## 2 Background and Related Work  
The privacy of network subscribers can be compromised if their IMSI are stolen. Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the most common attacks against subscribers. In mobile communication networks, MitM employs an RBS when a malicious third party Base Station (BS) masquerades as a legitimate network BS. DDoS attacks may involve implanted malware to simultaneously reboot all UEs in a target 5G coverage area at the same time. This may result in excessive malicious connection requests, constructing a storm of signalling to overload 5G RAN resources. Such an attack makes the RAN unavailable to legitimate subscribers [6; 16]. Mutual authentication between an LTE network's Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and the UEs is regarded as the primary technique for protecting privacy in the security architectures of pre-5G cellular networks. The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure is applied to achieve mutual authentication and generate a ciphering key to protect the encrypted data and an integrity key to derive session keys for signalling integrity. Although this method has provided a multitude of benefits, it cannot completely eliminate the risk posed by RBS attacks [17; 18]. 5G uses two mechanisms to boost subscriber privacy. The first mechanism encrypts a long-term identifier to prevent stingrays and IMSI catchers [19]. 5G networks exploit the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) rather than the IMSI as well as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to encrypt the SUPI into the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI). Furthermore, 5G changes subscribers' short-term identifiers frequently. Both techniques have already significantly improved resistance to RBS attacks in 5G networks compared with previous standards [20]. **Other Related Work. ** The most recent review of current technologies and open communication difficulties focused on 5G data transmission between BSs and V2X, as well as challenges of RBS attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) security [21; 22]. We report on security issues for V2X scenarios, and synthetic data generation, and delineate the various RBS schemes in the 5G environment [23; 24; 25; 26]. The authors of [27] present an RBS detection approach to prevent violation of the consistency of RSS reports in WiMax/802.16 wireless access networks. In this technique if a RBS is present in a network, anomalies in the RSS reports received by mobile stations (MSS) can be observed. For LTE and 5G technologies, their methods are not robust. In [28], the authors described an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect anomalies and identify RBS through data traffic. Their mechanism searches for false data such as emergency messages injected into the traffic data and informs the local administrator of their existence before destroying them. Their method has two limitations. First, their model only tests for the synthetic and static data traffic in a centralised BS and secondly, the designed IDS suffers from a lack of control of BS and the handover process. Both are addressed in this work, which considers multiple instances of BS and RBS as well as a simulated handover. Some solutions have mainly concentrated on large-scale RBS detection. For example, ref. [29] introduced a large-scale RBS detection mechanism to discover and control misbehaving traffic among UEs, especially for IoT devices demanding limited resources. This strategy was mainly tested using synthetic dataset and was unable to monitor previously received signals at each BS. In addition, the authors in [30] developed a shadow fading mechanism to check large-scale suspicious synchronization signal strength and region-matching criteria on a BS in an LTE system. Their method does not address IoT devices and platooning applications in a 5G environment. In [31], the authors presented an RBS metric mechanism compatible with GPRS to detect interventions by malicious intruders in 3G (UMTs) and 4G (LTE) communications.