# Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Generation Groups Considering Energy Price Fluctuation
### Main Work and Innovations  
Where coal-fired generation capacity can meet load requirements and natural gas prices are higher than coal, it is not appropriate for the gas-fired generation to enter the market and bid for the same, making it act as a peaking unit or participate in the ancillary services market is the solution to maintain stable system operation and facilitate market balancing. As new coal-fired units are banned, and more and more coal-fired units are due to be taken out of service, it is reasonable for gas-fired units to enter the market and take on the task of supplying electricity when coal-fired generation capacity cannot fully support the electricity load. The main work of this paper is to deduce the conditions under which the primary energy price ratio between natural gas and power coal can be set to meet the market equilibrium and not push up the market price of electricity when coal-fired generation cannot meet the load demand; otherwise, the market equilibrium can be achieved, and the stability of electricity price can be maintained by setting separate bids for coal-fired generation groups. In terms of the organization and structure of this paper, an evolutionary game model for the group of power producers under the influence of multiple factors is firstly developed. Secondly, the cost of electricity generated by the group of power producers under the fluctuation of primary energy prices, including the cost of electricity generated by coal and the cost of electricity generated by gas, is analyzed. Then, the multifactor game analysis and the dynamic evolutionary game analysis of the group of power producers under the influence of energy price fluctuations are studied. Finally, a simulation is carried out to analyze the price fluctuations in the energy market and the cost of electricity and to analyze the bidding game of the group of power producers considering the fluctuations in primary energy prices. This paper discusses the application of the evolutionary game model to the simulation and analysis of generation-side bidding dynamics in the electricity market. The evolutionary path and game equilibrium of the evolutionary game under multiple scenarios and multiple initial conditions are discussed. The focus of this paper is not on proposing new bidding strategies but on simulating the game equilibrium of the market as a whole when market players adopt different bidding strategies, to determine whether the declared electricity on the generation side of the market and the declared electricity on the consumer side are in balance. Based on the classical evolutionary game model in Ref. [11], the contribution of this paper is to model the bidding problem for different types of generating units in the electricity market and then perform a swarm simulation using the evolutionary model theory, which extends the application of evolutionary game models in complex environments and analyses the game paths and game equilibria in multiple scenarios. The paper designs and validates the electricity market bidding mechanism based on the evolutionary game path and evolutionary game results. Construction of Evolutionary Game Model of Power Generator Group under the Influence of Multiple Factors  
In the electricity market, the power generation group participating in the bidding game sets the bidding strategy according to the power generation group's primary energy price, power generation efficiency, market supply and demand, and other factors. The subjects of the bidding game all show bounded rationality, which will be affected by incomplete transaction information and the limited thinking of market transaction participants. With the fluctuation of natural gas and thermal coal prices in the primary energy market, coal-fired and gas-fired power generation groups will adjust their bidding strategies according to their respective power generation costs to maximize revenue as much as possible. Power producers purchase gas or coal from the primary energy market for storage for power generation.