# Optimal Pricing in a Rented 5G Infrastructure Scenario with Sticky Customers
## 6 Results
Finally, the stickiness factor \(\xi\) has been chosen to tilt stickiness towards the MNO as expected (because it is generally considered more reliable), and having \(N_{R}=1,3\) would give a balance value for the stickiness factor, respectively, equal to \(\xi_{0}=\ln 2=0.693\) and \(\xi_{0}=\ln 4=1.386\). The value \(\xi=0.5\) is consistently lower than both. We first compare the different price-setting scenarios by examining the profits generated for each operator. In Table 2, which has been obtained for \(B=60\), the first result is that profits decrease quite heavily as the level of competition grows. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c} \hline \hline
**Parameter** & **Value** \\ \hline \(C_{0}\) & 11.5 \\ \hline \(m\) & 0.0003 \\ \hline \(B\) & 60 \\ \hline \(\alpha\) & 0.5 \\ \hline \(\beta_{i}\) & 0.1 \\ \hline \(\eta_{i}\) & 0.5 \\ \hline \(\gamma\) & 0.7 \\ \hline \(z\) & 0.0005 \\ \hline \(\xi\) & 0.5 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Parameters employed in the analysis. Even when the MNO sets prices, we observe a real slump as MVNOs enter the picture. Even the introduction of a single competitor slashes down the profits of the infrastructure owner by 45.8%. The decline continues as competition grows. When two further MVNOs add to the group, profits fall by another 38.9%. Competition is bad for MVNOs as well. When we move from one to three MVNOs, the initial renter's profits are halved (precisely, they fall by 54.4%). The renters' profits lag behind those of the owner, which somewhat compensates the owner for the greater burden it suffers from taking care of a much larger infrastructure. When we have just one MVNO, its profits are 82.3% of what the owner obtains, but that fraction goes down to 61.3% when we have three MVNOs. The situation is improved for renters when they set the prices. Their profits are now close to those of the owner (precisely, 91.4%) when there is a single renter and 92.8% (even better) when there are three MVNOs. This is the combined effect of an increase in absolute terms of the renters' profits and a decrease in the owner's profits. For the owner, releasing the price-setting power to the renter(s) means a loss of 6% of their profits when there is a single renter, but a quite bigger 23.4% when there are three renters. The intervention of a regulator (who sets prices to maximize social welfare) changes things for the worse for all operators. When we have just one MVNO, the renter receives the most severe negative effects. Its profits fall by 22.1% in comparison to when the renter sets prices and by 18.7% when the owner acts as the price setter. The decline is sharp but less severe for the owner. Its profits fall by 9.5% from it obtains when the owner sets prices and by 3.7% when the renter sets prices. When the competition grows (here, when we have three renters instead of one), the situation reverses, and the owner is the most penalized. Its profits fall by a whopping 46.6% to its bet case (when the owner sets prices) and yet by 30.3% even when renters set prices. Instead, renters gain from social welfare maximization due to the larger weight in the overall scenario. Their profits increase by 15.6% with respect to what they obtain when the owner sets prices and stay nearly equal to their best case, when they can decide prices for themselves (there is actually a tiny decline of 0.3%). We can deepen the analysis of profits by considering the impact of bandwidth. In the following, for the purpose of assessing how price setting impacts operators' profits, we consider the worse cases where prices are set by another operator. For example, for the owner, we can consider the cases where prices are set by renters or the regulatory authority.