## 5 Resilience Assessment for Smart Power and Telecommunication: Case Study  
The electric power network is considered one of the most crucial infrastructures in the event of a hazardous occurrence. Scientists have identified failure types of electric power infrastructure and the consequences of power outages following natural or human-made disasters [62]. The core critical facilities of the electric power infrastructure include generation power plants, transmission substations, and transmission and distribution lines. Transmission lines connect generation power plants to transmission substations, which deliver high-voltage electricity over long distances. If any of these plants or materials are physically damaged or if supporting infrastructures such as operation systems collapse, the electric power infrastructure may experience severe effects and potentially a complete failure [63]. In addition to the power grid, telecommunication infrastructure is also considered one of the leading critical infrastructures in smart cities, providing a pathway for data transmission. The fundamental connections can be classified into three different levels: landlines, airwaves, and satellite links [64]. Both systems are interdependent on each other, and various resilience approaches have been proposed to overcome the failure event in any of the systems that develop after a disaster occurs [65; 66]. In this section, we present a case study that demonstrates essential measures for assessing the resilience of interdependent electrical and communication grids. The case study examines the feasibility and applicability of the General Resilience (GR) quantitative method for the Swiss electric power supply system (EPSS), which is considered an exemplary application. The study conducted by [PERSON] et al. [67] utilizes a hybrid modeling simulation approach to represent the behavior and functionalities of each subsystem, as shown in Figure 18. The EPSS is viewed as three interrelated subsystems, including the system under control (SUC), the operational control system (OCS), and the social system (SS). SUC and OCS are regarded as technical systems, while SS is viewed as non-technical. The resilience capabilities, including the absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capability, are identified and integrated into a unique resilience metric, which combines these capabilities into a comprehensive view of the system's resilience in different phases. The metric proposed is the General Resilience (GR), which integrates measures of robustness (R), rapidity (RAPI), performance loss (PL), the time-averaged performance loss (TAPL), and recovery ability (RA) into a simultaneous quantification. This metric is unique in its complete dependence on time and ability to merge all three required capabilities. The case study deploys a two-layer Agent-Based Simulation Modeling approach to integrate time-dependent stochastic factors into the vulnerability assessment of the electric power system. The simulation is based on the assumption that a natural hazard, such as a winter storm, impacts the central zone of Switzerland, where power transmission lines are located, resulting in the disconnection of 17 transmission lines out of 219 lines. The analysis is a causal data analysis that investigates what happens to one variable when another variable changes. Overall, this case study demonstrates how the GR method (3) can be utilized to estimate the interdependent resilience index of the EPSS. The proposed method and metric provide a holistic view of the system's resilience and allow for comparisons across multiple systems and configurations. The study highlights the importance of considering interdependent infrastructures and the need for a comprehensive approach to resilience assessment. The Swiss high-voltage electric power supply system (EPSS) is illustrated in Figure 19, which consists of 219 transmission lines and 129 substations.