# A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios
## 4 Games for Representing Information Warfare Operations
### A Taxonomy of Information Warfare Games
#### 4.2.4 Electronic Warfare Games  
The study by [PERSON] et al. [58] is one example of electronic warfare games with a sub-category of anti-radio. This study proposes a stochastic game framework for anti-jamming defense in cognitive radio networks. In particular, a game theory approach is used to model the interaction between the secondary users and the attackers. This study takes into account the spectrum environment \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**References**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{4}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{3-8}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Actors**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Goals**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Static (S)/ Dynamic (D)**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Complete (M)/ Incomplete Information (IM)**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Perfect(P)/ Ingredi**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Bayesian (B)/Non-Information (IP)**} \\ \hline
[49] & I & I & 2, 3 & D (Sequential) & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[50] & G & G & \(\begin{array}{c}2,3\\ 5,6\end{array}\) & S & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[51] & C, T & C, G & \(\begin{array}{c}1,2\\ 4,5\end{array}\) & S & IM & IP & B \\ \hline
[52] & I, T & I, C & 1–6 & D (Sequential) & M & IP & NB \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 4: List of Military Deception Games. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**References**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{4}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{2-9}  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Actors**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Goals**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Static (S)/ Dynamic (D)**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Complete (M)/ Incomplete Information (IM)**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Perfect(P)/ Ingredi**} & \multicolumn{1}{p{56.9 pt}}{**Bayesian (B)/Non-Information (IM)**} \\ \hline
[53] & T & G & 3 & S & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[54] & I, T & I & \(1,2,3\) & D (Stochastic) & IM & IP & NB \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 5: List of Psychological Warfare Games. which is time-varying and it also considers the case where the attacker uses an adaptive strategy. The secondary users, on the other hand, can adapt their strategy by observing the availability of the spectrum environment, the quality of the channel, as well as the actions taken by the attackers. The proposed framework in this study is able to model various defense mechanism in several layers of a cognitive radio network. Another example of electronic warfare games under the anti-radar sub-category is presented by [PERSON] et al. [PERSON] et al. (2016). This study addresses the problem of jamming adaptive radar systems where the interaction between a radar and a jammer is investigated. The results of this study indicate that game theory analysis can be used to identify the condition where jamming attack can be effective in platform self-protection. It is also shown that such an analysis can be employed to identify the condition where the radar can effectively detect the attacker. A game-theoretic approach to dealing with anti-radio jamming in sensor networks is proposed by [PERSON] and Jian [PERSON] and [PERSON] (2016). A non-zero sum game is used to model the interaction between the sensor network and the attacker. The study proves that there is no dominant strategy for the attacker or the sensor network in this game. Furthermore, the concept of game theory is employed by [PERSON] et al. [PERSON] et al. (2016) to find the best strategies to protect an electric power system against antagonistic attack. A number of defense strategies to protect the system against attack scenarios are investigated in this study. One of the aims of this study is to investigate whether a dominating defense strategy exist in the considered scenario. [PERSON] et al. [PERSON] et al.