\ }

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 157

the 19th could have and should have obtained similar orders of the High Court for serving them.

If that precaution had been taken again on May 19, 1958, probably what happened snbsequently ou the spot and th'3r'3after, would not have taken place.

I am therefore of opinion that the appellants committed no contempt of Court, and would allow their appeal.

BY COURT : In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

Appe, al dismissed.

THE NATIONAL UNION OF COMMERCIAL

EMPLOYEES AND ANOTHER

M. R. MERER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,

BOMBAY AND OTHERS

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and

K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)

.Industrial Dispute-Solicitor's profession-Work of solicitor, if an industry-Dispute with employee-Reference to Tribunal-Oompetence-IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), •. 2 (j).

The respondents were a firm carrying on the work of solicitors in Bombay.

For the years 1956 and 1957 a claim for bonus was made against them by their employees.

Before the Industrial Tribunal to .which the dispute was referred by the State Government for adjudication under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the respondents contended that the profession followed by them was not an industry within the meaning of s. 2(j) of the Act, that the dispute raised against them was not an industrial dispute under the Act, and that, therefore, the reference made by the Government was incompetent.

Held, that the work of solicitors is not an industry within the meaning of s. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, T947 and that, therefore, any dispute raised by the employees of

Hoshiar Singh

Gurbachan Singh

Raghr, bar Daya/_ J,

:l'ebruary 13.

.ht ve; onal Union

of Commncial

Employr1•

v. .111.R. Mtiotr, lntfusttial Tribunal

Bombay

158 suPRE:\[E COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

tllc solicitors against the1n cannot be n1adc the subject of r.ferfn•e to the Industrial Tribunal.

'I'he cliting-uihing fl':ature of an in<lustr~· is that for the produrtion of goods or for the rr.ndcring of sc:r\icr, rooperation bel\\'Ct-ll capital and labciur or between the ctnploycr and his t>mplo)CC rnut lie <lirrct.

A prrson f.Jl!ovi11~·:· a liberal profcs-;!on doe; not carry on his

profesion in any intclli!jihle sense \\'ith thraci ivr co-operation of his emplc1y!rs, and the princip; d, if not 1hc sole, capital \\hirh he hriI!s into his pr0fcsi1.n is his rrrial or peculiar intr.ll<Ttttal ar, d educational rquip111cnt. (; onsqucntly, a liberal profts:-:on like that of a o!icitor is outs!clc th1: definition of "indusrr~" unUcr s. 2(j) of the i\ct.

State f Bombay v. Tl.e liospit;1! Jfaz, J,1or Sab/1a, ( l 960) 2 S.C.R. 8~)G, rxplaincd and clistinguhhcd.

Brij Jfol.an Bagarirt v .• '\'/./. G'hrttterju:., 1\.l.H .. l9j8 Cal. 4GO and/). l'. /)un<lfrrltfP \'. G. J>. tlfu/, lt~.rjt>.r., t\ l.R. l95a c:al. 465, approvrd.

• Ohscrvations in 'f'r, U:ratr:d Jfuniriprzl nnrl ,'-,'/, irr. Council En1p!oyees' (} 1tion (If .l U.'i{ralia v . .\1 e /!Jou r11e Cor_JYJrat ion, { 19 J 0 J 2n C.L.R. 'il!I<, relied on.

Crn1. ArrELL.ll'E Ji:msnrCT!ON: Civil Appeal

o. 24 of 1!)61.

Ap1,.al fn>n1 the judgrn011t and ord"r datl :'{ovcmber 20, ltl:JS, of the 1.l:irnlny I fo:h Court in

C• • I c. . , \ 1 t.

N ')~ '') f I'}~ . • 1pec1a. l\'I .- pp 1r, a 1011 .. 0. -'~· o ,,)'.

A. S II. Cluiri and /(. R. Clwwlknri, for the appellant,,.

S. '/'. !Jcwi, and V.J. Jlerclumt, for responcJ., nts -.

Nos. 2 and 1 and the lntcn<mcr (l'hl' Bombay Incorporat,.d Law Socidy).

J 9fi:.'. February I :i, Th" .J 11rlgm1in t of tho Court was r.leli, ered by

GA.JE~JJIUGAllKAlt, , J.-Thi8 appal arises out of a di:; put" between the app1dliinh, the l\ationul Union of Ctm11nrrcial Employc<'s & Anr., and tho rcsponcle1.ts P<'reira, Fazalbhoy tmd lle, ai who constitult• an At t.orncys' firm by name Jl/o. l'erPirn

Fazalbhoy & Co. It 1ippear~ that iu August, 1\)57

the appellant wrote to the respondl"nt firm setting forth certain demands on behalf of its employees.

These demands related to bonus for the years 1955- 56 a!ld 1956-57 and to certain other mattel'f~ As the parties could not agree, the dispute was taken before tho Conciliation Officer.

Th'J Conciliation Officer also failed to bring about a settlement and so he su bmittod his failure report to the Gov, rnment of Bombay. Thereafter, the :State Government referred the dispute in regard to the bonus for the two years 1956 and 1937 for adjudication before an Industrial Tribunal under section 12(5) of the Industrial Di:; putcs Act (No. 14 of 1!1±7) (hereinafter called the Actl.

Before the Tribunal, the respondents raised a preliminary objection. They urged tlrnt thJ profession followed by them was not an indu,; try within the meaning of the Act, and so .tho dispute raised against them by the appellants was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act; the contention was that the dispute not being an industrial di; pute under tho Act, the reference made by the Government was incompetent and so, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon this dispute.

The Tribunal upheld the preliminary objection and recorded its conclusion thn, t it httd no jurisdiction to n.djudicate upon the dispute :is it was not an industrial dispute.

The order thus passed by the Tribunal was challenged liy th0 n, ppellants before the High Court at Bombay by specin.I Civil Application No. 2789 of 1958 filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Tho High Court considered the rival contentions misecl before it by the appelln.nts and the respondents and came to the conclusion that the respondents' firm did not constitute an industry and so tho dispute between the said firm and its employees was not an industrial dispute which could validly form the subject-matter of a reference under the Act. In that vkw of the matter, . the High Court held thn, t tqe Industrial Tribunal Wl\S

The .Natiollfll Union of Comme, cial

ErnpJoyets

Vo M.R. M, lier, fnd9strial T, ibunal,

Bombay

Gajenoragadkar J.

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

Tht , Vatio11af Union

of CommtrciJl

Emp/o.,•tta ·

right in refusing to mako an order on the reference and so the appellants' writ petition wa.s dismiBBed.

The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the said certificate that the present appeal has come to this c, mrt; and the short question which it

v. .M.R . .\lt1'er, Tndustrial- Tribunal,

Bombny raises for our decision is whether the respondents' firm which carries on th<' work of Solicitors in Born 'iay can be @aid to constitute an industry under s. 2(j) of the Act..

G•fendra1odkar J.

In dealing with this question, it would be necessarv to refer to the decision of this Court in the Staie of Bombay

v. The Hospital Mazdoor Srtbl11l ( 1 ).

Both parties a.greed that the present dispute would have to be determined in the light of the decision of this Court in that case. Let us, therefore, indicate the effect of tho said deciion.

In the Ho, pital Ca8e (1), this Court had occasion to consider whether the services of workmen cng1tged as ward A<•rvants in the .J.J. Group of Hospitals, Bombay, under State control were wol'kmcn a.nd whether the Hospital Group itself constituted an industry under the Act or not.

Both the questions were answ<rcd in the aflirmati\e and in rendering thoRe answern, the scope •Incl effect of the definition of the word 'industry' used in s. !!(j) of the Act wa.s conHidered. This Court held that the words

used hv s. '.? (j) in rh-fining 'industry' in a.n inclu- . sive manner WNO Of wide import and had to be

!<'ad in their wide dtnot.ation.

Ev<'n so, this Court state<! "that though s. 2(j) useH W(irus of very wide rlcnotation, n, line would havl' to be drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings, servic<'s or undertakings from its purview. If all the words used are given t.beir widest meaning all son ice~ and 'lll callings wou Id come within the purviow of the rlefiniti<Jn; even s"rvice renden:cl by a servant purely in a personal or domeet.ic matter

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT HEPORTS 161

or even in a casual way would fall within the definition. It is not and cannot be suggested that in its wide sweep the word 'service' is intended to include service h Jwsoever rendered in whatsower

capacity and for whatsoever reason." (p. 876).

Th<tt is why this Comt proceeded to consider where the line should be drawn and what limitations can and should be reasonably implied in interpreting the wide words nsed in s. 2(j).

In dealing with the somewhat difficult question of drawing a line, this Court observed: "as a working principle, it may be stated that an activity systematically or habitu11lly undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material services to the community at. large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking, Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the Pmployer and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure.

Thus, the manner in which the activity fo question is organisel or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between employer aml the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which are dis tine ti ve of activities to which s. 2 (j) applies." (p. 879).

It was in the light of this working princi pie that this Court came to the conclusion that the State was carrving on an undertaking in running the Group of Hospitals in question. In dealing with the question of hospitals, this Court also r0ferred to a material circumstance which supported the conclusion that running of hopitals is an inrlnetry under the Act. Secthn 2 (n} of the Act' defin<'s "public utility service" and under it fiv11 separate catogories

196t

The }lation1l Union of Commercial

Employees

M.R. Meher, Industrial Tribun•l,

 Bomb av

Gajendragadkar J.

TM NaliJnal Unio'I

a/ Comme1cial

Employ!t•

M.11. Meiiu, I nd11 rfrial T1ibu11., J,

Bombay

01Jjtn:l1a.~1JJkar J,

162 SUPREME COVRT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

of public utility servic<> are rnum<'ratecl. Clause (vi) of s. 2 (n) provides that .an, v industry spccifit•cl in the chcdule us thnrein indic:; tccl woulrl alsri be a puhlic utility service. In 1956, Entry :N"o. !) among>t

others, was a<lclccl in the First 8..Jwclnlc Apecifying another public utility SPrvicc. This Entry refer~ to service in hospitals and disp.0nsaries.

Thl'rnfore, it was clear that since the validity of this entry was not clisputecl, aftor sPr'l'ice in hospitals and disfl<'nsarics ws included in the First chedule. it was inarguable that the hoHpital would not be an industry under the Act; unless a ho"pital was an industry under the Act, service in the hospitals could not. bl' regarded as p11 hlic utility sen ice.

That is how this Court h"1d thnt in rnnning the J .• T. Hospital Group in Bomhny, the Statl' Gov1rnment wa.s c:nrying on an undertaking whic:h was an

indust1y undPr H. 2(j).

Th" qnct inn which calls for our decisi011 in the prest'nt appe:d is : wbnt would be the result uf the application of th•• working . test Jait.l down hy this Court. in the llospita.l cos~ (1 ) in relation to the controvPrsy bct.we!'n thP part i('s in the pnsent appeal ?

i\Ir .. Chari for t.he appellants contends that in dl'aling with tl' question as to wluthrr the respond1nts carried on an i11d11Rtry m1drr s. !2(j), it is necessary to distinguish between profession'.tl aervire nnderrd by an indiYidirnl acting by hims..Jf and similar senice irnclererl by a firm consisting of several partners, because h" >uirrsts that proft'H sional servire inrlivicluallv rci1derecl st>Lnds on a cliffonnt footi11g from profes, iona I sen ice which is rendered in an organioetl an<l instit11ti., nali;;1, d manner. Th" organisation of profossiunal H<'l'\'irp which kads to it.s institutionali"ation att.raets the provisions of s. 2(j) inasmuch as in such organised srrvic:e thf're is bound to he co-orwration b"twef•n the l'lllploycrs and the cmployrfS c11gagecl by the firm for doing diffcrP11t cat<'guries 1.1f work, Accor<ling to l\Ir. Chari, the employml'nt of

(l I [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866.

.. -

different categorit:s of staff facilitates the work of the solicitors and it enables them to dispose of more work more quickly and more efficiently and he suggests that the presence of . such co-operation between the employees and their employers in the organisation of the solicitors' firm satisfies the working test laid down by this Court in the Hospital case(1 ).

In our opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn bv Mr. Chari between professional service rendered by an individual actini:r bv himself and that rendered bv a firm is not logical for the purpose of the application of the test in question.

What is true about a firm of solicitors would be equally true about an individual solicitor working bv himself. As the firm engages different categories of employees. a single solicitor also eng•.ges different categories of emnloyees to carry out different tvpes of work and so the presence of co-oper•tion .between the employees working in a solicitor's office and their emplover, the solicitor, could be attributR-d to -the work of a single solicitor as much as to the work of the firm; _and, therefore, if Mr. Chari is right and if the firm of solicitors is held t.o be an industry under the Act, the office of au individual solicitor cannot escape the appliration of the definition of s. 2(j), That is why we think it would not be reasonable to deal with the matter on the narrow grounrl suggester! by Mr. Chari by confining our attention to the organisational or . imtitutionalise<l aspect of a solicitor's firm.

When in the Hospital case (1) this Court referred to the organisation of the undert1tking involving the co-operntion of ca pit1tl and Jabour or the employer and his employees. it obviously meant the co-operation essential and necessary for the purpose of rendering nrnterial Rervice or for the purpose of produ, ition. It would be realised th1tt

the concept of industry postulaes pMtnership

(!) [1960) 2 S.C.R. R66 •

Tk National Union

. oj lommercial

Emp/o)'ees v.

M.R.Meher, lndustrifll Tribunal,

Bombay

Gajendragadkar J.

19G2

711t Jlah'onnl L'nfott

of Commrrial .

/;"mp/o)'ttS

J.f.ll. !ifth1r, /nt'ttslrlal 11ilun:d,

Bwnbo;·

164 SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS [19t>2] SCPP.

bctwcPn capital anrl labour or hetwecn the employer ancl his employee~.

It is unde1 this partncr:; hip thn.fthc employer contributes hiA capit:l nnrl the emplo; veP8 their labour a11rl the jnint •.l••ntrihution

of capital anrl Jabour leads dirlldly to tho produe tion which the industry h<IA in view. fn other

word~. th" co.operatinn betw<'An c.ipitill an•! hhour

or h< tween the emplo~•cr ancl hi< employc<'s w}iich is treated :is a working t•, st in determinin'..( whcth•lr any activity amounts to an industry,

0 iS tho C<l operation which is directly involved in th" prorluc. tion of goods or in the rendering of sen-ice.

It. cannot be suggested that every form or ll.Bfl•!Ct of human activity in which capital and lahnur cooperate or l\mploycr and <'mplnyees assit !'a1.h other i~ an ind•istry.

The <listi11ir11iHhing feature of an industry iH that for the prnduction of goods or for the renrlering nf RCrYice, C(1opPration bdwc"n 1.apital ancl labour or between the i:mploycr and his em1iloyc<'A must be direct anrl must be ssential.

Tak<', for instance, a textile mill.

The cm ployP1' cont.ributPR capital and insla lls thf' rna<'hilllry r"gui"it,. for the millsanrl tho cm, plo~1.'<'S cnntribntl' th!'ir lahflur and by their co-opemtion ns;; ist the <'mplPyer in produ1.ing the tt'xt.ilc goods.

Whcn \\"(' refor to tPxtilc labour in r<'latjon to industrial

disputes under t.he Ad, we refer to workmen who

<U'tl engagl)d in the wo1k of producing textile l!Onds.

Tt is obvious that in l'Pf!anl to textile mills, a largr' majority of workmen concernerl in carrying out the acti\•iti"' of most of the departm<'nts nf tlw l•.'Xtilc mill• contribute clircetlv in 01w Lmn or another to the procl11cti"11 nf t .. x.tifo goccls.

It me, v he that '"en in a t<'xtile mill a very rniall minoril y of wnrknwn may not be clircf't.]y C<>IH'<'rned wit Ii the production of tPxtilP goorlR; !mt. <-Yll sn, their 1nrk iA so int.cirrall~· conncct<'d with tlw \\'Ork carriNI <>I\ by the majoritv of wnrkmPn "mplo~·"d thn.t they are tnal<'d as forming pall. (lf th~ same la hour forC'~.

Thu~, there cmi hll no clou lit t I.at

when a textile mill is regarded as an industry, it is because capital and labour jointly contribute to the production of goods which is the object of thA

mill.

Let us consider the case of the hospitals.

In the hospitals, the service to the patients begins with proper diagnosis followed by treatment, either medical or surgical, according to the requirements of the case. In the case of medical treatment, the patients receive medical treatment according to the prescription and are kept in the hospital for further treatment. In surgical cases, the patients receive surgical treatment by way of operation and then are kept in the hospital for further treatment until they are discharged.

During the period of such treatment, all their needs have to be attended to, food has to be supplied to them, nursing assistance has to be given to them, medical help from time to time has to be rendered and all incidental services required for their recovery have also to be rendered.

Now, in the c<>se of the activities of an organised hospital, the co operation of the employees is thus directly involved in rendering one kind of service or another which it is the duty of the hospital to render. It is true that the patients are drawn to the hospitals primarily because of. the doctors or surgeons associated with them. But there can be no doubt that the work of the hospital and its purpose are not achieved merely when a surgical operation is performed or medical prescription provided. After medical treatment is determined or a surgical operation is performed, the patient coming to a hospital as an indoor patient needs all kinds of medical assistance until he is discharged and the services rendered to him both initially and thereafter until his discharge are all services which the hospital has been ecltablished to render and it is in the rendering of the said services that the employees of the hospital co-operate and play their part. That is how the test of co-operation between

The National [Tnion

of Commercial

Employeer

M.R. Me!ier, lnduJtrial 1Tibunal,

Bomhay

Gajendragadkar J.

Tl.t N a•'ional Union

of Commt1cial

Empto)'tt"'

Jf.R. Jlfehtr, ln.i1utrial Tritwiol,

BcmWay

Gqjt11dragadku J.

166 SUPREME COCRT REPORT.S [19b2] SCPP.

tho employer a11d his employees is satisfied in rcg'.lrd to hospitafa which are properly organibed aml maintained. It is, of course, trne that the quality, the importance and the nature ot the service rendered by different categories of !'mployecs ill a hos pi ta! would not be the same, but nc\erthclesH, all the categories of service rendered by re,; per:tive classes of employees in a hospital are eHsential for tho purpose of giving service to the pati!'nls which is the objective of the hospital. That is how tho hospitals satisfy the test of co-operation between the employer and his employees.

Does a solicitorn' firm satisfy that test ?

Superficially onnsidercd, the solicitors' firm is 110 doubt organiHcd as an industrial concern would be organisNI. There are different catgo1 i!•s of sen-a11ts employed by a firm, each category being assigned separatB duties and functions.

But it must bo remembered that the service rendered by :\ Rolicitor functioning either individually or working together with partners is service which is essentially individual ; it depends upon tho professional equipment, knowledge 'lnd efficiency of the soliritor concerned.

ubsidiary \vork which is purely of an i11cidcntal type and which is intended to assist the solicitor in .doing his job has no direct relation to the professional service ultimately rendered by the solicitor.

For his own convenience, a solicitor may employ a clerk because a clerk would typB his opinion ; for his conve11ienc<', a solicitor may employ menial servant to keep his chamber clean and in order ; and it is likely that the number of clerks may ho large if the concern is prosperous and so would be tho number of menial servants.

But the work done either by the typist or the stenographer or by the menial servant or other employees in a solicitor's firm is not directly concerned with the sorvico which the solicitor rend ors to his client and cannot, therefore, be said to

satisfy the test of co-operation between the employer and the employees which is relevant to the purpose. There can be no doubt that for carrying on the work of a solicitor efficiently, accounts have to be kept and correspondence carried on and this work would need the employment of clerks and accountants. But has the work of the clerk who types correspondence or that of the accountant who keeps accounts any direct or essential nexus or connection with the advice which it is the duty of the solicitor to give to his client?

The answer to this question must, in our opinion, be in the negative. There is, no doubt, a kind of co-operation between the solicitor and his .employees, but that co-operation has no direct or immediate relation to the professional service which the solicitor renders to his client. Therefore, in our opinion, it is difficult to accept the plea that .a solicitor's firm carrying on the work of au Attorney is an industry within the moaning of s. 2(j).

There is no doubt that the words used in s. 2(j) are very wide, but as has been held by this Court in the case of Hospitals,(') it is necessary to draw a line in a fair and just manner putting some limitation upon the width of the said words and a working test has been enunciated in that behalf. The application of the said test to the facts in the preRent appeal leads to the conclusion that the work of solicitors which the respondents are carrying on as a firm is not au industry under s. 2(j} of the Act. That is the view taken by the Bombay High Court and we think, that view is right- It may be added that the same view has been taken by the Calcutta. High Court in the case of Brij Mohan Bagaria v. N. 0. Ohaterjee(') and D. P. Dund, erdele v. G. P. Mukherjee(').

Looking at this question in a broad and general way, it is not easy to conceive that a liberal profession like that of an attorney could have been (!) [1960] 2 s.c.R. 668. (2) A.LR. 1958 Cal. 460.

(3) A.LR. 1958, Cal. 465.

The National Union

of Commercial Employees

~.

M.R.'Meher, Industrial Tribunal,

Bombay

Gajendragadkar J.

17i1 , Vtltirmal .'Jnini

of Commerciol

Empl<J'Jtti

v, &l.R. ,\1ehtr, In-.liutriul r, ibun11/,

lJoonbay ·

GojttulragadJ;4T J.

SGPREME COURT REPORTS (19621 SUPP.

intendecl. by tho Legislature to fall within the defi nition of "industry" under s. 2(j).

The very conce pt of the liberal professions has its own spechl and di8tinctive features which do not readily permit tho inclusion of tho liberal professions into the four corners of industri<l l:w. The essential basis

of an industrial dispute is thH.t it is a dispute arising

between capital and labour in enterprises whortJ capital and labour combino to produco commodities

or to render sorvice.

This essential basis would be absent in the case of liberal professions.

A person following a liberal profe::1sion does uot carry on his professio11 i11 any intelligiblo tionRo with the activo co-operation of his employees and tho principal, if not thti solti, capital which he brings into his profession is his special or peculiar intollcctual and educational equipment. That is why on broad and general con;; ideratiollB which cannot be ignored, a liberal profession like that of an attorney must, wo think, be deemed to be outside the definition of "industry'' undor section 2(j).

In this connection, it would be useful to refer to the observation made by Isaccs and Rich JJ., in tho Ferleruted Jlunicipal and Shire Cauncil Employees' Union of Au.stralia v . .Melbourne Corporatimi (1).

"Tho concept of an industrial dispt; te", said the learned Judges, may thus be formulated: Indu8trial disputes occur when, in relation to operations in which capital and labour are contributed in cooperation for the tiatisfaction of human wants or desire8, those t>ngaged in co-operation dispute as to tho basis to bB observed, by the parties engaged, respecting either a sharo of the product or any other terms and conditions of their co-operation.

This formula exclurlos the two extreme contontione of the claimant and the respondents respectively. It excludes, for instance, the legal and tho medical profeSBions, because they are not carried on in any intelligible sense by tho cooperation of

(I) (1919) 26 C.L.R. 508, S54.

.. '

3S.C.R .

SUPREME COURr REPORTS 169

capital and labour and do not come within the sphere of indaatrialism. It includes, where the necessary co-operation exists, disputes between employers and employees, employees and employees, and employers and employurs. It implies that "industry" to lead to an industrial dispute, is not, as the claimant contends, merely industry in the abstract sense, as if it alone effected the result, but it must

be acting and be considered in association with its co-operator "capital" in some form so that the result is, in a sense, the outcome of their combined efforts". Those obaervations support the view which we h we taken about the character of co-operation between the employer and employees which affords a relevant test in determining whether the enterprise in question is an indubtry or not. Co-operation to which the test refers must be co-operation between the employer and his employees which is essential for carrying out the purpose of the enterprise and the service to bo rendered by the enterprfae should be the direct outcome of the combined efforts of the employer and the employees.

There is one more minor point which still remains to be considered.

Mr. Chari argued that it would be idle for the respondents to contend that the work of their firm is not an industry under s. (2j) because they have themselves described their work as the work of carrying on business of solicitors. It appears that the document of partnership executed between the different partners of the firm provided, inter alia, that all expenses o! the business of the partnership or losses incurred in carrying on the business of the partnership shall be borne out of the profits or capital of the partnership. It is on the use of the word "bu8iness" in this clause that Mr. Chri relies. In support of his argument, he referred us to a decision of .Farwell, J., in Dickson

v. J <Y11R, S ( l ). In that case, the Court was , concerned to examine the validity of an agreement between the plaintiff, solicitor, and his junior clerk, who

(1) [1939) 3 All. E.R. 182.

The tVationJl Uniori

of 0 ommercial Employees

v, 111.R. Meher, lr11115lr1at Trih•111al,

Bombay

, Gajndragadkar J.

1"h1 Nat1'.unol Union

ofCammtrcial

Employtts

v. ., l.ll. Mther, lndu11trial Trib1m2l,

llomhll}

Gaje11dragadlar J.

liO SUPBE)IE corRT REPORTS [Jf.(i2: SUl'P.

was sub8cqucntly u1ticlcd to him.

This agrermcnt provided that the latter would 11ot "at any time hercaft.er practise as a solicitor within a radious of

15 miles from the Town Hall, Hanley, aforesaid, or solicit unv client of the solicitor".

Farwell J., held that "the com binat.ion of a rcHtrictinn over an area so great as a.. ra<liot1s 15 mile~ an<l one extending to the whole life of the defendant, articled clerk, was, in the circumsta11ccs, wider than mi.s necessary for the protec; tion of the plaintiff and was, therefnre, unenforceable as being iu undue restraint of trade".

The argument is that the validity of an agreemtnt between a solicitor and his articled derk was tested on the ground that it was an agre0~11e11t in rci; traint of trade and so tho solicitor's work must be hrld to be a "trade" under s. :!(j). There is obviously 110 force in this argument. If in tlwir deed of partnership the respondents described th1, work of partner"

ship as the bu8iness of solicitorn, that can hardly assist the apprllants in contending that the work carried on by the firm is industry under s. 2(j). The work of a solicitor i;, in a loose sense, of course, of business, a11d so if tho solicitors f!nterrd into an agreement in restraint of trade, it.s validity would have to be judged on tho basis that their work in the nature of business.

Thut, however, is hurdly relevant in determining the quc8tion as to whether the said work is an industry under section 2(j); as

we have already made it clear, the definition of thn word "industry" is couched in words of very wide denotation. llut that precisely is the reason why a line has to bo drawn in a just and fair manner to domarcate the limitations of their scope and that necessarily leads to the adoption of somo working test.

Therefore, in our opinion, the argument that the respondeuts themselves have eallcd their work as "business" is of no assistance.

The result is, the appeal fails; there would be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.