## 1 Introduction  
With the mounting surge in the number of devices connecting to mobile networks, particularly within the realm of 4G networks, there is an ever-growing strain on network capacity. This challenge has spurred the imperative for network densification and the emergence of novel technologies like 5G to accommodate the escalating number of subscribers within the network ecosystem [1].  
In line with the observations presented in the Cisco Internet Annual Report [2], the forecasted volume of devices connected to IP networks is poised to surpass three times the global population by the year 2023. By 2023, there will be 3.6 network devices per capita, a substantial increase from the 2.4 network devices per capita recorded in 2018. Consequently, the global count of network devices is projected to surge to 29.3 billion by 2023, rising from 18.4 billion in 2018. This rapid expansion is underscored by the estimation that machine-to-machine (M2M) connections will account for half of all globally connected devices and connections by 2023, translating to 14.7 billion M2M connections.  
This seismic trajectory in mobile technology growth coincides with the advent of the 5G mobile network, a pivotal juncture that is exerting significant stress on network capacity. The advent of 5G technology constitutes a monumental leap forward in the capabilities of mobile networks, ushering in opportunities for a plethora of new use cases that were previously inconceivable with 4G technology. This remarkable stride has the potential to stimulate substantial economic growth for businesses across various domains. The far-reaching applications of 5G encompass realms such as industrial management,telemedicine (including remote surgical operations), IoT-equipped self-driving cars, smart city infrastructure, and much more.  
In light of these compelling dynamics, the imperative to safeguard the security of the entire 5G infrastructure becomes paramount, necessitating rigorous testing and scrutiny of the novel features introduced by this groundbreaking mobile standard.  
Developed under the aegis of the Third Generation Partnership Project (3 GPP), the 5G standard has been meticulously designed to rectify the vulnerabilities inherent in its precursor, 4G. This new standard incorporates more rigorous constraints to fortify user traffic and enhance end-user security. Nonetheless, it is imperative to recognize that while the 3 GPP imposes stringent rules governing network design and functionality, the responsibility for implementing security measures ultimately rests with 5G vendors and Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). This underscored dependence implies that network security can only be assured through the proactive engagement of MNOs in adopting and enacting suitable security protocols.  
In addition to the shifting paradigm brought about by the introduction of Network Function Virtualization (NFV), where dedicated hardware devices are being supplanted by software-based solutions deployable on generic servers, the relevance of adhering to secure development practices takes center stage. The adoption of practices such as establishing a continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipeline and leveraging code testing tools becomes paramount. These measures ensure the robust security and vulnerability-free nature of the functions deployed within the network architecture, especially as the landscape transitions towards software-oriented solutions.  
This paper is motivated by the need to critically examine and experimentally analyze the security vulnerabilities of two prominent open-source 5G projects, Open5 GS [3] and the Open-Air Interface (OAI) [4], within this rapidly evolving landscape. The selection of these two frameworks takes into account their popularity. Indeed, they are used in different large testbeds for experimentally testing alternative deployment architectures and new services and protocols [5].