# A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios
## 4 Games for Representing Information Warfare Operations
### A Taxonomy of Information Warfare Games
#### 4.2.5 Economic Information Warfare Games  
[PERSON] and [PERSON] [2] describe a game in which a group of attackers performs long-term information warfare that possibly results in economic losses and delay technical development. They call this the rebel game. In the rebel game, it is shown that excessive damages to a weaker party may cause rebellions. This may result in a large damage for both the dominating and weaker parties. It is therefore suggested that high costs for the weaker party should be avoided in this game. Otherwise, rebellions may emerge from the weaker party, and as a consequence, it leads to substantial costs to the dominating party. [PERSON] et al. [64] addresses the problem of determining the appropriate investment to protect critical infrastructure property from cyber-attack. To address this problem, they propose a new computational approach to quantitative risk assessment which they refer to as Quantitative Evaluation of Risk for Investment Efficient Strategies (Queries). In this approach, techniques from game theory was employed to construct and evaluate the attack/protect economic model. [PERSON] et al. [5] modelled attacker intent, objectives and strategies (AIOS) using a general incentive-based method. Techniques from game theory are adopted to infer AIOS. It is diswnthat the concept of incentives is able to unify a variety of attacker intents. A number of specific case studies are used to show the feasibility of using attack strategies in real-world attack-defense scenarios. [PERSON] et al. [65] propose a novel game theory approach to model the conflicting motives between an attacker and a detection system. In particular, they focus their study on credit card fraud problem and propose a novel fraud detection using concepts derived from game theory. The proposed approach works by predicting the future move of the fraudster and conducts learning at each step of the game. This approach is new in the domain of information warfare and has shown to improve existing rule-based system. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [66] focus their work on export subsidies and international market share rivalry. They conduct an analysis based on imperfect competition to investigate why export subsidies can be attractive policies from a domestic viewpoint. They emphasized that it is beneficial for a country to capture a large share of the production of profit-earning imperfectly competitive industries. The industry in this case is represented as a simple Nash Quantity duopoly. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{3-8}
**References** & \begin{tabular}{c} **Actors** \\ **Offensive** \\ \end{tabular}  & \begin{tabular}{c} **Goals** \\ **Defensive** \\ \end{tabular}  & \begin{tabular}{c} **Static (S)/** \\ **Dynamic (D)** \\ \end{tabular}  & \begin{tabular}{c} **Complete (M)/** \\ **Incomplete** \\ **Information (IM)** \\ \end{tabular}  & \ \begin{tabular}{c} **Perfect(F)/** \\ **Imperfect** \\ **Information (IP)** \\ \end{tabular}  & \begin{tabular}{c} **Bayesian** \\ **(B)/Non-** \\ **Bayesian (NB)** \\ \end{tabular}  \\ \hline
[2] & \(\text{L},\text{T}\) & \(\text{I},\text{C}\) & \(1,2,3\) & S & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[64] &  
[PERSON] et al. [67] provide a model to evaluate Information Technology (IT) security investment using techniques drawn from game theory. In this study, the players of such IT security investment problem are the firm and the hackers. The payoff of the firm from security investment is based on the extent of hacking it is subjected to. On the other hand, the payoff of the hacker is determined based on the likelihood she or he will be detected. A Ggme theoretic approach is used to analysis the strategic interaction among these players. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [69] study the impact of cyber-terrorism on economy.