## 5 Secure Integration in the Smart Grid (SG) Network  
Integrity refers to preventing unnoticed alteration of information by an adversary while secure integrated communication allows a reliable and efficient real-time control and information exchange. In the SG and V2G networks, various modules and entities communicate with each other. Thus, the integrity of information and secure integration among the various modules of these networks are essential. It is important to understand the different directions and areas of integration in the SG network to securely integrate various SG entities. These integrations in the SG can be the technology integration [102], data integration [103], Internet-of-things (IoT) integration [104], customer-oriented integration [105], renewable generation integration [106], SOA-based smart grid integration architecture [107], secure integration of the home energy management system to the battery management system [108], _etc._  
There have been some standardization efforts for secure integrations in the SG. The IEC 61850-80-4 standard defines a one-to-one mapping of the IEC 62056 object identification system (OBIS) codes to the logical nodes for seamless integration [109]. The objective is to expand the availability of meter information to other smart grid applications defined within the IEC 61850 framework. [PERSON] _et al._[110]examined that the implementation of advanced control capabilities in the integration of IEC 61850 devices from different suppliers within the substation as well as integrating IEC 61850 with other types of protocols are presented, but still require information to be available in a timely manner for making decisions. It is also challenging to properly integrate these large applications from different vendors, each with a different method of implementing IEC 61850 in their devices, to an upgraded platform. There are also some integration issues due to redundant GW. Similarly, the industrial challenge is to develop more comprehensive common information model (CIM) that covers majority of the utility requirements for the integration. Current CIM Interoperability tests demonstrate how multiple vendors can interoperate using CIM compliant integration only with limited functionality [111]. In summary, the integration software must support device independence and should be user friendly. Some secure integration approaches have also been proposed by researcher community. In this direction, a secure integration approach was presented by [PERSON] _et al._[112] in which smart meters with communication ports for third party integration can share the data at the same time to both local building management system and the utilities. Further, feasible technical solutions are proposed by [PERSON] [113] related to the data format translation from legacy data into CIM-based data, security concerns between different applications with time consistent constraints. However, a detail analysis of these solutions is needed. Recently, [PERSON] _et al._[108] discussed secure integration of HEMS that supports Ethernet to the battery management system to support controller area network (CAN). Generally, most of the adversaries in the SG network target the private user information and network management information. In this direction, various researchers either introduced new attacks or evaluated the overall integrated system. In 2009, [PERSON] _et al._[114] introduced a new attack, called false data injection, to the monitoring center in order to compromise SMs. Then, [PERSON] _et al._[115] introduced a model that evaluates various control methods, transient responses, and overall dynamic behavior of the system using the network of SMs. [PERSON] _et al._[116] system architecture focused advanced technologies that can be deployed towards secure integration in the SG network. Further, [PERSON] _et al._[117] analyzed the effects of bulk energy generators, distributed energy resources, and storage devices on power grid based on power cumulative cost and service reliability.