## 5 Analysis of HWMP Security Protocols
### Ibc-hwmp, ECDSA-hwmp and Watchdog-hwmp  
Ben-Othman _et al._ proposed IBC-HWMP [16] and ECDSA-HWMP [31]. The MAC address is used as the identity for all mesh STAs in the IBC-HWMP. For the two proposed schemes, a private key is used to sign the MF of PREQ and PREP such that the authentication and the integrity of the MF are protected. Public keys are distributed to verify signatures. The identity based signature scheme and ECDSA are used to generate the signature for IBC-HWMP and ECDSA-HWMP, respectively. The digital signature on the broadcasting PREQ message can cause a lot of message drops if the mesh node cannot process the signature verification at line speed. Furthermore, to implement the ECDSA-HWMP, the mesh network system must transmit the digital certificate to the signature verifier and maintain the revocation list of the nodes' certificate, which requires the third trusted certificate authority (CA). In wireless mesh network, the implementation of CA is impractical. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c} \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Frame**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Field**} & \multirow{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{c} **Authentication** \\ **and integrity** \\ **(Point-to-to-point)** \\ **point)** \\ \end{tabular} } & \multirow{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{c} **Encryption* \\ **(Point-to-to-point)** \\ **(End-to-end)**} & \multirow{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{c} **Integrity** \\ **(End-to-end)**} & \multirow{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{c} **Anti-** \\ **replay** \\ **scheme** \\ \end{tabular} } & \multirow{2}{*}{\
\begin{tabular}{c} **Root** \\ **Permission** \\ **Level** \\ \end{tabular} } & \multirow{2}{*}{
\begin{tabular}{c} **Forgery** \\ **Detection** \\ **Method** \\ \end{tabular} } \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{PREQ} & HDR & No & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & MF & Yes & No & - & - & No \\ \cline{2-8}  & NMF & No & Yes & No & No & No & - \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{RANN} & HDR & No & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & MF & Yes & No & - & - & No \\ \cline{2-8}  & NMF & No & Yes & No & - & No & - \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{PERR} & HDR & No & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & MF & No & No & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & NMF & No & No & No & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & HDR & No & - & - & - & - & - \\ \cline{2-8}  & MF & Yes & No & - & - & - & No \\ \cline{2-8}  & NMF & No & Yes & No & - & - & - \\ \hline \end{tabular}
* indicates optional requirements.  
\end{table} 
Table 11: Analysis of the security services provided by SHWMP based on the security service requirements. The authors also suggested that the MF should be observed to detect illogical changes [32]. This scheme to detect illogical changes is called a Watchdog-HWMP. Figure 13 shows an example of this MF forgery detection method. The example starts with A broadcasting a PREQ frame to its neighbors. When B propagates the PREQ to C, A should capture this frame and observe the changes to the MF. When A first broadcasts the PREQ frame, D, E, and F propagate the PREQ frame as well. A must therefore capture all PREQ frames propagated by its neighbors and compare them with the original PREQ. This means that all mesh STAs must keep information on the PREQ frames they have transmitted and compare them with all PREQ frames propagated by their neighbors. Because the non-mutable field is a major target for internal attacks, illegal modification or creation in this field must be detected or prevented. Inclusion of the monitoring of message drop into watchdog processing is recommended. The security services provided by IBC-HWMP are listed in Table 12. IBC-HWMP does not explain how to protect RANN and PERR, nor does it have end-to-end and point-to-point authentication and