## 4 Prevention Mechanisms of the Proposed Scheme
### Elliptical Segment Area Transmission Range and Authentication Prevention Model  
In order for vehicles to communicate effectively and get authenticated, a specified transmission range of vehicles, which also utilize HDAM, is designated in the network. The designated transmission range is based upon the elliptical segment area (ESA) transmission range (ESATR), which utilizes V2V standardized road safety information exchange (SRSIE). The ESATR requirement is also based upon a model adoption in VANET. Based upon the model, the contribution of HDAM is also important for investigation. The model requires a further authentication prevention mechanism in the network. Therefore, this research investigates a model in VANET known as the proposed scheme elliptical segment transmission range model (PESATRM). PESATRM includes the tendency to utilize a secure authentication prevention method, which is integrated in the VANET communication process design. This is also used to mitigate all forms of attacks, including HDSA and DoS JSA attacks. Further secure authentication in the PESATRM can be achieved through FS and RSU deployment. In the PESATRM, the V2V communication process utilizes IEEE 802.11p beacon transmission to communicate and also secure the network links. This provides the capability for each vehicle to exchange messages securely within a specified ESATR. Based upon this, vehicles move along in the same direction of travel to their intended destination (as shown in Figure 6). Therefore, the PESATRM has been developed from a modified circular segment area model (CSAM) adopted in a previous study [39]. However, investigation revealed that the CSAM is insecure based upon limitations in HDSA and DoS JSA and other forms of attack investigation. In addition, another limitation worth noting is that the CSAM design does not utilize fog computing and cloud-based (VFC) integration investigation. Therefore, it is suggested that the PESATRM communication process should be designed to include VFC employing authentication/KDE (AKDE) to further secure the network. In addition, it is estimated that designing a secure PESATRM would also prevent high incidences of communication overhead (CO). CSAM limitations also include increased communication overhead (CO). In the design of PESATRM, we require that integration with the PSAM model is possible, which should include VFC. VFC integration provides enhancement in the end-to-end delayed path attacked packet detection process. This is based upon the fact that the neighbor-vehicle-to-neighbor-vehicle (NV2 NV) communication process requires further AKDE. Moreover, the SRSIE process that prevents  
Figure 6: Vehicles in the Elliptical Segment Transmission Range Model (ESATRM). CO due to the end-to-end delay/jitter path in vehicles is anticipated in the network, which requires trustworthiness. Secure VFC and FS integration provide secure real-time detection of all other forms of attacks, including HDSA and DoS JSA, which utilize the IEEE 802.11p beacon transmission relay process in a specified ESATR. Furthermore, in the design of the PESATRM, rapid topology changes in VANET are important for investigation. This is because HDSAs, including DoS JSA and other vulnerabilities, are eminent in the air, or in the open environment in which VANET deployment occur. Therefore, the PESATRM is also designed to detect traffic in DoS JSA and its associated vulnerabilities faster and more accurately. The network topology design should utilize VFC and AKDE, which are able to store large volumes of data utilized for secure delivery of SRSIE. Based upon this provision, it is possible for the proposed scheme to detect and mitigate HDSA, including DoS JSA and associated vulnerabilities that would incur CO in the network. In addition, VFC provides increased space search for SRSIE in the network and requires hybrid optimization algorithms (HOA). HOA deployment and integration in VANET is important. It provides swarm intelligence and utilizes a heuristic approach in solving VFC limitations.