## Appendix A Abbreviations
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l} \hline \hline
**NR** & Not relevant \\
**NC** & Not clear if there are threats (other than the ones already covered in different categories) \\
**CCR** & Changing the control routines \\
**CDD** & Disclosure of the data sent or received by the control device \\
**CDM** & Disclosure of the metadata of messages sent or received by the control device (this may e.g., reveal visited web pages) \\
**CDR** & Attacker might remotely control the Smart Home Device \\
**CLF** & The control device loses Internet-related functionality (which may be most of the functionality e.g., for a Smartphone) \\  & Depends on the data sent by the Smart Home Device, which might be less severe \\
**DCD** & data like logs concerning the device’s functionality or very sensitive data \\  & revealing private information or video material \\  & Depends highly on the usage of the control device or the security level of the \\
**DEP** & websites it connects to (e.g., no Internet access, no file syncing with remote \\  & client/server, session fixation/hijacking when browsing, etc.) \\
**DLF** & The Smart Home Device loses its functionality (totally or partially) \\  & The Smart Home Device obtains wrong or no information and therefore does not carry out an action (e.g., unlocking the door or raising an alarm) \\
**DWA** & The Smart Home Device obtains wrong information and in turn makes wrong \\
**EPI** & Attacker extracts private information from the device \\
**GAP** & Guest accesses the Private Smart Home Device \\
**GDS** & Guest denies the sending of a message (which might have triggered actions like \\  & unlocking the door or raising an alarm) \\
**IDC** & Attacker obtains control over the Smart Home Device indirectly by controlling an entity that already has control over it \\
**LCD** & A legitimate user (e.g., Smart Hub or Remote Control Device) loses control over \\  & the Smart Home Device because the control server is unavailable \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: _Cont._ \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l} \hline \hline
**BCC** & Manufacturer built the control/companion app in a way such that it collects data it should not \\
**BCS** & Manufacturer built the control/companion app in a way such that it sends data it should not send to the server \\
**BCT** & Manufacturer built the control/companion app in a way such that it sends data it should not send to a third party \\
**BDC** & Manufacturer built the device in a way such that it collects data it should not \\
**BDS** & Manufacturer built the device in a way such that it sends data it should not send \\
**BDT** & Manufacturer built the device in a way such that it sends data it should not send \\
**BST** & Manufacturer built the server in a way such that it sends data it should not send \\
**CBL** & Attacker collects local broadcast messages which contain information that identifies a device \\
**CME** & Attacker outside the local network collects metadata of the network traffic by \\
**CME** & observing network traffic leaving the home using an MitM position (MME) and compares them to patterns from known devices \\
**CML** & Attacker inside the local network collects metadata of the network traffic using an MitM position (MML) and compares them to patterns from known devices \\
**CMM** & observing encrypted WLAN traffic and compares them to patterns from known devices \\
**DCN** & The user has not been informed about the data collected \\
**HSD** & homeowner spies on device’s activity \\
**HUC** & homeowner unaware of data collection/logging enabled in the network \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 10: The attack vector descriptions along with their abbreviations for LINDDUN.