# Pressure on Judges: How the Budgeting System Can Impact on Judge's Autonomy
## 2 From \"Justice as a Power\" to \"Justice as a Public Service\"  
\"A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason\"3. \"A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.\"4 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct establish six guidelines for the ethical conduct of judges: Independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, competence and diligence. Independence is the first value: In most of the countries, judicial independence is enshringed in the Constitution. Footnote 3: The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, 25–26 November 2002—Principle 1.1. The \"separation of powers\" principle, according to [PERSON] (1748), implies that the three powers (executive, legislative and judicial) must be separated and independent from each other. Each power must check and limit the other two powers, and all three powers should have the same weight (\"check and balance\" principle). In this model, judges should be independent of external and internal pressures. Nevertheless, the budget can be a source of pressure and can influence the judicial independence. First, despite the separation of powers principle, the judicial funding is in the hands of the other two powers, which have some \"extra weapons\" and can potentially reduce the judicial budget if some disagreements between the branches arise ([PERSON] and [PERSON], 2004). Secondly, if judges' salaries are not adequate, judges can be vulnerable to undue influences. A proper amount of budget allocated to judicial training can also improve the integrity and the competence of the court staff. If, on the one hand, the dependence from executive or parliamentary driven funding mechanisms can affect judicial independence, on the other hand, an \"excessive financial independence of the judiciary could be used by some judiciary to shield themselves against legitimate reform efforts and reasonable expectation regarding performance5\"(The World Bank, 2011). Footnote 5: The World Bank 2011, p. 15). For these reasons, according to the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) guidelines, a funding mechanism based upon transparent criteria is necessary to maintain the independence of the judiciary, as long as the judiciary is closely involved in setting these criteria (European Network of Council for the Judiciary (ENCJ), 2016). \"Within the ENCJ the prevailing opinion is that a more business-like approach to management and finance is desirable, as it promotes, on the one hand, the functioning of the courts, and gives stronger incentives for the efficient use of public funds. On the other hand, it promotes the independence of the judiciary by making one of the vulnerable links between the judiciary and the other state powers much more transparent: More cases means more budget; otherwise court delays will increase6,7 ([PERSON] and [PERSON], 2013). Footnote 6: ([PERSON] and [PERSON], 2013). The \"performance-based budgeting\" models, as explained in the next paragraphs, link the funding to performance criteria, allocating money proportionally to the results. If, on the one hand, these models increase transparency and reduce the risk of arbitrary resources allocation and influence from the executive, on the other hand, they restrict the judicial autonomy by strengthening the control by court managers on judges' activities and self-organization.