# A Low-Complexity Security Scheme for Drone Communication Based on PUF and LDPC
## 3 Security Architecture
### Error Correction Schemes
#### 3.4.3 Decoding Algorithm Selection
For an attacker who does not have access to PUF information, all these information bits are independent of each other and it is not possible to compute the forward or backward information based on any one of them. ### Formal Security Analysis

To prove the security of this paper, the formal analysis uses the stochastic prediction model which classifies the attacker's attacks into seven types. The proof is as follows. The symbol \(\prod_{P}^{i}\) in this model represents the No.i session of participant \(P\), where \(P\) includes drones and GS. **Definition 1**. : _Suppose here exists an attacker \(A\) who has access to all messages and public parameters in the channel. The attacker can attempt the following to compromise protocol security:_

1. \(Send(\prod_{P}^{i}\)_,_\(p_{1},m_{1})\)_. This operation represents attacker_ \(A\) _posing as legitimate device_ \(P\)_, sending message_ \(p_{1}\) _to another device and receiving message_ \(m_{1}\)_._
2. \(Execute(\prod_{D}^{i}\)_,_\(\prod_{C}^{i}\)_,_\(m)\)_. This operation represents attacker_ \(A\) _intercepting message_ \(m\) _between the drone and the GS._
3. \(Reveal(A)\)_. This operation initiates a DoS attack on behalf of attacker_ \(A\)_, blocking the communication between the drone and the GS._
4. \(Corrupt(\prod_{D}^{i}\)_,_\(K)\)_. This operation represents attacker_ \(A\) _destroying the drone and accessing confidential information in memory._
5. \(Hash(M)\)_. This operation represents a hash query on message_ \(M\) _by attacker_ \(A\)_. The hash list_ \(L_{h}\) _in_ \(\prod_{P}^{i}\) _is queried to see if message_ \(M\) _is contained._
6. \(Query(CRP)\)_. This operation represents querying the CRP generated by the PUF during the authentication process, and if the query is successful, the_ \((C_{i},R_{i})\) _is stored into the list_ \(L_{\mathrm{C}}\)_._
7. \(Test(\prod_{P}^{i})\)_. This operation represents that attacker_ \(A\) _sends a test query to device_ \(P\) _to measure the semantic security of the session key._

**Theorem 1**. : _In the protocol proposed in this paper, an attacker cannot utilize multiple operations to pass the authentication (drone impersonation attack)._

Proof of Theorem 1.: The first stage in Table 3 protects the CRP through a static secret key \(key_{i}\). The second stage employs the secret key \(h(b)\) established in the first stage, and the information about the ECC is encrypted with random noise \(n,m,k\). Therefore, a simple eavesdropping channel cannot obtain any confidential information. Therefore, no \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c} \hline \hline
**Features** & [22] & [23] & [24] & [25] & [35] & **Ours** \\ \hline Resistance of impersonation attack & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\ Resistance of replay attack & No & No & No & No & Yes \\ Resistance of DoS attack & No & No & Yes & No & Yes & Yes \\ Resistance of MitM attack & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\ Resistance of drone physical capture attack & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & No & Yes \\ Resistance of desynchronization attack & No & No & No & Yes & No & Yes \\ Resistance of session key disclosure attack & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\ Provision of mutual authentication & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\ Provision of forward and backward secrecy & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\ Provision of PUF challenge–response pair & No & No & No & No & Yes \\ protection & & & & & & \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 6: Comparison of the security features. confidential information can be obtained by using only \(Send()\) and \(Execute()\) operations. If the attacker obtains a static secret key \(key_{i}\) by using operation \(Corrupt()\), the attacker can obtain the challenge \(a\) given by the GS and the response \(\hat{fp}\) of the drone. Since the attacker does not have access to the fingerprint PUF, the attacker cannot compute the challenge \(b\) given by the drone.