## 2 Related Works
[23] proposed a lightweight AKA scheme for UAV communication between new users and nodes without the aid of gateway nodes, adopting hash functions and XOR operations, which did not resist man-in-the-middle attacks and node simulation attacks, and does not provide anonymity protection for nodes. [PERSON] et al. [24] proposed an improved AKA scheme to address the shortcomings in the scheme of literature [23], which overcooked the shortcomings in the scheme of literature [23] but was not resistant to known specific temporary information attacks and user simulation attacks, etc. [PERSON] et al. [25] found security problems in the scheme of literature [24] and proposed a smartcard-based AKA scheme, but it still may be subject to smart card loss attacks and offline password guessing attacks. [PERSON] et al. [26] proposed a new signature-based elliptic curve AKA scheme. This approach features increased communication and computational overhead compared to previous approaches. [PERSON] et al. [27] proposed a new lightweight user AKA scheme for deploying Internet of Drones (IoD) setups. The scheme relied on a fuzzy extractor, a one-way cryptographic hash function and a bitwise anomaly operation. However, the proposed authentication protocol was vulnerable to session-specific temporary message attacks when the powerful Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) adversary stole temporary keys. In addition, the scheme failed to provide session key agreement. To overcome this shortcoming, [PERSON] et al. [28] proposed an improved alternative scheme. The summary of the related works is given in Table 1. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline
**Schemes** & **Techniques Applied** & **Advantages** & **Limitations** \\ \hline Ref. [9] & \begin{tabular}{c} Certificate-free tag key \\ encapsulation mechanism. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The solution significantly improves \\ computational efficiency. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The solution was not resistant to \\ drone capture attacks. \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline Ref. [15] & \begin{tabular}{c} White-Box Cryptography (WBC). \\ Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} Considering also security properties \\ such as confidentiality, integrity, \\ and non-repudiation. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The scheme was vulnerable under \\ man-in-middle attack. \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline Ref. [16] & \begin{tabular}{c} Long-Term Evolution (LTE). \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The authors discussed in depth \\ security attributes such as \\ authentication, confidentiality, \\ and integrity. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The scheme required high \\ maintenance costs because of the \\ LTE involved. \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline Ref. [18] & \begin{tabular}{c} A bilinear \\ pairing-based algorithm. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The scheme is resistant to known \\ attacks that affect confidentiality and \\ mutual authentication. \\ \end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c} The cost of asymmetric bilinear \\ pairing was very high. \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline Ref. [19] & \begin{tabular}{c} RFID tag that provides a \\ unique identification. \\ \end{tabular} & \
\begin{tabular}{c} The scheme ensures confidentiality, \\ availability, and \\ privacy-preservation requirement. \\ \end{tabular} &
\begin{tabular}{c} The scheme lacked mutual \\ authentication, which makes the \\ system vulnerable to \\ man-in-the-middle attacks and \\ simulation attacks. \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: The summary of the related works.