## 7 Results and Discussion  
The proposed protocol is simulated using Network Simulator-NS3. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 4. The performance and efficiency of the pro bounded HTCCR protocol are analyzed and compared with those of the proposed TBSEER ([PERSON] et al. (2021) [17]), CTRF ([PERSON] et al. (2023) [21]), and TAGA ([PERSON] et al. (2022) [20]) algorithms. The following parameters are analysed: PDR, average delay, overhead, average energy consumption, packet loss ratio (PLR), end-to-end delay, average throughput, and detection ratio. Figure 7 shows the delay involved in forwarding the data packet from the source to the sink. It is obvious that the propounded HTCCR protocol involves the least delay when compared with the benchmarked TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA protocols. The proposed HTCCR protocol involves 2.5, 2.3, and 1.7 times less delay compared with the TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA protocols, respectively. Figure 8 depicts the detection ratio of the proposed HTCCR protocol in a network scenario open to anomalous attackers. It is assumed that the number of attackers snooping data packets is nearly equal to the number of attackers furnishing forged information. The existing TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA schemes are capable of dealing with partial attacks, and hence maintaining security is tedious. The proposed protocol is efficient in identifying malicious nodes in the network. It offers an 18.1%, 12.5%, and 5.5% better detection ratio compared with the standard protocols investigated in this study. Figure 9 shows the amount of energy consumed during node failures. It is seen that the HTCCR protocol outperforms \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l} \hline \hline
**Parameter** & **Value** \\ \hline Simulator & NS-3.25 \\ \hline Topology & Random node positioning with a mobile sink \\ \hline Number of nodes & 500 \\ \hline Size of the packet & 3000 bits \\ \hline Size of the control packet & 300 bits \\ \hline Initial energy & 0.5 joules \\ \hline Eelec, Etx, Erx & 50 nJ/bit \\ \hline Rounds & 1200 \\ \hline Trust threshold & 0.5 \\ \hline Protocols considered & HTCCR (proposed), TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA (Existing) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 4: Simulation parameters. Figure 7: Average delay for a varying percentage of malicious nodes. the standard protocols considered in this study. The proposed protocol involves 2.9, 2.6, and 1.8 times less energy when compared with the benchmarked schemes. With an increase in the number of malicious nodes, the packet loss ratio (PLR) increases (Figure 10). The proposed HTCCR protocol is found to offer standard performance even when malevolent nodes are observed in the network. It is obvious that the proposed protocol involves a 2.2, 1.9, and 1.5 times lower PLR compared with the standard TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA protocols, respectively. The PDR decreases with an increase in the number of malevolent nodes. Figure 11 shows the PDR of the proposed and standard schemes considered in this study. It is evident that the HTCCR protocol offers a 14.5%, 10.5%, and 5.2% better PDR in comparison to the TBSEER, CTRF, and TAGA protocols, respectively. Figure 11: Packet Delivery Ratio for Varying Percentage of Malicious Nodes. Figure 12: Throughput for Varying Percentage of Malicious Nodes. Figure 10: Packet Loss Ratio for Varying Percentage of Malicious Nodes. Figures 14 and 15 show the impact of traffic rate on the end-to-end delay and throughput of RT and NRT packets. The average packet delay is the average time necessary for forwarding a packet to the sink from the source. As seen in Figure 14, the delay is directly proportional to the traffic rate, as increasing the PDR produces increased queuing delay. RT packets involve less delay in comparison to NRT packets for varying levels of traffic congestion. The HTCCR protocol involves 4.1% less delay for the 'C1' and 'C2' RT packets as it forwards packets in a pre-defined time before NRT data.