## 2 Overview of Cyber Threats in EM
### Information Systems
The US National EMIS (NEMIS) relied primarily on a single commercial off-the-shelf application security product that implemented RBAC assigned to the username [69], until a 2005 report revealed numerous failings in terms of user administration, server configuration, auditing, contingency training and testing. The report concluded that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Database did not have adequate security controls and there was an increased risk that unauthorised individuals could gain access to critical database resources and compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive NEMIS data. In addition, it might not be able to recover following a disaster. Seventy-one percent of the security enhancements suggested by this audit were soon implemented, but the remaining were deemed to have a negative impact on performance or were hindered by dependence on a commercial product [107]. At the most recent (June 2012) privacy impact assessment for key NEMIS modules related to the emergency recovery phase [108], the primary privacy risk identified was that information on individuals requesting assistance was not collected directly but through an intermediary body, thus increasing the chance of information being inaccurate, erroneously disclosed, retained for longer than necessary or used for purposes other than for what it was collected. NEMIS is still largely based on a RBAC architecture that restricts access to data or functionality in a manner pre-defined for each position and based on the principles of separation of duties and \"need to know\". This applies to both full-time personnel and first responders, as well as for contractors. [PERSON] _et al_. [70] have presented an approach based on the RBAC model for information sharing within a virtual multi-agency response team. Their framework includes rules for admitting new agencies in the virtual team and a coordinator web service for each member to authenticate users, share information, create roles and enforce access control policies. Information sharing is secured through XML document encryption. _Open issues in EMIS security_: Today, the most commonly discussed security requirement in EMIS is data confidentiality. As observed in [109], in life-threatening circumstances, many people would consider a loss of privacy a small price to pay. However, the interoperability of \"systems of systems\"between different emergency services, the proliferation of personal data, and the society's increasing awareness of privacy intrusion, lead towards the need for \"privacy by design\" for EMIS. [PERSON] _et al._ have argued that inscribing compliance into technologies is less useful due to the dynamic nature of emergency management, and that privacy should not be seen as a value that is traded in return for security, or as a right that has to be rigidly enforced [109]. Instead, they have emphasised on enhanced and comprehensive accountability and transparency, with the technological infrastructure of EMIS supporting not only access control and pre-defined rules, but also the mechanisms to trace the justification of inferences made during the disaster. This remains an open issue for research.