# Deep Learning-Based Symptomizing Cyber Threats Using Adaptive 5G Shared Slice Security Approaches
## 2 Materials and Methods
### Multi-Tier Approach for Placement of vCTS Module  
Transport layer security (TLS) and IP firewalls do not offer complete protection from intrusions. Assuring a security level where data cannot be breached requires fine-grained multi-tier security, where SLA can be employed safely at the access to core levels. A KPI  
Figure 4: CTS module analysis flow-chart.  
-based defense mechanism is a novel approach for deploying security modules, as depicted in Figure 5. The proposed defense system design is based on the 5G-SBA data analytic service \"NWDAF\". In a shared slice environment, virtualized (vNWDAF) can be used as a data analyzer with associated VNFs, which provides the ability to collaboratively work with third-party NFs. This ability of vNWDAF provides an advantage when coupling vCTS security modules to a slice in a shared environment. This approach allows an operator to query an event analysis using vCTS to examine intraslice data activity through VNFs communication on a shared slice. vCTS deployment at this level not only provides NetFlow monitoring but also raises an alarm or identifies symptomized suspicious activities in real-time. Additionally, it enables the safety of core slices and their associated NFs, particularly when these are shared with the tenants during SLA compliance. Shared services can be endangered via third-party network services in a virtual environment. The tenant can use both 5G and third-party wireless services. The compromised third-party services used by the legitimate 5G user can expose 5G slice services or cause bottlenecks or halt the network. Compromised 5G slice services can be dangerous to other 5G slices. However, we have outlined this novel challenge using predefined KPIs for the vCTS module deployment at logically demarcated PoPs on the 5G architecture. For cyber threat symptomization, the CTS module is placed as virtualized security scanner for data analysis on the 5G network:  
* Intra-slice (NFs): the CTS module behaves as a core security scanner as NF and can demand the event analysis from 5G NFs.
* Core filter (backhaul): the CTS filter can monitor the backhaul channel between the core and edge depicting the main to regional topography of the 5G system.
* Slice filter (front-haul): at this level, the CTS acts as a slice security scanner to safeguard individual slices with a distinct slice-ID.
* Inter-slice filter (multiple slices): inter-slice filtering is applied across 5G slices, where each slice is monitored by individual vCTS to safeguard from compromised tenants (using third party network services).  
The novelty of our approach is to enhance security at 5G verticals in contrast to past efforts based on physical rather than virtual infrastructure, which only deals with security at the RAN level. The deployment of the CTS module not only at the 5G RAN level but to promote the strategy from access to core level using the advantages of the SDN-NFV plane to initiate a security module on demand with multi-tier scanning capabilities in 5G communication channels in virtual slices (shared twins) in virtualized environments based on proposed KPIs.