# Fire Safety Risk Analysis of Conventional Submarines
## 3 Overview of Systems and Risks
### Safety Incident On-Board Submarines
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Submarine** & **Sub Type** & **Year** & **Incident Type** & **Cause** & **Fate** & **Fatalities** & **Injured** & **Ref** \\ \hline INS Shankush & Conventional & 2010 & Man overboard & \begin{tabular}{c} Washed \\ overboard \\ during repair \\ operation \\ \end{tabular} & Significant & 1 & 0 & [18] \\ \hline HMS Astute & Nuclear & 2010 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 0 & [19] \\ \hline HMCS Corner & Conventional & 2011 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 2 & [20] \\ \hline Yekaterinburg & Nuclear & 2011 & Fire & \begin{tabular}{c} Fire whilst \\ alongside, \\ caused during \\ welding \\ \end{tabular} & Damage & 0 & 9 & [21] \\ \hline HMS Astute & Nuclear & 2011 & Flood & \begin{tabular}{c} Cooling pipe \\ leakage \\ \end{tabular} & Damage & 0 & 0 & [22] \\ \hline HMS Astute & Nuclear & 2011 & Murder & \begin{tabular}{c} Crew member \\ deliberately fired \\ weapon \\ \end{tabular} & Significant & 1 & 1 & [23] \\ \hline USS Miami & Nuclear & 2012 & Fire & Deliberately lit & Decommissioned & 0 & 0 & [24] \\ \hline USS & Nuclear & 2012 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 0 & [25] \\ \hline Collins Class (unknown) & Conventional & 2012 & Fire & Fuel leak & Damage & 0 & 0 & [26] \\ \hline HMAS & Conventional & 2012 & Flood & \begin{tabular}{c} Weight \\ compensation \\ system, hose \\ rupture \\ \end{tabular} & Damage & 0 & 0 & [27] \\ \hline INS & Conventional & 2013 & Fire & \begin{tabular}{c} Fire whilst \\ alongside, cause \\ unknown \\ \end{tabular} & Sunk & 18 & 0 & [28] \\ \hline Tomsk & Nuclear & 2013 & Fire & \begin{tabular}{c} Fire whilst \\ alongside, \\ caused during \\ welding \\ \end{tabular} & Damage & 0 & 15 & [29] \\ \hline USS & Nuclear & 2013 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 0 & [30] \\ \hline INS & Conventional & 2014 & Fire & \begin{tabular}{c} Electrical wiring \\ fault \\ \end{tabular} & \
\begin{tabular}{c} Significant \\ Damage \\ \end{tabular} & 2 & 7 & [31] \\ \hline HMAS Waller & Conventional & 2014 & Fire & Unknown & Damage & 0 & 0 & [32] \\ \hline INS & Conventional & 2014 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 0 & [33] \\ \hline Sindhuratna & Conventional & 2014 & Collision & Navigation error & Damage & 0 & 0 & [34] \\ \hline HMAS Waller & Conventional & 2014 & Fire &
\begin{tabular}{c} Fire whilst \\ alongside, \\ caused during \\ welding \\ \end{tabular} & Damage & 0 & 0 & [35] \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: \(Cont.\)summarises an analysis of the incidents in Table 1 and shows that collision and fire remain among the top types of submarine incidents in recent years. In terms of fatalities, fire was the leading cause of death on-board a submarine from 2006 to 2015, as shown in Figure 2b. Those categorised as \"toxic substance exposure\" can be traced back to a single event which was caused by inadvertent triggering of the automatic fire suppression system. A review of the causes of incidents resulting in fatalities shows that fire in critical submarine components such as batteries, engines and electrical equipment, and fire safety system components, namely automatic suppression systems, account for the vast majority of submarine fatalities in recent years. For the purposes of this study, incidents involving conventional submarines are of particular interest. Incident types for conventional submarines follow much the same trend, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Relative Contribution of Conventional Submarine Incident Types, 2006–2015. Figure 2: (**a**) Relative Contribution of Submarine Incident Types, 2006–2015 (**b**) Submarine Fatalities by Incident Type, 2006–2015. Based on the case reviewed, fire incidents on submarines appear to have become more prevalent in recent years with flooding incidents becoming less frequent. As stated previously, recent advancements in energy storage and AIP technology will see the integration of new components previously unproven in a submarine which could potentially further increase operational risks related to fire.