< ;

) I

>.y

S; C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1191

to direct a retrial though this is. the rionnal course . when a jury frial is set aside on the grounds of i:nisdirection and non-direction. We tl).erefore discharge (nqt acquit) both the appellants leaving it to Government ither to drop t.he e.ntire matter or to poceed in such. manner as it may be advised.,. We do .this because the accused expressly asked that the • charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act shbuld be'' left over ·for a separate rial,. The two convictioµ:s re, ' therefore quashed and. also . the sentences: e. are . told that the first accused has already .served out his.; sentence. The fine if paid, will be refunded. The bail bond of the second accused will .be cancelled.

MAHANT SALIG RAM v.

MUSAMMAT MAYA DEVI.

' (~: ~· DAS, BHAGWAT! and SYED JAFER IMA¥ JJ.] '.'

Custom-succession-Non-ancestral property-Daughter virsus collateral within fourth degree-Saraswat Brahmins of Pathahl{ol •in the District of Gurdaspur-Riwaj-i-am-Entries ih'erein-Value of -Riwaj-i-am of Gurdaspur District of the year 1913-Whether a teliable document-,-Answer to questions 16 and 17.-Value of,

It is now well-settled that the general custoin of the Pnjab, being that a daughter excludes the collaterals from succession to the self-acquired property of her father. the initial onus, therefore, must, on principle, be on. the. collaterals to show that the general custom in favour of the daughter's succession to the. self-acquired property <1f her tather has been varied by a special local .custom . excluding tc, daughter which is binding on the parties. . . . , . •

It is also well-settled that though the entris in the' Riwaj-iam are entitled to an initial presumption in favour of their cortectne, s irrespective of the question whether or not the custom, 'as recorded, is in accord with the general custom, the quantum of evidence neces' sary to rebut that presumption will, however, 'vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.

Where, for instance; the Riwaj-iam lays down a custoin in consonance with the general agricultural custom of the province, very strong proof would be required to dis- place that presumption; but where, on the other hand, the custom as recorded in the Ri waj'i-am is opposed to the custom generally prevalent; the presumption will be considerably weakeneq, Likewise1 40-89 S. C. India/59

 Shreekanliak .Ramayya Munipalli v.

The Stale of

Bomha.J

Bose].

January ~1

!955

Maharit 'Sillig Ram

v; ' M11sammat Maya

Dtvi

where. ; he Riwaj-i-:an1 affects ad\ersely the fights Of the feffialeS who had ._no C!pportufiity tyhatever of appearing before the Revenue authOrities, the presumption will be \Veaker still and only a few instances would be sufficient -to rebut it.

~~ the Riw_j-i-am prOduced is a reliable and a trustworthy dot;:umeti.t, has'beeri. carefully prepared, and does not contain_ within its four corners cbntradictory s_taten1entiv ofcustom, and in "the op1n1on of the! Settleinent Officer is not a record of the wishes of the persons appearing before him as to what the custom sµould be, it would. he a pr, r:sumpive piece of evidence in proof of the special custom se~ up, which i~ left unrebutted by the daughters would lead to a result faVOUrable to the colfaterals. If, on the other liand, it is not a docU:rUent .of the kind indicated above, then such a Riwaj-i-am will have flo value at all as a presumptive piece of evidence.

The Riwaj-i-ams of the Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr.

Kennaway in 1913 in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of the daughter to succeed to the self-acquired property of hr. father are not reliable and trustworthy documents.

The answer to question 16 al)d the answer to question 17 recorded therein do l).Ot ontain the correct record of custom.

Held,. that the appellant-a collateral within fourth degreea saraswat Br3.hmin of Pathankot in the district of Gurdaspur had failed to discharge the onus that initially rested on him that the responde(ll (the. daughter) was excluded by him in respect of. the noiian~tral .property. _of her father and that therefore np burden was y cast op her. of adducing evidence of particular instances. ,

The ge.neral custom laid down in para 23 of Rattigan's Dige$t of ustornary .Law that "a daughter is preferred to collaterals in regard to .the self-acquired property of her father" was approved by the .S:iprCffie Court.

' Buta Sing}l v. Mt. Harnamon (A.LR. 1946 Lah. 306); Gopal

Sigk v. Uiagar Singh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 86), Mst. Subhani v. Nawab (I.L.R. [1940] Lah. 154), Beg v. Allah Ditta ([1916] L.R. 44 I.A. 89), Mt. Vaishno Ditti v. Mt. Rameshri ([1928] l.L.R. 10 Lah.

I 186; L.R. '55 I.A. 407), Khan Beg v. Mt.

Fateh Khatun ([1931] 'c l.L:R. 13 Lah. 276), fagat Singh v. Mst. fiwan (A.LR. 1935 Lah. 617), Qamar-ud-din v. Mt. Fathe Bano ([1943] J.L.R. 26 Lah. 110), Mohammad Khalil v. Mohammad Bakhsh (A.LR. 1949 E.P. 252), Gudit Singk v. Mt. Malan ((1924] 1.L.R. 5 Lah. 364), Kesar Singh ~

v. Achhar. Singh (A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68), Bawa Singh v. Mt. Partap

(A.LR. 1935 Lah.' 288), Kesar Singh v. Gurnam Singh (A.LR. 1935 Lah: 696), Najju v. Mt. Aimna Bibi (A.LR. 1936 Lah. 493), Gurdit Singh v .. Mt. 1vlan Kaur (A.LR. 1937 Lah. 90), Labh v. Mt. Fateh Bibi (A.LR. 1940 Lah. 436), Ramzan Shah v. Sohna Shah ([1889] 24 P.R. 191), Nanak Chand v. Basheshar Nath ([1908] 43 P.R. 15)

J_. and Mt, Mnmn v. Sawan Mal (A.LR. 1935 Lah. 453), referred to.

...

< -.r•

CrvrL

APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1953. ·

Appeal from the Judgment and Deree dated.· te 28th July 1949 of the High Court of Jud.icaiure, for

the State of Punjab at Simla in Civil , Regular ·.First Appeal No. 365 of 1946 ari, ing out of the Decree dated the 31st day of . October 1946 of the Court of the Su\).

Judg~, 1st Clas~, Patankot in Suit No. 110 of 1945'.. '. .

Raji11der Narain, for the appellant. , K. L. Gosain (R. s. Narula and Naunit Lal, with

j ( ; ' him), for the respondent.

1955.

January 21.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ds J.-This is an itppeal by the plintiff i~.· a 'dit for a declaration of his title as collateral within four degrees of Gurdial, who . was a Sarswat. Brah'.mi~, resident of Pathankot. in the ' distriGt of 'Gurdlspu~ .nd the last male holder of tl1e .properties in suit. . ·. · ·

Gurdial died many years ago lea; ing. cetain' 'lands in villages Bhadroya, Kingarian • and Pathankot, Tehsil. Pathankot . in the district of . Gurdaspur, .. and le'aving him surviving his widow Musammat Melo an9 a daughter Musammat Maya Devi,. the . respond!; nt before us ... So111e time in the year 1926, a . portiop. of the land in village Bhadroya was . acquired for ... the Kangra. Valley Railway and a sum of Rs; l,539-7-0 was awarded to Musammat Melo. On an objection py the appellant this .amount .was deposited in. the Court of the Senior Subordtnate Judge, Gurdaspur, with :l' direction to pay the interest on this amount to Musammat Melo,

 On the 28th September 1944 Musammat Melo died and the . Revenue Courts ordered mutations in respect of the lands in the three villages in favour of the respondent .as the daughter of Gurdial.

On the 10th March 1945 the appeliani: filed the• s~!t out of which this appeal arises against the respondent for a declaration that he wa's entitled . to the , lands mentioned . in the plaint as well as to . the sum of

Mahant Salig Ram

v.

Muslltnmat M'!)la

 , Devi: ,,1

'.

Mahant---Salig Ram v.

Mwammat Maya

D6vi

Das J.

Rs. ,1,539-7;0. in preference to 1the respondent under' the

Y ., custom governing the parties whereunder . the colla'

t~als , of , the last male j:iolder excluded fhe daughter .. , . Te)·, espondent contes.ted.: th'.e suit ', mainly on, the

gr9nd.~~- . ,':1 . · . ·, , . - i, ,. (i). that the 'suit '.tor ~.· iPere' . declaration was , n?t maintairiable,. . . . . 1 • , • •'\- , (iif, t, hat, the . parties ~~e governed , by Hindu ' Law and not by custom, ~

(iii) that the appellant was not a collateral of Gwc)ial., at all, . . . .. , . .. _ (iv) that the properties in sui\ .were not an.cestr~I, and

 (v) that there was '.no custom whereunder the collaterals of the father who was the last tnak holder excluded the . daughter from succession to the , selfacq\lie; f prperty .'of, her fathr. ' . ' ' ' . . . '.fhe .. l!bqrdinate Judge in his judgment pron0ttnceq

Ol)- 'fhe lt ,9c\obef 1946 hld~ . . . .: , 1 .

(i) that the !, ands, in. , suit being_ in. posession o~ tenants, the suit .for a declaration of title thereto was riiiinfainable but the ' suit' for . a: declaration iii respect of 'the' "siiih of Rs .. 1,539-7-0 was not maintainable in'

v\w of:UJ.e prvisions of the Indian Succession Act rdating to succession' certificates, ·

' '(ii)'that 'the parties were governed by custom atld not by Hindu Law, . . .'. (iii)'tha~ 'the 'appellant. was. a. collateral of 'Gurdlal within four degrees, ' . . ' . . ' '' (iy) 'that the land in Khata' No.' 2 of die' village Kihgarian Was ancestral while the ' rest' of the lands ill: si.iit 'Were 1 n:ofl-allcestral, ad ' .,, '' i, ' (v)"that there was a custom according "to which,' a daughter was excluded from inheritance by the collaterals up to the fourth degree ·, •with respect to ahC!!St, ral "as weU •as self-acquired ·. property i:Jf the last male holder as laid down' in the case of Buta Si11gh v: Mt. Harnamon('). · · ' In .. the result, the, Subordinate Judge / decreed . the• suit in:-respe<; t only'.'of.. tile_ lands, iri sujt and order.ed. the parties to: beat. their , own costs. . ... , . .. 1 ·!-(I):A.I.ll.' 1946 Lah. 306.

 Against this judgment and decree the respondent preferred an appeal to the Lahore High Court.

The appellant preferred cross-objections against the .: order. as to costs and against the finding that the lands" 'in the three villages except the land in Khata' No., 2, of village Kingarian were non-ancestral. After . the . parti-: -. . ~: tion of India the . appeal was transferred . to the . High ' , Court of East Punjab. . . , · · " : • By its judgment dated the 28th July 1949 the <East' Punjab High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross"objections on the following findings:- ·.. '1 •

(i) that the suit' for .: declaration of titl~ to tn~· lands was maintainable as all the lands 'in suit wer~' in the possession of tenants, · · · (i:i) that, the lands iri suit except the land in Khata No. 2 of village Kingarian were nonancetrai; and , ·(iii) that according to the custom' prevaiiing iri the Gurdaspui: district a daughter was entitled to. s:iJo ceed to non-ancestral property iri preference to col-· laterals even ' though ' they were within the fourth degree. · ' ' ' " 'r The, .High Court accordingly, modified the decree 'of the Subordinate Judge . to the extent. th.at the. decla~: ration . in the appellant'.s favour was made. to .. relate only to the land in. Khata No. 2 of village Kingarian which was held to be ancestral.

Qn an applica_tion: made by the appellant on the 26th August 1949 he.

High Court, by its order dated the . 5th June 1950, granted him a certificate of fitness to appeal. ' . to ' the Federal Court.

After the commencement of 'the Constittiti<?n of India the ; ippea~ has. cope before this ' Court for final disposal.· The firs~ question rai.sed before us . but not . v.ery

t: seriously pressed is as to whether the : lands in .sui, t. other than those in Khata No. 2 in village, _Kingarial). were ancestral or self-acquired.

Our , attentiop. , JJ.as not been drawn to any material. on tht; recon; l which. induces us .to take a view ' different from the view eon~ J.i currently taken by the . Courts _below.

We, _therefore, see n.o force or substance in this contention.

Mahant Sa/ig /Wm

Musammat Maya

Devi ·

Das Ji

Mahant Salig Ram v.

Musammat Mqya

:..,, Devi

Das J.

The main fight before us has been on the question as' to 'whether there is a_ custom in the Gurdaspur district governing' the parties under which a collateral within the fourth degree excludes the daughter of' the hist, male holder from succession to the -elf-acquired p'roperty _ of her father.

The customary --rights - of' succe_ssjcin of daughters as against the collaterals -of 'the father with reference to ancestral and non:ancestra:l lands are stated in paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Diget of Customary Law. It is categorically stated in subparagraph (2) of that paragraph that the daughter succeeds to the self-acquired property of the father in_ preference to the collaterals even though they are within -the fourth degree.

Rattigan's work has been. accepted by the Privy Council_ as "a book _ of _ U!).- questioned authority in the Punjab".

Indeed, the correctness of this paragraph was not disputed before this Court in Copa/ Singh v. Ujagar Singh(').

The general custom of the Punjab being that a daughter excludes the collaterals from succession to the selfacquired property of her father the initial onus, therefore, must, on principle, be on the collaterals to show_ that the general custom in favour of the daughter's succession to the self-acquired property of her father has been varied by a special local custom excluding the daughter which is binding on the parties.

Indeed, it -has been so held by the Judicial Committee in T:rfst.: Subhani v. Nawab( 2 ) and the matter is now We\1-se, ttled.

The appellant claims to have discharged this -initialonus in two ways, namely (1) by producing the Riwaji-am of the - Gurdaspur district prepared by Mr: Kennaway in 19i3 and (2) by adducing evidenc~ showing that the collaterals of one Harnam _ Singh, who was also a Sarswat Brahmin of the Gurdaspur district and indeed a member of this very family of Gurdial succeeded in -preference to his daughter. It is pointe9 out that no instance has been proved on the part of the respondent showing that the daughter ever excluded the collaterals from succession to the self-acquired property of the father.

The trial Court (1j [19551 1 s.c.R. se.

(2) LL.R. [1940) Lah. 154.

'r .,

as well as the High Court took the view that the evi~ dence as to the succession to the propertyof Harnam Singh was of no assistance to the appellant for the reason that the evidence was extremely sketchy; that it did not appear whether the properties left by Harnam Singh were ancestral or selfacquired or whether " the .. properties left by him were of any substantial , .._._._,, value at all as would have made it worth while for the daughter to claim the same in addition to the properties gifted to her by her father during his lifetime: Further, the. fact that the daughter did .not contest the suq.:ession of the collaterals to the pro-· perties left by fiqfllaIU Singh, eyen if they were selfacquired, might well have been the result, as held by the High Court, of sorrie family arrangement.

We find . ourselves in agreement with the Courts below that the instance relied upon by the appellant is wholly insufficient to discharge the onus that was on him to displace the general custom recorded in paragraph 23(2) of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law.

The appellant contends that in any case he has fully discharged the onus that was on him by producing in evidence the Riwaj-i-am recording the. custom of the district of Gurdaspur which was compiled by Mr.

Kennaway in 1913.

Reference is also . made to the earlier Riwaj-i-ams of the Gurdaspur District prepared iri 1865 and 1893.

Answer to question

16. as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am of 1913 shows that subject to certain exceptions, which are not material for our purpose, the general rule is that the daughters are excluded by the widow and 1llale kindred of the deceased, however remote.

This answer goes much beyond the answers to the same question as recorded in the Riwaj-i-ams of 1865 and 1893 for those. answers limit the exclusion in favour of the male kindred up to certain specified degrees.

The answer to question 17 of the 1913 Riwaj-i-am like those to question 17 of the 1865 and 1893 Riwaj-i-ams clearlyindi<;:ates . that except amongst the Gujjars of the Shakargarh tehsil all the remaining tribes consulted by the Revenue authorities recognised no distinction as to the rights of the daughters to inherit (i) the immovable or

1955 ...

Mahant Salig Ram

"'.' •.

Musamrnat Maya

Devi -.· Das J.

ig55

Mdiiant Salig' Ra'Ji

v,' '' MuSam1nat Maya

DeVi1

iJ/u J.'

antestral and (ii) the niovable or sdf acquired property of' their' respective fathers.. It is claimed that these answers _quite ': aequatdy displace the general custom and' shif\ the onus to the . respondent to disprove the ptesrtmption arising on these Riwaj-i-ams by citing instan:2es of successioncontrary to these answers.

In stlj'lpOrt' °c:if this contention" reference is made to the observations . of the Privy Conncil in Beg v. Allah Di'tta(1 ) 'that ·the statements contained in a Riwaj-iani. <£oi-ih a sttbng piece of evidence iff support of the c'uston\. "therein: entered subject to rebuttal.

Reliance is also .-placed on the observations of the Privy Council'in Mt. VaishnlY Ditti y. Mt. Rameshri(2 ) "to the effect that 'the statements in the Riwaj-i-am might be accepted' even if unsupported by instances.

The conterttioii is that on production by the appellant of the Riwaj-icain of the Gurdaspur district the onus shifted to the respondent 'to prove instances rebutting the statements contained therein. This, it is urged, the respohdent has failed to do. ·

:.There is n'o doubt or dispte :is to the value of the. entries . in the . Riwaj-i-am.

It is well-settled that tl}ough' they are entitled to an initial presumption . in favour "of their correctness irrespective of the question whether or not the ' custom, as recorded, is in accord with the general custom, .the' quantum of evidence necessary to rebut that presumption will, however; vary ith_ the facts and . circumstances of each case.

Where, for instance, the Riwaj-i-am lavs down a ustni in . consonance with the general agricultural cust9m of the province, very strong proof would be required to displace that presumption; but where, on the oiher hand, the custom" as recorded in the Riwaji-a'.~ , {s'. oppo; ed to the custom g'eneraliy prevalnt,. the'.presumption will be , considerably weal<ened.

Likewise .where the Riwajci-am . affects adversely the rights of . the femals who had no opportunity whatever of ppearing before the Revenue authodties, _te presufI1ptio11 will be weaker still and only a fe.w mstances would be .sufficient to rebut it. [See Khan Beg v.' Mt.

(i) (1916].i...R. 44.i. A. 89.

(2) [tg~S] i.L.R. to Lah. 186; L.R. 55 I.A. 407.

y ......

Fateh Khatun(1 ), Jagat Singh v. Mst. Jiwan( 2 ) ]. The principles laid down in these cases were approved of by the Judicial Committee in Mst.

Subhani's case supra.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends that even if the presumption as to the correctness of the Riwaj-i-am be weak, the respondent has not cited a single instance of a daughter having excluded the collaterals from succession to the selfacquired property of her father and has, therefore, failed to discharge the onus that was thrown on her as a result of the production-by the appellant of the Riwaji-am of 1913 and, consequently, the appellant must succeed.

This argument overlooks the fact that m order to enable the appellant to displace the general custom recorded in Rattigan's work and to shift the onus to the respondent the appellant must produce a Riwaj-i-am which is a reliable and trustworthy document. It has been held in Qamar-ud-Din v. Mt.

Fateh Bano( 3 ) that if the Riwaj-i-am produced is a reliable and a trustworthy document, has been carefully prepared and does not contain within its four corners contradictory statements of custom and m the opinion of the Settlement Officer is not a record of the wishes of the presons appearing before him as to what the custom should be, it would be a presumptive piece of evidence in proof of the special custom set up, which if left unrebutted by the daughters would lead to a result favourable to the collaterals.

If, on the other hand, it is not a document of the kind indicated above then such a Riwaj-i-am will have no value at all as a presumptive piece of evidence.

This principle has been followed by the East Punjab High Court in the later case of Mohammad Khalil v. Mohammad Bakhsh( 4 ), This being the position in law, we have to scrutinise and ascertain whether the Riwaji-ams of the Gurdaspur district in so far as they purport to record the local custom as to the right of succession of daughters to the self acquired properties of their respective father are reliable and trustworthy documents.

(1) [1931] l.L.R. 13 Lah. 276, 296, 297.

(2) A.LR. t935 Lah. 617.

(3) [1943] l.L.R. 26 Lah. 110.

(4) A.LR. '949 E.P. 252.

Mahant Salig Ram v.

Musammat Maya

Deui

Das].

Mahant Salig Ram v.

Musammat Maya Devi

Da> ],

Twenty-two tribes including Brahmins were consulted by Mr. Kennaway who prepared ' the Riwaj-i-am of 1913.

In paragraph 4 of the Preface Mr.

Kennaway himself states that many of the questions related to matters on which there really existed no custom and the people had merely stated what the custom should be and not what it actually was.

In Appendix 'C' are collected 56 instances of mutuations rn which the daughter inherited.

In these there are four instances relating to Brahmins.

Answer to question 16, as recorded in this Riwaj-i-am, has been discredited and shown to be incorrect in at least three cases, namely, Gurdit Singh v. Mt. Malan('), Kesar Singh v. Achhar Singh(') and Buta Singh v. Mt. Harnamon ( 3 ) • The answer to question 16 as recorded in the 1913 Riwaj-i-am, it was pointed ont, went much beyond the answer given to the same question in the Riwaj-i-ams of 1865 and 1893.

The answer to question 17 of the 1913 Riwaj-i-am that no distinction is to be made between ancestral and self-acquired property has not been accepted as correct in not less than six cases, namely, Bawa Singh

v. Mt. Partap( 4 ), fagat Singh v. Mt. fiwan( '), Kesar Singh v. Gurnam Singh( 0 ), Najju v. Mt. Aimma Bibi('), Gurdit Singh v. Mt. Man Kaur('), and Labh v. Mt.

Fateh Bibi('). The statements in a Riwaj-i-am the truth of which is doubted by the compiler himself in the preface and which stand contradicted by the instances collected and set out in Appendix 'C' of the same Riwaj-i-am and which have been discredited in judicial proceedings and held to be incorrect cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a reliable or trustworthy document and cannot displace the initial presumption of the general custom recorded in Rattigan' s book so as to shift the onus to the daughter who is the respondent.

The appellant relies on the cases of Ramzan Shah

v. Sohna Shah( 10 ), Nanak Chand v. Basheshar Nath(11 ), Mt. Massan v. Sawan Mal (,.) and Kesar Singh v. (I) [r924] LL.R. 5 Lah. 364.

(3) A.LR. 1946. Lah. 306.

(5) Ibid. 617.

(7) A.LR. r936 Lah. 493

(9) A.LR. 1940 Lah. 436.

(n) 1908] 43 P.R. I5.

(2) A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68.

(4) A.LR. 1935 Lah. 288. r6) Ibid. 696.

(8) A.LR. 1937 Lah. 90.

(IO) [I889] 24 P.R. '9'

(r2) A.LR. '935 Lah. 453

~ I

Achhar Singh(1), The first three cases are of no assistance to him although the second and third relate to Brahmins of Gurdaspur, for the properties in dispute in those cases were ancestral and the respondent does not now dispute the appellant's right to succeed to her father's ancestral properties.

These cases, therefore, do not throw any light on the present case which is concerned with the question of succession to selfacquired property.

Further, in the last case, the collaterals were beyond the fourth degree and it was enough for the Court to say that irrespective of whether the properties in dispute were ancestral or selfacquired the collaterals in that case could not succeed.

It is also to be noted that the earlier decisions were not cited or considered in that case.

In our opinion the appellant has failed to discharge the onus that was initially on him and that being the position no burden was cast on the respondent which she need have discharged by adducing evidence of particular instances.

In these circumstances, the general custom recorded in Rattigan's book must prevail and the decision of the High Court must be upheld. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

NANAK CHAND

fl.

THE STATE OF PUNJAB.

[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and

SYED JAFER IMAM JJ.]

Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 34---Merely explanatory-No offence created thereby-Ss. 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code-Distinction between the two-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 233-Charge under s. 302 1ead with s. 149, Indian

Penal Code-No speci'fic charge under s. 302, Indian Penal Code as required by s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure-Conviction

under s. 302-Legality thereof.

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is merely explanatory.

It does not create any specific offence.

Under this section several persons must be actuated by a common intention and when in further-

(1) A.LR. 1936 Lah. 68.

Mahant Salig Ram

Musammal Ml!)'a

Devi

Das].

January 25