# Enhancing Cybersecurity in Smart Grids: False Data Injection and Its Mitigation
## 3 Classifications of Cyber-Attacks in SGs
Results of an attack is provided in [82]:  
* By stopping or delaying the flow of information between the control networks, the fulfilment of critical-time functions can be prevented;
* Threshold values that can damage or deactivate or turn off the hardware by unauthorized changes in instructions, commands, or alarm;
* It may create negative environmental consequences;
* Wrong information can be sent to system operators;
* Software or configuration settings can be changed;
* Operation of security systems that may endanger human life can be intervened. The criticality and sensitivity of the infrastructures managed by CS have made it one of the primary targets of cyber terrorism and cyber warfare. Therefore, it is vital to analyse  
Figure 5: The architecture of Control System with CPS. it in depth to reveal gaps in control systems' protocols and components [81]. Only in this way it will be possible to take precautions against the detected gaps and prevent them from being re-exploited by the attackers [82; 83]. As discussed in the study [84], vulnerabilities in control systems can cause attackers to infiltrate the network, access control software, and cause unwanted damage by changing the systems' operating conditions. All connections used that only belong to the relevant institution and organization can be very useful in preventing unauthorized access and keeping the network confidential. However, it is impossible to manage systems with such an \"isolated\" network today, which is almost mandatory to use interconnected networks [85]. A significant part of the communication or control system attacks is not disclosed to the public by many countries due to bad reputation. However, most of the research work in CPS security focused on transmission or control systems. Accordingly, a great deal of the assumptions made for attacks formulation and detection algorithms do not hold for both systems [81]. The renewal and integration of SG communication sheets in the power grids have authorized significant improvements and have composed new issues and challenges. In this way, the communication architecture is operated to receive real-time (RT) data between control and digital centres. This combination has allowed a few challenges like incorporating high DER's [82] and sufficient microgrids coupling [83]. Besides, integrating the AMI has authorized two-way communication between customers and utilities and the constitutional ingredient of demand side management [84]. However, when communication architecture includes a large geographic area, power and control systems become vulnerable to CPS attacks, which was recently assumed as one of the most crucial issues for SG [85; 86; 87; 88; 89; 90]. The most threats and hazardous attacks in the world are examined in detail with a timeline in Figure 6 for the last two decades. It can be seen different countries were affected and miscellaneous systems have been damaged for years since 1982. Moreover, the impacts of these malicious attacks are summarized. Unwanted events that may be encountered in smart grids can be summarized as follows:  
* Disruption of control and monitoring operations as a result of blocking or delay of information carried on the network;
* Endangering the lives of the environment, employees, and other people as a result of the system components being shut down, disabled, or damaged by unauthorized modification of commands, instructions, and alarm thresholds;
* The adverse effects of situations that cause operators to send inappropriate commands by sending incorrect information to system operators or hiding unauthorized changes risk people's lives by intervening in secure systems. Malicious CPS attacks can have severe impacts ranging from economic effects to partial malfunctioning of equipment, all the way to cascading failures and shut-down of entire power systems [54; 86]. These attacks can target both the cyber part, which consists of the software and communication layer, and the physical part, which consists of the electrical power devices [91].