# Data Element Sharing in Convergence Media Ecology Based on Evolutionary Game
## 3 Data Element Sharing Model Based on Evolutionary Game
### Basic Assumption  
In order to construct a three-party game model in the convergence media ecology and analyze the game strategy of all parties, the stability of equilibrium points and the influence of each factor on the game results, the following assumptions are made by comprehensively considering the node characteristics in the ecology:  
Figure 4: Data element sharing node relationship. 1. Node-wise finite rationality. The business organization node, common user node and regulator node are all limited and rational subjects. 2. Policy space (\(S\)). All three parties of the evolutionary game are users in the convergence media ecology. The policy space of the business organization node \(S_{B}\) = {positive data element sharing, negative data element sharing}, the probability of the business organization node to positively participate in data element sharing is \(x\); the policy space of the common user node \(S_{U}\) = {participate in data element sharing, not participate in data element sharing}, the probability of the common user node participating in data element sharing is \(y\); the policy space of the regulator node \(S_{R}\) = {regulate data element sharing, not regulate data element sharing}, and the probability of the regulator node participating in data element sharing regulation is \(z\). In order to facilitate the research, this paper regards the business organization node, common user node and regulator node as a whole, respectively. 3. Participation cost (\(G\)). In the process of data element sharing, nodes need to pay a certain cost, which includes but is not limited to data, time cost of content production, labor cost, economic cost of data abuse, etc. In this model, the positive sharing cost of business organization nodes is denoted as \(G_{11}\), and negative sharing costs are denoted as \(G_{12}\); the cost of common user nodes participating in sharing is denoted as \(G_{2}\), and the cost of not participating in sharing is 0; and the cost of regulation carried out by the regulator node is denoted as \(G_{3}\), and the cost of not regulating is 0. 4. Benefits of participation in sharing (\(E\)). When the business organization node chooses to positively share data elements and the common user node chooses to participate in data element sharing, the node will receive sharing revenue. The business node is mainly generated by sharing its own data element with other nodes, mainly determined by the value of the shared data element and unit price; the common user node is mainly generated by the revenue generated by consumption after obtaining the data element, which depends on the value of shared data element, the value transformation ability of data element and the sharing revenue coefficient of data element. In this paper model, \(E_{11}\), \(E_{12}\) represent the revenue of positively participating in sharing and the revenue of negatively participating in sharing of business organization nodes (\(E_{11}>E_{12}\)), and \(E_{2}\) represents the revenue of common user nodes participating in sharing. When the business organization node is positively sharing, and the common user node is participating in sharing, it will promote the harmonious development of ecology, and the two parties will have collaborative benefits \(H(H>0)\). 5. Dynamic incentive benefits (\(I\)). In the media ecology, in order to encourage nodes to participate in data sharing, dynamic incentive rewards are given to participating nodes, and the size of incentive value is positively correlated with node credit C and node sharing participation \(P\). In this model \(I_{1}\) and \(I_{2}\) are the dynamic incentive benefits of business organization nodes positively participating in data element sharing and common user nodes participating in data element sharing. 6. Regulatory benefits (\(R\)). The basic revenue generated by the regulator node choosing to regulate the ecological node is \(R\).