## 7 Conclusions  
This work presents an analysis of the effects of blockchain technology's limitations on the performance of a BBSM system. To obtain a more realistic model of a BBSM system, an experiment was conducted in the form of an online game. Based on the results of this experiment, an analysis of the players' strategies was carried out and used to model a multi-agent simulation model that mimics the behavior of the players during the experiment. The model was verified based on the results of the experiment and used to test how different blockchain network settings affect the performance of the BBSM concept. The experimental results have been published in the same repository [58] as the source code of the application developed and used to conduct the experiment. The collected data can be utilized for future performance comparisons of similar experimental methods in the field of blockchain-based manufacturing. The main findings of our analysis are as follows:  
* The results of the preliminary experiment indicate that when the scalability of the blockchain network does not meet the needs of the BBSM system, the role of the manufacturer becomes less beneficial than the financial role, which means that such a limitation can affect whether or not the system works at all, as manufacturers could lose incentive to participate in such a system. Higher transaction costs and lower prices for manufacturing services emerge in the BBSM system due to congestion of  
Figure 20: Comparison of service provision frequencies over time between simulations with constant \(f_{BC}\) and those with increased \(f_{BC}\). the blockchain network, and as a result the system is not able to utilize the existing maximum production capacities in the manufacturing system. Our strategy analysis of the performed experiment shows that because of the scalability limitations of the blockchain network in the game, staking funds in the blockchain network instead of using them to upgrade production capabilities is the winning strategy. * The results of our simulations suggest that changing the scalability of the blockchain network in the BBSM system does not directly affect the system's properties (i.e., minimum fee, maximum price, and capacity utilization); however, the change in these properties depends on the production function. Therefore, when introducing scalability enhancing technologies into the BBSM system, it is not trivial to predict how the system will respond to the increased throughput. The results of our simulations show that in the presented game a 100% increase in \(f_{BC}\) when the blockchain is clogged changes the upper bound of service provision frequency from \(f_{BC}\) to the maximum frequency of the service provision as defined by the production function. At that moment, the actual frequency of service provision is increased by approximately 40%, and does not completely follow the production function, which is due to the concurrent financial transactions (i.e., staking and unstaking transactions). Due to the relieving of pressure on the blockchain network, the efficiency of utilizing the maximum production capacity within the BBSM concept increases. In conclusion, this study has demonstrated, contrary to early assertions that blockchain systems can significantly reduce costs for manufacturers by eliminating the need for expensive intermediaries, it is instead evident that zero-trust and intermediary-free blockchain systems are faced serious with operating capacity limitations. The experiment and simulations presented in our research serve as a compelling illustration of this critical observation. Scalability-enhancing technologies seem to be a solution to the scalability limitations of blockchain technology. Our results suggest that the implementation of such solutions can improve the operation of BBSM systems. However, the same results indicate that a balance between the scalability properties of the blockchain network and users' requirements is necessary in order for the BBSM system to operate.