## 2 Overview of Cyber Threats in EM
### Information Systems  
From information gathering to planning and sharing of plans, EM operations depend heavily on EMIS that support interoperability between all functions and may involve multiple governmental organisations and the civilian population. Prior to an emergency, they are used to collect information for risk analysis, simulation of different scenarios and the development of contingency plans. During response and recovery they provide tools for the management and coordination of people and assets, as well as to improve transparency in aid. EMIS software may facilitate computerised modelling, prediction and risk analysis for the development of preparedness and contingency plans, and may be used to quantify the true cost of a disaster. During an actual emergency, they provide tools for managing the monitoring and warning networks, and for supporting decision-making, supervision, coordination of command and even context-aware emergency service streaming deliveries [103]. EMIS need to ensure the interoperability of all the functions they support [71], which implies the use of an inherent trust model within them [104]. Yet, EMIS typically consist of a combination of purpose-built and commercial off-the-shelf communication mechanisms and software, such as document readers, multimedia players and of course the operating system itself, each with their own and often well-known security flaws that make them vulnerable to malware and exploits. EMIS include or rely on geographic information systems (GIS) that use information generated through remote sensing for spatial analysis, interactive maps and hazard mapping, which can be vital to improve EM response times. GIS make extensive use of satellite tracking for accurate mapping (Section 2.2.1). They also use information through remote sensing for spatial analysis, interactive maps and hazard mapping. GIS often operate in conjunction with or based on cloud environments, such as third party web mapping services, and so effectively inherit cloud security threats. If the information that generates the map is modified, this will directly affect emergency response capability and planning [105]. Voice over IP (VoIP) is also often employed in EMIS, but VoIP has not been designed for critical communications and is inherently insecure. An attacker can disrupt communication by flooding the VoIP servers or through the \"Invite of Death\" attack, leading to processing delays to VoIP traffic, unauthorised access and eventually denial of service [106]. A replay attack on the SIP protocols would cause the secured real time protocol to repeat the key stream used for media encryption, effectively breaking the transport layer security. Eavesdropping, spoofing and masquerading are very realistic threats in VoIP communication [66, 67]. Where VoIP has been implemented as a soft phone, such as Skype, these soft phones have access to the system resources and hence the privileges of the user of the computer. Mechanisms for exploiting this have been presented in [68]. Policy-making, disaster planning, insurance risk analysis and EM scientific research rely heavily on databases with detailed information on previous disasters. Geospatial databases are also used to ensure transparency by tracking the aid received and by monitoring housing reconstruction programmes at the recovery phase. As with other software-based systems, off-the-shelf databases introduce known vulnerabilities in the EM process. When the target database system does not verify the input received from the user, SQL injection attacks can allow malicious users to both read and modify data [64, 65]. The vulnerabilities described above are related to technologies used by EMIS rather than EM specific. In practice, security of EMIS has been gradually increased over the years.