# A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios
## 4 Games for Representing Information Warfare Operations
### A Taxonomy of Information Warfare Games
#### 4.2.6 Information Attack and Hacker Warfare Games
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l l l l l l} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**References**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{4}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{2-9}  & \multirow{2}{*}{**Actors**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Goals**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Static (S)/**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Complete (M)/**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Perfect(P)/**} & \multirow{2}{*}{**Bayesian**} \\  & & & & & & **Incomplete** & **Imperfect** & **(B)/Non-** \\  & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Offensive Defensive**} & & & & **Information (IM)** & **Information (IP)** & **Bayesian (NB)** \\ \hline Personal & & & & & & & & \\ \hline
[71] & L T & I & \(1,2,3\) & S, D & IM & IP & B \\ \hline
[72] & L T & L C & \(1,2,3\) & D (Sequential) & M & P & NB \\ \hline
[74] & L T & I & \(1\)–\(6\) & D (Stage) & IM & P &
\begin{tabular}{c} NB \\ (Game Tree) \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline
[75] & I & I & \(1\)–\(6\) & S & IM & P, IP &
\begin{tabular}{c} NB \\ (Binary Channels) \\ \end{tabular} \\ \hline
[76] & I & I & \(1\)–\(6\) & D (Stage) & IM & P & B \\ \hline
[77] & I & \(1\) & \(1\)–\(6\) & S & IM & IP & B \\ \hline
[78] & I & \(1\) & \(1,2,3\) & D & M & P & Markov \\ \hline
[80] & I & I & \(1,2,2\) & D & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[81] & I & \(1\) & \(2,3,5\) & D & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[82] & I & \(1\) & \(1\)–\(6\) & D & M & IP & NB \\ \hline Corporate & & & & & & \\ \hline
[83] & L C & C & \(4,5,6\) & S & IM & IP & NB \\ \hline
[84] & L T & L C & \(1,2,3\) & S, D & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[85] & I & L C, G & \(4,5,6\) & D (Stochastic) & IM & IP & NB \\ \hline Global & & & & & & \\ \hline
[2] (evidoor) & L T & L C & \(1,2,3\) & S & M & IP & NB \\ \hline
[2] (vandal) & L T & L C & \(1,2,3\) & S & M & IP & NB \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 8: List of Hacker Warfare Games. the level of security a player selects for his/her resource. The second parameter, on the other hand, is the self-insurance level which reduces losses when successful attacks occur. The considered games were studied from a rational agent perspective and from a central player's view. The main results of the simulations indicated that the type of game that is chosen determines the difference between the impacts of central planning and the laissez-faire. In their study, [PERSON] and [PERSON] [PERSON] and [PERSON] (2016) propose a game-theoretic method for analyzing the security of computer networks. The interaction between an attacker and the system administrator (defender) is viewed as a two-player stochastic game. This study offers an analysis of the best strategy the players can choose from a set of available options in the game. Explanation on how these strategies are realistic and how the administrator can employ the results to improve its network security are presented. Table 8 shows a list of corporate hacker warfare games. Global Hacker Warfare Games  
[PERSON] and [PERSON] [PERSON] and [PERSON] (2016) present a hacker warfare game they call the evildoer game. The evildoer game involves two players, an attacker and a victim, which are assumed to be rational. The aim of the attacker is to damage the victim networks and systems. These include harmful actions such as crashing the hosts, installing harmful software, causing loss of service, and so on. To successfully launch such attacks, the attacker needs to carry out a primary attack which can not be directly identified by the system. Each player in the evildoer game has two strategies. The fist strategy of the attacker is to attack the victim by launching many secondary attacks in parallel with the primary attack. This is done to overwhelm the victim so that the primary attack can not be detected. Such an attack may also interrupt the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA)-loop of the victim. The second strategy of the attacker is to only launch the primary attack. The victim has also two strategies to defend his/her networks from such attacks. The first strategy of the victim is to detect and to be alert on all suspicious network traffic.