## 5 Results
### Second Phishing Attack
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Department** & **Number of Persons** & **Number of People Endangered in the Second Attack** \\ \hline Higher education & 41 & 3 \\ Sale & 26 & 1 \\ Lifelong learning & 11 & 0 \\ Infrastructure & 4 & 0 \\ Marketing & 4 & 0 \\ IT & 9 & 0 \\ Business Areas & 4 & 0 \\ Educational consulting and eLearning & 3 & 0 \\ Finance & 2 & 0 \\ Projects & 6 & 0 \\ Management & 1 & 0 \\ Propaedeutics Business Area & 1 & 0 \\ Professional Services Sector & 1 & 0 \\ Vice-Rector’s Office for Quality & 1 & 0 \\ N/a & 3 & 0 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 8: Users by department in the second attack. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Age Group** & **Number of Persons** & **Number of People Endangered in the Second Attack** \\ \hline
20–29 & 23 & 0 \\
30–39 & 42 & 1 \\
40–49 & 34 & 3 \\
50–59 & 3 & 0 \\ N/a & 15 & 0 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 9: The details of the attack per age group. outcomes and assessing the potential impact of structured education on phishing awareness and readiness. Attendance data from Moodle was exported to an Excel sheet for analysis, offering a direct tabular format due to the lack of a simplified graphical reporting option in Moodle. Table 11 displays the distribution of users by department and their corresponding completion rates for the phishing awareness course assigned to Group B. A chi-square test for independence was conducted to assess whether departmental affiliation influenced the likelihood of course completion. The result (\(\chi^{2}\)(10, N = 130) = 9.14, \(p\) = 0.519) revealed no statistically significant differences across departments. These findings suggest that factors beyond the organizational unit, such as individual engagement, perceived relevance, or institutional encouragement, may have played a more significant role in determining training completion rates. To enhance the effectiveness of educational interventions, future strategies may need to incorporate more targeted motivational or supervisory mechanisms. Table 12 analyzes compromise rates by age group during the second phishing simulation. A chi-square test was performed to determine whether the likelihood of falling victim to phishing significantly varied across age categories. The result (\(\chi^{2}\)(5, N = 119) = 8.84, \(p\) = 0.116) did not reach statistical significance, although the 40-49 age group accounted for the most significant number of compromised users. These findings suggest a possible trend that merits further investigation into larger or repeated samples but do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that age was a statistically reliable predictor of phishing susceptibility in this simulation round. Table 13 presents phishing compromise data stratified by professional qualifications during the second simulation. A chi-square test for independence revealed no statistically significant differences across qualification levels (\(\chi^{2}\)(4, N = 120) = 7.74, \(p\) = 0.101). \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c} \hline \hline
**Professional Qualifications** & **Number of Persons** &
\begin{tabular}{c} **Number of People Endangered** \\ **in the Second Attack** \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline Secondary education & 21 & 0 \\ Higher education & 17 & 0 \\ University degree & 58 & 3 \\ Doctorate & 6 & 1 \\ N/a & 15 & 0 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 10: Users per professional qualifications. While users with secondary education exhibited a proportionally higher rate of compromise, and those with advanced degrees showed lower rates, the results did not reach statistical significance. These findings suggest a potential trend that warrants further exploration in larger studies. Still, they do not support a definitive conclusion regarding educational background as a determinant of phishing susceptibility. The second phase of this study entailed a comparative evaluation of two unique interventions: direct phishing simulation (Group A) and structured educational training (Group B).