# Cyber Conflicts as a New Global Threat
## Results
### Technical Elements of Cyber Conflicts  
As the technical element of CCs is the first known one, it has the best consideration. It constitutes the application of the technical means of cyber conflicts (technical MCCs), including malicious software and hardware, malicious activities (DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service), hacking, phishing, etc.) and devices controlled with cyberspace means (including those programmed for autonomous operation) to gain superiority in the conflict. The following features make technical MCCs a weapon of the next generation of warfare:  
* Dynamic and changeable nature [13]. Technical MCCs are being developed and changed very quickly. Unlike any kind of weapon, they have not any common form and are limited by minimal constraints. * Single or limited use [13]. If a technical MCC was used to attack the target, it is highly likely that its characteristics and mechanisms of attack would become known and would be used to build countermeasures, remove vulnerabilities, etc. Only the technical MCCs that are the most innovative and unknown to the adversary will be the most efficient. The longer a technical MCC is used, the lower efficiency it has, and the fewer targets it can hit. It is impossible to develop a universal virus worth billions of US dollars that could be efficiently \"deployed\" for a few decades to hit different targets. Even the successful use of advanced persistent threat (APT) against a single target for a long time does not guarantee that APT would not be removed tomorrow and that it could be used to hit other targets of high priority. * High scalability. Technical MCCs could be applied to a target of any scale, from individual pacemakers to critical infrastructures of global significance. * Unpredictability. Technical MCCs have far more attack vectors and malicious mechanisms to harm the target than conventional weapons. For example, a technical MCC or vulnerability could be deployed in an enemy system covertly and activated at H-hour. * Unobvious nature of technical MCCs' effect. Technical MCCs by nature do not inflict any direct damage to an object of an attack (e.g., destroy equipment, disrupt communication, etc.). They have their own interim target of influence: artificial data systems, the impact on which will cause damage to the target (whatever it is), information stored in the system or physical objects managed by the system. * Exceptional nature of technical MCCs. At first glance, especially for the general public [14], the threats of technical MCCs are insignificant in comparison to previous generations of weapons, such as nuclear or space weapons. This makes technical MCCs almost an ideal instrument to use and an issue of serious concern. * Further complications. Both technical MCCs and protection against them are actively evolving to become more resilient, mutable, adaptive, and smart. These trends also make technical MCCs more autonomous and potentially less controllable. Naturally, they could have only a limited scope of targets, like Stuxnet had. However, that does not exclude the potential application of broad-spectrum uncontrollable destructive technical MCCs, as such attacks have also shown their efficiency. * Clandestine operation. Due to cyber battlespace peculiarities, the majority of technical MCCs are built to operate covertly. This means that not only the operation itself, but also its consequences could be unnoticed for a long time. That makes the \"fog of cyber conflict\" even more dense. * Recoverability of damage and time-limited effect. Technical MCCs could disrupt, incapacitate, or destroy critical infrastructure, but in the most cases \"homefield advantage\" gives a defending party an opportunity to repair the damage and rebuild technical protection in the short term. * Offensive nature [15]. In the case of nuclear weapons, their immense destructive power makes them offensive. As for technical MCCs, we can say that their offensive nature is rooted in unpredictability and their broad, unmanageable effect.