# An Integrated Testbed for Power System Cyber-Physical Operations Training
## 6 Conclusions  
The paper presents insight into the intrinsic correlation between the physical and cyber elements of the electric power system. With the current widespread use of IEDs to support power system operation and the advancement of fast communication protocols and control actions, cybersecurity is critical to ensure reliability. However, to ensure security, it is first necessary to understand the malicious behaviors and their impact on the system's performance. This study proposed and developed a complete cyber-physical testbed, with a focus on teaching and training industry professionals on different CPS aspects. The testbed was designed to demonstrate cyber vulnerabilities by simulating different cyberattacks in real-time power system models and actual IEDs. Different operational scenarios were developed and tested under different types of cyberattacks to analyze the response and performance of the system under intrusions. The specific outcomes of these operations scenarios are:  
* A protection study on the distribution system was carried out to demonstrate the operation of protection devices and the SCADA system.
* A DOS attack for a wired network and the jammer attack for a wide-area wireless network on a wind farm SCADA operation with the demonstration of node failure and missing packets was carried out.
* The manipulation of phasor signals showed how data from PMUs at remote locations can be manipulated to interrupt wide-area system monitoring.
* The final module on wind power plant operation showed the impact of false data injection in control variables and a DOS attack on wind turbine actuators. Results were observed as the misguided SCADA operation was reflected by loss of generation at a larger scale.
* Using secured broadcasting capable of detecting DoS and jamming mechanisms will aid in the design of highly resilient SCADA systems for emerging smart grids that can mitigate cyberattacks while achieving high-level availability.  
The proposed modules provide vital insights into information security management, secured communication architecture, system and device security, and software-based attestation. However, the initial assumption was made that the cyber intruder was already within the control network without stating how the intruder gained access to the network. The study also lacks a description and analysis of defense mechanisms. However, further research can be carried out to develop and test cyber-mitigation algorithms using the existing testbed. The testbed also provides flexibility to add the concept of software-defined networking, machine learning for attack detection, adaptive defensive strategies, port management, password rotation, etc. This testbed has already been used to train more than 100 students and industry professionals over 2 years through a Texas Workforce Grant, and it is expected that the development of this testbed will support and encourage advancements in training, teaching, and developing CPS solutions in other institutions. Moreover, the testbed also provides an interoperable platform to implement and test different industry-standard cyber-physical security solutions.  
Conceptualization, M.C. and R.B.; methodology, R.B. and K.S.; software, R.B.; validation, R.B., K.S. and M.C.; formal analysis, R.B., K.S. and R.S.; investigation, R.B. and K.S.; resources, R.S.; data curation, R.S.; writing--original draft preparation, R.B.; writing--review and editing, M.C. and K.S.; visualization, K.S.; supervision, S.B. and M.C.; project administration, S.B. and M.C.; funding acquisition, S.B. and M.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.  
This research was funded by the Texas Workforce under the Wagner Peyser Program, award number W912 HQ20C0022.