## 2 Related Works
The paper [46] describes the operation of a portable identification system on the battlefield, which contains standard VHF radio communications for signal transmission, interfaced via portable computers with laser rangefinders and receivers of the Navstar space radio-navigation system. The identification process lasts no more than two seconds, and information can be requested about a specific target or all of its forces and means located within a given area with a radius of up to 5000 m. The range of the system is up to 35 km, and the probability of correct identification is at least 0.95. The paper [47] describes the operation of a civil aircraft identification system that uses the frequency-time coding method. To recognize the identity of an airplane, a requestor transmits three radio pulses of a predetermined shape at a predetermined time interval \(\tau\)1. A responder located on the airplane receives the signal and determines the time interval \(\tau\)1. Then, the responder, depending on the value of \(\tau\)1, generates three radio signals with time interval \(\tau\)2. At the same time, the first signal is modulated by the FAM frequency. Depending on the value of \(\tau\)1, the responder can generate 36 different signals. As a result, this recognition system has low imitation resistance. The probability of the correct imitation of the responder's signal is 0.028. The identification system described in [48] has a higher imitation resistance. This system uses a table containing \(N=911\) variants of the responder's signals. Each day, the codes of the request signal are selected. Each of these codes is matched with one of the 16 possible response signal codes. This mode of operation reduces the probability of an intruder imitating the \"friend\" signal to 0.005. Summarizing the conducted analysis of works, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the methods currently used for aircraft authentication cannot be applied because they have low imitation resistance against guessing the responder's signal. Second, the main constraint that prevents the use of the above methods for the authentication of the satellite RSU is the need for the periodic replacement of secret keys. One solution to this problem is to create a sufficiently large database of secret keys to be placed on the satellite. However, in the event of a fall or the removal of the satellite from orbit, an intruder can capture the secret keys. This will negatively affect the imitation resistance of the satellite IoV. The second solution to the problem is the daily transmission of secret keys of OBUs and RSUs over a closed communication channel, but it requires the additional use of encryption hardware. This, in turn, also requires the use of periodically changed secret keys. This issue can be solved by using zero-knowledge authentication protocols (ZKAP). These protocols have high cryptographic strength, which is achieved even without the use of symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods [33]. However, these protocols have drawbacks. First, to provide high cryptographic strength to the process of guessing the correct prover's signal, these protocols use large prime numbers \(Q\), which increases the verification time. As a result, the attacker has additional time to guess the correct prover's signal. This leads to a decrease in the imitation resistance of the satellite system. Second, the issues of noise resistance in such protocols have not been considered. These problems can be solved by implementing the zero-knowledge authentication protocol on the basis of modular codes. Parallel computations performed in the residues of modular codes will reduce the time needed to authenticate the prover without reducing the cryptographic strength. This will address the first drawback of ZKAP. The independent processing of data on the bases of the code is the basis for detecting and correcting errors that occur during transmission over the communication channel due to interference. This property of codes will allow for eliminating the second disadvantage of ZKAP.