# AIS Data Vulnerability Indicated by a Spoofing Case-Study
## 3 Results
### AIS Vulneribilities
It consists of a 5-module procedure: Context study, study of dread events, study of the threat scenarios, study of the risks, study of the security measures. Following on from the EBIOS risk analyses, [PERSON] [34; 35] presented different dread and threats scenarios and risks. Using the EBIOS method, 11 risks with an intolerable level linked to the AIS use have been identified. These risks are linked to integrity and availability: dynamic data, AIS data, transmission function, reception function, positioning and visualization function. Some of the identified risks deal with data integrity issues, which is one of the data quality dimensions. To conduct AIS data quality assessment, different kinds of possible anomalies in AIS messages have been recognized and presented in Table 3.  
To assess AIS data and detect AIS anomalies, different algorithms and filters could be used in order to provide the maritime surveillance community with information on unusual behavior [36]. To prevent the AIS security weaknesses, some solutions have been proposed. [PERSON] [28] proposed the protected AIS (pAIS) software, which uses a public-key cryptography method. The pAIS software provides authentication of the AIS message senders as well as a message integrity service. This method could be implemented by a simple software upgrade at the existing AIS protocol. [PERSON] et al. [9] proposed the secure AIS application protocol, which is based on a pairwise key and aims to encrypt and authenticate the transmission of messages between two AIS stations using a certification mechanism. This application will be integrated in AIS Class A and B stations. [PERSON] et al. [15] extended this work and introduced the Auth-AIS as an authentication scheme using the Deterministic Security Configuration model based on Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) symmetric authentication protocol or Probabilistic Security Configuration model based on the coupling of TESLA with Bloom Filter tool. Those proposals require software updates and provides authentication of AIS messages. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [16] proposed the architecture of maritime certificate-less identity-based public-key cryptography (mIBC) and discussed the feasibility of the implementation aspects of mIBC. The architecture will enable the use of extant AIS and an additional four secure modes of operation. This proposal provides on-demand authentication, message integrity, and confidentiality of AIS data. The implementation of this proposal requires some changes in the existing AIS service [16; 37]. All these proposals are based on cryptography methods enabling encryption of AIS messages. They are also backward compatible, enabling interoperability with the existing AIS devices, which do not use the modified software or hardware. The next section will provide analyses of the AIS spoofing incidents in recent years. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \multicolumn{4}{c}{**Ais Anomalies**} \\ \hline Behaviour & Content of the Message & Lawfulness & Quality \\ \hline Kinematic (position, move) data & Static data & Criminal issues & Unexpectedly changing data \\ \hline Voyage data & Human data & Breach-level issues & Impossible data \\ \hline \multicolumn{4}{c}{Impossible with respect to others information} \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: AIS anomalies, according to [PERSON] et.al. [34; 35].