# Quantum Computing for Healthcare: A Review
## 6 Security of Quantum Computing for Healthcare
### Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution  
DI QKD [137] aims to fill the gap in the practical realization of the QKD without considering the working mechanism of the underlying quantum device. It requires a violation of the Bell inequality between both ends of the communication and can provide higher security than classical schemes through reduced security assumptions. Alternatively, information receivers on both ends need to identify the infringement of Bell inequality. \begin{table}
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DI attributes to the fact that there is no need to acquire information on the underlying devices. In this case, the device may correspond to adversaries. Therefore, the identification of elements is necessary as compared with considering how quantum security is implemented [157]. In this context, DI QKD is capable of defending against different kinds of security vulnerabilities including time-shift attacks [158], phase-remapping attacks [159], binding attacks [160], and wavelength-dependent attacks [161]. Additionally, security vulnerability identification generated by quantum communication channels can be defended using the technique presented in [162]. Furthermore, [PERSON] et al. proposed a generalized two-mode Schrodinger cat states DI QKD protocol [163]. The taxonomy and summary of the device-independent quantum key distribution is presented in Table 8.  
[PERSON] et al. proposed a device-independent measurement scheme [164], which is a step forward in achieving information theory security for key sharing among two legitimate remote users. Comparatively, MDI-QKD incorporates different added advantages as compared with DI-QKD. The actual key rate of MDI-QKD achieves a higher rating as compared with DI-QKD by successfully eliminating the detector channel vulnerabilities. Moreover, both ends of communication do not require to execute any kind of measurements where they only need to transmit quantum signals that could be measured. In this case, both ends of the communication do not need to hold any measurement devices treating them as black boxes. This could help in eliminating the requirement to validate detectors in the QKD standardization mechanism. In this regard, bit strings designated to both ends of the communication would not be secured from the detector side channels due to the non-availability of detectors, though they need to characterize the quantum states they transfer  
\begin{table}
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**Author** & **Objective** & **Security Algorithm** & **Pulse** & **Cons** \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [137] & \multirow{2}{*}{ \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular}  } & \multirow{2}{*}{ \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular}  } & \multirow{2}{*}{ \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular}  } & \multirow{2}{*}{\ \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular}  } & \multirow{2}{*}{ \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular}  } \\ [PERSON] et al. [137] & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & &  
using channels, which occurs in a secure paradigm. This paradigm is relatively secure from the adversary who may exploit the encoding and decoding modules without focusing on polarization maintenance. [PERSON] et al. proposed an untrusted third-party attack detection using a continuous-variable MDI protocol [165]. Similarly, [PERSON] et al. [166] proposed an MDI-based scheme using Gaussian-modulated coherent states. The authors in [167] proposed a decoy-state protocol. In this scheme, a measurement basis is chosen to have a biased probability and intensities of various types of states, and an optimized strategy is used to achieve a finite secret key rate. In [168], authors proposed two techniques for phase encoding including phase locking and conversion of BB84 standard encoding pulses into polarization modes. [PERSON] et al. [169] improved the performance of a coherent-state continuous-variable MDI protocol by virtual photon subtraction.