# Elliptic Curve Signcryption-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol for Smart Cards
## 2 Literature Review
He also presented an enhanced scheme, which provides more security than [PERSON] et al. 's [16] mechanism. [PERSON] et al. [18] developed a password-centered key agreement and authentication mechanism and announced that it is safe from all the security attacks. However, [PERSON] and [PERSON] [19] proved that [PERSON] et al. 's [18] scheme failed to resist impersonation and password changing attacks. They also designed a password-based session initiation mechanism using smart cards, but this scheme was not found to be secure from password guessing attacks. [PERSON] et al. [20] figured out that [PERSON]'s [21] scheme suffered from time synchronization problems. They developed and proposed an improved scheme, which overcame the weaknesses in [PERSON]'s [21] scheme. [PERSON] et al. [22] presented a two-factor authentication mechanism, which provides user anonymity and untraceability while resisting de-synchronization attacks. They also claimed that their scheme did not incur any additional cost. However, the major weakness of [PERSON]'s scheme was that it failed to satisfy forward security. [PERSON] et al. [23] designed a three-factor scheme for key agreement schemes and authentication with session initiation based on ECC; however, it was found defenseless from replay attacks, password guessing attacks, and stolen smart card attacks [24]. [PERSON] et al. [25] projected an ECC-based authentication protocol with anonymity for mobile computing environment and announced that their protocol was efficient and secure. Later, [PERSON] et al. [26] showed that [PERSON] et al. 's [25] protocol was unsuccessful in achieving mutual authentication and key agreement. In addition, it was susceptible to known session-specific temporary information attacks. [PERSON] et al. [27] performed a comprehensive analysis of the authentication scheme presented by [PERSON] et al. [28] and figured out that [PERSON] et al. 's [28] scheme was prone to forgery and impersonation attacks. Furthermore, they explored that it also has correctness issues. [PERSON] et al. also developed an enhanced scheme overcoming the drawbacks and weaknesses of [PERSON] et al. 's scheme. [PERSON] et al. [29] designed an authentication mechanism on the basis of ECC for the multi-server environment and claimed that their schemes provided necessary security functionalities. However, [PERSON] et al. [7] performed a critical analysis of [PERSON] et al. 's [29] approach and showed that it failed to resist password guessing attacks and the impersonation attacks. They also proposed a smart card mutual authentication protocol on the basis of ECC, which removed the deficiencies in the protocol presented by [PERSON] et al. [PERSON] and [PERSON] [30] presented a two-factor scheme based on the Rabin Cryptosystem implementing an authentication mechanism and key agreement for remote users. However, this scheme involved modular exponentiation operations and is not appropriate for low computationally capable devices and environments including the Internet of Things. [PERSON] et al. [31] presented a three-factor mechanism for wireless sensor networks integrated with Internet which facilitates authentication and key setting. However, this scheme was not found to be efficient and consumed more computational time since it involved modular squaring and square root modulo operations. [PERSON] et al. [32] developed a mutual authentication mechanism for healthcare information systems based on ECC and announced that their scheme was efficient and could resist all kinds of security attacks. However, [PERSON] et al. [33] proved that the scheme proposed by [PERSON] et al. [32] was defenseless against insider attacks and denial of service attacks. [PERSON] et al. [34] designed an authentication mechanism with session initiation using ECC and explained that their scheme was forward secure and could counter all kinds of attacks. However, [PERSON] et al. [35] showed that [PERSON] et al.