out. In that case 1he amendment was sought after the evidence was closed in the case.

Ti\is Court allowed the same.

Courts are ordinarily liberal in allowing amendment of pleadings B unless it results in prejudicing the case of the opposite party. Any • inconvenience caused by an amendment can always be compensated by costs..

We think that the amendments asked for, should . have been allowed and we allow the same.

The election peti , tion will be accordingly amended and the respondent will be

afforded an opportunity to file any additional written statement, if c she so desires.

This leaves us with the question of interrogatories. As many as 31 interrogatories have been served on the respondent as mentioned earlier.

Out of them Nos. 24 to 30 have been allowed.

Hence we need not consider them.

Interrogatories Nos. 19 to 23 relate to Issue No. 2.

Therefore they are rightly struck out.

We now come to in~rrogatories Nos. I to 18 and 31. We have carefully ex!!!!).ined those interrogatories.

None of them' 1ouch the core of the allegations relating 'to commission of the corrupt practice which is the subject matter of Issue No. 1. They merely tourh the frin2.e of the matter.

Order XT, r. I, C.P.C. provides :

"In any wit the plaintiff or defendant by leave of '>the Court may deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the opposite parties or any one or more of such parties and such interrogatories when delivered shall have a note at the foot thereof stating whicn of

uch interrogtories each of such person. is required to

lnswer; Providd that no party shall deliver more than one set of interrogatories to the same party without an order for that purpose.

Provided, a\so that interrogatories which do not rejate to. any matters in question in the suit shall be

de4)e~ melevant, notwithstanding, 'that they might be admtssible on the oral cross-examination of a witness."

Qu~ion~ that may be :elevant during cross-examination me not neceanly relevant as rn~rrogatories. The only questions that are .relevant. as, injrrogatories are those relating to "any matters m quest10n'.

The interrogatories served must h

reasoab!y close onnection with "matters in question".

Vie~~~ !bus, mterro2atones I to 18 as well as 31 mu51 be held t ,_, 1rrelevarrt. o "'"

In the result Civil Appeal No. I 08 or 1972 is allowed to the A extent mentioned abov.~. In other respects the same is dismissed.

Civil App;:al No. 109 of 1972 is .allowed in full. In the circumstances of 1hese cases, we make no order as to costs.

K:B.N.

Civil A ppea/ No. !08 of 1912 allowed in part.

Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1972 allowed. : B

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