# A Secure and Scalable Authentication and Communication Protocol for Smart Grids
## 6 Conclusions  
The proposed secure communication protocol addresses critical security challenges within smart grid environments with a comprehensive approach. By incorporating ECDSA- and ECDH-based key exchange in conjunction with AES-256, the protocol delivers robust authentication, secure key distribution, and reliable data encryption. Performance evaluations highlight its suitability for real-world deployment, achieving a total server-side execution time of 3.940 ms, a throughput of 288.27 requests per second on high-performance devices, and 21.79 requests per second on embedded platforms like ESP-8266. The protocol demonstrates a low power consumption of 37.77 W on average with an energy cost of 0.063 joules per request and resilience to network failures with an average recovery time of 3 ms. Minimal cryptographic overhead, efficient AES encryption (0.002-0.158 ms), and HMAC generation times (0.006-0.040 ms) further establish its adaptability for dynamic and resource-constrained environments such as smart grids.  
Future efforts will expand the protocol's capabilities to adapt to emerging technologies and tackle the challenges posed by quantum computing, especially concerning [PERSON]'s algorithm. Integrating post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions and exploring hybrid handshaking approaches will facilitate secure transactions in smart grid systems. Furthermore, upcoming research will focus on innovative security mechanisms, including physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and AI-driven anomaly detection to strengthen smart grid robustness.  
Conceptualization, A.M.: methodology, A.M. and M.A.H.: software, M.A.H. and K.H.S.: validation, A.M.: formal analysis, A.M., M.A.H. and K.H.S.: investigation, A.M.: resources, A.M.: data curation, M.A.H. and K.H.S.: writing--original draft preparation, M.A.H. and K.H.S.: writing--review and editing, A.M.: visualization, M.A.H. and K.H.S.: supervision, A.M.: project administration, A.M.: funding acquisition, A.M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.  
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), under Award Number DE-CR0000050. This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of theiremployees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.  
The code of the developed security protocol is available at: [[https://github.com/iscaas/DOE-CESER-2024-2027/tree/main/JCP_PKE](https://github.com/iscaas/DOE-CESER-2024-2027/tree/main/JCP_PKE)]([https://github.com/iscaas/DOE-CESER-2024-2027/tree/main/JCP_PKE](https://github.com/iscaas/DOE-CESER-2024-2027/tree/main/JCP_PKE)).  
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.