###### Abstract  
The blockchain-based searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme allows the retrieval and verification of outsourced data on cloud servers in sixth generation (6G) networks while ensuring the privacy of data. However, existing schemes are challenging to comprehensively meet the requirements of 6G-based intelligent application systems for low latency, high security, and high reliability. To address these limitations, we present VSSE, a novel blockchain-based SSE scheme designed for 6G-based intelligent application systems. Our scheme constructs a state chain structure to resist file injection attacks, thereby ensuring forward privacy. Moreover, we execute the search and verification operations separately on the cloud  
has been conducted under the ideal assumption that the cloud server is honest but curious. [PERSON] et al. [4] established an inverted-index-based searchable encryption scheme using Bloom filters. This article formally discusses the security model that searchable encryption needs to satisfy for the first time. [PERSON] et al. [5] were pioneers in defining several types of leaked information and identified issues in the existing security models. Additionally, they constructed the first inverted-index-based SSE scheme, which achieved sub-linear search efficiency. These schemes are all designed based on static databases and cannot meet the requirements of real-time data updates (addition or deletion) in intelligent application systems. Therefore, a practically valuable SSE scheme should possess dynamic updating capabilities. To enable SSE to support dynamic updates, [PERSON] et al. [6] proposed the first dynamic searchable encryption (DSSE) scheme. Subsequently, several DSSE schemes have been proposed in various studies [7; 8]. However, these schemes overlook the threat of file injection attacks [9] on leaked information during the update. Such powerful attacks recover keywords by establishing a connection between previous search tokens and currently updated files, which seriously compromises data privacy. Therefore, the need to counteract file injection attacks becomes a crucial factor for consideration. [PERSON] et al. [10] were the pioneers in introducing the concept of forward privacy as a defense mechanism against file injection attacks. [PERSON] et al. [11] presented a groundbreaking public-key-based hash-link structure to construct a DSSE scheme with forward privacy. [PERSON] et al. [12] and [PERSON] et al. [13] both implemented DSSE schemes with forward privacy by using symmetric cryptographic primitives based on the scheme in [11]. [PERSON] et al. [14] utilized homomorphic encryption with bitmap index to achieve forward privacy in their scheme. These schemes employed various methods to achieve forward privacy, making significant contributions to the security of SSE schemes and widely acknowledging the role of forward privacy. Subsequently, several works have revolved around the DSSE function [15; 16; 17], security [18; 19; 20], and efficiency [21; 22; 23], providing numerous excellent schemes. Additionally, certain files could contain a significant volume of sensitive messages, such as personal health records, which should not be accessed indiscriminately. Only specific authorized users should be able to access the corresponding files. Therefore, while investigating the functionality, efficiency, and security of DSSE, introducing access control functionality can effectively enhance the practicality of the schemes [24; 25; 26]. The SSE schemes mentioned above all assume that the server will honestly return the correct search results. However, in practical settings, the server should be semi-honest and curious, meaning it might return incorrect search results to save computational resources or gain service fees dishonestly. Therefore, incorporating verification functionality into DSSE schemes has become a challenge. Some verifiable searchable symmetric encryption schemes attempt to verify search results locally by users [27; 28; 29].