## 1 Introduction
This flaw likely affected all the commercial platforms using this implementation, including Google, Microsoft, and AWS [8; 18; 19]. In this regard, the scientific community has been actively working on proposing solutions to enhance the security of virtual TPMs. Most of these studies focus on integrating the vTPM with the platform's physical TPM [5; 6], implementing hardware-independent certification authorities (CAs) [5; 15], and exploring Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [11; 20]. These proposals generally prioritize confidentiality, suggesting approaches to specifically protect TPM keys. Approaches that anchor the vTPM to the physical TPM have the advantage of establishing a hardware-based root of trust. However, these approaches require the presence of a TPM chip. In the event of a host machine failure or during the migration of the vTPM instance to another host, the recovery or re-establishment of the anchoring process can be complex since the vTPM is directly linked to a physical TPM. Another relevant aspect in cloud computing environments is the migration of virtual machines, a widely adopted practice due to various benefits, such as the dynamic reallocation of VMs, optimization of physical resource usage, cost reduction, and maximization of performance and profit. However, during migration, it is necessary to ensure that vTPM data are transferred securely and consistently, as well as to re-establish the chain of trust in the new environment. According to [PERSON] et al. (2006) [5], the migration of the virtual TPM must ensure that any state of the vTPM instance in transit is not subject to modification, deduplication, or any other form of compromise. Such guarantees are challenging to achieve. Additionally, the requirement for a TPM chip limits its applicability in scenarios where not all the nodes have this component. Virtual machines utilizing vTPMs are often found in large-scale infrastructures, such as those in data centers. These environments are typically distributed and heterogeneous. In this context, standardizing hardware requirements can present a significant challenge. Moreover, in certain situations, this diversity can be advantageous as it eliminates the need to equip all the devices with every available technology, which can be costly. Instead, more expensive resources can be selectively implemented, reserved for specific demands that truly require such advanced capabilities. Moreover, over time, data centers have evolved to adopt hyperconverged infrastructure (HCI), which integrates computing, storage, and networking resources into a single solution. While traditional data centers rely on separate components for each function--leading to increased complexity and management costs--HCI simplifies the infrastructure by consolidating everything into a unified platform. The adoption of technologies such as server virtualization, software-defined storage (SDS), and software-defined networking (SDN) within hyperconverged architectures has further accelerated this transition. However, in emerging technologies, the initial focus is often on automation, deployment, and performance rather than on designing robust security mechanisms. In this context, it becomes more convenient to rely on traditional tools for system protection. Nevertheless, many security products were not designed with HCI in mind, lacking the flexibility and capability to extend and prevent malicious activities across all the levels and types of resources within the infrastructure. Therefore, security in the realm of hyperconvergence still requires significant exploration [21]. While HCI aims to integrate resources into a cohesive infrastructure, its security must also be integrated and comprehensive to effectively protect the platform. Thus, security in HCI is just as vital as the unified and comprehensive nature of the platform itself.