esa-sceva/satcom-chunk-collection huggingface dataset:
## 5 Practical Implications  
The findings of this study provide several useful practical insights for stakeholders in the manufacturing industry, emphasizing the transformative role of advanced digital technologies in improving workplace safety, training, and operational efficiency.  
First, it highlights the shift from traditional reactive safety measures to proactive safety management through the use of DTs and IM technologies, which enable predictive simulations and risk assessments to identify and mitigate potential hazards before their occurrence. Secondly, immersive training solutions using VR/AR provide safer and more cost-effective alternatives to traditional training methods, especially for tasks involving high risk, by allowing workers to practice in realistic controlled virtual environments without exposure to actual real-world danger. Furthermore, the integration of IoT devices, wearable sensors, and CPS facilitates continuous, real-time monitoring of environmental conditions and human factors, enabling the early detection of unsafe situations and improving incident prevention. Additionally, AI-driven analytics derived from human DTs support ergonomic optimization by tailoring work environments and tasks to individual workers' physical and cognitive capabilities, thereby promoting both safety and productivity. Finally, this study highlights the importance of scalability, recommending the adoption of lightweight, cloud-based XR platforms that reduce the cost and complexity of the initial implementation, making advanced technologies more accessible to organizations of varying sizes, especially SMEs with limited financial resources and digital maturity.
## Acronyms  
DDS  
EurAAP  
FFT  
Fast Fourier Transform  
HF  
High Frequency (3-30 MHz)  
HFSDR  
High Performance Software Defined Radio  
IFDR  
Intermodulation Free Dynamic Range  
IRI  
International Reference Ionosphere  
ITU  
International Telecommunication Union  
IGRF  
International Geomagnetic Reference Field  
LHCP  
Left-Hand Circular Polarization  
NEC  
Numerical Electromagnetics Code  
NVIS  
Near Vertical Incidence Skywave  
RHCP  
Right-Hand Circular Polarization  
SNR  
Signal-to-Noise Ratio  
TCXO  
Temperature Compensated Crystal Oscillator
# Efficient and Effective Unsupervised Entity Alignment in Large Knowledge Graphs
## 5 Experiments
### Overall Results on Dwy100K  
To validate the effectiveness of our method on large-scale datasets, we also conduct experiments on _DWY100K_. The experimental results are presented in Table 3, where the marking symbols correspond to those used in Table 2. As illustrated in Table 3, _MPGT-Align_ outperforms 16 supervised and unsupervised methods, achieving superior performance across all metrics. While most baselines demonstrate commendable performance, the Hits@1 score of _MPGT-Align_ on _DBP-YG_ reaches an impressive 100.0%. This indicates that the monolingual setting effectively mitigates name bias and enhances the recognition of aligned entities. In contrast to supervised methods, _MPGT-Align_ achieves excellent results in most cases without relying on supervised labels. Furthermore, it shows overall improvement over other unsupervised methods across three evaluation metrics. Given that the size of _DWY100K_ is several times larger than that of _DBP-15K_, this experiment demonstrates that our method exhibits good scalability and superiority when applied to larger real-world monolingual KGs.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Datasets** & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**DBP-WD**} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**DBP-YG**} \\
**Models** & **Hits@1** & **Hits@10** & **MRR** & **Hits@1** & **Hits@10** & **MRR** \\ \hline \hline \multicolumn{8}{c}{Supervised methods with pure relation structures} \\ \hline MTransE [56] & 28.1 & 52.0 & 36.3 & 25.2 & 49.3 & 33.4 \\ BootEA [54] & 74.8 & 89.8 & 80.1 & 76.1 & 89.4 & 80.8 \\ AliNet [59] & 69.0 & 90.8 & 76.6 & 78.6 & 94.3 & 84.1 \\ EMEA \({}^{\star}\)[60] & 83.6 & 95.2 & 88.9 & 86.2 & 97.3 & 90.4 \\ RPR-RHGT [7] & 99.2 & 99.8 & 99.5 & 96.5 & 98.8 & 97.4 \\ STEA \({}^{\star}\)[61] & 90.6 & 97.8 & 93.2 & 89.3 & 96.5 & 91.9 \\ RANM [8] & 99.3 & 99.8 & 99.5 & 97.2 & 99.4 & 98.0 \\ \hline \hline \multicolumn{8}{c}{Supervised methods with auxiliary information} \\ \hline JAPE [53] & 31.8 & 58.9 & 41.1 & 23.6 & 48.4 & 32.0 \\ GCN-Align [63] & 50.6 & 77.2 & 57.7 & 59.7 & 83.8 & 68.6 \\ MRAEA [24] & 65.5 & 88.6 & 73.4 & 77.5 & 94.2 & 83.4 \\ AttrGNN \(\dagger\)[27] & 96.0 & 98.8 & 97.2 & 99.8 & 99.9 & 99.9 \\ MHNA \({}^{\star}\)[29] & 99.3 & 99.9 & 99.4 & 99.9 & 100.0 & 100.0 \\ \hline \hline \multicolumn{8}{c}{Unsupervised methods} \\ \hline MultiKE [10] & 91.8 & 96.2 & 93.5 & 88.0 & 95.3 & 90.6 \\ SEU \({}^{\star}\)[43] & 95.7 & 99.4 & 97.2 & 99.9 & 100.0 & 99.9 \\ SelfKG \({}^{\star}\)[14] & 98.0 & 92.8 & 98.9 & 99.8 & 100.0 & 99.9 \\ UPLR \({}^{\star}\)[12] & 97.6 & 99.5 & 98.6 & 99.2 & 100.0 & 99.6 \\ _MPGT-Align_\(\dagger\)\(\dagger\)\(\dagger\) & **99.11** & **99.92** & **99.47** & **100.0** & **100.0** & **100.0** \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 3: Comparative results of _MPGT-Align_ against 16 baselines on _DWY100K_. Results with underlining represent the best results among each category of baselines, while **bold** formatting highlights the top performance among unsupervised methods.
## 2 Physical Layer-Based Full-Duplex Underwater Acoustic Communication Systems
### Digital Modulation Based Systems
#### 2.3.2 Fsk-Uwac  
The UWAC systems based on FD frequency shift keying (FSK) are energy-efficient, capable of transmitting over longer distances with long battery life, and safe data transmission. For instance, in [29], the FSK-based FD-UWAC system is developed while two users communicate using ASCII commands. Every text converted into a string of 7 bits uses the 7-bit ASCII code, and FSK modulation is used to modulate the information between the two users. This FD-FSK-ASCII-based communication system has a data rate of 21 bps and can transmit up to 50 m while using 6.35 W of transmit power per user. The mentioned FSK-based UWAC systems are energy efficient and capable of transmitting over longer distances, but they are complex and incapable of dealing with multipath interference, necessitating further research in this field.
# Sporiasis Pathogenesis and Treatment
## 3 Therapy
### Biologics
#### 3.2.4 IL-17  
So far, three human monoclonal antibodies targeting IL-17 are available. Secukinumab and izekizumab block IL-17A; whereas brodalumab is directed against the IL-17 receptor A. IL-17-targeted biologics are fast acting, showing significant differences from placebo within the first week of treatment. Secukinumab was the first IL-17A inhibitor approved for psoriasis in 2015. A year later, the approval extended to include PsA and ankylosing spondylitis. At week 12, 81.6% of patients on secukinumab reached a PASI 75 response, and 28.6% reached a PASI 100 response [209]. At week 52, over 80% maintained PASI 75. Secukinumab showed a rapid onset of action, reflecting a significant likelihood of achieving PASI 75 as early as the first week of treatment when compared to unstekinumab, and surpassed the latter in clinical superiority at week 16 and 52 [210; 211].  
Ixekizumab also showed a significantly rapid onset of action in the first week when compared to placebo: a 50% PASI 75 response at week four, and 50% PASI 90 by week eight. At week 12, response rates were 89.1% for PASI 75 and 35.3% for PASI 100 [212]. Secukinumab and ixekizumab have proven effective for scalp and nail psoriasis, which are two clinical variants that are resistant to conventional topical therapies.  
Brodalumab is a human monoclonal antibody that targets the IL-17 receptor type A, thus inhibiting the biological activity of IL-17A, IL-17F, interleukin-17A/F, and interleukin-17E (also called interleukin-25). Brodalumab showed an 83.3% PASI 75, 70.3% PASI 90, and 41.9% PASI 100 response rate at week 12, and a satisfactory safety profile [213, 214]. After the discontinuation of treatment with secukinumab, 21% of patients maintained their response after one year and 10% after two years [215]. This finding suggests that targeting IL-17 signaling exerts some disease-modifying effect that might reestablish the homeostasis of the inflammatory pathways in a subset of psoriasis patients. Frequent adverse effects under IL-17 blockade include nasopharyngealitis, headache, upper respiratory tract infection, and arthralgia. Furthermore, IL-17 signaling is critical for the acute defense against extracellular bacterial and fungal infections. Candida infections are more frequent in patients receiving anti-IL17 biologics secukinumab and ixekizumab compared to etanercept [209]. Nonetheless, candida infections were not severe, and did not warrant treatment interruption. The risk of tuberculosis reactivation is considered small under biologic therapies other than anti-TNF-\(\alpha\)[216]. Anti-IL-17 biologics should not be used in psoriasis patients also suffering from [PERSON]'s disease.
## 7 Discussion of the Filtering Impact on Security and Privacy
### Influence of Filtering on LINDDUN Attack Vectors  
After the effect on security threats has been assessed, now, the influence on the privacy-related vectors according to Table A3 is discussed following the same principles as before. Because the effectiveness of filtering-based approaches depends highly on the rules that are in place to filter traffic, scenario-specific circumstances need to be considered. Therefore, scenario-specific adjustments of the influence ratings are discussed after the vector-specific discussions.  
_BCC_, _BCS_, _BCT_, _BDC_:  
It is clear that any technical measure taken by a homeowner has no effect on the manner in which a manufacturer designs and builds its products. Therefore, there is no impact on the collection of data on the device. Although a filtering approach may potentially influence the transmission of data, this is not assumed to be the case for data sent by a control or companion app, given that such an app would typically run on a device, such as a Smartphone or tablet, which requires access to the entire Internet. Therefore, the influence on these vectors is rated as _no or only low_ (_BCC_, _BCS_, _BCT_, _BDC_).  
_BDS_, _BDT_, _BST_:  
It can be observed that there is still _no or only low_ influence on communication with servers that contribute to the functionality of the device. This is based on the assumption that the functionality of a device should be fully preserved. Nevertheless, an owner may determine that it is preferable to trade some features of the appliance (e.g., remote control) for enhanced privacy (_BDS_, _BDT_, _BST_).  
_Cbl:_  
The way _Bark_ handles broadcast and multicast is to permit transmission to all hosts in the network and to allow them to answer for a specified period of time as indicated by an example of an SSDP discovery ([26], Figure 8). That way an attacker can still collect messages. But this is only true if the sending of such messages is permitted in the first place. Because there is no general discussion about the handling of broadcast and multicast messages given in the paper, based on the given example, the influence on this vector is rated as _some_ (_CBL_).
# The Odyssey of Entropy: Cryptography
## 3 Entropy and Encryption
### Analysis and Evaluation
#### 3.2.4 Analysis of Well-Known Cryptographic Schemes  
In the following, we review the applications of entropy in the analysis and evaluation of well-known traditional or modern cryptographic schemes, algorithms, systems and mechanisms.  
* **Analysis of Traditional Cryptosystems:** Several researchers have made use of entropy analysis in their evaluations of well-known traditional cryptographic schemes. For example, Bivium [195], RSA [196], AES [197], DES [198] and SOBER-t [199] were subject to entropy analysis by different researchers.
* **Analysis of Emerging Cryptographic Paradigms:** In addition to traditional cryptographic schemes, entropy has been used in research on cutting edge cryptographic schemes and paradigms, such as quantum cryptography, homomorphic encryption, white-box cryptography and attribute-based encryption. Some related research works are briefly reviewed in the following. **- Quantum Cryptography:** Entropy was used by [PERSON] et al. [200] and [PERSON] et al. [201] in order to evaluate OTP video stream encryption that use quantum-generated secret keys. [PERSON] et al. [202] used entropy to analyze the security of a device-independent quantum cryptography scheme. Moreover, entropy was used in several research works for the purpose of evaluating QKD (quantum key distribution) protocols [203; 204]. **- Attribute-Based Encryption:** A technique aimed at increasing the entropy available for proving the security of dual system encryption schemes under decisional linear assumption was presented by [PERSON] and [PERSON] [205]. They showed the efficiency of their method in an attribute-based encryption scheme as a case study.
## 4 Considerations for the Reliability Analyses of the Structural System  
### Database of Experimental Tests and Data Filtering Criteria  
To set up the resistance models for punching shear with shear reinforcement, the database compiled at the Institute of Structural Concrete (IMB) of RWTH Aachen University (Germany) was used. Initiated by [PERSON] [32], the database has been continuously maintained and updated by multiple researchers (e.g., [33; 34; 35; 36; 37]). The version considered in this investigation comprises 308 tests on RC flat slabs with punching shear reinforcement. According to the database, these tests are divided into different failure modes. Since the tests could not always be allocated to a single failure mode, some tests were assigned to several failure modes. The sum of the tests evaluated for the different failure modes is, therefore, greater than the total number of tests.  
For a proper statistical evaluation of the model uncertainties (Section 4.2), the tests were filtered according to the following criteria:  
1. The tests should contain at least one row of punching shear reinforcement.
2. Only star-like punching shear reinforcement was used.
3. Only stirrup reinforcement (or comparable reinforcement) was considered (note that this criterion does not apply to failure mode (ii) referring to failure outside the punching shear reinforcement zone).
4. The tests should have complete documentation of all the parameters needed for the design calculation according to DIN EN1992-1-1+NA(D) [4; 5; 6; 7].  
In addition to these filters defined on the basis of DIN EN1992-1-1+NA(D) [4; 5; 6; 7], individual test series were excluded from the evaluation after reviewing the corresponding literature. This applied to the cases where the results were not comprehensible, or the data parameters were not properly described. The application of these filters together with this individual analysis reduced the database to 38 tests regarding failure inside the punching shear reinforced zone (failure mode (i)), 44 tests regarding failure outside the punching shear reinforced zone (failure mode (ii)) and 41 tests regarding failure at the maximum punching shear capacity (failure mode (iii)).
# A Framework for Constructing a Secure Domain of Sensor Nodes
## 5 Results and Discussion
### Security Evaluation
#### 5.3.6 Botnet Activities  
One of the significant threats to the IoT network is botnets. Internet of Things botnets have received only sporadic attention from researchers. The bot is malware that infects IoT devices and aims to propagate the infection to misconfigured devices and to attack a target server after it receives the corresponding command from the person controlling the bot, or the botmaster. An example of a bot is Mirai malware [24]. Mirai primarily spreads by first infecting IoT devices such as webcams, DVRs, and routers that run some version of the software (BusyBox). It then deduces the administrative credentials of other IoT devices by means of brute force. In 2016, a spectacular distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) using Mirai malware (with at peak 1.1 Tbps) was performed, which targeted the French webhost and cloud service provider On Vous Heberge (OVH) [24]. The solutions proposed within the framework provide resistance to bot injection because they prevent the sensor nodes of the secure domain from software manipulation by using PCRs of the TPM.
## 3 Proposed Approach
### Contrast Adjustment  
Contrast defines the range of luminance differences that enables objects in an image to stand out from their background [11]. Adjusting contrast can significantly enhance edges and boundaries, making features like windows and walls more distinguishable in building facade images. The underlying operation, shown in Equation (2), rescales pixel intensities in relation to the mean image brightness:  
\[I^{\prime}_{contrast}(x)=\alpha\cdot(I(x)-mean(I))+mean(I) \tag{2}\]  
In this equation, \(I(x)\) is the original intensity at pixel \(x\), \(\alpha\) is the contrast multiplier, \(mean(I)\) is the average pixel intensity of the original image, and \(I^{\prime}_{contrast}(x)\) is the resulting pixel intensity after contrast adjustment. Values of \(\alpha\) greater than 1 boost contrast, whereas values below 1 reduce it. Two examples of contrast-augmented images are depicted in Figure 3, one using \(\alpha\) = 2.6 (left) and the other \(\alpha\) = 0.5 (right).
# LoRaWAN Physical Layer-Based Attacks and Countermeasures, A Review
## 1 Introduction
### LoRaWAN Security  
One of the major development goals of LoRaWAN is to lift the level of frontend security to be on-par with the level of its backend security. To this end, several efforts have been made to expose attack vectors in the protocol and at the LoRaWAN device level. Shortly after the publication of the LoRaWAN v1.0 specification, security analysts were able to identify vulnerabilities in the LoRaWAN medium-access protocol. For example, a bit-flipping attack [7] allows an attacker to issue malicious modifications to an encrypted payload, which enables tampering with, e.g., sensor values. Further analysis [8] indicated shortcomings in replay attack protection for the network join procedure and the downlink acknowledgement messages. These network layer vulnerabilities have been reviewed earlier, in [9], where a more comprehensive description of the attacks can be found. More recently, security issues on the physical layer have been reported as well. For instance, by launching DoS attacks against LoRaWAN nodes, the device's current consumption is drastically increased, which leads to battery depletion. This kind of denial-of-sleep attack [10] has been reported for LoRaWAN, e.g., in [11]. On the wireless physical layer, proof of concepts for triggered- and reactive-jamming attacks have been given [12], which also play a significant role in wormhole attacks [13].  
Next to studies involving vulnerabilities in LoRaWAN, research efforts have been devoted to system hardening and to the development of novel protection mechanisms on the physical layer, such as device authentication based on LoRa transmitter fingerprinting [14; 15; 16; 17; 18] and wireless secret key agreement [19; 20; 21]. The core idea behind protection techniques on the physical layer is to make use of existing physical components as building blocks to improve security and trust. For instance, key agreement techniques can be utilized to refresh root keys to enable secure communication. To this end, LoRaWAN is a well-suited target for an approach such as the security functions of the protocol, i.e., encryption and message integrity checks, that rely heavily on symmetric key cryptography. Further protection topics involve jamming-detection [22; 23] and jamming-prevention [24] mechanisms. Since LoRaWAN is freely accessible and the monitoring of the network operation for security incidents is left as the responsibility of the user, it is highly relevant to study ways to improve the resilience of the wireless communication in LoRaWAN networks.
## 3 Chang'E-5T Orbit Determination
### Processing Strategy  
The modified version of Position and Navigation Data Analyst (PANDA) software package [31] developed by GNSS Research Center of Wuhan University is employed to conduct Chang'E-5T orbit determination in this study. Table 2 summarized the observation models, dynamical models and estimated parameters. The entire 2-h GPS L1 and C1 data, sampled at 3 s, starting from 19:20:00, 31 October 2014 is processed in a batch mode. It is noted that the Helmert variance component estimation method [32] is employed to determine the weights of code and carrier phase observations. The International GNSS Service (IGS) final orbit and 30 s clock offsets products are employed to bring high-precision coordinate and time frame. The phase-windup errors and relativistic effects are corrected using theoretical equations or empirical models. The igs08.atx antenna calibrations are used for the GPS satellites phase center offset (PCO) and phase center variation (PCV) corrections [33]. The receiver PCO and PCV are not considered as they are not available. The non-spherical gravity perturbations are computed by EIGEN_GL04C gravity model with degree and order of 50. The JPL DE405 ephemeris is used to calculate the N-body perturbations, while the solar radiation pressure is calculated using the Extended CODE Orbit Model (ECOM). The Chang'E-5T initial state vector, dynamic parameters, receiver clock errors as well as ambiguities are estimated during OD. The corresponding orbit solutions are called dynamic orbits.  
The initial orbits of Chang'E-5T are obtained by Standard Point Positioning (SPP) using C1 code observations. The polynomial fitting method is used to detect outliers and cycle slips in L1 carrier-phase as well as C1 code measurements [34]. The post-fit residuals are also analyzed to detect minor cycle slips.  
Figure 8: C1 code errors as a function of C/N0.