## 3 Results
### Step 1: Define the Purpose of the Analysis  
STPA is a process for evaluating system safety and identifying potential hazards, following a systematic series of steps. In the \"Define Purpose of the Analysis\" phase, losses are first identified, which then serve as a basis for determining system-level hazards. Subsequently, system-level safety constraints are defined to prevent these hazards. Clarifying the relationship between losses, hazards, and safety constraints is crucial. This ensures traceability throughout the analysis process, clearly demonstrating how measures to improve system safety contribute to preventing losses. Additionally, since the system is intended to integrate with existing infrastructure, identifying stakeholder-related information is deemed necessary in subsequent identification processes. Therefore, the analysis yields the following results. For stakeholder traceability, connect stakeholders to losses, as shown in Table 2 below. Table 2 underscores the essential task of identifying potential losses to guide the development of safety measures and system design. It outlines each loss along with its impacts on stakeholders and ensuing consequences, highlighting the extensive implications of each identified loss. For instance, the loss of public trust affects law enforcement and municipal governance, potentially undermining future urban safety initiatives. Similarly, the risk of injury or death has far-reaching effects, not just on civilians and law enforcement but also in terms of legal and societal consequences. This succinct analysis aids in crafting targeted safety constraints and mitigation strategies by offering a comprehensive perspective on the stakes involved. For example, the loss of \"L-1: Loss of Human Life or Injury\" is linked to multiple stakeholder groups, including Emergency Service Agencies (SH-2), Department Personnel (SH-3), and Citizens (SH-8). This indicates that these groups have a critical role in preventing or responding to situations that could lead to loss of life or injury. Similarly, the loss of \"L-7: Loss of sensitive information\" is mapped to stakeholders such as Community Groups (SH-4), Lawmakers and Policy Makers (SH-5), and Citizens (SH-8), highlighting their shared responsibility in maintaining public trust and the system's reputation. By establishing these links between losses and stakeholders, the analysis provides a foundation for developing targeted risk mitigation measures and assigning clear responsibilities for loss prevention. It also helps to ensure that the concerns and values of all relevant stakeholders are considered in the system's design and operation. Table 3 presents a comprehensive overview of potential hazards that could arise in the operation of UAS within the defined system. Each hazard is categorized by its unique identifier and described in terms of how it could potentially compromise system safety or efficiency. Importantly, the table links each hazard to specific losses identified in Table 2, reinforcing the traceability aspect of TPA. This traceability is crucial as it ensures that mitigation strategies can be directly aligned with preventing or reducing the identified losses. For example, Hazard H-1 addresses the risk of UAS operating in a manner that causes harm to people or property, which could lead to injuries, fatalities, or damage to assets. This hazard directly links to losses of human life or injury (L-1), damage to UAVs (L-2), and damage to objects outside the UAVs (L-3), highlighting the interconnected nature of system operations and the broad implications of such hazards. Moreover, the identification of system-level hazards emphasizes the importance of considering both technical and operational aspects of UAS usage. For instance, H-5 concerns unauthorized access to surveillance data, pointing to the critical need for robust data security measures to protect sensitive information and maintain operational integrity.