However, the CSI of the user is difficult to obtain by the base station in certain scenarios, such as when the user has not yet connected to the network. In addition, after the user has connected to the network, an eavesdropper can also disrupt beamforming and achieve eavesdropping through pilot contamination attacks [18; 19; 20]. For millimeter wave (mmWave) systems, the estimation of CSI requires a huge overhead for channel training [21]. Therefore, some works consider using alternative user information for beamforming, such as statistical CSI [13; 15; 16] and location information [21; 22; 23; 24; 25]. In certain scenarios, the location information of the user could be available. For example, the legitimate user is within a confidential area and dedicated networks can only be accessed within this area. We hope that users outside the confidential area cannot eavesdrop on the information of the dedicated network, because attackers can launch jamming, spoofing [26], or distributed denial-of-service attacks based on the network information. Location-based beamforming can be used to protect the dedicated networks. The performance of location-based beamforming has been studied in [22] in Rician wiretap channels. Based on the location information of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, the optimal location-based beamformer has been determined for the legitimate user through a grid search algorithm, which minimizes the secrecy outage probability of the system. Due to the absence of AN, eavesdroppers near legitimate users have a high secrecy outage probability when the number of antennas at the base station is small. The authors in [23] considered a wiretap system with the presence of a jammer. By assuming that the CSI of the legitimate user is known to the base station and the jammer, while the location of the eavesdropper is also available at the base station, the optimal beamformer that minimizes the secrecy outage probability has been proposed. Because the CSI between the legitimate user and the jammer is known, the AN signal is transmitted in the null space of the channel of the legitimate user. The authors of [25] studied the covert threat region of three-dimensional (3D) location-based beamforming, and the covertness performance for resisting detection from a location-unknown warden has been evaluated and compared with that of the conventional maximal ratio transmitting scheme. In this paper, we study the performance of location-based beamforming with the assistance of AN. Based on the location information of the legitimate user, we minimize the area near the user that has eavesdropping risks. Hence, the eavesdropping performance of eavesdroppers at different locations next to the user has been studied. The impact of AN has been considered for both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:  
1. Based on the location information of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) expressions have been derived for both the user and the eavesdropper, and the impact of AN has been considered. Close approximations of the probability density functions (PDFs) of SINRs have been proposed for Rician channels. 2. The expectations of SINRs have been derived in closed-form expressions. Moreover, the bit error rate (BER) expressions are derived using Gaussian-Laguerre (GL) approximation. 3. A quality of service (QoS)-based beamforming scheme is proposed to minimize the SINR of the eavesdropper and ensure the minimum SINR requirement of the legitimate user. Simulation results show that, when eight antennas are used at the base station, the block error rate (BLER) of eavesdroppers located \(5^{\circ}\) away from the legitimate user reaches 1. Some works in the literature considered using ergodic secrecy rate [16; 27] or secrecy outage probability [22; 28] to design a secure transmission strategy. The ergodic secrecy rate refers to the difference in ergodic rate between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. Ref.