## 3 Attacks on HWMP
### HWMP Security Requirements  
Table 9 describes the security service requirements and the relevant message fields involved to protect HWMP message from possible internal and external attacks. The requirements are determined based on the information from Tables 7 and 8. The authentication and integrity services (point-to-point) are required for all frames and fields. If those services are in use, a receiver can verify the origin of the frame. The receiver will also be able to \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c|c|c} \hline \hline
**Attacks** & **Descriptions** & **Required** & **Relevant** & **Involved** \\  & & **Security Services** & **Frame** & **Field** \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Path Diversion Attack} & Transmitting frames with fake path metric. & Forgery detection method & PREQ & \multirow{2}{*}{MF} \\  & & & & PREP & \\  & & & & RANN & \\ \cline{2-4}  & Modifying the sequence number. & Authentication and integrity (End-to-end) & All & \multirow{2}{*}{NMF} \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Impersonation Attack} & Pretending to be the root mesh STA. & Root permission level & RANN & \multirow{2}{*}{NMF} \\  & & & PREQ & \\ \cline{2-4}  & Impersonating the originator/target by changing the originator/target & Authentication & & \multirow{2}{*}{All} & \multirow{2}{*}{NMF} \\  & & and integrity (End-to-end) & All & & \\ \cline{2-4}  & & address field. & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 8: Internal attacks, the required security services, and the relevant HWMP frames and fields involved. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Frame**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Field**} & **Authentication** & **Encryption * & **Authentication** & **Anti-** & **Root** & **Forgery** \\  & & **and Integrity** & **(Point-to-point)** & **(Point-to-End)** & **and Integrity** & **Replay** & **Permission** & **Detection** \\  & & **(Point-to-point)** & **Point)** & **(End-to-End)** & **Scheme** & **Level** & **Method** \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{PREQ} & HDR & Need & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-6}  & MF & Need & Need & - & - & - & Need \\ \cline{2-6}  & NMF & Need & Need & Need & Need & Need & - \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{RANN} & HDR & Need & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-6}  & MF & Need & Need & - & - & - & Need \\ \cline{2-6}  & NMF & Need & Need & Need & - & - & - \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{PERR} & HDR & Need & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-6}  & MF & Need & Need & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{2-6}  & NMF & Need & Need & - & - & - & - \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{PREP} & HDR & Need & - & - & - & - & Need \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{2-6}  & MF & Need & Need & Need & - & - & Need \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{2-6}  & NMF & Need & Need & Need & - & - & - \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 9: Security service requirements according to the relevant frames and fields involved. verify that the frame has not been modified by attackers. This security service is sufficient to protect HWMP frames from all external attacks except eavesdropping. An encryption service can only be provided for the MF and NMF. Frames must be encrypted in a point-to-point manner instead of an end-to-end manner because intermediate mesh STAs must read the frame information as well. Encryption should only be used if the application requires high secrecy because encryption is computationally expensive. Network administrators should be given the option to disable encryption. Authentication and integrity (end-to-end) services are required only for the NMF. These services prevent intermediate mesh STAs from modifying the information in this field. With these services implemented, intermediate mesh STAs will not be able to modify the HWMP sequence number or to impersonate the originator/target mesh STAs. A root permission level is required for the PREQ and RANN frames, depending on the proactive tree-building mode. Meanwhile, a permission level is required only for the NMF. This permission level will prevent a normal mesh STA from declaring itself as the root.