# Team-Communication Modeling Framework for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Accident Analysis
## 3 Results and Analysis
### Team-Communication Process Model  
While the investigation model contains all the factors influencing team communication, there is no description of the occurrences or the ways communications take place. Team communication is an information exchange process between at least one sender to one receiver, regardless of the medium [9], and it is performed to properly accomplish tasks [15]. Thus, we created the process model to represent the information exchange between teams of NPP operators in performing multi-unit accident-management tasks. Ideally, this model will contain the whole team-communication process of multi-unit accident management; however, since we aim to analyze the intra- and inter-communication of the operators, the information of interest is very detailed (request, report, order, etc.), thus modeling the entire accident-management tasks was highly complicated and ineffective. Instead, we performed a task analysis and divided the model into several levels, as will be explained with examples in the case study.  
We decided to develop the process model in the form of a functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) model [43]. FRAM is a system-modeling method that has gained high interest, especially in the field of accident modeling [44; 45]. In this method, the target system or work domain is represented through functions that are linked to each other via the function's six aspects, i.e., Input, Time, Precondition, Control, Resources, and Output. We chose FRAM since it was developed by considering the principles of resilience engineering, namely the equivalence of failures and successes, the approximate adjustments, emergence, and resonance. Resiliency is the ability to handle unexpected situations safely. Thus, NPP operators must be equipped with high resiliency during accident management [46]. Also, FRAM accommodates a high degree of freedom in the modeling process. There is no predefined sequence of the functions in the FRAM meta-model level; the sequence of functions is defined in the instantiations of the model. There is also no limitation on the number of items for each aspect, and, using a software called the FRAM model visualizer Version 3.1.0, there is no constraint on the placement of the functions [47]. We found this modeling freedom to be beneficial to model team communication because we can capture the high number of possibilities in both communication flow (e.g., the same content can be sent to multiple receivers) and items of information exchanges (request, report, order, etc.).  
The reference model (SEIPS) also has a work process, which was elaborated to cover physical, cognitive, and social/behavioral performance processes and was the center of its latest improvement, SEIPS 3.0, showing the importance of a process analysis [41]. This work process is comparable to our team-communication process model; however, while we opted to apply a specific modeling method, i.e., FRAM, the reference model did not; it merely provided guidance tools such as a journey map and systems story. Since our research domain is specific, we were able to specify a modeling method and the modeling hierarchy, which improves the applicability of the team-communication process model.  
As a type of FRAM, the process model covers its application scenarios, namely retrospective analysis (accident analysis) and prospective analysis (risk assessment) [44]. Application of the process model as an accident analysis can guide the analyst to find problematic team communication, such as incorrect content, off timing, and unsuitable communication methods. For risk assessment, the insights extracted from the analysis of the process model offer safety improvement insights.