# Survey on Security Threats in Agricultural IoT and Smart Farming
## 4 Mitigation Measures and Strategies for Security Threats in Agriculture
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline
**Layer** & **Security Threats** & **Smart Farming Effects** & **Studies** \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Application} & Data Thefts & The top of the stack in the already mentioned IoT layer & \\  & Access Control Attacks & architecture. Possible effects or problems could be & \\  & Service Interruption Attacks & considered the lack of the delivery of services between & \\  & Malicious Code Injection Attacks & the respective users from various domains such as & [62; 79; 106; 107; 108] \\  & Sniffing Attacks & farmers, retailers and/or other stakeholders. & \\  & Reprogram Attacks & Accessibility problems for the involved users and lack & \\  & & of security and privacy are also major issues. & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Middleware} & \multirow{4}{*}{Man-In-the Middle Attack (MITM)} & This layer operates in two-way mode. More & \\  & Man-In-the Middle Attack (MITM) & of the application and the hardware layer and also acts & \\  & SQL Injection Attack & as an interface between them. Major problems that & \\  & Signature Wrapping Attack & come as a result of attacks on this layer can affect data & [62; 79; 107; 109] \\  & Cloud Malware Injection & and/or device (nodes installed into the agriculture) & \\  & Flooding Attack in Cloud & infrastructure) management and other types of issues & \\  & & such as device information discovery, access control by & \\  & & the users and data analysis as well. & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Internet} & \multirow{4}{*}{Phishing Site Attack} & The most crucial layer concerning the establishment of & \\  & the communication between two distinct endpoints, & & \\  & Choss/Dos Attack & such as device-to-device, device-to-cloud, & \\  & DDoS/Dos Attack & device-to-gateway and back end data-sharing. In case & \\  & Data transit Attacks & of a failure the communication is being disrupted and & \\  & Routing Attacks & the ICT system is, practically, out of service. Improper & \\  & & documenting attacks & communication services and/or lack of automatic \\  & & updates could lead to privacy concerns among the & \\  & & users’ private information (e.g., access credentials) & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Access Gateway} & \multirow{4}{*}{Secure on-Boarding Extra Interfaces End-to-End Encryption Firmware Updates} & Access GW layer contributes to the handling of the & \\  & & very first data as well as to bridging the gap between & the client (farmers, stakeholders, retailers) and the & \\  & & point (mode or device). Messages routing, & \\  & Secure on-Boarding Extra Interfaces & identification and subscribing problems between the & \\  & End-to-End Encryption & smart farming nodes could be possible outcomes to the & \\  & Firmware Updates & client side concerning the final form of the received & \\  & & message. This message may also include the desired & \\  & & information as well as lack of transport & \\  & & encryption/integrity verification, so sensitive data & \\  & & could easily then be interpreted. & \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Edge Technology} & \multirow{4}{*}{Node Capturing Malicious Code Injection attack False Data Injection Attack Side-Channel Attacks Eavesdropping and Interference Sleep Deparbit Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks Rooting Attacks Root Attacks and/or tampering could also be possible results. \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}