# Review of Physical Layer Security in 5G Wireless Networks
## 3 Literature Review
Physical layer security can directly secure the transmission of sensitive data or even support cryptographic encryptions in the 5G network. [PERSON] et al. [18] examine the privacy presentation of the traditional Wyner's wiretap ideal, which models the central and eavesdropper networks consuming a flexible and all-purpose fading model. A proposed model to improve conservation privacy in contradiction to snooping in wireless message networks is physical layer security (PLS). The typical privacy aptitude and confidentiality outage possibility have new and precise expressions. Furthermore, the resulting results can also be used to analyze the privacy view of specific topic dimensions (such as those in millimeter tendency transformations), which could not be completed using the earlier findings. In the active eavesdropping scenario of the ASC Analysis, node B has access to occupied channel state info mutually for the central and eavesdropper stations. To learn more about the ASC, asymptotic analysis is employed. This study is conducted on behalf of the ASC's presentation in the great transfer SNR command, supposing that B = E. As a result, we can see from Figure 3 that there is no enhancement in ASC through increasing transmit SNR. Similar to this, the ASC improves when it is decreased from 1 to 0.7 for =2, =0, and =p. In Figure 4, they match the SOP for various values of E and Rs = 1 as a function of B. The graphic illustrates how the SOP declines as the eavesdropper SNR, E, rises as in figure Figure 5.  
[PERSON] et al. [19] explored that due to the substantial amount of accessible bandwidth at mm-wave frequencies, millimeter layer (mm-wave) transportations have drawn interest as a feasible method for sustaining exponentially rising data rates in 5G. One of the most important elements in the success of 5G is communication. The PHY security in mm-wave conservations through FTR vanishing channels is examined in-depth in this study. The PHY refuge examination for mm-wave transportations has extensively used [PERSON]'s wiretap model. The FTR channel model includes ground reflections in mm-wave channels and features two inconsistent specular constituents with variable stages in addition to a verbose element. In terms of straightforward functions, they originate systematic equations on behalf of the SPSC, ASC, and SOP that can rapidly and progressively congregate with as rare as N expressions as necessary to achieve the requisite precision. The research confirms that by raising the ordinary SNR of the core channel or lowering the middling SNR of the observer station, the performance of the system under consideration can be enhanced. Additionally, the observer network's light surveillance will raise the SPSC. Regarding up-to-date and upcoming instructions, it would be interesting to look into how well mm-wave communications perform in terms of PHY security by considering more useful network and structure functions such as impasses, structure, and multi-antenna. [PERSON] et al. [20] analyze different characteristics intended for the enhancement of the Medium Access Control (MAC) and the expansion of a robust locked communication solution. There are conference chores in which the Dueck proof of identity strategy is significantly further effective rather than [PERSON]'s communication pattern, such as in the resulting generation linking systems that trust on reliable and lesser invisibility material sharing. The illogically changing bug frequency (AVWC), which simulates cramming assaults and offers a programming technique for safe proof of identity and figuring out the AVWC's mystery volume, is the main focus of this article. We also examine this capacity function's crucial characteristics, such as steadiness and super complexity. These characteristics are crucial for the optimization of the Medium Access Control (MAC) and the expansion of a robust refuge communication solution. [PERSON] et al.