## 7 Conclusions  
This paper focuses on the problem of transaction privacy leakage risk in the public environment of blockchain. This paper first elaborates on the contradictory problem of the open and transparent nature of blockchain and the risk of transaction privacy leakage and analyzes and summarizes the current research status and progress, as well as the challenges and problems in the field of blockchain transaction privacy protection. To this end, this paper proposes the blockchain transaction privacy protection method that integrates the stealth address and the note mechanism, whose implementation does not depend on any third party and guarantees the privacy of transaction relationships and transaction amounts on the blockchain. In order to verify and evaluate the feasibility, security, and efficiency of the proposed scheme in this paper, this paper concludes with a detailed analysis of the scheme in terms of both privacy and security. From the analysis results, it can be seen that the method proposed \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline \hline  & **The Protection** & **The Protection of** & **Trusted** & **Relies on Trusted** \\  & **Transaction** & **Trading** & **Setup** & **Third Party** \\  & **Amount** & **Relationship** & & \\ \hline Zerocash & yes & yes & yes & yes \\ BTPP & yes & yes & no & no \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: Comparison of Zerocash and BTPP method. in this article can prevent fraudulent behavior by transaction senders, transaction receivers, and verifiers, ensure security, and also ensure the privacy and integrity of transaction information. Then, this paper evaluates and analyzes the BTPP scheme by designing relevant experiments based on different experimental purposes. Through the experimental results, it can be concluded that the proposed method consumes milliseconds in key processes, and the related commitments and proofs are also very small, which is crucial for controlling transaction costs. At the same time, it also verifies that only honest transaction participants can complete transactions. In addition, the BTTP method is compared with recent related works. The BTPP method can address the shortcomings of the original stealth address scheme, such as the inability to protect the privacy of transaction amounts, privacy loss caused by temporary key leakage, and the need for the receiver to calculate repeatedly. The BTPP method can also address the issues of requiring zk-SNARKs for relevant proving and third-party trusted settings in the Zerocash privacy trading system, achieving a completely decentralized privacy trading solution. The findings of this article bear significant implications not only for enhancing the privacy capabilities of existing blockchain systems but also for the broader development of the digital security domain. For instance, these privacy protection methods can be applied in areas such as digital identity verification, secure data exchange, and enhancing the anonymity of financial transactions. Blockchain developers should consider integrating these privacy protection mechanisms to enhance user privacy and overall system security. Additionally, this article encourages subsequent research to build upon this foundation to make these privacy protection methods more applicable to a wide range of blockchain scenarios. Further studies are also needed to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of these methods in different blockchain architectures and their resilience in the face of advanced security threats. Through these practical applications and continuous research, the research results of this article will have a lasting and positive impact on the progress of blockchain technology and the development of digital security. The BTPP method uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to generate the randomness seed known only to both parties when generating the temporary key pair, which requires multiple interactions between the two parties.