# Protecting Data at Risk of Unintentional Electromagnetic Emanation: TEMPEST Profiling
## 6 Conclusions  
Unintentional intrusion by EM emission leaves no trace of an attacker's presence; the attacked device operates properly, and the infiltration does not cause physical damage. It is possible in some cases to intercept and reconstruct hidden information based on electromagnetic leakage. This study investigates various sources of EM leakage, including computer monitors, wireless keyboards and mice, printers, scanners, conductors, piezoelectric sensors, and radio-frequency identification devices. The TEMPEST profile is used to describe how devices are protected against EM leakage.  
Side-channel attacks are significant security threats to hardware systems and applied software. The risks of these attacks can be mitigated by applying various preventive measures. It is difficult to completely prevent side-channel attacks, but designers can implement several strategies to mitigate the potential risks. The strategies involve either eliminating EM data leakage and/or removing the link between sensitive data and information leakage.  
The expansion of innovative devices and services driven by the growing interest in the Internet of Things and 5G technologies will lead to an increase in potential vulnerabilities in the foreseeable future. Conducting basic TEMPEST measurements on newly developed electronic devices would therefore be useful and would mean significant progress in this particular domain.  
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the literature and highlights interesting research directions and their future potential. Future work includes applications to real-life EM side-channel attack scenarios, such as data encryption, network protocols, and file system reads and writes. Establishing future standards and tools requires consideration of relevant standards and tools in both the hardware and software security areas. It can be important to assess the potential of machine learning models in classifying data arising from EM radiation from electronic equipment and devices. EM side-channel attacks to recover cryptographic keys and other sensitive information can be evaluated as a possible solution to cryptographic challenges in digital forensics, especially on IoT devices. Our further work will focus on researching EM leakage protection measures, which mainly include strategies aimed at eliminating EM leakage by protecting vulnerable components and devices from potential security threats.  
Conceptualization, V.A., R.P., D.P. and M.M.; methodology, V.A., D.P., R.P. and M.S.; validation, M.S., R.P. and M.M.; formal analysis, G.O., S.S., M.M., M.S. and D.K.; investigation, V.A., D.P. and R.P.; resources, S.S., G.O. and M.M.; data curation, D.K., M.S. and R.P.; visualization: D.P., V.A. and R.P.; writing-- original draft preparation, V.A., D.P., R.P., M.S., M.M., G.O., S.S. and D.K.; writing--review and editing V.A., D.P., R.P., M.S., M.M., G.O., S.S. and D.K.; supervision, M.S., M.M. and S.S.; funding acquisition, G.O., S.S. and D.K. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.  
This research was funded by the Provincial Secretariat for Higher Education and Scientific Research of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, Republic of Serbia, through project no. 142-451-3507/2023-01-02.  
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.  
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.