###### Abstract  
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communication is gradually becoming the main carrier for satellite communication by virtue of its advantages, such as high landing power, narrow beam, large transmission bandwidth, and small time delay. In the military field, interference with LEO satellites has become a core element in combat, but the existing interference and confrontation methods cannot meet the needs of LEO satellite interference. Aiming at the above problems, this paper proposes an LEO satellite navigation signal multi-dimensional interference optimisation method based on hybrid game theory. Firstly, the method achieves a dynamic classification of jammers within the airspace. Then, an interference effectiveness evaluation function is established, which reflects the time, frequency, and power domain losses, as well as the strategy gains. With the help of hybrid game theory, the optimal resource allocation under Nash equilibrium is achieved, and the distributed interference optimisation problem is effectively solved. The experiment uses a large microwave darkroom as an interference verification scenario. The results indicate that the interference bit error rate (BER) of the algorithm proposed in this paper is on the order of \(10^{-2}\), under the premise of guaranteeing the full coverage of the area to be interfered. The value of the multidimensional interference utility function, including the power, time, and frequency domains, is improved by at least 0.4993 times compared to other algorithms. multi-dimensional interference; interference optimisation; LEO; hybrid game theory 2025 IEEEexample: accepted configurations drastically reduce the convergence time for high-precision positioning [7; 8]. However, in modern warfare, the enemy can use LEO satellites to establish a powerful navigation and communication system to achieve real-time perception of the battlefield situation and rapid transmission of information [9]. This may result in the opposing side being at a disadvantage in communication and reconnaissance. Implementing electronic jamming against the enemy's LEO navigation system can not only disrupt the enemy's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), armoured vehicles, and other navigation equipment-dependent deployment stations, significantly reducing their offensive efficiency but also make their precision-guided weapons deviate from their target, significantly reducing striking accuracy [10; 11; 12]. Therefore, the jamming of LEO satellites is an indispensable electronic warfare means in modern warfare, which is of decisive significance for seizing battlefield information superiority and ultimate combat victory. The existing traditional LEO jamming methods are difficult to implement and have a low success rate. Jamming techniques against LEO satellites mainly include blanket jamming and deception jamming [13]. Blanket jamming is mainly implemented by transmitting high-power RF jamming signals [14], but this method is easily detected and has poor jamming effects. Deception jamming is mainly divided into repeater deception jamming and generative deception jamming [15]. Generative deception jamming requires the direct generation of satellite spoofing signals based on the premise that the LEO signal format is known [16]. However, in the military domain, it is often difficult to know the specific form of enemy LEO encrypted signals. Repeater deception jamming takes the LEO signals received, adds some time delay and then forwards them [17]. However, it is often regarded as multipath interference. LEO satellites typically use narrow beams to achieve precise coverage of specific areas [18]. This beam-focusing technique not only allows the signal energy to be highly concentrated on the target area, but also avoids interference from other incoming sources by adjusting the beam pointing and shape [19]. The directional filtering technique of the LEO signal-receiving antenna can effectively filter out the interfering signals from a single jammer.