## 6 Experimental Evaluation and Results
### Executor Scheduling Algorithm Performance Analysis  
The executor scheduling algorithm proposed in this work represents a hybrid approach that integrates both event-triggered and periodic scheduling mechanisms to enhance system resilience against common-mode attacks. This section evaluates the performance of our proposed scheduling strategy through a comprehensive comparison with pure event-triggered and periodic scheduling approaches, with particular emphasis on system availability under varying degrees of executor vulnerability correlation. To establish a rigorous analytical framework for comparison, we consider the symmetric case where all executors maintain identical individual vulnerability levels (\(p_{i}=p\)) and uniform correlation coefficients (\(\rho_{i,j}=\rho=1/2\)). This symmetric assumption enables systematic analysis of common-mode attack scenarios while maintaining mathematical tractability. Following the theoretical foundation established in Theorem 1 of Section 5.1, we derive the probabilities of common-mode attacks affecting two executors and three executors simultaneously, providing the basis for availability analysis under different attack scenarios. The evaluation methodology focuses on calculating availability metrics under various common-mode attack probabilities and subsequently computing expected availability values based on the likelihood of different attack scenarios. Figure 7 presents the comprehensive analysis results, illustrating how system availability varies with common-mode attack probability across the three scheduling strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that when executor heterogeneity is sufficiently high, specifically when the probability of common-mode attacks affecting two executors remains below \(10^{-4}\) (a reasonable common-mode probability threshold established in the literature [13]), all three scheduling strategies achieve exceptional availability levels exceeding 99.988%. However, practical industrial control system deployments face significant constraints that compromise the ideal heterogeneity assumptions. Technical limitations, cost considerations, and resource availability often restrict both the number and diversity of heterogeneous executors that can be deployed in real systems. Furthermore, heterogeneous executors may suffer from underlying common-source vulnerabilities, where components sharing similar design principles, development frameworks, or hardware platforms create common-mode vulnerabilities that enable certain attacks to sim  
Figure 7: Availability varies with common-mode attack probability for the three scheduling strategies. multiple executors despite their apparent heterogeneity. In realistic deployment scenarios where common-mode attack probabilities exceed the \(10^{-4}\) threshold due to insufficient heterogeneity, our proposed hybrid scheduling strategy demonstrates superior performance compared to pure event-triggered or periodic approaches. In addition, our proposed architecture can integrate complementary detection mechanisms that identify potential common-mode vulnerabilities when anomalies are detected while arbitration results remain consistent across executors. In such scenarios, adaptive scheduling and cleaning operations can be triggered to mitigate threats through cross-validation with diverse offline executors. The effectiveness of our mechanism operates under the premise that not all online and offline executors share identical common-mode vulnerabilities simultaneously--scenarios where this condition is violated exceed the protection scope of our method and require manual vulnerability remediation guided by detection results. Regarding implementation complexity, while our architecture incorporates multiple components including credibility indices, adaptive privacy budget adjustment, and hybrid scheduling mechanisms, these components are designed with modular characteristics that support flexible on-demand deployment based on specific system requirements.