J962

}r! arch 6

618 SUPRE!IIE COURT REPORTS [Hl62] SUPP.

STRAWBOARD MANUFACTURING CO.

GO BIND

(P. B. GAJElWRAGADKAR, A. K. SAHKaR, and

K. N. \VANCHOO, JJ.)

Industrial Dispute-Autliority of emplovcr to dismiss employee before appro1:a./ of Tribunal-Rule of 111-lerpr(; fation of stalute-['niteil Provinc<S lndu.•lrial Di"putrs Act, J!i47, (L'. P. 28 ~{ J.?47), s.6-E(2)(b)-lndustrial1Xspufos Act, J.'t.Ji), r 14 o'

lfl47), as amended by Act 36 of J!J!jlj, s. 33(2)(b). ' ·

1, he respondent \vas in the r.mplo)ment rif the appellant company.

I-le refused to comply \\'ith orders ghcn to hin1 by various officers of the appellant con1pany from 1iJnc to time.

He ,, as suspended and chargr.-shee1ed.

An c1quiry \Vas heJd.

After the enquiry, thr appellant referrer! thr matter .for the decision of the Labour Comrnissioncr \\'ithCJlil giving a11y prior decision of its ov.111. !Iowever, the Labour Con1missioncr refused to pas; any order and dire.cted the appellant to takr. such action as it thought fit. rhcrcupon, the appellant <lismh:sc<l the appellant. .i\s t\\'O di ... putcs \\Tre pending bet\\ocen the appellant and its \\'orkmen at .'\llahahad and Meerut, the appellant sent applications by post on the sarne day to the tv.o authorities for appro\•al of the ar.tion ra.ken.

The Tribunal at Allahabad approvrd of the action Lut the Labour Court at Meerut refused to approv•: tl.1 <amc.

However the Labour Court held that the appellant \\";-t!i not moti vated by victimisation and a prima fncic rasc had hc:cn 111adc out for the dismissal of the respondent.

Thr. appro\'al was refused on the ground that the application for appro\al ha<l bcr.n made after the dismissal of the rcsponrle11t and the same should have been made before dismissing hin:.

field, that the employer ran disl'hargc or dismiss the employee hr.fore obtaining the approval of 'I'ribunal or the I .. abour Court concerned. The uc of tl:e \\ord ''approval"

suggests that something has been <lone hy tlic en1ploycr "ho seeks approval of. the same fro1n the 'I'ribunal.

If the intention had bce.n that the etnploycr could not pas the order of dismissal or discharge "ithout first obtaining the approval, the language usec.l "otild have bcc11 diffcrer11.. 'fhe legislature intended that the cn1ployer \\ould ha\'e the right to pass an order of <lischare or dismbsal ... ubject to tv.•o conditions, namely, pavment of wages for one n1onth an<l making of an applicaiion to the authority concerned for

approval of the action taken. If the Tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and the workmen would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would continue to be in the service of the employer.

The dismissal or discharge of an employee, payment of wages and the making of an application for approval should be simultaneous and part of the same transaction.

When an employer dimisses or discharges an employee. he should immediately pay him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time. Although all this cannot be done literally• simultaneously, the conduct of the employer should show that the three things were done as a part of the same transaction.

Metal Press Works Ltd. v. Deb (H. R.) and Others, (1962) L. L. j. 7 5, approved. .

The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Ramchandra Bhimayya, J.L.R.'(1950) Born. 289 and Indian Extractions Private Ltd. v.

A. V. Vyas, Conciliation Officer,

A. I. R. 1961 Guj. 22, disapproved. '

It is agatnst the rules of interpretation to add words to a provision, \Vhen the provision, as it stands, is capable of a reasonable n1eaning which will give effect to the intention of the legislature even on the words a-; they stand.

CrvIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 387 of 1961.

Appeal by special leave from t, he judgment and order dated April 29, 1960, of the Labour Court, Meerut in case No. 1 of 1960.

B. 0. Misra, for the appellant.

Ranganadham Ohetty, A. V. Rangam, A.

Vedavalli and P. 0. Agarwala, for the respondent.

1962. March. 6.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

WANCHOO, .J.- This appeal by special leave raises th~ question. of interpreta:tion of s. 6-E (2l(h) of the Umted Provmces Industrial Disputes Act, U.P.

Act No, XXVIII of 19-li, (hereinafter called the

Strawboa1d Manfacturing Co.

Go-bind

T1'af'lchoo J,

Strawbr.ard Al cnujactttring Co v.

Gob ind

Wancllao J.

620 SUPREME COl'RT REPORTS [191l2] SUPP.

U. P. Act), which is in exactly the Aame terms as s. 3:1 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter referred to aH the Act), 118 amended by Act 36 of LH:"i6.

The question arises in this way. The appellant is a Strawboard Mill. The respondent was in the employ of the appellant. On August 12, I 959, the respondent was 'given certain orders by the Technfoa.l Director of the appellant, but he refused to comply with them.

The same day the respondent refused to comply with certai11 similar order~ given by the machinoman. Again on August 13, l 959, he refused to obey similar orders of the shift in.charge.

Finally, on August 14, he refused to obey similar orders of another shift in-charge. Consequently a notice was rnrved on the respondent to show cause why he should not be dealt with under cl. 22(a) of t.he Standing Orders which provided that wilful insubordination or disohcdicnc(' of anv lawful orders of superior was miAconduct. The respondent submitted his explanation. HP was then suspended and a ebarge-sheC't was served on him nu August 16, l!.l.J9.

Thereafter an inquiry was hcl<l. into th" alleged mi8condnct.

After t.ho inquiry was over t!l<' appellant referred th<' rnattN for the clccision of the Labour CommiHsioncr without gidng any prior dedson of its own as provickd in cl. :10 of the ::lta.m]. ing Orders. The Labour Commission, howc'l'cr, rcfusC'd to give a decision and informed the appellant that it could take such action as it was entitled to under the Standing Ordern. Tho appollant again approached the Labour Commisioner for giving an order as envisaged by cl. 30 of the 8Urnding Orders, but the Labour Commissioner finally refused to pass any order :m(] directed tho appellant to t:ike such action as it thought fit and as was within its power. 'l'hcr<, upon the appellant clismisHctl the r<>spondcnt on February' l, I 960.

As however. two disput-0s were pending between t.he appullant and its workmen one before the Industrial Tribunal

No. 3. at Allahabad and the o\her before the Labour Court at Meerut, the appellant sent applications by post on the same day to the two authorities for approval of the action taken, namely, the dismissal of the respondent. It appears that the tribunal at Allahabad approved of the action on March 22,

1960. When however the same matter came before the labour court at Meerut on April 29, 1960, it refused to approve the action taken, even though the order pas3ed by the tribunal at Allahabad already was brought to its notice. The labour court at Meerut held that the appellant was not motivated by victimisation. It further held that in the inquiry held by the appellant, prima f acie case had been made out rufthe dismissal of the respondent ; but the labour court said that though ordinarily the application of the appellant should have been granted in these circumstances it refused to approve the dismissal on the ground that the application for approval had been made after the respondent had already been dimissed; therefore it held that the application was not bona fide and in the circumstances the prayer that the order of dismissal should be approved was not granted. It was of the view that the proviso to s. 6E(2)(b) required that the application for approval should be made before the dismissal of the workmen concerned, and failure to do so amounted to contravention of the terms of the section. Therefore as the application in this case was made after the dismissal, approval could not be granted and on this narrow ground the la.hour court refused to approve of the dismissal of the respondent. Thereupon the appellant obtained special leave from this Court and that is how the matter has come up before us.

The question thus raised depends upon the interpretation of the terms . of s. 6E (2) which as we have said already correspond word for word with the provisions of s. 33 (2) of the Act. We shall

Strawboard Manufacturing Co.

Gobind •

Wonchoo J.

Strawboard Manufacturing Co.

Oobind

J.t'anchoo J.

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP

therefore set out the provisions of s. 33 (2) which reads as below :-

"(2) Durin!! the pcnde11c:y of any Ruch procceding in respect of an industrial dlRputc, the employer may, in 11ccordanc(J with the standing orders applicablo to a workman concerned in such dispute-

( a)

"(b) for any misconduct not <:onnected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman;

Provided that no such workman shall Le discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been ma.do by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the ac:tion taken by the em ployer."

We aro concerned in the present appeal with the interpretation of the proviso to cl. (b) which says that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application haH been made by thn employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It is unnecessary to consider in the present case whether applications have to be made, where more than one dispute is pending before more than one tribunal, to all the tribune.ls where the disputes are pending or whether an application to oniy ono of them would be enough. In the present case disputes were pending before two authorities and applications were made to both of them, though curiously the result has been rather unfortunate for the appellant, for one tribunal has approved of the action while the other has not.

Before however we turn to the interpretation of the proviso we may refer to the circumstances in which s. 33( 2) came to be enacted. Originally there was no such provision like s. 33(2) in the Act and the only provision to be found therein corresponded to the present section 33( 1 ).

The objAct behind enacting s. 33 as it was before the' amendment of 1956 was to allow continuance of industrial proceedings pending before any authority prescribed by the Act in a calm and peaceful atmosphere undisturbed by any other industrial dispute. The plain obje<Jt of the section was to maintain the status quo as far as possible during the pendency of any industrial dispute before a tri- . bunal. But it seems to have been felt that s. 33, as it stood before the amendment of 1956, was too stringent for it completely took away the right of the employer to make any alteration in the con ditions of service or to make any order of discharge or dismissal without making any diatinction as to whether such alteration or such an order of discharge on dismissal was in any manner connected with the dispute pending before an industrial authority. It seems to have been felt therefore that the stringency of the provision should be softened and the em ploy er should be permitted to make changes in oonditi!:ms of service etc. which were not connected with the dispute pending before an industrial tribunal.

For the same reason it was felt that the authority of the employer to dismiss or discharge a workman should not be completely taken away where the dismissal or discharge was dependent on matters unconnected with the dispute pending before any tribunal. At the same time it seems to have been felt that some safeguards should be provided for a workman who may be discharged or dismissed during the pendenoy of a dispute on account of some matter unconnected with the dispute.

Consequently s. 33 was redrafted in 1956 and considerably expanded. It is now in five sub-sections

Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v.

Gob ind

Wanchoo J.

StrOUJl><i ord Milflff!W#ri•g Co. v.

Goliod

IV an<hoo J.

624 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1962] SUPP.

while before 19;)6 it consisted practically of what

is now sub-s. (l).

The present scheme thereforo of s. 33 is as follows :-Sub-section (l) refers t" matters connected with a dispute which might be pending and forbids any alteration to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, in the conditions of eervice applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the industrial proceedings resulting from such dispute and also forbids the employer from discharging or punishing any workman whether by dismissal or otherwise in connection with any matter connected with the dispute; and the employer, if he wants to make any alteration i11 the conditions of service or to punish any workman or discharge him, must get the express permission of the authority before which the proceeding relating to tho dispute might be pending.

Thus sub-s. (l) lays down that if an employer proposes to alter any conditions of service or proposes to punish or discharge a workman in relation to a matter connected with the dispute which might be pending befor<' a tribunal the employer must put such proposal before the tribunal and obtain itl! express permiBl!ion in writing before carrying out the proposal wlwther it be for alteration of any conditions of service or for punishment or discharge of a workman by dismissal or otherwise. Sub-se!]tion (2) (a) on the other hand gives power to the employer to alter any conditions of service not connected with the dispute and this the employer can do without approaching at all the tribunal where tho dispute may be pending. It further permits the employer to discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman where tbis may be 'on account of any matters unconnected with the dispute pendinit

before the tribunal; but such discharge or dismissal is subject to the proviso, which imposes certain

Strawboard conditions on it. The intention behind enacting sub-s. (2) obviously was to free the employer from the fetter which was put on him under s. 33 as it was before the amendment in 1956 with respect to action for matters not connected with a dispute pending before a tribunal. So far as conditions of service were concerned, if they were unconnected with matters in dispute the employer was iven complete freedom to change them, but so far as discharge or dismissal of workmen ws concerned, though the employer was given freedom, it was

.i:ll anufacturing Co.

not complete and he could only exercise the power of discharge or dismissal subject to the conditions / laid down in the proviso. Even so, these condi-,, ' tions in the proviso cannot be so interpreted, unle1>ii

of course the words are absolutely clear, as tr.f require that the employer must first obtain approval of the tribunal where a dispute may be pending before passing the order of discharge or dfismissal of a workman, for on this interpretaticfn there will be no difference between s. 33 (1 }' (b) and s. 33(2)(b) and the purpose of the amerndment of 1956 may be lost. / Then we come to sub-s. (3) whch provides that notwithstanding anything contained n sub-s. (2) certain workmen who are called protected workmen shall not be dealt with except with the e)i:press permission in writing of the authority before\which the proceeding is pending. Thus the freedom which was given to the employer under sub-s. (2) jth respect to conditions of service unconnected with the dispute or with respect to discharge or punishment of workmen on the ground of matters unconnected with .the dispute was cut down by sub-s.(3) with respect to a small class of workmen, even though the action of the employer may be unconnected ' with any matter in dispute before the tribunal. The explanation to sub-s. (3) defines who is a protected workmen and sub-s. ( 4) makes consequential provisions with respect to him.

Gobind

Wonchoo .1,

Strawloard MtttrUjacturing Cu.

Go; i1ui

Wanchoo J. \ \ \ \ \ ' •

!i26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

Lastly we come to sub-s. (5) which lays down that where an employer makos an application under the proviso to Bubs. (2) for approval of thu action taken by him, the authority concerned shall without delay hear such application and pass as expeditiously as possibl<' such order in relation thereto as it deems fit.

Let us now turn to the words of the vroviso in the background of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been mad~ by the employer to the authority before which the p.r?ceeding is pending for approval of the action ta.ken by the employer. It will be clear that two kinds 1-:>f punishment are subject to the conditions of the pr1oviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any other ki.µd of punishment is not within the proviso.

Fnrther \ the proviso lays down two conditions, namely (f,) payment of wages for one month and (ii} making o'f an -application by the employer to the authority lleforc which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us tht when the proviso lays down tho condition as t<;> payment of one month's wages, a.II that the employer is required to do in order to carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the l'mployeo. 1 But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages, he canot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages to him by tho employer. Therefore, though s. 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages it can only moan that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount, for payment, for otherwise a work man could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages.

So far as the second condition about the making of the application is concerned, the proviso requires that the application should be ma.de for approval of the action taken by tho employer. It has been urged on behalf of the

' ..

3 s.c.Ji.

SUPREMlli COURT REPORTS 627

respondent that the words "action taken" in this part of the proviso mean the action proposed to be taken and therefore all that the employer can do is to make an application to the tribun11, l asking it to approve the action proposed to be taken by it and it is only after the approval that the employer

can proceed to dismiss or discharge the workman.

We are however of opinion that on this interpl'etation there would really be no dilference between sub-s.(2) and subs. (I) of s.33 and the intention of the legislature in making the amendment in 1956 would be rendered nugatory.

Moreover, it is against the rules of interpretation to add words to a provision, when the provision, as it stands, is capable of a reasonable meaning which will give effect to the intention of the legislature even on the words as they stand. On the plain meaning of the proviso, it is clear that it gives the employer the power to discharge or dismiss the employee before obtaining the approval of the tribunal concerned; but at the same time the protection afforded to the employee by the proviso has to remain effective. It seems to us therefore that when the proviso speaks of an application for approval of the action taken, the action taken there is the order of actual discharge or dismissal made by the employer and it is for the approval of this order that the application . is to be made. This is borne out by form 'K' under r. 60 of the Rules framed under the Act which corresponds to form XV under r. 31 of the U.P. Rules. Further the use of the word "approval" in the proviso also suggests that something has been done by the employer who seeks approval of that from the tribunal. If the intention was that in view of. the proviso the employer could not pass the order of dismissal or discharge without first obtaining the approval of the tr\ bunal, we see no reason whv the words in the proviso should not have been similar to those sub-ss. (I) and (3), namely, that no workmen shall be discharged or dismissed without the express permission

.Strawbrtl Jlt111uJacturfrig Co

•• Gob ind

Wanckoo J.

SIYouboard Al .nufatturing Co •

•• Golit1d

628 ::H.:PHEME COUl~T ltEPURTS [19ti2] SUPP.

writing of the authority concerned. The change therefore in the la111mage used in the proviso to u b-s. 2

(b) clearly. shows in our opinion that the lngislat?re intended that the employer would have the nght to pass an order of discharge or dismiseal subject to two conditions, namely, (i) paymnt of wages for one month and (ii) ma.king of an appli oatic:in to the authority concerned for approval of the action taken. The use of the word "approval" also suggests that what has to be approved has already taken place, though sometimes approval ma.y also be sought of a proposed action.

But it seems to us in the context that the approval here is of something <lorn;, as otherwise it wonld have been quite easy for the legislature to use the words ."for approval of the action proposed to be taken"'

in the proviso.

Further sub.s. ( 5) also suggests when. it uses the words "approval of the action taken" that some action has been taken and it is that action which the employer wants to be approved by his application. The difference between sub-s. ( 1) and sub-s.(2) is therefore that under sub-s. (1) the employer proposes what he intends to do and asks for the express permission of"thc authority concerned to do it; in sub-s. (2) the employer takes the action and merely asks for the approval of the action taken from the authority concerned by his application. There can therefore be no doubt that sub-s. (2) (b) read together with the proviso contemplates that the employer may pass an order of dismissal or discharge before obtaining the approval of the authority concerned ancl at the same time make an application for approval of the action taken by him. It is however urged on behalf of the respondent that if the employer dismiBses or dfaeharges a workman and then applies for approval of the action taken and the tribunal refuses to approve of the action tho workman would be left with no remedy as there is nu

provisions for reinstatement ins. 33 (2). We how ever see no difficulty on this score. If the tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman woufd be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the tribunal not approving the action of the

employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the em- . ployer. In that sense the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the tribunal under s. 33(2).

The next question is as to when should an application be made. In this connection our attention was drawn to s. 33A of the Act which gives a right to the employer to apply for redress in case an employer contravenes the provision of s. 33 and there is no doubt that the proviso to s. 33 (2) (b) should be so interpreted as not to whittle down the protection provided by s. 33-A. As we read the proviso, we are of opinion that it contemplates the three things mentipned therein, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payments of wages and (iii) making of ; m application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction, so that the e'.11.ployer when he takes action .under s. 33 (2) hy dismissing or discharging an employee, should immediately pay. him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application to the tribunal for approval at the same time.

When however we say that the employer must take action simultaneously or immediately.we do not mean that literally, for when three things are to be done they cannot be done simultaneousl; v bu~

Strawboard Manufacturing Co.

Gobind

W anchoo J.

St1aw•1tl .\/ anufacluring C1 . ..

w .. ei... J.

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G2] SUPP

can only be dom., one after the other. What we mean is that th<' employer's conduct should Hhow

that the three things 0ont€mplatcd under the proviso, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of the wages, and (iii) making of the application, are parts of the same transaction. If that is done, there will be no oocasion to frar that the employee's right under s. 33-A would bo affected. The question whether tho application was made as part of tho same transaction or at the same time when the action was taken would be a question of fact and will depend upon the circumstances of each case.

We may now refer to certain caaes which have ooen relied upon by either side.

The main ea8e on which learned couusel for the respondents relies is The Premier A ulomobiles f, imited ,. . Ramclw.ndra

Bhim.ayyri(').

In that case the Bombay High Court held that thti application should be made before the action has been taken by the employer and that it was not correc:t to infi>r from the us" of tho word "approval" in the proviso that. the legislature intended that such an applicatio11 should bu made a.fter the action had been takon. The High Court

haR pointecl out that there is 1ippara.nt conflict betwt>cn the first and last part of the proviso and the view it took was with the object of harmonising the two parts.• 'fhiR view has been followed by the Gujarat High Court in Indian E:rtraction-< Prii:al.e LimifR; J, v. A. V. Vyan, Conciliation Offic£r(') though with some hesitation. With respect we foe] t, hat it is not necessary to read tho words "action taken•• in tho proviso as "qual to "action proposed to be takon", as the Bombay High Court has done and that the apparent conflict between tho two parts of the proviso can be harmonised, as we ha.ve indicated above, leaving it open to the employer to dismiss or discharge the employee and at tho same time pay him the ncecssary wages and

(ll f.LR. [1960] Born. 289.

(2) A.J.R, 1961 Guj. 22.

make an application to the authority concerned for approval of the action taken. The c.mtrary view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Metal Press Works Limit'!, f], v. Dib (ll.R.)(') where it has been held that payment of wages and the making of the application should be simultaneous with the order of discharge or dismissal. It has further been pointed out that the word "simultaneously" must of course be taken reasonably and a notion of splitsecond timing should not be imported. It should be done at once and without delay", and it will depend upon the facts of each case whether the application has been made at once or without delay. This, we think, is the correct view to take.

Let us therefore see what has happened in this case, The appellant-concern is situate at Saharanpur while one tribunal was at Meerut and the othe-r at Allahabad. What the appellant did was to pass an order of dismissal on February I,

1960. On the same day he sent two applications by post addressed to the two tribunals. The application at Meerut was received on February 3 and the application at Allahabad on February 4, 1960.

In these circumstances we are of opinion that the appellant had made the application to the tribunal simultaneously and without delay on its passing the order of dismissal and its action was thnefore in accordance with the proviso. The view taken by the labour court that the application must be made before dismissing the respon<lent is not correct.

The appellant in this case had complied with the proviso to.s. 33 (2) (b) when it diemissed the workman, paid him or offered to pay the necessary wages and at tho same time sent the application by post to the tribunal concerned for approval of th<)

action taken by it. ·

\IJ [1962] I. T. L.J. 75.

J96S

StrawbOard Manufacturing Co. v.

Gobind

Wanchoo J,

I96Z s1; dr; J;;; rd M tnU}aeturing Co. . v. "G'obind

v,;;:;~J;

March 7.

632 Sl)'PREl\lE COURT RE; E'ORTS [1962] SUPP.

This being the only'poin~ on whioh the labour court had refued to give approval, the appeal mst suc'ceed. We therefore allow the appeal, .set.aside

the order of the labour court and approve the action taken by 'the appellant. In the circumstances we pass na order as to costs.

{l.ppool allowed.

JOSEPH KURUVILLA •VELLUKUNNEL

THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS

(With connected petition)

Banking Companies-Winding up-Enactment providing for an order for winding up by High Court on the basis of

Reser11e Bank's opinion-Constitutional validity-Banking Companies Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), ss. 2, 35, 35A, 36, 38- -Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), ss. 7, 8, 38- Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956), ss. 433, 450(2)-Constitution of Inaia, Arts. U, 19(1)( f) and (g), 301, 302. ·

Subsection (l) of s. 38 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, provided : '1Notwithstanding anything contained in ss. 391, 392, 433 and 583 of the Companies Act, 1956 .... the High Court shall order the win'ding 'up for a banking company . ... if an application for its winding up has been made by the Reserve Bank under s. 47 of this .section."

Under s. 38(b)(iii) of the Act .''the Reserve Ban'k may make an application under this section for the winding up of a banking company• if in the opinion of the Reserve Bank the . 1 continuance of the banking company is prejudicjal to the interests of its depositors."

 rn exercise of, the p9wers vested in it by the Banking companies Act, 1949, as w'ell -as the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the Reserve Bank had been inspecting the Palai Central Bank Ltd., periodically, and had been warning the Bank that its business was being .conducted in a manner detrimental to the .interest of its depositoi-s.

In June 1960, there was a run on several branches of the Bank.

The Reserve Bank was of the opnion that the Palai Bank was not jn a positipn to fay its depositors in f'lll and h11t lhr