## 2 Theoretical Background
### Control and Governance  
Governance approaches for inter-organizational relations can be classified in a number of ways, one of which is the division into contractual and relational governance. The first is a rule-oriented and formal approach, with precisely defined expectations for output, processes, rights, etcetera. The second is based on trust between the organizations. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [41] found that these two types of governance are complementary and work best when there is an interplay between them, with the approaches improving each other's effectiveness as a result. Being aware of the interplay between different governance mechanisms is specifically important within the context of complex buyer-supplier relationships [42]. When a buyer can trust that a supplier is on the same wavelength when it comes to TBL goals, relational governance is more at play. The complexity and uncertainty of sustainability makes it difficult to set stable performance specifications, hence relying on contractual governance alone is insufficient. Instead, balancing contractual and relational governance mechanisms is necessary for successful sustainability integration, echoing the value of interplay between the types of governance [43]. Furthermore, supply chain relations influence this process, especially when it comes to complex topics like sustainability and information asymmetry [44]. The methods of management control discussed earlier are part of the more technical cybernetic approach of control (more similar to the contractual approach of governance), but the scholars in the more behavioral oriented approach have their doubts about how malleable reality is: \"The primary function of management control is to influence behaviors in desirable ways. The benefit of management control is the increased probability that the organization's objectives will be achieved\" [45] (p. 43). A distinction made by [PERSON] and [PERSON] [45] is between three objectives of control: (1) action controls, (2) result controls, and (3) personnel and cultural controls. The first two are closer to the technical approach discussed earlier, but the third, for example, also involves unwritten and informal rules for behavior. The latter might be a better approach to managing (internal) commitment to pursue people and planet, as the less exact nature of both those bottom lines seems a better fit with such personnel and cultural controls. [PERSON] [9] provides managers with four \"levers of control\" (LOC), with which they can influence their employees. The LOC are: (1) diagnostic control systems; (2) beliefs systems; (3) boundary systems; and (4) interactive control systems. The first type is more technical in nature and oriented towards performance measurement. The second interlinks with sincerity and commitment, as it has the goal of having the employees to fully embrace the core values of the company. The third lever entails the setting of boundaries of what is (un)acceptable behavior. Within these boundaries anything is allowed, but because of the clear limits, it is all risk free. The fourth lever, interactive control systems,involves a rich exchange of information, providing the opportunity for organizational learning and possibly discovering both potential risks and opportunities. Together the LOC form a framework for control and governance mechanisms that can be used in different ways. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [10] describe the effects of the application of the LOC specifically in a multinational just after a merger and the positive effects the cultural change had on the adaption of the business strategy and performance. They argue that the power of the four levers lies in how they work together and complement each other [9; 46]. [PERSON] et al. [47] juxtapose diagnostic control systems and interactive control systems as competing systems in their analysis of sustainability control systems.