# Role-Based Access Control Model for Inter-System Cross-Domain in Multi-Domain Environment
## 6 Model Evaluation
### Security Analysis
#### 6.2.1 Model Confidentiality Analysis  
1. Unauthorized access; \[sr\
otin user\_authorization(u)\wedge s\in user\_session(u)\wedge sr\in session\_sr(s)\] (27)  
This formula describes that if user \(u\) does not authorize the specific role \(sr\), but the user still activates session \(s\), \(sr\) is used in session \(s\). This indicates that the user has used an unauthorized specific role for unauthorized access. **Proof that RBAC-IC does not meet Formula (27). **  
Assume that user \(u\) has authorized \(sr\), that is,  
\[sr\in user\_authorization(u)\wedge s\in user\_session(u)\wedge sr\in session\_sr(s) \tag{28}\]  
is established;  
When the \(sr\) is not authorized to the user, if there is a case where \(s\) can be activated by the user and \(sr\) can be used in \(s\), Formula (27) holds;  
At the same time. Illustrate the following formula,  
\[sr\
otin user\_authorization(u)\wedge sr\in user\_authorization(u)\wedge s\in user\_session(u)\wedge sr\in session\_sr(s) \tag{29}\] \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Schemes**} & **Support Role Name** & **Platform–Domain** & **Inter-Domain Isolation** & **Cross-Domain Sharing** \\  & **Repetition** & **Isolation Management** & **Management** & **\\ \hline RBAC96 [13] & Not supported. & Not supported. & Not supported. & Not supported. \\ \hline ARBAC97 [14] & Not supported. & Not supported. & Not supported. & Not supported. \\  & Not supported. & (Administrative role can be & Not supported. & Not supported. \\  & redundancy can be & & & \\ [PERSON] et al. [17] & reduced through highly & Not applicable. & Not applicable. & Not applicable. \\  & dynamic workflow and & & & \\  & task concepts) & & & \\ \hline Literature [18; 19] & Yes. (Expand the role to & Not supported. & Yes. (Roles are valid only & Not supported. \\  & two or three dimensions.) & & within the specified scope.) & Not supported. \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{[PERSON] et al. [20]} & Yes. (Expand the role to & Yes. (The category element & \\  & few dimensions.) & of the 4D role distinguishes & Yes. (Roles are valid only & \\  & four dimensions.) & the platform administrator and & within the specified scope.) & Not supported. \\  & & user). & & \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [21] & Yes. (Use the role & Yes. (It can be isolated & Fine-grained is not \\  & namespace as the role & Not applicable. & through the role & supported. (By delegate the \\  & prefix.) & & namespace.) & role assignment rights to \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{[PERSON] et al. [23]} & \multirow{3}{*}{Not applicable.} & \multirow{3}{*}{Not applicable.} & Fine-grained is not supported. (After the issuer of the truster & \\  & & & establishes private role sets and public role sets, it establishes & \\  & & & a trust relationship with the truste. The issuer of the truster & \\  & & & can authorize users roles of the public role set.) & \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{[PERSON] et al. [22]} & \multirow{3}{*}{Not applicable.} & Yes. (It designs service & Yes, fine-grained is & Yes, fine-grained is \\  & & providers and domain & supported. (It supports the \\  & & administrators.) & Not applicable. & \\  & & administrators.) & & \\  & & & & \\  & & & & \\  & & & & \\ \hline \multirow{3}{*}{RBAC-IC} & Yes. (Expand the role to & Yes. (Administators are & & Fine-grained is not \\  & abstract roles and specific & divided into platform & & supported. (The domain \\  & roles, and allow the & administrators and domain & \\  & specific role under & administrators to handle & \\  & different domains to have & specified businesses, & they belong to.) & administrator can authorize the role \\  & the same name.) & & & \\  & & & & \\  & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: Characteristics comparison between RBAC-IC and other schemes.