## 1 Introduction  
While there are economic benefits to developing countries from infrastructure projects implemented under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there are perennial concerns such as the expansion of China's economic and geopolitical influence, economic security vulnerabilities, debt-trap diplomacy, socially inefficient compensation rates to landowners, the insufficient engagement of local stakeholders, the halting and cancellation of infrastructure projects, and questionable labour and environmental standards. Additional concerns that are rarely discussed in the literature but are of immense importance are the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) issues and the challenge of using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in developing countries ([PERSON] & [PERSON], 2020). The conflict between demands for consumption and growth and demands for a higher quality of life is central to every case of NIMBY. NIMBYs are becoming more and more widespread in recent times due to rising affluence, greater educational opportunities and higher literacy rates, wider information dissemination, globalisation, the distrust of governments and private corporations, the increasing demand for energy, and the expansion of facilities to meet economic growth objectives. Even before any of the available conflict resolution instruments are used for NIMBYs, projects need to be assessed through properly tuned and adapted valuation techniques of CBA. CBA is meant to provide a systematic evaluation based on economic principles, along with transparency and accountability. Taking into account both tangible and intangible benefits and costs, it includes environmental impacts, ecosystem goods and services, normative preferences and so forth. Expressing gains and losses using the measuring rod of money allows for comparisons with economic impacts. The fundamentals of CBA for both developed and developing countries are the same. However, in applying the principles, specific valuation techniques commonly used in developed countries are not as appropriate for developing countries. Labour, goods and financial markets differ between developing and developed economies, and these differences may result in erroneous CBA if certain valuation techniques are used. As such, these intricacies between countries are rooted in varying and unique preferences and needs for infrastructure among the developing countries. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the market for global and regional infrastructure initiatives is vast and it is quickly being filled with competitors. To counter or complement BRI cooperation, several alternatives to BRI have emerged including the Build Back Better World (B3W) in June 2021 (rebranded as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in June 2022), led by the U.S. and G7 partner countries; Global Gateway (GG), which was launched in 2021 by EU member states; Japan's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (POI), which was launched in 2015 as a key component of the broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) and was formalised in 2016; the Blue Dot Network (BDN), which was founded in 2019 by the U.S. in collaboration with Australia and Japan, providing a certification mechanism for PGII and FOIP; and the Three Seas (Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Sea) Initiative (3 SI) which was founded by 12 EU countries in 2015. While the empirical literature on infrastructure development has focused heavily on China's BRI, there remains limited systematic comparative analysis studies across the BRI and other emerging global and regional infrastructure initiatives. [PERSON] (2023) applies a geoeconomic framework based on [PERSON] and [PERSON] (2016) to compare the BRI, PGII, and GG across dimensions such as trade policy, investment tools, sanctions, energy, foreign aid, and cyber elements. [PERSON] and [PERSON] (2022) offer a more narrative-driven account of the competition and complementarity between the BRI and PGII in the Middle East, with a focus on financing models, institutional mechanisms, and development standards.