# A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios
## 5 Research Findings, Challenges, and Opportunities
### Coverage of Information Warfare Categories  
It is clear from the classification in Section 4 that the majority of information warfare games in the current literature falls within the hacker warfare category. This category, as mentioned earlier, consists of attacks on civilian computer networks and systems. The vast development of technology allows people to easily access and share information through these systems. As a consequence, people become more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. We identified, perhaps unsurprisingly, that majority of extant game-theoretic approaches under the information warfare category focus on these issues alone. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline \multirow{3}{*}{**References**} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{5}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{2-9}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Actors**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Goals**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Static (S/Dynamic (D)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Complete (M/)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Perfect(P/)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Bayesian**} \\ \cline{3-9}  & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Offensive**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Defensive**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Oceans**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Dynamic (D)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Incomplete Information (IM)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Imperfect Information (IP)**} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{**Imperfect (B)/Non-Bayesian (NB)**} \\ \hline \multirow{2}{*}{[86]} & \multirow{2}{*}{I, C, G} & \multirow{2}{*}{I, C, G} & \multirow{2}{*}{I} & \multirow{2}{*}{D (Sequential)} & \multirow{2}{*}{IM} & \multirow{2}{*}{IP} & \multirow{2}{*}{B} \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{6-6}  & & & & & & & & NB \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{6-6}  & & & & & & & & (Minimax Theorem) \\ \hline \multirow{2}{*}{[88]} & \multirow{2}{*}{I, T} & \multirow{2}{*}{I, C} & \multirow{2}{*}{I} & \multirow{2}{*}{D (Sequential)} & \multirow{2}{*}{M} & \multirow{2}{*}{IP} & \multirow{2}{*}{
\begin{tabular}{c} NB \\ (Markov Approach) \\ \end{tabular} } \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{6-6}  & & & & & & & NB \\ \cline{1-1} \cline{6-6}  & & & & & & & (Markov Approach) \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 9: List of Intelligence-based Warfare Games. Subsequently, there are a number of information warfare related categories where there are either no games or only limited research has been reported. In the three subcategories of hacker warfare, most of the games we identified fall under the category of personal hacker warfare. Compared to this category, a smaller number of studies have been found within the corporate hacker and global hacker warfare categories. One possible reason for this imbalance could be a fuzzy classification of related warfare categories. Such studies generally involve more than one manifestation of information warfare, and thus, they can be classified into various categories. For example, we found that a number of studies in corporate warfare category can also be classified under economic warfare category as they involve economic objective. It is also identified that studies that fall under global warfare may also involve aspects of command and control warfare, intelligent based warfare and/or electronic warfare. Even though many scenarios in information warfare domain involve a combination of multiple information warfare manifestations, current game theory approaches concentrate mainly on a single manifestation of information warfare. One potential research direction is thus to provide a game theory approach that can possibly be implemented for scenarios with multiple information warfare manifestations. We also found that in some game theory literature, the actors/players of the game, e.g., whether they refer to individuals, corporate, government, and/or nation are often not clearly specified. Some of the literature in game theory related to information warfare considers players as general attacker(s) and defender(s).