## 1 Introduction  
With the advantages of global coverage, all-weather service, multiple functions, high accuracy, and simple operation, satellite navigation is now widely used in all aspects of social life. In the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) released by ICAO in 2016, it is clearly pointed out that GNSS is an important foundation of modern air navigation systems and an important means of enhancing the safety level and service quality of global air navigation. As an important infrastructure, satellite navigation is an important support system for high-tech warfare in the age of information [1]. However, due to the openness of navigation signal frequencies, the low-power characteristics of navigation signals, and the growing dependence of many modern wireless systems on satellite-based navigation, external interference can easily affect the normal operation of satellite navigation systems. As recently noted in the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Safety Report and the European Control Voluntary Air Traffic Management (ATM) Incident Reporting System, the number and sources of GNSS interferences have grown alarmingly over the past few years [2]. Once the satellite navigation receiver locates incorrectly or loses the ability to locate due to interference from satellite navigation signals, it will produce incalculable consequences in military and civil fields. Therefore, the study of satellite navigation interference technology is of great significance [3; 4; 5; 6; 7]. However, at present, there are few research studies focusing on satellite navigation jamming technology; the research is mainly based on the evaluation of anti-jamming algorithms and the testing of environmental conditions. Therefore, more research is necessary on satellite navigation interference technology. Satellite navigation jamming mainly includes unintentional jamming and intentional jamming. However, since the operating frequency band of unintentional interference is usually inconsistent with the carrier frequency band of satellite navigation signals, it has little impact on satellite navigation signals. Intentional interference is more harmful to satellite navigation signals and mainly includes suppression interference and deception interference. Suppression interference and deception interference can be classified in many ways according to their different characteristics. Summarizing satellite navigation jamming technology from different classification perspectives helps us to improve the shortcomings of existing satellite navigation jamming technology. Existing research on satellite navigation interference sources positioning mainly focuses on suppressing interference, and its positioning method mostly adopts the classical two-step positioning [8]. The first step is to intercept the interference signal through the receiver, process the original signal, and estimate the parameters related to the location of the interference source, such as time of arrival (TOA), frequency difference of arrival (FDOA), TDOA, AOA, etc.al (FDOA), angle of arrival (AOA), etc. [9; 10]. The second step is to establish the equation between the relevant parameters and the position of the interference source, and then to solve the equation to obtain the position information of the interference source [11]. In addition, there are also methods to locate the interference source using parameters such as the dry signal ratio of the receiver [12]. Reference [13] introduces a modified pole representation that utilizes the angle of arrival to uniformly localize the source without considering whether it is close or far away. A general closed-form formulation of the Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB) for hybrid time-of-arrival/angle-of-arrival (TOA/AOA) target localization is presented in Reference [14]. For a given localization scenario, it is theoretically demonstrated that the optimal accuracy of the joint TOA/AOA scheme outperforms any of the TOA and AOA schemes.