# Honesty-Based Social Technique to Enhance Cooperation in Social Internet of Things
## 3 Proposed Model
### Decision Module
The selfish node will be given a chance to improve its reputation score and rejoin the community. If the node shows repeated selfish behavior, the SCH can punish the node by expelling it from the community. A message will be sent to all the nodes to refrain from communicating with selfish nodes. ## 5 Monitoring System

The SMH in the community monitors the behavior of the nodes. The monitoring head monitors the value in the assessment table and reports the SCH to act based on the node's behavior. The node's behavior depends on how many data bundles it sends that successfully reach their destinations, and a time delay in each data bundle is observed. Equation (29) calculates the ratio of data bundles received to data bundles generated. \[D\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}=\frac{R\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}}{G\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}} \tag{29}\]

\(D\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}\) is the data bundles delivered, \(R\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}\) is the number of bundles received at nodes \(x\), and \(G\
abla_{n_{x_{i}}}\) is the data bundles generated by node \(n_{x_{i}}\). ## 6 Simulations Parameters and Performance Analysis

The effectiveness of the proposed Honesty-Based Social Technique (HBST) is evaluated in this section. The performance parameters considered are throughput, overhead, packet delivery ratio (PDR), and packet delivery latency. These measures are contrasted for two environments where different numbers of selfish nodes were introduced to examine their impact on the network. Selfish nodes can significantly reduce a network's PDR, delivery delays, and routing overhead. It is essential to separate the selfish nodes to prevent any impact on the network's overall performance. Due to the selfish node's lack of cooperation, packet delivery takes longer. To deliver the packets to their destinations on time, the cooperative nodes must therefore exert twice as much effort. As a result, the packages will take longer than usual to arrive at their destinations. When packets are kept in the node's buffer for an extended period, the buffer becomes congested, leading to increased packet drops. The rise in dropped packets can also be attributed to the prevalence of selfish nodes. Selfish nodes do not collaborate, which causes the network to drop more packets and perform worse. The nodes depart from the protocol as a result of this. As a result, selfish nodes significantly affect the network nodes' route information. The overhead also influences the network's performance. It reduces the network's protocol bandwidth. The results demonstrate that the overhead caused by selfish nodes causes the network's performance to decline as their number grows. Table 4 shows the parameters used in the simulation. The proposed scheme was simulated and compared with the Copy Adjustable Incentive Scheme (CAIS) [20], Honesty-Based Democratic Scheme (HBDS) [34] and Social Selfishness Aware Routing protocol (SSAR) [46]. ### Comparison of Results with 25% Selfish Nodes in the Network

In this environment, 50 selfish nodes of 200 nodes were used, and the results were checked for performance metrics. Figure 2 shows the results for network throughput. The proposed mechanism did not work effectively at the initial pause times, since the frequency of interactions heavily influences it. The throughput dramatically increases after pause time 20 when the communities were formed following the initial input operations. The throughput of the HBST began to increase as the community commutated and nodes began to show interest in the community. At pause time 60, HBST had a throughput that was 28.27% higher than that of the CAIS, 50% higher than that of the HBDS, and 56.52% higher than that of SSAR. Before pause 20, the continuous improvement in the throughput was due to detecting selfish nodes in the network by the HBST protocol and isolating them in a separate domain to improve the honesty parameters, and the increasing traffic volume.