# Positioning Information Privacy in Intelligent Transportation Systems:
## 5 Related Security and Privacy Threats
### Security Threats  
**Conventional and Infrastructure-Related Attacks**  
_Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM):_ (today also referred to as person-in-the-middle attack) is an active attack where an eavesdropper can intercept and modify fully or partly the positioning signaling  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt}} \hline \hline
**Protocol** & **Storage Space** & **Complexity** \\ \hline Protocol-2004 (P-04) & 2 random nonces; Hash value & \(5O(n)+8O(1)\) \\ \hline Protocol-2006 (P-06) & 2 random nonces; Hash value; Symmetric keys & \(5O(n)+8O(1)\) \\ \hline Modified Protocol-2006 (P-06-M) & Random nonce; Hash value; Symmetric keys & \(5O(n)+5O(1)\) \\ \hline BS-based anonymity-focused protocol (P-AF-BS) & Random nonce; Hash value; Symmetric keys; Interval sigma & \(9O(n)+7O(1)\) \\ \hline Vehicle-based anonymity-focused protocol (P-AF-V) & Random nonce; Hash value; Symmetric keys; Interval sigma & \(2O(\lambda^{3.5})+10O(n)+9O(1)\) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 2: The complexity evaluation.  
Figure 9: Number of different operations required per protocol.  
between two vehicles or between a vehicle and the terrestrial infrastructure used for positioning, such as cellular signaling [96]. Increasing the security and authentication of the data signaling protocols is one solution to mitigate this attack type.  
Replay attackThis attack is similar to the previous one. Here, the attacker can replay the messages traveling between vehicles or vehicles and infrastructure thus affecting the correctness of the positioning itself instead [97].  
Sybil Node (Rogue AP)This attack and hardware/software unauthorized modifications are another active attacks, where BS or AP would transmit intentionally erroneous positioning-related data [98]. To cope with this attack type, outlier detection mechanisms need to be used [99].  
Jamming attackThe attacker can be either a stationary or a moving jammer. Given the nature of the mobility of the vehicular networks, it is rational to have a moving jammer that tracks the desired node and causes regular interference. Utilizing spread spectrum techniques could assist in addressing this attack. As one of the options, the Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) makes the incoherent signal period impulse-noise to the eavesdroppers. On the other hand, Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) symbolizes each data bit in the original signal by multiple bits in the transmitted signal [100] which is also a recommended technique to resist jamming.  
Passive Eavesdropping attackIn this type of passive attack, an attacker can listen to the positioning signaling between two vehicles or between a vehicle and the infrastructure [101]. If the positioning signaling channel is strongly encrypted - this type of attack may be mitigated.  
Message modification attackThis attack is targeted at altering the message during or after transmission (active attack) [102]. The adversary may wish to change the source or content of the message in terms of the position or time information that had been sent and saved in its device, in order to escape the consequences of a criminal/car accident event.  
Key and/or Certificate ReplicationThis attack involves the system endorsement with a node of similar identity. The execution of the attack relies on the key management or certificates replacement, in order to forbid the identification and abuse the authorities [103].  
While most of the security threats could be mitigated by employing the integration of stronger information security systems, privacy-related attacks could not be overcome by mere modifying the hardware/software side of the system.