# A Survey of Game Theoretic Approaches to Modelling Decision-Making in Information Warfare Scenarios
## 4 Games for Representing Information Warfare Operations
### A Taxonomy of Information Warfare Games
#### 4.2.2 Military Deception Games  
[PERSON] et al. [49] investigate the use of deception by rational players in non-cooperative stochastic games with partial information. In the context of information warfare, this study falls under the category of military deception games. Specifically, this work considers problems that occur in the control of military operations. It is shown that deception can be used to increase player's payoff when one of the player can manipulate the information that is available to the opponents. In the case where the degree of possible manipulation is high, however, deception becomes useless against an intelligent opponent as it can potentially ignore the information that has been manipulated.  
The role of deception in game theory and information warfare has also been considered by [PERSON] [50]. This study considers the case where the opponent can use deception so that the decision maker might misperceive the likelihood that a particular state was selected. The deception value is represented in terms of the payoff matrix and the misperceived likelihoods. This work considers the case of Normandy invasion in 1994 as an example case study to test the proposed approach.  
In general, [PERSON] and [PERSON] [51] define deception as disclosing a signal that is different from the hidden action. They consider the specific case of homeland security where deception is considered as displaying a different level of defensive investment to the enemy than what is actually implemented. A game-theoretic approach is used to determine whether and how resource allocation should be disclosed by the first mover. Simulation results show that deception can be employed as equilibrium strategies for the defender.  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c c c} \hline \hline  & \multicolumn{3}{c}{**Information Warfare Properties**} & \multicolumn{5}{c}{**Game Theory Properties**} \\ \cline{3-8}
**References** & **Actors** & & **Goals** & **Static (S)/ Dynamic (D)** & **Complete (M)/ Incomplete Information (IP)** & **Perfect (P)/ Bayesian (B)/Non-** \\  & **Offensive** & **Defensive** & & **Information (IM)** & **Information (IP)** & **Bayesian (NB)** \\ \hline
[2] & I, T, G & G & \(2,3\) & S & M & IP & NB \\
[47] & G & G & \(2,5\) & D (Stage) & M & IP & NB \\
[48] & G & G & \(2,4,5\) & S & IM & IP & B \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 3: List of Command and Control Games.  
[PERSON] and [PERSON] [52] propose a game theory framework to model deception in honeynets. Honeypot in this study is defined as a host that is left unprotected to the attackers in order to test the vulnerabilities of a system. Honeynets, accordingly, is defined as a set of interconnected honeypots. An example of deception moves in this study includes the strategy to make the attacker believes that the system is a honeypot when actually it is a regular host. The equilibrium solutions of an extensive games of imperfect information are studied in this work. Simulations show that the solutions of such a game can be used to examine the strategies of the attacker and the honeynet system (defender). Other relevant literature exists which investigates deception in a game theoretic setting [55; 56; 57].  
Table 4 lists game theoretic approaches that fall under military deception category.