# Operation of Water Supply Systems in the Czech Republic--Risk Analysis
## 3 Results and Discussion
### Risk Analysis
The risk of power outages in the drinking water supply has been addressed in studies by a number of authors, e.g., [PERSON] et al. (2020) or [PERSON] et al. (2020). As for outages or failure of electricity supply, the level of risk was assessed as critical, with a medium-high probability of incidence. The analysis showed Operator C as the best prepared to manage this risk. In the event of an outage, they can use their own back-up \begin{table}
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**Possible Risk** & **Possible Risk Consequences** & **Possible Cause** & **Current Precautions** & **RPN** \\ \hline \hline \multirow{4}{*}{**Power cuts**} & \multirow{4}{*}{Restriction of the water treatment penalty} & Power cuts due to natural phenomena (icing, strong winds, floods, etc.) & \multirow{2}{*}{3} & Use of backup power sources & 2 & 30 \\ \cline{3-4}  & & Power cuts due to technical reasons (substation out of terrorist act) & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & Limited functioning of information systems, disabling of water treatment plant control & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
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Table 13: Top identified water treatment risks (RPN greater than 20)—Operator C (compartmentalized model). \begin{table}
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**Possible Risk** & **Possible Risk Consequences** & **Possible Cause** & **Current Precautions** & **RPN** \\ \hline \hline \multirow{4}{*}{**Cyber-attacks**} & Limited functioning of information systems, disabling of water treatment plant control systems, disruption of operations & \multirow{4}{*}{2} & Power cuts due to natural phenomena (icing, strong winds, floods, etc.) & \multirow{2}{*}{3} & Use of backup power sources & 2 & 30 \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \cline{3-4}  & & & & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
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Table 12: Top identified water treatment risks (RPN greater than 20)—Operator B (mixed model). power sources as well as automatic booster stations using generators. Operators A and B do not own any back-up power sources (diesel generators) but can borrow them if necessary. Building photovoltaic plants is a recommended measure to mitigate this risk, and Operator C is currently preparing an investment plan to build its own photovoltaic plant. However, this is a financially challenging solution for operator B (he is trying to keep water prices at an acceptable level and therefore does not have enough funds for this investment), which applies also for small operator A. Another proposed measure is to increase operators' preparedness for this emergency situation, e.g., by practicing a blackout. Operator C took part in a regional blackout drill in 2018 together with other operators which included a test of preparedness to provide emergency drinking water to the population in the event of a large-scale power outage over a large area. The preparedness for such a situation is also addressed in the emergency preparedness plans of the individual operators; nevertheless, these are often not regularly updated at the level of small operators. The risk of cyber -attacks was assessed as the most significant one for Operator B. Protecting water infrastructure from cyber -attacks is also addressed by [PERSON] et al. in their article \"Protecting Drinking Water Utilities from Cyberthreats\" [24]. The current trends and challenges in cybersecurity in the water sector are also addressed by [PERSON] et al. in their article [25]. In the Czech Republic, a proposal to amend the Cybersecurity Act, which transposes the European Directive 2022/2555 [26] into the Czech environment, was submitted in 2023. The consequences of a cyber-attack could include limiting the functionality of information systems, disabling the water treatment plant's control systems, and disrupting operations.