## 4 Results  
A Network Simulator (ns-2.34) is used to create the wireless network environment. A network environment that explores the potential of SOPR-BEER is planned for the development of a Secure Optimal Path-Routing Protocol (SOPR) along with a Balanced Energy-Efficient and Reliable (BEER) algorithm to save energy. The simulation is executed in the environment with 100 nodes with a 250 \(\times\) 250 square-meter terrain area. The environment uses a wireless channel and omnidirectional antenna. The results are compared with the existing works of [44; 45]. The simulation parameters for the network and the SOPR-BEER parameters are highlighted in Table 2.  
The existing works discussed the increasing number of black-hole triggers, in addition to route detection. In Figure 7, pro-SOPR-BEER, the average time to find a black hole indicates that adversary nodes masquerading as black holes are detected faster than ATTEMPT, M-ATTEMPT, and algorithm proposed in [45] The detection is faster because black-hole discovery is only performed locally in pro-SOPR-BEER. However, alternative path requests are sent from the source node to the intermediate node's next hop in ATTEMPT, M-ATTEMPT, and algorithm proposed in [45] to check the route authenticity. The discovery of the black-hole node is significantly delayed by this method of verification.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c} \hline \hline
**Parameters Used** & **Value** \\ \hline Region of sensor fields & 250 \(\times\) 250 \\ \hline Location of the Base Station & 50 \(\times\) 100 \\ \hline Maximum number of nodes & 100 \\ \hline Maximum number of rounds & 1500 \\ \hline Propagation model & Free-space and Multipath fading channel model \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 2: Simulation parameters.  
Figure 7: Route-discovery overheads.  
In Figure 7, the overhead message to create a secure path against numerous non-cooperative black-hole attacks is displayed. Although data are being transmitted, there exist packet overheads over the communication network. The overhead in the existing work involves the message overhead in the response to the route and in the exploration of the path. Even when the number of attack nodes surges, the message overhead for pro-SOPR-BEER is almost the same, which remains consistent with the result of a computational cost analysis of T(N), where N denotes the number of sensor nodes in the wireless environment. However, it is significantly less than in existing systems. The above process is due to the black-hole node being found locally in pro-SOPR-BEER. However, in the existing work, if the route response is received by the source node, a route request is additionally sent to the black-hole node's subsequent hop to validate the route response. Consistent with the results of computational cost analysis in existing studies, increasing the number of attacks results in the detection of additional routes.  
In Figure 8 pro-SOPR-BEER, the average time to find a black-hole node indicates that adversary nodes masquerading as black holes are detected faster compared to existing works. The detection of the black hole is faster because the discovery is performed locally in pro-SOPR-BEER. However, the source sensor node initiates an alternative path request to the intermediate node's next hop in ATTEMPT and M-ATTEMPT to check the route authenticity. The discovery of the black-hole node is significantly delayed by this method of verification.