## 3 Proposed Hybrid Approach  
In this study, we combine two consensus mechanisms for a fair mining reward for the miner and validator into a hybrid model. Assume that the behaviour of nodes is likely to be known as the most massive chain. As a result, the first block generated in this model is usually referred to as the main chain, along with the majority of the nodes in the network. In Figure 4, we present our proposed finite state automata (FSA) model for the block-forging process. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Solution**} & **P2P** & **Proportional Gain** & **Fair Voting** & **Stable Block** & **Autonomous** & **Punishment** **for Malicious** \\  & **Protocol** & **Proportion** & **Mechanism** & **Time** & **Network** & **Nodes** \\ \hline Komodo [57] & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) \\ ZEN [29] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & \(\surd\) \\ Decred [30] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) \\ Casper [30] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\surd\) \\ Proposed & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) \\ mechanism & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 2: Comparison of the proposed hybrid mechanism and other hybrid solutions. transactions that cannot be arbitrarily modified. Other block records, such as timestamps and earlier hash blocks, are irreversible. Therefore, to adjust the hash and achieve a correct pattern, the nodes use the nonce arbitrary field. As part of the PoW loop, miners start with 0 and continue to increase the nonce and produce hashes whilst merging this nonce with other block data. When a correct hash that meets the requirements of the block hash is discovered, the peer achieves success in mining. A complexity factor is added for the block interval to be preserved. By applying this approach, we can achieve excellent control over the generation time interval for blocks. In addition, the benefits of mining and transaction fees are evenly distributed amongst investors. Apart from this mining method, another security measure is implemented to secure the network against the misbehaviour of nodes by preventing these nodes in a predefined period. A minimum of one hour is required to ban the simulation setting. Whenever a peer node obstructs, the peer is banned for one hour from the network. Figure 5: Process of the proposed hybrid model with supported features. The protocol imposes an additional restriction that all nodes must be fairly validated. Both network nodes are equally weighted with regard to decision making. It involves validating a rich node and judging a weak node fairly. The two peer nodes share the same code and weight. Given that the mining process involves a degree of risk, every node can verify transactions and blocks. The frequency of the chance depends on its staking capacity. Furthermore, our proposed method incorporates PoS and PoW into a stochastic coherence process without sacrificing availability, and a decentralised stack is essential. Considering that the systems run based on computations and stakes in the network, we define a rule-based forking mechanism to ensure that new blocks are produced between the two consensus types. By examining how much effort is made and the rewards obtained by stacker and miner devices, which should be fair, this study demonstrates its novelty. This simulation proposes a minor tweak to the difficulty adjustment, as indicated in Equation (2). \[td_{s},c_{0}=\text{argmax}\;td_{wi}\cdot td_{wi};i\in\{1,...,N\} \tag{2}\]  
In general, the algorithm chooses the appropriate complexity to match the inside network's hash/stake power. However, this choice is sometimes gradual. Consider, for example, that stake complexity is approximately 10 times greater than miner complexity. There is a 10x increase in stake in comparison with its hash rate.