## 3 Literature Survey
The authors in [56], provided an exhaustive analysis from the perspective of protocols, vulnerabilities, and preemptive architectonics. Four distinct developments are investigated, including cryptography, fog computing, edge computing and Machine Learning (ML), to extend the degree of IoT security. The authors [57] discussed case studies of major cybersecurity attacks on ICS infrastructures. They described attacks in terms of the goal and the consequences. In [58], the authors reviewed the SCADA system architectures and comparative analysis of some communication protocols, followed by attacks on such systems. They presented a short investigation of the current state of intrusion detection techniques in SCADA, followed by a brief study of testbeds for scada systems. The work in [59] analyzed the research landscape about Deep Learning (DL) approaches applied to IoT security. The study is based on three main research questions, namely, the security aspects involved, the used DL network architectures and the engaged datasets. The paper highlights the drawbacks and vulnerabilities of the DL approaches in the IoT security scenarios. In [60], the authors analyzed how the different IoT platforms handle security and privacy vulnerabilities affecting the most common security services of confidentiality, integrity, availability and access control. The work [61] investigated various opportunities and threats of using artificial intelligence (AI) technology in the manufacturing sector with consideration for offensive and defensive uses of such technology. The work in [62] presented an analytical study of detecting anomalies, malicious activities, and cyber-attacks in a cyber-physical of critical water infrastructure in the IIoT infrastructure. The study uses various machine learning algorithms to classify the anomaly events including several attacks and IIoT hardware failures. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) publishes a series of good practice guides on the industrial systems security. The documents [63; 64] propose measures focused on particular issues, both strategic and organizational and addressed to political decision-makers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a guide on the security of industrial systems [65]. Its content is very similar to ISO 27019. The Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) based in United Kingdom published a series of guides on the security of industrial systems [66]. They offer a high level vision by proposing strategic, managerial and organizational practices. The topics covered range from risk analysis to third party risk management and incident response. These guides are supplemented by documents which provide technical information on issues such as security audits of industrial systems. The international standard IEC/CEI 62645 [67] is the benchmark for the safety of industrial systems in the nuclear field. It emphasizes the fact that security measures must not conflict with operational safety measures. The international standard IEC/CEI 62351 [68] aims to develop the security of communications protocols used in the distribution of electricity (power grid), targeting dedicated protocols. The standard offers protection measures in accordance with the state of the art in terms of security (use of the TLS protocol, public key infrastructure, etc.). The American Gas Association (AGA) has published a series of guides called Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications [69]. These guides analyze the possibility of adding Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to existing programmable logic controllers and SCADA to allow them to use cryptographic primitives. The Cyber Security Forum Initiative (CSFI) published a guide called CSFI ATC (Air Traffic Control) Cyber Security Project [70]. Thisdocument offers a technical analysis of the risks and countermeasures targeting the field of air traffic control.