## 1 Introduction  
In the modern era, Maritime Logistics and Supply Chains (MLoSCs) are the blood veins of global trade and economy where cross-border Critical Infrastructures (CI), such as ports, maritime authorities, airports, railways, energy providers, banks, maritime logistics and transport companies, collaborate in offering critical complex services, such as container management, vehicle transport, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transport and cruising. The CIs that operate within their MLoSCs have physical and cyber multi-interdependencies, interacting with all sectors of the economy and therefore, their malfunctioning or disruption could have cascading effects on several other infrastructures or services depending on it throughout the global supply chain. MLoSC services embed physical processes, such as vehicles and cargo steedering, ports Plant power supply procedures, pipeline management during LNG transport, which are monitored and controlled by composite and heterogeneous Industrial Control Systems (ICS) including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). Such installations play a vital role in the Maritime Industry as they analyze and display information aiming to promote a smooth and efficient performance of maritime logistics operations. SCADA systems, because of their high-level automation mechanisms and data interpretation capabilities, have managed to reduce waste of time and provide cost savings in logistics, maritime transport and control operations. In addition, they can gather environmental information, such as temperature, to protect both Port's plant and cargoes from physical disasters and potential industrial hazards [1]. Cargo ships are connected to ports and other MLoSCs operators via a plethora of communication and data links (e.g., through satellite network or conventional radio channel) and their navigation today is widely reliant on electronic solutions (e.g., satellite navigation with GPS, Galileo, Radar ARPA-Radio Direction and Ranging). MLoSCs can be viewed as complex CPSs composed of heterogeneous, interconnected physical and cyber assets, owned by different national and foreign CIs, ensuring seamless and swift product/data exchange from the producer down to the end consumer. MLoSCs' interconnected physical and cyber assets are highly valuable and thus lately they have become targets for attacks [2], attracting the attention of terrorism (e.g., Russian Business Network) [3], cyber-hacktivism organizations, militias (e.g., Anonymous, LulzSec) [3] and agencies (e.g., Stuxnet, Flame, Conficker, DuQu, APT1) [3]. In this context, the MLoSCs have garnered front-page attention as a victim of recent cyber-attacks: (i) A Chinese manufacturer stands accused of implanting malware in inventory scanners to steal supply chain intelligence [4]; (ii) hackers recently shut down a floating oil rig by tilting it [5]; (iii) engineering experiments have demonstrated that low-cost GPS jammers can be used to change a vessel's course by interfering with its navigation systems (GPS, ECDIS, AIS) causing a trackline-following autopilot to inaccurately interpret the ship's position and alter its course [3]; (iv) Somali pirates used hackers to gain access to shipping company's databases and vessel tracking systems to identify vessels with valuable cargoes, thus, many ships that transit the Gulf region are turning their Automatic Identification System (AIS) navigation tracking system off so that pirates cannot identify, locate and track them [3]; (v) in port of Antwerp, between 2011 and 2013, cyber-attacks were used to highjack, divert, or steal cargo [3]; (vi) a major maritime company, engaged in a deal to order a sea floor mining vessel, was the victim of a cyber-attack as it unknowingly pre-paid ($10 million of the $18 million charterer's guarantee) the deposit into a bank account that belonged to a cyber-criminal [6].