# Setonix: Blockchain-Based Hierarchy Domain Name System for Web3
## 7 Related Works  
In this section, we will explore attempts to resolve the issues of conventional DNSs using blockchain, as well as cases where blockchain has been utilized to support access to Web3 and blockchain-based DNSs. The study in [31] pointed out that while a conventional DNS supports security extensions through DNSSEC, it does not inherently support encryption, and it allows for unwanted webpages and services to be censored by authoritarian regimes. To escape from such threats, alternative solutions for DNSs were explored, and one of the chosen options was blockchain-based DNSs. However, through actual experiments, it was demonstrated that blockchain-based DNSs also have potential for abuse, including the distribution and concealment of malware, exploitation of weak registration mechanisms, the permanence of malicious content and domains, as well as challenges related to system maintenance and trust. Based on these findings, this paper recognizes the vulnerabilities in blockchain-based DNS configurations and includes finding ways to improve them in future research. Ref. [32] proposes a solution to build a secure and reliable decentralized name service using blockchain technology to address the issues arising from the significant inherent design flaws of conventional DNSs. The advantages of blockchain-based DNSs include immutability, decentralization, and enhanced user authority. To explore this, the current state of blockchain-based name services is analyzed, focusing on ENSs. Figure 10: QPS for each DNS measured using the dnsperf program. Note that the y-axis representing QPS is on a log scale. ENS offers advantages such as the elimination of SPoF, guaranteed data immutability, and protection against various attacks like cache poisoning and DNS poisoning. However, it also has drawbacks, including the potential for abuse by attackers through squatting, malicious content, fraudulent addresses, as well as issues related to record permanence, complexity, and costs. This paper has clarified the strengths to adopt and the areas for improvement in blockchain-based DNS design through the analysis of existing blockchain-based DNSs from various perspectives, as discussed in the referenced paper. In particular, even if a good system is built, it will not be used if its complexity makes it difficult for users to access it. Therefore, we focused on ensuring that the system is easy for users to use. The study in [33] points out that conventional DNSs are vulnerable to both external attacks and internal threats due to their centralized structure, mentioning the 2002 incident in which 9 of the 13 root DNS servers were hit by a large-scale DDoS attack. It emphasizes not only external attacks such as DoS and reflection attacks but also the risks of internal attacks caused by malicious root servers. While the current DNS responds to external attacks through DNSSEC and BGP anycast, it still points out security vulnerabilities due to the potential for internal attacks. To address these issues, the paper proposes TD-root, which offers security through decentralized root-zone file management and the C-RAND consensus algorithm. This approach is expected to eliminate single points of failure (SPoF), prevent data tampering and censorship, and securely and efficiently protect the DNS. However, there is no mention of how users would actually use the system or generate their Web3 domains, which, like Handshake, makes it clear that TD-root's purpose is solely to replace the existing DNS, lacking broader objectives compared to Setonix. Ref. [34] points out that key components of the internet backbone, such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), DNS, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are vulnerable in terms of security, performance, and privacy due to their centralized architecture, and argues that blockchain can address these issues. The decentralization and security properties of blockchain can improve certificate transparency and revocation transparency in PKI, path validity in BGP, and the SPoF issue in DNSs. Ref.