## 2 Background and Motivation  
Safety II principles are well-suited to the challenges of complex and dynamic systems. In these environments, variability in work and the ability to adapt to change are essential for safe and successful operations [15]. As discussed in [16], Safety II promotes a proactive and flexible approach to safety. It emphasizes systems thinking, which focuses on how different parts of a system interact. In this view, safety is not a fixed outcome of individual components, but something that emerges from the relationships between them [2]. Furthermore, RE highlights the system's ability to adapt and recover from both expected and unexpected conditions, ensuring continued safety [5]. Unlike Safety I, which responds to failures after they happen, Safety II aims to anticipate problems and prepare for them in advance [17]. It also values learning and adaptability, where organizations continuously evolve their safety practices based on lessons learned from both successes and failures [18]. Additionally, Safety II recognizes human performance variability as an asset, viewing human adaptability and performance variation as key to enhancing resilience and maintaining safety in dynamic environments [19]. In this context, a key concept is [PERSON]'s distinction between different perspectives on human work [20], particularly how people _perceive_ or _imagine_ work versus how it is _actually performed_. In this sense, four fundamental types of work can be identified:  
- Work-As-Imagined (WAI): What people think others are doing, or expect to do. - Work-As-Prescribed (WAP): The formal instructions or rules about how work should be conducted (e.g., laws, procedures, checklists, job descriptions). - Work-As-Disclosed (WADi): How people describe or report their work in documents or conversations. - Work-As-Done (WAD): The actual work that takes place in practice, i.e., the real actions that people perform. It includes the influences of variability, fluctuating goals, changing demands, and unexpected conditions. These four types of work highlight the gap between how work is imagined and how it is executed, underscoring the complexity and variability in real-world practice. Such complexity and variability are highly characteristic of a complex socio-technical system, where a systemic perspective is required [21]. To address a systemic perspective, RE suggests considering the four resilience abilities previously mentioned: (i) respond, (ii) monitor, (iii) anticipate, and (iv) learn [22]. These abilities must be viewed together, as they are interdependent and all essential. Furthermore, they form the foundation of the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG), which was adopted in this study for its versatility and adaptability to the context of interest. The RAG is a questionnaire-based tool that provides guidelines for categorizing information into the four systemic potentials, known as cornerstones. Each cornerstone needs to be articulated and, therefore, operationalized into items. Typically, each item is associated with a question that has a specific response mode and a corresponding score. Once combined, the score associated with the items of a systemic potential provides the proximal measure of the corresponding systemic potential. Through its implementation, it is then possible to measure the resilience potential of a process, an organization or an entity in general [23]. It does not provide strict guidelines on the methods to be used for data collection or analysis. Rather, it provides a method for organizing, itemizing, and disaggregating information. It also relies on intuitive graphical representations, such as radar charts, to support intuitive information visualization and interpretation [24]. Since the RAG is a questionnaire-based tool only broadly defined to be then further tailored to the organization or system under study [9], it has been tested in a variety of settings, e.g., healthcare [25], transport [26], and air traffic management [27], and also for OSH purposes [28; 29].