## 2 Literature Review, Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis
### The Distortion Effect of Monopoly on 'Digital Technology to Goodness'  
Simply from the technical level, digital technology is neutral in value orientation; that is, it does not have the role of protecting specific subjects. However, the specific application of digital technology is implemented by people, so even if it is a technical means, it is inevitably embedded in complex social networks [40; 41]. Most of the current scholars' research affirms the positive role of digital transformation in enterprise development [42; 43; 44], but to a certain extent, it ignores the risks borne by enterprises due to digital transformation. In the process of transformation, the introduction of digital technology requires a lot of cash investment, which not only squeezes out other investments that can get returns in the short term but also makes it difficult to directly attribute the possible returns to the investment of digital transformation. Therefore, in the short term, its economic empowerment effect is not significant [11]. Therefore, for many SMEs, it is better to rely on large platforms and take the collective transformation route than to transform independently [45; 46], this phenomenon also aggravates the existing problems of algorithm discrimination [47] and data security [48] and promotes the monopoly advantage of online platform owners. From the perspective of market competition, the purpose of obtaining a monopoly advantage is to obtain a strong position in the competition process. According to the resource-based theory in the theoretical system of competitive advantage, monopoly enterprises can use their unique resources to crowd out potential competitors in the market and obtain monopoly profits. At present, not all enterprises can successfully implement a digital transformation. Even with successful transformation, the specific distribution of digital resources is also uneven; for example, in China, digital resources will be largely concentrated in the BAT (Baidu, Ali, Tencent) enterprises, so such enterprises can easily manipulate this special resource (digital resources) to further grab monopoly profits. In terms of algorithm discrimination, monopoly enterprises that master online platforms can easily make enterprises in the platform bow to them by integrating platform resources so that monopoly enterprises can leverage the market structure of the entire industry by virtue of online platforms. The recent incident of Alibaba blocking SF Express and purchasing \"ELEME\" Takeout is a typical representative of this behavior. The specific method is as follows: according to the online data performance of potential competitors, by changing the execution parameters of the algorithm, the 'non-partner' enterprises are intentionally shielded so that such enterprises lose the online market. In terms of data security, although according to the existing laws and regulations ('Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China', 'Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of Platform Economic Norms'), the platform needs the user's informed consent before obtaining the relevant data of the service object. However, according to the current implementation status, the service terms given by most platforms are ambiguous on key issues. It is not known to what extent online platform users can recognize the potential risks [49]. Taking Alibaba as an example, its platform basically arranges all the processes of products except the production process until they are sent to consumers, including even lending services. In these services, consumers are basically required to agree to their terms of service. If they do not agree, they cannot receive the next service. Therefore, to a certain extent, consumers' consent to the terms of service is 'passively voluntary' rather than 'completely voluntary'. This is obviously contrary to the current concept of protecting consumer data.