## 1 Introduction  
Although the aviation industry upholds a rigorous culture of procedures and safety regulations, many of these practices are absent in general aviation (GA)--a sector of aviation which includes \"all civil aviation operations other than scheduled air services and non-scheduled air transport operations for remuneration or hire\" [1]. Previous studies indicate that 94% of civil aviation accidents occur within the GA sector [2]. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, between 2013 and 2023, 62% of aviation accidents occurred during the approach, landing, and post-impact phases of flight [3]. Within commercial aviation, decision-making aids on approach are often utilised, such as using approach \"gates\" [4]. Comparatively, GA pilots often rely on specific height and speed requirements during the approach and landing phase of flight. This typically involves a stabilised approach, in which pilots maintain a constant descent angle toward a predetermined landing point [5]. The landing phase begins with the aircraft configured in a flare for touchdown [6]. However, if either stage is not executed properly, a go-around can be initiated to reject the landing attempt [7]. This manoeuvre places the aircraft into a climb and reintegrates it into the circuit pattern. Notably, in GA, the decision to go around is often made by the pilot. Since the decision-making aids lack a suitable definition in GA, pilots often subsequently conduct last-minute \"go-arounds\" that involve a considerable degree of risk of an accident occurring. A go-around is a manoeuvre when an aircraft is initially configured for landing; however, for whatever reason, landing no longer becomes the best option and the pilot reconfigures to climb away from the runway, adjusting power, pitch, flaps, and gear [7]. These manoeuvres occur when the aircraft is in a low-energy state, described as when an aircraft has a lower altitude and thrust, which, if not properly managed, may compromise flight safety [8]. Prior to landing, pilots are already handling a high workload, increasing the risk associated with its implementation. The cumulative absence of safety protocols and the difficulty of executing the go-around may contribute to accidents during landing. A Flight Safety Foundation Study [9] highlights that 54% of all aviation accidents could have been preventable had a go-around been executed. Within Canada, the Transport Safety Board of Canada [3] accident data shows that 57% of the country's aviation incidents are associated with private flights. Moreover, 53% of aircraft involved in accidents are classed \"recreational\". Finally, 20 out of the 33 fatalities in 2023 were also involved with recreational operations [3]. Between 2013 and 2023, the data indicates that 61.5% of all aircraft accidents in Canada occur during the approach, landing and post-impact phases of flight [3]. Landing alone comprises 40.2% of airplane accidents [3]. This paper attempts to identify why so many accidents involving private, recreational GA flights occur during the approach, landing, and go-around phases of flight, alongside investigating the operational and cognitive challenges pilots face in executing a go-around. With flights segmented into phases such as taxiing, takeoff, and landing, this helps to examine causal factors specific to the manoeuvres in each stage of flight. As 30% of accidents involve multiple flight phases [3], this study will analyse the approach, landing, and go-around phases of flight together. Furthermore, the analysis considers the role of human factors (HF hereafter), language, culture, and procedures upon incident and accident occurrence. Although student pilots cover HF during their private pilot license (PPL) theory syllabus, previous studies in Canada have shown that the most frequent cause of accidents was \"pilot error\" [10]. As pilot decision-making is key to commencing a go-around, understanding the variables that assist with this ensures that a robust analysis of the go-around process is conducted.