## 6 Discussion  
### Threat Analysis of Shipping in the SOMS  
Having discussed the nature of cyber and hybrid threats to the MTS in the preceding section, this section will focus on a specific geographic zone (the SOMS) to present an analysis of the likely non-state threat actors and their motivations and vectors for targeting international shipping (This article does not include discussion of threats to shipping from state actors). Taking account of past incidents and capabilities of malicious actors in and around the SOMS, how likely is it that they would seek to, or could, conduct kinetic, cyber or cyber-physical attacks on shipping? Interviews indicate that Indonesian terrorist groups--the country with the most active terror networks and cells in the SOMS littoral states--have some level of skill in using online tools for recruitment and financing; however, they are unlikely to have the necessary knowledge or background in conducting attacks on the maritime sector. Whereas \"the maritime terrorism threat [in the SOMS region] is largely a Southern Philippines phenomenon\" and proven links exist between regional groups in Philippines and the SOMS littorals [54], Indonesian terrorist groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD), and others have directly targeted the maritime domain in the past. [PERSON] notes an aborted J1 attack \"against three American warships and a Coast Guard vessel docked at Surabaya in May 2002 during a CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) American Indonesian naval exercise\" [55]. In 2005, J1 planned a USS Cole-style attack on shipping in the Sembawang region of the Johor strait separating Singapore from Malaysia in a \"strategic kill zone where...a warship would not have room to avoid a collision with an explosive-filled suicide boat\" [56]. An advanced plot in August 2016 by an Indonesian group linked to ISIS, _Katihah Gongong Rebus_ (KGR), led by [PERSON], planned to shoot a rocket from the Indonesian island of Batam, across the Singapore Strait to strike the landmark Marina Bay Sands (MBS) resort [57]. One of [PERSON]'s proteges, [PERSON], \"had been able--based on information gleaned from YouTube--to build and successfully test-fire a makeshift rocket launcher employing a plastic tube, potassium nitrate extracted from fertilizer, and other substances\" [57]. In February 2004, the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) committed its most lethal attack, a striking example of maritime terrorism, the attack on _SuperFerry 14_ in Manila Harbour, which killed 116 and wounded many others. The attack was far more lethal than other frequently cited maritime terrorist attacks, such as the following: the _USS Cole_ in 2000, which killed 17 US sailors and severely damaged the ship; the 2002 attack on the _M/V Limburg_, a tanker chartered to Malaysian state-petroleum agency, Petronas, which \"blew a gaping hole in the side of the tanker\" [58] off the coast of Yemen, killing one crew member and causing a massive and disruptive oil spill; and the hijacking of cruise ship _Achille Lauro_ in 1985, resulting in one fatality [59]. From the foregoing discussion of regional terrorist threats to shipping, several points are evident. First, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if any of the aforementionedterror attacks had been successfully committed in or around the SOMS, they would have severely impacted the flow of shipping through the region causing knock-on effects similar to that of the 2021 _M/V Ever Given_ incident. The scope and scale of the disruption would depend on the incident and there have been attempts to estimate the economic disruption from such attacks [28]. Second, these examples illustrate the desire to target the maritime space and that, if the opportunity presented itself to commit a large-scale cyber attack on shipping, it would be strongly in line with the general call to _jihad_ that is characteristic of regional terror groups.