## 6 Proposed Methodology
This is the reason why the SPP protocol is installed very close to the SDN controller. The figure indicates that SPP packet-in messages are much fewer when compared to the other two models during the attack. It also clearly shows that there are more unwanted packet-in requests in RYU during the attack. The average number of packets in the message is below 1000 messages per minute in the SPP model as shown in Figure 14, proving its better suitability to SDN environments than other approaches [48; 49; 50; 51]. ### Response Time

The response time increases during DOS attacks owing to fake requests on the controller. Therefore, there was a delay in the response time. Therefore, the proposed SPP overcomes this issue by blocking the unwanted traffic. The figure shows that the average response time of SPP is 5.23 milliseconds when compared to other models with 6.03 and 7.24 milliseconds, respectively, as shown in Figure 15.

Figure 14: Flow control. Figure 15: Response time. ## 9 Conclusions

When network technologies emerge at a steady rate, SDN will be implemented at higher rates in the upcoming years in all fields. Although SDN technology removes the complexity of tying control and data planes together over a traditional networks, it makes certain aspects, such as security, controllability, and the economy of network resources, vulnerable. Among these aspects, security is one of the main concerns to be viewed seriously as far as the applications of SDN are concerned. This study addressed recent ICMP protocol-based attacks and their impact on SDN environments. This work proposes a security policy protocol (SPP) and client authentication model to avoid unauthorized attacks on SDN networks. The proposed model was evaluated using parameters such as CPU utilization, channel bandwidth, packet delivery ratio, response time, and the number of flow requests. The final experimental results proved that the proposed model performed with higher performance and minimum overhead in terms of efficiency. This model can effectively defend against flooding attacks in SDN network environments. The proposed SPP protocol achieved 92% accuracy in ICMP detection Compared with traditional approaches. Conceptualization, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; methodology, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; software, S.B. ([PERSON]); validation, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; formal analysis, S.B. ([PERSON]); investigation. E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; resources, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; data curation, S.B. ([PERSON]). ; writing--original draft preparation, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; writing--review and editing, E.M.O., M.A.K., S.B. ([PERSON]), S.B. ([PERSON]), A.U.R., E.T.E. and M.S. ; visualization, S.B. ([PERSON]); supervision, M.A.K. ; project administration, S.B. ([PERSON]); funding acquisition, E.T.E. and M.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. This research was supported by Future University Researchers Supporting Project Number FUESP-2020/48 at Future University in Egypt, New Cairo 11845, Egypt. Not applicable. The authors declare no conflict of interest. ## References

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