## 4 Case Analysis
### Analysis of User Travel Mode  
Figure 5 delineates the proportional shifts in residents' travel modes following adoption of the TRS. Our findings indicate that the TRS significantly curtails the number of private car users, simultaneously promoting the uptake of public transportation. The principal driver behind this shift is the TRS's constriction of traffic volume on main commuting corridors, compelling non-reserved commuters to consider alternative routes or gravitate towards public transit options. Given the augmented costs often associated with detours, many travelers prefer public or combined transit modes. This strategy-oriented travel mode shift is consistent with multiple studies [51; 52], which show that managing personal vehicle usage rights can effectively improve the utilization of public transportation and has positive significance for urban traffic management and sustainable development. Moreover, following the introduction of the incentive and penalty mechanism, there was an increase in private car usage and a decrease in public transportation (buses and metro) usage in Scenario 3 compared to Scenario 2. This indicates that the incentive mechanism somewhat reduced the economic advantage of public transport by lowering the relative cost of private car travel. The sensitivity to the subsidy mechanism varied among users with different time values. In user classes 1, 2, and 3, the proportion of private car travel increased by 0.4%, 2.6%, and 3.0%, respectively, while public transport usage  
Figure 5: Variation in user travel mode proportions. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline  & **Scenario 1** & **Scenario 2** & **Scenario 2** \\ \hline
**Network traffic volume (vph)** & 32,459 & 29,843 & 31,258 \\
**Average saturation of road network** & 0.428 & 0.379 & 0.388 \\
**Average saturation of reserved roads** & 1.119 & 0.643 & 0.757 \\
**Average saturation of non-reserved roads** & 0.358 & 0.356 & 0.353 \\
**Average network speed (km/h)** & 31.83 & 34.22 & 33.96 \\
**Average speed of reserved roads (km/h)** & 26.60 & 31.65 & 29.85 \\
**Average speed of non-reserved roads (km/h)** & 34.27 & 34.60 & 34.28 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 9: Network performance in different scenarios. decreased by 1.4%, 2.1%, and 3.0%. Users with a high time value prioritize convenience and comfort in their travel. They perceive the ability to reserve travel times in advance or adjust their schedules as more valuable than waiting in congestion, and reserved travel provides a more predictable and stable travel experience. Consequently, these users tend to favor private car usage, as it offers more personal space and flexibility, which are particularly important for those who highly value their time. Thus, even with subsidies, they may still prefer private cars. Conversely, users with a lower time value may be more influenced by cost incentives and lean towards choosing lower-cost public transportation. For those with medium (class 2) and lower (class 1) time values, travel mode choices are likely more influenced by cost-benefit considerations. Therefore, introducing the incentive mechanism might encourage more users in these categories to choose private cars, especially when the subsidies significantly reduce the relative costs of car travel. This paper further analyzes the proportion of users choosing reserved travel and the changes in their travel time decisions. In Scenario 2, only 5916 users opted for reserved travel, whereas in Scenario 3, the number increased to 8784 users, a growth of 48.5%. This significant increase indicates that users' willingness to adopt the reserved travel mode intensifies under incentive and penalty mechanisms. By reducing the cost of reserved travel, the incentive mechanism enhances its appeal. This finding is consistent with previous survey results, suggesting a positive response from users to economic incentives, showing their readiness to adjust travel habits for financial benefits [53].