2 8.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 571

MITHOOLAL NAYAK

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA

(S.K. DAs, K. SunnA RAO and RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)

ln•urance-Life Policy-Obtained by deliberate mis-statement and fraudulent suppiusion-Re'JlUdiatio1t by Company <rfter l'JJO yean-Whether proper-Rtfund of money paid. as premium-Insurance Act, 1938 ( 4 of 1938) s. 45-lndian Contract Act, 1/172 (9 of 1872) ss. 64 and 65.

In 1942, one M sent a proposal for the insurance of his life.

He was examined by Dr. D who submitted two reports, one with the proposal form and one confidential. The confidential report showed that M was anaemic, had a dilated heart and his right lung showed indications of an old attack of pneumonia or pleurisy and that he was a total physical wreck. Nothing carr.e out of this proposal and it lapsed. In 1943, M consulted and was treated by one Dr. L for anatrnia orderna of the feet, diarrhoea and panting on exertion.

In 1944, M made a second proposal fur insurance of his life. Against the question in the proposal form whether he had consulted any medical man for any ailment within the last five years, he gave tl:e answer, "'No'.

He also did not disclose any of his ailments. Aft'f medical examination by one Dr. K the proposal was accepted and a policy for Rs. 25,000/- was issued on March 13, 1945.

The policy lapsed for non-payment of premium but was revived in July, 1946.

In November, 1946, M died.

His assignee, the appellant, made a demand for Rs. 26,000/· but the Company on October

10, 1947, repudiated it on the ground that the policy had been obtained by delibernte mis-statem<nt and fraudulent suppression of material facts.

Thereupon, the appellant filed a suit to reco\er the amount of the policy contending that s. 45 Insurance Act, barred the Company from calling in question the policy after two ye'!rs on the ground that any statement made in the proposal was inaccurate or false.

Held, that the policy-holder was guilty of frudulent suppression of material facts relating to his health and the Company was entitled to avoid the contract.

Section 45 Insurance Act applied to the case as two years had lapsed since the policy was effected ; in view of the Ian guage of s.45 the two years could not be count<d from the date of the revival of the policy. The second part of s. 45 entitled the company to repudiate the contract even after the expiry

Jf16S

Jat1110ry JS.

l96Z

MilAH/"1 Jicyal; •.

Li/t 1Mt1'anct Corpor.tion of lnclia

572 SUPREME:; COURT REPORTS [1962] BUPP.

of two years if three conditions were fulfilled viz.

(a) the statement was on a material matter or there was suppression of facts which it WIU material to disclose; (b) the supprcuion was fraudulently made by the policy-holder, and (c} the policy-holdor m, ust have known at the time of the making of the statement that it was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose.

When M was treated in 1943 by Dr. L he wa• sull'ering from serious ailments.

He must have known that it was material to disclose this but made a false statement that he had not been trated by any doctor for any serious ailment. There was deliberate supprc- 8'ion fraudulmtly made. by M.

Even though the Company had got M examinG!I by four doctors before issuing the policy, it was nlM estoppedirom questioning the policy.

It had no means oflmowing that M had been treated by Dr. L for

srrious ailments.

H•ltl, further, that the appellant was not entitled even to a refund of the money paid as premium as one of the term• of the policy was that all monies paid belonged to the Company if the policy was vitiated by fraudulent suppresalon of matrial facb. To such a contract neither s. 65 nor s. 6-l of the"Indlan Contract had any application.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 224 of 1959.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 28, 1956, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in F.A. No. 90 of 1949.

A. V. Vnatha Saatri-, l!J. N. Andley, Ramuhwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the appellant.

S. T. Desai, R. GanapatAy Iyer and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent.

1962. January 15-The Judgment of the Olurt was deli v.ered by

o., 1, S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a oertifioate granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh

under Art. 133 (I) (a) of the Constitution, The appellant ill Mithoolal Nayak, who took an &88ignment on Ootober 18, HM5 of a life imuranoe policy on the life of one Mahajan Deolal for a sum of Re. 25,000/- in ciroumstanooe which we shall presently state. Mahajan Deolal died on November 12, 1940

Thereafter, the appellant made a demand against the respondent company for a sum of Rs. 26,000/- and odd on the basis of the life insurance policy which had been assigned to him.

This claim or demand of the appellant was repudiated by the respondent. companv by a letter dated October 10, 1947, which in substance stated that the insured Mahajan Deolal had been guilty of deliberate mis-statements and fraudulent suppression of material information in answers to questions in the proposal form and the personal statement, which formed the basis of the contract between the insurer and the insured. On the repudiation of his claim the appellant brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen.

The suit was originally instituted against the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd., Bombay, which issued the policy in favour of Mahajan Deolal on March 13,

1945. Latter, on the passing of the life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, there was a statutory transfer of the assets and liabilities of the controlled (life) business of all insurance companies and insurers operating in India to a Corporation known as the Life Insurance Corporation of India. By an order of this Court made on February 16, 1960, the sitid Uorporation was substituted in plaP, e of the original respondent. For brevity and convenience we shall ignore the distinction between the oriinal respondent and the said Corporation and refer to the respondent in this judgment as the respondent company. The Suit was decreed by the learned Additional District Judge of Jabalpur by his judgment dated May 7, 1919. The respondent company then preferred an appeal to the Hi!!h Court of Madhya

Pradesh. This appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the said High Court and by a judgment dated August 28, 1956, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismis8ed with costs. It is from

Jlithoolat NaJalc

" Lif~ l11surance CorporaJion of l 11dic

Das J

JlitA .. W N9•

y, Lif1 1"""""" eo.,.ro1w. •11 "'"1

DasJ.

574 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

that appellate judgment and decree that the prosent appeal has been brought to this Court.

We now proOP.ed to state some of the relPvant facts relating to tho appeal and the contentions

urged on behalf of the appellant. Mahajan Deolal was a reBident of village Singhpur, Tehsil Narsinghpur. It appears 'hat he was a small land

holder and poBBessed several acres of land. Sometime in December, 1942, Mahajan Deolal submitted a propoeal through one Rahatullah Khan, an agent of the respondent company at Narsin!!'.hpur, for the insurance of his life with tho respondent company for a sum of Hs. 10,000f only. Mahajan Deolal's age at that time was about 45 as stated by him. In the propoal form which was submitted to the respondent company, Mahajan Deolal mentioned the name of one Motilal ayak, by profc88ion a doctor, as a personal friend who best knew the state of the health and habits etc. of the insured. This Motilal Nayak, be it noted, is a brother of th<• appellant, the evidenee in the reC'ord showing that the two brothers lived together in the same house. Wht-n the proposal for msurance of his life Wiil! made by Mal1ajan Deolal in December 1!142, he was examined hy a doctor named Dr. n. D. Desai.

This doctor submitted two reports about Mahajan Deolal; one report, it apy.ears, was submitted with the proposal form through the agent of the reapondent company; anuther report was sent in a confidential cover along with a letter from tho doctor.

Jn this letter (Ex. D-22) the doctor explained why he was submitting two medical reports. In substance he said that the report submitted with the proposal form at the instan<"e of the agent, Rahatullah Khan, was not a correct report and the correct report was the one which he enclosed in the confidential cover. In that rE'port Dr. Desai said that Mahajan Deolal

was anaemic, looked about 55 years old, had a dilated heart and his right lung showed indications of an old attack of pneumonia or pleurisy. The doctor further said that the general health of Mahajan Deolal was very much run down and he was a total physical wreck. The doctor opined that Mahajan Deolal's iife was an uninsurable life. It appears that nothing came out of the proposal made by Mahajan Dcolal for the insurance of his life in December, Hl42.

The evidence of the Inspector of the respondent company shows that on receipt of Dr. Desai's repcn'ts, the respondent company directed that Mahajan Deolal shou Id bP further examined by the Civil Surgeon, Hoshangabad and District l\Iedical Officer, Railways at Jabalpur.

Mahajan Deolal could not, however, be examined by the two doctors aforesaid and according to the rules of the respondent company the proposal lapsed on the expiry of six months for want of completion of the medical examination as required by the re:, pu11dcnt company. Then, on July !ti, HJ44, a second proposal was made through the same agent of the respondent company for the. insurance of the lifo of ilfahajan Deolal, this time for a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. The Inspector of the respondent company said in his evidence that this second proposal was made at the instance of the same a.gent, Raha.tullah Khan, inasmuch as the proposal of 1942 had not been rejected but had only lapsed. It appears that at the time of the first proposal in 1942 Mahajan Dcolal had paid a sum of Rs. 571/- and odd towards the first premium due in case the proposal was accepted. In the personal statement, accompanying the second proposal of July 16, 1944, it was stated that an earlier proposal for insuring tht> life of Mahajan Deolal was pending with the re11pondent company. Now, in the proposal form (Ex. D-ll) there was a question (question no. 13) to the following effect :

Mithoolal Nayak

v, Life lnsuranc1 Corporation of India

Das J.

.v;11Nolal Nay"

LiJ• 1 ruiua11ee c .. ,,,.,;.,. of llllii•

Das J,

576 St"PREMECOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

"Have you within the past five yeal'll consulted an:v medical man for any ailment, not neC<'ssarily confining you to your house7 If so, givn details and state names and dddre.eeea of medical man consulted."

The &nswor given to the question was-"No".

This answer, 'MJCording to the case of the resp on dent, w:i.e false and deliberately false, because, according to the evidence of one Dr. P.N Lakshma nan, Consulting Physician at Jabalpur, Mahajan Deolal was examined and treated by the said doctor between the dates September 7, 1943, and October 6, 1943, when the doctor found that Mahajan Deolal was suffering from anaemia, oedema of the feet, diarrhoea and panting on exertion. Wo shall advert in greater det, ail to the evidence of Dr. Laksbmanan at a later stage. In his personal statement acoompanying the second prop088.I Mahajan Deolal answered in the negative question l 2(b), the queation boing as to when he was last under medical treat. ment and for what ailment and how long.

In the samo personal st11.tement with regard to questions, for example, question nos. 5(a); 5(b) eto., as to whei.ber he snffored from shortness of breath, anaemia, asthma eto., Mahajan Deolal gave negative answel'll. The contention on behalf of the respon dent oompany was that these answers in the personal statement were alao deliberately false and constituted a fraudulent supprei; eiort of material particulars relating to the health of the insured.

With regard to' the second proposal and the pel'llonal

statemnt accompanying it, Dr. Motilal Nayak, brother of the appellant, gave a friend's report, in which he aid that Mahajan Deolal's health lvas good and that he had never heard that Mohajan Deolal suffered from any illness.

It is worthy of note here that Dr. Motilal Nayak himself took .Mahajan Deolal to Dr. Lakshmanan for trf'atmcnt at Jabalpur in September.October,· 1943. On reocipt

of the second proposal in July, 1944, Mahajan Deolal was examined by Dr. Kapadia, who was the District Medical Officer of the Railways at Jabalpur.

Dr. Ka, Padia reported that Mahajan Deolal was a

helthy man and looked about 52 to 54 years old.

He recommended that Mahajan Di; olal might be given a policy of fourteen years. In his report Dr.

Kapadia noted that Mahajan Deolal had stated that he had suffered from pneumonia four or five years ago, and that he had also cholera some years ago.

No mention, however, was made of anaemia, asthma, shortness of breath etc. On December 29, 1944, Mahajan Deolal made a further declaration of his good health and so also on February 12, 1945.

On March 13, 1945, the policy was issued by the respondent company. It contained the usual terms of such life insurance policies, one of which was that in case it would appear that any untrue or incorrect averment had been made in the proposal form or personal statement, the policy would be void. The first premium due on the policy was taken from the amount which was already in deposit with the respondent company in connection with the proposal made in 1942.

Then, on May 22, 1945, Mahajan Deolal wrote a letter to the respondent company in which he said that his financial condition had become suddenly wors9 and that he would not be able to pay the premium for the policy. He requested that the policy be cancelled.

In the meantime the premium for l 945 not having been paid, the policy lapsed. Then, on October 28, 1945, Mahajan Deolal made a request for revival of . the policy, but a few days before that, namely cm

October 18,-1945, the policy was assigned in favour of the appellant, by an endorsement made on the policy itself. This assignment was duly registered by the respondent company by means of its letter dated November 1, 1945 in which the respondent company said that . it accepted the assignment without expressing any opinion as to its validity or

IHI

M ith,./al N 9alo

•• Life I nSVfdfUI CorJ>ottJliota of IUi11

Da1J.

lHI

llu"-"'N•Jd

•• Lift lruw-• c .. ;.rolilA o/ IMW.

o., J.

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

eff6Ct.

The respondent company also made an enquiry from the appeflant as to whether the latter had any insurable interest in the life of the insured and what consideration had passed from him to the

insured. To this the appellant replied that he had no insurable interest in the life of Mahajan Deolal except that the latter waa a. friend and he (the appellant) had purchased the policy for a sum of Re. 427.12 nP. being the premium paid by him so

far, because Mahajan Deolal did not wish to continue the policy.

On his request for a revival of the policy Mahajan Deola.l was again medically examined, this time by one Dr. Belapurkar. Later on February 25, 1946, he was examined by Dr.

Clarke. The policy was then revived on payment of all arrears of premium, these arrears having been paid by the present appellant. On receipt of the revival fee, the policy appears to have been revived some time in July, 1946. We have already stated

that Mahajan Deola.I died in November, 1946. The certificate of Dr. Cla.rke, who was the medical attendant at the time when Mahajan Deolal died, showed that the primacy cause of death of Mahajan Deolal . was malaria. followed by Bt>vere type of diarrhoea. ; the secondary cause was anaemia, chronic bronchitis and enlargement of liver. In the certificate which Dr. Clarke gave there was mention of certain other medical practitioners who had attended Mahajan Deolal at t.lle tiine of his <lea.th.

One of such medical practitioners mentioned in the certificate was Dr. Lakshmanan. On r6Ceipt of this certificate the respondent company got into touch with Dr. Lakshmana.n and discovered from him that Mahajan Deolal had been treated in September October, 1943, by Dr. Lakahmana.n for ailments which, according to the doctor, were of a 1erioua nature.

Several iuul!ll were tried between the partiea in the trial court. But the four questions which

were argued iu the High Court and on which the fate of the appeal depends were these :-

( l) Whether the policy was vitiated by fraudulent suppression of material facts by Mahajan Deolal ?

(2) Whether the preeent appellant had no insurable interest in the life of the insured, and if so, can he sue on the policy ?

(3) Whether the Fespondent company had issued the policy with full knowledge of the facts relating to the health of the insured and if so, is it estopped from cont.eating the validity of the policy ? and

(4) Whether in any event the appellant is entitled to refund of the money he had paid to the respondent company ?

These are the four questions which have been agitated before us and we shall deal with such of them as are necessary for deciding this appeal.

So far as the first question is concerned, the learned trial Judge found that though Mahajan Deolal had given a negative answer to question no, 13 in the proposal form and to questions nos. 5(a), 5(b), 5 (f) and l2(b) in the personal statement, these answers though not strictly accurate, furnished no grounds for repudiating the claim of the appellant by the respondent company, in as much as s.45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938) applied and the answers did not amount to a fraudulent suppression of material facts by the policy-holder within the meaning of that section.

The learned trial Judge fonnd that the ailments for which Dr. Lakshmanan treated Mahajan Deolal in

September-October, 19.43, were of a casual or trivial nature and the failure of the policy-hG!der to disclose those ailments did not attract the second part of

Mil/too/al Nlf)d v.

Life 1 nJ:uranu Cortia 4f India

DasJ,

,,,,

M~N~

•• LVw , __ c.,_, i. •Ir..-

D .. 1.

580 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

s. 45 of the Insnr&nce Act. The High Court came

to a contrary conclusion and held that even applying s. 45 of the Insurance Act, the policy-holder was guilty of a fraudulent suppression of material facts relating to his health within the meaning of that section and the respondent oomp'lny was entitled to avoid the contract on that ground.

On behalf of the appellant it has been argued before us that the finding of the learned trial Judge on thiA question was the correct finding and that the High Court was wrong in arriving at a contrary finding on this question in view of the evidence given in the case.

The judgment of the High Court is a judgment in reversal and the appellant has a right of appeal under Art. 133( l )(a) of the Constitution in as much as the value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute is more t.han Ra. 20,000f-.

We have, therefore, allowed learned counsel for the parties to take us through the evidence in the case.

On a consideration of that evidcnoe we have come to the conclusion that the finding of the .High Court is the oorreot finding.

We shall presently consider the evidlliloe, but it may be advantageous to read first s. 45 of the Insnranoe Act, 1938, as it stood at the relevant time. The eeution, so far as it is relevant for our purpoee, is in these terms :

"No policy of life insurance effected before the commencement of this Act shall after the expiry of two yea.rs from the date of commencement of this Act and no policy of life insuranoe effected after the coming iu to force of this Act shall, after the expiry of two years from the date on which it was effected, be oalled in question by an insurer on the ground that a statement m9.de in the proposal for insurance or in any report of a medical officer, or referee, or friend of the inlllred, or in any other dooument le&dilli to

the issue of the policy, was inaccurate or false, unless the insurer shows that such state ment was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and th11t it was fraudulently made by the policy holder and that the policy-holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it wu material to disclose. x x x x x x" It would be noticed that the operating part of s. 45 states in effect (so far as is relevant for our purpose) that no policy of life insurance effected after the coming into force of the Act shall, after the expiry of two. years from the date on which it was effected, be called in question by an insurer on the ground that a statement made in the proposal for insurance or in any report of a medical officer, or referee, or friend of the insured, or in any other document leading to the issue of the policy, was

inaccurate or false ; the second part of the section is in the nature of a proviso which creates an excep tion. It says in effect that if the insurer shows that such statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to dicclose and t.hat it was fraudulently made by the policyholder and that the policy-holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose, . then the insurer can call in question the policy

effected as a result of such inaccurate or false statement. In the case before us the policy was issued on March 13, 1945, and it was tci come into effect from January 15, 1945. The amount insured was payable after January 15, 1968, or at the death of the insured, if earlier. The respondent company repudiated the claim by its letter dated October 10, 1947.

Obviously, therefore, two years had expired from the date on which the policy was effected. We are clearly of the opinion thats. 45 of the Insurance Act applies in the present caae in

IHB

M itA.olal N .,.,,

•• Lifel.,.,..., Corp.ratioo of 1.-.

Das J,

MW1Do/ol }.'nyak ...

M lttJttronc. l:MJHwalion "' 1"4 ;,/

DaaJ.

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

view of the clear terms in whkh the s11ction is worded, though learned counsrl for the resporident company S'•ught, at one stage>, to arf!ue that the revi\'al of the poli0y somP time in July, 1946, constituted in law a new contract between the parties and if two yrars were to be counted from July, 1916, then the period of two years had not

expired from the date of tl1c revival. 'Whether the revival of a lapsed policy constitutes a new contract or not for other purposeB, it is clear from the wording of the operative part of s. 45 thnt the period of two years for the purpooe of the sfction has to be calculated from the date on vhirh the policy was origirndl.v cffeced ; in the present case this can only mean the date on whieh the policy (Ex. P-2) was effected.

From that date a period of two years had clearly expired when the respondent company rtpudiated the claim. As we think that s. -t.'i of the Insurance Act. applies in the present case, we aro relieved <; f the tl\8k of examining the lagal position thll.t W<l\llcl follow as a. result of ina.ccnrn te catl'mt'nts mu<lt' by the insured in the proposal form or the !)(•rsonal statement etc. in a case where b. 4ii docs not apply and where the aver111e11ts made in the proposal form and in the personal statement art' made the basis of the contrnct.

The three conditions for the application of the second pa.rt of s. 45 arf'-

(a) the statemPnt must he on a. material matter or must supprcBB facts which it was material to disclose ;

(b) the suppreBBion must be frau<iulently made by the poliry-holder ; and (c} the policy-holder must have known at the time of 111aking the stakment that it waa false or that it suppreBSed facts which it was material to disclose.

The crucial question before us is whether these three conditione were fulfilled in the present

case. We think that they were. We are llnable to agree with the learned trial Judge that the ailments for which Mahajan Deolal was trnaterl by Dr.

Lakshmanan in September-October, 1943, were trivia I or casual ailments. Nor do we think that Mahajan Deolal was likely to forget in July, 1944, that he had been treated by Dr. Lakshmanan for certain seriouR ailments only a few months before that rlate. This brings us to a consideration of the evidenee of Dr. Lakshmanan. That evidence is clear and unequivocal. Dr. Lakshmanan says that Dr.

Motilal Nayak brought the patient to him atJabalpur.

We have already referred to the fact that Dr.

Motilal Na.yak had himself made a false statement in his friend's report dated July 17, 1944, when he said that he had never heard that the insured had suffered from any illness.

It is impossible to believe that Dr. Moti!al Nayak would not remember that he had himself taken the insured to Jabalpur for treatment by Dr. Lakshmanan who was an experienced consulting physician. Dr. Lakshmanan said that when he first examined Mahajan Deolal on September 7. 1943, he found that his condition was serious as a result of the impoverished condition of his blood, anrl that Mahajan Deolal was suffering from anaemia, oedema of the feet, diarrhoea and panting on exertion. The doctor ask<'d for an examination of the blood. The pathological report supported the diagnoeis that Mahajan Deolal was suffering from secondary anaemia meaning thereby that anaemia was due to lack of iron and malnutrition. Dr. Laksbmanan further found that from the symptoms disclosed the disease was a major one. Mahajan Deolal had also cardiac asthma which was a symptom of anaemia and due to dilatation of heart. Dr. Lakshmanan saw the patient again on Septomb<'r 9, 1!14:~, and then a"ain on September J6, W-t::.

On October 6, 1943 :M:,.hajan Deolul Lilll3ei f :.Vent to Dr. Laksh manan. On that date Dr. Lakshmanan found that

IUU

Millu>olal N~

Li/elnsur- Corpo<alion of In4i.

Da.r J.

J~Z

.11.ilWWN~

Lift '"""•11t1 c..p...,;,. of /Nlia

/las 1.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

anaemia bad very greatly diea ppeared. In croesexamina.tion Dr.

Lakhm1man admitted that the anaemia, dilatation of heart and cardiac asthma from which Mahajan Dola.l was suffering constitued a pa.ssing phase which might disa.ppcar by treatment. He furthllr admitted that he did not mention cardiac asthma in his letter addressed to the respondent company. We have given our very earnest consideration to the evidence of Dr. Lakshma.nan and we arc unable to hold that the ailments from which Mahajan Deolal was then suffering were either trivial or casual in nature. The ailments were serious though amenable to treatment.

Mahajan Daolal's son gave ovidence in the case

and he sa.id in hiR ovidence that though Dr.

Laksb.manan prescribed some medicine, his father did not tuko it. He further said that his father was a. strict vegetarian. Tl.is evidence was given by thll son with regard to what the doctor had 11&id that he prescribed fresh liver juice made a.t home according to his directions three times a day.

He also prescribed iroa sulphate in tnblet from with plenty of water. Tho son furth1>r said that during his stay at Jabalpur his fathn frlt weakneBB, though he used to move about freely and was never confined to bt>d.

The son tried to make it appear in his evidence that his father was suffering from nothing eerious. Dr. Lakshma.nan said in his evidence that his fees for visiting a. patient a.t Jaba.lpur were Rs. 16/· per visit. We agree with the High Court that if Mahajan Deolal was not suffering from any serious ailment, he would not have been ta.ken by his physican, Dr. Motile.I Na.yak from his village to Jabalpur nor would he have consulted Dr. Lakshmanan, a consulting physioian

of repute, for so many days on payment of Rs.16/- per visit. No doubt, Mahajan Deola.l's son now tries to make light of the illness of his father but Dr. Lakshmana.n's ovidcnco shows olearly enough that in September-October, 1943. Mahajan

Deolal was suffering from a serious type of anaemia for which he was treated by Dr., Lakshmanan.

Mahajan Deolal could not have forgotten in July, 1944, that he was so treated only a few months earlier and furthermore, Mahajan Deolal must have known that it was material to disclose this fact to the respondAnt company. In his answers to the questions put to him he not only failed to disclose what it was material for him to disclose, but he made a false statement to the effect that he had not been treated.by any doctor for any such serious ailment as anaemia or shortness of breath or ast

hma. In other words, there was a deliberate suppression fraudnlently made by Mahajan Deolal.

Fraud, according to s. l 7 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (IX of 1872), means and includes Inter ttUa any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract. wit.h intent to deeive another party or to induce him to enter into a contract- (!) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; and

(2) the active concealqient of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact.

Judged by the standard laid down in s. 17, Mahajan Deolal was clearly guilty of a fraudulent suppression of material facts when he made his

statements on July 16, 1944, statements which he must have known were delibarately false.

Therefore, we are in agreement with the High Court

in answering the first question against the appellant.

We may here dispose of the third qu\)stion.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued before us that Mahajan Deolal was ex? mined under the direction of the respondent company by as many as four doctors, namely, Dr. Desai, Dr. Kapadia, Dr. Belapurkar and Dr. Clarke. It is further pointed out that Mahajan Deolal had correctly

J&62

Milhoolal Na; ak

Life IRJUrante Copo1"1ion o/'f•li•

Dad.

1118!

Jlillll>OW N9" v.

Lif1.i-_, c.p.,.,;. •f 11"U.

D.s }.

586 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

disclosed that he had suffered previously from malaria, pneumonia. and cholera.

Dr. Kapadia, it is pointod out, was specifica.Jly asked t.o oxamine Mahajan Deolal in viow of the conflictiniz reports which Dr. Desai had earlier submitted. On theee facts, the a.rgumE'nt has been that the repondent company had full knowledge of a.II facts relevant to the state of health of llfahajan Deola.I and having knowledge of the full facts, it was not open to the respondent company to call the policy in question on tho basis of the answers given by Mahajan Deolal in the proposal form and the personal statement, even though those answers were inaccurate. Learned counsel for th<' a.ppell1mt has referred us to th~ Explanation to s. 19 of the Indian Contract Act in support of his argument. We are unable to accept this argument ns correct.. It is indeed trne that llfahajan Deolal was examinPd by as many as four doctors. It is also tnri> that the respondent company had before it the eonflfoting reports of Dr. Desai and it specially asked Dr. Kapadia to examine Mahajan Deolal in view of the rl'ports submitted by Dr. Desai.

Yet, it muRt be pointed out that the respondent comprmy had no means of knowing that Mahajan Deolal had been treated for the serious ailment of secondarv anaemia followed by dilatation of heart etc. in"Septcmber- October, 1943 by Dr. Lakshmane.n. Xor e:in it be 11aid that if the respondent company had know ledge of those facts, they would not have made any difference. The principle underlying tho Ex planation to s. 19 of the Contract Act ie that a false representation. whether fraudulent or innocent is irre

levant if it has not induced the party to whom it is made to act upon it by enteriniz into a contract.

We do not think that that principle applies in the present ca11C. The terms of the policy make it-clear thai the avermunts ma<le as to the state of health of the insured in the proposal form and the personal statement were the basis of tho contract l>etween the

2 $.C.R.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS f187

parties, and the circumstance that Mahajan Deolal had taken pains to falsify or. conceal that he had been treated for a serious ailment by Dr. Lakshmanan only a few months before the policy was taken shows that the falsification or concealment had an important bearing in obtaining the other party's consent. A man who has so acted cannot afterwards turn round and say: "It could have made no difference if you had known the truth." In our opinion, no question of waiver arises in the circu mstanoes of this case, nor can the appellant take advantage of the Explanation to s. 19 of the Indian Contract Act.

Our finding on the first question makee it un necessary for us to decide the second question, """. namely, whether the present appellant merely gambled on the life of Mahajan Deolal when he took the assignment on October 18, 1945. The contention of the respondent company was that appellant had no insurable interest in the life of Mahajan Deolal and when be took the assignment of the policy on October. 18, 1945 he was merely indulging in a gamble on Mahajan Deolal's life; the contract waq therefore, void by reason of s. 30 of the Indian Contract Act. On behalf of the appellant, however, the contention was that s. 38 of the insurance Act provided a complete code for assignment and transfer of insurance policies and the assignment made in favour of the appellant by Mahajan Deolli.l was a valid assignment in accord. ance with the provisions of s. 38 aforesaid. The High Court, it appears, proceeded on the footing that from the very inception the policy was taken for the benefit of the appellant on the basis of a gamble on the life of Mahajan Deolal ; it said that the appellant and his brother, Dr. Motilal Nayak, knew very well that Mahajan Deolal was not likely to live very long aud when the policy was taken out in 1944, it was really for the benefit of the persent appellant, who soon after took an assignment

M it/JNlal ll8'11k

•• Ufa'"'"'~ OorfJ"alW.. of .tndil

Dos J,

.llilMolol Jf9olf

Lif• 1.,.,,_,

ll'f81io1 •/ l1 1lio

Doll.

588 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

on payment of the premium already pa.id by Ma.ha.ja.n Deolal a.nd s11ch arrears of premium aa were then outstanding. It iB unneoesea.ry for us to give our decision on these contentions; becuse if Ma.ha.ja.n Deolal wa.s himelf guilty of a fraudulent supprossion of mterial facts on which the respon dent company w~ <lisch<1.rged from pJrforming its pa.rt of the contract, th~ appellant who holds an assignment of the policy cannot stand on a. better footing than Mahajan Do!R.I himself. It wa.s argued before us tha.t if the policy was valid in its inception, that ii to say, if it was in fa.ct effecte<l for the use nn<l bandit of Mahajan Ddolal, who undoubtedly had an insurable interest in his own lifo, it could not afr.erwards be invalidated by R.Bsign. ment to a person who had no interest but who merely took it IH a speculation. Ollr attention was drawn to SE>v<ral decisions on t.his quest.ion, American e.nd English, noticed in para 502 of Ma.cGillivray on Insurance law (fourth Edition).

We consider it mmecessary to examine those decisions or to go into tho question posed therein.

That question must be left to be determined in a. ca.so where it properly a.rises.

As we have stated earlier, on our conclusion on the first question, the appellant is clearly out of Court and can not claim the bendit of a contra.ct which had been entered into R.B a result of 1~ fraudulent suppression of material facts by Mahajan Deolal.

This brings us to the last question, namely, whether the appellant is entitled to a refund of the money he had paid to tbu respondent company.

Here again one of the tcr:n~ of the policy was that all moneyR that had bren pa.id in consequence of the policy would belong to the company if the policy was vitiated by reason of a fra.11d11lent suppression of material fact8 h~· t lH' iusur1·1l.

We agree with the High Court that where t be contract is had on the groun<i of fran<i, the party who hn.s been guilty of fraud or a. person whc, cln.ims under him ca.n not

2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 589

ask for a refund of the money pa.id. It is a wellestablished principal that courts will not entertain an action for money had and received, where, in order to succeed, the plaintiff has to prove his own fraud. We are further in agreement with the High Court that in oases in which there is stipulation that by reason of a breach of warrantyby one of the parties to the contract, the other party shall be discharged from the performance of his part of the contract, neither s. 65 nor s. 64 of the Indian Contract Act has any application.

For the reasons giv.en above we have come to the conclusion that there in no merit in the appeal.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

M/s. STEELWORTH LTD.

'!)8.

STATE OF ASSAM lB. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, M. 1IIDAYATULLAH'

J.C. SHAH and J. R.MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Saki Tax-Provincial legialation imposing Un; in certain circu111.!lancea-Oonstitutional validity-Amendment-Effect-- Assam Sales T1J11: Act, 1947 (Act, XVII of 1947), as amended by

Assam Sale8 T1J11: (Amendment Act, 1960) (Act, XIII of 1960) s. 15 (1) (b) (i) (b) and (c)-Oonstitution of India, Arts. 14, 19 (l)(f).

The petitioner carried on business of manufacturing, selling and supplying iron and steel materials in the State of Assam. Before the Assam Sales Tax Amendment Act of 1960, it held a registration certificate under which all its purchases for use in manufacture or production of goods taxable under the Act were exempted from Sales Tax, but after the amendment it became liable to pay tax on those goods. It was contended that by omission of sub-cl. (b), discrimination was introduced by differentiating between materials bought for articles to be supplied against a contract and articles produced and sold by the petitioner and that this was not a reasonable classification

Mithoolol Na]Oi

Li/• Inm011U Corporation of lnii<

Dos 1.

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