# Security Architecture for Cloud-Based Command and Control System in IoT Environment
## 7 Conclusions  
The Korean military is considering the integration of cloud computing technology into the defense command control information system with the development of cloud computing technology. However, the security requirements of the existing Korean military information system cannot effectively solve security vulnerabilities owing to cloud computing. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the U.S. military to apply new cloud security requirements. That is, the current defense information system security requirements lack the security requirements for cloud integration, and the security requirements for virtualization and cloud service asset management should be additionally applied. In addition, data security, network security, access control, and risk management requirements are required in the cloud environment. Therefore, we analyzed various security requirements for national defense and cloud computing, and then proposed a security architecture of a cloud-based Korean C4I system based on the security requirements derived. The future cloud-based Korean C4I security architecture is divided into the virtualization, physical and operational layers, and comprises security aspects for each element. The authentication and access control of the OV, unlike the existing C4I system, include a sequence of authenticating users and access services with a centralized IdAM. Furthermore, in order to show the feasibility of our proposed security architecture, we developed and tested an authentication and access control module for C4I service examples using \"OpenStack\", an open-source cloud platform.  
As mentioned previously, the main contribution of this research is to propose a new security architecture for the cloud-based C4I system. Despite the considerable research relating to cloud computing and IoT, little attention has focused on applying these technologies to the C4I system in the IoMT environment. Furthermore, most research has focused on the capabilities of cloud technology rather than any security concerns of national defense. In addition, research topics dealing with confidential information, such as the national defense sector, make it difficult for researchers to obtain relevant information. In particular, the C4I system is a closed and protected environment, and can only be accessed and used by pre-authorized users. Hence, it is difficult to propose a new security architecture for the future C4I system in IoMT and IoBT environments.  
The authors contribute of this paper as follows: [PERSON] wrote this article, analyzed and derived the security requirements; [PERSON]-G.K. supervised and coordinated the investigation; [PERSON]-[PERSON] performed and coordinated the implementation; [PERSON] inspected this article and coordinated the investigation. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.  
This research was supported by C2 integrating and interfacing technologies laboratory of Agency for Defense Development (UD180012 ED).  
The authors declare no conflict of interest.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Name** & **Existing C4I System** & **Cloud-Based C4I System** \\ \hline Inter-working among & Limited Interworking: Interworking & \\ Army/Navy/Air Force C4I & between KJCCS and other C4I systems & C4I service can be accessed depending on \\  & & the user’s authority. \\ \hline IdAM & Separated IdAM on each C4I system. & Centralized IdAM \\ \hline Authentication Factor & ID, password for the user’s C4I system, & ID, password, and secondary \\  & ID, Pwd for the KJCCS system and & authentication factor (biometric \\  & encryption module. & information, cryptographic module, etc.) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 5: Comparison between Existing C4I System and Cloud-based C4I System.