# A Secure and Lightweight Group Mobility Authentication Scheme for 6 LoWPAN Networks
## 2 Related Works  
A brief overview of the literature on group handover authentication schemes for 6 LoWPAN networks is provided in this section. In addition, summarize and compare SL_GAS with the most relevant schemes in Table 1. Several solutions have been proposed for reducing handover delays and packet losses during single-node handovers [11; 12; 16]. However, little focus is given to security issues that could cause severe problems for resource-constrained IP-based mobile nodes. [PERSON] et al. [17] provided a group mobility protocol that was designed for wireless body area network (WBAN)-based 6 LoWPAN to support many devices, reduce signaling messages, and reduce the execution time to switch devices. The performance of handovers in 6 LoWPAN networks has improved in regard to various aspects, but security issues have not been addressed much. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [18]presented a secure mobility protocol to protect the mobility of devices in the 6 LoWPAN network. However, the paper does not elaborate on the procedure for pre-distributing the pairwise key within the nodes. A secure password authentication mechanism (SPAM) [19] is proposed for fast and secure handovers in PMIPv6. However, whenever a mobile node tries to connect to another gateway, the SPAM requires full authentication, resulting in a long delay during handover. The security of the group handover for 6 LoWPAN is still insufficient, with current solutions only supporting secure handover for individual nodes. Therefore, the SGMS (Secure Group Mobility Scheme) was proposed in [11]. A cryptographic algorithm is used in the SGMS to ensure simultaneous handovers of multiple nodes. Despite its efficiency, this scheme still has security issues, such as key leakage attacks and PF/BS. A secure and seamless IP (SEIP) protocol for group lightweight authentication was proposed in [16]. Symmetric cryptosystems are employed to minimize computational \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline
**References** & **Security Primitives** & **Security Properties** & **Security Issues (Limitations)** & **Security Proof Technique** \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [17] & Standard protocol & Not considered & Do not consider any attacks. & None \\ \hline [PERSON] and [PERSON] [18] & Symmetric algorithm Temporary ID and hash function & Replay attack, address exhaustion attack, spoofing attack, and false address conflict attack, & Do not consider PFS, DoS, and leak key attacks. & Informal security analysis \\ \hline SPAM [19] & Symmetric algorithm Temporary ID and hash function & Modification attack, stolen-verified attack, replay attack, and forgery attack. & Do not consider PFS, DoS, and leak key attacks. & Informal Security analysis \\ \hline SGMS [11] & Aggregated MAC Symmetric algorithm Temporary ID and hash function & Replay attacks, MITM attacks, impersonation attacks, privileged insider attacks, and Sybil attacks. & Do not consider PFS and leak key attacks. & Informal Security analysis—BAN logic-Scyther tool \\ \hline SEIP [16] & Aggregated MAC Temporary ID and hash function & Redirection and DoS attacks attacks & Vulnerable to replay and MITM attacks; does not provide PFS & Informal security analysis \\ \hline CBAS [20] & Aggregated MAC Temporary ID and hash function & Replay attack, MITM attack, impersonation attack, and modification attack. & Do not consider PFS, DoS, and leak key attacks. & Informal security analysis \\ \hline Our proposed protocol (SL\_GAS) & Aggregated MAC with tag Symmetric algorithm Ticket and secret parameters & Impersonation attacks, privileged instider attacks, Sybil attacks, & & (Informal security analysis (DY, CK, and eCK adversary models)—SVO logic-Scyther tool) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Related-work summary. overhead. SEIP resists redirection and DoS attacks [16]. However, it does not resist replay, MITM attacks, and PFS/BS, making it unsuitable for highly dynamic mobile environments. [PERSON] et al. [20] proposed a scheme named \"CBAS\".