## 3 Deliberate Attacks on IECPS
### Cyberattacks
#### 3.1.6 Coordinated Cyberattacks  
Such CCAs exhibit high flexibility and complexity, which poses significant challenges for defenders to adapt to evolving threats and design effective countermeasures [57]. Table 3 shows some of the retrieved CCA. In [58], a synergistic attack model combining FDIA and delay attacks was proposed for the AGC system, aiming to disrupt its normal frequency control functions. In [59; 60], tampering with operational data on the gas and power sides, respectively, causes a reduction in gas turbine output, which subsequently leads to a loss of load in the power system. In [61], the authors proposed a destructive electro-thermal coordinated attack that exposes the potential information risks in electro-thermal integrated energy systems by jointly altering the load data of both power and thermal systems. In [62], a novel attack scheme for power systems based on FDIA and DoS attacks was presented. This scheme leads to tripping by tampering with the synergistic line topology and then uses a DoS attack to prevent the system from scheduling and ultimately leads to a large-scale system failure. With the development of artificial intelligence methods, some scholars have used AI algorithms to construct information cooperative attacks. In [63], deep reinforcement learning-based software intrusion attack and FDIA attack models were constructed, using the deviation of regional control errors in AGC systems as a reward function. In [64], a deep neural network was used to combine a time synchronization attack and a DoS attack, targeting the distributed secondary control device of microgrid. In addition, in [65; 66], information collaboration attacks were constructed using attack graphs and heuristic algorithms, respectively.  
The CCA above illustrates that attackers can combine various types of cyberattacks to suit their objectives. By targeting different system levels or operational stages, they can exploit the weaknesses of individual attack types, increase their success rate, and amplify the destructive impact. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the attention to CCA to deal with complex network threats.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Attack Targets**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Modeling Methods**} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{**Cyberattack**} \\ \cline{3-8}  & & **RA** & **MITM** & **FDIA** & **TSA** & **DoS** & \
\begin{tabular}{c} **Time Delay** \\ **Attack** \\ \end{tabular} &
\begin{tabular}{c} **Soft** \\ **Intrusion** \\ \end{tabular} & **Ref.** \\ \hline AGC & & & & \(\surd\) & & & \(\surd\) & & [58] \\ Integrated power and gas & & & & \(\surd\) & & & & [59] \\ Integrated power and gas & & & & \(\surd\) & & & & [60] \\ System & & & & \(\surd\) & & & & [61] \\ Integrated heat and electric & & & & \(\surd\) & & & & [62] \\ system & & & & \(\surd\) & & \(\surd\) & & [62] \\ Power system & & & & & \(\surd\) & & & [63] \\ \hline AGC & & Deep reinforcement learning & & & \(\surd\) & & & \(\surd\) & [63] \\ Microgrid & & Deep neural network & & & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & & & [64] \\ Power system & & Attack graph model & \(\surd\) & & \(\surd\) & & & [65] \\ Power system & & Heuristic algorithm & & \(\surd\) & & & & [66] \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 3: CCA Cases.