# A Simple Experimental Stand for Studying the Network Security Level of Power Electronic Devices
## 3 Related Work  
In [26], the authors address the challenges related to firmware security, vehicle charging safety, and power management security of connected electric vehicles. They have studied the vulnerabilities of electric vehicles to various cyber-attacks ranging from energy efficiency attacks to safety attacks. Simulations, including hardware in the loop studies, have been carried out to analyze the impact of cyber-attacks at both the power converter (device) and vehicle (system) level. The authors propose an architecture for the next generation of power electronics systems to address the cyber-physical security challenges of electric vehicles. The authors have also addressed potential research opportunities involving firmware vulnerability detection, model-based and data-driven detection and mitigation of these vulnerabilities. In [25], the authors focus on Grid-Connected Power Electronics Converters (GCPECs), providing a comprehensive literature review of existing results from selected sources in the aspects of vulnerabilities, countermeasures and test environments. By analyzing the GCPEC structure, the authors find that GCPEC vulnerabilities include both cyber and physical layers that are easily accessible to hackers. These vulnerabilities in both layers should be considered simultaneously and coordinated well with each other. Hardware protection is an essential approach to enhancing cybersecurity within the GCPEC. The authors find that detection and mitigation approaches must be taken into account for the complexity of the algorithms to be implemented and assess the limits of computational and data processing capabilities within the GCPEC while evaluating the feasibility and applicability of various techniques and methods to counter cyberattacks at test centers. In addition, countermeasures must comply with relevant standards to ensure the interoperability and cyber security of GCPEC devices in smart grids. Finally, based on the review and analysis, the authors have specified four recommendations for future research on the cybersecurity of GCPECs and their applications in smart grids. In [27], the authors present a network-level cybersecurity vulnerability assessment specific to synchrophasor measurement devices. A synchrophasor network is essential for a wide area metering system (WAMS) that collects time-synchronized data from multiple  
Figure 7: Replay attack. components of the power grid and facilitates the processing and transmission of this data. Hackers can use their knowledge of firmware and protocols to disrupt or damage the operation of the power system in an inconspicuous manner. However, exploitation can be limited or controlled if the operator is aware of the vulnerabilities. The authors have made a classification of attacks in the synchrophasor network. What type of resources and intelligence are sufficient to carry out an attack on field synchrophasor devices? They have identified and demonstrated what would happen if someone were to exploit the vulnerabilities found in the synchrophasor devices. The reverse-engineered attack by the authors focuses on capturing essential packet characteristics and consuming bandwidth during the three-way handshake between legitimate entities. The packet transmission delay gradually increases, leading to retransmission; thus, the legitimate link is terminated. Through their paper, the authors show, at the device level, reliable information regarding the gaps and weaknesses in field synchrophasor devices. The network security of a battery management system (BMS) is an essential factor to consider as more and more battery systems need internet connectivity for functionality such as intelligent monitoring, control and maintenance. In [28], the authors discuss the vulnerabilities that would lead to potential cyber-attacks.