# Towards a Cyber-Physical Range for the Integrated Navigation System (INS) System (INS)
###### Abstract  
The e-navigation concept was introduced by the IMO to enhance berth-to-berth navigation towards enhancing environmental protection, and safety and security at sea by leveraging technological advancements. Even though a number of e-navigation testbeds including some recognized by the IALA exist, they pertain to parts only of the Integrated Navigation System (INS) concept. Moreover, existing e-navigation and bridge testbeds do not have a cybersecurity testing functionality, therefore they cannot be used for assessing the cybersecurity posture of the INS. With cybersecurity concerns on the rise in the maritime domain, it is important to provide such capability. In this paper we review existing bridge testbeds, IMO regulations, and international standards, to first define a reference architecture for the INS and then to develop design specifications for an INS Cyber-Physical Range, i.e., an INS testbed with cybersecurity testing functionality. e-navigation; Integrated Navigation System; testbed; cyber-physical range +
Footnote †: journal: Marine Science and Engineering  
Collision Avoidance: _\"The navigational task of detecting and plotting other ships and objects to avoid collisions\"_[6]. Navigation Control Data: _\"Task that provides information for the manual and automatic control of the ship's movement on a task station\"_[6]. Navigational Status and Data Display: The task provides displaying data receiving from various sensors and devices, such as echo-sounder, Automatic Identification System (AIS), and anemometer [5]. Alert Management: _\"Concept for the harmonized regulation of the monitoring, handling, distribution and presentation of alerts on the bridge\"_[6]. The tasks of \"collision avoidance\" and \"route monitoring\" should be provided at least in the INS [6]. Additionally, the requirements of \"the presentation of navigation control data for manual control\" which is part of the task of \"Navigation control data\" should be implemented [5]. Last but not least, alert management requirements mentioned in Module C [7] should be implemented [5]. Even though the purpose and the functions performed by the INS are defined, a generic list of the devices that constitute an INS does not exist. This is largely because of several parameters, such as e.g., the vessel's gross tonnage, vessel type, navigation zone, ship construction date, directly affect the equipment to be fitted onboard. The testing of developed technologies on real ship bridges causes high costs and safety risks; this is why the development process may be divided into different stages [8]. Simulators can be used in the early development stages. However, not all aspects of a developed technology can be captured by a simulator, therefore porting of such technologies to real vessels may still create problems [8], that can be avoided by the use of a testbed instead. A testbed, defined by the IMO as _\"a platform for trialling development projects\"_[9] constitutes a realistic and safe environment for the transparent and replicable testing of research theories, computational tools, and new technologies. In particular, e-navigation testbeds allow for early testing of new system functionality, operational usability, areas of enhancement and identification of weaknesses [9]. Despite the fact that the IMO points out the importance of testbed applications to investigating the reliability of displaying information in the INS concept [3], no testbed focusing on the INS has been proposed. The INS, similarly to other marine systems on board and ashore, suffers from a number of cybersecurity vulnerabilities [10; 11; 12]. Further, several products have been developed to mitigate cyber threats against vessels [13; 14]. Given that such developing technologies might inherently entail cyber risks, they must be verified in a safe environment before being installed in the network of a ship.