## 2 Detailed Analysis of the Literature
### Prosumer Relationships
#### 2.2.1 Provider-Consumer Relationship
Another approach for prosumer relationship management is performance-based contract design [65; 66] which can also be a long-term contract or service agreement contract that may include two components--a fixed fee and a variable fee based on output and performance [65]. Energy Performance Contracting is an example of performance-based contract design which is a contractual arrangement between the energy service provider and its client where demonstrated performance determines remuneration [66]. It traditionally binds partnership agreements between the public sector and the private energy service company, but there are challenges regarding its adoption such as difficulties in ensuring win-win condition for both parties based on net benefits and selecting the suitable schema. One model aims to address this challenge by evaluating the net economic benefits for each party and measuring the schema using net present value (NPV) method [66]. The contract with the least NPV difference results in a win-win. The proposed model was applied in a project in Southern Italy to demonstrate its applicability. The study has several contributions. First, the study considers both technical and economic perspectives when assessing contract efficiency. Also, the study highlights the importance of benchmarking the contract schemes. Results also show that extending the contract period increases uncertainty and affects contract selection based on the win-win condition [66]. Profit and risk sharing is another form of prosumer relationship management [67]. Examining the risk-sharing processes between aggregators and prosumers reveals a dynamic contract problem. While the risk-averse prosumers can control their energy supply and intend to minimize the exponential type cost function, the risk-neutral aggregator will select an incentive strategy to control prosumers' energy generation indirectly [67]. Resolution of this problem can be through an optimal dynamic contract mechanism where prosumers and aggregators share the financial risk and the uncertainty of energy generation. The prosumers optimal control can be expressed as a solution of the Linear Exponential Quadratic Gaussian dynamic games, while the aggregator's optimal solution is determined analytically by using a standard global optimization algorithm. Simulation results show that the incentive-based mechanism effectively leads to risk-sharing between the aggregator and prosumers under moral hazard [67]. Another method to manage prosumer relationship is through implemented incentive strategies [11; 68; 69; 70]. A study investigated the incentive policies in China, identified effects and problems, and provided advice on how to improve these mechanisms [68]. One of these existing policies is the market development incentive strategy which leads to remarkable improvements in the renewable energy sector including the behaviors of its participants. However, it gives rise to complex issues such as grid connection difficulties. Addressing this challenge involves proper coordination of development plans [68]. A proposed multi-stage incentive model aims to motivate different stakeholders such as government, utility company, energy and equipment supplier, and the user [69]. Results reveal that social benefits and costs positively influence microgrid subsidy, enhance the technical competency of the supplier, and improve equipment quality. Such an incentive model can motivate prosumers to become more active. Similarly, prosumer incentives and penalty strategies can motivate existing passive prosumers to become active [70]. Thus, one approach to promote motivation is a performance-based penalty framework that influences prosumers' energy sharing behaviors [70]. A closer look at production and consumption in the energy system shows the existence of an expanded symbiotic relationship between production and consumption [71]. This perspective shifts from a linear flow of production to a circular process.