# Towards a Provably Secure Authentication Protocol for Fog-Driven IoT-Based Systems
## 6 Conclusions  
There are numerous applications of fog computing, ranging from normal to specific. Hence, the potential for offering privacy and security with fog-driven deployment is indispensably significant. In this article, an identity based three-party authenticated and key agreement protocol is proposed for a fog-driven IoT healthcare system. The proposed protocol is efficiently resists numerous known security attacks, as shown in Section 4. The performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme has great potential for deployment in real-world healthcare systems; the computation cost of our protocol is 0.5904 ms, which is less than the computation cost of related protocols. Similarly, the communication cost of the proposed protocol is less than the related protocols, except [PERSON] et al. and Ever. In the future, we will design a blockchain-assisted access control protocol for fog-driven IoT healthcare systems. The reason behind employing blockchain in such infrastructure is that patients' healthcare information is highly sensitive and confidential. Therefore, data will be stored in the blocks; due to its strong integrity and immutable and tamper-resistant qualities, blockchain will restrict adversaries from modifying healthcare data. Moreover, the proposed protocol will be simulated in a broadly-recognized NS3-simulator tool to assess its performance from distinct network parameters (i.e., end-to-end delay, throughput, etc. ). \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Protocols** & **Ours** & **[12]** & **[13]** & **[11]** & **[17]** & **[18]** \\ \hline Provides mutual authentication & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ \hline Provides user anonymity & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ \hline Resists tamper-proof device stolen attack & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ \hline Resists user masquerading attack & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ \\ \hline Resists fog-node masquerading attack & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ \\ \hline Resists cloud server-provider masquerading attack & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ & ✓ & ✗ \\ \hline Resists stolen-verifier attack & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ & ✓ \\ \hline Free from clock synchronization problem & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ & ✗ \\ \hline Ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ \\ \hline Resists insider attack & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✓ & ✓ \\ \hline Resists known session key attack & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ & ✓ & ✗ & ✓ \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: V of security and functionality. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l l l l} \hline \hline
**Protocols** & **\(\mathbf{U_{k}}\)** & \(\mathbf{\mathcal{CSP}}\) & \(\mathbf{\mathcal{FN}_{f}}\) & **Aggregated Computation Overhead** & **Aggregated Communication Overhead** \\ \hline Ours & \(\mathbb{E}_{\text{fault}}\) & \(\mathcal{T}_{\text{fault}}\) & \(3\mathbb{E}_{\text{fault}}\) & 0.5904 ms & 3744 bits \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [12] & \(\mathbb{E}_{\text{fault}}+2E_{n}\) & \(9E_{\text{fault}}+3\mathbb{E}_{n}\) & \(4E_{\text{fault}}+2E_{n}\) & 1.5823 ms & 4064 bits \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [13] & \(16E_{\text{fault}}+2E_{n}\) & \(11E_{\text{fault}}\) & \(10E_{\text{fault}}+3\mathbb{E}_{n}\) & 3.1449 ms & 4832 bits \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [11] & \(4E_{\text{fault}}+3E_{n}\) & \(9E_{\text{fault}}+8E_{n}\) & \(4E_{\text{fault}}+4E_{n}\) & 2.3706 ms & 4254 bits \\ \hline [PERSON] et al. [17] & \(10E_{\text{fault}}+2E_{n}\) & \(6E_{\text{fault}}+1E_{n}\) & \(4E_{\text{fault}}\) & 1.5825 ms & 2560 bits \\ \hline [PERSON] [18] & \(3E_{\text{fault}}+1E/D\) & \(3E_{\text{fault}}+2E/D\) & \(2E_{\text{fault}}+2E/D\) & 0.91771 ms & 1120 bits \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 5: Comparison of computation and communication overhead. **Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, M.R., K.M., F.A.-T., M.S.K. and C.A. ; Methodology, M.R., K.M., F.A.-T. and M.S.K. ; Validation, M.A.S. ; Formal analysis, M.A.S. ; Data curation, M.A.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. **Funding:** This research received no external funding. **Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.