## 2 Related Work
The attacker can initiate a wormhole attack in a hostile environment if they learn that a nearby property is vulnerable. The consequences of the wormhole attack are undesirable outcomes that cannot be remedied by cryptographic methods. In this study, a class of protocols that perform secure neighbor discovery in UASNs and are resistant to wormholes were suggested. The protocols suggested by this research are based on the arrival-signal direction methodology. The suggested plan has the ability to withstand wormhole attacks. The four protocols that make up the suggested system are as follows: (i) In neighbor discovery, the following protocols must be used: (i) B-NDP requires two nodes; (ii) DV-NDP requires three nodes; (iii) SDV-NDP enhances DV-NDP; and (iv) MA-NDP, which allows for node mobility. The following are the evaluation findings for the four protocols: (i) B-NDP has an extremely high chance of being able to prevent fraudulent neighbors from establishing neighbor relationships. In B-NDP, the real neighbors can get to know one another. (ii) With a probability close to 1 and minimal links lost as a cost, DV-NDP has the potential to prevent fraudulent neighbors from establishing neighbor relationships. (iii) SDV-NDP has the potential to locate every wormhole; however, it loses many more links than DV-NDP. (iv) MA-NDP can control node mobility and has the ability to detect wormhole links that are randomly placed with high probability. B-NDP and MA-NDP protocols are appropriate for those applications whose main concerns are connectivity and end-to-end delay. Low density is also catered for with these protocols. DV-NDP and SDV-NDP protocols are appropriate for those applications that have wormhole resilience and high-level densities of nodes. For the UASNs context, the authors of [34] recommended a security suite made up of both static as well as mobile nodes. The security suite's goal is to protect UASNs environment confidentiality and integrity. Secure routing protocols and cryptographic basics are part of the security suite. First, the researchers suggested the FLOOD technique. A protocol is introduced with a secure variant called secure flood (SeFLOOD). The SeFLOOD protocol's performance evaluation was carried out to determine how much overhead the FLOOD protocol required to become secure. The outcomes of the experiments show that the suggested suite is appropriate for the UASNs environment. The proposed suite has a lower level of communication overhead and requires less power consumption. The suggested suite needs less electricity and has lower communication costs. The suggested protocol suite's main successes are listed below. (i) The proposed suite is effective due to the cypher text expansion's modest impact. (ii) When compared to the unsecure protocol, the secure protocol's discovery phase incurs 6% less overhead. (iii) The secure protocol's reconfiguration phase produced no additional overhead when compared to the unsecure protocol. (iv) The secure protocol was created in accordance with [PERSON]'s advice on designing computer systems. Researchers concentrated on DOS attacks in [35]. Flooding, man-in-the-middle, and demolition attacks are included in the classification of the DOS attack. Data that was exchanged between sensor nodes was captured by MITM attacks in UWSNs. In the context of UWSNs, wormhole, Sybil, and selective forwarding are all viable MITM attacks. By transmitting a continuous stream of packets to the base station during a flooding attack, the malicious node or nodes induce congestion. In the context of UWSNs, the flooding attack affects network performance across the board. In UWSNs, a demolishing attack entails changing or fiddling with the sensor node's settings, which causes the network as a whole to be destroyed. A major factor in the demolition attack is physical security. In the UWSN context, mobile sensor nodes encounter problems like the out-of-coverage issue and the false neighbor identification issue. The authors of this study employed Aqua-Sim as a simulation tool.