# A Survey on Energy Drainage Attacks and Countermeasures in Wireless Sensor Networks
## 6 Conclusions  
We reviewed state-of-the-art research in energy drainage attacks in WSNs since 2019. First, the constraints of WSNs and security requirements were analyzed. Through in-depth existing survey papers, previous research works were identified. Next, we presented their  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{42.7 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt} p{56.9 pt}} \hline \hline \multirow{2}{*}{**Year**} & **Dataset Name** & **Security Relevance** & **Attack Types** & **Simulation Environment** \\ \hline
1999 & KDD Cup & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Denial of Service, Probing Attack, Remote to \\ Local Attack, User to Root Attack \\ \end{tabular} & Yes \\ \hline
2009 & NSL-KDD & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Denial of Service, Probing Attack, Remote to \\ Local Attack, User to Root Attack \\ \end{tabular} & No \\ \hline
2015 & SWaT & Yes & Various cyber attack scenarios & No \\ \hline
2015 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} UNSW- \\ NB15 \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Denial of Service, Exploitation Attack, \\ Local Cyber Attack, Shellcode Injection Attack, \\ Backdoor Attack, Fuzzing Attack, Reconnaissance Attack, Worms, Normal \\ \end{tabular} & No \\ \hline
2016 & WSN-DS & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Blackhole, Grayhole, Flooding, Scheduling \\ (TDMA), Normal \\ \end{tabular} & Yes \\ \hline
2017 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} CIC- \\ IDS2017 \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Brute Force Attack, HeartBleed Attacks, Bot- \\ net Attack, Distributed Denial of Service, Denial of Service, Web-based Attack, Network \\ Infiltration Attack \\ \end{tabular} & No \\ \hline
2022 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} Edge- \\ IIoTset \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Distributed Denial of Service, Mirai Botnet \\ Attack, Man-in-the-Middle Attack, Malware \\ Injection Attack \\ \end{tabular} & No \\ \hline
2023 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} DoS/DDoS- \\ MQTT-IoT \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Brute Force Denial of Service, Delay-based \\ Denial of Service, Invalid Subscription Flooding Denial of Service, Will Payload Attack \\ \end{tabular} & No \\ \hline
2024 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} WSN- \\ Leach \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Blackhole, Grayhole, Flooding, TDMA \\ (Scheduling) \\ \end{tabular} & Yes \\ \hline
2024 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} WSN- \\ BFSF \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Blackhole, Flooding, Selective Forwarding, \\ Normal \\ \end{tabular} & Yes \\ \hline
2024 & \
\begin{tabular}{l} ROS- \\ WSN-DS \\ \end{tabular} & Yes &
\begin{tabular}{l} Blackhole, Grayhole, Flooding, Scheduling \\ \end{tabular} & Yes \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 8: Lists of security data sets for WSNs.  
studies on the detection of energy drainage attacks and their countermeasures in a layered approach. We focused on jamming at the physical layer, denial of sleep at the data link layer, DoS at the network layer, flooding at the transport layer, and localization at the application layer. As open research challenges, five research topics were discussed.  
This survey paper will be extended to include more research papers related to this topic that are not mentioned, such as node tempering and trust-based routing. Furthermore, new research challenges, such as anomaly detection and privacy preservation, will be studied and investigated.  
Conceptualization, J.-K.L. and Y.-R.C.; Formal analysis, B.-K.S. and S.-W.J.; Project administration, K.-I.K. All authors read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.  
This study was conducted with the support of the National Research Foundation of Korea and funding from the government (Ministry of Science and ICT) under Grant No. RS-2023-00258052.  
Not applicable.  
Data Availability Statement: Data are contained within the article.  
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.