# SatGuard: Satellite Networks Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Risk Assessment Methods
## 3 Satellite Networks Vulnerability Risk Assessment Method
### Comparative Analysis with Existing Assessment Method
#### 3.2.2 Comparison with CVSS  
The proposed satellite network vulnerability risk assessment method and the CVSS share foundational objectives in quantifying vulnerability severity through structured metrics, but diverge in their design philosophy and technical implementations. Both frameworks employ hierarchical architectures comprising core risk evaluation, temporal adjustments, and environmental customization to balance standardized assessment with contextual adaptability. At the parameter classification level, they incorporate metrics related to exploitability (e.g., attack complexity in CVSS vs. likelihood in the proposed method) and impact (e.g., confidentiality/integrity/availability in CVSS vs. strategic/operational/economic impact in the satellite method). Dynamic adjustments are also common to both, with CVSS using temporal metrics (E, RL, RC) and the satellite method employing time decay (\(\delta\)(t)) and confidence (C) factors to reflect evolving risks. These similarities underscore their shared goal of translating qualitative vulnerabilities into actionable quantitative scores.  
However, critical distinctions emerge in their mechanisms for addressing domain-specific challenges. The proposed method introduces nonlinear parameter amplification via exponents (\(\alpha\), \(\beta\), \(\gamma\)) to prioritize high-impact, low-probability events--a design informed by empirical analyses of aerospace incidents where catastrophic failures exhibit disproportionate systemic effects. This contrasts with CVSS's linear multiplicative combinations (e.g., 8.22 \(\times\) AV \(\times\) AC \(\times\) PR \(\times\) UI for exploitability), which may underestimate rare but critical vulnerabilities in satellite ecosystems. Furthermore, the proposed method incorporates an exponential time decay model (\(\delta\)(t)) calibrated to satellite vulnerability lifespans, distinguishing between patched and unpatched states. This dynamic mechanism captures residual risks post-patching, a nuance absent in CVSS's static temporal multipliers (E \(\times\) RL \(\times\) RC). Environmental customization also diverges: CVSS modifies base metrics (e.g., MAV, MAC) and security requirements (CR, IR, AR) for generic IT assets, while the satellite method employs hierarchical segment weights (\(\omega_{\text{s}}\) = 1.5-1.0) to prioritize space and ground segments, reflecting the operational criticality of orbital infrastructure. Such granularity addresses the spatial complexity of satellite networks, where vulnerabilities in space-based components pose cascading threats to global connectivity and command systems. Table 4 shows the comparative analysis of CVSS and our proposed method.  
The satellite method's advantages lie in its domain-specific optimizations. By integrating nonlinear risk amplification, it overcomes CVSS's limitations in handling \"black swan\" events prevalent in aerospace systems. The dynamic decay model provides time-sensitive risk quantification, essential for satellite operators managing long patch deployment cycles. Segment-specific weighting ensures resource allocation aligns with mission priorities, a feature critical for heterogeneous networks spanning space, ground, and user segments. These innovations collectively enhance the framework's precision in capturing the unique risk profile of satellite infrastructures.