# Secure Aviation Control through a Streamlined ADS-B Perception System
## 3 Related Work
### ADS-B and ADS-B Vulnerabilities  
This subsection will showcase ADS-B and the evolution of the security threats it faces. First of all, [PERSON] and [PERSON] [11] used MATLAB (2021b) and software-defined radio (SDR) to transmit and receive signals on a frequency that is usually pre-specified, and they used a plane gadget radar as their aircraft to illustrate the first public ADS-B injection. This study emphasized how ADS-B, the newly adopted technology, faces multiple threats and vulnerabilities that must be addressed before deployment. Then, several studies focused on how low-cost equipment and technology could put aircraft in danger and cause devastating damage. So, in their research, [PERSON] et al. [12] devised a realistic jamming model and analyzed how it could affect aircraft surveillance. They presented how a top-tier jammer could affect and disrupt ADS-B signals and communications. They also showcased how attacks on ground stations are more menacing than attacks on aircraft because they are less costly to be carried out. [PERSON] et al. [13] also demonstrated a cost-efficient ADS-B attack costing around $300. They utilized Python as a programming language to perform ADS-B data encoding, HackRF as a radio frequency transmitter, and the message was received utilizing dump1090 with an RTL-SDR transceiver. Their main concern was to present the availability of such a low-cost attack setup and how it might motivate many attackers to perform malicious activity in the aviation industry. Moreover, the authors in [14] presented how a low-cost jammer can jam ADS-B communications. They jammed by creating an interfering signal in an ADS-B communication channel, which resulted in the original signal being fully or partially deformed. Another interference attack was performed by [PERSON] et al. [15]. This attack was executed by sending out fake signals. Their observations show that the interference caused an error rate of 32.39%, which is fairly high. They concluded that ADS-B is insecure and could be exploited by cheap and trivial technology. [PERSON] et al. [16] also presented how the attacks targeting ADS-B are low-cost and could yield a very high success rate. The authors transmitted fake signals and performed multiple attacks, such as ghost aircraft flooding, ghost aircraft injection, and ground sensor/station flooding. The outcome was that no critical air traffic control measure should be solely based on ADS-B data without being fully secure and prone to attacks. Other studies focused on how pilots and autopilots react to such misleading information an aircraft receives. Therefore, [PERSON] et al. [17] investigated how an injection attack could impact ADS-B messages; their main focus was testing how the autopilot responds to ghost aircraft injection. This type of attack shows an immediate and unexpected appearance of an aircraft (ghost aircraft) close to the responding aircraft. The misleading information had triggered the autopilot to turn to gain a safe route rapidly. According to the authors, this attack on ADS-B can affect pilots' decisions and other ground sensors, disturb air traffic, and hugely increase the rate of an aircraft collision. [PERSON] et al. [18] went on to test how humans would react to misleading and spoofed data; they chose 50 participants and tested their reactions while completing different tasks using a drone simulator. During their tasks, the attacker would send spoofed data of fake aircraft nearby to cause alteration in the drone's path and see how the pilot would react to such information. They gave interesting results from the perspective of having participants with multiple nationalities. However, their methodology still requires testing how an experienced pilot reacts to such false and misleading information. Another take was to perform other types of attacks rather than just jamming signals to see how reliable ADS-B is. In their research, [PERSON] et al. [19] analyzed an OpenSky sensor network in Europe with a distinct focus on the 1090 MHz channel.