## 5 Discussion and Summary
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Paper** & **Problem** & **Method** & **Contribution** & **Weakness** \\ \hline
[83] & Behavioral evolution interaction recognition & Bayesian network model by Repeated Prison’s Dilemma (PD) and evolutionary game theory & Assessing the internal dynamic trust between intention recognizers and their opponents and predict the next move of their opponents based on the past direct interaction & Intention recognition achieved high performance of cooperation in homogeneous network only \\ \hline
[21] & Illegal accessed of transmission in underwater communication & Iterative key distribution & Reduce the redundant keys in the key distribution system and adopt the mobility model to capture the movement of sensors & This scheme did not consider the impaired channel caused by path loss, noise, multi-path and adding in beam Routing Protocol & Inception the same location of the sea underwater environment \\ \hline
[46] & Centralized and distributed reputation management in massive number of entities, & Bayesian Reputation Game & They found that trust cooperation is sustained when the game is repeated and the average reputation values of the players increase over time and coverage & The approach does not focus on the security issues among nodes and hence is not reliable \\ \hline
[59] & Investigating the effectiveness of nodes cooperation incentives & Used game theory to analyse cooperative incentive by Integrated System which combine the Reputation system and Price-based system. & They found that the strategies of using threshold to find the trustworthiness node in reputation system and Price-based system. can be manipulated by clever or selfish node. & The limitation of these method is it does not provide solution to the security issues among nodes \\ \hline
[60] & Motivate to share services and resources and to avoid selfish nodes to hinder the functioning of the entire network & Virtual currency and reputation mechanism method & They exploit the willingness of member to share their resources/services in order to increase collective welfare and to extend the reach of existing infrastructures & Their scheme does not guarantee security of data, since a selfish or clever node can manipulate the threshold value \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 2: _Cont._ \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Paper** & **Energy** & **Delay** & **Routing Overhead** & **Packet Drop** & **Selfish Detection** & **Coverage** & **Security** & **Reliability** \\ \hline
[59] & No & No & No & No & Yes & Yes & No & No \\
[24] & Yes & No & Yes & No & No & Yes & No & Yes \\
[32] & No & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & No \\
[72] & No & No & No & Yes & Yes & No & Yes & No \\
[21] & Yes & No & Yes & No & No & No & Yes & No \\
[70] & Yes & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & Yes & No \\
[71] & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No & No & No \\
[48] & No & Yes & No & No & No & Yes & No \\
[81] & No & No & No & Yes & Yes & No & Yes & No \\
[28] & Yes & Yes & No & No & No & Yes & No \\
[35] & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
[83] & No & Yes & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No \\
[60] & Yes & Yes & No & Yes & No & Yes & No & No \\
[51] & Yes & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No \\
[33] & No & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No \\
[40] & No & Yes & Yes & No & No & Yes & No & Yes \\
[50] & No & Yes & No & Yes & No & Yes & No & Yes \\
[59] & No & Yes & No & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & No \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 3: Evaluation and comparison of the approaches based on the performance metrics satisfied. An analysis and evaluation of existing literature works is highlighted in Table 3 where many metrics are compared and it is demonstrated that there is a gap which need to be filled in order to achieve maximum effective, efficient and reliable cooperation among nodes in UASNs.