## 2 Literature Survey  
Recently, a significant amount of work has addressed the unique security and privacy challenges faced by IoT-aided SG. According to [PERSON] et al. [1], a key management scheme (KMS) is proposed for AMI secure communication that implements the hybridization of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) algorithms. The proposed scheme's execution time is very high without accounting for storage or network overhead. [PERSON] et al. [8] proposed an identity-based encryption scheme in order to ensure secure key distribution in SG. The system's protocol allows for anonymous access to a smart meter using only a single private key without the help of a trusted anchor. However, it implemented bilinear pairing, which is computationally expensive. In addition, the system is vulnerable to leakage attacks and lacks strong session key security. [PERSON] et al. [9] suggested a pairwise key distribution scheme among power operators, SMs, and DCs when setting up a secure and scalable smart meter data collection scheme. Even though the proposed scheme seeks to minimize data collection time, it lacks anonymity. Aside from that, the identities are sent in plaintext, opening the door for a variety of cyber-attacks. [PERSON] et al. [10] also presented a key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This protocol can withstand sybil and reply attacks and needs fewer communication messages. However, no performance analysis of the scheme has been conducted to evaluate the computational and communicational overhead. Later, in the next year, [PERSON] et al. [11] implemented a hybrid scheme using AES and Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) algorithms, with the addition of a precomputation of point scalar multiplication. This scheme requires a robust formal security analysis under any widely accepted threat model to prove its security strength than the suggested one. [PERSON] et al. [12] designed a provably secure authenticated scheme that reduces the computational overhead both for smart meters and service providers. Despite securing formal security properties, the system is vulnerable to impersonation, MITM, and traceability attacks. [PERSON] et al. [13] introduced a novel ECC-based secure authentication protocol in SG for preserving demand-response management. The scheme is secure against several known attacks and verified under formal and informal attack analysis. However, the total communication cost is 1376 bits, with a time cost of about 266 ms, which is computationally costly. Later, in the same year, [PERSON] et al. [14] proposed a key agreement framework to decrease the computational overhead of batch authentication using a binary tree. The drawback of this framework is the high computational cost of multiplication and pairing rather than hash operation. Intending to provide a key agreement protocol using two password authentication methods, [PERSON] et al. [15], proposed an ECC and Qu-Vanstone (ECQV)-based implicit certificates. Though it provides better communicational and computational costs, it consumes double the time as the original Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol. [PERSON] et al. [16] developed a novel multi-tier blockchain security system using a lightweight proof-of-efficiency (PoEf) algorithm to protect smart meter data. This layer-wise protection is specially designed to mitigate database tampering and claims to be scalable up to 2000 smart nodes. As the implementation is hardware-based, it lacks AMI components interoperability. [PERSON] et al. [17] designed a secure keyless signature scheme using a decentralized Go Ethereum (Geth) for SG data protection. The decentralization is achieved through PBFT consensus while maintaining transaction accuracy, effectiveness, and efficiency. According to the analysis, the execution of the designed functionalities of each smart meter takes 46.21 ms per meter. Even so, the chosen consensus algorithm needs to be optimized for efficient and reliable message distribution.