## 2 Motivation and Scenario  
The state of the art on supply chain advancements are studied across a wide range of products, industries, and markets, such as health products or food tracking. In order to highlight the issues considered in this research, we will focus on a specific and critical scenario in the context of the aerospace industry. In avionic manufacturing, the airplanes' basic components (i.e., actuation, propulsion, navigation, air-quality, etc.) might be manufactured by multiple different companies in a tiered approach [21], which ultimately converges to create a singular, sophisticated product: an airplane. In this scenario, not only does the plane have to pass through several validations and certification processes, but also,individually, each of the plane's parts is subject to specific regulations with their correlated verification. Passing through the certification process and proving adherence to the quality standards is complex and time-consuming. And still, risks brought by the supply chain are a source of problems more extensive than the design and equipment risks in the aerospace stand-alone devices [22]. For this reason, aerospace assemblers are interested in getting closer and raising the control over the second-tier suppliers to reach better coordination and increase competitivity [23]. In this context, the proposed approach aims to reduce risks and potential errors, mitigate costs, and increase the trust that due diligence is properly executed at all supply chain stages. Taking into consideration this context and motivation, in the following, we explain the reference use case of the current work. An authorized entity, e.g., a supply chain manager from an airplane assembler, when receiving a part (e.g., an instrument panel), identifies the part and obtains from a database the information regarding the manufacturer, the certificates, and the historical owners of this part. Then, this information can be used to validate whether the asset can be mounted on a plane. Finally, the manufacturer proves adherence to the quality standards in each of the components to a third-party reviewer, like a governmental administrator. Using the STRIDE methodology [24] and the analysts of [PERSON] and [PERSON]. [25], we identify the seven threats types of the use case in Table 1. These threats are particularly challenging in this scenario due to the nature of the supply chain, where any stakeholder is also considered a possible attacker if it can obtain an economic benefit in some way. For example, an airplane assembler performs a tamper attack to delete part of the life cycle of an asset to insert a cannibalized asset, saving money and still \"proving\" adherence to the quality standards, or a distributor may make a spoofing attack to duplicate the identity of an asset and insert a counterfeit in the supply chain. The threat analysis highlights that the link between physical parts and their cyber representation is a potential attack point that can lead to different threats to the supply chain. This emphasizes the necessity of a secure approach for parts hyperlinking and data storage. To mitigate the risks identified in a safety-critical industrial supply chain, the solution should be formulated in a way that does not rely exclusively on the trustworthiness of a single supply partner or an external party. Furthermore, the procedure should be designed as an easy-to-operate technology.