## 5 Conclusions  
In this study, for the first time, a multi-factor hash chain-based lightweight authentication scheme including T-OTP values applicable to VMF-based CNR networks was proposed. The existing military tactical message system using the VMF standard has potential vulnerabilities in terms of message integrity and authentication, which arise from the use of a digital signature algorithm based on SHA-1- and RSA-based encryption. Accordingly, through comparative analysis of previous studies based on pros and cons, in this study, a lightweight authentication scheme was proposed. This model could enhance the integrity of tactical message exchanges and reduce unnecessary network transactions and transmission bits for authentication flow in VMF-based CNR networks, while ensuring robustness with limited resources. In addition, by considering the actual limited military communication environment, such as HCTR, LCTR, TMCS, and unmanned ground and aerial system-based swarm communication, and presenting functional exception handling flows that are not implemented in the existing VMF military standard as a basis for possible cyber threats, military authentication processes applicable to small-scale combat situations can be practically constructed. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & **CKP (4)** & **LL (4)** & **RA (4)** & **LAO (4)** & **RR (4)** & **DI (4)** \\ \hline VMF [1] & O & O & O & O & X & X \\ [PERSON] et al. [12] & X & X & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [15] & X & \(\triangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [19] & X & \(\triangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [23] & X & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [24] & X & \(\triangle\) & X & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\triangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [25] & X & \(\triangle\) & O & X & \(\triangle\) & \(\triangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [26] & O & \(\triangle\) & O & \(\triangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) \\ [PERSON] et al. [27] & O & \(\blacktriangle\) & O & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) & \(\blacktriangle\) \\
**Our proposed authentication model** & **O** & **\(\blacktriangle\)** & **O** & **\(\blacktriangle\)** & **O** & **O** \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular} [Functional Satisfaction Score] (X = weak, \(\triangle\) = slightly weak, \(\blacktriangle\) = slightly strong, O = strong).  
\end{table} 
Table 9: Taxonomy of existing LSH hash chain-based authentication and proposed model. In the future, we intend to increase the reliability between wireless devices in the KVMF, and apply it in-depth as lightweight authentication in Korean Army network scenarios. Finally, the limitations of this study and plans for future research are as follows. * Because this hash chain-based study focused on the design and analysis of a lightweight authentication for a VMF standard, future studies will assess its quantitative performance through network load tests in TDL based on the Korean Army Corps network scenarios with related equations, pseudo codes, and compound All-IP- or non-All-IP-based wireless topologies. * During the re-authentication and re-validation phases, aiming to take advantage of the dedicated hash chain configured using the Byzantine fault tolerance property among other failure models in a distributed system, specific scenario-based schemes and attack graphs will be presented. In addition, they will be judged on their ability to be classified into specific tactical scenarios, including state machines for critical failure between actual operations. * To obtain a dynamic adaptation of the proposed authentication process for a rapidly changing battlefield environment, the responsiveness of each squad must be considered for the rapid deployment of various nodes and the successful execution of various tactics and strategies.