## 2 Comparison of BRI with Other Global and Regional Infrastructure Initiatives
### Coordination Mechanisms  
While all four initiatives share a commitment to rule-based governance, their degree of institutionalisation varies, with GG embedded in EU institutions, FOIP/PQI largely Japan-led, PGII coordinated among G7 states, and 3 SI coordinated among the relevant EU member states. Unlike the BRI, which is centrally coordinated by China, involving multiple actors can lead to challenges in aligning policy objectives. This may result in more diversified but less targeted infrastructure investments in developing countries. Although the broad objectives of PGII, FOIP/PQI and GG are well-established, specific details on funding sources, coordinating mechanisms, capital allocation, cross-border contractual obligations, and project timelines remain relatively less concrete and cohesive compared to the BRI, even though the latter has also been criticised for the opacity and viability of its operational strategy and implementation guidelines ([PERSON] et al., 2022; [PERSON] and [PERSON], 2022; [PERSON], 2019; [PERSON], 2023). Diplomatic principles at the strategic level do not always align with the actual implementation of infrastructure projects on the ground. Essentially, the misalignment between the soft power approach (e.g., promoting transformative ambitions through BDN certification) and hard power capacity (e.g., the BDN's actual ability to influence or change investment decisions) suggests that the market risks may remain unmitigated, and firms may not see guaranteed profits despite the emphasis on transparency and sustainability ([PERSON], 2021). These uncertainties might lead developing countries, which prioritise meeting their infrastructure needs over potential debt repayment challenges, to favour the BRI's financing approach. The BRI's straightforward loan structure from Chinese banks, which could be less expensive than market financing with fewer strings attached, offers a clearer and more immediate understanding of the financial terms involved ([PERSON], 2023; [PERSON] et al., 2022; [PERSON] et al., 2022). Regarding PGII, trade relations between G7 countries and China are not uniform. For instance, the U.S. is engaged in a trade war with China, while Japan maintains a relatively less confrontational bilateral relationship. While PGII and FOIP emphasise democratic values and high-quality, sustainable projects at their core, they are more reactionary to China's growing influence through the BRI compared to GG. Given the U.S.'s critical stance toward China, this introduces challenges in reaching consensus among member states on PGII's and FOIP's investment-led infrastructure policies, which may serve as competitors or complements to the BRI ([PERSON] et al., 2022). While the U.S. plays a central role in FOIP, especially in safeguarding geoeconomic security in the Indo-Pacific region, the [PERSON] administration appeared to distance itself from leading the economic and infrastructure components of FOIP by failing to implement adequate institutional and funding commitments, leaving Japan to shoulder much of the financial responsibility for implementing digital technology, infrastructure, and energy projects to counter the BRI. Moreover, U.S.-Japan relations were strained by the U.S.'s withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 and demands from the U.S. to reduce Japan's trade surplus ([PERSON], 2019). Moreover, there is disagreement among G7 and EU member states about which regions--Sub-Saharan Africa, South/Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Western Balkans--should be prioritised for infrastructure investment ([PERSON] and [PERSON], 2022; [PERSON], 2023). Bottlenecks may also occur in policy implementation, since multilateral cooperation may imply lower efficiency and more bureaucracy despite enhancing legitimacy and inclusiveness. For example, after its initial launch in 2019, the BDN did not see significant progress or activity for a period of time until the OECD took a more active role in 2021, which revitalised the initiative ([PERSON], 2021).