# Analyzing Cyber-Physical Threats on Robotic Platforms +
## 2 Related Work  
Recently, the studies on the cyber-security aspects relate to the robotic platforms or cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have received extensive attention by the research community with numerous published articles and Special Issues targeting this subject (e.g., Special Issue on cyber-security in robotics and autonomous systems in Elsevier [6] and Special Issue on Safety, Security, and Rescue Robotics (SSRR) in the journal of Field Robotics in Wiley). Most of the studies focused on how to have a safer and more secure robotic systems by addressing one or more of the following issues:  
* identification of possible security and privacy threats against many modalities of robotic systems;
* evaluation of impact of the identified threats in a systematic manner; and
* prevention and mitigation of the threats. The answers to the aforementioned issues altogether are known in the literature as security risk assessment. In fact, the security risk assessment on the robotic platforms is an active and rapidly growing research area due to its increasing significance. Despite that, the number of publications addressing risk assessment on the robotic platforms is limited, and several articles stated that security risk assessment tends to be an overlooked issue in robotic systems [15]. The main reason is that the focus is commonly placed in robot functionality, design and innovation. Further, there is inadequate understanding of what are the actual risks and the affected security goals [19]. Next, we present a thorough summary from literature about some of the studies that targeted security threat analysis and detection for several robot platforms or CPSs. [PERSON] et al. [20] analyzed the quality of different communication solutions used in robotics, when security features are enabled. The authors analysis focused on robotic applications that are based on distributed middleware and transmitted regular robotic data packets of different sizes on various network settings. The analysis results showed that the communication quality in terms of latency and packet loss rate is acceptable; hence, the authors recommended that security capabilities should be enabled in common cases. [PERSON] et al. [21] proposed an experimental approach to assess the efficacy of cyber-attack detection methods when applied to robotic platforms. To evaluate their approach, the authors used the educational robots, AmigoBotsTM, and applied three cyber-attacks (i.e., injection, stealthy, and scaling) and seven sensor attack detection methods. The evaluation results indicate that M1 and M5 are most effective for detecting cyber-attacks on AmigoBots. [PERSON] et al. [14] presented a secure communication channel that enables ROS-nodes to communicate with authenticity and confidentiality using cryptographic methods (Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)). The authors described the implementation changes to ROS core and assessed the overhead introduced by embedding the new security functions. They provided their implementation source code to the Open Source Robotics Foundation (OSRF) for consideration to be included in the SROS project [22] and ROS 2.0. In [23], [PERSON] et al. presented the most common security vulnerabilities of ROS and gave examples of attack vectors that can easily exploit vulnerabilities. Moreover, the authors proposed an application-level approach that helps to secure small ROS applications by securing all communication channels without being invasive to the ROS source code. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [13] performed a formalized and structured forensic investigation of ROS. They focused on creating a formalized and analytical framework to acquire related digital evidence after a forensic investigation of cyber-crimes such as that of ROS. [PERSON] et al. [24] focused on cyber-security attacks that target Real Time Location Systems (RTLSs), which are critical components for many robots and autonomous systems.