## 4 End to End Security Analysis on the Proposed IIoT Security Architecture
### Device Layer
#### 4.1.2 Ubiquitous Code (Ucode)  
Ubiquitous code (ucode) was developed by Japan to uniquely identify objects, places, and concepts in the real world with a length of 128-bit. In the future, it can be further extended to the multiple of 128-bit, includes 256-bit, 384-bit, and 512-bit [70; 71; 72]. The ucode consists of five components: version, top-level domain code, class code, second-level domain code, and identification code. The ubiquitous ID center is responsible for establishing the ucode standard and its ubiquitous ID architecture consisting of  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt}} \hline \hline
**Security** & **Description Risks and Threats** & **Deployed Security Countermeasures** & **Ongoing Challenges and Future Research Works** \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Confidentiality and Privacy} & \multirow{7}{*}{*} & EPC identifiers and tags data that are stored in “things” with minimal & Secure communication channel via SSL/TLS & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } \\  & storage and computation power are subjected to identity theft, illegal information disclosure risk and spoofing attack & Privacy protection with routine auto-kill command to destroy EPC information & & \\  & spoofing attack & Enforce access password for reading and writing the internal memory of the between RFID tags and readers & & \\  & EFC and brute force on the serial number & & \\  & & & \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Integrity} & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } & Malicious attackers controlling intermediate ONS servers and return the ferged EPC information & & \\  & Man-in the middle attack on the communication networks between “things” and ONS server & & & \\  & Data tampering, loss or corruption of the information stored within the EPC tag & & & \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Authentication} & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } & SSL/TLS & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } \\  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & 6-bit pseudo-random number generator (PFNG) and cyclic & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & redundancy code (CRC) on EPC Gen2 tags & & & \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Authentication} & \multirow{7}{*}{\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } & EPC code can be scanned by any unauthorized reader, thus leading to skimming attacks, spoofing attacks & Enforce 32-bit PIN for reading/writing the internal memory of the tag, as well as a 32-bit PIN for executing an internal auto-killing routine & \begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} \\  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & & & \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Availability} & \multirow{7}{*}{\
\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } & Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) or smurring attack on the ONS servers or networks connections & Distributed ONS server & \multirow{7}{*}{
\begin{tabular}{} \end{tabular} } \\  & & The availability of ONS and EPC resolution services for finding & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & matching information sources with a large scale of “things” growing rapidly & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 4: Security analysis on electronic product code (EPC) and its object naming service (ONS) architecture.  
municator, resolution server, and information server. The recent ubiquitous ID architecture is secured with eTRON security framework, and its detailed analysis is presented in Table 5. Overall, security enforcement and privacy protection mechanisms exist on the ucode and its Ubiquitous ID architecture. Recently, the Ubiquitous ID Center is moving forward the ucode and its architecture to support IIoT's scalability and interoperability issues, such as designing the hierarchical and distributed resolution server and information server.