# Competing Reverse Channels' Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input
## 5 Comparison and Insights
### Numerical Analysis
#### 5.2.2 Impact of Cost Factor for Recycling Innovation Inputs
For example, the emergence of intelligent recycling bins and the _Internet Plus_ recycling platform have increased the environmental recycling awareness of the society, and the overall recycling volume of the society has risen. The manufacturer can purchase second-hand or used materials from collector 2 at a lower transfer price. Therefore, the cost savings of the manufacturer's recycling and remanufacturing are further reduced, and consequently, profits are further improved. The manufacturer is more willing to sell new products to consumers at lower retail prices. The collectors' profits can not be established. From Figure 19, collector 1 incurs the highest profit in the hybrid system with innovation input. With the increase of \(R\), it indicates that the cost of innovation input gradually increases, while the profit of the recycler decreases. Even if collector 2 does not invest in recycling innovation, his profit slowly decreased with the increase of \(R\). When the value of \(R\) is low, it reflects that the recycler invests less cost for recycling innovation. The profit  
Figure 17: The influences of \(R\) on the manufacturer’s profit \(\Pi_{M}\). Figure 18: The influences of \(R\) on the total supply chain’s profit \(\Pi_{T}\). relationship between each recycler is as follows: \(\Pi_{\text{C1}}^{H*}>\Pi_{\text{C}}^{BE*}>\Pi_{\text{C2}}^{H*}\). Correspondingly, we can observe the recovery rate relationship among various recyclers: \(\tau_{1}^{H*}>\tau^{BE*}>\tau_{2}^{H*}\). It is shown that recyclers have just started to innovate in the recycling market with low input costs, low barriers to entry, and large gains. With the influx of a large number of collectors into the market, the competition for recycling innovation is fierce. Correspondingly, the cost of innovation investment has increased. When \(R\) gradually increases, it indicates that the cost of investing in recycling innovation investment by collectors is relatively high, greatly reducing the enthusiasm of collectors for innovation investment. However, due to the lack of recycling volume, which cannot compensate for the losses caused by the cost of innovation input, we find that the sorting of the profit size of the collectors has changed, \(\Pi_{\text{C1}}^{H*}>\Pi_{\text{C2}}^{H*}>\Pi_{\text{C}}^{BE*}\). The recovery rate also changes as follows, \(\tau_{1}^{H*}>\tau_{2}^{H*}>\tau^{BE*}\), correspondingly. **Proposition 6**. : _The profits of each member decreases with the increase of \(R\). Interestingly, the hybrid recycling system is superior to the basic centralized recycling model, \(\Pi_{T}^{H*}>\Pi_{T}^{BE*}\). The \(e^{*}\) and \(\tau^{*}\) of competing collectors' case are also greater than the optimal \(e^{*}\) and \(\tau^{*}\) in the monopoly case. From the perspective of the collector, \(\Pi_{\text{C}}^{BE*}\) is not only less than \(\Pi_{\text{C1}}^{H*}+\Pi_{\text{C2}}^{H*}\), but also less than \(\Pi_{\text{C1}}^{H*}\), and in some cases less than \(\Pi_{\text{C2}}^{H*}\). From the manufacturer's perspective, \(\Pi_{M}^{H*}>\Pi_{M}^{BE*}\)._  
Comparing the two settings, we can find that the optimal level of collection effort, innovation input of collector, the retail price, the transfer price and the total profit of the supply chain in the basic centralized model are always lower than those in the hybrid model. The vertical externality effect not only affects the profits of the supply chain and members but also influences the collection effort of the collector with or without innovation input. **Proposition 7**. : _When the market conditions of \(K\) are large and \(R\) is low, it is very beneficial to the development of recycling innovation, and the social welfare brought by recycling innovation investment is also high._