## 1 Introduction  
In recent decades, a steady increase in CO2 emissions by the global population has significantly contributed to manmade climate change, the consequences of which are already being felt [1, 2, 3, 4]. For some time now, discussions have been taking place at various levels--both nationally and internationally--on the awareness of the problem and the need for global or international efforts [5, 6] to sustainably reduce greenhouse gases--first and foremost CO2--in order to limit the increase in the Earth's average temperature to such an extent that tipping points are avoided. Such efforts to drastically reduce CO2 emissions are defined by national agendas and politically set milestones, which mainly foresee a stepwise reduction in greenhouse gas emissions towards climate neutrality in all sectors [7, 8] by approximately the middle of the 21 st century. In the context of the so-called energy transition with reference to the energy sector, depending on the political framework, geographical and economic boundary conditions, differences in climate targets, variable technology mixes, and different time schedules can be envisaged with regard to the phasing out of fossil-based forms of energy generation and the integration of climate-neutral energy technologies in national transformation paths [9]. Germany is in a special situation here, as not only has an ambitious roadmap--65% reduction by 2030, 100% reduction by 2045 [10]--been postulated, but nuclear energy no longer plays a role in the future mix of sustainable power generation technologies with the politically enacted nuclear phase-out. Even if Germany, as part of the European interconnected grid, can compensate for fluctuations by means of electricity imports, there must of course be a massive expansion of renewable energies and storage in order to achieve the climate targets that it has set itself. The decarbonization of industry--e.g., adding more hydrogen-based power and heat generation [7; 8; 11]--indicates quite clearly that it is not just a matter of replacing existing fossil-based power generation plants, but also of meeting an ever-increasing demand for electricity and the necessary supply infrastructure (i.e., conversion, storage, transport, and distribution). In addition to purely political and administrative hurdles, as well as economic uncertainties regarding suitable long-term locations of sustainable energy supply technologies, decision-making processes regarding grid planning should be relatively fast in order to achieve the ambitious climate targets in the energy sector. However, questions regarding regional energy system planning and decentralized integration of sustainable energy technology (SET)--which mainly take place at the distribution grid level [12], and entail environmental impacts--should be answered in cooperation with the population via appropriate participation and engagement formats. Though there is a widespread awareness of the problem among the population, and the energy transition as well as the achievement of corresponding climate targets via climate actions generally enjoy great acceptance in society in many countries, this is rather restrained when it comes to concrete regional SET integration and on-site grid expansion, and deviates from the approval or acceptance of measures to achieve abstractly formulated sustainability targets [13]. This discrepancy or ambiguity, which often has to do with a phenomenon labeled \"not in my back yard\" (NIMBY) [14; 15], can complicate and delay SET deployment. In conclusion, acceptance problems related to specific regional integration plans contrast with the generally rather positive attitude towards the energy transition. Thus, the following question is of utmost relevance: How should decision makers--e.g., grid planners or politicians--sustainably deal with these ambiguities or discrepancies?