## 5 Conclusions  
The conclusions and identified factors are drawn from the opinions of experts, authorities, and managers of transport- and flood-related institutions to understand why information exchange fails; why despite having significant ICT resources, timely actions do not happen; and how to bridge the gap of information between experts and communities. It is concluded that in both evolved and under-evolved economies, ICF related to transport systems under floods is a challenge at all times. The role of ICTs is overlooked, yet carries a huge exploitable potential to sustain lifeline systems during floods. To understand the barriers to implementing ICTs in floods, responsible factors were identified. The input information came from samples of expert sets, 240 (York) and 300 (HM). KMO and Bartlett's test confirmed high sampling adequacy with values ranging from 0.679 to 0.823 (i.e., \(\geq\)0.5) with \(p\)-values \(\leq\) 0.05. All factors with Eigenvalues \(\geq\)1 were retained whilst those \(\leq\) 1 were neglected. For York, two factors emerged for both ICT-1 and ICT-2, and for HM, two factors for ICT-1 and three factors for ICT-2 emerged. These factors were highly reliable with values ranging between 0.89 and 0.96. Factors were explained based on communalities with repeated iterations that show the information contribution of each drawn factor. Factor rotation uncovered PM and SM to show the strength of relationships between information sources and obtained factors. Extracted communalities showed that in York, all factors were contributed with information from micro-scaled ITS managers, i.e., set 8 with values 0.691 for ICT-1 and 0.983 for ICT-2. In HM ICT-1, all factors contributed information from environmental protection agencies, i.e., set 5 for ICT-1 with a value of 0.912, and city traffic police, i.e., set 10 for ICT-2 with a value of 0.746. ICT-1 was a group of technologies used to exchange and dispatch information among people and authorities. Factors related to ICT-1 in York and HM were nearly of a similar nature. In York, the transport system network required an integrated system of ICTs to regulate ICF during floods so that people and authorities could communicate effectively. The ICF particularly needed event-specific information with which anyone can benefit from the information they require to manage evacuation and ER operations. Similarly in HM, the information to be delivered to people was unstructured and shapeless. It required formal and standardized information, especially in the local language so flood-affected people can understand. Also, operational coordination among different institutions was absent, which did not support the ER operations even if information from ICT-2 was gathered. The extended delays and laborious and unneeded extended procedures caused many affected people left out to die. ICT-2 included highly technical devices used by the experts only and based on these technologies, informed decisions were made. Identified factors highlighted a difference in the behaviors of communities. In York, people were overly dependent on authorities in terms of ER and no significant resilient behavior was observed compared to HM. Likewise, authorities in York approached people who were easy to approach and despite critical challenges to the lives of people, fewer efforts were observed to approach far-resided people even though highly precise information from ICT-2 was available in most of the instances. In HM, gray areas were identified in which the lack of formal ICT-2 deployment plans and laborious procedures to use ICTs caused prolonged delays and inefficiencies in ER operations. Considerable ICTs-2 were not even deployed to attain required information. Also, community people over-burdened the transport system through contraflow towards the flooded area, which distracted and troubled ER teams.