## 3 Related Works
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c} \hline \hline
**Company/Country** & **Context/Remarks** \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Voatz/United States} & From 2018 to 2020, Blockchain-based elections were held in West Virginia, Utah, and Colorado. The company used a voting application using biometrics, Blockchain, and hardware-based cryptography by generating paper and chain voting, but the authors in [28] have expressed concerns about its vulnerability to third-party attacks. \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{Agora/Sierra Leone} & In 2018, Sierra Leone deployed a Blockchain-based network for a presidential election to count votes in addition to the official count [29]. The network was an independent vote count, and as a result, privacy and anonymity were very evident because anonymous votes are placed on the Blockchain. \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{LVH Group/Nasdaq/Estonia} & Estonia’s cyber security is derived from its keyless signature (KSI) infrastructure, which verifies every electronic activity mathematically using the Blockchain. This system issues each shareholder’s voting assets and symbolic voting assets [30]. \\ \hline \multirow{7}{*}{I.T. Department of Moscow Government/Russia} & In December 2017, the Moscow City Active Citizen Program began using a Blockchain for voting and to make voting results publicly auditable [31]. Voting using Blockchain technology was held in Moscow and other regions in 2020, but Ethereum was unable to handle the load, and also there were challenges in securing the ballot [32]. \\ \hline \multirow{2}{*}{LayerX/Japan} & Tsukuba City in 2018 introduced a Blockchain voting system but had problems mainly due to forgotten passwords [33]. \\ \hline \multirow{2}{*}{Switzerland} & In June 2018, Switzerland held elections in the city of Zug based on Blockchain, but it was an experiment and the result was not binding [33]. \\ \cline{1-1}  & \\ \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Blockchain-based electronic voting applications. Another approach was taken by [34], which proposed using ZeroCoin to give Bitcoin anonymity. ZeroCoin's proposal fixes voting groups and makes it difficult for the administrator to vote fraudulently. The authors of the paper [35] proposed the implementation of smart contracts in Ethereum, and they addressed voter security, voters' privacy, and non-repudiation of votes. To gain privacy, the authors of paper [36] used a blind signature as proposed by the authors of paper [37], which mathematically prevents every other person from linking a blinded message to the only one who signed it. The proposal uses Blockchain technology and smart contracts to build a reliable and efficient scheme without using certificates. The various online platforms, their consensus, and the technology used for systems development are given in [12], but problems with scalability are highlighted. Developing a transparent online voting protocol using Ethereum through the open voting network is presented in [38], but this proposal fails to prevent system corruption. The authors of [39] suggested using a distributed, anonymous, and transparent system with minimum trust between the parties, but even their proposal fails to be secured from attacks. A Blockchain-based anti-quantum electronic voting protocol making changes to the Niederreiter cryptosystem algorithm is proposed by [40], but according to [41], security and efficiency decrease as the number of voters increases. The authors of the paper [12] compare many electronic voting proposals using Blockchains, such as a comparison of schemes, systems, and scalability analyses. These comparisons define the framework, cryptographic algorithm, consensus protocol, audit, anonymity, verifiability, mining difficulty, block, scalability, integrity, accuracy, and other aspects. According to [12] and the comparison of BSJC, Anti-Quantum, OVN, DATE, BES, and BEA, no scheme offers solutions for any security requirements, such as anonymity, security, integrity, variability by voter, scalability, privacy, and auditing.