# A Multi-Tier Security Analysis of Official Car Management Apps for Android
## 4 High-Level Static Analysis  
This section outlines all noteworthy results per app in regard to a first-tier, coarse static analysis. Extracting the security permissions listed in the AndroidManifest.xml file of an app is a key step towards understanding its overall behavior [55]. Additionally, the lookup for potentially privacy-invasive API calls in the app's code can on the one hand provide supplementary information about higher-risk actions the app may perform, and on the other, reveal whether the identified calls coincide with the requested permissions. For this purpose, as already pointed out, the Androtomist tool [20] has been employed. Specifically, for the needs of this study, the tool collected the permissions from the app's manifest file and the API calls from the smali files. Table 2 gathers the potentially privacy-invasive, \"dangerous\" according to the API [56], permissions requested by each examined app. Bear in mind that, in contrast to a \"normal\" permission, every higher-risk permission requires prompting the user. In Table 2, the following 12 permissions are identified. * P1: READ_CALENDAR allows an app to read the user's calendar data. * P2: WRITE_CALENDAR permits an app to write the user's calendar data. * P3: CAMERA grants access to the camera. * P4: READ_CONTACTS allows the app to read the user's contacts data. * P5: WRITE_CONTACTS enables the app to write the user's contacts data. * P6: GET_ACCOUNTS allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service, namely it offers access to the existing accounts on the user's device. * P7: ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. This permission allows the app to access the precise location of the device via the use of GPS, WiFi, and mobile cell data. It is also required \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l l} \hline \hline
**Manufacturer** & **App Name** & **Group** & **Examined App ver.** \\ \hline Volvo & Volvo On Call [24] & AB Volvo & 4.6.16 \\ BMW & BMW Connected [25] & BMW & 6.5.0.6411 \\ BMW & My BMW [26] & BMW & 1.2.2 \\ Mini Cooper & MINI Connected [27] & BMW & 6.5.0.6411 \\ Mini Cooper & MINI [28] & BMW & 1.2.1 \\ Mercedes-Benz & Mercedes me [29] & Daimler & 1.5.0 \\ Alfa Romeo & My Alfa Connect [30] & FCA & 1.10.2 \\ Fiat & FIAT [31] & FCA & 1.10.2 \\ Jeep & My UConnect [32] & FCA & 1.13.3 \\ FCA & UConnect LIVE [33] & FCA & 2.21.7 \\ Ferrari & MyFerrari [34] & Ferrari & 1.10.2 \\ Ford & FordPass [35] & Ford & 3.14.0 \\ Mitsubishi & MITSUBISH Remote Control * [36] & Mitsubishi & 1.0.0 \\ Mitsubishi & OUTLANDER PHEV Remote Ctrl * [37] & Mitsubishi & 3.1.1 \\ Nissan & NissanConnect [38] & Nissan & 2.1.2 \\ Citro\(\tilde{\text{n}}\)en & My Citro\(\tilde{\text{n}}\)en [39] & PSA & 1.26.1 \\ DS & MyDS [40] & PSA & 1.26.2 \\ Opel & myOpel [41] & PSA & 1.26.1 \\ Peugeot & MYPEUGEOT [42] & PSA & 1.26.2 \\ Jaguar & Jaguar InControl [43] & Tata & 1.81 \\ Land Rover & Land Rover InControl [44] & Tata & 1.81 \\ Tesla & Tesla [45] & Tesla & 3.10.9-433 \\ Toyota & MyT [46] & Toyota & 3.16.1 \\ Audi & myAudi [47] & VW & 3.10.1 \\ Bentley & My Bentley [48] & VW & 4.0.1 \\ Lamborghini & Lamborghini Unica [49] & VW & 4.2.21 \\ Porsche & Porsche Connect [50] & VW & 3.7 \\ Seat & SEAT CONNECT [51] & VW & 1.1.29 \\ Skoda & MySKODA [52] & VW & 3.7.3 \\ Skoda & SKODA Connect LITE [53] & VW & 2.1.9 \\ Volkswagen & We Connect [54] & VW & 5.5.3 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Official car management apps found in Google Play Store. * In the following, they are referred to as MITSUBISHI RC and OUTLANDER PHEV RC, respectively. for some connectivity tasks, including connecting to nearby devices over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). * P8: ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION is potentially privacy-invasive as it allows the app to access the approximate location of the device through the use of either or both WiFi and mobile cell data. * P9: READ_PHONE_STATE. This permission allows read-only access to phone state.