## 1 Introduction  
The digitization and networking of technical devices with each other and with the Internet is constantly increasing, which is shown by, e.g., the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices growing by 22% in 2022 [1]. IoT devices, which have multiple sensors, e.g., for light, voice, and temperature, make everyday life more comfortable. Beyond sensing the environment, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) can influence their environment using actuators and software. Such connected embedded systems are becoming more and more established in various areas, for example, smart grids, industrial process control, medical devices, robots, or vehicles [2]. Through networking and increasing amounts of software, simple embedded systems that solve dedicated individual tasks are becoming intelligent and autonomous systems in many areas. Examples of this are automated driving, surgical robots, flexible production plants, or energy management systems. Even if the devices of different industries have different networking standards, protocols, and basic software (e.g., operating systems), there are some commonalities concerning the core challenges in development. Especially, the design of the CPS's software architecture is a challenge. A design paradigm that is therefore becoming increasingly popular is the service-oriented architecture (SOA) [3]. Each function is a self-contained service with clearly defined interfaces, and the implementation is considered a black box from the external perspective [4]. Larger functions are developed by combining (\"orchestrating\") several services, which increases the degree of reuse of the software. A common factor of CPSs is the risk of cyber-attacks [5]. In addition to functional safety (protecting the environment from system failures), protecting systems from unauthorized access is a significant challenge. Especially in the case of medical devices, cyber-attacks can result in direct physical damage. As more and more medical devices are connected with each other and will become part of the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) [6], the risk of unauthorized access increases. Healthcare data in particular are valuable, with cyber-criminals stealing 707 million records worldwide in 2015 alone, and the healthcare sector accounted for 23% of attacks and nearly one-fifth of all data captured [7]. However, also in production plants or vehicles, human damage by vicious attackers should be taken into account. The best-known example in the vehicle sector is the so-called Jeep Hack [8], in which [PERSON] and [PERSON] gained access to the vehicle controls miles away via a fake mobile network. In the case shown, 1.4 million vehicles could theoretically have been driven into the road ditch remotely. The research for security measures for CPSs has gained interest in recent years. Especially measures that are well-known from traditional IT have been introduced to CPS research, e.g., firewalls, IDS, authentication, or encryption [5]. This is partially caused by CPS networks becoming more similar to IT networks. In the automotive [9] and medical sectors, for example, Ethernet technology was introduced in addition to the legacy bus systems, such as Controller Area Network (CAN). Another typical approach of medical device manufacturers as well as the automotive industry was \"security by obscurity\", which means the usage of proprietary security measures and protocols. This has been shown to be not sufficient, as adversaries always will be able to break into such systems [10]. Especially for the automotive domain, reverse engineering to understand and break proprietary protocols and software is possible for each and every car, because cars and car parts are freely accessible on the market. An approach, that is viable for every system, is to limit the functionality that can be invoked via the network interface [11]. However, according to [PERSON] et al.