# Deploying Secure Distributed Systems: Comparative Analysis of GNS3 and SEED Internet Emulator
## 2 Background
### Emulated and Virtualized Systems
#### 2.1.2 Hypervisors and Data Privacy
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt}} \hline
**Literature Reviewed** & **Vulnerability** & **Exploitation** & **Remediation Techniques** \\ \hline [PERSON] et al., 2013 [23] & Overloading network interface cards using a two-layer bridge, resulting in all traffic passing through it. & Compromised VMs used to launch attacks against other VMs or the hypervisor, spreading attacks across networks (Hyperjacking, Hyperjumping). & Host intrusion detection system: monitors specific activities and communications, audits file integrity, identifies insider threats, and detects modifications of file permissions. \\ \hline [PERSON] et al., 2010 [24] & Virtual network sniffing and virtual network spoofing. & “Bridge Mode” creates a virtual hub for network communication, allowing VMs to sniff the virtual network using tools such as Wireshark, leading to denial of service attacks. & Firewall and shared network layer: firewalls prevent spoofing attacks by identifying the network ID specified in the configuration file. A Shared Network Layer can block communication between shared VMs. \\ \[PERSON] and [PERSON] 2009 [25] & Unauthorized access to VM contents through file-level vulnerabilities and unrestricted resource allocation, resulting in VM crashes. & Unauthorized users with inappropriate file permissions can steal and observe VM contents. Improper resource allocation, resulting in VM crashes. & Restricting file permissions and implementing appropriate resource allocation can secure against these attacks. \\ \[PERSON] et al., 2017 [26] & Software-based vulnerabilities in VMs, including VM hopping, VM Escape, and VM mobility. & VM hopping can cause denial of service by blocking user access to resources. VM Escape allows a Guest VM to attack the host VM mobility across physical machines can result in data breaches. & Access control solutions can restrict access to the VCCI by implementing Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and virtual firewalls that provide packet filtering and monitoring services. \\ \hline [PERSON] et al., 2012 [27] & Footprinting identifies virtualized operating systems. & Security wrappers and application firewalls: reject packets incoming from the Internet containing internal IP addresses in the header and outgoing packets with external IP addresses in the header. \\ \hline [PERSON] et al., 2012 [27] & ARP Spoofing and MAC Flooding Attacks due to the bridge forwarding all incoming packets without filtering. & Containers’ direct communication with the host kernel facilitates attacks on the host system. & Sockets and API, security hardening, Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Type Enforcement (TE), Multi-Category Security (MCS), Docker security policies, and best practices. Security mechanisms for enhanced security for Docker containers include process, file, system, device, IPC, and network isolation to defend the virtualized environment from denial of service. \\ \hline [PERSON] et al., 2010 [29] & Malware vulnerabilities creating backdoors in the system. & Malware provides remote control of the system through malicious code execution. & Kernel-based virtual machine intrusion detection system: secures curds by checking data integrity and detecting modification of critical system files and data structures. \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Cyber Attack Landscape in Virtualization Technologies. [PERSON] et al. [31] proposed the Prevent VM Hopping (PVMH) solution, which also adapts the Bell-LaPadula AC model with virtualization technology to secure and prevent _VM hopping attacks_ between different VMs in operation. By significantly reducing the risk of attacks, this solution enhances the overall reliability of the computing platform. The Access Matrix is stored as a binary file in the hypervisor, with a backup file stored in the privileged VM.