###### Abstract
Therefore, it is of immense importance to explore the implementation of spoofing and the subsequent power control problems for receivers in the acquisition phase. Some scholars conducted research on the necessary conditions for successful spoofing. In 2014, [PERSON] et al. discussed the effective implementation of spoofing, which requires a 5 dB jamming-to-signal ratio to ensure that the receiver acquires the spoofing signal during the acquisition phase [9]. In 2015, [PERSON] and others adjusted the spoofing power in real time, while realizing the traction of the receiver acquisition loop, noise floor was limited to 3 dB, and the maximum spoofing signal-to-noise ratio was limited to 22 dB, thereby achieving a continuous effective spoofing [10]. In 2016, [PERSON] et al. categorized spoofing into acquisition phase and tracking phase, it is believed that in the acquisition phase, if receiver has not locked signal, spoofing can be successfully implemented as long as the spoofing signal power is greater than the authentic signal power [11]. Additionally, avoiding spoofing detection is also a problem that needs to be studied [12]. In 2012, [PERSON] believed that because spoofing signals can raise the noise floor of the receiver, the receiver can detect and identify spoofing signals more effectively by measuring the absolute power of correlation peak than by monitoring technology. In 2013, [PERSON] and others proposed that in the signal acquisition process, if the peak of the spoofing signal and authentic signal exceeds 1.5 chips, the correlation function will have multi-peak characteristics [13]. In 2014, [PERSON] et al. used the Monte Carlo experiments to verify that the carrier frequency difference is extremely large in the process of acquiring the spoofing signal and authentic signal under the specific receiver phase locked loop parameter setting, causing the receiver to loss of lock [14]. Some scholars also studied the implementation methods of spoofing. In 2018, [PERSON] and others studied spoofing algorithm, through theoretical analysis, it was confirmed that for the acquisition phase, the algorithm of suppressing and spoofing needs to be adopted [15]. There are also some spoofing detection methods, such as the method of measuring the total signal energy based on spoofing signal and authentic signal proposed by [PERSON] et al. [16]. However, when the phase difference and Doppler frequency difference between the spoofing signal and authentic signal are small, the spoofing detection performance deteriorates, and for multipath signals, the spoofing detection performance also deteriorates. [PERSON] et al. used the unencrypted IRIDIUM Ring Alert (IRA) message broadcast by IRIDIUM satellite to detect spoofing [17]. [PERSON] et al. proposed a low complexity strategy for detecting intermediate spoofing attacks based on Neyman Pearson theory [18]. [PERSON] et al. proposed a spoofing detection method using two antennas, which can detect a single spoofing signal or spoofing signals from multiple directions. However, for dynamic scenes, the spoofing detection value is unstable [19]. Obviously, any spoofing detection technology is difficult to detect all spoofing methods, and our research focuses on the design of spoofing signal power to avoid the related power detection techniques as much as possible. Navigation security, or GNSS security, like renewable energy, has attracted more and more attention [20; 21]. Currently, there is limited research involving GNSS spoofing signal power control, and there is no systematic complete power control scheme, most of which is limited to qualitative or simulation, and the actual application effect is still unclear. It is of immense importance to explore the implementation of spoofing and the subsequent power control problems for receivers in the acquisition phase.