## 6 How to Utilize the MITIGATE Security Assessment Services
### Utilization of SAS-1: LNG Transport Service Modeling  
All partners, representing their business entities, use the MITIGATE system to model their interconnected SCADA cyber-assets, operating in the processes supporting the LNG Transport Service, such as the LNG Monitoring Service process. The LNG Monitoring Service process refers to the LNG handling functions of the LNG port terminal and the LNG carrier vessel operating during the LNG Transport (i.e., pipeline monitoring and fuel monitoring) The MITIGATE system's invitation/acceptance functionality facilitates collaboration among business partners to declare their assets as participating in each specific process (i.e., Figure 7 shows that regarding the LNG Transport Service, Port Authority has invited the Local Agent to participate and the latter has accepted the invitation). This refined CI representation of the various cyber-assets and their interconnections is fundamental towards measuring and assessing their threats and vulnerabilities and the investigation of scenarios with combined cyber-attacks. The current example presents indicative SCADA componentsof the LNG Transport Monitoring Service process: (i) FUEL monitoring service assets (i.e., software installed on an operating system) that deliver fuel consumption information for the LNG carrier vessel; (ii) PLCs that handle the LNG tank capacity; (iii) a MTU, which controls the PLCs using the Modbus TCP/IP communication protocol; (iv) a Historian Data Server, which records historical data upon LNG tank capacity and stores in the LNG database center; (v) a HMI, which is considered an input-output device with a panel view for depicting graphically the process data to human operators of the engineering workstations; (vi) a SMTP mail server with each mail operating system for the e-mail communication across the LNG Transport network.  
To this purpose, the Supply Chain Service Modelling (SAS-1) provides asset mapping (assets are characterized based on its cyber-nature; Application, Operating System or Hardware) and asset cyberdependency identification (Figure 7), where a set of logical rules are followed that guarantee the valid creation of a graph of assets and their cyberdependencies according to the twofold dependency concept analyzed in Section 4; an indicative example is presented in Table 1. This allows the business partners of the LNG Transport Service to understand assets interrelations within the LNG Transport Network. The asset-graph of the LNG Transport Network example is depicted previously in Figure 2.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline  & & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Dependency Type: 1. Hosting,**} & **Dependency Access** \\
**Asset Source** & **Asset Destination** & **2. Exchange, Data, 3. Storing,** & **Vector: Adjacent** \\  & & **4. Controlling, 5. Processing,** & **Network (A), Local (L),** \\  & & **8. Trusted 9. Connecting** & **Network (N)** \\ \hline LNG—PLC software & LNG—PLC OS & installing & L \\ SMTP Mail Server & Local Agent Mail Server & Exchange data & N \\ LNG—PLC & LNG—Master Terminal Unit & Connecting & A \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 1: Example of SCADA assets cyberdependencies within the LNG Transport Network.  
Figure 7: The “Exchange Data” cyberdependency is declared between the Port Authority and the Local Agent accepter business partner as a result of an e-mail exchange.