# Bridging the Gap: Enhancing Maritime Vessel Cyber Resilience through Security Operation Centers
## 2 Background
### Maritime Future with Remote Operations Centers (ROCs)  
While the adoption of M-SOCs is presently limited to monitoring conventionally manned surface vessels, the future of shipping is progressively moving towards autonomous vessels. Therefore, a discussion on M-SOCs would not be complete without looking to the future where they will be tasked with monitoring autonomous vessels and what the implications of the same would be. The potential benefits that have been attributed to autonomous vessels include fuel cost savings, crew cost savings, improved crew safety, and a reduction in emissions. The introduction of these autonomous vessels will come with a significant redesign of the fleet operational models, most notably through the introduction of Remote Operation Centers (ROCs) [47]. These ROCs, which have also been referred to as shore control centers [48], would enable greater oversight of vessels and enable shipping companies to have more shore-based control of their assets. Some of the functionalities that have been proposed for ROCs include the monitoring of physical processes onboard the vessel, navigation control, taking over control during emergencies, and implementation of software updates [49]. This presents a context where rich data flows from a vessel are available onshore to operators who may then undertake actions to change the vessel's state. The primary concern for humans operating a vessel remotely is their keeping up adequate situational awareness through remote sensing of the state of the vessel [50]. An unmanned ship in a fleet might require support from the operator in the ROC, either due to regulations, mistrust in automation, or automation capabilities. Ensuring connectivity is reliable is pivotal to maintaining adequate situational awareness [48]. More critical challenges the ROC could face concerning maritime security monitoring control systems operation is memory corruption vulnerabilities where the program's control flow could be hijacked by cyber attackers to execute a random or unreasonable code in the application's context [51]. The increased data flows arising from the implementation of ROCs expand the threat attack surface which has severe implications for the safe operation of the autonomous vessel. While not comprehensive, such scenarios highlight that there is a natural overlap for the M-SOC when it comes to defending both the vessels and the ROC from cyber-attacks. While currently limited, a body of research has emerged looking into how cyber security can be better managed in an ROC. For example, recent research investigated how cyber alerts can be effectively presented to ROC operators in a way that does not negatively impact their overall situational awareness, yet still elicits a sufficient response [52]. Potential cyber-related risks in the ROC have also been identified including confidentiality breaches, data tampering, and the loss of connection availability [5]. For autonomous vessels more than conventionally manned ships, connectivity, and efficient ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication are key components for their safe operation [53]. Factors to consider include the speed and reliability with which the data generated from sensors and cameras can be transferred between the vessel and the ROC to enable real-time situational awareness and handling for operators [54]. This is an area that has increasingly received research attention. Research by [55] conducted a risk assessment of hazards that would impact the safe operation of autonomous vessels. Some of the hazards that featured in their final ranking included system failure due to a breakdown of the communication link and a system failure due to the jamming or spoofing of AIS and GPS signals. When it comes to managing the efficient flow of data in the communication channels, Ref. [56] for example looked into spectrum requirements for the control and communication of autonomous vessels.