Research and Prospect of Defense for Integrated Energy Cyber-Physical Systems Against Deliberate Attacks  
1 College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China; [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (X.T. ); [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (C.L. ); [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (Y.G. ); [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (R.S. ); [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (B.Z.) 1  
1 College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China; [EMAIL_ADDRESS]. technologies. This approach significantly improves energy utilization efficiency and effectively leverages the potential for system coordination and mutual support. By effectively harnessing this coordination potential, IECPS can mitigate the impact of renewable energy integration on the overall energy system, thus increasing renewable energy consumption. IECPS employ advanced communication technologies to enhance energy efficiency and support renewable energy integration. However, the deep integration of physical systems and high cyber-physical coupling elevates global and localized vulnerabilities. Due to system convergence, even minor faults within a single energy system can propagate across systems, thereby widening the scope of faults. In more severe scenarios, these faults may continuously accumulate across systems, ultimately resulting in significant multi-system cascading failures. A major blackout occurred at the Datan power plant in Taiwan in August 2017, caused by a disruption in the gas supply. This disruption led to intermittent blackouts across 17 counties and cities, excluding Hualien and Taitung, affecting a total of 6.68 million users [4]. In February 2021, Texas, USA, experienced an extensive blackout that was exacerbated by extreme cold weather conditions. Several natural gas facilities were shut down prematurely, causing fuel shortages and leading to the shutdown of generating units. Additionally, power plant failures and disruptions in load wheeling exacerbated the shortage of natural gas, further contributing to the widespread blackout. This event ultimately affected over 4.5 million people [5]. On the other hand, the coupling of physical and cyber systems leads to the expansion of system network boundaries, thereby significantly increasing cybersecurity risks [6]. For instance, in 2015, the malware \"Black Energy\" compromised the Ukrainian power grid's cyber system, resulting in the activation of seven substation switches and causing power outages for 750,000 households over several hours. The attack was orchestrated by multiple programs with well-defined objectives and is regarded as the first significant power outage triggered by a deliberate message attack [7]. In March 2019, a cyberattack on Venezuela's largest Simon Bolivar hydroelectric power plant triggered a major blackout across 22 states. Following the incident, although 40% of the power was restored, an explosion at the power plant significantly hindered the power restoration process [8]. In September 2019, a cyber nuclear terrorism incident at India's largest nuclear power plant, the Kudankulam nuclear power plant, resulted in minimal physical damage but sparked widespread spanic [9]. These events highlight that IECPS face growing risks from deliberate attacks, extreme disasters, and occasional system failures, significantly obstructing their development and the progress of energy transition. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the defense capability of IECPS to cope with the increasing threat of deliberate attacks on the system and to promote the energy transition and the development of IECPS. Currently, researchers and scholars have extensively studied deliberate attacks on cyber-physical power system and their corresponding defense strategies, leading to the development of relatively mature defense systems. However, research focusing specifically on defending IECPS against deliberate attacks remains scarce, with a systematic review of this domain still notably absent. To address this gap, this paper first analyzes the attack modes and modeling techniques associated with deliberate attacks targeting IECPS.