## 5 Simulation Analysis
### Optimization Result Analysis
As a result, the distribution company can guide the output power of the RE by adjusting the purchase price, so as to reduce the peak-valley difference of the power load and reduce the peak-shaving pressure. Figure 7 shows a comparison of the peak-valley difference of the power grid load under different conditions. It can be seen from Figure 7, when there is no RE, that the peak-valley difference of the power grid load is 61 MW. When RE is directly connected to the grid, the peak-valley difference of the equivalent load taking the RE output into account is increased to 76 MW. However, when the RE company and BSS work together, the peak-valley difference could be reduced to 67 MW by adjusting the output of different time intervals in response to the purchase price of the distribution company. * Influence of the pricing strategy of the distribution company  
The RE company improves its earnings by shifting electricity from lower-price periods to higher-price periods. Therefore, the pricing of the distribution company's acquisition of the RE is very important. If the purchase price is unreasonable, it may lead to a further increase in the peak-valley difference of the power grid load. In order to analyze the impact of the distribution company's pricing strategy, we selected another pricing strategy shown in Figure 8. Contrary to the pricing strategy in Figure 4, the RE purchase price of the distribution company is 300 during the peak-load period and 900 during the valley-load period in Figure 8. Figure 9 shows the load curve under this pricing strategy. Since the purchase price of the distribution company is higher during the valley-load periods, the RE company will sell as much electricity as possible during these periods in order to increase revenue. As a result of this unreasonable pricing strategy of the distribution company, the peak-valley difference of the power grid load increases from 61 MW to 90 MW. It should be noted that the pricing strategy of the distribution company can also consider other goals, such as minimum load fluctuations. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Swapping Demand MWh** & **BSS Revenue V** & **Discharged Energy of BSS MWh** \\ \hline Case 1 & 51,851 & 45.1 \\ Case 2 & 58,671 & 30.5 \\ Case 3 & 58,539 & 14.0 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: The influence of swapping demand on BSS. Figure 7: The load curve under different conditions. * Influence of the RE production profile  
In order to prove that the proposed model is effective under different RE production profile, two cases are designed. Case 1: the RE production profile is shown in Figure 3;  
Case 2: the RE production profile is flat. The RE power is the average value of the power curve shown in Figure 3.  
Table 7 compares the revenue of the RE company and the BSS under the cooperative and non-cooperative models in case 1 and case 2. As can be seen from Table 7, the cooperative model proposed in this paper can generate higher revenue for the RE company and BSS, both in case 1 and case 2. As a result, the RE company and BSS have the motive of cooperation in both cases. On the other hand, the power profile of the RE in case 2 is flat, which is more consistent with the purchase price curve decided by the distribution \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l l l} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Scenario**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Cooperative Scenario**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Non-Cooperative Scenario**} \\ \cline{2-5}  & **Case 1** & **Case 2** & **Case 1** & **Case 2** \\ \hline Revenue of the RE company & \(\forall\)276,480 & \(\forall\)286,791 & \(\forall\)252,054 & \(\forall\)262,467 \\ Revenue of the BSS & \(\forall\)58,671 & \(\forall\)60,100 & \(\forall\)52,200 & \(\forall\)52,200 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 7: The revenue of the RE company and the BSS in different scenario. Figure 8: Price of electricity purchased by the distribution company. Figure 9: The load curve with different pricing strategy. company.