## 6 Results
In the second scenario, we utilized the proposed model, which involves the application of a modified version of [PERSON]'s algorithm. In this context, node A serves as the sender, while nodes B, C, D, and E represent different receivers within the steganographic network. Table 1 contains specific parameters for each network interface. Step 1: Calculating OSPF Metrics. Using the proposed parameters and the provided Equation (1), we compute the OSPF metrics. With the suggested secrecy index from [55], where k1 = 1, k2 = 0, and k3 = k4 = 1, we proceed to calculate the OSPF metrics. The results are presented in Table 6. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline
**Stegochannel** & **C** & \(P_{cont}\) & **Metric** \\ \hline AB & 2,048,000 & 0.5 & 32 \\ AC & 2,048,000 & 0.2 & 40 \\ BD & 4,000,000 & 0.1 & 23 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: OSPF metrics with secrecy index. Figure 12: Example 2 of a steganographic network system. Based on the results obtained in Table 6, we obtained information about the metrics and secrecy indices, as shown in Figure 13:  
Step 2: Establishing Data Transmission Routes. In this step, utilizing the modified version of the Dijkstra algorithm [13], we will determine sets of data transmission routes along with their associated metrics. The algorithm's execution steps are detailed in Appendix A. Table 7 summarizes the primary routes (shortest paths) and backup routes. Here, \(\mathrm{D_{i}}\) represents the sets of metrics for primary routes, \(\mathrm{L_{i}}\) represents the sets of primary routes, \(\mathrm{Z_{i}}\) represents the sets of backup routes, and \(\mathrm{S_{i}}\) represents the sets of metrics for backup routes. Comparing the Secrecy Index and Probability of Violating Secrecy in the Case of Fixed Routes and Case 1:  
Based on the results from Tables 4 and 5 in Example 1 and Table 8 in Example 2, it is evident that using a different transmission route from the set of n available routes (by \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{c c c c} \hline \hline
**Stegochannel** & **C** & \(P_{con}\) & **Metric** \\ \hline BC & 10,000,000 & 0.6 & 6 \\ CE & 1,544,000 & 0.5 & 43 \\ DE & 10,000,000 & 0.5 & 7 \\ AE & 4,000,000 & 0.3 & 19 \\ DC & 2,048,000 & 0.3 & 37 \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: _Cont._  
Figure 13: Example 2 of a hidden network system with OSPF metrics and secrecy index. alternating routes) for transmitting the message significantly increases the secrecy index of the transmitted message compared to using only a single transmission route. Additionally, the probability of violating the secrecy of the message decreases. Comparing the outcomes of Tables 4 and 5 illustrates that as n increases, the secrecy index also increases. Examples Combining Sequential and Parallel Connections (Case 2):  
In this scenario, for computational simplicity, we assume the existence of n parallel routes, each with an identical secrecy index of \(P_{con\;c}\). Consequently, Equation (3) simplifies to:  
\[P_{con}=1-\prod_{i}^{n}\left(1-P_{con\;c}\right)=1-\left(1-P_{con\;c}\right)^{n} \tag{8}\]  
Table 9 illustrates the dependency of the secrecy index on the number of parallel routes and the secrecy index \(P_{con\;c}\) of each individual route according to Equation (8). Below is the dependency graph of the secrecy capacity on the number of parallel routes with the given secrecy capacity \(P_{con\;c}\). Based on Table 9 and the graphs in Figure 14, it can be observed that transmitting the message through multiple parallel routes increases the secrecy index of the message compared to using a single dedicated route. The secrecy index of the message increases as the number of parallel transmission routes (n) increases.