## 6 Future Directions  
As IoT-based smart grids and smart energy systems are becoming more complex (with ICTs as the backbone), so do the security issues of these systems when they become more exposed to cyber spaces and the Internet. As smart grid initiatives grow, it is important to highlight that there are numerous research areas that need be studied in order to help improve smart grid security. It is important to note that the integration of various technologies to smart energy systems has led to cybersecurity issues, which has opened a spectrum of research areas. Each of these technologies has joined energy systems bringing their benefits as well as their cyber threats. Allowing customers to be involved actively in smart energy systems through buying and selling electricity as well as other activities, has also led to cybersecurity issues, which need to be studied. Due to all these reasons, proper future directions need to be investigated to tailor specific solutions for smart grids systems. Blockchain, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital twins are example of future directions that can play a critical role in enhancing the security of smart grids against cyberattacks while addressing the core principles of the CIA triad--confidentiality, integrity, and availability. With blockchain, data integrity is preserved, ensuring that unauthorized changes can be detected and reverted. AI can identify unusual patterns (e.g., sudden control system changes) and trigger defenses, while digital twins can simulate the grid's response, enabling recovery and continuity during the attack. What follows are detailed discussions on the main future directions that are of great importance and need to be researched and investigated to ensure smart grid high protection against cyber threats: \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline
**No.** & **Attack Types/Category** & **Compromised CIA Parameter** & **Vulnerable Network Layer** & **Ref.** \\ \hline
1 & Denial of Service (DoS) & Availability & Transport, MAC & [81, 82, 83] \\ \hline
2 & Jamming & Availability & MAC, Physical & [84, 110] \\ \hline
3 & Spoofing & Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality & Transport, MAC & [93, 94] \\ \hline
4 & Flooding, Buffer Flooding, HTTP Flooding & Availability & Application, Transport, MAC & [85, 86] \\ \hline
5 & Lowrate DoS (LDoS), & Availability & Application & [81] \\ \hline
6 & Buffer Overflow & Availability & Application, Transport & [87, 88] \\ \hline
7 & Masquerading & Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability & MAC & [35] \\ \hline
8 & Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) & Availability & Transport, MAC & [111] \\ \hline
9 & CPU Exhausting & Availability & Application & [35] \\ \hline
10 & Eavesdroping & Confidentiality & Physical & [90, 91] \\ \hline
11 & Traffic Analysis & Confidentiality & MAC & [98, 99] \\ \hline
12 & Unauthorized Access & Confidentiality & Application & [39, 77] \\ \hline
13 & Password Pilfering & Confidentiality & Transport & [40] \\ \hline
14 & Man in the Middle (MitM) & Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability & Transport, MAC & [100, 112] \\ \hline
15 & Sniffing & Confidentiality & Transport & [90, 101] \\ \hline
16 & Replay & Confidentiality, Integrity & Transport & [96, 97] \\ \hline
17 & Social Engineering & Confidentiality & Transport & [102] \\ \hline
18 & Data Injection Attacks, FDIA & Confidentiality, Integrity & Application, Transport & [46, 103] \\ \hline
19 & Tampering/Smart Meter Tampering & Integrity & Physical & [57, 104] \\ \hline
20 & Wormhole & Availability, Integrity & Transport & [43, 113] \\ \hline
21 & Time Synchronization (TSA) & Integrity, Availability & MAC, Physical & [105, 106] \\ \hline
22 & Load Drop Attacks & Integrity & Application, Transport & [108, 109] \\ \hline
23 & Covert & Integrity & Transport & [107] \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 4: Cyberattacks against smart grid with compromised CIA parameter and vulnerable grid network layer.