## 3 Security Attacks on AV Sensors: A Closer Examination of GPS Systems
### Vulnerability of Global Positioning Systems  
In the spectrum of autonomous vehicles, global positioning systems (GPS) are integral, facilitating accurate location tracking and route navigation. However, this reliance creates a potential vulnerability that can be exploited by malicious entities. Given the open accessibility of GPS technology, an adversary could potentially manipulate signals, provide incorrect navigational instructions, or even trigger vehicle crashes, posing significant safety threats [24].  
GPS-based attacks on autonomous vehicles take two primary forms: jamming and spoofing. Jamming involves an adversary broadcasting a more potent signal at the identical frequency as the GPS, consequently causing temporary interference [25]. This type of attack can significantly hinder the operation of autonomous vehicles, as these highly sophisticated vehicles rely heavily on accurate GPS data for efficient navigation and overall functionality.  
Spoofing, a more invisible form of attack, involves an attacker disseminating falsified GPS signals designed to emulate authentic ones. This deceptive method leads the receiver to inadvertently acknowledge the fraudulent signals as genuine. Typically, the process of GPS spoofing incorporates an initial phase of GPS jamming to obstruct real signals, subsequently followed by the broadcast of counterfeit signals, thereby fooling the system [26].  
Given the intrinsically unguarded nature of public GPS systems, the singular defense mechanism against GPS spoofing lies in the domain of authentication. Achieving this safeguard necessitates the use of precise encryption techniques [27]. Regardless of these concerns, the scientific community must address these vulnerabilities and develop effective countermeasures to ensure the safety and dependability of autonomous vehicles in an era of GPS-centric navigation.  
Due to the design of GPS systems, which are inclined to accept stronger signals, a well-executed attack can imperceptibly alter a vehicle's location by transmitting a strong, fake signal [28]. Various countermeasures, such as monitoring of identification codes, satellite signals, and timing intervals, have been proposed to combat these attacks. It is known, for instance, that the expected signal strength is approximately 163 decibel watts, so a countermeasure could consist of blocking signals with higher frequencies [29]. In their research, the authors developed an antenna-array-based hybrid antijamming and antispoofing method for GPS receivers. Using a compressed sensing framework, they determine the direction of arrival (DOA) of the despreading satellite navigation signal and identify the deception signal following the elimination of the interference via subspace projection. The receiver uses adaptive multi-beamforming to accomplish undistorted reception of the authentic satellite signal and to suppress deception based on the DOA of the authentic and spoofing signals.  
However, these measures can be circumvented if the attacker's signals are sophisticated enough to mimic genuine ones convincingly, causing the validation checks to fail and resulting in the manipulation of the GPS device. Currently, an entirely foolproof and practical solution to these GPS-based attacks remains inaccessible. The use of military-grade cryptography currently stands as the only feasible solution that can definitively prevent both GPS jamming and spoofing attacks.  
In the broader perspective of emotional intelligence, the ability of autonomous vehicles to recognize and react appropriately to these threats is a significant challenge. Just as humans must navigate and respond to deceptive cues in social contexts, autonomous vehicles must discern between genuine and deceptive signals in their environment. Thisability to perceive and react appropriately under a potential attack is crucial to the future development and widespread acceptance of autonomous vehicles.