# LogRESP-Agent: A Recursive AI Framework for Context-Aware Log Anomaly Detection and TTP Analysis
## 3 Proposed Method
### Recursive Reasoning Framework for Log Analysis
Privilege Escalation via Chrome (Monster-THC, Log ID: 30048)**

In this binary classification scenario, LogRESP-Agent analyzes a malicious log entry involving a multi-stage execution flow initiated from Chrome. The reasoning begins with the _DescriptionGenerator_, which summarizes the event involving conhost.exe and highlights suspicious command-line parameters. _RuleMatcher_ immediately raises alerts for multiple known indicators: forced execution flags (e.g., _-ForceV1_), indirect command invocation (_cmd/c ComputerDefaults.exe_), and privilege-related tokens such as _SeChangeNotifyPrivilege_, all of which suggest stealth or traversal activity. The complete reasoning trace for this case is shown in Figure 4.

To further assess behavioral context, the agent invokes _SequenceScorer_, which classifies the log as abnormal, and _ContextRetriever_, which reconstructs a multi-process lineage. This reveals that Chrome was executed with sandbox restrictions disabled, launched PowerShell in hidden and non-interactive mode, downloaded a payload (msgbox.exe), which in turn executed cmd.exe with elevated commands. The sequence illustrates a staged privilege abuse attack across several process hops. _\"Observed behavior includes indirect command execution, PowerShell in hidden mode, and multi-process escalation from Chrome to cmd.exe.\"_

Finally, _TTPMapper_ maps the observed pattern to multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques, including T1202 (Indirect Command Execution) under the Defense Evasion tactic and T1548 (Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism) under Privilege Escalation. The agent's final malicious classification aligns precisely with the annotated ground truth and is well-supported by the combined results of all invoked tools. This case demonstrates LogRESP-Agent's ability to surface latent threat signals by coordinating recursive reasoning steps. Its integration of rule-matching, anomaly scoring, and contextual reconstruction enables deep behavioral inference--moving beyond surface-level indicators to expose sophisticated attack strategies. **(3)** **Case 3. Credential Access via IIS Tooling (EVTX, Log ID: 441)**

The final case highlights LogRESP-Agent's reasoning in a multi-class classification scenario labeled as Credential Access. The event involves the execution of _appcmd.exe_ from PowerShell, using suspicious arguments such as _list vdir/text:password_, which suggest attempts to enumerate credentials via IIS tooling. As the reasoning begins, the _DescriptionGenerator_ captures this behavior in a natural language summary, emphasizing potential information extraction intent. The complete reasoning trace for this case is shown in Figure 5.

_RuleMatcher_ then detects multiple known indicators of credential theft and evasion: use of obfuscation flags (_-top -noni -enc_), execution from a _Temp_ directory (a common sign of staging or evasion), and IIS-based credential access attempts via _appcmd.exe_. To validate execution context, _ContextRetriever_ reveals that the web server process _w3 wp.exe_ was the origin of the PowerShell instance, forming an abnormal parent-child hierarchy. This server-side compromise pattern deviates from normal usage and indicates possible remote exploitation. _\"The process appcmd.exe was launched by PowerShell with arguments suggesting credential enumeration via IIS.\"_

_SequenceScorer_, backed by a Random Forest classifier, assigns the final label \"Credential Access.\" _TTPMapper_ confirms this attribution by linking the behavior to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1552.001 (Credentials in Files) and T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information). By combining rule-based matching, contextual reconstruction, and ML-driven classification, LogRESP-Agent delivers a precise and interpretable judgment. This case illustrates the agent's ability to detect layered credential access techniques with high semantic fidelity--transforming complex log evidence into clear tactical mappings for downstream analysts. Figure 4: Reasoning trace and final output of LogRESP-Agent for attack Chrome log entry (#30048).