# Mdpj _sciences_
###### Abstract  
The rapid evolution of mobile and optical communication technologies is driving the transition from 5G to 6G networks. This transition inevitably brings about changes in authentication scenarios, as new security demands emerge that go beyond the capabilities of existing frameworks. Therefore, it is necessary to address these evolving requirements and the associated key challenges: ensuring Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) to protect communications even if long-term keys are compromised and integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) techniques to defend against the threats posed by quantum computing. These are essential for both radio and optical communications, which are foundational elements of future 6G infrastructures. The DMRN Protocol, introduced in 2022, represents a major advancement by offering both PFS and PQC while maintaining compatibility with existing 3 rd Generation Partnership Project (3 GPP) standards. Given the looming quantum-era challenges, it is imperative to analyze the protocol's security architecture through formal verification. Accordingly, we formally analyze the DMRN Protocol using SVO logic and ProVerif to assess its effectiveness in mitigating attack vectors, such as malicious or compromised serving networks (SNs) and home network (HN) masquerading. Our research found that the DMRN Protocol has vulnerabilities in key areas such as mutual authentication and key exchange. In light of these findings, our study provides critical insights into the design of secure and quantum-safe authentication protocols for the transition to 6G networks. Furthermore, by identifying the vulnerabilities in and discussing countermeasures to address the DMRN Protocol, this study lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure 6G Authentication and Key Agreement protocols. 6G AKA; formal verification; security protocol Article  
Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks:  
A Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif  
[PERSON], [PERSON], [PERSON], I.W.A.J. ; [PERSON] Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks:  
Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif  
1  
I.W.A.J. ; [PERSON] Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks:  
Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif
* The desire to extend authentication credentials to 5G convergence applications (5G cAPPs) beyond the initial authentication phase. As a result, two critical security features have emerged in the context of 5G AKA. First, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) has been proposed to ensure that current communication sessions remain secure, even if long-term secret keys are compromised in the future. Second, quantum-safe cryptographic techniques, i.e., Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) techniques, are suggested to protect current cryptographic systems against potential threats posed by the advent of large-scale quantum computers. These features are essential for safeguarding against future security threats and providing long-term data protection. The importance of these features is evident in the ongoing standardization efforts for non-3 GPP primary authentication protocols. For instance, extensions to the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA') [2] are being developed, specifically EAP-AKA'-FS [3] for perfect forward secrecy and EAP-AKA'-PQC [4] for post-quantum cryptography support. In this context, the DMRN Protocol [5] proposed by [PERSON] et al. in 2022 represents a significant advancement. It is the first protocol to simultaneously offer both perfect forward secrecy and post-quantum cryptography support while maintaining compatibility with the 3 GPP primary authentication protocol, 5G AKA. The innovative features of the DMRN Protocol are expected to have a substantial impact on future research, particularly in the development of 6G AKA protocol standards.