## 1 Introduction
The most recent typical case is Stuxnet targeting industrial controllers in 2010 [10]; since PLCs did not support digital signatures of control logic, or ICS operators did not use/configure them, attackers modified the control logic of Siemens S7-300 PLCs connected to variable frequency drive to manipulate the control behaviors of the PLCs; actually, they disrupted the normal operation of the motor by periodically changing the speed of the motor; at the same time, the monitoring data was modified to deceive the remote state estimation system and the human-machine interface (HMI), that is, Stuxnet recorded the sensor measurements under normal operating conditions before each attack and replayed these measurements in a loop during the attack. [PERSON] et al. [11] referred to this kind of spoofing attack, which hijacks the communication between the human-machine interface and the programmable logic controller (PLC) and reverses the semantics, as \"Stealthy Deception Attacks\". [PERSON] et al. [12] refer to this kind of attack as a replay attack. [PERSON] et al. [13] proposed an enhanced multi-stage semantic attack against ICS, which is undetectable by existing IDS, and the attacker can manipulate the measurement data and control instructions simultaneously. [PERSON] et al. [14] refer to this kind of attack that causes the industrial control system to enter a bad or critical state as a \"semantic attack\", and propose a state-based semantic attack detection framework adapted to security. Industrial control systems depend on the feedback control loop (as shown in Figure 1), which needs to continuously monitor the physical process data before making control decisions, and many of the SCADA system measurement and control data are usually transmitted through unprotected wireless communication networks, and the fragility of wireless communication channels brings new network security threats to the SCADA system--attackers can use false data injection (FDI) attacks to trigger control algorithms to make wrong decisions. [PERSON] et al. [15], researching from the perspective of the transmission system, found that attackers could launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without being detected by the residual state estimation, resulting in system state estimation error; if attackers understood the topology of the power system, they could completely bypass the false data detector by adjusting part of the system measurements, so that such system anomalies could not be detected by the residual-based \(\chi^{2}\) false data detector [15; 16]. [PERSON] et al. [17] proposed a \"Ladder Logic Bombs (LLB)\" attack against industrial control systems. By manipulating the content of feedback messages, attackers can tamper with the sensor readings sent to PLC and SCADA systems, to trigger the PLC ladder logic language and change the command sent by the controller to the actuator. [PERSON] et al. [18] proposed packet-reordering integrity attack, which they analyzed and studied using discrete-time linear changes. The false data detector can be successfully deceived by changing the time order or sequence order of sensor data, which leads to the remote state estimation system triggering the wrong control algorithm or control conditions to achieve the effect of a sequential logic attack on a control command. We named this kind of attack as sequential logic attack on sensor data. In response to this attack, a sequential signature transmission scheme for sensor data based on a one-time signature is proposed. The rest of this article is arranged as follows. The second part introduces the related work; the third part is the attack model; the fourth part proposes the transmission of the sequential signature of sensor data; the fifth part carries out the security analysis of the scheme in this paper; the final part is the summary and outlook of the sequential logic security of the sensor data.