# Preparations for Galileo PRS in Poland
## 6 Conclusions for Future PRS Tests  
In recent years, threats to the integrity and availability of GNSS systems have increased. The Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS), dedicated for authorized European governmental users, is one of the most promising solutions, being more resilient and robust than the initial GNSS open services. The Full Operational Capability phase of the PRS service is planned for 2023 [13], but the monitoring stations across Europe, including in Poland, are already reporting more and more cases of unintentional or deliberate activities in the GNSS frequency bands. Moreover, the coexistence of the Radio Navigation Satellite Services (RNSS) with the amateur service within the E6 band has become a source of significant controversy in Europe. Until the upcoming World Radiocommunication Conference,WRC-23, neither technical measures nor regulatory decisions will be possible or made. Due to the importance of the increasing security risk for GNSS, it is essential to act now. The experience gained by the National Institute of Telecommunication (NIT) during the jamming tests discussed in the article (selected jamming signals library, design and development of the high-flexibility measurement station and development of measurement methodology) can be used for the future tests aimed at the Galileo PRS service's resistance to intentional interference. The proposed measurement station can be easily adjusted for the purpose of the future measurements, both in the controlled laboratory environment and in outdoor dedicated test sites. It also can be adopted for mobile applications. The jamming signal library and the static and dynamic scenarios can be easily extended to create various sophisticated tests. The results presented in the article showed that the resistance to various jamming signals depends on the manufacturer of the GNSS receiver (both the GNSS chipset and the smartphone). It can, therefore, be expected that a similar effect might be observed with different manufactures of the PRS receivers. The pre-operational PRS receivers are now available, and in the near future, it can be expected that some EU Member States will develop their own PRS receivers to support national authorities and organizations responsible for security tasks and authorized and governmental users. The experience gained by the NIT is also used to support CPA Poland in the process of formally launching the Galileo PRS service in Poland, and it constitutes the basis for the preparation for the national Galileo PRS equipment evaluation measurements laboratory for CPA Poland purposes. The future measurement can also evaluate the added value of Galileo PRS over other GNSS services and give an opportunity to compare its quality and resistance to jamming and spoofing with other services. The PRS field tests will also enable PRS validation in specific use cases, as well as assess the suitability of the PRS to meet the needs of potential users in hostile environments, in which unintentional, as well as intentional, GNSS interference may occur. Nowadays, the risk of deliberate interference with GNSS signals is substantial and growing, and may also be used to support military operations [14; 15; 16]. Such actions have become an inseparable element of modern warfare and are used to disturb the navigation systems of surveillance drones and targeting missiles, as well as to destabilize (cellular) radio communication networks that use GNSS signals, e.g., for synchronization purposes. As GNSS signal jamming has now become a part of military offensives, the role of the Galileo PRS service, resistant to typical spoofing and jamming attacks, is of great importance for the safety and security of the European Union. It can, therefore, be expected that the risk of disrupting the Galileo PRS will be even greater than for the initial GNSS Open Services.