## 3 Proposed Method
### Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-Based Energy-Efficient Routing Protocol (EERP)  
For enhancing the security and optimizing the energy in medical healthcare systems, we developed an elliptic curve cryptography-based energy-efficient routing protocol (ECC-EERP) for secure encryption and transmission. Each sensor node generates a unique encryption code for every communication cycle. The following elements are included in the 186-bit encryption system that was designed to overcome storage limitations. The initial element is composed of 148 bits generated by the ECC, and the devices also include the ECC criteria. The node ID is represented in 15 bits by the second part of the value. However, a WSN typically has 300 or fewer nodes in most real operations; a huge WSN might have numerous nodes. As a result, we allowed 15 bits for the node identity, which may indicate more than 8000 sensors. The next element uses 15 bits to represent the sensor's range from \(\text{D}_{\text{i}}\), \(\text{C}_{\text{H}}\). The sensor node i's random key is defined as \(\{\text{K}_{\text{i}},\text{D}_{\text{i}},\text{D}_{\text{i}},\text{C}_{ \text{H}}\}\). The authorization method is based on the initial component of the key to reduce networking transmission congestion. A two-party authorization mechanism is used for the key generation between a sink node (SN) and the base station (BS). To start the transfer operations, the cluster heads  
Figure 3: Flow of proposed method. (CHs) transfer the hashing ECC code from the individual nodes to the BS. Each node is assumed to be aware of its identity. The computing algorithm is used to create the hashing code for the ECC code. To ensure that ECC encryption speed is acceptable, we tested it. In most cases, an elliptic curve is a cube formula, as shown in Equation (1):  
\[b^{2}=a^{3}+xa+y \tag{1}\]  
Each SN in the networking should first be aware of the elliptic curves and a baseline position p that sits on the curves before any information can be transferred across the SNs. Every SN has its storage preconfigured with the baseline position P and the elliptic curve variables. X selects a randomized prime number \(k_{X}\), and Y selects a randomized prime number \(k_{Y}\) to create a sharing secret key between SN X and SN Y. The secret keys of X and Y are denoted by \(k_{X}\) and \(k_{Y}\), respectively. Afterward, the common keys \(\bar{k}_{X}\) and \(\bar{k}_{Y}\) for X and Y, respectively, are generated by applying Equations (2) and (3). \[\bar{k}_{X}=k_{X}*P \tag{2}\]  
\[\bar{k}_{Y}=k_{Y}*P \tag{3}\]  
Both A and B's public identities are curved endpoints. The instances for which the baseline position p should be multiplied by itself to create the public keys are specified by the personal keys kA and kB. After exchanging public keys, the public keys are multiplied by their keys, as shown in Equation (4), to create a combined confidential key Q, which we need to be the first part of the suggested encryption key. It is theoretically impossible for an unauthorized person to determine \(k_{X}\) and \(k_{Y}\), which are the personal keys of A and B, given the known values of \(\bar{k}_{Y}\), \(\bar{k}_{X}\), and P. As a consequence, opponents are unable to determine Q, the combined confidential key. \[Q=k_{X}*\bar{k}_{Y}=K_{Y}*\bar{k}_{X} \tag{4}\]  
The elliptic curve's primary functions of point adding and point multiplication are used by the SN to produce its public key. The complexity of determining the number of times P is combined with itself to obtain this public key determines the strength of an ECC encryption algorithm. The private key for the SN is represented by this value. The point can be multiplied along the elliptical curves by repeatedly connecting it to its original position. Equations (5) and (6) provide the adding function for any 2 points, (x\({}_{1}\), y\({}_{1}\)) and (x\({}_{2}\), y\({}_{2}\)), on the elliptical curves under the presumption that a novel position is equivalent to +. (x\({}_{3}\), y\({}_{3}\)).