## 5 Conclusions  
The proposed design of the LED-PHOTON lightweight authenticated encryption uses a repetitive architecture implemented on multiple FPGA devices from Altera. This \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**AE Scheme** & **Ref.** & \begin{tabular}{c} **Provable** \\ **Confidentiality** \\ \end{tabular} & \
\begin{tabular}{c} **Provable** \\ **Authenticity** \\ \end{tabular} &
\begin{tabular}{c} **Nonce Misuse** \\ **Resistance** \\ \end{tabular} & **Attacks** \\ \hline AES-CLOC & [44] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [45] \\ PRIMATEs & [46] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & Cube attack [47] \\ AES-JAMBU & [48] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\surd\) & Nonce-misuse attack [49] \\ Tiaoxin & [50] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [51] \\  & & & & & Key-recovery attack [53] \\ Ketje\_v2 & [52] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Cube-like attack [55,56] \\  & & & & & State-recovery attack [57] \\  & & & & & Cube attack [59] \\ MORUS\_v2 & [58] & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & \(\times\) & State-recovery attack [60] \\  & & & & & Fault attack [60] \\ JOLTIK & [61] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & Hypercat attack [62] \\ SILC-AES & [64] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [65,66] \\ SILC-LED & [64] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [65,66] \\ Keyak & [67] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [54] \\ ACORN\_v3 & [68] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack [69] \\  & & & & & Preimage attack [71] \\ ASCON\_v1.2 & [70] & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Template attack [72] \\  & & & & & Side-channel attack [73] \\  & & & & & Cube attack [74] \\ LED-PHOTON & Proposed & \(\surd\) & \(\surd\) & \(\times\) & Fault attack on LED [75] \\  & & & & & S-Box attack on LED [76] \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 5: Comparison of security features and related attacks. architecture is based on rounds, whereby the permutation operations are performed in a single iteration. The LED-64 block cipher takes 32 permutation rounds to complete the encryption of one 64-bit input block. The PHOTON-80/20/16 sponge structure's absorbing phase requires 48 rounds to handle four 20-bit messages, and the squeezing phase generates the 80-bit hash output in 60 rounds. The proposed design is more efficient in terms of area-performance tradeoffs compared to existing designs because it employs common components from both types of architecture. The proposed encrypt-then-MAC design consumes fewer logic resources while maintaining the performance of the single architectures. The proposed design of LED-PHOTON authenticated encryption consumes about 1017-1030 logic elements, achieving approximately a 14% reduction rate in logic utilization depending on the targeted FPGA device. Since there is an area-performance tradeoff, the proposed AE exhibits a slight degradation in performance, whereby the maximum allowable frequency was slightly reduced. However, the performance is considerable compared to the achieved area reduction. As a future recommendation, we suggest implementing the design on actual hardware to obtain more accurate timing data and investigating potential design alternatives, including serialized architectures with smaller areas and pipelined architectures with higher throughput. Conceptualization, M.A.-S. and F.A.H. ; methodology, M.A.-S.; software, M.A.-S.; validation, M.A.-S., F.A.H. and A.A.A. ; formal analysis, X.-T.T. ; investigation, M.A.-S. and F.A.H. ; resources, T.A.E.E. and M.E.E.D. ; data curation, M.A.-S.; writing--original draft preparation, M.A.-S.; writing--review and editing, F.A.H., A.A.A. and X.-T.T. ; visualization, T.A.E.E. and M.E.E.D. ; supervision, F.A.H., A.A.A. and X.-T.T. ; project administration, F.A.H. ; funding acquisition, T.A.E.E. and M.E.E.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.