# Characterization and Modelling of Potential Seaborne Disasters, in the ANA Region
## 2 Practitioners' Incident Characterization and Risk Assessment Priorities  
In this section we review some key related practitioners' reports, and practitioner-based articles in the literature, and then position our contribution with respect to them. In particular, the USCGA and Centre for Arctic Study and Policy (CASP) [5] present an assessment of incidents that are most likely to occur in the ANA Region. This paper provides analysis, tools, and techniques that can systematise the lessons learnt and decision-making processes in order to learn from incidents and hence prevent, mitigate, and respond to future ones. Specifically, the USCGA/CASP report is based on a set of interviews with key stakeholders in the ANA region and highlights important themes in answering some key questions, such as: Is Arctic Shipping Increasing and what are the current changing trends? What are the critical gaps and failures in governance structure in the ANA region? And which incidents are most likely to occur in the ANA region? The report is based on a set of interviews where participants were asked to rank the likelihood of three events presented to them, including seaborne disasters (e.g., collisions or groundings), catastrophic incidents (e.g., cruise ship accidents or oil spills), and soft security threats (e.g., human trafficking, piracy, transport of illegal goods, or failure to adhere to the polar code [6]). Understanding that _risk_ = _probability_\(\times\)_consequence_, many respondents preferred to focus more on the consequence portion of the equation, rather than the most likely event from a probabilistic viewpoint. In fact, a few of the respondents mentioned explicitly that looking at risk _of_ an event was less useful than looking at the risks stemming _from_ a particular event [5]. Hence in our proposed approach, we provide techniques that can be used retrospectively (i.e., analysing a past incident), or a prospective one (i.e., prevention or mitigation against a possible future scenario of an incident). Research published by the MARPART project [7; 8; 9] presents a number of relevant components which relate to the definition and characterisation of ANA themed challenges. In considering maritime activity and risk patterns in the ANA region, ref. [7] review these concepts on a regional basis, presenting findings associated with key Arctic territories such as Russia, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland. The research suggests that traditional cross-cutting challenges associated with the High North and Arctic such as extreme environments, remoteness/vast distances, sea ice conditions, ecological sensitivity, and high levels of public attention continue to be at the fore when it comes to the maritime domain. Furthermore, increasing access to regions as a result of climate change, technology limitations such as reduced satellite communication and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) coverage, and limited hydrographic survey efforts further amplify the challenges associated with ANA operations, while also increasing the potential likelihood of accidents or incidents occurring. In terms of more localised causal factors of seaborne incidents, ref. [10] analyses highlight a number of cross-cutting challenges which manifest themselves with greater prominence depending on the region [7]. Human factors such as lack of or varied navigational experience within the High North, fragmented emergency response competence, and crew fatigue feature significantly across all regions, but were suggested to be of particular prominence within Russian seaborne contexts. Extreme variations in seasonal conditions particularly during winter months are highlighted and suggested to be of significant prominence within regions of Norway. While vast distances have been highlighted in all geographical contexts, these challenges were proposed to be amplified within Greenland as a result of vast areas of responsibility, combined with the disbursement of SAR and emergency preparedness infrastructure.