## 3 Predictive Power & Observer Localization  
In the last section I have enumerated some models of (parts or including) the universe, roughly sorted in increasing size of the universe. Here I discuss their relative merits, in particular their predictive power (precision and coverage). Analytical or computational tractability also influences the usefulness of a theory, but can be ignored when evaluating its status as a ToE. For example, QED is computationally a nightmare, but this does not at all affect its status as the theory of all electrical, magnetic, and chemical processes. On the other hand, we will see that localizing the observer, which is usually not regarded as an issue, can be very important. The latter has nothing to do with the quantum-mechanical measuring process, although there may be some deeper yet to be explored connection. **Particle physics. ** The standard model has more power and hence is closer to a ToE than all effective theories (E) together. String theory plus the right choice of compactification reduces to the standard model, so has the same or superior power. The key point here is the inclusion of the \"right choice of compactification\". Without it, string theory is in some respect less powerful than SM. **Baby universes. ** Let us now turn to the cosmological models, in particular [PERSON]'s baby universe theory, in which infinitely many universes with different properties exist. The theory \"explains\" why a universe with our properties exist (since it includes universes with all kinds of properties), but it has little predictive power. The baby universe theory _plus_ a specification in which universe we happen to live would determine the value of the inter-universe variables for our universe, and hence have much more predictive power. So localizing ourselves increases the predictive power of the theory. **Universal ToE. ** Let us consider the even larger universal multiverse. Assuming our universe is computable, the multiverse generated by UToE contains and hence perfectly describes our universe. But this is of little use, since we can't use UToE for prediction. If we knew our \"position\" in this multiverse, we would know in which (sub)universe we are. This is equivalent to knowing the program that generates _our_ universe. This program may be close to any of the conventional cosmological models, which indeed have a lot of predictive power. Since locating ourselves in UToE is equivalent and hence as hard as finding a conventional ToE of our universe, we have not gained much. **All-a-Carte models** also contain and hence perfectly describe our universe. If and only if we can localize ourselves, we can actually use it for predictions. (For instance, if we knew we were in the center of universe 001011011 we could predict that we will'see' 0010 when 'looking' to the left and 1011 when looking to the right.) Let \(u\) be a snapshot of our space-time universe; a truly gargantuan string. Locating ourselves means to (at least) locate \(u\) in the multiverse. We know that \(u\) is the \(u\)'s number in Champernowe's sequence (interpreting \(u\) as a binary number), hence locating \(u\) is equivalent to specifying \(u\). So a ToE based on normal numbers is only useful if accompanied by the gargantuan snapshot \(u\) of our universe. In light of this, an \"All-a-Carte\" ToE (without knowing \(u\)) is rather a theory of nothing than a theory of everything. Localization within our universe.The loss of predictive power when enlarging a universe to a multiverse model has nothing to do with multiverses per se. Indeed, the distinction between a universe and a multiverse is not absolute. For instance, Champernowne's number could also be interpreted as a single universe, rather than a multiverse. It could be regarded as an extreme form of the infinite fantasia land from the NeverEnding Story, where everything happens somewhere. [PERSON]'s number constitutes a perfect map of the All-a-Carte universe, but the map is useless unless you know where you are.