# Analyzing Port State Control Data to Explore Future Improvements to GMDSS Training
## 1 Introduction
This area must be at least reliable and effective to actively collaborate in safety, and this can only be achieved when the Officer of the Watch (OOW) in charge of communications reaches a level of experience that allows them to adequately operate and manage the station. In recent decades, the role developed by technology in radio communications for navigation safety has been notable [30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 35]. The present study focuses precisely on maritime communications and the problems detected during PSCO inspections on board ships. A look back at the past attests to the IMO's continued concern for safety based on radiocommunications. Unfortunately, many of these advances have been motivated by accidents with catastrophic consequences. It should not be forgotten that the first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914, in response to the Titanic disaster, and whose consequences on onboard communications related to distress represented a qualitative leap. The latest revolution resulted in the creation of a global emergency system, which encompasses the International Convention on Search and Rescue (SAR) and the automation of radio communications through the implementation of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). It should be taken into account that the automation of certain communications processes (transmitting and receiving distress alerts, continuous watching, etc.) is achieved by applying digital techniques to traditional equipment (VHF/MF/HF) as well as to the newest satellite communications systems (INMARSAT and EPIRBS). It was in February 1999 when the GMDSS definitively came into force, forcing passenger and cargo ships over 300 gross tons (GT) to comply with the requirements of international radiocommunication regulations [36]. The main objective of the GMDSS is to alert search and rescue authorities on land, as well as vessels close to the maritime incident, in the shortest possible time to receive the necessary help without delay. The system also provides not only distress, urgent, and safety communications but also commercial and routine communications. To this end, SOLAS contemplates the minimum equipment required for ships depending on the maritime areas where they carry out their activity. The entry into force of the GMDSS implies the non-obligation of the Radioelectronic Officer on board, in charge of radio communications, maintenance, and repair of the equipment. Both the IMO and the ITU, aware of the importance of the tasks and jobs entrusted to the radio officer, established in the amendments to the SOLAS Convention that ships required to comply with the GMDSS should have trained personnel, in accordance with the following:  
* International Convention on STCW Chapter IV Section IV/2;
* SOLAS 2014, chapter IV, article 16, personal radio;
* European Radiocommunication Committee articles 9 and 10. Therefore, SOLAS establishes that ships, depending on the area in which they navigate, must comply with the maintenance requirements described in the Rules of Part C of Chapter IV 15.6 and 15.7, as well as that both Captain and Deck Officers have the necessary training that allows them to fulfill the functions of the GMDSS, following IMO Resolution A.703 (17) and A702 (17) [37; 38]. For this purpose, both the GMDSS General Operator Certificate (GOC) and the GMDSS Restricted Operator Certificate are issued by the National Maritime Administration. There are some maritime incidents whose outcomes (whether positive or negative) have been influenced by radio communications, which justifies the importance of the study even in the era of satellite communications. There are many examples, but one of the most striking of the current century is the Costa Concordia (a cruise ship). In 2012, the accident investigation revealed that the chain of communications during the accident was not very orthodox. First, a passenger called the Italian Coast Guard, and then the Coast Guard contacted the captain of the ship. So the delay implied that the evacuation began one hour late.