# Consumer Preferences for Wood-Pellet-Based Green Pricing Programs in the Eastern United States
## 4 Results and Discussion
### Paired Estimates for BWS
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & **Alabama** & **New Jersey** &
\begin{tabular}{c} **New York** \\ **Coeff (Std Dev)** \\ \end{tabular} & **Pennsylvania** & **Virginia** & **Pooled States** \\ \hline \multicolumn{6}{c}{**Attribute impacts**} \\ LC & 0.139 (0.093) & \(-\)0.131 (0.094) & 0.424 (0.095) *** & 0.299 (0.095) ** & 0.341 (0.095) *** & 0.213 (0.042) *** \\ VP & 0.328 (0.094) *** & 0.071 (0.095) & 0.478 (0.095) *** & 0.324 (0.095) *** & 0.519 (0.096) *** & 0.342 (0.042) *** \\ FC & 0.238 (0.086) ** & 0.063 (0.087) & 0.279 (0.087) *** & 0.202 (0.087) ** & 0.403 (0.087) *** & 0.235 (0.039) *** \\ LC & 0.348 (0.087) *** & 0.350 (0.089) *** & 0.534 (0.088) *** & 0.429 (0.089) *** & 0.556 (0.090) *** & 0.440 (0.040) *** \\ RC & 0.970 (0.094) *** & 1.215 (0.096) *** & 1.186 (0.094) *** & 1.375 (0.097) *** & 1.544 (0.097) *** & 1.249 (0.043) *** \\ \hline \multicolumn{6}{c}{**Level scale values**} \\ M6 & \(-\)0.559 (0.091) *** & \(-\)0.516 (0.092) *** & \(-\)0.270 (0.091) *** & \(-\)0.656 (0.093) *** & \(-\)0.577 (0.093) *** & \(-\)0.510 (0.041) *** \\ M12 & 0.308 (0.091) *** & 0.448 (0.092) *** & 0.338 (0.091) *** & 0.477 (0.093) *** & 0.449 (0.093) *** & 0.400 (0.041) *** \\ FP & \(-\)0.875 (0.088) & \(-\)1.075 (0.090) *** & \(-\)0.859 (0.089) *** & \(-\)1.376 (0.090) *** & \(-\)1.110 (0.090) *** & \(-\)1.051 (0.040) *** \\ FS & 0.187 (0.088) & 0.319 (0.089) *** & 0.101 (0.089) & 0.359 (0.089) *** & 0.273 (0.090) *** & 0.247 (0.040) *** \\ NOPEN & 1.081 (0.074) *** & 1.214 (0.076) *** & 0.967 (0.074) *** & 1.555 (0.076) *** & 1.310 (0.075) *** & 1.216 (0.034) *** \\ INSTATE & 0.761 (0.075) *** & 0.527 (0.077) *** & 0.508 (0.074) *** & 0.814 (0.077) *** & 0.704 (0.077) *** & 0.659 (0.034) *** \\ MED & 0.450 (0.090) *** & 0.292 (0.090) *** & 0.325 (0.089) *** & 0.398 (0.092) *** & 0.299 (0.091) *** & 0.346 (0.040) *** \\ HIGH & 0.541 (0.091) *** & 0.677 (0.091) *** & 0.427 (0.089) *** & 0.691 (0.092) *** & 0.551 (0.091) *** & 0.574 (0.041) *** \\ USD 10/MWH & \(-\)1.530 (0.104) *** & \(-\)1.346 (0.106) *** & \(-\)1.345 (0.105) *** & \(-\)1.683 (0.107) *** & \(-\)1.714 (0.106) *** & \(-\)1.512 (0.047) *** \\ USD 20/MWH & 1.046 (0.104) *** & 1.098 (0.106) *** & 1.057 (0.105) *** & 1.355 (0.107) *** & 1.413 (0.108) *** & \(-\)1.183 (0.047) *** \\ USD 30/MWH & 0.456 (0.104) *** & 0.453 (0.107) *** & 0.587 (0.104) *** & 0.601 (0.107) *** & 0.633 (0.106) *** & 0.541 (0.047) *** \\ \hline No. of observations & 72,000 & 72,000 & 71,970 & 72,000 & 71,970 & 359,910 \\ No. of respondents & 400 & 400 & 400 & 400 & 400 & 2000 \\ Log likelihood & \(-\)7421.826 & \(-\)7421.826 & \(-\)7711.252 & \(-\)7355.097 & \(-\)7421.699 & \(-\)37,670.374 \\ \hline \multicolumn{6}{c}{*** indicates significance at 1% level, *** indicates significance at 5% level. Note that the attribute REC and attribute levels (M24, F10, FEN, OUTSTATE, LOW, USD 40/MWH) were the omitted/baseline variables.} \\ \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: Paired model conditional logit parameter estimates for hypothetical biomass GPPs. to the other attributes applied in their study. Other studies [31; 46; 57; 58] show that low enrollment rates to GPPs can be attributed to deterrent premiums. The level scale value for the flexibility of contract (FC) attribute was positive and statistically significant for both the state-wise and pooled estimates, indicating that respondents support GPPs with no penalties (NOPEN). This outcome was expected given that penalties detract customers from enrolling onto GPPs. Across all Eastern states, having an open agreement with no penalties held the most value in a consumer's choice to support a GPP. This finding is critical for developing an acceptable GPP; however, it does cause complications for the GPP provider. If the GPP provider were to not include a breach of contract penalty, it could lead to high participation with low retention.