# Jamming and Spoofing Techniques for Drone Neutralization: An Experimental Study
## 3 System Design and Methodology
### Methodology
#### 3.2.4 RC and Video Barrage Jamming  
This script follows the same logic outlined in Section 3.2.1, with specific adjustments for the jamming of RC and video signals in the 2.4 GHz band. In this case, the sample rate was set to 20 MHz to match the maximum available bandwidth of the SDR, and the noise amplitude was adjusted to 2 to provide stronger interference without saturating the SDR. These adjustments were insufficient for covering the entire 2.4 GHz band, which spans approximately 80 MHz. As a result, further modifications to the GNU Radio-generated Python code were required to extend the jamming coverage across the full band. The codes can be accessed through the GitHub repository: [[https://github.com/Younes619/UAV-Jamming-Scripts.git](https://github.com/Younes619/UAV-Jamming-Scripts.git)]([https://github.com/Younes619/UAV-Jamming-Scripts.git](https://github.com/Younes619/UAV-Jamming-Scripts.git))  
(a) Sequential Frequency Increment Jamming Script  
The initialization method was modified to include a frequency parameter stored as a class attribute. The frequency setting for \(\text{i}\text{o}_{\text{i}\text{o}\text{l}\text{o}\text{u}\text{s}\text{i} \text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n}\text{n }\text{n}\text{  
To evaluate the implementations, a Rohde & Schwarz FSV30 Signal/Spectrum Analyzer, covering frequencies from 10 Hz to 30 GHz, was used to accurately assess the output signals against expectations. Additionally, the power at the amplifier's output was measured to gauge the potential effectiveness of the attack, with a 30 dB attenuator used to protect the equipment during these measurements. Multiple approaches were explored for the GNSS barrage jamming tests by modifying the filter's cutoff frequency while keeping the rest of the script unchanged. Figure 6 shows the signal spectrum for the cutoff frequency set to one-third of the sample rate (SR/3), while Figure 7 displays it for SR/6. Figure 5: Satellite image of the physical testing space. Figure 6: GNSS barrage jamming (fc = SR/3) signal spectrum. The frequency on the X-axis ranges from approximately 1.5686 GHz to 1.5823 GHz. Despite different cutoff frequencies, the implementations show minimal differences in calculated signal output power determined by the area under the blue-shaded region of the spectrum. The signal output power density at marker M1 for the SR/6 cutoff frequency is approximately \(-43\) dBm, 3 dB higher than the \(-46\) dBm power density for the SR/3 case. This shows that reduced bandwidth can lead to greater power levels due to energy concentration in a narrower range. To estimate the actual output power of the amplifier for the SR/6, we add back the 30 dB attenuation, resulting in a calculated output power of 31.6 dBm. The amplifier was connected to a Yagi antenna with a gain of 12 dBi, yielding an Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) of 43.6 dBm. The interference results in Table 1 were promising. The distance (D) indicates the space between the jammer and the drone, with the jammer fixed while the drone was moved to assess jamming effectiveness. The green checkmark signifies complete jamming success, leading to a 100% disruption of geolocation signal reception, rendering the drone unable to receive any satellite information. The red \"X\" indicates a failed jamming attempt, where the geolocation signal reception was not fully disrupted; despite some interference, the drone can still receive satellite data and maintain its positioning capabilities. \begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{l l l l l l} \hline \hline
**Drone/Distance (D)** & **80 m** & **100 m** & **120 m** & **130 m** & **140 m** \\ \hline DJI Mini 3 & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ \\ DJI Mini 3 Pro & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ & ✗ \\ Autel Evo Nano+ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✗ \\ Husban Zino Mini Pro & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ ZLL SG 108 & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ & ✓ \\ \hline \hline \end{tabular}
\end{table} 
Table 1: Effectiveness of GNSS barrage jamming at varying distances between the jammer and the drone. (✗) shows that jamming was ineffective.