# Cyber-Security Challenges in Aviation Industry: A Review of Current and Future Trends
## 6 The Future Civil Aviation Industry and Its Cyber-Security Challenges
### E-Enabled Aircraft  
The use of electronic data exchange and digital network connectivity are the spines of the approach adopted by the industry to increase the efficiency of on-board aircraft operations; IoT will play an important role in this respect, according to [PERSON] et al. [73]. A review on the role and the potential of e-enabled devices in enhancing digital network connectivity and electronic data exchange in future e-enabled aircraft, together with their attendant vulnerabilities, attack surfaces and possible mitigating factors, is thus of benefit.  
[PERSON] et al. in 2010 [85] reported on a design of an adaptive security architecture of future network-connected aircraft, while [PERSON] [86], [PERSON] et al. [87; 88] surveyed both the current and future security provision of embedded system in e-enabledaircraft networks. [PERSON] et al. [85] proposed a secure system topology for the embedded aircraft system network, referred to as SecMan for application in Fiber-like aircraft satellite telecommunications. [PERSON] et al. provided evidence that the safety, security and efficiency of e-enabled aircraft will be highly dependent on the security capabilities of the communications, network and cyber-physical systems. The consequence of the deployment of advance sensing, extensive computerised systems, enhanced communication channels between on-ground and on-board systems, on-board system integration and smart software-enabled interfaces is a proliferation of attack surfaces. Such surfaces present opportunities to exploit on-board cyber-physical systems remotely through radio frequency jamming, node impersonation and passive eavesdropping [88]. Table 5 provides a summary of the classes of attacks in the context of the evolution of the sector.  
The on-board trend of increasing the degree of integration of IT services into aircraft mechanical devices will undoubtedly enhance efficiencies, however, at the expense of an increase in attack surfaces. The relatively recent harnessing of artificial intelligence techniques by cyber-attackers to automate attack processes [89; 90] is a worrying development and stimulates a response strategy also founded on the use of AI-enabled cyber-defence frameworks in safeguarding e-enabled aircraft against severely damaging breaches.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{42.7 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt}} \hline \hline
**Domain** & **Ref** & **Experimental Tests/Scenarios** & **Tools** \\ \hline \multirow{6}{*}{IoT} & [91] & Network mapping attack/implementation of profiling module (training and testing algorithm) & \multirow{2}{*}{TestStad/Machine Learning Algorithm} \\ \cline{2-3}  & [92] & Discrete-time Markov chain model (DTMC): Analysing the capacity of the block chain & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [93] & Manual test: Analysis and attacks of each device, Automated test: process testing of different IoT device & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [94] & DoS massif traffic/Transfer Data/Abnormal code/System crash & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [95] & Real-world attack scenarios: internal and external network attacks & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [96] & Anomaly intrusion/attacks traffic & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [97] & Command injection attack & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [98] & SWaT/WADI datasets: Normal and attack scenario & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [99] & Man-in-the-middle attack & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [100] & LAUP algorithm(authentication)/key distribution test & & \\ \hline \multirow{6}{*}{Smart Grid} & [101] & Offline co-simulation Test-bed: DoS/FDI attacks model & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [102] & Access to communication link ([103]) attack model & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [104] & Deep packet inspection & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [105] & Power supply interruption Attack/Physical damage attack & & \\ \cline{2-3}  & [106] & MMS/GOOSE/SV implementation & & IEC 61850 Protocol/Ethernet RaspberryPi 3B+ \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 5: A summary of the classes of attacks in next generation aviation systems.