## 5 Validation Demonstration
### Parameters Settings  
Two countries, denoted as the attacker (\(R\)) and the defender (\(B\)), are in conflict with each other. \(R\) will deploy a sort of weapons in the next five years. As a result, \(B\) should develop a defense system consisting of new weapons as CMs. As shown in Table 2, \(R_{1}\), \(R_{2}\), \(R_{3}\), \(R_{4}\), \(R_{5}\), \(R_{6}\), \(R_{7}\) and \(R_{8}\) are \(R\)'s current weapons; \(B_{1}\), \(B_{2}\), \(B_{3}\), \(B_{4}\), \(B_{5}\), \(B_{6}\), \(B_{7}\), \(B_{8}\), \(B_{9}\) and \(B_{10}\) are new weapons that \(B\) may develop. Each weapon can be characterized as one or several meta-functional nodes. For example, \(R_{1}\) is abstracted into two meta-functional nodes. \(B_{1}\) is abstracted into three meta-functional nodes. In addition to the functional descriptions of the nodes, the threat vectors that can counter \(R\) must be computed. Part of the data is obtained from prior studies on [41; 42]. Tactical and technical index values of \(B\)'s weapons are shown in Table 3.  
The reference values of the tactical and technical indexes are provided in Table 4, and the normalization result is calculated in Table 5 according to the normalization method mentioned in Section 2.2.2. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c|l c} \hline \hline  & \(R\) & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\(B\)} \\ \hline
**Name** & **Nodes** & **Name** & **Nodes** \\ \hline \(R_{1}\) & \(S_{R1},D_{R1}\) & \(R_{1}\) (Main Battle Tank) & \(S_{R1},D_{R1},I_{B1}\) \\ \(R_{2}\) & \(D_{R2},I_{R2}\) & \(R_{2}\) (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) & \(S_{B2}\), \(D_{B2},I_{B2}\) \\ \(R_{3}\) & \(I_{R3}\) & \(B_{3}\) (Armored Front Observation Command Vehicle) & \(S_{B3}\), \(D_{B3},I_{B3}\) \\ \(R_{4}\) & \(S_{B4},D_{R4},I_{R4}\) & \(B_{4}\) (Self-propelled Howitzer) & \(I_{B4}\) \\ \(R_{5}\) & \(S_{B5},I_{R5}\) & \(B_{5}\) (Low Level Search and Warning Radar Vehicle) & \(S_{B5}\) \\ \(R_{6}\) & \(S_{B6},D_{R6},I_{R6}\) & \(B_{6}\) (Self-propelled Antiaircraft Gun) & \(I_{B6}\) \\ \(R_{7}\) & \(S_{B7},I_{R7}\) & \(B_{7}\) (Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle) & \(S_{B7},I_{B7}\) \\ \(R_{8}\) & \(S_{B8},D_{R8}\) & \(B_{8}\) (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) & \(S_{B8}\) \\  & & \(B_{9}\) (Reconnaissance Information Vehicle) & \(S_{B9},D_{B9}\) \\  & & \(B_{10}\) (Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter) & \(S_{B10},I_{B10}\) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 2: WSOS composition. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Weapon**} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\(S\)} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\(D\)} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\(I\)} \\ \cline{2-13}  & **TS1** & **TS2** & **TS3** & **TS4** & **TD1** & **TD2** & **TD3** & **TD4** & **TT1** & **TT2** & **T3** & **TT4** \\ \hline \(B_{1}\) & 7 & 0.85 & 0.4 & 0.9 & 0.8 & 10 & 3 & 250 & 600 & 0.9 & 2 & 60 \\ \(B_{2}\) & 5 & 0.8 & 0.5 & 0.7 & 0.7 & 15 & 4 & 280 & 600 & 0.8 & 1.5 & 45 \\ \Next, we classified and aggregated the threat value of various nodes. The result was shown in Table 6. The weights were set to be the same. To facilitate the calculation, we set all threats from \(R\) as 40. Some restrictions exist based on real-life operational situations: (1) if more than one \(S\) node exists in one loop, they can only be arranged based on their values of _Radius_ in descending order. For example, the _Radius_ of \(S_{B3}\) and \(S_{B2}\) are 10 and 5, respectively. Then, \(S_{B3}\)\(\rightarrow\)\(S_{B2}\) is logical, \(S_{B2}\)\(\rightarrow\)\(S_{B3}\) is unreasonable; (2) if more than one \(D\) node exists in one loop, they can only be arranged in descending order in terms of _Efficiency_. For example, the _Efficiency_ of \(D_{B2}\) and \(D_{B9}\) are 15 and 10, respectively. Then, \(D_{B2}\)\(\rightarrow\)\(D_{B9}\) is logical, \(D_{B9}\)\(\rightarrow\)\(D_{B2}\) is unreasonable; (3) for the connection from node \(S\) to node \(D\), due to the limitation of communication links, \(D_{B1}\), \(D_{B2}\), \(D_{B3}\), and \(D_{B9}\) can only receive information from \(S_{B1}\)