## 1 Introduction  
CAVs are continuously developing to provide safer and more convenient transportation. These vehicles can prevent many road accidents due to human errors [1]. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J3016 (2016) defines six levels of driving autonomy for on-road CAVs, from level 0 to level 5 [1]. Higher levels have more automated driving features, making them entirely driverless vehicles [1; 2]. In levels 0 to 2, a human driver is required to be present at all times. These levels have supporting/assisting features (e.g., warning systems). In level 3, human drivers are also present. Still, these vehicles are said to be conditionally automated, i.e., the vehicle can handle a few situations (such as lane changing, autonomous emergency braking (AEB)), and the driver should be monitoring and ready to take over the vehicle at any instant. Level 4, which includes higher automation features, has an automated driving system (ADS) that can handle most dynamic driving tasks without human intervention [1; 3]. Ultimately, the vehicles are expected to handle all situations and become fully autonomous in SAE level 5. Today, level 2-4 vehicles are being tested and deployed in the market [3; 4]. For example, Tesla's level 2 with autopilot system [5] and level 3 with the fully self-driving mode [6] are commercially available [1; 3]. Even with remarkable advancements in CAV development, it would be unrealistic to anticipate zero system failures. It is widely acknowledged that CAVs may not handle all road incidents and will depend on human decisions [7], as the real world can be very uncertain. In this case, a human operator is required to take over the vehicle. It may not be through physical access but by remotely assisting/operating the vehicles in challenging situations [1]. This remote access is known as teleoperation. The word 'tele' comes from a Greek word meaning \"at a distance\" [8]. It involves a remote human operator to monitor, assist, and control a vehicle from a distant location for some manoeuvres or edge situations [7]. For CAVs, it is also known as remote driving or tele-driving. One particular use case of remote driving to enhance vehicle safety is by bringing the vehicle to the minimal risk condition (MRC), a stable and safe stopped state when a problem occurs [1]. Additionally, integrating human teleoperators in the over-the-network control loop can improve the vehicle's operational efficiency by broadening the vehicle's operational design domain (ODD) allowing it to cope with challenging environmental conditions such as weather, visibility, speed limits, types of roadway, and motorways [3]. The communication system is an essential aspect of teleoperation. Maintaining the safety and security of the teleoperation communication systems is important, as these systems should be uninterrupted and transmit data in real time [9]. The British Standards Institution (BSI) Flex 1886 recommends that ADS have appropriate autonomous capabilities to perform a minimal risk manoeuvre (MRM) safely (as a fallback solution to achieve an MRC) when connectivity is compromised or lost. The communication system can be compromised by system malfunction/failure, cyber-attack, or simply network issues (e.g., latency or bandwidth constraints). The communication capabilities of fourth-generation (4G), fifth-generation (5G), and future generations of wireless networks can facilitate the remote driving of CAVs [3]. A few companies have already demonstrated that 5G networks are reliable for the teleoperation of remote vehicles, and they expect promising results in future experiments [10]. Various networking technologies, including Ethernet, wireless fidelity (WiFi), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), third generation (3G), long-term evolution (LTE), 4G, and 5G [10], have been considered in the literature through real-world implementations, simulations, and emulations. However, ensuring the availability of 5G and newer technologies on every road at all times might not be realistically achievable [10].