# Enhancing Cybersecurity in Smart Grids: False Data Injection and Its Mitigation
## 4 False Data Injection Attacks Detection Modelling and Methods
### Detection Methods of FDIA
An attacker can increase his current attack's privacy with an alternative attack password, turning it into an undetectable FDI attack. It can be named \"Blind FDIA\" [188]. PCA based attacks can occur if there is a significant error in the measurement data and ALM-based stealth FDI attacks can be successfully injected [188]. MTD to detect blind FDIA is implemented in [189]. Moreover, [190] is used PCA to Blind False Data Injection Attack. Data Driven [191] and Geometric Approach are used to detect blind false data injection in [192]. Observations can be made from the review of the studies above and the works listed in Table 3:  
* The researchers had attempted various approaches. However, no attempts to use general SG-based learning approach have been undertaken up to now. * Almost all the studies used simulated datasets for validating their methods. Power flow data from the Ireland power grid is used in [162], but it seeded synthetic attacks into the dataset later or [177] used data from the Nigerian power grid, but it seeded synthetic attacks into the dataset. * A few works mentioned here used classifiers as individual methods for communication or power but none used any ensemble fields method. All the mentioned attacks are caused by the security vulnerabilities used with the standards examined in the table below. In this sense, the mitigations of the protocols most preferred by the standards are summarized in Table 4.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline
**Standards** & **Protocols** & **General Issues** \\ \hline \multirow{6}{*}{NIST, FERC} & Structured Query Language (SQL) or Hypertext & \multirow{6}{*}{IPv4 and IPv6 discussions [41, 42, 193]} \\  & Transfer Protocol (HTTP), TCP and User Datagram & \multirow{6}{*}{IPv4 and IPv6 discussions [41, 42, 193]} \\  & Protocol (UDP) Internet Control Message Protocol & & \\  & (ICMP), Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) & & \\  & and Internet Protocol Security (IpSec) & & \\ \hline ISO/IEC 15,408/EAL, ITSEC, TCSEC, CTCPEC & IoT and Internet Protocols such as REST, CoAP, MQTT, MQTT-SN, AMQP \(\ldots\) etc. & \multirow{6}{*}{Insufficient for complex infrastructures [43, 194]} \\  & & Security Management System Protocols, ISMS, & \\  & & SSL/TLS/SSH, VPN, IPSec & \\ \hline \multirow{6}{*}{**Communication**} & TCP/IP and specify security requirements for \multirow{6}{*}{ICO/IEC 62,351, IEC 60870-5 and DNP, IEC 60870-5, the IEC 60870-5, the IEC 60870-6, the IEC 61,9850, the IEC 61,970, and the IEC 61,968 families.} & \multirow{6}{*}{Vulnerabilities about protocol-based attack such as IP spoofing and DoG [48, 194]} \\  & & Wireless Communication protocols (Bluetooth, Zigbee, WiMax \(\ldots\) etc), Internet Protocol (IP), Information and & \\  & IEEE 802.11.i and IEEE 802.16.e, IEEE 61,850 & Configuration Protocol (DHCP), SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) with Communication & \multirow{6}{*}{Setting security level and protecting to MitM [194, 195]} \\  & Technology-Interoperability architectural perspective & & \\  & (CT-IAP) & & \\ \hline \multirow{6}{*}{AES} & Structured Query Language (SQL) or Hypertext & \multirow{6}{*}{Despite being approved by many organizations, selection of encryption techniques is not trivial [196].} \\  & Transfer Protocol (HTTP), TCP, UDP, Internet Control & & \\  & Message Protocol (ICMP), Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) and IpSec with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Algorithms for cryptography. & \multirow{6}{*}{Sleep to be rolled out by 2030 due to insufficient security, as stated by NIST [197].} \\  & & Public key-based protocols may also be used (e.g., ANSI 3.94.2). & \multirow{6}{*}{NIST and FERC should coordinate the development and adoption of smart grid guidelines and standards [41].}