###### Abstract
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{p{56.9 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt} p{113.8 pt}} \hline \hline
**Ref.** & **Communication Model** & **Method** & **Tool** & **Advantages** & **Limitations** \\ \hline
[29] & Single gateway & RSA public key & GNY logic & Mutual authentication & Vulnerability to offline password guessing, insider, and gateway node impersonation attack. \\
[30] & Single gateway & ECC & Prototype (MCA2 sensor node) & Vulnerability to offline password guessing, insider, and gateway node impersonation attack. & Vulnerability to various impersonation attacks. \\
[31] & Single gateway & Hash function, and XOR & PBC library & Reduces computation burden. & Node captured impersonation attack. \\
[32] & Single gateway & AES & PBC library & Denial-of-service attack and sensor node impersonation attack. & Fail to provide acclaimed security goals. \\
[33] & Dynamic & & Most suitable for agriculture monitoring. & Needs to concentrate on redundancy. \\
[34] & Single gateway & Blockchain & PBC library & Ensures data privacy and integrity. & Single point failure. \\
[35] & Single gateway & ECC & JJPBC library & Provides mutual authentication between the user, the sensor, and the gateway. & Lack of user anonymity or smart card stolen attack. \\
[36] & Single gateway & PKI & Crypto ++ & Agriculture field monitoring. & Packets drop and latency ratio. Vulnerable to user impersonation, stolen smart card, privileged insider attacks and does not support anonymity, and traceability. \\
[37] & Single gateway & ECC & PBC library & Computationally less expensive. & An adversary could gain unauthorized access to the device. \\
[38] & Single gateway & ECC & Crypto ++ & Secure from numerous security attacks. & Vulnerability to attacks. \\
[39] & Single gateway & ECDH & JPBC library & Achieves essential security requirements like integrity, anonymity, forward secrecy. & Vulnerability to offline guessing attack, and sensor capture attack. \\
[44] & Single gateway & Fuzzy extractor. & Crypto ++ & Secure monitoring. & High computation cost. \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Comparison of the existing WSN authentication scheme in the agricultural field. cure communication between the sensor nodes, gateways, and agriculture professionals makes the IoT agriculture environment vulnerable to various potential attacks, including replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, privileged-insider, and physical smart devices and drones capture attacks [46]. Apart from these, anonymity and mutual authentication properties to be highly maintained is essentially required. An adversary cannot trace the entities sending the data securely to the control room via a gateway. Therefore, to address the above issues, we propose a multi-gateway authentication scheme with the three factors being the identity, password, and personal biometrics for agriculture WSN. The proposed scheme relies mainly on the fuzzy extractor method. We have also provided the simulation of our scheme using AVISPA, a powerful validation tool for network security applications, and showed that our scheme is safe against popularly known attacks. Similarly, the BAN logic is utilized to prove the secure mutual authentication between entities.