## 4 Analysis and Discussions
### Overall Implications  
The preceding discussion offers a rich amount of contextual detail based on the analytical and numerical evaluation. Subsidies make sense to encourage R&D activities in areas that would benefit society, stimulate greener product consumption with a society's environmental objectives, such as less contamination, cleaner air, etc., provide much-needed help to innovative startups, or support a  
Figure 4: Graphical representation of **(a)** change in profits for the manufacturer, **(b)** change in profits for the retailer, **(c)** change in product collection rates, **(d)** change in greening levels (\(\lambda_{1}=0\)), **(e)** change in amount of government subsidies, and **(f)** change in social welfare in Scenarios MC, RC, MRE, RRE, MT, and RT (\(\lambda_{1}=0\)). manufacturer in surviving financial losses due to high R&D investment. However, there has been little discussion on comparative analysis among outcomes under the government SW optimization goal. The present study discloses some eye opening issues. It has always been a topic of interest to consider which subsidy policy can lead to a pragmatic CLSC business model, or which is both environmentally and economically worthwhile for participating member and government organization. Based on the discussion, one can articulate that the optimal decision, preference, and implications of subsidy policies significantly change between MS and RS games. To maintain goodwill and dominate a green-sensitive market, it is always imperative for the retailer to sell greener product. However, the manufacturer receives a higher subsidy in the MS game; yet, GL and SW is higher in the RS game. Therefore, the power of a CLSC member adds a degree of conflict, and government organizations needs figure out the dynamics of power before implementing subsidy policies. Overall, Policy C under the RS game can drive toward encouraging outcomes in the perspective of consumers, retailer, and government organization. It is commonly believed that a subsidy assists manufactures to produce greener products and trade them at low price to the consumers. To some extent, the results of the present study support the convention, but in the presence of government subsidy policy, CLSC members need to be prepared for sudden operational changes. In practice, government organizations sometimes commit to environmental policies for several years but afterward renege on their commitments. For example, the government of China recently recommended to withdraw a subsidy from the EV battery industry ([[https://chinaeconomicreview.com/subsidy-withdrawal-to-decimate-chinas-ev-industry/](https://chinaeconomicreview.com/subsidy-withdrawal-to-decimate-chinas-ev-industry/)]([https://chinaeconomicreview.com/subsidy-withdrawal-to-decimate-chinas-ev-industry/](https://chinaeconomicreview.com/subsidy-withdrawal-to-decimate-chinas-ev-industry/))), and the government of India recently revised the amount of subsidy for the scheme \"Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Hybrid and Electric Vehicles\" ([[https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/govt-withdraws-sops-to-conventional-battery-vehicles-under-fame/65990495](https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/govt-withdraws-sops-to-conventional-battery-vehicles-under-fame/65990495)]([https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/govt-withdraws-sops-to-conventional-battery-vehicles-under-fame/65990495](https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/govt-withdraws-sops-to-conventional-battery-vehicles-under-fame/65990495))). If the government suddenly revises a subsidy amount due to a sudden fall of market demand, the manufacturer needs to adjust its production rate and to be prepared for adjustment of the entire operations and marketing activities. For example, when the Indian government revised the scheme and reduced the direct subsidy to consumers, car manufacturers faced market fall.