# Automatic Symbol Resolution on Embedded Platforms by the Example of Smart TV Device
## 2 Related Works  
Smart TVs have caught the attention of the hacking community [26; 34], who are modifying TV systems to allow users to take full advantage of device capabilities. The research conducted in 2012 about various Smart TV security implementations revealed that all of the tested vendors had vulnerabilities [35]. In [36], the authors presented that it is possible to build a system for remote parental control by hacking a Samsung Smart TV. In [37], this idea has been improved and expanded into remotely managed Kids Mode. There is an analysis of Samsung Smart TV devices, with examples of how particular components of TV firmware, applications, and web browsers can be easily attacked [38; 39]. One of Smart TV standards is HbbTV (Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV), which enables broadcasting stations to deliver additional interactive content through the Internet to the end users. The data transmitted between the broadcasting station and the HbbTV applications allow monitoring home network traffic to interfere in which TV programs the users are watching [23]. In [40], the author investigated what kinds of data are exchanged between HbbTV and the broadcasting stations. It was also noticed that privacy-sensitive information could be sent unencrypted. In [41], the author discovered that LG, in a similar way, automatically transmitted data to their servers. Transmitted information concerned not only the channels viewed, but also the names of the files that were being watched from external USB devices. What is more important, all of these data were sent unencrypted. Not only the private information about the watched files can be sent to the manufacturer, in the case of TVs equipped with microphones, eavesdropped private conversations were transmitted online to a specialized voice recognition provider [42]. A few years later, the CIA developed an attack that turns a TV into a listening device [43; 44]. It was also found that certain Smart TVs send voice data to the third party services to get the result of voice recognition [45]. Modern Smart TVs are exposed to attacks by transmitting malware through a radio signal [46]. In such cases, there is no need to have any physical access to the attacked TVs. Additionally, the attacker did not leave any traces of their identity, like IP address or Domain Name System (DNS) transactions. In [47], the authors described different  
Figure 1: U.S. Smart TV market share [28]. attacking scenarios that use two public area networks: the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) network and the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) network. In one of the experiments, the authors replaced one of the video streams with their live webcam feed. In [48], the researchers described an attack against a popular Samsung TV model that exploits the movie player feature. During the playback on the attacked Smart TV, a corrupted video file can give the remote attacker complete control over the TV. Another way to attack Smart TVs is through their firmware. Analysis of the firmwares may help discover possible essential security flaws. Some studies presented, in detail, how to capture a firmware upgrade by emulating the Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) devices [49]. In [47], the authors were able to get a live Secure Shell (SSH) connection with the Smart TV by exploiting some of the firmware's vulnerabilities. The online firmware upgrade achieved by impersonating Samsung's update servers was described in [50]. Those and many other examples [14; 51; 52; 53; 54] clearly illustrate the rising importance of security on Smart TV devices. In the case of firmwares with removed symbols, the hackers of Samsung's Smart TVs were hardcoding addresses of used functions, as there was no reliable way to resolve their names.