ABHINANDAN JHA & ORS. v.

DINESH MISHRA (With Connected Appeal)

April 17, 1967

[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure (Act S of 1898), ss. 169, 170, 173 and 190(1)-Report tc police of cognir.able offence-Report by police to magistrate after investigation that offence not made out-If magistrate can direct police ro file charge-sheet.

On the question whether a magistrate could direct the police to sub mil a chargheet1 when the police, after investigation into a cognizable offence, had sublllltted a report of the action taken under s. 169, Cr.

P.C., that there was no case made out for sending up the accused for trial, HELD : There was no such power conferred on a magistrate either expressly or by implication.

When a cognizable offence is reported to the police they may after investigation take action under s. 169 or s. 170 Cr. P.C. If the police think there is not sufficient evidence against the accused, they may, under s. 169 release the accused from custody on his executing a bond to appear before a competent magistrate if and when so required; or, if the police think there IS sufficient evidence, they may, under s. 170, forward the accused under custody to a competent magistrate or release the accused on bail in cases where the offences are bailable. In either case the police should submit a report of the action taken, under s. 173, to the competent magistrate who considers it judicially under s. 190 and takes the following action :

(I) If the report is a charge-sheet under s. 170 it is open to the magistrate to agree with it and take cognizance of the offence under s. !90(! )(b); or to take the view that the facts disclosed do not make out an offeeee and decline to. take cognizance. But he cannot call upon the police to submit a report that the accused need not be proceeded against on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence.

(2) If the report is of the action taken under s. 169, then the magistrate may agree with the report and close the proceeding. If he disagrees with the report he can give directions to the police under s. 156(3) to make a further investigation. If the police, after further investigation submit a charge.,.heet, the magistrate may follow the procedure where the charheet under s. 170 is filed; but if the police are still of the opinion that there was not sufficient evidence against the accused, the

mastrate may agree or disagree with it Where he agrees, the case agamst the accused is closed. Where the magistrate disagrees and forms the opinion that the facts set out in the report constitute an offence, he can take cognizance under s. 190(1) (c). The provision in s. 169 enabl

ing the police to take a bond for the appearance of the accused before a magistrate if so required, is to meet such a contingeilcy of the magistrate Jaking cognizance of the offence notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police.

The power under s. 190(l)(c) was intended to secure that

ABINANDAN v. DINESH (Vaiaialingam, J.) 66~

offences may not go unpunished and justice may be invoked even whpersons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute, or the police either wantonly or through a balW fide error do not submit a charge-sheet.

But the magistrate cannot direct the polioe to submit a charge-sheet, because the submission of the report depends entirely upon the opinion formed by the police and not on the opinion of the map Irate. The magistrate, if he disagrees with the report of the police, caa himself take cogniZance of the offence under s. 190(1)(a) or (c), but, he cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion on inveatlp tion and submit a report according to such opinion. [672F-H; 673B; 676H; 677B-H: u78A-fJ: (j79A-C. E-H]

Slate af Gujarat v. Sh<h Lakhamshi, A.I.R. 1966 Gujarat 283 (F.B.); Vcnkatu.rnbha v. Anianayulu, A.LR. 1932 Mad. 673; Abdul Rahim v.

Abdul Muktadin, A.I.R. 1953 Assam 112; Amar Premanand v. Stal•, A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 12 and A. K. Ray v.

State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 135 (F.B.), approved.

State v. Murlidhar Gavardhan, A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 240 and Ram Nandan v. State, A.I.R, 1966 Pat. 438, disapproved.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966.

Appeal by special leave from the order dated August 5, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1020 of 1966,

AND Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 40 cif 1965.

B. P. Iha and Subhag Mal Jain, for the appellants (in Cr. A.

No. 218 of 1966).

Nuruddin Ahmed and R. C. Prasad, for the appellants (in Cr. A. No. 238 of 1966).

U. P. Singh, for the respondents (in both the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J.

The common question, that arises for consideration, in these two criminal appeals, by special leave, is as to whether a Magistrate can direct the police to submit a chargesheet, when the police, after the investigation inio a congnizable offence, had submitted a final report, under s. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called the Code). There is a conflict of opinion, on this point between the various High Courts in India. The High Courts of Madras, Calcutta; Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Gujarat have taken the view that the Magistrate has no such power, whereas, the Patna and Bombay High Courts have held a contrary view. Jn Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966, the respondent, o:uesh Mishra, lodged a. first informat10n report, on June 3,

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1965, at the Rajoun Police Station, that he saw a thatched house, of one lJma Kant Misra, situated on the northern side of his house, burning, and the ptitioners herein, running away from the scene.

The police made an investigation and submitted what is called a 'final report', under s. 173(1) of the Code, to the effect that the offence complained of, was false.

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate received this report on July 13, 1965, but, in the meanwhile, the respond.nt had filed what is termed 'a protest petition', challenging the correctness of the report submitted by the police. The Magistrate appears to have perused the police diary and, after hearing the counsel for the respondent and the public prosecutor, passed an order on October 27, 1965, directing the police to submit a charge.sheet, against the petitioners, herein.

The petitioners challenged this order, without success, both before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur, and the Patna High Court. It was held .by the High Court, following its previous decision, that the Magistnite has jurisdiction to call for a charge-sheet, when he disagrees with the report submitted by the police, under s. 173 ( 1) of the Code. The petitioners. in this appeal, challenge these orders.

S1milarly, in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966, the second respondent therein, had lodged a written report, on Fe)lruary 24, 1964, before the police, at Malsalami police station, that his daughter, Hiramani, was missing from February 21, 1964, and that the appellants in , that appeal, had kidnapped her. A case

under s. 366 I.P.C. was registered against them.

The police, after investigation, submitted a final report to the Magistrate, to the effect that the girl concerned, had been recevered and that she had stated that she had, of her own accord, eloped; and therefore the police stated that the case might be treated as closed; ·

The second respondent filed a 'protest petition' in Court, challenging the statements of the police and he also filed a complaint, under s. 498 I.P .C.

The Magistrate, after a perusal of the case diary of the police, and bl'.aring the lawyer for the appellants and the second respondent, a• also the public prosecutor) passed an order directing the .investigating officer to submit a charge-sheet, agiµnst the accused persons, under s. 366 I.P .C This order has been confirmed by the learned Sessions Judjle, as well as the Patna High Court.

Here also, the Patna High Court, in accordance with its previous decision, held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass the order, in question.

All these. orders are challenged by the appellants, in this appeal.

On behalf of the appellants, in Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966, Mr. Jha. learned counsel pointed out that when a final report is submitted by the police, under s. 173 (l) of the Code.

ABINANDAN v. D!NESH (Vaiaiaungam, J.) 671

A stating that no case is made out, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct the police to file a charge-sheet.

It may be open, counsel points out, to the _Magistrate, to direct further investigation to be made by the police, or to treat the protest petition filed by the second respondent, as a complaint, and take cognizance of the offence and proceed, according to layv., The scheme 11 of Chapter XIV of the Code, counsel points out, clearly indicates that the formation of an opinion, as to whether or not there i5 a case to place the accused on trial, is that of the investigating officers, and the Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a par_ticular opinion on the investigation and to submit a r.eport, according to such opinion. In this case, there is nothing to show c that the protest petition, filed by the second respondent, has been

treated as a complain,!, in which case, it may be open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, but, in the absence of any such procedure being adopted according to counsel, the order of the Magistrate directing a charge-sheet tO be filed, is lllegal and not warranted by the provisions of the Code. These contentions have been adopted, and reiterated, by Mr. Nuruddin D Ahmed, on behalf of the appellants, in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966.

Both the learned counsel pressed before us, for acceptance, the views, as expressed by the Gujarat High Court, in its F-ull Bench judgment, reported as State of Gujarat v. Shah Lakham- E shi('). On the other hand, Mr. U. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, in Criminal Appeal No. 218 of 1966", has pointed ou, t that the Magistrate has jurisdiction, in proper cases, when he does not agree with the final report submitted by the police, to direct them to submit a charge-sheet. Otherwise, counsel points out, , the position will be that the entire matter is left to the discretion of the police authorities, and the Courts will be powerless, F even when they feel that the action of the police is not justified.

Quite naturally, counsel prays for acceptance of the views expressed by the dissenting Judges, in A. K. Roy v. State of W. B.(2) and by the Bombay and Patna High Courts, in .the decisions reported as State v. Murlidhar Govardhan(8 ), and Ram Nandan

v. State('), respectively.

Jn order, propely, . to appreciate the duties of e police, in the matter of 1nvestigat1on of offences, as well as their powers, it is necessary to refer to the provisions contained in Chapter XIV of the Gode. That chapter deals with 'Information to the Police and their Powers to investigate', and it contains the group of section beginning from s. 154 and ending with s. 176. Section 154 deals with information relating to the commission of a cognizable

(!)A. I, R. 1966 Guj, 283.

(2) A. I. R, 1962 Cal. 135 (F. B.).

(3) A. I. R. 1960 limn 240.

(4) A. I. R. 1966 Pat. 438,

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offence, and the procedure to be adopted in respect of the same.

Section 15 5, similarly, deals with information in respect of noli• cognizable offences. Sub-s. (2), of this section, prohibits a police officer from investigating a non-cognizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Section 156 authorizes a police officer, in-charge of a police station, to investigate any cognizable case, without the order of a Magistrate. Therefore, it will be seen that large powers are conferred on the police, in the matter of investigation into a cognizable offence.

Sub-s. (3), of s. 156, provides for any Magistrate empowered under s. 190, to order an investigation.

In cases where a cognizable offence is suspected to have been committed, the officer, in-charge of a police station, after sending a report to the Magistrate, is entitled, under s. 157, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and also to take steps for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Clause (b ), of the proviso to s. 157 (1), gives a discretion to the police officer not to investigate the case, if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation. Sectip_n 158 deals with the procedure to be adopted in the matter of"a rePort to be sent, under s. 157. Section 159 gives power to a Magistrate, on receiving a report under s. 157, either to direct an investigation or, himself or through another Magistrate subordinate to him, to hold a preliminary enquiry into the matter, or otherwise dispose of the case, in accordance with the Code. Sections 160 to 163 deal with the power of the police to require attendance of witnesses, examine witnesses and record statements. Sections 165 and 166 deal with the power of police officers, in the matter of conducting searches, during an investigation, in tlie circumstances, mentioned therein.

Section 167 provides for the procedure to be adopted by the police, when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours.

Section 168 provides for a report being sent to the officer, incharge of a police station, about the result of an investigation, when such investigation has been made by a subordinate police officer, under Chapter XIV.

Section 169 authorises a police officer to release a person from custody, on his executing a bond, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate, in cases when, on investigation under Chapter XIV, it appears to the officer, in-charge of the police station, or to the police officer making the investigation, that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, to justify the fonvarding of the accused to a Magistrate. Section 170 empowers the officer, incharge of a police station, after investigation unde.r Chapter XIV. and if it appears to him that there is st111icient evidence, to fonvard the accused, under custody, to a competent Magistrate or to take securtiy from the accused for his appearance before the Magistrate in cases where the offence is bailable. Section 172 makes it obligatory on the police officer making an investiga?on, to maintain a diary recording the various particulars therein and in the

ABH!NANDAN v. DINESH (Vaidialingam, J.) 673

manner indicated in that section.

Section 173 provides for an investigation, under Chapter XIV, to be completed, without unnecessary delay .and also makes it obligatory, on the officr, incharge of the police station, to . send a report. to the Mgtstrate concerned, in the manner provided for therem, contammg the necessary particulars. It is now only necessary to refer to s. 190, occurring in Chapter XV, relating to jurisdiction of criminal Courts in inq.uiries and trials. That section is to be found under the headmg 'Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings' and its sub-s. ( l) is as follows:

" ( I ) Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistra'.c specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence-

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; ( b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer; ( c) upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed." From the foregoing sections, occurring in Chapter XIV, it will be seen that very elaborate provisions have been made for securing tha'. an investigation does take place into a reported offence and the inveitigation is carried out within the limits of the law, without causing any harassment to the accused and is also completed without unnecessary or undue delay.

But the point to be noted is that the manner and method of conducting the investigation, are left entirely to the police, and the Magistrate, so far as we can see, has no power under any of these provisions, to interfere with the same.

If, on investigation, it appears to the officer, in-charge of a police station, or to the officer making an investigation, that 1here is no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds of suspicion justifying the forwarding of an accused to a

Mag1strat.~, s. 169 says that the officer shall release the accused if in custody. on h_is execu'.ing a bond to appear before the Magis'.

Irate.

S1m!larly, 1f, on the other hand, it appears to the officer,

rn-harge of a police station, or to the officer making the investigation, under Chapter XIV, that there is sufficient evidence or 1 easc; nable ground to justify the forwarding of an accused to a Magistrate, such an officer is required, under s. 170, to forward the accused to a Magistrate or, if the offence is bailable, to tajce security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate. But, whether a case comes under s. 169, or under s. 170, of the Code, on the completion of the investigation, the police officer has to L7SupCl/67-13

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submit a report to the Magistrate, under s. 173, in the manner indicated therein, containing the various details. The question as to whether the Magistrate has got power to direct the police to fi!e a charge-sheet, on receipt of a report under s. 1.73 really depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate, on receiving a report.

In this connection, we may refer to certain observations, made by the Judicial Committee in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed(') and by this Court, in H. N. Rishbud and Ind!!r Singh v. The State of Delhi('). In Nazir Ahmed's Case('), Lord Poiter observes, at 212, as follows:

"Just as it is essen'.ial that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry.

In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. fhe functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus.

In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then."

These observations have been quoted, with approval, by this G Court, in State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak('). This Court in Rishbud and lnder Singh's Case('), observes, at p. 1156, as follows:

"Investigation usually starts on information relating to the commission of an offence given to an officer incharge of a police station and recorded under sec- H

(t) L. R, 711. A, 203.

(2) [1955] I. S. C. R, 115 I.

(3) A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 447.

'.H


ABHINANDAN v. DINESH (Vaidialingam, J.) 675

tion l 54 ef the Code. If from information so received or otherwise, the officer in charge of the police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence, he or some other subordinate officer deputed by .him, has to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and if necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender.

Thus investigation primarily consists in the ascertainment of the facts and circums!ances of the case.

By definition, it includes 'all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer'."

Again, after a reference to some of the provisions in Chapter XIV of the Code, it is observed at p. 1157 :

"Thus, under the Code investiga'.ion consists generaliy of the following steps : ( 1) Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case,

(3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, ( 4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of

(a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and ( 5) Forma'.ion of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under section 173 ..... It is also clear that the final step in the investigation viz.. the formation of tlie opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is to be that of the officer in-charge of the police station."

V'!~ are referring to these observations for the purpose of emphasizing that the scheme of Chapter XIV, clearly shows . that the formation of an opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial, has been left to the officer incharge of a police station.

Bearing in mind these principles referred to above, we have to consider the question that arises for consideration, in this case.

The High Courts which have held that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to call upon the police to file a charge-sheet, under such circumstances, have rested their decision on two principles viz., (a) that there is no express provision in the Code empowering a Magistrate to pass such an order; and (b) such a power, in view of the scheme of L7SupCl/67-14

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Chapter XIV, cannot be inferred-vide V enkata Subha v.

Anjanayulu('); Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Muktadin('); Amar Prctnanand v. Stare('); the majority view in A. K. Roy v. State of W. B.('); and State of Gujarat v. Shah Lakhamshi("). On the other hand, the High Courts which have recognised such a power, rest their decision again on two grounds viz., (a) when a report is submitted by the , POiice, after investigation, the Magistrate has to deal with it judtcially, which will mean that when the report is not accepted, the Magistrate can give suitable directions to the police; and (b) the Magistrate is given supervision over the conduct of investigation by the police, and therefore, such a power can be recognised in the Magistrattl-'-vide State v. Murlidhar Goverdhan( 6); arid Ram Nandan v. State(').

Though it may be that a report submitted by the police may have to be dealt with, judicially, by a Magistrate, and although the Magistrate may have certain supervisory powers, nevertheless, we are not inclined to agree with the further view that from these considerations alone it can be said that when the police submit a report that no case has been made out for sending up an accused for trial, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge-sheet. But, we may make it clear, that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless, because, as will be indicated later, it is open to him to take cognizance of an offence and proceed, according to law We do not also find any such power, under s. 173 ( 3), as is ., ought to be inferred, in some of the decisions cited above. As we have indicated broadly the apP.roach made by the various High Courts in coming to different conclusions, we do not think it necessary to refer to those decisions in detail.

It will be seen that the Code, as such, does not use the expression 'charge-sheet' or 'final report'. But it is understood, in the Police Manual containing Rules and Regulations, that a report by the Police, filed under s. 170 of the Code, is referred to as a 'charge-sheet'.

But in respect of the reports sent under s. 169, i.e., when there is no sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, it is termed variously, in different States, as either 'referred charge', 'final report', or summary'.

In these two appeals, which are from the State of Bihar, the reports, under s. 169, are referred to as 'final report' .. Now, the question as to what exactly is to dcme by a Mag1strte, on receiving a report. under s. 173, will have t'? be considered.

That report may be in respect of a case, commg under s. 170,

-(i) A IR 19:ffi.\.; d67J-

(2) A.l.R. 1953 Assam 112.

(3) A°I'R' 1960 Mp

0 12 . (4l A.l.R.1962 Cal. 135.

(5) Al:R: 1966 Gj.

0 283. .

(6) A.l.R. 1960 Born. 240. . (7l .A.l.R. 1966 Pat. 438.

ABHINANDAN v. DINESH (Vaidia/ingam, J.) 677

or one coming under s. 169.

We have already referred to s. 190, which is the first section in the group of sections headed 'Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings.' Sub-s. (l), of this section, will cover a report sent, under s. 173. The use of the words 'may take cognizance of any offence', in sub-s. (1) of s. 190 in our opinion imports the exercise of a 'judicial discretion', and the Magistrate, who receives the rert, Ul)der s. 173, will have to consider the said report and judicially titlce a decision, whether or not to take cognizance of the offence.

From this it follows that it is not as if that the Magistrale is bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is a case for placing the accused, on trial.

It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts disclosed in the report do not make out an offence for tak:ng cognizance or he may take the view that there is no sufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. On either of these grounds, the Magistrate will be perfectly justified in declining to take cognizance of an offence, irrespective of the opinion of the police. On the other hand, if the Magistrate agrees with the report, which is a charge-sheet submitted by the police, no difficulty whatsoever is caused, because he will have full jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, under s. 190(1 )(b) of the Code. This will be the position, when the report undei' s. 173, is a charge-sheet.

Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under s. 173, that no case is made out for send<ing up an accused for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a 'final report'? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be . instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a consideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is not based on a full and complete investigation, in which case, in our opinion, the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under s. 156 ( 3), to make a further inves'.igation.

That is, if the Magistrate feels, after considering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direc'. th.~ police to make further investigation, under s. 156(3).

The police, after such further investigation, may submit a chargesheet, or, again submit a .final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If, ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he can take cognizance of the offence under s. 190 ( 1) ( c). notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police. expressed in the final report.

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111 this connection, the provisions of s. 169 of the Ccide, are relevant. They specifically provide that even though, on investigation, a police officer, or other investigating officer, is of the opinion that there is no case for proceeding against the accused, he is bound, While releasing the accused,, to tal!; e a bond from him to appear, 'if and when required, before a Magistrate. This provision is obviously to meet a contingency of the Magistrate, when he considers the report of the investigating officer, and judicially takes a view different from the police.

We have to approach the question, arising for consideration in this case, in the light of the circumstances pointed out above.

We have already referred to. the schem11 of Chapter XIV,. as well as the observations of this Court in Rishbud and lnder Singh's Case(') that the formation of the opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial before a Magistrate, is 'left to the officer in-charge of the police station. There is no express power, so far as we can see, which gives jurisdiction to pass an order of th.e nature under attack; nor can any such powers be implied.

There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police.

Under those circumstances, if he still suspects that an offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to tal!; e cognizance, under s. 190(1)(c) of the Code.

That provision, in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may not go , unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute. or the police, either wantonly or through bona fide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts constituting the offence.

Therefore, a very wide power is conferred on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. not only when he receives information about the -commission of an offence from a third person, but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that the offence has been committed. It is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, under s. 190 ( 1 )( c), on the ground that, after having due rellard to the final report and the police records placed before hnn, he has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed.

Therefore. these circumstances will also clearly negative the power of a Magistrate to call for a charge-sheet from the police, when they have submitted a final report. The entire scheme of Chapter XIV clearly indicate~ that the formation of the opinion, as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused for trial, is that of the officer in-charge of the police station and that opinion determines whether the report is to be under s .. 170. being a 'charge-sheet', or under s. 169, 'a final report' It is no (i).[t9ss1ls.c.R. 11so:- ···-

. j

ABliINANDAN v. DINESH (Vaidialingam, J.) 67~

doubt open to the Magistrate, as we have already pointed. out, to accept or disagree with lhe opinion of the police and, if he disagrees, he is entitled to adopt any one of the courses indicated by us.

But he cannot direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, because, the submission of the report depends upon the opinion. fonned by the police, and not on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion, on the investigation, and to submit a report, according to such opinion. That will be really encroaching on the sphere of the police and compelling the police to fonn an opinion so as to accord with the decision of the Magistrate and send a report, either under s. 169, or under s. 170, depending upon the nature of the decision. Such a function has been left to the police, under the Code.

We have already pointed out that the investigation, under the Code, takes in several aspects, and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected, a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or a final rport is dependent on the nature of the opinion, so formed.

The formation of the said opinion, by the police, as pointed out earlier, is the tina.l step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority.

The question can also be considerd from another point of view.

Supposing the police send a report, viz., a charge-sheet, under s. 170 of the Code.

As we have already pointed out, the Magistrate is not bound to accept that report, when he considers the matter judicially.

But, can he differ from the police and call upon them to submit a final report, under s.169? In our opinion. the Magistrate has no such power. If he has no such power, in law, it also follows that the Magistrate has no power to direct the police -to submit a charge-sheet when the police have submitted a final report that no case is made out for sending the accused for trial.

The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the circumstance5 mentioned earlier, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to challge their opinion, so as to accord with his view.

Therefore, to conclude, there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on .a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under s. 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial.

L7 Sup. Cl/67--15

SUPREME COURT REPORT$


In these two appeals, one other fact will have to be taken note of.

It is not very clear as to whether the Magistrate, in each of these cases, has chosen to treat the protest petitions, filed by the respective respondents; as complaints, because, we do not find that the Magistrate has adopted the suitable procedure indicated in the Code, when he takes cognizance. of an offence, on a complaint made to him. Therefore, while holding that the orders of the Magistrate, in each of these cases, directing the police to file charge-sheets, is without jurisdiction, we make it clear that it is open to the Magistrate to treat the respective pro-- test petitions, as complaints, and take further proceedings,

according to law, and in the light of the views expressed by us, in this judgment.

Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1966, particularly urged that it is unnecessary to direct further proceedings to be continued, so far as his clients are concerned. Learned counsel pointed out that the police report before the Magistrate clearly shows that the girl, in question, who is stated to be above 19 years of age, has herself stated that she had eloped, of her own accord and that if that is so, further proceedings against his clients, are absolutely unnecessary, to be continued.

We are not inclined to accept these contentions of the learned counsel.

As to whether an offence is made out or whether any of the appellants or both of them are guilty of the offences with which they may be charged, are all matters which do not require to be considered, by this Court, at this stage.

Jn the result, subject to the directions contained above, the orders of the Magistrate, directing the police to file a charge, will be set aside, and the appeals allowed, to that extent.

V.P.S.

Appeals allowed.