# BGPcoin: Blockchain-Based Internet Number Resource Authority and BGP Security Solution  
[PERSON]  
1 College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China; [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (Q.X.); [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (X.W.)1 College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China; [EMAIL_ADDRESS] (Q.X.); xf_wang@nudt.  
BGP routers to perform origin authentication, detect prefix hijacks and discard illegitimate BGP route advertisements for which AS announce an IP prefix that is not legitimately owned by it.  
Although RPKI has been advocated by the IETF Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) group and the frequent prefix hijacks motivate the adoption of RPKI to eliminate some risks, the potentially misconfigured, faulty or compromised RPKI authorities may introduce new ones and become one of the reasons for the disappointing adoption of RPKI [12]. RPKI [22] and ROVER [23] both provide a PKI-based trustworthy mapping from IP prefixes to the ASes. However, they both introduce a new dependence on centralized authorities.  
A security tradeoff between centralized hierarchical systems, which are easy to control, but more vulnerable to misuse, and decentralized designs, which are more robust to abuse, but harder to manage, should be considered. In the absence of RPKI and ROVER, this process of reclaiming an IP prefix requires costly, bilateral negotiation or even litigation, which limits the power of the delegator of address space. With RPKI or ROVER, however, an authority can instantly and unilaterally take down an IP prefix, simply by revoking the Resource Certificates (RCs) or Route Origin Attestations (ROAs) that it issued. By employing certificate revocation lists and displacing certificates, the RPKI allows delegators of address space to revoke or withdraw their delegations unilaterally.  
To address the problem of misbehaving authorities, researchers proposed solutions [24] like appending transparency logs to alarm about the changes of RPKI and adding dead objects to realize the consent of revocation. Although they provide the tool to alarm about and visualize changes of the RPKI repositories and the consent mechanism for revocations to balance the power of RPKI authorities, they cannot refrain from the following problem:  
1. Firstly, the PKI for origin authentication does not have the function of resisting the malicious authorities to delete and overwrite objects they certify arbitrarily. Therefore, it is hard to maintain a consistent vision of information (RCs, ROAs, manifests) in the unsynchronized global view.
2. Recording or monitoring authority behavior by appending logs to alarm about the changes of RPKI is not sufficiently incentivized, and responding to the reported misbehavior takes time and requires manual effort.
3. Realizing the consent of revocation in RPKI requires a complicated and burdened collaboration between RC issuers (to sign) and relying parties (to validate), which may lead to a passive application to RPKI.  
As another solution to extricate ISPs from IP hijackings or take downs, several existing data governance alternatives for routing security [25] have been examined for shortcomings. As we debate, current solutions cannot give an efficient and reliable solution.