## 7 Conclusions and Recommendations  
The preceding analysis, drawing on primary data from surveys, interviews, roundtable discussions, conference papers, reports, and insights from the Maritime Cybersecurity Database, yields critical conclusions and recommendations for the maritime sector's cyber-security landscape. Firstly, it is evident that cybersecurity attacks on the maritime industry are on the rise and evolving in sophistication, with a noticeable increase in ransomware payments. This escalating threat is exacerbated by challenges such as aging, outdated, and unpatched IT systems on ships, the growing connectivity from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite internet, the convergence of IT and Operational Technology (OT) systems, and a deficiency in cyber awareness and hygiene among ships' crews. The shortage of IT and cybersecurity staff onboard ships further compounds these vulnerabilities. Data from surveys and interviews confirm a number of points in regard to cybersecurity in the maritime sector, briefly listed as follows: an increasing reliance on ICT and networked devices in shipping creates challenges for traditional ships' crews; current levels of cybersecurity in ships are insufficient, as are current regulations; and criminal groups will leverage cyber vectors and new technology to pursue innovative ways of conducting their illicit activities. Addressing these issues requires a multifaceted approach. One key recommendation is the imperative need for comprehensive cybersecurity training and simulations to enhance preparedness and awareness among ships' crews. This becomes particularly crucial in light of the potential for catastrophic accidents, especially in congested shipping lanes such as the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS). The injection of confusion into a ship's bridge could lead to collisions or accidents, underscoring the urgency of heightened preparedness. In the SOMS region, the looming threat of terrorist actors targeting shipping persists, with a history of malicious attacks on critical infrastructure. While piracy remains largely opportunistic, security organisations warn of the continued possibility of violent crew abductions. In response, the maritime industry must remain vigilant and cooperative within regional frameworks like the MSP, ReCAAP, ACG, and ASEAN Maritime Outlook. A regional statement, convention or code, focussed specifically on cyber and cyber-physical maritime security should be formulated and issued under the auspices of ASEAN. On the regulatory front, progress is being made with initiatives like the IMO's circulars, mandating cybersecurity integration into a ship's overall risk assessment processes. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Universal Requirements (UR E26 and E27) are pushing for mandatory cybersecurity in device design, albeit with a realisation that enforcement and real-world results will take time. Nevertheless, the regulations highlight cybersecurity as an aspect of ship design, and the important point that a device is only as secure as the systems that it is connected to. However, challenges persist in the practical implementation of regulations. Port state controls, while demanding clear evidence of a cyber breach, lack practical guidelines for Port State Control Officers (PSCs). The beginnings of PSCs in some jurisdictions, such as questioning ship masters about shipboard cybersecurity during port visits, can be seen and will raise industry awareness. Still, PSC detentions on cybersecurity grounds are unlikely in the near term due to a lack of clarity on breach definitions and concerns about liability. To fortify the maritime cybersecurity ecosystem, enhanced cooperation and coordination among domestic governmental agencies in the SOMS littorals are imperative.