## 3 Results
Additionally, it is assumed that the operator will be familiar with how to deal with an emergency autorotation through adequate training, real exercises, and properly performing the emergency procedures on a simulator. In the case of assurance level, the medium level is also reached through testing and simulations. Procedures cannot be validated against standards, because adequate standards do not exist. The operator also has a training syllabus and pilots perform periodical theoretical and practical training. Then, we establish the M3, which relates to the Emergency Response Plan. For the level of integrity and level of assurance, a medium level is reached. M3 determines the crisis management plan for the UAV. Final GRC is determined according to the formula below:  
\[ \begin{split}& Final\;GRC=Intristic\;GRC+GRC_{M1}+GRC_{M2}\\ & Final\;GRC=5+(-2)+(-1)\\ & Final\;GRC=2\end{split}  \tag{1}\]  
In the case under consideration GRC equals 2. In the fourth phase, the initial risk of using the shared air space is determined. In the case of the scenario implementation site (Sevilla), it is located in the airport zone (CTR SEVILLA). Therefore, the development team in such a case would recommend contacting TWR Sevilla to repair manned traffic in this area and maintain constant and direct communication with ATC and FIS. This would make it possible to minimize the risk of a UAV collision with other airspace users. Thanks to such a procedure, the AIR RISK CLASS would be ARC-a. The next, optional step in the SORA methodology is to further mitigate airspace risks. Due to the type of event and a large number of people, it should be assumed that other UAVs, including those of outsiders, e.g., journalists, may soon appear. To reduce this risk we propose:  
* Informing the FIS;
* Installation of the anti-collision light;
* Submission of a NOTAM application;
* Inform the public order services about the prohibition of using civilian UAVs;
* Activate the detection and neutralization systems for other UAVs (if available);
* Establishing a UAV flight coordinator in the area of operations. The next, sixth step in the methodology is the definition of TMPR and robustness levels. It is based on the analysis and application of tactical risk mitigation measures, which were described earlier in the article. Because:  
1. During the scenario UAV will be used in VLOS operation, and;
2. The designated residual ARC is of the class and does not require a TMPR, and TMPR level of robustness. The next step assumes the Final Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels (SAIL). This is a SAIL-level determination that depends on the final GRC and residual ARC. SAIL values are in the range I-VI and are determined by the table [41]. In the considered case for final GRC = 2 and residual ARC-a, the SAIL level is I. This makes the operational safety requirement minimal or optional. The penultimate step in determining the risk of UAV operations using the SORA methodology is the analysis of the space near the UAV operation. At this stage, the effects of the uncontrolled flight of the drone to another adjacent air zone, which it may violate, are analyzed. The analysis consists of identifying possible problems based on the pilot's experience and taking appropriate risk mitigation measures. Most often, such problems are caused by, but not limited to:* Loss of the operator's radio signal due to too much distance, interference from external sources (tactical command and communication vehicles, BTS, antennas, etc. );
* The GPS signal interference;
* The GPS receiver failure;
* A badly planned mission (flying over an obstacle blocking the signal);
* The GCS failure;
* The perception error or loss of orientation by the operator. The above examples can be easily limited by using various methods. One of the simplest is the use of so-called geofencing. It allows maintaining the UAV at the space and range specified by the operator. However, this is a method that depends heavily on the GPS signal and may be affected by increased solar activity.