## 4 Discussion  
In this scheme, the identity provider solely offers decentralized identity (DID), without interfering with the address of the subsequent identity user involved in logistics. The logistics company can access the actual addresses of the senders or receivers, but cannot associate the addresses with the users' real identities or any other information. Consequently, internal logistics staff is restricted from indiscriminately accessing users' identity data throughout the course of logistics transportation. The logistics process usually involves the participation of multiple entities such as logistics companies, delivery centers, users, etc. In contrast to other domains, the logistics sector also encompasses the phase of freight transportation. Therefore, beyond the scope of internal data breaches, the logistics realm also confronts the risks of theft or manipulation during transportation. The following paragraphs analyze this from each of the perspectives of privacy and security. From the privacy perspective, each time the user logs in with a one-time-use account, the logistics company cannot ascertain the actual identities of the senders or receivers. Instead, the logistics company only identifies the person actually responsible for sending and receiving the package, which can also be supervised. The design of the one-time-use account based on the DID minimizes the disclosure of identity information. With the design, it becomes challenging for the logistics company to correlate the user's multiple different addresses with identity information. At the same time, it reduces the amount of information obtained by other parties during the transportation process, thereby enhancing privacy and reducing the risk of data leakage. Additionally, the scheme allows senders and recipients to hide the address information from each other, which could reduce instances of unscrupulous merchants using address and phone number information to retaliate for negative reviews. From the security perspective, if the private key is lost, the courier will continue to deliver goods according to the currently set path, with only modifying and viewing privileges being lost. The sender and recipient can contact the logistics company to change the route by co-signing. If the private key is stolen, the attacker will have the ability to modify the logistics information. However, stealing the goods requires a real identity, rendering arbitrary modification of logistics information meaningless. Regulators have access to identity data and wallet accounts held by identity providers and users to associate real identities with wallet accounts for the purposes of sanctions or criminal investigations. This helps ensure the safety and integrity of the logistics process. Importantly, regulators provide evidence of malicious behavior in the account to be investigated before the identity provider grants access to corresponding identity data. To prevent the concentration of power in a few regulators, corresponding laws and supervision mechanisms must be in place. To avoid the situation where regulators become overly powerful and force identity providers to disclose user data, identity providers should have at least the same powers as regulators. Figure 9: Connecting test tokens to the account wallet can be used for trading. In terms of the traditional models, such as where logistics companies hide information on express delivery orders, companies cannot be prevented from abusing information. Thus, protection of user privacy is solely reliant on the companies' conscientiousness. However, companies often have internal attackers and the databases often face hacker attacks. As long as one logistics company is breached, a large amount of user information will be leaked. This scheme reduces the value of information held by logistics companies as an overall mechanism, prevents internal intrusions, and protects user data privacy.