# Smart Grid Fault Mitigation and Cybersecurity with Wide-Area Measurement Systems: A Review
## 5 Cyber-Physical Power Systems and Smart Grid Development  
The potential of the WAMS network to transform conventional power system networks is well established, but it comes with risks and concerns that potentially compound issues that smart grids were designed to solve [67]. The rise of modern communications systems means that existing power networks will inevitably be integrated to develop a more coherent smart grid architecture responsive to dynamic changes in the grid (as shown in Figure 6a) [67; 68]. Despite the inevitability of the design, conventional power systems (especially those of sub-Saharan Africa) are naturally prone to conventional faults on a scale that threatens power system stability and operation. With a poor cybersecurity platform, highly volatile communications systems may be exploited to cause more damage to these networks [67]. [PERSON] et al. pointed out different forms of cybersecurity attacks on CPPS integrated with Industry 4.0 tools, industrial ethernet, internet of things (IoT), and TCP/IP with the potential of testing the resilience of the CPPS [69; 70]. With an analysis of the impact of cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power systems and the impact of natural hazards on CPPS, [PERSON] et al. concluded that cybersecurity attacks on CPPS are categorized based on intent, which will then determine the form of protection strategies to be deployed on the network [69]. A CPPS, which is based on an ICS with high security requirements, can still fall prey to cybersecurity threats targeting integrity, availability, and confidentiality [67; 69; 71]. This paper's  
Figure 6: (**a**) Block diagram of how WAMS integrates into physical power system through strategic PMU deployment to become CPPS. (**b**) Schematic of potential application in multi-energy system with wide-area network (WAN) and neighborhood-area network (NAN). analysis of the future role of AI in WAMS and CPPS makes this threat more concerning. In mitigating these looming issues, advancements in WAMS design (and especially its communication infrastructure) should be built on cybersecurity models [67; 71]. An absence of this may cause chaos, especially in cases where natural hazards like storms can derail most wireless communication systems at specific frequencies. [PERSON] et al. emphasized the impact of natural hazards on physical systems while mostly focusing on wireless compromising power system networks. They encourage a holistic view of natural hazards, citing the impact of 2008's storms in China's southern province where 678 power lines (500 kV) and 1432 towers (220 kV) collapsed, compromising the existing CPPS and making it tenuous for integrating potential smart grid infrastructures [69]. Disruptions to the physical power system network often impact the cyber infrastructure, which is also complex to maintain and replace since WAPS are mostly integrated and coupled together (as shown in Figure 6b) [67; 72]. Consequently, cyber threats arise for the PMUs and WAMS infrastructure, e.g., from hackers introducing malware into low-risk systems incorporated into the larger networks responsible for regulating voltage and current levels in the system. In this situation, a greater impact can mean that DERs, which are constantly being integrated into the conventional grid, can become a conduit for more comprehensive cyber-attacks in CPPS [72]. [PERSON] et al. also highlighted that when considering WAPS, attention must be paid to their framework [31]. Cybersecurity threats are not only in software areas [16]. Their study pointed out that physical damage to the power system could be the basis of further cyber threats that can evolve and compromise the entire system. A WAMS, as shown in Figure 6b, could help facilitate this transition from traditional power system networks to comprehensive CPPS in sub-Saharan Africa. With this understanding, cybersecurity measures should address both the software and hardware of a power system network. [PERSON] et al. assessed different models of visualizing CPPS interaction models.