## 3 Related Work
The report critiques simple pseudonym modifications' vulnerability to pseudonym-linking attacks and ineffective defense. This leads to an evaluation of pseudonym-changing tactics. A successful VANET pseudonym-changing strategy remains unsolved despite these efforts. A complete assessment and classification of pseudonym-altering tactics is provided in the paper, along with important criteria. Additionally, it illuminates current research activities, open difficulties, and future research objectives. [PERSON] et al. [2] discusses the complex issues of security and privacy in VANETs, especially in ITS. It shows how VANETs' decentralized design can jeopardize location privacy and secrecy, especially when trusted third parties (TTPs) are unavailable or corrupted. Reusing digital signatures or certificates across communications makes VANETs vulnerable to linking attacks. They noted that many VANET systems fail to balance security, location privacy, and efficiency. The protocol lets vehicles conceal their private certificates for communication outside mix-zones and create an anonymous shared key using zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The protocol functions without Roadside Units or Certificate Authorities, allowing secure operation outside mix-zones. An ideal/real simulation paradigm verifies protocol security, ensuring authentication, forward unlinkability, and accountability. Their performance analysis showed that the suggested protocol outperformed previous systems in computational and communication efficiency. Modern cars have sensors for collision avoidance, automatic lane tracking, and semiautonomous driving, which improve the driving experience and offer a variety of services to drivers and passengers. Despite these advances, VANET acceptance depends on resolving privacy, authentication, and secure data dissemination. Research has focused on these difficulties because of their importance. The research work in [36] discusses these fundamental VANET difficulties and reviews solutions offered over the previous decade to address them. The article also indicates outstanding concerns, suggesting VANET research areas. In [41; 42; 43; 44], the authors investigate the feasibility of electric vehicle (EV) self-sovereign decentralized identity system implementation in great detail. Essential terminologies such as EVCC, SECC, OEM, and EVSE were defined by them. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was highlighted as crucial to automotive cybersecurity, with digital certificates playing a key role in facilitating safe communication between various parts of a vehicle. It resolves issues with communication and charging for electric vehicles caused by incompatibilities between two ISO standards (i.e., 15118-2 and 15118-20) [45]. They also detailed the cryptographic methods and X.509v3 certificate specifications that are required by ISO 15118-20. They also highlighted the need for strong security measures by shedding light on possible dangers to smart car GPS systems and Electronic Control Units. An extensive section is devoted to outlining a privacy-preserving architecture for electric vehicle charging and communication using Self-Sovereign Decentralized Identity (DID) and Verifiable Credentials [24]. Among these were the charging process workflow, the responsibilities of different parties involved, and the use of blockchain technology to provide a safe, decentralized identification system for electric vehicles. Finally, they proposed both software and hardware ways to secure cryptographic keys utilized in EVs, stressing the fundamental need for doing so. With an emphasis on cyber security, standardization, and blockchain applications, they provided a thorough review of the problems and possible solutions associated with implementing decentralized identification systems in the electric vehicle industry.