## 3 Arctic Shipping Risk
### Risk Perspectives and Applications  
Different risk perspectives and applications have implications on risk acceptance and operational decision making. [PERSON] et al. [28] remind us that there is a broad range of complex risk perspectives,and risk-based decision-making should aim to incorporate the full range of stakeholders and their diverse perspectives on risk and consequence (e.g., scientific, economic, social, and cultural). [PERSON] and [PERSON] [29] examined a range of risk definitions and perspectives that have been applied in maritime transportation. Based on this, it can been seen that the risk definition adopted in POLARIS accounts for the likelihood of an undesirable event (i.e., the vessel incurring ice damage), but does not account for the relevant consequences of that event. The framework proposed here aims to complement POLARIS by accounting for the severity of consequences resulting from an ice damage event. Similar foundational issues are present in oil spill risk analysis. [PERSON] et al. [30] provided context on the ambiguity in risk perspectives and risk governance related to oil spills in the Barents Sea. Through the development of qualitative mental models for various stakeholders, they demonstrated there are multiple ways in which stakeholders define and understand risk, but existing risk assessment and management practices do not reflect this broad range of perspectives. Further adding to the complexity of assessing Arctic shipping risk is the treatment of uncertainty, or strength of evidence. Risk analysis for maritime transportation seldom incorporates an assessment of uncertainty [1; 29] despite the implications it has on risk acceptance and decision making. The lack of experience and data for Arctic operations has made expert elicitation a common approach to risk. Expert judgement introduces additional uncertainties and bias that need to be considered and communicated to decision makers [30; 31]. There are also \"black swan\" events [4; 22; 32]. These are rare or surprising events with the potential for severe or extreme consequences that are not captured in traditional risk analyses. As Arctic shipping activity increases and high risk exposure vessels enter new geographic regions, \"black swan\" events should be considered. Several recent studies have proposed operational risk frameworks for ships in ice with a variety of risk perspectives and applications. Bayesian networks are a common risk assessment methodology applied to Arctic shipping. They allow the integration of quantitative and qualitative (e.g., expert knowledge) data and a means of quantifying uncertainty. [PERSON] et al. [33] used empirical data sets and Bayesian networks to assess ship performance (speed) as a function of ice conditions. Such a model supports operational risk management to avoid besetting in ice and to manage fuel economy. [PERSON] et al. [34] adopted a Bayesian Belief Network using empirical data supplemented with expert judgement to assess the risk influencing factors leading to ship besetting. [PERSON] et al. [35] investigated goal- and risk-based design to assess the performance of ships operating in ice. The ship is treated as a subcomponent of a larger Arctic marine transport system, utilizing principles of system-based design. While their intent was to incorporate a risk-based assessment of system performance at the design stage, their systems thinking approach has merit for the scenario-based framework proposed here. [PERSON] et al. [2] used the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to model Arctic ship navigation as a complex system and analyze the system functions (human, technical, and organizational) that influence ship performance. While FRAM is not a risk assessment methodology, it promotes a holistic understanding of system dynamics that can support real-time risk-based decision making. Figure 1 summarizes the range of factors and foundational issues that should to be considered in the evaluation of consequences of Arctic shipping.