###### Abstract
Regardless of the theoretical validity of a pricing scheme, if it imposes excessive financial burdens on existing market participants, its implementation in the actual electricity market becomes challenging. Moreover, it may also cause social problems owing to substantial stranded costs [22]. Furthermore, unforeseen challenges may arise during the pricing-scheme transition, such as the potential for abuse of market power [23]. For instance, in markets wherein a single entity plays multiple roles (e.g., as both a transmission company and a retailer), the transition to more granular pricing could result in conflicts of interest and market inefficiencies. Considering these complexities, a comprehensive quantitative analysis of pricing-scheme transitions is crucial. Such research can identify the financial impacts on market participants and the potential social risks that may occur during the transition process. This proactive approach is essential for formulating an appropriate pricing transition pathway that balances improved market efficiency with stability, thereby contributing to more sustainable electricity markets. Previous studies have recognized the importance of this issue and attempted to analyze the effects of transitioning pricing schemes from various perspectives [2; 4; 15; 17; 18; 22; 24; 25; 26]. These studies consistently concluded that the transition to more granular pricing schemes induces significant improvements in terms of maximizing social welfare and congestion management. Despite the significant contributions of these studies, several important challenges remain. First, although pricing schemes encompass both pricing mechanisms and market-clearing models, most previous studies have not comprehensively considered these two elements. (In this paper, we use the term \"pricing schemes\" to refer to broad market structures such as uniform, zonal, and nodal pricing. \"Pricing mechanisms\", in our context, describe specific methods for calculating market prices within these schemes, including system marginal price (SMP), zonal marginal price (ZMP), locational marginal price (LMP),and extended locational marginal price (ELMP). Although these terms may be used differently elsewhere, we maintain this distinction throughout this paper). For example, within a specific pricing scheme, various pricing mechanisms such as system marginal price (SMP), zonal marginal price (ZMP), locational marginal price (LMP), and extended locational marginal price (ELMP) are applicable [18]. Moreover, when implementing zonal pricing, different market-clearing models can be formulated, such as available transfer capacity (ATC), which facilitates power transactions between bidding zones based on predefined maximum transmission interface limits, and flow-based market coupling (FBMC), which optimizes power transactions between bidding zones based on the physical characteristics of the network [6; 27; 28]. However, previous studies have focused on the analysis of the changes in either the pricing mechanism or market-clearing model individually. Consequently, they have not comprehensively analyzed pricing schemes that reflect various combinations of these two elements. In addition, prior research has primarily focused on analyzing the impact of transitioning to nodal pricing. This has resulted in a relative lack of comparative studies on the transition from uniform to zonal pricing. The objective of this study was to comprehensively evaluate the impact of zonal and nodal pricing schemes on large power systems by considering various combinations of pricing mechanisms and market-clearing models. By analyzing diverse schemes, this study proposed an appropriate pricing transition pathway. The study sought to strike a balance between implementing more granular price signals, which theoretically enhance social welfare, and minimizing potential market disruptions, relative to the currently adopted scheme.