# An Intrusion Resistant SCADA Framework Based on Quantum and Post-Quantum Scheme
## 7 Conclusions  
We have proposed a collision and preimage resistant framework for ensuring SCADA system security. SPHINCS-256, a post-quantum algorithm, provides \(2^{128}\) security against a quantum threat. However, researchers have increased the efficiency and speed of quantum algorithm based on [PERSON]'s algorithm, which reduces the post-quantum security from \(2^{128}\) to \(2^{119.6}\) in a quantum setting. Therefore, we proposed to use B92, a quantum key distribution protocol, to obtain the cipher and a quantum random number generator to generate a truly random number for the HORST secret key used in SPHINCS-256. We have formally verified our proposed scheme by using PRISM and Scyther. We conclude that with the number of qubits, the probability of detecting intruder [PERSON] increases exponentially, decreasing the likelihood of information leakage. Furthermore, B92 is more likely to detect [PERSON]'s presence in case of a Random-Substitute attack than an Intercept-Resend attack. We validated our hypothesis by simulating our proposed scheme and performing statistical analysis. We analyzed the randomness of RSA, ECDSA keys used in AGA-12 against the randomness of the quantum key used in our proposed algorithm. We observe that keys generated by QKD satisfy 100% of the NIST randomness tests, unlike RSA and ECDSA keys. RSA private key passed 90%, and ECDSA keys passed 96% of the tests. We also performed a comparative analysis between two algorithms, SPHINCS-256 with Chacha-12 and SPHINCS-256 with QRNG. We observe that the Quantum Random Number \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline \multirow{3}{*}{**Algorithms**} & **Public Key** & **Private Key** & **Raw Key** & **Final** & & & **Percentage of** & \\  & **Size** & **Size** & **Size** & **Size** & **Size** & **Size** & **Passed** & **Passed** & **Execution Time/** \\  & **(bits)** & **(bits)** & **(bits)** & **(bits)** & **(bits)** & **(mean)** & **NIST Randomness** & **Time Complexity** \\ \hline RSA & 1041 & 2048 & N/A & N/A & No intrusion detection & Private key: 92\% Public key: 98\% & O (\(n^{2}\)) \\ \hline ECDSA & 384 & 192 & N/A & N/A & No intrusion detection & 96\% & O (\(n^{3}\)) \\ \hline  & & & & & & & \(d2^{h/d}\) OTS key generations \(d2^{h/d}\) + 2 PRF calls. \(d2^{h/d}\) + 1 PRNG calls & \\  & & & & & & & \(d2^{h/d}\) + 2 PRF calls. \(d2^{h/d}\) + 1 PRNG calls & \\  & & & & & & & & \(2t\) + \(d\)(( 1 (w+1))\) \(2^{h/d}\) - \(J1\) hashes & \\  & & & & & & & \(98\%\) QRNG: 100\% & QRNG : \(O\)(\(nlogn\)) in classical hardware. \(O\)(\(1\)) in quantum hardware. \(O\)(\(1\)) in quantum hardware. \(\mathrm{Public Key Generation}\): 160 \(\mathrm{\SIUnitSymbolMicro s}\) & \\  & & & & & & & & Public Key Generation: 238.89 \(\mathrm{\SIUnitSymbolMicro s}\) & \\ \hline  & & & & & & & \(d2^{h/d}\) OTS key generations \(2^{h/d}\) + 2 PRF calls. \(d2^{h/d}\) + 1 PRNG calls & \\  & & & & & & & & \(d2^{h/d}\) + 1 PRNG calls \\  & & & & & & & & & \\  & & & & & & & & & \\  & & & & & & & & & \\  & & & & & & & & & \\  & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 9: Synthesis of comparative analysis of the proposed algorithm, RSA, ECDSA and SPHINCS-256. Generator passes all the statistical tests for randomness, unlike Chacha-12 PRNG. However, in computational hardware, the computation cost of our proposed SPHINCS-QRNG is higher than that of AGA-12 and the existing SPHINCS-PRNG algorithm. Thus, we conclude that there is a trade-off between security and computation cost. Our proposed framework, using true random numbers based on uncertainty and quantum superposition principles, provides more resistance than AGA-12 and SPHINCS-256 against quantum and classical threats. Moreover, as part of future work, we will propose a quantum-resistant encryption algorithm and compare it with various encryption algorithms to obtain a more effective cipher for the SCADA security framework. S.G.: conceptualization, formal analysis, methodology, writing--first draft; M.Z.