Authors study the relation between eavesdropper's information gain and disturbance introduced into legitimate users' information, known as the information disturbance theorem, used for the BB84 protocol. Authors show that [PERSON]'s extracting information disturbs the quantum states and increases the error probability, as expected. In the fifth article paper [15], authors introduce a QKD post-processing method, cubically raising the SKR in the number of double matching detection events. In the proposed protocol, contrary to the conventional QKD protocols, the secret bits rely on [PERSON]'s measurement basis selection rather than [PERSON]'s transmitted bits. Furthermore, the proposed protocol combines the sifting, reconciliation, and amplification into a unique process, thus requiring a single-round iteration without sending redundancy bits. In the sixth article [16], authors study a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from [PERSON] [17] and formally prove that the corresponding protocol is insecure. In the seventh article [18], authors study the phase-matching QKD (PM-QKD) protocol, employing discrete-phase randomization and the post-compensation phase to quadratically improve the SKR. Unfortunately, according to the authors, the discrete-phase randomization opens a security loophole. Authors introduce the unambiguous state discrimination measurement and the photon-number-splitting attack against PM-QKD with imperfect phase randomization, demonstrating the rigorous security of decoy state PM-QKD with a discrete-phase randomization protocol. In the eight article [19], authors introduce a nonclassical attack on the QKD system and propose a corresponding countermeasure method. The proposed attack is based on the sync pulses attenuated to a photon level to determine the signaling interval. To solve this attack, authors propose using variable power synchronizing pulses at varying lengths, combined with the controlled signal attenuation. In the wineth article paper [20], an entanglement-based QKD protocol is proposed that employs a modified symmetric version of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm to achieve secure and efficient key distribution, with two variants presented (fully symmetric and semi-symmetric). In the 10 th article paper [21], related to the physical-layer security, authors study the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a MIMO wireless system and show that the man-in-the-middle attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users. To solve for this problem, authors propose reducing the injection attack by using a particularly designed pilot randomization technique. Then, by employing a game-theoretic approach, authors evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers. In the 11 th article [22], authors introduce a Bayesian probabilistic algorithm that incorporates all published information in a qubit-based synchronization protocol to efficiently determine the clock offset without sacrificing any secure key. Given that the output of the algorithm is a probability, it can be used to quantify the synchronization confidence. In the final article paper [23], related to the secure computation, authors present randomized versions of two known oblivious transfer protocols--one being quantum and the other being post-quantum with ring learning and an error assumption, thus demonstrating their security in the quantum universal composability framework with the use of a common reference string model. [title=Finding:This research received no external funding. [title=Finding:This research received no external funding.