## 5 Results  
Figure 6 presents the time series of GDP when there is no BI (NoBI) in Condition I and when BI is delivered at 20% (BI20%) and 40% (BI40%) of average income. Experimental levels of 60% and 80% were also tested, but no difference was observed above 40% because all of the collected tax revenues were used for BI. Figure 6, which shows the time-series trend of GDP, shows that the bottom of the NoBI condition tends to be one level lower during economic downturns, but it is difficult to clearly distinguish the other trends. Therefore, a comparison using the average GDP over 360 periods, as shown in Table 4, shows that GDP is higher in the conditions in which BI is delivered. Similarly, the amount of capital investment and the number of products and prices produced in the market, as shown in Table 4, indicate that the conditions without BI are more active than those with BI being granted. The comparison between BI20% and BI40% also shows that the benefits of BI tend to be more active with respect to investment and product production status, which is inversely proportional to the amount of BI benefits granted. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|l|r|r|r|} \hline Simulation period \(T\) & 360 & Fixed wage \(W_{f}\) & 4000–5000 \\ Number of item type \(I\) & 10 & Basic consumption \(bc\) & 1000–1500 \\ Number of household \(H\) & 500 & Marginal propensity to consume \(mpc\) & 0.5 \\ Number of firm \(F\) & 60 & Withdrawal rate \(wd\) (random every period) & 0.5–0.8 \\ Number of Government \(G\) & 1 & Update interval of working willingness & 12 \\ Number of Equipment maker \(E\) & 1 & Number of product type can be produced & 2 \\ Number of Bank \(B\) & 1 & Initial Equipment \(K_{t}\) & 1 \\ Initial Cash of household & 3000–5000 & \(a\) of Cobb-Douglas type production function & 10–12 \\ Initial Cash of firm & 100,000 & Capital distribution ratio \(\beta\) & 0.2 \\ Initial Cash of Government & 100,000 & Forecasted period \(ti\) & 10 \\ Initial Cash of Equipment maker & 1,000,000 & Safety coefficient \(sa\) & 1.65 \\ Initial Cash of Bank & 40,000,000 & Initial price of every firm’s goods & 1000–1500 \\ Budget rate for government purchases \(gr_{p}\) & 0.5 & Bonus ratio of firm \(r_{b}\) & 0.5 \\ Budget rate for firm subsidies \(gr_{s}\) & 0.5 & Repayment period of long-term loan & 100 \\ Equipment price & 500,000 & Maximum number of long-term loans & 2 \\ Maximum production of equipment per period & 10 & Interest rate of loan & 0.01 \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 2: Basic parameters. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l r r} \hline  & **Condition I** & **Condition II** \\ \hline Parameters of labor & \(-\)0.02 & \(-\)0.1 \\ motivation \(\varepsilon\) & 0.2 & 0.2 \\ Income tax rate \(r_{i\_tax}\) & 0.4 & 0.4 \\ BI budget rate \(gr_{BI}\) & No, 20\%, 40\% & No, 20\%, 40\% \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: Experiment levels. Furthermore, with respect to GDP, when \(\varepsilon=-0.02\), BI20% resulted in a higher GDP than BI40%. This suggests that with regard to BI benefits, a higher benefit amount does not automatically translate into a healthier society. In fact, in the \(\varepsilon=-0.1\) condition, i.e., a society with members who respond more rapidly to a decline in work motivation due to higher income, the BI20% condition outputs better results, with a higher GDP compared to NoBI and more investments being made than in the BI40% condition, as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4 also displays the minimum work motivation of the agents who had the lowest work motivation during the simulation. At \(\varepsilon=-0.02\), the minimum work motivation never falls below 80% because the decline in work motivation is gradual, even for very high earners. At \(\varepsilon=-0.1\), the work ethic of high-income earners is set below 10% because the decline in work ethic accelerates rapidly from a certain point. However, the average work motivation for 500 and 360 periods is about 95% under both conditions. Under the condition of \(\varepsilon=-0.1\), BI20% GDP was slightly inferior to BI40%.