# A Hybrid Key Generator Model Based on Multiscale Prime Sieve and Quantum-Inspired Approaches
## 8 Discussion on Security Implications of Optimised Quantum Key Generation Algorithms  
Quantum key generation algorithms must balance efficiency and security. Speed and entropy are important, but variations can also affect quantum security guarantees, particularly from security threats. Let us now evaluate the impact of our optimisations on security. 1. Security of the ultra-optimised QRNG. Summary: it directly produces decimal digits (0-9) instead of converting them from binary; it optimises the uint8 data type for low memory usage and better performance; since the QRNG uses classical pseudo-random number generation (np.random.randint), it does not use quantum principles, which could reduce security guarantees; Unlike hardware-based QRNGs that rely on quantum noise or quantum vacuum fluctuations, the current implementation is purely computational and therefore vulnerable to predictability in some cryptographic applications; classic pseudo-random generators can be initialised and potentially reconstructed if an attacker knows the initial state of the system. True quantum randomness is necessary for cryptographic key security in applications such as quantum cryptography and QKD. To further improve security, we could replace np.random.randint() with a hardware-based quantum random number generator (e.g., quantum optics or radioactive decay). True quantum randomness is necessary for the security of cryptographic keys in applications such as quantum cryptography and QKD. To improve security, we could replace np.random.randint() with a hardware-based quantum random number generator (e.g., using quantum optics or radioactive decay). 2. Optimised QKD security (BB84). Summary: the use of the uint8 data type for faster speed and lower memory overhead; simplified bit-matching process to generate keys faster. Quantum security guarantee: The BB84 protocol, when used correctly, is unconditionally secure against classical attacks; the additional security of quantum key distribution is computationally independent of assumptions, meaning that even quantum computers cannot break it. Device-specific attacks: side-channel attacks: realistic QKD systems are vulnerable to detector imperfections (e.g., photon number splitting attacks). Man-in-the-middle attacks: if the attacker can influence the channel (e.g., by introducing leaks or noise), then they will attempt to read information from the quantum states. 3. Optimised Schrodinger key generation security. Summary: reduction in grid points from 100 to 50 to improve computational efficiency; Quantum robustness: this algorithm is based on the eigenvalues of a quantum system, which remain unguessable due to the collapse of the wavefunction; The eigenvalues retain their intrinsic randomness, making them more secure than classical PRNGs. Numerical approximation risks: Reducing the grid points can affect numerical accuracy and introduce distortions in key generation. If the attacker is aware of the approximation model, then they may be able to attack weaknesses in the distribution of eigenvalues. Instead of reducing grid points, use parallel computing via GPU acceleration to provide security without performance degradation. The solution was achieved through a non-trivial use of the potential within the Schrodinger equation to make it impossible to predict eigenvalues. 4. Security of optimised quantum simulation key generation. Summary: reduction in quantum states from 100 to 50 to improve computational efficiency; Quantum probability security: the approach is based on the probabilistic results of a simulated quantum system, which makes it impossible to predict the keys; the randomness of the wavefunction offers protection against classical computational attacks; Simulation-based vulnerabilities: an attacker who knows the parameters of the quantum system could recreate the wavefunction and predict the keys. The pseudo-randomness of quantum simulation can introduce potential deterministic patterns.