## 7 Conclusions
The strength and dynamics of these networks can facilitate or hinder technology adoption. New technologies, especially those that are disruptive, bring inherent risks. In the automotive sector, these risks can include cybersecurity threats, technology obsolescence, and integration challenges. We propose adding \"Risk Perception\" (RP) and \"Risk Management\" (RM) to the extended TAM framework. RP captures the perceived risks associated with adopting a new technology, while RM involves the strategies and processes that organizations implement to mitigate these risks. Finally, by integrating these additional factors into the TAM framework, we provide a more comprehensive understanding of technology adoption in the automotive industry. Our extended TAM framework not only captures individual user perceptions but also considers the broader organizational and supply chain contexts. This holistic approach is essential for understanding the complexities of technology adoption and diffusion in an industry characterized by rapid innovation, regulatory pressures, and intricate supply chain networks. Future research should empirically validate this extended framework and explore the interplay between these additional factors in influencing technology adoption. Moreover, this framework can serve as a foundation for developing tailored strategies that facilitate successful technology integration within the automotive sector, ultimately driving innovation and competitive advantage. From the practical implications for policymakers, we have shown that the maintenance of cybersecurity in vehicles is not exempt from challenges. That said, these challenges arise from the design of a vehicle itself, through the implications of connectivity in terms of exposure, from the environmental impact that cybersecurity will have on vehicles and, finally, from the cost of production and maintenance, to adjust to the industry regulations. As we discussed in the previous section, given the need for cybersecurity in vehicles, OEMs must think about how they are going to apply cybersecurity to them. Initially, we can point out some preliminary concerns that pose difficulties to consider when adopting and maintaining cybersecurity in a car. First, the design and development of a car are characterized by being very long (the duration being between two and three years per vehicle, or even longer if it is a new platform), and having very strict standards and approval since the safety of the occupants and other pedestrians depends on it. Second, it must be considered that the application or implementation of cybersecurity during the development of a vehicle is only the tip of the iceberg since cybersecurity is characterized by being a process that never ends because the product to which it has applied control has to be tested and monitored to find vulnerabilities, zero-day exploits or some other type of failure which makes the product, in this case, a vehicle, malfunction. Third, given the nature of a vehicle (its main function is not to be connected to a network), it is very likely that it has not had any software or firmware updates since it first left the dealership. Finally, we must not forget the importance of suppliers and supply chains in the automotive industry, as they play the main role when it comes to delivering a vehicle. All of this adds up to the complexity of successfully applying cybersecurity in the automotive space. Additionally, we propose some business implications for the maintenance of cybersecurity in a vehicle must be extensively adaptable, covering all types and models of vehicles, and the whole life of a vehicle. In this context, we must not forget the vast combinations and complexities at the technological level that each manufacturer has, considering that a solution cannot be applicable for all vehicles, since there are different architectures, heterogeneity of components (ECUs, engines, etc. ), different levels of connectivity and, finally, an increase in the number of autonomous vehicles.