GAKA-LCCO: A Secure 5G Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol with Less Communication and Computation Overhead  
[PERSON]  
1 School of Modern Posts, Xi'an University of Post and Telecommunications, Xi'an 710061, China12 Shanxi Provincial Information Engineering Research Institute, Xi'  
certain security vulnerabilities from the EPS-AKA protocol, such as impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks (MitM), and denial of service (DoS) attacks [5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11]. In [12], the authors analyzed the 5G AKA protocol of the technical specification (TS) 33.501 v0.7.0. They discovered a protocol vulnerability that could enable an attacker to impersonate another user in a serving network (SN). Based on the Tamarin model checker [13], [PERSON] et al. [14] investigated the security properties of the 5G AKA protocol of TS 33.501 v15.1.0, and several major issues were revealed. These issues are related to user localization, the leakage of activity, the impact of active attackers, and the presence of malicious SN while roaming. In [15], the authors pointed out that the 5G AKA protocol suffers from link-ability attacks and proposed a new authentication scheme by making use of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm to generate the session key. This scheme was successful in preventing link-ability attacks along with an MitM attack. For the more recent 5G AKA protocol, the authors in [16] found a new attack type. They claimed that the protection mechanism of the sequence number (SQN) can be defeated under specific replay attacks due to its use of exclusive-OR (XOR) and a lack of randomness. In [17], the authors modeled all key components of the 5G AKA protocol (i.e., the user equipment, the serving network, and the home network) according to the definition in the 3 GPP specification document. They discovered an attack that exploits a potential race condition and additionally showed that solving the race condition for the honest case does not necessarily prevent the attack. In [18], the authors investigated the privacy properties of the 5G AKA protocol using the Bana-Comon logic [19; 20]. They discovered a novel desynchronization attack and proved that their proposed protocol guarantees these privacy properties. In [21], the authors proposed a novel version of the 5G AKA protocol to prevent active attacks and gain resistance against malignant serving networks. Unfortunately, there is a possibility of an SN impersonation, so this scheme does not eliminate the vulnerability toward a MitM attack. Further, [PERSON] et al. [22] also attempted to launch a revised version of the 5G AKA protocol. However, their proposed protocol suffers from privacy preservation, as the device identities are clearly transmitted in the air, which leads to numerous security attacks. As time goes on, more attacks on the 5G AKA protocol were found due to the insecure channel between different network domains in the legacy mobile network. In [23], the authors discovered an attack exploiting the subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) to track a subscriber in the 5G network, which is directly caused by the insecure air channel. To cover this issue, they proposed a secure authentication scheme by utilizing the existing public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanism. Further, they found a location-sniffing attack, which can be implemented by an attacker through inexpensive devices [24]. Similarly, they proposed a fixed scheme based on the existing PKI mechanism. In [25], the authors modeled the 5G AKA protocol by using ProVerif based on three- and four-entity models and then proposed their security consideration. Further, [PERSON] et al. [26] proposed an enhanced version of the authentication and key agreement protocol for the 5G system that surmounts the limitations existing in the 5G AKA protocol. [PERSON] et al. [27] introduced a protocol that preserves the privacy of the user identity and overcomes the identified problems of the 5G AKA protocol. Similarly, 3 GPP has also been enhancing the security of the 5G AKA protocol [2; 3; 4].