# EBR: Routing Protocol to Detect Blackhole Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
## 3 Proposed Protocol
### EBR Routes Properties
Therefore, our proposed mechanism necessitates similar routing space as the case of AOMDV implementation. Other protocols are similar, such as SUPERMAN [27]. However, SUPERMAN has a lot of overhead when the number of nodes increases. Algorithms 1 and 2 will be employed and run periodically to filter out the routes returned by AOMDV to avoid data transmission through suspicious routes (passing though blackhole nodes) or congested routes. If routes to the destination node are not available at the sender end, a route discovery process will be initiated though triggering the AOMDV protocol together with Algorithm 3, and hence multiple reliable routes will be provided. Filtering routes using EBR will not affect the processing time of the route selection using AOMDV. On the other hand, data communication through those reliable routes will save time, obviously, through reducing the data retransmissions. This was shown in the simulation results compared to other mechanisms, where network performance is enhanced. ## 6 Conclusions

The paper introduced a new concept that is able to detect and prevent malevolent intruders and also selects less congested routes. This is accomplished through a protocol that behaves normally to lure a malicious node to give a sign of its suspicious behavior. We presented an Enhanced Blackhole Resistance (EBR) protocol that can be integrated into any reactive routing mechanism in MANETs. Each node can determine the confidence level of neighboring nodes through employing a combination of time to live (TTL) and round trip time (RTT), and this in turn can determine the existence of the blackhole node(s). Out of the safe available routes, EBR would select the path with the minimum RTT, which implies the least congested routes. Our introduced protocol does not require the use of cryptographic methods, and this in turn preserves energy and computational resources. Additionally, EBR does not demand any special packets, and, therefore, the routing overhead is minimal. Figure 2:7 Routing overhead vs. number of nodes (with attack). Simulation results showed that the EBR protocol provides an obvious improvement of the network performance compared to AODV, AOMDV, and SUPERMAN. The proposed technique is successful in detecting blackhole nodes in a limited time, irrespective of the number of malicious nodes in a route and the time they are joining the network. Conceptualization, D.K. and H.E.-O. ; methodology, D.K. and H.E.-O. ; software, D.K. ; validation, D.K. ; formal analysis, D.K. and H.E.-O. ; investigation, D.K. and H.E.-O. ; resources, D.K. ; data curation, D.K. ; writing--original draft preparation, D.K. ; writing--review and editing, H.E.-O. ; visualization, D.K. ; supervision, H.E.-O. ; project administration, H.E.-O. ; funding acquisition, No funding. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. This research received no external funding. The authors declare no conflict of interest. ## References

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