## 1 Introduction  
The industry of oil and gas is a highly regulated market because it involves many stakeholders, once it handles and transfers large volumes of high-value products [1]. Crude oil and natural gas are some of the most traded commodities globally, being the feedstock for fuel products, such as gasoline, diesel, and many other petrochemical derivatives. This market, with special attention to the segment of exploration and production, has been looking for new solutions, focusing mostly on the digitization of the operations. However, instead of innovating, most initiatives still seek only to improve something that already exists. Additionally, the resistance to change can be explained precisely either by the excess of standards and regulations or by the various safety aspects involved in the activities of the production units [2]. Another similarly important factor about this market is that it is common to come across outdated technologies under the control of the producers, once their offshore platforms and onshore units were installed many decades ago, consequently making it more challenging and costly to upgrade them [3]. However,there is an application that has been attracting extraordinary interest in the market: fiscal measurement and/or measurement through the transfer of ownership. Typically, natural resources are under the ownership of nations. Therefore, there is a need for specific authorizations (concessions) and the establishment of rules for the remuneration of the real owners, the society. Over the decades, such models have been through development, giving rise to three basics, internationally adopted types: concession, sharing, and mixed regimes. They differ mainly in the level of intervention of the state and the distribution of the oil revenues. In general, OECD countries prefer to adopt the regime of concession, while Middle Eastern countries prefer the sharing model. The volume of reserves, the consumption of each country, and the production structure affect the preference for a particular kind or another. In the concession model, the government carries out auctions of exploration sites for which companies compete, paying taxes or royalties over the earnings resulting from the oil production. In the share contract model, those who win the auction pay a flat-rate subscription bonus, and the government is entitled to a percentage of the oil and/or gas produced, which is called \"Profit oil\" or \"Profit gas\" [4]. Both the concession and sharing models stem from the same central idea: the reliability in the process of quantification of the volume of oil produced. This quantification makes it possible to define how much the concessionaire should pay in royalties and taxes. It also allows the determination of the percentage held by the government in the sharing. For this reason, this quantification is extremely regulated. Plant operators need to ensure low levels of uncertainty, traceability of actions, and high quality of measurements. They must consider technical measurement regulations specified by the regulatory agents of the operating contracts and count on the direct participation of agents responsible for the metrological aspects of each country [5]. As much as these regulations seek to create such conditions, there is still room to improve transparency, efficiency, and optimization concerning data flow. It covers solutions from sensors and field meters to flow computers (that effectively run the algorithms to calculate the standard volumes) and the monitoring stations (interfaces with operators) until they reach the production report, which in turn reports to the regulator the volumes produced, consumed, and offloaded into the reservoirs. Throughout this data transfer process, failures may occur. In most cases, however, it is precisely the last stage that is the most fragile and subjected to manipulation and errors, once this step is performed manually.