# REISCH: Incorporating Lightweight and Reliable Algorithms into Healthcare Applications of WSNs
## Results
#### 5.1.3 Security Comparison  
In this section, we discuss the superiority of REISCH over existing schemes in terms of security (Table 3 shows a comparison of security features between our scheme and existing schemes). Compared with the scheme in [17] that uses a small key (\(F_{2163}\)) and is extremely vulnerable to attacks, REISCH uses a key with 256 bit that resists attacks (reputable organization recommendations). REISCH also uses BLAKE2 bp to get rid of hash attacks (collision and preimage) while the scheme in [18] focused on SHA1 performance without attention to the collision/preimage threats. In addition, all security parameters in REISCH such as \(SN_{i}\)'s location are completely hidden, while the scheme in [19] transfers some information explicitly, such as ID (the elliptic curve parameters), in the registration and authentication phases.  
* [2007] % OEMC % Version of 2006/02/13 SUOMMARY  SAFETETETALIS  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS  PRMOTOCOL  /none/span/span/span/testsuite/results/REIESSCH_new11.if  GOAL  An_specified  BACENCY  OPMC  COMPENTS  STATISTICS  parseTime: o.00s  searchTime: S32.61s  visitedNodes: 1899 nodes  depth: 7 piles  
Figure 16: Simulation result using CL-AtSe.  
Figure 15: Simulation result using OFMC.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Security Feature** & **[PERSON] and [PERSON]** [17] & **[PERSON] and [PERSON] [19] & **[PERSON] et al.** [20] & **[PERSON] et al.** [21] & **[PERSON] et al.** [22] & **[PERSON]** [23] & **[PERSON] et al.** [24] & **[PERSON] et al.** [25] & **RESCH** \\ \hline Anti MTM & & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ Anti replay & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ Antivisibility & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓  
This allows intruders to distinguish a specific \(SN_{i}\). Additionally, this scheme did not address the problem of hiding the \(SN_{i}\) location. Although the authors of [20] addressed privacy in their scheme's architecture to protect the \(SN_{i}\) parameters. Their scheme did not use the signatures camouflage or \(SN_{\mathit{TPP}}\) that are used in REISCH to support the privacy of data signing. This makes the privacy parameters in their scheme vulnerable to analysis and easy tracking. Furthermore, REISCH outperforms the scheme in [21], which did not use the signature aggregation scheme to support security and hide signatures. The scheme in [22] uses ECDSA to secure heterogeneous network environments. However, their scheme gives medical evaluators privileges to modify the medical parameters in the monitoring environment, \(SN_{i}\)'s locations and even creates keys that could be the cause of an internal attack. Moreover, some information sent from \(SN_{i}\) to the server can clearly leak to intruders. Fortunately, REISCH does not suffer from these problems. REISCH adds sufficient randomization to hide security parameters, and patient records are protected even after \(LS\) is penetrated, while the scheme in [23] needs to support randomization and protect user information when a demand-response management unit is penetrated by an intruder. Besides, an intruder can send messages from a forged unit and deceive users after penetrating this module and revealing information. REISCH is robust against information leakage, while the scheme in [24] uses a 160-bit key that is vulnerable to attacks. It explicitly sends patient identities within the encrypted message in the login and authentication phases. If an intruder can break the encryption, he/she can use this information in data disclosure. REISCH uses ECDSA-BLAKE2 bp and random pseudonyms to secure data signing. The scheme in [25] is based on SHA1 and HMAC, which are vulnerable to attacks in signing and authenticating collected data. It also does not include a pseudonym mechanism to protect \(SN_{i}\) parameters from misbehaving.