# Information Fusion in Autonomous Vehicle Using Artificial Neural Group Key Synchronization
## 2 Related Work
[19] present the very first multi-user key management system, which is a Diffie-Hellman modification based on the concept of symmetrical functions. Members are connected in a ring, with \(USER_{j}\) accepting only information from \(USER_{j-1}\) and transmitting to only \(USER_{j+1}\). Member \(USER_{j}\) is able to calculate the secret key after \(n-1\) sessions. However, being closer to a silent attacker who can monitor the communication pathways between both the members, this method was found to be vulnerable. [PERSON] et al. [20] present modifications of the Ingemarsson guidelines, in which member \(USER_{m}\) can calculate the secret key after completing the very first phase. In stage 2, the member \(USER_{m}\) transmits messages to \(USER_{m-1}\) then the end portion of the communication is used by \(USER_{m-1}\) as the power of its arbitrary value \(s_{m-1}\) to create a secret key. The text's last \(m-2\) portion is then sent to \(USER_{m-2}\) In compared to the [PERSON] et al. method, this technique requires lesser computing costs from the principal but takes twice as many sessions. No communications could be transmitted till the previous secrets signal has been acknowledged in this method. [PERSON] et al. proposed a different method to lower every user's average computation. Additionally, separate rules for joining and leaving of members are included in [21]. A circular method is used in Burmeset-Desmedt key (BD) [22]. Members are connected in a circle in this approach. The calculation of the secret key is conducted in two steps, every adjacent couple of principles \(USER_{j}\) and \(USER_{j+1}\) finishes the fundamental DH key interchange in the first step. Client \(USER_{j}\), on the other hand, instead of calculating the secret key separately, calculates the proportion of its two secret key \(Y_{j}\) with adjacent client. At step 2, every client transmits their \(Y_{j}\) value, allowing any client to calculate the secret key. When users are organized in a logical line instead of a circle. A slight change in the secret key emerges, which now just comprises the adjacent exponent sets on the connection. The approach for calculating the secret key is therefore dependent on the user's location on the line, and it is much more capable than [22], especially when there are a high number of users. [PERSON] [23] proposed a GKA technique in which users are arranged as leaves in a B-Tree. The advantage of [PERSON]'s technique over prior techniques is that the quantity of necessary synchronization steps is logarithmic in terms of the total number of users; however, the technique's restriction is that it allows \(2^{m}\) users. [PERSON] et al. [24] have demonstrated that the tree-based key establishment technique is particularly useful when the group's arrangement has to be changed without having to restart the entire technique. They had also demonstrated that by re-configuring the tree of keys, they could easily add and remove individuals. Asymmetric GKA was described by [PERSON] et al. [25] and [PERSON] et al. [26], while [PERSON] et al. [27] suggested a consolidated GKA technique to reduce encrypting time. In ad hoc networks, [PERSON] [28] proposed an ID-centred GKA mechanism including well constant round. [PERSON] et al. [29] created a resilient GKA technique in 2011 that permits a group of people to launch a shared secret key despite network problems. Many group key establishment techniques that have been provided can be implemented in one phase, but they do not provide advance confidentiality [30]. Most of the DH generalizations presented to date need minimum of two stages to create the mutually agreed key. The Joux [31] technique is the GKA technique that may be executed in a single stage while still maintaining advance confidentiality; however, it can only function with three members. The researchers of [10] proposed the CVTPM, which uses complex integers for all control factors. It is unclear if the CVTPM can resist a majority threat because they only looked at the geometric threat.