## 4 Result and Discussion
### System Simulation Analysis
#### 4.3.3 The Impact of Mental Account Factor on Evolutionary Results  
This paper also explores the effects of labor, mental, and psychological costs on the evolutionary game between the two parties. Taking Figure 8a as an example, we take the initial values \(p=0.5\) and \(q=0.5\) and set the loop function for \(m_{0}=2.0\):\(0.5\):\(5.0\). It can be seen that, to a certain extent, the lower the labor cost of intelligent construction of coal mining enterprises, the faster the speed of coal mining enterprises and local governments in choosing the ideal state. The government should make enterprises deeply aware of the benefits of this transformation for the enterprise, eliminate the cognitive barriers and labor cost obstacles to intelligent construction, so that enterprises are willing to actively invest funds to drive production and operations. With the continuous increase in labor cost \(m_{0}\) for the implementation of intelligent construction in coal mine enterprises, the trend of the evolution system converging to 1 gradually becomes smooth. When the critical value \(m_{0}=3.7\) is exceeded, the probability of intelligent construction in coal mine enterprises no longer evolves in the direction of 1 but tends towards 0. Similarly, the evolutionary trend of \(m_{1}\), the mental cost paid by coal mine enterprises to implement intelligent construction, is roughly the same as that of \(m_{0}\), and its critical value is about 3.9 after simulation. However, the psychological cost \(m_{2}\) path of coal mine enterprises that have not implemented intelligent construction is just the opposite of \(m_{0}\), and the implementation probability of intelligent construction will increase with the increase of \(m_{2}\). Similarly, an analysis was conducted to determine the influence of the psychological account factor on government strategies. As illustrated in Figure 8b, the initial values are \(p=0.5\) and \(q=0.5\), and the loop function is \(g_{0}=2.0\):\(0.5\):\(5.0\). As illustrated in the figure, a reduction in the cost of labor, which is subject to strict regulation by the local government, will result in a more rapid convergence towards a stable evolutionary strategy by the government and enterprises. As the labor cost subject to government regulation continues to rise, the final strategy of the evolutionary system undergoes a gradual transformation. When the critical value exceeds \(g_{0}=3.7\), the probability of strict government supervision does not evolve towards 1 but rather towards 0. Similarly, the evolution trend of the mental cost \(g_{1}\) of strict government supervision is roughly the same as \(g_{0}\), and its critical value is 3.8 after simulation. Nevertheless, the psychological cost of deregulation on local government departments has the opposite effect on government decision-making as labor cost \(g_{0}\). Consequently, the rate at which government tends to stabilize increases with psychological cost \(g_{2}\). Specifically, as the costs of strict government supervision increase,so too does the potential for enterprises to benefit from deregulation. This, in turn, allows the government to pursue a policy of governance by non-interference, thereby reducing the psychological costs of deregulation for enterprises. In other words, the government need not be excessively diligent and restrictive, and enterprises will assume the initiative to achieve intelligent construction. This indicates that to achieve this objective, the government need not be unduly concerned about the intelligent development of enterprises and should permit them to develop freely and exercise self-restraint. A sensitivity analysis of the aforementioned factors pertaining to mental accounting revealed that these factors can effectively control and influence the final direction of the evolutionary strategy.