# Analysis of Security Issues and Countermeasures for the Industrial Internet of Things
## 5 Discussion and Future Research Direction
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline
**IIoT Architectural Layer** & **Security Issues** & **Potential Countermeasures** \\ \hline \multirow{8}{*}{Perception} & Attack on Physical Devices & The devices’ hardware must be checked and evaluated frequently [140]. In addition, the hardware components should meet the standard (e.g., NIST, FIPS, etc.). \\ \cline{2-3}  & Impact on Devices’ Performance & Employment of identity/based trust management model for trusted data sharing is beneficial [143]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & \multirow{2}{*}{Impact on Devices’ Performance} & Mobility-aware policy-based security techniques, e.g., Quantum Lifecycle Management (QLM), can be employed [144], and IP-based security management protocols that are usable to a distributed system can be used for achieving end-to-end encryption [145]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Cross-Domain Jurisdictions & Privacy-preserving authentication and data control schemes can be employed for cross-domain jurisdictions [147]. \\ \hline \multirow{8}{*}{Network} & Controlling Over Communication & An attack-resistance trust-management-based routing protocol can be employed for a reliable trust relationship [149], and a context-aware, secure multi-hop routing protocol can also be employed [150]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Infecting Data Packets & Intrusion detection system (IDS)-based security architecture can be used [152]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Flooding Attacks & Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques can be placed [153]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Heterogeneity of Networks & A privacy preserved access control protocol can be employed [154]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Non-Trusted Network Connections & A secure mobile handshake mechanism that verifies insecure mobile nodes over an insecure channel using attribute-based encryption matching handshaking scheme can be used [156]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Dynamic Infrastructure & A lightweight and end-to-end security mechanism with less overheads, e.g., [157], can be used. \\ \hline \multirow{8}{*}{Support} & Flooding Attacks & A light weight security and privacy enhanced middleware infrastructure can be employed [158]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Impact on Devices’ Performance & A secure and dynamic trust-management system based on a dynamic trust management protocol can be used [159]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Device Impersonation & An attribute-based signature scheme that supports user’s privacy can be employed [160]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Data Confidentiality & Policy-based access control mechanisms e.g., [161], can be enforced. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Heterogeneity of Networks & A privacy-preserving access control protocol can be employed [154]. \\ \cline{2-3}  & Cascading Services & A hierarchical access control model, e.g., [162], can be exercised for resource-limited devices. \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Identified security issues and their potential countermeasures in different layers of an IIoT architecture. The IIoT is an integration of different technologies at scale, and therefore it is significant to capture various aspects from data processing to storage within the infrastructures. However, making a seamless integration between the various services coming from many devices and infrastructures is a challenging task [175]. Moreover, these control processes, monitoring, and management services create several security issues of privacy, identity, and trust. Our study identified potential security concerns related to the heterogeneous infrastructure, anonymity, or even cascading services. To gain more fine-grained control over security and trust management, recent trends in security mechanisms are employing blockchain-based security solutions for IIoT systems [176; 177; 178]. Blockchain originated as a tool for developing crypto-currency (a new form of virtual currency) [180]. Blockchain is used for transactions to be verified with a group of actors that are not trusted.