# Blockchain-Embedded Strategic Options for Satellite Operators: Sell, SataS, or Dual?
## 4 Models Including Blockchain Technology
### BD Model: Dual Channel with Blockchain Technology  
Analogous to the ND model, when the SO employs a dual-channel strategy, consumers are free to choose to purchase satellites or subscribe to SataaS. In this scenario, the valuation \(v_{d}\) of the marginal consumers who are indifferent to these two channels is equal to \(\frac{p_{s}+\beta s-p_{r}}{1-be}\). According to the valuation, the market segmentation of the blockchain-embedded dual-channel strategy can be written as follows:  
\[\text{if }p_{s}^{B}+\beta s\geq\frac{p_{r}^{B}}{be},\;D_{d}^{B}= \begin{cases}D_{r}^ {B}=\frac{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be}-\frac{p_{r}^{B}}{be},\\ D_{s}^{B}=1-\frac{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be},\end{cases}  \tag{13}\]  
\[\text{otherwise},\;D_{d}^{N}= \begin{cases}D_{s}^{N}=1-p_{s}^{B}-\beta s,\\ D_{r}^{N}=0,\end{cases}  \tag{14}\]  
Thus, the SO's payoff function can be written as follows:  
\[\text{if }e\geq\frac{p_{r}^{B}}{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s},\;\pi_{d}^{B}= \begin{cases}(p_{ r}^{B}-c_{r})\times(\frac{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be}-\frac{p_{r}^{B}}{be})+p_{s}^{B} \times(1-\frac{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be})-C-B,\\ s.t.\frac{p_{s}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be}\geq\frac{p_{r}^{B}}{be}\\ \frac{p_{r}^{B}+\beta s-p_{r}^{B}}{1-be}\leq 1\end{cases}  \tag{15}\]  
\[\text{otherwise},\;\pi_{d}^{B}=p_{s}^{B}\times(1-p_{s}^{B}-\beta s)-C-B \tag{16}\]  
By solving the constraint equation, we obtain Lemma 2. The equilibrium outcomes are summarized in Table 6.  
**Lemma 2**. : _With the adoption of BCT, according to the relationship of \(e\), \(s\), and \(c_{r}\), there are three strategies for the SO:_  
1. _When_ \(\frac{c_{r}+c_{b}}{b\beta s}\leq e\leq\frac{1+c_{r}+c_{b}-\beta s}{b}\)_, the dual-channel exists,_ \(p_{r}^{B^{*}}=\frac{be+c_{r}+c_{b}}{2\hbar e}\)_,_ \(\pi_{d}^{B^{*}}=\frac{\phi}{4 be(1-be)}-C-B\)_, where_ \(\phi=(c_{r}+c_{b}-be)(c_{r}+c_{b}-be\beta s)+be(1-\beta s)(1-be+c_{r}+c_{b}- \beta s).\)__
2. _When_ \(0<e<\frac{c_{r}+c_{b}}{b\beta s}\)_, there is only the SataaS channel, where_ \(p_{s}^{B^{*}}=\frac{1-\beta s}{2}\)_,_ \(\pi_{s}^{B^{*}}=\frac{(1-\beta s)^{2}}{\beta s}-C-B\)_._
3. _When_ \(\frac{1+c_{r}+c_{b}-\beta s}{b}\leq e\leq 1\)_, there is only the sell channel, where_ \(p_{r}^{B^{*}}=\frac{be+c_{r}+c_{b}}{2\hbar e}\)_,_ \(\pi_{r}^{B^{*}}=\frac{(be-c_{r}-c_{b})^{2}}{4 be}\)Lemma 2 indicates that the conditions for dividing the channel in Lemma 2 are similar to those in Lemma 1, but with slight differences. We will discuss the differences in detailed in Section 5. From the threshold expressions in Lemma 2, we obtain the following insight. Here, \(c_{r}\) is the blockchain-related satellite unit customization cost, \(b\) is the coefficient of the launch success rate improved by BCT, and \(\beta\) is the coefficient of data security risks reduced by BCT. Therefore, when the launch success rate is low and the satellite cost is high, no users will choose to purchase the satellite, and the dual channel is reduced to the pure SataaS strategy. When the utility loss to the user from data security is high, no users will choose SataaS, and the dual channel is reduced to the pure sell strategy. Therefore, the SataaS and sell channels can exist simultaneously only if the satellite launch success rate remains at \(\frac{c_{r}+c_{b}}{b\beta s}\leq e\leq\frac{1+c_{r}+c_{b}-\beta s}{b}\). Similar to the ND model, as the launch success rate declines, satellite buyers in the dual channel will no longer choose to launch satellites and will shift to the SataaS market. As the launch success rate rises, users will move to the sell market when the utility of launch success outweighs the utility of lost data security. Furthermore, in order to derive the optimal strategy with BCT, we compare the profits of the dual-channel strategy with those of the sell and SataaS channels, respectively. From the analysis, we obtain Proposition 2, and the comparison results are summarized in Table 7.  
**Proposition 2**.