## 4 Discussion and Conclusions
These tools help quantify both social welfare outcomes and the net present value of projects, enabling more inclusive and evidence-based infrastructure decisions. The BRI and other initiatives will need to co-evolve to better meet the needs in the developing world and this could be a unique opportunity for innovation in conflict resolution schemes that mitigate the NIMBY syndrome. Ultimately, whichever initiative is more capable of addressing NIMBY issues together with local authorities and communities, along with a practical roadmap of how the infrastructure projects will be financed and implemented, will be able to secure a larger share in the global market of infrastructure projects. As such, the competition between infrastructure initiatives is a positive development for the countries in need of such investments. When the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated that a USD 26 trillion bill of infrastructure is needed in Asia from 2016 to 2030, this sum was adjusted to factor climate change impact (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2017). In fact, the total amount pledged by all major Western and allied infrastructure initiatives combined remains substantially below the estimated infrastructure investment needs for Asia alone--let alone the global requirements. There is a wide array of investments needed such as the building of land and maritime networks, but the most important one by far is the energy sector. Most of the developing countries still primarily rely on fossil fuels to generate energy to sustain their economic growth momentum. This will continue to be the case in the foreseeable future despite the enormous social cost of carbon when both climate change impact and public health costs are taken into account. The transitioning of the global economy to meet sustainable development goals is not achievable with a one-size-fits-all solution. The developing world needs a wide range of policies, technologies, and funds to fulfil both environmental commitments and economic growth objectives. China, the US, EU, Japan or other countries are unable to meet these needs single-handedly. Developing countries will need all of these initiatives as potential infrastructure financing options to assess and pick what works best for them and their populace. The presence of competition is ultimately beneficial for all sides. Competition also creates opportunities to cooperate in areas where cooperation brings about mutual benefits. One of such areas is addressing climate change and achieving sustainable development goals. Even with heterogeneous preferences at the national level, infrastructure projects under the BRI and alternative initiatives can be complementary rather than purely competitive at the regional level. As shown in the literature and grounded case studies (beyond official rhetoric), the BRI and initiatives such as PGII, GG, and FOIP often embody contrasting models--state-led versus market-driven, speed versus quality, hard versus soft infrastructure, etc. Each approach has its respective strengths and trade-offs. State-led financing under the BRI can provide rapid capital deployment, which may complement the quality assurance and private sector participation emphasised in Western and allied infrastructure initiatives. The implementation of the PPP model, which is still maturing in many developing economies, could benefit from such synergies. In the case of 3 SI, opportunities for coordination are evident--for instance, the proposed Three Seas Digital Highway aligns with China's Digital Silk Road; academic collaboration has emerged among universities along the New Silk Road; and the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed rail, a BRI project, could be linked to strategic 3 SI projects such as Rail Baltic, enhancing regional connectivity and co-financing potential. Moreover, while clear differences exist today, these may narrow over time.