###### Abstract
Given the high-value nature of modern Wi-Fi environments, they have become increasingly attractive for Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), sophisticated, well-resourced adversaries capable of sustained and covert network infiltration [3]. Unlike conventional cybercriminals, APTs typically consist of organized teams with access to custom toolkits, zero-day exploits, and deep technical expertise. Their hallmark traits include persistence, stealth, and the ability to move laterally across systems over extended periods. Common actors include nation-state groups, advanced criminal syndicates, and elite hacktivist collectives. To evaluate WLAN resilience, this study classifies APT capabilities into tiers based on resource availability and operational scope, as shown in Table 1. These targeted, long-term attacks, often motivated by espionage or data theft, seek to exploit weaknesses in WLAN infrastructures as entry points to broader network environments. This research aims to study this aspect and answer the following research questions:  
* To what extent is the current implementation of WLANs effective in resisting APTs? * What characteristics make future WLAN implementations resilient and robust in countering APTs? \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c l l l} \hline \hline
**Tier** & **Description** & **Capabilities** & **Typical Actors** \\ \hline Tier 1 & Opportunistic advanced attackers & Moderate computing resources, open-source tools, long-term access via phishing & Hacktivists, cybercrime groups \\ \hline Tier 2 & Coordinated persistent groups & Custom malware, lateral movement, infrastructure control & Organized cybercrime syndicates \\ \hline Tier 3 & Nation-state-level APTs & Zero-days, supply chain attacks, firmware/rootkit access, ISP compromise & Government agencies, military units \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: APT tier classification based on capabilities and resources. To answer these research questions, this article extensively investigates the various attack surfaces of WLANs. In addition, several experiments are performed to explore how these surfaces can be exploited with increased resources. The focus of this paper is solely on logical attacks, excluding any consideration of physical attacks where an attacker breaches the environment to perform actions that grant them access to WLANs. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:  
* Conducting an in-depth analysis of the attack surface of WLANs, categorizing it into three primary areas: the radio access network, compromised insider nodes, and the gateway to the Internet service provider. * Exploring how attacks on these surfaces can be amplified or made more potent through the resources yielded by APTs. * Evaluating the effectiveness of current WLAN implementations in mitigating APTs involves detailed examination and experimentation. * Deliberating on future design implementations geared towards bolstering the security of WLANs in the forthcoming years. This study aims to fill the gap in WLAN security literature by conducting a holistic analysis of attack surfaces, including ISP-layer traffic analysis, resource scalability of APT attacks, and non-intrusive empirical evaluation of packet flows. Although previous studies have provided valuable information on protocol-level vulnerabilities or device-based risks, few have examined ISP-level privacy issues or provided attack scalability models grounded in resource scaling. This study addresses these gaps. The manuscript is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses various research projects on wireless network security analysis, encompassing both theoretical analysis and practical applications. Moving forward, Section 3 offers a detailed exposition of the various attack surfaces that are pertinent to WLANs. Section 4 builds upon this foundation by providing an in-depth analysis of these attack surfaces. Section 5 summarizes the research findings and outlines security enhancements for WLAN systems.