## 8 Discussion  
The space sector's evolution over recent decades can be comprehensively analyzed through the lens of the modified Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) framework. This approach illuminates not only the conventional industrial economics forces shaping the industry but also the unique astrophysical and geopolitical factors at play. Outer space creates extremely harsh conditions not only for humans but also for the objects they produce. Orbital mechanics realities--gravity wells, launch energy requirements, and radiation--impose fixed technological thresholds--e.g., the extremely high cost of placing the payload into orbit and the steep reliability standards. These astrophysical constraints raise capital intensity and favor scale economies unmatched in most terrestrial industries. It was neither the love of knowledge (curiosity) nor the pursuit of profit that initially drove mankind to venture into this harsh domain. The main motivation, which remains mostly influential today, was the desire to dominate or the fear of being subjjugated by others. This \"original sin\", born of military and geopolitical rivalries, continues to cast a shadow over the evolution of the space economy. Indeed, it seems likely to still be the key driving factor shaping its trajectory for the foreseeable future. Geopolitically, the strategic value of presence in space channels the majority of public space budgets into defense-related programs. This second condition is closely related to the third differentiator of the space economy, namely the state's outsized presence in the midstream. Governments are the anchor customers (and often the regulators) for satellite operation services such as GNSS, reconnaissance, and deep-space communications. This triad--harsh physics, great-power rivalry, and a state-centric midstream--produces a sector whose traits diverge from conventional industrial-organization baselines. As government agencies once exerted near-exclusive control over upstream, new entrants--often dubbed \"New Space\" companies--have begun altering market structures, offering serially produced small satellites, reusable rockets, and lower launch costs. Whereas the initial space economy depended on extensive government contracts under cost-plus systems, contemporary developments are more open to fixed-price models and diversified private funding. New entrants pursue strategies (conduct) that differ markedly from traditional, large-scale, government-backed incumbents. New Space entities like SpaceX and others adopt aggressive cost-reduction measures, high launch cadence, and reusability, challenging long-standing practices of infrequent launches and bespoke engineering. Performance outcomes are mixed: some particular aspects of technical efficiency have risen sharply, but some doubt about market power and negative externalities arises. As regards performance, some general limitations should be discussed. Data about decreasing costs of launching in total as well as calculated per kilogram of payload mass or per spacecraft cannot give us a full and consistent picture of the technical efficiency because they are only the proxies. To assess technical efficiency in a coherent manner, we need standardized inputs and outputs and clearly defined relations between them based on a given technology (namely, production function). However, these assumptions are deeply challenged in the space economy. Firstly, space products are often non-repetitive and custom-built, which limits the use of benchmarking of productivity comparisons across firms as well as along the timeline. Moreover, the public sector's dominance in demand creation (midstream) is responsible for a blurred boundary between political objectives and technical optimization. Space programs could be effective in meeting geopolitical or military goals, but not efficient in a narrow technical efficiency sense, in which they could be perceived simply as a waste. This issue is reinforced by a dual-use logic, where technologies serve both civilian and military functions.