## 4 Case Study
### Results
The reason is that PVP alliance members maximized their overall benefits through Nash negotiation. Then a \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Strategy**} & **PVP Alliance** & \multirow{2}{*}{**Final Benefit/CNY**} & **Power Transaction** \\  & **Members** & & **Revenue/CNY Between PVP** \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{\(1\)} & 1 & \(-\)18,516.48 & 290.38 \\  & 2 & \(-\)13,363.47 & 231.71 \\  & 3 & \(-\)13,599.49 & \(-\)2755.02 \\  & 1 & \(-\)18,744.75 & 0 \\
2 & 2 & \(-\)13,591.97 & 0 \\  & 3 & \(-\)13,828.13 & 0 \\  & 1 & \(-\)19,846.63 & 3974.08 \\
3 & 2 & \(-\)14,095.51 & 21.19 \\  & 3 & \(-\)14,483.02 & \(-\)3520.78 \\  & 1 & \(-\)20,090.78 & 0 \\
4 & 2 & \(-\)14,339.87 & 0 \\  & 3 & \(-\)14,727.28 & 0 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 4: Benefits for PVP alliance members under different strategies. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**PVP**} & **Income Before** & **Profit After** & **Final** & **Revenue Increase** \\  & **Cooperation/CNY** & **Cooperation/CNY** & **Revenue/CNY** & **Percentage/\%** \\ \hline \hline \(1\) & \(-\)20,090.78 & \(-\)23,820.71 & \(-\)19,846.63 & 1.215 \\ \(2\) & \(-\)14,339.87 & \(-\)14,116.70 & \(-\)14,095.51 & 1.698 \\ \(3\) & \(-\)14,727.63 & \(-\)10,962.23 & \(-\)14,483.02 & 1.661 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 5: Benefit analysis before and after PVP alliance cooperation. fair benefit distribution mechanism is adopted to ensure that the benefits of each member of the alliance are improved and to ensure the fairness and justice of income distribution. Because the demand response is not considered in Strategy 3, it can be found that the total benefit of the PVP alliance in Strategy 3 is reduced by CNY 2945.74 compared with Strategy 1 (our proposed strategy). The SES benefit is increased by CNY 1217.23, and the VPP benefit is reduced by CNY 1814.9. This is because, through demand-response VPP and lower-level PVP alliance, they can adjust their own energy demand and reduce energy use when electricity prices are high, thus reducing their own operating costs. When demand-response is not taken into account, the PVP alliance has a high dependence on VPP and VPP on SES, and the power grid and is forced to accept a higher electricity price to meet its own energy demand, thus reducing its own income, while SES's income greatly increases. By comparing Strategy 3 and Strategy 4 in Table 3, it can be found that neither Strategy 3 nor Strategy 4 considers the demand-side response, but Strategy 3 considers the point-to-point power transaction between members of the PVP alliance. There is little difference between the two scenarios of SES and VPP benefits, but the overall benefit of the PVP alliance is CNY 733.11. This shows that both demand response and peer-to-peer transactions can effectively reduce operating costs. By comparing Strategy 1 (our proposed strategy) and Strategy 4 in Table 3, it can be found that the VPP and PVP alliance benefits of Strategy 1 and Strategy 4 increased by CNY 1556.28 and CNY 3678.85, respectively, and the SES benefits decreased by CNY 1228.75, but the overall system benefits increased by CNY 4006.38, which increased by 13.4% compared with Strategy 4. Through the comparison of the above strategies, it is found that the proposed energy trading strategy in this paper can effectively ensure the maximization of the interests of all entities, stimulate the interaction potential of each entity, and ensure the fair distribution of total income for VPPs with incomplete resource aggregation.