## 3 Results
### Cultural Differences by Demographic Variables  
#### 3.2.1 Differences by Company  
The comparative analysis of the six survey scales by the demographic variable \"company\" shows that, generally speaking, there is a high level of homogeneity between nuclear power plants (\(\delta<0.20\)) (Table 6, Figure 4). The only difference is found in the risk perception scale, which has a lower score in NPP2 than in NPP3, even if this difference is very small (NPP2 M = 4.07; NPP3 M = 4.41; \(\delta=-0.20\)). \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP1**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP2**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP3**} \\  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**(N = 533)**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**(N = 1975)**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**(N = 1818)**} \\ \hline
**Scales** & **N** & **M** & **SD** & **N** & **M** & **SD** & **N** & **M** & **SD** \\ \hline Hazard perception & 532 & 4.25 & 1.60 & 1973 & 4.07 & 1.66 & 1812 & 4.41 & 1.65 \\ Safety & 533 & 5.94 & 0.72 & 1974 & 5.91 & 0.70 & 1812 & 5.86 & 0.85 \\ SCWE & 532 & 4.61 & 1.49 & 1974 & 4.81 & 1.40 & 1811 & 4.58 & 1.42 \\ Planning & & & & & 1972 & 5.32 & 1.08 & 1805 & 5.48 & 1.07 \\ Adaptive capacity & & & & 1972 & 4.45 & 1.25 & 1805 & 4.57 & 1.36 \\ Overall resilience & & & & 1972 & 4.89 & 1.07 & 1806 & 5.02 & 1.13 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP1-NPP2**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP1-NPP3**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**NPP2-NPP3**} \\ \hline Hazard perception & 0.11 & & \(-\)0.10 & & \(-\)0.20 \\ Safety & 0.05 & & 0.10 & & 0.06 \\ SCWE & \(-\)0.14 & & 0.02 & & 0.16 \\ Planning & & & & & \(-\)0.15 \\ Adaptive capacity & & & & & \(-\)0.09 \\ Overall resilience & & & & & \(-\)0.13 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the scales by company. Figure 3: Global percentages of categorized BARS. The comparison between BARS attention to safety in the nuclear power plants provides quite a compact vision, as shown by Cohen \(\delta\) values (F(2476) = 0.835, \(p\) = 0.434; \(\delta\) < 0.20) (Table 7, Figure 5). However, it is worth noting that although the three nuclear organizations have a favorable vision of how the organization prioritizes safety, over 12% of personnel in NPP1 and NPP2 think there is a fragile balance between plant safety and production. The most negative visions on this topic (1.71%) are found in NPP 2 (Figure 6). The analysis of BARS formalization shows heterogeneity between the stations. Some differences are statistically significant (F(2141) = 4.399; \(p\) = 0.014) and have magnitudes with a moderate effect between NPP1/NPP3 (NPP1 M = 4.07; NPP3 M = 4.36; \(\delta\) = \(-\)0.47) and NPP2/NPP3 (NPP2 M = 3.92; NPP3 M = 4.36; \(\delta\) = \(-\)0.57) (Table 7, Figure 7). The larger number of employees with a critical score in terms of norm definition and procedure and method normalization is found in NPP2 (11.11%) (Figure 7). On the contrary, BARS resources allocation only shows a small and statistically insignificant difference (F(2180) = 0.921; \(p\) = 0.400) between NPP1 and the other two nuclear plants (NPP2 and NPP3)--with NPP1 more critical in terms of resources allocation. Results also reveal that opinions about resources allocation within the organization are quite polarized. Over 25% of personnel in NPP1 and NPP3 have a critical vision on this issue (Figure 8).