## 3 Results
### Agriculture Case Study
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Threat Title**} & **Affected** & **Violated Security** \\  & **Components** & **Attributes** \\ \hline Separation of execution environments & IoT Gateway & Input Validation \\ \hline Update authenticity and integrity for & Edge Computing & Tamper Protection, \\ embedded/network devices & Input Validation \\ \hline Information confidentiality & Interface1 & Encrypted, \\  & Authorization \\ \hline Network protection from malicious code & Field Gateway & Input Validation \\ \hline Automated audit log access & Sensor Fusion & Anomaly Detection \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: Some selected potential threats identified by THREATGET. consider the edge computing component as the most essential unit and requires sophisticated security measures. Therefore, in the following scenarios, we propose that attack propagation shall proceed from an external unit until reaching the edge computing unit. **Surface Attack: Path 1**  
* The unauthorized access to the cloud storage component gives an attacker the way to inject malicious code/data into the system network. * The connected system component (i.e., IoT Gateway in this case) should receive a set of compromised data/code, which lead to multiple negative consequences, such as changing the configuration of any critical system component. * The authenticity between connected network devices shall be guaranteed, which is considered essential to confirm the authenticity with which the component is communicating. * In addition, the input sanitization and anomaly detection shall be considered in this attack path in order to detect and prevent the flow of any compromised data/code into the rest of the connected system components. * The data transmitted through the network to the edge computing unit shall be encrypted and transmitted from authorized service, human, or component. * Additionally, the edge computing unit needs to check all incoming data from this path to ensure that it does not doubt the integrity of the received content. * Furthermore, we consider that the system update for the edge computing unit is essential to keep this device up-to-date with all required security measures. **Surface Attack: Path 2**  
* Sensor components shall authenticate and authorize external interactors in order to ensure the authenticity of the incoming data. * The sensor fusion plays an essential role in handling incoming data; therefore, input validation and secure booting are needed to mitigate any such similar cyberattack propagation. * The data shall be encrypted; therefore, Interface1 shall be responsible for encrypting all of the data transmission. * The edge computing unit may check all integrity of all received data from external environment. * In addition, the edge computing unit shall be protected against any tampering activities. **Attack Propagation Towards System Actuator. ** Once the edge computing system has been compromised, we cannot anticipate any additional consequences for the other components of our system network connected to the edge computing system. Therefore, we believe that the system updates for the edge computing unit are essential to keep this device up to date with all required security measures. * Interface2 needs to verify all connected components' authorization to ensure the validity of all incoming data. * The lack of authorization could bypass other essential security attributes for the Actuator ECU, such as anomaly detection, secure boot, input validation, and authentication. * Once an attack successfully reaches the system Actuator ECU, an attacker may gain full control of the component, leading to unexpected outcomes. For example, as described in Section 3.1, the system actuators control the irrigation process or the application of nutrients. Therefore, any unauthorized manipulation could lead to a financially or operationally negative impact.