## 6 Conclusions  
We herein assumed three forms of e-waste recycling and remanufacturing market: new products, remanufactured products and refurbished products. Under the influence of factors such as government subsidies, consumer preferences and other factors, the CLSC pricing and service level decision, as well as coordination issues were studied. In the modeling process, a combination of symbolic model \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{\(\theta\)} & \multirow{2}{*}{\(g\)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Centralized Decision**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Decentralized M-R Decision**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Decentralized R-M Decision**} \\ \cline{3-8}  & & \(\Pi_{S}^{\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{R}^{d\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{M}^{d\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{R}^{d\intercal*}+\Pi_{M}^{d\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{R}^{d\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{M}^{d\intercal*}\) & \(\Pi_{R}^{d\intercal*}+\Pi_{M}^{d\intercal*}\) \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{0.7} & 50 & 196,896 & 51,706.1 & 92,477.6 & 144,183.7 & 103,413 & 40,778.2 & 144,191.2 \\  & 70 & 198,570 & 52,113.7 & 93,217.5 & 145,331.2 & 104,237 & 41,166.8 & 145,403.8 \\  & 90 & 201,967 & 52,944.9 & 94,715.9 & 147,660.8 & 105,918 & 41,947.5 & 147,865.5 \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{0.8} & 50 & 197,552 & 51,865.4 & 92,934.7 & 144,800.1 & 103,733 & 41,089.3 & 144,822.3 \\  & 70 & 200,028 & 52,459.9 & 94,002.2 & 146,462.1 & 104,941 & 41,658.1 & 146,599.1 \\  & 90 & 204,650 & 53,574.5 & 95,969.5 & 149,544 & 107,210 & 42,685.3 & 149,895.3 \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{0.9} & 50 & 200,153 & 52,517.9 & 94,553.7 & 147,071.6 & 105,040 & 42,133.7 & 147,173.7 \\  & 70 & 205,857 & 53,762 & 96,659.2 & 150,421.2 & 107,686 & 43,323.1 & 151,009.1 \\ \cline{1-1}  & 90 & 216,724 & 56,086 & 100,384 & 156,470 & 112,660 & 45,279.8 & 157,939.8 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 4: Effect of the change of parameters \(g\) and \(\theta\) on the optimal model. Figure 5: Change in optimal profit of manufacturers and retailers under changing income-sharing intervals. construction and numerical simulation was used to construct a pricing model based on consumer preferences. The optimal solutions under different models were determined, and a revenue-sharing contract and two toll-making contracts were proposed to coordinate the CLSC pricing model. Based on the findings, we can conclude that consumer preferences have a positive correlation with the overall return of the CLSC system; as the degree of consumer preference increases, the service differentiation of new products, remanufactured products and refurbished products decreases. Government subsidies can effectively increase the surplus of producers, and the consumer surplus improves the overall profitability of the supply chain system. Under the dynamic game model, the dominant player achieves higher returns through bargaining advantages, but causes the decentralized M-R decision making and R-M decision to have double marginal effects, thereby producing a non-optimal system. The revenue-sharing contract and the two charge contract coordination models constructed herein can effectively mitigate the contradiction caused by the double marginal effect, which is embodied in the following: (1) In order to stimulate the retailer's sales volume, the manufacturer will transfer some of the proceeds to achieve the effect of small profits, but quick turnover. At this point, how to determine the revenue-sharing ratio \(\delta\) is especially critical (extremely, when the revenue-sharing ratio \(\delta=1\), the manufacturer does not cooperate with the retailer). (2) Retailers in a strong position tend to charge manufacturers a certain amount of access fee to achieve the retailers' goal in capitalizing their markets. The Stackelberg game model proposed in this paper provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for the differential pricing and service level decision making and coordination of real enterprises.