# Will Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) Ever Be Possible? Testing the Hypothesis
## 7 Results' Interpretation and Discussion  
Our original disclosure of ZVC described Supra OS (SOS) [45], which obliterated a computer's attack surface, and in-computer offline storage (ICOS) [46] as components of the ZVC framework. Such disclosures were essentially in reference to mainstream computing devices, such as laptops and desktops. However, during our experimentation at IMEC labs with the ZVC hardware wallet device, we had to implement the SOS directly on the NAND Flash firmware, as there was no OS involved. We discovered that such an implementation was more efficient and secure and that ZVC can be directly implemented on non-volatile NAND Flash memory without having to piggyback on any legacy firmware or OS. Because such an approach eliminates all the variables introduced by the complex multilayered legacy computing architecture, it is simpler and easier to control the attack surface of IoT devices with limited processing power. Complexities and a multitude of variables create a situation similar to the pre-solid-state electronics era, wherein moving parts in electronic devices of that era made the devices fragile, bulky, energy inefficient, and vulnerable to external risks. The advent of solid-state technology in the 1960s-1970s revolutionized electronics and made portable computing devices possible today. Although some device manufacturers tend to market their computing devices as solid-state simply because their devices are built using one or more of their components using solid-state hardware components, they cannot really be called solid-state, as these devices run multi-layered legacy software systems. The multi-layered legacy software system running on any device introduces variabilities and, consequently, vulnerabilities to the devices. The more complexities and variabilities present in a software system, the more vulnerable it becomes. The layered architecture of traditional computers introduces complexities and variability. The variabilities in the layered architecture of legacy software systems are analogous to those in the moving parts of electronic devices. Because ZVC essentially bans all third-party permissions at each layer of the legacy computers, thereby merging all the layers between the hardware and human-computer interface (HCI), it creates a scenario akin to no moving parts of solid-state electronics. Hence, the direct implementation of ZVC on the nonvolatile memory chip of a computing device eliminates the need for piggybacking on the firmware of the device or the OS. This can potentially lead to the conceptualization of a radically novel concept of solid-state software-on-a-chip (3 SoC) with no conventional distinguishable layers of firmware, drivers, OS, and application (all moving parts) between the hardware and the HCI. This 3 SoC approach creates a compact solid-state software milieu that is ideal for IoT devices with limited resources. Moreover, because IoT devices are mostly single-purpose devices with little or no need for third-party applications to run on them, banning all third-party permissions would not adversely affect their usability. As illustrated in Figure 15, the multilayered legacy computing system is built on granting third-party permissions at each layer, thus allowing an attack surface at each layer to simulate a situation analogous to the moving parts scenario of old-generation electronic devices. Thus, the proposed ZVC ecosystem can merge all the layered components in the legacy software by banning all third-party permissions, thus obliterating the attack surface and rendering it free of vulnerabilities. Although our ZVC hardware wallet experiments supported and tested the two ZVC hypotheses and met the objectives of the study, the results must be interpreted with caution, warranting further rigorous validation of the concept beyond the limited environment of these experiments.