## 7 Performance
Such dominance by a few actors theoretically could lead to predatory pricing or other undesired behavior due to monopoly power and reduced consumer choice. At the moment, it seems that huge efficiency gains due to the cost-cutting effects of New Space development substantially outperform possible distortions regarding allocative efficiency. For example, customers do not care about monopoly pricing in a situation in which a firm suspected of having monopoly practices, due to disruptive innovations, is able to offer prices many times lower than incumbent competitors, as is the case with launching services by SpaceX. It would be helpful to refer here to [PERSON]'s (1966, 1979) X-efficiency theory, which challenges the orthodox assumption that firms invariably operate on their optimal production frontiers [119; 120]. X-efficiency theory posits that factors such as worker motivation, managerial practices, and organizational structures substantially influence the degree to which firms exploit existing technology and resources [121]. From this perspective, a technically efficient dominating firm may, in certain circumstances, deliver greater net benefits, which would outperform the allocation distortions (also known as  
Figure 13: Decreasing cost of doing business in space in the years 2011–2023 as measured by: (a) average cost of launching a rocket (USD mln per launch); (b) average cost of launching an individual spacecraft (USD mln per object). Source: own based on [6; 103; 115; 116]. deadweight loss) due to monopoly or oligopoly market structure. For instance, New Space firms streamlining processes through programs such as lean production and agile project management, and probably attracting better talent and/or better motivating them, could reduce X-inefficiencies, resulting in higher total efficiency. [PERSON]'s theory underscores the idea that certain forms of monopoly power need not always be counterproductive. For instance, SpaceX has demonstrated superior technical efficiency compared to established players by innovating reusable rocket technology and streamlining manufacturing processes. This has led to significantly lower launch costs, showcasing how a technically efficient \"monopoly\" in certain launch segments can outperform multiple inefficient competitors. The intriguing question about the long-term net effect of trade-offs between allocative and X-efficiency regarding the New Space transformation remains open for further study. Up to now, however, benefits from gains in technical efficiency improvements seem to be overwhelming in cases such as SpaceX. Considering public goods led us to the next problem, namely the scope. Should we take the welfare of the national population as the normative baseline (national public goods), or should we think about global scope (global public goods)? For decades, the space economy supplied a lot of uncontroversial global public goods, such as basic science and astronomy data, space situational awareness, and space debris mitigation. On the other hand, we have military surveillance and strategic deterrence, or even building an offensive potential (e.g., anti-satellite weapon--ASAT). Such activities support national security. However, they raise controversies and the fear of an increased risk of global conflict. While they could be perceived as desired goods from the national security perspective (public goods), from the broader global perspective, they are not socially desired (if one could imagine such an abstract construct as a global society). The issue is, however, that there is not a global state yet; thus, there is no organized will for such an abstract construct in the form of a global government. There are also public goods somewhere between these two categories, such as Global Navigation and Timing (GNSS) or space debris active removal. They are both dual-use and dual-scope. Normally, they are very helpful public goods supplied globally. However, they could switch in the case of conflict and become military-use national public goods.