## 5 Experimental Results and Analysis
### Discussion  
Since IoT devices are utilized in a variety of applications, there is a need to ensure data privacy and security, based on the application domain and the type of data being communicated between parties, such that an adversary cannot eavesdrop or tamper with the data. Due to the IOTA distributed ledger, we achieved a tamper-proof audit trail of environmental sensor data, published from various IoT devices. The MAM extension module of IOTA provides environmentalists with the ability to publish, store and fetch the encrypted, authenticated, on-demand environmental sensor data by using the Tangle. The MAM protocol empowers the environmentalists by providing agency over the collected environmental sensor data, allowing them to share this data with the environmental officers for monitoring purposes. MAM's limited mode gives environmentalists fine-grained access controls over how data is shared across specialists in the digital environmental ecosystem, while the Tangle adds an extra layer of integrity to ensure that data is not tampered with. We discuss the privacy, security, and feasibility of our proposed system in the remainder of this section. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Processor**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Action**} & **Payload** & **Trials** & **Avg.** & **St. Dev.** & **Variance** & **Min** & **Max** \\  & & **Size (KB)** & **Time (s)** & **(s)** & **(s)** & **(s)** & **(s)** & **(s)** \\ \hline Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Create & 145 & 300 & 15.82 & 0.35 & 0.12 & 15.35 & 17.25 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Create & 330 & 300 & 29.03 & 0.62 & 0.38 & 27.88 & 31.49 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Create & 515 & 300 & 34.91 & 0.74 & 0.56 & 33.75 & 37.96 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Create & 740 & 300 & 91.75 & 1.73 & 2.99 & 88.76 & 97.07 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Attach & 145 & 300 & 23.3 & 0.11 & 0.012 & 22.97 & 23.59 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Attach & 330 & 300 & 52.91 & 0.11 & 0.013 & 52.45 & 53.2 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Attach & 515 & 300 & 82.53 & 0.18 & 0.033 & 81.87 & 82.95 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Attach & 740 & 300 & 118.3 & 0.68 & 0.471 & 116.4 & 119.6 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Fetch & 145 & 300 & 56.51 & 1.6 & 2.58 & 53.77 & 64.08 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Fetch & 330 & 300 & 135.1 & 38.4 & 6.2 & 159.2 & 127.2 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Fetch & 515 & 300 & 223.4 & 10 & 101 & 206.2 & 254.4 \\ Intel(R) CoreTM \(\mathcal{F}\)-8565U & Fetch & 740 & 300 & 327.9 & 5.99 & 35.9 & 318.1 & 346 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: Results of the non-protocol method. Since every node in a distributed ledger's network needs a copy of the current state of the ledger, distributed ledger technology seems to go against our present understanding of digital privacy. Despite the fact that value transactions on distributed ledgers may be pseudonymous, monitoring network traffic by analyzing the frequency of transactions and locations of origin could lead to the conclusion that one person has communicated with another regularly. Moreover, finding out the number of tokens an entity possesses is also possible, with varying levels of uncertainty. On a distributed ledger, enhancing privacy while maintaining auditability is still an ongoing area of research. Nevertheless, since MAM eliminates the concept of two entities communicating with each other, this issue does not pose a difficulty for our proposed system. Instead, the issuer generates transaction addresses at random in a data stream, regardless of who has access to the information required to decrypt the data. The following along of a public or private chain of messages can be achieved by the subscribers from their point of entrance forward since  
Figure 11: Line graph displaying the average “attach time”, with respect to payload size, for the MAM protocol and non-protocol methods.