## 4 Discussion
### Implications of This Study  
This study reveals the usefulness of the three theoretical approaches to understand the practical reality of the industry. The aim is, in terms of the [PERSON] and Pidgeon analogy [6], to reduce \"blind spots\" affecting the safety of Spanish nuclear power plants during their end-of-cycle stage, within prospects of gradual shutdown over the next few years. The diversity of these theories provides, as if they were watchtowers, a comprehensive, wide, and detailed view of the status of safety culture within the industry. The idea is to apply a pragmatic approach that integrates concepts not necessarily aligned but certainly complementary--a kind of theoretical crossbreeding that makes it possible to understand a concept as polyhedral and complex as organizational culture. The \"real\" safety of high reliability organizations is more robust if theoretical diversity is added as an interpretative framework for its \"reading\", rather than with a monolithic view from a single theoretical prism. In this regard, this study shows some valuable safety-related contributions provided by other, less known theoretical approaches, such as the conflicting objectives perspective (COP). Measuring how organizations solve organizational dilemmas provides insights that complement knowledge about the value they place on risk and safety (HRO) and how they manage uncertainty (RE). In short, the analysis of results under the interpretative framework of the three theoretical approaches of reference in our study favors practical reflections on safety culture at SNPPs.  
According to the theory of HRO, organizational culture should be focused on safety and to prevent catastrophic failures, and to promote a constructive work environment that tolerates discrepancies [27; 30]. Based on the results of our study, one could wonder to what extent the existence of workers who perceive that safety is not always the priority could be considered as a warning. Perhaps one could also consider that the resolution of the safety-production dilemma is sensitive towards safety once the local context or executing activity (facility, contractor) is the actual focus. Similarly, it is necessary to wonder about the impact of differentiated perceptions when it comes to the possibility to dissent without fear of retaliation (contractors).  
The theory of resilience includes the stages before, during, and after disruptions [73]. Nuclear power plants are complex organizations that operate under variable conditions and comprise highly interdependent parts. Thus, their adaptive capacity is paramount to prevent disastrous consequences [43]. In fact, the essence of organizational resilience is the capacity to recover the system's dynamic stability following critical disturbances [74]. Considering this approach, results show that SNPPs are perceived as solid organizations in their development of anticipative activities, but less solid and robust in their coping capacity. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the impact of this differentiated perception as a question to be addressed in order to make SNPPs more resilient.  
Lastly, within the COP framework [44] it is necessary to ask if SNPPs take into consideration the importance of correctly managing conflicting objectives. In other words, to which extent is the resolution of the dichotomy \"precise objectives and sufficient resources\" versus \"vague objectives and resource shortage\" coherent with the emphasis on safety? Similarly, from a perspective that is both dynamic and changing over time, to what extent could safety and quality be gradually displaced in favor of an increased sensitivity towards economic costs and time pressures? In this respect, it is necessary that top management address objectives that are partially conflicting, making unacceptable risk-related limits both visible and known, as proposed by [PERSON] [44] (p. 189).