## 2 Literature Review  
Conducting \"a systematic literature review and bibliometric analysis of the available academic research studies in the discipline of maritime cybersecurity\" [PERSON] et. al. note that with an increase in publications beginning in 2017, this field of research has \"only recently received appropriate attention\" and that the broad themes of the published academic literature to date include \"the regulatory framework in connection to maritime cybersecurity, the vulnerabilities in maritime systems, potential cyber attack scenarios, and risk assessment techniques\" [5]. [PERSON] et. al. further conclude that the leading countries publishing in this field are \"Norway, the United Kingdom, France and the USA\" [5] indicating a lack of analysis from other areas such as Asia and Africa. As such, this study, which focusses on a specific geographical region in Southeast Asia, the SOMS, provides a novel perspective on the themes of regulatory frameworks, and threat analysis. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [6] provide a systematic literature review of Port Facility Cyber Risk Management and highlight a range of International Standards Organisation (ISO), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) approaches to cyber risk management in ports. [PERSON] et. al. [7] examine penetration testing of an Integrated Navigation System (INS) and identify technical vulnerabilities and \"point out cyber threats related to weaknesses of the INS underlying operating system, suggesting a need for occasional preventive maintenance\". As such, the focus of this and many other papers identified by [PERSON] are operational or technical in nature. Of the \"few identified studies\" [5] that focus on maritime law and insurance framework studies identified in the literature review from [PERSON], [PERSON] et. al. [8] identifies \"there is still no proper legal mechanism for regulating cybersecurity due to the lack of universal approach to the conceptual apparatus of cybersecurity and international cooperation in this area\". [PERSON] recommends \"a robust and well-defined \"code\" that broadens and concretises a \"new\" concept of maritime safety in the broad sense\" [9]. [PERSON] and [PERSON] argue the case for \"a standalone Cyber Code\" under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) noting \"it is often a specific newsworthy event, or disaster, which acts as a catalyst for discussion and change within the IMO\" citing the Titanic disaster of 1912 and the Deepwater Horizon explosion of 2010 as two notable examples leading to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and \"the instigation of numerous amendments to IMO regulations relating to oil spills\" [10]. Multiple sources, summarised below, have discussed hybrid vulnerabilities within the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) and the potential for a catastrophic attack and disruption to global supply chains. The complex \"system of systems\" [11] that comprises the global Maritime Transportation System (MTS) is critical to the smooth running of global trade and commerce. In the words of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it is \"the backbone of international trade and the global economy\" [12]. As is often noted in discussions around maritime security and \"sea blindness\" [13], \"around 90% of traded goods are carried over the waves\" [14]. If the MTS were to suffer a catastrophic breakdown it could potentially result in severe disruption to global supply chains and concomitant economic, political, and social disorder. Key stakeholders are now beginning to understand the MTS's growing dependence on complex digital and automated systems [15; 16; 17], and the vulnerabilities of those systems to malicious cyber-physical interference [18] capable of causing a catastrophic collision or simultaneous cascading disruption to fleets of ships, or a major port. The pursuit of enhanced efficiency, decarbonisation, cost reduction, and improved safety necessitates technological solutions.