## 5 Structure
SpaceX re-flow a previously used booster the following year, proving that reusability could work in practice. This innovation slashed launch costs substantially. The cost of launching Falcon 9 is USD 2600 per kilogram of payload, which is less than 5% of the space shuttle cost [38,70,71,78,79,80,85]. Falcon 9 became the workhorse of contemporary spaceflights, accounting for around half of them (Figure 5). Thanks to its first-stage reusability, SpaceX undercut traditional launch providers like American ULA (United Launch Alliance) and European Arianespace, which had long dictated prices for the Western countries' customers. Those customers face entry barriers if they would like to buy launch services from the rapidly developing launching sector in China. Consider American regulations like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) established during the Cold War, which made space trade not available to \"U.S. enemies and their fellow travelers\" [87] (p. 9). Since the late [PERSON] administration, the possibility of using Chinese or Soviet launch vehicles became allowed, and since [PERSON], licensing under ITAR was moved to the U.S. Department of Commerce. However, in the mid-1990s, China experienced a few failures in launches, some of which involved US-built satellites being destroyed, with the most notable accident being that of a Chinese rocket carrying an American Intelsat 708 payload that failed. After the subsequent Cox Commission report was completed in 1998, licensing under ITAR went back to the Department of State, with the primary role of the Department of Defense. As a result, space trade with China was quashed [87; 88]. For a few years, the situation was leveraged by European Thales Alenia Space. Between 2005 and 2012, this company used Chinese rockets to launch so-called ITAR-free satellites successfully. However, this collaboration ended in 2013 when a U.S. company was fired for selling ITAR-controlled components, prompting Thales Alenia to discontinue its ITAR-free satellite line [87; 89; 90]. Satellite operators from Western countries looking for bargain offers could still deal with Russians (e.g., Soyuz and Proton rockets). However, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and EU on Russia in 2014, following its annexation of Crimea, have indeed narrowed the path to Russia's orbital launch market, and after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they closed it definitively. Therefore, ITAR and sanctions lead to a bifurcated market, prioritizing geopolitical control over open competition (according to [PERSON], the opportunity cost of ITAR restrictions for the U.S. space companies was around USD 2.35 billion for the period of 2003-2006 [88] (p. 22)). This situation solidifies U.S. dominance in the space sector by segmenting the global market, thus resulting in the reliance of Western countries on U.S. or allied (France, Japan) launch providers to avoid legal risks. These barriers, combined with the bargain price of launching, created an opportunity for SpaceX to expand its market share (Figure 5). The company capitalized on this shift by increasing its launch capabilities. By doing it, SpaceX not only secured more contracts  
Figure 5: Number of global and SpaceX orbital launches since the first launch of Falcon 1. Source: own based on [4; 6; 86]. but indeed opened the door more widely to the New Space transformation in the satellite segment of the space economy. Since the emergence of Falcon 9, the number of active satellites has accelerated exponentially (Figure 6). The most momentum of this growth was added by the so-called SmallSat (Figure 7). Although typically defined by mass, small satellites lack a universal subdivision standard, and different sources use varied mass ranges. Here, the FAA classification [92] will be used combined with Bryce Tech's approach [93]. According to the FAA, small satellites are defined as between 601 and 1200 kg [92] (p. 94). Here, they will be called small satellites sensu stricto.