## 2 Background and Related Work
### Previous Studies on Sidedchain Methods and Rewardless Block Mining  
Previous research on sidechain methods has explored various aspects, highlighting their diverse applications and technical challenges in blockchain ecosystems. For example, studies such as [39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 45] have focused on the technical design and implementation of sidechains, investigating key aspects, including interoperability, security, scalability, sharding, and consensus mechanisms. In contrast, the research in [46; 47; 48] examined the security and trust implications of sidechains, including their impact on the security of the mainchain, potential vulnerabilities, and strategies to ensure trust and integrity in sidechain operations. Additionally, studies such as [24; 49; 50] have explored the practical applications of sidechains across various domains, including finance, digital content management, supply chain management, healthcare, and identity management. These works sought to identify use cases in which sidechains can offer specific benefits and address industry-specific challenges. Furthermore, the economic and incentive models associated with sidechains, including token economics, staking mechanisms, and reward structures, were investigated in [51; 52], with the goal of aligning incentives for participants in sidechain networks. Two notable sidechain implementations, Liquid and RSK, illustrate contrasting approaches to trust and incentive structures. Liquid, developed by Blockstream [53], is a federated sidechain governed by a consortium of functionaries and offers no monetary rewards for block production, instead relying on institutional trust and multisignature consensus. RSK [54], by contrast, employs merge mining, where Bitcoin miners are incentivized through transaction fees and token rewards. While both systems provide strong security, they are better suited to large-scale or token-driven environments. For small-scale digital asset trading platforms without native tokens or the infrastructure to manage economic incentives, these models may be unnecessarily complex. Alternative incentive models for decentralized blockchain systems without block mining rewards have attracted considerable attention within the blockchain research community. Most studies have concentrated on developing consensus algorithms that do not rely on block mining rewards [34; 35; 55]. Other research has explored alternative compensation models, such as transaction-free-based systems or community governance and funding mechanisms, to replace traditional mining incentives [36; 56; 57; 58]. However, these approaches encounter several challenges. Consensus mechanisms such as Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) and Proof of Stake (PoS), despite eliminating the need for mining rewards, encounter scalability challenges and security vulnerabilities, such as the 'nothing-at-stake' problem, particularly in high-throughput environments [55]. Additionally, the absence of traditional block rewards complicates the design of effective incentive mechanisms, making it challenging to sustain validator participation and ensure network security during low transaction periods [34]. Transitioning to new consensus mechanisms can also introduce governance complexities and adoption barriers, potentially leading to reduced participation or even network splits [59]. Moreover, reliance on transaction fees or community funding models can reduce validator incentives during periods of low transaction volumes, thereby affecting both security and decentralization [36; 57]. Governance complexities and the transition from existing reward models further complicate the adoption of these approaches [56; 58]. While these models present promising alternatives, their practical implementation requires further research to address these critical challenges comprehensively. Unlike previous studies that emphasized extending mainchain functionalities through sidechains, this study adopts a different approach by using the mainchain as a reference for independently purposed sidechain networks.