## 5 Conclusions
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**ID** & **Item** & **Question** & **1** & **2** & **3** & **4** & **5** \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{L1} & \multirow{4}{*}{Selection criteria} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{What types of OrIs incidents or} \\  & & near-misses are investigated (e.g., only & No clear criteria for selecting events & Events are rarely selected based on & Events are sometimes selected for & Most events are & All OrIs events are \\  & & severe accidents or also near-misses)? & No clear criteria & Events are sometimes selected based on & selected for & Consistently selected \\  & & where criteria (e.g., injury severity) & to investigate & clear criteria & frequency or severity, & investigation based on & based on well-defined \\  & & for detailed investigation? & for detailed investigation? & for detailed investigation? & for detailed investigation? & for detailed investigation? & for detailed investigation? & and for detailed investigation? \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{L2} & \multirow{4}{*}{Learning basis} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{Does the organization learn from} \\  & & positive events (e.g., instances where) & The system learns from sources, & The system rarely & The system sometimes & The system often & integrates learning from both & \\  & & employees avoid accidents through & never from & primarily focusing & but mostly & successes and failures in a \\  & & negative ones (e.g., actual accidents)? & & & & & \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{3-10}  & & How are OrIs incidents described, & There is no system & Incidents are rarely & Incidents are classified or & Most incidents are & comprehensively \\  & & classified, and categorized (e.g., based & for classifying or & classified or & inconsistently or with & \\  & & on type of injury, location, & categorization incidents & meaningful way & Limited structure & and categorized & \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{3-10}  & & \multicolumn{6}{c}{Are there formal procedures for} \\  & & collecting, analyzing and learning from & There are no formal & Procedures are informal and & & Procedures are mostly & Procedures are in place \\  & & OHS incidents (e.g., root cause analysis, & procedures in place & inconsistently applied & they are not & \\  & & safety debriefs)? & & always followed & and followed & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{L5} & \multirow{4}{*}{Training} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{Is the formal training on how to} \\  & & collect and analyze safety data? & There is no & There is no & Training is minimal & Some training is & Adequate training is & \\  & & employees and supervisors trained on & training provided & and insufficient & & provided, but it & provided to all relevant \\  & & how to apply lessons learned from & & & needs improvement & occasional gaps & staff, ensuring effective \\  & & past incidents? & & & & & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{L6} & \multirow{4}{*}{Learning style} & \multicolumn{6}{c}{Is learning from safety incidents} \\  & & continuous (e.g., integrated into regular & & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & safety meetings or only triggered by & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & specific events (e.g., after a & & & & \\ \cline{1-1}  & & major accident)? & & & & \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{3-10}  & & & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 13: Ability to Learn (OHs in Manufacturing Context). \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**ID** & **Item** & **Question** & **1** & **2** & **3** & **4** & **5** \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{A1} & \multirow{4}{*}{Expertise} & What kind of expertise is used to anticipate future OrS risks (e.g., inhouse safety experts, external) & No expertise is used to anticipate future risks & Minimal expertise is available, and it is often insufficient & Expertise is mostly sufficient and specific manufacturing knowledge? & Expertise is mostly sufficient, comprehensive, and consistently applied \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{A2} & \multirow{4}{*}{Frequency} & How often are future OrS threats (e.g., potential risks from new machinery, changes in production lines) assessed?