# BGPcoin: Blockchain-Based Internet Number Resource Authority and BGP Security Solution
## 6 BGPcoin Transaction vs. RC/ROA in RPKI  
BGPcoin and RPKI both provide their trustworthy binding methods to authorize AS to originate the prefixes in BGP against prefix/subprefix hijacks. The binding methods are supported by their crucial data structures (RCs and ROAs in RPKI and transaction in BGPcoin, respectively). We compare the transaction in BGPcoin with the objects including RCs and ROAs in RPKI and observe that BGPcoin yields significant benefits on three characteristics, as shown in Table 2.  
In RPKI, malicious CAs that pose great threats and misconfigurations [12] need attention as well. We give a case study to demonstrate how BGPcoin eliminates the risks that have been highlighted [16; 24; 32] in RPKI efficiently. We show in Figure 5 that RPKI suffers from unilateral resource revocation and inconsistency view attacks, manipulating to whack targeted ROAs, and misconfigured ROAs will cause all routes that covered it to become invalid. We set the \(ROA3\) as the target ROA in Figure 5. In the framework of RPKI, every entity has its resource certificates, and every ROA is issued by an EE certificate (which is for an end entity and not allowed to issue its child certificate). The malicious authorities have the ability to do attacks as follows:  
1. **Unilateral revoke:**\(ISP2\)can simply add the EE certificate in the \(ROA3\) to its certificate revocation list, to make the target ROA \(ROA3\) invalid. 2. **Stealthy deleting:**\(APNIC\), as the RIR, can stealthily delete or corrupt \(ROA3\) or the entity certificate for 218.241.108.0/22 in its repository and changes its manifest appropriately. In this case, RPs will accept and update the change, and \(ROA3\) will be absent. 3. **Overwriting:**\(ISP2\) overwrites the EE certificate for 218.241.108.0/22 with a different key, so \(ROA3\) is no longer signed by the new key and becomes invalid. 4. **Targeted whacking:** A more complex targeted whacking can be launched by \(CNNIC\), as a NIR,, which modifies the RC of \(ISP2\)and issues a new \(ROA3\) that covers 218.241.96.0/20, but with a new ASN \(AS3\). Then, the former \(ROA3\) becomes invalid since no RC covers it, and \(AS1\) is no longer the bound AS who legally originates 218.241.96.0/20. As collateral damage, \(ROA1\) becomes invalid as well. In contrast, the characteristics of history-based trustworthiness, autonomic transaction audit and explicit resource ownership enables BGPcoin to minimize the capability of authorities to eliminate the risk of misconfiguration and misbehaving above. **History-based trustworthiness**: The transparency is a critical property to avoid the authority misbehaving. Supporting the transparency in RPKI requires an additional logging mechanism [24]. In contrast, the history-based trustworthiness of BGPcoin supported by the blockchain presents its inherent transparency provided by the type of sequence-appending hash-chained data structure. **Inherent transaction audit**: The miner verification and the process logic of smart contracts of BGPcoin provide the inherent transaction audit and eradicates the violation of the contract like the authority misbehaviors and misconfigurations. The immutable ledger of BGPcoin blockchain