## 2 Related Works  
In this section, we surveyed some articles [1; 2; 3; 4]. In [1], the author only mentioned how EHRs are used and managed. The author also talked about the EHR format that followed the definition of HL7 [5] and that performed well-known protocols to encode each patient's EHR from TCP/IP, MIME, HTTP(S), and SOAP. In [2], the authors discussed several security requirements, such as EHR storage security, malicious code prevention, protected access right management, and other aspects to protect the health information system. However, they did not provide a practical scheme that would allow a patient to migrate their EHR to a health information system. We can imagine a scenario where a hospital only adopts the above simple protocols to develop its own health information system without any security mechanism. Additionally, it is not feasible for each patient to perform their own EHR exchange under this scheme. On the other hand, in [5], the authors suggested that each patient's health records (or files) could be portably stored on a flash disk. This idea is appealing but is currently difficult to implement. There are many security issues to be handled, including portable device security and patient medical file access rights. However, more security mechanisms are needed to solve these kinds of security issues, which are beyond the scope of this research. In addition, various patient authentication schemes of e-health systems have been proposed [6; 7; 8; 9; 10]. In [6; 7], the schemes suffered a user impersonation attack and did not offer session key establishment with a formal security proof. The authors in [8; 9; 10] did not provide session key establishment with a forward secrecy proof. In [11; 12], the authors each proposed a framework with a patient-centric access right in a blockchain environment. However, they did not provide a practical mechanism for each patient to perform EHR migration exchange securely. Additionally, many studies are now examining the importance of personal privacy and data authorization. For example, the prevalence of COVID-19 has made many patients reluctant to disclose information about their infection, but government healthcare units want to control the trajectory of tracking these patients. A method of providing improvements in these mechanisms is the main motivation and purpose of our study. Therefore, in this paper, we emphasize providing a secure, simple, and complete mechanism for authorizing data transfer during personal information migration and demonstrate that our approach is secure and effective in practice through a professional information security authentication model. Hence, we summarize and list here seven kinds of security attack when a patient attempts to migrate their personal information data through a traditional authentication model:Replay Attack Resistance: A malicious attacker intercepts the parameters used in the mutual authentication transaction successfully. They can then forward these parameters again to impersonate one party to communicate with other parties during the mutual authentication transaction and vice versa. * Resist User Impersonation: A malicious attacker impersonates some party by replaying the intercepted signatures or random variables to other parties engaged in the mutual authentication transaction. * Mutual Authentication: Without mutual authentication with other e-health systems, an attacker can pretend as a fake system to let other patients register and login. Then, patient's EHRs information cannot be stored securely in this storage location. * Data Security Problem: An attacker intercepts the parameters, including ciphertext, successfully during the mutual authentication transaction, and they may then decrypt the intercepted ciphertext by adopting these intercepted parameters. * Session Key Establishment with Forward Secrecy: Each party communicates a temporary symmetric key for data transmission after performing mutual authentication successfully.