## 4 Prevention Mechanisms of the Proposed Scheme
### Elliptical Segment Area Transmission Range and Authentication Prevention Model
Based upon this, we require that integration of PSAM and PESATRM models should include intelligence for efficient ESATR. HOA integration with VFC utilizes HOA heuristics to solve problems in the network, such as end-to-end delay and jitter performance evaluation. Based upon this, the dynamic transmission range is provided in the network. Dynamic transmission is usually more effective in maintaining connectivity. HDSAs, including DoS JSA and all other forms of DoS attacks, can be detected and eliminated from the network when a specified ESATR is deployed in the PSAM and the PESATRM integration. We also anticipate that the design of ESATR needs to be more secure. Comparatively, the circle segment transmission range (CSAM) that PESATRM was modified from is more confined. Therefore, we anticipate that the CSAM will incur a lot of trustworthiness concerns, since it does not detect and eliminate HDSA and its associated DoS JSA in the proposed scheme models. Figure 6 is used to explain the deployment of the PESATRM. It is anticipated logically for the PESATRM to utilize AKDE. In Figure 6 (as shown below), the vehicles within the ESATR are also known as neighbors. These neighbor vehicles (NV) are secure in the network using the AKDE method. NVs are also required to keep one global key (Gk). The Gk provides the requirement in authentication of the NVs in the models (PSAM the PESATRM). The method of acquiring the Gk, which also represents the public key, is given through FS and the RSU. In addition, secure sharing of the Gk is important. This must be complied with for every NV using NV2 NV communication. In addition, secure sharing of the Gk includes SRSIE accurately. Therefore, implementing a further authentication mechanism is required in the network, which is also investigated in the models. In addition, the objective of the NV2 NV communication is to utilize authentication of each NV in the PESATRM. This verifies that the communicating NV entities are all neighbors with each other. Subsequently, NVs exchange \"hello\" messages to initiate the communication process. Thus, NVs are capable of utilizing sufficient time in the NV2 NV communication to be able to transmit SRSIE. This successfully leads to processing of standardized road safety traffic emergency information (SRSIE) exchange for VANET in the same ESATR. Based upon this, Figure 6 also depicts the PESATRM, which utilizes V2 Vcommunication. The PESATRM NVs exchange \"hello\" neighbor messages. The hello message exchanged by NVs is initially broadcast or multicast and finally unicast using NV2 NV and secure NV communication. NV2 NV and secure NV communication processes include neighbor vehicles (NV), origin vehicles (OV), and the destination vehicle (DV). Each NV that communicates with other NVs initially gets authenticated. Afterwards, NVs transfer the Gk securely with each other. Subsequently, NVs or NV2 NV simultaneously transmit the SRSIE with each NV. The message transmitted is also used to obtain the direction, speed, and time information of each NV. Since the NV2 NV communication process includes secure sharing of the common Gk and SRSIE, these are designated to occur in the proposed ESA. Each NV segment S is as shown in Figure 6 with the dark black lines. The probability analysis of the proposed scheme PESATRM will be determined subsequently below. For now it is important to determine the ESATR as follows:  
From Figure 6, the area of the ellipse is \(A=\frac{b}{a}\pi a^{2}=\pi ab\). An elliptic sector is the region bounded by an arc and line segments connecting the center of the ellipse (which is the origin in the figure) and the arc endpoints. Segment area  
\[S_{Area}=[MON]=\frac{b}{a}\bigg{(}\frac{\propto-\beta}{2\pi}\bigg{)}\pi a^{2} =\frac{1}{2}(\propto-\beta)ab.(\alpha>\beta) \tag{2}\]  
An elliptic segment area is bounded by an arc and the chord that connect the arc's endpoint.