## 5 Problematizations of Unsustainable Public Procurement
### Unsustainability as a Result of Technical Design Flaws  
The problem representations falling under this category were produced through guides to practice that offer technical solutions presumed to create favorable conditions for sustainable innovations. At the center of these were numerous guidelines explicitly focused on facilitating the conditions that promote market competition between tenderers. However, they also included suggestions on how to improve knowledge sharing of innovative technical solutions for sustainability, as well as proposals for how sustainability can be better mainstreamed in the procuring organization. Despite their different focus on procurement of nature-based solutions, GPP and SRPP, these guides to practice all shared the assumption that unsustainability can be managed with technical solutions. As suggested above, the most central problem representation in this category was that unsustainability is a matter of insufficient creation of markets and market incentives for sustainable innovations. Mirroring the assumptions of homo economics, this problematization was based on the presumption that innovation and development are best driven by rational actors seeking to maximize their interests on a competitive market. Accordingly, a central role of public procurers is to design procurements that facilitate as much competition as possible. This also entails the perception that procurements that attract few tenders represent a serious problem. This problem representation emerges through recommendations of how public procurers can increase market competition when procuring so-called nature-based solutions (NBS):  
Public procurers may face difficulties in finding suppliers willing to develop innovative NBS solutions when contract values are low. Where possible, grouping several small contracts together in a single call for tender, or where possible allowing suppliers to enter a framework agreement for NBS solutions, may provide suppliers with an incentive to better engage with procurers on such projects. Inter-city collaboration may be valuable here: joint procurement of NBS projects may increase contract value and give suppliers an incentive to participate in a call for tenders. [82] (p. 43)  
As this quote illustrates, there is an emphasis on creating sufficient economic incentives to attract as many bidders as possible, and one way of doing this is to create a single call for tenders in cooperation with others to increase the economic value of the call. Other examples of this problem representation were from guides to practice for GPP that, among other things, represented this 'problem' through a recommendation to use a performance-based approach to design calls for tenders, which \"... usually allows more scope for innovation and in some cases will challenge the market into developing new technical solutions\" [83] (p. 33). The benefits of this approach were, moreover, highlighted through a 'good example' of a GPP for a new school building in Malta:  
Tenderes were able to present different solutions for achieving this goal. Certain minimum requirements, for example on energy and water efficiency, were also included in the specification. Additional points were awarded for even better performance during the award stage. The winning bidder installed solar panels and wind turbines, producing a total of 35,000 kWh over the first ten months of the contract. [83] (p. 34)  
Another variation of this problem representation was expressed through a policy document for SRPP, in which it was stressed that public authorities should develop incentives for companies, i.e., correct technical flaws. If so, it was suggested that SRPP could start a market-driven chain reaction towards social sustainability:  
Socially responsible public procurement (SRPP) is about setting an example and influencing the marketplace. By promoting SRPP, public authorities can give companies real incentives to develop socially responsible management.