# Novel Designated Ownership Transfer with Grouping Proof
## 1 Introduction
Most ownership transfer protocols operate based on the following assumptions. After the ownership transfer is complete, the former owner can no longer access the RFID tags, and the new owner can prove ownership of cargo by means of mutual authentication with the RFID tags [12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17]. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [17] proposed a RFID protocol for group ownership transfer, in which a group of tags' ownership can be transferred in one attempt. Later, [PERSON] et al. [13] presented a physical-unclonable-function-based RFID ownership transfer protocol in an open environment. A physical unclonable function is used to to prevent that the tag is cloned, and a reader does not need to store the response values in [PERSON] et al. 's protocol. According to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Version 2 standard, [PERSON] et al. [15] proposed an ultra-lightweight authentication and ownership management protocol, which reduces the storage and the computational costs of the tags. In 2015, [PERSON] et al. [14] presented lightweight authentication and delegation protocol for RFID tags, which also adopts physically unclonable function to enhance the security of the tags. [PERSON] et al. 's protocol can achieve the security requirement of privacy for the original owner and the new owner. Based on the XOR operation and a 128-bit pseudo-random number generator, [PERSON] et al. [16] proposed a ownership transfer protocol for a multi-tag multi-owner RFID environment, in which it protects privacy for individual-owner and prevents tracking attacks. However, [PERSON] et al. [18] mounted some attacks on [PERSON] et al. 's protocol [16]. In the demonstrated attacks, an adversary can trace a tag, and the previous owner can obtain the private information shared among the tag and the new owner. By using the ownership transfer protocol, both parties can trade tagged objects more easily. A few researchers have worked to reduce security threats in ownership transfer, including replay [3] and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [19]. A ownership handover process between a supplier or retailer and a recipient requires two protocols, namely, a grouping proof protocol to ensure all cargo is in place and an ownership transfer protocol to transfer ownership of cargo to the designated party. This process is inefficient and time consuming. Owing to an increasing number of security threats in SCM, there should be a complete RFID protocol that preserves message integrity and privacy. Consider two scenarios in which a malicious party might intercept messages transmitted between tags and mobile readers. In the first scenario, the malicious party might retransmit the messages to execute unauthorized operations, such as by generating bogus proofs or achieving fake authentication. In the second scenario, the malicious new owner might attempt to gain access to the previous transactions of the former owner or the former owner might try to access the future transactions of the new owner. To solve these problems, the grouping proof and ownership transfer protocols must be combined. A different scenario would involve certain products needing to be shipped in groups--for example, safety regulations that require medication to be shipped along with the corresponding information leaflets [20]. Ownership transfer guarantees that the medication and the leaflets originate from the respective owners within a drug manufacturer, and grouping proof ensures that each of the medications is imported along with the correct leaflets. Scenarios in which medication is delivered without the correct leaflets or the leaflets are delivered with counterfeit medication are unacceptable, because they might cause a patient's death due to medication-related errors [21]. To prevent such a scenario from occurring, grouping proof is required for a valid group ownership transfer. To that end, in 2010, [PERSON] [22] proposed a protocol based on ownership transfer with the capability to integrate any grouping proof protocols.