# Coordination and Private Information Revelation
## 2 Literature Review  
The early literature on voluntary disclosure of private information discusses complete unraveling of private information. Ref [1], for instance, demonstrates full disclosure in a persuasion game involving a privately informed seller and an informed buyer. Similarly, ref [2] finds that unraveling holds for a single seller with private information and no reputational concerns when facing many buyers with no prior experience of the good, as long as the seller makes _ex post_ verifiable claims (or can offer warranties), and beliefs are skeptical.  
However, there are many environments where the incentive to reveal private information is limited. In the context of a buyer-seller exchange [8] shows that the unraveling result fails to hold in monopolistically competitive markets with costly disclosure of private information. Ref [17] obtains a similar result when buyers are unsure about the existence of private information in the market. Furthermore, ref [18; 19] note that competition increases the amount of private information disclosed in market exchange. Ref [20] observe that intermediary agents in agricultural markets with limited competition do not voluntarily reveal private information. Ref [21] mentions that there is no voluntary disclosure in the market for insurance plans offered by Health Maintenance Organizations despite competition.  
Reference [9] qualifies the unraveling result in the context of an uninformed decision-maker, who has to rely on information provided by interested parties. If the decision maker is fully informed, competition is not necessary for complete information revelation. However, in case the preference of the interested party is private information, competition itself is not sufficient for full disclosure. Finally, for accounting disclosures, ref [22] shows that the context decides whether revelation will be complete or incomplete.  
None of these papers marry the problem of information revelation to the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination. This is the precise problem investigated in our paper, which is closest in spirit to [11; 23]. We examine an asymmetric private information version of the complete information committee standardization game in [11]. Ref [23] study a related framework with symmetric private information among all agents in the context of a war-of-attrition game. In both these papers, however, the focus is on the issue of standardization, rather than on information revelation. We, on the other hand, analyze the interaction between coordination uncertainty and private information.  
Some papers, such as [24; 25], show that even when there is a unique equilibrium in the second stage, unraveling fails. This paper contributes to the literature on both revelation of private information, as well as coordination games, the central contribution being the identification of strategic uncertainty in coordination as a reason for non-disclosure and the finding that complete non-revelation can obtain in a robust fashion. In our paper, the conditions in [24; 25; 26] for a \"worst case type\" supporting full disclosure equilibrium is not satisfied by the continuation equilibrium payoffs of player A, given that player B randomizes in the second stage.