## 2 Related Works
(2018) proposed an honesty-based democratic scheme to motivate selfish nodes to cooperate in the internet of things-based vehicular delay-tolerant networks. In the democratic process, different leaders such as cluster head, incentive head, and monitoring head are elected based on two important characteristics such as honesty level and cooperation. These elected heads perform different roles inside the cluster. [PERSON] et al. (2018) proposed a novel reputation mechanism called Distributed Approach for Selfishness Handling (DASH) in a DTN to cope with selfish nodes. Instead of permanently removing the selfish nodes from the network, they seek to prevent communication with them until they collaborate once more. As a result, selfish nodes are given the chance to adjust their behavior, assist in package forwarding and, therefore, enhance the performance of the network. [PERSON] et al. (2018) proposed a socially omitting selfishness (SOS) scheme to handle the issue of selfishness in smart and connected communities in IoT. This scheme uses the extended version of the Dempster-Shafer model to discourage selfish nodes in the communities. When the nodes show selfish behavior repeatedly, such nodes are also penalized in the form of removal from the community. [PERSON] et al. (2018) presented a long-term reputation system that focuses its effectiveness on regular evaluations of roadside infrastructure. This concept describes car reputation scores by observing approaching vehicles regularly. To achieve this, the approach needs the use of a private and verified credential for vehicles. [PERSON] et al. (2018) proposed a reputation system for VDTNs. To distinguish the mobile selfish nodes from the cooperative nodes, this model employs a reputation criterion. A node is characterized as a cooperative node if its reputation score exceeds the reputation criterion; otherwise, it is designated as a selfish node. The following are the tit-for-tat strategies used for cooperation. [PERSON] et al. (2018) proposed the Dempster-Shafer-based tit-for-tat technique using a QoS-OLSR protocol to deal with the issue of vehicle cooperation in a VANET with selfish nodes. QoS-OLSR is one of the proactive protocols that evaluate the nodes' Quality of Service (QoS) when electing cluster heads and picking MPR nodes. Cluster heads and MPRs can behave badly on the road. To study the connection between vehicles, traditional and helpful tit-for-tat is introduced. [PERSON] et al. (2018) introduced two collaborative-based tit-for-tat approaches called Group Reputation and Cooperative Detection strategies. Both techniques can strengthen the determination to identify misbehavior and therefore improve MAC-layer cooperation in VANETs. The reputation of the node's neighbors is combined in the Group Reputation tit-for-tat technique, whereas the reputation of the node's neighbors is grouped in the Cooperative Detection tit-for-tat approach. The following are the hybrid incentive strategies used for cooperation. [PERSON] et al. (2018) proposed a new hybrid reward system called ICARUS that relies on DARWIN, a popular reputation-based system that combines the benefits of both reputation-based and credit-based mechanisms. ICARUS aims to successfully identify and punish selfish nodes and also motivate nodes to cooperate by encouraging packet forwarding. Moreover, ICARUS guarantees that different nodes are treated equally and that selfish nodesdo not compromise the system by providing false information. [PERSON] et al. [42] proposed a reputation-based credit model (RCM). It is a new hybrid reward framework that incorporates payment risk relying on reputation. In the non-cooperation game, when associated with a routing cost paradigm neighboring nodes gain a Nash equilibrium that strategically offers a reasonable decision on the assignment of routing activities for transmitters within an appropriate incentive. Different incentive-based schemes have been discussed in the literature.