## 2 Related Work
It focuses on secure operator-to-GCS authentication using lightweight symmetric key operations and fuzzy extractors, differentiating itself from more complex PUF-based, ECC/HECC-based, or blockchain-centric solutions by aiming for a balance of strong security against specific threats (keylogging, shoulder surfing, basic impersonation) with high efficiency. The dual formal verification using BAN logic and the BPR model aims to provide a high degree of confidence in its security claims within its defined scope. The performance evaluation of wireless network protocols, especially for Low Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs) like the IoD, often relies on simulation tools that can accurately model the operating system constraints and radio medium characteristics. The Contiki OS is a widely used lightweight operating system for networked embedded systems, and Cooja is a flexible Java-based simulator designed specifically for Contiki-powered sensor networks ([PERSON] et al., 2017; [PERSON] et al., 2017). [PERSON] et al. (2017) demonstrated the importance of a compliant IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA implementation on the Contiki OS to obtain realistic WSN performance results. [PERSON] et al. (2017) performed extensive simulations of RPL (Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks) in Contiki using Cooja, evaluating its performance in terms of energy, latency, packet delivery ratio, control overhead, and convergence time, while also optimizing various parameters. These studies highlight the effectiveness of Contiki/Cooja for realistic performance evaluation in resource-constrained wireless networks, providing a solid foundation and methodology for our own simulation analysis. To provide a clearer comparison of related works, Table 1 summarizes their key features and characteristics. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline
**Protocol** & **Primary Mechanism** & **Key Security Goals** & **Formal Analysis Method** & **IoD-Specific** & **Biometric/PUF** \\ \hline [PERSON] (2018) & Visual 2 FA & Keylogging and shoulder-surfing resistant & AVISPA & No & No \\ [PERSON] et al. (2015) & Biometric, PUF & Drone capture & & & \\ [PERSON] et al. (2015) & Biometric, PUF & resilience, RoR security & RoR, AVISPA & Yes & Yes \\ [PERSON] et al. (2018) & HMAC-SHA1 & Lightweight, replay attack resistance & ROM, ProVerif & Yes & No \\ [PERSON] et al. (2018) & HECC, blockchain & Anonymity, decentralization & ROM, AVISPA & Yes & No \\ [PERSON] et al. (2018) & AES-RSA, handover & Anonymous handover, performance & RoR, ProVerif & Yes & No \\ [PERSON] et al. (2018) & ECC, blockchain & Privacy-preserving, decentralization & None (informal) & Yes & No \\ [PERSON] et al. (2018) & DRAM PUF, lightweight IoT & Lightweight authentication (general 2025) & None (informal) & Partial & Yes \\
**Bio-2 FA-IoD (proposed)** & **Biometric, 2 FA, symmetric** & **Keylogging, shoulder-surfing, and drone capture resilience; lightweight** & **BAN, BPR** & **Yes** & **Yes** \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular} Note: Bold indicates the proposed protocol for emphasis.  
\end{table} 
Table 1: Comparative analysis of related works.