## 7 Conclusions and Future Development Direction  
### Research Results  
In order to exert scarce energy pressure and cope with climate change, China is striving to stimulate the development of battery technologies, and accelerate the deployment of new energy vehicle markets. Information asymmetry in the closed-loop supply chain system of used batteries will have an impact on the expected utility of the supply chain. This paper assumes that the dismantling ability of the agent in the market is a discrete variable. From the standpoint of the battery manufacturer,  
Figure 4: The entrusted party expects the profit of \(\Pi_{M}\) to change with \(\delta\), \(f(v)\).  
\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c c c} \hline \multirow{2}{*}{\(f(v)\)} & \multirow{2}{*}{\(\delta\)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**False Ability Information**} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{**Report Truthfully**} \\ \cline{3-6}  & & \(\Pi_{LH}\) & \(\Pi_{HL}\) & \(\Pi_{LL}\) & \(\Pi_{HH}\) \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{0.75} & 0.4 & 11.6304 & 17.4115 & 13.0714 & 17.4115 \\  & 0.6 & 11.4081 & 15.855 & 13.0714 & 15.855 \\  & 0.8 & 11.1622 & 14.1341 & 13.0714 & 14.1341 \\  & 1 & 11.0002 & 13.0714 & 13.0714 & 13.0714 \\ \hline \multirow{4}{*}{0.95} & 0.4 & 11.8589 & 18.9624 & 14.0714 & 18.9624 \\  & 0.6 & 11.6088 & 17.2115 & 14.0714 & 17.2115 \\ \cline{1-1}  & 0.8 & 11.3322 & 15.2758 & 14.0714 & 15.2758 \\ \cline{1-1}  & 1 & 11.1524 & 14.0714 & 14.0714 & 14.0714 \\ \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 3: Recycler expects profit \(\Pi_{T_{ij}}\) with \(\delta\), \(f(v)\) changes.  
a closed-loop supply-chain system consisting of a battery manufacturer, a new energy automobile company, and a recycler is constructed. Based on principal-agent theory, we have explored how to design a contract that inspires recyclers to disclose their true recycling and dismantling abilities, and improve the level of effort after agreeing to a contract. The established information screening contract enables the recycler to obtain a fixed remuneration while also achieving their remanufacturing goals. According to the nature of the information screening contract, our study has confirmed the following facts.  
Firstly, high-capacity agents should choose high-risk contracts. The commission of information rent is not related to the proportion of dismantling ability in the market and the level of dismantling ability of low-capacity agents. Those with low ability should choose low-risk contracts, and the commission of information rent will follow. In the market, the proportion of agents with high dismantling ability decreases, and the greater the degree of capability, the less information rent is added. In addition, with the increase of market uncertainty and the cost of labor, the risk aversion of recyclers increases, and information screening reduces incentives for recyclers.  
Secondly, in the information screening contract model of this article, recyclers will report their true information truthfully regardless of their capacity. Battery manufacturers can therefore effectively identify the dismantling abilities of the recycler, presenting the characteristics of \"self-selection\" and reducing the \"self-selection\" features. The risk of \"reverse selection\", and those with high ability, will choose high-risk contracts, while those with low ability will try to avoid risks.  
Thirdly, in the closed-loop supply-chain system with disassembly and use at its core, the revenue of the battery manufacturing enterprise is closely related to the pre-estimated value of the ratio of the agent's capability type in the market, and the signing of agent with high dismantling ability will increase the entrusting party's income. This will also reduce the moral hazard, that is, the stronger the ability of the agent, the greater the recovery effort after agreeing to the contract, and the greater the profit of the client.