# Energy Communities Design Optimization in the Italian Framework
## 4 Results
### Benefit Distribution Results  
The distribution of the remuneration obtained from the energy sold and from the incentives has been computed with the proposed methodology for the scenarios in which the energy community is considered (A-EC and B-AC). Each member of the configuration receives a pay-off that depends on its contribution to the collective self-consumption (i.e., to the achievement of the incentives). The condominium receives a revenue that depends both on the energy injected into the grid and on the energy that is shared among the members of the configuration. Each of the other members receives a payoff for its contribution to the collective self-consumption. The families and the offices have a direct benefit thanks to the payoff they receive, but it is worthwhile to mention that also part of the revenues allocated to the condominium may represent an indirect advantage for them. Indeed, once the return of the investment is guaranteed, additional profits for the condominium can be used to cover shared costs for the building management. The revenues of the passive members of the configuration depend on their contributions to the collective self-consumption and they are reported in Table 8. Considering Scenario A-EC, the minimum revenue is obtained by the user Young couple 1 and it is equal to EUR 31, while the higher one is achieved by the user Office 3 and it is equal to EUR 130. On average, each member receives EUR 71. On the other hand, the condominium receives the greater part of the generated value (EUR 1987). Indeed, the condominium is the owner of the PV power plant and its pay-off needs to guarantee the return of the investment. The Shapley value properly accounts for the importance of the condominium in the configuration. Specifically, it allocates the entire value of the produced energy to the condominium (EUR 1231). This constitutes \(62.0\%\) of the entire revenue. Moreover, it also allocates part of the incentive obtained due to the shared energy (\(54.2\%\)). When considering Scenario B-EC, the amount of energy physically self-consumed by the condominium increases and the revenues from the incentive based on the collective self-consumption decreases. The overall revenue of the configuration decreases from EUR 2627 to EUR 2159. Only EUR 1580 are allocated to the condominium. On the other hand, in this scenario, the condominium saves the cost of the gas, due to the installation of the heat pump. The revenues of a passive user can be increased if they are able to shift their electricity consumption in the hours of PV production. The effect of load shifting has been tested for Scenario A-EC. A simple load shifting model has been implemented, moving a percentage of the daily load in the hour of PV production according to the following equation:  
\[Load_{shifted}(t)=(1-LS_{\%})\cdot Load(t)+LS_{\%}\cdot PV(t)\cdot\frac{ \sum Load(t)}{\sum PV(t)} \tag{9}\]  
where \(Load(t)\) is the daily load profile for the considered user, \(LS_{\%}\) is the percentage of load shifted, and \(PV(t)\) is the power production profile, scaled by the factor \(\frac{\sum Load(t)}{\sum PV(t)}\). The results of the pay-off distribution, in the case Family 1 is performing load shifting, are reported in Table 9 and are depicted in Figure 2a. It is important to notice that the load shifting of one user affects the economic results of every stakeholder of the configuration. For the user itself, the load shifting increases the revenue up to EUR 154, with an increment of 155% with respect to the same result when considering no load shifting. For all the other users, the load shifting of Family 1 has a slightly negative effect. This is due to the competition generated by the distribution rule. The user that shifts its load becomes more important, in relative terms, with respect to the other members. This effect could stimulate virtuous behavior, since all the other users are motivated to follow Family 1 and shift also their load profile.