# A Hybrid Key Generator Model Based on Multiscale Prime Sieve and Quantum-Inspired Approaches
## 8 Discussion on Security Implications of Optimised Quantum Key Generation Algorithms
The solution is to inject chaotic quantum systems (e.g., through many-body physics or quantum cellular automata) to prevent predictability. Avoid oversimplifying the model, as this could make it easier for an attacker to reverse engineer. 5. Optimised quantum hashing security. Summary: reduction in the matrix size from 256 to 128 to speed up the quantum Fourier transform (QFT); strength of quantum hashing: QFT provides non-invertibility, making it a natural candidate for hash functions and digital signatures; its quantum resistance properties make it extremely resistant to classical attacks; reducing the matrix size weakens security: a small transformation matrix reduces the complexity of the key space, thus facilitating collision attacks. If an attacker discovers a pattern in the hash, then they can deduce the relationships between inputs and outputs. The solution is achieved by reducing the matrix size and using sparse QFT techniques to achieve speed optimisation without altering security. Quantum hashing together with lattice-based cryptography makes it resistant to quantum attacks. Although the current implementation emphasises performance and entropy, we acknowledge the absence of formal security proof in terms of PQC, since, although correct, we consider the standard NIST key randomness tests, while PQC is not the subject of this work, as we are more interested here in solutions for the transition period from traditional to quantum computing. Here we introduce a brief comparison with the post-quantum standards Kyber and Dilithium, which are based on hard lattice problems. Our approach differs in that it focuses on structural obfuscation and information fusion, and although it does not currently offer reduction-based security proof, future work will aim at formalisation under accepted post-quantum assumptions, also analysing the effect of standards such as Kyber and Dilithium in a hybrid setting such as the current one. As final considerations on security when quantum hardware becomes commercially available, we can state the following:  
1. Ultra-optimised QRNGs require true quantum entropy sources. Replace the pseudo-random generator with quantum vacuum fluctuations or radioactive decay. Use hardware-based QRNG devices for real-world cryptographic applications. 2. QKD should implement advanced countermeasures. Introduce bait-and-switch QKD to protect against photon number splitting. Use error correction and privacy amplification to mitigate side-channel risks. 3. Schrodinger and quantum simulation methods should use stronger potentials. Increase computational complexity using multiparticle wavefunctions. Avoid overly simplistic approximations that could introduce distortions. 4. Quantum hashing should maintain high matrix complexity. Maintain large transformation matrices by optimising with sparse QFT algorithms. Implement post-quantum cryptographic hybridisation to ensure security longevity. Let us consider the trade-off between security and efficiency. Optimisation has significantly improved speed, but security must remain a priority. The ultra-optimised QRNG is now the fastest algorithm, but its dependence on classical randomness weakens its cryptographic strength. QKD remains the most secure but requires careful hardware implementation. Schrodinger, simulation and hashing methods require parameter tuning to balance speed and unpredictability. These insights ensure that future implementations of quantum key generation will maintain high-speed performance while remaining cryptographically inviolable.