# Maritime Cyber Security: A Global Challenge Tackled through Distinct Regional Approaches
## 4 Findings and Discussion
An aggregated response of both European and Asian is demonstrated in Figure 4. As both groups consider classification societies to be the authority to assist the maritime transport sector in tackling cyber security, it is therefore the highest scoring sector, with 40%, while the second most suitable organizations for tackling cyber security in maritime transport are governments, with 20%. Therefore, as demonstrated in Figure 4, classification societies have more \"authority\" than governments due to the multinational nature of shipping. Figure 1: How important is information (cyber) security to your daily job and activities? **(a)** Europe; **(b)** Asia. Figure 2: How important is information (cyber) security to your daily job and activities? (Asia and Europe). Aiming to understand the diversification between the responses in the two groups, examination of the broader picture should not be neglected. Going beyond cyber security, shipping professionals in Europe rely on the IMO's authority to regulate the industry. Similarly, P&I clubs, created by shipping professionals themselves, have a long-standing tradition in handling claims. On the contrary, classification societies are the de-facto entities that define responses to all, short of regulatory requirements in Asia. As such, cyber security would be no different. Based on the findings of the previous questions, question 3 from Table 1 goes beyond the regulatory requirements and explores if the IMO resolution can effectively protect shipping from cyber breaches. As presented in the literature review, industry specific press has criticized the IMO cyber resolution as high level and not offering any tangible outcomes for its implementation, let alone specific steps for its inclusion in shipping companies' safety systems. Outcomes presented in Figure 5a,b are aggregated in Figure 6, and demonstrate findings regarding the IMO cyber resolution per region, Europe and Asia. The responses in Figure 6 are split, with half of the participants agreeing that the IMO 2021 cyber resolution  
Figure 4: Which agency is more suitable to assist and guide the maritime transport sector in addressing cyber security? (Asia and Europe). Figure 3: Which agency is more suitable to assist and guide the maritime transport sector in addressing cyber security? (a) Europe; (b) Asia. is the answer to cyber security for shipping and the other half either disagreeing or not being able to agree or disagree. This split in the responses, which is similar for both the European and Asian participants of the survey, highlights the issue that the IMO 2021 cyber resolution, unlike other IMO guidelines, does not provide a clear answer to the sector's needs. For example, the ballast water management and sulfur cap regulations provide clear instructions on their applications, followed by technical specifications. As demonstrated from the findings of the survey, the IMO cyber resolution does not clearly pass the message required to the sector. The reason for that is because the IMO resolution is more descriptive rather than prescriptive. Expanding on the previous question, the analysis explores the level of preparation for shipping companies when meeting the IMO 2021 resolution and, consequently, addressing cyber security. According to the practitioners who participated in the survey, and in contrast to the previous question, a difference between the responses in Europe and Asia was observed. While nearly half of the respondents in Europe believed that the sector is somewhat prepared (Figure 7a), a roughly similar percentage in Asia believed the opposite  
Figure 5: Is the IMO 2021 Cyber regulation the answer to cyber security for shipping? (**a**) Europe; (**b**) Asia. Figure 6: Is the IMO 2021 Cyber regulation the answer to cyber security for shipping? (Asia and Europe). (that the sector is somewhat unprepared, Figure 7b).