# SLMAS: A Secure and Light Weight Mutual Authentication Scheme for the Smart Wheelchair
## 2 Literature Review  
Numerous authentication mechanisms have been researched in the literature since [PERSON] [17] introduced the first authentication mechanism in 1981. [PERSON] et al. [18] presented an efficient two-factor authentication system for WSN in 2009. Afterwards, [PERSON] et al. [19] and [PERSON] et al. [20] observed that [PERSON] et al.'s technique is prone to impersonation, offline password-guessing, and insider attacks. Later, they also suggested a different plan to address the security challenges with the [PERSON] et al. scheme.  
[PERSON] et al. [21]'s physical unclonable functions (PUF) design uses logic circuits' built-in latency to verify the authenticity of integrated circuits. A PUF circuit that provides privacy-protected verification among a server and limited devices was created by [PERSON] et al. [22]. On the verification side, [PERSON] et al. suggested a technique replicating a PUF circuit [23; 24]. Regarding passive devices such as radio-frequency identification (RFID), this study combines the authentication procedures presented in [25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 32]. Although the suggested techniques offer physical-level protection, they are frequently challenging to apply in an IoT environment, because an authentication server stores many challenge-response pairs (CRPs).  
The technique proposed by [PERSON] et al. [33] that used an ECC-based user authentication scheme was deemed insecure against impersonation assaults by [PERSON] et al. [34]. Additionally, [33] has large communication and computational overheads. An approach centered on IoT-based cloud systems was presented by [PERSON] et al. [35]. This method is, unfortunately, susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM), impersonation, privileged insider, and replay attacks [36].  
User authentication and key agreement mechanisms for various WSN and IoT networks were proposed by [PERSON] et al. [37]. [PERSON] et al. [38] found some flaws with this method and exposure to impersonation attacks and offline password-guessing attacks. In the meantime, [PERSON] and [PERSON] used a lightweight user authentication scheme, whereas [PERSON] and [PERSON] [39] demonstrated this as unsafe against privileged insider attacks. In addition, another novel technique for user authentication and key agreement was suggested by [PERSON] et al. [40]. This technique was discovered to be susceptible to various attacks, including offline password guessing, user impersonation, and attacks on sensor nodes [41]. A minimalist key management authentication technique ideal for Internet of Things deployment was developed by [PERSON] et al. [42]. This method offers faster and more efficient connection using the xor operation and a one-way cryptographic hash mechanism.  
Different authentication methods were studied by [PERSON] et al. [43] with two different classifications. Additionally, they investigated the various authentication strategies and outlined the benefits, drawbacks, obstacles, efficiency evaluations, and resilience versus various security attacks. The security assessment and performance assessment were unfortunately incomplete. Regarding the security component, the researchers only highlighted a few of the discovered threats. Only a portion of the computational costs was covered in the efficiency section, and no discussion of communication, energy, and storage costs was included.  
The existing security solutions are exposed to numerous attacks, such as impersonation, MITM, and replay, as shown by the relevant schemes covered in this literature survey; most of the solutions offered failed to solve these anonymity and untraceability problems. Therefore, the current schemes are inappropriate for resource-constrained deployments of IoT-based smart wheelchairs, due to poor security and pricey features; these drawbacks are displayed in Table 1.