# OSINT-Based LPC-MTD and HS-Decoy for Organizational Defensive Deception
## 3 Proposed Deception Models with Organizational OSINT, LPC-MTD and HS-Decoy
### Organizational Social Engineering Deception in the Proposed Model
#### 3.1.2 LPC-MTD
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Category** & **US Organization** & **Trade-Off Based on Time Slot Length (s)** \\ \hline \multirow{8}{*}{Armed forces} & US Army & 23 \\  & US Air Force & 19 \\  & US Navy & 26 \\  & US Marine Corps & 25 \\  & US Coast Guard & 21 \\  & US Space Force & 2 \\ \hline \multirow{8}{*}{Unified combatant command} & USPACOM & 13 \\  & USEUCOM & 6 \\  & USSOUTHCOM & 7 \\  & USCENTCOM & 13 \\  & USNORTHCOM & 6 \\  & USCYBERCOM & 5 \\  & USSTRATCOM & 8 \\  & USSPACECOM & 5 \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Intelligence community} & US CIA & 20 \\  & US NSA & 19 \\  & US FBI & 28 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: Optimized trade-off results based on deception simulation by major US organization in Figure 9.

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