# The Influence of Energy Certification on Housing Sales Prices in the Province of Alicante (Spain)
## 5 Conclusions  
This work seeks to examine the effect of energy qualifications on the asking price of housing located in the Alicante (Spain) real estate market. To do so, a database was constructed based on 52,939 observations, of which 9194 offered information on energy qualifications (17.4%). The information contained in the database has permitted the creation of 63 variables that are used to estimate the regression model. In order to compare the results of this work with those of other studies, the model has been estimated 9 times. The first objective attempts to determine if an interest exists in not publishing energy qualification information for homes being sold. Two initial hypotheses are proposed--H\({}_{1}\) and H\({}_{2}\). The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals that the H\({}_{1}\) hypothesis is supported, since hiding the qualification may lead to higher asking prices. The second proposed hypothesis--H\({}_{2}\)--attempts to contrast whether or not energy qualification is a determining characteristic of the asking price. Estimations 1 and 2 reveal that this hypothesis is rejected, since homes with an energy qualification--ABCDEFG grouping--or those having a high qualification--letter A--as  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**Study Data**} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{**Economic Price Premium in \% According to the Reference-Ref.–Certicate**} & \multirow{2}{*}{ \begin{tabular}{c} **Compared** \\ **with** \\ \end{tabular}  } \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{6-13}
**Paper** & **Country** & & **Estim. ** & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline
[16] & Spain & 3B (Table 4) & & \ \begin{tabular}{c} 9,62 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & - & -3.0 & \begin{tabular}{c} 3,87 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & 2.0 & 1.0 & Ref. & & & & & & & Estim. 7 \\ \hline
[17] & Spain & 3 (Table 3) & \begin{tabular}{c} -6.3 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & & & & & & & & & & & & & Estim. 8 \\ \hline
[27] & United Kingdom & 5 (Table 5) & \begin{tabular}{c} 11.6 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & Estim. 9 \\ \hline
[22] & Netherlands & 4 (Table 2) & & \begin{tabular}{c} 5.6 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & \begin{tabular}{c} 1.1 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & \ \begin{tabular}{c} -0.8 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & -2.0 & \begin{tabular}{c} -1.4 \\ * \\ \end{tabular}  & -1.4 & -1.6 & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline  & & 3 & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline  & & & & & & & & & & &compared to those that did not publish their rating --NT--, have a negative premium of 3.2% (significant) and of 0.3% (not sig.) respectively. The second objective proposes quantifying the economic impact of energy qualification on the asking price, offering the hypothesis--H\({}_{3}\). Estimations 4 to 9 suggest the contrary, finding that housing qualified with letters C and D have higher premiums than housing with higher qualifications (A or B). This study reveals that, in multi-family housing sold in the Alicante (Spain) province, a positive relationship does not exist between the energy certification system and the housing's asking price. This is due to a variety of reasons. * First, real estate sellers and owners who do not publish energy qualifications offer their homes at prices that are similar to those having high qualifications. * Second, there is the lack of sanctions placed by the public administration on companies, owners and real estate portals that do not publish the energy qualifications of the housing that is for sale or rent, motivating owners to not publish the letter and generating distorted asking prices for the housing. Therefore, it is important for the administration to closely supervise compliance with regulations and assign the necessary resources to local authorities to ensure said compliance, and if needed, to impose sanctions. * Third, owners are not interested in improving energy qualifications, since, according to [71; 72] there is no compensation for the additional investment needed to improve this qualification.