## 4 Results
### Japanese Experience on Development of Community Disaster Resilience
#### 4.2.3 July 2018 Torrential Rains Disaster and the Effect of Areal Regulation  
In the Takahama District, drills were initially conducted with the purpose of evacuation from the coastal areas to higher grounds. Such a scheme was developed based on the past experience of high-tide disasters and the expected damage caused by the Nankai Trough earthquake, which is expected to cause enormous damage. In other words, maritime threats were the most feared hazard in the district. However, in 2015, the Ehime prefecture set up a sediment disaster warning area in the district. This fact had a great impact on the area. In other words, they did not expect a sediment disaster to occur in their area. Before the establishment of the zone, the evacuation strategy of the community was to evacuate from the coastal area to higher ground. However, due to the establishment of the mentioned zone, it was realized that the designated evacuation zones at the higher grounds of the area were prone to sediment disasters. This areal regulation led to new activities in the region. First, a response plan was developed for each type of disaster. Second, the participatory disaster prevention map, prepared for marine-related hazards, was revised, and a new evacuation site was set up for sediment disasters. The new evacuation sites were marked on the map and communicated to the residents in the district. Figure 9: Disaster drills that included the participation of people with various professions from various generations [51]. This new approach helped to successfully avoid any casualty in the Takahama district during the sediment disaster caused by a prolonged heavy rainfall in July 2018. Known as the West Japan Torrential Rains, the disaster caused a large number of casualties, especially in Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime prefectures, while the number of evacuees reached 40,000, i.e., its peak [52]. In the morning of 6 July 2018, the day before the damage occurred, a sediment disaster warning was issued for the whole of Matsuyama City. This information triggered the voluntary disaster prevention organizations to start patrolling the district in the afternoon. During the patrol, they noticed an anomaly and confirmed a mudslide, which became the main reason to perform door-to-door socialization on the evacuation from around 6 p.m. Furthermore, due to the sense of imminence of the disaster, the residents requested Matsuyama City to issue an evacuation order. At 9 p.m., an evacuation order was issued for the area and a warning to evacuate was also issued by the local government. As a result, the information was delivered through a variety of channels, from the perspective of local residents who were familiar with the situation in their area, and from the government, which had the means to send out a simultaneous announcement. After that, the rain reached its peak from around 10 p.m. to midnight and mudslides, as well as debris flows, which occurred in 35 places in the district before dawn on the 7 July 2018. See Figure 10 for debris flowed into a residential area in the Takahama district. Although it was the first time for the district to experience a sediment disaster, the evacuation was carried out without waiting for instructions from the government and everyone was safe. This cooperation was possible because of the mutual understanding of the strengths of the voluntary disaster prevention organizations, which know the local community well, and the strengths possessed by the government. The government is able to deliver information such as evacuation advisories to many residents at the same time through area e-mails and disaster prevention administrative radios. This is a great advantage that the residents do not have. The voluntary disaster prevention organizations played a central role in the subsequent recovery and reconstruction of the district. The information was disseminated to the residents in the district using circular boards.