# On Localized Countermeasure Against Reactive Jamming Attacks in Smart Grid Wireless Mesh Networks
## 5 Localized Trigger Identification Algorithm
### Trigger Nodes Detection Procedure
#### 5.2.2 Identification of a Single Trigger Node (ISTN) Algorithm
**Theorem 2**: _The total number of messages required to identify entire triggers node in the network is \(O(n\times(t+1))\) when \(n\) is the sum of devices and \(t\) is the sum of triggers in the wireless network._

## 7 Experimental Results

An intensive series of experimental simulations has been conducted in order to validate the theoretical proof and the effectiveness of the _TNI_ algorithm against the feasible reactive jamming threat in the Smart Grid wireless mesh networks. Accurately, our solution, _TNI_ approach, is comprised of two types of jamming signal testing schemes, Sequential Group Testing (_TNI-SGT_) and TNI using Individual Testing (_TNI-IT_). In this section, the experimental comparison of both methods is to be simulated and illustrated in terms of effectiveness on Group Testing against wireless security threats. Furthermore, the computational performance, latency, message overhead and the size of quarantine areas, from the _TNI_ algorithm against the wireless DoS threat is to be compared and assessed to the outputs from the _JAM_ approach in ref. [12] as well. The objective on the set of experimental investigations in this section is to evaluate our solution in various Smart Grid wireless mesh networks by several teams of parameters in the transmission ratio between jammers and wireless Smart Grid devices, varied from \(\alpha=\frac{R}{r}=2.5\) to \(\alpha=\frac{R}{r}=8\), and the network densities from growing number of nodes, \(n=1000\) to \(n=5000\), and jammers, at most \(J=10\)Moreover, the initiative group of parameters on the Smart Grid wireless network is that jammers and the wireless devices are randomly deployed by the pseudo-uniform distribution manner in an area 1000 m \(\times\) 1000 m along with the transmission range \(r=20\) m.

Since the implementation of this experimental simulation is to evaluate the performance of identifying trigger devices against the jamming threat only, MAC misbehavior, link-congestion, packet losses except the disruptive signals from jammers are not considered. The experiments with each configuration from above are iterated 100 times and averaged to depict in graphs, so that the analysis on the results would suffice to show the efficiency of _TNI_ algorithm. Furthermore, we implemented our experimental simulation on the Linux with kernel version 4.13 by leveraging igraph library. ### Results and Analysis

#### 7.1.1 Testing Rounds \(T\)

The round of group testing is averaged from the network configuration with a varying number of wireless devices \(n\in[1000,5000]\) in Figure 5a, which indicates the computational latency of _TNI-SGT_ algorithms by the predefined duration of a testing round. As depicted in Figure 5a, the testing rounds for the completion on the identification of all trigger nodes gradually ascend, compared to the incremental size of nodes in denser networks. In the duration of the devices in increments from 1000 until 5000, while the number of testing rounds grow steadily by approximately 120 additional rounds in _TNI-SGT_, _TNI-IT_ tests require at most 50 more rounds for the identification of all triggers. The observations can be explained as follows: sequential GT with _Quick Identification_ and _Quick Elimination_ method detects all trigger nodes efficiently due to the fact that more nodes require to be tested with more rounds, as the density of networks increases with additional devices. Furthermore, the design of _TNI-SGT_ algorithm for the identification of all trigger devices only on the convex hull of every hexagon provides a great benefit over the latency of the time complexity. Figure 5: Rounds by Various Parameters. The performance of _TNI_ algorithms from different numbers of the reactive jamming devices is addressed via Figure 5b so as to provide the efficiency of the localized countermeasure scheme in the case of massive number of jammers in the Smart Grid wireless mesh networks.