# A Survey on Energy Drainage Attacks and Countermeasures in Wireless Sensor Networks
## 4 Recent Review Based on State-of-the-Art Works for Energy Drain Attack
### Application Layer  
As a representative application of WSNs, a target tracking and monitoring system requires location information that is acquired by localization algorithms. During localization procedures based on relationships with neighbors, the node is highly vulnerable to localization attacks. This phenomenon implies that the DoS attack on this localization system can be severe and energy-consuming. In this section, we will review the localization attack and its countermeasures in WSNs.  
[PERSON] et al. [84] addressed the problem of node localization in the presence of DoS attacks and proposed the distributed iterative localization (DILOC) algorithm while assuming a general attack model. Because the existing DILOC algorithm is assumed to work in aperfect communication environment, it cannot achieve localization under attack. To work correctly in the DoS attack, a novel extended abandonment strategy (AS)-DILOC algorithm is proposed. This model is based on the barycentric coordinates, which are based on relative distance measurement. If a packet is lost due to a DoS attack, a sensor node abandons the location estimation to prevent inaccurate computation. Based on this AS-DILOC algorithm, extended research work in mobile sensor networks was presented in [85]. In mobile sensor networks, communication between sensor nodes is intermittent. Therefore, it poses time-varying characteristics for communication networks. To support the technical challenges posed by time-varying network topology in mobile sensor networks, their extended version involved graph composition and a substochastic matrix. [PERSON] et al. [86] proposed a localization scheme to overcome attacks, specifically independent and collusion attacks, using two algorithms, namely the improved randomized consistency position algorithm (IRCPA) and the enhanced attack-resistant secure localization algorithm by combining the voting method, location optimization, and the PSO algorithm paradigm. The model focuses on mitigating the impacts of localization attacks on the anchor nodes, as well as calculating the fitness value for anchor nodes. In an IRCPA operation, the unknown node under collusion attack is localized using three random anchor nodes and PSO optimization. Prior to measuring the distance between the anchor node, the attack is detected using the trilateral detection method. If the anchor node is attacked, then the anchor nodes violate the trilateral detection conditions. In this case, localization is performed without affecting anchor nodes by excluding malicious nodes.  
Unlike the two studies mentioned previously, [PERSON] et al. [87] proposed the localization method against wormhole attacks with the distance vector hop (DV-HOP) algorithm. The original DV-HOP positioning process involves (1) determining the minimum hop value between beacon nodes, (2) calculating the average hop distance between beacon nodes, and (3) determining the distance between it and each beacon node. To extend the DV-HOP for the wormhole attack, changing the hop count between the beacon nodes is critical to remove ties between them. If the wormhole node is detected, then the hop count is adjusted. After computing a node's location, this information is sent using a broadcast method and compared with one in each node. If the distance between the two nodes is sufficiently large, then the location of the wormhole link can be determined.