## 3 Results
### Scenario S2\({}_{x}\)  
A cooperative strategy is studied in each S2\({}_{x}\) scenario. Each dwelling supports the other as long as its battery is above \(SOC_{C}\). Between this value and \(SOC_{L}=20\%\) (minimum value considered as a limit), the dwelling reserves its energy for its own use. This strategy avoids some interruptions in one of the dwellings, while it allows them to help the other in some periods of time. With this strategy, it is also possible to take advantage of the energy surplus of one installation to charge the other's ESS, which would reduce the overall ENU. The key parameter for the study of this cooperative strategy is the value of \(SOC_{C}\). If \(SOC_{C}=SOC_{L}\), then all of the energy available in each dwelling can be shared with the other. This situation can be beneficial in global terms, but if the reliability of each dwelling or the consumption pattern is different, this shared strategy produces unequal benefits. The dwelling with the worst performance is greatly benefited, while the other may have a much lower improvement. This situation seems clearly unfair and it would be rejected by the dwelling with the best starting situation, since it would encourage dwellings to try to design their facilities with fewer resources and then take advantage of others' resources. Therefore, starting from this shared scenario called S2\({}_{20}\), the value of \(SOC_{C}\) will  
Figure 6: SMC results in Scenario S1 for the most representative indicators (ENS and LOLP). Figure 7: Generation and demand profiles during a week with the proposed design. be gradually increased to analyse the improvements obtained in each dwelling and find the best situation for both. Table 2 shows the global results of both dwellings and the individual results of S2\({}_{20}\). It is observed that this scenario produces better overall results than S1. As the table shows, there are significant improvements in reliability indices. However, dwelling D2, which was the one with the best initial results, is less benefited than D1. D2 is being more helpful to D1 than the other way around, which means that the situation is not fair, since the ideal scenario would be that both contributed in a similar way to improve the system. That is why the S2\({}_{30}\) scenario is simulated, in which every dwelling reserves an energy reserve to supply its own demand, so that it stops relying on the other dwelling when \(SOC_{C}=30\%\). The results of this scenario compared to scenario S1 are shown in Table 3.  
In this scenario, the results obtained by both dwellings are very similar. It would not be a good idea to arbitrarily raise the \(SOC\) threshold that has been set as a limit to stop sharing resources, that is \(SOC_{C}\), since then the support between the dwellings would decrease. For example, setting \(SOC_{C}=35\%\), scenario S2\({}_{35}\) is simulated, the results of which are shown in Table 4, compared again with those of scenario S1. As it can be seen, although the total results are very similar to the previous case, dwelling D2 is now the most favoured. Finally, if \(SOC_{C}\) is further increased to a value of \(SOC_{C}=40\%\), the results worsen, as seen in Table 5, where scenario S2\({}_{40}\) is compared with scenario S1. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline  & **ENU (Wh)** & **HNU (h)** & **ENS (Wh)** & **LOLP (\%)** \\ \hline D1 alone (S1) & 4,552,022.19 & 1825 & 133,083 & 2.70\% \\ D2 alone (S1) & 3,290,158.96 & 1584 & 80,284 & 2.38\% \\ D1 shared (S2\({}_{20}\)) & 4,283,190.49 & 1611 & 100,543 & 2.18\% \\ D2 shared (S2\({}_{20}\)) & 3,252,527.15 & 1514 & 67,712 & 2.13\% \\ S1 (global) & 7,842,181.15 & 1705 & 213,368 & 2.54\% \\ S2\({}_{20}\) (global) & 7,535,717.64 & 1563 & 168,255 & 2.15\% \\ \hline \multicolumn{5}{l}{S2\({}_{20}\) improvement compared to S1 (\%)} \\ \hline D1 & 5.91 & 11.75 & 24.45 & 19.09 \\ D2 & 1.14 & 4.42 & 15.66 & 10.58 \\ Average & 3.91 & 8.34 & 21.14 & 15.10 \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 2: Scenario S1 vs. scenario S2\({}_{20}\).