## 4 Result and Discussion
### System Simulation Analysis
#### 4.3.2 The Impact of Spillover Penalties on Evolutionary Results  
Figure 7a illustrates that the slope of the blue line is consistently lower than that of the black line. This implies that the rate of intelligent enterprise construction under a penalty system with spillover effects is invariably slower than that under a system without such effects. This, in turn, suggests that the imposition of cascading penalties delays the system's attainment of a stable equilibrium point, particularly in the case of enterprises, and impedes the implementation of their intelligent construction. As can be seen from Figure 7b, in the presence of spillover penalties, the rate of intelligent construction by coal mining companies declines as the strength of initial government constraints increases. This is contrary to the fact that the intensity of government regulation is proportional to the speed of contractorization in the context of no spillover effects. This indicates that, from a value perception standpoint, rather than facilitating the expeditious development of enterprise intelligence, the imposition of spillover penalties by governments can impede the process. In extreme instances, where the initial pressure exerted by the government is considerable, it is often challenging for enterprises to initiate the process.  
Figure 7: Influence of the spillover effect on evolutionary game. (**a**) Comparison 3D map with or without the spillover effect (different initial strategies). (**b**) Two-dimensional comparison with or without the spillover effect (different initial strategies). (**c**) Comparison 3D map with or without the spillover effect (different regulatory intensity). (**d**) Two-dimensional comparison with or without the spillover effect (different regulatory intensity).  
Similarly, we analyze the extent to which spillover penalties affect the probability of strict government oversight, using the probability of strict government oversight as the vertical axis. This finding is in alignment with the aforementioned conclusion that spillover penalties exert a limited influence on the rate at which full implementation of strict monitoring occurs. It is evident that the introduction of spillover effects can only impede the development of intelligence, yet it cannot alter the ultimate evolutionary strategy. Specifically, the joint and several liability punishment mechanisms has the effect of punishing those enterprises that comply with the regulations and conscientiously carry out transformation for the illegal business practices of their peers. This has the effect of dampening the enthusiasm of these enterprises to improve their intelligent construction, discouraging those that are in the midst of the critical process of improvement and hindering their continued promotion and upgrading of intelligent in the future. As a result, the overall national intelligent construction process of coal mines is delayed.  
This contradicts the viewpoint in the original Hypothesis 3 that in the game model based on value perception, the spillover penalty strategy can also promote intelligent construction. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 does not hold.