## 4 Prevention Mechanisms of the Proposed Scheme  
### Proposed Scheme System Architecture Model (PSAM)  
In this research, PSAM represents the proposed scheme system architecture model. It is used for the detection of end-to-end delayed path packets of vehicles in the network that have also encountered HDSA attacks with the HDAM. PSAM utilizes the attacked packet detection algorithms (APDA) deployed in the PSAM, as shown in Figure 4. The APDA is utilized to capture all forms of attacks categories, including HDSA and all other forms of associated attacks with VANET, as identified with the PSAM. The HDSA categories include PD/FI, DoS JSA, and RCRCO, which would require high memory computation and high bandwidth. Figure 4 depicts the PSAM of this research, whereby the APDA method has been implemented. The APDA method used is attached through every RSU and the FS via a packet detection mechanism that distinguishes exact message positions on the path of the vehicle. It also utilizes ESA communication range (ESACR), which has the objective of evaluating end-to-end delay and jitter experienced in the network. In addition, one of RSU's main job functions include serving as a gateway for the PSAM for all vehicle communication. The RSU also coordinates with FS to disseminate secure transmissions of V2V communication. The RSU is also connected with the FS logically through wireless or wired means. After the detection of vehicle position, the information or messages are derived based upon the effectiveness of the utilization of the above two attacks models, which include the DoS attack model (DAM) and jamming attack model (DJSAM). These two models (DAM and DJSAM) are together known as the HDSA model (HDAM). These attack models are deployed for the proposed scheme for detection of the HDSA and other attacks, discussed previously in Section 3. HDAM models, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3, utilize RSUs and the FS to process the communication. Thus, HDAM utilizes the IEEE 802.11p beacons and signals for vehicle communication. IEEE 802.11p beacons employ the devices in the VANET, which have on-board units (OBUs) and Tamper Proof Devices (TPDs). These are used to store the comprehensive information for the vehicles, such as position, speed, etc. The position of the vehicles is identified by the velocity of the vehicles, frequency of the vehicles, the vehicle position, and the number of packets sent to the vehicles. The vehicle position identification utilizes the following communication processes: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, the vehicle-to-road-side unit (V2 RSU), and the inter-roadside-communication unit (RSU2 RSU), as shown in Figure 4. The communication process also encompass the relay of IEEE 802.11p beacons that utilize hybrid multicast/broadcast and unicast data transmission. The communication process also sensitizes awareness for road safety and driver vigilance. Figure 4: Proposed system architecture model (PSAM) for the proposed scheme. In the PSAM, when the packet is not attacked, then the V2V communication, V2 RSU, RSU2V, and RSU2 RSU communication will not track the path in end-to-end delay of the exact vehicle. This capability includes the tendency to reduce communication overhead (CO) in the PSAM. An algorithm has been designed on the basis of requirements as per the variations in the positions of vehicles in the VANET. The identification of the attacked packets can be done by \(V\) (velocity) and \(F\) (Frequency); \(\lambda\) is a co-efficient that has been determined by the characteristics of the road and Vmax is the maximum Speed, m as shown in the Equation (1):  
\[F=\lambda^{*}\left|V-\frac{v_{max}}{2}\right| \tag{1}\]  
where \(F\) is the number of packets unicast and multicast (or broadcast) per second. The identification of the attacked packets is done with the below conditions:  
The ranges of \(F\) and \(V\) are high, as the vehicle's position varies instantly. The ranges of \(F\) and \(V\) are low, as the vehicle's position does not vary instantly.