## 4 Results and Discussion
### Discrimination Performance  
In this subsection, the effectiveness of the proposed discrimination method is verified by computer simulations. In the scenario set at the beginning of the section, the self-defense repeater jammer carried by the physical target generates an active false target with a deception distance of 1000 m. The deception velocity of FT varies from 50 m/s to 1000 m/s with an interval of 50 m/s. For each value of the deception velocity, 5000 Monto Carlo simulation experiments are performed to obtain the performance curves of the discrimination probability of PT and FT. The desired misjudgment probability of the physical target is set as \(P^{\prime}_{PT}=0.01\). The discrimination threshold can be obtained from Equation (31) as \(\varepsilon=6.63\). For each value of deception velocity, the homologous detection method based on location information association (LIA) [13], the velocity vector association (VVA) discriminator, the proposed deception velocity-based (DVB) method and the combination method of location information association and deception velocity association (LIA-DVB) are performed to discriminate active false targets, which are denoted by LIA, VVA, DVB and LIA-DVB, respectively, in the simulation result of Figure 4. For comparison, the VVA discriminator is also derived into the multistatic plane. In Figure 4, the performance curves of the discrimination probability of PT \(P_{PT}\) and that of FT \(P_{FT}\) are given versus different deception velocities. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c} \hline \hline
**Radar** & **T/R\({}_{0}\)** & **R\({}_{1}\)** & **R\({}_{2}\)** \\ \hline Location coordinate (km) & \([0,0,0]^{T}\) & \([50,0,0]^{T}\) & \([-50,0,0]^{T}\) \\ \hline Range Measurement Standard Deviation \(\sigma_{\rho}\) (m) & 40 & 40 & 40 \\ \hline Angle Measurement Standard Deviation \(\sigma_{\alpha}\) (\({}^{\circ}\)) & 0.10 & 0.10 & 0.10 \\ \hline Angle Measurement Standard Deviation \(\sigma_{\beta}\) (\({}^{\circ}\)) & 0.10 & 0.10 & 0.10 \\ \hline Velocity Measurement Standard Deviation \(\sigma_{\varphi}\) (ms) & 2 & 2 & 2 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Table of bistatic radar system parameters. When there is a physical target and an active false target, the target combination composed of one target selected from each receiver has eight cases: H\({}_{0}\)--one case, H\({}_{1}\)--one case and H\({}_{2}\)--six cases. At this time, the principle of successful discrimination of physical and false targets is defined as follows: only when the combination [PT, PT, PT] is finally judged as H\({}_{0}\), the physical target is considered successfully discriminated, and when any combination containing a false target is judged as H\({}_{0}\), the false target will be considered misjudged. It can be seen from Figure 3(a) that the discrimination probability of the physical target of LIA remains near the expected value, 99%. According to the algorithm principle, its discrimination performance has nothing to do with the deception velocity. On the other hand, for VVA and DVB methods, the discrimination probability of the physical target increases with the deception velocity, and finally remains around the expected value, 99%. When the deception velocity is small, the velocity of the false target is similar to that of the physical target, and there are cases where the target combination of physical and false targets passes the hypothesis test. It can be seen from Figure 3(b) that the discrimination probability of the LIA method for the false target is only near 54%. With the increase in deception velocity, the discrimination probability of active false targets is gradually increased for both the VVA and DVB methods. Under the current parameter setting, when the deception velocity is 150 m/s, the discrimination probability of the two algorithms has reached 90.0%; when the deception velocity reaches 200 m/s, the discrimination probability can reach 99.0%.