# Is Malware Detection Needed for Android TV?
## 2 Related Work  
A very extensive body of literature on the topic of Android security exists. However, the security of Android devices other than smartphones has received very limited attention in the literature. [PERSON] et al. [21] introduced the ImposTer framework for simulating a smart home environment and monitoring the behaviors of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. ImposTer aims to identify privacy breaches and security risks by replicating the conditions of a smart home and examining diverse IoT devices within the network. The results of their analysis reveal that many devices pose privacy risks as a result of using network scanning and discovery methods. This framework presents an opportunity to refine and expand the development of more accurate and comprehensive black-box testing mechanisms specifically tailored to IoT devices. However, some limitations of this study exist, such as challenges in both static and dynamic analyses, shortcomings in the network monitoring capabilities, the necessity for a deeper understanding of the device discovery mechanisms, and the assessment of the effectiveness of various countermeasures. [PERSON] et al. [22] assessed the vulnerabilities in WiFi remote control protocols to address the security risks associated with the increasing prevalence of smart TV devices. Their study analyzed four major smart TV platforms, namely Android TV, Amazon Fire OS, Roku OS, and webOS, and identified significant security breaches in these platforms. This research demonstrated the impact of these security weaknesses by developing a malware named Spook, specifically targeting Android TV devices. The findings were communicated to relevant vendors, prompting partial patches from Google. Nevertheless, this research argues that these patches inadequately fulfill the envisioned security requirements for WiFi remote control protocols, emphasizing the necessity of a more resilient solution. They have proposed an alternative defense mechanism by designing a WiFi remote control protocol within the Android ecosystem using ARM TrustZone. This proposed solution aims to ensure security while preserving the flexibility of virtual remote controls. This study explores the root causes of the security challenges in smart TV environments, discusses alternative defense strategies, and makes a significant contribution to the field. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [23] delve into a comprehensive analysis of the Android TV ecosystem for potential privacy threats based on a dataset of over 4500 TV applications. They reveal that static identifiers for tracking persist despite Google's new policies, as well as potentially harmful behaviors often linked to tracking and advertising services. The static analysis, network traffic collection, and manual analysis results of their study expose privacy-invasive practices, obsolete communication APIs, and insecure coding practices among developers. However, there are some limitations in their study, such as certificate-based identification challenges and the omission of dynamic elements from the static analysis. They conclude that improved development practices, guidelines for porting mobile applications to the Android TV platform, and improved user interfaces to provide better control over app permissions are needed for a more secure and privacy-aware Android TV ecosystem. [PERSON] et al. [24] chose 3163 Android TV applications from the Google Play Store and shared the SHA-256 checksums of these applications publicly. They extracted the unique package names of the applications from the Androzoo [20] dataset and filtered the TV applications by searching for the package names and capabilities of the applications on the Google Play Store. They analyzed the VirusTotal scans, requested permissions, security flaws, and privacy leaks of the applications. They observed 299 unique TV-specific permissions which contained the \"tv\" keyword. They found out that 119 applications declared the same permission more than once, an indicator of application repackaging.