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3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 25

DALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF PUNJAB (B. P. 'INHA, o. J., :K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAJAGOPALA

AYYANGAR, , J. R. MuDHOLKAR and

T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)

Police Force-Breach of discipline-Law providing for penalty for such breach-Validity-Pepsu. Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act, 1953 (Pepsu 1 of 1953), s. 3-Constitution of India, Art. 19(1)(a), 19(2), 33.

Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act, 1953, provided: ''Whoever intentionally causes or attempts to cause, or does, any act whichhe knows is I_ikely to caue, disaffectioh towards any Government estabhshed bylaw in India amongst the members of a police force, or induces or attempts to induce, or does any act wh1ch he knows is likely to induce, any member of a police force to withhold hisservices or to commit a breach of Jiscipline shall be punishable with imprisonment .. ,.,,

After the administration of the State of Pepsu was taken over by the Presiclent under Art. 356 of the Constitution o[ India, Parliament enacted a law by which the power of the legislature of the State of Pepsu !was conferred on the President. By virtue of this power the President enacted the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953, the object of which was to provide a penalty, inter alia, for spreading dis. affection among the police. The appellants were charged with having induced or attempted to induce members of the police force tO withhold their services and thus to commit a breach of discipline by staying away without doing their duty, and thereby having committed an offence under s. 3 of the Act.

They were convicted by the Magistrate and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court. The appellants challenged . the validity of the conviction on the ground that s. 3 was violative of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(a) of the Constitution and was not saved by Art. 19(2).

Held, thats. 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act, 19j3, did not infringe Art. (19)(l)(a) of the Constitution and was intra 1)ires.

The Police service is an arm of the State charged with the duty of ensuring and maintaining public order and since ilny breach of discipline on. the part of its members mi&hi

February 6.

Dalbir _ Singh

v. 7 A~ State oj Punjab

AJya11ga1 J.

SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

result in a 1hreat to puLiic order, s. 3 nnist he held to be valid as having br.('n r:-naclrd "in the intr.rets of public order" within the meaning of Art. 19(2).

l9upr:rintendent, ('fntral /lrison, Frrll'.lu; arh v.

Rr1111 Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S. C.R. 821, relied on.

Held, furrhrr, that Art. 33 of the Conc; titution \Vas not applicable became Parliament had deh ga1ed the pow.rs of the legislature of ti.<: State to tl.e President and any law enacted by hiih \\ould riot have the force of Parliamentary legisla1ion contemplated by Art. 33.

Cnnni; AL A l'PJ:LLATE .J cn1s PICT!ON: Criminal Appeal No. I 02 of 1960.

 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order daterl October 7, 1959,- of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revision N:o. 610 of 1959.

Hardei.• Singh ancl Y. Knmar, for the appellants.

S. JJ. Sikri. Advocate.General for the Stat, e of Punjrtb, S. S. Rindm and P. I>. Menon, for the

respondent.

1962. February 6.

The .Tmlgment of the Court wa8 delirnr<cl. by

AYL1-.<Hll, .f.--This app<'al hy special bavc against th!l rleci•ion of tlw High Court of Punjab raises for considcation principally the contitu tional valirlitv of"· :~ <>f the Pepsu P<llicc~ : Incitement to dis11ffPction) Act. (Act, I nf Hl:>3 ), which will be referre<I to hereafter ns thP imp:igned Acr ..

The four app., llants were at one tiarn member• of the Peps11 P.J!ice force anrl wer<' chaqed, before the First Cla's Ma!!istrnte at Faridkot., with having committed three offunccs: (I) under s. :>6 of tho Pepsu Public S; ifoty Orilinancc (Xo. 7 of Sam 1at 2006), (2) under s. 33 of tlte said Ordinance,

JLnd (3) under"· 3 of the impugned Act.

Wt• shall he referring to th" provisinns of the r<levant enact monts in due course.

The accused pleaded not guilt.v and were tried by tho learned Magistrate who by bis judgment dawd. August ~8, IU58, l)eld thl'

prosecution case fully established against all the accused. He convicted the four appellants under s. 26 of .the Public Safety Ordinance and sentenced them to imprisonment for six months. The third appellant alone was convicted of the offence under s. 33 of the same Ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonmPnt for six months. Appellants 1, 2 and 4were further convicted of off onces under s. 3 of the impugned Act and sentenced to imprisonment for six months, the several entences against the respective accused being directed to run concurrently. The appellants filed an appeal to the Sessions Judge at Bhatinda who upheld the convictions but reduced the sentences. In respect of the offence under s. 26 of the Public Safety Ordinance the sentence passed against the four appellants was reduced to imprisonment 'for three months while in respect of the third accused who had been additionally sentenced under s. 33 of the Ordinance the same was reduced to imprisonment for 1-J /2 months and the sentences on appellants 1, 2 and 4 under s. 3 of the impugned Ac't was reduced to imprisonment for three months, the sentences again being directed to run concurrently. With these modifications the appeals stood dismissed.

The appellants thereafter preferred a revision to the High Court

and this was heard by a learned Single , Judge who while accepting the revision of the appelhnts in so far as it related to their conviction and sentence nnder s. 26 of the Ordinance. maintained the other convictions and sentences but reduced the sentences.

It is from this judgment of the High Court that this appeal has been preferred by the four appellants.

It would be seen from the above narrative that the appeal is concerned with the propriety of the conviction of appeilants 1, 2 and 4of an offence under s. 3 of the impugned Act and of the third appellant under s. 33 of the Ordinance, all the appellants having been acquitted by the High Qm1rt of the charge against t!iem under s, 26 of the

Dalbir Singh

v. 1'he ')fate of Punjab

Ayyangar J.

I>alb ir Singh

' T~ SL2tt of Pun, j"h

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

Ordinance. It is therefore not necessary to refer to the terms of s. 26 or the offenco comtitut.ed by it. In the Courts below including the High Court no challenge was made as regards the legality of any of the provisions of law of the violation of which the appellanta were found guilty but before us though learned Counsel did not raise any contention regarding the validity of~. 33 of the Pepsu Public Safety Ordinance, challenged the constitutio11ality

of s. :i of the impugwd Pcpsu Polic~ (Incitement to disaffection) Act which appellants I, 2 and 4

were found to have violated and for which thev were sentenced to :t tcrm of imprisonment. •

Le1trned Counsel for the appellants raised for our co11sideration three points : ( l) the constitutional 1alidity of s.:J of thn irnpugnerl Act, (2) ifs. 3 were constitutional a11d vidid whether appcllant8 I,

2 and 4 were• pro1cd to have been guilty of an offence for 1iolating that provision, and(:!) whether appellant 3 was properly held guilty of an offone under "· 3:! of the p,, I' •u Public Safety Ord inn nee.

\Vn shall first take up for consideration the attack on the validity of s. :i of the impugned Act.

Patiah and East. Punj:Lb State Uuion, commonly oallecl Pepsu was one of the States specified in Part B of the First Sohrdulc to the Coustitution when the Constitution was brought into forco in .January

J!l;)(J, For reasons uot necesoarv to be stated here, the administration of Pepsu was taken over by the Prcsidc., nt under Art. :i.; G of the Constitution.

The powers of the State Lrgislature were declared by t:he Presidential Proclamation ismecl on ~Tarch 4, I 953. to be "exerciseable hy or under the authority of Parliament" (virl<1 Art. :r>G(l )(b) ).

Thereafter Parliament enacted Ac. XXII of 195:! which received the assent of the Pros1clent on i\Iay Ii, 195:1, which was entitled : "The Patiala and East Punjab States Union Legislaturn {D"lrgatiou of Powers) Act, ) 953." Section :i oft his enactment provided ;

3 'S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPOR'.l'S 29

"The power of the legislature of the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union to make Jaws which has been declared by the proclamatioIJ.to be exercieable by or under the authority of the l!arliament is hereby conferred on the .l:'resident."

There are other provisions which are contained in the other sub-sections of s. 3 but these have no relevance for. this appeal. In exercise of the power thus delegated to him by Parliament the President enacted Pepsu Act l of 1953 whose long title runs :

"An Act to provide a penalty for spreading disaffection among the police and for kindred offences."

It is the 3rd section of this cnJ.ctm0nt whose vali- . dity is challenged in this appe1.l and that reads :

":1.

Penalty for causing disaffection, etc. -Whoever intentionally causes or attempts to cause, or .does any act which he knows is likely to cause, disaffection towards any Government establiRhed by law in India amongst the members of a police force, or induces or attempts to induce, or does any act which he knows is likely to induce, any member of a police force to withhold his services or to commit a breach of discipline shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with

both."

The attack upon the validity of this provision was rested on its •being violative of the freedom guaranteed by Art.• l9(l)(a), the submission being that the section was not saved by Art. 19(2).

Before considering the arguments advanced it is necessary 1to mention, for being put aside, that in construing the validity of s. 3 of the impugned Act

Ealbir Singh

v. 'The State of Punjab

Ayyangar J.

Da/bir ; Singh

Thi State nf Punjab

A)'J.lngar J.

30 SUPREME COURT .REPoRTs (1962] SU.PP.

the provision contained in Art. 3:l of the Constitution bus nu relevance. That 'Article enacts :

"Art. 33. Parliament may by law determine tn what Pxtcnt any of the rights conferred by this Part, shall in their application to the members of the Armed Forces or the Forces' charged with the maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensuro the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them." No doubt, the impugned provision is concerned with ensuring discipline among the forces charged with the nmintenance of public order but as the powers of the President were exercised by virtue of the delegation contained in s. 3 of Act XXII of 1953 under which only the powers of the State Legislature were v<'st-cd in him, any law enact-cd by him would not have the force of Parliamentary legislation eontomplated by Art. 33.

Article 3:l being out of the way the very short question that bas to be considered is whether the impugner! provision is saved by Art. 19(2), for it is common ground that that provision does not violate any freedom other than that of "free speech and expression" gunra.nteed by Art. 19 (I) (a).

Article 1!1(2) as it. stands after the amendment by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 reads :

"19(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) shall affect. the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so for as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on tho exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interest of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, de(l(•ney or morality, or in relation t-0 contempt of cou::t, defamation or incitement to an .offence," Of the criteria set out in this clause the one re)eyant

• ...

::i S.C.R.

SbPREMtll COURT REPoRTS 31

in the present context is that which refers to "in the interests of ............ public order". The contention urged hy learned Counselwas thats: 3 was too wide in that it embraced within itself not merely matters which might h<tve relevance to circumstances intimately connected with the maintenance of public order, but also those whoslil connection with it might .be remote or fanciful.

While not seriously disputing that seducing the loyalty of the police force, or inducing the mem hers thereof not to do their duty might imperil public order and so fall within the limit of restrictions permissible of imposition under Art. 19(2), learned Counsel laid stress on the fact that the impugned section made it an offence to induce a member of the police force to "commit a breach of discipline," laying special emphasis on the fact that the words "breach of discipline" besides being vague, might include within itself acts which might be innocent as wdl as others of varying degrees of culpability.

The content of the expression "in the interests of. ........... public order" has been the subject of detailed and elaborate consideration by this 0ourt in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v.

Ram M anohar Lohia ( 1) where the effect of the First (Constitution) Amendment by which the words "for the maintenance of public order" were replaced by the words "in the interests of public order" was considered in the light of the previous decisions of thie Court on that topic. Subba Rao, J., speaking for this Court said that the expression "public order'' in the juxtaposition of the different grounds set out in Art. 19(2) was. synonymous with "public peace, safety and tranquillity". He also pointed out that the expression "in the interests of public order" though undoubtedly wider than the previous phrasing "for the maintenaP.ce of public order" could not mean that the existence of any . remote or fanciful connection between the impugned act

(I) [ 1960] 2 S.C.R. 821.

Dalbir Singh

v. 7 he State of Punjt1h

-1_vyanga1 J,

Dolhir Sin1h ..

The State of Punjab

Ay1angar J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.

and public order was sufficient to sustain the validity of the law, but that on the other hand, tho connection between the act prohibited or pnnalised and public order should be intimate; in other words there should be a reasonable and rational relat.ion between it and the object sought to be achieved, viz., public order. The nexus shoulrl thus bn proximate-not for-fetched, problcmaticlll or too remote in the chain of its relation with public order.

Keeping this exposition in mind. the question to bo considered is whether the connection between what is prohibited or penalised by the impugned provision and public order, i.e., the ensuring of tranquillity and orderly lifo is so remote or fanciful as to lead tu an inference that there is no proximate connection between the two.

We have no hesitation in answering this question against the appellants. The impugned enactment seeks to lay an embargo on certain >1ctivities in thti interests of the Police service which is tho <trm of tho State charged with the duty of ensuring and maintaining public order. The efficiency of that service and its utility in achieving the purpose for which it is form ed and cxista is sought to be secured by penalising attempts to undermine its loyalty and dissuad ing the members of that force from performing their functions and boing available to the State as a disciplined body.

Any breach in the discipline by its members must neceBBarily bn reflected in a threat to public order .and tranquillity. If the police force itself were indisciplined they could hardly servo as instruments for the maintenance of public order or function properly as the machinery through which order could bo maintained among the general public. As we have pointed out e•ulier, learned Counsel did not seriously contest that the impugned provision in so far as it penalised tho creation of disaffoctiun among members of the police force or the incitement of the members of the police forco to withhold their services from the government could properly be sustained as enacted

' 1

• '

"in the interests of public order," We consider that attempts to induce indiscipline among the police do not stand on any different footing.

Wo do not further consider well-founded the submission of learned Counsel that the word "discipline" or the phrase "breach of discipline" is vague. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this challenge to the validity of s. 3 of the impugned Act.

The next question that was urged by learned Counsel was that the High Court was wrong in considering that the three appellants 1, 2 and 4 were guilty of any contravention oi s. 3 of the Act.

We do not consider that this submission is justified.

It is needless to point out that in considering an appeal which comes before us by special leave this

Court normally accepts as final every finding of fact reached by the High Court as well as its appreciatiOn of oral testimony and that if there is evidence which could serve as a basic for any finding reached by the High Court the same cannot be canvassed before us. If the submission of learned Counsel is viewed in the light of this principle it appears to us that there is hardly any scope for argument as regards what might be termed the merits of the case. One of the witnesses whose evidence has been accepted by the Courts below and which is referred to in the judgment of the learned Judge in the High Court was Krishan Dayal P.W, 4 who deposed to the accused saying "Police brothers, come and join us, stop the office work; we will .sit here in dharma, start hunger strike ............ and would not allow the office work to run." It is clear from this evidence that the accused had induced or had attempted to induce members of the police. force to withhold their services as also to coi:nmit a breach of discipline by staying away without doing their duty. In our opinion, it is not shown that the conviction of appellants I, 2 and 4 of an offence under s. 3 of Act I of 1953 was improper or illegal.

Dalbir Singh

The State of Punjah

Avyarigar J.

lf/62

Dolbir Sin/lh

•• Tiu Slate aj Punjab

Ayyangor J,

SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

The last of the points arising in the appeal is as regards the conviction of Lal Siugh the third appellantof an offence under s. 3~ of tht• Ordinance. Soctiou 33 of the Ordinance runs :

"Whoever induces or attemptH: to i11uueu any public se1 rn.11t or any serva11t of local . authority to disregard 0·1 fail in his duties as. such servant shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year. or with fine or with both.''

As regards this appellant this is what th~· learned Judge qf tho High Court stated :

"As against Lal Siugh there is evidcni:e of P.W. II Kartar Singh and P.W. 18 Balwant Singh, Foot-Constable that he asked them to disobey their officers and should give up government work.

His offence under s. 3:J of the Ordinance is substantiated."

As we have pointed out earlier, th1 validity of s. ::ia (If the Ordinanre was not challcnµed and the 1mly qu<'Etion therefore was whether the th(rd appellant was properly held guilty of th1 offence.

It was not disputed that the two prosecution witnesses I l & 18 did state on oath the ma.ttern referred to by the learned Judge. In view of what we have stated earlinr as regards the manner in which this Court deals with appeals under Art. 13fi there is no ground shown for interfering with the conviction of the third appellant or the sentence passed.

Before parting with this case it is necessary to advert to one matter. In the course of his arguments learned Counsel for the appellant drew our

attntion to certain police rules framed by the State Government which prohibited policemen from joining unions and ought to raise a point that the said rule was unconstitutional as in violation of Art.19(l)(b) and that all the activities of the four

accused were in reality an attempt to form an union and that therefore we should consider the legality of this rule of the police force in considering the propriety of their convictions.

Though there is a reference to the rule in the judgment of the High Court, it is referred to only incidentally and as part of the narrative in detailing the activities of the accused. The offence with which the accused were charged was certainly not the violation of that rule, which it might be pointed out did not create any offence, so that the validity of that rule was wholly irrelevant to their guilt when charged with substantive offences under the various enactments we have noticed earlier. It need hardly be pointed out that the fact that a person is engaged in aseert ing a fundamental right affords no defence to a charge of having contravened a valid penal statute while so engaged. In the High Court the validity of the police rule was never challenged and in the circumstances we declined to permit learned Counsel to argue any question before us in relation to the validity of that rule.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

196a

Dalbir Singh

•• The State of Punjab

Ayyangar J.